

# Spain and the Portuguese Revolution of 1974-1975: the limits of a surveilled press

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*To 2010*



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Some people, despite being normal human beings the rest of the time, have these opportunities, from time to time, to re-evaluate their cycles in life and thank publicly people in their life for having been part of that cycle.

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## **Abstract**

The end of both Iberian Dictatorships, the New State in Portugal and Francoism in Spain, distanced more or less a year and a half. During this period, while Spain discussed a way out of Francoism, Portugal embarked on a Revolutionary journey searching for a Portuguese path towards Socialism, whose driving force was the Armed Forces' Movement. The aim of the present dissertation is to understand how late-Francoist press dealt with this Portuguese Revolutionary process that followed the overthrow of the Portuguese Dictatorship and also how this process served as mediation to negotiate Spain's internal tensions.

## **Resumen**

El final de las dos dictaduras Ibéricas, el Estado Nuevo en Portugal y Franquismo en España, distó cerca de año y medio. Durante este periodo, mientras en España se discutía como lograr la salida del Franquismo, Portugal empezaba un proceso revolucionario, cuyo motor eran las Fuerzas Armadas, que tenía como objetivo lograr la vía Portuguesa al Socialismo. El objetivo de la presente tesis es entender cómo reaccionó la prensa tardo-franquista al proceso revolucionario portugués que se siguió al derrocar de la dictadura y también de qué forma este proceso sirvió como mediación para que España negociara sus tensiones internas.





## Prologue

The object of this dissertation is the last revolution in twentieth century Europe with left-wing referents (Rosas 2004, 123) and which took place in Portugal between the years of 1974 and 1975. In 1974, Portugal was a 48-year-old dictatorship facing a long colonial war spanning over a decade that consumed around 40 to 50% of its annual budget (Barreto 2000, 40). The war was an effort to contain the liberation movements shaking its African territories of Angola (from 1961), Guinea-Bissau (from 1963), and Mozambique (from 1964). The New State [*Estado Novo*] fell on 25 April 1974, when a group of low-rank army officers carried out a *coup d'état*. This group, emerged from the inside of the Portuguese Armed Forces, soon became the Armed Forces Movement [*Movimento das Forças Armadas*, MFA] and one of the driving forces of the Revolutionary Process in Portugal, due to their politicization while fighting the colonial wars.

After the coup, a National Salvation Junta [*Junta de Salvação Nacional*, JSN] was appointed<sup>1</sup>, and six provisional

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<sup>1</sup> The Junta was composed of members of the three branches of the army: General Diogo Neto and Colonel Galvão de Melo, which according to Sánchez (1993) were appointed by General Spínola and Costa Martins, respectively, represented the Air Force; from the Navy came the future prime-minister of the VI Provisional Government, Pinheiro de Azevedo, and Rosa Coutinho, later known as the «red Admiral»; lastly, from the Army came General Costa Gomes and General Spínola, as well as General Silvério Marques, former governor of Macau, which according to Sánchez was also nominated by Spínola.

governments<sup>2</sup>, four of them with the presence of Communist cadres<sup>3</sup>, succeeded in the two years between the coup and the first constitutional elections of 25 April 1976. However, General Spínola, who had starred previous antagonism towards the regime official colonial policies, was called to endorse the coup and ended up President of the Republic in the first stage of the process. The evolution of the process implied the alienation of Spínola, who was involved in several attempted counter-coups, and the emergence of the MFA as a preponderant political subject.

The colonial territories' right to independence was recognised, and Guinea became independent on 9 September 1974, while Mozambique, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Angola were declared independent in 1975, respectively on June 25<sup>th</sup>, July 5<sup>th</sup>, July 12<sup>th</sup>, and November 11<sup>th</sup>. The last fragment of what had once been the Portuguese colonial empire, Timor, was invaded by Indonesia on 7 December 1975<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> I Provisional Government (16 May 1974 – 10 July 1974); II Provisional Government (18 July 1974 – 30 September 1974); III Provisional Government (30 September 1974 – 26 March 1975); IV Provisional Government (26 March 1975 – 8 August 1975); V Provisional Government (8 August 1975 – 19 September 1975), and VI Provisional Government (19 September 1975 – 23 July 1976).

<sup>3</sup> After the failure of the constitutional coup attempted by Spínola and Palma Carlos, prime minister of the I Provisional Government, the latter resigns and the MFA Assembly replaces him by Vasco Gonçalves, prime minister from the II until the V Provisional Government, with support of the Portuguese Communist Party [*Partido Comunista Português* PCP].

<sup>4</sup> Different forces struggled for independence and self-determination in the colonial territories, but when the revolution started PAIGC (Guinea and Cape Verde), MLSTP (São Tomé and Príncipe), FRELIMO (Mozambique), MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA (Angola) became the main interlocutors with Portuguese authorities.

However, more concretely the object of this dissertation is the coverage and discourse produced about this revolution by the daily legal press of its neighbouring country, Spain, during the final stages of Francoism. For that purpose a sample of five daily newspapers was put together, being the analysis focused on newspapers such as *ABC*, *Arriba*, *Informaciones*, *La Vanguardia Española* and *Tele/eXprés* and the debate the Portuguese event originated in their pages.

During Francoism (1939-1975) the Spanish system of information comprised a very considerable sector of public media, mostly resulting from the confiscation of Republican newspapers during and after the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) by the winning faction. Television [*Televisión Española* TVE], which began to broadcast regularly in 1956, was State-owned, and news broadcasts on the Radio were also a prerogative of the Spanish National Radio [*Radio Nacional de España* RNE]. Throughout the Francoist regime, the private press was maintained under strict surveillance, constrained by censorship, and later made the target of possible sanctions by two different press law regimes: the first one decreed during the war, in 1938, and updated by the 1966 press and printing law.

Nonetheless, the Spanish press under Francoism cannot be described as a fixed and stable object. Rather, it should be seen as a result of pressures in different directions: on the one hand, government constraints and, on the other hand, the desire of several of the participants for these constraints to be loosened. In what concerns the Portuguese revolutionary process the Spanish press

kept its focus on its institutional aspect, namely its stages, crises and leaders. The discussion is also framed by what becomes established as an acceptable conception of democracy, therefore focused on its liberal definition and the electoral legitimacy it embodies; establishing this way also the limits of what is to be acceptable and desirable politically. The establishment of this conception of democracy as consensual will be a process of debate coerced, in gramscian terms, by both the «consent coercion» produced within the same debate and to which fear contributed a great deal, and by the coercion exerted by the «political society», namely by the State apparatus coercive action, which prevented alternative views of being expressed publicly.

The timeframe delimiting the object of this dissertation starts with the publication of General António de Spínola's book, *Portugal e o Futuro* [Portugal and the Future], on 22 February 1974, and ends with the first constitutional elections held on 25 April 1976. The first date was chosen due to the relevance that the Spanish press gave to this book following the failed Caldas Coup of March 16<sup>th</sup>, and regarding the second date, because with the approval of the Constitution on 2 April 1976 the electoral process that ensued marked the beginning of the Constitutional order.

With the aim of making the reading process more fluid, all quotes were translated by the author into English. Nonetheless the original ones are found at the end of each chapter. For referencing it was used the author-date system followed the Chicago 16<sup>th</sup> edition of the Chicago Manual of Style. However, both archive documents and primary sources are referenced in notes.

# Index

	<b>Page</b>
Abstract.....	Vii
Prologue.....	Ix
List of Figures.....	Xix
List of Tables.....	Xxi
List of Abbreviations.....	Xiii

## **PART PREVIOUS QUESTIONS**

### **I.**

---

<b>1. Introduction</b>	3
<b>2. Goals and Structure</b>	27
<b>2.1 Goals</b>	27
<b>2.2 Structure</b>	28
<b>3. State of the art</b>	29
<b>3.1 Foreign views of the Portuguese revolutionary process</b>	29
<b>3.2 The Spanish view</b>	44
<b>4. Methodology</b>	57
<b>4.1 Historical Method</b>	57
<b>4.2 Newspaper Analysis</b>	58
<b>a) Defining the universe</b>	58
<b>b) Collecting a Sample</b>	58
<b>c) Selection of sources</b>	59
<b>d) Hemerographic Forms</b>	68
<b>1. Newspapers presentation</b>	73
<b>1.1 ABC</b>	73
<b>1.2 Arriba</b>	74
<b>1.3 Informaciones</b>	76

1.4	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	79
1.5	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	81
e)	Date selection	85
f)	Specific content selection: Multistage sample	89
g)	The corpus	91
h)	Biographic form	97

**PART II. THE BACKSTAGE: INFORMATIVE AND POLITICAL CONTINGENCIES IN THE MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF NEWS PRODUCTION.**

---

<b>1.</b>	<b>The fundamental role of private newspapers</b>	107
1.1	Television	107
1.2	The Foreign Press	121
1.3	Externally broadcasted Radio	124
<b>2.</b>	<b>The production of information</b>	126
2.1	The Ministry of Information and Tourism	127
2.2	Civil servants fostering an «anti-Spanish» sentiment	130
2.3	Human resources	137
a)	Spanish Journalists attached to the process: permanent versus special correspondents	139
b)	Waves of special correspondents	144
c)	Different types of journalists	150
d)	«Curious Journalists»	152
2.4	Foreign Sources – the incorporation of the «foreigner»	155

2.5	Repression	159
<b>3.</b>	<b>Circumventing the Informative System</b>	170
3.1	Listening to the BBC	170
3.2	The trip: Spaniards as «voyeurs» of freedom	176

**PART MAPPING THE COVERAGE  
III.**

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<b>A.</b>	<b>Coverage features</b>	193
1.	The national utterance of the newspaper	193
2.	Editorial columns and the newspaper identity	197
3.	Voicing of opinion	202
4.	The democratic emphasis	211
5.	Individual interests and its evolution	214
5.1	<i>ABC</i> 's anticommunism	214
5.2	<i>Arriba</i> 's complicated relationship with Portugal	222
5.3	<i>Informaciones</i> ' anticommunism	225
5.4	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i> 's moderation	227
5.5	<i>Tele/eXprés</i> ' internationalism	231
6.	The omnipresent rumour	233
<b>B.</b>	<b>The Coverage</b>	243
1.	<i>The unexpected March 16<sup>th</sup>: will the Empire fall?</i>	243
a)	micro approach: the metropole's events	244
b)	macro approach: the Colonial Empire	257
c)	The news report: micro and macro analyses converge	266

<b>2. <i>April 25<sup>th</sup>: the successful coup</i></b>	287
a) The downfall of the New State: what failed versus what possibilities the future offers?	290
b) The lack of frameworks of interpretation	300
c) The Military take charge: divergent interpretations	314
d) The May 1 <sup>st</sup> demonstration: a moment of redemption	322
<b>3. <i>Decolonization : two divergent World-views</i></b>	337
a) The last Colonial Empire	349
b) Colonialism	352
c) Returnees: the Empire leftovers	359
d) Geopolitics	367
<b>4. <i>General Spínola's downfall: the first sign of right-wing reemergence</i></b>	379
a) The «silent majority»: Two versions of the same event	381
b) Framing General Spínola	391
c) Spanish reading: lessons for the right-wing	395
<b>5. <i>January's turmoil : violence makes an appearance</i></b>	411
a) Semantic opposition	430
b) ABC: the end of democracy	434



c)	Spanish Reading: the possibility of open criticism	437
<b>6.</b>	<b><i>The expected March 11<sup>th</sup> : the Spanish press as an enemy of the revolutionary process</i></b>	<b>451</b>
a)	The expected feature of the coup: the rumours of imminent insurgence	452
b)	Journalists in the field: action in Badajoz	463
c)	The «Portugalization» of the Spanish public life	468
<b>7.</b>	<b><i>The first electoral process: a determinant moment</i></b>	<b>483</b>
a)	Failed models of interpretation	484
b)	The results : a victory of moderation	505
c)	Spanish reading: the superiority of electoral processes	515
<b>8.</b>	<b><i>Hot Summer of '75</i></b>	<b>533</b>
a)	Reinforcing electoral legitimacy	549
1.	the number game	549
2.	The «north»: the formation of the counter-revolutionary people	550
<b>9.</b>	<b><i>The invasion and destruction of the Spanish diplomatic premises</i></b>	<b>561</b>
<b>10.</b>	<b><i>The pending coup of November 25<sup>th</sup></i></b>	<b>569</b>

<b>11. <i>The second electoral process: the return of the right-wing</i></b>	583
a) 1975 and 1976: two different elections	583
b) The results: ambiguous interpretations	598
c) Spanish reading: a common path for both countries	603

**PART  
IV.**

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<b>CONCLUSIONS</b>	623
<b>REFERENCES</b>	637
<b>APPENDIX I</b> Hemerographic Files	<b>CD</b>
<b>APPENDIX II</b> Biographic files	<b>CD</b>

## List of Figures

	<b>Page</b>
<b>Fig. 1.</b> Graphic: Chronological distribution of Editorial columns'	86
<b>Fig. 2.</b> Article: Maximo.1974. «Y al este, España» <i>La Vanguardia Española</i> , Apr. 28, p.8	291
<b>Fig. 3.</b> Front-covers: <i>ABC</i> (1974.06.09, 1974.08.06, 1974.08.28, 1974.09.07, 1974.09.27)	344
<b>Fig. 4.</b> Article: Alcantara, Manuel. 1975. «Los niños de Angola», <i>Arriba</i> , Nov 12, p.4	363
<b>Fig. 5.</b> Front-cover: <i>ABC</i> (1975.01.29)	434
<b>Fig. 6.</b> Front-cover: <i>Arriba</i> (1975.03.09)	453
<b>Fig. 7.</b> Front-covers: <i>ABC</i> and <i>La Vanguardia Española</i> (1975.03.15)	467
<b>Fig. 8.</b> Vasco Gonçalves' downfall front-covers: <i>ABC</i> (1975.08.30), <i>Arriba</i> (1975.08.30), <i>La Vanguardia Española</i> (1975.08.30), <i>Informaciones</i> (1975.08.30), <i>Tele/eXprés</i> (1975.08.30) Special Document: Cavero, José.1975. «El norte proclama su anticomunismo» <i>Arriba</i> , Aug. 24	546
<b>Fig. 9.</b> Special Document: Cavero, José.1975. «El norte proclama su anticomunismo» <i>Arriba</i> , Aug. 24	551
<b>Fig. 10.</b> Front-covers: <i>Arriba</i> (1975.07.11, 1975.07.20, 1975.08.12) <i>ABC</i> (1975.08.07, 1975.08.12, 1975.08.26) <i>La Vanguardia española</i> (1975.07.12, 1975.08.12)	554
<b>Fig. 11.</b> Spanish Embassy destroyed front-covers: <i>ABC</i> (1975.09.28), <i>Arriba</i> (1975.09.28) <i>La Vanguardia Española</i> (1975.09.28), <i>Informaciones</i> (1975.09.29), <i>Tele/eXprés</i> (1975.09.29)	562



## List of Tables

		<b>Page</b>
<b>Table 1.</b>	Print Run and Circulation numbers, Source: OJD	61
<b>Table 2.</b>	Main areas of Circulation, Source: OJD	61
<b>Table 3.</b>	Collected material divided by category	85
<b>Table 4.</b>	Sample divided by moments and categories	86
<b>Table 5.</b>	Distribution of corpus by moments and categories	92
<b>Table 6.</b>	Distribution of corpus by authorship	93
<b>Table 7.</b>	Number of Correspondents and Special correspondents	140
<b>Table 8.</b>	Journalists' profile	142
<b>Table 9.</b>	Use of foreign press	156
<b>Table 10.</b>	Pluralization used in editorial columns	198
<b>Table 11.</b>	Electoral results, Source: CNE	599



## List of Abbreviations

AOC	<i>Aliança Operário-Camponesa</i> Workers-Peasants Alliance
AMI	<i>Agrupamento militar de intervenção</i> Intervention Military Group
BOC	<i>Bloc Obrer i Camperol</i> Workers and Peasants' Bloc
BR	<i>Bandera Roja</i> , Red Flag
BSI	<i>Brigada de Investigación social</i> Social Investigation Brigade
CDS	<i>Centro Democrático e Social</i> Democratic and Social Centre
CNE	<i>Comissão Nacional de Eleições</i> Elections National Commission
COPCON	<i>Comando Operacional do Continente</i> , Continental Operation Command
DGS	<i>Dirección General de Seguridad</i> Security General Direction
EM	<i>Emissora Nacional</i> , National Broadcaster
ERC	<i>Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya</i> Republican Left of Catalonia
ES	<i>Estat Català</i> , Catalan State
ETA	<i>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna</i> , Basque homeland and Freedom
FNLA	<i>Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola</i> National Liberation Front of Angola
FOC	<i>Front Obrer de Catalunya</i> Catalonia's Workers Front
FRAP	<i>Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota</i>

	Revolutionary Antifascist Patriotic Front
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique Mozambique Liberation Front
FSP	<i>Frente Socialista Popular</i> , People's Socialist Front
GDP	<i>Grup Democràtic de Periodistes</i> Democratic Group of Journalists
GTE	<i>Groupes de Travailleur Espangole</i> Groups of Spanish Workers
JSN	<i>Junta de Salvação Nacional</i> National Salvation Junta
MC	<i>Movimento dos Capitães</i> , Captains' Movement
MDP-CDE	<i>Movimento Democrático Português- Comissão Democrática Eleitoral</i> Portuguese Democratic Movement-Democratic Electoral Commission
MÊS	<i>Movimento Esquerda Socialista</i> Socialist Left Movement
MFA	<i>Movimento das Forças Armadas</i> Armed Forces Movement
MIT	<i>Ministerio de Información y Turismo</i> Ministry of Information and Tourism
MLSTP	<i>Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe</i> Liberation Movement of São Tomé and Príncipe
MPLA	<i>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</i> People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MRPP	<i>Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado</i> Reorganized Movement of the Party of the Proletariat
OJD	<i>Oficina de Justificación de la Difusión</i> Circulation controlling Office
PAIGC	<i>Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde</i>



	African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde
PCE	<i>Partido Comunista de España</i> Communist Party of Spain
PCP	<i>Partido Comunista Português</i> Portuguese Communist Party
PDC	<i>Partido da Democracia Cristã</i> , Christian Democracy Party
PIDE/DGS	<i>Policial Internacional e de Defesa do Estado-Direcção-Geral de Segurança</i> International Police of State Defense-Security General Direction
POUM	<i>Partido Obrero de Unificaión Marxista</i> Workers' Party of Marxist Unification
PS	<i>Partido Socialista</i> , Socialist Party
PSC	<i>Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya</i> , Socialists' Party of Catalonia
PSI/PSP	<i>Partido Socialista del Interior/ Partido Socialista Popular</i> Domestic Socialist Party/Popular Socialist Party
PSOE	<i>Partido Socialista Obrero Español</i> Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
PSUC	<i>Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya</i> United Socialist Party of Catalonia
RCP	<i>Rádio Clube Português</i> , Portuguese Radio Club
RNE	<i>Radio Nacional de España</i> , Spanish National Radio
RTP	<i>Radiotelevisão Portuguesa</i> Portuguese Radio and Television broadcaster
SUV	<i>Soldados Unidos Vencerão</i> United Soldiers Shall Win
TOP	<i>Tribunal de Orden Público</i> Spanish Public Order Tribunal

TVE	<i>Televisión Española</i> , Spanish Television
UDP	<i>União Democrática Popular</i> Popular Democratic Union
UGT	<i>Unión General de Trabajadores</i> General Union of Workers
UNITA	<i>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</i> National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

**Part I.**  
**Previous questions**



# 1. Introduction

Mark Twain used to say that the worst things in his life did not actually happen to him. Some of the best revolutions of my life happened to others. The first political joy I recall happen to me an afternoon in late-April in Madrid, in 1974, when I bought *Informaciones*, the newspaper that us anti-francoists read, and I saw the headline announcing the Carnation revolution in Portugal. The dictatorship had just fall, but it had done so on the other side of the border. For many of us the inebriation provoked by the liberation was not less stimulating for happening to others. It was hope and on the other side of the coin melancholia. The same way that one watched films imagining embracing Faye Dunaway and Warren Beauty, I would starred at photographs of people bathing in the fountains of Rossio square completely dressed or climbing on top of army tanks to put flowers on the Soldiers weapons. The habit, enhanced by literature and cinema, of vicariously living the lives of others and imagine that what mattered to us happened elsewhere and in a different time translated intact into our political experience<sup>1</sup> (Muñoz-Molina 2011).

The Spanish coverage of the revolutionary events that took place in Portugal between 1974 and 1976 was chosen due to the particular political situation of these two countries in this period. Both Portugal and Spain were in 1974 dictatorships that managed to survive the post-Second World War wave of democratization, between 1943 and 1962, coined the short second wave (Huntington 1993, 16). But while in 1970 Portugal had replaced António Oliveira Salazar, due to an illness and his subsequent death, by his protégé Marcello Caetano, in Spain the original dictator, Francisco Franco, was still in power, although his age made his end visibly foreseen. Franco had appointed Don Juan Carlos as his successor as head of State a few years earlier, in 1969. But the death in an ETA operation on 20 December 1973 of Admiral Luís Carrero Blanco, Franco's choice to succeed him as prime minister, changed the regime's plans. The regime was thus debating, and preparing, a transition to Francoism without Franco when the Portuguese experience of a dictator's replacement failed.

Nonetheless, in order to contextualize this work it will be necessary to frame the Portuguese event in the context of the Spanish

reality of that moment, identifying both the common features of both Iberian realities as well as the points where the Portuguese events were prone to cause friction in Spain. This will be followed by an overview of the Spanish mass media panorama and the functioning of the Spanish «public sphere», to better understand the object we will be analysing.

It should be remarked that the military coup that easily overthrew the Portuguese regime was not decided overnight, since it had roots in the colonial war situation that the country was facing for over a decade. Back in 1973, some officers of the Portuguese armed forces organized themselves to demand for the labour rights that were being taken away in order to sustain the war effort<sup>5</sup>. From these original claims soon arose the idea that democratization of the country was the only way to end the war and to have all their demands met<sup>6</sup>. Hence, a *coup d'état* was planned and executed on 25 April 1974 by a group of lower-rank officers naming themselves the Captains' Movement [*Movimento dos Capitães*, MC], which later became a political subject called Armed Forces Movement [*Movimento das Forças Armadas*, MFA].

Meanwhile, other factions of the military institution were also betwixt: a coup from the far-right-wing<sup>7</sup>, unhappy with the official policy towards the colonial territories, was denounced. The plan was to

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<sup>5</sup> The Captains' Movement had its roots on the discontentment provoked by the approval, in 1973, of the law decrees 353/73 of July 13<sup>th</sup> and 409/73 of August 20<sup>th</sup> (Sánchez 1993), that made it easier to have access to the Army's permanent body by the military recruited to fight the colonial war. These decrees were revoked on 22 December 1973 in order to appease the Army. When higher-rank military saw their situation corrected by the second decree, lower-rank professional military, namely Captains, felt they were being treated unfairly.

<sup>6</sup> Following the first meetings held in Guinea (Moura 2012), the coordinating committee elected in an Óbidos meeting, on 1 December 1973, voted for the *coup d'état* solution to stir the situation, casting aside both the possibility of free elections controlled by the army or of restricting the movement's demands exclusively to military issues.

<sup>7</sup> This coup was planned around Generals Kaúlza de Arriaga, Joaquim Luz Cunha, Silvino Silvério Marques and Henrique Troni.

force Council President, Marcello Caetano, to resign and go back to academic life<sup>8</sup>, but the group needed General António de Spínola's agreement to have enough military support. Spínola, former governor of Guinea, published the book *Portugal e o Futuro* [Portugal and the Future] in February 1974, where he not only recognized that there was no military solution for the war, only a political one, but also advocated for a commonwealth-like solution to end the colonial conflict. Since a special position as Deputy-chief-of-staff of the Army was created to incorporate Spínola after he left office as governor of Guinea, and his political positions were considered to be liberally threatening, the «rheumatic brigade», as the previous group was derogatorily called, was supposed to be planning the neutralization of Spínola and the Army-Chief-of-Staff, General Costa Gomes. Spínola's agreement to participate in Kaúlza's manoeuvre was dubious and through contacts with the movement of members of the militia, the coup was denounced by Captain Carlos Fabião at a course for High Officers he was taking. The rumour rapidly spread, Fabião was punished, and the coup prevented (Sánchez 1993).

The MC therefore continued to organize itself and to recruit both low-rank military as well as holding meetings with high-rank figures like Spínola (February 2<sup>nd</sup>) and Costa Gomes' right-hand man (February 3<sup>rd</sup>) (Sánchez 1993, 165). As Spínola himself put it, the publication of his book was anticipated to February 22<sup>nd</sup> to allure the MC – which by then was preparing its own political program –, as his claims were more moderate (Sánchez 1993, 168) than the ones the MC was forging.

The military distress and the success of Spínola's book led Caetano to offer his position to both Costa Gomes and Spínola, who declined it, and to present his resignation to Admiral Américo Thomaz,

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<sup>8</sup> «Senhor presidente, já fez tudo o que pôde pelo país. Muito obrigado mas agora é o momento de governarem outras pessoas. Demita-se e dedique-se à universidade.» (Sánchez 1993, 161).

the president of the Republic, who did not accept it either. In an attempt to gain leverage, Caetano went to the National Assembly to gather the support of members of parliament, which he got. It was then time to get the military to bow before him in public, so he summoned the military hierarchy for a ceremony on March 14<sup>th</sup> where support for Caetano's official policy towards the colonies was confirmed.

Knowing beforehand that the Army Chief-of-Staff and his deputy were going to be removed from office, the MC started preparing a military coup, with Spínola's knowledge and under his guidance. The date was not totally agreed upon, and on March 16<sup>th</sup> only the regiment from Caldas da Rainha went forward with the uprising. Around two hundred men were arrested but only thirty-three officers remained in prison a few days later. This represented a neutralization of most of the MC's leaders, which according to Sánchez was the development Spínola had hoped for (1993).

Following the failure of the Caldas coup and the imprisonments or deportations that ensued, Vítor Alves and Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho took charge of the movement. The first one finished the MC's political program, and the second took charge of the development of a new military operation (Sánchez 1993, 173). The final version of the program was entrusted to Melo Antunes and then submitted to both General Costa Gomes and General Spínola, the latter having insisted on some changes to the document. By April, the MC had a program, a plan of operations and a military Junta ready to take power, and a coup was scheduled.

Regarding this successful coup, there is the question of its secrecy. Contrary to Kenneth Maxwell (1999), Sánchez (Torre Gómez and Sánchez Cervelló 2000) argues that the international community and politicians were well aware of what was about to happen, especially after the first attempt of March 16<sup>th</sup>. Likewise, the massive imprisonments of April 18<sup>th</sup> forecasted imminent tensions. Furthermore, according to Sánchez, the government of Marcelo Caetano knew «it was a matter of



time», and the same was being reported by the international press, except by the Spanish one (2000:366). Maxwell (1983), on the other hand, reiterates the idea that the downfall of both Iberian dictatorships was an unexpected change: the military *coup d'état* in Portugal was as unexpected as in Spain Don Juan Carlos' action after General Franco's death, since he was a prince educated by the Francoist regime.

In Portugal on April 24<sup>th</sup> at 10:55 pm, Paulo de Carvalho's song «E depois do adeus» [After saying goodbye] was played by Lisbon's Associated Broadcasters [*Emissores associados de Lisboa*] to indicate that the operations had started. To confirm that there was no turning back for the on-going military operations, José Afonso's song «Grândola, Vila Morena» [Grândola, swarthy town] was played at 12:25 pm during the radio show *Limite* of Radio *Renascença*. In its afternoon edition, the oppositionist newspaper *República*, whose editor-in-chief, Raúl Rêgo, would later become the first Minister of Social Communication, recommended listeners to tune in to this radio show that evening.

According to Nelson Ribeiro's account of this event (2000 and 2002), the crew of *Limite* was not aware of the meaning of the sign they were transmitting. The complete password included José Afonso's song, whose first quatrain was to be recited previously by *Limite*'s presenter Leite de Vasconcelos, a second reading of the same quatrain, the reading of two poems – «Geografia» [Geography] and «Revolução Solar» [Solar Revolution] – and, finally, the song «Coro da Primavera» [Spring Choir] by the same José Afonso. This password had been pre-recorded by Carlos Albino and Manuel Tomás, members of staff, although the program was broadcasted live, as always. The only difference, that night, was that Leite de Vasconcelos was too nervous to go live, and ended up being replaced by his colleague Paulo Coelho.

Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho's plan for the coup had the main goal of controlling Lisbon. From Santarém, a column of ten armoured tanks of

the Trooper's Practical School [*Escola Prática de Cavalaria*] headed to Lisbon at 3:00 am, arriving at downtown Lisbon by sunrise. At the same time, Armed Forces units were taking up arms all around the country and controlling the selected key points (Sánchez 1993). At 3:00 am were occupied the TV broadcaster's building [*Radiotelevisão Portuguesa RTP*], and the Portuguese Radio Club [*Rádio Clube Português RCP*] and the National Broadcaster's studios [*Emissora Nacional EM*] in Lisbon; and Lisbon Military Region's headquarters and Lisbon's airport and Aerial Base at 4:30. In Oporto, the Northern Military Region's headquarters was also occupied by the insurgent military. At around 4:30 am RCP started broadcasting MFA's first communiqué.

Government resistance was feeble and came late. In downtown Lisbon, for instance, the defence forces joined the insurgent column coming from Santarém, led by Captain Salgueiro Maia, and both of them surrounded Carmo's headquarters, where Marcello Caetano sought refuge. The population also gathered around the siege and waited for the expected outcome: the surrender of government forces. Caetano refused to surrender to a Captain and demanded the presence of a higher-rank official to avoid letting «power fall on the streets». Ultimately General Spínola filled that role, heading to Carmo at around 5:30 pm to receive power directly from Caetano's hands. The recently discharged Council President was then led to Pontinha's headquarters. Américo Thomaz, President of the Republic, was arrested at his home, when the military operation was considered finished, as he posed no threat to the situation. They were both deported to Madeira the following day, along with the former Ministers of Defence, Joaquim da Silva Cunha, and of Domestic Affairs, César Moreira Baptista. Most of them subsequently moved to Brazil, with Spínola's permission, a decision that was not well received by the MFA.

The coup could have been carried out without bloodshed if the political police [*Policial Internacional e de Defesa do Estado-Direcção-Geral de Segurança*, PIDE/DGS] had not resisted the insurgent forces and fired over a crowd of people protesting in front of its headquarters. This led to four deaths and forty-five injured. The next day the members of PIDE/DGS eventually surrendered to the forces of the new situation.

Against MFA's orders disseminated in its frequent communiqués in this period, a considerable number of people did not stay at home. On the contrary, they came out massively to the streets. In fact, it was this immediate and intense adhesion of the people that transformed the military coup into a revolution. Regarding the factors that were crucial in triggering the Revolution and the preponderance of different forces in its development, António Reis (1993) argues that elites, and namely political parties, were preponderant, although the relationship is more of mutualism rather than of subordination (1995). Conversely, both Josep Sánchez Cervelló (1993) and José Medeiros Ferreira (1993) consider the military action to be the decisive element, although the latter also recognizes the importance of political parties. Fernando Rosas (2004:123) supports the idea that although social and political unrest occurred, the events did not amount to an insurrectional situation with the MFA as its military arm, since from the beginning the MFA asked people to stay home. The latter concludes that the coup contributed towards the revolutionary outburst but it was not aimed at provoking that outburst. Likewise, Diego Palacios (2003) demonstrates that in specific moments the military and the State apparatus acted according to the will of the people, demolishing the myth that this was a revolutionary process conducted by the military. This author, among others (Boaventura Sousa Santos 1990; Nancy Bermeo 1986; Durán Muñoz 1997; Ramos Pinto 2013), instead credits the leading role to social movements.

It was the people that surrounded the prisons and demanded all prisoners to be set free, which happened on the 26<sup>th</sup>. The urban social movement (Ramos Pinto 2008) that materialized in the occupation of urban property began very soon after the coup, when residents of the *Boavista* shanty-town, in Lisbon, occupied empty houses on the 28<sup>th</sup> and refused to leave even after the military came to evict them. Also on the 28<sup>th</sup>, workers occupied several union headquarters in Oporto – drivers, clerks and bakers. The following day, bank clerks, who had started mobilizing before the coup and would later force the nationalization of the banking system, started controlling money withdrawals and picketing (Noronha 2010 and 2011). On the 30<sup>th</sup>, several unions entered the former Ministry of Corporations and Social Security, renamed Ministry of Labour; a massive assembly of students took place at the Technical Superior Institute [*Instituto Superior Técnico*, IST]; the Women's Liberation Movement (MLM) was formed; construction workers dismissed their union leaders and occupied the union's headquarters; and, finally, a strike started at *Transul*, a transport company (Varela 2011).

Mobilization reached the Portuguese media also on the 30<sup>th</sup>, when at 7 pm the newsroom and broadcaster operators of radio *Renascença* went on strike due to serious divergences regarding news criteria. The Board of Administration did not agree with the way the arrivals of the socialist Mário Soares (on the 28<sup>th</sup>), the communist Álvaro Cunhal (on the 30<sup>th</sup>), and a few protest singer-songwriters were covered by the radio, and news reports on these topics were forbidden. The workers were also outraged that a fellow journalist was almost fired by the same Board because he used a telex from news agency *Nova China*. The strike lasted until 2 am of May 1<sup>st</sup> (Ribeiro 2000; Borges Santos 2005).

All these movements happened before the May 1<sup>st</sup> demonstration, which had a massive attendance and was portrayed by the international media as a proof of Portuguese political maturity and the emergence of the

Portuguese people as a collective actor (Mesquita b 1994). The social revolution continued with demands of an end to colonial war and independence of colonial territories, land reform, full employment and higher salaries, housing and public education. For nearly nineteen months, tensions ensued between different concepts of democratic realizations, mostly between a representative and a grassroots democracy.

Democracy, Decolonization and Development were promised by the MFA as a future for Portugal and constitute the lines of the political debate and action of the period examined in this dissertation. Decolonization was considered inherent to a process of democratization of the Portuguese society, and will guide us throughout our analysis since it is a somewhat long process that ends with the recognition of Angola as an independent State on 11 November 1975. Decolonization will also be one of the points of rupture between General Spínola and the MFA, due to the different political configurations preferred for the former colonial empire. Therefore, it could be argued that the points of rupture of the revolutionary process – April 25<sup>th</sup> and September 28<sup>th</sup> of 1974, and March 11<sup>th</sup> and November 25<sup>th</sup> of 1975 – determine the course of the decolonization process, as Sánchez (1993) does, as well as the other way around: that to some extent the rupture points were determined by the decolonization process when the different projects it embodied clashed.

One of the goals of the initial coup was to end the colonial war, although the MFA and General Spínola soon clashed about the type of action desired. Spínola will remain president of the Republic until 30 September 1974, in what Sánchez (1993) considers the «Spínola against MFA» stage of the process. During this time the revolution is seen as a bourgeois type of democratic revolution, with civil liberties and a cease-fire in Africa being achieved, as well as the rejection of the Spínolista Presidential system project.

After Spínola's resignation and the nomination of Costa Gomes as president of the Republic up to March 11<sup>th</sup>, the day of the failed counter-revolutionary coup led by the overthrown General, a stage of «MFA against Spínola» is identified by Sánchez (1993). Student civic service of basic literacy and health education of rural populations started with the academic year in the fall of 1974 (Oliveira 2004) and was strongly encouraged by the MFA (Vespeira de Almeida 2010); and in February 1975 rural workers started land grabs in Alentejo, beginning a movement of Land Reform (Piçarra 2008).

To understand the «MFA against MFA» (Sánchez 1993) stage of the process, ending with the clash between military units with different political loyalties of 25 November 1975, it is important to remember that the MFA grouped different factions of the military that had different political stances regarding the revolutionary process of 1974-1975. This power equilibrium within the military institution is the object of Maria Inácia Rezola's research (2005), where the importance of the Revolution Council as a political agent in the Portuguese democratic transition is investigated. The Revolution Council (RC) was the result of the fusion of different military bodies after the failed Spínolista coup of 11 March 1975. According to this author, after this date the Revolution Council in fact commanded the social-political life in Portugal. This new body gathered several powers: constituent power, the power of audition and control of the government's executive and legislative action— all stemming from the State Council –, the power to ensure MFA's abidance by the program and constitutional laws, as well as the role of advisor to the president of the Republic – powers stemming from the National Salvation Junta<sup>9</sup>. Lastly, to the RC additional military power proceeding from the General Staff

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<sup>9</sup> Both these bodies – State Council and National Salvation Junta – were part of the six sovereign bodies defined by the MFA program: Constituent Assembly, President of the Republic, National Salvation Junta, State Council, Provisional Government, and Courts.

Council was given. Rezola follows the struggle for power among the Armed Forces, putting aside the classical thesis of the Revolution Council as a guarantor of the revolution.

The Military institution, and not just the MFA, was not politically homogenous. According to Maxwell (1999) at the right of the political spectrum were the officers close to Spínola, as well as the officers that supported action bounded by the MFA's program, where the armed forces had no political role. This was a larger group that included not only the Spinolist wing, but also the area that gathered men like the future president of the Portuguese Republic, General – then Lieutenant Colonel – Ramalho Eanes.

At the left of the political spectrum, three main tendencies can be identified. On the one hand, there were the Marxist-Leninist military that gravitated around the PCP and figures like Colonel – at the time General – Vasco Gonçalves, leader of four of the six provisional governments. There were also partisans of pro-democratic socialism, gravitating around Melo Antunes after the Document of the Nine was drafted, and lastly what Maxwell (1999) calls «populists». Among the latter, who mostly distrusted all political parties and defended a «popular democracy», are figures like Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, a natural-born leader<sup>10</sup> and head of the military unit Continental Operation Command [*Comando Operacional do Continente* COPCON], formed on 8 July 1974 with the goal of containing public disorder, but that would end up having a completely different role, backing up many of the revolutionary actions instead of dismissing them.

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<sup>10</sup> Otelo inherited his Shakespearean name from his grandfather, a public servant at the post office who was also a trained actor devoted to the managerial aspect of theatre. Otelo's father, also a public servant at the post office, devoted himself to amateur theatre, and Otelo dreamed and planned to become an actor himself (Moura 2012, 31-33).

Historian Inácia Rezola (2007) assumes that the debate over the nature of the coup has been overcome, since there were palpable changes in the country's structures, for instance at the economic, social and cultural levels. It thus seems to be widely accepted that the 1974-1975 revolution started with a military action, a formal *coup d'état*, which through the intervention of other historical subjects became a revolution.

In the past however, authors such as Medeiros Ferreira put the use of the term revolution into question. In his first account (1983) on this subject, this author uses the term revolution to characterize the events initiated on 25 April 1974. Shortly thereafter he rather called it an «imperfect revolution» (1985), because of the lack of temporal perspective and what he perceived as an unfinished movement. Later still, Medeiros Ferreira (1993) referred to a structural change in History as a discipline, at the time more interested in economic, social history and the history of mentalities, rather than political history. Those fields are not as akin to discussing movements of rupture and to using concepts such as «revolution». However this author concludes that the concept is used to «characterize a moment, evoke a possibility, measure its insufficiency or inquire about the past»<sup>ii</sup> (1993:11).

Medeiros Ferreira also states that although the notion that the democratic normalization meant the end of the revolutionary period is widely accepted, the use of the term «revolution» to characterize the transformations occurred in Portuguese society is not at all common, and, in fact, its use allows to draw a clear distinction between historians who use it and those who do not. Among the first group, Medeiros Ferreira differentiates between the radicals, who consider that the revolution was a potential that was not fulfilled, and the ones who consider that the revolution was prevented and wilted on its final stage before its death after 25 November 1975. According to the author, the latter stance is supported by historians ideologically close to the Portuguese Communist Party,



since November 25<sup>th</sup> represented a loss of influence of the Communists and a rise of the moderate and, among them, the Socialists. Medeiros Ferreira defends the idea that the abrupt change of the Portuguese reality provoked by this event marks a clear «before» and «after», and, because of that, if not a revolution, it is definitely a landmark of this era (1993: 11).

This argument over terminology reveals that this question is still a source of debate and dispute about the past to justify present political demands, a claim that might be confirmed by the recent book *Revolução ou Transição? História e Memória da Revolução dos Cravos* (Varela 2012), where the revolutionary character of the Portuguese Transition to Democracy is asserted. On the subject of memory, Luciana Soutelo (2012) supports the idea that during «Cavaquismo» – the period during which Aníbal Cavaco Silva was prime minister of Portugal (1985-1995) – the public use of history on the press focused on portraying the Portuguese variation of historic revisionism, a Portuguese version of the conservatism felt worldwide after the 1970s and deepened after 1989. Hence the revolution is understood either as a historic mistake or at least an unnecessary event, according to the more extreme revisionist visions.

However at that moment the Portuguese revolution became an international event that allowed debating topics such as the end of a long dictatorship – which was also the case with Spain –, the search for a new regime, a wish expressed by numerous voices within Spain's particular case of «public sphere», and the organization of the political forces of the centre, which soon also became a pressing matter within the same «public sphere». In this sense, Mário Mesquita has demonstrated that with regards to the francophone press (French, Belgian and Swiss), one of the only international repercussions that it dared to predict was «an indirect influence in Spain»<sup>iii</sup> (Mesquita b 1994, 60).

Prior to 25 April 1974, both Iberian countries shared the experience of sustaining a survivor to the post-war period «personal dictatorship», since they represented regimes where the «individual leader is the source of authority and that power depends on access to, closeness to, dependence on, and support from the leader» (Huntington 1993, 111). But they shared other characteristics as well, for example their common origin in military uprisings<sup>11</sup>, their political models based on traditional powers such as the Roman-Catholic Church, the patriarchal law and the Military institution, and lastly their rejection of the liberal parliamentary system, which both replaced by corporative assemblies.

Likewise, the respective Communist parties led opposition movements in both countries, and, accordingly, both dictatorships shared a strong anti-Communist ideology and struggle. Therefore both their political police corps viewed communists as the main enemy of the State.<sup>12</sup> Of course opposition movements were not only composed of communists, and Spain had a peculiarity, in that the Francoist vision of

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<sup>11</sup> In Portugal, the military coup of May 28<sup>th</sup> 1926 that put an end to the I Republic (1910-1926) and in Spain the uprising of the national faction that started the Civil War on July 18<sup>th</sup> 1936.

<sup>12</sup> In Portugal, the political police or PVDE (1933-1945), Surveillance and State Defence Police, was renamed PIDE (1945-1969), International Police and State Defence, and then, with Caetano's reforms, DGS (1969-1974), General Security Office. In Spain, control was in charge of the «Political-Social Brigade» (BSI), whose official name was actually Social Investigation Brigade (1941-1986). Though the latter changed its name to Central Information Brigade and had its functions severely reduced after the legislative reforms of 1976, 1978, and 1981, it was only completely dismantled in 1986 by an organic law which reintegrated the functionaries of the several services closed down in the new National Police Body («Ley Orgánica 2/1986, de 13 de marzo 1986, de Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad», Madrid: BOE n°63, March 14<sup>th</sup> 1986 BOE-A-1986-6859 [available at <http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1986-6859>, consulted on October 3<sup>rd</sup> 2014] ). This special police force, integrated in the General Police Body (CGP), followed orders from the General Security Office (DGS) and the Ministry of Administration, and worked alongside the Civilian Police Department.

the Unitarian National State was opposed mostly by Basque and Catalan nationalists.

During the 1960s and 1970s, other leftist groups, developed mainly in universities, had become important opposition collectives (Pimentel 2007; Fontes 2012). Students constituted, in 1973, a third of political prisoners in Portugal, while in Spain, in 1976, they amounted to 22% of the cases brought before the Spanish Public Order Tribunal [*Tribunal de Orden Público* TOP] (Carrillo-Linares and Cardina 2012).

Prior antagonist movements also existed in both countries, although their structure and action were not as similar as it was by the end of both regimes, due to the circumstances in which the latter were forged. In Portugal, the consolidation of the New State, which followed the military dictatorship, was frequently challenged between the years of 1926 and 1940, although more actively until 1931, by what was depreciatively called the *Revirvalho* by the State apparatus. This was not a uniform movement, since it gathered left-wing republicans, radical military, intellectuals connected with the magazine *Seara Nova*, and had communist and anarchist support whenever it was taken to the streets. In fact, this movement is seen as a «reconstitution of what had once been the socio-political basis of the republican movement» (Farinha 1998, 19). After 1931, it became a minority movement, as the petty-bourgeoisie progressively started supporting the new regime and a considerable number of *revirvalhistas* took exile in republican Spain, wherefrom in turn they had to flee through the Pyrenees – much like the Spanish supporters of the II Republic – after 1939 (Farinha 2007).

Republican Spaniards exiled in France soon gathered around refugee camps and constituted what became known as Groups of Spanish Workers [*Groupes de Travailleurs Espagnols* GTE], joining the French resistance during the Nazi occupation of France. From 1942, they could already be included in the *Maquis* phenomenon of armed struggle. From

1944, the Spanish *Maquis* reportedly became more significant and more offensive, and the Communist Party of Spain [*Partido Comunista de España* PCE] had a prevalent role in it (Temime 1996). The PCE, one of the better-organized groups in France, had a key role, since from the beginning it had supported the idea that the fundamental task of its militants involved working towards a return to Spain and a defeat of the Francoist regime. This task would continue to be pursued and was facilitated after France's liberation, when an organized structure with a solid basis and enough material was finally gathered. Toulouse then becomes the capital of the Spanish resistance. In 1948, when Franco finally called off the state of war, communist guerrilla tactics were officially replaced, following Staline's advice, by an «entryism» strategy: communist infiltration in legal Francoist organizations.

The democratic opposition in Portugal hoped that the end of the WWII and the defeat of the Axis powers would force the downfall of the New State. The Portuguese regime was «forced» to introduce some superficial changes, including the stage of elections. The opposition gathered then around the Movement of Democratic Unity [*Movimento de Unidade Democrática* MUD] until this one was dissolved by the government in 1948. Although the opposition always lost, the several electoral campaigns became important moments of mobilization, especially the presidential one of 1958, when General Humberto Delgado was able to gather around him a great deal of popular support. Finally the outburst of the colonial wars allowed the dissemination of the oppositionist movement to sectors it had not reached before. In the articulation of all these struggles the Portuguese Communist Party, formed in the beginning of the 1920s and underground since the military coup of 1926, had a central role. On the one hand maybe because of the absence of other oppositionist parties, i.e. a Socialist Party was only officially formed as an organized party in 1973 and leftist parties became a reality in the

1960s. On the other hand because when the Communist party, mostly forged under dictatorship, was reorganized in 1941 that implied a commitment to a unity of the Portuguese people in the national struggle against the New State (Neves 2008).

However, despite the heterogeneous structure of their opposition movements, in Portugal much as in Spain, Communists will remain in the collective imaginary as the main element of resistance and opposition to the respective dictatorships. The perceived hegemony of both PCP and PCE could have stemmed from the assumption, from the point of view of power, that all antagonistic action (demonstrations, labour conflicts, sabotage, strikes, etc.) were communist actions, whether this was accurate or not. The fact that communists were regarded as the main enemy of the State also gave them the aura of being its most resilient opponent. This hegemony was numerically tested in the first elections held in both countries – on 25 April 1975, in Portugal, and on 15 June 1977<sup>13</sup>, in Spain –, and the results were similar: Communist parties came out as the third political force, with 12.36% and 9.33% of the votes, respectively.

In an effort to contain dissention, both countries also shared a long tradition of publishing and press control, namely through the use of censorship (Barrera 1995; Arons de Carvalho 1999). Not only did Portugal and Spain spend almost half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century under dictatorial regimes, who exercised part of their rule over society by controlling the mass media, but this type of systematic control of media content had roots in earlier experiences (Chuliá 2001; Timoteo 1989; Guillamet 2003; Seoane and Saiz 2007; Matos and Lemos 2006; Rodrigues 1980), and would prove hard to contain (Mesquita 1994a, Nobre-Correia 2009, Seaton and Pimlot 1983). In fact, restriction of information is, unsurprisingly, a common feature of authoritarian regimes, especially in

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<sup>13</sup> By the time the elections took place, PCE had been legalized very recently, on 9 April 1977.

cases where a high percentage of the population is illiterate (Brigs and Burke 2010), like in both Iberian countries at the time.

Of course differences did exist, and one of the singularities of the Spanish press, especially when compared to the Portuguese one, is the academic training of its journalists. Not only did University studies of Journalism in Spain (1971) start earlier than in Portugal (1979), but Spain also had a tradition of Journalism schools, inaugurated by the pioneer school of *El Debate* in 1926, which had no parallel in Portugal. A Press Association also existed in Spain since 1895, and journalist credentials were in use since March 1910 (Seoane and Saiz 2007), which helped establish a community of professionals. On the other hand, during the entire dictatorship, as Seaton and Pimlott contend, in Portugal «(...) journalism was a low Status, essentially clerical sub-profession providing few opportunities for an interesting career; hence few talented or imaginative people entered it» (1983: 97). Spain was not, nonetheless, foreign to the reality of journalists holding several jobs in order to make a living.

The fact that preventive control was instituted by the 1938 Press Law (Chuliá 2001 and 2004) in the territories that were progressively conquered by the uprising Francoist troops, helped to settle this tradition. After this press law was enforced, and along with the Francoist cleansing of newsrooms undertaken after the war, in order to continue writing for Spanish newspapers journalists had to enrol in the Official Registry of Journalists [*Registro Oficial de Periodistas*], inspired in the Italian one [*Albo professionale dei giornalisti*]. After 1941, it also became mandatory to previously attend the Official School of Journalism [*Escuela Oficial de Periodismo* EOP], the only one available<sup>14</sup> until 1958, when the Journalism Institute [*Instituto de Periodismo*] was opened in the Navarra

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<sup>14</sup> Some other sporadic courses were offered since 1945 by institutions usually connected to the Church (Chuliá 2001, 115-117).

Official Study, controlled by Opus Dei. Finally, in 1960, a third school, the Church's School of Journalism [*Escuela de Periodismo de la Iglesia EPI*], is opened by the Catholic National Association of Propagandists [*Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas ACNDP*].

In the 1970s journalism studies reach the university, when the first degree in Information Sciences [*Ciencias de la Información*] is made available in three Spanish universities (Complutense, in Madrid, Autònoma, in Barcelona, and Navarra, in Pamplona) in 1971. The first graduates will reach the job market in 1976, a year of important changes in the newspaper panorama and the year in which newspapers such as *Avui* (April 23<sup>rd</sup> 1976), *El País* (May 4<sup>th</sup> 1976), *Diario 16* (October 18<sup>th</sup> 1976-November 7<sup>th</sup> 2001), and *Catalunya Express* (December 14<sup>th</sup> 1976 - 1980) are founded. Among the journalists registered in the Official Registry of Journalists between 1963 and 1977, 59% had not attended the Official School of Journalism, 75% were born after 1930, and 50% were born after 1945 (Chuliá 2001, 187- 193), which means that the majority not only had not fought in the civil war but also that half the journalists had not endured the harsh post-war period.

As an inheritance of the civil war (1936-1939), the predominance of public, and thus official media, was a feature of the Spanish informative system during Francoism. Newspapers (and the news agency *pyresa*) that were part of the Movement's Press Network [*la Cadena de Prensa del Movimiento*] – with 44 newspapers and 22, 3% of the total circulation in 1975 (Reig 2007, 155) – and *Pueblo*, the newspaper published by the Unionist Organization [*Organización Sindical*], were owned by the State. This public network existed as a result of the civil war, since most of its newspapers had been confiscated when Francoist troops marched on the Republican zone. Barrera (1995) claims that during the war it became a common and frequent practice, on both sides, to occupy the enemy's buildings and printing workshops and then keep

printing the newspaper but with a different editorial line, to simply use the premises to print other existing newspaper, or even to launch new titles. Both sides had seized the enemy publications in their zone of influence, but the winners kept this control long after the war was over. In July 1940 Movement's Press Network was officially created by law 13/7/40, and all the assets that had been seized became property of the Press and Propaganda National Delegation of FET and JONS [*Delegación Nacional de Prensa y Propaganda de Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista*], ultimately State-owned (Heras 2000). This included 35 newspapers, 45 broadcasters and *pyresa* news agency (Álferez 1986). The main publication of the public network was the second series of Madrid's *Arriba*, a newspaper whose first series had been founded in 1935 by José Antonio Primo de Rivera. But the latter was also prolific in the regional press: it published *La Nueva España* (Oviedo), *Sur* (Málaga), *El Pueblo Gallego* (Pontevedra), among other titles (Heras 2000).

Despite its importance in the first stage of Francoism, by 1975 several factors contributed for the Movement's Press Network's loss of about 1.500 thousand pesetas yearly (Álferez 1986, 142). The economic losses started in 1971 and became constant thereafter. By 1984, the newspapers that once formed the public network were no longer State-owned (cf. Heras 2000; Álferez 1986; Fuentes and Fernández 1997, 317-335; Barrera 1995).

Also owned by the State was the only Television broadcaster – *RTVE* – and the National radio that had a monopoly over news broadcasting – *RNE*. Though private radios did exist, *RNE*'s monopoly over news broadcast meant that until October 1977<sup>15</sup>, private radios were

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<sup>15</sup> Exceptions were «Matinal Cadena SER» (initiated in 1964) and «Hora 25» (launched in 1972), both from broadcaster SER, which was nonetheless partly owned by the State. The strategy for the first one consisted in presenting itself as



forced to broadcast its news broadcast [*el Diario hablado*], best known as «*el parte*», twice daily: at 2:30 pm and at 10 pm (Balsebre 2002), and to focus on entertainment.

In this context, and while undoubtedly criticized for its role in reporting the Portuguese events, private newspapers, though under strict control and subject to contingencies which favoured compliance, became, by exclusion, the most likely vehicles for non-official versions of events within the Spanish informative system.

Additionally, until the democratic transition the best students of Journalism schools usually considered newspapers in general to be the journalistic medium par excellence, and it is where they hoped to pursue a career (Balsebre 2002, 380). Newspapers were probably also the medium with more employment opportunities, since only one public TV and Radio broadcaster existed, and private Radio did not have proper information programs.

The business structure of the private press in Spain was however not all identical, and in fact according to José Reig (2007) three categories existed in the 1970s, depending on the ties that united them. The *Editorial Católica* (*Ya, Ideal de Granada, El Ideal Gallego, La Verdad de Murcia* and *Hoy de Badajoz*) and the Luca de Tena family group, or *Prensa Española* (*ABC, Blanco y Negro*), constitute examples of the *formal* type of group, whereas Godó group, formally TISA since 1961 (*La Vanguardia Española, Dicen, El Mundo deportivo, Gaceta Ilustrada*) and *Mundo* group (*Tele/eXprés, Mundo diario* and later on *Catalunya Express* and *Informaciones*) constitute more *informal* and unstable groups, «whose grouping depended more on the coincidence of certain names in

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a magazine with local information (weather information and agenda); the second one followed the same *modus operandi* and started by being presented as a space for sports information, which was then followed by current events information in connection with the several correspondents SER had across Spain (Balsebre 2002, 372-393).

administration boards than on a voluntary wish of the company»<sup>iv</sup> (2007:156); and finally the *bounded* type, a group of weakly defined corporate relationships between publications that somehow became mostly related to *Opus dei* (cf Reig 2007, 158) and other regional groups.

Typical of this more *informal* type of group, structural changes happened during this period, especially the change in the ownership of *Tele/eXprés*. This newspaper's main shareholder was Jaume Castell Lastrotas until 50% was bought by Count Godó, who in 1975 became the sole owner of this newspaper<sup>16</sup>. Also 25 % of *Prensa Castellana SA*, publisher of *Informaciones*, is bought in 1976 by *Prensa Española SA*, *ABC*'s publisher. This last purchase was accompanied by the statement that «*Informaciones* will maintain its current editorial line»<sup>17</sup>.

Historical complicities between most of the Spanish press and the regime were relatively clear, since newspapers formerly associated with the defeated faction during the civil war were mostly closed down or not reopened (i.e. *El Diluvio* in Barcelona). Some newspapers were also nationalized (i.e. *Solidaridad Obrera*, later called *Solidaridad Nacional*, also in Barcelona) and became part of *La Cadena del Movimiento*. Some of the remaining newspapers resurfaced after the civil war (like *ABC*, *Ya* and *Informaciones*, in Madrid), invariably returning to their previous owners: *Informaciones* was returned to its last editor-in-chief before the war, Victor de la Serna; *ABC* and *La Vanguardia* were returned to the Luca de Tena and the Godó families, respectively. In other cases new ventures were entrusted to people close to Francoism, like *Madrid* (1939-1971), handed as a reward to Juan Pujol (Barrera 1995), or permits were delayed, like *El País*, whose permit request was filed in 1971 and granted

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<sup>16</sup> «Cambio empresarial en “TELE-EXPRES”».1975. *Tele/eXprés*, February 6, pp.3.

<sup>17</sup> «“Informaciones” mantendra [sic] actual línea editorial».1976. *Tele/eXprés*, February 26, pp.12.

only in 1975 (Chuliá 2001, 194). In both cases, newspapers were generally given to people entrusted by the regime to be faithful followers. But even under these circumstances newspapers had their activity under strict control and during the dictatorship part of the Spanish press found ways of reacting and resisting such control (Barrera 1995, Chuliá 2001).

Perhaps more useful than this distinction according to ownership structure is the distinction José Reig draws between *regime press* and *democratic press*. Since the author found no clear division between the political editorial content of official and independent – i.e. private – press, Reig identifies the discursive praxis linked either to a pro-regime or pro-democratic political culture.

According to this view then, the *regime press* congregates not only the official one, but also any private press that «modulates its discourse according to francoist parameters, of acceptance of the legal-political frame, even if eventually it supports its “development” or “updating”»<sup>v</sup> (Reig 2007, 160), like in the case of *ABC*, *Ya* and *La Vanguardia Española*, among others. Reig does not imply that all these newspapers take on a univocal and «identical discourse», especially after the «Spirit of 12 February», when two opposite discourses, *inmovilismo* and *aperturismo*, emerged, and since this indeed makes for a fairly heterogeneous group. Reig however argues that «similarly to the regime’s families, the glue that binds them is nothing but Franco’s leadership and the vague loyalty to his life’s work».<sup>vi</sup> Even if different voices arise in this group, «there is a mutual acceptance of the political framework as definitive and the latter’s legitimacy as undisputed, and especially of the view that all democratic alternatives are undesirable and subversive»<sup>vii</sup>(2007:160).

The *democratic press*, on the other hand, forms a much smaller group, and until 1976, when *El País* joined the group, it was formed only by weekly (*Triunfo*, *Destino*, *Cambio 16*) and monthly (*Cuadernos para*

*el Dialogo*) publications. For Reig, this type of press «represents a wide spectrum of democratic and rupture stances with a strong left-wing component»<sup>viii</sup>(2007:161).

This distinction, however, cannot be used rigidly by simply placing publications in two separate fields. Otherwise, where would *Informaciones* (or *Tele/eXprés* we add) stand? Somewhere in between, claims Reig. As for dissident voices, they also found their place within the so-called *regime* press.

Spanish newspapers are, in this context, an object of mass communication responding to their own rules within the framework of a mass media culture, which goes beyond the fact that they are a product of a dictatorship. On the one hand, they are produced within the boundaries of an authoritarian regime that has a particular conception of what their role is in its idea of society and State, and therefore enforces strict policies to make sure that role is fulfilled accordingly. On the other hand, despite the political configuration in which they exist, they also function according to the rules of their own structure, as a mass media product.

The transition to a mass media culture brought with it newspapers conceived as apolitical and directed purely at informing its public, hence the liberal «ideology of objectivity» that though born in the second half of the nineteenth century with the massification phenomenon, remained common sensical during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. By developing the concept of «cultural industry», Adorno and Horkheimer, on the one hand, blur the autonomous status of art and culture, underlining its link to the political sphere and, on the other hand, identify the mass media as serving the interests of the market economy of advanced capitalism by feeding the «passive masses» instead of participating in the formation of a critical public: «The effectiveness of the culture industry depends not on its parading an ideology, on disguising the true nature of things, but

removing the thought that there is an alternative to the status quo» (Bernstein 2010, 11).

Thus the «culture industry» art is said to have lost all its subversive potential and to serve apologetically the status quo (Hohendahl and Silberman 1979), similarly to how the press is dominated by the interests of its advertisers:

Advertising becomes information when there is no longer anything to choose from, when the recognition of brand names has taken the place of choice, when at the same time the totally forces everyone who wishes to survive into consciously going along with the process. This is what happens under monopolistic mass culture. We can distinguish three stages in developing domination of needs: advertising, information and command. As form of omnipresent familiarization mass culture dissolves the three stages into one another (Adorno 2010, 85).

In this sense, Spanish newspapers would be coerced by both logics: the market and the authoritarian desire of control over the mass media. Some readings of Adorno and Horkheimer's concept do emphasize the similarities in the outcomes of mass media control over the individual, whether it is achieved through political domination or through the market domination of the field:

The culture industry, which involves the production of works for reproduction and mass consumption, thereby organizing 'free' time, the remnant domain of freedom under capital in accordance with the same principles of exchange and equivalence that reign in the sphere of production outside leisure, presents culture as the realization of the right of all to the gratification of desire while in reality continuing the negative integration in society. While Adorno nowhere identifies the culture industry with the political triumph of fascism, he does imply, both directly and indirectly, that the culture industry's effective integration of society marks an equivalent triumph of repressive unification in liberal democratic states to that which was achieved politically under fascism. This analogical interpretation of culture industry itself requires the terms of reference provided by the idea of 'integral freedom' (Bernstein 2010, 4).

The power of manipulation that Adorno identifies in the «culture industry», disseminated by mass media, casts aside the audiences'

hypothetical autonomy as consumers. Audience is hence conceived as masses, a concept which is undifferentiated and devoid of agency, and that reception studies, namely Stuart Hall's «encoding/decoding» model (1980), have meanwhile challenged.

For instance, when on the terrain before the downfall of the New State in Portugal, Spanish journalists claim that information is crucial in order to mobilize people, or at least for them to show interest for their own future. Thus arguing Spanish special correspondent, Luís Carandell, that « [t]his country [Portugal] has to change its point of view regarding the future. But for that to happen the people has to be aware, informed about what is truly happening in its colonies.»<sup>ix 18</sup>. This type of idea is the ideology Michel de Certeau (2002) adjoins to reading: a society might be moulded by what is read. Which is an enlightenment idea, prevalent until recently, that the high culture could via education transform society; or that the popular culture can contaminate and lower the standards of such society.

But all through this evolution, the idea of producing a society by a «scriptural» system has continued to have as its corollary the conviction that although the public is more or less resistant, it is moulded by (verbal or iconic) writing, that it becomes similar to what it receives, and that it is *imprinted* by and like the text which is imposed on it. This text was formerly found at school. Today, the text is society itself. It takes urban, industrial, commercial, or televised forms. But the mutation that caused the transition from educational archaeology to the technocracy of the media did not touch the assumption that consumption is essentially passive – an assumption that is precisely what should be examined. (de Certeau 2002, 166-167)

De Certeau's work has helped transforming this notion, by transporting the focus from the producer to the way it is consumed. Not all readers will read a text in the same way, and thus, unlike what was previously believed, a good set of readings will not necessarily improve a

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<sup>18</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo and Carandell, Luis.1974. «Caetano hablara hoy a la nación» in *Informaciones*, March 28<sup>th</sup>: 4

human being, much like the yellow press will not necessarily transform its audience into denser individuals.

This is nevertheless a prevalent idea among journalists at that time, and it is often expressed through the notion that information has the power to transform, like Luís Carandell argues. Even retrospectively, when asked about his work in Portugal, Xavier Roig gave a glimpse of this ideology about how people can be moulded by what they read, in this case newspapers: «In the case of *Tele/eXprés*, we interpreted that what was to be done was to push for democracy from a point of view of, let us say, the left or the centre-left»<sup>x</sup> (Mauri 2014, 288), hence reinforcing the power of the producer in transforming the consumer.

The mass media phenomenon has thus been subject to different approaches that try to determine its due place in a given society and answer, among others, the following questions: how do the mass media interact with the several spheres that constitute a society? How is power distributed among those spheres? How significant is the contribution of the mass media to society? What determines their action and how relevant is, in fact, their action?

Not all these questions have been successful and unequivocally answered, but going a step further and not dismissing in any way the ideological substrate of mass media, Gaye Tuchman (1978) is one of the advocates of the idea that instead of just mere reflectors, mass media themselves participate in the construction of realities. This is particularly evident, for instance, in their capacity to generate phenomena of «moral panic» (Hall et al. 1978/1982). In *Mythologies*, Roland Barthes evokes the petty-bourgeois character of the reality created by mass media, namely through newspapers, in that it is subject to an operation of «mystification which transforms petty-bourgeois culture into a universal nature» (1957/2009: XVII). Thus by myth Barthes understands: «(...) the sight of

the ‘naturalness’ with which newspapers, art and common sense constantly dress up a reality which, even though it is the one we live in, is undoubtedly determined by history.»(2009: XIX).

In this perspective, newspapers are regarded as agents of socio-historical change and not so much as primary sources for historical inquiry. This involves an understanding of how the discourses present in newspapers were produced and evolved. Discourses are understood as events in the sense that they are completely dependent on their context and their engagement with it, on how a text performs an idea. In this sense, we share Luís Trindade’s views in his work about the Portuguese newspaper *O Diabo*:

The newspaper is understood as a universe (where themes, individual and discourses intersect) that is not a reflex nor an explanation of an outside reality, but rather an event, or a set of events in the form of a text, happening in a specific context (the cultural milieu of the 1930s) that, as such, it helps to explain (...) The newspaper is neither an illustration of the existence (...) nor the narrator of those realities, but a medium through which all those leading figures exist and build the reality of that moment<sup>xi</sup> (2004, 12-13).

The present dissertation accepts the part newspapers, and mass media in general, play in the construction of realities. In this sense, and as pointed out in José Reig’s work on the political cultures of late-Francoism (2007), both the works of E.P. Thompson and Raymond Williams have been crucial for advancing the role of the imaginary and the construction of reality as agents of history. In the present case, we also embrace the conception of the Spanish democratic transition as a process of emergence of a «public opinion» under dictatorship, which started long before General Franco’s death and for which the debate surrounding the Portuguese revolutionary process contributed. This involves understanding how mass media relate to the concept of «public sphere», but also how specific ideas, and, in the present case, relatively moderate ones, become hegemonic. However, we must also bear in mind, following



Gaye Tuchman, that «[a]s Raymond Williams explained in *Marxism and Literature* (1977) a cultural hegemony spawns the terms of its own rejection» (Tuchman 2002, 91) and that, therefore, two opposing discourses will be facing each other, even if one seems to be dominant.

José Reig's hypothesis assumes the existence of a fractured «public sphere» in the Spanish society throughout Francoism. This fracture would divide the Spanish «public sphere» into two collectives according to the relationship they have with the dominant political regime: identification and alienation. Nonetheless, Reig also argues that under Francoism a truthful public opinion «does not exist and cannot exist (...)». If we can talk about it, it is because of its division into two simulacra, but none of them taken in isolation or at the same time constitute public opinion, neither on the normative (liberal) nor on the psico-social (mass democracy) sense»<sup>xiii</sup> (2007:53). For this purpose, Reig adapts Habermas' model of late-capitalism «public sphere» to fit the Spanish reality of late-Francoism.

By «public sphere» Jürgen Habermas understands the space existing beyond the realm of the State, a space where individuals in the eighteenth century were able to exchange ideas, knowledge, and views, namely by direct contact in different types of clubs and societies, like bars, coffeehouses, etc., or mediated by various publications (newspapers, pamphlets, and so forth). Later these historical forms evolved differently. A member of the second generation of the Frankfurt School, Jürgen Habermas (1962-2010) argues that the «representative culture», which Marx once called the feudal stage, was gradually replaced by a «public sphere culture», the capitalist stage, in the sense that a culture of domination, where power was exerted from an active subject over a mass of passive subjects, was replaced by a culture of dialogue between subjects. Although a process of gradual replacement was taking place

throughout the eighteenth century, Habermas identifies the French Revolution as the moment of final collapse of a representative culture. Given that it was a process coincident, and intrinsically connected with, the rise of the bourgeoisie as the dominant class, it is also identified as a «bourgeois» public sphere. Likewise, the public sphere is considered by Habermas as a constitutive part of processes of democratization and the development of capitalism. Nonetheless the same way that this space of exchange was once erected – although this is a conceptual model and not a material reality – Habermas identifies its decline– the place for a dialogue that aims to achieve consensus through rational debate – with the development of commercial mass media and the welfare State, i.e. the culture industries. Commercial mass media are credited with transforming a once active and critical public into a mass of, once again, passive consumers (instead of subjects).

This Habermasian model of «public sphere» has nevertheless been repeatedly criticized and a great deal of its critics emphasizes precisely its failure in being truthfully democratic. Peter Hohendahl (1979) underlines several of the contradictions in Habermas' model by contrasting several claims of Habermas' German-speaking critics. Among these, Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, who present the alternative «proletarian counter-public sphere», denounce how Habermas inherited the elitism in Adorno and Horkheimer's concept of culture industry in his perspective on mass culture products. Hohendahl concludes that even with Habermas' reformulation of his own model following these critiques, the concept of a populist «public sphere» replacing the early ideal liberal one is still a concept which is «relatively vague and [that] requires specification» (Hohendahl and Silberman 1979, 117).

After the publication in English of *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, in

1989, Nancy Fraser (1990) developed a critique of Habermas' universal «public sphere» model, underlining the extent to which it was based on multiple exclusions, and gathering previous critiques of a group of historians who focused their approach on gender (Landes 1988), class (Eley 1992), and the exact reach of the concept of «public» (Ryan 1990 and 1992)<sup>19</sup>.

Drawing on the empirical work of this group of historians, Nancy Fraser argues that Habermas' exclusions and conflicts, rather than accidental, as assumed in the model, are constitutive of the concept «public sphere» in itself (1990:62), and that this concept, then, is not adequate for contemporary critical theory (1990:76). This fostered a nuanced alternative to the concept focused on four of the assumptions in which the «bourgeois masculinist» conception of public sphere is based, and thus a «post-bourgeois conception».

Given the *sui generis* formulation of the Francoist Spanish «public sphere», it is worth going through the critique formulated by Fraser a little bit further. Firstly, instead of considering that social equality is not a necessary condition for political democracy, Fraser demonstrates how access to the public sphere is dependent on criteria of gender, class, race, among others, and argues that participatory parity means that systemic social inequalities are eliminated, since they generate relations of domination and subordination. This is a critique that remains effective for our case, given that even if considered the fragmented «public sphere» proposed by Reig exclusions, despite also based on political grounds, are based on the same criteria mentioned by Fraser: gender (the sub-representation of women is very much visible), class and eventually race, among others.

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<sup>19</sup> Fraser bases her arguments on papers presented by Eley and Ryan at a conference in 1988, later published in 1992, hence the posthumous publication dates.

Secondly, and drawing on Ryan's notion of several publics, against Habermas' singular bourgeois conception of the public sphere, Fraser presents the multiplicity of public spheres in both stratified societies and egalitarian and multi-cultural ones – unrelated with the decline of Habermas' concept – which she coined as «subaltern counterpublics» by merging of Gayatri Spivak's «subaltern» (1988) concept and Rita Felski's «counterpublic» (1988). In this sense, Reig solves this problem by concluding that the application of Habermas' «decadent model» should be subjected to «local adjustments» in order to be able to account for the Spanish late-Francoist reality: «two political cultures, two subsystems of political communication and two subsystems of public opinion, in a non-peaceful co-existence»<sup>xiii</sup>(2007:57), a fractured public sphere between a «culture of identification» (the so-called «sociological Francoism») and a «culture of alienation» (that Reig deems «of democratic opposition»).

Therefore, on the one hand, regarding informal opinion, Reig states that under Francoism the political culture was divided into two subgroups – an authoritarian and a democratic one – subject to opposite logics of legitimization. The biological experience, namely belonging to either one of the groups existing by the end of the civil war (winners or losers), determined and accentuated this division, even if transferences from one group to another took place and the mass culture resonated the existing cultural division. On the other hand, regarding opinions aimed at «publicness», the «published opinion» in the newspapers also embodied the existing division, namely after the new 1966 press law, and among the political «elites», a set of families united under General Franco's authority, the possibility of expressing dissent also existed. The gradual integration of dissident voices in the «published opinion» thus resulted from two processes: the break of former allies, who nevertheless remain

present in the public sphere and, from 1966 on, the possibility of incorporation of «dissident voices».

However Fraser is also dismissive of the conception of «common concern» that Habermas defines as subject of discourse in the public sphere, arguing, like Mary Ryan, for the inclusion of «interests and issues that bourgeois masculinist ideology labels “private”» (1990: 77), hence embodying a logic of dominance, and giving as an example the evolution of the concept of «domestic violence» from a matter of private to a matter of public concern. Lastly, Nancy Fraser does not endorse Habermas' assumption that «a functioning democratic public sphere requires a sharp separation between civil society and the state». She argues that a defensible concept would have to acknowledge the existence of weak publics, «whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion-formation and does not encompass decision-making», and strong publics, «whose discourse encompasses both opinion-formation and decision-making» i.e. the parliament (1990: 75), and blur the lines of the strict separation between State and civil society.

Overall these critiques focused on the demonstration of how the habermasian concept of a universal «public sphere» is indeed comprised of multiple exclusions (e.g. women and western civilization's multiple minorities; collectives that endure the hegemony of the «universal» public sphere without having their concerns represented in it) and that, therefore, lacks freedom for the excluded. In this sense, the parallel with the Francoist situation is easy to draw, given that a Spanish «public sphere» would not only exclude all the minorities already mentioned, but also all the existing underground collectives (political exclusion), sometimes even mentioned in the «public sphere» but unable to fully take part in it. In other words, authoritarian public spheres were relatively free to the bourgeoisie, but excluded a great deal of the remaining members of

society. The problem would be then at the origin of the concept, as, according to the critics, Habermasian «public sphere» is not democratic in the first place. In this sense, Habermans's public sphere may ironically be appropriate to think Francoist public sphere, given that adding to the implied exclusions that Habermas' critics underline, are the official and explicit exclusions existent based on political criteria: not all citizens have access to the «public sphere», meetings are restricted by State laws (freedom of assembly, of speech, of enterprise, of association, of thought, etc., are denied), and the debate over how society is ruled is limited by the overwhelming power of the State.

If we understand late-Francoism and the Spanish democratic transition as a process of construction of the public sphere, «reuniting» as José Reig puts it, or, in other words, instituting a regime of opinion, it is not certain that all exclusions would be resolved, but certainly the political one would. In the sense of accounting for exclusion, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe approach is useful given that they, despite agreeing with several habermasian postulates, assume that « a non-exclusive public sphere of rational argument is a conceptual impossibility.» (2001: xvii-xviii) This means that « [t]he central role that the notion of antagonism plays in our [their] work forecloses any possibility of a final reconciliation, of any kind of rational consensus, of a fully inclusive 'we'». (2001: xvii-xviii). However for them, unlike for Habermas, the notion of conflict is not negative, but the very possibility of democratic politics:

Conflict and division, in our view, are neither disturbances that unfortunately cannot be eliminated nor empirical impediments that render impossible the full realization of a harmony that we cannot attain because we will never be able to leave our particularities completely aside in order to act in accordance with our rational self – a harmony which should nonetheless constitute the ideal towards which we strive. Indeed, we maintain that without conflict and division, a pluralistic democratic politics would be impossible. To believe that a final

resolution of conflict is eventually possible – even if it is seen as an asymptotic approach to the regulative idea of a rational consensus – far from providing the necessary horizon for the democratic project, is to put it at risk. Conceived in such a way, pluralist democracy becomes a ‘self-refuting ideal’, because the very moment of its realization would coincide with its disintegration. This is why we stress that it is vital for democratic politics to acknowledge that any form of consensus is the result of a hegemonic articulation, and that it always has an ‘outside’ that impedes its full realization. Unlike the Habermasians, we do not see this as something that undermines the democratic project, but as the very condition of possibility.» (Laclau and Mouffe 2001 xvii-xviii)

Like this we would have to consider the consensual support of moderation achieved through debate within the Spanish «public sphere» around the coverage of the Portuguese Revolutionary process more as an operation of «hegemonic articulation», hence embodying a certain notion of dominance. As Laclau contends «[t]his game [the political game], which Gramsci called ‘war of position’, is, strictly speaking, a logic of displacement of political frontiers» (2005: 153). That is a process were the media have a privileged role. How the support of moderation would be established as the hegemonic option will be approached in Part III.

## **2. Goals and Structure**

### **2.1 Goals**

The main goal of the present work is, therefore, to give an account of the way Spanish newspapers reacted to the Portuguese revolutionary process occurred between 1974 and 1976. This goal will be pursued by comparing the different types of newspapers in an effort to understand if the coverage, opinion and treatment of the Portuguese events are dependent on the editorial politics of each newspaper and how do they relate to the two political cultures’ discourses existent in Spain.

To understand this process, however, we must first fulfil another goal by outlining the evolution of information circulation in Spain in this

period in order to differentiate material constraints from ideological decisions.

Finally, the comparison between different reactions to the Portuguese revolutionary process aims to help identify how the ideas of both political cultures interact, and through a debate favoured by constraints of several types, including censorship, a dominant idea is established and moderation achieves the status of common sense.

These general goals translate in more specific aims that include:

1. Determining whether there is an official line of discourse.
2. Observing which ideological intervention is reflected in the «published opinion».
3. Identifying the making of leading figures in the revolutionary process.
4. Understanding which symbols and frames of interpretation are recurrently used and by whom.
5. Identifying which moments, leading figures, and ideas are obliterated or concealed.

## 2.2 Structure

Bearing in mind these goals, the present dissertation is divided into two parts that involve different types of methodological approaches. The first part, titled «The Backstage: Informative and political contingencies in the material conditions of news production», draws on documental research and analysis with the aim of developing a critical description of how information was gathered, processed, and produced, on the one hand, and, on the other, how it was controlled by the several offices that existed for that purpose.



The second part, titled «Mapping the coverage», is the result of the reading, analysis, interpretation, and systematic categorization of the corpus, composed of an organized selection of Spanish journalistic materials related to the Portuguese events.

### 3. State of the art

#### 3.1 Foreign views of the Portuguese revolutionary process

Very recently, Vieira and Monico (2014) published *Nas Bocas do Mundo – O 25 de Abril e o PREC na Imprensa Internacional* [On the tip of the tongue – April 25<sup>th</sup> and the PREC in the international press], a book that gathers around 100 publications from about 20 countries<sup>20</sup>, mostly

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<sup>20</sup> South Africa (*The Cape Times*); Germany (in this case West Germany, though the authors do not state so) (*Berliner Morgenpost*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, *Der Spiegel*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*; *Der Tagesspiegel*, *Die Welt*, *Welt am Sonntag*, *Die Zeit*), Argentina (*La Prensa*, *Clarín*), Austria (*Arbeiter Zeitung*, *Kleine Zeitung*, *Kronen Zeitung*, *Kurier*, *Neue Kronen Zeitung*, *Die Presse*, *Wiener Zeitung*), Belgium (*Le Soir*), Brazil (*O Estado de São Paulo*, *Fatos e Fotos*, *Folha da Manhã*, *Globo*, *Jornal de Brasília*, *Manchete*, *Veja*), Canada (*The Ottawa Journal*, *The Province*, *Montreal Gazette*, *The Sun*), Czechoslovakia (*Rudé právo*), Colombia (*El Tiempo*), Denmark (*Aalborg Stiftstidende*, *Aktuel*, *Berlingske Tidende*, *Morgen Avisen*, *Politiken*), Spain (*ABC*, *Arriba*, *Blanco y Negro*, *Cuadernos para el Diálogo*, *Destino*, *Diario de Barcelona*, *Doblón*, *Informaciones*, *Nuevo Diario*, *Pueblo*, *Solidaridad Nacional*, *Triunfo*, *La Vanguardia Española*, *Ya*), the United States (*Boston Globe*, *Chicago Tribune*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, *International Herald Tribune* (European edition), *Los Angeles Times*, *Newsweek*, *The New York Times*, *Time magazine*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Washington Post*), Finland (*Helsingin Sanomat*, *Suomen Sosialdemokraatti*, *Uusi Suomi*), France (*Afrique Asie*, *L'Aurore*, *Le Canard enchaîné*, *La croix*, *L'Express*, *Charlie Hebdo*, *Le Figaro*, *France Soir*, *Le Hérisson*, *L'Humanité*, *Libération*, *Le Monde*, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, *Le Quotidien de Paris*, *Paris Match*, *Le Point*, *Politique Hebdo*, *Realités*, *Témoignage Chrétien*), Great Britain (*Daily Mail*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Daily Mirror*, *The Economist*, *Evening Standard*, *Evening Star*, *The Financial Times*, *The Guardian*, *News of the World*, *The Observer*, *The Sunday Telegraph*, *The Sunday Times*, *The Times*), Ireland (*The Irish Independent*, *Irish Times*), Italy (*Il Borghese*, *Candido*, *Corriere della Sera*, *L'Europeo*, *Il Globo*, *Paese Sera*, *Panorama*, *Il Popolo*, *Il Resto del Carlino*, *Il Secolo d'Italia*, *Il Settimanale*, *La Stampa*, *Il Tempo*, *L'Unità*), Switzerland (*Construire*, *Le Courrier*, *Journal de Genève*, *National Zeitung*, *Nebelspalter*, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, *La Suisse*, *Tribune de Genève*, *Tribune de Lausanne*-*Le Matin*, *Tages*

European. Structured around eight moments, reflected in eight chapters, this book allegedly only used opinion articles such as editorials, comments and analysis about metropolitan Portugal published in the Western press. But even though the authors claim that their choice is based on the fact that «the press of the so called socialist bloc was subjected to severe forms of political and ideological control, printing just what corresponded to the official discourse and reinforced ruling positions»<sup>xiv</sup> (2014:20), the use of Spanish, Brazilian, Uruguayan and Czechoslovakian press comes across as contradictory, since the latter were countries then under authoritarian rule, and therefore also with their mass media under control.

Despite consulting a wide variety of publications, at least in the Spanish case the pieces effectively used came only from *La Vanguardia Española*, *ABC*, *Blanco y Negro*, *Diario de Barcelona*, *Triunfo*, *Ya* and *Arriba*, in a total of 63 «*unités rédactionnelles*» (Kayser 1982). Rather than analytic, this book is an account of the revolutionary process through the eyes of the international press supported by a vast collection of iconography, and constitutes an upgrade of earlier works because of its wider timeframe that includes the revolutionary process, not just the *coup d'état*.

Foreign views of the Portuguese revolutionary process, especially the francophone one, have also been explored. Gilles Rodrigues (2007) considers that in France, in terms of magnitude of coverage, the Portuguese revolution was only second to events such as Salvador Allende's downfall (1973) and the invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968). This author also argues that the initial reaction was of surprise and caution, since it was a military coup, and the Chilean experience was still very fresh in people's minds. Authors that study foreign views of the

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*Anzeiger*, *24 Heures*, *Voix Ouvrière*, *Die Weltwoche*, *Wir Brückenbauer*), Uruguay (*La Mañana*, *El País*), and Venezuela (*El Mundo*).

Portuguese process often argue that the existing framework of analysis is inadequate to account for this *sui generis* event. Rodrigues concludes that, in general, the French press<sup>21</sup> struggled to understand the Portuguese events because of a certain amount of ignorance regarding Portugal's political, economic and social conditions, as well as on the genuine authors of the coup and their intentions. Only in September 1974 did the French press recognize the MFA as the leading actor of the process, claims Rodrigues. Similarly to what we will see in the Spanish case, in France the revolution will be observed from the perspective of an internal analysis. Since 1972 the French left wing, composed of socialists and communists, was united in a Unitarian platform named Left-wing union [*Union de la gauche*], which aimed to be elected. The open clashes between Portuguese socialists and communists thus became an important topic for the French press.

Mesquita and Rebelo (1994) also focus on the francophone press, but with different aims and objects. Mesquita (1994b) performs a comparative press study, consisting of an analysis of two sequences of events in quality press<sup>22</sup> written in French and of French, Belgian, and Swiss origin. Through the analysis of the Caldas coup and the April 25<sup>th</sup> coup as sequences of events, this author concludes that the francophone press gives the Portuguese event the coverage of a «great event», of «quality» features, but at the same time with visible signs of implication (in the case of *Le Monde*) and with a narrative constructed around a clear «visible hero» – Spínola – and a «hidden one» – the Captains – emerging after the Mayday demonstration.

Mesquita adds that although the Rosengren hypothesis is not corroborated in most of the francophone press, which reacts directly in an

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<sup>21</sup> Rodrigues' sample is composed of dailies: *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro*, *l'Humanité*, and the weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur*.

<sup>22</sup> *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro*, *Le Soir*, *La Libre Belgique*, *Journal de Genève*.

«interpretative» mode and not in a «narrative» one, it is more adequate if applied to the case of special correspondents. According to the Rosengren hypothesis, the journalistic reconstruction of an event has two phases – an initial «narrative» phase followed by an «explanatory» one (Mesquita 1994b, 29). In the case of the Portuguese Revolution, the failed Caldas coup seems to have worked as a prelude, allowing for newspapers to react immediately in an interpretative mode.

In the same book, José Rebelo (1994) on the one hand deals with the repercussions in the French daily *Le Monde* of the *República* case and, on the other, with the status of the special correspondent. The author links both topics with the accusation that this French newspaper suffered from of a «lack of objectivity» because of its support to the political position close to «popular power» instead of the position of «democratic socialism».

In May 1975, while the socialists were trying to get the results of April's elections recognized, the *República* case started. On 2 May 1975, *República*'s non-journalist workers elected a commission that prevented two journalists from being hired by the newspaper, claiming they were close to the Socialist party. This commission also elected a new editor-in-chief, Belo Marques, whom the commission attempted to impose to the Administration and the newsroom on May 19<sup>th</sup>. When it failed to fulfil these goals, the workers' commission occupied the premises of the newspaper and published an edition directed by Belo Marques. The Portuguese Socialist party [*Partido Socialista Português* PS] called for a demonstration to evict the workers from the premises of the newspaper, but COPCON prevented it from taking place. This event marks the first time slogans against the MFA are heard. The daily is closed down and the socialists abandon the IV provisional government. *República* will be returned to its previous administration on 22 January 1976. For the French press, Rebelo (1994) sets the highpoint of this case in July 1975, after the

editorial published on July 21<sup>th</sup> titled «Revolution and Freedom» (Rodrigues 2007, 48) originated reactions from Raymond Aron, Edgar Morin, and *Le Monde*'s editor-in-chief, Jacques Fauvet. *Le Monde* was one of the few newspapers who considered that the upheaval of *República*'s workers that was being portrayed by the Socialists (PS) as an attack perpetrated over freedom of the press, was a manoeuvre intended to influence public opinion and that it was detrimental not only to the image of the communists (PCP) but also the military (MFA). For that reason, the Socialists attitude was criticized by *Le Monde*. Furthermore, Rebelo dismisses the objectivity claim regarding the press, but especially in the case of the functions fulfilled by special correspondents.

Mário Mesquita (1994a) also addresses the *República* case in a work whose importance stems mainly from the sources used, in general particularly privileged. Mesquita himself was a journalist at this newspaper between 1971 and March 1975, and acknowledges that at that time no neutrality could have been possible, given his solidarity with «the administration and the newsroom of *República*» (1994a: 509). Mesquita argues that this case gave an international dimension to the problem of freedom of the press and the definition of the political regime in Portugal, in other words that it was a «critical incident» that suddenly influenced the path of events. Moreover, he adds that in the name of the Revolution and freedom of the press, the symbol of freedom itself had been destroyed, which in a way reveals the author's position regarding his object.

More recently, the studies of Marco Gomes (2014) on the Italian press demonstrate, for instance, how every Italian political party made a political use of this conflict during the campaign for regional elections. Carla Luciana Silva (2012), focusing on the Brazilian Liberal press, reiterates this notion of an analysis of the process based on the internal situation of a given country. This author argues that this press searched for a way out of the Brazilian dictatorship, based heavily on class interests,

and therefore used the Portuguese example as a way of advocating for the establishment of a liberal democracy in Brazil.

### 3.2 The Spanish view

Several overarching studies about the Spanish view of the Portuguese revolution have already been undertaken, some focusing on the influence of this process in the Spanish Democratic transition, like the seminal works by Josep Sánchez Cervelló (1985 and 1993) or the more recent approach of Inmaculada Cordero (2010), others devoted to a short temporal analysis of the process, like the one devoted to what Sánchez (1993) coined the «positive phase» of the revolutionary process authored by Marie-Claude Chaput (2005), or the one devoted to the contrasts between the reaction of two types of press, the official and the democratic, during the first month of the revolutionary process (Teresa Pinheiro 2012). Other studies focus on specific types of press, like the one close to the Spanish «Bunker», the ultra-right-wing, by González Sáez (2013), or the regional press, by Jesús Ángel Santos Caña (1997-1998) and María de Jesús Fernández García (1996).

Likewise, monographic projects about specific publications like *Destino* by Carlos Geli and Josep M<sup>a</sup> Huertas (1991), *Cuadernos para el Diálogo* by Javier Muñoz Soro (2006) or *Cambio 16* by José M<sup>a</sup> Díaz Dorronsoro (2012), briefly address the impact of this particular moment in each publication, similarly to a thematic monographic project about graphic humour in the press during the Spanish transition (Segado Boj 2008). Since their aim exceeds the one addressed in this work, their findings will be mentioned whenever necessary.

Some important issues to be addressed in this dissertation have thus been already established, namely by the pioneering author in this field, Sánchez Cervelló (1985 and 1993), for whom the Portuguese revolution of 1974-1975 influenced the Spanish democratic transition that

took place after 1975. Sánchez (1993) actually goes back in time to demonstrate other cases of influence and to sustain that both countries have a long history of political influence on each other, and the events of 1974-1975 were just another example of this. Still according to this author (1993), it was through the mass media and, in particular, through the printed press, that the influence was felt more widely and faster, due to reasons of geographical and chronological proximity of both processes.

While trying to demonstrate the huge influence the Portuguese revolution had on Spanish society, Sánchez (1985) distributes eleven publications among several specific socio-political sectors: *Fuerza Nueva* and *Nuevo Diario* to the “bunker”; *Arriba* and the local *Diario Español* (Tarragona), to the government for being examples of official press; *Ya* and *ABC* to the conservatives and *Informaciones*, *Ultima Hora* (Palma de Mallorca), *Triunfo*, *Cuadernos para el Diálogo* and *Oriflama* to left-wing and liberal sectors. According to this author, the Portuguese lesson, following the newspapers account, would be not to allow a void of power to be created in Spain like it had happened in Portugal; to reform the authoritarian State so as to ensure civil liberties without the disintegration of the authoritarian State apparatus (1985: 221).

As general features of the coverage of these events in Spanish newspapers, Sánchez evokes the generalized misinformation, or total lack of information, about Portugal, though *Triunfo* is pointed out as an exception to this panorama; and the shuddering of the entire political map, with the press linked to the liberals and the left wing welcoming the surprise, while the «ultra» one, dreading it, emphasizing disruption as the process radicalized itself. This was a campaign that the press associated with the left tried to dismantle or, at least, denounce (1985: 217).

The influence is characterized in Sánchez’s (1993) work as being both positive and negative. Sánchez identifies the months between the coup and the downfall of General Spínola as a time filled with hopes of a

quick dismantling of the Spanish regime. The rule of Prince Don Juan Carlos while Franco was sick during the summer months of 1974, but also the downfall of the Greek dictatorship on July 23<sup>rd</sup> of the same year, strengthened this view. It therefore seems that rather than a repercussion of the Portuguese situation, hope stemmed from the combination of unrelated events.

On the other hand, after General Spínola delivered his speech of resignation on September 30<sup>th</sup>, where he denounced the Portuguese path towards a communist regime, exacerbating the fears of Western powers, Spain tightens its vigilance. The Minister of Information and Tourism, Pío Cabanillas, responsible for a liberalization of the Spanish media in this period, was removed from office on October 29<sup>th</sup> following a direct order from Franco, fourteen moderate oppositionists were arrested on November 26<sup>th</sup> and, in December, UNESCO's Friend Club was closed. Sánchez considers that a negative influence of the Portuguese revolutionary process starts precisely at this moment and that, until the end of 1975, the more the Portuguese process radicalized, the more authoritarian the Spanish regime presented itself (Sánchez 1993, 341). Defining influence in these terms is not without its problems, because it overlooks the ideological differences not only present in society, but also – and this is what concerns us more in the present work – present in mass media. Regarding mass media, Sánchez concludes that:

All mass media reflect their position before the Portuguese process according to the editorial line they represent (...) Ultimately in all Spanish mass media the debate over the Portuguese situation had the purpose of making explicit the way out of Francoism. The revolution was massively criticized or partially defended, but was widely considered by right, centre and the moderate left wing as a process that could not and should not be imported<sup>xv</sup> (1993:360-364).

But rather than a continued reading of the process in each of the sectors he defined, Sánchez shares a great deal of information about several issues: the thirst for Portuguese related news, the repression



exerted over the mass media because of positions taken regarding the Portuguese process, and the positions taken by some sectors of society when faced with latest developments.

The thirst for information is suggested by the quantity of special issues of several publications devoted to this subject. *Arriba*, *Cuadernos para el Diálogo* and *Triunfo*<sup>23</sup> are some of the examples given by Sánchez. Additionally, it is reflected in the number of correspondents sent to Lisbon, of which he does not provide a number, but mentions some examples<sup>24</sup> and, lastly, in the fact that when comparing two Barcelona based dailies, he came to the conclusion that both of them had news related to Portugal almost daily<sup>25</sup>.

Sánchez connects the removal from office of Pío Cabanillas not only with the chronological coincidence of the increased radicalization of the Portuguese process, but also with an increase in repression of information. From this point until May 1975, Sánchez mentions 25 confiscations of publications, though without providing a source or any more details. When León Herrera replaced Cabanillas as head of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, publications were again censored for political reasons. Sánchez also mentions two episodes that will be discussed in Part II, where media suffered the consequences for their involvement with this subject: the sacking of Carlos Pérez de Rozas from *Destino* for allegedly being pro-Cunhal; and the sanction of *El Correo de Andalucía* for the article published after March 11<sup>th</sup> where it denounced Spain as a home base for the Portuguese counter-revolution (Sánchez 1993, 360).

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<sup>23</sup> See the special 32-page edition of *Arriba* on April 25<sup>th</sup>, issued at midnight; an extra issue of *Cuadernos para el dialogo*; and *Triunfo*'s May number, a third of which focused on Portugal.

<sup>24</sup> Cesar de la Lama for *EFE* and *Cifra*, Luís Carandell for *Triunfo*, Eduardo Barrenechea for *Informaciones*, Xavier Roig for *Tele-eXpres*, and Alberto Míguez for *La Vanguardia Española*.

<sup>25</sup> *La Vanguardia Española* and *Diario de Barcelona*.

Finally the positions taken by some sectors of society are somewhat confusing, even if accounting for the impossibility of considering society as a fixed and immutable object. On the one hand, it is claimed that the conservative mass media (*Fuerza Nueva*, *Diário Español* are the examples given) was pro-change of regime until Spínola's downfall, but was at the same time critical, due to fear of replication of the Portuguese phenomenon. At the same time, Sánchez states, without further distinctions, that the conservative mass media (*ABC*, *La Vanguardia Española*) were initially pleased with the change and did not see cause for alarm in it. The shift reportedly happened after Spínola's exit, when this above-mentioned conservative press (*Ya*) began praising the stiffness of the Spanish regime rather than claiming for liberalization when confronted with the current Portuguese radicalism. However the example given is from as early as June 1974, several months before Spínola's resignation. It is also claimed that from then on the conservative right wing (*Actualidad Española*, *ABC*) reacted against the Portuguese process until the communists were removed from the State apparatus. From this account it is not quite clear if the positions taken do in fact correspond to the classification of conservative or right-wing conservative mass media. What constitutes one or the other? What are their main features, similarities and differences?

The same goes for the following statement, with which we do agree, but feel needs to be developed further: «It was clear that the news related to Portugal had a Spanish reading»<sup>xvi</sup> (Sánchez 1993, 362). This is a common topic that should be addressed in an effort to understand its veracity and functioning, as will be developed in Part III.

On the other side we are left with both the Liberal and the Left wing press. Sánchez makes three points about the left wing press (*Triunfo*, *Cuadernos para el Dialogo*): it counter-attacked the conservative press' criticism of the Portuguese events, it showed active solidarity with the

Revolution's response to the September 28<sup>th</sup> and March 11<sup>th</sup> conspiracies, and, finally, it kept defending the Portuguese democracy and denouncing the counter-revolutionary forces exiled in Spain, even when most of the other types of press repeatedly condemned it. In this it contrasted sharply with the Liberal press (*Informaciones*), which withdrew the support given earlier when fear of replication took over.

These too broad terms oversimplify a much more complex and nuanced picture of the political affiliation of the press. It also overlooks the fact that different sensibilities might work together in the same newsroom and the fact that several correspondents and special correspondents wrote for more than one publication, sometimes even of opposite political forces. On this topic, José Rebelo notes that:

The journalist inscribes himself, through his own praxis, in the reality he describes. The journalist carries, the *Lebenswelt*, a concept Habermas draws from Husserl's phenomenology to designate the profound level of a group, a collective, where language, norms and common behaviours ingrain. Simultaneously the journalist establishes with the newspaper for which he writes a mimetic relationship that leads him to reproduce the lexicon and values of the same publication. The journalist therefore acts at the same time as subject of a dialogic discourse, in the bakhtian sense, and as a member of a professional collective with rules and projects of his own<sup>xvii</sup> (Rebelo 1994, 116-117).

It can be argued that journalists adapt to an interiorized style book or a model reader, depending on the media they work for and the expectations editors-in-chief, colleagues, employer, owner, censorship office and readers might have. But even then, some caution must be used when categorizing it all so simply.

Also, and although influence is an extremely difficult concept to measure, there is already a tradition of studies that presuppose its existence regarding the downfall of both Iberian dictatorships. Sánchez inaugurates it, but is followed by Encarnación Lemus (2001, 2002 and 2011), among others. Lemus (2001) considers both events to be fragments

of a single Iberian Transition, composed of two parts, and mutually influencing each other.

According to this view, firstly the Portuguese revolutionary events influenced the Spanish transition, in the sense that they mitigated it. Then, the Spanish agreed transition and its democratic normalization influenced the Portuguese one.

Working alongside Lemus, a group of historians (Ángeles González 2010; Alberto Carrillo-Linares 2010, and 2012; Inmaculada Cordero 2010) are researching different areas of both Iberian societies under the umbrella concept of «Iberian transition». In Inmaculada Cordero's (2010) work about the Spanish press, the Spanish reaction to the Portuguese revolutionary process is divided into three phases, coinciding with Sánchez argument: a positive one, from April 25<sup>th</sup> until October 1974; a negative one, dominated by fear, from October 1974 until November 1975, and, finally, indifference, from November 1975 until April 1976.

One of the common claims made on this subject, and reiterated by Cordero (2010), is the assumption of a Spanish subtext in the reporting of the Portuguese revolution, which explains why the coverage was so extensive. However, when characterizing this extensive coverage, some of the statements made, for instance that «the news were not usually from press agencies; all newspapers maintained regular correspondents in Lisbon, who almost daily sent their chronicles (...) over the telephone; apart from other special correspondents in critical moments»<sup>xviii</sup> (2010: 70), are debatable and will be addressed in Part II. The same applies to the idea of a «liberalization atmosphere during the years of Pío Cabanillas as head of the Ministry of Information»<sup>xix</sup> (2010: 68). In fact, it could be argued that the coverage of the Portuguese Revolution was facilitated by the liberalization of the press introduced by Pío Cabanillas, but his stint at the MIT lasted only eight months in 1974 (January to October), hence not

everything can be explained by that fact. Furthermore, because of the high number of opinion articles and editorial columns published, as well as the social and political importance of some of the authors who wrote about it, the reception of this subject is seen as having been of extreme importance.

Additionally, it is argued<sup>26</sup> for the beginning of the negative vision period in the fall of 1974, grounding this argument with *ABC*'s front cover picture of a downtrodden carnation, claiming that it is from September 1974 (2010:73). This cover is in fact from January 29<sup>th</sup> 1975, as it was mentioned earlier by Sánchez (1993: 362), although he dates it from early January, when in fact is a reaction to the single union law, backed by the PCP, and to the siege of CDS congress by leftists militants in Oporto (cf. Part III).

Overall, Cordero's work on the reception of the Portuguese revolution in the Spanish press can be summarized through a few basic ideas: the downfall of the Portuguese Dictatorship was bound to happen; after a period when it was portrayed in a positive manner, throughout 1975 Portugal was seen as what Spain should never become; in order to stop the communist threat, the international community favoured socialist parties; and, finally, that Portugal and Spain were two completely different subjects. To strengthen this last idea, some «Portuguese lessons» were taken: the regime should open itself in order to stay in power, the right-wing should start organizing itself in case the regime fell, the Socialists should be tolerated because they are less threatening than the Communists.

Like Sánchez (1993), Cordero reiterates the idea that without the instructive example of the Portuguese revolution, the Spanish Transition might not have happened in the way it did. It is argued that its reception in

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<sup>26</sup> «En Otoño de 1974 los claveles de abril se habían marchitado, una ilustrativa portada de ABC lo simbolizaba con una fotografía de un clavel tirado en el suelo empedrado mustiándose» (Cordero 2011, 73).

the press functioned as a cautionary tale, an example of what not to do, when the time came. It is also argued that it served the purpose of criticizing internal affairs, advising the opposition, warning the army and the ultraconservative sectors and mobilizing the liberalizing right-wing sector, and by doing it so, the press assumed a leading role in a Transition without rupture. This argument is based in the widely accepted myth that the Spanish press functioned as a «Paper Parliament» (Barrera 1995) throughout these crucial years. Defining the «Paper Parliament» conception as a myth comes from the need of a study that would actually approach this assumption, in order to understand what exactly is a «Paper Parliament»? How does it work? Why should the Spanish Press of that period (and all of it, or just part of the publications?) be defined in that way? Would not all press function as a «Paper Parliament»?

From Cordero's work (2010:69) we also learn that the press service of the Portuguese Embassy in Spain considered that the following newspapers were to be kept in close watch: *Pueblo*, *El Álcazar*, *Triunfo*, *Informaciones*, *Cuadernos para el Diálogo*, *La Vanguardia*, *ABC* and *El Correo Catalán*. Moreover, *Pueblo* was seen as being linked to the «left wing of the National Movement», *El Álcazar* as representative of the «Extreme Right wing», *Triunfo* as Socialist, *La Vanguardia* as «independent controlled by the interests of big companies», *ABC* as «Monarchist and centrist», and, finally, *El Correo Catalán* as «Liberal Regionalist». It is, nonetheless, not clearly stated which newspapers were used to produce this study, but it can be inferred that *El Álcazar*, *Pueblo*, *Cuadernos para el Diálogo*, the underground *El Socialista*, *ABC*, *Nuevo Diario*, *Arriba*, *Ya*, *La Vanguardia*, *Tele-eXprés*, *El Correo Catalán*, and *Triunfo* were used because they are quoted. The timeframe is however clearly defined, and spans from the moment the *coup d'état* happened, in April 1974, until the promulgation of the Constitution, in April 1976.

Marie-Claude Chaput (2005) analyses the positive phase (Sánchez 1993) of the revolutionary process through the Spanish press, using both independent (*Triunfo*) newspapers and «regime press» (*ABC*, *Álcazar* and *Arriba*), and organises its discourses along three axes: national/international manoeuvres; Portugal as model or counter-model; and the political use of History. But Chaput's work is less about newspapers as an object than as sources. Some interesting considerations are nevertheless made about the invasion of the Portuguese subject across every section of newspapers, not only the international one, the replacement of Chile by Portugal in metaphors and metonymies used by the independent press, and, finally, the republican semantic subtext conveyed by the Portuguese revolution.

The political use of History can be seen across this sample of newspapers, but is differentiated. Chaput thus concludes that the official press of the regime tried to make a political use of the Portuguese revolution by emphasizing the civil war spectrum to justify the maintenance of the Francoist status quo. This attitude was however not immediate, since some time passed before the lack of authority existing in Portugal was perceived in Spain. Up until the end of September 1974, the conservative press trusted the replacement of Marcelo Caetano by General Spínola to be the definitive feature of what was happening in Portugal. Where the conservative press sees the anticlerical, bloody May 1931, *Triunfo*, on the other hand, sees 14 April 1931, claims Chaput.

For Santos Caña (1997-1998), *Movimiento*'s publication *el Odiel*, Huelva's only newspaper, configures the reaction of power groups who, following the «Portuguese example», felt that the only way to remain in power while keeping things as they were was for them to lead the process of change, in other words democratization. In this work, the role of leading figures (and other assumptions) should be, nonetheless, mitigated, as well as some minor details corrected. As such, António Salazar had,

moreover, an increasingly significant role within the military dictatorship established in 1926. First as Minister of Economy and then as the Council President who defeated all factions and legitimated his power by founding the New State with the 1933 Constitution. Likewise Vasco Gonçalves was not personally responsible for the nationalization of banks, the land reform or the strengthening of the power of unions, though Santos Caña (1997-1998: 260) argues he controlled these policies. Power, which according to this author Gonçalves personified, was in fact distributed among several spheres like the MFA, the Revolution Council, etc. Moreover, when these events took place, governments were similar to «popular front» governments, and always formed heterogeneous coalition. On the other hand, the assault on Spanish diplomatic premises was not exactly part of a strategy aimed at discrediting the IV government abroad, but rather a protest against the latest Francoist executions that was part of a world-wide reaction to this event. And, lastly, the failed left wing coup took place on November 25<sup>th</sup>, not 20<sup>th</sup>, 1975. *Odiel's* view of the Portuguese revolutionary process is thus characterized as a crises-related coverage embodying a catastrophic view of events, that often uses the II Republic and civil war framework – a view shared by Chaput (2005) –, and that reinforces the idea that tranquillity will come with elections.

The weekly *Fuerza Nueva*, the «bunker» press object of González Sáez's (2013) analysis, was also present in Sánchez's studies about the press (1985 and 1993), but the former limits his timeframe to 1974. Going further than Sánchez, González Sáez argues that the perception and impact of the Portuguese revolution in this publication, and therefore in what the author assumes as the socio-political sector behind it – the «bunker» –, was that the lesson to be taken from the Portuguese case was the failure of the liberalization path followed by Marcello Caetano, in Portugal, and Arias Navarro, in Spain. In fact, Caetano and his policies were seen as responsible for the breakdown of the Portuguese regime.



Santos Caña (1997-1998) and González Sáez (2013) reached similar conclusions regarding the positions and strategies of the press analysed in each study: this press emphasized the differences between Francoism and the New State, praised Salazar and accused Caetano of being responsible for the breakdown of the regime, and denounced the Spanish media that searched for the similarities between both regimes. Santos Caña nevertheless claims that, unlike the «bunker» press studied by González Sáez, *Movimiento*'s organ in Huelva argued that small concessions to calls for democratization should be made in order to maintain the *status quo* unscathed.

Finally, the article «The reception of the Carnation revolution in the Spanish press», authored by Teresa Pinheiro (2012), presents a contextual analysis of text editions of both *Arriba* and *Cambio 16* published between 25 April and 25 May 1974. Pinheiro concludes specifically with regards to the beginning of this process that different ideological positions originate different receptions of the April 25<sup>th</sup> *coup d'état* (2012: 346-347).

Due to its initial ambivalence given its perpetrators, there was a breeding ground for divergent interpretations. *Cambio 16* declared its support to freedom without hesitation, its discourse was clear and the events were seen as positive. *Arriba*, on the other hand, was cautious, and late, in recognizing that the dictatorship had actually been overthrown, and events were conveyed in a pejorative tone through the image of a chaotic and violent situation, in clear contrast with the rule of Salazar.

The same can be argued about how the situation in the two countries was compared. *Cambio 16* immediately establishes a connection between the events in Portugal and reformists' claims in Spain, whereas *Arriba* avoids any kind of direct reference to Spain. These newspapers also advanced different reasons for the breakdown of the Portuguese regime. *Cambio 16* argues that the latter represented the overdue end of a

dictatorship that had become obsolete after the end of World War II, and also that both the population and the armed forces longed for democracy. On the contrary, *Arriba* credits the colonial war as the sole reason for the breakdown, emphasising how the conflict in Africa had strained the regime in Portugal. Mono-causality would allow ignoring any further comparisons with Spain.

Finally, and unlike the previous authors, Fernández (1996) addresses the Spanish press not as a representative of different sectors, but through the terms used in the coverage of the Portuguese revolutionary process, from which, she claims, one could grasp the event. This author also claims not to be interested in a historiographical interpretation of the event, but rather in a lexicological analysis of this press over time. For that purpose, Fernández not only analyses the week of April 25<sup>th</sup> to May 1<sup>st</sup>, but also several commemorations of the *coup d'état* (the first four and then every five years up until 1994).

Fernández' conclusions about this lexicological analysis – as in the gathering of the words used to describe an event – of the coverage made by *Hoy*, *Editorial Católica*'s newspaper in Extremadura, are somewhat confusing, especially regarding the distinction between what is contemporary and what relates to memory, but propose three main ideas: the description of a military event through a warlike lexicon; the description of the revolution through the use of process as a concept; and finally, with regards to commemorations, the different uses of military lexicon or the «carnation revolution» semantic area. Though the purpose of this analysis – approaching the event through the terms used in its description – seemed promising, the execution is fairly disordered and the conclusions unclear.

## 4. Methodology

### 4.1 Historical Method

Building on previous studies, the first part of this work aims to characterize the context of production of information in Spain in the period under study, to discuss the availability of information, including the diversification of sources (the use of the radio, of foreign newspapers, etc.), and, finally, to analyse how the political power controlled information, and especially the subjects it was interested in.

The first phase, the heuristic one, was preceded by bibliographic research, and consisted in searching for primary sources that could be used in the task of conceptualizing a past «reality», which is here assumed as something that we can only access through its «textualization», or in other words, something that can only be grasped through text.

The documentation was subject to a process of critique, as the documents were analysed and scrutinized on their date and place of production, their authorship, origin and previous form (what material was used to elaborate them: letters, telegrams, newspapers, testimonies, etc.) in order to produce a reliable synthesis.

The material produced by several divisions of the former Spanish Ministry of Information and Tourism (MIT), held by the Administration General Archive (AGA – *Archivo General de la Administración*), and the Portuguese and Spanish services of the BBC World Service found at the Written Archive Centre (WAC) of the BBC, was also analysed. At AGA three funds were consulted: the Press Office of the MIT, the Interlacing Office of the MIT and the Press Office of the Spanish Embassy in Lisbon. More specifically, the documents consulted belonged to the following series: the series of snippets of both national and international press selected by the press office of MIT (1964-1979 series); the informative dossiers of foreign affairs and national and international press relating to

Portugal produced by the Interlacing Office of the MIT; the information sent by the press office of the Spanish Embassy in Lisbon to both these offices; and, finally, the series concerning disciplinary procedures filed by the MIT. At the WAC of the BBC we consulted the complete funds of both Iberian services, as well as the BBC data films concerning foreign services (1973 to 1977).

## 4.2 Newspaper Analysis

### a) Defining the universe

In order to define the universe of this study, in other words «to specify the boundaries of the body of content to be considered» (Wimmer and Dominick 2011, 160), it was necessary to define its topic and time period. Therefore an operational definition of what is considered to be part of the Portuguese events was in order.

To be included in the topic, the event reported in the Spanish newspapers must be an event in itself or related to one, resulting directly or indirectly from the *coup d'état* of 25 April 1974, or the events that preceded it, and the subsequent revolution, or a reaction to any of these. This included any news or commentaries regarding the former colonial territories until their independence.

The time period chosen is the twenty-six-month period between the beginning of February 1974, the month of the publication of Spínola's book, and the end of April 1976, the month of the first constitutional elections.

### b) Collecting a Sample

Subsequently, the object of study had to be clearly defined for a sample to be constituted. For that purpose, although this study does not rely on content analysis, Wimmer and Domminick's (2011: 162-164) recommendations on the collection of a sample for this kind of analysis

were followed, as they were considered suitable for the present study. In order to compose a sample, sources, dates, and specific contents needed to be selected. Regarding the sources, five heterogeneous newspapers published in the two biggest Spanish cities, Madrid and Barcelona, were chosen. Such newspapers were also chosen in order to meet different criteria, namely a varied readership in terms of geographical focus, a varied ideological stance, a different time of issuance during the day, and a diverse ownership.

In this case the sampling period is provided by the duration of the story, since what is at stake here is the coverage of the Portuguese revolution as a process. But further sampling was made after the analysis of the «Editorial Columns» sub-corpus, which guided the construction of a multistage sample. Specific content was delimited by different elements such as the dates and themes selected, but also by its authorship.

### c) Selection of sources

In the process of selection of sources our goal was to have diversity. We therefore engaged in a comparative analysis of morning and evening papers published in the two main Spanish cities, with differences in circulation and in terms of their public or commercial nature and readership, in order to understand if these contrasting features lead to a different coverage of events.

Starting by the latter element, in this sample, two types of ownership, private and public, are represented. According to data from 1970, in Spain 118 daily newspapers were published, of which four were sports' related, two were written in English, and two were specialized press. 75 of these newspapers were privately owned and 43 were owned by some kind of government structure (Pizarroso 1994, 315). Several groups of mass media already existed, one of which with public

ownership (*La Cadena del Movimiento*), and the rest were commercial in nature. Among the latter Godó group (*La Vanguardia Española*, *Tele/eXprés*, *Mundo Diario*, *Dicen*, etc.), Editorial Católica (*Ya*, *Ideal de Granada*, *El Ideal Gallego*, *La Verdad de Murcia*, *Hoy de Badajoz*, etc.), and Luca de Tena family group (*ABC*, *Blanco y Negro*), are the main representatives (Alfárez 1986, 19). Thus in this sample we not only have both kinds of ownership – four privately owned newspapers (*La Vanguardia Española*, *ABC*, *Informaciones* and *Tele/eXprés*) and one State-owned (*Arriba*), via the *Delegación Nacional de Prensa y Propaganda de FET y de los JONS* (Heras 2000) –, but also newspapers that belong to three of the four main networks (*La Cadena del Movimiento*, Godó Group, and Luca de Tena Family). Likewise, in the sample we have both morning (*La Vanguardia Española*, *Arriba* and *ABC*) and evening (*Informaciones* and *Tele/eXprés*) newspapers.

Regarding readership, circulation numbers need to be used in order to characterize its geographic distribution. Print run numbers concern the number of copies printed, but since not all these copies are distributed, circulation numbers are a more accurate source of information on the impact of a publication. In this period, the Circulation Control Office [*Oficina de Justificación de la Difusión OJD*], a body that controlled numbers of print runs and circulation rates for advertising purposes from 1964 onwards, oversaw most publications in Spain. But since this body did not control *Arriba*, there is no independent data on its print run or circulation.

Hence in this sample two of the three newspapers – *La Vanguardia Española*, *ABC* (Madrid) and *Ya* – with the highest rates of circulation are present (Pizarroso 1994: 315), but also newspapers which had more modest circulation rates, like *Informaciones* and *Tele/eXprés*, as shown in table 1.

	Print Run (average)			Circulation (average)		
	1974	1975	1976	1974	1975	1976
<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	225.876	226.533	226.250	218.755	220.217	220.127
<i>ABC</i>	208.173	200.092	208.221	190.220	181,437	186.323
<i>Informaciones</i>	71.269	76.247	93.657	56.915	61.197	74.797
<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	40.703	42.163	48.084	31.058	32.613	37.865

Table 1 OJD data <sup>27</sup>

Of these four titles, only *ABC* was bought across the entire Spanish territory, although predominantly in the area of Madrid, in clear contrast with *La Vanguardia Española*, which was mostly bought in Catalonia. Likewise, both *Informaciones* and *Tele/eXprés* were bought mainly in their publication area, respectively Madrid and Barcelona, as shown in table 2.

	Main area(s) of Circulation (%)		
	1974	1975	1976
<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Barcelona 83,09	Barcelona 81, 88	Barcelona 81,75
	Girona 5,70	Girona 5,85	Girona 5,99
	Tarragona 3,99	Tarragona 4,19	Tarragona 4,32
<i>ABC</i>	Madrid 61,80	Madrid 64,23	Madrid 67,75
	Oviedo 1,70	Alicante 2,04	Alicante 1,91
	Alicante 1,70	Toledo 1,61	Toledo 1,83
<i>Informaciones</i>	Madrid 78,80	Madrid 79,67	Madrid 79,60
	Seville 2,35	Seville 2,28	Valencia 1,72
	Burgos 1,88	Burgos 1,83	Seville 1,52
<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Barcelona 83,09	Barcelona 85,82	Barcelona 87,23
	Girona 7,07	Girona 6,55	Girona 5,78
	Tarragona 4,07	Tarragona 3,06	Tarragona 3,59

Table 2 OJD data

Both *La Vanguardia Española* and *ABC* had their Sunday edition controlled by OJD autonomously from the rest of the week, with the

<sup>27</sup> *Boletín de la Oficina de Justificación de la Difusión, Tomos X-XII (1974-1976)*, Madrid: OJD.

difference that *ABC* Sunday's edition was common to both *ABC Madrid* and *ABC Sevilla*. The Sunday edition of *ABC* reached the number of 382.849 copies sold in 1974 and 397.689 in 1976, while *La Vanguardia Española* never went beyond the figure of 300.000 (288.917 in 1975 and 287.313 in 1976), indicating that *ABC*'s Sunday edition is widely read, or at least much more than its weekly edition. Furthermore, between 1920 and 1982 (and earlier for brief period between 1904 and 1905) a weekly day off was instituted on Sundays, which means that morning newspapers were not published on Mondays and evening newspapers did not have a Sunday edition (Seoane and Saiz 2007). Within the present sample, that was the case of *Informaciones* and *Tele/eXprés*.

Ideological stance is a problematic concept, since, on one the hand, it has to do, to a great extent, with perceptions and, on the other hand, it is not a stable and homogeneous category. Providing an ideological characterization of *Arriba*, the second series of the publication created by the founder of *La Falange*, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, and published by the *Delegación Nacional de Prensa y Propaganda de FET y de los JONS*, should not be a problem. However, by the mid-1970s, and especially after Franco's death in late 1975, this newspaper was changing quickly. It never ceased to be the stronghold of an anti-capitalist nationalism with an extreme disdain for parliamentary democracy, but it slowly embraced other points of view more sympathetic towards the Common Market Europe and all the elements it implied, namely a market economy, parliamentary democracy, civil liberties. Moreover, given that is it a newspaper above suspicion, it is also easier for a younger generation to get by with different ideas (Alfárez 1986, 145).

In April 1975, *Arriba* reacts with irony to *Le Figaro*'s accusation of being the spokesperson of the Spanish Bunker. It did so not by denying the claim, but rather by ridiculing it, both because it was too obvious and



because it dismissed the sources used by the French Press Agency (*Agence France-Presse* AFP), claiming that the political information the agency received came from their opponents, «notable Spanish journalists from other Madrilenian publications»<sup>xx28</sup>, and was therefore biased.

In turn, *ABC* was a long-time liberal, pro-centralism and monarchic supporter newspaper, close to the right wing during the II Republic. During Manuel Azaña's government (1931-1933), it was sanctioned and suspended on several occasions, including for a three-month and a half period in 1932. After Alfonso XIII went into exile, the newspaper published an interview with the former head of State clearly stating the newspaper's ideological values – monarchism, pro-centralism, Catholicism and liberalism, but especially a strong opposition to any kind of separatism, laicism and communism. Its initial repudiation of the Republican regime was sustained throughout the entire II Republic and, in a way, even during the Francoist regime. This stance caused some frictions between the newspaper and Francoist authorities regarding the monarchic question and, in particular, the newspaper's support of Don Juan, which clashed with the official policies of the regime. In his history of the newspaper, Victor Olmos considers that the newspaper actively

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<sup>28</sup> «“Le Figaro”, que no falla una, acaba de revelar a la OTAN lo que hemos tratado de ocultar durante muchos años: ARRIBA es “un diario español de extrema derecha”. Chapeau. Es más. Confesémoslo: ARRIBA es “el órgano del movimiento de los Cristo Rey”. Nos han descubierto. Sepultados en oprobio y en ceniza, expuestos en la picota europea, nuestro Director ha decidido que los jefes de sección se aflojen los cilicios que mordían sus carnes desde el estreno de “Jesuscristo Superstar” y que los guerrilleros que infestan nuestros pasillos se despojen de sus capuchas. Es más: una redactora llamada Angelica ha presentado expediente de crisis y se han borrado, en honor de “Le Figaro” las pintadas de “SECAM al paredón” que cubrían nuestras paredes. Por último, cúmplenos felicitar a la agencia France Press, especializada en defuncionar jefes de Estado, suministradora de la noticia, y cuya información política corre a cargo de notables periodistas españoles adscritos a otras publicaciones madrileñas. Desde la extrema derecha, ARRIBA saluda cordialmente a France Press al grito de “Espérame en el bunker, vida mía...”» («France Press: Chapeau // Que no se mueva nadie». 1975. *Arriba*, 12 April, pp. 2)

intervened in favour of Don Juan because of the «(...) political objectives that the newspaper pursues: support of the restoration of the monarchy through the legitimate heir of the last King of Spain, Don Juan, Count of Barcelona»<sup>xxi</sup> (2002:17).

It should be noted, however, that *ABC* experienced a conservative phase in the late-Francoist period (Olmos 2002), reflected, in 1969, in the support of the official thesis that the student Enrique Ruano Casanovas (1948-1969) committed suicide by falling off a seven-storey building in Madrid, when he was found dead under the custody of the Socio-Political Brigade. In that occasion, *ABC* published pages of an alleged personal journal as proof of his suicidal tendencies. The following year, while the Burgos trial was being held, the newspaper supported the Francoist government, once again, by refusing to publish the chronicles in which the defendants described several forms of torture and oppression suffered while in custody of the State. And finally, just before the revolution started in Portugal, *ABC* praised the coup headed by General Pinochet on 11 September 1973, which put an end to the democratically elected Socialist government of Salvador Allende.

*La Vanguardia Española* considers itself to have a tradition as a conservative commercial newspaper that, despite having started as a political newspaper supporter of the Liberal Party, reclaims to have an apolitical history. But for Josep María Huertas (2006:131) this apolitical and independent status claimed by the newspaper is not completely accurate. Firstly, because from Carlos and Bartolomé Godó, founders of the newspaper, to Carlos' grandson, all Godó generations took part in politics. Carlos, Bartolomé and Carlos' son, Ramón, were MPs for the Liberal Party. Ramón Godó was also an active member of Monarchic Union (*Unión Monárquica*), and his son, Carlos Godó Valls, was not only supporter of Antonio Maura, member of the right-wing monarchist party

Spanish Renovation (*Renovación Española*), during the II Republic, but also militant of *Falange Española* and MP at the Francoist Assembly (*Las Cortes españolas*) on more than one occasion (Nogué and Barrera 2006, 397). As founders and owners of *La Vanguardia*, much can be said about the influence the Godó family had in the newspaper.

A key characteristic associated with *La Vanguardia* is its pragmatism<sup>29</sup>. For the newspaper's former editor-in-chief, Agustí Calvet Pascual, also known as Gaziel, pragmatism resulted in the «automatic submission to the triumphant institutions and the unquestionable defence of the established order»<sup>xxii</sup> (Gaziel 1994, 68). Although Gaziel is referring to his own experience in the newspaper between WWI and the beginning of the Spanish civil war, Marcel Mauri contends that several of the changes (incorporation of collaborators, Javier Godó's incorporation as commercial manager of the newspaper printing company TISA, etc.) the newspaper experienced during the 1970s allowed the return to:

(...) its historical identity as a liberal, conservative, monarchic and, even if complacent with the authority of the time, independent newspaper. All this without radicalisms, with moderation and tranquillity, which, for example, explains this newspaper's lack of support to some waves of protest of the press held at those moments, and how the adjective «Spanish» remained untouched in the newspaper header until three years after Franco's death<sup>xxiii</sup> (2010:103).

*La Vanguardia española* was the only newspaper published in Barcelona, along with the ones belonging to the *Movimiento* network,

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<sup>29</sup> «El tono de *La Vanguardia* fue otra de sus señas de identidad características. La autoridad moral y política que habitualmente se le atribuía venía en buena parte dada por la búsqueda consciente de un estilo propio a la hora de informar y, sobre todo, de opinar. El equilibrio en las formas, el respecto a las personas en la crítica política, el acatamiento a las instituciones establecidas formaban una especie de reglas de oro a las que el periódico debía siempre atenerse, que sus principales responsables tenían en mente como pautas de edición y que constituían también parte esencial de la tarea del director Horacio Sáenz Guerrero y, por supuesto, del propietario y presidente Carlos Godó» (Nogué and Barrera 2006, 399).

which did not support the strike held in protest against Josep María Huertas Clavería's arrest in July 1975.

On the other hand, Anna Nogué and Carlos Barrera sustain that *La Vanguardia española* approached the question of the end of the regime without compromising itself with a definitive political attitude:

In the context of the dilemma between political immobilization and liberalization that characterized political, and journalistic, life during the last years of Franco's dictatorship, *La Vanguardia* aligned with those who were pushing for an opening of the regime (...). This was done within known political boundaries, while at the same time the newspaper was trying to recover its Liberal-conservative, monarchic and bourgeois historical identity. (...) *La Vanguardia's* liberalizing ways were in general soft in terms of form but clear. (...) Count Godó's anti-nationalism and anti-Marxism motivated several of its complaints, which on more than one occasion were aimed at journalists and contributors to the same newspaper»<sup>xxiv</sup> (Nogué and Barrera 2006, 397-398).

The evening newspaper *Informaciones* is considered to have resumed the newspaper *Madrid's* task (Sánchez and Barrera 1992, 484), which had been suspended by government order in 1971, though they have different characteristics. Novelist Antonio Muñoz Molina (2011) connects his first news of the outburst of the Portuguese revolution with this newspaper and identifies it with the anti-Francoist political culture, what Reig call «the culture of alienation»: «The first political joy I recall happened to me one afternoon in late April in Madrid, in 1974, when I bought *Informaciones*, the newspaper that us anti-francoists read, and I saw the headline announcing the Carnation revolution in Portugal»<sup>xxv</sup>. Furthermore, and according to Carlos Barrera, it was a newspaper essentially read by both middle and upper-middle classes (1995:15).

Although *Tele/eXprés* is considered a technologically efficient and predominantly informative newspaper, unconnected to any political tendency by some (Sánchez and Barrera 1992, 452), the politicization of its staff is also acknowledged. According to Nogué and Barrera (2006,

186), «[t]he politicization of some of its journalists, mostly those close to PSC and PSUC, was not unfamiliar to Ibàñez Escofet, who arranged for its containment to protect the newspaper from its consequences»<sup>xxvi</sup>.

Regarding the politicization of this newspaper's staff, the editor-in-chief of this period, Manuel Ibàñez Escofet, describes it as being divided between «what would then become PSC-PSOE and PSUC, until a well-planned manoeuver made the first master of the situation»<sup>xxvii</sup> (1990:305). As for his own function in this situation, Ibàñez Escofet considers it was a protective one, giving several examples of how earlier the owner, Count Godó, had prevented some of the staff from being punished, e.g. Pere Oriol Costa for having been denounced as a socialist<sup>30</sup> (1990:305-306), and Manuel Vázquez Montalbán for an article that was considered disrespectful towards Opus Dei<sup>31</sup> (1990:306).

The newspaper is classified as a «centre-left cultured evening newspaper»<sup>xxviii</sup> (Guillamet 2003, 194), but also as a newspaper «without popular acceptance»<sup>xxix</sup> (Sánchez and Barrera 1992, 453).

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<sup>30</sup> «Quan el sots-director Pere Oriol Costa va anar a Xile invitat pel Govern d'Allende, amb un grup de socialistes - en Costa ho era i després fou un home de partit total -, el comte de Godó, advertit per algun emissari del poder, em cridà per dir-me que un socialista a la sots-direcció del diari era perillós. Vaig negar que Costa fos socialista i li vaig assegurar que l'havien enguanyat. Vaig pactar amb Costa que no fes cap article extraordinari del viatge, del qual podria parlar en el seu comentari polític habitual» (Ibàñez Escofet 1990, 305-306).

<sup>31</sup> «Les queixes van arribar al comte Godó, que em va cridar al seu despatx per dir-me que Vázquez Montalbán s'havia acabat. Vaig defensar-lo deient: - Miri, don Carlos, Pío Baroja, que és una de les glòries de la literatura espanyola, va ser anarquista en la seva joventut. Imagini que ara es digués en la seva biografia que havia estat acomiadat de "La Vanguardia". Traslladi el fet a vui i pensi que Vázquez Montalbán, que és també un gran escriptor, podria trobar-se en aquest cas. No seria bo per a "La Vanguardia". El comte de Godó, que era un senyor, em tallà ràpid:- Jo només he parlat de no escriure, no de no cobrar... Així començà un altre període de silenci, curt realment, que Manolo Vázquez qualificà de "beca Godó"» (Ibàñez Escofet 1990, 306).

## d) Hemerographic Forms

To characterize, systematize and summarize the data from each newspaper, a Hemerographic Form was developed drawing on the one created by Pere Anguera, Antoni Galvadà, and Xavier Pujades for the regional Catalan press (1996:15-18) by modifying Almuiña's model (1991:389-399). This hemerographic form model was also the one used by Marcel Mauri (2010) for his study of the role and evolution of the press published in Barcelona during the democratic political transition in Spain.

### I. DESCRIPTION

#### A. Newspaper

1. Title
2. Subtitle
3. Motto
4. Vignette
5. Place
6. Language

#### B. Dates

1. Chronology
  - a) First Number
  - b) Last number
  - c) Suspensions
2. Periodicity
3. Type
4. Number of editions
5. Collections
6. Headquarters
  - a) Administration
  - b) Newsroom
  - c) Printer

#### C. Technical Features

##### 1. Format

- a) Pages
  - a. Number
  - b. Measures
- b) Columns
  - a. Number
  - b. Measures

##### 2. Structure

- a) First page header
- b) Head measures
- c) Headlines
- d) Illustrations
- e) Feuilletons
- f) Sections

3. Printer

II. ANALITICAL FORM

D. Company

1. Legal Features

- a) Founder
- b) Ownership
- c) Publisher
- d) Council Delegate

2. Economic Features

- a) Administration
  - a. Administrator
  - b. Places of subscription
- b) Publication price
  - a. By copy
  - b. Subscriptions
  - c. Advertising fee
  - d. Print Run

E. Newsroom Team

1. Editor-in –chief

- a) Newsroom Council
- b) Editor-in –chief

2. Newsroom

- a) Head of newsroom
- b) Journalists
- c) Correspondents
- d) Cartoonists

3. Frequent Collaborators

4. Also publishes articles from

F. Nature and Orientation

1. Social or Political tendency

2. Purpose (First number editorial)

3. Polemics

G. Circulation

1. Distribution

2. Main areas of circulation

3. Readership

- a) Number

- b) Composition
- III. HISTORICAL ASPECTS
  - 1. Importance
  - 2. Historical source
    - a) Preferred subjects
    - b) Featured articles
    - c) Featured information
    - d) Exceptional numbers devoted to
    - e) Books and other press advertised
    - f) Other types of advertising
- IV. LOCALIZATION
- V. INFORMATION ABOUT OTHER NEWSPAPERS
- VI. INFORMATION ABOUT JOURNALISTS. PRESS ASSOCIATION
- VII. OBSERVATIONS

This original form was adapted to meet the needs of the present study. For this, the category «II.B.1. Editor-in-chief» was divided into two: «II.B.1.a) Editor-in-chief» and «II.B.1.b) Deputy editor-in-chief», the category «II.D.1. Circulation numbers» was added, and the following twelve categories were removed:

- I. DESCRIPTION
  - B. DATES
    - 5. Collections
  - C. TECHNICAL FEATURES
    - 2. Structure
      - a) First page header
      - c) Headline
      - d) Illustrations
      - e) Feuilletons
    - 3. Printer
- II. ANALITICAL Form
  - A. Company
    - 1. Legal Features
      - d) Council delegate
    - 2. Economic Features
      - a) Administration
        - a. Administrator
        - b. Places of subscription
      - b) Publication price
      - c. Advertising fee
  - B. Newsroom Team
    - 1. Editor-in-chief



a) Newsroom Council

**C. Nature and Orientation**

**2. Purpose**

This adaptation process resulted in the following form (which can be found, duly filled for each newspaper, in appendix I):

**I. DESCRIPTION**

**A. Newspaper**

1. Title
2. Subtitle
3. Motto
4. Vignette
5. Place
6. Language

**B. Dates**

1. Chronology
  - a) First Number
  - b) Last number
  - c) Suspensions
2. Periodicity
3. Type
4. Number of editions
5. Headquarters
  - a) Administration
  - b) Newsroom
  - c) Printer

**C. Technical Features**

**1. Format**

- a) Pages
  - a. Number
  - b. Measures
- b) Columns
  - a. Number
  - b. Measures

**2. Structure**

- a) Head measures
- b) Sections

**II. ANALITICAL FORM**

**D. Company**

**1. Legal Features**

- a) Founder
- b) Ownership
- c) Publisher

**2. Economic Features**

- a) Publication price
  - a. By copy
  - b. Subscriptions
- b) Print Run

**E. Newsroom Team**

**1. Editor-in-chief**

- a) Editor-in-chief
- b) Deputy Editor-in-chief

**2. Newsroom**

- a) Head of newsroom
- b) Journalists
- c) Correspondents
- d) Cartoonists

**3. Frequent Collaborators**

**4. Also publishes articles from**

**F. Nature and Orientation**

- 1. Social or Political tendency
- 2. Polemics

**G. Circulation**

- 1. Circulation Numbers
- 2. Distribution
- 3. Main areas of circulation

**III. HISTORICAL ASPECTS**

**1. Importance**

**2. Historical source**

- a) Preferred subjects
- b) Featured articles
- c) Featured information
- d) Exceptional numbers devoted to
- e) Books and other press advertised
- f) Other types of advertising

**IV. LOCATED AT**

**V. INFORMATION ABOUT OTHER NEWSPAPERS**

**VI. INFORMATION ABOUT JOURNALISTS. PRESS ASSOCIATION**

**VII. OBSERVATIONS**

Although the present study draws on five titles only and does not aim to be a comprehensive study of the Spanish press, but rather a representative study of the reaction and discourse of the latter, the forms were considered to be helpful in the descriptive and organizational tasks required in such a study.

## 1. Newspapers presentation

### 1.1 *ABC*

Founded by Torcuato Luca de Tena, *ABC* started on 1 January 1903 as a weekly publication, was converted into a biweekly on June 16<sup>th</sup> of the same year, and on 1 June 1905 into a daily newspaper, the latter becoming the official date of establishment of the newspaper (Olmos 2002, 97). It is followed by a printing company, *Prensa Española*, in 1909, also owned by Luca de Tena, but had been predated by the publication of the weekly *Blanco y Negro* in 1891 (Iglesias 1980).

The *ABC* of the beginning of the twentieth century was a modern newspaper and constituted somewhat of a novelty, «[w]ith its small format (unchanged until today), its graphic penchant and its dynamic character for both informing and self-promoting»<sup>xxx</sup> (Barrera 1995, 18). By the 1970s *ABC* had become, in terms of format, printing and visual appearance, an old newspaper.

During the war *ABC*'s two editions were divided between rival factions. The original one in Madrid was taken over by Martínez Barrio's *Unión Republicana* and was published under the motto «Left-wing Republican newspaper», while the Seville edition, launched in 1929 (Seoane and Saiz 2007) stayed under the control of Luca de Tena and a supporter of the insurgents.

With the end of the civil war the monarchist question, one of the key questions for *ABC*, raised some discomfort, and was subject to

silencing or treated with hostility (Barrera 1995, 48), hence the newspaper was kept under close watch. In *ABC* the coverage of Alfonso XIII's death and funeral in 1941 was subject to several restrictions and a quarrel emerged between the newspaper and the Press Office to escape the mandatory official propaganda regarding the referendum that ratified the Succession Law of 1947. Nevertheless, and despite *ABC*'s fierce loyalty to Don Juan de Borbón, when in 1969 Don Juan Carlos was appointed Franco's successor, the newspaper «complied with the decision in observance of the political law and the policy of *fait accompli*. The hereditary legitimacy principle was broken but the monarchic institution was saved»<sup>xxxii</sup> (Sánchez and Barrera 1992, 473). In 1975 *ABC* had the photogravure covers, which contained an interview with Don Juan, of its February 23<sup>rd</sup> edition sequestered (see Part II).

The Luca de Tena family regained ownership of the Madrilenian edition by the end of the war, but like with most newspapers, *ABC*'s editor-in-chief was chosen by official authorities until 1962<sup>32</sup>. If until the 1970s the newspaper had maintained a certain distance from the official Francoist rhetoric despite all the constraints it faced, from then on *ABC* began a path of «continuous oscillation between its old liberal spirit and the francoist political immobilization»<sup>xxxiii</sup> (Sánchez and Barrera 1992, 473) we mentioned above. Likewise, its circulation declined from over 200.000 between 1967 and 1970, to slightly over 180.000 in 1975.

## 1.2 *Arriba*

Founded as a weekly publication in Madrid on 21 March 1935 by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, *Arriba* was suspended between July 4<sup>th</sup> and October 31<sup>st</sup> and later closed down on March 5<sup>th</sup> of the following year. This first series of the publication was characterized by Sánchez and

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<sup>32</sup> José Losada de la Torre (1940-1945), Ramón Pastor (1945-1954), and Luis Calvo (1954-1962).

Barrera as a typical product of *Falange's* publications: «poverty of information, resources, and pages» (1992: 351).

At the end of the civil war, after the fall of Madrid, *Arriba* re-emerged, on 29 March 1939, using *El Sol's* workshop for printing its edition. The post-war period was the highlight of this newspaper with over 140.000 copies printed (Alfárez 1986, 141) and distinguished collaborations, including from Francisco Franco himself. As an official newspaper, it enjoyed a certain amount of autonomy from censorship mechanisms and engaged in several controversies with *ABC*, without ever directly touching on political subjects (Alfárez 1986, 141; Sánchez and Barrera 1992, 440).

It is a newspaper with an unmistakable Falangist ideology and, in general, a supporter of government policies and decisions. For instance in 1968 *Arriba*, as well as the rest of the *Movimiento* group, does not oppose the Official Secrets Law, which allowed the Francoist State to classify certain subjects as secrets or reserved matters. This subjugation to power when several of the groups that once supported the Francoist order started to disengage from it, reflected the newspaper's decreasing importance for most Spanish readers. Sánchez and Barrera add to the equation its relationship with the independent press, in contrast with the official press:

Its political exclusivism, which led the newspaper to present itself as the definer of the regime's orthodoxy, was regarded with fear by the independent press. The latter criticized its dogmatism and its Falangist bias, when the newspaper should serve all Spaniards, according to the legal definition of the *Movimiento*, and not just part of them (...) <sup>xxxiii</sup> (1992: 469).

Under Antonio Izquierdo's<sup>33</sup> leadership, between 1974 and 1975, *Arriba* had several frictions with Arias Navarro's government (Barrera

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<sup>33</sup>*Arriba* had «historic journalists» as editors-in-chief, namely José María Alfaro (1939), Xavier Echarri (1939-1949), Ismael Herráiz (1949-1956), Sabino Alonso

1995, 141). In fact, Izquierdo claims to have been removed from office precisely for having failed to please the head of Government, Carlos Arias Navarro:

[Antonio Izquierdo in *El Alcázar*, 12 May 1977] I did not resign. I was fired, which is different. (...) I was fired because the President of the Government (Carlos Arias Navarro) was extremely angry with *Arriba*'s silence regarding the anniversary of the «February 12<sup>th</sup> spirit». We know how liberals are. What Mr. President did not know is that I received the order of publishing nothing about it, but that is another story. I, of course, never believed in that spirit, it seemed an enormous amount of nothing. It was an artless manoeuver to fire me<sup>xxxiv</sup> (Alfárez 1986, 143-144).

Economically, the situation started to deteriorate in 1971, and culminated in a debt of 841 million pesetas by 1975 (Barrera 1995, 141). This situation was solved with public investment. According to Antonio Alfárez, by 1978 each copy of *Arriba* sold cost the Spanish State 275 pesetas (1986: 139).

Following the general elections of 1979, the first one held after the 1978 Constitution ratification, the Council of Ministers decided to close down the newspaper on 15 June 1979, and in the following day *Arriba* published its final number.

### 1.3 *Informaciones*

*Informaciones* was founded on 24 April 1922 by Leopoldo Romeo, who was also its first editor-in-chief. Its goal was to exist without advertising<sup>34</sup>, which proved to be an impossible task after less than two months. It was a four-page at six columns broadsheet format daily newspaper with the

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Fueyo, Jesus Fueyo Álvarez, and Adolfo Muñoz Alonso. These were followed by an «intermediate generation», for instance Vicente Cebrián, Rodrigo Royo, Jaime Campmany (1970-1971), under which the newspaper experienced a brief liberalizing moment, Félix Morales, and Antonio Izquierdo (1974-1975), under which the newspaper went back to its falangist matrix. Lastly, Blanco Tobío, Cristóbal Páez (1976), who had as deputy editors-in-chief Fernando Onega, Pedro Rodríguez and Alejo García, and Alejandro Armesto (Alfárez 1986, 143).

<sup>34</sup> Altabella, José. 1972. «Hace 50 años nacio “Informaciones”» in *ABC*, January 25<sup>th</sup>, pp. 39

slogan «Always tell the truth, no matter how hard it is, and while doing it, do not use two words if you can express it using only one» (Crespo 2008, 49).

*Informaciones* never had a stable ownership. Its founder sold it to the Majorcan banker Juan March in 1924<sup>35</sup> (according to most sources, or 1925 according to Crespo, 2008), who later declared he was feeling persecuted by the Republican government and sold it to Juan Pujol in 1932 (Barrera 1995, 26, Seoane and Saiz 2007, 213). It was sold again in 1936<sup>36</sup> to a cooperative formed by its own journalists. This happened due to Pujol's double role as MP (representing CEDA for Madrid in 1933 and for Mallorca in 1936) and editor-in-chief<sup>37</sup> of the newspaper. When in

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<sup>35</sup> Juan March owned two newspapers, *La Libertad* and *Informaciones*. According to Seoane and Saiz, during the Republican period, «Procesado por la República, durante su defensa ante la comisión de responsabilidades, el 8 de junio de 1932, March alegó, como prueba de sus 'notorios ideales de izquierdas', su contribución al 'sostenimiento decoroso de *La Libertad*'. Como era de esperar, en seguida se le echó encima la prensa adversa sacando a relucir *Informaciones*- al que Prieto había denominado meses antes en las mismas cortes 'la face del contrabandista' – y acusándole de 'encender una vela a dios y al diablo'. El 4 de noviembre de 1933, *La Libertad* anunciaba a toda plana: 'Don Juan March abandona la prisión de Alcalá para atender al restablecimiento de su salud', y una carta del financiero justificando su fuga. En mayo de 1934 se desprendería de este periódico. Con anterioridad había cedido la cabecera de *Informaciones*, aunque al parecer no las instalaciones, a su director, Juan Pujol. Ambos periódicos, siempre en sus respectivas posturas de izquierda y derecha, siguieron luego una complicada trayectoria empresarial. Cuando estalló la guerra, la cabecera de *Informaciones* pertenecía al ex ministro del Partido Radical, Salazar Alonso y lo dirigía Victor de la Serna, que volvería a hacerse cargo de él en la posguerra» (2007:213).

<sup>36</sup> According to Crespo, *Informaciones* shares were freely handed to its newsroom workers, which immediately appointed as President António Miguel Martín (Crespo 2008, 21-22).

<sup>37</sup> The newspaper's editors-in-chief were: Rafael Barón (1922-1925), Augusto Vivero (1925), Juan Sarradell (1925-1931), Juan Pujol (1931-1936), Victor Ruiz Albéniz (1936), Rafael Salazar Alonso (1936), Victor de la Serna (1936), Antonio Gascón (1936), and Francisco Torquemada (1936-1939) during the war, José de la Cueva (for a few days in 1939), Victor de la Serna (1939-1948), Enrique Giménez Arnau (for a few days in 1948), Francisco Lucientes (1948-1952), Antonio de Miguel (1952-1954), Juan José Peña e Ibáñez (1954-1957), Ramón Sierra (1957-1959), Salvador López de la Torre (1959-1960), Jesús Revuelta

1936 the popular front won the elections, Pujol felt that the sanctions the paper was facing were due to his connection to it.

During the II Republic the conservative *Informaciones* sided with the Monarchist restoration cause, so when the Civil war started the newspaper was confiscated, like other Madrilenian right-wing publications<sup>38</sup>, by the Republican side and was handed to the PSOE sector led by Indalecio Prieto. After the war, only *ABC*, *Ya* and *Informaciones* reappeared in Madrid. *Informaciones* was returned to its last editor-in-chief before the war, Victor de la Serna. De la Serna also became its publisher, and for that reason he created *Editorial Madrileña*, which was transformed in *Prensa Castellana S.A.* in 1944 (Barrera 1995). Eventually de la Serna left to pursue another publishing project – *La Tarde* – and *Informaciones* was sold in 1948 to former government minister Demetrio Carceller (Crespo 2008). In 1956, 60 % of its stock shares were bought by Bilbao Editorial, which printed it until 1965.

In 1967, the newspaper was bought by a group that in 1974 would form the *Unión Democrática Española*<sup>39</sup>. This group was represented by Ignacio Acha, the owner of *Agencia Publidís*. It tried to get Emilio Romero<sup>40</sup> to be *Informaciones*' editor-in-chief but failed, apparently because of the intervention of José Solís, the *Movimiento*'s secretary minister. Miguel Angel Gonzalo was hired instead. Romero would eventually leave *Pueblo*'s editorial board and run the *Informaciones* board in 1977.

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(1960-1962), Luis Fernando Bandín Ramos (1962-1967), Miguel Angel Gozalo (1967-1968), Jesús de la Serna y Gutiérrez (1968) [Altabella 1972], Guillermo Solana and Emilio Romero (1977).

<sup>38</sup> *ABC*, *El Siglo Futuro*, *El Debate*, *Ya*, and *Informaciones*.

<sup>39</sup> UDE was a Christian Democratic group led by Federico Silva Muñoz, the Minister of Public Works in 1967.

<sup>40</sup> Romero was the *Movimiento*'s national adviser until 1975, and therefore enjoyed parliamentary immunity, which given the particularities of the 1966 press law was an advantage.



In 1968, Emilio Botín, in charge of Banco de Santander, convinced Banco Central, Vizcaya and Banesto and March to form a business group to finance the newspaper. Jesús de la Serna and the young Juan Luís Cebrián were hired as editor-in-chief and deputy editor-in-chief, respectively. They both had been part of *Pueblo*'s editorial staff<sup>41</sup>. This is the moment when *Informaciones* gains some relevance, as its circulation rises to 60.000 copies in 1975. The broadsheet format of the newspaper had been changed into a tabloid one by Gonzalo, but Jesus de la Serna was also responsible for the clean and ordered new look of the newspaper.

In 1976, several members of its youthful and active newsroom were lost to *El País* and multiple venture difficulties started. For instance, Banco de Santander sold its 25%, alleging it was distressed with being repeatedly identified with the newspaper's points of view. *Informaciones* changed hands again, and this time it was purchased by the Catalan entrepreneur Sebastián Auger. With him came Guillermo Solana as editor-in-chief, but he was quickly replaced by Romero. Despite many efforts, it would not survive the regime's transformation. In 1980 its publishing was stopped to resurface in 1981, and was permanently shut down in 1983.

#### 1.4 *La Vanguardia Española*

*La Vanguardia* was founded by brothers Bartolomé and Carlos Godó on 1 February 1881 as a political publication whose motto was «Political newspaper of notices and news. Organ of the Constitutional Party of Provinces»<sup>xxxv</sup>. By 1888 the publication was launched as a commercial newspaper in a wider format, with two editions, a morning and an evening one, and only one publisher, Carlos Godó. To reinforce the notion that the newspaper was no longer politicized, Godó abandoned the party he belonged to. According to Nogué and Barrera (2006, 395-396),

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<sup>41</sup> Due to Emilio Romero's parliamentary immunity, *Pueblo* had the opportunity, for some time, to mildly avoid censorship.

«economic profitability was, from his point of view, along with the family structure of the company, the indispensable ground for the newspaper's independence»<sup>xxxvi</sup>.

The start of the war led to Carlos Godó Valls' into exile (and afterwards his incorporation into the nationalist territory), thus leaving its editor-in-chief, Gaziel, alone to handle the situation. The workers' commission seized control of the newspaper and Gaziel also went into exile. During the civil war *La Vanguardia* became the medium of communication of the first *Generalitat* government, and when the republican government of Juan Negrín was moved to Barcelona, the newspaper had the role of transmitting its news. When the war ended, the newspaper was returned to its previous owners, but two conditions were demanded by the new authorities: it was to have a nominated editor-in-chief, like other newspapers, and the adjective «Spanish» was to be added to its title, thus transforming *La Vanguardia* into *La Vanguardia Española* from 28 January 1939 until 16 August 1978 (Nogué and Barrera 2006, 283).

Between 1939 and 1966, when the new Press Law was issued and different rules applied, *La Vanguardia Española*'s editors-in-chiefs had been, until 1963, imposed and, between 1963 and 1966, nominated by the Government. Immediately after the fall of Barcelona, Manuel Aznar and Josep Pla took over the newspaper as editor-in-chief and his deputy, respectively. With the end of the war, Luis Martínez de Galinsoga, formerly at *ABC* Sevilla, would be imposed as the newspaper's new editor-in-chief<sup>42</sup>. Martínez de Galinsoga remained in office until he

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<sup>42</sup> Previous editors-in-chief were Modesto Sánchez Ortiz (until 1902), Alfredo Opiiso (1902-1906), Miguel de los Santos Oliver (1906-1920), Agustí Calvet Pascual, «Gaziel», (1920-1936). During the Civil war the newspaper had as editor-in-chief María Luz Morales Godoy (July 1936-February 1937), Paulí Masip Roca

starred an episode of Catalan antagonism that led to his replacement in 1960<sup>43</sup>. To appease the situation, Manuel de Aznar came back for three years (1960-1963) and then, between 1963 and 1969, the former editor-in-chief of *Arriba*, and also former press delegate of the Spanish Embassy in Lisbon, Xavier de Echarri, took over (Nogué and Barrera 2006, 96). With Echarri's death his deputy, Horacio Sáenz Guerrero, held the job until 1982.

From 1961 onwards the newspaper is no longer private property of Count Godó but owned by a public limited company – *TISA (Tallers e Imprentas, S.A.)* – detained by the Godó family (Sánchez and Barrera 1992, 453). In 1970, Javier Godó, Carlos Godó Valls' son, became the commercial manager of TISA and pressed for the newspaper to adjust to the new Spanish reality even before Franco's death (Mauri 2010, 102-103; Nogué and Barrera 2006, 177-183).

### 1.5 *Tele/eXprés*

When on 14 September 1964 the evening newspaper *Tele/eXprés* published its first number, more than twenty years had passed since a new newspaper had been published in Barcelona (Guillamet 1996, 36). *Tele/eXprés* was the first private venture in Barcelona to receive permission to publish after the civil war, at the time when Manuel Fraga, as head of the MIT since 1962, was preparing to set the path for a new journalistic paradigm.

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(February-October 1937), and Fernando Vázquez Ocaña (October 1937-January 1939) (Nogué and Barrera 2006:36-42).

<sup>43</sup> During the summer of 1959 Luís Martínez de Galinsoga attended a church service partly held in Catalan (while the rest was in Latin), and reportedly proclaimed that «All Catalans are a piece of shit». The episode gave rise to protests, including the burning of copies of *La Vanguardia Española* in the streets, a decrease in copies sold, and a significant number of cancelled subscriptions. As a result, Count Godó asked for an intervention from the Government, at the time responsible for the nomination of newspaper editors-in-chief (Huertas 2006).

The project was considered a sign of novelty for several reasons: the model, inspired by *France Soir*, was different from the usual Spanish one, as was the wider format, the blue header and even the name, which was neither descriptive nor ideological (Guillamet 1996, 37-38). It was conceived as a modern newspaper that used teletypes for agency services, telefacsímils for photos and telexes for correspondents' and special correspondents' chronicles (Guillamet 1996, 38).

The newspaper was property of the company *Diario Tele/Exprés S.A*, whose major shareholder was Jaume Castell Lastortas, someone very close to the Franco family (Mauri 2010, 112). Minority shareholders included Juan Antonio Samaranch Torelló, member of the Barcelona city council, provincial MP and sports delegate, Joaquin Viola Sauret, Lleida council president, journalists Ignasi Agustí and Carles Sentís (at the time general-executive of EFE agency), Sabadell's industrial Joan Casablanças, and former *Diario de Barcelona*'s journalist Carmelo San Nicolás (Guillamet 1996, 38-39).

By 1968, in the midst of acute financial difficulties, 50% of the newspaper was bought by the Godó Group and *Tele/eXprés* started to be printed by TISA (Guillamet 1996, 95) and its newsroom moved to Carrer Tallers<sup>44</sup>. In late 1974, Jaume Castell Lastortas sells the rest of the

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<sup>44</sup> «En 1968, Carlos Godó acordó con Jaume Castell i Lastortas la compra de la mitad de Tele/eXprés, así como la parte que este tenía en la empresa de El Mundo Deportivo de la familia Grau. Como lógica consecuencia, ambos diarios pasaron a imprimirse meses después en la imprenta de TISA, en la calle Tallers y sus redacciones ocuparon la misma planta que hasta pocos años antes había alojado a la revista Destino y la editorial con el mismo nombre. Abandonan así el edificio que se había construido para ellos apenas cuatro años antes en el número 39 de la calle Aragón. En 1974, con la caída del pequeño grupo Castell, Godó se convertiría en propietario único de Tele/eXprés y en socio mayoritario de El Mundo Deportivo, junto con la familia Grau, herederos del fundador Jaume Grau i Castellà» (Nogué and Barrera 2006, 127).

newspaper and the Godó group becomes the sole owner of *Tele/eXprés* (Nogué and Barrera 2006, 186).

*Tele/eXprés'* first editor-in-chief, Andreu Avellís Artís, also known as Sempronio, with a republican past as journalist in several Catalanian publications (Mauri 2010, 112), was fired and replaced by Ignasi Agustí for a couple of weeks, and later by Carles Sentís. In 1968, with the new ownership situation also came a new editor-in-chief, Manuel Ibáñez Escofet:

Similarly to what happened in the case of *Diario de Barcelona*, those who had been in charge of nominating the editor in chief of *Tele/eXprés* Manuel Ibáñez Escofet in 1968 were *La Vanguardia's* men, firstly Sáenz Guerrero and Javier Godó, and later Manuel Aznar. (...) Even if a large margin of autonomy was granted, the tutelage of Godó Group remained present, especially in the moments when the newspaper was not consolidated. The nominations were made directly from *La Vanguardia*. (...) Horacio Sáenz Guerrero often used to represent Godó before the editors-in-chief of other newspapers of the group, therefore creating a peculiar situation, since it meant that the journalists were under the direct or indirect supervision of the editor-in-chief of the main newspaper of the city (Nogué and Barrera 2006, 201-202).<sup>xxxvii</sup>

Ibáñez Escofet was replaced by Pere Oriol Costa, his deputy, in the aftermath of a heart attack and Josep María Huertas' arrest in 1975. Huertas was imprisoned and taken before the war council due to the publication in *Tele/eXprés* of the article «Vida erótica subterránea» [Underground erotic life] that implicated army widows with «dating» flats. Given the 1966 Press Law, Manuel Ibáñez Escofet, as editor-in-chief, was ultimately responsible for the publication of the article, and was, therefore, removed from office. Nevertheless, according to Nogué and Barrera (2006: 203-204), Count Godó agreed to maintain Huerta's wage while he was imprisoned and offered to relocate Ibáñez Escofet within the company.

Ibáñez Escofmet's account of this episode underlines some resentment towards Oriol Costa, whom the former implicates in an «entryism» manoeuvre:

The desire of having "Tele/Exprés" in the orbit of socialism, which began to be hinted as a party with ambitions of governing, was the driving force of the action. The same operation performed by the youth of PSOE, liquidating the historical beards and the survivors of the Civil War, was repeated in small scale inside the newspaper of Carrer Tallers»<sup>xxxviii</sup> (Ibáñez Ecofet 1990, 321).

