UNIVERSITAT DE
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David, Some Davids, and All Davids: Reference, Category Change, and Bearerhood of Real-Life Names

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Doctoral Thesis

David, Some Davids, and All Davids: Reference, Category Change, and Bearerhood Of Real-Life Names

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Abstract

This essay is devoted to the study of proper names. Although the view that sees proper names as referential singular terms is widely considered orthodoxy, there is a growing popularity to the view that proper names are predicates. This is partly because the orthodoxy faces two anomalies that Predicativism can solve: on the one hand, proper names can have multiple bearers. But multiple bearerhood is *prima facie* a problem to the idea that proper names have just one individual as referent. On the other hand, proper names can have predicative uses. But the view that proper names are singular terms arguably does not have the resources to deal with these uses.

In this dissertation I argue that the Predicate View of proper names is mistaken. In the first part of the thesis, I analyse this view in its main contentions and offer several arguments to reject it. This critical exercise provides useful insight into the life of proper names that I incorporate in my own view as follows: I argue that the behaviour of proper names should be understood in light of the wider phenomenon I call *category change*. Thus, I maintain, with orthodoxy, that proper names are fundamentally referential terms, but I also argue that they also have other uses, including the predicative uses highlighted by the predicativist. I also offer a semantic theory according to which proper names are *polyreferential*, that is, they are terms that can have more than one referent in a way that is distinct from both plural terms and general terms. This theory resolves the problem of multiple bearerhood and provides a base to account for all other uses of proper names that are not referential, i.e., common noun, adjectival and verbal uses, as semantically derived from the more fundamental referential meaning.

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I dedicate this thesis to Elia Zardini, who has been to me a constant example of excellence, discipline, and creativity. I can only hope that with this modest essay I honour his example.

Contents

For Elia

Chapter 1

Introduction

This thesis is devoted to deepening our understanding of real-life names. By this I mean understanding names as we actually find them in natural language, taking what we see of their behaviour as a relevant guide to their nature.

Burge once wrote that, "It is perhaps surprising that one needs to theorize about proper names. They seem to present a straightforward, uncomplicated example of how language relates to the world".[1] It seems indeed highly intuitive that proper names represent a paradigmatic example of one such word-to-world relation, i.e., the relation of *reference*. Reference, as intuitively conceived, is the relation that obtains between a word and the thing it *stands for* in the world. Proper names can be seen as a paradigmatic example of referential expressions because they seem simply to stand for the individuals whose name they are, as opposed to describe or express something about those individuals.

However, the behaviour of proper names turns out to be complex in a way that has been rather overlooked in theorizing about them until recently. This complexity runs along two dimensions: On the one hand, proper names can have uses that are different to what is considered their paradigmatic referential role. In particular, they have predicative uses. On the other hand, proper names can have multiple bearers. These aspects are undeniably part of what real-names are.

Sometimes theories about names set aside, or explain away, some data about their behaviour that does not conform to preconceptions of what names should be, or to particular theoretical goals. Of course no theory can account for everything, however, this essay attempts to develop a theory that takes proper names's *surprising* complexity as a guiding principle. Proper names's actual behaviour, varied as it can be, would be the focus of this work.

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[1]This is the opening to Burge's seminal article *Reference and Proper Names* (Burge, 1973, 425).

1.1   Brief Historical Background

Theorizing about proper names was never straightforward. Historically, the debate can be characterized as oscillating between two extremes: thinking of proper names as singular terms or individual-constants, and thinking of proper names as definite descriptions. The Millian [2] view that the sole semantic function of proper names is to stand for the objects they are names of has been challenged by a number of well-known problems, including Frege's puzzles on the difference in informativeness or cognitive significance that co-referential terms can present, and the impact that substitution of co-referential names in propositional attitude contexts can have on truth values; the problem of empty names and the problem of true negative existential statements. Let's call these the classical problems for proper names. The Millian view apparently does not have the resources to deal with these problems.

Descriptivism emerges as an alternative view, capable of accounting for these problems. According to Descriptivism, proper names are associated with definite descriptions, either because in addition to having a referent, proper names also have a *sense* or meaning that is given by a definite description, or because proper names can actually be conceived as being equivalent to some definite description(s), or abbreviating one(s).

According to Frege, although proper names by definition are the type of term that designate objects (as opposed to properties or *functions*) have nonetheless an additional meaning – the Sinn, or sense – whose main functions are, on the one hand, to determine a referent for the proper name, and on the other, to contribute, somehow compositionally, to the thought expressed by the sentence in which the name occurs. The sense of a proper name is thought to be something like a definite description associated with it, whose satisfier would then be the referent of the name – Frege talks about sense as a 'mode of presentation' of the referent, an individuating characterization that would determine the referent.[3]

Frege proposed this move partly in order to explain the puzzles we mentioned. For example, while co-referential terms have the same referent, they can nonetheless have different senses or meanings, i.e., be associated with different

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[2]The label 'Millian' appear in reference to John Stuart Mill (1843/1973), who is standardly attributed the idea that proper names are mere referential 'tags' for individuals and contribute only those individuals to propositional content.

[3]This core idea appears in a number of texts, the most important being the article *On Sinn and Bedeutung* (Frege, 1892/1997).

descriptions. This difference in meaning accounts for the difference in informativeness or cognitive significance co-referential terms can manifest. Also, empty names can have a meaning even though they have no referent and this explains why sentences in which empty names occur can still be meaningful.

In a number of works[4], Russell showed that the classical problems for proper names also arise for definite descriptions if conceived as singular terms that refer to individuals, i.e., as terms whose meaning simply is whatever they designate.[5] Russell argued for an analysis of definite descriptions that treats them as quantificational expressions, rather than singular terms. He analysed sentences of the form 'The F is G' as containing three general statements: that there is at least one individual that is F, and that there is at most one individual that is F, and whatever is F is also G. This analysis effectively eliminates reference to any particular individual. Since this analysis of definite descriptions arguably affords a solution to the classical problems for definite descriptions[6], Russell proposed to extend it to the case of proper names. Thus, Russell proposed that ordinary proper names really abbreviate a definite description, or are semantically equivalent to it. Then the classical problems for proper names would disappear just as they do for definite descriptions on his theory.

Despite the advantages in dealing with the classical problems, Descriptivism faced a number of criticisms, the most decisive being those of Kripke (1980).[7] Kripke claimed that, contrary to what Descriptivism holds, proper names do not abbreviate definite descriptions or are not synonymous with the definite descriptions that may be associated with them. Indeed, he claimed that proper names are *non-descriptional*, i.e., they refer independently of any identifying descriptions that were claimed to give the meaning of proper names. Kripke supported these claims with different arguments that appeal to modal, epistemological and semantic intuitions about the reference of proper names.

Alongside the criticisms, Kripke offers what he claims to be a better 'picture' of referring (not quite a theory developed in detail) by introducing two main ideas: The first is that proper names get their reference determined at

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[4]See Russell (1905, 1918, 1919)

[5]For example, the 'empty expression' 'The king of France' is as problematic as the empty name 'Pegasus' is, on the view that definite descriptions are singular terms.

[6]For example, 'The king of France is bald' would be analysed as $\exists x(Kx \& \forall y(Ky \rightarrow y = x) \& (Bx))$, and therefore, rather than making reference to a non-existent entity and predicating baldness of it, the sentence would make an assertion of existence of a unique individual who is both king of France and bald. Thus the sentence can be meaningful, as well as false, since there is no king of France.

[7]Other critics include notably Strawson (1950), Searle (1958) and Donnellan (1966, 1970).

some kind of initial baptism where the name is introduced as the name of a particular object; and this reference is preserved through a causal chain liking speakers to this initial baptism. The second thesis is that names are rigid designators, that is, they refer to or designate the same object with respect to counterfactual situations, or in every possible world.[8] It is difficult to overstate the importance of the rigidity thesis; it has pass to orthodoxy as a characteristic mark of proper names almost unchallenged.

Partly as a result of Kripke's powerful arguments against descriptivism, the view that proper names are referential singular terms, i.e., singular terms whose semantic contribution to propositional content is simply its referent, became established orthodoxy. The orthodox view, or *Millianism*, typically holds in addition that names are directly referential, i.e., not mediated by any propositional constituent, and rigid designators as Kripke claimed.[9]

However, the classical problems for proper names discussed above persist for the orthodox view. Its worth mentioned here that Descriptivism persisted in different forms, an important one being the metalinguistic approach. On this approach a proper name N means something like 'the entity named 'N'' or 'the bearer of 'N''.[10] Metalinguistic theories attempt to give a solution to the classical problems for proper names along descriptivist lines, while avoiding some of Kripke's criticisms. Despite there being some widely accepted ideas about proper names, i.e., their referential nature, or their rigidity, it is fair to say that the debate on how best to give a semantic analysis of them persists.

Predicativism (the view that proper names are predicates) emerged setting a new controversy. Sometimes Predicativism is counted among the family of metalinguistic theories.[11] However, Predicativism did not emerge as a theory seeking to advance the virtues of Descriptivism in dealing with the classical

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[8]For example, he famously argued that in modal contexts proper names and definite descriptions come apart. Supposing the meaning of 'Aristotle' is given by the description 'The teacher of Alexander', the possibility that Aristotle was not the teacher of Alexander is not made true in a situation in which the teacher of Alexander was not the teacher of Alexander, but in a situation in which *Aristotle* did not teach Alexander. This shows that our use of 'Aristotle' does not track the object satisfying the definite description in the counterfactual situation, but the object that is the referent of 'Aristotle' in the actual situation. This is explained by the notion of rigid designation. It is because 'Aristotle' designates its reference rigidly that it designated the same man in the counterfactual situation. In turn, the description 'The teacher of Alexander' is not rigid, so it designates different individuals in different worlds.

[9]See Kaplan (1989a,b), Salmon (1986, 1990) and Soames (1987, 2002).

[10]For examples of this approach see Kneale (1962); Bach (1987, 2002); Katz (1977, 2001); Récanati (1993); and Geurts (1997).)

[11]And fairly so – Predicativism it is relevantly similar to metalinguistic theories as characterized above. However it is also different in some important respects – for one thing, not

problems;[12] it rather emerged to account for the anomalies we noticed above: The view that proper names are predicates is able to account for the fact that names have predicative uses, and also resolve the problem of multiple bearerhood. I turn now to characterize this new debate.

1.2   The New Controversy On Proper Names

Burge emphasized two problems that had been rather overlooked in theorizing about proper names, and proposed a view to account for these problems, i.e., what is now known as the Predicate View or Predicativism. But Burge introduced his view as a *modified* Predicate View, in reference to what he calls 'the traditional Predicate View', that is, the views of Russell and Quine, that can also be considered predicativist views, insofar as they claim proper names to play the role of predicates in a formal semantical theory, as opposed to the role of constant, non-complex singular terms (Burge, 1973, 426).

Russell's and Quine's views were motivated by entirely different problems (i.e., the classical problems of proper names mentioned above), and are substantially different. But they are also problematic, partly given Kripke's arguments against Descriptivism, and partly, according to Burge, because they contradict some intuitive considerations about proper names and thus have a 'disadvantage of artificiality', in particular with respect to the treatment of proper names as abbreviated descriptions, or artificial predicates (Burge, 1973, 426). Among these intuitive considerations that generally supported thinking of proper names as individual constants are: that proper names in their ordinary uses are singular terms purporting to pick out a unique object; that they appear to lack internal semantic structure; and that they do not seem to describe the objects the purportedly designate, as definite descriptions do (Burge, 1973, 426). Burge proposes instead that proper names do not abbreviate descriptions or predicates but that they are predicates in their own right. And his view apparently does not have the disadvantages of its predecessors.

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every metalinguistic theory counts as predicativist; some are developed as a form of Referentialism, for example, Recanati's theory. Predicativism would be the focus in this work, and I shall not discuss metalinguistic theories any further.

[12]Although it may be so construed, and indeed Burge applies his theory to the problem of empty names (Burge, 1973, Section 3).

Burge goes on to substantiate the claim that proper names are predicates in their own right by calling attention to certain uses of proper names that count as predicative. He says that "strictly speaking proper names are general terms which, together with a copula and an indefinite article on some occurrences, are parsed as predicates in a formal semantical theory" (Burge, 1973, fn8). Thus, he presented cases where proper names behave as general terms, or common nouns, that is, where they occur in the plural, take indefinite and definite articles, and quantifiers (Burge, 1973, 429)[13]:

(1)   a.   There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton.

        b.   An Alfred Russell joined the club today.

        c.   The Alfred who joined the club today was a baboon.

        d.   Some Alfreds are crazy; some are sane.

Burge argues further that given that these modified occurrences (i.e., predicative) should not be set aside as special, and moreover that there is no reason to considered them as semantically independent from the more typical unmodified occurrences (i.e. referential), then the best theory is a *uniform* theory that can account for both occurrences within a single semantics. And this is possible, according to Burge, because modified occurrences of proper names have the same conditions of literal application to an object that singular, unmodified proper names have: "A proper name is (literally) true of an object just in case that object is given that name in an appropriate way" (Burge, 1973, 430). Burge accounted for the referential occurrences of proper names by treating them as the nominal part of a complex demonstrative (Burge, 1973, 432).

So this is the first of the problems Burge introduced to theorizing about proper names. Names have predicative uses. The view that names are singular terms or individual constants does not have the resources to account for these uses.

The second problem is stated less explicitly. Proper names have multiple bearers, that is, for most names there are many individuals who bear the name. But multiple bearerhood is (*prima facie*) a problem to the idea that proper names have just one individual as referent. Burge argues that an individual-constants view would have to treat proper names as ambiguous, to be indexed for every – perhaps indefinite – number of denotations. But this approach would

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[13]Burge mentions Sloat (1969) as a predecessor of his view. Sloat had a linguistic theory that proper names were a kind of count nouns, based precisely on the distributions of proper names and determiners.

fare badly with respect to the predicativist approach, since the later provides a single semantic clause for all occurrences of proper names (Burge, 1973, 438).

In sum, these problems would make an individual-constants view more complicated, first in that it would need to give different semantics for the different occurrences of proper names (predicative and referential) and second, in that it would need to treat proper names as ambiguous.

Burge's Predicate View elicited little discussion at the beginning. Boër (1975) was the main critical piece, but also Cohen (1980), Higginbotham (1988), Larson and Segal (1995), Segal (2001), Bach (2002) and Elugardo (2002) contain some critical commentary[14] on Burge's view; some of them however still defending some kind of Predicativism. One of the main points against Burge in Boër (1975) was that proper names did not have the same conditions of literal application on *all* of their occurrences, as Burge claimed; Boër points at family names as a type of occurrence where they don't follow Burge's condition. This point was later taken up by Jeshion (2015a,b,c) who, based on this and other similar occurrences of proper names, developed one of the most important criticisms against Burge's *uniform* semantic theory.[15]

Hornsby (1976) was the main defence Burge's view received in the early stages. Hornsby's most important contribution was to emphasize the virtue of Burge's uniform semantic account in explicating the important and intuitive connexion between predicative and referential uses of proper names. To highlight this connexion, Hornsby called attention to certain inferences involving both predicative and referential occurrences of names that are at least intuitively valid (e.g., 'All Alfreds are crazy. Therefore Alfred is crazy', etc.), but would be inexplicable if these occurrences were semantically unrelated (Hornsby, 1976, 229). Accounting for the intuitive validity of such inferences came to be considered one of the advantages of Predicativism over Referentialism, and sometimes even as a requirement for an appropriate theory of proper names.[16]

There was also a relevant discussion between Geurts (1997) and Abbot (2002). Geurts defended a type of metalinguistic view in which proper names were said to be synonymous with a description of the form 'individual named so-and-so' (Geurts, 1997, 320). He provided in that paper a bunch of linguistic data aimed to prove that proper names were like definite NPs in all relevant

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[14]Reference to some of these would be made at different points in this essay.

[15]I'll discuss this in Section 2.6.1

[16]For example, Elugardo (2002, 475-76), Sawyer (2010, 207), and Fara (2015c, 114) highlight this as a virtue of Predicativism. Leckie (2013) and Schoubye (2017) place it as a challenge for Referentialism to overcome. I'll discuss this in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.6.2

respects (Geurts, 1997, 319). I think most of this data is perfectly inconclusive with respect to proving that proper names were equivalent to definite descriptions because, as Abbott (2002) points out, definite descriptions are not the only kind of NP there is, and proper names (together with at least pronouns and demonstrative phrases) are also standardly considered NPs (Abbott, 2002, 192). Abbott devotes the remainder of this paper to undermine (I'd say rather successfully) the data offered by Geurts. From this discussion two issued remained lurking in the debate on proper names as predicates. One is the fact that names sometimes take the definite article in English and other languages (e.g. 'the Thames', 'la Maria'). This has been continually cited in support of Predicativism.[17] The other is the observation that proper names have 'bound-variable uses' (Geurts, 1997, 321) that apparently are only explicable if names at least sometimes function as definite descriptions or predicates.[18]

Predicativism saw a sort of revival starting with Elbourne (2005) that defended a version of Predicativism in which proper names were said to be the nominal part of a definite description. King (2006) put forward a powerful argument[19] against Burge's version of Predicativism that treated names as part of demonstrative phrases; contributing thus to discredit this version (Burge's version was subsequently defended only by Sawyer (2010)). Matushansky (2006, 2008) followed Elbourne's path of treating names as the predicate part of a definite description. Fara became the main defender of Predicativism; starting with a manuscript in 2011 (Fara, 2011a), later developed the most detailed theory of proper names as predicates (Fara, 2011b, 2015a,b). Gray has also written considerably about Predicativism, both defending and criticizing it (Gray, 2014, 2015, 2017).

Early dissenters in the referentialist camp included Jeshion with a manuscript in 2011 (that later was superseded by Jeshion (2015b,c)) and myself (Delgado, 2011). The thrust of these earlier works was to bring about new linguistic data that conflicted with the predicativist treatment of names as (a specific type of) predicate in all of their occurrences, and challenge thus the predicativist's uniform semantic theory. These works also proposed alternative ways of accounting for predicative uses of proper names, as well as the additional uses they discussed, while still treating proper names as fundamentally referential. Delgado (2011) also proposed a variant of Contextualism for proper names to

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[17]I will discuss it in detail in Chapter 4.
[18]Something will be said about this in Section 5.2.
[19]This argument will appear in Section 5.1

deal with the problem of multiple-bearerhood.[20]

The most important works defending Referentialism against Predicativism include Leckie (2013); Rami (2014a,b, 2015, 2016); Jeshion (2015a,b,c, 2017, n.d.); Schoubye (2016, 2017, n.d.); García-Carpintero (2017); and Delgado (n.d.).[21] All these authors had taken issue with the predicativist's contention that names are predicates in all of their occurrences. They all have alternative (sometimes very similar) accounts of the different uses proper names have. Rami (2014a, 2015) and specially Schoubye (2017, n.d.) have argued against the definite description version of Predicativism from its failure to adequately account for the rigidity of proper names. In addition, all of these authors have a theory to deal with the problem of multiple-bearerhood. The merits of these different theories would be discussed at different points in this essay.

This thesis presents a thorough analysis and a sustained critique of Predicativism. I also offer a new theory of proper names (the Polyreferential view) and a way to understand the apparent multiple life of proper names (Category Change). I consider this work with all its parts to be a major contribution to this new debate on proper names. In the following sections I will outline what this contribution is. I'll start by specifying the core of the Predicate View. I will then give a summary of my criticisms. The final section briefly describes the Polyreferential View.

1.3 Predicativism - An Overview

In this work, I will discuss the Predicate View as broadly construed, and will focus when pertinent on the version of Burge on the one hand, and the version of Elbourne, Matushansky and Fara on the other. We will refer to these different versions as *That*-Predicativism and *The*-Predicativism respectively. I propose to see the core of the predicativist position in the following way (detail will be postpone until later in the thesis).

The story begins with Burge's observation of certain syntactical facts about proper names, namely, that they can occupy the position of count nouns

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[20]This particular variant of Contextualism was perhaps not fully consistent, and thus I abandoned it in favour of the Polyreferential view, to be defended in this essay (cf. Chapter 6.

[21]Substantial material from Chapters 2 and 3, and the whole of Chapter 6 appear in the article *Between Singularity and Generality: The Semantic Life Of Proper Names*, forthcoming in *Linguistics and Philosophy*.

in noun phrases and can combine meaningfully with determiners, and take the plural form, as in the examples in (1) noted above. It is suggested that this data should be taken seriously – i.e., not dismissed as weird or special in some way – leading therefore to the conclusion that proper names are a kind of count noun and therefore are predicates. Call this the *Syntactical Argument* for the Predicate View.

A more sophisticated version of the Syntactical Argument, initially introduced by Sloat (1969), but later defended by Fara (2015c), starts by noting that the distribution of proper names and determiners almost exactly matches that of count nouns and determiners with only one notable exception concerning the definite article. The behaviour of proper names with respect to the definite article is taking to be a puzzling fact, i.e., the definite article does not appear with singular names unless they are modified. The claim is then that *The*-Predicativism is in the best position to explain this exception, since it postulates the existence of an unpronounced definite article to go with overtly unmodified names. The challenge to referentialists is that, whatever they says about proper names occurring as count nouns, they also need to explain the behaviour of proper names with respect to the definite article.

Next we have what we may call *Semantic Arguments* for the Predicate View. The first goes more or less like this. It is indisputable that predicative uses of proper names are predicative: the best semantic explanation of proper names occurring as count nouns is to treat them as predicates. If proper names are predicates, then the truth-conditions of sentences involving predicative uses of names are straightforward. But then, the argument goes, referential uses of proper names should be treated equally as predicative. This is because, first, since referential and predicative occurrences of names are obviously connected, postulating different semantic accounts for these uses would leave this intuitive connection unexplained. And second, since it is both possible and desirable (for the sake of theoretical economy and simplicity) to achieve semantic uniformity between referential and predicative names, all thing being equal, it is best to achieve semantic uniformity.

The second semantic argument concerns multiple bearerhood. This is simply the thought that Predicativism can explain multiple bearerhood without complications in the theory. If names are predicates there is nothing surprising about the fact that a name can be true of many individuals. But the referentialist arguably would have to treat proper names as ambiguous, and so they would

have to be indexed for every – perhaps indefinite – number of denotations, in the formal theory. That seems more complicated. Predicativism, in contrast, can provide a single semantic clause for proper names.

Both these syntactic and semantic arguments culminate in what is known as the *Uniformity Argument* for Predicativism. Referentialists cannot provide a uniform semantic account because proper names in predicative uses clearly cannot be interpreted as singular terms or individual constants. So they must hold separate accounts for referential and predicative occurrences of proper names. Moreover, Referentialism would probably have a complicated semantics to account for multiple-bearerhood. In contrast, Predicativism can provide an account of proper names that is both simple and uniform. Since simplicity and uniformity are both virtues for a semantic theory (other things being equal), Predicativism is therefore thought to be superior to Referentialism.[22]

1.4 What's Wrong With Predicativism?

I believe that the Predicative view as specified above is fundamentally mistaken. I will proceed throughout 4 chapters to undermine it in detail. The essential claim against Predicativism – that will be substantiated by different arguments throughout these chapters – is that proper names cannot be predicates fundamentally, although they do function as predicates on occasions. This critical exercise has provided a lot of insight into the life of real-names. I aimed to incorporate this insight into my own general view of proper names. I will now outline how I have proceeded.

I begin my case against Predicativism by questioning the linguistic data provided in support of their view. I argue that this linguistic evidence – that proper names exhibit the syntactical properties of common nouns – is incomplete and, as it stands, fails the mark: it doesn't support the view that proper names are predicates across the board – specially when considering cross-linguistic data. Some cross-linguistic data is discussed in this debate, usually concentrating on those languages where proper names take the definite article, that are thought to support Predicativism. However I present more extensive

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[22]The Uniformity Argument is generally appealed to by predicativist in some way or another: Burge (1973, 437), Hornsby (1976, 229); Elugardo (2002, 474-83); Elbourne (2005, 170-71); Sawyer (2010, 207); Fara (2011a, 9) and Fara (2015c, 109-12).

cross-linguistic data: I include more languages, and discuss the distribution of proper names and the rest of determiners and plural form, not just the definite article. This, I believe, provides a better picture of the syntactic behaviour of proper names cross-linguistically and allows more significant conclusions to be drawn from it.

Further, the reasoning behind employing this limited linguistic evidence to infer the nature of proper names as predicates over-generates: other words also, on occasions, exhibit the syntactical properties of common nouns, but it would be a mistake to consider them as predicates across the board. Lastly, there is additional linguistic data concerning proper names that Predicativism did not initially considered but which represent an important challenge to the view: this additional data cannot be accounted for within the predicativist's uniform semantics and furthermore, it suggests that proper names are not fundamentally predicates. This discussion will be taken up in Chapter 2.

The discussion of additional data in Chapter 2 begins my reply to the predicativist's Uniformity Argument. As we will see, this data cannot be subsumed into the predicativist's uniform semantics. In addition, I present in Section 2.6.2 my reply to the argument from the intuitive semantic connexion between predicative and referential uses of proper names. The additional uses discussed in Chapter 2 are also semantically connected to referential uses of proper names, and therefore finding an alternative way of explaining this connexion is as much a challenge to the predicativist as is it for the referentialist to explain connexion between predicative and referential uses of proper names.

My proposal on how to interpret the behaviour of proper names discussed in Chapter 2 will be presented in Chapter 3. I argue there that proper names participate in a more general phenomenon I have labelled *category change*. According to this phenomenon, words of virtually every word-class can sometimes change categories (i.e., nouns can change to verbs, adjectives can change to nouns, etc.). Thus the mere fact that proper names sometimes function as common nouns, seen in light of category change, does not give one reasons to conclude that proper names should be treated as count nouns or predicates generally. In this chapter I present the phenomenon and argue that details about how it apparently works should inform our understanding of proper names when changing categories. Certain characteristics of the phenomenon support the claim that proper names should not be considered as predicates fundamentally.

Other authors have appealed to similar widespread phenomena such as

polysemy, and metonymy and Nunberg's meaning-transfer to explain the derived nature of predicative uses of proper names (Leckie (2013), Jeshion (2015c), Rami (2015), and García-Carpintero (2017)). The novelty of my proposal resides in two things. First, the discussion of these other phenomena focuses on the semantics of the different uses of proper names, in particular on the predicative use and how the predicative meanings can be seen as derived. My discussion of category change focus also in the syntactic aspect of other uses of proper names, and has thus serve to make distinct arguments, i.e., that the predicativist methodology over-generates, that based on syntactic facts we should consider proper names also as adjectives or verbs, and that certain category changes may only be partial (cf. Section 3.3.1).

Second, and more importantly, the discussion of the characteristics of category change as I presented it, allowed me to make some specific arguments against the fundamentality of the predicative use (these will appear in Section 3.3), undermining a possible reply from the predicativist that the different uses of proper names can be seen as derived from the fundamental predicative meaning appealing precisely to polysemy or meaning-transfer phenomena (as indeed Fara (2015b) has proposed).

I continue my case against Predicativism in Chapter 4, taking issue with the predicativist's identification of proper names and common count nouns. It seems clear that proper names and common count nouns have different properties, and this undermines the thesis that proper names are in fact common count nouns. Therefore, for the Predicate View to be successful, it would need to bridge these intuitive differences. Further I argued that the predicativist's postulation of an unpronounced determiner to go with unmodified proper names is not well justified and worse, it does not help make proper names and count nouns *unified*; rather, it makes proper names exceptional as count nouns. The arguments in this chapter, together with those of Chapter 2, complete my reply to the Syntactic Argument for Predicativism.

Other differences between proper names and common count nouns or predicates will be discussed in Chapter 5. Here the main concern is to show that Predicativism cannot adequately account for referential uses of proper names. I will argue that there is a significant semantic difference between proper names and common count nouns that cannot be bridged by making the former part of definite descriptions or complex demonstratives. Lastly, I will argue in Section 5.5 that the predicativist's account of what N means *fundamentally*, i.e.,

being called 'N', or something of the sort, is unconvincing – arguably this predicative meaning depends on names being referential. So I conclude that it is unlikely that the predicative meaning of names is more fundamental than their referential meaning.

To summarize: I claim that proper names cannot be fundamentally predicates.This claim is based from the following considerations: First, for proper names to be fundamentally predicates, it needs to be shown that all the additional data presented in Chapter 2 can either be accounted for within the predicativist semantics, or shown to be derived from the predicative meaning of proper names. I argue that this is not possible (cf. specially Sections 2.6.1 and 3.3). Second, for proper names to be fundamentally predicates, the cross-linguistic data with respect to predicative uses should be more consistent. But it is not (cf. Section 2.4.

Third, the predicativist's strategy of postulating an unpronounced determiner for proper names makes them effectively exceptional qua predicates (cf. specially Section 4.2), undermining the desired syntactic uniformity and therefore also the justification for semantic unity between proper names and count nouns.

Fourth, the treatment of referential names as predicative fails (as the arguments in Chapter 5 seek to show). If, on analysis, proper names turn out to behave differently from the definite descriptions or the complex demonstratives that are thought to embed them, then referential uses are genuinely referential, and they cannot be interpreted as predicative. Fifth, and last, the predicativist's semantics fails to show that the predicate meaning of proper names is more fundamental than their referential meaning (cf. Section 5.5).

1.5   The Polyreferential View

The last chapter of the thesis defends my own view of the semantics of proper names. This view emerges as an alternative to extant accounts of multiple-bearerhood and, significantly, as a way to account for the semantics of other uses of proper names as dependent on the referential meaning, that I claim to be the fundamental meaning.

We said that in addition to accounting for the fact that names have predicative uses, Predicativism is also able to resolve the problem of multiple bearerhood; problem that arguably has been lurking at least since Kripke set up the basis for the now orthodox view that names are to be treated as referential terms or individual constants in the formal language.[23] Although Predicativism has an admittedly simpler solution to this problem – i.e., if names are predicates there is nothing surprising in the fact that they can apply to many individuals – it is not the only solution available. Since Predicativism turned out to be inadequate in several other respects, there is sufficient motivation to abandon it in favour of a different view.

To account for multiple bearerhood, there are basically two views on offer. One view, adumbrated by Kripke in the quote above, later defended by Kaplan (1990), treats names as homonyms. This means to say that for any name N that seem to have multiple bearers, there are really many distinct albeit homonymous names. Think of David Kaplan and David Lewis. They seem to share the first name, but really these are two distinct names spelled or pronounced as 'David'. What they share is a *generic* name, something like a template from which their *specific* names were generated. In the recent literature, Garcia-Carpintero (2017), Jeshion (2015c), and Sainsbury (2015) defend this view.

The other view treats names as context sensitive expressions. Thus David Kaplan and David Lewis are both bearers of *one and the same* name all right, but the reference of a use of this name is decided in context. In some context 'David' refers to Kaplan, in some other it refers to Lewis. Proponents of this view include Delgado (2011), Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998), Rami (2014b, 2015), Récanati (1993), Schoubye (2017), and Voltolini (1995).

The view defended in this essay represents a third view, hitherto relatively unexplored in the literature.[24] This is the Polyreferential View, according to which one and the same name has many different referents, as many as bearers of the name there are. I took inspiration for this view while thinking about polysemy. Polysemous words are standardly thought to be single words that can have different (although related) meanings, as opposed to be like ambiguous words (e.g. 'bank') that are more standardly considered homonyms. Then I

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[23]Recall the preface to *Naming and Necessity* "In the present monograph I spoke for simplicity as if each name had a unique bearer..." and the suggestion that one could treat names as homonyms to deal with this problem (Kripke, 1980, 7-8).

[24]The views of Perry (2001) and Katz (2001) count as predecessors of the Polyreferential View. However, these views are different from mine in some important respects that will be discussed in Section 6.1

thought that names could be polyreferential, that is, words that can have many referents – nothing in principle seems to prevent this possibility. Polyreferentialism is however distinct from both polysemy and ambiguity, as I explain in Section 6.2.

On the polyreferentialism view, the problem of multiple bearerhood does not arise. One does not need to decide which of the many bearers of the name is its referent. All of them are. This obviously has consequences to a number of issues; such as what would be the name's contribution to the propositional content, or what would be the truth-conditions of sentences containing names, etc. Further details will be given in Section 6.1.3.

In my account, proper names are still singular terms and fundamentally referential. The view emerged not only as a way to account for multiple bearerhood, but also as a way to give a semantic base to all other uses of proper names, which in my account are treated as derived from the fundamental referential meaning. I discuss this in Section 6.3. I will argue further that my own account is superior both to Predicativism, and other referentialist's views, in accounting for the multiple uses of proper names.

Chapter 2

Predicativism and the Linguistic Data

In this chapter I begin my case against the Predicative View of proper names. I start by questioning a foundational argument for the Predicate View, namely, that there is some linguistic data concerning proper names that is better explained by treating names as predicates. While I agree with predicativists that proper names have predicative uses, I reject the move from the fact that names have predicative uses, to a general treatment of proper names as predicates in *all* its uses. This chapter will discuss additional data concerning proper names that reveals the inadequacy of the predicativist explanation. This discussion also challenges the predicativist's main selling point, namely that they hold an advantage over Referentialism in being able to provide a uniform semantic account of proper names.

