TESIS DOCTORAL

European citizenship and political incorporation. Pathways to power of British and Romanian residents in Spain

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Summary

The doctoral thesis focuses on the political dimension of EU citizenship and seeks to explain and understand how the Europeans who make use of the right of free movement are incorporated politically in the member states of residence. I discuss the case of Romanian and British residents in Spain, two groups which are illustrative of the diverse landscape of European mobility in terms of socio-economic resources, migration typology and perception and reception in the host societies.

From a theoretical perspective I propose a revised framework of political incorporation that goes beyond the agency/structure approach and incorporates the transnational perspective into the analysis. I study how organizations and political entrepreneurs (candidates and local councillors) of Romanian and British origin are included in the political arena of their contexts of residents. From a methodological perspective, I follow a mixed-methods approach that allows me to have both a broad, quantitative perspective and an in-depth qualitative understanding of the processes of political incorporation.

The theoretical and empirical analyses of the dissertation support two general arguments. I show that Romanians' and Britons' processes of incorporation are contingent upon their reception and self-perception in the host society. Beyond a common status as European citizens and inherent differences in group resources, Spanish institutions and political actors approach organizations and political entrepreneurs from the two groups differently. This differentiated approach shapes their diverse trajectories to local power. Second, I demonstrate that transnational links and membership resources can constitute an asset in gaining visibility and incorporation outcomes in the host society. The thesis embraces a broad concept of transnationalism that refers to EU and country-of-origin citizenship entitlements and to other forms of cross-border interactions. External voting rights and special representation in the country of origin as well as political representation in the European Parliament are some of the transnational membership resources I take into consideration in the dissertation.

More specifically, the British in Spain display a high level of civic and political mobilization and a contentious-mobilizer trajectory to politics. This fact makes them relatively independent of material support from administrations and Spanish mainstream parties. As a consequence, the British enter politics 'on their own' and manage to have influence over the local political agenda. For their part, Romanian political entrepreneurs rely on low levels of group resources in terms of civic and political mobilization. To that extent, party loyalism and organizational leadership open the pathway to the local political arena. The strategic use of European citizenship by Britons and home country citizenship entitlements by Romanians empower immigrant political entrepreneurs to gain visibility and influence vis-à-vis Spanish political actors.

Resumen

La presente tesis doctoral se enfoca en la dimensión política de la ciudadanía europea. La investigación pretende entender y explicar cómo los ciudadanos europeos que viven en otro país están incorporados en la política local de sus lugares de residencia. El análisis discute el caso de los residentes rumanos y británicos en España, dos grupos de europeos que ilustran el diverso paisaje de la movilidad europea en término de recursos socio-económicos, tipología migratoria y percepción y recepción en sus países de acogida.

Desde una perspectiva teórica, propongo un nuevo marco analítico sobre la incorporación política. Dicha propuesta va más allá de la dicotomía agencia/estructura de oportunidades y plantea introducir una perspectiva transnacional en el análisis. El estudio se enfoca en cómo las organizaciones y los emprendedores políticos (candidatos y concejales locales) por parte de los dos grupos están incluidos en los procesos políticos de sus lugares de residencia. Desde una perspectiva metodológica utilizo un enfoque multi-metódo que me permite tener tanto una visión de conjunto como una mirada en profundidad de los fenómenos de incorporación política.

El análisis plantea dos argumentos generales. En primer lugar, demuestro cómo los procesos de incorporación de los dos grupos están condicionados por su recepción y percepción en la sociedad receptora. Más allá del estatus común de ciudadanos europeos y diferencias de recursos, las instituciones políticas españolas se acercan a las organizaciones y emprendedores políticos de los dos grupos de una manera diferenciada, que, a su vez, generas trayectorias distintas de incorporación. En segundo lugar, enseño cómo los vínculos transnacionales son un factor positivo en los procesos de incorporación. La tesis embarca un concepto amplio de transnacionalismo, refiriéndose a derechos de ciudadanía en el país de origen y en la UE y a interacciones transfronterizas. Los derechos de voto del exterior y la representación política en el país de origen y en el parlamento europeo son unos de los recursos transnacionales discutidos en la tesis.

Más específicamente, los ciudadanos británicos residentes en España tienen un nivel relativamente alto de movilización política y una trayectoria independiente hacia la política local. Dichas características determinan que los residentes ingleses sean independientes de los recursos ofrecidos por las administraciones y partidos políticos. Los residentes rumanos, en cambio, tienen menos recursos cívicos y políticos. La lealtad partidista y el liderazgo organizativo son dos de los factores que promueven su incorporación. El uso estratégico de la ciudadanía europea por los residentes británicos y el apoyo recibido por parte de las instituciones políticas del país de origen en el caso rumano son dos recursos transnacionales que empoderan los grupos estudiados para ganar influencia y visibilidad en la política local española.

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Chapter five. Incorporation opportunities for foreign-born residents in Spain

Chapter six. The non-electoral pathway. Romanian and British organizations in Spanish local politics

List of abbreviations

AAPR- Asociación de la Ayuda del Pueblo Rumano [Association for the Support of the Romanian people]

AMB- Activa Mas Baztan [Activa Mas Baztan]

CA- Conservatives Abroad

CDP- Coalición Democrática de Parcent [Democratic Coalition of Parcent]

CEPI- Centro de Participación e Integración de la Comunidad de Madrid [Centre for Participation and Integration of the Community of Madrid]

ENI- Encuesta Nacional de Inmigración [National Immigration Survey]

EPA- Encuesta de la Pobalción Activa [National Survey of Active Population]

FADERE-Federación de asociaciones rumanas en Europa [Federation of Romanian Associations in Europe]

FEDROM- Federación de asociaciones rumanas en España [Federation of Romanian Associations in Spain]

INE- Instituto Nacional de Estadística [National Institute of Statistics]

IU- Izquierda Unida [United Left Spain]

LI- Labour International

PDL- Partidul Democrat Liberal [Liberal Democratic Party Romania]

PECI I- Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración 2007-2010 [Strategic Plan on Integration and Citizenship 2007-2010]

PECI II- Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración 2011-2014 [Strategic Plan on Integration and Citizenship 2011-2014]

PP- Partido Popular Español [Spanish Popular Party]

PSD- Partidul Social Democrat [Social Democratic Party Romania]

PSOE- Partido Socialista Obrero Español [Spanish Socialist Party]

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

European citizenship is considered by normative and legal scholars as a cutting-edge form of citizenship in that it decouples membership from rights and residence in the national territory (Fox 2005; Kostakopulou 2005; Wiener 1998). EU citizenship adds new rights to those attached to nationality, although it derives from the nationality of the member states (Kochenov 2008). Besides the right to free movement, work and supranational political representation at the European Parliament, the political rights of mobile EU citizens are central to the conception of Union citizenship. EU migrants are acknowledged the right to vote in the local elections of the member state of residence under the same conditions as the national citizens of the country in question.

Besides the provision on non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality of origin, EU citizenship lacks a series of procedural guidelines about what its political dimension entails. Yet, the political practice of EU citizenship is not as straightforward as the normative texts imply. EU migrants' low levels of participation and representation in the politics of their countries of origin, as well as the physical and symbolic barriers imposed to the new wave of intra-EU mobility from Eastern countries are some illustrative examples.

This dissertation intends to contribute to a better understanding of the practice of EU citizenship in the political field. It does so by focusing on how British and Romanian migrants to Spain are incorporated politically in their localities of residence. The scope of the study is not restricted to political participation. Rather, it directs its attention at what intra-European migrants' rights to political participation entail in terms of access to and representation in the politics of their places of residence. The analysis is centred, in consequence, on the transformative role of the political dimension of EU citizenship and starts

from a set of general empirical puzzles: How are Europeans incorporated in the local politics of their localities of residence? What are the factors that promote or impede their inclusion? How do policies and political dynamics in the contexts of residence respond and adapt to EU mobility and its political expressions? What is the role of European institutions and homeland political actors in the political incorporation of EU citizens in the member states of residence?

The question of how foreign-born residents are included in the politics of their host societies is not new in political/sociological literature, albeit it has been mainly studied in the context of migration to the United States. This scholarship deals with the study of distinct waves of migration and integration of ethnic minorities in the United States: incorporation of European migrants at the beginning of the century, incorporation of Blacks starting with the sixties and incorporation of 'new immigrants', such as Latinos and Asians, in recent decades.

The concept of incorporation as such has not been widely used in European academic research until recently (Morales and Giuni 2011). Rather, authors refer to individual and group-level participation (van Heelsum 2002, 2005), representation (Garbaye 2005; Michon et al 2007; Maxwell 2012), and 'getting into the local power' (Garbaye 2005). To the date, there is no comprehensive study related to incorporation of EU movers in their host societies. A few studies focus on their low level of political participation and local representation in the residence context (Strudel 2002; Teney et al 2002; Collard 2010).

The relevance of the political dimension of EU citizenship increases once it is taken into account that European mobility is characterized by distinct migratory practices. 'EU movers' are 'Eurostars' who live in capital cities such as Amsterdam and Paris, and have a high educational and occupational status (Favell 2008). But they can also be 'Polish plumbers' or 'Romanian *badante* (domestic workers) who live in suburbs and small towns and many times suffer

the effects of 'downward mobility' and social discrimination in their host societies (Recchi et al 2012). It is already acknowledged that East-West migration poses the biggest demographic change in Europe since the end of the Second World War (Favell 2008). The academic implications of this historical change are twofold: on the one hand, Eastern enlargement calls for the transformation of immigration research in Europe, focused so far on post-colonial, guest worker and asylum migration. On the other hand, East-West migration offers scholars a comparable research context to the Mexico-US scenario. Although many of the theories related to this scenario can be applied and offer rich analytical tools to explore East-West migration in Europe, they need to be re-read and revised in the light of EU mobility and citizenship entitlements (idem: 702).

This dissertation welcomes the invitation to this research agenda related to the new configurations of European mobility and seeks to contribute to it from two broad perspectives. From an empirical perspective, it attempts to offer a better understanding of the political dimension of intra-EU migration, both in its West-West and East-West dimensions. From a theoretical point of view, the thesis proposes a grounded theoretical framework that focuses on how group related characteristics, host country structure of opportunities and transnational opportunities interact and shape intra-EU migrants' incorporation processes in their residence societies. The analysis embraces a broad concept of transnationalism that refers to EU and country-of-origin citizenship entitlements and to other forms of cross-border interactions.

From a methodological perspective, the dissertation adopts a comparative focus and analyses the processes of political incorporation of Romanian and British residents in Spain. The two cases selected are illustrative of the social heterogeneity of EU mobility. They show how a group of 'old' Europeans use their political entitlements attached to EU citizenship and gain representation and policy influence in their places of residence. Their processes of inclusion are compared to how the group of 'new' EU citizens, labelled until recently third

country nationals, make their way onto the local political scene. The transformative role of EU citizenship is not analysed only in relation to the agency of movers. It also enquires how Spanish political actors and institutions respond to, adapt to or resist the migratory phenomenon in general and its European dimension in particular.

1.1Approaches to political incorporation

Political incorporation is an attribute that describes the status of both individuals and groups. At the individual level it refers to the choice to naturalize and/or to participate in electoral and non-electoral politics (DeSipio 1996; Jones-Correa 2005; Wong 2002). As empirical indicators, various authors propose registration, voting as well as other forms of political participation (protest, petitioning, boycotting, etc). Morales (2011) distinguishes between individual political incorporation and integration. The former denotes the dynamic process through which migrants become included into the political process, while the latter refers to the 'static' element of the process at a given point in time (p. 23).

At the group level, political incorporation refers to the extent to which migrant groups are represented and manage to promote their interests in the political arena (Browning et al 1984; Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009; Ramacrishnan and Bloemraad 2008). Shefter (1986) gives a broader definition that encompasses the process through which new social forces enter the political system. The concept of political incorporation overlaps in many ways with the sociological concept of assimilation, although it escapes the ideological burden of the latter (Alba and Nee 2005). Similarly to how classic assimilation theories interrogate under what circumstances there is no difference/distance between minority/immigrant groups and mainstream society in the social, cultural and economic fields, political incorporation scholars investigate under what conditions immigrants become like natives in the political field. The expected

similarity between the immigrant and the national population in the field of politics is not perceived as a threatening ethnocentric project. On the contrary, it is considered a fair state of affairs as the underlying presupposition is that access to power should be open and on equal terms between various groups in society.

The relation between individual political incorporation and group incorporation is not always straightforward. The members of a group may be incorporated politically in the sense of being active citizens and participating in elections, while the group as a whole may lack representatives in the political arena (Jones-Correa 2008). And vice versa, some group notables may become representatives or visible among the political elite, but that does not necessarily entail that all the members of the group participate. This is especially the case where the processes of incorporation are top-down, incentivised by political institutions rather than by group members. While taking into account the distinction between individual and group-level incorporation, this research focuses mainly on the latter and therefore it will not enter into the details of British and Romanian migrants' political participation in Spain.

Studies on group-level incorporation tend to focus on elected representatives and the extent to which they manage to generate policy changes in their group's favour (Browning et al 1984). This dissertation expands this research framework in two respects. On the one hand, it proposes to study the 'incipient' forms of incorporation such as migrant origin candidacies. Romanian and British migration in Spain have a recent history, and to that extent the political representation of these groups is still a rare phenomenon, especially in the case of Romanians. Nonetheless, Romanian political entrepreneurs have already established contacts with Spanish political actors and many of them participated as candidates in the 2011 local elections. On the other hand, electoral politics is not an unique venue through which immigrant groups participate in the processes of policy making. Through consultative processes and forums specially organized in order to include migrants into the political process,

immigrant organizations are formally the main actors that represent immigrant interests in these processes.

In consequence, the analysis focuses on three categories of 'subjects' of incorporation: immigrant organizations, candidates and elected representatives of Romanian and British origin respectively. The concept of incorporation is operationalized in three broad political incorporation outcomes: non-electoral incorporation of immigrant organizations, candidate selection for local elections and immigrant electoral representation in local councils. Formal inclusion of organizations and immigrant representatives respectively in decision-making bodies is a step forward towards incorporation. However, it does not necessarily entail that these actors can also influence the policy agenda in order to include immigrant-related claims and demands (Browning et al 1984; Ramachrishnan and Bloemraad 2008). The analysis looks at both the presence of organizations, candidates and representatives on the political arena and their capacity to influence the policy process. Table 1.1 presents the main indicators of the dependent variable in this thesis.

Table 1.1. Political incorporation indicators

Non-electoral inclusion		***Electoral inclusion***		
Presence of immigrant organizations in decision-making processes	Influence of organizations in decision-making processes	Selection of immigrant-origin candidacies	Immigrant-origin elected representatives	Influence of immigrant-origin elected representatives

1.2 Explanatory theories on political incorporation

The explanatory frameworks of political incorporation outcomes tend to focus on group-related determinants and the structure of opportunities in the context of reception (Browning et al 1984; Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2009; Rogers 2006; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008). Group-related factors such as organizational infrastructure and level of political mobilization increase groups' visibility and capacity to advance demands in the political arena. This, in turn, has a positive impact on both their non-electoral and electoral incorporation (Bird et al 2011; Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2009).

Regarding the role of structure, scholars argue that political institutions in the context of reception mediate the way in which groups use their resources in order to gain representation and advance claims in the political process (Koopmans and Statham 2000; Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2009). Ireland (1994) consider that institutions 'channel' immigrant demands to the extent that various groups' political mobilization in the same context is more similar than the level and form of political mobilization of the same group across various countries. Among the central institutions that mediate, shape or channel immigrants' incorporation, the literature is centred on integration policies and political parties. The former provides the resources for groups' organization and mobilization capacities and has a direct influence on non-electoral incorporation outcomes. The latter have a central role for immigrants' access to political office.

There are at least three under-explored roads of the agency-structure perspective on political incorporation. One is related to the neglect of how differentiated political opportunities in the country of residence shape the practices of incorporation of various groups in the same context. Scholars studying the political inclusion of immigrant groups in one country tend to assume that integration policies offer the same set of opportunities for all immigrants.

Nonetheless, integration policies in several countries at the national, regional and local levels have a differentiated approach towards resident foreign-born, based on their socio-economic status, nationality of origin or special links with home countries (Barbulescu 2011; Bloemraad 2006; Joppke 2005; Vermeulen 2005). Regarding the political parties in the same country of residence, studies show that they have a differentiated approach towards the electoral inclusion of distinct immigrant groups (da Fonseca 2012; Ciornei 2013).

The present landscape of European mobility entails a high level of diversity in terms of migration typology, socio-economic resources and reception in host societies. This fact makes plausible that intra-EU migrants encounter differentiated opportunities in their European countries of residence. To that extent, this dissertation proposes a thorough examination of how a group's origin, its reception in the host society and its self-perception interact with political opportunities in the host society in the processes of incorporation.

A second underexplored research thread is related to the relation between the non-electoral and the electoral pathways to incorporation. At the individual level, participation in immigrant associations is considered to have a positive influence on political participation (Verba et al 1989; Putnam 2000). At the meso-level, organizational leadership and board membership increase political entrepreneurs' visibility and prestige in relation to a future political career (Brady et al 1999). Nonetheless, case-oriented empirical analyses yield contradictory conclusions related to whether groups with higher degrees of immigrant organization incorporation also enjoy higher levels of electoral representation and influence in host country politics (Garbaye 2005; Michon and Vermeulen 2013). The present analysis explores this puzzle by looking at the interplay between organizational/electoral political incorporation in the case of Romanian and British residents in Spain. As the following chapters will show at length,

Romanians enjoy a higher relative level of non-electoral inclusion, but, nonetheless, achieve less electoral incorporation than the British.

A third contribution of this analysis to existing research on political incorporation is the discussion of how transnational links and opportunities influence the process. Transnational networks and institutions are considered to have a positive influence on migrants' integration in the host society (Pantoja 2005). At the group level, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a) shows that the pursuit of an emigrant agenda does not presuppose a neglect of claims and demands related to immigrant integration. I approach the concept of transnationalism from a broader perspective, by taking into account not only home country ties and citizenship entitlements, but also the role of European citizenship resources and other cross-border networks that facilitate migrant incorporation processes. As the empirical analysis will show, transnational ties and citizenship resources (both in the home country and at the EU level) empower immigrant actors to achieve non-electoral and electoral incorporation outcomes in the context of reception.

Overall, the theoretical and empirical analyses of this dissertation support two arguments. I contend that Romanians' and Britons' processes of incorporation are contingent upon their reception and self-perception in the host society, in the case of both non-electoral and electoral pathways to politics. Beyond a common status as European citizens and inherent differences in terms of group resources, Spanish policies and political actors categorize organizations and political entrepreneurs from the two groups and act accordingly. This differentiated approach leads to diverse pathways to local politics. Second, I demonstrate that transnational links and membership resources can constitute an asset in gaining visibility and incorporation outcomes in the host society.

1.3 Research design

1.3.1 Research context

Incorporation of immigrant actors into host country politics can take place at the local, regional and/or national levels. While representation in national politics is considered to indicate a higher degree of political incorporation, it requires a long immigration history, a large enough group of naturalized immigrants who can vote in national elections and favourable conditions for the presence of ethnic minorities on the political scene. This is, for example, the case of Canada, the UK and the Netherlands, characterized by decades of immigrant settlement, high rates of naturalization and emerging immigrant-origin political actors at the national level (Bird 2005; Bloemraad 2013). Less so is the case of France, where, in spite of having more than five decades of recent immigration history, immigrants are almost invisible in the national government (Bird 2005). Incorporation of immigrants at the sub-national levels of politics is less studied at the regional level. There is a larger number of studies that take the local level of politics as the main site of research for political incorporation.

The popularity of the local level as research site is due to several factors. In the past decades, municipalities became sites of political engagement and citizenship practices due to the new forms of multilevel governance and increased attributions of local governments in social and cultural policy areas (García 2006; Subirats 1989). Secondly, in most cases, immigrants' political rights are recognized only in local elections, while voting at the national level is conditioned by naturalization. It is more likely, in consequence, that incorporation outcomes emerge where immigrants can actually have a say in politics. Thirdly, the local level is considered as the 'nearest' and most visible political level for immigrants and to that extent it is more likely that the first steps towards political inclusion are taken in local politics. Nonetheless, although local political incorporation

seems precede incorporation in regional and national politics, there are cases where more incorporation outcomes occur at higher levels of politics (see for example Canada and Norway).

This dissertation takes the local level of politics as the context of research. Apart from the considerations mentioned above, it can be added that local political incorporation is an intrinsic part of the concept of EU citizenship, since intra-EU migrants are granted *only* local voting rights in the member states of residence. Participation and representation at higher levels of politics are prerogatives upon which member states have decisional power and, to that extent, these do not fall under European law (Shaw 2007). Moreover, immigration to Spain is a recent process, reaching notable proportions only after 2000. To that extent, the first steps towards political incorporation are being taken at the local level, with the regional and national levels of politics falling short of immigrant incorporation at the moment.

More specifically, this dissertation discusses the processes of political incorporation of British and Romanian residents in a selection of Spanish municipalities. First, it examines how Romanian and British associations are incorporated in local decision-making processes. Nonetheless, as immigrant organizational inclusion is a multi-level process in Spain, the dissertation also takes into account whether the immigrant organizations in question have links with regional or national levels of politics. Second, the analysis compares the processes of nomination at the local elections of 2011 for candidates belonging to each group in selected localities that are discussed at length in Chapter III. Third, it discusses the role of British representatives in various localities from the Valencian coast. A similar analysis cannot be performed in the case of Romanians, as only one Romanian origin councillor became elected after the 2011 local elections.

1.3.2 The groups

Romanians and Britons in Spain illustrate distinct realities of European mobility in the context of EU enlargement. They are the largest groups of EU origin residents in Spain (800,000 Romanians and 400,000 British) and some of the most numerous among the overall immigrant population. The British score higher for all socio-economic indicators except for language proficiency in comparison to Romanians. Thus, British residents have higher educational background, monthly income and occupational status that the average for Romanians (Encuesta Nacional de Inmigración, ENI 2007). Nonetheless, survey data shows that Romanians have a higher level of proficiency in Spanish than British expats (ENI 2007). Both groups are recent arrivals, but, on average, Britons have resided in Spain for a decade longer than Romanians. On average, the British have lived in Spain since the mid-nineties, while Romanians started to settle after 2002. As Chapter IV discusses in more detail, Romanians and Britons have very different public images. While no Spanish citizen nominates British residents among the most disliked (or for that matter preferred) foreign-born residents, Romanians are perceived as the most disliked group (CIS 2010).

At the 2011 local elections the British and Romanian residents are situated in distinct stages of the political incorporation process. As Chapter VII shows, Romanians managed to have a relatively high number of candidates, albeit only one got elected. Instead, British is the second most numerous nationality among local elected councillors in Spain. To that extent the comparative analysis of Romanians and Britons' electoral pathway to incorporation is not symmetrical. Presence and influence through electoral politics can only be studied in the British case. Yet, official data shows that Romanians score better with regard to their level of formal non-electoral inclusion.

Part of these differences is explained by British residents having had a larger period of socialization in Spanish politics, caused by a longer duration of

residency and a longer period of enjoying local political rights in comparison to Romanians. Thus, Britons in Spain can vote and be represented in local politics since 1999, after the implementation of the Maastricht treaty. Romanians achieved this right after 2007.

An important part of the differences in incorporation outcomes stems from the manner in which political actors and policies in the context of reception approach the two groups. These backstage processes of politics are not easily made visible unless a detailed and in-depth analysis is made. As Chapters VI-VIII show, group resources do play a role in explaining why the British migrants in Spain achieve more electoral incorporation than Romanians. But, besides the simple equation that associates more socio-economic, cultural and political resources with more political inclusion, host country political institutions also influence the incorporation outcomes in that they have different policy approaches depending on the nationality of origin of the EU citizens in question. Moreover, transnational links and membership resources intervene and influence how Romanian and British political entrepreneurs relate to host country political actors and institutions.

Table 1.2 Political incorporation indicators for British and Romanian residents in Spain

Group	***Presence in non-electoral politics***	***Influence in non-electoral politics***	***Presence among party candidates***	***Presence in local councils***	***Influence through elected representatives***
British residents	Not part of immigration councils	-change of the Ley Reguladora de Actividad Urbanistica de la Generalitat Valenciana (Regulatory Law for urban planning of the Valencian Community) (LRAU) and postponing of local urbanization projects -informal participation in local policies and programmes -collaboration with local administrations, perceived as service providers -multilingual local institutions	The highest among immigrant groups	The highest among immigrant groups	Medium -part of governing coalitionsresponsible for various areas -policy initiative in integration and environmental areas
Romanian residents	Several organizations	-participation in integration plans -subsidies for various events -collaboration with local administrations - funding for immigrant churches	Medium among immigrant groups	Virtually none (one councillor)	None

1.3.3 Methodology

The current predominant comparative strategy in social sciences is the 'most similar research design' (Przeworski and Teune 1970). The core strategy of such an approach is to make matched comparisons, i.e to select cases that are 'most similar' in as many features as possible and diverge in terms of outcomes. The features that mark the differences among these cases are also those that explain the variation in outcome (Locke and Thelen 1995).

The universe of cases of the topic approached in this dissertation consists of intra-EU migrants and their trajectories to political inclusion at the local level in another member state. The topic in itself makes it difficult to implement a matched comparison research design, due to the fact that intra-EU migrants are a heterogeneous category. The various groups of Europeans migrating to another EU country display 'systemic features' that cannot be controlled for unless new sub-categories are formed. These sub-categories can be for example Western EU residents/Eastern Europeans, professional migration/economic migration, labour migration/retirement migration, etc. Comparing, for example, how French and Italian residents are incorporated in British politics or how Romanians and Poles take the first steps towards political inclusion in France facilitates a most similar research design. Romanian and British residents in Denmark would also qualify for a most similar research design due to similarities in high socio-economic and cultural resources of the two groups in that respective context (Eucross 2013). However, what a most similar research design would do in these cases would be to go against the current state of affairs, which is European enlargement towards a more diverse group of countries that diverge strikingly from older members in terms of GDP per capita and HDI index (Eurostat 2013).

In consequence, this dissertation proposes to make a contextual comparison of two groups that are illustrative of recent European mobility.

Building on Locke and Thelen's (1995) definition, contextual comparisons aim to show how common trends/ideas/policies/institutions are actually *not* translated and approached equally by national institutions and actors involved in the process. In the case of this dissertation, the contextual approach aims to show how EU citizenship rights are subject to a differential approach by policies and institutions in the member state of residence and how groups of EU migrants make use of these rights differently.

More specifically, the subsequent analysis combines quantitative and qualitative approaches in order to illustrate these different processes of inclusion. Thus, I have selected a group of localities from the Community of Madrid and the Valencian Community where I conducted qualitative research related to how British and Romanian organizations relate to and are included in decision-making processes. In the same localities, I also give an account of the parallel processes of electoral inclusion of Romanian and British-origin candidates in the local elections of 2011. By constructing an original dataset with almost 1,000 localities, I was able to provide a quantitative perspective on the determinants of Romanian and British candidacy selection in the 2011 local elections. A detailed description of the research sites is given in Chapter III.

1.4 Structure of the dissertation

The theoretical discussion regarding political incorporation and its determining factors is included in Chapter II. I propose a model of political incorporation that goes beyond the agency-host country structure perspective. The model discusses how the interaction between group-related factors and the host country/transnational structure of opportunities shape the process of incorporation. The theoretical analysis is structured around six hypotheses that are developed in the following chapters. These hypotheses elucidate the interactions between group resources and the structures of opportunities in the

host country and at the transnational level in shaping political incorporation outcomes. The third chapter discusses at length the methodological approach and the selection of research sites for the empirical analysis.

Chapter IV focuses on two of the main independent variables used in the analysis: group resources and the transnational structure of opportunities for British and Romanian migrants. It therefore sheds light on migration typologies and socio-economic determinants, as well as on the level of political participation and representation. Related to the transnational structure of opportunities, the chapter briefly presents the set of rights and entitlements that the two emigrant groups have back home, as well as the way in which these overlap with the immigration contexts.

Chapter V discusses the Spanish structure of opportunities for political incorporation of immigrant groups. It presents the institutional arrangements related to non-electoral and electoral incorporation, as well as political parties' discourses and behaviour in proposing immigrant candidacies and therefore opening the path to electoral incorporation. The main argument of the chapter is that Spanish administrations set up distinct incorporation opportunities for EU15 and EU12/non-EU residents respectively. At the same time, the campaign discourses of Spanish political parties use a blanket approach towards immigrant groups, although a closer look at evidence from various territories also shows a 'selecting by origin' strategy.

Chapter VI discusses the non-electoral pathway to incorporation by focusing on the processes of inclusion of Romanian and British organizations in Spain. After making a general presentation of the organizational landscape of the two groups, it focuses the research on the two territories with the largest concentration of Romanian and British migrants: the Community of Madrid and the Valencian Community. The numerical variable is important since it implies a larger associational network, therefore maximizing the diversity of our units of

analysis. The chapter argues that structured incorporation does not entail a larger capacity of political influence of Romanian organizations in comparison to their British counterparts. The structured incorporation does, however, contribute to the visibility of certain immigrant actors over others, leading to a segmented structured incorporation. Another argument that is made is related to the transnational structure of opportunities, showing that its uses have had a positive effect on the process of organizational political incorporation. The chapter uses mainly qualitative techniques based on interviews with association leaders and Spanish political actors in a series of selected localities from the abovementioned autonomous communities.

Chapter VII focuses on the electoral pathway to incorporation and examines the factors that promote the nomination of Romanian and British candidates in local elections. It gives an account of how party-related variables and group resources influence the processes of candidate incorporation and representation in local politics. The main argument is that in spite of a national discourse directed towards the global immigrant voter, the parties do not approach the two groups similarly in practice. The parties are motivated by different contextual and electoral constraints when incorporating British and Romanian candidacies at the local level. The analysis is based on an original dataset with almost 1,000 Spanish localities, which compiles the data on Romanian and British candidacies and representatives.

Chapter VIII takes the analysis of the electoral pathway to incorporation further and looks at the mechanisms through which British and Romanian political entrepreneurs become visible in local politics. While Chapter VII gives an account of where they are and why they are in certain localities and not in others, Chapter VIII inquires about who they are and how they got there. The main proposition is that while Romanian migrants have been co-opted by the parties based on closed networks of acquaintances and previous militancy, Britons are

contentious mobilizers that gained prestige and visibility in the local setting before being co-opted by the mainstream Spanish parties.

The last chapter discusses the representation of British residents in the selected localities. It approaches the concept of electoral incorporation as both presence and influence in local councils and policy processes. The main argument is that Britons' representation practices are a function of local institutional arrangements and the level of contention these political entrepreneurs had previous to entering the local councils. The chapter uses quantitative and qualitative methodology. This latter is based on interviews with British political entrepreneurs and Spanish political actors in selected localities from the Valencian Community.

CHAPTER TWO

A threefold framework for explaining political incorporation

Theories on immigrant groups' political incorporation tend to focus on group-related characteristics and country of residence political opportunity structures in order to explain migrants' pathway to politics and differences in incorporation outputs between various groups (Dahl 1961; Browning et al 1994; Fennema and Tillie 2001; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008). Less attention is given to the interplay between the organizational and electoral pathways to incorporation in the case of one group or when comparing various groups (but see Maxwell 2012). At the same time, incorporation-related scholarship concentrates little on the importance of the transnational structure of opportunities that provide migrants with a set of resources that they can use in order to gain visibility and influence in the political arena of their host countries (but see Østergaard-Nielsen 2011).

In this chapter I propose a revised theoretical framework that aims at a better understanding of the determinants of incorporation dimensions, as well as at a more attentive examination of the factors that account for group differences in terms of political incorporation. I argue that groups' political incorporation is a function of group resources, opportunities in the context of residence and transnational structure of opportunities. The framework proposed adds to previous literature a dynamic focus on the process of political incorporation by showing not only how these factors influence the process, but also by illustrating how their interactions shape the incorporation pathways. More specifically, I show that the a) the structure of opportunities in the receiving context does not address and

react to migrant groups' resources and status uniformly in spite of the unifying abstract discourse of the EU citizenship regime and that b) the transnational structure of opportunities has a positive effect on incorporation outcomes by having a 'boomerang effect' on both groups' resources and the political actors and institutions in the context of reception. In the following sections, this chapter provides a more detailed analysis of the electoral and non-electoral (organizational) pathways towards migrants' inclusion, as well as of the factors that explain variation in these incorporation scenarios between groups.

2.1 Approaches to political incorporation

At the group level, political incorporation encompasses social processes and outputs that describe and evaluate the extent to which immigrant groups are present and manage to promote their interests in the political arena of their host societies (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009; Dahl 1961; Browning et al 1985; Rogers 2006; Ramacrishnan and Bloemraad 2008). There are two venues through which immigrants can achieve presence and influence in the policy process. In recent immigration contexts the initial pathway is through non-electoral inclusion, in which group leaders/individual migrants/immigrant organizations promote immigrant interests at various stages of the policy process through consultative institutional arrangements. The second venue is the electoral pathway, in which elected representatives of immigrant origin serve in the governing bodies of their localities/regions/countries of residence. Nonetheless, for recent immigration experiences as Romanian migration to Spain, immigrant electoral representation is a scarce resource. In order to become elected representatives, immigrants must be first incorporated as candidates by political parties in the context of residence. To that extent, a pre-step to actual representation is nomination on party lists. An intersection between incorporation outputs and pathways generates five analytical dimensions of the concept of incorporation (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Summary of indicators for political incorporation

Political incorporation					
Venue	**The non-electoral pathway**		**The electoral pathway**		
Actor	Migrant organizations		Immigrant-origin candidates	Elected representatives of immigrant origin	
Dimension	Presence	Influence	Presence	Presence	Influence
Indicator	Presence in consultative processes	Access to political networks	Presence on party lists	Representation in elected bodies	Access to power networks and resources. Participation in and support of the governing party/coalition
	Acquaintance and support among local politicians	Participation in the formulation of integration/immigration policies and programs			Participation in the formulation of integration/immigration policies and programs

2.1.1 Non-electoral incorporation

The development of participatory democratic arrangements expanded the concept of political participation and incorporation beyond electoral politics. Citizens participate in the process of decision making not only through their elected representatives, but also in consultative and deliberative forums individually or through the voice of their organization/group representative. In the case of migrants, participation beyond electoral politics may sometimes be the rule, as in many countries non-national residents do not have the right to vote, either for a period at the beginning of their stay or until naturalization. In Western Europe, participatory and consultative arrangements involving migrant organizations have been set up as the first steps towards political integration of newcomers, especially starting with the decade of the nineties. These consultative

institutional arrangements take various forms in practice, the most common being immigration councils tied to local, regional and national government levels (Council of Europe 1999; Ireland 1994; Martiniello 2005; Soysal 1994; Vertovev 1999).

Consultative structures are designed with various *raisons d'etre:* as a palliative to the absence of electoral participation, as a mechanism to channel immigrant voices or as a symbolic recognition of ethnic diversity (Vertovec 1999). A common element of these arrangements is that they promote migrant organizations as immigrants' spokespersons and representatives. To that extent, their underlying philosophy is that migrant organizations act as a link between immigrant groups and the political institutions of the country of residence. As Odmalm (2004) argues, they can function as an intermediary for the complex bureaucracy and contribute to immigrants' integration and adaptation to the new society. At the same time, they constitute the voice of immigrant communities vis-à-vis the administrations of the host societies. They thus become active subjects who get incorporated in various degrees in the politics of the residence context.

Bloemraad and Ramakrishnan (2008) propose a series of indicators for organizational incorporation that will be used in the subsequent analysis. The political presence of migrant organizations is measured as visibility and recognition among officials, as well as organizational affiliations with elected officials and other organizations involved in political activities. Nonetheless, presence does not necessarily entail the capacity to influence the policy process. The political weight/influence of migrant organizations is indicated by their ability to have their interests represented in agenda setting, policy decision-making and policy implementation (Table 2.1). However, migrant organizations need not to be present in all policy stages. Their political influence is strongly related to their set goals, such as policy outcomes, material benefits, electoral success or symbolic recognition (idem, p. 22).

Yet, non-electoral representation remains an imperfect form for channelling individual and group voices and interests in the political process. As Vertovec (1999) signals, the structuring of immigrant participation and representation processes through non-electoral participation leads to self-selection of 'migrant brokers' whose role and capacity to represent is often limited. At the same time, these structures tend to reproduce the political constraints of the administrations, leaving little room for the genuine voice of immigrants and their leaders (Soysal 1994). Moreover, immigrant incorporation through consultative politics presupposes a corporatist conception of representation that may reinforce essentialist stereotypes of monolithic cultures of immigrant groups (idem, p. 16).

2.1.2 Electoral incorporation

In spite of fierce criticism, the main formula through which individuals are linked to political institutions and through which governments are held accountable is electoral representation (Laycock 1995; Manin et al 1999; Pitkin 1967). Social groups' electoral representation and influence in the political process are multifaceted concepts that have been approached by academics not only in relation to the inclusion of immigrant communities. Feminist scholars like Anne Phillips (1995) call for a distinction between the politics of ideas and the politics of presence and argue that social diversity cannot be fully understood in terms of divergence of opinions, beliefs, interests and goals. Rather, adequate representation implies representation of distinct social groups not only in what regards their ideas and interests, but also in what concerns their descriptive features as gender, class and ethnicity. In the case of immigrants, presence in elected political bodies has often been equated with their descriptive representation, i.e., with presence of immigrant-origin political actors in representative bodies (Pitkin 1967; Mansbridge 1999; Bird 2003).

The mere presence of immigrant-origin politicians does not necessarily entail that they have an impact on the policy agenda. Their capacity to influence can be measured by means of two indicators summarized in Table 2.1: that they manage to promote and include immigrant interests in the policy agenda; or that the representatives are part of a ruling coalition that promotes immigrant interests (Browning et al 1984; Rogers 2006). In the former perspective, the concept of influence entails that the system is responsive to immigrants' demands and interests (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009). In the latter perspective, influence is equated with representatives' position in the power hierarchy (see Woods 1998 for a broader perspective).

In the electoral incorporation framework, a migrant group's political incorporation is quantified along a continuum which starts with a low end of no minority representation and ends with an upper end at which groups are part of a dominant coalition committed to minority interests (Browning et al 1984). In between, groups with a medium level of political incorporation have representatives in city councils, but no power over the policy agenda. In other words, the absence of representatives from representative bodies is equivalent with no incorporation, while representation and policy responsiveness are equated with full political incorporation.

One shortcoming of this approach is that it can hardly be applied to recent immigration contexts. Since it developed in relation to incorporation experiences of Latinos and blacks in the US, it focuses on groups that have decades or even centuries of socialization in the American political system. Yet, political representation requires not only group mobilization and openness of the political system but also time (Dahl 1961). In more recent immigration contexts, as is the case of Spain, immigrant representation in local politics is a novel experience with

distinct timings of various groups: EU15 starting with 1999, EU12[1] since 2007 and certain non-EU groups since 2011. As already anticipated in the introduction, Romanians are virtually absent among local representatives, and to that extent a 'full incorporation' perspective is not applicable to them. Still, several community leaders have already been introduced to the machinery of electoral politics. In order to grasp their first steps to electoral representation, the analysis takes the concept of candidate selection and nomination as an initial stage of electoral inclusion.

In sum, this section discussed five dimensions of the concept of immigrant incorporation distributed along two main venues of entrance in the political arena of the country of residence. While the link between nomination and electoral incorporation is straightforward, it is disputable whether the non-electoral pathway actually leads to incorporation in electoral politics. The last section of this chapter discusses the connection between the incorporation pathways into more detail.

2.2 Explaining pathways to political incorporation

The literature on political incorporation is centred on two broad categories of factors that explain the degree and configuration of incorporation outcomes for immigrant groups: group-related variables and institutional opportunities existent in the context of reception (Dahl 1961; Mollenkop and Hochschild 2009; Jones-Correa 1998, 2009; Kittilson and Tate 2005; Anderson 2005; 2011). As I shall argue further, both resources and opportunities help explain incorporation trajectories, but they offer an incomplete framework of analysis.

[1] EU15 refer to the member states that formed the EU before the 2004 enlargement. EU12 refer to the member states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 respectively.

On the one hand, immigrant political incorporation theories are not sufficiently attentive to the terms of the interaction between group resources and the structure of opportunities. Scholars studying the processes of incorporation argue that groups relate differently to the same structure of opportunities, and yet explore less the fact that the integration policies are differentiated in relation to various immigrant groups which in turn have different sets of resources.

On the other hand, the embeddedness of migrant agency in cross-border interactions and institutional arrangements calls for the inclusion of the transnational perspective in the study of local processes of incorporation. As I will explain further, the transnational networks and opportunities have a 'boomerang effect' on groups' incorporation pathways by providing organizational and mobilization resources to immigrant political entrepreneurs. Moreover, transnational opportunities interact with the structure of opportunities in the context of residence and can influence the political process on their behalf. This observation is even more relevant for intra-EU mobility, which is structurally shaped and defined by the European citizenship framework.

The argument that political incorporation is a function of group resources, structure of opportunities in the receiving context, transnational opportunities and the terms of interaction of these factors is summarized by the following formula:

$$PI = f\{R, SO, TSO, R*SO, R*TSO, SO*TSO\},$$

where a*b represents the interaction between a and b.

Group resources in the host society (R) comprise two broad indicators: members' socio-economic and cultural resources and group reception and self-perception in the host society (Verba et. Al 1995; Fennema and Tillie 1998; Landolt and Goldring 2009).

The structure of opportunities in the context of residence (SO) is formed by discursive opportunities and political opportunities (Koopmans et al 2005; Koopmans 2004). Building on Koopmans's (2004) definition of discursive

opportunities for immigrant mobilization and claims-making, I define the discursive opportunity structure as established notions and frames of inter-ethnic/inter-cultural relations, and on what immigrant groups are considered and perceived as welcome, legitimate and equal, or on the contrary, as a threat to natives' access to economic resources and security. The political structure of opportunities in the context of residence refers to the formal and informal rules, institutions and political actors that determine and influence the conditions under which immigrants have access to and may be represented in the political arena (Bloemraad 2006; Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009).

The transnational opportunities (TSO) encompass horizontal and vertical ties and membership entitlements from the country of origin, EU citizenship and cross-border organizations and networks (Janoschka 2008; Portes 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).

The model proposed borrows the notion of interaction among explanatory terms from statistical analysis. Although the effect of interactions can be deduced only from quantitative data, I consider that its theoretical underpinnings can offer guidance and clarity to empirical models that use mainly qualitative data. The basic idea of an interaction effects model claims that if theoretically the relationship between x and y is conditional upon z, then the relation between z and y should be conditional upon x (Franzese and Kam 2007). Literature on political incorporation is abundant in theoretical and empirical claims that use interaction effects language (Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2009; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008). The most common is that immigrant groups' patterns of inclusion in the host country's politics are determined by both group resources and political opportunities.

'Immigrants bring resources, needs, desires into the political arena and they are met by political institutions, practices and commitments [...]. The

interaction among these forces shapes the patterns of political incorporation' (Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2009: 12).

Yet, many empirical analyses reduce the interaction hypotheses to one term, analysing only the effect, say, of x over y when conditioned by z, without fully accounting for the fact that the effect of z on y is also conditioned upon x. For example, scholars analysing the effect of group resources on political incorporation conditioned by political opportunities do not take into account how group resources interact with political opportunities in shaping incorporation outcomes (see for example Bloemraad 2007). To that extent, the model proposed aims at offering a more comprehensive approach to how the interaction between group resources and host country/transnational structures shapes the processes of political incorporation of immigrant groups. Figure 2.1 displays the main elements of the model graphically.

The model in Figure 2.1 captures the mechanisms and the interactions through which group resources, host country opportunities and transnational opportunities shape the processes of immigrant political incorporation. Group resources influence the process of incorporation either directly (arrow 1) or through the mediated effect of groups' organizational infrastructure and level of political mobilization (arrow 2). As the subsequent analysis shows, groups' reception and self-perception are relevant for how immigrant organizations and group leaders are included in the political process. Moreover, it shapes the practice of representation of immigrant-origin local councillors, as the last chapter will show. Resources can also affect how immigrants are organized and mobilized civically and politically.

Migrants' level of visibility in the host country (through their organizations, electoral mobilization and group political entrepreneurs) increases their levels of political incorporation (arrow 3). Groups that have a strong organizational

infrastructure or high levels of electoral mobilization are more likely to gain visibility and voice vis-à-vis host country political actors.

However, migrants' level of visibility through their organizations and political mobilization is not only a function of group resources. Host country and transnational structures of opportunities provide the symbolic and material incentives through which immigrants build their organizational infrastructure and mobilize politically (arrows 4 and 6 respectively).

Figure 2.1 Model of group-level political incorporation



Host country political opportunities also have a direct effect on political incorporation (arrow 5). More explicitly, integration policies shape non-electoral incorporation by establishing the norms and constraints through which immigrant organizations are present and achieve influence on the policy process. Host country political parties have a central role in the processes of immigrant-origin candidate nomination and representation. Also, factors pertaining to the broad institutional context, such as configurations of local power, as well as decisional and material capacities of local governments, influence immigrant representatives' activities and capacity to influence the political process.

Apart from illustrating the mechanisms through which these three broad set of factors influence the political incorporation process, the model proposed also depicts the interaction between them. Group resources, host country opportunities and transnational opportunities are not separate boxes in the process of immigrant political incorporation. Their mutual influence is relevant, especially when comparing the processes of incorporation of two groups in the same context, as is the case of this dissertation.

Arrow 7 indicates the interaction between group resources and the structure of opportunities in the host country. This interaction manifests itself through two dynamics: on the one hand, political opportunities shape how group resources influence the process of incorporation. Thus, groups with distinct sets of resources seize differently the discursive and political opportunities they find in the context of residence (Ireland 1998; Bloemraad 2006; Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009; Dancygier 2013). On the other hand, political opportunities are not constant for all immigrant groups. Group resources interact and define what incentives and support is given by integration policies, political parties or broad institutional contexts to immigrant political entrepreneurs willing to enter and influence the political process. One example is that integration policies are differentiated on the basis of national origin, historical ties between immigrant

groups and host country, migration status or socio-economic resources (Vermeulen 2005; Joppke 2005; Bloemraad 2006; Barbulescu 2011). Political parties may also have a differentiated approach towards incorporating various groups of immigrants on the basis of their nationality or reception in the host society. In the case of practices of representation, the broad institutional context may be open to certain representatives' claims, depending on how their nationality of origin is perceived and received. The interactions between the structure of opportunities and group resources are explored in a series of hypotheses (H2, H3a, H3b, H4), in the following sections of the chapter.

Regarding the role played by transnational opportunities, I have already specified that they have an indirect effect on the process of immigrant political incorporation, by supporting immigrants to gain visibility in host country civic and political arena (arrow 6). Arrow 8 specifies that transnational resources may interact with group resources and influence the process of incorporation. This type of interaction is manifest at the individual level and is especially relevant for individual processes of incorporation. For instance, scholars argue that migrants' engagement with transnational networks and activities can improve their civic and political skills, which in turn have a positive effect on groups' levels of organizational infrastructure and political mobilization (Pantoja 2005; Portes et al 2008).

