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**Imperialism and Hegemony: The Role of the United  
States in the Brazilian Civilian-Military Coup of  
1964**

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## Resum

Aquesta tesi doctoral té com a objectiu analitzar l'imperialisme nord-americà i la seva política d'ingerència a Brasil durant els anys previs al cop d'estat civil-militar de 1964. Malgrat les promeses del govern de John F. Kennedy d'implementar *Nation Building* i de promoure desenvolupament en les nacions més endarrerides, l'arribada a la presidència de João Goulart i el creixement de tendències *nacional-reformista* suposaven un afront als interessos nord-americans. Per tant, és un estudi que examina com els EUA va reaccionar davant d'una amenaça a la seva hegemonia hemisfèrica, i quins mecanismes i quines estratègies va emprar per mantenir a Brasil sota la seva influència. Utilitzant investigacions prèvies i fonts ja conegudes a més de documentació nova, la qual ha sigut desclassificada en els últims anys, la proposta aquí és donar una altra perspectiva sobre l'actuació dels EUA. Com es veurà, la política nord-americana per a Brasil era desarticulada, irracional, temerària i provocava reaccions i conjuntures que portaven els fets cap a un punt de no retorn. Tanmateix, això no vol dir que l'imperialisme nord-americà no fos implacable. En aquest sentit, la decisió de recolzar un cop d'estat contra l'ordre democràtic en una nació aliada, no suposava cap mena de dubte per als oficials nord-americans, en Brasil i en Washington, si així podien aconseguir el seu objectiu.

## **Abstract**

This doctoral thesis aims to analyse United States' imperialism and its policy of interference in Brazil in the years leading up to the 1964 military coup d'état. Despite the John F. Kennedy government's pledges to implement *Nation Building* and to promote development in the most underdeveloped nations, João Goulart's coming to the presidency and the growth in popularity of *nacional-reformista* tendencies were a menace to U.S. interests. Therefore, this is a study that examines how the U.S. reacted to a threat against its hemispheric hegemony, and what mechanisms and strategies it employed to keep Brazil under its influence. Using previous investigations and already known sources in addition to new documentation, which has been declassified in recent years, the proposal here is to give another perspective on U.S. meddling. As it will become clear, the United States' policy for Brazil was disjointed, irrational, reckless and provoked reactions and conjunctures that led events to a point of no return. However, this does not mean that U.S. imperialism was not ruthless. In this regard, the decision to support a coup d'état against the democratic order in an allied nation caused no doubts for U.S. officials, in Brazil and Washington, if they could achieve their objective.

## Agraïments

M'agradaria donar les gràcies i expressar el meu agraïment a totes aquelles persones que m'han acompanyat aquests anys. En primer lloc, vull agrair al Jordi Figuerola Garreta, director de la tesi, tots els seus consells, el seu suport i la seva amistat al llarg d'aquests anys.

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## List of Abbreviations

ACM	Associação Cristã de Moços
ADEP	Ação Democrática Popular
AFL	American Federation of Labor
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations
AIFLD	American Institute for Free Labor Development
ALUSNA	American Legation, U.S. Naval Attaché
AMFORP	American and Foreign Power
AP	Associated Press
ARMA	Army Attaché
CAMDE	Campanha da Mulher pela Democracia
CENIMAR	Centro de Informações da Marinha
CGSC	U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
CGT	Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores
CI	Counterinsurgency
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CONESP	Comissão de Nacionalização das Empresas Concessionárias de Serviços Públicos
CPI	Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito
CTAL	Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina
ESG	Escola Superior de Guerra
FA	Forças Armadas do Brasil
FEB	Força Expedicionária Brasileira
FMP	Frente de Mobilização Popular
GOB	Government of Brazil
IBAD	Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática

ICT	Instituto Cultural do Trabalho
INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research
IPES	Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais
ISEB	Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros
ITT	International Telephone and Telegraph
JBUSMC	Joint Brazilian United States Military Commission
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP	Military Assistance Programme
MTTs	Mobile Training Teams
NSC	National Security Council
NSD	National Security Doctrine
OAS	Organization of American States
OEA	Organización de Estados Americanos
ORIT	Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores
PCB	Partido Comunista Brasileiro
PEI	Política Externa Independente
POL	Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant
PSB	Psychological Strategy Board
PSD	Partido Social Democrático
PTB	Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro
SNI	Serviço Nacional de Informações
SUDENE	Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste
SUPRA	Superintendência da Política Agrária
TIAR	Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca
UDN	União Democrática Nacional
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIS	United States Information Service

VPR Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária  
WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions



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## Introduction

The purpose of this doctoral thesis is to analyse the policy of American interference in Brazil during the João "Jango" Goulart administration from 1961 to 1964. The analysis of this policy has the ultimate goal of not only identifying the role of Washington in the fall of Goulart's government but, also, to document its attempts (whether successful or not) at subverting and indoctrinating the South American country so that it would adhere to the anticommunist world order accepting American values, ideologies and policies as if they were their own. In essence, it is a study of U.S. imperialism in Brazil, and how it reacted to solve a problem that signified an affront to its hegemony.

Historically, there have been various informed opinions on the causes of and the reasons for the military takeover in 1964. As a consequence, there have been a great number of investigations on these subjects that explain other aspects of the historical process that lead to the coup d'état. For this reason, this study does not have the intention of denying other facts or establishing the role and the behaviour of the U.S. as the underlying factor and reason for the overthrow of João Goulart. Rather, by examining the conduct of the United States, the aim here is to hopefully produce a thesis that can add to the understanding of a historical period in time that culminated in the establishment of the military dictatorship.

That said, one of the main focuses of this study is the nature of U.S. imperialism in Brazil, and how it intervened in order to achieve its objectives. Undoubtedly, this is a complex subject with many twists and turns along with considerations, which exceed both the period in question in addition to the scope of this thesis. Yet, to treat the United States dealing of João Goulart as an isolated case of interference would ignore decades of propaganda, along with other efforts by the U.S. to penetrate and indoctrinate Brazilian society with its ideals, values and doctrines<sup>1</sup>. It would also overlook the ideological struggle between the United States and Brazilian nationalist elements, whose policies on reform along with modernisation seriously threatened the former's interests. In this regard, the subject under analysis here is just one episode in a longer running saga<sup>2</sup>. Finally, it would relegate to a certain level of

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<sup>1</sup> For information on the *Good Neighbour Policy* and propaganda during World War Two see VALIM, Alexandre Busko. *O Triunfo da Persuasão: Brasil, Estados Unidos e o Cinema da Política de Boa Vizinhança durante a II Guerra Mundial*. São Paulo: Alameda Casa Editorial, 2017.

<sup>2</sup> BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *A Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira S.A., 1978. details the U.S. intervention against Getúlio Vargas during his second mandate as president (1951-1954) when he took a more independent line. Vargas was in no way anti-U.S., but he advocated nationalist positions when it came to Brazil's development.

insignificance imperialism as a system which essentially looks to ensure as well as maintain the dominance of one nation over another.

In effect, what transpired in Brazil was simply a hegemonic nation guaranteeing its supremacy over one of its satellites, using all means at its disposal to ensure its objectives<sup>3</sup>. Employing colder more analytical language, it could be said that a military coup was just another option Washington had for dealing with a problem. After all, it had worked against Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala in 1954<sup>4</sup>. Therefore, the decision to support a coup d'état against Goulart was simply the result of the United States deciding it had found a suitable solution to a problem. This does not mean that other actors or elements were not involved, nor does it relegate their importance, however this doctoral student believes that had the United States behaved in a different manner, or made different decisions, a successful coup against Goulart would have been very unlikely. The establishment of a military dictatorship, ideologically aligned with the *National Security* and the *Counterinsurgency* doctrines, further attests to the degree of U.S. influence and involvement in the whole process.

Before venturing any further, and for the purpose of this investigation, it is necessary to define the word "interference". For the benefit of this study the term "interference" needs to be understood as a general concept that encompasses different strategies and tactics, all of which had the overall goal of changing the policies of the Goulart government, and influencing the Brazilian political, social and economic situation to benefit U.S. interests. Therefore, it is necessary to examine a wide range of issues carefully and in detail. Another fact to take into account is that the "interference" came from both the public sector as well as the private sector. Individuals and private organisations and institutes played an important role in this process, and many of these were native Brazilians with *denationalised* interests<sup>5</sup>.

To aid the understanding and coherence of this investigation, the topics which are to be examined have been divided into five subcategories: *Influence, Pressure, Infiltration,*

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<sup>3</sup> FONTANA, Josep. *Por el Bien del Imperio, Una Historia del Mundo desde 1945*. Barcelona: Pasado y Presente, S.L., 2013. Titled *For the Good of the Empire, A Global History of the World since 1945*, the book is a classic on U.S. imperialism, with the author exploring how the United States strove to establish as well as enforce its global supremacy.

<sup>4</sup> For a detailed account of the United States' coup against Árbenz see CULLATHER, Nicholas. *Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala 1952-1954*. Washington D.C.: Centre for the Study of Intelligence, 1994.

<sup>5</sup> Due to personal and/or professional relationships with a foreign hegemonic power, an individual starts to accept the values and interests of that power as their own and, consequently, rejects the interests and values of their own society. See BLACK, Jan Knippers *United States Penetration of Brazil*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977, p.xvi.

*Organisation/Orientation and Participation.* Here it is necessary to emphasise that these subcategories have received a name that the doctoral student believes to be the most suitable, and that describe best what is considered in this thesis to be the policy of U.S. interference. Furthermore, these subcategories could be referred to as stages of the United States' policy toward Brazil.

This brings us onto the next point, the term "policy" must not be taken literally to mean something rigid or set in stone that always had the same fixed objectives from day one. It was something that was moulded and influenced by individuals as well as governmental departments that were pursuing their own interests and points of view. Therefore, it was susceptible to change depending on who was able to impose their criteria. In this regard, there was an element of inconsistency surrounding policy decision making, in addition to banality and recklessness. By this we mean that there seemed to be a lack of consideration (or even indifference) given to the possible outcomes along with effects that certain strategies could have. One question that will be examined in this thesis is in relation to the rationality of U.S. policy toward Brazil.

In general, and as it will become clearer later on, U.S. policy for Brazil was based on maintaining the South American country in the American sphere of influence. However, due to a perceived loss of hegemony (also the threat that that posed to U.S. interests in the region) and the failure of different strategies and tactics to try to regain dominance, Washington's position and policy towards the Goulart government became more radicalised as well as ruthless regarding how it hoped to accomplish its goals. For this reason, and for this thesis, the word "policy" must be seen as something flexible and malleable according to the situation. It must be seen as a process where different facts are both the consequences and causes of other facts.

Another thing that is essential to point out is that the thesis focuses on the role of the United States during the whole period that culminated in the coup d'état, and it tries to clarify it as much as possible. It is not, therefore, an investigation that looks to place blame on the U.S. or that wishes to start a witch-hunt. This would not only lead to a biased study, but also one where Brazil would have to be treated as a victim that was not able to play an active part in its own history, or even have the ability to make decisions. Obviously, this is not true and if it was not for the behaviour of certain Brazilians the military takeover in 1964 would not have been possible.



It is also important to highlight certain problems with the subject of this thesis. Due to the delicate nature of certain parts of the study, there is a lack of or in-existence of documentation to corroborate certain hypothesis and theories. Even though this obstacle has been pointed out by other researchers over the years, it is necessary to explain that it still exists. Nonetheless, over the last few years more documents have been made public, shedding new light on the events leading up to the military takeover. On the 50th anniversary of the coup, the *National Security Archive* released a trove of previously classified White House records, which "chart [the] genesis of [the] regime change effort in Brazil"<sup>6</sup>.

In a project called *Opening the Archives*, *Brown University* and the *Universidade Federal de Maringá* have worked towards digitalising 100,000 files from the U.S. State Department in an effort to document Brazilian-United States relations from the 1960s to the 1980s. Finally, over the last decade or so in Brazil, the investigations and findings from the *Comissão Nacional da Verdade* in addition to federal state backed commissions, such as the *Comissão Estadual da Memória e Verdade Dom Helder Câmara* from Pernambuco, have provided further information on the successes that lead up to the events of 1964. Furthermore, these recent revelations tend to confirm that there is still much more to be uncovered in order to have a clearer understanding of the role of U.S. imperialism in Brazil. However, this is all dependent on the periodic publication of previously declassified documentation.

Finally, I would like to emphasise that this is not a definitive research project and, as stated previously, it does not have the goal of presenting U.S. imperialism as the root cause of the coup in 1964. To really understand the period of time leading up to the coup and the reasons for it, it would be necessary to examine individuals and their behaviour (this would include motives, fears, points of view, leadership, awareness, etc.), institutions (their functions, strengths, weaknesses, limits, etc.) and all the social, political, economical and ideological factors that led to the end of the Fourth Brazilian Republic. Evidently, this would take years of research and dedication to produce a piece of work capable of including an analysis of all these aspects. Clearly, this is not appropriate for a doctoral thesis and, for this reason, the investigation limits itself to focusing on issues solely related to U.S. interference.

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<sup>6</sup> HERSHBERG, James G and KORNBLUH, Peter. (April 2nd, 2014). *Brazil Marks 50th Anniversary of Military Coup*. The National Security Archive. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/>

## **Background**

The military takeover on the 31st of March 1964 not only spelt the end for João Goulart and his government, but it also brought to a close the Fourth Brazilian Republic (1946-1964). While this period is often referred to for its political instability and for its social and economic problems, it was also a period of politicization where many lower class Brazilians, who had before been excluded, started to become a political force. In addition, and due to the policies of different governments, a serious effort was made to industrialise and modernise Brazil. For these reasons, and for all its shortcomings, The Fourth Republic, also known as *República Populista*, has also been judged to be Brazil's first endeavour at a truly democratic system<sup>7</sup>.

Nevertheless, and despite the efforts, between 1945 and 1964 there were a total of five successful coups as well as ten attempts at regime change<sup>8</sup>. Evidently, the clash of ideologies, interests, values and the distinct views of the different ruling elites on how Brazil should be governed could not be solved without military involvement. In fact, in Brazilian politics the military maintained the role of *O Poder Moderador*<sup>9</sup> or the moderating power, and this was accepted on a broad basis by all the political parties. Although the armed forces were expected to be loyal to the President and the government, in the Brazilian constitution of 1946 a clause<sup>10</sup> existed which permitted military intervention when it was deemed necessary. In theory, this function as the defender of the law and democracy was only meant to be used when it was considered that the aforementioned were at risk of being violated. Unfortunately, this was not always the case.

Even though it was accidental<sup>11</sup>, João Goulart's possession of the presidency posed a problem for a certain sector of the elite that would not be solved until the coup of 1964. Goulart was

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<sup>7</sup> FERREIRA, Jorge; DELGADO, Lucilia de Almeida. *O Brasil Republicano: o tempo da experiência democrática 1945/1964*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003.

<sup>8</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974. p. 86

<sup>9</sup> Idem p. 65-66

<sup>10</sup> Idem p.77

<sup>11</sup> Jânio Quadros was elected President in 1961 with Goulart elected as his Vice-president. After just six months in office he resigned in what was a ploy to gain the necessary support and power to push ahead with his reforms. Unfortunately for Quadros, his plan did not have the desired effect and, instead of there being a massive public outcry for him to continue as President and for him to be given the powers to carry out reform, his resignation was accepted without hesitation. As Vice-president Goulart was the immediate successor. Quadros' resignation sparked

the political godson of Getúlio Vargas, the ex-populist dictator who was deposed in 1945 but whose popularity was so high among the working class that he was elected President in 1950. Through *trabalhismo* (a populist political policy that granted certain improvements for the working class) and nationalist development projects, Vargas had converted himself into the defender of the workingman and of Brazilian national interests. However, as a result of these policies Vargas had also made himself into the enemy of the interests of one prominent elite, *os interesses multinacional-associados*<sup>12</sup>, that is multinational associated interests and, as a consequence, into an adversary of the United States. Therefore, as heir to Vargas' political throne and for also being seen as even more radical, Goulart posed an even greater threat to those same interests<sup>13</sup>.

Although a very brief explanation, it is important to understand this history in the context of the Cold War. Due to the global situation, the evolution of the *National Security Doctrine* (this will be discussed at great length further ahead) and theories about *Total war* mixed with paranoia, any divergence from American policies and interests or any criticism of the U.S. was seen as communist subversion and as a threat to its security. As a result, any opinion, demand, movement, etc. that did not coincide became a synonym of communist aggression that, consequently, had to be confronted<sup>14</sup>.

Additionally, and due to the nature of the Cold War doctrines as well as theories, even neutralist and independent positions posed a threat to U.S. supremacy<sup>15</sup>. Not only did they undermine the ideology and thinking behind the *National Security Doctrine* (from here on it will be referred to as the NSD), a world divided between two superpowers where each nation had to align itself with a block, but they also offered an alternative doctrine free from American values and interests.

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<sup>12</sup>DREIFUSS, René Armand. *1964: a conquista do Estado. Ação política, poder e golpe de classe*. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1981.

<sup>13</sup> Detailed analysis of the second Vargas government can be found in FERREIRA, Jorge. *A democratização de 1945 e o movimento queremista*. In: FERREIRA, Jorge; DELGADO, Lucilia de Almeida. *O Brasil Republicano: o tempo da experiência democrática 1945/1964*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003. in BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz *Op. cit.* and in DIAS, José Carlos; FILHO, José Paulo Cavalcanti; KEHL, Maria Rita; PINHEIRO, Paulo Sérgio; DALLARI, Pedro Bohomoletz de Abreu; CUNHA, Rosa Maria Cardoso da. *Comissão Nacional de Verdade: Relatório Final Volume 1*. Brasília, DF: CNV, 2014. p.88-91

<sup>14</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.194 and p.211

<sup>15</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *A Ideologia da Segurança Nacional: O Poder Militar na América Latina*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1978. p.112 the author explains that during J. F. Dulles' "crusade" during the Eisenhower government neutral countries were considered to be "favourable toward communist expansion", and were therefore "a threat to U.S. national security".

It is for this reason that Goulart and other politicians like him were perceived as dangerous. Whether João Goulart was an effective and decisive president or not is not of importance, it was the ideas he defended which were more troubling. Although the reforms and type of development that he advocated were not communist, socialist or even anti-American, they were just as menacing from Washington's viewpoint because, by pursuing this model, they looked to minimise U.S. influence and control.

Consequently, from the U.S. point of view to safeguard national security would mean to avoid this possible loss of control over strategic interests. After all, the possible existence of an 'independent' and non-aligned Brazil with all its resources, and its position of dominance over the other South American countries, could have been incredibly harmful to U.S. geopolitical interests in the Cold War struggle. In the ensuing chapters of this thesis the way in which the United States averted this scenario will be analysed so as to make it possible to understand some key factors in the process that lead to the military coup of 1964.

## **Defining Imperialism; What Constitutes Imperialism?**

As it has already been stated, in this thesis the word 'interference' is used to describe the specific tactics and strategies used by the U.S. to impose its hegemony during the period being studied. Furthermore, these terms must be classed as principles of the universal concept of 'imperialism'. This is because instruments of interference such as 'pressure', whether diplomatic or via economic sanctions, or 'infiltration', by means of propaganda in the form of *Soft Power*<sup>16</sup> or all-out psychological warfare, are all ways of maintaining the imperialist structure.

Before continuing with the analysis of U.S. imperialism in Brazil, it would be appropriate to take a look at imperialism in general as a power structure, and as a multifaceted dominance system<sup>17</sup>. When we talk about imperialism we are not just referring to the more visible or obvious types of imperialism, such as economic or military, rather we are making reference to a structure that penetrates all forms of national life. As Johan Galtung puts it "it is a sophisticated type of dominance relationship which cuts across nations"<sup>18</sup>, he is quick to point out that it is not a simple military occupation or threat of power that one nation might hold over another.

The question is then, how do we determine when a dominance relationship is imperialism or not? If the use of extra-economic means to extract resources or to condition the behaviour of another nation is not imperialism, what is? The consensus seems to be in the existence of links and ties between the elites of one nation and those of another; when there is not only a situation of financial and diplomatic dependence<sup>19</sup> but, also, when there are shared interests or harmony of interests<sup>20</sup> between the two elites. In other words, the ruling class in a periphery nation aligns itself with the dominant class in the centre nation, and it identifies the interests of the elite in the centre nation as its own. Private organisations play a prominent part in this process, because it is through their expansion that many links are created. For example, when a multinational from a centre nation establishes a national company in a periphery nation, there begins a process where an elite in the periphery nation will emerge

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<sup>16</sup> Concept of Joseph S. Nye see NYE, Joseph S. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

<sup>17</sup> GALTUNG, Johan. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism". *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no.2 (1971): p.81.

<sup>18</sup> Idem p. 81.

<sup>19</sup> LENIN, Vladimir I. *El Imperialismo, Fase Superior del Capitalismo (Ensayo Popular)*. Pekín: Editorial del Pueblo, 1975. p.54

<sup>20</sup> GALTUNG, Johan *Op. cit.* p.83

that is "strongly identified with and well harmonising with the Centre elites"<sup>21</sup>. In Brazil's case these were multinational associated interests.

However, it is necessary to emphasise there are five types of imperialism: 1. Economic 2. Political 3. Military 4. Communication 5. Cultural<sup>22</sup>. Therefore, the creation of links between elites and the interests that they share can include many varying factors and scenarios. It is not just a relationship based on pure economic advantages. A good example of this is the very close and intricate relationship that the U.S. military shared with the Brazilian Armed Forces. Due to military alliances, training courses, assistance and the shared experience in Italy during World War Two, there were many well established bonds, and harmony of interests was high. The significance of this bridgehead<sup>23</sup> is vital for this study, which will be examined in detail further on.

In order to understand the conduct of the U.S. during this specific period of time, it would first be a good idea to analyse the structure of imperialism itself, and how it was administered. From the end of WW2 until the 1970s, the basic premise was that of a system of multiple nation-states that were more or less sovereign, who helped the hegemonic power to regulate and manage it. In this system, although the U.S. had extra-economic means, such as massive dissuasive military power, its supremacy was established and maintained on its ability to dominate other states economically<sup>24</sup>. "Allies who had to be controlled, foes that needed to be contented and the 'Third World', which was essential for Western capital, were integrated into this complex world order"<sup>25</sup>. In the case of Europe, it was European reconstruction after World War Two, which was dependent on American help, that assured its conformity with and acceptance of U.S. global economic conditions along with the new imperial order.

When it came to the 'Third World', development was also tied to strict economic imperatives, requiring adherence to the U.S. development model<sup>26</sup>. While it is not appropriate to compare Western Europe's position in the system to that of the 'Third World', the way the two regions

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<sup>21</sup> GALTUNG, Johan *Op. cit.* p. 96

<sup>22</sup> As established by Galtung.

<sup>23</sup> Galtung uses this term to refer to a bond established by the elite of a Centre nation in the Periphery nation.

<sup>24</sup> WOOD, Ellen Meiksins. *El Imperio del Capital*. Londres: El Viejo Topo, 2003. p.156-158.

<sup>25</sup> *Idem* p.156.

<sup>26</sup> WOOD, Ellen Meiksins. *Op. cit.* p.184. As Wood explains "a significant danger is that popular struggles for truly democratic states, for a transformation in the balance of class forces in the state" can "present a great challenge to the imperial power". The need to control reform and development in the Third World was, therefore, vital to the U.S. maintaining as well as extending its hegemony. The United States could not risk independent development.

were integrated does allow us to comprehend how this imperialism governed and defended itself.

When discussing imperialism there are, according to Galtung, two key mechanisms that both sustain and protect it. The first is *vertical interaction relation*, which considers the value-exchange between two nations and the effects of these exchanges on them as vital in explaining inequality<sup>27</sup>. When talking about the exchange of goods what must be taken into account is not the balance in flow of products, but the *intra-actor effects* these goods can have on the rest of the national economy. This means "does the interaction have enriching or impoverishing effects inside the actor, or does it just lead to a stand-still?"<sup>28</sup>.

A good example to examine is the importation of raw materials from an undeveloped country to a developed one. In the industrialised nation, where there is a high *degree of processing*<sup>29</sup>, these will obviously have far reaching effects because they will go towards the production (directly or indirectly) of manufactured goods. What must be taken into consideration here is that the fabrication of these products does not just depend on one sole sector, but it involves various ones that will all be needed to not only create the final product but also transport it. Furthermore, if we consider the research and innovation needed in each area, the infrastructure that is required to produce it (for example, universities) also the offshoots that that possible research can create, then, they must also be regarded as enriching effects in the interaction relation<sup>30</sup>. Therefore it is easy to see that the effects and benefits (whether economical, technological, social, etc.) that the raw materials create far outweigh the price they were bought for.

Nevertheless, it is not just the price that is paid for the raw materials and the effect that they have on the developed nation that provoke inequality. When an undeveloped nation imports manufactured goods the overall effects on the country are, more often than not, negative or null for a number of reasons. One being that when the product arrives it is already processed and it exists in its final form, so, there is no need to involve other sectors so that it can be further enhanced. Basically, the imported good is destined to be used in one area, as a consequence, its effects are only felt in that area. Another explanation for the unequal interaction relation is actually due to the attitude of the elite in the periphery nation. For the

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<sup>27</sup> GALTUNG, Johan. *Op. cit.* p.89.

<sup>28</sup> Idem p. 86. Explanation of *intra-actor effects*.

<sup>29</sup> Idem p.88.

<sup>30</sup> Idem p. 87

ruling class, the exchange of raw material for money, which can then be converted into anything, is a highly beneficial relationship, and requires no extra effort on their part<sup>31</sup>. There is no need to innovate or modernise to produce manufactured goods because these can be purchased from the centre nation.

Finally, when talking about interaction relation, it is essential to bring up the subjects of loans and aid in the form of financial assistance. While both of these concepts seem fairly benign and even, in the case of aid, altruistic, they actually contribute to inequality. This is a result of what has just been explained about the difference in the *degree of processing* between industrialised and unindustrialised countries. For example, a loan from a developed nation or from an international organisation under its control to an undeveloped nation will not only entail interest rates but, also, conditions that oblige it to buy goods from the developed nation. Consequently, inequality increases; as well as owing money, the Periphery nation makes purchases that have deep repercussions in the Centre nation<sup>32</sup>. While being more 'generous', grants or aid for an undeveloped nation will have the same effects, as the procurement of products from the Centre nation will stimulate and affect its various sectors. It will be "forced to create and thereby expand, and consequently forced to enrich"<sup>33</sup> itself.

If the *vertical interaction relation* is the mechanism of imperialism that causes inequality or, better said, explains it, what mechanism protects and maintains it? What is the reason for the dependence that the Periphery nations have on the hegemonic nation? This is achieved through the *feudal interaction structure*, which is "an expression of the old political maxim *divide et impera*, divide and rule"<sup>34</sup>. It is used by the Centre nation to protect itself against the Periphery nations by preventing them from alliance formation, or from achieving independence (independence being the power to choose and act freely). The premise is basic in the sense that the imperialist nation accomplishes this by treating each satellite in a particular way; by "having separate deals with them so as to tie them to the Centre in particularistic ways", and "by reducing multilateralism to a minimum with all kinds of graded membership"<sup>35</sup>. As a consequence, each country is dependent on the hegemonic state and, as previously mentioned, they play their part in upholding security and maintaining the system as a whole.

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<sup>31</sup> GALTUNG, Johan. *Op. cit.* p.88

<sup>32</sup> Idem p.88.

<sup>33</sup> Idem p.89

<sup>34</sup> GALTUNG, Johan. *Op. cit.* p.90

<sup>35</sup> Idem p. 90



Consequently, it is because of these two mechanisms of imperialism that a sovereign<sup>36</sup> Brazil would have been perceived to be such a threat to U.S. supremacy. Brazil's aspiration for development following a nationalist and independent project, and its break with American doctrines would have freed Brazil from a lot of economic impositions and pressure, allowing it to act as it saw fit. The power to choose from who and where to export and import, the ability to act independently on the international scene and the destabilising influence (from Washington's point of view) that Brazil, as the regional power, would have exerted in South America, were all factors that provoked U.S. interference.

