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Emotional Experience: its Nature, its Rationality and its Epistemology

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PHD DISSERTATION

EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE

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Abstract

Emotions are intrinsically and extrinsically interesting. On the one hand, they are *intrinsically* interesting because they are part of our mental economy standing in relations to other mental states (e.g., the belief that I am in danger and the emotion of fear, the satisfaction of a desire and the experience of joy, etc.) and actions (e.g., the emotion of admiration and emulative behaviour, the emotion of disgust and avoidance behaviour, etc.). As an important part of our psychological inventory, they play an explanatory role, at least a partial one, in explaining and justifying our mental and physical actions and behaviour. On the other hand, emotions are extrinsically interesting as evidenced by their appearance in many philosophical debates. In chapters 1 and 2, I contribute to give an answer to this question: what are the *primitive*, in the sense of being *fundamental*, types of mental experiences that constitute the human stream of consciousness? I do so by answering this particular sub-question: *is emotional phenomenology a fundamental or derivative type of phenomenology?* In chapter 3, I explore a new puzzle for the relation between emotion and rationality. Emotional phenomenology seems to be dogmatic, in a certain sense, and hypothetic, in a certain sense, at the same time. I explore whether this apparently contradictory feature of emotional phenomenology is compatible with rationality. In chapter 4 of this dissertation, I will explore the epistemic nature of emotion. Particularly, I propose a way out of the dialectical impasse between perceptualist and non-perceptualist, using Ernest Sosa's idea of *animal* and *reflective* knowledge. I propose a similar distinction for the epistemic role of emotion.

Contents

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Introduction

Emotions are intrinsically and extrinsically interesting. On the one hand, they are *intrinsically* interesting because they are part of our mental economy standing in relations to other mental states (e.g., the belief that I am in danger and the emotion of fear, the satisfaction of a desire and the experience of joy, etc.) and actions (e.g., the emotion of admiration and emulative behaviour, the emotion of disgust and avoidance behaviour, etc.). As an important part of our psychological inventory, they play an explanatory role, at least a partial one, in explaining and justifying our mental and physical actions and behaviour[1]. Among the philosophical questions on the intrinsic interest of emotions, the following are among the more important: What is an emotion? What kind of mental state is an emotion? Are emotions assimilable to combinations of other mental states like, for instance, beliefs + desires or, on the contrary, do they belong to a sui generis kind of mental state? The first two papers that correspond to the two first chapters of this dissertation will revolve around these topics.

On the other hand, emotions are extrinsically interesting as evidenced by their appearance in many philosophical debates. Let me mention and briefly explain just a few, some of which will be expanded in this introduction and will be dealt with in the rest of the papers that constitute the chapter of this dissertation. For instance, in meta-ethics, there are different *species* of neo-sentimentalism (Kurtz 2022; McDowell 1985; Wiggins 1987; D'Arms and Jacobson 2005). In *conceptual* neo-sentimentalism, the claim is that emotions are constitutive of our evaluative concepts and their deployment. That is, without emotions we could not *understand* nor *deploy* evaluative concepts (like ADMIRABLE[2], DANGEROUS, DISGUSTING, etc.). In *metaphysical* neo-sentimentalism, the claim is that emotions are constitutive of evaluative properties like the admirable, the dangerous, the goal-congruent, etc. That is, for x to instantiate a given evaluative property, x must stand in the appropriate relation to a given emotion. Finally, in *epistemic* neo-sentimentalism (e.g., Tappolet 2016) emotions are constitutive of our knowledge of evaluative properties (admirable, fearsome, dangerous, disgusting, etc.), being *the* route to a well-founded evaluative epistemology, in an analogous way to perception in the case of perceptual knowledge. That is, if perception is the privileged

[1] Here I distinguish between *action* and *behaviour* intentionally. The former entails agency, whereas the latter need not entail it (e.g., a reflex or a stereotypical behaviour like crying).
[2] I will use capital letters to designate concepts.

source of spatial-temporal information about the external world, emotion would be the privileged source of evaluative information about the external and internal world. Note that I have avoided speaking about *descriptive* or *factual* information in contrast with *evaluative* information, if this latter label makes any sense. The reason is that I am presupposing a minimal realist position about evaluative properties and, hence, I am committed to evaluative facts. There will be more about these metaphysical commitments along this introduction.

It is important to note that the theoretical import of emotions is not only felt in metaethics and epistemology. In the related but different sphere of rationality, the importance of emotions is not only a philosophical debate but also an empirical and testable hypothesis. Regarding the philosophical import of emotions for a theory of human rationality it is enough to acknowledge that emotions figure in the aetiology of most of our actions and, for that reason, we may worry that, if they are irrational, they could vitiate the actions that (partially) spring from them. Chapter 3 of this thesis is a paper which deals specifically with this issue. Regarding the empirical hypotheses about the role emotions play in human rationality, the work by neurologist Antonio Damasio (1994) is particularly interesting. He has shown that subjects with normal cognitive abilities but impaired affective ones, due to some neurological damage in the areas of the brain that process emotional responses, do worse in specific lab test but also in life than those who have both normal cognitive and affective abilities.

The plan for the rest of this introduction is the following. In section 1 I will present the classical metaphysical question about emotions, namely: what is an emotion? This is one of the aspects in which emotions are intrinsically interesting. Philosophers have given different answers to this question in the form of different theories of emotion. I will explain briefly those theories in order to show how my two first papers make a significant contribution to these metaphysical issues about emotion. In section 2, I will explain some of the interest emotions have for other philosophical debates, like emotions' contribution to human rationality and the debate about our knowledge of evaluative properties and facts, if any, through emotions. These two topics are the ones covered in the papers of the third and fourth chapters, respectively, as I will explain in section 3, which will be a preview of the chapters/papers.

1.- The Classical Metaphysical Question About Emotions: What is an Emotion?

1.1. Preliminary Distinctions and Some Assumptions

1.1.1. Emotions' intentionality, phenomenology and motivational profile

Every theory of emotions *starts from*, and is *constrained by*, three evident facts about emotion: emotions are about something, that is, emotions are *intentional* mental states. For instance, if you are *happy about* presenting your Ph.D dissertation after working on it for 4 years, then your happiness is about something, namely, that you presented your Ph.D thesis. Similarly, if you fear the predator in your surroundings, then your fear is about something, namely: the predator. In principle, then, it seems that the intentionality of emotions can be either objectual (e.g., fear of an object; in the previous example, *the predator* in your surroundings) or propositional (e.g., being happy about some proposition or fact; in the previous example, the fact that you presented your Ph.D dissertation after years of hard work).

An important distinction within the intentionality of the emotions is that between the *particular* and the formal *object* of the emotion (Deonna and Teroni 2012; Keny 1963). Emotions' intentionality is two-layered. To illustrate this distinction, take these two examples of emotional episodes. Let's suppose that you are happy that you got your Ph.D. Now let's take the classical example of you fearing a dog with errant behaviour. These two token emotional episodes are intentional. They have an intentional *particular* object, where "object" is understood here in a broad sense as *that* thing about which the emotion is about, ranging from external objects (e.g., the dog in the example) to states of affairs, facts and propositions (e.g., the fact that you got your Ph.D. in the happiness example).

However, the particular object of the emotion does not exhaust the contribution of the emotion to the intentional profile of a given subject. Indeed, the particular object of the emotion is not a contribution of the emotion to the intentional profile of a subject at all. The particular object of the emotion is not provided by the emotion itself. It is provided by other mental states and means, like perception (e.g., *seeing* a predator provides you with the intentional object to fear), imagination (e.g., *imagining* a predator also provides you with the intentional object to fear), testimony and belief (e.g., that someone tells you that there is a predator behind the door and you believe her, also provides you with the intentional object to fear), etc. These mental states that provide the emotion with their particular intentional object are the *cognitive bases* of the emotion.

In the examples above, the emotions are about a particular object, provided by the emotions' cognitive bases, but they are also about some evaluative property *apparently* instantiated by those particular objects. In the case of fear, it seems that emotion is about *danger*. In the case of joy, it seems the emotion is about, let's say with Richard Lazarus (1999), *goal-congruence*. Danger and goal-congruence are the *formal objects* of fear and joy, respectively.

These kind of properties, danger or goal-congruence are not or need to be conceived in mysterious terms. Authors like Jonathan Dancy (1993) and Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni (2012) conceived of these evaluative properties as *supervenient properties*. Thus, danger supervenes on natural properties like sharp teeth, errant behaviour, etc., in the case of the predator. Goal-congruence supervenes on non-mysterious properties like getting a well-paid job, getting a mate, etc. That is, any change in those evaluative properties entails a change in their natural non-mysterious properties. If the predator is no longer dangerous, then something must have changed at the base properties: it got sedated, it lost its teeth. In other words, sameness in natural properties entails sameness in evaluative properties. A change in evaluative properties would entail a change in natural properties, therefore, if there is no change in natural properties, then there cannot be a change in evaluative properties. Two twin predators in terms of their natural properties are equally dangerous.

Another important aspect of emotions is their *phenomenology*. Emotions feel like something to their subjects. In Nagel's famous way of putting it, there is something it is like to feel an emotion (Nagel 1974). When you feel fear about a predator, that fear feels in a particular way for you. It has some subjective intrinsic properties: it is aversive, it is hedonically negative, maybe it has a certain phenomenal intentionality, etc.

The last but not least important aspect of emotions is their connection to *motivation* and action. When you feel an emotion, you are inclined to act in certain ways. For instance, when you feel fear, you are inclined to flee from or fight the object of your fear. When you feel admiration, you are disposed to emulate the person you admire and so on and so forth for most emotions. Indeed, psychologists like Nico Frijda (1986; 2006) thinks that emotions always imply a link to action or certain action readiness. That is, action readiness would be an essential component or aspect of emotions, if not the emotion itself.

1.1.2. The relationship between emotions' phenomenology and emotions' intentionality

These three important aspects of emotions are not unrelated. Specifically, emotions' phenomenology and emotions' intentionality seem to be connected in a strong sense. The logical space here is complex so let me elaborate a bit. Until recent times, with some notable exceptions (Searle 1983) analytic philosophers assumed that intentionality and phenomenology were neither necessary nor sufficient for each other. That is, according to this assumption, you can have a non-conscious intentional mental state and a non-intentional conscious mental state. Some examples of the former: an unconscious belief, a desire understood as a disposition, cognitive computations of all sorts involved, for instance, in linguistic understanding, etc. Some examples of the latter: the feeling of a visceral movement, a pain, a pleasure, the experience of seeing colours, etc. This is what Terence Horgan and John Tienson have called *separatism* about the mind (Horgan and Tienson 2002), namely, the idea that phenomenology and intentionality are two separable aspects of mind.

Indeed, some current theorists of emotion have proceeded under the assumption of *separatism*. For instance, Jesse Prinz (2004), following William James (1884) and Antonio Damasio (1994), maintains that emotions are feelings of bodily changes which carry no propositional content in virtue of their phenomenology. Emotions, understood as *raw feelings* of bodily changes acquired their content through a teleosemantic process of the sort Ruth Millikan (1984) describes.

As a follower of James, who also seems to buy s*eparatism*, Prinz conceives of emotions as mental states eminently phenomenal. For him, like for James, emotions are feelings of bodily changes that do not carry propositional content. Under this view emotions are more like a pain or a pleasure than like a judgement, a belief or a desire. However, Prinz explains the intentionality of emotion deriving it not from their phenomenology but from a teleosemantic process.

According to Prinz's teleosemanticist theory of emotion, the semantic content of the emotions, the homeostatic value they represent, was fixed by *natural selection*, in virtue of the benefits for the emotive subject to fulfil its biological functions. At the beginning, the correlations take place between innate basic emotions (fear, sadness, etc.) and particular emotional objects that cause those innate emotional reactions (darkness, the absence of caregivers, etc.) and which instantiate homeostatic values (danger, loss, etc.) resulting in durable and reliable correlations between those basic emotions (or bodily feelings) and those homeostatic values. By "homeostatic value" I mean values which are relevant for the survival and well-being of the organism. Besides, those correlations ground the semantic content of the

emotions which become fixed, naturally selected, by being *consumed* by the organism in order to fulfil its biological functions.

In subsequent stages of psychological development, these limited basic emotions are associated with other stimuli in the process of *recalibration*. This process is driven by judgements that imply axiological concepts that represent the mentioned homeostatic values and that have been acquired by abstraction, like DANGER. In this way, these judgments end up causing emotions and correlating with them durably and reliably, extending the scope of information to which the raw bodily feeling of the emotion can be attached to.

One of the putative theoretical benefits of a program like Prinz's is that it seems intentionality, associated with information, is an aspect of mind more easily naturalizable than phenomenology, associated with first person experience. This digression about Prinz's theory of emotion is to show different general trends in the philosophy of emotion. In this case, the trend is that which imports the assumptions of separatism.

Of course, there has been attempts to reduce phenomenology to intentionality and intentionality to, for instance, functional or brain states. This is the so-called intentionalist program (see, for instance, Dretske 1995). More recently, there have also been attempts to explain intentionality in terms of phenomenology, giving up the desideratum of naturalizing the mind in the classical sense of naturalization (see, for instance, Kriegel 2013). According to this relatively new research program, the only type of underived intentionality is the one that is suitably related to phenomenology, the rest of it (the intentionality of natural language, the intentionality of pictures, etc.) being derivative.

In any case, both intentionality and phenomenology have been taken as, at least, paradigmatic features of the mind. There has been attempts to use them, both individually and jointly, as the mark of the mental. The debate on the mark of the mental is beyond the scope of this dissertation. For our purposes, what is important to note is the common assumption between the two mentioned research programs. According to both, intentionality-first and phenomenology-first research programs, phenomenology and intentionality are deeply and essentially connected. Indeed, authors like Searle (1983) have even proposed a connection principle between intentional and phenomenal states such that every intentional state of the mind is potentially conscious.

In this dissertation I am working under the assumption that there is indeed such a connection between intentionality and phenomenality. I am not endorsing any commitment on

which one is more fundamental, explanatorily prior, etc. However, I think that there is a special connection between these two paradigmatic properties of the mind. This connection is clear in some paradigmatic cases and less clear the more we depart from those.

Take perception as a paradigmatic case. When you perceive an orange, your perceptual experience of it has phenomenology, that is, there is something it is like to perceive it. Besides, that same experience is about something, namely: the orange you perceive. It seems that the intentionality and the phenomenology of this perceptual experience are clearly connected: you are aware of an orange (*intentional* content), which appear to you as such due to the *phenomenology* of experiencing it. Examples like this are used, for instance, by Siewert (1998) to show that certain kind of phenomenology necessitates intentionality.

Now, there are those other cases in which the connection between phenomenology and intentionality is more dubious. Take the experience of an orgasm. It is clearly phenomenal. However, describing its intentional content has proved to be difficult. Some authors like Uriah Kriegel (2015) would say that an orgasm is a phenomenal experience that consists in a phenomenal attitude that presents-as-good-in-a-sensorial-way its contents (sexual gratification?). Other authors would insist that there is no intentionality at all in the case of an orgasm, just phenomenology.

Let's suppose now that you have some belief which has a functional role in your behaviour of which you are not conscious. Imagine, further, that this belief is such that you cannot be conscious of it for some reason that has to do with its nature (e.g., some psychoanalytic belief, supposing that they exist). You cannot introspect it. You may realize that you have that belief by observing your own behaviour, but you cannot be acquainted with it in the immediate way in which you are acquainted with your occurrent thoughts.

The last two cases seem to be cases in which the connection between intentionality and phenomenology is not that clear. I think emotions are more like the first case, in which there is a clear connection between the emotion's intentionality and the emotion's phenomenology. That is, changes in the intentionality of the emotion would entail changes in its phenomenology and the other way around. This is going to be a leading assumption throughout this thesis. Let me illustrate it with an example.

Imagine that you fear a predator in your immediate surroundings. Your emotional experience of fear has phenomenology: there is something it is like for you to feel it. It also seems that your emotion has intentionality: the predator is presented as dangerous.

Additionally, it seems you are aware of that content, namely, that there is a dangerous predator, due to the phenomenology of experiencing fear about said predator.

That said, the reader should not be surprised when I use considerations based on the phenomenology of emotions to elucidate aspects of their intentionality or when I use consideration based on the intentionality of the emotions to support and illustrate theses about their phenomenology. This is an expression of my assumption that intentionality and phenomenality are in the case of emotions deeply and essentially connected.

1.1.3. Emotions and Reasons

Among the important features of emotions, we should also count that they are normative phenomena. The normative dimensions of emotions are complex. Emotions can be subjected to ethical, prudential, epistemic and sui generis reasons. Let us give some examples.

Martha Nussbaum (2016) has insisted that anger is not an *ethical* emotion and that, as such, it should be repressed in the public sphere. However, anger can be a *prudentially* good emotion: if you are prone to show anger in the relevant personal situations, it is more likely that people are deterred from taking advantage of you. Let's take another emotion to illustrate the other kinds of reasons mentioned. You can have or lack epistemic reasons to fear something. For instance, if you hear an unfamiliar noise in your house, you may have an *epistemic* reason to fearfully consider the presence of an intruder.

Finally, as argued by Justin D'arms and Daniel Jacobson (2000), emotions have their own normativity, their own *sui generis* fitting conditions. Fear is appropriate iff its particular object instantiates a danger. Anger is appropriate iff its particular object instantiates an offence. And so on for the different emotions. This means that, if the particular object of an emotion does not instantiate its formal object, then the emotion is unfitting. In other words, there are sui generis reasons to not have that emotion. They are sui generis reasons because they emanate from the emotion's formal object, which, in turn, establishes the correctness conditions of the emotion.

This last normative sense is closely related to the emotions' intentionality. The two layers of the intentionality of emotions shed light on the normativity of emotions. Indeed, emotions' intentionality and emotion's normativity seem to be two faces of the same coin. The intentionality of the emotion determines its correctness conditions. That is, emotions'

representational content determines *conditions of adequacy* for the emotions, which in turn determine *norms of appropriateness* (e.g., feel fear only if the object of your emotion is dangerous!, stop feeling fear if the object of your emotion is harmless!, etc.), which in turn determine *reasons to feel* or not feel certain emotions.

It is important to bear in mind the different senses of normativity that affect emotions. I will be referring to them in the different papers that constitute the chapters of this dissertation. Specifically, in chapter two, which corresponds to the paper entitled "An argument from normativity for Primitive Emotional Phenomenology"[3], I devised an argument focused on the *sui generis* normativity of emotion to argue against those who think that emotions are reducible, in a sense yet to be specified (more on the (ir)reducibility of emotions in the next section, 2, and in the preview of the chapters), to other mental states.

1.2. The Three Families of Theories of Emotion

Following Charlie Kurtz (2022) we can distinguish among three major families of theories of emotions. (1) Those that emphasize the *intentionality* and *normativity* of emotion as their definitional features or *cognitive theories*; (2) those that emphasize the *phenomenology* of emotion as their definitional feature or *perceptual theories*; and, finally, (3) those that emphasize the *motivational profile* of emotions or *motivational theories*. In the following sub-sections I review these theories and show how some of my conclusion in the papers of the first and second chapters bear on these issues.

1.2.1. Cognitivists Theories

Cognitivists theories are reductive theories of emotion. They equate emotion with evaluative judgments (Nussbaum 2001; Solomon 1988) or a combination of beliefs and desires (Marks 1982). For instance, according to the judgemental theory of emotion, fear about object O *is* the evaluative judgement that O is dangerous. According to the belief-desire theory of emotion, joy about passing the exam would be equivalent to the desire to pass the exam and the belief that one passed the exam.

This family of theories has several advantages but also drawbacks. Let's start with the virtues of the theory. For starters, these theories seem to accommodate emotions' intentionality.

[3] Published in *Philosophical Papers*, 50 (1-2):31-52.

Both beliefs and judgements have a predicative structure: some property is predicated of some object, in this case an evaluative property. Thus, both evaluative beliefs and judgements can explain emotions intentionality: the particular object of the emotion would correspond to the object for which the name stands in the judgement/belief, and the formal object would correspond to the evaluative predication.

Given the close connection between emotions' intentionality and normativity, cognitivist theories are also well-equipped to explain emotions' normative dimension. The normativity of emotion is inherited from the normativity of evaluative judgement and belief. What is wrong with feeling fear towards a harmless object is explained by the fact that the axiological concept predicated, namely, DANGEROUS, in not instantiated by the object of which it is predicated. The same goes for beliefs. The problem would be that of a false and/or unjustified belief/judgement.

Let's now examine the drawbacks of these theories. In the first place, it seems that the phenomenology of judgments and beliefs is too cold to explain the phenomenology of emotion. Relatedly, there are non-emotional evaluative judgments. Think about the heavy smoker who is really convinced of the dangerousness of her habit, but she is not afraid of it. It seems, then, that evaluative judgements are *not a sufficient condition* for emotion. In order to solve this problem, cognitive theorists would have to posit some special kind of belief/judgement, namely, an *emotional judgement*, but then, it seems their theory of emotion is just circular.

Non-emotional evaluative judgements target a problem of sufficiency in the cognitivist analysis of emotion. However, there is also a problem of necessity for the cognitive analysis of emotion. These are the so-called *recalcitrant emotions* (D'Arms and Jacobson 2003). Recalcitrant emotions are an agent's emotions in tension with the agent's evaluative judgments at a given time. An episode of recalcitrant fear consists of an agent experiencing fear about something while she knows or judges that there is not a real danger or, if any, no an important one.

Recalcitrant emotions were understood as a problem targeting the necessity of the cognitivist analysis. It seems that you can have an emotion, say, fear, without the corresponding evaluative judgement. Thus, it seems that the corresponding evaluative judgement is *not a necessary condition* for having the emotion. You can even have the opposite evaluative judgement, as when you judge that the spider is harmless, but still, you fear it.

One way the cognitivist theories have dealt with the problem of recalcitrant emotion is by claiming that what explains the recalcitrant emotion is that the subject has contradictory evaluative beliefs and/or evaluative judgements. This entails that the subject is deeply and massively irrational, given the frequency of recalcitrant emotions within such subjects. However, this seems to be too radical a charge of irrationality on emoters. Most of us would be considered irrational agents. The misdiagnosis cognitivists made when it comes to recalcitrant emotions also counts against it.

There is also an objection to the necessity of the analysis based on phylogenetic and ontogenetic reasons. John Deigh (1994) has argued that cognitive theorists require a certain degree of *cognitive sophistication*, enough as to being able to entertain predicative mental states, like judgements and/or beliefs. However, it seems that beasts and babies lack such a cognitive sophistication, which would entail that beasts and babies cannot have emotions. However, beasts and babies manifestly have emotions. Therefore, it cannot be true that emotions require the cognitive sophistication required to have evaluative beliefs and/or make evaluative judgements. Hence, emotions do not require axiological concepts and, hence, neither evaluative judgements nor beliefs.

These drawbacks have led emotion theorists to search inspiration in less cognitively demanding mental states, like perceptions. Perceptual theories of emotion will be explained in the next subsection.

1.2.2. Perceptual Theories

Perceptual theories of emotion may take different forms. Firstly, depending on how theorist take the analogy with perception we will have different theories. We have those theorists who take the analogy at face value and claim that emotions *are* perceptions of value of some kind (see, for instance, Tappolet 2016), and those who take the analogy less literally and only think that emotions resemble some aspects of perception (see, for instance, Carter 2019). Whereas the former tries to answer the metaphysical question about emotion, that is, *what is an emotion*; the latter does not answer the question directly. However the analogy with perception may be useful for other purposes, like modelling the epistemic role of emotion (Brady 2013). Here we will consider those who take the analogy with perception at face value and claim that emotions *are* perceptions.

Among perceptual theorists we find those who think that emotions are *direct* perceptions of value, like Tappolet (2016), and those who think that emotions are *indirect* perceptions of value, like Prinz (2004).

Direct perceptual theorists of emotion claim that emotional experiences are perceptual experiences of value that present evaluative contents in virtue of their phenomenology. They start from the similarities between emotional and perceptual experiences and from there they infer, in an abductive way, that emotions are perceptions. Among these similarities we find that both perceptual and emotional experiences have a rich phenomenology beyond an exhaustive linguistic description, both are capabilities shared along the phylogenetic tree and that both play similar epistemic roles (emotion would be to evaluative beliefs what perceptions are to perceptual beliefs).

Indirect perceptual theorists of emotion claim that emotional experiences are indirect perceptions of value. Indirect because there is nothing in the phenomenology of emotion that directly presents evaluative contents. Emotional experiences *acquire* these contents by means of different mechanisms. For instance, Prinz, as it was said, appeals to biological functions following Millikan.

Perceptual theories share many of the advantages of cognitivist theories of emotion and none of its drawbacks. However, perceptual theories have their own drawbacks. Let's examine them.

Several authors have pointed out that emotions are disanalogous to perception in several respects (see, for instance, Brady 2013; Deonna and Teroni 2012). For starters, emotions seem to be subjected to reasons, whereas perceptions do not. It makes sense to ask a *normative* why-question regarding emotion, like "Why are you feeling fear?". The answer may be "well, because this dog has an unpredictable behaviour and can hurt me". That would be a reason to be afraid of the dog. However, it does not make sense to ask a normative why question regarding perception. The only kind of why-question perception accepts is the *causal* one, like, when someone asks, "Why are you seeing red?" and you respond: "because light with a certain wavelength is stimulating my eyes".

Perhaps the most important criticism maybe is that emotion does not behave epistemically like perception. Emotion, unlike perception, does not seem to present chunks of reality. It seems emotion is not presentational, but *reactive*: it reacts to the contents presented by perception, among other mental states that figure in their cognitive bases.

Relatedly, emotions do not seem to be transparent mental states, whereas perceptions are (Harman 1990; Salmela 2011). That is, when you try to focus on your perceptual experience the only thing you can pay attention to are the objects you perceive. That is, describing your perceptual experience is just describing its correctness conditions (Searle 2015). By contrast, emotions seem to be opaque, they have valence and reflexivity, something feels as *good/bad for me* (Mitchell 2017).

Besides, it seems that an emotion cannot end the regress of epistemic justification for this reason (Brady 2013). When someone asks you why do you think you have hands, it seems natural to answer that you see them. However, when someone asks you why do you think you have been offended, it seems that answering that you feel anger is not sufficient reason. The anger itself needs to be justified. It does not seem to present reality itself.

These and other lines of criticism against the perceptual theory are explored in chapter 3 and 4 of this dissertation.

1.2.3. Motivational Theories

The last family of theories of emotion is the motivational theory of emotion. According to the motivational theory of emotion, emotions are (felt) patterns of action readiness. The motivational theory of emotion is inspired by the work of psychologists like Nico Frijda (1986; 2006), for whom the motivational aspect of emotion is essential to what an emotion is. According to Frijda, emotions are patterns of action readiness characterized by what he calls "control precedence". That emotions have control precedence means that emotions take control over whatever other thing the cognitive system is doing. If you have an episode of fear, fear-related thought and actions take precedence over whatever other thing is going on in your mind.

Motivational theories of emotion may require that the patterns of action readiness that constitute emotion are felt, that is, that they have an associated phenomenology. By contrast, other strands of the motivational theory do not require that patterns of action readiness are felt: the emotion *is* the pattern of action readiness, which typically but not necessarily, is accompanied by phenomenal feelings of those bodily changes. Among the former, we find authors like Deonna and Teroni and their attitudinal theory. Among the latter, we find authors like Andreas Scarantino for whom emotions are behavioural programs typically but not necessarily accompanied by a phenomenal feeling (Scarantino 2014).

The obvious advantage of the motivational theory is that it is able to explain perfectly the motivational aspects of some emotions, like, paradigmatically, anger, fear, disgust, etc. However, the theory faces some problems that have to do, precisely, with the individuation of the action patterns characteristic of emotions like sadness, resignation, etc. It seems that those kinds of emotions do not present clear action patterns. Another problem for these theories is that they may have trouble explaining the action readiness of emotions about the past, like regret. Contemplative emotions, like emotions towards fictional character and events, also lack a clear motivational profile. In the first paper of this dissertation I assume the existence of contemplative emotions, which of course, is incompatible with the motivational theory.

Motivational theories of emotion have not received much attention in the papers that constitute this dissertation. The reason is that the focus is on emotional experience. Of course, felt patterns of action readiness may be constitutive of emotional experience, but not non-phenomenal action readiness as such. However, the puzzle presented in chapter 3 is deeply concerned with the contribution emotional experience makes to action as lived experience of agency and whether this contribution is compatible with acting rationally. In the next section I explain the focus on emotional experience and the philosophical issues that revolve around it.

1.2.4. My Contribution to the Metaphysical Debate about the Nature of Emotion

As I will explain in the next section, the first three chapters of this dissertation are focused on emotional experience and not emotion simpliciter. However, the conclusions that I extracted about the nature of emotional experience impose some constraints on what theories of emotion would be more plausible if those conclusions were accepted.

For the reasons that one can find in the mentioned papers, I arrived at the conclusion that emotional phenomenology is primitive, that is, not reducible to other varieties of consciousness (more on the meaning of reducibility at stake in the next section). This conclusion excludes those theories of emotion that try to assimilate it to other mental states, like, evaluative beliefs, evaluative judgements, pairs of beliefs and desires, etc. At the same time, this conclusion is compatible with some of the theories explained above. Let me explore briefly what are the compatibilities and incompatibilities of my results in the current debate about the nature of emotion. Of course, there is insufficient space to make an exhaustive

examination of this issue, but some considerations will be enough to give the reader a taste of the implications of my results.

Take the *attitudinal theory of emotion* (see, for instance, Deonna and Teroni 2012). According to this theory, emotions are bodily attitudes whose formal objects are the core relational themes of the given emotion (e.g., danger for fear, goal congruence for joy, etc.). In principle, this bodily attitude can be objectual (e.g., fear of a predator) or propositional (e.g., fear about the fact that the predator may eat me alive). For instance, fear is a specific bodily attitude through which dangerousness is represented. An emotion is fitting when and only when its particular object instantiates its formal object. Fear about a *dangerous* (formal object) *predator* (particular object) is fitting. It seems that the attitudinal theory of emotion is compatible with my results, according to which emotional phenomenology is primitive, since the type of bodily attitude emotions are may be sui generis or non-reducible to more familiar ones. The attitudinal theory as conceived by Deonnna and Teroni is not the only option. They conceive the relevant emotional attitude as a *bodily* attitude. This makes the temptation of reduction salient, the obvious reducer being proprioceptive and bodily feelings. But emotional attitudes need not be conceived this way. It is perfectly plausible to suppose that each basic emotion is a sui generis attitude, not a bodily one, as I do in chapter three.