The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, I present the predicative view and discuss the uniformity argument. In Section 2.2, I outline the reasons I have to reject the view, some of which will be taken up in the following chapters. In Sections 2.3-2.6, I present additional linguistic data concerning proper names, both in English and in other languages, and explain why this data challenges Predicativism. At the end of Section 2.6 I begin the argument against the predicativist's uniform semantics, argument that will be developed further in parts of Chapters 3 to 6.

2.1   The Predicative View

The predicate view of proper names is mainly motivated by the observation that, on some occurrences, proper names behave like common count nouns. This in

turn is based on the fact that proper names, at least in English, combine well with a full range of determiners and take the plural form, which are well–known syntactical characteristic of common count nouns only. Here are a few examples, first emphasized by Burge (1973, 429) (these exemplify *predicative uses* henceforth)[1]:

(1)   a.   The David that bought the car is married.

       b.   A David came to see me today.

       c.   That David is not in my class.

       d.   There are only two Davids in this town.

       e.   Few Davids came to the party.

       f.   Every David has voted.

The predicativist takes this datum to be significant: the fact that proper names exhibit striking similarities to common count nouns with respect to their combination with determiners and permission of plural form is taken as indication that proper names belong to the same syntactical category as common count nouns.[2] And if proper names are common count nouns, then it is reasonable to think that they must have the same kind of semantic value that common nouns have, namely, that of predicates – a property, or a set of objects, etc. Burge says that proper names are *true of* objects, and gives the following condition of application: "A proper name is a predicate true of an object if and only if the object is given that name in an appropriate way" (Burge, 1973, 428). Thus 'David' would have as semantic value either a property, i.e., *being called 'David'*; or an extension consisting in those individuals called 'David'. Most predicativist accept that the meaning of N is given by what we will call, following Fara, the *being-called-condition*[3]:

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[1] The label 'predicative uses' has become customary in the literature, and normally refers only to the kind of common count noun uses exemplified in (1) where a name N can be paraphrased as 'individual called 'N'' or something of the sort. But the label is slightly misleading since there are other kinds of common count noun uses of proper names that should qualify as *predicative* in so far as their semantics also assigns them a predicate as value, albeit a different one. However, we'll keep the custom of calling the common count noun uses exemplified in (1) 'predicative', and use the term 'Jeshion's examples' to refer to the additional common noun uses (cf. Section 2.6.1

[2] Fara actually thinks that proper names are count nouns but not *common* count nouns, and are semantically predicates. However, she similarly takes their syntactical behaviour as evidence that proper names are count nouns (Fara, 2015c, 61-63).

[3] See for example Elbourne (2005, 172-74) and Matushansky (2008, 599).

BCC '*N*' (when a predicate) is true of a thing just in case it is called *N* (Fara, 2015c, 64).[4]

It is argued that the occurrences of proper names in the sentences in (1) are *literal* and not metaphorical or ironic, or 'special' uses that diverge from the usual (Burge, 1973, 429-30). The occurrence of 'David' in the above sentences is given the literal meaning of something like *being called 'David'*. For contrast, Burge gives the following example of a metaphorical occurrence of proper names,

(2)   George Wallace is a Napoleon.

It seems clear that what is meant here is that George Wallace shares certain characteristics with the famous Napoleon and not that George Wallace bears the name 'Napoleon' (Burge, 1973, 429). This 'metaphorical' use of proper names is not what is intended in the above sentences; rather, it is intuitive enough that sentences in (1) purport to say something about people that are literally Davids (people that are called 'David').[5].

The Predicate View has the obvious advantage of providing a straightforward syntactic and semantic treatment of predicative ocurrence of proper names (i.e. (1.a)-(1.f) above): Syntactically, if proper names are count nouns, then predicative occurrences are the standard case. Semantically, if proper names are predicates, then they can be interpreted in exactly the same way that common count nouns are, and so the truth-conditions of sentences containing predicative occurrences of proper names can be easily given. In contrast, if proper names are treated as referential singular terms in all occurrences, it is not clear what to assign as semantic value to the predicative occurrences, and how to give the truth conditions of the sentences in which they occur. This is because proper names *as* referential singular terms cannot pick out a class of individuals, as general terms do – but this is intuitively what the predicative

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[4]Note the lack of quotation marks around 'N' in the construction 'it is called N'. Fara, following Matushansky (2008, 2015), gives an argument to the effect that in naming constructions the name is not mentioned but used, and it is effectively a predicate (Fara, 2015c, 65-69). However, as we will see in Sections 5.5 and 6.3.1, what predicativists apparently mean by *being called N*, boils down to the same property we have been designating all along with *being called 'N'* – that is, the property of having '*N*' as a name, bearing *N*, being named with '*N*', being dubbed '*N*', etc. I will keep using the quotations marks around '*N*', but all I say about 'being called 'N'' can be also applied to 'being called N'.

[5]Although of course the sentences in (1) could have a metaphorical reading too, as well as other readings that we will discuss in Section 2.6.1. Thus, while agreeing that there are predicative uses of 'David' as exemplified in (1) that are not metaphorical, it is not immediately obvious that they are not 'special' in some other way, for example, by being coerced uses, or elliptical for 'person called 'David'.

occurrences of proper names do in sentences like those in (1). Therefore, the
Referential View will need a separate account to able to cope with predicative
uses of proper names. And this is believed to be a disadvantage for the ref-
erentialist: the predicativist argues that since she is able to accommodate the
putative referential uses of proper names while still treating them as predicates,
her view has the advantage of providing a uniform account of the semantics of
proper names.

Referential uses of proper names are indeed the paradigmatic case: this
is when they appear bare in the singular in argument position, seemingly des-
ignating a particular individual,

(3)   a.   David is happy.
        b.   I saw David yesterday.

Predicativists typically take the main challenge for their view to be that of
offering an account of these uses. Clearly, if proper names are still predicates in
their typical referential uses, the predicativist needs to explain two things. The
first is the semantic ability of proper names, when appearing as bare singulars
in argument position, to denote a particular individual, while common count
nouns cannot denote a particular individual in their extension unless they are
restricted by some determiner (and perhaps also by some nominal restrictor).[6]
The second thing to explain is the syntactic fact that proper names can appear
as *bare* singulars in argument position while common count nouns cannot; in
argument position common count nouns must take some determiner.

Predicativists attempt to explain both things by postulating an unpro-
nounced determiner. They argue that proper names in their bare uses – where
they *appear* to function as singular terms – are never *really* unmodified: they ap-
pear bare on the surface but their analysis yields an unpronounced determiner
and perhaps also a nominal restrictor (Burge (1973, 342); Elbourne (2005, 188);
Matushansky (2006, 285); Matushansky (2008, 574-75); Fara (2011a, 9); Fara
(2015c, 60)). In their view, proper names are in fact just a common count noun
occupying the nominal position in either a definite description or a complex
demonstrative. Since definite descriptions or complex demonstratives can be
referential (or at least can designate a single individual) this would preserve the
intuition that proper names refer.

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[6]Or are used non-standardly as a proper name of an individual, or used vocatively. We
will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 4.

With this apparatus in place predicativists claim to be able to explain the syntactic oddity that proper names, being count nouns, can appear bare in argument position: the explanation is that they do not really appear *bare* in argument position, and the syntactic oddity is *reduced* to the determiner attached to them in these occurrences being unpronounced. And since this allows the proper name to stay the same semantically – i.e., a predicate – Predicativism can claim uniformity between predicative and referential uses, and their account to be theoretically simpler.

2.1.1   The Uniformity Argument

The ability to provide a uniform semantic account for *all* occurrences of proper names (that is, predicative uses as exemplified by the sentences in (1) and referential uses as exemplified by the sentences in (3)) is claimed to be the main argument for the Predicative view.[7] And indeed it seems a good selling point: all things being equal, a theory that explains more phenomena with fewer resources is desirable. Burge points against the Referential View that treats proper names as individual constants that it is "more complicated in that it must give a different semantics for these different occurrences" (Burge, 1973, 437). If the Predicative View can offer a single semantics for these uses, it would be preferable.

Apart from these theoretical virtues of simplicity and economy, some kind of uniformity is clearly desirable in order to account for the fact that predicative and referential uses are intuitively connected. Burge states that it would be a mistake "to hold that modified [i.e., predicative] and unmodified [i.e., referential] occurrences of ordinary proper names are semantically independent of each other", especially given that "a straightforward semantical relation between these different uses can be found" (Burge, 1973, 430). Further, one would need to justify the 'disunification' of these uses (Burge, 1973, 437).

This intuitive semantic connection between referential and predicative uses is borne out by certain inferences that appear to be perfectly valid.[8] Consider,

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[7]See Jeshion (2015b,c); Leckie (2013); Rami (2014a); and Sawyer (2010).

[8]The notion of validity here is more intuitive; these inferences are neither logically nor truth-conditionally valid, but in some sense the conclusions seems to follow from the premises. Some people propose a sort of 'contextual validity', i.e., that if the premises are true at c, conclusion must be true at c too. For discussion see Hawthorne and Manley (2012, Section 6.12) and Schoubye (2017, 721-23).

i. $\dfrac{\text{Alfred joined the club today.}}{\text{Therefore, an Alfred joined the club today}}$ (adapted from Hornsby (1976, 28-29)).

ii. $\dfrac{\text{Frida is painting.}}{\text{So, at least one Frieda is painting}}$ (Leckie, 2013, 1144).

iii. $\dfrac{\text{No Pauls are tired.}}{\text{So, Paul is not tired}}$ (Schoubye, 2017, 721).

If the occurrences of proper names in the premises and conclusion have different independent meanings it would be hard to explain why the conclusions seem to follow from the premises. But on the Predicative view, this is easily explained, since the proper names across these occurrences have the same meaning.

In addition, other phenomena seem to require a semantic connection between predicative and referential uses. Leckie notes that ordinary speakers who are competent with referential uses of proper names normally would also be competent with predicative uses. Also, intra- and cross-linguistic uniformity seem to require some connection between referential and predicative uses; the fact *all* names seem to have both uses, in English as well as in a number of languages, would be a case of massive coincidence if these uses are semantically independent (Leckie, 2013, 1143-44).

Another advantage of treating all occurrences of proper names as predicates is that it eliminates the problem of multiple bearerhood.[9] This is supposed to be problematic for the view that proper names are singular terms because a standard assumption about singular terms is that they have just one semantic referent. But if names have multiple bearers the issue arises of deciding which one of the bearers of a given name is its semantic reference. The predicate view can straightforwardly account for this problem: if proper names are predicates then they are the kind of term that can be true of many individuals. Thus, there is nothing surprising about the fact that proper names can have multiple bearers. And so Predicativism would seem superior to Referentialism in this respect.

Therefore, it seems that the proposed uniform semantics places Predicativism in a position of advantage, for its theoretical virtues of simplicity and economy, for eliminating the problem of multiple bearerhood, and for its ability to explain the intuitive connection between referential and predicative uses –

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[9]This is not always explicitly stated as an argument for Predicativism, a main exception being Burge (1973, 438). Elbourne (2005, 171) also mentions this as an advantage of Predicativism over Referentialism.

and therefore the phenomena we just discussed (i.e., inferences, competence and intra- and cross-linguistic uniformity).

2.2 Against Predicativism

Despite the merits just discussed, there are several problems with the Predicative view. I would like to divide the issues into three main camps to be discussed in turn. The first concerns the linguistic data with which the predicative view originated. The second concerns the predicativist identification of proper names with common count nouns at a fundamental level, including the justification for the predicativist's unpronounced determiner thesis. The third concerns the predicativist's strategy to account for referential uses of proper names and achieve syntactic and semantic uniformity for all uses.

With respect to the first camp, I think Predicativism made a mistake in drawing the conclusion that proper names are fundamentally predicates based on limited linguistic data. Although the fact that proper names exhibit the syntactical properties of common count nouns is an important challenge to any theorizing about proper names, this datum naturally compels one to investigate further the syntactic and semantic behaviour of proper names. My initial reaction was first to question whether the predicativist's claims about the syntactic behaviour of proper names would really holds across languages. Second, I wondered whether names could be used as adjectives or as verbs, given that they can be used as count nouns on occasions. And third, I wondered if this phenomena was more general, that is, whether words other than proper names can on occasions be used as common nouns, adjectives or verbs. My conclusion is that the linguistic evidence predicativist offered in support of the view is incomplete and, as it stands, fails the mark: it doesn't support the view that proper names are predicates across the board. In the remainder of this chapter I will present all the evidence that lead me to this conclusion.

One obvious consequence of widening the linguistic data concerning proper names is that there are now more things to explain about their behaviour. The predicativist's challenge to the referentialist about predicative uses of proper names is thus counter-challenged: the predicativist must account for the additional data as much as referentialist must account for predicative uses of proper

names. A less obvious consequence is that the predicativist's claim to uniformity is undermined. Predicativism not only cannot account for the additional data within a single semantics, but further, it is unlikely that the additional data can be accounted for as derived from the putative fundamental predicative meaning. This will be taken up in Section 2.6, and developed further in parts of Chapters 3 and 6.

The second main problem area is with the predicativist's identification of proper names and common count nouns. From the outset, it seems clear that proper names and common count nouns have different properties, and this undermines the thesis that proper names are in fact common count nouns. Therefore, for the predicate view to be successful, it would need to bridge these intuitive differences. I offer detail discussion of this in Chapter 4 Further I argued that the predicativist's unpronounced determiner thesis is not well justified and worse, it does not help make proper names and count nouns *unified*; rather, it makes proper names exceptional as count nouns.

The third main problem concerns the predicativist's strategy to account for referential uses of proper names, including the postulation of an unpronounced determiner to achieve semantic uniformity. I will argue in Chapter 5 that there is a significant semantic difference between proper names and common count nouns that cannot be bridged by making the former part of definite descriptions or complex demonstratives. In addition, I will argue in Section 5.5 that the predicativist has not made a convincing case that the fundamental meaning of proper names is their predicative meaning. Therefore I believe that the Predicate View does not succeed in accommodating referential uses of proper names.

2.3   The Linguistic Data

The data that motivated the predicativist – that proper names exhibit the syntactical properties of common nouns – is taken to reveal the nature of proper names as predicates, and so it is used as evidence for the thesis that proper names are predicates across the board. But, as I will show in what follows, the data is more complex than what the predicativist initially considered; in at least three respects it does not support the thesis that proper names are predicates across the board.

First, proper names cross-linguistically do not consistently exhibit the syntactical behaviour observed with proper names in English, i.e., in many languages proper names do not combine well with the whole range of determiners or do not take plural form, at least not naturally. But if proper names were predicates across the board, we should expect to find more cross-linguistic consistency in their syntactical behaviour.

Second, the predicativist's inference from the syntactical behaviour of proper names to the conclusion that proper names are predicates over-generates. If the fact that proper names exhibit the syntactical properties of common nouns is taken to reveal their nature as predicates then, by parity of reasoning, we would have to consider many other words as predicates, since they also exhibit on occasions the syntactical properties of common nouns.

Third, there are other uses of proper names that the predicativist did not initially considered, namely, adjectival and verbal uses, as well as some cases of 'semantic extension' (we will also call these 'Jeshion's examples', as noted in fn1). Although the predicativist claims the advantage of being able to provide a uniform account of proper names, in fact the view does not have the resources to accommodate all these additional uses of proper names.

2.4   Proper Names Cross-linguistically

For this survey, I am relying on intuitions of native speakers. The data I have collected is by no means exhaustive, but it is comprehensive enough as to give a good idea about the use of proper names cross-linguistically.

2.4.1   The Definite Article

Of all determiners that may combine with proper names, the definite article is the one with most variation, ranging from obligatory absent, optional, to obligatory present. In Afrikaans, Basque, Danish, French, Macedonian, Norwegian, Romanian, and Swedish, the use of the definite article with an unmodified proper name is not admissible:

Afrikaans (data due to Laura Pereira, p.c.)

   (4)   a.   *Die Pieter is gelukkig.
               The Pieter is happy

          'The Pieter is Happy'

    b.   *Ek het met die Laura gepraat.
       I   have with the Laura spoken
       'I spoke to the Laura'

Basque (data due to Ekain Garmendia, p.c.)

(5)   *Mikel*a*   zoriontsu dago.
       Mikel-DET happy   is
       'The Mikel is happy'

Danish (data due to Andreas Stokke, p.c.)

(6)   *Peter*en* kom i   går.
       Peter-the came yesterday
       'The Peter came yesterday'

In Danish, attaching the definite suffix to a proper name is not allowed even when the name is modified by a restrictive clause:

(7)   *Peter*en* der købte bilen kom i   går.
       Peter-the who bought car-the came yesterday
       'The Peter who bought the car came yesterday'

French (data due to Aurélien Darbellay, p.c.)

(8)   *Le   Pierre est venu hier.
       The Pierre has come yesterday
       'The Pierre came yesterday'

Macedonian (data due to Jelena Brajovik, p.c.)

(9)   a.   *Petar*ot*   e srekjen.
          Petar-the is happy
          'The Petar is happy'

    b.   *Vchera   zboruvav so   Marija*ta*.
          Yesterday spoke-I   with Marija-the
          'I spoke to the Marija yesterday'

Norwegian (data due to Torfinn Huvenes, p.c.)

(10)   *Peter*en*   er glad.
       Peter-the is happy
       'The Peter is Happy'

Romanian (data due to Dan Zeman, p.c.)

(11)   *Petre*le*   e fericit.
       Petre-the is happy
       'The Petre is happy'

Swedish (data due to Johan Gebo, p.c.)

(12)   *Johan*en*   är glad.
        Johan-the is   happy
        'The Johan is happy'

According to the informant, some names in Swedish sound better when used with the definite article, i.e., Maria*n* (the Maria). However, he still thinks this use would be odd.

In German, Italian and Spanish the use of the definite article with proper names in singular form varies regionally. As for German, the definite article is not used in the north of Germany but is common in the south and even preferred in Switzerland.[10] With respect to Italian[11],the definite article is obligatory absent in the south (data due to Alessio Santelli and Laura Celani, p.c.) but common in the north. More specifically, the definite article is obligatory in some northern regions while optional in others. In most regions, whether optional or obligatory, the article is only used for female names (e.g. Veneto) but in some it is used for both female and male names (e.g. Lombardy and Tuscany – data due to Elia Zardini and Daniele Sgaravatti, p.c.).

With respect to Spanish[12], the definite article is typically absent in most countries. It is very common in Chile and the regions of Catalunya and Murcia[13] in Spain; and not common but used in certain contexts in Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, rest of Spain and Venezuela. In these countries the use of the definite article with names is considered idiosyncratic to rural areas or associated with low socio-economical background, or other special contexts.[14] In a number of other countries the article is obligatory absent (e.g., Cuba[15], Peru, Puerto Rico

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[10]Data due to Barbara Vetter and Sven Rosenkranz (Germany); and Julia Langkau (Switzerland), all p.c. This regional variation is also acknowledged in Matushansky (2008, 580).

[11]I am fluent in Italian, and familiar with some of its dialects. However, I have also consulted native speakers of different regions.

[12]For this I am relying on myself as a native speaker of Spanish, particularly familiar with the Argentinian, Chilean and Spanish variations.

[13]Although in Murcia this use is very informal (data due to to Esa Díaz León, p.c.), and in Catalunya the use is considered an import from Catalan (where the use of the article is mandatory).

[14]Data due to Carlos Muñoz and David Rey (Colombia), Valentina Islas (Mexico), Gladys Aquebeque (Venezuela), all p.c. According to De Mello (1992), this is also true of Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Paraguay.

[15]De Mello (1992, 223, 226)

and Dominican Republic).[16][17]

In Faroese and Icelandic the definite article with proper names in singular form is admissible but not common. It works in Faroese only with monosyllabic names and it may be used when referring to someone in an endearing way. In Icelandic the definite article occurs with proper names mostly in poetic or playful contexts. In Icelandic there is a special article that goes only with proper names of people -– the personal or *preproprial* article – which is standardly used, and it is not interchangeable with the ordinary definite article.

Faroese (data due to Jens Ziska, p.c.)

(13)   ?Hans*urin* / *Pet*urin* er glaður.
        Hans-the / Petur-the is happy
        'The Hans/The Petur is happy.'

  Icelandic (data due to Guðmundur Andri Hjálmarsson, p.c.:

(14)   ?Eysteinn*inn* er glaður.
        Eysteinn-the is happy
        'The Eysteinn is happy.'

In Portuguese, the definite article with proper names in singular form is obligatory colloquially (example due to Ricardo Santos, p.c.):

(15)   Vou chamar o   Pedro.
        Go-I to-call   the Pedro
        'I am going to call the Pedro'

However, as with the versions of Spanish and Italian that use it, it is absent in formal writing. For example, (16.a) below is from the entry on Kant on Wikipedia in Portuguese, and (16.b) is from a philosophy paper in Portuguese:

(16)   a.   Immanuel Kant foi   um filósofo   prussiano.
             Immanuel Kant was a   philosopher prussian
             'Immanuel Kant was a Prussian philosopher.'

        b.   Frege identifica o   sentido de uma frase   com um pensamento.
             Frege identifies the sense   of a   phrase with a   thought
             'Frege identifies the sense of a sentence with a thought.'

---

[16]Data due to Carmen Espejo (Peru), Dylan Dodd (Puerto Rico) and Sandra Tommasino Pugno (Dominican Republic), all p.c.

[17]The Spanish data I collected is consistent with the findings of De Mello (1992). In this study, De Mello analyses cultured speech in ten cities (from Latin America and Spain) and concludes that the definite article is strongly present only in Santiago (Chile), and present but mostly in special cases in Buenos Aires (Argentina) – e.g., in rural contexts; and Caracas (Venezuela) – e.g., with names of Italian artists.

In Catalan and Greek the definite article with proper names in singular form is obligatory[18], although in Catalan the article is not used in formal writing.[19] In Catalan, there is a personal or preproprial article (*en/na*) that goes only with proper names of people, which use is the norm in Balearic Catalan (data due to Pilar Terrés, p.c.) but in Catalonian and Valencian Catalan (data due to Jordi Valor, p.c.) is often considered too formal (or even archaic) for most contexts, and so the ordinary article is used instead.

2.4.2 The Indefinite Article

The use of the indefinite article with proper names is possible in most languages I reviewed, although it is uncommon and felt non-standard in Afrikaans, Faroese, and Romanian:

Afrikaans (Data due to Laura Pereira, p.c.)

(17) a. ?'n Pieter het gebel en 'n boodskap gelos.
          A Pieter has called and a message   left
          'A Pieter called and left a message'

      b. ?Gister   het ek 'n Laura ontmoet.
          Yesterday have I a Laura met
          'I met a Laura yesterday'

Faroese (data due to Jens Ziska, p.c.)

(18) ?Ein   Petur ringdi og legði eini boð.
       A/one Petur called and left   a   message
       'A Petur called and left a message'

The forms 'one, who is called Peter' (Ein, sum eitur Petur) or 'someone, who is called peter' (Onkur, sum eitur Petur) would be preferred to 'one Peter'.

Romanian (data due to Dan Zeman, p.c.)

(19) ?A   sunat un Petre si   a   lasat un mesaj.
       Has called a Petre and has left   a   message

---

[18]Greek data due to Ira Kiourti, p.c. For Catalan, I am relying on my own competence although I have also consulted native speakers.

[19]For example, (i) below is from the news feed of the website of the Catalan Studies Institute (Institut d'Etudis Catalans):

(i) Moderarà   el debat Elvira Riera, de la Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
     will-moderate the debate Elvira Riera of the University   Pompeu Fabra
     'Elvira Riera of Pompeu Fabra University will moderate the debate'

'A Petre called and left a message'

In Basque, there are no separate definite and infinite articles. There is a definite suffix, *–a*, which can head an indefinite noun-phrase (thus, depending on context, it will act as a indefinite article). Attaching this suffix to proper names in Basque is inadmissible. An alternative way of constructing an indefinite expression will be by using the numeral 'one' (*bat*). However, this use is felt non-standard:

(20)   a.   *Mikel*a*   ezagutu nuen atzo.
             Mikel-DET to-know aux   yesterday
             'I met a Mikel yesterday'

        b.   ?Mikel bat ezagutu nuen atzo.
             Mikel one to-know aux   yesterday
             'I met a Mikel yesterday'

In French the use of indefinite article with proper names in singular form is only admissible with the interpolation of an adjective like 'certain', e.g., 'Un certain Pierre' (data due to Corine Besson, p.c.).

2.4.3   Demonstratives

With respect to demonstratives, their use with proper names in the singular is admissible in most languages I reviewed, but it is uncommon and felt as non-standard in Danish and Swedish, and ungrammatical in Norwegian.

Danish (due to Andreas Stokke, p.c.)

(21)   ?Jeg snakker ikke om   den Peter.
         I   speak   not about that Peter
         'I am not talking about that Peter'

Swedish (due to Johan Gebo, p.c.)

(22)   ?Den där Johan är också glad.
         That   Johan is also glad
         'That Johan is also glad'

Norwegian (due to Torfinn Huvenes, p.c.)

(23)   *Den Peteren   strøk også på eksamen.
         That Peter-the failed also at exam-the
         'That Peter also failed the exam'

2.4.4 Pluralisation, Quantifiers and Numerals

The pluralisation of proper names and their combination with numerals and quantifiers show more interesting variations across the languages reviewed. A number of languages can pluralise proper names fairly naturally (Afrikaans, Catalan, German, Greek, Icelandic, Macedonian, Portuguese and Spanish) and in these languages the use of number words and quantifiers with proper names is admissible.[20] In Faroese, even though some names can be pluralized, the use of quantifiers (even those that require a singular noun, like 'every') with proper names is not admissible (data due to Jens Ziska, p.c.):

(24) a. *Fáir Petrar   skrivaðu seg   inn í   dag.
          Few Petur-PLU enrolled them in   today
          'Few Peturs enrolled today'

      b. *Hvør Súsanna kom til veitsluna.
          Every Susan-SIG came to party-the
          'Every Susan came to the party'

In a number of languages pluralisation is not permissible for every name, and so the use of numerals and quantifiers that require a plural noun (i.e., 'all', 'some', 'few', 'most') would be admissible only with those proper names that can be pluralised. Otherwise, either the name might appear in the singular even with numerals or quantifiers that require a plural noun, or the expression 'people called N', or something equivalent, may be used.

In Swedish, some proper names can be pluralized – mainly female names ending in –*a*, e.g., Maria (pl: Mari*or*) – but pluralisation is felt non-standard even for those names. Proper names that cannot be pluralised cannot take numerals, and would only take quantifiers that require a singular noun (data due to Johan Gebo, p.c.):

(25) *Få Johan*ar*/   *två Johan*ar*/   ?två Mari*or*   skrev   in sig   i
      Few John-PLU/ two John-PLU/ two Maria-PLU enrolled   them today
      dag.

      'Few Johans/two Johans/ two Marias enrolled today'

---

[20]However, there is a large class of Spanish proper names that end in consonant for which the plural affix –*es* is not natural, and in some cases very odd sounding, e.g., 'Ariel*es*', 'Omar*es*', 'Esteban*es*', 'David*es*' ,'Godoy*es*', 'Carlos*es*', 'Marcos*es*', etc. When combined with numerals or quantifiers, these names might be used in the singular (or else the construction 'people called 'N", or something equivalent, would be used). Note, however, that pluralisation is not problematic for the large class of common nouns ending in consonants, e.g., 'riel*es*', 'amor*es*', 'examen*es*', 'aptitud*es*', 'pared*es*', 'ley*es*', 'arnes*es*'.

(26)   Varje Johan   kom till festen.
        Every Johan-SIG came to party-the
        'Every Johan came to the party'

In Italian, pluralizing proper names is not admissible for most male names, especially for those with –a ending (e.g., 'Elia', 'Andrea').[21] If used with numerals or quantifiers, male names might appear in the singular, i.e., 'Due Pietro' ('two Pietro'). Similarly in Romanian, some names sound too bad in the plural, e.g., 'Petrii' ('Peters') and so, if used with numerals or quantifiers, they would appear in the singular: 'Doi Petre/Cativa Petre' ('two Petre'/'Few Petre') (data due to Dan Zeman, p.c.).

In Norwegian pluralizing names sounds bad and so do, consequently, the use of proper names with numerals and quantifiers, but they can appear with a quantifier that takes the name in the singular (examples due to Torfinn Huvenes, p.c.)

(27)   *Få Petere   /*to Petere   meldte seg   på i   dag.
        Few Peter-PLU/ two Peter-PLU signed themselves on today
        'Few Peters/Two Peters enrolled today'

(28)   Enhver Peter   er sinnsyk.
        Every   Peter-SIG is crazy
        'Every Peter is crazy'

In some languages names are not pluralised but can appear in the singular with numerals and quantifiers. This is the case with French (example due to Corine Besson, p.c.):

(29)   Tout les   Pierre   / Peu de   Pierre   sont venus aujourd'hui.
        All   the-PL Pierre-SIG / Few PART Pierre-SIG are   come today
        'All the Pierres/Few Pierres have come today'

Mandarin Chinese only pluralises those common nouns and other expressions designating persons with the help of a plural marker –*men* that is suffixed to the noun (for example, 'xuesheng' (student), 'xuesheng*men*' (students)), and only in some contexts, i.e., with quantifiers but not with numerals. Attaching the plural maker to proper names is weird, and so proper names would appear in the singular with quantifiers (data due to Zi Lin, p.c.):

(30)   a. *Wo ban li you hao jige   bide*men*.
            My class in has quite a.few Peter-PL suffix
            'There are quite a few Peters in my class'

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[21]But note that common nouns ending in -*a* present no problem: 'poeta'/ 'poeti'; 'artista'/ 'artisti'.

     b.   Wo ban li you sange bide.
           My class in has three Peter-SIG
           'There are three Peter in my class'

In Hindi, there are various pluralising suffixes for common nouns but those suffixes sound very odd when applied to proper names. Thus with quantifiers and numerals names would appear in the singular. However, this use is not common and with certain quantifiers the combination is less felicitous (data due to Nakul Krishna, p.c.):

(31)   Meri kaksha mein do Peter   hain.
        My   class in   two Peter-SIG are
        'There are two Peters in my class'

(32)   a.   Saare Peter   / Kai   Peter   / ?Kucch Peter   aae.
             All   Peter-SIG / Several Peter-SIG / Some   Peter-SIG came-PLU
             'All Peters / several Peters / some Peters came'

        b.   ?Har   Peter   aaya.
            Every Peter-SIG came-SG
            'Every Peter came'

In Basque, neither quantifiers nor numerals require the noun they take to be plural; in these constructions, it is the determiner that assumes the plural form, and the noun stays unmodified. However, in other constructions where common nouns do appear in the plural, i.e., in plural definite descriptions or with plural possessives, proper names could not appear pluralized (data due to Ekain Garmendia, p.c.):

(33)   *Iñaki*ak*   euskaldun*ak*   dira.
        Iñaki-DET-PLU Basque-DET-PLU are
        'The Ikakis are Basque'

(34)   *Gure Iñaki*ak*   etorri dira.
        We-of Iñaki-DET-PLU came have
        'Our Iñakis have come'

In Danish the pluralisation of proper names is inadmissible and they would not appear, not even in the singular, with numerals or quantifiers (data due to Andreas Stokke, p.c.):

(35)   *Få Petere   / *Få Peter   meldte sig i   dag
        Few Peter-PL / Few Peter-SIG signed them today
        'Few Peters/Few Peter enrolled today'

2.4.5 Conclusions

The cross-linguistic data concerning the combination of proper names and determiners and the use of proper names in plural form is too varied to support the claim that proper names are predicates in full generality. Although in every language I have surveyed, proper names do combine at least with some determiners, certainly the general data is too varied to offer solid support to the thesis that proper names *just are* common count nouns. On the contrary, this cross-linguistic evidence uniformly shows referential uses of proper names to be standard; thus lending support to the referentialist's thesis that the primary function of names is to refer.

Importantly, the perception that the linguistic data concerning the use of proper names cohere with the Predicate View and the *only* exception to be explained is the referential use is mistaken. The predicativist should also explain why, if proper names are in fact common count nouns generally, they present these conspicuous cross-linguistic anomalies with respect to their combination with determiners and permission of plural form: for example, she should explain why the combination of proper names with the definite article is inadmissible in many languages where the combination of common count nouns with the definite article is the norm, or why the pluralisation of proper names is either inadmissible or rare in many languages in which the pluralisation of common count nouns is the norm.

2.5 Over-generation

The predicativist's inference from the syntactical behaviour of proper names to the conclusion that proper names are always predicates over generates. There are also other words that on occasions can be combined with determiners. But one should not want to conclude that for this reason these words are predicates across the board. Consider the following examples,

(36)　　a.　There are *few ifs* to this argument.

　　　　b.　*A crucial if* has been overlooked.

　　　　c.　We are always raking up *some if* or other, to disturb our faith (OED)

　　　　d.　I have *two buts* to your proposal.

　　　　e.　I sense *a but* coming.

　　　　f.　The Romans valued *the old*.

g.   *The poor* are always *the most affected.*

h.   Is *a she*! (said of e.g., a new born baby)

i.   '*The why and how* of effective altruism'[22]

In these examples, conjunctions, adjectives and even pronouns function as count nouns, as signalled by the plural markings and the combination with determiners. Thus, if having these syntactical properties on some occasions were a good criterion to classify these words as predicates fundamentally, then conjunctions, adjectives and pronouns would be really predicates.