Finally, another principle that has to be considered when discussing imperialism, is that 'imperialism' is not unilateral, especially when we take into account U.S. imperialism with all of its cultural exports. What is meant by this is that because the victim does not know that it is the victim of imperialism, it consumes products (whether cultural or material) that create a link. Whether by means of films, television, music, products, etc. the victim connects symbolically with the U.S.<sup>37</sup> As a consequence of this consumption, a certain lifestyle is adopted and 'foreign' customs and values are internalised. Imperialism, therefore, is not something that solely exists through imposition, for it to truly work it has to be accepted and assimilated by the victim<sup>38</sup>.

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<sup>36</sup> By 'sovereign' we mean free from most, if not all, imperial coercion and pressure that could force a country to act or behave in a dependent way.

<sup>37</sup> RINKE, Stefan. *América Latina y Estados Unidos: Una historia entre espacios desde la época colonial hasta hoy*. Madrid: Ediciones de Historia, S.A., 2015. p. 140.

<sup>38</sup> As Joseph S. Nye explains a key concept of *soft power* is persuading a target public to accept that there are shared interests and values so that it will support the objectives of foreign country.

## Chapter 1: Influence

As it is already well known and historically documented, U.S. influence and its presence in South America, whether referring to the Monroe Doctrine, the Olney interpretation or the Roosevelt Corollary, have always been made to be impose U.S. policy<sup>39</sup>. For this reason, it is not pertinent for this thesis to get sidetracked by starting a debate on the finer points of American diplomacy, American Business and their history in the region. Rather, it will concentrate on the period in question, 1961 - 1964.

This section of the thesis will focus on U.S. influence in Brazil and how the conduct of the Goulart administration seemed to weaken it or pose a threat to it. The concept of 'influence' is key to this study because it was the loss of it that forced the U.S. to adopt new strategies and tactics to reaffirm its supremacy. The theory is that as influence and the ability to exert it in traditional ways waned, Washington became more aggressive and, even, less rational in its approach to maintain Brazil in its condition as a Periphery nation. In addition, when considering 'influence' we must examine different aspects of Brazilian national life because it was not a fixed variable applicable to all of them. Rather, the influence that the U.S. exerted differed according to the area of national life.

Due to the demands of World War Two and the geostrategic importance of Brazil, the U.S., by way of psychological warfare, started to make a concerted effort to assert its influence over Brazil. In this context *The Good Neighbour Policy*, which relied heavily on the use of propaganda by means of cinema, as well as economical and political interests, sought to persuade<sup>40</sup> Brazil to align itself with the United States in the war against the Axis Powers. However, this policy also had longer term goals that went beyond winning WW2. On the one hand, there was interest in strengthening hemispheric security, and convincing Brazil to accept the presence of U.S. economic imperatives<sup>41</sup>. On the other hand, the U.S. wished to show Brazil that there was only one way forward, that there was only one legitimate path towards prosperity.

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<sup>39</sup> RINKE, Stefan. *Op. cit.* Provides a detailed look at the history of U.S. policy toward South America.

<sup>40</sup> VALIM, Alexandre Busko. *Op. cit.* p. 22 the author uses the term *persuasão* to describe the U.S. attempts at rapprochement with Brazil.

<sup>41</sup> Idem p. 37

This last objective of the *Good Neighbour Policy* propaganda campaign is of particular importance as it looked to undermine *o Getulismo*. "The Brazilians had to be convinced that the *American Way of Life* was a better alternative to the authoritarianism of the Vargas regime"<sup>42</sup>, that it was not an ideology capable of bringing about development. For the U.S., therefore, it was essential to delegitimize the political systems of rival powers, in order to reduce their influence, as well as any other native ideology that could threaten American interests.

The fact that American-friendly politicians and political parties were not capable of dominating the political scene of the Fourth Brazilian Republic, due to the predominance of the two political parties (the *Partido Social Democrático* and the *Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro*) that were founded by members of the *Estado Novo*, would have generated a certain amount of concern in Washington. Even though Brazil was a member of the *Organisation of American States* and it signed the *Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance* (more commonly known as *TIAR* due to its name in Spanish), it could be stated that U.S. persuasion had not convinced the majority of Brazilians to abandon *pró-getulista* politics. In this sense, it is possible to perceive how the popularity of João Goulart and his rise to power, albeit fortuitous, caused alarm for the U.S. government.

## **Bridgeheads**

In the section on Imperialism the subjects of bridgeheads and shared interests have been mentioned briefly. Here they will be analysed in further detail because, when talking about influence and how it is established, it is vital to examine the importance of the role they play. As it has already been stated, for imperialism to truly work there needs to be a link between the elite in the Centre nation and the ruling class in the Periphery nation. Without a bridgehead there is no influence or hegemony. Consequently, if there is no influence the dominant nation will not be able to attain the resources or conduct it requires from the secondary nation, as the ruling class there will have its own interests to fulfil.

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<sup>42</sup> Idem p. 33

For the reasons mentioned above, we must examine the concept of "denationalisation"<sup>43</sup>, as it refers to the process through which national elites become bridgeheads. Denationalisation occurs when a national elite's "values and attitudes cease to derive from the common experience of the common people, or even from the common experience of a national elite, and are ingested instead from an external reference group". In addition, the national elite will have also advanced materially due to its cooperation with a foreign elite. As a consequence, the denationalised ruling class will sacrifice national interests in order to protect its adopted foreign interests<sup>44</sup>. It will act as a partner to the hegemonic nation, and it will assist in furthering imperialist goals and interests without the Centre nation having to resort to extra-economic means.

This necessity to denationalise and convince the ruling classes in other nations was not a new concept or facet of imperialism. U.S. investment had long been present in the region, which "caused the motivations of many well-positioned foreign nationals to coincide or dovetail with those of agents of U.S. government and business"<sup>45</sup>. Nevertheless, in the context of the Cold War, many American strategists started to see it in a new light, and as even more significant. The U.S. was now fighting a psychological war where the use of propaganda was not only essential in eroding enemy positions<sup>46</sup>, but also in establishing the *American Way of Life* as the world's belief system<sup>47</sup>. National elites were seen as having an incredibly important role to play if this was to be achieved, and this was reflected in the *Psychological Strategy Board's* (PSB<sup>48</sup>) doctrinal plan. Also known as PSB D-33/2, the programme had the objective of creating a controlled and coordinated doctrine that would produce ideas representative of *Americanism*<sup>49</sup>. While its stated goal was to "predispose young, as well as developed, minds against any new versions of communism or other totalitarian doctrines"<sup>50</sup>,

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<sup>43</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. Cit.* p.60

<sup>44</sup> *Idem* p.60

<sup>45</sup> *Idem* p.61

<sup>46</sup> SAUNDERS, Frances Stonor. *La CIA y la guerra fría cultural*. Madrid: Editorial Debate, 2001. p.35

<sup>47</sup> *Idem* p.213

<sup>48</sup> In 1953 it became the *Operations Coordinating Board*. This was abolished in 1961, and its functions were taken over by the *Special Group*. JACOBSEN, Annie. *Surprise, Kill, Vanish: The Secret History of CIA Paramilitary Armies, Operators, and Assassins*. New York: Little Brown and Company, 2019. p.115

<sup>49</sup> SAUNDERS, Frances Stonor. *Op. cit.* p.213

<sup>50</sup> Psychological Strategy Board. (1953). *The U.S. doctrinal programme, PSB D-33/2*. Copy No. 43 <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01731R003200050006-0.pdf>

it was also a mechanism that would counteract any other ideology that did not coincide with the philosophy and spirit of the Free World<sup>51</sup>.

To reach this goal it was necessary to target "the developed, articulate mind. This mind, engaged in developing concepts and rationalisations and capable of projecting the same to others"<sup>52</sup>. As the authors of the PSB D-33/2 went on to clarify more clearly, "members of the elite most generally possess developed minds". The strategy was based on the premise that as leaders of public opinion and generators of ideology the elites would pass their newly acquired values and ideas onto the rest of the nation. In other words, the U.S. had designed a programme that, through the prior indoctrination of national elites, aimed to indoctrinate and condition societies as a whole. "The use of subtle and indirect forms of domination over peoples behind the facade of their independence"<sup>53</sup> was essential for the programme's success, as an aggressive propaganda campaign of obvious American design would have been counterproductive. What was necessary was to produce "people, who of *their own reasoning and conviction*, were persuaded that everything the United States government did was right"<sup>54</sup>.

The elaboration of the doctrinal plan PSB D-33/2 with its specific targeting of local elites acknowledges the significance that bridgeheads play in the process of establishing influence. While other tactics, such as assisting the material advancement of elites, were important and necessary in the process of denationalisation, the overall goal to convince individuals that their interests were that of a foreign power needs something more. Material benefits to local elites will only buy short-term cooperation, and any future collaboration will be dependent on further gifts. However, for true long-lasting influence a concerted doctrinal programme must be implemented so that the ruling class in the Periphery nation sees the needs and interests of the Centre nation as its own. Due to the demands of the Cold War as well as American imperialist desires, the U.S. strove to establish bridgeheads so that national elites perceived American economic and security interests as their own. In Chapter Three, the way the United States did this in Brazil will be examined.

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<sup>51</sup> SAUNDERS, Frances Stonor. *Op. cit.* p.213

<sup>52</sup> Psychological Strategy Board. *Op. cit.*

<sup>53</sup> MORRIS, George. *CIA and American Labor: The Subversion of the AFL-CIO's Foreign Policy*. New York: International Publishers, 1967. p. 26

<sup>54</sup> SAUNDERS, Frances Stonor. *Op. cit.* p.214

## **Cuba and a *Política Externa Independente***

The dilemma of Cuba, the *Política Externa Independente*<sup>55</sup> (PEI) and what they entailed for U.S. influence over Brazil are of real significance when examining the period in question. For varying reasons, the Brazilian drive to act in a diplomatically independent way and in favour of its national interests, at a time when Cuba had successfully broken with American hegemony, was of great concern to the United States. The fact that the Goulart administration refused to adhere to Washington's rule not only affected the United State's ability to discipline and counteract Cuba on the international scene, it also implied that traditional American influence over Brazil was weakening.

The Cuban Revolution and the effect that it had on the United States and all of South America cannot be underestimated. "What happened in Cuba directly affected all the Latin-American nations"<sup>56</sup>, and it would profoundly change the course of history in the region. The success of the revolution with its clearly socialist, popular and defiant anti-imperialist agenda, caused panic in Washington. In 1960, when Castro signed a trade agreement with the USSR, President Eisenhower tasked the CIA with toppling the Castro government<sup>57</sup>. This desire to overthrow the Cuban government became so radical during the Kennedy administration that it was claimed that "the Kennedy brothers were absolutely obsessed with getting rid of Castro"<sup>58</sup>.

While this thesis does not wish to get drawn into a debate on President Kennedy's Cuba policy, it is important to mention the way it affected the United States' policy on South America as a whole. The U.S. president labelled Latin America "the most dangerous area in the world"<sup>59</sup>, and the fact that he "measured Latin American leaders by their position on Castro"<sup>60</sup> is an indicator of how troubled he was with the whole situation. It is claimed that after a Khrushchev speech in 1961, Kennedy truly came to believe that the Soviet Union was intent on furthering revolution in the underdeveloped world by way of subversion and

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<sup>55</sup> Translated *Independent Foreign Policy*

<sup>56</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p. 241

<sup>57</sup> RINKE, Stefan. *Op. cit.* p. 180

<sup>58</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America*. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999. p. 21.

<sup>59</sup> Idem Kennedy made this statement in 1963. It is also the title of Rabe's book.

<sup>60</sup> Idem p.8 and p.100-103 Rómulo Betancourt, who was "Latin America's most blunt and credible critic of Fidel Castro", was a personal favourite of Kennedy.

guerrilla warfare<sup>61</sup>. The idea was that the USSR would turn wars of liberation into communist revolutions without having to use troops to invade or occupy a territory. Castro and the success of his revolutionary movement seemed to confirm this belief. Furthermore, top Kennedy officials feared that Cuba would then be used as the base from which the infiltration and subversion of the rest of the continent would be carried out<sup>62</sup>. From their point of view, if the United States did not act swiftly, it would only be a matter of time before the whole continent fell under communist influence.

Although the Kennedy administration's suspicions about the USSR have been proven to be ill-founded<sup>63</sup>, Revolutionary Cuba and the American inability to bring about its downfall taught a lesson to the United States. It would mark a turning point in the U.S. Cold War strategy for the continent. Never again would the United States let there be another Cuba<sup>64</sup>. Counterinsurgency and defence against infiltration and subversion would become the new focus points for continental security. In addition, the *Alliance for Progress* was founded to ensure that any attempt to implement reforms would be controlled and based on U.S. development models<sup>65</sup>. If a push for reforms got out of hand or deviated from the plan, coup d'états and military dictatorships were much more preferable<sup>66</sup> than the possible establishment of another revolutionary government.

If on the one hand prevention of a 'second Cuba' became one of the Kennedy government's main objectives, on the other the U.S. was still trying to find a way to deal with the original problem. The fact of the matter was that the Cuban revolution provoked certain sympathy and support in South America. As João Goulart explained to Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, "Latin American masses are instinctively on the side of tiny Cuba whenever it is menaced by the

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<sup>61</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil 1961-1969*. Kent and London: Kent State University Press, 1990. p. 7-8 .

<sup>62</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.21

<sup>63</sup> Idem pp. 21-22 and LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p. 8.

<sup>64</sup> *The Kennedy Doctrine* stated that ...

<sup>65</sup> RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *A Aliança para o Progresso e a relações Brasil-EsUA*. 2006. Tese (Doutorado em Ciência Política) - Departamento de Ciência Política, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, São Paulo. p.17-18 By assuring the prosperity of other Western nations, the United States was also safeguarding its own prosperity and well being. In this regard, the *Alliance for Progress* was created with national security concerns very much present. The hope was that "economic development and social reforms, which had never before been proposed by the U.S. government in Latin America, would create political stability, and legitimacy for the region's democratic regimes, stopping the presumed communist advance".

<sup>66</sup> ROSENMAN, Marcos Roitman. *Tiempos de Oscuridad: Historia de los golpes de estado en América Latina*. Madrid: Ediciones Akal, 2013. p.132

colossus to the North"<sup>67</sup>. In addition, many members of the OEA saw the article of non-intervention as sacred and untouchable<sup>68</sup>. It was a way of assuring that the United States could not impose its will as freely as it had historically done. Consequently, it was quite difficult for Washington to generate enough support for its proposals against Cuba, much less a unified front which supported open intervention against the Castro government.

In this context, the *Política Externa Independente* became a major sticking point between the Brazilian and the United States governments. For Goulart, it was one of the big dilemmas that his administration would have to deal with, as his position of non-intervention directly pitted him against U.S. hegemonic interests. In the opinion of the Kennedy government, and of Goulart's domestic opposition<sup>69</sup>, the decision to uphold the PEI was another sign that he could not be trusted<sup>70</sup>. The fact that Brazil wished to act independently and in favour of its own national interests implied "the curtailment of the power of the U.S."<sup>71</sup>.

It is important to state, however, that to believe that the PEI had the explicit intention to limit U.S. power is a dangerous misinterpretation of its true objectives. The PEI was, in part, a result of criticism by the *nacional-desenvolvimentista*<sup>72</sup> ideology of Brazil's automatic alignment with the United States. For this school of thought, the alliance with successive governments in Washington had not been beneficial, as it had not produced the level of development a country like Brazil could expect with all its territory and resources<sup>73</sup>.

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<sup>67</sup> Gordon to State Department on conversation with President Goulart 21/10/1961 in RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.65

<sup>68</sup> Idem pp. 96

<sup>69</sup> It is of interest here to mention that the continuation of the PEI by Goulart would further antagonise the conservative domestic opposition aligned with U.S. interests. In MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Em guarda contra o perigo vermelho: o anticomunismo no Brasil (1917-1964)*. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2002. p292. the author explains that "during Goulart's presidential administration, Brazil's diplomatic relations were the subject of constant anti-communist diatribes, motivated by the continuity of independent politics". He goes on to say that these conservative groups "wanted Brazil to support the US offensive to eradicate communism from the continent", and they interpreted the government's position on Cuba "as an indication of communist influence on the President".

<sup>70</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p. 67

<sup>71</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.39

<sup>72</sup> National-development

<sup>73</sup> ARAÚJO, Brás José de. *Política Exterior Independente*. In: FGV CPDOC. <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/politica-externa-independente> [accessed 20 Feb 2018]



Therefore, the PEI, which was put into effect by Jânio Quadros<sup>74</sup>, envisaged stimulating economic and social development by increasing trade with non-traditional markets, as well as providing Brazil a position of leadership among uncommitted nations by promoting peace through coexistence, non-intervention and respecting self-determination<sup>75</sup>. In addition, Brazil would not be tied down with commitments to any bloc. This ability to act independently would allow the Brazilian government to reach conclusions on international issues that best reflected its national interests<sup>76</sup>.

It is noteworthy to mention that, even though both Quadros and Goulart followed the PEI during their mandates, there were important differences in how they implemented and managed it. During the Quadros administration Brazil's ability to distance itself from and maintain its neutrality in the *East Vs West* confrontation was seen as being key to the concept of independence<sup>77</sup>. However, for the Goulart government, the concept of development and the North-South divide would replace the Cold War conflict as the principal factor that drove foreign policy. Goulart's independent foreign policy and the Brazilian capacity to act as it saw fit were ultimately linked to self-sufficiency through economical, social and political development<sup>78</sup>.

From Washington's point of view, the implementation of the PEI was a clear affront to its hegemony. This independent diplomacy "constituted an obstacle to U.S. pretensions, as it did not accept the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS, much less the possibility of armed intervention". While the "Brazilian government did not intend to break with the U.S., neither did it accept to bend to Washington's pressure"<sup>79</sup>. It was a sign that the *nacional-desenvolvimentista* ideology was making ground, and that the U.S. had lost some of its influence over Brazil. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk would make clear to Brazilian

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<sup>74</sup> It is noteworthy to mention that the PEI would be the point of contention that would lead to Quadros' resignation. According to the author, the virulent attacks in the press controlled by the "liberal-conservative alliance", which had backed Quadros' election as president, created so much tension that the latter chose to resign and denounce to the nation these "terrible forces". It was an extremely "risky political manoeuvre" which, in the end, did not pay off. WEGNER, Felipe Henrique. *A nação que salva a si mesma: O CCC e a sua luta contra a "subversão"*. 2021. Dissertação (Mestrado em História) - Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis. p.58-65

<sup>75</sup> DULLES, John W. F. *Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises 1955-1964*. Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1970. p. 120-122 and ARAÚJO, Brás José de. *Op. cit.*

<sup>76</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p. 64 Telegram Quadros

<sup>77</sup> WEGNER, Felipe Henrique. *Op. cit.* p.58-59 Quadros aimed to establish political and economical relations with the USSR as well as other socialist countries in order to expand Brazilian international commerce.

<sup>78</sup> ARAÚJO, Brás José de. *Op. cit.*

<sup>79</sup> MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.292 and QUINTANEIRO, Tania. *Cuba e o Brasil: da Revolução ao Golpe (1959-1964)*. Belo Horizonte: Editora da UFMG, 1988

Foreign Minister San Tiago Dantas, Brazil's independent foreign policy was not a problem "if it were one that did reflect real judgment between the two camps, our common background and heritage and beliefs [that] would bring them [Brazil] to our support more often than not"<sup>80</sup>.

In other words, independence was only acceptable as long as Brazil supported U.S. policies and interests. Nevertheless, the Brazilian insistence on defending the principle of non-intervention was especially problematic for the United States because it affected its ability to deal with Cuba<sup>81</sup>. Unfortunately for Goulart, his already dubious reputation with some U.S. officials meant that non-intervention had "become an euphemism for a pro-Castro posture"<sup>82</sup>. It was an allegation that would plague his government until the very end.

## **The Influence of The National Security Doctrine on The Brazilian Armed Forces**

The impact that the National Security Doctrine (NSD) had on the military is of utmost importance when examining U.S. influence in Brazil during the period in question. Without doubt, the doctrine was a key factor in determining the Armed Forces conduct not only in Brazil, but in many other South American countries. The establishment of military dictatorships throughout the continent during the 1960s and 1970s, and the strict adherence of the newly formed military juntas to the principles of national security, tend to confirm the effects of the NSD and how far-reaching they were. In effect, the NSD "worked not only as an instrument for maintaining the status quo of" the different national elites, but also as a "means of spreading U.S. ideals on democracy". In Brazil, "the U.S. strategy convinced the

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<sup>80</sup> Department of State Office of the Historian: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics, Brazil*, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwarz and W. Taylor Fain III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), Document 227. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d227> [accessed 10 Jan 2020]

<sup>81</sup> Goulart's refusal to support a possible U.S. invasion of Cuba at the time of the Missile Crisis provoked dislike for Goulart in the Kennedy government. In BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *Brasil-Estados-Unidos: A rivalidade emergente (1950-1988)*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1989 p. 78-83

<sup>82</sup> Airgram from American Embassy Brasília Office to Secretary of State, *A New Look At BRA Foreign Policy 1962*, 9 Oct 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:819443/> [accessed 13 Mar 2020].

civil and military elites to adopt its liberal, democratic and national security principles<sup>83</sup> as a way of containing nationalist as well as leftist popular elements.

For many in the Brazilian Armed Forces the NSD was a very attractive doctrine as much of its content expressed the same ideas and concepts as some of Brazil's leading military theorists. From the Brazilian point of view, the NSD would not only confirm the validity of their hypothesis, but also enhance them. Under the auspices of General Golbery do Couto e Silva and General Carlos de Meira Mattos, theories on geopolitics, bipolarisation and Brazil's role in the world had already been developed<sup>84</sup>. According to the two Generals, Brazil was a natural ally of the United States<sup>85</sup> and a member of the Western Bloc due to its moral superiority as well as geographical reasons that made it vital to Western security interests. In their opinion, Brazilian importance for the West was linked to two key concepts; the defence of South America against the communist threat; Brazil as a strategic bridge that connected the American continent with the *Heartland*<sup>86</sup>.

However, what is even more significant is that they saw a clear correlation between Brazil's role in defending the Western hemisphere, and the attainment of Brazil's world power status. The NSD was so easy for them to accept because Brazilian national objectives, such as development and security, were ultimately connected with the security of the West<sup>87</sup>. By adhering to the concept of collective Western Security in the fight against communism, Brazil would be able to fulfil its own *Manifest Destiny*<sup>88</sup>.

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<sup>83</sup> STEPHAN, Claudia. A Doutrina da Segurança Nacional de Contenção na Guerra Fria: fatores que contribuíram para a participação dos militares na política brasileira (1947-1969). *Conjuntura Global*. Paraná, v.5 p.537-565, December 2016. p.548.

<sup>84</sup> Before 1960 General Golbery had already written *Planejamento estratégico*, in 1955 and *Geopolítica do Brasil* in 1958 see FAVERZANI, Alex da Luz. Geopolítica do Brasil: a trajetória de Golbery do Couto e Silva e sua perspectiva no campo intelectual. *Revista Ágora*, [S. l.], n. 22, p. 350–360, 2018. Disponível em: <https://periodicos.ufes.br/agora/article/view/13626> [accessed 8 Apr 2021].

<sup>85</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p. 179 and COUTO E SILVA, Golbery in *Geopolítica do Brasil* not only defended Brazilian alignment with the United States, but he also advocated the importance of U.S. hegemony over other Western nations. p.175 and p.239. Quoted in ASSUNÇÃO, Vânia Noeli Ferreira de. *O Satânico Doutor Go: A Ideologia Bonapartista de Golbery do Couto e Silva*. 1999. Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciências Sociais) - Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, São Paulo. p.125-126. He also wrote that Brazil had to use its geographical position "for the benefit of our brothers in the north" who they were bound to by such "traditional ties of friendship and interests, and in defense, at the same time, of Christian civilization... against communist imperialism". p.52. Quoted in ASSUNÇÃO, Vânia Noeli Ferreira de. *Op. cit.* p.142

<sup>86</sup> The term Heartland was used by Halford John Mackinder in *The Geographical Pivot of History*. Quoted in COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p. 29 and FAVERZANI, Alex da Luz. *Op. cit.* p.365

<sup>87</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p 29.

<sup>88</sup> Idem p.29-30

Another reason why the National Security Doctrine captivated and convinced the Brazilian Generals was the concept of *Total War*<sup>89</sup>. They were already heavily influenced by the theories of Thomas Hobbes on human nature, and how the security of an individual was constantly threatened by the desires of other human beings in the state of war against all (when analysing the Cold War, General Golbery spoke of "a generalised insecurity that humankind debated in agony"<sup>90</sup>, and "the constant and relentless quest for power and more power that ceases only with death"<sup>91</sup>). Therefore, the American notion that the Cold War was permanent as well as total, and that all sectors of national life were at threat from Soviet plans to conquer the world, seemed to justify as well as coincide with their postulations about the theories of Hobbes on insecurity<sup>92</sup>.

*Total War* was, therefore, an integral part of the NSD, and it was key to convincing South American Generals to adopt it. The belief that everything was subjected to the insecurity of war and that it would eventually be absorbed by the need to fight it<sup>93</sup>, gave way to the idea that the Generals were the only ones capable of leading the nation. In that sense, if politics, economy, and the psychosocial elements were to become a continuation of war by other methods, then they would have to be controlled and directed only by military officers<sup>94</sup>. Furthermore, through the sensation of complete insecurity, *Total War* looked to force a total submission of the civilian population to the state. This aspect will be analysed further ahead,

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<sup>89</sup> GOLBERY concept of *Total War*: "From a strictly military war it passed, thus, to total war, both economic and financial, political, psychological and scientific as warfare of armies, fleets and aviation; from total war to global war; and from global war to indivisible war and - why not recognise it as such? - permanent war. Hitler's "White War" or Stalin's Cold War replaced peace. In fact, it is no longer possible to distinguish where peace ends and where war begins". p.24-25. Quoted in ASSUNÇÃO, Vânia Noeli Ferreira de. *Op. cit.* p.128

<sup>90</sup> GOLBERY *Geopolítica do Brasil* p.9 Quoted in COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.210

<sup>91</sup> GOLBERY *Planejamento Estratégico* p.174. Quoted in ASSUNÇÃO, Vânia Noeli Ferreira de. *Op. cit.* p.120

<sup>92</sup> In his book *Geopolítica do Brasil*, Golbery wrote that the nature of the conflict was total due to the Communist-Soviet bloc's "duel plan" to bring non-Western nations under its orbit, and to weaken the West by spreading "turmoil, mistrust and chaos". The "deep ideological roots" of the conflict meant that "communist materialism from the East" and "Christian civilisation from the West" were competing for "the domination or the liberation of the world". As a result of the total nature of this struggle, the rest of the planet would be overwhelmed, and left with no room to "escape". Neutrality would be "impotent". p.186-187. Quoted in ASSUNÇÃO, Vânia Noeli Ferreira de. *Op. cit.* p.121-22

<sup>93</sup> ASSUNÇÃO, Vânia Noeli Ferreira de. *Op. cit.* p.130. According to the author total war "uses all kinds of weapons: politics (negotiations diplomatic relations, pressures and interventions, alliances and counter-alliances, agreements and treaties), economic (sanctions, loans and capital investments, exchange rate pressures, political tariffs and trade discrimination, embargoes, boycotts, dumping), and above all psychosocial (propaganda and counterpropaganda, persuasion or intimidation by radio and press, blackmail, threats, terrorism)".

<sup>94</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p. 210

but, in order to defend the nation and its interests (i.e. to maintain security), individual rights and other values associated with democracy had to be sacrificed<sup>95</sup>.

If the West was locked in a fight for its survival against communism, and its insecurity was the result of this incessant, permanent and total conflict<sup>96</sup>, then the *National Security Doctrine* was created as the war strategy to follow if victory was to be assured. Nevertheless, if the basis of the NSD was this obligation, imposed by the USSR, to engage in a total war, then the NSD as an ideology would also be total. One of the problems for the United States as well as the other countries that adopted the NSD, was that security as a concept is absolute and unlimited<sup>97</sup>. In other words, when is it possible to say that there is enough security?

The four main elements of the NSD (*National Interests*<sup>98</sup>, *National Security*, *National Power* and *National Strategy*) contributed to this unlimited scope for national defence. For the purpose of National Security, which means the protection and attainment of National Interests, there were no limits or restrictions. The difference between diplomacy and war disappeared, the need to rationalise the use of force also ceased to exist and new concepts such as pre-emptive strikes against possible, but, undefined future threats became valid. As it will be demonstrated, the coup against Goulart falls into this pre-emptive category, as the threat that he presented was only based on possibilities and not realities.