In fact, Pere Oriol Costa was a founding member of the Democratic Group of Journalists [*Grup Democràtic de Periodistes* GDP] (Roglan 1992), an underground organization of anti-Francoist journalists active in Catalonia between 1966 and 1976:

The growing importance of the Democratic Group of Journalists was clearly reflected in the fact that at the moment of Franco's death, its members occupied important offices in the Barcelona Press Association and positions of responsibility as editors or as deputy-editors-in-chief in almost every newspaper in town. In late 1976, and with political reforms already in place, the group ceased to exist<sup>xxxix</sup> (Nogué and Barrera 2006, 194).

According to Nogué and Barrera, the group imposed its presence by means of «entryism», which means that Ibáñez Escofet's claims might be caused by more than just resentment.

All these five newspapers give considerable relevance to the revolutionary process in Portugal as an event. They have, nonetheless, different characteristics, as they address as well, to some extent, different audiences. For instance *Arriba* is the one whose discourse changes the most, *ABC* the one that uses more often the Portuguese events to argue for a specific Spanish outcome: the maintenance of the Spanish Communist party illegal, *La Vanguardia Española* the newspaper who most often dismissed the alarmist vision of the events, *Informaciones* the one who

disengages first from the process and *Tele/eXprés* the one where divergent opinion is more frequently expressed.

### e) Date selection

The collected material concerns forty-six months of daily newspaper research which was subject to a longitudinal analysis that allowed us to identify the moments these newspapers recognised as worthy of an editorial column.


Category	Total of pieces
Editorials	90
Articles	517
Special Correspondents	308
Correspondents <sup>45</sup>	1837

**Table 3 Collected Materials**

Out of a total of 90 editorial columns published between March 1974 and April 1976, 34 were published by *ABC*, 26 by *La Vanguardia Española*, 12 by *Arriba*, 9 by *Informaciones*, and other 9 by *Tele/eXprés*. Of all these newspapers, only *ABC* and *La Vanguardia Española* published daily editorial columns during this period.

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<sup>45</sup> Included in this category are Eduardo Barrenechea's chronicles from the period between January and July 1975, when he was working in Lisbon for *Informaciones* as a permanent correspondent rather than as a special correspondent.



**Figure1: Chronological distribution of Editorial Columns**

From the analysis of Editorial columns production it was possible to differentiate between three types of moments according to the respective newspapers' interest: moments of individual interest (9), moments of particular interest (2), and moments of generalized interest (9). After these moments were identified, a corpus was built using a multistage sample (Wimmer and Domminick 2011, 162-164) through chronological guidelines based on the former, and thus for each moment of interest a sample of specific content was assembled, as can be seen in table 4:

Moment	Type of Moment	Event	Date
1	General interest	Failed Caldas coup	March 16 <sup>th</sup> 1974
2	General interest	April 25 <sup>th</sup> coup	April 25 <sup>th</sup> 1974
3	Individual interest ( <i>Informaciones</i> )	Socialist party threatens to leave the government coalition over disagreements with JSN	1 <sup>st</sup> week of June 1974
4	Individual interest	Animosity towards the	Last week of



	<i>(Arriba)</i>	Spanish national team in the roller hockey world championship held in Lisbon	July 1974
<b>5</b>	General interest	Decolonization	August 1974- November 1975
<b>6</b>	Individual interest <i>(La Vanguardia española)</i>	Mário Soares' declarations about a common path towards the common market Europe for Portugal and Spain	3 <sup>rd</sup> week of August 1974
<b>7</b>	General interest	General Spínola's downfall	September 28-30 <sup>th</sup> 1974
<b>8</b>	General interest	January's turmoil: single union question, CDS's congress invasion	Second half of January 1975
<b>9</b>	Individual interest <i>(ABC)</i>	Reinforcement of JSN's power	2 <sup>nd</sup> week of February 1975
<b>10</b>	Individual interest <i>(ABC)</i>	Presentation of the socio-economic plan by Vasco Gonçalves	4 <sup>th</sup> week of February 1975
<b>11</b>	Individual interest <i>(Arriba)</i>	Portugal as a counter-model to Spain	1 <sup>st</sup> week of March 1975
<b>12</b>	General interest	Right-wing failed coup	March 11 <sup>th</sup> 1975
<b>13</b>	Individual interest <i>(Tele/eXprés)</i>	Rosa Coutinho's declarations as MFA's spokesperson	3 <sup>rd</sup> week of April 1975
<b>14</b>	General interest	1975 elections	April 25 <sup>th</sup> 1975
<b>15</b>	Individual interest <i>(ABC)</i>	<i>República's</i> case	May-June 1975
<b>16</b>	General interest	«Hot summer»	July-September 1975
<b>17</b>	Particular interest	Spanish diplomatic premises invaded and destroyed	September 27 <sup>th</sup> 1975
<b>18</b>	Particular interest	Military clashes between units loyal to a leftist conception of power and moderate ones loyal to the government coalition	November 25 <sup>th</sup> 1975
<b>19</b>	Individual interest <i>(La Vanguardia española)</i>	Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho's imprisonment	January 20 <sup>th</sup> 1976
<b>20</b>	General interest	1976 elections	April 25 <sup>th</sup> 1976

**Table 4 Sample divided by moments**

By «generalized interest» we mean topics that most of the newspapers devoted editorials to. This includes military manoeuvres, both successful and unsuccessful, like the failed coup attempts of 16 March 1974 (moment 1), 11 March 1975 (moment 12), as well as the successful coup of 25 April 1974 (moment 2). It also includes the electoral processes that took place in April of 1975 (moment 14) and 1976 (moment 20); politically defining moments such as the resignation of General Spínola after an attempt to overturn the power equilibrium in his favour in late September 1974 (moment 7); the approval by the MFA of the communist backed proposal of a Unitarian union in January 1975 against the pluralistic union proposal backed by the socialists (moment 8); the period of several institutional and military crises that became known as «Hot Summer», in 1975 (moment 16); as well as, during the entire period, the decolonization process (moment 5).

Moments of «particular interest» require that a minority of newspapers devoted editorials to. Included in this category are the assault on the Spanish Diplomatic representations in Lisbon and Oporto following the five death penalties carried out on 27 September 1975 by the Francoist regime (moment 17), as well as the tense moment that preceded the failed left-wing coup of 25 November 1975 (moment 18).

Finally, by «individual moments» we mean events that only one of the five newspapers devoted attention to. For *Arriba*, that was the case with the animosity towards the Spanish national selection during the Roller Hockey World Championship in Lisbon (moment 4) and Portugal standing firmly as a counter-model by March 1975, even before the failed coup of March 11<sup>th</sup> (moment 11). *ABC* was the only newspaper to report the moment when the new functions of the Junta were announced (moment 9), Vasco Gonçalves' speech about MFA's vision for Portugal's future (moment 10), both in February 1975, and the complete *República*

affair (moment 15). For *La Vanguardia Española* these moments correspond to Mário Soares' declarations about a common path towards the common market Europe for both Portugal and Spain (moment 6) and the imprisonment of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho following the turn of events of November 25<sup>th</sup> (moment 19). Finally, for *Informaciones* and *Tele/eXprés* this includes the threats made by the Socialist party about abandoning the I Government because of disagreements with the *Junta de Salvação Nacional* about the decolonization process (moment 3), as well as Admiral Rosa Coutinho's declarations just before the 1975 elections (moment 13).

#### f) Specific content selection: Multistage sample

From these five newspapers we first selected all the types of articles that could be related to the Portuguese events, including photos, cartoons, agency communiqués, agency news or news services, interviews, news reports, correspondent and special correspondent chronicles, opinion articles and editorials. Agency news and news services were mostly used as sources to characterize each newspaper in terms of their use of foreign information (Part II) and were not included in the corpus later subject to a more in-depth analysis.

Likewise, we considered that, in general, images should be the object of an independent study. This has already been partly done by Francisco Segado Boj (2008; 2012), who in his analysis of humoristic drawings reached several findings, namely that regarding external affairs, the Portuguese revolution was the third most represented subject in the Spanish press (following the retreat of the Spanish troops from the Sahara and the Spanish relationship with the Common European Market, whose coverage the author explains by geographic proximity and Spanish involvement). A second finding was that the highpoint of the interest about the Portuguese events was in 1975, and disappeared with the end of

the radicalization. Lastly, the author found that newspaper *Ya* «ridicules the extreme attention that the mass media, especially the radio, devoted to the Portuguese revolution»<sup>xi</sup> (2008: 197-198). According to Segado Boj, this was due to the liberalization that radio, contrary to television, was undergoing. Still, in the present study images are taken into consideration when, accompanied by a text, they reinforce or disregard a given discourse.

Before detailing further the content of the corpus, it should be reminded that the Latin/Continental European journalistic tradition is opposed to the Anglo-Saxon one in its genre division, in the sense that instead of two broad genres – «story» and «comment» – it includes three: «information», «interpretation» and «opinion» (Martínez Albertos 1983).

Among the different conceptualizations of this tradition, for the purposes of the present work we adopt Héctor Borrat's division between «narrative» and «comment» texts (1989). A «narrative» texts category includes both «information» and «interpretation» genres. The informative genre, whose goal is to describe or narrate events, encompasses strictly objective informative texts, notes and news reports (Martínez Albertos 1983). On the other hand, the interpretative genre intends to «offer an interpretative framework of reality»<sup>xii</sup> (Martínez Albertos 1992, 279), and is considered a hybrid genre that takes on the textual form of news reports, interviews and chronicles. A «comment» texts category includes opinion or the «argumentation» genre (Borrat 1989; Casasús and Núñez Ladevéze 1991), sometimes also referred to as «a genre for comment and opinion» (Martínez Albertos 1983, Gomis 1989 and Santamaría 1990) or an «evaluative genre» (van Dijk 1990). This category, then, includes all the journalistic genres that convey judgements about the certain events, namely opinion articles, columns, critical reviews, editorials, letters to the editor and comic strips (Borrat 1989).

For moments of «individual» and «particular interest», the sample of specific content is based solely on «comment» texts, in particular editorial comments, columns and opinion articles. On the contrary, moments of «generalized interest» include both «narrative» and «comment» categories, such as editorials, columns, opinion articles, interviews, news report, as well as correspondent and special correspondent chronicles that fall within the «informative» or the «interpretative» genre, and in some cases have an «argumentation» status. In fact, hybridity is such a definitive feature of the journalistic genres and its typologies in the Spanish press – given that a news report or an interview might be presented as a correspondent or special correspondent chronicle, for instance – that we chose to work with four categories organizing the different typologies: «Editorial Column», «Article», «Correspondent Chronicle» and «Special Correspondent Chronicle».

In some special cases we decided to include front covers, comic strips or illustrations in the sample, although no systematic study of these elements is proposed.

### g) The corpus

The corpus used, then, is composed of the 90 editorials published by these five newspapers and the special content selected by dividing it into 20 moments of three different types. Once it was selected, the corpus reached through the multistage sampling was organized by category – «Editorial Column», «Article», «Correspondent Chronicle» and «Special Correspondent Chronicle» –, and arranged in four chronological series (one for each category) that were coded according to the moment they belonged to. The serial process included all the bibliographic data of each piece, as well as quotations.

The corpus used for the second part of the present work includes a total of 960 texts (comprising 90 editorials, 208 articles, 286 special correspondent chronicles and 376 correspondent chronicles), which are divided by moments and categories in table 5 below:

Moments	Nº of Editorial comments	Nº of Articles	Nº of Special Correspondent chronicles	Nº of Correspondent chronicles
1	4	8	31 <sup>46</sup>	11
2	10	16	61	14
3	1	-	-	-
4	1	1	1	-
5	13	26	50 <sup>47</sup>	-
6	1	-	-	-
7	4	15	1	22
8	6	19	-	43 <sup>48</sup>
9	2	1	-	1 <sup>49</sup>
10	1	-	-	1 <sup>26</sup>
11	1	-	-	-
12	6	11	8 <sup>50</sup>	31 <sup>25</sup>
13	1	-	-	-
14	8	16	33	74 <sup>25</sup>
15	4	5	-	11 <sup>26</sup>
16	14	39	7	39
17	5	6	-	15 <sup>26</sup>
18	2	34	52 <sup>26</sup>	65 <sup>26</sup>
19	1	2	-	3 <sup>26</sup>
20	5	9	42	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>286</b>	<b>376</b>

**Table 5 Distribution of the corpus by moments and categories**

If the corpus is distributed by authorship, we have 9 correspondents authoring a total of 376 chronicles, 32 special

<sup>46</sup> Included in here is the set of 5 articles «Portugal, en su calma» written by JL Gómez Tello.

<sup>47</sup> For the purposes of this analysis, we consider Alberto Míguez a Special Correspondent in Africa even though he was *La Vanguardia Española*'s correspondent.

<sup>48</sup> From mid-January until late-June 1975, Eduardo Barrenechea's work is more of a Correspondent than a Special correspondent, therefore within this timeframe the pieces were counted as Correspondent Chronicles.

<sup>49</sup> These pieces were regarded as «comments» of an argumentation genre, due to their hybridity.

<sup>50</sup> Special correspondents sent to Badajoz, not Portugal.

correspondents (two of them collaborators and a «curious journalist») authoring a total of 286 chronicles) and 59 «commentators» signing a total of 208 pieces: 65 (of 159) published in *Arriba*, 49 (of 106) in *Tele/eXprés*, 44 (of 135) in *ABC*, 27 (of 52) in *Informaciones*, and 23 (of 65) in *La Vanguardia Española*. Among the latter, the most prolific commentators were authors of regular columns such as José Javayoles («El Meridiano Mundial») in *ABC* (50), J.L. Gómez Tello («El Mundo») in *Arriba* (50), Jaume Miravittles («Una voz al margen») in *Tele/eXprés* (46), who also published articles in the section «Firmas» in *Informaciones* (7), Augusto Assia («Los problemas y los hombres») in *La Vanguardia Española* (28), Pedro Rodríguez («el Pendulo») in *Arriba* (28), Manuel Vázquez Montálban («Del alfiler al elefante») in *Tele/eXprés* (20/7).

From table 6 we withdrew non-signed articles (or articles signed by the newspaper), including columns.

<b>Name</b>	<b>Newspaper</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Number</b>
** (Manuel Ibáñez Escofet)	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Adrián Mac Liman	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Special Correspondent	1 (of 1)
Albert Abril <sup>51</sup>	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Special Correspondent	8 (of 8)
Alberto Miguez	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Correspondent	102 (of 494)
Alberto Miguez	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Special Correspondent	25 (of 25)
AMC	<i>Arriba</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Andrés Kramer	<i>Arriba</i>	Correspondent	29 (of 86)
Ángel Luis de la Calle	<i>Informaciones</i>	Special Correspondent	5 (of 7)
Antonio Alférez	<i>ABC</i>	Special Correspondent	11 (of 11)
Antonio Calle	<i>ABC</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Arturo Bonpaix	<i>Arriba</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Augusto Assia	<i>La Vanguardia</i>	Special	34 (of 42)

<sup>51</sup> Pieces written with Quim Monzó.

	<i>Española</i>	Correspondent	
Augusto Assia	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Article	4 (of 28)
B	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Article	4 (of 5)
Baltasar Porcel	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Article	2 (of 4)
Bernabé Pertusa	<i>Arriba</i>	Special Correspondent	1 (of 1)
Carlos Sentís	<i>Informaciones</i>	Article	1 (of 4)
Consuelo Martínez	<i>Arriba</i>	Special Correspondent	4 (of 4)
Domingo Manfredi Cano	<i>Arriba</i>	Article	2 (of 4)
Eduardo Barrenechea	<i>Informaciones</i>	Correspondent	42 (of 100)
Eduardo Barrenechea	<i>Informaciones</i>	Special Correspondent	15 (of 19)
Eduardo Corregedor da Fonseca	<i>Informaciones</i>	Correspondent	6 (of 36)
Eduardo Freitas da Costa	<i>Informaciones</i>	Article	1 (of 2)
Emilio Lozano	<i>ABC</i>	Article	1 (of 4)
Fernando Jáuregui	<i>Arriba</i>	Correspondent	28 (of 212)
Fernando Jáuregui	<i>Informaciones</i>	Special Correspondent	12 (of 12)
Fernando Onega	<i>Arriba</i>	Article	4 (of 8)
Florentino Pérez-Embid	<i>ABC</i>	Article	2 (of 3)
Francisco Caparrós	<i>Arriba</i>	Special Correspondent	5 (of 5)
Gerardo González	<i>Informaciones</i>	Article	6 (of 10)
Gómez del Prado	<i>Arriba (ALFIL)</i>	Special Correspondent	1 (of 1)
Guillermo Diaz-Plaja	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Inocente Palazón de Olivares	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Correspondent	4 (of 18)
J. M. Casasús	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
J. Martin	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
J.A. González Casanova	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	2 (of 4)
J.A. González Casanova	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
J.A. González Casanova	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Special Correspondent	6 (of 6)



J.L. Gómez Tello	<i>Arriba</i>	Special Correspondent	5 (of 5)
J.L. Gómez Tello	<i>Arriba</i>	Article	40 (of 50)
Jaime Vergara	<i>Informaciones</i>	Special Correspondent	3 (of 3)
Jaume Miravittles	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	21 (of 46)
Jaume Miravittles	<i>Informaciones</i>	Article	5 (of 7)
Javier Figuero	<i>Arriba</i>	Special Correspondent	3 (of 3)
Javier M. Padilla	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Special Correspondent	9 (of 9)
Jesús Feyo	<i>Arriba</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Jesús Suevos	<i>Arriba</i>	Article	5 (of 8)
Joan Fuster	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	2 (of 4)
Joan Fuster <sup>52</sup>	<i>Informaciones</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Joaquin Garrigues Walker	<i>Informaciones</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Joaquin Garrigues Walker <sup>53</sup>	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Jordi Borja	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	5 (of 5)
Jorge Ventura	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	3 (of 3)
José Javayoles	<i>ABC</i>	Article	27 (of 50)
José Jimenez Blanco	<i>Informaciones</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
José M <sup>a</sup> Areliza	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
José M <sup>a</sup> Ruiz-Gallardón	<i>ABC</i>	Article	5 (of 5)
José Mario Armero	<i>ABC</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
José Reis	<i>Arriba</i>	Correspondent	58 (of 363)
José Rey	<i>Arriba</i>	Special Correspondent	5 (of 5)
José Salas y Guirior	<i>ABC</i>	Correspondent	106 (of 518)
Josep Ramoneda	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Curious Journalist	2 (of 2)
Josep Ramoneda	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	1 (of 3)
Juan Luis Calleja	<i>ABC</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Juan Ramón Pérez Clotas	<i>Arriba</i>	Special Correspondent	3 (of 12)
Julio Alonso	<i>ABC</i>	Article	1 (of 1)

<sup>52</sup> Publication of an article that had been previously published in *Tele/eXprés*.

<sup>53</sup> Publication of an article that had been previously published in *Informaciones*.

Julio Colomer	<i>Informaciones</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Luis Carandell	<i>Informaciones</i>	Special Correspondent	14 (of 14)
Luis Emilio Arias Llorca	<i>Informaciones</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Luis Mendez Dominguez	<i>Informaciones</i>	Article	4 (of 7)
Luis Reyes	<i>Informaciones</i>	Special Correspondent	7 (of 7)
M. Blanco Tobio	<i>Arriba</i>	Article	1 (of 3)
Manuel Alcantara	<i>Arriba</i>	Article	3 (of 5)
Manuel Aznar	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Article	3 (of 8)
Manuel Campo	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Special Correspondent	8 (of 8)
Manuel Fernández Areal	<i>ABC</i>	Article	1 (of)
Manuel Leguineche	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Special Correspondent	10 (of 10)
Manuel Vázquez Montalbán	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Special Correspondent	3 (of 3)
Manuel Vázquez Montalbán	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	7 (of 20)
Margarita Sáenz-Diez	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Special Correspondent	4 (of 4)
Martin Maqueda	<i>Informaciones</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Maximo	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Pablo Magaz	<i>ABC</i>	Special Correspondent	41 (of 41)
Paulo Correia da Fonseca	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Correspondent	1 (of 5)
Pedro Crespo	<i>ABC</i>	Article	1 (of)
Pedro Gómez Aparício	<i>Arriba</i>	Article	2 (of 3)
Pedro Oriol Costa	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Quim Monzó <sup>54</sup>	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Special Correspondent	8 (of 8)
R. Mazo	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Rabanal de Brito	<i>ABC</i>	Special Correspondent	3 (of 3)
Rafael LaFuente	<i>Arriba</i>	Article	3 (of 5)
Ramón Bayot y Serrat	<i>Arriba</i>	Article	1 (of 1)

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<sup>54</sup> Pieces that were written with Albert Abril.

Ramón Trias Fargas	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Ricardo de Olague	<i>Informaciones</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Roberto de Arenzaga	<i>ABC</i>	Article	1 (of 2)
Salvador López de la Torre	<i>Arriba</i>	Special Correspondent	15 (of 15)
Salvador Millet y Bel	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Article	1 (of 3)
Santiago Nadal	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Article	3 (of 4)
Tono	<i>Arriba</i>	Article	1 (of 3)
Vicent Ventura	<i>Informaciones</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Vicent Ventura	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	1 (of 2)
Xavier Barbe	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	1 (of 1)
Xavier Roig	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Special Correspondent	23(of 23)
Xavier Roig	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	Article	1 (of 3)

**Table 6 Distribution of the corpus by authorship**

## h) Biographic form

Finally, to undertake a systematic collection of data about each of these authors published in the Spanish press (whether journalists, columnists or occasional collaborators), we used the following Biographic Form, also used by Jaume Guillamet (cf. 2014):

1. **Name**
2. **Place and date of birth**
3. **Place and date of death**
4. **Profession or main activity**
5. **Profession or secondary activity**
6. **Publications, functions, dates**
7. **Books published**
8. **Activities related with Journalism**
9. **Other career highlights**
10. **Family connections to journalism**
11. **Family connections to activities related with Journalism**
12. **Incidents**
13. **Bibliography and references**

Each author's data was gathered and organized according with the categories of the form. All this information can be found in appendix II.

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**Original quotes:**

<sup>i</sup> «Decía Mark Twain que algunas de las peores cosas de su vida no habían llegado a sucederle. Algunas de las revoluciones mejores de la mía les han sucedido a otros. La primera alegría política desbordada de la que tengo recuerdo me sucedió una tarde de finales de abril en Madrid, en 1974, cuando compré el diario Informaciones, que era el que leíamos los antifranquistas, y vi el titular que anunciaba la Revolución de los Claveles en Lisboa. La dictadura acababa de caer, pero había caído al otro lado de la frontera. Para muchos de nosotros la ebriedad de la liberación no era menos estimulante por que fuesen otros los que estaban viviéndola. Tenía un reverso de esperanza, y otro de melancolía. Igual que veía uno las películas queriendo imaginarse que era él quien abrazaba a Fay Dunaway y no Warren Beauty, así miraba las fotos de la gente que se lanzaba vestida a las fuentes de la plaza del Rossio o que trepaba a las orugas de los carros de combate para poner claveles en los fusiles de los soldados. El hábito fortalecido por la literatura y el cine de vivir vicariamente las vidas de otros y de imaginar que las cosas que nos importaban sucedían en lugares y tiempos ajenos a los nuestros se trasladaba intacto a la experiencia política.»

<sup>ii</sup> «caracterizar um momento, evocar uma possibilidade, medir a sua insuficiência ou indagar sobre o passado»

<sup>iii</sup> «previsão de uma influência indirecta em Espanha»

<sup>iv</sup> «cuyo agrupamiento depende más de la coincidencia de ciertos nombres en los consejos de administración que de una voluntad unitaria de la empresa»

<sup>v</sup> «modula su discurso de acuerdo con parámetros franquistas, de aceptación del marco jurídico-político aun cuando se apueste eventualmente por su “desarrollo” o “actualización”»

<sup>vi</sup> «igual que ocurre con las familias del régimen, el cemento que unifica y consolida el conglomerado no es otro que el liderazgo de Franco y la fidelidad difusa a su obra. (...)»

<sup>vii</sup> «Lo común es la aceptación del marco político como definitivo y la legitimidad del mismo como indiscutible y, sobre todo, la consideración de toda la alternativa democrática como indeseable y subversiva.»

<sup>viii</sup> «representan un espectro amplio de posiciones democráticas y rupturistas, con fuerte componente de izquierda»

<sup>ix</sup> «Este país tiene que variar su óptica respecto al futuro. Mas para ello tendría que estar enterado, informado el pueblo, de verdad, de qué es lo que sucede en sus colonias.»

<sup>x</sup> «En el caso de *Tele/eXprés*, interpretábamos que lo que había que hacer era empujar a favor de la democracia desde una perspectiva, digamos, de izquierda o centro izquierda.»

<sup>xi</sup> «O jornal é entendido como um universo (onde se cruzam temas, indivíduos e discursos) que não é nem reflexo nem explicação de uma realidade exterior, mas algo como um acontecimento, ou um conjunto de acontecimentos em forma de texto, que se dá num contexto (o meio cultural dos anos 30) que, assim, ajuda a

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explicar (...) O Jornal não é ilustrador da existência (...) nem narrador dessas realidades, mas um meio através do qual todos esses protagonistas existem e constroem a realidade daquele momento.»

<sup>xii</sup> «no existe ni puede existir una verdadera opinión pública. Si podemos hablar de ella, es porque se ha escindido irremediabilmente en dos sucedáneos de opinión pública, ninguno de los cuáles por sí mismo, ni ambos conjuntamente considerados, pueden ser tenidos por una opinión pública en sentido normativo (liberal), ni en sentido psico-social (democracia de masas)»

<sup>xiii</sup> «dos culturas políticas, dos subsistemas de comunicación política y dos subsistemas de opinion pública, en convivencia no pacífica»

<sup>xiv</sup> «a imprensa do chamado bloco socialista estava sujeita a apertadas formas de controlo político e ideológico, imprimindo apenas o que correspondia à linha oficial e reforçava as teses do poder»

<sup>xv</sup> «Todos os meios de comunicação reflectem a sua posição perante o processo português em consonância com a linha editorial que representam (...) Em última análise, nos meios de comunicação espanhóis, o debate sobre a situação portuguesa serviu para explicitar a saída para o franquismo. A Revolução foi criticada em bloco ou defendida parcialmente, mas foi de facto considerada unanimemente por toda a direita, centro e esquerda moderada como um processo que não se podia, nem devia importar.»

<sup>xvi</sup> «Era claro que as notícias referentes a Portugal tinham uma leitura espanhola»

<sup>xvii</sup> «O jornalista inscreve-se, pela sua própria praxis, na realidade que descreve. Transporta, em si, a Lebenswelt, conceito que Habermas retirou da fenomenologia de Husserl para designar aquele nível profundo de um grupo, de uma colectividade, onde se enraízam linguagens, normas e comportamentos comuns. Paralelamente, estabelece com o jornal para o qual escreve uma relação mimética que o conduz a reproduzir o léxico e os valores desse mesmo jornal. Actua assim, duplamente, como sujeito de um discurso dialógico no sentido bakhtianiano do termo, e como membro de um colectivo profissional com regras e projectos próprios.»

<sup>xviii</sup> «No solían ser noticias de agencia; todos los diarios mantuvieron corresponsales habituales en Lisboa, que casi a diario, enviaban sus crónicas (...) telefónicamente; y eso al margen de otros enviados especiales en momentos críticos»

<sup>xix</sup> «el clima de liberalización de los años en los que Pío Cabanillas dirigió el Ministerio de Información»

<sup>xx</sup> «notables periodistas españoles adscritos a otras publicaciones madrileñas»

<sup>xxi</sup> «(...) objetivos políticos del diario para el que trabaja: apoyar la restauración monárquica en la persona de don Juan de Borbón, conde de Barcelona, heredero legítimo del último rey de España.»

<sup>xxii</sup> «acatament automàtic a les institucions triomfants i defensa, sense discussió possible, de l'ordre establert»

<sup>xxiii</sup> (...) la seva identitat històrica de diari liberal, conservador, monàrquic i, tot i que sempre diligent amb l'autoritat del moment, independent. I tot això sense radicalismes, amb moderació i tranquil·litat, fet que, per exemple, explica que no secundés algunes de les vagues de protesta que es van realitzar a la premsa durant

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aquells anys o que fins tres anys després de la mort de Franco no s'elimini l'adjectiu española de la capçalera.

<sup>xxiv</sup> «Dentro del dilema entre continuismo y aperturismo que caracterizó a la vida política y a la periodística durante los últimos años de la dictadura de Franco, *La Vanguardia* se alineó con quienes intentaban la apertura del régimen (...) Lo hizo dentro de unos límites políticos conocidos, al tiempo que intentaba recuperar su identidad histórico liberal-conservadora, burguesa y monárquica. (...) Los modos aperturistas de *La Vanguardia* fueron normalmente suaves en las formas pero decididos en el fondo. (...) la querencia antinacionalista y antimarxista del conde Godó fue motivo de bastantes de sus quejas, que en más de una ocasión tenían como destinatarios a periodistas o colaboradores del propio diario.»

<sup>xxv</sup> «La primera alegría política desbordada de la que recuerdo me sucedió una tarde de finales de abril en Madrid, en 1974, cuando compré el diario *Informaciones*, que era el que leíamos los antifranquistas, y vi el titular que anunciaba la Revolución de los Claveles en Lisboa.»

<sup>xxvi</sup> «La politización de los periodistas que en él trabajaban, sobre todo los afines al PSC y los proclives al PSUC, no pasaba inadvertida a Ibàñez Escofet, que trataba de contenerla para que el periódico no sufriera las consecuencias»

<sup>xxvii</sup> «el que després sería el PSC-PSOE i el PSUC, fins que una maniobra molt pensada va fer dels primers amos de la situació.»

<sup>xxviii</sup> «vespertino culto de centro-izquierda»

<sup>xxix</sup> «sin aceptación popular»

<sup>xxx</sup> «Con su pequeño formato (invariable hasta nuestros días), su apoyo en el elemento gráfico, su carácter dinámico en lo informativo y en la autopromoción»

<sup>xxxi</sup> «acató la decisión por obediencia a la ley política y política de hechos consumados. Se quebraba el principio de legitimación hereditaria pero se salvaba la institución monárquica.»

<sup>xxxii</sup> «continuos vaivenes entre su viejo espíritu liberal y el continuismo franquista»

<sup>xxxiii</sup> «Por su exclusivismo político que le llevaba a presentarse como definidor de la ortodoxia del régimen, era mirado con recelo por la prensa independiente. Esta le criticaba su dogmatismo y su parcialidad falangista cuando debía servir, por definición legal del Movimiento, a todos los españoles y no sólo a una parte de ellos»

<sup>xxxiv</sup> « Yo no dimití. Fui destituido, que es distinto. (...) Fui destituido porque el presidente de Gobierno (Carlos Arias Navarro) se enfadó mucho, muchísimo, porque *Arriba* no había publicado ningún artículo conmemorativo del “espíritu del doce de febrero”. Ya se sabe los liberales son así. Lo que no sabía el señor presidente es que yo recibí orden de no publicar nada al efecto, pero ésa es otra historia. Yo, por supuesto, nunca creí en ese espíritu; me parecía un fenomenal buñuelo de viento. Fue una maniobra tosca para cesarme.»

<sup>xxxv</sup> «Diario político de avisos y Noticias. Órgano del partido Constitucional de la Provincia»

<sup>xxxvi</sup> «La rentabilidad económica era, desde su punto de vista, junto con la estructura básicamente familiar de la empresa, la base imprescindible para la independencia del diario.»

<sup>xxxvii</sup> «Igual al que ocurrió en el caso del Diario de Barcelona, quienes llevaron el peso de la iniciativa de nombrar director de Tele/eXprés a Manuel Ibàñez Escofet

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en 1968 fueron los hombres de La Vanguardia: Sáenz Guerrero en primer lugar y Javier Godó y Manuel Aznar después. (...) Aunque se le dejó un amplio margen de autonomía, la tutela del grupo Godó siguió estando presente, máxime cuando el vespertino no acababa de cuajar. Los nombramientos se hacían desde La Vanguardia. (...) Horacio Sáenz Guerrero solía representar a menudo a Godó ante los directores de los otros diarios del grupo, creándose así una situación peculiar por lo que suponía, para los periodistas que lo hacían, la supervisión directa o indirecta por parte del director del principal diario de la ciudad.»

<sup>xxxviii</sup> «El desig de posar el "Tele/Exprés" dins l'orbita del socialisme, que començava a dibuixar-se com un partit amb ambicions de govern, fou el motor de l'acció. La mateixa operació portada a terme per la joventut del PSOE, liquidant les barbes històriques i les supervivents de la Guerra civil, es repetia en la petita escala del diari del carrer Tallers.»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «La importancia creciente del Grup democràtic de Periodistes se vio reflejada con claridad en el hecho de que, en el momento de la muerte de Franco, sus miembros ocupaban importantes cargos en la Asociación de Prensa de Barcelona y puestos de responsabilidad como directores o subdirectores en casi todos los diarios de la ciudad. A finales del 1976, y con la reforma política ya en ciernes, por vía de hecho el Grup dejó de existir.»

<sup>xl</sup> «ridiculiza la extrema atención que los medios de información, en especial los radiofónicos, prestan a la revolución portuguesa»

<sup>xli</sup> «ofrecer un cuadro interpretativo de la realidad»





**Part II.**  
**The Backstage: Informative and political contingencies in the material conditions of news production.**



«Spaniards have reached in 1974 the highest level of freedom of the last decades. We are still far away from other European countries, but today things are said and published in Spain, which were unthinkable only two or three years ago»<sup>55</sup>, claimed Luís María Ansón, deputy editor-in-chief of *ABC*<sup>55</sup>, two days after the Portuguese *coup d'état* of 25 April.

At that moment Pío Cabanillas was already in charge of the Ministry of Information and Tourism (MIT). Furthermore, only a few months earlier, Carlos Arias Navarro, who replaced the late Carrero Blanco as prime-minister, had announced new times of *aperturismo* for Spain, inaugurating what would become the opposing discourse to *inmovilismo*<sup>56</sup>, the two main features of institutional late-Francoism. For historian Javier Tusell, *aperturismo* «never meant substantial transformation but did suggest a desire to loosen the severe controls that had been in place in earlier times. It did not mean anything beyond change within the regime, and it certainly did not mean a regime change» (2007:211). In fact, since the beginning of Arias Navarro government, between January and April 1974, two death penalties - Heinz Chez and Salvador Puig Antich - were carried out on 2 March; Bilbao's Bishop, *Monseñor* Añoveros, was put under house arrest; and 325 political arrests took place (Sánchez 1993).

Within the boundaries of *aperturismo*, this rhetorical idea of Spain reaching new limits in terms of freedom of the press, as if it were an unavoidable path, maintained its presence and was somehow reiterated by León Herrera, who in October 1974 replaced Cabanillas as head of the MIT, despite the increase of sanctions targeting the press during his stint – from 11% to 26% of indictments resulting in sanctions (Chuliá 2001, 209), particularly by reinforcing the norms on political, rather than just

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<sup>55</sup> Ansón, Luís María. 1974. «La evolución política», *ABC*, April 27, pp.23

<sup>56</sup> *Aperturismo* and *Inmovilismo* might be roughly translated as openness/political liberalization and immobility/politics not open to change.

moral, justification for it (Barrera 1995, 156). Almost a year later Herrera reiterates that:

The press is reaching limits that it did not reach before (...) When I presented myself for the first time before you, in the very same room as today, on 7 November 1974, I told you that I was not coming to close anything that was open or to restrain anything that was ongoing, and told you as well how I understood the practice of freedom of the press and how I understood that this channel of freedom of the press could be as wide as possible, but it would necessarily have some limits that should not be crossed and I would also say some bridges that should not be crossed either in width or in height.<sup>ii57</sup>

Despite how Ansón and Herrera constructed the Spanish reality of the freedom of the press in their public allocutions, as heading towards the right path or, using Herrera's metaphor, as a river to be contained, when considering how a typical Spaniard could inform himself about what was happening in the country next door, one realizes that the publicly available information was probably not as freely produced and distributed as Ansón and Herrera had suggested.

The term backstage is therefore used in this part as the informative and political contingencies that surrounded the production of news in the Spanish press in this period, and in particular the material conditions under which the Spanish discourse about the Portuguese revolutionary process is produced. These contingencies can be summed up under three different issues: the structure of the Spanish information system itself, which privileged the public, and therefore official or governmental, media; the role of the MIT in the above mentioned information system and, lastly, some habits of forcing the limits forged by

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<sup>57</sup> «Consejo de Ministros-Señor Herrera Esteban, a los informadores políticos: “La prensa está rozando límites que antes no alcanzaba”». 1975. *Informaciones*, April 5, pp.6.

the search of information, which will help us to put into perspective the weight of the above mentioned information system in Spanish society.

## **1. The fundamental role of private newspapers**

As it was mentioned previously, the Francoist informative system was in great part dominated by the State, leaving in private hands only the possibility of publishing press. The private press had, therefore a fundamental role in this system, without nevertheless having a univocal place in it as well. As such, other informative channels composed the Spanish panorama, without achieving, as it will be seen, the role had by newspapers.

### **1.1 Television**

As we have seen, the only television in Spain at the time was TVE, and its coverage of Portuguese events – not the subject of the present dissertation – was widely criticized. Firstly, among the different media in Spain, TVE was the closest to power. When the situation in Portugal erupted, a TVE crew lead by Manuel Alcalá was thus sent immediately under a direct order from the MIT Minister, Pío Cabanillas, who wanted a complete report on what was going on in Portugal probably to make sure the MIT was duly informed.

Because Cabanillas also wanted other government members to watch this report, a session in the MIT film theatre was organized eight days later. According to the Portuguese weekly *Expresso*,<sup>58</sup> apart from Pío Cabanillas and the Council President himself, Carlos Arias Navarro, the Ministers of Internal and Foreign Affairs and members of the three

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<sup>58</sup> Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), Ministerio de Información y Turismo (MIT), “Cultura”, box: 42/9049, dossier “Dirección general de coordinación informativa/ Subdirección general de documentación y análisis/ Serie C – España en el exterior/ Información sobre España en la prensa de Portugal/ (27 de Abril a 10 de Octubre de 1974)”, “Día 25 de Mayo de 1974 ‘EXPRESSO Revista”.

branches of the Armed Forces were also present in this session. «One of my colleagues, after the screening, commented on how a *Guardia Civil* squat would have ended all right away»<sup>59</sup>, remarked Pío Cabanillas in Victoria Prego's documentary – *La Transición* –, one of the elements of the official history of the Spanish democratic transition. With hindsight and carefully distancing himself from the events, Cabanillas denounces the contemporary scorn caused by the rapid downfall of the Portuguese regime, and the trust in the repressive mechanisms of the Spanish one, felt by part of the Spanish elite.

The session reportedly lasted nearly three hours and the news report included footage of the first week of the new Portuguese regime: the May 1<sup>st</sup> demonstration, the arrivals of the socialist and communist leaders, Mário Soares and Álvaro Cunhal, several other demonstrations and interviews with some of the political leaders. This footage was considered important enough for a version with more than one hour to be sent both to Francisco Franco and Juan Carlos de Borbón, but it was not made available to the general public.

Apart from Manuel Alcalá's special mission, TVE's *Informe semanal* aired on April 27 1974<sup>60</sup> was also devoted to the Portuguese situation. But even though TVE had sent a crew to Portugal, this news program was produced using old footage. Images presented were mostly of the African countryside – displaying both troops and African populations – and of official military ceremonies. In a way, the voice over does not match the footage. The chronicle dealt with current events taking

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<sup>59</sup> Pío Cabanillas' statement in *La Transición*, chapter 3, dir. by Victoria Prego (1995; TVE, VHS)

<sup>60</sup>Cf. “El pronunciamiento militar del 25 de abril en Portugal”, 27 Apr. 1974, “Informe Semanal”, RTVE [RTVE Archive, <http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/informe-semanal/informe-semanal-pronunciamiento-militar-del-25-abril-1974-portugal/478106/> (accessed on 2013.04.09 12:54)]

place in metropolitan Portugal, namely in Lisbon, whereas the images mostly depicted the African territories. It was a program focused on the figure of General Spínola and presented the coup as a «direct consequence» of the publication of *Portugal e o Futuro* [Portugal and the Future], the book authored by the latter and issued in February 1974.

The colonial solution presented by the General, according to TVE, entailed the independence and integration of these territories in a «Luso-Brazilian-African-community». No reference was made to the Captains Movement's action *per se*, although the piece mentioned that Spínola's ideas did not exactly match the latter's, and were rather the outcome of debates among the opposition movements. Spínola is presented, in the middle of triumphant music *in crescendo*, as the origin of the whole process: «Spiritually, he was the one who made the young officers' movement possible»,<sup>iii</sup> states the *Informe Semanal*.

From this contrast – between the single action of a general presented to the public, and the street and political movements described by *Expresso* and reported to the political elite – it can be inferred that Spanish elites were provided with information that was withheld from the broader Spanish public. This can be considered one of the main characteristics of the dialectic between visibility/invisibility that the coverage of the Portuguese events was subjected to.

Conversely, as early as June 1974, TVE was considered biased and was accused of emphasizing the disruptive side of events in Portugal, as argued by Manuel Vázquez Montálban: «(...) Up until now things are going quite well in Portugal, despite TVE's efforts to convince us that Portugal is nothing but uncontrolled and striking chaos»<sup>iv61</sup>. In fact, TVE was criticized not only in the Spanish press but also by the Portuguese press and authorities, though the latter in a context of distrust regarding

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<sup>61</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, M.1974. «USA y la Península Ibérica», *Tele-eXprés*, June 19, pp.14

not only Spanish media in particular but also several Western media that were reporting on the revolution.

At some point, Portuguese media and authorities started identifying TVE as well as other Spanish media as the enemy. Street violence against journalists covering events in revolutionary Portugal was also an issue, not only when they seemed to represent a fascist State, like the Spanish ones, but also when they were identified, rightly or not, with the CIA or Imperialistic agents. Hence both types of aggression were perpetrated against perceived enemies of the Portuguese revolutionary process.

Such was the case of Christopher Reed, for instance, an English photojournalist from *the Guardian*, and five other foreign correspondents<sup>62</sup>. Reed wrote a chronicle on 10 March 1975 narrating the beating he had suffered in Setúbal the previous Friday, 7 March, while covering a leftist demonstration against the Popular Democratic Party [*Partido Popular Democrático PPD*] in the area, which resulted in one casualty and twenty-seven injured. According to Antonio Parra, *pyresa* and *Arriba's* correspondent in London, the military controlling the event were passive and even indifferent when faced with the violence exerted on journalists, who were accused by the mob of being CIA agents. Parra also mentions the sorrow felt in Fleet Street, home of the national British press until the 1980s, especially since *the Guardian* had been an enthusiastic supporter of the Portuguese revolutionary process from the start. In *the Guardian's* editorial of the same day the Communist Party (PCP) is furthermore accused of sabotage of the on-going electoral process, since victory in the fast approaching elections was likely far from becoming a

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<sup>62</sup> Some sources claim the other five journalists were North American citizens. (AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box:42/9117, "Visión informativa de agencias extranjeras Día 11-03-1975, Turno 21 a 03, pág. 9") Rebelo (1994:88) claims they were journalists Martha Cal, in fact a North American citizen, and her husband, Peter Collins, an Englishman, but does not mention Reed.



reality. Sabotage was reportedly taking the form of «renting the services of leftist subversive organizations» in order to cause chaos in the streets or «defaming all non-revolutionary left-wing forces as fascists». For *the Guardian*, explains Parra, all hope lies precisely in the union of the non-revolutionary forces to prevent the «Marxist threat» of establishing a «communist dictatorship». Finally, civil war is the expected outcome for the British press other than *the Guardian*, claims António Parra.<sup>63</sup>

Subsequently, in late-August 1975, during what is understood to constitute a similar crisis to that of September 1974 or March 1975, the Portuguese service of the BBC reports two episodes of restrictions to the work of foreign television crews in Portugal. On the same day, 25 August, two German journalists working for the American Broadcaster NBC in Oporto were «savagely battered by a leftist mob who accused them of working for the Central Intelligence [sic] Agency»<sup>64</sup>; and in Lisbon three journalists working for British Independent Television News were arrested for five hours when filming the 5<sup>th</sup> Division Headquarters, where a crisis was developing that night. *Diário de Lisboa* mentions only one German reporter, Georg Horct Peter Dehmel, and provides contradictory versions of the event, but confirms that the motivation for the aggression was the suspicion that Georg Dehmel was a member of the CIA<sup>65</sup>.

Albeit for different reasons, Spanish journalist Francisco Sendil was also the victim of violence. The special correspondent for *el Noticiero Universal*, a daily from Barcelona, was attacked in Porto, where a meeting of PPD was being held, on 22 March in the middle of a scuffle between a group of young communists and another group of non-identified youth (according to *Europa Press* citing *el Noticiero Universal*) or young leftists

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<sup>63</sup> AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9117, “Periodista ingles apeleado en Setubal”, 10 Mar. 1975.

<sup>64</sup> BBC – Written Archive Centre (WAC), BBC data films, external services/registry sample scripts, box 16 “Portuguese service script 1974-1977.

<sup>65</sup> «Ser ou não ser da C.I.A».1975. *Diário de Lisboa*, August 26, pp.9

(according to *AFP*). The clashes happened in front of the PCP headquarters in Porto, which the first group was defending against the attack perpetrated by the second one. Shouts of «death to the Spanish press» and «fascist» were heard, according to *Europa Press*, while members of the second group, according to *AFP*, hit the Spanish journalist, who was later also injured by the military that came to appease the two groups.<sup>66</sup>

In all these cases violence is connected with street power struggles, the identification of a foreign enemy, and is met with the passivity – or even the support – of the military, sustaining the idea that the alliance between the people and the MFA forms a strong bond between the winter and the Summer of 1975.

Criticism regarding the Spanish media extends beyond street violence and is also expressed in the Portuguese press. The correspondent in Madrid for the Portuguese news agency *ANI*, Manuel Lopes, argued in 21 April 1975 that «hiding Portugal from Spanish eyes» was «the goal of the neighbour's press»<sup>67</sup>. Lopes added that «reality is only given by the weekly press» and that the Spanish Television «gives a far more tragic image and reveals a profound disdain towards the democratization process in Portugal»<sup>68</sup>. Spanish correspondents working for *Ya*, *ABC*, *Informaciones* and *Arriba* (to which *La Vanguardia Española* could also be added, since Alberto Miguez wrote both for *Ya* and *La Vanguardia*

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<sup>66</sup>AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9117, “Visión Informativa de Agencias Extranjeras (V.I.A.E.), Día 24-3-75, Turno 15 a 21, pág. 23” and “Agredido en Oporto el enviado especial de “El noticiero universal”, Francisco Sendil”.

<sup>67</sup>AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9049, “Difusión Informativa de la Dirección General de Coordinación (D.I.D.G.C.): Fecha 23-4-75 Hora 22,15 Ref n-LF/JT – 1806 Reseña de prensa extranjera (Recibida del Consejero de Información de Lisboa) /”Diario de Noticias””.

<sup>68</sup>AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9049, “D.I.D.G.C: Fecha 22 de Abril de 1975 Hora 20,45 Ref n· 1789 LF um. Reseña de prensa extranjera (Recibida del Consejero de Información de Lisboa) /Vespertinos de Lisboa (día 21)/ “Diario Popular”.

*Española*) were accused of deforming the Portuguese revolutionary process, although Manuel Lopes acknowledged that the new *Arriba* correspondent – probably referring to Fernando Jaurégui, who was in Portugal between June 1974 and May 1975 – seemed to be more «open-minded».

Likewise, in the beginning of the same year the Portuguese weekly *Sempre fixe* published an article signed by JAM where the Spanish correspondents' subject was mentioned. This article was collected and resumed by the border's DGS office of Tuy. JAM considers that the Spanish correspondents' job in Portugal before the revolution used to be a fairly easy one: it merely consisted of praising the Portuguese landscape and denouncing accusations made in international media against Salazar and Caetano's policies:

Before 25 April few magazines devoted their attention to the “brother country”; in fact, daily newspapers such as Madrid's “ABC” and daily “Ya”, also from Madrid, had high profile correspondents in Lisbon, who praised the beauty and excellence of the Portuguese land and life, and when Salazar and then Caetano started facing difficulties at the international level, lambasted the international press, accusing it of conspiracy against the Portuguese Republic, conspiracy which, much like in Spain, was fed by the resentment caused by the defeat that in both countries had been inflicted upon atheist and antipatriotic Marxism<sup>vii69</sup>.

This underlying support of the Portuguese dictatorship had made the task of the Spanish press after the revolution a fairly difficult one, since:

The right wing press, and the governmental one, cannot disguise its jitters and its desire that things fail in Portugal. (...) In this regard, the emphasis given by this press to the controversy between Portuguese socialists and communists is particularly significant. In the latter this debate is felt as the struggle between the good (naïve) and the evil. There is no need to explain who in this drama represents the good and the evil.<sup>viii</sup>

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<sup>69</sup>AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9049, DGS Report: “Tuy, 10 de febrero de 1975/ Asunto: Sobre los sucesos en Portugal/N/Ref<sup>a</sup>: Jefatura, nº314”.

This biased character of the press thus led to a lack of information about, or the distortion of, the situation in Portugal, and even to the perpetuation of a state of complete ignorance about what was going on. JAM's conclusions generally match Manuel Lopes' views on the subject a couple of months later. On the eve of the first Portuguese elections, while in Madrid, Lopes writes:

From the reading of the press and the comments heard here and there about the Portuguese Revolution, it is easy to conclude on the lack of information, and to a certain extent on the deformation of the events, or at least of their true meaning when they reach the Spanish opinion – At the present moment, few Spaniards have a clear idea of what is happening in Portugal.<sup>ix 70</sup>

Apart from Lopes and JAM, *RCP* and the Communist newspaper *Avante!* also insisted on this denunciation of the Spanish media as well as of other western media. On 17 March, *RCP* accused *AP*, *BBC*, *AFP* and especially *RNE* of «offending the truth» and of being part of «an international reaction against Portugal and its democracy», of which *RNE* would be in the front line.<sup>71</sup> *Avante!* went even further, and on 20 March published an article where foreign correspondents were accused of conspiring against Portugal and calls were made for the latter to be treated accordingly. According to the same newspaper, some information published in the US, UK, France, Brazil and Spain was insulting, and it suspected a few foreign journalists of knowing about the 11 March failed counter-coup and even of being implicated in it, since «in the foreign correspondent bars one subject was the mother of all subjects: the imminent coup». As evidence of this *Avante!* gave the example of a piece by Alberto Míguez published in *La Vanguardia Española*, where the

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<sup>70</sup>AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9049, DGS Report: “Tuy, 10 de febrero de 1975/ Asunto: Sobre los sucesos en Portugal/N/Ref<sup>a</sup> : Jefatura, nº314”.

<sup>71</sup>AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9117, “V.I.A.E., Día 17 de marzo de 1975, Turno 9 a 15, pág. 11”.

possibility of a rebellion in Tancos, the military barracks where the insurrection actually originated, was reported. *AP* was also accused of perpetrating the same kind of activities in Portugal that forced Fidel Castro, Salvador Allende and Velasco Gómez to take measures against them.<sup>72</sup>

Portuguese authorities, in particular Commander Correia Jesuíno, Minister of Social Communication, also addressed this subject. Although Jesuíno declared in late February that the foreign press in Portugal should be « severely punished » due to its hostile attitude<sup>73</sup>, after the incidents in Setúbal he received foreign press representatives and expressed his condolences for what had happened. Later that day, the Ministry furthermore issued a statement arguing that violence against foreign correspondents should not be repeated and that the spokespersons of the international public opinion should be respected when performing their « noble and sometimes difficult » mission<sup>74</sup>. The statement however also reminded that violence was frequent all over the world when changes in the public order took place<sup>75</sup>, and that therefore it was not a Portuguese particularity.

In a public effort to contain antagonisms, Correia Jesuíno once again received foreign press correspondents two weeks later after they complained of being censored at their hotels. Jesuíno reiterated that performing this type of censorship was not part of the Ministry's plan of action, that in fact restricting the telexes sent by foreign correspondents at

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<sup>72</sup>AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box: 42/9117, "V.I.A.E., Día 20 de marzo de 1975, Turno 9 a 15, pág. 14".

<sup>73</sup>AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box: 42/9049, "87 Lisboa, 25 [-2-75]. – (EFE)"

<sup>74</sup>AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box: 42/9117, "V.I.A.E., Día 11-3-1975, Turno 21 a 03, pág. 9".

<sup>75</sup>AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box: 42/9117, "V.I.A.E., Día 11-3-1975, Turno 21 a 03, pág. 5".

their hotels' desks was condemned by the government, and that an investigation about it would be promptly carried out.<sup>76</sup>

In this context of instability, *TVE*'s special correspondents left Portugal twice: in March and then again in September 1975. For Medeiros Ferreira (2006; 1989), September 1975 was the most difficult period between the two countries. March 1975 can nevertheless also be considered one of the most troubled months in Iberian relations during the revolutionary period.

In September demonstrations were organised around the world against the Francoist regime and its recent execution of three FRAP and two ETA militants. In Portugal, these demonstrations<sup>77</sup> resulted in the ransacking of the Spanish diplomatic institutions in both Lisbon and Porto on 27 September. Drawing on statements by Eloy Ibáñez, the Embassy's *chargé d'affaires*, Sánchez (1993: 354) suggests that the actions in Portugal were premeditated and were aimed at kidnapping the Ambassador in Lisbon to force negotiations. To support this theory, he argues that protests in Portugal preceded the ones held elsewhere, thus before the executions had taken place. This argument is somewhat debatable since demonstrations are reported to have started firstly in

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<sup>76</sup> AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box: 42/9117, "V.I.A.E., Día 24-3-1975, Turno 15 a 21, pág. 22".

<sup>77</sup> In this regard, it is important to mention that the week from the 22<sup>nd</sup> to the 28<sup>th</sup> was chosen by internationalist leftist movements to become a week of international mobilization for "Red Portugal" culminating with a massive protest on the 27<sup>th</sup>. This was approved in Lisbon in late August, published in the Italian publication *Il settimanale* on September 3<sup>rd</sup>, and cited by Portuguese publications before most of the War Councils in Spain took place. Whether or not these were motivated by the francoist death penalties, the fact is that this week might have congregated in Portugal international leftist activists summoned to participate in the "Red week" that were available to be part of the protest against Spain. (AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box: 42/9049, "Voz da Trofa – Braga 15-10-75"). Likewise, César Oliveira also mentions that the Italian newspapers *Avanguardia Operaia* and *Il Manifesto* brought several militants from Italy to Lisbon during 1975 to analyze the Portuguese Revolutionary Process (Oliveira 1993:169).

Madrid, where a group of French intellectuals<sup>78</sup> was arrested and expelled on 22 September; and then continued in several European countries from 25 September<sup>79</sup>, with an attack on the Spanish Embassy in Brussels<sup>80</sup> also taking place on the 26<sup>th</sup>. Protests in Lisbon may have had this purpose, and it is out of the scope of this work to analyse it, but other arguments should be used in support of this view.

By then the diplomatic bond between the two countries was certainly broken, and during this crisis Spain recalled their diplomatic representatives, while posts in the Algarve border, like Ayamonte, were closed down due to hostile demonstrations on the Portuguese side. In turn, TVE correspondent Diego Carcedo was sent back to Madrid<sup>81</sup> on 22 September<sup>82</sup> because of a piece about FRAP militants<sup>83</sup> shown on Portuguese television, not as a retaliation for the attack, as assumed by Sánchez (1993), although eventually the relationship went back to normal. The Spanish ambassador returned to Portugal in the beginning of January 1976; Eloy Ibáñez reportedly did so on 22 October 1975; the Huelva border had meanwhile been reopened on 24 October, and the reopening of the Ayamonte one followed shortly. Portuguese authorities also immediately took on the task of reconstructing the Spanish diplomatic premises.

This was the first time the Spanish Ambassador, Antonio Poch y Gutiérrez de Cavieres, in Lisbon since June 1974, was recalled, but it was

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<sup>78</sup> «Expulsados 7 franceses». 1975. *Arriba*, September 23, pp.52

<sup>79</sup> EFE.1975. «París atentado contra el banco popular», *Arriba*, September 26, pp.9; EFE.1975. «Italia: Persisten las manifestaciones anti-españolas», *Arriba*, September 26, pp.9

<sup>80</sup> EFE. 1975. «Bruselas: ataque a la embajada española», *Arriba*, 27 Sep. 1975, pp. 48

<sup>81</sup>AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/8951, “V.I.A.E., 25.09.1975 turno 21-03 pág. 59”.

<sup>82</sup> Cifra.1975. «TVE retira su corresponsal en Lisboa», *Arriba*, September 23, pp.52

<sup>83</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Las relaciones hispano-lusas en un momento delicado», *La Vanguardia Española*, September 24, pp. 42

not the first time for a TVE correspondent, since one had already left the country in March.

Although the months before March 1975 had been marked by repeated protests, with demonstrations of solidarity towards Spanish political prisoners<sup>84</sup> and even episodes of violence<sup>85</sup>, the situation became tenser in the beginning of March. It would however worsen considerably after the failed 11 March coup and the political radicalization that ensued.

Street unrest and several «anti-Spanish»<sup>86</sup> activities were recorded as early as 3 March, when an anarchist «anti-Spanish» demonstration took place in Lisbon. This demonstration reportedly gathered 500 people according to *Ya* or 1000 according to *Pueblo*, and marched from Rossio Square through Liberdade Avenue until it reached the Spanish Consulate, on Salitre Street, where a huge military apparatus was waiting for the demonstrators. It then continued its way until Espanha Square, where the ambassador lived. No violence was recorded by the Spanish press, even though black flags were seen and slogans of «support of the Spanish

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<sup>84</sup> After a solidarity day organized by the Portuguese Authors Society (SPA) had been cancelled in late 1974, petitions were presented in January 1975 at the Spanish Embassy in solidarity with Alfonso Sastre and Genoveva Forrest – among others – detained since September 16<sup>th</sup> 1974, and Sebastian Reyna Fernandez, accused of being member and chairperson of the socialist youth for which he risked three years in prison. (AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9049, “Jefe de la sección de consejeros del Gabinete del servicio exterior a Ilmo. Sr. Jefe de la Oficina de enlace del Exmo. Sr. Ministro: Fecha 5 de febrero de 1975, Asunto: Remisión de artículos de prensa portuguesa: “Diario Popular, 22 jan.1975”, “Diario de Lisboa” 28 jan 1975”; “Cultura”, box: 42/8952, “Servicios informativos de la Dirección General de Prensa, Fecha 28 noviembre 1974 Hora 17, 15 Ref. Nº AM/eh 3.301, Asunto: Solidaridad con los presos políticos españoles, Fuente: consejero de Información en Lisboa”; “Presidencia”, box: 51/9511, “D.I.D.G.C., publicación *Ya* Fecha 5 Dic. 1974”)

<sup>85</sup> Spanish buses were destroyed in Lisbon as reported by *Hoja del lunes* on February 17<sup>th</sup> 1975 (AGA, MIT, “Presidencia”, box: 51/9511 “D.I.D.G.C., publicación *Hoja del lunes* Fecha 17 Feb. 1975”).

<sup>86</sup> «Anti-Spanish» is the terminology used within the several layers of the MIT bureaucratic system.



workers» and «Spanish and Portuguese social revolution» were heard.<sup>87</sup> According to the Portuguese newspapers *Diário de notícias* and *O Século*, humorous slogans such as «barbecued Franco» or «Franco on a stick»<sup>88</sup> were also voiced, and an Alitalia building in Marquês de Pombal Square was mistakenly hit by rocks, as protesters were aiming at Iberia's offices, located in the same Square. Likewise, Fonseca & Burnay Bank's office had its windows smashed<sup>89</sup>. Seemingly unrelated, but adding to the narrative of these events, on the same day a Spanish businessman, Joaquín Pena, was sentenced to jail by the COPCON, an army unit created after the beginning of the revolutionary period.

After 11 March tensions rose, and reports appeared on Spanish rent-a-cars unwilling to rent cars to people travelling to Portugal (14 March), on the arrest and quick release by COPCON of Spanish poet Antonio Jimenez, working for the bilingual literary magazine *Litoral*<sup>90</sup> (15

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<sup>87</sup> AGA, MIT, "Presidencia", box: 51/9511, "D.I.D.G.C., 3, Publicación *Ya*, fecha 4 MAR. 1975 n°3" and "D.I.D.G.C 13, Publicación *Pueblo*, fecha 4 MAR. 1975 n° 13".

<sup>88</sup> In Portuguese the words Franco and chicken (frango) are phonetically very similar, hence the humorous tone of the slogans, that might have not been picked up by the international press or willingly not reported by the Spanish press.

<sup>89</sup> AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box: 42/9049, "Anarquistas manifestam-se ns ruas de Lisboa" 4 -3-75, De Jefe de la sección de información exterior a Ilmo. Sr Jefe de la oficina de enlace. Fecha 8 de marzo 1975, Asunto: Portugal".

<sup>90</sup> *Litoral, Revista de la poesía y el pensamiento* (n° 53-58, February 1976) was a special number devoted to the Carnation revolution. This magazine is bilingual, written in Spanish and Portuguese, but was edited in Spain (Málaga) in November 1975. In this edition wrote for the Portuguese thinking section: Jorge de Sena, Ramiro Correia, Maria Velho da Costa, Mário Dionísio, Augusto Abelaira, João Martins Pereira, Fernando Lopes Graça, Júlio Silva Martins, Armando Castro; for the Portuguese poetry section: Fernando Pessoa, Sophia de Mello Breyner, José Gomes Ferreira, Carlos de Oliveira, Egito Gonçalves, Ary dos Santos, Joaquim Pessoa, Thiago de Melo and Fernando Batinga (Brasil), and finally Nicolau Spencer and Agostinho Neto (Angola); for the Spanish thinking section: Carlos Castilla del Pino, Juan Maestre Afonso, Roberto Mesa, Enrique Tierno Galván, Jaime Vergara (Bolivia); for the Spanish poetry section: Pablo Neruda, José C. Fernández Ortiz, Carlos Alvarez, José María Amado, Andrés García Madrid, Gabino Alejandro Carriedo, Francisco Moreno Galván, Dionísio Ridruejo. There is also a section of portuguese protest songs: "Hino de Caxias", "Cantemos o novo dia", "Avante Camarada", "Canto de Esperança", "Alerta,

March), on trains arriving in Galicia with Portuguese slogans (16 March), on groups of Spanish tourists being insulted in Porto (22 and 23 March), and Galician travel agencies cancelling trips to Portugal (27 March).

As mentioned above, unrests and «anti-Spanish» sentiments were also reported in the media: *RCP*'s accused *RNE* of «offense» (17 March), *Avante!* denounced a conspiracy among foreign correspondents citing directly *La Vanguardia Española* (20 March), and Francisco Sendil's beating in Porto (23 March). This animosity and the controversy surrounding the claim by some correspondents that they were not allowed to send telexes from their hotels (24 March) were followed by Jesuino's statements (11 and 24 March), an attempt to appease the situation.

In this context, Manuel Roglan, TVE's special correspondent, was first advised by the radio and TV workers' union committee not to enter RTP's broadcasting studios, where he used to broadcast his reports from<sup>91</sup>, then forbidden to do so, and also advised to leave the country, which he did on 18 March along with the three members of his team.

Following these developments, Fernando Jaurégui<sup>92</sup>, special correspondent of *Arriba*, reflects on the question of freedom of the press in Portugal and the possibility of biased correspondents being banned from the country. Although he dismisses the possibility of Spain being one such case, Jaurégui recognizes the misunderstanding of the Portuguese reality by part of the foreign media, resulting in an incomplete and inaccurate coverage of the Portuguese process. He therefore seemed

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Jornada, Canta, camarada, canta”, “A vitória é difícil”, “Unidade”, “Grândola vila Morena”, “Livre”; and one with illustrations by: João Abel Manta, Eduardo Nery, Nikias Skapinakis, Júlio Pomar, Eduardo de Luís, Sá Nogueira. Pablo Picasso, Canogar, Guinovart, Tàpies, Francisco Moreno Galvan, Genorves, Vazquez de Sola, Alberca, Barbadillo, Peinado, Brinkmann, Julio Visquerra (Honduras).

<sup>91</sup>AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9117, “Informaciones sobre Portugal.99. Lisboa, 17 [.3.75] (Enviado especial de PYRESA, Fernando Jaurégui) ”.

<sup>92</sup>AGA, MIT, Cultura, box: 42/9117, “Informaciones sobre Portugal.99. Lisboa, 17 [.3.75] (Enviado especial de PYRESA, Fernando Jaurégui) ”.

to be himself in favour of the expulsions of these foreign correspondents, which eventually did not happen.

## 1.2 The Foreign Press

In Spain, foreign newspapers like *Le Monde*, *Tribune de Genève* or *The Times*<sup>93</sup> were available in the newsstands of major cities like Madrid, Barcelona or Bilbao<sup>94</sup>, and this press had an important role in Spanish society, since it represented the only source of uncensored information. Because of the language barrier that limited it to a certain kind of readership<sup>95</sup>, it was however unable to rival the local press. Furthermore, even though the international press was not officially censored in Spain, like it had been in the aftermath of the civil war (Chuliá 2001), it could be censored commercially. If authorities objected to something published in it, the publication would not reach the newsstands on the day it was meant to, or even not reach them at all. By the time these issues eventually reached them, they had lost their value as news and would probably not even be sold. William Chislett, correspondent for *the Times* in Madrid between 1975 and 1978, describes how:

(...) Foreign correspondents were free to write what they wanted, but they were subject to a commercial censorship. The regime was able to control the distribution of foreign publications in Spain as copies of each one were sent from Madrid's airport, as soon as they arrived, to the Information Ministry. The articles on Spain were then translated and given to senior officials, including the Minister in some cases, and the

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<sup>93</sup> Eduardo Barrenechea in "Espanha/mesa redonda" (AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box: 42/9049, "Periodico: Jornal Novo, Fecha 27 Mai 1975").

<sup>94</sup> Eduardo Barrenechea in "Espanha/mesa redonda" (AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box: 42/9049, "Periodico: Jornal Novo, Fecha 27 Mai 1975").

<sup>95</sup> Elisa Chuliá (2001:216) reports on an internal document that circulated in *Ya*'s newsroom – a study of the "Instituto de la Opinión Publica" titled "Ante la nueva Ley de prensa" published around the time the 1966 press law was issued – that provided numbers on the readership of the foreign press in Madrid: 5% of the population read it; 25 % of the population, who earned more than 20.000 pesetas monthly or were of medium level professionals, read it; and 33,3% of the population, who had university degrees or were higher level professionals, read it.

decision taken whether to allow the sale of the publications at newsstands. Distributors were then given permission, or not, to deliver the publications to newsstands. All the copies of an unauthorized newspaper were thrown away. Another tactic was to allow distribution, but to hold it up for several days. A newspaper published on a Monday was unlikely to sell on a Thursday. In the case of weekly magazines, a copy was sent directly to the Ministry and if permission was not granted to sell the issue the publisher did not send copies to Spain (Chislett 2011, 10).

Walter Haubrich, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*'s correspondent in Madrid, reinforces this view when recalling how in post-March 11<sup>h</sup> Portugal<sup>96</sup> the communist newspaper *Avante!* «had demanded a type of censorship to be enforced»<sup>97</sup>: control over foreign correspondents. In his article, recovered by the press service of the Spanish Embassy in Bonn, Haubrich dismissed the possibility that the Portuguese Government might resort to censorship of foreign journalists, since in Portugal foreign newspapers were not subject to commercial censorship like they were in Spain as they could actually be sold, thus revealing to the German audience this peculiar condition of the international press in the Spanish territory.

Even though this was still far from being an ideal situation in terms of freedom of the press, the increasingly permissive character of the international press situation in Spain did not go unnoticed, and three days after the Portuguese *coup d'état* it was criticized by José Antonio Girón de Velasco in a political manifesto – nicknamed by the contemporary press (e.g. *Cambio 16*) «El Gironazo» – published in the front cover of *Arriba*, an official newspaper. In this intervention Girón, one of the loudest voices

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<sup>96</sup> Several incidents occurring in March 1975 – a moment of radicalization of the process after the failed coup of March 11<sup>th</sup> – related with foreign correspondents in Portugal made some voices claim there was a lack of freedom of the press in revolutionary Portugal.

<sup>97</sup> AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/8952, “Embajada de España en Bonn/ Oficina de información/ nº 428, 26-3-1975” (“Traducción/ Título: Lisboa rechaza la censura/El gobierno reafirma el derecho de libre información/Fuente: *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 26-3-1975, pág.6/ Autor: W. Haubrich).

of the Spanish bunker, among other accusations against Pío Cabanillas, responsible for a liberalization of the MIT's rules, reacts against the fact that the foreign press was duly authorized and was being ostensibly inconvenient:

We have reached a state of affairs in which it is easy to find in the Spanish newsstands duly authorized foreign newspapers where the respectable and remarkable figure of Francisco Franco is ridiculed or the July 18 1936 regime is offended, or even where homologations are established, or comparative systems, between political situations that are unquestionably alien to us.<sup>x98</sup>

Girón's words are not only a reaction to the intensive immediate coverage of the Portuguese situation by the Spanish press, but also to the comparative analysis of both countries' situations made by the international press.

Within the influence area of the regimes, two opposing discourses emerged: bunker positions such as this one, based on a notion of preservation of the status quo, were slowly entering, in this period, into a «Spiral of Silence» (Noelle-Neumann 1993). They were becoming a minority in a divided public space (Reig 2007), cornering themselves in their own newspapers, like *Arriba*, or gatherings of supporters where their ideas were backed. Pro-liberalization stances, coming both from within the Francoist State and part of the opposition, in turn, were gaining strength in the public sphere.

This could help explain why the «Gironazo» was somewhat ridiculed, starting by its very name, given by *Cambio 16*, and why in a way it was not taken seriously by a lot of the Spanish press. *Tele/eXprés'* correspondent in Madrid, Ramón Pi, for instance, comments on Girón's manifesto in the following humorous tone:

The ex-Labour minister's gushing pitch, though normally used in his public interventions, did not go by without stupor, at least in the

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<sup>98</sup>Girón de Velasco, José Antonio. 1974.«Se pretende que los españoles pierdan la fe en Franco y la de en su Revolución Nacional», *Arriba*, April 18, pp.1

politically-interested surroundings, since, honestly, it did not seem like things were so close to the edge of the apocalypses.<sup>x199</sup>

Still, despite how delusional «el Gironazo» may have seemed to part of the Spanish press, the downfall of Pío Cabanillas as head of the MIT, in October 1974, is associated with it, and a sign of the Francoist detachment from reality in those moments (Muñoz Soro 2007, 456).

### 1.3 Externally broadcasted Radio

Apart from the foreign press, foreign radios had also played an important role historically in this system. In fact, in 1975 Spanish territories were served with foreign broadcasters from both blocks<sup>100</sup>: «26 foreign radios, apart from the BBC and the two “clandestine” Spanish stations, daily transmit their programmes to the Iberian Peninsula».<sup>101</sup>

For Alberto Pena (2009), foreign radio broadcasters that could be reached in Spain, especially in border areas had a specific role in critical times. During the Spanish civil war, for instance, the Portuguese radios Portuguese Radio Club [*Rádio Clube Português* RCP] and National Broadcaster [*Emissora Nacional EM*], increased their intensity and range, started broadcasting in Spanish and put rebels in the North and the South

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<sup>99</sup>Pi, Ramón. 1974. «Dudas sobre quien son los «infiltrados», según Girón, en las altas esferas del poder», *Tele-eXprés*, May 1, pp.9

<sup>100</sup> «A particular major effort is being mounted by a variety of Communist transmitters. These range from the so-called “Radio Independiente Spain, known to be broadcasting from somewhere in Eastern Europe, with its 126 hours per week, through Warsaw Radio’s 21 hours, Moscow’s 19 hours, East Germany 12hours 45’, to other East European stations, most of which considerably exceed the length of our programmes. Among Western broadcasters Radio Nederland transmits more than twice as much to Spain as the BBC, whilst Swedish, German and French Radios roughly compare with our [sic] own duration. It is significant that in spite of its recent drastic reduction in foreign broadcasts, French radio has maintained its Spanish transmission.»(BBC-Written Archive Center (WAC), E40/732/1 B045/XB043-004-001, “30<sup>th</sup> October 1975/ Extension of Spanish Transmissions”)

<sup>101</sup> BBC - WAC, E40/732/1 B045/XB043-004-001, “30<sup>th</sup> October 1975/ Extension of Spanish Transmissions”

of Spain in contact with each other, intensifying as much as possible the propaganda in favour of Francoism. In fact, Pena argues that the influence of the Portuguese radio in Spain increased the *Movimiento*'s popularity (2009: 203).

However, external radio broadcasting was in no way welcomed, and in 1941, immediately after the foundation of the clandestine Independent Spain Radio [*Radio España Independiente-REI*<sup>102</sup> (1941-1977)], the Radiated Interference Service [*Servicio de Interferencia Radiada* (SIR)] was created. This army service created under a «private and reserved» law-decree signed by Carrero Blanco, was in charge of keeping all broadcasting under surveillance and when necessary shutting it up or producing interferences. As Zaragoza (2008) reveals, its functions included not only surveillance in the form of continued listening and interference, but also the production of counter-propaganda.

The National Broadcaster – as well as Portuguese Radio-Television [*Radio-Televisão Portuguesa* RTP] –, which in this period could be reached in Spain especially in border areas like Castile, Andalucía and Galicia, was considered to be listened by the Spanish middle class who understood Portuguese better than other foreign languages, but nevertheless preferred radio broadcasting in Spanish like the BBC service or Radio Paris. Though less threatening than other foreign media, the Portuguese audio-visual broadcasters worried the Spanish Government more – one of its presenters was even accused of «Anti-Spanish» activities by the DGS<sup>103</sup> – than the printed media, since Portuguese newspapers available in Spain (*Diário de Notícias* or *O*

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<sup>102</sup>Nicknamed and commonly known as «Estación Pirenaica», or simply «La Pirineica» by Dolores Ibárruri “*Pasionaria*”, which reportedly had given Spaniards the impression that the radio broadcasters were located somewhere in the Pyrenees, when in fact, REI broadcasted first from Moscow, then Ufa, and finally from Bucharest.

<sup>103</sup>AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/8951, DGS Report: “Asunto: Propaganda anti-española en Portugal”.

*Século*) circulated a negligible number of copies and at the time had no correspondents in Spain other than the ANI ones<sup>104</sup>.

Apart from the obvious political aspect of foreign broadcasters being reached in Spain, their formal influence should also be considered. French border radios, such as *Radio Europa nº1* and *Radio Monte-Carlo*, reportedly influenced *Radio Barcelona*, part of SER broadcaster. The latter constituted an exception news wise, as it introduced new formats like «surprise news» or «live news», or what in the north-American audio-visual journalism slang is called «breaking news» (Balsebre 2002, 390).

The feeling of being surrounded by a fence in terms of information was also mitigated by the tolerated Spanish services of foreign radios like *BBC* or *Radio Paris* – the Spanish service of *Radio diffusion-Télévision Française* (RTF) –, as a Spanish listener of the BBC describes on the its annual report:

(...) we listen most of all to the press review on Sunday. In my opinion the BBC programmes, together with those of Radio France International, are the best and most widely informed broadcasts in Spanish among all the various European stations. And I want to thank you also for the splendid service you are rendering to us (Orense).<sup>105</sup>

Both these services had programmes where the English and the French press were respectively read, a way of bypassing the language barrier of both the foreign press and radios.

## 2. The production of information

The production of the Spanish newspaper in its relation with the Portuguese revolutionary process is a compromise between several economic and ideological contingencies, but also largely depends on the central actor of this mode of production: the action of the Ministry of

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<sup>104</sup> Carlos Zayas in “Espanha/mesa redonda” (AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9049, “Periodico: Jornal Novo, Fecha 27 Mai 1975”)

<sup>105</sup> BBC - WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, “Spanish service Summary Report for 1975”, Appendix 1



Information and Tourism (1951-1977) in both its tasks of restraining and sanctioning activities.

## 2.1 The Ministry of Information and Tourism

By 1974 Francoism is already an institutionalized reality, in the sense that rule is no longer based on the exceptional laws issued during the civil war. When it comes to the media, this means that the tactics of information control were no longer the original, mostly preventive ones, forged during the implementation stage of the regime (1936-1948) (Chuliá 2001). The 1966 press and printing law (BOE 19 - III - 1966) embodied this transition from mostly preventive (i.e. State nomination of editors-in-chief, post-war purge of journalists and censorship previous to publication) towards more repressive (i.e. sanctions for the newspaper, the editor-in-chief or journalists after publication), mechanisms of control. Nevertheless, between 1974 and 1976, the Spanish informative system still encompassed both tactics of regulation: a preventive and a repressive approach.

After the 1966 press law rejected some of the previous censorship mechanisms and replaced them by the ability of enforcing sanctions over journalists, editors in chief and publishing companies, the MIT itself was conceived differently, and became the main provider of information to the mass media.

News was now to be managed or filtered by the services of this Ministry, mainly by the action of the Informative services of the Press Managing Direction, responsible for bringing news from the administration to the press. The MIT building was to be the centre of information in Spain and therefore was equipped with teletypes receiving information from the main international news agencies and Spanish Ministries. Journalists and translators worked 24/7 for the informative services in four shifts, transferring the international news that they

believed to be of Spanish interest to the EFE's services, and the national, and governmental, ones to Cifra's services (Chuliá 2001:204-206). Both services would then distribute the news over to the newspapers.

Especially when it came to international events, sources could become problematic. The main provider of international news, EFE news agency, had its *in facto* monopoly over foreign news agencies<sup>106</sup> recognized by law in 1966 (through BOE 19 - III - 1966 art. 49° combined with an Order of 1 September of the same year). Although two thirds of the latter ultimately belonged to the State, EFE was not entirely a public company, but its action was aligned with the government, since both EFE's President and Executive-Director, responsible for the decisions regarding its informative policies, were in practice nominated by the State (Chuliá 2001).

Therefore the MIT's restraining action – and its several services<sup>107</sup>, including EFE –, constituted the most powerful filter within the Spanish informative system. In fact, given this feature, some information obviously did not reach the newsrooms, and was classified as reserved, confidential or simply withheld from public by being plainly termed as «non-spreadable information».

The latter case applied to a meeting held in Lisbon between the Portuguese (PS) and Spanish (PSOE) Socialist parties in June 1975. The Paris Information Adviser sent this information on 21 June 1975 after a communiqué was issued about it in Paris by the PSOE. The same

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<sup>106</sup> EFE was the only distributor in Spain of news from *Reuters* (since 1939), *United Press International* (since 1945) *Agence France Presse* (since 1962), and *Associated Press* (since 1964).

<sup>107</sup> The main services where information about the Portuguese events was gathered include: “Dirección General de Coordinación Informativa” (created by BOE 12-I-1974); “Subdirección General del Gabinete de Servicios exteriores” (created by BOE 13-IX-1974 and extinguished by BOE 24-IV-1976) and “Gabinete de Enlace” (created by BOE 13-IX-1974, previously called “Oficina de enlace” and the “Dirección General de Prensa”).

happened with some remarks made by Mário Soares<sup>108</sup> on French television about the end of the Spanish regime, and supplied by EFE, at the moment of the detentions and expulsion from Spain of several European public figures like Yves Montand, Régis Debray, Claude Jean Marc Maulac, Michel Foucault, André Jean Mario Laudouzo, Constantin Gravas, better known as Costa Gravas and Jean Marie Gerard Zacouture<sup>109</sup>, who protested in Madrid against the last francoist death penalties of September 1975. In common both these «non-spreadable information» have their origin in the French territory, the connection with the Portuguese Socialist Party and its leader – Mário Soares –, and the condemnation of the Spanish regime.

Another tactic used by this filter was the delay in transmission of information, which seems to have happened, for example, on 25 April 1974. EFE's account of ANI's – the Portuguese news agency – first telegram on the subject was sent to newsrooms across Spain more than one hour after its arrival, and simply read: «Lisbon, 25 (EFE) – “At dawn today a military uprising, of yet unknown extension and characteristics, was registered in Lisbon”, informed at 7AM – Spanish hour – the Portuguese Agency ANI»<sup>xii</sup> (Roig 1974, 35).

EFE's services therefore took more than one hour to transmit this scarce information about what was happening in Lisbon. At 7 AM – Portuguese hour – Marcello Caetano had already taken refuge in Carmo's barracks, and at 7:30 AM (Sousa Santos, Cruzeiro and Coimbra 2000, 76) a new communiqué leaving no doubts regarding the movement's objectives was read by Luís Filipe Costa in RCP. It stated that «The

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<sup>108</sup>AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/8952, “D.I.D.G.C., 25-09-1975, 00,20, “Declaraciones de Mario Soares sobre España”.

<sup>109</sup> «Expulsados 7 franceses». 1975. *Arriba*, September 23, pp.52

Armed Forces started at dawn today a series of actions aiming at the Country's liberation from the regime that dominates it for so long». <sup>110</sup>

Roig identifies this delay of hours – the first MFA communiqué was issued at 4:20 am (Sousa Santos, Cruzeiro and Coimbra 2000:72), 5:20 in Spain – in getting information to the newspapers as a «sign of the reluctance that accompanied the transmission of news, and later its processing, by EFE's central services.»<sup>xiii</sup> (Roig 1974:35)

## 2.2 Civil servants fostering an «anti-Spanish» sentiment

Information regarding the Portuguese events of 1974-1975 was sent, among others services, to the Interlacing Cabinet [*Gabinete de Enlace*] (created by BOE 13-IX-1974, art. 1) from several places, for instance the Security General Direction<sup>111</sup> [*Dirección General de Seguridad DGS*], especially its border delegations in Tuy<sup>112</sup> and Salamanca<sup>113</sup>; and the

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<sup>110</sup>Associação 25 de abril, “As acções do dia 25 de Abril” in Base de dados históricos of “Associação 25 de Abril”, <http://www.25abril.org/index.php?content=1&hora=1>, (accessed on 12 Jun. 2013 at 11:29)

<sup>111</sup> DGS reports have different origins and are of different sorts. For example, if they come from border offices, they are drafted by the city's “Comisaria General de Investigación Social, sección local de investigación social”, under the jurisdiction of the “Ministerio de la Gobernación”. Such reports were then sent to “Comisaria General de Investigación Social” in Madrid, where another report was made and forwarded to services such as SERCO or “Gabinete Central de Identificación”, and would get to the MIT via the Press Managing Direction or the Interlacing Cabinet. In other cases, information would reach the Interlacing Cabinet directly from the “Jefatura de Información” of DGS. It could also be the case that information classified as confidential could be sent directly to the head of the MIT.

<sup>112</sup> Information coming from border services was a type of “grassroots” one: it consisted of press reviews (of newspapers such as *Primeiro de Janeiro*, *Comércio do Porto*, *Jornal de Noticias*, *Sempre Fixe*, *A Rua*, mainly Portuguese press published in Porto, probably because those services are located in the northern part of the border) and of information on activities that took place closer to the border, i.e. the “Campanhas de dinamização cultural” in Alto Minho, political meetings, border traffic reports, political activities related to the beginning of the election campaign period (i.e. graffiti and posters in Valença do Minho), or events which were considered to be of Spanish interest, such as a quarrel between

Foreign Affairs Service, which collected information sent by the Information Advisers of the Information Services of the Spanish Embassies in Paris, Bonn, but especially, as expected, in Lisbon<sup>114</sup>.

This service (1962-1977), previously known as Interlacing Office, was a facility under the direct dependence of the Minister himself, and its functions were to «coordinate, handle and process aspects of general and political information, which both Ministry and other departments of the administration or entities might receive or provide»<sup>xiv</sup> (BOE 13-IX-1974, art.1<sup>st</sup>). Zaragoza (2008, 378-381) describes it as a sort of a documentation centre, where all the information was to be analysed, classified, expurgated and when considered important enough, to be catalogued and archived in the Cabinet collection by subject areas or names, which are now part of AGA – General Administration Archive. This catalogue was to be consulted whenever reports, notes, dossiers had to be put together by

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UDP and the Spanish Embassy in post-September 1975. (AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9049, DGS Report: “Tuy, 22 de Junio de 1974/ Asunto: Sobre los sucesos en Portugal/N/Ref<sup>a</sup> : Jefatura, n°1.152” and DGS Report: “Tuy, 10 de febrero de 1975/ Asunto: Sobre los sucesos en Portugal/N/Ref<sup>a</sup> : Jefatura, n°314”; “Cultura”, box: 42/8951, DGS Report: “Tuy, 2 de Abril de 1975/ Asunto: Sobre los sucesos en Portugal/N/Ref<sup>a</sup> : Jefatura, n°667”; “Cultura”, box: 42/8952, DGS Report: “Tuy, 12 de Mayo de 1976/ Asunto: Noticias de la prensa portuguesa relacionada con España/N/Ref<sup>a</sup> : Jefatura, n°882”. )

<sup>113</sup> Apart from press reviews, in Salamanca’s branch investigations were pursued to identify the people displayed in the photo presented by Eurico Corvacho when denouncing ELP’s actions on March 24<sup>th</sup> 1975. Nothing was reportedly found, although authorities believed one of the men portrayed in the photograph was related to one of the two Portuguese subjects who asked for political asylum in Fuentes de Oñoro on October 11<sup>th</sup> 1974. (AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/8952, DGS Report: “Salamanca, 25 de Marzo de 1975/ Asunto: Relativo a declaraciones del Coronel de Estado Mayor Portugués Eurico Corvacho, aparecidas en el periódico portugués “Jornal de Noticias” (Diario de Noticias)”.)

<sup>114</sup> The information sent by the Information Adviser in Lisbon is not that different in type: press reviews, comments about gatherings or events; and is usually accompanied by snippets of Portuguese press related to Spanish interests. The “foreign press reviews” received daily mostly deal with 1975, at least until August, and then there is a gap until 1977, which could be connected to the withdrawing of the diplomatic delegation from Portugal after the demonstrations of September 27<sup>th</sup> 1975.

the reserved bulletin Service upon demand of any of the organs present in the interlacing junta<sup>115</sup>.

Information arriving to this service would be gathered or developed by civil servants of the Spanish State, who, as repeatedly stated in their own reports, performed these tasks of reporting firstly with what could be of «Spanish interest», and, secondly, their duty of denunciation of «anti-Spanish» sentiment, in mind. This is not surprising as being part of the State apparatus and given the severe depuration the latter had suffered (Cuesta 2009), «civil servants or even mere public employees were not allowed to be neutral<sup>116</sup>: they had to be committed supporters of the regime» (Tusell 2007, 25). It is however not that relevant to discuss how truthfully committed towards Francoism civil servants were at this point, since their *habitus* (Bourdieu 2010) in the ordinary completion of their task, whether more or less individually convinced, and regardless of who was in charge of the Ministry, implied the identification of «anti-Spanish» sentiment. Ultimately this is one of the main features at work in the several stages of the information flow within the MIT's action.

«Anti-Spain» is a much older concept than Francoism itself (Álvarez-Junco 2011). But it was, nonetheless, part of the political ideology of Francoism, despite its «relative lack of any clear ideological basis [which] allowed it to shift from one form of dictatorship to another,

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<sup>115</sup> Foreign affairs Ministry, Military Staff, Army Ministry, Navy Ministry, Air Ministry, Documentation General Service (SECED) under the Government Presidency, Movimiento General Secretary, Education and Science Ministry, Justice Ministry, Labour Ministry, Union Organization, Civilian Guards general Direction, Security General Direction (Government Ministry), Ministry of Information and Tourism.

<sup>116</sup>Although in the same work Javier Tusell (2007:31) is apologetic of censors: «Working on the subversion of freedom of expression at the lowest levels, the censors, on minimal salaries and in a precarious position, rather than being enthusiastic supporters of the regime, were individuals forced to perform a deplorable task – or even to submit their own writings to scrutiny – because of their personal circumstances and in exchange for a pittance.»

bordering on fascism in the 1940s and resembling more modernizing dictatorships in the 1960s» (Tusell 2007, 19). Regardless of how broad the concept of Francoism might have been, in its core remained the idea of «a patriotic organization that would defend Spain against its dissolution at the hands of *anti-Spain*. (...)» Thus «Spain was not only Catholicism, it was also the system of inherited social power – order, property, family, tradition, authority, anti-liberalism and anti-Enlightenment – while “anti-Spain” was not only revolution but also modern civilization, the ‘godless’ materialistic, secular, urban world» (Álvarez-Junco 2011, 373).

Given that Spain is also identified with its regime, all actions which, in one way or the other, might represent antagonism towards such regime are therefore coined not as «anti-fascist» or «anti-francoist», but «anti-Spanish». In this context, activities which are directly coined as «anti-Spanish» concern mostly public demonstrations of support. That was the case of solidarity actions held in support of Alfonso Sastre, Genoveva Forrest, Maria Paz Ballasteros, Lidia Falcon and Eliseo Bayo<sup>117</sup>, prisoners in Carabanchel prison, namely in the Portuguese press<sup>118</sup>. Or the cases of acts in support of the Spanish democratic forces<sup>119</sup> organised in Portugal by Portuguese or even by Portuguese in collaboration with «anti-Spanish» Spaniards. But especially the case of communist infiltration on the Portuguese mass media, since it was

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<sup>117</sup> Eliseo Bayo wrote about the Portuguese events for *Sabado Gráfico* and authored the book *Portugal: en libertad condicional*, published in 1974 by Diro, Barcelona.

<sup>118</sup> “Carta de Alfonso Sastre” snippet sent by the Spanish embassy in Lisbon (AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box 42/9049).

<sup>119</sup>“Esta noche, a las 21,30 horas, se celebrará un acto antiespañol en el teatro villaret (..) bajo las consignas “España vencerá. Contra el fascismo en España. Contra la derecha en Portugal. Por la democracia y el socialismo.” En El dicho acto intervendrán Mario Soares, en representante de las Juventudes Socialistas de España y los miembros de las juventudes socialistas de Portugal Maria da Paz, Antonio Ribeiro, Artur Neves y Carlos Garcia.”(AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/8951, “D.I.D.G.C., Fecha 29-3-76 hora 19.30, asunto: Acto anti-español en Lisboa; Fuente Consejero de Informacion de Lisboa”)

assumed that communists were, by definition, «anti-Spanish», despite the public efforts of the Portuguese Communist party members in Office to appear less antagonist towards Spain. An example of this can be seen in Álvaro Cunhal's remarks on the subject in an interview published in *Cambio 16*:

As is known, I'm a communist, and it is easy to infer which feelings I have towards the Spanish people regarding its fight for freedom, but, at the same time, as minister of the Portuguese democratic government, I mean, and I have insisted on it several times, a good neighbouring relationship and the implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence between the Portuguese and the Spanish governments are needed.<sup>xv120</sup>

Discreet surveillance of the mass media was thus omnipresent even before the revolutionary process had begun. Regarding the replacement, in 1970, of *A Capital's* editor-in-chief and his deputy, Norberto Lopes<sup>121</sup> and Mário Neves, by Maurício de Oliveira, the latter was considered by the Information and Tourism Counselor to be «our great friend»<sup>122</sup>, since «he was correspondent of our civil war and is at our entire disposal, which means that the previous leftist leaning maintained by the previous editor-in-chief, Norberto Lopes, is now replaced by a discreet governmental tendency»<sup>xvi</sup>. This insistent use of personal deixis<sup>123</sup>: «our friend», «our war», «our entire disposal», denotes the

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<sup>120</sup> AGA, MIT, “Presidencia”, box: 51/9511, “DIDGC, N°2, Publicacion: Cambio 16, Fecha 6-4-75 n°5-6”.

<sup>121</sup> In a letter sent to the Press Managing Director, accompanied by a report apparently drafted by a Spanish correspondent in Lisbon, the same Norberto Lopes is mentioned as the source – “I believe that through Norberto Lopes, I will have news about this joke” – of the Adviser in the oppositionist milieu, whether because he was part of it and had a cordial relationship with the Adviser, which is the most likely hypothesis since he is later connected – by the same service – with the “leftist drift” of *A Capital*, or because he was an informer of the Spanish Embassy.

<sup>122</sup> AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9049, Informative Note from the Adviser: “Asunto: Cambio de director de “A CAPITAL” 27 abril 1970”.

<sup>123</sup> Deixis is one of the ways in which referent is granted to a linguistic sequence: placing the enunciation in space and/or time in relation to its enunciator. Among



worker self-inclusion – and of its interlocutor within the MIT – in the group still in charge of defending «Spain» from «anti-Spain». The latter was not solely an internal enemy, but also potentially an external one, since if «(...) the rogue characters there find a mysterious way to connect with the ones we have here, we cannot lose track of the game of the Portuguese opposition. I believe I will have news about it through Norberto Lopes.»<sup>xvii</sup> This was a concern expressed in 1965 by Ismael Herraiz<sup>124</sup>, Information and Tourism Counselor in Lisbon, in a letter to Manuel Jiménez Quilez, MIT’s press managing Director.

Therefore, even in a country that posed no threat to the Spanish order like Portugal in 1970 – which is inferred by the fact that the new editor-in-chief of *A Capital*, friend of Spain, was also someone who installed a «discreet governmental tendency» in the newsroom – the importance of having «our» friends in charge of what could be potentially threatening, as the media were, was acknowledged.

Moreover, when the revolutionary process begins – and the threat is felt because media can change hands – media could be directly coined to be «so openly an enemy of Spain»<sup>xviii</sup>, as was the case with weekly *Sempre fixe*<sup>125</sup>; or to be at the mercy of communist infiltration, which ultimately meant the same. In that sense, denunciations, and its «proofs», start happening constantly: the constitution of a «revolutionary commission» within the *RCP*<sup>126</sup> «represents a proof of the communist

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the elements that have personal deictic expression – that inform about the interactors of the situation –are not only personal pronouns (we), but also the possessive pronouns (our), and the verbal inflexion, which is richer in the Romanic languages than in English.

<sup>124</sup> AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/8951, “Carta de Ismael Herraiz dirigida a Manuel Jiménez Quilez”.

<sup>125</sup> AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/8952, Note from the Embassy: “Lisboa, 4 de enero de 1975”.

<sup>126</sup> AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box 42/9049, Note from the Embassy.

infiltration in that broadcaster»<sup>xix</sup>; journalist Luiz Filipe Costa, accused of being a member of PCP, is also said to have visited Spain «with the objective of producing anti-Spanish news reports», as part of the National Broadcaster's<sup>127</sup> – which is noticeably named «the Portuguese National radio» – «“anti-Spanish” campaign» orchestrated by elements of the PCP, such as Costa. The latest of these reports, concerning the Spanish Army, was picked up by «our Portuguese collaborators», informs the report<sup>128</sup>.

At that point, there were still «friends» of Spain in Portugal, seemingly eager to help Spanish authorities oversee the Portuguese media, but the conflict between communists and socialists in Portugal, especially regarding mass media, also served this purpose. Based on the proofs<sup>129</sup> produced by PSP, the communist infiltration in *Diário de Notícias*, on the eve of the first elections of April 1975, was picked up by the Information and Tourism Counselor and duly reported.

However, this broadening aspect<sup>130</sup> of what may constitute the «Spanish interest» leaves room for improvisation and cautiousness,

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<sup>127</sup> Luis Filipe Costa stopped for *RCP* after November 25<sup>th</sup> and joined *Antena 2*, part of *Emissora Nacional*, renamed *RDP – Radio Difusão Portuguesa* in 1976 (Daniel Cerejo, “Luís Filipe Costa distinguido com prémio da Sociedade Portuguesa de Autores”, *JPN*, 19 Nov. 2012, [http://jpn.c2com.up.pt/2012/11/09/luis\\_filipe\\_costa\\_distinguido\\_com\\_premio\\_da\\_sociedade\\_portuguesa\\_de\\_autores.html](http://jpn.c2com.up.pt/2012/11/09/luis_filipe_costa_distinguido_com_premio_da_sociedade_portuguesa_de_autores.html), (accessed on 15 Jul. 2013 at 11:50).

<sup>128</sup> AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/8951, DGS Report : “Asunto: Propaganda anti-española en Portugal”.

<sup>129</sup> AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9049, “Lisboa, 21 de Abril de 1975”.

<sup>130</sup> Of interest to Spain, according to the border services, were also: references in the Portuguese press to a poll carried out by *Actualidad Española* on foreign affairs; Palma Carlos' declarations on Iberian relations to *Arriba*; the reception of the Portuguese events in Spain by *Sempre Fixe*'s correspondent in Madrid, the mention of a *Daily Telegraph* editorial on Franco's return to power after his first illness, Corvacho's declarations about ELP's activities and its relation to the Spanish territory, Mitterrand's visit to Spain upon invitation by Felipe Gonzalez, who is presented by the Portuguese press as the general secretary of PSOE, or finally Melilla and Ceuta's population displacement.

sometimes mixed with some corporative interest<sup>131</sup>, which is expected to be reverberated in the several stages of MIT's chain of production: from the grassroots, where news are collected, to their delivery.

Thus, in order to deal with this restraining feature of the system, two elements become of key importance in the production of news in newspapers: the human resources available to get the information directly and the use of foreign sources available in Spain.

### 2.3 Human resources

The presence of foreign correspondents in Portugal was relatively limited before 1974, given the country's minor relevance in world informative routines. According to Galtung and Ruge's study (1965), this situation stems from the fact that Portugal was not considered an «elite nation» and was not frequently related with one, nor was it home to «prominent people» worthy of personalized attention, and it was not the «centre stage» of events considered to be negative, such as wars, coups, natural catastrophes, etc. Some isolated exceptions to this general situation were the colonial wars, the Santa Maria hijacking (1961) or Humberto Delgado's assassination (1965); but particularly from the Spanish point of view, the fact that since 1946 Lisbon was Don Juan de Borbón's home in exile. This fact justified the presence of Spanish correspondents in Lisbon working for several newspapers, against the general rule.

Despite its historical scarce relevance, the events that unfold in Portugal since March 1974 cause a global informative interest (Rebelo 1994; Vieira and Monico 2014), as well as a specific Spanish interest (Sánchez 1993, Cordero 2010). For Spanish newspapers, it was important

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<sup>131</sup> Other information, like the publication in the Portuguese press of 42 names of teachers of PIDE's Technical School, could be called of corporative interest, since DGS' workers are similar to PIDE's ones.

to have journalists in Portugal between 1974 and 1976, and moments like the military failed coup of 16 March, the 25 April coup and the 1975 and 1976 elections were the pinnacles of an event-based coverage, not unlike the francophone coverage of the same process (Nobre-Correia 1994), despite the difference in the events chosen to be covered. After the Caldas' coup on 16 March the first wave of special correspondents arrives, and throughout 1974 permanent correspondents are reinforced and/or replaced by younger professionals.

The Spanish presence in Portugal is not, nonetheless, free of important conflicts, especially in 1975. Furthermore, not only distinct political-ideological sensitivities but also different journalistic schools were present in Lisbon, and the political engagement of some of the professionals, given that the Portuguese events are assumed transversely as a «test tube» for the Spanish case, must be taken into consideration.

Spanish correspondents in Portugal were mostly veteran journalists, and frequently conservative, working for newspapers like *ABC* and *Arriba*, like José Salas y Guirior, correspondent in Lisbon during the entire revolutionary process (Cernuda, Jáuregui and Menéndez 2001, 75), Juan Ramón Pérez Clotas, who had been, as he himself stated, in a «*donjuanian* mission» between 1969 and 1970 (Morán 2010) and returned as special correspondent for both *Arriba* and *pyresa* to cover the revolution; or *La Vanguardia Española*'s veteran correspondent, Inocente Palazón Olivares, who was in Lisbon for two decades.

Foreign correspondents fulfil the need for information beyond the one provided by news agencies, the «real lung of the newsroom», as José Rebelo calls it (1994: 111). In the Spanish case they become even more important because of EFE's role in the filtration of the news flow coming from international agencies, in conformity with MIT's action and because it held the monopoly of international news distribution (Chuilá 2001)

Foreign correspondents are also one of the main voices in the construction of the «foreign», in the sense that according to social construction of reality theories meaning is created rather than found. «Assuming that reality is brought into existence by communication» (Dell’orto 2002, 3), by the reporting of what exists outside, correspondents create a meaning for it, through the use of language and the choice of themes, in the newspaper’s pages and the readers’ minds. Nevertheless, it should also be reminded, as Hess appropriately does, that ultimately «journalists produce a product or a service for an organization and are expected to conform to its expectations» (2005:10).

Thus, depending on their means, newspapers sustain foreign correspondents around the world and, particularly, send special correspondents to cover relevant events, whenever necessary, to «report on an important event although in a limited space and timeframe (...); to “refresh” the newsroom with an external contact (...); and lastly, to cast a new view about the same event already reported by the correspondent»<sup>xx</sup>, argues Rebelo when distinguishing between these two functions (1994:111-112).

### a) Spanish Journalists attached to the process: permanent versus special correspondents

In what concerns the written press, especially the newspapers subject of in-depth analyses here, human resources available were uneven. In total, as shown in table 7, these newspapers had 40<sup>132</sup> main journalists covering Portuguese events between February 1974 and April 1976. The Falangist *Arriba* (11) was the medium who devoted more human resources to this coverage, followed by *Informaciones* (9) and *La Vanguardia Española* (8). On the opposite side were both *Tele/eXprés* (7) and *ABC* (5). Small

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<sup>132</sup> Fernando Jáuregui appears only once in this total, despite having been correspondent for *Arriba* and special correspondent for *Informaciones* (see table 8).

newspapers such as *Tele/eXprés* and *Informaciones* were in clear disadvantage when compared to newspapers like *La Vanguardia Española* and *ABC*. Alongside *Arriba*, the latter already had foreign correspondents in Lisbon, and therefore a permanent source of information.

<b>Newspaper</b>	<b>Correspondent</b>	<b>Special Correspondent</b>
<i>ABC</i>	1	4
<i>Arriba</i>	3 <sup>133</sup>	9
<i>Informaciones</i>	1 <sup>134</sup>	8
<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	2 <sup>135</sup>	6
<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	2 <sup>136</sup>	5
<b>Total</b>	9*	32*

**Table 7: Number of correspondents and special correspondents by newspaper**

As events unfolded, foreign correspondents, but especially special correspondents, were sent to Portugal, as shown in table 7. Women, although existent, are clearly underrepresented<sup>137</sup> (3 out of 40), and amount to less than the number of photojournalists (4 out of 40) or the number of journalists writing exclusively from the Portuguese European territories (4 out of 40).

Regarding correspondents, *ABC*'s José Salas y Guirior, already in Lisbon before the coup, accompanied the entire process. *La Vanguardia Española* had financial means to sustain a worldwide network of correspondents, and is both the only newspaper providing its own information about Macau (via Javier M. de Padilla, its eastern Asia

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<sup>133</sup> Andrés Maria Kramer replaces Fernando Jáuregui as correspondent for both *Arriba* and the news agency *pyresa*.

<sup>134</sup> Eduardo Corregedor da Fonseca is presented by the newspaper as correspondent of *Informaciones* for a period of about five months.

<sup>135</sup> Inocente Palazón Olivares is replaced by Alberto Miguez, who also writes for *Ya*.

<sup>136</sup> José Jorge Letria and Correia da Fonseca are presented by the newspaper as correspondents of *Tele/eXprés* for a short period.

<sup>137</sup> «Robin Wright divides the history of foreign correspondence into three periods: first there were no women, then there were single women, finally there were married women» (Hess, Stephen.1996. *International news & Foreign correspondents*, Washington : The Brookings Institution, pp.19)

correspondent) and sending a journalist to the African territories. Indeed, Alberto Miguez, correspondent in Lisbon, was sent to Guinea (August 1974), Mozambique (June-July 1975), and Angola (July 1975) to cover their road to independence. Alberto Miguez, former Rabat correspondent and recently arrived from an assignment as special correspondent in Mexico and Colombia (previously he had also been in Chile), replaced Inocente Palazón Olivares as permanent correspondent in Lisbon in July 1974. *Arriba* is nevertheless the only newspaper that increases its presence in Portugal in terms of permanent correspondents: José Reis narrates the Portuguese events for most of the period, helped by Fernando Jáuregui between June 1974 and May 1975, after which the latter is replaced by Andrés Maria Kramer.

On the other hand, both *Informaciones* and *Tele/eXprés* are characterized by a more precarious flow of their own information. Corregedor da Fonseca<sup>138</sup>, writing regularly until 15 June 1974, is *Informaciones*' correspondent in Lisbon. Eduardo Barrenechea, though maintaining the status of special correspondent, covered the Portuguese process so intensely between mid-January and late-June 1975 that during that time he was filling the role of permanent correspondent. Oddly enough, considering the earlier attention given to the Portuguese revolutionary process by this newspaper, *Informaciones* does not replace Barrenechea after he leaves Portugal. In December 1975, Barrenechea is appointed as editor-in-chief of the weekly version of *Cuadernos para el Dialogo* starting from March 1976. As for *Tele/eXprés*, two Portuguese journalists – José Jorge Letria and Correia da Fonseca – become correspondents in Lisbon in the beginning of the process. Both wrote a small number of articles in May and between July and September 1974,

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<sup>138</sup> Later on Eduardo Corregedor da Fonseca will be nominated Press Adviser of the Portuguese Embassy in Madrid («Presentación del libro sobre la muerte del general Humberto Delgado». 1974. *Informaciones*, November 9, pp.13).

respectively. However, after that *Tele/eXprés* had no permanent correspondent in Portugal.

<b>Newspaper</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Age group</b>
<i>ABC</i>	José Salas y Guirior (C)	Feb. 1974-April 1976	(1914-1979)
	Pablo Magaz (SC)	Oct.1975	(1924-1983)
	Rabanal de Brito (SC)	March 1975	-
	Ismael Fuente Lafuente (SC)	Feb. 1976	(1951-1994)
	António Alférez (SC)	April 1976	(1942)
	Luis Alfonso (SC photo)	May 1974	-
	Teodoro Naranjo (SC photo)	April 1976	(1930-1982)
<i>Arriba</i>	José Reis (C)	Feb. 1974-Feb.1976	-
	Fernando Jáuregui (C)	June1974-May 1975	(1950)
	Andrés Maria Kramer (C)	June1975- April 1976	(1940)
	José Rey (SC)	March/April 1974	(1919)
	Francisco Caparrós (SC)	March/April1974	(1948)
	JR Pérez de las Clotas(SC)	March/May1974/May1975	(1923-2012)
	JL Gómez Tello	March 1974	(1916-2003)
	Salvador López de la Torre (SC)	April/Sep 1975	(1919-2011)
	Antonio López López (SC)	December 1975	-
	Bernabé Pertasa (SC Luanda)	August 1974	-
	Javier Figuero (SC)	March 1975	(1948)
	José Pastor (SC photo)	March 1975	(1919-2010)
	Consuelo Sanchez Vicente (SC)	April 1976	(1953)
Julio Martinez (SC)	April 1976	-	



<i>Informaciones</i>	Corregedor da Fonseca (C)	March- July 1974 <sup>139</sup>	-
	Eduardo Barrenechea (SC)	Mar-Apr/Apr- May/ Sep 74/ Jan-Jun 75	(1937-1994)
	Luís Carandell (SC)	Mar./Apr-May 1974	(1929-2002)
	José Luis Sanz (SC photo)	March 1974	-
	Lorenzo Contreras (SC) <sup>140</sup>	June 1974	(1933)
	Teofilo Menchero (SC)	January 1975	(1941)
	Fernando Jáuregui (SC)	April 1976	(1950)
	Ángel Luis de la Calle (SC)	Mar.75/Sep. 1975/ Feb.1976	(1947)
	Julio Colomer	Nov. 1975/April 1976	-
	Jaime Vergara	Nov. 1975	-
	Luis Reyes (SC Africa)	Summer 1974	(1945)
	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	Inocente Palazón de Olivares (C)	until June 15 1974
Alberto Miguez (C)		Jul. 1974- Apr. 1976 <sup>141</sup> Guinea (August 1974) Mozambique (June-July 1975) Angola (July 1975)	(1941-2009)
Manuel Leguineche (SC)		Mar./Ap.-May 1974 <sup>142</sup>	(1941-2014)
Adrián Mac Liman (SC)		April 1974	-
Augusto Assia (SC)		Apr- May/Jun1974/Apr/Dec.1975/ April 1976	(1906-2002)
Margarita Sáenz Diez (SC)		May 1974 / Apr 1976	(1942)
María Dolores		July 1974	(1936)

<sup>139</sup> Eduardo Corregedor da Fonseca writes frequently until July 15th 1974.

<sup>140</sup> Lorenzo Contreras, for *Informaciones*, and José Oneto, for *La Vanguardia Española*, cover the same events on June 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> 1974 that gathered about fifty Spanish personalities in Lisbon: a dinner celebrating Don Juan de Borbón's saint at Hotel Estoril-Sol and a dinner with Portuguese Ministers of the I provisional Government at Hotel Tivoli, the following night.

<sup>141</sup> Alberto Miguez was in Guinea from August 21st 1974 until the 30<sup>th</sup>; then in Mozambique for the Independence on June 25<sup>th</sup> 1975, and then Angola until July 19<sup>th</sup> 1975.

<sup>142</sup> Firstly from the 17<sup>th</sup> until the 22<sup>nd</sup> of March 17<sup>th</sup>-22<sup>nd</sup> and then from April 25<sup>th</sup> until May 7<sup>th</sup>.

	Masana (trip)		
	Javier M. de Padilla (SC Macau)	June/Sept. 1974/July1975/ Jan. 1976	(1927-1995)
	José Oneto	June 1974	(1942)
Tele/eXprés	José Jorge Letria (C)	May 1974	(1951)
	Correia da Fonseca (C)	July-September 1974	-
	Xavier Roig (SC)	Apr-May 1974/April 1975	(1946)
	Daniel del Puig (SC) <sup>143</sup>	December 1974	-
	J. A. Gonzalez Casanova (SC)	April 1975	(1935)
	Manuel Campo (SC)	April 1976	(1951)
	Manuel Vázquez Montálban (SC)	May 1974	(1939-2003)
	Quim Monzó (c Africa)	Summer 1974	(1952)
	Albert Abril (c Africa)	Summer 1974	(1947)
	Josep Ramoneda (trip)	April 1975	(1949)

**Table 8: Profile and assignment time of Correspondent (C) and Special Correspondent (SC), Collaborator (c)<sup>144</sup>**

### b) Waves of special correspondents

Spanish interest about events taking place in Portugal is materialized in four waves of generalized attention, beginning with the failed Caldas coup, followed by the 25 April coup, and later the electoral processes of April 1975 and 1976. Similarly to other European press mediums (Mesquita and Rebelo 1994), the military crisis of 16 March 1974 caused the first influx of Spanish special correspondents: *La Vanguardia*

<sup>143</sup> Daniel del Puig, special correspondent in Paris, covers socialist-related events in December 1974: first the arrival of a delegation of the MFA to meet the Portuguese immigrant community in Paris, in the context of the meeting between Breznev and Giscard and the commotion produced by Mitterand's press conference which caused a controversy between French socialists and communists; and later PSP's congress in Lisbon.

<sup>144</sup> The distinction between the three categories is made according to their own designation on the newspaper. Collaborators were not taken into account in the totals of correspondents or special correspondents.

*Española* sent Manuel Leguineche; Luis Carandell and Eduardo Barrenechea, working for *Informaciones*, produced a series of five articles titled «Portugal:¿del gallo al avestruz?» [Portugal: from rooster to ostrich?]<sup>145</sup>, and «Viaje a Portugal» [Trip to Portugal]; but once again, it was definitely *La Cadena del Movimiento*, hence *Arriba*, who invested more resources in this period: apart from its correspondent José Reis, José Rey, Francisco Caparrós and Juan Ramón Pérez de las Clotas were writing from Portugal. Also part of this significant attention given to the latest woes of the dictatorship was the five part article-series «Portugal, en su calma» [Portugal in its tranquility]<sup>146</sup> signed by JL Gomez Telo, author of *Arriba*'s international opinion column «El Mundo» and contributor to the far-right wing magazine *Fuerza Nueva*, interrupted in the very day of the coup.

Since this first moment was so chronologically close to the 25 April coup, the second influx of special correspondents saw some of the same journalists returning, like José Rey and Francisco Caparrós (*Arriba*), Manuel Leguineche (*La Vanguardia Española*), and Carandell and Barrenechea (for both *Informaciones* and *Triunfo*). Among these, only Barrenechea will remain connected to the same medium covering this process; after May 1974, the others are no longer connected to the Portuguese events in these newspapers.

Initially, *La Vanguardia Española* strengthens its journalistic team with Adrián Mac Liman, the newspaper's correspondent in Geneva, and Augusto Assia, pseudonym of Felipe Fernández Armesto, the special correspondent *par excellence*, who travels to Portugal five times, publishing his chronicles, like Miguez, in both *La Vanguardia Española* and *Ya. Tele/eXprés*, without a journalist reporting from Portugal at that moment, sent Xavier Roig and Manuel Vázquez Montalbán to Lisbon, the

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<sup>145</sup> Published in April 1974, between the 15<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup>.

<sup>146</sup> Series published in April 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup>, 20<sup>th</sup>, 21<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> of 1974.

former on the very day of the coup and the latter on the second week of May.

The elections of 1975 and 1976 constitute the other two influxes of special correspondents. For the 1975 electoral process about 1200 foreign journalists from 44 countries (Rodrigues 2008) are reportedly in Portugal, but this number varies slightly according to different sources. Indeed, Vieira and Monico (2014:147) set the number of journalists at 800, among which at least 35 duly registered professionals from Spain. According to *Arriba*, for the 1975 elections:

A thousand information professionals are estimated to have travelled to Lisbon, coming from 35 countries, to cover all the information related with the elections. The country that sent a higher number of correspondents was France, with 69. The English have deployed 50, the North Americans 38, and accredited Spaniards, 35. Those 35 professionals have been sent by some medium to cover the information while the elections take place (...) Almost the entire newsroom of magazines such as «Triunfo», «Cambio-16», «Contrastes», «Posible», etc., have themselves travelled to Lisbon in order to live step by step all the events. Television Española chartered an airplane and made it available for all the professionals who had an interest in living these transcendental days for Portugal. According to estimates, other than the distinct media professionals sent to Lisbon as special correspondents, over 200 “curious journalists” will accompany today’s journey<sup>xxi147</sup>

Even if there is a variation in the actual numbers provided, they are of the same magnitude and allow us to conclude that when it comes to the 1975 elections, the Spanish interest, reflected in the amount of human resources made available, fits the international response. Conversely, when in the post-March 11 period more than 400 hundred journalists reportedly travelled to Lisbon, none of these newspapers sent special correspondents<sup>148</sup>. Yet Spanish magazines such as *Cambio 16* and *Triunfo*

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<sup>147</sup> Sánchez, Gabriel.1975. «Doscientos periodistas españoles, en Lisboa», *Arriba*, April 25, pp.15 (AGA, MIT, “Presidencia”, box: 51/9511, “ DIDGC, Fecha 25 abr 1975, publicación Arriba nº85”)

<sup>148</sup> “Tras la intentona derechista del 11 marzo, más de cuatrocientos periodistas de todo el mundo llegaron a Lisboa” (AGA, MIT, “Presidencia”, box: 51/9117, “DIDGC, Publicacion “Cambio 16”, Fecha 6-4-75, nº5”)

are actually present in these moments of radicalization, like in the post-March 11 period,<sup>149</sup> and even before that, after Spínola's removal from office (September 28<sup>th</sup>-30<sup>th</sup> 1974), an event coined by Luis Carandell as the «ratification of freedom» and «the new victory over fascism»<sup>150</sup>.

For the newspapers included in this sample, more journalists covered the 1976 elections than the 1975 ones. In the latter case, besides José Reis and Jáuregui, *Arriba* sent Salvador Lopez de la Torre to Portugal, *Tele/eXprés* sent Xavier Roig once again with by J.A. González Casanova,<sup>151</sup> and *La Vanguardia Española* sent Augusto Assia to help Miguez. In turn, in 1976 Margarita Sáenz-Diez was added to *La Vanguardia Española*'s team; *Informaciones* sent Fernando Jaurégui, *Tele/eXprés* sent Manuel Campo; *Arriba*, at the time with only Andrés Kramer in Lisbon, sent Consuelo Sánchez-Vicente along with Julio Martínez, who prepared an extensive dossier on Portugal: «Y al oeste, Portugal» [And at west, Portugal] published in *Arriba Dominical* on 25 April 1976, the day of the elections. Finally, *ABC*, who had José Salas in Lisbon, failed to send journalists in 1975, but had António Alférez, head of the international section, sent in 1976 alongside the photographer Teodoro Naranjo. They produced a series of seven articles titled: «Portugal ante el Nuevo 25 de abril» [Portugal before the new April 25<sup>th</sup>] published between April 18 and 25.

Distinct are the moments when the coverage is not homogenous and therefore where each newspaper's interest becomes more visible. This varying interest can be seen in the coverage of different types of events, like post-crisis phases, extra-European developments and diplomatic

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<sup>149</sup> Carandell, Luís. 1975. «Cronica de un golpe fallido», *Triunfo*, March 22, pp.8-9

<sup>150</sup> Carandell, Luís. 1974. «Mi último día en Lisboa», *Triunfo*, October 11, pp.16

<sup>151</sup> In May 1975 Gonzalez Casanova's book *La Lucha por la democracia en España*, edited by Ed. Juan Lliteras was denounced by political reasons (Rojos Claros 2005).

interactions between Portugal and Spain. In the latter case, the February 1976 meeting between Ernesto Melo Antunes and José María de Areiliza, Portuguese and Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministers, respectively, in Guarda, was covered by Ismael Fuente Lafuente from *ABC* and Ángel Luis de Calle for *Informaciones*. But *Informaciones* was the only newspaper in this sample with a journalist, Teofilo Menchero, reporting on the exhumation and transfer of General Humberto Delgado body, a known oppositionist assassinated by PIDE in Spanish territory, from Villanueva del Fresno to Lisbon in January 1975. Furthermore, only *Arriba* and *Informaciones* sent members of their staff to Badajoz after the failed coup of 11 March 1975 to cover General Spínola's escape from Portugal to Brazil via Spain: *Arriba* had Javier Figueroa together with photographer José Pastor; and *Informaciones* had Angel de la Calle.

In terms of human resources, little attention is arguably given to extra-European territories, although, as mentioned, *La Vanguardia Española*'s Alberto Miguez travels to Guinea, Angola and Mozambique; Javier M. de Padilla travels to Macau in different occasions; *Arriba/pyresa* sends Bernabé Pertusa to Angola in August 1974 and Luis Reyes reports both from Angola and Mozambique for *Informaciones*; and during the summer of 1974 *Tele/eXprés* sends Quim Monzó and Albert Abril to Africa – in October 1973 they had covered the south Asian conflict –, resulting in an eight-part news report titled «Africa: la muerte del colonialismo» [«Africa: Death of Colonialism»]<sup>152</sup>. Despite these examples, the overall tonic of investment in human resources is on Europe because of matters of affinity and costs, but also perhaps for a question of interest, since colonialism was not as relevant for Spain as the downfall of the dictatorship.

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<sup>152</sup> Series published between September 4<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> 1974.

Lastly, all post-crisis moments take place in 1975. Firstly, the post-1975 election moment, for which Pérez Clotas (*Arriba*) arrived in Lisbon in time to witness the incorporation of the electoral process in the revolutionary dynamics; then, the moment that followed Vasco Gonçalves' downfall as prime-minister (30 August); the final stretch of what became known as «Hot summer» had Ángel Luis de la Calle (*Informaciones*) in Lisbon, followed by Salvador de la Torre (*Arriba*)<sup>153</sup>, who got there just in time for the United Soldiers Shall Win demonstrations [*Soldados Unidos Vencerão SUV*] and the negotiations to form the VI provisional government; and, finally, the post 25 November order, on which Fernando Jáuregui, already in *Informaciones*, prepared an issue with several interviews for the political supplement *Informaciones Políticas*, for which Jaime Vergara also writes from Lisbon; and the pretext for Augusto Assia's (*La Vanguardia Española*) trip to Lisbon in December.

All in all, in terms of human resources made available, it is safe to argue that *ABC* is probably the newspaper that gave less attention to the revolutionary process without a significant change of its policy towards Portugal. As shown above, few special correspondents are sent, and even then only in the late phases of the process<sup>154</sup>. *ABC* was also the only newspaper of this sample that did not send any special correspondent to report on either the coup or the 1975 election. The fact that in this period *ABC* experienced a phase of financial difficulties that would last until the 1980s may or not be related with this (Alfárez 1986). In the beginning of

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<sup>153</sup> Salvador de la Torre was also the journalist covering the Helsinki summit in August 1975 and the meeting of southern-European socialist parties in Paris in January 1976.

<sup>154</sup> Pablo Magaz, who in 1976 became correspondent for *ABC* in Bonn, is in Portugal for a month in October-November 1975 replacing José Salas y Guirior while the latter is probably enjoying his holidays – since it is the only period during these twenty-six months when he fails to publish chronicles. Later, in 1976, Ismael Fuentes and Antonio Alfárez also reported from Portugal.

1975 rumours actually emerged about the possible selling of the newspaper<sup>155</sup>. On the other hand, *Arriba* and *Informaciones* strike us as the newspapers with a more intense and expressive interest in the events, even if they had different interests, as reflected in the diplomatic interaction moments each newspaper chose to cover. Yet *Arriba*'s investment cannot be dissociated from the fact that it belongs to *La Cadena del Movimiento*, and, therefore that it benefits from public funding. In other words, investment made by *Arriba*, due to its public nature, is also an investment made by the Spanish State. Furthermore, the higher number of journalists it had in Portugal cannot be dissociated from the fact that most of its foreign correspondents and special correspondents were also working for *pyresa*, the public network's news agency.

### c) Different types of journalists

Two opposite types of journalists, veterans and beginners, coexisted in Lisbon. José Salas' and Pérez Clotas' career, for instance, started in the post-civil war period, while Augusto Assia and whose professional achievements include covering Hitler's rise to power in Germany, World War II in London, and the Nuremberg trials, started working in 1924. This group of journalists shares a certain type of chronicle, particularly entangled in opinion. It is a type of personalized chronicle, where the author's proximity to his object, either by the mention of «friends» as sources or the quotation of Portuguese literary works, is emphasized. This procedure helps to establish these authors as experts on the Portuguese reality in the eyes of the readers.

But for several Spanish journalists covering the Portuguese revolutionary process was their first, or one of their first, professional experiences. This is probably the case of journalists like Fernando Jáuregui, Francisco Caparrós, and Consuelo Sánchez, all beginners in

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<sup>155</sup> «No se vende ABC».1975. *Informaciones*, February 26, pp. 32



*Arriba*, born when the veterans were starting their careers. Sánchez, who covered the 1976 elections, a student of the first undergraduate degree in Information Sciences, started in 1971 at the Complutense University, in Madrid, Autònoma University, in Barcelona, and Navarra University, in Pamplona. Caparrós travelled to Portugal as special correspondent at least twice in the first two waves: 16 March and 25 April. Finally, Jaurégui reinforced *Arriba* and *pyresa*'s contingent in Portugal from June 1974 up until 1975. Like Jaúregui, Caparrós later transfers to more progressive media, in this case *Diario 16*.

Also present in Portugal were what can be termed as politically engaged journalists, several of them members of the Barcelona Journalists' Democratic Group [*Grup Democràtic de Periodistes GDP*, 1966-1976]. Although distributed among several newspapers, they were more present in *Tele/eXprés* (Roglan 1992).

While not young, these journalists are in general not veterans, and their performance is mostly dependent on the medium where they publish. In this sense, Eduardo Barenechea's example is instructive, even though he was not a member of this underground group. While writing for *Informaciones*, a daily newspaper, and therefore less prone to having its issue confiscated, Barrenechea authored less explicitly politicized articles than the ones published in the magazine *Cuadernos para el Diálogo* (i. e. an article on the behaviour of the Portuguese right-wing after General Spínola's dismissal from office, and another after the first electoral process denouncing PCP's demand of «unity» as fraudulent).

On the other hand, their performance is not completely predetermined by the medium. This is the case of both Fernando Jaurégui and Alberto Miguez, who despite writing for conservative-leaning newspapers such as *Arriba* and *La Vanguardia Española*, often deviate

from the discourse reflected in these newspapers' editorial lines. Later on in the process, Jaurégui is incorporated by *Informaciones*.

#### d) «Curious Journalists»

A feature of the Spanish coverage of the Portuguese revolutionary process – which could also be true for other countries' coverage and common to the Anglo-Saxon coverage of the Spanish Civil war (Deacon 2008) – is the fact that not only journalists that were actually dispatched to cover the event travelled to Portugal. Some journalists travelled at their expense and initiative. Regarding his analysis of the coverage of the civil war and Anglo-Saxon journalistic culture, Deacon (2008:49) distinguishes the latter, according to the level of contractual relationship and identifies freelancers (who «provided written copy to news organizations») and stringers (who «provided factual information and leads»). This distinction is not as operative in the case of Spanish journalistic culture, where these two functions are not so clear. However this type of journalist could also be sometimes integrated in initiatives such as TVE's, which prompted *Arriba* to christen them as «curious journalists». Indeed, the Spanish television chartered a plane for around 200 journalists interested in the process, when only around 35-40 actually had credentials to cover the event. Magazines that transferred their entire newsroom to Portugal such as *Triunfo* or *Cambio 16*, as mentioned by *Arriba*, are known for their political engagement, so rather than mere curiosity, their decision was perhaps a feature of an internationalist militancy that saw in Portugal the latest stage of a worldwide revolution, similarly to the perception of part of the French left (Pereira 2010), and like Spain itself had been perceived during the civil war.

This «curious journalists» phenomenon could be included in what has been coined as «political tourism» (Roberto Mesa in Muños Soros 2006, 325), helped by the Portuguese Tourism Agency campaigns of 1974

«Portugal so new and so different» and «Portugal, so close and so new» of 1975 (Sánchez 1993). But it refers to the phenomenon which Vázquez Montalbán described as «The revolution one can go by car»<sup>156</sup>, and of which the examples of Maria Dolores Masana in *La Vanguardia Española* and Josep Ramoneda in *Tele/eXprés* are illustrative examples. Having travelled to Portugal during the summer of 1974, Masana<sup>157</sup> (1974) published an article in the form of a letter in *La Vanguardia Española*. Although announced as a series, ultimately only this first article was published. Ramoneda's accounts of the first electoral process<sup>158</sup> (1975; 1975a) place him in Portugal by the deixis of his writings, although he was the newspaper correspondent in Paris, which probably means he was one of these «curious journalists» travelling in TVE's entourage.

Although it did indeed exist, this type of freelance journalism was not nearly as important as freelance journalism in the early stages of the Spanish civil war, before the arrival of staff and special correspondents, when the bulk of the coverage was ensured by this sort of «curious journalists» (Deacon 2008, 49). The Spanish coverage of the Portuguese revolutionary process is, in this sense, more institutional. Journalists in this sample tend to be integrated in a news organization rather than just freelancers, even if sometimes they are connected to several organizations (like Barrenechea, Assia, Miguez, etc.). A reason for this could be found in the fact that using the services of a collaborator-correspondent that lacked the status of a properly recognized journalist by the *Registro Oficial de Periodistas* was considered an infraction and could

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<sup>156</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, M. 1974. «A la revolución, en coche», *Tele-eXprés*, March 13, pp.5

<sup>157</sup> Masana, M<sup>a</sup> Dolores. 1974. «Impresiones de un viaje al «Nuevo» Portugal (1). Lisboa, máximo exponente del cambio provocado por la nueva situación política del país» *La Vanguardia española*, July 20, pp.18

<sup>158</sup> Ramoneda, Josep. 1975. «Los socialistas portugueses y la administración de su victoria electoral» *Tele/eXprés*, April 29, pp.4 and Ramoneda, Josep. 1975a. «El MFA y las elecciones portuguesas» *Tele/eXprés*, April 30, pp.16

be punished, like in the case of *El Correo de Andalucía* in 1975<sup>159</sup>, when in the aftermath of 11 March the newspaper noticed north American military presence in Spain heading to the Portuguese border.

In any case, the trip – and especially the return – of the Spanish travellers, and in particular Spanish journalists, became an opportunity to get direct information, as argued by Carandell and Barrenechea: «The return of the Spanish journalists that had been in Portugal in those days was, in itself, an event. We got phone calls from friends saying: “Well let’s see when you will share the details with me.” (...) The ones who were planning trips to Lisbon asked us the addresses of Portuguese people they could talk to. “Do you know where *the three Marys* book can be bought?»<sup>xxii</sup> (1974: 149).

Finally, the experience of this coverage prompted a self-reflection on the work conditions of the Spanish journalist. Xavier Roig’s first experience as special correspondent in Portugal was reflected in his book *Portugal: la muerte de un fascismo. Crónica de un golpe de estado* [Portugal: The death of Fascism. Chronicle of a coup d’état], written in «eighteen days» and published in the summer of 1974 with the purpose of being «useful»<sup>160</sup>. About this experience, Roig claimed in an interview when the book was published that:

Professionally there are few possibilities of practicing what you’re taught... There were journalists from everywhere and many of them could be seen working with means that are not available to us (...) Another thing is the cliché of having to be well dressed and all that. Most of the important journalists use jeans and military styled vests to have pockets where to store film rolls, tapes, newspapers... But the worst thing that happens to the Spanish journalists is that we self-restrict ourselves.<sup>xxiii</sup>

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<sup>159</sup>«Utilizar los servicios de un colaborador-corresponsal en Cádiz que carece de la condición de periodista, lo cual puede suponer infracción del artículo 11, párrafo cuarto del estatuto de la profesión periodística (texto refundido aprobado por decreto 744-1967, de 13 de abril).” LOGOS.1975. «Sobre “el desembarco en Rota”, Aclaración de “El correo de andalucía”», *Arriba*, March 27, pp.9

<sup>160</sup> «En 18 días escribió una crónica de la revolución: “Portugal la muerte de un Fascismo”». 1974. *Tele/eXprés*, August 7, pp.6

Roig's reflections suggested three important points regarding Spanish journalists' own idea of themselves, and their limitations, when performing their task on a foreign mission: the lack of means when compared with journalists working for other countries or journalistic cultures; the lack of contact with other routines and ways of working, i.e. the comment about the ideal dress code for a journalist; and, finally, the lack of freedom which prevented – alongside with the self-protection developed in order to deal with it – Spanish journalists from fully performing their job.

#### 2.4 Foreign Sources – the incorporation of the «foreigner»

Foreign press had an important role in the mode of production of part of the Spanish Newspaper. We are not referring to «borrowed news» (Hess 2005, 101), as in the construction of reports inspired by the ones the local press is publishing, despite their being present as well; but what we are referring to is the reproduction of articles, news reports or foreign correspondent pieces originally printed in international newspapers, other than Portuguese.

Smaller newspapers like *Informaciones* or *Tele/eXprés*, which, as shown, had less possibilities of maintaining permanent correspondents in Lisbon, were the ones that resorted to publishing information originally from foreign press more frequently and extensively, when reporting on Portugal. After Eduardo Barrenechea left Portugal in July 1975, the daily information on the revolutionary process in *Informaciones* was mostly given through EFE or the foreign news services the newspaper had hired, and presented as such.

By resorting to these services newspapers were not only able to provide information beyond the one provided by official channels (EFE, RNE), but also information which at the same time was perceived as

credible, of good quality and, of course, produced within a system that was not perceived as filtered. It was common practice in the newsrooms not only to translate chronicles (Mauri 2014) originally published in newspapers like *The New York Times*, *The Guardian* or *Le Monde*<sup>161</sup>, but also to use these newspapers as sources for pieces produced in the newsroom.

These practices are not specific to Spain and could be found elsewhere, but it is important here to draw a distinction between the newspapers that in the sample that used this method and the ones that did not.

In what concerns the sample of press used in this dissertation, newspapers like *Informaciones* or *Tele-eXprés* seem to be the ones that do it more often and extensively, as shown in table 9.

<i>ABC</i>	<i>Arriba</i>	<i>Informaciones</i>	<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	<i>Tele/eXprés</i>
-	-	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>
-	-	<i>The Times</i>	-	-
-	-	-	<i>The New York Times</i>	<i>The New York Times</i>
-	-	-	-	<i>The Guardian</i>
-	<i>Finacial Times</i>	-	-	-

**Table 9: Use of foreign press**

*Tele/eXprés* is the newspaper that uses foreign press more often to report on the Portuguese process, probably due to the fact that it is the newspaper that relied less on information provided by foreign correspondents or special correspondents. As a reference, one of the pieces published almost daily is from a foreign source. Furthermore, the foreign press used – *Le Monde*, *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* – can be connected to liberal political positions (Hess 2005, 102).

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<sup>161</sup> «The newspaper *Madrid* was fined 250,000 pesetas and suspended for two months in 1970 for printing a piece which had originally appeared in *Le Monde* on police control at Spanish universities. The sale of that particular edition of *Le Monde* had not been authorised in Spain either.» (Chislett 2011, 6).

*Informaciones* exclusively uses the English daily *The Times* until 27 May 1975, when the newspaper announces that from then on, information from *Le Monde* would also be published. This newspaper bases this decision on the fact that «its interest is supported by the level of quality and accuracy of *Le Monde*'s information, qualities unanimously recognized by all sectors of the international journalism. With the inclusion of these chronicles, together with the ones we have been publishing for a while of daily *The Times* from London, and the activity of our correspondents in New York, Paris, London and Brussels, the informative coverage of our newspaper in the world stage reaches the level and quality that *Informaciones*' readers deserve.»<sup>xxiv</sup><sup>162</sup>

*Le Monde*, the only newspaper that is used by all the titles in our sample that engage in this practice, holds a symbolic importance for the Spanish reader. For José Luís López Aranguren, for instance, *Le Monde* is the «informative organ of the Spaniards» (Chuliá 2001, 217), mostly because of its correspondent in Spain, José Antonio Novais, an iconic figure of resistance to Francoism. Alejandro Muñoz-Molina also reflects on this symbolic meaning of the French daily, but not only, in late-francoist Spain (2012, 9):

My generation was intellectual and politically 'fed' by *Le Monde*, which we usually got in the newsstand, with the exception of the days when Francoist censorship prevented its sale, almost always because it contained some information or a not very nice article for the Regime. *L'Express* was also read; and later, when it began, *Le Point*. Some of us had already discovered *The Economist* and started to become interested in *Time* or *Newsweek*. But without any doubt, the French penchant was predominant.<sup>xxv</sup>

In fact when this everyday habit of reading the foreign press could not be performed, and «when readers did not find their copy in the newsstands, the phone calls to friends and acquaintances living in France

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<sup>162</sup> 1975. *Informaciones*, May 27

would multiply to inquire about which news was probably responsible for the circulation prohibition that day»<sup>xxvi</sup>(Chuliá 200, 218).

*La Vanguardia Española*, *Arriba* and *ABC* had other means of getting information. And if *La Vanguardia Española* did integrate complete pieces from international newspapers, both *Arriba*, which published just a few number of articles printed originally by the *Financial Times*<sup>163</sup>, and *ABC* do not resort to this instrument when reporting about Portugal.

As mentioned above, foreign press in Spain kept this aura of working restrictions and together with it remained the perception that crossing the border meant non-controlled and, therefore, relevant information.

Not only readers, when confronted with the lack of their daily international newspaper, called others to hear the news, but part of the newsroom routine also consisted of calling the newspaper's foreign correspondents to find out what they knew about a variety of topics. For instance, according to Xavier Roig when the Portuguese events burst a call was made in *Tele/eXprés* to Josep Ramoneda, *Tele/eXprés* correspondent in Paris, who, the newsroom believed, «probably not to have been let in the dark by “France-Press” like they had been by EFE or *Radio Nacional* (...)»<sup>xxvii</sup> (Roig 1974, 36).

This type of connection with foreign media routines also included listening to foreign radio broadcasts that were, as we have seen, reachable in the Spanish territory. That was the case of the issue of 25 April 1974 of *Tele/eXprés*. When faced with the scarce information available and disappointed with the type of information provided by EFE and RNE, the newsroom resorted to their improvisation skills to come out with an issue

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<sup>163</sup> Chronicles of Bridget Bloom (in Lourenço Marques, as it was called Maputo at that time) and Jane Bergerot (in Bissau) were included under the *pyresa service* - *Financial Times* label (August 16<sup>th</sup> 1974).



referring to the Portuguese events. For instance, Roig explains how he traded information with a colleague from another Barcelona daily, who informed him that the BBC world service had reporting from Portugal since 6 am (1974, 35-36). One of the articles that were published by *Tele/eXprés* on that first day was based on such information, which, when compared with the other information published on the event, clearly stands out (except the pieces prepared by foreign correspondents), since the former were produced from the same sources: official communiqués, EFE's telegram, and so forth.

## 2.5 Repression

1975 was a particularly intense year for the Spanish press in terms of conflicts. Even Luís Ansón, who announced the unequivocal and direct path towards freedom of the press in Spain and had been nominated editor-in-chief of *Blanco y Negro* in February<sup>164</sup>, was indicted<sup>165</sup> because of two articles published under his tenure.

Repression therefore constituted the other main feature of MIT's action within the Spanish informative system, although it was not limited to this entity. The MIT's repressive action entailed economic losses, whether in the form of fines or the suspension of the publication – that once suspended might risk losing both readership and advertising –, but repression could also take the form of plain executive decisions, or ultimately it could assume a violent form. Repression however exists in a dynamic relation with resistance, since it cannot be dissociated from the

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<sup>164</sup> «Luís María Ansón, director de Blanco y Negro».1975. *ABC*, February 27, pp30

<sup>165</sup> Luís Maria Ansón, editor-in-chief of *Blanco y Negro*, was indicted for articles published on edition 3.297 of July 12<sup>th</sup> titled: “Yenia, hija de Marcelino Camacho, elegida Enlace sindical” and “El caso de los 23, tres años más tarde” on the presumption of article 2<sup>nd</sup> infraction. (Europa press.1975. «Dos expedientes al director de “Blanco y Negro”», *Arriba*, August 8, pp. 9)

resistance it causes, as described by Lluís Bassets (1982: 553-554) when discussing clandestine action: «the magnitude of the clandestine machine is a direct function of the magnitude of the repressive machine»<sup>xxviii</sup>.

By then newspapers showed a tendency for self-surveillance because of MIT's repression. While subject to several layers of bureaucratic control, newspapers could still denounce the situation. It was a common practice to reflect about journalism, and some newspapers (at least *Arriba*, *Informaciones*, and *Tele/eXprés*) had a section specifically devoted to newspaper-related news. On the one hand, the news concerned ordinary events such as nominations, purchases, new ventures (i.e. *El País*, *Avui*, and later on *Diario 16*), elections in Press' Associations (held in Barcelona in October 1975), and the closing of newspapers (i.e. *Telesiete* and *Arriba Española*). On the other hand, references were made to sanctions, declarations on hot subjects – such as «article 2<sup>nd</sup>» –, trials or convictions, journalist demonstrations or threats made against publications or journalists that were also extensively reported throughout those years, but especially in 1975. At some point in 1975, given the frequency of this kind of news, one could be led to believe that these were mundane events.

The amendment of article 2, responsible for most of the repression exerted by the MIT, became an intense subject of public debate after Minister Leon Herreras's declarations, in January<sup>166</sup> and again in April 1975<sup>167</sup>, on his openness to a change. Herrera calls for a public discussion of the interpretative criteria for its application, hoping – in his words – that a more accurate definition might be found. For that purpose, throughout 1975 a commission – nominated by the *Consejo Nacional de*

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<sup>166</sup> «El Ministerio de Información, dispuesto a revisar el artículo 2 de la ley de prensa». 1975. *Informaciones*, January 8, pp.3

<sup>167</sup> Pyresa. 1975. «Se estudia la modificación del artículo segundo», *Arriba*, April 24, pp. 38.

*Prensa* – was formed<sup>168</sup>, declarations were issued and books published.<sup>169</sup> The change ultimately did not take place, but on 1 April 1977 the article was repealed (BOE, 12-IV-1977).

When one of the books on this topic was launched, Basilio Rogado, journalist and editor of radio programme «Hora 25» – one of the exceptions in radio news reporting, given that radio information was monopolized by *RNE* – declared to *pyresa* that:

This book (...) reflects the life of a few journalists who produce a daily newspaper, on any given day. Their work reflects, in a way, what is happening in the country. It is sort of a novel-news-report, in this case made with the collaboration of journalists from the Madrid daily quoted in the title. (...) The book reveals what is and what is not published in the newspaper during a working day, and it is a reflection about a journalist' anxieties vis-à-vis his own auto censorship, the silences, what he keeps to himself.<sup>xxix 170</sup>

Rogado, in fact, dedicated this book to the 15.000 future journalists about to graduate, in the hopes «(...) that they will be able to practice their profession without the Damocles sword that constitutes article 2 of the press law for the information professional»<sup>xxx</sup>. However, this public debate on freedom of the press was met with the official repression still enforced on publications, especially active in those months and aimed at non-daily publications:

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<sup>168</sup> This commission was formed by: Lucio del Alamo, Ramón Cunill, Emilio Romero, José Juan Cebrián, Antonio Herrero, Aquilino Morcillo, Guillermo Luca de Tena and Eugenio Suárez; and constituted on June 17<sup>th</sup> 1975 (Europa Press. 1975. «La commission del artículo 2, terminó su dictamen», *Arriba*, July 16, pp.4)

<sup>169</sup> Crespo de Lara, Pedro (1975) *El artículo 2. La Prensa, ante el Tribunal Supremo*, Madrid: Prensa Española S.A and Rogado, Basilio (1975) *La Prensa del Silencio: un dia en la vida del* Informaciones, Madrid: Mirasierra, both books are connected with *Informaciones*, the latter by obvious reasons, the first one by being written by Crespo Lara who was an *Informaciones*' journalist.

<sup>170</sup> *Pyresa*.1975. «La Prensa del Silencio”: un dia en la vida del “Informaciones” (de Basilio Rogado)», *Arriba*, July 26, pp. 33

Manuel Velasco, editor-in-chief of “Cambio 16”, has a new judicial order on his back, dictated by the Public Order judge number 2, and it is related with the sequestration this magazine suffered last week. Regarding this subject, Miguel Angel Aguilar writes in the last edition of «Posible», recently reappeared after being sequestered for the third time: magazines have endured a truly diabolic spell. Minister Leon Herrera was not yet done declaring in Canarias that “the objectiveness of the press is overwhelming” when “El Europeo”, “Guadiana”, “Doblon”, “Triunfo”, “por favor” (twice), “Valladolid Semanal”, “El Indiscreto”, “Posible”, “Cambio 16”, “El Cocodrilo Leopoldo”, etc. were facing the objective difficulties of sequestration or substitution of “non-gratae” pages. “Contrastes” will not appear either.<sup>xxxii171</sup>

In 1975, *Cambio 16* and *Codorniz* were suspended for three months each; *Mundo* and *Triunfo*, for four months; and *El Papus* for eight months, and was also faced with the maximum fine of 500.000 pesetas (Barrera 1995, 156). During this four-month suspension endured by *Triunfo*, following an article published in April<sup>172</sup> (Barrera 1995, 156), its journalists were invited to write in *Hermano Lobo*, in what Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, under one of his pseudonymous Sixto Camara, qualifies as an act of resistance:

«When it was suggested that «Triunfo»’s team work for HERMANO LOBO during the four-month suspension, we understood that things like this happened in the Resistance, that in all resistances the driving force has been moral and more or less always resembled our friend Galileo Galilei’s ‘And yet it moves’, may he rest in peace. The suspension of four months is now over, ‘Triunfo’ never received any present, on the contrary, ‘Triunfo’ was robbed. Its possibility of making history was taken, on a daily basis, while on board of the streetcar heading towards desire. The *trionfistas* leave HERMANO LOBO and we return home. While I pack my typewriter, a heavy and old portable Continental, my Dutch sandals and that pear brandy that I always bring along to perk me up in this unbelievable country, I think about my odd condition of traveller among magazines that are closed down or opened, but always magazines on the edge of the cliff, the only decent way to practice journalism or matrimony.»<sup>xxxii 173</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> «Personas».1975. *Informaciones*, May 14, pp. 19

<sup>172</sup> Aumente, José.1975. «Estamos preparados para el Cambio?», *Triunfo*, April 26, pp. 51

<sup>173</sup> Camara, Sixto. 1976. «Pero se movia», *Hermano Lobo*, February 3, pp.5

Despite the resistance, along with official repression came the repression of civil society, which took the form of several demonstrations of violence towards journalists and media. This happened more intensely in 1975, for instance when a Molotov cocktail and excrement were thrown at the *El Noticero Universal* and *Diario de Barcelona*'s<sup>174</sup> correspondents' house, husband and wife; when *El correo de Andalucía*<sup>175</sup> received a bomb threat over the telephone; when another Molotov cocktail was thrown, this time at *Diario de Barcelona*, signed «GAS» – which apparently stood for Unionist Action Groups [*Grupos de Acción Sindicalista*] –, and graffiti with the words «Huertas Clavería, to the firing line», «Marxist press, no» and «Lieutenant Pose García, present» were written<sup>176</sup>; and when *Le Monde*'s correspondent, José António Novais, received threats in the form of graffiti in his Madrid house and a telephone threat in which perpetrators identified themselves as warriors [*guerrilleros*], even though *Fuerza Nueva* denied any involvement in it<sup>177</sup>. In June, and following a failed attack on *Ya*'s newsroom, *Informaciones* issued a statement denouncing this situation:

The attack against fellow *Ya* puts the systematic persecution suffered by the informative media at this crucial Spanish hour in the forefront of current events. (...) along with the administrative, political and managerial hazards, anonymous threats, attacks and even bombs are, unfortunately, nothing new to us. Those among us who believe in the value of the freedom of the press and of the right to express one's own ideas, will not stop condemning every type of violence, no matter where it comes from.<sup>xxiii 178</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> Cifra.1975. «Atentado contra la casa de dos corresponsales», *Informaciones*, June 30, pp.8

<sup>175</sup> Cifra.1975. «“El Correo de Andalucía” amenazado», *Informaciones*, July 7, pp.32

<sup>176</sup> «Cocktail Molotov contra Diario de Barcelona».1975. *Tele/eXprés*, August 19, pp.3

<sup>177</sup> Cifra.1975. «Amenazas al corresponsal de «Le Monde» en Madrid», *Tele/eXprés*, October 17, pp.11

<sup>178</sup> «Atentado frustrado contra el diario “Ya” ». 1975. *Informaciones*, June 5, pp.9

As a result of this dynamic of surveillance and repression, some articles become events in themselves, less because of what they are reporting than the context of their production and reception, which leads to specific mentions in the bureaucratic activity of the MIT. That was the case with *Cambio 16*'s new issue after a three-week suspension<sup>179</sup> in the first week of April 1975, a special number devoted to Portugal. This issue becomes an event because of the level of expectation surrounding it – when a magazine is suspended for three weeks it probably has information that authorities do not want to see published –, reflected in the increase from 160.000 to 250.000<sup>180</sup> copies, and because it is news in both the national<sup>181</sup> and international<sup>182</sup> press. Additionally, since it is a special number devoted to Portugal, one of its key pieces, which helped rise expectation levels, is the first interview given to the press by Vasco Gonçalves, along with interviews with Mário Soares, Álvaro Cunhal and Francisco Pinto Balsemão, after the failed coup of 11 March. Portugal is also chosen, according to the editorial piece «Portugal en ascuas» [Portugal on pins and needles], because of its importance for contemporary Spanish politics:

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<sup>179</sup> *Cambio 16* had been suspended by decision of the Ministers' Council for three weeks in March 1975 due to the publication in January of two articles: "Vascos y 13" and "En el umbral del cambio". Both Manuel Velasco, editor-in-chief, and Luis Gonzalez Seara, head of the administration board of the publishing company, were sentenced to the payment of a fine of 100.000 pesetas and the magazine suspended. Estimated losses amounted to 13 million pesetas. (AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box: 42/9049, "Jornal do Comércio 4Mar.1975" and "Diario de Noticias 4 Mar.1975"; "Presidencia", box: 51/9511, "DIDGC, Publicacion: Nuevo Diario, Fecha: 25 Mar.1975, n°76")

<sup>180</sup> AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box: 42/9117, "DIDGC, dia 24-3-75, turno 15-21, pág.35".

<sup>181</sup> AGA, MIT, "Presidencia", box: 51/9511, "DIDGC, Publicacion: Nuevo Diario, Fecha: 25 Mar.1975, n°76"; "Cultura", box: 42/9117, "Madrid, 24, Europa Press".

<sup>182</sup> *UPI* (AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box: 42/9117, "DIDGC, dia 24-3-75, turno 15-21, pág.35" and "DIDGC, dia 25-3-75, turno 21-03, pág.7"), *AFP* (AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box 42/9117, "DIDGC, dia 25-3-75, turno 21-03, pág.9").

Cambio 16 returns today to its readers after three weeks of silence with a special number in which we try to reincorporate ourselves in national life by providing as much information as possible about the events in the neighbouring country that are so important for this side of the peninsula.<sup>xxxiv183</sup>

In this context, even though the newspapers in the sample did not suffer sanctions or episodes of violence directly related to the Portuguese events, some of them did suffer sanctions during this period (i.e. *ABC*, *Informaciones* and *Tele/eXprés*<sup>184</sup>) for other reasons. MIT's repression towards publications took several forms. The press faced criminal, civil and administrative charges. Administrative sanctions could be in the form of a fine between 1.000 and 500.000 pesetas and the suspension of the journalist (or editor-in-chief) or the publication (or publishing company) for a time period of up to six months (BOE-A-1966-3501, art.69).

Despite the distinctive goals pursued through them, different newspapers describe the means of repression used as very homogeneous. When *ABC*'s photogravure was seized in February 1975, the newspaper reached newsstands on Sunday, 23 February, without its photogravure pages, and the editorial in the following Tuesday's issue presented an incomplete version of the article.<sup>185</sup> This was the second time *ABC* was sequestered since the adoption of the 1966 law, and this time the action was motivated by an interview Don Juan had given to *ABC*'s former editor-in-chief, Torcuato Luca de Tena y Brunet, printed in its

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<sup>183</sup> AGA, MIT, "Presidencia", box: 51/9511, "DIDGC, Publicacion: Cambio 16, Fecha 6-4-75, n°2".

<sup>184</sup> *Informaciones* suffered three indictments (n°32, n°79 and n°86 of the year 1975) all related to infringement of article 2<sup>nd</sup> although none of them resulted in sanction (AGA, MIT, boxes 71.12361, 71.12365 and 71.12366) and *Tele/eXprés'* journalist Josep María Huertas was arrested in 1975 as a result of an article published in June (HUERTAS, Josep Maria.1975.«Vida erotica subteranea», *Tele/eXprés*, June 7, pp.11).

<sup>185</sup> Editorial: «El levantamiento del secuestro de ABC».1975. *ABC*, May 11, pp. 3

photogravure pages. Regarding the process of sequestration, *Informaciones* stated:

For that effect, two MIT officials went to the *Prensa Española*'s workshop, where they presented the respective order, the deposit of the printed copies and the suspension of the remaining print run of this issue.<sup>xxxv186</sup>

Likewise, the sequestration of *Triunfo*'s issue in April 1975 due to the article mentioned previously – an issue devoted to the Portuguese elections allowed to reach the newsstands by administrative authorities but ultimately sequestered – was described similarly:

The sequestration was communicated to “Triunfo”[sic] by two inspectors of the Social Investigation Brigade, who presented themselves at the magazine's workshop and showed the order signed by the Public Order Judge. No justification for the sequestration was given.<sup>xxxvi 187</sup>

Like *Triunfo*, *Cuadernos para el Diálogo* was also sequestered, though in June 1974, before the sizzling months of the first semester of 1975. According to Muñoz Soro (2006:324), this was a result of the censorship office's unwillingness to tolerate any more explicit comparisons between the Portuguese and the Spanish situations. The magazine later circulated in a visibly truncated version, without the twenty-one pages containing the inquiry «Portugal, el fin de una dictadura» [Portugal, the end of a dictatorship], which included statements from, among others, Mariano Aguilar Navarro (one of the founding members of *Cuadernos para el Diálogo*, law professor and later member of PSOE), Roberto Mesa (law professor), Pablo Castellano (lawyer and member of PSOE and UGT), Enrique Barón (lawyer and member of Madrid's Socialist Convergence [*Convergencia Socialista*], Socialist Parties Federation [*Federación de Partidos Socialistas*] and, from 1977,

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<sup>186</sup> «“ABC”: secuestro y cambios directivos».1975. *Informaciones*, February 24, pp.1

<sup>187</sup> Europa press.1975. «Secuestrado el último número de triunfo» in *Arriba*, April 26, pp 5.



of PSOE), Manuel Jiménez de Parga (law professor), Tierno Galván (law professor and founder of Domestic Socialist Party [Partido Socialista del Interior], in 1974 called Popular Socialist Party [*Partido Socialista Popular*]), José M. Gil-Robles (lawyer and later on a member of Popular Alliance [*Alianza Popular*] ); and also without most of the editorial, devoted to the Portuguese process as well.

As for Federico Villagrán, editor-in-chief of *Correo de Andalucía*, removed from office after his newspaper was indicted, MIT's action essentially followed the same steps. After the failed coup of 11 March, *El Correo de Andalucía* published a piece in the front page of its 25 March issue on the landing of 7000 soldiers, reportedly south American mercenaries<sup>188</sup>, in Spanish territory and heading towards the Portuguese border<sup>189</sup>. This resulted in the one-week arrest of *El Correo de Andalucía*'s editor-in-chief, Federico Villagrán, charged with violating article 2 of the Press Law for reasons of «Truth», «External Peace» and «Infiltration»<sup>190</sup> and article 127 of the criminal code<sup>191</sup>.

Villagrán was not unfamiliar with the repressive aspects of the Spanish informative system, since just a few months earlier he had been expelled from the Seville Press Association for allowing «entryism» in his newspaper. Villagrán had also faced several indictments, the latest of which due to the publication of a review of the famous «Christianity» homily by monsignor Añoveros, Bilbao's Bishop. Ultimately Villagrán

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<sup>188</sup>Logos.1975. «Motivo de la detención», *Arriba*, April 2, pp.3

<sup>189</sup>«Mentis oficial español. No hay tropas en Rota (con destino a Portugal)».1975. *Arriba*, March 26, pp.3

<sup>190</sup>AGA, MIT, box: 71/12362, Expediente nº25 año 1975.

<sup>191</sup>Logos. 1975. «Motivo de la detención», *Arriba*, April 2, pp.3

was acquitted and escaped a three-month jail sentence and a fine of 25.000 pesetas<sup>192</sup>. On this indictment, *Informaciones* reported that:

Earlier, at dawn, the Provincial Delegation of the Ministry of Information and Tourism had made a phone call urging the text to be removed from the newspaper pages, which editor-in-chief Mr. Villagrán refused to do, since the copies had been duly subject to a legal deposit, the print run had almost all been distributed and because sequestrations fell under government authority. In the beginning of the afternoon our newspaper was informed of the related list of charges that fell on Mr. Villagrán.<sup>xxxvii193</sup>

Moreover, when he was actually arrested on 1 April, the procedure followed was similar to the sequestration of a newspaper, as described by *Arriba*:

Just before 7 pm, two officials of the regional branch of the Social Investigation Brigade came to our newspaper yesterday, asking for the *Correo de Andalucía*'s editor-in-chief, Mr. Federico Villagrán Bustillo, who had not arrived yet. Then they went to Mr. Villagrán's home, where they detained him. He was taken to the Jefatura Superior de Policia (...)<sup>xxxviii194</sup>

Later Villagrán ended up resigning from his post as editor-in-chief and negotiating his departure from *El Correo de Andalucía*<sup>195</sup>.

Action taken against Nestor Luján, editor-in-chief of *Destino*, and Carlos Pérez de Rozas, *Destino*'s head of the newsroom, also led to their resignation and discharge. However in their case this outcome was not a result of direct MIT repression, but of executive decisions, which revealed the anxieties caused by the restrictions imposed by the system. These events were portrayed as a direct consequence of the magazine's pro-Cunhal stance and anti-communist retaliation by the administration.

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<sup>192</sup>Europa press.1975. «Absuelto el director de “Correo de Andalucía”», *Tele/eXprés*, March 26, pp.11

<sup>193</sup> Logos. 1975. «Nota de “El correo de Andalucía” sobre el expediente incoado a su director», *Informaciones*, February 27, pp.7

<sup>194</sup> Pyresa.1975. «El director de “El correo de Andalucía” en prisión», *Arriba*, April 2, pp. 3

<sup>195</sup>«Es solo una formalizacion legal».1975. *Arriba*, April 18, pp. 6

Baltasar Porcel, at the time recently nominated director of the publishing group *Publicaciones y Revistas* which *Destino* integrated, claimed with respect to Luján and Pérez de Rozas' discharge, that «We do not want Carrillo and Cunhal in our house»<sup>196</sup>. Expelling «communism» from the newsroom has a better sound bite than explaining publicly how exactly repression was incorporated in *Destino*'s newsroom.

