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**The development of family policies
in a familist welfare state: the Spanish case, 1900-1958**

Guillem Verd Llabrés



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
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PhD in Economic History

Thesis Title

The development of family policies in a familist welfare state: the Spanish case, 1900-1958

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Introduction

From the 1970s and with more intensity during the last decades, family policies have received increasing attention from academic researchers and policymakers, becoming one of the areas of social spending with the fastest growth within the OECD countries (Daly and Ferragina 2017, 255).¹ Policies like generous parental leaves, family allowances and universal childcare services have been found crucial to improving child welfare (Boling 2015), reducing inequalities within and between families (Nieuwenhuis, Need, and van der Kolk 2019; Van Winkle 2020), influencing work-family balance and female labour force participation (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013), fighting poverty (Pressman 2014) and increasing fertility rates (Esping-Andersen 2009). Furthermore, by shaping women's capabilities in the family and the labour market, family policies are essential in improving or worsening gender equality (Daly 2020; Bahle 2008; Esping-Andersen 2007; Korpi 2000; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017; Lewis 2002). Consequently, family policy development is becoming increasingly relevant to comparative, typological welfare state research (Daly 2020; Van Winkle 2020; Eydal and Rostgaard 2018b; Nieuwenhuis, Need, and van der Kolk 2019; Flaquer 2000; Kamerman and Kahn 1978; Gauthier 2018; Lynch 2006).

¹ In this thesis, I define family policies as 'the cash and service benefits for dependent children as well as for their parents in order to provide financial as well as care support' (Eydal and Rostgaard 2018b, 2) (see Chapter 1).

In explaining cross-country differences in such a development, the literature emphasises the role of many different factors, such as Left-wing organisations (Esping-Andersen 1999; Korpi 2000; Wennemo 1992), Catholicism and religious competition (Morgan 2009; Manow and Van Kersbergen 2009; Van Kersbergen 1995), feminist movements (O'Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999; Koven and Michel 1993a), institutional legacies (Castles 1993), and long-term family formation (Bahle 2008). Most of these elements give in-depth historical research a fundamental role in disentangling family policy changes and regularities. As Boling (2015, 6) argues, building comprehensive explanations requires confronting 'the historical, institutional and ideological barriers to passing and enforcing exemplary policies'.

Moreover, family policies were central to early welfare state formation. Starting from the late 19th Century, declining fertility rates, high infant mortality rates, child poverty, and massive human losses resulting from the World Wars increased demographic concerns among policymakers and social reformers (Gauthier 1996). To countervail what was perceived as a 'crisis of the family', most European countries developed public provisions to reinforce the male breadwinner family model, with paid maternity leaves and family allowances being among the most significant (Gauthier 1996; Therborn 2004; Montanari 2000). Maternity leave originated as a progressive development of protective labour laws, particularly the prohibition of women's postnatal paid work, and by compensating for income losses and childbirth expenses, it became the first work-family policy (Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017). Furthermore, family allowances were implemented as a public-sponsored alternative to meet the demands for family wages (Pedersen 1995). As a result, most European countries passed these legislations by the end of World War II. Nonetheless, this period also led to different policy models, influencing family policy development during the second half of the 20th Century (Daly and Ferragina 2017; Gauthier 1996; Boling 2015; Pedersen 1995).

Thus, disentangling the historical origins of such differences appears crucial not only to understand policy foundations but also to comprehend the long-term institutional, economic and cultural constraints of family policy change. On this point, authors like Quine (2003) have compared how interwar dictatorships and liberal democracies responded to the population issue during the interwar period. Other comparative (Bock

and Thane 1996a; Koven and Michel 1993b; Pedersen 1995; Naldini 2003; Gauthier 1996; Valiente 1997; Misra 1998) and case studies (Voegeli 2003; Mouton 2007; Lewis 1994; Quirin 2014; Cousins 1999; Seccombe 1986; see also Bock and Thane 1996b; Koven and Michel 1993a) have shown how different European States became more interventionist regarding the family throughout the first half of the 20th Century due to the pressure of diverse interest groups. All these studies make valuable contributions to our knowledge about the different strategies the European States followed to support (normative, male-breadwinner) families. However, few of them focus specifically on how, when and under which model family policies —particularly maternity leaves and family allowances— were formed, and even fewer connect those findings with the welfare state comparative literature.

This thesis provides an in-depth, historical analysis of family policy formation by taking the development of Spanish maternity leaves and family allowances from 1900 to 1960 as a case study and approaching it from a European comparative perspective. Along with Portugal and Italy, Spain is usually considered a representative country of the Southern European Welfare Regime (Ferrera 1996; Flaquer 2004; Naldini 2003; León and Guillén 2011; Sarasa and Moreno 1995). These countries are currently characterised by a low development of family policies and substantial insider/outsider differences in access to social policies (Ferrera 1996; Espuelas 2013a; Sarasa and Moreno 1995; Valiente 1996; Meil 2006; Pérez-Caramés 2014). As a result, the family remains the welfare provider in the first instance. In explaining this policy gap, several authors emphasise the role of long-term historical factors such as the late and incomplete industrialisation, authoritarian tradition and political patronage, State softness, Catholic dominance, extended family and political polarisation (Espuelas 2013a; Ferrera 1996; Giner 1995; Sarasa and Moreno 1995; León and Guillén 2011). However, the historical roots of these elements remain largely unexplored.

Furthermore, although family policies are currently underdeveloped in Southern European welfare states, they significantly shaped their early social policies (Naldini 2003; Carolo and Pereirinha 2010). In Spain, paid maternity leave was implemented in 1931 as the country's second compulsory social insurance, only preceded by the 1919 pension system (Pons 2010). Family allowances emerged in 1938 as a third compulsory

social policy, becoming the flagship of the Francoist social policies during the 1940s and the 1950s (Espuelas 2013a; Molinero 2005; Meil 2006). In fact, some authors point out that the backlash against Francoist family policies was a significant factor in explaining the abandonment of family policies after the Spanish Democratic Transition (Ayuso and Bascón2021; Pérez-Caramés 2014; Valiente 1996). Therefore, investigating the origins of Spanish family policies remains essential to explain this policy shift.

Authoritarian legacies and the influence of Catholicism have often been associated with the particular development of the Southern European Welfare regimes. As in Portugal and Italy, Spanish political history in the 20th Century was shaped by the conservative dictatorships of Primo de Rivera (1923-1931) and Franco (1939-1977).² However, Spain also experienced a democratic period under the Spanish Second Republic (1931-1936). These regime changes are relevant in explaining social policy development (Espuelas 2017; Vilar and Pons 2019; Pons and Vilar 2012). On the other hand, this was a period of heated religious conflicts between Catholics and anti-Catholics. Although religion (Montero 2004) and regime changes (Espuelas 2017) were influential in shaping social policy formation, few studies have systematically addressed how they conditioned the development of Spanish family policies.

Spanish social policy history has emphasised ideological and demographic factors in explaining the origins of family policies. Indeed, some studies highlight that early welfare reforms were embedded with the male breadwinner ideology (Nielfa 2004; 2003; Arbaiza 2000; Borderías 2007). As in other countries, they were largely a response to high infant mortality rates and the perception of a 'crisis of the family'. Therefore, early family policies implied a redefinition of maternity as a social function that had to be protected (Cenarro 2016; Blasco 2016). Such ideal intensified during the Francoist dictatorship, as it was consistent with the regime's Catholic and Falangist (Spanish Fascist) ideology and as a response to massive human losses in the Spanish Civil War (Molinero 2005; González and Ortiz 2017; Espuelas 2013a; Guillén 1997; Meil 2006;

² For simplicity's purposes, the thesis considers the broadest chronological ranges for both dictatorships. Thus, Primo de Rivera's dictatorship was technically succeeded by Dámaso Berenguer's 'soft dictatorship' (*Dictablanda*) from 1930 to 1931, but the political regime did not change substantially until 1931 (after the proclamation of the Spanish Second Republic). Similarly, although Francisco Franco died in 1975, the political regime did not completely change until the first democratic general election in 1977.

Nash 1996; Valiente 1997; Gracia 2010). Yet, other authors emphasise that, despite the underlying ideology, Spanish family policy models and timing responded more to complex distributional conflicts between social groups, labour market factors, and institutional constraints (Vega 2007; Bengoechea 2007; Pons and Vilar 2014; Espuelas 2022).

This thesis aims to integrate both perspectives to understand, from a European, long-term perspective, the political economy of early Spanish family policies. The thesis organises in three independent but interrelated chapters, plus a concluding section. Chapter 1 undertakes a comparative reconstruction of Western European family policies from 1880 to 1960. Chapter 2 investigates the political economy of the Spanish paid maternity leave (1900-1944), and Chapter 3 does the same with the Spanish family allowances (1926-1958).

Chapter 1, *'Emerging worlds of welfare familism: the development of family policies in Western European Countries, 1880-1960'*, presents the first systematic comparison of the development of European family policies up to 1960, and it is also the first step to frame the Spanish case within the European context. Although several long-term historical factors have been emphasised in explaining cross-country differences in early European family policies, systematic comparative investigations on the topic remain scarce, mainly due to data availability (Gauthier 2018; Lohmann and Zagel 2018; Daly and Ferragina 2017). This chapter compares the formation of maternity leaves and family allowances across Western European countries from 1880 to 1960. It uses several contemporary reports and previous comparative analyses to build a novel database on their timing, generosity, universality and funding for 1919, 1939 and 1960.

By doing so, the chapter shows that European family policies developed in two waves: paid maternity leave schemes led the first wave (until World War I), while family allowances led the second wave (from the interwar period). In this process, different models emerged: except for Norway, most Scandinavian countries were latecomers in developing maternity leaves, but developed universal, tax-funded family allowances and family services after World War II. The United Kingdom and Ireland, also latecomers in the former, developed tax-funded family allowances for the second and third child on,

but no significant family services. By contrast, the rest of Western European countries implemented insurance-based family policies. More specifically, Central European countries pioneered the development of insurance-based maternity leaves, and Belgium, France, Spain, and Italy did so with family allowances. Nevertheless, while French and Belgian family allowances reached significant coverage (expanding their coverage beyond the working class) and benefits, the Southern European countries remained linked to the contributory social insurance and family wage principles, with different levels of coverage and generosity.

Chapter 2, *'The Political Economy of Social Insurance under Dictatorship and Democracy: The Case of the Spanish Maternity Leave, 1900-1944'*, analyses the political debates that shaped the formation of compulsory maternity leave insurance in Spain and shows how political regime changes conditioned such process. Spanish high infant mortality rates led to enact an unpaid maternity leave scheme in 1900—i.e., the prohibition of women's paid work after confinement. Although most of the country's political spectrum recognised the need for paid maternity leave, it was not implemented until 1931 and, even then, became (except for the 1910 Italian system) the only scheme in Europe to be implemented independently from health insurance until 1944 (Pons and Vilar 2014). Therefore, exploring the debates it triggered throughout this period provides an excellent case study of how ideology, distributive conflicts and regime change influenced policy models.

To that end, the chapter relies on a number of sources such as Parliamentary and public debates, party press and publications and reports from institutions for social reform. Moreover, it systematically investigates the 'public information on the compulsory maternity leave Draft Bill', a report gathered by the National Welfare Institute (INP, for *Instituto Nacional de Previsión*) to extract the explicit preferences of the different groups and ideologies on the scheme. By doing so, the chapter undertakes a comprehensive, long-term analysis of the political debates between social groups, considering how regime change influenced their lobbying capacity and even their opinions.

The chapter shows that social groups' preferences regarding maternity leave coverage and generosity highly depended on the underlying assumptions on the funding system.

Moreover, it shows that such preferences differed between and within social groups. For instance, Catholic workers and employers from capital-intensive industries and regions supported tripartite contributions, while socialist workers and employers' organisations from labour-intensive industries and regions rejected contributing to the system. Moreover, the chapter suggests that the change in socialist attitudes towards workers' contributions was crucial to implementing maternity leave and developing a health insurance scheme during the Spanish Second Republic. It also shows that, despite their ideological division, women's groups were influential in developing the scheme. Finally, regime changes were essential as dictatorships, although ideologically sympathetic towards this policy, constrained their development by repressing or ignoring bottom-up pressures—even from their allies such as Catholic unions. By contrast, I argue that the Spanish Second Republic was crucial in shaping socialist policy preferences, making them supportive towards contributory schemes.

Chapter 3, *'The Political Economy of Family Allowances in a Catholic Country: The Spanish Case, 1926-58'*, investigates the underlying debates on family allowances and the influence of the political regime in shaping the final scheme. Only preceded by Belgium, France, and Italy, Spain was a first comer in developing family allowances. Passed during the Spanish Civil War (1938) in the Francoist zone, family allowances rapidly became the flagship of the regime's social policy. However, the debates that preceded the adoption of family allowances, which took place during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and the Spanish Second Republic, remain largely unknown, as is the performance of such a policy during early Francoism. Therefore, the chapter analyses the political economy of family allowance's development throughout that period. It uses Parliamentary debates, official publications, and party press to outline the preferences of the different social groups and political factions, and official statistics and reports to describe the performance of the policy.

The chapter shows that family allowances gained momentum among conservative Spanish activists, Catholic unions, and reformist elites during the interwar period. However, apathy from the labour movement, fiscal constraints and opposition from most employers and landowners to additional economic costs prevented the scheme from being passed during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and the Spanish Second

Republic. The Spanish Civil War reshaped the political landscape, creating a new context in which family allowances emerged as an appropriate strategy for the Francoist regime. As in other countries (see Macnicol 1980; Pressman 2014), such a policy became a cost-effective, anti-inflationary alternative to general wage increases to fight child poverty, reinforce the male breadwinner model, and bolster the regime's legitimacy. However, the scheme's coverage and generosity remained modest as the regime proved unable or unwilling to overcome the traditional constraints to social policy formation, such as limited fiscal capacity and employers' opposition to insurance contributions, particularly in the countryside.

Overall, the dissertation shows how ideological frameworks interplay with social groups' preferences, political mobilisation, economic and institutional constraints, and political regime changes to explain family policy outcomes. In Spain, Catholic social reformers and policymakers sought to develop generous, explicit, and conservative family policies to reinforce the male breadwinner family. In particular, they turned to family allowances as the best policy to complement the family wage of the breadwinner. On the other hand, the Left —particularly the socialist labour movement— envisioned a different, more implicit family policy model as they sought to improve social insurance systems, social services and the working class bargaining capacity.³ Nevertheless, in the end, the Francoist dictatorship curtailed both goals. Despite trying to enforce a Catholic family policy model, the dictatorship was unwilling to raise direct taxation and employers' contributions due to its reliance upon political and economic elites and landowners. On the other hand, it could not increase indirect taxation and workers' contributions as it feared intensifying social unrest. As a result, Francoist family policies achieved limited coverage and remained generous only to some concrete elements of the industrial, permanent working class. This scenario paved the way for the final decline of the Spanish family policies after 1967.

This story has implications for our understanding of the origins and development of social policies. By showing the historical roots of the Southern European Welfare

³ According to Kamerman and Kahn (1978), unlike *explicit* family policies, designed to have an effect on the family, *implicit* policies are not deliberately or primarily directed towards families but have indirect consequences over them.

Regime, it contributes to the comparative studies of family policies and welfare states. On the other hand, highlighting some of the mechanisms by which the Spanish dictatorships curtailed family policy development has implications for analysing the relationship between political regimes and social spending. Finally, the thesis provides some insights to investigate the gendered dimensions of (Spanish) social reforms by emphasising how distributive struggles shaped family policy formation.

Chapter 1

Emerging worlds of welfare familism: the development of family policies in Western European Countries, 1880-1960

1.1. Introduction

The relationship between the family and the State has become a common topic in the welfare state literature following the emergence of gender relations as an essential analytic category in social sciences. Building on the critique of Esping-Andersen's *Three Worlds* (1990), a growing number of studies emphasise how social policies —and welfare regimes— contribute to either strengthening or weakening the male breadwinner or the dual-earner family models (Somme stad 1997; Lewis 1997; Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013). Other authors emphasise that welfare states are critical in shaping the role of families towards welfare provision, either increasing their role —familising— or undermining it —defamilising— (Esping-Andersen 1999; Van Winkle 2020; Saraceno 2016; Lohmann and Zagel 2016).⁴

As a result, family policies have received growing attention from academic researchers and policymakers during the last decades, becoming an increasingly fruitful subfield in comparative social policy studies (Daly 2020; Van Winkle 2020; Eydal and Rostgaard 2018b; Nieuwenhuis, Need, and van der Kolk 2019; Flaquer 2000; Kamerman and Kahn

⁴ The familisation/defamilisation dichotomy has been conceptualised, measured, and even spelt in several ways (for an overview, see Zagel and Lohmann 2020). This Chapter uses a narrow but common definition that accounts for the relative importance of the family as a welfare provider for its members.

1978; Gauthier 2018).⁵ The concept ‘family policy’ can be elusive since it can refer to several public provisions such as social policies, normative legislation, and other public policies targeting families (Daly 2020; Eydal and Rostgaard 2018b). This study uses the more narrow definition of family policies as ‘the cash and service benefits for dependent children as well as for their parents in order to provide financial as well as care support’ (Eydal and Rostgaard 2018b, 2). In this regard, family policies are the most relevant indication of the age orientation of a welfare state (Lynch 2006). They also directly affect family relations by actively supporting their role as welfare providers —as in the case of family allowances— or replacing them —as in the case of childcare services (Van Winkle 2020).

Comparative family policy research highlights the existence of different clusters among Western European countries (Kamerman and Kahn 1978; Pfenning and Bahle 2000; Bahle 2008; Flaquer 2000). To start with, the Scandinavian welfare states focus on universal, defamilising family policies, such as childcare services and generous parental leaves, aimed at socialising care activities, incentivising dual-earner families, and improving work-family balance and gender equality. By contrast, central and Western European family policies support the family conceived as an institution, thus providing cash benefits and services for families with children linked to the wage-earning condition. Some authors find Belgium and France to have a particular situation within this cluster of countries, as they combine public policies to support families as an institution —family allowances and services— with childcare social services aimed at integrating young mothers into the labour market (Bahle 2008; Pfenning and Bahle 2000; Lewis 1997). On the other hand, welfare states in Southern Europe and North Western Europe are found to develop family policies poorly. As a result, while in the former, family kinship remains a fundamental welfare provider, in the latter, this function has been increasingly provided by the market and poor-relief-oriented safety net policies.

⁵ For an overview of this growing research agenda, see the volumes edited by Robila (2014), Eydal and Rostgaard (2018a), and Nieuwenhuis and Van Lancker (2020). For a long-term history of family policy research, see Gauthier (2018).

Most comparative accounts assume that long-term historical factors such as religion and Church-State divisions, family formation —the relative abundance of the nuclear, stem, and extended families— or institutional legacies are crucial in explaining the origins of such European diversity (Ferrera 1996; Castles 1993; Esping-Andersen 1990; Rhodes 1996; Bahle 2008). Moreover, recent studies point out to the necessity of analysing long-term trends to unpacking family policies' continuity and changes (Daly and Ferragina 2017). However, there is still a lack of systematic, comparative analysis of European family policies up to 1960. Yet, as Gauthier (1996) shows, family policies were central to the development of the welfare states during the first half of the 20th Century, being designed as familist social policies, that is, to help (male breadwinner) families effectively provide welfare to their members (Gauthier 1996; Montanari 2000; Wennemo 1992; Hantrais 2004). Nevertheless, historical-comparative (Gauthier 1996; Pedersen 1995; Quine 2003; Sommestad 1997; Jenson 1989; Montanari 2000; Wennemo 1992; Naldini 2003) and case studies⁶ show crucial differences in family policy outcomes. Moreover, a historical perspective is the only way to comprehend long-term transformations and policy shifts.⁷

The major obstacle to developing more systematic analyses of early family policy formation in Western European countries has been the relative scarcity of sources for this period (Gauthier 2018; Lohmann and Zagel 2018; Daly and Ferragina 2017). This Chapter provides a systematic, comparative analysis of the development of family policies in Western European countries by reconstructing the evolution of maternity leaves and family allowances between 1880 and 1960. These were the most relevant family policies of the period, implemented in all the Western European countries (Gauthier 1996; Daly and Ferragina 2017). Moreover, these policies account for two fundamental dimensions of family policies: work-family policies —in the case of maternity leave— and cash benefits for families —in the case of family allowances— (Bahle 2008). The analysis relies on contemporary reports —mainly from the

⁶ For good examples, see the volumes edited by Bock and Thane (1996a) and Koven and Michel (1993b).

⁷ For example, the literature has found that the underdevelopment of Southern European family policies during the last decades contrasts with the popularity they enjoyed under mid-20th Century dictatorships (Valiente 1996).

International Labour Organisation (ILO)— and later comparative and case studies to build a comparative database of these two policies. It focuses on three benchmarks (1919, 1939 and 1960) to facilitate comparison and gathers information about policy benefits, coverage and funding. For 1960, it also provides some information about the actual operation of policies by measuring their generosity and universality and —for family allowances— the effort they represented in terms of social spending.

The results show that different models emerged: most Scandinavian countries were latecomers in developing maternity leaves but developed universal, tax-funded family allowances and complementary public assistance for families after World War II.⁸ The United Kingdom and Ireland, also latecomers in the former, developed tax-funded family allowances for the second and third child on but no significant family services. By contrast, the rest of Western European countries developed insurance-based family policies, as Central European pioneered the development of maternity leaves, and Belgium, France, Spain, and Italy did so with family allowances. Nevertheless, while French and Belgian allowances reached significant coverage (expanding beyond the working class) and benefits, the rest remained linked to the insurance, and family wage principle, with a variable degree of coverage and generosity. By showing so, this research connects early family policy formation with contemporary typologies, discussing the effect of path dependence factors, policy shifts and political regimes.

The rest of the Chapter is organised as follows. The next section describes the methodology and primary sources used here. The third section analyses the development of European maternity leave schemes, and the fourth section does the same with family allowances. The Chapter ends with some conclusions.

1.2. Methodology

Data scarcity and sources' fragmentation remain the main obstacles to systematically comparing family policies before World War II. As Lohman and Zagel (2018, 55) point

⁸ With 'complementary public assistance' and 'family services' I refer to both cash and in-kind benefits such as allowance for childcare and child maintenance, school meals and child welfare, and rent allowances for large families (see Appendix, Table A1.5).

out, few comprehensive comparative studies go back further than the 1990s, and even fewer analyse the pre-World War II period. The Parental Leave Benefit and Child Benefit Database (SPIN Database), the OECD Family Policy Database, and the Comparative Family Policy Database (Gauthier, 2010) are the only databases that provide systematic information about specific family policies from 1960 (see Lohmann and Zagel 2018, 56). By using these datasets, some studies have captured the evolution of family policies in OECD countries from 1960 to 2010 (Daly and Ferragina 2017). On the other hand, authors like Wennemo (1992) and Montanari (2000) approach the development of family policies post-World War II by analysing child benefits and child tax credits. Other studies, such as Flora et al. (1983; 1987), collect aggregated social spending data and social policy regulation, thus providing valuable information about family policies—particularly family allowances— from 1949. However, these analyses and datasets provide no information about family policy development before World War II, and, what is more, some overlook relevant countries such as Spain or Portugal (Flora et al. 1983; Flora 1987; Wennemo 1992; Montanari 2000).

Nevertheless, some interesting studies have tried to overcome such a chronological limitation. In the most complete study to date, Gauthier (1996) shows the changing relationship between the State and the family in the Western World from the late 19th Century onwards, providing some valuable information about family policies—in particular, maternity leave and family allowances—as well as legal regulations and political discourses. However, it remains an overview rather than a systematic comparison, as some relevant dimensions of family policies—such as their funding or coverage— remain unexplored. Other remarkable overviews (see Bock and Thane 1996b; Koven and Michel 1993a) and comparative approaches to fewer countries (for instance, Pedersen 1995; Naldini 2003; Sommestad 1997) also address this topic, providing very valuable but unsystematic approaches to the formation of Western European family policies.

Therefore, the main empirical contribution of this study is to provide a systematic reconstruction of the family policy models developed in Europe between 1880 and 1960. To that end, it gathers information about the timing and models of maternity leave and

family allowances in Western European countries. These were the most relevant and widespread family policies in that period (Gauthier 1996; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017). Paid maternity leaves emerged from the late 19th Century as the first family policies to be generalised as protective legislation proved ineffective in assisting working mothers. On the other hand, family allowances spread after the interwar period as a public-sponsored alternative to family wages. Given that I focus on public cash support for families with children, other public provisions, like family legislation or tax allowances, are not analysed.

In comparing family policy models, the analysis focuses on coverage, benefits and funding of Western European maternity leaves and family allowances (see Table 1.1). To a large extent, these dimensions depended on whether the schemes were designed as compulsory (C), voluntary (V), or means-tested (M-T) social insurance. Universality has been considered a crucial feature in the feminist literature on the welfare state because it can entitle women to welfare benefits as citizens, wives or workers (Lewis 1997; Sommestad 1997; Sainsbury 1993; Jenson 1997). Consequently, universal entitlements can reduce women's dependency on the breadwinner, while job-related entitlements can reinforce it (Esping-Andersen 1999; Van Winkle 2020; Orloff 2009; Saraceno 2016). Regarding family allowances, a highly controversial issue was whether to entitle the mothers —as a maternity endowment— or the head of the family —as a family wage supplement— (Pedersen 1995; Gauthier 1996). While the former model was associated to universal (U) schemes, the latter maintained job-related or occupational (O) family allowances. Moreover, extending coverage beyond the traditional frontiers of industrial workers has been a crucially divisive issue in social policy debates (Hellwig 2005; Baldwin 1990; Espuelas 2022).

Table 1.1. Essential dimensions of family policy models

	Maternity leave	Family Allowances
Type	Compulsory (C), voluntary (V) or means-tested (MT); part of health insurance or not	Occupational (O), universal (U) or means-tested (MT)
Benefits	Type of benefits: flat rate (FR) or wage-related; Leave extension (maximum weeks); Health services; breastfeeding benefit	Type of benefits: flat rate (FR) or wage-related
Coverage	Sectors included; entitlement of wives of insured male workers	Minimum dependent children; sectors included; benefits paid to the mother (M) or the head of the family (HF)
Funding	Workers', employers' and State's share	Workers', employers' and State's share

Source: Own elaboration (see text).

On the other hand, coverage needs to be analysed vis-à-vis benefits in order to understand policy models fully. In some cases, such as the American health insurance, lower universality may have been compensated by higher generosity (Murray 2007). Moreover, some schemes developed wage-related benefits, while others provided flat-rate (FR) benefits, the latter being more redistributive but also more vulnerable to inflation shocks. Finally, both generosity and universality depend on the sources of funding that a country establishes for their social policies. The distribution of these costs has usually become the most controversial issue in social policy debates (Thane 1978; Espuelas 2022; Pons and Vilar 2014; Baldwin 1990; Dutton 2002).