Arrow 9 indicates the interaction between transnational opportunities and host country political opportunities. Since intra-EU migration is framed by a unique citizenship constellation (Baubock 2010), political institutions and actors from the host country and at the transnational level (EU and home country) have direct and regular contacts and interactions. In this case, the transnational structure of opportunities influences the processes of immigrant political incorporation through institutional bilateral and multilateral ties and inter-dependencies. The interplay between transnational resources and immigrant

political incorporation is further discussed and summarized by two hypotheses (H5a, H5b).

Lastly, as the chapter discusses further, there is not a necessary correlation between groups' level of non-electoral incorporation and electoral incorporation (dashed arrow 10). In other words, a higher level of incorporation through organizations may increase group's level of electoral incorporation. However, it is not a necessary condition, since groups may have a high level of electoral incorporation (candidates and representatives) without necessarily having a high number of organizations present and influent in the political arena.

2.3 Group resources, patterns of settlement and political incorporation

Group-related theories provide useful analytical tools for comparing the incorporation trajectories of distinct groups in the same setting. Overall, the literature argues that groups with higher levels of civic and political mobilization help them gain visibility vis-à-vis political actors and institutions in the contexts of residence, which, in turn, has a positive influence over their organizational and electoral inclusion (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008: 25; Hochshild and Mollenkopf 2009: 19). In the following I discuss how socio-economic and cultural resources and group's patterns of settlement in the host society are connected to immigrants' pathways to political incorporation.

2.3.1 Socio-economic and cultural resources

Drawing on research related to native citizens' political behaviour, it has been argued that the pool of resources of the individual members of an immigrant group influences their levels of political participation (Verba et al 1995; Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009). High levels of electoral mobilization may be translated into more 'ethnic power', which spills over into more representation and policy

influence (Crewe 1983 in Bird 2003). To that extent, it has been argued that what is good for enhancing immigrants' political participation and mobilization also has a positive effect on the group level of incorporation in the host societies.

Individuals with more socio-economic resources, time and civic skills tend to participate more in politics, both by voting in elections and by signing petitions, demonstrating, contributing to political campaigning or contacting politicians (Verba et al 1993; 1995). Language proficiency, length of stay in the country of residence and social connectedness are resources that have direct implications for political engagement. For migrants and natives alike, membership in voluntary and religious organizations is an asset inasmuch as it develops the civic skills that facilitate political involvement (Verba et al 1993; Verba et al 1995). Following Putnam's arguments, Fennema and Tillie (1999) maintain that immigrants' participation in ethnic associations increases their levels of trust and political participation.

Immigrants' pathways to political incorporation are not shaped solely by their socio-economic and associational resources, but also by the cultural and political traditions in their countries of origin. Immigrants' political culture is a flexible toolkit embedded in networks and processes of political socialization that define a group's way of doing politics (Landolt and Goldring 2009; Jones-Correa 1998). 'In this light, the range and modes of immigrant politics are determined in part by the character and convertibility of pre-migration political skill sets' (Landolt and Goldring 2009: 4). It is expected for example for migrants coming from more participatory settings or democratic traditions to have a larger degree of participation and incorporation in the host societies, although evidence from Europe and the US does not support the claim (Apteker 2011; Recchi and Favell 2009).

The link between socio-economic and cultural resources, participation and representation is not observed linearly across groups in various immigration

contexts. More socially integrated immigrants do not necessarily develop strong ethnic networks which then spill over into more representation and influence in the political process (Maxwell 2012). This is for example the case of EU residents in Belgium, but the finding can hardly be generalized to the group of intra-EU immigrants due to the lack of empirical scrutiny of the topic (Jacobs et al 2002). An intervening element in how group socio-economic and cultural resources are translated into civic and political mobilization is related to group's patterns of settlement in the host society (group reception and self-perception).

2.3.2 Group reception and self-perception

Groups' perception/reception in the host society are shaped by group related characteristics and the discursive and political opportunities in the context of reception. Increasingly, Western societies have witnessed heightened debates related to immigration and integration, and manifestations of both subtle and blatant prejudice against immigrants (Pettigrew 1998). Group threat theories posit that natives' anti-immigrant attitudes develop as a result of the perceived economic or social threat posed by immigrants (Hjerm 2009; Quillian 1995). To that extent, less resourceful groups may be perceived as a threat to natives' access to socio-economic resources and be received/perceived with hostility. Yet, not all immigrant groups in a country are perceived with hostility. Factors such as race, immigrant groups' economic resources and the public perception of immigrants' countries of origin play an important role in shaping natives' opinions and attitudes towards foreign-born residents (Ford 2011).

A group's reception in the host society is a central element for how it is further incorporated in local political life. Groups with high levels of socio-economic and cultural resources can find it easy to organize and mobilize, due to their skills and resources. It may also be the case that less resourceful groups, which are perceived with hostility, achieve ethnic solidarity. This in turn enhances

their visibility and capacity to enter the political arena (Bloemraad 2013; Maxwell 2012). At the same time, an unwelcoming environment does not necessarily have to be perceived as an injustice by immigrants. It can determine immigrants to choose to become 'invisible' and not to revive ethnic identity and consciousness (Sears et al 2003).

Groups do not necessarily need to *counter-react* to natives' attitudes. Their mobilization and presence on the political arena may be determined by the way migrant communities frame their position in the host society and by the 'cognitive dissonance' between their core values and the ways in which native public opinion or political institutions function and operate (Garbaye 2005). A homeland democratic and participatory political culture can enhance more participation and integration but, depending on the context, it may also entail a higher degree of contention and opposition to the host country's policies and institutions in case they are seen as unfair or undemocratic (Ireland 1994). To that extent, the use and transformation of the home country 'toolkit' into political participation and representation does not depend only on its characteristics, but rather on the interaction between these characteristics and the broader features of the incorporation opportunities in the context of residence.

Socio-economic and cultural resources and groups' patterns of settlement in the host society shape immigrants' organizational and political mobilization in various ways. High socio-economic and participatory resources may lead to the formation of a strong and mobilized ethnic community. They can also lead to direct assimilation into mainstream political culture an institutions and, to that extent, to the development of a weak ethnic community and immigrant electorate. But high levels of group resources can also create discontent/contention towards the host country's institutions and lead to the formation of a strong and visible associational sector and of a highly mobilized electorate. On their part, low levels of socio-economic and participatory resources can have a disempowering effect on groups' capacity to build a strong ethnic community and to mobilize politically.

Yet, a negative perception/reception of less resourceful groups can also increase their degree of ethnic solidarity. This in turn, can incentivize groups to mobilize and form a strong ethnic community and mobilized ethnic electorate or, alternatively, to shun any type of ethnic-oriented mobilization.

2.3.3 Visibility and political incorporation

I have argued so far that group resources influence immigrants' capacity to become visible on host country political arena. The role of host country political opportunities and transnational opportunities in enhancing group visibility will be discussed at length in the following sections. In the following, I discuss how visibility in host country politics increases group's political incorporation.

Groups may become visible in the host country's politics by developing a strong organizational infrastructure and/or high levels political mobilization (Bird 2003). A strong organizational infrastructure and/or high levels of political mobilization enable immigrant groups to articulate claims gain representation and influence in the host country's political process (Hochshild and Mollenkopf 2009; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Michon and Vermeulen 2013). Organizational infrastructure and political mobilization are related concepts, but one does not necessarily determine the other. A strong group-level organizational infrastructure may boost political participation and mobilization, but it can also reduce interest and engagement in mainstream political affairs (Morales and Pilati 2011: 110; Jacobs et al 2004).

A strong organizational infrastructure is an asset for non-electoral incorporation. A good guidance related to how to measure groups' organizational infrastructure is given by the concept of ethnic community and its further reformulations (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Fennema 2004; Morales and Ramiro 2011). An ethnic community consists of voluntary immigrant organizations in one area (country, region, locality) that are related (or not) by overlapping memberships

and leadership and/or by various degrees of cooperation and coordination. Ethnic communities may be strong or weak, depending on their level of connectedness and membership capacity (see Chapter VI for a more detailed discussion of indicators).

High levels of political mobilization are especially relevant for the electoral pathway to incorporation. Group levels of electoral mobilization is measured by levels of voter registration, participation rates in elections as well as other forms of non-electoral participation, ranging from claims-making, demonstrations, petitions. High levels of electoral mobilization may also be favoured by the size of the immigrant community and its degree of immigrants' residential concentration (Maxwell 2012; Morales and Vintila 2013). As discussed in the previous section, the patterns of settlement in the host society are another element that may foment high rates of immigrant political mobilization. Summing up, a first hypothesis proposed is that

> *H1: Groups' capacity to become visible and mobilized (organizationally or politically) in the host society increases their chances to be politically incorporated.*

It is expected therefore for groups with a higher degree of organizational infrastructure to have increased opportunities to become incorporated in non-electoral politics (1a). Groups with higher rates of political mobilization also increase their chances to gain nomination and representation in electoral politics (1b). As already mentioned in the previous section, a strong organizational capacity is many times an asset, but not a sufficient condition for being incorporated in electoral politics. Hypothesis H1a is debated in Chapter VI, while hypothesis H1b is discussed through both quantitative and qualitative approaches in Chapters VI-VIII. However, group resources are not the sole element shaping migrants' level of visibility in the host society. The political opportunities available in the host country and at the transnational level also influence migrants' level of visibility in the host society.

2.4 Political opportunities and political incorporation

When comparing groups in the same residence context, there are two central elements of the host country political opportunity structure that influence and mediate the processes of migrant political incorporation: the legal-institutional framework related to citizenship and integration policies (Bloermraad 2006; Ireland 1994; Pennix et al 2002) and political parties' discourses and behaviour in relation to immigration and immigrant voters (Kittilson and Tate 2005; Andersen and Cohen 2005). Additionally, the 'broad institutional features' (such as power relations between the local council and the mayor or the policy capacity of local governments) are especially influent in the representational patterns of immigrant origin elected councillors (Bird 2005; Michon 2011).

2.4.1 Citizenship and integration policies

Since citizenship policies are mainly connected to non-EU migration, it may be argued that they do not necessarily affect incorporation of intra-EU migrants. EU immigrants are not considered resident foreigners in the same way that third country nationals are. Nonetheless, they are not on an equal footing with national citizens, since they do not have the right to vote in national (and, where they exist, regional) elections. Moreover, Eastern European migrants have passed from being resident foreigners to being resident EU citizens in the last decade only. To that extent, until recently, processes related to their incorporation have been regulated in the same way as processes related to the incorporation of non-Europeans.

Citizenship and integration policies channel foreign-born resident groups' trajectories of political incorporation in three ways. First, they establish how and with what resources migrants can mobilize and voice their interests in the political arena. This is done by regulations in the field of acquisition of voting rights, but also by broader policies related to socio-economic integration. These subsequently

spill over into immigrants' capacity to participate in the civic and political life of their country of residence (Ireland 1994; Bloemraad 2006; Soysal 1994; Koopmans and Statham 2000). In spite of a post-national converging discourse, citizenship conceptions differ across countries in terms of equal access to naturalization, political rights and accommodation of ethno-cultural differences (Joppke 2005; Koopmans et al 2005). Ethnic conceptions of citizenship tend to favour co-ethnics or post-colonial migrants in their access to naturalization and other socio-economic rights. Civic conceptions, instead, have a universalizing discourse and do not grant special treatment to foreigners on the basis of nationality or historical links. At the same time, both ethnic and civic conceptions of citizenship can be coupled with distinct legal arrangements for the recognition of foreign residents' cultural distinctiveness (Koopmans et al 2005). On this dimension, countries may have policies that foment cultural assimilation into the mainstream values and practices or, on the contrary, may encourage multiculturalism by granting recognition of cultural rights on the basis of group membership. This recognition is made manifest through measures that help immigrants to preserve their linguistic and religious identity.

Secondly, integration policies direct the formation, typology and structure of consultative and advisory bodies. For instance, the typology and functioning of immigrant consultative/advisory councils mimic the structure of opportunities in the context of reception (Ireland 1994). Thus, a more multicultural integration policy may influence the formation of councils where immigrant groups have a high profile and capacity to voice their concerns. In a more assimilationist setting, immigrants' claims and demands expressed in these advisory and consultative councils may have a lesser impact than in contexts promoting multiculturalism.

Thirdly, the broad context of citizenship and integration policies sets the scene for immigrants' representational practices. They frame legitimate/illegitimate types of claims and representative behaviour. Depending on their ethnic/civic character, citizenship and integration policies may favour certain groups to

promote their demands in the political arena. As well, multicultural integration policies leave a larger room for cultural demands than the assimilationist ones.

Citizenship and integration policies do not only differ among countries. The same national context may have distinct citizenship and integration provisions in relation to resident foreign-born groups. The relation between group resources and political opportunity structure is not defined only by how different groups use opportunities in the context of reception, but also by how political opportunities are based on perceptions of needs of migrants according to their socio-economic and ethno-cultural differences (Barbulescu 2011).

2.4.1.1 Differentiated integration policies in the same residence context

Citizenship and integration policies in Spain and several other Western countries do not approach foreign residents as a homogeneous category (Barbulescu 2011; Joppke 2005; Bloemraad 2006; Vermeulen 2005). On the contrary, these policies differentiate and establish categories between the various nationalities of foreign residents on the territories of the countries in question. In most cases, the basis of distinction is the extent to which immigrants countries' of origin have special links with the receiving state (ranging from post-colonial ties to EU membership) or certain socio-economic characteristics (Joppke 2005; Barbulescu 2011; Vermeulen 2005). In the case of Spain and other European countries there is, for example, a differentiated treatment in what regards co-ethnics compared to other immigrants' access to nationality[2] (Joppke 2005).

Integration policies do not only 'select by origin', but tend to have a structured integration approach towards less-advantaged migrant groups (Alexander 2007; Barbulescu 2011; Bloemraad 2006). The structured approach to

[2] Foreign residents coming from South American and Lusophone countries have a fast track to naturalization (two years of residence) in comparison to other immigrants (ten years of residence).

integration entails that government policies actively support the integration of specific groups of immigrants through direct material and symbolic support to organizations and individual immigrants, in order to promote their integration in the socio-economic, cultural and political arenas (Bloemraad: 677). Related to political incorporation, a structured approach signifies that some groups are provided with more resources in order to mobilize and gain presence on the political arena than others. This may be made manifest, for example, in inviting specific groups that to take part in consultative processes and councils. It may also be that migrant associations of less advantaged groups receive more funding than organizations grouping more affluent nationalities.

Besides socio-economic determinants, groups' perception in the host society and public opinion attitudes play an important role in the differentiated integration approach to immigrant groups. As already mentioned in the previous section, public opinion tends to react to and categorize various immigrant groups differently, depending on their national origin, cultural familiarity and socio-economic status. This may be enforced by legal and political discourse, but, at the same time, it can also determine affirmative action on the part of national and local governments, as for example special measures for less advantaged or discriminated against groups.

2.4.1.2 Political incorporation and differentiated integration policies

Do structured integration policies towards specific groups entail higher incorporation outcomes for the respective groups? Group resources and the structured character of integration policies (R*SO) have an interaction effect on political incorporation outcomes, not only at the policy formulation level, but also in practice. This means that the positive relation between structured incorporation policies towards specific groups and their higher chances to achieve *more* electoral and non-electoral presence and influence cannot be fully accounted for.

As I have already discussed in the previous section, more resourceful groups have two broad patterns of accommodation: to develop a weak organizational network which decreases their chances to enter host country politics or to develop a strong organizational network, due to their high level of resources and skills, or motivated by contentious patterns of settlement. Less resourceful groups have the same possibilities: to develop a weak organizational infrastructure or, due to contentious patterns of accommodation, to develop a strong one. On their part, integration policies that tend to correct for disadvantages related to group resources decrease the chances of incorporation of groups with more resources in comparison to groups with less resources.

There are four configurations of the interactions between high/low levels of group resources and structured/unstructured integration policy approach. In the first case, group A has high socio-economic and participatory resources and develops a **weak** organizational infrastructure. A does not receive integration support (or receives very little). These conditions lead to low levels of non-electoral incorporation. Group B has low socio-economic and participatory resources and develops a **weak** organizational infrastructure. But B receives integration support. In this case, it can be argued that B has higher levels of non-electoral incorporation than A.

In the second scenario group A has high socio-economic and participatory resources, develops a **strong** organizational infrastructure. but does not receive integration support (or receives very little). It is possible in this case to achieve medium and high levels of non-electoral incorporation. Group B has low socio-economic and participatory resources, develops a **strong** organizational infrastructure and receives integration support. In this case B has equal or higher levels of non-electoral incorporation than A.

In the third situation group A has high socio-economic and participatory resources, develops a **weak** organizational infrastructure and does not receive

integration support (or receives very little). It is probable that A achieves low levels of non-electoral incorporation. Group B has low socio-economic and participatory resources, develops a **strong** organizational infrastructure and receives integration support. It is likely that B has higher levels of non-electoral incorporation than A.

In the fourth setup, group A has high socio-economic and participatory resources and develops a **strong** organizational infrastructure. A does not receive integration support (or receives very little), leading to medium or high levels of non-electoral incorporation. Group B has low socio-economic and participatory resources and develops a **weak** organizational infrastructure. B receives integration support. It may be argued that A and B's levels of incorporation depend on how strong the effect of group resources is in comparison to the compensatory effect of policies.

As the subsequent empirical analysis shows, the cases studied fit into this last scenario. To that extent, I propose the following hypothesis that fully accounts for the interaction effect of group socio-economic resources and non-electoral incorporation:

> *H2: High levels of non-electoral inclusion are supported by both high levels of group resources and preferential treatment in integration policies.*

When low levels of group resources decrease groups' capacity to form a strong and visible organizational infrastructure in comparison to more resourceful groups, the negative effect of this factor is alleviated by the positive role played by structured integration policies. As well, the negative effect of policy laissez-faire on the incorporation of more resourceful groups is compensated by their higher capacity to form a strong and visible organizational infrastructure. Chapter VI contextualises this hypothesis through the study of Romanian and British organizations in Spain.

In the case of the electoral pathway to politics, the link between a differential and structured approach to integration and immigrant origin candidate

nomination and representation is not as straightforward as in the case of non-electoral pathway to incorporation. A structured approach can have a positive impact on the mobilization capacities of less resourceful groups by offering symbolic and material support for their mobilization. As well, it contributes to strengthening groups' organizational sector, which in turn can have a positive impact on immigrants' electoral and non-electoral participation. To that extent, group's political mobilization increases its opportunities to gain electoral incorporation outcomes, but it is not a sufficient condition. As the subsequent section argues, political parties are a central institution in shaping migrants' trajectory to political power.

2.4.2 Political parties and electoral inclusion

The role of political parties in the process of immigrant political incorporation is threefold. The behaviour of parties has a direct impact for individual incorporation and participation, as they socialize and mobilize non-citizen residents on the political issues of their host countries (Dahl 1961; Kittlison and Tate 2005). Political parties also have a direct influence on the process of candidate nomination and representation, as they are the gatekeepers to political office. In spite of the fact that there are cases of immigrant mobilization that leads to direct entrance on the political scene, political parties are an institution that may hinder or, on the contrary, promote the entrance of immigrant residents in the political arena (Jones-Correa 1998; 2005; Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009). Parties can also have an indirect influence on how immigrants are electorally included and represented by shaping (anti)immigration public discourses. In the past decades, European countries have witnessed increasing anti-immigrant public opinion (Brader et al 2008; McClaren 2003), shifting the political discourse on immigration towards a more closed, restrictive stance. This has also influenced

mainstream parties' discourses and strategies regarding ethnic tolerance and diversity (Alonso and da Fonseca 2010).

Political incorporation literature divides the relationship of political parties and immigrants between a golden past and a disappointing present. Thus, during the process of settlement and incorporation of European migrants in the US at the end of the XIXth century, political parties used to be the mediating institution between immigrants and the state (Dahl 1961; Erie 1988). They offered various goods and services to immigrant communities in exchange for votes. One of the main promises made by the political parties was related to access to political office, either among the local politicians or as part of the bureaucracies governing the city.

> "In New Haven, they made it easy for immigrants: they encouraged ethnics to register and put candidates on the party rolls, and aided them in meeting the innumerable specific problems resulting from their poverty, strangeness and lowly position. To obtain and hold the votes, the political leaders awarded them with city jobs. They also appealed to their desire to ethnic prestige and self-respect by running members of the ethnic group as candidates for the elective offices." (Dahl 1961: 34).

The past decades show a different dynamic between parties and immigrants. Parties have passed from being the central institution in promoting and incorporating the foreign-born in electoral politics to being 'selective mobilizers' (Jones-Correa 1998; Kittlison and Tate 2005; Andersen 2008). More specifically, parties address migrant voters and include foreign-born candidates on their list if they perceive that the gains are higher than the costs. Factors such as the loosening links between parties and voters, lack of voting rights for immigrants, as well as the rise of anti-immigrant public discourses and political organizations may explain the decline in parties' interest in incorporating newcomers. But the central element that led to the transformation of political parties from mobilizing and pushing immigrants onto the political scene to being 'selective' is related to parties' rational behaviour once they become entrenched machines. While being embryonic organizations, parties needed immigrants and other social groups to consolidate their power position (Dahl 1961; Jones-Correa

1998; Wong 2002; Andersen and Cohen 2005). But once parties become established political organizations, they incorporate immigrant candidates inasmuch as the gains are higher than the costs.

2.4.2.1 Immigrant origin candidacies and differentiated party behaviour

Nomination is the first necessary step for immigrants' entrance into the host country's political arena. It does not assure successful representation per se, but, nonetheless, it is an indicator of early forms of political incorporation. The phenomenon can be studied from various angles, each revealing the particular role played by group resources and local and transnational opportunity structures. As already stated in section 2.2 group resources and patterns of settlement in the host society are relevant predictors of immigrants' electoral incorporation. High levels of civic and political visibility (electoral and non-electoral mobilization, spatial concentration) are likely to empower immigrant political entrepreneurs to become visible and influent in the eyes of host country political actors. A visible and active migrant elite (encouraged by socio-economic and symbolic resources or militancy) also constitutes an asset in the process of electoral incorporation (Bird 2011; Fennema and Tillie 2001; Michon and Vermeulen 2013). In Dahl's (1961) classic study, large numbers of immigrant voters were the necessary and sufficient condition for parties to become interested in promoting immigrant political entrepreneurs on the political scene. Yet, as studies of more recent migration patterns show, immigrant numbers are a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for their political inclusion.

Parties' perception that incorporating immigrants can be a win-win game is influenced by contextual factors such as the level of electoral competition. In competitive environments, parties tend to nominate immigrant candidates as a symbolic effort to win the immigrant vote (Farrer et al 2009). The competition can be generated by both close races and by ethnically diverse communities that

increase parties' interest in attracting immigrant voters (Jones-Correa 1998; Bird 2003; Sobolewska 2013). Where the immigrant vote can tip the balance in close electoral races, parties attempt to tap into the support of such relatively marginal groups of voters as immigrants. While their control over the political process is assured, parties have no incentive to bring new players into the political process (Garbaye 2005; Jones-Correa 1998). Party competition is not only fomented by the distance between competitors. A diverse ethnic community in which several immigrant groups dispute a place on the local political scene may escalate the competition between parties to win the vote of the non-citizen voters (Da Fonseca 2011; De Agueda 2011; Sobolewska 2013; Teney et al. 2010; Uhlaner and Garcia 1998).

A drawback of the literature that compares incorporation outcomes among various groups is that parties' behaviour is considered as being constant in relation to immigrant groups. But, in spite of similar contextual and group-related inputs, as for example electoral mobilization, associational density or leadership capacity, parties have a differentiated approach towards distinct immigrant groups. This is determined by the fact that parties often have to balance the gains that come from the immigrant voters with the losses that may happen from the native electorates. As already mentioned in the previous section, immigrant groups are perceived and received distinctly by both public opinion and integration policies of the host country.

To that extent, groups that have a negative public image may incur a nativist backlash or a heightened electoral activity from anti-immigrant parties (Van der Brugh and Fennema 1999). This affects mainstream parties' behaviour (Alonso and da Fonseca 2009) and therefore determines them to refrain from incorporating immigrant-origin candidates. In this case, where and how immigrant candidates are incorporated cannot be explained only by the level of group resources or contextual conditions that incentive parties to chase the immigrant

vote. A negatively perceived group may generate costs even in close elections and determine therefore that parties chose not to take the risk to lose native voters.

It can also be the case that certain immigrant political entrepreneurs become visible civic actors, either motivated by perceived injustices done to immigrants or by broader processes of 'cognitive dissonance' with host country's discursive and institutional opportunities (Garbaye 2005; Jones-Correa 1998; Maxwell 2012). In these cases, it is in parties' interest to incorporate them, even in the absence of competitive conditions generated by close races or a diverse ethnic community. In consequence, immigrant candidacies are not favoured only by high levels of electoral mobilization or contextual conditions that incentive parties to compete for the immigrant vote. They are also determined by groups' processes of settlement in the host society and the way parties weight how these processes may benefit or hinder them when incorporating immigrant candidacies. To that extent the first argument related to the electoral pathway to incorporation is that

> *H3a: Parties' strategies to nominate immigrant candidates are influenced by groups' perception and self-reception in host society. This, in turn, entails distinct trajectories of entering the political arena among immigrant groups.*

This hypothesis is discussed at length in Chapters VII-VIII through qualitative and quantitative analyses. In Chapter VII, by developing a set of sub-hypotheses, I show how Spanish parties have different sets of incentives when approaching the group of Romanian and British voters. In Chapter VIII I discuss the hypothesis from an agency perspective by illustrating how patterns of settlement in the host society influence immigrant entrepreneurs' tactics to enter the political arena and political parties' strategies to incorporate them.

2.4.2.2 Representation and differentiated party behaviour

Immigrant-origin candidate nomination is a necessary but not a sufficient step for immigrants' descriptive and substantive representation. Especially in

recent immigration contexts, immigrants tend to be nominated by political parties on marginal positions or constituencies (Sobolewska 2013). To that extent, a factor that plays a crucial role in immigrants' chances to become elected is the electoral system (Bloemraad 2013; Togeby 2007; Bergh 2011). Although proportional systems are considered to reflect more accurately societal cleavages in terms of ethnic identification (Reynolds 2006), the empirical evidence supporting this claim is scarce (Ruedin 2009). Nonetheless, open–list proportional and single-member district systems have been found to explain a large degree of ethnic minorities' success in local politics, provided that they receive the support of large shares of immigrant voters (Togeby 2007; Saggar 2000). To that extent, the electoral system alone as a feature of the political opportunity structure does not explain immigrants' success or failure in terms of electoral representation. Rather, it is the interaction between the electoral system (open-list proportional and single-member district) and group resources (spatial concentration and electoral mobilization) that explains immigrants' success in becoming representatives.

Nonetheless, what happens with immigrant candidates in proportional closed-list systems, as is the case of Spain? In these cases, immigrant electors cannot influence the ballot (Farrell and Scully 2010) and therefore parties' control in ranking candidates is close to absolute. As already discussed in the previous section, the presence of immigrant candidates on party lists is a clear sign that parties are interested in courting immigrant voters. But, as Czudnowsky (1970) argues, in a proportional closed-list system, no individual candidate needs to win an election and personal vote-getting is not essential in the nomination (p. 229). The electoral success of the party depends to a high extent on the names that are placed at the head of the list rather than the overall composition of it.

Party selectors tend to position migrant candidates at the bottom of the lists, especially in their first rounds of elections. In these cases, migrant candidates' history in politics, skills and prestige are assets that may be used in order to obtain an eligible position. As Jones-Correa (1998) argues, when the new

political actors manage to mobilize themselves on their own is when the party starts to co-opt them (p. 70). It is probable that a more contentious or visible immigrant elite will also manage to pass the threshold of eligible positions on party lists. The second hypothesis related to the electoral pathway to incorporation is that

> *H3b: Parties' strategies to nominate immigrant candidates in an eligible position that leads to electoral representation are influenced by groups' and leaders' reception and self-perception in the host society.*

Chapter IX discusses this hypothesis in the case of British elected representatives in local councils. As already mentioned, there is no elected Romanian representative in the research context selected (and only one at the level of Spain), a fact which determines that the analysis of two indicators of the electoral pathway (presence and influence) lack the comparative focus.

2.4.3 The broad institutional context and immigrant representation

While it is true that parties are the 'gatekeepers' to political office, that is, to immigrants' entrance in politics, the structure of opportunities in the context of residence (discursive and political) shapes and constraints immigrants' representational practices (Bird 2005; Garbaye 2005; Maxwell 2008; Martiniello 1998; Michon 2011). 'The broad character of local politics', the power relations between mayor, council and other influent groups in the local society define the degree to which local councillors can influence the policy agenda (Subirats 1989; Valles and Brugué 2001). In the particular case of immigrant elected representatives, the degree to which they can push for immigration related concerns in the policy making process is influenced by both their positioning in these networks of power and by their choice to pursue and to distance themselves from the ethnic message (Bird 2005; Michon 2011).

An important element in shaping immigrant representatives' behaviour is related to the wider political and social context that legitimizes or, on the contrary, calls off immigration related claims. As well, representatives belonging to a contentious or a negatively perceived group may be influenced by these particularities in their formulation of policy proposals or policy preferences. To that extent, as a broad hypothesis at this point it can be argued that

> *H4: The interaction between the structure of opportunities and patterns of settlement in the host society shape the way immigrants are represented in the political arena.*

2.5 Transnational opportunities

Immigrant organizations and ethnic leaders do not operate in an environment determined solely by the host country's institutions and policies. Cross-border interactions of migrants' political agency presuppose involvement and connectedness with the politics of their country of origin (Portes et al. 1999, 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a,b; Smith and Bakker 2005), European citizenship institutions (Kostakopoulou 1994; Greenwood 2003) and wider networks of civil society activism and religion beyond borders (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2002; Fiorini 2000).

In spite of this broad picture of cross-border sites of political engagement and resources, political incorporation scholars have rarely looked beyond group resources and context of residence opportunities in order to explain political incorporation outcomes at the group level. Immigration and transnationalism scholars, instead, highlight that transnational practices and local incorporation are not a zero-sum game. This has been argued in relation to migrant organizations' political practices in the host and home countries (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a,b; Østergaard-Nielsen 2011; Portes et al 2008) or to individual migrants' naturalization and political participation (Itzighson et al 1999).

In this dissertation, the concept of transnational opportunities is approached from two perspectives. On the one hand, it denotes horizontal transnational resources, understood as individual and organizational relations between non-state actors that span the borders of the country of residence. On the other hand, it refers to vertical transnational resources, wherein migrants and their organizations are connected and make use of membership and citizenship entitlements that are located in political communities beyond their country of residence. This latter dimension encompasses membership rights conferred by migrants' countries of origin and by the EU citizenship regime.

Following Vertovec (2010), I define horizontal transnational opportunities as 'sustained linkages and ongoing exchanges among non-state actors based across national borders – businesses, non-government-organizations, and individuals sharing the same interests (by way of criteria such as religious beliefs, common cultural and geographic origins)' (idem, p. 3). An important part of migrants' horizontal transnational resources come from connections and practices in relation to homeland societies. Alejandro Portes (2003) classifies migrant transnationalism into three areas: political, economic and socio-cultural, whose main actors are non-governmental organizations and migrant associations and organizations. In an encompassing definition, Basch et al (1994) argue that

'[migrant transnationalism is] the process by which transmigrants, through their daily activities forge and sustain multi-stranded social, economic and political relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement and through which they create transnational fields that cross national borders (Basch et all 1994: 6).

But migrants' and their organizations' cross-border networks and connections do not necessarily have to be restricted to their homeland. Migrants and their organizations can participate in transnational advocacy networks, defined as binding actors 'who share values, discourses and dense exchanges of

information and services' (Keck and Sikkink 1999). Examples include cross-country or European federations of immigrant organizations, transnational networks and associations of highly skilled migrants or membership in larger networks of organizations that focus on religious membership, charity, or human rights issues (Ebaugh et al. 2002; Menjivar 1999).

Alongside these horizontal interactions that take place between civil society actors from several polities, there is a parallel process of vertical transnationalism that denotes cross-border interactions between migrants and political actors and institutions that are not located in their context of residence. The vertical transnational resources are framed and constrained by constellations of citizenships. A citizenship constellation is defined as 'a structure in which individuals are simultaneously linked to several political entities, so that their rights and duties are not determined only by one political authority, but by several.' (Baubock 2010, 848). In the particular case of EU migration, intra-EU migrants benefit from citizenship entitlements from their country of origin and the EU beyond the political opportunities they encounter in the countries of residence (Baubock 2010).

Related to home country citizenship entitlements, Itzigsohn (2000) identifies two sets of institutions that shape the transnational orientation of migrants and their organizations: the policies towards external citizens and the political parties of the country of origin. Sending states' policies range from cultural measures aimed at the preservation of the linguistic and cultural identity of the emigrated communities to the right to vote from abroad or special representation in homeland parliaments. In places with important emigrant communities, the political parties from the country of origin opened offices and branches in order to stay in touch with the external electorate (Levitt 2001). Kastoryano (2010) considers that a 'transnational nationalism' can also be witnessed. With this concept, the author seeks to grasp the way in which support

from the country of origin influences immigration claims and policies in the context of residence.

Another set of rights and political opportunities that are not bound to one political context only stem from European citizenship. These rights refer to the freedom of movement, residence and work in any country of the Union and the right to participate in local and European Parliament elections. European integration also set the scene for supranational articulation of interests of individuals and groups. Greenwood (2011) performs a comprehensive analysis of the representation of interests in the EU, showing the interplay between various national and cross-national organizations and initiatives and EU and national politics.

To summarize, transnational opportunities stem from cross-border practices with civil society actors located beyond the borders of the residence countries. Secondly, they are derived from membership and citizenship entitlements conferred by political communities such as the country of origin and the EU. There are two mechanisms through which transnational resources are linked to immigrants' processes of political incorporation: by increasing their visibility vis-à-vis host country political actors and by direct institutional relationships that arise between the political actors and institutions belonging to the same citizenship constellation. Although the mechanisms denote two separate analytical categories, they may occur simultaneously.

2.5.1 Political incorporation, visibility and transnational opportunities

Transnational opportunities boost immigrant groups' visibility (organizational infrastructure, leadership strength and/or level of political mobilization) in three ways. Transnational opportunities interact with group resources by contributing to the development of group members' civic and political

skills. Both individual- and group-level involvement in transnational networks and practices can develop skills and widen civic and political knowledge, which in turn may spill over into increased participation in the civic and political arena of the societies of residence (Levitt 2008; Pantoja 2005; Portes et al 2008). However, several studies question the significant positive effects of the interaction between group resources and transnational resources on migrants' political incorporation in the host societies. DeSipio (2012) finds that individual transnational engagement has limited impact on immigrants' involvement in host country (US) based organizations. As the author argues, the civic and political participation in both home and host countries is a question of 'political socialization' and 'political activism' in general, rather than an effect of transnationalism per se. Morales and Morariu (2011) arrive at a similar conclusion in a study related to the civic and political engagement of various groups of immigrants in ten European cities.

A second mechanism through which transnational opportunities are connected to immigrants' visibility in the county of residence is related to the direct financial and symbolic support that immigrant political entrepreneurs receive from cross-border networks or EU and home country institutions. Transnational organizations located both inside and outside the country of residence may offer direct assistance and support to their sister organizations formed by the immigrant community. International charity and religious organizations are such an example. Also, immigrant organizations can access funds and receive assistance at the EU level. Moreover, home country administrations can allocate special funds to emigrant associations in order to preserve their cultural and linguistic identity or to assist emigrants in situations of social exclusion. These activities contribute to a strengthening of both the organizational infrastructure and migrant political entrepreneurs' visibility and political capital vis-à-vis host country political actors. Through their external chapters, the political parties from the countries of origin may mobilize the migrant community in relation to host country, home country and/or EU

elections. This strategy has a direct effect on immigrants' level of political mobilization and on strengthening the civic visibility and political capital of the migrant political entrepreneurs involved in the process.

A third mechanism through which transnational opportunities increase immigrants' visibility in host country politics is through their potential 'boomerang effect'. Home country and supranational citizenship entitlements, as well as membership in cross-border networks, can have a 'boomerang effect', similar to the case of transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1999). The resources stemming from vertical and horizontal transnationalism can be used as pressure or lobby when institutions in the context of reception are not responsive or act unjustly. Migrant organizations and their leaders make use of a multi-layered institutional environment in order to pursue their goals and bring about policy changes (Kostakopoulou 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). In this case, when immigrants find the political environment of the host country to be non-responsive, they may activate the lobby and support of cross-border organizations or political actors from the home country and the EU. This, in turn, has a positive effect on their level of civic and political mobilization and on political entrepreneurs' level of visibility in relation to host country political institutions. To summarize,

> *H5a: The transnational structure of opportunities and networks offers immigrant groups resources that contribute to the strengthening of their organizational infrastructure and political mobilization. This, is turn, has a positive impact on their political incorporation in the residence context.*

2.5.2 Political incorporation and overlapping political structures

The lobby effect of transnational opportunities on immigrant incorporation outcomes does not necessarily have to occur in contentious situations. The case of Romanian and British migration to Spain is framed at the legal-normative level by a unique citizenship constellation. To that extent, there are constant and direct

exchanges between political actors from host country, EU and home country politics, which may foster policy changes in favour of intra-EU migrants. In this case, intra-EU migrants may obtain political incorporation outcomes as a consequence of the interactions between the institutions related to transnational resources (EU citizenship, host country citizenship) and the political institutions of the country of residence.

More specifically, there are 'nested' citizenship statuses between Spain, Romania, the UK, respectively, and the EU. Under these nested relations, Spain as the receiving context and Romania and the UK as states of origin devise horizontal relations, in which the opportunity structures related to Romanian and British residents overlap. The horizontal relations that develop between sending and receiving states outside the EU are qualitatively different from horizontal relations that take place between intra-EU migrants' state of origin and state of residence.

First, the EU contributes to the intensification of these horizontal relations through constant social, economic and political integration (Hix and Marsh 2007; Deutsch 1957). Second, the principle of representation in the European Parliament blurs the distinction between home country/host country constituency: according to article 22 of TFEU, intra-EU migrants are allowed to vote for MEP candidates in their host countries, but most EU member states allow their non-resident nationals to choose if they want to vote for homeland or country of residence EP candidates. In other words, the principle of supranational representation allows for both (but not concomitant) home country/host country links between mobile EU citizens and their representatives in the European parliament. Third, in recent years, the European Commission has started to get involved in defining and establishing common principles for the representation and participation of intra-EU migrants in their countries of origin (COM(2010)603).

The relations that arise between the overlapping citizenship statuses of mobile individuals also have institutional spillovers. Community law has

prevalence over national law. To that extent, it is likely that decisions taken by European institutions in areas that concern intra-EU migrants' rights in their countries of residence have direct effect on policies and measures affecting them. Also, countries of immigration and emigration may coordinate their policies in various areas that affect the migrant community. As Baubock (2010) explains, 'Within a citizenship constellation decisions taken by one state have external effects on other states' relations with populations linked to them through citizenship ties. Such externalities are obvious in the case of the EU where each country may produce under its own law citizens who enjoy the immigration right in other states' (p.849).

Another example of institutional spillovers may be observed in the case of political parties. Recent research documents the presence of political parties from countries of emigration in the residence context, campaigning for homeland elections or taking joint action with the political parties in the context of residence (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2013). It is therefore likely that where we find homeland political parties and immigrants' parliamentary representatives in the country of origin, they will contact the local institutions and political actors in order to obtain policy benefits for their constituents. All these nested and horizontal institutional ties have an impact on immigrants' incorporation in their host societies, by opening the possibility of policy changes in their favour.

It is worth noting that the two mechanisms through which transnational resources impact positively on immigrant incorporation processes (via increasing visibility or via direct exchanges in citizenship constellations) may occur simultaneously. In practice, the direct interactions between the country of residence and EU/host country political institutions reinforce the visibility mechanism. In other words, pre-existing contacts and interactions at the polity level increase immigrants' chances of becoming visible when activating

opportunities found at the transnational level. Taking into account this argument, it can be argued that

> *H5b: Transnational opportunities can increase migrants' level of political incorporation in host country politics through the direct relationships developed between transnational and home country political actors and institutions.*

2.6 Relations between pathways to incorporation

The multi-dimensional approach to political incorporation raises the question related to the relationship between the non-electoral and the electoral pathway. The question can be answered from two perspectives. From an agency-related perspective, becoming a 'migrant broker' may be an asset for immigrant organizational leaders, since it gives them visibility and political capital in the eyes of the host country party leaders, as well as knowledge and skills in the new political context. If the focus is group-level incorporation outcomes, the link between non-electoral and electoral inclusion is not necessarily straightforward (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2010). A migrant group may have a high number of visible and incorporated organizations and, at the same time, a low number of elected representatives.

The role of associational background for immigrant-origin politicians is a patchy topic in the literature related to political inclusion. Social network theories predict that associational leadership and membership bridge relations between immigrants and political actors in the context of residence (Putnam 1993; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Michon and Vermeulen 2013). Related to this is the rational recruiter argument: political recruiters want to spend their time and resources efficiently. One way of maximizing the recruitment strategy is to 'look close to home', i.e to people about whom the recruiter has information from close networks and acquaintances. Another maximization strategy is to select people with visible and relevant characteristics for political involvement, including

associational involvement and leadership (Brady et al 1999; Myrberg 2011). Non-electoral inclusion can therefore be an opportunity for immigrant leaders to become visible and access the power networks in their contexts of residence.

Empirical support for this claim is sparse in migration literature. Studies of the electoral incorporation in the US context show that political parties tend to co-opt visible and notable members of immigrant communities, for whom organizational/community involvement is an asset (Dahl 1961; Jones-Correa 1998). Nonetheless, evidence from European countries shows that the associational background being an asset for migrant leaders' electoral incorporation is dependent on context and group resources (Garbaye 2005; Michon and Vermeulen 2013). In other words, it constitutes an asset for some groups, but not necessarily for all.

As this study will further show, organizational leadership is a double-edged sword. It may offer skills and visibility, but at the same time it can constitute a reason for not incorporating associational leaders who did not 'perform' well or 'adapt' to the predominant pattern of politics in the context of reception. Migrant organization leaders may lack enough community support and legitimacy (Vertovec 1999) which in turn can affect their prestige among the local politicians. Non-electoral incorporation is context-bound and shaped by the institutional rules of the contexts of residence (Ireland 1994; Soysal 1994), a fact which entails that not all immigrant actors fully integrate into the political machinery. In this sense, access to more information about immigrant leaders can provide both positive and negative inputs for rational selectors and can actually deter them from co-opting such leaders. To that extent, the first argument related to the connection between the pathways is that

H6a: At the agency level, organizational leadership and non-electoral inclusion may constitute an asset, but it is not a necessary condition for electoral inclusion.

This observation leads to a question related to the connection between group-level incorporation outcomes. Here, two models can be opposed: the pluralist and the non-linear perspectives on incorporation. The basic idea of the pluralist model is that newcomers have a straight path towards integration, as it is in both their interests and those of the receiving polity (Dahl 1961). The first step in the process of incorporation of newcomers is their mobilization around ethnic politics. Thus, newcomers step into the political scene when they see themselves as a cohesive group, with a shared identity. In this process, ethnic brokers become spokespersons for immigrant interests and try to channel them into the political arena. On their part, local political parties will be interested in courting the immigrant elite, since it can bring a new wave of support from the new electorate, but it does not threaten the way local politics is made. Dahl (1961) also argues that ethnic politics is a transitional phase in the processes of incorporation. Once immigrants climb the socio-economic scale, their political interests will be less directed by their ethnic identity and more by their structural position in society.

The pluralist model starts from a set of presuppositions: that the system is liberal, open and equalitarian for all groups, and that newcomers have no rational reason for which they would remain outside the system (Rogers 2006; Minnite 2009). There are several elements of this model that are worth mentioning: a) that ethnic politics is just a temporary strategy through which immigrants get inside the power structures and b) that mobilization, participation, descriptive representation and substantive representation (capacity to influence the process of policy making) are the logical steps of incorporation. To that extent, we witness a linear process of incorporation that presupposes a longitudinal accumulation of assets as more presence, more representation and more influence over the years.

Having in mind the latest migration trajectories in Western societies and the new political and social challenges, Hochschild and Mollenkopf (2009a), argue that 'we should not assume a straightforward increase in the amount or direction of political involvement. Moreover, there is no linearity in the process of political incorporation as a whole' (ibid: 23). The episodes of the logic of incorporation follow more or less the same sequence as Dahl's proposal:

Entry into the host country --> (non)entry into the political arena --> (non)involvement into the political arena --> (non)responsiveness of and to the political system (ibid: 17).

The difference from the pluralist model is that exclusion mechanisms and contextual factors are key elements for the linearity of the model and the logical sequence of each episode. The process of migrant political incorporation is not necessarily complete, in the sense that it may stop at any stage, either because the opportunity structure impedes it, or because the migrants themselves chose to halt the process, as they may perceive themselves as temporary or they do not accept the norms of the receiving context. To that extent, a non-linear perspective on incorporation presupposes that it is not a 'stage' process, but rather a plurality of scenarios. Drawing on the non-linear perspective on incorporation, I propose the following hypothesis:

> *H6b: At the group level, higher levels of non-electoral incorporation does not necessarily entail higher levels of electoral incorporation.*

In sum, the non-electoral pathway does not necessarily set the scene for more electoral inclusion, although in some cases it may constitute an asset for migrant leaders. What actually determines how incorporation outcomes play out on the ground for various groups is the interaction between group resources and political opportunities.

2.7 Conclusions

This chapter has argued that political incorporation of groups is a multifaceted phenomenon shaped by the interaction of group resources and host country and transnational structures of opportunities. The model proposed complements previous research in the field of immigrant political incorporation by taking a closer look at how integration policies and political parties in the context of residence have a differential approach to immigrant groups on the basis of their socio-economic and cultural differences. This, in turn, is manifested in distinct pathways to political incorporation of immigrant groups. The model proposed also takes 'transnational opportunities seriously' and suggests how these may interact with the context of reception policies and institutions and increase groups' resources and influence in the policy process.

On a final note, it is important to highlight a series of considerations regarding the applicability of the model in multi-level political contexts, as is the case of Spain. The model proposed does not consider in detail the role of multi-level political institutions and policies as public administrations, political parties and integration policies in the context of reception. This is justified by two factors: a) the model is defined at a level of abstraction that allows it to be applied to any administrative and territorial context and b) the central goal of the dissertation is to understand and explain incorporation pathways of intra-EU migrants. This takes into consideration how distinct resources and political opportunities in the context of reception and at the transnational level play out on the ground in spite of the common unifying discourse of European citizenship. In consequence, the focus is not on explaining differences in the incorporation outputs of the two groups among localities or autonomous communities/regional entities. However, the quantitative analysis in Chapter VII takes inter-regional differences into account in order to offer a broad perspective of how these may influence Romanians and Britons' processes of political incorporation.

Regarding the level of abstraction, I consider that the main explanatory elements of the model (R*SO, R*TSO and SO*TSO) may occur at any level of politics and administrative-territorial demarcations. As Chapter V shows, national, regional and local integration policies tend to classify and give differential/preferential support to immigrant groups on the basis of their socio-economic characteristics. It is, nonetheless, the national integration policy that sets the general framework of the demarcation between who is an immigrant and how immigrants' socio-economic inequalities should be tackled. Political parties' behaviour and their consideration of how to include positively perceived/negatively perceived groups is another feature that does not depend on their level of organization. In relation to the transnational structure of opportunities, it may be used as an asset at both the local and the national level of politics, depending on where immigrants want to push for policy changes and influences. As well, the institutional spillovers related to the nested/horizontal structure of the opportunity structures in the context of residence, at the supranational level and in home countries can take place between actors and institutions at any level of politics.