According to Geli and Huertas (1991:153-159), the sacking of Pérez de Rozas was more connected with internal affairs than with the international situation. When the Catalan nationalist leader, Jordi Pujol, joined the administration, Néstor Luján was left in charge of the weekly, in turn entrusting Pérez de Rozas with the renovation of the magazine. Although only two members of the newsroom council were in fact members of PSUC (Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia), there was a suspicious atmosphere, and Pujol put Salvador Casanovas in charge of supervising matters. This meant the systematic vetoing of articles and a difficult situation to manage, which led Luján<sup>197</sup>, and alongside him the entire newsroom council, in solidarity, to ask for his resignation. Pérez de Rozas was sacked during this process because the administration considered him a collaborator. Since this caused a scandal, the administration tried to overturn the dismissal, but Pérez de Rozas did not accept it. In fact, most writers for *Destino*'s, at the time based on contributions, also resigned as well, and a widespread wave of solidarity in the Barcelona press ensued.

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<sup>196</sup> Europa press. 1975. «No queremos a Carrillo y Cunhal en nuestra casa», *Arriba*, May 30, pp.13

<sup>197</sup> Luján had had difficulties with the publication of some articles on the Sahara, Portugal, PSOE, and the unionist elections, that the publishing company believed did not fit *Destino*'s editorial line. («Serias dificultades para la continuacion de "Destino"»). 1975. *Informaciones*, May 28, pp. 9)

### 3. Circumventing the Informative System

Despite the efforts to build an official informative system that contained as much dissent as possible, either through restrictions or repression, some room was found within the Spanish informative system for phenomena that arguably constitute forms of resistance to the confinement embodied by official channels. The reception of the Portuguese revolutionary process cannot be separated from the changes Spain experienced between 1974 and 1976. Activities such as listening to the BBC, which had increased with Franco's imminent death, attending book presentation sessions by or meeting people who had been in Portugal, or traveling to see what was happening there *in loco*, therefore not only demonstrate the interest felt in Spain for the Portuguese revolutionary process, but also ways of relating to it other than the ones offered by the Spanish informative system. But this type of activity also faced limits and prohibitions, as will be shown below.

#### 3.1 Listening to the BBC

In any case, Solís Ruiz' warning that political developments continues might be useful in a preventive way. I've installed two bolts in my front door and I listen to the Spanish broadcast of the BBC every evening, like I used to do when Antonio Machín<sup>198</sup> sang:

We only live once

One had to learn to want to and to live.<sup>xxxix199</sup>

In 1975 the Spanish service of the BBC world service<sup>200</sup> experienced «(...) a 34% increase in ordinary mail (...) occurred mainly in the last

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<sup>198</sup> Antonio Machín was a Cuban singer that came to live in Spain during the post-civil war period fleeing from the II WW.

<sup>199</sup> Camara, Sixto. 1975. «Los hay optimistas», *Hermano Lobo*, October 11, pp.11.

<sup>200</sup> The BBC World Service was created in 1932 as the “Empire Service”, but its Iberian services – the Spanish and Portuguese ones – only started in 1935 and 1939, respectively. The Portuguese service broadcasts started on June 4<sup>th</sup> 1939 (Ribeiro, 2010), but were interrupted on August 9<sup>th</sup> 1957 (BBC - WAC,

quarter of the year and (...) due to the reaction to the Service's coverage of political events in Spain»<sup>201</sup>. This happened because the audiences felt the need to, among other things, get information about their own country: «It is a paradox: to tune in to the BBC to be able to know what is going on in one's own country»<sup>202</sup>, as one listener argued in 1975:

I had heard other people comment on your programmes in Spanish, but it was only recently that I began to tune in regularly myself. I want to congratulate you on the planning and presentation of these transmissions as well as on the usefulness of the subjects and the impartial way in which they are dealt with. At present Spanish people need objectivity in analysing their problems and they find this in your broadcasts. I think that we will only really enjoy freedom and democracy in our country when we are capable of expressing such a variety and contrast of opinions as you do. (Lorca)<sup>203</sup>

Although increasing in 1975, listening to the BBC, as we have seen, was not a recent practice for everyone: «I have been listening to the BBC on and off since 1936»<sup>204</sup> or «I have been listening to the BBC Spanish broadcasts since World war II»<sup>205</sup>, explained some listeners; others had gained this habit in recent years: «This is the first time I write

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E1/2306/1, File 3: 1955-1963), together with Danish, Dutch, Norwegian and Swedish services as a savings decision, and reopened on April 1963. The Spanish Service started earlier, on June 4<sup>th</sup> 1935, and was closed down – for the European audience – on December 31<sup>st</sup> 1981. Until 1956 the BBC broadcasted also in Catalan, Euskera and Galician. Between 1956 and 1966 several documents attest the audience demands for them to return. Between 1974 and 1976 the Spanish service broadcasted daily twice: from 1:15 pm to 1:30 pm and from 9:15 pm to 10 pm, in a total of 7 hours a week (BBC - WAC, E3/141/1- 1955-1981 “Spanish Service Summary report for 1974”, “Spanish Service Summary report for 1975” and “Spanish Service Summary report for 1976”; E1/2345/1 - 1949-1965).

<sup>201</sup> BBC -WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, “Spanish service Summary Report for 1975”, p.1

<sup>202</sup> BBC - WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, “Spanish service Summary Report for 1975”, Appendix, p.3

<sup>203</sup> BBC - WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, “Spanish service Summary Report for 1975”, Appendix, p.1

<sup>204</sup> BBC - WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, “Spanish service Summary Report for 1975”, Appendix, p. 1-2

<sup>205</sup> BBC - WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, “Spanish service Summary Report for 1974”, Appendix, p. 1

to you although I have been listening to your programmes for two years»<sup>206</sup>. But generally listeners agreed that values such as objectivity<sup>207</sup> and impartiality<sup>208</sup>, together with moral support<sup>209</sup>, were the reasons why they tuned in to the British radio broadcaster.

This adhesion does not come without criticism,<sup>210</sup> and a clear way to assess this adhesion could be the number and the type of letters in the BBC Archives from its Spanish audience. Some letters are written spontaneously, while others are the result of the annual assessment «External Broadcasting Audience Research», where panel members received a questionnaire about the service. In 1974 listeners complained about the dullness of BBC's coverage of Spanish news, since by then Spanish newspapers were ahead of it, and these complaints highlight the changes the Spanish press was undergoing:

Your programmes are usually interesting though the comments on Spanish affairs have been dull lately, for nearly all of them appeared in Spanish newspapers and magazines. (Madrid)<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>206</sup> BBC - WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, “Spanish service Summary Report for 1975”, Appendix, p. 2

<sup>207</sup> «Your programmes are usually objective but sometimes unjust to us. Unfortunately most of your comments on our country are negative. If you ever find any favourable report on Spanish affairs in the newspapers you usually consult, we would like to hear about it. We expect that from your objectivity. (Barcelona )»(BBC - WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, “Spanish service Summary Report for 1974”, Appendix, p. 1)

<sup>208</sup> «(...) Above all I appreciate your impartiality. (Santander)» (BBC - WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, “Spanish service Summary Report for 1975”, Appendix, p.1)

<sup>209</sup> «Every day we listen attentively to your programmes and we are very pleased on account of the moral support you are giving us. After the crime committed by a Spanish minority, endowed with powerful weapons, against five young patriots, it is pleasing to hear the words of encouragement broadcast by some European stations, especially the BBC. (Oviedo)» (BBC - WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, “Spanish service Summary Report for 1975”, Appendix, p.2 )

<sup>210</sup> Criticism is expressed in a relative low percentage of the correspondence received by the service: not contemplated in the 1974 report, about 4% in 1975 and 2% in 1976.

<sup>211</sup> BBC -WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, “Spanish service Summary Report for 1974”, Appendix, p. 1

Other complains included the sense of injustice towards Spaniards by BBC's highlight of just the negative news related to Spain or the lack of sensitivity regarding nationalistic movements and the language used in relation to them<sup>212</sup>.

In 1975 complaints evolved to a generalized claim of lack of objectivity. The failure to live up to one of its values quickly becomes a problem. The BBC is accused of not fulfilling the criteria of objectivity in relation to a number of subjects, such as the favouring of the Spanish radical left in their news programmes:

I enjoy listening to the BBC transmissions in English, which are very interesting. I also listen to the transmissions in Spanish, and they are good in as much as they reflect the English ones. However I do not much like their political position which I think supports the Spanish political radical left. In particular I have little interest in the comments on Spain itself made by the British and international press, as they miss many facts which everyone in Spain knows about through our information services. (Madrid)<sup>213</sup>

The BBC is also accused of allowing its journalists to give a politicized tendency to their programmes, mainly a left-wing one, which elicited a critique similar to the previous one:

I wish to draw your attention to the fact that your programmes seem to be more and more politically minded. I do not believe that the press there can be interested in what happens here to such an extent. It seems rather as if there is a sort of campaign from London, using the BBC as its medium to impress Spanish public opinion. You should reduce the number of such press articles, so as to calm down the people here, and thus appear impartial in a political game that is very delicate. Things are not as stormy as the BBC reflects them. Even the intonation used by some of your announcers when reading those articles is passionate rather

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<sup>212</sup> «We would be glad if you could give us more thought to the language you use when talking about nationalistic revolutionary movements, such as IRA, language which often seems to correspond with that used by dictatorships, and that surprises democratic people very much. (Vitoria)» (BBC - WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, “Spanish service Summary Report for 1974”, Appendix, p. 2)

<sup>213</sup> BBC - WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, “Spanish service Summary Report for 1975”, Appendix, p.3

than indifferent. If they are political exiles, then many things can be explained. (Teacher, Tortosa, Panel Member)<sup>214</sup>

This left-wing leaning feature is reinforced by specific complaints regarding the coverage of Franco's death. This coverage is considered to be partial by one listener because there was no mention of Franco's mourners, who in his view are a considerable part of the Spanish society:

Let me tell you that BBC reports on Spanish events during Franco's death have missed the point of what was happening. Apparently you haven't [sic] been informed about the two hundred thousand Spaniards of every social class who queued in the streets of Madrid to say goodbye to Franco. Everybody showed deep sorrow, and the massive demonstration on Sunday morning had no "party" meaning whatsoever. There were no party flags, songs or shouts. Why didn't [sic] they report any of these facts? I'm sure that millions of people in Spain would think more [sic] highly of England if you commented on what everybody has seen. (Cádiz)<sup>215</sup>

The coverage of the Portuguese events, not just of news about Spain, was also regarded as non-objective:

The only thing I find less objective is the news about Portugal. This country is on our doorstep and we can assure you that your information tends to be exaggerated, as well as that published in your newspapers. (Valladolid)<sup>216</sup>

Given the importance the broadcaster realized it had for its Spanish audience, at some point in 1975 the idea of increasing the Spanish service transmission length arose. In October, on the verge of Franco's death, «an increase in the prescription on the lines of that introduced in August in the Portuguese services»<sup>217</sup> is suggested. On 11 August 1975, due to the rising political tension in Portugal, the BBC's Portuguese

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<sup>214</sup> BBC - WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, "Spanish service Summary Report for 1975", Appendix, p.3

<sup>215</sup> BBC - WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, "Spanish service Summary Report for 1975", Appendix, p.3

<sup>216</sup> BBC - WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, "Spanish service Summary Report for 1975", Appendix, p.2

<sup>217</sup> BBC-WAC, E40/732/1 B045/XB043-004-001, "Broadcasts to Spain, 24<sup>th</sup> October 1975, CONFIDENTIAL"



Service had been increased by 15 daily minutes in its evening edition, broadcasted between 10pm - 10:45 pm<sup>218</sup>.

However the broadcaster understands that this change in the Spanish service is not to be undertaken without an inquiry into «not just what like-minded countries are doing, but also how others not so like-minded – Moscow, etc. – are reacting, how much they broadcast, etc.»<sup>219</sup>. The plan will not be concluded for this occasion: the 15 minutes afternoon edition was altered, as usual during the summer months, from 1pm to 12 am, but BBC continued to broadcast for a total of seven hours weekly for the rest of 1975 and during 1976<sup>220</sup>.

A course of action for the BBC's role is nevertheless drawn according to, and assumed to be dependent on, three different outcomes for the Spanish political situation: «an authoritarian regime, either from the right or from the left», a civil war situation or a «gradual evolution towards democracy and free information»<sup>221</sup>. The first option, «an authoritarian regime», would imply «reflecting the broadest possible spectrum of Western opinion» in their programmes and would «call for the lengthening of our [their] evening transmission». In the case of a «civil war», «additional news bulletins including, possibly, a dawn transmission» was the probable course of action. Finally, for the third option, «the main effort should be centred on the provision of comprehensive news news [sic] services, including once again an early transmission, to utilise to the full the corporation's efficient and widespread resources in competition with the Spanish media, on the lines of our early morning

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<sup>218</sup> BBC - WAC, E3/1035/1- 01/01/1975-31/12/1984, "Portuguese service Summary Report for 1975", pp.1

<sup>219</sup> BBC-WAC, E40/732/1 B045/XB043-004-001, "Broadcasts to Spain, 24<sup>th</sup> October 1975".

<sup>220</sup> BBC-WAC, E3/141/1 – 1955-1981, "Spanish service Summary Report for 1976", pp.1

<sup>221</sup> BBC- WAC, E40/732/1 B045/XB043-004-001, "Extension of Spanish Transmissions, 30<sup>th</sup> October 1975".

French programmes.»<sup>222</sup> Regardless of how the situation evolved, the BBC seemed to be determined to try to have a role in it, indicating its firm believe about the influence the broadcaster could have in the development of the political situation in Spain.

### 3.2 The trip: Spaniards as «voyeurs of freedom»

Shortly after the beginning of the 25 April coup, Manuel Vázquez Montalbán<sup>223</sup> pointed out two fundamental topics of the «new Portugal» from the Spanish standpoint: on the one hand, Spaniards would travel massively to Portugal, like they had been doing to France; on the other hand, this would be a different type of tourism, a more politicized one. Moreover, he writes:

If escape tourism was one of the most important sources of income of fascist Portugal, political tourism will replace it in the democratic Portugal (...) the hotels are packed with freedom “voyeurs”, and mysterious individuals listening to every word said and watching everything with special dedication are not in short supply either.<sup>xl224</sup>

Vázquez Montalbán was actually quite insightful, since Spanish tourism to Revolutionary Portugal could be mostly described by these two main features: Portugal actually replaced France as the main destination for Spaniards, a fact confirmed by January 1975; to a certain extent, «escape tourism» is replaced by an «engaged» one, and the rise in the volume of Spaniards visiting Portugal coincided with the radicalization of the process, namely after General Spínola’s demise.

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<sup>222</sup> BBC- WAC, E40/732/1 B045/XB043-004-001, “Extension of Spanish Transmissions, 30<sup>th</sup> October 1975”.

<sup>223</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, M. 1974. «El precio de la Libertad», *Tele-eXprés*, May 2, pp.11

<sup>224</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, M. 1974. «A la revolución, en coche», *Tele-eXprés*, May 13, pp.5

The chance to watch films that were censored in Spain was one of the motivations behind what Montalbán called French «pilgrimages»<sup>225</sup>. A similar thought – with Portugal taking France’s place – is expressed in the epilogue of Luis Carandell and Eduardo Barrenechea’s book: «Spanish cultural programmers are reportedly renting film theatres and auditoriums on the other side of the border to organize cinematographic tourism on the weekends»<sup>xli</sup> (1974:150). Equally, the screening of Bernardo Bertolucci’s *Last Tango in Paris* (1972) – premiered in Portugal shortly after the April coup and only available in Spain in January 1978 – is frequently referred as something that attracted Spaniards to Portugal. Lisbon’s *Diário popular* illustrates this situation with a cartoon of a Spanish couple posing in front of one of the film’s posters<sup>226</sup>. Likewise, Alberto Míguez, *Ya* and *La Vanguardia Española*’s correspondent in Lisbon, links the city’s charm with the possibility of watching films, especially Bertolucci’s: «And Lisbon, with its prices, its “last tango” in the billboards and its winter sun, shyly coming out, it’s quite a show...»<sup>xlii</sup><sup>227</sup>. Thus, what was initially an intuition about Portugal replacing France as a mecca for Spaniards to exercise their civil liberties, proved to be accurate in the beginning of 1975, as Montalbán, using in *Triunfo* his Sixto Camara pseudonym, describes: «exerting the right of watching whatever film they wish, of buying the book that has been avoided for a while, and especially of

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<sup>225</sup> These «French pilgrimages» are a very common topic in the Spanish imaginary and are frequently present in cartoons or films. The film *Lo Verde empieza en los Pirineos* (1973) by Vincente Escrivá features three friends in this French quest for films, in this case pornographic ones.

<sup>226</sup> AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/8952, Note from the Adviser: “Fecha 12 Noviembre 1974 Hora 18,15h, pp. 1-2”.

<sup>227</sup> AGA, MIT, “Presidencia”, box: 51/9511 “DIDGC, Publicación Ya Fecha 3 Nov 1974, n°21”.

contemplating the exciting show of how a people rehearses the practice of freedom»<sup>xliii</sup><sup>228</sup>

In this period Spanish borders registered more travellers entering from the Portuguese border than from the French one. Of these, only 10 to 20% were actually Portuguese, thus indicating a high percentage of Spaniards returning from Portugal, alongside travellers from other nationalities crossing Spain:

This increase of activity in the Portuguese border becomes more significant when we bear in mind the fact that entrances through other borders diminished in the period January-February of this year compared to the same period in 1974 (...) which makes you wonder that given the increase of comings and goings to Portugal most people rather than aiming for the north of France, turn left.<sup>xliv</sup><sup>229</sup>

This subtle play with words at the end brings us to the following feature of the wave of Spanish tourists travelling to Portugal: the replacement of its motivation. March 1975 specifically represents a moment when «family excursions» seem to be replaced by «progressive student travelling». Indeed, according to Alberto Miguez, «from April 25<sup>th</sup> on there has been a sort of political “tourism” coming from Spain. Nowadays not only the rich but also the progressive students come here.»<sup>230</sup> In fact, in an effort to retrace the atmosphere of a border town such as Badajoz, Manuel Vázquez Montalbán<sup>231</sup> describes the several «character-types» of such travellers:

In Badajoz I found people who cross the Portuguese border searching for their own shadows, erudite liberals laden with memory and desire, like all erudite liberals; COU's boys and girls taking notes in the «advanced»

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<sup>228</sup> AGA, MIT, “Presidencia”, box: 51/9511 “Publicación Triunfo (Madrid) Fecha 1-3-75, n°16”.

<sup>229</sup> AGA, MIT, “Presidencia”, box: 51/9511, «DIDGC Publicación Ya Fecha 23 Mar 1975, n°26»

<sup>230</sup> Alberto Miguez *in* “Espanha/Mesa redonda” (AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9049, “Periodico: Jornal Novo, Fecha 27 Mai 1975”)

<sup>231</sup> AGA, MIT, “Presidencia”, box: 51/9511, «DIDGC , Publicación Triunfo (Madrid) Fecha 1-3-75, n°16»

conferences; young university students; young girls, maidens or not, who struggle with the infamous slap (their face on their fathers' hand) to gain the right to extend curfew after ten pm; young and honest journalists who search for the truth under the destructions and conspiracies of silence<sup>xlv232</sup>.

Despite a certain degree of lyricism and a certain romantic perspective, Vázquez Montalbán's reflection emphasizes the preponderance of the youth factor in such travellers. Similarly, a couple of months later *Contrastes* journalist, Maria Luísa Bueno<sup>233</sup>, reiterates the idea of Lisbon invaded by Spaniards, adding that «[t]housands of Spaniards, mostly young, filled the streets during the last holidays.»<sup>xlvi234</sup>. Bueno is referring to the Easter week of 1975 – a Spanish tradition as important as the Christmas holidays – a moment that brought many students to Portugal. Coinciding with the last week of March, this is a particular effervescent political moment. Not only is it the aftermath of 11 March, but it is also the eve of the first elections, so Spaniards were

(...) finding themselves in a lively atmosphere: several left-wing parties were celebrating rallies, at the same time that some right-wing parties – including PPD – distributed communiqués to passers-by asking for the death penalty not to be reinstated (PPD) or protesting against their own illegalization, like the Christian Democrats.<sup>xlvii</sup>

Agencies reported on the «hundreds of Spanish youngsters [who] go to the neighbouring Portugal during this Easter holidays to see the leftist revolution taking place next door»<sup>xlviii235</sup>. Once in Portugal they enjoy the opportunity to meet in Lisbon's downtown, in its bars and restaurants» and «some say they had some informal contacts with Portuguese students and that other encounters are foreseen for the next couple of days»<sup>xlix</sup>. It is

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<sup>232</sup> Sixto Camara (AGA, MIT, "Presidencia", box: 51/9511, "DIDGC , Publicación Triunfo (Madrid) Fecha 1-3-75, nº16")

<sup>233</sup> AGA, MIT, "Presidencia", box: 51/9511, «DIDGC, Publicación Contrastes (Madrid) Fecha 8-4-75, nº14»

<sup>234</sup> María Luisa Bueno (AGA, MIT, "Presidencia", box: 51/9511, "DIDGC, Publicación Contrastes (Madrid) Fecha 8-4-75, nº14").

<sup>235</sup> AP (AGA, MIT, "Cultura", box: 42/9117, "DIDGC/VIAE Dia 28 de marzo de 1975/ Turno 9 a 15pag 12").

an opportunity for them to be involved in political activities of Portuguese parties such as a «mass meeting of the Communist Party»<sup>l</sup> where «a solidarity message from the Democratic Junta» was read «and afterwards the multitude sang “Spain will win” and “Franco, fascist, murderer”»<sup>li</sup>. But this also proved to be an opportunity to voice their own protest, and thus in the last week of March a demonstration of Spaniards was held in Rossio:

Between two and three thousand Spaniards demonstrated Friday in Lisbon against the francoist regime. The demonstration happened without incidents. The protestors that had, for the most part, their face covered with handkerchiefs gathered around Rossio square. They marched around the square shouting: «Popular front», «popular democracy» and «solidarity with the Portuguese regime».<sup>lii236</sup>

On the other hand, the traditional Spanish tourism of this season is restrained. For instance, *Cifra* claims that: «The Pontevedra province inhabitants used frequently the North of Portugal for their family excursions of this season»<sup>liii237</sup>. However, and despite several news asserting that the border was open for «family excursions»<sup>238</sup>, after 11 March traditional Spanish tourists were somewhat discouraged to travel to Portugal. In the North part of the country trains started arriving to Galicia filled with graffiti allusive to «the most varied political motives and the situation the neighbouring country is going through»<sup>liv239</sup>, this agency reported. Rental cars agencies do not want their cars in Portugal, and their owners stated that «following instructions from the Police, they will not rent vehicles with Spanish license plates to travellers going to Portugal,

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<sup>236</sup> AFP (AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9117, “DIDGC/VIAE Dia 28-3- 1975/ Turno 21 a 03pag 31”)

<sup>237</sup> AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9117, “Vigo, 27 Cifra”.

<sup>238</sup> Juan Pla (AGA, MIT, “Presidencia”, box: 51/9511, “DIDGC, Publicación Pueblo Fecha 20 Mar 1975, nº5”.

<sup>239</sup> AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box:42/9117 “Vigo, 17 Europa press”.

since they are not welcome there»<sup>lv240</sup>. Finally, on 27 April, Galician travel agencies cancelled most of their Portuguese programs after reports of Spanish tourists having been mugged in Porto the previous weekend (22 and 23)<sup>241</sup>. In general, the idea – accurate or not – that «Spaniards that go to the neighbouring country are far from being cheered»<sup>lvi242</sup> was being created by the news and agencies are not willing to lose costumers if they encourage such travels»<sup>lvii243</sup>, argues *Cifra*. While there one type of traveller is accepted, there is antagonism towards the other.

Portuguese authorities, wrongly identified by the Spanish Embassy to be the Social Communication Ministry, which did not exist at that moment since a state secretary had replaced it, reinforce this idea that Spaniards were not unwelcome, quite on the contrary. A communiqué disseminated by the Portuguese press in mid-November stated that more than ever they were welcome in Portugal after the demise of General Spínola in late September 1974,

Contrary to what has often been stated, the influx of Spanish tourists to our country has not diminished but actually increased. So much so that, after the program “Holidays in Portugal” spread internally in some Spanish cities, mainly in the north, hotels in Minho in the last weekend were fully booked, while the car queue to enter Portugal from the neighbouring country in Tuy was over 2-kilometre long. We also stress the fact that the Tourism Office of Portugal in Madrid, in the last three weeks, has tripled its usual workload to answer all the demands of touristic information about Portugal. As a logical consequence, the main travel agencies in Madrid inform that in the last two weeks the demands for hotels reservations in the Portuguese Capital are of «peak season» (...) This should not be disconnected from the intense advertising campaign carried out by the official organizations of National Tourism in that country.»<sup>lviii244</sup>

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<sup>240</sup> AP (AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9117, “DIDGC/VIAE Dia 14-4-75Turno 15-21 pág. 30”).

<sup>241</sup> AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9117, “Vigo, 27 Cifra”.

<sup>242</sup> AP (AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box 42/9117, “DIDGC/VIAE Dia 14-4-75Turno 15-21 pág. 30”).

<sup>243</sup> AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/9117 “Vigo, 27 Cifra”.

<sup>244</sup> AGA, MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/8952, Note from the Adviser: “Fecha 12 Noviembre 1974 Hora 18,15h, pp.1-2”.

The Spanish Embassy's Information Adviser finds this note to be both surprising and puzzling: «the intention of this publication is not clear»<sup>lix245</sup>. However it seems clear that for Portuguese authorities the increase in Spanish tourism is related to the change in the Portuguese order. This change, described by Spínola in his last speech in office as an unavoidable path towards communism, was also supported by Spaniards, who instead of repulse showed unprecedented interest by increasing their visits to Portugal. As Alberto Miguez describes it:

Never so many fellow countrymen were seen strolling down the Portuguese Capital. I was told that in the Caya-Badajoz border the Spanish car queues were astonishing, much more than in the high season.<sup>lx246</sup>

One may conclude then that despite all its political and informative contingencies of production and reception, the printed press had a very important role in the reception of the Portuguese Revolution in Spain. However, given the importance of the existent contingencies it is useful to incorporate channels of information other than the Spanish mass media, in the above mentioned reception process. Accounting for other channels of information allows framing the mass media in a wider context and like this understand its relative importance, given that the coverage as it will be seen was intensive but not always exhaustive, probably given the context of its production.

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**Original quotes:**

<sup>i</sup> «Los españoles han alcanzado en 1974 los más altos niveles de libertad de las últimas décadas. Estamos lejos todavía de otros países europeos, pero hoy se dicen y se publican en España cosas impensables hace sólo dos o tres años.»

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<sup>245</sup> AGA,MIT, “Cultura”, box: 42/8952, Note from the Adviser “Fecha 12 Noviembre 1974 Hora 18,15h, pp.1-2”.

<sup>246</sup> Alberto Miguez (AGA, MIT, “Presidencia”, box: 51/9511, “DIDGC, Publicación Ya Fecha 3 Nov 1974, nº21”)



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<sup>ii</sup>«La prensa está rozando límites que antes no alcanzaba (...) Cuando yo me presenté por primera vez a ustedes en esta misma sala, el 7 de noviembre de 1974, dije que no venía a cerrar nada que estuviera abierto, ni venía a frenar nada que estuviera en marcha, y dije cómo entendía el ejercicio de la libertad de prensa y cómo entendía que ese cauce de la libertad de prensa podría ser tan ancho como fuera posible, pero tenía necesariamente que tener unas riberas que no debían ser sobrepasadas y decía que también unos puentes que no debían ser sobrepasados ni en anchura ni en altura.»

<sup>iii</sup>«Espiritualmente fue quien propició el movimiento de los jóvenes oficiales.»

<sup>iv</sup>«(...) Hasta ahora las cosas de Portugal han ido sorprendentemente bien a pesar de que TVE se esfuerce en convencernos de que Portugal es solamente un caos huelguístico y descontrolado.»

<sup>v</sup>«Esconder Portugal a los ojos de los españoles, - objetivo de la prensa del país vecino.»

<sup>vi</sup>«(...) la realidad solo es dada a conocer por los semanarios», afirmando también que la Televisión Española, “da una imagen más trágica y reveladora del mayor desprecio por el proceso de democratización en Portugal”.

<sup>vii</sup>«Antes del 25 de Abril, rara era la revista que se ocupaba de lo que sucedía en el “país hermano”; en verdad, cotidianos como el madrileño “ABC” y el diario “Ya”, también de Madrid, tenían destacados corresponsales en Lisboa, que cantaban las bellezas y excelencias de la tierra y de la vida portuguesas y cuando empezaban las dificultades, internacionales de Salazar y después de Caetano, fustigaban a la prensa internacional, acusándola de conspiración contra la República Portuguesa que tal como en España, estaba alimentada por el resentimiento ante la derrota que en ambos los países se había infligido al marxismo ateo y antipatriota.»

<sup>viii</sup>«La prensa de las derechas, y del régimen, no puede disimular su nervosismo y su deseo de que las cosas no marchan en Portugal. (...) Es muy significativa, a propósito, el relace que la prensa está dando a la controversia entre socialistas y comunistas portugueses. Aquí, se presiente ese debate, como la lucha de los buenos (ingenuos) contra los malos. No es necesario decir quien representa en el drama el papel de bueno y de malos.»

<sup>ix</sup>«De la lectura de la prensa y de los comentarios que se escuchan aquí y allí, sobre la Revolución Portuguesa, es fácil concluir por la falta de información, y en buena medida por la deformación que sufren los acontecimientos o cuando menos su sentido verdadero cuando llegan a la opinión española. – En estos momentos, muy pocos españoles tienen idea [sic] en mínimo claras de lo que sucede en Portugal.»

<sup>x</sup>«Se ha llegado a tal estado de cosas que ya es fácil encontrar en los quioscos de España, con las debidas autorizaciones oficiales, periódicos extranjeros donde se ridiculiza la figura insigne y respetable de Francisco Franco o donde se ofende al Régimen del 18 de Julio de 1936 o donde se trata de establecer homologaciones o sistemas comparativos entre situaciones políticas que nos son resueltamente ajenas. (...)»

<sup>xi</sup>«El tono arrebatado del ex ministro del trabajo, pese a ser el que habitualmente emplea en sus intervenciones públicas, no ha dejado de producir estupor, al

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menos en los ambientes más interesados por la política, ya que, sinceramente, no parecía que las cosas estuvieran tan al borde del apocalipsis.»

<sup>xii</sup> «Lisboa, 25 (EFE) – “Esta madrugada se ha registrado en Lisboa una sublevación militar cuya extensión y características son aún desconocidas” informó a las 7.00 – hora española- la agencia portuguesa AN”»

<sup>xiii</sup> «un signo de la reticencia con que la noticia fue transmitida y posteriormente procesada por los servicios centrales de EFE»

<sup>xiv</sup> «coordinar, tratar y procesar aspectos de información general y política, que tanto este ministerio como otros departamentos de la administración o entidades puedan recibir o proporcionar»

<sup>xv</sup> «Como se sabe, yo soy comunista y es fácil suponer cuáles[sic] son mis sentimientos hacia el pueblo español y en relación con su lucha por la libertad, pero , al mismo tiempo, como ministro de gobierno democrático portugués, quiero decir , y he insistido en ello muchas veces, que son necesarias relaciones de buena vecindad y aplicación de los principios de la coexistencia pacífica entre el gobierno portugués y el gobierno español.»

<sup>xvi</sup> «(...) al mismo tiempo que Mauricio de Oliveira, gran amigo nuestro, toma posesión de la dirección de “A Capital”. El nuevo Director, que fue corresponsal de nuestra guerra civil, está enteramente a nuestra disposición. Lo que quiere decir que la dirección izquierdista mantenida por el anterior Director Norberto Lopes es ahora sustituida por una corriente discretamente gubernamental.»

<sup>xvii</sup> «Comprenderás que si los pillastres de allá encuentran caminos misteriosos para ligar con los de aquí, no se puede perder de vista el juego de la oposición portuguesa. Creo que, a través de Norberto Lopes, tendré noticias del sainete.»

<sup>xviii</sup> «(...) tan declaradamente enemigo de Espanha.»

<sup>xix</sup> «(...) en los que se da cuenta de la conferencia de prensa convocada por la “Comisión Revolucionaria” de Radio Club Portugues[sic], Comisión que representa una prueba más de la infiltración comunista en aquella emisora.»

<sup>xx</sup> «relatar um acontecimento importante embora delimitado no tempo e no espaço, (...) “refrescar” a redacção mantendo-a constantemente em ligação com o exterior (...) e, por último, lançar um “olhar novo” que o correspondente, por demasiado embrenhado na actualidade que é a sua, dia após dia, terá dificuldade em conseguir»

<sup>xxi</sup> «Se calculan en un millar los profesionales de la información que se han trasladado a Lisboa, procedentes de 35 países, para cubrir toda la información referida a las elecciones. El país que mayor número de corresponsales ha mandado ha sido Francia, con 69. Los ingleses han destacado a 50, los norteamericanos, a 38, y los españoles acreditados, 35. Esos 35 profesionales han sido enviados por algún medio de comunicación para cubrir la información mientras duran las elecciones. (...) Redacciones casi en pleno de revistas como “Triunfo”, “Cambio-16”, “Contrastes”, “Posible”, etcétera, se han desplazado hasta Lisboa para vivir paso a paso todos los acontecimientos. Televisión Española ha fletado un avión y lo ha puesto a disposición de todos aquellos profesionales que tenían interés de vivir esos días trascendentales para Portugal. Se calcula que, además de los profesionales que los distintos medios de comunicación han destacado en Lisboa como enviados especiales, el número de “periodistas curiosos” que asistirá a la jornada de hoy será más de 200.»

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<sup>xxii</sup> «El regreso de los periodistas españoles que habíamos estado en Portugal aquellos días, constituyó por sí solo un acontecimiento. Nos llamaban los amigos: A ver cuándo me cuentas.”(...) Los que planeaban viajes a Lisboa nos pedían que les diéramos direcciones de amigos portugueses con quienes poder hablar. “¿Sabes dónde se puede comprarse el libro de *las tres Marías*?»

<sup>xxiii</sup> «Profesionalmente, hay pocas posibilidades de practicar aquello que te han enseñado... Había periodistas de todas las partes y a muchos de ellos se les veía trabajar con unos medios de los que nosotros no disponemos. Claro que había quienes no daban prácticamente golpe... Otra cosa es el tópico de que hay que ir bien vestido y tal. La mayoría de los grandes periodistas van con tejanos y guerreras de esas estilo militar para poner en los bolsillos carretes, cintas magnetofónicas, diarios.. Pero lo peor que nos sucede a los periodistas españoles es que nos autolimitamos.»

<sup>xxiv</sup> «cuyo interés está avalado por la cualidad y precisión de las informaciones de Le Monde, cualidades unánimemente reconocidas en todos los sectores del periodismo internacional. Con la inclusión de estas crónicas, junto a las que venimos publicando desde hace tiempo del diario “The Times” de Londres, y la actividad de nuestros corresponsales en Nueva York, París, Londres y Bruselas, la cobertura informativa de nuestro periódico en los escenarios mundiales alcanza la altura y la calidad que los lectores de Informaciones merecen.»

<sup>xxv</sup> «La gente inquieta de mi generación “se alimentaba” intelectual y políticamente de Le Monde, que normalmente comprábamos en los quioscos, salvo en los días en que la censura franquista impedía su venta, casi siempre porque incluía alguna información o artículo poco simpático para el Régimen. Se leía también L'Express y, más tarde, cuando apareció, Le Point. Algunos, desde luego, ya habíamos descubierto The Economist y empezábamos a interesarnos por Time o Newsweek. Pero el predominio de lo francés era evidente.»

<sup>xxvi</sup> «Cuando los lectores no hallaban en número en el kiosco, no faltaban las llamadas telefónicas a amigos o conocidos residentes en Francia para que informaran de la noticia que presumiblemente había provocado la prohibición del número.»

<sup>xxvii</sup> «al que probablemente “France-Press” no habría dejado tan in al aire como a nosotros la EFE o Radio Nacional»

<sup>xxviii</sup> «la envergadura de la maquina clandestina es una función directa de la envergadura de la maquina represiva»

<sup>xxix</sup> «Este libro –dijo a Pyresa Basilio Rosado – refleja la vida de unos periodistas que hacen un periódico al día, cualquier día elegido al azar. Su trabajo refleja, en cierto modo, lo que acontece en el país. Es una especie de novela-reportaje, que en esta ocasión se ha hecho gracias a la colaboración de los periodistas del diario madrileño que se cita en el título. (..) Se expone, en el libro, lo que se publica y lo que no se publica en un periódico durante una jornada y es un reflejo de las inquietudes de un periodista ante su propia autocensura, de los silencios, de lo que calla.»

<sup>xxx</sup> «con la esperanza - según el autor - , de que puedan ejercer la profesión sin la espada de Damocles que es el artículo segundo de la ley de Prensa para el profesional de la información.»

<sup>xxxi</sup> «Manuel Velasco, director de “Cambio 16”, tiene un Nuevo auto de procesamiento a sus espaldas, dictado por el juez de Orden Público número 2, y

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relacionado con el secuestro de la revista de la semana pasada. En relación con este tema, Miguel Angel Aguilar escribe en el último número de “Posible”, recién reaparecido tras su tercer secuestro: “las revistas han pasado una racha verdaderamente endiablada. No acababa el ministro Leon Herrera de decir en Canarias “la objetividad de la Prensa es aplastante”, cuando “El Europeo”, “Guadiana”, “Doblon”, “Triunfo”, “por favor” (dos veces), “Valladolid Semanal”, “El Indiscreto”, “Posible”, “Cambio 16”, “El Cocodrilo Leopoldo”, etc, se enfrentan con las dificultades objetivas de los secuestros o sustituciones de páginas “non gratas”. “Contrastes” también dejará de aparecer”»

<sup>xxxii</sup> «Cuando se sugirió al equipo de “Triunfo” que durante los cuatro meses de suspensión nos pasáramos a HERMANO LOBO comprendimos que en la Resistencia pasaban cosas así, que en todas las resistencias el principio motor ha sido moral y más o menos siempre se ha parecido al: **Pero se mueve** del amigo Galileo Galilei, en paz descanse. Terminan ahora los cuatro meses de suspensión, día a día, a “Triunfo” nunca nadie le ha regalado nada y más de una vez le han quitado la cartera histórica en el tranvía del deseo, los triunfistas dejamos HERMANO LOBO y volvemos a casa. Mientras empaqueto mi máquina de escribir, una pesadísimo y vieja Continental portátil, mis holandesas y esa botella de aguardiente de pera que siempre me acompaña para entonarme en el país del desentono, pienso en mi curiosa condición de viajero por revistas que se cierran o se abren, pero siempre por revistas al borde del abismo, única forma decente de ejercer el periodismo y el matrimonio.»

<sup>xxxiii</sup> «(...) El atentado contra nuestro colega “Ya” coloca de Nuevo en primer plano de la actualidad la sistemática persecución que sufren los medios informativos en esta hora de España. (...) junto a los riesgos administrativos, políticos y empresariales, al amenaza anónima, el atentado y hasta la bomba no son, por desgracia nada nuevo entre nosotros. Quienes creemos en los valores de la libertad de prensa y en el derecho a la expresión de las propias ideas, no cesaremos en la condena de todo el tipo de violencia, venga de donde viniere.»

<sup>xxxiv</sup> «Cambio 16 vuelve hoy a sus lectores después de tres semanas de silencio con un número especial en el que tratamos de reintegrarnos a la vida nacional ofreciendo el máximo de información sobre los acontecimientos del país vecino que tanta importancia tienen en este lado de la península.»

<sup>xxxv</sup> «A tal efecto, se personaron en los talleres de Prensa Española dos funcionarios del Ministerio de Información y Turismo, donde procedieron a extender la correspondiente diligencia y depósito de los ejemplares que ya estaban impresos y suspender la tirada de los restantes previstos para su edición»

<sup>xxxvi</sup> «El secuestro fue comunicado a “triunfo” por dos inspectores d [sic] ela Brigada de Investigación Social, que se personaron en los locales de la revista y exhibieron la orden oportuna firmada por el juez de orden público. No especificaron los motivos del secuestro.»

<sup>xxxvii</sup> «Con anterioridad, aun de madrugada, la Delegación Provincial del Ministerio de Información y Turismo había instado telefónicamente para que retirara de nuestras páginas el texto en cuestión, cosa a la que se negó el director señor Villagrán, por obrar en su poder debidamente cumplimentado el ejemplar del depósito legal, estar prácticamente distribuida toda la tirada y entender que en caso de posible secuestro era la autoridad gubernativa a quien correspondía tal

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acción. A primera hora de la tarde, en nuestro periódico, se ha recibido el correspondiente pliego de cargos que se imputan al señor Villagrán.»

<sup>xxxviii</sup> «Poco antes de las siete de la tarde de ayer lunes se personaron en nuestro periódico dos funcionarios de la Brigada Regional de Investigación Social, quienes preguntaron por el director de “El correo de Andalucía”, don Federico Villagrán Bustillo, el cual no había llegado aún. Desde aquí se desplazaron al domicilio del señor Villagrán, donde procedieron a su detención. Fue conducido a la Jefatura Superior de Policía en cuyas dependencias le visitaron el presidente del Consejo de Administración y el director general de Editora Sevillana, editora de “El correo de Andalucía”, don Juan Barrero Hortal y don Antonio Uceda López, respectivamente, y por nuestro director en funciones, don Jose Maria Requena, con las cuales departió largamente. (...)»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «En cualquier caso, la advertencia de Solís Ruiz de que continua el desarrollo político puede servirme a título preventivo. Ya he puesto dos cerrojos en la puerta de mi casa y escucho cada noche le emisión en castellano de la BBC, como hacía en aquellos tiempos en que Antonio Machin cantaba: Se vive solamente una vez//Que hay que aprender a querer y a vivir.»

<sup>xl</sup> «Si el turismo evasivo era una de las primeras fuentes de ingresos del Portugal fascista, el turismo político va a sustituirle en el Portugal democrático. (..) los hoteles se llenan de “voyeurs” de la libertad, aunque tampoco escasean misteriosos seres que escuchan todo lo que pueden y miran con especial dedicación.»

<sup>xli</sup> «Según dicen, exhibidores españoles están comprando cines y salas de espectáculos al otro lado de la raya para organizar el turismo cinematográfico de los fines de semana.»

<sup>xlii</sup> «Y es que Lisboa, con sus precios, su “último tango” en las carteleras y su sol de invierno, tímidamente sugerido, es todo un espectáculo...»

<sup>xliiii</sup> « (...) ejercer el derecho de ver el cine que les pasa por la montera, comprar el libro emplazado y, sobre todo, contemplar el emocionante espectáculo de cómo un pueblo ensaya el ejercicio de libertad»

<sup>xliv</sup> «Ese aumento de trasiego por la línea de Portugal adquiere más significación al fijarnos en que las entradas por otras fronteras han disminuido en el periodo enero-febrero de este año en relación a igual periodo de 1974 (...) lo que hace suponer, dado el aumento del ir y venir a Portugal, que la mayoría más que mirar al norte francés giran a la izquierda.»

<sup>xlv</sup> «En Badajoz encontré gentes que cruzan la raya de Portugal en busca de sus propia sombra; liberales ilustrados cargados de memoria y deseo, como todos los liberales ilustrados; chicos y chicas de COU que toman apuntes en las conferencias “avanzadas”; jóvenes universitarios que han aprendido el duro ejercicio del grito y de la carrera; muchachas con o sin flor que forcejan a bofetada sucia (ellas ponen la cara y sus padres ponen la mano) para conseguir el derecho de volver a casa después de las diez de la noche; periodistas jóvenes y honestos que buscan la verdad bajo las destrucciones y las conspiraciones de silencio»

<sup>xlvi</sup> «Lisboa, invadida por los españoles (...) Miles de españoles, en su mayoría jóvenes, llenaban las calles durante las pasadas fiestas, (...)»

<sup>xlvii</sup> «(...) encontrándose con un ambiente animado: varios partidos de izquierda celebraban comicios, al mismo tiempo que algunos partidos de la derecha –

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incluido PPD – repartían comunicados a los transeúntes pidiendo el no restablecimiento de la pena de muerte (PPD) o protestando contra su ilegalización la Democracia Cristiana.»

<sup>xlviii</sup> «Centenares de jóvenes españoles van al vecino Portugal durante estas vacaciones de Pascua para ver la vecina revolución izquierdista de Portugal.»

<sup>xlix</sup> «Numerosos estudiantes españoles se encuentran en el centro de Lisboa en sus bares y restaurantes Algunos dicen que han tenido contactos informales con estudiantes portugueses y que otros encuentros están previstos en los próximos días»

<sup>l</sup> «reunión de masas del Partido Comunista»

<sup>li</sup> «un mensaje de solidaridad de España de la “Junta democrática”, grupo de elementos antifranquistas y después la multitud cantó “España, vencerás” y “Franco, fascista, asesino”»

<sup>lii</sup> «De dos a tres mil españoles se manifestaron el viernes en Lisboa contra el régimen franquista. La manifestación se desarrolló sin incidentes. //Los manifestantes, que tenían en su mayor parte la cara disimulada con pañuelos, se habían reunido en la plaza del rossio.// Desfilaron en cortejo alrededor de la plaza gritan-do[sic]: “frente popular”, “democracia popular” y “solidaridad con el régimen portugués”»

<sup>liii</sup> «“La provincia de Pontevedra utilizaba mucho el Norte de Portugal con motivo de excursión[sic] familiar por estas fechas»

<sup>liv</sup> «los más variados motivos políticos, y la situación que atraviesa el país vecino»

<sup>lv</sup> «siguiendo instrucciones de la Policía, no alquilarían vehículos con placa de matrícula española[sic] a viajeros que vayan a Portugal, pues no son nada bien recibidos allí.»

<sup>lvi</sup> «los españoles que se trasladan al vecino[sic] país están lejos de ser vitoreados.»

<sup>lvii</sup> «las agencias no están dispuestas a perder la clientela si la animan a viajes de este tipo.»

<sup>lviii</sup> «Contrariamente a lo que, a veces, ha sido divulgado entre nosotros, no disminuyó, antes bien, ha aumentado, el flujo de turistas españoles a nuestro país. Tal es así, que, en la continuación del programa “Vacaciones en Portugal” divulgado internamente en algunas ciudades españolas especialmente en el norte, la capacidad de los hoteles del Miño en el último fin de semana estuvo totalmente agotada, mientras que la cola de automóviles del país vecino en Tuy alcanzaba más de dos kilómetros de longitud, teniendo como objetivo la entrada en Portugal. Subrayamos, además, el hecho de que la delegación de Turismo de Portugal en Madrid, en las últimas tres semanas, ha triplicado su trabajo habitual para atender las peticiones de información turística sobre Portugal. Como consecuencia lógica, las principales agencias de viaje de Madrid informan que en las dos últimas semanas las peticiones de reservas de hoteles de la capital portuguesa son de auténtica “alta temporada”. (...)En esta la verdad a la que no debe ser ajena la intensa campaña de promoción llevada a cabo, intensamente por los organismos oficiales del Turismo Nacional portugués, en aquel país.»

<sup>lix</sup> «no se comprende la intención que pueda tener con tal publicación.»

<sup>lx</sup> «Nunca se había visto tantos compatriotas callejando [sic] por la capital portuguesa. Me han contado que en la frontera de Caya-Badajoz las colas de

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automóviles españoles eran impresionantes, mucho más que en plena temporada turística.»





Part III.  
**Mapping the Coverage**



## A. Coverage features

### 1. The national utterance of the newspaper

When holding a newspaper, one holds an object that embodies a certain idea of the public it is aimed for, but also a projection of a certain idea of the country where it is being produced, in that this object embodies choices made according to the answers to questions such as “is it important for «us»?”, “will people buy it?”. Moreover, certain authors contend that the ritual of reading the same newspaper every day knowing that it is a gesture repeated by others at the same time produces a sense of community. In this sense, and according to Benedict Anderson:

In this perspective, the newspaper is merely an ‘extreme form’ of the book, a book sold on a colossal scale, but of ephemeral popularity. Might we say: one-day best-sellers- The obsolescence of the newspaper on the morrow of its printing – curious that one of the earlier mass-produced commodities should so prefigure the inbuilt obsolescence of modern durables nonetheless, for just this reason, creates this extraordinary mass ceremony: the almost precisely simultaneous consumption (‘imagining’) of the newspapers-as-fiction. We know that particular morning and evening editions will overwhelmingly be consumed between this hour and that, only on this day, not that. (...)The significance of this mass ceremony – Hegel observed that newspapers serve modern man as a substitute for morning prayers – is paradoxical. It is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion. Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly repeated at daily or half-daily intervals throughout the calendar. What more vivid figure for the secular, historically clocked, imagined community can be envisioned? At the same time, the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his subway, barbershop, or residential neighbours, is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life (2006: 35-36).

Leaving behind the historic role that, also according to Anderson, mechanical printing technology had in the establishment of nation-states, but retaining the idea of an «imagined community» built through the formation of «fellow-readers», we get to the newspaper role in this

performance, because they address, more or less intensively, their readers as members of the same nation. Newspapers have this ability to participate on a daily basis in this construction by defining who and what belongs to this «imagined community», what constitutes the latter's common concerns, who are its allies as well as its enemies. In the specific case of the Spanish press, in general the common enemy explicitly enunciated is communism. The a priori establishment of communism as an enemy of the Spanish nation and State will thus shape the entire coverage of the Portuguese Revolutionary process.

But how do newspapers actually make its readers feel part of this dynamic? How were Spanish readers able to relate to this enemy?

In his thesis on banal nationalism and on how citizens of established and democratic nations are continually reminded of the fact that they belong to the nation, Michael Billig presents the newspaper as one of the means to do so, since «[t]hey present news in ways that take for granted the existence of the world of nations. They employ routine 'deixis', which is continually pointing to the national homeland as the home of their readers» (Billig 2008, 11). Leaving aside Billig's main argument regarding banal nationalism, let us now focus on this particular way through which newspapers address their readers: «the deixis of homeland is embedded in the very fabric of the newspapers» (2008: 94). Furthermore, Billig argues that the «homeland-deixis» embodies more than just deictic words (such as 'we', 'here' or 'now', which are words that anchor the sentence to its context of utterance), and also includes the use of the definite article and the way in which the newspaper is organized in different sections.

Engaging with Michael Billig's argument allows us to interpret the generalist newspaper as an object that is national-bounded, and therefore where the relation with foreign events typically assumes a

national perspective, more through its own structure than because of an explicit or implicit purpose. For instance, Billig considers that «[i]t is a truism that, in the British press, national news predominates over international items. Roger Fowler (1991) refers to the ‘homocentrism’ of the press, which is “preoccupation with countries, societies and individuals perceived to be like oneself”» (2008, 117-118). For Billig, however, the principle that guides the structure of the newspaper is not so much «homocentrism», as Fowler suggests, but rather «home-centric»:

The signposts are not merely page headings. «Home» indicates more than the contents of the particular page: it flags the home of the newspaper and of the assumed, addressed readers. Daily, we, the regular readers, flick our eyes over the directing signs. Without conscious awareness, we find our way around the familiar territory of our newspapers. As we do so, we are habitually at home in a textual structure, which uses the homeland’s national boundaries, dividing the world into «homeland» and «foreign», *Heimat* and *Ausland*. Thus, we readers, find ourselves at home in the homeland and in a world of homelands (2008: 119).

In the Spanish press, with the exception of *ABC* all newspapers were structured around the division between «national news» and «international news» sections duly signalled. *ABC* identified where (i.e. the city) the news came from and established a usual and more or less stable space for foreign news, without nonetheless having a specific headline.

Curiously enough, until General Franco’s death *Informaciones* presented the «international news» section before the domestic news one, but as soon as the death of the dictator seemed eminent it immediately changed this order. This could be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, reporting on foreign news was less risky, in terms of censorship and sanctions, than reporting on domestic affairs. On the other hand, but intrinsically linked with the former interpretation, international news were more appealing, in other words became more interesting, because they

were supposedly less tainted by internal censorship, and were therefore perceived as a small space of relative freedom, given that they also allowed newspapers to mediate their commentary to the internal situation. It could also be the case that the newspaper, because of censorship and the autocratic regime, believed, like Maximo writes in *La Vanguardia Española*, that «nothing ever happens in Spain»<sup>247</sup>, and when it does happen censorship does not allow it to be reported, hence the preference for international news.

The newspaper is therefore a place where the reader feels at home because it is structured from the point of view of the nation as its home, as Billig proposes with his concept of «homeland deixis». All news addresses the reader specifically as a member of the national community. The nation is assumed by the structure of the newspaper as home, so it can be referred to by the use of the definite article – for instance by stating «this country» or «the country» – without adding any more information. Likewise, all that is related to «this country» does not require further details: «the President of the Republic», «the economy», «the weather», are all related to the nation from where the point of view is taken, which by the use of the definite article is assumed to be a commonly known fact. Therefore it could be argued that the relationship of the foreign press with the Portuguese events can be subject to different national readings depending on the country they emanate from. A Spanish reading of the Portuguese revolutionary events is, therefore, more a structural matter than a particularity of the Spanish press. Regardless of the national point of view as a structural characteristic, the events highlighted by the Spanish press are context-based. In the present dissertation, we assume that a community is built by newspapers and their readers, that it takes on the

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<sup>247</sup> Maximo.1974. «Y al este, España» in *La Vanguardia Española*, April 28<sup>th</sup> pp. 8

form of a national, imagined community, and that it is materially detectable in the use of terms such as «brother country» when referring to Portugal, a term preferred by *La Vanguardia Española*, for instance.

## 2. Editorial columns and the newspaper identity

Despite the presence of a «homeland deixis» in the newspaper as a whole, editorial columns constitute a privileged space for the expression of each newspaper's identity, hence our focus in them. In over two years of attention devoted to the Portuguese revolutionary process, examined in this dissertation, for the Spanish press some moments seemed to be worthy of more concern than others, and were therefore discussed in editorial columns.

In her work on the political role of editorial columns, Elisabeth Le argues that «[u]nsigned editorials, as official expressions of a media position on an issue they choose to highlight over all others in a given context, appear one of the most relevant means of investigating media socio-cultural identities» (2010:3). Even if not a daily feature in all Spanish newspapers in that period –only *La Vanguardia Española* and *ABC* presented an editorial column in a fixed position in every edition of the newspaper –, unsigned editorial columns remain a central piece for the identification of interests and attitudes regarding specific events in a given newspaper, and therefore became the guidelines of the present dissertation.

Editorial columns help to define: 1) the importance given by Spanish newspapers to certain events in the context of the Portuguese revolutionary process; 2) the particular interests of some of the newspapers; and 3) how the community built around the newspaper is called on to interact with the events. In this sense, as Le argues, «[e]ditorials depict how media perceive and react to the world around

them. Each editorial defines at a given time how media construct their socio-cultural environment and where they position themselves in it. In this sense, they are snapshots of media socio-cultural identities» (Le 2010: XI).

One of the ways editorial columns interact with their readers is through the use of an inclusive «we» with a national aim. As Billig contends «[r]outinely, newspapers, like politicians, claim to stand in the eye of the country. Particularly in their opinion and editorial columns, they use the nationalized syntax of hegemony, simultaneously speaking to and for the nation, and representing the nation in both senses of ‘representation’. They evoke a national ‘we’, which includes the ‘we’ of reader and writer, as well as the ‘we’ of the universal audience» (2008, 114-115).

	«we, the newspaper»		Inclusive «we»=«we, Spain/Spaniards»		Impersonal/not explicit	
	Absolute n°	%	Absolute n°	%	Absolute n°	%
<i>ABC</i>	19	55,89	4	11,76	11	32,35
<i>Arriba</i>	1	8,33	10	83,33	1	8,33
<i>Informaciones</i>	1	11,11	2	22,22	6	66,67
<i>La Vanguardia Española</i>	12	46,15	5	19,23	9	34,62
<i>Tele/eXprés</i>	2	22,22	0	0	7	77,78
<b>All newspapers combined</b>	35	38,89	21	23,33	34	37,78

**Table 10 Pluralization used in editorial columns**

As table 10 shows, not all newspapers use a national «we». For instance *Tele/eXprés* never seems to resort to it, and along with *Informaciones*, it is a newspaper whose editorial columns are usually written in an impersonal and distant way. On the contrary, *Arriba* is a newspaper whose style of editorial column is based mostly on the use of a national «we», since out of a total of 12 editorials, 10 take on this form. A national «we» is used to address questions of common concern such as the



antagonism between both nations during moments of crisis, like the Roller Hockey World Championship or the assault on the Spanish Embassy, or to address political influence phenomena, for instance when Portugal is constructed as a counter-model for Spain after January's turmoil and just before the failed March 11<sup>th</sup> coup:

It would be sad, from the «brotherly» perspective we recognise the Portuguese nation, if the meaning of the last revolution and the signs through which it wants to present itself before the world, would have its highpoint in the uncivilized show of a few disappointed and bitter spectators in a stadium.<sup>i 248</sup>

The last days culminated in the increasing protest against our nation, against our nation's law, but we will not be scared.<sup>ii 249</sup>

The question is that in reliable media several fingers apprentices of democracy have pointed us Portugal as the model for our most desirable future. (...) We, with the regime's evolution, are heading towards a democracy forged by the Spanish society itself, and that is what we want to defend and save.<sup>iii 250</sup>

Both *ABC* and *La Vanguardia Española* use a national «we» occasionally but not predominately as *Arriba* does. Nevertheless, when a national «we» is used, it concerns the same type of argumentation. Still relating to the antagonism between Portugal and Spain, following the promise of compensations made by the Portuguese government in relation to the assault of the Spanish diplomatic premises, *ABC* demands the return of the assets expropriated from their Spanish fellow-citizens in a national tone:

The Portuguese Government should prepare as soon as possible the legal and economic resources to ensure that our compatriots dispossessed by the revolutionary wave be compensated according to their legitimate rights.<sup>iv 251</sup>

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<sup>248</sup> Editorial: «Con la más clara repulsa».1974. *Arriba*, July 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>249</sup> Editorial: «Actitud firme».1975. *Arriba*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp. 1-2

<sup>250</sup> Editorial: «Los fáciles ejemplos...».1975. *Arriba*, March 7<sup>th</sup>, pp-3-4

<sup>251</sup> Editorial: «Los intereses españoles, lesionados en Portugal».1976. *ABC*, February 6<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

*La Vanguardia Española* assumes a national point of view when in the summer of 1974 Mário Soares makes declarations about a common path towards the CEE for both Portugal and Spain, a speech highly regarded by the newspaper, given its unmistakably pro-European inclinations:

Let us hope we could say the same ourselves regarding the century-old Spanish indifference towards this country united to Spain as a Siamese twin. (...) nothing seems as useful for the brotherly nation or as reasonable for us.<sup>v 252</sup>

Furthermore, when in January 1975 the crisis between communists and socialists intensifies, the newspaper presents a defence of the electoral process as a way out of the conflict.

If the entire western world is watching Portugal, we have more reasons to be watching ourselves, from the common Iberian Peninsula, what is happening in our neighbour country.<sup>vi 253</sup>

When Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho is incarcerated for his involvement in the military manoeuvres that culminated in the November 25<sup>th</sup> confrontations, the newspaper compares the different treatment Otelo is receiving to the treatment given to both General Spínola and Marcelo Caetano, never sentenced to prison. But the national «we» is used to draw a lesson about the role of public opinion in the stabilization and moderation of a given society.

The lesson can be useful, and not only for the neighbouring country. Public opinion, as the experts on the subject suggest, is a stabilizing and moderating factor, because it is a factor of articulation of interests. At the moment of casting their vote, people think about it carefully.<sup>vii 254</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> Editorial: «Juntos hacía Europa». 1974. *La Vanguardia española*, August 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>253</sup> Editorial: «Mirando a Portugal». 1975. *La Vanguardia española*, January 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.

<sup>254</sup> Editorial: «Los vaivenes portugueses». 1976. *La Vanguardia española*, January 30<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

Finally, when faced with the pending coup situation in November 1975, *ABC* intervenes in a national way, relating like *La Vanguardia Española*, to phenomena of political influence:

Whose revolutionary journey – incidentally, by the way – has been presented to Spaniards, from a wide variety of fields, as the alternative paradigm to every political period defined by a long authoritarian imprint.<sup>viii 255</sup>

As Billig contends «[a] national ‘we’ was being invoked, comprising the ‘reasonable people’ of the nation, who were being represented as the whole nation. This ‘we’ included non-readers of the paper, whilst the readers were being addressed as nationals» (2008:115). The use of a national «we» is preponderant in moments like the failed coup of March 16<sup>th</sup> <sup>256</sup> (*Arriba* and *ABC*), the coup of April 25<sup>th</sup> <sup>257</sup> (*ABC*, *La Vanguardia Española* and *Arriba*), the resignation of General Spínola<sup>258</sup> (*Arriba*, *La Vanguardia Española* and *ABC*), the failed coup of

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<sup>255</sup> Editorial: «Portugal: el peligro de la anarquía».1975. *ABC*, November 15<sup>th</sup>, pp. 3

<sup>256</sup> «Nos sería particularmente penoso a los españoles que el presente conflicto de Portugal» (Editorial: «Horas difíciles para Portugal». 1974. *Arriba*, March 17<sup>th</sup>: 3) and «De tan entrañable interés para nosotros los españoles: el otro país que, como el lusitano, quiso, supo y pudo, realizarse históricamente en una legión de pueblos que hablan entre ellos y rezan a dios en romance peninsular.» (Editorial: «La actualidad portuguesa». 1974. *ABC*, March 17<sup>th</sup>: 26)

<sup>257</sup> « Portugal no es sólo un país vecino sino el otro pueblo ibérico.» (Editorial: «Portugal y España».1974. in *ABC*, May 5<sup>th</sup>:19); «Esperemos que el país hermano y vecino encuentre pronto el camino pacífico de solución de sus problemas. Le interesa a él. Y nos interesa también a nosotros.» (Editorial: «Portugal y el futuro».1974. in *La Vanguardia española*, April 26<sup>th</sup>:5) and «Como españoles, nuestra amistad de esta hora se traduce en una expresión clara y terminante de afecto.» (Editorial: «Fraterna Portugal».1974. in *Arriba*, April 26<sup>th</sup>:3)

<sup>258</sup> «Conviene que nos fijemos en esos lamentos que acaso pueden ser también aplicables a nuestro país a muchos recién conversos a la democracia.»(Editorial: «Portugal y su problema político». 1974. *Arriba*, October 11<sup>th</sup>, pp.); «(...) son apenas los avatares que el fraterno país acaba de experimentar con un mínimo de coste social y con un máximo de patriotismo.» (Editorial: «Avatares de la democracia» .1974. *La Vanguardia española*, October 1<sup>st</sup>, pp.5)

March 11<sup>th</sup><sup>259</sup> (*Informaciones*, *ABC* and *La Vanguardia Española*) and both electoral processes<sup>260</sup> (1975: *Informaciones* and *Arriba*; 1976: and *La Vanguardia Española* and *Arriba*).

### 3. Voicing of opinion

Despite the editorial column role in establishing the identity of the newspaper, this identity is also constructed through the myriad of articles published in its pages, where different voices expressing different concerns sometimes supporting, other contradicting, the newspaper editorial stance, are found.

Like this we enter the realm of what Gramsci called the «war of position», where the media have a significant role. For Gramsci, and others after him, the media are both instruments that are used to express the dominant ideology as well as the place to fight it (let us not forget Tuchman's advice and remember Raymond Williams' view that cultural hegemony always embodies the terms of its own rejection, or in other words what Ernesto Laclau (2005, 153) calls the «antagonist frontier»). The possibility of struggle implies the presence of counter-hegemonic

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<sup>259</sup> «Estos son hechos que los españoles deberíamos meditar» (Editorial: « Los sucesos de Portugal». 1975. *Informaciones*, March 13<sup>th</sup>); «Pero pese a nuestro sincero deseo de progreso y bienestar en el país vecino, no creemos probable un pronóstico positivo.» (Editorial: «Nacionalizaciones». 1975. *ABC*, March 19<sup>th</sup>, pp.)

<sup>260</sup> «Cualquier radicalización contraria a ese espíritu de integración y de tolerancia no tendría en nuestro país, verdaderamente, un expresión de claveles.» (Editorial: «*El segundo 25 de abril*».1975. in *Arriba*, April 25<sup>th</sup>). «Ojala la espera se compense al menos con un ingreso en la normalidad democrática de ese sector de mundo al que Portugal pertenece, y al que nosotros mismos pertenecemos también» (Editorial: «Dos años para elegir».1976. *La Vanguardia española*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp.) and « España quiere entrar en el futuro dentro del mismo elenco de democracias. (...) hoy queremos sacar de Portugal la siguiente lección: España debe llegar a la democracia sin necesidad de un periodo como el que ha atravesado Portugal.» (Editorial: «Portugal, por ejemplo».1976. *Arriba*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.).

positions, despite the existence of a dominant position. To maintain itself, hegemony is constantly readjusted and renegotiated, and alliances keep mutating, its achievements never being final or stable. Furthermore, it is more useful to talk about hegemonies rather than a singular hegemony, given the stratified character of societies in the twentieth century.

In order to think about how ideas circulate within a given society, and in particular case Spain's constrained mass media universe, it is helpful to look a little further into Antonio Gramsci's theory of ruling class domination through «culture hegemony» in western European nations. Gramsci (1971) departs from the traditional Marxist conception of «false consciousness», the dominant ideology that prevents subjects to recognize, and reject, their dominance, to develop further the concepts of «hegemony» and «manufacture of consent». Gramsci's thought is also less dependent on economic determinism than Marx's, and there is a place for human agency within it. Therefore, instead of a traditional mechanical (or linear) causality between base and superstructure, Gramsci conceives it rather as a circular movement in permanent formation/interaction. Despite multiple criticisms of several of its aspects (i.e. that this theory is able to conceptualize cultural hegemony as well as to promote revolution; the empirical impossibility of testing «falsifiable hypotheses» (Lears 1985); or even that it is altogether Marxist), it can still be considered a very pertinent point of departure for the process of understanding how ideas function in a specific society. What happened in the twentieth century, argues Laclau, is that the illusion of immediacy, «of a non-discursively mediated access to the things themselves» dissolved and «had to be replaced by one form or another of discursive mediation.» (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: xi) In this sense, Gramsci's contribution was to transform class identity into «hegemonic identities constituted through non-dialectic mediations.»

Like this Gramsci understands the State as an exercise of power of dominant classes, and in this sense it is constituted by its coercive hand, the «political society» (dictatorship), and the ability to generate consent, the «civil society» (hegemony). As T. J. Jackson Lears stresses, «the concept of hegemony has little meaning unless paired with the notion of domination» (1985, 568), therefore consent and coercion by force usually coexist, even if one of them is dominant. In other words, according to Gramsci, in these nations the dominant order is sustained not only by visible coercion (economic, political or physical) exerted by «political society», i.e. the coercive apparatus of the State, but also by «consented coercion» achieved by «civil society», i.e. the institutions that are the means by which hegemony is established (trade unions, schools, and churches). The latter are all involved in the production of active consent, namely through ideology – as a worldview that dominates all others, though hegemony might encompass several ideologies at once.

The ruling class is hence the one who establishes its own discourses, ideas, values and norms – its own culture – as hegemonic, and therefore this culture is transformed in the «cultural universal» common sense of a given society. Hegemony is then firstly a form of leadership but later it becomes «common sense» of a given epoch. Hegemony is not just the leadership but the how of leadership, the belief that partial interests (of the ruling class) are universal interests – similarly to Barthes' claim about the naturalization of the petty-bourgeois culture as universal culture performed by myth.

The status of cultural hegemony «includes cultural as well as economic and political power – the power to help define the boundaries of common-sense 'reality' either by ignoring views outside those boundaries or by labelling deviant opinions 'tasteless' or 'irresponsible'» (Lears 1985, 572). Therefore «(...) the essence of the concept is not manipulation

but legitimation. The ideas, values, and experiences of dominant groups are validated in public discourse; those of subordinate groups are not, though they might continue to thrive beyond the boundaries of received opinion» (Lears 1985, 574).

Because ideas are transmitted by language, and since words, text and language, following Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogist tradition (later developed into the notion of intertextuality by Julia Kristeva and theorized by Gerard Genette, among others), are in permanent dialogue with the former, their use is tainted by cultural meanings or, at least, they are never neutral.

There are traces left by other speakers, by other rhetorical and discursive traditions. Language is marked by a plurality of value-laden perspectives in challenging contact with one another. It is also by its very nature dialogical: each utterance implies a symbolic exchange with at least one speaker. All these qualities are especially relevant to the language of a hegemonic culture. By virtue of its leaders' effort to win popular consent, a hegemonic culture becomes internally persuasive rather than merely authoritative (Lears 1985, 591).

Gramscian «civil society» is a public sphere where the process of struggle for power, i.e. hegemony, takes place. The process of interaction between the several spheres of a given society is made possible by the formation or shaping of «historical blocs» through the alliance of a particular group with other groups or classes based on a shared claim. However, in order to achieve cultural hegemony, the worldview supported by this historical bloc should appeal to a wide range of other groups or classes, should be able to claim that their particular interests are those of the community, and should be able to reformulate their stance continuously to accommodate other groups or classes. This is thus an open system where the creation of counter-hegemonies is always a potential option.

From a Gramscian point of view, hegemony is a strategy to control the State through two main, and simultaneous, tactics – a «war of

manoeuvre» and the already mentioned «war of position» –, and once control of the State is achieved, to assume the role of education of the masses. If the «war of manoeuvre» implies a direct attack, as in seizing the means of production and administration, the «war of position» implies a long and continued intellectual struggle to create a counter-hegemonic culture, to defy established ideas on what is ‘normal’ and ‘natural’, and hence the development of a culture of the new order, which will make a successful «war of manoeuvre» possible.

For this «war of position», intellectuals will be needed as mechanisms to produce hegemony within the ideological apparatus of the State (in education, the media, the church). Gramsci, who considers that «[a]ll men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals» (1971:140), however draws a distinction between two types of intellectuals: the traditional one, a professional-like intellectual that possesses an inter-class aura; and the «organic» one, who is the thinking and organizing element of a particular fundamental social class and is differentiated by its function in directing ideas and aspirations of the class he organically belongs to. The latter was a role that several Spanish journalists recognised they had during these moments:

We were never impartial. We spoke of reality and pursued the facts with the obsession of newspapermen in normal conditions, and only formally hide the fact that the regime had to fall. The press of those years differed much from what the press should be in a democratic country. We were not neutral. We practiced a journalism that adopted definite political positions.<sup>261</sup>

Of the voices present in the Spanish newspapers who have this role, two types might be distinguished: authors of regular columns (i.e. José

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<sup>261</sup> Juan Luis Cebrian, paper presented at the Conference on Communications and Political Cultural: The Iberian Peninsula in Transition (Columbia University, September 1978) (Maxwell 1983, 17).



Luis Gómez Tello in *Arriba*, José Javaloyes in *ABC*, Augusto Assia and Manuel Aznar in *La Vanguardia Española*, Jaume Miravittles and Manuel Vázquez Montalbán in *Tele/eXprés*, etc.) which sometimes is an opinion backed by the medium (Reig 2007); and authors of sporadic articles. The latter are, nonetheless, of several distinct sorts. In this specific case there are politicians, or at least proto-politicians, (i.e. José Maria de Areiliza, Ramón Trias Farga, José María Ruiz-Gallardón, Jordi Borja, Carlos Sentís, Joaquín Garrigues Walker), but there can also be experts in a particular field (i.e. Gerardo González, J.A. González Casanova, Florentino Pérez-Embid) or historic voices (i.e. Santiago Nadal, Jesus Suevos). Some voices embrace all, or several of, these characteristics.

In what concerns correspondents and special correspondents it could be said that names such as José Salas, Eduardo Barrenechea, Fernando Jáuregui, Augusto Assia and Alberto Miguez are structural for the establishment of the lines of discourse that frame the Spanish coverage of the Portuguese revolutionary process, given that their chronicles are not only all of «personalized experience», but also given the hybridity of their genre, which makes them a privileged vehicle for informed opinion to arrive to Spanish readers.

José Rebelo (1994) divides the usual special correspondent production into different categories: an initial «Atmosphere chronicle», followed by news reports and interviews and finished by an in depth analytical article, sometimes written a posteriori. *Tele/eXprés'* special correspondent Xavier Roig first experience in Portugal emulates this logic. Nevertheless not all other special correspondents do; the publication of interviews, for instance, is not common.

Interviews are usually introduced into their chronicles that verse other subjects as well, and are very frequently reported by indirect speech, which is a form of conferring evaluation to a report (Gruber 1993) and a

reason for the hybridity of the genre. There are exceptions, of course, but they are usually presented as «special documents» or inserted in a photo-news-report.

All in all, Spanish special correspondents' style might be divided into three types of chronicles: «News report», «Daily information», close to what is called «copy» in the Anglo-Saxon journalistic tradition, and «Personalized experience». The first one is usually though as whole, sometimes written *a posteriori* of the stay; divided in coherent chapters and usually each piece is devoted to one specific subject (Albert Abril and Quim Monzó series about African nationalist groups published in *Tele/eXprés*, Gómez Tello series after March 16<sup>th</sup> in *Arriba* or Antonio Alférez series about the second elections published in *ABC*); the second one uses long quotations and tackle several themes according with the different events of the day/week; finally, the third one, uses of the first person of singular (although sometimes of plural as well) and takes the reader along with the chronicler, some like Eduardo Barrenechea, Augusto Assia or José Salas, even address the reader directly strengthening the idea of proximity. News report might use this type of storytelling as well, but the organization of the pieces differentiates them.

Correspondents, on the other hand, tend to write «personal experience» type of chronicles, with some exceptions that are probably related to the fact that the journalist was probably working for an agency that afterwards distributed his work and not directly for the newspaper (i.e. Eduardo Corregedor da Fonseca, José Oneto, etc.).

However, and related to this question, it was argued at the beginning of this process by Eduardo Haro Teclen that the Spanish coverage had been ransacked by politicians, thus displacing journalists from exerting their task. In late-June 1974 Haro Teclen writes the following in *Mundo diario*:

A first wave of reporters found in April some facts that were reported with rigor and clarity. That we are aware of only in one newspaper – the Madrilenian «Nuevo diario» - conflict erupted between the political editorial team and its special correspondents. (...) Nonetheless, the attitudes of the Spanish press starts to diverge. The gran truthful vanguard of reporters has been replaced by politicians (...) Political commentators – many of them, professional politicians (in the degree of professionalism existent in Spain) frequent users of the commentary as an instrument of their activity – are about eighty percent conservative and about twenty percent moderated or gutless. They use Portugal as a metaphor. And they are converting information into misinformation.<sup>ix 262</sup>

Haro Teclen hints at a trend that might not be completely accurate, but that was defining of the Spanish coverage of the Portuguese Revolutionary process: its politicization. On one hand when March 16<sup>th</sup> military distress occurred, that was a subject of journalists; then when the coup of April 25<sup>th</sup> succeeded in overthrowing the New State, the coverage was not only a moment of journalists but of special correspondents, given the scarce quantity written by the permanent correspondents in Lisbon. However the latter is also a moment when known names such as Baltasar Porcel, Santiago Nadal, José María de Areiliza and Jesus Suevos address the Portuguese events. Among those there are examples of politician or proto-politician names like Jesus Suevos, who was a long-time Falangist writing in the main exponent of the official chain. However José María de Areiliza was what can be described as a politician (diplomat, former mayor of Bilbo, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the first Monarchic government) writing in the pages of a major newspaper: *La Vanguardia Española*.

Given that after these initial moments special correspondents would only travel massively to Portugal again for the 1975 elections and that there are other examples of politician or proto-politician articles (José

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<sup>262</sup> Haro Teclen, Eduardo. 1974. «Portugal y España», *Mundo Diário*, June 30 [Archivo General Administración (AGA), Fondo Presidencia, box 51/9716, “Difusión Informativa de la Dirección General de coordinación”, n°61].

María Ruiz-Gallardón, Carlos Sentís, Ramón Trias Farga, Jordi Borja and so forth) that fall after the period Haro Teclen is referring to, one could accept Haro Teclen's claim of politicization. Moreover given the politicized nature of a great deal of the articles published, whether or not its author was identifiable as politician given the «organic intellectual» role they assume, the nature of their writing fit the claim. Nonetheless to address it as a complete replacement would not be entirely accurate.

It thus seems that a discursive «historical bloc» started to develop slowly, organized in a common platform that supported the worldview of a democratic Spanish society and that implied few changes in the economic structure. This discourse managed to congregate former allies of the Francoist regime with its antagonists, by supporting moderate claims and exerting like this, hegemonic «consented coercion» (very much framed by the fear surrounding memories of the civil war, and a fear which was increased by the 1964 campaign surrounding the «XXV years of peace» that established successfully Francoism as the peace warranty, instigating fear of what would follow it) over the other groups.

The formation of this worldview where democracy is given a positive connotation, and which is supported by a wide and somewhat unlikely group of advocates, enhanced its visibility in the mass media, in this specific case in the printed mass media, after the assassination of Carrero Blanco in December 1973 and before General Franco's death in November 1975, despite the increase of repression in 1975. This is a period that roughly corresponds to the Portuguese revolutionary process. The discourse about the Portuguese revolutionary process results then of the combination of these voices that slowly shaped the question into a dispute between extremism and moderation, (and where a defence of moderation was established as consensual) despite some sporadic attempts – mostly in the pages of *Tele/eXprés* - of framing the question otherwise.

#### 4. The democratic emphasis

As it has been seen, throughout the entire Portuguese revolutionary process the Spanish press focused on the possibility of democracy becoming a reality in Portugal, and given the national utterance of the same coverage, a reality in Spain as well. In addition to this possibility there is the fact that Communism had long been established as an enemy of the Francoist state, as well as of liberal democracies, given the Cold war context and rhetoric. The fact that Communists take in Portugal a determinant role, not only in the State apparatus – given the presence of Communists in government since the I provisional one – but also on the streets, triggers from the beginning the alarm of the sectors closer to the regime.

From the point of view of the Francoist *status quo* Communism is an enemy of Spain. On the one hand, both *ABC* and *Arriba* establish since the beginning, Communists as enemies of Democracy, assumption that *Informaciones* joins more cautiously and in a critical way when it points out that Communists in Portugal have to prove by their action that they are in fact democrats<sup>263</sup>. However after the radicalization that followed the failed counter-revolutionary coup led by General Spínola on 11 March 1975, this newspaper blames Communists for the hypothetical future Democracy failure. On the other hand, also an enemy of Spain are Liberal democracies, despite the consecutive Spanish attempts of having the Francoist regime accepted by them (in this sense it is significant the complaints expressed by *Arriba* in the Summer of 1975, against the Common market Europe for refusing, once more, collaboration with Spain while giving support to both Portugal and Greece<sup>264</sup>). After all, Spain was a dictatorship that had been erected on top of some basic assumptions, one

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<sup>263</sup> Editorial: «Portugal, Europa y los países comunistas». 1974. *Informaciones*, June 8<sup>th</sup>, pp. 19

<sup>264</sup> Editorial: «El ultimo argumento». 1975. *Arriba*, June 26<sup>th</sup>, pp-7

of the most important: the refusal of the liberal democratic order and the associated capitalistic one. Of course by 1974 this assumption was no longer consensual, given the debate between *aperturismo* and *inmovilismo* going on within the boundaries of the regime and the antagonism regarding Liberal democracies between them, but still had in *Arriba* an enthusiastic supporter. In this newspaper Jesús Suevos is a frequent champion against liberal democracies and both him as Florentino Pérez-Embid in *ABC* express their surprise regarding the sudden democrats that 1974, combining the spirit of 12 February and the Portuguese Revolution, uncovered. *Arriba* in general ‘warns’ the Spanish democrats of what will be waiting for them every time violence strikes in Portugal.

Nonetheless it is also present, from the initial moments of the coup, a democratic emphasis, which the rest of the newspapers more or less support and that will be established as hegemonic. In this sense it is significant *La Vanguardia Española* and its journalist, Augusto Assia, continuous support of Liberal Democracies and dismissal until very late in the process of the Communist plot theory. A significant difference lies in the fact that, contrary to *Arriba* and *ABC*, the former uphold a vision of Democracy that includes Communist parties. In fact, not only Communist parties are accepted as part of the game, but Socialists are welcomed to it as well since they are seen as an antidote: social-democracy would prevent socialism. (In this sense it is also significant that during what became known as «Hot Summer» *Arriba* condemns more harshly social-democracy than Communism). Like this, democracy is not only given a positive connotation, but becomes, at the same time, the horizon of the Spanish political expectations. A movement that reaches even *Arriba* by the time of the Portuguese first Constitutional elections in 1976. How does this happen, one might ask.

For starter democracy has different meanings for each of their supporters. With time, and reacting to the development of the Portuguese

situation, an antagonism is established that goes beyond the previously existent between Communism and Democracy, which was not widely shared. This one was transformed into an antagonism between electoral and revolutionary legitimacies (in the words of moderation versus extremism) and able to be established as hegemonic, or in other words as a consensus able to congregate both positions of alienation and identification from the regime in their support, as well as the positions of both *continuismo* and *aperturismo*, hence establishing it as the common sense attitude to have.

In this sense, by hegemony is understood, the operation described by Ernesto Laclau as «[t]his operation of taking up, by a particularity, of an incommensurable universal signification (...) And given that this embodied totality or universality is, as we have seen, an impossible object, the hegemonic identity becomes something of the order of an *empty* signifier, its own particularity embodying an unachievable fullness » (2005: 70-71). Given this, at some point the concept of Democracy seems to function in the Spanish press as this that Laclau calls an «empty signifier». An empty signifier, as Laclau himself states is a signifier without signified. However, given that it is strictly impossibility to have one, more appropriated would be to refer to a «tendentially empty signifier» or a «floating signifier» depending on whether the antagonistic frontier is stable or not. As Laclau argues:

In practice, however, the distance between the two is not that great. Both are hegemonic operations and, most importantly, the referents largely overlap. A situation where only the category of empty signifier was relevant, with total exclusion of the floating moment, would be one in which we would have an entirely immobile frontier – something that is hardly imaginable. Conversely, a purely psychotic universe, where we would have a pure floating without any partial fixation, is not thinkable either. So floating and empty signifiers should be considered as partial dimensions – and so as analytically distinguishable – in any process of hegemonic construction of the ‘people’.» (2005, 133)

Like this «the hegemonic operations would be the presentation of a particularity of a group as the incarnation of that empty signifier which refers to the communitarian order as an absence, an unfulfilled reality. » (Laclau 1996, 44) To demonstrate how it works, Laclau resorts to ‘order’ in a situation of radical disorder, but we can extrapolate to ‘democracy’ in a context of ‘lack of’, i.e. an authoritarian regime, and argues:

‘Order’ as such has no content, because it only exists in the various forms in which it is actually realized, but in a situation of radical disorder ‘order’ is present as that which is absent; it becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier of that absence. In this sense, various political forces can compete in their efforts to present their particular objectives as those which carry out the filling of that lack. To hegemonize something is exactly to carry out this filling function. (We have spoken about ‘order’, but obviously ‘unity’, ‘liberation’, ‘revolution’, etcetera belong to the same order of things. Any term which, in a certain political context becomes the signifier of the lack, plays the same role. Politics is possible because the constitutive impossibility of society can only represent itself through the production of empty signifiers.) (1996: 44)

The antagonistic frontier that bounds democracy is then displaced, and under the umbrella of demand for democracy rest several equivalent demands (social justice, civil liberties and so forth, but also - and in this case the crystallization around the concept of liberal democracy is fundamental - a certain desire that change might happen but maintaining the positions of dominance untouched). All these demands (and others) are summed up in the demand for democracy and, afterwards, in the demand for moderation.

## 5. Individual interests and its evolution

### 5.1 *ABC*'s anticommunism

*ABC*'s anticommunism is expressed in a variety of ways, the most distinctive being the constant, if not immediate, violent criticism of the alliance between communists and socialists, which had a Spanish reading in the creation of the Democratic Junta of Spain [*Junta Democrática de*



*España JDEJ* in July 1974. This anticommunism is mentioned explicitly in the aftermath of the 1975 elections and implicitly most of the time. For *ABC*, the army in Portugal is a continuation of the Army that was responsible for the 1926 coup, which is a singular reading among these newspapers. The recurring Chilean comparison is also unique.

The decision of the State Council to grant JSN new political and economic powers which would allow the Junta to take measures against all actions considered detrimental to the national economy and «public tranquillity»<sup>265</sup>, surpassing the competences of the provisional government and adding legislative power to its prerogatives, was finally recognized in law on February 19<sup>th</sup> (Santos, Cruzeiro and Coimbra 2000). Both PPD and PS opposed this decision, but *ABC* somewhat praised it and this action merits further analysis. In its editorial, the newspaper considers that this measure will define the Portuguese situation a little bit more and constitutes a point of inflexion of the revolutionary process. The Junta's new competences «should be understood, to be precise, as a return to the existing conditions after the downfall of caetanismo»<sup>x266</sup>. According to *ABC*, this concentration of power in the JSN means that power was taken back from the civilian actors, visibly unable to solve the latest crisis («General Spínola's downfall, Oporto's events, the Communist victory over the democratic parties in the controversy about the single union law, the boxing in mass with which the Marxist forces defy the Government itself»<sup>xi</sup>), but the path Portugal will take is not yet completely clear: «April 25<sup>th</sup> itself should be understood as the beginning of a revolution only at the political level, or as the start of a revolutionary social and economic change»<sup>xii</sup>. Now that the JSN has taken power back, the definition of the political situation is also in its hands, and *ABC* wonders if it will accept

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<sup>265</sup> EFE.1975. «Atribución de poderes legislativos a la Junta de Salvación nacional» in *ABC*, February 9<sup>th</sup>, pp.19-20

<sup>266</sup> Editorial: «Reajuste de poderes en Portugal».1975. *ABC*, February 11<sup>th</sup>, pp. 22

the result of the electoral process or enforce the «new revolutionary order».

At the same time the institutionalization of the MFA is decided by the 200 Assembly, and both the newspaper correspondent in Lisbon, José Salas<sup>267</sup>, and the international politics opinion column «Meridiano Mundial»<sup>268</sup> argued against it, since along with power already detained by the Armed Forces, this would make it harder for political parties to participate in any way in the already complex Portuguese institutional system. Both argue that if that were to be the case the electoral process might be compromised in terms of real and practical meaning.

The institutionalization is interpreted by the newspaper as an increase in the hegemony of the Communists after their victory over the single union proposition opposed by the Socialists. *ABC* supports the argument that Communists are unable to accept democratic pluralism, despite recent French and Italian efforts to prove otherwise. To support this argument the newspaper reaches out to the Chilean and the Portuguese experiences, dismissing the Chilean for its heterodox and mythological feature and underlining the path towards a totalitarian regime of the Portuguese one, visible in the latest events.

That the hierarchy of the Socialist party challenges the democratic authenticity of Marchais' party not only reveals the profoundness and amplitude of the crack arising in the left-wing alliance but also reflects the impact produced in the European pluralist left by the manoeuvres of the Portuguese communist party.<sup>xiii 269</sup>

The Communist party is conceived as one and thus ultimately responsible for its several national experiences.

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<sup>267</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «División entre los militares portugueses sobre el papel político de las fuerzas armadas» in *ABC*, February 12<sup>th</sup>, pp. 23-24

<sup>268</sup> «Meridiano Mundial (de nuestra redacción)» in *ABC*, February 12<sup>th</sup>, pp.21

<sup>269</sup> Editorial: «Izquierda, comunismo y democracia». 1975. *ABC*, February 16<sup>th</sup>, pp. 14

Because of the precarious state of the Portuguese economy, frequently mentioned by the Spanish press since the beginning, a meeting of the Council of Ministers in October 1974 (Rezola 2007:123-126) proposes a plan for reorganizing it and assigns a team to prepare it led by Ernesto Melo Antunes<sup>270</sup>. The Programme of social and economic politics, as it was finally named, is then presented to the public opinion in the form of a book after a long broadcasted speech («two hours minus 10 minutes»<sup>271</sup>) by Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves that advanced some of its propositions, which José Salas duly reports:

The important is that, according to him, for the program to be followed the active presence of the Armed Forces Movement must be warranted. Hence the need for the institutionalization of the Movement. This comes to corroborate what has been said about how such institutionalization will convert the Movement not only in its watchdog, but mostly in its driving force. Its projection is already in the program we are mentioning, among other things. Thus we found ourselves before an approach that will privilege politics over economics. In what concerns politics, brigadier Vasco Gonçalves was explicit and clear: «We will not lose electorally what we have already accomplished for the Portuguese people». Its declaration fits very well with what brigadier Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho said about the triumph of non-revolutionary political forces being a reason for another coup to be carried out.<sup>xiv272</sup>

Gonçalves' sentence «[w]e will not lose electorally what we have already accomplished for the Portuguese people» quickly became a sound bite prone to causing reactions. In the face of this claim *ABC* no longer has doubts on what kind of revolution is happening in Portugal: «The Portuguese future will not have to wait for the ballot boxes to be revealed.

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<sup>270</sup> The drafting of this plan leads to disagreements and even ruptures within the military institution, namely between Vasco Gonçalves' desire for a complete collectivization and Melo Antunes' less radical proposal, as Inácia Rezola (2007) explains. After being heavily criticized by the MFA's Assembly and the 20 Council, a compromise is reached and the plan is approved by the Council of Ministers on February 8<sup>th</sup>.

<sup>271</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «Las fuerzas armadas se reservan la última palabra en el proceso portugués» in *ABC*, February 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.35-36

<sup>272</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «Las fuerzas armadas se reservan la última palabra en el proceso portugués» in *ABC*, February 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.35-36

After Vasco Gonçalves' speech today is already tomorrow in Portugal»<sup>xv273</sup>. It is the first time Gonçalves is the object of an *ABC* editorial and it is not a positive one. Thus this newspaper considers the claims made by the MFA about pursuing a path of democratization are a sham. The call for the participation of political parties is seen at the same time as a strategy to continue with the decolonization process without carrying all the responsibility for it and disguising the revolution's totalitarian feature.

Finally a particular interest of *ABC* was *República*'s case, a socialist newspaper that was taken over by its workers. This case was framed as an open conflict between Socialists and Communists, as well as between a totalitarian and pluralist order:

[Mario Soares] promised he would regain «Republica» two months ago and «Republica» remains in the hands of the communists. After all, the latter did nothing less than take it back given the long-lasting rumour that the money used by Soares to buy this newspaper in order to overthrow the regime came from the USSR<sup>xvi274</sup>.

The workers control of the socialist-owned newspaper *República* triggered severe criticism in *ABC*. From the newspaper correspondent in Lisbon José Salas, to the international politics column «Meridiano Mundial», authored by José Javaloyes, as well as the newspaper's editorials, criticism was common to different levels of the newspaper. The whole episode is seen as one step further in the Communist strategy of complete control over Portuguese society and constitutes a specificity of *ABC*'s coverage, since it was the only newspaper that gave this kind of relevance to this subject, publishing editorials between May and June that often addressed the event.

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<sup>273</sup> Editorial: «La vía portuguesa». 1975. *ABC*, February 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.26

<sup>274</sup> Gómez Tello, J.L. 1975. «La ruptura» in *Arriba*, July 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.32

José Salas firstly reports workers control over *República* as something that is now ordinary in revolutionary Portugal, but which can mean that freedom of the press is endangered<sup>275</sup>. From early on Salas counterpoises the Socialist and the Communist interpretations of the event, a political versus a labour conflict, and tends to support the socialist claim<sup>276</sup>. Through anaphoric repetition, *ABC* emphasizes how there was one independent newspaper left after the nationalization of most of the written press (via the nationalization of the banks who owned most of the newspapers) and how the latter had had a central role against the former dictatorial regime, a fact that is also frequently mentioned by the newspaper correspondent, and thus it certainly is not a right-wing or reactionary newspaper. What *ABC* wants to establish is that a newspaper that Salazar and Caetano did not close has now been deactivated «against the support of the public opinion demonstrated in front of its building, by an irresistible pressure exerted by the Portuguese Communist Party»<sup>xvii277</sup>, underlining that this is not the newspaper's opinion, but rather an information transmitted by news agencies. So unavoidably, *ABC* claims there is a lesson to be learned from this situation. What was praised as a «triumph of democracy» in Portugal by some sectors of the Spanish press, whether by a misunderstanding of what democracy actually is, whether by naïvely trusting the communist democratic principles, has now been demonstrated an allure by the close of *República*. This event expresses once more the totalitarian tendency previously demonstrated by the single union project, the violence towards socialism at the May 1<sup>st</sup> demonstration, etc., and Salas notes that it has opened the ancient feud

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<sup>275</sup> Salas, José.1975. «Reunión inesperada del Consejo de la revolución» in *ABC*, May 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.

<sup>276</sup> Salas, José.1975. «El partido comunista organiza para mañana una manifestación en favor de las fuerzas armadas» in *ABC*, May 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.17

<sup>277</sup> Editorial: «Un periódico clausurado».1975. *ABC*, May 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.3

between socialists and communists<sup>278</sup>. For *ABC* it also means that «the pluralistic spheres have been reduced in extension and number»<sup>xviii279</sup>. According to the newspaper, in Portugal there is only place for a certain kind of left – that approved by both the MFA and Cunhal, an idea also expressed by Javaloyes on May 23<sup>rd</sup>. Moreover Javaloyes<sup>280</sup> argues that instead of identifying with several of the European socialisms «that stand with freedom»<sup>xix</sup> – the ones that embody a parliamentary conception of democracy – Cunhal and the COPCON identify with Allende's Chile, which means coercion, the closing of newspapers, purges, etc., contradicting an idea that will later be expressed editorially that the Chilean experience failed at the hands of its free, and critic, press<sup>281</sup>. *ABC* argues that this path towards a communist dictatorship began with the downfall of Spínola and *República* is just its latest development. The newspaper reminds that just before the elections took place it had declared that it would be «[v]oting for nothing», which is now proved by the Socialists' situation: they had the majority of votes and their newspapers is, nonetheless, being silenced.

For *ABC*, the Communist strategy for taking power, which is believed to be causing a red pressure on the Mediterranean, is unfolding in different, and sometimes formally antagonistic, tactics such as the Portuguese and the Italian<sup>282</sup>. Those are two different, but equally dangerous, tactics. José Salas had already noted Santiago Carrillo's strategy of dissociation from Álvaro Cunhal, namely by endorsing the

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<sup>278</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «Parece confirmarse el eclipse de los partidos políticos» in *ABC*, May 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

<sup>279</sup> Editorial: «El camino portugués a la dictadura» 1975. *ABC*, May 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>280</sup> Javaloyes, José. 1975. «Claveles Atlánticos y Rojos» in *ABC*, May 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp. 19

<sup>281</sup> Editorial: «Mensaje desde París» 1975. *ABC*, June 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>282</sup> Editorial: «Dos tácticas diferentes». 1975. *ABC*, June 19<sup>th</sup>, pp.3-4

Socialist claim over *República*, which the journalist deems a «fake softness»<sup>283</sup> compared with the hardness of Cunhal.

From late June 1975 on, *República's* case will always be mentioned side by side with *Renascença's* conflict. In *Renascença* radio, owned by the ecclesiastic hierarchy (episcopate), workers also took power in response to their disagreement with the editorial line of the broadcasting. The radio was occupied after the newspaper, on May 25<sup>th</sup>, and the conflict got to the point that the VI Provisional Government bombed the broadcasters (on November 7<sup>th</sup>) after the sealing of the premises (on October 15<sup>th</sup>) had proved unable to solve the conflict. After the failed leftist coup of November 25<sup>th</sup> the radio was returned to its owner.

Javaloyes believes that in both these conflicts rest the most important fights against the regime, both for the Socialists and the Church, translating respectively tensions of a political and institutional nature<sup>284</sup>. After the Revolution Council declared that the radio, like the newspaper beforehand, should be returned to its owners, Javaloyes sees it as an opportunity for the regime to finally prove if its claims of pluralism<sup>285</sup> were truthful or not. From Javaloyes' point of view, this did not happen since *Renascença's* case seemed to be following the same path of *República's*<sup>286</sup>, hence the last remnants of informative freedom were about to be erased from the map, leaving ground for the implantation of the Unitarian antiparty formulas of grassroots organization. Javaloyes identifies these two crises as the foundation of the crisis between the MFA

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<sup>283</sup> Salas, José.1975. «Los socialistas portugueses sacan un periódico con la cabecera del clausurado "Republica» in *ABC*, May 31<sup>st</sup>, pp.20

<sup>284</sup> Javaloyes, José. 1975. «Panamizar las Azores» in *ABC*, June 8<sup>th</sup>, pp.13

<sup>285</sup> Javaloyes, José. 1975. «Libertad de información y solidaridad socialista» in *ABC*, July 3<sup>rd</sup>, pp.16

<sup>286</sup> Javaloyes, José. 1975. «Temor cumplido» in *ABC*, July 4<sup>th</sup>, pp. 16

and political parties – a couple of days before the Socialists left the government – and predicts the disappearance of parties altogether<sup>287</sup>.

*ABC*, who supported Pinochet's coup, argues – contrary to what Javaloyes previously claimed – that the outcome of the Allendist path towards socialism had as a fundamental cause the existence of a free press always ready to pinpoint the failures and shortcomings of the Popular Unity Government while the latter was pursuing the revolutionary transformation of the Chilean economic structure. To avoid this from happening again, in Portugal a fundamental part of the Communist strategy was to take power to silence the critics, which *ABC* considers was achieved<sup>288</sup>. Not only *República*, owned by the Socialists, but also *Renscença* radio, owned the Catholic hierarchy, had already been deactivated. Thus *ABC* interprets the publication of *República* in Paris as the voice of the majority forced to exile, in that it was able to express what was forbidden in Portugal. José Salas, on the other hand, despite the claims, in Portugal and outside, that freedom of the press has been shut down in Portugal, is not as dramatic: «I would not go so far, given that both cases are waiting for a resolution and it may be favourable or detrimental to the cause of freedom»<sup>xx289</sup>. On December 22<sup>nd</sup> *República* was returned to its previous administration (Boaventura, Cruzeiro and Coimbra 2000:310).

## 5.2 *Arriba*'s complicated relationship with Portugal

*Arriba* is the newspaper that presents the most distinctive position throughout this period, and also the one that, proportionally, draws

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<sup>287</sup> Javaloyes, José. 1975. «Portugal: adiós partidos» in *ABC*, July 10<sup>th</sup>, pp. 7

<sup>288</sup> Editorial: «Mensaje desde Paris» 1975. *ABC*, June 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>289</sup> Salas, José.1975. «El caso "Republica" preocupa cada vez menos a los portugueses» in *ABC*, June 27<sup>th</sup>, pp. 18



explicit comparisons with Spain more often. *Arriba* originally denotes a total alignment with the previous Portuguese regime, followed by a phase of generalized spirit of brotherhood in March and April 1974, and later by open antagonism during the summer of 1974 in reaction to the events surrounding the Roller Hockey World Championship. This championship took place in Lisbon and ended up with Portugal winning the tournament, followed by Spain and Argentina.

During the Championship, Gómez del Prado, *Alfil's*<sup>290</sup> special correspondent covering the event in Lisbon, addresses the animosity vis-à-vis the Spanish team in his chronicles, claiming, for instance, that the Spanish team has two rivals in the field: «the one at the rink and the audience that filled the “Eduardo VII” pavilion»<sup>xxi291</sup>. And if the Spanish Roller Hockey national team seemingly had no problems defeating the Dutch one (6-0), the same cannot be said about the Portuguese audience, since «Spaniards were very nervous and became even more so throughout the game, when the pillows, plastic cups, papers and all kind of objects started landing on the rink (...)»<sup>xxii</sup>.

After the skirmishes between part of the Portuguese audience and the Spanish players, *Arriba* blames the Portuguese authorities for the lack of intervention and the resulting lack of respect for Spain. This editorial column inaugurates the openly negative stance regarding the revolutionary process, since *Arriba* wonders if this event is not a consequence of the latter.

The behaviour of the Portuguese audience, which the author claims to be increasing anti-Portuguese feeling among Spaniards, is also

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<sup>290</sup> *Alfil* was a sports news agency integrated in *pyresa* and part of «La Cadena del Movimiento».

<sup>291</sup> Gómez del Prado.1974. «Agresiones y Victoria» in *Arriba*, July 25<sup>th</sup>, pp. 27

the central subject of a sarcastic opinion article by Tono<sup>292</sup>, where the author imagines a situation wherein if this type of behaviour catches on, and soon the championship will oppose the teams' supporters trying to beat each other by spitting at the opponent's team. But among the sarcastic claims a more serious allegation is made, thus reinforcing the editorial stance taken by the newspaper:

The aggression of foreigners by natives of any country is an unquestionable cowardice because whoever perpetrates the action is protected by their compatriots, while the foreigners are left defenceless, especially when the attacking country is, as in the case of Portugal, the one whose "competent" authorities witnessed the local spitting with indifference.<sup>xxiii 293</sup>

In July 1974 is already present what will be a constant complaint during the following months: the authorities' lack of action when violence is happening, and the accusations of complicity and inability to exert their own power.

Despite *Arriba's* lack of intervention during the increasing atmosphere of animosity among part of the Spanish press and intensified from January on, just before the failed coup of March 11<sup>th</sup> this newspaper attacked the Spanish proponents of Portugal as a role model for Spain to follow. According to the newspaper, this attack is even more justified by the path the Portuguese revolution followed almost a year after it began:

Ok, things happened according to plan, in accordance with the firmly established aetiology, which one day Political Science will deserve this name: Cunhal's communists behaved like all communists of that family do, establishing the ground floor to seize total power, Mario Soares' socialists behaved like all the second and dispossessed brothers of communists (...) the bourgeois parties, mimetic of European Christian

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<sup>292</sup>Also author of the only two pieces found that address the gay rights demonstrations occurred in Lisbon: Tono. 1974. «Las "respetuosas" Lusitanas» in *Arriba*, June 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.2 and Tono. 1974. «A propósito de los "respetuosos"» in *Arriba*, June 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.2.

<sup>293</sup> Tono. 1974. «El "hockey" sobre ruedas» in *Arriba*, August 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp.2

Democracy and other moderate forms of bourgeois ideology, found much difficulty in showing signs of life (...).<sup>xxiv294</sup>

Given this opportunity *Arriba*, part of the official press network of the regime, argues instead for the opposite solution to the Portuguese path: «We, with the regime's evolution, are heading towards a democracy forged by the Spanish society itself, and that is what we want to defend and save».<sup>xxv</sup> Despite the proximity of an electoral process, which *Arriba* considers to be tainted by the Military claim that a solution contrary to the spirit of April 25<sup>th</sup> would not be accepted, for the moment Portugal is a proof of what part of the regime does not want for Spain: a disruption with a promise of democracy. If democracy is to come, it will be as a result of the Francoist regime's actions. The same newspaper however congratulates Portugal after the 1976 elections for entering the universe of Western parliamentary democracies, signalling that it is a desirable path for Spain.

### 5.3 *Informaciones* ' anticommunism

*Informaciones* is, along with *ABC*, the newspaper that expresses anticommunism more vehemently. Despite expressing it less explicitly, *Informaciones* distrusts the Communist party, and therefore sees with concern the possibility of the Socialist party leaving the coalition government. This possibility resulted from disagreements between the Socialist Party (PS) and the National Salvation Junta [*Junta de Salvação Nacional* JSN] over the decolonization process.

General Spínola only took office as President of the Republic on May 15<sup>th</sup>, a few weeks after the 25<sup>th</sup> of April coup, and the I Provisional Government was only appointed on May 16<sup>th</sup>. From the outset different

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<sup>294</sup> Editorial: «Los fáciles ejemplos...».1975. *Arriba*, March 7<sup>th</sup>, pp-3-4

positions regarding the colonial territories issue opposed each other. Members of the JSN, and especially General Spínola, were known for their federalist solution, which clashed with the view supported by the majority of the parties in the government coalition: the immediate recognition of the right to self-determination of colonial territories. This tension therefore predated the appointment of the I provisional Government, and remained latent. In late May 1974, Mário Soares was head of the Portuguese delegation in London meant to negotiate with a delegation of the PAIGC the situation of Guinea, but the dialog fell through.

*Informaciones* picks up on this tension and on Mário Soares' threats of Socialist party members abandoning the I Provisional Government if a common ground regarding the decolonization process was not achieved, to develop its opinion on a hypothetical government where the Communist party was left in charge because of the desertion of the Socialists. Thus the newspaper transfers the issue from a question of a tension between different decolonization projects, to the relationship between Communists and Democracy:

Throughout Europe the communist parties will still have to transform themselves if there is to be no doubt that they have reached an unmistakably democratic feature. It is not enough that the French communists, in a process of historical adaptation, without any doubt positive and noticeable, play by the democratic «rules of the game». The democratic attitude does not just consist of reaching power democratically, but also, and especially, in abandoning power by the same means and respecting the opposition. But in order to achieve that political attitude, will not the Western Communist parties have to undergo a profound doctrinal revision? And alongside this revision two conditions should be met so that the arrival of a Western Communist party to Power is not considered a threat to the continuity of the pluralist democratic system: first, the democratization of the Communist parties' structure, secondly, the definition of its national feature, in other words,

the full political and doctrinal independence from Soviet Communism. Is this possible? Is Marxism in Democracy possible?<sup>xxvi295</sup>

Given that Communist parties still have to prove their democratic credentials, and especially given the possibility that the Portuguese Communist party has to achieve hegemony in Portugal, *Informaciones* considers that «[t]he predominance of the latter [the Socialists], moderate and pro-European, within the Left, is necessary in order for the pluralistic democratic path to emerge».<sup>xxvii</sup>

On the other hand, *Informaciones* is the first of the newspapers in the sample to identify what was happening in Portugal with a process of democratization, and, along with *Tele/eXprés*, the only one to mention democracy in March and April 1974. It was also the first newspaper to disengage itself from the process, with its last editorial column published at the moment of the first election in April 1975. Likewise, its special correspondent Eduardo Barrenechea leaves Portugal in June 1975, after a prolonged sojourn. *Informaciones* always supports moderate forces and demonstrates a disregard for communists from very early on. For *Informaciones* on 8 June 1974 communists still have to prove they are in fact democrats, and by March 11<sup>th</sup>1975 they are seen as responsible for the not yet confirmed failure of the Portuguese democracy.

#### 5.4 *La Vanguardia Española*'s moderation

*La Vanguardia Española* is always quite moderate and throughout this period it is the newspaper that more often claims the supremacy of electoral legitimacy above all other legitimacies. From the beginning the newspaper opposes military rule and supports Portugal's path towards

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<sup>295</sup> Editorial: «Portugal, Europa y los países comunistas». 1974. *Informaciones*, June 8<sup>th</sup>, pp. 19

common market Europe, defending the Western democratic order whenever possible.

*La Vanguardia Española*'s pro-European stance is voiced when the newspaper devotes socialist Mário Soares, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, special attention on its editorial column after Soares' declarations about the relationship between Portugal and Spain and the relationship between both countries and Common Market Europe:

In the declarations about the relationship between Portugal and Spain by the Lusitanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mario Soares, are highlighted, for their current relevance and for their accurate vision of the future they embody, the paragraphs where the reasons that force both countries, united by their historic fate and geographic reality, to strengthen that relationship with the aim of being able to project them in a common international political trend.<sup>xxviii296</sup>

The newspaper is pleased with the role Soares gives to Spain, which involves the possibility of a European future. The overall attitude of the new Portuguese rulers towards the Spanish regime is also praised, in particular the respect for the Iberian pact and the desire shown to develop new economic relationships: «The “fecund Iberia”, which could have a voice in Europe and vote in the Latin American continent, is thus evidenced».<sup>xxix</sup> The newspaper conceives Spain as a country that is forging an unavoidable path towards the political development that accompanies economic development, and that therefore can benefit from a more integrated economic relationship with its neighbour. This will according to this view probably lead both countries to a much-desired European integration.

Later on, after the investigation of the November 25<sup>th</sup> military manoeuvres, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho is arrested on 20 January 1976 (Boaventura, Cruzeiro and Coimbra 2000, 318-320), only to be released

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<sup>296</sup> Editorial: «Juntos hacía Europa». 1974. *La Vanguardia española*, August 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

on March 3<sup>rd</sup> (Boaventura, Cruzeiro and Coimbra 2000, 326). The news of Otelo's imprisonment, which according to Alberto Miguez did not surprise anyone in Portugal<sup>297</sup>, was scrutinized by Augusto Assia and Baltasar Porcel, two opinion heavy-weights of *La Vanguardia Española*, both of which draw Spanish readings of the situation. Assia criticizes a Spanish magazine that presents Otelo as personality of the year in 1975, a choice made by its Spanish readers, and suggests that the inquiry was tainted:

In any case, there is no doubt that the inquiry that leads the magazine «Mundo» to proclaim Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho as the most important man in Europe in 1975 demonstrates that we are manifestly poorly prepared, mentally and ideologically, to enter Democracy and to participate in the European game, or there are people conducting secretly invented, seditious manoeuvres to discredit the Spanish public opinion and make it believe in Europe, and making us believe that we Spaniards think what we do not think, and have a preference for people who are such enemies of Europe and of their own country and Democracy as former General Carvalho, whom is accused of subversion in the name of Communism by his own comrades-in-arms and the Portuguese Government.<sup>xxx 298</sup>

Porcel, in turn, believes that the Portuguese example might be useful for Spain in the sense that it proves that reforms should not be delayed: «For us not to dwell on the path towards liberalization and democratic normalization, nor to dance at the edge of a cliff, even if holding carnations in our hands. In Portugal, a country that did not evolve harmoniously, monarchy, republic and dictatorship failed. In Spain the same thing happened, with the enormous and awful addition of a civil war...».<sup>xxxi 299</sup>

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<sup>297</sup>Miguez, Alberto.1976. «Lisboa: Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, encarcelado en la prisión militar de Santarém» in *La Vanguardia española*, January 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.3-4

<sup>298</sup>Assia, Augusto.1976. «Incomprensible coincidencia del encarcelamiento de Saraiva de Carvalho con una "encuesta" realizada en España» in *La Vanguardia española*, January 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.23

<sup>299</sup>Porcel, Baltasar.1976. «Una trayectoria escasamente sugestiva» in *La Vanguardia española*, January 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.13

Baltasar Porcel also thinks that Otelo dug his own grave and that therefore Portugal cannot be considered a case of a revolution that devoured its children. Moreover, his downfall should be considered a direct result of his lack of training, his ideological inconsistency, etc.: «The inconsistency, on the one hand, the ambition, on the other, and finally the political satiety, reduced him to a character as popular as he is inconsistent, and, therefore, ineffective».<sup>xxxii</sup> On the other hand, Augusto Assia considers the former head of COPCON less a pathetic character than a dangerous one that fortunately was neutralized:

The fact that the person who only a couple months ago (at least apparently) was the almighty head of the Portuguese secret police and one of the architects of the revolution that tried to deliver the power to the Communist Party, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, has entered Santarém's prison, marks a milestone in the restoration of Portugal's independence.<sup>xxxiii</sup>

Otelo's imprisonment is interpreted by Assia as an opportunity for «Portugal to regain its independence» because he believes that previously the country was subjected to a communist strategy drawn and managed directly by Moscow.

Shortly thereafter, *La Vanguardia Española* includes Otelo's imprisonment within the «cleansing process» that the current leading sector of the Portuguese Armed Forces is carrying out. This process is part of an internal struggle for power that had different consequences in previous moments, since for instance neither Marcelo Caetano nor General Spínola were treated like Saraiva de Carvalho. This power struggle continues nonetheless, in the newspaper's opinion, casting aside the Portuguese people, forced to be an observer rather than having the leading role it deserved and was promised. The newspaper takes advantage of this opportunity to, once again, call for the preponderant role that electoral processes should have in Portugal as much as in Spain:



When casting their vote, people think about it carefully. The proof of that is that if Portugal heads towards another April 25<sup>th</sup> hoping that from the ballot boxes will emerge the will of the people and that this one allows it to rule with authority, this is because in previous elections it became evident that it is not always those who shout the most, or the most skilled organizers of masses, or those who are faster and more resourceful at occupying the reins of power, who in fact represent the majority of the people. To have this data, and with it the necessary knowledge of reality in order to govern, ballot boxes are essential. The plan of inventing other means usually ends up in an explicit or tacit recognition of failure.<sup>xxxiv 300</sup>

The editorial stance of the newspaper is, therefore, less explicitly anticommunist than that of its regular writers, given that it focuses more on a defence of electoral processes than a condemnation of former leading figures or its former political endeavours.

### 5.5. *Tele/eXprés*' internationalism

*Tele/eXprés* was one of the newspapers that gave more relevance to Angola's independence and civil war, a feature that suits this newspaper's not necessarily national way of reading events. It is the only newspaper that does not condemn, though it does not defend it either, the 1<sup>st</sup> MFA-political parties' pact, formalized before the first elections. Likewise this newspaper understood that the dynamic pursued in Portugal was not adaptable to the Western democracy's frameworks of interpretation used by most newspapers to establish the pact as anti-democratic. However, by time of the second election the reading of the moment is much more a Spanish one.

According to *Tele/eXprés*, the declarations of rear-admiral Rosa Coutinho just before the Constitutional Assembly elections confirm what had been an intuition during the previous months: the dominant bloc

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<sup>300</sup> Editorial: «Los vaivenes portugueses».1976. La Vanguardia española, January 30<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

within the MFA favoured a socialist government, though it was unclear what kind of socialism would be followed. As the spokesperson of the MFA, Rosa Coutinho advanced that the Movement would not feel compromised by an antisocialist majority as a result of the elections. He also expressed the MFA's desire for a coalition between the far-left parties, the Communist party and the Socialist party. This coalition would mean, according to *Tele/eXprés*, that both PCP and PS would split in two, since the MFA's desired coalition would integrate the left-wing sector of the Socialists and the right-wing sector of the Communists, thereby making the socialism desired by the MFA somewhat *sui generis*: «It is therefore a very local type of socialism, oddly delimited by the rear-admiral's elliptic allusions to certain people and leaders instead of references to contrasting programmes or doctrines (...)»<sup>xxxv301</sup>.

The desired socialist path for Portugal is, nevertheless, constrained by the influence zone to which Portugal belongs to, and while *Tele/eXprés* acknowledges that influence zones must not limit social change, it also reminds that the Portuguese Communist Party supported the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia back in 1968: «History's drastic changes undermine some people and takes others hostages. However the lesson of Cunhal's cheering of Czechoslovakia's invasion should make Cunhal's communists think. What you do not desire for yourself you should not desire for others»<sup>xxxvi</sup>. *Tele/eXprés* calls attention to this detail, given that if autonomy is not claimed as a value at decisive moments, like 1968 was for the history of socialism, it might haunt the future, which in a way might be considered a lesson for Spain.

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<sup>301</sup> Editorial: «Portugal y el mundo dividido».1975. *Tele/eXprés*, April 16<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

## 6. The omnipresent rumour

Lastly the media coverage and the reception of the Portuguese events in Spain were surrounded by the steady presence of different types of rumours, which are given account of its existence by the same channels that sometimes spread them, e.g. the mass media. Rumours are also intrinsically connected with politics, in the sense that they are sometimes part of a strategy of communication/action. The foreign press, namely the Spanish one, was accused in Portugal of echoing only rumours<sup>302</sup>.

Rumours have the ability of constituting imaginary that is as real as if it was. A clear example of this feature is the one given by Slavoj Žižek in the introduction of his book devoted to Deleuze:

During the shooting of David Lean's *Doctor Zhivago* in a Madrid suburb in 1964, a crowd of Spanish statistas had to sing the "Internationale" in a scene involving a mass demonstration. The movie team was astonished to discover that they all knew the song and were singing it with such a passion that the Francoist police intervened, thinking they were dealing with a real political manifestation. Even more, when, late that evening (the scene was to take place in darkness), people living in the nearby houses heard the echoes of the song, they opened up bottles and started to dance in the street, wrongly presuming that Franco had died and the Socialists had taken power. This book is dedicated to those magic moments of illusionary freedom (which, in a way, were precisely not simply illusory) and to the hopes thwarted by the return to «normal» reality. (2012: XXII)

Rumours were frequently related to the terrestrial border that divides Portugal and Spain, and whether or not this one could be crossed. From the day of the initial coup, and because the aerial space was close, the rumour that the border was closed was present and the idea of lack of communication settled. It is with surprise that Manuel Leguineche confirmed the opposite to be true: «Never in my fifteen years as a special correspondent or as a tourist around the world have I ever crossed a

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<sup>302</sup> AGA, MIT Cultura, box 42/9049, "Jornal Novo 27 Mai 75"

border as easily as this time.»<sup>xxxvii 303</sup> The border would be in fact closed soon and not all special correspondents had Leguineche's fortune. The attention to the border was constant, as it is expectable from a neighbouring country, and not only the reports from the border delegations attend to it, but also did the press. News alternate about border controls and normality, but the rumour about closed borders is constant. Also constant will be the rumour of an imminent *coup d'état*, although its possible executors will be changing according to the situation.

Likewise moments of disruption are prone to rumours spreading and the rumour in itself became subject of news and/or reflection. In March 1974 it is blamed the censorship system, arguing Luís Carandell that the lack of information – which was enhanced given the informative blackout enforced at that moment – was cause for rumours to flourish. Nonetheless other moments of commotion like the moment of the «silent majority» demonstration in late September 1974 or the failed counter-revolutionary coup of March 11<sup>th</sup>, even if official blackout was not always the case, became moments when rumour is almost as important as facts, news-wise, e.g. the presence of the guns during the this «silent majority» demonstration.

When in March 1974 special correspondents arrive in Portugal they assume the rumour to be resultant of a constant lack of information. Rumours are assumed as the result of the existence of censorship and a part of the alienation in which the Portuguese people exist. The blackout that the Portuguese press was facing regarding all things related to the military institution is dully mentioned in *Arriba* as well by José Rey: «This subject censorship is profoundly rigorous, therefore nothing was allowed to be published about the foggy event happened at Lamego's

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<sup>303</sup> Leguineche, Manuel (April 26<sup>th</sup> 1974) “Castello [sic] Branco: “ni un solo soldado en los puestos de control”” in *La Vanguardia Española*, pp. 8

anti-guerrilla camp (...) <sup>xxxviii</sup> 304 Meaning this that not a word has been said about the deported officers involved in the failed coup or an explosion happened in the Lamego's barracks; however Rey does link the lack of information with an institutional aim of controlling the situation, like Leguineche, Barrenechea and Carandell do. Given the official informative blackout imposed on this subject Barrenechea asserts that:

Publically nothing is known about the more than eighty officers detained (...) Nothing is known about the interrogation to which is being submitted lieutenant colonel Bruno. Nothing is known about whether if a war council will be formed or not. Nothing is known about the petition signed by more than a thousand officers of the Portuguese Army (...) directed at the President of the Republic. Officially nothing is going on, nothing is happening, nothing has meaning or importance. Portugal, always according to the Government spokespersons remains unmoved regarding its overseas politics. Newspapers are able to say very little, almost nothing, truly significant. Even less the radio or the television (...) <sup>xxxix</sup> 305

The man-on-the-street had what is called a total «misinformation». Television and radio gave no hint about what was happening. Press limited itself to indirect allusions, calls to the «serenity» the country was in need at that moment, but without mentioning the motivations for their recommendation. <sup>xl</sup> 306

José Rey's attitude is similar to the one of *ABC*'s correspondent. José Salas acknowledges that lack of information is due to the existence of previous censorship: «The news, known by some mass media last night, was not granted permission of publication until yesterday at five in the morning.» <sup>xli</sup> 307 However, neither one of them criticizes the fact *per se*, but

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<sup>304</sup> Rey, José.1974. «La situación está perfectamente controlada» in *Arriba*, March 19<sup>th</sup>: 15

<sup>305</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo and Carandell, Luis.1974. «Caetano hablara hoy a la nación» in *Informaciones*, March 28<sup>th</sup>: 4

<sup>306</sup> Carandell, Luis.1974. «Un paseo por Lisboa/Viaje a Portugal 3»in *Informaciones*, April 17<sup>th</sup>: 6

<sup>307</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «La crisis Portuguesa» in *ABC*, March 17<sup>th</sup>: 27

its consequences. José Salas for instance does it because he links the lack of information with the propensity for rumours' effervescency, and rumours are, in his professional opinion, the enemy of proper information:

I will say it once more: when there is no clear, precise and accessible information, more or less truthful rumours grow and become very difficultly discernible from unfounded rumours. Those unfounded rumours and the more or less truthful rumours move around Lisbon by the dozen and are like the boils that are formed in the absence of vitamins.<sup>xlii 308</sup>

The amount of rumours existent in Portugal and the ability for them to pass as news is, in fact, a common concern, as Carandell agrees and exemplifies further: «In Portugal there was not, is not, news. Just rumours.»<sup>xliii 309</sup>

From another point of view, Leguineche and Carandell coincide again in what they interpret to be one of the main consequences of the lack of information freedom: an attitude of apathy, detachment and alienation as the main feature of the Portuguese people. «What do the Portuguese people think? It did not utter a word. Is keeping itself on the margins of the problem and thinks this one to be a question of internal dissidence that demands no interference from it. It has saved all its enthusiasm for football pools and Sunday's game.»<sup>xliv 310</sup> As Leguineche voices his complains, to which Carandell adds: «Apathy in the Portuguese life and absolute domination of the great escapist subjects (...) Apathy and free circulation of soldiers around the Lisbon streets, who walk

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<sup>308</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «La situación militar en ultramar, difícil, pero no desesperada» in *ABC*, March 26<sup>th</sup>:24

<sup>309</sup> Carandell, Luis.1974. «Un paseo por Lisboa/Viaje a Portugal 3» in *Informaciones*, April 17<sup>th</sup>: 6

<sup>310</sup> Leguineche, Manuel. 1974. «El General Spínola hace vida normal y no habla en favor ni en contra de los sublevados de Caldas da Raíña» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 19<sup>th</sup>: 21

around the Liberdade Avenues their boredom or angst about their coming departure towards the overseas.»<sup>xlv 311</sup>

However by the time of General Spínola's downfall, when censorship had already disappeared despite the *ad hoc* control commission by then existent (Law-decree nº 281/74), rumours once again take a protagonist role given the importance journalists assume they had in the development of the situation: from the calling of the frustrated demonstration of the «silent majority» up until Spínola's dismissal from office, given that information was shut down during the weekend<sup>312</sup>: «From that moment on [tv and radios shut down and no newspapers], a wave of rumours, some correct others pending confirmation, swoop down over Lisbon, spreading afterwards around worldwide through the news agencies.»<sup>xlvi 313</sup> In the sense that press was assumed to have decisive role in the preparation of this event, as Fernando Jáuregui informs: «All this, and some other things, were suggested – important was the part of the press in this “counter-coup”-, without anyone accusing general Spínola yet of being directly implicated in the complot.»<sup>xlvii314</sup> Also the press, and political circuits, was assumed to be overflowed with rumours<sup>315</sup>

Again the counter-revolutionary coup of March 11 was conferred its expectable feature through the leaking of rumours to the press that were eventually published. At that moment Alberto Míguez was accused

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<sup>311</sup> Leguineche, Manuel. 1974. «Lisboa: Clara escisión en las filas del ejército» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 22<sup>nd</sup> :21

<sup>312</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1974. «Spínola, bloqueado por el Movimiento de las fuerzas armadas» in *Informaciones*, September 30<sup>th</sup>, pp

<sup>313</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «Grave situación política» in *ABC*, September 29<sup>th</sup>, pp. 13 and 15

<sup>314</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando. 1974. «Destituciones en la Junta de salvación nacional» in *Arriba*, October 1<sup>st</sup>, pp. 11

<sup>315</sup> Míguez, Alberto. 1974. «Lisboa: Serios enfrentamientos entre extremistas de izquierda y de derecha» in *La Vanguardia española*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.

of conspiracy for being the first one to give account of the rumours of rebellion coming from Tancos. Moreover not just the feature of expectancy but the coverage of these events, including Spínola's evasion through Spanish territory, was based in trying to establish if rumours are actually accurate. Part of the Spanish coverage of the Portuguese revolutionary process is therefore embedded in imaginary situations provoking reactions as if «real» ones.

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**Original quotes:**

<sup>i</sup> «Sería triste, desde la perspectiva «hermana» que atribuimos a la nación portuguesa, que los significados de la última revolución y de los signos con que se quiere presentar al mundo, tuviesen su máximo exponente en el espectáculo incivilizado de unos cuantos espectadores defraudados y amargados de un estadio.»

<sup>ii</sup> «Los últimos días han culminado la escalada de la protesta contra nuestra nación, contra la del derecho en nuestra nación, pero tampoco vamos a asombrarnos.»

<sup>iii</sup> «El caso es que en solventes medios de opinión, múltiples dedos aprendices de democracia nos señalaron a Portugal como modelo de nuestro más deseable futuro. (...) Nosotros, en la evolución del régimen, vamos hacia una democracia que genera la propia sociedad española, y eso es lo que queremos defender y salvar»

<sup>iv</sup> « Gobierno portugués debe habilitarse cuanto antes los recursos jurídicos y económicos para que nuestros compatriotas expoliados por la ola revolucionaria sea repuestos en sus legítimos derechos.»

<sup>v</sup> « Ojalá pudiéramos decir lo mismo nosotros respecto a la vaga indiferencia secular española hacia ese país unido a España como un hermano siamés. (...) nada parece tan útil para la nación hermana ni tan razonable para nosotros»

<sup>vi</sup> « Si el mundo occidental entero está mirando a Portugal, con mucha más razón tenemos que estar viendo nosotros, desde la común península ibérica, lo que sucede en el vecino país.»

<sup>vii</sup> « La lección puede ser útil, y no solo para el vecino país. La opinión pública, como los estudiosos del tema tienen bien analizado, es un factor estabilizador y moderador, porque es un factor de articulación de intereses. A la hora de votar la gente se lo piensa.»

<sup>viii</sup> « Cuya peripecia revolucionaria - dicho sea al paso - nos ha sido puesta a los españoles, desde una gran variedad de ámbitos, como paradigma de alternativas a todo período político definido, largamente, por la impronta autoritaria.»

<sup>ix</sup> «Una primera vanguardia de reporteros se encontró en abril con unos hechos y los explicó con bastante entereza y claridad. Que sepamos, sólo en uno periódico - el madrileño «Nuevo diario» - hubo conflicto entre la dirección política y los



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enviados especiales. (...) Sin embargo, empieza a variar la actitud de la prensa española. La gran vanguardia veraz de los reporteros ha ido siendo substituida por los políticos (...) Los comentaristas políticos - muchos de ellos, políticos profesionales (en la profesionalidad que cabe en España para la política) utilizadores del instrumento del comentario - son en un ochenta por ciento conservadores; y en un veinte por ciento moderados o timoratos. Utilizan Portugal como metáfora. Y están convirtiendo la información en desinformación.»

<sup>x</sup> «cabe entenderlo, más concretamente, como un regresar a las condiciones que de inmediato siguieron a la caída del caetanismo»

<sup>xi</sup> «La caída del General Spínola, los sucesos de Oporto, la victoria comunista en la polémica con los partidos democraticos sobre la ley Sindical, el pugilato de masas conque las fuerzas marxistas desafían incluso al propio Gobierno»

<sup>xii</sup> «el propio 25 de abril debe entenderse como principio de una revolución solamente política, o como inicio de un cambio revolucionario en los social y lo económico.»

<sup>xiii</sup> «Que la jerarquía del partido socialista francés se ponga en cuestión la autenticidad democrática del partido de Marchais no sólo revela la profundidad y amplitud de la grieta surgida en la alianza de izquierda, sino que también refleja el impacto producido en la izquierda pluralista de Europa por las maniobras del partido comunista portugués.»

<sup>xiv</sup> «Pero lo importante es que, según su criterio, para que ese programa se cumpla es precisa la garantía a través de su presencia en activo del Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas. De ahí la necesidad de su institucionalización. Esto viene a corroborar cuanto ya se dice que dicha institucionalización convertirá al Movimiento no sólo en centinela de la revolución, sino en el motor de la misma. Su proyección está en el programa a que aludimos, entre otras cosas, Por tanto, nos encontramos ante un planteamiento en el que lo político privará sobre lo económico. Y en lo político, el brigadier Vasco Gonçalves fue explícito y claro: «Nosotros no vamos a perder por vía electoral aquello que tanto costó a los portugueses.» Esta afirmación se hermana perfectamente con lo que dijo el brigadier Otelio Saraiva de Carvalho acerca de que si triunfaran unas fuerzas políticas que no fuesen las revolucionarias, los militares darían otro golpe de Estado.»

<sup>xv</sup> « El futuro portugués no habrá de esperar a las urnas para revelarse. Después del discurso de Vasco Gonçalves hoy ya es mañana en Portugal.»

<sup>xvi</sup> «[Mario Soares] Prometió que reconquistaría «Republica» hace dos meses y «Republica» sigue en manos de los comunistas. Que, al fin y al cabo, no han hecho más que recuperarla, porque siempre hubo el rumor de que el dinero con que Soares compró este periódico para derribar al régimen procedía de la URSS.»

<sup>xvii</sup> «contra la adhesión de la opinión pública manifestada ante su edificio, por una irresistible presión del partido comunista portugués»

<sup>xviii</sup> «Los ámbitos del pluralismo han ido reduciéndose en extensión y numero.»

<sup>xix</sup> «del brazo de la libertad»

<sup>xx</sup> «Yo no diré tanto, puesto que ambos casos se encuentran pendientes de resolución y esa resolución puede ser favorable o adversa a la causa de la libertad.»

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<sup>xxi</sup> « el que estaba en la pista de juego y el público que llenaba el Pabellón "Eduardo VII"»

<sup>xxii</sup> «Los españoles salieron muy nerviosos y se pusieron mucho más a lo largo del encuentro, a medida que almohadillas, vasos de plástico, papeles y toda clase de objetos caían a la pista (...)»

<sup>xxiii</sup> «La agresión a unos extranjeros por parte de los nativos de cualquier país es una indudable cobardía porque se actúa protegido por sus compatriotas, mientras que los foráneos se encuentran indefensos, máxime cuando el país agresor es, como en el caso de Portugal, en el que la autoridad "competente" presencié impertérrita los escupitinajes locales.»

<sup>xxiv</sup> « Bien, las cosas han transcurrido según lo previsto, de acuerdo con una etiología tan establecida, que un día la ciencia política merecerá este nombre: los comunistas de Cunhal se han comportado como todos los comunistas de esa familia, tratando de poner las bases para capturar el Poder total; los socialistas de Mario Soares se han comportado como los hermanos segundones, desposeídos, de los comunistas (...) los partidos burgueses, miméticos de la cristiano democracia europea y otras formas moderadas de ideología burguesa, han encontrado muchas dificultades para dar fe de vida (...)»

<sup>xxv</sup> «Nosotros, en la evolución del régimen, vamos hacia una democracia que genera la propia sociedad española, y eso es lo que queremos defender y salvar»

<sup>xxvi</sup> « En toda a Europa, los partidos comunistas deberán transformarse aún para que no quepan dudas de que han alcanzado un carácter inequívocamente democrático. No basta con los comunistas franceses, en un proceso de adaptación histórica, sin duda positivo y perceptible, jueguen «las reglas del juego» democráticas. La actitud democrática no consiste solo en alcanzar el poder por la vía democrática, sino también, y sobre todo, en abandonarlo por la misma vía y respetar la oposición. Pero para alcanzar esa actitud política, ¿no tendrán los partidos comunistas occidentales que realizar una profunda revisión doctrinal? Y junto a ello deberán producirse dos condiciones para que la llegada al Poder de un PC occidental no sea considerada como amenaza para la continuidad del sistema democrático pluralista: en primer lugar la democratización de la estructura de los partidos comunistas, y en segundo lugar, la definición del carácter nacional de los mismos, es decir, de la independencia plena, política y doctrinal, respecto del comunismo soviético. ¿Es esto posible? ¿Es posible un marxismo en la democracia?»

<sup>xxvii</sup> «El predominio de estos últimos [the Socialists], moderados y europeístas, dentro de la izquierda, resulta necesario para que se afirme la vía democrática pluralista.»

<sup>xxviii</sup> « En las declaraciones que, sobre las relaciones entre Portugal y España, ha efectuado el ministro lusitano de Asuntos exteriores, Mario Soares, destacan, por su actualidad y por si certera visión de futuro, los párrafos en que expone las razones que obligan a uno y otro de los dos países, unidos por el destino histórico y por la realidad geográfica, a estrechar aquellas relaciones a fin de poderlas proyectar hacia una vertiente política internacional común.»

<sup>xxix</sup> «Se vislumbra así la "Iberia fecunda" que podría tener voz en Europa y voto en el continente iberoamericano.»

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<sup>xxx</sup> «En todo caso, de lo que hay poca duda es de que la encuesta que la llevado a la revista «Mundo» a proclamar como el hombre más significativo de la Europa de 1975 a Saraiva de Carvalho lo que indica es que o manifiestamente estamos mal preparados, mental e ideológicamente, para entrar en la democracia y participar en el juego europeo o hay gentes que llevan a cabo, secretamente confabuladas, maniobras sediciosas para desacreditar a la opinión pública española y hacerle creer a Europa, además de hacérselo creer a nosotros mismos, que los españoles pensamos lo que no pensamos, y sentimos preferencias por gentes tan enemigas de Europa y de su propio país y de la democracia como el ex general Carvalho, a quien sus propios compañeros de armas y el Gobierno portugués acusan de subversión al servicio del comunismo»

<sup>xxxii</sup> «Para no detenernos en el camino del aperturismo y la normalización democrática, ni para bailar al borde del precipicio, aunque será con claveles en la mano. En Portugal, que no evolucionó armónicamente, fracasaron la monarquía, la república y la dictadura. En España ocurrió lo mismo, con el gigantesco y terrible añadido de un guerra civil...»

<sup>xxxiii</sup> «La inconsciencia por un lado, la ambición por otro, el empacho político el fin, lo han reducido a personaje tan popular como inconsecuente y, por tanto, ineficaz.»

<sup>xxxiii</sup> «Que el hace sólo unos meses (al menos en apariencia) todopoderoso, jefe de la policía secreta portuguesa y uno de los artífices de la revolución que intentó entregarle el poder al Partido Comunista, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, haya entrado en la Cárcel de Santarém marca probablemente un hito en la restauración de la independencia de Portugal.»

<sup>xxxiv</sup> «A la hora de votar la gente se lo piensa. Prueba de ello es que si Portugal se encamina a otro 25 de abril con la esperanza de que de las urnas salga la voluntad del pueblo y que ésta permita gobernar con autoridad, es porque en anteriores elecciones se reveló que no siempre son los que más gritan o los que más diestros organizadores de masas, o los más rápidos y hábiles en ocupar los resortes del poder, quienes realmente representan la mayoría del pueblo. Para tener este dado, y con ello el conocimiento de la realidad necesario para gobernar, las urnas son imprescindibles. La pretensión de inventar otras vías suele acabar en un reconocimiento, expreso o tácito, de fracaso.»

<sup>xxxv</sup> «Se trata, pues, de un tipo de socialismo muy localizado, exquisitamente delimitado en el que el contraalmirante más que referirse a unos contrastes de programas o de doctrinas aludía elípticamente a unas personas concretas, a unos líderes determinados (...).»

<sup>xxxvi</sup> «Los vuelcos que da la historia desautoriza a unos e hipoteca a los otros. Pero la lección del aplauso a la invasión de Checoslovaquia ha de hacer meditar a los comunistas de Cunhal. Lo que no quieres para ti, no lo quieras para los otros.»

<sup>xxxvii</sup> «Nunca en mis quince años como enviado especial o como turista por el mundo he cruzado una frontera con tanta facilidad.»

<sup>xxxviii</sup> «La censura de este aspecto es sumamente rigurosa, y así no permitió se publicase nada acerca de un suceso un tanto confuso acaecido en el acampamiento antiguerrilla de Lamego (...).»

<sup>xxxix</sup> Nada se sabe públicamente de los más de ochenta oficiales detenidos (...) Nada, de los interrogatorios a que está siendo sometido el teniente coronel Bruno.

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Nada, de si se le va o no a formar consejo de guerra. Nada, del escrito que firmado por más de mil oficiales del Ejército Portugués (...) han dirigido al Presidente de la Republica. Oficialmente nada pasa, nada sucede, nada tiene significación ni importancia. Portugal, siempre según portavoces del Gobierno, continua impertérrito su política ultramarina. Los periódicos nada o muy poco pueden decir realmente significativo. Menos aún la radio o la televisión (...)

<sup>xl</sup> El hombre de la calle tenía lo que se llama una total «desinformación». La televisión y la radio no daban el menor indicio de lo que estaba ocurriendo. La prensa se limitaba a hacer alusiones indirectas, simples llamamientos a la «serenidad» que el país necesitaba en aquellos momentos, pero sin hablar de los motivos que la recomendaban.

<sup>xli</sup> «La noticias [sic], que anteanoche ya conocían algunos medios informativos, no tuvo permiso de publicación hasta las cinco de la mañana de ayer.»

<sup>xlii</sup> Lo diré una vez más: cuando no hay información clara, precisa y asequible, crecen los rumores más o menos veraces, siendo éstos difícilísimos de separar de los bulos sin fundamento. Estos bulos sin fundamento y estos rumores más o menos veraces circulan por Lisboa a docenas, y son como los diviesos que se forman por falta de vitaminas.

<sup>xliii</sup> «En Portugal no había, no hay, noticias. Solo rumores.»

<sup>xliiii</sup> «¿Que piensa el pueblo portugués? No ha dicho esta boca es mía. Se mantiene al margen de los problemas y piensa que se trata de disensiones internas en las cuales para nada tiene que intervenir. Ha guardado todo su entusiasmo para las quinielas y los partidos de la Liga del domingo»

<sup>xlv</sup> «Atonía en la vida portuguesa y dominio absoluto de los grandes temas del escapismo (...) Atonía y libre circulación de los soldados por las calles lisboetas, que pasean su aburrimiento o su angustia de la marcha a ultramar por la avenida de la Libertad.»

<sup>xlvi</sup> «A partir de ese momento [tv and radios shut down and no newspapers], una oleada de rumores, ciertos unos y pendientes de comprobación otros, se abatió sobre Lisboa, esparciéndose después por el ancho mundo a través de las agencias de noticias».

<sup>xlvii</sup> «Todo esto, y algunas cosas más, ha quedado así sugerido - importante el papel de la Prensa en este "contragolpe"-, sin que nadie haya acusado todavía al general Spínola de estar directamente implicado en un complot»

## B.The Coverage

### 1. *The unexpected March 16<sup>th</sup>: will the Empire fall?*

Even in moments of liberalizing mess, I was buying, other than Monday's *Marca*, six daily newspapers, six. (...) the last couple of week, journalistically speaking, were a heavy blow to my morals of a man *who-believed-to-be-well-informed*.

Allow me to explain myself: *Portugal*. Apart from the elementary geographic notions learned at school («Spain is limited by Portugal in its western border...») and a famous song by the everlasting Celia Gámez, *hit parade* of the fifties (the one in which she wondered about the reasons behind her love of Portugal, which the beauty of its women, the scent of its roses and the heart-warming wine), the Iberian Pact that connected us to NATO and the fact that Don Juan de Borbón had settled in Estoril («the most beautiful place outside our borders...») according to the lyricism of an *ABC* chronicler), the idea that I had from the other Iberian country, acquired through the Spanish press, was that of an idyllic country governed wisely and in a paternal fashion by a wonderful political regime (at my school Portugal and the Argentina of the first Perón were always given as exceptions of the intrinsic depravity of the republican regime) that managed to get more than 80 out of 100 of the vote at electoral processes. Furthermore, Portugal did not have *colonies* but *overseas provinces*, and only Moscow and its *compagnons de route* explained the consecutive UN condemnations. (...) But, almost suddenly, Spanish newspapers started talking about Portugal, even in their front-page. And they assume as a given a series of things that, I give you my word, I knew nothing of, in the most literal sense of the term. Which Spanish newspaper talked about the stern dictatorship, the lack of freedom, the torturing political police, the ignorance regarding the most elementary human rights, the fact that the Portuguese people had had enough with the regime? I go over my archive. Not a single word. (...) My morals of a man *who-believed-to-be-well-informed* was shaken (...) But the worst is that now I am thinking that my misinformation about Portugal might be repeated regarding other places. Perhaps even about Cuenca... In the age of Informatics, the subject is disheartening. At least for me. From now on it will be better to acknowledge, like the people present at wedding ceremonies do, that *we do not know a thing*. And that having read all the newspapers every day is not enough palliative.

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The unexpected March 16<sup>th</sup> crisis brings the world's attention, and in this case Spain's, to the detail that Portugal remains a colonial Empire, despite the fact that there were liberation wars going on for over a decade, using

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<sup>316</sup> Altares, Pedro. 1974. «Yo no sabía de nada...» *Cuadernos para el Diálogo*, May, 129:59

what the Cuban Revolution had been able to do, which was to put «the guerrilla strategy on the world's front-pages» (Hobsbawm 2010, 438). Since Portugal was sustaining a war for so long that it was no longer news, the military unrest brought the attention back on this subject. Suddenly it was no longer 1961 or 1964, the French Empire had been dissolved by the wars in Algeria, an independent nation since 1962, and in Vietnam the US war effort was decreasing after it had reached its peak in 1968 (Judt 2006: 407). At this point, the idea that Portugal could, in fact, sustain its identity as an Empire was already an anachronism, and even if the regime was able to avoid disintegration, for the colonies it was only a matter of time before the collapse of the dominant structure.

For the Spanish press, like for the francophone press (Mesquita 1994), the failed military coup of March 16<sup>th</sup> configured a sort of a first introductory glimpse of the Portuguese Revolutionary Process. Special correspondents were sent to see what was going on and newspapers prepared the reader for the situation about to unfold. And the situation was an authoritarian regime, which was also an Empire fighting colonial wars for over a decade, where one of the most important generals published a book arguing that these wars no longer had a military solution, hence a political one should be found. The same General suggested that a commonwealth-like solution would be ideal. At the same time, there were rumours of unrest within the Military institution, and a coup failed to gain power.

#### a) Micro-approach: the metropole's events

It is this event – a military column departing from Caldas, intercepted even before arriving in Lisbon – that provoked the first influx of special correspondents from newspapers such as *Informaciones*, *La Vanguardia Española* and *Arriba*. Most of these special correspondents were active

between March 17<sup>th</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup>. However Eduardo Barrenechea and Luis Carandell, from *Informaciones*, arrived only on the 27<sup>th</sup>, when most of the other journalists had already left. Rather than the colonial Empire concept, special correspondents focus on the more immediate reality of the metropole: what is happening on the streets, the functioning of the informative system, the book that questions the colonial war strategy, and so forth.

Despite not showing interest editorially – also no opinion articles published or comments from its correspondent in Lisbon were made - *La Vanguardia Española* had a special correspondent, Manuel Leguineche, soon travelling to Portugal by car, offering «personalized experience» type of chronicles for about less than a week.

Only after this event did a previous one – the publication of General Spínola's book *Portugal and the future* [Portugal e o Futuro] on February 22<sup>nd</sup> – made the news. Most permanent correspondents in Lisbon at this point barely wrote<sup>317</sup>, and when they did so they gave little relevance to the event that attracted special correspondents from around the world.

The veteran José Salas y Guirior is an exception, since he not only wrote extensively about the military unrest on *ABC*, covering the entire crisis since even before the military manoeuvres of March 16<sup>th</sup>, but he also reported on the publication of *Portugal and the Future* before this crisis happened:

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<sup>317</sup> In *La Vanguardia Española* Inocente Palazón Olivares writes very little about the subject in hand and when he does he refers to the football match Oporto-Sporting – the same that allowed *República* to mention the failed coup even during an informative black out. Likewise, José Reis in *Arriba* barely mentions the convulsion. Eduardo Corregedor da Fonseca writes on this subject for *Informaciones*, but always in a very descriptive fashion, perhaps due to the fact that he was probably employed by an agency that would subsequently sell his copy to *Informaciones* and not directly by the newspaper.

It is unusual for a book to be the adequate subject of a current events chronicle. This seems to be the field akin to the critic, while current events are a task for the correspondent. I do not follow those criteria for the simple reason that no incident, event, revolution, war or anecdote happens in the world without first originating in the human mind. The human mind has as fate to emerge in printed letters, either forming doctrines on whichever topic, either attempting to explain the latter's phenomenology. The news without an explanation has very little meaning<sup>ii318</sup>.

Malaga-born José Salas started contributing to *ABC* in the 1950s while in South Africa. Having travelled around the African continent as special correspondent, Salas settled in Rome and Rabat before arriving in Lisbon, where he was to become *ABC*'s correspondent for almost a decade. Born in 1914, in his youth he stood with the nationalist faction, joining «Navarra's brigades» during the civil war. In the 1950s, and while following his literary ambitions, he embarked on a journey through Africa in the search for materials for a book. A monarchic supporter, Salas inherited his mother's title, becoming Marquis of Guirior in 1976. For Salas any action is rooted in theory, thus, Spínola's book, in particular, would constitute the guideline for a future development regarding the colonial territories. From Salas' point of view the political subtext of this book, and of the crisis, is quite evident, even if the author claims otherwise:

I ignore the reason why [Spínola] being so reserved for so many, embraces exposure on French television. (...) Apparently this feebleness that many Portuguese, at some level, feel towards sweet France, reached General Spínola as well. He has the right to do so. But I am not so sure about it when he declares that «the book» is not a political work<sup>iii319</sup>.

Like Salas, Manuel Vázquez Montalbán in his international politics column published by *Tele/eXprés* foresees in Spínola's action a

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<sup>318</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «El general Spínola no cree en una victoria militar ultramarina» in *ABC*, March 5<sup>th</sup>: 34

<sup>319</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «Se habla se la posible sustitución de Caetano» in *ABC*, March 24<sup>th</sup>: 25



necessary change, even before the interception of the military column on March 16<sup>th</sup>: «That a General with the prestige that Spínola has, dares to publish a book in which he recommends a “political solution” for the problem of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, means that Portugal is reaching its final hour»<sup>iv 320</sup>. Vázquez Montalbán also perceives General Spínola as an unwilling leader confirmed by the failed coup:

All the tremendous Portuguese jam began with a book titled «Portugal and the future». Its author, General Spínola, has from now on his future so entangled with that of his country that the book might even be called «Spínola and his future». (...) It was also a warning flag for Spínola, converted overnight and in spite of his own wishes in the visible figure of the Portuguese renovation.<sup>v 321</sup>

The publication of this book prompted the idea for the Spanish press that General Spínola was, therefore, deeply involved in the failed military manoeuvre. The weekly international section review «Meridiano Mundial» in *ABC* was very clear on this matter: the regime was threatened by a book:

Spínola's book generated a lot of interest (50.000 copies sold in under a month) and strongly echoed among younger Army officers (over one hundred captains were reportedly arrested). Thus the General's dismissal does not solve the entire affair. Especially given that if the book was published it was because it received authorization to do so, maybe even at higher spheres than Spínola's immediate supervisor, General Costa Gomes, the sole responsible at this moment for this «nihil obstat»<sup>vi 322</sup>.

In *ABC*, Salas, along with Julio Alonso, and in *Tele-eXprés* Vázquez Montalbán, sustained the idea that a movement was unleashed by the idea of a «political solution» embodied by General Spínola's book, and that even if action was stopped the drive remains intact. Soon after

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<sup>320</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel. 1974. «Spínola o nada» in *Tele-eXprés*, March 14<sup>th</sup> :12

<sup>321</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel. 1974. «Spínola y su futuro» in *Tele-eXprés*, March 18<sup>th</sup>: 12

<sup>322</sup> Alonso, Julio. 1974. «El régimen portugués, amenazado por un libro» in *ABC*, March 17<sup>th</sup> : 45

March 16<sup>th</sup> *Informaciones*<sup>323</sup> and *La Vanguardia Española*<sup>324</sup> publish extracts of *Portugal and the future*, more or less simultaneously, in an effort to present their readers the General's positions about the colonial war.

In *ABC* José Salas shares the interesting detail of how his Spanish friends asked him to get hold of copies of this book, which somewhat hints at the kind of best-seller status this book enjoyed: «From what I've been told it has sold over 100.000 copies. The avidity with which it is being bought is reflected by the fact that yesterday I went through five bookshops wishing to get some copies that a couple of friends in Spain had asked me and in all five places I was told they were waiting for a new shipment to arrive»<sup>vii325</sup>. Since Manuel Leguineche, like Carandell and Salas, described his difficulties in purchasing *Portugal and the future*, and that the extracts published by *La Vanguardia Española* appear a few days after the end of his sojourn in Portugal, perhaps the extracts were published because he got hold of the book. Subsequently, this book also had a very successful Spanish edition<sup>326</sup>:

Meanwhile Antonio Spínola's book, «Portugal and the future», reaches a second edition today. After having tried to find it in more than six bookshops to no avail, I was able to find it through a friend at the

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<sup>323</sup> Extracts published in a four-part series on March 26<sup>th</sup>, 27<sup>th</sup>, 28<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> 1974.

<sup>324</sup> Extracts published in a two-part series on March 24<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> 1974.

<sup>325</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «Se habla se la posible sustitución de Caetano» in *ABC*, March 24<sup>th</sup>:25

<sup>326</sup> «Without any doubt, the political subject that gathered more bibliographic attention during the summer months was the coup of April 25<sup>th</sup> in Portugal and its sequels»/«Sin duda alguna, el tema político que los meses de verano ha merecido una mayor atención bibliográfica, ha sido el golpe de estado del 25 de abril en Portugal y sus secuelas.» [King Kong, Carandell, José M<sup>a</sup>, Gimenez-Frontin, JL and Saladrigas, Robert, «Diccionario Literario del Verano y de la "Rentree"», *Tele/eXprés*, 18 Sep. 1974, pp. 14]. This was the conclusion that the group of literary critics responsible for *Tele/eXprés*' literary page got in September 1974. Moreover, António de Spínola's book, *Portugal and the Future* even made it to the Top 25 of most sold books in Spain during that year [«Los libros más vendidos en 1974», *Informaciones*, 7 Apr. 1975, pp. 21]

bookshop «Opiano»[sic]. If Caetano knew what the consequences of Spínola's book would be, surely he would not have given permission for its publication. More than eighty thousand copies of «Portugal and the Future» have already been ordered<sup>viii 327</sup>.

In this context, Leguineche has suspicions that the reason why he could not find the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition of Spínola's book might be related with the military crisis the country is going through: «Mysteriously, Spínola's book, with its second edition under preparation, is not reaching the bookshops at the planned date. There are no copies of "Portugal and the future" and no one knows when they will arrive»<sup>ix 328</sup>. But Leguineche's suspicions regarding Marcelo Caetano's reaction to the commotion the book was causing is not widely shared. While Leguineche in *La Vanguardia Española* argues that if Caetano had been aware of its impact, he would have never authorized its publication, *Arriba* and *pyresa's* special correspondent, Francisco Caparrós, sustain exactly the opposite view: «There is no need to worry because it seems that Mr. Caetano had known about the content of the book that caused this considerable commotion around General Spínola for almost two months»<sup>x329</sup>. Vázquez Montalbán, in turn, advances the hypothesis that Caetano might have been conducting an experiment by allowing the publication, in order to examine its consequences and empirically establish the current balance of power:

When Spínola dared to publish his book, he did it with Caetano's seal of approval and with the support of the conscience of a great part of the Portuguese national bourgeoisie, frightened that the deterioration of the political-military situation in the colonies might culminate in the irreparable deterioration of the situation of economic dependence. A proof that Caetano wanted to make a political use of the publication of the book to assess «what would happen» is the fact that the vigilant

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<sup>327</sup> Leguineche, Manuel. 1974. «Las fuerzas armadas han dado las primeras muestras de escisión» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 17<sup>th</sup>: 21

<sup>328</sup> Leguineche, Manuel. 1974. «Lisboa: Clara escisión en las filas del ejército» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 22<sup>nd</sup>:21

<sup>329</sup> Caparrós, Francisco.1974. «Relato de un motin» in *Arriba*, March 19<sup>th</sup>: 14

Portuguese censorship did not, and does not, say anything before the consecutive editions of an oeuvre that has reached a hundred thousand copies.<sup>xi 330</sup>

Novelist and chronicler Manuel Vázquez Montalbán (MVM) had a long career in the Spanish press interrupted by his three years of incarceration between 1962 and 1965, when he wrote his first book *Report on Information* [Informe sobre la información] published in 1963. Born in 1939, just after the end of the civil war, into a family belonging to the defeated faction, MVM joined the United Socialist Party of Catalonia [Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya PSUC] while in prison and would later become a member of its central committee. His international politics column in *Tele/eXprés*, «Del Alfiler al elefante», is interrupted in late October 1974 due to an overload of professional engagements (Salgado 2009).

It is in *Arriba*, and on the same day, that both special correspondent Juan Ramón Pérez Clotas and J.L. Gómez Tello, in his international column «*El Mundo*», convey a negative view on this book. Pérez Clotas deems it «anecdotal»<sup>331</sup>, and Gómez Tello considers it a «dangerous thing»:

It is clear that the arguments for a new political orientation regarding the African provinces could be reflected upon. But was it necessary to throw the stone that provoked such a storm? Was not it dangerous to open a crisis among the forces within the system when it is known that the forces outside the system are – or were? – waiting for a commotion to happen in order to act against the regime? The passivity that some subversive elements, who showed their resources on other occasion, maintained, calls attention and confirms our judgement that this is where

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<sup>330</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel. 1974. «Spínola y su futuro» in *Tele-eXprés*, March 18<sup>th</sup>: 12

<sup>331</sup> «Porque la realidad es que el mismo texto del hoy popular libro sobre sus experiencias ultramarinas y en el que quiere verse la clave de la actual situación, no pasa de ser una anécdota incidental dentro de esta situación de orden interno, a la que desde ahora cabe negar toda transcendencia política.» Pérez de las Clotas, Juan Ramón. 1974. «Normalidad en la Ciudad» in *Arriba*, March 17<sup>th</sup>: 13

the problem rests, and that the deepening of the conflict surrounding the book was awaited to give the crisis a very distinct feature<sup>xii 332</sup>.

Stirring the Portuguese political situation, as Gómez Tello argues Spínola did by publishing this book, and opening dissention within the confines of the regime, goes against the idea of serenity that *Arriba* tries to convey to its readers regarding the Portuguese regime, hence this negative or at least dismissive reaction to it. José Luís Gómez Tello had a long career as a journalist mostly in the official media of the Spanish regime, including in the RNE, and later occupied executive positions such as Antonio Izquierdo's deputy-editor-in-chief in *Arriba* (1974-1975), in *pyresa* (1975-1979), and in *El Alcázar* (1980). Born in Madrid in 1916, Gómez Tello was a volunteer of the Blue Division, the Spanish division that served the German Army during WW II and Francisco Caparrós recalls him wearing straps and a pistol for work (Lamata 2014) while at *Arriba*. To reinforce the idea of serenity, in his news report «Portugal in its tranquillity» [Portugal, en su calma], Gómez Tello considers not only that Spínola's is totally unrelated to the military crisis despite the attempts (presumably of the Spanish press) to connect both to enrich its purposes and enlarge its support base: «this attempted coup has been related to the publication of the book “Portugal and the future” by General Antonio de Spínola, and the measures adopted against it. In Portugal both questions, which some wished to unify by the subtle chronological link, are seen as completely separate»<sup>xiii</sup>. Moreover, the book is considered a «disappointment» after all:

As for Spínola's book, it constitutes one of those great disappointments that are reserved for the books presented as sensational. First, it is improper to be talking about an underground book when this one is to be found at the windows of bookshops around Lisbon. His ideas, on the other hand, are not new: they were well known by the head of Government and the Military leaders, and are presented in a completely

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<sup>332</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Una semana inquieta» in *Arriba*, March 17<sup>th</sup>: 11

abstract and academic tone, because they are precisely that: the ideas of the former head of Guinea's military contingent about possible solutions for the overseas provinces<sup>xiv 333</sup>.

J.L. Gómez Tello, unlike José Salas, essentially tries to portray it as a book completely devoid of political intentions.

Besides the fuss that Spínola's book had provoked, when arriving in Portugal, Spanish special correspondents were confronted with a reality they were not unfamiliar with: censorship. Most of them, mention it, at least, and both Manuel Leguineche and the Barrenechea and Carandell team not only refer to its existence more than once, but also make it the object of their work and use as a source at least one editor-in-chief of a Portuguese newspaper.