What about the *perceptual theory of emotion* (see, for instance, Tappolet 2016). According to this theory, emotions are sui generis perceptions of value. Given that this type of perception is sui generis and non-dependent on cognitive (and according to Tappolet neither on conative) elements, the theory is compatible with the result that emotional phenomenology is primitive. However, in chapter three I offer different reasons why the perceptual theory of emotion cannot be true, like its inability to allow us to formulate the puzzle outlined in that chapter.

What happens with the *judgemental theory of emotion* (see, for instance, Nussbaum 2003)? Is it compatible with the claim that emotional phenomenology is primitive? According to this theory emotions *are* axiological judgements. The judgemental theory of emotion would be ruled out because emotions would necessarily involve some cognitive elements, namely, judgements, and those cognitive elements would also be sufficient for them. This can be counted as an additional reason, besides the ones given above, to reject the judgemental theory since it would not be compatible with the claim that emotional phenomenology is primitive and the reasons that support it.

Finally, let's examine how the *motivational theory of emotion* (see, for instance, Scarantino 2014) clashes with my conclusions. This theory would be ruled out by my results because emotions would necessarily involve conative elements, and this is incompatible with the idea of contemplative emotions, a possibility I exploit to make a case for the claim that emotional phenomenology is primitive, concretely in chapter 1.

1.3. A Focus on Emotional Experience

1.3.1. A phenomenological shift

Some philosophers have inaugurated several phenomenological discussions in the analytic tradition. Especially important has been the debate about the fundamental types of consciousness. Authors like Tim Bayne, Michelle Montague, Jesse Prinz, David Pitt and Uriah Kriegel, to name a few, have been discussing what types of consciousness exist (perceptual, cognitive, algedonic, etc.) or, in the jargon of grounding (Schaffer 2009), what types of consciousness are fundamental.

All the chapters of this dissertation, with the exception of the last one, owe a lot to Uriah Kriegel's project of describing *the varieties of consciousness* (Kriegel 2015). According to Kriegel there are *only* six primitive elements of consciousness: perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertaining, and conative. The previous are the *basic* ingredients or aspects of consciousness, while other types of phenomenology, like *emotional* phenomenology, would be *grounded* in them, they would *derive* from them, would be nothing but them or would be *reducible* to them (more on the sense of "reduction" at stake in the next sub-section).

The papers of this dissertation, with the exception of the fourth one, which can be inscribed in the tradition of virtue epistemology, must be understood within this *analytic phenomenological tradition*. Thus, the papers are not framed, or not entirely framed, in the classical terms in which the philosophical discussions about emotion have proceeded. Here, the focus of attention is on emotional experience and not on emotions simpliciter. Though it may seem just a nuance, this thematic shift has dialectical effects. For instance, theories of emotion for which the phenomenology of the emotion is just accessory are not considered (see, for instance, as it was said, Scarantino's motivational theory). Framing the debate in these terms entails some dialectical exclusions, but it does not come without dialectical benefits. It allows to one to isolate debates that have to do exclusively with emotions' phenomenal aspects. To

insist, it is not that emotional experience is dealt with in isolation of other topics like emotions' contribution to action, but that accounts of emotions for which emotional phenomenology is not essential are less relevant for the discussion.

Some of those phenomenal debates about emotion dealt with along this dissertation are: is emotional experience fundamental or derivative? (more of this in a second); what is the contribution of emotional experience to human rationality? Is rationality compatible with action guided by emotional experience? What is the epistemic contribution of emotional experience? What is the characteristic representational content/attitude of emotional experience?

1.3.2. (Anti)Reductive phenomenological Analysis

The first two chapters of this dissertation are concerned with the question of whether emotional phenomenology is *fundamental* or *derivative*. In other words, those chapters are concerned with the question of whether emotional phenomenology is *reducible* or *irreducible*. For this reason, it is advisable to devote some time of this introduction to clarify in what sense can emotional phenomenology be fundamental or derivative, irreducible or reducible.

In those chapters I assume Kriegel's metaphysical framework, exposed in the introduction of his *The Varieties of Consciousness* (2015). According to him, there are three possible options regarding the question about the existence of a particular type of phenomenology. Take cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenology of thought. One can be an *eliminativist* about it, saying, for instance, that there is nothing it is like to think that 2 + 2 = 4 (Nelkin, 1989). Another dialectical alternative is being reductivist. Thus, authors like Prinz (2011) think that there is something it is like to think the thought that 2 + 2 = 4. However, this something it is like to think would be nothing but familiar sensorial phenomenology: "hearing" in inner speech through one's mind's hear the auditory phenomenology that 2 + 2 = 4. This would amount to the second dialectical alternative, namely: *reductivism*. Finally, there is the dialectical option of *primitivism*. Some authors like Pitt (2004) think that there is something in the phenomenology of thought, which is not captured by sensorial phenomenology and, hence, the phenomenology of thought must be posited as primitive.

Regarding the notion of reduction at stake here, Kriegel tries to remain as neutral as possible. He thinks that his project is compatible with different readings of metaphysical reduction. Particularly, he mentions the notions of *grounding* (Schaffer 2009) and the more epistemological flavoured one of *scrutability* (Chalmers and Jackson 2001). The idea behind

the former is that the business of metaphysics is discovering the ungrounded grounds of reality and the structure of what grounds what, that is: those primitive objects and/or properties which are *ungrounded* and *ground* the rest of objects and/or properties in a particular way. These are supposed to be the more fundamental layers of reality.

Regarding scrutability projects, if A *reduces* to B, then the idea is that it is a necessary condition of metaphysical reduction that all truths about A are scrutable, that is derivable, from all truths about B. In other words, all truths about B would *a priori* entail all truths about A. This entailment amounts to saying that an *ideal reasoner*, without cognitive limitations, would be able to *a priori* deduce all truths about A from B.

At some point Kriegel mentions an apparent difficulty, the explanation of which will allow us to advance the understanding of the metaphysical reduction at stake here. The problem is the following: it seems that for the project to be an interesting one, the reduction should proceed at a certain level of generality. Recall that we are talking about *perceptual*, *algedonic*, *cognitive*, etc., types of phenomenology. However, note the length and variety of phenomenal properties within, say, perceptual phenomenology: you have the experience of blue and the experience of orange, and even, the experience of numerous shades of blue and numerous shades of orange. The experience of blue and the experience of orange are irreducible between each other, they are primitive at their *level of generality*.

The way out of this problem then is to consider that the notion of reduction at stake here is a relative notion: some properties are primitive and other reducible or derivative *relative to* a given layer of generality. A way of fleshing out this relativity may be through the notions of *determinable/determinate* and *genus/species*. These two notions are very different, but they can be used to illuminate what is relevant for a given reduction.

In any case, there is a clear way in which we could understand the notion of reduction as a relative notion. Depending on the level of generality some phenomenal properties would be more interesting than others. Let's consider the *most* general level of phenomenal reality. This most general level is phenomenality simpliciter, that is, the property of feeling like something for a given subject. The *second* more general level is the one in which Kriegel develops his project. It seems perceptual, algedonic, imaginative, entertaining, cognitive and conative phenomenology are immediate *species* of *determinates* of the first level, namely, phenomenology simpliciter. Thus, the question that is dealt with in the two first chapters of this

dissertation is concerned with whether emotion is primitive or derivative relative to this second level of generality.

In the papers/chapters of this dissertation, especially in the two first ones, I defend the view that emotional phenomenology is primitive regarding this second level of generality. That is, I defend that emotional phenomenology is an immediate determinate or species of phenomenology simpliciter on a par with perceptual, algedonic, imaginative, entertaining, cognitive and conative phenomenology.

2. Emotions and Other Philosophical Issues: (Evaluative) Knowledge and Rationality

2.1. Emotions and Rationality

Historically, the compatibility of emotions and rationality has been the object of heated debates. For the most part of western intellectual history, emotions were considered obstacles to being a rational agent. Nowadays, however, scientists and philosopher have realized that emotions are not only compatible with human rationality, but, maybe, indispensable for it.

Most philosophers of emotion nowadays think that emotions make some options more salient than others, putting an end to the process of deliberation (see, for instance, De Sousa 1987). Many others think that emotion inform us about what is valuable, being one of the essential conditions of evaluation in general (Tappolet 2016). For others, emotions are guides of attention that, keeping the attention fixed, help us come with better and better assessments of our axiological situation (Brady 2013). The importance of emotions for rationality is not only a philosophical debate but also an empirical and testable hypothesis as already said (see, for instance, the somatic marker hypothesis by Damasio (1994)).

One of the questions addressed in my third paper, *Emotional Phenomenology: a New Puzzle*, is whether emotional behaviour, both bodily and mental, is compatible with rationality. There I outline a puzzle for the rationality of emotion. Unlike perceptual phenomenology, which permits of dogmatic treatment (Huemer 2001; Pryor 2000), emotional phenomenology is puzzling. When you feel an emotion, you feel an urge to act, you feel, among other things, your body's action readiness (Deonna & Teroni 2012; Frijda 2007; Scarantino 2014) and, if this pull is not to be considered blind, then the subject must take what the emotion "says" at

face value. On the other hand, at least sometimes, you are aware that an emotion by itself is not a sufficient reason to justify an evaluative judgment and/or an action, not even prima facie (Brady 2013; Brogaard & Chudnoff 2017). As I said, in chapter 3 I outline this puzzle and try to offer the sketch of a solution.

2.2. Emotions and (Evaluative) Knowledge

In the last decades there has been an interesting debate regarding several epistemic issues related to emotion. Here are some of them: are emotions epistemically superfluous when it comes to the acquisition of evaluative knowledge and justification, i.e., would subtracting an emotion from the process of acquiring a justified evaluative belief leave the process unchanged in its epistemic profile? What is the role of emotion, if any, in the formation of justified evaluative beliefs? Can emotion, like perception in the case factual knowledge, afford us a well-founded evaluative epistemology?

A brief caveat. Talking about the epistemic role of emotion in a modest foundationalism about evaluative knowledge, I am assuming a minimal kind of realism, given that knowledge is factive. I assume that evaluative properties and facts, which are the truth makers of evaluative propositions, exist. Of course, one need not presuppose robust realism about those evaluative properties and facts. It is possible that they exist in a response-dependent way. In any case, these are some uncontroversial candidates of what an evaluative property is: the admirable, the fearsome, the disgusting, etc. I am using the terminology as I found it in the debate. Tappolet, for instance, when describing her view, mentions evaluative properties as that for which the emotion is a dedicated representation. Here is Tappolet:

> On this account, emotions are claimed to have representational content. They represent their object as having specific evaluative properties. To use the medieval jargon Anthony Kenny favored (1963), the emotions' formal objects are evaluative properties. Thus, an emotion of fear with respect to a dog will be correct just in case the dog is really fearsome. In the same way, the fear that a storm is brewing will be correct just in case the brewing of a storm is really fearsome.
>
> (Tappolet 2016: 40)

Regarding the last question, it is not uncommon in the debate a kind of epistemic sentimentalism that sees in emotion the epistemic foundational base for our evaluative knowledge. Emotions would be, like perception in the case of perceptual belief, the regress-stopping justifiers for evaluative judgements/beliefs. An example: The belief that our friend is admirable would be founded in our feeling of admiration, in the same way in which the belief

that there is an orange in our surroundings is based on our perceptual experiences presenting as if an orange were there.

This modest foundationalism about evaluative knowledge is associated with phenomenal dogmatism: the view that phenomenology itself has certain epistemic properties that confer immediate though defeasible justification. According to this view, if, absent defeaters, it seems to you that P, then you have prima facie justification for believing that P (Huemer 2001; Pryor 2000). Phenomenal dogmatism is quite plausible for perception, but its case for emotion is much more controversial.

In any case, foundationalism need not be articulated assuming phenomenal dogmatism. It is consistent with externalistic, reliabilist virtue epistemology. This is what I try to show in the last paper of this dissertation, the one that corresponds to chapter 4. I will show that bringing Sosa's distinction between *animal* and *reflective* knowledge (Sosa 1985; 2007), we can do justice to the foundational epistemic role of emotion in its richness but also overcome several theoretical impasses between those who assume phenomenal dogmatism about emotion and those who don't.

3. Preview of the Thesis' Chapters

3.1.- Chapters 1 and 2. The Nature of Emotional Experience: Fundamental or Derivative?

In this part of the dissertation, constituted by two published articles[4], I try to contribute to give an answer to this question: what are the *primitive*, in the sense of being *fundamental*, types of mental experiences that constitute the human stream of consciousness? What are the *primitive* forms of consciousness, that is, what are the *fundamental* ingredients or aspects of consciousness[5]? The sense of fundamentality at stake here has been described in section 2 of this introduction and can also be found in the papers themselves. This dissertation contributes to *partially* answer this general question concerning what the fundamental elements or aspects

[4] The papers already mentioned: "Isolating Primitive Emotional Phenomenology in the 'Lab' of Fiction" published in *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* (online first) and "An Argument from Normativity for Primitive Emotional Phenomenology", published in *Philosophical Papers*.

[5] I use 'ingredient of consciousness' and 'element of consciousness' because I want to remain neutral on the question of whether consciousness is atomistic or holistic. If the former, the stream of consciousness would be a molecular phenomenon formed by atomic constituents. If the latter, then there would not be any atomic element, but different aspects of the same substance, so to speak.

of consciousness are by answering this particular sub-question: *is emotional phenomenology a fundamental or derivative type of phenomenology?* [6]

As I said, in this enterprise I engage with Uriah Kriegel's taxonomy of the varieties of consciousness. According to Kriegel in his 2015 book, *The Varieties of Consciousness*, there are *only* six primitive elements of consciousness: perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertaining, and conative. The previous are the *basic* ingredients or aspects of consciousness, while other types of phenomenology, like *emotional* phenomenology, would be *grounded* in them, they would *derive* from them.

In "Isolating Emotional Phenomenology in the 'Lab' of fiction" I take fiction-elicited emotions as emotions produced in a "controlled" environment in which they are devoid of conative impurities. Setting aside the metaphor, the idea is that this type of *contemplative* fiction-elicited emotions gives us particularly favourable conditions to *isolate* emotional experience from conative elements. The rationale of this strategy also relies on the fact that there are robust similarities between fiction-elicited emotions and their garden variety counterparts. These robust similarities justify us in drawing general metaphysical conclusions about emotions from fiction-elicited emotions, as is defended in the paper.

It seems that every time you have a contemplative emotion, that emotion lacks any link to action. This, indeed, seems to be the case in our emotions elicited by fiction. Thus, every time you have a contemplative emotion, you lack any link to action, which is an essential condition for conative phenomenology. In other words, contemplative emotional phenomenology cannot be co-instantiated with conative phenomenology, because the former implies the absence of an essential condition for the latter. That is, the instantiation of contemplative emotional phenomenology entails the *absence* of conative phenomenology, and the instantiation of conative phenomenology entails the *absence* of contemplative emotional phenomenology.

Our contemplative emotions elicited by fiction cannot be accounted for by conative phenomenology, plus Kriegel's other elements (some of which are only *individually necessary*

[6]To prevent misunderstandings, it is worth emphasizing that the question of whether emotional phenomenology is fundamental, or derivative, is *relative* to the debate on what are the fundamental varieties of consciousness. That is, one can hold that emotional phenomenology is primitive but be a physicalist about the ultimate nature of reality. In other words, one can believe in the primitive existence of emotional phenomenology *in the context* of the debate on what are the fundamental varieties of consciousness. However, one can believe that the only fundamental thing in *absolute* terms is physical reality. Thus, even if emotional phenomenology is a fundamental type of phenomenology, in comparison, for instance, with moral phenomenology; phenomenology in general would not be as fundamental as matter.

for emotional phenomenology but *not sufficient* neither individually nor jointly), because conative phenomenology necessarily would not be present in those cases. Thus, given that contemplative emotional phenomenology necessitates the absence of conative phenomenology, we can say that conative phenomenology is not necessary for emotional phenomenology. Now, given that conative phenomenology is necessarily not present in the cases under discussion, then we cannot add it to the other necessary elements (the phenomenology of the possible cognitive bases of the emotion + algedonic phenomenology) to have a combination that is jointly necessary and sufficient for the emotional phenomenology of the fiction consumer.

Thus, contemplative fiction-elicited emotions are *at least* an emotional case for which (a relevant combination of) Kriegel's elements are neither individually nor jointly sufficient for its emotional phenomenology. If my reasoning is correct, then it follows that emotional phenomenology in general is not reducible to Kriegle's inventory.

In "An argument from Normativity for Primitive Emotional Phenomenology" I take a different dialectical route for the same conclusion, namely: emotional phenomenology is primitive. In this paper I deploy a thought experiment that, by means of a *phenomenal contrast*, shows that (a combination) of Kriegel's elements is not sufficient for emotional phenomenology, even if some of those elements are individually necessary for emotional phenomenology.

The method of the phenomenal contrast is used by different philosophers to argue for the existence of different phenomenal contents and attitudes (see, for instance, Siegel 2012; Strawson 1994). It starts with the intuition that two subjects differ phenomenally, sharing, however, different tokens of the same phenomenal types. Take phenomenal types A, B, C and overall total phenomenal state-type D. Now imagine two conscious subjects Zoe and Rachel. Both Zoe and Rachel share phenomenal state-tokens a, b, c, exemplifications of phenomenal states-type A, B, C. However, Zoe and Rachel differ phenomenally. Zoe exemplifies phenomenal state token-d, exemplification of phenomenal state-type D, whereas Rachel does not. This shows that sameness in exemplifications a, b and c is not sufficient for exemplifying d. Hence, d is the token of an independent phenomenal type D, which Zoe exemplifies but Rachel does not. D is not reducible to A, B and C.

My thought experiment and the phenomenal contrast proposed in it is the following. Imagine the *Almost Radically Recalcitrant Emoter* (ARRE from now on). She is a human being

the majority of whose emotions are recalcitrant[7] because of an accident that results in brain injury. After the accident, all her Kriegelian phenomenal attitudes, realized in her brain, are still there, intact. However, our subject has developed a strange condition: everything causes her joy. If she is receiving good news, she feels joy. If she is offended, she feels joy. If she perceives that she is in danger, she feels joy and so on. Among all these reactions, only the first one, to feel joy in the presence of good news, is a case of an appropriate emotion.

There is a phenomenal contrast between the consciousness of the subject after and before the accident even though Kriegel's phenomenal attitudes are preserved in both stages. This shows that sameness in Kriegel's elements does not entail sameness in emotional phenomenology and, hence, sameness in overall phenomenology. This paper is devoted to the task of showing the cogency of this phenomenal contrast.

3.2.- Chapter 3. A Puzzle about Emotions and Rationality

Traditionally, it was thought that emotions distort rationality. This has been the common conception about the relation between emotions and rationality until recently. However, as already said, more and more theorists, from neurology and psychology to philosophy and artificial intelligence, think that emotions are crucial for human rationality.

In chapter 3, which corresponds with the paper[8] entitled "Emotional Phenomenology: A New Puzzle", I explore a new puzzle for the relation between emotion and rationality. Some authors compare emotions and evaluative judgements with perception and perceptual beliefs. Emotional experience (e.g., anger about the assassination of an innocent) is said to justify evaluative judgments (e.g., the judgment that this is unjust) and actions (e.g., retaliation) in the same way in which perceptual experiences (e.g., seeing a red sphere-like object in your surroundings) justify existential beliefs (e.g., the belief that there is an apple in this room) and/or actions (e.g., extending your arm to pick up the apple).

From the first person perspective, from the point of view of what is rational to do for the agent from the perspective of the agent, it seems emotional experience leads us to a puzzle.

[7] Recalcitrant emotions are an agent's emotions in tension with the agent's evaluative judgments at a given time. An episode of recalcitrant fear consists of an agent experiencing fear about something while she knows or judges that there is not a real danger or, if any, a little one. Irrational phobias are a classic example. For more detail see D'Arms and Jacobson (2003).

[8] Published online first in *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*.

On the one hand, emotional experience is not the kind of experience which allows being treated dogmatically. It lacks some property that we may find in other kinds of experiences, like perceptual experience or intuitionistic experience. On the other hand, emotion makes you aware in a *specific emotional* manner of a given state of affairs provided by other mental states (e.g., fear present-as-dangerous the fact that there is a something that looks like a predator in my surroundings). However, emotional experience *in itself* is silent with regards to the *objective existence* or instantiation of the values it presents.

Here is the puzzle then: when you feel an emotion, you feel an urge to act, you feel, among other things, your body's action readiness (Deonna & Teroni 2012; Frijda 2007; Scarantino 2014). This *felt* pull to action must entail some sense in which the subject perceives the situation as the emotion presents it. That is, it is necessary for this pull to action to be rational that what the emotion presents is somehow taken dogmatically. Otherwise, it would just be a blind cause. But then, it seems that the emotion presents its contents as epistemically hypothetic but also as dogmatic in some sense. This represents a puzzle of rationality from the first-person perspective: how can a mental experience which is apparently contradictory, hypothetic and dogmatic at the same time, guide the subject's actions rationally? As I said, the paper "Emotional Phenomenology: a New Puzzle", which corresponds to chapter 3 of this dissertation, explores this question for the philosophical conception of emotion and tries to offer the sketch of a solution to this problem.

3.3.- Chapter 4. Bi-level Evaluative Epistemology

Emotions bear an interesting relation to epistemology. On the one hand, given that emotions are representational, they are subjected to correctness conditions and epistemic reasons. On the other hand, debates about how we come to know certain aspects of reality, like evaluative properties, find answers in emotions and their epistemic role.

Regarding this debate, namely, the debate on the epistemic nature of emotion, there are two clear dialectical sides: those who defend the view that emotions are epistemically akin to perception and those who deny it. Call the former, *epistemic perceptualism about emotion* (EPE from now on); call the latter, *epistemic non-perceptualism about emotions* (NEPE from now on).

In chapter 4 of this dissertation, I will explore the epistemic nature of emotion. The paper of this chapter[9] is entitled "Bi-level Evaluative Epistemology". The idea is to try to overcome the debate between EPE and NEPE, acknowledging the kernel of truth of both theories. Particularly, in this paper I propose a way out of the dialectical impasse based on Ernest Sosa's idea of *animal* and *reflective* knowledge (Sosa 1985; 2007), I propose a similar distinction for the epistemic role of emotion.

With this distinction at hand, we can devise a *virtue-externalist* version of EPE, along the lines of Carter's view (Carter 2019), immune to the objections traditional *internalist* EPE faces (e.g., Tappolet 2016). The externalist version of EPE is compatible with the internalist insights offered by NEPE (e.g., Brady 2013). Under this description, defenders of EPE and NEPE do not disagree with each other, they are just offering an analysis of *different but complementary epistemic achievements*, which have *different but compatible epistemic statuses* and *different epistemic requirements*. Under this description, we can take theoretical items from both EPE and NEPE to understand emotion's contribution to human evaluative knowledge.

EPE's and NEPE's insights are *not only compatible* but also *complementary*. If we just accepted the new virtue-externalist version of EPE proposed by Carter, then our picture of the epistemic role of the emotions would be incomplete. As Sosa has noted, there is something epistemically admirable in reflection, in having a *reflective* epistemic perspective on your *animal* knowledge (1983; 2015). In the paper of this chapter, I claim that there is also something epistemically valuable in *evaluative reflection*. For this reason, emotion's epistemic contribution cannot be exhausted by some *virtue reliabilism* on emotion, as the one articulated by Carter (2019). We also need to account for the value of having an *epistemic perspective* on one's axiological situation. We need what we may call a *virtue perspectivism* on emotion.

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1

Isolating Primitive Emotional Phenomenology in the 'Lab' of Fiction

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There is an important debate in the philosophy of mind that has roots in the phenomenological tradition, namely: what are the primitive forms of consciousness, that is, what are the fundamental ingredients or aspects of consciousness. This paper wants to contribute to *partially* answering this general question by providing an answer to a required sub-question within this question: is emotional phenomenology fundamental? I will answer in the affirmative and will offer an argument focused on contemplative emotions elicited by fiction. Another type of contemplative emotions, namely, *aesthetic emotions*, have been invoked in the literature but I will argue that the phenomenology of emotions elicited by fiction, given their continuity and sameness in kind with the phenomenology of garden variety emotions, are more dialectically efficient vis-à-vis the debate on the irreducibility of emotional phenomenology.

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Introduction

There is an important debate in the philosophy of mind that has roots in the phenomenological tradition (Brentano 1874/1973; Kriegel 2017), namely: what are the *primitive* forms of consciousness, that is, what are the *fundamental* ingredients or aspects of consciousness[11]. The question is: what are the elements or aspects of consciousness that we need to posit to explain a *given explanandum*, the stream of consciousness, our inner mental phenomenal life. For instance, some people in the debate have argued that the only ingredients or elements we need to posit are sensorial ones, and, hence, the stream of consciousness could be explained just mentioning sensorial consciousness broadly understood: consciousness of colours, forms, textures, smells, visceral movements, proprioceptive states… (e.g., Prinz 2011). For other contestants in the debate, we need to invoke non-sensorial forms of consciousness, like cognitive phenomenology (e.g., Pitt 2004).

One way of understanding the debate is in terms of grounding (Schaffer 2009). The idea of metaphysical grounding, as it is orthodoxically understood, is that *many things exist*, but *only few things are fundamental*. The former would be derivative from the latter which would be derivative of even more fundamental things until we reach fundamental bedrock: *ungrounded grounds*. Thus, someone could say that chairs exist as derivative objects, reducible to molecules which, in turn, are reducible to atoms which, in turn, are reducible to subatomic elements. Both chairs and subatomic particles exist, but whereas the former are derivative, the latter are fundamental.

One of the advantages of framing the debate in terms of grounding is that it makes available a kind of explanation, *metaphysical explanation*. Grounding relations are said to be explanatory. They concern a metaphysical form of explanation in which 'the explanans or explanantia are constitutive of the explanandum, or that the explanandum's holding consists in nothing more than the obtaining of the explanans or explanantia' (Fine 2012, 39). Metaphysical explanation would differ but complement causal explanation. Thus, settling the question of what are the primitive elements or ingredients of consciousness matters not only for *causal psychological explanations*, but also for the metaphysical explanation of the mind, that is, for adjudicating issues about the *basic ontology of psychology*.

[11] I use 'ingredient of consciousness' and 'element of consciousness' because I want to remain neutral on the question of whether consciousness is atomistic or holistic. If the former, the stream of consciousness would be a molecular phenomenon formed by atomic constituents. If the latter, then there would not be any atomic element, but different aspects of the same substance, so to speak.

Applying the idea of grounding to the question under discussion: the perceptualists about phenomenal consciousness, for instance, may say that cognitive phenomenology exists, but it is derivative from the more fundamental perceptual phenomenology (e.g., Pautz 2013). This paper wants to contribute to *partially* answer this general question concerning what the fundamental elements or aspects of consciousness are. It will do so by providing an answer to a required sub-question within this question: *is emotional phenomenology a fundamental or derivative type of phenomenology?* [12]

This question is not new. As it has been said, it has roots in the phenomenological tradition as a part of the more general question on the fundamental varieties of consciousness. More recently several philosophers in the analytic domain have contended about it. We can distinguish two positions, the reductivist and the non-reductivist. All agree that emotional phenomenology exists, the question is, then, *how* it exists, namely, *as derivative* (reductivist) or *as fundamental* (non-reductivist). I will argue for the claim that emotional phenomenology is fundamental, that is, *primitive*. Given the aforementioned explanatory role of fundamental elements, that would make emotional phenomenology a fundamental phenomenal kind in the basic ontology of human and animal consciousness.

In section 1, I will frame the debate and examine the different positions in the recent literature. In section 2, I will set the ground to announce my position which will be focused on the importance of contemplative emotions for the debate and, particularly, the importance of *contemplative emotions elicited by fiction*. Another type of contemplative emotions, namely, *aesthetic emotions*, have been invoked in the literature in the aid of non-reductionism about emotional phenomenology (Mitchell 2020). I will try to show that emotions elicited by fiction, which have not been invoked to my knowledge, are a type of contemplative emotions more effective, dialectically speaking, in aiding the non-reductionist. Though fiction-elicited emotions are not the only opened dialectical route for the antireductionist, they are particularly appropriate for that purpose since they give us particularly favourable conditions to isolate emotions from conative elements and there are robust similarities between fiction-elicited

[12]To prevent misunderstandings, it is worth emphasizing that the question of whether emotional phenomenology is fundamental, or derivative, is *relative* to the debate on what are the fundamental varieties of consciousness. That is, one can hold that emotional phenomenology is primitive but be a physicalist about the ultimate nature of reality. In other words, one can believe in the primitive existence of emotional phenomenology *in the context* of the debate on what are the fundamental varieties of consciousness. However, one can believe that the only fundamental thing in *absolute* terms is physical reality. Thus, even if emotional phenomenology is a fundamental type of phenomenology, in comparison, for instance, with moral phenomenology; phenomenology in general would not be as fundamental as matter.

emotions and their garden variety counterparts. In any case, both types of contemplative emotions, fiction-elicited emotions and aesthetic emotions, can work in tandem for serving the non-reductionist's thesis.

In section 3, I will put contemplative emotions elicited by fiction to work for the non-reductionist position on emotional phenomenology, *isolating through them primitive emotional phenomenology*. After that, in section 4, I will assess what seems to be the initial consequences of my arguments for ongoing debates on the nature of emotion. I will assess what theories of emotion are initially more plausible under the light of my results and which ones are ruled out. As it is known, one's conditional to perform *modus ponens* is another's *same* conditional to perform *modus tollens*. I want to depart from *arguably* intuitive premises, based on our phenomenology of fiction consumption, and from them derive the thesis that emotional phenomenology is primitive. Now, from my considerations about the primitiveness of emotional phenomenology, it follows that certain theories of emotion are plausibly true (*e.g.*, the attitudinal theory of emotion) whereas other theories of emotion are ruled out (*e.g.*, the judgemental theory of emotion). Those who have independent reasons to reject my conclusions, namely, that certain theories of emotion are not the case, would deny my antecedent analysis or, at least, would have more resistance to embrace it. However, even for those who reject the analysis, the argument is still interesting, since it shows what reasons we have for it and what theories of emotion follow from *that* way of understanding emotional phenomenology in fictional contexts.