Nonetheless, the empirical analysis does not underscore the role of subnational political actors in shaping the incorporation venues of the two groups and does not deny that there is variation between political actors' behaviour and attitudes, institutions and policies at the locality level and regional level. As it will be further observed, the empirical analysis does take into account the three-level structure - local/regional/national - when discussing integration policies and political party strategies. Yet, I consider that the functioning logic behind these entities in what regards political incorporation outcomes is captured by the model presented independently of the political-territorial level at which they operate. The following empirical chapters offer an operationalization of the main variables discussed in this chapter, as well as a contextualization and discussion of the hypotheses proposed in relation to the two cases studied.

CHAPTER THREE

Methodology

This chapter provides a methodological overview of the research developed in this dissertation. Apart from the general considerations presented here, each empirical chapter (Chapters VI-IX) includes a brief methodological discussion that introduces the research in question. The combination of a broad perspective of the methodology deployed with chapter-specific methodological discussions is motivated by the mixed methods approach. The thesis uses qualitative and quantitative methods in order to study the political incorporation of Romanian and British citizens in Spain. This approach has the added value of providing both a general perspective and an in-depth study of the mechanisms of political inclusion. However, one challenge posed by a mixed method/multimethod approach is that it uses diverse sample sizes and data treatment in each segment of the research. It is for this reason that each chapter clarifies briefly how the specific topic addressed has been approached methodologically. In the following, I discuss the motivation behind the selection of cases, the sampling strategies and the data sources.

3.1 Case selection

3.1.1 The groups

The central puzzle of the dissertation is to understand the mechanisms through which the diverse landscape of European mobility configures the political dimension of Union citizenship. As already stated in the introductory chapter, the purpose of the analysis is to adopt a contextual approach of the process of political incorporation, and not to make a matched comparison of group incorporation (Locke and Thelen 1995). A contextual comparison places at the

heart of the analysis the differences between cases. It seeks to unveil how group differences interact with general laws, principles or institutional changes (for an applied discussion to labour research see Locke and Thelen 1995: 339ff). The advantage of this approach is that it reveals how general norms and institutional arrangements (i.e Union citizenship) are not translated into practice equally, but are mediated by various institutional settings and typologies of mobility.

The focus on British and Romanian residents in Spain is therefore motivated by two considerations: first, they are part of the old and the new Europe, reflecting the diversity of the present-day EU, and second, they are the two most numerous groups of resident Europeans respectively. Group size is relevant, as it constitutes one of the primary variables that influence the level of political representation and influence. At the same time, the fact that the Romanians and the Britons are numerous immigrant populations allows us to focus on other variables in addition to their numeric and spatial concentration. But despite sharing the common status of European citizenship, Romanians and Britons are different in what regards their migration typology and group resources. By controlling for the context of research, the analysis reveals how these differences play out in the incorporation scenarios.

The groups are representative of two common types of European mobility: North-South lifestyle (retirement) migration and East-West labour migration. The British and other EU15 migrants live in the same area (residential areas along the Valencian and Malaga coasts) and are organized in 'European' associations or local parties that do not create national boundaries. Instead, the Romanian communities do not share residence areas or civic and political organizations with other Eastern Europeans. Factors such as group size and language barriers contribute to this difference. At the end of 2011 there were approximately 400,000 British living in Spain, 200,000 Germans, 180,000 Italians and 120,000 French (INE 2011). As for resident Eastern Europeans, at the end of 2011 there

were 880,000 registered Romanians, followed by 172,000 Bulgarians and 90,000 Poles.

The large disparities in group sizes in the case of the Easterners and their scattered residential patterns contribute to a much smaller probability that these immigrant groups reside in the same areas and find common spaces to meet. It is important to signal, in consequence, that Britons' processes of political mobilization and incorporation are representative of the group of EU15 migrants in Spain (Janoschka 2008, 2010). Moreover, the British in Spain rely on group resources that come from the whole community of EU15 migrants. Romanians, instead, do not share common civic and political goals with the other EU12 migrants. To date, there is no study related to the processes of political inclusion of Bulgarian or Polish immigrants, which would make it possible to pinpoint synergies with or differences from the Romanian case. However, for a better comparability I 'isolated' the group of British immigrants from the other EU15 residents, in the sense that I interviewed organizations in which the majority of members are British, as well as candidates and representatives who have British citizenship.

It is important to state that Romanians and Britons in Spain are not homogeneous groups in practice. The thesis approaches the two groups according to a series of general trends and aggregate figures, trading off the intra-group diversity for the sake of analytical clarity. Nonetheless, as the research employs both quantitative and qualitative research tools, it goes beyond these general categorizations and provides a more in-depth description and understanding of the political incorporation phenomenon.

3.1.2 The research context

Spain is a relevant context for the study of the practice of European citizenship, as it hosts one of the largest communities of Europeans among the

member states, being at the same time the second European country in terms of share of foreign-born residents. Besides the numerical dimension, another important characteristic is related to the diversity of immigrant communities. Thus, the shares of non-EU, EU15 and EU12 immigrants are relatively equal, a fact which allows a better contextualization of the various incorporation scenarios that may take place. Also, Spain did not experience only an exponential increase of the foreign-born population, but also a political and societal adaptation to the issue of diversity. In this sense, Spain has evolved from being a new immigration country in the nineties (Cornelius 1996) to taking for granted the ethnic and national diversity of its population (PECI 2011-2014).

Setting the research in Spain also allows for a better understanding of the political incorporation phenomenon and contributes to previous scholarship from at least two perspectives. First, the Spanish institutional structures offer opportunities for both electoral and non-electoral incorporation of non-citizen residents in the political process. Apart from the implementation of local voting rights for community nationals in 1999 and the extension of franchise for local elections to certain non-EU groups in 2010, Spanish administrations also devised participatory and deliberative councils and forums, which allow representatives of the immigrant communities to take part in the policy process. Second, the Spanish electoral system is proportional and based on a closed list. To that extent, the political parties have a strong influence on immigrants' access to political office and tight control over the electoral and political process. From this perspective, the study complements previous researched focused mainly on the political incorporation of immigrants in SMD or open list PR electoral systems (Saalfeld et al 2010; Bird 2011; Togeby 2007; Maxwell 2012).

3.2 Research design and methods

The dissertation uses a multimethod approach by combining qualitative and quantitative strategies for the analysis and interpretation of data. Qualitative and quantitative methodologies have been considered two separate paradigms in social sciences due to distinct epistemological presumptions (Morgan 2007). Yet, a growing number of researchers acknowledge the advantages brought by a mixed methods research design, in which the 'rigorous' but often 'superficial' quantitative perspective is complemented by a more in-depth and evocative qualitative analysis. These advantages for using a mixed methodology are complemented by several challenges. The triangulation of data collected through diverse methodologies is often difficult, due to the inherent differences in the nature of data, which do not necessarily answer a common research question (Manson 2006).

There are various definitions of the mixed methods approach. The broadest is related to the rigorous combination of both methods and the subsequent triangulation of the results.

> 'Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative approaches (e.g., use of Qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the purpose of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration.' (Johnson et. al 2007)

The combination of quantitative and qualitative methodology can be made by ordering them sequentially, merging them or embedding one within the other (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011). Additionally, this threefold combination may vary in terms of relative priority of one methodology, the timing of their application and the point at which they are mixed (during interpretation, data analysis or data collection). The mixed methods designs can be fixed or emergent. Fixed designs are those in which the use of both methods is predetermined and planned at the beginning of the research process. An emergent mixed methods

approach occurs when the combination of methods arises due to issues that develop during the process of conducting research (idem: 55).

Regarding the various combinations of research strategies, in a sequential approach the two methods are implemented sequentially. In an explanatory sequential design, qualitative findings are used in order to help interpret and contextualize previous quantitative results. In an exploratory sequential design, the qualitative strand is considered exploratory and it is followed by further testing and verification through a quantitative phase (Morgan 1998; Bryman 2006; Creswell and Plano Clark 2011). In the convergent parallel design, the quantitative and qualitative methodologies are used in order to form a more complete understanding of the topic. They are conducted separately and merged at the point of interpretation. In the embedded design, the researcher may include a qualitative strand in a quantitative study or vice-versa, in order to enhance the overall analysis (Creswell and Palo Clark:72). The transformative design presupposes a transformative theoretical framework, using both methods. And lastly, the multiphase design combines both sequential and concurrent strategies over a period of time.

This thesis employs an emergent embedded design with the qualitative approach as the main research strategy. The analysis is centred on the comparison of two groups in one context. While these groups are illustrative of the diverse landscape of European mobility, they are not necessarily representative of all forms of intra-EU migration. To that extent, the findings of this research cannot be generalized to the whole population. Moreover, the phenomenon studied (non-electoral and electoral pathways to incorporation) requires distinct data sources and collection strategies, which are not equally available. More specifically, while I was able to identify a large number of Romanian and British candidates and representatives after the 2011 local elections, there is no reliable source for having an accurate overview of Romanian and British organizations in Spain. For this reason, the study of the non-electoral

pathway to incorporation is based on a qualitative approach that could not be complemented by a rigorous quantitative analysis. The impossibility to collect accurate data for the two venues of political incorporation is what also explains the *embedded* character of the combination of methods. The quantitative analysis is included only in one stage of the research (the electoral pathway), while for the analysis of the non-electoral venue and of the connection between the non-electoral and electoral pathways to incorporation I mainly use a qualitative focus.

There are several reasons explaining the *emergent* character of the mixed methodology used in this dissertation. The initial research design focused on contrasting the limited level of incorporation of the Romanian residents in Spain (mainly non-electoral incorporation of organizations) to Britons' successful trajectory to local power, both through non-electoral and electoral venues. This is due to the fact that before 2011, the electoral venue to incorporation was mostly absent in the case of Romanian migration in Spain. The previous local elections, which took place in May 2007, did not leave much time for an approach between the Romanian political entrepreneurs and Spanish political parties. Yet, the 2011 local elections opened new windows of opportunity and almost one hundred Romanians became nominated. Although it involved a laborious process of data collection during four months, I was able to include a quantitative perspective in comparing Romanians' and Britons' access to local politics, which would complement and enrich the qualitative findings grasped through semi-structured interviews in a limited number of localities. Moreover, after the completion of the dataset, with data from almost 1,000 Spanish localities, I revised the sampling strategy used and conducted further fieldwork in both the Romanian and British cases.

The purpose of the embedded design used for the study of the electoral pathway to incorporation is to bring a perspective which complements the agency perspective on nomination and representation processes. More specifically, the introduction of the quantitative strand is meant to offer a contextual perspective

on electoral incorporation, i.e. how factors such as electoral competition, ethnic diversity and migrant political mobilization influence the electoral incorporation of the two groups selected. The qualitative design focuses on the perceptions and strategies of the main stakeholders, such as migrant political entrepreneurs and Spanish political actors, and unravels the mechanisms through which these interactions led to incorporation.

As Creswell and Palo Clarck (2011) explain, the complementarity of the methods used distinguishes an embedded design from a convergent one, where the researcher uses both methods to answer an overarching question. In this dissertation, there are two complementary questions that seek to explain and understand the same phenomenon: a) how do political-contextual factors play out in the processes of electoral incorporation of the groups selected and b) how do immigrant and Spanish political actors interact with and shape Britons' and Romanians' electoral incorporation. In consequence, there are two sets of dependent variables that are operationalized and measured according to the two research logics. Their joint discussion offers the advantage of having a broad, context-related viewpoint and a narrow, but in-depth perspective on the same phenomenon.

3.3 Sampling strategy

The primary sampling units are Spanish localities with more than five per cent Romanian and more than five per cent British residents, respectively, at the beginning of 2010. The rationale behind this strategy is that in order to observe dynamics and interactions between immigrants and political actors, processes and policies, the study should start from an integrated perspective on the context. The subunits observed at the locality level are Romanian and British organizations, Romanian and British candidates and elected representatives, local political parties and administrations. Out of 8,114 Spanish municipalities, I

generated a sample of 636 municipalities (hereinafter referred to as the Romanian residents sample), which include a total number of 270,189 Romanian migrants (out of 806,716 at the level of all Spanish municipalities). In the case of the Britons, there are 236 localities (hereinafter referred to as the British residents sample), with a total British population of 244,881 (out of 369,006 British residents in Spain).

The five per cent threshold is based on various scholarly sources, according to which a migrant group becomes a relevant group in a locality when it reaches nine per cent of the total population (Bird 2003). This threshold cannot escape several critiques, due to the fact that most thresholds imply an element of arbitrariness. However, as the general intention of this study is to observe how the processes of inclusion take place in localities with Romanian and British residents, I consider that five per cent is an adequate percentage, also because it captures localities that are below the nine per cent relevant group level.

These datasets provide information on the existence/non-existence of Romanian and British candidates and representatives at the 2011 local elections and on their political affiliation. The dataset includes dummy variables about British and Romanian organizations for each locality, with the caveat that the data is not accurate. In relation to the contextual variables, the datasets contain information on the size of each locality, the dimension of the immigrant community and of each of the groups studied, as well as their level of registration in the electoral census previous to the 2011 elections. The sources are the National Institute of Statistics and the Ministry of the Interior.

For the general overview of the Romanian and British organizations and federations in Spain, I use official data offered by the Romanian embassy and the Spanish Ministry of the Interior, respectively. However, this data is limited, in the sense that not all associations are officially registered. This is especially true for the case of the British and European residents' clubs. The National register contains around 60 registered organizations that contain the words 'British',

'britanico', 'European residents', 'residentes europeos', while an expat newspaper lists around 70 clubs for British and European expats only around the Costa del Sol. One important note is that several Romanian associations can be found in province capitals, although they claim to cover a larger area than the town or city where they are based. These localities have not been captured in the Romanian residents dataset, as their Romanian population is smaller than five per cent. Nonetheless, in order to account for the numeric and territorial patterns of the registered organizations of each group, I use the original sources (Romanian embassy and Spanish Ministry of Interior respectively).

The data regarding British and Romanian candidacies are taken from the provincial bulletins of April 20th 2011, in which each local government had to make public the party lists that would compete at the local elections of May 22nd 2011. I subsequently identified the British and the Romanian names on the candidacy lists. From the pool of localities with British and Romanian candidates, I checked which candidates got elected on the page of the Ministry of the Interior. Several scholars (da Fonseca 2011; Togeby 2008) have used the name recognition technique to identify candidates from specific groups, although it is not perfectly accurate. Nonetheless, I consider the error margin to be extremely low. The Romanian names and surnames are visibly distinguishable from a list of mostly Spanish names. As for British names, the risk that they could be confounded with American, Australian, or Canadian names is low, as the number of naturalized citizens of these nationalities in Spain is extremely low. To that extent, I assume that their presence on the party lists is virtually equal to zero.

The question of how the non-electoral and electoral pathways to politics are intertwined requires an in-depth analysis that seeks to unveil the processes and mechanisms through which the Romanian and British organizations and political entrepreneurs gain access to the political arena in Spain. In order to frame the qualitative research, the process of selection of the sites was developed in two steps: a) the selection of the autonomous communities as the broad

research context and b) the selection of the research sites in which the in-depth analysis is conducted.

As several authors have argued (Saez and Tamaso 2001; Diez-Nicolas 2004; Garcia 2006; Subirats 1998), the regional and local levels are central dimensions of the social and political forms of citizenship and integration of newcomers. The decentralization of the integration policies, as well as the recognition of political rights only in local elections, increases the visibility and the impact of the local and regional administrations in relation to the migrant civic and political actors.

The logic for delimitating the regional boundaries of the qualitative research is motivated mainly by the numeric criterion, in terms of organizations and candidacies in the 2011 local elections. To that extent, regions with a denser network of associations and candidacies maximize the diversity of the observational units and offer a better understanding of the incorporation processes. The weak point of this criterion is representativity, since these autonomous communities are not necessarily representative of the larger Spanish sample. In any case, as the general goal of qualitative analysis in the thesis is to provide a better understanding of the process and not to assure territorial representativity, I consider that maximizing the diversity of observations better fulfils this aim.

In the Romanian case, the Community of Madrid hosts the largest Romanian community in Spain. The largest number of organizations (56) and candidacies (22) can also be found in the capital region. Following the same criterion, the selected region for conducting the research related to the British group is the Valencian Community. It hosts the largest number of British candidates (89 candidates in 62 localities), British elected councillors (32 in 22 localities) and, according to the data available, British organizations (40).

The second step for framing the qualitative analysis is related to the selection of research sites in each of the autonomous communities named above. I use cluster analysis in order to group the observations in each of the abovementioned autonomous communities. The predictors used as the input variables are related to the size of the locality, the size of the British and Romanian community, respectively, as well as their share of the local electorate. The underlying assumption of these criteria is that both the dimension of the immigrant communities and their level of electoral mobilization are influential in the process of incorporation. Also, the level of urbanization matters in terms of local integration policies and participatory spaces set up by each local government.

Through a hierarchical cluster analysis using the Ward method, the localities with Romanian candidates in the Madrid sample have been clustered into five large groups (Table 3.1). The first two clusters are similar in terms of population and percentage of Romanians, but differ in what regards their proportion of voters registered in the electoral census. What distinguishes the first cluster is a relatively low percentage of Romanians and a low share in the municipal census (1%). The third and fourth clusters are characterized on average by a higher percentage of Romanian residents but differ again in what regards their level of electoral mobilization. The fifth cluster is comprised of the largest localities in the sample, with more than 90,000 inhabitants and a relatively high proportion of Romanians.

Table 3.1. Clusters of localities in the Community of Madrid

Cluster	***Mean total population***	***Mean % Romanian inhabitants***	***Mean %Romanian electors***
1	7,073	0.07	0.01
2	4,536	0.09	0.04
3	10,472	0.14	0.02
4	10,256	0.18	0.08
5	122,758	0.10	0.02

In the third step, I select a locality in each cluster, on the basis that it has both a Romanian candidate and an organization. The selection does not seek to explain differences in incorporation outputs across localities, and, to that extent, I have only included those that maximize the possibility to understand the dynamics that explain the non-electoral and electoral pathways to incorporation. The localities selected for the qualitative study are presented in Table 3.2. Coslada is included in the analysis because it hosts a large Romanian community and a relatively high number of organizations, although it did not have any Romanian candidate at the local elections.

Table 3.2 Localities in the Community of Madrid and the corresponding clusters.

Locality	*Nuevo Baztan*	*Brunete*	*San Fernando*	*Arganda del Rey*	*Coslada*	*Alcala de Henares*
Romanian candidate	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Romanian representative	No	No	No	No	No	No
Romanian organization	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population	6,295	9,967	41,480	54,220	91,832	203,686
Romanians out of total population	9%	10%	12%	19%	13%	9%
%Romanians in the census	2%	4%	2%	8%	2%	2%
Registered Romanians out of total no. Romanians	11%	27%	8%	26%	7%	12%
Cluster	1	2	3	4	5	5

Following a similar strategy of selection, the localities with British candidates in the Valencia community have been clustered into three groups. As

Table 3.3 shows, clusters one and two are similar in terms of number of inhabitants (albeit with large deviations from the mean), but distinct in what concerns the percentage of British residents and British registered voters. Cluster three is composed of the large towns of the sample (Orihuela, Benidorm and Torrevieja), characterized by a relatively low percentage of British residents and registered electors in relation to the native population.

Table 3.3. Clusters of localities in the Valencian Community

Cluster	***Mean total population***	***Mean %British residents***	***Mean %British electors***
1	4,446	0.14	0.08
2	4,995	0.40	0.32
3	86,467	0.13	0.06

As in the Romanian case, the localities have been selected based on the existence of candidates/elected representatives and British/expat associations. Due to the small number of clusters, I selected around three localities for clusters one and two. Javea and Benissa have been included due to the fact that two important associations are based in these coastal towns. The main demographic characteristics of these localities are presented in the table below.

Table 3.4. Localities in the Valencian Community and the corresponding clusters.

Locality	*Parcent*	*Alcalali*	*Benit*	*Teulada*	*Benissa*	*Calpe*	*Javea*	*Orijuela*
British candidate	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
British representative	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Expat association	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population	1,000	1,560	5,488	14,788	15,254	29,909	31,909	87,113
%British residents	24%	43%	38%	26%	13%	14%	25%	19%
% British in the census	21%	38%	33%	26%	11%	13%	17%	7%
Registered British	65%	52%	42%	52%	52%	40%	34%	20%
Cluster	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	3

3.4 Data collection

The analysis uses primary and secondary sources. Regarding the primary sources, I analyze semi-structured interviews, official statistics, surveys and written media. The fieldwork related to the Romanian community in Madrid took place in various rounds between 2009 and 2012. I conducted over 40 interviews

with Romanian organizational leaders (immigrant associations and churches) and party candidates, as well as with Spanish local politicians and public servants in each of the localities selected. I also interviewed the two Romanian federations that are based in Madrid, but operate at a national level (see Annex).

As previous research finds, not all officially registered associations are active (Moarles et al 2010; Aparicio 2010). In the localities selected, I first contacted the associations that appeared on the Romanian embassy list. I further interviewed those that had a valid phone number and agreed to be interviewed. The response rate of the active associations was of 80 per cent.

The fieldwork for the British case took place in the summer of 2010, in the abovementioned localities from the three clusters. It consists of 30 interviews with the British candidates and local councillors, British associations and Spanish political actors from local parties and city halls. The interviews were updated after the 2011 local elections, with phone conversations with the interviewees and local press analysis (see Annex).

As opposed to the Romanian case, several expat associations actually existed without being registered. In order to contact them, I used the snowball technique. I asked the interviewees in one locality to tell me about the local organizational landscape and to name the British associations and clubs they know. When I identified new names, I noted down their addresses and contacts. In most cases, the British interviewees were happy to give them.

The information provided in the interviews has been complemented with press analysis, campaign documents, city hall websites and local plenary sessions. The media is a rich source of information regarding the strategies and claims made by immigrant political entrepreneurs and Spanish political actors. I searched and classified the information appearing in the national and regional media between 2008-2011 in relation to the British and Romanian communities in Spain. I used the search words 'inmigrantes rumanos' and 'residentes

británicos' respectively in the search engine of the Factiva database. I explored all news related to political parties, electoral campaigns and immigrants in *El País*, *El Mundo*, *El Periodico*, *El Periodico Mediteraneo, Las Provincias, Diario de la Información, Puerta de Madrid, ABC, Puerta de Alcalá* for three months before each local election since 2003 onwards. I also analysed immigrant newspapers (*Noi in Spania*, *Romanul* for the Romanian case, and *Costa Blanca News*, for the British case) published during the six month previous to the local elections of 2011. I have also googled the name of each research site selected plus a relevant concept such as '(rumanos) rumanos' and '(residents) británicos/British residents' respectively.

For the description of group-related factors, I use the National Immigration Survey (ENI 2007) of 2007 and the Romanian Communities in Spain Survey 2007 (CRS 2007), conducted by Open Society foundation Romania. These surveys helped me construct the indicators related to the socio-economic status and occupational patterns of the two groups. I also use extensively the data available at the National Institute of Statistics and on the webpage of the Spanish Ministry of Work and Social Security. Upon request, I also had access to the database of foreign-born elected councillors serving in the interval between 1999 and 2007, compiled by the Ministry of Territorial Politics at the end of 2009. The data on attitudes towards the Romanian and British communities in Spain was obtained from three CIS surveys (2817/2009; 2846/2010; 2918/2011).

The description and analysis of the two main components of the Spanish political opportunity structure (government policies and political parties) is based on primary and secondary sources. Among the primary sources there are policy documents available on Spanish government websites, interviews with public servants and party leaders, as well as press analyses. The variable related to the transnational structure of opportunities is constructed upon primary and secondary sources. As primary sources, I refer to European treaties and external policies in the UK and Romania. Another important source are representatives of

Romanian and British political parties who relate to the emigrated communities in Spain.

3.5 Final reflections

One of the main challenges of studying political incorporation is its multidimensionality. Presence and representation in elected and non-elected political bodies are relatively easy to identify, especially in relation to foreign-born citizens, who usually differ in what regards their names, colour or appearance. Nonetheless, the study of their activities and capacity of influence is less straightforward. Scholars like Woods (1998), for example, talk about the difficulty to grasp the 'backstage exercise of power'. This entails that, apart from the formal dynamics that can be seen in the media, on institutional info pages or reported by interviewees themselves, the researcher has the difficult task of getting access to the 'back regions' of individual interactions. Many times, these interactions are discrete and take place away from the public eye.

I often had the feeling that the interviewees would refrain from reflecting on their influence. This was also the case of Spanish political actors who were supposed to weigh how much influence certain leaders have. Interestingly, though, I observed that the question of influence and how things 'actually happen' was more of a secretive issue for Romanians than for the British. The former had the feeling that politics should be all transparent (at least in Spain) and that they would reveal important information about which it is better not to talk. The British instead, as it will be seen in the empirical analysis, did not mind 'speaking their minds'. This is especially true in what concerns corruption and lack of democratic practices among Spanish politicians. Due to the fact that an important part of understanding influence relies on actors' perceptions and their willingness to communicate them, the analysis cannot ensure a perfectly accurate measurement of the concept.

CHAPTER FOUR

British and Romanian migration to Spain

British and Romanian migrants in Spain represent two distinct realities of the practice of European citizenship. The subsequent analysis focuses on the migration typologies and the social, economic and political resources that the Romanian and British residents in Spain rely on. The description of socio-economic and political indicators is relevant for the analyses of the following chapters. Although the transnational structure of opportunities constitutes a different category of factors, the chapter offers a succinct presentation of two main types of transnational resources that both the Britons and the Romanians 'bring' with them once they settle in Spain: the supranational and external citizenship rights and entitlements. Consequently, the role of this chapter is to set the scene for chapters VI-IX, which give an account of how these resources interplay in the various incorporation scenarios.

The comparison of the two groups is contextualized in relation to the Spanish residents. Most of the social, economic and political dimensions discussed further will take into account the averages for Spaniards. The analysis aims at grasping not only how the British and Romanian migrants in Spain differ in terms of socio-economic, cultural and transnational resources. It also intends to situate these differences in relation to the host society. Also, the chapter briefly introduces the overall migration characteristics and trends in the past decades in Spain.

4.1 Migration trends in Spain

In comparison to other European states, Spain has a short immigration history, undergoing the transformation from emigration country to immigration

country in less than a decade (Cornelius 2004; Zapata-Barrero 2010). Thus, if in 1995 there were half a million foreign born residents, the figure doubled by 2000 and multiplied tenfold by 2010 (Figure 4.1). In 2011 Spain became the second EU country by share of non-citizen residents (12 per cent of the total). In absolute numbers, only Germany has more foreign-born residents than Spain (Eurostat 129/2010).

Figure 4.1. Number of foreign legal residents in Spain, 2000-2010. Source: INE



Several factors account for the steep increase in the number of foreign-born residents. Constant economic development until the 2008 financial crisis determined a growing demand for a cheap and flexible workforce in sectors like construction, tourism and agriculture. A second factor is related to the complex system of short term labour contracts and residence permits that generated a stock of in and out 'legal' immigrants (Calavita and Suarez 2003; Cornelius et al 1994). It is for this reason that unofficial estimations raise the number of illegal immigrants to almost one million during the decade of the 2000s (Díez-Nicolas 2005).

The growth of the foreign-born population occurred in parallel to the diversification of the immigrant communities in terms of migration typology, areas of origin, religion and socio-economic characteristics. Up until the decade of

the nineties, the vast majority of foreign-born residents came from Western European countries (see Table 4.1 for the most numerous nationalities in 1996 and 2011). Most of these immigrants moved to Spain for lifestyle reasons and bough properties along the Mediterranean coast and the islands. The immigrant communities diversified with the arrival of North Africans (especially Moroccans), Latin Americans and East Europeans. These immigrants came mainly for economic rationales and got incorporated in the low paid economic sectors in demand for cheap (and often illegal) labour. In 2011 roughly 43 per cent of the foreign-born residents were EU citizens, followed by Latin Americans and Moroccans.

Table 4.1 Foreign-born residents by country of origin in 2011 and 1996. Source: INE

Rank	***Country of origin 2011***	***No. in thousands 2011***	***Country of origin 1996***	***No. in thousands 1996***
1	Romania	809	Morocco	81
2	Morocco	766	United Kingdom	65
3	Ecuador	478	Germany	50
4	United Kingdom	392	Portugal	28
5	Colombia	372	France	26
6	Peru	197	Argentina	19
7	Bulgaria	165	The Netherlands	13
8	China	160	Dominican Republic	13
9	Portugal	146	Italy	12
10	Italy	98	Belgium	10

All autonomous communities and provinces in Spain host immigrant populations, but Catalonia, The Community of Madrid and the Valencian Community rank first in terms of foreign-born residents; almost 30 per cent of the non-EU immigrants reside in Catalonia, while most of the EU27 residents are concentrated in the Community of Madrid and the Valencian Community. In terms of residence type, 63 per cent of the third country nationals have permanent residence permit, while the rest of them are short-term residents.

4.2 British and Romanian migration in Spain

4.2.1 The British residents in Spain

British migration to Spain can be subsumed to the larger trend of lifestyle migration. Benson and O'Reilly (2009) define the concept as the relocation of people within the developed world searching for a better way of life. The authors argue that lifestyle motivations are present in other historical instances of the migratory phenomenon. Nonetheless, its contemporary forms are related to the relative economic affluence of the developed world, the globalization process and fewer barriers to the freedom of movement within the Western region.

The international mobility of early (and older) retirees is a special category of lifestyle migration and it has been extensively studied especially in relation to intra-European North-South migration (Casado-Diaz et al. 2004; Casado-Diaz 2006; Huber and O'Reilly 2004; King et al 2000; Oliver 2008; O'Reilly 2000;). As pensioners constitute a large fraction of British mobility to the Mediterranean, several researchers characterise migration between the UK and Spain as 'retirement migration' (Gustafson 2002; King et al 1998, 2000). Nonetheless, O'Reilly (2007) shows that there is a large diversity in terms of age cohorts and socio-economic characteristics of the British in Spain, especially in some areas. This diversification is also a consequence of previous waves of migrated pensioners who bought a second home on the Spanish coast, a phenomenon that lead to the multiplication of ethnic businesses and services that support this trend.

Although British migration to Spain cannot be reduced to retirement migration, this latter concept is suitable for describing the general characteristics and trends of the phenomenon. Moreover, British retirees are the dominant group among foreign-born residents and local politicians in the research sites selected for this dissertation. To that extent, the theoretical insights related to the

characteristics of retirement migration are relevant for a better understanding of the phenomenon being studied here.

The British and other West Europeans started migrating to Spain in the late sixties, but the 'mass movement' intensified during the nineties. Many retirees bought properties on the Andalusian and the Valencian coasts, initially as a 'second home' that is used during holidays. King et al (2000) consider that there are several categories of British property owners in the Mediterranean: the full residents, the returning residents who spend the summer time in the UK, the seasonal visitors who come only for a few months a year, and the peripatetic tourists who chose Spain as a frequent holiday destination. For many regular tourists, the Mediterranean properties became their permanent residences, especially after the owners retired (Gonzalez-Enriquez 2008).

Relying on the official Spanish census, Figure 4.2 displays the migration trends of British residents over the last decade. Their number increased four times in the past ten years, reaching almost 400,000 residents in 2011. UK media and policy sources estimate that the number of British residents in Spain is actually larger than 800,000 (BBC 2010; Finch et al 2010). A set of structural factors such as increased life expectancy, material affluence, removal of barriers for mobility and property holding in the EU explain to a large degree the rise of the phenomenon. Sociologists argue that the development of taste for touristic places and their transformation into lifestyle alternatives are the main determinants of retirement migration (Casado-Diaz 2006; Casado-Diaz et al 2004; King et al 2000). An important element that acts as a 'pull' factor from the Spanish side is related to housing developments on the coastal areas and the real estate market established around them (Casado-Diaz et al 2004).

Figure 4.2. Number of registered British residents in Spain between 2002-2011. Source: INE



In the narratives related to life-style migration, people construct idyllic images of the Mediterranean, with its rich cuisine, sunny places and slow pace. On their part, mass media advertising and reporting about these places enforce the reproduction of the phenomenon (O'Reilly 2000). As Casado-Diaz et al (2004) show through a survey conducted in 2002, Britons' main motivations for moving to the Spanish coasts are related to the mild climate, Mediterranean lifestyle and cheaper living conditions. Disenchantment with home societies, seen as hosting too much diversity, urbanization and crime is another reason emphasized by British respondents.

But in spite of aggregate numbers that indicate higher socio-economic levels of British residents in comparison to the Spanish nationals and other immigrant groups, O'Reilly (2007) is surprised by their level of exclusion along various dimensions. The author shows that a segment of the British in Spain lack social connections, have the inability to speak Spanish, live in poor social conditions, are unemployed or in irregular situations. This reality is especially

characteristic of British immigrants with a working class background who moved to Spain in order to open local businesses and services. Gustafson (2008) finds that one of the main reasons of exclusion is related to their refusal to register as residents in Spain in order to avoid double taxation. The author further argues that this is the reason why official Spanish data does not coincide with the numbers given by UK media sources and statistics.

Table 4.2. Number of British residents and percentages of total population and total immigrant population respectively by autonomous community in 2011. Source: INE

Autonomous Community	***Number of British residents***	***% of total population***	***% of foreign-born***
Total Spain	392,852	0.83	5.88
Valencian Community	141,833	2.77	14.73
Andalusia	114,692	1.36	13.72
Canary Islands	41,395	1.95	10.54
Balearic Islands	23,606	2.12	8.72
Murcia Region	22,891	1.56	9.17
Catalonia	20,542	0.27	1.55
Community of Madrid	12,932	0.20	1.02
Galicia	6,315	0.23	2.87
Basque Country	1,914	0.09	1.09
Castile - La Mancha	1,249	0.06	0.51
Castile and Leon	1,234	0.05	060
Asturias	1,061	0.10	139
Aragon	972	0.07	0.53
Cantabria	657	0.11	1.29
Extremadura	614	0.06	1.23
Navarra	572	0.09	0.64
La Rioja	219	0.07	0.45
Melilla	92	0.12	0.51
Ceuta	62	0.08	0.68

The spatial distribution of British migrants is uneven across Spanish autonomous communities. As already anticipated, 90 per cent of the British reside in coastal areas and the islands (Table 4.2). British residents' share of the total number of inhabitants in these areas does not reach three per cent, but they make up more than the 10 per cent of immigrant residents in the Canary Islands, Andalusia and the Valencian Community. Reducing the territorial scale to the province level, 60 per cent of the Britons in Andalusia reside in the Malaga

province, while 90 per cent of those who live in the Valencian Community are concentrated in the Alicante province. Thus, they make up four per cent of Malaga County's total population and 20 per cent of the total number of foreigners. In Alicante County, the numbers are similar. Britons make up around six per cent of the total population and more than one quarter of the total number of foreigners. There are 50 municipalities in the Malaga and Alicante provinces where the number of Britons exceeds 20 per cent of the total population.

4.2.2 The Romanian residents in Spain

In contrast to the lifestyle-motivated British migration, Romanian migration to the EU is mainly driven by economic reasons (Recchi et al 2012; Sandu et al 2009). Sandu et al (2004) distinguish three phases of the Romanian migratory system. The first stage took place between 1990-1995 and is characterized by a low migration flux. The migrant profile during this period is that of a young man looking for work in Germany, Israel and France. The second stage lasted until 2002 and had more or less the same characteristics as the previous, except for an increase in the number of women. The destinations became more diverse than in the first period, including countries like Spain and Italy. The third stage started in 2002 and is characterized by mass migration of both men and women. The main destinations are Spain and Italy.

Ten years after the liberalization of the tourist visa regime and only six years after Romania's accession to the European Union, Romanians became the most numerous immigrant group in the EU. In 2012, Romanian immigrants numbered almost 2.3 million, more than 10 per cent of the total resident population of Romania (Eurostat 2012). In 2008, Romanians in Spain were ranked the most numerous group of foreign-born residents. In order to paint a more accurate picture of the migration trend, Figure 4.3 displays the numbers of

registered Romanian residents between 2000 and 2011. Their number grew from 68,000 in 2002 to 400,000 in 2007, while in 2011 their number reached 807,914.

Figure 4.3. Number of registered Romanian residents in Spain between 2000 and 2011. Source: INE



There are several formal and informal institutions that contribute to the steep increase in Romanian migration to Spain (Constantinescu 2003; Culic 2008; Sandu et al 2004). As pull factors researchers consider that

> 'A robust demand for low-skilled foreign labour, large informal economy, undeveloped programs of labour migrant admission and insufficient capacity to control irregular flows and stocks matched an impoverished and redundant labour force, which was linguistically and culturally compatible' (Culic 2008).

Sandu et al (2004) argue that the rough transition from the communist regime, rising unemployment levels, the lack of opportunities in urban areas and the existence of migratory networks are the main push factors for migration during this period. Related to the individual level motivations, Bleahu (2004) explains that most of the migrants started as itinerant migrants in search of work. But once they found a relative openness of the underground economy in the Mediterranean countries, as well as a stark opposition between their lifestyle and the Romanian context, they decided to settle in these countries.

> 'During 1990-2002 the illegal migration of Romanians to Spain was sustained by informal transnational networks of mainly legal migrants. The main connections in the networks, the ones that sustained their functionality, were the legal Romanian migrants from Germany and the legal and illegal migrants from France' (Bleahu 2004: 22).

Apart from kin and friendship supporting networks, the liberalization of tourist visas in 2002 generated a large influx of Romanian migrants to Spain and Italy. Thus, many Romanians would travel as tourists and eventually bypass the maximum legal tourist residence of three months. The 'intermediary agencies' offered support both for exit and overstay during the process. Transportation companies and illegal labour placement networks facilitated entrance of Romanians into Spain and Italy in exchange for money (Sandu et al 2004). Usually, these intermediaries would also offer contracts in the underground economy. For men, most of these jobs were in the construction sector and for women in the domestic service. Once at the destination, Romanians were 'employed' by other Romanians who own construction firms and obtain contracts with Spanish public and private sectors (Constantinescu 2003).

The institutional factors that shape Romanian migration Spain are not related to informal institutions only. The Romanian Government set up the Department for Labour abroad in 2002. It was concerned with signing bilateral agreements regarding the mobility of Romanian workers. Most agreements have been signed with Spain and Germany, especially in the agricultural sector. In Spain, Romanians were placed in Andalusia and the Mediterranean coast, and although they had temporary contracts, many decided to stay and find a 'permanent' job.

In contrast to the British community in Spain, Romanian migrants are more spread out on the Spanish map. It is true, though, that the Community of Madrid and the Valencian Community comprise 40 per cent of all Romanians residing in Spain. In Castilla La Mancha and Aragon Romanians are the largest immigrant group. Almost half of the Romanians residing in the Valencia region are in Castellon. At the same time, they constitute up to 10 per cent of Castellon

County population. As it will be further discussed in Chapter VII, there are only nine Spanish localities with more than 20 per cent Romanians.

Table 4.3. Number of Romanian residents and percentages of the total population and the total immigrant population respectively by autonomous community in 2011. Source: INE

Autonomous Community	***Number of Romanian residents***	***% of total population***	***% of foreign-born***
Total Spain	810,348	1.72	12.13
Community of Madrid	203,887	3.14	16.04
Valencian Community	134,232	2.62	13.94
Catalonia	95,713	1.27	7.24
Andalusia	93,973	1.12	11.24
Castile - La Mancha	93,313	4.41	38.04
Aragon	61,558	4.57	33.69
Castile and Leon	28,497	1.11	13.80
País Vasco	15,109	0.69	8.63
Murcia Region	13,074	0.89	5.24
Balearic Islands	12,665	1.14	4.68
La Rioja	11,402	3.53	23.31
Extremadura	10,141	0.91	20.34
Asturias	8,547	0.79	11.19
Galicia	7,871	0.28	3.58
Canarias	7,494	0.35	1.91
Navarra	6,781	1.06	7.55
Cantabria	6,035	1.02	11.89
Melilla	44	0.06	0.24
Ceuta	12	0.01	0.13

In sum, this section discussed the migration typology and spatial distribution of British and Romanian residents in Spain. Britons came primarily for lifestyle reasons, while Romanians arrived in order to improve their economic situation. For different reasons, almost a third of the two groups have resided illegally in Spain in the past decade. An estimated proportion of 30-50 per cent of the British residents chose not to register in the municipal census in order to avoid double taxation and the loss of residence-related benefits back in the UK. Almost half of the Romanians residing in Spain could not register before 2007 due to the fact that they could not obtain a legal residence permit. The following section offers a more comprehensive perspective of the two groups by discussing a series of aggregate socio-economic and political characteristics.

4.3 Socio-economic and political resources

The difference between lifestyle and economic migration is not determined by motivations to move only, but also by disparities in the social, economic and cultural resources. In order to illustrate this point, this section compares the main socio-economic characteristics of Romanian and British communities in Spain and gives an account of how they vary in relation to the same characteristics of the native population. The data relative to Romanian and British residents is available through the National Immigration Survey (ENI) of 2007, while the data regarding Spanish nationals is reported by the National Institute of Statistics in the Active Population Survey (EPA), the Yearly Income Survey (EES) and other statistical summaries.

4.3.1 Socio-economic characteristics

Overall, the age composition of the two immigrant groups differs considerably. Thus, 64 per cent of Britons are of working age while 27 per cent are older than sixty-five. In the communities with the largest share of British immigration (Valencian Community and Andalusia), one third of the residents are older than sixty-five. Eighty eight per cent of Romanians are between 16-65 years old, while less than one per cent is older than sixty-five. The percentage of working age population in Spain is 67, while the share of Spanish nationals older than 65 is 17 per cent.

Regarding the level of education, one third of the British respondents of the ENI survey declare to have a university degree or higher, the same proportion has a secondary level degree and another third the primary school diploma. In contrast to this, only eight per cent of the Romanians in the ENI sample have a tertiary degree. Instead, 50 per cent have a secondary degree diploma, while another 42 per cent completed primary school education. The averages for the Spanish population are as follows: 20 per cent completed primary education, 44

per cent hold a secondary school diploma, while roughly 22 per cent graduated from university or college (INE 2007).

In relation to economic resources, in 2007 almost 60 per cent of Romanians declared that they earned less than 1,000 Euros a month (ENI 2007). The proportion of Britons who lived on this income was less than 30 per cent. In Spain the data is available per year. Thus, the median gross income of Spaniards was 16,000 Euros in 2007 (EES 2007), which represents an approximated net salary of 1,100 Euros a month. On the basis of these estimations, it can be observed that that the median monthly income is the lowest for Romanians, followed by the Spanish and then the British.

According to the 2007 ENI data, 47.7 per cent of the Britons declared to be employed, in comparison to 59.5 per cent of the Romanians. However, not all the remaining 40 per cent of Romanian interviewees were unemployed and looking for work. Only a quarter of them, which is 10 per cent of the sample, declared to be searching for a job. Regarding the British, 40 per cent described themselves as retirees. In relation to British residents' occupational patterns, more than fifty per cent of the ENI respondents of this nationality were engaged in 'white collar work' (managers, researchers, etc), 13 per cent worked in administrative positions, 10 per cent were skilled workers and only three per cent were unskilled workers. Romanians display a different pattern. Only 13 per cent have a 'white collar' occupational background, while 20 per cent work in administrative positions. Forty-two per cent are skilled workers and 12 per cent are unskilled employees.

The main sectors of activity for Romanians in 2007 were construction (30 per cent), domestic service (23 per cent), industry (20 per cent) and agriculture (9 per cent). Most of the British in the ENI sample declare that they work in the educational sector (20 per cent), touristic services (13 per cent), industry (10 per cent), construction (5 per cent) and agriculture (less than 2 per cent). As it may be observed, those who are employed display a more scattered occupational map

than the Romanians, whose activities are concentrated in a few sectors. The distribution of the main sectors of activity at the national level[1] is: services (68 per cent), industry (17 per cent), construction (8 per cent) and agriculture (2.5 per cent) (EPA 2008).

The level of proficiency in Spanish is another relevant indicator for the level of social and economic integration (Verba et al 1993; 1995). According to the ENI survey, a quarter of British respondents consider that they need to improve their level of Spanish, while only 13 per cent of Romanians think so. The percentage of Britons who think that they speak Spanish fairy well is 57 per cent, while 73 per cent of Romanians gave a similar answer. These findings are consistent with previous studies related to Romanians' immigration to Spain, which claim that the cultural and linguistic proximity between the two countries has had a positive impact on migratory flows.

This section shows that there are significant differences regarding the socio-economic characteristics of the two groups studied. Except for language proficiency, Romanians score lower in all social and economic indicators. At the same time, both British and Romanian residents are different from the Spanish nationals' aggregate socio-economic determinants. It is expected that the civic and political participation of the two groups is stratified according to their socio-economic resources. The following section contains a descriptive analysis of participation along the civic and political dimensions, also taking into account the averages for Spanish nationals.

4.3.2 Civic participation, political mobilization and representation

According to the ENI survey, 33 per cent of Britons participate in at least one organization like cultural associations, leisure and sports clubs, religious

[1] No data on the sectors of activity by the dichotomy national/immigrant for 2008

organizations or charity. Disaggregating the data by the civic/ethnic profile of the organization, it can be observed that 17 per cent are members of an organization consisting mainly of co-nationals, while 30 per cent are members of organizations that are not composed primarily of co-ethnics. However, the data does not show if the mixed composition of these organizations is due to the fact that it is a Spanish organization or an immigrant organization consisting of various nationalities.

As opposed to the British case, only twelve per cent of Romanians participate in at least one organization. Regarding the composition of such organizations, five per cent participate only in ethnic organizations, while seven per cent are members of organizations that do not predominantly consist of co-nationals. It is worth noting that half of the Romanians who declare to participate in ethnic organizations are members of a religious congregation. These data confirm previous studies related to the role of religious organizations in enabling and sustaining migratory networks (Constantinescu 2003; Diminescu 2004; Pajares 2007). In order to provide a better description of the phenomenon, Table 4.4 contains a summary of the main religious denominations and the frequency of church attendance of Romanian immigrants in Spain. According to Eurostat, the percentage of Spaniards involved in at least one voluntary organization is 19 (Eurostat. Social Participation and Social isolation 2010: 10). In consequence, according to these data, civic participation among Britons, Romanians and Spaniards is stratified according to a similar pattern as in the case of socio-economic determinants. Romanians are the least civically engaged, while the British have higher participation rates than the natives.

Table 4.4. Main religious denominations and church attendance of Romanians in the Community of Madrid. RCS Survey 2008

Frequency of church attendance	***Religion***				
	Orthodox	Adventist	Pentecostal	Other	Total
once a year or less	298	2	0	19	331
on saint days	239	1	0	9	249

once-three times a month	84	5	1	6	98
once a week or more	36	68	30	15	149
Total	657	76	31	49	827

As it will be explained in more detail in the next chapter, Europeans' political participation in Spanish local elections is conditioned upon their registration in the electoral census. The procedure is open for three months before each local election and ends a few weeks before the start-up of the electoral campaign. The level of electoral mobilization is higher in the case of British residents, but it should be taken into account that the British started participating in local elections in 1999, while Romanians in 2007. There are no official data on the actual level of participation of the two groups in local elections. To that extent, both academics and political actors use voter registration rates as a proxy for the level of electoral mobilization of immigrant groups (Duran 2007; Mendez-Lago 2005). Table 4.5 presents the percentages of registered voters of each group before the local elections in which they were allowed to participate.