But this conclusion seems wrong; certainly conjunctives like 'if' and 'but' in their usual occurrences could not be analysed as predicates, since they are not thought of as functions from objects to truth-values but rather as functions from truth-values to truth-values. There are also good reasons why adjectives may be represented differently from predicates, i.e., as predicate-modifiers. At any rate, even if adjectives are considered ordinary predicates, arguably the semantic value an adjective has in a sentence like (36.f) and (36.g) is different from the semantic value it has in adjectival uses, i.e., when they occur modifying a noun.[23]

The inference from the syntactical behaviour of certain words to the conclusion that they are predicates seem to over-generate, for it would assign the semantic value of predicates to more words than we would want to. Although it is plausible to treat the relevant words as predicates when interpreting the sentences in (36), one does not need to assume that they are predicates across the board.

Moreover, it is a general fact about language that words of certain categories can sometimes play the syntactical role of words from some other categories – and change semantic value accordingly – as I will show in Chapter 3. But this suggests, at least *prima facie*, that unified semantic accounts for any type of word, proper names included, are not plausible. I turn now to discuss some examples that suggest that multiple semantic accounts for proper names would be preferable given their linguistic behaviour.

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[22]This is the title of a talk given by Peter Singer.

[23]his is because in (36.f) and (36.g) the nominalised adjective denotes a restricted class of individuals, i.e., *people* who are old/poor/affected, as opposed to any other individual.

2.6   Against Uniformity: Other Uses Of Proper Names

An interesting data that was not initially considered by the predicativist is that proper names can sometimes be used as adjectives and even as verbs.[24] Consider the following examples,

(37)   a.   That's a typical *Maria* attitude
        b.   That dress is so *Chanel*.
        c.   I enjoy watching *Almodóvar* movies.
        d.   That movie was the most *Almodóvar* of the festival.
        e.   I *googled* the title but didn't find anything.
        f.   My sister *Houdini'd* her way out of the locked closet (E. V. Clark and H. H. Clark, 1979, 783).

On the predicativist approach, given these uses of proper names, one may conclude that proper names are really adjectives, or that they are really verbs. This seems implausible. Moreover, we will need to decide whether the true nature of proper names is that of being common nouns, or adjectives, or verbs. Predicativists should not ignore the evidence that proper names sometimes function as adjectives or verbs, precisely because they take the fact that proper names share the syntactical properties of common nouns to be as significant as to support a semantic theory for proper names. But there is not reason why we should take the syntactical behaviour of proper names as significant only when they are used as common nouns, but not when they are used as adjectives or verbs.

Given theses uses of proper names that differ not only from referential but also from common noun uses in their semantic contribution to the sentences in which they appear, implementing the ideal of a uniform semantic account for proper names may not longer seem plausible. For the predicativist, a proper name N means something like *being called 'N'*. But of course when functioning as adjectives or as verbs proper names do not have that meaning: an *Almodóvar* movie is not a movie *called* 'Almodóvar'; or *to Houdini* is not to *call* something 'Houdini', or to do something with things *called* 'Houdini'. The predicative view has a point about common noun uses of proper names: on these uses, they are best interpreted as contributing a property or an extension as semantic

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[24]This data was presented in Delgado (2011), and some of this, in particular verbal uses, is now noted in a number of recent articles, including Rami (2015), Jeshion (2015c), and Schoubye (2017).

value rather than a single individual. But likewise, we should think that if it makes better semantic sense to interpret the adjectival and verbal uses of proper names as contributing a certain *other* property or extension – which differs from that which they contribute when functioning as common nouns – then this interpretation should be implemented. But clearly, this sensible methodology is in conflict with the ideal of having a uniform semantic account of proper names, one where they mean the same in all their uses.

2.6.1 Jeshion's Examples

On a similar vein, Jeshion (2015b,c) has called attention to certain uses of proper names that, although functioning as common nouns, are semantically different from the predicative uses in (1.a-f) above. These uses are divided into *producer* (38.a), *representation* (38.b), and *resemblance* (38.b) examples (Jeshion, 2015c, 371-72)[25]:

(38)   a.   The *Picassos* are in the east wing; the *Kollwitzs* are in the west wing.
    b.   Two *Obamas* came to the Halloween party.
    c.   Two little *Lenas* just arrived.

These examples have in common that while being count noun uses of names, their semantics cannot be explained in terms of the *being-called-condition* that the predicativist postulates for predicative uses. In (38.a) the terms 'Picassos' and 'Kollwitzs' apply to works of those artists: their meaning is something like 'x is a work by N', *and not* 'x is called 'N". Likewise, in (38.b) 'Obamas' applies to people representing (or dress up like) Obama, and in (38.c) 'Lenas' applies to people physically resembling Lena (e.g., when the sentence is said of two daughters of Lena that physically resemble her).

Jeshion also discuss uses of proper names that will have a mass interpretation, Consider (39.a) and (39.b) from Jeshion (2015c, 384), and (39.c) from Nunberg (1995, 124):

(39)   a.   Lenny reads too much *Heidegger* and not enough *Frege.*
    b.   Let's go home and listen to some *Bach.*
    c.   *Yeats* is still widely read.

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[25]Jeshion also discusses *family* examples (Jeshion, 2015c, 372-73, and Section 6), first discussed in Boër (1975), but I will leave them out in this essay.

Again, in these examples, the proper names cannot be interpret as meaning anything like *being called 'N'*; rather they have a non-count meaning of something like 'works of Heidegger/Frege/Bach/Yeats' respectively.

These examples are also used by Jeshion to argue against the uniformity argument. For the predicativist must either have a separate account for these examples, or provide a rationale for setting them aside as non-literal or non-genuine, or as derived from the 'literal' predicative uses. But Jeshion correctly points out, this rationale should not work against the predicative uses, such that by this rationale, predicative uses would also count as non-literal or derived from referential uses (Jeshion, 2015c, 374). This challenge is supplemented in Jeshion's paper with an account that makes predicative uses and Jeshion's examples all derived from referential uses (Jeshion, 2015c, Sections 4 and 5).[26]

Similarly, Delgado (2011), Leckie (2013) and Rami (2014a) challenge the uniformity argument by providing alternative ways to achieve a unified treatment of predicative and referential uses of proper names, one in which the predicative meaning is derived from the referential meaning. The import of the referentialist's challenge is that given that it is shown to be impossible to have a single semantic for all the uses of proper names considered so far, the only uniformity that one can achieve is the type of uniformity proposed by the referentialist, that is, an account of how the different meanings proper names can have in their different uses are connected or *derived* from a fundamental meaning.

Is it open to the predicativist to accept all the new data but still claim that the predicative meaning is the fundamental meaning from which all other meanings are derived? Fara, on an early response to Jeshion (Fara, 2015b), tried to argue just that. Fara claims that Jeshion's examples are cases of 'deferred interpretation' in Nunberg's sense (Nunberg, 1995).[27] She provides parallel cases to those in (38) with count nouns (adapted from her examples in Fara (2015b, 256-62):

(40)   a.   The *gorillas* are in the east wing (said of paintings made by gorillas).

          b.   Two *ballerinas* came to the party (said of people dressed like ballerinas).

          c.   Two little *kittens* just arrived (said of individuals resembling kittens).

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[26]Rami (2015) also provides such an account that makes predicative and Jeshion's examples all derived from the referential use, but from a different conception of the referential use.

[27]That is, the idea that a predicate can designate a certain extension, different from the extension that is its usual designation, as long as the two extensions are suitably related. See Nunberg (1995).

Fara argues that if these cases exist with count nouns without challenge to the 'literal' conditions of application for the predicates 'gorilla', 'ballerina' or 'kitten', then the same can be said of Jeshion's cases in (38): they do not challenge the literal condition of application of the name-predicate (i.e., the *being-called-condition*); they are cases of deferred interpretation.

However, I believe that Fara's reply is inadequate. There is a crucial difference between Jeshion's cases and cases of semantic extension or deferred interpretation involving count nouns: in the latter the new meaning is derived from the *unrestricted* meaning of the count noun, and not from the meaning of the noun *once restricted* to a particular denotation, as Jeshion (2015c, 377-79) notes. But this does not seem to be the case for the names in (38). Their meaning seem to depend on particular referents, e.g., 'picasso' in (38.a) depends for its meaning on the painter Picasso, and not on the property *being called 'Picasso'*. But 'ballerina' in (40.b) does depend for its meaning on the property normally denoted by the predicate *ballerina*, i.e., *being a ballerina* (with the new derived meaning being something like *looking like a ballerina*).

A fuller reply to this issue of whether the predicative meaning can be the fundamental meaning from which all other meanings are derived will be developed in Chapters 3, and 6.[28]

2.6.2 What's Left Of Uniformity?

The advantage claimed for the predicativist's uniform semantics disintegrates in the face of the additional data about proper name's uses just presented. The predicativist would need to postulate some mechanism or other to explain some of these uses as derived, just as the referentialist proposes. This discussion now turns into the issue of *fundamentality*: as was mentioned above, predicativists want to claim that all uses of proper names are derived from the putative fundamental predicative meaning. However, as I will show at different points in this essay, it is unlikely that the predicative meaning is the fundamental meaning from which other meanings are derived.[29]

Another advantage of Predicativism that we mentioned was the elimination of the problem of multiple bearerhood. This problem will be addressed in Chapter 6, with my proposal. However, other referentialists have also proposed

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[28]Matushansky (2015) believes further that it is *impossible* for the predicative meaning of a proper name to be derived from the referential meaning (Matushansky, 2015, 350-53). I also think that Matushansky's extreme claim is mistaken, and will address it in Section 6.3.1

[29]See in particular Sections 3.3, 5.5, 6.3.1, and 6.3.2.

alternative ways of accounting for this problem.[30]   Given this, Predicativism
does not necessarily holds an advantage over Referentialism on this point.

Lastly, we mentioned also the predicativist's ability to explain the intuitive
connection between referential and predicative uses – and therefore the phenom-
ena that bears on this connection, i.e., inferences, competence, and intra- and
cross-linguistic uniformity. With respect to this, it has been argued that an
account of how the different meaning are related or indeed derived (see espe-
cially Leckie (2013) and Rami (2014a)) is enough to account for the intuitive
connection between the different uses, and therefore for the intuitive validity of
inferences in which they appear, or the competence speaker display with them.
Also, appealing to a certain *rule* for deriving new meanings from fundamental
ones (rule that can be lexical, pragmatic or mixed, cf. Leckie (2013)) ensures
intra- and cross-linguistic uniformity.[31]   Therefore, even though Predicativism
accounts nicely for the intuitive connection between referential and predicative
uses, it is not necessary to explain this in terms of sameness of meaning.

Indeed, there are plenty of inferences similar to the ones we discussed in
Section 2.1.1, perhaps with different degrees of intuitive validity, also exploiting
connections between other meanings of proper names, but no one would feel
compelled to treat the occurrences of the name as having the same meaning in
order to explain the inferences. Consider,

iv. $\dfrac{\text{John googled the information.}}{\text{Therefore, John used Google.}}$

v. $\dfrac{\text{Picasso sold one of his paintings to MMM museum.}}{\text{Therefore, MMM museum bought at least one Picasso.}}$

vi. $\dfrac{\text{This is a Chanel dress.}}{\text{Therefore Chanel designed dresses.}}$

For example, if what it means *to google* is to search something using Google, the
conclusion of (iv) seems to follow from the premise. But clearly the verbal use
of 'Google' in the premise does not mean the same as the (referential) meaning
of 'Google' in the conclusion.

Again, the rub here is that Predicativist would need to appeal to some
mechanism of meaning derivation in order to explain inferences (iv-vi), just as

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[30]See for example, Delgado (2011); García-Carpintero (2017); Jeshion (2015c); Rami (2015);
and Schoubye (2017).

[31]The account I offer in Chapter 3 also suffices to account for intra- and cross-linguistic
uniformity.

referentialists do in order to explain inferences (i-iii). Therefore Predicativism does not hold any general advantage with respect to this.

Incidentally, the argument from competence gives us another reason to doubt the fundamentality of the predicative meaning. Competence with the meaning of 'Picasso' in (38.a) above requires the language user to be competent with the name 'Picasso' *as* the name of a particular individual, i.e., the painter. Mere competence with the predicative meaning 'being called 'Picasso'' would get him nowhere.

2.7 Conclusion

We have seen that the limited linguistic data that inspired the predicate view of proper names seems inadequate for the purpose. The extensive data discussed in this chapter would also need to be explained: First, the cross-linguistic data exhibit anomalies that are inconsistent with names being predicates across the board. Second, the additional uses of proper names discussed cast doubts on the possibility or indeed the desirability of implementing a uniform account. Lastly, noting how Jeshion's examples work, I suggested that it is unlikely that these can be treated as derived from the predicative meaning of proper names.[32]

I also discussed Predicativism's alleged advantage in explaining the intuitive connexion between uses of proper names, but noted the limitation in the scope of what Predicativism can explain, and therefore I concluded that Predicativism does not hold any advantage in this respect.

However, our discussion shows something important about the behaviour of proper names, as well as other words, namely that they seem to be able to function in different categories in some occasions. This would be the topic of the next chapter.

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[32]The same would be said of adjectival and verbal uses in what follows.

Chapter 3

Category Change

In this chapter, I will introduce and characterize the phenomenon I call *category change*. This is the observed phenomenon by which words belonging to certain syntactical categories can sometimes change into other categories. As it was suggested in the previous chapter, proper names can sometimes function as common nouns, but also as adjectives and verbs. Seen in light of category change, the fact that they can behave like this will not be surprising: I will argue that the different uses of proper names can naturally be taken as cases of category change.

3.1   The Phenomenon Of Category Change

Category change occurs when a word from a certain class or lexical category, i.e., a noun, verb, adjective, etc., is used in a different syntactic environment, entailing a change in its function and often a change in its meaning. Here are few examples of category change:

(1)   a.   The *sick* will be the most affected.   (adjective-to-noun)

b.   *Running* is fun.   (verb-to-noun)

c.   I always *butter* the bread when making sandwiches.   (noun-to-verb)

d.   That noise is *annoying.*   (verb-to-adjective)

This phenomenon is often labelled as *conversion* or *zero-derivation* (and also *functional shift, category extension*) and it is contrasted with the familiar process of *derivation* or *affixation,* in which new words are formed from a base word by adding affixes.[1]   But conversion (or zero-derivation) is taken as a different

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[1]For example, from the word *slow* (adjective) it is possible to form *slowness* (noun) and *slowly* (adverb) by adding the appropriate affixes (*-ness* marks nouns and *–ly* marks adverbs).

process because it concerns cases where words shift categories without the help of suffixes or any other morphological change.

Category change can be thought of as fundamentally a change in *function*, where function is understood as 'syntactic profile' (for example, in English, the syntactic profile of adjectives includes their ability to appear in attributive position before a noun, and to be sub-modified by adverbs). A change in function will typically involve also a change in meaning. We recognize that a word has changed categories because it is used in a different syntactical environment and it comes to have the syntactical properties of another category. It is plausible to assume that then it would also have the semantic properties of that different category, assuming there is some correlation between syntactic categories and semantic ones. At any rate, the semantic value of a word may change when it shifts categories.

A host of theoretical issues surrounds the discussion of conversion.[2] One of the main problems is that of defining this process, since it can be understood in different ways, i.e., as a type of derivational process by which a *new* word is derived from another, or as a process by which a single word can be a member of different categories. Relatedly, some conversions are stable or permanent, while others are sporadic or occasional. Every conversion may be seen as an innovation at the time of its introduction. Later on, possibly depending on pragmatic factors, this innovation may be introduced in the lexicon as a new item. Thus, the question of deciding whether conversion involves new words being introduced or new uses being given to the same word would be affected by whether we see conversion as a progression, with innovation and lexicalization at each end of the spectrum. For a case of occasional conversion hardly motivates classifying the resulting word as a new lexical item, while a case of permanent conversion does.

One might have other reasons to believe that conversion, at least sometimes, involves single words functioning in different categories, rather than always involving the generation of new words. One such reason is that sometimes, the word that shift categories seem to keep some properties of its original lexical category as well as adopting some properties of the category they change into. For example, in English, adjectives converted to nouns would take the definite article, as only nouns do, but some i.e., 'sick', 'poor', 'wealthy', 'wise',

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For some discussion see Bauer (1983), Cannon (1985), Pennanen (1971), Quirk et al. (1985), and Zandvoort (1965).

[2]For an overview of these problems see Bauer and Varela (2005, 7-17).

'blind'; would not follow the rest of noun inflections, namely, they would take neither the indefinite article nor the plural form (note the ungrammaticality of '*a sick', '*a wise', '*poors', '*wealthies'). Also, like ordinary nouns, adjectives converted to nouns can form noun phrases: e.g., 'the sick will be healed'. Lastly, adjectives converted to nouns can be modified by an attributive adjective (as only nouns do), e.g., 'the *unfortunate* sick', 'the *brave* British'; but also have the following properties, unlike nouns: can be modified by an adverb e.g., 'the *extremely* wealthy', 'the *badly* wounded'; can take comparative and superlative forms, e.g., the *poorest*; and are gradable, e.g., 'the *absolutely blind*', 'the *very old*' (all properties of adjectives). For this reason, these cases are sometimes called *partial* conversions (Bauer, 2005, 22-23).

Other problems surrounding conversion include the problem of defining lexical categories or word-classes, since the possibility of multiple category membership can be seen as somehow obscuring the boundaries between categories.[3] In addition, there is the question of how fine-grained word-class should be – i.e., the class of nouns can be further categorized into common and proper nouns, countable and uncountable nouns, etc.– and whether we should see changes between sub-categories as cases of conversion. In connexion with this there is also the question of *directionality*, that is, the question of deciding which word is the original, or primitive, and which word is the derived one.

All these issues are very complex and I shall not attempt to resolve them all here, as I am not aiming to provide fully-fledged account of category change. I chose a slightly different name for the phenomenon – I will talk of *category change* and only occasionally of *conversion* – because I want to avoid theoretical associations with established views. My purpose is only to introduce the phenomenon and discuss some of its implications, as they are relevant to the analysis of the different uses of proper names. Although I wish to remain neutral with respect to some of the issues mentioned above, I will argue in particular that, at least in some cases, a single word is capable of assuming the functions of a different category, without necessarily being lexicalized as a new word – this is the case with partial conversions, and I will argue that some category changes involving proper names are cases of partial conversions. Further, following the well-established criterion of semantic dependence to settle the issue

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[3]See for example Farrell (2001) who argues that the distinction between certain word-classes does not reside in the words themselves but in the position they occupy.

of *directionality*[4], I will argue that other uses of proper names semantically depend upon the referential use, suggesting that the latter is the fundamental use from which the other uses are derived.

I will also assume that changes between sub-categories are cases of category change, for example, a change from mass noun to count noun, which is signalled by functional change – e.g., 'water' when functioning as a count noun can take plural marking (e.g., 'The two waters got mixed'), combine with the indefinite article and be modified by numerals – and also semantic change.[5] Thus I see proper names changing into count or mass nouns as cases of sub-category change.

3.2   Cases Of Category Change

The most productive type of category change in English is that between nouns, verbs and adjectives. However, category change also encompasses other, perhaps more unusual, changes like those of prepositions used as verbs, or interrogatives or pronouns used as nouns. We will look at some examples of these first and then discuss category changes involving proper names.[6]

3.2.1   Verbs

Consider these examples of verbs changing into nouns:

(2)   a.   *Running/Swimming/Reading/Travelling* is fun.
       b.   *Hating* makes people unhappy.
       c.   The *killings* are gang-related/ I heard those *whisperings*.
       d.   The *walk/ talk/ hunt/ change* was pleasant.
       e.   *To build suff/ To kiss Mary* is great.

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[4]See Quirk et al. (1985, 1558): "Semantic dependence of one item upon another is sufficient ground for arguing its derivational dependence". See also Martsa (2013, 237).

[5]For example, 'water' will change from designating a substance abstractly when functioning as a mass term, to designating an instance of it when functioning as count noun.

[6]I have focused this discussion mainly on category change in English for reasons of space and focus, however the phenomenon occurs in other languages as well, although the types and frequency of the changes vary – e.g., noun-to-verb changes in Spanish are not possible without morphological change but verb-to-noun changes are very common. As far as I have been able to attest, the level of productivity of category change in a given language correlates with the level of productivity of common noun (and adjectival or verbal) uses of proper names in that language: for example, category change is much rarer in Danish than in English, and so is the use of proper names as common nouns, adjectives or verbs (data due to Andreas Stokke and Anders Schoubye, p.c.).

Note that nominalised verbs (2.d) and nominalised gerunds (2.a-c) share relevant properties of common nouns, namely, they occupy the argument position; can take different determiners and plural form, i.e., '*a* walk', '*some* changes', '*those* whisperings'; and can be modified by an attributive adjective (as only nouns do), i.e., 'his *brilliant* performing', 'an *outstanding* talk'.

Intuitively these category changes involve semantic changes as well: when a verb designating[7] a class of individuals engaged in some activity, or being in some state[8], appears as a noun (in the gerund or infinitive form), we may say that it has changed to designating the activity or state itself (2.a-b, 2.e). Nominalised verbs (2.d) and gerunds appearing with determiners (2.c) may denote an instance of this activity in a similar way that abstract nouns appearing with determiners seem to designate an instance of the abstract entity they denote when occurring bare (e.g., *Hope* is a virtue. / He destroyed *the hope* I had).

Verbs can also change into adjectives: English participles (past and present) quite generally function as adjectives:

(3)   a.   The job is *boring*/ *tiring*/ *amusing*.
       b.   *working* mother/ *annoying* neighbours/ *confusing* instructions

(4)   a.   I am *bored*/ *tired*/ *amused*.
       b.   *Annoyed*/ *Alarmed*/ *Disturbed* neighbours called the police.

The participles as adjectives express properties that characterize individuals as they are involved in the action or state expressed by the verb: In the case of present participles as *agents* – i.e., examples in (3); or as *patients* in the case of past participles – i.e., examples in (4).

3.2.2   Adjectives

It is quite common to find adjectives functioning as nouns:

(5)   a.   The new policy will help the *sick*/ *poor*/ *wealthy*/ *wise*/ *blind*/ *ignorant*/ *wicked*.
       b.   The *French*/ *British*/ *Japanese* fought in WWII.

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[7]There is a tricky issue about what exactly a verb, and predicates in general, designate. However, it is not crucial how this issue is resolved. I am here concerned with in showing that intuitively there seem to be a change in semantic value when verbs change categories.

[8]For the purpose of simplicity I am ignoring further classifications of verbs by which they denote achievements or accomplishments.

    c.   *Germans*/ *Russians*/ *Catholics*/ *Experts*/ *Patients* voted against the new regulation.

    d.   The *best* is yet to come/ John fears the *unexpected*/ The *unimaginable* happened.

    e.   He is among the *wealthiest*/ *wisest* of the country.

These nominalised adjectives would seem to designate a restricted class of individuals that bear the property expressed by the adjective, i.e., 'the sick' designates the class of *people* who are sick, as opposed to the whole class of individuals who are sick, or the property of being sick; 'the French'/ 'Germans' designate French or German citizens, and not, for example, French or German objects. It is sometimes argued, however, that certain classes of nominalised adjectives do not really function as nouns despite appearances but are really attributive adjectives modifying an elided noun. I will argue that the case of nominalized adjectives can be understood as cases of partial conversions (c.f. Section 3.3.1 below).

Borer and Roy (2010) Borer & Roy argue that most nominalised adjectives do not function as nouns but as adjectives that modify a null noun (Borer and Roy, 2010, 86). Evidence for this claim, based on linguistic data from four languages including English, is the observation that this class of nominalised adjectives do not behave as common nouns with respect to certain typical properties of common nouns. For example, with respect to English, nominalised adjectives such as those in (5.a), cannot take determiners except for the definite article and cannot take plural form. This class contrasts with adjectives such as those in (5.c) which can take the plural form and the full array of determiners. In their view, the latter are actually full nouns, which happen to be homophonous with adjectives (Borer and Roy, 2010, 86).

However, while it is perhaps plausible to think that adjectives such as 'sick', 'blind', 'wealthy', elide either a noun or the pronoun *one*, i.e., 'the sick *citizens*', 'the blind *people*', 'the wealthy *ones*'; for other type of nominalised adjectives is not so clear what the elided element may be. For example, 'the unexpected' in sentences like 'John fears the unexpected' or 'You can't control the unexpected', seem to denote some abstract entity that doesn't get translated into specific things, i.e., unexpected visits, unexpected problems, etc. Further, it seems that if nominalised adjectives such as 'sick', 'blind', 'wealthy', were simply elliptical, then they should be able to take every other determiner: if 'the blind' is elliptical for 'the blind ones', why don't we have '*a* blind' (for 'a

blind one') or '*that* blind' (for 'that blind one'). Note that in Spanish every elliptical occurrence of adjectives can generally take any determiner:

(6)   a.   Compre *los* blancos.   (Spanish)
             I-bought the white
             'I bought the white ones'

           b.   Esta caja grande y   aquella pequeña.
             this box big   and that   small
             'This big box and that small one'

           c.   Había   un vaso vacío y   tres llenos.
             There-was one glass empty and three full-PLU
             'There was one empty glass and three full ones'

Other cross-linguistic data supports the idea that nominalised adjectives sometimes function as nouns. In Spanish, Italian and French, nominalised adjectives can appear as elliptical in some constructions – as in (6) – but function as nouns in others. A reason to think that they function as nouns in some constructions is that they can take an adjective post-nominally, which only nouns can do. Unlike English, these languages do not allow an adjective to follow another adjective. In order to say 'a big old house', either a comma or a conjunctive must appear between the adjectives:

(7)   a.   Una casa grande **y**   antigua.   (Spanish)
             a   house big   and old
             'A big old house'

           b.   Una grande **ed**   antica casa   (Italian)
             A   big   and old   house
             'A big old house'

           c.   Une belle   **et** grande maison   (French)
             A   beautiful and big   house
             'A beautiful big house'

Thus, for example, when the adjective *vacío* (empty) is elliptical, i.e., 'uno vacío' for 'un **vaso** vacío' (an empty glass), it may be followed by another adjective but only via a comma or a conjunctive: 'uno vacío **y** grande', as one would expect if *vacío* still functions as an adjective in this construction, with an elided NP. However, *vacío* can take an adjective post-nominally, indicating that it functions as a noun:

(8)   Un vacío espantoso
        An empty awful

'An awful emptiness'

If *vacío* still functioned as an adjective in both constructions, the fact that it takes another adjective would violate the constraint on aggregating that we have observed above. But this fact is predicted to be perfectly grammatical if *vacío* functions as a noun in these constructions.[9].

Identical cases are found in Italian and French:

(9)   a.   Queste vuoto inutile.   (Italian)
             This   empty useless
             'This useless emptiness'

       b.   Un vide   terrible.   (French)
             A empty awful
             'An awful emptyness'

There is a similar case in German, where adjectives following the indefinite article *ein* must be marked for gender (because *ein* is not so marked). Masculine and neutral nominatives are marked *-es*:

(10)   Ein grosses   gutes   Bild.   (German)
       A   big-NEU good-NEU image
       'A big good image'

However, when the adjective *gute* is nominalised as in (11), the rule is not followed, indicating that in this construction, *gute* does not function as an adjective, but as a noun[10]:

(11)   Ein   grosses Gute.   (German)
       A-NEU big-NEU good
       'A big good'

Another important data with respect to nominalised adjectives comes from languages like Spanish, German and Greek, which have a neutral article. In Spanish, when an adjective takes the neutral article *lo*, it cannot possibly be understood as elliptical, and it always refer to an abstract entity. For example, while *el blanco* (the white) can either be a name for the colour, i.e., 'El blanco es mi color favorito' (the white is my favourite colour) or elliptical, i.e., 'Compré el blanco' (I bought the white [one]), *lo blanco* can only denote abstractly *that which is white*, or *whiteness*, i.e., 'Me gusta lo blanco' ('I like whiteness'). In

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[9]Compare with the grammaticality of 'un hombre espantoso' (an awful man)

[10]In addition, note that when *gute* functions as a noun, it is capitalised, as nouns are in German.

fact, the form *lo*+adjective is used when there is no corresponding noun, e.g., 'lo inesperado' (the unexpected), 'lo abrupto' (abruptness). Similarly in German, an adjective with the neutral article will denote an abstract entity, e.g., *das Wahre* (the true), *das Schöne*(the beautiful), *das Gute* (the good). In Greek virtually any adjective can be turned into a noun denoting an abstract entity by using the neutral article, e.g., *to omorfo* (the beautiful) *to kalo* (the good), *to askemo* (the ugly).

Adjectives can also change into verbs. For example, the adjectives 'warm' and 'free' change into the verbs 'to warm' and 'to free', displaying all the properties of verbs. With respect to semantic changes, the adjective would change from designating a state or quality, to designating the action of causing that state or quality, e.g., the state of being free/the action of causing freedom.[11]

We also find adjectives used as adverbs, although less frequently. Examples are 'Peter wiped the table *clean*'; 'Birds are flying *high*'; 'She spoke *low* but clearly'.

3.2.3   Nouns

A very productive kind of category change is that of nouns becoming verbs. Here are some examples:

(12)   *Bottle* the juice/ *carpet* the floor/ *dress* the boy/ *shoe* the horse/ *stamp* the passport/ *core* the apple/ *bone* the fish / *land* the plane / *paint* the ceiling (Examples from Clark & Clark 1979)

There is a clear change in meaning between the denominal verb and the noun it originates from, although the meanings are closely related: to bottle something is to put something into a bottle; to bone the fish is to extract the bones off the fish. Clark & Clark note that denominal verbs range from cases that are well established as verbs – like those in (12) – to cases that represent innovations, which, according to them, are context-dependant for their interpretation. Examples of these will be verbs such as '*porch* the newspaper' or '*hairpin* the door open', and more dramatically, 'When you're starting to *Sunday School* members, then I think you're going too far' (E. V. Clark and H. H. Clark, 1979, 767-68).

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[11]Other examples of de-adjectival verbs: to calm, to dirty, to dry, to cool, to empty, to clean, to tidy, to narrow.

Nouns can freely appear in attributive position modifying another noun, and thus functioning as adjectives, i.e., *school* bus, *brick* wall, *leather* bag, etc. It is a matter of debate whether nouns used in attributive position should be considered as converted to adjectives, because they don't acquire other properties of adjectives (e.g., they are not gradable). But some take they view that they are converted adjectives if they can also appear predicatively, as bellow:

(13)   a.   (*cotton/nylon* dress) – This dress is *cotton*, but that one is *nylon*.

          b.   (*reproduction* furniture) – This furniture is *reproduction*. (Quirk et al., 1985, 1562)

3.2.4 Other Category Changes

Having seen the phenomenon of category change in detail, it is plausible to think that the examples in (14) are also cases of category change:

(14)   a.   Martha is very *down-to-earth*.   (phrase-to-adjective)

          b.   His manners are very *upper-class*.   (phrase-to-adjective)

          c.   A shot of water *ups* engine power (OED).   (adverb-to-verb)

          d.   As soon as she'd *outed* the words, she cried (OED).   (preposition-to-verb)

          e.   That counts towards the *goddamned* word-count! (interjection-to-adjective)

          f.   The *why* and *how* of effective altruism.   (interrogatives-to-nouns)

          g.   A crucial *if* has been overlooked.   (conjunctive-to-noun)

          h.   This book is a *must* for philosophy students.   (auxiliary-to-noun)

The highlighted words exhibit functional changes – for example, the ability of interrogatives or conjunctives to be used with determiners, as nouns are; or a phrase used predicatively and being gradable, as adjectives are – as well as semantic changes. For example, 'up' in (14.c) changes from meaning (roughly) 'towards a higher place or position' when used as an adverb into meaning 'to increase' when used as a verb.

3.2.5 Proper Names

We are already familiar with examples of proper names functioning as count nouns (recall examples (1.a-f) in Section 2.1). The specific syntactical property that proper names exhibit on these occasions is their ability to take a wide range of determiners and also plural marking, which, in English, is a property of count nouns only. These cases also involve semantic change. On our view, since proper names are fundamentally referential terms, they have individuals

as semantic value. But when functioning as count nouns, their semantic value would change to designating a property or a set of individuals, as count nouns do. Arguably, a proper name would designate the extension consisting of people that bear that name. The exact analysis of the semantic changes names undergo will of course depend on the semantics one assigns to the base, so I postpone a more detailed analysis of this until after I present my own semantic account of proper names in Chapter 6.

Other interesting cases of category change for proper names are changes into adjectives or verbs. We have seen some adjectival uses of proper names in Section 2.6:

(15)   a.   That's a typical *Maria* attitude.
        b.   That dress is so *Chanel*.
        c.   These painting are much more *Picasso* than the earlier ones.
        d.   I enjoy watching *Almodóvar* movies.
        e.   These *Hornsby* entailments are a consequence of Predicativism.

Here the functional changes are manifest in that first, the proper name appears modifying a noun, as adjectives do; and second, the proper name can be gradable as in (15.b) and have comparative forms as in (15.c). Semantically, the changes seem to be quite liberal. We will discuss these in Section 6.3.2.

Another, perhaps more unusual, case of category change is that of proper names being used as verbs. The more common cases are those involving brand or artefact names being used as verbs:

(16)   Hoover, Scotchtape, Xerox[12], Google, Skype, Rollerblade, Photoshop, Facebook, WhatsApp.