Comparing family policy models requires relying on many different sources. Most of them are reports and studies of international organisations —particularly the International Labour Organisation (ILO)— and public offices. As a result of the growing concern about the family issue, Governments, international organisations, and academics produced prolific research in what Gauthier (2018) defined as the first wave of family policy studies. The conclusions of these studies are still handy for researchers and have not been fully exploited. Before World War II, evidence on maternity leave's development relies on Harris (1919) and ILO reports (1933; 1950; 1953), and data on

family allowances are available in Hoffner (1940), ILO reports and yearbooks (1948b; 1948a; 1958; 1961; 1964) and Iyer (1966). After World War II, more systematic spending, coverage and benefits data can be estimated based on Flora et al. (1983; 1987) and Gauthier (2010). In addition to those sources, I have filled most of the missing information using other ILO reports (1929; 1932; 1953) and case studies, especially for Portugal (Carolo and Pereirinha 2010; Cardoso and Rocha 2009) and Spain (Espuelas 2013a; Gala Durán 2007; Pons and Vilar 2014). In the Spanish case, some national statistical yearbooks have also been used (for more information, see Chapters 2 and 3). Finally, I have been unable to trace the post-war performance of Italian and Portuguese maternity leave because the available sources only provide aggregated health insurance data.

To offer a systematic comparison and, at the same time, account for the changes and regularities of European family policy models, this Chapter focuses on three benchmarks. First, it deals with family policies' early development by comparing the emergence of maternity leave schemes until the ILO's Washington Convention (1919) urged member states to implement them. Second, it analyses family policies' changes and innovations in the interwar period (1939). Finally, it shows how different family policy schemes emerged during the sharp expansion of welfare states after World War II (1960).

1.3. The early trends of maternity provision: European paths towards maternity leave schemes

1.3.1. The emergence of alternative strategies of maternity provision (up to 1919)

By the late 19th Century, several international conferences, such as Berlin (1890) and Zurich (1897), claimed that women's and children's labour conditions should be improved and recommended the States establish public support for working mothers to abstain from paid work after childbirth (Wikander, Kessler-Harris, and Lewis 1995). These initiatives led to the foundation of the International Association for Protective Legislation, a precursor of the ILO. After World War I, the newly established ILO promoted the Washington Convention (1919), urging the League of Nations member


States to implement paid maternity leaves for 12 weeks (6 weeks before and 6 after childbirth) for all female workers in industry and commerce (League of Nations 1919). Therefore, maternity protection became central to ILO's prospects. In 1921, the third ILO Conference recommended that the States also entitle agricultural workers (Gauthier 1996). By 1952 a new revision of the Washington Convention encouraged the States to establish 14 weeks of maternity leave for all working women at a 100% wage rate (Gauthier 1996).

These international Conferences set the framework for discussing maternity leave schemes in European countries. However, the impact of such international dispositions was relative, as Table 1.2 and Figure 1.1 show significant disparities among Western European countries in maternity leaves' timing and extension. Moreover, the Washington Convention did not establish how the benefit should be funded or by whom. Neither did it establish whether maternity leave should entitle sectors other than industry, commerce and agriculture until 1952, nor if the wives of insured male workers should receive some maternity benefit. This would lead to substantial cross-country differences regarding policy models.

Table 1.2. First maternity leave legislation (unpaid, allowance and statutory paid leave schemes)

Country	Unpaid leave	Maternity allowance	Statutory paid leave
Southern Europe			
Spain	1900	1923	1931
Italy	1902	X	1910
Portugal	1891	ns	X
Western Europe			
Austria	1884	1888	1911
Belgium	1899	1894	ns
France	1909	1913	1927
Germany	1878	X	1883
Luxembourg	ns	X	1901
Netherlands	1910	X	1913
Northern Europe			
Denmark	1913	1915	1933
Finland	1917	1937	1950
Norway	1892	X	1909
Sweden	1900	1912	1931
United Kingdom	1891	1911	1946
Ireland	1901	1911	ns

Note: 'X' means that such a scheme was not introduced during the 1880-1960 period, and 'ns' means no precise information has been found (see text).
Source: Own elaboration (see text and Appendix, Table A1.1).



Source: Own elaboration (see Appendix, Table A1.1).

Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show that early cross-country differences were associated with the relationship between maternity benefits and emerging social insurance systems.⁹ The countries that implemented compulsory health insurance schemes introduced statutory paid maternity leaves to replace lost wages while at the same time providing medical assistance to working mothers. Except for Norway, all were Central and Western European countries—Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands— following a Bismarckian scheme. Replacement benefits ranged from 50% (in the case of Germany and Luxembourg) to 100% (in the Netherlands). The Austrian scheme also provided a breastfeeding benefit after maternity leave, offering additional financial support to working mothers to nurse their children after paid leave. Compulsory contributions from employers and workers funded such benefits. In Norway, workers funded 60% and the State 30% of regular contributions, while in the Netherlands, the contributions were paid by half between workers and employers. In Austria, Germany and Luxembourg, on the other hand, the workers' contributions amounted to two-thirds of the total.

Moreover, except in Austria, the maternity leave system not only entitled industrial workers but also commercial, domestic and home workers (in Germany) or even all wage earners (in Norway, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). However, Labour Legislation in many countries did not recognise domestic service workers as regular workers (see Todd 2009; Borrell-Cairol 2020). Therefore, although labour regulations summarised by Harris (1919) suggest that all workers were entitled, it is not easy to ascertain whether this included the domestic sector. In the Austrian and Norwegian cases, the scheme also provided health services to the wives of insured male workers.

⁹ Between the late 19th Century and the mid-20th Century, Western European Countries developed social insurance schemes as a precedent of post-war social security systems. For an overview, see Herranz-Loncán (2010).

Table 1.3. European maternity leave schemes before the Washington Convention, 1880-1919

Country	Type	Sickness insurance	Leave (max. weeks)	Cash benefit	Health services included	Sectors included	Insured wives	Funding		
								Workers	Employers	State
Southern Europe										
Spain	V	No	2	FR	No	Industry, commerce, agriculture	No	No	No	100%
Italy	C	No	4	FR	No	Industry, public employees	No	50%	50%	Yes
Portugal	ns	ns	8	ns	No	Industry and commerce	X	ns	ns	ns
Western Europe										
Austria	C	Yes	10	60%	Yes	Industry and manual workers	Yes	66%	33%	No
Belgium	V	Yes	6	FR	No	X	No	X	X	X
France	M-T	No	8	FR	Yes	All	No	No	No	100%
Germany	C	Yes	8	50%	No	Manual, Commercial, Domestic, Home-workers	No	66%	33%	No
Luxembourg	C	Yes	4	50%	Yes	All	No	66%	33%	No
Netherlands	C	Yes	ns	100%	Yes	All	No	50%	50%	Yes
Northern Europe										
Denmark	V	Yes	1.4	FR	No	X	X	X	X	X
Norway	C	Yes	8	60%	Yes	All	Yes	60%	10%	30%
Sweden	V	Yes	4	FR	No	X	X	X	X	X
United Kingdom	C	Yes	4	FR	No	Industry	Yes	37,50%	37,50%	22%

Note: Given that no benefit was passed before 1919, Spanish and Portuguese data correspond to 1923 and 1922, respectively. Regarding funding, data about workers and employers refer to the proportion of regular contributions. As for the State funding, Yes and No refers to regular State subsidies and 100% to tax-funded schemes. Fields with an 'X' and 'ns' refer to cases with no or unclear information. In the case of voluntary schemes, benefits depended on each fund.

Sources: Data on Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway from Harris (1919); on Belgium from Gauthier (1996), Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) and ILO (1929, 1932); on Portugal from Cardoso and Rocha (2009) and ILO (1929, 1932). For the Spanish data, see Chapter 2.

By contrast, countries like Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Sweden promoted State-sponsored voluntary social insurance schemes, giving friendly societies and trade unions the upper hand in welfare provision (Herranz-Loncán 2010). These countries implemented maternity allowances as lump-sum, flat-rate cash benefits to defray childbirth expenses. As entitlement depended on voluntary enrolment in sickness funds, most women became excluded from maternity benefits.¹⁰ Moreover, the amount depended on each fund, which generally did not provide health services.

Other countries followed particular paths. Despite developing a voluntary health insurance scheme in 1898, France passed a non-contributory, daily flat-rate benefit for poor mothers in 1913. Although funded by the State, approved societies administered cash benefits (Harris 1919). The French scheme also introduced a complementary leave benefit at full pay under medical prescription and a breastfeeding benefit for up to 12 weeks if the mother nursed her children. On the other hand, the United Kingdom established compulsory health insurance in 1911 that provided maternity benefits for female industrial workers and the wives of male industrial workers. This scheme differed from their continental counterparts as it entitled to flat-rate, lump-sum maternity benefits to cover childbirth expenses rather than compensations proportional to the lost wages plus health services. Finally, Italy became the only country that passed compulsory maternity leave without relying on health insurance, providing flat-rate benefits to female industrial workers funded by employers, workers and the State.

Spain and Portugal lagged behind, as they became the only Western European countries to develop maternity benefits well after World War I, thus suggesting a sort of Iberian exceptionalism. In 1923, Spain implemented a non-contributory, lump-sum maternity benefit for industrial, commercial and agricultural working women covered by the pension system. Although formally entitling a relevant share of working women, receiving maternity benefits required a formal application. In the Portuguese case, according to Gauthier (1996), the Hours of Work Regulation Act established in 1922 compulsory paid maternity leaves at a 100% rate for working women in industry and commerce, funded by employers. Two ILO reports (1929; 1932) provide a similar picture,

¹⁰ For instance, in Finland, by 1933, only one fund provided maternity benefits (ILO 1933).

suggesting that the Sickness Insurance Act (1919) provided maternity benefits for working mothers. However, this information should be taken carefully. Carolo and Pereirinha (2008) show that health insurance projects, although projected by the Portuguese Government in 1919, were never successfully implemented. Cardoso and Rocha (2009) reach similar conclusions by showing that although the Institute for Compulsory Social Insurance and Welfare —the State agency in charge of developing and implementing social insurance— did provide some maternity benefits, the 1919 legislation was largely unsuccessful. Moreover, under the dictatorship (1926-1974), maternity leave benefits only appeared after the 1962 social insurance reform (Carolo and Pereirinha 2008).

1.3.2. The beginning of Western European convergence: the interwar period (1919-1939)

During the interwar period, there was a second wave in the development of European maternity leaves, as many countries implemented schemes that aligned with the 12-week leave stipulated by the Washington Convention (see Table 1.4). Moreover, the compulsory system linked to health insurance became the most common scheme during this period as Italy, France, Denmark, Sweden and Ireland —by maintaining the British scheme— established it. The French health insurance provided benefits equal to 50% of previous earnings during 12 weeks for female workers in industrial, commercial, agricultural and domestic service jobs, and health services for the wives of insured male workers.¹¹ Equal contributions from workers and employers funded the scheme. Italian health insurance provided an 8-week, flat-rate maternity benefit for working women in industrial and commercial sectors.

In Denmark and Sweden, the State began to take a significant (although still incipient) role in providing universal maternity services. The Danish People's Insurance Act (1933) provided cash benefits and services for 4 weeks to all working women covered by sickness funds financed by the insured and municipalities. If the mother was not a member of the sickness fund, the Law established a 2-week leave funded by the

¹¹ Nevertheless, health insurance did not replace the former means-tested, tax-funded maternity allowance that continued to entitle all needy French mothers (ILO 1933).

municipalities. In Sweden, sickness funds provided flat-rate benefits funded by the municipalities. This guaranteed an 8-week leave to all working women covered by the Labour Protection Act and 4 weeks to all other Swedish mothers.

Table 1.4. European maternity leave schemes in the Interwar period, 1919-1939

Country	Type	Sickness insurance	Leave (max. weeks)	Cash benefit	Health services included	Sectors included	Insured wives	Funding		
								Workers	Employers	State
Southern Europe										
Spain	C	No	12	FR	Yes	Except for domestic workers	No	49%	51%	Yes
Spain (1936)	C	Yes	12	50%	Yes	All wage earners	Yes	50%	50%	Yes
Italy	C	Yes	10	FR	No	Industry and commerce	No	43%	57%	Yes
Portugal	ns	ns	8	ns	Yes	Industry and commerce	No	ns	ns	ns
Western Europe										
Austria	C	Yes	12	60%	Yes	All wage earners	Yes	Yes	Yes	ns
Belgium	V	Yes	6	FR	Yes	ns	Yes	ns	ns	ns
France	C	Yes	12	50%	Yes	Except for domestic and home workers	Yes	50%	50%	Yes
Germany	C	Yes	12	50%	Yes	All wage earners	Yes	66%	33%	No
Luxembourg	C	Yes	8	50%	Yes	Except for domestic workers	No	66%	33%	ns
Netherlands	C	Yes	12	100%	No	Except for domestic workers	No	50%	50%	No
Northern Europe										
Denmark	C	Yes	4	FR	Yes	All wage earners	No	ns	ns	Yes
Finland	V	Yes	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Norway	C	Yes	8	60%	Yes	All wage earners	No	60%	10%	30%
Sweden	C	Yes	8	FR	ns	Universal	No	No	No	100%
United Kingdom	C	Yes	4	FR	No	Except for domestic workers	Yes	44%	56%	Yes
Ireland	C	Yes	4	FR	No	Except for domestic workers	Yes	43%	57%	Yes

Note: Regarding funding, data about workers and employers refer to the proportion of regular contributions. As for the State funding, Yes and No refer to regular State subsidies and 100% to tax-funded schemes. Fields with 'X' or 'ns' refer to the cases where no or unclear information is given. In the case of voluntary schemes, benefits depended on each fund.

Source: Own elaboration based on ILO (1932, 1933). Italy from Naldini (2003). For the Spanish data, see Chapter 2.

As mentioned earlier, Portugal did not improve public maternity benefits during this period. Furthermore, the Institutions of Social Provision Act—a benchmark of *Estado Novo*'s early social insurance legislation— did not contemplate paid maternity leaves (Carolo and Pereirinha 2008). By contrast, Spain experienced a frustrated convergence with the compulsory maternity leave schemes of countries like Germany or France (see Chapter 2). In 1931, the Spanish Second Republic (1931-1936) implemented a compulsory maternity leave scheme following the Italian model of 1910. In 1936, the INP presented a Bill to the Government to develop a compulsory health system that would provide replacement benefits at 50% of the previous earnings and health services to all working women and the wives of the insured male workers. The Bill also included additional cash benefits for families with children. However, this project was never passed, as the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) prevented its parliamentary discussion, and later on, the Francoist Dictatorship discarded it.

1.3.3. Converging models, different outcomes: maternity leaves after World War II (1945-1960)

The large number of human losses due to World War II and the economic hardship of the post-war period exacerbated previous depopulation fears and led to a new wave of family policies in Western European countries. As the next section shows, this renewed welfare familism focused on reinforcing the male breadwinner family model and privileged child welfare over working mothers (Gauthier 1996). However, maternity leaves did improve during this period as many countries introduced compulsory schemes, linked cash benefits to wage levels, and extended the duration of the leaves.


Western European countries consolidated their paths towards providing maternity benefits. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show that although most countries incorporated maternity leaves into their social security systems, such a process led to different outcomes. Most Northern European countries improved their maternity leaves, as Ireland, Norway, and Sweden introduced 12-week leaves. In 1946, the United Kingdom extended maternity leave up to 18 weeks, thus becoming the country with the most extended leave and the only one that surpassed the 14-week recommendation of the newly revised Washington Convention. By contrast, Finland—that introduced a 6-week leave in 1950— and

Denmark —that maintained a 4-week leave— remained the countries with shorter leaves in Western Europe.

On the other hand, in the Scandinavian countries —particularly Sweden and Denmark— public hospitals and municipal funds extended maternity services and cash benefits to all citizens (ILO 1953). In Norway, the universalisation of Sickness insurance in 1953 and 1956 also led to the introduction of flat-rate benefits that, together with the expansion of tax-funded public health, brought the country closer to its Scandinavian neighbours (Kuhnle 1986). I have been unable to find data for Finland on maternity leave coverage. However, by 1968, maternity cash benefits barely reached 87,000 mothers —6% of women aged between 15 and 65— (see Flora 1987, 179). Moreover, as Alestalo and Uusitalo (1986) suggest, after World War II, Finnish health policy concentrated on prevention against infectious diseases, building a public hospital network, and health services for children rather than mothers, while family policies focused on child allowances. With the development of such a universal model, and although it still was relatively ungenerous, the Scandinavian countries —and particularly Sweden and Denmark— were at the threshold of the massive development of maternity leave schemes that took place from the late sixties onwards, leading to longer leaves with wage-related benefits (Daly and Ferragina 2017; Gauthier 1999).

Ireland and the United Kingdom also improved their maternity leave schemes. In the British case, the National Insurance Act (1946) covered all employed and self-employed women and the wives of insured male workers. In conjunction with expanding health and maternity services, these changes resulted in British maternity cash benefits and services achieving nearly universal coverage. Nevertheless, cash benefits and leave extensions remained lower for women who did not usually participate in waged work.¹² On the other hand, I have not found coverage data for Ireland. However, as its maternity benefit closely resembled the British one (see Flora 1987, 434), one could expect similar outcomes.

¹² For instance, women without a permanent occupation were only entitled to a 4-week leave (Robson 1947).



Notes: replacement rates for 1960, and coverage rates for 1952. Spanish coverage data refers to the proportion of assisted childbirths with cash benefits in 1955.

Source: See Appendix, Table A1.2.

Central and Western European countries consolidated a different maternity leave model, closely linked to social insurance principles. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands implemented 12-week leaves, while France extended it to 14 weeks. On the other hand, by the end of the period, all these countries had introduced wage-related benefits making their maternity leaves more generous than their Northern European counterparts. However, relying on social insurance principles made Central and Western European maternity leaves less extensive than in Northern European countries. Therefore, Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands' schemes replaced 100% of previous earnings, while Luxembourg compensated 75%. Belgian and French schemes remained less generous, replacing 60% and 50% of previous earnings. These countries have been found to be leaders in family policy development, so these findings may seem shocking. However, as the next section shows, both countries' family policies focused on family allowances.

Finally, ILO reports do not provide disaggregated coverage rates for Italy, Portugal and Spain. In the Spanish case, the insurance coverage rate has been estimated by calculating the proportion of childbirths that received cash benefits as assistance (see Appendix, Table A1.2). Moreover, data on benefits suggest significant differences between Southern European countries. In 1950, the Italian Government passed a reform extending maternity leave to 14 weeks —which could be extended to 20 weeks, depending on occupation— with cash benefits equal to 80% of previous earnings. On the contrary, Portugal had to wait until 1962 to establish a 9-week maternity leave at full pay. In Spain, maternity leave was linked to health insurance in 1944, maintaining the leave extension of the Republican period but setting their benefits at 60% of previous earnings. However, although the scheme entitled insured women and the wives of insured male workers, the underdevelopment of the Spanish health system constrained its coverage (Pons and Vilar 2014). Such relative ungenerosity and small coverage made the Spanish maternity leave appear as an outlier in Western Europe.

1.4. Western European paths towards family allowance schemes

1.4.1. An alternative to family wage: family allowances until World War II (1900-1939)

Family allowances emerged as a crucial social policy among Western European countries from the interwar period to the post-war decades. As an ILO report (1948b) stated after the conflict, the objectives of such a policy were to relieve child poverty, increase fertility rates and redistribute resources to large families. As other authors argue, the system was also conceived as a cheap and anti-inflationary alternative to general wage increases (Pressman 2014; Macnicol 1980). However, the national paths towards generalising family allowances differed from country to country both in timing and model (see Table 1.5). Belgian and French employers pioneered the development of private wage supplements for workers with large families from the late 19th Century. During World War I, employers established compensation funds to homogenise contributions and redistribute benefits, allowing to generalise this employer-led family allowance scheme during the twenties (Dutton 2002; Pedersen 1995). However, this

system did not succeed beyond the Belgian and French borders. Although some compensation funds emerged during the war in Germany, they were rapidly dismantled after the conflict (Richardson 1924). Instead, German employers relied on social insurance schemes to provide family benefits, such as the eligibility for child supplements for workers with school-aged children (Dutton 2002).

Table 1.5. First family allowance legislation

Country	Residual family allowance	Fully developed family allowance
Southern Europe		
Spain	1926	1938
Italy		1936
Portugal		1944
Western Europe		
Austria		1950
Belgium		1930
France	1913	1932
Germany	1938	1941/1954
Luxembourg		1947
Netherlands		1939
Northern Europe		
Denmark		1952
Finland	1943	1948
Norway		1946
Sweden		1947
United Kingdom		1945
Ireland		1944

Note: residual family allowances refer to means-tested schemes (France 1913, Germany 1938) or targeted very large families (Spain 1926, Finland 1943).

Source: Own elaboration (see text Tables 1.6 and 1.7).

A third path towards family allowances that emerged in the early 20th Century was based on State funding. During World War I, the British Government established a tax-funded separation allowance scheme for the soldiers' wives. Such a system inspired feminists like Eleanor Rathbone (1917; 1924) to advocate for universal, State-funded family allowances conceived as a State endowment for maternity. On the other hand, the French Government established a means-tested family allowance for families with four children or more in 1913 (Pedersen 1995), and in Spain, the Primo de Rivera Dictatorship

implemented tax-funded family allowances for families with eight children or more (see Chapter 3).

These different models influenced the design of family allowance schemes from the interwar period onwards. During the thirties, Belgium, France, Spain, and Italy emerged as first-comers in implementing this policy. Two models emerged during this period (see Table 1.6). Belgian and French schemes developed based on the compensation fund system, which was made compulsory for all wage earners from the first (in Belgium, 1930) and the second (in France, 1932) child onwards, and remained fully funded by employers. Moreover, in 1937 and 1939, the Belgian and French Governments expanded the schemes beyond waged workers. Belgian family allowances introduced flat-rate benefits for independent workers, funded by the self-employed themselves. French allowances went even further by entitling independent workers, landowners and employers whose benefits became primarily funded from tax revenues (ILO 1948a). Unlike the Belgian ones, French benefits became fixed as a proportion of the average departmental wage—10% for the second and 20% for the third and subsequent children. Moreover, the 1939 French reform also introduced a lump-sum birth bonus and an additional 10% departmental wage benefit paid to mothers working at home (Hoffner 1940).

Table 1.6. European family allowance schemes before the Second World War, 1939

Country	Type	Cash benefit	Beneficiary	Min children	Sectors included	Children age	Funding	
							Insured	Employers State
Southern Europe								
Spain	O	FR	HF	2	Industry, commerce	14	17%	83%
Italy	O	FR	HF	1	Industry, commerce, agriculture, credit	14	ns	ns
Western Europe								
Belgium (general workers)	O	FR	HF	1	All wage earners	14		100%
Belgium (independent workers)	O	FR	HF	1	Independent workers	14	100%	
France (general workers)	O	10%-20%	HF/M	2	All wage earners	14		100%
France (independent workers)	O	10%-20%	HF/M	2	Independent workers, small landowners and non-permanent agricultural workers	14		100%
Germany	M-T	FR	M	3	Eugenic controls	14		100%

Notes: For the meaning of Type, Cash benefit, and Beneficiary, see Table 1.1.

Source: Own elaboration based on Hoffner (1940).


Apart from the French and Belgian schemes, family allowances were only established in the Italian, German, and Spanish dictatorships before World War II. Germany developed a particular model, becoming the only country to implement a tax-funded and (quasi)universal family allowance scheme. In 1938, the Nazi Government implemented a non-contributory, means-tested child allowance scheme emerging from the marriage loan system (Voegeli 2003). In 1941, income limitations disappeared, and the allowances became a tax-funded, quasi-universal —due to the presence of eugenic controls— system payable to Aryan mothers from the third child onwards—the first, in the case of single mothers (Voegeli 2003).

By contrast, Italy and Spain developed occupational schemes. Italian family allowances emerged from a collective agreement between the regime's trade unions and employers' associations in exchange for working time —and wage— reductions in 1934 and became systematised and centralised under a National Fund for Family Allowances from 1936 (Lynch 2006).¹³ The system provided flat-rate benefits to head-of-family workers in industry, commerce and agriculture —from 1937, it also included liberal professions, credit workers and artists— from the first child and was funded by contributions of workers and employers. However, as the National Fund became divided into different branches, benefits were set up differently across sectors. The Spanish family allowance scheme, passed during the Civil War, closely resembled the Italian one, although without significant precedents in collective bargaining. Initially, the scheme covered only industrial and commercial workers, providing flat-rate benefits to the heads of families from the second child. Contributions were set up at 6% of the wage rate, of which employers paid 5% and workers 1% (see Chapter 3).

Therefore, except for Germany, all the Western European countries that passed family allowances during the interwar period developed occupational schemes designed as a family wage supplement. Only Belgium and France expanded family allowances' coverage beyond waged workers, while Italy and Spain did not. Figure 1.3 shows a

¹³ Collective bargaining-driven family allowances were not exclusive to the Italian experience, as during the thirties, such arrangements became common in countries like the Netherlands (Lynch, 2006). Nevertheless, Italy was the only country to scale the system into a National scheme.

measure of universality —covered families as a proportion of the total population— and generosity—spending per insured person as a proportion of the GDP per head. Given the lack of homogeneous and reliable data, this measure is approximate.¹⁴



Source: See Appendix, Table A1.3.

In any case, the estimates suggest that different models led to different outcomes. For instance, the Belgian allowances appear the most ambitious in both universality and generosity, followed by the French ones. However, Figure 1.3 heavily underestimates the French numbers as, while it includes the Belgian 1937 independent workers' scheme, it does not reflect the French 1939 reforms nor the special allowances for coal miners or railway workers. Thus, one could expect the post-1939 French scheme to be much more similar to the Belgian one. By contrast, Italian and Spanish allowances performed similarly, suggesting an emerging cluster of countries on family allowances consistent with the Southern Welfare State literature. The low Italian coverage and


¹⁴ In particular, although family allowance benefits as a proportion of unskilled industrial workers' wage would be a better estimate than the spending per head/GDP per head ratio, the lack of reliable and homogeneous data for this period complicates the estimations.

spending per capita are also consistent with Lynch's (2009) definition of Fascist Italy as a clientelist rather than a Conservative welfare state. According to Saraceno (1994), the Italian dictatorship developed an ambivalent familism, i.e., a social emphasis on the significance of the family combined with a lack of public financial support towards families. Although fewer studies have analysed the Francoist family allowances in-depth, some authors have provided similar arguments to the Italian ones (Espuelas 2017; Vilar 2009).

1.4.2. Family wage or universal entitlement? The consolidation of family allowances after World War II (1939-1960)

Family allowances spread throughout Europe during the World War II and the following years. However, inter-country differences also exploded during this period related to three interrelated variables: State capacity, policy preferences and policy models. Figure 1.4 shows public spending in family allowances as a proportion of GDP and total social security spending in 1960. It allows classifying countries between those with high and very high spending (France, Belgium, and Italy), medium spending (Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, and Sweden), and low spending (Norway, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Germany). On the other hand, these data suggest that Spain and especially Portugal emerged as outliers regarding family policy development, as they focused on developing family allowances far more intensely than the rest of their social policies, with poorer results. In other words, Portuguese and Spanish Governments remained unable or unwilling to develop generous schemes compared with other European countries despite giving a prominent role to family policies in their welfare states—in line with their Conservative, familist ideology. Therefore, more than a Southern European model, spending on family policies suggests again a sort of Iberian exceptionalism driven by the political regime.¹⁵

¹⁵ These findings are consistent with the welfare state historical literature, which has strongly emphasized the negative impact of dictatorships on social spending (see Espuelas 2012; Lindert 2021).



Source: Own elaboration (see Appendix, Table A1.4).

Cross-country differences in family allowance expenditure levels can be associated with different policy models (see Table 1.7). In Northern European countries, family allowances were inspired by Eleanor Rathbone’s demands for a State endowment for mother’s work—in the United Kingdom and Ireland—and by the Myrdals’ progressive population policy—in the Scandinavian countries (Somme stad 1997; Pedersen 1995). As a result, universal child allowance schemes emerged, entitling citizen mothers to a flat rate allowance from the first, the second or the third child onwards. Except for Finland, where employers bore most of the cost, and Norway, where the insured and employers slightly contributed to the scheme, these systems were funded out of tax revenues.