For these reasons, the *Truman Doctrine*, would construe that any change in the global status quo was a result of Soviet intervention, and was an act of war that threatened U.S. national security<sup>99</sup>. As a result, the perceived omnipresence of communism was opposed by the ubiquity of National Security<sup>100</sup>. During the Kennedy government, revolutionary war would further the *Truman doctrine* by focusing on the enemy within. As stated previously, the belief that the Soviet Union would achieve world domination through backing *Third World* revolutions was of utmost concern. The problem was, however, that due to the total as well as

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<sup>95</sup> ASSUNÇÃO, Vânia Noeli Ferreira de. *Op. cit.* p.120 and p.128 "War becomes extended to the entire territorial space of the State, absorbing all the efforts of which the Nation is capable, redirecting all of its activities to the purpose of victory, charging the same sacrifices and exposing to the same dangers soldiers, civilians, men, women and children and forcing the abdication of secular liberties and acquired rights".

<sup>96</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.190-200 and p.31-32

<sup>97</sup> *Idem* p.107

<sup>98</sup> An interesting footnote for this thesis is the Brazilian National Interests established by General Golbery. These were: "national integration, self-determination or sovereignty, well being and progress". Quoted in COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.159. Brazilian national security was based on the defence and the fulfilment of this interests.

<sup>99</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p. 39 and p. 110

<sup>100</sup> *Idem* p.54-55

limitless nature of the NSD no distinctions were made. Everything was viewed through the prism of revolutionary war and *Counterinsurgency*; every criticism, every plea for reform, every liberation movement and so on formed part of this revolutionary war process.<sup>101</sup>

The *Counterinsurgency Doctrine*, which will be discussed later, was fundamental in influencing and persuading certain Brazilian Generals to take power and govern for themselves. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to mention that it was not just the American doctrine that persuaded them, as "before the basic U.S. concern with counterinsurgency, Golbery's own interest in revolutionary warfare was already being clearly articulated"<sup>102</sup>. Unfortunately, the United State's take on it played a key factor in determining the Brazilian military government as an incredibly violent and repressive dictatorship. If the enemy was everywhere, and if all forms of criticism, disagreement, opposition, subversion, terrorism and guerrilla warfare were signs of revolutionary war, then the defence against them had to be total and ruthless.

## **A Política Trabalhista and The Political Crisis of The Fourth Brazilian Republic**

Whether the repercussions and effects of *trabalhista* politics on U.S. influence were real or they only represented possible future problems, they were enough to warrant the Kennedy Administration's full attention. The strive for national reform through the *reformas de base*<sup>103</sup> as well as modernisation without adhering to U.S. models on development and *Nation Building*, were major points of friction between the two governments. In addition to this, the political crisis that preceded the overthrow of the Fourth Brazilian Republic not only helped to weaken the Goulart Government but, also, the legitimacy and the belief in the Republic as

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<sup>101</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.194-210 and COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.42-46.

<sup>102</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.130

<sup>103</sup> Translated as grassroots reform, they were seen as key to producing change in Brazil. "Under this broad denomination 'grassroots reform', a set of different initiatives were united: banking, fiscal, urban, administrative, agrarian and university reforms. There was also a need to extend the right to vote to illiterates and to the subordinate ranks of the armed forces, such as sailors and sergeants. Nationalist measures were advocated providing for broader State intervention in economy and greater control of foreign investments in the country, by regulating remittances of profits abroad". See GUIMARÃES, Alberto Passos and MEDEIROS, Leonilde Servolo de. *Reforma Agrária*. In: FGV CPDOC. <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/reforma-agraria-5> [accessed 22 Feb 2018]

a viable political system. This section will examine the ways in which João Goulart's policies coupled with the political crisis endangered U.S. hegemony.

The policies and projects of the Goulart government as well as their credentials are not to be judged or examined here. Rather, what is of interest are the ways in which they provoked the United States to distrust the Brazilian President and his intentions. The need for development and reform was recognised by both the Goulart and the Kennedy administration, however, they did not see eye to eye on how to go about achieving it. Goulart's national development programme was based on the ideology of the *Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros* (ISEB), which advocated that development through industrialisation was the only way to "overcome the colonial or underdeveloped structure"<sup>104</sup>. It also promoted a nationalist development (*nacional-desenvolvimentista*) policy as the only way to attain emancipation and full sovereignty.<sup>105</sup>

The ISEB's position was that foreign investment, both technical and financial, was a hindrance to an independent industrialisation process for two reasons. The first being that foreign capital would not be interested in industrial sectors, but only in the service and extractivist sectors<sup>106</sup>. As a result, this would only aggravate Brazil's dependence on exports and on a one crop culture.<sup>107</sup> The second explanation for ISEB's opposition to foreign investment was that even if it was in industrial sectors, it would signify a Brazilian loss of control over national assets as well as economic dependence on centre nations.

Directly related to the subject of independent national development was the policy of nationalising public services and natural resources. While it had started nearly a decade earlier during the Vargas Presidency, it was reactivated under the Goulart administration. To study and analyze the purchases of electrical companies the *Comissão de Nacionalização das Empresas Concessionárias de Serviços Públicos* (CONESP) was set up in May 1962, as Goulart intended to carry out these nationalizations by cooperating with the U.S.<sup>108</sup>. In 1962

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<sup>104</sup> ABREU, Alzira Alves de. *Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (ISEB)*. In: FGV CPDOC. <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/instituto-superior-de-estudos-brasileiros-iseb> [accessed 19 Feb 2018]

<sup>105</sup> Idem

<sup>106</sup> Idem

<sup>107</sup> RADOSH, Ronald. *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy*. New York: Random House, 1969. p. 357-358

<sup>108</sup> CAMPOS, R. *A Lanterna na Popa*. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1994. p.482 the author mentions Goulart's doctrine of "negotiated nationalisation", which was designed to reassure foreign capital that it would not be restricted. Quoted in RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.179

Goulart visited Kennedy due to "the need to personally understand"<sup>109</sup> the purchase of a subsidiary of *International Telephone and Telegraph* (ITT), and would even agree on fair compensation for the U.S. company. However, as it will be explained later in the chapter on *Pressure*, the nationalisation of the ITT would end up becoming a diplomatic issue, and a major point of misunderstanding between the U.S. and Brazil.

The rift on nationalisations was accompanied by attempts to pass legislation that would put limits on profit remittance. Even though Goulart "typically, hesitated, not wishing to offend"<sup>110</sup> *American Business* nor the Kennedy government for almost two years<sup>111</sup>, the possibility of him signing a profit remittance bill posed a huge threat to U.S. interests as well as influence. For Brazil the authorisation of the law was "Goulart's most important measure"<sup>112</sup> as it was the one that would look to correct the draining effects of imperialism on the Brazilian economy.

A study of the concept of profit remittance explains that between the period 1947 to 1960 \$1,814 million entered Brazil in the form of loans and investments, but at the same time \$2,459 million came out in the form of luxury remittances and interest. Therefore, this practice would leave Brazil with a negative balance of \$645 million in addition to a figure of \$1,022 million in 'clandestine remittances' (capital earned from fraudulent and illicit business which was sent abroad). In other words, this would benefit the United States with a positive balance of \$ 2,481 million<sup>113</sup>.

Although Goulart's policies and projects were firmly identified with reform, their nationalist, anti-imperialist nature presented a challenge to the United States' theories and conceptions on promoting change<sup>114</sup>. During his presidential campaign as well as his presidency, Kennedy had positioned his government as the one that would bring about reform in South America<sup>115</sup>. The concept of *Nation Building* highly appealed to him, and he and his advisers saw it as the

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<sup>109</sup> BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *Op. cit.* p.423

<sup>110</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.101

<sup>111</sup> Since September 1962 the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies had attempted to introduce limits on profit remittance. On the 23rd of January 1964 Goulart signed the act that "established procedures for administering the law on profit remittances". LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.166

<sup>112</sup> BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *Op. cit.* p.149

<sup>113</sup> FRANK, Andre Gunder. *As Relações Econômicas entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos. Jornal do Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro, March 17 1963. p.6

<sup>114</sup> RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.69-70

<sup>115</sup> Idem p.25 while in practice the results of the *Alliance for Progress* are arguable, "in its original conception" it was "unique". "What the Alliance set out to do originally, had no precedents or parallels in history" when it came to programmes for aiding development. "In essence, the U.S. government proposed to reform Latin American social, political and economic structures".



way to stave off radical revolutions. The belief was that as living conditions in underdeveloped countries improved ever so slightly, there would be a revolution of rising expectations. If these were not answered or shown the democratic way of achieving reform, they could turn to violence or, even worse, communism to attain change<sup>116</sup>.

Due to these reasons, the Kennedy administration saw it as the United State's duty and responsibility to nurture progress and economic growth in the 'Third World' by strictly democratic means. The hope was to produce a sort of liberal revolution inspired by American values<sup>117</sup>. The *Alliance for Progress* was set up in 1961 for this exact purpose, and it was to be JFK's "major nation-building effort"<sup>118</sup>. Reform in South America was to be controlled and implemented by the Alliance along with USAID (also set up in 1961<sup>119</sup>), and adherence to tough prerequisites was essential for economic aid to be granted. A country had to present a reform programme that would benefit all social groups as well as providing development. Agrarian, educational, tax and political reform were all part of the agenda along with the increased exploitation of natural resources<sup>120</sup>.

If this was the case, then, it has to be asked why did João Goulart and Kennedy clash over Brazil's attempts at national development and reform? Why were the Brazilian pushes for reform classed as "superficially resembling *Alliance for Progress* policies", as well as being "little... more than demagoguery"<sup>121</sup>? One factor was ideological, U.S. officials knew that Goulart's plans for reform were guided by a "nationalist ideology with all its *varguista* and *trabalhista* heritage" very much present. In this regard, the Brazilian president saw help from the United States in the form of the *Alliance for Progress* as an "obstacle". From the point of

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<sup>116</sup> MILLIKAN, Max F. and ROSTOW, Walt W. *A Proposal: Key to An Effective Foreign Policy*. New York: Harper, 1957. p.149 -150 also see LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.62-63.

<sup>117</sup> The Kennedy administration's policy toward underdeveloped nations was heavily influenced by the theories of Rostow and Millikan. They proposed that by aiding the economies of Third World nations, in addition to their long-term development, the U.S. could further its own foreign policy: "A vast long-term programme of American participation in the economic development of underdeveloped areas could be one of the primary means of advancing American foreign policy objectives". Linked to the economic nature of the programme, was the belief that this strategy would promote the values of liberal democracy, and Western society in such a way that it would be irresistibly persuasive to people everywhere. In other words, it was about expanding U.S. values in different directions. MILLIKAN, Max F. and ROSTOW, Walt W. *Op. cit.* p.1

<sup>118</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.67

<sup>119</sup> RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.148

<sup>120</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.30-31 and LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.67-68

<sup>121</sup> Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, *The President's appointment with Gordon*, 30 Jul 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:684415/> [accessed 13 Mar 2020]

view of the Goulart administration, while "American money was necessary" the Alliance was not<sup>122</sup>.

Another point would be the Kennedy government's uncompromising defence of U.S. business interests<sup>123</sup>. When the *Alliance for Progress* was founded at the Punta del Este conference in 1961, one of the key elements that had helped convince the South American nations to sign up to it was the semi-exclusion of private enterprise. Only a handful of U.S. businessmen had been invited to assist the conference and, even then, they had been asked to come as observers<sup>124</sup>. This would lead to American business criticising the Kennedy government for undermining private enterprise with the creation of the Alliance, and for not doing enough to protect U.S. corporations from nationalisations<sup>125</sup>.

Nevertheless, this initial stance toward business quickly changed due to certain events<sup>126</sup>. In essence, the Kennedy administration became "far more sensitive to the concerns of U.S. traders and investors than these capitalists realised"<sup>127</sup>. This was due to the need to obtain congressional support for the *Alliance for Progress* which the "Kennedy administration used... to achieve its hemispheric goals"<sup>128</sup>. As Goulart would find out, his endeavours to further reforms through nationalisations and profit remittance laws were met with stern rebuke from Washington.

Related to the protection of U.S. corporate interests is the subject of where most of the Alliance's funds were directed. More often than not, investment was made in those sectors which were dedicated to agriculture and extractive activities; those which were already well established as well as linked to foreign capital or interests<sup>129</sup>. This meant that South America tended to be heavily dependent on the exports of primary products and raw materials, which often experienced fluctuating prices, as well as a reliance on imported manufactured goods.

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<sup>122</sup> RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.132 and on p.158 the author explains the political mobilisation experienced during the Goulart government "largely released those internal forces identified with anti-American nationalism, in addition to other forces also antagonistic to the program [of the *Alliance for Progress*]. These elements were "all somehow or to some degree allied to the Goulart administration, having, in this way, reasonable influence on decision-making".

<sup>123</sup> This will be examined in Chapter Two

<sup>124</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p. 80-81

<sup>125</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.166-67

<sup>126</sup> RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.173-174 Governor Leonel Brizola's expropriation of ITT installations in Rio Grande do Sul provoked congressional as well as public outrage in the United States, forcing the Kennedy government to act in its defence, and to adopt a more pro-business stance. The ITT nationalisation will be examined in Chapter Two.

<sup>127</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.167-168

<sup>128</sup> *Idem* p.167-168

<sup>129</sup> *Idem* p.158-59

This would inevitably create an unfair balance of trade between the North and the South<sup>130</sup>. Moreover, investment projects in the aforementioned sectors meant that the money was not going to be used to improve the existence and living conditions of the poor and needy, rather, it was being employed to modernise the industries that were controlled by the local elites<sup>131</sup>.

The Brazilian Northeast and the need for reform was another conflict between the two administrations which would prove to be unsolvable. The basic problem came down to disagreements on how to carry out effective and orderly change. The United States believed that the Northeast of Brazil was a hotbed for communist insurgency, and its strategy was built on the need to win the battle for hearts and minds. In the Kennedy governments attempts to demonstrate the credentials as well as the viability of its *Nation Building* policy, Brazilian projects for long term development and progress were sacrificed for immediate and superficial impact initiatives, such as food and water relief<sup>132</sup>. Goulart's moderate proposals for the Northeast, such as agrarian reform<sup>133</sup>, which contained clauses on compensation for expropriations and rental of un-used land<sup>134</sup>, were rejected and labelled as radical.

This view of radicalism or, in the context of the Cold War, communist subversion was the overriding factor in provoking disagreement and mistrust between the U.S. and Brazil. The more Goulart pushed and manoeuvred for reforms, accepting the support of diverse leftist movements over the years to achieve this, the more the United States government and American Business "viewed the situation with alarm"<sup>135</sup>. The problem was not, however, the alliance with the left, but the grave contradiction and affront that Goulart's *reformas de base* supposed for U.S. hegemony and influence in the form of *Nation Building* as well as the *Alliance for Progress*. The theories behind *Nation Building* were imbued with American ideals and values, as well as bringing about reform and development while avoiding violence and extremism; "the nation builders were confident they understood the dynamics of development", and that they knew the "remedies" to be implemented to achieve change<sup>136</sup>.

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<sup>130</sup> Idem p.164-65

<sup>131</sup> Idem p.157-160 and p.164-165

<sup>132</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.70 and BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.131-132

<sup>133</sup> RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.84 Interestingly, point six of the *Alliance for Progress* charter called for land reform in order to transform the structures of ownership and land use, yet the U.S. would oppose Goulart's plans to try and carry it out.

<sup>134</sup> DULLES, John W. F. *Op. cit.* p.227-228

<sup>135</sup> Department of State Office of the Historian: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Brazil*, eds. David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2004) Document 184 <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d184> [accessed 6 May 2020]

<sup>136</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.63.

While Goulart was far from being violent or extremist, he proposed reform ignoring American models based on assuring U.S. interests<sup>137</sup>.

It is also necessary to highlight that the policy of *Nation Building* was highly linked to the NSD<sup>138</sup>, and, as a result, its rhetoric on change and reform was contradictory as well as ill-informed when applied to South America. The reality was that to achieve real development and renovation, a certain "disposition to confront a period of insecurity and disorder"<sup>139</sup> was necessary; no effective progress or reform could be made without a minimum of instability. Therefore, the insistence on implementing change while, at the same time, maintaining the status quo through security and order would condemn those reform projects that aimed to achieve the goals initially stated by the Alliance<sup>140</sup>. The problems and reality of Latin America had not been taken into account, and unrealistic projections were the consequence<sup>141</sup>. Even so, reality was no substitute for discourse in the Cold War struggle for hegemony; the Kennedy administration would even raise objections to the Brazilian government questioning the *Alliance for Progress* for its ineffectiveness<sup>142</sup>.

## The Political Crisis

The dispute over development, reform and, really, how Goulart's proposals on how to achieve them could have affected U.S. influence, must be understood in the context of a political crisis that seriously afflicted the Fourth Republic. The conflicting ideological positions of the two most prominent elites on which path to follow in order to transform Brazil, as well as the

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<sup>137</sup>RIBERIO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.68 The *Alliance for Progress* was the result of Millikan and Rostow's proposal. Alaggio Ribeiro wrote that their vision reiterated "a theme that runs consistently through U.S. history". That it provides "a modern example of the traditional American sense of mission, a quasi-imperial sense, expressed in the doctrine of manifest destiny". The idea that the United States could transform and better the world by spreading its values and ideas was very much present in U.S. thinking on promoting development. Goulart's plans presented an obstacle to this.

<sup>138</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.74

<sup>139</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.229 and RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.74 "It does not take much imagination to come to the conclusion that, given the historical development of most democratic regimes in Latin America, the likelihood of a peaceful democratic revolution in the early 1960s, with substantial structural reforms, seemed very questionable".

<sup>140</sup> The concept of how any uncontrolled change to the status quo was a threat to national security see p.13.

<sup>141</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.150-155 and GORDON, Lincoln. *A New Deal for Latin America: The Alliance for Progress*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. p.101-02

<sup>142</sup> Telegram from Rio de Janeiro to Secretary of State, *Ambassador Gordon's conversation with Evandro Lins*, 7 Aug 1963. Brown Digital Repository, <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:679072/> [accessed 17 Sep 2020]

rise of the working class as a political force, exacerbated and discredited the *República Populista's* ability to maintain order and satisfy popular demands. The next few pages will examine the power struggle between these two elites, the political crisis and how certain factors as well as possible outcomes could have been detrimental to U.S. hegemony.

One of the key analysis of the political crisis in question points towards a hegemonic fight between two elites<sup>143</sup>. Both the elites had the overall objective of establishing their politics and model of development as the dominant ideology for the transformation of Brazil into a world power. The *socio-econômicas-modernizante-conservadoras*<sup>144</sup> forces were made up of those Brazilians who defended and represented the *multinacionais e associados* (multinational-associated) interests along with the sector of agro-exports. These are the sectors that can generally be classed as conservative, as well as those that "linked Brazil's development to a dependency on the hegemonic capitalist power"<sup>145</sup>. The opposing elite is classed as *nacional-reformista* and it advocated a nationalist development policy as well as the programme of grassroots reform that have previously been mentioned.

Goulart's rise to the presidency signified a severe blow to the aspirations of the *modernizante-conservador* block because his reform and development policies posed a serious threat to the multinational-associated interests. The existing form of capital accumulation was to be altered<sup>146</sup> through different initiatives, such as, shifting the focus of industrialisation from the expansion of multinational corporations to the production of basic consumer products for the domestic market. The emphasis would now be on manufacturing goods for a large market of low income consumers instead of products for high income earners.

Furthermore, the Goulart administration's focus on improving the living conditions of the working class by implementing a more equitable distribution of wealth would prove to be a further setback for multinational-associated interests. This was to be achieved directly by raising salaries, as well as indirectly through increases in public spending on health, education, housing and transport<sup>147</sup>. If that was not enough, there was also Goulart's profit

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<sup>143</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.130-145

<sup>144</sup> Translated as social-economic modernizing conservatives.

<sup>145</sup> ABREU, Alzira Alves de. *Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (ISEB)*. In: FGV CPDOC. <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/instituto-superior-de-estudos-brasileiros-iseb> [accessed 19 Feb 2018]

<sup>146</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.133

<sup>147</sup> *Idem* p.133

remittance law which, as it has already been explained, had the objective of trying to limit the gains made by multinationals in addition to obliging them to reinvest in Brazil.

These policies would, obviously further aggravate the opponents of João Goulart from those sectors of society representative of multinational-associated interests, along with the upper classes who perceived Goulart's socially orientated politics as a betrayal<sup>148</sup>. For instance, the upper echelons of the armed forces felt insulted as they believed that "the granting of large pay increases contributed to inflation, violence, and the erosion of their own status and salaries"<sup>149</sup>. However, the condemnation of Goulart as a class traitor<sup>150</sup> would gain traction at a time when the populist system was in crisis. It was transformed from a form of government that manipulated lower classes to one that permitted their participation by way of the expression and articulation of demands. Brazilian populism was losing its power to control<sup>151</sup>, and the traditional politicians were no longer able to dominate public feeling. As a consequence, the prevailing political discourse was that of the masses, and Goulart was seen as the irresponsible instigator who was allowing this to happen<sup>152</sup>.

Unfortunately for the Goulart administration, while the pro-reform but anti-multinational-associated interest policies would never have been likely to garner U.S. support, the political rise of the Brazilian masses along with the shift in power balance would cause alarm in Washington. This change in the status quo, which affected the Brazilian elites traditionally aligned with United State's interests and values, was immediately viewed through the Cold War prism; it was judged to be communist subversion as well as infiltration. The polarisation

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<sup>148</sup> STARLING, Heloísa. *Os senhores das Gerais: os novos inconfidentes e o Golpe de 64*. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1986 p.42 and PRESOT, Aline Alves. *As Marchas da Família com Deus pela Liberdade e o Golpe de 1964*. 2004. Dissertação (Mestrado em História Social) - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro. p.51 When Jango took office, the multinational-associated business community was alarmed as a result of the former's performance in the Ministry of Labor during the Vargas government. They especially remembered the announcement of a 100% increase in the minimum wage. That was one of the reasons for the antipathy of the elites toward the new president. They saw him as the political heir of Vargas, the "head of the Brazilian Peronism", he represented "unbridled corruption", and the destruction of the "capitalist order". His visits to China and the USSR rendered the image of "clear leftist".

<sup>149</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.141

<sup>150</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.141

<sup>151</sup> PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.51 explains that it was during the Goulart government that Brazil "saw considerable growth and maturation of popular mobilization, especially of the peasants, around political projects". "Political tensions and pressures on the government intensified, with an increase in strikes and demands for implementation of basic reforms" by groups representative of the popular forces. As FIGUEIREDO (see PRESOT p.50) said Goulart "fluctuated between a greater commitment to the demands of the left and the attempts to assuage the fears of conservatives by ensuring that their property rights and institutional channels of political decision were respected".

<sup>152</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.141

of political opinion was judged to be the result of leftist influence and welcomed communist and fellow-travelling support for the PTB<sup>153</sup>. Goulart was, at the very least, perceived to be guilty of "giving the damn country away to the"<sup>154</sup> communists, or wanting to establish "a so-called syndicalist republic"<sup>155</sup>.

The context of the moment (and all the effects and prejudices which it imposed on individuals as well as institutions, etc.) would not allow for the 'subversion' to be seen for what it truly was: the emergence of the masses as a political force that subverted the power of the elites in what was then the prevailing political system. The deterioration and failure of the traditional parties of the centre and right, *Partido Social Democrático* and the *União Democrática Nacional* (UDN), as "mechanisms of social control and mobilization"<sup>156</sup> was becoming evident.

Furthermore, the UDN, which represented the political interests of liberal-conservative anti-*trabalhista* elements, had been overtaken by the PTB along with other national reformist formations as being favoured by the electorate<sup>157</sup>. A good example of the growing popularity and power of *nacional-reformista* block, was the *Frente de Mobilização Popular*<sup>158</sup> (FMP), an extra-parliamentary block made up of diverse popular associations, trade unions, members of parliament and certain national reformist officials from the armed forces, which signalled a very present and real danger to the conservative forces.

From the multinational-associated block's point of view the situation was especially alarming. In addition to the increase in popularity of national reformist politics, a study made at the time demonstrated that despite its economic power, the multinational linked elite's political representation was insufficient. While it produced 40% of the GDP as well as constituting

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<sup>153</sup> Idem p.140

<sup>154</sup> White House, Transcript of Meeting between President Kennedy, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and Richard Goodwin, July 30, 1962. (Published in *The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises, Volume One* (W.W. Norton), edited by Timothy Naftali, October 2001.) National Security Archive <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%201%20kennedy%20brazil%20meeting%20July%2030,%201962.pdf> [accessed 2 Jul 2020]

<sup>155</sup> Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, *The President's appointment with Ambassador Lincoln Gordon*, 30 Jul 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:684415/> [accessed 13 Mar 2020]

<sup>156</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.138

<sup>157</sup> WEGNER, Felipe Henrique. *Op. cit.* p.66-67 During the Fourth Republic, the UDN, representing multinational-associated interests in addition to other conservative elements, only won one presidential election. That was the electoral victory of Quadros in 1960.

<sup>158</sup> Front of Popular Mobilisation

12% of the population it was represented by less than 10% of congress<sup>159</sup>. In the eyes of the multinational-associated block, this would confirm they were incapable of winning power and, as a result, the possibility of controlling the system in order to implement their ideology and to model "the course of development"<sup>160</sup> would not become a reality.

What was referred to as communist subversion and infiltration throughout the period of the Goulart government was far from the truth. Even though the support of the *Partido Comunista Brasileiro* (PCB) along with other leftist groups for national reformist politics is undeniable<sup>161</sup>, what was really at stake in Brazil was the increasingly likely loss of *multinacional e associado* interests, backed by the United States, in its struggle against the national reformist block for hegemony; the U.S. would not allow for this to happen, and as early as July 1962 the Kennedy government was weighing up the possibility of a coup if influence and pressure could not be born to bear:

*Goodwin: - ...Then I think that that's why we can't have the OAS meeting because this would really discourage the military. If you start getting all these countries together and-  
President Kennedy: Yeah.*

*Goodwin: - passing resolutions against-*

*President Kennedy: That's what I want to say today at this [unclear].*

*Goodwin: Because we may very well want them [the Brazilian military] to take over at the end of the year, if they can.*

*Gordon: We have that military front. And as I see it their function is first to keep Goulart on the rails.<sup>162</sup>*

Really, Goulart's *nacionalista-reformista* policies and projects, which intended to develop Brazil through the promotion and defence of the masses, supposed a war on two fronts; "firstly there is international insecurity because it is about emancipating oneself from the domination of the superpowers... then there is internal insecurity. Without doubt, in a society

<sup>159</sup> ASSIS RIBEIRO in DREIFUSS p. 138

<sup>160</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.138

<sup>161</sup> DULLES and MONIZ BANDEIRA explain this, however as Dulles points out the PCB also pacted with General Lott and other more conservative politicians.

<sup>162</sup> White House, Transcript of Meeting between President Kennedy, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and Richard Goodwin, July 30, 1962. (Published in *The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises, Volume One* (W.W. Norton), edited by Timothy Naftali, October 2001.) National Security Archive <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%201%20kennedy%20brazil%20meeting%20July%2030,%201962.pdf> [accessed 2 Jul 2020]



in which privileges are excessive, any promotion of the masses entails terrible conflicts"<sup>163</sup>. The political crisis provoked by Goulart's national reformist politics became worse because he was also attacking imperial hegemony. As a result the United States would resort to other strategies in order to reassert its influence.

## **Government Ministries and The Armed Forces: Influence in Prominent Posts**

The subject of prominent posts and positions in the Brazilian government along with the Armed Forces is of considerable importance when examining influence. In the struggle for ideological supremacy between the multinational-associated block and the national-reformists, Goulart placed and promoted pro-reformists to key posts. In the eyes of the United States, this was a direct affront to its influence as pro-U.S. individuals supportive of Washington's foreign policy were replaced by others who were, more often than not, of an anti-imperialist mindset.

Consequently, the United States' concern with the subject of promotions and cabinet posts was a constant throughout the period, and various strategies were employed in order to force different outcomes favourable to Washington's interests. For these reasons, the content in this section on influence is of vital importance because it demonstrates clearly U.S. interference in Brazilian domestic politics, so as to counteract the negative effects of the Goulart presidency on U.S. hegemony.