Table 4.5. Number and percentages of British and Romanian registered voters. The numbers of British and Romanian residents refer to persons 20 years or older. No data available for persons between the ages of 18-20. Source: INE.

Year	***British registered voters***	***British residents***	***% British registered voters***	***Romanian registered voters***	***Romanian residents***	***% Romanian registered voters***
2003	44,826	136,223	32%			
2007	86,549	272,394	31%	66,339	422,260	15%
2011	105,825	330,765	31%	103,797	695,223	15%

The British in Spain also make up the second largest nationality of local councillors after the Spanish. However, their proportion is extremely low. Thus, in 2007 there were 30 Britons elected, while in 2003 and 1999 there were 18 and 7 respectively. This increasing trend suggests a positive path towards incorporation into Spanish local politics, setting aside their underrepresentation (one British councillor for approx. 13,000 British residents in comparison to one Spanish councillor for approx. 600 residents). Half of the British councillors are

located in the Valencian Community (Alicante county) while nine are elected in Andalusia.

According to the official data, no Romanian has become local councillor after the local elections in 2007. The local elections of 2011 seem to have opened a new window of opportunity for the Romanians who intended to enter the local power apparatus. Both the PP and PSOE made public the fact that they promote immigrant candidates on their lists, the Romanians being the most numerous nationality after the Britons. According to the Romanian residents data-set, I identified only one Romanian-origin local councillor after the 2011 local elections. The councillor was elected in the small village of La Jana, Castellon Province, the Valencian Community.

All things considered, Romanians' level of civic and political engagement confirms the expectations according to which lower social, economic and civic resources are associated with poorer levels of electoral mobilization. However, the data related to the British case suggest that higher levels of socio-economic and civic engagement in comparison to Spaniards do not entail higher participation rates. A plausible explanation is related to the relative short length of residence (10 years on average), language difficulties for a large proportion of the collective and possibly low interest in Spanish politics. At the same time, this state of affairs suggests that the political dimension of citizenship still acts as an instrument of closure on the part of the receiving society (Brubaker 1992), in spite of relative opening and convergence in the social, economic and civic dimensions.

4.3.3 Public perception

Public perception regarding the two groups is also divided. According to the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS) Survey 2846/2010, Romanians are the most disliked group of immigrants in Spain. Thus, 16 per cent of Spanish

nationals declare that the immigrants they least like are the Romanians, followed by Moroccans (14 per cent) and way above Latin Americans (4.4 per cent). No respondent placed the Britons among the most disliked or the most liked immigrant group, a fact which suggests that British residents are not associated with the immigration phenomenon in Spain.

The public opinion reflected in this survey is closely related to the mass media coverage of the two groups. In order to gauge the public image of Romanians in Spain, I conducted media analysis between January 2007 and June 2011 of the four main national newspapers: *El Pais*, *El Mundo, ABC*, and *El Periodico*. The regional editions of these newspapers have also been included in the analysis. The press database Factiva was used in order to find and classify articles using the keywords 'inmigrantes rumanos.' First, articles were coded as 'positive,' 'negative,' and 'neutral,' then a list of the most common topics was generated. In total, there were 329 articles related to Romanian residents in Spain. Of these, 208 had a negative connotation, while 117 were classified as neutral. The most common topics covered in the negative articles were related to the shanties conflicts between Romanian communities (in particular, the Roma minority) and local authorities throughout Spain. A smaller number, around 20 per cent, pertained to crimes such as robbery and prostitution in which Romanians were involved. The neutral news reports generally provided statistics related to the increase in the proportion of Romanian residents. Such news could, of course, be interpreted negatively, particularly as the increases reported were often steep, but since no interpretation of the numbers was offered in the reports, I chose to classify them as 'neutral.' Only four articles spoke positively about Romanians, challenging the idea that all Romanians, as a group, emigrated in order to steal, and emphasizing instead positive multicultural exchanges in various Spanish localities.

As for Britons in Spain, the national news reports relatively little. Using the same timeframe and newspapers as for the Romanians, substituting the

keywords 'residentes británicos,' the Factiva database revealed a total of 43 articles. Of these, 39 had a neutral tone, while only four reported negative events. These latter pertained to crimes committed by British residents around the Alicante coast. Most of the topics covered by the neutral articles were related to the census of British residents, mobilizing campaigns on the part of Spanish parties to win their vote, and the 'land grab scandal.' With regard to the latter, due to the Planning Law of Valencia and the Coast Law, many British residents saw their properties threatened by the urbanization plans of local governments (Janoschka 2010). The mostly unresolved conflicts prompted Britons and other European residents to ask for the support of the European Parliament, signing more than 150 complaints to the Petition Committee. British litigants also took various local administrations to the Spanish courts.

In sum, Romanians' and Britons' levels of socio-economic and political resources predict distinct patterns of incorporation. This conclusion has already been anticipated by the short presentation of the levels of electoral representation of the two groups. But, as discussed previously, groups' resources are not limited to the social, economic and political dimensions. The following section summarizes the transnational structure of opportunities that the groups enjoy, focusing especially on the supranational and country of origin level. The following chapters point to a more diverse array of transnational networks and connections that the groups enjoy, but these are limited to particular contexts. For this reason, I focus on presenting the main dimensions of the transnational opportunities on which the migrant political entrepreneurs can rely on.

4.5 The transnational structure of opportunities

4.5.1 European Union citizenship

European citizenship as established in the Maastricht Treaty offers a set of rights that complement the right to free movement and work of member state

nationals. These rights refer to: a) the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of nationality within the scope of application of the Treaty; b) the right to access the Commission's, the Council's and the EP's documents; c) the right of free movement, residence and work in another member state; d) the right to vote for the EP elections and the right to vote in local elections in the member state of residence; e) the right to appeal the Ombudsman; f) the right to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of other Member States when in a non-EU Member State, if there are no diplomatic or consular authorities from the citizen's own state; g) the right that enables one million citizens to invite the Commission to bring forward legislative proposals (TFEU 2012).

The core innovations in terms of supranational citizenship in comparison to provisions in previous treaties refer to intra-EU migrants' right to vote in the local elections of the country of residence and to the right to be treated on equal terms with the national citizens of the state of residence. Apart from these core rights, European citizens benefit from an array of institutional structures to which they can file complaints against host/home country institutions and legislation. These institutions are the Petition Committee of the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice (concerning Community law).

The right to free movement is universal, albeit with some restrictions. Europeans are entitled to stay more than three months on the territory of another member state provided that they are economically active persons, students, and former workers in the host-state. Regarding economically inactive persons, they have the right to reside in another member state as long as they have sufficient resources. After five years of residence, Community citizens are entitled to permanent residency in the host state.

The accession of the CEE countries in 2004 and 2007 imposed further barriers to the residence/working rights of the new Europeans. The transitional

provisions set up in the Accession Treaties of EU8 and EU2[2] refer to the possibility for the old member state to restrict the free movement of workers from these countries for a period of maximum seven years. In 2004 almost all member states, except for the UK, Sweden and Ireland, closed their labour markets to the new members. Romania and Bulgaria faced even stronger barriers to the labour market in the Union, as all the old EU states except for Sweden and a bundle of new EU states imposed transitional measures. Spain lifted these measures in January 2009, thus legalizing the stay of an important number of Romanians who used to work without a permit. The restrictions have been re-implemented in the summer of 2011, as a consequence of the high unemployment rates and economic crisis.

Scholars of European integration argue that the main reason for imposing transitional measures was the fear of an 'Eastern invasion' and a negative domestic public opinion regarding the new waves of European migration coming from former communist countries. Moreover, the transitional periods of Romania and Bulgaria have been importantly influenced by how the EU8 had already made use of their free movement rights where not restricted (Currie 2010). What these transitional arrangements show is that there is a gap, both legally and at the level of public perception, between the 'new' and 'old' Europeans, a fact which plays an important role in how Romanians and Britons are incorporated in Spanish local politics.

4.5.2 External citizenship in the UK and Romania

External citizenship refers to the array of civic, socio-economic and political rights and entitlements that emigrants possess in relation to their state of origin. The political rights of non-resident citizens occupy a broad space in

[2] EU8 refer to Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, while EU2 refer to Bulgaria and Romania.

both academic and policy debates related to external citizenship. Romania and the UK are two examples of expansive and respectively restrictive external citizenship policies. Both acknowledge the retention of nationality in the case of emigration, but have different perspectives on the political participation of citizens residing abroad. Romania imposes no restriction on the length of residence abroad and has special seats in the national parliament for the Diaspora. UK citizens residing abroad for more than 15 years lose the right to vote in their country of origin. Within these 15 years, they are entitled to vote and be represented in the constituency where they last resided. Opposed to the case of non-resident Romanians, British expats cannot elect their own representatives in home country parliament.

The Romanian state granted the right to vote from abroad in early 1990, with the intention to include the Diaspora in the democratization process (Bauböck 2007). The votes were cast in the Bucharest constituency and there hardly ever was any connection between Romanian elected officials and emigrant communities. Relations started to intensify after 2006, when the Law for the Rights of Romanians Abroad was implemented and the Department for Romanians abroad broadened its activities and funding opportunities for external communities. The Romanian Democrat Liberal Party (PDL) opened the first transnational office in Castellon as early as 2006, offering legal counselling and other support activities for emigrated Romanians. President Basescu and other PDL leaders visited Spain on several occasions in order to campaign and ask for the support of the emigrated Romanians.

The 2008 Electoral Law marks a breakthrough in the relations between the Romanian state and Romanian emigrants. As a consequence of the shift in the electoral system in Romania from proportional to mixed-uninominal, emigrated communities are granted special representation in the national parliament by four deputies and two senators. Each deputy represents one of the following districts: Western Europe, Eastern Europe, America and Asia-Africa-

Oceania. The senators represent Europe and America-Africa-Asia-Oceania respectively. This legal change generated an increased interest in emigrant communities on the part of Romanian political parties, as well as regular contacts between the special representatives and their constituents (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2013). Thus, by 2012 all four major parties opened transnational offices in most Spanish localities with important Romanian emigration. Also, the special deputies and senators for Western Europe make regular visits to Spain in which they are in contact with the Romanians and their associations as well as with Spanish political actors.

The rights of political participation of British nationals do not have a long history. They were introduced in the 80s, due to the efforts of the Conservative Party (Ellis et al 2007). Until 2000 British nationals living abroad for less than 25 years could vote in national elections in their homeland. The Act on Political Parties, Elections and Referendums from 2000 reduced the time qualification period to 15 years. The expats can vote in their hometown constituency by post or by proxy.

Although the UK does not have special representation for the expats, both the Conservative and Labour Party have branches abroad. As there is a shared public perception that votes cast from abroad usually go to the Conservative Party, Torries established a wider infrastructure and periodic contact with expat British communities (Finch et al 2010). Although the contacts between British politicians and emigrated communities are not as intense as in the Romanian case, various MPs have visited the British in Spain over the years. They come at the request of the external branch presidents or as old acquaintances and connections. David Cameron himself visited the British community in Spain in 2010 and spoke about the importance of the expat vote. During his visit the PM did not make many promises related to future policies for the expats, but rather commented on the overall economic situation in the UK.

4.6 Conclusions

This chapter discussed the main determinants of British and Romanian migration to Spain, as well as the core transnational opportunities that immigrants may use in their processes of local incorporation. The goal of the chapter is twofold: to evaluate the degree to which the two groups differ along the socio-economic, political and transnational dimensions and to contextualize their differences in relation to the host society. Related to this last point, the Britons do score higher in terms of socio-economic resources in relation to both the Romanians and the Spanish, but nonetheless, their level of political mobilization and representation is much lower than expected. Thus, only 30 per cent of the British residents are registered to vote, in comparison to 66 per cent of Spaniards who actually voted. Also, the representation ratio between the Spanish nationals and the British residents is 20 to one. These findings support previous studies related to the deficit in participation and representation of immigrant groups in relation to the natives (Verba et al 1995; Bird et. al 2011; Ruedin 2013). However, when compared to other immigrant groups, Britons fare better in terms of electoral mobilization and representation. In comparison to Romanians, they have higher socio-economic and political resources, but are less integrated linguistically and have a lower degree of transnational resources.

In consequence, the comparison between Romanians and Britons in terms of group-related characteristics and resources cannot be summarized in a clear-cut 'less-more'. It is expected for the interplay between the advantages and disadvantages of the two groups to configure pathways to incorporation through complex mechanisms that are not based on a straightforward relation between socio-economic resources and political incorporation. The following chapter discusses one such factor that can alter the relation between group resources and the degree of incorporation: the structure of opportunities in the receiving context.

CHAPTER FIVE

Incorporation opportunities for foreign-born residents in Spain

This chapter presents the political opportunity structure related to the process of incorporation of foreign-born residents in Spain. The analysis focuses on three related institutional dynamics: the immigration and integration policies that delimitate access to residence, work, socio-economic and political rights and, at the same time, provide the resources that immigrant groups may rely upon in the process of their integration into the host society. Second, the chapter presents the opportunities for migrants' political participation and incorporation through the electoral and non-electoral venues. The last section discusses the role and positioning of Spanish political parties in the incorporation of immigrant residents. The chapter also illustrates the political opportunities in the two autonomous communities and the selected localities at which this dissertation takes a closer look (Community of Madrid and the Valencian Community). The analysis seeks to clarify how these policies and institutions approach various groups of immigrants in Spain, focusing especially on the distinction between EU and non-EU immigrants.

The overall argument of the chapter is that both integration policies and political parties have a differentiated approach towards resident foreign-born depending on their national origin. Integration policies favour the incorporation of EU2 and non-EU migrants through affirmative measures as opposed to policy laissez-faire towards Western Europeans. Political parties' official campaign discourses differ across autonomous communities in what regards the targeted group of foreign-born voters.

The chapter relies on analysis of primary and secondary sources. The sections related to integration policies are based on the reading of the official texts of these policies and secondary analyses. Since the role of Spanish political parties in incorporating immigrants among their members and candidates is a new phenomenon, there are few studies related to the topic (but see Zahonero de Agueda 2011). To that extent, the analysis relies on primary sources collected by the author. The two main national newspapers, *El Pais* and *El Mundo*, as well as regional newspapers from the Community of Madrid (*ABC, Puerta de Madrid, Puerta de Alcalá*) and the Valencian Community (*Las Provincias, Diario de la Información*) have been searched and analysed for the three months previous to the local elections in 2003, 2007 and 2011. Also, interviews have been conducted with the PP and the PSOE Madrid representatives in charge with immigration in the summer of 2012 (see Annex).

5.1 Institutional framework and integration policies

Recent scholarship acknowledges that immigration and integration policies at the national, regional or local levels do not address foreign-born residents as a homogeneous category (Barbulescu 2011; Bloemraad 2006; Vermeulen 2005). In Spain and other Western countries, integration policies structure the incorporation of non-EU migrants by supporting the development of their organizational sector or by including them in the consultative policy processes. Nonetheless, EU15 residents are left in a sort of 'laissez-faire' situation, in which no special measures are taken in order to promote their incorporation into the host society.

The underlying presuppositions of this policy approach are that European migrants do not *need* to be integrated, due to their cultural and socio-economic resemblance with the native population. But, as already foreseen by Favell (2008) the new East-West intra-European migration presupposes a change in the

migration system and in the way host societies relate to the new Europeans. As the following analysis shows, 'EU citizen' is not a category that refers to the actual composition of the EU, but rather to a contingent perspective about who is an immigrant. Romanians and Bulgarians in Spain, in spite of being EU citizens, are targeted by integration policies and are offered a structured incorporation approach similarly to non-EU immigrants. This national level dynamic is reproduced alike at the regional and local levels.

5.1.1 Access to citizenship and immigration laws

Spanish naturalization law is one clear example of how kin ties and colonial past favour some categories of foreign-born residents over others. Immigrants who possess special ties to the Hispanic Community, such as Latin Americans, Portuguese, Brazilians and Sephardic Jews, can apply for Spanish citizenship after two years of legal residence in Spain. All the rest can apply after 10 years. Joppke (2005) considers that the differentiated treatment in the acquisition of citizenship depending on origin is a reminiscence of the Franco regime and the exaltation of Hispanity as a basis for political inclusion and ethno-cultural definition of the demos. The preferential treatment entails an easier procedure to obtain work permits and residence cards. Due to constant pressure from European institutions and the liberalization of immigration discourses and policies, the nationals of the *Comunidad Hispanica* lost their privileges in immigration law, but strengthened their foothold in the nationality law.

Spanish immigration laws are restrictive in character and oriented towards the control of migration flows and the imposition of quotas. Since entrance and residence of EU citizens are regulated by European law, these policies target only the non-EU immigrants. Prior to 2010 five Immigration Laws, four Regulations and six Extraordinary Regularization Processes were enacted.

The first immigration law (5/1985) was passed in haste, in order to meet the EU accession requirements, and was focused on control and expulsion measures targeting illegal immigrants. The second immigration law (4/2000), initiated by the Socialist Party, introduced a human rights approach to immigration, by the expansion of rights and liberties of legal and illegal foreign-born residents, the recognition of family reunification and the possibility of permanent residence (Zapata-Barrero 2004; 2010). This law was never amended, as the new PP government adopted Law 8/2000, which reduced the rights and liberties of foreign residents and denied any such rights and liberties to irregular migrants. It restricted the right to family unification and strengthened border control. 'The law also reformed the agenda for issuing work and residency permits and visas, making it impossible to receive a work permit after arriving in Spain irregular (ibid: 6). In 2008, the Socialist government approved an even stricter immigration law, by limiting family reunification and the possibility to obtain a work permit, as well as by obliging transportation companies to provide data on their passengers.

These 'police' style immigration laws (Arango 2004) have been complemented by quota systems and legalization processes. In 1993, the central administration established the quota system, aimed at controlling the number of incoming immigrants per each economic sector. In order to legalize the contingents already present on its territory, the Spanish government carried out six 'extraordinary' regularization processes between 1986 and 2005. However, the quota system did not reach its goal of controlling the entrance of immigrants. Stark differences have been observed between the low quotas (around 30,000 yearly) and the high number of applications for regularization (more than 600,000 in 2005) (Serra et al 2005).

Immigration laws have no impact on the entrance and residence of EU15 citizens. However, prior to the European enlargement of 2007, Romanians found themselves targeted by these policies. They were one of the largest nationalities

'legalized' at the end of 2005 and constituted an important proportion of the immigrants without a residence permit at the beginning of 2007. This observation is made manifest by comparing the number of registered Romanians in 2006 and at the end of 2007. The difference of 300,000 Romanian migrants is not so much the result of a huge exodus from Romania to Spain but rather the consequence of the fact that the already migrated Romanians were able to register legally under the EU citizen status.

5.1.2 Integration policies at the national level

The scholarly opinion on Spanish integration policies has been until recently that they could hardly be associated to a specific 'philosophy of integration' (Cornelius 2004). This reality changed by the mid-2000, when Spanish integration policies associated concepts such as integration and civic citizenship. One of the main motors of this change are the European agreements reached in Tampere (1999), by which EU institutions promote the concept of civic citizenship as the backbone of member state integration policies for third country residents (Zapata-Barrero 2005).

During the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, integration policies were oriented towards regularization of illegal migrants rather than towards their incorporation into the host society (Lopez-Sala 2007; Díez-Nicolas 2005). Most integration proposals during this period were the result of bottom-up pressure from sectors of civil society and local governments that faced the reality of migration closely, also in its irregular form. Growing governance responsibilities of regional and municipal governments in areas such as social policy, housing and management of cultural diversity prompted these institutions as central actors in the process of immigrant integration (García 2006). Thus, regional governments and local administrations took charge of the integration of immigrants, while the national government were responsible for the management

of stocks, quotas and work permits. Saez and Carrillo (2002) argue that the lack of coordination between the government levels regarding integration measures led to tensions between the regional and local integration policies that offered access to welfare benefits to both legal and illegal migrants and the restrictive national policies.

In 1994, the government proposed the *Plan for the Social integration of migrants*, which was centred on the symbolic recognition of immigration in Spain. The lack of coordination between different levels of administration and the scarcity of resources allocated meant that the idea of integration was more of a sample of political rhetoric than a truly recognized policy goal (Bruquetas-Callejo et al 2008). The subsequent *Global Programme to Regulate Immigration and Aliens in Spain* (*GRECO* plan 2000) failed to provide a substantive integration solution, establishing the central role of autonomous communities and regional governments in dealing with the issue. Moreover, the general idea of the plan was that immigration is a temporary event, and consequently the plan focused more on return that on integration.

After 2005, policy circles at both national and regional levels started to associate the concepts of integration and citizenship. Spain not only proposed a national framework of integration, but also promoted a civic and post-national discourse in line with the core EU values on citizenship. The concepts of 'citizenship in the city and 'interculturalism' are at the forefront of any integration plan. Autonomous community governments and local governments expanded their discourse on immigration and integration towards concepts like regional citizenship and active participation of immigrant residents in local life (García 2006; Zapata-Barrero 2013). In order to reach these goals, both national and regional policy plans proposed various measures in the fields of social security, education, housing and health. Regarding migrants' civic and political participation, the plans stress the central role of immigrant and non-immigrant

organizations and propose various measures that would boost the organizational life of the immigrant communities.

The *Strategic Plan on Integration and citizenship 2007-2010* (PECI I) deserves special attention for the substantial resources allocated, as well as for the central role it gives to the concept of citizenship. PECI I is a general policy framework that serves as a reference point for all autonomous communities and municipalities when formulating integration policies and measures (Zapata-Barrero 2013). The first strategic plan is inspired by the open method of coordination used by the EU and recognizes that autonomous communities and local administrations are responsible for giving content to integration policies on their respective territories. As general normative guidelines, PECI I acknowledges the diversity of the foreign-born population in Spain, introducing a division between citizens residing under the EU regime (regimen comunitario) and citizens residing under the general regime (regimen general). Although the subsequent policy measures do not distinguish between the two groups, they mainly refer to the social and political integration of non-EU immigrants.

The plan draws its inspiration from the civic citizenship concept established by the EU Council in 1999 in Tampere. Apart from its conceptual similarity with the European document, PECI I has a marked republican character. It assesses the importance of active citizenship jointly with its civic character. It promotes a bottom-up dynamic, starting with the creation of *citizenship in the city*. It calls for a deeper integration of immigrants into their closest receiving context as a first step towards broader integration into Spanish society, which should culminate with naturalization. Reading between the lines, PECI I argues for the desirability of local voting rights, but it does not make any strong provision on that.

The subsequent *Strategic Plan on Integration and Citizenship 2011-2014* (PECI II) grants the same responsibilities to lower government levels as PECI I, but slightly modifies its underlying integration philosophy. PECI II is the first

integration proposal that differentiates between EU residents (from EU25 countries) and 'immigrants'. This latter category includes Romanians, Bulgarians and non-EU. The integration policy plan thus makes it explicit that its targets are all immigrants from non-EU countries plus Romanian and Bulgaria, while EU25 residents are placed outside the scope of the integration requirements:

> 'Se considera población inmigrante a la población extranjera de nacionalidad no perteneciente a la Unión Europea de los 25 (es decir, los nacionales de Rumanía y Bulgaria se consideran personas inmigrantes).'[1] (PECI II: 38)

PECI II inherits the post-national rhetoric on citizenship and integration from the previous plan, but acknowledges the change in the migration cycle in Spain. Immigrants have become settled 'new neighbours' who are already part of their host communities. The plan offers a well-documented analysis of the contribution of migrants to economic growth and a wide sociological description of immigration in terms of binational marriages, second-generation migrants, schooling, employment, etc. It also triggers alarm signals in relation to xenophobic and discriminatory factors that may arise and talks about the necessity to accommodate diversity in the workplace and in other areas of the society. As opposed to the first plan, which gave a central place to the reception policies, PECI II talks about the centrality of incorporation, inclusion and cohesion. The plan stresses the importance of citizenship in the city but states that the latest point of incorporation is the acquisition of nationality and full participation in society.

[1] 'The immigrant population is made up of foreign-born residents of non-EU25 (more specifically, Romanian and Bulgarian citizens are considered immigrants)'. My translation.

5.1.3 Integration policies at the regional and local levels

At the regional level, the government of the Community of Madrid drafted the first integration plan in 2001, followed by a further two integration plans by 2012. These policies have a marked social character aiming at reducing the level of exclusion of foreign-born residents in the social and economic sectors (social assistance, health, education, housing, culture, civic participation and co-development). Although the plans do not have a specific philosophy of integration beyond combating exclusion and requesting 'legality' on the part of the immigrants, their budget is quite robust. Thus, the plans estimate to dedicate almost 9 per cent (€1.64 million) of the regional budget in 2008 to immigrant integration in various policy areas.

The Valencian government has proposed two integration plans since 2005. The core philosophy of the 2008-2012 plan is to assure the equality of opportunities of all Valencians (natives and immigrants). The integration of immigrants is seen as a threefold process in the social, labour and cultural fields, while no special mention is made to civic and political participation. Similar to the Community of Madrid policy, the plan sets forth various measures in the social, economic, cultural and labour sectors, estimated at roughly €1.29 million in 2008 (9 per cent of the regional budget). Although the Valencian Community hosts the largest community of EU15 residents, there is no special mention to measures regarding the 'richer' immigrants. Similar to the other policy proposals discussed, this plan targets immigrants in danger of social exclusion and marginalization.

Among the 14 localities that constitute the research sites of this dissertation, only Alcalá de Henares (the Community of Madrid) has a local integration plan in 2013. According to the local press, the Orihuela (Valencian Community) local government was preparing the first integration plan in early 2012 (*ABC*, 13.02.2012) These two localities are also the largest in the sample

(around 100,000 inhabitants), a fact which confirms previous findings regarding the unequal decentralization and governance opportunities across the Spanish urban contexts (García 2006).

The local integration policies in these two contexts follow the differentiated policy philosophy set up by the national government. They aim at improving the socio-economic conditions of immigrants in danger of social exclusion. For instance, the preamble of the First Integration Plan of Alcalá de Henares (2010-2013) states that:

> 'Términos como población, personas, alumnos, usuarios o beneficiarios de programas de integración de origen inmigrante hacen referencia a personas con una **nacionalidad distinta de la española** y de origen, generalmente, extracomunitario. En el caso de Alcalá de Henares la excepción la marcan las personas originarias de Europa del Este (fundamentalmente Rumanía, Polonia, Bulgaria). Esta precisión resulta necesaria por tres motivos: A pesar de que **Rumanía y la República de Bulgaria** son países pertenecientes a la Unión Europea desde el 1 de enero 2007, hay que tener en cuenta las restricciones establecidas transitoriamente para la libre circulación de trabajadores por cuenta ajena. Esto implica que no todos los nacionales de estos países han podido trabajar libremente en España, como el resto de los ciudadanos comunitarios, lo que implica un planteamiento de excepcionalidad; [..] las especiales circunstancias tendentes a la vulnerabilidad social en la que se encuentran' (p.11)[2]

The Orihuela local plan, although not available at the date of drafting this chapter, is aimed at improving the socio-economic and cultural integration of the immigrant population, especially of Latin-American and African origin (*ABC*, 13.02.2012). Though British migrants constitute 20 per cent of the town population, there is no mention to them in the declarations of the local councillor for integration, nor on the webpage of the local Department for Integration.

[2] Concepts such as population, persons, students, users or beneficiaries of integration programmes refer to **individuals who do not hold Spanish citizenship** and who, in general, are not EU citizens. In the case of Alcalá de Henares, citizens of Eastern European countries (mainly Romania, Bulgaria and Poland) are the exception. This clarification is necessary for three reasons: although **Romania and the Republic of Bulgaria** are EU members since January 1st 2007, the transitory restrictions regarding the free movement of workers must be taken into account. This implies that not all the citizens of these countries have been able to work freely in Spain, as the rest of the EU citizens have. This implies a special policy perspective.[..] the special social conditions [of the Romanian and Bulgarian residents] who make them prone to social vulnerability. (My translation. The highlighted words in bold are as such in the original text)

Although the remaining 12 localities selected in this dissertation do not have a local integration policy, primary sources such as interviews and official documents reveal that the respective local governments follow the logic of the national integration framework: to prioritize and to support the integration of non-EU15 local residents. Nonetheless, as the next chapter shows, EU15 residents are not excluded from the policy process, but are incorporated as 'equal' (non-dependent) dialogue partners with the local administrations.

5.1.4 Integration policies and immigrant associational landscape

Immigrant organizations are one of the main stakeholders in the implementation of integration policies, alongside administrations and pro-immigrant Spanish associations. Migrant organizations' protagonist role in the management of integration processes is manifest through the material and symbolic support they receive and through their inclusion in consultative policy processes[3]. As previously argued, the political opportunity structure has a direct effect on migrants' organizational patterns in one country (Koopmans et al 2005; Vermeulen 2005; Bloemraad 2006; Bloemraad and Ramakrishnan 2008; Maxwell 2012). In the case of Spain, the policies and programmes aimed at channelling material and symbolic support to immigrant associations have four broad consequences for the immigrant organizational landscape.

First, ethnicity and national identity become an organizational resource, especially in the case of non-EU15 foreign-born residents (see Maxwell 2012 for the case of France and Britain). The differentiated treatment between EU15/EU2 and non-EU in national and regional integration policies entails a much stronger emphasis on the funding available for non-EU15 associations. However, non-EU15 immigrants are not targeted as a unitary group, but are allocated funds and symbolic support according to their nationality. This, in turn, generates

[3] Section 5.3.2 develops the latter point in more detail

incentives for non-EU15 migrant elites to mobilize around their nationality of origin, in order to access the resources offered by administrations.

In the case of EU15 residents, national identity is peripheral to their organizational patterns. Most EU15 migrants' organizations are leisure-oriented, although, as I will illustrate in Chapter VI, charity and rights guardian types of organizations are also common. Even in the case of cultural organizations, the main rationale for association is not the culture of origin, but rather cultural activities, such as reading, music, travelling, etc. In terms of political identity, there are around ten organizations in Spain that use 'European residents' in their denomination, without further specifying the nationalities of origin.

A second consequence of the differentiated integration policies is that they have generated a diversification of immigrant organizations' scope of activities. Thus, migrant organizations become service providers in various sectors, competing for projects aimed at the cultural and social integration of immigrants. In the EU15 case, the lack of formal support for these residents' socio-economic integration boosted participation and organization 'from below', initiated by migrants. Several self-funded charities seek to alleviate the social and economic difficulties faced by more vulnerable group members, such as single retirees.

A third consequence of the structured integration approach towards the non-EU15 can be observed in immigrant associations' organisational and territorial network structure. As Veredas (2003) argues, the formal rules for funding tend to favour larger immigrant organizations that can prove to have a wider scope in terms of membership and geographical coverage. As a response, EU2 and non-EU organizations have a pyramidal structure that ranges from small and resourceless organizations to regional and national federations clustered by nationality of origin. It is often the case that several immigrant organizations are based in province capitals, claiming to address all immigrants in that respective region, although they lack the necessary infrastructure and

material means. Instead, since EU15 organizations are not targeted by funding programmes, they are autonomous and lack a pyramidal structure.

Lastly, the structured focus of integration policies for non-EU15 residents, as well as the important role given to their organizations in the management of integration processes created a so-called 'migrant elite clientele' (Veredas 2003; Aparicio 2010). Apart from membership and territorial scope, organizations' age and experience in managing integration projects are other evaluation criteria for public funding. These requirements presuppose that only a limited number of immigrant organizations actually have funds for developing their activities. Moreover, they entail that a larger number of projects already developed attract more funds, a fact which creates a segmented organizational sector, with a few 'old' clients and a large pool of associations that receive very little material and symbolic support. In the case of EU15 organizations, there is a lesser discrepancy between 'big' and 'old' organizations, since there is no formal policy that would favour some over others.

To sum up, Spanish national, regional and local immigration and integration policies follow different rationales in relation to immigrant groups. Specifically, naturalization policies favour co-ethnics, while immigration laws aim at restricting and controlling entrance of non-EU citizens. Integration policies have gradually embraced a civic concept of citizenship, of European inspiration, targeting non-EU residents while glossing over incorporation measures for European residents. The latest developments in the national and sub-national integration policies suggest that laissez-faire in terms of integrating European migrants is not related to a general concept of European membership, but rather to practical considerations about who is a European citizen. To that extent, EU citizenship is not only a legal status established in various treaties, but also a social and political construction that delimitates between 'real' EU citizens and the others.

5.3 Institutional opportunities and the political participation of migrants

5.3.1 Provisions for electoral participation

The Spanish constitution firmly establishes that only Spanish citizens are entitled to have political rights. Notwithstanding, the fundamental law acknowledges two exceptions. Foreign residents of non-EU origin may vote and be elected in local elections under conditions of reciprocity with their home country. EU residents are granted the right to vote in local and European elections under the provisions of community law. Aja and Moya (2008) argue that the condition of reciprocity enshrined in the Spanish constitution expresses the intent of legislators at the time to improve the position of Spanish emigrants in other countries. In 1978, immigration to Spain had negligible proportions, while emigration to especially South America and Western Europe was a widespread practice. To that extent, the drafters of the constitution thought that the condition of reciprocity would be an incentive for other countries to sign bilateral agreements with Spain by which they would grant local voting rights to Spanish immigrants (p.14). In spite of being constitutionally recognized since the seventies, the signing of bilateral agreements with third countries took place twenty years later, before the local elections of 2011.

The provisions of the Maastricht Treaty regarding local voting rights for Community nationals prompted the modification of the Spanish constitution in 1992. This modification allows foreign residents not only to vote (as it was originally stipulated) but also to be elected in municipal bodies. The implementation of the constitutional provisions took several years. It was not until the local elections of 1999 that EU residents in Spain were able to register and vote in municipal elections. In the declaration of the Constitutional Court related to the 1992 modification, municipal elections are considered administrative elections, and therefore elected municipal officials are distinct

from the elected bodies at the regional and national level. The Court clearly stated that the right to participation in electing representative bodies is reserved exclusively to Spaniards and that foreign residents are not part of the citizenry (Aja and Moya: 464). Although the declaration of the Constitutional Court may seem in contradiction with the growing intent to incorporate foreign residents in political life, it actually grasps the concept of 'new neighbours' that the Spanish government proposed almost 20 years later in PECI II.

The debates related to the political participation of non-EU residents grew in intensity during the 2000s. These debates were generated by the embracement of European Commission and EP recommendations regarding recognition of local voting rights for third country nationals at the EU Council in Tampere in 1999. During this period, several legal scholars formulated moral and legal arguments for recognition of the political rights of migrants (de Asis 2005; Lucas Martin et al 2008 Solanes-Corella 2008; Velasco 2006). In 2005, the United Left party (Izquierda Unida-IU) submitted a bill to Parliament according to which immigrants would be granted the right to vote in local elections. All parties voted in favour at the beginning of 2006, with an ambiguous position of the Catalan centre-right party (CiU). After a second proposal issued later in 2006 by the parliament and driven by the IU and PSOE, the Government committed itself to starting negotiation procedures with several countries in order to enact bilateral agreements as requested by the Constitution.

The parliamentary bill proposes the recognition of voting rights for legal foreign residents, especially those coming from countries with which Spain has historical and cultural links (Gimenez and Sanchez 2007: 596). Before the local elections in 2011, Spain had signed agreements with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Iceland, Norway, New Zeeland, Paraguay, Peru and Cape Verde. To that extent, the 'selection by origin' of the preferred group of migrants (co-ethnics) is manifest not only in the access to citizenship provisions but also in the access to political rights.

5.3.2 Non-electoral participation

Although the electoral inclusion of specific migrant groups was enacted after a decade of Spain becoming an immigration country, non-electoral participation had been used as a substitute solution since mid-nineties. This type of participation has been enabled by the establishment of participatory and consultative immigration councils at the national, regional and local levels. The decisions taken by these councils have a consultative character and are mainly used in order to inform the national and regional governments about the needs and demands of immigrants.

The composition of immigration councils and forums varies in time and across the Spanish territory, but the common element is the presence of the main stakeholders of the immigration phenomenon: immigrant associations, Spanish NGOs and representatives of Spanish administrations and labour unions. In many cases, the representatives of the administrations and Spanish immigration NGOs outnumber the representatives of the immigrant communities who are designated to symbolically represent most areas of origin of the immigrants: Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. No EU15 association has been invited to become part of these forums.

In 1995, echoing several European experiences, the Spanish government established the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants. This structure was conceived as one of the main dialogue platforms between migrant associations and the national administration. It composition has been extended in 2006 and comprises several representatives of the administration, ten migrant association/federation leaders and representatives of entrepreneur organizations and labour unions. Romanians are represented by the Federation of Romanian Associations (FEDROM), alongside Ecuadorians, Moroccans and other groups. Except for Bulgarians, no other EU community is present in the composition of the Forum.

The regional and local governments have also designed consultative bodies consisting of representatives of various communities. Lucas et al (2008) considers that the participatory impact of immigrants is more effective at these levels of the administration, due to the fact that regional and local governments actually deal with the process of integration and also because they are 'closer and more visible' to the migrants (p. 86). For example, in the two regions where the research for this thesis took place, Community of Madrid and the Valencian Community, there are the *Foro regional para inmigración de la Comunidad de Madrid* and the *Foro Valenciano de inmigración* respectively. These regional bodies are complemented by other participatory spaces and consultative councils in several municipalities.

There are several critiques that have been directed at the organization and functioning of these councils. As Lucas et al (2008) shows, the de facto representative role of the National Forum has been rather limited. In most cases, migrant representatives do not take part in the process of formulation of policies, but only in the approval of such policies. The representative role of the councils is also doubtful from a sociological perspective (Aparicio p and Tornos 2010). The number of integrating associations is very small in relation to the general organizational landscape of the immigrant communities. At the same time, the associations as such fail to represent more than a very limited number of adherents who take part in their activities.

In sum, the 'old' EU member state residents have a direct path to political participation after the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1999, while the 'new' Europeans and third country nationals achieved this right after 2007 and 2011 respectively. Until these dates EU2 and non-EU residents were politically included through the non-electoral pathway, such as consultative processes and immigration councils. This fact determined that non-EU15 residents have been situated at the periphery of the electoral processes. At the same time, it facilitated the appearance of migrant elites that had regular contacts with administrations

but a low representational profile among the immigrant community (see also Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). The apparently closed circuit between migrant elites and Spanish administrations contributed to the accumulation of political capital by migrant leaders. Their contacts with the administration facilitated not only the non-electoral participation of a certain immigrant group, but also the rise to prominence of various migrant figures at the local, regional or national levels. It may be expected therefore that the absence of the EU15 organizational sector from these consultative processes to negatively influence their visibility in relation to the Spanish administrations.

Besides administrations and consultative forums, political parties are the other central actor that facilitate the political incorporation of the immigrant communities. A detailed analysis of the dynamics between the migrant leaders of the Romanian and British communities in Spain and political parties will be offered in the following chapters. In the meantime, it is important to contextualize how political parties approach the issue of immigration and incorporation of non-national residents in Spanish civic and political life.

5.4 Political parties and the incorporation of immigrants

Spanish political parties are tactical gatekeepers in mobilizing the immigrant (or anti-immigrant) vote and in granting access to political office to immigrant political entrepreneurs. Their behaviour does not follow a clear divide between left (pro-immigrant participation and representation) and right (against or neutral regarding participation and representation of immigrants). Moreover, national organizations, on the one hand, and regional and local chapters, on the other hand, do not pursue a unified strategy in what regards their immigration-related discourse. What can be observed is a progressive opening towards incorporating immigrants as party members, as well as a broad discourse in relation to the various immigrant groups.

Spanish parties' national discourses for the local elections of 2011 addressed the whole immigrant communities, irrespective of their nationality of origin. Both the PP and the PSOE exposed in public meetings the diversity of their members and candidates from the EU, African and Latin American countries (*El Mundo* 29.04.2011). However, a closer look at the regional and local strategies, as well at the practical tactics of incorporation reveals that Spanish parties have a differentiated approach towards the foreign-born residents. In order to illustrate these points, the following sections discuss the organizational adaptation and discursive approach of Spanish parties in relation to immigration, as well as their behavioural strategies in incorporating foreign-born residents among their members and candidates.

5.4.1 Party organizational level and immigration

The organizational level of Spanish parties has undergone changes generated by the large increase of the foreign-born population. At the national level, both the PP and the PSOE have special areas that deal with the immigration and integration issue. The Socialists created federal groups organized around their ethnic, cultural or sexual identity that would assist the party's politics from the national to the local level in 2007. Related to immigration, the socialist federal groups are: The Socialist Arabs, the Latin Point and the Romanians-Bulgarians. The group of EU15 residents has not been formed because, as one of the party leaders declared, they do not suffer from exclusion and discrimination in the host society (interview P.Z., PSOE Madrid (PSM), 2012).

The PP did not design special structures for immigrant participation, but, starting in 2008, the party has sought to mobilize immigrants to become members, especially in local chapters. One of the justifications for this strategy given by party officials is that immigrants are included in the party on an individual basis, just like the natives. To that extent, the criteria for entrance is

not ethnicity, but 'hard work and commitment to the party' (interview O.C., PP Madrid, 2012). Although the PP's membership criteria do not discriminate between immigrants and natives, the Valencian PP does distinguish between European residents and immigrants. The regional organization of the party has separate areas for the two groups of foreign-born residents under the Social Policy Secretariat. This structure is also reproduced at the Alicante province level.

Another aspect that shows the openness of the two mainstream Spanish parties towards the incorporation of foreign-born residents is related to immigrants who have leading roles in the organizational structure or among the elected candidates of the parties. After 2007, both the national and the regional press (especially in Madrid) start to report about successful foreigners in politics. Apart from the group of EU15 elected councillors to which I dedicate a more detailed analysis in the following section, parties have also supported the candidacy of Latin American origin senators (PP) and regional deputies (PSOE Madrid). Also, since 2008 the PP Madrid Community has made public that the party promotes Latin Americans and Romanians in the directory board (*El Bolletin* 24.05.2012). No similar announcements have been made by the Populars and Socialists in Valencia.

5.4.2 National and regional elections and immigration

Until the 2008 general elections, Spanish mainstream parties did not dedicate a large amount of space to immigration issues in their programmes and campaign discourses. According to Pujol (2008: 20-21), immigration was the topic with the largest increase during the months previous to the 2008 general elections, covering around 13 per cent of all campaign topics discussed by the PP and 10 per cent of the campaign themes of the socialists. In 2008, although no national Spanish party was an anti-immigrant party as elsewhere in Europe, the

range of discourses covered topics from 'orderly immigration' to 'the benefits of interculturalism'.

The group of foreign-born that is the subject of these measures consists of economic migrants in danger of social exclusion and in need of integration into the host society. The French style contract of integration is one of the most publicised proposals of the Popular Party. 'No hay lugar para todos! (We do not all fit in here!)', Mariano Rajoy declared in a campaign meeting in the winter of 2008. This statement was fiercely criticised by leftist circles, which were warning that Spain is falling into a xenophobic spiral. Taking the opposite stance, the PSOE continued its discourses related to inclusive citizenship and integration of immigrants. In a campaign meeting in San Sebastian, former socialist president Zapatero declared that Spain should be sensitive to immigration, due to its emigrant past, and that it should assure full equality for the new members of society (*ADN*, 12. 01. 2008).

The discourses of the 2011 general elections were exclusively focused on the economic crisis and for this reason immigration was a topic that almost nobody mentioned. This pact of silence upon immigration between the mainstream parties was also in line with the 2010 and 2011 public opinion polls, in which only two per cent of Spaniards thought that immigration was a an issue of concern to them. But the absence of immigration from the national campaign discourses in 2011, in contrast to 2008, does not imply a shift in the parties' perception on immigration during these years. On the contrary, both the PP and the PSOE continued to politicize immigration in certain autonomous communities, without a substantive binding discourse coming from the centre.

This fact is visible in the strategy of PP Catalonia for both the regional and local elections of 2010, when the party moved 'more' to the right and embraced an anti-immigration and xenophobic discourse. The Catalan elections of 2010 constitute a turning point in relation to the anti-immigrant discourse of political parties in Spanish politics. The growing popularity of the far right party

Plataforma per Catalunya and growing tensions between immigrants and Spanish residents in various Catalan localities prompted the Populars to adopt an aggressive tone towards immigration. During 2010 and 2011, the Catalan PP covered the Badalona municipality public spaces with flyers and posters claiming that Romanians were unwelcome in the locality. The national PP office declared that what the PP leader Albiol was doing in Badalona was not in line with the party's principles. Nonetheless, the PP president Mariano Rajoy openly supported the controversial candidate in electoral rallies in various Catalan cities (*El Pais*, 19.05.2011)

In opposition to the Catalan PP, PP Madrid has striven to project the image of a diverse and inclusive organization, especially after 2008. In several public appearances, the Popular president of the Madrid Community declared that the capital region had no problems of coexistence. Moreover, PP Madrid promoted to its executive committee an Ecuadorian, seen as the first foreigner to attain such a high position within a Spanish political party (*El Mundo*, 29.09.2008).

5.4.3 Local elections and immigration

In opposition to national and regional elections, where the targeted group of voters is the autochthonous population, local elections entail a deeper engagement of political parties with the foreign-born electors. Until 2007, the only group of foreign-born voters were the EU15 residents, but their presence as a special sector of the electorate did not draw attention beyond the local context where they were present. In 2007, a few articles from the regional and local press in Castellon talked about the potential of the Romanian vote and strategic moves of both the PP and the PSOE to approach the Romanian associations in the area. However, it was not until the local elections of 2011 that both parties organized

public meetings and issued declarations stressing the importance of immigrants in politics, not only as passive subjects of the integration policies.

The vote of the European residents (EU15) passed almost unobserved in the 1999 local elections, except for a few localities in Alicante where European residents were proposed by parties to candidate. This low level of attention to the European voters on the part of the political parties coincided with their low rate of registration in the electoral census (approx. 30,000). In total, 30 foreign born candidates got elected. Eight came from Germany, while seven were of British origin, an equal number with the French. Other nationalities were Dutch (3), Italians (1), Portuguese (1) and Swedish (1). The most numerous lived in Alicante province (10) and only two in Malaga. The rest resided in small localities from Catalonia or Northern Spain.

The 2003 local elections brought a large number of EU15 registered electors (100,000) and an increased level of activity among the Valencian parties to capture the EU15 vote. Thus, both the PP and the PSOE of the Valencian Community included special measures related to the needs of EU15 residents in their electoral programmes, as well as personalized campaigns in strategic localities (*El Pais*, 02.11.2002). During this period, the local political landscape of the PP and the PSOE candidates was complemented by local independent parties lead by Europeans or by Europeans and Spaniards who promised to bring novelty and European know-how to the city halls of coastal municipalities. That year, the number of elected foreign-born councillors rose to 51. Most of them were British (18), followed by French (10) and Germans (5). Almost half of the foreign-born elected councillors were located in the Valencian Community (26), while the rest were scattered around various regions.