In Central and Western European countries, two different models emerged. During the forties, Austria (1950), Luxembourg (1947), and the Netherlands (1946) developed contributory family allowances funded mainly by employers, entitling wage earners from the first child to flat-rate benefits. In 1954, Germany developed a similar system,

covering workers with three or more children. Unlike in the Northern European countries, this occupational scheme meant that child benefits remained linked to the family wage principle, mainly entitling the head of the family (Gauthier 1996; Flaquer 2000). Only the Netherlands moved towards a model similar to their Northern European counterparts by introducing, in 1951, means-tested benefits to independent workers and by entitling, in 1962, all Dutch residents from the third child onwards to tax-funded flat-rate benefits (Lynch 2006). Complementary legislation introduced additional benefits for the first two children to waged workers, the self-employed with modest incomes and civil servants.

On the other hand, Belgium and France preserved the model implemented in the thirties. Consequently, although the system's core remained linked to social insurance principles, insured persons' (in the Belgian case) and the State's (in the French case) contributions remained important in entitling independent workers, landowners and employers, achieving a remarkable degree of universality. Finally, France introduced a complementary single-wage allowance that provided families where women were not engaged in paid work with increased benefits —that could account for up to 50% of their wages— from the first child.

Table 1.7. European family allowance schemes after World War II, circa 1960

Country	Type	Cash benefit	Beneficiary	Min children	Sectors included	Children age limit	Funding		State
							Insured	Employers	
Southern Europe									
Spain	O	FR	HF	2	Industry, Commerce, Agriculture, Maritime	14	18%	74%	6%
Italy	O	FR	HF	1	Industry, Commerce, Agriculture	14	0%	96%	4%
Portugal	O	FR	HF	1	Industry, commerce, intellectual professions	14	2%	98%	0%
Western Europe									
Austria	O	ns	ns	1	All wage earners	ns	3%	94%	4%
Belgium	O	FR	ns	1	All wage earners	14	11%	82%	7%
France	O	20%-30%	ns	2	All wage earners, self-employed, dependants of social insurance recipients, unemployed, invalids	17	8%	74%	9%
Western Germany	O	FR	ns	3	All wage earners	18	0%	98%	1%
Luxembourg	O	FR	ns	1	All wage earners	ns	0%	79%	20%
Netherlands	O/M-T	FR	ns	1	All wage earners; self-employed (M-T)	16	0%	92%	3%
Northern Europe									
Denmark	U	FR	M	1	Universal	ns	0%	0%	100%
Finland	U	FR	M	1	Universal	16	0%	94%	6%
Norway	U	FR	M	2	Universal	16	5%	3%	92%
Sweden	U	FR	M	1	Universal	16	0%	0%	100%
United Kingdom	U	FR	M	2	Universal	16	0%	0%	100%
Ireland	U	FR	M	3	Universal	16	0%	0%	100%


Notes: For the meaning of Type, Cash benefit, and Beneficiary, see Table 1.1. Fields with a 'ns' refer to cases where no or unclear information is given. In Spain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, contributions from the insured, employers and the State were complemented by other sources of income (see Appendix, Table A1.5). Most of this alternative funding came from transfers from other social security schemes (see ILO 1964). Source: Own elaboration based on ILO (1948a, 1948b, 1966), CISS (1953). Data on funding from ILO (1964).

Southern European countries developed another model of family allowance that, as the French and Belgian ones, conserved the essential characteristics of the former period. Therefore, Italian family allowances were reframed after Mussolini's fall but maintained their essential characteristics (Lynch 2006). The system also provided benefits for the wife and other dependants of the insured worker. The Spanish dictatorship developed the scheme during the forties and early fifties, including agricultural and maritime workers, civil servants, widows, and orphans (see Chapter 3). On the other hand, Portugal implemented a family allowance scheme covering industrial and commercial workers during the war (1944). The three countries developed systems with conservative and population goals (Naldini 2003; Carolo and Pereirinha 2010), framing them as occupational models administered by different branches. However, some crucial differences emerged. First, Portuguese family allowances reached fewer families as they excluded agricultural workers. Second, employers funded most of the Italian and Portuguese schemes, while the Spanish one also relied significantly on workers' contributions. Third, unlike the Italian and Portuguese systems, the Spanish maintained a single flat-rate cash benefit for the different branches.

Policy models and spending influenced the scope and generosity of family allowances. Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of generosity (benefits for 1 to 3 children as a proportion of the wage of an unskilled worker) and universality (covered children as a proportion of 0-14 year children). On the other hand, Figure 1.6 shows whether civil servants and public employees captured a significant proportion of family allowances and if complementary family services were provided.¹⁶ In Northern Europe, most Scandinavian countries developed a universal model with relatively low benefits but complemented with relatively ambitious public services for families—particularly in Denmark and Sweden. With such an infrastructure, those countries were at the gates of the development of defamilising family policies during the sixties and the seventies (Van Winkle 2020). The British and the Irish schemes show a similar pattern, though their coverage was constrained by entitling families from the second (in the United Kingdom)

¹⁶ The evidence provided by ILO (1964) only allows to distinguish those social services explicitly designed to support families. Thus, this data overlooks indirect public family services and services aggregated in other spending categories.


and the third children (in Ireland), and their family services were less developed in comparative terms—in the British case, inexistent. By contrast, the low coverage of Norwegian allowances is more surprising. Although some studies have emphasised Norway as being more insurance-oriented —less universal— than their Scandinavian counterparts (Lewis 2007), from 1946, a universal child allowance was in force from the second child onwards (Kuhnle 1986).¹⁷



Note: a 0% benefit means no benefits were provided for the first and/or the second child.

Source: Own elaboration (see Appendix, Table A1.4).

¹⁷ Nonetheless, the data provided by Iyer (1966) is consistent with the Yearbook of Labour Statistics (ILO 1961) and with Flora (1987).



Source: Own elaboration (See Appendix, Table A1.5).

Insurance-based family allowance systems —such as in the central European countries— show significant variability in their coverage. For instance, while Austrian allowances achieved the same degree of universality as the Scandinavian ones with more generous benefits, the German ones are the less ambitious in the sample—the Netherlands ranks in an intermediate position. French and Belgian schemes achieved a remarkable degree of universality —though less than the Scandinavian countries— and generosity—France, in particular. French data does not include single wage allowances, so one must expect that both benefits and coverage were higher in France than reflected in the graph, which would be more consistent with the size of French public spending. On the other hand, none of these countries implemented explicit public services but relied only on cash benefits to support families. Furthermore, except for Luxembourg, Central and Western European countries allocated a portion of their family allowance spending to civil servants and public employees, which was particularly significant in the Netherlands and Germany.

Finally, evidence suggests that Southern European countries concentrated family policy spending on increasing benefits rather than the scheme's coverage. Furthermore, Italian data does not include the allowance scheme for dependants other than children, although it accounted for 42% of total Italian beneficiaries (see Appendix, Table A1.4). Italian and Spanish numbers do not disaggregate spending on civil service. Nevertheless, Spanish evidence for 1958 shows that civil servants represented 2% of total family allowance spending (see Chapter 3, Appendix Table A3.6). Italy also introduced a separate family allowance system for public employees in 1952 (Lynch 2006). These figures are consistent with definitions of Southern European welfare states as clientelist systems, characterised by significant insider/outsider differences (Ferrera 1996). However, it also suggests significant differences between these countries, notably between Iberian dictatorships and Italy, where the political regime may have shaped the overall development of their welfare states—i.e., social spending capacity.

1.5. Conclusion

Family policies emerged as a fundamental dimension of welfare state formation during the first half of the 20th Century as most countries implemented policies to support male breadwinner families, mainly through cash benefits. However, an analysis of the development of maternity leaves and family allowances shows significant differences in timing and policy models that became apparent even before World War II. Central and Western European countries pioneered the implementation of family policies, as Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands developed early, statutory maternity leaves before World War I. By doing so, they established the model towards which most other countries tended to converge—maternity leaves designed as a part of health insurance to replace lost wages and provide health services to working mothers and the wives of insured male workers. On the other hand, France and Belgium pioneered family allowance implementation before World War II by developing employer-funded schemes covering all workers, which were later extended to independent workers, employers and landowners. This model prevailed among Central, Western and Southern European countries, although France and Belgium were the only countries to expand their scope beyond the working class.

By contrast, Northern European countries developed weak family policies until World War II. Except for Norway, these countries maintained much less generous maternity leaves than Central European countries until the end of the period. Nevertheless, after the conflict, Scandinavian countries developed universal family allowance schemes that, although with low cash benefits, became complemented by growing family services. Neither the United Kingdom nor, later on, Ireland developed ambitious family policies before World War II. Like the Scandinavian countries, they also developed tax-funded family allowances after the conflict, but, unlike them, their coverage remained more limited and did not implement effective family services.

By highlighting the different timings in the development of maternity leave and family allowance schemes in various countries, I do not claim the existence of a contradictory relationship between them. However, these findings contrast with Daly and Ferragina's (2017) research, which provided evidence of a layering pattern in the gradual diversification of family policies in OECD countries after 1960. According to their findings, after fully implementing maternity leave and universal family allowance schemes ('foundational phase'), these countries diversified their policy portfolio by introducing parental leave schemes and childcare services ('consolidation phase'). In contrast, the patterns observed in this chapter suggest that the development of core policies during the 'foundational phase' followed alternative patterns rather than a generalized layering process.

Furthermore, some countries show mixed features. For instance, early Norwegian maternity leave followed a social insurance model (although with higher State support). After World War II, Norwegian family allowance followed a tax-funded, universal scheme, but the evidence suggests that it remained far from universal. Luxembourg and the Netherlands also implemented a German-style maternity leave early in time. Nevertheless, family allowance spending and maternity leave performance data suggest that family policies moved towards a French-Belgian family policy model. Finally, the 1962 Dutch reform of family allowances increased their universality, making them more similar to their British counterparts.

Finally, Southern European countries were also latecomers in implementing maternity leave schemes but, in contrast, Italy and Spain emerged as pioneers of family allowance implementation. Along with Portugal, they invested a significant portion of their social spending in relatively generous but not universal schemes. These accounts are consistent with the Southern European Welfare Regime literature (Ferrera 1996; Naldini 2003) and the ‘families of nations’ (Pfenning and Bahle 2000; Bahle 2008) frameworks. However, there were significant differences between the three countries. For instance, although the Spanish and the Italian schemes emerged simultaneously and with similar outcomes before World War II, after the conflict, Italian spending, coverage and benefits became higher than in the Iberian countries. This suggests that, albeit the model was similar, the spending capacity was not and was driven by the overall social spending increase.

On the other hand, while the proportion of social spending devoted to supplying family allowances was impressive in Portugal as late as 1961, in Spain, this share had experienced a steady decline throughout the fifties. By showing so, the evidence suggests that political factors such as the political regime have more potential than cultural (Catholicism) and demographic (extended families) factors in explaining family policies in Southern European countries. At the same time, it reinforces the literature emphasising the role of political regimes in explaining social policy development (Lindert 2021; Espuelas 2012).

This story has other implications for the literature. First, by showing relevant differences between European family policies’ early development, it nuances some of the previous arguments about pre-1965 muted cross-country differences (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013; Van Winkle 2020; Montanari 2000). In other words, although most countries developed family policies to support the male breadwinner family — particularly family allowances— (Montanari 2000; Wennemo 1992), they did so by implementing different models. Moreover, this story suggests how a country performed during the first (maternity leave) and the second (family allowances) wave of family policy development highly conditioned its potential to cope with the third wave (de-familising family services). For instance, the reliance of French and Belgian family

benefits on the compensation fund system conditioned the subsequent reforms of the family allowances to build upon them rather than implementing a new, tax-funded, and comprehensive universal scheme (Dutton 2002; Pedersen 1995). By contrast, the absence of continental-style family policies before World War II and the existence of other universal, tax-funded welfare programs may help explain why, in Sweden and Denmark, the State invested more in universal cash benefits and services for families after the conflict. Moreover, those early efforts provided these countries with the necessary physical and social infrastructure to expand childcare centres dramatically after 1965. In other words, path dependence factors matter in explaining welfare regimes.

Nevertheless, the sharp transformation of family policies in Spain between the Second Republic and the Francoist dictatorship and in Germany between the Nazi regime and the Federal Republic also highlights the role of contingency, regime change and policy shifts in welfare state formation. This is relevant, given that traditionally, comparative, typological literature has relied on long-term structural factors as significant drivers of welfare typologies (Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera 1996; Castles 1993; Bahle 2008). Therefore, although this Chapter can help to approach the development of the European family policies from a historical perspective, more in-depth historical studies and comparative investigations are needed to explore the reasons behind such differences in the long run. Such research is provided in the following Chapters.

Appendix Chapter 1

Table A1.1. Leave extension in the European countries (max. number of weeks)								
	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960
Spain	0	0	0	0	2	12	12	12
Italy	0	0	4	4	8	10	10	14
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
Austria	4	4	4	10	12	12	12	12
Belgium	0	6	6	6	6	6	12	12
France	0	0	0	8	12	12	14	14
Germany	4	6	8	8	12	12	12	12
Luxembourg	0	0	4	4	8	8	12	12
Netherlands	0	0	0	12	12	12	12	12
Denmark	0	0	0	1.4	1.4	2	4	4
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	6
Ireland	0	0	0	4	4	4	4	12
Norway	0	0	6	8	8	8	8	12
Sweden	0	0	0	4	4	8	8	12
United Kingdom	0	0	0	4	4	4	4	18

Notes: Data from Portugal in 1960 refers to 1962.

Source: Own elaboration based on Harris (1919), ILO (1929, 1933, 1950), and Gauthier (1996, 2010).

Table A1.2. Replacement and coverage rates of European maternity leaves, circa 1955

Country	Replacement rate	Female pop (age 15-65, in thousands)	Coverage (in thousands)	Childbirths		Coverage rate
				assisted (cash benefit)	Total childbirths	
Southern Europe						
Spain	60%			225,910	601,500	38%
Italy	80%					
Portugal	33%					
Western Europe						
Austria	100%	2,510	1,915			76%
Belgium	60%	3,056	2,017			66%
France	50%	15,383	8,840			57%
Germany	100%	18,794	13,204			70%
Luxembourg	75%	104	69			66%
Netherlands	100%	3,102	2,033			66%
Northern Europe						
Denmark	19%	1,401				100%
Finland	39%					
Ireland	35%					
Norway	40%	1,137	960			84%
Sweden	45%	590				100%
United Kingdom	37%	16,499				100%

Source: Own elaboration. Replacement rates for 1960 from Gauthier (2010), female population from Mitchell (1998), and coverage for 1952 from ILO (1952). In the Spanish case, data on assisted childbirths in 1955 from the Year Book of Labour Statistics (ILO 1958, 495) and total childbirths from Nicolau (2005, 126).

Table A1.3. Family allowance generosity and coverage rate, 1937-1938

Country	Spending (Own currency)	GDP per head 1937 (own currency)	Covered families	Population	Spending per capita	Spending per head/GDP per head	Coverage rate
Spain	50,772,667	1,236	266,763	25,877,971	2	0.16%	1%
Belgium (workers)	342,323,422	10,583	566,722	8,092,000			
Belgium (independent)	193,168,000	10,583	1,301,000	8,092,000			
Belgium	535,491,422	10,583	1,867,722	8,092,000	66	0.63%	23%
France	1,340,000,000	10,052	1,617,000	41,183,000	33	0.32%	4%
Italy (industry)	127,567,344		790,000	42,919,000			
Italy (commerce)	13,709,948		ns	42,919,000			
Italy (agriculture)	16,133,500		257,729	42,919,000			
Italy	157,410,792	3,611	1,047,729	42,919,000	4	0.10%	2%

Notes: Spending and GDP per head are expressed in each country's currency. Spending and GDP data refer to 1937 for Belgium and Italy and 1938 for Spain and France. Population data refers to 1940 for Spain, 1936 for France and Italy, and 1930 for Belgium.

Source: Own elaboration, Data for GDP for Spain, Belgium, and France comes from Smits, Woltjer and Ma (2009), and for Italy from Baffigi (2013), Data about coverage and Spending from Hoffner (1940); population from Mitchell (1998). For Spanish data, see Chapter 3.

Table A1.4. Family allowance spending, coverage rate and cash benefits as a % of an unskilled industrial worker, 1960

Country	Spending (%GDP)		Spending (%Social Security)		Beneficiaries (children)	Beneficiaries (children)*	Beneficiaries (other)	Pop <14	Replacement rate (1 child)	Replacement rate (2 children)	Replacement rate (3 children)	Coverage rate
Southern Europe												
Spain	0.30%		10.07%		3,068,678		8,579	8,348,000	0%	6%	9%	37%
Italy	2.25%		18.80%		6,558,105	6,400,000	4,707,539	12,404,000	11%	11%	11%	53%
Portugal	0.87%		38.70%		704,496	775,897	109,215	2,390,000	15%	15%	15%	32%
Western Europe												
Austria	1.43%		10.90%		1,850,000	N		1,585,000	5%	6%	7%	100%
Belgium	2.02%		15.10%		1,911,204	1,855,038		2,191,000	9%	11%	13%	85%
France	2.99%		23.60%		7,091,319	N		12,238,000	8%	6%	17%	58%
Germany	0.30%		2.00%		1,538,100	1,056,000		12,185,000	0%	0%	7%	9%
Luxembourg	1.89%		13.00%		73,220	N	4,873		6%	6%	6%	
Netherlands	1.34%		14.00%		2,048,867			3,464,000	5%	6%	6%	59%
Northern Europe												
Denmark	0.45%		4.00%		1,270,000	1,406,000		1,135,000	2%	2%	2%	100%
Finland	1.36%		16.00%		1,415,292	1,415,000		1,338,000	5%	5%	5%	100%
Ireland	1.14%		13.00%		826,619	590,500		877,000	0%	2%	3%	67%
Norway	0.64%		7.00%		500,000	500,000		927,000	0%	2%	2%	54%
Sweden	1.30%		11.00%		1,843,350	1,847,000		1,649,000	2%	2%	2%	100%
United Kingdom	0.53%		5.00%		5,677,000	9,532,000		11,924,000	0%	8%	8%	80%

Note: Coverage rates are calculated from children beneficiaries as a % of the total population under 15 years of age.

*Data from Flora (1987).

Source: Own elaboration. Data for social spending from Flora et al. (1983), except for Luxembourg (see ILO 1964), Spain (see Espuelas 2013a), and Portugal (see Carolo and Pereirinha 2010). Data for children corresponds to 1958 and is gathered from ILO (1960, 1966). Replacement rates for 1960 from Gauthier (2010). Spanish data refers to 1958 (see Chapter 3).

Table A1.5. Distribution of family allowance revenues and family policy spending (family allowances for workers and civil servants, family services), 1960

Country	Distribution of family allowance revenues (own currencies)				Distribution of family policy spending (own currencies)				
	Insured	Employers	State	Other	Total revenues	Family allowance	Family allowance (civil servants)	Public assistance	Total social spending
Southern Europe									
Spain	660	2,638	230	56	3,584	2,543	-	-	26,414
Italy	-	416,471	16,760	167	433,398	416,096	-	-	ns
Portugal	12	669	2	2	683	612	122	-	3,794
Western Europe									
Austria	79	2,922	122	-	3,123	2,307	325	-	23,063
Belgium	1,290	9,899	803	25	12,016	12,090	1,936	-	86,498
France	798	7,707	903	954	10,362	10,069	1,951	6	40,776
Germany	-	908	9	6	923	903	450	-	47,970
Luxembourg	-	368	95	2	465	476	-	-	3,597
Netherlands	-	564	21	31	615	585	218	-	4,731
Northern Europe									
Denmark	-	-	170	-	170	170	-	237	4,214
Finland	-	201	14	-	215	215	-	96	1,376
Norway	11	6	190	0	208	208	-	73	3,061
Sweden	-	-	829	-	829	829	-	628	7,902
United Kingdom	-	-	141	-	141	141	-	-	2,831
Ireland	-	-	7	-	7	7	-	1	58

Notes: The Category 'others' includes income from capital, transfers from other social policy schemes, and 'other receipts'. The category 'public assistance' refers to a number of public complementary family services. In Scandinavian countries, public assistance captures social spending on complementary allowances for care and child maintenance, rent allowances, and services such as child welfare and school meals. Similarly, Irish public assistance for families refers to public health services for mothers and children, whereas in France, it refers to maternity allowances for the non-active population. Source: Own elaboration based on ILO (1964). Data from Italy refers to 1959 and comes from ILO (1961).

Chapter 2

The Political Economy of Social Insurance under Dictatorship and Democracy: The Case of the Spanish Maternity Leave, 1900-1944

2.1. Introduction

Income support for families with children was a constitutive part of the development of welfare states. From the late 19th Century, most Western European countries introduced compensatory provisions in their health insurance schemes guaranteeing working mothers the right to rest before and after childbirth (Gauthier 1996). By doing so, maternity leaves emerged as the first relevant family policy of European welfare states with essential gender dimensions. In explaining such a development, some authors have emphasised the role played by political elites, doctors, hygienists, and social reformers aiming at enhancing motherhood as a social value, protecting working mothers and their children and boosting fertility rates (Bock and Thane 1996b; Gauthier 1996; Pedersen 1995). However, most analyses focus on the general relationship between women, families and the State rather than investigating the specific configuration of maternity leave.

Yet, health insurance schemes developed with significant cross-country differences (Murray 2007) that influenced the shape of maternity leave models. Explaining such a diversity requires focusing on distributive conflicts and social coalitions that went beyond the gendered ideologies of political elites and social reformers. Therefore, several analyses have explained such differences as alternative ways to deal with moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Murray 2007), fiscal capacity (Pond and Vilar

2014), or the ability of doctors to capture the policymaking process (Companje et al. 2009). More generally, some authors emphasise the positive role of the working class political mobilisation in developing more generous and universal social policies (Esping-Andersen 1990; Hicks 1999; Rasmussen 2021; Korpi 1989). By contrast, other studies argue that employers in capital-intensive, high-risk firms also stimulated the formation of contributory social insurance for multiple risks, often in collusion with skilled workers (Mares 2004; Hellwig 2005). Similarly, some authors associate the development of universal, non-contributory entitlements with the lobby of export-led, family agribusiness (Baldwin 1990). Other studies highlight the role of women's movements — particularly maternalist feminism— in developing increasingly generous family policies (Hobson and Lindholm 1997; Koven and Michel 1993a; Skocpol 1995). Finally, several authors suggest that such cross-class distributive conflicts should be examined through the lens of institutional constraints such as religion —particularly in the case of family policies— (Morgan 2009; Van Kersbergen 1995) or the political regime (Lindert 2021).

This Chapter combines both historical debates by focusing on the Spanish case, which represents a good case study for several reasons. In Spain, paid maternity leave emerged as a primary issue among social reformers and policymakers, becoming the second compulsory social insurance passed in the country. However, although unpaid leave was introduced in 1900, Spain did not develop a voluntary, state-subsidised maternity allowance until 1923 and a compulsory scheme until 1931. At the same time, it appeared as a laggard compared to Western European countries as many of them had passed some maternity benefits before World War I. Moreover, unlike most other European schemes, it performed independently from any general health insurance scheme until 1944 (Pons 2010). Finally, such a process took part throughout regime change, from competitive oligarchy (1874-1923) to democracy (1931-36) and dictatorship (1923-31 and 1939-77), that conditioned social policy formation (Espuelas 2017; Comín 2010).

However, we still lack historical, long-term research investigating how political regimes, ideology, and social debates influenced maternity leave formation. As in other European countries, many authors explain Spanish maternity leave development as top-down policymaking led by an elite of Catholics, doctors and hygienists who conceived it as a

population policy to reduce infant mortality rates while at the same time reinforcing the male breadwinner family model (Blasco 2016; Nielfa 2004; Arbaiza 2000; Cenarro 2016). Moreover, although the elites developed this policy, most social groups shared their ideological underpinnings (Blasco 2016). As Cenarro (2016) argues, the Francoist dictatorship inherited these ideas, even though the regime reframed them in an authoritarian format. Top-down explanations of the maternity leave, developed without the direct involvement of its primary beneficiaries, are consistent with Vega's (2007) findings on the protests the scheme faced by large groups of working women who refused to pay for the insurance's contribution.

Despite highlighting important ideological drivers of maternity leave development, top-down explanations do not fully explain the scheme's timing or model. Generally speaking, previous literature has suggested that social unrest and regime stabilisation objectives were critical to drive the Spanish elites to introduce social reform in the first place, as were Left governments under the republican regime to implement and develop such reforms (Espuelas 2017; Samaniego 1988; Comín 2010). By contrast, insurance companies, the medical sector, employers, and landowners restrained health insurance's development for different reasons. Companies tried to avoid public competition, doctors wished to avoid public regulations of prices and fees, and employers and landowners opposed increasing financial burdens (Pons and Vilar 2014; Comín 2010; Cuesta 1988). Such distributive conflicts had profound implications for the model of compulsory maternity leave.

However, a systematic analysis of the long-term influence of social groups' divisions and political regimes over the development of compulsory maternity leave is still lacking. This Chapter investigates the political debates between interest groups —social reformers, the labour and women's movement, employers, doctors— and ideological factions —socialists, communists, anarchists, Catholics, reformist liberals, and feminists— from 1900 —when the unpaid maternity leave was passed— to the 1940s—when compulsory health insurance was implemented. It does so by focusing on the three key policy reforms that took place during the period: the frustrated development of health, maternity and invalidity insurance in 1922-1923; the indirect

controversies that preceded the approval of the Compulsory Maternity Insurance Act (1929); and the reactions to the Law's implementation and health insurance projects launched after 1931.

To that end, the study relies on several sources. For the first period, it is particularly relevant the use of the proceedings and reports of the National Conference on Sickness, Invalidity and Maternity Insurance held in Barcelona (hereafter, Barcelona Conference, 1922) organised by the INP, where several social groups debated about the shape of the future health insurance scheme. As for the subsequent period, the study predominantly relies on the Public Information on the Draft Bill on Maternity Leave. It resulted from an open call launched by the INP to collect the opinions of several organisations and prominent figures from the labour, women's and catholic movements, employers and doctors about the compulsory maternity leave Draft Bill they had developed. As a result, the Institute collected several reports sent by 168 respondents, with their opinions about the Bill's different articles. Despite the scarcity of respondents in absolute terms, the report collected a diverse and representative sample of the Spanish associative world and has been used by several qualitative studies, either as a central (see Cuesta 1988, 2012) or complementary source (see Blasco 2016; Pons and Vilar 2014; Sananiego 1988). However, to the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to systematically establish the opinions of social groups by codifying their preferences about alternative maternity leave models—i.e., about the benefits, coverage and financial resources the scheme should have. Finally, the analysis mainly relies on several reports about the social reaction to the scheme's implementation and the prospect of integrating it into a comprehensive health insurance scheme between 1931 and 1936. All these sources are complemented with information from trade unions, political manifestos, Party press, and other public forums and Parliament debates.