It is fairly clear that these category changes involve full functional change. The proper names in (16) have all the syntactical properties of verbs: for example, they can be inflected for person and tense and can be modified by adverbs. The semantic change is also evident: Proper names for artefacts used as verbs designate a specific action, namely, the kind of action that the kind of object that bears the proper name in question was made for: *to google* something is to search something using Google – Google is a search engine; *to photoshop* a photo is to modify it using Photoshop – Photoshop is an image processor. However, some of the verbs in (16) have lost the tight connection with the proper name from which they originate, for example, one may hoover the floor without using

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[12]The first three examples are from E. V. Clark and H. H. Clark (1979, 783).

a Hoover vacuum cleaner (although the verb still designates an action for which
the Hoover was made for)[13]. This may just be evidence of the progressive na-
ture of category change; while 'Facebook' used as a verb is felt as an innovation
– unheard of few years ago – 'Hoover' and 'Xerox' became lexicalized.

But proper names of people can also sometimes be used as verbs. Consider
the following examples (a-d are from E. V. Clark and H. H. Clark (1979, 783)):

(17)   a.   I am aware of the perils of *Don Juaning*.
         b.   We all *Wayned and Cagneyed*.
         c.   They *Bonny and Clyde* their way through the West.
         d.   My sister *Houdini'd* her way out of the locked closet.
         e.   I need to *Chisholm* this definition.
         f.   He looked like he was going to *Hannibal Lecter* me.

These verbs designate an action that is characterized after the actions of a
famous bearer of the name. Of course this use of proper names is highly con-
textual, as Clark & Clark argue; it appeals to fairly widespread knowledge of
the famous individual involved. Houdini was famous for his skilful escape acts,
thus 'to Houdini one's way out' would mean in the right context, 'to escape by
trickery' (E. V. Clark and H. H. Clark, 1979, 784). Thus, what proper names
as verbs denote depends on knowledge of particular bearers of the proper name.

3.3   Understanding Proper Names In Light Of Category Change

The wide range of cases presented in the previous section illustrates how perva-
sive and flexible category change in English is. We have seen that changes are
possible for virtually every word-class and there is in principle no constraint on
which new changes may be introduced in the language (except that changes are
always into open classes, i.e., into nouns or verbs, etc., but not into pronouns,
or prepositions). As Bauer said, "Any lexeme can undergo conversion into any
of the open form classes as the need arise" (Bauer, 1983, 226). Some innova-
tions would stick and then become established, others would remain occasional.

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[13]Note that 'Hoover' is supposed to be the name of the type of artifact, not the name
of every particular object that exemplifies it. But 'Hoover' is also used as a count noun to
designate the particular objects.

Very unusual category changes, like those in (14) are also possible and meaningful because they occur in languages, like English, in which more ordinary category changes occur constantly and pervasively. Given this, it will be indeed surprising if proper names did not at least sometimes change categories as well. In fact, the evidence suggests they sometimes do. Thus, the fact that proper names are used as common nouns, adjectives or verbs on occasions is not only unsurprising but to be expected and to be accounted for on any adequate theory of proper names.

However, once category change for names is accepted, the motivation for unifying the referential and the predicative uses of proper names is lost. What would justify the unification of these two uses, when you have other uses that require a separate account? Fara tried to make a case that predicative and referential uses of proper names were the 'literal' uses, in order to justify the unification of these, and set aside the rest as non-literal, derived or metaphorical (Fara, 2015b). I already mentioned Jeshion's reply to Fara's argument (Jeshion, 2015c, 374; cf. Section 2.6). I would say in addition that in principle, given category change, it is not sensible to assume *one* literal use for any given word, for a word may have different meanings depending on whether it functions as a noun, verb or adjective, etc. The word 'bottle' designates a particular kind of object when it functions as a noun, but it designates an action when functioning as a verb. But it doesn't make sense to take one of these meanings as literal and the other as non-literal.

That said, of course *some* uses of proper names or other word classes are non-literal or metaphorical all right. But it would be odd to think that I am using 'Google' or 'Almodóvar' non-literally, or metaphorically, when I say 'I googled the movie title', or 'I saw an Almodóvar movie last night'.[14] Thus, the *literal rationale* does not succeed in providing a distinction between count noun uses of proper names on the one hand, and verbal, adjectival, etc., uses on the other, to justify the predicativist unification project.

Further, apart from being unmotivated, the unification of referential and predicative uses into a single syntactic and semantic category would seem futile. It seem to follow from category change that there can't be a uniform semantics of count nouns because their meaning changes according to the different uses they have when they change categories. So if proper names were count nouns, they

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[14]I won't attempt to define here what it is for a use to count as metaphorical, but minimally I would say the examples just mentioned don't qualify as metaphorical since they don't seem to have a false reading or an obvious alternative 'literal' reading.

would *also* need a non-uniform semantics to account for the different meanings they would have when changing categories. I take this as a decisive point against the predicativists' uniformity argument.

3.3.1 Partial Convertion

As said above, the discussion of conversion in the literature has as one of its aims to establish whether we can think of conversion as involving the generation of new words from existing words, or the generation of new uses for them.[15] I think the fact that some category changes are *partial* supports the idea that, at least in some cases, a *single* word comes to have new uses, and therefore new meanings. What is meant by 'partial changes' (or 'partial conversions', see Bauer (2005, 22-23) are those cases in which a word changes categories without adopting all the properties of the category it is changing into, and/or without loosing all the properties of its original category. For example, as we said, in English adjectives converted to nouns would take the definite article, as only nouns do, but some, i.e., 'sick', 'poor', 'wealthy', 'wise', 'blind'; would not follow the rest of noun inflections, namely, they would take neither the indefinite article nor the plural form (i.e.,'*a sick', '*a wise', '*poors', '*wealthies'). Also, like ordinary nouns, adjectives converted to nouns can be modified by an attributive adjective (as only nouns do), i.e., 'the *unfortunate* sick', 'the *brave* British'; but also have the following properties, unlike nouns: can be modified by an adverb i.e., 'the *extremely* wealthy' 'the *badly* wounded'; can take comparative and superlative forms, i.e., 'the *poorest*'; and are gradable, i.e., 'the *absolutely* blind', 'the *very* old' (all properties of adjectives). Conversely, *full* changes are those in which the changing word becomes fully functional in another category. This is the case of nouns converted to verbs in English; they acquire all the properties of verbs.

That some category changes are partial allows us to say in a non ad-hoc manner that at least some of the category changes proper names undergo are partial changes. This is important for two main reasons. First, because it explains the restricted functionality of other uses of proper names, including the common noun use, consistently with cross-linguistic data. Second, because it helps settling the issue of directionality, i.e., deciding which use of proper names is fundamental, and which is derived.

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[15]See Martsa (2013) for an overview of the different interpretations of conversion.

As we have seen, in other languages proper names can sometimes function as common nouns but do not take the full range of determiners or the plural form, as it is the case with Basque, Danish or Romanian, for example (cf. section 2.4). Further, even in English it is not clear that proper names as common nouns are fully functional. One reason is that proper names do not normally appear with the definite article (unless modified pre- or post-nominally), i.e., '*The David is happy'.[16] This is recognized as a problem for the view that claims proper names are *type-ambiguous* between referential and predicative types[17] as much as it is a problem for Predicativism. If proper names are fully converted into predicates (or *are* predicates, as the predicativist claims) they should not be subject to the constraints (on pluralisation or the use of determiners) the cross-linguistic data shows; and in particular, there should be no problem with the use of the article with proper names in English (Schoubye, 2017, fn34).[18]

A second reason to doubt the full functionality of proper names as common nouns is that sometimes, while taking the syntactical properties of common nouns when used predicatively, proper names resist taking some of the *semantic* properties assigned to these predicative uses. A first example of this, noted by Jeshion (2015b, 247-48) is that some proper names (i.e., those well known to have unique bearers) encourage a special reading when used as common nouns. She gives the following example:

(18)   a.   Kristallnacht was horrifying.

           b.   There have been relatively few Kristallnachts (Jeshion (2015b, 248) and also Jeshion (2015c, fn30)).

The thought is that the most natural reading of (18.b) – perhaps the only available – is a reading where 'Kristallnachts' is not about individuals called 'Kristiallnacht' but about things relevantly similar to Kristiallnacht. But if names are lexicalized as full predicates, with a meaning like *being called 'N'*,

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[16]Although there is some disagreement about the grammaticality or acceptability of the use of the article with proper name (see Jeshion (2015c, 2017) for a challenge to this assumed ungrammaticality), most people agree that a certain set up is required to hear the use of the article with proper names as fine.

[17]For such view see Schoubye (2017). Similarly, Jeshion (2017, n.d.) conceives of proper names as coming in two types: the referential type (what are properly called 'names') and the predicative type (that are called 'collective names'). See Jeshion (2017, 231) and Jeshion (n.d., Sections 2-4 and 13).

[18]Predicativists, however, do have an explanation for why the definite article doesn't show up with bare proper names in English (See Fara (2015c, Sections9-11); Matushansky (2006, Sections2-3)). I shall discuss this in detail in Chapter 4

it is odd that in these cases we don't automatically get also the reading where they mean just that.

For a second example, and conceding for a moment that *The+N* is grammatical after all,[19] note that for (19) a generic reading is very hard to access:

(19)   The Sarah is an individual with a short name.[20]

But count nouns appearing with the definite article can normally generate generic sentences[21] :

(20)   a.   The potato was unknown in Europe before 1400.   (D-generics)
          b.   The feminist believes in the equality of genders.   (I-generics)
          c.   The tiger is the largest feline.   (D-generics)

Count nouns appearing with a definite article can generate generic sentences because this construction can either denote the extension of the noun (generating I-generic sentences, as in 20.b) or refer as a whole to the kind, or class, consisting in the individuals in the extension of the noun (generating D-generic sentences, as in 20.a and 20.c). But a proper name appearing with the definite article can apparently do neither.

We can eschew the problems that come with the claim that names are fully-fledged predicates by saying instead that proper names changing into common nouns are cases of partial conversion, and therefore we should not expect them to be fully functional as common nouns.

3.3.2   Directionality

Claiming partial conversion for proper names also supports the thesis that proper names are fundamentally referential. One of the criteria employed in establishing directionality in conversion is 'restriction of usage': according to this criterion, the derived member of a conversion pair has a smaller range of usage (Martsa, 2013, 238). The previous discussion shows the predicative use of proper names to have a smaller range, both in English and cross-linguistically, since it has restrictions, especially in other languages, that the referential use

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[19]As Jeshion has argued (Jeshion, 2017, n.d.). See Section 4.5 for discussion on the issue of whether *The+N* is grammatical.

[20]I'm not suggesting that predicative names cannot generate any generic sentence. For example, the following are generic sentences with predicative names: 'A Sarah is an individual with a short name', and 'Sarahs are scary'.

[21]However, not every count noun definite can generate generic sentences. I'll discuss this in Section 5.4, particularly in fn25 on that section.

doesn't have. This in turn counters a potential argument from the predicativist to the effect that proper names are fundamentally predicates and all other uses are derived (cf. Section 2.6).[22]

A more important criterion, mentioned above, is that of semantic dependence. According to this, a word of a conversion pair is considered as derived if its semantic analysis is dependent on the meaning of the other word (Martsa, 2013, 237). For example, 'kick$_{Noun}$' must be seen as converted from kick$_{Verb}$ for it can be paraphrased as 'an act/instance of kicking', or, conversely, bicycle$_{Verb}$, converted from bicycle$_{Noun}$, is paraphrasable as 'ride a bicycle'' (Martsa, 2013, 104).

In category changes involving proper names, their different meanings as adjectives or as verbs do not depend on the meaning they have as count nouns (roughly *being called 'N'*), alleged to be their fundamental meaning by predicativists. Rather, they crucially depend on a referential meaning, or at any rate, from their meaning once restricted to a single denotation. Proper names for artefacts when used as verbs typically designate the kind of action to be carried out with the object that bears the proper name in question (what the object was made for): i.e. 'to google' is to search something using Google (the search engine), not an action involving the property of being called 'Google', or the extension of things that are called 'Google' (that would include the search engine and the company). That is, the change from 'x is called 'Google'' (which is what 'Google' means according to the predicativist) into the verb 'to search using a particular object (the search engine) called 'Google'' will require first a restriction on 'Google' to this single object. But not such restriction is needed when a count noun such as 'bottle' changes into a verb 'bottle'. Likewise with proper names of people, 'to Houdini' would mean in the right context, 'to escape by trickery' (E. V. Clark and H. H. Clark, 1979, 784). Thus this meaning crucially involves a particular Houdini – the magician famous for his skillful escape acts – and not the property of being called 'Houdini', or the whole extension of Houdinis.

Thus, while in noun-to-verb conversions the meaning of the converted verb crucially involves the extension the noun denotes (i.e., bottle$_{Verb}$ means 'to put something into a bottle$_{Noun}$'), the meaning of a verb converted from a proper name involves a particular individual (an individual the proper name designate)

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[22]Matushansky (2015) argues not just that referential uses of proper names are derived from predicate uses, but also that predicate uses cannot be derived from referential uses. I'll respond to her argument in Section 6.3.1

but not the set of people called 'N', or the property *being called 'N'*. This indicates that at least adjectival and verbal uses semantically depend on the referential meaning of the proper name, and not on its predicative meaning.[23]

In addition, the same can be said of Jeshion's examples. Jeshion also argues that the meanings of proper names in Jeshion's examples semantically depend on the referential meaning of the proper name (i.e., 'Picasso' in a production example means something like 'painting by Picasso', thus depending on a particular bearer of the name). As we said in Section 2.6.1, Jeshion's examples are different from parallel cases of semantic extension involving common nouns, because in the latter the new meaning is derived from the *unrestricted* meaning of the common noun, and not from the meaning of the noun once *restricted* to a particular denotation (See Jeshion (2015c, 377-79)).

Further, cases of common derivation (using affixes) with proper names are also examples where the base for the semantic derivation seems to be the referential meaning and not the predicative meaning:

(21)   (as adjectives or nouns): Fregean, Russellian, Newtonian, Kantian, Freudian, Aristotelian, Shakespearean, Victorian, Darwinian, Londoner, Parisian.

As adjectives, these words express different properties that are related to particular bearers of the proper name, e.g., 'Russellian' may mean 'being suitably related to Russell's ideas'; 'Victorian' may mean 'being characteristics of the period of Queen Victoria's reign', etc.[24] As nouns, the words typically denote people identified as followers of, or experts on, etc., the ideas of a particular bearer of the proper name.

Lastly, something similar happens with *compounding*, that is, when nouns appear modifying another noun, e.g. *leather bag*, *car engine*, *school bus*, etc. Here the meaning of the first noun restricts the denotation of the second noun, such that, for example 'school' restricts the extension of all buses to those used by schools to transport their students. But the meaning of the first noun is not restricted to a particular denotation before it can restrict the second noun. However, when proper names appear modifying another noun the meaning that restricts the second noun is not the predicative meaning *'being called 'N'* but

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[23]Cf. Section 2.6. I elaborate this point again in Section 6.3.2

[24]For contrast, note that adjectives derived from common nouns such as 'childish', 'presidential', 'girly', do not need the noun to be restricted to a particular denotation for the new meaning to be derived.

a meaning restricted to a single denotation – what we would think of as its *referential* meaning. Consider,

(22)   a.   She chose the *Chanel* dress for this occasion.
       b.   These *Hornsby* entailments are a consequence of Predicativism.
       c.   I enjoy the old *Woody Allen* movies.

It is clear that a Chanel dress is not a dress called 'Chanel', and a Hornsby entailment is not an entailment called 'Hornsby'. Thus, the meaning that restricts the noun 'dress' in (22.b) is not the predicative meaning the Predicativist postulates, but a referential meaning of 'Chanel', that is, a particular individual (the famous designer). Thus 'Chanel dress' comes to mean 'a dress made by Chanel'.[25] Likewise, 'Hornsby entailment' comes to mean (something like) 'an entailment first noted by Hornsby', where the meaning of 'Hornsby' that restricts 'entailment' is just a referential meaning fixed on a particular individual (the philosopher).

This data undermines the predicativist's claim that the fundamental meaning of proper names is the predicative meaning (the unified meaning of both predicative and referential uses), because the predicative meaning does not appear – and significantly, it is not even required – in the semantic analysis of the different derived meanings of proper names as adjectives, predicate modifiers or verbs, and Jeshion's examples. Instead, these cases suggest that the primary meaning of a proper name is its referential meaning, since it is from this meaning that new meanings are generated.[26]

But one would not expect this result if proper names are just common count nouns that change categories and undergo semantic changes (like both ordinary count and mass nouns do). On the contrary, if proper names were predicates fundamentally, we would expect to find cases of category changes (or cases of semantic extension, or derivation using affixes) where the semantic

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[25]'Chanel' can also be used as an adjective, i.e., 'That dress is so Chanel', with different meanings, such 'being characteristic of Chanel', or 'being elegant like Chanel's designs', etc. But these adjectival meanings still crucially depend on a referential meaning of 'Chanel', and not on its predicative meaning.

[26]Of course, this is insofar as the derivation is semantic, i.e. when the new meaning is derived from the original *meaning* of the expression, as opposed to being derived from other aspects, such as its morphology. Consider for example,

Four "awesome"s is more than enough in one blog-spot (Jeshion, 2015c, 385)

where the intended predicative meaning of "'awesome"s' (i.e, occurrences of 'awesome') seem to be derive from the word itself (the phonological string), and not from what 'awesome' means.

changes are based on their alleged fundamental meaning (i.e., *being called 'N'*). But the cases we find are not of this sort; and examples of adjectival or verbal uses of a proper name where its meaning is derived from the predicative meaning being called 'N' are yet to be found.

In connection with this, the following is also odd: if proper names are fundamentally predicates, and the referential use is derived, it is strange that proper names would be highly polysemous (having adjectival and verbal meanings, as well as the different meanings in Jeshion's examples) based on their referential meaning, while exhibiting no semantic changes based on their predicative meaning. For all I know it is possible that this is so, but I haven't found other examples where the target of a conversion pair is in turn highly polysemous while the base is not.

3.4   Conclusion

The view that proper names engage in category change satisfactorily explains their behaviour with respect to their occurrences as count nouns, mass terms, adjectives or verbs. Since this phenomenon is widespread across languages, the hypothesis that the occurrences of proper names as count nouns, mass terms, adjectives or verbs are cases of category change explains both the intra- and cross-linguistic uniformity of these occurrences (cf. Sections 2.1.1 and 2.6.2.[27] Further, since category change in general can be more or less productive in different languages, it correlates with the degree of productivity of non-referential uses of proper names, thus also explaining the variations on the distribution of proper names and determiners and plural form we see in other languages (cf. fn 6).

Given category change, it seems unlikely that there can be a uniform semantic theory for any word-class, that is, a theory where words mean the same in all of their uses. For the same reason, the fact that a word exhibits the syntactical or semantic properties of a certain category does not give enough justification to thereby treat the word as belonging to that category exclusively.

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[27]Competence is also, to some extend, explained: speakers are competent with category changes in general; therefore they are also competent with new meanings obtained with names changing categories. However, many of the changes we have seen require knowledge of facts about a particular referent, therefore, competence with a verbal use of 'Houdini', for example, cannot be explained solely in terms of a semantic process.

What may be possible perhaps is to establish *fundamentality*, i.e. to decide which of a word's uses are fundamental and which are derived. The arguments in Section 3.3 suggest that the fundamental meaning of proper names is their referential meaning, and all the other uses derived from it.

Chapter 4

Names *vs* Nouns

Despite the cross-linguistic variation in the use of determiners with proper names that we discussed in Chapter 2, it is accepted as uncontroversial that proper names can have predicative uses. The phenomenon of category change discussed in Chapter 3 suggests that proper names, like many other words classes, can have a variety of uses, including the uses as count nouns that the predicativist have taken as the basis for the view. However, there are *prima facie* important contrasts between proper names and common count nouns: semantically, proper names in their typical uses seem to have an individual as semantic value, while count nouns designate a property or an extension. The syntactic correlate of this difference is that names, when used referentially and unmodified (i.e., by restrictive adjectives or clauses) typically occur *bare* and resist taking the definite article, i.e., '*The David is happy'[1], while count nouns cannot appear bare in the singular in argument position, i.e., '*book is red'. These important contrasts between count nouns and proper names undermine the predicativist identification of proper names with count nouns.

The predicativist, however, has an explanation of these contrasts. They argue that proper names in their bare uses – where they *appear* to function as singular terms – are not *really* bare: their analysis yields an unpronounced determiner and perhaps also a nominal restrictor (Burge (1973, 431); Elbourne (2005, 188); Matushansky (2006, 285); Matushansky (2008, 574-75); Fara (2011a, 9); Fara (2015c, 60)). In their view, proper names are in fact just a common count noun occupying the nominal position in either a definite description or a complex demonstrative. Thus the syntactic difference is rendered superficial: underlying the proper name a determiner is operative. Semantically, the difference is eliminated: proper names will still denote a property or extension. Together with

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[1]This claim will be qualified in the following section. Also, the ungrammaticality of this type of occurrence has been challenged by Jeshion in a number of works (Jeshion, 2015b,c, n.d.), and will be discussed in Section 4.5

the unpronounced determiner, proper names can designate a single individual, explaining the *impression* that they refer.

I believe, however, that the predicativist's strategy of postulating an unpronounced determiner does not resolve the contrasts between proper names and count nouns. In this chapter, I revisit these contrasts and argue that the predicativist's strategy still makes names exceptional as count nouns. I also examine the different considerations offered in support of the unpronounced determiner thesis and argue that they are unconvincing independently of the hypothesis that proper names are predicates. The success of the strategy in accounting adequately for referential uses of proper names will be assessed in the following chapter. Lastly, I also discuss the referentialist's take on proper names as count nouns.

4.1   The Issue With *The*

I would like to qualify the claim that proper names in their referential uses typically appear bare. The first thing to note is that this is true for English and a number of other languages (cf. Chapter 2). For those other languages where proper names appear with the definite article either optionally or obligatorily (e.g., Catalan, Greek, versions of German, Italian and Spanish, and Portuguese) my view is that the definite article there is semantically empty (that is, it function neither deictically nor quantificationally). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to prove this, but I will provide three cases in Chapter 5 (cf. Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4) which suggest the definite article with proper names in these languages is semantically empty (i.e., an expletive)[2]. The rest of this chapter will focus on proper names in English.

Second, some lexical classes of names typically involve the definite article. Names for some geographical entities always take the definite article, i.e., names for rivers ('The Nile', 'The Thames'), oceans ('The Atlantic', 'The Pacific'), volcanoes ('The Etna'); but others don't, i.e., names for countries ('France', 'Germany'), lakes ('Garda'). Also names of ships typically take the article: 'The Titanic'. However, these uses are not *ipso facto* considered predicative, and indeed it is not clear what to say about the article here, since typically in these

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[2]I'll come back to this in Section 5.3. For some discussion that the definite article with proper names in Italian is an expletive see Longobardi (1994, Section 7)

cases the article is neither deictic nor quantificational (e.g., 'The Thames looks grey today') and is arguably considered an expletive (See Hinzen (2016, 599) and Longobardi (1994, 650-52), although Rabern (2015) offers some considerations to the contrary).

I also said that count nouns cannot appear bare in the singular in argument position, i.e., '*book is red'. However, there are some cases that have been discussed in the literature as 'exceptions' to this rule, in order to diminish this difference between proper names and count nouns (Hawthorne and Manley, 2012, 219-20). One is the case of certain count nouns for family members, i.e., 'mother' 'mum', 'father', 'dad', 'grandma', in sentences like 'Mum is very happy', 'Father doesn't like to have dinner late', 'I gave it to Grandma'. However, I think one can argue that these words are used as referential terms for the family individuals involved. Indeed Hawthorne & Manley recognized that "none of this demonstrates that no deep semantic shift from predicate to referential term has occurred" (Hawthorne and Manley, 2012, 220).[3] Moreover, this use is limited, involving few terms, and circumscribed to the specific context of individual families (i.e., I can say to my sister but not to my friends 'Mum called me') and does not arise in other contexts of familiarity, for example it does not arise with words like 'friend', 'girlfriend', 'wife', 'boss', 'professor', etc.

The second exception evoked is the case of vocatives. In vocative cases, count nouns appear bare: 'Waiter', 'Driver', 'Doctor', 'Lady', etc. Virtually any noun can be used as a vocative in a given context. However, I don't think this use of bare count nouns can serve to illuminate the use of bare proper names. First, the vocative is not an argument position; the issue under discussion is whether count nouns can appear bare in argument positions (i.e., subject, direct object, prepositional object, etc.). Second, the vocatives case does not admit of any determiner, i.e., one cannot say 'that waiter, bring me the bill' or 'the driver, stop here', etc. Given that the vocative evidently changes the syntactical properties of count nouns with respect to their combination with determiners, it does not serve to support the idea that count nouns can ordinarily appear bare. So, vocative uses of count nouns do not parallel the bare uses of proper names.

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[3]Not everyone may have the intuition that these uses of these terms are referential. Maybe these cases might help: consider an anaphoric sentence, e.g., '?Mum came in, and another one arrived right after', where 'Mum' does not serve as anaphoric anchor for 'one', but it should if it was still functioning as a count noun in that sentence. Or compare, 'Every time a child fails the exam, Mum complains about the teaching' with 'Every time a child fails the exam, the mum complains about the teaching' where the co-varying reading of the later is not so available in the former.

An actual exception to this rule is the case of bare singular nouns in prepositional phrases, i.e., *at school*, *in place*, *after dinner*, etc. It is not clear to me what to say about these cases but my tentative thought is that a bare count noun in a PP has an abstract or kind-referring interpretation. Otherwise a determiner appears (contrast: *in place*/ *in the place*, *in a place*; *at school*/ *at the school*). And regarding those PP with proper names, i.e., *with John*, *from Mary*, *by Paul*, note that the only possible parallels with count nouns are those that can be given a referential interpretation, i.e., *with Mum*, *from Grandma*, *by Dad*; and conversely **with student*, **from teacher*, **by president* (one can say 'knowledge passes *from teacher to student*', but here the nouns 'teacher' and 'student' have a more abstract or general meaning, not a definite one). These cases apparently reinforce rather than diminish the difference between count nouns and proper names.

4.2   The Significance of the Unpronounced Determiner Thesis

In order to accommodate referential uses and maintain semantic uniformity with predicative uses, predicativists argue that bare proper names in argument position carry an unpronounced determiner, and perhaps also a restrictor (Burge (1973, 431); Elbourne (2005, 188); Matushansky (2006, 285); Matushansky (2008, 574-75); Fara (2011a, 9); Fara (2015c, 60)). In their view, proper names are in fact part of either a complex demonstrative or a definite description.

Recall that according to Predicativism, the meaning of proper names in both predicative and referential uses is given by the *being-called-condition* (cf. Section 2.1):

BCC 'N' (when a predicate) is true of a thing just in case it is called N (Fara, 2015c, 64).

We mentioned also Burge's condition: "A proper name is a predicate true of an object if and only if the object is given that name in an appropriate way" (Burge, 1973, 428). All predicativists endorse some version of the BCC.[4] Thus, in both predicative uses and in putative referential uses, proper names will have

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[4]See for example Elbourne (2005, 172-74) and Matushansky (2008, 599).

the same meaning or semantic value – i.e. the property *being called 'N'*, or the extension consisting of those individuals called 'N' – and the same contribution to propositional content.

However, in putative referential uses, i.e. 'David is happy', proper names clearly denote a single individual. Predicativists agree: the view is not that 'David is happy' is semantically equivalent to a generic, kind-denoting or somehow quantified sentence 'Davids are happy' (or where 'David' could be read as kind-denoting, something like '*Davidhood* is happy'), as is the case when some count nouns appear bare with a mass or kind denoting interpretation, e.j., 'Lamb is tasty' 'Man is a mammal'[5] Thus, predicativists must explain how the meaning of proper names is restricted to a single denotation in these putative referential uses.

In order for a count noun (or a term that is or functions as a count noun semantically) to be used to designate a single individual, either it must appear with a determiner that restricts its designation down to one individual, while keeping its meaning as a count noun (e.g., '*the* dog is hungry', '*that* dog is hungry', '*one* dog is hungry', etc.); or must be read as kind denoting (or be given a mass term interpretation) (e.g., 'I ate *dog*', 'This stew has *dog* in it').[6] Since you can't have a singular count noun that appears bare (without determiners) in argument position designating one individual in its extension (witness: '*dog is hungry')[7] [8], if names are count nouns, then there is the need to explain why they can appear bare in argument position, and how they manage to designate a single individual.

The unpronounced determiner hypothesis does explain how a name *qua*

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[5]'Man is a mammal' is an example appearing in Hinzen (2016) where he claims that"all common nouns can occur without an overt determiner [somehow read as referential or kind-denoting]" (Hinzen, 2016, 593). I doubt that this is the case for all count nouns (and fail to find other examples). Kind-denoting interpretation still requires the noun to appear as a plural, a definite or an indefinite (i.e., '(*Logician)/Logicians are smart' '*(A) chair is used for sitting', '*(The) potato originated in South America') unless the count noun has a mass interpretation, i.e., 'Lamb is tasty'.

[6]See Longobardi (1994, 633) for the claim that in Romance and Germanic languages the *empty determiner* (that is, when count nouns appear bare) with count nouns always selects the mass interpretation.

[7]Of course nouns can be used non-standardly as a proper name for a particular individual, e.g., if my dog is called *Dog*, then 'Dog is hungry' is fine if I am referring to my dog. But this is not quite a case in which a bare noun designates an individual in its extension; rather it designates a referent.

[8]And recall what we said above: In prepositional phrases, count nouns may have a abstract or generic interpretation, certainly not one in which they denote a single individual in its extension e.g., in 'after school', 'school' makes a general contribution, not one related to a specific school.

predicate, occurring overtly bare, can denote a single individual in its extension. However, it doesn't explain why *only* proper names carry an unpronounced determiner (since count nouns do not, when semantically used as count nouns). Predicativists sometimes speak cautiously of proper names as 'some kind' of count nouns that differ syntactically from *common* count nouns in that they allow for the unpronounced determiner. Thus Fara claims that this syntactic difference should not be a reason to exclude proper names from noun-hood, since there are other types of nouns – i.e., mass terms – that do not have all the syntactic characteristics of common count nouns (for example, mass terms cannot be pluralized, or take the indefinite article, or certain quantifiers like 'many') (Fara, 2015c, 77-78).

However, there is a semantic correlate to the syntactic difference that place mass terms and count nouns into separate classes: e.g., mass terms do not denote stuff that can be counted, thus it is not surprising that they cannot take determiners that quantify over individuals. No such explanation can be used to separate proper names from common count nouns; on the assumption that proper names are predicates of multiple applications that are true of their bearers, they denote objects that can be counted (and they do take other determiners that count individuals, i.e., '*a* Martin', '*one* Martin', '*few* Martins', '*many* Martins'). Further, on the same assumption, there is no apparent reason to consider proper names as count nouns that are not *common* (for every *N*, *N* is *common* to every individual to which it applies). So, wherein lies the difference? It seems doubtful that, if the predicativist is correct and names are predicates, they form a separate class based solely on one syntactic difference.

On the other hand, mass terms can be used as count nouns, thereby acquiring the syntactic characteristics of count nouns, just as proper names do.[9] But if having a different syntactic profile when used as mass terms is enough for them to be considered as a separate class of noun, why not consider proper names as a separate kind of noun based on their syntactic characteristic of being able to appear bare when used referentially? In addition, just as mass terms (as mass terms) have a different semantic interpretation than that of common count nouns (i.e., they may be interpreted as referring to a substance), and this semantic difference informs the division of mass terms into a separate class, then the semantic characteristic of proper names (as referential terms) of seemingly having a single individual as semantic value, should also inform their

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[9]For example, 'The gold we had was sold'; 'The two waters got mixed'; where 'gold' and 'water' can take the definite article or numerals.

separation into a special class of noun which is neither *common* nor *count*.[10] In sum, appealing to the case of mass terms does not really help Fara to justify her classification of proper names as a separate class of count nouns.

The unpronounced determiner thesis still makes proper names exceptional *as* count nouns. Predicativists have offered some explanations for *why* the unpronounced determiner is unpronounced. This is important because both *that* and *the* can appear overtly with names in some occasions. As Segal (2001) has pointed out that, the predicativist should provide the rules governing when the determiner can appear on the surface and when it can be dropped (Segal, 2001, 561). We will discuss this after seeing in detail the different versions of Predicativism.

However, even if the best account can be given for why the unpronounced determiner is unpronounced, an issue remains that proper names would still be exceptional in that they would not follow a general rule for count nouns that was mentioned above (cf. fn6). When count nouns appear bare, or they appear with an 'empty determiner' (Longobardi, 1994, 633),[11] they receive a mass or kind-denoting (or otherwise 'abstract' as speculated in relation to prepositional phrases) interpretation. Not proper names, as argued by the predicativist: with the empty determiner proper names will have the same interpretation they would with an overt determiner. This is unprecedented: Hinzen on the same vein remarks,

> "the obligatory presence or absence of the definite determiner makes a fundamental difference to meaning. It is not a 'merely syntactic' fact, which we could decide to simply discard in favor of a 'uniform' analysis . . . their obligatory presence or absence is systematically important to what reading we get" (Hinzen, 2016, 593).