The 2007 local elections coincided with the diversification of the group of European voters. However, this did not bring about any change in the national discourse of the political parties. Most of the strategies were discussed at the local and regional level. Thus, EU15 candidates continued to be publicised by

Valencian parties as symbols of their interest in the European resident community. Political parties included special measures for European residents, organized various rallies in urbanizations and personalized campaigns in each locality where EU15 candidates were present. At the same time, they tried to avoid sensitive issues like corruption scandals and the discontent of the EU15 voters with the Valencian coastal law.

In parallel to the mainstream parties' efforts, a growing number of local independent parties, newly created or continuing the job started in 2003, featured EU15 candidates that would put an end to the 'corrupt Spanish way of doing politics'. In total, 71 foreign-born candidates won seats in the council. Of these, 31 were from the UK, followed by 15 Germans and ten French. There were one Czech, one Lithuanian, one Bulgarian and one Hungarian elected among the EU12 residents. No Romanian managed to win a seat in the council, in spite of the high number of residents of this nationality. As in the previous elections, most foreign-born councillors could be found in Alicante and Malaga province. In terms of party membership, 21 were on the PP lists, an equal number with the Socialists. Also, 14 EU citizens chose to run on independent party lists.

Until the 2011 local elections, the presence of immigrants among party candidates and in local politics was circumscribed to EU15 migration. In spite of being a strategy designed by the regional cupule of political parties, immigrants' presence in politics was mainly a local phenomenon, especially in the Alicante province and other coastal territories. It did not, however, have wider implications for a philosophy of immigrant incorporation among the Spanish parties. The 2011 local elections changed this perspective. Both the PP and the PSOE appeared in the national press embracing immigrant candidacies (from Europe and elsewhere) and directly targeting immigrant voters (Zahonero de Agueda 2011).

The 2011 local elections revealed three broad changes in relation to the previous polls. First, immigrants are no longer perceived as objects of policies, but as active residents who are entitled to vote and to be represented. The

campaign messages were directed towards immigrants themselves, in comparison to previous years, when immigration topics had been aimed at the native population. Second, the incorporation of immigrant candidates was supported by the regional and national leaders of the parties. To that extent, the ethnic/national diversity of candidates ceased to be a local phenomenon and became a national party philosophy. Third, the PP radically changed its approach towards immigration in comparison to the 2008 national and the 2010 Catalan elections. Even more so than the Socialists, the PP campaign for the 2011 local elections played a key part in constructing the image that the party opens the doors to immigrants and promotes their active social and political involvement.

Both the PP and the PSOE declared in the national and the regional press that they included a large number of immigrants on their lists all over Spain (500 and 600 respectively). Although the embracement of diversity among party members and candidates has been framed as part of the national parties' philosophy, it is true that implementation of measures to this effect has been carried out mainly in the Madrid Community. In comparison to the capital region, the Valencian Socialists and Populars did not organize any mass meetings or debates for the purpose of presenting their immigrant candidates. On the contrary, the meetings and discourses related to immigration reproduced the same pattern as in the previous elections: immigrants are perceived as objects of policies rather than active members of the community.

In order to better understand these points, several campaign strategies and events from the Madrid region are illustrative. The parties did not approach the immigrant electorate on an equal basis. While the Socialists oriented their activity towards the Latin American communities, the PP focused especially on Eastern European immigrants. The PSM representative for Social movements and NGOs relations of opined that it is more difficult for Romanians to embrace the Socialist party due to their past (interview P.Z., PSM 2012). On the contrary, the PP Madrid Secretary for immigration declared that Romanians have more affinity

for the PP than for the PSOE due to their history (interview O.C., PP Madrid 2012). Regarding the campaign strategies, while the PSOE continued the previous work of fomenting the connection with the associative movement, the PP chose an 'individual basis' type of incorporation. (Zahonero de Agueda 2011).

Relying on its links with the associative movement, the PSOE organized various debates and meetings hosted by the large immigrant federations of the Madrid Region. The party sent key figures to participate in the manifestation organized by the Regional Migration Forum and organized various meetings and seminars at its head office. However, the strong links with the organizational sector proved to be the weak part of the PSOE's campaign. A few days before the local elections, the largest federations of Latin American immigrants write a critical open letter to the PSM president Tomas Gomez in which they deplored the absence of their co-national, Yolanda Villavicencio, from the list of candidates to the Madrid regional parliament. The Colombian born Villavicencio had been a regional deputy in the previous legislature, representing the Socialists, and she had become the public symbol of immigrants' success in politics. This event showed the ambivalent relationship between the PSOE and the immigrant organizational sector and has been interpreted by the PSOE's political adversaries as one of the weakest points of the party's campaign (Zahonero de Agueda 2011).

The PP chose to include and address the immigrants on an equal basis with the natives, according to their merits and willingness to be party members and supporters (interview O.C., PP Madrid, 2012). It cannot be claimed that the PP had a conflictive relation with the organizational sector, but what the primary and secondary sources reveal is that they did not use it as the primary pillar of the campaign. The PP organized a mass meeting in Alcala de Henares, at which the party's president, Mariano Rajoy, and the Madrid Community president, Esperanza Aguirre, were key invited speakers. Various other meetings were organized at the head office in Madrid, while president Aguirre toured several

municipalities of the Community in order to support the campaign New Madrileños (Nuevos Madrileños).

In comparison with the high level of activity developed by the PP and PSOE in the Madrid Community, the Valencian PSOE and PP did not use immigrant origin candidacies as the central strategy to mobilize EU12 and non-EU immigrant voters. Localized campaigns continued to target the EU15 voters from the coastal regions. The regional and local structures of both PP and PSOE Valencian Community acknowledged the importance of immigrant political participation in public speeches and campaign events while proposing a very small number of Latin Americans and East Europeans to run for the local councils. Thus, the president of the Valencian Socialists encouraged the immigrants to participate in elections during the Party Forum on Immigration Policies organized by the PSOE in Elche in mid-January (*Europa Press*, 16.01.2011). Close to the local elections day, PP Castellon organized a mass campaign event during which they presented the success of the immigration policies developed by the city hall and stressed their 'commitment to working for integration'. Nonetheless, none of the party leaders presented the immigrant candidates, nor did they take an active stand towards mobilization and incorporation, as their colleagues in Madrid did.

5.5 Conclusions

This chapter discussed the two main components of the Spanish structure of opportunities that shape the process of political incorporation of foreign-born residents: the government policies and political parties. A third component mentioned in the theoretical model in Chapter II, the broad institutional context, is discussed in detail in Chapter IX, as it is especially related to British councillors' representational patterns.

As already argued, the Spanish government and sub-national administrations propose a structured process of incorporation for the non-EU and EU2 residents, whose main actors are immigrant organizations. The main venue to inclusion in the policy process is participation in consultative structures, while broader integration policies are aimed at correcting the socio-economic exclusion of these groups. In contrast, there are no special provisions related to the mobilization and incorporation of EU15 residents. A plausible explanation for this fact is that the EU15 are considered not to need special procedures in order to be incorporated, as their EU membership is enough to ensure that they enjoy political equality with the native citizens.

Spanish political parties developed a somehow opposed strategy to the governmental one. They shifted from a localized strategy to mobilize the EU15 voters to a philosophy of integration that does not differentiate according to the nationality of origin. However, although this is what can be read from the official discourses of the national party offices, a closer look shows that this incorporation philosophy is stratified across the Spanish regions. Related to the two autonomous communities that are the context of the present research, it can be observed that the global discourse is what characterizes the Madrid community party chapters. On the contrary, a localized, EU15 focused strategy is what mainly motivates the Valencian party leaders.

The following three chapters discuss how these two components of the Spanish political opportunity structure shape the incorporation of the British and Romanian residents. In particular, the next chapter focuses on the first pathway to incorporation, namely the non-electoral inclusion of immigrant organizations in consultative policy processes.

CHAPTER SIX

The non-electoral pathway. Romanian and British organizations in Spanish local politics

This chapter discusses the non-electoral pathway to incorporation, focusing on the processes of inclusion of Romanian and British organizations in Spanish local politics. Building on the previous theoretical arguments, the analysis illustrates how the presence and capacity of influence of immigrant organizations is shaped by the interaction of group resources and host country/transnational political opportunities (hypothesis 1a, 2, 5a and 5b). The preceding chapters show that Romanians and Britons in Spain enjoy different levels of group resources and distinct treatment by the host country's laws and integration policies. The British migrants have higher organizational resources and less support from national, regional and local integration policies. Romanian migrants are less visible in terms of civic and political mobilization, but are targeted by a structured integration approach. The two groups also differ reagrding their transnational resources. Romanian and British residents in Spain possess the common status of European citizenship, but do not have a similar array of opportunities in the country of origin.

There are several puzzles related to these differentiated resources and opportunities. How do structured incorporation approaches compensate for lower group resources regarding political incorporation? Do Romanian and British residents manage to achieve a similar degree of non-electoral presence and influence in spite of having different 'starting points' and roadmaps for their

incorporation in Spanish political life? What role do various categories of transnational resources play in the non-electoral pathway to incorporation?

The main argument of the chapter is that the structured incorporation of Romanian immigrants does not necessarily lead to a higher degree of political inclusion in comparison to the 'laissez-faire approach' that the Spanish administrations have had towards EU15 residents. To that extent, the affirmative policies of inclusion do not circumvent the segmented incorporation produced by groups' organizational resources. But while local opportunities and group resources do not favour the Romanian community in comparison to the British, the transnational structure of opportunities has an empowering effect on the visibility and influence that the two groups have in the decision making process.

The following analysis presents and evaluates the degree of political incorporation of Romanian and British organizations regarding their level of inclusion in Spanish politics, i.e. high, medium, or low. This evaluation is based on organizations' degree of presence (representation) in formal consultative structures and/or enduring contacts with Spanish political actors in case these structures are not available. In terms of capacity to influence, I present organizations' main activities and the degree to which they manage to receive public support for their goals and proposals. Moreover, I also illustrate how they are actually perceived by Spanish political actors in terms of presence and influence. Finally, I present organizations' links and connections with transnational actors and institutions.

6.1 Immigrant organizations and political inclusion

6.1.1 Immigrant organizational incorporation

The concept of 'immigrant organizations' covers a wide spectrum of associational practices and behaviour. Morales et al. (2008) define a migrant organization as 'a formally organized group whose members are not financially

recompensed for their participation (apud Knoke 1986:2) and where at least half of its members (or board members) are of immigrant origin' (Idem: 3). The authors distinguish between migrant organizations and organizations for immigrants, whose majority of members are nationals and which are devoted to working for migrants. Following this definition, this chapter focuses on the political incorporation of the immigrant organizations falling in the former category.

Immigrant organizations can be of various types. They can function as cultural associations whose main goal is to promote the culture of the country of origin, to socialize and to give socio-economic support to their members. Immigrant organizations can also focus their activities around religious and charitable goals (Bloemraad 2008: 26). Several studies show that immigrant organizations can also have a political profile, often representing chapters of the political parties in the country of origin (Levitt 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2013; Recchi et al 2012).

Briefly recalling the theoretical discussion in chapter one (Table 2.1), immigrant organizations differ in their ability to establish formal and informal contacts with political actors as well as to be present and promote their demands or interests in the process of policy making. Table 6.1. presents graphically a way to evaluate and measure the non-electoral pathway to host country's politics by considering migrant organizational inclusion in the political process. It ranges from lack of contact with local politicians to responsiveness and inclusion in the policy process (Bloemraad and Ramakrishnan 2008).

Table 6.1. Immigrant organization incorporation indicators

Presence			***Influence***	
No incorporation	Sporadic contacts with local politicians	Representation in immigration councils/enduring contacts with local politicians	Involvement of the organizations in policy-making	Material support/responsiveness to organization' demands

Source: own elaboration starting from Bloemraad and Ramakrishan (2008)

Organizations with a high level of incorporation have both presence and influence over the policy process. Those with a medium degree of inclusion have regular contact with host country political actors but have a low degree of influence. This may be manifest, for example, in a limited amount of material support received from host country administrations and a sporadic involvement in political programmes and policies. And lastly, excluded organizations are those that lack the support and formal recognition of political actors and institutions in the host country.

6.1.2 Explanations of organizational political inclusion

This model, as proposed in the first chapter, aims to explain how British and Romanian immigrant organizations differ in terms of achieving various degrees of incorporation outcomes. To that end, the model discusses three broad hypotheses related to how group resources and structures of opportunities in the host country and at the transnational level lead to differences in incorporation outcomes between groups.

The first hypothesis that structures the subsequent analysis (H1a in Chapter II) argues that the development of a strong organizational infrastructure contribute to increasing group visibility in the residence context. Following Fennema (2004) and Morales and Ramiro (2011) I define the organizational infrastructure of a group as the totality of immigrant organizations in an area which are connected by overlapping memberships, interlocking directorates or joint collaboration and cooperation. The strength of immigrant groups' organizational infrastructure is measured by its density, connectedness and organizational filling. In Fennema's (2004) terms, organizational density is operationalized as the number of organizations divided by the number of immigrants in an area. The degree of connectedness refers to the number of overlapping memberships of board members in various associations or the

number of connections that one organization has with other organizations. Organizational filling refers to the perceived mobilization potential and membership rates of the (main) immigrant associations of a group. As chapter one explains, the strength of the organizational infrastructure can be enforced by group-related factors such as members' socio-economic resources, political culture in the country of origin and patterns of accommodation in the host society (Landolt and Goldring 2009; Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2009).

The second hypothesis discussed here (H2 in Chapter II) makes the connection between group resources/visibility and the type of integration policy regarding the respective immigrant group. Low levels of group resources do not necessarily lead to political exclusion, due to the compensatory effect of structured/preferential integration policies towards groups with low resources. Conversely, non-structured/laissez-faire integration policies towards resourceful groups do not necessarily entail political exclusion, due to high levels of group resources. The reason is that higher levels of group resources boost the strength of the organizational infrastructure, which in turn is positively related to political incorporation outcomes. At the same time, preferential treatment in integration policies alleviates the negative effect of low levels of group resources in the processes of non-electoral incorporation.

The main indicators of a structured integration approach are: a) if the group is regarded as a 'priority' community in national, regional and local integration policies; b) if the group is targeted by special measures, such as extra funding or socio-economic programmes, which are made manifest in symbolic and material support for the group's organizations and individual members; c) if group representatives (organizations) are invited to take part in immigration councils; d) if group representatives (organizations) are invited to collaborate in the formulation and/or implementation of immigration-related measures. As the previous chapter shows, Romanians qualify as a group that benefits from a

structured integration approach, while in the case of the British the integration philosophy is rather a policy of laissez-faire.

The third hypothesis discussed (H5a and H5b in Chapter II) is related to the role of the transnational structure of opportunities and networks. Transnational opportunities refer to home country and EU citizenship entitlements, as well as to networks with cross-border/international organizations that provide resources, information and support to immigrant organizations. I argue that these factors have an empowering effect on immigrant organizations. On the one hand, transnational opportunities can be translated into symbolic and material support for immigrant organizations in the context of residence, which increases their visibility and the strength of their organizational infrastructure. On the other hand, transnational political and social actors, through their direct connections with host country actors and institutions, may lobby for and support immigrants' claims.

6.2 Methodological considerations

As already discussed in the methodological chapter, the organizations selected for studying Romanian migrants' non-electoral incorporation are cultural associations and religious congregations in six localities from the Community of Madrid (Table 3.2). I interviewed the federations of Romanian associations and immigrant organizations from various towns in the metropolitan area of Madrid. I spoke to local councillors dealing with immigration as well as local and regional representatives of the Popular Party (PP) and the Spanish Workers' Party (PSOE). I also interviewed representatives of the regional administrations that work with immigrant associations. Other important interviewees have been representatives of Romanian political parties that represent transnational party chapters in As most of the Spanish interviewees claim that churches are actually the most prominent organizations of the Romanian community, I went to various churches

and interviewed the Orthodox priests and the Adventist and Pentecostal pastors in the selected localities.[4]

The information obtained through interviews has been complemented by press research on Romanian immigrants in Spain. Therefore I considered four different types of media/sources: 1) the Spanish national and regional press using the Factiva search engine (2008-2011); 2) a Romanian online database (www.ziare.ro) compiling most of the Romanian national press (2007-2011); 3) immigrant newspapers in Spain as *Romani in Lume* and *Noi in Spania* (2007-2011); and 4) internet news related to the Romanian community and its organizations in each of the research sites selected

The organizations selected for the qualitative approach to British residents' non-electoral incorporation cover a wide spectrum of leisure, charity and contentious organizations. They are located in the eight localities from Alicante province, the Valencian Community listed in Table 3.4. As in the Romanian case, I interviewed representatives of British organizations, local councillors related to immigration, representatives of Spanish political parties and representatives of British parties in Spain in each of the research sites mentioned. I triangulated and complemented the information obtained with various media sources: 1) Spanish national and regional press using the Factiva search engine (2008-2011); 2) British national media using the Factiva data base (2008-2011); 3) British newspapers in Spain such as *Costa Blanca News;* 4) internet news related to the British community and its organizations in each of the research sites selected.

[4] see Annex for a complete list of interviews

6.3 Romanian organizations

6.3.1 Strength of organizational infrastructure

Romanian organizations in Spain are divided into two broad categories: socio-cultural immigrant associations and religious organizations, Orthodox and Neo-Protestant, (Buitrago et al 2006; Pajares 2007; Sandu et al 2009; Tamames et al 2008). According to the Romanian embassy, as of 2012 there were 154 Romanian associations and 103 churches that serve the Romanian community in Spain. The largest number of associations can be found in the Community of Madrid (56) and of Valencia (26). Many of the associations are located in province capitals, although the number of Romanians in those specific localities is not high. Regarding the churches, the overwhelming majority are Orthodox (76) followed by Pentecostal (9), Greek Catholic (8), Adventist (5), Roman-Catholic (3) and Baptist (1).

The majority of the Romanian organizations were established between 2000 and 2005, although there is a large degree of volatility and instability related to the landscape of Romanian organizations in Spain. Thus, some organizations that had formed in the early 2000s did not last a decade, while new ones appeared and disappeared after 2007, mainly as a consequence of internal struggles and dissent (Buitrago et al 2006; interviews).

Romanian organizations in Spain display a medium-low level of organizational infrastructure. At the aggregate level in Spain, the density of associations per 100,000 Romanian immigrants is 19. Aparicio and Tornos (2010) find that the associational density for 100,000 Romanians is 15 only focusing on Madrid, Valencia, Murcia and Andalucia. Merely considering Community of Madrid, the density of Romanian organizations is 28 cultural associations and 20 religious organizations per 100,000 residents. However, in comparison to other groups, Romanians have the lowest associational density. For example, in 2008-

2009 immigrants coming from the Dominican Republic had 63 associations per 100,000 residents, while the Peruvians had 43 (idem: 58).

Romanian cultural associations are clustered into two federations. In spite of this formal connectedness, their degree of collaboration and cooperation is not necessarily high (Buitrago et al 2006). Previous research and my own fieldwork have come across a divided associational landscape, with newly formed associations that split from old ones and with internal and sometimes public conflicts among members (interview AAPR, 2009). Religious organizations have a higher degree of collaboration, especially the Neo-Protestant ones. Adventist and Pentecostal churches undertake joint projects and support a high degree of mobility among their believers.

It is difficult to evaluate Romanian organizations' membership rates, since the official register numbers do not correspond with the actual number of people who participate in their activities on a regular basis. Overall, the association leaders declare that they have between 100 and 300 registered members, but that they can usually count on the presence of roughly 30 people at the events they organize. Nonetheless, religious organizations have much higher participation rates. Although the orthodox priests and Neo-Protestant pastors do not give specific numbers, they claim to have a 'full room' at every Sunday and Saturday service.

6.3.2 Highly incorporated organizations

The Federations

The Federation of Romanian immigrants in Spain (FEDROM) is the Romanian organizational structure that is best placed and connected to the Spanish administration at the national, regional and the local level in the localities it operates. The federation is a permanent member of the Consultative Forum for the Integration of Immigrants of the Ministry of Labour and Social

Affairs and of the Council of Associations of the Madrid Community. FEDROM also has a strong collaboration with the Europe Direct Centre in Coslada, organizing joint events related to the social and economic integration of the Romanian immigrants and to their rights as European citizens.

The federation is composed of 26 associations and started its activity in 2002, at the initiative of a Spanish association militating for peace and solidarity (MPDL), which wanted to unite the Romanian associations of that time in a representative entity. Initially, the Adventist and Pentecostal associations from the Valencian Coast and Madrid community were the core members of the Romanian Federation, but subsequently newer laic organizations from the Castellon and Madrid area became the main actors and leaders inside the federation. The federation's president is a Spanish-Romanian public servant who used to have strong links with the workers' unions in the Madrid region (interview president FEDROM, 2009).

Since 2004, FEDROM has performed various activities related to the cultural and linguistic identity of the Romanians. It offers legal consultancy for immigrants and has several local integration initiatives in collaboration with the local administrations of Madrid Community localities. It lobbies for issues related to Romanians' rights in Spain, as, for example, the equivalence of driving licences and recognition of working rights after Romania's accession to the EU. Related to political integration, the federation organizes information campaigns for the Romanians to register themselves in the electoral census, in order to be able to vote in the local elections in Spain and the European elections. In collaboration with the Department for Romanians Abroad, FEDROM organizes Romanian language and civilization classes for Romanian children in Spain and for the public servants of the Madrid Community government. In 2011 alone, five out of eight of the projects funded by the Department for Romanians Abroad in Spain were initiated by FEDROM.

The Federation of Romanian Immigrants in Europe (FADERE) and its core organization, the Association for the Development of Romanian People in Europe (ADERE), are known to have special links with the Romanian president, T. Basescu, and with the former president of the Madrid Community, E. Aguirre. FADERE was initiated in 2008 by expanding the scope and collaborations of ADERE under a larger umbrella of associations and goals. Although its target is to reach the Romanian diaspora in Europe and beyond, FADERE's leader acknowledges a special relation with the regional government in Madrid, from where the federation receives most of its funding.

FADERE has various cultural and social projects directed at Romanian immigrants from the Madrid Community, development programmes in African countries and social projects in Romania. The Federation leader also declares that he received the support of the Madrid government to build a house for poor people in Bucharest (interview, president FADERE, 2009). FADERE received substantial support from the Madrid Government in order to organize the Congress of Romanians abroad in 2008, whose guest of honour was Romanian president Basescu. In the political field, FADERE's president is one of the most visible association leaders campaigning for the Popular Party in local elections in Madrid. Discussing the federation's relations with the Spanish political actors, the FADERE president considers that

> 'The politicians want to see that you are faithful to them. In a way they are right…If they give you money to do this project for the Romanians, it is normal to expect something in return' (interview, president FADERE, 2009).

Yet, not all the projects proposed by the federations are successful. One of the issues for which both FEDROM and FADERE fought is the lifting of working restrictions in Spain for Romanian residents. Nonetheless, none of their intents has been successful. To that extent, the federations have a high degree of incorporation in what regards their presence and contacts with Spanish politicians, as well as their success in having various cultural and social projects

funded. Nevertheless, their capacity of influence is small regarding topics that are not/different than the Spanish government agenda in terms of immigrant integration.

The Orthodox Church

The Romanian Orthodox church created an archbishopric in Madrid at the end of the 1970s, but it was only after 2000 that smaller Orthodox churches were formed in various Spanish towns and villages, at the request of the immigrants. One of the oldest 'bottom-up' funded churches is in Alcala de Henares, where in early 2000 the president of the Association for the Support of the Romanian People (AAPR) and a young Romanian priest lobbied their country of origin administration and church archbishop in order to receive the green light for the celebration of the mass in Alcala.

Orthodox churches provide their believers with important information and support, especially after arrival. At the entrances there are various noticeboards, listing jobs and cheap accommodation (Pajares, 2008). At the same time, the priests and congregation members help the newcomers with important information about the rights and facilities they can find in Spain. Sometimes, the churches help the immigrants in need with shelter and other social benefits, but only in special cases. The Orthodox priest in Arganda explains that the church is not 'any type of social organization' in the sense that it does not have an official programme of social assistance. When it is possible, the members collect money or offer other types of goods in order to help another parishioner. However, this is not a common practice.

The Orthodox Church has strong links with the local administrations, the Catholic Church and Romanian politics. Romanian Orthodox churches in the localities studied are not formally present in immigration councils. Nonetheless, they are acknowledged and contacted by Spanish politicians in order to

collaborate and give support in various projects oriented towards the Romanian communities. Apart from being co-opted in the implementation of local immigration policy initiatives, the influence of Romanian Orthodox churches is visible especially in relation to the support they receive from Spanish administrations in order to build new churches.

In Alcalá de Henares, the construction of the Orthodox church building was one of the most commented issues in the local press at the beginning of 2007, a few months before the local Spanish elections. The opposition and the other migrant groups more or less openly criticized the local administration's decision to 'support the construction of a cult place for a foreign population', while the migrant leaders from the area all stressed their role in lobbying the authorities on this issue. In spite of the criticism, the mayor declared that he 'likes to take care of his migrant community'. However, in his statements the mayor assured the native population that the city ceded the plot for a limited period. In a few years, the Romanians would return to their homeland and in consequence the church would become the town's property (B. Gonzalez, mayor of Alcalá de Henares, interview *La Sexta*, 14.05.07).

The year 2010 brought a shift in the public political discourse. In a much-publicised meeting, the president of the Community of Madrid and the Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox church laid the first stone of the future Orthodox Cathedral in Madrid. This Cathedral will serve the Romanians in Spain and Portugal and fulfil several other functions, such as the provision of social services and legal advice. As the Councillor for Immigration declared, the construction of this temple is proof of the common Christian principles that Europeans share (Interview with the Madrid government councillor for Immigration in *ABC*, 19.04.2010).

Besides the collaboration with local administrations, the Orthodox churches have been involved in social projects with the help of the local Catholic churches (Dascalu 2011). The Catholic churches have developed over the past

thirty years a dense network of NGOs (the most prominent being Caritas) that offer social assistance to immigrants in situations of social exclusion, as well as information and legal orientation. Since the onset of Romanian immigration to Spain, the Catholic Church has been a faithful friend of the Romanian priests and their organizations. In many towns, the service is celebrated in Catholic churches and the Spanish priests offer support for the integration of their orthodox counterparts (interview Orthodox Priest Coslada, 2009).

Apart from the Catholic Church, the Romanian state is another key actor that supports Orthodox Church' activities among its emigrated communities. The central role of religion as a marker of national identity is stipulated in the Law of Romanians Abroad (299/2007). According to this law, the state supports the maintenance and affirmation of the Romanian identity in its cultural, linguistic and religious manifestations among the emigrated communities and Romanian minorities in the neighbouring countries. One example is the lobby pursued by the Romanian embassy in Madrid in order to convince the local and regional authorities in Spain to cede properties for the establishment of Romanian churches (interview Orthodox Priest Coslada, 2009).

The immigrant religious actors and institutions have also gained visibility in the relation between Romanian politicians and the emigrated communities. Since the referendum in 2007, president Basescu has travelled to Spain several times, in order to participate in the Congress of the Romanians Abroad and to conduct other official visits. Other party leaders from both the left and right of the political spectrum also established contacts with religious representatives and paid various visits to the Sunday services held in diaspora communities. As many declare, the church is important due to the fact that it is the only institution that is able to connect and bring together the Romanian community.

6.3.3 Moderately incorporated organizations

Socio-cultural organizations

Cultural organizations like Asociación de Rumanos de Bruenete, Dor Roman in Arganda del Rey and Integra Mas in Alcala have enduring contacts with local politicians, although they do not participate in regional and national immigration forums. Due to the fact that local governments in the abovementioned localities did not form immigration forums or councils, the leaders of these organizations contact local politicians 'whenever it is needed'. These associations were established between 2006 and 2008, in order to 'promote tolerance and integration' of the Romanian immigrants in Spain. An important role in the establishment of these organizations was played by local administrations. Local governments encouraged the establishment of Romanian entities in order to foster dialogue and achieve better knowledge of the needs of the Romanian communities in each locality (interview city hall councillor Arganda del Rey, 2009; interview Integra Mas Alcala 2012).

The activities of these associations are diverse, such as Romanian holiday celebrations, voter registration campaigns before Spanish local elections and language and legal support for Romanian immigrants. The core cultural projects focus on celebrating the National Day and other Romanian holidays. Dor Roman association also has a literary circle and a women's circle that gather periodically.

The Romanian state has not been active in supporting the activities of these associations. The migrant organizations managed to obtain a limited amount of financial support through the Department of Romanians Abroad funding schemes. The association leaders declare that they are contacted especially before elections in Romania and for this reason they do not perceive home country government as truly interested in the life of the Romanian communities abroad.

Homeland political parties, instead, contacted the associations extensively around the time of their establishment. However, several association leaders considered that they should not be identified with a specific political party in Romania and, consequently, the relations with homeland political parties remained distant during the past years. As one association leader declares, Romanian parties do not necessarily need immigrant associations, as they established their own chapters abroad. Some associations chose to inform their members and supporters about various political proposals, 'without taking sides'.

The associations are only halfway to achieving political incorporation for several reasons. Their relations with the administrations are mainly top-down. They respond to city hall calls in terms of specific projects that local governments plan to implement among the local immigrant community. These organizations do not participate in the agenda setting part, but only in the implementation. Moreover, the associations perceive that they receive support for only a small part of their proposals. Local governments usually provide an office space and give limited funding for one or two projects a year. Some of the associations have also received funding from the regional government in order to organize the celebration of the National Day of Romania. For the rest, the associations struggle to survive on the benevolence and dedication of the most active members. As one association leader declares, 'the politicians do not want to be perceived as paying too much attention to us, because the Spanish constituents may not like it' (interview association leader under anonymity, 2013).

Spanish political actors' perception of these associations is ambivalent. The main negative comment is related to organizations' capacity to mobilize and establish connections with the Romanian immigrants. The Spanish do not invoke fear of backlash, but rather a limited level of visibility of these associations among Romanians. Churches are perceived as having larger membership rates and resonance among the immigrants. Nonetheless, a few medium incorporated association leaders are perceived as hard working and trustworthy. For some (in

Brunete and Alcalá de Henares) the recognition came as nomination on candidacy lists in the 2011 local elections.[5]

The Adventist and Pentecostal churches

The Adventist and Pentecostal churches are other visible institutions in the processes of political incorporation of the Romanian immigrants. They collaborate with local administrations in various integration policies and programmes. Nonetheless, they receive less official support than the Orthodox Church, relying mainly on members' resources and dedication.

While the strengthening of the Orthodox organizations in the diaspora owes a great deal to the support of the homeland government, the Adventist and Pentecostal churches became visible and influent due to the national and transnational networks of their believers. The arrival of the first Romanians in Spain, mostly Adventists and Pentecostals, took place in the early nineties (Serban and Grigoras, 2000; Diminescu, 2004; Constantinescu, 2003). The consolidation of these churches is generated by migratory networks based on kinship and close acquaintances (Constantinescu 2003). Spanish Adventists and Pentecostals have also offered help to the first Romanian believers who arrived in Castellon and Coslada (Pajares, 2007; 2008).

Just as the Orthodox Church, the Adventists and Pentecostals provide various services for the community, albeit in a much more formalized manner. For many early Romanian migrants, both Orthodox and Adventists, the first destination they had when arriving in Spain was the Adventist temples. There they could find temporary accommodation and often jobs on the black market. Most of the members of the Adventist church declare that they receive help from their ministers and that the churches from all over the world support mobility between their members. This kind of support is usually formalized in letters of

[5] This topic is further developed in chapter VII.

recommendation that the migrant be well received in the Adventist church from the country she chooses to immigrate. As opposed to the Orthodox Church, which does not have a practical strategy regarding the socio-economic support of its believers, the Adventist church covers more than the spiritual needs of its members. It organizes various spare-time activities, from talks about morality and family and extra-curricular education to cooperation in order to help a member in deep need.

The mobilizing capacity of the Neo-Protestant churches is what also prompts Spanish politicians to establish a dialogue with them on immigration issues. For example, the local government official in charge of immigration and integration in Coslada declared to the local newspaper that the collaboration with the Romanian churches has been very fruitful. Birth control, drug dependency and town cleaning are some of the projects that have been successfully completed with the help of the churches (*Global Henares*, 15.07.2010). Adventists and Pentecostals are also engaged in social projects and asked the local administration in Arganda del Rey for support in order to create a centre to deal with alcoholic or homeless Romanians. In spite of receiving growing attention from the political actors in Spain, Neo-Protestants do not benefit from public support to construct churches. Most of the Adventists and Pentecostals in Madrid gather in warehouses that the local municipality or their Spanish counterparts allow them to use. The Pentecostals in Coslada contributed volunteer work and money in order to remodel the warehouse destined to them.

The visibility of Neo-Protestant churches among emigrated Romanians determines Romanian political actors to adapt to the religious pluralism of the Diaspora. For example, president Basescu visited the Pentecostal and Adventist churches, received a bible as a gift and stressed the important role of the pastors as moral guardians of the community. During electoral campaigns, Romanian political parties also liaise with Neo-Protestant churches in order to disseminate

their message. Nonetheless, Neo-Protestant churches do not receive any material support from the Romanian state.

6.3.4 Organizations with a low level of incorporation

Apart from the 'winners' of the incorporation processes there are associations that have limited resources and do not manage to maintain their activity. They consider that the competition for local and regional subsidies is fierce and they believe that they do not receive enough support. For this reason these associations have neither a physical headquarters, nor members who meet regularly.

This is the case, for example, of the Association for the Support of the Romanian People (AAPR) in Alcala. AAPR was funded at the beginning of 2000 and developed several cultural and social projects for the Romanians. Although the association is part of the town immigration forum, its relations with the local political actors haven often been contentious. The AAPR president took a critical stance towards the lack of material support from the local administration in several declarations in the local press. Before the local elections of 2007, the AAPR leader courted both PP and PSOE and, after failed negotiations, made public the intent to create his own party. These actions generated the isolation of the association and the perception that its leader is mainly interested in entering Spanish politics.

Nonetheless, the AAPR leader is quite popular among the Romanian community and the press. The local newspaper, *Diario de Alcala*, interviews him every time there is news related to the Romanian community. But as a local politician declares, being visible in the press does not translate into more cohesion and collaboration among the immigrants. The president of the Romanian-Hispanic Center, (CEPI) an institution subordinated to the Madrid Government and responsible for the integration of immigrants thinks that:

> 'I know him well and I collaborate with him [the president of AAPR]. Every time there is an accident involving the Romanians in Alcala he is present. And he gives statements to the press. But is this important? No, I think it is not… […] The Romanians do not trust their association leaders. They are suspicious. If you want to find the Romanians together come to CEPI or go to the church.' (Centro Hispano-Rumano president in Alcalá de Henares, 2009).

Summarizing this section, it can be argued that the strength of the Romanian community is weak, with 'isolated' cultural associations and religious organizations. Although the latter are perceived as having a higher degree of legitimacy among Romanian immigrants, their promotion as immigrant representatives actually suggests the failure of 'civic' socio-cultural organizations to represent immigrants' interests. The weakness of Romanians' organizational infrastructure did not preclude, and in part is the reason why, immigrant organizations are formally included in immigration councils or invited to collaborate with local authorities to implement socio-cultural programmes. However, formal inclusion does not affect how these organizations are generally perceived by Spanish political actors: as lacking influence, both in the process of decision-making and as immigrant representatives. It may be argued, therefore, that the structured integration approach may lend visibility to immigrant organizations that otherwise lack the necessary resources, but it does not entail that these organizations are seen as 'equal' dialogue partners in the political process.

6.4 British organizations

6.4.1 Strength of organizational infrastructure

British associations display different organizational patterns from the Romanian ones. It is difficult to find an *immigrant organization* per se, whose main objective is to preserve and organize events related to the culture of the country of origin. Even if they are called 'British', they may be dedicated to

fundraising and charity. Others are contentious organizations that fight against legal injustices in their areas of residence. These various types of activities entail three broad types of organizations: the rights guardian type of association, focused on defending British and other Western European residents' rights, charity organizations and leisure-oriented associations and clubs.

According to the National Registry of Associations (RNA), as of 2012 there are only 17 organizations whose names contain the word 'British' or 'británico'. As already mentioned in Chapter V, Britons do not tend to form ethnic associations but join and usually lead international charity organizations and European citizens' associations.[6] Taking these criteria into account, the RNA lists around 60 organizations with these characteristics[7]. Most of the organizations are located in the Malaga and Alicante provinces, with only a few on the Catalan coast and Madrid. Due to the lack of precise official data, there is no possibility to estimate the organizational density of the British community at the level of Spain. Secondary sources claim that there are 43 British and European residents' associations in the Alicante county[8], which means that there are approximately 33 associations per 100,000 British residents (Huete 2013).

Although the difference in associational density between Romanians in Madrid Community and the British in Alicante county is not substantial (28-33, excluding religious organizations), their levels of connectedness significantly According to various interviewees, the British residents are linked to various associations that serve different purposes. As opposed to the Romanian

[6] Expat newspapers and web pages providing lists of 'expat club as well as interviews with British political entrepreneurs support this claim.

[7] The search words used in order to obtain a list of the abovementioned organizations are: 'británicos', 'british', 'residentes europeos', 'european residents', 'ciudadanos europeos', 'european citizens'; Lions; HELP; Rotary; U3A; Age concern; Abusos urbanísticos no. These search words are selected on the basis of interviews and press analysis of expat newspapers that list existing British organizations in one area, as for example Costa del Sol or Costa Blanca. The organizations that dedicate their activity to environmentalist and urban planning issues usually contain 'Abusos urbánisticos' or 'European residents' in their name.

[8] European residents associations refer to organizations that include more nationalities. I did not take into account associations that were oriented towards a specific nationality as for example the Belgian Club, French associations or Dutch associations.

organizations that perceive multiple membership as a sort of betrayal, the British organization leaders interviewed consider that it is normal to participate in leisure, charity and rights guardians associations at the same time. 'Actually, an active member of one is also a dedicated member of the other', as several interviewees declare (interview AFPO 2010; interview Lions Club 2010; interview AUN 2013).

British organizations in Spain are not present in the national or regional consultative forums on immigration. This is mainly explained by the Spanish institutional logic that associates these forums with the economic migration coming from third countries or Eastern Europe. Due to the fact that the British and the other Western Europeans are not regarded as immigrants, their collective incorporation occurs on a more contextual basis. Most of the British associations deal with the local administration and with the Alicante county government (diputación). The latter has a special department called *European Citizens,* whose main aim is to be in contact with the community and to solve inasmuch as possible the social problems that may arise. The department head, M.A. Prieto, explains that the Alicante county government organizes regular meetings with all the European and non-European associations in the area, in order to listen to their problems and proposals.

6.4.2 Highly incorporated organizations: the rights guardians

Highly incorporated British organizations, as the rights guardian type, are not present in formal immigration councils but they have enduring (and contentious) connections with Spanish politicians and manage to influence local and regional policy agendas related to urban development. The rights guardian type of organization was born in order to fight the injustices and corruption related to urban development on the Valencian coast (Janoschka 2010). The main object of contention has been the urban development laws *Ley Reguladora de la*

Actividad Urbanistica (LRAU 1995) and its modification from 2005, *Ley Urbanistica Valenciana* (LUV). As Janoschka (20110) explains, the laws regulate the developments in the field of urban politics. The laws allow local administrations to change the zoning plan of an area whenever a developer presents a new project. Apart from the protected landscape, real estate construction is allowed anywhere in the municipality. The consensus of the property owners living in the areas affected by the new plans is not necessary. As many interviewees declare, they had to cede part of their land or pay for further developments in their neighbourhood, as lightening, water supply and roads, although this had not been stipulated in the original contract. The application of these laws generated various waves of conflicts between the residents (initially European and subsequently European and Spanish) and the local authorities.

> 'By and large most people didn't have problems until the late 1990s. In 1994-1995 they enforced this law. And the law says that in the public interest everybody can steal another's' property. For example, I have a 12,000 sq meter property. Somebody submits a plan that includes our property as if it didn't exist. In the end, they are going to take away our property and make us pay 400,000 € for infrastructure, which I already paid. It is basically stealing our property.' (interview president AUN 2010).

Two of the most illustrative organizations of the type are Abusos Urbanisticos No (AUN) and Association of Foreign Property Owners (AFPO). In spite of having similar goals, the two organizations use divergent, but equally successful strategies in their relation to the local and regional power. AUN was founded in 2002 and spread throughout Spain, having more than 3,000 members at present. The founding members are a former British accountant and a retired Canadian diplomat. The majority of the AUN affiliates are British, although various Spanish groups duplicated its structure in other parts of Spain, in order to fight local authorities on planning issues.

When the AUN initiators decided to form an association in order to complain against the LRAU, they found out that there were hundreds of Britons affected, many of whom did not speak Spanish, nor had a clear idea about the implications of the law. Prior to the first meetings, the AUN contacted the British

ambassador and the expat press, in order to get in contact with the rest of the residents. In the following years, the AUN leaders travelled seven times to the European Parliament and presented over 150 petitions at the Petition Committee. Their actions culminated with visits of MEPs from both the left and right and two EP reports denouncing the abuses of the Valencian laws. The pressure exerted by the European institutions and MEPs determined the cancellation of several residential projects that affect European residents and Spaniards' properties.

The European Commission took Spain to the European Court of Justice on the grounds that a member state fails to fulfil its obligations in the awarding of public work contracts. The first opinion of the Court was that the Commission failed to prove its case, but nonetheless, the impact of AUN actions has not been halted by Court's decision. It continues to act as an inspiration to the British residents and a point of reference for most of those who feel their property threatened by the Spanish authorities.

At a smaller scale and using mainly local resources, AFPO is one of the most active organizations in taking local authorities to court. Its president recognizes the titanic work of the AUN leader and says that their goal is also to defend owner's rights. AFPO is located in Calpe and concentrates its activities on issues that arise in the town area. It was formed in the late eighties by a British and a German, but eventually it became frequented mainly by British migrants, due to the language barriers. Its president says that he is a well-known figure at the city hall. He goes there almost daily and all politicians know him. AFPO representatives are invited to both party and plenary meetings. AFPO collects complaints from its members related to real estate projects that threaten their property or the environment and passes the message on to the local authorities in order to solve the complaints. When asked about the objective of the association, its president answered:

> 'The first is to talk to the local councillors and the mayor. And I am very well received. I have achieved a lot by talking to our local councillors and mayors. That's the first stage. How do you talk to the mayor and the councillors about corruption that involves them directly? You can't. So in these cases we go straight to the court. We go to our lawyer. We pay him money and he will see our man. We make our own judgments and investigations and we take them to the court, provided that we are going to win. Which we do in general. We never lost one.' (interview AFPO president, 2010)

Unlike the AUN leaders, the AFPO president considers that the EU institutions cannot be of much help. It is true that the EP and the Commission took a stance in response to the AUN complaints, but in the end the LUV did not change. Property abuses are ongoing and that is why he considers that the only way to win the fight against the administration is to go the Spanish way. This implies talking to the politicians and threatening with the Spanish courts. Some of AFPO president' s mistrust towards the European institution comes from the fact that 'too many European rules ruined England' and their involvement should therefore be avoided.

The rights guardian associations do not have regular contacts with their homeland authorities. During their protest activities, the AUN contacted British MPs, but this event was part of a wider strategy to get to be known in relation to various political actors in the homeland and abroad. The AFPO leader, instead, writes monthly to various MPs in order to protest against what they say in Parliament, but he has received no special attention so far.

6.4.3 Moderately incorporated organizations

Charity organizations are primarily community oriented. They relate to the local or regional administration in order to receive support for their activities (festivity rooms, public spaces, etc) but they do not intend to influence local policies or to obtain public funding. Rather, charity organizations are seen as the right hand of the social services department of the local administration because 'they provide services instead of receiving them' (interview S.T., local councillor Social Services, Teulada 2010). To that extent, charity organizations cannot be

labelled as fully incorporated, since their intention is not to enter and have a voice in local politics. Nonetheless, by the nature of their activities of giving support and assistance to immigrants and Spaniards alike, they have enduring contacts with local administrations.

Charity is an activity that cuts across various types of organizations. It can be performed by locally constituted groups and associations or by a branch of an international charity organization of which the immigrants had knowledge and experience in their home country. But even these internationalized charity organizations are actually built bottom-up, at the initiative of the members of local communities. The migrants decide to open a branch that respects the common lines of action and principles, but which is formed by and for the local community.

Locally constituted charity organizations can come in the form of service provision, especially for old Britons who are far away from their families. One example is HELP, which was formed in Denia in late seventies. Over the years, HELP gathered an important number of volunteers and donations, being one strong ally of the local hospitals in the Marina Alta area.

> ' [In late seventies] Barbara Bridgen, discussed with a group of fellow Britons at her Javea home the best way of offering assistance to any British person throughout illness, disability, old age, loneliness, or merely acting as interpreters.' (HELP Marina Alta 2013).

The international charity organizations coordinated by British residents range from The British Ladies Associations to Lions Club. Usually these organizations collaborate with local charity organizations and social service providers such as Caritas, but they also help locals on an individual basis. One of the main activities of these charity organizations is to organize events such as fairs where the members sell used goods and products. The funds collected are further distributed to children or poor families on an individual basis. The beneficiaries of their actions are seldom Britons, and more frequently Spaniards or other immigrants in the area.

6.4.4 Organizations with a low level of incorporation

Leisure associations and clubs are organized around a common hobby or activity and work mainly as socialization platforms. Some examples are Sporty People, Wine Lovers, We love sailing, etc., which may be coordinated by British migrants, but are open to all foreign and national residents in an area, provided that they speak English. These associations connect with local politics in order to obtain spaces for the development of their activities. Beyond these points of encounter, the leaders of these associations claim that they are apolitical and do not wish to be involved. They rely on donations from members and do not depend on public funding.

One of the most popular associations for the British retirees is University of the Third Age (U3A). It is present in several coastal localities in Alicante and Malaga and each branch works independently, although there are a few activities that are organized jointly. As the president of U3A Calpe declares, U3A has a total of 6,000 members of all nationalities, although the vast majority of them are British. The first U3A in Spain was formed in Calpe, in early 2000, at the initiative of two British residents who knew the organization's work from the UK. The main activity of the U3A is travel, although the organizations provide a wide range of activities from yoga to Spanish history lessons. As the president of U3A Calpe declares, 'It has to do with things that always people wanted to do all their lives and they didn't have either the time or the opportunity.' (interview president U3A Calpe, 2010).

Summarising this section, it can be argued that British organizations and their leaders are evaluated as having a wide support (especially U3A and The Lions) or as prominent contentious figures (AUN and AFPO). This is opposed to the Romanian case, where the organizations (except for a very small number of associations and churches) are perceived as non-representative. In the British case, as it will be shown in Chapter VII, local parties do not refrain from courting

the association leaders and invite them to their meetings. Nonetheless, most of the British association leaders declare that they chose to stay away from party politics. One of the justifications is that their organization is not political and therefore the roles would be contradictory. Another reason is that they have more influence if they do not get attached to any party. But what seems to play the decisive role for British representatives' distancing from the local politicians is related to corruption scandals and the perceived lack of real democracy of Spanish administrations. As several interviewees declare, they chose to stay away and to look at politics with a critical eye, be it publicly or privately.