Therefore, maternity leave emerged from a Gordian Knot in Spanish social insurance history as low fiscal capacity and workers' and employers' opposition to funding health insurance forced social reformers to develop an isolated maternity leave scheme from 1923 (Pons 2010; Vilar and Pons 2014). As late as 1927, relevant employer's associations rejected any contributory maternity leave, and most workers —except Catholics—


opposed their contributions even if that meant shrinking its coverage and generosity. The Spanish Second Republic was crucial in implementing the scheme in 1931, as it made the socialist labour movement supportive of workers' contributions. This allowed compulsory maternity leave to be implemented without significant and persistent worker resistance, paving the way to develop a comprehensive health insurance scheme covering all waged workers and the wives of the insured male workers. However, the Spanish labour movement remained divided as anarchists, communists, and Catalan Left-wing republicans kept their opposition to workers' contributions. After their victory in the Spanish Civil War, the Francoist dictatorship developed a different health insurance and maternity leave scheme in 1944, less universal and with more participation from private insurance companies, employers' mutuels and the regime's trade unions.

This story has some implications for the literature. By presenting some evidence about Catholic opinions vis-à-vis policy outcomes and political regimes, it reassesses the influence of religion over social policy formation. Moreover, by considering the significant regime changes during the development of maternity leave, the Chapter provides some evidence about the mechanisms that link political regimes with social policy outcomes. Finally, analysing workers' ambivalence towards social policy allows for discussing the labour movement's role in the welfare state formation.

2.2. From protective legislation to compulsory maternity leave: The debates over social insurance during the Spanish Restoration regime (1900-1923)

Spanish fertility rates were higher than in other European countries, and the country's neutrality in World War I avoided massive human losses (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.1). In fact, demographic concerns were fuelled not by the decrease in fertility but by the relatively high infant mortality rates (Blasco 2016; Samaniego 1988). As Figure 2.1 shows, Spanish infant mortality rates remained among the highest in Western Europe throughout the period. In the words of Severino Aznar (1923, 186), one of the architects of compulsory maternity leave, 'infant morbidity and mortality is a terrifying plague. Every year Spain loses more than 100,000 children aged under one year, and as a result

[...] the population increase is negligible'. As the INP claimed in the justification of the compulsory maternity leave Bill, women's waged work before and after childbirth caused an important portion of those surplus deaths (INP 1928, 380). Therefore, the future insurance aimed to 'ensure the preservation [...] of the race, to reduce morbidity and mortality and to mitigate avoidable suffering of the Spanish mother and her children' (INP 1928, 383).



Source: International Historical Statistics (2013).

Nevertheless, demographic concerns did not translate immediately into effective public policies. Following the international conferences claiming maternity protection (see Chapter 1), the Social Reform Commission (CRS, for *Comisión de Reformas Sociales*) developed a Bill that, passed in 1900 and reformed in 1907, established the prohibition of work after childbirth for women in commercial and industrial workplaces.¹⁸ However, this legislation proved ineffective as employers sought to avoid workforce replacements

¹⁸ The Law of 1900 established a compulsory rest for the 3 weeks following childbirth, and the 1907 reform extended this period up to 6 weeks, plus 4 weeks before confinement under medical prescription (Gala 2007).

while working women could not afford to leave paid work without income compensation (Gala 2007).

The leading Spanish reformist institutions—the Institute for Social Reform (IRS, for *Instituto de Reformas Sociales*, 1903) and the INP (1908) were founded in the following years. Both Institutes included employers' and workers' representation, allowing these sectors to channel their demands. In 1906, the socialist General Union of Workers (UGT, for *Unión General de Trabajadores*) asked the IRS to modify the scheme. The proposal, advanced by the socialist leader Virginia González, would extend the leave and compensate wage losses by creating German-style Assistance Funds—also covering illness and invalidity (IRS 1909). Although this motion essentially reacted against an ineffective law, it was nonetheless a turning point in the attitude of the labour movement towards social policies. If both anarchists and socialists had been hostile to State reform in the past, workers' participation in the IRS and the INP made socialists more sympathetic to these (Martínez 1988).

However, no cash benefit for working mothers was introduced. Instead, the INP committed itself to promoting voluntary insurance in areas such as retirement pensions and maternity provisions to encourage self-help (Leal 1923). Nevertheless, the insufficient saving capacity of the Spanish working class and the scarce State support hindered the success of voluntary subsidised insurance schemes (Espuelas 2013b). As a result, only some regional institutions, such as the Women's Workers Institute, established in 1919 by the Catalan Fund of the INP, provided contributory maternity allowances and social services to married working mothers (López 1925).

Communitarian formal organisations did not perform better. In 1924, friendly societies barely covered 10% of non-agricultural workers in Spain, while these figures rose to 40% in the United Kingdom (Largo 2016, 647). Moreover, by 1921, only 1.23% of these societies provided maternity benefits (Pons and Vilar 2014, 51). As a result, maternity protection relied mainly on local charities, as milk depot initiatives (*gotas de leche*) expanded from covering 5% of the child population in 1914 to 25% in 1925 (Gracia 2010, 138).

Therefore, compulsory social insurance did not develop until the destabilising consequences of World War I became apparent. The rising inflation rates during the conflict and the industrial crises once it concluded dramatically increased social unrest, starting the so-called crisis of the Restoration regime (1917-1923). Class conflict fuelled the expansion of Spanish unions and worker's parties. The UGT exceeded the number of 200,000 members by 1920—3% of the total labour force.¹⁹ Its political branch, the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE, for *Partido Socialista Obrero Español*), gained its first MP in 1910. On the other hand, the anarchist National Labour Confederation (CNT, for *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo*) achieved an even more impressive membership of 699,369 in 1919 (Casanova 2000)—9% of the Spanish labour force. Social unrest also expanded Catholic and Conservative unionism. The most important among these, the General Corporation of Labour–Association of Free Unions (commonly labelled as the *Libres*), was founded in 1919 and reached around 175,000 members in 1922—2% of the active population (Zoffmann and Marinello 2021).

Although the immediate goals of this mobilisation were recognising labour unions as legitimate collective bargainers and improving working conditions (Martín 2008), the development of social policies was also gaining momentum. The UGT leader, Francisco Largo Caballero, raised a demand to the Government in 1919 for a Labour Code, including social insurance for sickness, maternity, and invalidity (Martín 2008). The *Libres* and other Catholic organisations also advocated implementing compulsory social insurance. In 1917, Catholic Action for Women—a leading cultural and political apostolic organisation—required the Government to implement a paid maternity leave covering married working women and funded by workers, employers, and the State (Cuesta 1988).

International commitments also pushed Spanish governments into action as the Washington Convention urged them to establish a paid maternity leave scheme. In this context, the Spanish last governments of the Restoration implemented some reforms, such as the 1919 compulsory old-age insurance (ROO, for *Retiro Obrero Obligatorio*). In 1922, the INP promoted the Barcelona Conference. Its objective was to discuss a project

¹⁹ Data on the Spanish labour force in Nicolau (2005, 147).

of compulsory insurance covering health, maternity, and invalidity with a broad representation of Spanish social groups (Cuesta 1988). It was compulsory to broaden coverage beyond skilled workers and to improve cost-effectiveness by managing a larger pool of premiums. As in the case of sickness, maternity leave would provide a flat rate cash compensation of 2.5 daily *pesetas*, since the absence of a professional census prevented to determine proportional benefits, although voluntary contributions could supplement benefits up to 75% of the worker's income (INP 1925, 127). Replacement benefits would be completed with a 100 *pesetas* lump-sum bonus to afford childbirth expenses and health services.

The scheme covered all wage earners except the self-employed —tenants, artisans, small landowners, and retailers— since their unknown numbers could substantially increase administrative costs. Furthermore, the INP feared that their inclusion, having to pay both personal and employer premiums, might escalate opposition to the scheme (INP 1925, 12). By contrast, they explicitly included domestic and home-based workers. Although occupying 31% of the female workforce (Núñez 1989), domestic workers had traditionally been excluded from labour regulations and social policies (Borrell-Cairol 2020), so their inclusion would represent a landmark in the Spanish social policy history. However, except for the speaker Graciano Silván's assessment of the numeric relevance of domestic workers among female employment (INP 1925, 112), no other argument favouring their inclusion has been found. The proposal also included agricultural workers, 24% of the female labour force—even more, considering the informality of this sector (Núñez 1989, 164).²⁰ Unlike other more industrialised countries, such as Germany, social reforms in Spain were not intended only to appease the urban working class but also the high levels of social unrest in the countryside (Espuelas 2022). However, Spanish agriculture was dominated by large, labour-intensive exploitations and small-sized family farms with fluid class relations, both with a high degree of seasonal employment. Such characteristics persistently hampered the implementation

²⁰ Nicolau (2005, 149) provides a similar picture. Moreover, considering that official statistics highly underrepresented female agricultural employment (Humphries and Sarasúa 2012), their importance would have been even higher.

of new social policies in the sector and the proper performance of the existing ones, largely due to employers' resistance (Cuesta 1988; Espuelas 2022).

Unlike ROO —funded by employers and the State— the future health insurance should also be funded by workers. Severino Aznar, a Conference promoter, argued that worker support was necessary to pay for the insurance health services, guarantee workers' representation in its administration, and turn its benefits into a social right (INP 1925, 268-269). As for the State involvement, the organisers specified that the municipalities and provincial administrations should fund part of health services out of charity budgets, while central Government expenditure remained ambiguously established 'according to the common good' (INP 1925, 126). In other words, Spanish governments had been persistently unable or unwilling to increase tax revenues, and, as a result, their support for social policy initiatives had been negligible (Espuelas 2013). Therefore, conference organisers conceived a scheme funded by compulsory contributions of employers and workers, relying occasionally on public support.

Socialists agreed with all issues except coverage and funding. As socialist Manuel Vigil argued, workers could not afford the costs of contributions, so they should be exempted from paying them (INP 1925, 267). Moreover, this was the model followed by the ROO. Regarding coverage, the scheme should also cover the wives of insured workers. Unfortunately, no socialist women spoke at the conference, but as the next sections will show, they probably shared their comrades' concerns. Catholics —including Catholic women— agreed with socialists on coverage but accepted the need for workers' contributions, as it was compatible with corporatism emphasised by social Catholicism (Montero 2004; Van Kersbergen 1995). Moreover, they also advocated for including a breastfeeding allowance for the mothers who nursed their children after maternity leave had finished. Those provisions represented a step towards 'what in Christian sociology is known as the family wage' (i.e., a sufficient wage for male workers to sustain his needs and those of his family) (INP 1925, 300).

On the other hand, representatives from insurance companies and doctors showed concern about the scheme's generosity. They warned that a costly leave could 'close the factory gates to married women' (INP 1925, 304). Moreover, they argued that future

insurance should only provide cash benefits. As in other countries (see Ansell and Lindvall 2021; Companje et al. 2009), Spanish doctors were hostile to the public regulation of fees and services (Pons and Vilar 2014; Espuelas 2022). However, the employers' representatives proved to be the most hostile sector towards the INP proposal. As José Marvá, President of the INP, complained, they did not speak at the Conference (INP 1925, 371). Such an opposition became, nevertheless, active once the Draft was sent to the Government (Pons and Vilar 2014), as it had been against the ROO (Cuesta 1988).

None of these complaints altered the INP's plans, as the document was approved and submitted to the Government without significant changes. However, the Government finally rejected the health insurance project, commanding the Institute to develop an isolated compulsory maternity leave. In August 1923, the Government also introduced a non-contributory maternity allowance of 50 *pesetas* per childbirth for all women insured by the ROO. This followed the ratification in 1922 by the Spanish Government of the 1919 Washington Convention (Cuesta 1988). Although conceived as a provisional policy whilst the INP developed the compulsory system, the collapse of the political regime in September delayed that development.

As Pons and Vilar (2014) outlined, Spain was not ready to develop a health insurance scheme. The country lacked the necessary infrastructure, the State could not fund it, and the contributions of workers and employers would have been excessive—they also generally refused to pay them. By 1920, Spanish tax collection was 5.7% of GDP, while Germany collected 20.7%, France 15.1%, Italy 16%, and Britain 23.3% (Comín 1996). Spanish Treasury benefited from the country's neutrality during World War I, thus avoiding the financial pressures that had pushed for fiscal modernisation in other countries. Moreover, Spanish employers' organisations, landowners, and their political allies fiercely opposed all the tax reform projects (Betran 2002). This opposition increased institutional instability, prevented Governments from finding resources for new social projects, and even made them unable to pass ordinary budgets (Betran 2002). As a result, six different governments took office from 1920 to 1923. Public order

was finally re-established after a coup d'état of General Miguel Primo de Rivera, establishing a dictatorship until 1931.

2.3. Contending schemes of compulsory maternity leave: The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1931)

The new regime changed the power balance between social groups. Primo de Rivera promoted Catholic parties, unions, and industrial and agrarian employers (Artola 1977). Under the dictatorship, the *Libres* trade unions reached their highest numbers, with 200,000 members (Zoffmann and Marinello 2021). The dictator also incorporated some distinguished Catholic women in his National Consultative Assembly, a corporate institution designed to replace Parliament. Nevertheless, the new regime also had to rely on the progressive labour movement, tolerating socialist activity —although restricting collective bargaining and strike actions— and incorporating the UGT leader Largo Caballero into the State Council (Martín 2008). Therefore, if limited, socialists maintained their presence in the corporate institutions and the INP under the dictatorship. Communists and anarchists faced a much worse scenario, as their organisations were prohibited and their members persecuted. These constraints limited their influence on social legislation and radicalised their attitudes toward the State and the reformist labour movement (Casanova 2000).

The institutions for social reform also experienced a problematic relationship with the regime. The Ministry of Labour, held by Eduardo Aunós, shut down the IRS because of the employers' pressure (Espuny 2021).²¹ Although the INP survived, it suffered a persistent lack of financial support throughout the period (Cuesta 1988). This social context is essential to understand the delay in developing the compulsory maternity leave Bill and the pressure each social group could exercise over it. In 1927, the INP sent several organisations a draft Bill on maternity leave to collect their opinions on the project. Their answers were published the same year in a report—the public information on the Draft Bill on maternity leave. As the document shows different social groups'

²¹ Employers' associations had always been hostile to the regulation of labour relations, which was the main aim of the IRS (Cuesta 1988).

preferences on how compulsory maternity leave ought to be, it has been used in many works (Cuesta 1988, 2012; Samaniego 1988; Pons and Vilar 2014).

However, to my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to treat its information systematically. As responding to public information was voluntary, the opinions collected were numerically scarce (see Table 2.1) and constituted a sample with some potential biases—for instance, many of those who replied were more sympathetic to the INP/maternity leave. However, as Cuesta (2012) argues, it did collect a significantly varied and representative source of the Spanish pressure groups. Furthermore, this chapter has complemented this report with many other sources to enhance the evidence's representativeness and introduce a diachronic perspective. As Table 2.1 shows, working-class organisations (trade unions and individual representatives), employers' associations (companies, chambers of commerce and employers' mutual benefit societies) and the medical sector (medical associations and schools, and individual doctors) are the three most important groups.

Table 2.1. Respondents to the 1927 public information by social group

Group	Total (nº)	% of total	Catholic (nº)	Catholic (% of category)	Women (nº)	Women (% of category)
Working-class	49	29%	12	24%	7	14%
Employers	32	19%	0	0%	0	0%
Medical sector	46	27%	0	0%	2	4%
Welfare Institutions	9	5%	1	11%	0	0%
Friendly societies	8	5%	1	13%	0	0%
Charity and philanthropy	7	4%	1	14%	0	0%
Mixed Unions	3	2%	3	100%	0	0%
Cultural and political associations	8	5%	5	63%	6	75%
Other individuals	6	4%	0	0%	1	17%
Total	168	100%	23	14%*	16	10%*

Note (*) These numbers indicate the share of Catholics and women within the total respondents.

Source: Own elaboration based on INP (1927).

The report also allows for an analysis of the views of women and Catholics separately. Catholics predominate among the mixed trade unions —they were actively Catholic and included both employers and workers— and among the cultural and political associations. They were also well-represented among workers. On the other hand, some female respondents overlapped with the Catholic ones—it is the case with cultural, political or trade unions. Moreover, most female trade unions were actively Catholic, as only one socialist women’s union, The Female Awakening, answered the survey.²² The report also shows respondents linked to the incipient —though weak— Spanish feminist organisations, such as Clara Campoamor, Victoria Kent, and Julia Peguero.²³

²² Founded in 1903 and with ramifications in the agriculture and textile sectors, it was an important socialist union of working women (Simón 2014).

²³ Clara Campoamor was a leading figure of the Spanish suffragettes. She and Victoria Kent —who would eventually oppose women’s suffrage some years later— were part of the Women’s Lyceum Club, and Peguero was a leading figure at the National Association of Spanish Women.

Among workers, it includes some UGT provincial branches and the leading socialist figures Lucio Martínez and Santiago Ramos.²⁴ The report also identifies remarkable Catholic unions such as the Regional Confederation of the *Libres* in Northern Spain or the Regional Confederation of Catholic Unions in Eastern Spain. Nevertheless, one of the report's most problematic omissions is the under-representation of Catalan workers. It only collects one —feminine and Catholic— union in a region which clustered the bulk of the ongoing maternity allowance's beneficiaries and female labour force participation.²⁵ Primo de Rivera's prosecution of anarchists, together with socialists' meagre presence in Catalonia, may explain this underrepresentation.²⁶

The INP also collected opinions from some employers' leading associations, such as the Federation of Manufacturers of Spinning and Textile Industries of Catalonia, the Employer's Federation of Gipuzkoa, and the Employer Commercial Defence of Madrid. However, the information did not record any answers from agricultural employers. The abovementioned opposition of agricultural employers and landowners to social insurance schemes may explain the lack of agricultural employers in the report. It did not record the participation of any insurance company either. Again, their opposition to the development of public social insurance and the conflicts that the INP maintained with the General Insurance Board during this period could explain such an absence (Pons and Vilar 2014; Cuesta 1988).

An aggregated approach to the explicit preferences of these groups regarding benefits, coverage, and funding suggests that different models were in place (see Table 2.2), with particularly acute controversies regarding coverage and funding. Therefore, the INP successfully promoted a twelve-week leave, covered by a flat rate payment representing 90%-100% of the average wage of textile working women. As the respondents gave their opinions as total amounts, as a proportion of workers' wages, or in *pesetas* per day, I

²⁴ Lucio Martínez was a member of the National Commission that coordinated UGT and PSOE and, during the Republic, a member of the UGT executive. Santiago Ramos was a spokesman at the INP (Martín 2008).

²⁵ Between 1923 and 1929, Catalonia and the Balearic Islands concentrated 48.57% of the maternity allowance recipients (Pons 2010).

²⁶ While Catalonia concentrated nearly half of the CNT membership, in 1931, the UGT only had 16,683 members in the region— 2.41% of their militancy (Bizcarrondo 2008).

have harmonised their preferences by taking a textile worker's daily wage as a reference. To standardise preferences expressed as total sums, I assumed a 6-day working week to divide these sums by the number of weeks of leave proposed.²⁷ In the few cases when the respondents proposed cash benefits without specifying the leave extension, I assumed they agreed with the INP proposal of twelve weeks. Although some of these estimations may not represent precisely the actual wage proportions that the responding groups envisioned, they help clarify each proposal's relative generosity vis-à-vis the other respondents.

Table 2.2. Explicit preferences of social groups on compulsory maternity leave

Group	Benefits				Breastfeeding allowance	Coverage		Funding
	Leave extension (max weeks)		Compensation (as % of wage)*			Sector	Wives of insured	
	Average	Median value	Average	Median value				
<i>INP Bill Proposal</i>	12	12	90%	90%	No	Except domestic	No	Tripartite
Non-Catholic workers	9.41	12	79%	90%	No	Except domestic	Yes	Employers + State
Catholic workers	10	12	118%	100%	Yes	All wage earners	Yes	Tripartite
Catholic	10.9	12	103%	100%	Yes	Except domestic	Yes	Tripartite
Medical sector	10.3	12	101%	90%	No	All wage earners	No	Tripartite
Women	10.5	12	105%	90%	Yes	All wage earners	No	Tripartite
Employers	10.9	12	106%	90%	No	Except domestic	No	Tripartite


*This proportion refers to the average wage of female textile workers as provided by the Spanish Statistical Yearbook (INE 1946, 1174-76).

Source: own elaboration based on INP (1927). For the distribution of preferences in absolute numbers, see Appendix, Table A2.1.

Non-Catholic workers were the less ambitious group in the sample (see Figure 2.2 for a more disaggregated picture). For instance, socialists like Santiago Ramos defended the

²⁷ As Vilar (2004) shows, the 48-hour working week in 6 days became the most common working time by the late twenties.

same compensation as the maternity allowance: a lump sum of 50 *pesetas*, 45% of the reference wage. The union from Callosa de Segura proposed a lump sum compensation of 87 *pesetas* (39%), higher than the maternity allowance but considerably lower than the INP project (INP 1927, 70, 82). As the following pages will show, this preference is mainly explained by their refusal of workers' contributions. By contrast, Catholic workers were the most ambitious group, as the Regional Confederation of the *Libres* in Northern Spain defended one of the most generous cash benefits —6 daily *pesetas*— that almost doubled the reference wage (INP 1927, 58). Since maternity leave addressed two primary concerns of Spanish (and European) social Catholicism —appeasing class conflict and promoting motherhood— they actively demanded generous benefits (Montero 2004; Van Kersbergen 1995).



Source: Own elaboration based on INP (1927).

Catholic women also advocated for a generous scheme. Rosa Urraca, Director of the Catholic Women's Action Bulletin in Vizcaya, suggested a leave of 12 weeks at full pay plus an allowance of 100 *pesetas* (1927, 63). Two feminine Catholic unions also proposed benefits surpassing the reference wage. Doctor Elisa Soriano also envisioned a generous leave by arguing for 12 weeks at full pay plus a 50 *pesetas* allowance. However, women's


representatives were divided, as liberal feminists generally converged with INP's preferences. Therefore, Clara Campoamor advocated for a 60% wage compensation — with a minimum of 2.5 daily *pesetas* — for 12 weeks (INP 1927, 68). On the other hand, the socialist union The Female Awakening advocated for a 200 *pesetas* compensation (INP 1927, 77).

The medical sector was also considerably divided. The Union of Doctors of Catalonia and Francisco Giner (a Charity doctor) proposed, respectively, 5 daily *pesetas* increased by a lump sum payment of 50 *pesetas*, and leave at full pay plus 125 *pesetas* (INP 1927, 123, 167). Nevertheless, some doctors were less generous, such as the Municipal Institute of Maternity and Paediatrics Director in Seville, who proposed a lump sum payment of 50 *pesetas* (INP 1927, 83).

There is an interesting outlier among employers, an individual company that appears in the report as *Sucesor de Montalvo y Redondo*. This company advocated for the most generous benefits in the sample—more than twice the wage of textile working women. However, this apparent generosity resulted from advocating a lump-sum payment of 250 *pesetas* for just 4.5 weeks of leave (INP 1927, 62). Two employer representatives also envisioned generous leaves that surpassed the reference wage: the Federation of Manufacturers of Spinning and Textile Industries of Catalonia and the *Société Générale des Cirages Français*. Both represented highly feminised sectors—textiles and canning. The former proposed 20 weekly *pesetas* compensation for twelve weeks, and the latter suggested the same benefit for ten weeks (INP 1927, 54, 57).

Among benefits, the most divisive issue was the inclusion of a breastfeeding allowance (see Figure 2.3). The Bill did not include it, and only Catholics and women advocated for the necessity of such allowance, whether in kind or cash. Although the survey defined in-kind benefits poorly, most of them —such as feminist Clara Campoamor or Doctor Elisa Soriano— referred to the right to rest during worktime or to use workplace nurseries (INP 1927, 66, 68). Monetary benefits were popular among Catholics, and some of them were ambitious, as cash benefit was a common social policy preference among European social Catholics (Van Kersbergen 1995). The Pamplona Union of Catholic Workers' Associations recommended 2.5 daily *pesetas* for 75 days and 2 daily


pesetas for the following two months (INP 1927, 124). The *Libres* unions envisioned a breastfeeding benefit of 4 *pesetas* for 12 weeks (INP 1927, 58). Others, such as the social Catholic and INP Provincial Inspector Alberto López, proposed 50 *pesetas* lump sum allowance (INP 1927, 60).




Source: Own elaboration based on INP (1927).

However, the evidence suggests higher controversies regarding coverage and funding. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 disaggregate preferences on coverage per family status and sector. First, all respondents accepted the inclusion of agricultural workers, except for the Federation of *Libres* Trade Unions of Vitoria, which defended that maternity leave should only cover industry and commerce. Therefore, entitling domestic workers and the wives of insured male workers became the major cleavage. Unlike at the Barcelona Conference, even the elites at the INP were reluctant to include them because ‘without effective [labour] inspection, the law will be unfruitful, and bureaucratic inspection at the household level always has frightened states away’ (INP 1929, 24). Consequently,

they feared that ‘efforts of including domestic workers [...] could cause resistances against the maternity leave that complicate its performance’ (INP 1929, 24).



Source: Own elaboration based on INP (1927).



Source: Own elaboration based on INP (1927).

In the 1927 report, Catholics (mainly Catholic unions) advocated including all the female labour force and the spouses of insured male workers. Given that the family was one of the pillars of Catholic ideals, its willingness to include the insured workers' wives is unsurprising (Montero 2004). They were also generally favourable to the inclusion of domestic workers. This might seem surprising given that the sanctity of the home was even more relevant for Catholics, but it is consistent with catholic unions' efforts to enrol a growing portion of the working class (Zoffmann and Marinello 2021). Furthermore, by 1920, Catholic unions performed better among domestic service than among industrial workers (Simón 2014, 335).

Non-religious workers generally advocated for a scheme covering wives of the insured workers, but without including the domestic sector. Meeting all the family's childbirth expenses was essential for a working class with little saving capacity. On the other hand, the lack of support for including the domestic sector is consistent with the weak unionisation of these workers and their abovementioned marginalisation as 'non-workers' in Spain and other countries (Borrell-Cairol 2020; Todd 2009). Among socialists,

however, it is worth noting that the three provincial UGT branches and Lucio Martínez did support their inclusion, illustrating an interest that would increase in the future.


The medical sector and women generally advocated for a professional-based maternity leave covering all sectors but not the wives of the insured workers. On the other hand, the survey suggests a cleavage between middle-class and working women. Women's unions overwhelmingly argued for entitling insured wives but did not support covering domestic workers. By contrast, most middle-class women rejected including male workers' wives in the scheme and were divided about insuring domestic workers. Such a division emerged even across ideological lines, as liberal Clara Campoamor and Catholic Juana Salas proposed entitling them (INP 1927, 29, 41), while republican Victoria Kent and Catholic Rosa Urraca opposed that (INP 1927, 21, 34).

The employers presented less universal preferences and generally favoured excluding the wives of the insured and the domestic sector. Some of them, like the Federation of Manufacturers of Spinning and Textile Industries of Catalonia, also advocated excluding home-based workers. Although difficult to estimate, this type of work, highly feminised and informal, was particularly spread in the textile sector (Núñez 1989).