The basic problem the U.S. had with Goulart when it came to assigning posts was that they, rightly or wrongly, believed him to be a political opportunist "with no strong motivation save his craving for popularity and personal power". This they felt was extremely dangerous because "a significant consequence of Goulart's political opportunism is the favour and patronage which he has shown to Communists and suspected Communists throughout his career, in return for their political support"<sup>164</sup>.

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<sup>163</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.229

<sup>164</sup> Department of State Office of the Historian: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics, Brazil*, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor Fain III (Washington:

Although this is partly true, it does tend to ignore the finer and more intricate details of Brazilian politics and coalition building in order to have sufficient support. In Brazil it was not uncommon for parties or politicians of opposing ideologies to pact with the objective of achieving electoral success. Nor was it rare for politicians to change parties so as to assure their election. If anything, personal rivalries, friendships or patronage played more importance than political issues<sup>165</sup>. Both Jânio Quadros as well as Marshall Henrique Teixeira Lott (the PSD/PTB presidential candidate for the 1960 elections and Goulart's running mate) are good examples of this.

In Marshall Lott's case he received praise from PCB leader Luís Carlos Prestes for his patriotism following his role in the coup of 1955, along with the official backing of the PCB and all its "press and crowd-producing apparatus" for the presidential elections of 1960<sup>166</sup>. Even though Quadros did not receive PCB endorsement, he won much needed leftist votes through a number of gestures. For instance, unlike Lott he accepted an invitation by Fidel Castro to visit Cuba, and on his return Quadros praised the revolution. In another attempt to attract votes from the left, he "came out in favour of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union"<sup>167</sup>. Finally, when he was president, Quadros awarded the *Ordem do Cruzeiro do Sul* to Ernesto 'Che' Guevara<sup>168</sup>, which was one of Brazil's most prestigious medals.

Both Lott and Quadros' links and symbolic gestures to the Brazilian left serve as good examples of how João Goulart's relationship with it could have been seen in a less threatening light. Nonetheless, the United States would forever be suspicious of Goulart's intentions. As they saw it Goulart "put important communists or people who are very anti-United States in important positions of power". It was, therefore, necessary to "bring their [the Goulart government's] general political orientation into a more wholesome direction", but the problem the U.S. had was how to deal with this dilemma of "political performance". Lincoln Gordon stated that "We can't write a piece of paper which we get them to sign that says that on such a such a day they will fire A, B, and C"<sup>169</sup>. Evidently, this would have been

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United States Government Printing Office, 1999) Document 228.  
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d228> [accessed 18 Oct 2018]

<sup>165</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.58

<sup>166</sup> DULLES, John W. F. *Op. cit.* p. 83 and p. 109-111

<sup>167</sup> *Idem* p. 109-110

<sup>168</sup> MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.289

<sup>169</sup> Excerpts from John F. Kennedy's conversation regarding Brazil with U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon 8 Mar 1963 (Meeting 77.1, President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston) National Security Archive. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%206%20brazil-jfk%20tapes-030863-revised.pdf> [accessed 7 Jul 2020]

construed as a blatant act of interference, and it could have sparked a diplomatic row. In Gordon's opinion, it was "a matter of continuing pressure"; the United States would get its way by coercion. Ultimately, Washington would tie economic aid along with general assistance to adhering to U.S. directives. In order to receive much needed financial support, Goulart had to realise that he could not "have it both ways", he had "to do something specifically about these people"<sup>170</sup>.

The Kennedy administration was not only intent on conditioning the political performance of the Goulart government, but also on controlling (or at least trying to control) promotions and changes of command within the Brazilian Armed Forces (*Forças Armadas do Brasil*). Just two months after João Goulart was inaugurated as president the United States was already fretting over the changes being made in the armed forces:

*"Since Goulart's accession to the Presidency an extensive shake-up has occurred in the Brazilian armed forces. Those officers best known as enemies of the Communist movement have been scattered and demoralized, either by retirement or by reassignment to positions where they can exercise little influence on military or political affairs. These officers have been replaced by others who are in most instances without experience in or proven capacity for their new posts and who in some instances are suspected of being Communist sympathizers or even secret agents"*<sup>171</sup>.

Throughout the period in question, United States officials in Brazil constantly denounced the relegation of officers of "pro-U.S. orientation away from troop command"<sup>172</sup> in contrast with "the high percentage of ultra-nationalist radicals occupying key command positions"<sup>173</sup>. Once again, the ideological struggle between national reformism and, what can be described as a general conservative stance in favour of the U.S. as well as its values, was the overriding factor. From the United States point of view, a loss of influence in institutions (especially in the Brazilian Army), which had been bastions of pro-U.S. sentiment since World War Two,

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<sup>170</sup> Idem

<sup>171</sup> Department of State Office of the Historian: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, Volume XII, American Republics, Brazil, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor Fain III (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996) Document 218. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d218> [accessed 17 Oct 2018]

<sup>172</sup> Department of Defence Intelligence Information Report, *Brazilian Army Roles*, 9 Sep 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:806256/> [accessed 30 Jan 2020]

<sup>173</sup> Department of Defence Intelligence Information Report, *Analysis of Recent Promotions to Brigadier General*, 4 Sep 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:692925/> [accessed 28 Jan 2020]

was translated into communist subversion. As the U.S. military attaché to Brazil General Vernon Walters reported:

*"I found in the Brazilian Army a sharp division between those who were sincerely devoted to democracy and hemispheric solidarity and those who were following an extreme nationalist, socialist orientation, either through conviction or opportunism"*<sup>174</sup>.

The blame for this tendency was ultimately and, obviously, placed on Goulart. In the end, it was his men of confidence who were being favoured. Unfortunately, Washington once again failed to understand that the use of the *Forças Armadas do Brasil* for political ends had been common practice for every Brazilian government, except Kubitschek's, between 1937 and 1964<sup>175</sup>. Goulart was no exception, he strategically placed his military allies in positions of prominence, and he "actively used the military as one of his major policy instruments" when his government was faced with problems<sup>176</sup>. A good example of this was use of the generals Goulart had appointed to command the First, Second and Third Armies; they were "the most effective instruments of pressure against Congress in the battle for the return to presidentialism"<sup>177</sup>.

The U.S. decision makers' failure to grasp this customary political use of the Armed Forces, along with their tendency to view everything as a potential threat to national security, would lead them to believe that Goulart's trend was "serious enough to require the coordinated use of all available U.S. assets"<sup>178</sup>. From the beginning of his presidency different tactics would be used against Goulart with the ultimate objective of conditioning his choice of personnel. These would include the failed visit of Attorney General Robert Kennedy in 1962<sup>179</sup>, which would provoke the Kennedy administration to toughen its stance against Goulart. The fact of the matter is that while Goulart acted in the same manner as other Brazilian leaders, his nominations as well as choices of promotions severally affected the hegemony of the multinational associated interests and, as a consequence, those of the United States too.

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<sup>174</sup> Letter from Vernon Waters to Major General Alva R. Fitch, *Assessment of Anti-American Sentiment in Brazilian Army* 6 Mar 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:668977/> [accessed 11 Apr 2018]

<sup>175</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.67-68

<sup>176</sup> *Idem* p. 69

<sup>177</sup> FAUST, J.J. *A Revolução Devora Seus Presidentes*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Saga, 1965. p.39

<sup>178</sup> Department of State Office of the Historian: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics, Brazil*, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor Fain III (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996) Document 218.

<sup>179</sup> DULLES, John W. F. *Op. cit.* p.195

## **Chapter 2: Pressure**

The first chapter examined how Goulart's presidency affected U.S. dominance in the region. The loss of influence over Brazil along with the growing disharmony of interests between the two countries was enough for the strategists in Washington to adopt new measures which, could be said, had the ultimate aim of achieving one of two objectives: If on the one hand the United States hoped to use pressure to persuade João Goulart to rethink as well as refocus his policies, on the other hand the strong-arm tactics would also weaken and destabilise his government if he refused to comply. However, with the passing of time, this doctoral student believes that the U.S. realised that it was becoming less likely for them to attain the first objective. Consequently, the pressure applied would have more to do with undermining the Goulart administration in addition to strengthening pro-U.S. opposition groups to carry out a coup.

Clearly, it must be taken into account that there are different degrees as well as concepts of pressure, and in an imperialist dominance relationship coercion is a constant. Therefore, for this thesis pressure is considered to be those strategies which were more visible as well as overt. For a better description, we could define it as a show of force through the use of bullying tactics in the hope of creating an impact not just on president Goulart and the members of his government, but also on public opinion.

### **Economic Pressure**

The crippling economic crisis and exorbitant rates of inflation meant that the need for aid was imperative for the Goulart government if it was to consolidate short-term economic stability. In addition, financial assistance was equally necessary for the implementation of the grassroots reform programme. This section deals with those American tactics that tried to pressure Goulart into adhering to U.S. commands as well as supporting its traditional influence. If the then Brazilian president was to hope to receive much needed economic assistance, the United States expected certain policies to be respected and followed.

As it has been briefly mentioned in the section on "Influence In Prominent Posts", linking possible aid to good political performance was an incentive that Washington gave to Goulart

during the first year or so of his tenure as president. For the United States, the Goulart administration had to change its position on key questions such as Cuba, as well as giving public support to the Alliance for Progress. American Business interests would also need to be upheld, in the opinion of the U.S. government "a satisfactory settlement of the IT&T case" and "a clear Brazilian administration position on remedying the defects in the present profits remittance law" were imperative. According to the Kennedy administration, "any further large-scale assistance to Brazil in connection with an economic stabilisation program should be considered only after Brazil had taken certain significant positive steps" in regards to these subjects of interest<sup>180</sup>.

Aid along with financial support were, therefore, to be heavily linked to the condition of strict compliance with Washington's orders<sup>181</sup>. Logically, this was something to be expected as the United States was not to be expected to award aid and loans to a country that constantly defied its hegemony on issues of foreign policy such as Cuba. Nevertheless, the requisites that the U.S. tried to impose as necessary for receiving financial assistance, often had more to do with defending private business interests<sup>182</sup> or with combating subversion than for example, promoting those points defended in the *Alliance for Progress* charter<sup>183</sup>. The cases of both AMFORP, Hanna Mining Company and ITT tend to demonstrate exactly this.

In February 1962, the state government of Rio Grande do Sul expropriated a subsidiary of ITT in what at first seemed to be a simple operation. The state decided to pay a sum of \$400,000 to ITT after it had made deductions (for illegally exported profits and for land

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<sup>180</sup> NSC Memorandum, *U.S. Short-Term policy Toward Brazil*, 11 Dec 1962. National Security Archive. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%20%20US%20short%20term%20policy%20toward%20brazil.pdf> [accessed 2 Jul 2020]

<sup>181</sup> Memorandum for the Secretary of State, *Mexico and Brazil Agreement to Oppose OAS Trade Restrictions with Cuba*, 17 May 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:671216/> [accessed 29 Sep 2019]

<sup>182</sup> The reasons why Kennedy ended up sacrificing *Alliance for Progress* ideals in order to safeguard U.S. business interests has been subject to discussion. Initially the U.S. president maintained a certain distance from the business community and, with the aim of setting up the *Alliance*, an indifference to their interests. While authors such as Ruth Leacock and Stephen G. Rabe tend to present Kennedy's swift change in stance sceptically, as if the benefits of U.S. businesses were always going to trump *Alliance for Progress* values, Ricardo Alaggio Ribeiro sees it as a result of the outrage provoked by the ITT case. According to this view, the Kennedy administration was reluctant to yield to the demands of these private enterprises as it realised the negative effects it would have on the *Alliance*, however because of the huge amount of congressional pressure it was forced to.

<sup>183</sup> The *Alliance for Progress* charter outlined 12 general objectives. Copies of the charter in English and in Spanish can be found in the OAS Virtual Library of Inter-American Peace Initiatives.

donated to the company) to a valuation by an agreed upon arbitration panel<sup>184</sup>. Even though ITT had agreed to the arbitration, the company suddenly refused to accept the decision pushing for new negotiations, and claiming the subsidiary was worth an "exaggerated" 7 to 8 million dollars<sup>185</sup>.



Governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Leonel Brizola, signs the expropriation of ITT subsidiary Cia Telefônica Nacional. Source: Memorial da Democracia (<http://memorialdademocracia.com.br/card/brizola-encampa-a-bond-share>).

The dispute would take on a new twist when the ITT president Harold S. Geneen formally requested that the U.S. government take action to defend the interests of the business<sup>186</sup>. ITT would also publicly condemn the takeover creating a media storm. By invoking memories of Cuban nationalisations as well as questioning the political orientation of the governor of Rio

<sup>184</sup> United Press International. Encampada Por Brizola A Companhia Telefônica. *Diário de Notícias*, Rio de Janeiro, 17 Fev 1962. [http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/docreader.aspx?bib=093718\\_04&pasta=ano%20196&pesq=ITT&pagfis=19545](http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/docreader.aspx?bib=093718_04&pasta=ano%20196&pesq=ITT&pagfis=19545) [Accessed 16 Apr 2019]

<sup>185</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p. 85-87.

<sup>186</sup> Idem p.86-87 Geneen sent "urgent and confidential telegrams" to both Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk demanding that the U.S. government "act immediately to force the Brazilian government to rescind" the expropriation. Other ITT officials alerted the press about Brizola's nationalisation.

Grande do Sul and João Goulart's brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola<sup>187</sup>, public outrage grew along with pressure on the Kennedy administration to act swiftly. The U.S. business community also reacted to such an extent that the matter was debated by congress<sup>188</sup>.

Whether one agrees with diplomatic intervention in the defence of private business interests or not, the reality was Kennedy had his own electorate to answer to, and public opinion was incredibly sensitive to the topic of nationalisations<sup>189</sup>. The fact that ITT had been offering a poor service for years, that it had been legally expropriated or that the company was trying to impose unconstitutional negotiations (the conflict was with a state government, but ITT insisted on negotiating with the federal government) did not matter. In a clear attempt to show a more "pro-business position" Kennedy sided with ITT accepting its "interpretation of the incident as a political act of anti-Americanism"<sup>190</sup>. Furthermore, Kennedy agreed with Geneen's argument that the solution to the disagreement be negotiated by the U.S. and Brazilian governments. By deciding to back this last claim, Kennedy ended up turning a commercial dispute, between a state and a company, into a diplomatic and ideological one between the two governments<sup>191</sup>.

Another impact of Kennedy's decision to support ITT was the position it put Goulart in. He was being forced to negotiate a problem which he had no constitutional power to resolve. The United States government knew this but, even so, they were adamant that the Brazilian federal government find the solution<sup>192</sup>. Lincoln Gordon was given specific orders to give "fullest possible support to the company's effort [to] obtain prompt and adequate

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<sup>187</sup> One curious fact related to the ITT expropriation was Goulart's reaction to it. The Brazilian President was both angered and surprised, and he expressed these feelings to Ambassador Gordon, even though Brizola was his brother-in-law (he was married to Goulart's sister). Goulart questioned whether Brizola was "trying to ruin" his official visit to Washington. See GORDON, L. *A Segunda Chance do Brasil – A Caminho do Primeiro Mundo*. São Paulo: Ed. SENAC, 2002 p.321 and RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Cit. op.* p.175

<sup>188</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Cit op.* p.87

<sup>189</sup> *Idem* p.87-88 Leacock details the public backlash.

<sup>190</sup> *Idem* p. 88

<sup>191</sup> *Idem* p.88 Even though Gordon had informed Washington that the expropriation had been carried out "in accordance with Brazilian law", Kennedy denounced it and agreed that the solution had to be negotiated by the U.S. government with the Brazilian government. ALSO In a conversation with Brazilian Ambassador Roberto Campos, Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned that the nationalisation went against U.S. government efforts to "mobilise capital necessary for development". Memorandum of Conversation. Washington, February, 19, 1962. FRUS. 1961-63. American Republics. Brazil. Volume XII. Documento 221. Quoted in RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.175

<sup>192</sup> BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *Brizola e o Trabalhismo*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1979. p.65 and LEACOCK p.88 Gordon was well aware that to negotiate a solution to the ITT case was beyond Goulart's constitutional power.



compensation utilizing in this regard full weight [and] influence of U.S. government"<sup>193</sup>. In this sense, the warning of cutting economic aid was put on the table; Gordon forced Goulart's compliance to pay a settlement of \$8million by threatening to invoke the *Hickenlooper Amendment*<sup>194</sup>.

What needs to be explored here is why did the United States adopt this strategy? The ITT case would not be the only one where Washington directly intervened, demanding the protection of U.S. business interests in exchange for aid. Pretty much the same could be said of AMFORP (*American and Foreign Power*), which intended to sell different properties (some of which had already been expropriated) in various states by negotiating with the federal government. The Kennedy government once again came to the assistance of private business, this time urging Goulart to take "constructive action" on the AMFORP proposal<sup>195</sup>. Here, it must be mentioned that the Brazilian president wrongly and naively committed himself to the AMFORP proposition with the aim of gaining political prestige<sup>196</sup>.

Firstly, the outcome of the negotiations on the nationalisation of AMFORP would generate a lot of tension between the Brazilian and Washington governments because there was a scandal over the price of compensation, which forced Goulart to eventually reject the American offer. Basically, AMFORP demanded double the figure calculated by CONESP<sup>197</sup>, ignoring decades of plundering through profit remittance and underinvestment<sup>198</sup>. However, to make matters worse, the Goulart administration had signed a *Memorandum of Understanding* with AMFORP prior to the CONESP evaluation<sup>199</sup>. In this regard, Kennedy and later Johnson saw Goulart's refusal to follow through with the purchase as a sign of mistrust<sup>200</sup>.

Domestically, Goulart would also lose out. For the left, the fact that Goulart had accepted to negotiate was already a contentious issue with some elements accusing him of betrayal. On top of that the U.S. proposal was disrespectful. For the right, it was the perfect opportunity to

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<sup>193</sup> RUSK to Embassy, 7 Mar 1962, NSF Co-K. Quoted in LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.88.

<sup>194</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.79 The *Hickenlooper Amendment* was a provision attached to the foreign aid bill in June 1962 that sought to cut off foreign assistance to any country that failed to provide adequate compensation for expropriated U.S. companies.

<sup>195</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.89-90.

<sup>196</sup> *Idem* p.91

<sup>197</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.147 highlights the inflated price that the Goulart government was effectively being forced to pay.

<sup>198</sup> BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *A Presença dos...* p.443-46

<sup>199</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p. 145

<sup>200</sup> CORRÊA, Marcos Sá. *1964 visto e comentado pela Casa Branca*. Porto Alegre: L&PM Editores, 1977. p. 113

attack the Brazilian government for its apparent ineptitude in negotiating a fair price, in addition to possible illegalities related to the federal government intervening in the affairs of individual states<sup>201</sup>. In the end, this pressure from both sides forced Goulart to reject the conditions for the company's nationalisation. The failure to try to buy AMFORP weakened his government, and it irritated the Kennedy administration<sup>202</sup> causing it to increase fiscal pressure; Kennedy "suspended all Alliance for Progress agreements that could fund the balance deficit of Brazil"<sup>203</sup> to force Goulart to pay the exaggerated compensation for AMFORP.

Another example of the Kennedy government intervening on behalf of private business, as a form of coercing Goulart, is the attempted expropriation of Hanna Mining Company. Even before the corporation had itself reacted, Washington issued an official protest against the decision of the Goulart administration to act on an investigation (initiated by Quadros) to expropriate the company<sup>204</sup>. It was a formal warning to not interfere with the business of another U.S. company. Hanna also challenged the decree, but its future would not be decided until after the 1964 coup when the dictatorship sided in favour of the company<sup>205</sup>. One noteworthy fact is that a few years after Goulart's attempts at expropriation, Hanna provided "trucks for the Minas Gerais troops that launched the revolution"<sup>206</sup> to oust him.

The destabilising effects that Kennedy's pro-business strategy had on the Goulart administration should not be ignored. The threat to cut financial assistance if U.S. companies and their usually unfair demands were not respected would have massive repercussions. It has to be asked, was this a means to pressure him to fall in line and respect American hegemony? Maybe it was a ploy to undermine his leadership as well as the *reformas de base*? Was it even part of broader plan to prepare for the possibility of regime change as early as 1962<sup>207</sup>?

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<sup>201</sup> RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Cit. Op.* p.180 ALSO attacks and criticism of Goulart by individuals of the left and right of the political spectrum are mentioned in Telegram from Embassy to Secretary of State. *Goulart view on AMFORP Case.* 17 Jul 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:679290/> [accessed 24 Feb 2020]

<sup>202</sup> SKIDMORE T. *Brasil: De Getúlio a Castelo.* Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1979 p.313

<sup>203</sup> BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *A Presença dos...* p.464

<sup>204</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.86-88

<sup>205</sup> *Idem* p.87-90 Hanna Mining Company saw itself massively favoured by the military junta receiving enormous concessions.

<sup>206</sup> *Idem* p.87 The word revolution was used by the participants and supporters of the coup d'état.

<sup>207</sup> The discussion on preparing the "military front" has already been mentioned in Chapter 1. See page 40.

A CIA memorandum on aid suspension in South America confirms the belief that, "in no case has cessation of U.S. aid been followed by quick collapse of the regime", however in an example like Brazil's it would entail "considerable belt-tightening" and "could well generate a serious financial crisis with attendant political repercussions"<sup>208</sup>. The authors of the document also stated that much more was needed to encourage regime change than the discontinuing of aid:

*"The durability of ... Goulart in Brazil attests to the limited effectiveness of aid suspensions or reductions over the short run. Suspension of aid is not the equivalent of a quick knock-out punch but is rather part of a sequence of blows in a contest that has to go many rounds."*<sup>209</sup>

To say that the United States were working to cause the collapse of the Goulart government as early as 1962 would not be correct. Nevertheless, by putting the onus on Goulart to solve, what were in many cases, problems outside of his constitutional reach would ultimately make him the number one culprit whatever the outcome, along with making him look weak. Domestically, he could be attacked from opposition on the right for being inept as well as siding with the 'communists' in the case negotiations failed. Or, in surrendering to the demands of ITT, AMFORP or Hanna as well as the threats of the U.S. government, he could be accused of being an *entreguista* traitor by the left<sup>210</sup>.

In the eyes of U.S. business, Goulart's failure to solve these disputes confirmed he was "anti-American by instinct, and consciously or unconsciously inclined toward putting the country either under outright communist control" or under some sort of "Peronist, syndicalist dictatorship"<sup>211</sup>. For American officials it would affirm he was untrustworthy. President

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<sup>208</sup> Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum. *The Impact of Punitive Suspension of U.S. Economic Assistance in Latin American Countries*. 18 Oct 1963. Brown Digital Repository. p. 2-3. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:692124/> [accessed 11 Feb 2020]

<sup>209</sup> Idem p.2

<sup>210</sup> Effectively, the Goulart government was criticised. In an article in the *Diário de Notícias* the reporter made the following comment when referring to the failure to nationalise AMFORP: "It is the government's responsibility, because if the problem had been addressed clearly, providing public opinion with all the information necessary for its fair assessment, it would have been difficult for agitators to take advantage of the situation for their designs to deceive [public] opinion, leading it to hasty judgments". A Compra da AMFORP. *Diário de Notícias*, Rio de Janeiro, 30 Jun 1963. [http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/docreader.aspx?bib=093718\\_04&pasta=ano%20196&pesq=Amforp&pagfis=30966](http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/docreader.aspx?bib=093718_04&pasta=ano%20196&pesq=Amforp&pagfis=30966) [accessed 17 Apr 2019] ALSO LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.91 confirms criticism of the AMFORP purchase from across the political spectrum.

<sup>211</sup> Department of State Office of the Historian: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, Brazil*, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor Fain III (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996) Document 235. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d235> [accessed 10 Jan 2020] ALSO see

Kennedy would even go so far as to say that Goulart's failure to sign off on the AMFORP agreement "raised [the] question of personal good faith of [the] president"<sup>212</sup>.

This analysis shows that the threat of deferring aid, destined for economic stabilisation and reform, in the defence of U.S. companies was ultimately a pressure tactic. The fact that payment "needs should be contingent upon explicit standards of GOB performance in implementing necessary economic policies", along with assistance being submitted to "periodic review and making possible the withdrawal of support on either economic or political grounds"<sup>213</sup> only serves to emphasise U.S. intentions of forcing Goulart to obey. It could be said that the United States could claim certain legitimacy in demanding compliance for aid to be granted, as well as to cut financial assistance if these were not met.

However, this 'legitimate' imperialist pressure strategy of paying or not paying, in order to regain influence, would have serious consequences. In the face of U.S. intransigence and the use of aid suspension, which only served to undermine Goulart's political alliances with moderates, the Brazilian president came to the conclusion that he could not rely on the United States if he was to realise reform. Therefore, what the United States hoped to achieve by suspending aid, that is, economic interests, the elimination of leftist influence in and support for the Goulart government as well as backing of U.S. foreign policy objectives, did not become reality. More than anything, this pressure tactic helped to create a volatile political atmosphere favourable to radical outcomes. Washington would also realise that it needed to pursue more drastic approaches if Brazil was to be brought back under control.

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Department of State, Memorandum to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, *Political Considerations Affecting U.S. Assistance to Brazil*, 7 Mar 1963. National Security Archive. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%205%20political%20considerations%20affecting%20us%20assistance%20to%20brazil.pdf> [accessed 3 Jul 2020]

<sup>212</sup> Telegram from Rio de Janeiro to Secretary of State, *Concern with Further Postponement Communicated by Dantas*, 9 Apr 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:671086/> [accessed 2 Mar 2021]

<sup>213</sup> Department of State Office of the Historian: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, Brazil*, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor Fain III (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996) Document 235. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d235> [accessed 10 Jan 2020]

## **The Brazilian Legislative Elections of 1962**

U.S. interference in the Brazilian legislative elections of 1962 are yet another example of Washington's strategy to coerce Goulart, as it clearly demonstrates a calculated and concerted effort to fill the Brazilian chamber of deputies with candidates of its choosing. While the plan ultimately failed to pay off, it does not hide the fact that by backing what can be generally be termed as pro-U.S./anti-Goulart candidates, the United States hoped to limit the Brazilian president's room for manoeuvre increasing pressure on him. Furthermore, the elections of 1962 have an additional significance as many of the tactics, which were to become common practice for the United States in other South American countries, were first perfected in Brazil.

In many senses, Washington's intervention in the elections can be seen as a prelude to the *Islands of Sanity* strategy; this was the irregular financing of anti-Goulart and U.S. friendly politicians and institutions. The enormous amounts of financial assistance invested in the electoral campaign were, therefore, the first stages of a much more far-reaching destabilisation plan. During the months leading up to the elections, the CIA was to play a key role in distributing funds which were to be used to support chosen candidates, as well as to attack undesired ones. In what is now one of the most famous publications on CIA activities, the ex-CIA agent Philip Agee confirmed that the Brazilian elections of 1962 were "the climax of one of the WH [Western Hemisphere] Division's largest ever political-action operations"<sup>214</sup>. The exact amount which the U.S. spent, however, is not entirely known. Ambassador Gordon stated that while he "didn't know all of the details" he believed around \$5million was used to influence the results. Agee estimated that the United States could have paid out anything between \$12 and \$20million<sup>215</sup>.

These funds were to be employed in what was an obvious attempt "to twist the will of the Brazilian people according to the will of the White House"<sup>216</sup>. In this regard, the U.S. directly tried to influence the elections because questions related to national sovereignty, such as economic development with greater autonomy and an independent foreign policy, "constituted the axes of political forces" which were growing in popular support, and these

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<sup>214</sup> AGEE, Philip. *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*. New York: Bantam, 1976. p.216

<sup>215</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.120 and AGEE p. 274

<sup>216</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.121

directly affronted their interests<sup>217</sup>. For this reason the *Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática* (IBAD) along with its subsidiary *S.A. Incrementadora de Vendas Promotion* to carried out a saturation campaign which included over eighty weekly radio programmes, television and radio advertising, a free monthly magazine of some 250 million copies and the usage of billboards and pamphlets<sup>218</sup>. Furthermore, candidates receiving IBAD backing had to sign an ideological contract in which they committed themselves to following IBAD ideological orientation if they were elected<sup>219</sup>.