6.5 Assessing the non-electoral incorporation of Romanian and British organizations

The analysis of the political incorporation of Romanian and British organizations in Spain exemplifies the practical consequences of differentiated integration policies, i.e., of a structured vs. unstructured/laissez-faire logic of incorporation (Barbulescu 2011; Bloemraad 2006) and its interactions with group and transnational resources. A larger amount of organizational resources in the British case has a positive effect on British associations' incorporation, but it does not necessarily entail that Romanian organizations, with their lesser organizational resources, are excluded from the political arena. This finding expands previous arguments related to the positive effect of a strong organizational infrastructure on individual migrants' political incorporation (Fennema and Tillie 1999, 2004; Fennema 2004). The present analysis shows that in the case of group level incorporation, a weak organizational infrastructure does not necessarily entail exclusion from the political process. Moreover, the empirical analysis of British migrants' non-electoral incorporation in Spain contextualizes the arguments related to the positive impact of organizational social capital on political presence (Morales and Ramiro 2011).

In both cases analysed, transnational resources and opportunities constitute positive assets in the incorporation process, as they confer visibility by providing material and symbolic resources to immigrant organizations. This finding expands the argument according to which organizations' transnational networks and connections do not presuppose a zero sum game in terms of incorporation in the host society (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Portes 2007). Transnational opportunities and connections do not contribute only to 'civic skill formation' (Portes 2007) but also to the local empowerment of immigrant political entrepreneurs.

6.5.1 Interacting group resources and political opportunities

The first hypothesis of the model proposed in Chapter II (Figure 2.1) argues in favour of a positive correlation between groups' organizational infrastructure and non-electoral inclusion. Hypothesis number two posits that the effect of organizational resources on non-electoral political incorporation is conditioned by the type of integration policy towards the group and vice-versa.

British associations are more resourceful in terms of financial means and strength of organizational infrastructure. Higher levels of economic resources mean that British organizations are more independent from funding from the local governments. Also, a mobilized and active immigrant community entails that British organizations have high rates of organizational filling and connectedness. In addition to their financial and civic participation skills, Britons' contentious patterns of accommodation in Spain, generated by the land grab scandal and local political corruption, contribute to a vibrant, visible and combative organizational sector. All these factors confer to British organizations more autonomy and prestige in relation to local politicians. This recognition by the local politicians and public servants does not refer exclusively to the charity organizations. Due to the fact that they rely mostly on donations from their own

members, the leisure associations and clubs, as well as the rights guardians, are perceived as autonomous and representative.

Romanian organizations, instead, are regarded as being dependent on public funding and, at the same time, as having a low degree of connectivity with the immigrant community. Except for the Federations, which are perceived as having a higher degree of connectivity and manpower, local cultural organizations are perceived as weak and unrepresentative. However, not even the Federations and the churches are considered by Spanish political actors as 'equal' dialogue partners. Their performance is evaluated as being better in comparison to the rest, but they are not considered to be the 'true' representatives of the Romanian community.

As part of a broader policy strategy to assist and include the organizations of *immigrant* groups in formal and informal consultative processes (PECI I, PECI II, regional and local integration policies), Romanian organizations are 'pooled in' the political process. Their level of formal inclusion depends primarily on the existence of institutional resources, i.e., formally organized immigration councils. To that extent, larger organizations that claim to have a wide territorial basis (as the Federations) have a higher degree of formal inclusiveness. Nonetheless, even in localities where these councils do not exist, local governments establish dialogue channels with migrant organizations. And yet, the dialogue does not necessarily entail that these associations manage to have 'real' influence.

As opposed to the structured approach towards the incorporation of Romanian associations, the inclusion of British organizations in the political process is based on a dialogue and problem solving logic. The fieldwork reveals that there are no special forums, but regular meetings; there are no general policies, but identification of problems and focused solutions (interview, Diputacio de Alicante 2010). To that extent, although the effect of preferential treatment in integration policies diminishes the negative effect of a weak

organizational infrastructure, it does not, however, entail that Romanian associations become more influent than the British ones.

6.5.2 Interacting group resources, transnational opportunities and political opportunities in the context of residence

Hypotheses 5a and 5b in Chapter II claim that organizations' access to transnational networks and structure of opportunities increases their degree of inclusion in the host society. The first mechanism explaining the connection is related to the material and symbolic support immigrant organizations and their leaders receive from transnational networks and opportunities. The second mechanism is associated with the direct institutional links between political actors and institutions pertaining to the same citizenship constellation. The incorporation of British and Romanian organizations in Spanish politics is tied to institutions and networks that span the borders of their country of residence. First, transnational opportunities refer to the transnational solidarity that develops among religious and charity groups and determines the empowerment of Romanian immigrant churches and British charity organizations. Second, it has to do with sending state actors who maintain contact with the immigrant leaders in the context of residence, empowering and supporting some over the others. And third, it is related to the role of the European institutions in supporting immigrants' demands and influencing the local political process.

Through its repertoire of hospitality (Itçaina and Burchianti, 2011) the Catholic Church not only develops various projects in the field of the social and the cultural integration of immigrants. It also positions itself and acts strategically in relation to the new management of religious diversity. The close collaboration and support it gives to the Orthodox churches and priests may be interpreted in the wider context in which a diversification of the religions and religious actors in Spain can be witnessed. To that extent, the Catholic Church strengthens its ties with certain actors that are closer to the principles of

'Christian humanism' than others. Although the fieldwork did not reveal conflictive relations with the Neo-Protestant churches, I could not find testimonies of collaboration either, as in the case of the Romanian Orthodox Churches. On their part, the Neo-Protestant churches receive support from other sister congregations in Spain and abroad.

A somewhat parallel process can be observed in the case of the charity organizations developed by British migrants. A transnational philosophy of social solidarity and, in some cases, members' previous socialization in these types of institutions in the country of origin is what determines the appearance of these organizations on Spanish soil. But, unlike the processes of religious solidarity between the Orthodox and Catholic churches or the Neo-Protestant ones, the transnational charity organizations do not develop and coordinate their activities in an institutionalized setting. The migrants themselves, and not the international organizations such as the Lions or the British Ladies, are the driving forces for the formation of their local branches on the Alicante coast.

Another transnational actor that is engaged in the processes of local political incorporation of these organizations is the state of origin. Through its promotion of national culture and identity across borders, the Romanian state supports certain associations and churches in the development of projects in the context of residence. Moreover, as Romanians abroad have the right to vote in the presidential and parliamentary elections of their country of origin, electoral politics is another field in which the associations position themselves and gain access to certain Romanian politicians. During the electoral campaigns directed at immigrants and due to the transnational contacts and collaborations that the Romanian politicians develop with their Spanish counterparts, the associations become the third party involved (Itzigsohn 2000; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). They gain visibility in the eyes of the Spanish politicians and therefore future possibilities to establish venues of dialogue. This point is illustrated by the case of Romanian federations and Orthodox churches whose transnational relations

with homeland political actors constitute another resource that the associations have in gaining visibility and influence in the Spanish political arena.

In the British case, the state of origin has no presence in the dynamics between the group organizations and the Spanish political arena. Although there are contacts between the British leaders and MPs back in the UK, these contacts do not result in any type of empowerment in the context of residence. The main explanation is the fact that the British government has no cultural policy oriented towards the expats and their organizations.

As opposed to the invisibility of the UK administration, the European institutions have played a crucial role in the processes of incorporation of the British (and other European) expat organizations. Through the activation of the European membership resources, and due to previous experience in international organizations, the AUN members managed to bring to the Alicante coast various rapporteurs of the EP and to determine the Commission to bring the Spanish regional government in front of the ECJ. But, as the AUN president admits, they were also 'lucky' that the European institutions have been open and receptive. He believes that filing the complaints a few years before would not have had the same odds of success. The EP changed its strategy to become closer its citizens in the early nineties, and this openness to the European citizenry is a relevant factor that determined its involvement in the 'land grab' scandal (interview AUN, 2010).

6.5.3 Non-electoral incorporation and electoral inclusion

The connection between the non-electoral and electoral pathways to political incorporation is centred on two questions: a) what are the connections between immigrant organizations, their leaders and electoral politics and b) how are they connected to the organizational sector that actually managed to become nominated and elected? This chapter answers the first question, while Chapter VIII focuses on the second.

The Romanian case shows that immigrant leaders are connected to political parties and that most of them have a specific ideology. The main indicator is the composition of federations: those who affiliate with FEDROM are perceived as left-wing (both in relation to Spanish and Romanian parties), while those supporting FADERE are considered to be close to the PP and the PDL Romania circles. Nonetheless, in practice, the association leaders interviewed do not follow the ideological paths of the federations and prefer to support parties that correspond to their own views.

Overall, Romanian association leaders and board members can be divided into two categories: the majority, consisting of those who would like to become elected councillors, and a small minority consisting of those who do not wish to get involved in politics. From the first category, only few have been approached to candidate in the local elections in 2011 (in Brunete and Alcala de Henares). The main reason for this is, according to parties' statements, that association leaders are not necessarily representative and trustworthy. To that extent, they are not perceived as being able to mobilize the vote of the Romanian community. Romanian association leaders explain the parties' reluctance to incorporate them as a sign that politicians are afraid of a natives' backlash. Actually, the perception that the Spanish public opinion might react negatively if Romanian immigrants become 'too integrated' in politics is what explains in Romanian association leaders' minds the relative distance between them and the parties and the insufficient support they receive from local governments.

The British case tells a somewhat different story. The majority of charity and leisure association leaders and board members do not wish to get involved in politics. This is mainly generated by the fact that they perceive their mission as 'civic and non-political' (interview U3A Teulada, 2010). Another reason is that in general, Britons have a negative evaluation of Spanish local politics. They see it as corrupt and 'jungle law' like (interview, U3A Calpe, 2010). The minority of rights guardian leaders who wish to enter politics do it by forming or joining local

parties that represent European residents' interests (the case of Javea and Benissa). In time, though, they become incorporated in mainstream parties, as chapters VIII and IX will show. On their part, Spanish political actors know that most British association leaders truly differentiate civic engagement from a political career. For this reason, they do not pursue a strategy of attempting to co-opt them, but they would be happy to include them in party organizations if British leaders changed their mind (interview PP Alicante, 2010).

In sum, the non-electoral pathway does not necessarily lead to more electoral incorporation in either case. In the Romanian case, the contacts established between Romanian organizations and Spanish political actors are an opportunity for local politicians to evaluate (negatively) their skills and activities. In the British case, civic and political engagement are often seen as antithetic. The contacts between the British political entrepreneurs and Spanish political actors also constitute an opportunity to evaluate (negatively) the performance of local institutions and actors for British organizational leaders.

6.6 Conclusions

The analysis in Chapter VI reveals the complex relations that exist between the immigrant organizations, the political and institutional opportunities in the receiving context, the transnational networks and institutions and the organizational resources they develop. The comparison of the two cases shows that structured opportunities for incorporation (formal and informal consultative councils or forums, special support for the community) do not necessarily entail a higher degree of incorporation (for a different argument, see Bloemraad 2006). On the contrary, where associations are perceived as being autonomous from government funding and as having a wide pool of members, this enables them to be perceived as equal collaborators of the administration.

Although structured incorporation policies do not entail a higher degree of incorporation of the Romanian associations in comparison to the British ones, they contribute to the formation of an immigrant elite that otherwise would have no means of entering the political arena. The downside of this process is the formation of a group of winners, the associations who manage to be present in these structures and to have contacts with the Spanish politicians. In consequence, this process entails a stratified degree of incorporation across the immigrant organization.

I have also argued for a transnational perspective on the process of immigrant group-level incorporation. As the cases show, the concept of transnationalism is not restricted to the emigrant-sending state dynamics, as understood by the classical migration literature (Basch et al 1994; Portes 2003). It reveals a cross-border philosophy of social solidarity that develops among the religious organizations or through the establishment of charity organizations in various places of residence. At the same time, it entails a strategic role played by the European institutions in empowering and supporting certain immigrant organizations in making their claim.

While this chapter focuses on the non-electoral pathway to incorporation, the following two chapters discuss the electoral venue. To that extent, chapters VII and VIII focus on the dynamics between the political parties and the immigrant political entrepreneurs of British and Romanian origin. The chapters explore what factors account for their presence among party candidates and elected representatives, as well as their capacity to influence the political process.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The electoral pathway to incorporation. Romanian and British candidacies in Spanish local elections

This chapter discusses the role of political parties in the incorporation of the British and Romanian candidates in the 2011 local elections in a large sample of Spanish localities. The previous analysis in Chapter V has already anticipated that the recognition of local voting rights for certain groups of non-EU residents generated a shift in parties' incorporation philosophy. Spanish parties' philosophy of inclusion in 2011 has evolved from a localized process of mobilization of EU15 voters to a national discourse that welcomes the recruitment and mobilization of all foreign-born residents. Nonetheless, the preliminary analysis in Chapter V already suggests variations in how parties approach the immigrant voters depending on the geographical location or the groups targeted The following analysis reveals how this national philosophy of incorporation has been put into practice in the case of Romanian and British residents and how it interacts with other party characteristics related to a rational, vote-getting behaviour.

In this chapter, electoral incorporation (nomination) is approached as 'occurrence', i.e., an event predicted by factors related to group and party behaviour. The central questions are a) where and why are Romanian and British candidates nominated? and b) do parties employ the same type of strategies of candidate recruitment for the two groups?

The analysis develops hypotheses 1b and 3a proposed in Chapter II. Hypothesis 1b argues that civic and political visibility increase the probability of

electoral incorporation. Hypothesis 3a assesses that groups' patterns of settlement in the host society influence parties' behaviour related to the incorporation of immigrant candidacies. Chapter VIII will take this analysis further and explore the phenomenon from a qualitative perspective, giving an account of the role of immigrant agency and transnational structures of opportunities in shaping the process of electoral incorporation.

The chapter uses a quantitative methodology based on the analysis of an original data-set concerning British- and Romanian-origin candidates and representatives in the Spanish local elections of 2011. The following section covers the theoretical underpinnings of the process of nomination of foreign-born residents in local politics. Sections two and three discuss the selection of cases. Section four gives a detailed description of our methods and data, while section five presents the results of the analysis.

7.1 Predictors of immigrant-origin candidacies

7.1.1 Group resources and visibility

The model proposed in Chapter II argues that immigrant-origin candidate nomination is a phenomenon shaped by groups' capacity to become visible and mobilized in the host country, factors related to party behaviour and the transnational structure of opportunities. One important indicator of visibility is groups' level of political mobilization (Bird 2003). A migrant group's level of political mobilization constitutes an asset for migrant entrepreneurs who wish to pursue a political career. At the same time, migrant political mobilization incentivise political parties to compete for the immigrant vote. The literature uses various measurements of the concept, such as level of voter registration and past turnout. Several studies argue that immigrant electoral mobilization is actually a function of the size of the immigrant community in one area (Dahl 1961; Maxwell 2012; Morales and Vintila 2012). Although the two variables are inter-related,

they do not necessarily measure the same phenomenon. In many cases, immigrant residents do not register or participate politically, a fact which accounts for a much larger community of residents in comparison to the community of voters. The following analysis distinguishes between the two variables and probes their relevance for the nomination of immigrant candidacies.

7.1.2 The interaction between group resources and party behaviour

Various studies related to the nomination and representation of immigrants argue that contemporary political parties are 'selective mobilizers' of immigrant electorates (Bird et al. 2011; Garbaye 2005; Jones-Correa 1998; Kittilson and Tate 2005; Maxwell 2012). The selective mobilizer type of behaviour presupposes that the incorporation of immigrant candidates is not unconditional. Rather, it is mediated by a set of contextual and electoral constraints that carefully weigh the gains and the losses related to the incorporation of immigrant candidacies.

Examples of such constraints are the level of electoral competition, the existence of a far right party in the locality or the neighbouring area and the number of parties entering the electoral race (Bird 2011; Garbaye 2004; Hero and Wolbrecht 2005; Kittilson and Tate 2005; Jones-Correa 1998). A low level of electoral competition (large votes/preferences distance between the main competitors) and the existence of a far right party have a negative effect on the probability of immigrant candidacies nomination. A greater number of parties, instead, is consider to be beneficial. Party competition is not fomented only by the distance between competitors, but also by the makeup of immigrant communities in a certain setting. As Teney et al. (2010) argue, parties manage to conquer local ethnic electoral niches, especially in contexts with diverse migrant populations.

Recent studies show that party ideology is not a significant predictor for migrant candidate incorporation, although leftist parties are the first to break the

barriers of race and ethnicity and promote the inclusion of 'visible' or negatively perceived minorities (Hero et al. 2000; Saggar and Geddes 2000; Da Fonseca 2011; Sobolewska 2013;). As Chapter V has already shown, both left and right oriented Spanish parties proposed and almost equal number of immigrant candidacies at the 2011 local elections (Zahonera de Agueda 2011). The analysis takes into account the ideological variable, but it is expected that the ideological differences are not relevant for predicting Romanian and British candidacies at the local elections.

The literature on the selective-mobilizer type of behaviour, however, pays little attention to how groups' status in the host society interact with the contextual constraints that motivate parties to nominate immigrant origin candidates. Party strategies are not disconnected from the trends in the attitudes and perceptions of native constituents. Rather, they seek a balance between the quest for a new pool of voters and behaviour that does not stir the native electorate's idiosyncrasies (Dancygier 2013). Parties may, thus, craft a list of 'safe' versus 'risky' immigrant groups, depending on the local environment. This is a difficult task, however, as parties rarely have accurate data on public opinion at the municipal level. Rather, parties' strategies are guided by national surveys, media discourse, and general perceptions of the majority-minority elections in each locality. As a consequence, contextual electoral constraints do not influence the process of incorporation uniformly across groups. They interact with how a group is perceived, received and settled in the host society and impact differently on the processes of nomination of distinct immigrant groups (H3a in Chapter II).

As the analysis in Chapter IV indicates, Romanians are labelled as 'the most disliked' group by the Spanish public opinion. Mass media frequently reports negative news about Romanians' patterns of settlement in the host society. The anti-Romanian episode in Badalona before the Catalan and local elections of 2011 is only one example, albeit the most publicized, related to the politicisation of Romanian immigration to Spain. On the contrary, the British are

not perceived as an immigrant group and in most of the cases their media portrayals are neutral or positive. Based on the facts and figures presented at length in the fourth chapter, it can be affirmed that Romanians are a representative example of a negatively perceived group, while Britons qualify as having a neutral, even positive public perception. It is expected, therefore, that political parties place Romanians on the list of 'risky' groups and evaluate Britons as a 'safe' group.

In order to illustrate how national origin and perception in the host society influence party behaviour, I propose a series of sub-hypotheses related to how structural electoral constraints operate in the case of Romanian and British candidacies respectively. Thus, fear of alienating native voters may overcome the electoral competition incentives and impede parties from mobilizing the immigrant vote. In these circumstances, the presence of a far-right party does not affect the nomination of candidates belonging to safe groups, as for example the British residents, but it may obstruct the incorporation of Romanians (H3a1). A greater number of parties is expected to benefit the Romanians, who are faced with a more difficult entrance into local politics than the Britons (H3a2).

The closeness of an electoral race will only have a positive effect on the incorporation of immigrant-origin candidates belonging to groups that benefit from a neutral or positive public image such as the British. Conversely, close electoral races will not necessarily incentivise parties to propose candidates representing a 'risky' or negatively perceived immigrant group as the Romanians (H3a3). Instead, a diverse ethnic community enhances party competition for the immigrant vote, which, in turn, increases the likelihood that parties will nominate immigrant-origin candidates representing visible or negatively perceived groups. In the case of a 'safe' group, on the other hand, the selection of candidates is not necessarily incentivised by party competition over a diverse immigrant vote. Party strategies depend in this case on a strategic calculus of how to allocate resources in order to win the immigrant vote. It is expected, then, that the level of diversity

of the ethnic community does not have an effect on the selection of candidates belonging to positively perceived groups such as the Britons (H3a4).

7.2 Data and method

The process of collecting the data on Romanian and British candidacies has already been explained in the methodological chapter. The following analysis is based on the Romanian and British residents data-sets respectively, which contain information on the existence of at least one candidate of these nationalities at the 2011 local elections in a large number of Spanish localities (636 in the Romanian residents data-set and 236 in the British residents data-set).

7.2.1 Dependent variables

The analysis is centred on two dependent variables: the probability of a Romanian resident to be nominated, and b) the probability of a British resident to be nominated. In consequence, the analysis uses logistic regression. For each of the localities I identified the Romanian and the British names on the list of candidacies presented at the 2011 local elections. I coded as '1' the localities where at least one Romanian or one Briton was present on any party list, and coded all other localities as '0' (see pages 74-77 for a detailed description).

7.2.2 Independent variables

The degree of electoral mobilization is measured as level of voter registration in one locality, since no data is available regarding the participation rates of the two groups in the 2007 local elections. As specified above, non-citizen residents in Spain must register up to two months before elections in the electoral census. It is expected that the larger the share of Romanian and British electors, respectively, the higher the probability that parties will compete for their

vote. The data regarding the British and the Romanian electors has been provided by the National Institute of Statistics. The data related to the total number of electors in each locality is available on the website of the Ministry of Interior. The analysis controls for the size of the immigrant community, calculated as the percentage of British and Romanian residents, respectively, out of the total number of inhabitants in one locality.

Regarding contextual electoral constraints, I have constructed four variables: the existence of far-right parties in a locality, the number of parties entering the electoral race, the closeness of the race in each setting and the diversity of the ethnic community. The localities in which the far right parties PxC, España 2000, and Falange de las Jons presented candidates in 2011 are coded as '1' and '0' otherwise. The number of local parties counts the number of party lists presented in each locality. Following previous studies (Gray 1976; Key 1949), electoral competition is constructed as a continuous variable that expresses the difference in percentages of the total number of valid votes obtained by the first two parties in the previous local elections of 2007. The previous elections are a good indicator of the closeness of the results in a given locality, since the parties do not have public opinion surveys for each municipality that measure the vote intention before the 2011 elections.

The variable related to the level of ethnic diversity in each locality is measured as the effective number of groups (N) in each locality (see Fearon 2003; Ruedin 2009 for a different measurement). The variable is calculated similarly to how Laakso and Taagepera (1979) calculate the effective number of parties in a legislature. It entails the effective number of components of a system (how diverse the system is) that should satisfy two conditions: a) if all components have equal shares, then N should be equal to the actual number of groups; b) and if all components except one have zero shares, then there is a single component group N=1 (idem: 5). The formula is:

$$N = e^{-\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i \ln(p_i)},$$

where pi is the share of each component in the system.

In the case of the Romanian residents data-set, I calculated the diversity related to three immigrant community components in each locality: the share of Romanians, Latin Americans and Other immigrants, respectively, out of the total number of immigrants. Together, these groups represent 100 per cent. I chose Latin Americans as they are the second largest group of migrants after EU residents and have had the right to vote and run as candidates in local elections since 2011. Thus, in a perfectly diverse locality N equals 3, while in a locality where Romanians are the dominant group N is 1. An intermediate level of ethnic diversity (around 2) entails that two groups have the largest share of immigrants, with a third one having a very small percentage. When N increases to 2.5, it suggests that the share of the two largest groups decreases and the third one gains in proportion. In reality, N is much larger, due to the fact that Latin Americans and the Other category of immigrants are heterogeneous groups comprised of various nationalities. In this case, the analysis relies on the 'lower bound' scenario of diversity, which entails that if N has a significant impact on nomination in a scenario with only three system components, then the relationship holds in contexts with an even larger number of components. In the case of the localities in the British residents data-set, the three system components are Britons, EU15 residents minus Britons, and EU12 and non-EU immigrants. I chose other EU15 residents minus Britons as one system component due to the fact that in most of the localities where Britons reside, the immigrant community is composed mainly of EU15 nationalities. It is also probable that parties target the block of EU15 voters separately from that of non-EU or EU12 residents.

The diversity of the ethnic community and its impact on political mobilization and representation is inter-related to groups' position within the

immigrant community. When a particular immigrant group increases its share among the foreign-born, it is easier for group members to mobilize and gain political influence (see McClain and Karning 1990 for the U.S. context). Although an increasing population of a migrant group may decrease the degree of ethnic diversity, the two concepts do not exclude each other. The same degree of ethnic diversity may be associated with distinct configurations of groups' share within the immigrant community. The analysis controls to that extent for the share of Romanians and Britons, respectively, within the immigrant population in a locality.

7.2.3 Control variables

As already specified in the theoretical chapter, the analysis does not focus on explaining intra-local or intra-regional differences, but it cannot be insensitive to variations that may arise due to the 'locality' effect. Nonetheless, the logic behind these differences lies in various configurations of the predictors discussed above, rather than in an essentialist role of the local or regional setting. Astudillo Ruiz (2010) argues that the institutional decentralization and the creation of autonomous communities after the end of the Franco era have also generated a process of decentralization of the state-level parties. The degree of decentralization does not imply full independence from the central office, but rather a growing level of power of both PP and PSOE regional leaders inside the general structure of the party. In the case of local and regional elections, the central office proposes a framework electoral programme that gives the main guidelines, while each regional organization is responsible for implementing and designing the electoral campaign in detail.

In consequence, the regionalization of the state-level parties, a steady increase in the role of the regional networks of power and the planning of the electoral campaign by each regional and sub-regional organization may lead to

variations across the autonomous communities in terms of approaching the migrant voters and immigrant-origin candidates. The analysis controls for the regional effect by introducing region dummies. It also controls for the level of urbanization. It is expected that larger localities have a positive impact on the nomination and representation of immigrant groups. This is because the number of nominees on the list and the number of council positions increases as the size of the locality increases.

7.3 Descriptive statistics

Table 7.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in each of the two data-sets constructed. An important difference between the two groups in the sample lies in their spatial concentration. Romanians make up more than 20 per cent of the total population in 18 Spanish localities, while Britons exceed this percentage in almost a quarter of the localities in the sample (53). This fact suggests that the British residents are concentrated in smaller localities, while Romanians are dispersed both territorially and in terms of share of the total population. Important differences can also be observed in relation to groups' levels of registration in the electoral census and their share of the total number of voters. In more than one hundred Spanish localities (50% of the sample), the British make up more than ten per cent of the number of registered voters, reaching almost 50 per cent in Arboleas. Romanians' share of the number of registered voters is much smaller, to the extent that there are only ten localities in which Romanians constitute at least ten per cent of the number of registered voters. The locality with the largest share of Romanian registered voters is Pradejon, in La Rioja. These findings contextualize the previous discussions related to the different levels of pre-electoral mobilization of the two groups, according to which, on average, Romanians' share of voter registration is 15 per cent, while Britons' is roughly 30 per cent.

The Romanians in the sample tend to be the dominant immigrant group in a higher proportion of localities than the British. Thus, in more than 300 Spanish localities (50%, Romanians are dominant among the foreign-born inhabitants, constituting at least 60 per cent of all immigrants in one locality. Instead, Britons are the dominant group in only 53 localities (22%). In roughly 112 localities, Britons constitute less than 30 per cent of the local immigrant population, which may be explained by virtue the fact that the community of European residents is often mixed and diverse.

Almost three per cent of the localities in the Romanian residents data-set have a far right party that presented candidacies in the local elections of 2011. In the British residents data-set, I was able to identify only two localities with far-right parties. As already discussed in previous studies, the autonomous community with the largest share of far-right parties in the sample is Catalonia (Hernandez-Carr 2011). Thus, twelve localities out of eighteen are situated in Catalonia, while four can be found in the Valencian Community. It is worth noting that the far-right parties in these localities are not the same across the two regions. While in Catalonia the dominant anti-immigrant party is Plataforma, in the Valencian Community it is España 2000. The latter can also be found in Alcala de Henares in the Community of Madrid, which is also the municipality where the PP organized its mass meeting with immigrant candidates before the local elections.

The number of parties (N) ranges between 1 and 11, but in almost ninety per cent of the localities in the Romanian residents data-set, N is lower than 5. In the British residents data-set, the number of parties is between one and nine. To that extent, the main players in the local elections are the PP and the PSOE, which can be found competing in almost all localities of the sample. The third and the fourth party are usually a regional party and a local political group, respectively.

The level of electoral competition across localities ranges from 0 to 96 per cent. Twenty per cent of the localities in the sample may be labelled as having a local hegemon party, since the distance between it and the second party exceeds one third of the votes. In 13 per cent of the localities in the Romanian residents data-set and in 16 per cent of the localities in the British residents data-set, the distance between the first two parties is less than five per cent of the votes. In relation to the diversity of the ethnic community, the mean in the Romanian residents data-set is 2.17, while in the British residents data-set it is 2.45.

Table 7.1. Description of the main variables.

Variable	***British residents***	***Romanian residents***
Percentage of the group out of the total number of inhabitants		
Min-max	0.05-0.48	0.05-0.58
Percentage of the group out of voters registered in the municipal electoral census		
Min-max	0.0006-0.18	0-0.47
Percentage of the group out of the total number of immigrants		
Min-max	0.09-1	0.14-1
Mean	0.59	0.47
Electoral competition (results 2007 elections)		
Min-max	0-0.95	0-0.95
Mean	0.20	0.22
Diversity of immigrant community		
Min-max	1-2.99	1-2.99
Mean	2.17	2.45
Far-right parties		
Yes	18 (2.83%)	2 (0.008%)
Number of parties competing in the 2011 elections		
Min-max	1-9	1-11
Number of inhabitants		
Min-max	100-203,686	100-101,091
Number of localities in which PP won most of the votes in 2007	107	255
Number of localities in which PSOE won most of the votes in 2007	88	259

Regarding the demographic variables, the localities in the two samples are small size, more than 90 per cent of them having less than 20,000 inhabitants. The proportion is similar to the overall number of Spanish municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants (94 per cent). In the Romanian sample, the number of localities with population between 20,000 and 50,000 is 19 (3%), while the municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants constitute only one per cent of the sample (seven in total). The largest localities in the Romanian residents data-set are Alcala de Henares, in the Community of Madrid, and Castellon, in the Valencian Community, with 200,000 inhabitants each. In the British residents data-set, the localities with more than 20,000 inhabitants constitute ten per cent of the sample. The largest locality is Torrevieja, with 100,000 inhabitants, followed by Orijuela. Both are in the Valencian Community, Alicante province.

Concerning the regional distribution, almost 50 per cent of the localities in the Romanian sample are situated in Castile-La Mancha and Aragon (Table 7.2). Notwithstanding, the highest number of Romanians can be found in the Community of Madrid, a fact which is in line with the national distribution. Also, the Romanians are the most concentrated in the Madrid and the Valencian communities, in comparison to a high degree of territorial dispersion in Aragon and Castile-La Mancha.

In relation to the territorial distribution of the British residents, Table 7.3 shows that the Valencia Community hosts more than 40 per cent of the localities and almost half of the total number of British residents in the sample. It is also worth noting that the British sample covers 62 per cent of all the British residents in Spain and 82 per cent of all the British residing in the Valencian Community. This implies that in this region, in almost all localities where British communities can be found, they form at least five per cent of the total population.

Table 7.2. Number of localities and Romanian residents by autonomous community in the Romanian residents data-set.

Autonomous Community	***Number of localities***	***Percentage of localities***	***Romanian immigrants by autonomous community***
Community of Madrid	54	8.49	87,756
Castile-La Mancha	191	30.03	52,653
Valencian Community	80	12.58	52,619
Andalusia	41	6.45	28,945
Catalonia	91	14.31	22,499
Aragon	104	16.35	17,883
Castile and Leon	50	7.86	4,611
Extremadura	7	1.10	3,799
La Rioja	10	1.57	1,875
Canary Islands	1	0.16	841
Basque Country	2	0.31	825
Navarra	4	0.63	321
Cantabria	1	0.16	81
Total	636	100	274,638

Table 7.3. Number of localities and British residents by autonomous community in the British residents data-set.

Autonomous Community	***Number of localities***	***Percentage of localities***	***British immigrants by autonomous community***
Valencian Community	103	43.22	117,310
Andalusia	95	40.25	75,113
Canary Islands	10	4.24	31,394
Balearic Islands	11	4.66	10,730
Murcia Region	5	2.12	9,671
Catalonia	12	5.08	861
Total	236	100.00	244,881

7.4 Parties, local contexts and political incorporation

Of the 636 localities of the Romanian residents data-set, 88 (13.88%) have at least one Romanian candidate on any party list presented in that respective locality for the 2011 local elections. In total, there are 97 Romanian nominees. Of the 236 localities with more than 5% British, 125 (53 %) have at least one British candidate on any party list. In total, there are 185 candidates. As the unit of analysis in the data-sets are the localities, the impact of party ideology on the probability of incorporation cannot be tested directly. Notwithstanding, the

descriptive analysis is useful in order to see whether certain parties tend to propose Romanian or British candidates more than others.

Romanian and British candidates are distributed evenly among the political parties, a fact which suggests that ideology is not an important factor in the process of immigrant candidate incorporation. The PP has incorporated 32 per cent of the British candidates and 26 per cent of the Romanian ones. Thirty-two per cent of the Britons and 25 per cent of the Romanians can be found on the lists of PSOE. The local independent parties[1] proposed 15 per cent of the British nominees and 21 per cent of the Romanian ones. Smaller numbers are found on the lists of the IU (3% of the Britons and 6% of the Romanians) and of the regional parties (9% of the Britons and 11% of the Romanians). The impact of group resources, visibility and local electoral constraints and locality-related variables is presented in Table 7.4, while Table 7.5 introduces the autonomous community dummies for the Romanian and the British group, respectively.

7.4.1 Group resources and party behaviour

Models 1-3 and 4-6 introduce sequentially the variables related to diversity of the ethnic community and group dominance within the immigrant community, for a better understanding of the interplay between the two variables. As Model 1 gives the best fit for the Romanian case and Model 6 for the British case, the predicted probabilities and marginal effects are calculated according to these estimations.

Regarding the role of group resources, contrary to expectations, the percentage of Romanians out of the total number of inhabitants does not have an impact on candidacies from this group. In the case of the municipalities in the

[1] Local independent parties refer to political parties that are formed only at the locality level, without a provincial, regional and national superstructure.

British residents data-set, I did not include the variable in the model due to its high correlation (0.89) with the variable related to the percentage of Britons registered in the electoral census. After testing separately the effect of the two variables, the (log) percentage of Britons in the electoral census gives a better fit of the model (AIC lower with 9 units). In the localities of the Romanian residents data-set, both variables could be included in the model, as there is not a high correlation between them (0.45), and the degree of tolerance is acceptable in both cases (0.75). This difference suggests that the proportion of British residents who register in the electoral roll is related to the proportion of Britons who reside in one locality. In other words, the pre-electoral mobilization is a uniform phenomenon between various localities. In contrast to that, Romanians' level of pre-electoral mobilization is stratified across localities.

The proportion of the British and respectively of Romanians relative to the total number of registered voters does have a positive effect. Although not shown in these models, testing the impact of this variable on its linear scale in the Romanian residents data-set does not have a significant effect. But after effectuating its logarithmic transformation, it influences positively the odds of incorporating candidates of Romanian origin. In the case of the Britons, the variable has a positive impact in both its linear and logarithmic scale. Notwithstanding, using its log improves the adjR2 (from 0.28 to 0.31) and gives a lower AIC with 30 units. In consequence, the probability of finding a Romanian or a British candidate increases for lower percentages of these groups relative to the total number of registered voters.

The share of immigrant electors is significant for both groups, albeit with a stronger effect in the case of British candidate incorporation. In Model 1, in the case of Romanians, it has a marginal effect of 0.04 and predicts a probability of incorporation of 3 per cent when the share of Romanian electors is 0 and all other variables are kept at means. This probability increases to 16 per cent when the share of Romanian voters is five per cent of the total number of registered voters

and reaches 23 per cent when Romanians make up nine per cent of the electors. It may be argued, therefore, that Romanians' level of pre-electoral mobilization influences positively parties' decision to nominate a candidate from this group, but only in a marginal sense. On the contrary, where Britons are mobilized and their share in the census increases, the parties are determined to include them as candidates. Thus, the proportion of British electors in the municipal census has a marginal effect of 0.17 points and predicts a probability of incorporation of 1% when no Briton is registered to vote. But, when the proportion of British electors reaches 5 per cent, the probability of finding a candidate belonging to this group goes up to 50 per cent. For a proportion of 9 per cent of British voters, the probability to find a British candidate is more than 75 per cent.

Regarding the role of contextual constraints, the presence of a far-right party in the electoral race does not affect the odds of nomination of a Romanian candidate. As already specified, there are only two cases of far-right parties in the British sample and to that extent it has not been included in the regression analysis. A different effect for each group is also given by the variable related to the number of parties that competed in the 2011 local elections. Thus, a larger number of parties increases the odds of success of the Romanian candidates, but it does not affect the probability of incorporating Britons. Notwithstanding, it has a low significance in the case of the Romanians as well, a fact which suggests that the process of incorporation has been mainly carried out by the two mainstream parties, the PP and the PSOE.

Table 7.4 Logit coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the probability of finding a Romanian candidate and a British candidate respectively on any party list in the two data-sets.

	Romanian residents			***British residents***		
	Model1 b/se	*Model2*	*Model3* b/se	*Model4* b/se	*Model5* b/se	*Model6* b/se
Percentage out of number of inhabitants	0.34	0.36	0.48			
	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.42)			
Percentage out of number voters registered in the electoral census (log)	0.43**	0.39***	0.41**	1.48***	1.20***	1.13***
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Far right	-0.12	-0.29	-0.20			
	(0.64)	(0.63)	(0.64)			
Number of parties	0.34**	0.32***	0.33**	0.28	0.24	0.30
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Electoral competition 2007	0.45	0.42	0.43	-1.79*	-2.22*	-2.08*
	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.03)
Diversity of immigrant community	1.16***		0.93*	0.62		1.98**
	(0.35)		(0.42)	(0.53)		(0.71)
Percentage out of number of immigrants		-2.16***	-0.94		1.93	4.98**
		(0.81)	(1.03)		(1.17)	(1.63)
Size of locality (log)	0.10	0.13	0.09	0.47**	0,58***	0.66***
	(0.11)	(0.1)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Constant	-3.80***	-0,15	-2.39	-1.2	-2.00	-9.43**
	(0.99)	(1.48)	(1.83)	(1.51)	(1.6)	(3.12)
N	636	636	636	636	236	236
Positive predicted values%	57.14	50.00	57.00	78.12	77.60	78.74
R-sqr	0.105	0.095	0.103	0.29	0.30	0.32
AIC	474.1	478.5	475.3	237.9	237	230
BIC	509.8	514.1	515.4	258.6	257.6	254.2

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Models 1-6 show that the electoral competition in the previous municipal elections has a significant negative effect on the incorporation of British candidates, but no significant impact in the case of the incorporation of Romanians. More specifically, as the distance in votes obtained in 2007 by the first two parties increases, the probability of a Briton being proposed as a candidate decreases. Notwithstanding, this phenomenon does not influence the incorporation of Romanian candidates. Thus, H3a3, stating that the impact of close electoral races is mediated by group origin and the way it is perceived in the host society, is confirmed.

The level of ethnic diversity in a locality has a positive effect in the case of the localities in the Romanian residents data-set (Model 1) and remains significant after controlling for group's percentage over the immigrant population (Model 3). The fact that Model 1 gives a better prediction than Models 2 and 3 suggests that the level of ethnic diversity per se is relevant for the incorporation of Romanian candidates, regardless of the group's position within the immigrant community. This finding thus confirms hypothesis H3a4, which states that a diverse ethnic community has a positive impact on the nomination of a candidate belonging to a negatively perceived group. Hence, the more balanced the distribution of Romanians, Latin Americans and other immigrants in the total immigrant population is, the higher the probability that the parties will propose a Romanian candidate on their lists. When calculating the marginal effects of this variable and keeping the others at their means, the probability of finding a Romanian candidate increases by 0.10 points with each unit increase in the level of diversity of the locality. A better illustration is given by calculating the predicted probabilities in various contexts of ethnic diversity. The probability of finding a Romanian candidate in an average locality increases from three to nine per cent when the effective number of immigrant groups changes from 1 (the Romanians are the dominant group) to 2. In a perfectly diverse locality (effective number of groups

equal to three), the probability of nomination of a Romanian candidate increases to 24 per cent.

In the case of British immigrants, local ethnic diversity is significant only when controlling for the percentage of Britons relative to the immigrant community (Model 6). For a locality with a diversity index of one, the probability of a British nomination is 49 per cent when the Britons' proportion in the immigrant community is 100 per cent. In an average locality where the effective number of groups is two, the probability goes from 7 to 48 per cent when Britons' proportion within the immigrant community increases from 10 per cent to 60 per cent. In an average locality with a diversity index of three, the probability of nomination is 58 per cent. Summarizing these findings, it can be argued that the degree of ethnic diversity per se does not incentivise parties to recruit British candidates, confirming hypothesis H3a4 (Model 4). The variable is significant only after controlling for the group's status among the immigrant community. That is, in contexts with moderate levels of diversity (effective number of groups between 1.5 and 2.5), what increases the odds of nomination is that the Britons constitute the largest part of the immigrant community in one locality. In any case, in a perfectly diverse context, Britons' probability of nomination is ten points higher than in the contexts where they are the only immigrant group.

Summing up, the results of the empirical analysis presented so far confirm that groups' share of voters, and not of residents, is what determines parties to nominate immigrant-origin candidates. Close electoral races are an incentive for the electoral incorporation of immigrant-origin candidates from a 'safe' group, such as the British, that does not risk incurring a nativist backlash. In the case of Romanian residents, the co-existence of several immigrant groups foments competition among parties for the immigrant vote and, to that extent, increases the probability of electoral incorporation, confirming hypothesis H3a4. This finding is also supported by the variables related to group size and rate of registration in the electoral census. The fact

that the size of the Romanian group in a locality is insignificant, but that the proportion of registered immigrant electors has a positive effect suggests that the competition for the immigrant vote is parties' main rationale to incorporate candidates belonging to 'risky' groups.

In the case the British, the diversity of the ethnic community is not relevant unless the group increases its dominant position over the other immigrant groups. Hypothesis H3a4 is therefore confirmed, with the specification that only in certain configurations of local ethnic diversity the British residence increase their probability of having members nominated. This finding may be explained by the fact that when a safe group increases its dominance, it has more resources to mobilize both the vote and the interest of the local parties. Thus, local diversity per se does not incentivise political parties to nominate candidates belonging to a safe group. Rather, the parties are guided by a strategic allocation of resources in places where the group can also mobilize and assure party support.

7.4.2 Group resources, party behaviour and intra-regional differences

Models 7 and 8 display the impact of group resources and local electoral constraints when taking into account the effect of intra-regional differences. In order to obtain robust results, I have established a threshold of at least ten localities per autonomous community. In the Romanian case, four autonomous communities have been excluded from the original sample (Navarra, Basque Country, Cantabria and Asturias) as the average number of localities from each is three. Castile and Leon could not be included in the analysis, as it displayed no variation in terms of outcome: of the 50 localities considered, none had a Romanian candidate. In the British case, twenty-seven observations have been dropped on the basis of the same considerations.

Although thirteen localities with at least five per cent Britons can be found in Catalonia, none has a candidate from this community.

The reference region in the Romanian case is the Community of Madrid, as it hosts the largest Romanian community. The percentage of Romanian electors, the number of parties and the degree of ethnic diversity remain significant predictors, even after controlling for the autonomous community effect. As Model 7 shows, all other communities have a negative effect on the probability of incorporating Romanian candidates in comparison to the Community of Madrid. On a virtual 'inclusion scale', the Community of Madrid ranks the highest, followed by Andalusia. Catalonia, Aragon and Castile-La Mancha are situated in the middle, while the least inclusive for the Romanian community is the Valencian Community. These results have already been anticipated in Chapter V by the analysis of Spanish parties' strategies and discourses regarding immigration in the local elections of 2011. The press and secondary analyses have already indicated that both the PP and the PSOE Madrid had a positive stance towards the incorporation of immigrant candidates, while the Valencian parties refrained from putting the inclusive discourse into practice.

As opposed to the Romanian case, the Valencian Community has a slightly positive effect on the incorporation of British candidacies, although its differences from the other regions are marginal (Model 8). Nonetheless, introducing the dummies with the autonomous community changes the significance of the variable related to electoral competition. To that extent, the significance of close electoral races is mainly associated with localities in the Valencian Community. This observation is better understood when running the regressions separately on the sample with the Valencian localities and on the sample with Andalusian localities.

Table 7.5. Logit coefficients for the probability of finding a Romanian candidate and a British candidate respectively on any party list in the two data-sets after controlling for the autonomous community effect. Robust SE. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

	Romanian residents	***British residents***
	Model 7 *b/se*	*Model 8* *b/se*
Percentage out of the number of inhabitants	0.59 (0.37)	
Percentage of the group out of the number of voters registered in the municipal electoral census (log)	0.34** (0.12)	1.03*** (0.21)
Far-right party in the locality	0.57 (0.77)	
Distance between 1st two parties 2007	0.27 (0.76)	-1.83 (2.34)
Diversity of ethnic community	0.77* (0.29)	1.97** (0.73)
Percentage of the group out of the total number of immigrants	-1.32 (0.92)	5.50*** (0.73)
Number of parties	0.26*** (0.06)	0.34** (0.12)
Number of inhabitants (log)	0.00 (0.06)	0.65*** (0.13)
Autonomous community (ref: Community of Madrid)		
Andalusia	0.14 (0.18)	
Aragon	-0.80*** (0.14)	
Castile-La Mancha	-1.04*** (0.14)	
Catalonia	-1.20*** (0.26)	
Valencian Community	-1.98*** (0.18)	
La Rioja	-1.39*** (0.23)	
Ref: Valencian Community		
Andalusia		-0.60*** (0.13)
Canary Islands		-0.74 (0.57)
Balearic Islands		0.02 (0.56)
Intercept	1.14	-9.75***
N	570	217
Pseudo-R2	0.14	0.32
AIC	425.88	209.623
BIC	451.95	219.763

Thus, in the Valencian sample (101 observations), the logit coefficient of the electoral competition is -6.7, significant at 99 per cent. In the Andalusian sample (95 observations), the coefficient (1.5) does not meet the significance level of 90 per cent. It can be claimed, therefore, that close electoral races are an incentive for the Valencian parties to include British candidates, but this logic is not necessarily reproduced across all regions. However, a high level of voter registration and the dominance of the British within the immigrant communities in one locality, along with a higher level of ethnic diversity of the locality in question, have a positive effect on the probability of candidate incorporation, regardless of the region of residence.

In sum, close local races are an incentive for the incorporation of a group that does not have a negative public perception and does not create discontent among the native voters. This is especially relevant in the Valencian Community, where the British community is the largest in Spain, as well as the second largest in the region. Thus, Spanish parties approach the British community in competitive elections where their vote may be crucial for winning the elections. In this sense, the data confirms the previous research, according to which local hegemons do not mobilize the immigrant vote in a locality (Jones-Correa 1998; Garbaye 2005).

The regional effect is also visible in the Romanian case, albeit in the opposite direction. Thus, in comparison to the Community of Madrid, a Romanian candidate living in the Valencian Community has half the chances of being incorporated. An explanation of this fact is given by the general director of immigration of the Valencian Government, the conservative Jose Maria Felip. At the summer course related to immigrants' voting rights in the 2011 elections, organized by the CEU University in July 2010, Felip declared that in only 14 of the 541 municipalities the electoral competition between the PP and the PSOE is so high that the immigrant vote can be decisive. It is for this reason that the parties should intensify their attention towards

these municipalities and focus on the key communities: Romanians, Britons, Germans, Ecuadorians, Bulgarians and Bolivians (*Noticias Universia* 28.07.2010).