Funding was the other crucially divisive issue (Figure 2.6). It divided non-Catholic workers, who strongly opposed their contribution, and all other respondents—even Catholic workers—who overwhelmingly supported a tripartite scheme. Moreover, evidence from non-Catholic workers suggests a sharp division within socialist unions. First, although socialist leaders Lucio Martínez and Santiago Ramos rejected workers' contributions (INP 1927, 145, 163), regional UGT federations from Cáceres and Biscay accepted them (INP 1927, 152, 160). Second, although some divisions arose between high-skilled and low-skilled workers, finding a linear division explaining the degree of support for the tripartite contribution is challenging.²⁸ Third, the religious division also influenced women's unions, as even Catholic women's unions advocated for the

²⁸ For example, some unions from agricultural and textile workers and waiters, refused to pay contributions (INP 1927, 156, 159, 165) while office and printing workers accepted it (INP 1927, 19, 163). However, one can find also some chemical workers opposing workers' contribution (INP 1927, 156) and agricultural workers accepting the tripartite scheme (INP 1927, 21). Unfortunately, the collected answers are not large, representative, and detailed enough to find more systematic patterns.

tripartite scheme. Only the Catholic Union of Working Women of Santiago refused the workers' share, probably because they came from a region with many labour-intensive firms and high temporary employment rates (Samaniego 1988). On the other hand, the socialist union Female Awakening refused tripartite contributions by arguing that female wages were insufficient to afford their shares (INP 1927, 167).



Note: Category 'other' may refer to just the State, workers and the State, or employers and workers.

Source: Own elaboration based on INP (1927).

Opinions of employers' representatives also present interesting patterns. All individual companies accepted a tripartite contribution—almost all from the industrial region of Gipuzkoa. Moreover, 12 out of 21 already provided maternity allowances to their workers. These facts suggest that the companies whose opinions were collected by the INP's report were the most sympathetic to compulsory maternity leave. The Chambers of Commerce also supported tripartite contributions. This is consistent with research that shows that the dictatorship was able to subordinate them to Government purposes (del Rey 2007). Employers' mutuels also agreed with the INP Draft. Amongst employer's

associations, the Employer's Federation of Gipuzkoa accepted the tripartite contribution and even argued for reducing the workers' share (INP 1927, 162). This region had many large-scale, capital-intensive firms, a feature associated with a more positive attitude from employers regarding social insurance (Mares 2004). Moreover, female labour force participation was weaker in this region, making maternity leave a relatively cheap social policy. Finally, social Catholicism was robust, and the most influential right-wing political party, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV, for *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*), maintained close ties with the Catholic labour movement (Ansel 2011).

By contrast, the Employer Commercial Defence and the Federation of Manufacturers of Spinning and Textile Industries of Catalonia advocated for an entirely State-funded scheme. However, the proposals of the two organisations were different. The former rejected even the compulsory scheme 'because it imposes a new burden on production in crisis and overburdened with taxes' (1927, 19), an over-taxation that would eventually reduce women's employment (INP 1927, 162).

The Federation proposed a scheme funded by 'a percentage of the inheritance tax allocated to the workers' retirement fund, a portion of the fines levied by the Labour Inspectors, and a share of the amount allocated by the Town Councils and County Councils to the Charity Service in their budgets' (INP 1927, 147). Therefore, raising taxes or introducing new ones was not part of their proposal. If this was not possible, the Federation accepted the tripartite formula but argued that the State should afford 60% of the insurance cost while employers and workers should bear no more than 20% each. As a lobby from a sector dominated by labour-intensive firms, they had incentives to avoid increasing labour costs (Espuelas 2022). Furthermore, some companies already provided this service to their workers and feared that workers would transfer the cost of their contributions to the employers via wage increases. In a 1929 survey regarding the expansion of social insurance, the President of the employer's organisation Social and Economic Studies warned that compulsory workers' contributions 'would likely lead to higher wages in the long run' (AIPS 1929, 34).

The other respondents overwhelmingly agreed with the tripartite contribution. Catholic's agreement was coherent with the necessity to develop a more ambitious

scheme. Moreover, it was consistent with their corporatist ideology, aimed at countervailing class antagonisms by promoting collaboration between labour and capital, and their preference for social policies over wage improvements (Montero 2004; Van Kersbergen 1995). Middle-class professionals —doctors and liberal women— also accepted tripartite contributions, which is not surprising given that they were ideologically or professionally committed to the elites of the INP.

In the end, the INP managers overcame resistance from employers and workers. In a session of the National Consultative Commission for Employers and Workers (CANPO, for *Comisión Asesora Nacional Patronal y Obrera*) held in March 1927, employers' representatives conceded that 'compulsory insurance must be supported by the co-participation of the employers and workers' (CANPO 1927, 42). Workers' representatives also accepted their share in the scheme, conceding that it 'will be more than compensated by the extent of the insurance' (CANPO 1927, 43–44). However, they also warned of the extreme difficulty of their decision since there were 'various elements in the working class whose mission is to ensure that the cost of this, like other social insurances, should be paid entirely by the employer's class or by the State' (CANPO 1927, 43). These oppositions would still prove challenging in the future.

2.4. Maternity leave implementation under democracy and dictatorship: the Spanish Second Republic and early Francoism (1931-1944)


In the end, INP's Bill was passed in March 1929. It established a compulsory leave of six weeks after and up to six weeks before childbirth by providing a cash benefit of 90 to 180 *pesetas* and health services to all female workers who earned less than 4,000 yearly *pesetas*, except the domestic ones. Unlike most European flat rate benefits, which provided a fixed sum, the Spanish compensation depended on the number of quarterly premiums paid—15 *pesetas* per trimester funded by workers and employers at 50%, being the minimum six and the maximum twelve premiums. In addition, the State provided a bonus of 50 *pesetas* per childbirth and, during the first triennium, the difference needed to complete the minimum premiums for all pregnant workers. The

previous debates inspired some modifications in the final Law, introducing a breastfeeding allowance of 5 *pesetas* per week and child for a maximum of 10 weeks.

Nonetheless, the dictatorship fell before implementing the scheme. In April 1931, the Spanish Second Republic was proclaimed, and a Republican–Socialist Coalition came to power. In the new context, the PSOE became the leading political party, and the UGT membership dramatically increased, surpassing one million members —12% of the labour force— in 1932 (Bizcarrondo 2008). The new context enabled the socialist leader Largo Caballero and their allies to advance social programs. Thus, they ratified 16 of 33 ILO conventions endorsed between 1919 and 1936, extended workplace accident insurance to agricultural workers, developed a voluntary unemployment insurance scheme and started the development of two unified social insurances—health, invalidity and maternity, and old-age and death (Cuesta 2021; Samaniego 1988).

However, the economic conditions made structural changes challenging. Although the Depression did not hit the Spanish economy as hard as other countries, industrial production decreased, and unemployment rose during the early thirties (Cabrera 1983). Moreover, the new regime had to manage capital flights and hostility from capitalists and landowners to tax reforms (Cabrera 1983). These restrictions made the republican governments focus on fiscal discipline, restraining the budgetary funding of new social policies (Martorell and Comín 2002). Therefore, they focused on modifying labour relations and improving contributory social insurance to increase working-class bargaining power and living standards (Espuelas 2022).

In this context, the compulsory maternity leave was implemented in October 1931. To strengthen the scheme, the Government prohibited dismissal due to marriage, introduced specific contributions for home-based workers and accelerated the legal proceedings against defaulting employers (Núñez 1989). As a result, maternity leave developed steadily throughout the Republican period, thus becoming central among Spanish social policies. As Figure 2.7 shows, by 1935, it accounted for 35% of public social insurance spending, only outperformed by the ROO. Moreover, by the end of 1933, it covered 591,243 workers. Compared with data provided by Nuñez (1989, 164, 176), this represented 78% of potential recipients and 54% of the women’s labour force.



Source: Own elaboration based on INP (1936, 166). Spending data has been deflated using Prados de la Escosura (2003, 365). For more information, see Appendix, Table A2.2.

However, the new scheme faced opposition and resistance from different sides. From the beginning, many working women mobilised against its contributory character, advocating for a scheme funded only by employers and the State. Protests were significant in Catalonia, Valencia, Galicia, Aragon, and Navarre (Vega 2007), particularly in industrial sectors where the labour movement was stronger (INP 1932, 9). Campaigners received support from the anarchist CNT, which competed with the UGT to increase their influence over the working class (Casanova 2000).

The strike activity decreased after a few months, and the CNT engaged in collective bargaining to modify the scheme. In Catalonia, they negotiated an agreement with the Federation of Manufacturers of Spinning and Textile Industries of Catalonia that would include modifications in the maternity leave and exempt workers from their contribution (Vega 2007). Although they failed to introduce this demand at the provincial or regional level, they did achieve some modifications at the local level. In Mataró —an important textile city in the Province of Barcelona— employers agreed to

pay their employees' contributions and complement the maternity leave up to 180 *pesetas* (INP 1932, 149).


Nevertheless, finishing active resistance did not mean the end of workers' opposition to tripartite contributions. As socialist Enrique Santiago (1935, 720) complained, the persistence of anti-insurance attitudes among workers impeded a faster implementation of compulsory maternity leave. For instance, in their Manifesto for the 1933 general election, the Spanish Communist Party advocated establishing a social insurance scheme funded by employers and the State (reproduced in Artola 1977, 477). Other Communist parties like the French one shared suspicion towards social insurance funded by workers (Dutton 2002, 78). The Soviet health model, funded by the companies and the State (Kaufmann 2013), and their hostility to the Republican regime and the PSOE (Artola 1977) probably influenced this opposition. Similarly, the Republican Left of Catalonia —the leading party in the Catalan Parliament— also advocated in 1933 for establishing a universal and regional-based social insurance scheme funded by a 'tax on employee's wages, from 8% to 10%, paid by the employers' (Macià 1933, 5).²⁹

Employers' resistance to maternity leave took the form of evasion. A report on social insurance performance showed that the inspection's judicial action collected 1,490 million *pesetas* from 16,004 defaulting employers (INP 1936a, 73). Another report, in this case of the Insurance Inspection for the year 1935, argued that the inspection was challenging 'in agricultural labour and related sectors, because of their extraordinary eventuality; in the fishing and canning industries; in piecework, [...] and especially in home-based work' (INP 1936a, 44). According to Inspector José de Posse (1935, 9), the number of defaulting employers was higher among small-scale businesses. Although I have not found systematic evidence of defaulting employers on maternity leave, these figures are consistent with the difficulties denounced by the INP (1932) in consolidating the scheme, particularly in agriculture, home-based, piecework and temporary workers.

²⁹ The Second Republic recognised Catalonia as an autonomous region, with their own Parliament and a regional Government.

In fact, by 1933, temporary workers accounted for 34% of insured workers and agricultural workers for 24% (Núñez 1989, 176).

The last crucial constraint to developing the scheme was the opposition from doctors. According to the INP (1936b, 34), developing health services had found the opposition of medical associations and institutions, which had delayed the development of clinics and other vital services. Consequently, the scheme invested most of its resources in replacing working mothers' incomes during the leave and breastfeeding periods (see Figure 2.8). However, spending on direct childbirth assistance and health care services performed worse as it did not rise at the same rate. Such underperformance was a failure, given that one of the main goals of the maternity leave was to develop the necessary health infrastructure to assist working mothers during their pregnancy and childbirth (INP 1936b, 34).



Source: Own elaboration based on INP (1936b, 164). For more information, see Appendix, Table A2.3.

By contrast, most socialists joined the INP in defending the scheme. The UGT General Congress held in 1932 publicly accepted the need for workers' contributions as a

precondition to developing a German-style comprehensive health insurance system (UGT 1933, 288–90). Socialists Manuel Vigil and José Torre justified this position by considering the high cost of social insurance; that contributions from workers distinguished poor relief from social entitlements; and because it was the most common scheme in neighbouring countries (Vigil and Torre 1932, 12–13).

Establishing a unified social insurance system also addressed the debate about entitling domestic workers. The UGT leaders Largo Caballero and Julián Besteiro included this demand in an open letter to the union's membership (1930, 16). Moreover, in March 1931, an assembly of domestic workers chaired by the UGT member Claudia García demanded being covered by social policies and labour regulations (*El Socialista* 03/03/1931, 3). Socialist interest in these workers intensified from the late twenties when they realised their numerical importance among the female labour force (*El Socialista* 08/03/1931, 5). Some feminists also supported covering domestic workers, as Clara Campoamor urged the Labour Commission in the Spanish Parliament to amend the scheme to entitle them (*Comisión Parlamentaria de Trabajo* 1/9/1931, 14).

This attitude was gaining momentum even in the INP. In a document approved by its Corporate Commission, they advocated for including domestic workers in all social insurance schemes. They argued that the traditional paternalistic barriers differentiating domestic from other workers had vanished with economic transformations. The domestic service was becoming increasingly similar to the general labour force, so it should no longer be excluded from the labour legislation (CANPO 1931, 72–74). This position had earlier materialised in the Labour Contract Law of 1931, which considered domestic workers subject to the general labour regulation (Borrell-Cairol 2020).

In the end, the Popular Front Government elected in February 1936 submitted the Bill in May 1936 and called for a public opinion process (*Gaceta* 28/05/1936, 1787-1792). The Bill entailed the Spanish maternity leave to converge with the German, Austrian, or French models. It would incorporate compulsory maternity leave into a health and invalidity scheme, covering all working women and entitling the wives of insured workers to health services and facilities. Cash benefits would be equivalent to those of the health insurance —25% of a variable wage base from the fourth day and 50% from

the eighth one— plus 50 *pesetas* per childbirth and a new supplementary subsidy for family expenses. As cash benefits, premiums paid by employers and workers would also be proportional to a variable wage base.³⁰

Nevertheless, the Spanish Civil War outbreak in July 1936 finished this project. Moreover, the conflict reinforced the opposition from employees in collectivised companies to pay insurance contributions by arguing that ‘since the employer has disappeared, they have nothing to pay’ (Santiago 1936, 753). Such opposition was particularly intense in Catalonia, leading the regional Government—which from September included republicans, anarchists, and communists—to release women workers from paying their contribution, which would be fully collected from employers and the State (DOGC 10/10/1936, 124).

The Spanish political landscape changed dramatically after the republican defeat. The new regime abandoned the social insurance unification projects and crushed workers’ bargaining capacity. The fall in real wages became the centre of a labour-intensive industrial strategy, and social insurance arose as a cheap alternative for maintaining working-class living standards and enforcing the regime’s legitimacy (Pons and Vilar 2012).

In that context, health insurance was finally passed in 1942 and implemented in 1944. It modified the maternity leave scheme by establishing a cash benefit equal to 60% of previous earnings—higher than for health insurance, established at 50%— plus a breastfeeding benefit of 7 weekly *pesetas* until 10 weeks. Nevertheless, given that the regime became persistently unable or unwilling to develop a comprehensive hospital system, maternity leave proved incapable of providing adequate healthcare services (Vilar and Pons 2019). Moreover, although the scheme formally entitled domestic, agricultural and home-based workers, effective coverage of these sectors under Francoist social insurance was hardly enforced (de Dios 2018; Vilar and Pons 2014). Finally, the scheme’s effectiveness became increasingly under threat under a dictatorship that performed aggressive legislation to remove women from paid work,

³⁰ Although the Draft envisaged an official base wage scale, it did not specify its values or the family bonus amount.

thus pushing a remarkable number of working women towards informal employment (Nash 1996). As a result, although it also entitled the wives of insured workers to maternity benefits, they were not linked to the health insurance but to the family allowance system, aimed at reinforcing the family wage.

2.5. Conclusion

From the last decades of the 19th Century, high infant mortality rates, international conventions, and social unrest increased Spanish reformers' and policymakers' concerns over maternity protection. Moreover, the failure of the 1900 unpaid maternity leave and the relative weakness of friendly societies fuelled public interest in developing public cash compensation. However, the Spanish low fiscal capacity constrained the State's ability to support social policies (Comín 2010). This forced social reformers and policymakers to develop compulsory social insurance schemes, like in Germany, Britain and France, rather than tax-funded, universal systems as in Sweden. However, Spanish relatively abundant labour-intensive firms, low company concentration and a high share of agricultural employment increased conflict about the distribution of insurance costs (Espuelas 2022). This delayed the development of compulsory maternity leave, and once implemented, it became —as in Italy in 1910— the only European maternity leave system independent of health insurance.

In that process, the political regime became crucial in shaping the lobbying capacity of each social group and, at the same time, it conditioned their attitudes towards the scheme. Therefore, this Chapter shows significant differences between social groups regarding compulsory maternity leave models. Moreover, it also highlights relevant intragroup differences. Most employers persistently opposed funding social insurance. As seen in the Catalan case, medium-sized and labour-intensive firms tried to avoid further increases in production costs, sharing this concern with agricultural employers (Espuelas 2022). Furthermore, Spanish employers feared workers could transfer their insurance costs via wage increases. Nevertheless, after the republican proclamation and the implementation of compulsory maternity leave, some employers —as shown in the Catalan case— accepted to fund maternity leave even on more generous terms than the

national scheme. Furthermore, the INP's survey suggests that employers from some regions did accept tripartite contributions, as in the case of the Basque country, probably related to the regional importance of capital-intensive firms, low female labour force participation, and the influence of social Catholicism (Ansel 2011; Mares 2004). However, as the evidence presented here does not allow for more systematic comparisons, further research is needed to fully understand employers' differences regarding social insurance.

On the other hand, the Spanish labour movement shows clear divisions regarding compulsory maternity leave—and social insurance more broadly. Anarchist and communist workers consistently opposed the contributory maternity leave by arguing that women's wages were too low to afford their share. Such an attitude did not change until the Spanish Second Republic increased socialist influence over social insurance development, the political system and labour market legislation. As the INP survey suggests, socialist workers shared such concerns, advocating for a scheme fully funded by employers and the State even if that meant limiting its generosity and universality. Unlike them, Catholic workers did support tripartite contributions in exchange for developing a generous and quasi-universal maternity leave scheme. Catholics envisioned maternity leave as a key policy to enforce the social role of maternity and the family as a central institution, and tripartite contribution was consistent with their corporatist ideology (Montero 2004, Blasco 2016).

The INP survey suggests similar divisions among the women's movement—most middle-class women sided with the INP, while women's unions shared the opinions of male trade unions. This lack of women's unified agenda is consistent with the lack of a massive, grassroots feminist movement in Spain as in Anglo-Saxon countries (Tavera 2009). Finally, doctors advocated for a generous maternity leave covering all working women, but during the republican period, the resistance to regulated fees and services delayed the scheme's implementation, especially its health services.

This story shows that the political regime was central in explaining social policy development by shaping the labour movement's influence over policymaking (see Espuelas 2017; Lindert 2021). This has implications for the literature on the impact of

religion and familist ideology on social policies, particularly family policies (Morgan 2009; Van Kersbergen 1995). In Spain, Primo de Rivera and Franco dictatorships constrained compulsory maternity leave development even if they promoted Catholic trade unions —which envisioned a generous scheme— and such a policy was consistent with the regime’s ideology. Finally, showing how the political regime influenced the labour movement’s preferences has implications for the power resource theories (Esping-Andersen 1990; Hicks 1999; Rasmussen 2021; Korpi 1989). In Spain, the Republican regime increased socialist influence over policymaking, which was essential for them to accept workers’ contributions as a part of a reformist agenda. Given the Spanish low fiscal capacity and in the context of an economic downturn, developing contributory schemes became the only way to achieve these goals. This suspicion-to-support process is similar to the transformations of the British Labour movement’s attitudes towards state welfare during the same period (Thane 1984, 2007; Graves 2009; Pelling 1979). Nevertheless, the persistent division of the labour movement and the bottom-up revival of workers’ opposition to paying for social insurance during the Civil War suggests that the support from the apparatus did not translate immediately to the rank-and-file members of the labour movement and depended on institutional stability to be secured.

Appendix Chapter 2

Table A2.1. Distribution of explicit preferences regarding benefits (absolute numbers)

Typology	Leave extension (weeks)				Compensation (wage proportion)*					Compensation (average)		Compensation (modal value)	Breastfeeding benefit			
	Less than 12	12 or more	Other	NS	Less than 80%	80%-100%	More than 100%	NS	Total Benefits	Daily pesetas	Wage proportion		Monetary	In-kind	NS	Total
INP Bill proposal	X				X					2.78	90%	2.78	X			
Non-Catholic workers	4	7	0	6	3	14	0	3	20	2.46	79%	2.78	2	0	15	17
Catholic workers	2	2	1	1	1	3	1	1	6	3.64	118%	3.09	3	0	3	6
Catholic	3	8	1	3	1	8	2	4	15	3.19	103%	3.09	8	1	6	15
Medical sector	8	4	1	11	2	8	5	11	26	3.11	101%	2.78	3	8	13	24
Women	4	5	0	3	1	4	2	5	12	3.24	105%	2.78	3	4	5	12
Employers	3	8	0	1	1	8	3	1	13	3.28	106%	2.78	2	1	9	12
Welfare institutions	1	2	0	0	0	4	0	0	4	2.76	89%	2.78	2	0	1	3
Friendly societies	1	2	0	1	0	4	0	0	4	2.64	85%	2.78	0	1	3	4
Charity and philanthropy	2	2	0	0	0	2	1	1	4	3.09	100%	ns	0	0	4	4
Mixed unions	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	1	3	2.39	77%	3.09	2	0	1	3
Cultural and political associations	2	3	0	1	0	3	1	2	6	3.13	101%	2.78	1	3	2	6
Other individuals	1	1	0	3	0	1	1	3	5	4.05	131%	ns	0	1	4	5
Total	31	47	3	30	9	61	16	32	118	3.08**	100%**	2.87**	15	14	55	84

*This proportion refers to the average wage of textile-working women (see text).

** It refers to the average compensation envisioned by all social groups.

Source: Own elaboration based on *Resumen de la Información pública sobre el anteproyecto de seguro de maternidad* (INP 1927).

Table A2.1 (cont.). Distribution of explicit preferences regarding coverage, and funding

Typology	Coverage								Contribution				
	Wives of the insured workers			Excluded sectors					Tripartite	Employers + State	State	Other	Total Contribution
	No	Yes	NS	Domestic and more sectors	Domestic	None	NS	Total coverage					
INP Bill proposal	X			X					X				
Non-Catholic workers	5	17	4	1	16	8	1	26	7	19	0	1	27
Catholic workers	1	7	0	0	0	4	4	8	6	1	0	0	7
Catholic	6	12	0	1	5	6	6	18	14	1	0	1	16
Medical sector	9	4	2	1	2	8	4	15	7	0	1	2	10
Women	7	6	0	0	3	5	4	12	7	3	1	2	13
Employers	9	0	1	4	6	0	0	10	10	0	4	1	15
Welfare institutions	1	2	0	0	3	0	0	3	5	0	0	0	5
Friendly societies	4	2	0	0	3	2	1	6	2	1	0	1	4
Charity and philanthropy	2	2	0	0	1	2	1	4	3	2	0	0	5
Mixed unions	1	2	0	1	0	1	1	3	5	0	0	1	6
Cultural and political associations	5	1	0	0	3	2	1	6	3	0	0	0	3
Other individuals	2	1	0	0	1	1	1	3	1	0	1	0	2
Total	52	56	7	8	43	39	24	114	70	27	7	9	113

Note: 'NS' refers to the cases where no explicit preferences are provided.

Source: Own elaboration based on *Resumen de la Información pública sobre el anteproyecto de seguro de maternidad* (INP 1927).

Table A2.2. Social spending of Spanish social insurance schemes in 1958 pesetas (1920-1933)

Year	Old age insurance		Maternity allowance and insurance		Voluntary insurance (State subsidy)		Other		Total spending (in pesetas)
	Total spending (in pesetas)	As % of total spending	Total spending (in pesetas)	As % of total spending	Total spending (in pesetas)	As % of total spending	Total spending (in pesetas)	As % of total spending	
Until 1920	-	0%	-	0%	3,424,480	89%	413,383	11%	3,837,863
1921	-	0%	-	0%	1,556,090	88%	210,778	12%	1,766,868
1922	174,182	7%	-	0%	1,845,441	78%	345,128	15%	2,364,750
1923	688,009	19%	127,881	4%	2,320,565	65%	407,205	11%	3,543,660
1924	2,720,898	32%	2,174,793	26%	2,605,277	31%	942,065	11%	8,443,032
1925	9,155,584	55%	2,836,091	17%	3,085,629	19%	1,449,351	9%	16,526,656
1926	18,014,423	62%	4,300,740	15%	4,047,952	14%	2,599,664	9%	28,962,779
1927	25,899,178	59%	7,048,715	16%	7,265,371	16%	3,954,838	9%	44,168,102
1928	32,265,471	64%	6,023,256	12%	6,960,833	14%	5,011,658	10%	50,261,218
1929	54,650,146	69%	6,930,449	9%	11,138,316	14%	6,198,698	8%	78,917,610
1930	56,401,003	64%	6,060,000	7%	16,046,826	18%	9,271,370	11%	87,779,199
1931	59,479,580	50%	28,097,599	24%	19,037,760	16%	11,738,313	10%	118,353,251
1932	70,341,708	55%	24,405,431	19%	17,973,743	14%	15,580,010	12%	128,300,891
1933	92,356,832	46%	67,652,841	34%	21,118,769	11%	17,550,978	9%	198,679,419
1934	85,023,190	45%	64,881,777	34%	20,604,894	11%	18,430,803	10%	188,940,663
1935	101,942,454	46%	76,053,490	35%	21,054,580	10%	20,598,758	9%	219,649,281
Total	587,270,293	51%	287,711,118	25%	154,821,082	14%	110,892,165	10%	1,140,694,658

Source: INP (1936, 166). Data has been deflated using Prados de la Escosura (2003: 365).

Table A2.3. Distribution of compulsory maternity leave spending

Benefits	Spending (in current pesetas and as a proportion of total spending)				Total (in %)
	1932	1933	1934	1935	
Direct assistance					
Regular childbirths	430,407	877,738	936,141	992,560	15%
Anomalous childbirths	119,302	339,209	393,886	885,789	12%
Total direct assistance	549,709	1.216.947	1.330.027	1.878.349	25%
Health care benefits					
Complementary assistance*	0%	637,247	463,728	298,304	4%
Maternity and child assistance	0%	1,050,929	758,071	479,646	6%
Nursery and sanitary inspection	9%	286,933	98,655	255,330	3%
Total health care	203,078	1,975,109	1,320,454	1,033,280	14%
Total Health care benefits	752,788	3,192,056	2,650,481	2,911,629	39%
Cash benefits					
Leave benefits	823,032	1,604,448	2,407,785	3,163,993	42%
Breastfeeding benefits	703,648	1,359,905	1,222,290	1,370,015	18%
Total cash benefits	1,526,680	2,964,353	3,630,075	4,534,008	61%
Total benefits	2,279,467	6,156,409	6,280,556	7,445,637	100%
Total	4,975,032	12,655,116	22,162,068	4,531,921	20%

*Such benefits were provided for a persistent child illness, a surgical operation or an illness resulting from childbirth
Source: INP (1936, 164)

Chapter 3

The Political Economy of Family Allowances in a Catholic Country: The Spanish Case, 1926-58

3.1. Introduction

In a seminal work, Gauthier (1996) pointed out that, from the end of the 19th Century, European societies became increasingly aware of the necessity to sustain the family, which had formerly been a purely private field. By the mid-twentieth Century, family allowances —cash transfers to families with children— consolidated as a popular measure, becoming one of the pillars of the post-war welfare states (Flaquer 2000; Gauthier 1996). When explaining their popularity among policymakers, some authors stressed the willingness to boost fertility rates by alleviating child poverty while reinforcing the male breadwinner family model —achieving family wage— (Creighton 1996; Bock and Thane 1996b; Gauthier 1996; Seccombe 1986; Quine 2003).