In effect, the "conservative sectors" hoped to "create the feeling that the elections represented an absolute polarisation between democracy and communism". With the objective of avoiding "the election of leftist parliamentarians", in order to prevent "the establishment of solid institutional support for" reformist proposals, conservative press presented Brazilians with the idea that "the fate of" their "preferred way of life" would be at stake, and "threatened by an electoral victory for the communists and their allies"<sup>220</sup>.

These actions along with the vast amounts of money needed to carry them out did not go unnoticed, and suspicions about foreign interference grew. Even before the votes had been cast, U.S. officials in Brazil were informed that Goulart was aware of backing being given to candidates opposing the administration<sup>221</sup>. In addition, a Brazilian congress investigation into the whole affair would come close to revealing the full extent of the financing of certain electoral campaigns. Apparently, only the refusal of the *First National City Bank*, the *Bank of Boston* and the *Royal Bank of Canada* to disclose the foreign origin of the funds, as well as a fire that conveniently destroyed IBAD records, prevented a major diplomatic scandal<sup>222</sup>.

In the end, the results of the elections were fairly inconclusive from a U.S. perspective. Despite the sizeable expenditure, very little had changed in the makeup of the Brazilian

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<sup>217</sup> COELHO, Fernando de Vasconcellos. et al. *Comissão Estadual da Memória e Verdade Dom Helder Câmara Relatório Final Volume II*. Recife: CEMVDHC, 2017. p.50

<sup>218</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.99

<sup>219</sup> DUTRA, Eloy *IBAD: sigla da corrupção*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1963. Quoted in FILHO, Reinaldo Cardenuto. *Discursos de intervenção: o cinema de propaganda ideológica para o CPC e o IPES às vésperas do Golpe de 1964*. 2008. Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciências da Comunicação) - Escola de Comunicação e Artes, Universidade de Sao Paulo. p.46

<sup>220</sup> MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.308-309

<sup>221</sup> Telegram from Rio de Janeiro to Secretary of State. *American Connections Elections*, 18 Sep 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:684746/> [accessed 13 Mar 2020]

<sup>222</sup> AGEE, Philip. *Op. cit.* p.274 and LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.120

congress<sup>223</sup>, nor had enough been done to prevent the victories of prominent "nationalist" candidates such as Miguel Arraes (elected governor of Pernambuco) and Leonel Brizola (elected as a Federal Deputy)<sup>224</sup>.

While not a success, the Kennedy administration's meddling in the Brazilian elections is a prime example of using pressure tactics against the Goulart government. This blatant attempt to manipulate the results, demonstrates to what extent Washington wished to regain its position of dominance over Brazil. The theory that a national political scene dominated by pro-U.S. personalities and opinions could have obliged Goulart to conduct himself in a very different way, was very prominent in American strategist's thinking. The fact that the tactic did not produce the desired results does not mean that this episode should be ignored. Additionally, it should be stated that the United States lack of success to impose its will on the electoral process, would only serve to convince many officials along with members of the Brazilian elite that *trabalhista* politics could not be beaten by democratic practices<sup>225</sup>.

## **The Draper Commission: Its Report and Consequences**

In October 1962, due to the Kennedy administration's preoccupation with the political and economical situation in Brazil, an interdepartmental survey group was sent to Brazil to analyse the state of affairs. Known as the Draper Commission, it spent fifteen days in Brazil visiting various regions and interviewing different individuals. The visit of the commission to Brazil did not have the intentional objective of coercing Goulart, it was simply a fact finding

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<sup>223</sup> In fact, the PTB would increase its presence in congress from 62 deputies in the 1958 elections to 104 in 1962. BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *O Governo João Goulart...* p.75-76.

<sup>224</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.122-124 and MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.257

<sup>225</sup> Goulart's victory in the plebescite to bring back presidentialism on the 6th of January 1963 further confounded this conviction. By a margin of 82% to 18%, eligible Brazilian voters backed Goulart and restored full presidential powers. In what can be described as a more traditional interpretation of events, certain historians have analysed the compromise to establish parliamentarianism in 1961 (judged to be the solution to the conflict surrounding Quadros' resignation and Goulart's possession of the presidency as the legitimate constitutional successor) as an outcome that succeeded in "preventing the coup attempted by Quadros' military ministers". In other words, "the military were isolated in their attempt to break institutional norms" and democracy prevailed. However, another interpretation states that the military ministers, rather than holding onto power, only intended to prevent Goulart's succession. Due to the opposition to their plan, which created a division in opinion in both civilian and military circles, they had to settle for parliamentarianism, "the only coup possible in that scenario". Yet, this settlement can be considered a partial triumph, as they managed to "disfigure the constitution in order to empty the power that by right belonged to Goulart". Therefore, the victory of the return to full presidential powers in the 1963 referendum, signified the defeat of the conservative opposition's semi-coup of 1961. See WEGNER, Felipe Henrique. *Op. cit.* p.86-87.

mission to evaluate the results of the 1962 legislative elections, as well as to prescribe ways to accelerate U.S. development programmes<sup>226</sup>. What is of importance is the subsequent report along with the recommendations made in it.

The report is of great significance when examining the concept of, what in this thesis is referred to as, 'pressure' because the strategy it encouraged Washington to follow was one of "destabilisation"<sup>227</sup>. While pressure and destabilisation might seem like different ideas, they are included here together for two reasons. Firstly, the U.S. hoped that by refusing to aid Brazil in its desperate bid to find a way out of its financial crisis, Goulart would implement the IMF stabilisation plan which the Kennedy government was insisting on. Secondly, if Goulart refused to adopt these "adequate remedial measures"<sup>228</sup>, then the report recommended that the United States "carry out the hard-line"<sup>229</sup>. What the committee meant by hard-line was denying "emergency balance of payments assistance, debt postponement, or any new financing" until Goulart agreed to the IMF programme<sup>230</sup>.

Of great importance here is the judgement behind the interdepartmental team's decision to advise this course of action. As stated in their report "the developing financial crisis will soon begin to hurt seriously the general population and thus threaten the stability of the Goulart administration"<sup>231</sup>. The document then goes on to declare what the consequence of this instability would be: "The likely result would be the final commitment of Goulart to the radical left, an intensification of anti-American sentiment, and the polarisation of domestic political forces. In these circumstances, a military takeover might become the only alternative to a Cuba-type political evolution under Goulart or some successor"<sup>232</sup>. A CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate from February 1963 also predicted Goulart to follow "a radical

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<sup>226</sup> FICO, Carlos: *O Grande Irmão - Da Operação Brother Sam aos Anos de Chumbo - O Governo dos Estados Unidos e a Ditadura Militar*, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Civilização Brasileira. 2008. p. 78 and LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.124

<sup>227</sup> Gordon to SecState, 2 Nov 1962, NSF Co-K in LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.126

<sup>228</sup> Report to the President by The Interdepartmental Survey Group on Brazil (Draper Report), 3 Nov 1963. Brown Digital Repository. p. 16. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:672153/> [accessed 5 Mar 2020]

<sup>229</sup> *Idem* p. 21

<sup>230</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.126

<sup>231</sup> Report to the President by The Interdepartmental Survey Group on Brazil (Draper Report), 3 Nov 1963. Brown Digital Repository. p.20 and LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.126.

<sup>232</sup> Report to the President by The Interdepartmental Survey Group on Brazil (Draper Report), 3 Nov 1963. Brown Digital Repository. p.20



leftist ultranationalist policy" that would "risk provoking a military-conservative coup"<sup>233</sup>, if Brazil did not receive necessary financial assistance.

Both sources clearly illustrate that, even though predictions, the United States were well aware of the possible repercussions of their implementation of the 'hard-line'. The reasons, therefore, for adopting this strategy can become questionable. If the Draper Report and the CIA intelligence estimate forecasted a situation that, in theory, Washington wished to avoid (that was, Goulart relying on radical ultranationalist support to back his policies on reform and development), why choose to pursue such a policy? Regime change was not the overall aim back in 1962, but was it just being debated<sup>234</sup>? One thing is to converse another is to take action and promote a coup d'état. Nevertheless, could the deferral of the takeover and the initial caution to encourage it come down to serious doubts about its success?

In her book *Requiem for Revolution The United States and Brazil, 1961-1969*, Ruth Leacock points out that, when it came to the Draper Report and its recommendations, ambassador Gordon "was not concerned about keeping Goulart in office; he was worried that he could not easily be ousted"<sup>235</sup>. Other documentation from late 1962 to early 1963 tends to confirm Washington's doubts about regime change were not so much about it happening but, rather, with it being successful. A memorandum for a meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council from December 1962 outlining U.S. short term policy toward Brazil, rejects collaboration with "Brazilian elements hostile to Goulart with a view to bringing about his overthrow", because "there is not sufficient evidence of either (a) effective military or civilian opposition leadership in Brazil in a position to act promptly; (b) an organised opposition movement with a present capacity and will to overthrow the Goulart government"<sup>236</sup>. In another document from March 1963, Gordon advised to give aid on a "short-leash basis" to a "technically satisfactory" Brazilian economic programme for one sole reason:

*Our present view is that, in the absence of overtly unconstitutional action by Goulart himself there does not now exist in Brazil adequate leadership, organisation or strength to carry out a coup successfully... the mere deterioration of confidence as a result of non-support for the*

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<sup>233</sup> Special National Intelligence Estimate, *The Character of the Goulart Regime In Brazil*. 27 Feb 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:665857/> [accessed 5 Apr 2018]

<sup>234</sup> Transcript of Meeting JFK, Gordon and Goodwin 30 Jul 1962. See page 40.

<sup>235</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.127

<sup>236</sup> NSC, Memorandum, *U.S. Short-Term policy Toward Brazil*, 11 Dec 1962. National Security Archive.

*economic program by the U.S., however, cannot be relied upon to lead to a successful centre-right action against Goulart.*<sup>237</sup>

Whatever the conclusions we can draw from the Draper Commission's report, one fact that can be verified is the shift in the Kennedy government's policy when dealing with Goulart. The 'hard-line' with all its possible consequences, was to be Washington's new strategy to force Goulart's compliance. If he adhered to U.S. demands and fell in line, then the United States were willing to "avoid ostentatious favouritism toward those elements in Brazil friendly to us but hostile to President Goulart"<sup>238</sup>, as well as to financially assist the Brazilian leader so as to stave off social unrest. However, U.S. officials were not hopeful of his subordination<sup>239</sup> so, for this reason, the application of the hard-line is of certain importance.

To understand the significance of the recommendations in the Draper report, two concepts must be taken into account. The first one is that by employing the hard-line all the calculations made about Goulart's slide to the left were only informed predictions. No U.S. official nor department were capable of knowing exactly how the future would unfold. Secondly, in conjunction with the hard-line, different tactics and initiatives were set in motion to ensure that the option of establishing an alternative regime would be viable. Good examples of some of these initiatives will be examined in the following chapters, they vary from indoctrination and infiltration, to what could be described as orientation of conservative forces. In this sense, the appointment of General Vernon A. Walters as the new U.S. military attaché is incredibly significant. It would be incorrect to say that an active conspiracy was underway at the beginning of 1963, but it could be said that Washington's efforts to consolidate one, keeping all other options on the table, were a reality.

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<sup>237</sup> Department of State, Memorandum to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, *Political Considerations Affecting U.S. Assistance to Brazil*, 7 Mar 1963. National Security Archive. ALSO see: Telegram from Rio de Janeiro to Secretary of State, *Anti-regime Plotting Military*. 23 May 1963 . Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:671214/> [accessed 26 Sep 2019] Current Intelligence Memorandum, *Plotting against Goulart*. 8 Mar 1963. Brown Digital Repository. [accessed 7 Jul 2020]. Department of State Office of the Historian: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, Brazil*, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor Fain III (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996) Document 235. These sources demonstrate U.S. unease over "premature coups". The possible coup plotters not having enough support for their movement, would evidently fail and cause Goulart's position to be strengthened.

<sup>238</sup> NSC, Memorandum, *U.S. Short-Term policy Toward Brazil*, 11 Dec 1962. National Security Archive.

<sup>239</sup> Report to the President by The Interdepartmental Survey Group on Brazil (Draper Report), 3 Nov 1963. Brown Digital Repository. p.36

## **Robert Kennedy's Failed Trip to Brazil and The Application of The Policy of *Islands of Sanity***

As indicated in the previous section, the suggestions given in the Draper Commission's report meant that the Kennedy administration's approach was going to be much more rigorous when it came to Brazil. This next section will examine Robert Kennedy's trip to Brazil in order to meet with João Goulart, and how it ultimately failed. Due to the nature of the visit, as well as Robert Kennedy being the U.S. president's brother, it was hoped that Goulart would finally succumb to pressure and accept the United State's demands. However, a major factor to the failure of the tactic to achieve the required result was the Attorney General's attitude, resulting in Washington deciding to pursue the policy of *Islands of Sanity*<sup>240</sup>.

The decision to send Robert Kennedy to Brazil was taken in an Executive Committee National Security Council meeting on the 11th of December 1962. Previous to this meeting, Gordon sent an alarming telegram to Washington warning that if "appointments [of] extreme nationalist leftists in key position", and if the "inter-American system continues to be eroded, we think Brazil will be well on [the] road down which Cuba went". He then went on to recommend that an "especially authoritative presidential emissary" be sent "to confront Goulart"<sup>241</sup>. As the ambassador saw it, this tactic would produce the desired effect for the United States by way of three possible scenarios:

*"(A) catch Goulart at [a] time of maximum political vulnerability and hence political malleability , (B) tend to rally elements in Brazil disturbed at [the] recent trend of events to put pressure on Goulart for reasonable performance in cooperation with US, and (C) in [the] event he decided to denounce US encourage such forces to attempt to depose him"*<sup>242</sup>.

During the NSC meeting the State Department paper *US Short-term policy toward Brazil* was debated, and its suggestions were approved. In short, the Executive Committee concluded that the best course of action at that moment was "to seek to change the political and economic orientation of Goulart and his government" because, as previously mentioned, the option of overthrowing Goulart was not feasible at that moment as there was not sufficient

<sup>240</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.135 and p.279

<sup>241</sup> Telegram from Rio de Janeiro to Secretary of State, *Present Thoughts on Strategy*, 20 Nov 1962. Brown Digital Repository. p.2 <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:683572/> [accessed 24 Sep 2019]

<sup>242</sup> Idem p.2-3

civilian or military opposition "in a position to act promptly"<sup>243</sup>. Therefore, and due to it being the only approach "with a reasonable chance of success", a special representative of president Kennedy would be sent to Brazil. The visit was to be the first part of a strategy of "conversion"<sup>244</sup>, as well as an opportunity to confront Goulart on internal and external policies not to the liking of the Kennedy administration. It would set the tone for "more harmonious U.S.-Brazil relations"<sup>245</sup>.

On the 17th of December 1962 Robert Kennedy arrived in Brasília in what was to be a flying visit, with the intention of holding a discussion, which would "reflect the views of president Kennedy"<sup>246</sup>. Accompanied by ambassador Gordon, the Attorney General spoke with Goulart for three hours to try to press home U.S. concerns, however, owing to the true nature of the trip it was never likely to succeed. Before Robert Kennedy had even departed, the Brazilian ambassador in Washington, Roberto Campos, warned State Department officials against the meeting as the abrupt character of it "might be construed as an ultimatum that could embitter Goulart" causing the Brazilian president to take further action "in order to maintain his public image of independence"<sup>247</sup>. With this in mind, Robert Kennedy's attitude during the meeting did little to help, and Goulart along with other Brazilian officials were left furious<sup>248</sup>.

The discussion started with the Attorney General sternly expressing President Kennedy's unease over "recent trends" in the U.S.-Brazilian relationship, the lack of Brazilian "active participation or leadership" in the Alliance for Progress, "communist or extreme left-wing nationalist infiltration" in the government and military along with "business abuses"<sup>249</sup>. For over an hour Goulart responded to each and every one of the U.S. president's concerns mentioning, among other things, that there was "no Brazilian predisposition against American policies" when it came to Cuba or the region, in relation to communist subversion "the U.S. Government gets its information mainly from" the Brazilian press and groups "that are linked with American business interests", that the Alliance for Progress "is more

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<sup>243</sup> NSC, Memorandum, *U.S. Short-Term policy Toward Brazil*, 11 Dec 1962. National Security Archive.

<sup>244</sup> If Goulart reacted favourably to the visit, the U.S. would look to build on it. In the NSC Memorandum, *U.S. Short-Term policy Toward Brazil* there is a list of eight points detailing exactly how.

<sup>245</sup> NSC, Memorandum, *U.S. Short-Term policy Toward Brazil*, 11 Dec 1962. National Security Archive

<sup>246</sup> Idem

<sup>247</sup> Roberto Campos interview in PARKER, Phyllis R. *Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979. p.30-31.

<sup>248</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.138

<sup>249</sup> U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Airgram A-710, *Minutes of Conversation between Brazilian President Joao Goulart and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Brasilia, 17 Dec 1962*, 19 Dec 1962. National Security Archive. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%204%20Airgram%20from%20Rio%20de%20Janeiro%20December%2019%201962.pdf> [accessed 3 Jul 2020]

concerned with social symptoms than with reforms in the social structure" or economic development, and that "there were political difficulties" to consider when it came to finding a solution to the ITT case<sup>250</sup>.

Finally, in reference to the tensions between the two governments and Washington's perception of events in Brazil, Goulart warned president Kennedy against confusing "the Brazilian peoples struggle against domestic economic groups with antagonism to the United States". He continued that these Brazilian elites "try to identify themselves always with the United States" with the intention of "lining up United States opinion against popular desires". The Brazilian president concluded, "unfortunately, some of the main defenders of American policy in Brazil are the same people and groups who fight me and fight the popular forces in Brazil"<sup>251</sup>.

It was at this point, when Goulart was finishing his intervention, that Robert Kennedy passed a note to ambassador Gordon which read "we seem to be getting nowhere". The Attorney General was not interested in what the Brazilian president had to say, he was, more than anything, frustrated that João Goulart refused to understand what the real message was. By way of Robert Kennedy's express visit, president Kennedy wanted to make very clear to his counterpart that U.S. assistance was dependent on the removal of those individuals "who are systematically opposed to" the United States. The Brazilian government could not expect cooperation if "high officials in Brazil are either attacking the United States constantly or being silent in the face of such attacks"<sup>252</sup>. In other words, aid was dependent on Brazilian personnel in key posts being pro-American<sup>253</sup> in order to uphold U.S. hegemony.

According to the different sources available, the meeting between Robert Kennedy and Goulart seemed to finish cordially enough. Nonetheless, the friendly end to the meet was probably more of a formality. The damage was done and the tactic of confronting the Brazilian president would not pay off. Goulart reacted "sharply" to the accusations of officials in his administration being "systematically hostile to the United States", implicitly asking the Attorney General to name names as well as claiming that Robert Kennedy's views

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<sup>250</sup> Idem p.3-9 and LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.137

<sup>251</sup> U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Airgram A-710, *Minutes of Conversation between Brazilian President Joao Goulart and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Brasilia, 17 Dec 1962, 19 Dec 1962.* National Security Archive. p.4 and p.9

<sup>252</sup> Idem p.10-13

<sup>253</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.137

"were greatly exaggerated"<sup>254</sup>. From Goulart's point of view, the meeting with the Attorney General was seen as an ultimatum, leaving him feeling as if "he had been told that he had no capacity for judging the men surrounding him"<sup>255</sup>. President Kennedy's message was also an offence to Goulart's personal pride because, as well as Washington directly trying to intervene in the process of naming government officials, he really had no other option but to be obedient and accept it all<sup>256</sup>.

In the opinion of the United States the visit also failed to produce the desired results. In a meeting with President Kennedy in March 1963, both Robert Kennedy along with Gordon vented their frustration at Goulart for having not done enough<sup>257</sup> on political performance since the Attorney General's trip. Undesirable individuals ("ultra-radical anti-Americans" and left-wing elements simply classed as communists) were still in positions of prominence because appropriate action had not been taken; "he can't have it both ways, [he] can't have the communists and put them in important positions and make speeches criticising the United States and at the same time get 225-[2]50 million dollars from the United States"<sup>258</sup>.

Then again, the strategy of sending Robert Kennedy was never expected to be successful. Even though Gordon had written the recommendation for the Attorney General to be sent as an emissary, "he had never been very confident that much could be accomplished by it"<sup>259</sup>. In addition, it seemed that the visit was a last ditch attempt before shifting "rapidly and effectively to Alternative B - collaboration with friendly domestic elements, including the great majority of the military officer corps, to unseat President Goulart"<sup>260</sup>. As Ruth Leacock explains in her book, during the Executive Committee NSC meeting it was decided that, if Goulart's reaction to the emissary was not favourable, then the next step would be

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<sup>254</sup> U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Airgram A-710, *Minutes of Conversation between Brazilian President Joao Goulart and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Brasilia, 17 Dec 1962, 19 Dec 1962*. National Security Archive. p.13-17

<sup>255</sup> PARKER, Phyllis R. *Op. cit.* p.31

<sup>256</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.138

<sup>257</sup> Excerpts from John F. Kennedy's conversation regarding Brazil with U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon 8 Mar 1963 (Meeting 77.1, President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston) National Security Archive. p.7 In reference to some of Goulart's new government officials Robert Kennedy said "now they got some people on the other side [pro-United States], too, and I think that's encouraging", but he still had not gone far enough to satisfy U.S. demands.

<sup>258</sup> *Idem*

<sup>259</sup> DULLES, John W. F. *Op. cit.* p.195 ALSO in Telegram from Rio de Janeiro to Secretary of State, *Present Thoughts on Strategy*, 20 Nov 1962. Brown Digital Repository. Gordon stated that the Attorney General was "uniquely qualified" for the role as an "especially authoritative presidential emissary".

<sup>260</sup> NSC Memorandum, *U.S. Short-Term policy Toward Brazil*, 11 Dec 1962. National Security Archive. p.5

destabilisation through *Islands of Sanity*<sup>261</sup>. With all this information in mind, a question that must be asked is why was an emissary sent? Could it be that the U.S. government, knowing that Robert Kennedy's visit would result in failure, aimed to have an excuse to increase its level of hostility toward President Goulart?

Officially, the strategy of *Islands of Sanity* had the ultimate objective of avoiding providing any "kind of assistance that benefitted the federal government directly". It was seen as a way of keeping "Alliance for Progress projects going" by supporting "states which were headed by good governors" who the United States believed "strengthened democracy"<sup>262</sup>. From Washington's point of view, João Goulart had declined not to step in line after receiving president Kennedy's message, but the U.S. did not wish to collectively punish all of Brazil. The reality was, however, that *Islands of Sanity* was in fact a CIA tactic to destabilise and weaken the Goulart administration.

In what amounted to a completely "unreasonable act of interference", Washington redirected funds to those state governors who opposed Goulart. The strategy totally disregarded and undermined the authority of the federal government by financing high impact projects, which enhanced the image of the United States as well as of those pro-U.S. state governors<sup>263</sup>. This political use of assistance would specifically favour politicians who were deeply involved in different plots against the Goulart government. Governor Carlos Lacerda of Guanabara along with Governor Adhemar de Barros of São Paulo, who both played significant roles in the conspiracy against Goulart as well as in his overthrow, were both "highly favoured by the United States". According to one source, Gordon promised Lacerda "the lion's share of Alliance for Progress funds so that he could construct demonstration projects", which would help him to obtain the presidency of Brazil<sup>264</sup>. Evidently, as well as assuring that anti-Goulart opposition elements received the appropriate encouragement to conspire and make

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<sup>261</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* "The minutes of this NSC-Executive Committee meeting have not been declassified. Some idea of the proceedings can be reached by reading the State Department memorandums submitted to the Committee and by analysing subsequent administration actions". p.279

<sup>262</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.65 also RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio p.171-172 explains that the U.S. had decided by 1962 that it was necessary to direct a "substantial part" of Alliance funds toward "moderate" groups and institutions in order to "strengthen" them. This new directive meant that Washington could "bypass politically unreliable governments", using aid to target "institutions or centres of power within a country more in tune with the programme philosophy". In other words, aid was dependent on ideological affinity to U.S. interests.

<sup>263</sup> FICO, Carlos. *Op. cit.* p.78

<sup>264</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.68

arrangements for a coup, the tactic of *Islands of Sanity* also intended to make clear that loyalty to the U.S. would be rewarded with aid.

This whole section is a good validation of how miscalculated and poorly thought out U.S. strategies contributed toward creating a situation where a military coup was perceived to be an adequate solution. The sending of a presidential emissary on such short notice to effectively confront João Goulart on his selection of government officials was never going to be received positively by the Brazilians. However, the fact that so much rested on the Attorney General's visit may confirm what an error in judgement it was. The Kennedy administration believed that a three hour meeting would be enough to force Goulart to "instantly face up to his errors and promptly turn things around"<sup>265</sup>.

Conversely, if Goulart refused to obey, which he did, collaboration with elements hostile to him was seen as the next step. The implementation of *Islands of Sanity* tends to confirm that after the failure of Robert Kennedy's trip, the United States began to put in motion plans that would permit the possible removal of the Brazilian president if it was to be desired. The disastrous outcome of the visit by Brazilian Finance Minister San Tiago Dantas to Washington attests to this. Dantas' mission was to secure support for the Brazilian economic stabilisation and development plan<sup>266</sup>, which ambassador Gordon described as containing "essential ingredients of an effective programme"<sup>267</sup>. However, strict terms were to be enforced as prerequisites to any deal on aid, and the Kennedy administration unofficially linked any immediate financial assistance to an agreement on the purchase of AMFORP<sup>268</sup>.

The trip was also marred by Gordon's accusations of communist infiltration of the Brazilian government and other sectors of national life<sup>269</sup>, made before a subcommittee of the House of

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<sup>265</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.139

<sup>266</sup> The Three Year Plan for economical stabilisation and development was drafted by Celso Furtado. See MIRANDA, José Carlos da Rocha. *Plano Trienal de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social*. In FGC CPDOC. <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/plano-trienal-de-desenvolvimento-economico-e-social> [accessed 19 Feb 2018]

<sup>267</sup> Department of State, Memorandum to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, *Political Considerations Affecting U.S. Assistance to Brazil*, 7 Mar 1963. National Security Archive. p.2

<sup>268</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.144-45

<sup>269</sup> It is of interest to mention here that accusations of communist infiltration were one of the key "mottos of propaganda" employed by anti-Goulart, conservative elements before the coup took place. These groups claimed that there was "communist presence... in several sectors of national life, in social organisations and especially in the state apparatus". The conservative propaganda alleged communists to be in control of the UNE (*União Nacional dos Estudantes*), and certain trade unions, such as the CGT. It also professed that communists had infiltrated different governmental ministries, such as the ministry of education, the armed forces and national institutions like *Petrobras* and the post office. MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.262-63



Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, being leaked publicly. As could be expected, U.S. public and congressional opinion was incredibly unfavourable to helping Brazil economically, and Dantas spent most of his time in Washington denying the validity of Gordon's declarations. However, in the end Dantas' efforts to push ahead with the Three Year Plan would ultimately meet with failure due to the uproar in Brazil (for reasons already explained) which followed the reaching of an agreement on the purchase of AMFORP. The Brazilian Finance Minister along with Goulart were virulently attacked from both the left and right of the political spectrum leaving the Brazilian president with little option but to deny his knowledge of the deal<sup>270</sup>.

On a different note, what the Brazilian Finance Minister's visit ultimately identifies is the aforementioned shift in U.S. policy toward Brazil after Robert Kennedy's meeting with Goulart. Political and economical stability along with an improved Brazilian-U.S. relationship rested on the prospect of Dantas reaching a satisfactory agreement with his counterparts. Before the trip, the embassy in Rio de Janeiro had stated that the Goulart government was pursuing the stabilisation and development programme "with apparent firmness of purpose unmatched in Brazil in recent years", as well as having "taken steps to eliminate certain specific areas of friction between Brazil and the U.S."

In many ways, and even though this was unknown at the time, the sending of Dantas to strike a deal on the Three Year Plan can be seen as Goulart's last sincere attempt at cooperation with the United States. The fact the Kennedy administration looked to impose such harsh principles might have the appearance of an all or nothing play forcing Goulart to play by their rules. In reality, even before Dantas had arrived in Washington, the United States had "set forth" its "basic general approach" towards Brazil, irrespective of what had to be negotiated. "Efforts should be made to strengthen and encourage democratic anti-government forces outside the government", and if it was not possible to impede a nationalist swing to the left by Goulart, the U.S. was to "prepare the most promising possible environment for his replacement by a more desirable regime". It seems the only reason why Gordon (the author of the document) recommended "to seek to change the political and economic orientation of

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During his intervention before the subcommittee, Gordon made claims and allegations based on anti-Goulart opposition propaganda. In chapter five Ambassador Gordon's ties to members of the conservative elite will be explored.