Leguineche narrates a visit to *República*, a newspaper the journalist describes as the one that «catalyses the democratic opinion»<sup>334</sup>, where he meets Raúl Rêgo, who introduces Leguineche to the contingencies of producing a newspaper in Portugal at that moment: «Yesterday [Spínola] was given a golden biretta as a former student of the Military School. The publication of such news was forbidden. The editor-in-chief of the daily "La República", Raúl Rego [sic], showed me the censorship prohibition, which is now called preliminary examination. (...) the informative "black-out" is complete. Rego showed me today's editorial gallery proof all crossed out»<sup>xv 335</sup>.

Without naming his source, Luís Carandell does the same, and probably in the same newspaper, voicing several complaints of the editor-in-chief interviewed:

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<sup>333</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Spínola y los "doscientos de Caldas/ Portugal en su calma (4)» in *Arriba*, April 21<sup>st</sup>

<sup>334</sup> Leguineche, Manuel. 1974. «Las fuerzas armadas han dado las primeras muestras de escisión» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 17<sup>th</sup>: 21

<sup>335</sup> Leguineche, Manuel. 1974. «Las fuerzas armadas han dado las primeras muestras de escisión» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 17<sup>th</sup>: 21

«We write every day two complete editions in order to put out one», I was told by the editor in chief of a newspaper while he showed me the gallery proofs field with red crossed out parts chosen by the censorship employees, now called in Portugal euphemistically «preliminary examination office». The press law, decreed two years ago, was never enforced in Portugal (...) <sup>xvi</sup> 336.

Though present in both countries, censorship is enforced differently. Addressing the subject reinforces its existence because it allows journalists to discuss it directly, whereas when referring to Spain they can only describe it. The stances taken regarding the existence of censorship become a defining feature of the two opposing discourses aimed at two opposing political cultures, since they encompass different definitions about its usefulness and its possibilities of provoking damages.

The modus operandi of Portuguese censorship is further unveiled by Manuel Leguineche, a Basque journalist who incarnated the role of the special correspondent *par excellence*, having worked mostly as war correspondent in places like Algeria, India and Pakistan, Vietnam, Lebanon, Nicaragua, etc. When on his farewell day Leguineche becomes aware that the renamed «Preliminary Examination office» not only prevented the publication of news, but also that special correspondents were admonished by the same office whenever an already printed information on a foreign newspaper was disliked, he writes: «Its publication [“the manifest of the young Turks”] in the Parisian newspaper “Le monde” by the special correspondent Dominique Bouchin [sic], earned him a serious reprimand by the high-ranked employees of the information services of the Portuguese Government» <sup>xvii</sup> 337.

The arrival of special correspondents from around the world to cover this Portuguese event, prompts José Salas, who often reflects in his

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<sup>336</sup> Carandell, Luis.1974. «Un paseo por Lisboa/Viaje a Portugal 3» in *Informaciones*, April 17<sup>th</sup>: 6

<sup>337</sup> Leguineche, Manuel. 1974. «Lisboa: Clara escisión en las filas del ejército» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 22<sup>nd</sup>:21

chronicles about the way modern journalism works, to focus on the different tasks and timings of correspondents and special correspondents when covering an event. Salas first witnessed the increasing arrival of special correspondents attracted by the military unrest: «The number of special correspondents arriving to collect their nuances grows by the day»<sup>xviii338</sup>. Soon thereafter, rather than just observing their presence, Salas mildly condemns it: «well this place is packed with foreign journalists enthusiastic about sensationalism»<sup>xix 339</sup>, identifying the special correspondent's drive as sensationalist, prompted by the continuous flow of new developments around the world.

The day before yesterday, late at night, an Anglo Saxon special correspondent told me he was thinking about leaving since the Portuguese crisis could be declared over. (...) My colleague's vision cannot be seen as ludicrous at first sight either. Before a human landscape that offers little possibility for change other than purely verbal, or the subterranean and secret stages of a vague conspiracy that is proving difficult to happen, it is difficult to do the job. Especially if one wants to do it according to the modern rules of getting to the point, making facts clear. Given that up until now there were almost no facts to be mentioned, it was only possible to collect rumours, considering them to be the prelude of what might happen. But if actually nothing had happened, speculating about the near or far away future was not necessary. Of course that is no longer «modern journalism», but an historical essay. In that case the breed of modern journalists tries to leave. But when they have already packed their departure is restrained by new symptoms that indicate that something might happen at any minute.<sup>xx 340</sup>

Salas is however probably addressing two distinct traditions of making journalism, the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin, rather than the modus operandi of special correspondents versus permanent ones. What Salas deems «modern journalism» corresponds to the Anglo-Saxon traditional division between «facts» and «comments», and the current emphasis on

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<sup>338</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «La crisis Portuguesa» in *ABC*, March 17<sup>th</sup> : 27

<sup>339</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «La situación se vuelve más problemática para Marcelo Caetano» in *ABC*, March 22<sup>nd</sup> : 27

<sup>340</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «Portugal, en calma» in *ABC*, March 19<sup>th</sup> : 20



obtaining the former, which Salas considers is guiding special correspondents. Sala's observations regarding special correspondents convey a criticism of superficiality when compared to the task of a permanent one.

This meta-journalism writing is in fact a veteran journalist particularity, and hence the international observers' work in Portugal is criticised as well in Gómez Tello's column and Pérez Clotas' articles in *Arriba* for exactly the same reason: the projection of their own desires onto their analysis of the situation. In other words, they are criticised for letting their chronicles become a «comment» instead of sticking to «facts». Both make the same claims and their reasoning follows the same logic, despite their different roles in the production of this newspaper, given that Pérez Clotas is a special correspondent and Gómez Tello is part of the editorial team.

First and foremost, both of them try to emphasize calm. Pérez Clotas described the crisis as an event that not only has reached its end but can also be considered to have been a minor one: «(...) tension decreased by several degrees and Saturday's bloodless episode starts to situate within its truthful context: that of an irresponsible adventure»<sup>xxi</sup>. For his part, Gómez Tello also dismisses the importance of the crisis because of its lack of echo in the several spheres of society: «After years describing Portugal as seated on a hotbed, it is hard to explain how an attempted coup has not produced echo either in the Armed Forces, on the political cadres, or the population»<sup>xxii</sup>.

Secondly, they both condemn foreign observers who do not portray the same reality they do, for seeing it in the light of their own desires, and thus failing to grasp its features:

If someone thought – outside the Portuguese borders of course, since inside them this was always given its real weight – that the insurgents

might represent a radical and definitive stance regarding the overseas situation, at the same time new and distinct, would have fallen in the easy mirroring that the wave of correspondents, which seem to have been parachuted over Lisbon, has fallen into: mistaking reality with their own desires.<sup>xxiii 341</sup>

The mistake of foreign observers has always been to take their own wishes as reality when the situation concerns countries that do not match their point of view. (...) The discipline and unity of the Armed forces, the political cadres and of the great majority of the Portuguese people – a solid and conscious «silent majority», as we are able to see –, will require an end to the concessions and weaknesses backed by the easy word «liberalization»<sup>xxiv 342</sup>.

On one hand, both these journalists do not include themselves in the «foreign observer» category, although technically they are, regarding Portugal, part of it. They assume a unity between Portugal and Spain, as authoritarian regimes that share, and fight, the same enemies, might they be Communism or liberal democracies, and the values attached to it.

In this case, rather than their *modus operandi*, what is scrutinized is their ideology, disregarding for now that the *modus operandi* of foreign journalists also embodies ideology. Interestingly, one could say exactly the same about both journalists' analysis at this point, given that the turn of events proved their interpretations were wrong. And if Pérez Clotas' task as special correspondent seems to be very much entangled by the production of «comments» rather than «facts» given the detachment from reality portrayed here, Gómez Tello was responsible for a great part of *Arriba*'s campaign of tranquillity that resulted in an obviously mistaken view of the situation. This is the case not just because of Gómez Tello's position in the newspaper hierarchy, and consequently his responsibility for what was published, but also because of his frequent choice of the

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<sup>341</sup> Pérez de las Clotas, Juan Ramón. 1974. «El conflicto entre bastidores» in *Arriba*, March 19<sup>th</sup>:38

<sup>342</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Unidad y disciplina» in *Arriba*, March 19<sup>th</sup>:14

Portuguese events as a subject of his opinion column, and especially because of his five-part news report duly titled «Portugal, in its tranquillity»<sup>343</sup>[Portugal, en su calma].

## b) Macro approach: the Colonial Empire

If *Arriba* and *ABC* refuse to take sides by expressing an opinion for or against any of the colonial solutions embodied by Marcelo Caetano and General Spínola, but show high regard for the latter, *Tele/eXprés* considers explicitly that Spínola's solution, no matter how overdue, may be the wiser one. All these three newspapers establish a Spanish reading of this event, but *Tele/eXprés* goes back in the Spanish past to look for an analogous situation, by comparing the imminent dismembering of the Portuguese Empire with the Spanish one of the previous century:

Also in Spain there were wise generals Spínola and Costa Gomes who said what had to be said (...) Spinola's solution still is the wisest one. What is dramatic is that it might be coming too late. The conflict is already too rotten<sup>xxv</sup>.

Ultra's nationalism is blamed, in the case of both countries, for the situation, underlining another reading of the current Spanish situation: «Once again the responsibility for a national ruin rests entirely on the extreme-nationalists' back»<sup>xxvi344</sup>.

On the other hand, the Spanish reading performed by *Arriba* and *ABC* is different: *Arriba* hopes for a quick appeasement of the situation, whereas *ABC* finds it is a positive learning opportunity for Spain to see

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<sup>343</sup> «Portugal, en su calma» is the title of a news report series in five parts: 1. «Lisboa como telon de fondo», 2. «Cambio de piel», 3. «Un problema llamado ultramar», 4. «Spínola y los “doscientos de Caldas», 5. «Guerra de calumnias y terrorismo», published respectively on April 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup>, 20<sup>th</sup>, 21<sup>st</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> 1974. Despite José Luis Gómez Tello not being mentioned by the newspaper as special correspondents on assignment in Portugal, like Barrenechea and Carandell were, according to Cernuda, Jáuregui and Menéndez (2001: 75-76) he was sent to Portugal. Also the deixis of the pieces demonstrates his unequivocal presence in Portugal.

<sup>344</sup> Editorial: «El 98 Portugués». 1974. *Tele/eXprés*, March 16<sup>th</sup>: 7

how conflict is debated, and eventually solved, within the boundaries of the regime: «It would be particularly painful for us Spaniards if Portugal's present conflict, because of an unexpected eventuality, went beyond the normal polemic courses»<sup>xxvii345</sup>. *ABC* is however more expansive than *Arriba*, and inscribes this crisis in the natural evolution of the post-Salazarism dynamics:

Spínola's book, like the developments it generated, already seem to point to the unequivocally post-salazarist phase in the political dynamics in Portugal. It is of real interest for us Spaniards: the other country that, like the Lusitanian did, was willing, knew how and managed to historically become an entity among a legion of peoples that speak among themselves and pray to god in a peninsular Romance<sup>xxviii346</sup>.

The difference can be also be seen in the use of the national «we» by both these newspapers, which has no parallel in the other two. For *ABC* and *Arriba* this was a moment to speak in the name of all Spaniards, informing those Spaniards of what their feelings should be on this matter («It would be particularly painful for us Spaniards<sup>xxix</sup>», claims *Arriba*), whereas *ABC* understands this to be a matter «[o]f real interest for us Spaniards<sup>xxx</sup>». On the contrary, *Tele/Expres* and *Informaciones* addressed the subject in an impersonal and more distant way despite their Spanish reading.

*Informaciones* is the only newspaper that foresees – and does not dread, unlike *Arriba* – the coming unrest, despite the reign of tranquillity that seems to have taken over:

According to the latest news, tranquillity reigns in Portugal. This is satisfactory information, but deceitful since the riot attempt of the past Friday in the Lisbon area clearly reveals the accumulation of tensions in a «caetanism» that still has not escaped from being a «salazarism without Salazar» (...) if the subject of the African War is the authentic scenario of the internal Portuguese dissent (at least at the level of the

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<sup>345</sup> Editorial: «Horas difíciles para Portugal». 1974. *Arriba*, March 17<sup>th</sup>: 3

<sup>346</sup> Editorial: «La actualidad portuguesa». 1974. *ABC*, March 17<sup>th</sup>: 26

ruling elites), the most dangerous problem that Portugal is facing seems to be the division within its military cadres<sup>xxxii 347</sup>.

This lack of unity within the military includes disagreements regarding internal questions and the solution for the Portuguese Colonial Empire. Because this division has not been solved, despite the appearance of calm the question remains open.

In this sense, the main question special correspondents try to answer is a double one. On the one hand there is the need to answer the question of whether or not the crisis has been solved, and, on the other, the question lies in understanding whether or not the Portuguese Army has been politicized and if this failed coup attempt has anything to do with that process.

*Arriba's* coverage, as a whole, is notably produced in order to emphasize the idea that tranquillity has been achieved, that this matter is solved, and that, contrary to recurrent claims, the Portuguese regime is not about to fall. Francisco Caparrós, one of its special correspondents, while participating in the construction of the tranquillity scenario, nevertheless felt differently about the idea that the matter was solved.

The tranquillity idea is the main axis of *Arriba's* (and *pyresa's*) special correspondents in Portugal, José Rey, Francisco Caparrós and Pérez Clotas, who produce «daily information», and the latter, «personalized experience», type of chronicles.

Rey, who like Pérez Clotas works for the Galician press and is on assignment for *pyresa*, travels to Oporto and makes his observations from there. From Rey's point of view, calm reigns in Portugal and Spínola should be dissociated from the military failed upheaval: «What seems

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<sup>347</sup> Editorial: «El drama africano de Portugal».1974. *Informaciones* March 18<sup>th</sup> : 18

almost certain is that Spínola had nothing to do with this action<sup>xxxii</sup> 348, he claims. Francisco Caparrós, who crossed the country by car, also attests to the reigning tranquillity.

This special correspondent narrative is backed by Gómez Tello's opinion column, where the coup is naturalized through its insertion in a long line of previous coups and the Military institution – understood as the backbone of the regime, by making reference to the 1926 coup – is portrayed as a solid, disciplined and united block:

It is not the first of this type of attempted coups that the regime assists, yesterday with Salazar and today with Caetano. Some were quickly stifled like the attempt of assault of Beja's barracks; others were more dramatic, like the uprising of part of the Navy and the Air Force in 1931, and others never even began given how early their leading figures, candidates of rebellion, were arrested. (...) From this point of view it is necessary to take note of a fact that has a considerable importance: the army's discipline and cold-bloodedness were considerable at a moment that definitely embodies an open crisis<sup>xxxiii</sup> 349.

Any comparison between the Algerian or the Vietnamese wars and the war occurring in the colonial territories – designated provinces by Gómez Tello (and overseas provinces by José Salas) –should, in his opinion, also be dismissed.

This might seem an anecdote, but it is not. The way the events developed indicates it is not a centurion revolt, but an isolated fact, without a real profoundness and it would not be excessive to talk about an «African evil» suffered by the Portuguese Army. (...) Indeed, the strength of the Portuguese regime, born in 1926, rests fundamentally on the Army's unity, who understands better than anyone the vital reasons why a war is being fought in the overseas provinces. The war is hard and has been long, but it would be extreme to compare it with Algeria and even more so with Vietnam<sup>xxxiv</sup> 350.

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<sup>348</sup> Rey, José. 1974. «La situación está perfectamente controlada» in *Arriba*, March 19<sup>th</sup>: 15

<sup>349</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Una semana inquieta» in *Arriba*, March 17<sup>th</sup>:

<sup>350</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Unidad y disciplina» in *Arriba*, March 19<sup>th</sup>: 14

In sum, Gómez Tello downplays the unrest within the Military institution by naturalizing it, on the one hand, by remembering several past ones and, on the other, by bringing to the surface its anecdotic feature. However, at the same time, this is the same journalist that considered Spínola's book to be a «dangerous and irresponsible thing» because of the disturbance it could cause.

Overall, while journalists (Rey, Pérez Clotas and even Caparós in *Arriba* and José Salas in *ABC*) mostly sustain that tranquillity is reigning in Portugal after a short period of unrest, some journalists evoke directly the change about to come (Carandell and Barrenechea in *Informaciones*). For Francisco Caparrós and José Salas, despite the existent tranquillity, the process is not yet over and therefore the situation is precarious.

Malaga-born Francisco Caparrós began his journalist career in *Nuevo Diario* already a member of the underground Workers' General Union [*Unión General de Trabajadores* UGT], according to himself (Lamata 2014). Born in 1948, this mission as Special correspondent was the first one of this journalist's career and he claims to have been immensely helped by Manuel Leguineche's professional expertise while in Portugal.

For Caparrós the key of the situation is Spínola, since this General is not only seen as a hero, but especially as someone who has the ability to end the colonial war. As for Salas, the key is the spread of dissention within the army and the ability of the regime to control it, or lack thereof:

Now we will see if these groups of military are really important or if they are nothing but a small sector, whose most relevant components are under arrest or have been moved to the Azores. This, of course, belongs in future chronicles. In the meantime, order and normality are everywhere around the country, which pursues its rhythm of life as if nothing had happened<sup>xxxv 351</sup>.

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<sup>351</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «Portugal, en calma» in *ABC*, March 19<sup>th</sup> : 20

Still, this latent change has for Salas the potential to be a drastic one, despite the evermore evident possibility of Caetano's downfall giving rise to the constitution of a more radically right-wing new government: «Gradually a Government's renovation is expected. A more extreme right-wing Government, I repeat, more radical. The circumstance demands no less than that»<sup>xxxvi</sup> <sup>352</sup>.

Salas was far from imagining that change would happen in the opposite direction. At least, not in the same way as the Carandell and Barrenechea «personalized experience» chronicles hint it. The latter are produced immediately after their arrival, much later than the other special correspondents, and before the publication of their news report series in mid-April. Although they both sign it, some of them are written in the first person and the first one, a piece<sup>353</sup> containing long quotations of the first (issued before Caldas) and the second communiqué of the MC, is written in a rather impersonal style.

Unlike Leguineche, Carandell and Barrenechea are not so much focused on Spínola, although they connect the agitation caused by Spínola's book with the MC. They distinguish two different motivations behind this process, the officers and the «subtle battle» for Caetano's place going on in the high spheres: «The rumours of a possible destitution of Caetano, to give way to an extreme right man, have almost ceased after his speech last week»<sup>xxxvii</sup> <sup>354</sup>. In any case, Carandell and Barrenechea are the journalists that more explicitly support the idea that change will happen, even if it is prompted by inertia: «In the meantime, there is a feeling that the official and dominating policy in Portugal is that time will

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<sup>352</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «La crisis Portuguesa» in *ABC*, March 17<sup>th</sup> : 27

<sup>353</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo and Carandell, Luis. 1974. «El Movimiento de oficiales se mantiene frente al Gobierno Portugués» in *Informaciones*, March 27<sup>th</sup> :32

<sup>354</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo and Carandell, Luis. 1974. «Cesan los rumores sobre la destitución de Caetano» in *Informaciones*, April 2<sup>nd</sup> : 3



fix or ruin everything. (...) Everything is a matter of time, maybe even of little time»<sup>xxxviii 355</sup>.

As they later develop in the «news report», their expressed belief of an imminent turnover might be related with the very close contact they had with the officers who were members of the MC. They also introduce, at this point, the main line that will structure their «news report» pieces – the very challenging economic situation of Portugal:

At last, we need to make it clear that even if an official minimal wage exists, the average wage of a unskilled worker is around 120 pesetas daily, but they only get paid working days, hence Sundays and holidays are not paid. We need to think that the cost of life in Portugal is not that different than in Spain. Two years ago Portugal was an economic paradise for Spaniards but now it is as expensive as Spain for most things, and some are even more expensive than in Spain<sup>xxxix 356</sup>.

Similarly Vázquez Montalbán connects the crossroads in which Portugal finds itself with the crisis of the economic model – more than the political one – sustaining the Empire: young Portuguese capitalists aspire for a new economic model, less dependent on the State, and hope the relationship between the metropole and the colonies adapts to the desired model, or only American and English capital will benefit from the exploitation of those territories.

The underdevelopment has been justified in Portugal by the colonial war, and the end of the Portuguese armed presence in Africa might be the beginning of the end of an already misplaced system. (...) Spínola is not alone. He is supported by most of the young officers, since the General does not speak without a reason. (...) Spínola is starting to have the support of the younger sectors of Portuguese capitalism, which are willing to play the card of political liberalization of the colonies in exchange for the maintenance of the economic exploitation, alone or in alliance with North American and English investors. They want the guarantee that Portugal's political inheritance will not be taken over by national-Marxism, but by nationalist tout court. Spínola and his

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<sup>355</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo and Carandell, Luis.1974. «Caetano hablara hoy a la nación» in *Informaciones*, March 28<sup>th</sup>: 4

<sup>356</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo and Carandell, Luis.1974. «Cesan los rumores sobre la destitución de Caetano» in *Informaciones*, April 2<sup>nd</sup>: 3

followers consider that Portugal still has time to decide before a solution is imposed upon the country<sup>xl 357</sup>.

The question at this point lies, for most of the Spanish press, in what is going to happen to the Portuguese colonial territories, rather than what will happen to the political regime ruling in Portugal. Further extensive articles published by *Tele/eXprés* and *Informaciones*, like the editorial columns, focused mostly on the colonial Empire feature of the Portuguese regime and how this feature, as it was then conceived, could not last much longer.

In *Tele/eXprés* a former political exile, Jorge Ventura<sup>358</sup>, Professor of Economic History at the University of Barcelona, suspects at that point that the multinational companies would support, and press for, a new type of colonialism, more in touch with their wishes. This idea is not far from what Gómez Tello<sup>359</sup> and Pérez Clotas<sup>360</sup> argue when they identify Spinolists' positions with Spínola's personal connection to the conglomerate CUF [*Companhia União Fabril*], whose publishing company published his book. To this equation, Ventura adds the pressure exerted by the South African and Rhodesian governments.

There is a tendency for the two ideas to be entangled, as the people who argue that the matter is solved and emphasize calm tend to be the same who do not acknowledge the politicization of the whole question. Journalists like Pérez Clotas, who similarly to Gómez Tello had a long career in the official media and had been *Arriba* and *pyresa*'s correspondent in Lisbon some years earlier (1969-1970), dismissed any

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<sup>357</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel. 1974. «Spínola o nada» in *Tele-eXprés*, March 14<sup>th</sup>:12

<sup>358</sup> Ventura, Jorge. 1974. «La crisis colonial portuguesa» in *Tele-eXprés*, March 28<sup>th</sup>: 14

<sup>359</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Guerra de calumnias y terrorismo/ Portugal en su calma (y 5)» in *Informaciones*, April 25<sup>th</sup>

<sup>360</sup> Pérez de las Clotas, Juan Ramón. 1974. «El conflicto entre bastidores» in *Arriba*, March 19<sup>th</sup>:38

possibility of politicization of the army, as much as any possibility of Spínola being in a process of detachment from the regime:

Because in reality the text of the now popular book about his overseas experiences and the one in which some want to see the key solution for the current situation, is nothing but an incidental anecdote within the internal situation, whose political transcendence should be denied. (...) This means that his [Spínola] loyalty to the regime remains unaltered and today's episode is inscribed, at least at the moment, within a frame that does not surpass the limits of the disciplinary code<sup>xli 361</sup>.

Like Gómez Tello, Augusto Assia and José Salas, Pérez Clotas' hybrid chronicles are close to opinion articles. This journalist uses the same tactics for gaining the audience's trust as a Portuguese expert, namely by giving details of his knowledge of all things Portuguese. However, in this process, not unlike Augusto Assia will do later, for instance, Pérez Clotas spreads several small mistakes, that somewhat discredit him as the expert he intended to impersonate, for instance, when he describes Spínola as the former governor of Mozambique instead of Guinea.

Dismissing the political substrate of the Military action allows this journalist to participate in the general portrait of tranquillity put in place by the *Movimiento's* newspaper, prompted by their Special correspondents *in loco* and backed by their columnists. This zooming feature that has a parallel in all newspapers – editorials being linked with the general outline of the subject, e.g. the Empire, and special correspondents (and correspondents) with the practical and micro vision of metropolitan Portugal – is overcome by the «news report» that go from the small details narrated in a special correspondent style to inserting them into the general frame of the problem: the macro-economic structure of the Portuguese Empire.

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<sup>361</sup> Pérez de las Clotas, Juan Ramón. 1974. «Normalidad en la Ciudad» in *Arriba*, March 17<sup>th</sup> : 13

### c) The news report: micro and macro analyses converge

Two contrasting «news report» are published from mid-April on by *Informaciones*<sup>362</sup> and *Arriba*. In *Informaciones*, Carandell and Barrenechea, though working as a team and even signing the «personalized experience» pieces together, have different approaches on the subject of their «news report» series. Luís Carandell and Eduardo Barrenechea had worked together before, for instance on the books *The Portuguese raia, the border of underdevelopment* [La raya de Portugal, la frontera del subdesarrollo] (1972) and *Mountainous' Andalucía* [La Andalucía de la sierra] (1973), published by the publishing company of *Cuadernos para el dialogo*. Only a child during the civil war, Carandell lived in exile with his family until the end of the conflict.

In «Trip to Portugal» [Viaje a Portugal] this journalist takes the reader along a road trip to Portugal, putting him in contact with the crossing of the Portuguese border, the gas shortage resulting from the oil crisis of 1973, and the number of soldiers one could encounter through the very impoverished Portuguese landscape, as are described the farming lands of Alentejo and Ribatejo:

Soldiers, Soldiers, Soldiers. The military effort that Portugal makes in order to maintain its colonies has the country anchored to the past. (...) the last colonial Empire of Europe is a poor and backward country. Immense fields of olive trees and oaks. Charming villages and small towns, frequently warped up under the medieval castle, which now seems to defend their poverty, where life elapses spiritless and quietly. (...) From Alentejo the colonial problem seemed far away. But its inhabitants, like all Portuguese people, suffered its consequences in their

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<sup>362</sup> In *Informaciones* are published by Eduardo Barrenechea «Portugal ¿Del gallo al Avestruz» divided in six parts: «La Sangria», «La Verdadera Dimençao [sic]», «Galopa la inflación», «¿Que piensan los portugueses?», «Los héroes también cansan», «Portugal- Cronologia» and «Viaje a Portugal», by Luís Carandell, also divided in six: «Soldados. Soldados, soldados», «El palacio de Vila Viçosa», «Un paseo por Lisboa», «De Lisboa a Batalha», «Una tumba en Vimieiro», «El movimiento de los Capitanes»; respectively published on April 15<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup>, 17<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup>, 20<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup>.

everyday life. The country is suffering from an acute economic crisis, a situation of stagnation as a consequence of the effort that the government's policy is doing to maintain (...)<sup>xliii 363</sup>

Like Barrenechea, Carandell links poverty and underdevelopment with the costs of the war: if the money wasted in the war were to be used to develop the metropole, the Portuguese people would not live in such miserable conditions.

In fact, if the main line of Carandell's narrative is the trip and a sort of very long inductive travel plan across the country, from which the reader gets a seeming x-ray of the complete picture, Barrenechea grounds his news report, «Portugal: from rooster to ostrich?» [Portugal ¿Del gallo al Avestruz?], deductively along the lines of the analysis of the war effort and its relationship with the underdevelopment of the country, which he will later give examples of, instead of starting from the examples, like Carandell. Despite the opposite logic in the structuring of their thought, they argue the same idea: the colonial war is preventing Portugal from thriving.

On the contrary, the main purpose of Gómez Tello's «Portugal in its tranquillity» [Portugal, en su calma] is to portray a country of bliss, whose main problem rests not in its people, but in its foreign enemies: international capital and the socialist world.

Portugal in its tranquillity and its tenacity. But...Against Portugal there is an international conspiracy aimed at the entire Iberian Peninsula and where elements coming from a wide variety of origins, sometimes even incompatible, mix. Where the biggest disappointment about nothing having happened in Portugal occurred was not in the Kremlin, but in certain external plutocratic environments. An anarchic Portugal like the one before 1926 – that would be the ideal goal of the respectable foreign investors willing to squeeze it like a lemon<sup>xliiii 364</sup>.

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<sup>363</sup> Carandell, Luis.1974. «Soldados, soldados, soldados/Viaje a Portugal 1» in *Informaciones*, April 15<sup>th</sup> : 7

<sup>364</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Guerra de calumnias y terrorismo/ Portugal en su calma (y 5)» in *Arriba*, April 25<sup>th</sup>

Like before, Gómez Tello places himself on the inside of the authoritarian order unity, claiming the goal of this «international conspiracy», is not only Portugal but the entire Iberian Peninsula, and therefore Spain. Their common enemy, Communism, transforms both countries as an object of the same analysis. Hence the line that guides Gómez Tello's narrative is the possibility of giving a spin to the reality. Like this he is protecting its own country by dismissing all possible motives of dissent, much like a «spin doctor» would act. So while Carandell addresses the question of censorship and informative coercion<sup>365</sup> and the way this reality is damaging the Portuguese people by provoking apathy and detachment, Gómez Tello not only does not acknowledge the existence of coercion but even argues that the opposition is entitled to its own space in the public sphere, given the existence of some publications like «A Opinião», «O Tempo e o Modo» and «Jornal do Centro», «publications openly opposed to the regime, which are sold, or better yet not sold judging by the yellowish piles at the entry of this old coffee shop»<sup>xliv 366</sup> as unequivocal proves of that. He thus draws the conclusion that despite the efforts of some to corrupt them, the Portuguese people are not interested in oppositionists' ideas.

Furthermore, Gómez Tello explains the silence of the Portuguese press before every crisis, namely the official blackout denounced by Leguineche, Carandell and Barrenechea, by the existence of a generalized pondered attitude and discretion, which waits for the official stance to be presented in order to follow and disseminate it:

The Portuguese press practices the advice of the ancient romans: that your silence be the first and your word the last. This means that its usual discretion

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<sup>365</sup> Carandell, Luis.1974. «Un paseo por Lisboa/Viaje a Portugal 3» in *Informaciones*, April 17<sup>th</sup> : 6

<sup>366</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Lisboa como telón de fondo/ Portugal en su calma (1)» in *Arriba*, April 18<sup>th</sup>

about the problems that trouble the popular subconscious and the government's decisions is nothing but a way of channelling its serious stances until a precise attitude has been defined or until the circumstances impose it. No, do not look for journalistic polemics about the Portuguese rights over the Overseas territories, among other reasons because it would be useless given that nine million metropolitan Portuguese – including the opposition – are irreversibly in favour of the view that «Angola is ours». (...) Spending ink and paper to convince who is already convinced would be a waste<sup>xlv 367</sup>.

As the title enlightens, the entire series is devoted to demonstrating how tranquillity is reigning in Portugal despite the recent international attention received. The first article is almost entirely devoted to deny all the recent news or predictions: «Is this the city that during a couple of days occupied the headers of the international press? Under a low and Spring-like sun, crowded and rapturous, Lisbon is at peace and in the glory of God»<sup>xlvi 368</sup>. Gómez Tello presents a city, Lisbon, where absolutely nothing happens apart from the commotion generated by Benfica's victory over Sporting<sup>369</sup>. In coffee shops no one is interested in the subject, and the recent unrest is so forgotten that one has to go to the Library and look up old newspapers in order to find out what actually happened: «The history of what happened not even a month ago seems so ancient and forgotten that no one speaks about it in Portugal, not at Nicola's gatherings, neither at Brasileira and the Swiss [sic] ones, nor at Cacilhas' bars, nor at newspapers, including the opposition ones that are concentrating their fire on unionist and student questions»<sup>xlvii 370</sup>.

The need to depict order leads Gómez Tello to bucolic descriptions of the landscapes, without noticing (or at least describing), as

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<sup>367</sup>Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Un problema llamado ultramar/ Portugal en su calma (3)» in *Arriba*, April 20<sup>th</sup>

<sup>368</sup>Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Lisboa como telón de fondo/ Portugal en su calma (1)» in *Arriba*, April 18<sup>th</sup>

<sup>369</sup> The game was nevertheless between Sporting and Porto.

<sup>370</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Spínola y los “doscientos de Caldas/ Portugal en su calma (4)» in *Arriba*, April 21<sup>st</sup>

Carandell does, the poverty of the people that inhabits them. In fact, Gómez Tello repeats on several occasions much of the rhetoric of the New State, praising fishermen, peasants and their honourable poverty, uncorrupted by industrialization, reinforcing his reasoning by quoting a classic Portuguese writer: «Eça de Queiroz philosophized in his oeuvre “The city and the mountains” about the inability of civilization to make man happy. His defence of the simple life of the countryside even if thought for the late nineteenth century is still valid for today»<sup>xlvi</sup> 371.

On the contrary, Carandell addresses the rurality not by its idealistic feature, but from its materialistic one. In its open old markets Carandell sees the backwardness of the country: «These open markets, which I have seen in other parts of the country, give an idea of the poverty and primitiveness that still reigns in rural areas. (...) It is frequent to find in the streets of the cities or at the roadside people selling all kinds of stuff»<sup>xlvi</sup> 372. Considering them, once again, representatives of the poverty in which most of the population lives, but that the manipulated statistics<sup>373</sup> do not account for. Finally, and very much in line with his narrative, Carandell’s road-trip ends in António Salazar’s death tomb in Vimieiro, the figure this journalist holds responsible for the country’s miserable condition he previously exposed.

In response to those who denounce the Portuguese economic disaster and poverty, which might be related to *Informaciones*’s stance on

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<sup>371</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Cambio de piel/ Portugal en su calma (2)» in *Arriba*, April 19<sup>th</sup>

<sup>372</sup> Carandell, Luis.1974. «De Lisboa a Batalha/Viaje a Portugal 4» in *Informaciones*, April 19<sup>th</sup> : 7

<sup>373</sup> «La estadística he aquí una ciencia que no se practica en Portugal. O no existen en absoluto o son incompletas, atrasadas o triunfalistas. Para algunos conceptos no se han publicado estadísticas desde hace diez años, y el hecho de que si se hayan realizado significa que el país no ha progresado desde que se hicieron las ultimas.» [Carandell, Luis.1974. «Una tumba en Vimieiro/Viaje a Portugal 5» in *Informaciones*, April 20<sup>th</sup> :9]



this subject, Gómez Tello dismisses any kind of economic tragedy in Portugal, emphasizing its strong coin, thanks to António Salazar, and presenting the development of strong economic groups like CUF, a situation which he considers amounts to an «economic miracle»: «Let us go back to the economy. The State's financial equilibrium, which became the great oeuvre of Salazar and the economic stability as its natural consequence, constitute one of the main reasons not only of the rhythm of the Portuguese development of the past couple of years, but also of the attraction it exerts over foreign capital»<sup>1 374</sup>.

Gómez Tello, like Barrenechea, relates Spínola's position with CUF and its economic interests, underlining the desire of Portuguese capitalism for a new political configuration that would better suit its interests. However, after vowing for General Spínola's integrity as a man of the regime<sup>375</sup>, Gómez Tello concludes that Spínola is being used by the imperialistic countries through CUF:

Spínola's intentions might have been good. But what is true is that Arcadia Publishing house, which is the General's publisher, is connected with the «Companhia União Fabril» [CUF], a powerful «trust» whose connections and interests in great international capitalism are known. (...) This is the real point of the problem: the banking and industrial capitalism's demagogy for whom all means of attacking Portugal are valid, and for that reason allies itself with the long-term plans of the Marxist countries. And like that alongside walk together neo-colonialists, Marxists, «useful idiots» and «compagnons de route».<sup>li 376</sup>

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<sup>374</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Cambio de piel/ Portugal en su calma (2)» in *Arriba*, April 19<sup>th</sup>

<sup>375</sup> «(...) al que puede adjudicársele cualquier etiqueta menos la de izquierdista. A las cautelosas aproximaciones de la oposición que quería aprovechar el nombre de Spínola, éste les contestó: "Yo no seré un segundo Humberto Delgado." Así se descarta que estuviera detrás de los insubordinados de Caldas da Rainha, y las seguridades de que no estaba comprometido se las dio personalmente al jefe del Gobierno, Marcelo Caetano, de quien fue siempre amigo.» [Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Spínola y los “doscientos de Caldas/ Portugal en su calma (4)» in *Arriba*, April 21<sup>st</sup>]

<sup>376</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Guerra de calumnias y terrorismo/ Portugal en su calma (y 5)» in *Arriba*, April 25<sup>th</sup>

The visions of both journalists on Empire and the colonial war are completely opposed. Barrenechea supports the idea that dismantling the Empire is, in fact, the only solution to start mending the Portuguese situation. In this sense, the animal metaphors used on the title embody what has happened to Portugal: from a resurrected rooster, hinting at the Barcelos legend, to an ostrich, whose head is stuck in the sand, totally unaware of the reality surrounding it.

Must the symbol of Portugal be changed? Is the rooster who shouts at dawn with the first light of day no longer the symbol of the Lusitanian? Today the symbol of Portugal could be another type of bird: the ostrich (that not by chance is originally from Africa). The ostrich hides its head under its wing, refusing to see the danger that blinds its eyes, shuts them before the light, the truth, reality. When the reservoir is overthrown the rooster might be able to sing again. For Portugal losing its colonies will not be the sign of its end but a sign of a new working day and the first stone of its prosperity. Just by dragging its economy out of the current «war economy» and into a peace time one. Portuguese would have enough power and resources to be a booming economy. Today they are an «Empire», yes. They are the last colonial Empire of the world. An Empire that has thirteen thousand emigrants in Europe. An Empire that has an old war without end in sight. An Empire whose human and economic bleeding has him fallen in a deep anaemia, which it can only cure if it cuts the double haemorrhage: the colonial war and emigration.»<sup>lii 377</sup>

Quoting Mário Soares in his book *Gagged Portugal* [Portugal Amordaçado], Barrenechea sustains that the idea of Empire has its roots in the Portuguese historical complex of inferiority regarding Spain, and that the threat of a possible invasion of small Portugal legitimates the regime's discourse in favour of the maintenance of Empire and, thus, the colonial war. From Barrenechea's point of view, living in a continuous state of war caused an increase in the cost of living in Portugal, which before the war had been lower than the Spanish one, but had by then already surpassed it. Although authorities attributed this rapid increase to an «imported

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<sup>377</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1974. «La Sangria/ Portugal ¿Del gallo al Avestruz?» in *Informaciones*, April 15<sup>th</sup> : 6

inflation» or rapid increase in wages, disassociating it from the war situation, Barrenechea very firmly opposes this explanation: «Portugal had a higher standard of living than the Spanish one while the colonies gave it no problems. (...) For thirteen years Portugal has been living in a war economy, i.e., in an “uneconomy”»<sup>liii 378</sup>. Barrenechea also covers the functioning of the Portuguese electoral processes in order to interpret how that system was still holding on.

For his part, regarding the topic of colonial war, Gómez Tello repeats, once more, the New State rhetoric, arguing that the African territories under Portuguese rule are not exactly at war – he in fact refuses the use the term «colonial war» –, but rather there are pacification troops in the field. As proof of this claim he gives the example of the prosperity of Angola, rhetorically asking how could Angola’s economic health be explained, if a war was indeed an existing problem?

For the most part the fabulous development of Angola is due to the foreign and metropolitan investment of capital. Would this be happening in Angola if a real terrorist problem existed? Angola is nearly pacified. (...) Colonial war? The war is categorically refused by the Minister: half of the troops fighting against terrorists are African soldiers<sup>liv 379</sup>.

Gómez Tello’s refusal to use the term colonial war, the insistence in using the terms «overseas provinces» (shared by José Salas) and «terrorists», in clear contrast with Carandell and Barrenechea (and MVM for instance), is, as Teun van Dijk (1990: 252) puts it, an important aspect of the journalistic discourse, since the choice of lexicon can reveal hidden opinions or ideologies. A great deal of the implied opinion or denied ideology by the press might be inferred through the identification of the lexicon used by social groups and their members. In this case, it clearly

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<sup>378</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1974.«Galopa la inflacion/ Portugal ¿Del gallo al Avestruz?» in *Informaciones*, April 17<sup>th</sup> : 5

<sup>379</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Un problema llamado ultramar/ Portugal en su calma (3)» in *Arriba*, April 20<sup>th</sup>

defines two groups. One, where Carandell and Barrenechea are included, that condemns colonialism and gives legitimacy to national liberation struggles, as the ones occurring in the Portuguese colonies; and, on the other hand, a social group, where Gómez Tello is included, that legitimizes the current Portuguese regime, its claims of a pluricontinental and multiracial country, and condemns the claims for sovereignty of the African territories under Portuguese rule. In the same sense, the fact that Gómez Tello's only two interviewees are two ministers – César Moreira Baptista (Minister of Internal Affairs) and Baltasar Rebelo de Sousa (Minister of Overseas Territories) –, two high representatives of the institutional power, reinforces his belonging in this group.

Unlike his partner, Barrenechea ends his series with an article not devoted to the origins of the problem, but to where its solution may rest: the military institution. In fact, Barrenechea finishes it with the following disclaimer: «We are witnessing in Portugal from a political, military, institutional, social and economic point of view, what many qualify as the most serious crisis of the country's history. The last chapter however remains unwritten. To make a prognosis is not neither my speciality nor my mission as a journalist. When the facts are produced I hope I will be able to report them»<sup>iv 380</sup>.

Barrenechea and Carandell had close contact with what became the MFA, not only because in this last piece Barrenechea mentions the MC and its dismantling by the regime, but also because later, on April 25<sup>th</sup>, they published what was actually the final article: a chronology of the emergence of this movement based on an interview the MFA's members. The author's disclaimer is therefore a way of suggesting that something will happen, because the last chapter remains unwritten.

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<sup>380</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1974. «Los héroes también cansan/ Portugal ¿Del gallo al Avestruz?» in *Informaciones*, April 20<sup>th</sup>: 8-9

Unsurprisingly, following his main narrative thread, Gómez Tello attempts to deny the existence of dissent within the army, claiming that most of the news about it constitutes nothing but rumours which he dismisses one after the other: «It was said that a battalion refused to embark Overseas. Let us set things straight: the soldiers just demanded some more hours with their families in Lisbon. They arrived in the city with their guitars. And revolutions are not made with guitars. The famous petitions signed by over two hundred captains? In the entire metropole there are not two hundred captains since the majority of the troops are by now Overseas. One after the other all rumours fall (...) Erased the echoes of what was not more than an accident and an economic question, what can happen in Portugal?»<sup>lvi 381</sup> Unable to deny the interrupted military march over Lisbon, Gómez Tello assures his readers that the military column only had work-related motivations: «In reality the Caldas da Rainha gesture was a response to questions related to the wages and professional demands of the captains»<sup>lvii</sup>. It was in fact a gesture so devoid of serious intentions that the officers «did not even carry ammunitions in their march towards Lisbon»<sup>lviii 382</sup>. Moreover, these military refused any connotation with the communists, hence reinforcing, once again, the chronicler's belief that the Portuguese people did not support in any way oppositionist ideas:

It has been said that the insurgent insisted on not being called communists. In fact, even if it is possible that infiltrators existed among them, they refused their help. This says enough about the party's unpopularity, which drew the consequences of the lack of popular support for the attempted coup and restrained itself from acting or revealing itself before the masses<sup>lix 383</sup>.

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<sup>381</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Guerra de calumnias y terrorismo/ Portugal en su calma (y 5)» in *Arriba*, April 25<sup>th</sup>

<sup>382</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Spínola y los “doscientos de Caldas/ Portugal en su calma (4)» in *Arriba*, April 21<sup>st</sup>

<sup>383</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Guerra de calumnias y terrorismo/ Portugal en su calma (y 5)» in *Arriba*, April 25<sup>th</sup>

Gómez Tello considers the attempts of political use, and their failure, of both the commotion provoked by the publication of *Portugal and the future* and military discontentment by oppositionist groups, namely the communists, to justify the need in Portugal of a personal regime, ruled by a strong leader, as he is constantly reminded by Lisbon's topography: «In my view, I deduct from the measure adopted by the Marquis, whose statue strongly dominates the end of the Liberdade Avenue – is it another coincidence? –, that Portugal always needs a strong man to keep moving forward»<sup>lx384</sup>.

In sum, these newspapers had different approaches to the first moment of what became a revolutionary biennium in Portuguese history. *Tele/eXprés'* approach remained exclusively based on the «comment» genre (Borrat 1989), and no correspondents or special correspondents were sent to Portugal, whereas this genre was altogether absent from *La Vanguardia Española*, despite Manuel Leguineche's presence in Portugal.

Recalling the observations, about the presence of Portugal in Spanish newspapers, that Pedro Altares made in his *Cuadernos para el dialogo's* article, quoted in the beginning of the chapter, it could be inferred that some of them are backed by this analysis. It showed to be correct that there was no mention of the political police action, but the coercive nature of the regime is exemplified by its use of censorship. It showed to be correct that the praise of the landscape and regime were present, but present were also critical views of the latter and even a glimpse of the mole's underground work (Marx 2000), especially in Luis Carandell and Eduardo Barrenechea's work.

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<sup>384</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luís. 1974. «Guerra de calumnias y terrorismo/ Portugal en su calma (y 5)» in *Arriba*, April 25<sup>th</sup>

At this moment two political cultures, characterized by «alienation» and «identification» towards the Spanish regime (Reig 2007), being fed separately can be identified, two opposing lines of discourse travelling across parallel paths without crossing each other. What one considers positive, the other one views as negative, and thus there are little chances of reaching consensus on matters such as censorship or colonial rule.

Mediation is also visible in the sense that especially the political culture described by its identification with Francoism tends to create between Portugal and Spain a unity of analysis that has as antagonists the enemies of both regimes, i.e. Communism and liberal democracies, hence transforming the Spanish analysis as an internal one.

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### **Original quotes:**

<sup>i</sup> «(...) Incluso en épocas de desmadre aperturista he llegado a comprar, sin contar el Marca de los lunes, seis diarios, seis (...) las últimas semanas, periodísticamente hablando, han supuesto un duro golpe a mi moral de hombre *que-creía-estar-bien-informado*. Me explico: *Portugal*. Aparte de las nociones geográficas elementales de la escuela («España limita al Oeste...») y de una famosa canción de la eterna Celia Gámez, *hit parade* de los años cincuenta (aquella donde Celia se interrogaba sobre las razones de su amor a Portugal, que resultaban ser la hermosura de sus mujeres, el olor de sus rosas y el vino que alegraba el corazón), del Pacto Ibérico que nos conectaba con la NATO y que en Estoril («el más bello lugar allende de las fronteras...», en la lírica de un cronista de *ABC*) tenía su residencia don Juan de Borbón, la idea que yo tenía del otro país ibérico, adquirida en la prensa española, era la de un lugar paradisiaco gobernado sabia y paternalmente por un maravilloso régimen político (de la perversidad intrínseca del sistema republicano, en mi escuela se exceptuaba siempre a Portugal y a la Argentina del primer Perón) que conseguía más de un 80 por 100 de los votos en las elecciones. Portugal, además, no tenía *colonias*, sino *provincias ultramarinas*, y sólo las maniobras de Moscú y sus compañeros de viaje explicaban las sucesivas condenas en la ONU. (...) Pero he aquí que, casi de repente, los periódicos españoles han empezado a hablar de Portugal, incluso en sus primeras páginas. Y dan por supuestas una serie de cosas de las que, palabra de honra, *yo no tenía noticia*, en el sentido más literal del término. ¿Qué diario español habló de la férrea dictadura, de la falta de libertad, de torturadora policía política, de desconocimiento de los elementales derechos humano, de que los portugueses estuviesen hasta el gorro del régimen? Repaso mis archivos. Ni palabra. (...) Mi moral de hombre *que-creía-estar-bien-informado* se ha venido

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abajo (...) Y lo peor es que estoy pensando que mi desinformación de ahora con Portugal puede repetirse con otros lugares. A lo mejor incluso con Cuenca... En plena era de la informática, el asunto es desmoralizador. Al menos para mí. A partir de ahora será mejor reconocer, como responden en las bodas los asistentes, que *no sabemos de nada*. Y que el haber leído los periódicos todos los días ni es un eximente.»

<sup>ii</sup> « No suele ser un libro el tema adecuado para forjar la crónica de lo que pasa. Parece que eso es terreno acotado para las tareas del crítico, mientras que los acontecimientos que se producen son los que determinan la tarea del corresponsal. Disiento de esos criterios por la pura y simple razón de que no existe en el mundo suceso, acontecimiento, revolución, guerra o anécdota sin que no tenga su antecedente en el pensamiento humano. Y el pensamiento humano tiene por destino aparecer en letra impresa, bien sea formando doctrina al respecto de lo que sea, bien pretendiendo explicar su fenomenología. La noticia sin explicación apenas tiene sentido.»

<sup>iii</sup> «Ignoro por qué razón ha venido estando [Spínola] tan cerrado para muchos cuando luego se destapa ante la televisión francesa. (...) Por lo visto, esa enamorada debilidad que muchos portugueses en cierto nivel sienten por la dulce Francia le llegó también al general Spínola. Tiene pleno derecho. Pero lo que no estoy tan seguro de que lo tenga es para decir que «el libro» no es una obra política. (...)»

<sup>iv</sup> «El que un general del prestigio de Antonio de Spínola se atreva a publicar un libro en el que recomienda una «solución política» para el problema de las colonias portuguesas africanas, quiere decir que Portugal se acerca a su hora de la verdad.»

<sup>v</sup> «Todo el tremendo embrollo portugués empezó por un libro titulado “Portugal y su futuro”. Su autor, el general Spínola, tiene a partir de ahora el futuro tan ligado al de su país que el libro de marras bien hubiera podido titularse “Spínola y su futuro”. (...) Ha sido un aviso también para Spínola, convertido de la noche a la mañana y a su pesar en la cabeza visible de la renovación portuguesa.»

<sup>vi</sup> « El libro de Spínola ha tenido una amplia difusión (50.000 ejemplares vendidos en menos de un mes) y un gran eco en la oficialidad joven del Ejército (se ha llegado a hablar de un centenar de capitanes arrestados). Por tanto la destitución del general no lo resuelve todo. Máxime cuando si ese libro ha podido publicarse ha sido porque fue previamente autorizado, quizá a más alto nivel que el de su jefe inmediato, general Costa Gomes, único responsable por ahora de ese «nihil obstat».»

<sup>vii</sup> «Según me dicen ya va por los 100.000 ejemplares vendidos. Y de la avidez de su compra dará la idea el hecho de que ayer recorrí cinco librerías para comprar varios ejemplares que me han pedido unos amigos de España y en las cinco me dijeron que estaban a la espera de nuevas remesas»

<sup>viii</sup> «Mientras tanto, el libro de Antonio de Spínola, “Portugal y el Futuro”, lanza a partir de hoy su segunda edición. Después de tratar de conseguirlo inútilmente en más de seis librerías, lo he encontrado por fin a través de un amigo, en la librería “Opiano”[sic]. Si Caetano llega a saber de las consecuencias que iba a desencadenar el libro de Spínola, seguro que no hubiera dejado que saliera a la



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calle. Hay ya más de ciento ochenta mil ejemplares pedidos de “Portugal y el Futuro”»

<sup>ix</sup> «Misteriosamente, el libro de Spínola que acuñaba su segunda edición, no llega en la fecha prevista a los almacenes de las librerías. No hay ejemplares de "Portugal y el futuro", y no sabe nadie cuándo se recibirá.»

<sup>x</sup> «Que nadie se lleve las manos a la cabeza, porque parece que hace algo así como dos meses el señor Caetano ya conocía el contenido del libro que ahora ha levantado algo más que una polvareda en torno al general Spínola.»

<sup>xi</sup> «(...) Cuando Spínola se atrevió a publicar su libro, lo hizo con el visto bueno de Caetano y respaldado por la conciencia de buena parte de la burguesía nacional portuguesa, temerosa de que el deterioro de la situación de dominio político-militar en las colonias, culmine en el irreparable deterioro de la situación de dependencia económica. Una prueba de que Caetano quiso instrumentalizar la salida del libre para «ver qué pasaba» es que la celosa censura portuguesa no dijo, ni dice ni pío ante las sucesivas ediciones de una obra que ya va por los cien mil ejemplares.»

<sup>xii</sup> «(...) Es claro que se podían reflexionar todos los argumentos para una nueva orientación en la política a seguir en las provincias africanas. Pero ¿era necesario lanzar la piedra que ha promovido tales remolinos? ¿No ha sido peligroso abrir una crisis entre fuerzas que se mueven dentro del sistema cuando es sabido que hay otras que esperan - ¿o esperaban?- que se produjera un enfrentamiento para actuar contra el régimen? La pasividad que han mantenido unos elementos subversivos que mostraron sus recursos en otras circunstancias, llama también la atención y confirma nuestro criterio de que ahí es donde hay que buscar el fondo del problema, y que se aguardaba la acentuación del conflicto en torno a un libro para dar a la crisis un carácter muy distinto.»

<sup>xiii</sup> «Se ha relacionado esta intentona con la publicación del libro «Portugal e o Futuro» del general Antonio de Spínola, y las medidas adoptadas contra éste. En Portugal se separan tajantemente ambas cuestiones que se han querido unir por el hilo sutil de la aproximación de fechas.»

<sup>xiv</sup> «En cuanto al libro de Spínola, constituye una de esas grandes decepciones que reservan los libros presentados como sensacionales. Empezando porque es inútil hablar de clandestinidad cuando se le encuentra en los escaparates de las librerías de Lisboa. Sus ideas, por otro lado, no son nuevas: eran conocidas por los dirigentes del Gobierno y por los jefes militares, y están presentadas con un tono perfectamente académico y abstracto, porque se trata justamente de eso: de las ideas del antiguo comandante de las tropas de Guinea sobre las soluciones posibles para las provincias de ultramar.»

<sup>xv</sup> «Ayer le [a Spínola] fue entregada la birretina de oro como ex alumno del Colegio Militar. Se ha prohibido la publicación de esta noticia. El director del diario "La República", Raúl Rego, me ha enseñado la prohibición de la censura, que ahora llaman examen previo. (...) el “black-out” informativo es total. Rego me ha enseñado las galeradas editoriales de hoy tachadas.»

<sup>xvi</sup> «Escribimos cada día dos periódicos para que pueda salir uno», me decía el director de un periódico, mientras me mostraba galeradas llenas de tachones de lápiz rojo hechos por los funcionarios de la censura, o, como se dice ahora en

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Portugal eufemísticamente, de la "Oficina de examen previo". La ley de prensa, dictada hace dos años, nunca ha entrado en vigor en Portugal (...)

<sup>xvii</sup> «Su publicación ["manifiesto de los jóvenes turcos"] en el diario parisiense "Le Monde", por el enviado especial Dominique Bouchin [sic], le ha valido una seria reprimenda de los altos funcionarios del servicio de información del gobierno portugués. (...)

<sup>xviii</sup> «El número de enviados especiales que llegan para recoger sus matices crece de día en día.»

<sup>xix</sup> «pues esto se encuentra lleno de periodistas extranjeros aficionados al sensacionalismo»

<sup>xx</sup> «Anteayer, a última ora [sic] de la noche, un enviado especial anglosajón me decía que pensaba marcharse ya puesto que la crisis portuguesa podía darse por terminada. (...) Tampoco la visión de mi colega anglosajón puede considerarse como disparatada de buenas a primeras. Ante un paisaje humano que no ofrece más alteraciones que las puramente verbales o cuando más las subterráneas y secretas fases de una vaga conspiración que no acaba de concretarse, resulta difícil ejercer el oficio. Sobre todo, si se quiere perfilar este según la normativa moderna de ir al grano, concretando hechos. Como apenas ha habido hasta hora hechos a los que referirse, tan sólo cabía recoger rumores, considerándolos como preludio de los que pudiera suceder. Pero si no se hubiese producido nada de lo esperado, no cabría sino especular sobre el futuro, bien a la corta, bien a la larga. Claro que eso ya no es periodismo "a la moderna", sino ensayismo histórico. En tal caso los periodistas modernos de raza intentan irse. Pero cuando tienen las maletas listas se ven retenidos otra vez por nuevos síntomas que cualquier cosa puede producirse a cualquier momento.»

<sup>xxi</sup> «(...) la tensión ha descendido muchos grados y el incruento episodio del sábado empieza a situarse dentro de su verdadero contexto: el de una aventura irresponsable»

<sup>xxii</sup> «Después de haber descrito durante años a un Portugal situado sobre un polvorín es difícil explicar cómo una intentona de levantamiento no ha encontrado eco ni en las fuerzas Armadas, ni en los cuadros políticos, ni en la masa de la población.»

<sup>xxiii</sup> «Si alguien pensó - por supuesto, fuera de las fronteras portuguesas, ya que no dejó nunca de valorarse en su justa medida - que la actitud de los sublevados podría representar una radical y definitiva toma de posición en orden a un nuevo y distintivo entendimiento de la situación ultramarina, habría caído en el fácil espejismo en el que a estas horas está cayendo la ola de corresponsales parachutados sobre Lisboa: la de confundir la realidad con sus propios deseos.»

<sup>xxiv</sup> «El error de los observadores extranjeros ha sido siempre tomar sus deseos como realidades cuando se trata de países no coincidentes con su óptica particular. (...) La disciplina y la unidad de las Fuerzas Armadas, de los cuadros políticos y de la gran mayoría del pueblo portugués - una "mayoría silenciosa" sólida y consciente, como se está viendo -, van a exigir que se ponga fin a concesiones y debilidades que se amparaban con la fácil palabra de "liberalización".»

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<sup>xxv</sup> «También hubo en España sensatos generales Spínola y Costa Gomes que dijeron los que había que decir (...) la solución Spínola todavía es la más sensata. Lo dramático es que quizá llegue tarde. Ya se ha podrido demasiado el conflicto.»

<sup>xxvi</sup> «Una vez más, la responsabilidad de una ruina nacional queda enteramente sobre las espaldas de los ultras del nacionalismo.»

<sup>xxvii</sup> «Nos sería particularmente penoso a los españoles que el presente conflicto de Portugal, en función de una virtualidad inesperada, desbordase los cauces polémicos que le son normales.»

<sup>xxviii</sup> «Tanto el libro de Spínola como los acontecimientos que ha generado, parecen señalar ya, inequívocamente la fase postsalazarista en la dinámica política de Portugal. De tan entrañable interés para nosotros los españoles: el otro país que, como el lusitano, quiso, supo y pudo, realizarse históricamente en una legión de pueblos que hablan entre ellos y rezan a dios en romance peninsular»

<sup>xxix</sup> «Nos sería particularmente penoso a los españoles»

<sup>xxx</sup> « De tan entrañable interés para nosotros los españoles»

<sup>xxxi</sup> « Según las últimas noticias, la calma reina en Portugal. Son informaciones satisfactorias, pero engañosas por cuanto el intento de asonada del viernes en la zona de Lisboa revela de forma explícita el cúmulo de tensiones agazapado en un «caetanismo» que aún no ha escapado del «salazarismo sin Salazar.» (...) Si el tema de la guerra africana es el auténtico telón de fondo de las disensiones internas portuguesas (al menos de sus elites dirigentes), el segmento más peligroso de la línea de problemas que afronta Portugal parece ser la división de sus cuadros militares.»

<sup>xxxii</sup> «Lo que resulta prácticamente seguro es que Spínola nada tuvo que ver en la acción.»

<sup>xxxiii</sup> «No es la primera de las intentonas de este género a que asiste el régimen, ayer con Salazar y hoy con Caetano. Unas fueron sufocadas rápidamente, como el intento de asalto a los cuarteles de Beja; otras fueron más dramáticas, como la sublevación de una parte de las Fuerzas Aéreas y de la Marina, en 1931, y otras ni siquiera llegaron a iniciarse por la anticipación con que fueron detenidos sus protagonistas de candidatos a rebeldes. (...) Desde este punto de vista hay que tomar nota de un hecho que tiene considerable importancia: la disciplina y la sangre fría del Ejército en un momento que de cualquier modo representa una crisis han sido notables.»

<sup>xxxiv</sup> «Esto puede parecer anécdota, pero no lo es. La forma en que se desarrollaron los sucesos indica que no se trata de una revuelta de centuriones, sino de un hecho aislado, sin verdadera profundidad y que sería excesivo hablar de «mal de África» que sufriría el Ejército portugués. (...) En efecto, la solidez del régimen portugués, nacido en 1926, reposa fundamentalmente sobre esta unidad del Ejército, quien mejor que nadie comprende las razones vitales por las que se bate en las provincias de ultramar. La guerra es dura y se prolonga, pero sería abusivo compararla con Argelia y, mucho menos, con el Vietnam.»

<sup>xxxv</sup> «Ahora veremos si son realmente importantes esos grupos de militares o si no pasan de un sector pequeño, cuyos componentes de más relieve están bajo arresto o trasladados a las Azores. Esto, clara [sic] está, corresponde a nuevas crónicas. Entre tanto, el orden y la normalidad son completos en el país, que continua su ritmo de vida como si no pasara nada.»

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<sup>xxxvi</sup> « Poco a poco se espera que se lleve a cabo una renovación casi total del Gobierno. Un Gobierno, repito, más ultra, más radicalizado. Las circunstancias no son para menos»

<sup>xxxvii</sup> «Los rumores de la posible destitución de Caetano para dar paso a un hombre de la ultra derecha, han cesado casi por completo, tras su discurso de la semana pasada.»

<sup>xxxviii</sup> «Mientras tanto, la sensación que se experimenta es que dejar que el tiempo todo lo arregle o todo lo desbarate parece ser la única política oficial imperante hoy en Portugal. (...) Todo es cuestión de tiempo. Acaso de poco tiempo.»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «Por último, hemos de significar que aunque no hay salario mínimo oficial, la media que gana un trabajador sin cualificar es de unas 120 pesetas al día, pero no cobran más que los días que trabajan, ya que no se pagan los domingos ni los festivos. Y hemos de terminar significando que la vida normal en Portugal no se diferencia apenas nada del coste de la vida en España. Hace tan sólo dos años que Portugal era para los españoles un paraíso económico, pero ahora es tan caro como España en la mayoría de las cosas y en algunas más.»

<sup>xl</sup> «El subdesarrollo se ha justificado en Portugal por la guerra colonial y el fin de la presencia armada de Portugal en África, podría ser el principio del fin de un sistema ya definitivamente inmotivado. (...) Spínola no está solo. Le apoya buena parte de la oficialidad joven, porque el general no habla por hablar. (...) A Spínola empiezan a apoyarle los sectores más jóvenes del capitalismo portugués, dispuestos a jugar la carta de la liberalización política de las colonias, a cambio de mantener lazos de explotación económica, a solas o en alianza con inversionistas norteamericanos e ingleses. (...) De hecho, y desde hace años, norteamericanos e ingleses vigilan las colonias portuguesas como tierra de inversión. Quieren la garantía de que la herencia política de Portugal no sea recogida por el nacional-marxismo, sino por el nacionalismo a secas. Spínola y los que le siguen, considera [sic] que Portugal está a tiempo de decidir una solución, antes de que se la impongan.»

<sup>xli</sup> «Porque la realidad es que el mismo texto del hoy popular libro sobre sus experiencias ultramarinas y en el que quiere verse la clave de la actual situación, no pasa de ser una anécdota incidental dentro de esta situación de orden interno, a la que desde ahora cabe negar toda transcendencia política.(...) Quiere ello decir que su lealtad [Spínola] al régimen permanece inalterable y que el episodio de hoy se inscribe, al menos de momento, dentro de un marco que no traspasa los límites del código disciplinario.»

<sup>xlii</sup> «Soldados, Soldados, Soldados. El esfuerzo militar que Portugal realiza para mantener sus colonias tiene al país anclado en el pasado. (...) el último imperio colonial de Europa es un país pobre y atrasado. Campos inmensos de olivos y encinares. Precisosos pueblos y villas, muy a menudo cobijadas bajo el castillo medieval, que ahora parece defender su pobreza, en las que la vida transcurre apagada y como con sordina. (...)Desde el Alentejo el problema colonial se veía lejano. Pero sus habitantes, como todos los portugueses, sufrían sus consecuencias en su vida diaria. El país está padeciendo una gravísima crisis económica, una situación de estancamiento como consecuencia del esfuerzo que la política gubernamental hace para mantener (...)»

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<sup>xliii</sup> «Portugal en su calma y en su tenacidad. Pero... Contra Portugal hay una conspiración internacional que tiene como objetivo la Península Ibérica entera y en que aparecen mezclados elementos de los pelajes más diversos y a veces aparentemente inconciliables. Donde ha producido mayor decepción que no haya pasado nada en Portugal no fue en el Kremlin, sino en ciertos ambientes plutocráticos del exterior. Un Portugal anárquico como el que existió antes de 1926; ese sería el ideal de los respetables financieros extranjeros, dispuestos estrujarlo como un limón»

<sup>xliv</sup> «publicaciones de abierta oposición al régimen, que se venden, o más bien no se venden, a juzgar por los montones amarillentos, a las puertas de este viejo café»

<sup>xlv</sup> «La prensa portuguesa practica el consejo de los antiguos romanos: que tu silencio sea el primero y que tu palabra la última. Esto quiere decir que su discreción habitual sobre los problemas que van trabajando el subconsciente popular y las decisiones de los dirigentes no es otra cosa que un modo de canalizar sus rotundas tomas de decisión hasta que una actitud ha sido definida o cuando las circunstancias lo imponen. No, no busquéis polémicas periódicas sobre los derechos portugueses en Ultramar, entre otras razones porque resultarían inútiles desde el momento en que los nueve millones de portugueses metropolitanos - incluyendo la oposición- están irreversiblemente de acuerdo en que «Angola e nossa». (...) Gastar tinta y papel para convencer a los que están convencidos supondría un despilfarro.»

<sup>xlvi</sup> « ¿Es ésta la ciudad que durante unos días ha ocupado los titulares de la Prensa internacional? Bajo un sol redondo y primaveral, apiñada y clamorosa, Lisboa está en paz y gloria de Dios.»

<sup>xlvii</sup> «La historia de lo que sucedió hace poco más de un mes parece ya tan antigua y olvidada que nadie habla de ello en Portugal, ni en las tertulias de Nicola, la Brasileira y el Suizo, ni en los bares de Cacilhas ni en los periódicos, incluyendo los de la oposición, que concentran su fuego sobre cuestiones sindicales o estudiantiles.»

<sup>xlviii</sup> «Eça de Queiroz filósofo en su obra "La ciudad y las montañas" sobre la incapacidad de la civilización para hacer felices a los hombre. Su defensa de la vida sencilla de los campos aunque hecha a fines del siglo pasado, vale para hoy.»

<sup>xlix</sup> «Estos mercadillos, que he visto en otras ciudades del país, dan mucha idea de la pobreza y el primitivismo que aun predomina en las zonas rurales. (...) Es frecuente encontrar en las calles de las ciudades o en las carreteras a gente vendiendo cosas (...))»

<sup>i</sup> «Volvamos a la economía. El equilibrio de las finanzas del Estado, que fue la gran obra de Salazar, y la estabilidad económica como su natural consecuencia, constituyen una de las principales razones no sólo del acelerado ritmo del desarrollo portugués en los últimos años, sino también de la atracción que ejerce sobre los capitales extranjeros.»

<sup>ii</sup> «Las intenciones de Spínola podían ser buenas. Pero lo cierto es que la editorial Arcadia que lo lanzó está relacionada con la Compañía Unión Fabril un poderoso «trust» cuyas ligazones e intereses con el gran capitalismo internacional son conocidas. (...) Este es el verdadero fondo del problema: la demagogia del capitalismo bancario e industrial para el que todos los medios de atacar a Portugal

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son buenos, se une a los planes a más largo plazo de los países marxistas. Y así, codo con codo marchan los neocolonialistas, los marxistas, los «tontos útiles» y los “compañeros de viaje”.»

<sup>lil</sup> «¿El símbolo de Portugal debe ser cambiado? ¿Ya no es el símbolo de los lusos el gallo que con su canto alerta al próximo amanecer, de la llegada de la luz, del nacimiento del nuevo día? Hoy, el símbolo de Portugal podría ser otra clase de ave: el avestruz (que no en vano es oriunda de África). El avestruz que esconde la cabeza bajo el ala, negándose a ver el peligro, que ciega sus ojos y los cierra a la luz, a la verdad, a la realidad. Cuando el embalse de se derrumbe, el gallo podrá cantar de nuevo. No será para Portugal la pérdida de sus colonias el anuncio de su ocaso, sino el anuncio de un nuevo día de trabajo y cimiento de su prosperidad. Solo con trucar su actual «economía de guerra» por una economía de paz, los portugueses tendrían potencia y recursos suficientes para ser una nación pujante. Hoy son un «imperio», sí. Son, sí, el último imperio colonial del mundo. Un imperio con un millón trecientos mil emigrantes en Europa. Un imperio con una vieja guerra que no tiene fin. Un imperio con una sangría humana y económica que le tiene postrado en una profunda anemia, de la que sólo podrá curarse cortando la doble hemorragia: la guerra colonial y la emigración.»

<sup>lii</sup> «Portugal tenía un nivel de vida superior al español mientras mantuvo sus colonias sin problemas. (...) Portugal vive desde hace trece años una economía de guerra, es decir, una deseconomía.»

<sup>liii</sup> «En gran parte, el fabuloso desarrollo de Angola se debe a las inversiones de capitales metropolitanos y extranjeros. ¿Sucedería esto si existiera un verdadero problema terrorista? Angola está prácticamente pacificada. (...) ¿Guerra colonial? La palabra es tajantemente rechazada por el ministro: la mitad de las tropas que combaten contra los terroristas son soldados africanos.»

<sup>liiii</sup> «Estamos asistiendo, desde el punto de vista político, militar, institucional, social y económico a lo que en Portugal muchos califican de la más grave crisis de su historia. El último capítulo queda por escribir. Hacer vaticinios no es mi especialidad ni mi misión como periodista. Cuando los hechos se produzcan espero poder dar fe de ellos.»

<sup>liiii</sup> «(...) Se habló de un batallón que se negó a embarcar para Ultramar. Pongamos las cosas en su punto: los soldados permisionarios se limitaron a pedir pasar sus horas de estancia en Lisboa con sus familias. Llegaron a la ciudad con sus guitarras. Y no se hacen revoluciones con guitarras. ¿Los famosos manifiestos con las firmas de doscientos capitanes? En toda la metrópoli no hay doscientos capitanes porque la mayor parte de las tropas se encuentra en Ultramar. Uno tras otro han ido cayendo los «boatos» (...) Apagados los ecos de lo que no fue más que un accidente de recorrido y una cuestión económica, ¿qué puede pasar en Portugal? (...)»

<sup>liiii</sup> « En realidad, el gesto de Caldas da Rainha obedeció a cuestiones de sueldos y de la situación de los capitanes»

<sup>liiii</sup> « No llevaban ni municiones en su marcha hacia Lisboa»

<sup>liiii</sup> «Se dice que los insubordinados insistieron en que no se les llamara comunistas. De hecho, aunque es posible que hubiera infiltrados entre ellos, rechazaron sus avances de ayuda. Esto dice bastante sobre la impopularidad del partido, que sacó

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también sus consecuencias de la falta de eco popular de la intentona y no se aventuró a realizar acto alguno ni se descubrió ante las masas.»

<sup>lx</sup> «Por mi parte, deduzco de la medida adoptada por el marqués, cuya estatua con gesto enérgico domina el final de la avenida de Liberdade - ¿es otra coincidencia?- que Portugal precisa siempre de un hombre fuerte para seguir caminando. (...)»





## 2. April 25<sup>th</sup>: the successful coup

From where the revolution was able to draw so many red carnations, even if Portugal is a country of flowers, remains by now the biggest surprise of the revolution<sup>385</sup>.

It could be argued that the *coup d'état* of April 25<sup>th</sup> had most of the Spanish press prepared to address it. It is a moment of preponderance of special correspondents, who attended this event in significant numbers. Some of them, like José Rey, Luis Carandell, Eduardo Barrenechea, Francisco Caparrós, Manuel Leguineche and Pérez Clotas, returned after having been in Portugal to cover the previous military unrest of March 16<sup>th</sup>. *La Vanguardia Española* has, for the first time, Augusto Assia in Lisbon, something that will happen often throughout the entire Portuguese revolutionary process. It is also the first time that *Tele/eXprés* has special correspondents in Portugal, Xavier Roig and Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, and *ABC* has Luís Alonso photographing the May 1<sup>st</sup> demonstration for an *ABC graphic report*<sup>386</sup>. Subsequently, this newspaper's editor-in-chief, Torcuato Luca de Tena, would visit Marcello Caetano<sup>387</sup> in Brazil and an interview with the former Council President is published in *ABC*.

All chronicles published at this moment are of «personalized experience» and most journalists report from Lisbon, although some of them, Caparrós and Leguineche for instance, having crossed the country by car, contextualize the developments in the capital in a broader national frame. The contributions of Xavier Roig and Augusto Assia are particularly structural, since both special correspondents stayed in Lisbon

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<sup>385</sup> Assia, Augusto. 1974. «Lisboa: No se produjeron los temidos desordenes» in *La Vanguardia española*, May 2<sup>nd</sup>:5-6

<sup>386</sup> Alonso, Luís. 1974. «Reportaje grafico» in *ABC*, May 2<sup>nd</sup>

<sup>387</sup> Luca de Tena, Torcuato. 1974. «Yo no he entrevistado en Brasil al ex presidente del Gobierno Portugués: He visitado en Sao Paulo al profesor Marcelo Caetano» in *ABC*, May 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.39

for a longer period than the rest and therefore had more opportunities to explore different sides of the ongoing process.

Barcelona-born Xavier Roig is representative of a type of Spanish journalist. Much younger than Assia, he also is much less explicit in his views about the situation but is, nevertheless, a great chronicler of the street – more newspapers, less police, graffiti appearing suddenly on the walls – and the popular dimension of the movement – the ambiance, the happiness, the never-ending demonstrations, even before the overflow that meant the May 1<sup>st</sup> demonstration. He nevertheless emphasizes the normality of the entire situation and dismisses all disruptions as minor events that do not hinder a general atmosphere of tranquillity. One of Roig's singularities is the fact that among the journalists in the sample he was the only one visiting, or at least writing about his visit, to the political police's former headquarters.

On the other hand, the veteran journalist Augusto Assia has a conservative personality bounded by a very elitist conception of society and a very explicit anti-Communist sensibility. A reference in the Spanish press, the Galician Felipe Fernández Armesto got his pen name Assia when he started to write for *La Vanguardia* in 1929 while living in Berlin. Having gone to Germany to study in the 1920s, Fernández Armesto's chronicles sent from the German capital to Spanish newspapers like *Informaciones* and *ABC* became highly popular, therefore a motivation for Gaziel to hire him as *La Vanguardia*'s correspondent in Berlin. Assia's relationship with *La Vanguardia* lasted for over five decades during which he witnessed events such as Adolf Hitler's election in Berlin in 1933, the impact of WWII in London, from where he was moved after the war broke out, or the Nuremberg trials. Assia also worked as foreign correspondent in the United States and West Germany during the 1950s and 1960s, but from 1964 on he replaced the permanent correspondent

task for special correspondent missions, attending a great deal of the world's major events.

Assia's comments on Álvaro Cunhal's distinguished appearance, on the distinctiveness conferred by General Spínola's monocle, or how the announcement of the Communist presence in the I Provisional Government was made by «respectable people» instead of «young idealists», suit his very strong anti-Communist sensitivity, and in fact he stands out as the most explicitly outspoken journalist on this matter. Assia reportedly abandoned his youth Communist militancy in 1933, although he always denied ever having had one (Kharitonova 2005).

In general, Assia is very keen on expressing his contempt for communists and constantly uses the argument that one of the crucial errors of Salazar and Caetano's regime was to treat all the opposition equally, including the Communist Party. For Assia, the Communist Party was allowed to organize itself on the underground, but the centre and right wing sectors were not. The fact that the latter were then not organized around parties favoured, in his view, the Communist Party. Furthermore, Assia considers modern Communist parties, whether Soviet or Chinese, not to be romantic Communist parties anymore, like those of 1920s that were eager to take power by force. Thus he does not endorse the theory of a possible Communist takeover of the Portuguese Revolutionary Process, despite his frequent allusions to it.

In contact with the Portuguese Communist Party, Assia appreciates its moderate feature and, especially, Cunhal's elegance – or, in fact, Cunhal's distinguished appearance, a sign of his distance from a working class background. Therefore the communist presence in the I Provisional Government, a singular event in the Western context of the Cold War at that moment, is considered the best way to defend democracy given the context in which it is happening. It is a way of not showing fear,

even if communists are – in Assia’s own words – «tenebrous». Finally, the fact that the announcement was made by a senior officer is, in Assia’s view, comforting, because this journalist admits he trusts the Army’s hierarchy.

In his chronicles Assia, like other veteran journalists, tries to gain his audience’s trust by building his reputation as an expert on Portuguese affairs. His tactics are not much different from all others, as he quotes classic Portuguese authors such as Eça de Queiróz and claims to have important contacts, namely the literary group of liberal Salazarists he attends. He also calls on his earlier experiences by reminiscing of his interviews with Marcelo Caetano in 1968 and Mário Soares in 1969, when the Socialist leader came back from exile in Guinea – not Timor, as Assia states – and was campaigning for elections. Backed by this status of expert, Assia refers frequently to the «good Portuguese people» to mean not only peaceful, submissive and undemanding people, but also less sophisticated and enlightened than others, like Scandinavians, the British and the French for living under liberal democracies, which Assia deems as the desired political system above all others.

a) The downfall of the New State: what failed versus what possibilities the future holds?

All newspapers thus express their own editorial opinion about what is going on in Portugal and most of the opinion published is authored by important names, including politicians. An unequivocal Spanish reading of the Portuguese events is performed, whether or not explicitly, by all newspapers. In *La Vanguardia Española* cartoonist Maximo San Juan Arranz (Maximo), who made a smooth transition from a regime press to a democratic one (Morán 2014), explicitly supports a Spanish reading and draws a comparison between the situation in the two countries, inciting

several political figures to come forward and express their opinion on the matter:

Why should we Spaniards be interested in this subject? Until when will the Estrada doctrine<sup>388</sup> prevent the overflow of Tagus-Segura [rivers] (...) In Spain we almost do not have overseas territories. In Spain we have a successor with the title of King. In Spain, in theory, we are heading towards Europe and not Rhodesia. Etcetera. Areiliza, Fraga, Silva, Cantarero, even Cortina, if the discretion demanded by the Estrada doctrine did not seal their lips, they would explain to us the differences and would tell us that there is no possible comparison. (Even if, as a hypothetical inquirer, I would be interested as well in the oppositions of General Iniesta or Blas Piñar and even lieutenant general Díez-Alegria, also author of books himself.<sup>ii</sup> 389


**DOS AGUAS**  
**Y AL ESTE, ESPAÑA**

Si en España nunca pasa nada, en Portugal pasado así mismo. Como la democracia, en los otros el hecho de que Oliveira Salazar pudiese estar varios meses muerto, sin que ni el adelantado ni el propio inventor se diesen por enterados.  
Sin embargo ahora parece ser que ha pasado algo. Por de pronto, puede asegurarse con alguna solemnidad que el cadáver de Colares Antonio de Oliveira ha descendido de cuerpo insepulto al Pantano de Hombre Duro, se ha arrojado en lapidarios mármol y se dispone, si fin, a descansar en paz. Es un repeto eterno que la veía siendo sepado por la veía guardia del albatro Novo, siempre recia, como todas las veías guardas, a permitir la veías que las Oid.

A profesor muerto, profesor puesto, y así Marcelo

profesor Castano su amigo y colega el católico mundial en año sabiendo señor Lopez Nolas. Con este seurruciluna y el viento de fronda repudiado de proa, es hecho que el segundo profesor del Coposivo divino haya durado seis veces menos que el primero. No ha tenido parte el socio profesor. Socorro en Puncial.

¿Qué nos va y qué nos viene a los españoles en todo este asunto? Hasta qué punto la doctrina Estrada imita el traveso Tajo-Segura, salvando las distancias metafóricas y dando a este párrafo una oscuridad oscura que al saltar, con razón, a la señora Graham, del «Washington Post», es perfectamente la prudencia en una situación de veicidad literaria limitada, como la aconsejada por el señor Caballero, del «Boletín Oficial»?



Cualquier pudo hacerse la ilusión de que se hacía cargo del poder, sólo porque le permitían pronunciar ciertas frases por televisión e introducir, en estas cosas, el solomero político. La verdad es que la veía guardia del albatro Novo, disfranzada en tales grabaciones de aprensión de realidad, manipulada o iluminada, se dirigía al pensamiento del profesor Castano, instándole a una revolución de tipo inventivo que iba transformando la prometeda apertura en tradicional cerradura y la solución de ultramar en costumbre en solución.

Marcelo Castano podría haber ensayado la solución Spínola, pero para tal destino le faltaban cinco estrellas y un momento, distractivo y administrativo difíciles de conseguir en una vida civil a caballo de cuapero entre la enseñanza y la tenencia. Oliveira Salazar aún pudo durar treinta y seis o treinta y siete años, ya que sólo era profesor de Economía. Pero Castano explicaba Ciencia Política, ciencia inexacta, como las hay, y además Derecho Administrativo, disciplina gafe a la larga, como podría explicarle el

En España, prácticamente, no tenemos Ultramar. En España, realmente, tenemos a quien a Ulis de Rey. En España, teóricamente, vamos hacia Europa y no hacia Rhodesia. Rhodesia, Areiliza, Fraga, Silva, Cantarero, incluso Cortina, si la discreción Estrada no sellase sus labios, nos explicarían las diferencias y nos dirían que no hay ni mini-comparación posible. Aunque a mí, como lingüístico economista, no interesaría de interesarme las oposiciones del general Iniesta o de Blas Piñar, e incluso las del teniente general Díez-Alegria, también autor de libros.

Pero como punto y suspensorio que así, tengo que conformarme con el ramalazo coloquial (y nada significativo ni representativo, por supuesto) de un telepateador de a pie, quien, tras enterarse por el televisor de un bar de lo que sus nuevos salvadores de Portugal se proponen a corto y medio plazo, dice: «A ver si ahora los del Brasil nos van a pedir la solución de la doctrina política a los del Albatro»... MAXIMO.

On the one hand, Maximo expects most of the personalities he evokes to dismiss, or even oppose, the obvious comparison between situations, which he in fact mentions throughout his entire article. But in the end he alludes to Lieutenant-General Díez Alegria, a brief hope of the Spanish opposition that was often compared to General Spínola (Sánchez 1993), hinting that he might think otherwise. But moreover the steady and

**Fig.2** seemingly permanent character of both regimes is enhanced by Maximo (fig.2): «If in Spain nothing happens, in Portugal even less. This was

388 The Mexican «Estrada Doctrine» embodies a foreign policy political principle of non-intervention in government changes in other nations that includes not granting official recognitions because that act embodies disrespect to nations' sovereignty.

389 Maximo.1974. «Y al este, España» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 28<sup>th</sup> pp.

demonstrated by the fact that Oliveira Salazar was deceased for a couple of months without Salazarism, or even his own inventor, being declared dead. Nonetheless now it actually seems like something happened»<sup>iii</sup>. Portugal seemingly represents, among other things, an occasion to address the Marcelist continuity project and, especially, its failure.

The continuity project, namely by a liberalization of the regime, was one of the pressing questions in Spain, frequently and intensely discussed at least since Arias Navarro's February 12<sup>th</sup> speech, when a timid period of liberalization duly called «the February 12<sup>th</sup> spirit» was attempted. The failure of the Portuguese continuity project naturally will become one of the main Portuguese questions analysed by all Spanish newspapers, with the clear exception of *Tele/eXprés*.

*ABC* conveys the view that the coup was as a direct result of the failure of the Caetanist continuity project, attributing it partly to the short sightedness of the Portuguese «ultra» sector and partly to Marcelo Caetano's own inability to manage political affairs:

Caetano has been overthrown for his failure to develop continuity; and Salazarism's ultras were pushed out after an inauthentic victory against Caetano. The latter were the ones who made intelligent fidelity impossible, which Salazarist principles needed to continue inspiring Portuguese life<sup>iv390</sup>.

*ABC* does not question the regime itself but the way it has been managed since Antonio Salazar's death. *Arriba*, in turn, sustains an attitude of mourning, claiming that the present moment is not one for analysing past mistakes but for showing endearment. The newspaper expresses joy for the lack of the dreadful signs of civil war and desire that this crisis might be reaching its end:

Not just because we are neighbours, which is probably the weakest argument, but because of the spirit of historic community, given the natural and persistent friendship between the Portuguese people and the

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<sup>390</sup> Editorial: «Los acontecimientos de Portugal».1974. in *ABC*, April 27<sup>th</sup>:34

Spanish one, we wish that the process of crisis, which seems to have reached its end, to be a firm step forward in the construction of a great Portuguese society as all its governments and systems intended to achieve with a heroic will. As Spaniards, our friendship at this moment is translated into the expression of clear and determinant affection<sup>v391</sup>.

Both these newspapers argue that the crisis started with Salazar's replacement by Marcelo Caetano and that his project failed. In *ABC*, Emilio Lozano supports the same idea and expresses it straightforwardly: «General Spínola's *coup d'état* puts an end to the process of disaggregation started with Oliveira Salazar's sickness, which made him absolutely unable to exercise his functions in Government»<sup>vi 392</sup>.

In *La Vanguardia Española*, Augusto Assia, while adding the war situation endured by Portugal as a determinant factor in the regime's downfall, also endorses the idea that the regime fell at its own expense. Assia roots the downfall in the Caetano's failed experience of liberalization and his submission to the ultra forces, which were responsible for the unavoidable pulling apart of a regime that was unable to sustain itself. Hence the role of the opposition and the Army in that process is downgraded by this journalist.

The more one examines the situation coldly, the hardest it becomes to understand how Caetano and his advisers thought they could govern Portugal, sustain a distant double war and defeat at the same time as the enemy in Africa the economic hardship caused by the war costs in the metropole, without other resources, other pillars or supports other than the house of cards that collapsed at the first strike<sup>vii 393</sup>.

Moreover Assia praises the economic policies of the Salazarist regime, like he will do every once in a while, proclaiming that his attitude in doing so was by then something politically incorrect. In the context of the 1973 oil shortage and subsequent economic crisis, Assia contends that

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<sup>391</sup> Editorial: «Fraterna Portugal».1974. in *Arriba*, April 26<sup>th</sup>:3

<sup>392</sup> Lozano, Emilio. 1974. «Portugal, ruptura inevitable» in *ABC*, April 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.41

<sup>393</sup> Assia, Augusto.1974. «Lisboa: Los acontecimientos de Caldas das Rainha demostraron la debilidad del poder» in *La Vanguardia española*, May 4<sup>th</sup>:23

the Salazarist economic policies protected Portugal from capitalist insecurities through the maintenance of an undeveloped industrial society and the predominance of a rural majority, which he considers a positive feature of such policies:

Everyone seems to agree that the rural economy, the virtues of savings, the preference for agriculture in the last years, a choice of Salazar's regime, prevented progress from getting to Portugal. However, now that the scarcity of provisions threatens to become Europe's Achilles heel and that inflation has set free its horses from the Apocalypse, Portugal could draw some advantages from being an agricultural country and from not having fallen flat, like others did, in consumer society. But whatever is left of salazarism has to be banished in the name of democracy and of its verisimilitude<sup>viii</sup> 394.

That Augusto Assia endorses this kind of argument seems somewhat odd, since this journalist has a high regard for Western democracies, which were mostly sustained at least since WWII by following the opposite economic structures António Salazar did. This argument is used frequently by Assia throughout the entire Portuguese Revolutionary Process, especially when the gold reserves, accumulated during the New State, start to become scarce.

In *Arriba*, on the other hand, Jesús Suevos blames «the desperate perpetuation of the African war [that] made the situation of Salazar's heir harder and harder»<sup>ix</sup>395 and was responsible for the downfall of a regime with which he clearly empathizes, as he does with its leaders: «We understand Caetano's perplexity and angst, as well as that of his collaborators»<sup>x</sup>. Jesús Suevos was an old Falangist journalist, founding member of the Galician Falange even before the civil war broke out. During the civil war he was in charge of the newspaper *El Pueblo Gallego*, published in the nationalist faction territories. Later on Suevos

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<sup>394</sup> Assia, Augusto.1974. «Lisboa: El elevado número de partidos que están surgiendo podría entorpecer la futura estabilidad política» in *La Vanguardia española*, May 8<sup>th</sup>:27

<sup>395</sup> Suevos, Jesús. 1974. «Portugal, en el disparadero» in *Arriba*, April 30<sup>th</sup>, pp5



held several executive positions within the official media, as well as, for a brief period in the 1940s, a position at the Spanish Francoist Assembly [*Las Cortes*].

According to Suevos, the regime that had been «built so patiently by Salazar through an unbalanced yet important political experience would have endured without difficulties the death of its founder and would have carried on with Marcelo Caetano its path towards the future»<sup>xi</sup>. Faced with the new order, Jesús Suevos condemns the denigration of the prior one implied by some of the JSN's declarations:

Because we felt some of the National Salvation Junta's declarations were unfortunate. (...) But was it necessary to denigrate the regime that for over half a century provided Portugal the most prosperous years of the country's contemporary history and that they served in high-rank positions? Prudence is a virtue. The Greek Colonels also arrived with electoral promises and rhetorical invocations of freedom and civil rights and afterwards were forced to stick to the reality that allows no word games<sup>xii</sup>.

Suevos' reasoning clearly reveals what his ideological views are regarding liberal democracy and, inherently, the Junta's program.

In a second moment, both *ABC* and *Arriba* act in a similar fashion regarding the question of the maintenance of the Spanish regime. For *ABC* Portugal «is not just a neighbour country, but the other Iberian people»<sup>xiii</sup>, and this proximity prompted the newspaper to clarify other proximities, such as the ones between the New State in Portugal and Francoism in Spain, by underlining their fundamental differences: «Maybe the most fundamental difference lies in the fact that while salazarism is the history of a now, of a present that did not know how to become tomorrow, the Spanish regime has been, by contrast, a system always open to the future»<sup>xiv396</sup>.

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<sup>396</sup> Editorial: «Portugal y España».1974. in *ABC*, May 5<sup>th</sup>:19

If *ABC* dismisses any further projection of a similar future for the Spanish regime, *Arriba* does the same through a public praise of the Spanish Armed Forces: «Spain has great respect and admiration for its Armed Forces. These sentiments flourish from the recognition that without them, deeply united with its people, the great Spain that we are forging would not have been possible»<sup>xv397</sup>. This public acclamation doubles as a warning for whoever wants to see in the Spanish Armed Forces the democratic drive of the Portuguese ones: «Two things are clear and the head of Government duly reminded them. One that peace is an irreversible conquest of our people and the other that the country must count with the Armed Forces that it deserves»<sup>xvi</sup>.

*La Vanguardia Española* also senses that the Spanish future is involved with the Portuguese one, and one of the ways of showing this is by using the national «we» in its editorial columns: «We hope that our neighbourly and brotherly country will soon find a peaceful path to a solution for its problems. It is in its interest. It is in our own interest»<sup>xvii</sup>. This newspaper also endorses the idea that the previous Portuguese regime lacked support and signals Spínola's book as an evidence of precisely that. Although quite supportive of General Spínola, *La Vanguardia Española* is also from the beginning a strong supporter of an electoral process and states immediately that the establishment of a military regime would constitute a mistake: «It is expected that the perpetrators of the coup, up until now bloodless, will not make the mistake of enforcing a purely military regime, but will search for civilian support and, consequently, for a political thought that grounds their path and guides their action»<sup>xviii398</sup>. In spite of this, the newspaper recognizes that the lack of political culture and isolation of Portugal might constitute

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<sup>397</sup> Editorial: «Potenciación de las fuerzas armadas».1974. in *Arriba*, April 27<sup>th</sup>:2

<sup>398</sup> Editorial: «Portugal y el futuro».1974. in *La Vanguardia española*, April 26<sup>th</sup>:5

a problem in achieving that goal: «Freedom suits the Portuguese people well, however what some observers wonder with uneasiness is if the country will succeed in organizing its political life in order to solve the tremendous problems of its colonies and the ones existing in the metropole»<sup>xix399</sup>.

For that purpose, the newspaper shares advice on how to proceed to successfully install a Western democracy. *La Vanguardia Española* argues that European Socialism has proved successful in restraining the advances of Communism, and therefore Mário Soares needs to build a strong Socialist Party, given the strength of the Portuguese Communist Party. The latter, built clandestinely, is seen as the most organized party and the most ready for action, unlike all other political sectors. In this sense, *La Vanguardia Española*, while advocating for liberal democracies as a suited political horizon, acknowledges social-democracy, represented by the European Socialist parties as a legitimate actor of a democracy, especially for their role in fighting Communism. Like this the newspaper demonstrated from the beginning the antagonism that frames its own political performance: Communism versus liberal democracies.

August Assia's chronicles converge with this line of thought as the chronicler does not disguise that proximity with Western Europe democracies should be the path chosen by Portugal. Assia moreover identifies Junta's – and Spínola's – programme with precisely that: «The revolution's goal as such, the revolution that wants above all to replace the authoritarian system for a democratic one, consists in accessing the common market»<sup>xx400</sup>. Mário Soares' efforts to achieve this purpose are praised incessantly: «[the trip] has become a success susceptible of converting into the first step in a new path Portugal will follow towards

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<sup>399</sup> Editorial: «El Futuro político de Portugal».1974. in *La Vanguardia española*, May 11<sup>th</sup>:5

<sup>400</sup> Assia, Augusto.1974. «Lisboa: No se produjeron los temidos desordenes» in *La Vanguardia española*, May 2<sup>nd</sup>:5-6

Europe»<sup>xxi</sup><sup>401</sup>. Assia thus welcomes the proclamation of Spínola as President of the Portuguese Republic and the nomination of the I Provisional Government, which he considers as two steps forward in that direction: «Portugal took the first step, after forty-eight years of authoritarian government, towards a democratic regime inspired by humanist and liberal principles (...)»<sup>xxii</sup><sup>402</sup>.

Similarly, and following the idea that a Western democracy order was the desired future for Portugal, *Tele/eXprés* celebrates General Spínola's rise to power as President of the Republic, considering it «a great first step towards normality»<sup>xxiii</sup><sup>403</sup>.

Also in *Tele/eXprés*, Manuel Vázquez Montalbán's Spanish reading draws two very explicit lessons. The first one is in fact a Marxist inspired one: «all that is solid melts into air» (Marx and Engels 1974, 27), which is corroborated by the recent Portuguese experience: «The tremendous lesson of Portugal is that in just a couple of hours, with four or five actions and half a dozen measures, fifty years of political sham and tons of useless words and analysis have been buried»<sup>xxiv</sup>. MVM's idea might be connected with the incessant alteration of the capitalist mode of production that demands a continuous overthrow of social institutions in order to keep expanding. The inference for the Spanish situation is implicit and the idea embodies hope for the collapse of the Spanish regime despite its appearance of being everlasting, hinting that also Francoism might lack foundation. Vázquez Montalbán draws a second lesson from the Portuguese events: power can transform itself easily in order to remain effective. In this case the manoeuvre can be seen in the way the political

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<sup>401</sup> Assia, Augusto. 1974. «Lisboa: La gira Extranjera de Mario Soares ha sido una misión diplomática impulsada por la junta » in *La Vanguardia española*, May 5<sup>th</sup>:29

<sup>402</sup> Assia, Augusto. 1974. «Lisboa: Spínola fue proclamado presidente de la Republica en el palacio de Queluz » in *La Vanguardia española*, May 16<sup>th</sup>:5

<sup>403</sup> Editorial: «Tres momentos decisivos». 1974. *Tele/eXprés*, May 21<sup>st</sup>:5

police was forced to take all the blame for the 48 years of authoritarian regime:

Another tremendous lesson is how impassably salazarism and postsalazarism politicians, and their social and political allies, surrendered the police forces as scapegoats of an unfortunate past. The way they handled PIDE is a lesson in political cynicism. It was politically used as the supreme guarantor of a regime devoid of representativeness and now it is used once more as the only responsible for the survival of that regime. Once PIDE was defenestrated no important void of public order emerged<sup>xxv404</sup>.

The neutralization of the political police did not make the system collapse, reinforcing the idea that the regime was supported by a structure that went beyond the coercive mechanisms and that this structure has yet to be made responsible for its role in the maintenance of the former regime.

Also in *Tele/eXprés* Josep Antoni González Casanova, when confronted with the Portuguese events of April 25<sup>th</sup>, presents a defence of an Iberian federalist union project, a reminiscence of the political culture of the 19<sup>th</sup> century very dear to the republican, socialist and anarchist currents, mostly in Catalonia:

The Peninsula will present therefore as the natural framework of development and of economic and cultural expansion for the Portuguese. And if Spain progresses towards solutions more in touch with the popular will, the aspirational convergence will make the political forces of both countries closer until a tighter collaboration. (...) to build systems of political organization that allow to overcome the stagnant and old instruments of the national, traditional and Unitarian State. The Iberian utopia might be as old-fashioned as one wants it to be, but in the peninsular horizon there is not a more progressive project than this one<sup>xxvi405</sup>.

González Casanova, who had been politically active since the beginning of the 1960s as founder of Catalonia's Workers Front [*Front*

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<sup>404</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel. 1974. «Un pacto político» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 30<sup>th</sup>, pp. 10

<sup>405</sup> González Casanova, Josep Antoni. 1974. «España y Portugal» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp. 5

*Obrer de Catalunya* FOC] and then as member of small socialist groups that would integrate the Catalonia Socialist Party-Congress [*Partit Socialista de Catalunya-Congrés* PSC-Congrés], was a Professor of Theory of the State at the Economics Department of the University of Barcelona since 1971. He would later be a consultant for PSOE in the writing of the Spanish Constitution in 1978 and would participate in the writing of the Autonomy Status of Basque Country and Galicia. In this article González Casanova advocates for a State in every possible way opposed to the Francoist one: transnational instead of national; progressive instead of traditional, and pluralist instead of Unitarian. In this context the Portuguese events are used for the expression of a refusal of the present state of affairs. This way González Casanova includes the demands of the several nationalities present in the Spanish State which was one of the lines that guided the oppositionist movements to the Francoist regime.

## b) The lack of frameworks of interpretation

In order to understand and describe what was going on, there was also a need to search for the protagonists of the even, focusing on Spínola as the leading man despite the fact that the revolutionary framework used might hint other directions. Likewise, together with the hierarchical need for finding high-rank protagonists came the need to determine where, after the downfall of the New State, power was then being held.

The most distinctive feature of this moment is the lack of a grid of reference to interpret what is happening in Portugal. The events unfolding in Portugal did not seem to match the ideas of what a revolution should look like. Therefore after Gómez Tello's gaffe<sup>406</sup> of proclaiming tranquillity when a *coup d'état* was taking place, this journalist continues

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<sup>406</sup>«Guerra de calumnias y terrorismo/ Portugal en su calma (y 5)», the last piece of the news report, was published precisely on April 25<sup>th</sup> edition.

reinforcing the state of tranquillity reigning in Portugal by claiming that: «To a Portugal in its tranquillity succeeded a revolution in relative tranquillity. Until now there is no news of serious incidents and it would be hard to call revolution to events that move, in confusing systole and diastole, within the system»<sup>xxvii</sup>. Like the journalists in the field, Gómez Tello also feels there is a lack of interpretative framework to fit the events unfolding in Portugal: «We repeat that it is hard to talk about a revolution when there are no barricades on the streets and when since the early moments a complete secret was made about the names of the members of the Junta»<sup>xxviii</sup>. Gómez Tello then claims that «[t]he street was quiet in March. It does not seem to have been a decisive factor yesterday either»<sup>xxix407</sup>, thus dismissing the role of the people in the events that took place in Lisbon on April 25<sup>th</sup>. This early confusion about the character of what is happening is generalized, as Augusto Assia elaborates at length:

Some of the things that happened and are happening in Lisbon since the 25<sup>th</sup> look very much like a revolution. Others not at all. The political police, whose name and manners had been changed by Dr. Caetano, has been dissolved and this is without a doubt a revolutionary act. (...) What kind of lynching is this one that is called «almost», and what kind of crowds are these ones that «almost» lynch? (...) but banners, signs on the walls and shouts do not break bones and they are a big step away from a revolution. (...) [Regarding the way «Salazar bridge» was renamed «April 25<sup>th</sup> bridge», a member of the Junta claims] that the revolution was not coming to kill the dead. A revolution that does not come to kill the dead does not seem that revolutionary, since killing the living is one of the passions of all revolutions, and killing the dead is even more so. (...) This is the contradictory atmosphere I found Portugal in. (...) When first meeting the country it is seriously hard to find anything other than contradictions. (...) The total number of casualties is ten. It seems that all were killed by the police and not one by the crowd, which, again, is not a very revolutionary sign<sup>xxx408</sup>.

Most observers denote this lack of framework to understand what was actually going on in Portugal and end up resorting to their own

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<sup>407</sup> Gómez Tello, J.L.1974. «Portugal: de la calma a la Revolución» in *Arriba*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp11

<sup>408</sup> Assia, Augusto.1974. «Una revolución que no es una revolución de corte clásico» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 30<sup>th</sup>:21

political culture to contextualize what they are witnessing. According to Rebelo, the secret of the performance rests in the ability to resort to analogies, but also «in access to adequate sources, in the competence to make the un-said of the interlocutor explicit; in the agility in crossing statements; in the insightfulness for detecting apparently insignificant details; in the aptitude in reconstructing the event»<sup>xxxii</sup> (1994:112). Because it is a revolution even if it does not look like one, most often the frameworks used are of previous revolutionary processes, such as the Russian or the Cuban one, but also of other periods of unrest such as 14 April 1931 in Spain or the May of '68 in Paris.

The arrivals of former political exiles, especially of Álvaro Cunhal and Mário Soares, are described by most journalists using the imaginary of the Russian revolution. Mário Soares arrived by train on April 28<sup>th</sup> and Álvaro Cunhal by plane two days later. Although most journalists focus on the arrival of the Communist leader rather than of the Socialist, the framework used is the same: Lenin's arrival to Saint Petersburg. Eduardo Corregedor da Fonseca, the Portuguese correspondent of *Informaciones*, in turn resorts to a national framework: «The return of Dr. Soares recalled the arrival, also to this city, of General Humberto Delgado when he was a candidate to the presidency of the Republic»<sup>xxxiii</sup><sup>409</sup>.

In *La Vanguardia Española*, Augusto Assia, who unlike most of the special correspondents attends Soares' arrival and not Cunhal's, makes an explicit comparison with the soviet leader:

Mario Soares, the dynamic socialist leader, returned to Lisbon from his exile in Paris, like Lenin returned to San Petersburg from his exile in Zurich and this is a revolutionary act. Soares addressed the people from a balcony, like all revolutionary do when they return from exile to carry

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<sup>409</sup> Corregedor da Fonseca, Eduardo. 1974. «Vuelven los exiliados políticos » in *Informaciones*, April 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.1



out a revolution. But unlike the «May theses»<sup>410</sup>, what he said to the excited crowd gathered in front of the baroque Santa Apolonia Station was: “This is a moment of unity” and this can hardly be considered revolutionary<sup>xxxiii 411</sup>.

The upstage of Soares’ arrival by Cunhal’s is highlighted in *Tele/eXprés* by Xavier Roig, according to whom «[i]t is also quite likely that the appearance of the secretary general of the Communist party in legalised public life might have, at least by now, considerably upstaged the momentum of Soares’ spectacular arrival»<sup>xxxiv412</sup>. Despite not using it explicitly, Roig also frames Cunhal’s arrival within the imaginary of the Russian revolution by admitting its use by others:

There as a unique moment when several armed soldiers that cheered Cunhal placed themselves in front of a banner where the end of the colonial war was demanded. Minutes after his arrival by plane (...) Cunhal was forced by the crowds’ cheers to hop on an armoured car invited by young Army officers. From the top of the car Cunhal incited his followers with a megaphone, while the soldiers set guard around him. From the crowd shouts were heard about the presence among it of hated «pides», denouncing the possibility they could endanger Cunhal’s life. Cunhal accepted the advice given and talked surrounded by Army officers and other communist and socialist leaders. No other scene illustrated as dramatically as this one the change already happened in Portuguese life since the downfall of Caetano’s dictatorial regime. Several observers, like what happened with Soares, compared Cunhal’s return to Lenin’s arrival to Finland Station in Leningrad in 1917: Cunhal also adopted a clear conciliatory posture available to share power in the projected provisional government<sup>xxxv</sup>.

By climbing on top of a combat tank to address a demanding and enthusiastic multitude, Cunhal is rapidly in the spotlight. In *Arriba*, Francisco Caparrós highlights not only this action but also the fact that by doing so, Cunhal suddenly found himself in the middle of the

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<sup>410</sup> Probably a reference to the Spanish civil war events in Barcelona of May 1937 that embodied a division among the left united in the Republican faction fighting the National’s insurgency.

<sup>411</sup> Assia, Augusto.1974. «Una revolución que no es una revolución de corte clásico» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 30<sup>th</sup>:21

<sup>412</sup> Roig, Xavier.1974. «Se pide calma y serenidad» in *Tele/eXprés*, May 1<sup>st</sup>, pp.3

Communists' former military enemies, illustrating the profound change already happened in Portugal:

The most anecdotic detail of this action is that Cunhal addressed his supporters from a tank flanked by armour-plated cars that had cleared the area a moment earlier. The Communist leader, while climbing on top of the tank, embraced a young paratrooper officer, a body of the Army until now profoundly hated by the members of the Portuguese Communist party, given it had been used frequently to stop demonstrations<sup>xxxvi</sup> 413.

Despite all the similarities with the soviet experience generally assumed, Francisco Caparrós remarks that contrary to what was expected «(...) “The international” was not one of the songs heard»<sup>xxxvii</sup>. Likewise, Assia hints at an effective transformation of the Communist leader: «Cunhal returns somewhat old, he is 60 years-old, maybe a little purged of his Portuguese romanticism and surely lectured by the serious central-European soviet school»<sup>xxxviii</sup> 414. This once again shows how the Portuguese Revolution was unsettling international observers' predetermined grids of interpretation. Augusto Assia frequently adopts historical frameworks, not only the ones related to the Soviet experience as mentioned above, but also other (and mostly) European ones. For instance, to characterize Palma Carlos, the first Prime Minister after the coup, Assia goes back to famous leaders, claiming that Palma Carlos is not a Churchill or a de Gaulle, but might be an Adenauer<sup>415</sup>. As for Álvaro Cunhal – and by his own account paying him a compliment – Assia

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<sup>413</sup> Caparrós, Francisco. 1974. «Las fuerzas políticas buscan un puesto en el gobierno» in *Arriba*, May 1<sup>st</sup>:11

<sup>414</sup> Assia, Augusto.1974. «Lisboa: Primeros síntomas de desasosiego en las altas esferas de la revolución» in *La Vanguardia española*, May 1<sup>st</sup>:3

<sup>415</sup> Assia, Augusto.1974. «Lisboa: se empieza a sentir el efecto sedante y apaciguador del nuevo gobierno» in *La Vanguardia española*, May 19<sup>th</sup>:27

confesses that he does not even look like a Communist, like Trotsky or Lenin, but like an «old and distinguished actor»<sup>416</sup>.

In order to understand and describe what was going on, there was also a need to search for the protagonists of the event, focusing on the Military Institution and especially portraying Spínola as the leading man despite the fact that the revolutionary framework used might hint other directions. Likewise, together with the hierarchical need for finding high-rank protagonists came the need to determine who, after the downfall of the New State, held power, which allowed for a better understanding of what was in fact happening.

Like this in *Arriba* Jesús Suevos considers the military coup as an unavoidable outcome to the situation the New State was enduring: «What for some time now was expected to happen ultimately happened in Portugal: the Army took power through a *coup d'état*»<sup>xxxix</sup>. This idea is backed, according to Suevos, by history, namely the French example of the Algerian question:

And history, with its paradoxical tendency, demonstrates that only the Armed Forces are able to tackle negative events, when there is more to lose than to win (ex. de Gaulle). It is possible that now in Portugal it is another soldier, Spínola, the one who will do something similar in his country (...) But certainly what the Military cannot do could not possible be done by civilians, in Portugal like in previously France<sup>xl 417</sup>.

Similarly, Vázquez Montalbán underlines the inability of civilians to address the colonial question, in Portugal much like in France:

The Portuguese situation in 1974 reminds the French one in 1958, even if just in the dimension on how to end a colonial Empire. Politicians were not able to do it in France despite all the power that democratic authority granted them, and neither were they in Portugal, maybe because of all the authority that a totalitarian dictatorship removes from them. The question is that it took a conservative military like Spínola,

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<sup>416</sup> Assia, Augusto.1974. «Lisboa: La revolución del 25 de abril sigue enfrentándose con problemas de difícil solución »in *La Vanguardia española*, May 22<sup>nd</sup>:26

<sup>417</sup> Suevos, Jesús. 1974. «Portugal, en el disparadero» in *Arriba*, April 30<sup>th</sup>, pp5

who has considerable personal economic interests overseas (concretely in Portuguese Guinea), to say the first fairly wise legal words about the relationship between Portugal and its Empire<sup>xli 418</sup>.

Although they converge in the comparison with France and on the preponderance the Military institution had in the solution of the problem, there is no convergence possible on what a good solution for the colonial problem is.

In *Tele/eXprés*, more than the «de Gaulle» archetype of a decolonizing General, Jaume Miravittles sees in General Spínola General Prim's desire of Europeanization of an Iberian, hence backward, country:

General Spínola, who just took power of the situation in Portugal, has been compared to General de Gaulle (...) Given the little we know about Spínola in terms of domestic affairs he is closer to General Prim, who in Spain implemented the Liberal Monarchy of Amadeo de Saboya and who, representing the emerging bourgeoisie, wanted to set the clock of Spain by the European time<sup>xlii 419</sup>.

If Miravittles sees General Spínola as the representative of the interests of the Portuguese bourgeoisie, Vázquez Montalbán considers Spínola more than a representative but himself an interested part in pursuing a neo-colonial solution for the African territories. Furthermore, MVM does not see much improvement in Spínola taking over Marcelo Caetano's place: «Well then. If the young officers' movement ends up in the hands of Spínola, it cannot be said that things will be worst, but they will not certainly be better given the seriousness of the problem. Spínola is a radical authoritarian, without a political force of any kind supporting him and without the slightest intention of leaning on the opposition»<sup>xliii 420</sup>.

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<sup>418</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel. 1974. «Un de Gaulle para Portugal» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp. 12

<sup>419</sup> Miravittles, Jaume. 1974. «Spinola = De Gaulle+Prim» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>420</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel. 1974. «Un de Gaulle para Portugal» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp. 12

In the pages of *Tele/eXprés* both Vázquez Montalbán and González Casanova enhance the existing relationship between the political and the economic powers that are supporting General Spínola. González Casanova sees in Spínola someone who is at the service of both national and international capital: «The forty families of the monopolies and the multinational companies trust him [Spínola]. The United States and all the potential buyers of the low-cost African “confiscation” trust him. All has to change for everything to remain the same»<sup>xliv421</sup>. Similarly, for MVM Spínola ensures a transition of political system without a transformation of the social structure, something that he had already claimed not to be a sufficient transformation:

The nihilist craziness of postsalazarism had left the bourgeoisie without spare political solutions and the ones who wonder what Spínola’s role in the Regime’ collapse was have an indisputable logical answer: Spínola is the warranty that the normalization of the left-wing status will not mean the loss of a historical opportunity for the democratic right-wing. (...) And one of the elementary truths of this alphabet is the interrelationship between the political and the social pact. The great Portuguese entrepreneurs are interested in knowing who is who, who supports who, and how much support everyone has<sup>xlv 422</sup>.

While confronting Spínola and Mário Soares’ respective political stances in *La Vanguardia Española*, Baltasar Porcel draws attention to the fact that what during the regime seemed like a progressive stance – referring to Spínola’s defence of a political solution for the colonial war – might «now automatically start to embody the reactionary face of the situation»<sup>xlvi</sup>. Porcel also argues that «[t]hat Portugal of a week ago is not, at least for the moment, because you never know, the same of today»<sup>xlvii</sup>. For this reason, according to Porcel the only way out for General Spínola

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<sup>421</sup> González Casanova, Josep Antoni. 1974. «Primeiro de mayo en Lisboa» in *Tele/eXprés*, May 3<sup>rd</sup> pp. 5

<sup>422</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel. 1974. «Un pacto político» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 30<sup>th</sup>, pp. 10

is to follow de Gaulle's path and «slightly vary his assumptions»<sup>xlviii</sup>, like the French General did regarding Algeria.

Majorcan writer Baltasar Porcel, an important name for literature written in Catalan, collaborated as a journalist with several Barcelona-based publications such as *La Vanguardia Española*, *Destino*, *Tele estel* or *Serra d'Or*. On this occasion, Porcel reminisces into his own past and recalls interviewing Mário Soares at the moment of the 1969 electoral process, portraying the Socialist leader as the «the supreme leader of the Portuguese opposition»<sup>xliv</sup>, then and at the present moment. In fact, Porcel calls the attention of international observers to Soares: «But I believe that observers should notably take into account, while wondering about “o futuro” of Portugal, Mario Soares' consecutive steps... »<sup>1 423</sup>.

But if some critical positions towards the Portuguese General can be found within the Spanish press, the most generalized one, at this moment, is a laudatory opinion. Spínola is presented as «a great colonial soldier»<sup>li</sup> and «one of the most notable colonial heroes»<sup>lii 424</sup>. In *Tele/eXprés* the General is also called «Spínola, the monocle hero (...)»<sup>liii</sup>, and Jorge Ventura sees him as a leader that «[c]leverly knew how to hide his cards and not to confuse his young officers followers, accepting for that, to relinquish his official rank»<sup>liv 425</sup>.

Lastly one of the difficulties most special correspondents expressed when arriving in Portugal was to understand where and by whom, after the downfall of the previous regime, power was being held. If Manuel Leguineche asks «[b]ut who is the Gaddafi of this upheaval?»<sup>lv</sup>

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<sup>423</sup> Porcel, Baltasar.1974. «Los dos “Portugal e o futuro” De Spinola a Mario Soares» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 30<sup>th</sup> pp. 22

<sup>424</sup> Areiliza, José María.1974. «El centro de gravedad «Manu militar», al principio y al fin» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.7

<sup>425</sup> Ventura, Jorge. 1974.«Spinola, el militar que no quiso victorias pírricas» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>426</sup>, Francisco Caparrós wonders if «is Spínola really in charge of the Junta?»<sup>lvi 427</sup>, and José Rey assures that «Spínola, as expected, is the leader of the situation»<sup>lvii 428</sup>. Barrenechea and Carandell, in turn, have clearer answers. The interview they had with the members of the MC on their previous visit allowed them to dismiss General Spínola's role in the development of the entire operation<sup>429</sup>. If Spínola was heading the process it was a result of the conjuncture, since a clear ideological division between General and Captains regarding the colonial problem solution was a given from the start. Later on Barrenechea gives more details about political differences between these two groups, considering that «General Spínola and the other six members of the National Salvation Junta represent the liberal, bourgeois and capitalist right-wing, which is in charge. The young officers (...) are the ones who are making possible the legal game of the left possible»<sup>lviii 430</sup>.

For most the immediate response to the question “where is the power” was, as we saw, the Military. But since the Military Institution was also no longer what it had once been, the long and close relationship between the Armed Forces and the New State dictatorship became one of the recurrent topics surrounding this debate.

In *La Vanguardia Española*, José María de Areiliza, later Foreign Affairs Minister of the first Monarchic government, underlines the part the Armed forces had in the establishment of the regime they ended up

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<sup>426</sup> Leguineche, Manuel. 1974. «Castello [sic] Branco: "Ni un solo soldado en los puestos de control"» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 26<sup>th</sup>:8

<sup>427</sup> Caparrós, Francisco. 1974. «Las fuerzas políticas buscan un puesto en el gobierno» in *Arriba*, May 1<sup>st</sup>:11

<sup>428</sup> Rey, José. 1974. «Doce muertos y más de cien heridos» in *Arriba*, April 26<sup>th</sup>:36

<sup>429</sup> Carandell, Luís. 1974. «El movimiento de los Capitanes» in *Informaciones*, April 25<sup>th</sup>:17

<sup>430</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1974. «Es probable que Spínola asuma la jefatura de estado» in *Informaciones*, April 30<sup>th</sup>:1-2

burying: «After almost half a century of a paternal, stagnant, corporative power and resistant to any kind of change, what began at the hands of the Army in 1926 ends at the hands of the Army in 1974»<sup>lix 431</sup>.

In turn, in *ABC*'s weekly international politics column «Los últimos siete días», Emilio Lozano understands the latest developments in Portugal to be a result of negotiations between the military and political elites. Lozano reaches this conclusion because of «the time between the publication of Spínola's book and the coup d'état of past Thursday, [which] was used by Caetano to get a political compromise that could had been to grant the presidency to the African general without Salazar's successor leaving power»<sup>lx</sup>, and the fact that «there was willingness and dialogue between the Armed Forces and Caetano [as] demonstrated by the respectful treatment given to the fallen President of the Republic and prime-minister, who were taken until the airplane bridge with military honours»<sup>lxi</sup>. In this sense, what happened in Portugal is seen as a movement propelled by the elites that was well received by the people: «The Portuguese nation seems to have supported, with relief, the Armed Forces' revolution»<sup>lxii 432</sup>.

Nadal's interpretation diverges from the previous ones, in that he connects the coup with a parting of the Armed Forces from values of the regime. Nadal, a monarchist supporter and member of Don Juan de Borbón's private council, worked during the civil war in several of the nationalist faction newspapers. For several decades he was a journalist in *La Vanguardia Española*, becoming deputy editor-in-chief of the newspaper in 1969, and from 1971 President of the Barcelona Press Association, until his death in 1974. Unlike other commentators, Nadal

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<sup>431</sup> Areiliza, José María. 1974. «El centro de gravedad «Manu militar», al principio y al fin» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.7

<sup>432</sup> Lozano, Emilio. 1974. «Portugal, ruptura inevitable» in *ABC*, April 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.41



recognizes in the lower ranks of the Armed Forces, belonging primarily to the Army, the true protagonists of the regime's burial:

It is quite clear that the April 25<sup>th</sup> coup has been organized more by Officers and Heads than by Generals. (...) therefore, once realized the Heads and Officers that had organized it and conducted it searched for a visible leader within the Military ranks. They discovered that one of the only leaders of the supreme hierarchy in disagreement with the Salazarist African policies was Spínola<sup>lxiii</sup>.

Thus not only the protagonists are different than expected, but Nadal also identifies the hierarchic question, which is growing on the inside of the Military Institution, and wonders about its importance in a near future: «A great deal of Portugal's future depends on how a Captain, Otero Carbalho [sic], for instance, who reportedly is one of the main promoters of the successful politico-military venture, and his colleagues, obey or not the main political lines dictated by the Junta chaired by Spínola»<sup>lxiv</sup> 433. Nadal thus hints that a power shift has already happened.

In *Tele/eXprés*, J. Martin explains the details of this relationship and grounds this coup in the fundamental structural change happened within the Military Institution since the beginning – and in part as a result – of the colonial war: the replacement of the social origin of the officers.

Martin conceives Portugal «like the South American countries»<sup>lxv</sup>434, which means that «(...) the neighbouring Republic lives socially in the nineteenth century, and even if there is still room there for the ambitions of family clans, the haute bourgeoisie deserted the military profession in favour of better remunerated situations»<sup>lxvi</sup>. Given the start of the colonial wars in the African territories, «[t]he “good families” lost interest in having their children wasting their time fight in Guinea's jungle and risking losing a leg in a treacherous minefield. It is safer, convenient

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<sup>433</sup> Nadal, Santiago. 1974. «Los hechos de Portugal. El Ejército, tema central» in *La Vanguardia española*, May 2<sup>nd</sup> pp. 21

<sup>434</sup> Martin, J. 1974. «Los capitanes rebeldes» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

and above all else “profitable” to place them in a company (bank, export company, “holdings”) belonging to the family»<sup>lxvii</sup>. As a result the Military Institution is no longer composed by an upper-class majority and has been replaced by the petty-bourgeoisie. This is a fundamental change that means that «Heads of government, bankers and heads of monopolistic companies no longer have a younger brother in the Army»<sup>lxviii</sup>. But this shift particularly means that the Portuguese Armed Forces were no longer available to defend the economic interests in the African colonies of a class that was not their own.

Soon enough the idea of military hegemony is pushed aside due to the emergence of civilian politics, regardless of the distinctive forms they were then taking. While in Lisbon, and confronted with the first urban occupations, Augusto Assia is quick to distinguish the existence in Portugal of two different powers. On one corner there is the Junta and on the opposite corner there is the street. This is a situation that the journalist assumes is provoking anxiety not only in the Junta, but also himself:

The fear that if crowds, led by the returning agitators and the ones who were already here, follow a different path than the one the Army can and is able to pursue, the situation might reach before time a crossroads that will prevent the ones who put the revolution in motion and the ones who are trying to exploit it for their own personal benefit together, is looming. (...) the secret goal is credited to Communists from all tendencies backed by anarchists and other sinister movements<sup>lxix 435</sup>.

Assia does not conceive street power without its manipulation by the Communist Party, and this makes him nervous. By then the street seems to be ruled differently, a claim with which Vázquez Montalbán agrees but without fearing the results, like Assia does.

The ever-mentioned void of power left by the withdrawal of the Caetanist administration, despite the official transference to General

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<sup>435</sup> Assia, Augusto. 1974. «Lisboa: Primeros síntomas de desasosiego en las altas esferas de la revolución» in *La Vanguardia española*, May 1<sup>st</sup>:3

Spínola in order to «not let power fall on the street» (since Caetano refused to hand power over to the Captains), was filled by the union of the Armed forces and the left-wing goals, according to the *Tele/eXprés* columnist. He also argues that «the left wing is convinced that it dominates the street, but not the sentry boxes that patrol the street. The army is convinced that the street is out of its control, but that it dominates the sentry boxes that patrol the street»<sup>lxx 436</sup>. For MVM the power balance of the entire situation lies in this dynamics.

Juan Ramón Pérez de las Clotas arrives later but nevertheless identifies the dynamics of the situation easily, given that he understands the claim for amnesty as an imposition of the «younger and more radical sector»<sup>lxxi</sup> over the «great men who are their superiors»<sup>lxxii</sup>. To counteract this situation and to be able to remain in power, Pérez Clotas defends that Spínola urgently needs to form «a vast block, able to attract the conservative sector of the country, not compromised with the former regime, or even some sectors attached to it – there should be a couple of Caetanists still left, I say – (...) And urgent, as well, given that for each hour that passes the organized left wing increases its pressures and influence»<sup>lxxiii 437</sup>. Nonetheless, according to Pérez Clotas, the formation of this support bloc should not mean the incorporation of former rulers, given that this journalist voices his disregard for the last ones to jump on the bandwagon, unable to stick to their own former convictions. Therefore he classifies Veiga Simão's declarations when adhering to the new order as «pathetic». In fact *Arriba* and *pyresa*'s special correspondent deems the suicide of a member of the Portuguese Legion «more noteworthy than

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<sup>436</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel. 1974. « El precio de la libertad » in *Tele/eXprés*, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp. 11

<sup>437</sup> Pérez de las Clotas, Juan Ramón. 1974. «Portugal: tensiones en el nuevo equipo dirigente» in *Arriba*, May 5<sup>th</sup>:12

much of his former companions»<sup>lxxiv</sup> and as the last casualty – at that moment – of the revolution.

This formation of a support bloc, mentioned by Pérez Clotas, is understood by González Casanova in *Tele/eXprés* as the organization of the counter-revolutionary movement, which he feels is already in action: «The counter-revolution – if there was even a revolution – is already, at this precise moment – on its way. The National Salvation Junta can harbour a lot of things in the future, from a democratic and socialist Portugal to the same oligarchy as always: the forty families dressed up for the ceremony of “decolonization” and confusion. Dressed up for the party, their own party»<sup>lxxv438</sup>. Given all these elements, the view of the military taking charge of the situation cannot be completely univocal, especially in the sense that the Portuguese military institution is not, after all, what could be expected.

### c) The Military take charge: divergent interpretations

Unclear about what is actually happening in Portugal, two main attitudes towards the Military taking power among special correspondents surface: alarm and joy. On the 26<sup>th</sup> both José Rey and Francisco Caparrós in their respective «Atmosphere chronicles» emphasize unrest on the pages of *Arriba*, and on the 28<sup>th</sup> Adrian Mac Liman, in *La Vanguardia Española*, still contributes to this alarmist vision.

However like most of the correspondents in Lisbon, in the pages of *Arriba* (where contradictory views are expressed), José Reis enhances normality by describing everyday life details that would have been disturbed if a revolution were actually taking place: «There was already mail, bread and milk distribution, as well as garbage collection. Trams and

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<sup>438</sup> González Casanova, Josep Antoni. 1974. «Primeiro de mayo en Lisboa» in *Tele/eXprés*, May 3<sup>rd</sup> pp. 5

buses make their usual rounds, following their regular schedules. All newspapers could be bought today»<sup>lxxvi439</sup>. The peculiarity of the Portuguese revolution is not just that everyday life resumed very promptly, but also the absence of major disturbances, as «[t]hroughout the event of the past Thursday, neither electricity, nor water or gas were cut. Telephones worked at every moment, even if in some areas of the capital there were some breakdowns due to excessive consumption»<sup>lxxvii</sup>. This contradicts the common sense idea of how a revolution reverberates in everyday life.

In *ABC* José Salas adds more details to the normality of the situation: «The borders are open. The normality is absolute. In this context, people are able to devote to their normal tasks. These were the first news broadcasted by the radio yesterday at nine o'clock in the morning»<sup>lxxviii 440</sup>.

A certain degree of incongruence, mitigated by the fact that different days are at stake, is present in *La Vanguardia Española*. Indeed, while the correspondent in Lisbon, Inocente Palazón Olivares, an infrequent writer for the newspaper at this moment, portrays Lisbon as an empty and undisturbed city, stating that «[o]ver Lisbon falls a light drizzle and the city streets seem to be totally deserted. Every once in a while it is possible only to see a taxi or the car delivering newspapers»<sup>lxxix441</sup>, Adrián

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<sup>439</sup> Reis, José. 1974. «Declaración política de la Junta de Salvación nacional» in *Arriba*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.11

<sup>440</sup> Salas, José. 1974. « Cinco muertos en el golpe de estado» in *ABC*, April 28<sup>th</sup>, pp. 35

<sup>441</sup> Palazón Olivares, Inocente. 1974. « Lisboa: Marcelo Caetano se entregó sin resistencia a las fuerzas sublevadas» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp. 5-6

Mac Liman<sup>442</sup>, writing a few days after the coup, finds Lisbon a rather unsafe place to be in:

(...) during the entire night we witnessed street demonstrations, not always peaceful given that in specific occasions groups of youths attacked several public buildings, banks and newsrooms of newspapers. (...) Likewise, the National Popular Action headquarters was assaulted (...) At these incidents, which took a couple of hours, were heard several shootings, many of them of warning, made to control the rebellious people that were causing the several passers-by to panic. One of the shots hit a policeman on duty, resulting in one casualty. Store windows were also broken and in some cases pillaged, and some of the petty-thieves were detained<sup>lxxx443</sup>.

*La Vanguardia Española*'s special correspondent Manuel Leguineche had no problems crossing the border, and all the tranquillity he found – «I had to wake the policeman and with a smile he told me to go on»<sup>lxxx1</sup> – led him to understand the coup as a «Portuguese-style coup d'état»<sup>lxxxii</sup>. This meant that «[t]he young sleepy border policeman had nothing but a faint idea that something odd had happened in Lisbon. (...) Communications over the telephone with Lisbon are impossible; the radio programmes are slightly disturbed; the circulation is completely normal, I have not seen a soldier yet»<sup>lxxxiii</sup>. But since Leguineche «travelled almost 600 kilometres, through the places from where the coup departed»<sup>lxxxiv</sup>, he considers that «[t]he impact of the coup in the real country, in rural Portugal, has been minimal. (...) Normality is the word heard everywhere. (...) the commotion is located in the streets of Lisbon, where the first reprisals against the regime's repressive organizations are happening»<sup>lxxxv444</sup>.

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<sup>442</sup> Adrián Mac Liman was *La Vanguardia Española*'s correspondent in Genève (who has also some articles published by *Informaciones*) travels to Lisbon as Special Correspondent on this occasion.

<sup>443</sup> Mac Liman, Adrián. 1974. «Manifestaciones y violentos disturbios en el centro de Lisboa» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 28<sup>th</sup>:6

<sup>444</sup> Leguineche, Manuel. 1974. «La emisión radiada de una canción fue la contraseña para el levantamiento militar» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>:8

Contrarily, while writing from Oporto, José Rey is responsible for the most alarmist pieces published at this moment, which in fact made it to the front page of *Arriba*. In the first piece, titled «Twelve casualties and more than a hundred injured» [Doce muertos y más de cien heridos], he gives an account of the casualties occurred at the PIDE-DGS headquarters. Alongside «the morning victims (...) the revolutionary balance amounts to twelve deaths and a number that should reach the hundred injured»<sup>lxxxvi445</sup>. The next day, this journalist somewhat retracts himself by writing that «[c]alm continues across the country»<sup>lxxxvii446</sup>, and by using the word «continues» he implies it was felt earlier, despite his alarmist chronicle of the previous day.

In Francisco Caparrós there is an evolution towards the object of his work, from an alarmist first impression to being taken away by the revolutionary atmosphere following the May 1<sup>st</sup> demonstration<sup>447</sup>. After having trouble crossing the border where «almost a hundred journalists and travellers had to wait for over twenty hours, since on same Thursday night, at ten thirty, the border was closed»<sup>lxxxviii</sup>, Caparrós felt unrest in «the confused orders that the border guards received»<sup>lxxxix</sup>. He also claims to have felt the unrest upon his arrival in Lisbon, where «[c]alm is less than what it appears on the surface»<sup>xc</sup>, since «[t]he demonstrations organized by socialist groups are on the street since early in the morning.

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<sup>445</sup> Rey, José. 1974. «Doce muertos y más de cien heridos» in *Arriba*, April 26<sup>th</sup>:36

<sup>446</sup> Rey, José. 1974. «Continua la calma en todo el país» in *Arriba*, April 27<sup>th</sup>:12

<sup>447</sup> In retrospective, Caparrós claims to have been censored while in mission in Portugal, when his chronicles were published at the end of the newspaper or not published at all (Lamata 2014). Regarding the chronicles published, for the most part they appeared in the «international section» side by side with Gómez Tello's column «El Mundo», or in some occasions (i.e. April 27<sup>th</sup>) on the front-page and finishing on the last one, given it was the space dedicated to the «latest news». On the other hand, regarding the Mayday chronicle, which Caparrós claims to have been censored, one chronicle about that event was published, but perhaps the journalist is referring to a different one.

Some of them are peaceful, others involve shootings. Precisely this morning, on Marqués [sic] de Pombal square, a group of demonstrators painted a hammer and sickle on the statue»<sup>xci</sup>.

Caparrós moreover believes that although «[t]he rest of the population keeps trying to go about its normal life, but it would not be surprising that if touched by the euphoria of their fellow countrymen euphoria, it would decide to openly demonstrate as well, what would cause serious public order problems, problems that the Salvation Junta, for now, does not seem to be willing to mitigate»<sup>xcii448</sup>.

Contradicting the fearful account of some of the special correspondents of *Arriba* and *La Vanguardia Española*, and in some way the idea of normality, *Informaciones* and *Tele/eXprés*' special correspondents Carandell, Barrenechea and Xavier Roig, respectively, describe a country completely overwhelmed with joy and celebrations.

On the 27<sup>th</sup> Carandell<sup>449</sup> denies the alarmist idea and Barrenechea dismisses the importance of the existing violence, since a *coup d'état* had basically been carried out, which is in itself a potential violent situation. Barrenechea writes in a very personal style, sometimes involving a dialogue with the reader, like when he argues that «[n]evertheless, today's demonstration, which will be reaching its climax when you reader get to read these lines, is following its official programme»<sup>xciii450</sup>. His first impression is that the country is experiencing extreme joy: «The atmosphere of last Thursday and Friday propel optimism. The laugh is contagious, the joy is pleasant by nature and inside the box of human resonance the notes that this people is playing find a profound echo

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<sup>448</sup> Caparrós, Francisco. 1974. «Manifestaciones y tiroteos en las calles» in *Arriba*, April 27<sup>th</sup>:1 and 40

<sup>449</sup> Carandell, Luís. 1974. «El Pueblo en la Calle» in *Informaciones*, April 27<sup>th</sup>:5

<sup>450</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1974. «Inquietud en los círculos económicos portugueses» in *Informaciones*, May 1<sup>st</sup>:32



(...))<sup>xciv</sup>. Barrenechea's optimism is linked to the possibility that this coup might put Portugal a step forward in the European direction – «Portugal gave a big step forward closer to Europe (...)»<sup>xcv</sup>– which would mean an opportunity for the country to move on and leave behind a past of backwardness: «the future of Portugal will be hard and plenty of risks, that is certain. But it is a future. After fifty years of owning nothing but past, the Portuguese people can already think about tomorrow. (...) In only two days, this country went from Africa to Europe»<sup>xcvi451</sup>.

This journalist insists on his earlier «rooster» metaphor, arguing that this animal symbolizes the awakening of the Portuguese people: «At dawn the roosters are singing again in Portugal. (...) There have been deaths, but so few that not many coups present a less unfortunate result. However it was necessary to leave some “taps of the great reservoir” open. And demonstrations calling for strikes took place and some the windows of some shops were smashed. But that was that»<sup>xcvii452</sup>.

While opposing some of the Spanish analysis, Barrenechea nevertheless denies the leftist or extremist nature of the MFA, emphasizing the liberal feature of the demands voiced: «In short, this is a liberal-bourgeois revolution, painted in a socialist colour. It is hardly surprising. Portugal did not have in its history a bourgeois revolution or a social one. This void is being filled by a coup that tries to mix both of them. It is not at all surprising»<sup>xcviii453</sup>.

Xavier Roig, who in his chronicles pays a lot of attention to the atmosphere on the streets of Lisbon, in turn rebuts the idea of emptiness

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<sup>451</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1974. «Todos los partidos son legales» in *Informaciones*, April 29<sup>th</sup>:3

<sup>452</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1974. «Los gallos cantan» in *informaciones*, April 27<sup>th</sup>: 5

<sup>453</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1974. «Todos los partidos son legales» in *Informaciones*, April 29<sup>th</sup>:3

and portrays minor events of unrest as a result of the euphoria felt on the streets and the desire for celebration: «The Portuguese people's reaction was of happiness and satisfaction for Caetano's downfall. Citizens expressed their joy before a promise of civil liberties and offered soldiers food and drinks on the streets. A group of civilians sacked a liquor store, distributing bottles of wine among the soldiers.<sup>xciX454</sup>.

But the fear remains latent, especially due to the demonstration announced for May 1<sup>st</sup>. On the eve of this demonstration, Gómez Tello, still very worried about order and tranquillity, distinguished several reactions of the people he had very recently characterized as disengaged. For Gómez Tello «[y]esterday's Portugal is dividing into zones where populations reacted differently»<sup>c</sup>: the sector that backed the Armed forces' action by inertia; the sector far from Lisbon and Oporto that is observing all that is happening and is starting to get uncomfortable when faced with signs of disorder – such as «violence, red flags, raised fists, sickles and hammers»<sup>ci</sup> – and finally the sector, portrayed as minority, composed of «organized groups of the political parties, a minority coming from democratic and liberal tendencies and better organized groups coming from the Socialist and the Communist parties»<sup>cii</sup> that are trying to «take-over the street».

Gómez Tello argues that the sector that has been mainly observing the events unfold must show its support for the Junta in order to contain other political sectors, since the repressive structures of the State collapsed. Indeed, «partly since Caetano's time and partly as a consequence of the situation provoked by the coup, the State defence

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<sup>454</sup> Roig, Xavier.1974. «El Pueblo Portugués acoge la nueva situación con esperanza» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

instruments have disintegrated, and therefore for now the maintenance of order is falling overwhelmingly on the military»<sup>ciii 455</sup>.

The lack of order is also a cause of concern for *ABC*'s correspondent. José Salas is very disappointed with the continuous demonstrations and protests happening in Lisbon in the name of freedom, for he believes that they are the kind of actions that taint the essence of this coup:

And these popular joys brought protection to a series of demonstrations that come to distort its truthful essence. Casting aside other less important demonstrations, such as the ones in front of the General Direction of Security, the smashing of window shops, especially banks in Lisbon's commercial centre, the assault on the caetanist newspaper «*Epoca*» and other events of the same type, I would like to mention what happened in the beautiful Rossio square. (...) even if these days shows, as I say, the scars of the several political stoning I was referring to previously, in the name of the celebrated freedom (...)<sup>civ 456</sup>.

This journalist particularly condemns the destruction of the symbols and structures that supported a very long authoritarian regime, such as the headquarters of the political police and a pro-government newspaper and, in general, all street activities that might damage the city. His criticism is made in the name of an essence of freedom that is not being respected and that Salas y Guirior does not define. What Salas does is actually to continue with the alarmist vision very much present in the first couple of days, mostly in *Arriba* but also in *La Vanguardia Española*, and along with *ABC* these three newspapers constitute the space where alarm is staged.

Regardless of the existing chaos, Augusto Assia firmly opposes the possibility of a communist take-over of the process, «[t]he idea that the new, experienced and cold Communist parties, either directed from

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<sup>455</sup> Gómez Tello, J.L. 1974. « Lo de Portugal » in *Arriba*, April 30<sup>th</sup>, pp13

<sup>456</sup> Salas y Guirior, José. 1974. « La Junta asume todos los poderes » in *ABC*, April 30<sup>th</sup>, pp. 1-19

Moscow or Beijing, might challenge in the streets an Army strengthened by the solidarity of a recent success»<sup>cv457</sup>. Assia's contradicts the alarmist vision, and joy takes on a leading role, replacing alarm.

#### d) The May 1<sup>st</sup> demonstration: a moment of redemption

On May 1<sup>st</sup>, for the first time in almost fifty years, Labour Day was officially celebrated with one of the biggest demonstrations ever organised in Portugal. This day is generally considered, even by the most sceptical, as a huge victory of the process begun a week earlier, but also the moment when the Portuguese people surfaces as a collective protagonist of the events unfolding. Alarm is replaced by joy, and someone like Francisco Caparrós, who at first contributed quite decisively to the alarmist vision of the process, is very much taken by the spirit of that day:

At this moment the car horns are ringing furiously in Lisbon and in my ears the scream of the Portuguese throats begun six days ago is still resonating: «The united people will never be defeated». In my mind still rest the joyful and peaceful images of thousands of people celebrating (...) an unforeseen May 1<sup>st</sup>. Against all fears, it has been a day of flowers and smiles, of national flags and hugs of the Armed Forces representatives, without any kind of violence. If this was a test for the new Portuguese situation, the population passed the exam with a good score<sup>cvi458</sup>.

Clearly emotional, Caparrós, who dates his militancy in the underground UGT to the late 1960s, claims this was the first time he celebrated Labour Day openly and with people holding flags, identifying themselves with the celebration taking place (Lamata 2014).

To mark the end of their stay in Lisbon, Luis Carandell and Eduardo Barrenechea signed a chronicle together where the civility of the

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<sup>457</sup> Assia, Augusto. 1974. «Lisboa: Primeros síntomas de desasosiego en las altas esferas de la revolución» in *La Vanguardia española*, May 1<sup>st</sup>:3

<sup>458</sup> Caparrós, Francisco. 1974. «Portugal supero la prueba» in *Arriba*, May 2nd:16

Portuguese people is enhanced, given the peaceful and joyful nature of the May 1<sup>st</sup> demonstration, especially considering the lack of repressive forces controlling the masses:

On the streets there was little vigilance, few policemen and few soldiers. (...) The atmosphere of solidarity felt on the street is truly extraordinary. The atmosphere, for instance, among drivers, who kindly give way for other drivers or streetwalkers. Strangers salute themselves. Yesterday night at the tavern where we had dinner, in Ferreira de Alfama, situated in the famous old Lisbon neighbourhood, there was an extraordinary environment of comradeship and friendship towards Spaniards<sup>cvii459</sup>.

The urban *locus amoenus* that Barrenechea and Carandell describe, where suddenly people are civil, polite and nice to each other, is backed Manuel Leguineche's account of the day:

I will quickly say, to avoid any misunderstandings, that everything has developed in a context of order, order that will remain until late in the night by groups that drunken by this mix of joy and enthusiasm, still have energy left to shout or continue the horning concert heard all throughout the day (...) the traffic jam has been gigantic. However without nerves, without verbal attacks, the city smiled, the shop windows remained intact<sup>cviii460</sup>.

To interpret this event and the political cleansing required in the dismantling of an authoritarian regime, Leguineche recalls Jânio Quadros' brief Brazil of the beginning of the 1960s: «Over the cockpit of a big truck a boy hoisted a broom, as a symbol of all that is left to clean in Portugal. Jânio Quadros also used this same symbol in Brazil, but he was given no time, or he did not know how to, handle his cleaning»<sup>cix 461</sup>.

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<sup>459</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo and Carandell, Luís.1974. «Gran Manifestación sin incidentes en Lisboa», May 2<sup>nd</sup>: 3

<sup>460</sup> Leguineche, Manuel. 1974. «El estadio "1 de mayo" ha sido un enorme caja de resonancia de la alegría popular» in *La Vanguardia española*, May 2<sup>nd</sup>:21

<sup>461</sup> Leguineche, Manuel. 1974. «El estadio "1 de mayo" ha sido un enorme caja de resonancia de la alegría popular» in *La Vanguardia española*, May 2<sup>nd</sup>:21

On a different note, in *Tele/eXprés* Vázquez Montalbán thinks that «[i]n Portugal things are being done correctly »<sup>cx462</sup>, and González Casanova inserts the Labour Day demonstration and the popular mobilization around it in a chronological line that includes «Castro's entrance in Havana, the end of the war in Algeria and, now, May 1<sup>st</sup> in Lisbon, [that] have been more than conjunctural political apotheosis»<sup>cx463</sup>. This places Portugal as a fundamental part of the 1960s at a «Third-Worldist» level (Jameson 1988).

On the contrary, Augusto Assia keeps using the soviet framework to characterize the intense social mobilization of May 1<sup>st</sup>, this time by quoting Trotsky: «Trotsky said that a revolution is a party. Today the Portuguese revolution was a party in which, like a cube of sugar in a glass of liquor, forty-eight years of the least hidden authoritarianism that never comforted history, are dissolving»<sup>cxii</sup>. But unlike the former special correspondents, Assia is not completely convinced that fear is over, as despite what he wrote earlier about the unlikeliness of a Communist takeover of this process, he openly mistrusts the Communist intentions and their proven ability to organize the masses: «The point is not whether the party was a lot of fun. What was not fun was a race towards gunpowder, a run-in between the people and the Armed Forces, or the settling of accounts or the separation between the paths of illusion and reality that most feared, others expected and others undoubtedly desired»<sup>cxiii464</sup>. In spite of the fear of a Communist takeover, which he continues to ponder, by the time he leaves Portugal –and not in the sequence of the Labour Day demonstration as it happened to most

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<sup>462</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel. 1974. « El precio de la libertad » in *Tele/eXprés*, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp. 11

<sup>463</sup> González Casanova, Josep Antoni. 1974. «Primeiro de mayo en Lisboa» in *Tele/eXprés*, May 3<sup>rd</sup> pp. 5

<sup>464</sup> Assia, Augusto. 1974. «Lisboa: No se produjeron los temidos desordenes» in *La Vanguardia española*, May 2<sup>nd</sup>:5-6

journalists— Assia is completely taken by the Portuguese Revolution, which he describes as an unprecedented achievement, able of smashing any interpretation grids:

One thing is clear. Rarely in the world was coup wrapped in more kindness and in politeness. (...) A triumphant regime capable of a similar humbleness and grace is uncommon. There is in all the April 25<sup>th</sup> revolution a kindness and education that sets it apart and distinguishes it from all revolutions that one has heard of, seen or studied. The programme, the language, the manners of its protagonists and leaders contained no word of hate or vengeance, not even one brutal gesture and, if something was missing, its supreme leader carries the symbolic monocle of the elegant and great society of past centuries. (...) But, among other things, one is disturbed by the possibility that this April revolution whose the good manners, kindness and grace one has fallen in love with, might one day be seen with a knife among its teeth and carrying guns. But maybe in the end the Portuguese might demonstrate that they are a people that know better than those who are afraid of them<sup>cxiv 465</sup>.

Joy became then the main feeling surrounding the Portuguese events. All in all, this was a privileged moment for special correspondents, who compared with permanent correspondents, had a more important role. The latter were however crucial in the evaluation of the disruption this event caused on the everyday life of the country, which Special correspondents are inherently less prepared to do since they arrive when events are already in motion. Both were surprised by the lack of semblance the event had with the classical revolutionary imaginary, even if, in some cases, they briefly contribute for an alarmist vision of it.

Oddly enough given that it was a newspaper that was considerably invested in it, *Informaciones* only publishes editorial columns and chronicles from its special and permanent correspondents. On the contrary, opinion was especially relevant in *La Vanguardia Española*. Unlike what had happened previously in March, the events in Portugal led

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<sup>465</sup> Assia, Augusto.1974. «Lisboa: La revolución del 25 de abril sigue enfrentándose con problemas de difícil solución »in *La Vanguardia española*, May 22<sup>nd</sup>:26

to articles by known names being published, but especially led Augusto Assia to travel to Lisbon.

Like before two clashing views of the same events, relating to the two opposing political cultures, are visibly present. The political culture defined by its identification with Francoism tends to focus its opinion in mourning or in explaining the past, trying to figure out what went wrong in Portugal. Despite the confidence that the Military institution instils, the tendency is for *regime press*, in the sense that José Reig confers to it, to emphasize an alarmist vision of events. For their part there is no praise of the action but no condemnation either, except for some remarks in *Arriba* regarding some JSN's declarations and liberal democracies in general. Accordingly, the political culture defined by alienation towards the francoist regime tends to focus on the future that is waiting for Portugal, celebrating the New State downfall and emphasizing joy over alarm.

Mediation is nonetheless present in both cultures, given that, on the one hand, *ABC* and *Arriba*, which just a couple of weeks before presented argumentations based on a unity composed by both regimes, enhance now the differences between them, in order to avert the obvious conclusion that what happened in Portugal might happen in Spain. On the other hand, for the democratic political culture, given the unity between both regimes, the process is the same but reaches the conclusion the former were trying to avoid: what happened in Portugal might happen in Spain.

Lastly, *La Vanguardia Española* distinguishes itself for, in general, endorsing liberal democracies as the desired political horizon and for celebrating Spínola, liberalization and freedom. Moreover for conferring legitimacy to Social-democracy in Portugal, as it exists in the Western democracies. In this sense, the newspaper participates in a democratic discourse that, given the proponent, cannot be described as



properly oppositionist, but that will be the starting point for a hegemonic stance to be established.

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**Original quotes:**

<sup>i</sup> « De donde la revolución ha sacado tantos claveles rojos, aunque Portugal es obviamente un país de flores, constituye por ahora la mayor sorpresa de la revolución.»

<sup>ii</sup> «¿Qué nos va y qué nos viene a los españoles en todo este asunto? ¿Hasta qué punto la doctrina Estrada impide el trasvase Tajo-Segura (...) En España, prácticamente, no tenemos ultramar. En España, realmente, tenemos sucesor a título de Rey. En España, teóricamente, vamos hacia Europa y no hacía Rhodesia. Etcétera. Areiliza, Fraga, Silva, Cantarero, incluso Cortina, si la discreción Estrada no sellase sus labios, nos explicarían las diferencias y nos dirían que no hay ni comparación posible. (Aunque a mí, como hipotético encuestador, no dejarían de interesarme las oposiciones del general Iniesta o de Blas Piñar, e incluso las del teniente general Díez-Alegria, también autor de libros.)»

<sup>iii</sup> «Si en España nunca pasa nada, en Portugal pasaba aún menos. Como lo demuestra, entre otros, el hecho de que Oliveira Salazar pudiese estar varios meses muerto, sin que ni el salazarismo ni su propio inventor se diesen por enterados. Sin embargo ahora parece ser que ha pasado algo.»

<sup>iv</sup> «Caetano ha sido derribado por su fracaso en desarrollar la continuidad; y los ultras del salazarismo, barridos tras haberse cobrado primero, frente a Caetano, una victoria inauténtica. Han sido éstos quienes han imposibilitado la fidelidad inteligente, que los principios Salazaristas necesitaban para seguir inspirando la vida portuguesa.»

<sup>v</sup> «No ya por simple vecindad geográfica, que tal vez fuese el menos de los argumentos, sino por espíritu de comunidad histórica, por la natural y persistente amistad entre el pueblo portugués y el pueblo español, deseamos que el proceso de crisis, que, al parecer, llega ahora a su culminación, sea un firme paso hacia adelante en la construcción de la gran sociedad portuguesa y todos sus Gobiernos y sistemas han pretendido con voluntad heroica. Como españoles, nuestra amistad de esta hora se traduce en una expresión clara y terminante de afecto.»

<sup>vi</sup> «El golpe de Estado del general Spínola pone fin al proceso de descomposición que se iniciara con la enfermedad que incapacitó de manera absoluta al doctor Oliveira Salazar para ejercer las funciones de Gobierno»

<sup>vii</sup> «Cuanto más fríamente se examina la situación, menos se comprende que Caetano y sus consejeros creyeran que podían gobernar Portugal, mantener una doble guerra a miles de kilómetros y derrotar al propio tiempo que el enemigo en África la adversidad económica provocada en la metrópoli por los gastos de la guerra, sin contar con otros recursos, otros fundamentos ni otros apoyos que el castillo de naipes que se ha venido abajo al primer mandoble.»

<sup>viii</sup> «Todo el mundo parece de acuerdo en que la economía rural, las virtudes del ahorro, la preferencia por la agricultura que, en los últimos años, del régimen de Salazar impidieron el progreso, ahora, cuando la escasez de víveres amenaza con convertirse en el talón de Aquiles de Europa y la inflación desenfrena sus caballos del Apocalipsis, Portugal podría derivar no pocas ventajas de ser un país

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agrícola y de no haber caído de bruces, como otros, en la sociedad de consumo. Pero lo que queda de salazarismo hay que desterrarlo en loor de la democracia y su verosimilitud.»

<sup>ix</sup> «la desesperante prolongación de la guerra africana [que] hizo cada vez más difícil la situación del heredero de Salazar»

<sup>x</sup> «Comprendemos muy bien la perplejidad y angustia de Caetano y sus colaboradores»

<sup>xi</sup> «compuesto por Salazar con tanta paciencia a través de una experiencia política desigual pero muy importante, había soportado sin dificultades la muerte de su fundador y proseguido con Marcelo Caetano su trayectoria hacia el futuro.»

<sup>xii</sup> «Por lo que nos han parecido poco afortunadas algunas de las declaraciones de la Junta de Salvación Nacional. (...) Pero, ¿era preciso denigrar a un régimen que durante medio siglo ha proporcionado a Portugal los años más prósperos de su historia contemporánea y al que han servido desde puestos de máxima jerarquía? La prudencia es una virtud. También los coroneles griegos llegaron con promesas electorales y retóricas invocaciones a la libertad y los derechos ciudadanos y después han tenido que ceñirse a una realidad que no admite juegos de palabras.»

<sup>xiii</sup> «no es sólo un país vecino sino el otro pueblo ibérico»

<sup>xiv</sup> «Quizá la diferencia más esencial de todas estribé en que mientras el salazarismo es la historia de un ahora, de un presente que no supo ser después, viene siendo el régimen español, por contraste, sistema permanentemente abierto al mañana. Alimentado de futuro. Instalado más allá de cualquier esclerosis tecnocrática.»

<sup>xv</sup> «España siente un gran respecto y una gran admiración por sus Fuerzas armadas. Estos sentimientos brotan del reconocimiento de que sin ellas, unidas entrañablemente con el pueblo, del cual forman parte, no se hubiera conseguido esta gran España que estamos forjando.»

<sup>xvi</sup> «Hay dos cosas muy claras y el Presidente del Gobierno las ha recordado con oportunidad. Una es que la paz es una conquista irreversible del nuestro pueblo, y otra, que le país debe contar con las Fuerzas armadas que le corresponden.»

<sup>xvii</sup> «Esperemos que el país hermano y vecino encuentre pronto el camino pacífico de solución de sus problemas. Le interesa a él. Y nos interesa también a nosotros.»

<sup>xviii</sup> «Es de suponer que los autores del golpe, hasta ahora incruento, no cometerán el error de instaurar un régimen puramente castrense, sino que buscarán apoyos civiles y, por ende, un pensamiento político que sirva de sustento y de orientación.»

<sup>xix</sup> «La Libertad les sienta bien a los portugueses; pero lo que se preguntan algunos observadores con aprensión es cómo logrará el país organizar su vida política para intentar resolver los tremendos problemas de sus colonias y los que tiene planteados en la propia metrópoli.»

<sup>xx</sup> «El objetivo de la revolución como tal, de la revolución que todo lo que pretende es sustituir el sistema autoritario por el democrático, consiste empero y se cifra en la entrada en el Mercado común.»

<sup>xxi</sup> «(...) [el viaje] se ha transformado en un éxito susceptible de convertirse en la primera etapa de un nuevo camino de Portugal hacia Europa.»

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<sup>xxii</sup> «Portugal ha dado el primer paso ritual, tras cuarenta y ocho años de Gobierno autoritario, hacia un régimen democrático inspirado por principios humanistas y liberales (...)»

<sup>xxiii</sup> «un primer gran paso hacia la normalidad»

<sup>xxiv</sup> «La tremenda lección de Portugal es que en breves horas, con cuatro o cinco acciones y media docena de disposiciones, han quedado sepultados cincuenta años de farsa política y toneladas de palabras y análisis inútiles.»

<sup>xxv</sup> «Otra tremenda lección es la impasibilidad con que los políticos del salazarismo y del postsalazarismo, así como sus aliados sociales y políticos, han entregado a las fuerzas de la policía política como el chivo expiatorio de un pasado infeliz. El trato dado a la PIDE es una lección de cinismo político. Se la instrumentalizó como supremo garante de un régimen vacío de representatividad y ahora se la utiliza como el único culpable de la supervivencia del aquél régimen. Defenestrada la Pide no ha habido un vacío importante de orden público.»

<sup>xxvi</sup> «La Península se presentará entonces en el marco natural del desarrollo y de la expansión económica y cultural de los portugueses. Y si España progresa la marcha hacia soluciones más vinculadas con la voluntad popular, la convergencia de aspiraciones irá acercando insensiblemente a las fuerzas políticas de ambos los países hasta una colaboración cada vez más estrecha. (...) construir sistemas de organización política que superen los anquilosados y envejecidos instrumentos del Estado nacional, tradicional y unitario. La utopía ibérica será todo lo decimonónica que se quiera, pero no se perfila otro proyecto más progresista en el horizonte peninsular.»

<sup>xxvii</sup> «A un Portugal en calma ha sucedido una revolución en relativa calma. No se tienen hasta ahora noticias de graves incidentes y sería difícil de calificar de revolución a unos acontecimientos que se mueven, en una sístole y diástole confusas, dentro del sistema.»

<sup>xxviii</sup> «Repetimos que es difícil hablar de una revolución cuando no hay barricadas, y cuando desde el primero momento se guardó el más completo silencio sobre los nombres de la Junta.»

<sup>xxix</sup> «La calle no se había movido en marzo. No parece que se haya movido tampoco ayer como factor decisivo de los acontecimientos»

<sup>xxx</sup> «Algunas de las cosas que han pasado y están pasando, en Lisboa desde el día 25 se parecen bastante una revolución. Otras no se parecen nada. La policía política, a la que el doctor Caetano le había cambiado ya el nombre y los modales, ha sido disuelta y esto indubitadamente es un acto revolucionario. (...) ¿Qué clase de linchamiento es al que se puede calificar de «casi», y qué clase de muchedumbres revolucionarias son las que «casi» linchan? (...) pero pancartas, letreros en las paredes y gritos en las plazas no rompen huesos, y desde ellos a una revolución hay un trecho largo. (...) [About the name change of the bridge from «Salazar's bridge» to «April 25<sup>th</sup> bridge», a member of the Junta claims]: que la revolución no venía a matar muertos. Una revolución que no venga a matar muertos no parece llamada a ser muy revolucionaria, pues si matar vivos es una de las pasiones de todas las revoluciones, aún lo es más la de matar muertos. En esta contradictoria atmósfera encuentro a Portugal (...) Al primer encuentro con el país es difícil descubrir seriamente nada más que contradicciones. (...) El número

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total de muertos es diez. Según parece hechos todos ellos por la policía y ni uno sólo por la muchedumbre, lo cual tampoco es, que se diga, un signo muy revolucionario.»