In spite of the fact that the party leaders in the Community of Madrid also perceived the immigrant vote as not decisive in many localities, they did not refrain from selectively incorporating immigrant candidates. One plausible explanation is given by Zahonero de Agueda (2011) who claims that the PP and the PSOE Madrid intended to project a long-term image as immigrant-friendly parties, being less interested in the immediate gains of vote-getting. This projection is even more credible in the case of the PP, which wanted to 'whitewash' its image after the previous general and Catalan elections. It should also be specified that president Aguirre had been projecting the inclusive image of the Madrid Community (and, in consequence, of her political party) for several years prior to the 2011 local elections. Some examples are the institutional campaigns organized by the regional government in order to combat discrimination and promote equality: Madrid the sum of all, People painting the flag, Chewing gum against racism (Lopez-Vasquez et al 2009).

7.5 Conclusions

As predicted by previous studies, groups' levels of pre-electoral mobilization do influence parties' decisions to include immigrant candidates. A high proportion of registered immigrant voters has a positive effect on immigrant candidacies, regardless of groups' national origin or regional location on the Spanish map. To that extent, the degree of political mobilization is the only variable in the model that has a similar effect for the two groups studied, confirming hypothesis H1b.

Contrary to previous studies (Maxwell 2012), the analysis of the British and Romanian candidacies in Spanish local elections reveals that the size of the immigrant community and its spatial concentration does not constitute an incentive

for the political parties to nominate immigrants. This finding is explained mainly by the electoral system. Thus, in first-past-the-post or open-list systems, an electoral district with a high concentration of immigrant voters is arguably a good opportunity for an immigrant-origin candidate to maximize their number of votes. But in closed-list systems, as is the case of Spain, the size of the immigrant community in one area or their high percentage among the local population cannot change the order of the candidates on the lists, nor can it influence an immigrant's chances of entering the electoral race.

The analysis shows that in spite of the global discourse on the immigrant voters and candidates at the 2011 local elections, national origin and regional location matter. At equal proportions of electoral mobilization, contextual electoral constraints such as close races and ethnic diversity have distinct effects for Romanians and Britons. This finding suggests that negative/positive evaluations of immigrant groups moderate the effect of variables related to party behaviour related, confirming hypothesis H3a. The relation between groups' patterns of settlement in the host society and party behaviour is an example of the effect that the interaction between group resources and the political opportunity structure has on immigrant political incorporation, one of the core ideas of the model presented in Chapter II.

Regarding the 'regional effect' on incorporation, as the following chapter shows, parties in the Madrid Community opened their lists to the incorporation of 'risky' immigrants, even though this has been used more as a symbolic gesture than as a concrete measure for immigrants' representation. Instead, Valencian political parties continue to focus on the incorporation of EU15 voters, especially in localities with a high level of electoral competition. The cross-regional differences in terms of electoral incorporation between Valencia and Andalusia may be explained again by the value the parties attach to close races. As already specified, a tight electoral competition motivates the Valencian parties to mobilize the British voters and to include British

candidates in an eligible position on the party list. Nonetheless, the same logic does not apply to the Andalusian parties, which are mainly motivated by a high rate of Britons' registration in the electoral census. However, as the next chapter shows, the relatively high rate of success of the British councillors in the Valencian community is not determined solely by these contextual factors and the rational party calculations. An embattled relationship with the local authorities and the strategic use of European citizenship resources may also explain why the Britons in the Valencian community are more successful in winning a seat in the council than elsewhere in Spain.

CHAPTER VIII

The electoral pathway to incorporation. Romanian and British trajectories to local power

This chapter expands the analysis in the previous chapter by approaching the concept of nomination not only as an event explained by structural and group-related constraints, but also as a dynamic process. While Chapter VII offers a broad perspective on the electoral incorporation of the two groups, Chapter VIII goes in depth by analysing what lies behind numbers and probabilities. I argue that Romanian and British citizens in Spain follow distinct paths of incorporation in the politics of their locality of residence. While Romanians display a top-down, party loyalist way of incorporation, British candidates are rather contentious mobilizers. Group reception and self-perception and the strategic use of the EU membership resources are some of the factors that may explain these distinct pathways to the local power. The chapter uses a qualitative methodology based on semi-structured interviews with Romanian and British candidates and representatives, Spanish political actors and representatives of the local administrations in the 13 localities selected. Additionally, I use information from the interviews with representatives of Romanian and British political parties in Spain (see Chapters III and VI). I have also conducted extensive press research. Similarly to the methodology used in Chapter VI, besides the general overview of the Romanian and British residents in Spain in the

national and regional press, I searched information on British and Romanian origin candidates in the emigrant press and on Google for each of the municipalities selected.

8.1 The access to power of non-citizen residents

8.1.1 Trajectories to power

Political nomination is a first necessary step to representation and influence in host country politics. The concept is like the tip of an iceberg. Beyond observing who gets to candidate and win political office, one has to enter the 'secret garden of politics' and understand the backstage dimensions of power and influence (Gallagher and Marsh 1998). In the case of immigrant electoral incorporation, this secret garden is sketched by two contrasting typologies in the literature: the integrationist-assimilationist approach of Dahl (1961) and the contentious mobilizer model proposed by Jones-Correa (1998) and further refined by other authors such as Garbaye (2005) and Maxwell (2012).

Who Governs? discusses the successful incorporation of European-origin immigrants to the US at the end of the XIXth century. According to Dahl (1961), political parties made it easy for immigrants to be integrated in the local politics by mobilizing them to register and by proposing co-ethnics on the party roll (p.34). The equation proposed by Dahl (1961) is simple: parties needed votes and 'the ethnics' had numbers. In order to win the votes of the immigrant community, parties grant individual benefits to certain immigrant political entrepreneurs, such as political nomination and jobs in the city council. In return, immigrant political entrepreneurs strive to mobilize the immigrant voters. This is, for example, how Italians started to win political office in New Haven:

> '[Republicans] went into the Italian wards, which had been neglected by the Irish ward leaders in the Democratic party and helped to pull some of the Italians into the Republican ward organizations' (p. 39).

The Italian political aspirants had to be, in consequence, in the right place at the right moment. What they needed was 'passion for politics' and, as several authors would argue, 'time, availability, communication skills, confidence, motivation and knowledge' (Woods 1998: 2109).

As already discussed in the previous chapter, parties tend to be selective mobilizers. Close races or a diverse ethnic community are structural constraints that determine parties to compete for the immigrant vote. But the incentive does not necessarily have to be structural. Immigrant agency is an important element that can prompt parties to nominate immigrant-origin candidates. Giving the example of the Democratic Party in Queens, Jones-Correa (1998) claims that only when the new political actors manage to mobilize themselves on their own does the party start to co-opt them (p. 70). In the European context, Garbaye (2005) explains the success of ethnic politicians in Roubaix as opposed to the neighbouring town of Lille by the mobilization and contentious actions of local immigrant association leaders and activists. In this model, the civic and political strategies of immigrant political entrepreneurs play a crucial role in shaping their access to politics. They do not need, as in the case of the New Haven analysis, only passion for politics and personal capital, but also visibility and civic presence.

Although the selective mobilizer model claims that contemporary political parties do not make it easy for immigrants to become politically visible, the assimilationist and the contentious modes of incorporation do not need to be regarded as separate boxes. They are the ends of a continuum of possible actions, strategies, and modes of incorporation. Political parties tend to be tactical gatekeepers, i.e, tend to mobilize the immigrant vote and include immigrant candidates in places where electoral competition is high, as Chapter VII has already shown. However, this does

not preclude that the specific modes of actions resemble the assimilationist or contentious mobilizer strategies. Figure 8.1 graphically depicts this continuum of trajectories of incorporation, marked by three separate analytical regions.

Figure 8.1. Typologies of electoral incorporation



The assimilationist trajectory draws on Dahl's (1961) insight and presupposes that political parties are the drivers of incorporation, having an active role in identifying and proposing immigrant leaders on their lists. The party loyalist typology entails a more active immigrant elite than in the first case, but its activities are not necessarily contentious. The party loyalists can be for example association leaders or immigrant political entrepreneurs who have already established connections with host country political actors, which means that their nomination does not come as a surprise. It is rather the logical reward after previous militancy or activity inside party circles. Finally, the contentious mobilizer trajectory (Jones-Correa 1998; Garbaye 2005; Maxwell 2012) places immigrant agency at the centre of the incorporation trajectory. Parties are primarily convinced to take on board immigrant political entrepreneurs who prove to have a visible civic standing or challenging attitudes towards the local political status quo.

8.1.2 Explaining trajectories to local power

Recalling hypothesis H1 in Chapter II, a groups' capacity to become visible and mobilized (organizationally or politically) in the host society increases its chances to be politically incorporated. As the previous chapter shows, a high degree of pre-electoral mobilization increases the probability of immigrant candidacy nomination. But organizational and mobilization resources have a low impact unless channelled by 'shrewd', 'passionate' and skilful immigrant notables and activists. To that extent, a civically and politically engaged immigrant elite also boosts groups' visibility in the host society. As hypothesis H6a in Chapter II claims, associational leadership or board membership may develop social and political skills, as well as a pool of visible immigrant community leaders for whom it is easier to establish contacts with local politicians. Higher levels of education and middle-class occupational backgrounds also increase immigrant notables' chances to navigate easier through the local power structure and win nomination on parties' lists (Putnam 1976; Norris and Lovenduski 1995).

Besides group and leadership resources, political parties' behaviour is another element explaining how immigrant incorporation processes take place. Nonetheless, party behaviour and group resources are not independent factors (H3a in Chapter II). This hypothesis has been discussed in the previous chapter, by showing how the impact of contextual electoral constraints is influenced by group reception in the host society. This chapter discusses it from the perspective of how groups' self-perception in the host society influences their relation with the political parties and their trajectories to power. Thus, high levels of contention are more prone to stir up contentious-mobilizer trajectories, which in turn, call parties' attention towards immigrant political entrepreneurs that can threaten the status quo of the local power.

These contentious patterns may arise as a reaction to discriminatory environments (Bloemraad 2013), but also as a more general reaction of cognitive dissonance with the host country's institutions and social and political practices. Groups' self-perception in the host society is associated with home country ties and cues (Rogers 2006) or home country cultural toolkits (Landolt and Goldring 2009) that influence migrants' perceptions and modes of action when adapting to the political environments of their host countries.

Nonetheless, transnational opportunities are not only a cognitive resource. As already discussed in Chapter VI, they constitute assets for migrant organizations and their leaders when being included in non-electoral political processes. The following analysis explores how the transnational networks and resources interact with the electoral pathway to incorporation (H5a, 5b in Chapter II).

8.2 Local contexts and European trajectories

8.2.1 The British residents

Assimilationist trajectories

Assimilationist trajectories are the exception rather than the rule along the Alicante coast. This pathway to politics can be found in the small village of Alcalali and in the town of Calpe. In Alcalali, the PP has been ruling the local administration since 2003, when a Dutch-origin councillor was elected in order to represent the Europeans. As he did not manage to communicate well with his electors, both the Populars and the Socialists approached J. S., a retired Briton who ran his own antique business. Eventually, he decided to candidate on the PP list, because he liked their mayor candidate better. J.S had not been involved in politics in the UK, but when he came to Spain he felt that the Britons needed a voice on the local political

stage. Many have language problems, live segregated from the Spanish villagers and do not understand the system. J. S. believed that in order to enter the local politics, one has to be a member of a mainstream party rather than to start a new political group. However, this also means that the councillor is more subjected to the party discipline and hierarchy.

The embattled political life of Calpe (unstable coalitions and censure motion in 2009) is not so much a result of actions by the representatives of the European residents, as in other localities. It is the consequence of the conflict in the local PP between the old and the new generations, as well as the power struggles led by the Valencian Nationalists from Bloc. These circumstances have also involved the British representatives and influenced their positioning on the local political scene. It is, for example, the case of L. T., a local councillor since 1999 on the list of the PP. In 2011, she was not successful in winning, as she ran on an independent list, formed mainly by the old squad of PP, overthrown by the reformists.

L. T. is a lawyer and came to live in Spain in the late seventies. She speaks perfect Spanish and was the representative of the British in the local council during three legislatures. She says that she was close to the PP circles and that in 1999 they asked her if she wanted to candidate on their list. She is proud of her political ancestry, as her grandmother was the mayor of Oxford in the thirties. L. T.'s activity was mainly directed towards the integration of the British communities in the town. She is also part of the local Rotary Club and AFPO, an association dedicated to the protection of the property rights of European residents. Although integrated in the local political life for years, L. T. is still nostalgic about English-style politics:

> 'Here politics is more 'political'. In the UK you are not paid if you are a local councillor. It is not a full time job. Here it is and therefore we argue too much with each other.' (interview L.T. 2010).

Party loyalists

The 'party loyalists' typology is an infrequent trajectory of local incorporation among the British on the Alicante coast. It is worth mentioning the case of G. H. as illustrative for this pattern. In the 2011 elections, the PP of the small village of Benitatxell strengthened its links with the British community by nominating G. H., a former university professor in the UK. G. H. had been placed eight on the list, but, due to the wide success of the local nationalists, he did not manage to secure a spot on the city council. He is also the secretary of the Conservatives Abroad in the area, the local church organist and senior grand organist of Spain in Freemasonry. He ran in the 1983 UK general elections as a Conservative candidate in the Derby South constituency. Although not elected, G. H. continued to be involved in politics as the chairman of the Conservative Political Advisory committee. While in Spain, G. H. perceives the involvement in the local political life as a commitment to integration in the residence society. He declares that many Britons live isolated from the Spanish communities and do not speak the language. To that extent, Gerald H. and his wife try to bridge the distance between the Conservatives on the coast and the local PP, while also fighting for the recognition of British emigrant rights back in the UK.

Contentious mobilizers

Although many British candidates have been integrated on mainstream party lists in 2011, their venues to local power hide more contentious beginnings. Others continue to oppose mainstream Spanish politics from local party barricades.

A case illustrative of this latter trajectory is J. C. in Parcent. The local council in Parcent is disputed between two parties, the Democratic Coalition of Parcent (CDP) and the PP. J. C. has been the deputy mayor and the treasurer of Parcent since the 2007 elections. She says that she used to be a mum before entering the city hall. CDP

is perceived as a non-political party, but as an association of locals and Europeans funded 20 years ago, which fights for the good of the local community. J. C. started to protest in front of the PP dominated city hall in early 2006, after she and other locals found out about the town planning projects. New residential areas were going to be developed on the hills surrounding the village. While the protests were ongoing, J. C. attended a conference of the Green Party in Madrid, where she met MEP David Hammerstein. He and his team advised and supported CDP's activity. In just a few months, J. C. addressed various petitions to the European Parliament, in which she unveiled the environmental threats that the new projects posed to the village. British and non-British MEPs of both the left and right visited Parcent before the local elections in 2007 and fully supported the Coalition's activities. The MEPs drafted reports (Auken Report 2009; Petition Committee reports 2006, 2007) in which they recommended that the Spanish administrations take action in order to stop the new residential projects. Eventually, the Valencian Government turned down the plans on the grounds of conservation of forests and protection of species. J. C. also stood as a candidate in the European elections of 2009 for the Valencian Green Party, but she was not successful.

> 'There [in the UK] the constituencies are smaller and the electors know you. Here there is no room. You can't get through the party lists'. (interview, J.C. 2010)

In 2011, the CDP won the local elections with a large majority, being voted by both Spanish and European residents. Apart from J. C., more English names appeared on the candidate list, mainly 'British mums' who want to make a contribution to the local community. They promised to work hard during their term in office, in order to build new schools and a youth centre, while protecting the greatest asset, the mountains surrounding the village (*RTN*, 13-19 may 2011).

A similar story happened in the larger town of Orihuela. As in many other localities in the area, Orihuela had a PP mayor for more than two decades. One of the key actors in displacing the PP rule of the town is a local party funded by a former British diplomat, B. H. After years in service in places as New Dehli and Brussels, B H. moved to the Costa Blanca coast with his wife. In 2006, he formed the CLARO party, in order to lend a voice to the European residents in the area and to ensure that they register and participate in local politics. As he declared to the *Daily Mail* (26.05.2007) and *The Guardian* (04.12.2011), CLARO also stands for clean politics and anti-corruption. Party's goal is to complain about the corrupt practices of the former mayors of Orihuela. Moreover, B. H. considers that his party is neither anti-Spanish, nor left- or right-wing.

> 'This is all part of Europe. For me, that's the fascinating thing. Think global, act local, as they say' (*The Guardian* 04.12.2011).

Although his party did not manage to win seats in the 2007 elections, B.H. became known on the local political scene for lobbying against healthcare restrictions for the British expats by the Valencian government. He has also lead several campaigns against the urbanization projects of the Orihuela Costa district. In 2011, CLARO made an alliance with another local party (CLR), lead by Spanish centrists, and won four seats on the local council. The CLR-CLARO signed agreements with the Socialists and the Greens, thus bringing about the end of the PP dominance over the city hall.

A second category of contentious mobilizers were included in the mainstream party lists in 2011. Nonetheless, they started their political careers by fiercely fighting against the status-quo. This is, for example, the case of A. B., from Benitatxell, where in 2007 a European citizens' party (PIDEB) won the electoral race. Due to corruption scandals, the mayor and his team had to resign in 2009, while the rest of the

councillors were incorporated into the PP, supporting it in a coalition that ran the local administration until 2011.

A. B. is a former police officer from the UK who won a seat on the list of PIDEB in 2007 and another one in 2011, with the PP. In 2006, he was contacted by an Austrian-origin local politician (at that time PP) in order to form a local party and mobilize the British community. He thinks that the Europeans have formed local parties because the mainstream Spanish parties did not represent them. Before the Europeans entered the local councils, all the investment had been directed to the old town centre, populated mainly by Spaniards. No money was planned for the residential areas surrounding the old village. However, A.B. 's testimony reveals that even a local party formed by Europeans can fail in being representative. He claims that the 'Austrian lady' was authoritarian and treated all the others in the party as her personal possessions. And in spite of his disillusionment with Spanish politics, he joined the PP as the party seems to have learned that a genuine incorporation of the British community and of their representatives is a necessary step towards the political peace of the village.

S. T. from Teulada is another contentious migrant figure. She is a veteran in the local politics. She has been living in Spain for twenty years and entered the local city hall in 1999 on the list of Citizens for Moraira party (CpM). CpM used to be a contentious neighbours' association, which started its activities in the late seventies. At the end of the nineties, the party was composed equally of Spaniards and Europeans and fought for better local budget investment in the nucleus of Moraira, the coastal part of Teulada.

In the 2003 elections, the local PP was reformed and included independent politicians on its lists. Since then, he local administration has opened itself to all town residents, regardless of their origin, because they understood that 'you can stay in

power only if you are transparent and accountable (interview S.T., 2010). S. T. considers that the success of the PP in Teulada is due to the fact that its new members used to be part of the neighbour associations. This helped them understand how to listen and how to integrate the larger population in the local political dynamics.

Another British figure in the Costa Blanca political landscape is C. S. in Calpe. In 2011, she won a seat in the local council, on the list of the Green Party Calpe, and is part of the city government, together with the PP representatives. She had her own restaurant back in the UK. Her grandfather was a city councillor in Lancashire, while her sister is a lawyer who served in the county council. She came to Spain twenty years ago, but she got involved in the civic life of Calpe at the beginning of 2000, when she took part in an ecologist movement in the town. Back in 2007, C.S. was a candidate with the nationalist Bloc, but failed to get elected by a very small margin. At that time, the Valencian nationalists approached the activist European figures in the town and included some of them in the list. But due to the Bloc leader's behaviour during the previous legislature, many party members and representatives distanced themselves from the party. As part of her activism, C.S. would attend all city council meetings and write summaries in her own newspaper, called the *Grapevine*. She considers that corruption is endemic in local Spanish politics, but that it got better after the renovation of the local PP in 2011.

> 'The PP had a candidate list that was completely new and free of every hint of corruption. They did well but not well enough. A coalition was inevitable and we were asked to join them. After watching the futility of being in opposition I agreed, and I have not regretted my decision as we are working well together' (interview C. S. *CBwomen* May 2012)

In the town of Javea, British candidates have not been as successful as in Calpe. Although six were on the lists of various parties for the 2011 elections, none of them got elected. One explanation for the low profile of the British would-be politicians in this election is related to the previous scandals and conflicts in which

the European representatives had been involved. In 2003 various European residents became PP local councillors. But due to conflicts with the 'old-fashion politicians', the Europeans formed an independent party, ran by T. C. also co-founder of the AUN association (see Chapter VI). In 2007, the Europeans' independent party won four councillor seats.

T. C. used to be an accountant in the UK and is the co-founder of the AUN association, one of the most contentious organizations against the 'land grab' laws enforced by the Valencian government. Although largely popular among the Britons in Javea, T.C. had to resign soon after the 2007 elections, which is when the party started to go into decline. The reason was some unfortunate declarations in the *Daily Mail*, in which he claimed that his working period in Congo helped him to cope with Spanish politics (*Daily Mail*, 26.05.2007). In another newspaper article, T.C. claimed to be constantly harassed and discriminated against by the local politicians, especially by the Bloc, who impose Valenciano as the language of the local plenary sessions (*Informacion*, 12.06.2007).

8.2.2 The Romanians

Assimilationist trajectories

In contrast to the dynamic and multicultural political landscape of the Costa Blanca, the selected municipalities from Madrid are characterized by mono-national local councils. No third country or European resident has managed to enter the local power structure in the elections of 2011. Nonetheless, parties started to approach or groom Romanian political entrepreneurs. Even though they did not win the election, both parties and candidates think that 2015 will surely bring Romanian-origin representatives in the local councils.

An illustrative assimilationist trajectory of nomination is the case of I. B., in the small town of San Fernando, only half an hour away from the Spanish capital. San Fernando is somewhat atypical for the localities surrounding Madrid, mostly confined to the Popular Party. The United Left (IU) and the Socialist Party have been alternating in the local government for the past 30 years. In the 2011 local elections, the Socialists proposed I. B. on their list, one of the most famous Romanians in the town, due to the fact that she is the waitress at the central pub. I. B. has never been involved in politics and her collaboration with the PSOE was focused on the campaign period. She has social contacts with the PSOE, but does not think about becoming a militant member of the party.

> 'If they proposed that I should run in 2015, of course I'd do it again. And this time I'd do it better. It was so exciting this time, going on campaign rallies, talking to people…but I was so clumsy, I had never done it before' (interview I. B., 2012).

The party leaders decided to nominate a Romanian at the end of 2010. The reason is suggested by the Socialist interviewee:

> 'The Romanians in this town do not participate much, but they are part of the local community. You go to school and you meet Romanian parents there. You go to the neighbourhood meetings and you see them there as well. You realize that they are part of the town. They are like us. And they can vote' (interview L.M.G., PSOE San Fernando, 2012).

The village of Nuevo Baztan is another context for an assimilationist trajectory. One particularity of this locality is its high number of local political parties that are formed and eventually disappear after one or two legislatures. The main reason is related to the various factions inside the local PP. One of these new parties is New Baztan Activa (AMB) which apart from being joined by several ex-PP members, also proposed to C. F. to participate on the list of candidates. C. F. had been living in Nuevo Baztan for nine years and she used to do mainly domestic work. In spite of not having an association, C. F. declares that she helped many Romanians in the village

by giving them advice and support in the first weeks after their arrival (*Romanul*, May 2011).

The president of AMB proposed the list and was the one who decided to include a Romanian as well. He had known C. F. since 2007, because she used to work as a cleaning lady at the city hall and participate in various meetings of the local PP. Initially, the president of AMB, C. F. and the other members wanted to run on behalf of the PP, but eventually they decided to form a party of their own, since they felt that their interests would not be adequately represented. C. F. conducted an extensive campaign among the Romanian population, but she could never reach and convince the whole Romanian community to register in the census and to participate politically.

> 'She knew many people. These people came at the meetings, registered in the census. She knew maybe 100 and they were always present. But she could never get to the rest of 800. I don't know where they were' (interview J.M.C., president AMB, 2012).

Party loyalists

Party loyalists are the dominant venue of Romanians' electoral incorporation in the Madrid metropolitan area. This is for example the case of Brunete, but also of larger towns like Arganda del Rey and Alcalá de Henares. In 2011, both the PP and the PSOE in Brunete proposed Romanian candidates on their lists, albeit none got elected. The Romanian Socialist and Popular candidates are presidents of immigrant cultural associations. E. M., the president of the Romanian Neighbours' associations was a candidate of the PSOE, while D. Z., the president of the Association of Romanians in Brunete, was the eighth on the PP list.

The relations between the Romanian associations and the political parties date back to 2007, but at that moment the 'time was too short' to propose a Romanian on the list. Usually, these associations seek support for cultural and

religious manifestations. In turn, there are some Romanians who participate regularly in the parties' meetings, but they are few and not so much interested in politics. The parties' perception of the Romanian community is ambiguous, since they clearly state a growing interest in attracting the group. At the same time, they think that the Romanians are still passive and focused on their personal needs and problems, with a very low involvement in the community. Regarding the selection of candidacies, the parties admit that it was a top-down process and at the same time a mixture of vote seeking and knowing the right person at the right moment.

> 'Of course there are electoral reasons to nominate a migrant candidate. But if the person hadn't been her, E., maybe we wouldn't have nominated an immigrant just to nominate an immigrant. The decisive factors were the fact that we knew her, that she is an honourable person.' (interview PSOE Brunete, Madrid, 2012).

Both candidates continue to be active members of their parties. Moreover, D. Z. became the president of the Youth branch of PP Brunete after the 2011 elections. The nomination was received with considerable interest by the local press, especially because D.Z. is the first immigrant president of a youth branch of PP in Madrid. The general secretary of PP Community of Madrid came to Brunete to meet D.Z. and to explain that the selection for an office in the party is made according to merit and not to nationality (*La Quincena*, 22.07.2011).

Alcala de Henares is the second largest municipality in the Madrid Community, with a city council dominated by the PP for several legislatures. In 2011, the far-right party España 2000 participated in the elections, managing to win a seat in the council. As already commented in Chapter VI, in Alcala there are several Romanian associations and it is famous in the press for being the first municipality in Spain that supports the construction of an Orthodox church. The mayor (PP) has declared several times that he maintains an amiable dialogue with the local Romanian community. As proof he appointed a Romanian as the manager of the immigration

department of the local administration, during the eight months before the 2007 local elections. In 2011, the PP in Alcala nominated another Romanian on their list, who was one of the key speakers at the PP public meeting to present the immigrant-origin candidates.

A comparison between the 2007 and 2011 local elections gives a better insight of the process of incorporation of the Romanian community in this municipality. It illustrates the transition from a pure vote-seeking strategy to a more genuine political incorporation. At the end of 2006, the local administration in Alcala created the first immigration department, whose purpose is to better listen to and incorporate immigrant needs. The manager is E. R., the leader of an association that had been close to PP circles for several years.

The local press is ambiguous in relating the news, also because the mayor promised to cede a plot of public land for the construction of the Romanian Orthodox church. Various voices complained that the Romanians are given too much attention, that it is a bit premature to appoint a Romanian to such an important position and that all religions in the city should be given land in order to build their prayer houses (interview PSOE Alcala, 2009).

The mayor presented these facts as proof of the willingness of the local administration and of the PP to integrate the immigrants. Moreover, he stressed that political incorporation does not necessarily have to be on party lists, since the immigrants may occupy important positions in the local administration departments. However, right after the local elections E. R. was removed from her position and a former PP councillor was put in charge of immigration. In her interview, E. R. admits that she was nominated only in order to bring the votes of the Romanians and that the party gave up on her after the local elections (interview E. R., 2009).

In the spring of 2011, PP Alcala nominated A. M. R. as the Romanian-origin candidate. A. M. R. has a university degree in Romania and is struggling to have it recognised it in Spain. She indirectly admits that at some point she had to do domestic work after she arrived in Spain. In early 2010, A. M. R. established an association whose role has been to collaborate with various local administrations from the Community of Madrid in order to organize information campaigns for the Romanians in relation to their social and political rights. She declares that her nomination came as a surprise. Although she had good relations with the PP in various localities and knew many of their members, it was the Alcala leaders who called her one month before the elections to ask her if she was interested in running for a seat in the local council. But as many other political actors, she also complains about the low level of involvement of the Romanians in politics and their mistrust of community leaders. She continues to be an active member of the PP and participates regularly in their meetings.

Not all party loyalists of the localities studied have an associational background. This is the case, for example, in Arganda del Rey. Here, the Romanian community is perceived as being very religious, with four churches serving Pentecostals, Adventists and Orthodox. The politicians in the local administration also speak positively about the Romanian association in town, Dor Roman. The president of Dor Roman declares that the directory board of the association cannot be involved in politics and, as a consequence, they established good connections with both the PP and the PSOE. It is for this reason that the Romanian candidate on the party list, M. V., did not come from the associational movement.

M. V. immigrated to Spain in early 2002 and worked as a waitress and subsequently as a secretary in various firms around the capital city. She started to militate in the local PSOE after the local elections in 2007 and became the coordinator of the Immigration Department of PSOE Arganda and of the Romanian-Bulgarian

network of the local chapter. The Socialists in Arganda presented her candidacy as recognition of the importance of the Romanian community in the town (PSOE, February 2011). She had actually been placed in an eligible position, but did not win a seat due to the landslide defeat that the Spanish socialists suffered in many localities.

But M.V. 's political connections are not restricted to local politics. Her candidacy in the local elections was supported by the president of the Romanian Social Democratic Party in Spain (PSD-Spain). The president of PSD Spain, M. P., explains that the party leadership in Romania is very intent on helping the Romanians become local councillors. The main motivation is that this way the Romanian community is more integrated and gains prestige. It is also a way through which home country political actors have more dialogue channels with Spanish politicians (interview M.P., president PSD Spain, 2012). Actually, as the PSD Spain president explains, it is one of party's main tasks to identify and support Romanians who want to become involved in host country and home country politics.

8.3 Assessing British and Romanian trajectories to local power

Although British' and Romanian residents' incorporation in local politics cannot be subsumed by one trajectory only, the cases analysed show that, overall, Romanians enter as party loyalists while Britons follow the path of contentious mobilizers. Historical parallelisms are interesting and somewhat unexpected. Romanians' incorporation resembles early Europeans' inclusion by the US urban political machines at the end of the XIXth century. Britons' inclusion, on the other hand, recalls conflictive patterns of accommodation between poorer, discriminated against immigrants and assimilationist and non-responsive host societies.

These distinct trajectories do not predict which groups are more likely to be successful in gaining representation. The numbers show that the British have more candidates and representatives than the Romanians, but part of these differences is due to a longer length of stay and socialization in host country politics. Nonetheless, these trajectories are illustrative, in that they show snapshots of the practice of EU citizenship at the micro-scale, in small and anonymous localities surrounding the Spanish capital or the Costa Blanca coast. They are distinct expressions of the interaction between home country/transnational opportunity structures and immigrant group resources.

8.3.1 Group resources, non-electoral incorporation and electoral incorporation

One finding that somehow diverges previous theoretical findings is related to candidates' social background. The Romanian case does not confirm that political elites are a selected class that does not reflect the composition of the society (Putnam 1976; Norris and Lovenduski 1995). British representatives are highly educated, because the group of British residents in Spain mainly composed of affluent retirees who had a white-collar job back in the UK. Romanian candidates have an occupational background similar to the general profile of the group: workers in the construction sector, domestic workers, etc. It is true that this background is not necessarily an asset, but at the same time it is not a barrier. Spanish political parties are not looking for the elite among the Romanian immigrants, but for candidates who actually reflect the sociological profile of the potential voters.

The contentious behaviour of British candidates and representatives seem to have stemmed from a mismatch between the 'British experience of politics' and the Spanish reality. In Calpe, Javea and Benitatxell the interviewees contrast a more accountable, transparent and democratic way of doing local politics (in the UK) with

corruption and oligarchy (in Spain). This critical attitude towards corrupt local politicians is not a general feeling among the whole population. Jimenez (2007) shows that Spaniards do not necessarily vote corrupt politicians out of office, although in some cases they may lose trust and support in comparison to the previous election. This finding suggests that it is mainly the European residents who manage to translate their discontent with bad and unaccountable politics into political action.

In the British case, the cognitive dissonance between just and unjust patterns of accommodation to the host society is somehow at odds with the classical examples in the literature. It is usually the marginalized immigrant groups (albeit only in some cases) that mobilize and fight against host society institutions, arrangements and social practices. On the contrary, for Romanians, albeit negatively perceived in public discourses, incorporation in host country politics has been a positive experience. The interviews reveal that the Romanian candidates learned a lot during the electoral campaign. They expressed positive opinions about the Spanish political actors and institutions and compared them with the corrupt and nepotistic system back home.

These distinct experiences of self perception in the host society, as well as home country civic and political toolkits influence groups' level of political mobilization, which in turn leads to different pathways to power. Britons were able to enter local councils as candidates for local independent parties because they received sufficient votes from the European voters. Romanians, instead, did not mobilize massively to register in the electoral census. Moreover, as some parties declare, many of the Romanians do not trust their representatives and therefore would not vote for a local independent party with many Romanian names on the list. As an alternative, Romanian political entrepreneurs need to count more on networks and connections with local parties than on massive support from their co-ethnics. These observations confirm and contextualize hypothesis H1b in Chapter II, by showing how higher levels

of group resources (electoral mobilization, contentious leadership) are associated with a higher probability of incorporation.

While group-level electoral mobilization is not a lucky card for the Romanians interviewed, their associational background plays an important role in the pursuit of a political career, confirming hypothesis H6a in Chapter I only in the case of Romanians. For the British candidates, membership and leadership in various clubs and groups is not a pre-requisite for gaining civic visibility. This is also due to the fact that British associations tend to be apolitical, while Romanian immigrant associations establish much closer links with Spanish administrations and political parties. However, there are several presidents of Romanian associations in the Madrid region who clearly expressed their desire to participate in the local political life of their places of residence. In spite of this, the parties refrained from selecting them due to the fact that they are not representative or trustworthy, as Chapter VI shows.

8.3.2 Interacting group resources and party behaviour

This chapter provides a complementary illustration of hypothesis H3a, which was discussed in Chapter VII through a quantitative approach to immigrant candidate nomination. To reiterate, H3a argues that parties' strategies to incorporate immigrant candidates are influenced by groups' status in the host society, which in turn entail distinct trajectories of electoral incorporation. The analysis in this chapter shows how group self-perception and contentious patterns of settlement in the case of the Britons interact with political parties' electoral strategies and shape Britons' trajectory to local power.

In its regional congress of 2011, various leaders of the PP Valencia declared that they should try to incorporate the 'independent' candidates and local politicians of EU origin in the region (*El Pais,* 13.05.2012). The short stories of local contexts and

political trajectories confirm these declarations. After contentious relations and conflicts since the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty in 1999, more and more independent British councillors got integrated among the group of the mainstream parties. The foundation of local parties by the Europeans and the disillusioned locals constitutes a strategic starting point for their political career. Although these parties did not win more than two councillors, this number is enough to change the balance in favour of one or another traditional hegemon. There are the exceptions of Benitatxell and Javea, where the local parties won the majority in the council in 2007. But their failure to win councillor seats at the 2011 local elections pinpoints that the mainstream parties are the gatekeepers of a genuine political career of the immigrant aspirants to political office.

This is not the case of Romanians. The Romanians who entered party lists were actually co-opted by party leaders and placed in marginal positions. However, most of the party leaders were convinced that in the 2015 elections the Romanians, if they prove to be hard working and faithful to the party, will get a better position and may actually win a seat in the council. To many, the 2011 elections were the beginning of a process of incorporation that already offers recognition and prestige to the Romanian community in one locality.

Spanish parties' activities regarding the incorporation of resident EU citizens are in line with broader patterns of party behaviour in contemporary societies: parties do not make it easy for immigrants to become politically engaged (Rogers 2007; Jones-Correa 1998; Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2009; Andersen 2008). Paradoxically, Spanish parties seem friendlier to Romanian activists and aspirants to political office than to the British. But this observation is based on micro-level analysis. When moving the lenses at a larger scale, Romanians' electoral incorporation is rather a rare event. As the previous chapter shows, immigrant candidates were nominated in only 88 of the 636 Spanish localities with more than five per cent Romanians, as opposed

to almost half of localities with the same characteristics in the British case. In this case, it is true that Spanish parties approach Romanian political entrepreneurs as US political machines did in the case of early European immigrants. The difference is that, while in the US context, party behaviour in New Haven could be illustrative of more general dynamics between parties and European immigrants, in the cases analysed the assimilationist and party loyalist trajectories are rare occurrences. Rather, parties refrain from approaching Romanians unless motivated by strong competition for the immigrant vote, as Chapter VII has already argued.

8.3.3 Interacting group resources, transnational opportunities and political opportunities in the context of residence

The analysis presented in this chapter shows how transnational opportunities may be an asset in the process of electoral inclusion. In the discourses of some of the British interviewees, the strategic use of the European Union resources has played a central role in their pathway to the local power. This is for example the case of Parcent, where J. C. managed to stop a large urbanization project and to become part of the city government by using the resources of the European Parliament and the European Commission. As she declares, 'The European Parliament is important to the people in Parcent because it helped them save their mountain'.

The role of EU citizenship is largely absent in the practices electoral incorporation of Romanians in the Community of Madrid. The PSOE Madrid coordinator of the electoral campaign explained that the party had a common strategy to integrate Romanian and Latin American candidates (interview P.Z., PSM 2012). Moreover, the candidates did not identify with Europe in their interviews, nor did they use EU membership as a discursive strategy during the campaign.

What actually seems to help Romanian candidates is a connection with the political parties in the country of origin, or with their transnational chapters. The

most relevant example is the case of Arganda del Rey, where the PSOE candidate was also supported by the Romanian Social Democrats in her campaign. According to the representatives of Romanian parties in Spain, the support for Romanian candidacies is an important goal of the activities of the external chapters. These transnational organizations belonging to Romanian political parties consider that Romanians' presence in Spanish local councils is a win-win situation. It entails more dialogue channels with Spanish political actors, as well as a better positioning of the community as a whole (interview M. P., president PSD Spain, 2012).

The role of the transnational structure of opportunities does not have to be regarded as either-or. It can also be the case that some Romanian political entrepreneurs do not wish to establish contacts with the Romanian political actors, due to the fact that they perceive them as corrupt and not trustworthy, as the Alcala interviewee declares. The lack of transnational connections and resources is not an impediment to entering the local political scene. But, where it exists, it actually has a positive effect, as it builds more prestige and visibility for the candidate.

In the British case, the role of the homeland political actors is not so much to propel British notables onto the local political scene. Rather, British external chapters are part of a network formed by Spanish parties (at the local and national level) and British candidates and representatives. This is, for example, the case of G. H. in Benitatxell. However, these links are conditioned by two factors: that Britons are not contentious actors, at odds with the mainstream Spanish parties, and that they have had a previous trajectory in British politics, which provides them with knowledge, acquaintances and political skills. In contrast to the Romanian case, British parties do not try to build the expat community and to that extent they are not interested in identifying and forming new leaders.

However, these networks between Romanian or British parties and candidates, on the one hand, and Spanish parties, on the other hand would not be as strong without the EU membership. As party leaders of the same ideological colour declare, 'we are all part of the same family in the EP'. As a consequence, the horizontal relations that arise between home and host country political actors and institutions in the context of the EU are qualitatively different from the transnational networks formed in other migration systems, as for example the US-Mexico mobility. To that extent, they are an integrative part of the processes of political incorporation in the host country, confirming hypothesis H5b.

8.4 Conclusions

The analysis of the processes of local incorporation of British and Romanian residents in Spain reveals two distinct trajectories to the local power---Romanians as party loyalists and the British as contentious mobilizers. Although Romanians have a higher degree of underrepresentation, the 2011 elections opened various windows of opportunity for the aspirants who want to enter the Spanish local councils. The processes of inclusion of the British residents have been much more contentious, although an upward trend can be observed in the number of Western Europeans in the local councils, as already discussed in Chapter V. Higher levels of group resources, a strategic use of the EU membership and the cognitive dissonance between their experiences with politics at home and abroad are some of the main factors that explain these differences.

The next chapter complements the analysis presented here by discussing the representational practices of British representatives. How do they actually act, once elected? Does their presence in local councils also imply influence over the policy process? As already stated, the analysis is not symmetrical and comparative, due to

the lack of a sufficient number of Romanian elected representatives. The analysis focuses, in consequence, not so much on how group-related factors explain variation in terms of representative practices, but rather on how the structure of opportunities and trajectories to power shape the process of immigrant representation.

CHAPTER NINE

The electoral pathway: British representatives in local politics

The preceding analysis of the electoral pathway to incorporation approached the concept of political inclusion from the perspective of candidate nomination and trajectories to power. Although nomination is a necessary step for groups' access to electoral representation, it does not entail that groups actually manage to gain presence and influence in the local political arena. This is the case, for instance, of Romanians, who, in spite of having 97 candidates nominated, did not manage to win more than one local councillor position in the 2011 elections. In consequence, the analysis of what elected representatives actually do is conducted only in the British case and lacks a comparative focus.

The chapter aims to provide an understanding of a) what the factors that lead to a successful candidacy are and b) if electoral representation entails mere presence, or, on the contrary, an influent position on the local political scene. In order to answer the first question the analysis discusses hypothesis 3b in Chapter II, according to which groups' and leaders' reception and self-perception in the host society are key factors for transforming political nomination into an eligible position on the list. Regarding the second question, the analysis shows how the interaction between the broad political context and groups' patterns of settlement in the host society shape the representation practices of British elected councillors (H4 in Chapter II).

9.1 Immigrant representation and political incorporation

9.1.1 Presence and influence

The concept of immigrant representation is one of the most studied aspects of migrants' political integration. It draws on arguments of political theory scholars such as Hannah Pitkin (1967) and later works of feminist and multiculturalism theorists (Young 1989; Phillips 1995; Kymlicka 1995). Summarizing it in one sentence, representing is seen as making present those who are absent (Pitkin 1967: 3). Since women, sexual minorities, national ethnic minorities and immigrants have many times been excluded from having their interests represented politically, members of these groups are considered to be the best representatives of their interests by advocates of differentiated representation (Young 1989; Mansbridge 1999; Dovi 2007). To that extent, immigrants' *presence* on the political scene is equated to the degree to which they have representatives belonging to their respective ethnic groups. In the following analysis, political presence and descriptive/stratistical representation are used interchangeably.

The normative argumentation in favour of immigrants' descriptive representation generates the empirical question regarding the extent to which the political presence of immigrant-origin local councillors (descriptive/statistical representation) also entails substantive representation; in other words, if it allows immigrant-related claims to become visible and heard in the process of policy making (Michon 2011; Saalfeld 2011). However, substantive representation and policy influence are two concepts that do not fully overlap. Substantive representation is closely related to representatives' discourses on representation (Michon 2011). Immigrant local councillors can act as delegates, submitting to the interests of their (immigrant) constituents or as trustees, following their own judgement regarding the right course of action (Pitkin 1967). In many cases, the tension between delegation and trustee is translated into the tension between

loyalty to (immigrant) constituents' interests and loyalty to the position of the political party to which the representative belongs. As Martiniello (1998) notes, immigrant representatives' behaviour suffers from 'political schizophrenia':

> 'Les élus d'origine étrangère me semblaient coincés entre deux types de contraintes. D'une part, les partis pouvaient essayer de les utiliser pour attirer le nouvel électorat d'origine étrangère. Dans cette optique, le rôle principal des élus d'origine immigrée était uniquement d'être présent et non pas de proposer des idées et des actions politiques, notamment quand celles-ci étaient dirigées vers les populations issues de l'immigration. D'autre part, les Belges d'origine étrangère et les associations d'immigrés pouvaient chercher à instrumentaliser les élus et tenter d'en faire des leaders ethniques porteurs de revendications communautaires ou particularistes.' (idem, 1998: 144)

The degree to which immigrant-origin representatives are influent depends on their access to power resources and on their capacity to mobilize those resources in the pursuit of a particular aim (Woods 1998: 2106). This aim, however, does not have to be immigration related. Browning et. al (1984) consider that the core resources needed are related to being part of the city government ruling coalition and receiving the support of mainstream political actors involved in the process of decision-making. Empirical studies show that there are cases in which immigrant-origin elected representatives have a symbolic role in local power hierarchies, as opposed to representatives who perceive that they can actually have an impact over the policy process (Bird 2005 for the case of France). To that extent, group-level incorporation through the electoral pathway does not entail only influent representatives, but also influent representatives who pursue the groups' interests in the local political process.

Corroborating the concepts of substantive representation and policy influence, there are three typologies of representative behaviour that can be connected to the concept of political incorporation: the non-influent representative, the influent trustee and the influent delegate. The influent trustee has a good position in networks of power and influence and receives the support of host country political actors and institutions for his or her proposals. However, the content of these proposals is not necessarily immigration-related and covers a

wider array of topics and policy issues. The influent delegate is well-placed in the networks of power and mainly uses his or her political mandate in the purpose of lending prominence to immigrant interests. Stricto sensu, having influent delegates is what predicts the 'full incorporation' immigrant group (Browning et al 1984).

9.1.2 Determinants of representation

As this chapter approaches the concept of representation as both presence and influence, I will discuss separately the factors that account for each of these two phenomena. The factors that explain successful immigrant representation as 'occurrence' (presence/descriptive representation) are related to those that give an account of immigrant candidate nomination in the first place: group-related factors, party behaviour and transnational opportunities. Nonetheless, there are some variables that have a stronger influence on transforming political nomination into successful representation. As already discussed in Chapter II, the electoral system (first past the post or PR open list), residential concentration and electoral mobilization are considered as key 'push' factors for transforming candidacies into local council seats (Togeby 2008; Bird 2003). Still, scholarly research reserves little space for a thorough exploration of the relation between immigrant candidate nomination and successful representation, especially in closed list PR systems, where the voters cannot influence the success of the candidates.

Recalling hypothesis 3b in Chapter II, I argue that groups' and their leaders' patterns of settlement in the host society influence parties' behaviour related to the successful representation of immigrant groups. Since voters cannot influence the ballot in PR closed list systems, there is no external constraint that immigrant candidates are placed in a safe position on the list. To that extent, the incentive has to come from candidates themselves. An element that may

contribute to obtaining a safe position on the list is the role of the trajectory to power. As the previous chapter has shown, a contentious mobilizer trajectory is, in most of the cases studied, associated with a safe place on the list.

In what concerns the degree of political influence obtained through descriptive representation, studies approaching the issue refer to the 'lack of influence' of ethnic councillors (Laurence and Maxwell 2011; Bird 2005). As most of the research focuses on cross-country comparisons, the core factors responsible for representatives' success in influencing local politics are related to the 'character of local political institutions' and the electoral system. Thus, an elitist and hierarchical political context, as is the case of France, leaves little room for policy initiatives coming from the floor of local councils. As Bird (2005) and Garbaye (2005) explain, the mayor and his or her close circle are perceived as having the final word over the agenda. At the same time, a proportional electoral system that results in coalition formation may encourage the inclusion of immigrant-origin politicians among the city government members (Bird 2005). The level of urbanization is another element that constraints immigrant representatives' practices. Local governments of small localities, as is the case in this analysis, have limited resources to develop and sustain broad initiatives and services for their inhabitants (Valles and Brugue 2001). It is therefore expected that the structural policy capacities of the local government limit the extent to which immigrant councillors make proposals and demands.