Matters are worse given that there are mass term uses of proper names as we mention in Section 2.6.1. Recall:

(1)   a.   Lenny reads too much Heidegger and not enough Frege.
        b.   Let's go home and listen to some Bach.

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[10]Indeed, proper names are standardly considered as belonging to the general category *noun*, forming a subclass of their own, distinct from other subclasses - like count, mass, abstract, concrete, plural, etc.

[11]The expression here is 'empty determiner' because what is hypothesized is that it is the determiner position what is empty, not a particular determiner. Thus, a way to analyse 'I had lamb' would be 'I had [$_{DP}$ ∅ [$_{NP}$lamb]], with 'I had *some* lamb' being one way to interpret it (Hinzen, 2016, 593).

c.   Yeats is still widely read.

But these uses are ruled out by the predicativist's unpronounced determiner thesis: given that the names in (1) appear bare, they would realize the unpronounced determiner, and would therefore receive a definite interpretation, not a mass or abstract interpretation.[12]

Thus, the unpronounced determiner thesis makes names exceptional not only in that they will systematically appear with the unpronounced determiner in all argument positions but also in that the determiner being over or covert would not change their meaning, unlike what is the case with count nouns.

4.3   The Demonstrative Hypothesis

Burge believes that bare occurrences of proper names are to be represented as playing the role of a demonstrative and a predicate: "Roughly, singular unmodified proper names, functioning as singular terms, have the same semantical structure as the phrase 'that book'" (Burge, 1973, 432). One way to interpret this would be to say that a bare name N has the semantic value of a complex demonstrative *that N* without having the syntactic structure. A problem with this interpretation, as pointed by King (2006, 149-50) is that complex demonstratives make a different contribution to propositional content than the contribution made by predicates. But then if N in predicative uses has a different semantics than N in referential uses, there is no 'single semantics' for all occurrences of proper names. Therefore it is unlikely that this is what Burge had in mind. Another way to interpret Burge is to say that a bare name has the *syntax* of a complex demonstrative, in other words, that bare names carry an unpronounced demonstrative 'that' or 'this'. Then 'Maria is happy' would be analysed as '*that/this* Maria is happy'. This allows names to stay the same semantically – a predicate – that when combined with the demonstrative will give a single individual as value. Roughly, 'Maria is happy' would be true if and only if the individual intended or demonstrated is a Maria ('Maria' is true of that individual), and that individual is happy.

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[12]On the other hand, as we noted, if names were count nouns, then they should get an abstract of general interpretation in prepositional phrases (i.e., *with John, from Mary, by Paul*), like count nouns do. But they don't, they have a definite interpretation.

Burge mentions two sources of evidence for the view that proper names involve a demonstrative element. The first is the observation that sentences containing proper names – e.g., 'Jim is 6 feet tall' – are like sentences containing demonstratives – e.g., 'That book is green' – in that they are 'incompletely interpreted', that is, they lack truth-value until reference is fixed by context or speaker-intentions:

> "The user of the sentence must pick out a particular (e.g., a particular Jim or book) if the sentences are to be judged true or false. It is this conventional reliance on extrasentential action or context to pick out a particular which signals the demonstrative element in both sentences" (Burge, 1973, 432).

Of course this consideration in itself does not really give evidence for the existence of a demonstrative covertly attached to unmodified proper names. It works together with the assumption that unmodified proper names must contain a covert determiner. Thus, if unmodified proper names must contain a covert determiner (for the reasons discussed in Section 4.2), then given the apparent context-sensitivity of sentences containing proper names, the determiner involved would be a demonstrative.

The second source of evidence that the unpronounced determiner attached to proper names is a demonstrative derives, according to Burge, from the fact that proper names take the widest possible scope, as demonstratives do. Compare:

(2)   Jones is necessarily a Jones.

(3)   This entity called 'Jones' is necessarily an entity called 'Jones' (Burge, 1973, 430).

Burge notes that "it is hard to hear a reading of either [(2) or (3)] under which the scope of the singular term is small and the sentence comes out true" (Burge, 1973, 432). Definite descriptions also have natural readings in which they take wide scope with respect operators, but since they also have narrow readings, it seems that a better analogy is between proper names and demonstratives, since both these expressions always take wide scope.

As I said, the considerations offered in support of the existence of an unpronounced determiner do not work independently of the assumption that

proper names do carry an unpronounced determiner in their unmodified occurrences. This is especially true of *That*-Predicativism, since Burge did not provide linguistic or syntactic evidence that proper names must involve a demonstrative element.

As for the considerations that Burge did offer, I think they are still insufficient for his argument. One reason is the following. I think the fact that sentences containing proper names may be context sensitive in the indicated way – incompletely interpreted independently of context - does not show that a demonstrative must be part of the structure of the proper name when it appears to refer to a specific individual. For one thing, sentences containing definite descriptions can be incompletely interpreted in the same way, i.e., 'The book is green' would lack truth-value until reference is fixed on an individual book. This is to say, a definite description 'The F' could be as context-sensitive as the complex demonstrative 'That F' is. So, the covert determiner attached to proper names may well be the definite article. Thus, Burge's appeal to the context-sensitivity of sentences containing proper names does not show that a demonstrative 'that' is attached to them in their unmodified occurrences.

There is an argument given by Higginbotham (1988) to the effect that we should prefer the unpronounced determiner to be the definite article instead of the demonstrative 'that'. Higginbotham notes that (4) and (5) have different truth-conditions:

(4)   That Mary had fish for lunch.

(5)   Mary had fish for lunch.

Consider the following context,

> "On seeing a woman emerge from the seafood restaurant and taking her for my friend Mary, I might volunteer either [(4) or (5)]. Suppose that the woman is a Mary, but not my friend Mary. Then [(4)] is true if the woman had fish for lunch, but [(5)] is not verified thereby" (Higginbotham, 1988, 36).

The thought is that since (4) would be true in the envisioned context while (5) might be false, we cannot assign to (4) and (5) the same truth-conditions. The same difference is present between 'that Mary' and 'the Mary', suggesting that the covert determiner is more plausibly taken to be the definite article.

Another problem with Burge's argument that sentences involving unmodified proper names are context-sensitive is that it leaves it open that their context-sensitivity may results not from the presence of a demonstrative, or other determiner, but from the proper name itself. In fact, it is at least *prima facie* plausible to treat proper names as context-sensitive. But if proper names were context-sensitive, it would be in principle no more problematic to determine their reference than it is to determine the reference of demonstratives. But this possibility weakens Burge's overall argument against the referential view of proper names.

As we saw, one of the two problems posed to the view that proper names are referential *singular* terms is the problem of multiple bearerhood, i.e., the problem of determining the referent of a proper name, given the fact that most proper names designate different individuals. Burge argues that given this, the semantic theory would have to treat proper names as ambiguous, and so they would have to be indexed for every – perhaps indefinite – number of denotations. And the argument goes that this approach would fare badly with respect to his, since it would have to provide as many denotation rules as there are indexes for each proper name, while the predicate approach "provides a single satisfaction rule for [the proper name], plus the set of primitive reference clauses applicable to all occurrences of demonstratives (implicit of explicit) in sentences" (Burge, 1973, 428).

But if demonstratives are referential terms and the fact that they can be used to refer to indefinitely many things is not a reason to treat them as ambiguous, then if proper names are context-sensitive in a similar way, the fact that they can be used to refer to different individuals should not disqualify them as referential terms, nor it is necessary to treat them as ambiguous. So, if proper names can be context-sensitive in the same way demonstratives are, Burge's argument against the referential view of proper names from the problem of multiple bearerhood is defused.

A last problem for this version of Predicativism is the issue of explaining why if proper names can indeed appear with an overt demonstrative (e.g., 'That Martin is nice') the demonstrative will be unpronounced in the typical referential uses (recall Segal's challenge from last section). Burge is silent on these issues. Sawyer (2010) however, attempts an answer to Segal's challenge arguing that it is the context that determines whether '(that) Martin came today' or 'That Martin came today' are appropriate, and she gives the following rules

(Sawyer, 2010, 217):

R1 If the conversational context is such that the referent of a singular use of
a name would be evident without an accompanying demonstration, then
the implicit determiner should not be made explicit.

R2 If the conversational context is such that the referent of a singular use of
a name would not be evident without an accompanying demonstration,
then a demonstration should be provided, whether of not the implicit
determiner is made explicit.

But it was supposed to be the fact that sentences containing unmodi-
fied proper names – e.g., 'Jim is 6 feet tall' – were *as incompletely interpreted*
as sentences containing demonstratives that gave us reasons to believe that a
demonstrative was covertly attached to the proper name. In other words, it was
argued that since a bare use of a proper name in argument position manages
to refer to a single individual, the underlying mechanism should be the same as
that which makes 'that book' refer to a particular book in a context, and so it
was conjectured that bare uses of proper names in argument position carry a
covert demonstrative. This covert demonstrative, albeit unpronounced, is sup-
posed to be *real*; it is supposed to do the same job that the overt demonstrative
does in a sentence like 'That book is green'. Why there should be a difference if
there is more than one N in the context, such that the demonstrative should be
made explicit (or be accompanied with some extra-linguistic demonstration)?
If every time I am using a proper name bare in argument position, I am really
employing the mechanisms of a complex demonstrative to manage to refer to
someone in particular with N, why this underlying structure, which is suppos-
edly operative, does not suffice in the envisioned context? This explanation
rather suggests that the covert demonstrative is not there at all in the first
place.

It is also unsatisfactory that these rules apply to proper names only, and
never to count nouns in general. For example, even if there is only one dog in
the context, the determiner cannot go unpronounced: '*(that) dog is tired'. In
my opinion, these kind of rules imposed on the behaviour of proper names help
to highlight the specialness of proper names in contrast with count nouns, and
therefore weaken the hypothesis that they are (even just a kind of) count noun.

4.4 The Definite Description Hypothesis

Elbourne (2005), Matushansky (2006, 2008) and Fara (2011a, 2015c) share the view that proper names are part of a definite description. Their view is therefore that the unpronounced determiner covertly attached to bare proper names is the definite article. Proper names occupy the nominal position usually occupied by a common noun in a definite description. Thus, 'Maria is happy' is analysed as '*the* Maria is happy'. The predicate 'Maria' would be restricted to denote a single individual by some mechanism just as other definite descriptions containing count nouns may be restricted to denote a single individual.

In support of the definite description hypothesis, Elbourne partially endorse Higginbotham's argument for preferring the definite article to the demonstrative, seen in the previous section.[13] Elbourne also says that a 'very powerful' reason for taking the unpronounced determiner to be a definite article is that one gets automatic cross-linguistic support for it, since in other languages proper names take the definite article (he mentions Greek and some dialects of German only) Elbourne (2005, 172). Matushansky and Fara make similar claims.[14] Yet the use of the definite article with proper names is less widespread and less stable cross-linguistically than it appears on the predicativist's suggestion, as we saw in Chapter 2. The fact that the use of the definite article with proper names varies from admissible to not admissible proves nothing either way. However, the optionality of this use[15] and the lack of semantic import of the article in some cases (cf. Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4), in some languages, do suggest that the use of the definite article with proper names in at least some of the languages cited do not support Predicativism.

In both Elbourne's and Fara (2011a)'s view, proper names carry an unpronounced restrictor or predicate modifier in addition to the unpronounced definite article.[16] Thus a proper name in an argument position, e.g., 'Maria

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[13]With a caveat, see Elbourne (2005, 172 and fn3).

[14]Matushansky (2006) claims that "the default is instantiated by languages that do have definite articles with proper names in argument positions" (Matushansky, 2006, 285); and throughout the paper she cites in particular Portuguese, Greek, dialects of German and Italian, as well as languages with preproprial articles (i.e., Catalan, Icelandic, Northern Norwegian and Tagalog among others). Fara mentions Portuguese, Modern Greek, French, German, Italian, and Spanish (Fara, 2015c, fn21).

[15]For example, in Spanish, or in formal writing in Catalan, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish, cf. Section 2.4.1

[16]With the difference that while Elbourne believes that this unpronounced restrictor is an index attached to the definite article in its underlying structure (Elbourne, 2005, 95, 173), Fara (2011a) thinks it is a predicate modifier implicit in the *NP*, that gets assigned a value in context (Fara, 2011a, 8-12). In Fara (2015c), she declines to theorize about how exactly

is happy' would be analyzed as '*The_F* Maria is happy'/'*The* Maria*_F* is happy'
(where F is the predicate modifier). But the question now arises why, if this
structure is real (albeit unpronounced) the restrictor on the proper name does
not force the appearance of the definite article, given that generally restrictively
modified proper names force the presence of the definite article, as in 'The David
that bought the car is married'?[17] In other words, what is it that makes for
the difference between this predicative use of 'David' and a referential use of
it in 'David is happy' (supposedly also predicative) given that the same struc-
ture is operative in both? Particularly Elbourne, who makes the unpronounced
restrictor part of the semantics of the definite article, should explain why this
structure (definite article + restrictor) is covertly attached to proper names in
argument position while it is overt in a sentence like 'The David that bought
the car is married'.

Matushansky (2006) and Fara (2015c) have offered more substantial ar-
gument for the existence of the unpronounced definite article, as well as an
explanation for why it is unpronounced. We will discuss their views in turn.

4.4.1   On the Article Absence I: Fara's View

Fara draws from an argument given by Sloat (1969) to the effect that the un-
pronounced determiner attached to proper names should be the definite article.
The idea is that if one compares the distribution of proper names plus de-
terminers and count nouns plus determiners, the only difference is that bare
proper names in the singular do not take the definite article and count nouns
do not take a *null determiner* (that is, they do not appear bare). Here is Sloat's
original chart for reference, with the difference highlighted in the last two lines
(Sloat, 1969, 27, my highlight):

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incomplete definite descriptions in general (and incomplete definite descriptions containing
names in particular) get their denotation in a context. Whether it is a hidden variable in the
NP that gets assigned a predicate modifier, or it is purely pragmatic factors; whatever makes
a incomplete definite description like 'the book' get a denotation in a context, will work for
'the *N*' as well. See section 5.2.1 for further discussion of this issue.

[17]In her latest work, Fara says that in some cases, proper names are restricted by a hidden
domain variable, and therefore the article appears overt (Fara, 2015a). But this move turns
out to be problematic for her account, as I argue in section 5.2.1

Sloat's Chart

A man stopped by.	A Smith stopped by.
*Some man stopped by.	*Some Smith stopped by.
Sóme man stopped by.	Sóme Smith stopped by.
Some men stopped by.	Some Smiths stopped by.
Sóme men stopped by.	Sóme Smiths stopped by.
Men must breathe.	Smiths must breathe.
The clever man stopped by.	The clever Smith stopped by.
The man who is clever stopped by.	The Smith who is clever stopped by.
A clever man stopped by.	A clever Smith stopped by.
The men stopped by.	The Smiths stopped by.
The man stopped by.	**The Smith stopped by.*
*Man stopped by.	*Smith stopped by.*

Thus, the simplest explanation for this distribution would be to say that the null determiner for proper names is the definite article (given that proper names can take every other determiner overtly). Thus, the definite article would have a *null* form that is realized when proper names appear bare in the singular. Sloat's inference sounds plausible – after all, if proper names in English can take every other determiner, why wouldn't they take the definite article as well? Moreover, in some constructions – when modified either by a restrictive adjective or a restrictive clause, i.e., 'the older Smith', 'the Julia I know'; or with a stressed article, i.e., 'I saw THE Marc Jacobs' – proper names do take the definite article.

These cases are interpreted as *disruptions* to the null-determiner realization; that is, as cases where the definite article, covertly attached to the proper name all along, *surfaces*. In other words, these cases are taken as evidence that the article *is* covertly attached to the proper name. Fara thinks that the definite article somehow get smushed together with the name, and so becomes unpronounced. However, when something interferes in this relation, i.e., when the definite article does not have the proper name as its syntactic sister, the article is forced to appear and be pronounced. For example, in the phrase 'the Julia I know', the definite article has as sister an NP and not just the proper name, and thus the article shows up. Partly in answer to Segal's challenge discussed above, Fara spends a great deal of effort in providing the rules that governs the article's appearance on the surface, as she believes these rules make the account well-motivated. She arrives to the following generalization (Fara, 2015c, 93):

Where $\emptyset_{the}$ The definite article must appear as $\emptyset_{the}$ when it has a name as its
sister, unless it is stressed.

Fara thinks this rule makes it completely predictable when the definite article
appears overt and when it does not (Fara, 2015c, 94).

Further, Fara thinks the striking similarity of the distribution of proper
names and count nouns with respect to the definite article is a puzzling fact;
and she believes that the simplest explanation for this is given by her *Where*
$\emptyset_{the}$ rule. Fara also believes that the fact that the article appears overtly with
proper names in some constructions and does so in a principled way, confirms
the existence of the null definite article (Fara, 2015c, 94). I think, however,
that the existence of the null definite article is confirmed by the fact that it
sometimes appears overtly *on the assumption* that this fact is a prediction of
the theory that predicts when, and explains why, the article is unpronounced.
The mere fact that the definite article sometimes appears overtly cannot by
itself be evidence of the existence of the null definite article.[18]

But there is a problem with this assumption. Fara's theory does not fully
predict when the article will appear overtly. First, as noted in Section 4.1, there
are lexical classes of proper names in English that do take the definite article
(i.e., 'The Thames', 'The Titanic', 'The Everest') and exceptional cases (i.e.,
'The Sudan', though names for countries in English do not usually take the
article). Indeed, Fara's rule would make these proper names ungrammatical,
on the assumption that they are not being (overtly or covertly) restricted when
used in argument position, i.e., 'The Thames is the longest river in England'.
Further, no deep distinction divides those lexical classes of names that appear
with the article from those that do not: for example names for rivers and oceans
appear with the article but names for lakes do not. It seems doubtful that the
predicativist will have a principled way of explaining this.

Second, it is not clear how Fara's theory can handle complex names or
the combination of names and certain predicates denoting professions, titles or
styles in English, such as 'professor' 'doctor' 'miss', 'lord', 'queen'. Consider
some examples:

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[18]For illustration, consider an analogous case involving a mass term. In the sentence 'The
gold that was found was sold' the term 'gold' is clearly functioning as a count noun; it appears
with a restrictive clause and thus the definite article shows up. But this would not give us
good reasons to suspect that the definite article is covertly attached to occurrences of 'gold'
when it functions as a mass term (arguably functioning referentially), i.e., 'Gold is a yellow
metal'.

(6)   a.   Professor Smith/ Doctor Smith/ Miss Mary is here to see you.

       b.   The Prime Minister Tony Blair was the youngest Prime Minister of the 20th century (Wikipedia).

       c.   The emperor Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo (Matushansky, 2015, 353)

       d.   The designer Marc Jacobs is opening a new store (Fara, 2015c, 84).

Given Predicativism, 'professor Smith' should be considered as a compound of two nouns, where, plausibly, the first is a restrictive modifier on the second. Indeed, Fara says about (6.d), that 'designer' is a restrictive modifier that forces the article to appear overtly (Fara, 2015c, 84). But if 'professor' is restrictively modifying 'Smith', then the article should appear. On the other hand, we have examples like (5.b) where the compound 'Primer Minister Tony Blair' appears with the article, whereas it is probably more common to find this compound (as well as similar ones constructed with words like 'president', 'queen', 'governor', 'pope', etc.) without the article. The same should go for the combination of names and surnames, i.e., Martin Smith, where the first modifies the second, or the other way round.

The third problem arises with non-restrictive adjectives that, as Fara recognizes, can make the article appear somehow optionally.[19] Some adjectives like 'young' can appear non-restrictively interpreted, with or without article (Fara, 2015c, 84):

(7)   a.   I talked to young Martin about it.

       b.   I talked to the young Martin about it.

Some adjectives when non-restrictively interpreted seem to require the article, as in (8), and some others seem to disallowed it, as in (9):

(8)   a.   *(The) incomparable Callas (Matushansky 2008, 608)

       b.   *(The) ever-popular Marc Jacobs won yet another design award

(9)   We will talk to (*the) dear/poor Thomas about it (Matushansky 2006, 292).

Although Fara acknowledges that what she calls 'null-permissive modifiers' (e.g., 'young', 'dear', 'poor') are an exception to her generalization about pre-name modifiers, she hopes to be able to find a principled way to deal with these exceptions (Fara, 2015c, 88).

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[19]Matushansky also mentions the behaviour of non-restrictive adjective with proper names, but decides to set them aside on the basis of their complicated analysis (Matushansky, 2006, 290-92).

However, if in the analysis Fara gives of (8.b), the article appears overtly because it doesn't have the name as its syntactic sister, but an NP consisting on the adjective and the name (Fara, 2015c, 92), then surely the analysis of (7.b) should be the same. But then it seems very unlikely that the analysis of (7.a) would be much different, considering that the meaning of both sentences when non-restrictively interpreted is jut the same. Thus, we do not know exactly when or why a non-restrictively modified name may appear with an article.

Given these three problems, the assumption that Fara's theory fully predicts when (and fully explains why) the article must appear overtly and when it doesn't is mistaken, and so the fact that the definite article sometimes appears overtly does not work as evidence for the existence of the null definite article. Also, a general problem with Fara's *Where* $\emptyset_{the}$ rule is that it precludes a mass term interpretation of certain bare uses of proper names, as noted in examples (1) above (cf. Section 4.2), for the rule entails that these bare uses of proper names carry the unpronounced determiner and thus will be given a definite interpretation.

Fara believes that further evidence for the existence of the null definite article is found in the fact that the article is pronounced when stressed, and in the fact that a number of languages permit pronunciation of the definite article with unmodified singular names (Fara, 2015c, 95). With respect to the stressed article, it doesn't seem to me that the stress uncovers a hidden element – after all, you can stress other determiners, i.e., 'I saw THAT Martin Smith', 'I saw A Martin Smith'; but this doesn't show that those determiners are covertly attached to the name all along.

Also, Fara overlooks the facts that a great number of languages do not permit the use of the definite article, and many of those that do (Catalan, and versions of German, Italian, and Spanish) do not permit it in a principled way.[20] Also, if support is sought in those languages, it needs to be shown that a proper name plus definite article really functions as a definite description; for if the definite article appearing with proper names in some of these languages turns out to be an expletive, then clearly proper names in these languages would not function as definite description, robbing support to the predicativist's thesis.[21]

To conclude, it is not clear to me that the supposedly puzzling distribution

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[20]In these languages the use of the definite article with proper names varies regionally, or according to the context or wishes of the speaker (cf. Section 2.4.1).But this variability is at odds with the idea that proper names are really definite descriptions.

[21]See Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 for discussion.

facts about the definite article and proper names are made much less puzzling by postulating an unpronounced determiner. There is not further explanation in Fara's account for why names get smushed together with the article, especially since count nouns do not. Sloat's syntactic facts are puzzling on the assumption that proper names are always predicates. However, the referentialist can have a different account of what's going on with Sloat chart. We will discuss this in Section 4.5.

4.4.2   On the Article Absence II: Matushansky's View

Matushansky (2006) claims that proper names in argument positions are definite descriptions and therefore believes that the absence of an overt definite article in certain languages, including English, needs to be explained (Matushansky, 2006, 285). She argues that there are three cases in which the article is not only overtly present but its omission is not possible. These are (Matushansky, 2006, 290-95):

i. When proper names are modified by restrictive/non-appositive clauses, as in 'this is not ***(the) Elizabeth I know**'; or with restrictive adjectives, as in '***(the) older Miss Challoner**'.

ii. When proper names belong to a certain lexical class (e.g., names for mountains, rivers or ships, i.e., 'The Titanic', 'The Seine').

iii. When proper names appear in the plural (e.g. 'The Clintons')

Given that these cases force the overt presence of the definite article, Matushansky conjectures that something about the relation between proper name and definite article must require the article's presence in those cases as well as its absence in others. She argues that this relation is controlled by an operation called *m-merger*, which "takes two syntactic heads in a certain configuration and returns one syntactic head" (Matushansky, 2006, 296). In simple terms, given *m-merging*, the definite article becomes affixed to the proper name. This affixation can then be "conditioned to become null or to take on a special morphological form" (Matushansky, 2006, 297). This would explain the absence of article in some languages like English - where the affixation becomes null - as well as the existence of the *preproprial* article (a special definite article that goes only with proper names) in some other languages, as in Catalan.

In those three cases where the definite article does occur with proper names, the hypothesis is that the m-merge process is disrupted, and thus the article, unable to *merge* with the name, appears in the surface. When names are modified by clauses, or when they carry a plural affix, the m-merge relation is blocked, because both modifications and plural affixes *intervene* in the relation between the determiner and the name (See Matushansky (2006, 297-98, for more details).

For those lexical classes of names that take the article, the explanation is that an additional constraint is posed to m-merging so that either it applies to some sub-class of names only, or it is prevented from applying to certain sub-classes (Matushansky, 2006, 299). An example of such constraint would be *gender*: in languages like Italian (according to Matushansky) masculine names allow for m-merging but feminine names do not; this would explain why feminine names occur with the article in Italian. Lexical classes would give other constraints so that if a proper name belongs to a certain lexical class, i.e. *ship*, m-merging is blocked. The proposal in essence is that some morphological features of words either allow or block m-merging.

But Matushansky's account seems to me inadequate for several reasons.[22] First, regarding proper names in the plural, it is not always the case that the plural affix on names in English force the appearance of the article, for although some plural uses of names do take the article, i.e., 'The Clintons came last night', some others do not. Some generic sentences can only use the name in the plural without article, i.e., 'Alberts are widespread'.[23] In addition, there are indefinite uses of plurals that are thought to have not generic but existential readings, e.g., 'Kennedys from all over the world attended the meeting'; 'Tudors have ruled this country for too long'; 'In my school, Heidis were always made fun of

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[22]Note that the seemingly optional appearance of the definite article with non-restrictedly modified proper names discussed in the preceding section is also a problem for the m-merging hypothesis. Some explanation for when and why some adjectives interfere with m-merging should be provided.

[23]This is an example of D-generics (or kind-referring generics), where the predicate is thought to apply to the whole kind or group denoted by the NP and not to each individual (i.e., no individual is widespread). The reason why the article cannot appear in the intended sentence is that it would generate an existential reading, with a different meaning: 'The Alberts are widespread'. Note that, while I-generics (or characterizing generic sentences) are thought to carry a covert 'generic' quantifier *Gen*, that binds together two predicates (as in 'Birds fly', and 'Alberts are crazy'), it is generally agreed that D-generics do not contain *Gen*, since then their analysis would require the predicate in the VP to apply to each individual member of the kind referred to in the NP. See Krifka et al. (1995) for definitions and analysis of generic sentences. So it is not possible to argue that it is the presence of the covert generic quantifier *Gen* that prevents the article from appearing with names in D-generic sentence.

because of their names'. And also other uses, e.g., 'If each one of them is called Albert, then they all are Alberts', or 'We both are Alberts'. If these examples are right, then the plural affix on names in English, since it does not force the appearance of the article, does not block m-merging. Moreover, given those cases in which plural names take the article, we cannot say that the plural affix allows m-merging either.

Second, regarding lexical classes, it is claimed that belonging to a certain lexical class is a property of words that can serve to constraint m-merging. But certain words may belong to different lexical classes and so, it is not clear whether the properties of the word would either permit or block m-merging. For example, the name 'Jordan' belongs to different lexical classes, i.e., 'Jordan' is the name of a country and the name of a river, and can also be the name of a person. The simple rule that says if a name belongs to the lexical class *river* then it blocks m-merging would result in 'Jordan' always occurring with the article, since it belongs to that class. Likewise the rule that says that if a name belongs to the lexical class *person* then m-merging takes place would result in 'Jordan' never occurring with the article. Thus the different lexical classes to which 'Jordan' belongs make 'Jordan' both subject to, and exempted from, the m-merge operation. But given that 'Jordan' always appears with an article when it names a river, and without article otherwise, it would seem that its belonging to certain lexical classes is not a – at least not the only – property that determines the presence or absence of the article. In fact, it doesn't seem that what determines the presence or absence of the article for 'Jordan' would be a property of the name itself, for if any such property determines, for example, the absence of the article, then *ipso facto* the name would never appear with the article.[24]

Third, the proposed gender restrictions on m-merging for names in Italian would work only with respect to those variants of Italian where it is mandatory to use an article with female names. Thus, it would seem that rules for constraining m-merging should be formulated for versions of Italian, rather than for the Italian language as a whole. But still, having some such rule is problematic in those languages, or regional variations, where the use of the article

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[24] I grant that one might individuate lexical items according to their lexical class, and thus there would be three different, albeit phonologically identical, lexical items 'Jordan'. However, Mathushansky herself uses phonological strings as the individuating criterion for a name (cf. Matushansky (2006, 288) and Matushansky (2008, 592-599)) and thus it is not clear to me that 'Jordan', when it is just one phonological string, can be also different names (i.e., different lexical items). At worst, my argument shows that the m-merging proposal is in conflict with taking phonological strings as the individuating criterion for names.

is optional. So, in addition to gender restrictions, some complex combination of different parameters including such things as the informality or intimacy of the context or the preferences of the speaker should also appear in the constraining rules. Constraining rules would perhaps be even more difficult, if not impossible, to specify for variants of Spanish, since in most cases, m-merging would be blocked only in certain contexts that are difficult to delimit – e.g., certain low socio-economical contexts – and even then the blocking would not be stable, since a name could still be used without article in those contexts without being perceived as odd. Also, given that in some of those languages (or versions of languages) the article is used in speaking but not in writing, the rule constraining m-merging would need to change accordingly.

Fourth, the claim that for Catalan, the affixation of the definite article to the proper name is conditioned to take on a special morphological form – so that proper names in Catalan appear with a special preproprial article (*en/na*) is not accurate. While in Balearic Catalan, the preproprial article is customarily used in speaking, the use of the ordinary article is very common in Catalonian and Valencian Catalan, since often the preproprial article is considered too formal (or even archaic) for most contexts. However, in all these variants of Catalan, neither the preproprial nor the ordinary article is normally used in formal writing.[25]

In sum, m-merging would be highly context-sensitive in some languages and not just dependent on morphological features of proper names. One might feel that this context-sensitivity of m-merging drains away some of its initial plausibility. For the advantage of the m-merging hypothesis seemed to be that it gave an explanation of article absence based on the properties of the words involved in a principled way: it was supposed to be a property of certain proper names, and of certain configurations of these (i.e., when affixed or restricted) that they permit or block m-merging. But from our discussion it emerged that neither plural affixes nor lexical classes may necessarily constrain m-merging and moreover, at least for some languages, m-merging would not depend on the

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[25]I realize that there is a tricky issue regarding the individuation of languages and that I have been assuming here that there is just one determinate Italian language (or Spanish, or Catalan), and that there are determinate regional variations of Italian, Spanish or Catalan. But note that Matushansky does seem to assume the same when she formulates a rule for English or Italian. At any rate, even if languages are individuated differently, the cases discussed show that there might be languages for which m-merging would be difficult to articulate, and this cast doubts about its status as a grammatical rule. Also, Mathushanky's m-merging proposal would apply more restrictedly than what she might have envisioned.

properties of the names themselves but on the speaker's preferences, or some idiosyncratic conventions.

As it stands, therefore, the m-merging hypothesis doesn't seem adequate to explain either the absence of the article with proper names in some languages, or the variable presence of it in some others.

4.5   Sloat's Chart According to Referentialism

Referentialists accept that proper names have predicative uses and have provided different accounts of how the predicative meaning proper names have on these uses is derived from their fundamental (referential) meaning. Although many referentialists have made no commitments about the stability of proper names qua predicates[26], it seems that Sloat's chart still calls for some explanation. It is also unsatisfactory for the referentialist to claim that proper names function as predicates (even if they are not fundamentally predicates) but leave unexplained that the$+N$ is generally infelicitous. This is particularly problematic for Schoubye's account, since he claims that proper names are *type-ambiguous* between referential and predicate types (Schoubye, 2017). If proper names are fully lexicalized predicates in English, then there should be no problem with the use of the article with proper names.[27]

Jeshion emphasizes this point,

> "If [proper names in their predicative uses] can be understood as common count nouns or as singular terms coerced to function as common count nouns, the expressions in these examples ought to take determiners in all the ways that common count nouns do" (Jeshion, 2015c, 392).

And further, she believes this to be a 'significant strike against the view' that claims predicative uses of proper names to be count nouns homonymous to the proper name (Jeshion, 2017, 225).[28]

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[26]For example, García-Carpintero (2017), Leckie (2013) and Rami (2014b, 2015) provide an account of how names are converted to predicates, but they do not claim that proper names are lexicalized as predicates.

[27]Recall our discussion in Section 3.3.1 where we questioned the full functionality of proper names qua count nouns. Schoubye recognizes this problem (Schoubye, 2017, fn34).

[28]Jeshion raise this point particularly against Schoubye's view, see Jeshion (2017, fn12).