1.Reductivism vs. Non-Reductivism about Emotional Phenomenology

Imagine you are experiencing an episode of joy about receiving some grant. Question: is this emotionally conscious episode reducible to other conscious experiences like conative experiences (e.g., the desire of receiving that grant), cognitive experiences (e.g., the conscious judgement that receiving the grant is good), the feeling of bodily changes (e.g., feeling an accelerated heart rate and breath)? Or, on the contrary, is there an irreducible emotional aspect or element? The answer to these questions is supposed to be generalizable. If yes to the latter question, then emotional phenomenology is primitive. If yes to the former question, then emotional phenomenology is derivative or reducible to more fundamental types of consciousness.

Let me introduce the contenders. In the reductive side we have traditional analysis of emotions that assimilate their phenomenal character to some other mental state's one: emotional phenomenology = conscious evaluative judgements' phenomenology (Solomon 1976; Nussbaum 2001), emotional phenomenology = feelings of bodily changes (James 1884; Prinz 2004), etc. More directly aware of the question under discussion in this paper, we find Uriah Kriegel's reductive analysis of emotional phenomenology in his *Varieties of Consciousness* (Kriegel 2015). On the other side, we have those authors who hold a non-reductive analysis of emotional phenomenology, like Arnaud Dewalque (2017), Jonathan Mitchell (2020) and Michelle Montague (2009). According to them, emotional phenomenology is primitive, that is, a fundamental variety of consciousness non-reducible to other fundamental varieties and on a par with them.

In the following subsections I am going to present the recent exchanges in the current debate between non-reductivist and reductivists. The first most developed argument for non-reductivism in the analytic tradition is due to Montague (2009). Partly as a response to Montague's argument, Kriegel (2015) has presented his own reductive argument. As a response to Kriegel, Dewalque (2017) and Mitchell (2020) have presented their own non-reductive approach to emotional phenomenology. I will present all these views respecting their chronological order and their dialectical dependencies.

Though I consider that Montague's proposal is not successful defending the claim that emotional phenomenology is primitive, I think Kriegel's proposal is seriously challenged by Dewalque's and Mitchell's criticism. Besides, and this is the contribution of this article, there is logical space for one more argument in favour of emotional non-reductivism that has not been explored yet by the authors mentioned. This is my argument. It is based on emotions elicited by fiction as a special case of contemplative emotions whose existence can be explained only if we grant that emotional phenomenology is primitive.

1.1. Initial Non-reductivism: Montague

Montague (2009) argues that positing primitive emotional phenomenology is a plausible theoretical option given the considerations she adduces. The most plausible candidates for reducing emotions, given the orthodoxy of Humean psychology (Smith 1994), are beliefs and desires or pairs of them. Montague starts noting that emotions and cognitions (beliefs, judgements, etc.) have different inferential sensibilities. In Kriegel's terms: while

belief contexts seem to be *opaque*, emotional contexts seem to be *hyper opaque* (Kriegel 2015). Consider:

Case A

(1) I believe that Andrea won the grant

(2) Adrea's winning the grant = my losing the grant

(3) I believe that I lost the grant

Case A*

(1) I believe that Andrea won the grant

(2) I am aware that Adrea's winning the grant = my losing the grant

(3) I believe that I lost the grant

Whereas the reasoning in Case A is not valid, because I may fail to know premise (2), the reason in case A* is valid, that is, rational. If I am rational and I come to know that Adrea's winning the grant = my losing the grant, and I know that Andrea won the grant, then I am rationally compelled to believe that I lost the grant. The logical schema instantiated in Case A*, could be fed, if we have rational beliefs (i.e., non-contradictory), with whatever belief and the result will always be the same. Now, contrast this with case B and B*:

Case B

(1) I am happy that Andrea won the grant

(2) Adrea's winning the grant = my losing the grant

(3) I am happy that I lost the grant

Case B*

(1) I am happy that Andrea won the grant

(2) I am aware that Adrea's winning the grant = my losing the grant

(3) I am happy that I lost the grant

While there is a difference between case A and case A* in regard to their rationality, it seems that both B and B* are invalid. Clearly, in Case B, from (1) and (2) it does not follow (3), but neither does it in case B *. From the fact that I know that Adrea's winning the grant = my losing the grant, and that I am factively happy that Andrea won the grant, it does not follow that I am happy that I lost the grant. I can be sad about it.

Montague thinks that this is an initial clue to consider that emotional experience must be primitive, that is, irreducible to cognitive phenomenology. Otherwise, emotional phenomenology would inherit its inferential sensitivities from the cognitive one. But this is not the case. Thus, according to Montague, Emotional phenomenology must be primitive. Montague acknowledges that desires could also explain the inferential anomalies of emotional contexts. However, desires are neither sufficient nor necessary for emotional phenomenology. On the one hand, I can desire something, like living one hundred years, without feeling any emotion. On the other hand, if I am happy that Andrea got the grant, I do not desire it, since this has already happened. Thus, Montague claims, emotional phenomenology must be primitive.

1.2. Kriegel's Phenomenal Realm and Emotional Phenomenology

Uriah Kriegel (2015) has tried to offer a list with the primitive elements of consciousness, that is, a list of the basic building block or aspects of consciousness that you have to invoke to explain the stream of consciousness. He proposes six primitive elements: perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertaining, and conative. The previous are the basic ingredients or aspects of consciousness while other types of phenomenology, like emotional or moral phenomenology, would be derivative from those. These primitive elements are phenomenal attitudinal features of consciousness. That is, these *phenomenal attitudes* contrast with their *phenomenal content*, namely with the object, proposition or situation presented by them. Thus, those types of phenomenology refer to the what-it-is-like of the *mode* in which the mental state presents its content rather than to the what-it-is-like of the *content* itself. Take, as an example, cognitive phenomenology. According to Kriegel, cognitive phenomenology *presents-as-true* its contents, for instance, that 2+2=4. Thus, it is the phenomenology of the mode of presentation or mental attitude (i.e., presenting-as-true), instead of the phenomenology of the content (i.e., that 2+2=4), that interests Kriegel. The reason for the emphasis in the phenomenology of the attitude instead of that of the content is to be found

in the fact that it seems to be more fundamental. Whereas having the phenomenology of belief located at the content would rule out cases of animals and children who lack the concept of TRUTH for predicating it of propositions, having it located in the attitude would allow beings who lack the concept of TRUTH to have beliefs. The concept of TRUTH would just be an explication of what is encoded in the way cognitive phenomenology presents its contents.

Perceptual and algedonic types of phenomenology, that is, sensorial types of phenomenology, are taken for granted, in the sense that they are manifest. By contrast, cognitive, conative and entertaining types of phenomenology are more controversial and, hence, Kriegel provides different arguments for each of them.

Sensorial phenomenology includes perceptual, (sensorially) imaginative and algedonic types of phenomenology. *Perceptual phenomenology* presents-*as-existent* its contents. A phenomenal mental state is sensorial when it has been produced by sensory or bodily systems (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, proprioceptive, etc.). An example of perceptual phenomenology: it presents-as-existent my computer while I am writing. *Sensorial imagination* shares the contents of perceptual experience, their source is sensorial, but not the attitudinal features. What is essential to the what-it-is-like of sensorial imaginative phenomenology, what differentiates it from perception, is its *presenting as-non-existent* its contents. For instance, if I see a banana on the table, it is presented as-existent to me, here and now. By contrast, if I sensorially imagine a banana on the table then it is presented as-non-existent to me. Finally, *algedonic phenomenology*, which has to do with pleasure and pain, is characterized by Kriegel as a mode of presentation *as-good/bad* of their contents in a sensorial way. An example of algedonic phenomenology: it presents-as-good sensorially this piece of cake that I am eating right now.

Now let's focus on non-sensorial phenomenology, which includes cognitive, conative and entertaining phenomenology. *Cognitive phenomenology* presents *as-true* its contents in a non-sensorial way. An example of cognitive phenomenology: It presents-as-true the content that 2+2=4. *Conative phenomenology* is characterised by Kriegel, following Brentano, as value-committed. In particular, conative phenomenology presents, in a non-sensorial way, *as-good/bad* its contents. A more precise characterization of conative phenomenology is *deciding-and-then-trying* phenomenology. An example of this kind of phenomenology could be that it presents-as-good good health and, hence, it presents-as-right physical exercise and as worth trying. *Entertaining phenomenology* consists in a phenomenal state that *merely-presents*

(neutrally, without any commitment) its contents in a non-sensorial way. It does not commit the experiencer neither with the desirability nor with the truth of the contents. This type of phenomenology is, as we will see, important to our project, since Kriegel considers that imaginings belong to this kind and it is widely accepted that the proper response to fictions' content is to imagine them. An example of entertaining phenomenology happens when it merely presents some content, without commitment to its truth or desirability. For instance, I entertained Schopenhauer's metaphysics last night. I bear it in mind without committing myself to its truth or desirability.

According to Kriegel emotional phenomenology is derivative from the aforementioned types of phenomenology. Cognitive, perceptual and both sensorial and non-sensorial imaginative types of phenomenology could provide emotions with their particular object as their *cognitive bases* (Deonna and Teroni 2012). The particular object (e.g., a predator) of the emotion (e.g., fear) is provided to the emoter by its cognitive bases (perception, imagination, memory, etc.) and upon that particular object, the formal object of the emotion supervenes (following with the example, danger). Algedonic phenomenology could explain emotions' hedonic tone, their valence. Lastly, conative phenomenology could explain emotions' action readiness. Thus, some combination of Kriegel's element is both necessary and sufficient for every emotional episode.

I agree with Kriegel's diagnosis of Montague's argument, which I reconstruct in the following lines to give the reader a complete grasp of the history of this debate.

Kriegel explains what *seems* to be the different inferential sensibilities between beliefs and emotions in terms of a distinction between *facts* and *events*. The individuation of facts is *finer grained* than the individuation of events. Thus, the facts mentioned in premise (2) in cases B and B* would not be identical. They could not be more different: one fact has to do with Andrea's success, another with my failure. Thus, premises (2) in cases B and B* would make an *equivocation* between fact and event and hence it would be false. By contrast, in case A* premise (2) is still true because it seems that the identity is unambiguously taken to be between the same event under two different *descriptions*.

Given the factivity of being fully aware of facts, it cannot be true that I am aware of the identity of two dissimilar facts. That would explain why case B* leads to a false conclusion. The falsity of the conclusion would be due to a false premise, (2), and not to an invalid schema. In other words, it is not true that from my knowing that Andrea's success = my failure and from

my happiness that Andrea succeeded, it follows my happiness that I fail. From the fact that I am happy that p (read as a fact), it does not follow that I am happy that q (read as a fact), unless p=q (read as facts) and I am aware of that. That Andrea succeeded cannot be equal to the fact that I failed. They are just different facts instantiated by *the same* event describable as Andrea's success or my failure.

Another possibility is that I may be fully aware of different aspects of the same *event* and ambivalent about them. Thus, I can construe (2) in both cases B and B* as targeting an event instead of a fact. If I construe case B* as targeting the event as a whole and not this or that aspect of it, then I am being irrational if I hold ambivalent emotions to it. I can be ambivalent about different aspects of the same event (i.e., have different feelings for different facts instantiated by the same event) without being irrational, something I cannot do on pain of irrationality with respect to the *whole* event.

Summing up, if we construe case B* as targeting facts, then the false conclusion, (3), would be due to a false premise, (2), and not due to the invalidity of the schema. By contrast, if we construe case B* as targeting the same event and that event obtains, and the rest of premises are true, given the validity of the schema, if I am rational, the conclusion (3) would be true. If I am happy about an event, not this or that aspect, then I should be happy about it under whatever description I gave of the event, on the proviso, of course, that I know that the different descriptions are descriptions of the same event. Thus, *either* conclusion (3) in case B* is false due to a false premise (2) when read as referring to facts; or conclusion (3) follows from the premises, when read as referring to events, and failing to infer it would be due to my irrationality. Therefore, emotional phenomenology is inferentially alike to cognitive phenomenology.

After having refuted Montague, Kriegel considers different ways in which his dialectical rival could argue for the primitiveness of emotional phenomenology. He considers conceivability arguments in which you could conceive of a partially zombified subject who would lack any type of phenomenology except for emotional phenomenology. He found those attempts as failures and he is probably right given that emotions have cognitive bases, that is, emotions cannot provide themselves with their own object (Deonna and Teroni 2012). So, it is impossible that you can have an emotion without any other mental state (e.g., belief, perception, imagining…) that provides it with its particular object. I cannot fear a predator unless I see it, imagine it, etc. Perception, imagination, testimony… are among the possible necessary

cognitive bases of emotion. Kriegel also confesses that he is unable to conceive a phenomenal contrast to show the primitiveness of emotional phenomenology, as he does to prove the primitiveness of conative phenomenology. Thus, he ends up concluding that emotional phenomenology is best understood as reducible to his phenomenal primitives which has, besides, the advantage of being the most parsimonious option.

1.3.- Non-reductionist Response to Kriegel: Dewalque and Mitchell

Arnaud Dewalque (2017) and Jonathan Mitchell (2020) offer irreducible analysis of emotional phenomenology that address directly Kriegel's reductive arguments. Let me briefly introduce their arguments to immediately elaborate on how my own argument differs from them though it is complementary with them.

Dewalque basically shows that cognitive phenomenology is not sufficient for emotional phenomenology, though it may be necessary for some emotions (secondary emotions, like shame, admiration, etc.). Besides, he shows that conative phenomenology is neither necessary nor sufficient for emotional phenomenology. Given that cognitive and conative phenomenology are at the core of Kriegel's reduction of emotional phenomenology, Dewalque takes himself as having refuted Kriegel.

To show that cognitive phenomenology is not sufficient for emotional phenomenology, he just appeals to cases in which one can have non-emotional evaluative judgements, like "War is unjust", without being moved by them.

Given that it is a very plausible assumption that a desire does not entail an emotion (i.e., given that desires are not sufficient for emotion), Dewalque focuses on proving that desires are not necessary for emotions (i.e., that an emotion does not entail a desire). To do so he mentions two emotions as counterexamples to the claim that emotion entails desires: *surprise* and *resignation*. In both cases you have an emotion without a desire. In the former case you cannot have a desire that explains the emotion, because the emotions represent novelty, something you have not considered before it and you cannot desire what you have not considered. The latter case is characterized by the absence of desire, by conformity to how the world already is.

Mitchell's arguments for non-reductivism about emotional phenomenology targets both the necessity and the sufficiency claim in Kriegel's analysis. Thus, for instance, cognitive, algedonic and/or conative phenomenology, central in Kriegel's reduction, would not be either necessary or sufficient for emotional phenomenology. To show the non-necessity of Kriegel's

elements or a combination of them he uses what he calls *subtractive arguments*. That is, arguments in which you are supposed to subtract a combination of Kriegel's elements from an emotional episode without losing the emotional phenomenal character. Mitchell conceives a contemplative aesthetic emotion about an abstract drawing. He then subtracts Kriegel's elements and shows that the phenomenal experience is still recognizable as emotional.

To show the insufficiency of Kriegel's elements or a combination of them he uses a *phenomenal contrast* argument. He imagines two phenomenal twins in terms of Kriegel's elements at the dentist's chair. However, there is a difference between them: though one is anxious the other is not. Thus, even though they have sameness of Kriegel elements, they have difference in the overall phenomenology which is plausibly explained by differences in the emotional phenomenal character.

I am not completely convinced about Mitchell's conclusion after applying his phenomenal contrast. It seems to me that there is going to be conflicted intuitions, something acknowledged by Mitchell himself. Some would say, given the discomfort of dental surgery, the desire of the discomfort to cease (conative) + the belief that one does not know whether it would cease soon or not + the psychological pain that this uncertainty brings are sufficient for the anxiety of both subjects and hence Mitchell's scenario, in which one subject is anxious whereas the other is not while both have the same combination of Kriegel's elements, would not be possible. Others would deny the implication. I, myself, feel conflicted about the case so, instead of trying to adjudicate between these two options, I suspend judgements on this thought experiment. However, after providing my own argument, I think we gain some support to the anti-reductionist conclusion in favour of which Mitchell argues.

2. Contemplative Emotions: Fiction-Elicited Emotions and Aesthetic Emotions

2.1. The Difference Between Fiction-Elicited Emotions and Aesthetic Emotions

I sympathize with both Dewalque's and Mitchell's arguments. However, I think I have a new argument for primitive emotional phenomenology to offer, which appears to be different from the above presented though it may be complementary with them. I will take fiction as a case study which allows the isolation of primitive emotional phenomenology.

We have seen that Mitchell appeals to aesthetic emotions to support the irreducibility of emotional phenomenology. Now, someone could ask what my contribution in this paper adds

to this debate, when Mitchell has already invoked contemplative emotions against the reductionist about emotional phenomenology. As an answer: the rationale of my contribution is that even though some type of contemplative emotions has been invoked, namely, aesthetic emotion, not all types of contemplative emotions work equally nor behave dialectically alike vis-à-vis the debate on the irreducibility of emotional phenomenology. In this paper I want to focus on fiction-elicited emotions.

Fiction-elicited emotions are *a type of* contemplative emotion[13]. Contemplative emotions are those emotions that lack a link to action and that have been used by Tappolet (2016) to defend the claim that conative elements are not a necessary condition for emotions. Why? Because when one emotes contemplatively one is not disposed to act in any way, nor has arguably any desire or wish. From the latter it would follow that conative elements are not necessary for emotions. Both aesthetic emotions (*e.g.*, *admiration* towards the aesthetic properties of the work of art, *awe* about the beauty of the artwork, etc.) and fiction-elicited emotions (e.g., fear about Stephen King's *IT*, sorrow for Anna Karenina's fate, etc.) seem to be different types of contemplative emotions.

Both are contemplative emotions, but for different reasons. The former's contemplativeness seems to come from the disinterested aspect of aesthetic contemplation (Hilgers 2017). The latter's contemplativeness seems to come *not* from the disinterestedness of affect, but from the characteristic cognitive bases that fiction-elicited emotions take (Teroni 2019). As we will see, fiction-elicited emotions' cognitive bases are either belief with a fictional operator (e.g., the belief that it is true that, *according to the fiction*, Bruce Wayne's parents were murdered) or imaginings (e.g., *simply imagine* that Bruce Wayne's parents were murdered).

My invocation of fiction-elicited emotions goes beyond, or differs from, Tappolet's general claims about contemplative emotions and Mitchell's invocation of aesthetic emotions.

[13] Derek Matravers (2014) argues that there is no clear divide between our encounters with fiction and non-fiction narratives. He argues for what he considers a more robust distinction: emotions elicited by *representation* and emotions elicited by *confrontation*, where the former precludes action since it is elicited by a representation which stands for an *absent* object, whereas the latter involves action since one directly confronts a given object. This distinction is supposedly capable of explaining puzzling aspects of our interaction with fiction without presupposing that fiction and the mechanisms of fiction-understanding and appreciation are different from those involved in the engagement with non-fictional works. My point is also compatible with alternative ways of understanding fiction as Matravers does. I want to take fictions with a specific content and only those fictions as a case study, namely: fictions whose intentional content is about characters and events that do not exist in the sense in which the current pope and his life exist. These emotions are clearly about a representation in Matravers' sense and they lack a link to action (in the sense specified at the end of this section).

Regarding the former, my invocation of fiction-elicited emotions goes beyond Tappolet's thesis that contemplative emotions show that conative elements are not necessary for emotions, because I show that it is not only that conative elements are not necessary for emotion but also that even if some of Kriegel's elements are necessary for emotional phenomenology, none of them is solely or jointly sufficient for emotional phenomenology.

Regarding Mitchell's invocation of aesthetic emotions, I take that an argument focused on fiction-elicited emotion is dialectically stronger than one focused on aesthetic emotions. Why? Because aesthetic emotion can be considered a borderline case of affective experience, and some can even doubt that it is an affective experience at all but sui generis feelings of aesthetic value. On the contrary, it seems that there is a continuity between the phenomenal character of garden variety emotions (e.g., 1. fear towards a real predator, 2. sorrow about injustices, etc.) and fiction-elicited emotional experiences (e.g., 1*. fear towards an imagined predator as in *Alien vs. Predator*, 2*. sorrow about imagined injustices as in *The Handmaid's Tale*, etc.). It also seems that the phenomenology of garden variety emotions and the one of fiction-elicited emotions belong to the same phenomenal kind, that is, the similarities between emotional phenomenology in fictional contexts and in ordinary life are robust enough as to leverage my metaphysical argument on the irreducibility of emotional phenomenology. This is what I will argue in the subsections that follow.

Before concluding this section, it is advisable to devote some time to clarify the idea that fiction-elicited emotions lack a link to action. What does this lack of a link to action mean? In paradigmatic garden-variety emotions there is a link to action that *targets* the object/state of affairs the emotions is about. When one feels garden-variety sadness about a particular situation, the link to action of the sadness targets the intentional object of the emotion in a relevant sense, namely: repairing the consequences of *that situation*. Take now the case of sadness about the events depicted in the example we will be commenting on, namely: Manchester-by-the-sea (Lonergan 2016). By contrast with the mentioned garden-variety sadness, in this fictional counterpart it seems that there is no clear action that *relevantly* targets *the situation depicted in the film* because that situation does not *knowingly*[14] exist in the same way in which the situation picked up by my garden-variety sadness exist.

[14] I have added this "knowingly" to emphasize that it is important that the emotional subject knows or believes that the intentional object of their fiction-elicited emotions does not exist in the sense in which ordinary objects and events exist. That way, cases in which the emotional subject mistakenly believes that a fictional character exist and acts consequently, would not count as cases of contemplative emotions in my sense.

Of course, one may say that after watching the film I may be more careful about the *type* of situation depicted in it, but this is a sense of "link to action" that is too broad *because* it does not target the intentional object of the emotion: the *token* situation, because that token situation does not exist in the relevant sense to be picked up by action. From now on, I will focus only on this specific type of fiction-elicited emotion. This type of emotion clearly lacks a link to action. Apart from that, I am not making any claim about the nature of fiction in general or about the nature of *all* fiction-elicited emotions.

2.2. The Counterpart Principle for Emotions Elicited by Fiction

Fiction-elicited emotions are governed by what I call the counterpart principle. In a nutshell: for every garden-variety emotion, there is a fiction-elicited emotion. This is an intuitive principle that seems manifestly true. Think about a case of fear about a predator. You can easily imagine a fiction in which the main character faces a predator. Think about the grief you may have experienced about the end of a romantic relationship. You can easily think about fictions in which this kind of emotions are elicited. And so on and so forth. The counterpart principle seems obvious: fictions seem to be able to elicit in principle the same variety of emotions that we experience in normal contexts.

If the counterpart principle is generally true, then there is a presumption that my strategy for arguing in favour of the irreducibility of emotional phenomenology relying on emotions elicited by fiction is justified. In the next section I will argue that, given the unity between the phenomenology of garden-variety and fiction-elicited emotions, we can *safely* reach metaphysical conclusions about emotional phenomenology taking fiction as a source of evidence.

2.3.-The Unity of Emotional Phenomenology

An objection my strategy may find is that emotions elicited by fiction are contentious cases of emotion. Some have even claimed that they are not real emotions (Walton 1978; 1993). For others, they are emotions with a *different but similar* functional profile than their counterpart garden-variety emotion (Currie 1989). Now, whereas it is true that emotions elicited by fiction are a controversial case, what is clear is that we *indeed* have feelings with an *affective phenomenal character* in response to fiction. Indeed, this is the object of generalized

agreement even among those who deny that emotions elicited by fiction are real emotions, like Walton, as noted by Robert Stecker:

> If all this is right, then the essential psychological state that occurs when we 'pity' a fictional character is just this: vividly imagining a character's suffering resulting in physiological changes that create strong feelings that have the phenomenology of pity. This is the aspect of the psychological state that Walton, Lamarque, and most others who have written about the paradox of fiction agree about.
>
> (Stecker 2001, 303)

To strengthen this line of reasoning, let me take the so-called paradox of fiction. The paradox of fiction is, precisely, what gives the impression that emotion elicited by fiction is a contentious case. In what follows, I am going to argue that my claim that the phenomenology of fiction-elicited emotions remains the same in kind than garden-variety emotions' phenomenology is compatible with whatever solution we offer to the paradox of fiction. In other words, my claim is compatible with whatever proposition we deny in the inconsistent triad that gives rise to the paradox, even if we deny that fiction-elicited emotions are emotions *stricto sensu*. The neutrality of my claim in regards to our preferred solution to the paradox of fiction should be enough to convince us that my appeal to the emotional phenomenology elicited by fiction, independently of whether this phenomenology is sufficient for having a full-fledged emotion[15], is uncontentious.

The paradox of fiction was initially proposed by Radford as a problem for the rationality of emotions directed towards fictional characters and events (Radford 1975). According to Radford, emotional responses are rational *only if* their targets exist. Fictional characters do not exist. Therefore, emotions towards fictional characters are not rational. Nowadays, it is currently acknowledged in the literature that there are two possible readings of the paradox of fiction: the *metaphysical* and the *normative* reading. Let's consider both versions of the paradox in turn.

The Metaphysical Version of the Paradox of Fiction (MVPF)

(PF1) We feel genuine emotions directed at fictional entities.

(PF2) We do not believe that fictional entities exist.

(PF3) To feel genuine emotions, we must believe that these emotions are directed at actually existing entities.

[15] It may be that emotional phenomenology is necessary but not sufficient for having an emotion. For instance, according to those who defend the motivational theory of emotion (Scarantino 2014), the individuation conditions for emotion are not only given in terms of their phenomenology but also, and crucially, in terms of their motivational profile.

(Teroni 2019, 113)

The Normative Version of the Paradox of Fiction (NVPF)

(PF1*) It is rational to feel genuine emotions directed at fictional entities.

(PF2*) We do not believe that fictional entities exist.

(PF3*) For an emotion to be rational, we must believe that it is directed at an actually existing object.

(*Ibid*.)

The normal way of solving paradoxes expressed in inconsistent triads consists in the rejection of one of the propositions which cannot be accepted together with the other two. Thus, for every triad there are normally three possible solutions. I am going to show how the rejection of every premise in every triad is compatible with the claim that the phenomenology of fiction-elicited emotions remains the same in kind as garden-variety emotions' phenomenology.

Let's first take MVPF. (PF1)'s negation is: we *do not feel* genuine emotions directed at fictional entities. This is Walton's solution to the paradox, where he claims that our *emotional feelings* towards fiction are quasi-emotions, though they fall short of genuine emotions. The common factor between genuine emotions and quasi-emotions elicited by fictions would be their *identical or very similar* phenomenology. The mere fact that these two states share the same phenomenology is sufficient for my dialectical purposes. If the phenomenology of emotional responses to fiction and the phenomenology of garden-variety emotions belong to *the same phenomenal kind*, then if fiction-elicited emotional responses' phenomenology instantiates a primitive metaphysical kind, so does garden variety emotions' phenomenology.

(PF2)'s negation is: we *believe* that fictional entities exist. For instance, if we were to believe that fictional entities exist as counterfactual people, places and events, then, our fiction-elicited emotions would not be different from our garden variety emotions. In that case, fiction-elicited emotions would not be contentious.

(PF3)'s negation is: *it is not true* that to feel genuine emotions, we must believe that these emotions are directed at actually existing entities. In that case, as in the previous one, our fiction-elicited emotions would not be different from our garden-variety emotions. Hence, the continuity between them is guaranteed and so are the metaphysical conclusions that we can make about both.

Let's now take NVPF. (PF1*)'s negation is: it is *no*t rational to feel genuine emotions directed at fictional entities. Irrational emotions are *still* emotions, so our thesis that the

phenomenology of fiction remains the same in kind as garden-variety emotions' phenomenology remains true.

(PF2*)'s negation is: we *do believe* that fictional entities exist. Again: If we were to believe that fictional entities exist as counterfactual people, places and events, then, our fiction-elicited emotions would not be different from our garden variety emotions. In that case the former are no longer problematic.

(PF3*)'s negation is: *it is not true* that for an emotion to be rational, we must believe that it is directed at an actually existing object. Again: Rational and irrational emotions share the same type of phenomenology, emotional phenomenology, and, hence, there is continuity between them.

If as I have argued, fiction elicited emotions are dialectically stronger than aesthetic emotions vis-à-vis the debate on the irreducibility of emotional phenomenology; and *if* the counterpart principle is true; and *if* the claim that there is unity in emotional phenomenology between garden-variety emotions and fiction-elicited emotions, independent of our preferred solution to the paradox of fiction, is true; *then* we can take fiction as a source of evidence to draw safe metaphysical conclusions about emotional phenomenology. And think that it is very plausible that the antecedent of the previous conditional obtains.

3. Isolating Primitive Emotional Phenomenology in the 'Lab' of Fiction

In this section I am going to show that some of Kriegel's elements are necessary for explaining the emotional reactions of a fiction film spectator. Others, particularly conative phenomenology, are neither necessary nor sufficient. However, none of them is individually or jointly sufficient for explaining our spectator's whole stream of consciousness. In other words, Kriegel's phenomenal inventory cannot explain our subject's experience while engaging with fiction and experiencing emotional reactions towards it. To explain it, we need to postulate primitive emotional phenomenology.

3.1. Some Essential Features of Emotion: their Reactive Character and their Hedonic Tone

Several authors in the philosophy of emotion have emphasized that emotions have cognitive bases (see, for instance, Deonna and Teroni 2012). Take an episode of fear about a predator. Emotions are such that they cannot provide themselves with their intentional object. In this case: fear is such that it cannot provide itself with its intentional object, the predator.

Emotions are reactive, not presentational. They react to the stimuli presented by other mental states, namely: their cognitive bases[16].