<sup>xxx</sup> «no acesso a fontes adequadas; na competência para explicitar o não dito» dos interlocutores; na agilidade em cruzar testemunhos; na perspicácia em detectar pormenores só aparentemente insignificantes; na aptidão para reconstruir o acontecimento»

<sup>xxxii</sup> «El regreso del doctor Mario Soares ha hecho recordar la llegada, también a esta capital, del general Humberto delgado, cuando era candidato a la presidencia de la Republica.»

<sup>xxxiii</sup> «Mario Soares, el dinámico jefe socialista, ha regresado a Lisboa de su exilio en Paris, como Lenin regresó a San Peterburgo de su exilio en Zurich, y esto es un acto revolucionario. Soares habló desde un balcón, como hacen todos los revolucionarios cuando vuelven del exilio a hacer la revolución. Pero en vez de las «tesis de mayo», lo que a las muchedumbres que le aclamaban ante la barroca estación de Santa Apolonia les dijo es: “Esta es la hora de la unidad” y esto difícilmente puede considerarse como revolucionario.»

<sup>xxxiv</sup> «Es también muy probable que la aparición en la vida pública legalizada del secretario general del Partido Comunista tenga, al menos por el momento, el resultado de ocultar sensiblemente el fulgor de la espectacular llegada de Soares.»

<sup>xxxv</sup> «Hubo una escena singular cuando varios soldados armados que vitoreaban a Cunhal se colocaron delante de una pancarta en la que se pedía el fin de la guerra colonial. Minutos después de su llegada por vía aérea (...) Cunhal se vio obligado por las aclamaciones de la multitud a subir en lo alto de un carro acorazado, al que fue invitado por jóvenes oficiales del Ejército. Desde lo alto del carro, Cunhal arengó a sus seguidores con un megáfono, mientras los soldados montaron guardia a su alrededor. De entre la multitud se oyeron gritos sobre la presencia de los odiados «pides» entre el público que podrían atentar contra el dirigente comunista, Cunhal aceptó los consejos que le dieron y hablo franqueado por oficiales del Ejército y por otros dirigentes comunistas y socialistas. Ninguna otra escena ilustró tan dramáticamente el cambio producido en la vida portuguesa desde el derrocamiento del régimen dictatorial de Caetano. Varios observadores al igual que sucedió con el regreso de Soares, compararon el retorno de Cunhal con la llegada de Lenin a la estación Finlandia de Leningrado en 1917: Cunhal también adoptó una clara iniciativa para compartir el poder en el proyectado gobierno provisional.»

<sup>xxxvi</sup> «Lo más anecdótico de este acto es que Cunhal se dirigió a sus partidarios desde un tanque, flanqueado por carros blindados que habían despejado minutos antes la zona. El líder comunista al encaramarse al tanque había abrazado a un joven oficial de paracaidistas, cuerpo del Ejército que hasta ahora había sido odiado profundamente por los miembros del Partido Comunista portugués, por ser utilizado habitualmente para cortar manifestaciones.»

<sup>xxxvii</sup> « (...) entre las canciones que se escucharon no estaba "La internacional"»

<sup>xxxviii</sup> «Cunhal vuelve algo viejo, tiene 60 años, quizá un poco purgado de su romanticismo portugués y seguramente aleccionado por la sobria escuela del comunismo centro europeo.»

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<sup>xxxix</sup> «Al fin ha sucedido en Portugal lo que desde hace algún tiempo se esperaba: la toma del Poder por el Ejército mediante un golpe de Estado.»

<sup>xi</sup> «Y la historia, con su tajante paradójico, nos demuestra que sólo las fuerzas armadas pueden abordar los grandes acontecimientos negativos, en los que hay mucho más que perder que ganar. (ex. De Gaulle) Es posible que ahora en Portugal sea otro soldado, Spínola, el que haga en su país algo semejante (...) Pero es seguro que lo que no pueden hacer los militares de ningún modo podrían hacerlo los civiles, lo mismo ahora en Portugal que antes en Francia.»

<sup>xli</sup> «La situación portuguesa en 1974 recuerda a la de Francia en 1958, aunque sólo sea en la dimensión de cómo se liquida un imperio colonial. Los políticos no lo habían conseguido en Francia con todo el poder que les daba la autoridad democrática y tampoco lo han conseguido en Portugal, tal vez por toda la autoridad que les quita la dictadura totalitaria. La cuestión es que ha sido necesario que un militar conservador como Spínola, con importantes intereses económicos personales en ultramar (concretamente en Guinea portuguesa) dijera las primeras palabras legales medianamente sensatas sobre la realidad de la relación entre Portugal y su imperio.»

<sup>xlii</sup> «Se ha comparado el general Spínola, que acaba de hacerse dueño del poder en Portugal, con el general De Gaulle (...) Todo lo poco que samebos (sic) de Spínola lo acerca en lo que se refiere a la política interior, general Prim, que instauró en España la monarquía liberal de Amadeo de Saboya y que, en representación de la burguesía naciente, quería poner el reloj de España a la hora europea.»

<sup>xliii</sup> «Ahora bien. Si el movimiento de los jóvenes oficiales termina en las manos de Spínola, no puede decirse que las cosas empeoren, pero tampoco mejorarán con la exigencia que pide la gravedad del problema. Spínola es un autoritario radical, sin una fuerza política que le respalde y sin la menor intención de apoyarse en la oposición.»

<sup>xliv</sup> «En él [Spinola] confían las cuarenta familias de los monopolios y de las empresas multinacionales. En él confía Estados Unidos y todos los compradores a bajo precio de la "desamortización" africana. Que todo cambie para que todo siga.»

<sup>xlv</sup> «La locura nihilista del postsalazarismo había dejado a la burguesía sin soluciones políticas de recambio y cuantos se preguntan qué papel juega Spínola en el hundimiento del Régimen, tienen una respuesta lógica inapelable: Spínola es el garante de que la normalización del estatuto de la izquierda no va a significar la pérdida de oportunidad histórica a la derecha democrática. (...) Y una de las verdades elementales de ese abecedario es las interrelaciones entre el pacto político y el pacto social. Al gran empresariado portugués le interesa saber quién es, con qué cuenta cada cual y con cuántos.»

<sup>xlvi</sup> « ahora pase automáticamente a encarnar el rostro reaccionario de la situación.»

<sup>xlvii</sup> « Aquel Portugal, el de una semana atrás, no es ya - al menos de momento, que nunca se sabe...- el de hoy»

<sup>xlviii</sup> «variar sensiblemente sus presupuestos»

<sup>xlix</sup> «máximo líder de la oposición lusitana»

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- <sup>i</sup> « Pero creo que los observadores deberán tener marcadamente en cuenta, al indagar sobre "o futuro" de Portugal, los sucesivos pasos de Mario Soares...»
- <sup>ii</sup> «un gran soldado colonial»
- <sup>iii</sup> «uno de los héroes coloniales más notorios»
- <sup>iiii</sup> «Spínola, el héroe del monóculo (...)»
- <sup>lv</sup> «Hábilmente, supo esconder a la vez su juego y no desorientar a los jóvenes oficiales que le siguen, aceptando por ello que le despojaron de su cargo oficial»
- <sup>lv</sup> «¿Pero quién es el Gaddafi de este levantamiento?»
- <sup>lvi</sup> « ¿Manda realmente Spínola en la Junta?»
- <sup>lvii</sup> «Spínola, como era de prever, es el hombre fuerte de la situación»
- <sup>lviii</sup> «El general Spínola y los otros seis miembros de la Junta de Salvación Nacional representan la derecha liberal, burguesa y capitalista y son los que están a la cabeza. Los jóvenes oficiales (...) son los que están posibilitando el juego legal de las izquierdas. »
- <sup>lix</sup> « Después de casi medio siglo de poder paternalista y autoritario, inmóvil, corporativo y desafiante a todo cambio, lo que empezó por obra del Ejército en 1926, acaba en 1974 por obra del brazo militar»
- <sup>lx</sup> «el tiempo que mediara entre la aparición del libro de Spínola y el golpe de Estado del pasado jueves, [que] fue empleado por Caetano en llegar a un compromiso político que hubiera podido consistir en otorgar la presidencia al general africano sin que el sucesor de Salazar dejara el poder»
- <sup>lxi</sup> «haya habido buena disposición y diálogo entre las Fuerzas Armadas y Caetano [como] lo demuestran los términos respetuosos del derrocamiento del presidente de la República y del primer ministro, llevados hasta el puente de plata del avión entre honores militares»
- <sup>lxii</sup> «La nación portuguesa parece haber respaldado, con alivio, la revolución de las Fuerzas Armada»
- <sup>lxiii</sup> «Resulta evidente que el golpe del 25 de abril ha sido organizado por oficiales y jefes más que por generales. (...) de modo que, realizado este, los jefes y oficiales que lo habían organizado y llevado a cabo buscaron una cabeza visible en las filas del Ejército. Encontraron que una de las pocas cabezas que la suprema jerarquía a que había llegado la disconformidad con la política salazariana en África era Spínola»
- <sup>lxiv</sup> « Que un capitán, Otero Carbalho [sic], por ejemplo, de quien se dice que es uno de los principales promotores de la empresa político-militar recién triunfante y sus colegas, obedezcan o no la grandes líneas de la política que trace la Junta presidida por Spínola, depende en gran parte el porvenir de Portugal.»
- <sup>lxv</sup> «Como los diferentes países de Sudamérica»
- <sup>lxvi</sup> « (...) la vecina República vive socialmente en el siglo XIX, y aunque hay sitio allí para las ambiciones de los clanes familiares, la alta burguesía ha desertado de la profesión militar, a favor de situaciones más remuneradas.»
- <sup>lxvii</sup> «Las "buenas familias" se han desinteresado que sus hijos pierdan el tiempo luchando en la selva guinea, con peligro de perder una pierna a causa de una mina traicionera. Es más segura, cómoda, y sobre todo "rentable" la colocación en la empresa (banco, compañía de exportaciones, "holdings") familiar.»

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<sup>lxxviii</sup> «Los gobernantes, los banqueros y los directores de las empresas monopolísticas, ya no tienen un hermano menor en el Estado Mayor.»

<sup>lxxix</sup> «El temor de que si las muchedumbres, llevadas por los agitadores que han vuelto y los que ya estaban aquí, siguen un camino distinto al que el Ejército puede y quiere seguir se llegue antes de lo que fuera de desear a una encrucijada en la que no pueden continuar juntos los que pusieron en movimiento la revolución y los que buscan el modo de explotarla para sus fines particulares, se abre paso. (...) se le atribuye a comunistas de todas las tendencias, secundados por anarquistas, y otras tenebrosidades el secreto propósito»

<sup>lxxx</sup> «La izquierda es consciente de que domina la calle pero no las garitas desde las que se vigila la calle. El Ejército es consciente de que no domina la calle, pero si domina las garitas que la vigilan.»

<sup>lxxxi</sup> «sector más radicalizado y juvenil»

<sup>lxxxii</sup> «prohombres en los que se oficializa ésta.»

<sup>lxxxiii</sup> «La formación de un gran bloque, capaz de atraerse al sector conservador del país, no comprometido con el viejo régimen, y aun de los sectores vinculados a éste - que algún Caetanista quedará todavía, digo yo -, sería, por consiguiente, el gran objetivo del general (...) Y urgente además, porque cada hora que pasa la izquierda organizada acrecienta sus presiones y condicionamientos.»

<sup>lxxxiv</sup> «más digno que muchos de sus antiguos compañeros»

<sup>lxxxv</sup> « La contrarrevolución - si es que revolución ha habido- está ya, en estos momentos, en marcha. Bajo el manto de la Junta de Salvación Nacional pueden cobijarse en el futuro muchas cosas, desde un Portugal democrático y socialista hasta la oligarquía de siempre: las cuarenta familias, vestidas para la ceremonia de la "descolonización" y de la confusión. Vestidas también de fiesta, La suya.»

<sup>lxxxvi</sup> «Ya hubo distribución de correo, pan y leche, así como se procedió a la recogida de basuras. Los tranvías y autobuses efectúan sus recogidos habituales, cumpliendo los horarios normales. Aparecieron todos los periódicos a la venta.»

<sup>lxxxvii</sup> «Durante los acontecimientos del jueves no se produjeron cortes de energía eléctrica, agua o gas. Los teléfonos funcionaron todo instante, aunque en determinados sectores de la capital se produjeron algunas averías por exceso de consumo»

<sup>lxxxviii</sup> «Las fronteras están abiertas. La normalidad es absoluta. Ante ello, las gentes pueden dedicarse a sus ocupaciones normales. Estas fueron las primeras noticias difundidas ayer por la radio a las nueve de la mañana de ayer»

<sup>lxxxix</sup> «Sobre Lisboa cae una ligera llovizna y las calles de la ciudad parecen totalmente desiertas. Sólo se ve, de vez en cuando, algún taxi o los coches de los periódicos»

<sup>lxxx</sup> «(...) durante toda la noche hemos podido presenciar manifestaciones callejeras, no siempre pacíficas pues en algunas ocasiones grupos de jóvenes atacaron varios edificios públicos, bancos y redacciones de periódicos. (...) Asimismo fue asaltada la Sede de Acción Nacional Popular (...) En los incidentes de esta zona, que duraron varias horas, sonaron bastantes disparos, muchos de los cuales eran de aviso para contener a los revoltosos, que provocaron el pánico de los números curiosos que por allí se encontraban. Uno de los tiros alcanzo a un guardia de la policía de seguridad pública, que estaba de servicio en

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aquel lugar, resultando muerto. También se registraron rotura de escaparates y casos de pillaje en algunos comercios siendo detenidos algunos de los rateros.»

<sup>lxxx</sup> «He tenido que despertar al policía y con una sonrisa me ha indicado que siguiera»

<sup>lxxxii</sup> «un golpe de Estado a la portuguesa»

<sup>lxxxiii</sup> «El joven policía dormilón de la frontera, no tenía más que una ligerísima idea de que algo muy raro había pasado en Lisboa.(...) Las comunicaciones telefónicas con Lisboa son imposibles; los programas de radio se han trastornado un poco; la circulación es absolutamente normal, no he visto todavía un solo soldado»

<sup>lxxxiv</sup> «recorrido casi 600 kilómetros, en viajes por estos puntos donde se ha fraguado en gran medida el golpe»

<sup>lxxxv</sup> « El impacto del golpe en el país real, en Portugal de los núcleos rurales, ha sido mínimo. (...) Normalidad es la palabra que ahora se oye por todos los lados. (...) el follón está en las calles de Lisboa donde se producen las primeras revanchas contras las organizaciones represivas del régimen caído.»

<sup>lxxxvi</sup> «las víctimas de la mañana (...) el saldo revolucionario se completa con doce muertos y un número que debe rondar la centena de heridos»

<sup>lxxxvii</sup> «Continúa la calma en todo el país»

<sup>lxxxviii</sup> «casi un centenar de informadores y viajeros hemos tenido que esperar más de veinte horas, porque en la misma noche del jueves, a las diez y media, la frontera se cerró»

<sup>lxxxix</sup> «en las órdenes confusas que recibían los guardias de la frontera»

<sup>xc</sup> «La calma es menos de lo que parece a simple vista

<sup>xc</sup> «Las manifestaciones organizadas por grupos socialistas están en la calle desde primeras horas de la mañana. Algunas pacíficas, otras con tiroteos. Concretamente, esta mañana, en la plaza del Marqués de Pombal, un grupo de manifestantes pintó una hoz y un martillo en la estatua».

<sup>xcii</sup> «El resto de la población permanece intentando hacer su vida normal, pero no sería de extrañar que, contagiados por la euforia de sus paisanos, se decidieran también por manifestarse abiertamente, con lo cual se crearían serios problemas de orden público, problemas que, por otra parte, la Junta de Salvación no parece estar muy dispuesta a mitigar.»

<sup>xciii</sup> « No obstante, la manifestación de hoy, que estará en su apogeo cuando usted lector, vea estas líneas, sigue su programa oficial»

<sup>xciv</sup> « El ambiente, el jueves y el viernes pasados, arrastran al optimismo. La risa se contagia, la alegría es simpática por naturaleza, y en la caja de las resonancias humanas encuentran eco profundo las notas de este pueblo que toca a rebato (...)»

<sup>xcv</sup> « Portugal ha dado un inmenso paso de acercamiento a Europa (...)»

<sup>xcvi</sup> « el futuro de Portugal será difícil y lleno de riesgos, esto es indudable. Mas es un futuro. Después de cincuenta años de no poseer más que pasado, el pueblo portugués ya puede pensar en el mañana. (...) En tan solo dos días, este país ha pasado de África a Europa.»

<sup>xcvii</sup> « Esta madrugada los gallos han vuelto a cantar sobre Portugal. (...) Muertos ha habido, pero tan escasos que pocos golpes de Estado pueden presentar un balance menos luctuoso. Mas hubo que dejar algunas "espitas" abiertas del gran



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embalse. Y hubo manifestaciones pidiendo huelgas y se apedrearon algunos establecimientos. Pero solo eso. »

<sup>xcviii</sup> «En resumen, esta es una revolución liberal-burguesa, más pintada vivamente de color socialista. Nada de extraño. Portugal no tuvo en su historia revolución burguesa ni revolución social. Este vacío intenta llenarlo de golpe con una mezcla de ambas. No es para sorprenderse. »

<sup>xcix</sup> «La reacción del pueblo portugués fue de contento y satisfacción por la caída de Caetano. Los ciudadanos expresaron su alegría ante a promesa de que tendrán libertades civiles y ofrecieron a los soldados amotinados alimentos y bebidas por las calles. Un grupo de civiles saqueó una tienda de licores, distribuyendo las botellas de vino entre los soldados.»

<sup>c</sup> «El Portugal de ayer se está dividiendo en zonas de población con reacciones muy distintas»

<sup>ci</sup> «violencias, banderas rojas, puños en alto, hoces y martillos»

<sup>cii</sup> «grupos organizados de los partidos políticos, más minoritarios en las tendencias democráticas y liberales y mejor organizados en los Partidos Socialista y Comunista»

<sup>ciii</sup> «se han desintegrado - en parte, desde la época de Caetano, y en parte, como consecuencia de la situación provocada por el golpe, los instrumentos de defensa del Estado, y así puede observarse que el mantenimiento de la orden recae abrumadoramente sobre los efectivos militares.»

<sup>civ</sup> «Y esas alegrías populares han arrojado una serie de manifestaciones que vienen a desvirtuar su verdadera esencia. Prescindiendo de otras menores, como las demostraciones frente a la Dirección General de Seguridad, los apedreamientos a los escaparates, sobre todo bancarios, del centro comercial de Lisboa; el asalto al diario caetanista «Epoca», y otros sucesos por el estilo, quisiera referirme a la que ha tenido lugar en la bellísima plaza del Rossio. (...) aunque en estos días muestra, como digo, las cicatrices de los apedreamientos políticos a que me refería, en nombre de la bien cantada libertad (...)»

<sup>cv</sup> « La idea de que los nuevos, experimentados y fríos partidos comunistas, lo mismo si dirigidos desde Moscú que inspirados desde Pekín puedan lanzarse a desafiar en la calle un ejército todavía cimentado por la solidaridad de un éxito reciente»

<sup>cvi</sup> «En este momento las bocinas de los coches atruenan en Lisboa, y todavía me zumba en los oídos el grito que ha desgarrado todas las gargantas portuguesas desde hace ya seis días: “El pueblo unido jamás será vencido”. Aún ahora me bailan en la retina las imágenes alegres y pacíficas de los cientos de miles de personas que han celebrado (...) un día 1 de mayo hasta ahora insospechado en esta ciudad. Para desmentir todo el temor, ha sido una jornada de flores y sonrisas, de banderas nacionales y abrazos a los representantes de las fuerzas armadas, en la que no ha habido violencia alguna. Si este era el día de prueba para la nova situación portuguesa, la población ha superado el examen con buena nota»

<sup>cvii</sup> «Había en las calles muy poca vigilancia, muy poca policía y muy pocos soldados. (...) El clima de solidaridad que se respira en la calle es verdaderamente extraordinario. El ambiente, por ejemplo, en la circulación, entre los automovilistas, que se ceden gentilmente el paso o con respecto a los

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viandantes. Los desconocidos se saludan. Anoche en la tasca donde hemos cenado, en Ferreira de Alfama, situada en el famoso barrio viejo de Lisboa, había un extraordinario ambiente de compañerismo y amistad para con los españoles.»

<sup>cviii</sup> «Me apresuraré a decir, para que no haya equívocos, que todo se ha desarrollado dentro de un orden, orden que continuará, hasta avanzada la madrugada por grupos que embriagados por esta intercomunicación de alegría y entusiasmo, todavía conserven energías para gritar o seguir con el concierto de bocinas que se ha escuchado a lo largo del día. (...) el embotellamiento ha sido gigantesco. Pero sin nervios, sin salidas del tono, la ciudad sonreía, los cristales de los establecimientos quedaban intactos.»

<sup>cix</sup> «Sobre la carlinga de un gran camión un muchacho enarbolaba una escoba, como símbolo de todo lo que queda por limpiar en Portugal. Ya Janio Quadros utilizó este mismo símbolo en Brasil, pero no le dieron tiempo, o no supo, llevar a cabo su limpieza.»

<sup>cx</sup> «En Portugal se están haciendo bien las cosas»

<sup>cxii</sup> «La entrada de Castro en la Habana, el fin de la guerra de Argelia, y, ahora, el primero de mayo en Lisboa, [que] han sido algo más que apoteosis políticas coyunturales»

<sup>cxiii</sup> «Trotsky dijo que la revolución es una fiesta. Ha sido una fiesta hoy la revolución portuguesa en la que como un azucarillo en un vaso de licor, están disolviéndose cuarenta y ocho años del más indisimulado autoritarismo que nunca reconfortaron la historia.»

<sup>cxiv</sup> «Si la fiesta ha sido muy divertida es otra cuestión. Lo que no ha sido es la corrida de la pólvora, el encontronazo entre pueblo y fuerzas armadas, o la rendición de cuentas ni la partida de los caminos de la ilusión y la realidad que muchos temían, otros auguraban y otros indudablemente deseaban.»

<sup>cxv</sup> «Una cosa está clara. Raramente ha visto el mundo un golpe de fuerza envuelto en más gentileza y en mejor educación. (...). Un régimen triunfante capaz de semejante humildad y gracia no es frecuente. Hay en toda la revolución del 25 de abril una gentileza y una educación que la aparta y la distingue de todas las revoluciones de las que uno da oído [sic] o que uno ha visto o las que ha estudiado. El programa, los propósitos, el idioma, los modales de sus progenitores y conductores no contenían ni una palabra de odio o de vergüenza ni un gesto brutal y, por si algo faltara, su jefe supremo porta el monóculo simbólico de la gran y elegante sociedad en siglos idos. (...)Pero, entre unas cosas y otras, a uno le conturba que también esta revolución abreña, de la que uno se ha enamorado, de los buenos modales, la gentileza, la gracia, la viera uno un día echándose el cuchillo a los dientes o la pistola al cinto. Pero quizás al fin los portugueses muestren que son un pueblo que saben más que aquellos que le temen.»

### 3. Decolonization: Two divergent worldviews

Four centuries of History – of a History reverentially saved by Lusitanian nationalism as if it were inside a sacred coffer – have been destroyed. A symbol of that destruction, the «anti-colonialists», now independent, of São Tomé and Príncipe have carried out the «defenestration» of statues of seafarers, conquerors and colonizers.<sup>i 466</sup>

On July 27<sup>th</sup>, General Spínola, as President of the Republic, declared the right to independence of the Portuguese colonial territories (Santos, Cruzeiro and Coimbra 2000). This announcement was followed by a special series of five articles in *Tele/eXprés* devoted to the end of the last colonial empire<sup>467</sup>. To celebrate the Portuguese official recognition of Guinea's independence, *Tele/eXprés* also printed a text<sup>468</sup> by Amílcar Cabral, the late leader of PAIGC, assassinated by PIDE in 1973, on the following day. Likewise, both *ABC* and *Arriba* produced this type of informative pieces to present the future new nation, more or less at the same time<sup>469</sup> and just before the official declaration.

Other types of pieces elaborated in the newsroom or by the newspapers' documentation services were also published by all newspapers, like news reports, specials, documents, etc. In fact, this subject is the one that more of this type of «unités rédactionnelles»

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<sup>466</sup> Gómez Aparicio, Pedro .1975. «Africa en plena ebullición» in *Arriba*, July 13<sup>th</sup>: 6

<sup>467</sup> «El fin del ultimo imperio colonial 1. La última victoria de Portugal». 1974. *Tele/eXprés*, July 29<sup>th</sup>: 4; «El fin del último imperio colonial 2. La represión no acallo los deseos de independencia». 1974. *Tele/eXprés*, July 30<sup>th</sup>: 4; «El fin del último imperio colonial 3. Guinea-Bissau accede a la independencia». 1974. *Tele/eXprés*, July 31<sup>st</sup>: 4; «El fin del último imperio colonial 4. El FRELIMO, representante de los angoleños». 1974. *Tele/eXprés*, August 1<sup>st</sup>: 4; «El fin del ultimo imperio colonial y 5. Angola, lo más difícil». 1974. *Tele/eXprés*, August 2<sup>nd</sup>: 4

<sup>468</sup> Cabral, Amílcar. 1974. «Amílcar Cabral, lealtad a una causa justa» in *Tele/eXprés*, September 10:13

<sup>469</sup> Arce, Alvaro. 1974. «ABC reportaje: Guinea-Bissau. Nuevo estado africano» in *ABC*, August 16<sup>th</sup> and Cavero, José. 1974. «Reportaje: Guinea-Bissau, el más nuevo de los países» in *Arriba*, August 14<sup>th</sup>: 15

(Kayser 1982) has devoted to it, probably in response to the lack of other types.

Not a single one of these newspapers had correspondents in any of the Portuguese colonial territories, therefore pieces produced in the newsroom and special correspondents became more important<sup>470</sup>. All special correspondent chronicles are of «personalized experience» in the first person, but they are very limited in their time scope, since they concern basically the summer of 1974 and of 1975.

Only *La Vanguardia Española*'s correspondent in Lisbon, Alberto Miguez, writes from and about Guinea during the summer of 1974<sup>471</sup>. In Guinea Miguez finds an atmosphere of tranquillity and happiness, a place where «[e]very once in a while a car with the flag of the new Republic passes by, [and] the atmosphere is of complete tranquillity»<sup>ii472</sup>. Therein he got in contact with leaders of all the sectors involved in the transference of sovereignty, namely PAIGC's second in command, Juvenio Gomes, Carlos Fabião from the MFA, and Manuel Medina, commissioner of Sahara's mission. Miguez also travelled to *Galinhas* Island to visit a prison where, despite the negotiations in place, prisoners from PAIGC were still incarcerated by the Portuguese Army. He actually interviewed one of those prisoners, Commander Farín (João Lopes Embalo), imprisoned for almost five years.

Alberto Miguez was head of the international section of the Madrilenian newspaper *Madrid* until it was closed by the Spanish Government in 1971. Miguez then started working for *La Vanguardia Española*, and among other places he was in Chile, from where he was

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<sup>470</sup> Both Alberto Miguez and Bernabé Pertusa mention TVE's crews in the field, precisely in Luanda, during the summers of 1974 and 1975.

<sup>471</sup> A total of 6 chronicles published between August 21<sup>st</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup>.

<sup>472</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1974. «Bissau: "No vamos a celebrar la independencia que ya la tenemos, sino la victoria"» in *La Vanguardia española*, August 21<sup>st</sup>: 17

expelled by the Military Junta in late 1973, and Portugal, where he replaced the veteran Inocente Palazón Olivares as correspondent of this newspaper in June 1974.

During the summer and autumn of 1974, Bernabé Pertusa (for *pyresa*) and Luis Reyes (war correspondent mostly in Africa and the Middle East, published by *Informaciones*) also wrote from Africa, but they were focused on Angola and Mozambique. In the beginning of August, Reyes' «Atmosphere chronicle» describe his arrival by plane to Luanda, portrayed as an apartheid-like city: the paved streets, where white and «assimilated blacks» live, and the «muceques» where «400.000 Africans struggle to make ends meet, where white racial violence emerged in Angola»<sup>iii 473</sup>. Reyes praised MPLA for the way its army dealt with these episodes of violence, in a way arguing the supremacy of this movement over FNLA. This journalist deliberately starts his journey through Mozambique in what was considered a war zone, Moatisse, and notices the change of the situation regarding sovereignty. According to this journalist, Mozambique risks the danger of a foreign intervention<sup>474</sup>, unlike Angola, where the menace lies within<sup>475</sup>, in favour of the white minority – since the Portuguese army is no longer willing to fight nationalist forces anymore<sup>476</sup> – helped by a column of members of the former political police, which had not been completely dismantled in Mozambique<sup>477</sup>. The following summer Miguez returns to Africa<sup>478</sup>, this

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<sup>473</sup> Reyes, Luis. 1974. «Los blancos de Angola reconocerían la autoridad del MPLA» in *Informaciones*, August 2<sup>nd</sup>: 2

<sup>474</sup> Reyes, Luis. 1974. «Mozambique: Una amenaza para dos Estados Blancos» in *Informaciones*, August 24<sup>th</sup>: 5

<sup>475</sup> Reyes, Luis. 1974. «Mozambique: Una amenaza para dos Estados Blancos» in *Informaciones*, August 24<sup>th</sup>: 5

<sup>476</sup> Reyes, Luis. 1974. «El cambio de soberanía en Mozambique, un hecho irreversible» in *Informaciones*, August 10<sup>th</sup>: 7

<sup>477</sup> Reyes, Luis. 1974. «Los "PIDES", quinta columna contra la independencia» in *Informaciones*, August 17<sup>th</sup>: 6

time travelling to Mozambique in time to witness first-hand the country's independence. He then heads to Angola, where he is confronted with a civil war about to burst<sup>479</sup>.

Quim Monzó and Albert Abril also travel to Africa, but unlike the former journalists, who produce chronicles *in loquo*, the latter go to Tanzania, more specifically to Dar es Salaam, where they interviewed several of the delegations of African nationalist groups (FRELIMO, MPLA, SWAPO, etc.), producing *a posteriori* an eight-part «news report» series titled «Africa the death of colonialism» [Africa la muerte del colonialismo<sup>480</sup>]. The series is similar in style to what they had written the previous fall about the Vietnamese conflict and in the beginning of 1974 for the Irish question<sup>481</sup>. Their style, however, is personal and intimate enough for their series to be considered of personalized experience<sup>482</sup> as well.

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<sup>478</sup> Miguez returns to Portugal on July 19<sup>th</sup>, but his later chronicles continue to be published until the 27<sup>th</sup> dated from their original place, since communication problems prevented them from arriving in time.

<sup>479</sup> *Tele/eXprés* also featured the upcoming war: Ibarz, Joaquin Ibarz. 1975. «La segunda guerra de Angola» in *Tele/eXprés*, September 27<sup>th</sup>: 2-3

<sup>480</sup> Abril, Albert and Monzó, Quim. 1974. «Africa la muerte del colonialismo» in *Tele/eXprés*, September 3<sup>rd</sup>-13<sup>th</sup>

<sup>481</sup> «En el pasado otoño ofrecimos a nuestros lectores una serie de reportajes-testimonio sobre las zonas de conflicto del sudeste asiático. Unos meses más tarde, en los primeros de 1974, se publicó en estas mismas páginas la crónica viva de un fin de año en la Irlanda atormentada por la guerra civil. Sus autores, Albert Abril y Quim Monzó han recorrido ahora otra zona del mundo en la que se desarrollan actualmente acontecimientos decisivos para el futuro del continente africano. Nuestros colaboradores han viajado por los territorios, colonizados por Portugal que, a raíz del cambio político registrado en Lisboa, están en camino de alcanzar la independencia.(...)» [«Africa la muerte del colonialismo 1». 1974. *Tele/eXprés*, September 3<sup>rd</sup>: 4]

<sup>482</sup> «Ya al despedirnos, nos dice que conoce Barcelona, ciudad que le gusta mucho y a la que la unen muchos recuerdos, puesto que el doctor Américo Boavida estudió su carrera de Medicina en la Universidad de Barcelona, precisamente, "Algún día nos veremos en Barcelona", apostilla. (...) Quizá un día nos veamos en Luanda, madame Boavida» (Abril, Albert and Monzó, Quim .

Joan Albert Abril, nowadays a filmmaker and producer, collaborated with *Tele/eXprés* since 1972 covering foreign events, including wars, electoral processes or conflicts of different kinds, often accompanied by Quim Monzó, currently a novelist. Abril worked afterwards as a journalist in several Barcelona publications, and both Abril and Monzó still maintain activity as newspaper columnists.

Lastly, Javier M. Padilla, *La Vanguardia Española*'s Far Eastern correspondent, put Macao and Timor's situation on the Spanish informative map. Padilla's career was made almost entirely abroad writing from places like the Middle East, North Africa and the Far East.

Despite not addressing the decolonization process editorially, *Arriba* published several special documents about the Portuguese decolonization, focused mostly on Angola and Timor. «The Portuguese sun sets in Angola» [El sol portugués se pone en Angola]<sup>483</sup>, «Angola: noisy independence» [Angola: ruidosa independencia]<sup>484</sup> or «Rhodesia in danger» [Rhodesia en Peligro]<sup>485</sup> are pieces that clearly contrast with the ones published by *Tele/eXprés* in terms of their views on colonialism: one newspaper celebrates the end of colonial rule, whereas the other mourns the death of the colonial Empire and only discusses the problems it raises. Problems like the return to Portugal of the former Portuguese settlers, for instance, that all newspapers highlight as an important future social and economic challenge. Similarly, though not addressing Angola's independence editorially, *Informaciones*, in its political supplement, publishes an interview with Agostinho Neto in the aftermath of the

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1974. "Africa la muerte del colonialismo 4. El MPLA se reorganiza en la conferencia de Lusaka Angola" in *Tele/eXprés*, September 6<sup>th</sup>: 4)

<sup>483</sup> Gómez Tello, JL. 1974. «El tema de la semana: El sol portugués se pone en Angola» in *Arriba*, August 25<sup>th</sup>: 20- 23

<sup>484</sup> «ABC reportaje: Angola: ruidosa independencia».1974. *ABC*, November 15<sup>th</sup>

<sup>485</sup> «Documento: Rhodesia en Peligro». 1974. *Arriba*, December 15<sup>th</sup>

country's independence<sup>486</sup>, legitimating this way the national liberation struggle.

After the *coup d'état* of April 25<sup>th</sup> *Tele/eXprés* and *Informaciones* report the downfall of the dictatorial regime and the democratization announced with an unavoidable independence of the colonial territories and the end of Empire. For *Tele/eXprés*, «[t]he process of independence of the African colonies is in full development and any initiative against the path of history would mortgage the future regime emerging out of last Thursday's military coup (...)»<sup>iv487</sup>. For this newspaper it is a given that democratization in the metropole implies independence in the colonial territories. *Tele/eXprés* wonders what implications this development might have for other coercive African regimes such as the Rhodesian and the South African. Despite all the difficulties it may bring, for this newspaper this process was a long overdue catching-up with history, an idea shared by *Informaciones*<sup>488</sup>, that sees in General Spínola's vision for the colonial problem the way for Portugal to achieve that. Certainly both newspapers see these developments as not only logical but desirable.

On the contrary, *Arriba* firmly expresses its hope that Portugal might be able to keep its «integral spirit of nation»<sup>v489</sup>, a desire shared by Jesús Suevos on the pages of the same daily and by Emilio Lozano on the pages of *ABC*. The latter argues that the Portuguese path towards Europe will only be successful if this country is able to sustain its Empire, a condition that would bring leverage to a hypothetical negotiation with common market Europe. Despite considering that if the liberalizations announced are actually carried out, they will point to a path towards Europe, Lozano is certain that it will be «[a] path bristling with thorns if

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<sup>486</sup> Moreira, Neiva. 1975. «Agostinho Neto: “No creo que pueda haber un entendimiento duradero”» in *Informaciones Políticas*, December 13<sup>th</sup>: 10

<sup>487</sup> Editorial: «África mira hacia Portugal».1974.in *Tele/eXprés*, May 1<sup>st</sup>:5

<sup>488</sup> Editorial: «Portugal ante su futuro».1974. in *Informaciones*, April 25<sup>th</sup>:18

<sup>489</sup> Editorial: «Fraterna Portugal».1974. in *Arriba*, April 26<sup>th</sup>:3



Portugal does not count with the African provinces and is reduced to the narrow limits of the metropole. Because not just democracy is needed to be happy in the European Community, and Portugal is an impoverished country.»<sup>vi</sup> 490. In order to produce this argument Lozano casts aside the fact that a colonial Portugal would probably not be welcomed at all by its European peers.

Jesús Suevos is particularly straightforward about his own preferences and presents the solution for the colonial problem as «a Lusitanian confederation if all goes well, the liquidation of the former Empire if things get complicated»<sup>vii</sup>. Suevos is clearly in favour of Portugal sustaining, by any means possible, its colonial Empire, for he dreads that «the capitalist and Marxist internationals will not be pleased with less than the independence of the Portuguese territories in Africa, for the success of their business and strategy»<sup>viii491</sup>. Without Portugal's hold over these African territories, they would become easy targets for those that Suevos had already described as the main enemies of the old Portugal and Spain: capitalist and socialist economies and their respective spheres of influence.

In *Tele/eXprés*, as well as in Suevos' reasoning, a concern over the geopolitical implications that the Portuguese decolonization might embody is expressed. But what *Tele/eXprés* envisions as positive – the possible influence of newly independent countries over white supremacy African nations such as South-Africa or Rhodesia, in the sense of strengthening their dispute for overthrowing colonial power – is understood by Jesús Suevos in *Arriba* as a menace.

Despite the references to the end of the Portuguese colonial Empire since the military coup of April 25<sup>th</sup>, decolonization as an editorial

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<sup>490</sup> Lozano, Emilio. 1974. «Portugal, ruptura inevitable» in *ABC*, April 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.41

<sup>491</sup> Suevos, Jesús. 1974. «Portugal, en el disparadero» in *Arriba*, April 30<sup>th</sup>, pp5

theme begins with the upcoming Lusaka agreements, on September 7<sup>th</sup>, and the proximity of the recognition of Guinea's independence by the Portuguese Government on September 10<sup>th</sup> (Santos, Cruzeiro and Coimbra 2000).

ABC's front-page covers during the summer of 1974 (fig.3) offer a guiding line of the several issues at stake, namely the problematic feature of the Angolan, and to a less extent the Mozambican, processes of decolonization. This helps explain (from left to right) the reference to «TNT», the positive feature of Guinea's process that leads ABC to repeat a cover used three years earlier portraying a smiling female combatant, the return of the Portuguese troops from Guinea, the Lusaka agreements, and a photo of a smiling Samora Machel, as well as the end of the war and the discharge of Portuguese troops that followed.



Fig. 3

*Informaciones*, *La Vanguardia Española* and *Tele/eXprés* all agree that Guinea was an easy process, but that the independence of Mozambique, and especially Angola, will not be that simple. Guinea was considered a simple process since its independence was already recognized by the UN, while Angola and Mozambique processes might be very problematic for Portugal, argues *La Vanguardia Española*. Regarding Guinea, this newspaper remembers that General Spínola is about to proclaim the opposite of his convictions, expressed in *Portugal and the Future*, and that this development may widen the dissention already existing in the Portuguese power sphere. This would mean that stances regarding the colonial Empire could enforce, once again, dissention in the metropole, therefore determining, once more, the political path to be followed:

The colonial war ended the Portuguese dictatorial regime, but the colonial problem will continue existing in Angola and Mozambique, or even Guinea-Bissau. Therefore it may end up provoking serious tensions in the heart of the heterogeneous leadership team in Portugal. Logically, the point of view about decolonization is not in the least unanimous (...) whatever happens in Angola and Mozambique might provoke serious and unexpected outcomes in Lisbon<sup>ix492</sup>.

*Informaciones* noted the different nature of the II Provisional Government, proclaimed on July 18<sup>th</sup>, and links Guinea's recognition of independence with the new coalition in office, which the newspaper considers to be more in line with the Captains' movement. Like *ABC*<sup>493</sup>, *La Vanguardia Española* and *Tele/eXprés*, *Informaciones* considers that «[d]ecolonization is currently the Gordian knot of Lusitanian politics»<sup>x 494</sup>. For *Tele/eXprés*, rather than just a political problem, decolonization means «(...) the only viable way out for a new regime that is seeking an

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<sup>492</sup> Editorial: «Portugal y la descolonización».1974. *La Vanguardia española*, August 14<sup>th</sup>:5

<sup>493</sup> Editorial: «Los blancos de Mozambique». 1974. *ABC*, August 8<sup>th</sup>: 14

<sup>494</sup> Editorial: «Portugal y la descolonización». 1974. *Informaciones*, August 12<sup>th</sup>:18

end to all sequels of salazarism (...)»<sup>xi</sup>, since the previous regime's struggle against it backfired and, for instance, «[t]he death of the leader [Amílcar Cabral] did nothing but accelerate the decolonizing process in the irreversible way of history»<sup>xii495</sup>.

Guinea's imminent independence coincided with the white insurrection that followed the Lusaka agreements in Mozambique. When Guinea's independence date was looming, *ABC*, who despite all the front-page covers did not address that specific process editorially, introduced the white Africans question, focusing its attention mostly on the Mozambican situation. This newspaper defends the right of white Mozambicans to have a say in the decolonization and self-determination process and shares the myth initiated by Gilberto Freyre (1933 [1992]) of the Portuguese colonization process as more integrative than others, because of the supposed ability of the Portuguese colonizers to miscigenate with the indigenous peoples :

If in Lisbon self-determination is discussed, white Mozambicans do not wish to be absent of its concrete and practical definitions. According to their logic, if FRELIMO cannot be taken as the sole interlocutor of black Mozambicans, neither should the blacks of Mozambique be considered the only interlocutor. (...) These theses, nonetheless, openly clash with the ideological atmosphere that has been settling since decolonization started in Africa. Indeed, in the eyes of the metropole, when negotiations of independence begin, no settlers can be at the table. And in the face of this argument it is useless to recall certain undisputable different features of Portuguese colonization in Africa and that developed by other European nations<sup>xiii496</sup>.

Following the violence perpetuated by the Portuguese settlers, *ABC* argues that both nationalisms, the African and the Portuguese, are equivalent. For this newspaper «[d]espite the difference in colour, white colonizers feel as African and as nationalist as FRELIMO's warriors. And these two nationalisms may either coexist, which seems less likely, or

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<sup>495</sup> Editorial: «La mejor victoria de Lisboa». 1974. *Tele/eXprés*, August 31<sup>st</sup>:7

<sup>496</sup> Editorial: «Los blancos de Mozambique». 1974. *ABC*, August 8<sup>th</sup>: 14

tragically clash against each another, which, in principle, is more plausible (...)»<sup>xiv</sup><sup>497</sup>. The history of domination of one people over the other is, therefore, completely disregarded by this newspaper. *ABC*'s take on decolonization is mostly connected to the difficult situation of its Portuguese settlers, hence and tends to be Eurocentric.

What *ABC* considers as «the emancipation by rebellion and not [done] by those who formally should receive it from the hands of the metropole (...)»<sup>xv</sup>, meaning the possibility of a white secession, is feared and disregarded by *Informaciones*<sup>498</sup>. However the newspaper recognizes that this possibility seems to have been prevented in Mozambique, while *Tele/eXprés* praises Portugal's firm opposition to it:

The determination of Portugal in opposing any secessionist movement is garnering worldwide respect for its decolonizing policy, which might serve as a counterweight to any incentive from racist South Africans for Mozambican settlers to unilaterally proclaim Rhodesian-style independence<sup>xvi</sup><sup>499</sup>.

*Informaciones* also considers that the Mozambican decolonization might constitute a valuable lesson for what is commonly considered the most difficult process since the beginning: Angola. In the latter *Informaciones* considers that a slower process towards independence is preferable. Despite the importance given to the Angolan case by most newspapers, only *La Vanguardia Española* and *Tele/eXprés* keep following it editorially.

During the summer of 1975 these two newspapers expressed their doubts regarding a positive outcome of this process. *La Vanguardia Española* is quite sceptical regarding the possibility of unity or at least

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<sup>497</sup> Editorial: «Mozambique, nacionalismos en conflicto». 1974. *ABC*, September 10<sup>th</sup>: 18

<sup>498</sup> Editorial: «Mozambique, la difícil descolonización». 1974. *Informaciones*, September 24<sup>th</sup>: 18

<sup>499</sup> Editorial: «La mejor victoria de Lisboa». 1974. *Tele/eXprés*, August 31<sup>st</sup>:7

cooperation between liberation movements in Angola<sup>500</sup>, while *Tele/eXprés* doubts any uninterested international party will actually make an effort to prepare an international plan to achieve peace in this territory<sup>501</sup>. In the beginning of 1976 *Tele/eXprés* considers the détente might even be at risk given the involvement of foreign powers in the Angolan civil war<sup>502</sup>.

When civil war in Angola becomes a reality, *La Vanguardia Española* blames the Portuguese policy towards Angola over the last centuries for it: «In short, until now Lisbon's governments have showed to be reluctant and slow in presenting any inspiration of renovation and development, and the consequences of this are being paid by the entire country in almost usurious interests»<sup>xvii 503</sup>. At the moment of Angola's independence, this newspaper also blames the UN for not enforcing tribal borders instead of the artificial ones forged by European colonization. For *La Vanguardia Española* the chances of Angola overcoming all the problems and becoming a successful independent nation are very slim, hence the pessimistic tone adopted<sup>504</sup>. The negativity of both these newspapers is visible in their titles: «Angola: a foreseen drama» [Angola: un drama previsto], «Civil war in Angola» [Guerra civil en Angola], «The tragedy of Angola» [La tragedia de Angola], «Angola, victim» [Angola, victim], «Angola: the hour of truth» [«Angola: la hora de la verdad»] and «Angola, a second Vietnam» [Angola, un segundo Vietnam].

One of the problems identified by *La Vanguardia Española* concerns Portuguese returnees, and when the mass transportation from

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<sup>500</sup> Editorial: «Angola: un drama previsto». 1975. *Vanguardia española*, June 26<sup>th</sup>: 5

<sup>501</sup> Editorial: «Guerra civil en Angola». 1975. *Tele/eXprés*, August 21<sup>st</sup>: 5

<sup>502</sup> Editorial: «Angola, un segundo Vietnam». 1976. *Tele/eXprés*, January 14<sup>th</sup>: 5

<sup>503</sup> Editorial: «Angola, victim». 1975. *Vanguardia española*, September 13<sup>th</sup>: 5

<sup>504</sup> Editorial: «Angola: la hora de la verdad». 1975. *Vanguardia española*, November 9<sup>th</sup>: 5

Angola started during the summer of 1975 the newspaper predicts the socio-economic challenge that the integration of these people in a «metropole that is already facing a high unemployment rate in an unhealthy economy and very little developed»<sup>xviii</sup><sup>505</sup> will represent for the Portuguese regime. As will be seen below, the Portuguese returnees constitute a subject of high relevance for the Spanish press.

### a) The last Colonial Empire

Articles and opinion columns, unlike editorials columns, address the decolonization subject since the beginning because of how it was linked with the Military's refusal to pursue the colonial war and the consequences it had on the political solution for the conflict. Nevertheless, before dealing with material problems such as the actual decolonization process, a wave of opinions about the Empire as a concept, which included its apology, emerges. For instance, the historian, opus-dei member and what Gregorio Morán (2014: 100) calls «organizer of cultural affairs», Florentino Pérez-Embid wonders in an *ABC*'s front-page cover article about what would a small Portugal, as in without an Empire, be like:

Those of us who – beyond its domestic politics – love the everlasting Portugal from «Os Lusíadas», desire only the best to the neighbouring and brotherly country. We hope the famous federation solution is viable. We are evidently facing new times. The «gaullism», the «salazarism», the British Empire and the splendid isolation of the English, the Federated Germany of Adenauer are over. In the case of Portugal, we hope that the foreseeable future does not impose an inexorable «Goodbye to the great Portugal». What would – in the context of the Peninsula – a small Portugal be like?<sup>xix</sup> <sup>506</sup>

Pérez-Embid, who had been responsible for censorship while head-executive of Information (1951-1957) when Arias Salgado was

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<sup>505</sup> Editorial: «Angola: un drama previsto». 1975. *Vanguardia española*, June 26<sup>th</sup> : 5

<sup>506</sup> Pérez-Embid, Florentino. 1974. «Adiós al Portugal grande», *ABC*, May 7<sup>th</sup>

Minister (Morán 2014), supports the Spinolist project of a post-colonial federalist configuration between Portugal and its former colonies. This author recognizes the anachronism of the former Portuguese political configuration, alongside other European ones, but at the same time wishes that Portugal maintains its supremacy over its former colonies, personalizing this hypothetical achievement by the use of the first person of plural. It is not about the peoples struggling for their right to self-determination, but about the impact their independence would have in Portugal, or even in the Iberian Peninsula. In fact, some authors (Sánchez 1993) advocate for the direct influence of the Portuguese April 25<sup>th</sup> over the attitude of Spanish government towards the Western Sahara situation, which remained the last colonized territory under Spanish administration. There is however no specific Spanish reading of the subject in any newspaper.

In *La Vanguardia Española*, on the contrary, Literature Professor and writer, Guillermo Diaz-Plaja, praises the decision to dismantle Empire emerging from the newfound freedom in Portugal:

Portugal «wanted to be», and «was». The Western front of the Peninsula had its historical opportunity in the sea, as much as the Spanish border signalled the end of the horizon. Portugal «had no other way» than to be a seafarer. (...) Now the enormous geo-historic reality of the territories in Africa will change directions. Portugal, which wanted to be the forefront of Empire, is preparing to be the origin of freedom. Then, as now, «wanted ». Maybe now with greater nobility since «to want» brings attached a tremendous tear. It is beautiful that, then and now, Portugal proceeds through an act of free will decision. Creating history, now as then, by its own free will<sup>xx507</sup>.

Through a personification of Portugal as an entity capable of actions, this author identifies both drives – the Portuguese discoveries and

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<sup>507</sup> Diaz-Plaja, Guillermo. 1974. «Sin pausa y sin prisa. Portugal, la que "Quiso"» in *La Vanguardia española*, August 6<sup>th</sup>:9



the decolonization – as equivalent achievements in relation to their own political, social and historical contexts.

A year later, though, Jaume Miravittles in *Tele/eXprés* blames the process initiated by the April 25<sup>th</sup> *coup d'état* for the confusion around the disaggregation of Empire. An Empire that this author claims would have died without anyone noticing it if the commotion caused by the revolutionary process in Portugal had not triggered the internationalization of the conflict:

The empire now in process of disaggregation has always been a pure political fiction, which apparently remained in place because of the weakness of the «metropole» and the «colonies». Without the actions occurred on April 25<sup>th</sup>, that «Empire» would have been dead, without anyone noticing it. But by leaving it «unleashed» in a timeframe of a couple of months, its disarticulation has raised extreme interest among worldwide powers and now it has been converted into an international problem that might dangerously worsen the situation everywhere<sup>xxi508</sup>.

Behind Miravittles' interpretation, which is unequivocally counterfactual, lies the author's utter anti-Communist criticism that is especially acute in his chronicles during the summer of 1975. Politically active since the 1920s, Jaume Miravittles was a prominent Republican politician connected with nationalist groups such as Catalan State [*Estat Català*] and communist ones such as Workers and Peasants' Bloc [*Bloc Obrer i Camperol* BOC], Workers' Party of Marxist Unification [*Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista* POUM], and later on Republican Left of Catalonia [*Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*]. His political engagement earned him two exiles, the first in the 1920s and a second one, lasting nearly twenty years, when the civil war ended. Miravittles' explicit anticommunism may constitute a technique of self-preservation due to his past, which made him a very identifiable target for censorship and labour retaliations. However, in *Tele/eXprés*, Miravittles is the most frequent

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<sup>508</sup> Miravittles, Jaume.1975. «El desmantelamiento del imperio portugués» in *Tele/eXprés*, September 6<sup>th</sup>: 7

commentator of the Portuguese revolutionary process and he is always against the URSS, and therefore the PCP.

From a materialistic point of view, economics expert Jorge Ventura, in *Tele/eXprés*, not only links the determination for decolonization with the desires of the Portuguese monopolies, namely entrepreneur António de Sommer Champalimaud, to broaden their markets, but is also suspicious of how the country's economy would react to the integration of the former Portuguese settlers: «Would it be possible, like the emigrants, to find space in the national economy for them, so underdeveloped still? And what about the hundred and eighty thousand soldiers of the “pacification” forces in Africa?»<sup>xxii509</sup>. Ventura introduces a topic in May 1974 that will be recurrent in the following years: with the end of the Empire, where will all the former settlers fit in the Portuguese economy, not to mention society?

## b) Colonialism

Aside from different attachments to the Portuguese Empire, different views about colonialism as a concept were also present. *Tele/eXprés* and *Arriba* displayed a different attitude, one celebrating and the other mourning the end of Empire, but it should be noted that a great majority of ideas about colonization expressed in this period tend to underline an elitist, borderline racist, vision of Europeans about non-Europeans.

When Javier M. Padilla, based in Hong Kong, travels to Macao at the moment of the summit held there to discuss Timor's future, he reveals a condescending attitude towards this people. FRETILIN, Timor's resistance movement, is not present because it claims that Lisbon would have been the appropriate place to hold the summit, not Macao. *La*

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<sup>509</sup> Ventura, Jorge. 1974. «Portugal, entre dos opciones: Europa o África» in *Tele/eXprés*, May 18<sup>th</sup>: 18

*Vanguardia Española*<sup>510</sup> was the only newspaper to address the Timorese question before Timor's invasion by Indonesia. At that moment international commentator B also remembers the powerlessness of Portugal – diplomatically, militarily and even morally – to be of any hope for the Timorese people.<sup>511</sup> However Timor is represented by Padilla as far-away undeveloped country where politics not only had no existence but, in fact, had no reason to exist and its people as an incarnation of the noble savage myth:

«Once upon a time, half of a paradisiac island, to the east of Bali, called Portuguese Timor, whose inhabitants lived peacefully without understanding politics, until...» The short story could start like this. Timor was caught by the Portuguese carnation revolution and decolonization, which is still in its infancy. In that remote place, where when a ship arrives it is still saluted by the jubilant natives and a propeller-driven aircraft – from time to time – is celebrated with renewed hope, the Portuguese had few problems over the past centuries. The natural fruits, generous, were enough to maintain a primitive, though healthy and simple, economy. Atmospheric pollution was, of course, unknown. (...) The 25 April 1974 did not start to have effects in Timor until a few months later. It turns out that the metropole was offering independence to its colonies...(...) The native politician – if I may say so – had to be searched with a magnifying glass...(...) But decolonization when it arrives is also relentless, except if Beijing is in charge of the decision, as happened in the cases of Macao and Hong Kong<sup>xxiii 512</sup>.

Decolonization is constructed by Padilla as an imposition from revolutionary Portugal upon peoples, such as the Timorese and the Macanese, who were not claiming it. Following a similar line of thought, Pedro Gómez Aparício in *Arriba* expresses a quite negative vision of the decolonization process, mostly linked to the «expulsion» of the former colonial ruler this process implies: «the independent “anti-colonialists” of

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<sup>510</sup> Editorial: «Ahora, en Timor».1975. in *La Vanguardia española*, December 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>511</sup> B. 1975. «Timor, la almoneda de un imperio» in *La Vanguardia española*, December 9<sup>th</sup>

<sup>512</sup> Padilla, Javier M. 1975. «Macao: Acuerdo precario sobre el futuro de Timor» in *La Vanguardia española*, July 1<sup>st</sup>: 15

São Tomé and Príncipe [that] have embarked on the «defenestration» of statues of seafarers, conquerors and colonizers»<sup>xxiv</sup>. Given this behaviour, Gómez Aparício warns the Spanish readers that «[t]he prognostics about this excessive “independence movement” are not good, independences, like revolutions, have a known start, but an unknown finish line, even if, in the case of the former Portuguese colonies we can presume that the finish line would resemble the situation of chaos now predominant in black Africa»<sup>xxv513</sup>. Chaos is the only future possible for them, since newly independent people are considered by Gómez Aparício unfit for ruling their own countries. Likewise, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that this commentator identifies with black Africa is by metonymy a very damaging organization:

(...) the Organization of African Unity has an immense capacity for action, on its negative side, such as the double fight against «colonialism» and «imperialism». Regarding the positive questions, like economic development, it is still very far from showing its efficiency. These are the «hopeful» perspectives offered by the hurried decolonization of the old and gigantic Portuguese overseas Empire<sup>xxvi514</sup>.

The quotation marks used by Gómez Aparício distance the writer from the terms used (Gruber 1993, van Dijk 2000), giving the impression that this journalist suspects concepts such as «colonialism» and «imperialism» or doubts their existence. An elitist conception of races (or civilizations) guides these interpretations. Both Padilla and Gómez Aparício assume a civilizational superiority that allows them to criticise how these peoples expelled colonial rule (effectively or symbolically) from their territories, and their reasoning embodies contempt for decolonization.

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<sup>513</sup> Gómez Aparício, Pedro .1975. «Africa en plena ebullición» in *Arriba*, July 13<sup>th</sup> : 6

<sup>514</sup> Gómez Aparício, Pedro .1975. «Africa en plena ebullición» in *Arriba*, July 13<sup>th</sup> : 6

Also in *Arriba*, Gómez Tello is dismissive of colonialism as a concept, which he catalogues as one more of the Soviet «inventions» used to disturb the world: «Perhaps who knows it is the “observer” that in “Pravda” came out in defence of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola for being Marxist, using the usual topics of “colonialism”, “colonialists”, “racists” and remaining songs of the soviet balalaika»<sup>xxvii515</sup>. Again, the use of quotation marks in words such as colonialism, colonialist or racist denotes a critical distance and distrust regarding their meaning. Angola’s difficult situation by the time of its independence, according to Gómez Tello, has to do with the internationalization of the conflict, which opposes two rival powers formally in a *détente*, and the richness of the Angolan soil that awakes both greed and independence sentiments. Regardless of reality, Gómez Tello completely dismisses the role of past colonial domination in that state of affairs by stating categorically that «[i]t is always easy to cast the blame about everything to on “colonialists”»<sup>xxviii516</sup>.

This idea of decolonization as an «invention», which Gómez Tello associates with USSR’s influence, is repeated by Eduardo Freitas da Costa in *Informaciones*, who considers «self-determination» to be «(...) an essential tool of the Marxist “decolonization” arsenal»<sup>xxix</sup>. Through the use of a war metaphor, Freitas da Costa associates it with violence, and since violence is considered almost universally as something negative, «self-determination» also resonates as negative. Freitas da Costa goes a step further and dismisses what he classifies as «the current and very modern “slogan” of the right of “self-determination” of peoples»<sup>xxx</sup> by identifying it with «a new word for the old-fashioned and bourgeois

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<sup>515</sup> Gómez Tello, J.L. 1975. «Independencia en la confusión» in *Arriba*, November 11<sup>th</sup>: 30

<sup>516</sup> Gómez Tello, J.L. 1975. «Independencia en la confusión» in *Arriba*, November 11<sup>th</sup>: 30

“principle of nationalities”, which came to settle in the political doctrines of the so-called “nationalisms” born out of WWI»<sup>xxx</sup>, and hence diluting the concept.

Like *ABC*'s editorial, Eduardo Freitas da Costa's article in *Informaciones* is also constructed based on Freyre's myth of the softness of Portuguese colonization. From the initial moment of his argumentation, Freitas da Costa speaks of two concepts, «the “colonization” [that] requires love»<sup>xxxii</sup>, opposed to «the “colonialism [that] supposes interest»<sup>xxxiii</sup>, and defends the first one as «noble in its deepest sense»<sup>xxxiv</sup>.

Colonization, according to Freitas da Costa, means «a sincere acculturation between civilizations (and peoples)»<sup>xxxv</sup> that would include «a no less sincere practice of miscegenation, of mix-racialism»<sup>xxxvi</sup>. Colonialism, «on the contrary, normally supposes a complete (yet dissimulated) ethnical (racial and cultural) segregation»<sup>xxxvii</sup>. At the economic level, the first one means an «intimate and ambivalent economic association between the colonizers and the colonized»<sup>xxxviii</sup> instead of «economic exploitation of the colonized people by the colonialist people, technically better prepared to take full advantage of the country's economic potentialities»<sup>xxxix</sup>. At the political field, the first implies «a profound and intimate political integration – where everyone, colonizers and colonized, participate in full conscience in the organization of the society that all, together and mixed, will build»<sup>xl</sup>, while in the latter «the unavoidable political domination of those who rule the economy over the underdeveloped locals»<sup>xli<sup>517</sup></sup> prevails.

Once again, to defend colonialism the text resorts to quotation marks when referring to the concepts whose meanings are put into question. Freitas da Costa presents an initial disclaimer, acknowledging

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<sup>517</sup> Freitas da Costa, Eduardo. 1975. «Colonizar y Descolonizar» in *Informaciones*, November 19<sup>th</sup>: 18

that he belongs to a minority and therefore supports a dissonant approach to the situation. Given the examples we have seen so far, the minority feature of his opinion regarding Colonialism might be questioned in the context of the Spanish press. However in the context of the newspaper where his article is published – *Informaciones* – that might be the case.

Without denying the inalienable right to sovereignty and self-determination of the African people, Gerardo González, a frequent observer in *Informaciones* of the so called Third-World, criticizes the vanguard of the decolonization process because of its European education, which he deems unfit for the task it has in hands. For instance, González hopes that the Mozambican group FRELIMO might be able to break this chain and «give a lesson on Africanism to all black leaders who had fought with arguments learned in the West to fight the continent of colonialism but who failed, in most cases, to bring to people the longing liberalizing fruits of decolonization»<sup>xlii518</sup>.

But the most insightful critic of Western views on colonialism and the decolonization processes is performed by Valencian writer and journalist Joan Fuster in an article first published by *Tele/eXprés* and a month later by *Informaciones*. Fuster contends that explicit defences of colonialism are no longer massively expressed and were, for the most part, replaced by disguised ones. Considering the sample used for the Spanish press, this seems to be the case. In 1962 Fuster had authored the book that inaugurated the publisher Ediciones 62, *We, the Valencian people* (Fuster 1962), a book paid by the Committee for Culture freedom (Morán 2014) that served as a stepping stone for left-wing nationalism. According to Fuster, disguised defences take the form of elitist arguments such as «”they are not ready yet”»<sup>xliii</sup> and scandal «before the, sometimes

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<sup>518</sup> González, Gerardo.1975. «Africa, tras la independencia de Mozambique» in *Informaciones*, June 26<sup>th</sup>: 18-19

bloody, events that usually accompany the emancipation process»<sup>xliv</sup>. The West's horror to violence, Fuster claims, is oblivious to how former colonies like the United States or all Latin American countries were once seen as losses by European Empires such as the British, the Spanish and the Portuguese one, and of how this independence came to happen. «The birth of each new State was made using forceps»<sup>xlv</sup>, writes Fuster. Moreover, instead of scandal and horror, Europeans should be ashamed, since colonization was, after all, their creation: «We, Europeans, appendix Europeans and full Europeans, instead of “being scandalized” should “be ashamed”. Colonial-daddy will have to take on what will come out of it: deaths, epidemics, famines, wars, droughts, overpopulation, superstitions, interests...He brought it all on him. Angola? Anything happening in Angola can be traced back to the Portuguese. And to all Portuguese: collectively (...)»<sup>xlvi</sup>. For Fuster all troubles emerging out of the decolonization process can be traced back to the colonizer. If colonization had as mission to «civilise» peoples under their rule, and now the same peoples strike out as «uncivilised» and prone to shock Europeans, the colonization mission has failed. «Salazar's Lisbon did not deign to convert them into “civilized” people, how ironic. (...) The colonial “patria potestad” was not able to make out of the “indigenous” an equivalent of the metropolitan citizen. What are they complaining about now?»<sup>xlvii</sup>. Again, Fuster also resorts to quotation marks, but the concepts highlighted are different ones.

What cannot be denied, and Joan Fuster does not do it, is that Angola is facing a bloody civil war at the moment of its independence. Regarding Angola's future, Fuster is not an optimist, since he argues that despite independence and the end of colonial rule the Angolan people was not freed from all forms of subjugation, hence the title of the article,



«Decolonized», and the question with which the author ends this article: «¿To decolonize?..»<sup>519</sup>.

### c) Returnees: the Empire's leftovers

The subject of the white population settled in the former Portuguese African territories at the moment of independence is divided into three phases: when their action is still the object of speculation, when they actually start to flee, and when the returnees are already a palpable reality in the former metropolitan soil.

While still a possibility, the white exodus is already seen as a very complicated question, both economically and socially. As mentioned previously, Jorge Ventura brings attention to the fact that dismantling the Portuguese Empire would probably mean receiving the former Portuguese settlers (plus the soldiers) in a very underdeveloped economy.

When during the summer of 1974 Spanish special correspondents travelled to Africa they dealt with the exodus question mostly on a theoretical level. Nationalist leaders were concerned about it. For instance when Alberto Miguez was in Guinea, Portuguese settlers are said to be welcomed in the construction of the new country: «no one will be deprived of their possessions, no white has nothing to be afraid of, we assure to non-African traders and professionals that there will be neither instability nor chaos. And that we need their participation in the building of a modern country. They should not leave»<sup>xlviii</sup>, argues Juvencio Gomes, second secretary of PAIGC and «the key-man of the situation, the supreme representative of PAIGC before the Portuguese authorities, who treat him as equal»<sup>xlix 520</sup>. Nonetheless, Bissau is described as a place from

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<sup>519</sup> Fuster, Joan. 1975. «Descolonizados» in *Tele/eXprés*, November 17<sup>th</sup>: 7 (also on *Informaciones* on the December 11<sup>th</sup>: 18-19 1975)

<sup>520</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1974. «Bissau: "No vamos a celebrar la independencia que ya la tenemos, sino la victoria"» in *La Vanguardia española*, August 21<sup>st</sup>: 17

where people are fleeing and that looks like «a capital of the American far west of old times. A capital for passing through, a provisional city, a boarding gate for those who are leaving these swampy and ungrateful lands for good (...)»<sup>521</sup>, hence not a welcoming place for people to settle in.

For Abril and Monzó, the spokesmen of both FRELIMO and MPLA identified the possibility of a *pieds-noirs* revolt as a possibility respectively in Mozambique and Angola. In fact, Abril and Monzó consider these revolts a standard development of a transition of this type: «the “pieds-noirs” upheaval seems to be unavoidable before the loss of their socio-racial privileges. It was like that in Algeria, in Rhodesia it is still like that; in Northern Ireland Protestants fulfil that role...»<sup>li 522</sup>.

However in the *locus horrendus* that is the Luanda constructed by Bernabé Pertusa in the summer of 1974, not only white, but also black people are fleeing every way they can: «The African exodus continues by train and the white scattered by boat and plane, while absenteeism among the black population in factories, workshops and stores of Luanda is reaching proportions of a general strike (...)»<sup>lii523</sup>.

When decolonization became closer to being a reality, with the Lusaka agreements in mid-September, Gómez Tello remembers «the situation of the civilian Portuguese population, white, of colour or as one wishes to call it, who until yesterday could not believe that from Lisbon

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<sup>521</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1974. «Bissau: Portugal y el PAIGC firmaron ayer en Argel la transmisión de poderes» in *La Vanguardia española*, August 27<sup>th</sup>: 16

<sup>522</sup> Abril, Albert and Monzó, Quim. 1974. «Africa la muerte del colonialismo 6. En Mozambique, con el apoyo de Sudáfrica y Rodesia. Los colonos boicotean la independencia» in *Tele/eXprés*, September 10<sup>th</sup>: 4

<sup>523</sup> Pertusa, Bernabé. 1974. «Se teme un golpe de estado en Angola» in *Arriba*, August 10<sup>th</sup>: 16

would arrive the order to retreat»<sup>liii524</sup>. Faced with a reality that they not only dreaded but also still believed to be impossible, the Portuguese settlers are regarded by Gerardo González as fundamental to the future independent countries' economies. If the Portuguese settler population exodus does occur, González considers it will be a mistake and that all parts involved – Portugal, Angola, Mozambique – will suffer, since settlers might be used as intermediaries in a future economic relationship between former colonizers and the colonized. Later, during the summer of 1975, when the fleeing is no longer a hypothesis but a *fait accompli*, González wonders who will occupy the settlers' place in Angola.

That following summer, despite the grim scenario of receiving so many people in a very impoverished country, Gómez Tello argues that that precarious situation is preferable to enduring the Angolan civil war situation:

It is true that in what was before the metropole a dark future is foreseen: this human wave will add to the 250.000 unemployed – 10 % of the labour census – already upon the shoulders of a country poor in resources and amputated of the former sources of richness. But at least, from Miño to Sagres, they will be spared from suffering the consequences of the civil war being projected from Zaire River to Moçâmedes<sup>liv 525</sup>.

By 1975 Alberto Miguez returns to Africa, and in Angola this journalist finds the concrete reality of what it means to be fleeing Africa. As Miguez writes, in Angola at that moment «fear and desperation have no colour. Even if class remains present...»<sup>lv 526</sup>. However, despite the violence, the white exodus is condemned by Miguez, who considers that «t[h]e white desertion, in these moments of fear and pain, is doubly to

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<sup>524</sup> Gómez Tello, JL. 1974. «Rebelión en Mozambique» in *Arriba*, September 10<sup>th</sup>: 10

<sup>525</sup> Gómez Tello, JL. 1975. «No hay paz en Angola» in *Arriba*, June 26<sup>th</sup>: 32

<sup>526</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Luanda: Una caravana de camiones y coches pretende cruzar africa para alcanzar Lisboa» in *La Vanguardia española*, July 12<sup>th</sup>: 17

blame»<sup>lvi</sup>. Miguez then alludes to the void González was addressing: «The city, the country is being emptied, without functioning services (no post, no telephones, nor telex communicating normally with the outside) in the middle of the great stampede»<sup>lvii</sup><sup>527</sup>.

Having witnessed that summer in Angola episodes of extreme violence during the «Luanda Battle» opposing FNLA to MPLA for the control of the capital, Miguez cannot but dismiss the allusions to violence made by the Portuguese settlers: «It is pathetic to listen the white settlers talk about the brutalities they witnessed, even if all of them recognize that only one of them died in the course of the clash between rival factions»<sup>lviii</sup><sup>528</sup>. Like this journalist had reflected before, although everyone is equal when facing fear and desperation, a very firmly implemented class system was still in place in Angola and furthermore was extremely visible. Therefore when the airlift of Portuguese Angolans started and the less well-off people were taken care of by the Portuguese State and at a faster pace than the rest, Miguez finds it to be both paradoxical and a form of historic justice:

Indeed – paradoxically in a society as commodified as the Angolan one – it turns out that the poor «evicted» are being repatriated at the expenses of the Portuguese government and in military planes at a considerably faster pace. The humble ones could not always be the ones getting slapped around<sup>lix</sup><sup>529</sup>.

Miguez does not seem too fond of this group of people, a sentiment which is visible in certain remarks he makes throughout his stay in Angola. In general Portuguese settlers try to forge a bond with this journalist, due to his nationality, assuming that by being Spanish he would

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<sup>527</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Luanda: En los graves enfrentamientos registrados, hasta ahora, unos dos mil muertos» in *La Vanguardia española*, July 15<sup>th</sup>: 22

<sup>528</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «La región angolana de Uige está totalmente controlada por el FNLA» in *La Vanguardia española*, July 20<sup>th</sup>: 20

<sup>529</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «El aeropuerto de Luanda, convertido en refugio para los fugitivos» in *La Vanguardia española*, July 19<sup>th</sup>: 16

be a supporter of their cause: «People want to talk from the moment they realize that I am Spanish. Some of them do not disguise their sympathies for the regime of my country»<sup>lx530</sup>.

The mass arrival of former Portuguese settlers to Portugal is reported by *Informaciones* in its political supplement: «The majority of these families of refugees arrive to the metropole with only what is essential; at the moment, the ones who have no family have been kept in camps, but in a near future they will pose severe labour and housing problems»<sup>lx531</sup>.



**Fig.4**

This arrival is also noted in *Arriba*. Malaga-born columnist and know poet and prize-winner of several Francoist poetry contests (Morán 2014), Manuel Alcantara authors a column framed with photos of black child soldiers titled «Angola’s children» [*Los niños de Angola*] that in fact addresses the question of white Portuguese children sleeping in airports while waiting to flee Angola (fig.4). This ensemble is deceiving, in the sense that the realities addressed by the photos

<sup>530</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Luanda: Una caravana de camiones y coches pretende cruzar africa para alcanzar Lisboa» in *La Vanguardia española*, July 12<sup>th</sup>: 17

<sup>531</sup> «Portugal y Angola: Situación patética».1975. *Informaciones Políticas*, August 16<sup>th</sup>: 3

and the text not only do not match, but the visual violence of childsoldiers is transferred to the violence that Alcantara is portraying. It is true that children are the object of both and that children are in general associated, like in Alcantara's article – «the children of Angola arrive innocent shipments at the Lisbon's airport»<sup>lxii</sup> – with innocence, and therefore all violence perpetrated against them is generally perceived as unjust. However children in Angola are carrying weapons and fighting alongside adults, whereas the children fleeing Angola «are lying around the sofas of the waiting rooms, scattered in the ground, the corridors, by fair means, by the love of God, very sleepy and hungry, among the suitcases, passports and hurries»<sup>lxiii</sup><sup>532</sup>. No comparison should be made between forms of violence, but the framing of this text by these photos reinforces one of the violence without any reference to the other. Furthermore, in identifying Angola's children with white children, Alcantara questions the legitimacy of an independence process that implies the expulsion of its own members, these «children of Angola»:

How can these children of Angola be so precocious? They just learned how to walk over African or Portuguese ground and they are already forced to escape it. You go ahead and explain it to them, or maybe Agostinho Neto should explain what is MPLA, or Holden Roberto what does FNLA desire, or even when he has a moment Doctor Jonas Savimbi may be able to inform them about UNITA's aspirations. We live in the «century of acronyms», but they do not even know how to read, and besides they are really sleepy and it is cold at Lisbon airport. (...) And while things go from bad to worse and a land that is where it has always been changes nationality, Angola's children pile up in an airport<sup>lxiv</sup><sup>533</sup>.

In this excerpt Manuel Alcantara moreover questions the existence of Angola as an independent nation. By using the children's point of view to cause an emotional response of pity towards this social

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<sup>532</sup> Alcantara, Manuel. 1975. «Los niños de Angola» in *Arriba*, November 12<sup>th</sup>:4

<sup>533</sup> Alcantara, Manuel. 1975. «Los niños de Angola» in *Arriba*, November 12<sup>th</sup>:4

group and a variation of a «skewed headline» (van Dijk 1985) used in this ensemble of photos and column, this piece, where a substantial critic of decolonization as a legitimate principle is performed and guilt is assigned to the African Nationalists (and very specifically, since Agostinho Neto, Jonas Savimbi and Holden Roberto are named), constitutes a sensationalistic approach relatively unique in this sample.

A headline is considered to be a «skewed headline» if one of the considered minor topics contained by the text is promoted to headline, which is a frequent action when obeying the principle of current news: the latest events are always more important considering they have the same informative value. However that is not always the case with skewed headlines, given their use in sensationalistic news.

When returnees are an undeniable reality of continental Portugal, Consuelo Sánchez-Vicente, while covering the 1976 elections, describes them as «illegitimate children that Portugal hides from foreign eyes»<sup>lxv</sup>. For this piece, Sánchez-Vicente interviewed some returnees, who not only expressed the feeling of being the leftovers of Empire, but also their political grievances, which make them prone to vote for right-wing parties, since «the left-wing parties have completely scorned them, accusing them of being “reactionary”»<sup>lxvi</sup> 534.

In fact, while still in Angola, Portuguese settlers clarify that upon arrival they will constitute a social force of opposition to Portugal’s new order, as they explain in an interview with Alberto Miguez. They believe that the Military power in Portugal is dreading their arrival: «(...) Why are the military in Lisbon afraid of us – pondered one of the members of the organization committee – they know that as soon as we get to Portugal we

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<sup>534</sup> Sánchez-Vicente, Consuelo and Martínez, Julio. 1976. «Y al oeste, Portugal/ 600.000 Os retornados» in *Arriba dominical*, April 25<sup>th</sup>: 16-17

will fight with all our means against them»<sup>lxvii</sup>. When asked about their motivations, their answer is straightforward:

«To get revenge», he answers. And adds: «the Portuguese government sold us, abandoned us. We are workers, not capitalists. We were able to get these trucks with work and savings, leading a modest life. Many brought their money from Portugal and invested it here. Now they want us to leave our only working tool. I would rather burn my truck than leave it to the «niggers» (blacks)<sup>lxviii</sup> 535.

Having clarified their oppositionist standpoint, some of them, while still in Angola, also express their counter-revolutionary inclination, which included the interest in, and support of, counter-revolutionary movements such as Liberation Army of Portugal [*Exército de Libertação de Portugal* ELP]:

«Listen, this thing, ELP (Portuguese Liberation Army), how is it going? », I am asked in a complicity tone by one of the «evicted». I answer him that ELP always seemed to me – in due respect – a «brincadeira» (joke). Completely serious, my interlocutor tells me that I am wrong, that it is not going to be fast, but that it is certainly not a joke. «If I could I would join them tomorrow», recognizes the sad, old, humiliated and haughty Portuguese. Voilà...<sup>lxix</sup>536.

Relying on the complicity with their interlocutor – despite Spain's repeated declarations of detachment regarding the counter-revolutionary movements that were gathering up in Spanish territory, as it was denounced in Portugal – Portuguese settlers do not feel constrained about endorsing their support towards an illegal organization and even sharing their desires of taking part in it. In their imaginary, the Spanish press is an allied of the Portuguese counter-revolutionary cause. In the same sense, when Mozambique declared its independency, the Spanish representation in the ceremony was headed by Spanish Communist, Santiago Álvarez,

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<sup>535</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Luanda: graves enfrentamientos entre los grupos armados de los principales movimientos de liberación» in *La Vanguardia española*, July 13<sup>th</sup>: 28

<sup>536</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Luanda: Una caravana de camiones y coches pretende cruzar África para alcanzar Lisboa» in *La Vanguardia española*, July 12<sup>th</sup>: 17



and no immediate diplomatic relationship with Spain was sought<sup>537</sup>, denoting that the opposite might be true as well.

#### d) Geopolitics

The most common approach is nevertheless to situate the African question, but also metropolitan developments, within the context of the détente pact and the influence zones that were effective in the 1970s. In *Informaciones* Luís Mendez Dominguez frames the question straightforwardly: «The influence in Africa will change hands (...) The United States and the Soviet Union must agree, if have not already done so, on the new geo-politics, geo-economy and geo-strategy of that extremely valuable part of Africa<sup>lxx538</sup>.

While in Angola Luis Reyes is surprised with how the situation is changing: «The fighters' radio broadcasting part of the speech of the Portuguese head of State...! This is how things are changing in the Lusitanian colonies at this moment»<sup>lxxi539</sup>. This journalist however acknowledges that Angola is not just Luanda, where the MPLA dominates, and that the rest of the territory is partitioned not only between MPLA and FNLA, but also between multinational companies – i.e. Diamang, in the northeast, or Gulf in Cabinda – that maintain private army forces and influence the power equilibrium.

The interests of multinationals in Angola are one of the main problems of this region for some observers. At the moment of Angola's independence, which Gómez Tello in his *Arriba* column considers to be

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<sup>537</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lourenço Marques: Mozambique deberá dosificar su ayuda a los movimientos de liberación de Sudáfrica y Rodesia» in *La Vanguardia española*, June 28<sup>th</sup>: 19

<sup>538</sup> Mendez Dominguez, Luís. 1974. «Yalta afroportugues» in *Informaciones*, November 14<sup>th</sup>: 19

<sup>539</sup> Reyes, Luis. 1974. «Spinola hablo a traves de la emisora de los guerrilleros guerrila radio» in *Informaciones*, August 3<sup>rd</sup>: 5

happening amidst chaos, the greed unleashed by Angola's abundance of natural resources shows its face: «And if the situation was not explosive enough, add Cabinda's oil, which also has its champions of independence»<sup>lxxii540</sup>, since «it is known that “black gold” is flammable and attracts disgrace for the peoples who have it»<sup>lxxiii541</sup>.

However Jaume Miravittles, who in *Tele/eXprés* is one of the commentators that most often addresses the Portuguese decolonization in the context of geopolitics, argues that in Angola's case the interests of multinationals have been overridden by a world dominance dispute: «(...) that territory has already entered in the worldwide maelstrom for being the goal not only of multinational companies wishing to exploit its richness, but also of the basic triangle around which the world balance gravitates: Russia, United States and China»<sup>lxxiv542</sup>. An assertion with which Gerardo González agrees in *Informaciones*, without, nevertheless, knowing «who will fill up the void of the Portuguese settlers who are massively leaving Angola?»<sup>lxxv543</sup>.

In Mozambique Alberto Miguez's first impression is that independence enforced a new order that may provoke changes on the geopolitical equilibrium in the region and in the existing feud between China and the USSR. The proclamation of the Mozambican Popular Republic is considered as measure that puts the stability of the white-

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<sup>540</sup> Gómez Tello, JL .1975. «Independencia en la confusión» in *Arriba*, November 11<sup>th</sup>: 30

<sup>541</sup> Gómez Tello, JL .1975. «Y ahora Cabinda» in *Arriba*, August 3<sup>rd</sup>: 28

<sup>542</sup> Miravittles, Jaume.1975. «Los chinos en Angola» in *Tele/eXprés*, June 11<sup>th</sup>: 5 (also in *Informaciones* June 18<sup>th</sup> 1975)

<sup>543</sup> González, Gerardo. 1975. «Angola, de mal en peor» in *Informaciones*, June 11<sup>th</sup>: 19

dominant regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia at risk by offering support and impulse to the liberation movements of both countries<sup>544</sup>.

The internationalist solidarity defended by Mozambique could get the country in trouble with Rhodesia, with whom the country already has a broken diplomatic relationship, and South Africa, where the diplomatic relationship is frozen despite the maintenance of an active economic one. Miguez also recognizes that despite independence and the void provoked by the Portuguese military and political retreat, this country's cultural presence will be maintained. This void of influence was being disputed by China and the USSR, who had helped the guerrilla during the war and continued to help the establishment of the new Republic. In Mozambique the presence of both was quite visible for Miguez:

Admirable these Chinese of Mao speaking Camões' language without an accent, admirable in their prudence and sympathy! A Mozambican told me, without disguising his preferences, that while Soviets send only money and high-level experts, the Chinese send from engineers to plain construction workers<sup>lxxvi545</sup>.

Miguez considers that the possibility of Mozambique remaining nonaligned depends on Samora Machel's leadership skills, highly praised by this journalist. Moreover, the Chinese presence not only seemed to be impossible to miss, but was visible as well in this country's future: «The "Chinese model" influenced by African spontaneity might give splendid fruits, guarantee many specialists on this matter»<sup>lxxvii</sup> notices Miguez, although not without admitting that «these structural changes could not have been conducted in a Western pluralist democracy. They will have then to be carried out within the frame of an "African popular

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<sup>544</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lourenço Marques: Mozambique deberá dosificar su ayuda a los movimientos de liberación de Sudáfrica y Rodesia» in *La Vanguardia española*, June 28<sup>th</sup>: 19

<sup>545</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lourenço Marques: Rusia y China se disputarán, sin duda, la primacía en el ánimo del presidente mozambiqueño» in *La Vanguardia española*, June 27<sup>th</sup>: 6

democracy»<sup>lxxviii546</sup>. Miguez also recognizes in Machel «the influence of Mao Tse Tung's thought in his theoretical formulations»<sup>lxxix</sup> and how those are translated into the model desired for Mozambique: «socialism in a country where capitalism had yet to show up (with exception of some urban centres)»<sup>lxxx547</sup>.

During the summer of 1975 Jaume Miravittles interprets the USSR's involvement in the Portuguese revolutionary process as a battle being held in two fronts, on the European and the African ground. Miravittles contends that although «Moscow wants to win both battles»<sup>lxxxi 548</sup> there is always the possibility that in order to ensure power in Africa it may have to accept defeat in Europe, since «[a] victory of Communism in Angola would be less spectacular but maybe more determinant for world balance than one in Portugal»<sup>lxxxii549</sup>. But regarding the Sino-soviet split, Miravittles argues that a new era has been inaugurated after Angola's independence and when European revolution is no longer a possibility:

Until now, in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and other places, the Russians and the Chinese, without renouncing their rivalry, fought together against «Imperialism». That «alliance» was broken in Bangladesh but indirectly. In Angola the split was making itself clear and the situation worsened. It was complicated by Mozambique's attitude, also a former colony of Portugal, pro-China within the country but supporter of helping in Angola Agostinho Neto against Holden Roberto, who is supported by the Chinese...<sup>lxxxiii550</sup>.

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<sup>546</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lourenço Marques: Los oficiales portugueses abandonaron Mozambique con un sentimiento de frustración» in *La Vanguardia española*, July 4<sup>th</sup>: 17

<sup>547</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lourenço Marques: El novísimo Mozambique se sitúa en el campo revolucionario, con tendencia no alineada» in *La Vanguardia española*, July 3<sup>rd</sup>: 20

<sup>548</sup> Miravittles, Jaume. 1975. «Portugal y Angola» in *Tele/eXprés*, July 22<sup>th</sup>: 5

<sup>549</sup> Miravittles, Jaume. 1975. «El desmantelamiento del imperio portugués» in *Tele/eXprés*, September 6<sup>th</sup>: 7

<sup>550</sup> Miravittles, Jaume. 1975. «¿Cambios de alianzas en Angola?» in *Tele/eXprés*, December 13<sup>th</sup>: 15

Miravittles concludes that «[g]etting China out of Africa is, in these conditions, an essential factor for Kremlin's policies. Of course it also would not hurt the Soviets that China's departure would take along with it the North Americans...»<sup>lxxxiv551</sup>.

In contrast with the interest China is showing in Mozambique and the Portuguese aspiration for proceeding with decolonization of its eastern territories, Beijing does not seem interested in recovering Macao. This territory, like Hong Kong, is considered «territories temporarily occupied», belonging to China, which in the opportune moment will be reclaimed»<sup>lxxxv552</sup>. Javier Padilla roots this in the fact that absorbing Macao would mean doing the same with Hong Kong, and China not only did not wish to engage in this discussion with London, but was also not keen on absorbing «over four million Chinese from Hong Kong and three hundred thousand from Macao, whose standard of living, habits and attitudes would shock dangerously with the ones of southern China, where the rhythm of existence is of a different kind and the socio-political and economic conditions are much different»<sup>lxxxvi553</sup>.

All in all, decolonization is a theme that allows dissent regarding the meaning of colonialism and its political, social, national and historical implications. On this matter, two opposing worldviews face each other without reaching a consensus beyond recognizing the extreme difficulty of the situation. Newspapers diverge in this sense, and opposing attitudes coexist within newspapers (*Informaciones*, *La Vanguardia Española*) while other newspapers tend to support one worldview (*Tele/eXprés*, *ABC* and *Arriba*).

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<sup>551</sup> Miravittles, Jaume. 1976. «La nueva hora africana» in *Tele/eXprés*, February 6<sup>th</sup>: 13

<sup>552</sup> Padilla, Javier M. 1974.«Macao: Pekin esta a favor de los cambios producidos en los mandos militares» in *La Vanguardia española*, June 8<sup>th</sup>: 23

<sup>553</sup> Padilla, Javier M. 1974.«Hong Kong: Gran confusion acerca del futuro de Macao» in *La Vanguardia española*, September 12<sup>th</sup>: 19

Moreover it might be said that in *Tele/eXprés* the 1960s are still present mostly by their «Third-Worldism» facet: «In short, the image of guerrillas with coloured skins amid tropical vegetation was an essential part, perhaps the chief inspiration, of the First World radicalization of the 1960s» (Hobsbawm 2010, 443). This newspaper seems particularly interested in National liberation movements, a characteristic that is not, however, completely absent from other newspapers, as is the case of *La Vanguardia Española*. Given the «homocentrism» feature that Roger Fowler (1991) concedes to the press, which in this case makes a Spanish reading less likely to be made, Alberto Miguez is able to praise during the summer of 1975 the Popular Democratic regime about to be installed in distant Mozambique, when at the same time any kind of positive view about the revolutionary legitimacy in Portugal has disappeared from the Spanish press.

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**Original quotes:**

<sup>i</sup> «Cuatro siglos de Historia- de una Historia reverencialmente guardada por el nacionalismo lusitano como en un arca santa - han sido liquidados; símbolo de esa liquidación, los independizados «anticolonialistas» de Santo Tomé y Príncipe han emprendido la "defenestración" de las estatuas de navegantes, conquistadores y colonizadores.»

<sup>ii</sup> «De vez en cuando un coche con la bandera de la nueva República, el ambiente es de calma absoluta.»

<sup>iii</sup> «malviven 400.000 africanos, donde la violencia racial blanca ha aparecido en Angola»

<sup>iv</sup> «El proceso de independencia de las colonias africanas está en pleno desarrollo y cualquier iniciativa en contra de la dirección de la historia no haría sino hipotecar el futuro del régimen salido del golpe militar del pasado jueves (...)»

<sup>v</sup> «integral espíritu de nación»

<sup>vi</sup> «Un camino erizado de espinas si Portugal no cuenta con las provincias africanas y queda resumida en los estrechos límites de la metrópoli. Porque no todo es democracia para ser feliz en la Comunidad Europea y Portugal está empobrecida.»

<sup>vii</sup> «una confederación lusitana, si todo va bien; la liquidación del antiguo imperio si las cosas se complican»

<sup>viii</sup> «las internacionales capitalista y marxista no se van a contentar con menos de la independencia de los territorios portugueses [sic] de África para la mayor gloria de sus negocios y estrategia»

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<sup>ix</sup> «La guerra colonial acabó con el régimen dictatorial portugués; pero el problema colonial seguirá existiendo en Angola y Mozambique, que no en Guinea- Bissau. De ahí, pues, que ello pueda acabar provocando graves tensiones en el seno del heterogéneo equipo de dirigentes de Portugal. Como es lógico, el punto de vista sobre el proceso descolonizador no es ni mucho menos unánime (...) Lo que ocurra en Angola y Mozambique puede provocar serios e inesperados desenlaces en Lisboa.»

<sup>x</sup> «La descolonización es, hoy por hoy, el nudo gordiano de la política lusa.»

<sup>xi</sup> « (...) la única salida viable para el nuevo régimen que buscaba acabar con todas las secuelas del salazarismo (...)»

<sup>xii</sup> « La muerte del líder [Amílcar Cabral] no hizo sino acelerar el proceso descolonizador en el sentido irreversible de la historia.»

<sup>xiii</sup> «Si se habla de autodeterminación en Lisboa, los mozambiqueños blancos no quieren estar ausentes de las definiciones concretas y prácticas de ella. Para su lógica, de la misma suerte que el FRELIMO no puede alzarse en interlocutor único por parte de los mozambiqueños negros, tampoco los negros de Mozambique deben ser el único interlocutor. (...) Estas tesis, sin embargo, chocan abiertamente con la atmosfera ideológica en que ha venido cristalizando, desde que comenzara, la descolonización de África. Se entiende, en efecto, que ante la metrópoli, a la hora de negociar la independencia, no pueden sentarse los colonos. Y frente a ello de poco valdrán ciertos indiscutibles caracteres diferenciales entre lo que ha sido la colonización portuguesa en África y la protagonizada por otras naciones europeas.»

<sup>xiv</sup> «Tan africanos y tan nacionalistas se sienten, pese a la diferencia de color, los colonos blancos como los guerrilleros del FRELIMO. Y estos dos nacionalismos tanto pueden convivir, lo que parece menos probable, como chocar trágicamente, que es, en principio más verosímil (...)»

<sup>xv</sup> «la emancipación por rebeldía y no por aquellos a quien formalmente corresponde recibirle de manos de la metrópolis»

<sup>xvi</sup> «La firmeza de Portugal para oponerse a cualquier movimiento secesionista también le está originando el respecto mundial a su política descolonizadora, que puede servir de contrapeso a cualquier inclinación de los racistas sudafricanos a alentar a los colonos de Mozambique para que declaren unilateralmente la independencia al estilo de Rodesia.»

<sup>xvii</sup> «En resumen, que los gobiernos de Lisboa se han mostrado hasta hoy remisos y morosos para cualquier inspiración de renovación y desarrollo y las consecuencias las está pagando todo el país ahora con intereses casi usurarios.»

<sup>xviii</sup> «metrópoli, que se encuentra ya con un alto índice de paro en una economía enferma y muy poco desarrollada. »

<sup>xix</sup> «Quienes- al margen de su política interior- amamos al Portugal de siempre, al de «Os Lusíadas», deseamos lo mejor al país vecino y fraterno. Ojalá resulte viable esa famosa solución federada. Estamos evidentemente de cara a una nueva época. Terminan el «gaullismo», el «salazarismo», el imperio británico y el espléndido aislamiento de los ingleses, la Alemania Federal de Adenauer. En el caso de Portugal, lo que deseamos es que el inmediato porvenir no nos imponga inexorable un «Adiós al Portugal grande». ¿Qué sería - en la Península- un Portugal pequeño?»

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<sup>xx</sup> «Portugal “quiso ser”; y “fue”. Frontal occidental de la Península, tenía señalada hacia el mar su salida histórica, tanto como la frontera española le señalaba el lugar donde se le cerraba el horizonte. Portugal “no tenía más remedio” que ser navegadora. (...) Ahora, la enorme realidad geo-histórica de los territorios del África va a cambiar de signo. Portugal, que decidió ser testa de Imperio, se apresta a ser ahora origen de libertades. Entonces, como ahora, “quiso”. Acaso ahora con mayor grandeza cuando el “querer” lleva aparejada una tremenda desgarradura. Es bello que, antes y ahora, Portugal proceda por un acto de libre voluntad decisoria. Creando historia, ahora como entonces, por su libre decisión.»

<sup>xxi</sup> «El imperio que se está desmantelando ahora ha sido siempre una pura ficción política que sólo se mantenía aparentemente en pie por la debilidad de la «metrópolis» y de las «colonias». Sin la jornada de aquel 25 de Abril, aquel «imperio» se hubiera muerto sin que nadie lo notara. Pero al dejarlo «suelto» en espacio de unos meses, su desarticulación ha despertado sumo interés entre las grandes potencias mundiales, y lo tenemos convertido en otro problema internacional capaz de agravar peligrosamente la situación en todas las partes.»

<sup>xxii</sup> «¿Sería posible, como a los emigrantes, darles cabida en la economía nacional, tan atrasada todavía? ¿Y qué decir de los ciento y ochenta mil soldados de las fuerzas de «pacificación» en África?»

<sup>xxiii</sup> «Erase una vez media isla paradisíaca, al este de Bali, llamada Timor portuguesa, cuyos habitantes vivían apaciblemente sin entender de política, hasta...» Así podría comenzar el cuento. A Timor le cogió la revolución portuguesa y descolonizadora de los claveles, lo que se llama en mantillas. En aquel remoto paraje, donde cuando llega un navío aún salen los nativos a saludarle alborozados y el aterrizaje de un avión a hélice - de tiempo en tiempo-, se festeja con ilusión renovada, los portugueses tuvieron pocos problemas en el transcurrir de los siglos. Los frutos naturales, generosos bastaban para mantener una economía primitiva, pero sana y sencilla. Por supuesto, se desconocía la contaminación atmosférica. (...) El 25 de abril de 1974 no empezó a digerirse en Timor hasta pasados varios meses. Resulta que la Metrópoli ofrecía la independencia a sus colonias... (...) A los políticos nativos - valga la expresión - había que buscarlos con lupa... (...) Pero la descolonización cuando llega también es implacable, a menos que sea Pekín la encargada de decidir si ha de producirse o no, como en los casos de Macao y Hong Kong.»

<sup>xxiv</sup> «los independizados “anticolonialistas” de Santo Tomé y Príncipe han emprendido la “defenestración” de las estatuas de navegantes, conquistadores y colonizadores.»

<sup>xxv</sup> «Los pronósticos sobre ese desbordado “independentismo” no son buenos, las independencias, como las revoluciones, se sabe dónde empiezan, pero no a dónde van a parar, aunque, en el caso de las antiguas colonias portuguesas, se puede presumir que pararán en la efectiva situación de caos que hoy predomina en el África negra.»

<sup>xxvi</sup> «(...) la Organización de la Unidad Africana, posee una inmensa capacidad de acción para los aspectos negativos, como la doble lucha contra el “colonialismo” y el “imperialismo”. En cuanto a las cuestiones positivas, como el desarrollo económico, se halla aún muy lejos de demostrar su eficacia. Tales son las



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perspectivas 2esperanzadoras” que ofrece la precipitada descolonización del viejo y gigantesco imperio ultramarino portugués»

<sup>xxvii</sup> «Quizá quien lo sabe es el "Observador" que en "Pravda" ha salido en defensa del Movimiento Popular para la Liberación de Angola por ser marxista, utilizando los habituales tópicos del "colonialismo", los "colonialistas", los "racistas" y demás música de balalaika soviética.»

<sup>xxviii</sup> «Siempre es fácil echar la culpa de todo a los "colonialistas"»

<sup>xxix</sup> «herramienta esencial del arsenal marxista de la "descolonización"»

<sup>xxx</sup> «el actual y modernísimo "slogan" de la "autodeterminación" de los pueblos»

<sup>xxxi</sup> « una nueva palabra para el decimonónico y burgués "principio de las nacionalidades", que vino a cuajar en las doctrinas políticas de los llamados "nacionalismos" salidos de la primera guerra mundial»

<sup>xxxii</sup> «la "colonización"[que] exige amor»

<sup>xxxiii</sup> «"colonialismo"[que] supone intereses»

<sup>xxxiv</sup> «noble en su sentido más profundo»

<sup>xxxv</sup> «una sincera aculturación entre las civilizaciones (y los pueblos)»

<sup>xxxvi</sup> « una práctica no menos sincera del mestizaje, de la mixtirracidad [sic]»

<sup>xxxvii</sup> « por el contrario, supone normalmente una completa (aunque disimulada) segregación étnica (racial y cultural)»

<sup>xxxviii</sup> «íntima y ambivalente asociación económica entre colonizadores y colonizados»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «explotación económica del pueblo colonizado por parte del pueblo colonialista, técnicamente mejor preparado para sacar todo el partido posible a las potencialidades económicas del país»

<sup>xl</sup> «una profunda y entrañable integración política - donde todos, colonizadores y colonizados, participen con plena consciencia en el ordenamiento de la sociedad que todos, juntos y mezclados, han de constituir»

<sup>xli</sup> «el inevitable dominio político, de quienes dominan la economía, sobre los autóctonos, subdesarrollados.»

<sup>xlii</sup> « dará una lección de africanismo a todos los dirigentes negros que lucharon con argumentos aprendidos en Occidente para liberar al continente del colonialismo pero que no han logrado, en la mayoría de los casos llevar a la población los ansiados frutos liberadores de la descolonización.»

<sup>xliiii</sup> «"aún no están maduros"»

<sup>xliv</sup> «ante los hechos a veces cruentos, a veces grotescos, que suelen acompañar al proceso de emancipación»

<sup>xlv</sup> «Cada parto de un Estado nuevo se ha hecho con fórceps»

<sup>xlvi</sup> «Nosotros, los europeos, europeos apendiculares y europeos plenos, en vez de "escandalizarnos", deberíamos "avergonzarnos". El papá-colonial ha de aguantar ahora lo que venga: muertes, epidemias, hambres, iras, guerras, sequías, superpoblación, supersticiones, intereses gordos... Él se lo había cultivado. ¿Angola? Todo lo que ocurra en Angola se remonta a los portugueses. Y a todos los portugueses: colectivamente. (...)»

<sup>xlvii</sup> «La Lisboa de Salazar no se dignó a convertirlos en "civilizados", y valga la ironía. (...)La "patria potestad" colonial no consiguió hacer del "indígena" un equivalente del ciudadano metropolitano. ¿De qué se quejan ahora?».

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<sup>xlviii</sup> «nadie será espoliado, que ningún blanco tiene nada que temer, que aseguramos a los comerciantes no africanos y al [sic] os profesionales que no habrá ni inestabilidad ni caos. Y que precisamos de su concurso para construir un país moderno, Que no se vayan»

<sup>xlix</sup> «el hombre clave de la situación, el representante máximo del PAIGC ante las autoridades portuguesas que lo tratan de igual para igual»

<sup>l</sup> «una capital de Medio Oeste americano durante la época legendaria. Capital de paso, ciudad provisional, apeadero para quienes se van definitivamente de estas tierras pantanosas e ingratas (...))»

<sup>li</sup> « parece ser inevitable revuelta de los "pieds-noirs" ante la pérdida de sus privilegios socio-raciales. En Argelia fue así, en Rodesia es aun así, en Irlanda del Norte los protestantes cumplen ese papel...»

<sup>lii</sup> «Sigue el éxodo de africanos por ferrocarril y la desbandada de blancos por barco y avión, mientras el absentismo en fábricas, talleres y comercios de Luanda, entre la población negra, está alcanzado proporciones de huelga general (...))»

<sup>liii</sup> «la situación de la población civil portuguesa, blanca, de color o como se quiera llamar, que hasta ayer mismo no podía imaginar que desde Lisboa llegara la orden de retirada »

<sup>liv</sup> «Es verdad que en lo que antes fue la metrópoli le aguarda un sombrío porvenir: esa oleada humana irá sumarse a los 250.000 parados - el 10 por 100 del censo laboral - que ya acampa sobre un país pobre de recursos y amputado de las fuentes de riqueza que tuvo. Pero, al menos, del Miño a Sagres se verán libres de tener que sufrir las consecuencias de la lucha civil que se proyecta desde el río Zaire hasta Moçamedes [sic]»

<sup>lv</sup> «el miedo, la desesperación no tienen color. Aunque siempre haya clases...»

<sup>lvi</sup> «La desertión de los blancos, en estas horas de miedo y dolor es doblemente culpable. »

<sup>lvii</sup> « La ciudad, el país, están quedándose en cuadro, sin servicios que funcionen (ni correos, ni teléfonos, ni telex, comunican normalmente con el exterior), en medio de la gran estampida...»

<sup>lviii</sup> «Resulta patético oír hablar a los colonos blancos de las brutalidades a que asistieron, aunque todos ellos reconocen que apenas uno de ellos falleció en el curso de los enfrentamientos entre fuerzas rivales. »

<sup>lix</sup> «En efecto - y por paradoja en una sociedad tan mercantilizada como la angolana- resulta que los "desalojados" pobres están siendo repatriados por cuenta del Gobierno portugués y en aviones militares a un ritmo considerablemente más rápido. No siempre habían de ser los humildes quienes se llevasen las bofetadas»

<sup>lx</sup> «Las gentes quieren hablar en el momento que saben que soy español. Algunos no ocultan sus simpatías por el régimen de mi país.»

<sup>lxi</sup> «La mayoría de estas familias de refugiados llegan a la metrópoli únicamente con lo indispensables [sic]; de momento, los que no tienen familiares han sido acogidos en campamentos, pero en un futuro no muy lejano plantearán graves problemas laborales y de alojamiento.»

<sup>lxii</sup> «los niños angolanos llegan en remesas inocentes al aeropuerto de Lisboa»

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<sup>lxiii</sup> «están tirados por los sofás de las salas de espera, por los suelos, por los pasillos, por las buenas, por el amor de Dios, muertos de sueño y de cansancio, entre maletas, pasaportes y prisas.»

<sup>lxiv</sup> «¿Cómo pueden ser tan precoces estos niños de Angola? Apenas saben andar sobre la tierra africana o portuguesa y ya tienen de huir. Vaya usted explicarles, o vaya a explicárselo Agostinho Neto, lo que es el MPLA, o que eles informe Holden Roberto de lo que pretende FNLA, o bien, en un momento libre, que el doctor Jonas Savimbi les ponga al corriente de las aspiraciones de UNITA. Vivimos en “el siglo de las siglas”, pero ellos aún no saben leer y además tienen mucho sueño y hace frío en el aeropuerto de Lisboa. (...) Y mientras las cosas van de mal a peor y una tierra que ha estado siempre en el mismo sitio cambia de nacionalidad, los niños de Angola se amontonan en un aeropuerto.»

<sup>lxv</sup> «los hijos ilegítimos que Portugal oculta con vergüenza a los ojos extranjeros»

<sup>lxvi</sup> « los partidos de izquierda [los] ha[n] despreciado olímpicamente, acusándoles de “reaccionarios”»

<sup>lxvii</sup> «(...)”Porque nos tienen miedo los militares de Lisboa- cavilaba uno de los miembros de la comisión organizadora - saben que cuando llegemos a Portugal vamos a luchar con todas las fuerzas contra ellos»

<sup>lxviii</sup> «Para vengarnos», responde. Y añade: «El gobierno portugués nos ha vendido, nos abandonó. Todos nosotros somos trabajadores, pero no capitalistas. Hemos podido comprar estos camiones con el trabajo y los ahorros, llevando una vida modesta. Muchos trajeron el dinero que tenían en Portugal y lo invirtieron aquí. Ahora pretenden que dejemos nuestro único instrumento de trabajo. Antes de dejarle el camión a los “pretos” (negros), prefiero quemarlo.»

<sup>lxix</sup> «Oiga, eso del ELP (ejército de Liberación Portugués), ¿cómo va?», me pregunta en tono cómplice uno de los «desalojados». Le respondo que a mí lo del ELP me ha parecido siempre - y con los debidos respetos para todos - «una brincadeira» (una broma). Muy serio, mi interlocutor dice que estoy equivocado, que la cosa va para largo, pero que es todo menos una broma. «Yo, si pudiera, me apuntaba mañana mismo», reconoce el triste, envejecido, humillado y soberbio portugués. Voilà...

<sup>lxx</sup> «La influencia en África pasará a otras manos (...) Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética deberán ponerse de acuerdo, si no lo estuvieran ya, acerca de la nueva geopolítica, geoeconomía y geoestrategia de esa parte valiosísima de África.»

<sup>lxxi</sup> «¿La radio de los guerrilleros retransmitiendo parte del discurso del jefe de Estado portugués..! Hasta ese punto está cambiando [sic] la situación de las colonias lusitanas en estos momentos»

<sup>lxxii</sup> «Y por si no fuera bastante explosiva la situación, agreguen el petróleo de Cabinda, que también tiene sus independentistas»

<sup>lxxiii</sup> «ya se sabe que el “oro negro” es inflamable y atrae la desgracia para los pueblos que lo poseen.»

<sup>lxxiv</sup> «(...) aquel territorio ha entrado ya en el vorágine mundial al ser el objetivo no ya de las multinacionales que aspiran explotar sus riquezas, sino del triángulo básico sobre el cual gravita el equilibrio mundial: Rusia, Estados Unidos y China.

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<sup>lxxv</sup> « ¿quién llenará el vacío de los colonos portugueses que están abandonando masivamente Angola?»

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<sup>lxxvi</sup> «¡Admirables, estos chinos de Mao hablando la lengua de Camoens [sic] sin acento, admirables en su prudencia y en su simpatía! Un mozambiqueño me contaba, sin ocultar sus preferencias, que mientras los soviéticos mandan solamente dinero y técnicos de alto rango, los chinos envían desde ingenieros a simples albañiles.»

<sup>lxxvii</sup> «El "modelo chino" pasado por la espontaneidad africana puede dar frutos espléndidos, aseguran bastantes especialistas en estos temas.»

<sup>lxxviii</sup> «estos cambios de estructura no podrían realizarse en el seno de una democracia pluralista occidental. Tendrán que llevarse a cabo, pues, en el marco de una "democracia popular africana".»

<sup>lxxix</sup> «la influencia del pensamiento de Mao Tse Tung en sus formulaciones teóricas»

<sup>lxxx</sup> «el socialismo en un país donde el capitalismo no hizo acto de presencia (si se exceptúan algunos centros urbanos).»

<sup>lxxxi</sup> «Moscú quiere [quiera] ganar ambas batallas»

<sup>lxxxii</sup> «Una victoria del comunismo en Angola sería menos espectacular pero quizá más decisiva para el equilibrio mundial que en el propio Portugal.»

<sup>lxxxiii</sup> «Hasta ahora, en Corea, Vietnam, Laos, Camboya y otros sitios, rusos y chinos, sin renunciar a su rivalidad, luchaban juntos contra el «imperialismo». Aquella «alianza» se rompió en Bangladesh, pero de una manera indirecta. En Angola la ruptura se hacía evidente y agravaba considerablemente la situación. Lo complicaba todavía más la actitud de Mozambique, ex colonia portuguesa también, pro china en el país, pero partidaria de ayudar a Neto en Angola contra un Holden sostenido por los chinos...»

<sup>lxxxiv</sup> «La eliminación de China en África es, en estas condiciones, un factor esencial de la política del Kremlin. Claro que tampoco les vendrá mal a los soviéticos que la salida de los chinos vaya acompañada de la de los norteamericanos...»

<sup>lxxxv</sup> «"territorios temporalmente ocupados", pertenecientes a China, y que en el momento oportuno serán reclamados. »

<sup>lxxxvi</sup> «más de cuatro millones de chinos de Hong Kong y más de trescientos mil de Macao, cuyo nivel de vida, costumbres y actitudes, chocarían peligrosamente con los de las regiones meridionales chinas, donde el ritmo de la existencia es otro, y las condiciones sociopolíticas y económicas, muy diferentes.»

#### **4. General Spínola's downfall: the first sign of right-wing reemergence**

Five months have thus gone by since in on April 25<sup>th</sup> the Portuguese Army went out on the street and started an unusual manoeuvre of cleansing and hope. The first sixty days were of joy, enthusiasm and folklore. Afterwards came the hesitations of power, the constitutional crisis triggered by Da Palma Carlos as Prime Minister, the wild strikes. In the end stability came from the hand of a severe and honest military, brigadier Vasco Gonçalves. And now, while the country has its eyes on the March elections, the moment of truth is approaching. The moment for antagonisms of class and interests, the clash of ideologies as an expression of those antagonisms, the surreptitious campaigns of a right-wing that is leaving its «sanctuaries» behind very carefully, the moment when we will know if the left-wing will run together in the election, or if the «creole» capitalism is willing to play along with European liberalization or prefers the catastrophe and chaos instead, as a demonstration that «all change is possible».<sup>i</sup>

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Five months after April's *coup d'état*, tension in Portugal rose to the point that special correspondents returned<sup>555</sup> to try to figure out not only what was happening but especially why General Spínola presented his resignation to the country on September 30<sup>th</sup>. Since General António de Spínola had been appointed Portugal's President of the Republic he had been involved in the demands for a reinforcement of Presidential and Government powers that Prime Minister Adelino da Palma Carlos, then head of the I Provisional Government, had been calling for. The demand was refused, Palma Carlos abandoned office, Vasco Gonçalves replaced him as Prime Minister on July 18<sup>th</sup>, and Spínola's intentions of having his office legitimated by a referendum were frustrated.

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<sup>554</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1974. «Lisboa: Parece llegada la hora de las definiciones para todos» in *La Vanguardia española*, September 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

<sup>555</sup> « (...) numerosos enviados especiales han llegado estos días a Lisboa (...)» [Jáuregui, Fernando.1974. «Spínola fue víctima de una conspiración, según Vasco Gonçalves» in *Arriba*, October 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp 12 and Carandell, Luís. 1974. «Mi último día en Lisboa», *Triunfo*, October 12, pp.16]

The Spanish attention is caught by the «silent majority» demonstration called for September 28<sup>th</sup>, a Saturday. As José Salas in *ABC* dutifully reminds Spanish readers, the origins of this social force, overarched by the «silent majority» concept, can be traced back to General Spínola's fiercely anti-Communist speech of September 10<sup>th</sup>:

All this stems from General Spínola's speech of the 10<sup>th</sup>, in which he attacked Communism without naming it. The right-wing saw on this occasion the opportunity to group around someone who seemed willing to adopt an attitude of strength and order before Communism. If a demonstration in his support was organized, an anti-Communist front, which would have its weight on the Portuguese situation, would be automatically formed.<sup>ii</sup> 556

Spínola's call is then materialized in a specific date, the announcement spread in the media and «Spínola gathered around him all the frightened and upset right-wing sectors, which were joined by the many nonconformists that are always formed by the wearing down deriving from the exercise of power»<sup>iii</sup> 557. This demonstration is, according to Alberto Miguez in *La Vanguardia Española*, condemned «by all the democratic parties' leaderships (except for the Christian Democracy, which supports it), and deemed a “serious mistake” and a “deplorable provocation”»<sup>iv</sup> 558. This generated some uncertainty regarding whether or not it would actually take place. *ABC*'s correspondent in Lisbon appears concerned with the possibility that the demonstration may actually be forbidden:

If wrote that while General Spínola is President of the Republic, the demonstrations and the propaganda on his behalf were to be considered by some sectors born officially after April 25<sup>th</sup>, and even represented in

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<sup>556</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «Grave situación política» in *ABC*, September 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.13 and 15

<sup>557</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «Multitudinaria manifestacion de apoyo a Costa Gomes» in *ABC*, October 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp.29-30

<sup>558</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1974. «Lisboa: Serios enfrentamientos entre extremistas de izquierda y de derecha» in *La Vanguardia española*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp. 23

the provisional government, as subversive manoeuvres, probably no one would understand. But it is so and it needs to be explained.<sup>v 559</sup>

But, how it can people who fulfil all the legal demands for it be forbidden to demonstrate, when we are tired of seeing how other people demonstrate without obeying even the most elementary rules?? (...) to deny permission would be admitting that the head of State is also the head of opposition. To allow it, insisting that it is a manoeuvre of the reactionary opposition would be equivalent to having the same opposition parade around the streets shouting governmental slogans. That is how mysterious and confuse Portugal is.<sup>vi 560</sup>

At this point José Salas, in *ABC*, and José Reis, in *Arriba*, classify this event as the first sign of life of the Portuguese right wing after the April 25<sup>th</sup> coup: «Even if disguised by the auto-proclaimed “silent majority” denomination and the adhesion of Spínola and the Armed Forces, it was not a secret for anyone that its true nature was against the current situation»<sup>vii561</sup>, underlines Salas.

#### a) The «silent majority»: two versions of the same event

The call of the «silent majority» demonstration stirred the question, in the mind of some journalists, of where the right wing had been hiding for the past five months. In *La Vanguardia Española*, Miguez considers that «[t]he right-wing was on its winter barracks, waiting for better times. Skilfully it was preparing the ground while the messy freedom converted Lisbon’s walls into a hieroglyph»<sup>viii 562</sup>. However, what José Reis calls «the Portuguese with right-wing or centre-right ideas that want to defend

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<sup>559</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «El enfrentamiento entre comunistas y spinolistas habrá de producirse tarde o temprano» in *ABC*, September 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.47

<sup>560</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «Hoy, prueba de fuego para el régimen portugués» in *ABC*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.21-22

<sup>561</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «Grave situación política» in *ABC*, September 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.13 and 15

<sup>562</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1974. «Lisboa: Parece llegada la hora de las definiciones para todos» in *La Vanguardia española*, September 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

and spread their convictions»<sup>ix563</sup> are for Alberto Miguez «the numerous and powerful followers of the former regime that from April 25<sup>th</sup> on, as a gloomy Guadiana, evaporated»<sup>x</sup>. This is a moment when the Spanish opinion is fairly polarized between refusal and support of these first signs of life and almost all newspapers take a stance, visible for instance in the way the collectives are described. José Reis seems annoyed with the fact that this collective, for whom he shows some sympathy, keeps getting harassed. This harassment materializes itself in language, Reis argues:

The far-right stigma that people are proposing to apply to everyone that is not defining clearly at least as centre-left, and the much used phrase «he is reactionary» serves to dismiss elements that might or not be «fascists», are two hats often placed on the heads of any candidate belonging to right-wing parties. For that reason some people are uneasy when pursuing what might become delicate situations for their political and professional future. (...) Demagogy is being used and in order to frighten a little bit more the reader or listener special terms are searched and a language of insult is used to describe the activities of the groups that need to be moved out of the way of a left-wing that is scared of losing support and political representation.<sup>xi 564</sup>

This question of semantic harassment is actually a specificity of *Arriba*. Not only does the newspaper's correspondent in Lisbon often reflect about it, but this is also mentioned by Gómez Tello. The use of the term «fascist» is particularly condemned. In fact, Gómez Tello deems the Communist Party tis responsible for the harassment and that it is part of a strategy of militancy: «An attempt of coup from the forces of the “reaction”, of the “ultra-right” of “fascism” – we will use the well-known language of Communist activism that is used today by part of its “compagnons de route” (...) The language used on the memorable occasions that we all know is so beautiful»<sup>xii565</sup>. The attack on the

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<sup>563</sup> Reis, José. 1974. «Clima de inquietud en Portugal» in *Arriba*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.13

<sup>564</sup> Reis, José. 1974. «Clima de inquietud en Portugal» in *Arriba*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.13

<sup>565</sup> Gómez Tello, J.L. 1974. «¿Principio o fin» in *Arriba*, September 29<sup>th</sup>, pp. 12



Portuguese right wing translates in the language used, which displeases many in *Arriba*.

All these terms – «reactionary», «provocateur», «fascist» – are used in *Arriba* between quotations marks, and Jesús Suevos even asks rhetorically «but what do some people think fascism is?»<sup>xiii 566</sup>. There is a clear dissociation in *Arriba* between the predominant social forces of the former regime and the concept used in Portugal to describe them, even if not so much with the regime in itself, and thus its search for concepts less loaded with historical meaning.

*Arriba* maintains in its core a group of Falangists (Gómez Tello, Suevos, Bayot y Serrat still follow falangist politics, while Aparício and Omega are more prone to evolve) which if not risking social outcast (Noelle-Neumann1993) in the 1970s society could perhaps still claim to be «fascists». Even if they do not use the term, they do however endorse values and policies that can be traced back to 1930s politics, when the Spanish Falange had been greatly influenced by Italian fascists. The refusal of both the capitalist and the Communist order, contempt for the bourgeoisie and the calling for working class values are some of its features.

The polarization is also visible in the portrayal of an event that took place on the eve of the day chosen to hold the demonstration. On Thursday, September 26<sup>th</sup>, there was a bullfight in Lisbon that General Spínola and now Prime Minister Colonel Vasco Gonçalves attended. This event was seen by the Spanish press as a popularity barometer of the Right and Left.

In *La Vanguardia Española*, Alberto Míguez finds Spínola to be embarrassed with the display of support of the not so «silent majority»,

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<sup>566</sup> Suevos, Jesus.1974. «Politica de monóculo» in *Arriba*, October 6<sup>th</sup>, pp.2

who shouted «Overseas! Overseas!»<sup>567</sup>. On the contrary, in *Arriba*, Fernando Jáuregui describes a delighted Spínola accepting this acclamation. The young Fernando Jáuregui, who had started working for *pyresa* very recently, joined José Reis in Lisbon in June 1974 and together they informed about the Portuguese events the several publications belonging to the *Movimiento* network, the official media chain.

However on the pages of the same newspapers there is a discrepancy, for Jáuregui mentions that this occasion «[w]as the first time since April 25, that I recall, that groups of right and left wing (to distinguish them plainly) confronted each other on the streets. The right wing groups, and this is significant, cheered Spínola, while the left cheered the Armed Forces Movement»<sup>xiv568</sup>. Whereas Gómez Tello sees in the bullfight incident a definite prevalence of the Portuguese right wing, given that «general Spínola was cheered while there was a significant silence regarding the Prime Minister's presence. The national anthem was played and then, following the habit of the new Portuguese democracy, the "Avante", Communist anthem, of which only the first notes were heard, erased by the hostile screaming and hissing»<sup>xv 569</sup>.

What actually took place between September 28<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> is another one of the questions that elicits opposite standpoints in the Spanish press.

The official Portuguese version about the events was that a right-wing coup was prevented by civilian action – mostly by Socialist and Communist militants. However this version is not broadly accepted, and not only in Spain, since according to Miguez «[m]uch of the European

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<sup>567</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1974. «Lisboa: Serios enfrentamientos entre extremistas de izquierda y de derecha» in *La Vanguardia española*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp. 23

<sup>568</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando. 1974. «Choques entre izquierdistas y derechistas» in *Arriba*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp. 13

<sup>569</sup> Gómez Tello, J.L. 1974. «Tensión en Lisboa» in *Arriba*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

mass media started to suggest that the alleged attempt was nothing but a pretext used by Vasco Gonçalves to do away with Spínola and to settle the score with a group of persons connected with the former regime»<sup>xvi</sup> 570. Addressing this distrust coming from foreign countries, Mário Soares, Minister of Foreign Affairs, met with «some special correspondents and correspondents of the European press»<sup>xvii</sup> and was able to «realize the extent of doubt existing for the great majority of journalists regarding the truthfulness of the facts more or less illustrative of the existence of a “reactionary conspiracy”»<sup>xviii</sup>. Miguez<sup>571</sup>, in particular, worries about how easily rumours take over the coverage, especially the international one, of a situation like this.

Within the Spanish press, Gómez Tello in *Arriba* is the reporter who expresses his doubts more sharply about what happened, as he writes: «An coup attempt from the forces of the “reaction”, of the “ultra-right” of “fascism” – we will use the well-known language of Communist activism that is used today by part of its “compagnons de route”? – What an odd coup d’état it was carried out at three and without troops or weapons»<sup>xix</sup> 572. In fact, more than doubting, Gómez Tello endorses the idea that the denounced coup is no more than a communist manoeuvre aimed at neutralizing a social force that is on the rise after a period of disaggregation:

From what can be understood from the confusing news, the existence of this dangerous plot was discovered by the Communists, and the Communists and the Socialists were the ones who rushed to lift up barricades at Lisbon’s entries to prevent the arrival of cars with potential demonstrators –earlier the unions under Communist control had been

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<sup>570</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1974. «Lisboa: Han sido elegidos los nuevos miembros de la Junta de salvación Nacional» in *La Vanguardia española*, October 3<sup>rd</sup>, pp.28

<sup>571</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1974. «Lisboa: Parece llegada la hora de las definiciones para todos» in *La Vanguardia española*, September 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

<sup>572</sup> Gómez Tello, J.L. 1974. «¿Principio o fin?» in *Arriba*, September 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

mobilized to stop trains and buses –, who exhorted its militants to prepare themselves to smash «the reaction and fascism»<sup>xx573</sup>.

In turn, other journalists in Lisbon not only do not dispute the prevented coup theories, but also elucidate the reasons why this theory must be valid. Among these journalists are Alberto Miguez, the new Lisbon correspondent for *La Vanguardia Española*, Eduardo Barrenechea, who hinting the distress returned to Lisbon, and Portuguese Communist Party member Paulo Correia da Fonseca, at that moment presented as *Tele/eXprés*' Lisbon correspondent.

In *La Vanguardia Española* Miguez described the «silent majority» demonstration as «nothing less than the first coup of a series of actions that would trigger a general insurrection around the country»<sup>xxi574</sup>. In *Informaciones*, Barrenechea explains to the hesitant reader that despite the uncanny bloodless April coup, tensions between social forces existed since then in Portugal and therefore this type of manoeuvre is completely plausible: «Many readers will wonder how it is possible that after April 25 a “bloody coup” like this one by the ultra-right could have been carried out (...) Those who know what the April coup was and what happened in Portugal since then, will not be extremely surprised (...)»<sup>xxii575</sup>. It is however in *Tele/eXprés* that the developments of September 28-30 get a more war-like description. Correia da Fonseca gives voice to several of the rumours spreading around the city, namely the arrest of Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves and of the head of the military unit in charge of security (COPCON), Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, in the Belém Palace. A rumour with some accuracy to it, depending on which interpretation of the events was taken (MFA 1975, 55; Moura 2012, 263-266). However by the

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<sup>573</sup>Gómez Tello, J.L. 1974. «¿Principio o fin?» in *Arriba*, September 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>574</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1974. «Lisboa: La manifestación en favor de Spínola ha sido prohibida» in *La Vanguardia española*, September 29<sup>th</sup>, pp. 5-6

<sup>575</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1974. «Spínola, bloqueado por el Movimiento de las fuerzas armadas» in *Informaciones*, September 30<sup>th</sup>, pp.3-4

time Correia da Fonseca wrote this article he considers that «the reactionary coup attempt begun Saturday at dawn has been completely dominated»<sup>xxiii</sup> 576.

A failed coup is also the interpretation of González Casanova's article in *La Vanguardia Española*, going against the rest of the Spanish opinion regarding this event. For González Casanova, «[t]he failure of the right-wing coup d'état in Portugal and the correlative rise to power of the democratic movement of the Armed Forces suggest some reflections about the future of all the non-democratic right wing»<sup>xxiv</sup> 577.

Exploring further the roots of this break, both Alberto Míguez and José Salas see this development as a dispute between opposing social forces. Yet Míguez limits his analysis to the military feature of such dynamics, thus opposing General Spínola to the MFA. An opposition that, he notes, was present since the beginning: «But anybody who knows Spínola's ideology, before April 25, knows really well that between what he thought before (and surely continues to think) and the Armed Forces programme, there is an infinite distance»<sup>xxv</sup>578. An ideological dispute «that, since the early days of May, opposed the general-president to the Armed Forces Movement, ended up bursting loudly. And, naturally, the strongest won, that is to say, the ones who on April 25 went out on the street risking their lives and taking back power»<sup>xxvi</sup>.

Salas nevertheless stresses the civilian feature of this dispute, dismissing the idea of a *coup d'état* situation. For *ABC's* correspondent, «without being a proper coup d'état, it was something similar in terms of

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<sup>576</sup> Correia da Fonseca, Paulo N. 1974. «Se rumoreia que Vasco Gonçalves fue arrestado por orden del general Spínola» in *Tele/eXprés*, September 30<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>577</sup> González Casanova, J.A.1974. «La derecha sensata ¿Quién teme la democracia?» in *La Vanguardia española*, October 5<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

<sup>578</sup> Míguez, Alberto. 1974. «Lisboa: El General Costa Gomes asume la presidencia» in *La Vanguardia española*, October 1<sup>st</sup>, pp. 5-6

the consequences it could have»<sup>xxvii</sup><sup>579</sup>. He therefore concludes that those who were better organized to face the opponent eventually won: «the left was better mobilized. It won the race and, therefore, will come out stronger from this test. The right, the loser, will have to pay for that once more. (...) Unless the situation changes its course, in the next couple of days we will witness the materialization of this conservative defeat»<sup>xxviii</sup><sup>580</sup>.

Again, it is in the description of the composition of the social forces openly fighting each other that two opposing standpoints present (or evident) in the Spanish press continue to settle.

On the one hand, the «silent majority» is seen in *Tele/eXprés* and *Informaciones*, in the words of Correia da Fonseca and Eduardo Barrenechea, as a political usage performed by far right-wing militants. In *La Vanguardia Española*, Alberto Miguez describes the process of co-optation in a more detailed way. First erupted «the first groups that obviously claim to be followers of the Armed Forces movement, condemn extremisms and graphically place on the same level the sickle and hammer and the swastika. “Neither Marcelo, nor sickle, nor hammer”<sup>581</sup> went graphically some of the inscriptions»<sup>xxix</sup>. After this outbreak «the remaining reactionary sectors preferred to hide behind a new denomination that was always so popular with the conservative: the “silent majority”»<sup>xxx</sup><sup>582</sup>.

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<sup>579</sup> Salas, José. 1974. « Multitudinaria manifestacion de apoyo a Costa Gomes » in *ABC*, October 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp.29-30

<sup>580</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «Grave situación política» in *ABC*, September 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.13 and 15

<sup>581</sup> In Portuguese “Marcelo” and “Hammer”, which is “Martelo”, rime, hence the power of the slogan.

<sup>582</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1974. «Lisboa: Parece llegada la hora de las definiciones para todos» in *La Vanguardia española*, September 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

Likewise, Manuel Vázquez Montalbán believes that Spínola's speech of September 10<sup>th</sup> «did nothing but set in motion directly from power the reaction of broad strata of the population, restless given the importance left wing parties had achieved»<sup>xxxii</sup> 583. This reaction was «immediately used by salazarism waiting to convert the Lisbon demonstration into a civil war provocation»<sup>xxxii</sup> 584.

On the other hand, for *ABC* the «silent majority» collective encompasses «all who have common sense»<sup>xxxiii</sup>, people eager for order, «neutral people who accepted with discrete jubilation the regime change, believing that a more honest and democratically overseen team would restrain the rising of prices»<sup>xxxiv</sup> 585 or plainly «conservative or simply dissatisfied people»<sup>xxxv</sup>586, in the words of José Salas. It also encompasses «the law-abiding Portuguese citizen»<sup>xxxvi</sup>587 for Ruiz Gallardón or «non-leftist people (right-wing supporters of simply non-leftists)»<sup>xxxvii</sup>588 in the words of the newspaper's editorial. In other words, the common and disappointed people the newspaper's readers could identify with.

*ABC* also shows interest for this defeated faction by producing a mostly photographic retrospective of General Spínola's consulate<sup>589</sup>, followed by an interview with a member of the «Portuguese Democratic Party of opposition»<sup>590</sup> probably exiled in Spain by then, and finally by

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<sup>583</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel.1974. «El pueblo unido, de momento, no ha sido vencido» in *Tele/eXprés*, September 30<sup>th</sup>, pp. 14

<sup>584</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel.1974. «El pueblo unido, de momento, no ha sido vencido» in *Tele/eXprés*, September 30<sup>th</sup>, pp. 14

<sup>585</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «Hoy, prueba de fuego para el régimen portugués» in *ABC*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.21-22

<sup>586</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «Grave situación política» in *ABC*, September 29<sup>th</sup>, pp. 13 and 15

<sup>587</sup> Ruiz Gallardón, José María. 1974. «De Portugal, la lección» in *ABC*, October 3<sup>rd</sup>, pp.31-32

<sup>588</sup> Editorial: «Spínola y el futuro de Portugal».1974. *ABC*, October 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp. 26

<sup>589</sup> «ABC reportaje Los 159 días de Spínola».1974. *ABC*, October 2<sup>nd</sup>

<sup>590</sup> An interview with an anonymous member of «Portuguese Opposition Democratic Party» [Partido democrático portugués de oposición] probably held in

printing a communiqué supposedly issued from Caxias' prison titled: «Communist methods in Portugal» [Metodos comunistas en Portugal]<sup>591</sup> regarding the people imprisoned following the «silent majority» event.

In *Arriba* «silent majority» participants are either called «right or centre-right-wing»<sup>xxxviii 592</sup> by José Reis or «an opposition formed by liberals, monarchists, Christian Democracy, right and centre parties, which did all they could, openly or in disguise, against salazarism»<sup>xxxix</sup>, according to Gómez Tello. In this opposition against the New State, Gómez Tello also includes Adriano Moreira, former minister of the fallen regime, who the chronicler describes as «the head of the moderated opposition to Salazar and the furthest away from a conspiracy apprentice that one can imagine»<sup>xl 593</sup>. In Jesús Suevos' opinion the «silent majority» is «a great part of the people»<sup>xli 594</sup>. The tendency seems to be describing its components as similar to the sectors that in Spain oppose the Francoist Bunker and are, therefore, an accepted opposition.

The views on who General Spínola is and about his role within the Portuguese revolutionary process and its latest developments are also contradictory.

On the one hand, General Spínola's moderation is praised, given that, according to *ABC*, it allowed him to become «evolution in reform; his opponents are the people who complement each other, those supporting political immobility and those supporting the revolution»<sup>xlii</sup>

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Spain given that is someone obviously defeated (Egido, Carlos. 1974. « Portugal: De los Claveles a las espinas del Otoño» in *ABC*, October 31<sup>st</sup>)

<sup>591</sup>«Metodos comunistas en Portugal».1974. *ABC*, December 10<sup>th</sup> (not signed communiqué)

<sup>592</sup> Reis, José. 1974. «Clima de inquietud en Portugal» in *Arriba*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.13

<sup>593</sup>Gómez Tello, J.L. 1974. «¿Principio o fin?» in *Arriba*, September 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>594</sup> Suevos, Jesus.1974. «Politica de monóculo» in *Arriba*, October 6<sup>th</sup>, pp.2



<sup>595</sup>. This stance, as *La Vanguardia Española* recognized, «left the international capital at ease»<sup>xliii</sup> <sup>596</sup>.

Yet Spínola's stepping away from power, makes Xavier Roig wonder in *Tele/eXprés* if this will not be «the symptom that the dominant economic sectors are taking back their support from the democratic experience started five months ago in Portugal»<sup>xliv</sup> <sup>597</sup>. In the same newspaper, Vázquez Montalbán considers that Spínola «never fooled anybody. He is a liberal conservative who wished for a happy ending of a consistent conservative legislative majority of 60% and an opposition kept at bay in its 40 %»<sup>xlv</sup> <sup>598</sup>. This columnist ponders, nonetheless, that «this type of sweet dreams are condemned to disappear from Europe's beds»<sup>xlvi</sup>, since by then «the social dynamics have sharpened and the differences between political and social blocks are minimal. Right and Left must learn how to lose and win alternatively without losing their mind»<sup>xlvii</sup>. This was a predicament that did not seem to agree with Spínola's personality.

## b) Framing General Spínola

In *ABC* Florentino Pérez-Embid compares General Spínola's role in the Portuguese Revolutionary process to those of Spaniards Alcalá Zamora and Miguel Maura in the establishment of the Spanish II Republic: «The dawn of the new Republican regime was presided by several great names and surnames of Alfonso XII's reign. At the end of the same year of 1931, because the Republic was not what their fantasies had envisioned, they

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<sup>595</sup> Editorial: «Spínola y el futuro de Portugal».1974. *ABC*, October 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp.26

<sup>596</sup> Editorial: «Avatares de la democracia» .1974. *La Vanguardia española*, October 1<sup>st</sup>, pp.5

<sup>597</sup> Roig, Xavier.1974. «La dimisión de Spínola puede acelerar los cambios» in *Tele/eXprés*, October 1<sup>st</sup>, pp.12

<sup>598</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel.1974. «El pueblo unido, de momento, no ha sido vencido» in *Tele/eXprés*, September 30<sup>th</sup>, pp. 14

resigned. Like Antonio de Spínola did in Portugal»<sup>xlviii599</sup>. In the Portuguese case this detour, as Spínola himself proclaimed on his departure speech quoted by Pérez-Embid, will lead the country into «anarchy and chaos». This chronicler does not directly blame Spínola and does not question his «good faith, nor his efforts to control the damage»<sup>xlix</sup>. Nevertheless, he recalls that «it would not be hard to evoke similar processes at the end of similar regimes: the great Fascist Council secession, the rivalry among the Greek Colonels, the end of the III and the IV French Republics»<sup>1</sup>. Pérez-Embid argues that in all these cases the outcome of the process was similar, given that «[t]he internal obsessions for “score settlements”, for “cleanings” between associates, for the extermination of natural allies, always leads not to the miraculous apparition of a moderate saviour – that at least would avoid the worst – but to the infamous defeat of all. And not just the oligarchy»<sup>li</sup>.

Different is the case of a very widespread point of view that sees in General Spínola the «Kerensky» of the Portuguese Revolution. In *La Vanguardia Española*, Manuel Aznar, and in *Arriba*, Gómez Tello and Jesús Suevos, condemn the General precisely for playing this part. Aznar, President of the Board of Administration of EFE agency and former editor-in-chief of *La Vanguardia Española*, was at this point one of the most influential journalists in Spain. Born in 1894, this Basque journalist started his career in regional newspapers as *La Tradición Navarra* and *Euzkadi* and worked as war correspondent during WWI before moving to Madrid to become editor-in-chief of *El Sol*. Manuel Aznar was connected to the Basque Nationalist Party [*Partido Nacionalista Vasco* PNV] before moving to Cuba, and to Miguel Maura’s Conservative Republican Party [*Partido Republicano Conservador* PRC] when he moved back to Spain at

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<sup>599</sup> Pérez-Embid, Florentino.1974. «La caída de Spínola desde Madrid» in *ABC*, October 8<sup>th</sup>

the beginning of the II Republic. Prone to a complicated political evolution, which is still under scrutiny, Aznar was caught in Madrid in the beginning of the Civil war but ended up becoming a significant figure of the Francoist regime, holding several diplomatic offices (i.e. Ambassador at the Dominican Republic, Argentina and the UN).

For Manuel Aznar, even if he had had earlier doubts, it was by then beyond doubt that what was happening in Portugal was indeed a revolution and «[t]he movements of a revolutionary nature usually distinguish themselves by their inexorability. They rigorously obey the plan they carry in their gut, despite the will of the transitional men who started it»<sup>lii600</sup>. From this point of view, General Spínola was one of these transition men, much like Kerensky was for the Russian revolution. Aznar actually believes that «Kerensky remained in the history of political movements as the founder of an innumerable caste»<sup>liii</sup>, a caste that Jesús Suevos deems responsible for the world as it was by then: «The world we live in is in great part the consequence of the political ingenuity or the messing around of these useful idiots. From Kerensky to Spínola, it is swarming with major figures that served as Trojan horses for their own enemies to conquer Power as soon as possible»<sup>liv 601</sup>. At the moment, as Gómez Tello argues, Spínola no longer had «a role in the revolutionary process of Portugal»<sup>lv</sup> since he was «already unnecessary to the real protagonists of that democratic and liberalizing revolution welcomed among little carnations by the same panglossian as usual»<sup>lvi 602</sup>. Suevos is not in the least surprised by this outcome, given that «[i]f there was something that the political commentators could foresee, and actually

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<sup>600</sup> Aznar, Manuel. 1974. «Portugal, el general Spínola y la revolución» in *La Vanguardia española*, October 6<sup>th</sup>, pp. 23

<sup>601</sup> Suevos, Jesus.1974. «Política de monóculo» in *Arriba*, October 6<sup>th</sup>, pp.2

<sup>602</sup> Gómez Tello, J.L. 1974. «¿Principio o fin» in *Arriba*, September 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

happened, was the swift end of general Spínola as President of the Portuguese Republic»<sup>lvii 603</sup>.

Even without resorting to the Kerensky frame, a great part of the Spanish opinion of these developments agrees in blaming Communists for Spínola's dismissal. It is an idea present since the beginning and Augusto Assia alludes to it frequently, but from this moment on a line of discourse that conceives the Portuguese Revolutionary process as a Communist plot starts to settle. This is the case of *Arriba* and its writers Gómez Tello and Jesús Suevos, of *ABC* and its opinion columnists José María Ruiz-Gallardón and Florentino Pérez-Embid, and, finally, of Jaume Miravittles in *Tele/eXprés*. This perspective is broadly summarized by José Salas' claims that «[t]he basic points professed on April 25 are not being fulfilled. This is not the new country that was supposed to be built»<sup>lviii 604</sup>.

This point of view is nonetheless balanced by an opposite one, expressed by Eduardo Barrenechea in *Informaciones*: «In this capital it is said that in Portugal today it is April 26<sup>th</sup>, since between April 25 and September 29 the Armed Forces movement's (MFA) programme has not been truly carried out, neither in letter nor in spirit»<sup>lix605</sup>. Much like Barrenechea, Vázquez Montalbán considers that a new beginning of the Revolutionary process is taking place and, above all, it seems to be one with extraordinary social consequences:

If everything goes according to plan, what the officers started is something more than a fascist decontamination. A structural adjustment following which the ones who always won will lose something and the ones who always lost will win something is envisioned (...) People are

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<sup>603</sup> Suevos, Jesús. 1974. «Política de monóculo» in *Arriba*, October 6<sup>th</sup>, pp.2

<sup>604</sup> Salas, José. 1974. «Multitudinaria manifestación de apoyo a Costa Gomes» in *ABC*, October 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp.29-30

<sup>605</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1974. «Spínola, bloqueado por el Movimiento de las fuerzas armadas» in *Informaciones*, September 30<sup>th</sup>, pp.3-4

fighting for first row seats to watch this fascinating and exemplary show<sup>lx606</sup>.

This looming structural change is also perceived by José Salas when *ABC*'s correspondent observes the people attending the demonstration of General Costa Gomes' acclamation as the new President of the Republic. Salas describes the demonstration in the following way:

(...) it was immense, rousing and enthusiastic. But not like the others I had the opportunity to watch in previous months. And I am not referring to the quantity as much as the quality. Because the proletarian feature is intensifying, given the growing absence of sectors of bourgeois and conservative appearance, which were more abundant before.<sup>lxi 607</sup>

Therefore, trusting José Salas' words, change has already started, if not completely at the institutional level, at least on the streets. In this sense, Santiago Nadal wonders what will happen to the defeated social forces: «The situation now, for the right wing, consists in knowing if it will remain in “purgatory” or if will be thrown directly to “hell”»<sup>lxii</sup>. By hell Nadal means the possibility that «influenced by the Marxist parties in power – and whose victory over Spínola has been a decisive factor –, the regime might take on a definite socialist feature and change the complete presentation of the political spectrum, with the current right-wing disappearing or losing influence »<sup>lxiii 608</sup>. This last one is, indeed, the fear that provokes most of the rants at this point.

### c) Spanish reading: lessons for the right wing

This occasion proved to be not only a moment of high polarization within the Spanish press but also a moment when conservative opinions – which took the form of alarmism – invaded the public sphere. At least this is

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<sup>606</sup> Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel.1974. «El impresionante espectáculo portugués» in *Tele/eXprés*, October , pp.12

<sup>607</sup> Salas, José.1974. « Caen dos ministros tras la dimisión de Spínola» in *ABC*, October 3<sup>rd</sup>, pp. 29, 33-34

<sup>608</sup> Nadal, Santiago.1974.« Claveles, pero menos.. El “purgatorio” o el “infierno”» in *La Vanguardia española*, October 4<sup>th</sup>, pp.21

how the Spanish reaction was perceived in Portugal, as Alberto Miguez describes:

On the other hand, Portuguese spokespersons underlined in several official declarations and press conferences that in the press campaign about the recent events, the media of a «neighbouring country» had not offered a true version of them. By involving this accusation in such ambiguity it is not possible to know if they are referring to ours or another country, even if I cannot think of another country that might be classified as neighbour. The press reviews about the foreign media reaction to the latest crisis reach several pages of Lisbon's dailies. References to the Spanish press are significant: the exaggerated and alarmist comments are highlighted while the moderate chronicles and editorials are silenced<sup>lxiv 609</sup>.

The Portuguese claim is not however completely groundless given that a majority of the points of view, opinion-wise, published reactions undoubtedly against the speeding of the Revolutionary process in Portugal. Moreover, not only is there a general condemnation, though with exceptions, but it is also an occasion for lessons to be drawn, exclusively by the right-wing sectors.

*Arriba* and *ABC* are worried. The *Movimiento* newspaper is worried that democrats keep mistakenly collaborating with Communists. By democrats, *Arriba* is probably referring to those more aligned with right-wing politics, which were the ones reached by this crisis. By opposing democrats to Communists, *Arriba* clearly defines communists as anti-democrats, and because the reaction against Spínola's intentions counted with the active involvement of the Portuguese Socialists, by extension, these ones should be anti-democrats as well. Moreover, *Arriba* denounces the anti-democratic inclination of political groups when the newspaper is not particularly favourable to that political regime in particular, which seems to indicate that the word might have by then more

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<sup>609</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1974. «Lisboa: El gobierno portugués se muestra hipersensible a las informaciones de la prensa extranjera» in *La Vanguardia española*, October 4<sup>th</sup>, pp.26

a performative role rather than a doctrinary one. It can also be seen as an occurrence of a «floating signifier» that is allowing to congregate demand others than the previously associated with it by establishing new antagonistic frontier. Lastly, *Arriba* aims to criticize the Spanish opinion that was favourable to democracy and, therefore, favourable to the political change occurred in Portugal in late-April. Therefore *Arriba* is warning the Spanish sectors prone to a democratic new order not to ally with the Communists or they will regret it, like the Portuguese by then do: «We should pay attention to those groans that might even be applicable in our own country to much of the recent converts to democracy»<sup>lxv610</sup>.

*ABC* is also worried with the Communist threat. However, given not only the Portuguese, but Italian and Greek examples, which all have as common denominator the Communist party, this newspaper considers that: «The political stability necessary to face the economic instability and insecurity existent in Europe's soft womb, makes the free anti-communist response ever more necessary»<sup>lxvi611</sup>. The main difference between both newspapers is that the latter, at least formally, conceives conservative democracy positively. In *ABC*, Florentino Pérez-Embido also reinforces this idea of a Communist threat:

In the improvised Portuguese government, for which it was even necessary to search quickly for a personality with enough notoriety to occupy its presidency, a compact group of extremists had the ability to set in. A group that did not have and still does not have electoral relevance. Their positioning in key-points was part of a plan, to which they devoted the needed energy. This is what happens whenever the former Power trembles. The emergency decisions then become irreversible and some day they will be decisive in making the future revolution easier and faster. The latest events leave no doubt that they are willing to play hard<sup>lxvii</sup>.

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<sup>610</sup> Editorial: «Portugal y su problema político». 1974. *Arriba*, October 11<sup>th</sup>, pp. 2

<sup>611</sup> Editorial: «Grecia, Italia, Portugal». 1974. *ABC*, October 20<sup>th</sup>, pp.16

This idea expressed by Pérez-Embid that the Communists – which he classifies as «extremists» – will take advantage of whatever opportunity they see in a disaggregating regime is reiterated by both Manuel Aznar, in *La Vanguardia Española*, and Jesús Suevos, in *Arriba*. To deal with such threat, hence the lesson, several options are given. Pérez-Embid, for instance, criticizes the former ruling class for not taking action to prevent this outcome:

In the meantime what have the «moderate» done? The ones belonging to the former ruling class of salazarism, after dividing over small rivalries during Caetano's time, in the moment of truth shined by their absence. The lack of unity and the atmosphere of uncertainty prevented them from acting together while there was still time. Now all the great “exes” are being taken to jail. What will happen to each one of them we will have to wait and see<sup>lxviii 612</sup>.

In *La Vanguardia Española* Aznar addresses his criticism vis-à-vis those holding conservative views, Spínola included, who believed in a «controlled revolution» and therefore supported it:

Real orderly and calm revolutions do not exist. The mission of revolutionaries is to «mess things up», that is to say, to destroy an «order» so as to create another one; and put an end to one «tranquillity» to organize a distinct one, their own, the one ruled by their thoughts and dogmas. (...) I do not wish to make a mistake but I hint very clear signs that the revolutionary movement of 25 April 1974 had the spiritual and material collaboration of more than a few Portuguese known for their conservative ideas and for their interests, even more conservative than their ideas. (...) It is important, once again, to stress – even if insisting on this is annoying – the fact that a political and social force, powerful for its doctrine and organization, travels around the world: Communism; a force that does not need excessive capitalist collaboration to spread its wings, but if given the opportunity knows how to take advantage of it marvellously<sup>lxix 613</sup>.

Sharing Manuel Aznar's opinion regarding General Spínola's role in this process as that of «useful idiot», Jesús Suevos wonders if «[w]ill

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<sup>612</sup> Pérez-Embid, Florentino. 1974. «La caída de Spínola desde Madrid» in *ABC*, October 8<sup>th</sup>

<sup>613</sup> Aznar, Manuel. 1974. «Portugal, el general Spínola y la revolución» in *La Vanguardia española*, October 6<sup>th</sup>, pp.23



our Spínola's apprentices learn the dramatic Portuguese lesson?»<sup>lxx 614</sup>. No collaboration whatsoever should be envisaged with the Communist forces.

This intense condemnation of alliances made with the Communist Party had roots in the proclamation of the Democratic Junta of Spain [*Junta Democrática de España* JDE] in July 1974 while General Franco, given his health condition, had been replaced by Don Juan Carlos. This platform, which PSOE did not join, congregated PCE, personalities close to Don Juan de Borbón, Enrique Tierno Galván's Socialist Party [PSI/PSP], leftist-sectors of *Carlismo*, Workers' Commissions [*Comisiones Obreras* CCOO], among others, around a political programme of «democratic rupture».

At this moment, the national «we» is used for a political analysis of the Portuguese situation, as *ABC* believes that «[n]othing of what is happening there [in Portugal] is foreign to us. The Iberian fraternity reaches far more than just sharing the Bull-hide, the most western space of the European continent»<sup>lxxi 615</sup>. Also in *ABC*, José Maria Ruiz-Gallardón is more specific: «The turn of events in Portugal is a good opportunity for us Spaniards to reflect. Not only because it is a neighbour and brother country, but also because of the multiple affinities in temperament and history existing between both countries»<sup>lxxii 616</sup>. Monarchic supporter of Don Juan, Professor Ruiz-Gallardón participated in the University revolt of 1956, following which he was arrested. At this moment he was reportedly very close politically to Manuel Fraga, would later join Popular Alliance [*Alianza Popular* AP], and was mostly a strong contender of a Democracy where there was no room for the Communist Party.

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<sup>614</sup> Suevos, Jesus.1974. «Política de monóculo» in *Arriba*, October 6<sup>th</sup>, pp.2

<sup>615</sup> Editorial: «Spínola y el futuro de Portugal».1974. *ABC*, October 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp.26

<sup>616</sup> Ruiz Gallardón, José María. 1974. «De Portugal, la lección» in *ABC*, October 3<sup>rd</sup>, pp.31-32

Ruiz-Gallardón, like Pérez-Embid and Suevos, is worried with what he considers the «right-wing constraint» existing in Portugal. This situation manifested in the recent revocation of the right to vote for people who had a previous involvement with the New State and was confirmed by the prohibition of the «silent majority» demonstration. Ruiz-Gallardón believes this question to be one of the most significant concerning the Portuguese situation: «I believe, and in my opinion this is the most important, that the most significant of what is happening in the Portuguese Republic is the fact that a democratic system without equal opportunities is what authorities are proposing to establish»<sup>lxxiii</sup><sup>617</sup>. He is not alone in his concern, since both Santiago Nadal, in *La Vanguardia Española*, and Jaime Miravittles, in *Tele/eXprés*, voice similar anxieties<sup>618</sup>.

Using a Portuguese reading of the concept «Sociological Francoism»<sup>619</sup>, which Amando de Miguel's book (1975) will focus later on, Santiago Nadal argues that unlike what he calls «a filo-Marxist thesis – or, better yet, pseudo-Marxist»<sup>lxxiv</sup> that claims that the Portuguese regime was sustained by «thirty or forty families (...) through a horrific instrument called PIDE»<sup>lxxv</sup>, the actual cause for the length of the Portuguese regime was that it had formed a class that did not question it:

A political regime cannot last thirty-eight years – to be exact – without a sociological support that gives it its political stability. The regime had sociological support and political reasons sustaining it. Naturally the sociological support did not rest only in the «thirty or forty families»

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<sup>617</sup> Ruiz Gallardón, José María. 1974. «De Portugal, la lección» in *ABC*, October 3<sup>rd</sup>, pp.31-32

<sup>618</sup> In an article published in *Cuadernos para el dialogo*, Eduardo Barrenechea argues that this is a question of defining what one conceives as right-wing, given that what the Portuguese government is trying to contain is the action of the former rulers and administrators that were otherwise not very much disturbed by the regime's substitution. [Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1974. «Portugal, Las protestas de la derecha» *Cuadernos para el Diálogo*, November, 134: 37-42]

<sup>619</sup> Miguel's book had an extensive presentation in *Tele/eXprés*, where what were considered the most important issues of the book were presented in a six-part series during March 1975.

who have a monopoly over industry and the property of the land. Salazar sought support among an important sector of the petty bourgeoisie, in wide sectors of the peasantry, especially in the northern and seacoast regions where property is more divided; political support resided in several circumstances that had favoured the regime, and had as first step the memory of the «bloody noise» – Eça de Queiróz «dixit» – that were the fourteen years of the parliamentary Republic that followed the downfall of Monarchy and preceded the Braga coup d'état that laid the foundations for the long salazarist period<sup>lxxvi 620</sup>.

Nadal's argument considered that in Portugal an ideological, economic and social force, which allowed the former regime to last for so long, was unequivocally present. A democratic regime would thus only be truly democratic if left and right political forces were duly incorporated in it. The reference to Eça de Queiróz, probably used to grant expert credibility, is probably a reference to António Eça de Queiroz, the famous writer's son, supporter of Salazar and collaborator in the SPN, given that his father died a decade before the implantation of a Republican regime in Portugal and was, for that reason, clearly unable to have described its bloody feature. Quoting Santiago Nadal, Jaume Miravittles defends the exact same idea, arguing that without the right wing «Portugal will be “a popular democracy” settled in the western region of Europe»<sup>lxxvii 621</sup>, but not a lawful democracy.

Unlike the majority of the Spanish opinion, González Casanova, while maintaining himself within the frame of the lesson, argues that the right-wing problem is not exogenous but endogenous and lies in its own inability to adapt: «The experience of these days in Portugal, like those of the thirties in Spain, make us suspicious that a wise right wing is only the one that stops being right wing»<sup>lxxviii</sup>. Given this inability «[t]he wise, reasonable and moderate politicians, willing to play the democratic card,

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<sup>620</sup> Nadal, Santiago.1974. « Portugal: un difícil equilibrio - La primera gran crisis» in *La Vanguardia española*, October 1<sup>st</sup>, pp.22

<sup>621</sup> Miravittles, Jaume.1974. «Dinamica política en Portugal» in *Tele/eXprés*, Octubre 3<sup>rd</sup>, pp.5

serve no purpose if a majority sector of the right is not willing to embrace a profound change»<sup>lxxxix622</sup>. Hence, a lesson for the Spanish right wing would be that it should be open for change, because it is unavoidable.

In sum, this event inaugurates an open criticism phase of the Portuguese Revolutionary process by the Spanish press. Pérez-Embid, Jesús Suevos and José María Ruiz-Gallardón converge in taking advantage of this moment to criticize not only the Portuguese process but also the Spanish reaction to it. Pérez-Embid argues thus far he has been alone in retracting the Portuguese events: «Since April 25 I devoted to the evolution of the neighbour country's events more than one article. All of them are placed among the few exceptions to the almost generalized chorus of flatteries performed by our press, suddenly taken by a “democratic” fervour of many of our commentators, to whom this feeling is actually fairly new»<sup>lxxx623</sup>. Jesús Suevos denounces the generalized condemnation of the former regime performed in the «jubilant comments of some sectors of the Spanish press»<sup>lxxxix</sup>. For Suevos «Salazar's “dictatorship” – the greatest of all Portuguese politicians since Pombal until nowadays – seems to have been so catastrophic, unfair and merciless that it only deserves insults»<sup>lxxxii</sup>. However, this moment of «consensual» condemnation, on the one hand, and euphoria, on the other, seems to have given way to a generalized reassessment of the situation, and Suevos considers that «[t]o reread now some of the Spanish journalistic comments about the happy days of the “carnation” revolution is a useful exercise even if unpleasant. All the ecstasies and orgasms produced by the triumphant democracy and freedom ultimately seem overwhelmingly

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<sup>622</sup> González Casanova, J.A.1974. «La derecha sensata ¿Quién teme la democracia?» in *La Vanguardia española*, October 5<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

<sup>623</sup> Pérez-Embid, Florentino.1974. «La caída de Spínola desde Madrid» in *ABC*, October 8<sup>th</sup>

ridiculous when contrasted with the harsh current reality»<sup>lxxxiii624</sup>. Ruiz-Gallardón, like Suevos, particularly highlights the fast pace this change took: «The carnation revolution, greeted with euphoric enthusiasm months ago by more than a few, now shows the ephemeral of the flower»<sup>lxxxiv625</sup>.

Nonetheless, despite the open criticism present, it was still possible to defend the Revolutionary Portuguese Process and present facts from an opposite point of view, especially by the journalists who were in Portugal, given that in terms of opinion the «Communist plot theory» is pervasive.

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**Original quotes:**

<sup>i</sup> Así, pues, cinco meses han transcurrido desde que un 25 de abril el Ejército portugués salió a la calle en una insólita maniobra de limpieza y esperanza. Los primeros 60 días fueron de alegría, entusiasmo y folklore. Después vinieron los titubeos del poder, la crisis constitucional desencadenada por Da Palma Carlos como primer ministro, las huelgas salvajes. Al fin llegó la estabilidad de manos de un militar severo y honesto, el brigadier Vasco Gonçalves. Y ahora, mientras el país sitúa ya sus metas en las elecciones de marzo próximo, parece que la hora de la verdad se acerca. La hora de los antagonismos de clase y de intereses, la lucha de las ideologías como expresión de estos antagonismos, las campañas solapadas de una derecha que abandona con cautela sus «santuarios», el momento de saber si la izquierda irá unida al comicios electoral, o al el [sic] capitalismo «criollo» está dispuesto a jugar la apertura europea o prefiere la catástrofe y el caos, como demostración de que «todo el cambio es posible».

<sup>ii</sup> Todo esto arranca del discurso pronunciado por el general Spínola el día 10 en que éste atacó al comunismo sin nombrarlo. La derecha vio la ocasión de agruparse en torno a quien parecía dispuesto a adoptar una actitud de firmeza y de orden frente al comunismo. Si se organizaba una manifestación gigante en su apoyo, quedaría formado automáticamente un frente anticomunista llamado a contar y a pesar en la situación portuguesa.