Partly motivated by this problem, Jeshion argues that in fact predicative names (when appearing unmodified) can take the definite article, in other words, the+N is grammatical after all. Jeshion provides detailed discussion and compelling arguments to demonstrate this (Jeshion, 2015c, 2017, n.d.). She gives mainly pragmatic reasons for why the+N, especially when discourse initial (i.e., 'The David is happy'), is judged ungrammatical, and provide a series of examples where the+N is seems right.[29] The most important result of Jeshion's argument for the grammaticality of the+N is that it undermines what Fara's regards as the strongest evidence for *The*-Predicativism, that is, that the only satisfactory explanation for the "puzzling distribution pattern" of proper names with respect to the definite article is given by the unpronounced determiner 'the' that she advocates (Fara, 2015c, 109). This is because if the+N is grammatical after all, Fara's *Where* $\emptyset_{the}$ rule fails, and more generally *The*-predicativist's account of referential uses as covert definite descriptions is undermined.

I however take a different stand. I think there is a problem with the assumption that motivated Jeshion, that is, that proper names coerced to function as count nouns "*ought* to take determiners in all the ways that common count nouns do" (Jeshion, 2015c, 392, my italics). As was argued in Section 3.3.1, not all cases of conversion are cases of *full* conversion – i.e., where a converted word takes on *all* the properties of the category is changing into – and this was suggested independently of the case of names, i.e., with nominalized adjectives. As I suggested, proper names converted to count nouns can be taken as a case of partial conversion. The issue Jeshion raises against referentialist's accounts is only an issue for those accounts that claim that proper names *qua* predicates are fully functional, e.g. Schoubye's account. I don't make such claim.

Moreover, a story for why the+N is infelicitous can be provided although I don't think it is strictly required on my account, since again, there is not assumption that proper names *qua* predicates are fully lexicalized. One reason for why the+N is infelicitous may be that this form is redundant, given the existing referential form N, that can be used in most (if not all) cases where one would want to use the+N, and so the need for conversion for this form does not arise.[30]

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[29]See especially Jeshion (2017, Section 7).

[30]Schoubye's tentative answer is similar (Schoubye, 2017, fn34), but it is still in conflict with the view that names are lexicalized as predicates. I believe Schoubye should either adopt my view and say that conversion for proper names into count nouns is partial or join Jeshion in accepting the grammaticality of the+N.

Gray ([2017](#)) has raised the concern that neither Predicativism nor Referentialism can satisfactorily explain why the$+N$ is infelicitous, and in particular he argues against the referentialist's pragmatic strategy of explaining this infelicity in terms of 'pragmatic competition', that is, the idea that the$+N$ is infelicitous because there is already a form (the bare name) that has the same effect (Gray, [2017](#), 453). Gray argues basically that looking at other cases of pragmatic competition, the fact that a *better* form exists (i.e., one that requires less interpretative work) to express a given thought, does not render the alternative infelicitous or ungrammatical. He gives an example with a 'polysemically derived' expression (Gray, [2017](#), 455):

(10)   a.   Please pass the fruits from the cherry tree.
         b.   Please pass the cherries.

where (10.a) would be a perhaps convoluted way to say what (10.b) says, but not infelicitous or ungrammatical. He claims, "*the fruits from the cherry tree* stands to *the cherries* as *the Alfred* stands to *Alfred*" (Gray, [2017](#), 455, my italics).

However, the type of explanation I offered involved the phenomenon of category change or conversion that doesn't always result in lexically established new forms. A characteristic of the phenomenon as I described it in Chapter [3](#), is that involves a change in the syntactical environment of the converting word. The result of using a word in a different syntactical environment than that to which it belongs (for example, using a verb or an adjective with determiners) may be that it can be judged as ungrammatical or odd, unless it has a semantic effect that is useful for communication. One can overcome a judgement of ungrammaticality or oddity if the converted word is useful, or its semantics can be easily calculated, or similar forms are already employed. etc. [31]

This is speculative; I don't have a solid account of why certain forms like the$+N$ in English do not arise (or have limited use), since I don't have a general account for why conversion is partial, i.e., I don't know why adjectives in English can take the definite article but not other determiners, while they can take every

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[31] Think of examples (14.c-d) and (14.g-h) in Section [3.2.4](#). Also, the forms 'the why' or 'the how' exist if this sentence can be accepted: '*The why* and *how* of effective altruism'. However, I doubt they are fully functional, e.g., it seems that one wouldn't say '?I want to know the why', or '?The book doesn't explain the how'. To give a further example, the sentence 'I will *exit* you from this room' will probably be judged ungrammatical, since it makes an intransitive verb into a transitive one. However, the form could arise if the context is right. For example, this happens in Naples's variant of Italian: it makes the intransitive verb *uscire* (to exit) into a transitive one.

determiner in Spanish (cf. Section 3.2.2). Further, considering that the use of the definite article with proper names and also the use of other determiners or plural form are infelicitous, or judged ungrammatical, in many other languages, I don't think it is a burden on the referentialist who only claims predicative uses of proper names *across languages* to be cases of (partial) conversion to explain exactly why not all forms are grammatical in a given language. Therefore, while agreeing that the problem of the grammaticality or ungrammaticality of the+N is general, I don't believe it is *equally* problematic to all parties in the debate. Predicativists are much pressed to explain this since they claim proper names are fundamentally predicates.[32]

With respect to the grammatical issue, Jeshion has made a strong case that the+N is grammatical. However, I think the+N does not semantically behave the same as a definite with a count noun, making it doubtful that this name-definite is fully functional. As was argued in Section 3.3.1, it appears that predicative names resist taking some of the semantic properties assigned to predicative uses. In particular we noted that for (11) a generic reading is very hard to access:

(11)   The Sarah is an individual with a short name.

But count nouns appearing with the definite article can normally generate generic sentences. This suggests that however grammatical, 'the Sarah' does not have the semantic ability of referring to a kind, or denoting an extension as a whole, as other definites with count nouns have (e.g., 'the potato', 'the feminist', 'the tiger' in the examples in Section 3.3.1), and other constructions with predicative names have (e.g., 'Sarahs', 'A Sarah').[33]

In addition, the case of apparently bound uses of proper names that have been discussed in the literature casts some doubt about the grammaticality judgment. Consider:

(12)   a.   In any family, Quintus is the fifth son. (Example credited to Kamp via Leckie in Hawthorne and Manley (2012, 236))

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[32]Note, also, that some people, while accepting predicative uses of proper names, find them less than optimal, perhaps a bit odd or informal; and would choose a form like 'people called 'N'' on occasions. In Spanish, I would probably never use the plural of certain names because they sound awful to my ears even when common nouns with the same form sound fine (e.g., 'Carlos*es*, 'Belen*es*', 'Anabel*es*', contrasted with 'dios*es*' (gods), 'vaiven*es*' (sways), 'decibel*es*' (decibels); cf. fn20 in Chapter 2) So, it is also something to be explained by the predicativist that on occasions speakers do not feel comfortable using what is supposed to be the fundamental form of proper names.

[33]This claim will be qualified in Section 5.4.

b. ?In any family, *the* Quintus is the fifth son.

(13)   a.   If a child is christened 'Bambi', and Disney Inc. hear about it, then they will sue Bambi's parents. (Geurts, 1997, 322)

       b. ??If a child is christened 'Bambi', and Disney Inc. hear about it, then they will sue *the* Bambi's parents.

(14)   a.   If John insists on calling his next son Gerontius, then his wife will be annoyed and Gerontius will get made fun of because of his name. (Elbourne, 2005, 182)

       b. ??If John insists on calling his next son Gerontius, then his wife will be annoyed and *the* Gerontius will get made fun of because of his name.

It is odd that the b-sentences in (12)-(14) sound marked where the name occurs precisely in the kind of environment argued to help hear the$+N$ as grammatical (i.e., where the property of having certain name is relevant, where there is anaphoric reference to a previous introduction of the name, or where there is a co-varying reading).

While none of these concerns prove anything about the grammaticality or functionality of the$+N$, they do lend support to the idea that predicative names are cases of partial conversion.

A last thing to say is that Sloat's argument from the distribution of proper names and determiners would work only in English, and few other languages. This distribution in many other languages is varied, and so we could not take the behaviour of the definite article as exceptional among other determiners, and conclude that it must be the definite article that has a null form. In other languages, the postulation of an unpronounced definite article will leave unexplained other facts.[34] Therefore, It is doubtful that a theory about the nature of proper names can be drawn based on the limited English data.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter examined the motivations and the theory behind the unpronounced determiner thesis, as a strategy to deal with referential uses of proper names,

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[34]For example, facts like the inability of names in Norwegian to take a demonstrative, or in Faroese to take quantifier words, or the resistance of male names in Italian to be pluralised. Indeed, in many languages (including Basque, Danish, Faroese, French, Hindi, Italian, Mandarin Chinese, Norwegian, Romanian, Swedish and Tamil) proper names do not take the full range of determiners or plural form (cf. Section 2.4).

and attain syntactic and semantic uniformity between their predicative and referential uses. I have shown that the arguments provided in support of the existence of an unpronounced determiner to go with referential names do not work independently of the predicativist's assumption that names must be predicates in all their fundamental uses. In other words, the predicativist has not provided any independent evidence for the unpronounced determiner. More importantly, despite the predicativist's claim that her theory achieves semantic and syntactic uniformity, I have argued that the unpronounced determiner thesis still makes proper names exceptional as count nouns.

The foregoing arguments lend support to one of my main theses, that is, that proper names cannot be fundamentally predicates. It is unlikely that proper names are fundamentally count nouns if they are shown to be exceptional among count nouns with respect to the use of the definite article. As discussed in Section 4.2, names would be exceptional not only in that they would realise an unpronounced determiner in all argument positions but also in that the determiner being over or covert would not change their meaning, unlike what is the case with count nouns. Further, it was suggested (and will be developed more in the next chapter) that languages in which proper names are used with the definite article do not provide evidence that they function as definite descriptions if the article turns out to be an expletive.

Lastly, the predicativist position does not represent an advantage with respect Referentialism in explaining the distribution of proper names and determiners. One reason is that their argument does not hold when taking cross-linguistic data with respect to this distribution. A more important one, as I hoped to have shown (together with the arguments in Chapter 3), is that there are adequate alternatives. On the one hand, Jeshion's position leaves nothing in need to be explained: in her view the distribution of proper names and determiners matches exactly the distribution of count nouns and determiners. On the other hand, my claim that predicative uses of names are a case of partial conversion is a perfectly tenable position: it is supported by cross-linguistic data, and it is capable of accounting for the syntactic distribution of proper names and determiners.

Chapter 5

Referential Names are not Predicative

In the preceding chapter, I have argued that there is no good evidence for the existence of the null determiner (either a demonstrative or a definite article) covertly attached to proper names in their singular unmodified occurrences. And despite the efforts of some predicativists, the differences between proper names and common nouns persist. In this chapter, I would like to argue that there are indeed good reasons to reject there being such null determiner covertly attached to proper names. On analysis, it turns out that in certain environments, proper names behave differently from demonstratives or definite descriptions. Thus, I argue against the thesis that proper names are really predicates in their typical referential uses. In the following sections I will discuss four environments in which proper names (when bare singulars in argument position) appear *not* to behave like the definite descriptions or the complex demonstratives that are thought to embed them. This suggests that the putative unpronounced determiner is not there – or else, why should we witness these differences? This also suggests that the meaning of proper names in these uses is not the predicative meaning the predicative view proposes.

I will also show that in those languages that permit or require the use of the definite article with names (i.e., Catalan, Greek, Portuguese and versions of German, Italian, and Spanish), the construction the$+N$ does not behave like an ordinary definite description in every context. This suggests that the fact that in those languages names appear with an article does not support the definite description hypothesis. In addition, I will present in Section 5.3 an argument by Longobardi that the definite article with proper names at least in Italian should be considered an expletive.

Lastly, I will argue in Section 5.5 that the account of the meaning of

proper names is unsatisfactory and the analysis of the *being-called-condition*
(cf. the *BCC* in Section 2.1) eventually requires names to be referential terms.
Therefore it is unlikely that proper names are fundamentally predicative.

5.1   One-Anaphora and Nouns *vs* Names

The first problem for the view that a proper name N is equivalent to the complex
demonstrative 'that N', as noted by King (2006, 149), is that unmodified proper
names do not interact with certain anaphoric uses of *one* whereas count nouns
do.[1] Consider the following pairs of sentences:

(1)   a.   That Martin is happy but this one isn't.
        b.   *Martin is happy but this one isn't (King, 2006, 149, slighly modified).

The thought is that if in (1.b) the demonstrative is present – albeit covertly –
both sentences should work fine. But (1.b) doesn't.

To reinforce the point against a possible rejoinder that what is preventing
the anaphoric 'one' from interacting with the proper name is the fact that the
determiner is implicit, King argues that even in cases where bare common nouns
are thought to carry an implicit determiner – i.e., the generic determiner *Gen*
– the analogous to (1.b) works fine:

(2)   a.   Dogs are kind.
        b.   Dogs are kind, but this one isn't (King, 2006, p. 149).

The anaphoric *one* would interact with proper names in their predicative
uses – i.e., (1.a) – but not when the proper name occurs unmodified. This
difference suggests that proper names in their unmodified uses do not involve
an implicit demonstrative and are not functioning as predicates.[2]

King's *one*-anaphora argument was raised against *That*-Predicativism.
I would like to argue that the problem also exists for *The*-Predicativism, at

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[1]I said 'certain' because there is at least one type of construction where *one* is anaphoric
on a bare proper name: 'I met David. Which *one*?'. However, the claim is not that *one*
can never be anaphoric on a bare name, or for that matter, on a referential term (witness: 'I
want to buy *it*/ I want *that*. Which *one*?). The claim is rather that on those cases where *one*
requires a count noun as anaphoric anchor, bare names in argument position cannot do the
job, suggesting they are not count nouns on those occasions.

[2]Similarly, Rami (2014b, 853) mentions the *one*-anaphora problem to argue that referential
names have no descriptive content (what he calls *the objection from descriptive austerity*).

least in some versions of it. For example, we saw that on Elbourne's and Fara ([2011a](#))'s versions, proper names carry not only an unpronounced definite article, but also an unpronounced restrictor or predicate modifier (cf. Section [4.4](#) and fn16 of that section), such that a bare occurrence of N in argument position is analysed as either 'The$_F$ N', or 'The N_F'. This unpronounced restrictor or predicate modifier serves to single out an individual from the extension of N. But if this were so, then there should be no difference between (3.a) and (3.b), where (3.a) makes the putative underlying structure of (3.b) explicit:

(3)   a.   The Martin I know/from Alaska/that we met is tall but this one isn't.

         b.   *Martin is tall but this one isn't.

In (3.a), the proper name can serve as anchor for the anaphoric *one*, since it is been used predicatively, just like any other count noun would, e.g. 'The teacher (I know/from Alaska/that we met) is tall but this one isn't'. But the fact that the proper name does not interact with the anaphoric *one* in (3.b) suggests that the proposed underlying structure is not correct.[3]

Further, I would also argue that the problem arises more generally for *The*-Predicativism. Consider the case of a stressed *the*, which arguably makes the proper name function like a predicate. This allows the proper name to interact with the anaphoric *one* in (4.a), whereas the bare name in (4.b) does not[4]:

(4)   a.   THE Marc Jacobs is rich but this one isn't.

         b.   *Marc Jacobs is rich but this one isn't.

My examples show that definite descriptions containing proper names (whether incomplete or complete) *can* interact with the anaphoric *one*, suggesting that

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[3]Schoubye ([2017](#)) also argues that King's *one*-anaphora problem carries over to *The*-Predicativism. He offers an example with an incomplete definite description containing a count noun that can serve as anaphoric anchor for a *one*-anaphor, i.e., 'I left *the duvet* outside, but there is another one upstairs' (Schoubye, [2017](#), 757, my highlight), whereas a bare name in its place would not: '(*) I left Paul outside, but there is another one upstairs'. But anaphora on an incomplete description does not always work well: '(?) I met the student, but there is another one outside'; '(?) The doctor is taller than the one I usually see'; '(?) The player is good but the one I met isn't'. And this perhaps allows for an alternative explanation of what prevents bare names from being anaphoric anchors on *one*-anaphora. Thus, while I agree with Schoubye in general, I argue for the same point appealing to a different case (see below).

[4]Note that the cases I flagged as marked in fn3 work better with the stressed *the*: 'I met THE student, but there is another one outside', 'THE doctor is taller than the one I usually see', etc.

it is nothing about the proper name as a class of word but about its syntactic position and corresponding semantics, that disallows *one*-anaphora anchoring.

5.2   The Argument from Binding

A second problem for both types of Predicativism is that bare proper names behave differently from complex demonstratives and definite descriptions when embedded in quantified sentences.[5] Consider

(5)   a.   Every philosopher who admires a logician will remain fan of that logician forever.
       b.   Every philosopher who admires a David will remain fan of that David forever.
       c.   We were searching for a Martin. So I requested to everyone who knew a Martin to call that Martin immediately.

On the most natural reading of the sentences in (5), the demonstrative phrases have narrow scope readings with respect to the quantifier phrases that precede them, so that their semantic value co-varies with the preceding quantifier phrase. That is to say, the demonstrative phrases 'that logician', 'that David', and 'that Martin' would pick up different individuals for every philosopher or person who knows a Martin, respectively. A wide scope reading with respect to the quantifier is possible too, but less salient: for example, (5.a) has a reading where every philosopher that admires one logician or other will remain fan of one particular demonstrated logician (referred to by 'that logician'). However, bare proper names in place of the demonstrative phrase in these sentences do not naturally have narrow scope readings – indeed the converse happens. Narrow scope readings are at best hard to access for (6.a)-(6.b) while wide scope readings are most salient:

(6)   a.   Every philosopher who admires a David, will remain fan of David forever.
       b.   We were searching for a Martin. So I requested to everyone who knew a Martin to call Martin immediately.

But this is surprising if according to *That*-Predicativism, names are covert demonstrative phrases.

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[5]This problem was originally raised by Elia Zardini to John Hawthorne and David Manley on a seminar in Arché (St Andrews) in November 2008. This has been taken up in Delgado (2011), Hawthorne and Manley (2012) and Schoubye (2017).

Definite descriptions also have very natural co-varying readings according to preceding quantified phrases:

(7)   a.   In every conference we hold, it is the organizer who writes to the speakers.

          b.   Whenever we come to this restaurant, the waiter manages to spill something.

On the narrow scope reading, the value of 'the organizer' or 'the waiter' will co-vary with the quantified expressions 'in every conference' and 'whenever' respectively. However, when a bare name occurs in place of the definite descriptions in (7.a)-(7.b), even if a special setup is provided, a narrow scope reading is simply not available[6]:

(8)   a.   In every conference we hold, it is David who writes to the speakers (assume that in the faculty there are three Davids and as it happens, them and only them organize the conferences, so there is a salient relation 'conference-David').

          b.   Whenever we come to this restaurant, David manages to spill something (assume that I always go to lunch with one of the Davids in the faculty).

This shows that bare proper names typically[7] behave differently from definite descriptions in quantified sentences, suggesting that at least in these occasions they are not incomplete definite descriptions.

Interestingly, in those languages where proper names can take the definite article, proper names still resist a co-varying reading. Consider the English sentence 'In every class, Maria passed the exam'[8] and its equivalents in other languages[9]:

(9)   a.   A totes les classes, la Maria ha aprovat l'exàmen.
                in all the classes, the Maria has passed the-exam

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[6]Schoubye argues that if we replace the bare proper name in (8.a)-(8.b) with the alleged semantic correlate 'the person called David', we get the narrow scope reading all right (Schoubye, 2017, 760). This shows (in my opinion, conclusively) that bare proper names do not have the predicativist's alleged semantics on these occasions.

[7]I said 'typically' because there are some (rather marginal) examples of proper names co-varying with quantified phrases. I will come back to this in section 5.2.1

[8]Note that in these examples, the sentences are ordered to give the quantified expression the widest scope more naturally, in order to facilitate the reading in which a different person in every class passed the exam.

[9]For these data, I am partly relying on my own competence in Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese. However, I have also consulted native speakers: for Catalan (data due to Sonia Roca Royes, p.c.), for Greek (data due to Ira Kiourti, p.c.), for German (data due to Barbara Vetter, p.c.), for Italian (data due to Elia Zardini, p.c.), and for Portuguese (data due to Teresa Marques, p.c.).

                                                                                        (Catalan)

'In every class, (the) Maria passed the exam'[10]

    b.   Se kathe taxe he Maria perase ten exetase.   (Greek)
            In each   class the Maria passed the exam
            'In every class, (the) Maria passed the exam'

    c.   In jedem Kurs, die Maria hat   bestanden.   (German)
            In every class, the Maria have passed
            'In every class, (the) Maria passed the exam'

    d.   In ogni classe, la   Maria ha   passato l'esame.   (Italian)
            In each class, the Maria have passed the-exam
            'In every class, (the) Maria passed the exam'

    e.   Em cada disciplina, a   Maria passou o   exame.   (Portuguese)
            In   each class,   the Maria passed the exam
            'In every class, (the) Maria passed the exam'

    f.   En cada clase, la   Maria aprobó el   examen.   (Spanish)
            In each class, the Maria passed the exam
            'In every class, (the) Maria passed the exam'

The sentences in (9) do not naturally have a reading in which in every class a different Maria passed the exam (the co-varying reading is not impossible, but it is hard to access and would require a special set up). This indicates that proper names in these languages, despite the fact that they take the definite article, do not automatically function like definite descriptions.

    In sum, the fact that proper names behave differently from complex demonstratives or definite descriptions in quantified sentences suggests that bare proper names are not equivalent to them on these occasions. Elbourne, however, believes that the inability of proper names to be bound in quantified sentences is not a problem for his approach: "It is quite open to us to say that, while they have the structure of definite descriptions, proper names also have some additional features that prevent their occurrence in [these] sentences" (Elbourne, 2005, 180). But he also says that he would not attempt to give an explanation of these additional features without which, I think, his remark is ineffective. Note that although it has been argued that proper names can have bound readings (cf. following section), the point is that proper names generally resist to be bound in just those quantified sentences in which ordinary count

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[10]Note I have bracketed the definite article before the name in the translation, to indicate that, in my opinion, the natural translation of these sentences into English would not include the definite article.

nouns can be bound.[11]

5.2.1   Fara's Reply to the Argument from Binding

Fara has recently reply to this objection arguing that in fact this inability of
bare proper names to be bound in quantified sentences is not a problem for the
predativist and her account can actually predict it (Fara, 2015a, 362). The
idea is that the contrast between (10.a) and (10.b) below is explained by the
hypothesis that the noun in (10.a) is subject to *nominal restriction* (as has been
argued by Stanley and Szabó (2000), and J. Stanley (2000, 2002, 2005)[12], while
the proper name in (10.b) is not. She volunteers (10.c) as a parallel to (10.a)
where the proper name would be subject to nominal restriction as well.

(10)   a.   In every race, the colt won.
         b.   In every race, John won.
         c.   In every race, the John won.

Nominal restriction is the mechanism by which each nominal expression
carries a variable syntactically attached to it. This variable can be assigned
in context a property or set as value that intersects the property or set of the
noun, yielding this intersection as denotation. This variable can also be bound
by a previous quantified noun phrase, thus explaining the co-varying reading
that (10.a) allows (that is, where different colts won in different races). Thus
the analysis of (10.a) would be,

 In every race [x], the colt [in x] won

Fara then explains the difference between (10.b) and (10.c) by the rules
governing the article appearance she provides in her theory (cf. Section 4.4.1)
summarized as follows (Fara, 2015a, 367):

Where '$\emptyset_{the}$' When a name occurs in a definite description, the definite article
must be unpronounced when the name is its structural sister, unless the
definite article is stressed.

Given this rule, if a proper name carried a covert nominal restriction
syntactically attached, then it would not have the definite article as its structural

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[11]This point is also made by Schoubye (2017, 760-61).

[12]Nominal restriction is arguably a controversial theory. However my discussion of Fara's
proposal does not depend on specific problems nominal restriction theory might have. For
the purpose of this discussion I would presume that the best formulation of this theory is in
place.

sister, and therefore the article would be required to appear, just like with overt restrictions. According to her, this explains the co-varying reading (10.c) has. This allows her to conclude that since in (10.b) the article is unpronounced, there is no nominal restriction at play, and this explains why the name in (10.b) cannot be bound into by the previous quantified noun phrase (Fara, 2015a, 370).

There are a number of worries about Fara's argument. From the outset, it is not clear that (10.c) is grammatical, that is, that 'the John' can appear without overt restriction (or stress).[13] If (10.c) is not grammatical, then Fara's explanation fails: either proper names are not subject to nominal restriction just the same as count nouns in definite descriptions are, or this nominal restriction does not forces the appearance of the article (and so the *Where* $\emptyset_{the}$' rule is false, at least with respect to covert restrictions).

On the other hand, if (10.c) is grammatical, we should find similar cases to be grammatical too. But note that there are other cases where definite descriptions show quantificational variability but where parallel sentences with proper names sound much worse than (10.c) does. Consider the following:

(11)   a.   Whenever executions occur in this country, the executioner is not proud of his job.
        b.   (??) Whenever presentations occur in this country, the Adolf is not proud of his name.

(12)   a.   Because they use alphabetic order, the anthropologist is always the first to be called.
        b.   (??) Because they use alphabetic order, the Aaron is always the first to be called.

The conjunction 'whenever' and adverbs like 'always', etc., may be considered as a kind of quantifier ranging over events, times, or situations. These expressions would bind a variable in the noun of the definite description.[14] If the same phenomenon was at play with the proper names in the b-sentences above – and Fara's argument is right – we will expect the definite article showing up with unmodified proper names to be perfectly grammatical. But I submit that these sentences are at best marked.

A second problem with Fara's explanation is that discussions on the possibility of binding into proper names do not cite examples like (10.c); rather,

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[13]*Pace* Jeshion (cf Section 4.5), some people hear (10.c) as marked even in the right set up.
[14]This is proposed by J. Stanley (2002, 23-34) and adopted, with some modifications, by Fara (2006, 82).

the discussion focuses on few examples where *bare* proper names apparently do have co-varying readings:

(13) a. If a child is christened 'Bambi', and Disney Inc. hear about it, then they will sue Bambi's parents (Geurts, 1997, 322)[15]

b. Every woman who has a husband called John and a lover called Gerontius takes only Gerontius to the Rare Names Convention (Elbourne, 2005, 181)

c. If John insists on calling his next son Gerontius, then his wife will be annoyed and Gerontius will get made fun of because of his name' (Elbourne, 2005, 182)

It is significant that Fara herself proposes some of these examples as cases of co-varying uses of names, where the name can be interpreted as bound by an antecedent noun phrase (Fara, 2015c, 105).

But now we have a dilemma: either (13.a)-(13.c) have co-varying readings as claimed or Fara is right. On the one hand, if (13.a)-(13.c) have co-varying readings as claimed, then Fara cannot be right, because if nominal restriction is what explains this co-variation, the *Where '$\emptyset_{the}$'* rule is false, given that the names in (13.a)-(13.c) appear bare and (13.a)-(13.c) are not ungrammatical.[16] On this horn of the dilemma, (10.b) should also have a co-varying reading – since the name would carry a nominal restriction, like any noun. However, this is the point of the initial objection: that (10.b) does not have a co-varying reading, even if (13.a)-(13.c) do. If, however, the *Where '$\emptyset_{the}$'* rule is right, then nominal restriction is not what explains the co-varying readings that (13.a)-(13.c) have; but then it is unlikely that nominal restriction explain anything regarding (10.b) and (10.c).

On the other hand, if Fara is right then, contrary to the intuitions, (13.a)-(13.c) do not have co-varying readings. It seems clear that we can't have (10.c) and (13.a)-(13.c) all being grammatical and also their alleged co-variation being explained by the same strategy. Therefore either Fara's explanation fails, or her proposal has counter-intuitive results with respect to (13.a)-(13.c).

The third problem I see with Fara's argument is that nominal restriction as proposed by Stanley (in particular in J. Stanley (2002, 2005) is supposed to apply to common nouns more generally[17], not just when they appear to be

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[15]Also discussed in Matushansky (2008, 601). Similar examples are discussed in Hawthorne and Manley (2012, 236-37).

[16]Note that if anything is wrong with (13.a)-(13.c), they certainly don't improve by adding the article to the proper name. Cf. Section 4.5

[17]J. Stanley (2002) argues for nominal restriction on nouns used with comparative adjectives, and on mass terms, for example.

bound by a quantifier. But, if count nouns are generally restricted, proper names are also generally restricted, given that, according to the predicativist, they are just count nouns. But then Fara's account makes the wrong predictions: proper names should never appear bare, since by Fara's rule, when the name is restricted, it is not longer the structural sister of the definite article, and this forces the article to appear. But it is clearly not the case that proper names never appear bare.

Further, it is not clear that Fara's proposal can be restricted to apply to proper names just when they appear to be bound by a quantifier[18], or that it wouldn't be *ad hoc* to do so. One reason it would seem *ad hoc* to reject nominal restriction as applying generally is that Fara has good reasons to adopt it: this is because proper names still need to be restricted to a single denotation when appearing in sentences like (10.b) above (i.e. when being used referentially), since they are supposed to be predicates of multiple application.[19] Thus, given this general need of a way of restricting proper names, so that they get a single denotation in these uses, it would seems unjustified to reject nominal restriction in general while adopting it for certain cases only.

Finally, it also seems *ad hoc* to adopt nominal restriction only to resolve the contrast between (10.a) and (10.b), given that Fara *also* has good reasons to reject nominal restriction as applying generally. This is because nominal restriction is in conflict with her account on the rigidity of proper names. In order to account for the rigidity of proper names, given that referential uses of proper names are incomplete definite descriptions in her account, Fara claims that incomplete definite descriptions in general are *rigid-in-a-context*. She argues that when we use incomplete definite descriptions, like 'the party' or 'the book', we use them to talk about particular things, without there being a particular way of completing the description which is part of its semantic value (Fara, 2015c, 98). Even though we can use such descriptions to talk about many different things, once its value is fixed in a context, the description is rigid.

Fara refuses to take a stand on precisely how incomplete descriptions are rigid. She considers but rejects a number of ways in which an incomplete description can secure a single denotation in a context, including nominal restriction (Fara, 2015c, 99-100). She rejects nominal restriction in particular because the resulting complete description would have both wide and narrow

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[18]Schoubye (2016, 5-6) argues that the proposal cannot be restricted to those cases Fara intends, and that it is not clear that her generalization (the *Where* $\emptyset_{the}$' rule) can be amended.

[19]Thanks to Elia Zardini to bring this detail to my attention.

scope readings with respect to a modal operator. Consider (14.b) as one particular way of completing the description 'the party' in (14.a) that would have both wide and narrow scope readings:

(14)　　a.　　Olga might have enjoyed the party.

　　　　b.　　Olga might have enjoyed the party I went to last night (Fara, 2015c, 99).

But Fara claims that (14.a) does not have a narrow scope reading. For its evaluation, the only relevant party is the party she is talking about, and not some other parties to which she went at other worlds: "In other words, [14.a] has only the truth conditions that it would have if the incomplete definite description were rigid" (Fara, 2015c, 100). Thus, if nominal restriction was adopted, incomplete definite descriptions cannot any longer be considered as generally rigid, and her account of the rigidity of proper names would then fail.[20] Therefore, given this reason to reject nominal restriction as applying generally, it seems *ad hoc* to adopt it only for the purpose of replying to the argument from biding.

5.3　The Expletive Definite Article

Longobardi provides evidence that at least in Italian, the article with proper names must be understood as an expletive. He begins by noting that when two singular NPs are coordinated in argument position,"a single singular determiner is sufficient to impose singular designation to the entire nominal expression, whereas the sum of two singular determiners automatically imposes plural designation" (Longobardi, 1994, 621). He gives (15) as an example of this in Italian (Longobardi, 1994, 620), which I take is true in English as well, as in (16):

(15)　　a.　　La mia segretaria e   tua collaboratrice sta/*stanno uscendo.
　　　　　　the my secretary and your collaborator is/are   going   out
　　　　　　'My secretary and your collaborator is/are going out'

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[20]However, the claim that incomplete definite descriptions consistently take wide scope with respect to the modal operator has been contested in Delgado (2011, 58-60), and in Schoubye (2017, 752). Fara does not deny that some incomplete definite descriptions have no-rigid readings. But she hopes to put aside these as cases of role-type uses of descriptions, as argued by Rothschild (2007) (Fara, 2015c, 103-05). Schoubye has argued however that incomplete descriptions that would not be classified as role-type also have non-rigid readings (or exhibit narrow scope readings with respect to a modal quantifier (Schoubye, 2017, 752).

     b.   La mia segretaria e   la   tua   collaboratrice stanno/*sta uscendo.
           the my secretary and the your collaborator   is/are   going   out
           'My secretary and your collaborator is/are going out'

(16)   a.   The secretary and collaborator is/*are going out.
        b.   The secretary and the collaborator are/*is going out.