Following with our example: let's suppose that we are in the jungle and see a dangerous predator approaching. In that case, our visual perceptual experience is the cognitive base of our fear. It provides us with the intentional object to emote about, to fear about. Thus, emotional phenomenology is *dependent on* other types of phenomenology, namely: those that play the role of their cognitive bases. Dependence is not equal to reduction. The cognitive bases of emotion are necessary conditions for the emotion but not sufficient ones. Thus, it is to be expected to find those phenomenal elements that play the role of cognitive bases of emotions within Kriegel's inventory.

Emotions also have a hedonic tone[17]. That is, emotions feel good or bad depending on the type of emotion we are talking about. In the case of fear, the hedonic tone is negative. So it is in the case of sadness, disgust, etc. By contrast, in the case of joy, the hedonic tone is positive. So it is in the case of admiration, excitement, etc. Thus, the phenomenology of most of the emotions is essentially valenced and, hence, we will find another dependency of emotional phenomenology on hedonic phenomenology. Here, again, dependence is not equal to reduction. Emotions' hedonic tone is a necessary element for emotional phenomenology but it is not individually nor jointly (together with the cognitive bases) sufficient for it (more on this in a minute). We will also find an element among Kriegel's taxonomy suitable for reducing this aspect of emotion: algedonic phenomenology.

3.2. What happens inside your Head while you see a Fiction Film?

Consider the following case. You are sitting on your sofa watching *Manchester by the Sea* (2016), directed by Kenneth Lonergan. Watching the film, we enter into the world of Lee

[16] Though emotions cannot provide themselves with their particular object, and have to parasite other mental states for that purpose, emotions make an original contribution to the intentionality of a subject´s consciousness: they represent the particular object under the guise of their formal object. Emotions parasite their cognitive bases to acquire their *particular intentional object* towards which they react, representing it according to their *formal intentional object*: as *dangerous*, in the case of fear; as a *personal loss* in the case of sadness; as *goal-congruent* in the case of joy; etc. Thus emotions are representational states whose *whole content* is not exhausted by their cognitive bases' content. In Deonna and Teroni's theory (2012), for instance, the emotion makes its intentional contribution by means of representing its particular object in a certain way, through a certain *felt somatic profile* which is constitutive of the emotion. Thus, for instance, joy represents-as-goal-congruent that I publish a paper by means of its felt somatic profile: felt accelerated heart rate, several felt Musculo-skeletal changes, etc.

[17] Surprise is a puzzling case. It is an exception to this rule because it is said to lack a clear valence. You can be surprised by what later can be assessed as a negative or as a positive stimuli.

Chandler, a solitary and emotionless man. Later in the film we discover the reason for his solitude and apparent lack of affection: he committed a negligent act while intoxicated by drugs and alcohol that made his house catch fire. As a result, his children died and his wife divorced him. Due to the fact that Lee's act was accidental, no charge is presented. During the film Lee is haunted by guilt, unable to overcome it.

Let's make a plausible inventory of our stream of consciousness during the projection of the film. We have perceptual phenomenology, the one corresponding to the visual and auditory character of the film. At the same time, we interpret or directly perceive, depending on our position regarding the contents of visual experience (see Siegel 2012), events as happening. Those events are the plot of the film and are not really happening. Instead, there are other events that really happen, the recorded activity of the actors embedded in a filmmaking process, by means of which the plot is represented. Thus, the plot materialized in the images and audio of the film produces the responses of the watcher, among them, emotional responses.

The representation of the fictional events that constitute the plot can be considered the cognitive bases of the emotions produced by the film (Teroni 2019). Note, as emphatically pointed out by Deonna and Teroni (2012), that emotions necessarily have cognitive bases. The particular object (e.g., a predator) of the emotion (e.g., fear) is provided to the emoter by its cognitive bases (perception, imagination, memory, etc.) and upon that particular object, the formal object of the emotion supervenes (following with the example, danger). Summing up, we have perceptual phenomenal properties, the images and audio of the film, and the imagination/comprehension of the propositional contents that constitute the plot itself, represented by those images and audio, and the emotional responses of the audience to those contents in their cinematic presentation.

The question now is: can Kriegel's basic phenomenal elements make sense of our stream of consciousness during the projection of the film? I think they cannot. In the following and last sub-section I am going to argue that some of Kriegel elements are necessary for emotions in virtue of being their cognitive bases or what gives them their hedonic tone. However, none of them is individually nor jointly sufficient for emotional phenomenology.

3.3. Isolating Primitive Emotional Phenomenology in the 'Lab' of Fiction

The question is then: can Kriegel's basic phenomenal elements make sense of our stream of consciousness during the projection of the film?

Obviously, the film has a sensorial character, its images and audio. Thus, the images and the audio, which produce a perceptual phenomenological episode in the audience, are taken as perceptual props by means of which the audience can entertain the propositional contents of the fiction. The idea is just that the audience acquires the propositional contents of the fiction (Kriegel's entertaining imaginings) relying on the perceptual character of the medium (Kriegel's perception). Clearly, perceptual phenomenology is necessary to account for our watcher's experience, but not sufficient.

The phenomenology of the watcher can neither reduce to the pleasure or the pain (normally, psychological), together with perception as a cognitive base, provided by the film. Algedonic phenomenology seems to be directed inwards (pain and pleasure are phenomenal phenomena located in the self), while our engagement with the film seems to be outwardly directed (it is about things 'happening' in a fictional world to fictional characters). Besides, algedonic phenomenology is too thin, good/bad, in comparison with the thicker character of emotional phenomenology: fearsome, shameful, etc.

Someone may ask: is not the experience of the film, including its emotional aspects, reducible to a combination of perception (cognitive base) + imagination of the fictional contents (cognitive base) + the belief that Lee's fate is terrible, sad, etc. (cognitive base) + the algedonic phenomenology directed at those contents (hedonic tone)? That is, is it not possible that, for instance, our sadness towards Lee's fate is factorizable into seeing and interpreting Casey Affleck's action as Lee's ones (perceptual phenomenology), registering the propositional contents conveyed by those images and audio (entertaining phenomenology), believing that those contents instantiate some negative property (sadness, personal loss, etc.) and feel bad about it (algedonic phenomenology)?

This factorization of emotional experiences of fictional movies may seem plausible at first sight, but soon we enter into complications. Recall that, there is a key evaluative judgement according to which Lee's fate is sad, or, according to which, Lee has suffered a great loss, etc. Now, one natural question is: what is the evaluative content of this judgement? That is, what is the meaning of the axiological concepts of SAD or PERSONAL LOSS? And why is that content tied to negative algedonic experiences? It seems that the most plausible answer is: the meaning of those terms is constituted by the ability to experience certain emotions. Indeed, there is a philosophical view about the meaning of evaluative discourse that enjoys very good theoretical health: *Neo-sentimentalism*.

Neo-sentimentalism (McDowell 1985; Wiggins 1987; D'Arms and Jacobson 2005) is the view that our appropriate deployment of evaluative concepts entails the recognition that the object of which we predicate the evaluative concept merits certain emotional reactions. Thus, if I predicate the evaluative concept PERSONAL LOSS of a certain object, that entails recognizing sadness about that object as a fitting response. If neo-sentimentalism is true, then, unless we have emotions as an independent source of axiological meaning, then we cannot appeal to evaluative judgements in the reduction, since they are constituted by axiological concepts which in turn are constituted by emotions. One of the elements required for the reduction would entail emotional phenomenology, rendering the reduction circular[18].

From this, it follows that emotional phenomenology, as one of the primary sources of axiological information, must be independent of evaluative judgements. That means that algedonic phenomenology plus the emotion's cognitive bases, though individually necessary, are not jointly sufficient for emotional phenomenology. A way out of this difficulty for reductivism may be to reject neo-sentimentalism. However, that move would be costly and would place the burden of proof in reductivism: they would owe us an explanation of the meaning of axiological terms.

It seems that Kriegel's last recourse in order to reduce emotional phenomenology to a combination of the elements of his inventory would be that emotional phenomenology is reducible to emotions' possible cognitive bases + algedonic phenomenology + *conative phenomenology*. Would conative phenomenology, together with possible emotion's cognitive bases + algedonic phenomenology, be sufficient for emotional phenomenology?

Remember that, for Kriegel, the paradigmatic conative phenomenology was characterized by deciding-and-then-trying phenomenology. However, he also accepts in a general sense that conative phenomenology is characterized by value-committed attitudes, like *presenting-as-good/bad their contents*. Good or bad in a sense essentially tied to action, so that other things being equal if I can bring about something presented-as-good to me by my conative phenomenology, then I would do it. The question is: can we explain the watcher's experience by appealing to conative phenomenology thus characterized? I do not think so.

[18] Several authors have also pointed out at the essential relation between emotional phenomenology and the meaning of our evaluative concepts. According to them, without emotional phenomenology our evaluative concepts would be emptied of meaning. See, for instance, Dewalque (2017) and Montague (2017). I am indebted to an anonymous referee of this journal for this point.

Conative phenomenology is neither necessary nor sufficient for emotional phenomenology. Nor is it jointly, with Kriegel's other elements, necessary nor sufficient for explaining our watcher's stream of consciousness. As we said in section 2, fiction-elicited emotions are a kind of contemplative emotion. Now it seems that every time you have a contemplative emotion, that emotion lacks any link to action. This, indeed, seems to be the case in our emotions elicited by fiction. Thus, every time you have a contemplative emotion, you lack any link to action, which is an essential condition for conative phenomenology. In other words, contemplative emotional phenomenology cannot be co-instantiated with conative phenomenology, because the former implies the absence of an essential condition for the latter. That is, the instantiation of contemplative emotional phenomenology entails the *absence* of conative phenomenology, and the instantiation of conative phenomenology entails the *absence* of contemplative emotional phenomenology.

Thus, the contemplativeness of our emotions elicited by fiction cannot be accounted for by conative phenomenology, plus Kriegel's other elements, because conative phenomenology necessarily would not be present in those cases. Thus, given that we necessarily have contemplative emotional phenomenology without conative phenomenology, we can say that conative phenomenology is not necessary for emotional phenomenology. Now, given that conative phenomenology is necessarily not present in the cases under discussion, then we cannot add it to the other necessary elements (the phenomenology of the possible cognitive bases of the emotion + algedonic phenomenology) to have a combination that is jointly necessary and sufficient for the emotional phenomenology of the spectator of *Manchester-by-the-Sea*. But, if there is *at least* an emotional case for which (a relevant combination of) Kriegel's elements are neither individually nor jointly sufficient for its emotional phenomenology, then emotional phenomenology in general is not reducible to them.

It seems then that we have exhausted Kriegel's elements without being able to reduce emotional phenomenology. What we have found is that some of Kriegel's elements are jointly and individually necessary for emotion: a disjunction of all the possible mental states that can play the role of the cognitive base of an emotion (perceptions *or* beliefs *or* imaginings), and algedonic phenomenology, which provides the hedonic tone of the emotion. However, no combination of Kriegel's elements is sufficient for emotional phenomenology. From this it follows that Kriegel's elements cannot reduce emotional phenomenology and, hence, that emotional phenomenology is sui generis, that is, that emotional phenomenology is primitive.

4. Primitive Emotional Phenomenology and Theories of Emotion[19]

Besides the debate about the irreducibility of emotional phenomenology, it exists a debate in the philosophical nature of emotion in which different theories try to explain emotions, assimilating them to, or making analogies with, more well-understood mental phenomena, like perception, belief, motivation, bodily feelings, desires, etc. Examples abound. Addressing all the different theories of emotion is beyond the scope of this paper. I will assess my results vis-à-vis four competing and renown theories of emotion: the attitudinal theory of emotion, the perceptual theory of emotion, the judgemental theory of emotion and the motivational theory of emotion. My purpose is to show the relation between my results and ongoing debates about the nature of emotion.

One's conditional to perform *modus ponens* is another's *same* conditional to perform *modus tollens*. In my argument, I have started from what I *arguably* took as intuitive premises, based on our phenomenology of fiction consumption. Reasoning from them and some other principles and theories, like neo-sentimentalism, I have derived the thesis that emotional phenomenology is primitive. Now, from my considerations it follows that certain theories of emotion are plausibly true (*e.g.*, the attitudinal theory of emotion) whereas other theories of emotion are ruled out (*e.g.*, the judgemental theory of emotion). Those who have independent reasons to reject my conclusions, namely, that certain theories of emotion are not the case, would deny the antecedent analysis that leads to that conclusion or, at least, would have more resistance to embrace it. So, for instance, someone who embraces the judgemental theory of emotion for independent reasons would find resistance to accept my premises maybe to the point of even rejecting them.

This means that my premises can be resisted and, though they are intuitive and supported by reasons (as I have showed in the previous sections), they are not universal. My argument is then conditional: for those who find these premises and the reasons for them plausible, this is what it follows. However, even for those who reject the premises, the argument is still interesting, since it shows what reasons we have for those premises and what theories of emotion follow from *that* way of understanding emotional phenomenology in fictional contexts.

[19] I owe the suggestion for this section to a reviewer from this journal.

In this last section I will examine the abovementioned theories of emotion vis-à-vis the consequences of my argument for primitive emotional phenomenology.

Let's start with the *attitudinal theory of emotion* (see, for instance, Deonna and Teroni 2012). According to Deonna and Teroni emotions are bodily attitudes whose formal objects are the core relational themes of the given emotion (e.g., danger for fear, goal congruence for joy, etc.). In principle, this bodily attitude can be objectual (e.g., fear of a predator) or propositional (e.g., fear about the fact that the predator may eat me alive). For instance, fear is a specific bodily attitude through which dangerousness is represented [20]. An emotion is fitting when and only when its particular object instantiates its formal object. For instance, fear about a *dangerous* (formal object) *predator* (particular object) is fitting. It seems that the attitudinal theory of emotion is compatible with my results, according to which emotional phenomenology is primitive, since the type of attitude emotions are may be sui generis or non-reducible to more familiar ones.

What about the *perceptual theory of emotion* (see, for instance, Tappolet 2016). According to this theory emotions are sui generis perceptions of value. Given that this type of perception is sui generis and non-dependent on cognitive (and according to Tappolet neither on conative) elements, the theory is compatible with the result that emotional phenomenology is primitive.

What happen with the *judgemental theory of emotion* (see, for instance, Nussbaum 2003)? According to this theory emotions *are* axiological judgements. The judgemental theory of emotion would be ruled out because emotions would necessarily involve some cognitive elements, namely, judgements, and those cognitive elements would also be sufficient for them.

Finally, let's examine how the *motivational theory of emotion* (see, for instance, Scarantino 2014) clashes with my results. This theory would also be ruled out by my results because emotions would necessarily involve conative elements, and this is incompatible with the idea of contemplative emotions.

[20] Emotions have a complex intentionality. They parasite their cognitive bases to acquire their *particular intentional object* towards which they react, representing it according to their *formal intentional object*: as *dangerous*, in the case of fear; as a *personal loss* in the case of sadness; as *goal-congruent* in the case of joy; etc. According to my interpretation of Deonna and Teroni's theory, the emotions represent their particular object under the guise of their formal object by means of their characteristic felt bodily profile. Thus, emotions are representational states whose *whole content* is not exhausted by their cognitive bases' content.

Conclusion

We have isolated primitive emotional phenomenology in the 'lab' of fiction. In that 'clean' environment we studied contemplative emotions and their phenomenology, devoid of conative impurities. We see that this primitive element, irreducible to other types of phenomenology plays an essential role in explaining our ordinary practices with fiction. Without primitive emotional phenomenology we cannot fully explain our stream of consciousness. The task ahead is articulating an irreducible analysis of it. This argument joins those already existent in the literature (by Dewalque and by Mitchell) and combines its force with them in claiming primitive status for emotional phenomenology.

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2

An Argument from Normativity for Primitive Emotional Phenomenology

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Uriah Kriegel (2015) has attempted to describe the varieties of consciousness, that is, the primitive elements that constitute the phenomenal realm. Perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertaining, and conative are the types of phenomenology acknowledged by him. This list, though right, is incomplete. My main claim is that for it to be complete it should include sui generis emotional phenomenology. To motivate that thesis, I will highlight the characteristic normativity of emotional phenomenology and contrast it with the characteristic normativity of Kriegel's phenomenal elements. I will conceive, by means of a mental experiment in the form of a phenomenal contrast, a felt normative clash between emotional phenomenology and Kriegel's primitive phenomenal states. The idea behind it is that the felt normative clash is possible because emotional phenomenology and Kriegel's phenomenal elements are metaphysically distinct.

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Introduction

Uriah Kriegel (2015) has attempted to describe the varieties of consciousness, that is, the primitive elements that constitute the *phenomenal realm*. Perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertaining, and conative are the types of phenomenology acknowledged by Kriegel. Those are, according to Kriegel, the atoms of human consciousness. Their combination gives rise to more complex, molecular, conscious states. These phenomenal types are the basic determinates of the determinable consciousness. Every human conscious state entails one of them or a combination of them. This list, though right, is incomplete. My main claim is that for it to be complete it should include *sui generis* emotional phenomenology.

The discovery/description of these basic phenomenal ingredients is then a great intellectual achievement. They are the ultimate components of consciousness. This is an enterprise of utmost theoretical value and, precisely for that reason, our inventory of primitive phenomenal states must be the right one. Of course, what is the right list of phenomenal primitives is a controversial issue for which there is no agreement and, perhaps, there will never be. As an example, some think phenomenology is exhausted by sensorial experiences (e.g. Prinz 2011) By contrast, others think that there is, besides sensorial, non-sensorial phenomenology, like cognitive phenomenology (e.g. Pitt 2004). However unachievable consensus is it is still worthwhile trying to discover/describe the basic phenomenal ingredients of consciousness. This is what Kriegel attempts with success to my view. He is able to provide convincing reasons in favour of the existence of the most controversial elements in his list: cognitive, entertaining and conative phenomenology. Sensorial phenomenology is not in need of reasons. Its existence is manifest.

However, there is, as I said, an omission in his list. According to him, emotional phenomenology is reducible to the other types of phenomenology. That is, as Jonathan Mitchell (2020) would express it, after subtracting Kriegel's primitive phenomenal elements in an emotional experience, there would be no phenomenal element left, no phenomenal experience at all or, if any, one unrecognisable as emotional[22]. Mitchell thinks that this must be wrong because emotional phenomenology is not reducible to Kriegel's phenomenal elements.

[22] Mitchell (2020) reaches a conclusion similar to mine: Kriegel's list is incomplete and emotional phenomenology is primitive. However, he deploys different arguments based on the disinterestedness of aesthetic emotional experiences and in several phenomenal contrast in which the normativity of emotional phenomenology does not play a central role.

As we will see, emotions depend on other mental states that provide them with their particular object, with the intentional object the emotion is about. I cannot fear a predator if it is not provided to me through, for instance, perception. In that *causal sense* my emotional phenomenology depends on other types of phenomenology. However, this is not the same as being reducible to them. At most, what follows from that is that other mental states' phenomenology is necessary to emotional phenomenology, not sufficient. My emotional phenomenology's phenomenal, representational and normative properties are not reducible to other phenomenal type's ones. In that *metaphysical* or *constitutive* sense, my emotional phenomenology is independent from others.

My aim in this paper, similar to Mitchell's in its conclusion but dissimilar in the path that leads to that conclusion, is arguing for the thesis that emotional phenomenology is primitive in the metaphysical or constitutive sense. To do that I will highlight the characteristic normativity of emotional phenomenology and contrast it with the characteristic normativity of Kriegel's phenomenal elements. To emphasize that normative contrast, I will make emotional phenomenology's normativity and Krigelian phenomenal states' normativity clash. I will conceive, by means of a mental experiment, which will present an almost radically recalcitrant emoter, a felt normative clash between emotional phenomenology and Kriegel's primitive phenomenal states. The idea behind is that the normative clash is possible because emotional phenomenology and Kriegel's phenomenal elements are metaphysically distinct.

Thus, in section *1. Kriegel's Phenomenal Realm*, I will present the Phenomenal Realm and its structure according to Kriegel. In section *2. The Almost Radically Recalcitrant Emoter* I will present what *recalcitrant emotions* are, why they are important in assessing the possibility of primitive emotional phenomenology, and how the Almost Radical Recalcitrant Emoter (whose emotions are mostly recalcitrant) is possible and constitutes a counterexample against Kriegel's Phenomenal Realm. Then I will conclude by pointing out the task of providing a characterisation of primitive emotional phenomenology, given that the possibility of the Almost Radically Recalcitrant Emoter (ARRE from now on) has given us a presumption for its existence. Without further ado, let's meet the ARRE.

1.Kriegel's Phenomenal Realm

In this section I will present the different putative basic elements proposed by Kriegel, their description and how they create and sustain his phenomenal realm, and the methods by which they are discovered, with special attention to conative phenomenology and the phenomenal contrast method used to arrive at it. That method is the one that I will deploy to show the primitiveness of emotional phenomenology.

First, an initial and important distinction that characterises Kriegel's theoretical framework (2015) and, hence, mine. Kriegel's basic elements of phenomenology are six attitudinal phenomenal types of mental states. These phenomenal attitudes contrast with their content, namely with the object, proposition, or state of affairs presented by them. Thus, those types of phenomenology refer to the what-it-is-like of the force with which the mental state presents its content rather than to the what-it-is-like of the content itself. Take, as an example, cognitive phenomenology. According to Kriegel cognitive phenomenology presents-as-true its contents. Thus, it is the phenomenology of the mental force of presentation or mental attitude that interests Kriegel and me, among other things because of the explanatory power that a theory about basic phenomenal attitudes has, it describes the basic structure of the (human) Phenomenal Realm. There is a finite set of basic attitudes with a characteristic associated phenomenology that can combine with infinite contents with their characteristic associated phenomenology: all the possible contents of beliefs, desires, imaginings, etc.

The first layer in the structure of Kriegel's phenomenal realm would be Phenomenology *simpliciter*. It is in the second layer, determining the first one, where we find the six primitive elements: perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertaining, and conative. Perceptual and algedonic types of phenomenology are taken for granted, in the sense that their existence and features are the object of generalised agreement. By contrast, cognitive, conative, and entertaining types of phenomenology are more controversial and, hence, each of them has its own chapter in the abovementioned book. Here I am going to briefly describe all the six types of phenomenology mentioned by Kriegel without criticising the arguments he offers in favour of them. The reason for this is that I mainly accept Kriegel's phenomenal realm and his arguments in favour of it, except for the fact that, as I will claim, it is incomplete.

Let's begin with sensorial phenomenology, which includes perceptual, (sensorially) imaginative, and algedonic types of phenomenology. Perceptual phenomenology is the sensorial analogue to the cognitive one in its force of presentation of its content, namely, as-existent. That is, both cognitive and perceptual phenomenology have a mind-to-world direction of fit. The essential difference is that perceptual phenomenology has it in a sensorial way, the predicate "sensorial" being defined by an extensional criterion: a phenomenal mental state is sensorial when it has been produced by sensory systems (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and proprioceptive). An example of perceptual phenomenology: it presents-as-existent my computer while I am writing.

Sensorial imagination shares the contents of perceptual experience, their source is sensorial, but not the attitudinal features. In Kriegel's slogan: ‘perception and imagination are similar in content, dissimilar in attitude’ (Kriegel 2015: 194). What is essential to the what-it-is-like of sensorial imaginative phenomenology, what differentiates it from perception, is its presenting as-non-existent its contents. For instance, if I see a banana on the table, it is presented as-existent to me, here and now. By contrast, if I imagine a banana on the table then it is presented as-non-existent to me. As such, sensorial imaginative phenomenology has the null direction of fit, neither it has to fit the world, nor the world has to fit it.

Finally, algedonic phenomenology, which has to do with pleasure and pain, is characterised by Kriegel as a state which presents its contents as-good in a sensorial way, both contrary and analogous to conative phenomenology. The latter presents-as-good its contents in a non-sensorial way. Hence, both have the world-to-mind direction of fit. An example of algedonic phenomenology: it presents-as-good sensorially this piece of cake that I am eating right now.

Now let's focus on non-sensorial phenomenology, which includes cognitive, conative, and entertaining phenomenology. Cognitive phenomenology is analogous to perceptual phenomenology but in non-sensorial terms. Cognitive phenomenology presents, then, as-true its contents in a non-sensorial way. Kriegel accepts Pitt's (2004) epistemic argument in favour

of cognitive phenomenology and offers one of his own: The Zoe argument, a mental experiment that describes the case of a mainly zombie-like human being who lacks any kind of phenomenology except for cognitive phenomenology. I take this to be metaphysically possible by the reasons given by Kriegel and, hence, I see the dialectical force of the mental experiment: if there can be cognitive phenomenology without any other type of phenomenology, then it is primitive. An example of cognitive phenomenology: it presents-as-true the content that 2+2=4.

Conative phenomenology is firstly characterised by Kriegel, following Brentano, as value-committed. Concretely, conative phenomenology presents-as-good its contents in a non-sensorial way, whose non-sensorial character makes it different from algedonic phenomenology (having both, however, a world-to-mind direction of fit). Kriegel arrives at conative phenomenology by means of several phenomenal contrasts, a method to discover phenomenal states and their contents. This method is important for my purposes because I am going to use it in my mental experiment to obtain a presumption of the existence of primitive emotional phenomenology. So before continuing with the exposition of conative phenomenology let me explain it in a brief excursus.

The 'phenomenal contrast' refers both to the *explanandum*, the phenomenal contrast, and to the *explanans*, the method used to explain that contrast. Given a contrast between the overall phenomenology of two experiences that are, however, relevantly similar in other phenomenal aspects, Siegel describes it as a method whose '…main strategy is to find something that the target hypothesis purports to explain, and then see whether it provides the best explanation of that phenomenon. […]. It is a way of testing hypothesis rather than a way of generating hypothesis in the first place' (Siegel 2012: 87-8). For instance, following an example by Strawson (1994), imagine two hearers of the same fragment of a given natural language, being one of them competent in that language and the other one not competent. Even though both hearers have the same auditory phenomenology (phenomenal similarity), the overall experience of both hearers differs phenomenally (phenomenal contrast). The competent hearer's overall phenomenology includes the phenomenology of linguistic understanding. Thus, 'the method of the phenomenal contrast starts off with an intuition that two overall experiences in a par contrast phenomenally' (Siegel 2012, p. 91). That contrast is supposed to be explained by two already existent hypotheses, being one of them the target hypothesis (the

one for which one is arguing), such that the one that best explains the contrast would be selected for the method as the *explanans* of that phenomenal contrast, the *explanandum*. The other hypothesis left would be, say, the control hypothesis. In our previous example, the target hypothesis, the one for which Strawson argues, would be that linguistic understanding phenomenology exists, whereas the control hypothesis would be another explanation for the difference in the hearers' overall phenomenology. If the user of the method of the phenomenal contrast succeeds, then her target hypothesis, which refers to the existence of a phenomenal state or content, gains credence along with the phenomenal item referred to by it. This is the method by which Kriegel arrives at primitive conative phenomenology and will be the method by which I will arrive at primitive emotional phenomenology.

Now, we can see one of the many phenomenal contrasts which Kriegel relies upon to favour primitive conative phenomenology, being this particular one borrowed from Ginet (1986). You can have an experience of both muscle-contraction and muscle-contracting. In the latter, you are exercising, as an agent, your will, whereas in the former you are a mere patient. Those two experiences are similar in terms of proprioception but dissimilar in terms of the act of will that accompanies the latter but not the former. In that sense, they contrast phenomenally, and what better explains that phenomenal contrast is that in the latter there is a conative phenomenal element irreducible to the internal feelings derived from the muscle-contraction. Kriegel, following Ginet again, says that you can even dissociate the exercise of the will from the contraction of the muscle in the muscle-contracting case if, for instance, you move your tongue, which has been injected with anaesthetic at the dentist's, without feeling it moving.

Finally, it is important to note that, for Kriegel, conative states are strongly linked to action: my desires motivate my relevant actions to bring about their content. Some conative states cannot be metaphysically linked to action, such as desires about the past or, better, wishes. However, those wishes are indirectly related to action in the sense that they appear in counterfactual scenarios of the form ‘had I had the chance of avoiding the killing of the child, I would have done it’. Thus, for Kriegel, a more precise characterisation of conative phenomenology is deciding-and-then-trying phenomenology. Deciding presents its content as-right, being right a species of the good that has to do with actions (instead of states of affairs). Regarding trying, its distinctive addition to conative phenomenology is the felt effortful

character of implementation of the decision it accompanies. An example of this kind of phenomenology could be that it presents-as-good good health and, hence, it presents-as-right physical exercise and as worth trying.

Entertaining phenomenology consists of a phenomenal state that merely-presents (neutrally, without any commitment) its contents in a non-sensorial way. It commits the experiencer neither with the desirability nor with the truth of the contents. Entertaining phenomenology is arrived at by means of an epistemic argument that resembles Pitt's (2004) one for cognitive phenomenology. For instance, I entertained Schopenhauer's metaphysics last night. I bear it in mind without committing myself to its truth or desirability.

According to this meagre inventory, emotional phenomenology is reducible to a combination of the aforementioned types of phenomenology. In normal circumstances, one can have the impression that emotions are reducible to cognitive, perceptual and imaginative phenomenology (which would explain the phenomenology associated with the object of the emotion) together with conative phenomenology (which would explain the motivational force of emotions) and algedonic phenomenology (which would explain the hedonic tone of emotions, normally identified with their positive or negative valence). In the following section I will try to prove that this is an illusion and that, under the *proper extraordinary circumstances*, we can appreciate the need for an account of the existence of primitive emotional phenomenology. The possibility of the existence of ARRE would allow us to make that appreciation.

2.The Almost Radically Recalcitrant Emoter

2.1. The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotions for Primitive Emotional Phenomenology[23]

[23] The title of this subsection is a way of honouring D'Arms and Jacobson for their influential and insightful paper on recalcitrant emotions (D'Arms and Jacobson 2003).

Before describing the Almost Radically Recalcitrant Emoter, ARRE, I will explain in this subsection what *recalcitrant emotions* are, being those most of the emotions that constitute ARRE's emotional life. Also, in this subsection, I will point out initial clues of what recalcitrant emotions can teach us regarding primitive emotional phenomenology. After that, I will bring those lessons to their ultimate consequences conceiving ARRE in the next subsections.