<sup>iii</sup> «Spínola agrupó en su torno a toda una derecha atemorizada y molesta, a la que se sumaron los muchos inconformistas que siempre se producen por el desgaste que el ejercicio del Poder impone.»

<sup>iv</sup> «por las directivas de todos los partidos democráticos (excepto la democracia cristiana, que se adhiere), como un "grave error" y una "lamentable provocación"»

<sup>v</sup> Si yo escribiera que siendo presidente de la Republica el general Spínola, las manifestaciones y propagandas en su favor eran consideradas por algunos

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<sup>624</sup> Suevos, Jesus.1974. «Política de monóculo» in *Arriba*, October 6<sup>th</sup>, pp.2

<sup>625</sup> Ruiz Gallardón, José María. 1974. «De Portugal, la lección» in *ABC*, October 3<sup>rd</sup>, pp.31-32

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sectores nacidos oficialmente después del 25 de abril, e incluso con representación ministerial, como maniobras subversivas, sería dudoso que alguien entendiese. Pero es así y hay que tratar de explicarlo.

<sup>vi</sup> Pero, ¿cómo se puede impedir que se manifiesten unas gentes que cumplen con todos los trámites legales, cuando estamos cansados de ver cómo se manifiestan otras saltándose a la torera los preceptos más elementales?? (...) Negárselo sería tanto como admitir que el jefe del Estado está a la cabeza de la oposición. Permitírsele, insistiendo en que se trata de la oposición reaccionaria equivaldría a que esa oposición desfilase por las calles aireando las consignas gubernamentales. Así es de confuso y misterioso Portugal.

<sup>vii</sup> «Aunque encubierta con la auto denominación de "mayoría silenciosa" y la adhesión a Spínola y a las Fuerzas Armadas, para nadie era un secreto su verdadero carácter, opuesto a la actual situación»

<sup>viii</sup> «La derecha estaba en sus cuarteles de invierno, esperando mejores tiempos. Hábilmente, preparaba el terreno mientras el desmadre de la libertad convertía las paredes de Lisboa en un jeroglífico.»

<sup>ix</sup> «los portugueses con ideas políticas de derechas o de centro derecha que quieran defender y propagar sus convicciones»

<sup>x</sup> «los numerosos y poderosísimos seguidores del antiguo régimen que a partir del 25 de abril, como un Guadiana tenebroso, se esfumaron»

<sup>xi</sup> El estigma de extrema derecha que se pretende aplicar a quien no se defina claramente como de centro izquierda como poco, ya la frase de «es reaccionario» muy aplicada para liquidar a elementos que pueden ser o no «fascistas», son dos capuchas colocadas frecuentemente en la cabeza de los tales candidatos afiliados de partidos de derecha. Por eso persiste el recelo en algunos de ir al encuentro de situaciones delicadas para el futuro político e incluso profesional. (...) Se hace demagogia y para conseguir amedrentar todavía más al lector o al oyente se buscan términos especiales y un lenguaje de insulto para describir las actividades de los grupos que es necesario apartar del camino de una izquierda recelosa de perder simpatizantes y representación política.

<sup>xii</sup> «Un intento de golpe de fuerza de la "reacción", de la "ultraderecha", del "fascismo" - utilizamos el bien conocido lenguaje del activismo comunista que hoy utilizan por otra parte sus "compañeros de viaje" (...) Es el bello lenguaje utilizado en las memorables ocasiones que todos conocemos.»

<sup>xiii</sup> «pero, ¿qué se creerán algunos que es el fascismo?»

<sup>xiv</sup> «Era también la primera vez desde el 25 de abril, que yo recuerde, que se enfrentaban en la calle grupos de derechas e izquierdas (llamémosles de esta forma, algo simplista, para entendernos). Los grupos de derecha, y esto es significativo, daban "vivas" a Spínola, mientras los de izquierda vitoreaban al Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas»

<sup>xv</sup> «el general Spínola fue aclamado, mientras se hacía un significativo silencio a la presencia del primer ministro. Se tocó el himno nacional y, luego, según la costumbre de la nueva democracia portuguesa, el "Avante", himno comunista, del que sólo se oyeron las primeras notas, apagadas por los gritos hostiles y los silbidos.»

<sup>xvi</sup> «Muchos órganos de información europeos han comenzado a sugerir que la supuesta tentativa no fue sino el pretexto utilizado por Vasco Gonçalves para

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prescindir de Spínola y ajustarle las cuentas a un grupo de personalidades del antiguo régimen.»

<sup>xvii</sup> «algunos enviados especiales y corresponsales de la prensa europea»

<sup>xviii</sup> «ver hasta qué punto la gran mayoría de estos periodistas pone en duda la veracidad de los hechos más o menos demostrativos de la existencia de la tan manida "conspiración reaccionaria".»

<sup>xix</sup> « ¿Un intento de golpe de fuerza de la "reacción", de la "ultraderecha", del "fascismo" - utilizamos el bien conocido lenguaje del activismo comunista que hoy utilizan por otra parte sus "compañeros de viaje"? -. Curioso golpe de Estado que iba a hacerse a las tres y en el que no se incluían ni tropas ni armamento.»

<sup>xx</sup> Por lo que puede deducirse en la confusión de las noticias, los que detectaron la existencia de este peligroso complot fueron los comunistas, y los que se apresuraron a levantar barricadas en las entradas de Lisboa para impedir la llegada de vehículos con eventuales manifestantes - antes se había movilizado a los sindicatos bajo control comunista para paralizar trenes y autobuses -, fueron los comunistas y los socialistas, que exhortaban a sus militantes a prepararse a aplastar «a la reacción y el fascismo».

<sup>xxi</sup> «ni más ni menos que el primer golpe de una serie de actos que habían de desencadenar en todo el país una sublevación general.»

<sup>xxii</sup> «Muchos lectores se preguntarán cómo es posible que tras el 25 de abril se haya podido intentar un "golpe de sangre" como este último registrado por la ultraderecha (...) Quien conozca lo que fue el golpe de estado de abril y lo que ha pasado en Portugal desde entonces, no tendrá excesiva sorpresa (...)»

<sup>xxiii</sup> «La tentativa de golpe reaccionario lanzada en la madrugada del sábado está totalmente dominada»

<sup>xxiv</sup> «El fracaso del golpe de Estado derechista en Portugal y el correlativo poder ascendente del movimiento democrático de las fuerzas armadas sugieren algunas reflexiones sobre el futuro de toda derecha no democrática»

<sup>xxv</sup> «Pero cualquiera que conozca la ideología de Spínola, anterior al 25 de abril, sabe muy bien que entre lo que él pensaba (y, seguramente, sigue pensando) y el programa de las Fuerzas Armadas, mediaba una distancia infinita.»

<sup>xxvi</sup> «que, desde los primeros días de mayo oponían al general-presidente al movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas, terminaron por estallar estrepitosamente. Y, naturalmente, ganó el más fuerte, es decir, quienes el 25 de abril habían salido a la calle, jugándose el tipo y ganando el poder.»

<sup>xxvii</sup> «sin ser un golpe de Estado era algo bastante parecido en cuanto a las consecuencias que pudiera tener»

<sup>xxviii</sup> «la izquierda se ha apuntado un tanto más. Ha ganado la partida y, por tanto, saldrá reforzada de esta prueba. La derecha, perdedora, tendrá que pagar una vez más. (...) A la substanciación de esa derrota conservadora asistiremos en los próximos días, a menos que las cosas varíen de rumbo»

<sup>xxix</sup> «los primeros grupos que, por supuesto reclamándose fervorosos seguidores del Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas, condenan los extremismos y equiparan gráficamente la hoz y el martillo a la cruz gamada. "Ni Marcelo, ni hoz ni martillo", rezaban gráficamente algunas inscripciones».

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- xxx «los demás sectores de la reacción prefieren ocultarse tras una nueva denominación que ha hecho siempre las delicias de los conservadores: la "mayoría silenciosa".»
- xxx<sup>i</sup> «no hacía otra cosa que poner en marcha desde el poder la reacción de amplias camadas de población, inquietas por el ascendente conseguido por los partidos de izquierda»
- xxx<sup>ii</sup> «inmediatamente aprovechada por el salazarismo al acecho para convertir la manifestación de Lisboa en una provocación de guerra civil. (...)»
- xxx<sup>iii</sup> «todos los de sentido común»
- xxx<sup>iv</sup> «gente neutra que aceptó con discreto alborozo el cambio de régimen, creyendo en un equipo más honesto y fiscalizado democráticamente contendría la subida de precios»
- xxx<sup>v</sup> «gente conservadora o simplemente descontenta»
- xxx<sup>vi</sup> «el ciudadano de orden portugués»
- xxx<sup>vii</sup> «gentes no izquierdistas (derechistas o, simplemente, no izquierdistas)»
- xxx<sup>viii</sup> «una derecha o un centro derecha»
- xxx<sup>ix</sup> «una oposición formada por liberales, monárquicos, Democracia Cristiana, partidos de la derecha y del centro, que hicieron todo lo que pudieron, abiertamente o enmascaradamente, contra el salazarismo»
- xl «la cabeza de la oposición moderada a Salazar y es todo lo menos aprendiz de conspirador que cabe imaginar.»
- xl<sup>i</sup> «una gran parte del pueblo»
- xl<sup>ii</sup> «la evolución en la reforma; sus opuestos las gentes entre sí complementarias, las gentes del inmovilismo y las gentes de la revolución.»
- xl<sup>iii</sup> «tranquilizaba al capital internacional»
- xl<sup>iv</sup> «el síntoma de que los sectores económicos dominantes retiran su apoyo a la experiencia democrática que se inició hace cinco meses en Portugal»
- xl<sup>v</sup> «nunca ha engañado a nadie. Él es un conservador liberal que desearía un final feliz consistente en una mayoría legislativa conservadora del 60 % y una oposición mantenida a raya con su 40 %.»
- xl<sup>vi</sup> «Este tipo de sueños felices están condenados a desaparecer de las alcobas de Europa»
- xl<sup>vii</sup> «La dinámica social se ha agudizado y las diferencias entre bloques políticos y sociales son mínimas. Las derechas y las izquierdas europeas han de aprender a perder y a ganar alternadamente, sin perder los nervios»
- xl<sup>viii</sup> «La aurora del nuevo régimen republicano la presidieron varios grandes nombres y apellidos del reinado de Alfonso XIII. A fines del propio año 1931, porque la República no era lo que ellos habían dibujado en sus fantasías, dimitieron. Como en Portugal ha hecho Antonio de Spínola.»
- xl<sup>ix</sup> «buena fe, ni que haya hecho entre cortinas esfuerzos para limitar esos males.»
- <sup>1</sup> «No sería difícil evocar procesos parecidos en el final de regímenes semejantes: la sesión del Gran Consejo Fascista, las rivalidades de los coroneles griegos, el final de la III y aun de la IV Repúblicas francesas.»
- li «Las obsesiones internas por los "ajustes de cuentas", por las "limpias" entre los afines, por el exterminio de los aliados naturales, conduce siempre no a la aparición taumatúrgica de un salvador moderado - que, al menos, evitar lo peor -, sino a la derrota infamante de todos. Y no sólo de la oligarquía.»



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<sup>lii</sup> «Los movimientos de naturaleza revolucionaria suelen distinguirse por su inexorabilidad. Cumplen rigurosamente el designio que alienta en su entraña, sea cual sea la voluntad de los transitorios hombres desencadenantes.»

<sup>liii</sup> «Kerensky ha quedado en la historia de los movimientos políticos como el fundador de una casta innumerable»

<sup>liv</sup> «El mundo que vivimos en gran parte consecuencia de las ingenuidades o los zascandileos políticos de los tontos útiles. Desde Kerensky a Spínola pululan los figurones que han servido de caballos de Troya para que sus propios enemigos conquistasen el Poder lo más rápidamente posible.»

<sup>lv</sup> «papel en el proceso revolucionario de Portugal»

<sup>lvi</sup> «ya innecesario a los verdaderos protagonistas de aquella revolución democrática y liberalizadora acogida entre clavelitos y musiquitas por los panglosianos de siempre.»

<sup>lvii</sup> «Si hubo algo que los comentaristas políticos pudieron prever y que, en efecto, sucedió, fue el rápido fin del general Spínola como Presidente de la República portuguesa. »

<sup>lviii</sup> «Los puntos básicos preconizados el 25 de abril no se cumplen. Esto no es el país nuevo que se trataba de construir.»

<sup>lix</sup> «Se dice en esta capital que hoy es en Portugal el 26 de abril, pues entre el 25 de abril y el 29 de septiembre, el programa del Movimiento de las fuerzas Armadas (MFA) no se había cumplido verdaderamente, ni en la letra ni en el espíritu.»

<sup>lx</sup> «Si no se estropea la mayonesa, lo que los oficiales han puesto en marcha es algo más que una descontaminación fascista. Se vislumbra un reajuste estructural según el cual los que siempre han ganado perderán algo y los que siempre han perdido ganarán algo. (...) Hay bofetadas por conseguir una entrada de platea para este fascinante ejemplar espectáculo»

<sup>lxi</sup> «(...) fue inmensa, clamorosa y entusiástica. Pero no como otras que he tenido ocasión de ver en meses anteriores. Y no me refiero tanto a la cantidad como a la calidad. Porque cada vez se agudiza más la característica proletaria por una mayor ausencia de sectores con apariencia burguesa y conservadora, que antes abundaba más.»

<sup>lxii</sup> «La situación ahora, para la derecha consiste en saber si quedará en el "purgatorio" o será definitivamente arrojada al "infierno".»

<sup>lxiii</sup> «Influido por los partidos marxistas que están en el poder – y cuya victoria sobre Spínola ha sido un factor importantísimo -, el régimen tome un carácter marcadamente socialista y, ello cambie la presentación total del abanico político desapareciendo o perdiendo toda influencia las actuales derechas.»

<sup>lxiv</sup> «Por otra parte, en diversas declaraciones oficiales y conferencias de prensa los portavoces portugueses señalaron que en la campaña de prensa sobre los recientes acontecimientos se habían destacado los medios de información de algún «país vecino» que no habían ofrecido una versión demasiado veraz de los acontecimientos. Al envolver semejante acusación tan vasta ambigüedad no es posible saber si se refiere a nuestro país o a otro, aunque no se me ocurre cuál otro podría ser calificado como vecino. Los resúmenes de prensa sobre el reflejo que en los órganos de información extranjeros ha tenido la última crisis, cubren varias páginas en los diarios lisboetas. Las referencias a la prensa española son

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significativas: se destacan los comentarios alarmistas o exagerados, se silencian las crónicas o editoriales moderados.»

<sup>lxv</sup> «Conviene que nos fijemos en esos lamentos que acaso pueden ser también aplicables a nuestro país a muchos recién conversos a la democracia. »

<sup>lxvi</sup> «La estabilidad política necesaria para encarar la inestabilidad económica y la inseguridad en el blando vientre de Europa hace más necesario que nunca la respuesta anticomunista en libertad.»

<sup>lxvii</sup> «En el improvisado Gobierno portugués de hecho, para el cual hubo que buscar a toda marcha incluso la personalidad con notoriedad suficiente que le permitiera ocupar la presidencia, tuvo buen cuidado de incrustarse un grupo compacto de extremistas. Que ni tenían, ni tienen aún, contraste electoral alguno es de toda evidencia. Su instalación en puestos claves se debió a que tenían un plan y a que lo aplicaron con la decisión necesaria. Es lo que sucede siempre que el Poder anterior tiembla. Luego, esos hechos de emergencia resultan poco después irreversibles y en su día serán en definitiva los que faciliten el acelerador para la futura revolución a fondo. De que están dispuestos a jugar fuerte, lo sucedido en los últimos días no deja margen para ninguna duda.»

<sup>lxviii</sup> «¿Qué han hecho mientras tanto los «moderados»? Los de la antigua clase dirigente del salazarismo, tras dividirse por menudas rivalidades durante el periodo Caetano, a la hora de la verdad han brillado por su ausencia. La desunión y el desconcierto les impidió actuar unidos cuando aún era tiempo. Ahora están siendo conducidos a la cárcel todos los grandes «ex». Lo que haya de suceder con cada uno ya se verá.»

<sup>lxix</sup> «No existen auténticas revolucionarias ordenadas y tranquilas. La misión de los revolucionarios es “desordenar”, es decir, destruir un «orden» para crear otro; y acabar con una “tranquilidad” para organizar otra distinta; la suya; la que se atiene a sus pensamientos y a sus dogmas.(...) No quisiera equivocarme; pero advierto indicios muy señalados de que el movimiento revolucionario del 25 de abril de 1974 contó con la colaboración espiritual y material de no pocos portugueses calificados por sus ideas conservadoras y por sus intereses, aún más conservadoras que sus ideas.(...) Importa, igualmente, registrar otra vez - aunque la insistencia sea fatigosa - el hecho de que en el mundo se mueve una fuerza política y social muy poderosa por su doctrina y por su organización: el comunismo; fuerza que no necesita excesivas colaboraciones capitalistas para desplegar sus vuelos, pero que, cuando se le brindan y regalan, sabe aprovechar la ocasión y valerse de ellas maravillosamente.»

<sup>lxx</sup> «¿Aprenderán nuestros aspirantes a Spínolas la dramática lección portuguesa?»

<sup>lxxi</sup> «Nada de cuanto allí ocurre nos es ajeno. La fraternidad ibérica alcanza mucho más que al puro compartir la piel de toro, el más occidental espacio del Continente europeo.»

<sup>lxxii</sup> «El giro de los acontecimientos en Portugal es buena ocasión para que meditemos los españoles. No sólo por tratarse de un país vecino y hermano; también por las múltiples afinidades de temperamento e históricas que existen entre los dos países.»

<sup>lxxiii</sup> «Tengo para mí, y vaya por delante, que lo más significativo de cuanto acontece en la República portuguesa es el hecho de que se pretende instaurar un sistema democrático sin igualdad de oportunidades.»

<sup>lxxiv</sup> «una tesis filo-marxista - o mejor, sin duda: pseudo-marxista»

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<sup>lxxv</sup> «treinta o cuarenta familias (...) mediante un instrumento terrorífico llamado PIDE»

<sup>lxxvi</sup> «Un régimen político no puede durar treinta y ocho años -para ser exactos - sin un apoyo sociológico que le dé su estabilidad política. El régimen tenía un apoyo sociológico; y unas razones políticas que lo sostenían. El apoyo sociológico, naturalmente, no estaba sólo en las «treinta o cuarenta familias» monopolizadoras de la industria y de la propiedad de la tierra. Salazar se apoyaba también en un sector importante de la pequeña burguesía, en amplias zonas del campesinado, especialmente en las regiones del norte y costeras donde la tierra está más dividida; y el apoyo político se encontraba en las diversas circunstancias que han ido favoreciendo al régimen; y como base primera, en el recuerdo del «barullo sangriento» - Eça de Queiroz «dixit»- que fueron los catorce años de república parlamentaria anteriores subsiguientes a la caída de la Monarquía y anteriores al golpe de Estado de Braga sobre el cual se alzó el largo periodo salazarista.»

<sup>lxxvii</sup> «Portugal será "una democracia popular" incrustada en la zona occidental de Europa»

<sup>lxxviii</sup> «La experiencia de estos días en Portugal, como la de aquella España de los años treinta, nos hacen sospechar que una derecha sensata es sólo la que deja de serlo.»

<sup>lxxix</sup> «De nada sirven los políticos sensatos, razonables y moderados, dispuestos a jugar la carta democrática, si no hay un sector de clase mayoritario en las derechas que este en actitud de reforma profunda.»

<sup>lxxx</sup> «Desde el 25 de abril he dedicado a la evolución de los sucesos en el país vecino más de un artículo. Todos ellos figuran entre las pocas excepciones al coro casi general de alabanzas movido en nuestra Prensa por el súbito fervor "democrático" de muchos de nuestros comentaristas, en bastantes de los cuales tal emoción no dejaba de ser un sentimiento bastante nuevo. »

<sup>lxxx1</sup> «algunos sectores de la Prensa española jubilosos comentarios.»

<sup>lxxxii</sup> « La "dictadura" de Salazar - el más grande de los políticos portugueses desde Pombal a nuestros días - ha sido, al parecer, tan catastrófica, tan injusta e implacable que sólo merece insultos»

<sup>lxxxiii</sup> «Releer ahora algunos comentarios periodísticos españoles de los días felices de la revolución "do cravo" es un ejercicio muy útil, aunque poco deleitable. Todos los éxtasis y orgasmos producidos por la democracia y la libertad al fin triunfadoras resultan de un ridículo abrumador cuando se contrastan con la cruda realidad vigente.»

<sup>lxxxiv</sup> «La revolución del clavel, saludada hace unos meses con eufórico entusiasmo por no pocos, muestra ahora lo efímero de la flor.»



## 5. *January's turmoil: violence makes an appearance*

The recipe for revolutions Portuguese-style: from the little carnations to the sad night of Oporto. And what will come next.<sup>i 626</sup>

A couple of weeks ago the Cassandras were claiming a «decisive triumph» of Communism in the neighbour country because of the arrest under government orders of ten or twelve financiers and industrialists accused of being involved in dirty business. When a Portuguese judge proceeded, in the most incompatible act possible with Communism that one can imagine, in setting free the people the government had imprisoned, the Cassandras did not even mention the fact<sup>ii 627</sup>.

A triad of events that include the discussion, and approval by the Ministers' Council (Rezola 2007:123), of a single union project supported most visibly by the Communist party (PCP)<sup>628</sup>, the attack of the Democratic and Social Centre [*Centro Democrático e Social CDS*] Congress in Oporto by leftists groups, and the call of three demonstrations for the same day, January 31<sup>st</sup> rivalling for power over the streets, set the Spanish focus back to Portugal by January 1975.

*ABC* in general, José Salas, José Reis, Eduardo Barrenechea and Fernando Jáuregui all agree that these developments will impose themselves on the media agenda, as they did. For *ABC* this subject, seen as a clear Communist takeover, is more important than the downfall of General Spínola:

Next to this fact the downfall last September of general Spínola is reduced to a small event and demanded by the radicalization dynamics in which Post-caetanism is now found. It is a step forward away from the democratic, parliamentary horizon shown to the Portuguese as promise adorning the red carnation on top of the rifles<sup>iii 629</sup>.

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<sup>626</sup> Gómez Tello, JL. 1975. « La noche triste de Oporto » in *Arriba*, January 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>627</sup> Assia, Augusto. 1975. « En Portugal, todo depende de las elecciones» in *La vanguardia española*, January 17<sup>th</sup>, pp.18

<sup>628</sup> This project had also the support of MDP/CDE, MES, UEC, MDM, MJT, FSP and intersindical (Rezola 2007: 122).

<sup>629</sup> Editorial: « Portugal: días decisivos».1975. *ABC*, January 19<sup>th</sup>, pp.14

It also should be noted that since General Spínola stepped down from office, this newspaper started coining this moment as «post-Caetanism», something that agrees with *ABC*'s current claim of an antidemocratic stage starting in Portugal in that moment. Also in *ABC*, José Salas upholds that the single union project proposed by the Communist party will cause a stir important enough to force the Alvor agreements, the negotiation of Angola's independence, or the economic plan out of the agenda of the media: «Faced with this panorama, any other subject seems to lack content. Angola's problem will be fixed little by little. And the emergency economic plan will have to receive another name, given that the circumstances changed since it began to be drafted»<sup>iv630</sup>.

The divergence of opinion between parties who are inherently part of the Government coalition in power is a sign, for some journalists, that a political crisis may be looming and that this Government may fall, an idea that José Reis sums up in *Arriba*:

Will there be a governmental crisis or not? Wanted to know a colleague who is seeing his professional interest divided between the Algarve, where the "summit" of Angola is being held, and Lisbon, where the Intersindical MDO and PC, in a skilful political game, are testing the government's resistance, maybe given the prospects that it might fall as a result of a stronger push. (...) The government either postpones the final discussion of the law and its subsequent approval in order to overcome the crisis, approves the law and there is a crisis, or refuses it and therefore the intersindical will not stand still<sup>v631</sup>.

For Fernando Jáuregui, also in *Arriba*, the theme is the division itself caused by the discussion of the project: «Any chronicle about Portugal should start mentioning, once again, the split that the draft law

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<sup>630</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «El carácter que se otorgue a los sindicatos puede ocasionar una crisis gubernamental» in *ABC*, January 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.34-34

<sup>631</sup> Reis, José. 1975. «El proyecto de ley sindical podría derribar al gobierno» in *Arriba*, January 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

about unionist associations has produced in the country»<sup>vi632</sup>. The cause for the media's attention displacement, for Barrenechea, is the battle being fought by the members of the government between a project of the «unity» of unions and another of a «single union»<sup>633</sup>, a division that Rezola (2007: 122) claims was commonly attributed to Francisco Salgado Zenha, the socialist member party that more actively advocated against the Communist project: «The ball is on the roof and there is no other subject in this country more important or of more relevance than to know what is going to happen to the question of the unity of unions or “single union”»<sup>vii 634</sup>. Against the project of a single union, gathered around the Socialists (PS), are the Popular Democratic Party [*Partido Popular Democrático* PPD] and CDS, as well as the Catholic Church. The Socialists repudiated the imposition by law that this project embodied, classifying it as an assault on the freedom inscribed in MFA's program. As Jáuregui explains in *Arriba*, «(...) the socialist party supports unity, but with the caveat that it should not be obtained by law, but instead reached through unionist practice. Given this position, the PS is now in conflict with the Communists»<sup>viii635</sup>. The Socialists are then accused, as Alberto Miguez narrates, by «the Communists and their allies» of «betraying the working class, proposing unionist solutions “that only help the bourgeoisie and the monopolies”»<sup>ix636</sup>. Hence the semantic division that will accompany the debate as it will be seen. In Spanish newspapers, however, the question will be addressed almost exclusively using the set of tools proposed by the main opponents of the project: the Socialists.

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<sup>632</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1975. «Portugal escindido ante la polemica sobre la ley sindical» in *Arriba*, January 19<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>633</sup> In Portuguese the terms are «unidade» and »unicidade».

<sup>634</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo.1975. «Aún no hay decisión sobre la ley sindical» in *Informaciones*, January 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>635</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1975. « El proyecto de ley sindical divide al país» in *Arriba*, January 10<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

<sup>636</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Gigantesca manifestación en apoyo de la "Unidad Sindical"» in *La Vanguardia española*, January 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.17

After the single union project was presented by the Government and the debate started, a demonstration supporting the project was called for January 14<sup>th</sup> with the support of PCP, Portuguese Democratic Movement-Democratic Electoral Commission [*Movimento Democrático Português- Comissão Democrática Eleitoral* MDP-CDE], the Socialist Left Movement [*Movimento Esquerda Socialista* MES], the People's Socialist Front [*Frente Socialista Popular* FSP] and the *Intersindical* union. The Council of the 20<sup>th</sup>, composed by all the officers who had political-military functions [the seven members of the JSN, the seven members of the Coordinating team, the head-deputy of COPCON, and five members of the MFA (Rezola 2007, 116)], had spoken out in favour of the single union project, strengthening the stance of its supporters.

On the eve of the demonstration, José Salas in *ABC* doubts the success of the turnout – «I find it hard to believe that they will reach half of this number [50 thousand people]»<sup>x637</sup> –, while fearing the provisional government's fall – «[t]omorrow the young Portuguese democracy might see how its provisional creation falls apart if, as it has been argued, the two non-Communist parties that are part of the government retreat from it»<sup>x1638</sup> –, as a consequence of this open dispute between party members of the coalition in office.

*ABC*'s correspondent was proved wrong by a turnout of «more than two hundred thousand demonstrators»<sup>xii</sup> according to «estimates that we believe to be reliable»<sup>xiii</sup>, claims José Reis in *Arriba*. In *Informaciones* and *La Vanguardia Española*, Eduardo Barrenechea and Alberto Miguez, respectively, compare the January 14<sup>th</sup> demonstration with the May 1<sup>st</sup> one, given its magnitude: «Since then – when all the people went out on

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<sup>637</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «El caracter que se otorgue a los sindicatos puede ocasionar una crisis gubernamental» in *ABC*, January 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.33-34

<sup>638</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «El caracter que se otorgue a los sindicatos puede ocasionar una crisis gubernamental» in *ABC*, January 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.33-34



the streets – there had not been seen such a numerous demonstration»<sup>xiv639</sup>, claims Barrenechea, then more of a correspondent type of journalist than a special correspondent, since he will be permanently in Portugal between January and June 1975. Miguez gives voices to popular claims that reinforce the demonstration's magnitude: «Some people actually state that this one had more people»<sup>xv640</sup>. The demonstration happened within «order and civility»<sup>641</sup>, and as Miguez notes it was not at all hostile towards its opponents:

Meanwhile today's demonstration highlighted that the Portuguese Communists despite everything are walking on eggshells since, as someone noted, «they are more afraid of loneliness than of PIDE». For almost three hours of demonstration not even one hostile shout against Socialists and their leaders was heard. Álvaro Cunhal and his boys do not want to create problems with the defeated because you never know...<sup>xvi642</sup>.

Overall, the demonstration was seen as a triumph of its proponents – the triumvirate, as Reis named them<sup>643</sup>, composed of union *Intersindical*, PCP and MDP. In his view it is likely that this victory «will influence the Council of Ministers and the State Council...»<sup>xvii644</sup>, since the single union project «had its biggest plebiscite through the demonstration of the past 14<sup>th</sup> in Lisbon»<sup>xviii645</sup>. However, since the open dispute between members of the same cabinet continued, the crisis was not mitigated but deepened. In his column in *Arriba* Gómez Tello

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<sup>639</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo.1975. «Cien mil trabajadores se manifiestan en apoyo de la "unicidad sindical"» in *Informaciones*, January 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>640</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Gigantesca manifestación en apoyo de la "Unidad Sindical"» in *La Vanguardia española*, January 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.17

<sup>641</sup> Reis, José.1975. «Manifestación comunista en apoyo de la unidad sindical» in *Arriba*, January 16<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

<sup>642</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Gigantesca manifestación en apoyo de la "Unidad Sindical"» in *La Vanguardia española*, January 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.17

<sup>643</sup> Reis, José.1975. «Manifestación comunista en apoyo de la unidad sindical» in *Arriba*, January 16<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

<sup>644</sup> Reis, José.1975. «Manifestación de trabajadores partidarios de la unidad sindical » in *Arriba*, January 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.14

<sup>645</sup> Reis, José.1975. «Sindicatos unicos» in *Arriba*, January 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.16

associates this moment of crisis with the one that prompted the downfall of General Spínola following the prevented «silent majority» demonstration. The protagonists, however, are not the same:

The new crisis looks like the previous one in its approach, but with a significant variant. Socialist Mario Soares and Communist Alvaro Cunhal coincided at the moment of the anti-Spínola turn. They were still on the honeymoon of the first days of the red carnation revolution, today so withered, as it was easy to predict<sup>xix646</sup>.

In *Informaciones*, Eduardo Barrenechea recognizes that this is in fact a critical moment, but he is not sure if any comparison with a previous period is possible:

Portuguese political and military lives, indissolubly united, are going through a critical moment, which does not mean that this moment is as important for the country as the moments that followed the resignation of Prime-minister, Palma Carlos, or the aborted coup attempt of September 28<sup>th</sup>, but of a different kind<sup>xx647</sup>.

Despite the protests, on January 20<sup>th</sup> the Council of Ministers approved the project by majority and with the votes against of the members of the Socialist (PS) and Popular Democratic (PPD) parties. In *Arriba*, José Reis assures that «the Ministry of Labour and Justice is still receiving telegrams of protest (in higher amounts) and in support of the new law»<sup>xxi648</sup>, underlining that the approval is not at all a matter of consensus, as was expected. In *ABC* Salas roots this approval in the influence Communists have on the unionist movement, which was aided by the «massive demonstration, which I referred to at the moment»<sup>xxii649</sup>. In *Tele/eXprés*, Xavier Barbé reflects about the reasons behind this approval:

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<sup>646</sup> Gómez Tello, JL. 1975. «La situación en Portugal» in *Arriba*, January 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>647</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo.1975. «Cien mil trabajadores se manifiestan en apoyo de la "unicidad sindical"» in *Informaciones*, January 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>648</sup> Reis, José.1975. «Sindicatos unicos» in *Arriba*, January 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.16

<sup>649</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «Los maoístas y la izquierda socialista, decididos a manifestarse hoy, pese a la prohibición oficial» in *ABC*, January 31<sup>st</sup>, pp. 31

Faced with this division in opinions, the MFA went with the single union. A question arises: Why does the MFA support the single union? And two possible answers stand out: to avoid a degeneration of the political crisis or because – even if some argue the opposite – the PC has a respectable influence within the MFA. Time will tell...<sup>xxiii650</sup>.

In *La Vanguardia Española*, Alberto Miguez re-establishes the limits of what is being called a «Communist triumph», given that it is «[a] triumph, we would add, with a limited scope, given that as the Minister of Labour, Captain Costa Martins, declared, the law is valid for a year (...)»<sup>xxiv651</sup>, mitigating the idea of a Communist take-over.

On the other hand, *ABC* sees in the approval of the single union project a step further in the establishment of a Communist regime in Portugal and, therefore, nothing but a disaster. A Communist regime is from *ABC*'s point of view the antithesis of a democratic one, hence its claim that «General Spínola's apprehension seems more than justified: the pre-democratic just swayed over to the anti-democratic»<sup>xxv 652</sup> by the approval of this project.

This newspaper conceives the dispute held between the supporters of the project and its critics as a «political war» between «the party of the sickle and the hammer» and «the Lusitanian democratic forces until now represented in power»<sup>xxvi</sup>, which may have lost a battle but not the war:

We say «political war» and we believe we are correct, because it is nothing but the logical dispute between the democratic forces and a party that only proclaims to be democratic when is not in power, but that shows its totalitarian nature as soon as it reaches it. That is the case of the – for now – settled dispute over the Lusitanian unions<sup>xxvii653</sup>.

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<sup>650</sup> Barbe, Xavier.1975. «Sindicación única por ramas de actividad» in *Tele/eXprés*, January 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.12

<sup>651</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Portugal contara con un sindicato único» in *La Vanguardia española*, January 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.5-6

<sup>652</sup> Editorial: «Políticos y militares en Portugal».1975. *ABC*, January 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.18

<sup>653</sup> Editorial: «Políticos y militares en Portugal».1975. *ABC*, January 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.18

For *ABC* Communists are, now undoubtedly, supporters of a totalitarian model of society, hence the fact that the «post-caetano» regime, as this newspaper now refers to the Portuguese revolutionary process, ends up approving a conception of unions that in many ways is similar to the New State's one. This makes them, at the eyes of *ABC*, equivalent political regimes:

The possibilities of political freedom have experienced since last spring a complete turn, from being denied by the corporative formulations sprung from pre-council Rome, to being diametrically opposed by the totalitarian equations radiated by Moscow<sup>xxviii654</sup>.

The union question is also very widely seen as a reason behind the emergence of the divisions between Socialists and Communists, thus breaking the tactical alliance sustained up until then. This is the point of view, for instance, of *La Vanguardia Española*, a newspaper that is very much moderate in its opinions at this moment:

Things are, nonetheless, more complicated. The union law draft, supported by the great majority of the unions that composed the Portuguese Intersindical after a patient Communist campaign of persuasion, was just a pretext for the serious divergences existing between Socialists and Communists to surface<sup>xxix655</sup>.

In *Informaciones* Eduardo Barrenechea argues that disagreement is precisely what democracy is about, so in a way this is a positive situation, which is precisely the point Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe make when they assert conflict and division as constitutive of a pluralistic democracy (2001). However, on the other hand, for disagreements to emerge plurality must be ensured, and this journalist stresses his preference for the Socialist rhetoric: «The future Union Law served as a wakeup call about political diversity, which is normal and beneficial in all societies that are “per se” naturally – you will forgive the repetition –

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<sup>654</sup> Editorial: «Políticos y militares en Portugal».1975. *ABC*, January 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.18

<sup>655</sup> Editorial: «El trasfondo político portugués».1975. *La Vanguardia española*, January 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

plural. What is at stake is not the Union Law, but the respect for everyone's opinions. This is the point»<sup>xxx656</sup>. The rhetoric preference of *Informaciones'* correspondent was also visible in the former case of a shift from discussing the union model to discussing a model of democracy, always present in his reasoning.

Less moderate are the claims of Gómez Tello, for whom «[u]ltimately, the famous Union Law is nothing more than a pretext to get to the crucial point of the great backstage conflict going on almost from the beginning of the new Portuguese regime»<sup>xxxi657</sup>. In *Informaciones*, Jaume Miravittles strengthens the idea of a warlike atmosphere by identifying the January 14<sup>th</sup> demonstration with a war movement: «The recent demonstration in favour of the “single union” in Portugal is, rather than a proof or a desire of making different left wing parties converge into a common goal, one more feature, maybe the most categorical one so far, of the Communist offensive against the Socialist party headed by Mr. Soares»<sup>xxxii658</sup>.

The main point of this fight, as Gómez Tello describes it, is the fact that the Communist Party had an ulterior motivation for supporting the single union project: «The “single union” does not matter to them, but to allow them to exert, through it, control over the unions and making sure that the most favourable positions regarding the Constitutional Assembly's election, which should be take place in the beginning of March, but realistically not until April»<sup>xxxiii659</sup>. Likewise, José Reis and

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<sup>656</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo.1975. «Esta en juego el respecto a la variedad ideologica » in *Informaciones*, January 20<sup>th</sup>, pp.4

<sup>657</sup> Gómez Tello, JL. 1975. «La situación en Portugal» in *Arriba*, January 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>658</sup> Miravittles, Jaume. 1975. «El enfrentamiento comunista-socialista» in *Informaciones*, January 27<sup>th</sup>

<sup>659</sup> Gómez Tello, JL. 1975. «La situación en Portugal» in *Arriba*, January 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

José Salas support the same theory. Salas differentiates between PCP's public and ulterior motivations: «Motivation for the audience: the existence of small unions correspondent to several parties would divide the masses of workers and by losing unity they would also lose their strength. The real motivation: the single union would give the Communist party great strength through the named influence»<sup>xxxiv660</sup>.

Salas thus concludes that it all boils down to a Communist manoeuvre aimed at strengthening its power. In *Arriba*, Reis claims that «the project of single unions created by the law [is] a way of hiding the guidelines of a one-party system»<sup>xxxv661</sup>. To these interpretations of the Portuguese developments is added the moderation emanating from both *La Vanguardia Española's* editorials and Augusto Assia's articles. However, only one active defence of the single union project is published, in *Arriba*, by the pen of Ramón Bayot Serrat. A less explicit defence, in the words of Jordi Borja, is expressed in the pages of *Tele/eXprés*.

*La Vanguardia Española* keeps repeating that there are several factors that stop a Communist takeover of the Portuguese process, as some newspapers, like *ABC*, claim is happening in Portugal. Factors such as «[t]he presence in Government of Socialists and Social-Democrats, the existence of an important group of military unwilling to let the ongoing democratization stop, Portugal's geographic situation and its assignment to the Western block, and lastly the proximity of the electoral test, on which the attention of all Portuguese and the entire world is concentrated»<sup>xxxvi 662</sup>. All these factors should contain a Communist

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<sup>660</sup>Salas, José. 1975. «El carácter que se otorgue a los sindicatos puede ocasionar una crisis gubernamental» in *ABC*, January 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.33-34

<sup>661</sup> Reis, José.1975.«Abierta confrontación entre comunistas y socialistas» in *Arriba*, January 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

<sup>662</sup> Editorial: «El trasfondo político portugués».1975. *La Vanguardia española*, January 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

attempt of domination, which the newspaper incidentally also considers to be a negative development.

A dialogue between José Salas and Augusto Assia sets in. José Salas claims in *ABC*, at the moment of the January 14<sup>th</sup> demonstration, that Portuguese unions are heavily influenced by the Communist Party. A single union would mean one more powerful instrument at the hands of the Communists even before a majoritarian elected Government<sup>663</sup>. To this argument Assia opposes the idea that «[e]xcept as a tool to make revolution, single unions will probably be worthless to a Communist party in opposition (...) Only in the case of a coup d'état that would bring them to power and postpone the elections, would the single union offer the Communists a tool able to help them destroy freedom»<sup>xxxvii664</sup>. Therefore the chronicler deflects the discussion by emphasizing the importance of the coming electoral process. Assia, who is not a supporter of a single union, reminds – like Ramón Bayot y Serrat will do as well – that single unions are not exclusively a communist idea: «like it happens in Russia or in the “popular democracies” and happened in Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany. Right here in Spain the “single union” were, before the civil war, part of the anarchist programme. Nothing is as new as it seems when one has forgotten history»<sup>xxxviii</sup>. Assia omits, probably on purpose, that single unions is also the Spanish model, which puts the negative reaction to the recently approved project in Portugal in perspective.

In support of the unionist matrix of *Arriba*, Ramón Bayot y Serrat authors an apologist article regarding single unions. Dismissing the idea of a Communist filiation of the single union model, Bayot y Serrat argues that «[h]istory proves that unity is positive for the working class»<sup>xxxix</sup>.

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<sup>663</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «El carácter que se otorgue a los sindicatos puede ocasionar una crisis gubernamental» in *ABC*, January 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.33-34

<sup>664</sup> Assia, Augusto. 1975. «En Portugal, todo depende de las elecciones» in *La vanguardia española*, January 17<sup>th</sup>, pp.18

Therefore what is happening in Portugal, from Bayot y Serrat's point of view, is a distortion of the question: «With plurality – a reactionary, extra-unionist invention, with the appearance of freedom – what is desired is nothing less than to manipulate the workers, presenting the single union as a Communist party invention, by the simple fact that the party supports it»<sup>xl665</sup>. Bayot y Serrat, Assia, and Miravittles converge in the option to evoke history to justify their stance regarding the union model, whether they are in favour or against the project. Miravittles remembers western models that rebelled against the single union model, such as the French and the Italian, although a path back to a single union was by then being instigated by the Communists in Italy.

Despite not condemning single unions in themselves, Jordi Borja's article considers that the way the Communist Party imposed the single union model on the Portuguese people is flawed. Borja moreover argues that it was the easy way out of the situation, despite acknowledging that it was also a result of several constraints, such as «the problems resulting from the economic backwardness and the disorganization of the working class, [the PCP] annoyed by the Socialist desire of gaining influence now, when they failed to be there when it was forbidden, opted for the easy way of enforcing it from the top and by decree»<sup>xli</sup>. Urban planner and Professor at the University of Barcelona, Jordi Borja had been a militant in the Communist organization of Spain-Red Flag [*Organización Comunista de España-Bandera Roja*], which was by then in the middle of the process of integration within PSUC<sup>666</sup>. His political militancy earned him a few of years in exile. A member of the Central Committee of the party, Borja was elected for Catalan Parliament in the

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<sup>665</sup> Bayot y Serrat, Ramón.1975. «Portugal y el sindicato único» in *Arriba*, January 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.17

<sup>666</sup> Cf. Interview with Jordi Borja in *Bucarest, La memòria perduda*, dir. by Albert Solè Tura (2008) available at <http://www.tv3.cat/videos/321389/Bucarest-la-memoria-perduda>. (accessed on 2014.11.01).



1980s. Maybe because of his militant status, Borja's subtle condemnation focused on the *modus operandi*: «To choose now the way of imposition to solve [the situation] might lead, first, to division, soon to passivity, and lastly to defeat at the hands of a reborn right wing or of a combination of military and Stalinist socialism»<sup>xlii</sup>. At the same time, a possibility other than the Socialist framing of the issue is attempted by Borja, without being successful in establishing it as a stable and recurrent alternative: «The problem in Portugal should not be the conflict between PC and PS, but to find the means to ensure a democratic and pluralist participation of a people carrying a lot of suffering on its back and with very little political education»<sup>xliii667</sup>.

While tensions were yet to be resolved, the coming of the I Congress of the CDS presented itself as «"a priori" like another touchstone to understand how in this country the respect towards the democratic game is being managed. The week beginning today presents itself with two great subjects of clarification of political stances»<sup>xliv668</sup>, as Eduardo Barrenechea notes. The congress, which was taking place at the Cristal Palace in Oporto, was seen as a test for Portuguese democratic convictions, but ended up surrounded by leftist militants and had to be called off.

This incident was generally condemned. Alberto Miguez, for instance, considers them as «serious events that suppose a new setback in the implementation of an authentic democracy in this country. »<sup>xlv</sup> He feels it is a particularly serious situation since «[t]he police was not able or did not want to repress those excesses. (...) It is easy to estimate to what extent this incident, unjustifiable and clumsy, discredits its

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<sup>667</sup> Borja, Jordi.1975. «Democracia política y democracia sindical» in *Tele/eXprés*, January 31<sup>st</sup>, pp.7

<sup>668</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo.1975. «Está en juego el respecto a la variedad ideologica » in *Informaciones*, January 20<sup>th</sup>, pp.4

promoters and casts serious doubts over the efficiency of those that should have, by duty, foreseen and prevented it. The Police»<sup>xlvi</sup>. For Miguez, as disturbing as the lack of action by the police is the fact that «while the Socialist party condemns Oporto's incident, its youth starred it by allying with the far-left»<sup>xlvii669</sup>.

*Informaciones* voices a concern at the possibility of this atmosphere of violence influencing the normal pace of the electoral process: «In this context the country is heading towards elections that are to be preceded by an electoral campaign in which the centre and the democratic right-wing sectors are going to be subjected to, to say the least, intimidation, threat and physical danger»<sup>xlviii670</sup>. Contradicting the dominant idea that democracy in Portugal is entering a precarious state, in *Tele/eXprés* Jordi Borja dismisses the importance of this event, considering that its protagonists were a «minority, and irresponsible, groups» that «showed their opposition regarding the conservative forces Congress, on another hand authorized, » and that this «does not seem to put at stake the rules of the democratic game.»<sup>xlix 671</sup>

However the most common stance is not only to condemn but also to argue that this situation was predictable, given the Communist takeover occurring in Portugal. All in all, this is how *ABC* and *Arriba* react.

In *ABC*, José Salas and Manuel Fernández Areal's reasoning contributes to this view, summed up in *ABC*'s editorial that not only single unions are a feature of a totalitarian Communist regime, but also that violence is a feature of a Communist takeover. Communists are thus

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<sup>669</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Nuevo golpe, en Oporto, contra la instauración de una democracia auténtica» in *La Vanguardia española*, January 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.3-4

<sup>670</sup> Editorial: «Portugal, la democracia y los comunistas». 1975. *Informaciones*, January 29<sup>th</sup>

<sup>671</sup> Borja, Jordi.1975. «Democracia política y democracia sindical» in *Tele/eXprés*, January 31<sup>st</sup>, pp.7

not only dangerous, but they also pose a worse threat to democracy than the right wing sectors: «The duplicity of resources aspired by the Portuguese PC – parliamentary and extra-parliamentary – is a more real and certain danger for the democracy in the neighbour country than what is attributed to the right wing»<sup>672</sup>.

José Salas argues that the violence that surrounded this event is an extension of the conflict opened by the union model discussion. Given that it is part of the same process, this violence was, therefore, predictable: «But it looks as though violence has already made its appearance. So the tense atmosphere, as I mentioned, and the nearing of elections may turn out to be an excellent breeding ground for the escalation of this violence»<sup>li673</sup>. Manuel Fernández Areal's article then links the predictable events directly to the Communists' increasing power:

What happened in Portugal was expected (...) Communism is a philosophy where there is no respect for private initiative, religious beliefs or political pluralism, even if the democratic game is tacitly played when it is convenient until power is reached (see Allendes's case or contemplate the embarrassing totalitarian show and lack of civility of Portuguese Communism)<sup>li674</sup>.

*Arriba* also converges into a unison discourse of Communist takeover, despite the notable exception of its correspondent in Portugal, Fernando Jáuregui, who links this foreseeable feature of the event less with the Communist takeover theory and more with the fact that given the existing social tension, a right wing gathering in Portugal at the beginning

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<sup>672</sup> Editorial: «Portugal: días decisivos».1975. *ABC*, January 19<sup>th</sup>, pp.14

<sup>673</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «Socialistas y comunistas intentan un acuerdo para evitar el choque en la calle» in *ABC*, January 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.

<sup>674</sup> Fernández Areal, Manuel.1975. «Portugal: una advertência» in *ABC*, February 5<sup>th</sup>

of 1975 was very likely to cause protests as had recently happened in Lisbon, as José Salas<sup>675</sup> recalled.

Regardless of Jáuregui's account, astrologist Rafael Lafuente, who prided himself of having prophesied several of the Portuguese developments, including Marcelo Caetano's downfall<sup>676</sup>, remembers in *Arriba* on January 24<sup>th</sup> that: «Nonetheless, my predictions about the Portuguese crisis milestones seem to be fulfilling. I announced that around the 26<sup>th</sup> a crisis would be emerging, even if it would not materialize until a month later. Let us see if the correspondents of "Ya" and "ABC" confirm my forecast»<sup>liii677</sup>. Dialoguing with Lafuente, Domingo Manfredi Cano ironically explains that, in his case, no special skills for predicting the future were needed, since all the recent developments fit in the very well-known Communist strategy to take power:

«This» is what has always happened, without getting not even one note wrong like a competent orchestra, for almost a century, but especially in the past half century. The same system, the same procedures, the same

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<sup>675</sup> «Hasta las piedras sabían que allí iban a ocurrir cosas de ese tipo, con motivo del Congreso Nacional del Centro Democrático social, en la llamada "Capital del Norte". Se sabía, porque con anterioridad se habían repartido miles de octavillas incitando a acabar con todo aquello por la brava. Se esperaba, porque así lo habían hecho saber diversos sectores del extremismo. Y por si algo faltara, cabía sospecharlo en virtud de un antecedente que estaba en el recuerdo de todos: el del mitin del mismo partido, en un teatro de Lisboa, donde también hubo asaltos, destrozos, choches volcados y escaparates rotos.» [Salas, José. 1975. «Socialistas y comunistas intentan un acuerdo para evitar el choque en la calle» in *ABC*, January 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.]

<sup>676</sup> «Anuncié desde "Pueblo" la caída del Gobierno de Caetano. Anuncie desde diversas publicaciones cuáles serían los hitos cronológicos de la presente crisis. No debo proseguir ocupándome del país vecino, porque para eso están los corresponsales de nuestra Prensa en el extranjero. Podían acusarme de intrusismo en la función de contar desde aquí lo que puede pasar y pasará delante mismo de sus narices. Lo que haría gustosamente es explicar a nuestras lumbreras las cosas que convendría hacer para desviar a España del riesgo de sufrir algún día los sinsabores que está experimentando el noble pueblo lusitano, que tomó demasiado en serio la esperanza de que su democracia iba a ser un coser y cantar en un aire embalsamado por el aroma de los claveles.» [Lafuente, Rafael. 1975. «¿Qué dice el futurologo?» in *Arriba* January 30<sup>th</sup>, pp.2]

<sup>677</sup> Lafuente, Rafael. 1975. «¿Qué dice el futurologo?» in *Arriba* January 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.2

«slogans», the same promises, the same joys at the beginning and the same deceptions and bitterness of the last hour<sup>liv678</sup>.

Gómez Tello connects the predictability with the dual power structures already existing, which he calls «soviets», arguing for the influence of the Soviet Union in what is happening in Portugal: «How would you call that? It has a name: soviets»<sup>lv679</sup>. Like Manfredi Cano, «El Mundo»'s author censures whoever is surprised by the turn of events in Oporto. He also identifies the situation as a classic Communist take-over, by designating the atmosphere lived in Portugal at that moment as an «an atmosphere of a new “Prague coup”»<sup>lvi</sup>. Evoking former reactions to the situation in Portugal, namely by Spaniards who cheered the Carnation Revolution almost a year earlier, which Manfredi Cano called insane<sup>680</sup> and Gómez Tello deems as naïve:

But why be astonished? (...) When they excitedly welcomed the “carnation revolution”... those were already red. One would have to be very naïve not to foresee what would come out of that folklore. (...) Was there the need to get to this dramatic night in Oporto to discover the cliff? Spínola was already late when he declared that Portugal was heading towards chaos and anarchy<sup>lvii 681</sup>.

Fernández Areal reflects on the current possibility of expressing negativity, like Manfredi Cano and Gómez Tello do, noting a fundamental change. Before this event expressing negativity towards the Portuguese Revolutionary Process was condemned by means of verbal aggression, something no longer happening: «And of course, to avoid looking like an ultra, right wing supporter, a caveman, backward and other nasty

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<sup>678</sup> Manfredi Cano, Domingo.1975. «Sin los parámetros de Rafael» in *Arriba*, January 30<sup>th</sup>, pp. 2

<sup>679</sup> «Gómez Tello, JL. 1975. «Portugal y la OTAN» in *Arriba*, February 9<sup>th</sup>, pp.10

<sup>680</sup> «Si alguien se ha sentido decepcionado, entristecido, amenazado, al enterarse de lo ocurrido en Oporto, es porque su sitio verdadero no está sino en el manicomio. O porque es uno granuja consumado»[Manfredi Cano, Domingo.1975. «Sin los parámetros de Rafael» in *Arriba*, January 30<sup>th</sup>, pp. 2]

<sup>681</sup> Gómez Tello, JL. 1975. «La noche triste de Oporto» in *Arriba*, January 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

comments the Communists usually throw at those who do not allow their game, no one or almost no one dared until now to publically express in Spain the forecast»<sup>lviii682</sup>. In this sense, all three converge in the notion that for the Spanish press the situation has changed and it is by then possible to openly express the negativity that once had to be disguised.

This dispute between socio-political forces is nevertheless far from being over, and the Socialist party had called for a demonstration for January 31<sup>st</sup>, as did the Communist party. Likewise, MRPP, MES and other leftist groups also called for a demonstration against imminent visit of NATO's fleet for the same day. The Council of 20 forbade the demonstrations, and only the latter came to the street, challenging the prohibition.

In *La Vanguardia Española* Alberto Miguez links the demonstration called by the PCP with an expression of antagonism towards the PS and expresses doubts as to the PCP's commitment to the electoral process: «This progressive divergence that is already pure antagonism is coincident with the Portuguese Communist Party's plans. It was not in vain that the latter made the divergences alive by bringing up the union law project – the touchstone of the crisis – when it suited it»<sup>lix683</sup>. The same link is established by José Salas. According to *ABC*'s correspondent, the PCP wishes to limit PS' capacity to dominate the streets in order to maintain its own superiority and therefore have leverage after the election, whose outcome Salas believes will not be in its favour<sup>684</sup>. Hence, argues Salas, in order to sustain their position, Communists resorted to their usual strategy: «Like on May 1<sup>st</sup>, on

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<sup>682</sup> Fernández Areal, Manuel. 1975. «Portugal: una advertencia» in *ABC*, February 5<sup>th</sup>

<sup>683</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Dos grandes manifestaciones se disputaran las calles lisboetas el proximo viernes» in *La Vanguardia española*, January 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6

<sup>684</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «Ventaja comunista ante las manifestaciones del viernes» in *ABC*, January 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.15 and 17

September 28<sup>th</sup>, on January 14<sup>th</sup>, like every time they used their old tactic, their permanent strategy, their efficient strategy»<sup>lx</sup>. Much like Salas, in *Arriba* Gómez Tello portrays this event as a Communist manoeuvre for annulling its rival's action: «With their manoeuvre of demonstration at the same place, on the same day and at the same hour, Communists achieved to cancel their rival's demonstration»<sup>lxi685</sup>. Again, the main issue that surfaced from this crisis is the language of war that would be then used, which is yet another proof of how the unity is now broken: «It is a language of war that makes us foresee days that are not much characterised by carnations. (...) Do you remember what was said about "O povo unido"?»<sup>lxii686</sup>. This is a development that Alberto Miguez in *La Vanguardia Española* and José Reis<sup>687</sup> in *Arriba* also address.

Miguez noted how the Communist Party is now attacked in a way that was unexpected just a couple of weeks earlier, since for instance «[n]o one would have believed it was possible, only two weeks ago, that the Portuguese Communist party would be accused of being "social-fascist", its general secretary of being a "little dictator" and Intersidical of totalitarian, by the militants of a party with whom the responsibilities of power are shared [PPD]»<sup>lxiii688</sup>. But most significantly, «[n]o one had dared until now, I repeat, remembering facts that are so significant, even if everyone knew about them in Portugal [That Cunhal was the second Communist leader, after Fidel Castro, who supported the soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia]»<sup>lxiv</sup>. These facts had, however, already been mentioned by the Spanish press.

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<sup>685</sup> Gómez Tello, J.L. 1975. «Acabo en tablas» in *Arriba*, February 1<sup>st</sup>, pp.11

<sup>686</sup> Gómez Tello, J.L. 1975. «Prueba de fuerza en Lisboa» in *Arriba*, January 31<sup>st</sup>, pp.12

<sup>687</sup> Reis, José.1975. «Se agudiza la rivalidad comunistas-socialistas» in *Arriba*, February 1<sup>st</sup>, pp.11

<sup>688</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Se ha levantado la veda contra los comunistas» in *La Vanguardia española*, January 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.17

Despite recognising that the crisis seems to have reached an end<sup>689</sup>, Miguez notes that the prohibition of the demonstrations meant that «for the second time in less than two weeks, the party that Mario Soares leads has seen how Communists can disrupt their plans and boycott their initiatives»<sup>lxv690</sup>.

At this moment the eruption of violence, as a replacement for the portrayal of social conflict, is visible in different forms, on the one hand, in the language used, namely the semantic opposition that translates a scenario of war; and, on the other hand, by the visual declaration of *ABC*, following the logic that violence is incompatible with democracy, that the democratic attempt is by then finished.

#### a) Semantic opposition<sup>lxvi</sup>

The Socialist opposition to the single union project supported by the PCP is built along a displacement of the question from a model of the union to a model of the regime in the process of being built. Whoever supports Communists' project of a single union is therefore against freedom and plurality in general, since it involves a totalitarian regime. The Spanish press, with notable exceptions, picked up this line of argument, and both realities were identified with opposing semantic fields.

The Communist proposal, conceived as emanating from a «triumvirate» formed by *Intersindical*, PCP and MDP-CDE, is negatively referred to as «wrong paths that can lead to disastrous solutions»<sup>691</sup>, «imposed single unions», «a very likely possible hegemony of the

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<sup>689</sup>Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Las Fuerzas Armadas han prohibido la celebración de las manifestaciones programadas para hoy » in *La Vanguardia española*, January 31<sup>st</sup>, pp.5-6

<sup>690</sup>Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Las Fuerzas Armadas han prohibido la celebración de las manifestaciones programadas para hoy » in *La Vanguardia española*, January 31<sup>st</sup>, pp.5-6

<sup>691</sup> Reis, José.1975. «Socialistas y popular-democráticos se mantienen en el gobierno » in *Arriba*, January 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.12



Communist Party by controlling the union heads’ or via the Intersindical»<sup>692</sup>. Whereas the Socialist opposition to it is positively understood as «socialism in freedom», «democratic freedom», «workers’ freedom inside and outside of their union»<sup>693</sup>, since it is proposed by «the political sectors that really desire to participate in the construction of the Portuguese democratic future»<sup>694</sup>.

Despite all these examples from José Reis’ texts, his case is not an exception and all correspondents do the same. For instance Alberto Miguez refers to this occasion as «a campaign –another one – of “controlled terror”»<sup>695</sup>, since «[PCP no longer wants to play the part] of the party willing to discuss and willing to integrate a democratic coalition»<sup>696</sup> and where the desire of a «disciplined and obedient union»<sup>697</sup> is present. José Salas, in turn, opposes a Communist proposal of «vertical mandatory single union»<sup>698</sup> to the Socialist path of «pluralism», «free and plural unions», «European liberal and democratic socialism», «European moderate path»<sup>699</sup>, «liberal, pluralistic and democratic socialists»<sup>700</sup>.

Finally, Fernando Jáuregui and Eduardo Barrenechea also positively view the Socialist project, the former by associating it with

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<sup>692</sup> Reis, José.1975. «Sindicatos unicos» in *Arriba*, January 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.16

<sup>693</sup> Reis, José.1975. «Abierta confrontación entre comunistas y socialistas» in *Arriba*, January 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

<sup>694</sup> Reis, José.1975. «Se agudiza la rivalidad comunistas-socialistas» in *Arriba*, February 1<sup>st</sup>, pp.11

<sup>695</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Aumentan los rumores de crisis gubernamental» in *La Vanguardia española*, January 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.21

<sup>696</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Dos grandes manifestaciones se disputaran las calles lisboetas el proximo viernes» in *La Vanguardia española*, January 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6

<sup>697</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: La crisis gubernamental, conjurada» in *La Vanguardia española*, January 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.17

<sup>698</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «Los maoístas y la izquierda socialista, decididos a manifestarse hoy, pese a la prohibición oficial» in *ABC*, January 31<sup>st</sup>, pp. 5-6

<sup>699</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «Oficiales del ejército ocuparan los ministerios vacantes en caso de que se escinda la coalición gubernamental» in *ABC*, January 26<sup>th</sup>, pp. 5-6

<sup>700</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «Los maoístas y la izquierda socialista, decididos a manifestarse hoy, pese a la prohibición oficial» in *ABC*, January 31<sup>st</sup>, pp. 5-6

Europe, like Salas – «unionist pluralism, understood as an European type of freedom»<sup>701</sup> –, and the latter by casting suspicion on the Communist one: «several opinions – even left-wing ones – saw in this demonstration a real palpable threat to something deeper than the union law: a threat against the establishment of a plural democracy in Portugal»<sup>lxvii702</sup>. This happens through two processes: on the one hand, by reclaiming the left-wing feature of the opposition to the Communist proposal and, on the other, by using the use of a metonymy that transforms the union model question into a question of the model for the regime.

This opposition is picked up editorially by *ABC*, where «democratic forces» are opposed to «left-wing totalitarian inclinations», or of a «totalitarian nature», and «totalitarian inclinations irradiated from Moscow».

Finally, Jaume Miravittles, this time in *Informaciones*, also participates in this construction by opposing unions as a «simple “transmission mechanism” between political power and workers»<sup>lxviii</sup> to unions of « great power and independence»<sup>703</sup>, and linking the first one to the Communist proposal. Miravittles also compares the Communist proposal to what is happening in the Congo, thus underlining the backwardness he sees in the former: «That is to say, in the African, black, tribal and fetishist Congo, the current slogan is “single union”, the organic unity of all institutions and the complete predominance of the State over the entire “society”, which has yet to reach maturity and will still take years in order to reach it»<sup>lxix</sup>.

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<sup>701</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1975. «El proyecto de ley sindical divide al país» in *Arriba*, January 10<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

<sup>702</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo.1975. «La "unicidad sindical" aprobada» in *Informaciones*, January 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.1-2

<sup>703</sup> Miravittles, Jaume. 1975.«“Unicidad”, otro nombre equivoco» in *Informaciones*, January 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.19

Furthermore, the dispute between opposing ideas is at this moment conceived as warlike, hence the use of words and expressions belonging to the related semantic field to describe it: «victory», «skilful political game», «hostilities» (all by José Reis); «“cold war”», «assault» (Fernando Jáuregui); «Communist offensive» (Jaume Miravittles); «backstage struggle», «atmosphere of a “new Prague coup”», «making war» (Gómez Tello); «battle», «political war» (*ABC*); «peace dove», «pure and simple antagonism» (Alberto Miguez); «street draft», «confrontation», «street power of the antagonistic dispositive», «[the demonstration was] neutralized» (José Salas). This idea of an ongoing conflict becomes stronger and stronger as the subsequent developments add to the resentment and fear.

## b) *ABC*: the end of democracy

Due to the chronological coincidence of the Oporto events (January 25<sup>th</sup>) and the approval of the single union project by the MFA's Assembly (January 28<sup>th</sup>) happening in the same week, *ABC*'s edition of January 29<sup>th</sup> is devoted to the end of democracy in Portugal. The publication in international media of a number of skewed declarations by Mário Soares contributed for this stance.

In *La Vanguardia Española*, Alberto Miguez interviewed the Socialist Party leader the day after the press conference that originated the alarm. Soares' declarations, following Oporto's episode of violence, were interpreted as an attempt to call the attention of the world to the fact that Portugal was on the verge of a civil war and risked a foreign invasion. As Miguez clarifies:

(...) certain international agencies preferred to simplify the words of the Portuguese leader or to mistranslate them into English in order to give them an alarmist and dramatic impression. I wanted to know exactly how

far Soares intended his declarations to go (I had heard them, like my fellow journalists) and therefore I asked him for an urgent interview<sup>lxx704</sup>.

Soares' skewed declarations had, nonetheless an effect on *ABC*, which prompted the newspaper to publish an alarmist editorial reacting not only to the Oporto events but mostly to the «civil war» spectrum, supposedly evoked by the Socialist leader:

The alarm is not coming from any media or personality suspected of having any special interest in revenge or alarm, but from a personality with a decisive and selfless trajectory in defence of the democratic cause in his country. (...) It is not just the incipient Lusitanian democracy that is in danger given the events we referred to in this comment. Peace in the all the Continent and maybe even worldwide is also compromised. Portugal is still not a small country...<sup>lxxi705</sup>.




Fig.5

The same idea – that in Portugal democracy is now compromised – is expressed visually by its front cover (fig.5), which depicts a scorned carnation over macadam tiles. The iconic symbol of the freedom brought by the Captains' action is shown destroyed on the street, probably by human action, much like what happened in Oporto with the fencing and invasion of the place where the European Christian democracy was exerting its freedom of assembly.

<sup>704</sup>Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Los comunistas, tras su intransigencia y totalitarismo, intentan ahora "reconstruir la coalición» in *La Vanguardia española*, January 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6

<sup>705</sup> Editorial: «Los sucesos de Oporto».1975. *ABC*, January 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.16

The same idea is expressed a week later in an article written by Antonio Calle constructed by the means of an allegory: «The rule of the rifle over the carnation, of the power machine over thought: the death of revolution – everyone’s hope, or at least of many – and the appearance of a single group, implacable holder of the dogma. (...) It is the new rebirth of the carnation over the rifles, which is now crushing them»<sup>lxxii706</sup>. This is an idea that Fernández Areal, also in *ABC*, sums up in a brief sentence: «(...) it turns out that carnations are no longer of use and violence made its debut out of the hands of the Communist party, as always»<sup>lxxiii707</sup>.

Contrary to this spirit of end of democracy, *La Vanguardia Española* sustains, nonetheless, its moderate rhetoric, denying the claim made that a dictatorship in already established in Portugal and recalling the pending electoral process, from which the political model to be installed in the neighbouring country depends:

(...) If the elections end up not taking place, the former regime will have been replaced by a new dictatorship. If they are held, Portugal – with every kind of difficulty – will enter the path of western democratic legality with an elected Government by the representatives the country elected in a peaceful ballot box confrontation<sup>lxxiv708</sup>.

The moderation of *La Vanguardia Española* and the insistence on the power of the coming electoral process in defining the present situation is sustained by Augusto Assia, who compares the insistence of the «Communist plot» theory with the tale of «Peter and the Wolf»: «It is not impossible that they will end up being right, like whoever was shouting

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<sup>706</sup> Calle, Antonio. 1975. «El Fusil y el Clavel» in *ABC*, February 7<sup>th</sup>

<sup>707</sup> Fernández Areal, Manuel. 1975. «Portugal: una advertência» in *ABC*, February 5<sup>th</sup>

<sup>708</sup> Editorial: «Mirando a Portugal». 1975. *La Vanguardia española*, January 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

about the “wolf” was, but those shouting “Communism” at every turn of events in Portugal, do not have, for the moment, any reason»<sup>lxxv709</sup>.

Similarly, Eduardo Barrenechea and Jordi Borja do not believe democracy has already failed in Portugal and agree that one should wait for further developments before arguing so. In *Informaciones* Barrenechea thus recognises the central role of the Military but argues that this preponderance does not necessarily determine that an authoritarian regime will be installed: «This, in my opinion, will not prevent a democratic game, but a game under surveillance or tutelage: in short a “cryptoperuvianization”»<sup>lxxvi710</sup>. In *Tele/eXprés* Jordi Borja admits that «[d]emocracy in Portugal is having a difficult childbirth and its infancy will have to overcome endless problems»<sup>lxxvii</sup>. But for Borja the solution does not rest, in any way, in reversing the situation, given that «the same waters will bring the same problems»<sup>lxxviii</sup>. Deeming the protesters’ attitude in Oporto as irresponsible, Borja underlines the difference between the latter and what he calls the Western European left wing, which includes both the Socialist and the Communist parties:

But besides that one should not forget that today the left wing in Western Europe, PS as much as PC, do not wish to exist outside of the democratic, constitutional and pluralistic framework. (...) And because the history of their failures but also of certain triumphs that showed them how they are the main victims of all totalitarianisms<sup>lxxix711</sup>.

In this sense, Borja’s rhetoric is quite near that which PCE started to adopt at this point, constantly reiterating the party’s desire of «playing the democratic game».

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<sup>709</sup> Assia, Augusto. 1975. « En Portugal, todo depende de las elecciones» in *La vanguardia española*, January 17<sup>th</sup>, pp.18

<sup>710</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo.1975. «Parece seguro un largo protagonismo político del MFA» in *Informaciones*, January 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.4

<sup>711</sup> Borja, Jordi.1975. «Democracia política y democracia sindical» in *Tele/eXprés*, January 31<sup>st</sup>, pp.7

### c) Spanish reading: the possibility of open criticism

As *La Vanguardia Española* directly puts it: «If the entire western world is watching Portugal, the more reason we have ourselves to watch, from the Iberian peninsula, what is happening in our neighbour country»<sup>lxxx712</sup>. Thus the Spanish newspapers' reaction is scrutinized by several of the commentators, mainly by the fact that, as Jordi Borja explains, «[t]he speed and complexity of the events happening in Portugal since the past April 25<sup>th</sup> allows all points of view to find arguments and data. No Spanish personality or political group is without a point or reason regarding Portugal»<sup>lxxxi713</sup>. Both *Arriba* and *ABC* are good examples of what Borja describes, given, for instance, Ramón Bayot y Serrat comments in *Arriba* regarding on how some media are presenting the single union issue as a plain and simple attack against freedom:

Paradoxically certain media are pleased, these days, in presenting the single union as an attack against freedom, at the same time that, mostly in Europe, many countries are silently rushing to achieve it, from top to bottom, with or without a law enforcing it. And looking at Europe is also a way of looking at what is happening in Europe<sup>lxxxii714</sup>.

The paradigm of freedom to which Portugal is being compared is the one enjoyed by Western Europe. On the other hand, in *ABC*, Manuel Fernández Areal appears to be relieved at the fact that, unlike in previous occasions, Spanish newspapers are not embracing and welcoming what is happening in Portugal: «Fortunately, Spanish newspapers – in general – have not fallen this time in the trap of presenting as democracy what is

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<sup>712</sup> Editorial: «Mirando a Portugal». 1975. *La Vanguardia española*, January 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>713</sup> Borja, Jordi.1975. « Democracia política y democracia sindical» in *Tele/eXprés*, January 31<sup>st</sup>, pp.7

<sup>714</sup> Bayot y Serrat, Ramón.1975. «Portugal y el sindicato único» in *Arriba*, January 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.17

not, but this could serve the purposes of the Communist party»<sup>lxxxiii715</sup>. Fernández Areal then brings back to the memory of the Spanish readers Salvador Allende's government, whose end *ABC* celebrated by supporting Pinochet's coup (Olmos 2002) that ended Chile's Socialist experience.

Therefore Fernández Areal brings together the Chilean and the Portuguese examples, namely Allende's government's elections and the downfall of Marcello Caetano's, as moments of democratic exultation for the Spanish press that were proved to be unmistakably misguided: «Because what we see now – and is a step further for the *marxistization* of a country – is neither democracy, nor respect for people's freedom, nor an honest struggle for finding solutions for the present and the future of a nation going through moments of particular difficulty at all levels»<sup>lxxxiv716</sup>. Fernández Areal is by then pleased with his fellow countrymen's newspapers for their effort in being objective, namely by denouncing the Communist takeover happening in Portugal.

On the contrary, in *La Vanguardia Española*, August Assia seems to be almost in dialogue with not only Fernández Areal, but *ABC* in general, when he dismisses all claims of «signs of communism» visible in Portugal, «[t]he Communism that the distinguished Spanish right wing discover under the bed or on the soup of every Portuguese»<sup>lxxxv</sup>. According to Assia, the Spanish right wing has two weights and two measures regarding Communism, and discussion is possible «[w]hen they talk about Communism in France, Italy, Czechoslovakia or Indochina»<sup>lxxxvi</sup>. However «[w]hen they deal with Portugal, the first thing they do is get involved, as if in a Spanish cape, in a cloud of spectres where any attempt of objectivity leads to a game of witches, where not

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<sup>715</sup> Fernández Areal, Manuel.1975. «Portugal: una advertência» in *ABC*, February 5<sup>th</sup>

<sup>716</sup> Fernández Areal, Manuel.1975. «Portugal: una advertência» in *ABC*, February 5<sup>th</sup>



even a Galician has any change of finding meaning unless if taken by the hand of Lewis Carroll»<sup>lxxxvii717</sup>, evoking, once again, what Roger Fowler (1991) suggested as the «homocentrism» of the press and the mediation, by means of the constructed unity to which both countries belong to, existent in the Spanish reading of the Portuguese events.

One could include in the group mentioned by Assia others voices like Manfredi Cano and Jaume Miravittles, who, respectively in *Arriba* and *Informaciones*, argue that Spaniards should take a look at Portugal to understand a few of things. For instance, Manfredi Cano urges «our own [Spanish] democrats, minor conspirators»<sup>lxxxviii718</sup>, to put themselves in the place of the Portuguese democrats who were sieged in Oporto, since Portugal should serve as lesson for those Spanish democrats who believe in a united front strategy (probably referring the JDE) for enforcing change.

In *Informaciones*, Jaume Miravittles is more pedagogic, in the sense that he tries to show how the Communist strategy evolved over time and how it is working at that moment:

In the meantime, nonetheless, the state of the worldwide public opinion has sifted noticeably and the quelling of the spring of Prague had profound repercussions across the free world and the non-Communist left-wing parties. Faced with that new situation, a new strategy: to go back to «popular unity» in Chile, the «common programme» in France, the «advanced democracy» first and the «historical block» afterwards in Italy. In Portugal, April 25<sup>th</sup> produced one of those historical opportunities that the Communist party expects and helps to develop. The catalytic element of that day was Spínola, who in the historic Portuguese complex of 1974, is what Kerensky was in 1917 Russia<sup>lxxxix</sup>.

In this context, and given the methodical character Miravittles concedes to the Communist strategy, the neutralization of the Socialist

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<sup>717</sup> Assia, Augusto. 1975. «Portugal está viviendo una revolución, pero no comunista» in *La vanguardia española*, February 12<sup>th</sup>, pp.17

<sup>718</sup> Manfredi Cano, Domingo.1975. «Sin los parámetros de Rafael» in *Arriba*, January 30<sup>th</sup>, pp. 2

demonstration of strength by calling a demonstration for the same day (achieving the prohibition of both) is seen as one more step towards hegemony. As Miravittles concludes, the Communists «[w]ill still find other means to weaken Socialism. What is happening in Portugal is a real “lesson” about the Communist methods of action. The only way out for the Portuguese democracy is the impartiality of the Military forces. Here we have the Portuguese lesson»<sup>xc719</sup>.

Fernández Areal argues that there is an actual Portuguese example: «Portugal is an example for us, Spaniards. But an example of what to avoid, that is to say, a warning»<sup>xcii</sup>. Fernández Areal also argues that what the Portuguese example is showing Spain is that the PCE should not be legalized. In this sense, he writes: «Is it necessary to recall once again that the Communist party is much more than just a party? If we find space for the Communist party in our political future, as if it were just another political opinion, forgetting that it is sectarianism destructive of the society and for whom the human being is just one more piece without freedom, we will have fallen in the silliest of naivetés»<sup>xcii720</sup>.

On the other hand, in *Tele/eXprés* Jordi Borja criticizes the approach of broad generalisations used to draw conclusions from the Portuguese example: «Much of has been written about the social conditions that make democracy possible or authoritarianism unavoidable. There is the danger of falling into the narrow lines of argument of the type “that society is not ready for democracy”. As if there was any other way of learning about freedom than by exercising it»<sup>xciii721</sup>. For Borja this means that Portugal should be left in peace without the constant Spanish

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<sup>719</sup> Miravittles, Jaume. 1975.« La lección portuguesa » in *Informaciones*, February 10<sup>th</sup>

<sup>720</sup> Fernández Areal, Manuel.1975. « Portugal: una advertência» in *ABC*, February 5<sup>th</sup>

<sup>721</sup> Borja, Jordi.1975. « Democracia política y democracia sindical» in *Tele/eXprés*, January 31<sup>st</sup>, pp.7

scrutiny over every new development in its political path. Moreover any comparison between Portugal and Spain should not be made, for the realities of both countries are incomparable, as Borja explains: «It is enough to mention the industrial development and the nature of the Armed Forces to make differences evident»<sup>xciv</sup>. Borja also claims there is a Spanish specificity, which he connects with the civil war experience and the shadow that this one still casts on Spain's present and future. Hence Borja argues for clarity in the discussion, which implies to cast aside both the Portuguese example, as well as figures of speech:

The political situation lived in Spain since the civil war has converted us into an opaque universe where ambiguous phantoms are expressed by elliptic formulations. It is high time for each of us to speak clearly if we want to get along. And we should let Portugal in peace with its own problems<sup>xcv 722</sup>.

Given the argument in favour of a future democratic Spain that does not include the Spanish Communist Party formulated from the Portuguese experience, especially by *ABC*, Borja wants to maintain a distance between both situations in order to reframe the question differently. In this sense, it could be inferred that from the point of view of the political culture of *alienation*, the purpose of mediation is to establish distance from what is going on in Portugal, given the way as social conflict is being portrayed by the *regime press* as violence.

The discussion is, hence, being framed by a language of war and two semantic fields in opposition. Given the negative connotation conferred by the violence that opposes pluralism, and the inherent political regime that is assumed to grant it: Western liberal democracy, it is no longer possible to oppose the dominant idea directly, because that would mean to stand with violence and totalitarianism. The antagonism

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<sup>722</sup> Borja, Jordi.1975. « Democracia política y democracia sindical» in *Tele/eXprés*, January 31<sup>st</sup>, pp.7

between pluralism and totalitarianism begins to be established as the hegemonic one.

Given this process the two opposing discourses are no longer as discernible as they had been previously. On the one hand, there is praise in the press for finally being possible to express open negativity towards the Portuguese Process and not disguised one, which is a discourse moreover resonant with the political culture of identification with the francoist regime. On the other hand, given that it is impossible to oppose a discourse framed as a question of pluralism versus totalitarianism, some voices, Jordi Borja for instance, try to reframe the question differently. However this attempt is not successful in granting an alternative frame for opinion to be thought outside of the frame of the antagonism between pluralism and totalitarianism; hence support of the revolutionary legitimacy, now attached by the dominant opinion to a totalitarian project, begins to be silenced.

Moreover there is a shift that results in the broadening of the scope of what is acceptable, from both political cultures. The political culture of identification with the francoist regime will have to incorporate pluralism as a positive value and liberal democracies as no longer an enemy. In the same way that the political culture of alienation from the francoist regime will have to renounce the support of the revolutionary legitimacy. Both operations are made in the name of democracy.

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**Original quotes:**

<sup>i</sup> «La receta de revoluciones a la portuguesa: de los clavelitos, a la noche triste de Oporto. Y lo que vendrá después.»

<sup>ii</sup> «Hace sólo unas semanas que era ya, para los Casandras, un «triunfo decisivo» del comunismo en el país vecino la detención por orden del Gobierno de diez o doce grandes financieros e industriales acusados de haber hecho negocios sucios. Cuando un juez portugués procedió, en el más incompatible acto que, con el comunismo, pueda imaginarse, a poner en libertad a los que el Gobierno había puesto en la cárcel, los Casandras ni mencionaron el hecho.»

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iii «Al lado de este hecho la caída el pasado septiembre del general Spínola queda reducida a un acontecimiento menor, y exigido por la propia dinámica de las radicalizaciones en que ahora se encuentra el poscaetanismo. Es un paso más en el oscurecimiento del horizonte democrático, parlamentario, pluralista, mostrado a los portugueses como promesa que adornaban los claveles rojos en la boca de los fusiles»

iv «Frente a ese panorama inmediato, cualquier otro tema parece carecer de contenido. Lo de Angola se irá arreglando poco a poco. Y el plan económico de emergencia tendrá que recibir otro nombre, puesto que las circunstancias variaron desde el tiempo en que se inició.»

v «¿Habrá o no habrá crisis gubernamental? Quiso saber un colega que ve repartido su interés profesional entre Algarve, donde se realiza la "cumbre " de Angola, y Lisboa, donde la Intersindical, el MDO y el PC, en un hábil juego político, experimentan la resistencia del gobierno, quizás ante la expectativa de que éste pueda caer debido a un "empujón" demasiado fuerte. (...) O el Gobierno aplaza la discusión final de la ley y su consiguiente aprobación para conseguir superar la crisis, o aprueba la ley y hay crisis, o la rechaza y entonces la Intersindical no se quedará quieta.»

vi «Cualquier crónica sobre Portugal debe comenzar hablando una vez más de la escisión que el proyecto de ley de asociaciones sindicales ha producido en el país.»

vii «La pelota está, pues, en el tejado y no hay otro tema en este país más importante ni de mayor trascendencia que el saber en qué va a parar el de la unidad o el de la "unicidad".»

viii «(...) el partido socialista defiende la unidad, pero con la salvedad de que ésta no debe ser conseguida por la ley, sino por la práctica sindical. Con esta postura, el PS se coloca, de facto, también frente a los comunistas.»

ix « los comunistas y sus aliados» of «traicionar a la clase trabajadora, proponiendo soluciones sindicales "que sólo ayudan a la burguesía y a los monopolios".»

x «Me cuesta trabajo creer que llegaran a la mitad de dicha cifra.»

xi «Mañana la joven democracia portuguesa puede ver como se desmorona su hechura provisional, sí, como se dice, los dos partidos no comunistas que forman parte del Gobierno se retiran de éste »

xii «más de doscientos mil los manifestantes»

xiii «cálculos que consideramos fidedignos»

xiv «Desde entonces - en que todo el pueblo se lanzó a la calle- no se había presenciado una manifestación tan numerosa»

xv «Hay incluso quien asegura a estas horas que la de hoy contó con mayor número de personas.»

xvi «Por de pronto la manifestación hoy puso de relieve que los comunistas portugueses, pese a todo andan con pies de plomo porque como dijo no sé quién «tienen más miedo a la soledad que a la PIDE». A lo largo de casi tres horas de manifestación no se oyó ni un solo grito hostil contra los socialistas y sus dirigentes. Álvaro Cunhal y sus muchachos no quieren ensañarse con los vencidos porque nunca se sabe...»

xvii «influirá al Consejo de ministros y al Consejo de Estado...»

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xviii «tuvo su plebiscito mayor a través de la manifestación del pasado día 14 en Lisboa»

xix « La nueva crisis se parece a la anterior en su planteamiento, pero con una variante significativa. El socialista Mario Soares y el comunista Álvaro Cunhal coincidieron en el momento en que se dio el viraje antispínola. Todavía estaban en la luna de miel de los primeros días de la revolución de los claveles rojos, hoy marchitos, como era fácil de prever.»

xx « La vida política y militar portuguesa, indisolublemente unidas, pasan por un momento crítico, lo que no quiere decir que sea de crisis tan importante para el país como los vividos tras la dimisión del primer ministro, Palma Carlos, o de la abortada intentona del 28 de septiembre pero de otro [sic] signo.»

xxi «continúan llegando a los Ministerios de Trabajo e de la Justicia telegramas de protesta (estos en mayor número) y de aplauso a la nueva ley»

xxii «manifestación multitudinaria a la que ya me referí en su día. »

xxiii «Ante esta división de opiniones, el MFA se decidió por la unidad sindical. Una pregunta surge: ¿Por qué el MFA apoya al sindicato unitario? Y dos respuestas posibles surgen: para evitar que la crisis política degenera o porque - aunque algunos se empeñen en lo contrario - el PC tiene una respetable influencia en el seno del MFA. El tiempo lo dirá...»

xxiv «Un triunfo, añadiríamos nosotros, con plazo limitado, ya que, según declaró el Ministro de Trabajo, capitán Costa Martins, la Ley tiene una validez de un año»

xxv «Las aprensiones del general Spínola aparecen más que justificadas: lo pre democrático acaba de bascular hacia lo antidemocrático»

xxvi «las fuerzas democráticas lusitanas representadas hasta ahora en el poder»

xxvii «Decimos «guerra política» y creemos decir bien, porque no es otra cosa la lógica disputa de las fuerzas democráticas con un partido que solo se proclama democrático cuando no está en el Poder, pero que de inmediato muestra su índole totalitaria cuando ha accedido a él. Tal es el caso de la -momentáneamente - zanjada disputa sobre los sindicatos lusitanos.»

xxviii « Las posibilidades de libertad política han experimentado desde la primavera un giro sobre si mismas: de ser negadas por las formulaciones corporativistas que exportaba la Roma preconiliar, pasan a ser diametralmente objetadas por las ecuaciones totalitarias que irradia Moscú.»

xxix «Las cosas son, sin embargo más complicadas. El proyecto de ley sindical, apoyado por la gran mayoría de los sindicatos que componen la Intersindical portuguesa tras una paciente campaña comunista de persuasión, fue solo un pretexto para que salieron a la luz la graves divergencias que separaban a socialistas y comunistas.»

xxx «La futura ley Sindical ha servido de despertador de la variedad política que es normal y beneficioso que exista en toda sociedad que, "per se" es natural que sea - valga la redundancia - plural. Lo que está en juego no es la ley Sindical, sino el respecto a las opiniones de todos. Este es el tema.»

xxxi «En el fondo, la famosa ley Sindical no es más que un pretexto para llegar al punto crucial de la gran pugna entre bastidores que se viene desarrollando casi desde el principio del nuevo régimen portugués.»

xxxii «La reciente manifestación en favor de la "unidad sindical" en Portugal es, más que una demostración o un deseo de hacer converger hacia un objetivo

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común los diferentes partidos que integran la izquierda de aquel país, un aspecto más, el más rotundo quizá hasta ahora, de la ofensiva comunista contra el partido socialista presidido por el señor Soares.»

<sup>xxxiii</sup> «No les importa en absoluto la "unicidad" sindical, sino ejercer, a través de ella, el control de los Sindicatos y asegurarse las posiciones más favorables para las elecciones a la Asamblea Constituyente, que se celebrarán, en principio, en marzo y verosímelmente retrasadas hasta abril.»

<sup>xxxiv</sup> «Razón para la galería: la existencia de pequeños sindicatos correspondientes a diversos partidos no haría más que dividir a las masas trabajadoras y al perder su unidad perderían también su fuerza. Razón verdadera: la unicidad sindical daría al partido comunista una gran fuerza a través de la influencia citada.»

<sup>xxxv</sup> «El proyecto de Sindicatos únicos impuestos por ley, [es] una manera de esconder la directriz de un partido único»

<sup>xxxvi</sup> «La presencia de socialistas y socialdemócratas en el Gobierno, la existencia de un grupo importante de militares dispuestos a que la democratización en marcha no se pare, la situación geográfica de Portugal y su adscripción al bloque occidental y, en fin, la proximidad de una prueba electoral sobre la que en estos momentos se concentra la atención de los portugueses y del mundo entero»

<sup>xxxvii</sup> «Excepto como instrumento para hacer la revolución, los sindicatos únicos lo más probable es que le sirvieran de poco a un Partido Comunista en la oposición (...) Sólo en el caso de un golpe de Estado que les conduzca al poder por la fuerza y relegue las elecciones al limbo le ofrece el sindicato único a los comunistas un instrumento capaz de ayudarles a destruir la libertad»

<sup>xxxviii</sup> «Igual que ocurre en Rusia o en las "democracias populares" y ocurría en la Italia fascista o en la Alemania nazi. Aquí mismo en España los "sindicatos únicos" fueron, antes de la guerra civil, parte del programa anarquista. Nada es tan nuevo como parece, cuando se ha olvidado la historia.»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «La historia demuestra que la unidad es positiva para la clase trabajadora.»

<sup>xl</sup> «Con el pluralismo - invención reaccionaria, extrasindical, con apariencias de libertad - lo que se pretende es ni más ni menos que manejar a los trabajadores presentando la unidad sindical como una invención del Partido Comunista, por el simple hecho de que éste la apoya.»

<sup>xli</sup> «Los problemas derivados del atraso económico y la desorganización de la clase obrera, [el PCP] irritado por la voluntad socialista de ganarse un puesto ahora, a las maduras, cuando no estuvieron a las verdes, ha optado por el camino más fácil de ir por arriba y por decreto»

<sup>xlii</sup> «Escoger ahora la vía de la imposición para resolverlo puede conducir a la división primero, a la pasividad luego y por último la derrota en manos de una derecha renacida o una combinación de socialismo militarista y stalinista»

<sup>xliii</sup> «El problema en Portugal no debería ser el conflicto entre el PC y el PS sino encontrar los medios para asegurar la participación democrática y pluralista de un pueblo con muchos sufrimientos sobre sus espaldas y poca educación política.»

<sup>xliv</sup> «"a priori" como otra piedra de toque para saber cómo se va dirigiendo en este país el respecto al juego democrático. La semana que hoy se inicia se presenta, pues, con dos grandes temas de clarificación de posturas políticas.»

<sup>xlv</sup> «graves acontecimientos que suponen un nuevo golpe para la instauración de una democracia auténtica en este país.»

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<sup>xlvi</sup> «La policía no pudo o no quiso reprimir aquellos excesos. (...) Es fácil calcular hasta qué punto este incidente, injustificable y torpe, desacredita a sus promotores y lanza serias dudas sobre la eficacia de quienes, por deber, debían haberlo previsto e impedido. La Policía.»

<sup>xlvii</sup> «mientras el Partido Socialista condena el incidente de Oporto, sus juventudes lo protagonizan, aliándose a la ultraizquierda.»

<sup>xlviii</sup> «En este contexto, el país se encamina hacia unas elecciones precedidas de una campaña electoral en la que los sectores del centro y de derecha democráticas van a verse sujetos, cuando menos, a la intimidación, la amenaza y el riesgo físico.»

<sup>xliv</sup> «El que unos grupos minoritarios y poco responsables manifiestan su oposición al Congreso de fuerzas conservadoras, congreso por otra parte autorizado, no parece que ponga en peligro las reglas del juego democrático.»

<sup>i</sup> «La duplicidad de recursos pretendida por el PC portugués - parlamentarios y extraparlamentarios - es, para la democracia del vecino país, peligro mucho más real y cierto que el atribuido a la derecha.»

<sup>li</sup> «Pero resulta que la violencia ha hecho ya su aparición. Y tanto el clima crispado, a que me refería, como la proximidad de unas elecciones, pueden llegar a ser un excelente caldo de cultivo para la escalada de esa violencia»

<sup>lii</sup> «Lo de Portugal era de esperar (...) El comunismo es una filosofía en la que no cabe el respecto a la iniciativa privada, ni a las convicciones religiosas de nadie, ni al pluralismo político, aunque se juegue tácticamente, cuando convenga, a la democracia hasta alcanzar el poder (véase el caso Allende o contémplese el bochornoso espectáculo de totalitarismo y falta de civismo del comunismo portugués).»

<sup>liii</sup> «Sin embargo, parecen ir cumpliéndose mis pronósticos sobre los hitos de la crisis portuguesa. Anuncié que hacia el día 26 esa crisis se perfilará, aunque no materializará hasta un mes después. Veamos si los corresponsales de "YA" y "ABC" confirman mi vaticinio.»

<sup>liv</sup> «Es que «eso» ha sucedido siempre así, sin fallar una nota como orquesta fidelísima, desde hace casi un siglo y, sobre todo, desde la mitad de este siglo. El mismo sistema, el mismo procedimiento, los mismos «slogans», las mismas promesas, las mismas alegrías de las primeras horas, y las mismas decepciones y amarguras de las horas postreras.»

<sup>lv</sup> «¿Cómo se llamaría a esto? Tiene un nombre: soviets»

<sup>lvilvi</sup> «ambiente de un nuevo "golpe de Praga"»

<sup>lvii</sup> «Pero, ¿Por qué asombrase? (...) En los días en que saludaban alborozadamente la "revolución de los claveles"... que ya eran rojos. Había que ser muy ingenuo para no prever en qué acabaría aquel folklore. (...) ¿Hacía falta llegar hasta esta noche dramática de Oporto para descubrir el precipicio? Spínola había ya llegado con retraso al declarar que Portugal iba hacia el caos y la anarquía.»

<sup>lviii</sup> «y claro está que, por no parecer ultra, derechista, cavernícola, retrogrado y otras lindezas que los comunistas suelen achacar a quienes no permitan su juego, nadie o casi nadie se atrevía hasta ahora a exteriorizar públicamente en España el vaticinio.»

<sup>lix</sup> «Esta progresiva divergencia que es ya antagonismo puro y simple, coincide con los planes del Partido Comunista portugués. No en vano este avivó las



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diferencias sacando el proyecto de Ley sindical - Piedra de Toque de la crisis - cuando le convino.»

<sup>lx</sup> « Como el 1 de mayo, como el 28 de septiembre, como el 14 de enero, como siempre que ha usado su vieja táctica, su impasible estrategia, su eficaz actividad.»

<sup>lxi</sup> «Con su maniobra de manifestarse en el mismo sitio, el mismo día y a la misma hora, los comunistas obtuvieron la anulación de la proyectada manifestación de sus rivales.»

<sup>lxii</sup> «Es un lenguaje de guerra que deja presentir días no muy floridos de claveles, precisamente. (...) ¿ Recuerdan aquello de "O povo unido"?.»

<sup>lxiii</sup> « Nadie hubiera creído posible, hace apenas dos semanas, que el Partido Comunista portugués fuese acusado de "social-facista", su secretario general de "pequeño dictador" y la intersindical de totalitaria, por los militantes de otro partido que, hombro con hombro, comparte las responsabilidades del poder con él. [PPD]»

<sup>lxiv</sup> «Nadie se había atrevido hasta ahora, repito, a recordar hechos tan significativos, aunque todo el mundo los conociera en Portugal.»

<sup>lxv</sup> «por segunda vez en menos de dos semanas, el partido que dirige Mario Soares ha visto cómo los comunistas lograban desbaratar sus planes y boicotear sus iniciativas.»

<sup>lxvi</sup> The expressions were translated from:«caminos errados que puedan lleva[sic] a soluciones desastrosas»; «sindicatos únicos im puestos»; una muy posible hegemonía del control por parte del Partido Comunista a través de direcciones sindicales o de la Intersindical»; «socialismo en libertad»; «libertad democrático»; «libertad de cada trabajador en su Sindicato y fuera de él»; «Los sectores políticos que quieren participar verdaderamente en la construcción del futuro democrático portugués»; «una campaña - una más - de "terror controlado"»; «[PCP no longer wants to play the part] del partido dialogante y "posconciliar" dispuesto a integrarse en el seno de una coalición democrática»; «sindicato obediente y disciplinado»; «sindicación única obligatoria y vertical»; «pluralismo»; «sindicatos libres y plurales»; «socialismo liberal y democrático a la europea»; «vía moderada a la europea»; «socialistas liberales, pluralistas y democráticos»; pluralismo sindical, entendido como libertad a la europea»; «fuerzas democráticas»; «inclinaciones totalitarias hacia la izquierda»; «índole totalitaria»; «ecuaciones totalitarias que irradia Moscú»; «vitoria»; «hábil juego político»; «hostilidades»; «"Guerra fría"»; «asalto»; «ofensiva comunista»; «pugna de bastidores»; «ambiente de "nuevo golpe de Praga"»; «hacerse la guerra»; «batalla»; «guerra política»; «paloma de la paz»; «antagonismo puro y simple»; «recluta callejera»; «confrontación»; «fuerza callejera del dispositivo antagonico»;«[the demonstration was] neutralizada»

<sup>lxvii</sup> « mucha gente - de izquierda también - vio en esa manifestación una amenaza real y palpable para algo más profundo que la Ley Sindical: una amenaza contra el establecimiento de una democracia pluralista en Portugal.»

<sup>lxviii</sup> «simple "correa de transmisión" entre el poder político y los trabajadores»

<sup>lxix</sup> «Es decir, en el Congo africano, negro, tribal y fetichista, la consigna al día es la "unicidad", la unidad orgánica de todas las instituciones y el predominio total

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del Estado sobre una "sociedad" que no ha llegado todavía a la madurez y que tardará muchos años en lograrla.»

<sup>lxx</sup> «(...) ciertas agencias internacionales prefirieron simplificar las palabras del dirigente portugués o traducirlas mal al inglés, de modo que se diera una impresión alarmista y dramática. Quise saber con exactitud hasta dónde llegaban, en la intención, las declaraciones de Soares (textualmente las había escuchado, igual que mis compañeros de oficio) y le pedí audiencia urgente.»

<sup>lxxi</sup> «La alarma no procede, pues, de ningún medio ni personalidad sospechosos de interés en la revancha o el alarmismo, sino de personalidad con definida y abnegada trayectoria en defensa de la causa democrática en su país. (...) No es sólo, por tanto, la incipiente democracia lusitana aquello que peligra por causa de los acontecimientos a que nos hemos referido en este comentario. Comprometida está también la paz de todo un Continente y, acaso, la del mundo todo. Portugal sigue no siendo todavía un país pequeño...»

<sup>lxxii</sup> «El predominio del fusil sobre el clavel, de la máquina del poder sobre la idea: la muerte de la revolución - esperanza de todos o muchos - y la aparición de un solo grupo, detentor implacable del dogma. (...) Es el nuevo renacer de los claveles sobre los fusiles, que ahora les aplastan.»

<sup>lxxiii</sup> « (...) resulta que los claveles ya no sirven y que la violencia ha hecho aparición de la mano del partido comunista, como de costumbre.»

<sup>lxxiv</sup> «(...) Si las elecciones no llegan a celebrarse, el antiguo régimen habrá quedado sustituido por una nueva dictadura. Si se celebran, Portugal - con todas las dificultades que se quiera- entrará en la vía de la legalidad democrática al modo occidental con Gobierno elegido por los representantes de que el país se dé en la pacífica confrontación de las urnas.»

<sup>lxxv</sup> «No es imposible que acaben teniéndola, como acabó teniéndola el que divertido gritaba "lobo", pero los que a cada vuelta de los acontecimientos en Portugal exclaman "comunismo" tienen, de momento, poca razón»

<sup>lxxvi</sup> «Esto, a mi juicio, no impedirá un juego democrático, pero un juego vigilado o tutelado: en resumen, una "criptoperuanización"»

<sup>lxxvii</sup> «La democracia en Portugal está teniendo un parto difícil y su infancia deberá superar un sin fin de problemas.»

<sup>lxxviii</sup> «Las mismas aguas traerían los mismos barros»

<sup>lxxix</sup> «Pero además no hay que olvidar que hoy las izquierdas en Europa Occidental, tanto los PS como los PC, no quieren ponerse fuera del marco democrático, constitucional y pluralista. (...) Y porque, la historia de sus fracasos y también de ciertos triunfos les ha demostrado que son ellos finalmente las principales víctimas de todos los autoritarismos.»

<sup>lxxx</sup> «Si el mundo occidental entero está mirando a Portugal, con mucha más razón tenemos que estar viendo nosotros, desde la común península ibérica, lo que sucede en el vecino país.»

<sup>lxxxi</sup> «La rapidez y complejidad de los acontecimientos que se producen en Portugal desde el pasado 25 de abril permite encontrar argumentos y datos para todos los gustos. No hay personalidad o corriente política española que no tenga su casita o sus razones, en Portugal.»

<sup>lxxxii</sup> «Paradójicamente, determinados medios informativos se complacen estos días en presentar la unidad sindical como una atentado a la libertad, al tiempo que son muchos, sobre todo en Europa, los países que silenciosamente se afanan hoy

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por conquistarla, desde arriba o desde abajo, con ley o sin ella. Y mirar hacia Europa consiste, también, en saber lo que realmente para en Europa»

<sup>lxxxiii</sup> «Felizmente, los diarios españoles - en general - no han caído esta vez en la trampa de presentar como democracia lo que no lo es, pero puede servir a los fines del partido comunista.»

<sup>lxxxiv</sup> «Porque eso que vemos ahora - y es un grado en el proceso hacia la marxistización de un país - no es ni democracia, ni respeto a la libertad de nadie, ni sincera lucha por encontrar soluciones para el presente y el futuro de una nación que atraviesa momentos de especial dificultad en todos los órdenes.»

<sup>lxxxv</sup> «El comunismo que las ínclitas derechas españolas descubren debajo de la cama de cada portugués o ven en la sopa de todos los portugueses»

<sup>lxxxvi</sup> «Cuando hablan del comunismo en Francia, en Italia, en Checoslovaquia o en Indochina »

<sup>lxxxvii</sup> « En cuanto se acercan a Portugal, lo primero que hacen es envolverse, como en una capa española, en una nube de fantasmas con los que cualquier intento de establecer cuentas resulta un juego de brujas, donde ni siquiera un gallego tiene la menor posibilidad de encontrar sentido alguno a no ser que se encomiende a la mano de Lewis Carroll»

<sup>lxxxviii</sup> « los demócratas nuestros, conspiradores de poca monta»

<sup>lxxxix</sup> « En el entretanto, sin embargo, el estado de la opinión pública mundial había cambiado sensiblemente y la liquidación de la Primavera de Praga tuvo hondas repercusiones en todo el mundo libre y en los partidos izquierdistas no comunistas. Frente a aquella nueva situación, una nueva estrategia: se volvía a la "unidad popular" en Chile, al "programa común" en Francia, a la "democracia avanzada" primero y al "bloque histórico" después en Italia. En Portugal se produjo el 25 de abril una de aquellas aperturas históricas que el partido comunista espera y ayuda a madurar. El elemento catalizador de aquella jornada fue Spínola, que es, en el complejo histórico portugués de 1974, lo que fue Kerensky en la Rusia de 1917.»

<sup>xc</sup> «Encontrarán otros medios todavía para debilitar el socialismo. Lo que ocurre en Portugal es una verdadera "lección de cosas" sobre los métodos de acción comunistas. La única salvación para la democracia portuguesa es la ecuanimidad de las fuerzas militares. He aquí la lección portuguesa.»

<sup>xcii</sup> « Portugal es un ejemplo para nosotros, los españoles. Pero un ejemplo a evitar, es decir, una advertencia»

<sup>xciii</sup> « ¿Habrà que recordar otra vez que el partido comunista es mucho más que un partido? Si hacemos un sitio en nuestro futuro político al partido comunista, como si fuera una opinión política más, olvidando que es un sectarismo destructor de la sociedad para el que la persona humana es sólo una pieza sin libertad, habremos caído en la más tonta de las ingenuidades. »

<sup>xciv</sup> «Mucho se ha escrito sobre las condiciones sociales que hacen posible la democracia o inevitable el autoritarismo. Hay el peligro de caer entonces en las estrechas argumentaciones del tipo de que "tal sociedad no está madura para la democracia". Como si hubiera otro modo de aprender la libertad que no sea su ejercicio.»

<sup>xcv</sup> «basta citar el desarrollo industrial y el carácter de las Fuerzas Armadas, para evidenciar las diferencias»

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<sup>xcv</sup>« La situación política que en España ha vivido desde la guerra civil nos ha convertido en un universo opaco en el cual fantasmas equívocos se expresan con fórmulas elípticas. Ya va siendo hora que cada cual hable claro si queremos entendernos. Y dejemos Portugal en paz, con sus problemas.»

## **6. The expected March 11<sup>th</sup>: the Spanish press as an «enemy» of the revolutionary process**

In less than a year, the distinguished military has starred a revolution and a counterrevolution, has been the human symbol of a country «that was awakening» and the factious leader of another on the verge of sinking; a superstar military and a demoted one, a President and an exiled. And all in less than a year. From the considerable distance that the disciplined Spanish soldiers have imposed between the aerial base of Talavera la Real and the generous amount of thirty journalists waiting for news about the Portuguese politician, Spínola is all that: too many characters merged into one<sup>i 723</sup>.

In Portugal the atmosphere remained in a continuous state of tension. Not only rumours of a pending coup were omnipresent, but also, just before March 11<sup>th</sup>, street violence stroke again, this time in Setúbal and involving foreign journalists, calling this way the Spanish attention back to Portugal.

In Setúbal, leftists demonstrated against a PPD congress and the occasion ended in violence, with several foreign journalists injured (see Part II). In *ABC* and *Arriba* both José Salas and José Reis agree that a rise of violence was to be expected with the approaching of elections, that this violence is perpetrated by extremists – to which José Salas adds that it was an attack of «extremism against moderation»<sup>724</sup>, and that this violence will probably be repeated. José Reis even believes that violence might be extended to Socialist's gatherings, up until now untouched by the actions of «parties considered extremists»:

Unfortunately (we have to be realistic), we believe that the events in Setúbal might be repeated over the victims of former boycotts (PDC and CDS) and PPD, and maybe even be «premiered» with PS. This would not surprise us, since we know that there are some who are open to that possibility<sup>ii725</sup>.

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<sup>723</sup> Figuero, Javier.1975. «Muro de Silencio en torno a Spínola» in *Arriba*, March 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.11

<sup>724</sup> Salas, José.1975. «Escalada de la violencia ante la ausencia de la autoridad» in *ABC*, March 11<sup>th</sup>, pp.32

<sup>725</sup> Reis, José. 1975. «Expectación e inseguridad en Portugal» in *Arriba*, March 11<sup>th</sup>, pp.13

In *Arriba*, José Reis focuses his attention on how the Socialist party was handling the coming election and emphasises the inadequacy of Mário Soares' interpretation of the same process when the latter claimed that the Socialist Party would abandon the provisional Government if the electoral process did not lead to a Socialist victory:

We find Soares' attitude a little exaggerated, compromising his word, given that the vote is destined to choose an Assembly, which will live, as planned, for two or three months, the months necessary to study and approve the new Constitution and that will not affect the normal life of the Government<sup>iii</sup>.

While Reis unveils PS' strategy regarding the elections, Salas does the same for the PCP. According to *ABC*'s correspondent, the escalation of violence would mainly benefit the Communist Party, along with the perpetrators of the violence outbursts, since an atmosphere of violence might lead to the calling off or postponement of elections: «And given that this suspension or a possible postponing is only convenient for the Communist Party, its position of beneficiary is clear»<sup>iv726</sup>. Adding up to this atmosphere of violence were the constant rumours spread regarding a possible upheaval of General Spínola's loyal troops.

#### a) The expected feature of the coup: the rumours of imminent insurgence

These rumours of rebellion against the III Provisional Government focused in particular in Tancos and Santarém's barracks and were firstly collected by Alberto Miguez in *La Vanguardia Española*. This fact will make him particularly visible before both the Portuguese criticism and the international reaction. Miguez underlines that «I should collect both on a provisional level and with all due reserve»<sup>v</sup>, but also concludes that

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<sup>726</sup> Salas, José.1975. «Escalada de la violencia ante la ausencia de la autoridad» in *ABC*, March 11<sup>th</sup>, pp.32

regardless of the reliability and truthfulness of the rumours, at least «something weird is happening. The secretiveness of some sources and the ignorance of others are very suspicious»<sup>vi727</sup>. The importance of the rumour lies in the possibility of reality, rather than on its accuracy. The Portuguese reaction is immediate, and Alberto Miguez is accused of being «an instrument of the “international reaction”»<sup>vii728</sup>. However the same day, in *Arriba*, Fernando Jáuregui returns to them in order to characterize the state of unrest lived in Portugal:

We would add to all these facts the uncontrolled circulation of rumours – almost always fake, it must be stated from the outset – about attempts of military insurrection. The latest rumours addressed Tancos and Santarém, where «spinolista» troops were to have tried some military action. This rumour, which was exploited yesterday in a sensationalistic fashion by some foreign press, has not yet been confirmed<sup>viii729</sup>.



Fig.6

This unrest and the proliferation of rumours involving General Spínola brought the Spanish attention back to Portugal. Consequently, even before the failed counter-revolutionary coup of March 11<sup>th</sup> happened, *Arriba* devoted a front cover (fig.6) to the palpable political tension felt in Portugal, conferring the coup its expected feature. In the same edition of this newspaper, from March 9<sup>th</sup>, Fernando Jáuregui uses the portmanteau word «Spinochet», also used later by other special correspondent

<sup>727</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1975. «Lisboa: Rumores de un levantamiento militar "Spinolista"» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 8<sup>th</sup>, pp. 5

<sup>728</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1975. «Lisboa: Un muerto y 14 heridos, balance de los graves incidentes de Setubal» in *La Vanguardia Española*, March 9<sup>th</sup>, pp. 5

<sup>729</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1975. «Algo hierve en Portugal» in *Arriba*, March 9<sup>th</sup>

covering General Spínola's escape through Spain for *Arriba*. By the use of this word, which Jáuregui identifies as slang used by the Portuguese Leftists<sup>730</sup>, Spínola is expected to represent in Portugal the part General Pinochet had in Chile. Like Pinochet did on 11 September 1973 against Salvador Allende's democratically elected socialist government, Spínola is expected to, sooner or later, stage a counter-coup that will put an end to Communist advances in Portugal and return the political and economic leading role to the former political and economic elites.

Thus when on March 11<sup>th</sup> the coup originates in Tancos' barracks, there is very little surprise. As Alberto Miguez ironically comments:

Three days ago, this chronicler explained what was happening in detail. He gave names and surnames of those who were conspiring, explained why part of the Army, of spinolista tendency, was in a state of «potential rebellion». And wrote that «something odd was happening». (...) My forecasts were rejected, even violently, by responsible characters. (...) Reactionary or not, the rumours that I was collecting (and just me, let it be clear) ended up converting into a sad reality<sup>ix 731</sup>.

What actually surprises the Spanish press, and the Western press in general, is that a coup led by such a prestigious Army officer as General Spínola could have been so poorly planned. This surprise leads to suspicion, which Albert Miguez, Fernando Jáuregui and José Salas, more or less, explicitly address.

Fernando Jáuregui, maintaining the Pinochet comparison, dismisses the official explanation: the hastened coup was a reaction to General Spínola's discovery of a list of people to be executed by the revolutionary forces, in an operation supposedly titled «Easter Slaughter». From Jáuregui's point of view, among several unlikely hypotheses was also «the statement given by Mr. Spínola, who said he embarked on his

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<sup>730</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando. 1975. «Algo hierve en Portugal» in *Arriba*, March 9<sup>th</sup>

<sup>731</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Aviones de las Fuerzas Armadas portuguesas bombardearon el cuartel de la encarnación, cercano al aeropuerto de la Portela, en la mañana de ayer» in *La Vanguardia Española*, March 12<sup>th</sup>, pp. 5



rash action when learning that he was at the top of a list of 1500 people, which a certain political organization planned to kill. “Easter Slaughter” would be the name of the operation exposed by Spínola. At one point Pinochet had a similar excuse»<sup>x732</sup>.

In *ABC*, José Salas insists greatly on the idea that «a violent rebellion capable of putting the country on the verge of a civil war is unthinkable when an election that might be won is so near»<sup>xi733</sup>. *ABC*'s correspondent considers that the only reason to lead a coup on the eve of an electoral process is by fear of its results, and according to him «neither the right wing, nor the moderate centre, or the Communist left wing had reasons for fearing anything similar»<sup>xii734</sup>. Salas grounds his claim in the fact that «[a]ll the polls give the moderate parties great chances»<sup>xiii</sup>, and given that he considers General Spínola and the other protagonists of the failed coup as moderate military, the entire situation seems uncanny. For this reason, Salas concludes that « (...) this coup attempt must be considered the most ludicrous adventure ever to have been conceived. (...) a French colleague has referred to it by saying that the Portuguese right wing may be the most foolish in the world or there may be a conspiracy behind it»<sup>xiv735</sup>. Without expressing it fully Salas hints at the possibility that the coup may have been a manoeuvre the military fell into, given the absurdity of its planning, timing and overall development, features that he emphasises continuously.

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<sup>732</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1975.«Nuevo giro a la Izquierda» in *Arriba*, March 16<sup>th</sup>, pp.13

<sup>733</sup> Salas, José.1975.«Portugal camina hacia una república popular» in *ABC*, March 16<sup>th</sup>, pp.23-24

<sup>734</sup> Salas, José.1975.«Probable depuración en el ejército portugués» in *ABC*, March 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.21and 28

<sup>735</sup> Salas, José.1975.«El consejo de la revolución portuguesa nacionaliza la banca» in *ABC*, March 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.35

It is Alberto Miguez in *La Vanguardia Española*, who spells out several of the explanatory theories of this otherwise unexplainable military manoeuvre. According to Miguez:

In most cases the mass media do not hide their perplexity. How is it possible, they wonder, that a coup had might have been so badly planned and carried out when it is being performed by such prestigious characters of the Portuguese Army? And hopefully this coup attempt<sup>736</sup> will not be qualified as an «invented coup» by someone trying to be funny (like on 28 September 1974)<sup>xv737</sup>.

Like the last time General Spínola had tried to gain leverage, on 28 September 1974 the international press was not entirely convinced by the explanations given for the stopping of the «silent majority» demonstration. This time, like in the past, «[m]uch of the mass media are accusing the Communist party of having invented, or at least, of having provoked the attempt of past Tuesday»<sup>xvi738</sup>. From Miguez's point of view, supporters of such theory are in general «people hostile towards the Portuguese regime»<sup>xvii739</sup> who believe that all was a plot «to exterminate all right-wing parties»<sup>xviii</sup>. Unlike Salas, who leaves the suspicion in the air, Miguez dismisses the Communist plot theories by exposing their origins and aims.

Later on, Jaume Miravittles in *Tele/eXprés* expressed surprise at this event, since in his view General Spínola was not only «a very

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<sup>736</sup> The words are «intentona» for attempted coup and «inventona» for invented coup.

<sup>737</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Se crea un "consejo de la revolución" con funciones ejecutivas y legislativas, como supremo organismo decisorio» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6

<sup>738</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Continúa sin desentrañarse la exacta dimensión de la conjura portuguesa» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

<sup>739</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Muchas son las incognitas sobre el fallido golpe de Estado» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6

intelligent man, with an excellent historical and military training»<sup>xix740</sup>, but he was also a military that had several historical examples that could have guided him in avoiding this outcome. From French General De Gaulle, Spínola could have taken a lesson of how a decolonization process involves a structural change of the State; from Spanish General Prim the importance of having «a liberal, bold and expedite bourgeoisie, able to emancipate the colonies and start the process of industrialization in their own country »<sup>xx</sup>; and, finally, from both Russian Kerensky and Czech Benes' experiences, Spínola should have been aware of the Communist threat and should have handled it at the right moment, which he failed to do:

(...) on September 28<sup>th</sup> it was too early and there had been not enough time to gather around him a coherent popular mass and faithful to the politic principles of April 25<sup>th</sup>. Finally, in an attempt called unanimously infantile and rushed, Spínola fell into a trap and dragged with him the people of Portugal, whose future looks darker and more doubtful each day»<sup>xxi741</sup>.

Miravittles is thus also a supporter of the Communist plot theory regarding the failed coup of March 11<sup>th</sup> that precipitated General Spínola's exile. Manuel Aznar in *La Vanguardia Española* and Jesús Suevos in *Arriba*, in turn, accuse General Spínola of, at least, being naïve. Without dismissing the Communist plot theory, they both accept that this is the way Communists act, as Manuel Aznar explains: «The Communists are already singing their song. It is only natural and there is no need to feel deceived. It is their game»<sup>xxii742</sup>. As for Suevos, rather than the Communist party, it is the Army – in other words the MFA – who is responsible for the advance of the revolutionary process. According to *Arriba's*

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<sup>740</sup> Miravittles, Jaume.1975.« Spínola- De Gaulle-Prim» in *Tele/eXprés*, March 19<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>741</sup> Miravittles, Jaume.1975.« Spínola- De Gaulle-Prim» in *Tele/eXprés*, March 19<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>742</sup> Aznar, Manuel. 1975.« ¿Para quién hiciste la revolución, hermano?» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 16<sup>th</sup>, pp.21

chronicler, when the Carnation revolution burst in April 1974, it was clear that it was a Communist plot to takeover Portugal. But the general international praise that included even the most reactionary Spanish press and persuaded everyone that it was a liberal revolution what was indeed at stake:

(...) it is not surprising that even the most naïve thought that the Lusitanian adventure was one of those «progressive» tricks to which Marxism brings the noise and capitalism the nuts, but that in the end gives to the plutocratic Caesars not only what belongs to Caesar, but what belongs to God and his people<sup>xxiii</sup><sup>743</sup>.

What the repercussions of the failed March 11<sup>th</sup> coup brought to this scenario was the open belief that a true revolutionary spirit is indeed guiding the Military's actions, not just «the liberal gibberish», but a concrete desire of changing the economic structure of the Portuguese society:

But now we see that behind the old-fashioned and ridiculous appearances, there was in the Portuguese coup something more dangerous, if you will, but much more important: an authentic revolutionary intention. Spínola and his crew of mummies were quickly removed and, from that moment on, any remotely wise observer was able to realize that the events happening there would not be well regarded by the European and American «free press». And not because of the Communist party, which as usual, compensates its scarce number with a formidable organization and discipline, but by realizing that the Armed Forces surviving the «purges» would not satisfied by the demoliberal guitars and cabinet revolutionaries, they were willing to push for a real revolution<sup>xxiv</sup>.

In this sense, Suevos' interpretation of the failed coup is unique, since he is the only one that sees that from now on the Portuguese revolutionary process will have as enemies its former allies, the national and especially the international ones, which are synonymous, from his point of view, of the interests of capital:

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<sup>743</sup> Suevos, Jesus.1975.« Ahora sí» in *Arriba*, March 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.3

Because now is not just the fatherland, or the national traditions, or the public peace what is at danger, but also the Banks, the business that surpass the borders and the oligarchies that always dominated the backstage and contributed to the «carnation revolution» precisely to maintain the domination. But this time they shot themselves on the foot. And true is that they did not deserve otherwise.<sup>xxv</sup>

Neither Manuel Aznar nor Jesús Suevos are exactly fond of the Portuguese General, as Spínola represents one of the mistakes that the revolutionary process keeps accumulating, which led to the current chaos. For the latter, the General, and for that matter also Mário Soares, were important for the public praise of the coup, at the international level, due to his conservative credentials, or in Soares' case, his oppositionist but moderate ones. Aznar considers the General's timing and sense of political opportunity to be, to say the least, flawed.

Although calm<sup>744</sup> was restored very quickly after the failed counter-coup, the atmosphere was tense<sup>745</sup> and dominated by rumours<sup>746</sup>, as Alberto Miguez, Eduardo Barrenechea, Fernando Jáuregui and José Salas testify. The Chilean factor is again evoked in *Arriba* by Jáuregui, rooting people's fear in the resemblance of the current Portuguese situation with the Chilean one: «(...) and the presence in everyone's spirit of the regrettable end of the great Chilean experience, has its weight in the heart of the Portuguese. The latter see how their present situation has some resemblances to the one that lead to Pinochet's dictatorship»<sup>xxvi747</sup>.

The new power-balance situation implied a new provisional Government to be appointed on March 26<sup>th</sup>, but also the

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<sup>744</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Se crea un "consejo de la revolución" con funciones ejecutivas y legislativas, como supremo organismo decisorio» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6

<sup>745</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Se esperan más nacionalizaciones» in *Informaciones*, March 17<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>746</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1975.«Nacionalización de la Banca. Hasta la derecha lo aplaude» in *Arriba*, March 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>747</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1975.«Nacionalización de la Banca. Hasta la derecha lo aplaude» in *Arriba*, March 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

institutionalization of the MFA through the creation of the Revolution council<sup>748</sup>, replacing the State Council, and the MFA's Assembly in order to replace the 200 Assembly, by incorporating low-rank officers as well. The JSN, the State Council and the 20 Assembly were closed down. All these developments made José Salas note that «[t]he coup attempt of the right wing in Portugal can now be said to have ended. Hence now it is the time to suffer the consequences»<sup>xxvii749</sup>. Part of these consequences include, for *ABC*'s correspondent, the fact that «[a]ll will remain, therefore, in the hands of the left, which is logical, if one takes into consideration that a socializing path is being shaped through a radical situation»<sup>xxviii750</sup>.

This shift of power towards the left is why Jáuregui considers the PCP «without any doubt the great winner of the last confrontation»<sup>xxix</sup>, and Alberto Miguez that the «PPD (Popular Democratic Party) that is part of coalition is the great defeated of the last couple of days. Their headquarters in Oporto were destroyed, their militants beaten up across the country, their flags burnt and their image of a “country moving forward” completely erased»<sup>xxx751</sup>. Fernando Jáuregui also alludes to this subtle change of colours, focusing nonetheless on the Military institution: «One thing is certain, between optimism and pessimism, there is a wide sector of the country still confused, observing how for instance lieutenant

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<sup>748</sup> The revolutionary council inherits the state council's powers (constituent, fiscal supervising and control over the government legislative power) JSN's powers (supervision of the MFA's program and of the constitutional laws; council of the Republic President) and the military power that once belonged to the chief of staff council. (Rezola 2007).

<sup>749</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «Portugal: Fracaso el Golpe» in *ABC*, March 12<sup>th</sup>, pp. 31-32

<sup>750</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «Probable depuración en el ejército portugués» in *ABC*, March 13<sup>th</sup>, pp. 21

<sup>751</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975. «Lisboa: Nacionalización de todas las instituciones bancarias con sede en Portugal» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 15<sup>th</sup>, pp. 5-6

colonel Almeida Bruno, who a year ago was presented to the country as “Caldas da Rainha’s hero”, is now imprisoned»<sup>xxxii752</sup>.

Like Spínola, other members of the military, once praised by their actions, are now on the run. There is also popular control, according to Jáuregui, propelled by the PCP<sup>753</sup>, on the whereabouts of all people, military or not, connected with the spinolist order: «The atmosphere has gone sour. At the entrance of the Spanish Embassy there were today groups of people asking for the ID of everyone entering it»<sup>xxxii754</sup>.

In the midst of this situation, according to Barrenechea, the coming electoral process even lost relevance when faced with «Spínola’s coup d’état attempt, the creation of the Revolution Council, the nationalizations»<sup>xxxiii755</sup>. The failed counter-revolutionary coup had several results, and most of them were directed at a speeding of the revolutionary process, but two of them come out as determinant in this path: the creation of the Revolution Council and the nationalization of banks and insurance companies, which brought with them most of the press publishing companies.

In this way the role to be played by the Armed forces in the political process becomes clear: they will be the driving force and the referee. They will also be the supreme judge. They will be the armed and the vigilant force. But the political game between parties will remain and civilians will have a determinant role, expect one: no one will be able to change the path of the Portuguese revolutionary ship. The path is set in the programme of the Armed forces and no detour will be tolerated<sup>xxxiv756</sup>.

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<sup>752</sup>Jáuregui, Fernando.1975.«Nacionalización de la Banca. Hasta la derecha lo aplaude» in *Arriba*, March 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>753</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1975.«El ejército está unido» in *Arriba*, March 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>754</sup> Salas, José.1975.«Probable depuración en el ejército portugués» in *ABC*, March 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.21

<sup>755</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Se esperan más nacionalizaciones» in *Informaciones*, March 17<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>756</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Nacionalizada la Banca » in *Informaciones*, March 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

The nationalization process had, nevertheless, more intense reactions, none of them exactly positive. For José Salas it was «relatively explosive news, since it should be expected anytime»<sup>xxxv</sup> given that «[t]he Portuguese radicalization that we mentioned yesterday, as a direct result of the failed counter-revolutionary attempt coup of the 11<sup>th</sup>, is characterized by its fast development»<sup>xxxvi</sup>. For this correspondent this measure embodies the current process of radicalization and is, in fact, «the first genuinely revolutionary measure»<sup>xxxvii</sup> 757.

Nonetheless, Fernando Jáuregui emphasises the normality surrounding this process<sup>758</sup> and the difficulty of the current Portuguese society to form an educated opinion on the subject, due to, once again, the high quantity of rumours and misinformation about the nationalization measures: «(...) grasped by a wave of rumours, more or less reactionary but almost always false, the less aware among the people do not know if the new measure, which is rumoured to be followed by the nationalization of insurance companies (long lines are being formed in front of those companies), will be good or bad for them»<sup>xxxviii</sup>759.

Both *La Vanguardia Española* and *ABC* manifested themselves editorially against the nationalization process but present different reasons for doing so. In *La Vanguardia Española* it is argued that Socialist economies have proven that nationalisations are not completely economically successful, therefore this measure is not seen as a positive one: «At the serious Portuguese crossroads, we fear that the measure can have little positive and really helpful effect in the task of combining the necessary efforts for the political and economic reconstruction of the

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<sup>757</sup> Salas, José.1975.«El consejo de la revolución portuguesa nacionaliza la banca» in *ABC*, March 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.35

<sup>758</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1975.«El ejército está unido» in *Arriba*, March 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>759</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1975.«Nacionalización de la Banca. Hasta la derecha lo aplaude» in *Arriba*, March 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.12



country in an atmosphere of freedom»<sup>xxxix760</sup>. On the other hand, in *ABC* it is claimed that: «The nationalization or the statisation of the economy is surely not the path to a true democracy»<sup>xl761</sup>, therefore that nationalizations are a step further away from establishing a democratic regime in Portugal.

## b) Journalists in the field: action in Badajoz

As a consequence of the coup's failure, General Spínola fled the country on a helicopter and arrived at the Spanish military base of Talavera la Real. Unlike in previous occasions, special correspondents travelled to Badajoz instead of Portugal, trying to get any information or at least have a glimpse of the fugitive General. To Badajoz travelled Ángel Luis de la Calle from *Informaciones* and Javier Figuero, accompanied by photograph José Pastor, from *Arriba*. Ángel Luis de la Calle had previously followed General Humberto Delgado's exhumation in Villanueva del Fresno and transference of his remains to Portugal. Also *ABC*'s correspondent in Badajoz, Rabanal Brito, became focused on the Spínola affair. None of them, however, was able to achieve what they were looking for. Journalists moved around the military Base of Talavera la Real, unable to get in, so they waited in front of the gate for something to happen. Another gathering place were Badajoz's hotels, specifically Hotel Zurbarán, where the great majority of special correspondents (and Portuguese travellers) were staying. Lastly the border situation was also frequently checked by most of them. In Lisbon, correspondents discuss the consequences for Spain of a closed border, given that, as Jáuregui remembers, Spain, as an exporting country, «is suffering more

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<sup>760</sup> Editorial: «Nacionalización bancaria». 1975. *La Vanguardia española*, March 20<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>761</sup> Editorial: «Nacionalizaciones». 1975. *ABC*, March 19<sup>th</sup>, pp. 43

consequences than Portugal with the close of the border»<sup>xli762</sup>. Spaniards traveling to Portugal for the Easter week became a concern. As Alberto Miguez notes, if the border remains closed «Iberian tourism would be severely damaged, [as] it is thought in the hotel milieu»<sup>xlii763</sup>. There is, nonetheless, confusion as to whether or not the border is actually closed. The Portuguese Embassy contradicts news agency Logos'<sup>764</sup> claims that there is discrimination towards Spaniards at the borders and rumours flourish.

In Badajoz, journalists also found a great number of Portuguese people. Rabanal insists that they are tourists who found themselves unable to get into their own country by borders being closed, whereas both de la Calle and Figuero recognise some of them to be political fugitives, much like General Spínola. In fact, Figuero classifies them politically according to the direction they are heading: «For the ones returning, Spínola is a traitor. For the others, a hero that simply was unable to win»<sup>xliii765</sup>. Some of the ones who escaped before the border was closed confessed their proximity to General Spínola's cause: «Some of them, the ones escaping, were able to leave before the border was closed: "We are anti-Communists and therefore, friends of order. What is happening in Portugal has no name. Spínola was the last hope" (Words said to the journalist in the hotel Zurbarán)»<sup>xliv766</sup>. The latter are rumoured to be seeking shelter in Spain: «in the declarations made by the Lusitanian refugees, at least of the majority and with the exception of Spínola, whose

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<sup>762</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1975.«Nacionalización de la Banca. Hasta la derecha lo aplaude» in *Arriba*, March 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>763</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1975. «Lisboa: Han sido liberados algunos de los financieros detenidos» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.26

<sup>764</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Nacionalizada la Banca» in *Informaciones*, March 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>765</sup> Figuero, Javier.1975. « Muro de Silencio en torno a Spínola» in *Arriba*, March 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.11

<sup>766</sup> Figuero, Javier.1975. « Muro de Silencio en torno a Spínola» in *Arriba*, March 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.11

problem may be different, the desire of Spain conceding them political asylum can be perceived»<sup>xlv767</sup>.

As a general rule journalists tried to confirm the initial rumour of Spínola's presence in Spanish territory, as Rabanal Brito wonders: «Was general Spínola in that helicopter? We are before a mystery that we could not solve. The rumour is not very useful if the task is checking a fact»<sup>xlvi768</sup>. However, the next day, Spínola's presence in Badajoz is already a given and no longer a rumour, as the same journalist notes: «It is not good, journalistically speaking, to move in the complex world of conjectures, but nonetheless conjectures are more reliable than rumours. But it is neither a rumour nor a conjecture that general Spínola is still being hosted at the air base of Talavera la Real (...)»<sup>xlvii769</sup>. Nonetheless this will be the most relevant information these journalists will be able to get, since as Ángel de la Calle states:

The wall of silence about what is happening or will happen in the next hours with general Spínola, his wife and his collaborators, is insurmountable. (...) The only proven facts, we insist, are four Portuguese helicopters coming from the areal base of Tancos landing yesterday at the Academy of Talavera la Real at about ten minutes past six in the afternoon. From that point on the story of general Spínola's presence in Spain is a total mystery<sup>xlviii770</sup>.

Javier Figuero is the only one among this small sample who advances more information. For instance he explains that General Spínola, despite being an inconvenient guest, is also a very well protected one: «But if in the midst of negotiations the disconcerting rumours make it visible that Spínola is an inconvenient guest, the tight vigilance

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<sup>767</sup> Figuero, Javier.1975. «"Hoy se lo llevan"» in *Arriba*, March 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>768</sup> Rabanal Brito. 1975. «La búsqueda del General Spínola» in *ABC*, March 12<sup>th</sup>, pp.33

<sup>769</sup> Rabanal Brito. 1975. «Spínola continua en Talavera la Real, retenido e incomunicado» in *ABC*, March 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.29

<sup>770</sup> Calle, Angel Luis de la. 1975. «Spinola sigue en Talavera» in *Informaciones*, March 12<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

surrounding him by the military of the base seems to confirm that his safety has been at risk»<sup>xlix771</sup>. But most importantly, Figuero advances a reason for Spínola leaving Portugal like he did, and claims that this information is new and exclusive. Only Jáuregui refers to it, as previously mentioned, without however giving it much credit: the existence of a target list, which the General headed.

But why did Spínola and his eighteen decide to escape? Here is the answer, still yet to be reported by a journalist: the former general discovered a list in the hands of the new officers of the armed forces, composed of a number of close to a thousand and a half people, between civilian and military, that would be at risk because they were considered anti-democratic. This precipitated the counter-coup, initially planned to take place in four months and with the participation of high-ranked officers. When the new circumstances advised for immediate action, those turned their back to spinolists, whose only pretension – they assure – was to get back to the spirit of April 25, created by them and from which executive Commission they had recently been marginalized.<sup>1 772</sup>

Like José Salas, Figuero's description of General Spínola also supports the idea that the Portuguese revolutionary process has gone off course and that Spínola was trying to bring it back to its original principles, which had been generally praised by the Spanish press. Spínola is thus not seen as someone against the Portuguese Revolutionary Process, but as someone who is trying to improve it.

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<sup>771</sup> Figuero, Javier.1975. «"Hoy se lo llevan"» in *Arriba*, March 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>772</sup> Figuero, Javier.1975. «Muro de Silencio en torno a Spínola» in *Arriba*, March 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.11



Fig. 7

Eventually Spínola left the military base without journalists even getting a glimpse of him. The only image they were able to get was one of the airplane where he travelled taking off, which made the cover of the editions of *ABC* and *La Vanguardia Española* of March 15<sup>th</sup> (Fig.7), and very little information about its destination: «It has not been possible to get any direct photograph of the Portuguese getting on board of the plane»<sup>li773</sup>, informs Ángel Luis de la Calle. The only outcome of this journalistic mission were shots of the take-off of General Spínola's flight: «The numerous Spanish and foreign journalists (...) could finally photograph the airplane that was taking the demoted general of the monocle away flying»<sup>li774</sup>.

As Javier Figuro advanced while Spínola was still confined to the Military base, his destination was rumoured to be South-America: «Spínola, – this is my mission – remains at the base awaiting a plane (by

<sup>773</sup>Calle, Angel Luis de la. 1975. «La salida de Spínola de talavera» in *Informaciones*, March 14<sup>th</sup>, pp. 32

<sup>774</sup> Figuro, Javier.1975. «Muro de Silencio en torno a Spínola» in *Arriba*, March 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.11

the way tonight there is a Madrid-Brazil-Chile flight) to makes him forever a hero or a “Spinochet”»<sup>liii775</sup>. Figuero’s suggestion, which Rabanal shares, proved to be almost correct, since General Spínola’s destination was in fact South-America, although Brazil instead of Chile.

### c) The «portugalization» of the Spanish public life

In *Arriba* Fernando Onega sums up the consequences of General Spínola’s sojourn in Spain, and of the new situation in Portugal overall, underlining how it could have been worse through the use of an anaphoric repetition of the expression «at least»:

At least the special airplane heading towards Rio de Janeiro left without setbacks. At least the new article on deviationism by «Fuerza Nueva» did not echo like the editorial «Señor Presidente». At least all was in order and the worst that happened was a couple of young men taking down the Portuguese flag over the windows of four universities. At least the dismissals were reduced to a regional president of a military order. At least, I will say, because otherwise there a couple of heart attacks might have happened. (...) What was not lost was enthusiasm. While Alfonso Sastre writes two and half pages from Caranbanchel to the Portuguese newspapers, another group of intellectuals and artists practices the old exercise of filling in bible paper – attention registration of Castellana 3 – talking about democratic freedom, amnesties, representation... We are, as we see, in the middle of the blossoming period of the political spring<sup>liv776</sup>.

The future deputy editor-in-chief of *Arriba*, Fernando Onega, authored a column, «El Pendulo», published on the front-cover of the newspaper. From Onega’s account of the Spanish reaction to the latter events of the Portuguese revolutionary process, one realizes that polarization is in order again, but no longer has a place in the press. As we have seen previously in Part II. March 1975 was a particularly intense month regarding the interaction of both Iberian countries. Not only, after March 11<sup>th</sup>, were several actions supporting the Portuguese Revolutionary

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<sup>775</sup> Figuero, Javier.1975. «Muro de Silencio en torno a Spínola» in *Arriba*, March 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.11

<sup>776</sup> Onega, Fernando.1975. «El Pendulo» in *Arriba*, March 15<sup>th</sup>, pp. 5

Process held in Spain (i.e. fast demonstrations before the Portuguese Consulate in Barcelona or Portuguese flags waved at the Universities), but also the Easter week served as an opportunity for massive student travelling to Portugal (while traditional Spanish tourists were not welcomed in the same country, in some cases). In this sense, the support of the revolutionary legitimacy existed despite its invisibility in the press. Most of these events are present in the information brought in by the news agencies, as it could be confirmed at AGA, but this information is not extensively published by the newspapers. After all, from March on and at least until the end of September, the Spanish press was portrayed in Portugal as an enemy of the revolutionary process. Therefore these explicit support actions towards the Portuguese Revolution taking place in Spain, as Onega comments, are mentioned by the press mostly in opinion articles like Onega's, but there is no active defence of these actions being performed.

As usual, what is occurring in Portugal has, for opinion voices in Spain, a Spanish understanding. At this point, this feature even has a name: the «portugalization» of the Spanish public life.

According to Manuel Aznar, this phenomenon of influence of the Portuguese revolutionary process over the Spanish political situation is not homogeneously perceived. In fact, he argues for the existence of a scale that goes from «a possibility» to an «absolute certainty», through a «probability». There are sectors for whom this is a completely certainty, like Aznar exemplifies: «(...) according to a friend's references, it seems that a certain fellow countryman of ours in exile declared a couple of days ago that he was getting his belongings to come back to Spain»<sup>777</sup>. Given the latter example, Aznar identifies the supporters of the «absolute

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<sup>777</sup>Aznar, Manuel.1975.«Del Duero al Douro y del Tajo al Tejo» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.23

certainty» of the influence of democratization occurred in Portugal with the «enemies» of the Francoist regime, forced to exile because of their beliefs and/or actions against it. Aznar, for his part, is self-professedly against the mutual influence theory:

I have neither a degree nor a calling for being a prophet. I think that from my Basque condition I get a clear affection for the tangible and explainable. (...) As such I will neither confirm nor deny the forecast of the fellow countryman on the verge of his trip. What I must add is that if his plan is followed through, it will be for Spanish reasons, not because of Portuguese influence. (...) As much as it seems odd to more than one reader, I have believe for a long time that in the world there no two other countries so close and yet with such little mutual influence<sup>lvi778</sup>.

But even if Aznar dismisses any political effect Portugal might have in Spain, he is not immune to establish comparisons between situations if they are not about the current situation in which both countries find themselves. General Spínola's attempt of getting power back – and his overall part in the Portuguese revolutionary process – is compared by Manuel Aznar with an episode of the II Spanish Republic, «La sanjurjada» of 10 August 1932, which Aznar wrongly dates of 1931:

The adventure starred by Spínola last Tuesday recalls a little bit our 10 August 1931. (...) The semblance is, in fact, not excessive. But each people has its manners, each country its fighting systems. August 10<sup>th</sup> 1931 was filled with consequences in Spain, but it has not been able to be fabulously bigger because the authentic revolution, the unforgiven because relentless one, was not willing to extract from it all the consequences. It was not ready. It was not ready until five years later. (...) I, a Spaniard in love with the Portuguese land, ask heaven for the revolutionary yeast not to be ready, and that, despite the episode involving the Regiment of light artillery, it is still possible to envision a peaceful future for Portugal, or at least relatively peaceful, without vast cemeteries, without nightly funeral processions, without torrential blood, or to put it simply, without a civil war. Without a civil war, brothers, which means burning in flames, perishing between storms<sup>lvii779</sup>.

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<sup>778</sup>Aznar, Manuel.1975.«Del Duero al Douro y del Tajo al Tejo» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.23

<sup>779</sup>Aznar, Manuel.1975.«¿Para quién hiciste la revolución, hermano?» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.21



The intentions of General Sanjuro's failed coup against the II Republic were ultimately successful some years later, with a civil war in-between. Hence the civil war spectrum is brought back to the Portuguese developments, in spite of Aznar's emphasis on the peaceful feature that surrounds the Portuguese revolutionary process: «The number of deaths is minimal. Very little Celtiberian, thank God»<sup>lviii780</sup>. But any comment regarding a possible similarity of paths between both countries is dismissed not only by Manuel Aznar in *La Vanguardia Española*<sup>781</sup>, but also Pere Oriol Costa in *Tele/eXprés*, though both had different reasons to do so.

Both journalists enumerate several differences that make a comparison between both the two countries' situation impossible: the distinct relationship with the Armed forces due to the inexistence of a colonial war in Spain, and the higher economic development existing in Spain that allowed for higher wages. Aznar then considers the Spanish State to be firmer than the Portuguese one, ruled by Américo Thomaz and Marcelo Caetano. Costa, for his part, considers the Spanish people to have superior cultural standards and Spain in general to have very different institutions when compared to Portugal.

As Aznar argued before, if change gets to Spain it will be because of Spanish reasons, rather than because of Portuguese influence. His insistence on underlining the differences between both situations has therefore roots on his repudiation of the influence theory and a restatement that the Francoist State was dominating the situation and not being dominated by it. For Costa, the case is different, since *Tele/eXprés'* deputy editor-in-chief clashes with «some sectors of the Spanish public

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<sup>780</sup> Aznar, Manuel. 1975.« ¿Para quién hiciste la revolución, hermano?» in *La Vanguardia española*, March 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.21

<sup>781</sup> Aznar, Manuel. 1975.« Del Duero al Douro y del Tajo al Tejo » in *La Vanguardia española*, March 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.23

opinion», namely *ABC* and *El Álcazar*, who Costa reckons are manipulating the Portuguese events – assuming an identification with the Spanish case – for the sake of their argument against the legalization of PCE: «Portugal is too close, and in “ABC”’s editorial it is easy to guess its references to the Spanish State and the impossibility – according to their opinion – of having democracy organized here if previous exclusions are not undertaken»<sup>lix782</sup>. Overall, Costa’s intervention is also a political utilization of the Portuguese situation, since the core of the question is the quest for a democratization of the Spanish State and the conditions for that to happen, rather than an analysis of the situation in Portugal. In sum, Costa considers «anti-democratic and fake the attitude of those trying to make an exact transposition situation in order to reinforce anti-democratic attitudes»<sup>lix783</sup>.

Pere Oriol Costa, a militant of the Socialist Party of Catalonia [*Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* PSC] and a founding member of GDP, was to become editor-in-chief of *Tele/eXprés* at the end of 1975, replacing Manuel Ibáñez Escofet. From the point of view of a Spanish Socialist militant, at that moment it was important to establish the differences of both countries’ situations because of the desire that democratization would be reached in Spain. In order to establish democracy as a hegemonic value, a distance from the Portuguese situation was important. Indeed, a common discursive platform that refused revolution had to be built, because certain sectors of Spanish society, most likely prone to refuse situations of disruption, had to be convinced that the end of the Francoist regime would not mean a repetition of the Portuguese process. Once again democracy as a «floating signifier» is present, this

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<sup>782</sup> Oriol Costa, Pedro.1975. « Los hechos de Portugal» in *Tele/eXprés*, March 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.14

<sup>783</sup> Oriol Costa, Pedro.1975. « Los hechos de Portugal» in *Tele/eXprés*, March 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.14

time being the frontier renegotiated by the discourse of the political culture of alienation from the the francoist regime.

The dangerous relationship between revolutionary Portugal and the Western powers, especially the United States, is seen as an opportunity for Spain to finally get the legitimacy of being accepted, or at least considered to be desirable, as a NATO member. This was the interpretation of *La Vanguardia Española*'s editorial<sup>784</sup>, but also of Pedro Gómez Aparicio in *Arriba*, who considers Portugal to be in a «fast pace (...) towards a semi-Communist regime»<sup>lxi</sup>, and since NATO is «an organization born precisely to oppose Communism»<sup>lxii</sup>, exclusion could be happening in a foreseeable future. Veteran Gómez Aparicio, who worked as a journalist since the 1920s, even advances the possibility that «the radicalized Armed Forces Movement enters into negotiations with the Soviet Union for the transfer of a base in Madera Islands»<sup>lxiii785</sup>, illustrating in this way the idea that Portugal was sliding between areas of influence.

Part of the Spanish reading comes out in the form of lessons to be drawn by Spain. As a general rule, Communists were by then blamed for the misappropriation of the Portuguese revolutionary process. Both *Informaciones* and *ABC* consider that the failure of democracy in Portugal is caused by the participation of the Communists. *ABC* proudly states that: «Once again the lesson taken from the facts is clear: it is naïve to hope for the birth of a democratic State if is sprung out of a revolution in which movements of a totalitarian inclination like Communism take part»<sup>lxiv 786</sup>. *ABC* also underlines its own part in denouncing the Communists during

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<sup>784</sup> Editorial: «La NATO y nosotros».1975.*La Vanguardia española*, March 19<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>785</sup> Gómez Aparicio, Pedro.1975.« La alianza atlántica, en crisis» in *Arriba*, March 22<sup>nd</sup>

<sup>786</sup> Editorial: «La triste experiencia de Portugal». 1975. *ABC*, March 12<sup>th</sup>, pp.22

the preceding months. For *Informaciones*, on the other hand, the failure of the Portuguese democracy is not yet confirmed, but «Communists have a clear responsibility in the failure – not yet consummated – of the Portuguese democracy. But the responsibility for this does not rest exclusively with the Communists, no matter how clear their intents are»<sup>lxv787</sup>. Therefore, for the Madrilenian evening newspaper, if a totalitarian regime were to be established, March 11<sup>th</sup> would have been its point of departure. In the same sense, Communists are the ones to blame for the failure of democracy in Portugal, since during 50 years of right-wing dictatorship they learned how to seduce, and manipulate, the Armed Forces. Commenting on the Spanish reaction to these events, *Informaciones* instils fear of things happening as in Portugal to force the idea of change, claiming that Spain should learn from it: «There is no doubt that it is still time to organize freedom in Spain»<sup>lxvi</sup>, thus moderate forces must organize themselves.

Given the threat that Communists are to democracy, not to pact with them is a much-repeated slogan. One again, and given the existence of a Democratic Junta, the condemnation of whoever pacts with the Communists is frequent. In *Arriba* both Jesús Suevos and Fernando Onega admonish several political associations about its dangers, given the Portuguese example. For Suevos the consequences come in stages due to the Communist small steps strategy, an idea that is also very frequently exposed by Jaume Miravittles in *Tele/eXprés*<sup>788</sup>. But even if step by step, they will be extended to all political forces: «Now the “centrists” and Christian Democrats can see what happens when they collaborate with subversion and play with fire. Very soon social-democrats will have to

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<sup>787</sup> Editorial: « Los sucesos de Portugal ». 1975. *Informaciones*, March 13<sup>th</sup>

<sup>788</sup> Miravittles, Jaume.1975.« ¿Qué ocurre en Portugal? » in *Tele/eXprés*, March 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.7

apply poultices on their wounds»<sup>lxvii789</sup>. Onega, for his part, warns the Christian Democrats in particular, exemplifying his point with the exile of Major Sanches Osório, founder and leader of the Christian Democracy Party [*Partido da Democracia Cristã* PDC], after March 11<sup>th</sup>: «At the end the stories of the day: Sánchez Osório arrived in Spain, and the Christian democracy watched Portugal as the promise land (...)»<sup>lxviii790</sup>. In *Tele/eXprés* Jaume Miravittles exposes as often as possible<sup>791</sup> this Communist small step strategy, responsible for the warnings spread in the Spanish press:

One of the secrets is to achieve, at the beginning of any movement, a common front as wide as possible against the enemy that must be defeated first and then, step by step, get all non-useful “allies” eliminated in an almost mathematical order<sup>lxix792</sup>.

Nonetheless *La Vanguardia Española*, always moderate, keeps sustaining that only the electoral process will define the political situation in Portugal, which is underlined by the division demonstrated by the failed counter-revolutionary coup of March 11<sup>th</sup>: «At the end of the day what is happening to the Portuguese military is almost the same as what is happening to their civilian fellow countrymen»<sup>lxx793</sup>. According to *La Vanguardia Española*, in the case of a division «the logical way of proceeding to face division, is electoral count. »<sup>lxxi</sup>

In *Tele/eXprés* Joan Fuster frames the question differently. In his view this coup was foreseen and not only because of the rumours that surrounded it, but because of the process that was at stake there: «It is about “to expropriate”, and no one lets himself get “expropriated” easily,

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<sup>789</sup> Suevos, Jesus.1975.« Ahora sí» in *Arriba*, March 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.3

<sup>790</sup> Onega, Fernando.1975. «el Pendulo» in *Arriba*, March 20<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>791</sup> Miravittles, Jaume.1975.« ¿Qué ocurre en Portugal? » in *Tele/eXprés*, March 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.7

<sup>792</sup> Miravittles, Jaume.1975.« La política de los pequeños pasos» in *Tele/eXprés*, March 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.7

<sup>793</sup> Editorial:« Amarga jornada».1975. *La Vanguardia española*, March 12<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

in a glimpse of an eye without a lot of Vaseline»<sup>lxxii</sup>. This is a critical process because it means that a group that always had power has to lose some, or a great part of it. It is a violent process, because it was also built on violence: «Portugal, the Portugal made by Professor Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, has no way out, has no other way out. Violence is not invented, is not entertaining – of flags or of terrorists –, it what a certain society gives out, at some point in history, “thanks” to those who directed this history...»<sup>lxxiii794</sup>.

At this point the rhetoric «extremism versus moderation» is completely settled. In previous moments this antagonism had served to negativity regarding the revolutionary process in Portugal to be formulated and, at the same time, for its defence to be, more or less successfully, prevented. It was the case of moments like the «silent majority» demonstration and the subsequent dismissal of General Spínola, or the single union law debate and the siege of CDS’ congress in January.

However, at this moment this antagonism has imposed itself as the logic in which the Portuguese Revolutionary process should be read, and, in spite of some attempts of framing the question differently, i.e. Joan Fuster in *Tele/eXprés*, active defences of the revolutionary legitimacy disappeared from the newspapers’ pages. It is so, because to stand by the revolutionary legitimacy, given the articulation of this antagonism, would mean to stand by with the opposite of moderation that is extremism.

Despite its invisibility in the press, which is not a surprise given the contingencies and constraints that a press under surveillance embodies, the defence of the revolutionary legitimacy is present outside of it, namely on the streets and other spheres less dependent on the control of the State apparatus.

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<sup>794</sup> Fuster, Joan.1975.« Lo que se veía venir» in *Tele/eXprés*, March 17<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

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### Original quotes:

<sup>i</sup> «En menos de un año, el distinguido militar ha protagonizado una revolución y una contrarrevolución, ha sido emblema humano de un país "que despertaba" y líder faccioso de otro que semeja hundirse; un militar superstar y un degradado, un Presidente y un exiliado. Y todo en menos de un año. Desde la considerable distancia que los disciplinados soldados españoles han puesto entre la base aérea de Talavera la Real y la bien generosa treintena de periodistas que esperan noticias del político portugués. Spínola es todo eso: demasiados personajes en uno solo.»

<sup>ii</sup> «Desgraciadamente (tenemos que ser realistas), creemos que los sucesos de Setúbal podrán repetirse sobre las víctimas de otros boicoteos anteriores (PDC y CDS) y el PPD, y quizá se «estrene» con el PS; lo que no nos extrañaría nada, pues sabemos que hay quien admite esa posibilidad.»

<sup>iii</sup> «Nos parece un poco exagerada esta aptitud de Soares, al comprometer su palabra, pues la votación se destina a escoger una Asamblea que tendrá, así se piensa, dos o tres meses de existencia, los suficientes para estudiar y aprobar la nueva Constitución, y que no afectará nada la vida normal del Gobierno.»

<sup>iv</sup> « Y cómo sólo al partido comunista conviene esa suspensión o un posible aplazamiento [de las elecciones], queda claro que su posición es la del beneficiado»

<sup>v</sup> « Debo recoger ambos a título provisional y con todas las reservas»

<sup>vi</sup> «algo raro está pasando. El hermetismo de algunas fuentes y la ignorancia de otras, es muy sospechosa.»

<sup>vii</sup> «un instrumento de la "reacción internacional"»

<sup>viii</sup> «Añadimos a todos estos hechos la circulación incontrolada de rumores - casi siempre falsos, dígase de entrada - sobre intentos de levantamiento militar. Los últimos rumores afectaban a Tancos y Santarém, donde tropas "spinolistas" habrían intentado alguna acción militar. Este rumor, que ayer era explotado en forma sensacionalista en alguna prensa extranjera, no ha sido confirmado.»

<sup>ix</sup> « Hace tres días, este cronista explicó con pelos y señales lo que se gestaba. Dio nombres y apellidos de quienes conspiraban, explicó por qué parte del ejército de tendencia spinolista se hallaba en estado de «rebelión potencial». Y escribió que "algo raro estaba pasando. (...) Mis vaticinios fueron rechazados, violentamente algunos, por personalidades responsables. (...) Reaccionarios o no, los rumores que yo recogía (y solamente yo, las cosas claras) han terminado convirtiéndose en triste realidad.»

<sup>x</sup> «la exposición dada por el señor Spínola, quien dijo que se habría lanzado a su temeraria acción al tener conocimiento de que encabezaba una lista de 1.500 personas, a las que determinada organización política pensaba asesinar. "Matanza de Pascua" se llamaría esta operación, sacada a relucir por Spínola. Pinochet tuvo a punto a una excusa semejante.»

<sup>xi</sup> « no cabe en cabeza humana una rebelión violenta capaz de poner al país al borde de una guerra civil cuando se está a la vera de unas elecciones que pueden ganarse.»

<sup>xii</sup> «ni la derecha portuguesa ni el centro moderado, ni la izquierda comunista tenían por qué temer semejante cosa.»

<sup>xiii</sup> «Todos los sondeos adjudicaban grandes posibilidades a los partidos moderados»

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<sup>xiv</sup> «(...) cabe considerar dicha intentona como la más disparatada aventura que pudiera realizarse. (...) un colega francés se ha referido a ella diciendo que o bien la derecha portuguesa es la más idiota del mundo o hay que imaginar un montaje a la sombra»

<sup>xv</sup> « En la mayoría de los casos, los medios de información no ocultan su perplejidad: ¿Cómo es posible, se preguntan, que un golpe de Estado haya sido tan mal planeado y realizado cuando en él intervienen personalidades tan prestigiosas del Ejército portugués..? Y se desea que esta intentona no sea calificada por algún gracioso (como ocurrió el 28 de septiembre de 1974) de «inventona.»»

<sup>xvi</sup> «Son muchos los órganos de información que acusan al Partido Comunista de haberse inventado, o al menos, de haber provocado la tentativa del pasado martes.»

<sup>xvii</sup> «hostiles al régimen portugués»

<sup>xviii</sup> «para exterminar a los partidos de Derecha.»

<sup>xix</sup> «un hombre muy inteligente con una excelente formación histórica y military»

<sup>xx</sup> «una burguesía liberal, audaz y expeditiva, capaz de emancipar las colonias y de iniciar en el propio país el proceso de industrialización»;

<sup>xxi</sup> «(...) el 28 de septiembre era demasiado pronto y no había tenido el tiempo suficiente para reunir a su alrededor una masa popular coherente y fiel a los principios políticos del 25 de abril. Finalmente, en un intento calificado unánimemente de infantil y precipitado, Spínola ha caído en una trampa, a la que ha arrastrado al pueblo de Portugal, cuyo porvenir aparece cada día más oscuro y dudoso.»

<sup>xxii</sup> «Los comunistas cantan ya su canción. Es natural, y no hay que llamarse a engaño. Hacen su juego.»

<sup>xxiii</sup> «(...) no puede extrañar que hasta los más ingenuos pensásemos que la aventura lusitana era uno de esos trucos «progresistas» en que el marxismo pone el ruido y el capitalismo las nueces, pero que, al fin, acaba por dar a los césares plutocráticos no sólo lo que es del César, sino, por añadidura, lo que es de Dios y de su pueblo.»

<sup>xxiv</sup> «Pero ahora vemos que, tras las anticuadas y ridículas apariencias, había en el golpe de Estado portugués algo si se quiere más peligroso, pero mucho más importante: una auténtica intención revolucionaria. Spínola y su sorteo de momias fue rápidamente irradiado y, desde ese mismo momento, cualquier observador un poco perspicaz pudo darse cuenta de que allí iban a suceder acontecimientos que no iban a ser muy gratos a la «Prensa libre» europea y americana. Y no por culpa del Partido Comunista, que, por no perderse la costumbre, compensa su escaso número con una organización y una disciplina formidables, sino al comprobar que las Fuerzas Armadas supervivientes de las "purgas" no se satisfarían con los violones demoliberales y los revolucionarismos de gabinete, sino que estaban dispuestas a emprender una revolución de verdad.»

<sup>xxv</sup> «Porque ahora no es la Patria, ni las tradiciones nacionales, ni la paz pública las que están en peligro, sino la Banca, los negocios que rebasan las fronteras y las oligarquías que dominaron siempre entre bastidores y que contribuyeron a la «revolución de los claveles» precisamente para seguir dominando. Sólo que esta vez les salió el tiro por la culata. Y la verdad es que no merecían otra cosa.»



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<sup>xxvi</sup> « (...) y la presencia en el ánimo de todos del lamentable fin de la gran experiencia chilena, no deja de pesar en el corazón de los portugueses. Estos ven cómo su presente situación mantiene algunas semejanzas con aquella que llevó a la dictadura de Pinochet.»

<sup>xxvii</sup> «La intentona de la derecha en Portugal puede darse por liquidada. Ahora toca, por tanto, sufrir las consecuencias.»

<sup>xxviii</sup> «Todo quedará, por tanto, en manos de la izquierda, lo cual tiene su lógica, si se tiene en cuenta que se pretende forjar una vía socializante a través de una situación radicalizada.»

<sup>xxix</sup> «sin duda el gran vencedor en esta última confrontación»

<sup>xxx</sup> «El PPD (Partido Popular Democrático) que forma parte de la coalición es el gran derrotado de los últimos días. Sus instalaciones en Oporto fueron destruidas, sus militantes apaleados a lo largo del país, sus banderas quemadas y su imagen de "partido que avanza" completamente borrada.»