<sup>270</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.145-48

Goulart and his government" was because there was still not sufficient support "to carry out such a coup successfully"<sup>271</sup>.



Brazilian Finance Minister San Tiago Dantas (middle) with President John F. Kennedy and Ambassador of Brazil, Roberto de Oliveira Campos (right). Source: Folha de São Paulo, As Horas de Golpe (<https://aovivo.folha.uol.com.br/2014/03/30/3145-5-aovivo.shtml#page=7>).

## **SUDENE and Development in the Brazilian Northeast**

In terms of development and modernisation, the Brazilian North-east was an area of major concern for both the Kennedy<sup>272</sup> and Goulart governments. Of significant size as well as

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<sup>271</sup> Department of State, Memorandum to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, *Political Considerations Affecting U.S. Assistance to Brazil*, 7 Mar 1963. National Security Archive. p.1-9

<sup>272</sup> RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.135-36 According to the author concern for the North-east was sparked by the *New York Times* South American correspondent, Tad Szulc, who wrote two articles on the region towards the end of 1960. He highlighted the adversity as well as inequality which the local population faced, and he warned of the threat posed by the "pro-Castro" *Ligas Camponesas* led by Francisco Julião. Quite frankly he wrote that is something was not done soon, "the North-east would turn communist". Reaction to his articles was such, that CBS and ABC even sent news crews to the region. LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.14 stated

population, the North-east was also incredibly impoverished suffering from chronic problems such as food and water shortages along with a high infant mortality rate<sup>273</sup>. For these reasons, it was perceived to be a highly volatile area which could explode into violent social unrest at any given moment. The need, therefore, to implement reform was of utmost importance. Nonetheless, an ideological dispute, between the two administrations, on the causes meant that they would try to pursue contrary plans of action. In this scenario, Washington would once again directly interfere, in what would amount to pressure tactics, in order to attain its objectives.

While both the United States and Brazil agreed on the symptoms that plagued the North-east, the fundamental disagreement between the two governments stemmed from opposing views on their origin in addition to how to cure them. That said, in 1961 the initial contacts between the *Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste*<sup>274</sup> (SUDENE) and the U.S. were fruitful. After visiting the region, the McGovern-Schlesinger mission concluded that the United States needed to "place emphasis on development in the region", and to avoid "the typical IMF stabilising policies"<sup>275</sup>.

In addition to recommending initiatives which would promote industrialisation along with improvements in health and education, the McGovern-Schlesinger mission heavily advocated agrarian reform for two reasons. Firstly, "the current land tenure system would imprison a large part of the population, preventing their effective participation in the economic and political life of the nation". Secondly, because the situation was starting to change with "the Francisco Julião's *Ligas Camponesas* mobilising and inciting the peasants to protest for their rights". The U.S. needed to act to ensure that "demagogues or communist parties" did not lead the cause. In the opinion of the mission, "the task of working in the Northeast would be facilitated because the Brazilian government already had an agency in the region, which shared many of the *Alliance's* ideas"<sup>276</sup>.

In 1959 SUDENE was created with the intention of effecting a policy for development in the region. Due to the industrialisation and advances of the Centre-south of Brazil, that is São

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that "Kennedy, winding up his presidential campaign, noted the articles and accepted them as concrete new evidence of Cuban subversive activity in the hemisphere".

<sup>273</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.170

<sup>274</sup> Superintendency of Northeast Development

<sup>275</sup> Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy. Kennedy Library. Schlesinger Papers. Washington, March 10. 1961. FRUS. Volume XII. Documento 07 Quoted in RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. Cit.* p.137

<sup>276</sup> *Idem* p.138

Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, interregional differences had been exacerbated. SUDENE's goal, therefore, was to "promote planning for industrial expansion toward the Northeast"<sup>277</sup>. It was to be a long-term project which was meant to improve infrastructure enabling the integration of the North-east into the national economy. One thing that SUDENE director Celso Furtado<sup>278</sup> wanted to avoid were short-term aid relief drives as well as "expensive show projects"<sup>279</sup>. Moreover, as a promoter of development along nationalist lines, Furtado aimed to avoid the sort of modernisation which would only serve to maintain Brazilian dependence on the United States<sup>280</sup>.

In 1961, Furtado would make a successful trip to Washington, where he would expose SUDENE plans as well as those parts that would require the United States assistance. After a meeting in the White House, President Kenney "guaranteed" that he would send another mission to "analyse the needs of the area and propose an aid programme to be evaluated" by his administration<sup>281</sup>. Nonetheless, this initial goodwill and spirit of cooperation quickly disappeared once Goulart had been sworn in as president. The rise in populism for leftwing movements along with nationalist-reformist politics caused alarm with "reports to Washington becoming increasingly threatening". The discussions of economic development started to diminish, with focus turning to a short-term programme based on U.S. national security goals along with militant anti-communism, thus overriding the rhetoric of developmental action defended by the *Alliance*<sup>282</sup>.

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<sup>277</sup> MASCARENHAS, Lícia and NETO, Sydenham Lourenço. *Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (SUDENE)*. In FGV CPDOC. <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/superintendencia-do-desenvolvimento-do-nordeste-sudene> [accessed 22 Feb 2018]

<sup>278</sup> Celso Monteiro Furtado is considered to be "one of the most important economists in the world", and "a national reference in the creation of modern Brazil". He was also a Nobel candidate, who held leading positions in CEPAL and UN missions to Africa, Asia and South America. See ARIAS, Juan. Celso Furtado, economista, una referencia en la creación de un Brasil moderno. *El País*. 22 Nov 2004. [https://elpais.com/diario/2004/11/22/agenda/1101078009\\_850215.html](https://elpais.com/diario/2004/11/22/agenda/1101078009_850215.html) [accessed 28 Apr 2021]

<sup>279</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.16 and RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.170.

<sup>280</sup> A decade later Furtado criticised the *Alliance for Progress*. He claimed that the *Alliance* worked toward creating a form of world organisation which, according to U.S. strategic thinking, would maintain the "American way of life" and guarantee the United States growing economic interests across the globe. See FURTADO, C. *A Hegemonia dos Estados Unidos e o Subdesenvolvimento da América Latina*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1972

<sup>281</sup> RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.142

<sup>282</sup> ROETT, R. *The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972 p.71-73 and RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.143



John F. Kennedy meeting Celso Furtado on the 14th of July 1961.  
 Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum  
 (<https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKWHP/1961/Month%2007/Da%2014/JFKWHP-1961-07-14-A>)

Within a relatively short amount of time, the dominant belief among many U.S. officials was that the North-east was "an international security problem" where revolution could break out at any moment. This caused the Kennedy administration to have a very different opinion of what needed to be achieved in the region. Apparent proof of communist agitators looking to spark an uprising was the rise of the *Ligas Camponesas*<sup>283</sup> and the popularity of their pro-Castro leader Francisco Julião. Consequently, the primordial dilemma was to combat the growing support for leftist tendencies among what was becoming a more organised and politicised rural poor. The need for reform and to eradicate the woes and hardships which affected the population, were replaced by the fight against communist subversion; projects and aid were to be subordinated to the needs of "purely economic development goals"<sup>284</sup>.

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<sup>283</sup> Peasant Leagues

<sup>284</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.128 and in RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.18-19 as the author explains U.S. foreign aid policy had different approaches, or objectives, built into its technical and financial assistance programmes. "First, the economic approach, the idea that aid would lead to economic development and this to the political successes desired by the USA... Second, the national security approach or what became known as the "cold war doctrine". In this conception, aid should be used not for economic and subsequent political results, but as a national security instrument applied in a well-defined way. Finally, the third, and the least influential of these approaches was the one that made explicit the growth and strengthening of liberal and democratic political systems in the third world through foreign aid". This last approach was visible "during the initial period of the Alliance, and was influential in its design".

With this in mind, Kennedy personally pushed for immediate impact projects in a bid to undermine "the appeal of agrarian radicals". A key concept behind these quick visible schemes was to convince locals that modernisation was only possible with U.S. involvement. They were to be carried out, without the approval of SUDENE, in states and municipalities controlled by anti-Goulart politicians who "represented traditional oligarchic interests". A good example of this was in 1962 when \$33million was given toward a food and water project, which would build public fountains<sup>285</sup> stamped with the *Alliance for Progress*. Another, was the construction of schools and hospitals which remained empty due to the lack of qualified doctors or teachers<sup>286</sup>.

The general attitude of the U.S. toward SUDENE and development in the North-east would lead to tensions. In the eyes of many of the Brazilians involved, the United States was to aid SUDENE in carrying out its "master plan". For some time Brazilian technicians had been studying the region and, as a result, they had formulated a strategy which would integrate its development into a wider national programme<sup>287</sup>. However, they perceived U.S. officials to be "ignoring SUDENE and working independently", perhaps with the intention of "formulating a completely separate plan of their own"<sup>288</sup>.

This opinion of what the United States hoped to do in the North-east was not wrongly informed. Essentially, the U.S. aimed to dictate which projects were to be carried out, and what type of development was to take place. When SUDENE leaders disagreed with or refused to sanction U.S. proposals, they found mechanisms to "circumvent assistance to a

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<sup>285</sup> "The idea was to drown the North East with *Alliance for Progress* water fountains" in order to impact public opinion. VERAS, Edimilson Correia. *A SUDENE e o Desenvolvimento Agrícola do Nordeste no Período 1960-1980*. 1993. Tese (Doutorado em Economia) - Instituto de Economia da UNICAMP, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Campinas. p.169

<sup>286</sup> In RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.170-71 and LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.70-71

<sup>287</sup> Airgram from American Consul Recife to Department of State. *The Alliance for Progress: A SUDENE View*. 23 Nov 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:683531/> [accessed 12 Apr 2021] p.2 and FURTADO, Celso. *A Fantasia Desfeita*. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Paz e Terra, 1989. p.116 Furtado saw the Northeast as a Brazilian economic problem, where he expected U.S. money to be fully invested in the projects of the SUDENE 'Master Plan', strengthening the institution's regional position. Quoted in RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.183

<sup>288</sup> Idem p.182 explains that the USAID mission in Recife decided it should have "a greater degree of freedom" than that which was initially agreed. This created "a relationship problem with SUDENE", which was trying to "maintain control of the USAID operational activities in the Northeast". However, U.S. authorities believed they could enter into negotiations with other Brazilian governmental entities when it was convenient or, if that was not the case, it could use SUDENE.

particular state"<sup>289</sup> against the will of the Brazilian authorities<sup>290</sup>. According to an air gram from U.S. officials stationed in Recife to the Department of State, "USAID/NE [had] just completed a study which envisage[d] setting up state level community development programmes", yet it was argued that SUDENE could not be used as a channel to implement these programmes as it was "opposed to United States Government agencies dealing directly with the states". The authors went on to state that:

*"SUDENE would either disapprove of our participation in such an activity, or for its own political purposes might choose to go along with the project. In the latter case it is also certain that SUDENE would act in such a way as to compromise the desired effect of the programme"*<sup>291</sup>.

In truth, Washington's plan for the North-east was based solely on its interests and security considerations. Projects were primarily focused on fighting what it perceived to be a communist threat to the region, in addition to generating electoral support for U.S. friendly politicians<sup>292</sup>. There was never any real desire to encourage long-term development as that would have required short-term instability and conflict. The United States' role was really about avoiding change. "American involvement sought first to preserve the basic structure of the status quo, and only incidentally to improve conditions in the region in ways that would not weaken the established order"<sup>293</sup>.

That said, the decision made to sabotage SUDENE's modernisation plan was not exclusively established on the necessity to avoid radicalised peasants throwing the North-east into violent revolution. In SUDENE, the U.S. was once again confronted by a Brazilian initiative to promote independent development. While the superintendency tried to remain apolitical, and its founding had the support of a broad political alliance, its strategy for industrialisation was

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<sup>289</sup> Memorandum for Mr. Ralph A. Dungan. *AID Program and U.S. Policy in the State of Pernambuco, Brazil*. 8 Feb 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:669036/> [accessed 13 Apr 2021] p.3

<sup>290</sup> RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.150 USAID country teams received great authority and freedom for program planning and execution. In this regard, they could actually reject or accept proposals of the host country, as well as favourably recommend proposals which were considered to be sound in Washington.

<sup>291</sup> Airgram from American Consul Recife to the Department of State. *Community Development Program for Northeast Brazil* 26 Mar 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:353908/> [accessed 13 Apr 2021]

<sup>292</sup> RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.183

<sup>293</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p. 128

of a national reformist nature. Of further concern was the lack of trust in director Furtado, who was labelled a "Marxist" or possible communist with close ties to the radical left<sup>294</sup>.

From the beginning U.S. officials in Brazil expressed their misgivings on the superintendency's ability to act. They "doubt[ed] that President Goulart ha[d] a well thought out reform plan", claiming he was "championing development planning in the short run (a) to impress President Kennedy and (b) to build his image for [the plebiscite] January 6"<sup>295</sup>. A CIA special report simply alleged that Goulart was making "demagogic appeals" to "give the impression" the Federal government was doing "everything possible to institute agrarian reform"<sup>296</sup>.

Nonetheless, these accusations covered up a broader truth, and the basis for the United States' opposition to the Goulart government's North-east modernisation policy had more to do with Washington combating national-reformism in the form of SUDENE. Although it was not aligned with Communism in any way, the challenge it presented to American models on development as well as strategic U.S. interests was not lost on U.S. officials. Therefore, a vital element of the United States' policy toward development in the North-east had to do with undermining SUDENE, while promoting its own cause. In this regard, the U.S. needed to create a favourable image of those states governed by "democratic forces" or, better said, United States friendly politicians<sup>297</sup>. Specifically:

*"it [was] in the interest of the United States to encourage these states to undertake programmes designed to develop favourable images of the democratically oriented political leaders, and give them the necessary assistance to project programmes which will bridge the traditional gap between government and the people"<sup>298</sup>.*

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<sup>294</sup> Idem p. 130

<sup>295</sup> From Brasília to Rio de Janeiro. *Developments on Goulart Reform Plan*. 10 Oct 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:1097144/> [Accessed 13 Apr 2021]

<sup>296</sup> CIA Special Report. *Political, Military, and Economic Trends in Brazil*. 16 Aug 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:678977/> [accessed 13 Apr 2021]. p.2-3

<sup>297</sup> A good example of the United States using aid in the North-east to enhance the reputations of those politicians aligned with its interests, was the financial support given to Governor Cid Sampaio. The Governor of Pernambuco publicly endorsed the pro-U.S. candidate, João Cleofas, as his successor in the Pernambuco election for State Governor in 1962. Cleofas was up against left-wing nationalist Miguel Arraes, who was seen as favourite to win, and in a bid to raise Cleofas' popularity the U.S. bypassed SUDENE and approved an emergency school construction project with Sampaio. See LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op cit.* p.122 and ROETT, Riordan. *Op. cit.* p.75

<sup>298</sup> Airgram from American Consul Recife to the Department of State. *Community Development Program for Northeast Brazil* 26 Mar 1963. Brown Digital Repository.



Correctly speaking, the tactic of weakening SUDENE falls into the category of *Islands of Sanity*. The reason why the SUDENE case has been examined apart, is due to the politically independent ideals that it represented along with the goals it was meant to pursue. It is also to highlight how intent the United States were on restoring its influence as well as making its presence felt. The assault on an apolitical institute, sabotaging its long-term development programme, goes to show to what extent the Kennedy administration was willing to go to ensure U.S. interests and hegemony. From the United States' point of view, it could be said that SUDENE success would have not only given credit to Goulart, it would have demonstrated the validity of concepts contrary to those of the *Alliance for Progress* based on *Nation Building*, thus threatening U.S. influence.

Through bypassing SUDENE and weakening its authority, it seems that Washington hoped to undermine the image and position of the João Goulart government, which in turn would further its own national security interests (the fact that aid was employed to increase the popularity of pro-U.S. and anti-Goulart politicians attests to this). This was effectively achieved as SUDENE was deprived of much of its political support from the centre, driving it further to the left<sup>299</sup>. As with countless other cases, SUDENE's slide to the left, along with its reliance on leftwing factions would be blamed on Goulart: his permissiveness and/or pro-leftist tendencies were seen as the reason for SUDENE along with the whole North-east falling victim to 'communist infiltration' and agitation.

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<sup>299</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.132

## **Chapter Three: Infiltration**

In this study, when we refer to infiltration we are not just considering the entering of people (whether they be spies, military advisors, civil servants, etc.), but also of ideas and ideologies. An integral part of the U.S. policy in Brazil was indoctrination with the aim of implanting in Brazilian society American values and beliefs. This process of subverting and, to put it more crudely, brainwashing the Brazilian population was by no means a short-term policy. As a matter of fact, since the Second World War the United States had made a concerted effort to indoctrinate and convince Brazil to adopt a pro-U.S. posture<sup>300</sup>. The PSB D-33/2 and the creation of Bridgeheads discussed in chapter one, most definitely formed part of this strategy of persuasion. Nonetheless, for the scope of this thesis we will limit the examination of indoctrination as much as possible to the period in question, because we are interested in identifying those attempts at forging an immediate change with regards to what Washington perceived to be threats to its hegemony.

One concept which must be taken into account when studying indoctrination is how the propaganda was received by the target audience. Although certain sectors of the Brazilian population would have been more susceptible than others to specific messages, it is impossible to decide to what extent these endeavours at seeking the compliance of the Brazilian society as a whole were productive. As it could be expected, "not all propaganda is effective", and not all the social groups would have absorbed so passively all the anti-Goulart, pro-capitalist and pro-western doctrine<sup>301</sup>. What is of importance here, then, are the reasons as well as the objectives behind a concerted U.S. effort at seeking the compliance of the Brazilian public irrespective of the success of these. The maintenance of Brazil under United States influence and, therefore, the continuation of U.S. hegemony in the region was only possible if a significant part of Brazilians shared certain ideals.

João Goulart along with *nacional-reformista* politics clashed with these principles. As a consequence, the undermining of his administration and the discrediting of reformist policies were pivotal goals of U.S. indoctrination. With the aim of reaching the maximum number of minds possible, U.S. infiltration targeted many different areas of national life. During this

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<sup>300</sup> VALIM, Busko Alexandre. *Op. cit.* provides a detailed study of the United States drive to "persuade", or convince Brazil to adopt U.S. values during the Second World War.

<sup>301</sup> FICO, Carlos. *Op. cit.* p.80

next chapter these tactics and initiatives will be looked at in order to present a clearer picture of Washington's use of psychological warfare against the Goulart government.

## **The Infiltration of Brazilian Trade Unions**

The endeavours of the United States to subvert and, ultimately, establish the dominance of U.S. labour<sup>302</sup> practices as well as values in Brazil, had been a constant since the end of the Second World War. Over the years, the *American Federation of Labor* (AFL, which later became the AFL-CIO after its merger with the *Congress of Industrial Organizations* in 1955) along with the State Department would take it upon themselves to try and change the dynamics of the Brazilian trade union system. Furthermore, the need to combat the influence of any policy, ideology or individual not to the liking of the United States was also imperative if U.S. hegemony in the field of labour was to be secured. The failure of these two goals coupled with Goulart's reluctance to help the U.S. in attaining them, lead American labour bosses to actively seek regime change.

During the first period of the Cold War, the national trade unions of most South American countries were targeted extensively in order to assure that the United States could count on their support. In its bid to rival the influence of the *World Federation of Trade Unions* (WFTU) with its Soviet affiliated unions, the United States had to first deal a blow to the dominance of the *Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina* (CTAL). In addition to being a member of the WFTU, the Latin American confederation "was a particularly bitter pill for the AFL" to swallow due to its leftist, anti-imperialist stance<sup>303</sup>. With this in mind, the AFL set in motion its plan of penetrating and influencing the trade unions of South America.

In the case of Brazil this was no different, but certain Brazilian peculiarities would cause extra headaches for U.S. labour leaders. In these circumstances, the corporatist nature of the government controlled trade union system, set up during the *Estado Novo*, was "a nightmare" from the AFL's "liberal perspective"<sup>304</sup>. Everything, from the creation of new entities and the

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<sup>302</sup> The term 'labour' is used in keeping with the historiography on the subject, as well as being the correct translation from Portuguese. It has nothing to do with the more British connotations of the word related to the political movement and party.

<sup>303</sup> RADOSH, Ronald. *Op. cit.* p.360-63

<sup>304</sup> WELCH, Clifford Andrew. O Envolvimento dos Estados Unidos nos Sindicatos Brasileiros, 1945-1964. *Revista Perseu* n°3 (May 2009). p.190

administering of elections to the collection as well as the distribution of union tax, was controlled by the Ministry of Labour. Under this "asphyxiating government control"<sup>305</sup> the U.S. labour representatives could not forward any new initiative without the Ministry's seal of approval.

The rationale, nonetheless, for the United States push to infiltrate the Brazilian unions was none other than the fight against communism or any other ideology that threatened the United States' interests. The U.S. government was extremely hostile to leftist influence in the trade unions, and in the AFL-CIO it had a partner to help fight for its anti-communist cause. The collaboration as well as collusion between the AFL-CIO and governmental institutions of the United States has been the subject of many studies over the years, with its alliance with the CIA being especially commented on. This synergy between American Labour and U.S. government really comes down to developments as well as shifting interests on the domestic front, which for this thesis, are not necessarily of importance<sup>306</sup>. What is of interest here is the alignment of objectives between government and labour, with the official AFL-CIO policy having been described as responding "like an echo to everything that comes out of the Pentagon or CIA"<sup>307</sup>.

Throughout the 1950s, the State Department in tandem with the AFL and directors of the *Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores*<sup>308</sup> (ORIT) would work together through the *Point Four Program*<sup>309</sup>. In a bid to foster anti-communist sentiment in Brazilian trade unionism, this government-labour partnership selected prominent leaders to be sent north to receive education. Including classes on economy, statistics and the history of trade unionism in the U.S., these trips were meant to show the Brazilians the benefits of the American capitalist labour model with the hope they would "become pro-U.S.", returning to their country to promote these recently acquired ideals. By way of these newly trained individuals, American practices would be established and the presence of pro-U.S. groups<sup>310</sup>

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file:///C:/Users/Richard%20Atczak/Downloads/Internacionalismo\_trabalhista\_o\_envolvim.pdf [accessed 15 Jun 2018]

<sup>305</sup> Idem p.198

<sup>306</sup> See RADOSH, Ronald. *Op. cit.* and MORRIS, George. *Op. cit.* for detailed studies of this dubious relationship between USGOV and U.S. Labour institutions.

<sup>307</sup> MORRIS, George. *Op. cit.* p.34

<sup>308</sup> Inter American Regional Organisation of Workers

<sup>309</sup> Four Point Programme refers to Truman speech on his four point plan see ABREU, Alzira Alves de. *Ponto IV*. In FGV CPDOC: <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/ponto-iv> [accessed 27 Jul 2019]

<sup>310</sup> One such group was the *Movimento Sindical Democrático* (MSD) which was linked to ORIT in FIGUEIREDO, Argelina C. *Democracia ou reformas? Alternativas democráticas à crise política: 1961-1964*. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1993. p.95

would begin to be felt taking the fight to communists, nationalists or anyone else who refused to cooperate<sup>311</sup>.

The tactic of infiltrating Brazilian labour through the *Four Point Program* failed to produce the desired results. On the one hand, U.S. labour did not succeed in its objective of eliminating "the interventionist nature of the Ministry of Labour", with the Brazilian bureaucrats arguing that the "trade union movement would break up or fall into communist hands in the absence of the Ministry's control"<sup>312</sup>. It would be during these years and, in part, due to this fundamental disagreement on government control, that AFL directors acquired a serious mistrust as well as disliking for João Goulart. Acting as Minister of Labour and then as Vice President, Goulart heavily influenced the Ministry. While never accusing him of being a communist, the American Labour agents viewed Goulart's cooperation with communists in addition to his tolerance of them as deeply suspicious<sup>313</sup>.

For all the disagreements with the Ministry of Labour, the failure of the joint AFL, ORIT and State Department strategy to co-opt the Brazilian unions ultimately came down to the inability to instil U.S. ideals as the prevailing ones. As previously mentioned in chapter one the steady rise in popularity of national reformism was unmatched, this being no different within the unions. The United States' endeavours were never likely to come into fruition, however this would not be confirmed until 1962 when the *Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores* (CGT) was founded<sup>314</sup>.

Although the CGT was an illegal organization due to it being established without government permission, it was tolerated by the Ministry of Labour. Ironically for the United States, while "the CGT remained largely free from government control and defended demands for union autonomy and collective bargaining as points of its agenda of claims"<sup>315</sup> it was of a clearly nationalist as well as anti-imperialist disposition. The lessening of government intervention meant nothing if the dominant labour organisation opposed U.S. values and interests.

The radical readjustment of American Labour's policy in Brazil after 1962 must not only be pinned on the institution of the CGT. As a traditionally loyal adherent and supporter of U.S.

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<sup>311</sup> WELCH, Clifford Andrew. *Op. cit.* p.196-97

<sup>312</sup> *Idem* p.198

<sup>313</sup> *Idem* p.203

<sup>314</sup> *Idem* p.204

<sup>315</sup> *Idem* p.204

foreign policy, the AFL-CIO eagerly adopted the role it was to be given by Kennedy in tackling Castroism<sup>316</sup>. The Kennedy administration regarded labour as a particularly explosive sector in the underdeveloped world, and concern existed over ORIT's ability to tackle Castroist influence in this area<sup>317</sup>. In Brazil, ORIT had been criticised by leading union officials for not being "attuned to the aspirations of Brazilian labour", in addition to representing the foreign policy of the Department of State<sup>318</sup>. The constitution, therefore, of the *American Institute for Free Labor Development* (AIFLD) in 1961, was based on this perceived need to confront subversive elements contrary to U.S. interests.

From its creation, AIFLD was set to be the United States "basic instrument for penetration of Latin American organised labour movements". Its stated goals of "assisting in the development of free, democratic trade unions" along with aiding social reform programmes masked "the reality of AIFLD's varied activities" as well as the true nature of its origin. Contrary to its appearance as an independent labour operation, AIFLD was in fact a joint "Labour-Government-Business" venture with a fusion of shared interests. The AIFLD board of directors was made up of representatives of large corporations with huge financial interests in South America, such as Chairman of the board J. Peter Grace<sup>319</sup>, in addition to 62 per cent of AIFLD's income in 1962 coming from the U.S. government (by 1967 this would rise to 92 per cent)<sup>320</sup>.

However, what is most striking about AIFLD are the strong ties it maintained with the CIA. From the beginning, the labour organisation's leadership was very much in the hands of the CIA with Agee confirming AIFLD's first executive director, Serafino Romualdi, as an agent from the CIA's International Organisation Division, as well as William Doherty, the institutes first social projects director, as also coming from the CIA. Furthermore, the AIFLD training

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<sup>316</sup> RADOSH, Ronald. *Op. cit.* throughout his book the author defends the hypothesis that *American Labour* has backed U.S. government foreign policy since World War One "in hope that such support would give the working class a share of the great American pie" p.452. He stresses that "leaders of organised labour have willingly offered their support... and have aided the Department of State in its pursuit of foreign policy objectives" as a way of attaining government backing for their own initiatives p.4-7. This process could be described as an exchange, where support was swapped for power and recognition within the labour movement both domestically and internationally.

<sup>317</sup> *Idem* p.415-16

<sup>318</sup> Memorandum of conversation, *Labor Matters*, 04 Apr 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:671807/> [accessed 19 Apr 2018]

<sup>319</sup> Grace was AIFLD Chairman of the board and president of W.R. Grace and Company. He also collaborated with the CIA on other occasions. As it will be seen further ahead, he urged the CIA to fund Patrick Peyton's *Family Rosary Crusade*.

<sup>320</sup> RADOSH, Ronald. *Op. cit.* p.415-17

centres, which were to be set up all over South America, were to be "headed by salaried CIA agents" where possible, "with operational control exercised by the [CIA] stations"<sup>321</sup>.