One of the foundational references in the philosophical literature about recalcitrant emotions is D'Arms and Jacobson (2003). There, the authors define recalcitrant emotions. According to them, recalcitrant emotions are an agent's emotions in tension with the agent's evaluative judgments at a given time. An episode of recalcitrant fear consists of an agent experiencing fear about something (e.g. taking a plane towards a desired destination) while she knows or judges that there is not a real danger or, if any, a little one.

Another way of defining recalcitrant emotions is using the widely used terminology of "particular object" and "formal object" of emotions (Deona and Teroni 2012; De Sousa 1987; Goldie 2000; Kenny 1963; Teroni 2007). The *particular object* of emotions, is provided by other mental states like beliefs, perceptions, imaginings, etc. The *formal object* of emotions is constituted by the evaluative aspect of emotions: in fear, dangerousness; in anger, offence; etc. For instance, in a case of fear about a predator, the predator would be the particular object of the emotion, provided through perception, and dangerousness its formal object. It is important to note that the phenomenology that corresponds to the formal object of emotions need not be constituted by the different concepts that individuate them: in fear, DANGEROUSNESS; in anger, OFFENCE, etc. By contrast, the evaluative aspect of the phenomenology of emotions, normally taken as non-conceptual, is said to be in systematic normative relations with the formal objects of emotions, specified by means of the abovementioned concepts (D'Arms and Jacobson 2003; Deona and Teroni 2012; Goldie 2000; Tappolet 2016). Thus, we can attribute emotions to beings who lack those concepts, like babies or beasts, and, even though they can't, we, who possess them, can evaluate their emotions as justified or unjustified. According to this terminology, then, an episode of fear about something is recalcitrant when the particular object of the emotion (e.g. taking a plane towards a desired destination) is judged to not instantiate the formal one (e.g. danger) by the emoter.

Judging from the widely recognised existence of recalcitrant emotions, it seems that the emotional and the cognitive systems are irreducible to each other. One can judge something as dangerous without experiencing fear and one can experience fear without judging the object of the emotion as dangerous. If those systems are irreducible to each other, then it is reasonable to expect that the corresponding phenomenology associated with them will be so as well. Hence, here we have a clue of the irreducibility of emotional phenomenology to cognitive phenomenology.

Another important clue regarding the significance of recalcitrant emotions for primitive emotional phenomenology lies in the relation of evaluative judgments or states with desires or, with conative attitudes more generally. According to some views about the nature of desire (Friedrich 2017; Oddie 2017), desires are essentially evaluative. That is, desires aim at the *Good*, instead of or besides being functional states that produce action. Of course, what is perceived or judged as good under some guise, tends to elicit action towards it. This evaluative view about desire can be fleshed out in a doxastic and/or a non-doxastic version. According to the former, desires are modelled in terms of evaluative judgments. According to the latter, desires are modelled in terms of (non-doxastic, non-conceptual) perception of value. For instance, Friedrich (2017) presents a notion of desire in terms of the Brentanian distinction[24] between *content* and *force* in a way similar to Kriegel. In any event, what is important here is to point out that desires are, at least under some view, essentially linked to an evaluative stance.

Indeed, Kriegel's characterisation of conative phenomenology is evaluative. Thus, the relevant fact that justifies the previous excursus about the nature of desire is the following. If recalcitrant emotions are in tension with our evaluative judgments, then recalcitrant emotions are in tension with our desires doxastically conceived (at least, under the evaluative view of desire). I think we can also conceive that emotions can be in tension with our non-doxastically conceived conative attitudes, even when they are modelled according to the Brentanian distinction as Kriegel and Friedrich have done. Someone can desire to take a plane, without formulating the evaluative judgment that taking planes is good, because she would arrive

[24] I have already explained this distinction in section 1.

earlier and more safely to her destination and at the same time feel fear about taking the plane. In this case, it seems that her fear and her desire of taking the plain clash and so do the evaluations and phenomenology associated with them. Maybe those emotions in conflict with desires are not recalcitrant because of the definition of recalcitrant emotions given above, which necessitates an evaluative judgment. However, there is something normatively anomalous about them: the desire of taking the plane is justified according to the ends of the subject (arriving earlier and more safely to her destination), whereas the emotion is not justified. Then, under the previous reading, emotions in conflict with justified desires are, if not recalcitrant emotions, very similar to them.

The possibilities above point to the fact that recalcitrant emotions could be independent of evaluative conative attitudes. Of course, one can say that what we have here are inconsistent conative attitudes, namely, an emotion (reducible to a conative attitude) and a proper conative attitude like a desire (doxastically or non-doxastically conceived or conceived in a Brentanian way). However, that move needs justification and is not obvious nor the only one available. Hence, the path to the irreducibility of emotions to desires, of emotional phenomenology to conative phenomenology, is open to be explored.

After examining the phenomenon of recalcitrant emotions, I pointed out how their existence highlights the presumption of the irreducibility of emotional systems (and, reasonably expected, emotional phenomenology) to cognitive systems (and, reasonably expected, cognitive phenomenology). Recalcitrant emotions also give us a clue in favour of the presumption of the irreducibility of emotional phenomenology to conative phenomenology. My aim in the next section is to try to bring those clues to their maximum expression by deploying a modal mental experiment in the form of a phenomenal contrast. Thus, we can explore whether these considerations, in their strong version, can threaten Kriegel's reductive account for emotional phenomenology.

2.2. Describing ARRE and discussing its possibility

Chapter 4 of Kriegel's book (2015) is devoted to emotional phenomenology. There Kriegel defends his version of the feeling theory of emotion according to which emotions are essentially individuated by their phenomenology. This is a thesis with which I agree. However, I disagree with Kriegel that emotional phenomenology, by which emotions are individuated, is reducible to the other primitive phenomenal states described in section 1.

Kriegel's reason for believing in the reducibility of emotional phenomenology has to do with the fact that, for him, primitive emotional phenomenology cannot be derived from the methods he uses to argue for other types of phenomenology: cognitive, conative, and entertaining. These methods, described in section 1, were, correspondingly: the deployment of a conceivability argument such that the subject lacks any type of phenomenology except for the cognitive one; the proposal of a phenomenal contrast that leads to postulate primitive conative phenomenology and, in the case of entertainment, an epistemic argument. I agree with Kriegel that it would be extremely difficult to provide a conceivability argument in the case of emotions, something like imagining a subject who lacks any kind of phenomenology except for the emotional one. This is due to the fact that emotions have cognitive basis, as pointed out by Deonna and Teroni (2012), such as beliefs and perceptions that provide the emotions with their intentional objects. In that sense, you cannot have emotions without their cognitive basis (beliefs, perceptions, imaginations, etc.) because then there would not be any provided intentional object to emote about. Thus, without cognitive, perceptual, etc. types of phenomenology, you could not have emotional phenomenology. This dependence of emotional phenomenology on the other ones does not mean that emotional phenomenology is reducible to them. Dependence and reducibility are just two different issues. As I said in the introduction, we have to distinguish between causal dependence and metaphysical distinctness. Even though emotions depend causally on other states, their phenomenal, representational and normative contribution to the stream of consciousness is metaphysically distinct from the other states' one.

Regarding the possibility of deploying an epistemic argument in favour of primitive emotional phenomenology, I think it would not help us in seeing whether emotional phenomenology is primitive or not, because I can be acquainted with emotional phenomenology and hence know what my emotions are through this acquaintance, without

knowing whether this emotional phenomenology is reducible or not. However, I do think that primitive emotional phenomenology can be discovered through a phenomenal contrast. Thus, in this section, I am going to meet Kriegel's challenge of providing a phenomenal contrast through which one can arrive at primitive emotional phenomenology.

To start answering the challenge, imagine an adult human being whose stream of consciousness includes all the primitive phenomenal attitudes described by Kriegel: perceptual, perceptual imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, conative, and entertaining. Now imagine that that human being is an almost radically recalcitrant emoter because of an accident that results in brain injury. We know from subsection 2.1., what recalcitrant emotions are. Now let me ask you to imagine a being most of whose emotions are recalcitrant.

After the accident, all her phenomenal attitudes, realized in her brain, are still there, intact. However, our subject has developed a strange condition: everything causes her joy. If she is receiving good news, she feels joy. If she is offended, she feels joy. If she perceives that she is in danger, she feels joy and so on. Among all these reactions, only the first one, to feel joy in the presence of good news, is a case of an appropriate emotion. The rest of them, are recalcitrant emotions and, hence, our emoter is an almost radically recalcitrant emoter: the formal object of almost all her emotional episodes is not instantiated by the particular object targeted by those episodes and she evaluatively judges so. For the sake of simplicity let's call our emoter's stream of consciousness before the accident SoC1 and her happy stream of consciousness after the accident SoC2. Our subject continues successfully with her life. The only difference is that she is now happy in every moment of her life and she knows, because her doctor told her, that that happiness is due to the brain injury (medical condition about which she is super happy). Knowing this (cognitive phenomenology), and wanting to behave in a coherent and rational way (conative phenomenology), our emoter makes the effort of showing offence (even though she feels joy) when she is offended (through cognitive phenomenology she knows that, for instance, an insult is offensive), of showing the signs of fear when she faces a danger, etc.

The Kriegelian phenomenal attitudes of our emoter would be the same that she had before the accident and yet it seems that her stream of consciousness after that event is different, it has something more to it. She would believe the same kind of things; she would desire the same stuff; she would perceive normally; entertain normally; and, maybe this is the only significant difference, she would feel pain in a mitigated way (due to the interaction of her always present joy) and she would feel pleasure intensely and frequently (due to the ever-present good mood). However, as we will see, this change in algedonic phenomenology would not be enough to save Kriegel's reductive model for emotional phenomenology. Other changes in cognitive and conative states are expected too, but I think they are not relevant here (e.g. she can come to believe, due to the joy, that life is always wonderful when she previously believed that life was sometimes miserable). I think that those non-relevant changes are pervasive in cases of phenomenal contrast, due to the reflective nature of experiencers. For instance, the native speaker in Strawson's example (1994), can always reflect on the fact that she understands the language, which would add a new element to the phenomenal contrast besides the experience of understanding itself. However, this new element does not seem relevant for the contrast.

We have here a phenomenal contrast between our emoter's stream of consciousness previous to the accident, SoC1, and her stream of consciousness after the accident, SoC2. We can ask: given the link between emotional and algedonic phenomenology, is not the contrast entirely due to the changes in algedonic phenomenology? Is not her ever-present joy due to our emoter's new algedonic profile, to the point that this alone can explain the phenomenal contrast? My answer is negative. It is true that emotions have a hedonic tone and, hence, an algedonic component. For the same reason, changes in algedonic phenomenology produce changes in overall emotional phenomenology. Both kinds of phenomenology are connected. However, emotional phenomenology is not exhausted by the algedonic one, nor by that component together with Kriegel's other basic primitives as we will see in the next section.

Now, let's see whether this experiment is not only conceivable but also metaphysically and nomically possible (I follow Chalmer's usage of modal terms in his (Chalmers, 2010)). Well, the scenario seems conceivable, since there is no contradiction in its description. Besides conceivable, the scenario seems metaphysically possible since it is not essential to emotions that they are caused by their normal causes in the actual world nor that they have the same

reasons that they have in the actual world. Emotions are individuated by emotional feelings and, as such, they can be dissociated from both their causes and reasons in the actual world. Indeed, a proof of the logical independence of emotions from their normal causes and reasons, and also a proof of the privileged metaphysical role of emotional feelings in the essence of emotions, is the very existence of recalcitrant emotions. In those cases, emotions are not in the appropriate relation with their normal causes and their appropriate reasons. It is precisely those emotions and their phenomenology that I deploy to conceive my mental experiment: the possibility of ARRE. Finally, I think that the scenario is nomically possible since there are a number of actual cases that resemble ARRE in some respects. Think, for instance, about people who are depressed and do not act in accordance with their depressive affective state (Solomon, 2002). Think, as another example, of the rationale of therapeutic techniques like exposure and response prevention in the case of phobias or other anxiety-related disorders (Abramowitz et al., 2011). The aim here is to act against what the emotional feeling is telling us about the world, using, both, our cognitive phenomenology (which tells us, for instance, that travelling by planes is safe) and our conative one (our desire to not be afraid of harmless situations and to act in accordance with that). If in those cases, those types of phenomenology, at the core of Kriegel's reduction of emotional phenomenology, are against emotional phenomenology, then we can start seeing why Kriegel's attempt of reduction will fail.

2.3. Can the ARRE be explained by Kriegel's phenomenal inventory?

As we have seen in the previous subsections, cognitive and conative phenomenology are, in cases of recalcitrant emotion, as the one described in our imagined scenario, against the emotion they are supposed to reduce. In our scenario, the emoter feels joy for reasons that are not appropriate and for causes that are not normal. However, our emoter wants to behave, following her *conative phenomenology*, in accordance with the values that she perceives in the world, informed by her *cognitive phenomenology* (for instance, it presents-as-true that insults are offensive). Although she manages to do so, she is still a recalcitrant emoter.

Someone could argue that what is recalcitrant here are some conative or cognitive states, instead of an emotional one[25]. For instance, someone could defend that ARRE's experience is constituted by the following conjunction of phenomenal experiences: judgment that someone insulted me + judgment that something good happened to me (cognitive); desire to hurt them back or to cry + desire that it will continue or happen again soon (conative); pleasure (algedonic). Thus, ARRE would have contradictory judgmental and desirous experiences, being one of them recalcitrant and, hence, explaining her recalcitrance as an emoter.

Even if *prima facie* the above reading of ARRE's emotional life seems attractive, it entails an important problem. I conceived ARRE as being aware of her emotional problem. She knows that one of the judgments is not true, the one corresponding to joy. Hence, she could not maintain that judgment. Besides, given her awareness of having been insulted, ARRE desires to behave fittingly, that is, retaliating against her offenders. Hence, it is difficult to see how she could desire that the offence occurs again.

Maybe one could explain the contrast relying on proprioception[26] (e.g. joy produces a characteristic musculoskeletal syndrome) or in algedonic experiences (e.g. joy produces pleasure). Both types of phenomenology seem important in the phenomenal contrast, but not decisive. I think the contrast has to do with the normativity of emotional states, which clashes with the normativity derived from conative and cognitive phenomenology, and proprioceptive and algedonic states seem to have no normative constraint on them. In the following lines, I will develop further this line of thought in order to show that algedonic and proprioceptive states are not plausible candidates to account for the contrast. I am going to give just an argument against algedonic phenomenology but I assume that, *mutatis mutandis*, that argument from normativity against algedonic phenomenology works also against proprioceptive phenomenology. The main reason for this is that, even though algedonic and proprioceptive phenomenology have phenomenal properties, they are not normative; that is, they are not, as we will see, responsive to reasons. Instead, they have neurophysiological causes.

[25] I am particularly indebted to Uriah Kriegel for suggesting this objection.
[26] I am, again, indebted to Uriah Kriegel for this suggestion.

Algedonic phenomenology does not have normative force, whereas emotional phenomenology does, and this normativity cannot be inherited from cognitive or conative phenomenology, as we have shown above. What is more, with regard to action, the normative force of cognitive and conative phenomenology goes in the opposite direction of the recalcitrant emotion and that is the reason why our emoter's joy is recalcitrant. Our subject does not act on her joy about an offensive remark by, for instance, hugging her offender because she knows (from her cognitive phenomenology) that the remark is indeed an offence and she wants (from her conative phenomenology) to be respected. There is a clash here between the different normative forces derived from cognitive and conative phenomenology on one side and emotional phenomenology on the other. The emotional phenomenology of our emoter's joy presents-as-goal-congruent the offensive remark asking for a joyful attitude and a joyful response, whereas the conative phenomenology of wanting to be respected presents indignation and reprehension as worth pressing against the offender. If algedonic phenomenology was responsible for the phenomenal contrast, there would not be such a normative clash. Why? Because there is a fundamental distinction between algedonic and emotional phenomenology.

While emotional phenomenology admits why-questions in a non-causal sense (Deonna and Teroni 2012; Goldie 2000; Helm 2001; Müller 2019; Vance 2018), algedonic phenomenology does not. By "Why-questions in a non-causal sense" I understand questions that ask for reasons. By "Why-questions in a causal sense" I understand questions that ask for (neuro)physical causes. While it makes sense to ask yourself, or others, why (non-causally) are you feeling, say, joy, it does not make sense to ask yourself, or others, why (non-causally) are you feeling, say, pain. The only possible answer for questions concerning pain and pleasure is causal, there is no reason to feel pain nor pleasure. You just feel pain and pleasure because of the stimulation of the fibres, say, X and Y. In other words, algedonic phenomenology is not normative (although it is evaluative because it represents-as-sensorially-good its contents), whereas emotional phenomenology is, besides evaluative (because it has a hedonic tone and, hence, algedonic phenomenology), normative. By "normativity" I understand here being subject or sensible to reasons. By "evaluative" I just mean something that is considered by the subject as good and, as such, can be a reason, without being, however, subject to reasons itself. The important difference here between normativity and evaluation is that the former not only

gives you reasons to act (for instance, to hug your benefactor if you feel gratitude), but also requires reasons to be adequate (It would be inadequate to feel gratitude towards someone who hurts you). On the contrary, the latter, evaluation, does not require reasons to be appropriate (indeed the question regarding appropriateness does not even arise), even though it can give you reasons to act. To illustrate this last point, think, for instance of episodes of pain in cases of phantom limbs. Although in those cases pain is atypical, it is not normatively inadequate because pains are not subject to reasons. To explain phantom limbs' pain you can give an etiological explanation at the neurological level, but you cannot give reasons (or, at least, talk of reasons is not admitted in empirically supported medicine). At the same time, although the pain is *arational*, it gives you a reason to go to the neurologist.

The question now, and possible objection, is whether this difference in the nature of emotional and algedonic phenomenology shows up at the phenomenological level, thus precluding algedonic phenomenology's potential to explain the phenomenal contrast between SoC1 and SoC2 and favouring emotional phenomenology. I think that the normative status of emotional phenomenology is felt and its ability to be felt is relevant for the possibility of ARRE. Our subject is not only a recalcitrant emoter but an *aware recalcitrant emoter* and this is essential for the case as we have described it.

Our recalcitrant emoter is aware of the recalcitrance of her joy because she preserves her other types of phenomenology and, for the same reason, she is aware of the normative clash among her recalcitrant emotional phenomenology and the other types, mainly cognitive and conative phenomenology[27]. ARRE feels joy in the presence of offences but, at the same time, thanks to her cognitive phenomenology, she knows that what is happening to her is bad, something that does not deserve a joyful response. At the same time, ARRE wants to behave rationally, thanks to her conative phenomenology. That is, she wants to have fitting attitudes towards the normative facts of the world. Hence, she wants to look offended in the face of an offence. That is the reason why she can continue with her life, although with much effort to not

[27] The best way of conceiving this normative clash between emotional phenomenology and cognitive and conative one, is as a case of "conflict without contradiction" (Grzankowski, 2020; Naar, 2020). The conflict does not entail a contradiction because cognitive phenomenology and emotional one are at different levels, the former is propositional and entails concepts, the later tends to be conceived as non-propositional and non-conceptual.

show happiness about offences. Otherwise, she would act on her ever-present joy, assessing the offence as congruent with her interests and hugging her offender.

If we would not have emotional phenomenology as a primitive and would attribute the contrast to algedonic phenomenology we could not explain the felt normative clash. Look at how different the contrast would be: our emoter would preserve her other types of phenomenology in a relevantly similar state except for algedonic phenomenology. Accordingly, she would feel more positive experiences, even those that in SoC1 were negative. However, she would not feel any type of normative clash, there would not be any normative prescription presented by the clash of her cognitive and conative phenomenology with emotional phenomenology. She would not feel that her happiness is inappropriate, that offences do not deserve such a response. It seems, then, that algedonic phenomenology is no longer an option for Kriegel and, hence, Kriegel's reductive account of emotional phenomenology cannot explain the phenomenal contrast between SoC1 and Soc2. Hence, emotional phenomenology must be primitive.

Conclusion

I hope to have shown that from the possibility of ARRE the presumption follows that emotional phenomenology is primitive, that is, irreducible to the other types of phenomenology described by Kriegel. The task ahead is to characterise it and to determine its differences regarding desirous phenomenology, algedonic phenomenology, etc. In other words, the task ahead is to find a framework to make ARRE's emotional life intelligible.

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3

Emotional Phenomenology: A New Puzzle

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Emotions are taken by some authors as a kind of mental state epistemically akin to perception. However, unlike perceptual phenomenology, which allows being treated dogmatically, emotional phenomenology is puzzling in the following respect. When you feel an emotion, you feel an urge to act, you feel, among other things, your body's action readiness. On the other hand, at least sometimes, you are aware that an emotion by itself is not a sufficient reason to justify an evaluative judgment and/or an action, not even prima facie. How can a single mental state, emotion, seem to be dogmatic and hypothetic at the same time? It seems that emotions alone fall short of the justifying role in which their guiding role would be grounded. If this is true, then emotional experience cannot be epistemically akin to perception. Unless we are willing to claim that emotions cause action blindly (i.e., not rationally), we need an account of the distinctive epistemic role of emotional experience that renders its guidance role rational. In this paper I outline this new problem and its consequences for the metaphysics and epistemology of emotional experience. I also try to offer the sketch of a plausible solution.

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Introduction

Emotions are taken by some authors as a kind of mental state epistemically akin to perception. Emotional experience (e.g., anger about the assassination of an innocent) is said to justify evaluative judgments (e.g., the judgment that this is unjust) and actions (e.g., retaliation) in the same way in which perceptual experiences (e.g., seeing a red sphere-like object in your surroundings) justify existential beliefs (e.g., the belief that there is an apple in this room) and/or actions (e.g., extending your arm to pick up the apple).

Unlike perceptual phenomenology, which allows being treated dogmatically (Huemer 2001; Pryor 2000), emotional phenomenology is puzzling in the following respect. When you feel an emotion, you feel an urge to act, you feel, among other things, your body's action readiness (Deonna & Teroni 2012; Frijda 2007; Scarantino 2014). On the other hand, at least sometimes, you are aware that an emotion by itself is not a sufficient reason to justify an evaluative judgment and/or an action, not even prima facie (Brady 2013; Brogaard & Chudnoff 2017). Emotional phenomenology seems to be at once *dogmatic* and *hypothetic*. The meaning of "dogmatic" is taken from the view in epistemology called *phenomenal dogmatism* (Huemer 2001; Pryor 2000). As we will see, phenomenal dogmatism is the view that, absent defeaters, if it seems to you that P, then you have prima facie justification for believing that P. By contrast, when I talk about a type of phenomenology being epistemically *hypothetic* what I mean is that it lacks the phenomenal character required to dogmatically justify a judgement/action. This is the new puzzle addressed in this paper. New, because, to my knowledge, it has not been articulated yet in the literature.

Mental states are rationally causally related to other mental states (Davidson 1980; Zangwill 1998). If you desire that P, and you believe that P, only if Q, then that tends to rationally cause your instrumental desire of Q. It seems that emotions also have those rational functional roles. If you see a predator and you feel fear, it seems to you that that tends to rationally cause the formation of a conscious evaluative judgment and/or an avoidance behavior[29]. I will call the former, the justificatory role of emotion for forming conscious evaluative judgments. I will call the latter, the guiding role of emotion for action and evaluative

[29] There are no conclusive reasons to think that it is the emotion which leads to the formation of an evaluative judgements instead of the other way around. Different theories differ in this regard. Either as an effect or as cause the emotion is rationally causally related to other mental states and actions. I am going to talk as if the emotion produces the evaluative judgement for the sake of simplicity but that I am well aware that it may be that the emotion is the effect of the evaluative judgement. In any case, the answer to this question is not dialectically important because whether the emotion is the cause or the effect of the evaluative judgment, its phenomenology is puzzling in both cases.

judgements. Some authors have claimed that certain mental states' guiding roles are constituted by their justificatory roles. For instance, Elijah Chudnoff (2013) claims that intuition's guiding role for mental actions, like inference (e.g., inferring the consequent), is grounded in intuition's justificatory role (e.g., to know that the antecedent is true and "see" how its truth necessitates the truth of the consequent). The same seems plausible *mutatis mutandis* for perception. However, it seems that emotions alone fall short of the justifying role in which their guiding role would be grounded. Unless we are willing to claim that emotions cause action blindly (i.e., not rationally), we need an account of the distinctive epistemic role of emotion that renders its guidance role rational, but not in a way similar to perception or intuition.

Some caveats about the nature of the puzzle are in place. It should be noted that when talking about the realization that one's emotions are not sufficient reason to justify one's evaluative judgments/actions, we are not talking about a second order mental state that has emotion as its content and predicates of it that it is not sufficient reason to justify other mental state/action. Rather, what is being claimed is that emotional phenomenology lacks some property P, possibly present in other phenomenal states, that would render it able to immediately justify other mental states/actions. The absence of this property can sometimes be felt, and then, the puzzle is triggered: your emotion compels you to act while you know the emotion alone is not sufficient for justifying your action. It may sound paradoxical that one can feel an absence, but it is not. One may or may not be aware that emotional phenomenology lacks property P. When one is aware of it, we have the puzzle and there are ways in which one can be aware of this absence. Consider that perceptual phenomenology has a phenomenal justificatory property, as some authors claim (Chudnoff 2013; Huemer 2001; Pryor 2000). Now imagine that one is comparing their emotions to their perceptions and "seeing" that perception justifies existential beliefs in virtue of its phenomenology, but emotion cannot justify evaluative beliefs in virtue of its phenomenology alone. In this case one is aware that emotional experience lacks something perceptual experience has. One is aware of this absence in comparing their phenomenal perceptual experience with their phenomenal emotional one.

Another caveat: perceptual and emotional experiences are both fallible sources of factual and evaluative knowledge respectively. However, when I say that perceptual experiences allow being treated dogmatically, whereas emotional experiences don't, I am referring to the phenomenal character of their epistemic commitment. Perceptual experience is felt as epistemically dogmatic whereas emotional experience is not. As we will see in the lines to come, this may be explainable in terms of perceptual experience's possession of

presentational phenomenology and emotional experience's lack of it (Brogaard and Chufnoff 2015). My claim is that, irrespectively of their fallibility, the phenomenology of perception is dogmatic whereas the phenomenology of emotion is not or not entirely dogmatic. Emotional phenomenology would be open, by its very nature, to criticism. That is, perceptual phenomenology has a dogmatic qualitative character (it feels dogmatic so to speak) whereas emotional phenomenology is, besides dogmatic in a certain sense, qualitatively epistemically hypothetic (it feels epistemically hypothetic). Thus, both perception and emotion are fallible, though *perceptual phenomenology* has a phenomenal dogmatic character, in an epistemic sense, which *emotional phenomenology* lacks.

As a final caveat, it is important to note that this non-dogmatic aspect characteristic of emotional phenomenology has nothing to do with the introspective ability of the subject of the emotion to know in which emotional state they are. *Pace* psychoanalysis, the subject of the emotion can justifiably be dogmatic about their justification to form a belief about the emotional state in which they are on the basis of introspecting their emotion. However, what the subject cannot be dogmatic about is the information conveyed by the emotion about the axiological properties of the world. The subject may be and feel infallible regarding their emotions, but their emotions are not, nor are always felt as, infallible sources of axiological information.

The plan of the paper is the following. Once the puzzle has been outlined, the time comes to diagnose why it has gone unnoticed so far. I will outline the puzzle and diagnose the reasons why it went unnoticed in section 1. Section 2 develops the consequences of the puzzle and addresses its impact in the philosophical discussion around the nature and epistemology of emotion, especially for the perceptual theory of emotion. Finally, section 3 aims to offer the articulation of some tentative but, I believe, promising ideas to start (dis)solving the problem, plus some objections to them and my answers to those objections.

1.-The puzzle and why it has gone unnoticed

In this section, I will try to develop the folk, scientific and philosophical considerations that support the idea that emotional phenomenology seems to be Janus-Faced, both manifestly unable to justify action but strongly motivating. I will also explain why this new puzzle has gone unnoticed in the literature so far.

1.1. Laws in tension?

Let's start with Nico Frijda's laws of emotion. Frijda's considerations about emotion are synthesized in the inductive generalizations that constitute his laws of emotion (Frijda, 2007). One of the main contributions of Frijda's account is the idea that emotions are patterns of felt bodily action readiness to react in the face of emotionally relevant objects. These patterns have a law-like behavior, summarized in the mentioned laws. What is significant for the question under discussion is that there is a tension between central laws. My claim is that this tension manifests our puzzle. Here is Frijda's *Law of Closure*:

> Emotions tend to be closed to considerations that its aims may be of relative and passing importance. They are closed to the requirements of interests other than those of their own aims. They claim top priority and are absolute with regard to appraisals of urgency and necessity of action, and to control over action.
>
> (Frijda *Ibid.*, p. 15)

Now consider the *Law of Care for Consequence*:

> Emotions are not always as absolute as just sketched. Emotions do manifest deliberation, calculation, or consideration. Infatuation can be stingy, and anger can be prudent. Although closure reflects the basic shape of emotions, that basic shape may run into opposite tendencies, usually caught under the heading of emotional regulation or emotion control. These manifest the law of care for consequence. Every emotional impulse elicits a secondary impulse that tends to modify it in the view of its possible consequences.
>
> (Frijda Ibid., p. 17)

These two laws seem to be in acknowledged tension. The law of closure seems to capture the dogmatically motivational role emotions play in the evaluative life of their subjects. By contrast, the law of care for consequence seems to capture the openness of emotion to criticism and consideration which reflects their non-dogmatic phenomenal aspect. The apparent tension between these two laws can be taken as an expression of our puzzle.

1.2. Degrees

While it is true that perceptual contents can vary in their degree of vivacity (e.g. this shade of green is brighter than that one), they do not vary in their *degree of epistemic commitment*. While one subject can experience the apple as more reddish than other subject perceives it, if both subjects really undergone an episode of perceptual phenomenology then, irrespectively of the vivacity of the phenomenal properties instantiated by the perceived objects, both represent-as-existent the apple. Thus, if one has perceptual experiences and *other*

things being equal, one has sufficient reason to move to a corresponding perceptual belief, irrespectively of the vivacity with which the perceptual contents are presented. Perceptual experience is constituted by a dogmatic attitude, it enables you to form a justified perceptual belief, other things being equal.