      With respect to proper names, Longobardi notes that the coordination of two singular NPs, the first headed by an articled proper name and the second by an articleless common noun, is impossible in Italian:

(17)   *La Maria e   (mia) segretaria è arrivata in   ritardo.
       the Maria and (my) secretary is arrived late
       'The Maria and (my) secretary arrived late'

suggesting that the proper name does not provide a range for the article to operate over (Longobardi, 1994, 651), unlike common nouns (i.e., (15.a)). This is explained by the hypothesis that the definite article is an expletive.[21] Identical ungrammaticality results in Portuguese[22] and versions of Spanish:

(18)   a.   *La Maria y   secretaria ha llegado tarde.   (Spanish)
           the Maria and secretaria has arrived late
           'The Maria and secretary arrived late'

        b.   *A   Maria e   secretária chegou   tarde.   (Portuguese)
           the Maria and secretaria arrived-SING late
           'The Maria and secretary arrived late'

      Incidentally, this phenomenon also suggests that proper names, when bare in argument position, do not carry an unpronounced determiner. A parallel of (16) with a proper name is sharply marked (19.a) and a single definite article cannot impose a singular reading on two coordinated NPs when the name is in the second position (19.b):

(19)   a.   *Mary and collaborator is going out.
        b.   *The collaborator and Mary is going out.[23]

To be fare, I'm not sure '*The* Mary and collaborator is going out' fares any

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[21]Longobardi also provides other arguments involving other languages like Catalan and German. See Longobardi (1994, Sections 7 and 8)

[22]Data due to Teresa Marques, p.c.

[23]Note that this should be possible also under the view that proper names are fully functional predicates (i.e., Jeshion's and Schoubye's), since in (16.a) above the second NP is headed by a bare common noun. Why can't this be headed by a bare name-predicate?

better. However, constructions like these should be possible in contexts where classifying people according to their names is relevant.

5.4 Generic Sentences and Nouns *vs* Names

A third piece of evidence that proper names behave differently from the definite descriptions to which they are supposed to be equivalent is that singular definites containing count nouns – that is, 'the F' when F is a count noun – can generate generic readings while bare singular proper names cannot. Generic sentences are classified into two main types: D-Generics and I-Generics.[24] D-generic sentences, also called *kind-referring* generics, attributes some property to a kind or class as a whole rather than to the instances of that kind individually. I-generic sentences, sometimes called *characterizing* generics, intuitively express a general attribution of properties to many individuals.[25] Singular definites containing count nouns can appear in both type of generic sentence. Consider the following examples:

(20) a. The potato was unknown in Europe before 1400. (D-generics)

   b. The potato is a starchy, tuberous crop. (I-generics)

(21) a. The tiger is the largest feline. (D-generics)

   b. The tiger is striped whereas the leopard is dotted. (I-generics)

(22) The ballpoint pen was invented by L. Biro. (D-generics)

(23) The pencil contains graphite. (I-generics)

Sentences (20.a), (21.a) and (22) are examples of D-generics because the property attributed to the noun in the NPis not a property individually had by every potato, tiger, or ballpoint pen respectively, but by the kinds *potato*, *tiger*, *ballpoint pen* as a whole. Conversely, sentences (20.b), (21.b) and (23) are examples of I-generics because the property attributed to the noun in the NP is (generally) had individually by the members in the extension of the noun, i.e., every potato is a starchy tuber, almost every tiger has stripes, and most pencils contain graphite.

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[24]See Krifka et al. (1995), for definitions.

[25]Henceforth, 'generic sentence' abbreviates 'sentence that has a generic reading'. Of course these sentence may have other readings as well.

Singular definites containing count nouns can in principle generate generic sentences of either type.[26] But bare singular proper names cannot: 'Sarah is scary' cannot possibly be read as a generic sentence, i.e. either attributing a property generally true of every Sarah, or attributing a property to the set of Sarahs as a whole. In other words, unlike count nouns, bare proper names cannot be understood as ordinary predicates, denoting an extension that intersects the extension of the predicate in the VP, as to generate I-generic sentences. Likewise, a bare proper name cannot be used to refer to the kind, or a class, consisting in the individuals in its extension, as to generate D-generic sentences. This suggests that bare singular proper names do not function as predicates, at least in these occasions.

In contrast, predicative uses of proper names can generate generic sentences:

(24)   a.   Sarahs are widespread.   (D-generics)
        b.   Sarahs from the north are scary.   (I-generics)
        c.   A Sarah is an individual with a short name.   (I-generics)
        d.   Every Sarah is scary.   (I-generics)

Sentence (24.a) makes reference to a certain kind, or set of individuals, and attributes a property to it as a whole (no individual is widespread), just like the sentence 'Dogs are widespread', containing an ordinary common noun does. Sentences (24.b) and (24.c) make a general attribution of a property (being

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[26]However, not every definite (the+count-noun) can generate generic sentences. It has been noted in the literature (see for example, Krifka et al. (1995); Vendler (1967)) that it is hard for a definite to generate a generic sentence if the noun does not denote a well–established kind or is too generic (where being 'generic' means being like a genus that subdivides into more specific kinds). For example, a noun like 'vehicle' is too generic for the definite 'the vehicle' to generate a generic sentence; however nouns denoting examples of vehicles (as specific kinds of the genus *vehicle*) can, e.g., 'the motorbike', 'the cart', 'the airplane', etc.

But is it not clear that a proper name qua predicate is too generic for the purpose. It denotes a class of people identified by the name they have (i.e., people called 'N'), much like other count nouns that denote classes of people identified by other things, like profession (i.e., the mathematician, the teacher, the fireman); religion (i.e., the Christian, the Buddhist); political inclination (i.e., the feminist, the socialist, the conservative); or other social categories or roles (i.e., the patient, the student, the transvestite, the widow, the professional). Definites with such count nouns that denote classes of people can generate generic sentences all right: e.g., 'The mathematician typically feels superior'; 'The feminist believes in the equality of genders'; 'The patient does not like to wait'. What a proper name denotes as a predicate (i.e., 'Martin' denoting the set of Martins/people called 'Martin') does not seem to be neither more, nor less, general than what count nouns denoting classes of people is (i.e., 'widow' / 'socialist' denoting the set of widows/socialists, respectively). So, I suspect that what prevents a bare name from generating a genetic sentence is not that its meaning is too generic, but that its meaning is too specific, indeed, referential on a single individual.

scary, or, having a short name) to every (or most) members of a set, i.e., the set of sarahs.

Note that, apart from ordinarily functioning like predicates, count nouns can also be used to denote the kind, or class, consisting of the individuals in their extension. This is a general property of count nouns. When proper names are functioning as predicates, they can also denote the kind or class consisting of the individuals that bear that name, as witness by the sentences in (24). But unlike definites with count nouns, bare singular proper names cannot be use to refer to the kind or class consisting in the individuals called that name. This suggests that bare singular proper names are simply not equivalent to a count noun with a covert definite article.

To press the point further, I would like to show that in some of those languages that permit or require the use of the definite article with singular proper names, the resulting the+N construction cannot generate generic sentences either (e.g. (25.a) and (26.a)); whereas singular definites with count nouns can (e.g. (25.b) and (26.b)). In contrast, predicative uses of proper names can generate generic readings (e.g. (25.c)-(25.d) and (26.c))[27]:

Spanish

(25)   a.   La   Maria es astuta, mientras que la   Marta no.   (no generic)
           The Maria is clever, while   that the Marta not
           '(the) Maria is clever while (the) Marta is not'

       b.   El   gato es astuto, mientras que el   perro no.   (I-generic)
           The cat   is clever, while   that the dog   not
           'The dog is clever while the cat is not'

       c.   Las   Marias son astutas, mientras que las   Martas no. (I-generic)
           The-PLU Marias are clever,   while   that the-PLU Martas not
           'Marias/The Marias as are clever while Martas/the Martas are not'

       d.   Todas las   Marias son astutas.   (I-generic)
           All   the-PLU Marias are clever
           'Every Maria is/ All the Marias are clever'

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[27]Identical examples can be written in Catalan and Italian (data due to Carlota Serrahima for Catalan, and Elia Zardini for Italian, both p.c.)

Portuguese[28]

(26)　a.　A　Anacleta detesta o　seu nome.　　　　　　　　(no generic)
　　　　　　The Anacleta hates　the her name
　　　　　　'(the) Anacleta hates her name'

　　　b.　O　varredor de rua　detesta o　seu trabalho.　　　(I-generic)
　　　　　　The sweeper of street hates　the his job
　　　　　　'The street sweeper hates his job'

　　　c.　As　　　Anacletas detestam o　seu　nome.　　　　(I-generic)
　　　　　　The-PLU Anacletas hate　　the their name
　　　　　　'The Anacletas/Anacletas hate their name'

5.5　The Problematic Semantics of Predicativism

In this section I will argue that the predicativist's account of what *N* means is
unconvincing. Further, I will suggest that the predicative meaning of *N*, i.e.,
being called N, or something of the sort, requires names to be referential. So
it is unlikely that the predicative meaning of names can be more fundamental
than their referential meaning.

　　As we said, predicativists agree that *N*, when a predicate, more or less
means *being called N* or *entity called N* (Elbourne (2005, 172-74), Matushansky
(2008, 599), Fara (2015c, 64)), or expresses the property *being an N*, which is
true of a thing just in case it is called *N*. This is intuitive enough for predicative
uses of names, for it will give the right truth-conditions for sentences in which
they appear. However, it is important to make this intuitive notion of *being
called N* more precise. Clearly, there is a sense of 'call' that is irrelevant here,
that is, the ordinary sense in which x counts as being called *N* if someone called
x *N* mistakenly, i.e., when x is not called *N* in the sense we are after. I was once
called 'Carmen' by a friend, but clearly that didn't make me a Carmen, and
this counts as a misidentification precisely because I am not called 'Carmen' in
the sense we are after.

　　To bring up this relevant sense, Fara (2011b, 2015c) has argued that the
name in naming constructions such as 'being called N' should be *used* and not
mentioned (hence the lack of quotation marks). Following Matushansky (2008,

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[28]Data due to Ricardo Santos, p.c.

2015) she argues that in naming constructions, when the name is used, it is a predicate. Fara then draws a parallel between *being called N* and *being called F* (when *F* is an adjective of other predicate), involving a single sense of 'call': "My father called me Delia; my father called me stubborn. We naturally say, in each case, that my father called me something. Both cases involve what I'm calling appellative 'call'" (Fara, 2015c, 68).

Fara (2011b) argues that the distinction between using and mentioning in called-constructions involving adjectives (or predicates) also applies to names. Consider, for example,

(27) a.   Maude called me stupid.
      b.   Maude called me 'stupid' (Fara, 2011b, 493).

The distinction between (27.a) and (27.b) is that in calling someone stupid something is said to the effect that *stupid* is being attributed to that person. For example, if you say 'You lack intelligence', you are calling me stupid. But calling someone 'stupid' involves using the word 'stupid'. The same distinction applies to names, according to Fara: "To be called Willard is to have 'Willard' as a name. To be called 'Willard' is for someone to address you, or refer to you, using that name" (Fara, 2011b, 493). Her account does not pose an ambiguity for 'being-called' but just make a distinction between using the name and mentioning it.

Fara then gives a single semantic clause for called-constructions, regardless of whether it is a predicate or a proper name what goes in the appellation position (Fara, 2011b, 497):

'Maude called Walter stupid/a liar' is true just in case Maude said or did something that entails that Walter ?? [['stupid']] / [['liar']].

'Hattie called Quine Willard' is true just in case Hattie said or did something that entailed that Quine [['Willard']].[29]

Fara (2015c) restates this distinction as follows, where *BCC* stands for the *being-called-condition* (cf. Section 2.1) and *BBCC* stands for the *bastardized-being-called-condition* (Fara (2015c, 64), and also Fara (2011b, 496)):

BCC '*N*' (when a predicate) is true of a thing just in case it is called *N*.

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[29]The double-bracket notation represents here the function from words to their semantic values. Taking the semantic value of a predicate to be an extension, then for any predicate *F*, [[F]] is a set—the set of things of which *F* is true (Fara, 2011b, 497).

BBCC '*N*' (when a predicate) is true of a thing just in case it is called '*N*'.[30]

And the semantic analysis of 'appellative 'call'' is similar to the one given in Fara (2011b, 497) (except for a mention of 'presuppositions'): "'*x* called *y* *F* ' is true just in case *x* said or did something that entails or presupposes that y is *F*" Fara (2015c, 68).

This account seems to me inadequate. I think there are important dissimilarities between the *being-called* constructions with proper names in the appellation positions, and the rest. First, while the use/mention distinction in *being called F* is relevant (for the predicate does not need to be mentioned, i.e., there are many ways of calling someone stupid without using the word 'stupid'), *being called N* involves the name in a very important way: Hattie cannot call Quine Willard in the intended sense without using the word 'Willard', i.e., either because she uttered the word in the naming ceremony, or wrote it down in Quine's birth certificate, etc. And if Quine is called Willard, then the name 'Willard' will figure in any plausible analysis of what that means, e.g., that his name is 'Willard', etc. – indeed, witness Fara:"To be called Willard is to have 'Willard' as a name" (Fara, 2011b, 493).[31]

Second, more importantly, Maude can call Walter stupid/a liar but her saying that does not entail at all that Walter is in the extension of 'stupid' or 'liar'. Obviously, whether that is the case has to do with Walter's properties, but this is completely independent of whether he is ever called stupid/a liar by anyone. Conversely, if Hattie called Quine Willard, she did thereby make it the case that he is in the extension of 'Willard' – the set of people that have that name. Consequently, if Hattie called Quine Willard (or Quine is called Willard) I can infer that 'Willard' is Quine's name, whereas I cannot infer from what Maude said or did that 'stupid' or 'a liar' are Walter's names; indeed I cannot infer anything about Walter, except perhaps that he was at least once called stupid or a liar by someone. In sum, if Quine is called Willard, then Quine is

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[30]This is not exactly how Fara states the *BBCC*, but it is one way of making clear that what she means, i.e., that "in the *being-called condition* the name 'Alfred' is used, while in the *bastardized being-called condition* the name 'Alfred' is mentioned" (Fara, 2015c, 64-65, my italics).

[31]This is why I said in fn4 of Chapter 2 that what the predicativist apparently means by 'being called N', boils down to the same property referentialists are after with the expression 'being called 'N': having set aside the case of misidentification as an irrelevant sense of being called 'N', we clearly are after something like the property of having 'N' as a name, or being named with 'N', or bearing 'N', etc., (see also Section 6.3.1.

in the extension of 'Willard', but if he is called stupid, he is not thereby in the extension of 'stupid'.[32]

Both these observations suggest that 'call' in these called-constructions does not have the same meaning, as Fara believes. When using adjectives or predicates in the appellation position, *being called F* really means something like *having being attributed the property F*; what Maude does in calling Walter stupid/a liar is ascribing the property of being stupid/a liar to him. But Hattie did not ascribed *Willard* to Quine, she just gave him this name. Since clearly having been attributed a certain property is not the same as having that property, if 'Quine is called Willard' means that Quine has the property *being called Willard*, then *being called N* does not mean the same as *being called F*. So it seems that *being called N* should mean something like *having been given N as name*, or *being named N*, etc.

Now, suppose that 'being called *N*' just is being in the extension of *N*. Then that Quine is called Willard just means that Quine is in the extension of 'Willard', or simply that Quine is a Willard. But we were supposed to get an explanation for *being an N* in terms of *being called N*; if *being called N* now means *being an N*/ *being in the extension of 'N'*, the account is circular. And also highly uninformative: it gives us no clue as to what things are *Ns*, or when *N* is true of something. It seems to me that explaining what *being called N* means requires talking about reference eventually.

In fact this is what Fara ends up doing: she appeals to naming or referential practices to explains what being called N means:

> "being called 'Michael' [sic] – being in the extension of the name 'Michael' – is something like having been dubbed Michael, with the name 'Michael' continuing to be used to refer to you in ways that are caused, with a chain of intentionally reference-preserving links, by the original dubbing" (Fara, 2015c, 73).

Matushansky also says the relation between an individual and a name is a naming convention (Matushansky, 2008, 599). But we don't really know what these naming practices or conventions are if they are not related to reference (See Section 6.1.1 for more on this). And indeed, Fara seems to suggest in the above quote that what it is for an individual to be in the extension of *N* is for a referential practice tying that individual and *N* to be in place.

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[32]Note that we do not normally ascribe properties by using calling-constructions, i.e., we wouldn't say that Quine is called a philosopher. It seems that calling *x F* is a particular way of ascribing.

But how would there be a referential practice linking an individual with a name if names are not referential devices, but predicates? When predicates are used referentially (e.g., when nouns are used vocatively: 'waiter', 'driver', etc.; or cases like 'mum' and 'grandma' as noted in Section 4.1) they are used to refer to those individuals the noun is true of on quite independent grounds of whether the noun is ever used referentially. In other words, what makes someone a waiter or a mother is quite independent of the fact that the words 'waiter' or 'mother' can be use referentially to designate a waiter or a mother. But with names, according to the predicativist, what we have is a predicate whose conditions of correct application to any individual depend on N being used to refer to that individual. But since on this account N is not referential, the only reason one can refer to an individual with N is that the individual is in the extension of N. Thus, it seems that the only way out of this circularity is to admit that N is referential after all.

I conclude that the predicativist has not made a convincing case that the fundamental meaning of proper names is their predicative meaning. If my considerations are correct the predicative meaning somehow depends on proper names being referential. This conclusion also indicates the futility of the attempt to render every referential use of a proper name predicative. Referential names are still needed for the predicativist semantics.

5.6   Conclusion

The success of the predicate view – and its superior ability to provide a uniform account of proper names – hinges on whether it can adequately accommodate referential uses of proper names. This crucially involves bridging the apparent differences between predicates and proper names. One of these differences is that unlike common nouns, proper names seem to be *referential* and *singular* terms, that is, in their typical uses, they seem to simply stand for the objects they refer to, and to have an individual as semantic value, as oppose to designating a property or an extension. The unpronounced determiner thesis is supposed to resolve this difference and provide semantic uniformity between predicative and referential uses of proper names: names would be predicates in all their occurrences. The appearance of referentiality and singularity that seem to be

the main characteristics of proper names would be explained by their putative underlying structure as complex demonstratives or definite descriptions.

But the unpronounced determiner thesis fails. I have argued that the significant semantic difference between count nouns and proper names persists notwithstanding the predicativist's treatment of referential proper names as definite descriptions or complex demonstratives. The evidence presented in sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 shows that proper names behave differently from the complex demonstratives of definite descriptions that are thought to embed them. In addition, In addition, I showed that proper names behave differently from definite description even in some of the languages that use the definite article with proper names, and therefore this aspect of the cross-linguistic data does not support *The*-Predicativism, as claimed. Lastly, the argument in section 5.5 shows that it is unlikely that the fundamental meaning of proper names is the predicative meaning. As it stands, therefore, Predicativism cannot be the right account of the semantics of proper names.

Chapter 6

The Polyreferential View of Proper Names

In this chapter I will present my own view about the semantics of proper names as referential terms. This view emerged as a response to the problem of multiple bearerhood – a problem that was stated at the beginning of this essay as one of the main challenges to Referentialism. The view also emerged as a way to give a semantic based to all other uses of proper names, which in my account are treated as derived from the fundamental referential meaning.

Multiple bearerhood is supposed to be problematic for the view that proper names are singular terms because a standard assumption about singular terms is that they have just one semantic referent. More precisely, the standard view is that singular terms *refer*, and reference for singular terms is a one-to-one relation between the term and its referent.[1] But if names have multiple bearers the issue arises of deciding which one of the bearers of a given name is its semantic reference.

The assumption that reference for singular terms is only a one-to-one relation *vis-à-vis* the problem of multiple bearerhood has resulted in two positions in the referentialist's camp: One option, taken by the Homonymy view, is to say that the name-bearing relation – the relation between a name and the individual that bears it – is the semantic relation of reference. And, given the assumption that reference is one-to-one, they claim that for any name N that seems to have multiple bearers there are really multiple distinct albeit homonymous names – what they call *specific* names – each one with just one referent.[2] The other option, taken by the Contextualist view, is to treat names as context-sensitive

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[1] In contrast with *plural terms* that can be reasonably taken to refer, but where reference would be a one-to-many relation.

[2] See García-Carpintero (2017), Jeshion (2015c), and Sainsbury (2015) for the Homonymy view.

expressions and the name-bearing relation as non-semantic, such that any given name N can have many different bearers, but reference between N and any one of its bearers only obtains in a context in which the name is used.[3]

Despite both strategies being reasonably adequate responses to the problem of multiple-bearerhood, they might seem counterintuitive: it seems counterintuitive to think that there are millions of distinct 'David' names. It is also counterintuitive or unnatural to distinguish the name-bearing relation from reference. But more importantly, both strategies present problems in the long run: while I think both views in general fare better than Predicativism at explaining the behaviour of proper names, neither Contextualism nor the Homonymy view can account for all uses of proper names satisfactorily – or so I'll argue in Section 6.3.

The view I present in what follows accounts for multiple bearerhood in a way that preserves the referentialist's contention that proper names are fundamentally referential singular terms, while keeping both the intuition that names are shared between bearers, and the intuition that bearing a name is a semantic relation (just reference). In addition, my account has the advantage of accounting adequately for all the uses of proper names discussed so far.

6.1 Polyreferentialism

My view is that proper names are what I shall call *polyreferential*.[4] I choose this label seeking to exploit a helpful analogy with polysemy: just as polysemous words are considered as single words that have more than one meaning (as well as possibly more than one extension or semantic value corresponding to the different meanings), polyreferential words are single words that have more than one referent.[5]

Polyreferentialism may be *prima facie* intuitive in the case of proper names in so far as it restates multiple bearerhood. However, Polyreferentialism

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[3]See for example, Rami (2014b, 2015) and Récanati (1993). Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998), Schoubye (2017) and Voltolini (1995) also defend contextualist accounts, although it is not clear what they think of the name-bearing relation. Delgado (2011) defends a variant of Contextualism that takes the name-bearing relation to be semantic.

[4]The semantic account that follows should be understood as accounting for the nature and behaviour of proper names as found in natural language.

[5]Or *can* have more than one referent, even if in some cases they happen to have just one, or none.

does not just restate that names have many different bearers but holds that each bearer of a given name N is a semantic referent of N. In other words, the view makes no distinction between bearing N and being a semantic referent of N. Thus, names that have many different bearers have therefore many different referents. In contrast with Contextualism, Polyreferentialism is not the idea that names can *potentially* have different referents, on different contexts of use, like context sensitive words do. Rather, it is the idea that names have different referents (as many as bearers the name has) in an absolute (or context-invariant) sense, that is, a name is referentially related to each one of its bearers independently of any given particular use of the name.[6] In contrast with the Homonymy view, Polyreferentialism claims that any name N is a *single* name that can have many different referents; in other words, the view does not proliferate names in order to pair them with the different bearers in a one-to-one fashion.

I should note here that the views of Perry (2001) and Katz (2001) are similar to mine. However, Perry says that names are 'nambiguous' (i.e., a type of ambiguity for names, similar but distinct from common ambiguity), and that "the same name has many different meanings" (Perry, 2001, 104-05). But Perry does not say much about reference, so it is not clear how much our views share.[7] On Perry's account, names only get to have a referent on a particular use. This is however not a contextualist view; according to Perry, the role of the context is pre-semantic, i.e., that of helping to single out which of the name's meanings is being exploited. Then this meaning determines a referent for that use. In my view, to say that a name has many referents is to say that in each use it semantically refers to each of them. I also think that names have at least the minimal (and very general) linguistic meaning that states its function in the language, like any other word has – something like 'N refers to its bearers/referents'. But this meaning or sense is not as robust as those in Perry's account, where each of a name's meanings determines a referent.[8]

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[6]Excepting perhaps an initial use where the association between the name and the bearer is established.

[7]García-Carpintero thinks that Perry's view is very similar to his own view (García-Carpintero, 2017, fn80). But García-Carpintero's view is in clear contrast with my view, or so I'll argue here.

[8]I take the view that reference is a part of the meaning of an expression, therefore my account does not entail that names have no meaning. However, I will leave the question of whether names could have a more robust type of meaning, more akin to a *Fregean sense*, to further research.

Katz claims that names are 'referentially equivocal', and adds as a clarification that "they have multiple bearers, not multiple senses" (Katz, 2001, 147), but not further elucidation of whether bearerhood is to be considered as semantic. In some sense his view is more similar to mine: he claims that proper names have a single sense, something like "the thing which is a bearer of 'N'" (Katz, 2001, 139). However, Katz seems to think that it is names as *types* that have many bearers, but *tokens* of it have, via the assigned sense, a determinate referent.[9] I think in this respect Katz view is more similar to Contextualism.

6.1.1   Bearing as a Semantic Relation

Why think that names have many different referents? I believe that it is more natural to assume no distinction between bearing a name and being a semantic referent for that name. Bearing a name, or being called a name, or being named a name, are intuitive notions. Spelling out what these notions mean more precisely would arguably cite facts about reference. We can say that bearing a name is to be associated with a name, and we can talk about the naming practices that initiate this association, i.e., baptisms, dubbings, birth certificates, formal ceremonies, etc. But we would still need to say just which association these many different practices institute, since clearly not any association that an individual may have with a name will count as bearing N – e.g., the association I have with my favourite name, does not make me a bearer of that name. In addition, there is the question of what purpose this association serves if not the purpose of reference. Suppose the association between a name and an individual is not reference: nonetheless, it seems that it only exist in order to enable reference, via some further stipulation such as that N refer to x only if x bears N. But why should this association between N and x fall short of reference if it is established only for the purpose of allowing one to refer to x with N?

On the other hand, it seems pretty intuitive that bearing N should consist of reference: that what it is for x to bear N – to be named N, or to be called N – is for N to refer to x, or N to be used to refer to x, etc. [10] The association the many naming practices institute – what they have in common – is just reference. What seems constitutive about bearing a name is not going to be

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[9]If I understand him correctly (see in particular fn42 in Katz (2001)) – he doesn't explain any further how this works.

[10]I'd say reference is captured by both the relation expressed as 'N refers to x', and the converse relation expressed as 'x is a bearer of N'. But I'll ignore this nuance in what follows.

anything that can be cited as a naming practice – of which there can be a vast amount – but rather that these practices, in different ways, institute reference between a name and an individual.[11]

Names have a purpose in the language: to be used to refer to, pick out, or talk about an individual. It seems natural to assume that given the referential purpose of names, the association of a name with an individual generates a semantic relation of reference, so that we will use the name to refer to (pick out, talk about) the individual. Moreover, the reference of any referential use of a proper name, and its contribution to propositional content thereby, would be an individual associated with the name. Thus it seems right to count this association as semantic.

6.1.2   Reference and Singularity

There seem to be in principle nothing against the thought that the *same* name can be used to initiate another naming practice, and thus comes to have another bearer. But on the polyreferential view this means that a referential practice is thereby initiated and the name comes to have another referent. Thus, a name would be referentially related to more than one individual, and reference for proper names as polyreferential would be a one-to-many relation. And this runs against the standard view that reference for singular terms is a one-to-one relation. Can proper names still be singular terms that refer on the polyreferential view?

Polyreferentialism claims that for a single name *N*, there are as many referential relations to individuals as bearers the name has, and the reference relation obtains between a single name and each one of its bearers *individually*. Thus, it is not that the name thereby refers to some plurality or looses its function as referential term and becomes instead a general term, designating a set of individuals. In other words, a polyreferential name does not have a single extension consisting of all of its bearers, but many extensions each consisting of one bearer.

To say that for polyreferential words reference is one-to-many just means that reference is such that can relate one item (a name) with many other items

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[11]Gray (2014, Section 2) makes a more detailed argument that facts about name-bearing depend on facts about reference, citing in particular Madagascar-like cases where it seems clear that the island's coming to have the name is has nowadays depended on certain referential practices of speakers, and not on any form of baptism or any other naming practice that is supposed to be constitutive of the bearing relation.

(individuals). But there are different ways for a relation to be one-to-many: for example, plural reference and *being-true-of* are one-to-many as well, but they are different from polyreference.

Consider plural reference for contrast: Plural terms refer to a number of objects *taken together*, i.e., 'The Beatles' refer to Paul, John, Ringo, and George taken together, but it doesn't refer to any of them individually. In contrast, 'David' refers to Hume, and to Kaplan, and to Lewis, but it doesn't refer to Hume, Kaplan and Lewis taken together. Or consider another analogy: the relations *being-father-of* and *being-surrounded-by* exemplify different ways of being one-to-many: *Being-father-of* is one-to-many in a way that is similar to polyreference: a single individual x can be related by *being-father-of* to different individuals, a, b and c. But in this case, it is true that x is a father of a, and x is a father of b, and x is a father of c. *Being-surrounded-by*, on the other hand, is more like plural reference: by it one individual x can be related to many individuals a, b, and c *taken together*, while not being the case that x is surrounded by a, and x is surrounded by b, etc.

The *being-true-of* relation is one-to-many as well, but it is different from the referential relation. For one thing, it is mediated by a property, i.e., a general term is associated with a property, or a description, and it is true of an individual if the individual has the property, or satisfies the condition in question. A referential name is associated with individuals directly, not in virtue of any property or condition the individual must satisfy; and it refers to them in virtue of this direct association.[12]

The difference between the reference relation and the *being-true-of* relation has a grammatical correlate: A general term like 'cow' cannot appear in argument position without determiners[13], since a general term cannot designate a single individual in its extension unless it occurs with a determiner that restricts its denotation.[14] The *being-true-of* relation apparently does not have the semantic effect of allowing the term to pick just one individual. This is arguably because a general term is not directly associated which each individual that it

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[12]This does not mean that names could not have Fregean senses, or something similar. I would say that still in this case, the name 'Aristotle' is associated with the individual (the philosopher) *and not* that it is associated with the sense (for example 'being the teacher of Alexander') and *only* with Aristotle as a satisfier of the property expressed by the sense. Note in addition that it would be implausible to say that a name *designates* whatever property is expressed by its sense.

[13]Except when it would received a mass or abstract interpretation, or is used either vocatively or non-standardly as a proper name for a particular object (cf. Section 4.1 and 4.2).

[14]Remember that this is why Predicativism must posit a hidden determiner to go with names when used referentially.

is true of, but associated with a property, or an extension that contains many individuals; what they contribute to propositional content is this property or extension. Indeed, sometimes, general terms (still appearing with determiners or in the plural) are used referentially, but to refer to the kind, class or property to which they *are* associated.[15] A proper name, on the contrary, does not need to be restricted by determiners in order to refer to one of its referents; it refers individually to each individual that is associated with it.

Note that *predicate denotation* can be defined as one-to-many in a way that is similar to polyreference. If a predicate is polysemous, it will be associated with at least two different properties, and (possibly) two different extensions. For example, the polysemous predicate 'walnut' has at least two meanings, i.e., 'x is a walnut *fruit*' and 'x is a walnut *tree*'. So this predicate has a one-to-many relation to its meanings (it doesn't seem plausible to think that 'walnut' has a single extension consisting of both trees and fruits; rather it seems to have two separate extensions).

When proper names are used as general terms, they will typically also be polysemous, since proper names can have the different senses exemplified in Jeshion's examples (cf. Section 2.6.1) or in adjectival or verbal uses. For example, 'Picasso', on a common noun use, has the following meanings (among others): 'x is called 'Picasso'', 'x is a painting by Picasso', 'x resembles Picasso', etc.

I think the issue of whether a term is *singular*, as opposed to *general*, should not be decided based on whether the term can designate only one object or many objects. Rather the distinction should be made based on whether the term *refers* to individuals, or is *true of* individuals (and designate properties, or extensions). Thus, according to Polyreferentialism, proper names are singular terms even thought they are polyreferential: because their fundamental semantic property is still that of referring; and they contribute individuals to propositional content directly, as opposed to being like a general term whose fundamental semantic property is that of being true of individuals, and whose contribution to propositional content is a property or a set of individuals.

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[15]For example, consider the generic 'The tiger is the largest feline'. Note that what we said is consistent with the fact that in this sentence, the definite article can be considered an expletive, for it doesn't have deictic or quantificational import, i.e., it does not select a particular tiger from the extension of tigers.

6.1.3   Polyreferentialism and Compositionality

Now the question naturally arises whether polyreferentialism entails that sentences containing names are also polysemous. Given that, according to Polyreferentialism, proper names have many referents – and what they do, being *referential* terms, is to contribute their referents to the propositional content of sentences in which they occur – then the sentences in which they appear will also express many different contents, as many as referents for the name there are.[16]

However, it is *each* of the referents of a polyreferential name that is contributed to propositional content, and not all of them at once. Consider,

(1)   David is happy.

This sentence does not express a *single* proposition about various Davids taken together (as a sentence with plural terms may do), or about a set of Davids. Rather, it expresses many different singular propositions, each about a single David. What we said above about 'David' referring to Hume, *and* to Kaplan, *and* to Lewis, *and not* to Hume, Kaplan and Lewis taken together, translates here into the thought that (1) expresses the proposition that Hume is happy, *and* it expresses the proposition that Kaplan is happy, *and* it expresses the proposition that Lewis is happy. But (1) does not expresses the proposition that Hume, Kaplan and Lewis are happy.

Thus, polyreference is governed by the following principle of non-agglomeration (PNA)[17]:

PNA When N is polyreferential, N refers to a, and N refers to b, but N does not refer to a & b.

And analogously for sentence expression (PNA-S):

PNA-S When S contains a polyreferential N, S expresses p, and S expresses p', but S does not express p & p'.

Something similar can be said about polysemous terms and sentences containing them. Given the (at least two) meanings of 'walnut', the term contributes the property or extension 'x is a walnut fruit' *and* the property or

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[16]In what follows I will use 'meaning' and 'content' for sentences and 'propositions' interchangeably.