As previously mentioned, the institute was formed with the idea of confronting *Castrismo* more effectively, and AIFLD's main objective was establishing anti-communist trade unions. For the CIA, a big part of this strategy involved being able to send money to be used in "the dirty struggles that characterise labour organising". AIFLD, as a non-profit private entity with business leaders "as front men on the board of directors" could receive and manage large sums of money without arousing suspicion<sup>322</sup>. Additionally, this "private and non-governmental image, would allow AIFLD to develop programs which, as a consequence of political and diplomatic conditions, were not able to be carried out directly by the U.S. government"<sup>323</sup>.

The AIFLD training programme was also of particular importance as the CIA was able to use it to advance its agenda in the struggle against communism or any other tendency that opposed U.S. values and corporations. First and foremost, these courses were heavily focused on ideological issues, such as training in democracy and totalitarianism, with little time being dedicated to labour problems. The curriculum was "geared to teaching students about the virtues of American corporate capitalism" producing anti-communist union leaders "ready to do the bidding of the Department of State". These recently educated unionists were then to "engage in political work meant to advance the interests of U.S. foreign policy" as well as establishing pro-U.S. labour movements where ever possible. More often than not, this 'political work' meant attacking "any opposition to U.S. economic penetration and informal control of Latin America" whether it was communist or not<sup>324</sup>.

In addition to indoctrination, the AIFLD training programme offered an opportunity for "spotting and assessment of potential agents"<sup>325</sup> with graduates being used "as a source of supply for the CIA"<sup>326</sup> in its numerous operations. These included coup d'états, and the role of AIFLD trained labour leaders participating in them has been the subject of much controversy. The overthrow of João Goulart is no different, with claims that U.S. trained union leaders played an important part in the success of the military coup. While AIFLD

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<sup>321</sup> AGEE, Philip. *Op. cit.* p.207-08

<sup>322</sup> *Idem* p. 206-07

<sup>323</sup> WELCH, Clifford Andrew. *Op. cit.* p.205

<sup>324</sup> RADOSH, Ronald. *Op. cit.* p.421-22

<sup>325</sup> AGEE, Philip. *Op. cit.* p.208

<sup>326</sup> RADOSH, Ronald. *Op. cit.* p.423

infiltration of the Brazilian trade union movement started back in 1962, it was towards the end of 1963 when São Paulo governor Adhemar de Barros informed Romualdi "of plans to mobilise military and police contingents against Goulart". In light of this information, AIFLD organised a course for a "special all Brazilian class of thirty participants" in Washington<sup>327</sup>.

Further documentation demonstrates that in April 1963 the *Instituto Cultural do Trabalho*<sup>328</sup> (ICT) was founded after "an agreement was reached between sectors of the trade union movement and AIFLD to create, in São Paulo, a training centre for union leaders"<sup>329</sup>. Whether the ICT was created in direct relation to Adhemar de Barros' revelations to Romualdi is difficult to verify. Nevertheless, a *Semi-Annual Political Review - June - December 1963* sent from the Consul in São Paulo to the Department of State, confirms that the ICT had "successfully conducted its first three-month intensive labour leadership course for 25 Brazilian labour leaders from ten states". This training course appears to be the same one referenced in Radosh's book. Another curious fact is that the document from the Consul goes on to declare that the ICT was an "operation" of "sensitive nature". For reasons which could have aroused suspicions the Consul General had to exercise "discretion in affording the ICT political orientation and other advice and assistance"<sup>330</sup>. Over the course of ten years the ICT in collaboration with AIFLD, would train more than one thousand workers in its resident courses, and over thirty thousand officials would attend its regional trade union orientation courses<sup>331</sup>.

According to William Doherty, AIFLD graduates played a significant part in the coup. The then AIFLD Director of Social Projects stated that some of the trainees "were so active that they became intimately involved in some of the clandestine operations of the revolution". He went on to claim "what happened in Brazil did not just happen - it was planned - and planned months in advance. Many of the trade union leaders - some of whom were actually trained in our institute - were involved in the revolution, and in the overthrow of the Goulart regime"<sup>332</sup>.

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<sup>327</sup> Idem p.425-26

<sup>328</sup> Labour Cultural Institute

<sup>329</sup> MANFREDI, Silvia Maria. As Entidades Sindicais e a educação dos Trabalhadores. *Cadernos de pesquisa*, Campinas, Sao Paulo: Unicamp, n.47, Nov 1983 p.64 78. p.68

<sup>330</sup> Airgram from American Consul São Paulo to Department of State, *Semi-annual Political Review - June - December 1963*, 2 Jan 1964. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:358317/> [accessed 3 Dec 2019] p.14-15

<sup>331</sup> AIFLD Project Appraisal Report 1974, 31 Dec 1974. USAID. [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDAAB529A1.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDAAB529A1.pdf) [accessed 12 May 2021]

<sup>332</sup> RADOSH, Ronald. *Op. cit.* p.426



The veracity of these statements cannot be trusted to be one hundred per cent accurate as AIFLD officials were prone to exaggerating the success of their operations<sup>333</sup>. To be able to measure the influence along with the significance of the part played by the U.S. trained unionists is a complicated task, but the success of the military takeover most likely did not depend on their participation. That being said, due to the efforts of Romullo Martinho, a communications union leader and AIFLD graduate, the communication workers refused to join the general strike, which had the intention of frustrating the coup attempt, keeping the lines open for the army to coordinate troop movements<sup>334</sup>.

Whatever the significance of AIFLD trained unionist's role in the coup of 1964 was, the fact that the United States strove to infiltrate the Brazilian unions cannot be denied. The combination of the failure of the *Point Four Program*, the intransigence of Kennedy, the unique characteristics of Brazilian trade unionism and the increase in popularity of *nacionalista-reformista* ideology, would create a situation where American labour could not impose itself. This effort to instil capitalist labour values and defend corporate interests while, at the same time, attack nationalist tendencies has less to do with communism than with asserting U.S. hegemony. The fact that AFL-CIO backed a military overthrow, which installed a regime that heavily repressed the Brazilian labour movement, tends to confirm this. In its joint venture with the U.S. government and Corporate America, the AFL-CIO paradoxically assured there would not be a movement strong enough to better the lives of the workers. Additionally, this pact ultimately condemned the Brazilian Fourth Republic.

## **Psychological Warfare, Propaganda and Control of The Media**

As it has already been seen in the section on Bridgeheads, persuasion through indoctrination was and is an integral part of U.S. imperialism. In Brazil, like in many other countries, the United States used propaganda to infiltrate society so as to promote its ideals and to further its interests. For this reason, a variety of operations and tactics were deployed in order to influence and mould public opinion. The success of these were of vital importance to achieve both long as well as short-term objectives, which were key to ensuring U.S. supremacy.

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<sup>333</sup> Idem p.416

<sup>334</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p. 117

In terms of long-term goals, the United States' employment of propaganda in addition to controlling the media would grant it a means of creating a positive image for itself and spreading its ideals, along with weakening (or at least attempting to weaken) nationalist tendencies. However, for Washington's more immediate aims, propaganda would be implemented as part of its psychological war against the João Goulart government and nationalist-reformist tendencies that represented an immediate threat to U.S. interests.

Therefore, a key hypothesis to this thesis is the significance that propaganda and psychological warfare played in the historical process that culminated in the military takeover of 1964. When referring to U.S. indoctrination in Brazil at this time, it is important to make a distinction between propaganda and psychological warfare in order to understand how the United States went about undermining the Goulart administration, as well as how its long and short-term goals differed. With regards to objectives related to João Goulart, it is the opinion of this doctoral student that the United States employed psychological warfare in an effort to accomplish them.

Due to its many forms as well as uses, propaganda is perhaps a little more difficult to categorise. It has unambiguously been termed as a concept that in modern technological society "envelops" everything<sup>335</sup>, in addition to being labelled as undistinguishable from advertising<sup>336</sup>. That said, for this study the following definitions seem to be more fitting: The first being that propaganda is "the organised manipulation of key cultural symbols and images (and biases) for the purposes of persuading a mass audience to take a position, or move to action, or remain inactive on a controversial matter"<sup>337</sup>. The second, from an official *National Security Council* directive, classified propaganda as "any organised effort or movement to distribute information or a particular doctrine, by means of news, opinions or appeals, designed to influence the thinking and actions of a particular group"<sup>338</sup>.

Psychological warfare is defined as "the planned use of propaganda and other activities, except combat, by a nation, which communicate ideas and information for the purpose of influencing the opinions, attitudes, emotions, and behaviour of foreign groups, in ways that

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<sup>335</sup> ELLUL Jacques, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*. The author stated that "propaganda is a good deal less the political weapon of a regime (it is that also) than the effects of a technological society that embraces the entire man". Quoted in GARY, Brett. *The Nervous Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War I to the Cold War*. New York: Colombia University Press, 1999. p.8

<sup>336</sup> Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell. Quoted in GARY, Brett. *Op. cit.* p.8

<sup>337</sup> Idem p.8 This is Brett Gary's own personal definition of propaganda.

<sup>338</sup> *National Security Council Directive*. 10th of July 1950. Quoted in SAUNDERS, Frances Stonor. *Op. cit.* p.17

support the achievement of national goals"<sup>339</sup>. In this regard, even though the concept of propaganda actually forms part of psychological warfare, they are not the same and, as it will become clear, their employment in Brazil was based on the achievement of different objectives.

For what were the United States long-term goals, it would be more correct to talk of indoctrination through the employment of propaganda in the style of *Soft Power*<sup>340</sup>, rather than psychological warfare. This is because the aim was to win over Brazilian society, so that it would perceive U.S. interests to be their own. In essence, pro-U.S. propaganda was used as an attempt to convince Brazil that to ally itself with the United States would be beneficial for it. This process started during World War Two with the *Good Neighbour Policy*<sup>341</sup>, which made use of cinema as a way of transmitting a favourable image of the U.S. Heavy emphasis was placed on showing the Brazilian public the "American way of life", in addition to highlighting shared values, such as family and individual liberty<sup>342</sup>. The United States also targeted specific groups with its propaganda, paying "special attention to police forces and the military"<sup>343</sup>.

However, more than the general public the "main objective" of this propaganda was the minority elite which dominated national politics. The fact that the control of Brazilian society was "in the hands of the few" provided the United States with an opportunity to infiltrate its ideas. By "convincing these minorities", who were associated with "economic groups, the Church, the armed forces and intellectuals", the U.S. had a "bridge"<sup>344</sup> to conquer the rest of the country<sup>345</sup>. In truth, the "misery" of Brazil and, in fact, all of South America presented the United States with the perfect scenario to spread its propaganda<sup>346</sup>.

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<sup>339</sup> *National Security Council Directive*. 10th of July 1950. Quoted in SAUNDERS, Frances Stonor. *Op. cit.* p.17

<sup>340</sup> NYE, Joseph S. *Op. cit.* "By definition *soft power* means getting others to want the same outcomes you want" because they believe it is also in their interest. Nye explains that governments need to employ "public diplomacy" in order to get the public of a foreign country to agree with it. Public diplomacy consists of "conveying information and selling a positive image" of oneself in addition to "building long-term relationships" with foreign publics. This is essentially achieved through gradual persuasion based on shared values, which is generally carried out by "non-governmental individuals and organisations". For *soft power* to be a success it is vital to avoid propaganda, which can be aggressive and misleading, along with preaching.

<sup>341</sup> see Chapter One p.16

<sup>342</sup> VALIM, Busko Alexandre. *Op. cit.* p.140 and p.175

<sup>343</sup> *Idem* p.87

<sup>344</sup> *Idem* p.93 in this thesis the word bridgehead has been employed in this context

<sup>345</sup> *Idem* p.93

<sup>346</sup> *Idem* p.93

Once World War Two was over, the focus of U.S. propaganda shifted from fighting the Axis powers to combating Communist-Soviet influence. Interestingly, propaganda efforts were also concentrated on countering nationalism, which was "a constant problem" for U.S. interests. "Weakening" and undermining nationalist tendencies became "the standard" from 1945 onwards<sup>347</sup>. As a Department of State document, titled "Guidelines for Policy and Operations", from January 1963 stated:

*"Once a firm anchor for U.S. policy in Latin America, Brazilian cooperation with the United States has in recent years become increasingly uncertain. The changed relationship between the two countries is largely an outgrowth of the basic changes taking place in the political, economic and social structure of a nation which, in the throes of rapid economic development, is increasingly conscious of its potential. Major difficulties arise from the firm Brazilian belief in the country's destiny to be a world power... The burgeoning Brazilian nationalism (running through all political, economic and social groups) is a growing obstacle... to cooperation with the United States"*<sup>348</sup>.

The *Independent Foreign Policy* along with the "disproportionate influence" enjoyed by ultranationalist leaders were blamed for encouraging the rise in Brazilian nationalist sentiment, which tended "to be directed largely against the United States"<sup>349</sup>. To counter this the document recommended certain lines of action to follow, such as expanding "exchange programmes" between professionals and civilians, increasing "the programme for the translation of books into Portuguese and their distribution in Brazil" and raising "the USIS budget to enable it to have a more forceful and sustained programme in Brazil and to expand its services and facilities in the interior". As it will be seen further ahead, the last strategy is of special importance due to the United States Information Service (USIS) existence being for purely propagandistic purposes.

If the United States long-term objectives for indoctrination were based on thinking related to *soft power*, its short-term goals related to the Goulart government were to be achieved employing techniques from *Psychological warfare*. In this regard, from September 1961 until the autumn of 1963, psychological warfare was carried out with a view to forcing the

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<sup>347</sup> Idem p.86-87

<sup>348</sup> Department of State, *Guidelines for Policy and Operations Brazil*, Jan 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:857522/> [accessed 28 Apr 2020] p.22-23

<sup>349</sup> Idem p.20

Brazilian president's compliance to maintain the *status quo*. After that date it was employed to bring about regime change.

The key to psychological warfare "operations" was to make sure they could not be attributed "to the CIA or to the U.S. government, but rather to some other person or organisation"<sup>350</sup>. They included "Media Operations" (further ahead there are examples of these and there is an explanation of the different types of propaganda involved), "Labour Operations" (see the first section of this chapter on the infiltration of trade unions) and "Political-Action Operations", which included "operations designed to promote the adoption by a foreign government of a particular policy vis-a-vis communism" (see Chapter Two on pressure), the recruitment of politicians along with military leaders (see the section on Vernon Walters in Chapter Four and the one on Lincoln Gordon in Chapter Five) and the "financing and guiding of local politicians" as well as operations involving national elections (see the section on the Brazilian legislative elections of 1962)<sup>351</sup>.

As it has been examined, the long-term penetration of the Brazilian media started before the period in question in this thesis. An important part of this process was actually obtaining control over the media so as to secure a platform from where public opinion could be formed and interests could be implanted<sup>352</sup> while avoiding the propaganda being linked to official government sources<sup>353</sup>. It was essentially the denationalisation of elements of the media in Brazil<sup>354</sup>. United states' dominance can be explained, in part, as a result of the power as well as influence of U.S. advertising agencies, eight of which accounted for fifty percent of all advertising in Brazil by 1966. Through funding, these agencies dictated "the rules which the Brazilian press" had to follow, they could "veto certain types of articles, insist on the dismissal of certain journalists, or, if the periodicals or other media refuse to bow to such pressure, withdraw all financing and force the offenders to fold". In the pursuit of ideological

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<sup>350</sup> AGEE, Philip. *Op. cit.* p.54

<sup>351</sup> *Idem* p.55-64

<sup>352</sup> For more information on what has been termed "manufacturing consent" see Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman's study on media control in the United States. The authors explore the how the media, which is owned and controlled by the elites, produces propaganda in order to mould public opinion. In essence, the media manufactures consent so that these elites can advance their agendas. CHOMSKY, Noam and HERMAN, Edward S. *Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of The Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2002

<sup>353</sup> NYE, Joseph S. *Op. cit.* Mentions the importance of non-governmental groups for *soft power* to be successful, and how, for example, advertising agencies, Hollywood and news corporations "not only sold their products but also America's culture and values".

<sup>354</sup> GARY, Brett. *Op. cit.* p.29 the talks about "controlling the flow of information to obtain desired social and political results".

goals along with the furthering of values, the advertising agencies acted as a semi-censor, any "publication shunned by these agencies [was] a publication condemned"<sup>355</sup>.

In addition to the influence exerted by U.S. owned advertising companies, there was also an influx of journals and periodicals from the United States. Due to Brazilian legislation, which defended "the importance of a communications media free of foreign control", many of these publications, such as *Visão*, disguised their ownership in order to present the interests defended in them as native ones<sup>356</sup>. The obvious objective here was to promote certain points of view as well as tendencies without arousing suspicion about their origin. The case of *O Globo* and its relationship with *Time-Life Inc.* is one such example of how the United States was able to infiltrate the Brazilian media with a view to creating a pro-U.S. propaganda platform.

In 1962, *O Globo*, which had originally started as a newspaper before branching out into radio, signed an illegal agreement (due to the Brazilian constitution) with *Time-Life* to launch a television channel. According to the deal, *Time-Life* "agreed to supply financial, technical and management assistance, in the widest sense, covering equipment, financial controls, training, programming marketing and commercialisation in general". In exchange it would receive thirty percent of the profits<sup>357</sup>. Over the next few years, *Time-Life* invested more than \$6 million in a venture that would allow *O Globo* to overtake its rivals converting itself into the biggest broadcaster in Brazil. The Brazilian station would also generate a close relationship with the military dictatorship<sup>358</sup>, "taking a strong pro-military line in its reporting", which earned it the cynical nickname of "the Ministry of Information"<sup>359</sup>.

*TV Globo* did not start transmitting until 1965, after the coup had taken place, yet it is still relevant to mention its story. In the first place, *Time-Life* was one of "the most valuable" news agencies to be associated with the CIA, documents proving "that journalists had been

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<sup>355</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.105-06

<sup>356</sup> *Idem* p.100-01

<sup>357</sup> SINCLAIR, John. *Latin American Television: A Global View*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. p.66

<sup>358</sup> It is interesting to mention here that Roberto Marinho had many "luncheons" with Castelo Branco, where sensitive and "confidential" information was shared.. See Telegram from Rio Embassy to Secretary of State, *Roberto Marinho Remarks on Presidential Succession Problem*, 14 Aug 1965. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:330839/> [accessed 11 May 2020]

<sup>359</sup> HENRY, James S. *The Blood Bankers: Tales from the Global Underground Economy*. New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003. p 137.

engaged to perform tasks for the CIA with the consent of the management"<sup>360</sup>. These links to the CIA and the fact *Time-Life* was able to gain a strong foothold in Brazilian television broadcasting should not be ignored. According to Henry, once the deal between *O Globo* and *Time-Life* had been signed, the latter "and its close friends at the CIA also encouraged multinationals to direct advertising to *Globo*, which soon was running a nation-wide advertising cartel"<sup>361</sup>. In her book, Jan Knippers Black stated "that the CIA had a policy of attempting to own or control at least one major newspaper in many countries. In Brazil, it had owned or controlled *O Globo*"<sup>362</sup>. This claim remains unconfirmed, but "the *Time-Life* connection may have been a cover for CIA control"<sup>363</sup>.

What is certain is the anti-Goulart posture that *O Globo* adopted during the years leading up to the coup. Under owner Roberto Marinho, who kept close ties with Ambassador Gordon informing him on comings and goings<sup>364</sup>, the news corporation was an ardent supporter of the principles defended by the *modernizante-conservadora* elite as well as the United States, in their ideological struggle against Goulart and the national-reformist forces. *O Globo* transformed itself into a platform from where João Goulart along with his policies could be attacked and slandered. In this regard, it formed part of the *Rede da Democracia* (a sort of association of some of the biggest media corporations in Brasil, such as *Diários Associados* and *Jornal do Brasil*), an initiative started by deputy and communications entrepreneur, João Calmon<sup>365</sup>, which "launched a powerful anti-communist propaganda offensive". The mainstream press making up this network "began to bombard the population daily with material that made use of anti-communist representations, and intensified the campaign that conservative sectors had been developing for some time"<sup>366</sup>.

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<sup>360</sup> JACKSON, Gayle Nix. *The Missing JFK Assassination Film: The Mystery Surrounding the Orville Nix Home Movie of November 22 1963*. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2016.

<sup>361</sup> HENRY, James S. *Op. cit.* p.137

<sup>362</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.102

<sup>363</sup> HERRMANN, Edward and McCHESNEY, Robert W. *The Global Media: The New Missionaries of Corporate Capitalism*. London and New York: Continuum, 2004. p.163-164

<sup>364</sup> Telegram from Rio Embassy to Secretary of State, *Roberto Marinho Remarks on Presidential Succession Problem*, 14 Aug 1965. Brown Digital Repository.

<sup>365</sup> Like Marinho, João Calmon also maintained regular contact with the U.S. ambassador, informing him on different events and subjects of interest related to Goulart and government policy See Telegram from Rio de Janeiro to Secretary of State, *Conversation with Calmon*, 4 Nov 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:683683/> [accessed 27 May 2021] AND Telegram from Rio de Janeiro to Secretary of State, *Brazilian financial situation and political orientation* 20 Nov 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:683561/> [accessed 13 Mar 2020] This relationship has been highlighted here because in Chapter Five an analysis of Gordon's ties to the Brazilian elite will be undertaken in order to better understand his role.

<sup>366</sup> MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.317-18

A good example of this is an opinion article from 1964 which accuses the Brazilian president of wanting to "bolshevis" the country in addition to using a literacy programme to achieve this<sup>367</sup>. Another warned its readers that a *Superintendência da Política Agrária* (SUPRA) decree on expropriation for agrarian reform aimed "to give communists the control of pipelines, telegraphic and telephone wires, routes operated by airplanes without radio, and, in short, the roads themselves". It went on to forecast that the decree "intends to deliver this area of great value to communists, who would thus have almost complete control over of communications in the country, since telegraph wires and telephones, microwave relay stations, pipelines and airplanes without radio use exactly that ten-kilometer strip along the highways and railways. With that control in their hands, the communists could initiate a plan to seize power, with great ease"<sup>368</sup>.

These two articles serve as perfect examples of what can be described as a propaganda campaign, and how it was carried out before the military takeover of 1964. This type of propaganda, which forms part of what the CIA refers to as *Psychological warfare*, was used in Brazil to smear Goulart, discredit reformist policies as well as generate a favourable image of the United States. According to Agee, propaganda was classed on a three tier system with white propaganda being "acknowledged as coming from the U.S. government", grey being "attributed to people or organisations who do not acknowledge the U.S. government as the source of their material" and who produce it as if it was their own, and finally black propaganda which "is unattributed material, or it is attributed to a non-existent source, or it is false material attributed to a real source"<sup>369</sup>.

What is important to understand when it comes to grey and black propaganda is that those who produce it "may be unaware of their CIA or U.S. government sponsorship... thus

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<sup>367</sup> GUDIN, Eugenio. A Despropriação por Atacado. *O Globo*, Rio de Janeiro, 13 Jan 1964. In Recortes de jornais sobre reforma agrária, Arquivo Nacional. [http://imagem.sian.an.gov.br/acervo/derivadas/br\\_rjanrio\\_pe/0/0/0023/br\\_rjanrio\\_pe\\_0\\_0\\_0023\\_d0001de0001.pdf](http://imagem.sian.an.gov.br/acervo/derivadas/br_rjanrio_pe/0/0/0023/br_rjanrio_pe_0_0_0023_d0001de0001.pdf) [accessed 23 Jul 2020] p.6

<sup>368</sup> Objetivo do decreto da SUPRA: Entregar áreas vitais aos comunistas. *O Globo*, Brasília, 14 Jan 1964. In Recortes de jornais sobre reforma agrária, Arquivo Nacional. [http://imagem.sian.an.gov.br/acervo/derivadas/br\\_rjanrio\\_pe/0/0/0023/br\\_rjanrio\\_pe\\_0\\_0\\_0023\\_d0001de0001.pdf](http://imagem.sian.an.gov.br/acervo/derivadas/br_rjanrio_pe/0/0/0023/br_rjanrio_pe_0_0_0023_d0001de0001.pdf) [accessed 23 Jul 2020] p.7 For more examples of the use of propaganda in the Brazilian national press to attack and undermine João Goulart along with national-reformism in general see MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Em guarda contra o perigo vermelho: o anticomunismo no Brasil (1917-1964)*. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2002 and WEGNER, Felipe Henrique. *A nação que salva a si mesma: O CCC e a sua luta contra a "subversão"*. 2021. Dissertação (Mestrado em História) - Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis.

<sup>369</sup> AGEE, Philip. *Op. cit.* p.54



editorialists, politicians, businessmen and others may produce propaganda, even for money, without necessarily knowing who their masters in the case are"<sup>370</sup>. Hence, the heavy involvement of U.S. capital in the Brazilian media, in addition to the type of propaganda produced by certain outlets, have lead to certain questions being asked. It is also the reason behind the belief that the *Time-Life* deal with *O Globo* was actually a cover for CIA activities.

Another organisation intimately involved in the short-term psychological campaign against João Goulart was USIS. Although its mandate was to "project a favourable image of the United States", in reality "in both overt as well as covert operations, the scope of the content of its projects is both broader and more goal orientated"<sup>371</sup>. With the threat that the Goulart government, along with diverse movements that supported it, posed to United States' interests in mind, USIS set about infiltrating diverse sectors of Brazilian society with pro-U.S. propaganda as well as messages conducive to the destabilisation of the Goulart government. USIS activities targeted government workers, public officials such as judges, governors in addition to mayors, the military, influential Brazilians, journalists and university campuses with the aim of reaching both students as well as faculty members<sup>372</sup>.

In terms of reaching these diverse audiences, USIS employed a wide range of tactics as well as mediums. The vast majority of the propaganda was transmitted through publications directed at the various groups mentioned above. For example, government workers along with public officials were targeted with leaflets and books in addition to the daily *U.S. News Letter*. Specialist books were translated for the military with \$15,000 a year being spent by 1964, and a monthly magazine was distributed to the trade unions. Furthermore, USIS made use of cinema to spread its doctrine. For the year of 1963 and only in the city of Rio de Janeiro, mobile projection units staged 1706 showings of specially made films to over 180,000 members of the armed services<sup>373</sup>.

USIS also hoped to indoctrinate or, at the very least, foster a pro-U.S. predisposition through the use of the strategy of trips to the United States. These all-paid trips aimed to show the Brazilians the successes and riches of the *American Way* with the hope they would return home to spread the message. Benefactors of this tactic included governors, deputies,

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<sup>370</sup> Idem p.54

<sup>371</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.97

<sup>372</sup> FICO, Carlos. *Op. cit.* p.80-85

<sup>373</sup> Idem p.80-81

journalists, professors in addition to students. Fico claims that while with other forms of propaganda it is difficult to assess its overall effectiveness, the trips to the United States organised by USIS most certainly "had positive results in terms of obtaining sympathy for the U.S."<sup>374</sup>.

Whether or not the United States was successful in its attempts at using propaganda to indoctrinate the civil population is something which is hard to prove. What can be declared, however, is that, irrespective of this, the ultimate objectives were to gain support for the U.S. and its interests as well as to undermine the Goulart government<sup>375</sup>. The use of propaganda as a means of indoctrinating did not stop with the examples mentioned in this section. In other parts of this chapter specific cases will be examined separately in order to shed full light on the depth of psychological warfare carried out against Brazil.

### **The Family Rosary Crusade and A Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade**<sup>376</sup>

For the United States, Catholicism was to become an important ideological weapon in the struggle against communism throughout South America. In addition to promoting "moral and spiritual values against which Soviet ideology had no response", the Roman Catholic church held a position of cultural as well as religious dominance in Latin America. It was "the only institution firmly established in every South American country", making it a force capable of organising and mobilising the multitudes<sup>377</sup>. The campaign of the *Family Rosary Crusade*, which heavily inspired the organisation of the *Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade*, is a perfect example of the use of religion in psychological warfare. Through the manipulation of religious beliefs, the U.S. aimed to reach all sectors of Brazilian society in its drive to discredit and, eventually, topple the Goulart government.