By contrast, emotional phenomenology is subjected to *degrees of epistemic commitment*. One can emotionally represent a particular object (e.g., an insult) as instantiating some evaluative property (e.g., offence) to a greater or lesser extent. Thus, the intensity of an emotion, or in the current terminology, the degree of epistemic commitment of an emotion, can vary. This property of emotions is akin to hypothetical or conjectural thought. To illustrate this point, consider Frijda's *Law of Apparent Reality*:

> Emotions are elicited by events with meanings appraised as real, and their intensity corresponds to the degree to which this is the case.
>
> Events that are taken to be real elicit emotions. Threats deploying in front of one's eyes, opportunities that are for the taking with smells, gestures or glances that caress and evoke terror or tenderness or mellowness within. What does not impress as true and unavoidable elicits no emotion, or a weaker one.
>
> (Frijda Ibid., p. 8)

1.3. Problems with emotional dogmatism

Phenomenal dogmatism is the view that, absent defeaters, if it seems to you that P, then you have prima facie justification for believing that P (Huemer 2001; Pryor 2000). Phenomenal dogmatists tend to understand the term "appearance" in terms of a phenomenal experience akin to a propositionally structured representation. The propositional content of, for instance, perceptual experience allows it to enter into logical relations with perceptual belief, such that perceptual experience's propositional contents can justify perceptual beliefs' propositional content. Phenomenal dogmatism is a very plausible view to account for the epistemic relation between perception and perceptual beliefs. If it perceptually seems to me that there is a rat under the table, this is *prima facie* sufficient reason to justify my belief that there is a rat under the table. One of the reasons for the plausibility of phenomenal dogmatism for the case of belief is due to the fact that, *pace* skeptics about the external world, perceptual experience is considered one of the privileged epistemic accesses to the external world.

Is phenomenal dogmatism about emotion a plausible option? I do not think so. Michael Brady (2010, 2011, 2013) has given three related reasons to doubt that emotional dogmatism is a plausible view. First, unlike perceptual experience, emotional experience seems to be

subject to reasons. Whereas it would not make sense to ask a *normative* why-question regarding why you are having a certain perceptual experience, it seems to make sense to ask such a question regarding emotional experiences (see also Deonna & Teroni 2012). The only type of why question that seems appropriate for perception is the *causal* one. The fact that perceptual experiences do not accept normative why-questions is also related to the fact that perceptual experiences are taken as *justificatory bedrock* when it comes to perceptual existential beliefs. The same cannot be said about emotional experience. To make this reasoning more vivid, take the following passage by Pryor and try to devise similar considerations for emotion. I bet that you would find it difficult:

> When asked, "what justifies you in believing there are hands?" one is likely to respond, "I can simply see that there are hands". One might be wrong: one might not really be seeing a hand. But it seems like the mere fact that one has a visual experience of that phenomenological sort is enough to make it reasonable for one to believe that there are hands.

(Pryor 2000, p. 536)

Second, if phenomenal dogmatism about emotional experience were true, then, as a rule, every emotional appearance undefeated at the moment would constitute sufficient reason for the corresponding evaluative judgments and, plausibly enough, for an action intelligible in the light of that emotion. However, Brady shows us how this would lead to undesired consequences. The following is a reconstruction of Brady's argument.

(1) Emotions and evaluative judgments have the same set of reasons. That is, something is a reason R for an emotion iff R is a reason for the corresponding evaluative judgement.

(2) By interdefinibility of the biconditional in (1), it follows that: If R is a reason for an emotion, then R is a reason for the corresponding evaluative judgement and if R is a reason for an evaluative judgement, then R is a reason for the corresponding emotion.

(3) By elimination of conjunction in (2) we obtain: If R is a reason for an evaluative judgement, then R is a reason for the corresponding emotion.

(4) *Perceptualist/Dogmatist claim*: an emotion is a reason R for the corresponding evaluative judgement, *other things being equal*.

(C) An emotion is a reason R for the corresponding emotion.

Premises (1), (2) and (3) seem very plausible: the set of appropriate reasons for an episode of fear about object O, is the same set of reasons for the corresponding evaluative judgement about the dangerousness of O. Premise (4) is the perceptualist claim as defended by authors like Christine Tappolet (2016). (C) follows if one jointly accepts all those premises. Now, premises (1), (2) and (3) are very plausible, so one should reject (4) in order to avoid the undesired consequence (C).

Third and narrowly linked with the previous consideration: phenomenal dogmatism about emotional experience collides with an independently plausible theory about the metaphysics and semantics of evaluative discourse, namely, neo-sentimentalism (McDowell 1985; Wiggins 1987; D'Arms and Jacobson 2005). Neo-sentimentalism is the view that our appropriate deployment of evaluative concepts entails the recognition that the object of which we predicate the evaluative concept merits certain emotional reactions. Thus, if I predicate the evaluative concept <dangerous> of a certain object, that entails recognising fear about that object as a fitting response. Now, epistemic emotional dogmatism is equivalent to this conditional: if I have an emotional episode in normal circumstances, then the corresponding evaluative judgment is *prima facie* justified by the emotion. If we put together emotional dogmatism and neo-sentimentalism we obtain, by transitivity, that having an emotional episode in normal circumstances is sufficient for recognising that emotion as an appropriate or fitting response to the relevant object. Again, we obtain the undesired and circular upshot that emotions can justify themselves. Given the independent plausibility of neo-sentimentalism about evaluative concepts, we have reasons to reject phenomenal dogmatism about emotional experience.

If Brady is right, we have reasons to reject phenomenal dogmatism for emotional experience. In the next section, I will address some recent criticism of Brady's arguments by Jonathan Mitchell (2017). For current purposes, it is sufficient that we acknowledge that once we reject phenomenal dogmatism for emotions, we have our puzzle. If phenomenal dogmatism about emotional experience were true, we could easily explain the action readiness of emotion: it seems to us that we are *directly perceiving* a value and for *that reason* we feel the need to act correspondingly. However, if Brady is right, then we cannot feel emotional experiences as direct perceptions of value. However, and here is the puzzle, we behave as if we were experiencing emotions that way.

Now someone can ask: how does this paper go beyond Brady's proposal? [30]For starters, my problem is a problem for Brady himself: if Brady is right, we cannot take emotional experiences as direct perceptions of value, but we behave and feel as if we were experiencing emotions that way. How is it possible to keep the rationality of emotions when they have such a contradictory phenomenology? Perception's guiding role seems to be grounded in perception's justifying role (e.g., I avoid the car, perception's guiding role, *because* I see it coming towards me, perception's justifying role), but if emotions lack a similar justifying role, then what guarantees that their guiding role is rational? Unless we are willing to assume that emotions are irrational causes of our behavior, we, including Brady. need a solution to the puzzle here presented.

1.4. Why has the puzzle gone unnoticed?

If the previous considerations are on the right track, we have confirmed a *new* puzzle for the philosophy of emotion. The natural question now is: why has this puzzle remained unnoticed in the literature so far? The reason is to be found in the puzzle itself.

Emotional experiences are pervasive, and they play if not an essential at least a *typical* role in our evaluative mental economy. They seem to be present in high cognition when, for instance, we *experience awe* contemplating the vastness of the universe. They also seem to be present in low cognition when, for instance, we *experience fear* at the sight of a spider in our bathroom. Emotion's pervasiveness makes our puzzle really *pressing*, because, if they are present in the etiology of most of our actions and they are not rational, then that could have the consequence that most of our actions were infected with the purported irrationality of their base. That is why we desperately need a solution to this puzzle[31]. Granted the importance of the puzzle, let me now explain why it has gone unnoticed so far.

It seems that emotions *directly guide* our actions. Following the previous examples: we start studying physics to understand the universe, we run away from the bathroom, etc. In all those cases our emotions are not isolated, they are accompanied by their usual cognitive bases (perceptions, imaginations, beliefs, etc.) but also by other mental states like evaluative judgements (for instance, the judgement that ordered complexity is beautiful), memories about

[30] I owe this interesting question to an anonymous reviewer of *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*.
[31] I owe this emphasis on the importance of the problem given the typicality of emotions in our evaluative life to the insightful comments of an anonymous reviewer of *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*.

past events or recollection of information (for instance, about spiders' venom), etc. The evaluative molecular net of mental states, of which the emotions is a part, contributes *as a whole* to the guidance of our behaviour. However, given its *affective* nature, emotion captures almost all the attention of their subjects and it seems to them that they are acting solely on the basis of their emotional experience. It is similar to how a painful experience in your foot captures your attention partially occluding the feeling of the feet against the shoe. Of course, this interpretation depends on having a rich enough conception of phenomenal consciousness (Schwitzgebel 2007). But the richness required is not so rich. In the end we are talking about *contiguous experiences* in an evaluative process (i.e., emotions, judgements, recognition of reasons for emotions and judgements, etc.) and not experiences in different modalities all the time (i.e., visual experiences, cognitive experiences, visceral experiences, tactile experiences, imaginative experiences, etc.). It is not a coincidence that in the analogy we used, the pressure of the shoe and the pain occur in the *same* foot.

My diagnosis, then, is that the scandalous phenomenal character of emotional experiences tends to capture almost all the attention of their subjects, partially occluding other phenomenal phenomena in the vicinity, like evaluative judgements and the conscious recognition of reasons for them. This has led to the overestimation of the epistemic and guiding roles of emotion in giving access to the evaluative aspect of the world, in justifying our evaluative judgements and in guiding our behavior. This partially explains as well, the attractiveness of perceptual theories of emotion, which will be examined in the light of our new puzzle in the following section.

2.-The puzzle and the nature and epistemology of emotional experience

When people have talked about the epistemic role of emotional experience assimilating it to perceptual experience's epistemic role, two accounts have been considered: the *reliabilist* and the *phenomenalist* as pointed out by Cowan (2016) and Kurtz (2022). In a nutshell: reliabilists claim that emotions justify evaluative judgements and actions in virtue of external reliable processes that correlate emotional experience and the presence of evaluative properties. The locus of justification is not in the emotional experience but in its reliable correlation with evaluative properties, orchestrated, for instance, by natural selection. By contrast, phenomenalists claim that the locus of justification is in the emotional experience itself. Our problem is more pressing for the phenomenalists than for the reliabilist. The former considers

that an emotion justifies an evaluative judgement if and only if it has the right kind of phenomenology, whereas the latter thinks that an emotion justifies an evaluative judgement if and only if the relevant emotion reliably tracks evaluative properties, independently of its phenomenal character. Our problem is a problem with first-personal character and hence eminently phenomenological. Why? Because if the reliabilist is right, then, the emotional subject need not be aware of the reliable process, it would be sufficient for them to be a part of that process, that is, to be the subject whose emotional processes correlate with evaluative properties. Thus, they would be *externally* justified in following the dogmatic pull to action of their emotion, irrespectively of whether their emotional experience lacks a justifying role akin to perceptual experience's one. By contrast, our problem is that our emotional subject is *phenomenally* aware that their emotional reactions *alone* cannot be sufficient for justifying her judgements and actions but, in a way, she feels as if her emotional experiences were able to do so due to the characteristic action readiness that accompanies those emotional experiences. Thus, from now on, when I speak of epistemic perceptual theories of emotion, I will be referring to phenomenalist perceptual theories of emotion.

In the subsections to come I will show that the perceptual phenomenalist about emotion's epistemic role cannot give an account of emotional phenomenology that makes it capable of overcoming the difficulty outlined in section 1. Even though they fail, they have identified an important aspect of emotional phenomenology: it plays an epistemic role in our mental economy when it comes to evaluation. Emotions are essential for evaluation. However, the role of emotion regarding evaluation is not properly captured by the analogy with perception and perceptual existential belief. In section 3 I will try to offer some ideas to capture the essential role of emotion for evaluative thought and knowledge without relying on the perceptual analogy.

The argument in this section is going to follow this path. First, I am going to point out that the feature of perceptual experience that enables it to have the epistemic justificatory role it has is lacking in emotional experience. As we will see, emotional experience lacks what Chudnoff (2013) has called *presentational phenomenology*. We will examine how emotional experience's absence of presentational phenomenology can combine with Brady's arguments, examined in the previous section, ruling out the perceptual theory of emotion as a plausible account of the epistemic role of emotional experience. After that, we will examine a recent defense of the perceptual theory against Brady's objections by Mitchell (2017). I will show that Mitchell's defense is not successful. The upshot of this section will be the following: emotional

experience' epistemic role cannot be modeled in perceptual experience's one, as Brady's arguments plus considerations on emotional experience's lack of presentational phenomenology show. However, once we embrace this result, we need to provide an account of how emotions can have a rational guiding role while lacking a justifying role analogous to perception's one. We need a solution to our problem, which is also a problem for Brady and accounts like his account. Besides, the inability of the perceptual theory of emotion for formulating this problem, which would be impossible given its assumptions, also tells against it. Finally, I will provide a sketch of an initial solution in the next section, section 3.

2.1. Emotional experience lacks justificatory phenomenology

Chudnoff (2013) identifies the justificatory phenomenology the phenomenalist is looking for with *presentational phenomenology*, which is the phenomenology characteristic of perception and intuition. Those mental attitudes make a subject aware of a content, say p, and make it seem to the subject as if they make them aware of what makes p true. Here is Chudnoff (2013, p. 18):

> An experience has presentational phenomenology with respect to the proposition that p when it not only makes it seem to its subject that p, but also makes it seem to its subject as if it makes him or her aware of the very chunk of reality that makes p true.

Thus, when you have a perceptual experience of a red apple, the experience makes it seem to you that there is a red apple in your surroundings and that this *precise experience* is what makes you aware of the truth maker of the proposition that there is a red apple in your surroundings. The same goes for the phenomenology of intuition, whose contents are abstract rather than concrete. When you have the arithmetic intuitive experience of the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4, the experience makes it seem to you that 2 + 2 = 4 and *this precise experience* is what makes you aware of the truth-maker of the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4.

The experiences that have presentational phenomenology in the above-described way, rationally allow their subjects to be dogmatists about the information conveyed by them. If I have a perceptual experience, I am, absent defeaters, rationally justified in taking at face value the information conveyed by it. *Mutatis mutandis* for intuitive experiences. As we saw in the previous section, emotional phenomenology *alone* does not allow their subjects to take at face value the information conveyed by it. Now we know why: emotional phenomenology lacks presentational phenomenology. When you are angry about your in-law's remark at the family dinner, it may be that your emotional experience makes you, together with auditory experience,

(more) aware of the remark. However, your emotional experience does not make it seem to you as if it makes you aware of the chunk of reality that makes the experience veridical (Brogaard & Chudnoff 2017). The emotion just presents the incident under a certain evaluative light but it does not seem to present the "chunk of reality" that makes that impression veridical. That is, unlike perceptual or intuitive phenomenology, emotion requires further evidence. It needs justification.

If we put together the previous considerations about emotional experience's lack of presentational phenomenology with Brady's considerations against modeling the epistemic role of emotion on perception, then we have a strong case against the emotional dogmatist. However, and here our puzzle reappears, we still need an account of the epistemic role of emotion in the plausible rational guidance of our actions. At least if we want to preserve the intuition that emotions are rational, something that I take as a *desideratum* for a plausible theory of emotion.

2.2. The wreck of perceptual/intuitionist theories of emotional experience and their theoretical treasure

If the above reasoning is on the right track, then theories of emotion that consider that they are epistemically akin to perception are doomed to fail. In this subsection I will consider reasons to reject perceptual theories of emotion. I will conclude that even if perceptual theories cannot succeed in explaining the epistemic role of emotion, they have left us an important theoretical treasure: the intuition that emotions are different from beliefs and desires and rationally guide action. I will devote the final part of the paper to try to explain and secure that intuition in non-perceptual terms. In the next subsection I will examine a recent defense of perceptual theories by Mitchell (2017).

Let's start with the core theses of perceptual theories of emotion. Consider the following quotes by leading perceptual theorists of emotion. You can see that they conceive of emotions as a dogmatic experience along the lines of perception.

Johnston (2001, p. 189):

> I maintain the following: it is because affect can be the disclosure of the appeal of other things and other people that it can have authority in the matter of what we should desire and do. By 'the authority of affect' I mean not to refer to its sheer effectiveness as a source of desire or action, but rather to the fact that the presence of the affect can make the desire or action especially intelligible to the agent himself. It can make the desire or act seem apt or fitting in a way that silences any demand for justification.

Döring (2007, p. 386):

> In judging that she ought to take action against the punishment the person has not only a reason but is also motivated to do so. This is so because the chain of reasoning which leads to that judgement starts from an emotion. As we have seen, emotions are capable of both rationalizing and motivating, although their representational content is not that of belief, nor is their motivational force that of desire. The person's judgement that she ought to take action against the punishment has motivational force due to the justifying relation holding between her judgement and her emotion. This relation forms a link in the form of necessary connection, and, because of that link, the emotion's motivational force is transmitted to the judgement.[32]

Tappolet (2016, p. 170):

> Quite generally, the justification of an evaluative belief would turn on the absence of any reason to believe that the emotion on which the belief is based is inappropriate. Consider the belief that a friend of yours is admirable. What I suggest is that your belief is justified on condition it is based on your admiration and you have no reason to distrust your admiration.

Now, if everything said about presentational phenomenology is true, that is, if it is true that emotion lacks the mark of justificatory phenomenology, then it seems that the above approaches to capture the nature of emotion are just false. Indeed, those approaches exploit the hot/categorical face of emotion while ignoring the hypothetical one. Those authors are not aware, for the reasons given above, of our problem and, if they were, they would be unable to solve it. Their theory of emotion is unilaterally based on the more phenomenologically salient face of emotion, the pain in the foot, ignoring the no less real hypothetical face, the sensation of the shoe against the foot.

What is more, the point of departure of these theories makes them incapable of even acknowledging our problem and hence precludes any hope for solving it within them. If you are convinced that our problem is real and that perceptualist theories of emotion cannot solve it, nor even formulate it, then you should conclude with me that they must be abandoned. Thus, if the identification of the problem is correct, then perceptual theories of emotion should be discarded, because there is nothing in the phenomenology of emotion that justifies being dogmatist about it, unlike the phenomenology of perception, and, hence, treating emotions like perceptions is just a bad theoretical move. However, there is a kernel of truth, a theoretical treasure, in perceptual theories of emotion: the idea that emotions are not as cognitively

[32] As it has been pointed out by an anonymous reviewer of *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, it seems that Döring distinguishes in this quote between two types of judgments: (1) that some object O *is offensive* and (2) I *must retaliate* against the producer or sustainer of O. Döring seems to be referring to judgements type (1). However, I think that type (1) and type (2) judgements are conceptually related to the point that if an emotion epistemically grounds type (1) judgements, it also epistemically grounds type (2) judgements *other things being equal*. If you judge (1) that something is wrong and you can change it, then you tend to judge and should judge (2) that you must intervene.

sophisticated as judgements and are something hotter, shared by beasts and babies, that orient our navigation through a world full of value and disvalue playing a significant rational motivational role. When I try to sketch a solution to the problem in the final section, I will emphasize how important it is that we reject dogmatism about emotional phenomenology being able to keep their motivational power and claiming that such power is, indeed, rational and not blind. That would start (dis)solving satisfactorily our new problem.

2.3. Mitchell's attempt to save the Perceptual View

Before abandoning the perceptual theories and stealing their treasure, it is advisable to consider some reasons offered by Mitchell (2017) to counteract skepticism about them. One of the criticisms made by Brady and reinforced by emotions' lack of presentational phenomenology is that emotions are not justificatory bedrock but instead are in need of justification themselves. That is, it is in general appropriate to ask normative why-questions regarding emotional experiences, but it is not so in the case of perception. Mitchell claims that there are some cases in which normative why-questions for emotions are not appropriate, because the emotion is, in those cases, as epistemically fundamental as a perception. He offers the case of someone in a funeral who is sad about the loss of a loved one. Mitchell claims that it would be inappropriate, and not for conventional or social reasons but for epistemic ones, to ask that person why she is sad.

Mitchell's clever example is interesting. However, I do not think it is able to make a strong case for phenomenal dogmatism about emotional experience. First, Mitchell's example is a special case, not the norm. So, generalizing from it would be theoretically suspicious. Second, the example can be analyzed differently and without the need to suppose that emotional experience is epistemically like perceptual experience in that case. Let's agree with Mitchell that the reasons for the inappropriateness of the normative why-question is intrinsically epistemic. However, the relevant epistemic aspect is not emotion's epistemic role in analogy with perception's epistemic role, but the relation between *justified* emotion and *justified* evaluative judgement. Let me elaborate. It is not appropriate to ask why the subject is sad because she knows that we know that she knows, given our shared knowledge of the human condition and our shared knowledge of our knowledge of the human condition, that she has suffered a personal loss. Given that, as Brady notes (2013), justified emotions and corresponding justified evaluative judgements have the same set of reasons, if one knows that the judgement is justified, one knows that the corresponding emotion is justified and, hence, it

does not make sense to ask for its justification. Asking why she is sad would be like asking why she believes that normal people run away from fire. In that case we know that we know that human flesh can be damaged by fire and that that is painful. So, asking why would be either theoretically insulant or a reason to suppose that we belong to another planet. This kind of psychologically iterative explanation, in which for instance we know that we know that we know what the human condition is, is not strange in human interaction. Indeed, the Gricean tradition has made its case for its definition of meaning in terms of them (Grice 1957), and for some Gricean philosophers, mutual knowledge is constitutive of human communicative interchanges (Loar 1981; Schiffer 1972).

Another argument deployed by Mitchell in the defense of emotional perceptualism consists in arguing that, *contra* Brady, emotions can include a sense of epistemic appropriateness from the inside. That is, there is a way in which, at a minimum, emotions can be and be felt as appropriate without entailing, on the assumption that Neo-sentimentalism is true, problematic self-justification. Here is Mitchell:

> It is plausible that for an evaluative property to be experienced as qualifying the particular object of an emotion, the emotion must necessarily (re)present its object's evaluative standing as independent of that particular experience of it. In this way a certain kind of content externalism implies phenomenal objectivity with regard to that evaluative standing, and this is necessary if at least some emotional experiences have value properties as part of their intentional content.
>
> (Mitchell 2017, p. 77)

Though Mitchell is right about the idea of a minimum epistemic appropriateness and a minimum feeling of epistemic appropriateness, this sense of appropriateness is not sufficient to claim that, epistemically speaking, emotions are to evaluative beliefs what perceptions are to existential empirical beliefs. It is true that emotions are outward directed and that they sometimes inform us about axiological aspects of the world, but they are far from having the objective character perception has, they lack robust presentational phenomenology. Emotions are more akin to hypothetical thought and, as such, they are about the external world and, sometimes, they get it right. However, this is not strong enough to posit an emotional epistemic role analogous to perception. In the following line I elaborate on these considerations further.

The idea that emotions involve a strong sense of objectivity akin to the sense of objectivity characteristic of perception is really controversial. As we saw, perceptual experience exhibits *presentational phenomenology* (Chudnoff 2013), whereas emotional experience lacks it (Brogaard & Chudnoff 2017). The idea of *presentational phenomenology* seems to imply some version of the transparency thesis in the sense that the experience which has

presentational phenomenology seems to present directly the chunk of reality that makes that precise experience true or veridical. That is, the experience does not present itself presenting reality but seem to present (a chunk of) reality directly, *transparently*. Thus, perceptual experience exhibits at least *some sort of* transparency, as has already been claimed by some authors (Harman 1990; Salmela 2011).

Mitchell acknowledges that emotions are not transparent in the perceptual sense but still insists that this does not prevent that emotion plays an epistemic role similar to that of perceptual experiences. It seems to me that this is not plausible, since it trivializes the distinctive epistemic role of perception and makes the notion of robust presentational phenomenology and the transparency entailed by it epistemically irrelevant. Let's consider the transparency thesis for perception. It seems that when you describe your perceptual experience you just refer to objects and properties which happen to be the *correctness conditions* of your perceptual experience (Searle 2015). By contrast, it seems that you cannot describe your emotional experience without mentioning the experience itself. This is a point acknowledged by Mitchell himself: he says that emotions tend to have reflexive (in fear, something in presented as dangerous *for me*) and valence opacity (fear *feels bad* to me). The transparency of perceptual experience, as opposed to the opacity of emotional experience, makes, for sure, an important epistemic difference between these two mental states. The former, but not the latter, seems to put you in immediate contact with the chunk of reality that would make it true. The former, but not the latter, has a robust presentational phenomenology.

If the reasoning above is right, we can learn what perceptual theories can teach us, but we should not follow them until their ultimate consequences.

2.4. Our new problem and theories of emotion apart from the perceptual ones

The existence of the new problem together with the considerations against emotional dogmatism are fatal for perceptualist theories of emotion or for theories of emotion that epistemically equate them with intuition. For the remaining theories of emotion, like attitudinal theories (Deonna and Teroni 2012) or motivational theories (Scarantino 2014), it is just a challenge, though a formidable one. Concretely, it is a challenge that every theory of emotional phenomenology should address. If emotional phenomenology is not presentational in the sense in which perceptual or cognitive phenomenology are, then how can we characterize emotional phenomenology while preserving the intuition that it plays a rational motivating role. Indeed,

it is a problem for Brady himself: once we reject that emotional experience is epistemically akin to perceptual experience, we cannot appeal to an emotional justifying role, as it is conceived by perceptualists, to explain emotions' guiding role. In the next and final section I offer the first brushes of a solution in which emotions have a fundamental epistemic role which is not akin to perception.

3. Sketching a solution to the problem

3.1. The sketch

It seems that the best way of characterizing emotional phenomenology is as a *sui generis* attitude (Álvarez-González 2021; Dewalque 2017; Mitchell 2020). Uriah Kriegel has attempted to provide an account of the primitive phenomenal attitudes indispensable for explaining the stream of consciousness. Kriegel's basic elements of phenomenology are attitudinal phenomenal types of mental states. These *phenomenal attitudes* contrast with their content, namely with the object, proposition or state of affairs presented by them. Thus, those types of phenomenology refer to the what-it-is-like of the mode in which the mental state presents its content rather than to the what-it-is-like of the content itself. Take, as an example, cognitive phenomenology. According to Kriegel, cognitive phenomenology *presents-as-true* its contents, for instance, that 2 + 2 = 4. Thus, it is the phenomenology of the mode of presentation or mental attitude (i.e. presenting-as-true), instead of the phenomenology of the content (i.e. that 2 + 2 = 4), that is relevant here. Given that emotional phenomenology is not transparent, it is reasonable to suppose that its intentional contribution is not only in terms of its contents but also in terms of its distinctive phenomenal attitude (Kriegel 2019). Given this, I am going to assume Kriegel's framework in order to develop a characterization of emotional phenomenology able to start (dis)solving our problem.

I present my proposal and then I indicate how it bears on the puzzle under discussion. My proposal: emotional phenomenology *presents-as-worth-attending* its contents. More specifically, emotional phenomenology presents-as-worth-attending-relative-to-a-specific-meaning its contents. The relativization to a specific meaning is because emotional experience is determined by primitive ways of presentation of their contents relative to specific given meanings or formal objects (Deonna and Teroni 2012; Kenny 1963; Lazarus 1999). Thus, for instance, fear presents-as-worth-attending-relative-to-danger its contents and anger presents-as-worth-attending-relative-to-offense its contents. The relativity to a specific meaning also

explains why emotions are or are not justified. If emotions are needed for a *dedicated* representation of what is worth attending relative to a specific meaning, then we can stablish some primitive connections of appropriateness. Anger is appropriate iff its contents are worth-attending-relative-to-offense; fear is appropriate iff its contents are worth-attending-relative-to-danger…Note that some objects may be harmless but worth attending relative to danger. I can rationally fear a dog I do not know yet even if, once I come to know him, I realize that he is harmless. In that case, my fear of the dog *at that time* was fitting and justified [33]because, for all I knew, the dog could have been dangerous and, hence, it was-worth-attending-relative-to-danger. The same goes, *mutatis mutandis*, for the other emotions.

Emotional phenomenology presents-as-worth-attending-relative-to-a-specific-meaning its contents. This is not the same as judging or perceiving that its contents instantiate the meaning under which they are being considered. Rather, emotional phenomenology presents a particular object under some evaluative light based on an universal concern of the emotional subject specifiable in terms of the formal object of the emotion. Fear presents as-worthy-of-attention-relative-to-danger its contents, which is not the same as-presenting their contents as dangerous. Something similar is said by Roberts (2003). According to him emotions are concern-based construals. That is, emotions would be "ways of seeing" their particular object analogously to how one can appreciate the rabbit-duck image as either a rabbit or a duck. Thus, when one has an emotion, one contrues the object of the emotion under the particular guise of the concern characteristic of that emotion: in fear, one construes the particular object of the emotion as dangerous; in anger, as offensive; in joy, as-goal-congruent, etc. Roberts' account

[33] According to some authors, emotion would be analogous to belief in that there is at least two dimensions of evaluation for each. A belief may be true and justified, being these two dissociable. According to Deonna and Teroni (2012) and other authors, emotions are also evaluable under two analogous dimensions. An emotion may be *fitting but not justified* and *justified but unfitting*. This interesting distinction between fitting and justified emotions is somehow collapsed in my proposal. Take fear. From my analysis it follows that a given emotion, fear, is not fitting with regard to danger, but fitting with regard to being worth of attention relatively to danger. This fear's fittingness coincides with its justification, because one should pay attention to what *seems* dangerous giving one's intention of remaining alive. So, according to my analysis, fearing a predator is both fitting if and only if it also justified. And fearing a predator is justified if and only if it is worth of attention relatively to danger. Instead of talking this consequence of the view as an undesirable result, I take it as a discovery about emotion's conditions of appropriateness.

is criticized because it cannot account for the emotionality of emotions (Deonna and Teroni 2012; Morag 2016; Müller 2019).