<sup>xxxi</sup> «Lo cierto es que, entre el optimismo y el pesimismo, existe un amplio sector del país que permanece confuso, viendo cómo, por ejemplo, el teniente coronel Almeida Bruno, que hace un año era presentado al país como "el héroe de Caldas da Rainha", es ahora preso»

<sup>xxxii</sup> «El ambiente se ha agriado. En la puerta de la Embajada de España había hoy grupos de populares que hacían identificarse a los que allí entraban.»

<sup>xxxiii</sup> «el intento de golpe de Estado de Spínola, la creación del Consejo de la Revolución, las nacionalizaciones»

<sup>xxxiv</sup> «De esta manera queda clara y diáfana establecido el papel que juegan las fuerzas armadas en el proceso político: serán motor y árbitro. Serán también juez supremo. Serán el brazo armado y vigilante. Pero habrá juego político de partido y papel civil determinante a todos los niveles, salvo en uno: Nadie podrá cambiar el rumbo de la nave revolucionaria portuguesa. El rumbo está marcado en el programa de las fuerzas armadas y ninguna variación en la derrota será tolerada.»

<sup>xxxv</sup> «una noticia relativamente explosiva, puesto que cabría esperarla de un momento al otro»

<sup>xxxvi</sup> «La radicalización portuguesa a la que nos referíamos ayer, como derivación de la fracasada intentona contrarrevolucionaria del día 11 está caracterizada por su rapidez de actuación.»

<sup>xxxvii</sup> « la primera medida de fondo auténticamente revolucionario»

<sup>xxxviii</sup> «(...) atezado por una ola de rumores, más o menos reaccionarios, pero casi siempre falsos, el pueblo menos consciente ignora si la nueva medida, a la que se rumorea seguirá la nacionalización de los seguros (largas colas se registran a la puerta de las compañías) le va a sentar bien o mal.»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «En la grave encrucijada portuguesa, nos tememos que la medida pueda aportar muy poco de positivo y realmente útil a la tarea de aunar todos los esfuerzos precisos para la reconstitución política y económica del país en un clima de libertad.»

<sup>xl</sup> «No es ciertamente la nacionalización o estatificación de la economía una vía a la verdadera democracia.»

<sup>xli</sup> «está resultando más perjudicada que Portugal por el cierre de la frontera.»

<sup>xlii</sup> «el turismo ibérico quedaría gravemente dañado, se piensa en círculos hoteleros.»

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xliii «Para unos, los de regreso, Spínola es un traidor. Para los otros, un héroe, que simplemente no ha podido vencer»

xliv «Algunos, los de la huida, consiguieron salir antes del cierre fronterizo: "Somos anticomunistas y, por tanto, amigos del orden. Lo que sucede en Portugal no tiene nombre. Spínola era la última esperanza" (Palabras pronunciadas al periodista en el hotel Zurbarán.)»

xlv «está en las afirmaciones hechas oír los refugiados lusos en el sentido de que su deseo, al menos el de la mayoría, y con excepción de Spínola, cuyo problema pudiera ser de ángulo distinto, sería que España les concediera el asilo político.»

xlvi «¿Iba en ese helicóptero el general Spínola? He aquí una incógnita que no hemos podido despejar. Poca cosa es el rumor de la calle, si ha de señalarse de una manera concreta el hecho.»

xlvii «Nada bueno es, periodísticamente hablando, moverse en el mundillo complejo de las conjeturas, pero, aun así y todo, la conjetura se diferencia del rumor en que aquélla es mucho más seria que éste. Pero no es rumor ni conjetura que el general Spínola continúe acogido en la base aérea de Talavera la Real (...).»

xlviii «El muro de silencio en torno a lo que sucede o vaya a suceder en las próximas horas con el general Spínola, su esposa y sus colaboradores es infranqueable. (...) Los únicos hechos comprobados, insistimos, son que cuatro helicópteros portugueses, procedentes de la base aérea de Tancos, aterrizaron ayer en la Escuela de Reactores de Talavera la Real sobre las seis y diez de la tarde. A partir de ahí la historia de la presencia del general Spínola en España es un absoluto misterio.»

xlix «Pero si en las negociaciones los desconcertantes rumores evidencian que Spínola es un huésped incómodo, la estrecha vigilancia montada a su alrededor por los militares de la base parece confirmar que su seguridad está puesta en entredicho.»

<sup>1</sup> «Pero ¿por qué Spínola y sus dieciocho decidieron escapar? Aquí está la respuesta, todavía no recogida por ningún comentarista: el ex general descubrió una lista en poder de los nuevos oficiales de las fuerzas armadas, con un número de hombres próximo al millar y medio, entre civiles y militares, que habrían de ser pasados por las armas, en razón a estar considerados como antidemocráticos. Esto precipitó el contragolpe, previsto inicialmente a cuatro meses vista, y que había de contar con las más altas colaboraciones. Cuando las nuevas circunstancias aconsejaban la actuación inmediata, éstas volvieron la espalda a los spinolistas, cuya única pretensión - aseguran - consiste en volver al espíritu del 25 de abril, creado por ellos mismos, y en el que, por vía ejecutiva del Comité recientemente institucionalizado pero actuante de antiguo, habían sido marginados.»

li «No ha sido posible obtener ninguna fotografía directa de los portugueses subiendo al aparato»

lii «Los numerosos periodistas españoles y extranjeros (...) podían, al fin, fotografiar en pleno vuelo al avión que distanciaba al general degradado del monóculo.»

liii «Spínola, - esta es mi misión - sigue en la base a la espera de cualquier avión (por cierto, esta noche hay un vuelo Madrid- Brasil- Chile) que le haga para siempre un héroe o un "Spinochet".»

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<sup>liv</sup> «Y menos mal que el avión especial hacía Rio de Janeiro salió sin tropiezos. Y menos mal que el nuevo artículo del desviacionismo de «Fuerza Nueva» no tuvo el eco del Editorial «Señor Presidente». Y menos mal que todo estaba en orden y lo más que pasó fue que unos muchachos descolgaron la bandera portuguesa por las ventanas de cuatro Facultades. Y menos mal que las dimisiones quedaban reducidas a la de un presidente regional de Maestrazgo. Menos mal, ya digo, porque de lo contrario pudiera haber más de un infarto. (...) Lo que no se pierden son los entusiasmos. Mientras Alfonso Sastre escribe dos folios y medio desde Carabanchel a los periódicos portugueses, otro grupo de intelectuales y artistas practican el viejo ejercicio de rellenar papel de barba - atención, registro de entradas de Castellana, 3 - para hablar de libertades democráticas, amnistías, representatividad... Estamos, ya se ve, en plena floración de la primavera política.»

<sup>lv</sup> «Tanto que, según referencias de un amigo, parece que cierto compatriota nuestro del exilio declaraba no hace muchos días que está preparando ya las maletas para venir a España»

<sup>lvi</sup> «Yo no tengo ni títulos, ni vocación de profeta. Me parece que de mi condición vasca me viene una clara afición a lo concreto y explicable. (...) De modo que ni confirmaré, ni negaré los pronósticos del compatriota exiliado y a punto de viaje. Lo que he de añadir es que, si su plan se cumple, será por razones españolas; en modo alguno por influencias portuguesas. (...) Por muy extraño que a más de un lector le parezca, tengo desde hace tiempo el convencimiento de que apenas hay en el mundo dos países de tan rigurosa vecindad geográfica que menos se interinfluyan.»

<sup>lvii</sup> «La aventura que Spínola protagonizó el pasado martes recuerda, siquiera sea en versión muy atenuada, un poco de lejos, nuestro 10 de Agosto de 1931. (...) El parecido, realmente, no es excesivo. Pero cada pueblo tiene sus modos; cada país, sus sistemas de lucha. El 10 de agosto de 1931 fue en España fecundo de consecuencias; pero pudo serlo en proporciones fabulosamente mayores si la revolución auténtica, la que no perdona, porque es implacable, hubiera estado dispuesta a extraer de aquel hecho todas las consecuencias. No lo estaba. No lo estuvo hasta cinco años después. (...) Yo, español enamorado de las tierras portuguesas, pido al cielo que la levadura revolucionaria no se halle a punto, y que, pese al episodio del Regimiento de Artillería Ligera, todavía quepa imaginar unos porvenires lusitanos en paz, por lo menos en relativa paz, sin cementerios espaciosos, sin fúnebres cortejos durante la noche, sin sangre torrencial; para decirlo en tres palabras: sin guerra civil. Sin guerra civil, hermanos, que es consumirse en llamas, perecer entre tempestades.»

<sup>lviii</sup> «La cifra de muertos es mínima. Muy poco celtibérica, gracias a Dios.»

<sup>lix</sup> «Portugal está demasiado cerca y en el editorial de "ABC" es fácil adivinar sus referencias al Estado español y a la imposibilidad - según su opinión - de que aquí pueda organizarse una democracia si no se procede a una exclusiones previas.»

<sup>lx</sup> «antidemocrática y falsa la actitud de los que pretenden hacer una exacta transposición de situaciones utilizándolas para reforzar actitudes antidemocráticas.»

<sup>lxi</sup> «acelerada marcha de Portugal hacia un régimen semicomunista»

<sup>lxii</sup> «una organización nacida precisamente para oponerse al comunismo»

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- lxiii «el radicalizado Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas entre en negociaciones con la Unión Soviética para la cesión de una base en las islas Madera»
- lxiv «Una vez más, la lección que se obtiene de los hechos es clara: es ilusorio esperar el nacimiento de un Estado democrático si surge de una revolución en la que participan movimientos de signo totalitario como el comunismo.»
- lxv «Tienen los comunistas una clarísima responsabilidad en el fracaso - todavía no consumado - de la democracia portuguesa. Pero esta responsabilidad no es exclusivamente de los comunistas, por muy claros que sean sus propósitos. »
- lxvi «No cabe duda que todavía es hora de organizar la libertad en España»
- lxvii «Ya ven los "centristas" y democristianos lo que pasa cuando colaboran con la subversión y juegan con fuego. Y muy pronto los socialdemócratas tendrán que ponerse también cataplasmas en los coscorriones.»
- lxviii «Al final, las historias del día: Sánchez Osorio llegó a España, y la democracia cristiana miraba a Portugal como el Paraíso perdido (...)
- lxix «Uno de sus secretos es el de propiciar, en los inicios de un determinado movimiento, el frente común más amplio posible contra el enemigo que hay que vencer prioritariamente y después, poco a poco, ir eliminando en un orden casi matemático a todos sus "aliados" que no puede sacar de ellos nuevos provechos.»
- lxx «A fin de cuentas a los militares portugueses les pasa lo mismo que a sus compatriotas paisanos: que no todos piensan igual no quieren lo mismo.»
- lxxi « el modo lógico de dirimir esas diferencias es el recuento electoral.»
- lxxii «Se trata de "expropiar", y nadie se deja "expropiar" por las buenas, en un abrir y cerrar de ojos y sin que medie mucha vaselina.»
- lxxiii « Portugal, el Portugal que confeccionó el profesor Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, no tiene salida: no tiene otra salida. La violencia no se inventa, ni es un entretenimiento - de cuartos de banderas o de terroristas -: es lo que una determinada sociedad da de sí, en un punto determinado de su historia, "gracias" a quienes dirigieron es historia..»

## **7. The first electoral process: a determinant moment**

I will say goodbye with a joke that went around in the days before today's election: "The Portuguese man supports PC on the street, supports PS at work, supports PPD at home... and votes CDS". It is valid as a joke but not as reality<sup>795</sup>.

After several months of constant tensions, the date of the electoral process, which some in the Spanish press doubted would actually take place, is approaching. This somewhat relieves part of the tension because it is hoped that the elections will weaken the revolutionary legitimacy. Despite the tension provoked by the 1<sup>st</sup> MFA-parties pact, the moderate result of the election allowed for some positivity regarding the Portuguese revolutionary process to re-emerge. On the other hand, on April 25<sup>th</sup> the last «state of exception» of the Francoist regime was decreed in the Basque provinces of Gipuzkoa and Biscay, a development that Sánchez Cervelló (1993) linked to the radicalization of the Portuguese process.

The election of a Constitutive Assembly with the aim of producing a new Constitution in the sequence of the downfall of the New State had Spanish special correspondents arriving in Portugal at different moments. Some – like Salvador López de la Torre (*Arriba* and *pyresa*) and Augusto Assia (*La Vanguardia Española*) – arrived in mid-April, still in time to follow most of the electoral campaign that had started in the beginning of April, while others – like Xavier Roig and González Casanova (*Tele/eXprés*) – arrived just a few of days before the elections, which took place on April 25<sup>th</sup>.

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<sup>795</sup> Barrenechea, Edurado.1975. «Cinco partidos se disputan el 90 por 100 de los votos» in *Informaciones*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp.16-17

## a) Failed models of interpretation

Some aspects of the situation found at this decisive moment in Portugal come across as consensual, by correspondents and special correspondents alike, such as the festive ambiance felt in the streets of Lisbon or the tranquillity and civil atmosphere that surrounded the ballot boxes, contrasting with the previous months, which had been described as filled with tension and violence.

*Informaciones'* special correspondent, Eduardo Barrenechea, who was in Lisbon since January, initially planned to go back to Spain after the electoral process was finished, and his departure was in fact announced by the newspaper on its May 2<sup>nd</sup> edition<sup>796</sup>. But Barrenechea is convinced to prolong his stay by the May 1<sup>st</sup> skirmish between Communists and Socialists, prompted by Mário Soares' accusations of having been restricted from entering the stadium where the Labour Day rally was taking place by Communist supporters, as the journalist explains:

We journalists should not use words such as “always”, “never” and “last”. I said yesterday that it would be my last chronicle from Lisbon, and when I was willing to enjoy my last free day in this city before going back to Madrid the «cat came out of the bag» regarding the latest brutal and open confrontation between the Socialist and the Communist party, which without a doubt would have consequences in the political near future of this country<sup>ii797</sup>.

Since their stay in Portugal has different lengths, the approach of special correspondents and permanent ones is also of a different calibre. Barrenechea, by then in Lisbon for a few of months, has an approach

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<sup>796</sup> «Cumplida su misión en Lisboa, donde ha permanecido desde los primeros días de este año, a fin de informar a nuestros lectores sobre el proceso de la revolución portuguesa en curso y hasta la celebración de las elecciones, Eduardo Barrenechea, redactor-jefe de INFORMACIONES ha dictado con la presente su última crónica desde la capital portuguesa, reintegrándose, por tanto, al quehacer de nuestro diario en su área nacional.» *Informaciones*, 1975 May 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp.2

<sup>797</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Enfrentamiento abierto entre comunistas y socialistas» in *Informaciones*, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, pp. 2

more of a permanent correspondent than a special one, in the sense that he is following some of the developments for a longer period. Like other correspondents in Lisbon – Alberto Miguez (*La Vanguardia Española*), Fernando Jáuregui and José Reis (*Arriba* and *pyresa*), and José Salas y Guirior (*ABC*) – Barrenechea also pinpoints the beginning of the long electoral campaign on the April 1<sup>st</sup> edition of *Informaciones*, painting a general picture of the actual conditions in which the elections will take place:

The «north» is settled and the only interest of these elections is in knowing for sure the current ideology of Portuguese. (...) This country, profoundly rural and cacique, has suffered a long dark evening of forty eight years of silence and «amen, Jesus», which has improbably been able to let go in only one year such a heavy and determinant past.<sup>iii 798</sup>

The permanent feature of the correspondent work converts some subjects, either because of its timing or its roots in previous developments, in themes that escape the special correspondent's scope and are only the object of correspondents' analysis.

In this occasion it was the case of Jean-Paul Sartre's conference in Lisbon, which was a question of timing. While visiting the revolution along with Simone de Beauvoir, the French philosopher gave a press conference, on April 4<sup>th</sup>, which Barrenechea and Alberto Miguez refer for different reasons and at different moments. If Miguez produces an overview of Sartre's press conference and overall presence in Lisbon<sup>799</sup>, Barrenechea returns to it, while criticizing the monolithic feature of the Portuguese press of those moments, an opinion shared by Sartre and that gives strength to Barrenechea's claim: «When Sartre was in this country

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<sup>798</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo.1975. «Esta noche comienza la campaña electoral» in *Informaciones*, April 1<sup>st</sup>, pp. 2

<sup>799</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1975. «“Los Estados Unidos no condicionarán la ayuda a Portugal al resultado de las elecciones”, dijo Carlucci.» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 5<sup>th</sup>, pp.21

(a few weeks ago), he told the Portuguese journalists that this country's Press was mono-chromatic, it had no criticism and criticism is necessary, and Sartre is not exactly suspicious of being "right-wing"<sup>iv800</sup>. By resorting to Sartre's opinion, Barrenechea ensures that it is not an ideological disagreement but a «fact», which is recognizable even by a supporter of the process. The fact that at this moment the Spanish press is established in Portugal as an enemy of the revolutionary process, as we have seen in Part II., is probably influencing Barrenechea's work and gives ground to these reflections.

For Barrenechea the monolithic feature is linked to the inability of the Portuguese press to be critical: «Today the Portuguese newspapers are not critical, with some very few exceptions. They are not critical, self-critical or even glad to be criticized by foreigners»<sup>v801</sup>. Barrenechea clarifies his concept of criticism and how it is a fundamental part of a democratic way of life:

(...) much of the Portuguese press mistakes honest and positive criticism with bad faith «attacks». Throughout half a century this country said «amen» to everything; it is good if it learns how to dialogue, to accept judgements and criticisms, to exercise criticism itself. To criticize is not just emphasising the bad, but to objectively express the good, the bad and the regular. To exercise that criticism is not just fair and the mission of all journalists, but an element that might really help the Portuguese process. Alfred Sauvy used to say «Informed I am a citizen, without information I am subject»<sup>vi802</sup>.

So, naturally, the arrival of a new newspaper – *Jornal Novo* – is celebrated by this journalist: «This circumstance, that freedom of the Press and Enterprise exists, is what ensures that in Portugal there will be criticism. It is written: Power corrupts, absolute Power corrupts

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<sup>800</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Las fuerzas armadas garantizan las elecciones de mañana» in *Informaciones*, April 24<sup>th</sup>, pp. 3

<sup>801</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Costa Gomes intenta tranquilizar a la opinión» in *Informaciones*, April 12<sup>th</sup>, pp. 4

<sup>802</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Costa Gomes intenta tranquilizar a la opinión» in *Informaciones*, April 12<sup>th</sup>, pp. 4



absolutely. That is not Portugal's path»<sup>vii803</sup>. A new publication to arise at this point is also proof that the «Communist takeover» is not yet complete, and an implicit defence of pluralism. On the other hand, after the nationalization of the banks, most of the press – which was owned by banks – became State owned. The open criticism of the press at this point embodies a criticism of this state of affairs.

Other subjects, such as the CDS difficulties in adapting to the electoral campaign, the Catholic Church's role in the electoral process and, finally, the publication of the preliminary report of the March 11<sup>th</sup> incident, are less connected with a question of timing and more with a further and continuous understanding of the Portuguese revolutionary process, characteristic of the permanent correspondent writing.

Fernando Jáuregui notes the publication of the preliminary report regarding the March 11<sup>th</sup> failed coup (MFAa, 1975) on the eve of the reflection day, which he considers to be a «vertiginous context»<sup>viii804</sup>. Regarding this report, Eduardo Barrenechea claims that «[a]ll that is said in the report was known. There is nothing new, except for some details. And some anecdotes»<sup>ix805</sup>. Nevertheless, Barrenechea thinks that the coup plotters' threat is still present: «Well, all this is ancient history, but not “water under the bridge”. The waters with the coup's perpetrators will once again pass by the revolution treadmill, not to make it work but to overwhelm or to paralyze it. The result of the coming elections might be the next detonator»<sup>x806</sup>.

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<sup>803</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «El gobierno portugués estudia la fijación de un salario máximo nacional» in *Informaciones*, April 30<sup>th</sup>, pp. 4

<sup>804</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando. 1975. «Hoy concluye la campaña electoral» in *Arriba*, April 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp. 13

<sup>805</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Termina la campaña electoral» in *Informaciones*, April 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.4

<sup>806</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Termina la campaña electoral» in *Informaciones*, April 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.4

The counter-revolutionary threat might still be present, from Barrenechea's point of view, but right-wing forces seem to be struggling to be present in the Portuguese public sphere, despite the Portuguese Catholic Church support of their endeavour, as all Spanish correspondents notice.

The adverse atmosphere is underlined in *ABC* by José Salas' recall the suspension of PDC, a party that this journalist considers to have been one of the hopes for the right wing sector to have any weight in the electoral process: «The case of the Christian Democracy party is different. This one has masses of possible voters. The right wing, counting with the former regime's clientele, would have joined forces in its favour»<sup>xi807</sup>. As for CDS, Salas adds that «[t]his Social and Democratic Centre party is the most moderate of the parties presenting for elections, and therefore the one which gets the more degrading reactionary slogans»<sup>xii808</sup>.

Following the March 11<sup>th</sup> failed counter-revolutionary coup, the Revolution Council not only postponed the elections from April 12<sup>th</sup> to April 25<sup>th</sup>, but also suspended the activities of parties that were considered to be working against the Revolutionary Process, such as the Christian Democracy Party [*Partido da Democracia Cristã* PDC], whose leader Major Sanches Osório fled Portugal through Spain, the Reorganized Movement of the Party of the Proletariat [*Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado* MRPP], and the Workers-Peasants Alliance [*Aliança Operário-Camponesa* AOC] (Santos, Cruzeiro and Coimbra 2000:200). Moreover, CDS and PDC had joint lists that CDS was forced by PDC's illegalization to reorganize just two weeks before the beginning of the election campaign (Sánchez 1993).

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<sup>807</sup> Salas, José .1975. «Hoy comienza la campaña electoral portuguesa» in *ABC*, April 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp. 1

<sup>808</sup> Salas, José. 1975. «Entusiasmo, tensión e intransigencia en el primer día de campaña electoral» in *ABC*, April 3<sup>rd</sup>, pp. 33

In fact, most correspondents note CDS' campaign peculiarities. Early in the electoral campaign, Barrenechea notices the gap between the electoral efforts of most parties when compared to the lack of presence of CDS:

CDS is until now the only one of the twelve political parties that has not been – physically and directly – in contact with the voters. Not a single poster has been hung up on the street, not a single rally, meeting, or public action has been hosted. Until now only radio and television spaces have been used (...) <sup>xiii809</sup>.

Lastly, the Social and Democratic Centre party (CDS) has not yet been face-to-face with the Portuguese voters. Only its official spaces in the radio and on television are used, but not one rally, public meeting, press conference has been held. (...) One will have to wait since until now its attitude is not exactly the normal or logical one of a party committed to an election campaign <sup>xiv810</sup>.

CDS's continuous lack of presence – and particularly its lack of physical presence on the streets – is combined with «a rumour – that I was not able to confirm until this moment – that indicates that the Social and Democratic Centre (CDS) will drop the electoral race in the last minute» <sup>xv811</sup>, which brought forward curiosity around its electoral strategy, as Jáuregui points out: «People are wondering what is the tactic of this group [CDS], which apparently has spread rumours that they are dropping the elections, while now it is arguing that it will be present in all the electoral circles where it is running...» <sup>xvi812</sup>.

On the contrary, in *La Vanguardia Española* Alberto Miguez calls attention to the lack of a favourable ambiance for CDS not only to campaign but also to exist:

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<sup>809</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo.1975. «Cinco grandes bloques políticos para las elecciones» in *Informaciones*, April 4<sup>th</sup>, pp.2

<sup>810</sup>Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «El almirante Rosa Coutinho propone un partido civil del MFA» in *Informaciones*, April 8<sup>th</sup>, pp.4

<sup>811</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Trazadas las líneas de la nueva política económica» in *Informaciones*, April 5<sup>th</sup>, pp. 2

<sup>812</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1975. «Se temen "intentonas" antielectorales» in *Arriba*, April 10<sup>th</sup>, pp. 14

On the other hand, poor DCS [sic] had its headquarters assaulted several times (whenever a «reactionary attempt» happened) and had its belongings stolen. Its central headquarters in Lisbon looks like a «bunker». Its leaders have no other option but to walk around with some robust and frowning gentlemen, their bodyguards<sup>xviii813</sup>.

However CDS is far from being the only party harassed, for the monopoly of violence and constraint does not belong to the left wing. Given the geographic-political division of Portugal, left-wing parties, in turn, have trouble campaigning in the north part of the country, as Miguez describes:

It is clear that in some parts of the country the left wing and the far-left-wing parties have little to do. The hostility of the people of the north against Communists and ultra-leftists justifies that Cunhal has yet to visit the regions of Minho, Oporto and Trás-os-Montes<sup>xviii814</sup>.

In the north of the country the wave of pre-electoral violence, which seemed to have been cancelled, continues. Violence that, according to all signs, does not belong exclusively to the left and far-left. For instance, it was PPD (Popular Democratic Party) who attempted to boycott a meeting of the Socialist party in Ribeira de Pena. Furthermore, 200 militants of CDS tried to assault a «working centre» of the Communist party in Famalicão. In Guimarães the situation was reportedly reversed, and the men of CDS had to wait for dawn in order to get out of the theatre that «the people» had sieged and the Army surrounded, as a basic measure of precaution. Despite all this, there were considerable shots fired and injured...<sup>xix815</sup>.

The existing political tension becomes even more visible through the communiqué issued by the Catholic Church in which its political position is clearly expressed. According to Paula Borges Santos (2005) the ecclesiastic hierarchy frequently recalled clerics that their involvement in political parties' activities or the acceptance of any political office

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<sup>813</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1975. «Lisboa: Hoy comienza la campaña electoral portuguesa» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp. 23

<sup>814</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1975. «Lisboa: Los católicos no pueden votar a aquellos partidos que sean incompatibles con la concepción cristiana del hombre» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.25

<sup>815</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1975. «Lisboa: Se han registrado enfrentamientos en diversos actos preelectorales» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.27

would lead to their suspension from clergymen activities. But the same historian also argues that faced with the MFA's call for a blank vote, the hierarchy publicly declared against it claiming that «no one should abstain from voting» (2005: 147) and that the usual restrictions from voting options were «incompatible with the Christian conception of men and life among society». In this context, Barrenechea underlines that tension had also characterised the relationship between the Portuguese Catholic Church and the State and that the elections became an opportunity for this tension to be released:

Even if officially Church-State relationships in this country appear cordial, the ongoing electoral campaign is giving rise to the emergence of certain frictions or criticism, which in some cases reached violence. Some little outbreaks (from the Church as from some parties) sign a possible «blossoming»<sup>xx816</sup>.

Alberto Miguez doubts the efficiency of the official Portuguese Catholic Church hierarchy's warning about the clergymen's political activity, given that «no less than four clergymen have presented themselves as candidates of left-wing parties»<sup>xxi817</sup>. Jáuregui speculates that unofficially the same hierarchy seems to have given authorization «for the priests to openly criticize the Communist party in their homilies»<sup>xxii</sup>. Facing this overt offense «PC states that its ideology is not incompatible with Catholicism and that several of its candidates are Catholics»<sup>xxiii 818</sup>, as Jáuregui adds. Again according to Borges Santos, the PCP had a policy of «outstretched hand» towards Catholics (2005:149), aimed at conquering their vote.

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<sup>816</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Manifestación de apoyo a las nacionalizaciones» in *Informaciones*, April 17<sup>th</sup>, pp.16

<sup>817</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1975. «Lisboa: Los católicos no pueden votar a aquellos partidos que sean incompatibles con la concepción cristiana del hombre» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.25

<sup>818</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1975. «Los obispos recomiendan votar» in *Arriba* April 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

However a week further into the electoral campaign there were no more doubts about the Catholic Church's crusade against left-wing parties, as José Salas comments in *ABC*:

The strength of Portuguese Catholicism should not be underestimated, especially in the northern part of the country. And in that respect the Lusitanian clergy has been explicit. The faithful should not vote for any Marxist party. Some clergymen even mentioned which parties should be voted for. Naturally those around which the right wing is organizing itself and the left wing is deeming of fascist and reactionary<sup>xxiv819</sup>.

This power of influence of the Portuguese Catholic Church over the population and its opportunity to do so is then developed by Fernando Jáuregui, who travels up north, to Braga, to follow this issue:

It is essential to get to know the lands up north in these pre-electoral days. They represent, as they say, two thirds of the total of the Portuguese electoral vote. It has been usually considered as more conservative, reactionary, anti-Communist...It is really like this? It is. The little enlighten and uneducated inhabitants of the Minho villages, of the small transmontana towns or even of the Estrela Mountain are under the almost complete influence of the conservative forces, often salazarist: the priest, the cacique...The small land owners peasants of the north have even been threatened with excommunication if they vote for the Communists. Last Sunday some homilies went as far as «forbidding» their parishioners of voting for Communists. Braga's ultra-conservative archbishop, don Francisco Maria da Silva, went further: he simply advised voting for the right wing party Social and Democratic Centre (CDS).<sup>xxv 820</sup>

What Jáuregui describes is a country in almost every way possible opposite to what most journalists find upon their arrival in Lisbon. Even José Salas, a veteran correspondent in Portugal, despite recognizing the Catholic Church's strength in Portugal, stresses the difficulties of the right wing in asserting its presence in a public sphere that is hostile to its existence. For Salas it is not that the right wing has vanished – given that

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<sup>819</sup> Salas, José .1975. «La derecha no ha podido presentarse a cuerpo limpio» in *ABC* April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp.1

<sup>820</sup>Jáuregui, Fernando.1975. «Predominio conservador en la zona norte» in *Arriba* April 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.15

its forces are still very much active in the north – but that fear<sup>821</sup> has forced it to present itself transvestite in the public sphere. «Where is the Portuguese right-wing? »<sup>xxvi</sup>, Salas asks and very quickly explains to himself: «The Portuguese right-wing is presenting itself disguised for the pure and simple reason that it cannot present itself unprotected»<sup>xxviii</sup><sup>822</sup>.

In this context of restlessness, the announcement of the electoral pact proposed by the MFA to political parties was absorbed by international observers, special and permanent correspondents alike, in different ways, though none ever supported its enforcement.

According to Inácia Rezola (2007), the idea of a pre-Constitutional agreement had come up in late 1974, firstly formulated by Álvaro Cunhal, but supported by Socialists like José Medeiros Ferreira, Jaime Gama or Vítor Cunhal Rego and even CDS' leader Diogo Freitas do Amaral. Later on PPD also accepts the idea. The MFA's proposal, despite accepted in several of its paragraphs, caused open dissent mostly in what concerned the MFA's aspiration of control over the legislative action of Parliament and Government, the choice of the President of the Republic, the dependence of the Government under Presidential tutelage and the Government's composition after the electoral process. CDS and PPD opposed all these items and the Socialist Party opposed the MFA's interference in both the Assembly and Government, either directly or through the Presidential tutelage of the Government. The negotiation of the pact and the institutionalization of the MFA in what became the Revolution Council were precipitated by the events of March 11<sup>th</sup>. Therefore the parties (PS, PPD, PCP, CDS, MDP/CDE and FSP) facing the options of conforming to the Constitutional Agreement Pact proposed

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<sup>821</sup> Salas, José .1975. «Los comunistas recibirán apoyo electoral de todos los partidos de izquierda» in *ABC*, April 4<sup>th</sup>, pp.33-34

<sup>822</sup> Salas, José .1975. «La derecha no ha podido presentarse a cuerpo limpio» in *ABC*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp.1

by the MFA or having the electoral process postponed, eventually signed it on April 11<sup>th</sup>. Outside of the pact remained parties like the Monarchist Popular Party [*Partido Popular Monárquico* PPM], despite having been present at the table of negotiations, and leftist parties that nonetheless would run in the elections: MES, UDP, FEC (m-l), PUP and LCI.

Special correspondents like Salvador López de la Torre, Xavier Roig or González Casanova, despite not actively defending the pact, do not denounce it as anti-democratic like most of the other Spanish journalists in Portugal do. The most common approach for the Spanish press is interpreting the Pact as one more antidemocratic turn of the Portuguese revolutionary process in a chronological line that includes the single union law, the nationalization of banks and now the containment of the electoral process. In this vision converged much of the writing of Augusto Assia, José Salas and Eduardo Barrenechea.

The hastiness of this decision is enhanced by both Salas and Assia, and both of them root this hastiness in the fear felt by the MFA of losing power to the parties. Assia identifies this decision with the Military's will of socializing the country: «Are the Armed Forces willing to impose in Portugal the system of Bulgaria, China or Albania, even if the Portuguese vote for a system like the ones that exist in France, the Netherlands or England?»<sup>xxviii823</sup>. A desire that Augusto Assia and José Salas alike consider fiercely antidemocratic if it is accomplished over the heads of the Portuguese people.

Given that the parties gave in and signed the pact that assures the Portuguese path towards Socialism despite the electoral results achieved, Salas criticizes them for their hypocrisy in signing it «when even stones know that they load the famous pact as much as children loathe

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<sup>823</sup> Assia, Augusto.1975. «Lisboa: graves contradicciones antes los proximos comicios» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.23



medicine»<sup>xxix824</sup>. Assia cannot stress enough that at least this «enthusiastic task of dictating decree after decree in order to economically dismantle the capitalist system»<sup>xxx825</sup> is until this point completely reversible «with the same easiness with which it has been promulgated. By using paper and ink»<sup>xxxi826</sup>. For Assia this detail is reassuring, because it gives ground for someone to step in and reverse the process.

The idea of having a pact conditioning the electoral event is looked down not only by the former correspondents, but also by Eduardo Barrenechea. All of them identify this attitude with paternalism towards the Portuguese people. Assia matches this view of the Portuguese people with the one the former regime had:

In the name of anti-salazarism and anti-caetanism, or anti-fascism, the military are in danger of falling into the same political principle of Caetano and Salazar, according to which the Portuguese people is not yet ready for democracy, because unlike the great European peoples, its ignorance prevents it from knowing what is convenient<sup>xxxii827</sup>.

Unlike Assia, Salas does not particularize a regime but considers that tangled by the pact, the Portuguese electoral process «looks too much like the elections usually celebrated in countries with authoritarian types of regime»<sup>xxxiii828</sup>. Barrenechea does not go this far and only considers that «[t]he elections will serve little purpose and will not decide a thing. This is certain»<sup>xxxiv829</sup>. For Barrenechea the pact means that the Portuguese

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<sup>824</sup> Salas, José .1975. «Los choques e insultos de los partidos, el "lenguaje" de la campaña electoral» in *ABC*, April 11<sup>th</sup>, pp.43

<sup>825</sup> Assia, Augusto.1975. «Ninguna de las acciones emprendidas por las fuerzas armadas portuguesas es irreversible» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 19<sup>th</sup>, pp. 25

<sup>826</sup> Assia, Augusto.1975. «Lisboa: graves contradicciones antes los proximos comícios» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

<sup>827</sup> Assia, Augusto.1975. «Lisboa: graves contradicciones antes los proximos comícios» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

<sup>828</sup> Salas, José .1975. «Penalizaciones a dos partidos en la campaña electoral» in *ABC*, April 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.47

<sup>829</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Los partidos temen la linea dominante de Rosa Coutinho» in *Informaciones*, April 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.5

revolutionary process is heading the way of the Peruvian-regime, something to which he had alluded to beforehand:

The formal liberties conceded to the political parties, the electoral call, etc., have no greater relevance or serve no purpose other than «keeping up appearances». The military are in the catbird seat. Freedom entails that everyone is free of choosing, but only from the options presented by the military<sup>xxxv830</sup>.

The superficiality of the electoral process, if constrained by the pact, is also underlined by Augusto Assia when he writes that it would have «[a]ll the elements of truly democratic elections, except to choose. The Armed Forces have already chosen for the Portuguese»<sup>xxxvi831</sup>.

This is one of the ideas that give ground to the fact that before the results are known, both *ABC* and *La Vanguardia Española* express their doubts regarding the effectiveness of an electoral process being taken in Portugal after the signing of this pact. *ABC* is bolder in its claim that the Portuguese people will be voting for nothing, whereas *La Vanguardia Española* considers it to be «a sort of a gigantic opinion poll»<sup>xxxvii832</sup>, an idea shared by Jaume Miravittes in *Tele/eXprés*, who calls it «a super Gallup poll»<sup>833</sup>.

Framing the process differently, González Casanova, uses the same word but dismisses the negative connotation of the concept of poll: «In this sense, the word “poll” – lacking the pejorative feature that some wanted to confer to it – is the one that fits best yesterday’s elections, only

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<sup>830</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Todo el poder, para los militares» in *Informaciones*, April 7<sup>th</sup>, pp.4

<sup>831</sup> Assia, Augusto. 1975. «Los únicos realmente entusiastas de la socialización son, al parecer, los militares portugueses» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.27

<sup>832</sup> Editorial: «El segundo 25 de abril». 1975. *La Vanguardia española*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>833</sup> Miravittles, Jaume. 1975. «Cifras portuguesas» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 30<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

preceded by democratic plebiscite and against the former dictatorship»<sup>xxxviii834</sup>.

*ABC* remembers the military continuum between both regimes, claiming that it is a characteristic of this institution not to endorse electoral consultations and also that the only difference between the Military Institution that in 1926 interrupted the parliamentary democracy and that who put an end to the New State is a question of semblance: the current ones want to seem democrats, whereas in the 1920s authoritarian regimes were not regarded as politically incorrect as they would later in the 1970s.

Half a century ago the Portuguese military set the rules of a system that excluded the possibilities of electoral consultations like the ones performed by parliamentary democracies. One year ago the Portuguese military threw down the political system resulting from those rules. The caetanist recreation of the salazarist system of Corporations disappeared from History, pushed by the rain, the riffles and the euphoria of the last April 25<sup>th</sup>. A year later, the Armed Forces Movement has prepared the ballot boxes. Formally, they are as open to the popular will as in any Western parliamentary system, but in practice and in reality they are as restricted as the ones of salazarist times<sup>xxxix835</sup>.

*La Vanguardia Española*, unlike *ABC*, does not deem the Military institution as an immutable structure. This newspaper's doubts about the sincerity and value of the elections, in fact stems from the MFA's evolution. The MFA is considered not to be the same entity of the previous year since by then it seems willing to perpetuate its political presence.

Notwithstanding, without explicitly endorsing the pact, López de la Torre acknowledges that the MFA and political parties are not

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<sup>834</sup> González Casanova, J.A.1975. «Elecciones en calma y con masiva participación» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

<sup>835</sup> Editorial: «Votar para nada» .1975. *ABC*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp.3-4

antagonist entities in Portugal, although «it would be inaccurate to say that there is a natural and spontaneous alliance between them»<sup>xl836</sup>.

Veteran Salvador López de la Torre, formerly at *ABC* and *Nuevo Diario*, but now working for both EFE agency and *pyresa*, had fought the civil war on the insurgent faction and later joined the Spanish blue division that fought WWII in the Soviet Union front. López de la Torre reveals a pragmatic point of view regarding the political parties' action when he states that «the six parties signing the pact (...) are the only important ones of the Portuguese political chessboard»<sup>xli837</sup>. López de la Torre assumes that the parties who refused the pact, which were mostly in the Left, are not relevant in any way; therefore the issue is not problematic. However, despite the evident difficulty in balancing wills, López de la Torre argues that the Military have not lost legitimacy over the process because of the part they had in it since the beginning:

The revolution was a Military initiative, performed by the Military, which the civilian politician joined when the games had already been decided. (...) and it is natural that those responsible for the revolution, i.e. the military, are the ones who consider themselves to be its authorized administrators<sup>xlii 838</sup>.

Xavier Roig dismisses the idea that the elections are made worthless by the existence of the pact. In the same newspaper, González Casanova deems the pact «the most original formula I know»<sup>xliii839</sup> because of the role political parties were cast to play:

For some the mere existence of the pact supposes that Friday's elections will serve no purpose. That all has been decided beforehand and that,

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<sup>836</sup> López de la Torre, Salvador.1975. «Declaraciones de Mário Soares» in *Arriba*, April 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

<sup>837</sup> López de la Torre, Salvador.1975. «Portugal vive un regimen predemocratico» in *Arriba*, April 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>838</sup> López de la Torre, Salvador.1975. «Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho: "No confiamos en los partidos politicos"» in *Arriba*, April 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.13

<sup>839</sup> González Casanova, J.A.1975. « El MFA y la asamblea constituyente» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.4

therefore, the country could avoid the sterile and expensive elections. If this thesis is correct, then we would have to assume that the political party leaders have become suddenly crazy, along with thousands of their supporters, given the show of mobilization observed in the country<sup>xliv840</sup>.

The fact that the elections have the purpose of electing a constituent assembly is seldom mentioned. However, without even mentioning it, or the pact, and coming across as an isolated voice in its favour, Jordi Borja is able to present an implicit defence of the pact, by framing its purpose. In *Tele/eXprés*, Borja explicitly contends that the framework of analysis used to understand the Portuguese developments cannot be the same used for other situations, because different social structures and balances of power require different analytical stances:

The analysis and assessment that the situation deserves cannot be made drawing on the ideas and power balances existing in Spain, France or Italy, in other words, by applying criteria deducted from the real possibilities in these countries. Instead the Portuguese case should be studied in its specificity if we want to apply to it general criteria such as democracy, pluralism, nationalizations, unionist autonomy, isolation or international integration, etc.<sup>xlv841</sup>.

This has several implications. Firstly, after March 11<sup>th</sup>, according to Borja, «the “Portuguese revolution” will be talked about as the Cuban, Chinese or Russian are talked about»<sup>xlvi</sup>, and one of the reasons for this has to do with the fact that there is in Portugal an effective crisis of the economic structure. Indeed, «[t]he downfall of the Colonial Empire means the crisis of the entire domination system of the Portuguese haute-bourgeoisie»<sup>xlvii</sup>, which, unlike the French one, had the economic power almost exclusively based «in its financier-commercial role of speculative and dependent intermediaries and in the abusive exploitation of the majority of the population in the framework of underdeveloped industrial and agricultural structures»<sup>xlviii</sup>. With the colonial defeat, «the haute-bourgeoisie lost its main economic role and the Armed Forces lived a

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<sup>840</sup> Roig, Xavier. 1975. «Portugal: Tranquilidad» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.3

<sup>841</sup> Borja, Jordi. 1975. «La revolución Portuguesa» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

progressive crisis of conscience that converted them from a tool of Empire into a revolutionary movement»<sup>xlix</sup>. Borja argues that the MFA and the left-wings sectors are forcing a democratization of the institutions and that that this process implies «the creation of new institutions» and those demand «the consideration of the new social relationships that should be formalized»<sup>l</sup>. In pursuing this endeavour, «there is no path for the right wing in Portugal, because the oligarch bourgeoisie has lost its economic and ideological hegemony, and lacks any political instruments or social responses»<sup>li</sup>, and therefore:

The process of democratization is being made against the interests of the big capital, which without the instruments of hegemony appears to be naked in front of the people. That is why the construction of the new State cannot be separated from the nationalizations, land reform, i.e. the «anti-monopolist policy»<sup>lii</sup>.

Hence, the existence of the pact ensures that this path will continue to be followed. Finally, because they lost their position in the socio-economic structure – and the resulting hegemony triggering the popular mobilization that would have granted a victory on March 11<sup>th</sup>, according to Borja – right wing sectors were by then recruiting support outside their own circle: «In the hinterland of the country they will try to convert, and have already begun to do so, the centre and left-wing forces (PPD, PSP and some sectors of MFS) into tools of opposition to the revolutionary process»<sup>liii</sup>. This analysis reveals attitudes of criticism and support regarding some of the developments taking place. For instance, based on Borja's reading of events, the electoral process loses importance when compared to the ongoing institutional democratization: «the current Portuguese democracy's character does not start or end with these elections»<sup>liv</sup>. He develops this argument further, by arguing that:

The elections have in this sense an undeniable importance because of what they suppose in terms of participation, but they cannot embody yet the driving force of the ongoing social change for the simple reason that it is just getting started and a great part of the population will vote still

under the pressure of fear and ignorance. The centre and north of the country represent more than two thirds of the population, most of it illiterate and who see the left wing as the devil<sup>lv</sup>.

A similar argument is made when Borja dismisses the generalized criticism towards the new press law. Borja defends this law by claiming that it has not been used in an authoritarian way: «That is not how it has been used and today the Portuguese press enjoys a considerable liveliness and very rich information»<sup>lvi842</sup>. Borja's opinion about the quality of the Portuguese press contradicts the claims of both Jean Paul Sartre and Eduardo Barrenechea and is probably guided by his intention of supporting the Portuguese Process.

Also the attack of the leftist parties' action, which Borja considers not to be part of «the real left (PC, unions, MDP, sectors of the PSP and the socialist left – FSP, MES, farmer and peasant unions, housing movements, students' and workers' organizations, etc.)»<sup>lvii843</sup>, is based on the general belief that «the far-left groups have infiltrated in those movements a great component of artificial division and clashes (...)»<sup>lviii</sup>, and that this is a source of «constant denunciation from the Government and the MFA». Borja refers, in this specific case, to the urban social movement, which Pedro Ramos Pinto (2008) has demonstrated became increasingly radicalized after the elections and not necessarily because of the actions of the far-left, as Borja is suggesting.

Overall, international observers continue to struggle with the lack of an appropriate interpretative framework to observe this subsequent step in the Portuguese revolutionary process, and realize that all the models applied failed to grasp the complexities of the Portuguese reality of this period.

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<sup>842</sup> Borja, Jordi.1975. «Democracia y elecciones en Portugal» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp.16

<sup>843</sup> Borja, Jordi.1975. «La revolución Portuguesa» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

There is a dispute among observers as to whether it is appropriate to use the Western democracy framework, and several of the Spanish observers argue that the particularity of the Portuguese process and the difficulty of making it fit into any already known framework, as Salvador López de la Torre claims: «Faced with the Portuguese revolution many attitudes can be adopted, but without any doubt the most flawed one would be to compare it with any other European political process, for the simple reason that this is a typically Portuguese endeavour»<sup>lix844</sup>. In his view, «some Spanish observers of the Portuguese reality seem so committed to draw conclusions from their own desires»<sup>lix845</sup>. The use of a Western democratic framework to observe this process, which is frequently the case of José Salas in *ABC*, Augusto Assia in *La Vanguardia Española* and Jaume Miravittles in *Tele/eXprés*, usually leads to accusations of paternalism against the MFA, for as Salvador López de la Torre remembers:

(...) jubilant foreign commentators – among them more than just a few Spaniards – insisted in seeing in the «carnation revolution», throughout the enthusiastic days of 1974, the blossoming of a democracy forged according to Anglo-Saxon standards, without realizing that what fell on 25 April 1974 was the political system but that it was impossible after forty years of salazarism to magically emerge as a totally equipped parliamentary democracy copied from London<sup>lix846</sup>.

Jaume Miravittles, for instance, uses several frameworks to analyse the situation in Portugal (i.e. the Cuban Revolution, Allende's Chile or Republican Spain) in order to argue for a Western type of society to be established in Portugal. Miravittles ranks, as he explains, freedom above the values of social wealth and its fair redistribution, considering

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<sup>844</sup> López de la Torre, Salvador.1975. « Portugal vive un regimen predemocratico » in *Arriba*, April 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>845</sup> López de la Torre, Salvador.1975. « El gobierno sera un mero ejecutor » in *Arriba*, April 16<sup>th</sup>,pp.17

<sup>846</sup> López de la Torre, Salvador.1975. « Portugal vive un regimen predemocratico » in *Arriba*, April 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.12



that in the defence of this trilogy, any idea of neutrality is, in his case and probably of all of those who write in newspapers, to be dismissed, hence identifying their role with Gramsci's «war of position»:

All of us who write about political subjects talk about our «objectivity»...I do not intent to be objective. My goal, within very humble limits, is to «influence» even if just one reader, and above all to fight clichés. «Democracy», «Socialism», the «people» have become clichés, which shows how deeply they are attached to the masses. Therefore, all that I am saying indicates my personal preferences and today I would like the Portuguese people to manifest above all its desire for freedom, which in that context means to vote in favour of the non-Communist democratic parties – and this is not a visceral reaction, the sincere Communist deserves all my respect, but loyalty to my fortunate trilogy<sup>lxii847</sup>.

Although Miravittles denies his views to be guided by anti-communism, which is somewhat debatable, he admits he wants to influence people with them. For him civil liberties come before both the creation of social wealth and its fair distribution, given that any change in this order of values will lead to the establishment of a dictatorship. Defending his ideal type of society, he argues that «the definition of what Portugal will become in the post-salazarist stage has to be given by the people and was effectively given by the people in such a categorical way that no one can say otherwise»<sup>lxiii848</sup>. Therefore, according to Miravittles, the electoral results should translate in MFA stepping down from power and a representative Government to take over from then on, a stance also backed by José Salas and Augusto Assia.

However there are some observers, like Jesús Fueyo in *Arriba*, Eduardo Barrenechea in *Informaciones* or González Casanova in *Tele/eXprés*, who acknowledge that the Portuguese Revolutionary Process is atypical and, therefore, who assume the failure of known frameworks to

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<sup>847</sup>Miravittles, Jaume. 1975. « Mi trilogia aplicada a Portugal » in *Tele/eXprés*, April 35<sup>th</sup>, pp.16

<sup>848</sup> Miravittles, Jaume. 1975. «Cifras portuguesas» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 30<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

interpret it. For Political Theory Professor, successor of Manuel Fraga as head of the Political Studies Institute and head of the Press managing office until 1962, Jesús Fueyo, who authored the column «La escritura invisible» in *Arriba*, this peculiarity makes the Portuguese process very difficult to predict. Furthermore Fueyo notes the irony in the fact that in order to achieve its goal of total equality, the process seems to need a superman, as in someone hierarchically positioned, to lead the way: «The irony, almost sarcastic, rests in the fact that democratic revolutions willing to establish a generous philosophy of equality from the moment they are born, need at least a superman to achieve it. Does Portugal have one?»<sup>lxiv849</sup>.

Barrenechea and González Casanova agree in the conclusion that there are no models applicable to the Portuguese Process, but not in the premises used to reach that conclusion. According to Barrenechea, «Portugal is searching for its future. An unprecedented path within Socialism, except if a right wing coup is carried out, which should not be cast aside either»<sup>lxv</sup>. Therefore, in this unprecedented path to socialism there is no place for paths already taken: «That it will not be the one imposed by Communism, neither by European Socialism, nor by the liberal-bourgeoisie, nor by the right wing under “slogans” of peace and tranquillity. Portugal is searching for roots. Better yet, it is searching for seeds. And the models breakdown»<sup>lxvi850</sup>.

The difference between Barrenechea and González Casanova lies in the fact that the latter, although agreeing that «I do not think that an existing model might be applied to the Portuguese case»<sup>lxvii851</sup>, identifies

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<sup>849</sup>Fueyo, Jesus. 1975. «Socialismo bajo las armas» in *Arriba* May 11<sup>th</sup>, pp.1-2

<sup>850</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Los partidos temen la línea dominante de Rosa Coutinho» in *Informaciones*, April 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.5

<sup>851</sup> González Casanova, J.A.1975. « El MFA y la asamblea constituyente» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.4

the MFA as the driving force of this process – «[t]he MFA just took from the Communist party the old self-definition of the “organized vanguard and conscious of the Armed people, guarantor and driving force of the revolutionary process”»<sup>lxviii852</sup> – and agrees in the self-identification that part of the MFA has with third-world movements, given that:

The colonial war allowed them to read the Marxist books written by the warriors, but especially made them aware of Portuguese underdevelopment, of its external dependence and of the need for socialism as a formula of independent national modernization. On this issue, the MFA is a classic «third worldist» movement<sup>lxix853</sup>.

However the MFA struggles with an ideological identification within the socialist field, since while it «repudiates the utopic leftism of the minority of maximalist groups»<sup>lxx</sup>, it also «does not seem to trust Mr. Soares’ Social-Democracy much either, which is termed as socialism for “doctors”»<sup>lxxi</sup>, and it seems to be increasing the distance between this structure and a Communist Party aligned with the Soviet Union. González Casanova detects from the language used the growing distance between the MFA and the PCP – «along with the clear Marxist language of the Captains, the nationalist, Third Worldist and neutral orientation that diminishes the traditional image of a PC linked to Moscow is increasing today»<sup>lxxii</sup> – which leaves the process without guidelines despite the Third Worldist inclination that González Casanova detects.

## b) The results: a victory of moderation

The results of the elections for the Constituent Assembly (PSP 37,89 %, PPD 26,39 %, PCP 12,46 %, CDS 7,61 %, MDP/CDE 4,14%, FSP 1,16%, MES 1,02%, UDP 0,79%, FEC (m-l) 0,58%, PPM 0,57%, PUP 0,23%, LCI 0,19%, *Associação para a Defesa dos Interesses de Macau* 0,03%,

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<sup>852</sup> González Casanova, J.A.1975. « El sistema de partidos ante las elecciones» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>853</sup> González Casanova, J.A.1975. « El MFA y la asamblea constituyente» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.4

CDM 0,02%) allowed for several different readings of the Portuguese situation, as Alberto Miguez states in *La Vanguardia Española*: «The resounding socialist victory in Portugal opens the door to very different “readings” and interpretations»<sup>lxxiii854</sup>.

The wining Socialist party is decomposed by the analysis of *Tele/eXprés*' journalists. For instance, Roig, González Casanova and Josep Ramoneda (one of the «curious» journalists in Portugal, detected by the deixis of his writing<sup>855</sup>), all call the reader's attention to the lack of correspondence between the Socialist party leadership and its grassroots, which combined with the lack of a coherent political program, allowed for the «enormous heterogeneity of the electoral background of the 37,87 % of the socialist victory»<sup>lxxiv856</sup>. Xavier Roig and González Casanova agree that «the Socialist party has taken the majority of the vote because its policies are not foreseen and, also, because of –among other things – its, up until now, manifest ambiguity »<sup>lxxv857</sup>. Having no clear and objective political program, the Socialist Party gathered votes from sectors with different goals and demands.

In *Arriba*, Salvador López de la Torre enhances not the ambiguity of the Socialist Party, but rather the role this party is willing to play in

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<sup>854</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1975. «Lisboa: Los partidos socialista y socialdemocrata obtuvieron el mayor número de votos» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6

<sup>855</sup> «En Lisboa los corresponsales extranjeros podían testimoniar como el MRPP se manifestaba a las cinco de la tarde - los Colegios electorales todavía abiertos - con la consigna "boicot a la farsa electoral" sin que hubiese el más mínimo enfrentamiento, sin que apareciese el COPCON - "realmente, nos decía un demócrata portugués, hay que desconocer completamente lo que era la PIDE para decir que el COPCON es una nueva PIDE"» [Ramoneda, Josep.1975.« El MFA y las elecciones portuguesas» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 30<sup>th</sup>, pp.16

<sup>856</sup> Ramoneda, Josep. 1975. «Los socialistas portugueses y la administración de su victoria electoral» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.4

<sup>857</sup> González Casanova, J.A.1975. «Los socialistas en la encrucijada» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.11

Portuguese society – a bulwark against Communism –, even if it is a result of an opportunistic way of doing politics:

It can be argued, without misrepresenting the truth, that the first anti-Communist party of Portugal is the Socialist party, and when the masses recited in chorus the official slogan «socialism yes, dictatorship no», they were referring to the Communist dictatorship. (...) Anti-Communism starts here, in the limits of Socialism, and continues without a continuity solution until the right wing of the Social and Democratic Centre, through the Social Democratic Party. In Portugal whoever is not Communist is anti-Communist, and Mário Soares had his troops on the streets of Lisbon to show how they were against Communism. (...) and we are sure that the day after the elections the Socialists who are today attacking the Communists and the Social-Democrats (...) will remain united in a Government that has seats for everyone.<sup>lxxvi 858</sup>

Socialists' opportunism is also stressed by Xavier Roig when he notes that in the absence of a political program, the party had to «limit its propaganda to a continuous call for freedom»<sup>lxxvii859</sup>. Here we have once more an empirical deployment of Lacalu's concept of a «floating signifier» at work.

From one point of view the results express a clear victory of the Portuguese people, in the sense that through its electoral choices the people emancipated itself from the paternalism of the Military – an idea shared by José Reis in *Arriba*, Eduardo Barrenechea in *Informaciones* and, with some nuances, by José Salas in *ABC*.

More than emancipation of the Portuguese people, Salas hopes that the elections might clarify who actually represents this people «[t]hrough them we will know who from now on will be able to say to be speaking in the name of the people. This people in the name of which

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<sup>858</sup> López de la Torre, Salvador. 1975. «Los grandes partidos miden sus fuerzas» in *Arriba*, April 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.15

<sup>859</sup> Roig, Xavier. 1975. «Socialismo marxista y socialismo pluralista, las dos principales opciones» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

everyone speaks for»<sup>lxxviii860</sup>. In *Arriba*, José Reis deems this people, «the good Portuguese people» a concept Augusto Assia had also used previously, responsible for the civility and tranquillity which surrounded the entire process: «One thing should be said: the necessary order for the elections to happen was ensured by the people, since we saw no policemen or military near or far from the ballot boxes in Lisbon»<sup>lxxix861</sup>. Reis' concept of the «good Portuguese people» also encompasses the idea that despite wrongful representations in this occasion, «[t]he country truly showed to be as it is, and not how sometimes some people want to perceive it to be: a nice peaceful people, affable and integrated in the life of its country»<sup>lxxx862</sup>. José Reis thus considers this people – «the authentic people, the six millions voters, the working people who earns its salary, and has a hard time managing it, is traditionally an “affable and delicate people”»<sup>lxxxii863</sup> – to be the genuine winner of the vote against a paternalist idea of politics: «Once again the people showed itself as it is, without supporting extremists and without allowing itself to get carried away by them (...) It became clear that the authentic desire of the Portuguese was voting and not turning their backs to the construction of the future, allowing others to make decisions in the key-moments of this country life»<sup>lxxxiii864</sup>. This idea is shared by Barrenechea, for whom the people proved that all patronizing attitudes are undesirable, including the MFA-Parties' pact:

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<sup>860</sup> Salas, José .1975. «Los portugueses votaron con serenidad y orden» in *ABC*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.15-16

<sup>861</sup> Reis, José .1975. «Colas desde la dos de la madrugada» in *Arriba*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.14

<sup>862</sup> Reis, José .1975. «Colas desde la dos de la madrugada» in *Arriba*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.14

<sup>863</sup> Reis, José .1975. «Dos partidos que esperaban mejor resultado» in *Arriba*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>864</sup> Reis, José .1975. «Dos partidos que esperaban mejor resultado» in *Arriba*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

Yesterday the Portuguese people reached the supreme victory. Much greater than a victory of this or that party, yesterday the Portuguese people demonstrated that there are «no underage peoples» (...) Yesterday Portugal gave a resounding answer to those exerting political paternalism and claim peoples to be underage. Yesterday Portugal said yes to freedom and to its Army in a clear, calm and joyful way<sup>lxxxiii865</sup>.

This point of view of emancipation is not incompatible with the one that grasps in the electoral results a victory of moderation, in fact an idea supported by the same journalists. For José Reis it was proved that the people voted in a conservative way, in the sense that it demonstrated not to want «adventurous invitations or non-convincing experiences»<sup>lxxxiv866</sup>, choosing, in opposition, the path of moderation.

José Salas and Eduardo Barrenechea say exactly the same thing but directed at opposite audiences. Both claim that this was a victory of moderation, but Barrenechea refuses to accept this Socialist victory as a victory of the Left, as some observers claim: «I would not dare to say that the left wing has won, given that the great winner until now is Mario Soares' Socialist party, which follows a moderate, European type of Socialism»<sup>lxxxv867</sup>. On the contrary, José Salas sees a victory of moderation despite the attempts of coining it a left-wing one:

Considering the overall panorama of the Portuguese elections, one could think that moderation has triumphed and that Communism has suffered a visible defeat. (...) With this the meeting was over. In it, moderation was converted into left wing. (...) Well it is all the same. The left wing won because the winners say so. And their victory was foreseen by the pact of the parties with the Armed Forces Movement that ensured the path towards socialism preconized by their components<sup>lxxxvi868</sup>.

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<sup>865</sup>Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Espectacular triunfo socialista en Portugal» in *Informaciones*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.1

<sup>866</sup>Reis, José .1975. «El electorado rechaza la aventura y el riesgo» in *Arriba*, April 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>867</sup>Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Espectacular triunfo socialista en Portugal» in *Informaciones*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.1

<sup>868</sup>Salas, José. 1975. «Los vencedores entienden su triunfo como victoria de la izquierda» in *ABC* April 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.1

In fact, after the electoral results were announced, *ABC*, *La Vanguardia* and *Informaciones*<sup>869</sup> all agree that elections represent a victory of moderation, an idea that is expressed in a very similar way: the electoral results embody a refusal of equivalent extremisms.

What the Portuguese want, what the majority of them wished, is well demonstrated in the election results: a desire of moderation, equidistant from extremisms<sup>lxxxvii870</sup>.

Portugal did not want to be either a right wing or a left wing dictatorship, and has chosen a European type of Socialism, socialism in freedom, with all the peculiarities of a poor country, recently out of a long lethargy, i.e., craving for deep changes in its social structure<sup>lxxxviii871</sup>.

In *Arriba*, Salvador López de la Torre interprets the electoral results as a victory of anti-Communism, since «[o]verall the vote is presented to us as anti-Communist, from a centre-left position, as the electoral image of the country. (...) At this moment, what can be argued is that Portugal is not Communist (...)»<sup>lxxxix872</sup>. Likewise, *ABC* and José Salas rejoice with the defeat of the Communists since, for this newspaper, among the several consequences of the electoral results was «this reduction to the minimum in the political spectrum of the Marxist-Leninist whooping»<sup>xc</sup>. Even before the announcement of the final results, Salas hinted that the Communist threat of achieving hegemony was about to be put in its rightful place:

In this way the Communist failure in the elections would be clear. This indeed does not match even in dreams the influence such party has in Portuguese national life and its noise in the streets. Once again, is useful

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<sup>869</sup> Editorial: «Portugal: el segundo 25 de abril».1975. *Informaciones*, April 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.18

<sup>870</sup> Editorial: «Portugal: un deseo de moderación».1975. *ABC*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp. 3

<sup>871</sup> Editorial: «La respuesta de Portugal».1975. *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>872</sup> López de la Torre, Salvador.1975. «Las elecciones: participación masiva» in *Arriba*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.13



to remember that noise is one thing, and another completely different thing is reality<sup>xcii873</sup>.

In *Arriba*, López de la Torre considers the Communist Party to have failed its momentum and for that reason to be the biggest loser of this process – an idea that Augusto Assia shares: «What is clear is that the Communist party might never enjoy again elections in such favourable conditions. Not even close»<sup>xciii874</sup>. For López de la Torre, the Communists made some mistakes that proved fatal, for instance «their electoral force, taken to extremes whenever a demonstration against the party's proposals was put together, the abusive use of the word “fascist” applied to anyone who did not think like them, has only served to confirm their unquestionable disaster. (...) and, in general, it is the party that fulfilled the most ridicule part»<sup>xciii875</sup>.

Nevertheless, for Xavier Roig in *Tele/eXprés* the percentage of votes reached by the Communist Party may be considered «normal given that it absolutely fits with the results that had been foreseen»<sup>xciv876</sup>, and therefore not a cause for either celebration or disappointment.

Finally, in *La Vanguardia Española* both Augusto Assia and Alberto Miguez proclaim a victory of the European feature of the Portuguese people, a point of view that is also compatible with the one that endorses a triumph of moderation. For Assia, «the real triumph of the

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<sup>873</sup> Salas, José .1975. «Triunfo de la moderación en más de un setenta por ciento» in *ABC* April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.1

<sup>874</sup> Assia, Augusto.1975. «Los comicios del Viernes fueron un modelo de madurez, orden y disciplina» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp. 20

<sup>875</sup> López de la Torre, Salvador.1975. «Las elecciones: participación masiva» in *Arriba*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.13

<sup>876</sup> Roig, Xavier.1975. «El centro-izquierda sumo el 65% de los votos» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

Portuguese elections, before anything and above everything, is a victory of Europe, of the Atlantic, of moderation and of democracy»<sup>xcv877</sup>.

Miguez acknowledges that the interpretation of the results very much depends on the point of view that one has when approaching them, and presents his readers with two contradictory interpretations of the same results. On the one hand, he argues «yesterday the Marxist left won (i.e. the Communist party, the Socialist – that every once in a while proclaims to be Marxist –, the Socialist Popular Front, the Portuguese Democratic Movement and other factions)»<sup>xcv<sup>i</sup></sup>. On the other hand, he states that «yesterday triumphed moderation given that Socialists and Social-Democrats achieved more than 64 % of the votes between them»<sup>xcv<sup>ii</sup></sup>. Miguez adds that «both hypotheses could be argued with equal seriousness and even passion. Both open very different and conflicting future perspectives»<sup>xcv<sup>iii</sup></sup>. In fact, Miguez argues that «in the ambiguity that both readings or interpretations of the electoral result allows, rests one of the most fascinating Portuguese political findings of the last couple of years»<sup>xcix878</sup>. Nevertheless, Alberto Miguez shares Assia's point of view about the European meaning of the results, given that:

The Portuguese political map looks very much like others in Western Europe (powerful social-democracy, minority Communist party, insignificant right-wing, and almost inexistent far-left, etc.) (...) In contrast the thesis that Portugal is a Third World country comes out very damaged. The results (and the simple fact that elections could be held) demonstrate that, at least in the political field, Portugal is more European than African or Asian<sup>c879</sup>.

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<sup>877</sup> Assia, Augusto.1975. «Los comicios del Viernes fueron un modelo de madurez, orden y disciplina» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.20

<sup>878</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1975. «Lisboa: Los partidos socialista y socialdemocrata obtuvieron el mayor número de votos» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6

<sup>879</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1975. «Lisboa: Los partidos socialista y socialdemocrata obtuvieron el mayor número de votos» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6

In its editorial *La Vanguardia Española* considers that without the MFA-Parties pact, Portugal could have been by then a democracy –, an idea reiterated by Jaume Miravittles in *Tele/eXprés* when he claims that «[i]n any Western type of European democracy, the President of the Republic would call Mr. Soares to form a govern»<sup>ci880</sup>.

For *Informaciones*, «these elections were the crucial requisite for the popular legitimacy of the “carnation revolution”»<sup>cii</sup>, and at that moment begins «the properly democratic stage of the new Portugal»<sup>ciii881</sup>. *Informaciones* stands by the opinion that the elections came to «unblock a situation that was becoming tenser and charged with vague anxieties»<sup>civ</sup> and that the MFA should give the power it holds back to civil society. This is also the last editorial column that this evening newspaper will devote to the Portuguese Revolutionary Process, beginning at this point a progressive disengagement from it.

Nonetheless, in the pages of the same evening newspaper Carlos Sentís, a couple of weeks later, reinforces the idea that democracy, despite the model electoral process, has yet to be established in Portugal, and the military is to blame for that setback: «Due to the centurions’ position, or the military who turned their back to the popular will expressed, despite all conditioning, with a truly exemplary vote, in the neighbouring country there is not enough democracy (...)»<sup>cv</sup>. Carlos Sentís, a veteran journalist that alongside Augusto Assia covered the Nuremberg Trials, was elected MP by UCD a few years later, and was integrated in the group of people who were positioning themselves politically in the Spanish press at this moment. Sentís refutes the idea that Portugal needs external help, instead advancing the idea that the political frenzy should be contained and that

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<sup>880</sup> Miravittles, Jaume. 1975. «Cifras portuguesas» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 30<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>881</sup> Editor

ial: «Portugal: el segundo 25 de abril».1975. *Informaciones*, April 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.18

people should go back to their workstations and make the economy turn once more:

For Portugal, foreign help might simply result in bread for today and hunger for tomorrow. In Portugal what is essential is that the Portuguese go back to work. The political frenzy has made them produce less than they produced before, which was already little and not enough<sup>cvii882</sup>.

Editorially, *Arriba* and *Tele/eXprés* are less prone to expressing convergent ideas about a victory of moderation at this point. In this sense, *Arriba* makes a Spanish reading of the process and *Tele/eXprés* is quite singular in its pro-MFA opinion, recognizing the practical aspect of the problem: the monetary funds needed to go through a complete transformation of the Portuguese society, which make the country dependent on foreign help.

The singularity of *Tele/eXprés*' opinion, which in a way tries to reposition the issue outside the dominant framework, lies in the fact that although the newspaper recognizes that «[w]hichever way you look at it, in Portugal prevails a military dictatorship however quite “sui generis”»<sup>cvii883</sup>, it also underlines that the elections, which were «honest and free», were not the adequate barometer to assess the situation, since the current concept of power in effect in Portugal was not that of a Western democracy. The newspaper, nonetheless, recognizes that the Third-world path desired by part of the MFA is limited by the fact that Portugal is indeed a European country: «They indicated a Socialist path, but safeguarding formalities, given that there is an imposing geopolitics and Portugal is located where it is and not in the heart of Africa, where it is always easier to start from scratch»<sup>cviii</sup>. Portugal is constrained by

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<sup>882</sup> Sentís, Carlos.1975. «La rosa y el clavel» in *Informaciones*, May 19<sup>th</sup>, pp.18-19

<sup>883</sup> Editorial: «Un elección o una lección».1975.*Tele/eXprés*, April 29<sup>th</sup>, pp. 5

geopolitics, but also by economic solidarity, and thus has to make a choice.

« Portugal has to choose between the third-world path, with UNICEF-style postcards, or the European one. Moral support, cordial greetings, sentimental demonstrations, does not become tractors»<sup>cix</sup>, states *Tele/exprés*. This idea of economic dependence ultimately conditioning the Portuguese Revolutionary Process is backed in the same newspaper by Vicente Ventura's article. A member of the *Falange Española de la JONS* in his youth, Ventura continued his political militancy in nationalist and socialist groups active in the Valencian area, for which he had to exile at some point during the 1960s. By this time he was also a very close collaborator of Dionisio Ridruejo (Morán 2014). Ventura reinforces the idea that Portugal's geographic position is determinant, given that:

a) That Portugal is in Europe and not in the continents where Third World countries are located. b) That it is from developed countries that Portugal – and in any case the Third-World – might get – a little or a lot, but most likely little given their sense of justice and of the future – the help needed to get out from underdevelopment. C) That it is precisely a part of that developed European world that has the possibility and the duty to help Portugal, since Portugal belongs to it historically, culturally and geographically<sup>cx884</sup>.

In this sense, both ideas converge in the fact that the European penchant makes, nonetheless, this balance uneven and a very conditioned choice if one wants to be realistic.

### c) Spanish reading: the superiority of electoral processes

The Spanish reading of the Portuguese events at this moment is frequently expressed in the form of lessons. But which lessons should one take from what is happening in Portugal and who thinks that lessons need to be

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<sup>884</sup> Ventura, Vicente.1975. « ¿Puede un país de la CEE ser socialista?» in *Tele/eXprés*, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp.7

drawn? Starting from the latter, all the opinion articles' authors published in *ABC* and *La Vanguardia*, but they are not the only ones.

The Spanish reading topic is less common among correspondents and special correspondents, but Augusto Assia is a special correspondent as much as he is an «international observer», and his chronicles are usually overlapped by his opinion on matters. Despite Assia's claim that his analysis did not have Spain as referent – «[i]t should be stated that I am not alluding to Spain's situation where, in spite of my personal and old preference for parties, I accept, as citizen, the status quo that forbids them»<sup>cxix</sup> – topped by the claim that one probably should not apply the conclusions taken from one situation to a different one – «I admit that maybe conclusions should not be drawn from what is happening in Portugal to deduce what might happen in another country»<sup>cxii</sup> –, Assia condemns the Spanish readings only on the surface. In fact, he is actually refuting an analysis he does not agree with – that the Portuguese experience confirms the Spanish option of not having parties – at the same time that he introduces one with which he agrees – about how to neutralize the Communist threat:

There are undoubtedly many reasons, and I am not going to be the one who analyses them at this moment, that could confirm and justify the path without parties (not to mention other elements) chosen in Spain. The Portuguese experience is surely not one of them (...) One of the Portuguese consequences that is susceptible of interesting Spaniards is, undoubtedly, the impressive efficiency with which political parties and elections were able to rectify and circumscribe to the minimum the Armed Forces' attitude in favour of the Communist party<sup>cxiii885</sup>.

For the Spanish opinion, however, one of the many things the Portuguese revolutionary process can teach Spain is that the popular front strategy is not sustainable. *ABC* contends that as proved by the Portuguese

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<sup>885</sup> Assia, Augusto.1975. «Los partidos políticos son los que señalan en Portugal el camino de la continuidad, la armonía y el orden» in *La Vanguardia española*, May 1<sup>st</sup>, pp.21

vote, Communists are not democrats, despite what PCE is trying to convey by forming the Democratic Junta, and people will not be fooled by their claims:

That is why when the people have the chance of freely expressing their preferences shy away from the Communist option. This makes the popular front politics, which the Spanish Democratic Junta proclaims, unjustifiable. By showing up in Lisbon during the electoral process under the pretext of giving visibility to its «Conciliation Manifest», the latter would have been able to observe the falseness of the supposed necessity of counting with the Communist party in any future political evolution<sup>cxiv</sup><sup>886</sup>.

The idea that the Communist Party is expendable in a hypothetical future Spanish society, which ABC continuously supports, is not endorsed widely. At least not as much as the power of an electoral process, for the Portuguese revolutionary process taught Spain that no matter how much the Communist party seems hegemonic, only elections will give an exact account of its effective power. Miravittles<sup>887</sup> in *Tele/eXprés* backs Luis Emilio Arias Llorca's article in *Informaciones*, which he considers «the most lucid contribution to the Portuguese elections' discussion (...)»<sup>cxv</sup><sup>888</sup>. Arias Llorca's article basically consists of a sequence of affirmative and negative phrases that sum up what Miravittles outlines as:

Few times in the history of free elections, he said, the result of the suffrage has been as unequivocal and categorical as in Portugal. The political options refused and accepted by the voters have been so in a way that is emphatic and crystal clear, and can be summarized in a schematic series of negative and affirmative declarations<sup>cxvi</sup>.

Like many others, Arias Llorca performs a reading of the electoral process that implies that no discussion is needed. As such, and based on a

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<sup>886</sup> Editorial: «Enseñanzas de las elecciones portuguesas» .1975. *ABC*, April 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>887</sup> Miravittles, Jaume. 1975. «Los "sies" y los "noes" en Portugal» in *Tele/eXprés*, May 12<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>888</sup> Miravittles, Jaume. 1975. «Los "sies" y los "noes" en Portugal» in *Tele/eXprés*, May 12<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

representative democracy conception, from that reading he draws several lessons. The most one being: that despite the seeming hegemony of the Communist Party, the Western sense of democracy came out triumphant in Portugal:

The celebration of the suffrage in conditions that were particularly favourable for the Communist party demonstrated that this is a minority party and that its omnipotence was only apparent. On the other hand, it was a categorical triumph of the organizations, even if improvised ones, which have asserted a clear democratic feature in the western sense of the word<sup>cxvii889</sup>.

For Ramón Trias Fargas in *La Vanguardia Española*, all Spanish sectors can draw lessons from the Portuguese experience. A professor of Political Economy at the University of Barcelona, Trias Fargas would be a founding member of the Democratic Left-wing of Catalonia [*Esquerra Democràtica de Catalunya* EDC], later on integrated in the Democrat Convergence of Catalonia [*Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* CDC], and elected MP (and Senator) more than once. But regarding the Communist party the lessons to be drawn are not that distant from the previous ones. The Communist party is conceived as a homogenous entity with several national branches, thus «Álvaro Cunhal and his Spanish followers are severely damaging Santiago Carrillo and the local Communist party»<sup>cxviii</sup>. Despite Berlinguer's attempt of *compromesso storico* and PCE's united front strategy formalized in the *Junta Democrática de España*, the Portuguese electoral process and the way the Portuguese Communist Party relate to it, cast a doubt on the existence of genuine democratic values among Communist ideology. An ideology that moreover is tainted with continuous wrongdoings, for which all Communist parties are accountable, as Trias Fargas enumerates them:

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<sup>889</sup> Arias Llorca, Luis Emilio .1975. «Las lecciones de unas elecciones» in *Informaciones*, May 6<sup>th</sup>, pp. 18-19



Otherwise, Mr. Cunhal, we will not be able to forget the Russian rape of Czechoslovakia in 1948, by the betrayal of the infiltrated Communists in Benes' government and at the cost of the intentional murder of Masaryk; neither the new rape of Prague in 1968 by the Russian Army, this time without any dissimulation. We can neither forget this nor many other things. I do not know if pacts with the Communist party should be accepted. What I do know is that this one has to solemnly submitted to the majority in Portugal, or in Portugal, as in Spain, compromises tangible of democratic sincerity will have to be demanded from it, and each day will be more difficult for them to be convincing.<sup>cxix</sup>

To prove his point, Trias argues that in order to trust the Communist party – in this case the Spanish one, but by his order of thought, the same reasoning might be applied to any communist party – one should analyse how the elections were handled in Portugal:

It is desired that we pact having in mind the legitimacy of democracy. Well, in that case, the first thing to do is to follow the results of the elections. And this Mr. Cunhal has not done, on the contrary. The Spanish exegetes of Communism are developing confusing arguments – but still do not dare to say that the elections are only valid when favourable to them<sup>cxx</sup>.

Trias uses a national «we» encompassing the Iberian Peninsula to stress the idea that what happens in Portugal helps define what is to be done in Spain. Trias also sees lessons to be learned from Portugal by the Spanish far-left, Army and right wing. The first ones, «our elitist intellectuals, our modern barbarians of contemporary Lerroxism, our young friends, spoiled by incompetent fathers and catholic and sentimental mothers, and, in general, by a decadent society, who believe and imagine that history exists for them to flaunt their shortcomings and personal frustrations»<sup>cxxi</sup>, should reduce themselves to their insignificance, as proven by the Portuguese electoral results, since «Portugal fortunately made it clear that the only ones who take them seriously are their respective families»<sup>cxxii</sup>. The Army, on the other hand, should not have the arrogance of undermining people's sage. As for right-wing supporters, they should understand that is not up to the Army to rule the people, but

rather up to people to choose their rulers through vote: «Just think, from now on, our ultras, that the people, the simple people, the common citizen, the anonymous majority, it the only decent thing we can count on. We should trust them with our political future»<sup>cxiii890</sup>.

Finally, also in *La Vanguardia Española*, economist Salvador Millet y Bel, a self-proclaimed disciple of Friedrich von Hayek, argues that the main lesson to be drawn from the Portuguese experience by Spain is that no revolution, or any abrupt change, will bring more civil liberties than the ones already enjoyed, but it might decrease them. In his view change, in the sense of evolution, would always be preferable to revolution:

The events in Portugal represent an evident danger for Spain, and Europe, but could also represent a profitable lesson for everyone. For well-intentioned Spaniards, in the right or the left wing, integrated in the system, collaborationists or anti-collaborationists, honestly wishing for a freer Spain, the Portuguese example teach us once again that, at least at this end of the century where we live, all revolutions – even the ones beginning with a carnation on top of a riffle – do not serve to conquer more civil liberties but rather to lose some of those that by means of evolution were already being enjoyed. Even general Spínola – always somewhat distracted – did not realize that the carnation was red<sup>cxiv891</sup>.

But Spanish readings not always take the form of lessons to be drawn from Portugal. Sometimes they simply address the subject from a Spanish point of view. For instance, in *ABC*, José Mario Armero reflects on how the diplomatic bond between countries is above regime changes, as proved by the relationship between Spain and the successive different regimes in Chile (Frey, Allende, Pinochet). He also gives the example of what is then happening with Portugal, since there is a pact that presupposes peace between the two countries, and this pact is above political

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<sup>890</sup> Trias Fargas, Ramón. 1975. «Más lecciones desde Portugal. Lo único decente cin que contamos» in *La Vanguardia española*, Mayo 10<sup>th</sup>, pp. 15

<sup>891</sup> Millet y Bel, Salvador. 1975. «Sobre la revolución portuguesa» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 9<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

regimes and ideologies<sup>892</sup>. Moreover, the Spanish reading is also an opportunity to criticize certain Spanish features, as Pedro Crespo, in *ABC*, and Jesús Suevos, in *Arriba*, do. Crespo argues that certain Spaniards are to a certain degree provincial in their support of the Portuguese process: «Certain Hispanic supporters of an easily identified filiation seem willing to embellish their collar with a red carnation and their hand – the left, of course – with a little flag of the neighbouring country»<sup>cxxv</sup>, unlike the sceptical «old liberal countries»<sup>893</sup>. On the other hand, Suevos, who embodies the Falangist matrix in *Arriba*, criticizes the naiveté of certain Spaniards (and Europeans), favourable to the capitalist order, who saw in Portugal the establishment of a Western democracy and became supporters of that process without realizing that this was not what was happening in Portugal. Suevos uses quotation marks to refer to «free world» and «free press» enforcing a distance from its meaning (Gruber 1993) that denotes distrust or even disdain from the freedom enjoyed in a capitalist society. Nonetheless, Suevos includes Spain in this conception of «free world» when he claims that: «The Portuguese revolution dismayed observers and political commentators in the “free world”, and among them naturally also the Spaniards»<sup>cxxvi</sup><sup>894</sup>.

Finally, for *Arriba* the «triumph of moderation» generally celebrated by the Spanish press, «is similar here in terms of intentions – not formulations – to the February 12<sup>th</sup> speech proclaimed by the President of Government at the Spanish Assembly»<sup>cxxvii</sup><sup>895</sup>. *Arriba* claims that 1970s Portugal is much like 1930s Spain, comparing the Portuguese

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<sup>892</sup> Armero, José Maria. 1975. «España y Portugal por encima de las ideologías» in *ABC*, April 16<sup>th</sup>

<sup>893</sup> Crespo, Pedro. 1975. «Precios y Claveles» in *ABC*, April 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.9

<sup>894</sup> Suevos, Jesus. 1975. «La segunda cosecha de claveles» in *Arriba*, May 4<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>895</sup> Editorial: «Las elecciones en Portugal. El triunfo Socialista y centro-democrático». 1975. *Arriba*, April 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.1-2

electoral process with the one held in Spain in 1931, after which King Alfonso XIII abdicated and the II Republic was established. Accordingly, «[t]he revolution that Portugal must do now with the Socialists has been performed by the Spanish regime throughout all these years»<sup>cxviii</sup>, distancing himself in this way from any possible comparison between the present situation in the two countries. By this logic, Spain is so ahead of Portugal, in terms of social and economic development, that no comparison can be drawn. Hence the Socialist victory «will be attractive to Europe and, of course, not unsettling for us»<sup>cxix</sup>.

Overall the 1<sup>st</sup> MFA-parties' pact provoked an almost consensual negative image of the process that prompted even *La Vanguardia Española*, up to that moment always dismissive of alarmist interpretations of the process, to distrust the democratic feature of the Revolutionary Process happening in Portugal. No categorical defences of this pact were possible and the condemnation was generalised. Nonetheless, some journalists (González Casanova, Xavier Roig, and Jordi Borja) mitigate its interpretation by reframing the issue outside the framework almost consensually used – that of «Extremism versus Moderation». Given this framework, the results of the electoral process are therefore broadly seen as a victory for moderation and hence a defeat of extremism, and are widely celebrated, even if some alternative frameworks are tested, namely in *Tele/eXprés*.

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**Original quotes:**

<sup>i</sup> «Me despediré con el chiste que circuló estos días anteriores a las elecciones de hoy: "El portugués es en la calle del PC; en el trabajo del PS; en su casa del PPD...y vota en el CDS" Como chiste, vale, pero como realidad no.»

<sup>ii</sup> «Los periodistas no deberíamos utilizar las palabras «siempre», «jamás» y «ultimo». Yo dije ayer que sería mi última crónica desde Lisboa, y cuando me disponía a disfrutar de un día de asueto en esta ciudad antes de regresar a Madrid saltó la «inmensa liebre» del enfrentamiento brutal y abierto del partido Socialista con el Partido Comunista, que sin duda habrá de tener grandes consecuencias en el futuro próximo de la política de este país.»

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<sup>iii</sup> «El «norte» está marcado y el único interés de las elecciones estriba en saber a ciencia cierta la ideología de los portugueses en este momento. (...) Este país, eminentemente rural y caciquil, que ha sufrido una larga «noche de piedra» de cuarenta y ocho años de silencio y «amén, Jesús», es muy improbable que haya logrado en su conjunto desembarazarse en tan sólo un año de lastre tan pesado y determinante.»

<sup>iv</sup> «Ya cuando Sartre estuvo en este país (hace escasas semanas) les dijo a los periodistas portugueses que la Prensa de este país era casi monocolor, que no tenía crítica, y que esa crítica era necesaria y Sartre no parece sospechoso de ser de "derechas".»

<sup>v</sup> «Hoy, los periódicos portugueses ni son críticos, salvo muy escasas excepciones. No son críticos, autocríticos, ellos, ni les gusta que los extranjeros hagamos crítica.»

<sup>vi</sup> «(...) mucha Prensa portuguesa confunde la crítica honesta y beneficiosa con los «ataques» de mala fe. Durante medio siglo, este país dijo a todo «amén»; bueno es que aprenda a dialogar, a aceptar los juicios y las críticas, a ejercer él mismo esa crítica. Criticar no es resaltar lo malo, sino decir lo más objetivamente posible lo bueno, lo malo y lo regular. Ejercer esa crítica no es solamente lo justo - y la misión de todo periodista -, sino un elemento que puede ayudar mucho al proceso portugués. Alfred Sauvy decía. «Informado, soy un ciudadano; sin informar soy un súbdito.»

<sup>vii</sup> «Esta circunstancia de que exista libertad de Prensa y libertad de empresa es lo que asegura para Portugal que habrá crítica. Está escrito: el Poder corrompe, el Poder absoluto corrompe absolutamente. No son esos los caminos de Portugal.»

<sup>viii</sup> «contexto vertiginoso»

<sup>ix</sup> «Todo lo que se dice en el relatorio se sabía. No hay realmente nada de nuevo, salvo pequeños detalles. Y anécdotas.»

<sup>x</sup> «En fin, todo esto ya es historia, pero no “agua pasada”». Esas aguas con golpistas van a volver a pasar por el molino de la revolución, no para moverlo, sino para intentar anegar y paralizarlo. El resultado de las elecciones puede ser el próximo detonante. (...)»

<sup>xi</sup> «Diferente es el caso del Partido de la Democracia Cristiana, Ese sí que tiene masas de posibles votantes. La derecha portuguesa, contando con la clientela del anterior régimen, se hubiera volcado a su favor.»

<sup>xii</sup> «Este partido del Centro Democrático Social es el más moderado de cuantos se presentan, y, por tanto, al cual se le colgarán con más ahínco las etiquetas denigrantes de la reacción.»

<sup>xiii</sup> «El CDS es hasta ahora el único de los doce partidos políticos que no se ha puesto - física y directamente - en contacto con los electores. No ha pegado un solo cartel en la calle, ni promovido un solo comicio, mitin o acto público. Hasta el momento tan sólo ha utilizado los espacios de que dispone en la radio y televisión (...)»

<sup>xiv</sup> «Por último, decir que el Partido del Centro Democrático Social (CDS) sigue sin dar la cara al público directamente. Sólo utiliza sus espacios oficiales en radio y televisión, pero no ha celebrado un solo comicio ni reunión pública, ni dado una sola rueda de prensa. (...) Habrá que esperar, pues, su actitud hasta ahora no es precisamente la normal y lógica en un partido que está empeñado en una campaña electoral.»

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<sup>xv</sup> «Un rumor - que no he podido confirmar de momento- indica que el Centro Democrático Social (CDS) desistirá en el último momento de presentarse a las elecciones»

<sup>xvi</sup> «La gente se pregunta cuál es la táctica de este grupo [CDS] que, al parecer, había llegado a difundir rumores de que podría retirarse de las elecciones, mientras que ahora afirma que concurrirá en todos los círculos a los que se había presentado...»

<sup>xvii</sup> « Por otra parte, al pobre DCS [sic] le han asaltado sus instalaciones varias veces (siempre que hubo una «tentativa reaccionaria») y robado la mayoría de sus pertenencias. Su sede central de Lisboa se parece bastante a un «bunker». Y los dirigentes no tienen más remedio que acompañarse de unos señores robustos y ceñudos, que son sus guardaespaldas»

<sup>xviii</sup> «Está claro que en algunas zonas del país los partidos de izquierda y extrema izquierda tienen poco que hacer. La hostilidad de las poblaciones del norte contra los comunistas y los ultra-izquierdistas justifica que Cunhal no se haya trasladado todavía a las regiones del Miño, Oporto y Tras-os -Montes.»

<sup>xix</sup> «En el norte del país continuó la ola de violencia preelectoral que parecía definitivamente cancelada, Violencia que, según todos los indicios, no cabe adjudicar en exclusiva a la izquierda y extrema izquierda. Por ejemplo, fue el PPD (Partido Popular Democrático) quien intentó boicotear un mitin del Partido Socialista en Ribeira da Pena. Así mismo, fueron 200 militantes del CDS, quienes intentaron asaltar en Famalicao [sic] un «centro de trabajo» del Partido Comunista. En Guimaraes [sic], como queda dicho se invirtieron los términos y los hombres del CDS tuvieron que esperar al amanecer para salir del teatro que «los populares» sitiaban y el Ejército rodeaba, como medida elemental de precaución. Pese a todo, hubo tiros y heridos en cantidad considerable...»

<sup>xx</sup> «Aunque oficialmente las relaciones Iglesia-Estado en este país discurren por cauces de suma cordialidad, la campaña electoral en curso está dando lugar a la aparición de ciertas fricciones o de ciertas críticas, que, eso sí, en caso alguno han alcanzado virulencia. Son a forma de pequeños brotes (tanto por la parte de la Iglesia como de algunos partidos) que apuntan hacia un posible «florecimiento».»

<sup>xxi</sup> «no menos de cuatro clérigos se presentan como candidatos de partidos de izquierda a las elecciones»

<sup>xxii</sup> «a los párrocos a criticar abiertamente al Partido Comunista en sus homilías»

<sup>xxiii</sup> « el PC afirma que su ideología no es incompatible con el catolicismo, y que varios de sus candidatos son católicos»

<sup>xxiv</sup> «No cabe menospreciar la fuerza del catolicismo portugués, sobre todo en la zona norte del país. Y en ese aspecto el clero lusitano ha sido explícito. Los fieles no deberán votar por ningún partido marxista. Algunos eclesiásticos han llegado a citar los partidos a los que deben votar. Naturalmente, éstos son aquellos en los que la derecha se agazapa y a los que la izquierda tilda de fascistas y reaccionarios.»

<sup>xxv</sup> «Es imprescindible conocer estas tierras del Norte en los días preelectorales. Representan, a lo que se dice, dos tercios del total electoral portugués. Corrientemente ha venido considerándosele como el más conservador, reaccionario, anticomunista... ¿Será esto así? Ciertamente es. Los pocos esclarecidos e incultos habitantes de las aldeas de Miño, de las villas transmontanas o de la Serra da Estrela están bajo la influencia casi total de fuerzas conservadoras,

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muchas veces salazaristas: el párroco, el cacique... Se ha llegado a amenazar a los campesinos minifundistas de las tierras del Norte con la excomuni3n si votan a los comunistas. El domingo, algunas homil3as no se recataban de «prohibir» a los feligreses que votasen a los comunistas. El archiconservador arzobispo de Braga, don Francisco Maria da Silva, ha ido m3s lejos: simplemente ha aconsejado que se vote al derechista partido del Centro Democr3tico Social (CDS).»

<sup>xxvi</sup> «¿D3nde est3 la derecha portuguesa?»

<sup>xxvii</sup> «La derecha portuguesa aparece disfrazada por la pura y simple raz3n de que no puede presentarse a cuerpo limpio»».

<sup>xxviii</sup> «Es que las Fuerzas Armadas est3n dispuestas a imponer en Portugal el sistema de Bulgaria la China o Albania, aunque los portugueses voten diciendo que quieren un sistema como el de Francia, el de Holanda o el de Inglaterra?»

<sup>xxix</sup> «cuando hasta las piedras saben que el c3ebre pacto les gusta menos que una medicina a un ni3o.»

<sup>xxx</sup> «entusiasta tarea de dictar decreto tras decreto a fin de desmontar econ3micamente el sistema capitalista»

<sup>xxxi</sup> « con la misma facilidad con que ha sido promulgada. A base de papel y tinta.»

<sup>xxxii</sup> «En nombre del antisalazarismo y el anticaetanismo, o el antifascismo, los militares est3n en peligro de caer en el mismo principio pol3tico de Caetano y Salazar, seg3n el cual el pueblo portugu3s no est3 maduro para la democracia, porque al rev3s de los grandes pueblos europeos, su incultura le impide saber lo que le conviene.»

<sup>xxxiii</sup> «se parece demasiado a las elecciones que suelen celebrarse en los pa3ses con r3gimen de tipo autoritario»

<sup>xxxiv</sup> « Las elecciones de poco van a servir y menos van a decidir nada. Esto ya es cantado.»

<sup>xxxv</sup> «Las libertades formales concedidas a los partidos pol3ticos, la convocatoria de elecciones, etc., no tienen mayor trascendencia ni sirven m3s que para «guardar las apariencias». Los militares tienen la sart3n por el mango y el mango tambi3n. La libertad estriba en que cada cual es libre de «fre3rse» en la sart3n pero s3lo con los condimentos y aderezos que los militares pongan dentro.»

<sup>xxxvi</sup> «Todos los elementos de unas verdaderas elecciones democr3ticas, menos el de elegir. Las Fuerzas Armadas ya han elegido por los portugueses.»

<sup>xxxvii</sup> «una especie de gigantesco sondeo de opini3n»

<sup>xxxviii</sup> «En ese sentido, la palabra "encuesta" - desprovista del caracter peyorativo que algunos le han querido dar - es la que mejor cuadra para estas elecciones de ayer, despu3s de la de plebiscito democr3tico contra la anterior dictadura.»

<sup>xxxix</sup> « Los militares portugueses sentaron hace medio siglo las bases de un sistema que exclu3a la posibilidad de consultas electorales conforme los t3rminos en que estas se efect3an dentro de las democracias parlamentarias. Los militares portugueses arrumbaron hoy hace un a3o el aparato pol3tico resultante de aquellas bases; la recreaci3n caetanista del corporativismo salazaristas desapareci3 por la cloaca de la Historia, empujado por la lluvia, los fusiles y la euforia del 3ltimo 25 de abril. Un a3o despu3s, el Movimiento de las fuerzas armadas ha dispuesto las urnas: formalmente, tan abiertas a la voluntad popular como en cualquier 3mbito del parlamentarismo occidental: efectiva y realmente, tan restringidas en su virtualidad como las del tiempo del salazarismo.»

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<sup>xl</sup> «sería inexacto decir que entre ellos se establece de modo natural y espontáneo una alianza.»

<sup>xli</sup> «los seis partidos firmantes del pacto, (...) son los únicos importantes del tablero político portugués»

<sup>xlii</sup> «La revolución fue una empresa de los militares, realizada por los militares, a la cual se sumaron los políticos civiles, cuando los juegos estaban definitivamente hechos. (...) y es natural que sean los artífices de la revolución -es decir, los militares, quines se consideren sus únicos administradores autorizados. (...)»

<sup>xliii</sup> «la fórmula más original que conozco»

<sup>xliv</sup> «Para algunos, la mera existencia del pacto supone que las elecciones del viernes no han de servir para nada. Que todo está decidido de antemano y que, por lo tanto, el país podría evitarse el ejercicio estéril y costoso de una consulta electoral. De ser cierta esta tesis, habría que admitir que todos los dirigentes de todos los partidos políticos se han vuelto repentinamente locos, junto con cientos de miles de afiliados y simpatizantes, tal es el espectáculo de movilización que se observa en el país.»

<sup>xlv</sup> «El análisis y el juicio que merezca la situación en Portugal no puede hacerse basándose en las ideas y relaciones de fuerza existentes en España, Francia o Italia, es decir, aplicando criterios deducidos de las posibilidades reales en estos países, sino que debemos estudiar el caso portugués en su especificidad si queremos aplicar a él conceptos generales como democracia, pluralismo, nacionalizaciones, autonomía sindical, aislamiento o integración internacional, etc..»

<sup>xlvi</sup> «se empezará a hablar de la "revolución portuguesa" como se habla de la revolución cubana, china o rusa»

<sup>xlvii</sup> «El derrumbe del imperio colonial significa también la crisis de todo el sistema de dominación de la gran burguesía portuguesa»

<sup>xlviii</sup> «en su rol financiero-comercial de intermediarios especulativos y dependientes y en la explosión abusiva de la mayoría de la población en el marco de unas estructuras industriales y agrícolas muy atrasadas»

<sup>xlix</sup> «la gran burguesía pierde su principal rol económico y las Fuerzas Armadas viven una progresiva crisis de conciencia que les convertirá de instrumento imperial en movimiento revolucionario.»

<sup>l</sup> «la consideración de las nuevas relaciones sociales que deben formalizar. (...)»

<sup>li</sup> «no hay en Portugal un camino a la derecha, porque la burguesía oligárquica ha perdido a la vez su hegemonía económica e ideológica, no dispone de instrumentos políticos ni de respuestas sociales»

<sup>lii</sup> «El proceso de democratización se hace contra los intereses del gran capital, que sin instrumentos de hegemonía, aparece desnudo frente al pueblo. Por esto no se puede separar la construcción del Estado nuevo de las nacionalizaciones o la reforma agraria, es decir de la «política antimonopolista.»»

<sup>liii</sup> «En el interior del país intentará convertir, ya ha empezado, a fuerzas de centro e izquierda (PPD, PSP algunos sectores del MFS) en instrumentos de oposición al proceso revolucionario.»

<sup>liv</sup> «el carácter de la actual democracia portuguesa ni empieza ni termina con estas elecciones.»

<sup>lv</sup> «Las elecciones tienen en este sentido una indudable importancia por lo que presuponen de participación, pero no pueden consagrar aún a las fuerzas motoras



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del cambio social en curso, por la sencilla razón de que éste se está iniciando y una gran parte de la población votará aún sometida a las presiones del miedo y de la ignorancia. El centro y el norte del país representan más de los dos tercios de la población, la mayoría analfabeta y ven a la izquierda como al diablo.»

<sup>lvi</sup> « No ha sido el uso que ha tenido y hoy la prensa portuguesa es de una viveza y riqueza de información considerables.»

<sup>lvii</sup> « la izquierda real (PC, Sindicatos, MDP, sectores del PSP e izquierda socialista -FSP, MES, sindicatos de trabajadores agrícolas y de campesinos, comisiones de moradores, organizaciones estudiantiles y profesionales, etc.)»

<sup>lviii</sup> «Los grupos de extrema izquierda han introducido en estos movimientos un fuerte componente de división y enfrentamiento artificiales (...)»

<sup>lix</sup> «Frente a la revolución portuguesa se pueden adoptar muchas actitudes, pero sin duda alguna la más equivocada sería la de compararla con cualquier otro proceso político europeo, por la sencilla razón de que es una empresa típicamente portuguesa»

<sup>lx</sup> « tan aficionados parecen ser algunos observadores españoles de la realidad portuguesa, empeñados en sacar conclusiones de sus simples deseos.»

<sup>lxi</sup> «(...) jubilosos comentaristas extranjeros - y entre ellos no pocos españoles - que se empeñaron en ver en la «revolución del claves», durante las ferverosas jornadas de 1974, el florecimiento de una democracia calcada sobre moldes anglosajones, sin darse cuenta que el 25 de abril de 1974 lo que cayó fue un sistema político, pero que era imposible, después de cuarenta años de salazarismo, que emergiese por arte de magia y totalmente equipado en una democracia parlamentaria copiada de Londres»

<sup>lxii</sup> « Todos los que escribimos sobre temas políticos hablamos de nuestra «objetividad»...Yo no pretendo serlo. Me propongo, dentro de límites muy modestos, «influir» aunque sólo sea a un lector, y sobre todo, luchar contra los tópicos. La «democracia», el «socialismo», el «pueblo» han llegado a ser tópicos, con lo que se demuestra, por otra parte, que tienen profundo arraigo en las masas. Por lo tanto, en todo lo que digo señalo mis preferencias personales y yo quisiera hoy que el pueblo de Portugal se manifestara principalmente a favor de la libertad, lo que en aquella coyuntura quiere decir que tuvieran gran mayoría de votos de los partidos democráticos no comunistas- Y no se trata de una reacción visceral, el comunista sincero merece todos mis respetos, sino de una fidelidad a mi dichosa trilogía.»

<sup>lxiii</sup> « La definición de qué es lo que será Portugal en la época post-salazarista tiene que darla el pueblo y la dio, efectivamente, de una manera tan rotunda que nadie podrá alarmarse a engaño»

<sup>lxiv</sup> «En lo que radica la esencial ironía, casi sarcástica, de las revoluciones por vía democrática, es en conducir bajo una generosa filosofía de la igualdad al parto, poco menos que necesario, de un superhombre. ¿Lo tiene Portugal?»

<sup>lxv</sup> «Portugal busca su futuro. Un camino inédito dentro del socialismo, salvo un golpe de la derecha, que tampoco puede descartarse»

<sup>lxvi</sup> «Que no va a ser el que imponga el comunismo, ni el socialismo a la europea, ni la liberal-burguesía, ni la derecha bajo "slogans" de paz y tranquilidad. Portugal busca raíces. Mejor: procura simientes. Y los modelos se rompen.»

<sup>lxvii</sup> «No creo que exista modelo alguno que se pueda aplicar al caso portugués.»

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lxviii «El MFA acaba de arrebatarse al Partido Comunista la antigua autodefinición de ser "la vanguardia organizada y consciente del pueblo armado, garante y motor del proceso revolucionario"»

lxix «La guerra colonial le ha permitido leer los libros marxistas de los guerrilleros, pero, sobre todo, le ha dado consciencia del subdesarrollo portugués, de su dependencia exterior y de la necesidad del socialismo como fórmula de modernización nacional independiente. En este punto, el MFA es un clásico movimiento «tercermundista».»

lxx «repudia el izquierdismo utópico de los grupos maximalistas minoritarios»

lxxi «tampoco parece fiarse mucho de la socialdemocracia del señor Soares, a la califica de socialismo para "doutores"»

lxxii «aumenta estos días - junto al claro lenguaje marxista de los capitanes - la orientación nacionalista, tercermundista y neutral, que tanto disminuye la tradicional imagen de un PC vinculado a Moscú»

lxxiii «La apabullante victoria socialista en Portugal abre las puertas a las más diferentes "lecturas" o interpretaciones»

lxxiv «enorme heterogeneidad de la base electoral que se engloba en este 37, 87 por ciento de la victoria socialista.»

lxxv «el Partido Socialista se ha llevado la mayoría de los votos: por no estar prevista su política y dada - entre otras cosas - su conocida ambigüedad hasta el presente»

lxxvi « Puede decirse, por tanto, sin falsear la verdad, que el primer partido anticomunista de Portugal es el Partido socialista, y cuando las masas salmodiaban a coro el slogan oficial: «socialismo sim, ditadura não», a quien se referían era a la dictadura comunista. (...) El anticomunismo empieza aquí, en la frontera del socialismo, y sigue sin solución de continuidad hasta la derecha del [sic] Centro Democrático y Social, pasando por el Partido Social Democrático. Aquí es anticomunista todo el que no es comunista y Mario Soares lanzó a sus huertes a las calles de Lisboa para demostrar que estaban contra el comunismo. (...) y estamos seguros de que al día siguiente de las elecciones los socialistas que hoy atacan a los comunistas y los socialdemocráticos (...) seguirán los tres bien unidos en un Gobierno que tendrá sillas para todos.»

lxxvii «resumir su propaganda a un constante llamamiento en favor de la libertad.»

lxxviii «Por ellas sabremos quién podrá de aquí en adelante decir que habla en nombre del pueblo. Ese pueblo en nombre del cual hablan todos.»

lxxix «Una nota más que señalar: El orden necesario para el acto electoral se puede decir que estuvo entregado al pueblo, pues no vimos en Lisboa ni policías ni militares, cerca o a pequeña distancia de las asambleas de voto.»

lxxx «El país se ha mostrado verdaderamente tal como es, y no por aquello que quieren a veces hacer de él: Pueblo pacífico, simpático, afable, integrado en la vida de su país.»

lxxxi «el pueblo auténtico, los seis millones de electores, la gente que trabaja y cobre su salario, administrándolo con dificultad, es, por tradición, como un "pueblo afable y delicado»

lxxxii «Una vez más el pueblo se mostró tal como es, sin apoyos extremistas y sin dejarse llevar por ellos (...) Quedó bien claro el deseo auténtico de los portugueses en votar y no volver la espalda a la construcción del futuro, dejando a otros decidir en los momentos claves de la vida del país»

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<sup>lxxxiii</sup> «Ayer el pueblo portugués alcanzó la máxima victoria. Muy superior a la de este o aquel partido: ayer el pueblo portugués demostró que no hay «pueblos menores de edad» (...) Ayer Portugal dio un mentís rotundo a los que ejercían el paternalismo político y dicen que los pueblos son menores de edad. Ayer Portugal dijo sí a la libertad y a su Ejército de forma clara, tranquila y alegre.»

<sup>lxxxiv</sup> «invitaciones aventureras ni experiencias poco convincentes»

<sup>lxxxv</sup> «Yo no me atrevería a decir que ha ganado la izquierda pues como queda expreso, el gran triunfador hasta el momento es el Partido Socialista de Mario Soares, que sigue un socialismo a la europea, moderado»

<sup>lxxxvi</sup> «Considerando el panorama de las elecciones portuguesas, en sus líneas generales puede pensarse que ha triunfado la moderación y que el comunismo ha sufrido una visible derrota. (...) Con esto, acabó la reunión. En ella, la moderación se convirtió en izquierda. (...) Es igual. Ha ganado la izquierda, puesto que así lo proclaman los vencedores. Y su victoria estaba prevista por el pacto de los partidos con el Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas para seguir la vía hacia el socialismo preconizada por sus componentes.»

<sup>lxxxvii</sup> «Lo que los portugueses quieren, lo que la mayoría de ellos desea, ha quedado bien manifiesto y claro en el balance de las elecciones: un deseo de moderación, equidistante de los extremismos.»

<sup>lxxxviii</sup> «Portugal no ha querido dictadura de derecha ni de izquierda y ha optado por un socialismo a la europea, un socialismo en libertad, con todas las peculiaridades de un país pobre y recién salido de un largo letargo, es decir, con deseos de cambios profundos en la estructura social.»

<sup>lxxxix</sup> «El voto, en líneas generales, se nos presenta como anticomunista, desde una posición de centro-izquierda, como imagen electoral del país. (...) De momento, lo que puede decirse es que Portugal no es un pueblo comunista (...)»

<sup>xc</sup> «se reducir a una banda mínima del espectro político la vocinglería marxista-leninista»

<sup>xci</sup> «Si así fuera quedaría claro el fracaso comunista a la hora de los votos, que, desde luego, no corresponde ni en sueños a la influencia de dicho partido en la vida nacional portuguesa y a su ruido callejero. Una vez más viene a cuento aquello de que una cosa es el ruido y otra son las nueces.»

<sup>xcii</sup> «De lo que hay poca duda es de que sea fácil que el Partido Comunista pueda volver a disfrutar de otras elecciones en las que las circunstancias le sean más propicias. Ni siquiera tanto.»

<sup>xciii</sup> «su contundencia electoral, llevada hasta la agresión cuando aparecía una manifestación contraria a su tesis; el empleo abusivo y repugnante de la palabra "fascista" para todo el que no pensase como ellos, sólo han servido para firmar un descalabro indudable. (...) y, en general, es el partido que ha cumplido el papel más ridículo»

<sup>xciv</sup> «normal ya que se ajusta absolutamente a las previsiones que se habían estado haciendo»

<sup>xcv</sup> «el verdadero triunfo de las elecciones portuguesas, ante todo, sobre todo y por encima de todo, es una victoria de Europa, del atlantismo, de la moderación y de la democracia»

<sup>xcvi</sup> «ayer ganó la izquierda marxista (es decir el Partido Comunista, el Socialista - que se declara marxista de vez en cuando -, el Frente Socialista Popular, el Movimiento Democrático Portugués y demás grupúsculos)»

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<sup>xcvii</sup> «ayer triunfó la moderación ya que entre socialistas y socialdemócratas consiguieron más del 64 por ciento de los votos»

<sup>xcviii</sup> «Ambas hipótesis pueden defenderse con seriedad y hasta con pasión. Ambas abren perspectivas futuras muy diversas y antagónicas.»

<sup>xcix</sup> «En la ambigüedad que las dos lecturas o interpretaciones del resultado electoral permiten, puede localizarse uno de los más fascinantes hallazgos políticos portugueses de los últimos años.»

<sup>c</sup> «El mapa político portugués se parece muchísimo ahora a otros de Europa Occidental (socialdemocracia poderosa, Partido Comunista minoritario, derecha insignificante, extrema izquierda casi inexistente, etc.) (...) En cambio la tesis de que Portugal es un país del Tercer Mundo sale bastante mal parada. Los resultados (y el mero hecho de que puedan celebrarse elecciones), demuestran que, al menos en el terreno político, Portugal es más europeo, que africano o asiático.»

<sup>ci</sup> «En cualquier democracia europea de tipo occidental, el presidente de la Republica llamaría al señor Soares para formar un Gobierno»

<sup>cii</sup> «estas elecciones eran el requisito imprescindible para la legitimación popular de la "revolución del clavel"»

<sup>ciii</sup> «la etapa propiamente democrática del nuevo Portugal.»

<sup>civ</sup> «descongestionar una situación que se estaba haciendo cada vez más tensa y más cargada de vagas inquietudes »

<sup>cv</sup> «Debido a la posición de los centuriones o militares vueltos de espaldas a una voluntad popular manifestada, pese a todos los condicionamientos, con una votación realmente ejemplar, no hay en el país vecino suficientes dosis de democracia (...).»

<sup>cvi</sup> «Las ayudas exteriores para Portugal pueden ser simplemente pan para hoy y hambre para mañana. Lo que es esencial en Portugal es que se pongan a trabajar los portugueses. El frenesí político les ha llevado durante un año a no producir ni de mucho lo que producían antes, que ya era poco e insuficiente.»

<sup>cvi</sup> «Se mire por donde se mire, en Portugal impera una dictadura militar pero muy "suigeneris"»

<sup>cviii</sup> «Señalaron un camino socialista, pero guardando las formas, porque hay una geopolítica que manda y Portugal esta donde esta y no en el corazón de África, donde siempre es posible partir del cero.»

<sup>cix</sup> «Entre la vía tercermundista, con postales estilo UNICEF o la europea, Portugal tiene que elegir. Los apoyos morales, los saludos cordiales, las manifestaciones sentimentales no se convierten en tractores»

<sup>cx</sup> «a) Que Portugal está en Europa y no en los continentes donde están los países del Tercer Mundo. b) Que es de los países desarrollados de los que, en todo caso, Portugal - y el Tercer Mundo - pueden recibir - poca o mucha, más bien poca dado su escaso sentido de la justicia y del futuro - la ayuda que necesitan para salir del pozo del subdesarrollo. c) Que es precisamente una parte de ese mundo desarrollado europeo la que tiene la posibilidad y el deber de ayudar a Portugal, ya que Portugal pertenece a él histórica, cultural y geográficamente.»

<sup>cx</sup> « Conste que no aludo a la situación de España donde yo, a pesar de mi preferencia personal y antigua por los partidos, acepto, como ciudadano, la legalidad constituida que los prohíbe »

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<sup>cxii</sup> «Me adelanto a reconocer que quizá no haya que sacar conclusiones de lo que ocurre en Portugal para deducir lo que puede ocurrir en otro país.»

<sup>cxiii</sup> «Hay indudablemente muchas razones, y no voy a ser yo quien las analice en este momento, capaces de confirmar y justificar a España en el camino sin partidos (por no mencionar otros aspectos) que ha elegido. La experiencia portuguesa no es una de ellas, desde luego y cuanto más pronto quede aclarado, más fácil será enjuiciar de verdad el proceso portugués y sacar las consecuencias que pueden derivarse para el nuestro, si deriva alguna. Sin duda, una entre las consecuencias portuguesas que son susceptibles de interesar más a los españoles es la sorprendente eficacia con que los partidos políticos y las elecciones han conseguido rectificar y circunscribir a límites inocuos la actitud de las Fuerzas Armadas en favor del Partido Comunista.»

<sup>cxiv</sup> «Por eso cuando la población tiene una oportunidad de expresar libremente sus preferencias rehúye la opción comunista. Ello hace injustificable la política de frente popular, que postula la Junta democrática Española, que al aparecer en Lisboa durante la jornada electoral, bajo pretexto de dar publicidad a su «Manifiesto de la Conciliación», habrá podido observar la falsedad de la supuesta necesidad de contar con el partido comunista en cualquier evolución futura.»

<sup>cxv</sup> «la aportación más lúcida al significado de las elecciones portuguesas (...)»

<sup>cxvi</sup> «Pocas veces en la historia de las elecciones libres, dice, el resultado del sufragio ha sido tan inequívoco y contundente como en Portugal. Las opciones políticas que han sido rechazadas y aceptadas por los electores lo han sido de manera rotunda y diáfana y pueden ser esquematizadas en torno a una serie de negaciones y afirmaciones. »

<sup>cxvii</sup> «La celebración del sufragio en condiciones específicamente favorables para el partido comunista ha demostrado que es un partido minoritario y que su omnipotencia era sólo aparental. En cambio ha dado un triunfo rotundo a las organizaciones, aún improvisadas, que han afirmado un claro talante democrático en el sentido occidental de la palabra.»

<sup>cxviii</sup> «Álvaro Cunhal y sus corifeos españoles le están haciendo mucho daño a Santiago Carrillo y al Partido Comunista autóctono.»

<sup>cxix</sup> «De otra forma, señor Cunhal, no podremos olvidar la violación rusa de Checoslovaquia en 1948, por la traición de los comunistas infiltrados en el gobierno Benes y a costa del asesinato alevoso de Masaryk; ni tampoco del nuevo estupro de Praga en 1968, esta vez ya sin disimulos, por el ejército ruso. No podremos olvidar, ni eso, ni muchas otras cosas. No sé si al Partido Comunista hay que aceptarle pactos. Lo que sí sé es que se somete solemnemente a la mayoría en Portugal o habrá que exigirle en Portugal, y en España, compromisos tangibles de sinceridad democrática, que será cada día más difícil que convezan.»

<sup>cxx</sup> «Se quiere que pactemos la vigencia de la democracia. Pues, en tal caso, lo primero es acatar el resultado de las elecciones. Y esto el señor Cunhal no lo ha hecho, sino todo lo contrario. Los exegetas españoles del comunismo están desarrollando confusas argumentaciones - todavía no se atreven a decir que las elecciones sólo valen cuando les son favorables»

<sup>cxxi</sup> «nuestros intelectuales elitistas, nuestros modernos bárbaros del lerrouxismo contemporáneo, nuestros jóvenes amigos, consentidos por unos padres ineptos y unas madres católicas y sentimentales, y, en general, por una sociedad decadente,

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que creen y se imaginan, ellos, que la historia existe para que puedan airear sus complejos y frustraciones personales»

<sup>cxxii</sup> «Portugal, por fortuna, ha dejado claro que sólo se los toman en serio sus respectivas familia»

<sup>cxxiii</sup> «Piensen, de ahora en adelante, nuestros inmovilistas, que el pueblo, el pueblo llano, el ciudadano común y corriente, la mayoría anónima, la gente ordinaria, es lo único decente con que contamos. A ellos es justo, incluso conveniente, que confiemos nuestro futuro político.»

<sup>cxxiv</sup> « Los acontecimientos de Portugal representan un evidente peligro para España y para Europa, pero podrían representar también para todos, una provechosa lección. Para los españoles de buena voluntad que, de derechas o de izquierdas, dentro del sistema, colaboracionistas o anticolaboracionistas, desean sinceramente una España con más libertad, el ejemplo portugués nos enseña una vez más que, al menos en esas postrimerías de siglo en que vivimos, todas las revoluciones - incluso las que se inician con un clavel en la boca del fusil - no sirven para conquistar más libertades sino, en todo caso, para perder aquellas de las que , por el camino de la evolución, había empezado ya a disfrutarse. El propio general Spínola - siempre algo distraído - no se dio cuenta de que el clavel era rojo.»

<sup>cxxv</sup> «Ciertos simpatizantes hispánicos de filiación fácilmente identificable parecen dispuestos a adornarse la solapa con un clavel rojo y la mano -izquierda, naturalmente - con una banderita del país vecino»

<sup>cxxvi</sup> «La revolución portuguesa tiene desconcertados a los observadores y comentaristas políticos del “mundo libre”, entre los que hay que incluir, naturalmente, a los españoles.»

<sup>cxxvii</sup> «tiene aquí su semejanza de intenciones - no de fórmulas - en el discurso del 12 de febrero pronunciado por el Presidente del Gobierno en la cortes Españolas.»

<sup>cxxviii</sup> «La revolución que Portugal debe hacer ahora con los socialistas ha sido efectuada por el régimen español a lo largo de todos estos años»

<sup>cxxix</sup> «será atractiva para Europa y, por supuesto, nada intranquilizadora para nosotros.»

## 8. *The Hot Summer of '75*

The crisis of authority of the last couple of months in Portugal is the main problem of the Portuguese situation. Or, in other words, the necessary condition to face any of the other problems. (...) The Portuguese game could be called «if (Vasco, Melo, Soares, Cunhal, Otelo, Fabião, Spínola, Braga's Archbishop, etc.) had won...». The complexity of the situation is expressed in the multiple possible protagonists, but excludes the existence of clear and simple alternatives at the moment (revolution or counter-revolution). (...) The Portuguese crisis might still be solved in a peaceful and democratic way<sup>896</sup>.

After the electoral results legitimised moderate parties' claim to power, a dynamic of mobilisation based on alternative forms of legitimisation flourished, as pointed out by Ramos Pinto (2008), and the two legitimacies eventually started clashing. The period spanning from mid-July to mid-September of 1975, known as the «Hot Summer», became a very politically intense one during which these clashes happened frequently. It involved moderate parties abandoning the IV Provisional Government, PS on July 10<sup>th</sup> and PPD on July 17<sup>th</sup> (Santos, Cruzeiro and Coimbra 2000); an institutional and military crisis; frequent attacks against and the destruction of Communist Party headquarters north of the Tagus river (Rio Maior on July 13<sup>th</sup>; Lourinhã, Cadaval, Aveiro on July 18<sup>th</sup>; Viseu and Ponta Delgada on July 20<sup>th</sup>, etc.); and returnees arriving massively from the former African colonies through an airlift organized by the Portuguese State. In the midst of this situation, a project of popular power emerged, congregating supporters of the revolutionary legitimacy, and was presented in a document titled «People-MFA Alliance» [*Aliança Povo-MFA*] in the beginning of July.

In Lisbon, Alberto Miguez, José Salas, José Reis and Andrés Maria Kramer, who replaced Fernando Jáuregui as correspondent of

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<sup>896</sup> Borja, Jordi.1975. «La encrucijada portuguesa. La crisis del poder militar y su salida actual» in *Tele/eXprés*, September 8<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

*Arriba* and *pyresa*, continued their informative tasks, but between vacaciones, replacements and Miguez reporting from Africa, only Salas and Reis addressed all these events. However special correspondents Ángel Luis de la Calle, from *Informaciones*, and Salvador de la Torre from *pyresa* go back to Portugal after Vasco Gonçalves' downfall to watch the reorganization of power, which included the MFA's assembly that marked Gonçalves alienation from power, the new constitution of the Revolution Council and the United Soldiers Shall Win [*Soldados Unidos Vencerão* SUV] demonstrations. Likewise, in *ABC*, *Arriba* and *Tele/eXprés* José Javaloyes, Gómez Tello and Jaume Miravittles follow very closely what is going on in Portugal in their respective columns.

Editorially, the Spanish press dedicates attention specifically to institutional actions/changes/disruptions, such as a) the moment when the Socialist Party left the IV Provisional Government after their demands regarding the conflict within the newspaper *República* were ignored. The Socialists were quickly followed by the Popular-Democratic Party [*Popular Democratic Party* PPD] and a few independents, with only PCP, MDP-CDE, ex-MES and the Military remaining in office. Other moments worthy of attention include b) the formation of a Triumvirate composed by General Costa Gomes, General Vasco Gonçalves and Brigadier Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho; c) the eruption of the «9 doc.» signed by nine members of the Revolution council that refused both the Eastern Socialist model of democracy and the Western social-democrat one; and, finally, d) the downfall of the V Government, together with General Vasco Gonçalves, who had been Prime Minister of four provisional governments since 12 July 1974. Spanish attention will be focused on the attack or the obstacles faced by the electoral legitimacy and overall reinforced this legitimacy over the opposing revolutionary one.



When in mid-July the Socialist Party members abandon the IV provisional government, arguing that they are protesting against the return of *República* under a new administration, *Arriba* remembers that the CEE's agreements make the Socialists bounded to the Portuguese Government despite Soares skilful political utilization of the *República* case to create a situation of rupture<sup>897</sup>. Moreover this moment embodies a general condemnation of the former alliance between the Portuguese Socialist Party and the Communists. *ABC* reiterates its claim that collaboration with any Communist party will always lead to a political suicide, since Communists will never be democratic and it is naïve for democratic parties to think otherwise:

The great lesson of the Portuguese moment is a dual one: neither the Communist party will ever be democratic, nor will those who think otherwise and make a pact with it stop being dangerously and suicidally naïve. Through this pact they will forge their own destruction. The Communist party makes democracy, all democracy, unattainable, impossible<sup>ii898</sup>.

Similarly, *Arriba* insists on this idea, arguing that European History proves that when Communists and Socialists ally with each other, the latter always end up being betrayed by the former. This newspaper thus concludes that Portugal is already a dictatorship and hence that the electoral process was worthless:

What have the ballot boxes served for? What were the votes worth, when publicly and notoriously popular expression has been changed? Once again Communism has betrayed the promised democracy, because Portugal is now governed, not by democracy as was aspired, but by a dictatorship, and the future of the neighbouring nation is as uncertain now as it was before 25 April 1974<sup>iii899</sup>.

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<sup>897</sup> Editorial: «Portugal: día “O”».1975. *Arriba*, July 17<sup>th</sup>, pp. 7

<sup>898</sup> Editorial: «Democracia imposible».1975. *ABC*, July 12<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>899</sup> Editorial: «Democracia Frustrada».1975. *Arriba*, July 25<sup>th</sup>, pp.7

Unlike *Arriba* and *ABC*, in *La Vanguardia Española* the understanding is that the situation is still not yet decided, despite the fact that revolutionary legitimacy is taking over electoral legitimacy:

The conclusion is simple: the type of political systems in which the Portuguese situation can culminate is limited. Exhausted the authoritarian dictatorship, even if it survives through another language, Portugal might end up being a Western democracy or a popular one. Elections pointed in one direction. The objective alliance – that might not be part of the intentions of a great deal of the military – between the armed movement and the Communists leads to the second. This does not mean that there is no way back. But that once open a new constituent stage (who remembers Salazar, Caetano or even Spínola now?), the Portuguese path will have to end in Brussels or Moscow. There is no other station in sight<sup>iv900</sup>.

Nevertheless *La Vanguardia Española*, much like *Arriba* and *ABC*, blames the Communist party, and part of the Military institution, for high-jacking the process. Following *Arriba's* editorial line, Gómez Tello blames Soares, «whose political lucidity remains unproven in these fifteen months of Portuguese revolution»<sup>v</sup> because of his collaboration with the Communists. Much like the editorial positions of *ABC* and *Arriba*, Gómez Tello is not the least surprised – like some people in Spain, an example of which is Martin Maqueda in *Informaciones* – by the path the revolution took in Portugal. In fact, according to him the course was clear since the beginning:

(...) 25 April 1974, 20 September 1974, 11 July 1975. Three dates that marked Portugal's collapse into the present situation. They were three steps of the same stairway. (...) First, the defence of a State was destroyed; a State that had already undermined its own base (...) Then it was the Christian Democrats, the liberals and the Centrists' turn (...) Now the time for Soares' Socialists and Popular Democratic Party's Social-democrats has come<sup>vi 901</sup>.

In *ABC* José Javaloyes, author of the international politics column «El Meridiano Mundial», predicts that the opposition between former

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<sup>900</sup> Editorial: «A mano alzada». 1975. *La Vanguardia española*, July 11<sup>th</sup>, pp. 3

<sup>901</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. «¿Y ahora, que?» in *Arriba*, July 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.32

allies happening in Portugal will also happen in France<sup>902</sup>, because it is unavoidable. The unity of the left is naturalized as impossibility. On the other hand, Jaume Miravittles in *Tele/eXprés* establishes a parallel between the current Portuguese situation and the Spanish civil war, focusing on the relationship between Communists and the far left. Going back to what he calls the original «May» – the events that took place in May of 1937 in Barcelona, opposing Communists to Anarchists, who were supported by leftists –, Miravittles considers that it is a warning to the liberal and democratic forces to remain vigilant, since Communist hegemony might spring out of this conflict, like in Spain<sup>903</sup>.

In «Meridiano Mundial» Javaloyes claims that given the results of the elections, what the majority wants is quite clear: it wants socialist rule, and «Socialist – and maybe even also Social-democrats – have done something more than just abandoning the government. They left the regime»<sup>vii904</sup>. Hence the present Provisional Government is seen as illegitimate. At this moment Javaloyes underlines that the MFA is only supported by the totalitarian left because of the electoral results and the hegemony they expressed: «an absolute expression of the majority of Portuguese vote – in favour of the pluralist parties and against the ones imposing “direct democracy”. Anti-democratic democracy because it has been democratically repudiated»<sup>viii905</sup>. Given that what exists in Portugal can no longer be called democracy, especially after the parties that gathered the majority of the vote left the government and became part of the opposition, there is, therefore, the risk of a civil war:

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<sup>902</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «Callados a la fuerza » in *ABC*, July 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.16

<sup>903</sup> Miravittles, Jaume.1975. «Izquierdismo infantil: Trampolin comunista», in *Tele/eXprés*, July 15<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>904</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. « El adiós de Soares» in *ABC*, July 12<sup>th</sup>, pp.8

<sup>905</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. « Las democracias antidemocráticas» in *ABC*, July 18<sup>th</sup>, pp. 19

The Socialists are already on the streets organizing their demonstrations; the ecclesiastic hierarchy approaches the radio Renascença with the political emphasis it deserves; the peasant attack on a PCP headquarter up north underlines the political differences between north and south; there are masses that take to the ballot boxes, others take to the streets. The risk of such an extreme bipolarization is inscrutable<sup>ix906</sup>.

For Gómez Tello the stepping down of PPD represents the final agony and subsequent death of the IV government. A characteristic of Gómez Tello is to always refer to Emilio Guerreiro, the current PPD leader given the sickness of Sá Carneiro, as someone who fought the Spanish civil war on the Republican side, in order to place him as a sort of enemy of the Francoist regime. Furthermore, he presents PPD in the following unflattering fashion:

Its general secretary, Emilio Guerreiro, refugee in Spain during Salazar's period, took part in a coup attempt against Lisbon's Government with the complicity of the Spanish Republic, which ended in a circus. Later he fought as an officer together with the militiamen in our war. Another of its leaders, Francisco Balsemão, after having been an MP in Caetano's period, crossed over to the liberal opposition and with his newspaper, «expresso», prepared the revolutionary movement of April 25<sup>th</sup>. Not long ago he was in London and Stockholm begging the Socialist International for a place for the Popular Democratic Party, which was refused for two reasons: because it is not considered a workers' party, but of cadres and salon socialists, and because the International's smiles are already taken by Mario Soares<sup>x907</sup>.

In *Informaciones* Martin Maqueda considers that the Portuguese Revolutionary process took a step back to the confusing moments that followed the downfall of the New State. With the removal of Soares, «the man that opened Portugal to Europe and skilfully devised a plan for the decolonization process of the African territories»<sup>xi908</sup>, and «democratic socialism», followed by the strengthening of the Military power, «seem to have broken the illusions born with the “revolution of the flower”»<sup>xii</sup>,

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<sup>906</sup> Javaloyes, José. 1975. « Riesgos portugueses» in *ABC*, July 17<sup>th</sup>, pp. 18

<sup>907</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. « La ruptura » in *Arriba*, July 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.32

<sup>908</sup> Maqueda, Martin. 1975. «Portugal: ¿Pierde la democracia?», in *Informaciones políticas*, July 19<sup>th</sup>, pp. 5

since only the Communists, whose intentions of taking power are well-known and have been rejected by the people's vote – remain allied to the MFA.

Furthermore, and given that *ABC* does not give much credit to a democratic possibility in Portugal, this newspaper sustains the idea that the guarantees given by Costa Gomes, in Paris, and Melo Antunes, in Rome, of a pluralistic regime as the Portuguese goal, are now of no value and therefore the CEE's support, which implied that condition, should be re-evaluated:

Wishing nothing but the best for the brotherly people of Portugal, we nevertheless feel the duty to point out that Brussels should be as objective with all when granting political credit as it is when agreeing to or denying economic credit<sup>xiii909</sup>.

*ABC* moreover accuses Common Market Europe of discrimination due to what it feels are the difference of criteria used to evaluate the Portuguese and the Spanish situations. Shortly thereafter, *Arriba* heavily criticizes the role of European Social democracy in the Portuguese revolutionary process. While commenting on the visit of the Danish head of Government, Anker Jorgensen, to Portugal, the newspaper stresses the paternalistic tone of the relationship between Western Europe and Portugal:

In spite of that, the Portuguese government treats him without the least cordiality, the Portuguese workers throw him out of the factories that he, as a good Socialist, wants to visit, and has to hasten his return to his own country without fulfilling the task of having the Portuguese appreciating the honour of being supervised by a Danish<sup>xiv910</sup>.

Aside from criticising the relationship between Portugal and European Social democracy, the newspaper also dislikes the very concept

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<sup>909</sup> Editorial: «Portugal: el crédito político y económico, en juego». 1975. *ABC*, July 19<sup>th</sup>, pp. 3

<sup>910</sup> Editorial: El país de todos». 1975. *Arriba*, August 19<sup>th</sup>, pp.7

of social democracy, «the last line of Capitalism's trenches»<sup>xv</sup>. In this sense, and while condemning the tactic association between Socialists and Communists in the beginning of the process, *Arriba* considers the Communist party, at least, to be more coherent in its revolutionary aspirations and has, therefore, more respect towards it than towards the Socialist Party.

Although the Portuguese situation started to be read through international frameworks, *La Vanguardia Española* downgrades the interaction between the US and the USSR regarding the alleged respective influence each of them was by then exerting in the territory: «Therefore all gestures performed by the Soviets and the North-American should be interpreted, for now, more as an ideological stance than strictly military»<sup>xvi</sup><sup>911</sup>. For this newspaper, despite all the commotion, the fact that Portugal is located in the middle of one of the influence zones, recently reasserted by the Helsinki agreements, is fundamental. Because of the same concerns, before leaving Portugal in late-June, Eduardo Barrenechea also produces a special on the Atlantic Islands<sup>912</sup>, including the Spanish Canarias, focusing on their role as pawns in the dispute for areas of influence, given the impasse that Portugal is enduring.

In late-July given the precarious state of the IV provisional Government, a Triumvirate formed by Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves, President of the Republic Costa Gomes and head of COPCON Otelio Saraiva de Carvalho is nominated by the MFA's Assembly of July 25<sup>th</sup>,

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<sup>911</sup> Editorial: «EEUU y URSS sobre Portugal ». 1975. *La Vanguardia española*, August 24<sup>th</sup>, pp. 3

<sup>912</sup> Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Tormenta en las islas atlánticas: Azores, Madeira y Canarias, nueva "Zona caliente"» in *Informaciones*, July 4<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6; Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Tormenta en las islas atlánticas 2: Madeira: ¿La oportunidad de la independencia?» in *Informaciones*, July 5<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6; Barrenechea, Eduardo. 1975. «Tormenta en las islas atlánticas 3: Azores: ¿Independientes de Portugal...Y dependientes de USA?» in *Informaciones*, July 7<sup>th</sup>, pp.6-7

becoming the main source of political and military power in Portugal. The Spanish press broadly disregards this political formula.

For *ABC*, the Triumvirate means a big step forward in an unstoppable revolution, which has an increasingly narrower support basis. Therefore it is a big step towards a totalitarian regime<sup>913</sup>. While not supporting the formula, *La Vanguardia Española* is not as alarmed by it as *ABC* and underlines its precariousness, not only because it is a naturally precarious political formula but also due to the disparity of interests between its three elements. Thus it feels that will probably not last. The newspaper remains hopeful that President Costa Gomes might intervene in favour of moderation and redirect the path of the revolutionary process: «We will see if Costa Gomes's reasonable words will be able to prevent revolution from following its rhythm, leaving behind the people in whose name the revolution is made for and the parties that had the majority of the popular trust»<sup>xvii914</sup>.

In *Arriba*, Gómez Tello keeps repeating, likewise, how Triumvirates are inoperative: «no "Troika" is viable for long, because two of its components are always left behind. The Lisbon Troika did not survive more than a couple of days»<sup>xviii915</sup>. Like *La Vanguardia Española*, Gómez Tello also points out that the ideological differences between its three members are too substantial, but adds the military power that Otelo holds as head of COPCON. The situation in which Portugal is living is, from Gómez Tello's point of view, the direct result of the military insubordination started by Spínola<sup>916</sup>.

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<sup>913</sup> Editorial: «Portugal: radicalización y triunvirato».1975. *ABC*, July 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.3-4

<sup>914</sup> Editorial: «El triunvirato».1975. *La Vanguardia española*, July 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>915</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis.1975. « La larga crisis portuguesa» in *Arriba*, August 1<sup>st</sup>, pp.27

<sup>916</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. « Portugal: entre el caos y la Violencia » in *Arriba*, August 5<sup>th</sup>, pp.28

José Javaloyes<sup>917</sup> argues that the formation of the Triumvirate expresses the highest moment of the existing crisis between the two opposing political legitimacies: the military that brought political change and the ones who won popular support with the election. Javaloyes links the difficulties in the formation of the V Government with the narrower support basis that the Triumvirate implies, like *ABC*'s editorial advanced.

In *Tele/eXprés*, Jaume Miravittles shows antagonism towards the Triumvirate formula as well, arguing that it represents an antidemocratic conception of power:

To understand the political significance of the new Triumvirate that governs the country's destiny, we should forget all democratic considerations regarding their responsibility as to the numeric value of their representation and limit ourselves to the fashionable new Marxist theory about the «balance of power»<sup>xix</sup><sup>918</sup>.

Furthermore, for *Tele/eXprés*' columnist, the creation of the triumvirate in Portugal confirms Althusser's proposal regarding the May'68 alliance between orthodox communists and leftist groups:

I have personally pointed out the newfound luck of the political principles espoused by the French Marxist Althusser, who since the French days of May 1968 is advocating an alliance between orthodox Communism and leftist groups. I said before that this likelihood seemed to materialize itself in Portugal. The formation of the Triumvirate confirms it.<sup>xx</sup>

Althusser's position on the May'68 events was more complex than what Miravittles assumes<sup>919</sup>. Nonetheless, by evoking Althusser,

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<sup>917</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. « El poder, cercado » in *ABC*, August 5<sup>th</sup>, pp. 16

<sup>918</sup> Miravittles, Jaume.1975. « Los “tres grandes” de Portugal», in *Tele/eXprés*, August 1<sup>st</sup>, pp.5

<sup>919</sup> In fact Althusser was criticized, firstly for having kept silence since he was hospitalized at the moment, and then for having supported the official PCF line that the situation was not truthfully revolutionary. Afterwards, in the sequence of Althusser's *Reply to John Lewis* (1973) where he defends himself of the accusation of orthodoxy and denounces Lewis' humanism, his former student, Jacques Rancière ([1974] 2011), addresses Althusser's influence in the French left-wing milieu, denouncing its hierarchic overwhelming presence.



Miravittles is resorting to an authority argument that resonates with left wing sectors, given the preponderance Louis Althusser had had in the renovation of Marxist theory since the beginning of the 1960s, which was by this moment having resonance in Spain. According to Gregorio Morán's account (2014), in March 1976 Louis Althusser would visit Spain, giving lectures in Granada, Madrid and Barcelona invited by people close to the still underground PCE. This way, Miravittles enters the on-going debate, linking Althusser's proposal with something that from his point of view is an antidemocratic conception of power and therefore taints it with negativity.

Then on August 5<sup>th</sup> a document drafted by what became known as the «Group of 9» was made public and delivered to President Costa Gomes on the 7<sup>th</sup>. In it nine officers with a seat in the Revolution Council declared they were against both the Eastern Socialist path, seen as totalitarian, and the Western social-democratic one.

For *ABC* this document is, on the one hand, another proof that there is a division within the MFA, even after the several purges that the Military institution already went through, and, on the other hand, is dismissible for it is considered it nothing but a dispute within Marxism therefore it does not mean a real possibility for democracy:

In this sense the so-called «Manifest of the Nine» is not an isolated fact, something that might not have happened. The bottom line is there is no Marxist unity within the MFA even after the purge of the centre and right-wing high-rank elements of the three branches of the Armed forces. On the other hand, and as a logical consequence of the above, the main board of the MFA's moderates is constituted by people who are as Marxist as the head of Government, Vasco Gonçalves. Even if not Leninist, as the latter, nor Stalinist, as Alvaro Cunhal<sup>xxi 920</sup>.

The newspaper contends that, in this scenario, President Costa Gomes must take action. In *La Vanguardia Española* this divergence of

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<sup>920</sup> Editorial: «La crisis portuguesa».1975. *ABC*. August 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

opinions is considered to be normal in a country with the electoral results that Portugal had. The elections showed that diversity of opinion regarding the desirable political configuration existed in Portugal, and that it was only natural that it also existed within the MFA. The problem lies in the fact that the Military Institution is ruled differently from a democratic society:

Now, if the preferences of the Portuguese people are known and we perfectly know where the majority stands, in the case of the Armed Forces the way of resolving differences and the consequences of that decision are much more problematic. Hopefully the leaders of the Armed Forces will be able to maintain the necessary unity to assign power to a Government that actually represents the majority of the country. This way its historical mission would be perfectly fulfilled, even if many would have to sacrifice their illusions, which could only be fulfilled by imposing a new dictatorship to the Portuguese people<sup>xxii921</sup>.

Therefore this newspaper defends that not only the Military must honour the electoral results, but that they should support a Government that reflects the latter, otherwise instead of a democracy a dictatorship will be established.

Gómez Tello, the only columnist to address the document directly, deems it unclear regarding its political purposes and written in a sappy tone, similar to the one used by Soares: «The truth is no one knows exactly what their programme is and the text is a complaint for having been robbed of power in the same tone used by Soares' lament»<sup>xxiii922</sup>. Moreover, *ABC* considers that not only both Mário Soares' letter to President Costa Gomes and this document were equally ineffective, but also that the document seems to have had the opposite effect its signatories wished for: «it has led to a stimulus for the radicalization of power, underlined, emphatic and defying, by the permanence of the same

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<sup>921</sup> Editorial: «El MFA con el pueblo al fondo».1975. *La Vanguardia española*, August 10<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>922</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis.1975. «Otra carretada» in *Arriba*, August 10<sup>th</sup>, pp.28

person as head of Government»<sup>xxiv923</sup>. The newspaper argues then that only Vasco Gonçalves' downfall would open a possibility for the present crisis to be solved, as anything less than that would be worthless.

However when the V Provisional Government falls and Vasco Gonçalves, Prime-Minister since the II Provisional Government, is replaced by Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo *ABC* remains sceptical. For this newspaper this replacement «has not solved the crisis»<sup>924</sup> as Gonçalves was replaced by someone who is considered by the same newspaper as «gonçalvista». Exactly the same is written by this newspaper correspondent in Lisbon, José Salas.

In this sense Gómez Tello ironically remarks ironically the unstable feature of the Portuguese executive power, given the downfall of the V provisional Government after so little time in power. : «It seems as though the Portuguese governments take less in falling than the cabalas and discussions, the fighting and the tension that are needed to their constitution»<sup>xxv925</sup>.

Moreover also General Costa Gomes' action is considered by *ABC* as ambiguous. Indeed, on the one hand, he is pro-radicalization by replacing Gonçalves by someone close to him, in *ABC*'s view, which is one shared by several observers, and, on the other hand, he is pro-moderation by neutralizing the action of the V division, responsible for much of the revolutionary commotion.

On the contrary, *La Vanguardia Española* conceives Costa Gomes as a «master in the art of keeping himself afloat in the midst of the biggest storms»<sup>xxvi</sup>, and a very agile maneuverer, who was able to bring

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<sup>923</sup> Editorial: «Portugal: un gobierno como desafío ». 1975. *ABC*, August 9<sup>th</sup>, pp. 3

<sup>924</sup> Editorial: «Portugal: una crisis agravada».1975. *ABC*, August 31<sup>st</sup>, pp.3

<sup>925</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis.1975. «Vasco Gonçalves marcha a la guerra» in *Arriba*, August 20<sup>th</sup>, pp.28

together the moderates of the «9 doc.» and Otelo's faction, which in the sequence of the «9 doc.» put out a document as well. *La Vanguardia Española* maintains that Gonçalves' downfall was achieved by this compromise between the «Group of 9» and Otelo's, but that it was imminent since the documents were made public, and unequivocal when Álvaro Cunhal withdrew PCP's support to the V Government. Unlike *ABC*, *La Vanguardia Española* considers Pinheiro de Azevedo to be neutral, not «gonçalvista». Yet this newspaper advocates, once more, for a new stable cabinet to be assigned, honouring the electoral results:

And the country, coming out of a tunnel of almost half a century of dictatorship, with serious problems of decolonization and a dying economy, urgently needs a capable, stable and representative cabinet – the people stated its options in the general elections, an option that unfortunately has been dictatorially ignored – to start the task it is supposed to carry out: to govern. Portugal needs it, because otherwise Portugal will die<sup>xxvii926</sup>.

All five newspapers make the news its front-cover, despite the evident emphasis of *ABC* and *Arriba* (fig.8) on Vasco Gonçalves' figure, especially if contrasting with the other newspaper covers:



<sup>926</sup> Editorial: « La caída de Vasco Gonçalves».1975. *La Vanguardia española*, August 31<sup>st</sup>, pp.3



Fig.8

The contrast between newspapers is also evident in the way they report the news. There is a difference between how *ABC* and *Arriba* relate to it and how the rest of the newspapers do. In general, the latter report the event of Gonçalves replacement as a normal one, given the context. They try to assess Pinheiro de Azevedo's political positions and, for instance, Alberto Miguez concludes that he is an enigma. In *ABC*, on the other hand, José Salas describes the event as Gonçalves having fallen down of his pedestal.

Likewise in *Arriba* Gómez Tello narrates step by step the crisis that culminates in Gonçalves' downfall as a war-like description: the progressive understanding between the «Group of 9» and the «COPCON' document», facilitated by Costa Gomes, against Vasco Gonçalves' faction: «Vasco Gonçalves goes into war» [Vasco Gonçalves marcha a la Guerra]<sup>927</sup>; still unable to syncretize completely, both factions solely agree on the fact that Gonçalves should be removed and the V division closed: «Are its days over?» [¿Con los días contados?]<sup>928</sup>; the rising of the Popular Unity Front [*Frente de Unidad Popular FUP*], a political

<sup>927</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. «Vasco Gonçalves marcha a la guerra» in *Arriba*, August 20<sup>th</sup>, pp.28

<sup>928</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. «¿Con los días contados?» in *Arriba*, August 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.28

platform in support of COPCON's document, popular power and V Government: «Two months of crisis» [Una crisis de dos meses]<sup>929</sup>; when the V Government's fall is finally decided and Pinheiro de Azevedo is then in charge of putting the VI government together: «A night in Belém» [Una noche en Belén]<sup>930</sup>; the Communist party dropping its support to the V government, and Gonçalves, in favour of Pinheiro de Azevedo: «The last battle of Gonçalves» [La última batalla de Goncalves[sic]]<sup>931</sup>; the atmosphere of collusion that anticipated the General Assemblies of Army delegates and the MFA: «A wind of confusion» [Un viento de confusión]<sup>932</sup>; and finally when during the Tancos' Assembly, Vasco Gonçalves renounces the nomination for head of the Armed Forces, which had been a strongly contested Presidential decision: «The defeat of Vasco Gonçalves» [La derrota de Vasco Goncalves]<sup>933</sup>.

The loss of all notion of Military discipline is given as the motivation of this long crisis that the downfall of the V provisional Government and Vasco Gonçalves did not solve. This loss will have its most visible incarnation in the SUV's demonstrations, «a soldier's soviet» as Salvador de la Torre calls it, of mid-September. For the special correspondent of *Arriba* (and *pyresa*) the demonstration in Oporto means the decline of the Military, since without discipline no Military Institution is possible, in spite of the political regime it integrates.

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<sup>929</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. «Una crisis de dos meses» in *Arriba*, August 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.28

<sup>930</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. «Una noche en Belén» in *Arriba*, August 30<sup>th</sup>, pp.29

<sup>931</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. «La última batalla de Gonçalves» in *Arriba*, September 3<sup>rd</sup>, pp.28

<sup>932</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. «Un viento de confusión» in *Arriba*, September 5<sup>th</sup>, pp. 28

<sup>933</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. «La derrota de Vasco Gonçalves» in *Arriba*, September 7<sup>th</sup>, pp.28

## a) Reinforcing electoral legitimacy

The hegemonic feature of the antagonism between extremism and moderation, which is translated into a positive connotation of electoral legitimacy against a negative connotation of the revolutionary one, is reinforced by several strategies of argumentation. On the one hand, the majority against the revolutionary legitimacy is given strength by the power of numbers. On the other hand, this majority is given a «body» by conceiving the Portuguese people as naturally counter-revolutionary, creating the notion of the northern majority against the «Lisbon's commune»: the truthful Portuguese against the imported red ideologies.

### 1. The number game

Regarding the legitimacies in confrontation, for the same situation – to address the electoral legitimacy – three journalists use numbers differently. «As is well known for news (...) *numbers* are the rhetorical device to suggest precision and objectivity, and hence credibility» (van Dijk 2000, 46). While all of them give preponderance to the electoral legitimacy opposed to the revolutionary one by emphasizing its majority, they also make numbers mean different things and attribute a different number to the same coalition.

In *ABC* José Javaloyes splits these two legitimacies into two groups – the ones that remain in government, a minority, and the majority opposing government: «Outside the Government, and organized against the system, remain the political forces that represent 70% of the vote of the last elections. Facing them are the forces that represent 18% of the suffrage in the same occasion»<sup>xxviii 934</sup>. In *La Vanguardia Española*,

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<sup>934</sup> Javaloyes, José. 1975. «Las democracias antidemocrática» in *ABC*, July 18<sup>th</sup>, pp. 19

Margarita Sáenz-Díaz addresses the same reality by referring to the Constitutional Assembly: «Both parties [PS and PPD] have 80% of the seats in the Constituent Assembly and refuse to accept that the chamber emerged through classic electoral proceedings should be devoted to ostracism»<sup>xxix935</sup>. The number, however, increases 10 %. The sum of the electoral results of PS, PPD and CDS is of 71,93%, which is probably what Javaloyes is referring to. Whereas the sum that Sáenz-Díaz is referring to is probably the percentage of seats in Parliament that PS and PPD got. Finally, in *Arriba*, Gómez Tello increases the percentage of the electoral legitimacy once more, this time without a reasonable explanation, and his own numbers do not make sense (84% plus 18% exceeds the total of 100% by two points): «Now it is the turn of Soares' Socialists and the Popular Democratic Party's Social-Democrats. Their illusion of getting respect from the Communists, given their 84% vote versus 18% of the Communists in the elections of April 25<sup>th</sup>, was a suicidal Panglossism»<sup>xxx936</sup>. As a strategy of argumentation, the number game is very successful, hence its common use both by journalists and politicians, when aiming at convincing an audience. In this case, it gives considerable strength to the electoral legitimacy that is not even questioned anymore in the Spanish press.

## 2. The «north»: the formation of the counter-revolutionary people

Another strategy is the conception of the Portuguese people as naturally counter-revolutionary, by opposition to the masses, devoid of agency,

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<sup>935</sup> Sáenz-Díaz, Margarita. 1975. «La ruptura como solución» in *La Vanguardia Española*, July 12<sup>th</sup>. pp.18

<sup>936</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. «¿Y ahora, que? » in *Arriba*, July 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.32



used by political parties, namely the Communists, to enforce their ideology (i.e. the demonstration of January 14<sup>th</sup> in favour of the single union proposed by the PCP).

In this sense, *ABC* and *Arriba* give a special coverage, mostly photographic, to the popular counter-revolutionary actions that were frequent during the summer of 1975, namely through a report by José Cavero on *Arriba*'s Sunday edition titled «The north proclaims its anticommunism»<sup>937</sup> (fig.9) [El norte proclama su anticomunismo], or a special report on Madera Island's self-determination groups that wanted to distance themselves from a «Communist continental country»<sup>938</sup>.



Fig.9

Moreover *Arriba* continues devoting attention to possible leaders of this people and, for instance, produces several «Specials», such as an

<sup>937</sup> Cavero, José Cavero. 1975. «El norte proclama su anticomunismo» in *Arriba dominical*, August 24<sup>th</sup>, pp. 2-3

<sup>938</sup> Cavero, José Cavero. 1975. «Tema del día: Madeira advierte a Lisboa» in *Arriba*, September 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp. 10

interview with General Spínola, in his Brazilian exile<sup>939</sup>, and with Mário Soares<sup>940</sup>.

Portugal is conceived, at that moment, as a divided country and where division is palpably visible. For Gómez Tello, the division within the Military institution is discernible in the several (and long) MFA assemblies, but it is also very much geographical: «Right now Portugal is adrift between the political chaos and the violence starting in the northern part of the country»<sup>xxxix941</sup>. For José Javaloyes, the Military division is patent and even the Military is joining the counter-revolutionary «snow-ball»: «The troops, on the contrary, have already started incorporating the snow-ball forming against the kidnapers of April 25»<sup>xxxix942</sup>.

In *ABC*'s «Meridiano Mundial» the image of a country where two opposing realities face each other is developed further: «They are two total and conflicting modes of conceiving change. They are the two halves of the country: the totalitarian and the pluralist. And both of them might be placed on top of Portugal's map: the anti-Communist north and the south under Communist influence»<sup>xxxiii</sup>.

It is also assumed that both factions are heading towards an open confrontation, a civil war that according to Javaloyes depends on Mário Soares' loyalties:

Clash will be avoided only if Mario Soares wishes to avoid it. The triumvirs have power in their hands, even if the future is in the hands of the Socialist leader. Soares has decided to wait, but without unveiling for how long. All depends on him loving Socialism more than freedom, or

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<sup>939</sup> EFE.1975.«Portugal, en la hora más grave de su historia» in *Arriba*, August 5<sup>th</sup>,pp.6

<sup>940</sup> Tomax, Piera C. 1975. «El ejército está dividido (por posiciones contradictorias)» in *Arriba*, August 10<sup>th</sup>, pp. 8

<sup>941</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. «Portugal: entre el caos y la Violencia » in *Arriba*, August 5<sup>th</sup>, pp. 28

<sup>942</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «Lisboa, Helsinki, Praga » in *ABC*, August 7<sup>th</sup>, pp.14

freedom more than Socialism. In his case, the problem is more a matter of the heart than of political reckoning<sup>xxxiv943</sup>.

Gómez Tello also warns about an imminent armed conflict due to the way people are able to mobilise themselves in revolutionary Portugal and the volatility of the signified contained by the significant «reactionary»: «Given that this word is so generously used in Lisbon, it is not clear who he was referring to: the ones of yesterday or the ones of tomorrow»<sup>xxxv944</sup>. Since «reactionary» is a signifier that is able to contain almost anything in the revolutionary Portugal, now already encompasses the Socialists: «The barricade erected to close Lisbon's entrance to the "reaction" – now the Socialists are the reaction –, the burning of 14 Communist headquarters, at the hands of the Socialists, suggest restless days»<sup>xxxvi945</sup>.

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<sup>943</sup> «El corazón de Soares».1975. in *ABC*, July 27<sup>th</sup>, pp. 12

<sup>944</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis.1975. « La larga crisis portuguesa» in *Arriba*, August 1<sup>st</sup>, pp. 27

<sup>945</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. « Los dados van a caer » in *Arriba*, July 26<sup>th</sup>, pp. 30



Fig.10

In this evermore visible latent confrontation, the counterrevolutionary forces, opposed to Communism, and especially present in the north of the country, are taking over the streets (fig.10) that

once belonged primarily to the PCP, backed by the MFA: «The Lusitanian liberal and democratic north, reluctant and resistant to Salazar, has said enough. It is resisting the left-wing dictatorship that Cunhal's men want to make irreversible»<sup>xxxvii946</sup>. This idea is repeated frequently by José Javaloyes, who argues that if moderation does not take over the process, open confrontation will necessarily happen:

The radical Marxism of the MFA does not even have the street anymore. Things seem to have gotten to the point of no return. Either the military power is open to internal moderation, or the installed minority and the rebellious majority will clash<sup>xxxviii947</sup>.

According to *ABC*'s journalist, in this battle for the control of the streets, Communists are being forced to retreat and the «people» appears as protagonist for the first time: «The Portuguese people is no longer curved and passive – like it was in the previous regime – waiting for the decision of the ones monopolizing the April 25<sup>th</sup> path. (...) The bull is on the square and the Portuguese people on the streets»<sup>xxxix948</sup>. In this context, for this journalist only the counter-revolutionary Portuguese people can count as people, and the rest seem to be considered as masses organised by the Communists.

No support of the revolutionary legitimacy, which gains presence in the Portuguese public sphere, is conceivable in the Spanish press. On the contrary, there is condemnation of most of its endeavours and a great emphasis of all the demonstrations of violence. Moreover, the concept that had been previously mentioned (i.e. by Fernando Jáuregui at the moment of the electoral campaign) emerges: the «north» of Portugal and its counter-revolutionary people. Together with the force of numbers, these strategies reinforce the strength of the electoral legitimacy.

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<sup>946</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «Vilanova de Famalicao» in *ABC*, August 6<sup>th</sup>, pp. 14

<sup>947</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. « El poder, cercado » in *ABC*, August 5<sup>th</sup>, pp. 16

<sup>948</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «Vilanova de Famalicao» in *ABC*, August 6<sup>th</sup>, pp. 14

Finally, the downfall of Vasco Gonçalves is celebrated as an important defeat of the revolutionary legitimacy, especially by the newspapers that more fiercely oppose it: *ABC* and *Arriba*. Gonçalves' defeat, nevertheless, fails to be able to solve the political-military crisis that Portugal is enduring and the atmosphere of tension remains.

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**Original quotes:**

<sup>i</sup>« La crisis de autoridad de los dos últimos meses es el principal problema de la situación portuguesa. O si se quiere la condición previa para afrontar los otros. (...) El juego portugués podría llamarse «si ganara... (Vasco, Melo, Soares, Cunhal, Oteló, Fabião [sic], Spínola, el obispo de Braga, etc.)». La complejidad de la situación se expresa en la multiplicidad de posibles protagonistas pero excluye la existencia de alternativas simples y claras, de momento (revolución o contrarrevolución). (...) La crisis portuguesa puede, aún resolverse de forma pacífica y democrática.»

<sup>ii</sup> «La gran lección de la hora portuguesa es doble: ni el partido comunista será nunca democrático, ni dejarán de ser peligrosamente, suicidamente ingenuos quienes, creyendo lo contrario, pacten con él y a través de ese pacto pongan los pilares de su propia destrucción. El partido comunista hace que la democracia, toda democracia, sea inalcanzable, imposible.»

<sup>iii</sup>« ¿De qué han servido las urnas? ¿De qué han valido los votos cuando publica y notoriamente se ha alterado la expresión popular? Una vez más el comunismo ha traicionado la Democracia prometida, porque ahora Portugal está gobernado, no por una democracia como se pretendía, sino por una dictadura, y el futuro de la nación vecina es tan incierto como podía serlo antes del 25 de abril de 1974.»

<sup>iv</sup>« La conclusión es sencilla: el repertorio de sistemas políticos en que puede desembocar una situación como la portuguesa es limitado. Agotada la dictadura autoritaria, aunque de alguna forma subsista, todavía con otro lenguaje, Portugal puede acabar siendo una democracia occidental o una democracia popular. Las elecciones apuntaron en una dirección. La alianza objetiva – puede no entrar en las intenciones de buena parte de los militares – entre el movimiento armado y los comunistas conducen a la segunda. No significa esto que la suerte esté echada. Pero sí que, abierta una etapa constituyente (¿quién se acuerda ya de Salazar, de Caetano, incluso de Spínola?), la vía portuguesa habrá que acabar desembocando en Bruselas o en Moscú. No hay otra estación de tren a la vista.»