Such goals would have been particularly relevant in explaining social policy initiatives of interwar European dictatorships (Espuelas 2012; Naldini 2003, Quine 2003). This is consistent with research about the importance of Catholicism in social policy formation, particularly those policies targeting families (Montero 2004; Morgan 2009; Van Kersbergen 1995). Furthermore, Catholic-oriented family policies have been found to be relevant to explain Conservative (Esping-Andersen 1990) and Southern European welfare regimes (Ferrera 1996; Gal 2010). However, the ideological basis of those policies is much more complex, since other studies have found a positive impact of Left-

wing parties on the scope and generosity of child cash benefits (Misra 2003; Wenneno 1992). Moreover, other authors emphasise that policymakers stimulated family allowances as a relatively cheap and anti-inflationary alternative to general wage increases to improve the living standards of working-class families (Macnicol 1980; Pressman 2014).

On the other hand, the common European trend towards the development of family allowances overlooks crucial differences across countries in timing and model, which were largely driven by social coalitions and distributive struggles. For instance, as was described in Chapter 1, French Catholic employers, supported by a powerful natalist movement, pioneered employer-based family allowances before World War I, often with the labour movement's opposition. During the thirties, Radical and Popular Front Governments implemented compulsory family allowances funded by the employers and the State, covering waged and independent workers and small landowners (Dutton 2002). Italian Fascist Government developed an occupational scheme linked to family wage principles, as it remained funded by workers' and employers' contributions and covered industrial, commercial and agricultural permanent workers (Lynch 2009). By contrast, Nazi Germany developed a quasi-universal, tax-funded family allowance system that directly targeted Aryan mothers (Stolleis 2013). Finally, in countries that passed family allowances after World War II, such as Sweden and the United Kingdom, feminists, liberals and socialists emerged as crucial actors in designing universal tax-funded family allowances (Pedersen 1995; Lundberg and Åmark 2001).

This Chapter focuses on the Spanish case, a Southern European welfare state with a strong Catholic background and an essential role of dictatorships in the development of social policies. When the Francoist regime established family allowances during the Spanish Civil War (1938), Spain became one of the first countries to develop such a scheme—after Belgium (1930), France (1932), and Italy (1936). Moreover, family allowances became the cornerstone of the Francoist social policy, both in propagandist terms (Molinero 2005; González and Ortiz 2017) and as a proportion of Spanish public social spending (Espuelas 2013a). This rapid development has been explained as a top-down project, broadly consistent with the natalist and conservative Catholicism of the

Francoist regime (Guillén 1997; Gracia 2010; Valiente 1997; Nash 1996; Meil 2006). According to Meil (2006), Nash (1996) and González and Ortiz (2017), the Civil War intensified demographic concerns, making family allowances a key population policy aimed at reinforcing the male breadwinner family model. Moreover, given the similarities between the Spanish and the Italian schemes, authors like Guillén (1997) emphasise the influence of Falange Española —swayed by Italian Fascism— in shaping this policy.


However, we still ignore much about the discussions on family allowances in Spain before the Civil War, the arguments and models discussed, and their implementation during early Francoism. This Chapter shows both dimensions by investigating the political economy of family allowances between 1926 and 1958. The first cash benefit for large families came into force during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1931). In 1926, the Government established a means-tested allowance for workers with eight or more children and a wage supplement for civil servants with eleven or more children. Although family allowances did not further develop until the Civil War —they were even eliminated under the Spanish Second Republic— some essential debates on the issue took place at the time, mainly initiated by Catholic cadres (Cogollos 2017). They identified the family allowance system as a key social policy, as it was compatible with reinforcing the male breadwinner family model, keeping large families out of poverty, and achieving social peace. Nevertheless, this Chapter shows that differences among Catholics, fiscal constraints, institutional instability, the indifference of the employers and the apathy —if not opposition— from the Left prevented a comprehensive family allowance system from being passed before the Civil War. Instead, the Republic promoted family supplements for social insurance recipients, facultative services for insured people's dependants, and raising real wages.

The Spanish Civil War changed the political landscape, making family allowances an ideal policy for the new regime, under which Catholics and Falangists enjoyed considerable influence. First, due to large-scale human losses, the war increased demographic concerns. Second, the Republican defeat wiped out the independent labour movement and eliminated alternative projects of broadening the scope of social insurance. Third,

in the context of strict wage regulation by the State, it became appropriate for the regime and employers to support large families' incomes while avoiding general wage increases. Nevertheless, fiscal constraints hindered the State's support, low administrative capacity hampered contribution collection in the countryside, and the underdevelopment of other social insurances forced the National Fund for Family Allowances to transfer resources to other social policies. As a result, the scheme finally implemented was far less generous and universal than the previous campaigners advocated. Thus, by deepening traditional problems associated with the Southern European model, such as low state penetration and clientelism (see Ferrera 1996), Francoism remained unable to ambitiously promote family policies despite being coherent with the National Catholic ideology of the regime itself.

3.2. The early institutionalisation of Spanish family allowances until the Spanish Second Republic (1900-1931)

The conditions that boosted demographic concerns and natalist movements in countries like France were absent in Spain. As Figure 3.1 shows, Spanish fertility rates remained higher than most other European countries throughout the period, and the country remained neutral during World War I, thus avoiding massive human losses. Hence, the objective of increasing fertility rates remained marginal in the Spanish policy agenda relative to other countries. However, family allowances were not unknown to Spanish social reformers, particularly amongst Catholics. As de Mujica (1920) reported, the Second Congress of Basque Studies advocated for developing family benefits following the French model of compensation funds—funded and administered by employers and distributed among employees with children. Although such funds were never fully developed in Spain, welfare provision for families was gaining momentum among policymakers and social reformers during the 1920s. The institutional context was propitious for testing such an initiative. After the collapse of the Restoration regime in 1923, Miguel Primo de Rivera established a dictatorship that would last until 1931. The regime relied heavily on Catholic organisations, campaigners and social reformers, and although tolerating socialist activity, the pressure from the Left remained extremely limited.



Source: International Historical Statistics (2013).

Therefore, the INP led the campaign in the context of emerging debates in international forums. The General Assemblies of the International Association for Social Progress held in Vienna (1927), Geneva (1928), and Zurich (1929) raised the necessity of family policies.³¹ In the first conclusion, the Association argued that workers' wages were insufficient to solve the reproductive challenges of needy families, and thus, specific social policies were needed (AIPS 1929, 31). According to INP senior advisor Carlos González Posada, three approaches coexisted on potential solutions:

'The supporters of [...] creating an insurance against family risks and continuing the extension of social insurances to family members, and those who wanted to maintain the practice of family assistance through compensation funds, along with

³¹ The 1927 general Assembly held in Montreux discussed unemployment insurance, maternity leaves, and the extension of social insurance to the families of insured workers. However, French delegates presented a report about family allowances which encouraged the Association further to deliberate on the topic in the other two Assemblies (Posada 1928).

the social insurance institution. These tendencies coexisted with the English advocates of assistance through social services of everything that meant economic protection of the family' (Posada 1930, 29).

Spanish representatives, like the German ones, advocated for the first formula. As Severino Aznar —Spanish delegate and INP speaker— argued (1930, 797–99), the French system was problematic. First, the higher fertility rates in Spain made the financial burden of this policy unsustainable for most employers. Second, it was voluntary and thereby subject to the employers' will. Third, employers' control of the compensation funds was facing strong opposition from the labour movement, which feared that it could be used to constrain their autonomy. This fear was apparent in the conclusions of the Assembly (see AIPS 1929, 32), which claimed the need for generalising compensation funds, 'if possible, in agreement with the workers' organisations [...], and if this cannot be achieved, by recourse to legal obligation'. However, even in this second case, 'sufficient guarantees of financial solidarity and trade union and workers' independence should be provided, and severe control of the funds should be organised'.

Instead, Spanish delegates advocated for 'compulsory family insurance'. That is, a contributory family allowance scheme funded by workers, employers and the State covering industrial, commercial, agricultural and independent workers (Aznar 1930; Posada 1930). In 1929, the INP raised a questionnaire to collect the opinions of relevant figures of Spanish reformists, social leaders and policymakers about the need for and the economic possibilities of developing family policies. As Table 3.1 shows, it enquired about entitling the families of insured workers to social insurance benefits, generalising compensation funds and establishing a compulsory family insurance system.

Table 3.1. Explicit preferences of the Spanish social reformers and policymakers about alternative family policy packages

Name	Title	Extend social insurance	Generalising compensation funds	Family insurance
Joaquín Chapaprieta	ex-Labour Minister	Yes	X	Yes
Vizconde de Eza	ex-Labour Minister	No	No	No
José Gascón y Marín	Government delegate at the Geneva International Labour Conferences	Yes	Yes	X
Antonio Lasierra	President of the Zaragoza Provincial Council	Yes	No	No
Conde de Lizarraga	ex-Labour Minister	Yes*	Yes	No
Pedro Sangro y Ros de Olano	Member of the Ministry of Labour	Yes	Yes	No
Adolfo Posada	ex-General Director at the IRS	Yes	X	X
León Leal Ramos	President of Extremadura's Social Insurance Fund	Yes	Yes	No
Álvaro López Núñez	Deputy Director at INP	Yes	Yes	Yes
José Marvá	President of the INP	Yes	Yes	Yes
Guillermo Sáez	Social insurance Inspector	Yes*	Yes*	Yes*

* Despite being a desirable policy, Spain did not have the economic resources to develop.

Note: X refers to lacking or unclear preferences.

Source: Own elaboration based on AIPS (1929).

Therefore, extending social insurance schemes was a priority among Spanish high-range policymakers and civil servants. By the last years of the Restoration regime (1917-1923), several claims and Conferences studied the development of a social insurance system covering health, maternity, invalidity and pensions. One of the claims that spread among these debates was that social insurance should also cover the spouses of insured workers.³² The voices against such entitlement, like the former Labour Minister Viscount of Eza, argued that the resistance from employers and workers to fund social insurance was too heavy and the Spanish economy too weak for the scope of existing schemes to be broadened (AIPS 1929, 23). Other figures, such as Count of Lizarraga and Guillermo

³² For example, this was a frequent claim in the Barcelona Conference (1922)—one of the most ambitious forums promoting the extension of the health, maternity and invalidity insurance. Furthermore, the Draft bill about compulsory maternity leave passed in 1929 established this extension in a transitional provision.

Sáez, argued that, although extending social insurance was desirable, the Spanish economy was ill-prepared to undertake such a development.

The report also shows that direct income support to families with children through compensation funds was gaining momentum. Most of the respondents' answers suggest that the knowledge about French funds drove their preferences in that matter. Moreover, the only responses acknowledging the necessity of an insurance system for large families did not define its model. Chapaprieta's only reference to that formula is that 'the State must be active in covering the necessity of the insured and their family in the case of sickness, maternity, accidents, invalidity, unemployment or large family' (AIPS 1929, 22). On the other hand, López Núñez argued that 'in this moment of crisis [of the family], due to the voluntary restriction of the procreative elements, the so-called childbirth insurance or birth premiums offer a clear social benefit'. In particular, 'the scheme of compensation funds [...] is very feasible [...] and can be accepted while waiting for better solutions' (AIPS 1929, 28).

Table 3.2 offers an even more interesting picture. Insurance companies' representatives claimed that extending social insurance to families was desirable but impossible. This is why they strongly recommended that the State promote private insurance and working-class saving. None of them had any opinions on a hypothetical family insurance. As these companies, employers also defended that the family extension of social insurance was necessary but unrealistic in Spain (see AIPS 1929, 32–33). According to Coderch, it 'implies a charge that public Treasury cannot afford. Our industry is not so flourishing that it is possible to overtax production costs with very high premiums for such insurance, and wages are too low to allow large discounts'. Ayats and Junoy, on the other hand, feared that employers would bear the social insurance costs because workers would avoid contributions or compensate for the new burdens with wage increases. On the other hand, as in France, those organisations supported family allowances based on voluntary compensation funds financed and controlled by employers.

Table 3.2. Explicit preferences of the Spanish social groups about alternative family policy packages

Name	Title	Extend social insurance	Generalising compensation funds	Family insurance
Insurance Companies				
Domingo Aldomá	General Delegate	Yes*	X	X
Félix Benítez de Lugo	Ex-General Director	Yes*	X	X
Ricardo Iranzo	Deputy Director	No	No	No
Employers' organisations				
José Ayats	Spanish Gremial Confederation (Secretary)	Yes*	Yes	No
D. R. Coderch	Railway Company MZA (Deputy Chief Engineer)	Yes*	Yes	No
Francisco Junoy	Social and Economic Studies (President)	Yes*	Yes*	No
Socialists				
Francisco Largo Caballero	General Workers Union (General Secretary)	X	X	X
Julián Besteiro	Spanish Socialist Workers Party (President)	X	X	X
Catholic unions				
José Gafo	<i>Libres</i> Workers' Union (Advisor)	Yes	X	X
José Maria Esteve	Confederation of Catholic Workers of Levante (President)	Yes	X	Yes
Other				
José Arauz	National Parents' Association (General Secretary)	Yes	Yes	No

Note: X refers to lacking or unclear preferences, while * means that, despite being a desirable policy, Spain did not have the economic resources to implement this policy.

Source: Own elaboration based on AIPS (1929).

Regarding workers' organisations, the report shows significant differences between Catholics and socialists. Catholic organisations strongly advocated for including the wives of insured workers. As argued by Gafo, 'social insurances for the risks of illness, accidents, invalidity, unemployment, maternity and reproduction [...] must necessarily be extended to the families of insured' (AIPS 1929, 35). In the case of socialists, even if

they did not answer the survey,³³ their organisations discussed the family extension of social insurance in the following years.

On the other hand, Catholics were sympathetic to introducing direct cash benefits for families. Gafo's advocacy for the necessity to attend reproduction as a risk suggests that the *Libres* defended family allowances under the basis of social insurance. On the other hand, Esteve's claims were more straightforward:

'Experience has shown that the family wage in the free market is not very reliable; therefore, it needs more permanent institutions, and it is necessary to find ways of separating the actual wage from the maintenance of the mother and children. Various means have been suggested: State assistance in the form of a direct cash benefit or granting large families allowances and facilities' (AIPS 1929, 36).

In particular, he suggested the development of a 'special branch of family wage insurance', allowing mothers to 'abandon all work outside the home and devote herself exclusively to managing the household and educating her children' (AIPS 1929, 36).

These opinions suggest that, even if family allowances were not particularly relevant to the Spanish public opinion, they were becoming increasingly popular among reformist institutions and Catholic organisations. Furthermore, in 1926, the Government passed a means-tested, tax-funded cash benefit for workers with eight or more children and a wage supplement for civil servants with eleven or more children. The minimum yearly workers' benefit was 100 *pesetas* for families with eight children, rising to 1000 *pesetas* for families with eighteen or more.³⁴ The cash transfer was supplemented with tax allowances and free school fees. Claimants had to apply to the Ministry of Labour to entitle, and then the Ministry decided on the worthy candidates and provided the payment (Gaceta 1/1/1927, 6).

³³ Besteiro argued that their party already had a social insurance programme and they adhered to it. On the other hand, Largo Caballero advised that his organisation had delegates in the institutions dealing with the preparation of bills on social insurance, and one of them would reply to the questionnaire (AIPS 1929, 34).

³⁴ For more information about the scale of benefits, see Appendix, Table A3.3.

Thus, the scheme was different from that proposed by the INP —neither a generalisation of compensation funds nor a ‘family insurance’ were developed— and so was their justification. Although the Law’s statement recognised that the depopulation problem was not as apparent in Spain as in other countries, Primo de Rivera claimed against ‘advances of neo-Malthusian doctrines and practices’ (Gaceta 22/06/1926, 1714). Hence, the allowance was part of a natalist policy —focusing on very large families— and an income support measure designed to enforce the regime’s legitimacy. However, given its focus on large families, the scheme benefited just 2.9% of Spanish families with some living children.³⁵ As for the actual recipients, in 1929, family allowances covered just 17,321 families—14.38% of their potential recipients and 0.42% of Spanish families with living children.³⁶ Among them, 9,003 beneficiaries out of 17,321 —that is, 52%— were agricultural workers, which is hardly surprising given the extent of agricultural employment in Spain.

On the other hand, the poor-relief orientation of this policy was also evident in their generosity. The minimum amount of 100 *pesetas* for eight children accounted for 5.7% of the average wage of an agricultural worker and 5.4% of a non-skilled industrial one.³⁷ Even if the maximum amount rose to 56.9% and 54.5% of the average wage of those workers, it is unlikely that it were enough to cover the increased expenses of such large families. Nevertheless, Primo de Rivera’s family allowances significantly increased Spanish public social spending compared with other social insurance schemes. By 1929, spending on family allowances accounted for 33% of all social insurance spending, only surpassed by public pensions.³⁸ Given that all this spending came from tax revenues, the continuity of this provision would be challenged in the future.

³⁵ Data for this estimation comes from the 1920 census (see INE 1927, 18–20).

³⁶ Estimated from the allowances spending data (see INE 1930, 600–601).

³⁷ Evidence of agricultural wages for these estimations are based on nominal wages in 1930 and comes from Vilar (2004, 2009). Although such sources provide nominal wages in daily *pesetas*, annual income has been estimated by assuming a six-day working week (based on Vilar 2004) for 52 weeks.

³⁸ For this estimation, see Appendix, Table A3.1.

3.3. A political cleavage on family support: family allowances and social insurance during the Spanish Second Republic (1931-1936)

In 1931, the political coalition that brought Primo de Rivera to power fell apart, and a new regime emerged. The Spanish Second Republic was born under a new coalition of republicans and socialists aiming to undermine the power of traditional elites —landed elites, high industrialists, Catholic Church and the Army— and to boost social reform. As a result, the new regime improved the labour movement's bargaining capacity — increasing real wages— and developed social insurance (Comín 2010). It also promoted an ambitious programme of gender equality by improving women's political and civil rights, including universal suffrage and the right to divorce (Valiente 1997).

On the other hand, during the last years of the dictatorship and throughout the republican period, the Great Depression imposed severe economic pressures on policymakers and social actors. In particular, the fall in industrial output led to increasing unemployment rates and exacerbated the Treasury's financial constraints. Even if Spanish unemployment never reached its magnitude in other European countries, it did become important in some areas —such as Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia, Vizcaya and Andalusia— and sectors —particularly construction and agriculture— until 1933 (Bengoechea and Borderías 2010). As in other countries, the fall in male employment deepened concerns over the need for public intervention in the labour market, becoming a prominent issue among Spanish political groups. Policy proposals ranged from increasing public investment to incentivise employment to regulating the labour market, developing social insurance, and establishing family wages (see Bengoechea and Borderías 2010; Cuesta 2021; Espuelas 2013b).

Comparing the political programs and manifestos of the main Spanish political parties reveals that the interest in family policies highly varied along the Left-right political spectrum. Table 3.3 shows that such policies included legal restrictions on family liberties, achieving the family wage, generalising compensation funds, and developing public family allowances. None of the Liberal Right parties defended such provisions. Among the centrists, the Autonomist Republican Union Party (*Partido de Unión Republicana Autonomista*) advocated for implementing family allowances paid by

municipalities. On the other hand, the Republican Catalan-nationalist Party (*Partit Catalanista Republicà*) envisioned achieving a family wage. Authoritarians—in the case of the Spanish fascist party Falange—advocated for restricting family liberties such as divorce, but only Traditionalist Communion supported the achievement of the family wage.

Table 3.3. Claims for family wage, family allowances, compensation funds and extension of social insurance

Right-wing and Centrist parties						
Political Party	Faction	Normative family model	Family wage	Extend social insurance	Compensation funds	Family allowance
Autonomist Republican Union Party	Republican Centrism	No	No	No	No	Yes
Republican Catalan-nationalist Party	Regionalist Centrism	No	Yes	No	No	No
Republican Liberal Right	Liberal Right	No	No	No	No	No
Radical Republican Party	Liberal Right	No	No	No	No	No
National Action/Popular Action	Catholic Right	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Spanish Confederations of Autonomous Right-wings	Catholic Right	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Spanish Farmer's Party	Catholic Right	No	No	No	No	No
Traditionalist Communion	Authoritarian Right	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Spanish Falange	Authoritarian Right	Yes	No	No	No	No
Catalan League	Regionalist Right	No	No	No	No	No
Basque Nationalist Party	Regionalist Right	ns	Yes	No	Yes	No
Left-wing Parties						
Republican Left of Catalonia	Regionalist Left	No	No	No	No	No
Radical-Socialist Republican Party	Republican Left	No	No	No	No	No
Republican Left	Republican Left	No	No	No	No	No
Republican Union	Republican Left	No	No	No	No	No
Spanish Socialist Worker's Party	Worker's Left (socialism)	No	No	No	No	No
Spanish Communist Party	Worker's Left	No	No	No	No	No
Workers' Party of Marxist Unification	Worker's Left (Communism)	No	No	No	No	No
Union's Party	Worker's Left (anarchism)	No	No	No	No	No

Source: Own elaboration based mainly on Artola (1977). Contextual data on the relative size of each Party in Congress and the Manifestos used in this Chapter can be found in the Appendix (Table A3.2).

Therefore, the two most relevant parties pushing for implementing such policies were the Catholic Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Right-wings (CEDA, for *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas*)³⁹ and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV, for *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*).⁴⁰ Both organisations defended the establishment of a variable wage according to the number of children and labour productivity (i.e., the share of wages in company profits).⁴¹ As in the case of some British supporters of child allowances, they considered that the labour market could not achieve the family wage, so a variable wage should be established with public support (Quetglas 1935, Aznar 1939). However, their arguments arose from the social-Catholic ideologists who believed that a harmonious organisation of society could only be reached through maintaining working-class living standards, paternalist industrialism and preserving the traditional family (Cogollos 2017). For instance, the Catholic campaigner Bartolomé Quetglas (1935), inspired by the Papal encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), campaigned for family allowances by arguing that they would support demographic growth and fight poverty among large families. In addition, Severino Aznar (1939) conceived family allowances as compensation for the mother's reproductive work, which should be paid to the mother.⁴²

Besides, the PNV was also influenced by the Solidarity of Basque Workers (SOV, for *Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos*), a growing Catholic union strongly connected with the Party.⁴³ In their 1929 Congress, the SOV advocated for the implementation of a family allowance scheme similar to that developed in France after 1932, i.e. the generalisation of compensation funds paid by the employers and the State. The scheme

³⁹ Formed in 1933, the CEDA became the most important Right-wing Spanish party under the republican period reaching 21.4% and 21.8% of MPs in 1933 and 1936, respectively (Linz, Montero and Ruiz 2005, 1100).

⁴⁰ Officially constituted in 1895, PNV became the leading political party in the Basque regions during the republican period reaching 19.8%, 44.6% and 32.9% of the regional MPs in the 1931, 1933 and 1936 General elections, respectively (Linz, Montero and Ruiz 2005, 1100).

⁴¹ See Euzkadi (03/09/1933), and Blanco y Negro (04/08/1935). For a discussion about the family wage and the share of workers in company benefits in the CEDA, see Cogollos (2017).

⁴² On this issue, Aznar (1939, 51) explicitly acknowledged the influence played by the British feminist and campaigner for family allowances Eleanor Rathbone, who advocated for this policy as an endowment to motherhood.

⁴³ By 1933, the union reached 40,342 members and was able to compete regionally with the socialist UGT (Ansel 2011).

would enforce a minimum wage —equal for men and women— to be increased by 7% per child —or 10% if canonically married, plus a lump sum allowance of 50 *pesetas* when the worker got married and 25 *pesetas* for each new child born (El Obrero Vasco 16/11/1929, 1).

By contrast, none of the Left-Wing Parties supported this model of family policies in their Manifestos, particularly in the case of the Republican Parties. Nevertheless, the UGT did discuss some of those issues. In November 1932, they reproduced the demands of the International Trade Union Federation over social insurance, which established that ‘social insurance benefits must meet the varying wage differentials and family responsibilities of insured persons’ (UGT 1932, 397). Moreover, they recognised family allowances’ usefulness for improving the living conditions of workers with families, but ‘as long as this shall not prejudice the workers’ wages’ (UGT 1932, 397). However, the union did not discuss the issue of family allowances in their General Assemblies of 1928 and 1932. Instead, UGT emphasised the need for social insurance to entitle insured workers to a family bonus and their families to social insurance services (UGT 1933, 556).⁴⁴

Therefore, family policies became a political cleavage during the Republican period, emerging as early as the constitutional debates began. In article 46, which established the protection of labour conditions, seven conservative MPs introduced an amendment to develop ‘the minimum and family wage, through compensation funds’ (DSC 23/09/1931, 1). According to Quetglas (1935, 100), José María Gil-Robles —the future leader of the CEDA— supported such an amendment. However, the proposal was finally rejected (DSC 07/10/1931). Furthermore, in 1932 the republican-socialist Government removed Primo de Rivera’s benefits. Left-wing Republican President Manuel Azaña, who signed this Decree, stated that they ‘decided to address the unemployment problem [...], and establish a paid maternity leave, even if it meant that this would require the abolition of the family allowance’ (Gaceta 28/12/1932, 2175). Such political priorities

⁴⁴ During the second Republic, the INP —supported by the UGT— aimed to develop two unified social insurances covering, on the one hand, health, invalidity and maternity, and on the other, retirement and death (Samaniego 1988).

suggest a trade-off between improving family allowances and developing social insurance,⁴⁵ worsened by the financial constraints derived from economic crises and the resistance to rising tax revenues (Martorell and Comín 2002).

Such a retrenchment faced opposition in Parliament. During the debate over the State Budget for 1933, Santiago Guallar, MP for the Right-wing Party Popular Action,⁴⁶ criticised the Government for eliminating the allowances, which he considered essential to 'relieve those who are in greater need because of their number of children and to contain those Malthusian tendencies which are the major concern of the modern States' (DSC 8/12/1932, 10050). This critique was one of the arguments for voting against the Government's budget. The suppression of the allowances also found criticism among the Left. Socialist MP Bruno Alonso, although recognising the relevance of social insurance projects, argued that the allowance should not disappear until those have been introduced (DSC 8/11/1932, 9335).

These critiques also pointed out another constraint to Spanish social policies: the low administrative capacity. Both Guallar and Alonso complained that family benefits were not being paid to the applicants, despite them meeting the conditions established by Law. Although such a topic of State-building processes has traditionally been overlooked compared to tax revenues, it strongly constrained social policy development, particularly in Southern Europe (Ferrera 1996). Indeed, both financial and administrative constraints—in this case, expressed as accountability problems—were apparent in the justification of the Labour Minister and UGT leader Francisco Largo Caballero. Moreover, he argued that their function would be covered by social insurance development—the newly implemented compulsory maternity leave—and the improvement of social services like school canteens.⁴⁷ In the words of Largo Caballero:

⁴⁵ The same trade-off was present in France, where employers used family allowances to delay the development of social insurance (Dutton 2002).

⁴⁶ Popular Action was the core party of the future CEDA.

⁴⁷ Generalising school canteens for workers' children was one of the priorities of the socialist-republican educational reforms, to be funded by the municipalities, the State and private donations (Gaceta 29/08/1931, 1496).

'Do you know how much this assistance would cost? Ten to eleven million pesetas. [Moreover] Other services provide this assistance, such as maternity leave and, on the part of the Ministry of Public Instruction, the school canteens. Because there was no State control over the use of these [...] million pesetas. These amounts were given to individuals who presented the proper documentation [...] from which it turned out that all these amounts did not go, far from it, to those who felt the need. Naturally, the Ministry of Labour [...] thought it would be preferable to use other policies over which the State has control, such as, for example, maternity leave (El Socialista 09/12/1932, 3).