That criticism can be overcome by means of reconstructing Robert's proposal in more sophisticated terms. Thus, Roberts' approach can be complemented with the idea that the construal is *emotional* because of the relevance the formal object of the emotion has for the emoter. This relevance makes intelligible the fact that the emoter feels an urgent categorical pull to inquire (which is a form of acting) whether it is the case that the particular object of the emotion instantiates the formal one.

We now have the ingredients for the solution. Emotional phenomenology presents-as-worth-attending-relative-to-a-specific meaning its contents. This is not the same as judging or perceiving that its objects instantiate the meaning under which they are being considered. The emotional experience is not *epistemically dogmatic*. However, one feels this categorical pull to action because of the meaningfulness for one's life the formal object of the emotion has. That's what explains the urgent, hot, character of emotion and is also what explains why the emotional experience is essentially linked to action, why it guides action. However, the emotion does not guide action through a justificatory role analogous to perception's one. Instead, emotions guide attention towards their intentional object through which the corresponding action is guided. Thus, emotions guide action *mediately through the guidance of attention*. Brady (2013) emphasized the important link of emotion, its epistemic role and attention. For him, emotions promote evaluative understanding, instead of making us aware of evaluative properties, by means of capturing and consuming attention.

Emotions fix and keep the attention fixed on what is important for the subject, guiding the processing of information, which includes perceptions, beliefs, motor representations, etc. Emotional appraisal is not dogmatic, it is *hypothetical*. However, given the importance of the formal object of emotion, the need to fix and keep the attention fixed until one reaches a resolution, is dogmatic. Emotional phenomenology is then epistemically non-dogmatic but *practically dogmatic*. Indeed, Wendy Wilutzky (2015) has conceived of emotions as *epistemic actions* that help the individual to uncover axiological information in a process of continuous

appraisal and re-appraisal whose end is precisely to change the individual epistemic status in regards to that information[34].

It seems to us that emotional phenomenology is epistemically dogmatic, that we *perceive* the instantiation of a value in some natural properties and that that explains the characteristic action readiness we feel when we are emotional. However, we are misattributing the dogmatic character: it is not the emotional appraisal that is dogmatic, but rather the need to confirm it and to keep the attention fixed until this happens, and keep the attention fixed subsequentially if needed (e.g., in order to fight with the predator, in order to hide from it, etc.). Of course, the scandalous phenomenal character of the need to keep such important values tracked, values like dangerousness (fear), toxicity (disgust), goal congruence (joy), injustice (anger), etc., occlude the epistemically hypothetical character of our initial emotional appraisals and, often, lead us to act before confirmation.

This is understandable since false positives are less costly than false negatives. However, this strategy of optimization does not entail that our emotions are dogmatic. It just entails that we have prudential reasons to take them as such, especially when we lack the time to do better. We are just *justifiably* betting. Indeed, reappraising initial emotional appraisals seems to be constitutive of emotions as Lazarus pointed out (1994, 1999); not only of human emotions but also of animal ones. It seems indispensable for coming up with the best strategy of coping with the situation targeted by the emotion. Here is Lazarus:

> Although the initial appraisal may be hasty and limited, if the opportunity for further investigation of what is happening presents itself, it would be a strange creature that let things drop before a full functional understanding has been achieved.
>
> (Lazarus 1994, p. 215)

The constitutive role of secondary appraisal should convince us that emotions are not essentially dogmatic, though the values represented by them recommend that sometimes we act dogmatically.

3.2. Some objections to the sketch

[34] I owe this point on Wilutzky's conception of emotions as epistemic actions to an anonymous reviewer of *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*. It is worth noting that Wilutzky only applies her ideas to emotions in social contents, whereas I think that those ideas are universally applicable for human emotions in general.

The first objection comes from considering the so-called factive emotions, emotions like, *regret-that*, *anger-that* or *delight-that* (Deitz 2017; Gordon 1987; Unger 1975; Williamson 2000). Unlike fear and hope, these kinds of emotions always admit a factive reading. Take regret-that. Imagine that you regret that you made a silly comment in the seminar. That you know that you made a silly comment in the seminar is a necessary condition for regretting it. That is, if you regret that you made a silly comment in the seminar, then you know that you made a silly comment in the seminar, and if you know that you made a silly comment in the seminar, then you made a silly comment in the seminar. In case you did not make a silly comment in the seminar, then you cannot regret it, though you may think that you regret it or you feel as if you regret it. It seems, then, that when we attribute the state of regretting-that to us or someone else, we are not in need of reasons for considering that the object of our regret is the case (either we know it is the case or we think we know it is the case). Someone could argue, then, that we do not need to confirm any emotional hypothesis in those cases. However, from the factivity of these emotions it does not follow that our general claim about the phenomenology of emotions is mistaken. What emotions *like regret-that p* entail is that we know that p and therefore that p is the case, not that p is worthy of regret. That is, we can regret that p, and, then, p is true, but that does not entail that we should regret p. That we regret p, entails that we know that p, but it does not entail that we know that p is shameful, worthy of regret, etc. If I regret p, it is clear, I know that p and, hence, p is the case. However, whether p instantiates the axiological properties that would made it worthy of regret is another question.

The second objection comes from emotions that seem to make us axiologically infallible, like disgust. It seems that if I feel disgust toward object o, then o is disgusting, and, hence, the question of whether o is disgusting or not is already settled. It seems to me that this objection relies on a radical subjectivist view on emotions like disgust. That I feel disgust towards some object is not sufficient for conferring to it the property of being disgusting. My episodes of disgust can be mistaken. There is some objective property, perhaps grounded on human psychology or evolutionary history, that make certain things disgusting but not others. That is, what is disgusting would be a mind-dependent property, dependent on the species, but not single-mind-dependent, that is, not dependent on the mind of a particular individual. Hence, if I feel disgust, the question of whether what disgusts me is indeed disgusting is still open, until I am able to provide sufficient reasons for ratifying or rectifying my initial emotional appraisal.

The third objection targets our characterization of emotion's phenomenal attitudinal profile. Above we said that emotions present-as-worth-attending-relatively-to-a-specific-meaning its contents. Someone could say that there is something phenomenologically inaccurate with this characterization: boring objects and disgusting objects are not worthy of attention. When we are in the face of a boring or disgusting object what we want, precisely, is to stop paying attention to it. This objection is partially correct, we do not want to pay attention to boring or disgusting objects because they are aversive. However, this same aversiveness is what demands our attention. That we do not want to pay attention to something does not mean that we do not pay attention to something. We need to pay attention to boring or disgusting objects to get rid of them, in order to avoid them. The objector may reply, then, that they are not intrinsically worthy of attention (only instrumentally) and, hence, that our characterization errs: we only pay attention to them to stop paying attention to them. However, this is not a good interpretation of our proposal. Disgusting and boring objects/events are intrinsically worthy of attention, though negatively valenced, because they reveal our axiological predicament and that is something we cannot be more interested in.

The fourth, last and more important objection is inspired by Uriah Kriegel (2015). According to him, there is "(i) a constitutive connection between attention and importance, and (ii) a contingent connection between emotion and attention" (p. 155). Thus, our characterization of emotional phenomenology's attitudinal profile as that phenomenology which presents-as-worth-attending-relatively-to-a-specific-meaning its contents would just refer to a contingent and not a constitutive connection between emotions and the values that they seem to track. In that case, our characterization is best understood as the characterization of attention's phenomenal profile. We would just need to substitute "presenting as-worth-attending" for "presenting-as-important". Here I just can sketch a way out of this difficulty which I think is correct. In the consideration quoted above, it seems that Kriegel reverses the order of explanation and misconceives of attention. I can focus on unimportant things. That is, I can have attention without considerations of importance. You, too: if I ask you to pay attention to the sensations in your nose while the air go through, that is something you can do, even if there is no interest in doing so at this particular moment. You have attention without appraisals of importance, that is, appraisals of importance are not a necessary condition for attention and, for that reason, importance cannot be constitutive of attention. Now, it seems unconceivable to have emotions without a sense of importance and, hence, a sense of importance seems to be constitutive of emotions. Our emotions determine what is *worth-attending*, because they have

an essential connection with what is important. So, I suggest we modify Kriegel's thesis: there is a constitutive connection between emotion and importance and, for that reason, a constitutive connection between emotion and what is worthy of attention.

Conclusion

If the previous reasonings are correct, then I take myself as having given a plausible characterization of emotional phenomenology that should be considered when one theorizes about the emotions and their epistemic role. Otherwise, one should provide an alternative account to face the problem presented here or just endorse the undesirable conclusion that our emotions are irrational forces.

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4

Bi-level Evaluative Epistemology

During the last decades we have witnessed a stagnated debate on the epistemic nature of emotion with two clear factions: those who defend that emotions are epistemically akin to perception and those who deny it. In this paper I propose a way out of that impasse. Based on Sosa's distinction, I propose that there is *animal* and *reflective* evaluative knowledge in both of which emotion's play a non-superfluous epistemic role. On the one hand, we can devise an externalist version of perceptualism immune to traditional objections. On the other hand, we not only can but should complement that *externalist* position with an account of reflective evaluative knowledge, used by non-perceptualist to attack traditional, internalist versions of perceptualism. Thus, perceptualism and non-perceptualism do not disagree with each other, they are just offering an analysis of different *epistemic achievements*, which have *different epistemic statuses* and *different epistemic requirements*.

Introduction

During the last decades we have witnessed a debate on the epistemic nature of emotion with two clear factions: those who defend the view that emotions are epistemically akin to perception and those who deny it. Call the former, *epistemic perceptualism about emotion* (EPE from now on); call the latter, *epistemic non-perceptualism about emotions* (NEPE from now on). EPE claims that emotional experience (e.g., anger about the assassination of an innocent) epistemically relates to the justification of evaluative judgments (e.g., the judgment that this is unjust) in the same way in which perceptual experiences (e.g., seeing a red sphere-like object in your surroundings) epistemically relates to the justification of existential beliefs (e.g., the belief that there is an apple in this room).

As noted by Adam Carter (2019), EPE proposes a *modest foundationalism*. *Foundationalism* because emotions, like perceptions when it comes to factual beliefs, would be the self-justifying or not-in-need-of-justification bases whose endorsement justifies non-inferentially basic evaluative beliefs, conferring them the status of justified beliefs which, when true, yields knowledge. *Modest* because the foundation is not an infallible experience like the Cartesian cogito, but a defeasible and *prima facie* foundation. NEPE denies that emotions can play an epistemically foundational role.

As it is common in philosophical debates, this one has reached a point of stagnation and impasse with defenders of EPE and NEPE reiterating their reasons in a failed attempt to convince each other. In this paper I propose a way out of that impasse: based on Ernst Sosa's idea of *animal* and *reflective* knowledge (Sosa 1985; 2007), I propose a similar distinction for the epistemic role of emotion. That way, we can vindicate the kernel of truth in EPE and NEPE, whose conjunction would offer an exhaustive and complete analysis of emotion's epistemic contribution.

Long story short: *Animal emotions* produce, when *justified* and *fitting*, *animal evaluative knowledge*. *Reflective emotions* produce, when justified and fitting, *reflective evaluative knowledge*[35]. EPE provides a philosophical analysis of the former, NEPE provides

[35] Hichem Naar (2019) has used the distinction between animal and reflective emotions but not in the same way in which this distinction is used here nor for the same purposes. Naar counts as animal emotions those emotions typically had by babies and beast that do not have among their cognitive bases evaluative judgements and/or beliefs constituted by axiological concepts. Accordingly, he counts as reflective emotions those that involve evaluative concepts, evaluative judgements and/or evaluative beliefs. He uses this distinction to show that the judgmental theory of emotion may be appropriate as an analysis of the latter, but not of the former, for which it would give an overintellectualizing analysis. Naar's distinction seems to have to do with linguistic capacities. By contrast, in this paper I use "animal emotions" and "reflective emotions" in a technical *epistemic sense*. Animal

a philosophical analysis of the latter. On the one hand, with this distinction at hand, we can devise a *virtue-externalist* version of EPE, along the lines of Carter's view (Carter 2019), immune to the objections traditional *internalist* EPE faces (e.g., Tappolet 2016). The externalist version of EPE is compatible with the internalist insights offered by NEPE (e.g., Brady 2013). Under this description, defenders of EPE and NEPE do not disagree with each other, they are just offering an analysis of *different but complementary epistemic achievements*, which have *different but compatible epistemic statuses* and *different epistemic requirements*. Under this description, we can take theoretical items from both EPE and NEPE to understand emotion's contribution to human evaluative knowledge.

EPE's and NEPE's insights are *not only compatible* but also *complementary*. If we just accepted the new virtue-externalist version of EPE proposed by Carter, then our picture of the epistemic role of the emotions would be incomplete. As Sosa has noted, there is something epistemically admirable in reflection, in having a *reflective* epistemic perspective on your *animal* knowledge (1983; 2015). I claim that there is also something epistemically valuable in *evaluative reflection*. Michael Brady also acknowledged this point, pointing to emotions promotion of evaluative understanding (Brady 2013). There is something epistemically valuable in *understanding* one's axiological situation, in *ascending* from one's evaluative animal knowledge and emotions to one's evaluative reflective knowledge and emotions. For this reason, emotion's epistemic contribution cannot be exhausted by some *virtue reliabilism* on emotion, as the one articulated by Carter (2019). We also need to account for the value of having an *epistemic perspective* on one's axiological situation. We need what we may call a *virtue perspectivism* on emotion.

This paper has a twofold aim. First, I hope to be able to show a way out of the dialectical impasse between epistemic perceptualism about emotion, EPE, and epistemic non-perceptualism about emotion, NEPE. In the process I hope to show the role emotion plays for human evaluative knowledge in general. To these purposes, the paper makes several original contributions: firstly, to show how Carter's version of EPE is immune to traditional criticism by NEPE against the traditional internalist version of EPE, something which is not in Carter's original proposal (Carter 2019); secondly, to complement Carter's new version of EPE, which

emotions are those emotions which partially constitute animal evaluative knowledge. Reflective emotions are those emotions which partially constitute reflective evaluative knowledge. Both types of emotions, animal and reflective, are phenomenally conscious and may or may not be linguistically articulated, but in the former the emotional subject lacks an *epistemic perspective* on her emotions, whereas in the latter the subject has that epistemic perspective on her emotions.

would only give an analysis of animal evaluative knowledge, with the possibility of reflective evaluative knowledge and; thirdly, and relaying on the previous points, to show how EPE and NEPE insights are not only compatible but also complementary.

Before leaving the introduction, a caveat. Partly because Sosa's distinction is historically presented in terms of knowledge, partly because I think the project of a bi-level evaluative epistemology is feasible, I have kept the *original* formulation in terms of animal *evaluative knowledge* and reflective *evaluative knowledge*[36]. However, most of the time, I will be talking about *epistemic justification*. When a belief is true and justifiably formed excluding environmental and interventing luck[37], that belief is knowledge. The same goes mutatis mutandis for an evaluative belief. Epistemic justification is a necessary component of knowledge and hence every epistemology must start showing that epistemic justification is possible: knowledge is possible *only if* epistemic justification is possible. The same goes for evaluative knowledge. Thus, I will focus on *evaluative epistemic justification* as the first step towards a bi-level evaluative epistemology.

The plan: in section 1. I am going to describe the state of the art in the debate between EPE and NEPE. I will defend the superiority of *virtue-externalist* ways of conceiving EPE (e.g., Carter 2019) over *traditional* ones (e.g., Tappolet 2016). In section 2, I will explain Sosa's idea of animal and reflective knowledge and the possibility of understanding the latter in terms of *understanding* instead of knowledge. After that, I will explain how this distinction applies in the evaluative domain such that, under certain conditions, *animal* emotions produce animal evaluative knowledge and *reflective* emotions produce reflective evaluative knowledge or, depending on our preferred view, evaluative understanding. I will finish section 2 showing how this distinction allows us to move forward on the debate on the epistemology of emotion, breaking the impasse between EPE and NEPE.

A brief caveat. Talking about the epistemic role of emotion in a modest foundationalism about evaluative knowledge, I am assuming a minimal kind of realism, given that knowledge is factive. I assume that evaluative properties and facts, which are the truth makers of evaluative

[36] Another related worry with this terminology is that it may not be empirically appropriate. The worry goes by noting that, maybe, animals do not have knowledge of values, but rather efficient associative systems that allow them no navigate their environment which fall short of knowledge-producing systems. In any case, this would be just a terminological issue. Sosa's definition of animal knowledge is not an empirical claim but an epistemological one.

[37] Pritchard (2012) has argued that Gettier cases are due to two types of luck: intervening luck (e.g., Gettier original cases presented in his 1963) and environmental luck (e.g., Goldman's fake barn cases presented in his 1976).

propositions, exist. Of course, one need not presuppose robust realism about those evaluative properties and facts. It is possible that they exist in a response-dependent way. In any case, these are some uncontroversial candidates of what an evaluative property is: the admirable, the fearsome, the disgusting, etc. I am using the terminology as I found it in the debate. Tappolet, for instance, when describing her view, mentions evaluative properties as that for which the emotion is a dedicated representation. Here is Tappolet:

> On this account, emotions are claimed to have representational content. They represent their object as having specific evaluative properties. To use the medieval jargon Anthony Kenny favored (1963), the emotions' formal objects are evaluative properties. Thus, an emotion of fear with respect to a dog will be correct just in case the dog is really fearsome. In the same way, the fear that a storm is brewing will be correct just in case the brewing of a storm is really fearsome.
>
> (Tappolet 2016: 40)

1.- Are emotions epistemically akin to perception?

This is the dialectical route for this section. I will begin with a presentation of EPE's (remember, epistemic perceptualism about emotion) reasons for treating emotions as epistemically akin to perception. Then I will present NEPE's (remember, epistemic non-perceptualism about emotion) reasons against EPE, focusing on Brady's arguments (Brady 2010; 2011; 2013) and Brogaard and Chudnoff's arguments against EPE (Brogaard & Chudnoff 2017). Finally, I introduce Carter's idea of an epistemic perceptual theory of the epistemic role of emotion conceived within the framework of an *externalist*, *virtue epistemology* (Carter 2019). I contend that this virtue, externalist version of EPE can succeed where its internalist predecessors failed.

1.1.- Traditional Epistemic Perceptualism about Emotion

There are many reasons for the attractiveness of a perceptual theory of emotion. Those reasons may be divided between non-epistemic and epistemic reasons[38]. These two types of reasons are independent though they can work in tandem and offer weak support to each other.

[38] My focus in this paper is on epistemic reasons for comparing emotion with perception. For an overview on non-epistemic reasons see Tappolet (2016). Basically, she argues by analogy for the *ontological claim* that *emotions are perceptions*: emotions, like perceptions, have a rich phenomenology; emotions, like perceptions, need not require as much cognitive sophistication as beliefs or judgements and, hence, our common-sense claim that animals and babies perceive and emote are preserved; emotions, like perceptions, have intentionality whose direction of fit is mind-to-world…

That is, if emotions are, *ontologically speaking*, perceptions of value, then it is easier to accept that they *epistemically* behave like perception. The reverse is also true: if emotions *epistemically behave* like perception, then it is easier to accept that they may be, *ontologically speaking*, perceptions. It is possible, however, that emotions are a type of perception that does not epistemically behave like factual perception; or that emotion epistemically behave like factual perception without being a type of perception. EPE is just committed to the e*pistemic claim* and the reasons for it.

One of the main, if not the main, *epistemic* reason for the attractiveness of EPE, as pointed out by Carter (2019), is that, if true, it is capable of halting an epistemic regress of justification for *evaluative* belief and knowledge.

The problem of the regress of the epistemic justification is an old one: at least as old as Agrippa. According to *Agrippa's trilemma*[39], the justification of a proposition/belief is either *circular* or *dogmatic* or invites to an *infinite regress*. Fortunately, epistemologists think that Agripa's trilemma does not force us to accept a skeptical conclusion. Agrippa's trilemma is framed in a way that tries to make any foundationalism succumb to the charge of an epistemically arbitrary foundation. Now, some epistemologists think that it is possible for a belief to both (a) not be based on another belief and (b) still not be epistemically arbitrary. In this paper I assume these epistemologists are right. Some of them have devised a type of modest foundationalism (see, for instance, Sosa 2007). *Modest* because the foundation is not an infallible experience like the cartesian cogito, but a fallible, defeasible and *prima facie* foundation.

There are mainly two versions of modest foundationalism about perceptual justification: the *internalist* and the *externalist* one. Roughly, according to the former there is *some epistemic property* instantiated by the phenomenology or the internally accessible intrinsic features of certain mental states, like perception or intuitions, that make them able to

[39] Let p, q, and z be propositions in a relation of purported justification: z purportedly justifies q which purportedly justifies p. Now, one may ask, what justifies z? According to Agrippa there are only three possible answers none of which is satisfactory. One of those answers is that p justifies z, but then the justification would be *circular*: p justifies z, z justifies q, q justifies p. Another answer is that z is not justified by any other proposition, but assumed, taken for granted. However, that is not satisfactory either, because that would be a *dogmatic* move which is at odds with justification. Finally, one can invoke another proposition to justify z: z purportedly justifies q which purportedly justifies p, and z is justified by z*. Now, if one asks: what justifies z*, one should invoke another proposition z**, but then, again, the question can be iterated for z**, and so on and so forth *ad infinitum*. From the previous reasoning Agrippa's concludes that justification is impossible.

justify beliefs non-inferentially (Chudnoff 2013; Huemer 2001; Pryor 2000). For instance, the fact that perceptual experience is propositional and that that propositional content is subsumed in it in an overall experience with *presentational phenomenology* confers perception this epistemic status (Chufnoff 2013).

By contrast, according to the externalist what matters is that these beliefs are the result of a *reliable* cognitive process (Goldman 1979), which can be, for instance, a truth-conducive disposition or virtue (Sosa 2007). Thus, that the subject is aware of that process is not a necessary condition for him to know the information derived from the process. If your perceptual system functions reliably enough, that fact is sufficient for perceptual knowledge production, irrespectively of whether you know about its reliability or not.

Analogous considerations follow for the domain of the *evaluative* justification and knowledge, where the objects to be known can be understood as evaluative properties or values (e.g., the admirable, the toxic, the dangerous, etc.). Like in the case of factual knowledge, in the case of evaluative knowledge we can distinguish the internalist and the externalist version of the epistemically foundational role of emotion for evaluative knowledge and/or justified belief[40]. We find, mainly, the *reliabilist* and the *phenomenalist* as pointed out by Robert Cowan (2016) and Charlie Kurtz (2022).

In a nutshell: reliabilists claim that emotions justify evaluative judgements and actions in virtue of external reliable processes that correlate emotional experience and the presence of evaluative properties. The locus of justification is not in the emotional experience but in its reliable correlation with evaluative properties, orchestrated, for instance, by natural selection or virtue dispositions grounded in the psychology of subjects. We will see that Carter's version of EPE is a sophisticated version of externalism mixed with elements of virtue epistemology, given the insufficiency of *mere* reliability for epistemic justification. By contrast, phenomenalists claim that the locus of justification is in the emotional experience itself. The traditional version of EPE is phenomenalist.

Traditional EPE is an internalist version of modest foundationalism. Consider the following quotes by a leading perceptual theorist of emotion. You can see that she conceives

[40] Someone may consider that there are *non-derivative* alternative routes to evaluative knowledge and justification other than emotion. In the case of evaluative human knowledge, emotion seem to be the most plausible and only candidate as a source of non-derivative evaluative knowledge. Intuition may be another candidate, but much less congenial to a naturalistic approach. The aim of this paper is not to cover all the routes to evaluative knowledge. It focuses on the relation between evaluative knowledge and emotion. At least, the emotional route seems to be sufficient for evaluative knowledge and justification.

of emotions as a dogmatic experience, along the lines of perception, which would be the locus of justification for evaluative judgements, in an analogous way in which perceptual experience is the locus of justification for perceptual beliefs. She defends a version of *phenomenal dogmatism about emotion*. Here is Tappolet:

> On the basis of seeing a poppy as blue, you are prima facie justified in believing that the poppy is blue ... In the same way, it appears plausible to claim that when you feel the emotion of fear, say, this not only prompts you to believe that what you are afraid of is fearsome, but you are also prima facie justified in believing that what you are afraid of is fearsome.
>
> […]
>
> Quite generally, the justification of an evaluative belief would turn on the absence of any reason to believe that the emotion on which the belief is based is inappropriate. Consider the belief that a friend of yours is admirable. What I suggest is that your belief is justified on condition it is based on your admiration and you have no reason to distrust your admiration.

(Tappolet 2016, pp. 168-70)

Tappolet's epistemic perceptualism about emotion is the most developed in the literature. As we can see, one of her main reasons for it is that it offers a way out of the epistemic regress for evaluative knowledge providing us with a *well-grounded* evaluative knowledge or, at least, justified evaluative belief. In the next page I examine arguments against EPE devised by several NEPE authors.

1.2.- Non-Epistemic Perceptualism about Emotion, NEPE

One of the most prominent defenders of NEPE and, hence, critics of traditional EPE is Brady. In this section, I will examine Brady' arguments and Brogaard and Chudnoff's arguments against traditional EPE, concluding with the thought that *traditional EPE* is a theoretical dead end.

Brady (2010; 2011; 2013) has given several reasons to doubt that emotional dogmatism, the traditional foundationalist account about emotional epistemic role, EPE, is a plausible view.

First, unlike perceptual experience, emotional experience seems to be subjected to epistemic reasons. Whereas it would not make sense to ask a *normative* epistemic why-question regarding why you are having a certain perceptual experience, it seems to make sense to ask such a question regarding emotional experiences (see also Deonna & Teroni 2012). The only

type of why question that seems appropriate for perceptual experience is the *causal* one. For instance, if A is having an episode of fear about object O, it is appropriate for B to normatively ask A why she is fearing object O. A may answer: "because O has sharp teeth, errant behavior, etc.". By contrast, if A is having an experience as of a red apple, it does not make sense to normatively ask why she is experiencing red. A cannot answer with a list of epistemic reasons, she just can point to a possible causal process between her perceptual systems and external objects. The fact that perceptual experiences do not accept normative why-questions is also related to the fact that perceptual experiences are usually taken as *justificatory bedrock* when it comes to perceptual beliefs. The same cannot be said about emotional experience. Now, how can a mental state that is in need of justification itself be at the foundation of evaluative knowledge? The prospects of traditional EPE does not seem very promising.

Second, if phenomenal dogmatism about emotional experience were true, then, as a rule, every emotional appearance undefeated at the moment would constitute sufficient reason for the corresponding evaluative judgments and, plausibly enough, for an action intelligible in the light of that emotion[41]. However, Brady shows us how this would lead to undesired consequences. The following is a reconstruction of Brady's argument.

(5) Emotions and evaluative judgments have the same set of epistemic reasons. That is, R is an epistemic reason for an emotion if and only if R is an epistemic reason for the corresponding evaluative judgement.

(6) By interdefinibility of the biconditional in (1), it follows that: If R is an epistemic reason for an emotion, then R is an epistemic reason for the corresponding evaluative judgement and if R is an epistemic reason for an evaluative judgement, then R is an epistemic reason for the corresponding emotion.

(7) By elimination of conjunction in (2) we obtain: If R is an epistemic reason for an evaluative judgement, then R is an epistemic reason for the corresponding emotion.

(8) *Perceptualist/Dogmatist claim*: an emotion is an epistemic reason for the corresponding evaluative judgement.

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[41] Some philosophers have argued for a knowledge-norm for action (see, for instance, Williamson 2000). Emotions arguably generate and justify evaluative beliefs. When those beliefs enjoy undefeated justification and are true they may rise to the level of knowledge and, hence, the action the emotion generate may satisfy the knowledge-norm for action.

(C) An emotion is an epistemic reason for the corresponding emotion by *modus ponens* over (3) using (4).

Premises (1), (2) and (3) seem very plausible: the set of appropriate reasons for an episode of fear about object O, is the same set of reasons for the corresponding evaluative judgement about the dangerousness of O. Premise (4) is the perceptualist claim as defended by authors like Tappolet (2016). (C) follows if one jointly accepts all those premises. Now, premises (1), (2) and (3) are very plausible, so one should reject (4) in order to avoid the undesired consequence (C).

Besides, the fact that premise (1) is probably true, namely, that emotions and the corresponding evaluative judgements have the same set of reasons, makes emotions epistemically superfluous. If what justifies an emotion and the corresponding evaluative judgements are non-evaluative facts, like sharp teeth, errant behavior, etc., for, for instance, the case of fear (Deonna & Teroni 2012), then the emotion would play no role in epistemically justifying the corresponding evaluative fact. An awareness of those non-evaluative facts would suffice for justifying both the emotion and, more importantly, the corresponding evaluative judgement. We will see that only an externalist version of EPE, like Carter's view (Carter 2019), can overcome this difficulty.

Let's consider now how the traditional version of EPE can be defeated by its own lights. As we saw, the traditional EPE assumes *phenomenal dogmatism*. Phenomenal dogmatism is the view that, absent defeaters, if it seems to you that P, then you have prima facie justification for believing that P (Huemer 2001; Pryor 2000). Phenomenal dogmatists tend to understand the term "appearance" in terms of a phenomenal experience akin to a propositionally structured representation. The propositional content of, for instance, perceptual experience allows it to enter into logical relations with perceptual belief, such that perceptual experience's propositional contents can justify perceptual beliefs' propositional content.

Now, phenomenal dogmatism is a very plausible view for perceptual experience's epistemic role. One reason behind its plausibility for perceptual experience is that perceptual experience has the right kind of phenomenology. Chudnoff (2013) identifies the justificatory phenomenology the phenomenal dogmatist is looking for with *presentational phenomenology*, which is the phenomenology characteristic of perception and intuition. Those mental attitudes make a subject aware of a content, say p, and make it seem to the subject as if they make them aware of what makes p true. Here is Chudnoff (2013, p. 18):

> An experience has presentational phenomenology with respect to the proposition that p when it not only makes it seem to its subject that p, but also makes it seem to its subject as if it makes him or her aware of the very chunk of reality that makes p true.

When you have a perceptual experience of a red apple, the experience makes it seem to you that there is a red apple in your surroundings and that this *precise experience* is what makes you aware of the truth maker of the proposition that there is a red apple in your surroundings.