<sup>v</sup> «cuya lucidez política no ha sido acreditada a lo largo de estos quince meses de revolución portuguesa»

<sup>vi</sup> «(...) 25 de abril de 1974, 20 de septiembre de 1974, 11 de julio de 1975. Tres fechas que han marcado el desplome de Portugal hacia la situación presente. Han sido los tres escalones de una misma escalera. (...) Primero se desarboló la defensa de un Estado, que se había zapado a si mismo los cimientos (...) Después le tocó el turno de ser eliminado a los demócratas cristianos, a los liberales y a los

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centristas (...) Ahora le ha tocado el turno a los socialistas de Soares y a los socialdemócratas del Partido Popular Democrático.»

<sup>vii</sup> «Los socialistas - y acaso también los socialdemócratas - han hecho algo más que abandonar y marcharse del Gobierno. Se han ido del régimen.»

<sup>viii</sup> «una votación expresa de la absoluta mayoría de los portugueses- en favor de los partidos pluralistas y en contra de quienes imponen la "democracia directa". Democracia antidemocrática porque ha sido democráticamente repudiada»

<sup>ix</sup> « Los socialistas se lanzan ya a la calle, organizando sus manifestaciones; la jerarquía eclesiástica toma el tema radio Renascença con el énfasis político que merece; el asalto campesino en el Norte, a un local del PCP, subraya la diferenciación política con el Sur; hay masas que ganan en las urnas y otras que toman la calle. Los riesgos de bipolarización tan extrema son inescrutables.»

<sup>x</sup> «Su secretario general, Emilio Guerreiro, refugiado en España durante la época de Salazar intervino en una intentona contra el Gobierno de Lisboa, con la complicidad de la República española, que acabó en un espectáculo circense. Después combatió como oficial junto a los milicianos en nuestra guerra. Otro de sus dirigentes, Francisco Balsemao [sic], después de haber sido diputado en la época de Caetano, se pasó a la oposición liberal, y con su periódico, «expresso», preparó el movimiento revolucionario del 25 de abril. Hace poco anduvo por Londres y Estocolmo mendigando el ingreso del Partido Popular Democrático a la Internacional Socialista, donde le dieron la callada por respuesta por dos razones: porque no le consideran un partido de trabajadores, sino de cuadros y socialistas de salón, y porque las sonrisas de la Internacional están reservadas para Mario Soares.»

<sup>xi</sup> «el hombre que abrió Portugal a Europa y que tejió hábilmente el proceso de descolonización de los territorios africanos»

<sup>xii</sup> «parecen haber roto las ilusiones que nacieron con "la revolución de la flor"»

<sup>xiii</sup> « No deseando otra cosa nosotros que lo mejor para el pueblo fraterno de Portugal, nos creemos, sin embargo en el deber de señalar la conveniencia de que Bruselas fuera tan objetiva para todos a la hora de otorgar el crédito político, como lo es en el momento de conceder y negar el crédito económico.»

<sup>xiv</sup> «Y a pesar de ello, el Gobierno portugués le trata sin la menor cordialidad, los obreros portugueses le echan de las fábricas que, como buen socialista, quiere visitar, y tiene que precipitar el regreso a su país sin haber conseguido que los portugueses valorasen el honor de ser dirigidos por un danés.»

<sup>xv</sup> «la última línea de las trincheras del capitalismo»

<sup>xvi</sup> « De ahí que cuantas manifestaciones realicen los dirigentes soviéticos y norteamericanos deben ser interpretadas, por ahora, más como toma de posición ideológica que estrictamente militar.»

<sup>xvii</sup> «Veremos si las razonables palabras de Costa Gomes logran impedir que la revolución siga acelerando su ritmo y dejando al margen al pueblo en nombre del que la hace y a los partidos que recogieron mayores márgenes de confianza popular.»

<sup>xviii</sup> «ninguna "Troika" es viable por mucho tiempo, porque siempre sobran dos de sus componentes. La de Lisboa no ha resistido más que unos días.»

<sup>xix</sup> «Para comprender pues el significado político del nuevo Triunvirato que rige los destinos del país, es recomendable olvidar toda consideración democrática

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sobre su responsabilidad en cuanto al valor numérico de su representación, y atenernos a la nueva teoría marxista en boga sobre las «relaciones de poder»»

<sup>xx</sup> «Personalmente he señalado la nueva fortuna de los postulados políticos del marxista francés, Althusser, que preconiza, desde las jornadas del mayo francés del 1968, una alianza del comunismo ortodoxo con los grupúsculos izquierdistas. Dije en aquel papel que aquella probabilidad parecía materializarse en Portugal. La constitución del Triunvirato lo confirma.»

<sup>xxi</sup> « En tal sentido el llamado «manifiesto de los Nueve» no constituyó un hecho episódico: algo que pudiera no haberse producido. El dato básico es que no existe unicidad marxista en el seno del MFA después de que los respectivos escalafones de las tres Armas fueran purgadas de elementos del centro y de la derecha. Y, de otro punto, tan importante como tal dato es su consecuencia lógica: el cuadro principal de los moderados del MFA lo constituyen gentes que son tan marxistas como el propio jefe del Gobierno, Vasco Gonçalves. Aunque no sean leninistas, como éste, ni stalinianos, como Álvaro Cunhal.»

<sup>xxii</sup> «Ahora bien, si las preferencias del pueblo portugués son conocidas y se sabe perfectamente dónde está la mayoría, en caso de las fuerzas armadas el modo de dirimir las diferencias y las consecuencias de la decisión resultan mucho más problemáticas. Quiera Dios que los dirigentes de las fuerzas armadas mantengan entre sí la unidad suficiente para ceder el poder a un Gobierno que represente realmente la mayoría del país. Con eso quedaría perfectamente cumplida su misión histórica. Aunque muchos tuvieran que sacrificar así ilusiones que sólo podrían cumplirse imponiendo al pueblo portugués una nueva dictadura»

<sup>xxiii</sup> «La realidad es que no se sabe claramente cuál es su programa y el texto es una lamentación por haberseles hurtado el poder, en el mismo tono en que se lamenta Soares.»

<sup>xxiv</sup> «ha resultado un acicate para la radicalización del Poder, subrayada, enfática y desafiadoramente, con la permanencia del mismo personaje en la cabeza del Gobierno.»

<sup>xxv</sup> «Parece como si los Gobiernos portugueses actuales tardaran menos tiempo en caer que, el que las cábalas y conciliábulos, las pugnas y las tensiones imponen a su constitución.»

<sup>xxvi</sup> «maestro en el arte de mantenerse a flote en las mayores tormentas»

<sup>xxvii</sup> «Y el país, salido de un túnel de casi medio siglo de dictadura, con gravísimos problemas de descolonización y una economía moribunda, necesita urgentemente que un gabinete capaz, estable y representativo - el pueblo manifestó sus opciones en las elecciones generales, opinión que por desgracia ha sido dictatorialmente ignorada - comience a realizar la tarea que compete: gobernar. Portugal lo necesita, porque, si no, Portugal se muere.»

<sup>xxviii</sup> «Al margen del Gobierno, y definidos contra el sistema, quedan las fuerzas políticas, todas que representan al 70 por 100 de los votos emitidos en las últimas elecciones. Y frente a ellas, las fuerzas que apenas alcanzaron el 18 por 100 de los sufragios en la misma ocasión.»

<sup>xxix</sup> «Ambos partidos [PS and PPD] disponen del 80 por ciento de los escaños en la Asamblea Constituyente y se niegan a aceptar por tanto que la cámara surgida por la clásica vía electoral sea arrinconada al ostracismo»

<sup>xxx</sup> «Ahora le ha tocado el turno a los socialistas de Soares y a los socialdemócratas del Partido Popular Democrático. Su ilusión de que con el 84



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por 100 de los votos en las elecciones del 25 de abril iban a hacerse respetar por los comunistas, con un 18 por 100 de sufragios, era, de un panglossismo suicida.»

<sup>xxx</sup> «Por el momento, Portugal va a la deriva entre el caos político en la capital y la violencia que se inicia en el norte del país.»

<sup>xxxii</sup> «Las tropas, por el contrario, han comenzado ya a constituirse en ingrediente incorporado de la bola de nieve que se abalanza contra los secuestradores del 25 de abril.»

<sup>xxxiii</sup> «Son dos modos totales y antagónicos de concebir el cambio. Son las dos mitades verticales del país: la totalitaria y la pluralista. Y ambas pueden superponerse y ensamblarse activamente con las dos mitades horizontales: el norte anticomunista y el sur comunistizado.»

<sup>xxxiv</sup> «Sólo no llegará la colisión si Mario Soares no quiere. Los triunviros tienen el Poder en sus manos, aunque el futuro está en las del líder socialista. Soares se ha decidido por la espera, pero sin decir por cuanto tiempo. Todo dependerá de que ame más al socialismo que a la libertad, o que a la libertad más que al socialismo. El problema, en su caso, es más de corazón que de cálculo político.»

<sup>xxxv</sup> «Como esta palabra se aplica tan generosamente en Lisboa, no se sabe bien a cuales se refería: si a los de ayer, a los de hoy o a los de mañana.»

<sup>xxxvi</sup> «Las barricadas erigidas para cerrar la entrada de Lisboa a la "reacción" - que son ahora los socialistas - el incendio de 14 locales comunistas en pocos días, a cargo de los socialistas, anuncian días inquietos.»

<sup>xxxvii</sup> «El norte lusitano, liberal y democrático, reticente y resistente a Salazar ha dicho basta. Se resiste a la dictadura de izquierdas que los hombres de Cunhal quieren irreversible.»

<sup>xxxviii</sup> «El marxismo radical del MFA ya no dispone ni siquiera de la calle como coartada. Las cosas parecen, pues, llegadas ya a un punto de no retorno. O apertura interna a la moderación, del poder militar, o choque, con todas las consecuencias, entre la minoría instalada y la mayoría rebelada.»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «El pueblo portugués ya no permanece plegado y pasivo - como si aún estuviera en el anterior régimen - a la espera de lo que decidan quienes monopolizaron el cambio brotado del 25 de abril. (...)El toro está ya en la plaza y el pueblo portugués en la calle.»



## **9. The invasion and destruction of the Spanish diplomatic premises**

The longest day has passed. It will remain in history, because it is not easy to recall a day of such anti-Spanish violence, demonstrations, boycotts, destruction of an Embassy. Nonetheless, the most important event of the day was the Spanish decision of remove Lisbon's diplomatic mission, leaving a *chargé d'affaires* in charge of national interests. It was an unthinkable outcome until 48 hours ago and was forced by the special circumstances surrounding the Embassy assault. This event puts an end to a long honeymoon between these neighbour countries, which the Portuguese media have been tainting for a while now.<sup>i 949</sup>

On September 27<sup>th</sup>, five opponents to the Francoist regime, two members of ETA political-military<sup>950</sup> and three members of FRAP<sup>951</sup>, were executed by firing squads, despite the strong internal mobilization and wide international condemnation, among which from Pope Paul VI, who asked for clemency for the prisoners. These were the last death penalties carried out by the Francoist regime. Until the last minute, there was hope that the prisoners would be granted clemency, and several protests, in Spain and abroad, were held against the executions (see Part II). In Portugal the protests resulted in the invasion and destruction of the Spanish diplomatic premises.

Both Alberto Miguez<sup>952</sup> and José Salas<sup>953</sup>, present at the moment when the Spanish Embassy in Lisbon was being assaulted, stress not only the lack of intervention of the police and the fire brigades, but also the late arrival of the military. All newspapers reported the event in their front

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<sup>949</sup> Onega, Fernando. 1975. «El péndulo» in *Arriba*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp. 7

<sup>950</sup> Juan Paredes Manot (Txiki) and Ángel Otaegui.

<sup>951</sup> José Humberto Baena, José Luís Sánchez Bravo and Ramón García.

<sup>952</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975 «Lisboa: Asalto y saqueo de la embajada y el consulado de España» in *La Vanguardia española*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>953</sup> Salas, José .1975. «Impune destrucción de la embajada y el consulado españoles en Lisboa» in *ABC*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.29-30

cover (fig.11), but only *Arriba* and *ABC*, in an equally outraged tone, dedicate editorials to it.



Fig.11

*Arriba*<sup>954</sup> interviews the Spanish ambassador, Antonio Poch, upon his arrival in Madrid and prints a photo-news segment of the burned Embassy<sup>955</sup> in Lisbon. This newspaper reacts to this event with a very dramatic condemnation of the international reaction and protests held, explaining in detail the legal cases that led to the death penalty sentencing to justify the executions. Through an anaphoric repetition of the sentence «we will not be scared», the newspaper’s editorial lists all its complaints

<sup>954</sup> S. 1975. «“Todo fue triturado” (embajador Poch al llegar a Madrid)» in *Arriba*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.48

<sup>955</sup> «Fotonoticia: Saqueadas e incendiadas» in *Arriba*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp. 4

against these international protests, emphasizing its violence by continuously claiming Spain's tranquillity:

We will not be scared. The Spanish Embassy in Lisbon was reduced to ashes, but we will not be scared. The newspapers may be filled with news about anti-Spanish demonstrations across liberal and democratic Europe, pressured by Socialists and Communists, but we will not be scared. Spanish trains are being assaulted, our diplomatic representations are being attacked, boats and commercial institutions of Spain are being boycotted, but we will not be scared. In the last days the increasing protests against our nation, against our nation's law, heightened, but we will not be scared. Being scared is not an option because these actions were predictable; they are the continuation of a long and sad tradition (...)<sup>ii956</sup>.

*Arriba* considers that all these events should not come as a surprise, since both France and Portugal had been conniving at ETA's and FRAP's activities in their own territories. The newspaper considers, then, these States hypocrites because they are harbouring these groups inside their borders but would never accept these groups' political programs, nor would any other Western or Eastern democracy.

Fernando Onega in his *Arriba* column «El Pendulo» also addresses the protests in general, considering what happened in Portugal to be the most serious situation, and that Spain had to «remove Lisbon's diplomatic mission, leaving a *chargé d'affaires* in charge of national interests»<sup>iii957</sup>, a situation of violence to which, in his opinion, the Portuguese media contributed relentlessly. On this subject, Alberto Miguez described how *Renascença* Radio and *Radio Clube Português* summed up the masses for the protest around the Spanish Embassy<sup>958</sup>. And the atmosphere of animosity towards the Spanish press in Portugal, as we have seen in Part. II, remains.

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<sup>956</sup> Editorial: «Actitud firme». 1975. *Arriba*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp. 1-2

<sup>957</sup> Onega, Fernando. 1975. «El péndulo» in *Arriba*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp. 7

<sup>958</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1975 «Lisboa: Asalto y saqueo de la embajada y el consulado de España» in *La Vanguardia española*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

On the other hand, *ABC*'s editorial is focused solely on the protests taking place in Portugal. It condemns them wholeheartedly and considers they are an act perpetrated by a barbaric people. It also argues that there is no possible dissent within the Spanish public opinion regarding such condemnation: «Faced with facts of this nature, there is no disparity of criteria, no dissent, on the Spanish public opinion. The condemnation, the repulse towards savage violence is unanimous»<sup>iv959</sup>. According to this newspaper, the incidents that took place in Portugal are even more outrageous given the impeccable Spanish diplomatic behaviour since the Revolution had started: «The contrast between these events of uncontrolled violence perpetrated against Spanish diplomatic headquarters and the Spain's correct position assumed and exerted vis-à-vis Portugal with respect to its new regime, its citizens, etc., cannot be more revealing nor regrettable»<sup>v</sup>.

In «Meridiano Mundial», José Javaloyes focuses on the same question that guides José Salas's interpretation: «Where is the Portuguese State? (...) Where is the Portuguese power? »<sup>vi</sup>. Javaloyes reaches the conclusion that, despite Marcelo Caetano's demand for an adequate figure to hand power to, power ended up on the streets, hence the recent developments:

It is on the streets, much more than on the first April 25<sup>th</sup>, when the insurgent went up to Spínola to place it in his hands. Now it is no longer possible to find another law than the one that emerged of the ideological and armed jungle by those who betrayed the national majority and their own Soldiers' moral. This is what is happening in this Western Iberia, where Spain had an interlocutor, and even though it was ideologically divergent, it was internationally valid. When a State existed<sup>vii960</sup>.

After the Portuguese government takes responsibility for all the damages, Javaloyes is forced to retract at least part of his previous point.

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<sup>959</sup> Editorial: «Salvajismo intolerable».1975. *ABC*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>960</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «Portugal: ¿dónde está el estado?» in *ABC*, September 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

If only a couple of days earlier this journalist was claiming that Spain no longer had an interlocutor because the Portuguese State had vanished, he is then forced to recognise that despite inexistent internally, on an external level the Portuguese State has accepted due responsibility:

Towards the outside, the Portuguese State is especially constrained to assume its responsibilities, whereas on the inside is giving in, administrating or wasting its possibilities of survival, towards the outside it is necessary to act as a State and assume the respective international responsibilities. Its personal problems cannot be transferred to third parties<sup>viii961</sup>.

In *La Vanguardia Española* Manuel Aznar writes a nostalgic piece about the building where the Embassy was located, once home to the illegitimate sons of the Portuguese King D. João V. A building that Aznar considers once was one of the jewels of the Spanish diplomacy, emphasizing the historical pieces, paintings, furniture, carpets, etc., lost in this process: «The losses are in essentially irreparable»<sup>ix962</sup>, he concludes. Despite the Portuguese Government's promise of restitution, Aznar is suspicious and remembers how Spain has not yet interfered in Portuguese domestic affairs. In his view the recent developments are thus even more difficult to grasp:

The stubbornness, with which some countries in Europe, despite the historical lessons that should be unforgettable, insist on attacking us on the elements of our national personality that we cannot compromise, is unbelievable. A Norwegian, for instance, can make that mistake, despite being ridiculously scandalous. But a Portuguese cannot go wrong in such an important subject. He only needs to take a look at himself to remember the feelings, preferences and duties of the Spanish spirit<sup>x963</sup>.

*ABC*, *Arriba* and *La Vanguardia Española* publish opinion articles about this event, none of them being in the least dismissive

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<sup>961</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «Chantaje al estado» in *ABC*, September 23<sup>th</sup>, pp. 18

<sup>962</sup> Aznar, Manuel.1975. «El palácio “dos meninos da Palhavã”» in *La Vanguardia española*, October 5<sup>th</sup>, pp. 27

<sup>963</sup> Aznar, Manuel.1975. «El palácio “dos meninos da Palhavã”» in *La Vanguardia española*, October 5<sup>th</sup>, pp. 27

regarding what happened in Lisbon. Additionally, *ABC* gives an expanded attention to the Spanish and Portuguese relationship, focused mostly on the antagonism towards Spain during the following couple of months. The newspaper's correspondent in Lisbon, José Salas, considers the main Portuguese problem to be the authority crisis the country is enduring, which constitutes the source of Portugal's entire troubles, including what happened on September 27<sup>th</sup>.

Immediately after the attack, correspondents in Lisbon are unanimous in stating that *a posteriori* the Portuguese public opinion considered the events to have been a mistake. Miguez describes how the Portuguese press is nothing but conciliatory<sup>964</sup> towards the neighbouring country. After the announcement by the Portuguese government that all the expenses caused by the destruction and relocation of the Spanish Embassy in Lisbon would be assumed by the Portuguese State, *ABC* gives<sup>965</sup> Portugal the benefit of the doubt.

Unlike Miguez in *La Vanguardia Española*, who is focused in denouncing, throughout the following couple of weeks, the difficult situation endured by Spaniards living in Portugal deprived from Diplomatic services, José Salas in *ABC* scrutinizes the evolution of the normalization of the relationship between Iberian countries. Late in 1975, *ABC* interviews the Spanish Ambassador, Antonio Poch, who is quoted claiming that he's ready to return to his functions<sup>966</sup>. At the beginning of January, *ABC* considers the Portuguese Government is not responsible for what happened to the Spanish Diplomatic premises in Portugal because of the crisis of state in which the country was living and that the Government

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<sup>964</sup> Miguez, Alberto.1975. «Asalto y destrucción de los Consulados de España en Oporto y Évora» in *La Vanguardia española*, September 30<sup>th</sup>, pp.26

<sup>965</sup> Editorial: « Madrid-Lisboa ».1975. *ABC*, September 30<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>966</sup> IFL.1975.«Estoy dispuesto a volver a Lisboa en cuanto me lo ordenen» in *ABC*, December 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.7



had since recognized: « (...) the Lusitanian Government should not be blamed for something that happened against its will, as it had publically acknowledged its inability to perform its duties (...) »<sup>xi967</sup>. However in the following month of February, just before the meeting in Guarda between Ernesto Melo Antunes and José María de Areiliza, the respective foreign affairs Ministers of Portugal and Spain, *ABC* reminds its readers of the losses Spaniards suffered in Portugal during the revolutionary period, namely expropriated lands<sup>968</sup>. According to this newspaper, Spaniards are getting discriminated against when compared to other foreigners regarding restitutions, hence Portugal is being disrespectful. *ABC* thus calls on the Portuguese government to promptly solve all Spanish economic losses.

An overall attitude of silence by the remaining newspapers, contrasts with *ABC* and *Arriba*'s indignation, or *La Vanguardia Española*'s correspondent's concern with Spaniards living in Portugal without Diplomatic support. For those who protest against the attack, the Revolutionary situation in Portugal is to blame and this further reinforces their previous negativity vis-à-vis the latter.

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**Original quotes:**

<sup>i</sup> «Ha pasado el día más largo. De alguna forma tiene que quedar en la historia, porque no es fácil recordar una jornada en que con tanta violencia se desatara la furia antiespañola con manifestaciones, boicots, destrucción de una Embajada... Con todo, el acontecimiento más importante del día ha sido la decisión española de reiterarla misión diplomática en Lisboa, dejando confiados los intereses nacionales a un encargado de negocios. Era un desenlace imprevisto hace sólo cuarenta y ocho horas, forzado por las características especiales que rodean el asalto a la embajada. Con este hecho termina momentáneamente una larga luna de miel con el país vecino, que se estaba volviendo agria por el comportamiento de los medios de comunicación portugueses. (..)»

<sup>ii</sup> « No vamos a asombrarnos. Quedó reducida a cenizas la Embajada española en Lisboa, pero no vamos a asombrarnos. Se pueden llenar páginas enteras de

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<sup>967</sup> Editorial: «Las relaciones entre Portugal y España».1976. *ABC*, January 4<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>968</sup> Editorial: «Los intereses españoles, lesionados en Portugal».1976. *ABC*, February 6<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

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periódicos con la noticia de las manifestaciones antiespañolas en la Europa liberal y democrática, presionada por socialistas y comunistas, pero no vamos a asombrarnos. Se asaltan trenes españoles, se atenta contra nuestras representaciones diplomáticas, se boicotean barcos e instituciones comerciales de España, pero no vamos a asombrarnos. Los últimos días ha culminado la escalada de la protesta contra nuestra nación, contra la aplicación del derecho en nuestra nación, pero tampoco vamos a asombrarnos. No cabe el asombro, porque estas acciones eran previsibles, son la continuación de una larga y triste tradición (...)

<sup>iii</sup> «retirar la misión diplomática en Lisboa, dejando confiados los intereses nacionales a un encargado de negocios»

<sup>iv</sup> «Frente a hechos de tal naturaleza no hay disparidades de criterio, no hay disidencias, en la opinión pública española-. La condena, la repulsa hacia una violencia salvaje, es unánime.»

<sup>v</sup> «El contraste entre estos hechos de violencia incontrolada contra sedes diplomáticas españolas y la correcta posición asumida y ejercida por España respecto a Portugal, a su nuevo régimen político, a sus ciudadanos, etcétera, no puede ser más revelador ni tampoco más lamentable.»

<sup>vi</sup> «¿Dónde está el Estado portugués? (...) ¿Dónde está el Poder portugués?»

<sup>vii</sup> «Se encuentra en la calle, mucho más que el primer 25 de abril, cuando los sublevados acudieron a Spínola para ponerlo en sus manos. No es posible encontrar ahora otra ley que la surgida desde la jungla ideológica y armada por quienes traicionan a las mayorías nacionales y a su propia moral de soldados. Tal es lo que pasa en ese espacio del Oeste Ibérico, donde España tenía un interlocutor, si ideológicamente disímil, internacionalmente válido. Cuando había un Estado.»

<sup>viii</sup> «Hacia el exterior, el Estado portugués se ve especialmente constreñido a asumir sus responsabilidades; pues al contrario de lo que hacia dentro no puede hacer y le cabe transigir, administrando o dilapidando sus propias posibilidades de supervivencia, hacia fuera necesita realizarse como tal Estado para asumir responsabilidades que internacionalmente le corresponden. Los problemas propios no son transferibles a terceros.»

<sup>ix</sup> «Las pérdidas son irreparables en lo esencial»

<sup>x</sup> «Es increíble la terquedad con que determinados países de Europa, pese a lecciones históricas que debieran ser inolvidables, se obstinan en atacarnos por aquellos frentes de nuestra personalidad nacional en que nos resulta imposible ceder. Que un noruego, pongo por caso, cometa esa equivocación, pese, aun cuando el dislate sea escandaloso. Un portugués no puede errar en tema tan principal. Le bastará con mirar hacia su propia intimidad para recordar los sentimientos, preferencias y deberes del espíritu español.»

<sup>xi</sup> «(...) no cabe culpar al Gobierno lusitano de lo que se produjo contra su voluntad, pues había hecho pública declaración de su incapacidad para llevar a cabo sus tareas»

## 10. *The pending coup of November 25<sup>th</sup>*

Who is, in fact, threatening the revolution? Who are the reactionary in power? In power there is President Costa Gomes, who claims to be socialist; the head of government, who also claims to be socialist; the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the Popular Democratic Party, which is nothing but left wing of social democracy. All of them received their christening in the opposition towards Salazar and Caetano. Even if they were a tolerated opposition during Caetano's rule and after April 25. Reactionary? No one can believe that. They have threatened the revolution? They are the revolution. Above all they started it, because without April 25 Álvaro Cunhal would still be wandering around Moscow and Prague, and Mário Soares – who just said that Sunday's demonstration had an insurreccional feature – would still be in Rome begging the Socialist and the Communist Internationals for help to defeat Caetano, when the latter was doing anything at reach to fall on his own.<sup>i 969</sup>

In November of 1975 several tensions exploded, some of them literally, like in the case of the explosion of *Renascença* radio's broadcasters by the Intervention Military Group [*Agrupamento militar de intervenção AMI*] under government orders, after months of a conflict between the church and the radio workers (November 7<sup>th</sup>). Others tensions are solved, like Angola's independence, even if without an elected government (November 11<sup>th</sup>). The VI Government lead by Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo, nevertheless, struggled to impose its authority: the Portuguese National Assembly was sieged and the MPs taken hostage by protesting construction workers (November 12<sup>th</sup>), and finally the Government declared to be on «strike» due to the «lack of safety conditions to exercise government» (Santos, Cruzeiro and Coimbra 2000). In addition to this, throughout this period was the constant rumour that the country was on the verge of a civil war and that a coup, coming from the left or from the right, was pending to happen.

While in Portugal tensions continued to rise, in Spain people were holding their breath: General Franco's final agony is on the front cover pages of newspapers during the entire month, along with daily reports of

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<sup>969</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. « No es exactamente la anarquía » *in Arriba*, November 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.28

minor improvements or a worsening of his condition. Eventually, on the 20<sup>th</sup>, Franco finally died. In Portugal, five days later, a military confrontation between factions within the MFA leads to the defeat of the «radical faction».

In the context of the omnipresent rumour of an imminent coup and the distribution of arms to the people, in the morning of the 25<sup>th</sup> of November paratroopers of the Tancos' aerial base occupied several areal bases, including the one of Monsanto, in Lisbon. They were hoping for the backup of COPCON but ended up defeated by the Amadora's Commandos unit that surrounded Monsanto. In the evening of the same day, the state of siege was declared, only to be revoked on December 1<sup>st</sup>.

The failure of this military action would have multiple consequences, including an imposition of the electoral legitimacy over the revolutionary one, and the consequent democratic normality. Despite the importance that this event had in refraining the Portuguese Revolutionary Process, the chronological coincidence with General Franco's death and the proclamation of Juan Carlos as King made it less important for the Spanish press. At this point, *Informaciones*, for instance, even altered the order of the newspaper, granting more importance to domestic affairs than before, when the newspaper began with «international news».

The correspondents Alberto Miguez, José Reis, and Andrés Kramer were in Lisbon. Also in Lisbon was Pablo Magaz since the beginning of October until mid-November, replacing José Salas, who was away on a leave. Bearing in mind the tense situation, Magaz decided to stay for a few more days to accompany the developments. After the military confrontation of November 25<sup>th</sup>, Julio Colomer and Fernando Jáuregui produced some pieces for *Informaciones políticas*, but Colomer could be seen as a «curious journalist» on this occasion. After writing an article arguing that regardless of Berlinguer and Marchais' intentions,

given the behaviour of the PCP in Portugal, Communists will clearly never accept the democratic game<sup>970</sup>, Augusto Assia travels to Portugal to assess the aftermath of the situation in December.

For *ABC*, what is happening in Portugal in mid-November is what Marcelo Caetano had warned against in 1974, since power unequivocally belongs to the streets: «At the end of eighteen months of political change, Power in Portugal rests in the middle of the street. There are as much legalities as clots of crystallizations of political and armed forces. In other words, there is no legality. There is no law, because law and order are indivisible»<sup>ii971</sup>. This newspaper also defends that by then any order is preferable to no order at all, since anarchy is reigning in Portugal and it makes governing the country impossible: «The conclusion – valid for all the Iberian sphere – should be as clear as it is severe: any order, any State, is preferable to anarchy. Instating order, imposing the “potestas”, safeguarding as well that “auctoritas” should be correctly understood, depends upon the Portuguese. The “auctoritas” emanating from the sovereign and majoritarian desire of the people»<sup>iii</sup>. It is, then, up to the Portuguese people to exert their sovereignty. Similarly, despite several attempts to force it upon the Spanish people, *ABC* refuses to accept the Portuguese way as a paradigmatic solution out of an authoritarian regime: «(...) the circumstances that the brotherly Portuguese people is going through. Whose eventful revolutionary journey – incidentally, by the way – has been displayed to Spaniards, from a wide variety of fields, as the alternative paradigm to all political period defined by a long authoritarian stamp»<sup>iv</sup>.

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<sup>970</sup> Assia, Augusto. 1975. « Nuevos caminos para el comunismo en Europa occidental» in *La Vanguardia española*, November 30<sup>th</sup>, pp. 22

<sup>971</sup> Editorial: «Portugal: el peligro de la anarquía».1975. *ABC*, November 15<sup>th</sup>, pp. 3

At the same moment, *La Vanguardia Española* summarises past developments but also lessons to be drawn from the Portuguese experience, as the newspaper recognises the importance Portugal has been having for the Spanish people:

For a year and a half – since 25 April 1974 – the political situation in Portugal is a topic of conversation for Spaniards. The interest is explainable for reasons of historical brotherhood, but also for the projection that is made of the foreign experience itself. For that reason, it is important, to periodically draw what we could call Portuguese lessons. There are undoubtedly very noticeable differences between the two countries, but in any case it is good to know what is happening in our neighbour's house<sup>972</sup>.

At this moment the newspaper lists three important Portuguese lessons. Referring to the opposition made in Portugal between bourgeois and popular democracy, the first lesson is that democracy has a long history in Western countries and there is no need to reinvent one. This opposition had ramifications in the Spanish press during the summer in the articles written by Jordi Borja and Jaume Miravittles in *Tele/eXprés*. The former refuses to differentiate between the two concepts, the latter refuses that popular democracy could even be considered «Marxist», and argues that without a bourgeois democracy, socialism would never go beyond the «proletarian dictatorship» stage of the process and popular democracy will result in a totalitarian State. For *La Vanguardia Española*, another lesson to be drawn from the Portuguese experience is that the Armed Forces should not be involved in politics, since «[a]mong the Portuguese Armed Forces have been displayed the same divergences of criteria and opinion present among the civilians, but they lack, on the contrary, a method of decision other than the simple military discipline»<sup>vi</sup>. Lastly, and on a positive note, the Portuguese experience has shown Spaniards that dissent is possible without bloodshed.

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<sup>972</sup> Editorial: «Lecciones de Portugal».1975. *La Vanguardia española*, November 16<sup>th</sup>, pp. 5

José Javaloyes identifies a change of path of the process already in late-September, by opposing the situation before and after the moment Pinheiro de Azevedo took office as Prime Minister of the VI Provisional Government, replacing Vasco Gonçalves: «The Portuguese political process just experienced an important change. (...) Almost exactly in a period of twelve months, the Lusitanian revolution has gone from the imminence of a bolshevist outcome to this moment, when Pinheiro de Azevedo has at his disposal a diffuse mandate to impose moderation and pluralism»<sup>vii973</sup>.

During this period that Javaloyes identifies with seeds of change and the aftermath of the November 25<sup>th</sup> coup, *ABC*'s chronicler's observations can be summed up in four axes. Firstly, Javaloyes describes a country where two conceptions of democracy are violently opposing each other, and therefore where there is an increasing possibility of the start of a civil war:

Portuguese political forces are being polarised. Two conceptions of democracy oppose each other – one pluralist, the other totalitarian and exclusive – and, in a way, the attitudes of military leaders in the north are also opposed to those of the rest of the country. The void of power is being filled with violence, the revolutionary process is reaching its almost unavoidable and almost fatal bloody stage. With polarisation, in the same measure of its radicalization, the hypothesis of a civil war is displaced from the realm of possibilities to that of probabilities<sup>viii974</sup>.

The construction workers' siege of the Constitutional Assembly is also read as a confrontation between these two legitimacies: the totalitarian-revolutionary and the electoral-democratic, and in any case as a minority coercing a majority – since the workers are seen as a parallel of PCP and the MPs, and the Government as a parallel of the socialist and social democratic vote:

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<sup>973</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «Hora de ambigüedad» in *ABC*, September 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp. 18

<sup>974</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «Bipolarización en Portugal» in *ABC*, October 12<sup>th</sup>, pp.18

What does the current Portuguese cabinet represent? It represents the political majorities defined by the April 25<sup>th</sup> elections: the Socialist and Social-Democrat seats – seats that compose indisputable, categorical and clear majorities – and the homeopathic representation of the Communists in the Constituent Assembly. What do the mobilised unionist masses in front of the São Bento Palace, sieging the MPs and even the Prime Minister, represent? It represents the other power, the one that disputes the legitimacy of the majorities of the Lusitanian electorate. (...) The two Portuguese legitimacies are clearly and unequivocally present in the São Bento scene: the revolutionary-totalitarian and the democratic. (...) The democratic majority was inside the building sieged by the strikers<sup>ix975</sup>.

For Javaloyes this situation of latent conflict gradually becoming effective and the efforts of Pinheiro de Azevedo's government to rebuild the authority of the Portuguese State indicate that civil war might be replaced by a coup perpetrated by Government forces:

If the coup d'état is organized from inside the State – to rescue, reunite and legitimately manage the coercive resources now floating dispersed in Portugal –, it is very likely that all these forces that have been armed – surreptitiously or openly – from the arsenal of the Army – will take up arms against the State. The coup d'état is, therefore, an alternative in Portugal to a civil war<sup>x976</sup>.

Two of the axes of Javaloyes' observations are here present as well. On the one hand, a clear respect is shown for Pinheiro de Azevedo's task of re-establishing the authority and power of the State, visibly trying to claim back the monopoly of violence of the State by demanding a handing in of weapons<sup>977</sup> and exploding the *Renascença* radio broadcasters to put an end to the conflict<sup>978</sup>. A stronger State would make a Communist coup<sup>979</sup> more difficult. On the other hand, he insists on emphasising the atmosphere of imminent coup existing in Portugal. In

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<sup>975</sup>Javaloyes, José.1975. «Cerco a las mayorías» in *ABC*, November 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

<sup>976</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «¡Golpe de estado en Portugal!» in *ABC*, October 31<sup>st</sup>, pp.23

<sup>977</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «¿Resurrección del estado Portugués?» in *ABC*, October 19<sup>th</sup>, pp.17

<sup>978</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «Autoridad a la dinamita» in *ABC*, November 9<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

<sup>979</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «Pinheiro y Ford» in *ABC*, November 5<sup>th</sup>, pp.23



late-October, for instance, Javaloyes writes: «Costa Gomes embarks on a new trip leaving behind a tense, strained, expectant Portugal on the eve of – as observers are asserting – a coup d'état»<sup>xi980</sup>. Just before the coup actually took place, Javaloyes observes that despite the fact that the necessary conditions for a coup to happen are met, they are still not effective enough: «For that reason supposed attempt coups are being announced, once and again, and taken into consideration. For the same reason, until this moment none of these rumours was transformed into an attempt, except for the Spinoist adventure of the past month of March»<sup>xii</sup>. According to the author of «Meridiano Mundial», this is so because: «There is no military head able to drag, nor a political leader with enough decisiveness to mobilize its clientele»<sup>xiii981</sup>.

Finally, Javaloyes shows as much respect for Pinheiro de Azevedo as he shows contempt for Costa Gomes, who he called a sphinx due to his constant puzzling posture:

Governments go by, but Costa Gomes remains in his place. Always there, undeterred, twice wiser, opportune in not keeping his word, the commitments made. He represents the continuity of discontinuity, the solid coherence in which the Lusitanian revolution has been resolving the political and ideological chaos. He is also the highest authority in Portugal, the pinnacle of the State, and watches undisturbed the devouring of governments though which the Lefts fight against each other. For Costa Gomes the art of staying does not lie in the common skill of avoiding making commitments, but in forgetting every previous commitment. (...) Buried in his armchair, Costa Gomes symbolises less the failure of a State than the betrayal of all the promises of April 24<sup>th</sup><sup>xiv982</sup>.

On the contrary, Gómez Tello in *Arriba* does not give much credit to the VI Provisional Government and Pinheiro de Azevedo's intentions:

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<sup>980</sup>Javaloyes, José.1975. «La esfinge portuguesa» in *ABC*, October 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.24

<sup>981</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «Condiciones para el golpe de estado» in *ABC*, November 20<sup>th</sup>, pp.20

<sup>982</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «Costa Gomes y las ilegitimidades» in *ABC*, November 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.11

«And the sixth government, the Pinheiro de Azevedo one, which just reached a month of existence, navigates lurching around and is on the verge of foundering in the ocean of rumours, conspiracies, intrigues and meetings»<sup>xv983</sup>. In fact, at the moment of the siege of the National Assembly, Gómez Tello argues that the Communists have won the arm wrestling against the VI Government and by then control that Government: «Now Pinheiro de Azevedo has no other option but to surrender to each Communist demand, or to resign»<sup>xvi984</sup>.

Gómez Tello also dismisses the atmosphere of an imminent coup. On the one hand, because *Arriba*'s chronicler identifies it with a Communist plot specifically related to Angola's independence: «The Portuguese Communist party, lately short of imagination, even if well stocked of Soviet subventions, sows rumours of right-wing coups, each day announcing one to be imminent»<sup>xvii</sup>. The Communist party continues to use the same old strategy: to create the rumour that a right wing coup is about to happen, and this time it actually sets a date: November 11<sup>th</sup>, the date of Angola's independence. Moreover, Gómez Tello argues that the PCP is spreading rumours about something that it wants to do: to carry out a coup. This rumour allows this faction to perform «revolutionary gymnastics», counting and regrouping its troops.

On the other hand, an imminent coup is not credible because according to Gómez Tello there are not enough forces to actually make it happen, neither on the Right or on the Left: «Rumours of right wing coups – but is there an organized right wing in Portugal? –, rumours of left wing

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<sup>983</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. «Demasiados Rumores, Demasiadas Amenazas» in *Arriba*, October 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.32

<sup>984</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. « Prueba de fuerza en Lisboa » in *Arriba*, November 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.32

coups – how many Lefts are there in a country where everyone claims to be to the left of one’s neighbour?»<sup>xviii985</sup>.

When it happened, the failed left-wing of November 25<sup>th</sup> embodied the inflection of the Portuguese revolution, the reinforcement of the VI Provisional Government and of the parties that supported it – PS, PPD and CDS – and the impairment of the Communist party and the military faction connected with the Popular Power project. It also embodies a claim for civilian politics by opposition to the previous preponderance of the military.

Immediately after the coup, Gomez Tello is still not sure if the situation will be stabilised because he doubts political parties will be able to follow the military action that prevented «the Communist takeover» of power. If not, civil war will probably be the outcome: «But casting aside this detail, the question lies in knowing whether another coup attempt will follow this one and when»<sup>xix986</sup>. For Gómez Tello, November 25<sup>th</sup> was a prevented «Prague coup», a frame that he used before<sup>987</sup> and after it happened<sup>988</sup>.

Nonetheless, according to Gómez Tello, politicians in Portugal seem to be unable to learn any lesson, and he specifically names the Socialists and Mário Soares since once again they accepted to take part in a Government where the Communists are also part of the coalition. For this chronicler, this means that the cycle is not over and that the Communists will never be removed from power completely:

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<sup>985</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. «¿A dónde va Portugal? » in *Arriba*, November 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.26

<sup>986</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. « Y vuelta a empezar» in *Arriba*, November 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.30

<sup>987</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. «¿A dónde va Portugal? » in *Arriba*, November 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.26

<sup>988</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. «División y enfrentamiento» in *Arriba*, November 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.30 and Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. « Y vuelta a empezar» in *Arriba*, November 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.30

When there is already discussions about a seventh government, the politicians – that have neither forgotten nor learned anything –, now that they lost their fear, insist once more that it should be formed with the participation of the Communists. Once again, Mario Soares does not give up on his unrequited love for the Communists. And starts again<sup>xx989</sup>.

On the contrary, in the aftermath of this failed coup, José Javaloyes suggests that there is a new beginning, a rebirth of the process: «The VI Portuguese Government resumes its functions. Administrating is now possible and perhaps even politics is too (...)»<sup>xxi</sup>. The author of «Meridiano Mundial» uses the past perfect to refer to the previous state of affairs that has been overcome:

When the ideological wave flooded the Armed Forces Movement institutions, the worst happened: the indiscipline took over the barracks and the Military regions ended up as political constituencies of a national and structurally fragmented power. The chains of the State were cut. The authority was shipwrecked. The order disappeared underwater. Things like the burning and the sacking of the Spanish Embassy and Consulate in Lisbon and Oporto were allowed to happen<sup>xxii</sup>.

This change, which Javaloyes identifies already in the title of his column «Cambio de eje», embodies a change from a horizontal to a vertical axis, a metaphor of the equality of horizontal associations to the order conveyed by hierarchy: «The axis of tensions could change from its former horizontality – side struggles within the MFA – to the verticality, from military power now homogenous in its political attitudes, to civilian power, still existing though fragmented»<sup>xxiii990</sup>.

This notion of change is confirmed later when Javaloyes claims that «[t]he Portuguese political crisis has reverted to the sphere of the parties»<sup>xxiv991</sup>, where it should be, and not at the military or street level, where it was before. Also in *ABC*, «A process that reaches its end» [Un

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<sup>989</sup> Gómez Tello, José Luis. 1975. « Y vuelta a empezar» in *Arriba*, November 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.30

<sup>990</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «Cambio de Eje» in *ABC*, November 30<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

<sup>991</sup> Javaloyes, José.1975. «Socialdemocracia y “Cunhalismo”» in *ABC*, December 7<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

proceso que toca a su fin]<sup>992</sup>, written by Roberto de Arenzaga, pseudonym of *ABC* Seville's editor-in-chief, Joaquín Carlos López Lozano, strengthens the idea that the end of a process has been reached, though without, contrary to Javaloyes, suggesting new beginnings.

Until April of 1976, Augusto Assia will write two stories that are allegories of the new order: one about a factory and the other about the Portuguese Right wing's new place in this new order of things. The first one, regarding an expropriated factory that is returned to its owner - a failed experience of collectivization<sup>993</sup> - is considered an example of the failed revolutionary process. In the factory, a majority of the workers (like the majority of the Portuguese people in the elections) won by voting against the minority who wanted to maintain the collectivization that was proving to be a disaster. Shortly thereafter, Assia writes about CDS' Congress taking place in Campo Pequeno. Supposedly this bullfighting arena was the place where Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho had once claimed that the right wing would be concentrated if the occasion presented itself, hinting at revenge. The irony rested in the fact that while CDS was holding its congress in this symbolic place, Otelo was the one who was in prison<sup>994</sup>.

All in all, and despite having its attention focused on their political developments, in general the Spanish press was able to perceived the change of path that the military confrontation of November 25<sup>th</sup> embodied. Even if change was not immediately captured, given the chaotic situation that these newspapers, in particular *Arriba* and *ABC*, had

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<sup>992</sup> Arenzaga, Roberto de. 1975. «Un proceso que toca su fin» in *ABC*, November 35<sup>th</sup>, pp.21-22

<sup>993</sup> Assia, Augusto. 1976. «Historia de una fábrica que fue devuelta al empresario por los propios obreros» in *La Vanguardia española*, February 7<sup>th</sup>, pp. 18

<sup>994</sup> Assia, Augusto. 1976. «La solidez social y el conservadurismo ideológico, muro contra la revolución portuguesa» in *La Vanguardia española*, February 7<sup>th</sup>, pp. 12

been constructing for the past few months, the declaration of state of siege represented an action of authority and, was therefore reassuring, because it meant that authority still existed.

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**Original quotes:**

<sup>i</sup> «¿Quién amenaza, en efecto, la revolución? ¿Quiénes son los reaccionarios que están en el Poder? En el Poder está el presidente Costa Gomes, que se proclama socialista; el jefe del Gobierno, que se declara también socialista; el Partido Socialista, el Partido Comunista y el Partido Popular Democrático, que no es otro que la social-democracia de centro izquierda. Todos ellos han recibido las aguas bautismales de la oposición a Salazar y Caetano. Aunque con éste eran ya una oposición que tolerada -, antes, en el 25 de abril y después del 25 de abril. ¿Reaccionarios? Eso no lo puede creer nadie. ¿Amenazan la revolución? Ellos son la revolución. Y, sobre todo, ellos fueron los que la pusieron en marcha, por sin el 25 de abril Álvaro Cunhal seguiría vagando entre Moscú y Praga, y Mario Soares -que acaba de decir que la manifestación del domingo tuvo un carácter "claramente insurreccional" -, seguiría en Roma mendigando la ayuda de la Internacional Socialista y de la Internacional Comunista para derribar Caetano que había hecho todo lo posible para caer de un pequeño empujón.(...) Pero los episodios del palacio de Sao Bento y del domingo, no son la anarquía, como pudiera parecer de un examen superficial. Responden a la táctica del Partido Comunista para hacerse dueños del Poder. »

<sup>ii</sup> «Al cabo de dieciocho meses de cambio político, el Poder en Portugal se encuentra en el medio de la calle. Hay tantas legalidades como coágulos o cristalizaciones de fuerza política y armada. Es decir, no hay legalidad. No existe ley, no existe orden, porque la ley y el orden son indivisibles.»

<sup>iii</sup> «La conclusión - con validez que excede a todo el ámbito ibérico - debe ser tan clara como severa: cualquier orden, cualquier Estado, antes que la anarquía. Y de los portugueses, depende que el orden que se implante, que la "potestas" se imponga, salve la libertad por preservar la "auctoritas" rectamente entendida. La que emana del soberano y mayoritario sentir del pueblo.»

<sup>iv</sup> «(...) las circunstancias que atraviesa el fraterno pueblo portugués. Cuya peripecia revolucionaria - dicho sea al paso- nos ha sido puesta a los españoles, desde una gran variedad de ámbitos, como paradigma de alternativas a todo período político definido, largamente, por la impronta autoritaria.»

<sup>v</sup> Durante año y medio - desde el 25 de abril de 1974- la situación política de Portugal es tema de conversación para los españoles. El interés se explica por razones de hermandad histórica, pero también por la proyección que se hace de la experiencia ajena al ámbito propio. Importa por eso periódicamente ir sacando lo que podríamos llamar lecciones de Portugal. Sin duda que hay diferencias muy notables entre un país y otro, pero en cualquier caso bueno es tener presente lo que pasa en casa del vecino.

<sup>vi</sup> « Entre las fuerzas armadas portuguesas se han manifestado las mismas divergencias de criterio y opinión que se ven entre los civiles, pero les falta, en cambio, un método de arbitraje que no sea la simple disciplina militar.»

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<sup>vii</sup> «El proceso político portugués acaba de experimentar una variación muy importante. (...) En el casi exacto plazo de doce meses, la revolución lusitana ha pensulado desde la inminencia de los desenlaces bolchevizantes a esta de ahora, en que Pinheiro de Azevedo dispone de una suerte del difuso mandato para realizar la moderación y el pluralismo.»

<sup>viii</sup> «Se polarizan las fuerzas políticas portuguesas. Enfrentadas, dos concepciones de la democracia - pluralista la una, totalitaria y excluyente la otra - y, en cierto modo, enfrentadas también, las actitudes de los jefes militares del norte con los demás. El vacío de poder va colmándose de violencia; el proceso revolucionario alcanza su casi inesquivable y casi fatal etapa de sangra. Con la polarización, en la propia medida que se radicaliza, la hipótesis de una guerra civil se desplaza del orden de las posibilidades al de las probabilidades.»

<sup>ix</sup> «¿Que representa el actual Gabinete portugués? Representa las mayorías políticas definidas en las elecciones del 25 de abril: los escaños socialistas y socialdemocráticos -escaños que componen mayorías inapelables, rotundas y claras -y la representación homeopática de los comunistas, en la Asamblea Constituyente. ¿Qué representa la masa sindical movilizada frente al Palacio de San Bento, acosado a los parlamentarios y al propio primer ministro? Representa el otro poder, que impugna la legitimidad de las mayorías del electorado lusitano. (...) De modo claro y paladino han contendido en el escenario de San Bento las dos legitimidades portuguesas: la revolucionario-totalitaria y la democrática. (...) Las mayorías democráticas estaban en el interior del recinto sitiado por los huelguistas.»

<sup>x</sup> «Si el golpe de Estado se organiza desde el Estado mismo - para rescatar, reunir y administrar legítimamente los recursos de coacción que flotan dispersos en Portugal -, lo más probable es que se levante en armas contra el Estado todas esas fuerzas que han sido armadas - subrepticia o claramente - desde las maestranzas del Ejército. El golpe de Estado, pues, se presenta en Portugal como alternativa de guerra civil.»

<sup>xi</sup> «Costa Gomes emprende nuevo viaje dejando tras de sí un Portugal crispado, tenso, expectante, en vísperas - aseveran los observadores - de un golpe de estado.»

<sup>xii</sup> « De ahí que supuestos intentos golpistas sean anunciados una y otra vez, y tomados en consideración. De ahí, asimismo, que hasta el momento no haya cuajado ninguno -como intento-, salvo la aventura spinolista del pasado mes de marzo.»

<sup>xiii</sup> «Ni existe un jefe militar capaz de arrastrar ni existe tampoco un dirigente político con decisión para movilizar sus clientelas.»

<sup>xiv</sup> «Los Gobiernos pasan, pero Costa Gomes queda. Sigue siempre, impertérrito [sic], sabio en dobleces; oportuno en el incumplimiento de la palabra dada, del compromiso asumido. Representa la continuidad de la discontinuidad; la sólida coherencia en que se viene resolviendo el caos político e ideológico de la revolución lusitana. Aunque protagoniza la magistratura suprema de Portugal, es el vértice del Estado, asiste impasible al devoramiento de los Gobiernos que practican unas izquierdas contra las otras. Para Costa Gomes el arte de permanecer no está plasmado en la más común habilidad de no comprometerse; se fundamenta en la capacidad para olvidar, uno tras otros, los compromisos

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contraídos. (...) Aferrado a su poltrona, simboliza Costa Comes menos el naufragio de un Estado que la traición de las promesas todas del 24 de abril»

<sup>xv</sup> «Y el sexto gobierno, el de Pinheiro de Azevedo, que acaba de cumplir apenas un mes de existencia, navega dando tumbos y a punto de zozobrar entre este océano de rumores, de confabulaciones, de intrigas y de reuniones»

<sup>xvi</sup> «Ahora a Pinheiro de Azevedo no le queda sino capitular a cada exigencia comunista, o dimitir.»

<sup>xvii</sup> «El Partido Comunista portugués, que anda escaso de imaginación, aunque bien abastecido de subsidios soviéticos, siembra los rumores de un golpe de Estado de la derecha, anunciando cada día como eminente.»

<sup>xviii</sup> «Rumores de golpes de fuerza de la derecha - ¿pero hay derecha organizada en Portugal?-, rumores de golpes de fuerzas de la izquierda - ¿cuántas izquierdas hay en un país donde cada uno se declara más a la izquierda que su vecino?- »

<sup>xix</sup> « Pero este detalle a parte, la cuestión es saber si a este intento seguirá otro y cuándo.»

<sup>xx</sup> «Cuando se habla ya del séptimo gobierno los políticos - que nada han olvidado ni aprendido - una vez que se les ha pasado el miedo, vuelven a insistir en que tiene que formarse con la participación de los comunistas. Mario Soares, una vez más, no renuncia a su amor mal correspondido por los comunistas. Y vuelta a empezar.»

<sup>xxi</sup> «El VI Gobierno portugués reanuda sus funciones. Ya es posible la administración y acaso lo sea también la política (...).»

<sup>xxii</sup> «Cuando la marejada ideológica anegó los institutos del Movimiento de las Fuerzas armadas aconteció lo peor: la indisciplina se apoderó de los cuarteles y las regiones militares acabaron por ser como distritos políticos de un poder nacional y estructuralmente fragmentado. Se quebraron las cadenas del Estado. Naufragó la autoridad. El orden desapareció bajo las aguas. Pudieron ocurrir cosas como el incendio y saqueo de la Embajada y el Consulado de España en Lisboa y Oporto.»

<sup>xxiii</sup> «El eje de tensiones pude cambiar de la horizontalidad en que estaba –pugnas laterales en el seno del MFA – a la verticalidad desde el poder militar, básicamente homogeneizado en sus actitudes políticas, al poder civil, que todavía subsiste en sus fragmentaciones.»

<sup>xxiv</sup> « La crisis política portuguesa ha revertido al plano de los partidos»



## **11. The second electoral process: the return of the right wing**

In two years everything seems to have changed. In reality it started to change when Vasco Gonçalves silently left through the backdoor, without any gesture, without any snub, with a lot of things on his mind and maybe a great disappointment<sup>995</sup>.

Following the approval of the new Constitutional text by the Constitutional Assembly on April 2<sup>nd</sup>, with only the votes against of CDS' MPs, and the amendment and resigning of the MFA-Parties' Pact on February 26<sup>th</sup> by the parties with parliamentary representation that had signed the previous one – CDS, MDP/CDE, PCP, PPD and PS (Rezola 2007) –, the first constitutional election was scheduled for April 25<sup>th</sup>, the second anniversary of the coup. A total of 14 parties<sup>996</sup> presented themselves to the elections with the campaign beginning on April 4<sup>th</sup>. This time, unlike the year before when what was at stake was the writing of a Constitution, it was the moment for electing a government, which would put an end to the provisional rule.

### **a) 1975 and 1976: two different elections**

Unlike the previous year, Spanish journalists travelling to Portugal to cover the second electoral process after the coup of 25 April 1974 arrived almost at the end of the election campaign. Most of the special correspondents were also new to the process, like Consuelo Sánchez-Vicente and Julio Martínez for *Arriba*, Margarita Sáenz Díez for *La*

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<sup>995</sup> Ramoneda, Josep. 1976. «Reivindicación del 25 de abril (1)» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.14

<sup>996</sup> PS, PPD, CDS, PCP, UDP, FSP, PCTP/MRRP, MES, PDC, PPM, LCI, PCP (m-l), AOC and PRT. Despite some troubles getting the legalization, finally PDC, PCTP/MRPP and PCP (m-l) were able to present themselves. Parties like MDP/CDE and PRP/BR did not run, however the former claimed to do it in favour of containing the dispersion of the left-wing vote.

*Vanguardia Española*, Manuel Campo for *Tele/eXprés* and António Alférez, accompanied by photographer Teodoro Naranjo, for *ABC*. Known names like Augusto Assia and Fernando Jáuregui also return, but Jáuregui is now writing for *Informaciones* instead of *Arriba*, since Andrés Kramer replaced him in July 1975. Special correspondents, except for *ABC* and *Arriba*'s teams, who produce *a posteriori* «news reports»<sup>997</sup> and were in Portugal for at least part of the election campaign, arrive just before the day of the elections, unlike in the previous year, when there was more interest in following the election campaign.

The election campaign is thus a subject covered mostly by correspondents, now reduced to three – Alberto Miguez, José Salas and Andrés Kramer –, since José Reis stopped writing for *Arriba* in February 1976. They all agree that these elections are held in a very difficult period of economic crisis, are tainted by an outburst of violence, mostly portrayed by Salas' chronicles in *ABC*, and are characterized by a return of right-wing parties, namely CDS, a party that contrary to the previous year is now campaigning fiercely.

The re-emergence of the right wing in Portugal gives ground to different readings depending on the chronicler. In *Arriba*, Andrés Kramer roots this return in a previous containment that no longer exists: «(...) we cannot forget the Christian-Democrats that were marginalized in April

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<sup>997</sup> *Arriba* published a 18-page dossier on *Arriba dominical* on the day of the election that was composed by four in-depth articles: one about the political ambiance lived in the Portuguese streets, other about the returnees and two profiles: Alvaro Cunhal and Mário Soares and The cover had a title claiming that «Portugal is choosing today» and a side banner on the right corner saying: «Spain: that is how a referendum is made». *ABC* published a special on the election in 11 parts distributed along 7 days. The first one was dedicated to an overview of the Portuguese process over the past two years, the second was devoted to the Portuguese very difficult economic situation and the last was an interview with Captain Sousa e Castro, one of the nine who signed the ninth document in August 1975. The other articles are dedicated to the four main political parties (PCP, PS, PPD and CDS) and their leaders.

1975 and are now looking to regain lost ground (or better yet, the ground that was once forbidden to them)»<sup>ii998</sup>. Andrés Maria Kramer, former journalist at *Informaciones* and *Actualidad Española*, became foreign correspondent for *pyresa* in 1975, when he replaced Jáuregui in Lisbon. By then he had published books on both Czechoslovakia's and Chile's recent experiences (Kramer 1970 and 1974). In Portugal, the rise of the Right, according to this journalist, is visible in the amount of rallies organized by these parties, despite the left-wing tactic of waving a possible right wing coup threat – the «imminent coup» rumour is heard for the entire duration of this process – in order to balance their presence on the streets:

Meanwhile, the spectre of the «coup» emerging as a result of some of Spínola's statements seems to vanish in the horizon. In the end, it served as a tool of propaganda. This is not odd, given that during the weekend PPD, for instance, performed 148 electoral acts, CDS 117 and the Communist party 56...<sup>iii999</sup>.

José Salas, in turn, maintains his view, already present in his analysis of the first elections. He argues there is a containment of the Right because for this sector to exist in Portugal it still has to appear travestied due to its connection to the previous regime:

The Portuguese right wing does not officially exist, since until the April 25<sup>th</sup> revolution it was in effect encompassed by the regime that fell on that date. But it has obviously re-emerged, wrapped and disguised under names and slogans theoretically alien to it. It is hard to be at the centre of something if there is nothing to the right or the left. In this case, those sectors have almost everything to their left, but nothing to their right, and hence can hardly be considered to be at the centre. All this is said secretly in Lisbon. But the Left does not stop saying it out loud, believing that in this way it will discredit these sectors before the Portuguese people. But far from producing this effect, it seems to be

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<sup>998</sup> Kramer, Andrés.1976. «Ambiente preelectoral» in *Arriba*, January 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp. 31

<sup>999</sup> Kramer, Andrés.1976. «Socialistas y comunistas cada vez más lejos» in *Arriba*, April 13<sup>th</sup>, pp.27

cheering up the fearful. And the disappointed. Because the Right in Portugal was strong and continues to be<sup>iv1000</sup>.

Despite the disguises the Right has been taking since 25 April 1974, Salas recognises that the atmosphere in Portugal finally seems to be comfortable enough for some public declarations to be made. This journalist traces the genealogy of this process as if he were uncovering a secret. Firstly, CDS declared it is not a Socialist party, which Salas considers crucial for the clarification of the present situation: «to what extent are things getting clear in the Portugal submerged under posters, discourses and declarations. A couple of months ago it would not have been possible to even dream about a party declaring not to be Socialist»<sup>v1001</sup>. But later on in the campaign, both CDS and the now legal PDC allowed themselves to openly criticise the revolution started on April 25<sup>th</sup>, by respectively attacking «everything that was done throughout the first revolutionary period: decolonization, land reform, anarchy, etc.»<sup>vi1002</sup>, or claiming that «the day April 25 was a crime multiplied by ten»<sup>vii</sup>. Regarding the latter declaration, Salas deems that «[s]omething similar could not even been dreamed of in the previous elections. It is, therefore, a difference that one should bear in mind if one wants to duly evaluate the current Portuguese atmosphere regarding Sunday's elections»<sup>viii1003</sup>. Finally Miguez concludes that right-wing sectors in Portugal have lost

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<sup>1000</sup> Salas, José.1976. «Fortaleza electoral de la derecha portuguesa» in *ABC*, April 14<sup>th</sup>, pp.19

<sup>1001</sup> Salas, José.1976. «Desconfianza entre los miembros de las fuerzas armadas» in *ABC*, April 10<sup>th</sup>, pp. 22

<sup>1002</sup> Salas, José.1976. «El CDS contra la trayectoria portuguesa posterior al 25 de abril» in *ABC*, April 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.22

<sup>1003</sup> Salas, José.1976. «La campaña electoral portuguesa toca a su fin » in *ABC*, April 20<sup>th</sup>

their fear of existence and therefore this time «the emboldened Right is calmer than the Left»<sup>ix1004</sup>.

The general idea is that returnees who arrived from Mozambique, and especially from Angola, will constitute a stronghold of right wing parties, as the special correspondents of *Arriba*, *ABC* and *Tele/eXprés* report. Alberto Miguez, the only correspondent who reflects about this reality, believes that returnees came to make the bad economic situation worst, and since they know «they will never go back, (...) they will without a doubt use Sunday's vote as a weapon against those who they deem responsible for their exodus. In other words, against the Socialist party and, especially, against the Communists. The almost 300,000 votes of the refugees (out of a total of 6 million and a half voters) may have some significance»<sup>x1005</sup>.

This return of the Right in Portugal after a revolutionary period is also one of the main subjects picked up by all the newspapers. The general tone of the editorials, at this point, is of relief vis-à-vis a country that seems to have overcome a tumultuous period and is finally ready to embrace «normality». The establishment of moderation as a fundamental value is thus unanimous.

For *ABC* the first elections were useless – «[i]t might be said that those elections of 1975 were voting for no purpose»<sup>xi</sup> –, but given the result of the current ones, «moderation and centrism»<sup>1006</sup> seemed to be in order. *La Vanguardia Española* disagrees with this interpretation of the

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<sup>1004</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1976. «Lisboa: Reina una calma tensa en la víspera electoral» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp.22

<sup>1005</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1976. «Estalla una bomba en la Embajada cubana en Lisboa: un muerto y cuatro heridos» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.23

<sup>1006</sup> Editorial: «Portugal: el tercer 25 de abril».1976. *ABC*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

former electoral process, which the newspaper deems as of fundamental importance, but agrees with the conclusion:

(...) thanks to the elections of the second April 25<sup>th</sup>, which at least had an informative feature and made possible the secret of this third April 25<sup>th</sup>, today's April 25<sup>th</sup>. It is very much possible that if one year ago those elections had not happened, the ones happening today might have not been possible<sup>xiii1007</sup>.

Even if in 1975 the elections had just an informative significance, while in 1976 they have a more pragmatic meaning, the legitimacy that allowed for the second ones to happen rested in the information that the first one revealed:

Like this the Portuguese voter has shown to be, in short, consistent with last year's results and clear in his preferences: the third April 25<sup>th</sup> confirms the diagnostic of the second. It will now be up to the politicians to find an operative way of accurately adapting to the popular guidelines<sup>xiii1008</sup>.

This idea of «back to normality» is sustained by all newspapers with the exception of *Tele/eXprés*. But the idea that the Western model of democracy is the ultimate goal and that electoral processes are the way to achieve it, is consensual: «There is no substitute to the will of all and each one, which is expressed in the ballot boxes. Whether or not it gets it right, a people has the right, when democracy is at stake, to make its own choice»<sup>xiv1009</sup>. The elections represents, according to *Tele/eXprés*, the «supreme and serene will of the ballot boxes»<sup>1010</sup>.

In *Tele/eXprés*, however, Josep Ramoneda, who despite being *Tele/eXprés*' correspondent in Paris devotes an important amount of

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<sup>1007</sup> Editorial: «Dos años para elegir».1976. *La Vanguardia española*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>1008</sup> Editorial: « El tercer 25 de abril ».1976. *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>1009</sup> Editorial: «Dos años para elegir».1976. *La Vanguardia española*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>1010</sup> Editorial: «Portugal ante las urnas».1976. *Tele/eXprés*, April 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

attention to the Portuguese Revolutionary process, sees «back to normality» as a synonymous of the return of the right wing, an idea with which Julio Colomer in *Informaciones* agrees at a time when the campaign is still far from over. Ramoneda quotes Mário Soares to explain his take on the situation: «“Everyone is getting back to the place where they belong”, this is how Mario Soares – “I am an optimist: the people is not deaf or blind” – just summarized the new Portuguese situation»<sup>xv</sup>. According to Ramoneda, this development is connected with the Military, since in 1974 «[t]he people knew very well that the military had been responsible for ending that long night and its instinct was saying that to avoid going back, it had to stick with the military. The military were for Socialism; the people were for Socialism»<sup>xvi</sup>. This points to the idea that part of the Socialist votes were not rightly theirs. As Freitas do Amaral, also quoted by Ramoneda, argues, «the Socialist party – not as suspicions of right-wing sympathies as the PPD, nor as radical as the PCP – gathered many votes that by nature did not belong to it»<sup>xvii</sup>.

In *Arriba*, Kramer claims that in 1975 «the people voted for Socialism because they were afraid that their true will would be thwarted by the military-politicians, then jubilant about the victory of leftism over spinolism and moderate political forces»<sup>xviii1011</sup>. But according to *Arriba*'s correspondent, in 1976 it will be the first time that elections «will be fully illustrative of the authentic Portuguese people's will»<sup>xix</sup>. To this difference Kramer adds the ideological nature of the first elections when compared to the focus on efficiency of the second: «the Portuguese people will go to the ballot boxes to elect a “programme” and a “government”. The ideological slogans, so exploited in the past, have lost their

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<sup>1011</sup> Kramer, Andrés.1976. «Ambiente preelectoral» in *Arriba*, January 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp. 31

attractiveness»<sup>xx1012</sup>. Margarita Sáenz-Diez, member of GDP and reportedly close to PSUC (Roglan 1992), a journalist in *Informaciones* but working in *La Vanguardia Española* since 1974, also distinguishes these two drives: «The romantic vote for a diffuse Socialism that was sensed in the “captains’ revolution” gave rise to a more responsible vote, the result of a greater political conscience and a better knowledge about the goals and strategies of the different parties»<sup>xxi1013</sup>. She calls this «conscious» voting.

For Alberto Miguez, despite their apparent similarity, propaganda wise, «between one April and the other there are significant differences»<sup>xxii</sup>. Miguez blames Vasco Gonçalves and «his dogmatic collaborators» for what he calls the subversion of the first «democratic exercise [that] the citizens would use to decide about their own future»<sup>xxiii</sup>. «In less than two years», he adds, «the Portuguese have learned to distinguish between the voices and their echoes and between promises and realities»<sup>xxiv</sup>. He also argues that:

The imposing scenery of posters, ads, speakers and declarations is probably similar. Certainly, the general tone of the speeches and the politicians is similar. But there is less love, that is, the enthusiasm has decreased. The «democratic dream» has ended following November 25<sup>th</sup> (the leftist coup attempt)<sup>xxv1014</sup>.

In *ABC*, Antonio Alférez, head of the international section, also situates the inflection point on November 25<sup>th</sup>, but confers it an explicit positive value by interpreting this failed left-wing coup as a moment when «the most responsible members of the Armed Forces Movement took the

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<sup>1012</sup> Kramer, Andrés.1976. «Un "programa" y un "gobierno"» in *Arriba*, April 20<sup>th</sup>, pp. 27

<sup>1013</sup> Sáenz-Diez, Margarita. 1976. «Los socialistas portugueses dispuestos a formar Gobierno con independientes de izquierdas y militares» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.25

<sup>1014</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1976. «Lisboa: Polarización de las fuerzas políticas e imposibilidad de gobernar sin pactos» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.25



opportunity presented by the coup attempt of the leftist group to sweep the pro-Communist group represented by Vasco Gonçalves, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and Fabião»<sup>xxvi</sup>. Miguez is less explicit in his judgment, but the use of quotation marks in «democratic dream», referring to the one that ended with the failed left-wing coup, embodies distance from the meaning of the expression (Gruber 1993, Van Dijk 2000) and, therefore, distrust regarding that claim.

For Alférez the fundamental change lies in the different role the MFA took from November 25<sup>th</sup> on: «The Armed Forces Movement has, therefore, stopped being the driving force of the revolution. Its new purpose is to ensure democracy, the people's will, demonstrated not by commotions and in demonstrations, but through the ballot boxes»<sup>xxvii1015</sup>.

Augusto Assia, in turn, considers that the fundamental difference between the two electoral processes rests in their significance. In 1975 what was at stake was a choice between political models, whereas in 1976 the electoral process is an election of government in a democracy that already follows a European framework:

(...) while what was at stake at last year's elections was to determine if Portugal would, or not, fall into a Communist dictatorship headed by a military «clique», in the present elections what is at stake is to determine if for the next five years Portugal will be governed by the Socialist party of Mario Soares, as England is being governed by the Labour party, or if it will be governed by a coalition of Social-Democrats and Democrats-Social – as Germany is being governed by Brandt and Genscher's parties<sup>xxviii1016</sup>.

In this sense, for Assia the two processes had in common the ability to refuse the Communists' model of society and to isolate the Communist party, which Assia considers from then on not «a national, or

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<sup>1015</sup> Alférez, Antonio.1976. « La hora de las urnas» in *ABC*, April 18<sup>th</sup>, pp.16-17

<sup>1016</sup> Assia, Augusto.1976. «Lisboa: Hay una diferencia radical entre los comicios del año pasado y los del próximo domingo» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 23<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

even local party, but a regional one»<sup>1017</sup>, hence the usefulness of electoral processes.

The electoral process of 1976 is a moment that Ramoneda deems the perfect one for right wing parties to go after the votes they claim to belong to them, given that:

The right wing saw that the left – dispersed between Cunhal's sectarianism, Soares' opportunism, how many responsibilities! – could not massively mobilise the people, came out of its silence and took on an offensive stance. It launched its traditional project: changing what is essential for nothing to change. It recovered its oracles, it frightened, and condemned, it returned to the surface. Now, Freitas do Amaral and Soares may be right, the adjustment will come: each one will take its rightful place regarding a people to whom the revolution was suggested at the same time that it was given back its freedom<sup>xxix1018</sup>.

In *ABC*, Antonio Alférez tries to explain this transference of vote that CDS is referring to when it claims it is about to double its vote after a period of near absence from the political arena, by emphasising the interference of the Armed Forces during the «period of revolutionary adventures», but mostly by naturalizing the idea that the Portuguese people is conservative: «Then two things happened: the Portuguese electorate is basically conservative and is beginning to wake-up from its revolutionary drunkenness, and, secondly, a party had the good sense of presenting to the Portuguese a real alternative of government»<sup>xxx1019</sup>. However, where Alférez sees the end of the «revolutionary drunkenness», Josep Ramoneda sees the Left's failure in presenting a common project, and roots this change not on the failed coup of November 25<sup>th</sup> but on Vasco Gonçalves' withdrawal from power, given that:

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<sup>1017</sup> Assia, Augusto.1976. «Lisboa: Unos seis millones de portugueses acuden hoy a las urnas» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6

<sup>1018</sup> Ramoneda, Josep. 1976. «Reivindicación del 25 de abril (1)» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.14

<sup>1019</sup> Alférez, Antonio.1976. «CDS: La alternativa de la derecha» in *ABC*, April 22<sup>nd</sup>

Vasco Gonçalves probably represented the only tangible political project that appeared in Portugal after April 25<sup>th</sup>. Vasco Gonçalves failed possibly because he was not able to assert his project as a left-wing one, in the widest sense of the word<sup>xxxii1020</sup>.

Now that Vasco Gonçalves' «threat» has been neutralized, it is suddenly possible to praise him, as Ramoneda does, though he is alone in this praise, after several months of consensual attack of his figure that culminated in a generalized celebration of his downfall. In what Ramoneda and Alférez agree is when they address the Portuguese people, which the latter classifies as a conservative, whereas Ramoneda thinks that not all the Portuguese people is conservative, but that the error of the process was maybe to «think a revolution fit to Lisbon» and not fit for the rest of the country. For this journalist the revolution failed to conform to the material conditions of a rural and backward country like Portugal: «The revolution here and now was a vanguardist suicide committed before a people that watched it scared, inconsolable, but was not following it»<sup>xxxiii1021</sup>.

Yet in *ABC* José Salas dismisses most of these readings regarding the defeat of the revolutionary Left in Portugal after November 25<sup>th</sup> and the resulting re-emergence of the Portuguese right wing, considering them to be superficial or even convenient interpretations. According to Salas, most international observers are oversimplifying the process:

According to them the left wing in Portugal was crushed due to a subversive movement initiated on November 25<sup>th</sup>. It is clear that in order to crush the left it is necessary to feel certain tendencies on the right. It is also clear that this supposes a «turn to the right» to be consolidated through elections that allow the majoritarian forces of the country, the same as always, to demonstrate freely. It is also clear, then, that the triumph of the right wing is looming, that the revolutionary process is

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<sup>1020</sup> Ramoneda, Josep. 1976. «Reivindicación del 25 de abril (1)» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.14

<sup>1021</sup> Ramoneda, Josep. 1976. «Reivindicación del 25 de abril (1)» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.14

over, that order will start again, that economic recovery helped by an interested western aid will come, that the dust will settle, etc...<sup>xxxiii1022</sup>.

Without disagreeing with the widespread claims about the different nature of the two electoral processes and the new visibility of the Portuguese right wing, *ABC*'s correspondent focuses on making continuities perceptible. Therefore for José Salas, despite the recent masses that gather in right wing rallies, in Portugal some institutions still limit the situation in favour of a left wing state of affairs:

However, it is also correct that the Socialist Party counts on what this sector does not have. And that there is a powerful intersindical, where Marxism has a clear influence. And that the Constitution that will be promulgated tomorrow will condition the political game in a way that would not be favourable, in case of getting to power<sup>xxxiv1023</sup>.

The Portuguese Constitution approved on April 2<sup>nd</sup> proclaimed Portugal as a country committed to transforming itself into a classless society (art. 1) and with the goal of the transition into a Socialist State (art. 2). For this reason, Salas argues that the Constitution conditions everything and that it will serve as a blockage, especially to a right wing government that «will find a Constitution contrary to its ideas»<sup>xxxv1024</sup>.

In *La Vanguardia Española*, Assia agrees with Salas, and not only thinks that the Constitution represents leftovers from the brief period of Communist hegemony, but also presents the new Portuguese fundamental law through the use of Francoist lingo, making it seem closer to the reality Spaniards were then starting to get away from. Assia also sees the Constitution as an obstacle: «The great problem lies in the fact that few admit that with the Constitution, which will be effective tomorrow, the

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<sup>1022</sup> Salas, José.1976. «El centro democratico-social confía obtener los votos de un Portugal conservador y tradicional» in *ABC*, April 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp.20

<sup>1023</sup> Salas, José.1976. «El centro democratico-social confía obtener los votos de un Portugal conservador y tradicional» in *ABC*, April 2<sup>nd</sup>, pp.20

<sup>1024</sup> Salas, José.1976. «La propaganda electoral deja paso a la reflexión» in *ABC*, April 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.21-22

centre or the right wing will be able to govern, or that it will be possible to immediately and peacefully amend the Constitution without the support of the socialists»<sup>xxxvi1025</sup>.

In *Tele/eXprés*, its young special correspondent and member of GDP, Manuel Campo, presents the Portuguese Constitution in a different light: in his view the problem lies in that the most progressive European Constitution will only be obeyed by a left-wing Government, because «if it is a turn to the right the Constitution will be even less followed than it is now»<sup>xxxvii1026</sup>.

Other differences that give meaning to the journalists' view of this second electoral process are related to comments regarding carnations and the way Diogo Freitas do Amaral, leader of CDS, is presented.

For instance, José Salas claims that this time «only rarely can one see anyone on the streets wearing the red carnation worn in important occasions»<sup>xxxviii1027</sup>. To this Antonio Alférez adds that «(the only “carnations” that I saw in Portugal were at Communist rallies)»<sup>xxxix1028</sup>. On the contrary, both Fernando Jáuregui, now in *Informaciones*, and Manuel Campo attested that: «Yesterday, April 25<sup>th</sup>, the carnations came back to many lapels»<sup>x1029</sup>. Aside from noticing their presence, Campo gives further explanation regarding their meaning when commenting on a press conference where Freitas do Amaral, a face of the return of the right wing, effusively compliments Mário Soares' party for not being Marxist:

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<sup>1025</sup> Assia, Augusto.1976. «Lisboa: Unos seis millones de portugueses acuden hoy a las urnas» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-5

<sup>1026</sup> Campo, Manuel. 1976. «El centro-derecha portugués puede consolidar su recuperación» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.1

<sup>1027</sup> Salas, José. 1976. «Portugal: un complicado equilibrio» in *ABC*, April 27<sup>th</sup>

<sup>1028</sup> Alférez, Antonio.1976. «Objetivo comunistas: consolidar sus desproporcionados avances» in *ABC*, April 21<sup>st</sup>

<sup>1029</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1976. «Victoria socialista en las elecciones legislativas portuguesas» in *Informaciones*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.1-3

After his serious speech, which was interpreted in Lisbon as a serious warning, the general secretary of CDS devoted himself in the press conference to compliment Mario Soares' party, saying that «it is a serious democratic party, given that despite being on the left it is not Marxist, etc., etc. (...)»<sup>xli1030</sup>.

To complement in Spanish can be said by using the expression «tirarle flores», which literally means throwing flours at something or someone. In this case, Manuel Campo emphasizes that the flowers being thrown were not exactly carnations. Carnations are therefore for Campo an unmistakable symbol of the Marxist feature of the Portuguese revolution that some want to leave behind, including the socialist leader, Mário Soares, when he declares that «his party is not exactly Marxist, but of “Marxist inspiration”»<sup>xlii1031</sup>. The political ambiguity of the Socialist party is a feature that several journalists note, namely Alberto Miguez: «And even if the Socialists love to pass off as left wing (and to demonstrate it they show their programme, which is more to the left than that of the Communist party), the facts demonstrate that thanks to Cunhal's dogmatism they are more and more on the right»<sup>xliii1032</sup>.

On the other hand, also connected with giving meaning to this second electoral process is the way different special correspondents present the leader of CDS to their readers. Augusto Assia, for instance, finds it paradoxical that the only two great personalities brought to the public eye by the revolution were the right-wing party leaders Francisco Sá Carneiro (PPD) and Freitas do Amaral, the latter being someone he describes as «Caetano's successor as Chair of Administrative Law at the

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<sup>1030</sup> Campo, Manuel.1976. «La derecha portuguesa presiona al PS para formar alianza» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.13

<sup>1031</sup> Sáenz-Diez, Margarita.1976. «Portugal: con sus 106 escaños de una asamblea de 263, el PS insiste en que va a gobernar solo» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

<sup>1032</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1976. «Estalla una bomba en la Embajada cubana en Lisboa: un muerto y cuatro heridos» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.23

University of Lisbon, as young, not as rich, but equally brilliant professor Freitas do Amaral»<sup>xliv</sup><sup>1033</sup>, while comparing him to Sá Carneiro. Unlike other journalists, Assia does not emphasise the proximity of Freitas do Amaral to the old regime and namely Caetano as a negative feature, and praises both these leaders as men of «the liberal right-wing. Both are Europeanists and humanists»<sup>xlv</sup><sup>1034</sup>, qualities that Assia greatly appreciates. This journalist sees – even if he disguises it by claiming to be something that numerous European observers do – in Freitas do Amaral «a politician of the English type and his party as the English conservative party»<sup>xlvi</sup><sup>1035</sup>, which is a great compliment, since the British political system has been continuously praised by Assia throughout these years in the pages of *La Vanguardia Española*. But while Assia manages to explain Freitas do Amaral's connection with the former leader of New State and puts forward a positive conclusion, Antonio Alférez does the opposite by emphasising the supposed dissention between master and disciple:

The party is created at its president's image, professor Diogo Freitas do Amaral. The head professor of Administrative Law at the University of Lisbon, who refused to collaborate with Caetano on more than one occasion, who is one of the six civilian members of the State Council (until its dissolution) and later a severe critic of a series of arbitrary measures taken in the gonalvist period, is thirty-four years old<sup>xlvii</sup>.

He also recalls other dissentions with the former Prime Minister, Vasco Gonçalves, now fallen in disgrace in the political realm as well as in the public sphere. Fernando Jáuregui and Manuel Campo in turn focus only on the closeness between Marcelo Caetano and Diogo Freitas do

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<sup>1033</sup> Assia, Augusto.1976. «Lisboa: Hay una diferencia radical entre los comicios del año pasado y los del próximo domingo» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.23

<sup>1034</sup> Assia, Augusto.1976. «Lisboa: Hay una diferencia radical entre los comicios del año pasado y los del próximo domingo» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 23<sup>rd</sup>, pp.23

<sup>1035</sup> Assia, Augusto.1976. «Lisboa: el gran problema esta ahora en consolidar el equilibrio democratico surgido de las urnas» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.24

Amaral. Campo remembers that Freitas do Amaral was «an intimate friend of Caetano and the heir of his chair»<sup>xlviiii1036</sup>, and Jáuregui recalls that the leader of CDS «had been appointed as his “dauphin” before 25 April 1974»<sup>xlxi1037</sup>. Even if in both cases there is no apparent negative judgment, by specifically highlighting the closeness of CDS’ leader to the former order there is a reinforcement of the continuity Freitas Amaral represents.

## b) The results: ambiguous interpretations

*Arriba*’s editorial column about the second Portuguese electoral process denotes the Spanish political shift happening at that moment. For the official chain newspaper, not only «Portugal entered in the past Sunday in the cast of Western democracies»<sup>l</sup>, but also «Spain wants to enter in the same cast of democracies in the future»<sup>li</sup>. Electoral processes are thus considered an inherent part of this chosen path: «what we want to highlight is that the process for achieving power has to come from the people’s vote»<sup>lii1038</sup>.

Not unlike the previous elections in 1975, the results of the 1976 electoral process (table 11) allowed for different interpretations. All in all, the Socialist Party was not able to secure the absolute majority required to fulfil its their desire of putting together a strong and completely socialist cabinet; PPD lost votes, CDS doubled its vote, PCP increased its percentage of the vote, and MDP/CDE did not present itself.

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<sup>1036</sup> Campo, Manuel.1976. «Incertidumbre ante las elecciones portuguesas del domingo» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 23<sup>th</sup>, pp.15

<sup>1037</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1976. «Portugal: Se aleja el peligro de crisis de Gobierno» in *Informaciones*, April 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.12

<sup>1038</sup> Editorial: «Portugal, por ejemplo».1976. *Arriba*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.7



Results	1975		1976	
	%	n° of seats	%	n° of seats
PS	37,89	116	34,89	107
PPD	26,39	81	24,35	73
PCP	12,46	30	14,39	42
CDS	7,61	16	15,98	40
MDP/CDE	4,14	5	-	
FSP	1,16	-	0,77	-
MES	1,02	-	0,57	-
UDP	0,79	1	1,67	1
FEC (m-l)	0,58	-	-	
PPM	0,57	-	0,52	-
PUP	0,23	-	-	
LCI	0,19	-	0,30	-
Associação para a Defesa dos Interesses de Macau	0,03	1	-	
CDM	0,02	-	-	
PCTP/MRPP	-		0,66	-
PDC	-		0,54	-
PCP (m-l)	-		0,29	-
AOC	-		0,29	-
PRT	-		0,09	-

**Table 11** Electoral Results **Source:** CNE

As Alberto Miguez reflects, much like he had done the previous year, several analyses of the same results can be made depending on the point of view chosen. This means that it could be argued that all parties lost and at the same time that all parties won. This is possible, according to Miguez, because:

Things are complicated like this: the Socialists win, indeed, but lose votes when comparing with last year. The right wing wins, of course (the Social and Democratic Centre was able to double its vote), but not as much as it was expected. The Communists also win, but with the support of the far left wing and the Portuguese Democratic Movement, which decided not to run and support Cunhal. Furthermore, Sá Carneiro's Social-Democrats (Popular Democratic Party) win because everyone thought that their vote would be less than what they got, even if is actually less than the one they got last year. Even the left wing UDP

(Popular Democratic Union) seems to have won, even if it does not have any MP in the new Assembly<sup>liii1039</sup>.

In *Arriba*, Andrés Kramer agrees with Miguez's proposition that the interpretation depends on the point of view chosen, yet according to him «[t]he Portuguese people who on Sunday went to the ballot box civically and with serenity still showed a slight preference for the left. Unfortunately, numbers are more numbers than reality. After this rainy April 25<sup>th</sup>, ambiguity has not vanished»<sup>liv1040</sup>. This means that within the sample used, very different interpretations of these results are present:

1. a preference for moderation and centrism, claimed *ABC*'s editorial;
2. a very clear polarisation of the Portuguese political spectrum with both PCP and CDS increasing their votes, as argued by Jaurégui in *Informaciones*;
3. a total refusal of the Communist proposals shown by the PCP's fall to fourth political force, as Augusto Assia insists;
4. and, on the contrary, a country that is not showing growing symptoms of anti-communism, an idea upheld by both Sáenz-Diez and Manuel Campo by stressing the fact that not only PCP had more votes than the previous year, but also was the only party member of the provisional Government that did not lose, but instead, gained votes.

Aside from the discrepancies surrounding who actually won or lost the elections and his view that the Communists' intentions were defeated, Augusto Assia suggests further interpretations:

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<sup>1039</sup> Miguez, Alberto. 1976. «La votación fue una clara muestra de civismo y sus resultados no alteraron sensiblemente el mapa electoral portugués» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

<sup>1040</sup> Kramer, Andrés. 1976. «"No a las alianzas"» in *Arriba*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp. 31

(...) the most significant results of the second election of the new Portuguese democracy are: 1. The approval, by vote, of the defeat of the Communist coup of November 26<sup>th</sup> as well as the rejection of the tactic its leader, Alvaro Cunhal, is pursuing after November 26 to make sure he is forgiven, by claiming to be the champion of democracy and the younger brother of the Socialists. 2. the general shift, even if with little significance, towards the right, with a certain stabilisation at the centre. 3. like in Germany, the creation of a tripartite correlation of parties, all unable to govern on their own<sup>lv1041</sup>.

In *ABC*, José Salas disagrees to a great extent with most of the interpretations given to this second election, especially the one that Mário Soares claims was a manoeuvre of the Communist party – «“[t]hat story about the left wing majority is a PCP technique, we were not the ones who used it”»<sup>lvi1042</sup> –, regarding the fact that the left wing won the elections. According to Salas, «[t]his is what is said, even in their headers, by some newspapers, with great joy of the readers inclined to that result. But the fact that it might be true serves no other purpose than to demonstrate a lie»<sup>lvii</sup>. According to *ABC*'s correspondent in Lisbon, «it would be more prudent to refer to the victory of a left: the socialist one (...) Therefore the right wing has lost. Which does not mean that the left, in general, has won, given that only one of them won, and not the way it wished it had»<sup>lviii1043</sup>. Salas' argument incorporates the notion that the results of the elections do not give the Socialists a solid majority to govern on their own, but also that any kind of coalition seems impossible, which is something that all the interpretations of the results reflect.

As Margarita Sáenz-Diez notes, the Socialist Party's decision to rule on its own, in a minority cabinet, «appears to be, in any case, very risky. To cast aside from the task of governing 65 per cent of the

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<sup>1041</sup> Assia, Augusto.1976. «Los socialistas y los centristas del PPD van en cabeza en el número de votos y escaños» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6

<sup>1042</sup> Jáuregui, Fernando.1976.«Comienza la batalla por la presidencia» in *Informaciones*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.1 and 48

<sup>1043</sup> Salas, José.1976. «El PPD busca la alianza con los vencedores socialistas» in *ABC*, April 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.23-24

electorate, represented in the Assembly by 59,60 per cent of the MPs, is to render the Republic's chamber to ineffectiveness. Allying with the right wing might (...) defraud the electorate. Refusing to try to make a pact with Cunhal (...) may lead to social instability»<sup>lix1044</sup>. Assia, on the other hand, simply does not believe it can be possible, or better said, wise: «Few serious observers assume that such a position [the PS governing alone] could be realistic under the economic and political circumstances such as the ones awaiting Portugal in the next summer and fall»<sup>lix1045</sup>.

Other journalists, for instance Manuel Campo, see in the lack of a strong government a very likely possibility of a right wing coup. Once again the «imminent coup» rumour is in action, and Freitas do Amaral's statement at the round-table on RTP after the results were known is interpreted by *Tele/eXprés*' special correspondent as a proof of that possibility:

With that [the last chance of saving democracy] the Social-Democrat leader implied something that Freitas do Amaral, leader of the Social and Democratic Centre, said yesterday straightforwardly: that the possibility of a right-wing military coup, if the country does not find stability, is real<sup>lix1046</sup>.

At the same time, Manuel Campo interprets the electoral results as a break to the right-wing's ambitions and the perception of its growing presence because it quantifies its effective power, much like what happened in the previous elections with the Communists. Thus, he argues that «above all the decisive advance of the right wing, which consolidated its offensive as predicted, but not as strongly as it was feared in Lisbon

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<sup>1044</sup> Sáenz-Diez, Margarita. 1976. «Los socialistas portugueses dispuestos a formar Gobierno con independientes de izquierdas y militares» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.25

<sup>1045</sup> Assia, Augusto.1976. «Lisboa: "No podemos aliarnos com el PC, porque destrozó las instituciones democraticas portuguesas"» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.21

<sup>1046</sup> Campo, Manuel.1976. «La derecha portuguesa presiona al PS para formar alianza» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 28<sup>th</sup>, pp.13

among the leaders of the left wing parties, has been refrained. These results refrained the ‘involution’ of the last couple of months»<sup>lxiii1047</sup>. Campo has, in this sense, a unique reading of the electoral process. For this journalist, contrary to the common interpretation, PCP did not lose, as it was the only party member of the Provisional Government that gained votes. Likewise, Campo dismisses the common interpretation of the MDP-CDE vote influence in PCP’s increasing percentage. For him CDS is also not a winner because it had expected to triple its vote and only doubled it. He also finds the elections are important to measure the actual balance of power in Portugal at that time and the effect this has on the return of the right wing forces. In the end it seems that its strength is not as widespread as it was thought to be, which leads Campo to conclude that the advance of right-wing sectors was blocked by the elections.

### c) Spanish reading: a common path for both countries

Because by then, after Franco’s death and with monarchy in place, Spain was committed to a process of reshaping the country, this moment is prone to Spanish readings as well as lessons to be drawn. On a first level, this translates in the language used. Some journalists, for instance Antonio Alférez and Augusto Assia, use known, and commonly used, Spanish political terms to describe Portuguese realities.

As an example, when Augusto Assia mentions the bond between the Communist Party and the brand new Portuguese Constitution he uses concepts deeply connected with the Francoist regime: «In the spirit of the Constitution, or if you will, of the Fundamental Laws»<sup>lxiii1048</sup>. Given the history this journalist has in claiming that all Communist parties are

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<sup>1047</sup> Campo, Manuel. 1976. «Resueltas las dudas, pero no los problemas portugueses» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.13

<sup>1048</sup> Assia, Augusto.1976. «Lisboa: Parece claro que los comunistas quedaran en minoria en las urnas» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6

totalitarian and never democratic, by using a concept drawn from an authoritarian regime, the Francoist «Fundamental Laws», extremely well known by its readers – their own regime – through analogy transference of meaning is performed and a suggestion of totalitarianism in the Portuguese Constitution is being made. The same happens when he makes the following statement: «The Communists have, in any case, abundant illusions that the future is secured and well secured, through the Constitution»<sup>lxiv1049</sup>. Indeed, as the known author of the expression «secured and well secured»<sup>1050</sup> in the context of the future of the Spanish dictatorship was General Franco, by using it once again Assia equates the Communists' relationship with the Constitution to General Francisco Franco's preponderance in the Spanish post-Francoist regime.

Another example is the parallel Alférez makes between the victory of the Socialist party as a continuity solution, a concept that in Spain is very much entangled with the option of “Francoism without Franco”, and therefore charged with meaning. The corollary is also not innocent, given that when this journalist writes the following excerpt he is transferring the desire of rupture with the Francoist regime to a desire of rupture with the «excesses» of the Portuguese revolutionary process, making them somewhat equivalent: «the win of a parliamentary majority by the right wing represents a “rupture” with the period now ending. It would be, indeed, to break with the process of land reform, to break with the nationalization spirit, to break more or less carefully with the origins of 25 April 1974»<sup>lxv1051</sup>.

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<sup>1049</sup> Assia, Augusto.1976. «Lisboa: Parece claro que los comunistas quedaran en minoria en las urnas» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.5-6

<sup>1050</sup> «atado y bien-atado».

<sup>1051</sup> Kramer, Andrés.1976. «Entre la derecha y los socialistas» in *Arriba*, April 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.31

The same happens when Andrés Kramer associates pre-November 25<sup>th</sup> Portugal with Francoist Spain, when he states that: «For almost two years it was forbidden in Portugal to be right wing, as in Spain it was a serious offense to believe that political parties were not intrinsically evil. Now the right wing and the centre (the right wing in disguise) seem to have their documents in order...»<sup>lxvii1052</sup>. The same journalist also makes an interesting point about how some words in Portugal seemed to have lost their signified and are kept almost as an «empty signifier» where different meanings and demands fit:

Strangely, an aspect that is being repeated is the use, by ideologically different organizations, of the same words. For instance, words like «democracy» and «Freedom» show up indistinctly in the mouths of Cunhal (PCP), Soares (PSP), Sá Carneiro (PPD) and Freitas do Amaral (CDS). Naturally, the interpretation that each one of them makes of those two concepts [when], sometimes the only thing they have in similar is the intonation [they give]<sup>lxvii 1053</sup>.

As we have been arguing this reflection could be made focusing the Spanish case rather than the Portuguese one, especially regarding the change in progress in *Arriba*.

Firstly, the widespread idea that Iberian countries are not fit to host a European type of democracy is contested by the Portuguese example, and by extension the example Spain wants to follow. *La Vanguardia Española* welcomes Portugal for its achievement while expressing the same desire for Spain: «Let us hope that the wait is at least compensated by an admission into the democratic normality of that sector of the world where Portugal belongs to, and where we belong as

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<sup>1052</sup>Miguez, Alberto.1976. «Lisboa: Polarización de las fuerzas políticas e imposibilidad de gobernar sin pactos» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 22<sup>nd</sup>, pp.25

<sup>1053</sup>Kramer, Andrés.1976. « Los partidos temen el absentismo» in *Arriba*, April 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.43

well»<sup>lxviii1054</sup>. This idea that Iberian countries, deemed incapable of living in democracy and therefore condemned to be subjected to some sort of paternalistic power, are proving – through the Portuguese example – not to be determined by concepts defined *a priori* is expressed more fiercely by *Tele/eXprés*' editorial:

About Portugal it was also said it was an ungovernable people, eternally immature for a normal political life, unable of administrating democracy. Portugal was observed through the unbelievable stereotypes of racial fatalism also used, a couple of days ago, by Henry Kissinger to refer to Spain. About Portugal it was also said it was a people of violence and cruelty, an uneducated and savage people that could only be led by a dictator yardstick. For the ones that are unable to let go of the primitive tools of the historical, social and racial determinism or the stereotypes of the most atavistic Manicheism, the failure of democracy in Portugal was unavoidable. Nonetheless, tomorrow millions of people will orderly and responsibly go to the polls in order to cast their political opinion with all the possible freedom. (...) The best proof that no people is unfit for democracy is offered by today's Portugal<sup>lxxix1055</sup>.

Not only stereotypes once applied to Portugal by the United States are by then being applied to Spain, but also the North-American political strategy that proved to be suitable for the Portuguese case is expected to start spreading eastwards after the democratic normalization in Portugal has been achieved, suggest Josep María Casasús in *Tele/eXprés*:

(...) within the logic of a North American global strategy for the south of Europe, conditioned by the Kissingerian «domino theory», once the Portuguese political equilibrium is settled, Washington's attention will shift towards the Spanish mysteries and it is very likely that a policy of stimulus and political contacts analogue to the one applied in Portugal since the Fall of 1974 and, more decisively, after the arrival of ambassador Frank Carlucci, a veteran in «crisis treatment», who showed his skills in Congo and Brazil. This means recognizing that in the south of Europe the consolidation of Social-Democrats and reformists is a lesser evil before the risks of the radicalization of the situation of change<sup>lxxx1056</sup>.

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<sup>1054</sup> Editorial: «Dos años para elegir».1976. *La Vanguardia española*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp. 5

<sup>1055</sup> Editorial: «Portugal ante las urnas».1976. *Tele/eXprés*, April 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>1056</sup> Casasús, Josep María. 1976. «Efectos del resultado electoral en la estrategia de USA en Europa» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.11



The US foreign policy of encouraging the establishment of social-democracies in the south-European area in order to prevent socialist revolutions in an area that Kissinger once called a possible «red Mediterranean» has been studied by Encarnación Lemus (2001, 2011). This North-American interest, claims Lemus, favoured parties prone to social-democracy like the Portuguese and the Spanish Socialist parties. Therefore it is not odd when Felipe González, in Lisbon after the electoral results were known, claims that «[t]he triumph of PS would benefit the neighbour country»<sup>lxxi1057</sup>.

Only Margarita Sáenz-Diez in *La Vanguardia Española* and Fernando Jáuregui in *Informaciones* reported that the leader of PSOE, Felipe González «gathered Spanish journalists in an extra-official press conference»<sup>lxxii1058</sup>. According to González « “[i]t is in Spain’s best interest that the Portuguese political process is maintained with a left wing government. A right wing government would reinforce the reformists’ theses”»<sup>lxxiii1059</sup>. But the preferred situation is the following: «“For Spain’s sake, we wish that in Portugal the political spectre resulting from last year’s elections can be kept”»<sup>lxxiv1060</sup>. There is however a very important difference between the two Iberian Socialist parties at that moment. In Portugal, PS is already a party who participated in provisional Governments for the past few of years and had a tough power struggle

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<sup>1057</sup>Sáenz-Diez, Margarita.1976. «Portugal: con sus 106 escaños de una asamblea de 263, el PS insiste en que va a gobernar solo» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

<sup>1058</sup>Sáenz-Diez, Margarita.1976. «Portugal: con sus 106 escaños de una asamblea de 263, el PS insiste en que va a gobernar solo» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

<sup>1059</sup>Jáuregui, Fernando.1976. «(Don Felipe Gonzalez revela en Lisboa) El PSOE se aliaría con el Partido Comunista si se dieran en España las circunstancias portuguesas» in *Informaciones*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>1060</sup>Sáenz-Diez, Margarita.1976. «Portugal: con sus 106 escaños de una asamblea de 263, el PS insiste en que va a gobernar solo» in *La Vanguardia española*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.23

with PCP, whereas in Spain both PSOE and PCE are still underground parties that would only be officially recognised the following year. Therefore in Spain the enemy is not, unlike in Portugal, the Communist party, but the current situation, which is why when asked if he would participate in a coalition with the Communists, Felipe González answered that «in such conditions, he would be effectively in favour of a similar coalition»<sup>lxxv1061</sup>. At that time this could not happen in Portugal, since – as most journalists report – the socialist party is the main focus of the Portuguese anti-Communist feeling.

But if the extra-official press conference with Felipe González is only covered in *La Vanguardia Española* and *Informaciones*, Antónío Alférez for his *ABC* special on the Portuguese elections only asks parties connected with the right wing what their relationship is with Spanish groups. Diogo Freitas do Amaral mentions the very close relationship CDS has with « the groups of Gil Robles and Ruiz-Giménez»<sup>1062</sup>, and Francisco Sá Carneiro recalls his past and present political relationships in Spain as well: «I had a great friendship with Dionisio Ridruejo and we were in close contact with his group, the USDE. Now we maintain a certain collaboration with some Galician Socialists and other groups»<sup>lxxvi1063</sup>.

Another point where the Portuguese situation proved helpful to draw a Spanish reading was in how to act towards illegal Spanish parties, namely the left-wing ones, and especially the Communist party. For instance, according to *Tele/eXprés* the recent Portuguese developments

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<sup>1061</sup>Jáuregui, Fernando.1976. «(Don Felipe Gonzalez revela en Lisboa) El PSOE se aliaría con el Partido Comunista si se dieran en España las circunstancias portuguesas» in *Informaciones*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>1062</sup>Alférez, Antonio.1976. «CDS: La alternativa de la derecha» in *ABC*, April 22<sup>nd</sup>

<sup>1063</sup>Alférez, Antonio.1976. «La socialdemocracia (PPD), a la búsqueda de votos entre la derecha» in *ABC*, April 23<sup>rd</sup>

show that political parties should not be forbidden, since as demonstrated by the Portuguese elections, freedom of choice leads people to opt for moderation:

[the tendency for moderates to win] There is no doubt that throughout these two years of freedom that Portugal sometimes has lived with difficulty, the participation of all the alternatives in the political scene, in equal terms, allowed the citizen to be able to contrast programmes and attitudes and freely decide for the most intelligent alternative and, of course, more favourable to its interests. On the contrary, it is possible that if a discriminatory treatment had been given to certain political groups with a keen militant base and disciplined cadres would have contradictorily favoured the outcasts wrapped in the prestige that the myth of the forced underground concedes. The forbidden fruit is the most deep-rooted temptation in human history and, therefore, it is always counterproductive to fertilise a tree of this nature<sup>lxxvii1064</sup>.

It is when describing the type of parties discriminated against that *Tele/eXprés* uses the type of features usually used to describe the Communist part, a party with «a keen militant base and disciplined cadres»<sup>lxxviii</sup> that if forbidden will symbolically gain the «prestige conferred by the myth of a forced underground»<sup>lxxix</sup>. Therefore *Tele/eXprés* is, without explicitly naming it, advocating for the legalization, and normal participation in a hypothetical democratized Spain, of the Spanish Communist Party, and eventually of other leftist parties that do not have at this point the same symbolic importance. This is a political development that *ABC* has been fiercely opposing, at least since the moment of Spínola's downfall in late-September 1974.

In the same political field, Josep Ramoneda argues that what Portugal clearly shows is that in order to succeed in taking a country out of the rule of a dictatorship and into a more progressive situation, the union of the left around a common project is crucial, something that clearly failed in Portugal. Thus, «[t]he lack of union of the left wing no

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<sup>1064</sup> Editorial: «Portugal ante las urnas».1976. *Tele/eXprés*, April 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

appears as the main cause of the great opportunity of the right wing (...))<sup>lxxx1065</sup>.

On the contrary, José María Ruiz-Gallardón in *ABC* is very clear in terms of what lessons Spain should draw from the Portuguese experience. One of them is, once again, never to make a pact with the Communists because, as seen in Portugal, they are not trustworthy:

Two conclusions, in my opinion, not at all provisional, can and should be drawn in these two years of Lusitanian carnation revolution. The first, that one should not make a pact with Communism. Not even a man like Soares, old companion-in-arms of Cunhal against salazarism, admits, on the eve of the elections, any type of pact. The second, that the return to personal political formulas is not possible either. (...) And I do not think it is absurd that today, in Spain and at the moment of reforms, we look ourselves in the Portuguese mirror, to go beyond political immobility and adventures that produce only – in the best-case scenario – hunger among the people. Above all, I ask myself, if the men in the opposition should not be making these or similar reflections<sup>lxxxi1066</sup>.

This clearly alludes to the Spanish political opposition by then very recently gathered around the Democratic Coordination [*Cordinadora Democrática*], popularly known as «Platajunta», that congregated two already existent political platforms: the Democratic Junta [*Junta Democrática de España* JDE], coordinated by the PCE since July 1974, and the Democratic Convergence Platform [*Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática*]<sup>1067</sup>, formed around PSOE in the summer of 1975. Yet Ruiz-Gallardón also argues that there is no way back to personalist models of rule, which is something that *Tele/eXprés* agrees with when it is claimed that political immobility is a concept on the wrong side of History: «Nevertheless, the course of History is undermining once again the apocalyptic and the fatalists that propose nothing but solutions such as

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<sup>1065</sup> Ramoneda, Josep. 1976. «Reivindicación del 25 de abril (1)» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.14

<sup>1066</sup> Ruiz-Gallardón, José María. 1976. «El espejo portugués» in *ABC*, April 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.4

<sup>1067</sup> PSOE, democristianos, socialdemocratas and Movimiento Comunista.

political immobility and starvation, two ways for a fast political death»<sup>1068</sup>. Ruiz-Gallardón's idea that Spain should overcome both political immobility and adventurous endeavours has a formula of how to do so in the Portugal's very recent history: to strengthen the political centre, hence the praise of moderation.

As R. Mazo argues in *Tele/eXprés*, the way to keep Communists and the far right away is similar and the solution lies, in Portugal, in a pro-West Government achieved through an alliance between PS and PPD. This would make it easier to obtain funds from CEE or the US in order to develop the middle classes and therefore stop a future Communist or right wing takeover:

If the future Government has a clear pro-western inclination based, for instance, on the mutual support of Socialists and Popular Democrats, this would mean that it might be able to apply for substantial economic help from the European Community or the United States, since it would represent at the same time a way of preventing any Communist adventure, or a comeback to power of the Military, or even a right-wing regime with a significant salazarist appearance<sup>1069</sup>.

However Ruiz-Gallardón's take on the Portuguese example is that despite the existing differences between the two countries: there was no change of regime in Portugal; there was no civil war in Portugal and there is no defeated colonial army in Spain; Portugal teaches Spain that reforms should be speeded, that far right-wing sectors of the regime should be incorporated and that no room should be given for the Communists to act:

Conclusions? The Spanish extensive reforms should be hurried; without forgetting – and even less by showing contempt – the men integrating the right wing; without allowing to be conned by Communism – above all by its false economic promises, which lead the country towards bankruptcy –; under the institutional protection of an Army that defeated Communism in 1939 and following the guidelines that the king

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<sup>1068</sup> Editorial: «Portugal ante las urnas».1976. *Tele/eXprés*, April 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>1069</sup> Mazo, R. 1976. «Hay que esperar a Junio» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 26<sup>th</sup>, pp. 11

proclaimed in his Message of the Crown. And without pauses or slowdowns<sup>lxxxiv1070</sup>.

Thus, once again, Ruiz-Gallardón gives voice to *ABC*'s campaign against the legalization of the Spanish Communist Party in a future democratic Spanish society.

In *Arriba*, both Fernando Onega and the commentator AMC agree that in Spain the path to democracy should be not to «portugalise». As AMC explains, «[t]he Portuguese process, painfully defined by the word portugalization»<sup>lxxxv1071</sup>, should not be repeated. To achieve democracy without damage, Spain should do the opposite of what has been done in Portugal. For Onega this means that Portugal «[i]s like a symbol for the other part of the Iberian Peninsula, but with a magisterial lesson: if the horizon is democracy, let us get there without portugalising anything. That is, if we take the path that supposes that divergences should one day be resolved at the ballot boxes, we do not have to burn them beforehand»<sup>lxxxvi1072</sup>. In fact, this idea that provisional power is a stage that should be avoided at any cost is shared by a wide range of opinions. Moreover Fernando Onega describes the Portuguese process as a progression of confusion that found its way to an acceptable outcome:

Look at Portugal. It cost tears, and blood, and influence from all the countries in the world. It cost condemnations, tears, agony. The word «portugalizar» was invented as a resource for the right wing to keep its reins of power. It mobilized thousands of journalists, sometimes to smell the aroma of a rising democracy, and other times to contemplate the street mess that could lead to destruction. But look at it now<sup>lxxxvii1073</sup>.

Likewise, in *ABC* something similar is argued: «To reach Sunday's results Portugal paid a price that neither Portugal nor any other

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<sup>1070</sup> Ruiz-Gallardón, José María. 1976. «Las elecciones portuguesas» in *ABC*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.4

<sup>1071</sup> AMC.1976. «Portugal» in *Arriba*, April 29<sup>th</sup>, pp.7

<sup>1072</sup> Onega, Fernando. 1976. «El pendulo» in *Arriba*, April 25<sup>th</sup>

<sup>1073</sup> Onega, Fernando. 1976. «El pendulo» in *Arriba*, April 25<sup>th</sup>

country is able to pay without essential and irreversible suffering»<sup>lxxxviii1074</sup>. Also *La Vanguardia Española* and *Arriba* condemn editorially a long stage of provisional power as strategy. *La Vanguardia Española* condemns it for its failure in proving that it serves any purpose: «The conclusion on this third April 25<sup>th</sup> might be that it is not yet proven that provisional moments with pedagogical purposes are beneficial for the people to whom they are imposed, or even beneficial for those imposing them»<sup>lxxxix1075</sup>. Whereas *Arriba* sees it as an explicit lesson to Spain: «(...) today we want to draw from Portugal the following lesson: Spain should get to democracy without the necessity of a period similar to the one endured by Portugal. If the Portuguese had to swim to cross the river, the border separating them from democracy, we Spaniards should build a bridge»<sup>xc1076</sup>.

Josep Ramoneda has a different opinion about the Portuguese process. For this journalist the Revolution is seen as a complete success and not a bump in the road that was ultimately overcome:

Does this mean that April 25 1974 has been a failure? On the contrary, it seems to me that the result is extremely favourable to the bloodless operation lead by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho – this brilliant man who makes demands to get out of prison – and completed by Vasco Gonçalves and Costa Gomes. Firstly it put an end to one of the last European fascisms (...) Secondly, it allowed the implementation of a regime of freedom (...) Thirdly, it made decolonization possible. From the international point of view, this might be the most important event and completely irreversible, since not even a right-wing coup in Portugal could change it. (...) If we add to this that all has happened in Portugal with almost no violence, the claim of this bloodless military coup seems justifiable<sup>xc1077</sup>.

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<sup>1074</sup> Editorial: «Portugal: el tercer 25 de abril».1976. *ABC*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.3

<sup>1075</sup> Editorial: «Dos años para elegir».1976. *La Vanguardia española*, April 25<sup>th</sup>, pp.5

<sup>1076</sup> Editorial: «Portugal, por ejemplo».1976. *Arriba*, April 27<sup>th</sup>, pp.7

<sup>1077</sup> Ramoneda, Josep. 1976. «Reivindicación del 25 de abril (1)» in *Tele/eXprés*, April 21<sup>st</sup>, pp.14

The dismissal of the «confusion» that Ramoneda claims by accentuating the very positive achievements made possible by the April 25<sup>th</sup> 1974 coup, is also common to *Tele-eXprés*' editorial. Indeed, this newspaper argues that the very long dictatorship endured by the Portuguese people justifies it, not giving that much importance to the «confusion» given the results Portugal achieved in just two years: «It is instructive that after forty years of absolute rule of obscurantism, the Portuguese people have been able to get used to the light in such a short period of time»<sup>xcii1078</sup>.

In sum, at this moment a generalized sense of relief is expressed. Moderation seems to have won, and democratic normality seems to have been established. Portugal no longer seems to be in danger of a Communist takeover and Spain takes advantage of the Portuguese lesson to avoid it. Two discourses seem timidly to oppose once again. On the one hand, there is an immense focus on the Portuguese right-wing and a positive connotation is given to their newfound place in the Portuguese political scene. On the other hand, once again, it is in *Tele/eXprés* that non-consensual opinions are voiced, like Josep Ramoneda's praise of Vasco Gonçalves or Manuel Campo's interpretation of the electoral results, stances that come out as antagonists of the conception of democracy that is vastly being endorsed. And democracy, in its liberal conception is by then hegemonic as having a positive connotation, even by *Arriba*.

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**Original quotes:**

<sup>i</sup> «En dos años todo parece haber cambiado. En realidad empezó a cambiar cuando Vasco Gonçalves se fue por la porta trasera en silencio, sin ningún gesto,

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<sup>1078</sup> Editorial: «Portugal ante las urnas».1976. *Tele/eXprés*, April 24<sup>th</sup>, pp.3



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sin ningún desaire, con muchas cosas en la cabeza y quizás con una gran decepción.»

<sup>ii</sup> « (...) no nos podemos olvidar de los demócrata-cristianos, que fueron marginados en abril de 1975 y que procuran ahora recuperar el terreno perdido (o, mejor dicho: el terreno que les fue entonces vedado)»

<sup>iii</sup> « Mientras tanto el fantasma del «golpe» surgido a consecuencia de unas declaraciones de Spínola parece desvanecerse en el horizonte. Al final sólo ha servido como instrumento de propaganda. Lo cual no es extraño, teniendo en cuenta que durante el fin de semana el PPD, por ejemplo ha realizado 148 actos electorales, el CDS 117 y el Partido Comunista 56...»

<sup>iv</sup> «La derecha portuguesa no existe oficialmente, pues hasta la revolución del 25 de abril estaba prácticamente incluida en el régimen que cayó en aquella fecha. Pero, como es lógico, ha reaparecido embozada y disfrazada bajo nombres y consignas que les son teóricamente ajenas. Difícilmente se puede ser centro de nada si no hay algo a la derecha y a la izquierda. Y en este caso, dichos sectores tienen a la izquierda todo lo que se quiera. Pero como más a la derecha no tienen nada mal pueden considerarse tan centristas como dicen. Todo eso es un secreto a voces en Lisboa. Y la izquierda no para de airearlo creyendo contribuir así a su descrédito ante el pueblo portugués. Pero lejos de producir tal efecto parece que ello sirve para animar a los recelosos. Y a los desilusionados. Porque la derecha en Portugal era muy fuerte y lo sigue siendo.»

<sup>v</sup> «hasta qué punto se están poniendo claras las cosas en el Portugal sumergido entre carteles, discursos y declaraciones. Hace unos meses no hubiera podido ni soñarse con un partido que se declarara no socialista»

<sup>vi</sup> «cuanto se ha llevado a cabo durante el primer periodo revolucionario: la descolonización, la reforma agraria, el desgobierno, etc.»

<sup>vii</sup> «el día 25 de abril fue un crimen multiplicado por diez»

<sup>viii</sup> «Una cosa semejante no hubiera podido ni soñarse en las elecciones anteriores. Es, por tanto, una diferencia que conviene tener presente si se quiere valorar, debidamente, el actual clima portugués de cara a las elecciones de domingo.»

<sup>ix</sup> «la derecha envalentonada está más tranquila que la izquierda.»

<sup>x</sup> «que no volverán jamás, (...) utilizarán sin duda el voto del domingo como arma arrojada contra aquellos a quienes responsabilizan de su éxodo. Es decir, contra el Partido Socialista y sobre todo, contra los comunistas. Los casi 300.000 votos de los refugiados (en un total de 6 millones y medio de votantes) pueden tener cierta relevancia.»

<sup>xi</sup> «Pudo decirse de aquellos comicios de 1975 que fueron votar para nada»

<sup>xii</sup> «(...) gracias a las elecciones del segundo 25 de abril, que al menos tuvieron un carácter informativo que a la postre ha resultado el secreto de ese tercer 25 de abril, el de hoy. Es muy posible que si hace un año no se hubieron celebrado aquellas elecciones hoy no pudieran haberse celebrado estas.»

<sup>xiii</sup> «De modo que el elector portugués ha mostrado, en resumidas cuentas, consecuente con lo que apuntó hace un año y claro en sus preferencias: el tercer 25 de abril reafirma el diagnóstico del segundo. Corresponderá ahora a los políticos encontrar el modo operativo de acomodarse fielmente a las orientaciones populares.»

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<sup>xiv</sup> «No hay sustituto para la voluntad de todos y cada uno que se expresa en las urnas. Acierte o no, un pueblo tiene derecho, cuando se le propone democracia, a elegir por sí mismo.»

<sup>xv</sup> «“Todos están volviendo a ocupar el sitio que les corresponde”, Mario Soares – “soy optimista: el pueblo no es sordo no ciego” – acaba de resumir así la nueva situación portuguesa»

<sup>xvi</sup> « El pueblo sabía bien que eran los militares quienes habían terminado con aquella larga noche y el instinto le indicaba que para no volver al pasado había que estar con los militares. Los militares estaban por el socialismo: el pueblo estaba por el socialismo.»

<sup>xvii</sup> «el partido Socialista - ni tana [sic] sospechoso de derechismo como el PPD, ni tan radical como el PCP -recogió muchos votos que por naturaleza no le pertenecían».

<sup>xviii</sup> «el pueblo votó el socialismo por temor a que su auténtica voluntad fuese contrariada por los militares-políticos entonces jubilosos por la victoria del izquierdismo sobre el spinolismo y las fuerzas políticas moderadas»

<sup>xix</sup> «serán plenamente demostrativas de la auténtica voluntad del pueblo portugués»

<sup>xx</sup> «El pueblo portugués va a ir a las urnas para elegir un "programa" y un "Gobierno". Los reclamos ideológicos, tan explotados en el pasado, han perdido atractivo.»

<sup>xxi</sup> «El voto romántico por un socialismo difuso que se intuía tras la "revolución de los capitanes" ha dado paso a un voto más responsable, fruto de una mayor conciencia política y de un mejor conocimiento de los objetivos y estrategias de las distintas formaciones partidarias.»

<sup>xxii</sup> «entre un abril y otro, hay sensibles diferencias.»

<sup>xxiii</sup> «ejercicio democrático [que] serviría para que los ciudadanos decidiesen sobre su propio futuro»

<sup>xxiv</sup> «En menos de dos años, los portugueses han aprendido a distinguir las voces de los ecos y las promesas de las realidades»

<sup>xxv</sup> «Es muy probable que la imponente escenografía de carteles, anuncios, altavoces y declaraciones se parezca. Desde luego el tono general de los discursos y de los políticos es parecido. Pero hay menos afición, es decir, disminuye el entusiasmo. El «sueño democrático» se ha terminado tras el 25 de noviembre (intento del golpe de Estado izquierdista).»

<sup>xxvi</sup> «los militares más responsables del Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas aprovecharon la intencionalidad de un grupo izquierdista para barrer al grupo de los procomunistas representado en Vasco Gonçalves, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho y Fabiao [sic].»

<sup>xxvii</sup> «El Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas ha dejado, pues, de ser el motor de la Revolución. Su nuevo cometido es el de garantizar la democracia, la voluntad del pueblo, manifestada no en tumultos y manifestaciones, sino en las urnas.»

<sup>xxviii</sup> « (...)mientras lo que estaba en juego en las elecciones de hace una año consistía en determinar si Portugal iba, o no, a caer en una dictadura comunista encabezada por una "clique" militar, en las de pasado mañana, lo que está en juego consiste en determinar si, durante los cuatro próximos años, Portugal ha de ser gobernado por el Partido Socialista de Mario Soares, como está Inglaterra

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gobernada por el Laborista, o si va a estar gobernada por una combinación de socialdemócratas y demócratas-sociales como está Alemania gobernada por los partidos de Brandt y de Genscher.»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «La derecha vio que la izquierda – desunida: el sectarismo de Cunhal, el oportunismo de Soares ¡cuántas responsabilidades!- no conseguía movilizar masivamente al pueblo, y salió de su silencio para pasar a la ofensiva. Puso en marcha su tradicional proyecto: cambiar lo indispensable para que no cambie nada. Recuperó sus oráculos, asustó, anatemizó: volvió a la superficie. Ahora, quizá Freitas de Amaral y Soares tengan razón, vendrá el reajuste: cada cual a ocupar el lugar que le corresponde en relación con un pueblo al que se sugirió la revolución en el mismo momento en que se le devolvía el ejercicio de las libertades.»

<sup>xxx</sup> «Después se han dado estos dos hechos: el electorado portugués es básicamente conservador y comienza a despertar de su borrachera revolucionaria, y en segundo lugar un partido ha tenido el buen sentido de presentar una verdadera alternativa de gobierno a los portugueses.»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «Vasco Gonçalves representaba posiblemente el único proyecto político concreto que apareció en Portugal después del 25 de abril. Vasco Gonçalves fracasó posiblemente porque no fue capaz de conseguir que su proyecto fuera asumido por la izquierda en el sentido más amplio de la palabra.»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «La revolución aquí y ahora era un suicidio vanguardista a lo bonzo ante un pueblo que contemplaba asustado, cariacontecido, pero que no seguía.»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «Según ellos, la izquierda fue aplastada en Portugal a raíz de un movimiento subversivo que se inició el 25 de noviembre. Está claro que para aplastar a la izquierda hay sentir ciertas tendencias hacia la derecha. Y no menos claro que eso supone un «giro a la derecha» llamado a consolidarse en unas elecciones que permitan manifestarse en libertad a las fuerzas mayoritarias del país, que son las mismas de siempre. Luego está claro también que el triunfo de la derecha se avecina, que el proceso revolucionario se acabó, que va a empezar nuevamente el orden, que vendrá el resurgir económico con la ayuda de occidente, interesado en ello, que las aguas volverán a su cauce, etc..»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «Sin embargo, también es cierto que el Partido Socialista cuenta con lo que este sector no cuenta. Y que existe una intersindical poderosa, donde la influencia del marxismo es notoria. Y que la Constitución que mañana será promulgada condicionará el juego político en forma que no le sería favorable, caso de llegar al poder.»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «se encontrará con una Constitución contraria a sus ideas.»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «El gran problema consiste en que pocos admiten que con la Constitución que entra en vigor mañana, puedan gobernar el centro o la derecha o que la constitución pueda ser modificada pacífica e inmediatamente sin el apoyo de los socialistas»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «Si el giro es a derecha la Constitución dejará de cumplirse todavía menos que ahora»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «Por las calles era rarísimo ver a alguien llevando el clavel rojo de las grandes ocasiones»

<sup>xxxix</sup> «(los únicos "cravos" que vi en Portugal fue en los mítines comunistas)»

<sup>xl</sup> «Ayer, 25 de abril, volvieron los claveles a muchas solapas.»

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<sup>xli</sup> «El secretario general del CDS después de su grave parlamento que se ha interpretado en Lisboa como una advertencia en toda regla, se dedicó en la rueda de prensa de ayer a tirarle flores - no claveles precisamente - al partido de Mario Soares diciendo que «se trata de un partido democrático, serio, porque no es marxista, aunque sea de izquierda, etc., etc. (...)»

<sup>xlii</sup> «su partido no es propiamente marxista, pero sí "de inspiración marxista".»

<sup>xliii</sup> «Y aunque a los socialistas les gusta presumir de izquierdista (y para demostrarlo, sacan a relucir su programa que está más a la izquierda que el comunista), los hechos demuestran que gracias al dogmatismo de Cunhal se encuentran cada vez más a la derecha.»

<sup>xliv</sup> «el sucesor de Caetano en la cátedra de Derecho Administrativo en la Universidad de Lisboa, el no menos joven aunque menos rico, pero igualmente brillante, profesor Freitas do Amaral»

<sup>xlv</sup> «la derecha liberal. Ambos europeístas y ambos humanistas.»

<sup>xlvi</sup> «un político al uso inglés y su partido con el partido conservador inglés»

<sup>xlvii</sup> «El partido está configurado a la imagen de su presidente, el profesor Diogo Freitas do Amaral[sic]. Treinta y cuatro años tiene este catedrático en Derecho Administrativo de la Universidad de Lisboa, que rehusó colaborar con Caetano en más de una ocasión, uno de los seis civiles miembros del Consejo de Estado (hasta su disolución) y más tarde crítico muy severo de una serie de medidas arbitrarias en las que tanto incidió la época gonçalvista.»

<sup>xlviii</sup> «íntimo amigo de Marcelo Caetano y heredero de su cátedra»

<sup>xlix</sup> «había sido apuntado como el "delfín" de éste antes del 25 de abril del 1974»

<sup>i</sup> «Portugal ha entrado el pasado domingo en el elenco de las democracias occidentales»

<sup>ii</sup> «España quiere entrar en el futuro dentro del mismo elenco de democracias»

<sup>iii</sup> «lo que queremos hacer resaltar es que el procedimiento de acceso al poder nazca por votación del pueblo»

<sup>liii</sup> «Las cosas son así de complicadas: ganan los socialistas, desde luego, pero pierden votos con respecto al año pasado. Ganan los derechistas, por supuesto (el Centro Democrático Social consiguió el doble de sufragios que el año pasado) pero no en la medida en que ellos suponían. Ganan los comunistas también, pero con el apoyo de la extrema izquierda y del Movimiento Democrático Portugués, que decidió no presentarse para apoyar a Cunhal. También ganan los socialdemócratas de Sá Carneiro (Partido Popular Democrático), porque todo el mundo esperaba que su votación fuera inferior a la conseguida, aunque sea también menor a la del año pasado. Hasta la izquierda UDP (Unión Democrática Popular) parece haber ganado, aunque no saque ningún diputado en la nueva asamblea.»

<sup>liv</sup> «El pueblo portugués que cívica y serenamente se dirigió el domingo a las urnas ha mostrado todavía una ligera preferencia por la izquierda. Desgraciadamente, las cifras son más cifras que la realidad. Después de este 25 de abril lluvioso, la ambigüedad no se ha disipado.»

<sup>lv</sup> «(...) los más significativos resultados de las segundas elecciones de la nueva democracia portuguesa son: 1. la aprobación, por los votos, de la derrota del golpe de mano comunista del 26 de noviembre así como la repudiación de la táctica llevada a cabo por su jefe, el doctor Cunhal, después del 26 de noviembre

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para hacerse perdonar, proclamándose campeón de la democracia y hermano menor de dos socialistas. 2. el corrimiento general, aunque pequeño significativo, hacia la derecha, con una cierta estabilización hacía el centro. 3. como en Alemania, la creación de una correlación tripartita de partidos en la que ninguno puede gobernar por sí solo.»

<sup>lvi</sup> «"Esa historia de la mayoría de izquierda es una técnica del PCP, no ha sido utilizada por nosotros"»

<sup>lvii</sup> «Así lo dicen, incluso en grandes titulares, algunos periódicos, con gran alegría de los lectores proclives a dicho resultado. Pero el hecho de que ello sea verdad no sirve más que para el intento de demostrar una mentira»

<sup>lviii</sup> « Sería más prudente referirse a la de una izquierda: la socialista (...) Por tanto, la derecha ha perdido. Lo cual no quiere decir que las izquierdas, en plural, hayan ganado, puesto que sólo lo ha hecho, y no en los términos deseados, una de ellas.»

<sup>lix</sup> «parece, de todos modos, muy arriesgada. Marginal de las tareas del gobierno al 65 por ciento del electorado, representado en la Asamblea por el 59,60 por ciento de los diputados, es anclar a la Cámara de la República [sic] en la inoperancia. Aliarse con la derecha puede (...) defraudar el electorado. Negarse a intentar pactar con Cunhal (...) puede fomentar la inestabilidad social.»

<sup>lx</sup> «Pocos observadores serios asumen aquí que una posición tal [PS solo] sea realista en circunstancias económicas y políticas como las que aguardan a Portugal del próximo verano y otoño.»

<sup>lxi</sup> «Con ello [la última oportunidad de salvar la democracia] el dirigente socialdemócrata insinuó algo que Freitas Do Amaral, líder del Centro Democrático Social, dijo ayer sin rodeos: que existe la posibilidad de un golpe militar de extrema derecha si el país no se estabiliza.»

<sup>lxii</sup> «ante todo ha quedado detenido el avance decidido de la derecha que ha consolidado su ofensiva como estaba previsto, pero sin la firmeza con que se temía en Lisboa entre las direcciones de los partidos de izquierda. Con ello la involución que venía registrándose en los últimos meses se habrá visto detenida.

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<sup>lxiii</sup> «Con la letra de la Constitución o, si ustedes lo prefieren, de las leyes fundamentales»

<sup>lxiv</sup> «Los comunistas se hacen, en todo caso, grandes ilusiones de que tienen al futuro atado y bien atado, a través de la Constitución»

<sup>lxv</sup> « La conquista de la mayoría parlamentaria por la derecha representa una "ruptura" con el periodo que ahorra se cierra. Sería, efectivamente, romper con el proceso de reforma agraria, romper con el espíritu de las nacionalizaciones, romper más o menos suavemente con los orígenes del 25 de abril de 1974.»

<sup>lxvi</sup> «En Portugal, durante casi dos años ser de derechas estaba prohibido, como en España era un grave delito creer que los partidos políticos no era intrínsecamente malos. Ahora la derecha y el centro (la máscara de la derecha) parece que tienen los papeles en regla...»

<sup>lxvii</sup> «Curiosamente, un factor que se vuelve a repetir es la utilización por organizaciones ideológicamente diferentes, de las mismas palabras. Por ejemplo, vocablos como los de «democracia» y «Libertad» aparecen indistintamente en boca de Cunhal (PCP), Soares (PSP), Sá Carneiro (PPD) y Freitas do Amaral

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(CDS). Naturalmente, la interpretación que cada uno de ellos da de estos dos conceptos, a veces, lo único que tienen de parecido es la entonación.»

<sup>lxxviii</sup> «Ojala la espera se compense al menos con un ingreso en la normalidad democrática de ese sector de mundo al que Portugal pertenece, y al que nosotros mismos pertenecemos también»

<sup>lxxix</sup> «De Portugal también se decía que era un pueblo ingobernable, eternamente inmaduro para una vida política normal, incapaz de saberse administrar la democracia. A Portugal se le consideraba con los increíbles tópicos del fatalismo racial que no hace muchos días Henry Kissinger desempolvó para tratar de España. De Portugal se decía también que era un pueblo de violencias y crueldades, un pueblo inculto y salvaje, que sólo podía ser conducido con la vara alta de los dictadores. Para los que no logran sacudirse la torpeza de interpretar la política con los instrumentos primitivos del determinismo histórico, social o racial o con los tópicos del más atávico maniqueísmo, resultaba inevitable que la democracia fracasase en Portugal. Sin embargo, mañana millones de portugueses acudirán ordenada y responsablemente a las urnas para depositar su opinión política con toda la libertad posible. (...) La mejor prueba de que ningún pueblo está negado para la democracia nos las ofrece este Portugal de hoy.»

<sup>lxxx</sup> «(...) dentro de la lógica de una estrategia global norteamericana en el sur de Europa, condicionada por la Kissingeriana "teoría del dominó", una vez estabilizado el equilibrio político portugués la atención de Washington se desplazará hacia las incógnitas españolas y es muy probable que se adopte una línea de estímulos y contactos políticos análoga a la que se aplicó en Portugal a partir del otoño de 1974 y, más decididamente, desde la llegada del embajador Frank Carlucci, un veterano en el "tratamiento de la crisis" que había demostrado su pericia en el Congo y en el Brasil. Se trata de romper [sic] en el sur de Europa una consolidación de socialdemócratas y reformistas como mal menor ante los riesgos de radicalización en una situación de cambio.»

<sup>lxxxi</sup> El triunfo del PS beneficiará al país vecino.»

<sup>lxxxii</sup> «se reunía con los periodistas españoles en una rueda de prensa extraoficial»

<sup>lxxxiii</sup> «"A España le interesa que se mantenga el proceso político portugués, de manera que gobernase la izquierda. Un gobierno de derecha reforzaría las tesis reformistas".»

<sup>lxxxiv</sup> «"Deseamos para bien de España que se mantenga en Portugal el espectro político que resultó de las elecciones del año pasado"»

<sup>lxxxv</sup> «en tales condiciones, se mostraría, efectivamente, partidario de una coalición semejante»

<sup>lxxxvi</sup> «Tenía una gran amistad con Dionisio Ridruejo y estábamos muy en contacto con su grupo, la USDE. Ahora mantenemos cierta colaboración con los socialistas gallegos y otros grupos.»

<sup>lxxxvii</sup> «[tendencia que ganen los moderados] No cabe duda que a lo largo de estos dos años de libertad que a veces con tantas dificultades ha vivido Portugal la comparecencia en la escena política, en pie de igualdad, de todas las alternativas de partido ha servido para que el ciudadano pudiera contrastar claramente programas y actitudes y decidirse libremente por la alternativa más inteligente y, por supuesto, más favorable para sus intereses. Por el contrario, es posible que de haberse dado un trato discriminatorio contrario a determinados grupos políticos

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con una base militante voluntariosa y unos cuadros disciplinados habría favorecido contradictoriamente a los proscritos envueltos en la sursola y el prestigio que otorga el mito de la clandestinidad forzada. La fruta prohibida es la tentación más arraigada de la historia humana y, por lo tanto, resulta contraproducente siempre abonar un árbol de esta naturaleza.»

<sup>lxxviii</sup> « una base militante voluntariosa y unos cuadros disciplinados»

<sup>lxxix</sup> « prestigio que otorga el mito de la clandestinidad forzada»

<sup>lxxx</sup> «La desunión de la izquierda aparece ahora como la causa de la gran oportunidad de la derecha (...)»

<sup>lxxxii</sup> « Dos conclusiones, a mi juicio nada provisionales, pueden y deben obtenerse de estos dos años de revolución clavera lusitana. El primero, que no se puede pactar con el comunismo. Ni siquiera un hombre como Soares, viejo compañero de lucha de Cunhal contra el salazarismo, admite, en vísperas de elecciones, pactos algunos. El segundo, que el retorno a fórmulas personalistas es también imposible. (...) Y no me parece absurdo que hoy, en España y en la hora de la reforma, nos miremos en el espejo portugués: para superar inmovilismos y aventuras que sólo producen - en el mejor de los casos - hambre en el pueblo. Sobre todo, me pregunto si los hombres de la oposición no deben hacerse éstas o parecidas reflexiones.»

<sup>lxxxiii</sup> «No obstante, el curso de la historia está desautorizando una vez más a los apocalípticos y a los fatalistas que no proponen más soluciones que el inmovilismo y la inanición, dos formas de rápida muerte política.»

<sup>lxxxiv</sup> « Si el futuro Gobierno tiene una marcada inclinación pro occidental basado, por ejemplo, en el apoyo mutuo socialistas y demócratas populares, esto significaría que podría solicitar una ayuda económica sustancial de la Comunidad Europea o de Estados Unidos, pues representaría al mismo tiempo una forma de parar cualquier aventura comunista, o una vuelta del poder a los militares o, incluso, un régimen derechista con acentuados visos salazaristas.»

<sup>lxxxv</sup> «¿Conclusiones? Hay que acelerar la reforma española en profundidad; sin olvido - ni menos aún menosprecio -de los hombres que integran la derecha; sin dejarse embaucar por el comunismo - sobre todo por sus falsas promesas económicas, que conducen a la bancarrota del país-; bajo el amparo institucional de un Ejército que derrotó en 1939 al comunismo y siguiendo las pautas de cambio que el Rey preconizó en su Mensaje de la Corona. Y sin pausas ni desaceleraciones.»

<sup>lxxxvi</sup> «El proceso portugués, definido penosamente por la palabra portugalización»

<sup>lxxxvii</sup> «Es como un símbolo para el otro trozo de Península Ibérica, pero con una lección magistral: si el horizonte es la democracia, lleguemos a él sin portugalizar nada. Es decir, por ese camino que dice que, si un día nos hemos de entender con unas papeletas de voto, no tenemos por qué quemarlas antes.»

<sup>lxxxviii</sup> «Mirad a Portugal. Costó lágrimas, y sangre, e influencias de todos los países del mundo. Costó condenas, lástimas, agonías. Se inventó la palabra «portugalizar» como recurso de la derecha para mantener sus resortes de poder. Movilizó a millares de periodistas, unas veces para respirar el aroma de la democracia naciente, y otras para contemplar el desmadre callejero que podía llevar a la destrucción. Pero miradlo.»

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<sup>lxxxviii</sup> «Para llegar a los resultados del domingo, Portugal ha pagado un precio que ni Portugal ni cualquier otro país puede satisfacer sin esenciales e irreversibles quebrantos.»

<sup>lxxxix</sup> «La conclusión en ese tercer 25 de abril podría ser la de que no está probado, ni mucho menos, que las provisionalidades impuestas con propósitos educativos sean beneficiosas para el pueblo al que se imponen, ni siquiera para los mismos que las imponen.»

<sup>xc</sup> «(...) hoy queremos sacar de Portugal la siguiente lección: España debe llegar a la democracia sin necesidad de un periodo como el que ha atravesado Portugal. Si los portugueses han tenido que cruzar a nado el río frontera que les separaba de la democracia, los españoles tenemos que tender un puente.»

<sup>xcí</sup> «¿Quiere esto decir que el 25 de abril de 1974, ha sido un fracaso? Todo lo contrario, el balance me parece extremadamente favorable a la incruenta operación que dirigió Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho - este hombre genial que pone condiciones para salir de la cárcel- y completaron Vasco Gonçalves y Costa Gomes. En primer lugar hizo caer uno de los últimos fascismo [sic] de Europa (...) En segundo lugar permitió la instauración de un régimen de libertades (...) En tercer lugar hizo posible la descolonización. Desde el punto de vista internacional quizás sea este acontecimiento más importante y completamente irreversible por que [sic] ni un golpe de la derecha en Portugal podría ya modificarlo. (...) Si a ello añadimos que todo ello ha acontecido sin apenas violencia en Portugal, la reivindicación de este golpe militar incruento parece justificada.»

<sup>xcii</sup> « Resulta aleccionador que después de cuarenta años de absoluto dominio del oscurantismo el pueblo portugués haya logrado habituarse a la luz en tan breve espacio de tiempo»



## Part IV. Conclusions

Throughout the present dissertation the Spanish press was established as an object at the same time constrained and mutable, and the coverage of the Portuguese Revolutionary Process reflected both these characteristics.

By constrained we understand coercion, in the gramscian sense, which is visible not only in its institutionalised form, in the existence of official channels of information, of a Ministry devoted to managing and controlling information, namely by the use of censorship, but also in the way that consensus was achieved regarding specific issues. In this consensus converged part of the political culture of identification with the Francoist regime and part of the political culture of alienation from the same regime, in a discursive platform supporting moderation, in the form of electoral legitimacy, which grew during the timeframe analysed, hence embodying a dominance of the political culture of identification. The most visible form of this «consented coercion» was the lack of support for revolutionary legitimacy. Conversely, electoral legitimacy was celebrated by the newspaper ideologically closer to the regime's bunker, *Arriba*, at the end of this timeframe, what makes visible how hegemony adapts in order to maintain dominance.

In this particular aspect, enters mutable characteristic of this object. Newspapers, like Spanish society, change throughout this timeframe, and in no other medium is this change more visible than in the official one, *Arriba*. If by April 1974 it was where the «Gironazo» took place (cf. Part II, 1.2), by April 1976 this newspaper expressed editorially the desire of Spain finding a quick path towards a liberal democracy (cf. Part III, 11.).

Despite the constrained feature of the Spanish Press, dissent regarding Portugal is possible, within limits, and frequent until January 1975 when the situation takes a clear turn. Before January there was frequent opposition, between what we can call the democratic political culture and the one that supported Francoism, regarding subjects such as censorship, colonialism or the former Portuguese New State. The new order in Portugal was not overtly attacked by the culture of identification with Francoism and it was possible for Spanish voices connected with the culture of alienation from the regime to defend it. The single union question in January 1975, which was portrayed as the eruption of violence, is the first time that there is a generalized negativity openly expressed towards Portugal. The two opposite discourses are no longer as visible, given that the rhetoric of the Portuguese Socialist party is assumed (opposing semantic fields used to describe both proposals; warlike semantic used to describe the dispute and the unionist question is transformed by metonymy into a definition of the regime), and a consensus surrounding the values of pluralism and moderation started to impose. No voice, but one coming directly from the bulwark of the regime: Ramón Bayot y Serrat in *Arriba*, defends the Communist project of a single union, but nonetheless *La Vanguardia Española* dismisses the claim of a Communist takeover, which can be considered a somewhat divergent position from the dominant one.

With the failed counter-revolutionary coup of March 11<sup>th</sup> and the radicalization that followed it, the rhetoric of extremism opposed to moderation completely sets in. This rhetoric had roots in earlier moments, specifically at the moment of the «silent majority» demonstration and the subsequent downfall of General Spínola, given that this moment was transformed by the «regime press» as the first sign of the re-emergence of the Portuguese right-wing. Moreover the right-wing is naturalized as the

common people and not as supporters of the former authoritarian regime. However by then the two antagonistic discourses were still present. It was still possible to oppose the «regime press» depict of events: what were the aims of the «silent majority» and who were its supporters. However by March 11<sup>th</sup>, given the antagonism established between moderation and extremism, it becomes very difficult to oppose the dominant support of moderation, since that would mean supporting what is conceived as extremism. A discourse of dissent and a celebration of the winning faction are therefore, at this moment, invisible in Spanish newspapers, but happening on the streets, and coincide with both the increasing Spanish presence in Portugal and Spanish mass media being considered an enemy of the Portuguese revolutionary process.

There are, nevertheless, exceptions, such as Joan Fuster's naturalization of the violence that a process such as the Portuguese one was bound to encompass. A structural change in terms of dominance, like it was happening in Portugal, would be always a violence procedure because it implies certain groups to give up power. However, the dominant discourse remains as one in support of moderation, which is framed as anti-revolutionary, and the identification of moderation with electoral legitimacy.

Up until this moment, *La Vanguardia Española* stands as the newspapers that editorially most contributed to calm down the alarmist claims that were continuously repeated since January, and only the 1<sup>st</sup> MFA-Parties' pact made this newspaper doubt the democratic endeavour of the Portuguese Revolutionary Process. This pact is widely seen as an anti-democratic imposition by the MFA, and therefore a demonstration of extremism, because if it is enforced, elections lose their purpose. No one mentions that these elections are not for electing a government but a Constitutive Assembly and no possibility of defending the pact exists.

However, some voices (Salvador López de la Torre in *Arriba*, Xavier Roig and Josep Antoni González Casanova in *Tele/eXprés*) do not explicitly attack it.

Because of the pact, the electoral process happened in the midst of a tendency for a generalised negative opinion towards it. Some divergent voices (Xavier Roig, González Casanova and Jordi Borja, all in *Tele/eXprés*) nevertheless try to reframe the question differently from the Manichaeist opposition «extremism versus moderation» framework already imposed.

The election results, however, are considered a victory of moderation, a strengthening of electoral legitimacy and, therefore, widely celebrated: joy invades the newspapers praising moderation and the results are seen as redemption for those who were claiming that elections no longer had a purpose. The reasoning's logic remains bounded by the opposition between extremism versus moderation because moderation won, but there is some discussion over the term to describe who won: the Left? Moderation? In *Tele/eXprés*, an unparalleled critical judgment of the winning party – the Socialist Party – was formulated by several of its journalists (Roig, Casanova and Ramoneda) that deem the win circumstantial.

Despite the force given to electoral legitimacy by the results of the 1975 elections, revolutionary legitimacy seems not to bend before it, and the summer of 1975 is a key moment of this conflict. Given the impossibility of defending revolutionary legitimacy or any of its subjects (social movements, the leftist parties, the radical faction of the MFA, the Communist party), silence is pervasive and throughout this summer the condemnation of the military and the Communist party's actions was massive, given that the discourse of the culture of identification takes the

stage. In *Arriba*, the condemnation is extended to European social democracy, the Portuguese Socialist party and its leader Mário Soares.

Despite previous appearances at the moment of the «silent majority» demonstration and specifically in Fernando Jáuregui's report in Braga during the election campaign, the counter-revolutionary people from the north of Portugal is formed during the Summer of 1975 as a protagonist of the Portuguese revolutionary process. It becomes a strong opponent of revolutionary legitimacy, which is portrayed as «extremism», hence embodying the role of guardian of moderation, even if its actions are violent.

In this context when the Spanish diplomatic premises in Portugal are invaded and destroyed following the executions carried out in Spain, there was an intense condemnation (*Arriba* and *ABC*) or a certain level of silence (*Informaciones*, *Tele/eXprés* and *La Vanguardia Española*) because it was, nonetheless, an extension of an internal question. The condemnation implied a relation of causality: the invasion was a result of the revolutionary process happening in Portugal.

Even if all the newspapers support electoral legitimacy, *Tele/eXprés* is where different ways of framing the situation are tested more often, without, nonetheless being able to break the dominant antagonism. On the other hand, *ABC* is the newspaper that most consistently attacks the Portuguese revolutionary process. In fact, this newspaper makes a political use of this process to justify the banning of the Spanish Communist Party from a future Spanish Democracy. *Informaciones* is the newspaper that loses interest earlier, and *Arriba* the newspaper that experiences the biggest change in its discourse. As such, the second elections, now in fact an election of a government, bring a generalized sense of relief, which had roots in the downfall of Vasco

Gonçalves and the failed leftist coup of November 25<sup>th</sup>, and is widely read as a situation that is going «back to normality».

Although the idea of «back to normality» is widespread, divergent views are then once again possible. The praise of Vasco Gonçalves, by Josep Ramoneda, or the divergent reading of the electoral results performed by Manuel Campo in *Tele/eXprés* and Margarita Sáenz-Diez in *La Vanguardia Española*, fall under that category. As a visible head of revolutionary legitimacy, Vasco Gonçalves was continuously attacked throughout 1975 and his downfall celebrated, in particular by *ABC* and *Arriba*. Both Campo and Sáenz-Diez also singularly argue against the widely expressed perception of anti-communist Portugal, given the increase in votes for the Communist party. Moreover, the perception of the growth of the Portuguese right wing that all newspapers point out is seen by Campo as having been refrained by the electoral results. Finally, Josep Ramoneda conceives the process beginning on April 25<sup>th</sup> broadly as a complete success dissenting from the widespread condemnation of the provisional power stage occurred in Portugal.

As a general feature, one could say that given the preponderance that the political culture of identification has, the Spanish coverage of the Portuguese revolutionary process has its focus on the «defeated faction», as in the Portuguese right wing (or supporters of the former regime), instead of having it on the revolutionary subject that took the stage. The struggle of the «defeated faction» is followed until this one regains preponderance in the Portuguese society, which is celebrated by the «back to normality» framework of interpretation.

In a certain sense there is an «official» line (in the sense that there is a line of discourse imposed as dominant) of discourse supporting moderation, a notion that crystalizes around the idea of «anti-revolution». Like this, besides the general absence of support of revolutionary

legitimacy, ideological intervention (not necessarily by means of censorship) in published opinion is mostly visible in certain absences, namely the absence of social conflict, which is replaced by violence; as well as, the absence of the people as a revolutionary subject or the absence of women as political subjects.

The making of leading figures is very much entangled with the use of frames and symbols and, given the preponderance for the institutional aspect of the process and the tendency to give visibility to right wing sectors, with leaders of the Military Institution, of Government and of political parties. Like this, the coverage of the Portuguese revolutionary process has as its most visible figure General Spínola, who is followed by Mário Soares and Álvaro Cunhal and, on another level of relevance, by Vasco Gonçalves, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and General Costa Gomes. The latter group gained visibility after the failed counter-revolutionary coup of March 11 but, especially, at the end of the summer of 1975.

The political culture of identification with the Francoism that imposes the dominant discourse throughout most of 1975 regards General Spínola positively, even after the failed counter-revolutionary coup. The same way as Vasco Gonçalves is regarded negatively and Costa Gomes is almost inexistent until the Summer of 1975. Other right wing figures emerge in 1975, but are specifically significant in 1976: the leaders of the right wing parties Sá Carneiro and Freitas do Amaral. The leader of PPD during the summer of 1975, Emidio Guerreiro was, on the other hand, continuously disregarded by the leading opinion of Gómez Tello in *Arriba*, given the fact that he fought the Spanish civil war on the Republican side.

The Socialist party leader, Mário Soares is not consensually regarded, given that it is more or less continuously raised by *La*

*Vanguardia Española*, criticized by *Tele/eXprés* inasmuch as the Socialist party political programme, and highly disregarded by *Arriba*, in particular by Gómez Tello throughout 1975. As for the leader of the Communist party, Álvaro Cunhal, unsurprisingly he is usually not well regarded, though at the beginning of the process, his bourgeois appearance is praised by Augusto Assia.

Symbols and frames are specially used by veterans like Jaime Miravittles, J.L. Gómez Tello, Jesús Suevos, Augusto Assia or Manuel Aznar, are usually applied to the leading figures and help in their construction as such. Lastly, a preference is given to frames connected with the revolutionary tradition or, at least, belonging to the socialist world history, as it would be expected.

Like this the Russian revolution is, without a doubt, the most common frame of interpretation used. For the arrival of Mário Soares and Álvaro Cunhal is used Lenin's arrival to Saint Petersburg and the part that, consecutively, General Spínola and Mário Soares have in the revolutionary process is considered to be the one of Kerensky. The Communist role in the Portuguese process is often compared to the Communist take-over of 1948 in Czechoslovakia, and the first Labour Day celebration in Lisbon to the *Sierra Maestra* fighters takeover of Havana in 1959 or the Parisian May of 1968. Also Spanish history serves this purpose, namely the II Republic and the subsequent civil war. 25 of April 1974 is 14 of April 1931 for the unexpected joy, March 11<sup>th</sup> counter-revolutionary coup is the *Sanjurada*, and the dispute between Communist and Socialists from January 1975 on is the events of May 1937 in Barcelona.

«Usefull idiots» the most common frame used by the culture of identification, as well as «panglossians» echoing Voltaire's character in



*Candide* (which is, in fact, a very similar concept), to refer to the «naïve people» who help the Communists and are afterwards betrayed by them.

Jaume Miravittles is prone to the use of historical frames in his opinion. According to him General Spínola, for instance, embodies the Europeanism desire of the Spanish General Prim and the strength to face decolonization of French General de Gaulle. Moreover, unlike Manuel Azanar, for whom Kerensky is just Spínola, Miravittles at some point extends the use of the frame to Mário Soares as well. Allende's Chile and Benes' Czechoslovakia are also part of his repertoire.

As for the use of the Chilean frame, it is interesting to note that Fernando Jaúregui uses in *Arriba* the frame used by the Portuguese left wing, *Spinochet*. In Spain, for the «regime press» Pinhochet was more of a saviour than a criminal, so Spínola's association with him would not be negative. However, given that Jaurégui mentions precisely the negative use of this frame, by mentioning the Portuguese left wing as the one that forged it, it becomes in the least ambiguous or even subversive. Finally, and connected with the discourse of the culture of alienation from the regime, Jordi Borja predicts that Portugal will become a frame like Cuba, China and Russia did.

It can be argued that the limits of a press under surveillance concern not only the limitation that an authoritarian regime imposes on its press, but also the structure of the media, which imposes a certain journalistic *doxa*. Therefore one could say that in this case there is a limitation from «above» (the presence of a repressive State apparatus) and from «beneath» (the consented coercion of supporting moderation). But there are, moreover, other limits, for instance the pervasive limitation that the Spanish «public sphere» embodies, given the inherent exclusions, which are not just political, but also based on criteria as class and gender, that its existence presupposes. And finally there is fear as a limit, in the

sense that it functions as a moderation factor. Back in 1964 the Francoist campaign for the celebration of the XXV years of peace was very successful in establishing the regime as the sole warranty of peace. At the same time that exacerbated the fear of what would follow if or when the regime disappeared.

As a result of these limits, in the coverage of the Portuguese revolutionary process are evident certain absences and invisibilities, as well as, the fact that social conflict is portrayed as violence and a naturalization of the Portuguese people as a conservative one. Although certain absences are continuous, the invisibility of revolutionary endeavours increases while the Spanish press is viewed in Portugal as an enemy of the process (more or less from March until September 1975).

Absences relate not only to the ones connected with the exclusions of certain groups inherent to the «public sphere», therefore the absence of the subject as: the land reform process (peasants), the women's demands, i.e. divorce, the end of illegitimate children, etc. (women), or labour conflicts and strikes (workers), but also of other types of conflicts.

As we mentioned, social conflicts such as urban and rural seizures of private property, strikes, political cleansing campaigns, etc. are generally absent from the coverage, although violence, which sometimes surrounded them, was actually portrayed. However social conflict and violence are distinct concepts. This situation results from both the focus the coverage has on institutional developments and the impossibility of supporting revolutionary legitimacy, which these social conflicts strengthen by their action, particularly after January 1975 and at least until after November 25<sup>th</sup>, precisely when revolution was perceived as a real possibility. Therefore social conflict is absent or portrayed as violence. When portrayed as violence, social conflict gives ground to fear, given the

civil war memory and the frame of the XXV years of peace working, and strengthens the support of moderation.

From this characteristic a naturalization of the Portuguese people as a conservative one, who is not willing to undergo a revolutionary experience, ensues. The revolutionary people, who is the subject of the conflicts portrayed as violence, is conceived as «masses» and, therefore, not only devoid of agency but also manipulated by political parties, especially the Communist one. It is only when counter-revolutionary actions become visible that its agents are conceived as the Portuguese people, with the clear exception of the moments that followed the April 25 coup and, especially, the first Labour Day demonstration.

Other conflicts are also absent, such as the one involving the newspaper *República* and its workers, which was only duly followed by *ABC*, who framed it as part of the Communist takeover. Also absent is a connection between the withdrawal of Spanish troops from the Western Sahara in late 1975 and the Portuguese experience of decolonization. In fact, the decolonization process is the only event of the Portuguese Revolutionary Process that is not addressed from a Spanish point of view, and hence also an object that allows for more acute dissent. Two distinct positions regarding colonialism are presented and each political culture is fed independently: *Arriba* and *ABC* decisively on one corner, and *Tele/eXprés*, *Informaciones* and *La Vanguardia Española* on the other.

Finally, a defence of the revolutionary process becomes impossible, and therefore absent or severely nuanced, from the moment this one questions the dominant socio-economic system, not only due to the regime this press emanates from, but also given the naturalization the Spanish press achieved of the concept of democracy, which is parallel to the Cold War polarization. Any other than the liberal concept of democracy is therefore unacceptable for the epoch common sense.

Dissidence is silenced by the system itself and the defence of electoral legitimacy imposes itself as the only stance possible. This defence becomes a platform able to agglutinate groups formerly antagonistic regarding questions as the legitimacy of regimes such as the dictatorial one, censorship or Colonialism.

This impossibility of supporting revolutionary legitimacy throughout 1975, when this one still had a possibility in Portugal could be linked to its closeness, given the «homocentrism» of the press mentioned by Roger Fowler (1991). This is visible in the possibility of Josep Ramoneda and Alberto Miguez praising respectively Vasco Gonçalves in 1976 and the Mozambican new Popular Republic. When Ramoneda praises Gonçalves the latter is no longer a threat to electoral legitimacy, which has been confirmed in the second electoral process. Likewise Miguez praise of Mozambique's revolutionary legitimacy in 1975 is possible given the distance, not only in terms of kilometres, between this African country and Spain. This is in fact, a question of mediation.

We can, therefore, conclude that two main lines organise the coverage of the Portuguese Revolutionary Process in Spanish newspapers: on the one hand, a national reading of events appears as something structurally part of the way of life of the newspaper, and not just a Spanish specificity. That being said, it is a fact that in spite of a Spanish reading being present across the newspapers, the newspapers closer to the regime tend to react by evoking the nation in moments perceived as of crisis. On the other hand, anticommunism takes an increasing leading role in shaping the view of what is happening in Portugal, thus influencing what is to be perceived as a moment of crisis, i.e. a possible communist takeover of the Portuguese revolutionary process.

In this sense it is evident the way as the Spanish press used Portuguese revolutionary process as mediation, in order to negotiate

Spain's own transition to democracy and the internal questions this one aroused. This mediation is also visible in the moments that «unity» between both situations is evoked, or dismissed, and by whom, given that both political cultures use this device to construct their arguments, as we have seen. That explains the less relevance given to key moments of the process, especially from newspapers that hosted voices of the political culture of alienation from the regime, after the first electoral process, when the Portuguese situation proved to be more useful for the political culture of identification.

Finally, in this dissertation a couple of journalistic practices were observed but it is considered that this subject could be developed further if some research that would include correspondents' life stories was made. It is considered that in what circumventing praxis is considered, as well as in how Spanish correspondents interacted with other foreign correspondents on assignment, and how did these exchanges contributed to their own role in the process, the field has not yet been exhausted and there are certainly several other aspects to grasp. This would help to have a clear picture of what configured the Spanish reception of the Portuguese Revolutionary Process and how this one dependent, or not, of the coverage the Spanish media offered of the same process. On the one hand, considering reception as a broader scope, further research seems to be in order regarding exchanges that have not been mediated by the mainstream mass media, namely among the Spanish left, but also among the exiled Portuguese right-wing.



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