Nevertheless, this was not the last time family allowances were discussed in Parliament. Due to internal divisions between socialists and republicans, the coalition broke up in 1933. The November 1933 General election brought a Right-wing coalition between the Radical-Republican Party and the CEDA to power. The new Permanent Labour Commission in Parliament, dominated by Right-wing parties, accepted two proposals to re-establish and improve Primo de Rivera's family allowances. Ten Right-wing and far-right MPs presented the first one in November 1934. They claimed the repeal of the 1932 Decree, deemed as 'complying with contraceptive dogmas and struggling with the true Cristian values', and asked to re-establish the allowances (DSC 15/11/1934, 4774).

The second proposal, presented in June 1935, was a Bill to introduce a new family allowance system (DSC 18/6/1935, 8323-8326). The Bill was signed by eleven MPs linked to the PNV and would establish a French-based family allowance system distributed by employer-funded Compensation Funds.⁴⁸ The funds would be autonomous, and State intervention would be limited to regulatory functions. The Bill proposed to fix a base wage for unmarried workers. When married, they would obtain a 10% benefit for dependent wives —or 20% if they refused to engage in waged work again. Workers would also receive an additional 10% subsidy for each dependent child.

When defending the Bill, MP Juan Antonio Irazusta avoided using natalist arguments. He argued that the foundation of this proposal was the Catholic social doctrine which

⁴⁸ Compensation Funds would be organised at a regional level, either by sectors or geographic areas.

intended to contain the class struggle by ‘sharing company profits with employees’ (DSC 18/06/1935, 2325). This objective was even more salient for the PNV after the recent workers’ insurrection in the neighbouring province of Asturias and the Party’s links with the trade union SOV (Ansel 2011). Therefore, the Bill aimed to support workers’ incomes, alleviate child poverty and, by reinforcing the sexual division of labour, fight unemployment. The beneficiaries of the scheme, in the words of Irazusta, would be:

‘Firstly, the father, ensuring that he does not suffer every time he wakes up the nightmare of feeding the children [...]; secondly, the mother that, away from work proper to men, can attend to the education of her offspring, giving back to her [...] femininity, and thus we will do the work of true feminism. Lastly, the children, avoiding the current spectacle of children flocking through the streets [...] as if they were no more than the dogs of Constantinople; and as a consequence of these three concerns, the decrease of unemployment among workers’ (DSC 18/06/1935, 2325).

This Bill was never voted and, after the Civil War, the leader of the PNV and Basque President in exile José Antonio Aguirre, blamed the CEDA for their passivity. However, in an interview with a Catholic newspaper, the CEDA’s Labour Minister Federico Salmón declared he was preparing a draft bill to develop family allowances. Unlike the PNV initiative —compulsory compensation funds funded by employers— Salmón proposed a voluntary compensation fund system funded by the employers, workers and the State. In his own words:

‘I am preparing a bill on a living wage, family wage and profit-sharing with great enthusiasm [...] The family wage will be introduced through voluntary compensation funds —since the present situation of our industry does not allow them to be compulsory— but strongly encouraged by the public authorities, with contributions similar to those made by employers and workers’ (Blanco y Negro 04/08/1935, 65)

Disagreements over the family allowances timing and model suggest deep controversies between Catholic parties that, in turn, highlight relevant regional differences in public

opinion. A nationalist sense of equality, the Catholic social doctrine and a powerful labour movement, in a region with many capital-intensive firms heavily influenced the PNV to promote ambitious, compulsory family allowances. Its case is heavily consistent with the role that social Catholicism and Christian Democratic Parties played in France (Dutton 2002) and other European countries (Van Kersbergen). By contrast, the CEDA's cadres, voters and supporters were much more usually recruited from landowners and employers from labour-intensive firms—more common in the rest of Spain.

In any case, a meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Commission testified that they were working on a report to implement the family allowances (Comisión Parlamentaria de Trabajo 15/11/1935, 40-41). However, the call for a General Election in January 1936 stopped the development of the Bill (Comisión Parlamentaria de Trabajo 20/11/1935, 44). As the Civil War broke out in July 1936, family allowances were never brought to Parliament again. Nonetheless, some compensation funds did develop in Spain during the republican period. According to the Industrial Engineer Jose Borrell (1951), Catholic cadres founded such funds in Majorca (1935), Salamanca (1937) and Avila (1937). According to the INP (1939, 8), some provincial funds were also developed in Vizcaya, Caceres and Granada.

On the other hand, the Institute for Unemployed Workers of Barcelona founded 1932 the Employers' Mutual for Family Allowances to bring together employers to pay compensations for dependent children to deal with unemployment (Borrell 1951, 454). Some initiatives also emerged among employer organisations, such as the Catholic Employers' Association —established in 1934—, that included in its statutes the progressive implementation of the family wage to comply with the Catholic doctrine and countervail class conflict (El Debate 24/11/1934, 1). Nevertheless, family allowances did not develop until the Spanish Civil War when the Francoist regime found them a crucial policy.

3.4. New State, old constraints: the implementation of family allowances in Spain (1938-1958)

Unlike previous political regimes, the Francoist dictatorship promptly passed a compulsory family allowance scheme during the Spanish Civil War, developing it during the decade following Franco's victory. The new context made family allowance an increasingly appealing social policy for the dictatorship. First, the literature has estimated that the war caused more than one million human losses (Carreras and Tafunell 2018), a demographic shock that exacerbated depopulation concerns among policymakers, social reformers, and public opinion (Meil 2006; Nash 1996). As a result, the INP (1939, 6) defined family allowances as 'the cornerstone of the New State's demographic policy'.

Second, the regime's population goals needed to enforce the social role of women as mothers and caregivers and thus relied on the male breadwinner family model. On the one hand, the regime firmly restrained women's civil liberties by re-penalising abortion, prohibiting divorce and civil marriage and enhancing the authority of the husband as the head of the family (Nash 1996). The regime also strengthened labour market gender discrimination (Molinero and Ysàs 1998). Moreover, state-sponsored organisations such as the Female Section of Falange and the education system stigmatised sexual liberties. In this context, family allowances were developed as part of a social program to support the male breadwinner model, together with other policies such as tax allowances and school, health, and housing benefits (BOE 10/04/1944). As the Labour *Fuero* established, one of the goals of the New State was to 'release the married woman from the workshop and the factory' by achieving the family wage and developing family allowances (BOE 10/03/1938).⁴⁹

Nevertheless, as achieving the family wage was challenging in the post-war labour market, family allowances became central to the regime's wage regulation policies. The dictatorship prohibited independent trade unions and established a strict wage regulation, which lasted until the Collective Agreements Act (1958) authorised collective

⁴⁹ The Labour *Fuero* was the first of the Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom underpinning the Francoist regime.

bargaining between the regime-approved entities (González 2021; Molinero and Ysàs 1998). This legislation extremely constrained working-class bargaining capacity, thus allowing employers to rely on cheap labour in the context of scarce capital goods, while the regime's autarchy sharply increased inflation rates (Vilar 2009). Such a strategy constrained Spanish aggregate demand, as workers were the largest consumption group. In that context, employers and the State relied on multiple wage supplements, services and other benefits to improve the workers' purchasing capacity and living standards, among which family allowances became one of the most relevant (Vilar 2009).⁵⁰

In implementing such a policy, Falange and traditional social Catholics became essential. On the one hand, José Antonio Girón de Velasco, the Spanish Falange Labour Minister between 1941 and 1957, supervised and implemented the scheme (Guillén 1997, González 2021). On the other, Severino Aznar, one of the former strong men in the INP and the Spanish social Catholicism, became General Director of Welfare and was commissioned to design the Family Allowances Act (Cenarro 2016). They developed a compulsory contributory scheme administered by the INP through a centralised National Fund for Family Allowances. This model differed from the compensation fund system envisioned by the CEDA and the PNV during the Republic. As Aznar (1939) justified, Spanish high fertility made them expensive relative to other countries like France; their voluntary basis constrained their generalisation, and they relied too much on the relative prosperity of private companies (Aznar 1939). A system funded by workers, employers, and the State could overcome such limitations. Moreover, it would also cover independent workers, small landowners, sharecroppers and middle classes, thus developing a quasi-universal scheme (Aznar 1939, 55). Importantly, although Aznar (1939, 23) did not conceive the allowance as 'a supplement to the father's salary, but as remuneration for the mother's work', their benefits were finally linked to the breadwinner.


⁵⁰ According to Vilar (2009), compulsory benefits for workers could amount to 44.86% of the employer's total labour costs, or even more.

However, despite such a scheme's ideological importance, its performance was severely undermined by the lack of State support due to the elites' opposition to increasing fiscal capacity, persistently high fiscal fraud and low administrative capacity. By 1950, Spanish tax collection fell to 7.8% of GDP, while Germany collected 29.3%, France 26.7%, Italy 20.9%, and Britain 41.3% (Comín 1996). As a result, the Spanish Treasury was forced to focus on fiscal discipline, thus hindering the development of social policies (Pons and Vilar 2019, Espuelas 2022). In the case of family allowances, contributions were fixed at a 6% rate of the employee's wage—5% paid for by employers and 1% by workers— while the State only contributed indirectly by providing the starting capital and creating a guarantee fund paid for by a tax on company dividends (INP 1939). As social reformer Luis Jordana (1953, 140) complained, 'State subsidies have decreased steadily as the Institute's operations have increased, certainly because they were conceived as transitional or complementary'. On the other hand, although employers formally paid for most of the contribution, high labour repression and autarchy enabled them to transfer the costs to the workers' wages or commodity prices (Espuelas 2022). Moreover, low wages constrained workers' capacity to pay high contributions, further restraining the scheme's resources.

Nevertheless, family allowances expanded substantially during the early Francoism (Figure 3.2), providing flat-rate benefits to an increasing number of workers. The rapid expansion of the number of recipients sharply increased the scheme's spending during the forties, as it included civil servants (1939), widows and orphans (1939), home-based workers (1942), agricultural workers (1943) and sea workers (1943) (INP 1949), reaching its peak in 1947.⁵¹ By that year, spending on family accounted for 31% of Spanish public social spending—a proportion that diminished in the following years as the development of sickness insurance increased health investments (Espuelas 2013a). Consequently, family allowances became one of the regime's preferred sources of propaganda (Molinero 2005). However, their relevance becomes less impressive in a country that barely spent in social policies 3.44% of GDP in 1945 and where social

⁵¹ The scheme also introduced benefits such as birth premiums and marriage loans in 1941 and maternity services for the wives of insured workers in 1942 (INP 1949).


spending stagnated in the following decade while, by 1958, Greece and Italy had already surpassed 10% (Espuelas 2013a). Therefore, financial limitations prevented the scheme's spending from growing steadily and, in a context of high inflation rates, it rapidly depreciated. Moreover, comparing the evolution of spending and revenues suggests that the system became loss making when it reached its coverage peak.




Source: Own elaboration. Data on social spending and recipient workers comes from INP (1943, 1948), Jordana (1953, 117) and Spanish Statistical Yearbooks (INE 1954, 1956, 1959), and revenue data comes from Jordana (1953, 116) and Spanish Statistical Yearbooks (INE 1954, 1956, 1959). Spending and revenues have been deflated using Prados de la Escosura (2003). See Appendix, Tables A3.5 to A3.7.

In a context of high inflation rates and slow but constant wage increases (see Appendix, Table A3.4), such a deficit may seem surprising given that contributions were proportional to wages, but their benefits were not. As Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show, agricultural workers accounted for an increasing proportion of the family allowance coverage and spending. Including large numbers of those workers represents a landmark in Spanish social policy history since, as Chapter 2 has shown, Spanish high rates of agricultural employment and social unrest in the countryside had compelled social reformers to include rural workers in social insurance schemes. Nevertheless,

their entitlement had been resisted by landowners since the early 20th Century (Espuelas 2022, González and Ortiz 2017, Vilar and Pons 2014, Espuelas 2022). Their entitlement by Francoist family allowances did not solve the problem since, as Figure 3.4 shows, the scheme faced a persistent incapacity of collecting contributions in the countryside. For instance, in 1947, agricultural workers accounted for 60% of the family allowance coverage and 62% of their spending but only provided 17% of the total revenue. As an INP report (1953, 7) complained, the institute could not collect contributions from agricultural workers and was forced to take resources from the general (industrial) branch ‘so that agricultural workers did not see their benefits interrupted’.



Source: own elaboration (see Figure 3.2).



Source: own elaboration (see Figure 3.2).

Collection in the countryside was problematic due to the lack of reliable information, diversity of land property, high rates of temporary workers, and self- and family employment (González and Ortiz 2017; Vilar and Pons 2014). Moreover, the Government introduced the agricultural branch with some particularities compared to the general system. It established landowners' contributions as a supplement to land tax (*contribución territorial*),⁵² while workers paid flat-rate contributions fixed at 5 monthly *pesetas* for permanent workers and small land producers and 2.5 *pesetas* for the other agrarian workers (INP 1949). This system facilitated fraud because tax evasion was historically high in the Spanish countryside and because of the workers' reluctance to be discounted a part of their wages (Vilar and Pons 2014).

The system finally consolidated as inflation rates increased wages and contributions and by purging defaulting individuals. However, 'this did not allow for an adjustment of subsidy scales in line with the rise of living standards, nor did it allow for other measures that would improve benefits, not only in the agricultural but also in the general scheme' (INP 1953, 15). In order to solve this problem, the INP proposed increasing employers'

⁵² In 1945, Landowners' contribution was established at a 5% land tax rate and raised to 7.5% in 1947 (INP 1949).

contributions, engaging the regime's agricultural organisations in the collection of fees and including the State in funding the scheme. Such a solution was similar to that implemented in France in 1939. As shown in Chapter 1, after failing to implement contributory compensation funds in the countryside, the French State had to provide tax-funded allowances to small landowners and their workers (Dutton 2002). On the other hand, by engaging agricultural organisations in contribution collection, the INP aimed to offset the Spanish low administrative capacity and raise the scheme's revenue. However, the Francoist State was unable or unwilling to support the scheme, making only one remarkable financial contribution in 1956, after a general wage increase in 1955-1956 sharply increased the labour costs (Vilar 2009) (see Figure 3.4).⁵³ As a response, the Government reduced employers' contributions, fixing them at a 1% wage rate in March 1956 (Pons and Vilar 2014). This reduced revenues of the scheme's industrial branch by more than 25%, from 1,596 to 1,192 million *pesetas*. As compensation, it granted the INP a 1,125 million *pesetas* subvention, 59% of which was allocated to family allowances. With that operation, the regime was supposed to increase the State's share in social insurance funding. Nevertheless, State support proved an exception, and employer contributions increased again in October 1956 to a 4% wage rate (Pons and Vilar 2014).

However, not all of the obstacles to developing family allowances came from the scheme's financial constraints. As shown in Figure 3.2, after 1947, the system registered steady surpluses. By contrast, the pension system only registered two years of surpluses throughout the fifties, while health insurance experienced continuous deficits (Pons and Vilar 2014, 208). In that context, part of the problems of the National Fund for Family Allowances came from these other social insurances. As Pons and Vilar (2019) show, between 1954 and 1957, the National Fund for Family Allowances advanced 934 million *pesetas* —11% of its revenue— to fund the necessary infrastructure for compulsory

⁵³ Although the regime officially regulated wages and prohibited collective agreements, employers still negotiated unofficial wage increases with their workers, especially after the labour conflict was reactivated in 1951 (Molinero and Ysàs 1998). The 1956 general wage increases indirectly recognised these unofficial negotiations (González 2021). Vilar (2009, 203) estimates that effective unskilled industrial wages almost doubled between 1955 and 1957, rising from 22.69 to 40.33 daily *pesetas*. See Appendix, Table A3.4.


health insurance. In other words, family allowance revenues served to fund other social policies when the State failed to do so.

Altogether, these constraints prevented Francoist family allowances from entitling independent workers and small landowners as Aznar had envisioned. Instead, their contributory design made them dependent on formal, permanent employment and set strict limits to its extension. By 1947, only 38% of families with two or more children, or 30% of total Spanish families, received the allowance.⁵⁴ According to Meil (2006, 366), in 1950 only 49% of children under 14 were beneficiaries.


As mentioned above, the scheme's limitations also squeezed its benefits, as it provided flat-rate allowances instead of making them proportional to wages. This made Francoist family allowances more redistributive, but high inflation rates decreased their purchasing power steadily (Meil 2006). As a response, the Government raised family allowance benefits in 1941, 1943 and 1955, the last increase coinciding with the abovementioned general wage increase (see Figure 3.5).⁵⁵ However, at the same time, the Government modified the scale of benefits by making them disproportionately larger for very large families. As a result (see Figure 3.6), family benefits became an increasingly important source of income for workers with very large families compared to their wages. By 1955, benefits for families with twelve children amounted to almost eight times that wage. This meant that those enjoying the highest benefits only accounted for 0.17% of all Spanish families—0.25% of families with two or more children. On the other hand, benefits for families with two to four children—57% of Spanish families with children—never accounted for a significant proportion of industrial wages. For instance, by 1955, benefits for families with four children accounted for 23% of a non-skilled industrial worker's daily wage, and benefits for families with two children represented just 11% of that wage.

⁵⁴ Data on the number of families with children comes from the Spanish Statistical Yearbook (INE 1950, 55).

⁵⁵ For instance, benefits for two children increased from 0.65 daily *pesetas* in 1938 to 2.4 daily *pesetas* in 1955.



Source: Own elaboration based on INP (1949) and BOE (19/10/1955, 6254).



Source: Own elaboration (see Appendix, Table A3.4).

As family allowances proved ineffective in improving the living standards of working class households and strengthening the sexual division of labour, the Government introduced an additional Family Bonus in 1945. It provided wage supplements to all family heads for marriage —if their wives did not participate in paid work— and from the first child, fully funded by the employers through company-based funds at a rate of 5% of their worker's wages (BOE 30/6/1945, 5401-5402). Bonuses were distributed among workers according to the number of dependants. Therefore, despite being compulsory, the Bonus system resembled the French private wage supplements that preceded the generalisation of compensation funds after World War I. As it was essentially a private supplement, quantifying its significance is challenging (Espuelas 2013a). However, according to Meil (2006, 366), by 1950, total family benefits amounted to 50-70% of the basic wage for a family with three children if they received the Bonus.⁵⁶ In other words, the economic significance of such a private supplement for workers with families far outweighed that of the family allowances.

Nevertheless, Family Bonus's coverage remained confined to industrial and commercial employees and excluded agricultural workers, home-based workers, temporary construction workers, and some feminised textile workshops.⁵⁷ Moreover, as benefits relied on the economic performance of each company, their importance highly varied across sectors and even firms. Finally, as a report from the Ministry of Labour (Ministerio de Trabajo 1962, 12) complained, this system increased employers' incentives to exclude workers with large families from employment.

In short, Family Bonuses revealed the regime's incapacity to develop a comprehensive family policy that provided significant benefits to a significant share of Spanish families. Furthermore, as with industrial accidents and health insurance, employers enjoyed a prominent role in providing family benefits (Vilar and Pons 2022). On the other hand, the State did not tax them severely to fund social services, and they could elude contributions (in the countryside), transfer social insurance costs to the workers' wages

⁵⁶ In the same case, regular family allowance benefits amounted only to 13% of a non-skilled worker's wage (see Appendix, Table A3.4).

⁵⁷ In particular, the Family Bonus excluded garment, clothing and headgear workshops with less than ten workers that did not employ male workers (BOE 30/6/1945, 5401).

or commodity prices (in the industry), and prevent further increases. In that context, by the late 1950s, the rise of the (official) female labour force participation made clear that the generalisation of the male breadwinner family would never be achieved, while the revival of class conflict revealed a steady decline in the regime's legitimacy (Vilar 2009, Domènech 2002).

3.5. Conclusion

The Francoist family allowance system was conceived as a top-down natalist policy, driven by demographic concerns and consistent with a Catholic, conservative ideology and the male breadwinner family model. However, as this Chapter has shown, distributive struggles and political regimes conditioned both the timing and model of the scheme. As in other countries, family allowances emerged in the public debate during the interwar period, promoted by Catholic social reformers, campaigners, and policymakers. Inspired by the French compensation fund system, they found it helpful to achieve family wages. Family allowances gained momentum among Right-wing groups during the Spanish Second Republic, emerging as a distinctive demand from the CEDA, the PNV, the Basque trade union SOV, and some relevant campaigners and Catholic employers.

However, such policy did not materialise until the Spanish Civil War. Compensation funds did not find as much support among Spanish employers as their French counterparts. High fertility rates relative to other countries and Spain's lower company concentration and fewer capital-intensive firms made this solution too costly for most employers. On the other hand, the apathy of the Left prevented family allowances from becoming part of the Republican reform programmes. The labour movement opposed employer-led compensation funds, and financial restrictions made the development of tax-funded, universal allowances difficult. Moreover, they prioritised other forms of family assistance, such as the development of social insurance schemes, general wage increases and the development of social services such as school meals. Finally, the institutional instability of the republican period and the lack of a consistent model

among Right-wing parties blocked the scheme's development under the Conservative biennium.

Ultimately, the Civil War intensified public concerns over developing an explicit population policy, but the political regime was essential in their implementation. Following the strengthened position of Falange and Catholics, the new regime—probably inspired by the Italian scheme—developed a relatively cheap policy to reduce economic hardship for large families. On the other hand, after whipping out independent trade unions and abandoning the republican projects to develop social insurance, family allowances appeared to employers as an acceptable alternative to general wage increases in the context of high inflation rates. As a result, the regime developed a contributory scheme as part of its wage policy. However, by slowing down fiscal and administrative development, the dictatorship squeezed the State's financial support and the scheme's ability to collect contributions in the countryside, limiting its generosity and coverage. In parallel, the regime established an additional Family Bonus as a private, compulsory supplement for permanent industrial workers, thus establishing a dual family policy with significant insider/outsider differences regarding benefits.

This story is consistent with some previous accounts of Francoist family allowances, which have described them as a social policy aimed at increasing the regime's legitimacy, but with limited effects in practical terms (González and Ortiz 2017; Molinero 2005; Molinero and Ysàs 1998). However, it also shows how ideological political prospects translated, in the Spanish case, into specific social policy models. Therefore, although Catholic campaigners and organisations were influential in pioneering the debates about the convenience of developing family policies in a Catholic country like Spain, they were unable or unwilling to enforce such models once they enjoyed more influence—as in the Primo de Rivera and Franco dictatorships. Spain lacked the social, economic and institutional conditions to develop the more universal family allowance models established in other countries. Unlike the French employers, the Spanish ones never developed extensive family allowance schemes, and Spanish higher fertility rates made natalist movements less influential than in France. This also brought Leftist parties to develop alternative models of family support. Unlike in the United Kingdom or Sweden,

the Spanish elites' resistance to raising tax burdens hindered the development of tax-funded, universal schemes. Therefore, as in Italy, Spanish family allowances developed as a contributory, job-related policy to support families with children and to reinforce the regime's legitimacy. As Lynch (2006, 2009) has shown for the Italian case, the Francoist dictatorship developed a clientelist model of family benefits more than a conservative, Catholic one, as it constituted a dual system whose most extensive benefits only targeted a small fraction of the working class.

This story has important implications for the Southern European Welfare Regime literature, as it shows the historical roots of some of their characteristic features, such as a low state penetration and underdeveloped social services, and an essential role of clientelism and family kinship in welfare provision (Rhodes 1996; Ferrera 1996; Gal 2010). It explains these features as outcomes of a failed welfare state formation. Spanish Francoist dictatorship hindered fiscal and administrative development —State penetration— as it relied heavily on economic elites and employers (Pons and Vilar 2014, Espuelas 2022), which constrained social policy formation—particularly in the countryside. Moreover, the need to countervail social unrest and sustain aggregated demand made the regime develop higher benefits for a segment of the working class (see Vilar 2009), thus developing clientelist and dual family provisions. Together with the low development of insurance markets during the autarchic period (see Pons and Vilar 2014), this increased the role of the family in welfare provision, laying the foundations of Spain as a Southern European Welfare Regime. In other words, it suggests that more than long-term, demand-based factors such as the role of Catholicism (or the Catholic Church) and extended families, regime-based supply factors and distributive struggles have more explanatory power when explaining the timing and models of social policies. Finally, stressing the centrality of the political regime in explaining such a process has also implications for the literature (Espuelas 2012, Lindert 2021) as it provides some mechanisms behind the negative effect of dictatorships on the development of social policies.

Appendix Chapter 3

Table A3.1. Social spending of Spanish social insurance schemes in 1958 *pesetas* (1920-1933)

Year	Old age insurance		Maternity allowance and insurance		Voluntary insurance (State subsidy)		Family allowances		Other		Total spending (in pesetas)
	Spending	As a % of total	Spending	As a % of total	Spending	As a % of total	Spending	As a % of total	Spending	As a % of total	
Until 1920	-	0%	-	0%	3,424,480	89%	-	0%	413,383	11%	3,837,863
1921	-	0%	-	0%	1,556,090	88%	-	0%	210,778	12%	1,766,868
1922	174,182	7%	-	0%	1,845,441	78%	-	0%	345,128	15%	2,364,750
1923	688,009	19%	127,881	4%	2,320,565	65%	-	0%	407,205	11%	3,543,660
1924	2,720,898	32%	2,174,793	26%	2,605,277	31%	-	0%	942,065	11%	8,443,032
1925	9,155,584	55%	2,836,091	17%	3,085,629	19%	-	0%	1,449,351	9%	16,526,656
1926	18,014,423	62%	4,300,740	15%	4,047,952	14%	-	0%	2,599,664	9%	28,962,779
1927	25,899,178	59%	7,048,715	16%	7,265,371	16%	-	0%	3,954,838	9%	44,168,102
1928	32,265,471	64%	6,023,256	12%	6,960,833	14%	-	0%	5,011,658	10%	50,261,218
1929	54,650,146	69%	6,930,449	9%	11,138,316	14%	25,867,689	33%	6,198,698	8%	78,917,610
1930	56,401,003	64%	6,060,000	7%	16,046,826	18%	-	0%	9,271,370	11%	87,779,199
1931	59,479,580	50%	28,097,599	24%	19,037,760	16%	36,990,605	31%	11,738,313	10%	118,353,251
1932	70,341,708	55%	24,405,431	19%	17,973,743	14%	-	0%	15,580,010	12%	128,300,891
1933	92,356,832	46%	67,652,841	34%	21,118,769	11%	-	0%	17,550,978	9%	198,679,419
1934	85,023,190	45%	64,881,777	34%	20,604,894	11%	-	0%	18,430,803	10%	188,940,663
1935	101,942,454	46%	76,053,490	35%	21,054,580	10%	-	0%	20,598,758	9%	219,649,281
Total	587,270,293	51%	287,711,118	25%	154,821,082	14%	60,320,940	5%	110,892,165	10%	1,140,694,658

Source: INP (1936, 166). Data has been deflated using Prados de la Escosura (2003: 365).