Is it plausible to say that emotional phenomenology also possesses presentational phenomenology? It does not seem to. Your emotional experience does not make it seem to you as if it makes you aware of the chunk of reality that makes the experience veridical (Brogaard & Chudnoff 2017). The emotion just presents the incident under a certain evaluative light but it does not seem to present the "chunk of reality" that makes that impression veridical. That is, unlike perceptual or intuitive phenomenology, emotion requires further evidence. It needs justification. Emotional phenomenology lacks a necessary element to be an epistemically justificatory kind of phenomenology, namely presentational phenomenology, or something epistemically akin to it.

All these arguments show that internalist traditional EPE is a theoretical dead end[42]. On the one hand, Brady has shown that emotions are in need of reasons themselves and hence cannot have a foundational role in our evaluative knowledge. Also that emotions cannot justify evaluative judgements on pain of circularity, given that emotions and evaluative judgements have the same set of reasons. Lastly Brady has shown that, again, given that emotions and the corresponding evaluative judgements have the same set of justifying reasons, emotions would be epistemically superfluous because the reasons for having a justified emotion would be *already* the reasons for justifying the corresponding evaluative judgement. Finally, Brogaard and Chudnoff's argument show that traditional EPE is internally inconsistent: in order for emotions to occupy a role analogous to perception, emotions must have presentational phenomenology but emotions lack presentational phenomenology.

1.3.-Carter's New Version of EPE and its plausibility

Carter (2019) has proposed a *new externalist*, *virtue* version of EPE. Two key elements of Carter's account are *generative emotional skill* and *doxastic emotional skill*.

[42] There have been recent attempts to save traditional EPE. See for instance Mitchell (2017). For critical discussion on Mitchell's ideas to save traditional EPE see Álvarez-González (2023).

Generative emotional skill is an ability possessed by the emoter that takes the form of a function that takes as input the presence of value in the world and offers as output the appropriate emotion. If a subject has the generative emotional skill of fear, then, under normal circumstances, if the subject acknowledges some danger in her surroundings, then her emotional system *generates* fear more often than not.

Doxastic emotional skill is an ability possessed by the emoter that takes the form of a function that takes as input the output of the previous function and offers a corresponding justified evaluative belief. Following with the previous example: once generative emotional skill has provided the emoter with a fear which is the product of a reliable disposition, doxastic emotional skill produces, *on the basis* of that fear, a justified evaluative belief according to which the intentional object of the fear, let's say a predator, is *dangerous.*

These two skills work in tandem to guarantee that emotion can play a foundational role in our knowledge of the evaluative domain. Generative emotional *skill* is needed because mere reliable correlation between emotions and values is not sufficient for emotion's having the foundational justificatory role EPE want it to have. Carter invites us to consider the case of a subject whose emotions veridically represent every evaluative property she encounters in the world. Now, the reliability is not due to an *ability of the subject* but rather to a benevolent demon who, unbeknownst to her, takes care of making the subject an accurate emoter. The intuition goes that in that case the subject is not justified in taking her emotions at face value. They are not the result of her abilities, they are not an *epistemic achievement attributable to her*, and epistemic attributability seems to be necessary for justification.

Now, generative emotional skill is necessary but not sufficient for emotional justification. It needs to be supplemented with doxastic emotional skill. Both are jointly necessary and sufficient for emotional justification. Why is generative emotional skill not sufficient for emotional justification? It is not sufficient because we can devise another demonic scenario in which the emoter has a perfect generative emotional skill but fails to base their evaluative beliefs on it. Rather unbeknownst to the subject another benevolent demon* cause her to have the corresponding evaluative judgements. In this case, again, the intuition goes that the subject is not justified in taking the judgements *apparently* based on her emotions at face value. They are not the result of *her abilities*; they are not an *epistemic achievement attributable to her* and, again, epistemic attributability seems to be necessary for justification.

Besides, without the intervention of the demons her emotions and judgements would be reliably inaccurate.

Let me reconstruct Carter's proposal in a more compact format. I propose we call this formulation *virtue realiabilism about evaluative knowledge* (VREK). The biconditional that follows, which presents a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, is my reconstruction of Carter's ideas. After offering this compact reconstruction, (VREK), I will examine how it can face the problems NEPE has pointed out to traditional internalist versions of EPE. Carter himself has not developed how his view would fare against this kind of criticism by NEPE. Carter's aim in his 2019 was to provide a well-founded foundationalism about evaluative knowledge and not to answer NEPE's criticism against the traditional version of EPE, neither to give a complete description of emotion's epistemic contribution to human evaluative knowledge. That said, let's formulate (VREK) and then see how it deal with NEPE's objections.

(VREK) A normal human H has a non-derivatively, externally justified evaluative belief B about object O in environment E *if and only if*

i. H is in E and one has emotional generative skill and doxastic generative skill,
ii. H's emotional generative and doxastic skills are seated in H's nature (at a psychologically or neural level, for instance),
iii. H's emotional generative and doxastic skills are virtuous, i.e., virtuously reliable, when emotional generative skill non-deviantly causally interacts with O and emotional doxastic skill non-deviantly causally interacts with emotional generative skill's result after its non-deviant causal interaction with O,
iv. B is the result of one's non-deviant exercise of one's reliable emotional generative and doxastic skills, and
v. B does not derive from memory, intuition, testimony or an inferential process.

Conditions i-v are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for having a *non-derivatively, externally justified* evaluative belief B about object O in environment E. There are other ways of acquiring justified evaluative beliefs, as we will see, but they would involve memory, testimony or inferential processes, paths ruled out by condition v. Intuition may be possible a non-derivative source for evaluative knowledge, but it is certainly not congenial with a naturalistic approach and including it would raise more questions than answers. Evaluative

justified beliefs acquired by those other means (memory, testimony and/or inferential processes) would not be *non-derivatively* justified[43].

Now we have a new version of EPE, VREK, that can overcome all the difficulties that the traditional EPE faces. Let's see how.

The objection that emotions are as much in need of justification as evaluative judgements are. Recall that the objection to traditional EPE was this: whereas it would not make sense to ask a *normative* why-question regarding why you are having a certain perceptual experience, it seems to make sense to ask such a question regarding emotional experiences. Perceptual experiences only admit causal why-questions because they are ideally caused by what they represent, but there are not normative reasons for perceiving. If emotions are in need of justification, how can they perform a foundational epistemic role?

For the internalist, the question of being justified in taking your emotions as justified and the question for the justification of your emotions collapse: your emotions are justified if and only if you are aware of the reasons that justify them. For Carter's version of EPE, these are different questions and you can answer one in the affirmative and the other in the negative. You may have justified emotions as long as you have a generative emotional skill, even if you are not aware of the reasons that justify your emotions. Under this perspective, that you have internally accessible reasons for your emotions is not as important for justification as the fact that your emotions are the manifestation of a truth-conducive disposition seated in your psychological constitution.

The objection that emotions would be problematically self-justifying. Recall the objection: emotions and evaluative judgments have the same set of reasons. That is, something is a reason R for an evaluative judgement if and only if R is a reason for the corresponding emotion. Thus, if an emotion is a reason for an evaluative judgement, then the emotion is a reason for itself, which makes the emotion circularly self-justifying. That result is really implausible so, the objection goes, we should get rid of the idea that emotions can play a foundational epistemic role.

[43] In the case of memory and testimony, it is controversial whether the justification acquired would be derivative. At least, in *a sense*, the justification acquired by means of them is derivative. Testimony needs to rely on other's non-derivative epistemic faculties or other's derivative faculties dependent on non-derivative faculties *themselves*. Memory needs to rely on the past use of one's other epistemic faculties which would be either non-derivative faculties or would depend on non-derivative ones *themselves*. Both memory and testimony derive their contents from other sources. In that sense, memory and testimony are derivative.

Now Carter's new version of EPE can face this objection easily. Traditional EPE conceives the justification of emotion in internalist terms. Thus, an emotion would be justified for its subject if and only if she is able to access the set of reason that justifies it and, accordingly to the abovementioned biconditional, its corresponding evaluative judgement. Now, within Carter's framework, an emoter would be justified in taking her emotions at face value as long as they are the result of cognitive-emotive virtues seated in her psychology/nervous system. It is not required that the subject can access internally those reasons, it is sufficient that she has those skills and is in the right conditions. Thus, emotions would not be self-justifying in the sense mentioned by Brady, which plays with an internalist notion of justification. In this externalist framework, emotion's justification has not to do with reasons but with being appropriately produced by the relevant skills of the subject and, hence, Brady's objection is not applicable to Carter's version of EPE.

The objection that emotions lack the proper type of phenomenology to play a foundational role. What is important for Carter's modest version of evaluative foundationalism is that externally justified and fitting emotions, generated through the subject's emotional generative skill, figure in the aetiology of an evaluative belief connected to it by the subject's emotional doxastic ability. Then, and only then, we can say that that judgement is justified by the corresponding emotions and that the corresponding emotion is a *regress stoper*, given its appropriate formation. The phenomenology of the emotion, presentational or not, does not play any epistemic role in the justification of the evaluative judgement or, better, it plays a role to the extent that it is appropriately produced by the subject's generative and doxastic skills.

The objection that emotions have the same set reasons as evaluative judgements and, for that reason, emotions would be epistemically superfluous for the justification of the corresponding evaluative judgements. This is perhaps the most difficult objection a defender of traditional EPE must deal with. Though in his original paper Carter (2019) does not comment on this objection and how his account can face it, I will argue here that only an account along the lines of his account can overcome this recalcitrant difficulty for traditional EPE. How? Let me elaborate on it. However, first, recall the objection: the fact that emotions and the corresponding evaluative judgements have the same set of reasons makes emotions epistemically superfluous. If a subject has a set of non-circular reasons R for her evaluative judgment J and, hence, for her emotion E, then E would not do any epistemic work in regard to the justification of J.

How can Carter's version of EPE overcome this recalcitrant difficulty for traditional EPE? It may be that emotions and evaluative judgements have the same set of reasons when you conceive reasons *in internalist terms*. So, in an internalist sense, the subject's reasons for her fear about O are the same reasons for her evaluative judgements about O's dangerousness. In the *internalist-perceptualist* framework emotions are epistemically superfluous. However, this is not the case in the *externalist-perceptualist* framework provided by Carter.

Recall that in Carter's story emotions are justified and fitting when they are the result of the exercise of emotional generative skill. Recall also that when doxastic emotional skill takes emotional generative skill's output as input, a justified evaluative belief is generated. There may be other ways of acquiring justified evaluative judgements more congenial to the internalist notion of justification as Brady (2013) himself rightly acknowledges: experience informs us of what is a reason for the justification of an evaluative judgement and for the corresponding emotion (e.g., experience inform us that a dog with sharp teeth and errant behavior is a reason for fear and for the judgement that the dog is dangerous). In any case, besides these internalist routes to justified evaluative judgements there is also the externalist route offered by the reliability of the emotional skills offered by Carter.

Deonna and Teroni have acknowledged (Deonna & Teroni 2015) that there are two routes to justified evaluative judgements, the emotional and the non-emotional one. Thus, Deonna and Teroni say that a justified emotion is *sufficient* for a justified evaluative judgement, though *not a necessary condition* for it. You can arrive at a justified evaluative judgement by derivative non-emotional means like the conscious recognition of reasons for it and some inferential processes. Now we have a way of epistemically substantiating Deonna and Teroni's point: Carter's one. It can explain how, even if emotions have the same set of reasons than evaluative judgements, conceived in internalist terms, emotions can be *sufficient* reasons for those evaluative judgements, when reasons are conceived in externalist terms. Thus, emotions are *external reasons* for evaluative judgements and when those emotions are produced by the proper generative skill and paired with an evaluative judgement by the proper doxastic skill, then those emotions suffice for the justification of the corresponding evaluative judgement, yielding, if true, evaluative knowledge.

It seems that the externalist version of EPE devised by Carter is immune to the objections traditional EPE faces. We will see that this version of EPE is not only compatible with the insights offered by NEPE but also a complement to them when it comes to fleshing

out the whole epistemic role emotions play. Indeed, if there were an objection to be made against Carter's version of EPE is that it cannot give an account of the *reflexive* evaluative knowledge experienced by adult human beings. A child's episodes of fear may produce apt evaluative belief, but if the child lacks an epistemic perspective on her emotion, her experiences of fear would not be reflectively apt. When the child is able to reflect on her emotions and their epistemic function and accuracy, she would be in a position to acquire not only animal evaluative knowledge from them, but also reflective evaluative knowledge.

In other words, *reflection* plays no role in Carter's framework. If we take Carter's version as exhausting the contribution of emotions to evaluative knowledge we would be left with no resources to account for a distinctive human epistemic achievement: reflective emotion and reflective evaluative judgements on the light of the former. For that reason, I claim that Carter's analysis of the epistemic role of emotion is right but incomplete. It should be enriched and complemented by the Sosian-inspired distinction between *evaluative animal knowledge* and *evaluative reflective knowledge*. We need a reflective perspective on Carter's *virtue reliabilism*, we need a *virtue perspectivism* on emotion.

1.4.- Conclusion to section 1

The case of phenomenal dogmatism about perceptual experience is controversial but much less controversial than its emotional analogue. I think what traditional EPE is after, a well-grounded evaluative knowledge is a desideratum. So, it is just natural that they persist in finding a way to articulate it satisfactorily. However, given their internalist commitments, they are not going to succeed, or so I conjecture. We have seen that the internalist version of EPE is formidably challenged by NEPE's criticism. Though the reasons are not conclusive, it seems that the internalist assumptions of traditional EPE make it implausible.

The theoretical desire for a well-grounded evaluative knowledge is an important one. Carter's externalist, virtue-reliabilist version of EPE promises to fulfil this desire avoiding the drawbacks traditional EPE faces. Indeed, Carter's new version is not only compatible with NEPE's insights but also needs to be complemented by them if we want to account for the role of reflection in *human evaluative knowledge*. In the next section I put together these two types of insight (the externalist one, characteristic of Carter's version of EPE, and the internalist one,

characteristic of NEPE). To do so I will borrow Sosa distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. With this Sosa-inspired bi-level epistemology of evaluative belief and knowledge we can accommodate the desire for a foundationalist structure within the domain of evaluative knowledge but also give a place to reflection in it. What is more, we can break the theoretical impasse between epistemic perceptualism about emotion and epistemic non-perceptualist that has dominated the philosophical discussion on the epistemic role of emotion for the last two decades.

2.- Emotion, Animal and Reflective Evaluative Knowledge

2.1.- Human knowledge: Animal and Reflective

Sosa characterized for the first time[44] his distinction between animal and reflective knowledge in his "Knowledge and Intellectual virtue". There he writes:

> One has *animal knowledge* about one's environment, one's past, and one's own experience if one's judgments and beliefs about these are direct responses to their impact – e.g., through perception or memory – with little or no benefit of reflection or understanding.
>
> One has *reflective knowledge* if one's judgment or belief manifests not only such direct response to the fact known but also understanding of its place in a wider whole that includes one's belief and knowledge of it and how these come about.
>
> (Sosa 1985).

Animal knowledge is understood as the output of reliabilist virtues or capacities when their input is appropriate and occurs under proper conditions, without the need that the epistemic subject understands those capacities and their appropriate relation with the world. Animal knowledge is *apt belief* (belief that is accurate *because* adroit), that manifests the reliability/virtue of the, say, perceptual systems that produce it. Reflective knowledge is *animal knowledge about animal knowledge*, that is, second-order animal knowledge. If one has reflective knowledge that p, then one knows that one knows p. That is, when one reflectively knows, one has an apt second-order belief about one's knowledge that manifests the reliability/virtue of the, say, reflective system that produce it. The passage from animal to reflective knowledge is a case of *epistemic ascent*.

[44] The latest formulation of this insightful distinction can be found in Sosa's *Epistemic Explanations* (2021). Though Sosa has added more details and nuances to the distinction, its core meaning has remained unchanged.

In recent years, Sosa has argued that the second-order level in which reflective knowledge occurs can guide the formation of reliable first-order beliefs (Sosa 2015). That is, I may reliably form, through a perceptual system in good shape and in the proper circumstances, the unreflective belief that there is a computer in front of me, which, if true, would amount to *animal knowledge*. Now, I may consciously judge that if I form the belief that there is a computer in front of me, then that belief would be apt given my awareness of the reliability of my perceptual system and my awareness of my good epistemic situation. So, I consciously form a belief which, in those circumstances and if true, amounts not to animal knowledge but to *reflective* knowledge.

Some authors have doubted that the notion of reflective knowledge is internally well-construed for several reasons. Stephen Grimm (2001), for instance, has argued that reflection, the mark of reflective knowledge, may be pernicious for the epistemic subject. Reflecting on something which I already animally know introduces possibilities of error that were not there, turning knowledge into ignorance. If, for instance, after reflection it seems to me that there is a contradiction where there is none, then reflection has impoverished my epistemic status. Hilary Kornblith (2002) has pointed out to the fact that the power of reflection is not that astonishing as Sosa suggests: the amount of beliefs on which I can reflect, given my cognitive resources, is certainly limited. I would not go far if I had to rely on reflection to enhance the reliability of my knowledge.

As a way of keeping Sosa's insights on a genuinely human cognitive activity, reflection and its fruit, but avoiding its drawbacks, some authors have proposed to consider that the output of reflection is not reflective knowledge but understanding (see, for instance, Grimm 2001). Understanding has some features that contrast with knowledge. Understanding, unlike knowledge, is *non-factive*: if I know *p*, then *p*, but if I understand *p* it does not follow that *p*. Understanding, unlike knowledge, is necessarily *holistic* and *deep*: I can have atomic knowledge of p, but I cannot have atomic understanding of p. Understanding is deep, that is, it requires some kind of coherent explanation: to understand fact *p* is to grasp how *p* relates to other propositions. Taking understanding, instead of reflective knowledge, to be the fruit of reflection would avoid the previous problems. Understanding requires reflection and reflection may be fallible, but given that understanding is not knowledge, failing to understand would not amount to failing to know. Understanding may enhance the reliability of our knowledge, but it is not the only, neither the most effective, route for such purpose.

This is not the place to adjudicate who is right, whether it is Sosa or his critics. All the distinctions and assertions made in this paper can be adapted to both positions. Whether what we humans have is animal and reflective knowledge or just animal knowledge and understanding, the fact is that we can have the same in the evaluative domain. Indeed, by making these distinctions we can learn what are the different epistemic achievements about the evaluative domain that one can attain. As we will see, one can achieve evaluative animal knowledge when one unreflectively relies on her reliable emotional generative and doxastic skills, as pointed out by Carter (2019). However, this is not all that one can epistemically achieve in the evaluative domain. One can also attain evaluative reflective knowledge and/or evaluative understanding, when one knows that one's emotions are justified and, hence, besides forming evaluative beliefs on the basis of them, one also makes conscious justified evaluative judgements.

In the next sections I will draw these distinctions in detail and, after that, I will show how they allow not only to describe the epistemic contribution of emotion to the human mental economy but also to break the dialectical impasse between EPE and NEPE.

2.2.- Emotion, animal and reflective evaluative knowledge/evaluative understanding

Recall the quotes abovementioned in which animal and reflective knowledge were respectively characterised. Now, let me propose an analogous characterization for *human evaluative knowledge*, substituting "animal knowledge about one's environment, one's past, and one's own experience", "reflective knowledge", "fact known" and "perception or memory" for "animal *evaluative* knowledge about one's axiological predicament", "reflective *evaluative* knowledge", "*evaluative* fact known" and "*emotion*", respectively. Thus, we obtain:

> One has *animal evaluative knowledge about one's axiological predicament* if one's judgments and beliefs about it are direct responses to its impact – e.g., through *emotion* – with little or no benefit of reflection or understanding.
>
> One has *reflective evaluative knowledge* if one's judgment or belief manifests not only such direct response to the *evaluative fact* known but also understanding of its place in a wider whole that includes one's belief and knowledge of it and how these come about.

With this characterization at hand let me explain how we can now integrate both EPE's and NEPE's contribution to the analysis of the epistemic role of emotion. Basically, if we construe EPE along the lines of Carter's proposal we have a story to tell about how emotions can yield animal evaluative knowledge directly. Their impact *produces* evaluative beliefs that are justified and may constitute animal evaluative knowledge to the extent that those beliefs are the result of the subject emotional doxastic skill when she takes as input the outputs produced by her well-functioning emotional generative skill. Thus, the subject is justified in believing that object O is dangerous when that belief is causally produced by his emotions with the intervention of the subject's well-functioning emotional generative and doxastic skills.

As we saw in the previous section, none of the traditional criticisms to EPE apply to our new version of it. A justified emotion when properly produced and paired with the appropriate doxastic attitude is sufficient for the justification of the corresponding evaluative judgement. The evaluative belief thus achieved need not be conscious and, given than consciousness is a necessary condition for reflection, reflective. Neither is it required that the subject is aware of the process of formation of her evaluative belief. At this point, we are still at the animal epistemic level.

We, humans, are reflective creatures and we reflect on our own mental states. We have meta-mental states. We are able of epistemic ascent. We are able of a *epistemic perspective* over our own mental states. This capacity allows us to aspire to intellectual achievements other than animal knowledge. Also, in the evaluative domain. Thus, Carter's conception of EPE is not sufficient to capture the whole contribution emotions can make to evaluative knowledge.

What happens when a subject is *happy* about *p* and she is justified in thinking that her emotion is justified and, hence, makes a conscious evaluative judgement according to which p is *goal congruent*? We have reflective evaluative knowledge when, and only when, our emotions and the corresponding evaluative judgments are accompanied by an *understanding* of how they come about and of how those emotions appropriately, externally tracked the set of reasons that now, under reflection, are internally available, being their internal availability what also brings, under reflection, a greater confidence in the corresponding evaluative judgements. When this kind of reflection is virtuously applied, one knows that p is goal congruent, but one also knows that one knows that p is goal congruent. One has thus acquired evaluative reflective knowledge.

At this point a possible objection that has been lurking reappears: emotion's epistemic superfluousness. In this new scenario, it runs as follows: if, as noted by Brady (2013), an emotion and its corresponding evaluative judgement/belief have the same set of justifying

reasons, then; if one is aware of the epistemic reasons that justify one's emotion, then one is also aware of the epistemic reasons that justify the corresponding evaluative judgement. If it is *this set of epistemic reasons* what does the justificatory role for the evaluative judgement, then the emotion is irrelevant and is not involved in the production of evaluative *reflective* knowledge. If what justifies an emotion and the corresponding evaluative judgements is the mere awareness of non-evaluative facts, like sharp teeth, errant behavior, etc., for, for instance, the case of fear (Deonna & Teroni 2012), then the emotion would play no role in epistemically justifying the corresponding evaluative fact. The objection is even harder than it was because *at the reflective level* we supposedly have access to the epistemic reasons that justify our emotions and evaluative judgements and, hence, we do not need the emotion to have a justified evaluative judgement.

This objection is not so devastating for our bi-level evaluative epistemology. First, emotions are not superfluous at the epistemic animal level. As we saw when we analyzed Carter's proposal, emotions do produce and justify evaluative belief yielding, in the best cases, animal evaluative knowledge. Second, there is a way out of this problem even at the reflective level.

We cannot reflect all the time on whether this or that particular emotion is justified. We do not examine all the epistemic reasons that we have for holding this or that particular judgement. That would be too costly. Indeed, even at the reflective level, we do not examine our emotions and evaluative judgements case by case. We do not form our reflective evaluative judgements always on the basis of considerations about the non-evaluative reasons that would justify them.

What is more plausible is that we arrive at certain inductive generalizations about the accuracy of our emotional system of the sort "my emotional system's outputs are well aligned with my evaluative situation, because it seems that every time there was a danger or a goal-congruent event I have felt the relevant emotions". *It is the accurate emotion* (generated by my virtuous generative emotional skill) *plus the corresponding evaluative belief that would be based on the emotion* (generated by my virtuous doxastic emotional skill) *plus the justified true second-order belief about the accuracy of the first-order evaluative belief thus formed* what gives us evaluative reflective knowledge, assuming that no intervention or environmental luck undermines the epistemic status of the belief thus formed.

An example: imagine that I feel admiration towards a friend's stoic attitude in the face of a great personal loss for her and that I form the corresponding evaluative belief that she is admirable based on that experience. Imagine further that she is indeed admirable and that my emotion is produced by my reliable generative emotional skill and my evaluative belief by my reliable emotional doxastic skill. If I did not reflect on my emotional system or haven't reflected on it in the past, then all I would get is animal evaluative knowledge. Now if I add to that emotion, reliably produced by my generative doxastic skill, and to the corresponding evaluative belief, reliably produced by my doxastic emotional skill, a meta-belief about the reliability of my evaluative beliefs thus formed, then I would have, on the proviso that there is no intervening or environmental luck, evaluative reflective knowledge.

The emotion, then, *does* contribute to our evaluative knowledge in the same way in which it contributes to our animal evaluative knowledge, but with a difference. In the reflective level something else apart from the emotion's contribution to our animal evaluative knowledge is needed, namely: a justified true belief about the accuracy of our emotional system and its outputs. Accurate emotions plus justified true beliefs about their reliability suffice for yielding justified reflective evaluative judgements that in turn would yield, in the best cases, evaluative reflective knowledge.

Of course, we could also achieve that evaluative reflective knowledge going case by case, that is, considering case by case our non-evaluative reasons for holding this or that evaluative judgement and, consequently, the claim that this or that emotion is warranted. This is an alternative way that would also suffice, if our beliefs are non-deviantly true and justified, for reflective evaluative knowledge. That there is this non-emotional alternative path entails that emotions are *not* necessary (thought they are sufficient when paired with appropriate inductive generalizations) for justified evaluative judgments. However, that emotions are not necessary for the justification of evaluative judgments does not entail that emotions are epistemically superfluous. Simply, there are two possible routes towards reflective evaluative knowledge, as pointed out by Deonna and Teroni (2012a): the emotional one and the non-emotional one. None of these routes would be individually necessary for evaluative knowledge though both are individually sufficient[45].

[45] It seems however, that emotions are the only non-derivative source of evaluative knowledge (as indicated in the biconditional that describes Carter's proposal, VREK, in this paper in pages 11-2). Even if you can know everything you know by emotion by means of non-emotional means, the latter would always seem to entail derivative routes to knowledge: inference, reflection, etc.

2.3.-A way out of the impasse

If everything said above is correct, then we have a way out of the impasse that has marked the last decade of the philosophical debate around the epistemic nature of emotion. How so? First, recall our conclusions so far: the externalist version of EPE devised by Carter is immune to the objections traditional EPE faces; this version of EPE is indeed compatible with and needs to be complemented by the internalist insights offered by NEPE; these compatibility and complementarity can be modelled by means of our distinction between animal emotions, which produce when justified and fitting, animal evaluative knowledge and reflective emotions, which produce when justified and fitting, reflective evaluative knowledge.

From these conclusions a further one follows: at least some versions of EPE, the virtue externalist one, and the NEPE thesis are not incompatible with each other. For the reasons given in section 1, our conjecture was that traditional versions of EPE could never overcome NEPE's criticism of them. Now, traditional EPE has an important insight to teach us: a foundationalist structure for evaluative knowledge is possible and desirable. But to fulfill that theoretical enterprise we need to switch to an externalist version of EPE which models the animal knowledge emotions give us and that is also compatible, and needs to be complemented, with the internalist notion of evaluative reflective justification and knowledge that NEPE is right in vindicating as part of or human evaluative knowledge. Impasse broken.

Conclusion

In this paper I have defended the following thesis: that the externalist version of EPE devised by Carter is immune to the objections traditional internalist EPE faces; that this version of EPE is indeed compatible with, and need to be complemented by, the insights offered by NEPE; that these compatibility and complementarity can be modelled by means of our distinction between *animal emotions*, which produce in the best cases and when justified and fitting, *animal evaluative knowledge,* and *reflective emotions*, which produce in the best cases and when justified and fitting, *reflective evaluative knowledge*/*evaluative understanding*; finally, that reflective emotions are not epistemically superfluous at the reflective level, to the extent that we can have second-order beliefs about the first-order evaluative beliefs formed through emotions, that is, to the extent that we have an *epistemic perspective* on the accuracy of our own first-order emotions and evaluative beliefs.

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Summary

Emotions are intrinsically and extrinsically interesting. On the one hand, they are *intrinsically* interesting because they are part of our mental economy standing in relations to other mental states (e.g., the belief that I am in danger and the emotion of fear, the satisfaction of a desire and the experience of joy, etc.) and actions (e.g., the emotion of admiration and emulative behaviour, the emotion of disgust and avoidance behaviour, etc.). As an important part of our psychological inventory, they play an explanatory role, at least a partial one, in explaining and justifying our mental and physical actions and behaviour. On the other hand, emotions are extrinsically interesting as evidenced by their appearance in many philosophical debates. In chapters 1 and 2, I have contributed to give an answer to this question: what are the *primitive*, in the sense of being *fundamental*, types of mental experiences that constitute the human stream of consciousness? I did so by answering this particular sub-question: *is emotional phenomenology a fundamental or derivative type of phenomenology?* My result was that emotional phenomenology is primitive or fundamental in the sense described in those chapters. This result was acquired through different but complementary methods, like the application of a *phenomenal contrast* and focusing on a case study, *fiction*, where emotions behave in ways that are illuminating vis-á-vis their nature. In chapter 3, I have explored a new puzzle for the relation between emotion and rationality. Emotional experience seems to be dogmatic, in a certain sense, and hypothetic, in a certain sense, at the same time. I have explored whether this apparently contradictory feature of emotional phenomenology is compatible with rationality. My answer is that emotions and rationality are compatible and that the tension can be solved once one realizes that emotions are *pragmatically dogmatic* but *epistemically hypothetic*. In chapter 4 of this dissertation, I have explored the epistemic nature of emotion. Particularly, I have proposed a way out of the dialectical impasse between perceptualist and non-perceptualist, using Ernest Sosa's idea of *animal* and *reflective* knowledge. I have proposed a similar distinction for the epistemic role of emotion, concluding that perceptualism and non-perceptualism do not disagree with each other, they are just offering an analysis of different *epistemic achievements*, which have *different epistemic statuses* and *different epistemic requirements*.