[17]Thanks to David Yates for help formulating this.

extension 'x is a walnut tree' to propositional content. Thus, a sentence such as 'My mother likes walnuts' expresses two propositions, namely, that my mother likes walnut fruits, and that my mother likes walnut trees. But it doesn't express the proposition that my mother likes all things walnut (i.e., 'walnut' does not contribute a single extension to propositional content consisting of both fruits and trees).

It seems clear, however, that when using proper names referentially, speakers typically[18] mean to talk about just *one* of the many referents a name may have, and typically only one referent is relevant to the conversation, or to evaluate what the speaker said and whether what she said is true. Here we will need to appeal to the distinction between semantic reference and speaker reference. Consider (1) again. Given that 'David' is polyreferential, the sentence will express many different contents, as many as referents of 'David' there are. The semantics of the name in (1) exactly (compositionally) determines the meanings or contents the sentence has.[19] However, a speaker that uses this sentence will typically mean to talk about a single David, and so the *speaker*'s meaning when using the sentence is typically just one of the meanings the sentence has. The speaker selects one of the meanings of the sentence, i.e., selects one of the referents of the name he is using (likewise, the speaker would select one of the meanings of polysemous words), and just this meaning is what *he* expresses – what the speaker said (as opposed to what the sentence says) and what is relevant in the communication, is the proposition the speaker means, and not the many propositions the sentence expresses.

That names are polyreferential, and sentences containing names express

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[18] *Typically*, because there may be referential uses of names in which is not clear that reference to only one referent is intended (cf. fn19 below).

[19] The account is designed to work on the normal cases, and on these, the semantics of the name will compositionally determine each proposition expressed by a given sentence. However, there are special cases in which it is not clear what compositional analysis to give. Polysemous words sometimes admit the activation of two of their meanings, and perhaps proper names too. An example of the first will be 'Lunch was delicious but took forever' (Falkun and Vicente, 2015, 2), where the different senses of lunch ('type of food'/'type of event') are both activated. But in this case, it doesn't seem plausible to say that the sentence expresses the proposition that lunch (food) was delicious and took forever, and it expresses the proposition that lunch (event) was delicious and took forever, since both these propositions would be odd (probably even a case of category mistake) but more importantly, neither of these propositions seem to be what a speaker will want to express with the sentence. The intuitive proposition that is expressed is something like <lunch (food) was delicious and lunch (event) took forever>. But as said, it is not clear how to get this result compositionally from 'lunch'. Examples with proper names that activate more than one of its referential meanings are hard to find, but perhaps the following, in the right context, will be an example of it: 'Aristotle is either a philosopher or a shipping magnate'.

many different propositions should generally not be problematic for communication. Despite a name having many different referents, for every speaker there would be a relative small number of referents for the name that he knows and would want to speak about, and the number of referents that overlaps with those his audience knows in most communications will typically be much smaller. The speaker's intention to refer to just one bearer of the name may need to be reinforced (by accompanying demonstrations or descriptions) if the context is such that more than one bearer of the name is a good candidate for speaker reference, in order to facilitate the audience's interpretation. The *semantic* reference for a proper name does not need to be *fixed* by appealing to any feature of the context in which is used. Reference is already fixed on the different bearers at the original naming acts. The speaker reference of a particular use of a proper name is determined both by the fact that the individual referred to is one of the referents of the name, and that the speaker has intended to refer to this individual.[20]

Note that both homonymists and contextualists would need to appeal to some kind of selection mechanism to explain reference as well. On the Homonymy view, when a speaker uses a name, she would be selecting one specific name among many homonymous ones. But it seems that the only basis for selecting between specific names that are formally identical is that they presumably have distinct referents (the only thing that distinguishes specific names from each other). Thus, I don't see how selecting a specific name does not boil down to selecting a particular referent. Contextualists appeal to a layer of meaning, or a character, for the proper name – roughly the condition that the individual referred to must be a bearer of the name. But this condition does not automatically deliver a referent for a use of a proper name in a given context; it rather acts as a constraint on reference in conjunction with speaker's intentions in referring to a particular individual. Further, since there are many contexts in which more than one bearer of the name is a good candidate for reference, contextualists accounts would need to appeal in one way or another,

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[20]In the normal case, the speaker's intentions alone do not determine a referent for a use of a proper name. The speaker is constrained to select among the referents of a particular name (but this is no more than saying that, in general, in using any word, one is constrained by the word's meanings). If the speaker means to refer to Smith but uses the name 'Jones', his use of 'Jones' does not thereby refer to Smith, for he did not succeed in selecting a referent of 'Jones'. Special cases of mistaken reference can result in reference being established between a name and an individual who was not initially associated with the name (i.e., Madagascar-like cases) but this does not contradict the point that the speaker's referential intentions alone do not generally determine reference.

to the speaker's intentions in referring to one bearer over another.[21]

There is a tricky issue on exactly what to say about the truth-conditions for sentences (in general, since not just those containing names but also those containing polysemous predicates will express many different propositions). My tentative account (which I hope to develop in detail in further work) would be the following.[22] Given a standard way of understanding sentence truth as depending on the truth of the proposition it expresses, we will have the following rule:

Truth-Conditions for Sentences For any sentence S, S is true when it expresses a true proposition *and* S is false when it expresses a false proposition.

As a result, most sentences containing either polyreferential terms or polysemous predicates will be true, *and* they will be false. Some sentences will be just true or just false; for example, the sentence 'David is self-identical' would be only true, since every proposition expressed by it is true. An ordinary sentence like (1) is true, and it is false. A speaker will say something true when the proposition he means to express with (1) is true, even if (1) is also false.[23]

Finally, Polyreferential names are still rigid designators: they refer to the same individuals across different possible worlds. If we evaluate (1) with respect to other worlds, we still looking at whether Hume is happy at those worlds, and whether Kaplan is happy, and whether Lewis is happy, and not at whoever happens to be a referent of 'David' in other worlds. Again, (1) is going to come out true at w, and is going to come out false at w (just for the same reasons it is true at the actual world, and it is false at the actual world). The truth and the falsity of the sentence with respect to any world will depend on how things are with the same individuals. A modal sentence, such as 'Aristotle could have been

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[21]For example, Rami's elaboration on the exact determination of reference includes parasitic, demonstrative or purely descriptive referential intentions, in addition to the constraint played by the condition that the individual referred to must be a bearer of the name (Rami, 2015, 2016). For Schoubye, the (contextually determined) variable assignment on which reference depends is said to represent the speaker's intentions (Schoubye, 2017, 732).

[22]Thanks to Elia Zardini for discussion here.

[23]My account entails that we won't be able to reason from the truth or falsity of sentences. For example, the sentence 'David is happy and David is not happy' expresses many different propositions, only some of which are contradictions, for many others are true propositions, e.g., when Hume is happy and Lewis is not (among many other possibilities). Likewise, we can't infer from 'David and Paul are happy' that 'David is happy'. Therefore I would say that the truth-conditions for a conjunction depend on the proposition the conjunction express: 'A & B' is true when the proposition that 'A & B' expresses is true, and not when A is true and B is true (likewise for disjunction, negation or entailment).

a farmer' is standardly thought to be true because there is a possible world w, where Aristotle is a farmer. On the polyreferentialist view it comes out true as well, since for every bearer of 'Aristotle' in the actual world, there is a possible world w where he is a farmer. With respect to identity statements like 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' we will say that only some of the propositions it expresses come out true (and necessarily so), i.e., when 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' name the same individual.[24]

6.2   Polyreferentialism, Polysemy and Ambiguity

One might wonder at this point to what extent polyreferentialism is really different from ambiguity or really similar to polysemy. A standard way of contrasting polysemy and ambiguity is to say that while in the former case there is just one word that have different senses or meanings, and these meanings are crucially related, in the later case there are really two distinct homonymous words, with unrelated meanings. Polyreferential words fall somehow between: a proper name N (when referential) is just *one* word that may have just one sense[25] and may have many referents. On this standard conception of ambiguity (i.e., where ambiguous words are conceived as separate words with unrelated meanings), polyreferentialism is not ambiguity, since the core idea of polyreferentialism is that one and the same word can have more than one referent. So, I think it is plausible to keep polyreferentialism separated from ambiguity.[26] However, in order to substantiate further this distinction, I will discuss some relevant differences between ambiguity and polyreferentialism.

Some of the properties that distinguish ambiguity from polysemy (or from other phenomena like context sensitivity) also distinguish ambiguity from

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[24]I'm aware that the account will need to be supplemented with a rule that states precisely what to do in case a name is iterated in the same sentence (i.e., 'David=David'; 'David saw David'), that is, whether we should require that the name gets the same value in both occurrences or not, resulting in that 'David=David' would either express the propositions that Hume=Hume, and that Kaplan=Kaplan; or the propositions that Hume=Hume, and that Hume=Kaplan, etc. I will leave this for further research, though I'm inclined to take the second option, with the result that 'David=David' will express only some necessary propositions.

[25]Cf. fn8 and fn12 above on whether names have senses, or linguistic meanings at all.

[26]Sometimes polysemy is considered as a type of ambiguity. In this case, polyreferentialism will count as another type of ambiguity, still distinguished from polysemy and ambiguity proper.

polyreferentialism. First, I think translation provides some support for the distinction between ambiguity on one hand and polysemy and polyreferentialism on the other. For example, while the word 'bank' is homonymous in English, this is not the case in other languages. This supports the idea that there are really two distinct words, $bank_1$ and $bank_2$, that just happen to be spelled and written the same in English. Polysemous words tend to be translated into a single word that also displays polysemy, or sometimes their different meanings get assigned different derivatives of one word (or at least words with shared etymology).[27] But proper names do not get translated into different names corresponding to their different referents in other languages.[28]

Second, if a word possesses different morphological derivatives, it is an indication of ambiguity: for example, form $bank_1$ you get *banker*, from $bank_2$, *embankment*; or $race_1$ has *race* (verb), and *racing* as derivatives, while $race_2$ have *racist* and *racial* (Cruse, 1986, 55-56).[29] But proper names, like polysemous words, don't seem to possess different morphological derivatives corresponding to their different referents: for example, *Victorian* is a derivative of 'Victoria' regardless of whether its meaning is related to Queen Victoria or another Victoria.

There is further evidence that supports distinguishing polyreferentialism, polysemy and ambiguity. Ambiguous words can also be polysemous, and polyreferential words (names) can also be polysemous and ambiguous. For example, 'bank' disambiguated as 'financial institution' (as opposed to 'riverside'), is also polysemous: it can mean the building where the bank is located (e.g., 'The bank is on South Street') or the directorate of the institution (e.g., 'The bank fired ten employees'). It can also change categories and be used as a verb (e.g. 'You should bank that money asap'). But it doesn't seem sensible to classify the different senses of 'bank' that are related in the same level as the different senses that are unrelated; we wouldn't want to say that 'bank' is ambiguous between 'building', 'financial institution' and 'riverside'. Thus it seems that the distinction between polysemy and ambiguity should be preserved.

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[27]For example, 'book' gets translated into the single word 'libro' (Spanish, Italian), and 'livro' (Portuguese), which are also polysemous between 'abstract work', and 'concrete copy', in their respective languages. 'Walnut' is translated in Spanish into 'nuez' (fruit) and 'nogal' (tree) but both words have their origin in the latin word *nux*.

[28]For example, the name 'Charles' is translated into the single 'Carlos' in Spanish, in reference to both Prince Charles, and Charles Darwin ('Príncipe Carlos', and 'Carlos Darwin' respectively).

[29]This is not to say that ambiguous words could not have a common derivative as well, for example *banking* is a derivative of both $bank_1$ and $bank_2$.

In the case of proper names, we already seen that they are typically poly-semous as well, i.e., they have different meanings when used as common nouns, adjectives or verbs, or in Jeshion's examples. But we also find that names can be ambiguous in addition to being polyreferential. An example of ambiguous names may be some acronyms, such as 'APA'.[30] 'APA' can be used to refer to the American Philosophy Association, or to the American Psychology Association (among many other things). But given their different origins as abbreviations of different names, we might think that there is really (at least) two different names 'APA', one for the American Philosophy Association, the other for the American Psychology Association, that just happen to be homonymous. Examples with proper names of people that can be considered ambiguous, because they have different origins, or belong to different languages or traditions, include: *Arn* (Yiddish contracted form of 'Aaron') and *Arn* (English short form of 'Arnold'); *Effie* (English pet form of 'Euphemia'), *Effie* (Scottish anglicised form of the Gaelic name 'Oighrig') and *Effie* (Jewish pet form of 'Ephraim').[31] With respect to translation, consider for example that 'WHO' is ambiguous between referring to the World Health Organization, and referring to the association Woman Helping Others . But when referring to the World Health Organization, 'WHO' gets translated into 'OMS' in Spanish (From 'Organización Mundial de la Salud') while the other 'WHO' would presumably get translated into 'MAO'(Mujeres Ayudando a Otros).[32] Intuitively, this is different from a case in which two or more people are called 'David'. Thus, it seems that ambiguity needs to be contrasted from polyreferentialism.

6.3   The Semantic of Other Uses of Proper Names

I have argued throughout this essay that proper names are fundamentally referential, but they also sometimes change categories – they have predicative uses, as well as adjectival and verbal uses – and have other derived uses, i.e., Jeshion's examples. I will now show how these other uses of proper names are semantically derived from the referential use.

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[30]Thanks to Elia Zardini for bringing this example to my attention

[31]Examples from *A Dictionary of First Names* (Hanks and Hodges, 2003).

[32]It is not clear that pet form of names ever get translated, but if they do, my guess is that, for example in Spanish, 'Effie' as the English pet form of 'Euphemia' would get translated into 'Eufe' or 'Eufi' (from 'Eufemia'); and as the Jewish pet form of 'Ephraim' would get translated into 'Efra' or 'Efri' (from 'Efraín').

6.3.1 The Predicative Meaning

We agree with the predicativist (and other referentialists) that in predicative uses, proper names express roughly the property *being called 'N'* or *bearing 'N'*. I suggested in section 6.1.1 that bearing a name or being called a name should be understood in terms of reference. We also noted (cf. Section 5.5) that the predicativist's account of what *being called N* means was circular and unsatisfactory in the end.

According to the Polyreferential view, given that it takes the name-bearing relation to be just reference, *bearing 'N'*, or *being called 'N'* (in the relevant sense), are equivalent to *being a referent of 'N'*. Thus the predicative meaning of a name depends on the referential meaning, its analysis crucially involves the name being referential. The predicative name expresses a property that individuals can have if they are *referentially* related to a referential name. Whenever a name N is associated with an individual (on the association that we call reference)[33] this individual acquires the property *being a referent of 'N'* (or *being a bearer of 'N'*, or *being called 'N'*). Thus, the semantics of the referential name (i.e., the referents it has) determines the extension of its predicative counterpart: the individuals in the extension of a predicative name N are just the referents of N. If a referential name does not (yet) have any referents (i.e., suppose I am creating a new name), its predicative meaning would still express the property of being a referent of this name, but its extension would be empty, since the predicate is true of nothing, insofar as the name does not (yet) have any referents.[34]

I turn now to discuss briefly how Contextualism and the Homonymy view (as broadly construed) derive the predicative meaning for proper names.

In general, accounts that treat names as context-sensitive assign something like a *character*, or a similar ingredient of meaning, to the proper name, that would help determine their referent in each context of use. This character

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[33]However this happens – I am not concerned in this essay with defining exactly how this association is initiated and sustained, only with its obtaining. Nothing I say here precludes incorporating, for example, Kripke's ideas of initial baptism and reference transmission through historical-causal chains, or accommodating for special cases of name changes (i.e., Madagascar-like cases).

[34]Matushansky claims that the predicative meaning of N being derived from its referential meaning requires the existence of a particular bearer of N, and because of this, she claims, it is impossible that the predicative meaning is derived from the referential meaning (Matushansky, 2015, 350). But I reject this claim: the predicative meaning of N does not depend on the existence of a particular bearer of N (only its having a member in its extension does). The predicative meaning of N only depends on N being referential. And a name gets to be a referential term by being introduced as a *name*.

would encode a condition or constraint on reference such that the object referred to must meet this condition. The analogy is with pronouns marked for gender, i.e., 'she', 'he'. The character of these pronouns encodes the condition that the thing referred to by a use of 'she'/'he' must be a female/a male respectively. In the case of proper names, their character would encode the condition that the thing referred to by a use of N must bear that name.

The pronouns 'she' and 'he' can sometimes be used as predicates, and as such they are true of those individuals who meet the condition expressed in their characters: e.g., 'my kitten is a *she*' would mean something like 'my kitten is a female'. Contextualists appeal to the same mechanism to explain the predicative use of proper names. When used as predicates, names express the property encoded in their character, i.e., *being a bearer of 'N'*; and are true of those individuals who have that property (See Rami (2014b, 425) and Schoubye (2017, *op. cit.* Sections 2.2-2.3)).

Although this is a fairly elegant way of deriving the predicative meaning from the referential meaning of proper names, a common criticism to this account has been to point out that predicative uses of the pronouns 'she' and 'he' are rather an exception among indexicals, that in general don't have predicative uses (witness: '*there are lots of Is in this room').[35] More dramatically, Jeshion (Jeshion, n.d., 54) points out that the predicative uses of 'she' and 'he' are limited to certain occurrences, and parallel neither predicative uses of names, nor common nouns with respect to a wide range of determiners and other constructions she discusses.[36] Therefore it seems doubtful that predicative uses of proper names can really be modelled to predicative uses of pronouns.

On the Homonymy view, each individual bears a specific name, and each specific name has at most one referent, i.e., there are not two individuals that share a specific name. The way this view attempts to account for common noun uses of names that seem to entail that different individuals have the same name, is by appealing to *generic* names. A generic name N_{G} is a name individuated in terms of its sound or spelling (taken as a word) than can serve as a 'template' from which to generate various specific names N_{S}. Thus, David

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[35]This criticism is acknowledged in Rami (2014b, fn51) and Schoubye (2017, fn31).

[36]For example, '*Some shes want water'; '*The she wants water'; '*My she needs a vaccine'; '*The shortest she needs water' (all from Jeshion (n.d., fn54)). Moreover, Jeshion also argues that when used referentially, proper names take affective demonstratives, ordinary possessives, bare expressives, and prenominal restrictive modifiers, while pronouns do not (e.g., '*Poor she has been ill') making the identification of proper names with pronouns unconvincing (Jeshion, n.d., fn54).

Hume and David Kaplan have two distinct specific names $David_S$ that were created or introduced at the time of their baptisms and share the generic $David_G$ from which their specific names were generated (Jeshion (2015c, 380), García-Carpintero (2017, *op. cit.*, Section 5)).

The predicative meaning needed to account for common noun uses of proper names cannot be derived from any referential N_S, simply because we would only generate a predicate that is true of at most one individual (i.e., 'being a bearer of 'N_S'). But the predicate meaning cannot be *semantically* generated from the generic name N_G either, since generic names do not have meanings and are not borne by anyone. The homonymyst's strategy is to take another expression that has the generic name as extension – that is, a quotation of the generic name ('N_G') – and claim, appealing to Nunberg's mechanism of meaning transfer[37], that this expression stands for a property shared by the different Davids, i.e., 'x is a bearer of a specific name generated from the generic $David_G$', or something of the sort (Jeshion (2015c, 381); García-Carpintero (2017, 52). In other words, a name for a certain word is used as a predicate to denote individuals that have a relationship with that word. Jeshion provides for analogy other examples of quotations of words used as predicates, e.g., 'awesome' to denote 'occurrences of 'awesome':

(2)   Four "awesome"s is more than enough in a blog-post (Jeshion, 2015c, 381).

The account is supplemented with the claim that speakers standardly quote without using quotation marks, to explain the lack of quotation marks when names are occurring as predicates, as in 'Every David is happy'.

I find this account problematic for three reasons. First, although we could grant that in practice quotations of words may occur without quotation marks, it should be at least also correct to employ them: 'Two 'David's came to the party', or 'Every 'David' is happy'. One would expect the use of quotation marks to be at most redundant but not weird. However, these sentences now seem odd and the intended interpretation is hard to access (at any rate, it would be hard to access to the ordinary speaker).[38] Further, it would be strange to remove the quotation marks of a predicative name when used in conjunction with a standard mention of the name that take quotation marks, as in the following:

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[37]See Nunberg (1995).
[38]For a related criticism, and few others, see Rami (2015, 414-418).

(3)   'David' is very popular these days, in fact I know at least five Davids.

Second, it just seems strange that one should use a quotation of a name to talk about people who have that name (or a specific one generated from that name). Jeshion's example (2) does not make the use a quotation of a name to talk about people plausible because (2) is about words and not about people. A relevant analogy would be that of using a quotation of the adjective 'awesome' to denote people who are awesome: 'There are four 'awesome's among my friends'. It is true that awesome people are somehow related to the *word* 'awesome', but a much more natural way to talk about them would be to use the adjective itself (as it happens when you convert adjectives to nouns, e.g., 'There are four *intellectuals* in this room') since a much more important relation these people have to the adjective is that of being in its extension.

Lastly, it turns out that the predicative meaning of a name N is not derived from N as referential, or does not depend on N's referential meaning; rather it is derived from the meaning of a different expression, i.e., the quotation of a generic name. But this robs homonymists the possibility of saying that referential names are more fundamental than predicative names, on criteria like semantic dependence (cf. Section 3.3.2). And this is damaging to the homonymist's response to the predicativist's uniformity argument, where the fundamentality of referential names (and the claim that every other use of proper names is derived from it) play a crucial role.

6.3.2   Adjectival and Verbal Meaning, and Jeshion's examples

I have argued against Predicativism that the different meanings of proper names as adjectives or as verbs, and in Jeshion's examples do not depend on the predicative meaning being called N, but rather they crucially depend on particular referents of the name involved (cf. Section 3.3.2. Although predicativists generally claim that some of these uses are derived, they have not shown that they are derived from what they take to be their fundamental predicative meaning. For example, Fara (2015b) takes production examples like 'There are two Picassos in the museum' to be cases of 'deferred interpretation' in Nunberg's sense, but does not explain how one arrives from 'x is called Picasso' to 'x is a painting by *Pablo* Picasso', i.e., the second property depends on a particular individual called 'Picasso' and not on the property *being called Picasso*. Matushansky

similarly claims that Jeshion's examples are derived via metonymy or coercion, but she claims they are derived from the "more basic naming-referential and simple-constant proper names" (Matushansky, 2015, 354), which in turn are, in her view, derived from predicative names. We already suggested that it is unlikely that referential names are actually derived from predicative names (cf. Sections 5.5 and 6.1.1).

Be that as it may, the point remains that this would be a peculiar way of deriving a new meaning from the predicative *being called N*, for this predicate will first undergo restriction to a particular individual before it can be turned into a new predicate, unlike cases of count noun derivations whose meanings are not restricted before new meanings can be derived.[39] In addition, no type of adjectival or verbal use, or Jeshion example, where new meanings are derived from the putative fundamental *being called N* has been provided.[40]

On the Polyreferential view, the derivation of these meanings is straightforward. A name can undergo category change, and therefore semantic changes, based on one of its referential meanings: just as a particular referent of a name is selected as the speaker-referent on a particular use of the name, also a particular referent of the name can be selected to derive a new meaning. Thus, a particular referent of 'Chanel' (the designer) is selected and the name is used as an adjective, or predicate modifier, to express a property related to that particular referent, i.e., to mean (among various possibilities) 'being like Chanel (elegant and feminine)' – e.g., 'that dress is so Chanel' – or 'being made by Chanel' – e.g., 'she wore the Chanel dress'. Likewise, a verbal used of 'Houdini' is based on a particular referent of the name (the famous magician), to mean something like 'doing like Houdini did (to escape by trickery)'. Finally, Jeshion's examples are treated the same: for example, a particular referent of 'Picasso' (the painter) is selected to derive a new meaning, i.e., 'x is a painting by Picasso'

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[39]Recall from our discussion in Sections 2.6.1 and 3.3.2 that deriving new meanings from count nouns do not requires the noun to be restricted to a particular denotation: For example, Fara's production example with 'gorilla' meaning 'x is a painting by a gorilla'(Fara, 2015b, 256-62); nouns used as verbs, e.g., *bottle*; examples of derivation using affixes, e.g., *girly*, *presidential*; etc.

[40]Matushansky believes the following is an example of a predicate derived from being called N (the example is due to Jeshion (2015b)):

'The new principal is such a Priscilla/an Orville'

Matushansky claims that it is from the predicate 'x is called Orville' that we get "the derived predicate of having the stereotypical properties associated with *being an entity called Orville*" (Matushansky, 2015, 358, my italics). However, according to Jeshion, the derived predicate has to do with the stereotypically characteristics associated with the name itself, i.e., being old-fashioned as the name is, etc. and not with the people so named (Jeshion, 2015b, 240)

in production examples; or a particular bearer of 'Obama' is selected to derive
the meaning 'x is dressed like Obama', in representation examples, etc. These
derivations are semantic insofar as the particular referents selected are part of
the *meaning* of the name (I take the view that the referent of a name is part of
its meaning – at any rate the referent of a name is part of its semantics.)

Note that something similar happens when polysemous words change cat-
egories or undergo sematic changes. Standardly, a new meaning is derived from
one of the meanings of a polysemous word. For example, the adjective 'healthy'
can be used as a noun – i.e., 'the healthy' – to denote people who are healthy,
based on one of the meanings of 'healthy' (being in a healthy state) and not
the other (promoting health)[41]. 'School' has the senses 'educational institution'
and 'building that host an educational institution'; when used as a verb, i.e.,
schooling, its meaning is derived from the sense 'educational institution'.

The Homonymy view works similarly to handle both Jeshion's examples
and the adjectival and verbal uses. Giving any specific name N_S that has
only one referent, one can derive a new meaning for a use of N_S that express
a property in relation to this referent. Thus, the specific name Picasso$_1$ that
names the painter, when used in a production example, means 'x is a painting by
Picasso$_1$'. Likewise for adjectival and verbal uses: since the property expressed
in these uses is related to a particular referent, it is derived from the specific
name of that referent.

In contrast, Contextualism does not seem to be able to handle these cases
well. This is because, on this view, a name only has a semantic referent at a
context; names do not refer to their bearers independently of context. Thus,
if 'Picasso' acquires the painter as semantic referent just at a context where
the term is used to refer to him, it is not clear how this (contextual) referent
of 'Picasso' can be used in a semantic transfer to obtain a new meaning for
the name in a producer example, or adjectival or verbal uses, on assumption
that any of these other uses of 'Picasso' constitute a different context on which
'Picasso' has to be interpreted. This is to say, in the sentence 'There are two
Picassos in the museum' (production example), 'Picasso' is not referential – it
does not refer to the painter; rather it expresses the property 'x is a painting by
Picasso'. But this meaning cannot be derived from the semantics of 'Picasso' as
a name, since its semantics do not include the painter (or any other referent),

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[41]Of course, not precluding that other common noun meanings might also be derived from
the other meanings of 'healthy'.

and further, this meaning is clearly not derived from the character, or other layer of meaning, of the proper name, as predicative uses are.

To press the point further, consider the case of pronouns. 'She' may acquire Chanel as semantic referent on a context where I am referring to the designer with 'she', but even if I just did this, I cannot go on to use 'she' in a producer example – e.g., 'this is a she dress' – to convey the meaning 'x is a dress designed by Chanel', or as an adjective – e.g., 'this dress is very she' – to convey the meaning 'x is elegant as Chanel', etc. An obvious explanation for this would be that Chanel is not part of the semantics of 'she', and therefore such extended meanings for 'she' that relate to Chanel are not possible.[42] Supposedly, a competent speaker is able to somehow draw the connection between the character of 'she' and the meaning of a predicative use of it(Schoubye, 2017, 735-36), since it is part of the semantics of 'she' as a pronoun that it has this character that encodes the property *being a female.*Likewise, if 'she' is used as an adjective, i.e., 'a she dress', its meaning would presumably be also derived from the character of 'she', to mean 'a female dress'[43], and not from any potential referent of 'she', since potential referents are not part of the semantics of 'she'.

But with proper names things are different. On the one hand, the adjectival uses (or verbal uses and uses in Jeshion's examples) that we are discussing are not derived from the name's putative character (i.e., *being a bearer of 'N'* or something similar).[44] On the other hand, since according to Contextualism, the individual bearers of a name are not part of the semantics of the name (recall that the name-bearing relation is non-semantic), it should not be possible to derive from name new meanings that relate to particular bearers. Thus, the fact that proper names do have derived meanings related to particular bearers tells against the contextualist's account of how names work.

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[42]I have been pointed out that there are some such uses of certain indexicals, i.e., 'this is so *you*'; 'That's very *me*'. But I think these uses are marginal, and do not generalize to other possible constructions with 'you' or 'me' ('there are two mes in the museum') or other indexicals, such as 'I', or 'that'. The use exists in Spanish with 'she' or 'he' but is also very marginal (thanks to the audience of the IIF-SADAF Seminar (University of Buenos Aires) for discussion here).

[43]Indeed, 'a she dress' would be interpreted as meaning 'a female dress'.

[44]As already stressed above, there doesn't seem to be any other adjectival or verbal uses, or Jeshion's examples, derived from the property of being a bearer of 'N'.

6.4   Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued for the Polyreferential View of proper names. The view may seem appealing on intuitive grounds: it validates two intuitions many people have, namely, that bearing a name should count as a semantic relation in some way, and that people can share names. However it is not for this relative intuitive value that I recommend the theory. I think the power of the theory resides in the adequate semantic account of derived uses of proper names it affords, and in this respect I believe the Polyreferential View to be superior to other referentialists's views. In addition, the view eliminates the problem of multiple bearerhood in a satisfactory way.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

The sustained critique to Predicativism that occupies good part of this essay has proven to be a fruitful exercise in providing insights into the life of real-names. Although I have vigorously rejected it, I believe Predicativism is somehow right in its insight that proper names express *generality*, understood as the notion that a word can be related to many things. The orthodox view in contrast takes proper names as the paradigm of *singularity*. Yet this dichotomy may not be adequate in explaining the nature and behaviour of proper names. In my own account I sought to incorporate both thoughts. There are two ways in which proper names live between singularity and generality: I claim they are singular terms fundamentally, but they can also be used as predicates, which apply to many things. I also claim that they are *polyreferential*, and as such they are referentially related to many individuals.

An essential part of my critique to Predicativism relies on the observation that proper names change categories, and also that they can be used as predicates with a variety of different meanings, as Jeshion's examples show. This observed complexity of proper names's behaviour revealed the inadequacy of treating names as simply predicates of one particular kind. I claim that this complexity should not be set aside for the purpose of semantic theorizing. On the contrary, I think paying attention to the multiple life of proper names helps precisely to see what they are at the core. Whatever is the true nature of real-life names, it will be revealed through this complexity.

My conclusion that being fundamentally predicates is not the true nature of real-life names is based on the following considerations. In Chapter 2 it was suggested that the thesis that names are count nouns or predicates across the board is not consistent with the cross-linguistic data. In contrast, the thesis that names are referential terms has cross-linguistic support: no language reviewed shows the referential use to be defective, including those languages

where referential names appear with the definite article. The fact that in some languages proper names are used with definite articles was shown, at different points in this essay, to be insufficient to prove that in those languages proper names really are definite descriptions.

Chapter 2 and 3 argued that proper names display a variety of uses that can neither be accounted for within the predicativist uniform semantics, nor be shown to be derived from the predicative meaning of proper names. But the right theory about proper names should account for all these additional uses of proper names. In Chapter 4, I argued that it is unlikely that proper names are fundamentally count nouns if they are shown to be exceptional among count nouns with respect to the use of the definite article, and with respect to certain semantic properties. But if proper names were fundamentally predicates they should be count nouns, since there are no better candidates (i.e., they can't be treated as mass terms, adjectives, verbs, etc., fundamentally).

In Chapter 5, I argued that Predicativism does not really accommodate referential uses of proper names. Since, on analysis, proper names turn out to behave differently from the definite descriptions or the complex demonstratives that are thought to embed them, then referential names cannot be interpreted as predicative. This suggests instead that referential names are genuinely referential. Moreover, referential uses of names cannot be shown to be derived from predicative uses if the predicative meaning somehow relies on names being referential.

Thus I conclude that proper names are referential singular terms fundamentally. They are a class of noun of their own – not count, mass, abstract, etc. But like many other words, particularly those under the same category *Noun*, they change categories, i.e., they can function as count nouns, as mass terms, as adjectives and as verbs. As count nouns their meaning can be varied (including the different types of sematic extensions in Jeshion's examples), only one of which is the predicative meaning *being called 'N'* that predicativists have concentrated on. I also claim that their behaviour is not very disciplined: only as referential terms they are fully functional and uniform in English and across the languages reviewed. When changing categories they show shortcomings (i.e., their conversion may be only *partial*). But I said that paying attention to this messy multiple life of proper names precisely helps to see what they are at the core: I have argued that all the uses proper names exhibit can be accounted for as semantically dependent on the referential role of names.

I have therefore developed a specific view, i.e. the Polyreferential View, that provides a semantic base to the many different changes of meaning names can undergo when they change categories. I believe the theory is powerful in its ability to explain how exactly the different meaning of proper names can be derived semantically from their referential meaning, and in this respect I believe it fares better than other referential accounts. In addition, the view eliminates the problem of multiple bearerhood.

Thus, the initial challenges posed by Predicativism are met. I believe this essay has made a significant contribution to vindicating Referentialism, properly construed, as the most plausible view on the semantics of proper names.

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