Table A3.2. Vote share, MP's share, ideology, and Manifesto's year of some Spanish political parties

Political Party	Political faction	Manifesto's year	General election 1931		General election 1933		General election 1936	
			Vote share in %	MPs share in %	Vote share in %	MPs share in %	Vote share in %	MPs share in %
			Autonomist Republican Union Party	Republican Centrism	1931	ns	ns	ns
Republican Catalan-nationalist Party	Regionalist Centrism	1933	0.8	0.6	0.4	0	0	0
Republican Liberal Right	Liberal Right	1930	8.9	5.5	ns	ns	ns	ns
Radical Republican Party	Liberal Right	1933	13.2	14.8	14.3	18.1	3.6	1.8
Traditionalist Communion	Authoritarian Right	1932	1	0.8	4.3	4.1	3.4	3.2
Popular Action	Catholic Right	1931	1.9	1	0.3	0	0	0
Spanish Confederations of Autonomous Right-wings	Catholic Right	1933	0	0	13.9	21.4	23.2	21.8
Spanish Farmer's Party	Catholic Right	1934	3	2.5	7.5	10.4	2.6	2.2
Spanish Falange	Authoritarian Right	1933, 1934	0	0	ns	0.4	0.1	0
Catalan League	Regionalist Right	1933	1.8	0.6	3.8	4.8	2.7	2.4
Basque Nationalist Party	Regionalist Right	1935	1.5	1.4	2.2	2.6	1.4	2.2

See Table A3.2. (cont.)

Table A3.2 (cont.). Vote Share, MP's Share, ideology, and Manifesto's year of some Spanish political parties

Political Party	Political faction	Manifesto's year	General election 1931		General election 1933		General election 1936	
			Vote share in %	MPs share in %	Vote share in %	MPs share in %	Vote share in %	MPs share in %
			Republican Left of Catalonia	Regionalist Left	1931	6.7	6.4	3.7
Radical-Socialist Republican Party	Republican Left	1929; 1930	11.8	12.5	1.4	0.2	0	0
Republican Left	Republican Left	1934	0.2	0.2	0	0	13.7	16.4
Republican Union	Republican Left	1934	0	0	0	0	5.9	7.1
Spanish Socialist Worker's Party	Worker's Left	1931; 1934	21.4	24.6	19.4	12.3	16.4	18.4
Spanish Communist Party	Worker's Left	1931; 1933	0.8	0	1.9	0	2.5	2.4
Workers' Party of Marxist Unification	Worker's Left	1935	0	0	0	0	0.2	0.2
Union's Party	Worker's Left	1934	0	0	0	0	0.3	0.4

Notes: Although their presence in Parliament was small, the Union's Party was the political branch of the CNT, the second Spanish union. Similarly, although the Autonomist Republican Union Party was a small party linked to the Radical Republican Party, became strong in the Valencia City Council until 1934.

Source: Own elaboration based on Artola (1977) and Linz, Montero and Ruiz (2005, 1100). Evidence for the National Basque Party's preferences from their parliamentary interventions. Evidence for the Radical Republican Party from PRR (1933), and for the Republican Left of Catalonia in ERC (1931).

Table A3.3. Scale benefits of Spanish Family Allowances (various schemes)

Nº of children	Family allowance scheme (year of the Act)						Family Bonus (points)**
	1926 worker's benefits (yearly <i>pesetas</i>)	1926 civil service (wage proportion in %)	1938 (daily <i>pesetas</i>)	1941 (daily <i>pesetas</i>)	1943 (daily <i>pesetas</i>)	1955 (daily <i>pesetas</i>)	
1							6
2			0.65	1.2	1.6	2.4	7
3			0.95	1.8	2.6	3.6	8
4			1.25	2.4	3.6	5.2	10
5			1.65	3.2	4.8	7	13
6			2.1	4	6.4	10	16
7			2.5	4.8	11.2	14	19
8	100		3.15	6	16	19	22
9	150		3.75	7.2	21.6	25.2	25
10	200		4.4	8.4	28	48	30*
11	250	5	5.2	10	35.2	100	35
12	300	10	6.05*	11.6*	43.2*	180*	40
13	375	15	7.21	12.76	44.39	181.67	45
14	500	20	8.38	13.92	45.57	183.33	50
15	600	25	9.54	15.08	46.76	185	55
16	700	30	10.70	16.24	47.94	186.67	60
17	850	35	11.87	17.4	49.13	188.33	65
18	1.000 (max)	40	13.03	18.56	50.31	190	70
19	1.000	45	14.19	19.72	51.50	191.67	75
20	1.000	50 (max)	15.36	20.88	52.68	193.33	80

* Each additional child increased benefits at a fixed rate

** Family bonus also provided 5 points for marriage if worker's wife was out of paid work

Source: Own elaboration based on Gaceta (22/06/1926), INP 1949, BOE (30/06/1945, 5401), BOE (19/10/1955).

Table A3.4. Family allowance benefits as a % of a non-skilled industrial worker (1939-1955)

Year	Wage (daily <i>pesetas</i>)	benefit as % wage (by n° children)											
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1940	11.61		6%	8%	11%	14%	18%	22%	27%	32%	38%	45%	52%
1941	12.42		10%	14%	19%	26%	32%	39%	48%	58%	68%	81%	93%
1942	12.91		9%	14%	19%	25%	31%	37%	46%	56%	65%	77%	90%
1943	12.63		13%	21%	29%	38%	51%	89%	127%	171%	222%	279%	342%
1944	12.54		13%	21%	29%	38%	51%	89%	128%	172%	223%	281%	344%
1945	12.45		13%	21%	29%	39%	51%	90%	129%	173%	225%	283%	347%
1946	15.11		11%	17%	24%	32%	42%	74%	106%	143%	185%	233%	286%
1947	16.15		10%	16%	22%	30%	40%	69%	99%	134%	173%	218%	267%
1948	17.31		9%	15%	21%	28%	37%	65%	92%	125%	162%	203%	250%
1949	17.24		9%	15%	21%	28%	37%	65%	93%	125%	162%	204%	251%
1950	20.12		8%	13%	18%	24%	32%	56%	80%	107%	139%	175%	215%
1951	20.63		8%	13%	17%	23%	31%	54%	78%	105%	136%	171%	209%
1952	20.59		8%	13%	17%	23%	31%	54%	78%	105%	136%	171%	210%
1953	21.03		8%	12%	17%	23%	30%	53%	76%	103%	133%	167%	205%
1954	22.33		7%	12%	16%	21%	29%	50%	72%	97%	125%	158%	193%
1955	22.69		11%	16%	23%	31%	44%	62%	84%	111%	212%	441%	793%
1956	38.6		6%	9%	13%	18%	26%	36%	49%	65%	124%	259%	466%
1957	40.33		6%	9%	13%	17%	25%	35%	47%	62%	119%	248%	446%
1958	40.83		6%	9%	13%	17%	24%	34%	47%	62%	118%	245%	441%

Source: Own elaboration. Proportions have been calculated by comparing daily wages with family allowance benefits for two and each additional child. For data on benefits, see Table A3. Data on wages from 1943 comes from Vilar (2009, 203) and between 1940 and 1943 from Vilar (2004, 101).

Table A3.5. Family allowance recipient workers by sectors and total spending and revenues in 1958 *pesetas*, 1939-1958

Year	Total	General workers	Agricultural workers	Widows and orphans	Sea workers	Civil servants	Total spending	Revenue
1939	266,763	266,763					356,299,416	-
1940	439,920	437,291		2,629			710,374,210	2,207,947,944
1941	500,201	494,650		5,551			1,250,291,583	2,363,902,988
1942	566,887	555,534		11,353			1,585,954,378	2,072,037,668
1943	648,136	543,702	20,443	15,527		68,464	1,925,681,897	2,545,645,266
1944	820,806	464,440	248,196	18,572	12,476	77,122	2,871,399,759	2,789,640,607
1945	1,304,123	463,139	724,626	23,716	14,717	77,925	4,428,790,430	2,450,380,095
1946	1,397,784	458,201	802,967	27,369	28,561	80,686	3,834,648,591	4,233,632,859
1947	1,506,467	457,049	903,672	33,546	33,044	79,156	3,574,142,813	3,589,927,665
1948	1,404,156	446,441	811,542	34,030	30,123	82,020	3,005,658,206	3,468,237,678
1949	1,314,201	433,067	762,320	34,484	30,233	54,097	2,619,031,529	3,288,198,574
1950	1,293,965	453,571	718,145	36,496	30,573	55,180	2,134,144,417	2,599,926,736
1951	1,299,250	463,755	730,243	40,104	31,067	34,081	1,817,562,958	2,378,125,915
1952	1,381,924	534,360	724,379	44,680	30,378	48,127	1,919,961,559	2,768,793,335
1953	1,345,717	479,741	732,329	43,807	30,173	59,667	1,735,307,943	2,459,021,530
1954	1,322,598	477,126	723,623	42,426	30,333	49,090	1,649,208,516	2,574,450,702
1955	1,335,706	515,794	714,907	42,341	31,054	31,610	1,578,347,198	2,574,887,926
1956	1,325,762	568,420	654,891	41,565	30,288	30,598	2,030,031,822	2,702,827,503
1957	1,399,069	598,976	696,716	40,791	32,573	30,013	1,986,671,063	3,482,462,725
1958	1,383,881	634,473	648,632	41,786	29,919	29,071	1,789,125,100	3,305,354,600

Source: Own elaboration based on INP (1943, 1948), Jordana (1953) and Spanish Statistical Yearbook (INE 1954, 1956, 1959). Spending and revenues have been deflated using Prados de la Escosura (2003: 365-366).

Table A6. Family allowance spending in 1958 pesetas by branches, 1939-1958

Year	Total	General workers			Agricultural workers			Sea workers			Civil servants			Other		
		nº	%	nº	%	nº	%	nº	%	nº	%	nº	%	nº	%	
1939	356,299,416	356,299,416	100%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	
1940	710,374,210	704,117,141	99%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	6,257,068	1%	
1941	1,250,291,583	1,172,678,570	94%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	77,613,013	6%	
1942	1,585,954,378	1,329,398,570	84%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	90,258,067	6%	166,297,742	10%	
1943	1,925,681,897	1,449,120,878	75%	74,703,875	4%	-	0%	208,221,236	11%	193,635,908	10%	177,137,780	6%			
1944	2,871,399,759	1,448,421,248	50%	918,710,576	32%	78,978,252	5%	248,151,904	9%	189,035,683	4%	189,035,683	4%			
1945	4,428,790,430	1,364,259,029	31%	2,556,997,920	58%	86,133,267	6%	232,364,531	5%	229,888,769	6%	229,888,769	6%			
1946	3,834,648,591	1,129,773,731	29%	2,211,429,480	58%	71,424,669	6%	192,131,943	5%	227,155,320	6%	227,155,320	6%			
1947	3,574,142,813	981,747,848	27%	2,122,765,365	59%	71,507,554	7%	170,966,726	5%	173,740,711	6%	173,740,711	6%			
1948	3,005,658,206	881,500,607	29%	1,729,262,129	58%	62,452,798	7%	158,701,962	5%	150,359,468	6%	150,359,468	6%			
1949	2,619,031,529	793,105,247	30%	1,511,010,232	58%	58,442,161	7%	106,114,421	4%	140,944,253	7%	140,944,253	7%			
1950	2,134,144,417	686,272,438	32%	1,172,937,569	55%	50,087,113	7%	83,903,044	4%	151,806,573	8%	151,806,573	8%			
1951	1,817,562,958	606,726,558	33%	970,118,235	53%	42,899,625	7%	46,011,966	3%	159,240,522	8%	159,240,522	8%			
1952	1,919,961,559	688,383,178	36%	967,614,001	50%	40,309,117	6%	64,414,742	3%	140,204,371	8%	140,204,371	8%			
1953	1,735,307,943	576,038,167	33%	907,202,577	52%	37,280,215	6%	74,582,613	4%	139,112,638	8%	139,112,638	8%			
1954	1,649,208,516	566,584,025	34%	847,758,116	51%	35,512,457	6%	60,241,280	4%	134,540,150	9%	134,540,150	9%			
1955	1,578,347,198	581,876,950	37%	791,505,488	50%	34,481,802	6%	35,942,808	2%	336,379,088	17%	336,379,088	17%			
1956	2,030,031,822	755,771,057	37%	857,941,659	42%	39,344,867	5%	40,595,151	2%	332,458,254	17%	332,458,254	17%			
1957	1,986,671,063	718,269,923	36%	861,704,258	43%	37,586,789	5%	36,651,839	2%	311,998,500	17%	311,998,500	17%			
1958	1,789,125,100	689,399,800	39%	721,985,800	40%	33,743,600	5%	31,997,400	2%							

Notes: from 1950, Statistical yearbook offers the data in thousand pesetas; Category "other" contains spending on Widows, Orphans and School, Marriage Bonuses, Birth Premiums and Maternity benefits.

Source: Own elaboration based on INP (1943, 1948), Spanish Statistical Yearbook (INE 1954, 1956, 1959).

Table A3.7. Family allowance revenue in 1958 pesetas by branches, 1934-1958

Year	Total	General workers		Agricultural workers		Sea workers		Civil servants		State subsidy	
		nº	%	nº	%	nº	%	nº	%	nº	%
1940	2,207,947,944	2,207,947,944	100%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%
1941	2,363,902,988	2,363,902,988	100%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%
1942	2,072,037,668	2,072,037,668	100%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%
1943	2,545,645,266	2,545,645,266	100%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%
1944	2,789,640,607	2,349,451,535	84%	403,970,652	14%	36,218,420	1%	-	0%	-	0%
1945	2,450,380,095	2,416,546,614	99%	-	0%	33,833,482	1%	-	0%	-	0%
1946	4,233,632,859	2,455,812,579	58%	1,748,376,682	41%	29,443,598	1%	-	0%	-	0%
1947	3,589,927,665	2,637,860,085	73%	602,048,815	17%	19,946,444	1%	330,072,321	9%	-	0%
1948	3,468,237,678	2,669,729,586	77%	711,674,333	21%	18,770,617	1%	68,063,141	2%	-	0%
1949	3,288,198,574	2,436,280,751	74%	695,732,515	21%	16,255,784	0%	139,929,524	4%	-	0%
1950	2,599,926,736	2,072,282,548	80%	411,567,169	16%	40,006,037	2%	76,070,983	3%	-	0%
1951	2,378,125,915	1,919,804,787	81%	358,975,710	15%	36,350,241	2%	62,995,178	3%	-	0%
1952	2,768,793,335	2,302,814,847	83%	376,649,621	14%	34,981,485	1%	54,347,381	2%	-	0%
1953	2,459,021,530	1,996,679,171	81%	355,347,741	14%	32,412,005	1%	74,582,613	3%	-	0%
1954	2,574,450,702	2,105,600,332	82%	369,540,994	14%	35,159,444	1%	64,149,932	2%	-	0%
1955	2,574,887,926	2,175,171,577	84%	332,082,034	13%	31,691,508	1%	35,942,808	1%	-	0%
1956	2,702,827,503	1,505,421,518	56%	290,280,086	11%	24,365,829	1%	40,595,025	2%	842,165,046	31%
1957	3,482,462,725	3,184,773,444	91%	256,911,255	7%	4,126,188	0%	36,651,839	1%	-	0%
1958	3,305,354,600	3,037,812,100	92%	229,867,100	7%	5,678,000	0%	31,997,400	1%	-	0%

Note: No data about civil servants contributions until 1947. Data from Spanish Statistical Yearbooks is in thousand pesetas; data for agricultural workers in 1945 is missing.

Source: Data from 1940 to 1950 from Jordana (1953) and from 1950 to 1958 from Spanish Statistical yearbooks (INE 1954, 1956, 1959). Data for civil servants from 1947 from Spanish Statistical Yearbooks (INE 1954, 1956, 1959).

Concluding remarks

How and why the States provide welfare to families have become crucial questions in the literature about gendered, comparative, and welfare state regimes. Among them, many approaches emphasise that long-term, historical factors are relevant to explain cross-country differences in the provision of family policies (Bahle 2008; Ferrera 1996; Rhodes 1996; Esping-Andersen 1990; Gal 2010; Daly 2020). For instance, in Southern European countries, factors such as late industrialisation, low state penetration, the traditional prevalence of extended families, and Catholic and authoritarian legacies would have led to the underdevelopment of progressive family policies (such as childcare services) in the present (Ferrera 1996; Giner 1995; Sarasa and Moreno 1995; León and Guillén 2011; Bahle 2008). However, historical analyses of family policy formation in Southern European countries are still scarce, and most of them focused on more general explanations of the women–family–State relationship (Naldini 2003; Valiente 1997; Lynch 2009; 2006; Gracia 2010; Nash 1996; Saraceno 1996).

This thesis combines in-depth and comparative historical approaches to investigate the formation of European —particularly Southern European— family policies from 1880 to 1960. At the international level, it uses several primary reports from supra-national organisations and earlier comparative and case studies to unravel the formation of

Western European family policies from 1880 to 1960. By doing so, Chapter 1 shows that while Central European, Bismarckian social insurance models pioneered the introduction of paid maternity leaves, Latin Rim countries did so with family allowances. In Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, developing a publicly funded complement to family wage became central to policymaking, and, as a result, family allowances emerged as a leading social policy before the second global post-war (Dutton 2002; Carolo and Pereirinha 2010; Espuelas 2013a; Lynch 2006; Gauthier 1996). Moreover, unlike Northern European countries, which developed tax-funded, citizen-based cash benefits for mothers with children after World War II, continental European countries consolidated job-related, contributory schemes. Nevertheless, while French and Belgian allowances were expanded beyond the working class, Southern European systems remained tied to permanent, head-of-family (male) workers.

The rest of the dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the Spanish case to contribute to explaining the development of the Southern European family policy model. It investigates the political economy of the Spanish family policies by studying political debates —gathered from social reform institutions, the Parliament and the press— and policy outcomes—collected from public reports and statistics. It shows that, although demographic concerns and conservative Catholic ideology increased demands for such policies, the inability to establish sufficient financial resources squeezed the schemes' benefits and limited their coverage. Several studies claim that Spain's low fiscal capacity during most of the 20th Century reduced the State's support for social policies, thus forcing policymakers to develop contributory social insurance systems (Espuelas 2022; Pons and Vilar 2014; Comín 2010). Nevertheless, Spain was a low-wage, mainly agricultural economy dominated by labour-intensive small and medium-sized companies and with abundant small landownership. This context increased distributive struggles over who would pay for the scheme, who would benefit from it, and for how much (Espuelas 2022; 2013b).

As a result, although the 1900 unpaid maternity leave was soon depicted as ineffective, compulsory paid maternity leave was not implemented until 1931, and after that, it became the only Western European compulsory scheme that remained independent from health insurance (Pons 2010). The analysis of public debates in Chapter 2 suggests

that the opposition from socialist workers and many employers and employer organisations delayed the scheme's development. Unlike Catholic workers, who strongly supported tripartite contributions, socialist representatives advocated for a scheme funded by the employers and the State, even if that meant lowering its generosity and coverage. Similarly, most employer organisations advocated for the State to fund the scheme. As Chapter 3 shows, many employers feared workers could use collective bargaining to transfer social insurance costs to them. Opposition from the socialist labour movement faded out after the Republic's proclamation, allowing the scheme to develop after 1931. However, the evolution of coverage, the slow growth of spending on health services and complaints from the INP suggest that the scheme faced persistent resistance from employers and medical associations after 1931. Eventually, republican attempts to improve services and develop health insurance failed in the face of the 1936 *coup d'état* and the Francoist dictatorship that implemented, in 1944, a health insurance system with minimal health infrastructure (Vilar and Pons 2019).

Likewise, family allowances emerged as a desirable policy among Catholic social reformers and policymakers during the twenties, but the scheme was not fully developed until the Spanish Civil War. As shown in Chapter 3, Spanish high fertility rates, low company concentration and predominance of labour-intensive firms made employers unable or unwilling to meet the cost of compensation funds, which was the preferred model of Catholic campaigners. Moreover, the Spanish low fiscal capacity prevented the Primo de Rivera dictatorship from developing ambitious, tax-funded family allowances —which remained residual— and allowed the Republican Left-wing Government to remove them. These obstacles persisted during early Francoism, constraining the scheme's development despite the regime's strongly Conservative ideology, the demographic collapse of the Spanish Civil War, and the emergence of family benefits as a part of wage rationalisation. As a result, Francoist allowances proved persistently incapable of reaching most Spanish families or maintaining their real value in the face of increasing inflation rates.

The political regime played a significant role in this story. Several cross-country analyses (Espuelas 2012; Lindert 2021), longitudinal approaches (Espuelas 2017; Comín 2010), and case studies (Vilar and Pons 2019; Lynch 2009) argue that conservative dictatorships

have a negative effect on social policy development. This dissertation builds on this literature by showing that Spanish authoritarian regimes hindered the development of even those social policies that were more consistent with their ideology—conservative family policies. It suggests that Primo de Rivera and Francoist dictatorships proved unable or unwilling to overcome the traditional resistance from economic elites, employers and landowners to raise tax burdens and enforce employers' contributions, as they feared undermining their social support—especially in the countryside. On the other hand, they also became incapable of charging a reluctant and low-wage working class with extra burdens such as indirect taxation and workers' contributions, as they feared increasing social unrest. As a result, the most ambitious schemes envisioned by Catholic social reformers were scaled down. By contrast, during the Republican period, political democracy had facilitated family policy formation by increasing bottom-up pressures and partisan, Left-Right competition over family policies, facilitating socialist support on workers' contributions and pursuing tax reform. Nevertheless, to what extent such pressures could have overcome Spanish constraints on social policy development or what policy package could have emerged if democracy survived is out of the scope of this thesis.

Yet, by analysing the different family policy models that emerged during this period, this thesis contributes to the literature on the influence of social groups on gendered early social reformism (Wikander, Kessler-Harris, and Lewis 1995; Nielfa 2004; Arbaiza 2000; Borderías 2007; Bock and Thane 1996b; Koven and Michel 1993a; Woodward, Bonvin, and Renom 2011; O'Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999). For instance, during the Republic, Socialists advocated for developing social insurance schemes covering all waged labourers and the wives of insured workers, with progressive benefits according to family size. They also sought to expand school meals and improve the working class's bargaining capacity to raise wages. As for the Catholic right, although they did not oppose such projects, Parliamentary initiatives and public campaigns suggest that they did advocate for a more explicit family policy model—family allowances. In that context, as Spanish feminism lacked the grass-roots organisations of their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, most women's groups campaigned from broader ideological frameworks (Blasco 2003). As the case of maternity leave suggests, this impacted their social policy

preferences, impeding the formation of a shared model across women's organisations. Thus, although they were not as visible as their male counterparts, they did play a role in Spanish family policy formation.

By studying the relationship between social groups' preferences, institutional and social constraints, and policy outcomes, this thesis also contributes to the literature on the role of religion —and ideology, broadly speaking— on social policy formation (Montero 2004; Manow and Van Kersbergen 2009; Morgan 2009; Van Kersbergen 1995). In particular, this thesis argues that political regimes and distributive conflicts over policy funding strongly restricted the influence of underlying ideological concerns about the shape of family policies. Hence, although Catholics advocated for generous and explicit family policies and enjoyed considerable influence under Catholic dictatorships, the abovementioned constraints to social policy formation made them unable to enforce their models.

This thesis has some implications for the Southern European Welfare Regime literature. The incapacity of the Francoist dictatorship to develop an ambitious scheme led to the foundation of some of the characteristic features of this welfare model, such as the considerable insider/outsider differentiation, clientelism and the primacy of family in welfare provision (Ferrera 1996; Kamerman and Kahn 1978; León and Guillén 2011; Bahle 2008). The development of the Family Bonus after 1945 confirmed the regime's failure to develop a sufficient public family policy that reached most Spanish families, drawing a significant division between permanent industrial workers in big companies and the rest. As in Italy (see Lynch 2009), entitling the most permanent, skilled working class to family benefits aimed at neutralising social unrest as much as improving family welfare, emerging as a form of political patronage. Finally, this story suggests that insider/outsider differences, together with the persistence of low wages (Vilar 2009), the underdevelopment of the private insurance sector (Pons and Vilar 2011) and the discrimination of women in the labour market (Nash 1996) could have led to an increasing role of family kinship in welfare provision.

Furthermore, these accounts also nuance the interpretations of the actual underdevelopment of Spanish family policies as a drawback resulting from its authoritarian past (Ayuso and Bascón 2021; Valiente 1996; Pérez-Caramés 2014). In Italy,

post-war democracy inherited and improved the Mussolinian family policy system, which remained relevant for years (Lynch 2006; Saraceno 1994). In Spain, those policies proved ineffective much before the Transition Period. Indeed, implementing a private compulsory wage supplement as the Family Bonus after 1945 confirms the regime's failure to develop a comprehensive family policy, as in Belgium or France.

Finally, the thesis draws an additional, tentative implication for the comparative and Welfare Regime literature, highlighting the value of comparing Latin Rim countries' family policies during the interwar period. Belgian and French family policies have been considered too particular to fit as a variant of a Conservative Welfare Regime (Bahle 2008; Kamerman and Kahn 1978). Moreover, when considering anti-poverty policies, authors like Leibfried (1993) argued that Portugal, Spain, (Southern) Italy, Greece, and, to some extent, France constituted a differentiated, 'Latin Rim' welfare state. Authors like Kahl (2005) explain such similarities as an outcome of Catholic long-term influence in these countries. Although French-Belgian family policies, *in the present*, contrast with those of the Southern European countries (Bahle 2008), this research has shown many similarities between them during the interwar period regarding timing, model, and cross-country political influence. In particular, the influence of the French family policy on Spanish social reformers cannot be underestimated. Thus, long-term studies comparing Latin Rim countries could be crucial to disentangling some of the determinants and mechanisms of early family policy formation.

This research has some limitations that must be overcome through future research. First, as it has been focusing on analysing the policymaking process, less attention has been paid to the mixed economies of welfare—i.e., how market agents, families, and communities provide welfare vis-à-vis public social policies (Harris 2004; Harris and Bridgen 2007). For instance, several studies emphasise that diversified family labour strategies (Borderías and Ferrer 2015) and working women's solidarity (Nyberg 2000) were relevant in providing childcare. Second, although this thesis has shed some light on employer-led social provisions, much more research is needed to understand the regional and sectorial variations in their role as welfare providers and claimants. Third, although this dissertation has done its best to introduce women's role in family policy formation, the fact is that their voices, motives and influence in such a process are still

relatively obscure. Further research must address this problem by focusing entirely on the role of women's organisations during social policy debates.

Ultimately, this dissertation opens various future lines of research. First, it ends, chronologically speaking, at the gates of the 1963/1964 Social Security reforms. One of the aims of such a reform was to integrate the public, more universal but less generous family allowances with the private Family Bonus. Indeed, after this reform, the share of family policy spending over the total social spending rose for the first time since 1945—from 5% in 1966 to 30% in 1967—to sharply decrease after that (see Espuelas 2013a). Therefore, analysing the political economy of family policy retrenchment during the late Francoism appears crucial to connect this thesis's analysis with comparative family policy studies.

A second fertile investigation would be to analyse, from a European perspective, the rise and fall of Italian and Spanish family policies from 1940 to the 1990s to disentangle why Mediterranean family policies declined precisely during the third wave of family policy development (Daly and Ferragina 2017). Similarly, a comprehensive comparative study of early family policy formation in Mediterranean countries has to be done. Moreover, the similarities between Italian, Spanish and French timings, the influences of the French model over Spanish social reformers, the shared influence of religion, and the similarities that have been highlighted among the 'Latin Rim' countries (Leibfried 1993) suggest that France should be incorporated to the comparison. Therefore, this future research will compare family policy development in Italy, Spain and France during the first half of the 20th Century.

Overall, this dissertation has shown that more studies are needed that combine historical, comparative research with typological and Welfare Regime analyses. Long-term perspectives are unavoidable, not only to draw comprehensive views on 'how did we get here', but to think about how the past constraints our present policymaking possibilities and to think about future policy reforms.

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