Besides the local political environment, candidates' entrance into local politics is another variable that influences their future political activity. A contentious mobilizer trajectory to local power either through a local independent party or coming from militant circles may increase representatives' chances of being co-opted by the mainstream parties wishing to form local coalitions. At the same time, a party loyalist background with a long period of militancy within the party can also increase representatives' influence and support among native politicians.

Whether representatives choose to focus their influence on immigrant issues or to broaden their representative practices depends to a high extent on the broader discursive and opportunity structures made available for immigrants. Thus, an anti-immigrant environment may induce immigrant representatives to 'distance themselves from ethnic messages' while a multicultural environment can promote a delegation type of representation (Bird 2005; Bloemraad 2013). However, representatives from positively or neutrally perceived ethnic groups do not necessarily need to distance themselves from pursuing immigrant interests. In sum, as hypothesis H4 in Chapter II claims, the manner in which immigrants are represented in host country politics is shaped not only by immigrant agency, but also by the interaction between group patterns of settlement and the broader opportunity structure.

9.2 A note on methodology

The chapter discusses two dimensions of the concept of representation: presence and influence in host country politics. Presence is operationalized similarly to the concept of nomination in Chapter VII, that is, as 'occurrence'. It entails the existence/non-existence of at least one British-origin local councillor in a given locality. The identification of British representatives has been performed by verifying which of the 185 nominees won local councillor seats according to the Ministry of the Interior electoral results website. The dataset and the operationalization of the independent variables are identical to the ones presented in Chapter VII. To that extent, a quantitative perspective on descriptive representation offers a better outlook of which of the group-related factors and contextual electoral constraints actually account for successful representation, as opposed to candidate nomination.

Corroborating data from interviews and secondary sources such as local press and online information, the analysis of Britons' descriptive representation

also aims to establish a connection between candidate's trajectory to local power and the success in becoming a local councillor. Thus, I have restricted the sample of British candidates and representatives to the province of Alicante. In total, I found 56 localities with candidates of British origin, of which 20 have a councillor of this nationality in the 2011 elections. In a further step, I searched for online information about each candidate by using the search engine Google and the Factiva press database, which contains a large sample of Spanish newspapers, including the provincial editions of *Las Provincias* and *Diario Información*. In total, I compiled information on candidates and representatives from 49 localities. I also used data from the interviews with British candidates. This helped me construct a short profile of the candidate and his or her visibility and claims made publicly. This information can be used in order to ascertain whether the candidate is a contentious figure or an obscure candidate most probably placed in a marginal position.

Regarding representatives' capacity to influence the process of policy making, this chapter approaches the concept of influence from two perspectives: a) as an external attribute of immigrant representatives, that is, whether they are part of a ruling coalition or they are outside the networks of local power and influence and b) as a subjective perception of their own capacity to influence the local policy agenda (Woods 1998; Harding et al 2005; Michon 2011).

A difficulty posed by the concept of influent substantive representation is that it requires a 'match' between immigrant constituents' interests and demands and the behaviour of their representatives. However, in most cases the lack of suitable empirical data makes this endeavour difficult. At the same time, 'immigrant constituents' interests' is a concept difficult to grasp in reality, due to the plurality of interests inherent in any community. It also poses a difficult normative task, as it requires a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate interests (Dovi 2007). Taking into account these considerations, policy influence is grasped in representatives' discourses and their perception of how their

proposals, immigration related or not, are supported by mainstream political actors and included in the policy agenda. The research sites for the study of representatives' behaviour and capacity to influence are the same as in the previous chapter.

9.3 Presence in local politics

Chapter VII has shown that the main predictors of British candidates' nomination are a high degree of electoral mobilization and a competitive environment, especially in the case of the Valencian Community. But do these factors also account for successful representation in local governments? Table 9.1 seeks to answer these questions by displaying the results of three logistic regressions. The first model shows the influence of group resources and local electoral constraints on successful representation, while model 2 does the same by controlling for the regional effect. Model 3 runs the regression only for the Valencian Community localities, since they are the context of the qualitative analysis presented in this chapter.

British councillors are found in 30 of the 125 localities with British candidates. In total, 45 out of the 185 candidates (24 per cent) won seats in local councils. The data reveals that the PP is the party with the highest number of British-origin local councillors (20), followed by PSOE (13) and the local parties (8). At the same time, the PP is also the party that best places British-origin candidates on its lists. One third of them managed to win seats in the councils, followed by local party candidates (27 per cent). By contrast, only 22 per cent of the British socialist candidates also managed to secure councillor seats. An explanation of this finding is also related to the fact that overall, in the localities included in the analysis, the PP had a higher success rate in the 2011 local elections. In consequence, they won more local councillor seats, a factor that also

had a positive influence on British PP candidates' chances to become local representatives.

As Model 1 in Table 9.1 indicates, neither the level of electoral competition, nor the number of parties presented is a significant predictor. As in the case of nomination, group resources translated into pre-electoral mobilization have a positive impact on the successful representation of British residents. Thus, the more the British register in the municipal electoral census in one locality, the higher their odds of having a representative. For example, in an average community with virtually zero British electors, the probability of having a British representative is less than three per cent. This probability increases to seven per cent if the British residents make up five per cent of the voters registered in the census and to 35 per cent if they are 20 per cent of the electors.

As opposed to the case of nomination, the level of ethnic diversity and the group's prominence among the immigrant community have a negative effect. In other words, the less diverse the immigrant community is and the less Britons are dominant among the other nationalities, the higher the chances that the British nominated candidate wins a seat in the council. Computing the predicted probabilities gives a better understanding of this phenomenon. Thus, in an average locality with a low level of ethnic diversity (1.3) and a low percentage of Britons relative to the total number of immigrants (20%), their probability of representation is 64 per cent. This probability decreases to 30 per cent once the percentage of Britons relative to the total number of immigrants increases to 70 per cent. In a diverse community (2.8) with a low percentage of Britons relative to the total number of immigrants (0.2), their probability of representation is 20 per cent. This goes down to 9 per cent once the percentage of Britons relative to the total number of immigrants increases to 50 per cent. According to these findings and the results in Chapter VII, Britons' dominant status among the immigrant community is an asset for their nomination, but in marginal positions. Nonetheless, a low percentage of Britons among immigrants is what favours their

placement in a secure position on the party lists. Thus, inter-group competition, coupled with a low level of ethnic diversity, has a positive effect on political incorporation outcomes in the British case. This means that Britons score best in terms of representation where they are the minority group among a less diverse immigrant community.

The regional effect is measured in Model 2. Since in several autonomous communities in the sample (Catalonia, Balearic Islands, Murcia Region) there is no British elected in local councils, the observations from these regions have been dropped. As the results show, British expats residing in the Valencian Community are more incorporated into the local political life than in Andalusia. The Canary Islands do not display significant differences in comparison to the Valencian localities. One explanation is, as in the case of nomination, the importance given by parties to contextual constraints such as close races.

As Model 3 shows, in the Valencian localities close races have a positive effect on British residents' successful representation. Although not shown in the table, in the case of Andalusian localities, the only significant predictor is related to pre-electoral mobilization. The general logic of representation independently of cross-regional differences is related to the same set of factors as in Model 1. A high level of electoral mobilization is what actually incentivises parties to place a British candidate in an eligible position. This finding can also be justified by the fact that a highly mobilized immigrant community empowers the candidates to negotiate a better position. Although the effect of the number of parties is significant, its impact is actually very low (an odds ratio of 0.93) and for this reason it cannot be considered as a powerful explanatory element of the process of incorporation through electoral politics. The level of ethnic diversity and the group's prominence among immigrants have the same negative effect as in Model1.

Table 9.1. Logit coefficients and standard errors for the probability of finding a British local councillor on any party list in the British residents data-set. Model 2 has clustered standard errors.

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Percentage of the group according to the municipal electoral census	1.49*** (0.35)	1.30*** (0.38)	1.04*** (0.43)
Distance between the 1st two parties 2007	-2.17 (1.5)	-2.09 (2.80)	-4.98** (2.12)
Ethnic diversity	-1.85* (1.05)	-2.17* (0.85)	-2.73* (1.5)
Percentage of the group out of the total number of immigrants	-4.11* (2.2)	-3.55* (0.85)	-4.73* (2.81)
Number of parties	-0.18 (0.22)	-0.16** (0.05)	-0.10 (0.29)
Number of inhabitants (log)	0.48* (0.24)	0.50*** (0.02)	0.52* (0.31)
Autonomous Community Ref: Valencia Community)			
Andalusia		-1.20*** (0.09)	
Canary Islands		0.66 (0.70)	
Intercept	5.67 (3.90)	6.00** (2.9)	7.54 (4.95)
Pseudo-R2	0.24	0.26	0.24
BIC	174.235	136.317	112.403
AIC	150.078	129.662	94.097
N	233	207	101

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

In relation to hypothesis H4b, Table 9.2 displays the results regarding the public profile of British candidates in the province of Alicante. By compiling data from online resources and fieldwork interviews, I was able to sketch a general profile of both candidates and representatives. Thus, as cell 2.3 shows, out of 29 British candidates who failed to win councillor seats, only three can be found in the press and online information sources. Of these, two only can be labelled as having a contentious profile, in the sense of being involved in civic organizations, local parties or militant groups that make critical political declarations. In opposition to this case, 16 of 20 successful candidates also appear one way or another in the media. Of these, 10 are contentious.

Table 9.2. Public profile of British candidates in the Alicante province

Office	***Total***	***Public profile (incl. contentious)***	***Contentious profile***
Unsuccessful candidates	29	3	2
Elected representatives	20	16	10

Most of the contentious cases have already been discussed in the previous chapter. To recall, the reasons of contention of the councillors interviewed are related to the 'land grab scandal', local urban planning, corruption and environmental issues. However, apart from the cases selected for the qualitative analysis, similar narratives arise in the villages of Llíber, Castalla and Rojales, to name but a few. In Castalla and Llíber, the object of contention is LRAU and its consequences on real estate properties. It is interesting to note that in these cases the contentious actor is the European residents' community as a whole, which pressures the local government through organizations, civic networks and elected representatives.

9.4 Presence and influence

The previous analysis discussed the factors that influence Britons' presence in local councils. A high level of electoral mobilization, competitive elections and contentious civic and political entrepreneurs are the main factors

that explain their success in the cases studied. However, presence on the local political scene does not necessarily entail policy influence. The concept is defined as membership in the governing coalition and the ability to advance proposals and to gain the support of the majority party and the Spanish-dominated local governments (Browning and Tabb 1984; Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2010).

According to the British residents dataset, half of the PP local councillors of British origin (20 in total) are also part of city governments. In the case of the socialists, only five out of 13 are also part of the dominant coalition. Restricting the numbers to the Valencian Community, three quarters of the PP British councillors are part of the local government, while in the case of the PSOE British local politicians, the number of those who are members of the governing team is reduced to one third. In most cases, British representatives elected as independent candidates or nominated by local parties ally with the local government and become part of the ruling coalition.

It is plausible to argue that opposition councillors lack the necessary resources to introduce changes on the policy agenda. To that extent, most of them can be classified as non-influential representatives, although they may be visible contentious figures on the local political scene. As the following analysis illustrates, British councillors pursue both the role of delegates and trustees. I further discuss how these roles are put into practice and how they are shaped by structural and group related constraints (the second hypothesis of this chapter).

9.4.1 The (influent) delegate

During their time in office, British councillors are usually put in charge of relations with European residents, although they also coordinate areas like Women, Pensioners, Environment and Health. They are the interface between the local power and the European communities in the locality. This occurs also because, in many cases, foreign-born residents have difficulties in understanding

and relating to the local administration (interviews British councillors Calpe and Alcalali 2010).

The councillors deal with general (European) community problems, such as access to information and language support, but also with the particular issues of a resident or a group of residents. Regarding general community problems, many of the councillors interviewed consider that it is important to open a local information point where foreign-born residents can receive advice and support in a language that they can understand. In several localities, the councillors also lobby for key local institutions, like the hospitals and the city hall, to provide information in migrants' languages.

The spokesperson role performed by British councillors may take various forms, depending mainly on how each politician understands his or her mission. In Calpe, for example, most of L. T. 's interventions in the local plenary sessions are related to questions regarding specific problems raised by British residents, ranging from street lighting to special garbage cans for batteries. In Cartalla and Llíber, European residents organize frequent meetings with 'their' councillor in order to discuss town planning issues, water and lighting facilities and concerns regarding LRAU. In Teulada, however, S. T. does not raise many questions related to the particular issues of a citizen or a group of citizens. She tries to solve the demands on an individual basis, 'every time a problem occurs, without bringing it up in local council debates' (interview S. T, local councillor Teulada 2010).

As a general evaluation, British councillors consider that Spanish politicians are receptive to their suggestions and proposals related to the European communities in one locality. The degree to which migrants' claims are met by the city government depends on the issue at stake. Requests that do not involve a large amount of resources are usually solved through direct pressure from community civic entrepreneurs and the lobby pursued by the British councillor. Projects that involve a significant quantity of resources, such as

modifying local development plans, granting amnesty for illegal properties or expanding electricity and water supplies are usually slow or even halt due to the economic crisis. To that extent, the representatives' capability to influence the local policy agenda is not a yes/no issue, but rather depends on local administrations' capacities to allocate the necessary resources. This is, for example, the case of a contentious British councillor, formerly independent and presently PP, who claims to have entered local politics in order to represents Europeans' interests, but finds this goal difficult to fulfil, due to the general lack of resources:

> "Why are there so many local parties in Costa Blanca?
>
> Because the large parties do not represent properly the community. We have 66% foreign residents. That's the legal community, paying taxes, being in the *padron*, doing the things we should do. And because we are paying taxes we should be represented in the local government.
>
> Do you mean that the local government represents only the Spaniards?
>
> Well, yes. The parties are run by rich families who do not have the interest to represent the whole community.
>
> And now?
>
> Now we are broke. The city hall does not have the money to do what we promised" (interview, A. B., Benitatxell, 2010)

9.4.2 The (influent) trustee

Apart from being spokespersons on behalf of European (EU15) resident communities, British councillors are political entrepreneurs in other policy areas. There is one policy field where British residents have managed to gain a leading role: environmental protection and sustainable development. The Parcent case is emblematic in terms of how J. C.'s leadership resulted in a greener town council that promotes village development while respecting the surrounding mountains. In Javea, A. D. was the first councillor to implement Agenda 21 Local, opening the pathway to bottom-up participation and development of several sustainable projects in the locality. In Calpe, C. S. started the implementation of the Agenda

21 Local in early 2012, being able to put into practice many of the ideas for which she had fought for several years from the civil society side.

Apart from immigration-related issues and sustainable development, British local councillors do not carry out an intense political activity in other policy areas. This relatively 'narrow' agenda can be largely explained by the limited number of issues discussed by the local administrations and not necessarily by the lack of support from the Spanish dominated ruling coalition. More specifically, the analysis of local plenary sessions of the 2007-2011 legislature in the localities selected reveals that more than 90 per cent of the plenary agenda is related to urbanization projects and infrastructure management. Other policy areas have not been found, except for the case when they were related to laws and policies coming from the regional and national levels of government.

9.5 Factors shaping political influence

The previous sections show that British councillors' presence among Spanish local representatives entails a certain degree of political weight. The councillors are both delegates of the British local communities and entrepreneurs in other policy areas, albeit in a limited way. The spokesperson role is accomplished, on one hand, on an individual basis, by trying to solve the requests and complaints that come from various foreign-born citizens. On the other hand, the spokesperson role is performed collectively, by lobbying for various programmes and policies that benefit European residents in the locality. Apart from political entrepreneurship in areas related to the immigrant community, British representatives have also managed to have a leading role in local policies related to sustainable development and the environment. The interaction between group resources and local political opportunities explains to a large degree these practices of representation.

9.5.1 Group resources and settlement in the host society

The British councillors interviewed embrace their double role as delegates and trustees without many difficulties. Unlike immigrant representatives from other countries, they do not intend to distance themselves from the ethnic message in their representational activities (Bird 2005; Michon 2011). Although many British councillors have several years of residence in Spain and speak Spanish fluently, they do not regard being labelled as 'the councillor for foreigners' as a burden. Factors such as group reception and self-perception in the host society and residential concentration help explain this representational role.

One explanation for this fact is the non-controversial nature of their ethnicities in the context of residence. As Bird (2005) has already commented, in less friendly immigration contexts immigrant-origin councillors try to conceal their label as 'immigrant representative' by pursuing a broader representational agenda and by claiming that they are the representatives of all constituents, not only of the immigrant voters. In the small localities of the Alicante coast, many of the British councillors entered politics in order to represent specifically the European (EU15) resident communities, due to the fact that they were not listened to adequately by native politicians. However, their representational perspective is not centred on ethnicity, but on a larger European identity. They perceive themselves as the councillors of the European residents, not only of the British, Dutch or French. Nonetheless, in towns where Romanians are also a relevant part of the immigrant population, the councillors interviewed do not perceive themselves as their representatives as well.

Another group-related factor that enables an influent delegate role is related to European residents' patterns of residential settlement. In all coastal localities with important British (and other European nationality) residents, the immigrant community lives in segregated residential areas, developed outside the

old town nucleus. These residential areas have distinct problems from the rest of the town neighbourhoods. Sometimes facilities, such as roads, electricity, water, postal addresses are not fully provided or are still under construction. In many cases, the houses are 'illegal', due to the fact that they are constructed without a building licence. These factors prompt the European communities in the area to mobilize, speak with one voice and transmit their demands easily both to their councillor and to the local administration. To that extent, they are perceived as a separate constituency with its own representative, although in the Spanish electoral system the constituency for local elections is the whole locality.

Mobilization around property stated demands and the 'cognitive dissonance' between how politics is understood in the UK and in Spain also offer an explanation for why British representatives have been successful in taking a leadership role in policy initiatives related to sustainable development. As already discussed, the 'land grab scandals', the LRAU and local corruption generated various waves of contention on the part of the civil society (lead mainly by European residents) and European migrant political entrepreneurs who managed to halt several urbanization projects in the area. These issues have been framed as being unjust and as a danger to the environment. For these reasons, the environment and sustainable development are policy areas where the British representatives and organizational leaders managed to be the main protagonists. It is important to note, therefore, that foreign born politicians' influence may be related to topics that are objects of contention, but which are broader than mere 'immigrant demands'.

9.5.2 Local institutional environment

One of the reasons why British councillors are active in a limited number of policy areas is strongly related to the opportunities available at the local level. Spanish municipalities have gained increasing legal autonomy from regional and

local levels. Nonetheless, this 'de jure' local autonomy is not backed by a 'de facto' financial autonomy and policy capacity (García 2006; Valles and Brugue 1998). Moreover, high disparities in terms of size and population generate visible differences in municipal governments' capacities to manage resources and offer high quality services to their inhabitants.

There are a handful of policy areas covered by the 'average' local government with less than 50,000 inhabitants (street lighting, town cleaning, town infrastructure, social services, libraries, etc). Nonetheless, many local governments have also developed 'strategic' policies aimed at the social and economic development of their territories (García 2006; Subirats 1989; Valles and Brugue 1998). This is the case of most of the localities with important British and European immigration. They are of small size, with populations rarely exceeding 40,000 inhabitants, but with large development projects that have to be halted, slowed down or modified along the way due to the lack of sufficient resources or legal issues. To that extent, the limited number of policy topics that can be found on British councillors' agenda is related to the broader structural capacities that small local governments have in terms of initiating and sustaining a wide array of policies.

Another element that influences British councillors' representational practices is related to the pyramidal character of local politics, especially in small localities. As elsewhere in Southern Europe and France, Spanish mayors are the gravity centre of local politics, in spite of emerging policy communities that gather stakeholders from civic and economic sectors (Botella 1992; Valles and Brugue 1998; Subirats 1989). The interviews reveal that some of the British councillors are 'impressed' by the fact that 'the mayor behaves as if the town were her property' and to that extent they find it difficult to navigate through the system. But in spite of perceiving Spanish local politics as being more authoritarian than in the UK, they make positive comments regarding how their proposals are received.

One element that enforces British-origin representatives' position vis-à-vis the mayor and the other councillors is the configuration of the local political system. As already noted by other authors (Bird 2005; Valles and Brugue 1998), coalition local governments increase the role played by local councillors in town government. As many of the British elected councillors entered politics as contentious mobilizers, they strategically play their card as 'indispensable' councillors who can form or destabilize local coalitions. Old party loyalists have also gained an important reputation and weight in the local power hierarchy. To that extent, councillors who mobilize power resources and networks to a lower extent are recent party loyalists who have not yet managed to consolidate their political trajectory.

9.6 From presence to influence

By and large, the analysis of the British case reveals that there are three mechanisms through which political presence is translated into political weight. The first condition is to be part of the ruling coalition (Browning et al 1984), since, in many cases, opposition councillors do not manage to exert a real influence on the local town council. As the data collected shows, most of the British candidates on the PP lists have also won a place in the local government, a fact which places them in a favourable position in relation to their co-nationals in the opposition.

Another mechanism that facilitates the translation of political presence into political weight is related to the level of salience of certain policy issues and the involvement of the British community in making these issues public and contested. Environmental preservation, opposition to urbanization laws and 'cognitive dissonance' caused by local corruption are all interrelated issues that have contributed to the clash between the European residents and the Spanish local politics. They have also constituted a springboard for community leaders to

enter local councils and promote the ideas which they think are worth fighting for when holding political office.

The third condition is related to the receptivity of native politicians. In most cases, the ability to promote certain issues on the policy agenda does not depend so much on the level of receptivity towards the British community, but rather on the local way of doing politics. This ranges from a mayor-dominated city council to a more democratic process in which the local power is shared between the council and the mayor. In this latter case, the representatives are able not only to discuss the projects proposed by the mayor, but also to make their own proposals and receive the support of the governing coalition.

A fourth element constraining the translation of political presence into political weight is related to local government capacities. This is relevant especially in the case of small localities, where most revenue comes from construction and infrastructure development. Due to this latter issue, the local agenda is focused mainly on town planning. The lack of diversity of the local agenda may imply little policy innovation in other fields, including those related to the demands of foreign-born residents.

It is worth noting that transnational connexions are absent from the representational practices of the British interviewees. While they play an important role in the non-electoral pathway to politics and the nomination processes, transnational resources are not activated in the actual practice of representation. One explanation may be that once elected, immigrant representatives seek to play by the rules of the institutional setting that frames their activity. However, predictions and generalizations are risky, given the fact that the analysis is based on one case only. Moreover, it is plausible to think that in the case of future Romanian representatives, transnational connections with homeland political actors and institutions do not need to vanish once they win an elected office.

9.7 Conclusions

This chapter has discussed the main factors influencing the representation of British immigrants in Spain. The analysis has shown that a high degree of electoral mobilization and low percentages of British expats among local immigrant communities have a positive influence on the probability to win a seat in the council. A contentious mobilizer entrance on the local political scene also increases the chances of becoming an elected representative.

Regarding the level of influence of British representatives, the analysis shows that, overall, the representatives who are part of the governing coalition/party manage to influence the local political agenda on issues related to immigrant integration and sustainable development. The uncontroversial nature of their national origin and a relative independence from Spanish parties are two factors that encourage a delegation style of representation, which is often supported by native politicians. Nonetheless, the low level of urbanization, coupled with the limited capacities of the local governments studied, moderates the level of policy innovation and influence of British representatives.

CHAPTER TEN

Conclusions

This dissertation proposes a revised framework for analysing the political incorporation of European citizens who migrate to another member state. The findings show that the political inclusion of EU movers does not follow a uniform logic dictated by the common abstract principles of the European citizenship regime. On the contrary, practices of political inclusion vary, depending on the manner in which the groups of European citizens are received and integrated, as well as on their ability to make use of their resources in the host societies. The study goes beyond the agency-host country structure approach, by including in the analysis a transnational perspective on the processes of political incorporation. As the cases of British and Romanian residents in Spain indicate, transnational links and membership resources can have an empowering effect in dealing with host country political actors and institutions. The following sections summarize the main findings and hypotheses proposed in the first chapter and contain a series of reflections regarding the limitations of the present study and ways of expanding it in future research.

10.1 The role of resources and political opportunities

The different paths to local politics undertaken by Romanian and British residents in Spain are explained by the interactions between group resources and political opportunities that span the borders of the country of residence. Chapters VI - IX show that the development of a strong organizational infrastructure and high rates of political mobilization help British political entrepreneurs to influence the process of policy making through both electoral and non-electoral channels (H1). The analysis suggests that the mechanism behind these higher rates of mobilization and organization is related not only to a participatory civic

and political culture in the country of origin, but also to the interaction between these group resources and the structure of opportunities offered by Spanish politics. An important role is played by Britons' contentious relationships and 'cognitive dissonance' with Spanish political actors and institutions, especially in relation to urban planning and local corruption.

A weak organizational network and low levels of electoral mobilization do not generate the exclusion of Romanian political entrepreneurs from the political arena. This is influenced by the fact that Spanish integration policies are not neutral in relation to the national origin of the foreign-born residents in general and EU citizens in particular. The two cases illustrate interplay between lower levels of group resources and higher levels of formal support from Spanish administrations in the Romanian case and higher levels of group resources plus lack of official support in the British case (H2). Yet, as Chapter VI indicates, the British associations are perceived as the right hand of social services, while Romanian organizations are evaluated by Spanish political actors as being little representative.

The analysis of the non-electoral pathway to politics presented in Chapter VI complements and expands previous research that tends to look at resources and structures of opportunities as separate factors influencing the process of immigrant political inclusion (Bloemraad 2006; Koopmans et al 2005; Verba et al 1995; Fennema and Tillie 1999). The core argument is that depending on how immigrant groups are received, categorized and supported by integration policies, neither lower levels of group resources nor integration laissez-faire entail political exclusion. In consequence, when comparing processes of incorporation of various groups it is important to map all possibilities and configurations that result from the interplay between resources and the structure of opportunities.

In terms of electoral incorporation, Romanians in Spain are still at an 'early stage' of inclusion, since only one candidate belonging to this group was

elected in May 2011. Factors such as the length of stay and the period of political socialization in Spain explain an important part of the difference in incorporation outcomes between Britons and Romanians. Additionally to these factors, political parties also select by origin when deciding to mobilize the immigrant vote (H3a). The analysis of the nomination processes of the two groups studied illustrates another instance of how the structure of opportunities interacts with groups' reception and self-perception in the host society. Chapters VII-VIII contribute, therefore, to previous work, by bridging findings from sociological research related to inter-group contact (Mclaren 2003; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995) and political science literature about immigrant candidate nomination and representation (Jones-Correa 1998; Garbaye 2005).

Although lacking a comparative focus, the last chapter of the thesis complements previous work related to patterns of immigrant representation. The study of British representatives on the Alicante coast suggests that the ethnic message is not perceived as a burden in pursuing a political career, especially due to the neutral/positive reception of British residents in Spain (H4). When studying immigrant representation, national origin should not be seen as an independent factor in how immigrants advance their demands in the political process, but as interacting with the broad discursive and political opportunity structures in the context of residence (Bird 2005; Michon 2011). Similar to the case of non-electoral incorporation, the structure of opportunities categorizes and defines tolerable and less tolerable identities, which in turn influence how immigrants are represented in the political process. Moreover, Chapter IX concludes that immigrant representation in Spain is a double-edge sword. On an optimistic note, the analysis shows that immigrant representatives are able to achieve policy influence, albeit in a limited number of policy areas. This observation brings a somewhat new perspective to previous studies that describe immigrant representatives as 'little influential' (Bird 2005). At the same time, the practice of representation is limited by the broad structural context of local

governments, characterized by limited resources, power hierarchies and corruption.

A transversal element of the analysis of these incorporation outcomes is related to the transnational structure of opportunities. Chapters VI and VIII show that both the non-electoral and electoral processes of incorporation are influenced by membership resources present in home country and EU citizenship regimes, as well as in broader networks of solidarity that span host country borders (H5a and H5b). Special representation in the country of origin, the right to petition and protest at the level of the European Parliament, as well as transnational solidarity networks such as those established by religious or charitable groups are entitlements and resources that empower and confer visibility to both Romanian and British organizational leaders and aspirants to political office.

The Romanian state is active in supporting emigrant organizations through direct funds for cultural and linguistic activities. To a lesser extent, Romanian organizations also receive financial support from EU institutions. British organizations do not access funds at the EU or home country levels in order to support their activities, but manage to activate European and home country political actors to lobby on their behalf. Both Romanian and British organizations improve their organizational infrastructure and leadership strength by receiving the support of transnational organizations such as religious or charity–related entities.

The influence of transnational resources is also manifest in the case of the electoral pathway to incorporation. Thus, the support received by the British from European institutions helps them advance claims and demands against host country political actors and increase their degree of political capital. The Romanian case illustrates that transnational resources increase the degree of visibility of immigrant political entrepreneurs in less contentious situations than

the British case. Thus, home country political parties are an active agent in identifying and supporting Romanian migrants in their pursuit of a political career in the Spanish localities where they reside.

Another mechanism through which these membership resources empower immigrant political actors is through the establishment of institutional networks between host country and home country/EU institutions. Regarding host country-home country institutional spillovers, Chapters VI and VIII illustrate how Romanian and, to a lesser extent, British political party representatives create networks and agreements in order to reach migrant voters. These networks, in turn, make it easier for political actors from the country of origin lobby in favour of immigrant demands. Regarding EU citizenship entitlements, EP representation opens dialogue channels between MEPs and political actors in the host country, as well as the possibility to impose legislative changes in favour of immigrant demands, in cases where supranational law prevails. This is, for example, the case of the Aucken Reports, which demand a change in the LRAU in favour of property owners.

It is important to note that the use of transnational membership resources is not a necessary condition for a successful nomination. Chapter VIII illustrates this point. Although there are cases in which immigrant political entrepreneurs gain visibility and are supported by homeland political actors in their bid to pursue a political career in their host country, there are also several examples of successful candidacies that do not have connections with homeland politics. Moreover, as the last chapter shows, British local councillors do not make use of transnational membership resources in their practice of representation. To that extent, transnational membership resources are an intervening factor that in most cases boosts immigrant leaders' probability of gaining civic visibility or, in specific circumstances, of bringing about legislative changes. It is relevant in the case of non-electoral incorporation, especially when host country institutions are not responsive to immigrant needs and demands.

The inclusion of the transnational perspective in the analysis contributes to previous research which argues that the pursuit of an immigrant/emigrant agenda by immigrant civic and political entrepreneurs is not a zero sum game (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Apart from confirming this finding, Chapters VI-IX show that the positioning of immigrant actors in power networks between home country/host country/EU political actors and institutions has a positive impact on various incorporation outcomes such as non-electoral inclusion, nomination and policy influence in the country of residence.

10.2 The connection between pathways to political incorporation

The case of Romanian and British residents in Spain shows that non-electoral inclusion constitutes an asset, but is not a necessary condition for electoral incorporation (H6a). This conclusion is drawn upon the analyses in Chapters VI, VIII and IX. Thus, organizational leadership/board membership gives an advantage to Romanian political entrepreneurs who wish to pursue a political career. Romanian aspirants to political office gain visibility and establish connections with Spanish political actors through their work as organizational leaders. This finding is in line with previous arguments related to the rational recruiter argument (Brady et al 1999; Myrberg 2011), according to which party selectors tend to look for 'political' qualities in their close circle, or in people who have already gained visibility among their communities. At the same time, the experience in leading an immigrant organization is likely to socialize leaders and board members in host country politics and confer to them skills and experience in relation to party leaders and local politics (Martiniello 1998).

Nonetheless, the pathway from non-electoral to electoral incorporation in the Romanian case is segmented according to organizational leaders' performance in representing the Romanian communities. As Chapter VI shows, there are several Romanian association leaders who aspire to a political career, but are not

successful in becoming nominated. According to party members, their lack of inclusion among party candidacies is related to their limited representational role and their lack of civic and political skills. On their part, organization leaders believe that their exclusion from electoral politics is a consequence of more adverse circumstances, such as anti-immigrant public opinion and party leaders' fear of a nativist backlash. However, as Chapter VIII shows, among the large pool of organizational leaders who aspire to gain political visibility there is the small group of winners who were offered the chance to candidate in the 2011 local elections.

In the British case, organizational leadership does not constitute an advantage or a disadvantage. As Chapter VI indicates, British organization leaders often refrain from establishing close links with Spanish political actors. The main motivation is related to a clear divide between the civic and political engagement and to the perception that expat organizations are 'apolitical'. From the candidate perspective, previous experience in civic organizations is not a prerequisite for a political career. As Chapter VIII shows, most of the British political entrepreneurs pave their way to local politics by forming/joining local independent parties, which eventually become integrated into the local branches of mainstream PP and PSOE. To that extent, British notables' venue to political incorporation is not influenced by previous political socialization as organizational leaders, as is the case of Romanians.

The main factors that explain the connection between organizational leadership and electoral inclusion in the Romanian case and the disconnection between the two in the British case are related to group resources and reception and self-perception the host society. Thus, Romanian aspirants to a political career do not rely on high rates of civic and political mobilization of their co-nationals. Their visibility and connection to Spanish political actors are dependent on the existence of 'points of encounter'. These points of encounter are most probably facilitated by the formal and informal participatory spaces

established by local, regional and national administrations, aimed at integrating immigrant demands into the political process.

British candidates, in turn, do not need organizational leadership in order to establish connections with Spanish politicians. They have the support of a large proportion of British residents (three times larger than in the Romanian case), a clear list of contentious issues upon which they demand justice and a critical eye towards Spanish local politics, which they perceive as corrupt and oligarchic. To that extent, contentious patterns of settlement in the host society and an organized and participatory immigrant community facilitate an 'independent' venue to electoral politics. This finding is in line with the previous work of Maxwell (2012) and Bloemraad (2013) who claim that visibility and contention may actually explain why some immigrant groups achieve more favourable incorporation outcomes than others.

Hypothesis 6a, which argues that groups accomplishing a higher level of electoral inclusion do not necessarily achieve higher levels of electoral incorporation, is demonstrated through the qualitative analyses in Chapters VI and VIII. Thus, there is a higher number of Romanian organizations included in consultative processes in comparison to the British case (Table 1.2). Nonetheless, the British score the highest in terms of number of candidacies and elected representatives. An explanation of this phenomenon is related to Britons' trajectory to local power. As already mentioned, this group has achieved political incorporation outcomes by developing a contentious-mobilizer trajectory, while Romanians' pathway to politics is a gradual process. These findings show that at the individual level, organizational background may constitute an advantage for a political career, as in the Romanian case. However, at the group level it does not presuppose a higher level of political incorporation. It may be therefore argued that Britons' pathway to politics is a nonlinear process, which does not follow the sequence from non-electoral to electoral incorporation, while Romanians become

incorporated in electoral politics after being socialized through organizational inclusion.

A quantitative approach to the non-electoral pathway to incorporation would have conferred a stronger justification of the hypothesis, but the lack of available data made the endeavour impossible. Thus, due to the fact that there is no accurate data on British (and to a lesser degree Romanian) organizations in Spain and their degree of inclusion in local and regional political processes, the quantitative analysis in Chapter VII could not include a variable related to the number of associations in the localities of Romanian residents and British residents datasets. The inclusion of this variable would have made it possible to test if the establishment of an immigrant organization in a locality and its collaboration with local political institutions influences the probability of Romanian and British candidacies, respectively.

10.3 The role of European citizenship

The analysis of British and Romanian incorporation in Spanish local politics reveals the heterogeneous political practice of EU citizenship. The political incorporation of intra-EU migrants is a key indicator of the extent to which they are accepted or not within a host society and recognized as full citizens. In spite of its uniform, homogenous, and equalizing principles, there are significant variations in how EU citizenship plays out on the ground in terms of how Europeans of various origins are perceived and politically incorporated in the member states of residence.

The microcosm of the towns and villages from the Valencian Community and the Community of Madrid epitomizes the diversity of Europe writ large. Mediterranean politics is a terrifying show in the eyes of the 'old Europeans', who consider that what they see in local politics in Spain is what happened in England during Queen Victoria's reign. At the same time, it is a clean spot in the

eyes of the Romanian workers who admire the professionalism, amiability and gender-inclusive attitudes of the Spanish politicians. Moreover, EU citizenship is a resource that some of the British political entrepreneurs have harnessed successfully in order to fight the corrupt local politics and to gain entrance to the local councils.

European citizenship is also the missing institution in Romanian migrants' incorporation processes. Romanians in Spain are not mentioned as EU citizens during the electoral campaign and they are grouped together with non-EU residents in official integration policies. Their electoral inclusion does not follow the logic of integrating the fellow European, but rather a group of immigrants who have the right to vote alongside various Latin-Americans. From this perspective, the practice of the European citizenship in the political field does not contribute to the construction of the European identity or to a public consciousness about a unitary Europe after the enlargement to the east.

10.4 Future research

The model proposed in the theoretical chapter (figure 2.1) opens new ways of analysing the processes of immigrant political incorporation in the context of EU citizenship. This focus complements previous research on political incorporation by introducing the transnational dimension and by offering an integrated approach between the non-electoral and the electoral pathways. But, as most research projects, the dissertation has its limitations. One way of expanding it would be to include a third country national group in the analysis. This broader comparison would allow a better understanding of the mechanisms of EU citizenship in practice and how political incorporation takes place in its absence. Besides lacking a set of resources inherent in the EU citizenship regime (such as supranational representation), the incorporation of non-EU citizens can also be distinct through the role played by home country political actors and

institutions and the way they are received in the host country. It may be the case that the level of immigrant entrepreneurs' empowerment by home country citizenship resources is weaker than in the case of EU residents, due to the weak and loose ties between the polities of the country of residence and of country of origin.

One difficulty in including a non-EU group in the analysis is the lack of quantitative data, as there is no official knowledge regarding non-EU local councillors elected in 2011. A possible approach would be to make a survey in selected localities in order to identify the existence of EU and non-EU elected local councillors (see Morales and Vintila 2012). However, this task is beyond the scope of this thesis and can be approached in future research.

Another way to expand the research presented in this dissertation is to make a cross-country comparison regarding the incorporation practice of EU citizens residing in another member state. The UK is a good case for comparison, due to the variation in terms of EU migration typology, but also in terms of local structure of opportunities. Thus, the UK hosts a large community of 'new' Europeans, such as the Poles, together with an important highly skilled group of French expats. Moreover, in the UK electoral system political parties have less control over the access to political office than in a closed-list PR system such as Spain. This characteristic may generate new trajectories to local power that expand the typology presented in Chapter VIII. The UK also has more experience in polishing integration and citizenship policies, which contribute to distinct categorizations and support for foreign-born residents.

Annex I

List of interviews (and press profiles)

Romanian cultural organizations

Alcala de Henares - AsociaŞia CulturalĽ, de Sprijin ќi Integrare a Românilor

Alcala de Henares - AsociaŞia Dacia

Alcala de Henares- AsociaŞia CulturalĽ Horizonte

Alcala de Henares- AsociaŞia CulturalĽ " Juan Ramon Jiménez y Lucian Blaga

Alcala de Henares- AsociaŞia RoIntegra

Arganda del Rey - AsociaŞia Dor Român

Brunete- AsociaŞia de los Rumanos de Brunete (not interviewed; profile from the press)

Coslada- FADERE

Coslada- AsociaŞia Obatala

Coslada/San Fernando- Coslada- AsociaŞia de Rumanos de Coslada y San Fernando

Madrid- FEDROM

Madrid - AsociaŞia Femeia;

Madrid - AsociaŞia de Rumanos de la Comunidad de Madrid

Madrid - AsociaŞia A Piel de Flor;

Madrid - AsociaŞia Dialogo Europeo

Madrid - AsociaŞia Comunitatea Românilor din Spania Interese Bilaterale

Madrid - Asociaţia Rumanos para España

Romanian religious organizations

Alcalá de Henares- Orthodox Church

Alcalá de Henares- Adventist Church

Arganda del Rey- Orthodox Church

Arganda del Rey- Pentecostal Church

Coslada- Orthodox Church

Coslada- Adventist Church

Romanian candidates

Alcala de Henares- A. M. R, PP candidate

Arganda del Rey- M.V., PSOE candidate (from the press)

Brunete- D. Z., PP candidate (from the press)

Nuevo Baztan- C.F., AMB candidate

San Fernando- I. B., PSOE candidate

Representatives of local and regional administration[1]

Alcalá de Henares- D.V., president Cepi Hispano Rumano (also PP representative)

[1] I interviewed the same person as a representative of the local and regional administrations and as a representative of a political party where they have a double role.

Arganda del Rey- L.M.U., local councillor for Immigration and Elderly people (also PP representative)

Brunete- F.C, local councillor (in opposition)

Coslada- A.R.E., president Cepi Hispano Rumano

Coslada- A.M.M, immigration expert, CEPI Hispano-Rumano

San Fernando- L.M.G., Immigration and integration inspector (also PSOE representative)

Community of Madrid Government- A.M, Immigration Advisor, Integration Department, Community of Madrid Government

Spanish Political Parties

Alcalá de Henares- M.G., coordinator of Immigration, PSOE Alcalá de Henares

Alcalá de Henares- D.V., PP member, also president of CEPI Alcalá

Arganda del Rey- V.M., general secretary of PSOE Arganda

Arganda del Rey- L.M.U, PP local councillor for Immigration and Elderly people

Brunete- F.C., PSOE local councillor

Coslada- A.G.P., Local councillor for Immigration PSOE Coslada

Coslada- M.P., Local councillor (in opposition) PP Coslada

Nuevo Baztan- J.M.C, president AMB

San Fernando- L.M.G., PSOE San Fernando

Community of Madrid PSOE- M.E.R., responsible for immigration, regional board of PSM in 2009

Community of Madrid PSOE- P.Z., responsible for social movements and relations with immigrants, regional board of PSM in 2012

Community of Madrid PP- O.C., coordinator of PP Madrid Villaverde District and coordinator of the relations with immigrant communities during the 2011 local elections campaign

External chapters of Romanian parties

PDL- D.B, member PDL Community of Madrid

PSD- M.P., president PSD Spain

British organizations

Benissa- Abusos Urbanisticos No

Benitatxell-International Women's Club

Calpe- Association of Foreign Property owners

Calpe- Asociación ecologista de Calpe 2000

Calpe- The Royal British Legion Calpe Branch

Calpe University of the Third Age Calpe

Calpe/Benissa-The Lions Club Calpe/Benissa Branch

Denia- HELP Marina Alta

Javea- Amigos Europeos de Javea

Javea- The Royal British Legion Javea Branch

Teulada- The Lions Club teulada Branch

Teulada- University of the Third Age

British candidates and representatives in the local councils (also interviewed as party representatives)

Alcalalí-J.S., PP councillor

Benitatxell- A.B., PP councillor, former PIDEB

Benitatxell-S.K., PP councillor, former PIDEB

Benitatxell- G.H., PP candidate

Calpe- L.T., PP councillor (until 2011)

Calpe- C.S., Green Party councillor

Javea- N.F., Nueva Javea Party

Teulada- S.T., PP local councillor

Teulada- A.T., independent local councillor

Orijuela- B.H., PP local councillor (former CLARO) (from the press)

Parcent- J.C., local councillor CDP

Representatives of local and regional administrations (of Spanish origin)

Alicante Province- M.P, Director of the European Residents Department, Alicante county government (also representative of PP Alicante)

Alicante province- J.M, Amics Agency

Spanish Political Parties

Javea- J.C, member PP Javea

Javea- J.C., member PSOE Javea

Alicante Province PP- M.P., coordinator of relations with foreign residents PP Alicante

External Chapters of British Parties

Conservatives Abroad- Focus group with Conservatives Abroad Javea

Labour International-M.D., Labour International Javea Branch

Annex II

Interview Guides

Migrant organizations

Description of the organization and the interviewee

1.Can you describe your activity inside the organization?

2.Can you describe the activities of the organization? When was it founded? By whom? How many members do you have?

3.What actors and institutions does your organization relate to?

Local participation

4.How do you relate to the local administration?

5.And with the regional administration?

6.How do you evaluate the relations with Spanish administration? Do you think you receive enough support?

7.Do you think these dynamics changed during the past years?

8.How do you relate to Spanish political parties?

Relation with the immigrant collective

8. Would you say that the … collective is civically and politically?

Transnational resources

9.How do you relate to home country political actors and institutions? Do you receive financial/symbolic support?

10.How do you relate to EU institutions/MEPs? Do you receive financial/symbolic support?

11.Do you have knowledge of connections between homeland political actors and Spanish political actors? How do these connections take place?

Spanish Political Parties

Nombre

Partido

Fecha

Relaciones con los colectivos

1.Cuál es la relación entre su partido y los colectivos de inmigrantes? Existe una estructura creada especial para la inmigración? Hay militantes por parte de los inmigrantes?

2.Cual fue la estrategia de su partido para acercarse a los colectivos de inmigrantes en las elecciones de 2011? (nivel nacional-regional-local)

3.Y en 2007?

Relaciones con los candidatos

4.Como se seleccionan las candidaturas? (en general---existe un comité de selección, a que niveles, local, regional, etc)

5.Cual fue el proceso de selección de candidatos extranjeros? (comité de selección, a que niveles, regional, municipal, etc)

6.Cómo se decidió la posición en las listas?

Percepciones sobre los candidatos

7.Recibieron muchas solicitudes por parte de los inmigrantes para ser incluidos en las listas?

8.Cuáles son las principales características que deberían cumplir los candidatos inmigrantes?

-militancia en el partido

-redes/contactos en el partido

-líder de asociaciones

-…….

Percepciones sobre el colectivo británico y rumano

9.Cómo se acercó su partido a los colectivos rumanos y británicos en particular?

Relaciones transnacionales

10.Relaciones previas con partidos rumanos y británicos? Que rol tienen?

Evaluación final

11.Es la presencia en las listas y en los órganos elegidos influencia? Cuál es el poder de voz y de influencia de los candidatos extranjeros electos?

12.La selección de candidatos inmigrantes es un proceso arriba-abajo o abajo arriba?

13.Qué es lo que determina a un partido proponer candidaturas en una localidad y no en otra? (dimensión de la localidad; dimensión del colectivo inmigrante, número de inmigrantes en el censo electoral, nivel de competición local, etc)

British local councillors

Name

Date

Place

Political trajectory

1.Let's first talk about your responsibilities at the city hall.

2.Let's now talk about your political trajectory. How did you become councillor?

Relations with local politics

3.What political actors and institutions do you relate to? (political parties, regional administrations, home country administrations, EU institutions, other local administrations)

4.How would you describe your relation with Spanish political parties? Do you think they are sensitive to European residents' needs and demands?

5.How do you evaluate the relation with Spanish administrations? Are they sensitive to European residents' demands?

6.Do you perceive a change in the last 10 years?

7.Would you say you have influence in the city council?

Relations with the British community

8.How do you perceive the British collective? Would you say they are civically and politically active?

Relations with home country/EU institutions

9.Do you relate to home country political actors/institutions? Did you contact any of themç?

10.Do you relate to the EU institutions? MEPs?

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