Before delving into the role as well as the operations of the *Family Rosary Crusade* during its time in Brazil, it would firstly be appropriate to analyse the origins of the organisation along with the reasons behind its involvement in the process which lead up to the coup d'état of

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<sup>374</sup> Idem p. 82-83

<sup>375</sup> Idem p.85

<sup>376</sup> Translated as the Family March with God for Liberty

<sup>377</sup> GRIBBLE, Richard. Anti-Communism, Patrick Peyton, CSC and the CIA. *Journal of the Church and State*, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2003, p.535-558. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23920511> [accessed 2 Mar 2018]. p.538-539

1964. From the very beginning the *Family Rosary Crusade*, along with those projects which preceded it, were born from the devotion of Patrick Peyton to the Virgin Mary and the rosary. The Catholic priest firmly believed that in addition to promoting religious values as well as saving the nuclear family from the "scourges of modernity", the rosary was "the offensive weapon that [would] destroy communism". In this context, Peyton set about spreading his message, by 1958 the *Family Rosary Crusade* had visited most if not all the continents except for South America<sup>378</sup>.

The arrival of Peyton's crusades in Latin America was being planned back in 1957, however it was in 1958, when J. Peter Grace intervened on behalf of the organisation earning it much needed financial support, that preparations really took off. Peyton's relationship with the magnate went back to 1946 when the two met on a boat going to Ireland, connecting instantly<sup>379</sup>. Grace had backed Peyton over the years and in 1958, after viewing a series of films based on the mysteries of the rosary, produced with the help of Generalísimo Francisco Franco<sup>380</sup>, Grace became convinced of the potential of the crusades in defending South America along with his many business interests against communism.

In this context, Grace got in contact with the then CIA director Allen Dulles. He made a case for the financial backing of the *Family Rosary Crusade* in Latin America, claiming that it could "be the strongest weapon against the communist menace", and that Peyton's organisation could deliver for the United States<sup>381</sup>. At this moment, when discussing CIA ties, it is pertinent to remember that J. Peter Grace would become chairman of the board of directors of the CIA controlled AILFD.

For the CIA it presented a perfect opportunity (especially after the announcement of the *Kennedy Doctrine*) to combat communist influence in South America as well as to infiltrate it. In general terms, CIA involvement with religious organisations provided the agency with intelligence through missionaries who acted as informants, in addition to perfect front operations<sup>382</sup>. Evidently, these religious groups were, from the local populations point of view, perceived to be as free from government control, therefore, their anti-communism

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<sup>378</sup> WILFORD, Hugh. *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2008. p.182-185

<sup>379</sup> Idem p. 188

<sup>380</sup> GRIBBLE, Richard. *Op. cit.* p. 541-542 mentions Peyton's time in Spain filming, but WILFORD, Hugh. *Op. cit.* p.184 confirms the participation of Franco in the production of the films

<sup>381</sup> GRIBBLE, Richard. *Op. cit.* p.543

<sup>382</sup> WILFORD, Hugh. *Op. cit.* p.186-187

supposedly had nothing to do with U.S. foreign policy. The *Family Rosary Crusade* was no different with specific characteristics and aspects making it an effective mechanism of infiltration.

Peyton compared the strategy used by the crusades to a "military campaign". The use of mass media to "soften the ground" in working class and middle class neighbourhoods was described as an "aerial bombardment". It was in this phase that the films on the mysteries of the rosary were used to reach the illiterate poor. This was followed up by an invasion of assistants and crusade workers before the "climatic battle" of the rally took place<sup>383</sup>. The *Correio Rio-Grandense* described the crusade as a "five week intensive campaign to restore family prayer", the last week consisted of "an army of previously instructed men visiting homes to obtain written promises" that family prayer would be undertaken<sup>384</sup>. The success as well as the efficacy of Peyton's crusades also lent themselves to the "proven technique of infiltration" by "employing indigenous organisations, communications and peoples to penetrate communist strongholds"<sup>385</sup>. In the pursuit of Peyton's goals, the *Family Rosary Crusade* was able to mobilise local forces in a way no other U.S. organisation was able to. The CIA, therefore, had found "a way to promote the American policy of appeasing the popular masses"<sup>386</sup>.

Due to the nature and source of the *Family Rosary Crusades'* funding, its destinations were determined by the CIA's perceptions of where communism or political events most threatened U.S. interests. In this sense, after the crusade in Colombia, where over 1 million people attended the rally in Bogota in 1962, Peyton's plans were abruptly changed and all the crusades efforts along with resources were to be focused exclusively on Brazil<sup>387</sup>. The crusade in Brazil has been referred to as "most noteworthy" due to the length of time spent in the country along with its "association" with the coup of 1964<sup>388</sup>. Starting in Recife in 1962, the *Family Rosary Crusade* went all over Brazil spreading its message as well as organising mass meetings until after the military takeover.

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<sup>383</sup> Idem p.184

<sup>384</sup> "Família que reza unida permanece unida". *Correio Rio-grandense*, Caixas do Sul, 27 Nov 1963. In Centro de Memória Câmara Municipal de Caixas do Sul. <http://liquid.camaracaxias.rs.gov.br/LiquidWeb/App/View.aspx?c=66709&p=0> [accessed 9 Mar 2020]

<sup>385</sup> GRIBBLE, Richard. *Op. cit.* p.542-543

<sup>386</sup> WILFORD, Hugh. *Op. cit.* p.193

<sup>387</sup> Idem p.190

<sup>388</sup> GRIBBLE, Richard. *Op. cit.* p.549

Through simple as well as direct rhetoric the crusades aimed to manipulate religious sentiments, turning public opinion against popular reformist politics. The idea that Brazil needed saving was a common theme. In Recife one of the future coup leaders, General Artur da Costa e Silva, claimed that Brazil desperately needed a movement like Peyton's as it "was going through one of the most distressing periods in its history"<sup>389</sup>. The public was also presented with the image of the family being eroded as an institution. Warnings that family life was being "threatened with death by a series of disruptive factors and flawed doctrines"<sup>390</sup> was common. The crusades and, therefore, adherence to their principles as well as participation in the different activities were key to "what everyone wanted... the salvation of the family"<sup>391</sup>. Another headline bluntly stated: "if you want unity, peace and happiness for your family, receive in your home the men who will ask for your commitment to prayer"<sup>392</sup>.

Furthermore, the idea of patriotism was firmly tied in with the values defended by Peyton's crusades. The concept that the backbone of a strong, united national community was that of happy, consolidated family which prayed together was a fundamental element to the crusades. It was desirable to convince the Brazilian public that demonstrating their faith through involvement in the crusades was a patriotic duty<sup>393</sup>. For this reason, the national anthem along with national symbols were ever present in the rallies which concluded Peyton's campaigns. In a 1963 television special, the *Family Rosary Crusade* even used appearances by Pele in addition to *bossa nova* star Agostinho dos Santos to attract audiences and spread Peyton's ideals<sup>394</sup>.

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<sup>389</sup> Cruzada do Rosário em Família empolga o nordeste. *Correio Rio-grandense*, Caixas do Sul, 17 Oct 1962. In Centro de Memória Câmara Municipal de Caixas do Sul. <http://liquid.camaracaxias.rs.gov.br/LiquidWeb/App/View.aspx?c=66755&p=0> [accessed 5 Mar 2020]

<sup>390</sup> F. H. Salvar a Família. *Correio Rio-grandense*, Caixas do Sul, 27 Nov 1963. In Centro de Memória Câmara Municipal de Caixas do Sul. <http://liquid.camaracaxias.rs.gov.br/LiquidWeb/App/View.aspx?c=66709&p=5&Miniatura=false&Texto=false> [accessed 9 Mar 2020] p.6

<sup>391</sup> Lançada em Porto Alegre a Cruzada do Rosário em Família. *Correio Rio-grandense*, Caixas do Sul, 11 Dec 1963. In Centro de Memória Câmara Municipal de Caixas do Sul. <http://liquid.camaracaxias.rs.gov.br/LiquidWeb/App/View.aspx?c=66711&p=0> [accessed 9 Mar 2020] p.6

<sup>392</sup> Chegou a hora do seu compromisso! Cruzada do Rosário em Família. *Correio Rio-grandense*, Caixas do Sul, 11 Dec 1963. In Centro de Memória Câmara Municipal de Caixas do Sul. <http://liquid.camaracaxias.rs.gov.br/LiquidWeb/App/View.aspx?c=66712&p=0> [accessed 9 Mar 2020] p.1

<sup>393</sup> Padre Peyton conquista o mundo com sua cruzada de salvação. *Correio Rio-grandense*, Caixas do Sul, 11 Dec 1963. In Centro de Memória Câmara Municipal de Caixas do Sul. <http://liquid.camaracaxias.rs.gov.br/LiquidWeb/App/View.aspx?c=66711&p=0> [accessed 9 Mar 2020] p.1

<sup>394</sup> WILFORD, Hugh. *Op. cit.* p.191



Father Patrick Peyton speaking in Rio de Janeiro on the 16th of December 1962. Source: The Catholic Sun (<https://www.catholicsun.org/2017/12/19/pope-puts-founder-of-rosary-crusade-one-step-closer-toward-sainthood/>).

What is most significant about the *Family Rosary Crusade's* time in Brazil are the *Family Marches with God for Liberty*. These marches were thought up as a response to a rally on the 13th of March 1964, when Goulart announced his would push ahead with his plans for agrarian reform, as well as the expropriation of all the oil refineries<sup>395</sup>. The family marches, therefore, were designed to be the focal point of "the revolution against reform"<sup>396</sup>, in

<sup>395</sup> PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.57 Also in MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.323. the author declares that the rally was "a political act whose purpose was to launch a public offensive in favour of carrying out basic reforms". With the rally "Goulart would demonstrate his willingness to align himself with leftist groups in the struggle" to carry out the reformist programme, "while at the same time exerting pressure against conservative mobilization. The idea was to rally popular groups sympathetic to the national-reformist cause, giving a show of force to conservatives and the majority sectors of Congress opposed to constitutional changes".

<sup>396</sup> GUI SOLPHI, Anderson José. O Movimento do Rosário em Família, estratégia anticomunista no Brasil dos anos 60. In: Anais do XXVI Simpósio Nacional de História, ANPUH São Paulo, Julho 2011. [http://www.snh2011.anpuh.org/resources/anais/14/1308095151\\_ARQUIVO\\_ArtigoAnderson.pdf](http://www.snh2011.anpuh.org/resources/anais/14/1308095151_ARQUIVO_ArtigoAnderson.pdf) [accessed

addition to a "public demonstration for the overthrow of the president"<sup>397</sup>. While *the Family Marches with God for Liberty* were not directly organised by Peyton's association, they were connected in addition to being a direct result of its time and work in Brazil<sup>398</sup>. Peyton himself was involved in the São Paulo march on the 19th of March 1964, leading the mass for the salvation of democracy, as well the march in Rio de Janeiro on April 2nd<sup>399</sup>. Furthermore, the organisers of the Marches were heavily inspired by the militant religiousness of the crusades, and the two movements shared the same messages as well as symbols<sup>400</sup>.

These were generally those equating communism with the destruction of institutions such as those of the family and the church, and then linking it with Goulart's plans for reform<sup>401</sup>. In this regard, the "Yankee priest's Crusade helped to publicize a symbol that played a prominent role in the anti-communist mobilizations of those years, the rosary"<sup>402</sup>. During the march in São Paulo, "Ladies with rosaries in hand prayed for the removal of the communist threat"<sup>403</sup>. In relation to the reforms, a manifesto denouncing "the communist lead" May 13th rally was published. This same text announced that the Brazilian public was united "in the defence of legality and faith", and that they would lay down their lives to "defend democracy"<sup>404</sup>. Ironically here, those who opposed socially progressive reforms, which looked to expand democratic practices, presented themselves as democrats<sup>405</sup>.

*The Family Marches with God for Liberty* were the work of different conservative civic groups intimately linked with multinational associated interests. The nature as well as origin of these organisations, which will be discussed later were dubious to say the least. The

17 Mar 2018] p.2. Also see PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.59 in his speech the senator and priest Benedito Mário Calazans represented "the stubborn opposition to the reformist proposals of the Goulart Government".

<sup>397</sup> PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.59

<sup>398</sup> Idem p.22 the *Family Rosary Crusade* "constituted a sort of embryo of the family Marches". Seeing as the *Family Rosary Crusade* was already highly active in Brazil before the Marches even existed, it would be more correct to qualify these as an embryo of the *Family Rosary Crusade*.

<sup>399</sup> MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.328 The march on April 2nd had been organised before the coup took place, but due to events and the success of General Mourão's rebellion it quickly transformed into a victory parade. PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.27 According to the author, Peyton, who had "wide experience with regards to popular regimentation through the manipulation of symbols linked to religiosity", took part in the march.

<sup>400</sup> GUILSOPHI, Anderson José. *Op. cit.* p.14

<sup>401</sup> PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.60

<sup>402</sup> MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.305 "The rosary referred to the representations built around Our Lady of Fátima, a figure adopted by many Catholics as protector or patroness of the fight against communism".

<sup>403</sup> PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.59-60

<sup>404</sup> Idem p.59-60

<sup>405</sup> MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.306 points out that this is probably because for conservative elements the word "democrat" had a generic meaning. This being simply the opposite of communist.

*Campanha da Mulher pela Democracia*<sup>406</sup> (CAMDE), perhaps the most prolific civic group behind the marches, was set up by members of the *Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais* (IPES), a leading think-tank with links to the CIA, which dedicated itself to antigovernment and pro-coup propaganda<sup>407</sup>.

During the period, CAMDE "was to play an important role in the battle against Goulart" as well as "to provide a model for the way in which middle-class women might be used in anticommunist causes in Latin America"<sup>408</sup>. This was due to the fact that "women's organisations gave a special appeal to conservative mobilisation". In essence, "they strengthened the impression that society as a whole was rising up against communism. The symbolic force of this female presence was great, with women representing the mother figure, the home, the housewife, and, in short, the family"<sup>409</sup>.

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<sup>406</sup> Translated as Women's Campaign for Democracy . For a more detailed analysis of CAMDE and its origins see PRESOT, Aline Alves. *As Marchas da Família com Deus pela Liberdade e o Golpe de 1964*. 2004. Dissertação (Mestrado em História Social) - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro. According to Presot, "CAMDE women used efficient tactics in its work of mobilizing public opinion" against the Goulart government. Through the distribution of doctrinal literature, the sending of telegrams as well as letters public figures of national relevancy in addition to radio transmissions, CAMDE hoped to "alert women all over Brazil to the threat that Communism presented". Inherent in its propaganda techniques was the equating of Goulart and national-reformism to the Soviet Union and Communist China.

<sup>407</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.245 affirmed that one aim of IPES psychological warfare was to "stimulate an almost hysterical reaction from the middle classes which, at the same time, would strengthen military rationalisation to intervene".

<sup>408</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.109-110

<sup>409</sup> MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.298





Participants in *A Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade* carrying a rosary. Source: Operamundi (<https://operamundi.uol.com.br/politica-e-economia/34445/golpe-de-64-marcha-da-familia-com-deus-pela-liberdade-completa-50-anos-saiba-quem-a-financiou-e-dirigiu>).



"Brazil won't be a new Cuba". An example of the type of propaganda employed in the march. Source: <http://juarezribeiroa.blogspot.com/2017/07/marcha-da-familia-com-deus-pela.html>

IPESS participation in the marches went much further than just its close links to CAMDE. Some of its members, such as deputies Herbet Levy, Padre Vidigal, Menezes Cortez and Arnaldo Cerdeira, marched or "were also present as speakers at the manifestations"<sup>410</sup>. It is for this reason that the marches, which were all to take place in 1964, had much more to do with demonstrating widespread anti-Goulart and anti-reform sentiment as they did with defending religious family values.

Whether the marches were created with this intention or not, their historical significance comes down to their success being seen as a definitive signal by the coup plotters to carry out their plans. The marches, especially the one in São Paulo demonstrated the opposition to the Brazilian government and, in that sense, they served to legitimise the military's intervention in politics. According to U.S. military attaché Vernon Walters "until the marches took place there was fear that the movement to overthrow Goulart would not succeed"<sup>411</sup>. A senior general in the Brazilian army claimed that the march in São Paulo "pushed the military into activity" as it proved that public opinion toward a military takeover was favourable<sup>412</sup>.

The extent of the popularity of the *Marches of the Family with God for Liberty* as well as *Family Rosary Crusades* in addition to the public's participation in them is not entirely clear nor possible to corroborate. Certain sources tend to confirm that the middle and upper classes were more receptive to the type of propaganda used by the movements, therefore, they were much more participative in them than the lower classes<sup>413</sup>. This, however does not mean that only the aforementioned groups were present during the marches<sup>414</sup>.

What is evident, however, is that the *Family Rosary Crusade* played a key role in preparing the terrain for the *Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade* as well as for a belligerent solution to what were seen as threats to Brazil. Coup leader Castelo Branco gave credit to the *Family Rosary Crusade* "for the formation of the public opinion of the Brazilian people in

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<sup>410</sup> PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.38

<sup>411</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.81

<sup>412</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.97

<sup>413</sup> FICO, Carlos. *Op. cit.* p.80

<sup>414</sup> PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.71 in her thesis the authors states that the marches "should not be reduced to the mere function of propaganda nor should it be understood only as product of the dissatisfaction of the urban middle classes". She went on to say that the objectives of her dissertation were not "to characterize the Family Marches with God for Freedom as demonstrations of a popular nature, not even to deny the existence of efficient organisation and promotion of the marches, but rather lead to a questioning about the plurality of such manifestations. p.71

order to have the valour to bring about the revolution of March 31"<sup>415</sup>. In reference to the march, General Mourão Filho, who initiated the coup, stated "he, like all the men who participated in the revolution, did nothing more than carry out what the women preached in the streets against communism"<sup>416</sup>.

Effectively, the *Family Rosary Crusade* was used to present an apocalyptic scenario to the Brazilian public. Traditional values were being threatened by Goulart and his communistic policies for reform, which aimed to abolish Brazilian ideals such as family and Catholicism. As stated throughout this section, the effect which the crusades had is difficult to calculate. What is certain is that the CIA used Peyton's movement with the clear objective of indoctrinating the Brazilian public. Whether this blatant manipulation of religious sentiment was geared towards creating public opinion favourable of a coup or one only critical of the Brazilian president and his reforms, is a difficult question to answer. Nonetheless, the fact the *Family Rosary Crusade* inspired the *Marches of the Family with God for Liberty* which, in turn, convinced the elements plotting against Goulart to act must not be overlooked.

## **Infiltration of the Brazilian Armed Forces**

In the first chapter on influence, the NSD along with the effect it had on certain factions in the Brazilian military was discussed. This next chapter can be seen as a continuation, with a more detailed analysis of imperialism in the military realm. The reason for this division on U.S. interaction with the Brazilian military is because, from this doctoral student's point of view, it is necessary to differentiate between what can be seen as softer more traditional means of influencing, from the United States' drive to indoctrinate the Brazilian Armed Forces in order to force an outcome.

As it will be seen in continuation, there was sometimes a very fine line between what can be considered as traditional mechanisms of creating bridgeheads and exerting influence from what can be considered here as infiltration to achieve a short-term result. That being said, both of these are overlapping sides of imperialism which, more often than not, work in

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<sup>415</sup> GRIBBLE, Richard. *Op. cit.* p.551

<sup>416</sup> SIMÕES, Solange de Deus. *Deus, Pátria e família: as mulheres no golpe de 64*. Belo Horizonte: UFMG, 1983. p.107. Quoted in PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.77

conjunction. Without the prior process of influencing, which establishes footholds, it is very unlikely that more direct ways of persuasion through indoctrination would have been successful.

When studying the conduct of the Brazilian Armed Forces in the coup of 1964, there are multiple events along with underlying factors which cannot be ignored. The fact that a group in the military decided to intervene in the political process can, in part, be explained by the traditional role given to the armed forces throughout history as *o poder moderador* (the moderating power). The constitution of 1946 specifically contained articles which entrusted the armed forces with this function<sup>417</sup>.

In this context, the armed forces, as the ultimate defenders of the nation, were not only authorised to intervene at times of crisis but, actually, expected to as part of their duty. This moderating function was also a result of the belief that the military was simply *o povo fardado*, that is, the people or nation in uniform<sup>418</sup>. Consequently, military arbitration at times of dispute was legitimised by the fact that the armed forces were merely acting on behalf of the people.

Another consideration of upmost importance, are the historic ties as well as the special relationship shared between the armed forces of both Brazil and the United States, which have been described as "unusually close"<sup>419</sup>. A subject of great interest here are the forging of bonds and the creation of a bridgehead between the U.S. military and a group of Brazilian soldiers who would end up forming the faction of plotters known as the *Sorbonne Group*<sup>420</sup>. Obviously, the members of the *Sorbonne Group* were naturally anti-communist and therefore, inclined to be supportive of the United States in the Cold War. However, through other experiences, the members of the plotting *Sorbonne* faction had come to share so much with the U.S. military (ideals, values, perspectives, doctrines, etc.) that they must be considered as what Galtung referred to as a bridgehead with denationalised interests<sup>421</sup>.

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<sup>417</sup> STEPAN, Alfred. *Op. cit.* p.75 According to the author, the Brazilian Armed Forces were "charged with the task of maintaining law and order in the country and of guaranteeing the continued normal functioning of the three constitutional powers: the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary". A second clause "made the military obedient to the executive, but... stated that they should only be obedient within the limits of the law".

<sup>418</sup> *Idem* p.43-44

<sup>419</sup> *Idem* p.130

<sup>420</sup> The group of military conspirators lead by Castelo Branco were given this name due to their formation in the ESG and their attendance at overseas training courses in France and the U.S.

<sup>421</sup> See the section on imperialism in the introduction.

One of these experiences which left a deep impression on the psyche of the members of the *Sorbonne Group* was the participation of the *Força Expedicionária Brasileira* (FEB) in World War Two. The sending of the FEB to fight in Italy as part of the U.S. commanded Fourth Corps, was one of the most consequential facts in "bringing about a close similarity in aims and outlook between elements of the Brazilian military and U.S. military"<sup>422</sup>. During the campaign in Italy members of the FEB were exposed to the United States' military might and witnessed firsthand its superiority. Furthermore, and just as significant, were the personal relationships the Brazilian soldiers built with their American counterparts<sup>423</sup>. The close friendship between U.S. military attaché, Vernon Walters, and Brazilian Field Marshall Castelo Branco, eventual leader of the *Sorbonne Group*, as well as president of the first military government, went back to the FEB's time in Italy<sup>424</sup>. In fact, one of the reasons Walters was chosen as military attaché was due to his personal relationships with various members of the Brazilian top brass<sup>425</sup>.

Inspired by what the U.S. had achieved in addition to what it was also capable of, these elements of the FEB returned to Brazil with the aim of establishing a first class military<sup>426</sup>. The FEB's time in Italy had taught them that in order for a country "to be powerful it needed organisation, technology and industry". More than a few soldiers in the FEB were decidedly impressed at the failure of Mussolini's Italy, which for all its demagoguery and ideology was no match for the real power of the United States. Even before returning home, FEB combatants, such as Castelo Branco, were expressing their dislike for the "irrational" and "unrealistic" Brazilian nationalism which, in addition to producing "false optimism", prevented development<sup>427</sup>.

For these reasons, a select group of Brazilian officers, who had fought in the FEB and who would form the core of the *Sorbonne Group*, founded the *Escola Superior de Guerra*<sup>428</sup>

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<sup>422</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.128

<sup>423</sup> DIAS, José Carlos; FILHO, José Paulo Cavalcanti; KEHL, Maria Rita; PINHEIRO, Paulo Sérgio; DALLARI, Pedro Bohomoletz de Abreu; CUNHA, Rosa Maria Cardoso da. *Comissão Nacional de Verdade: Relatório Final Volume 1*. Brasília, DF: CNV, 2014. explains that "ties of professional camaraderie and ideological affinity united Brazilian military and Americans" from when they "had worked on the same side of the front during World War II". p.88

<sup>424</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.128

<sup>425</sup> White House, Transcript of Meeting between President Kennedy, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and Richard Goodwin, July 30, 1962. (Published in *The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises, Volume One* (W.W. Norton), edited by Timothy Naftali, October 2001.) National Security Archive.

<sup>426</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.176

<sup>427</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.243-244

<sup>428</sup> Superior War College

(ESG) in 1949, and directed it. The ESG was based on the *U.S. National War College* as well as the *Industrial College of the Armed Forces*. As could be expected U.S. military involvement in the ESG was high, with a U.S. advisory mission aiding in the establishment of the ESG, and remaining there until 1960. Moreover, the United States was still, in 1970, the "only foreign country with a liaison officer with faculty status" at the school. Furthermore, even though its name might depict a different story, the ESG was actually set up with clear ideological objectives concerned with efficient governance instead of war related strategy ones. The belief was that in a country such as Brazil, a powerful armed forces could not be separated from economic development. As the chief founder of the ESG, General Cordeiro de Farias, said:

*"The impact of the FEB was such that we came back to Brazil in search of models of government that could work: order, planning, rationalisation of finances. We didn't have that model in Brazil at the time, so we made the decision to search for means which would find the path in the long-term. The ESG was a means with this purpose, and it was born out of the experience of the FEB"<sup>429</sup>.*

From the beginning, the founders of the ESG looked to establish an institute focused on pursuing an ideology based on the importance of national security for national development and vice versa. Due to the demands of modern warfare, national security was now no longer restricted to border protection, it now required a strong, central government with strategic planning capable of maximising economic output. In this context, the ESG set about fulfilling Brazil's potential by making the most of its national resources through organisation and strategy. Identifying Brazil's problems and finding solutions to them while maintaining national security was key to the ESG's doctrine, consequently it was concerned with establishing an efficient model of government. For this reason, the ESG placed heavy influence on civilian participation in its courses, as true development would require the involvement of all areas of national life<sup>430</sup>.

It is also pertinent to mention that the focus on the total development of all areas of national life, coupled with the strong emphasis placed on progress through private enterprise (multinationals and private investment were seen as pivotal to industrial development<sup>431</sup>) born out of the desire to follow U.S. models on development, lead to the ESG serving as an

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<sup>429</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.154

<sup>430</sup> FAVERZANI, Alex da Luz. *Op. cit.* p.353

<sup>431</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.79-80

important "instrument" at forging ties between the military and the multinational associated elite. For the ESG officials, the participation of likeminded civilians in its national project was a must, and it was through the institute that contact was made with members of IPES<sup>432</sup>.

The ESG's focus on the national security-development paradigm was, as could be expected, strongly linked to the Cold War conflict. According to ESG theoreticians, such as General Golbery, third-world countries were under enormous pressure not only because of their underdevelopment, but also because of the consequences which the global ideological struggle imposed on them. The belief that communist aggression would capitalise on the woes and misery of Latin American society in order to establish communist or, at the very least, communist favourable governments was a key part of ESG thinking<sup>433</sup>. In this context, all aspects of Brazilian national life were seen as susceptible to subversion, and the assignment of maintaining national security became an all encompassing managerial task<sup>434</sup>. The ESG strategists took it upon themselves to create a total development strategy which would uphold national security. More on how the Brazilian armed forces put emphasis on the need to combat internal subversion will be analysed in the next section.

The founders of the ESG naturally aligned themselves with the United States due to their anti-communist principles, but the FEB experience along with educational stays in the States also helped instil long-lasting convictions which were conducive towards tendencies not shared by the majority of the armed forces. Joseph Comblin in addition to Alfred Stepan explain how the *Sorbonne Group* defended economic policies which favoured foreign private capital. For example, while the bulk of the armed forces believed in the need for state control over key nationalised industries in order to promote development, the ESG advocated for pragmatic efficiency which could only be achieved through privatisation<sup>435</sup>. This type of economic planning, which differed significantly from those of Goulart as well as other military elements that even aimed to overthrow the Brazilian president, would earn the *Sorbonne Group* the full support of the United States when coup took place.

While it was not the only factor which would have forced sections of the Brazilian Armed Forces to act in 1964, it must be questioned whether the level of U.S. influence in them can

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<sup>432</sup> Idem

<sup>433</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.179-180

<sup>434</sup> FAVERZANI, Alex da Luz. *Op. cit.* p.356

<sup>435</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.156 and STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.182-183

be classed as "special institutional characteristics"<sup>436</sup>. Certainly, the members of the *Sorbonne Group* already held certain beliefs and defended specific ideals, yet the immense sway which the United States military held over this faction meant that its members would become highly receptive to U.S. doctrines as well as supportive of U.S. objectives. As one author puts it, in Brazil there had emerged "a generation of U.S.-trained, technocratically orientated officers... who had come to look upon the U.S. armed forces as the reference group by which it could measure its own achievement and to which it could look for approval"<sup>437</sup>.

These facts alone do not confirm that U.S. influence was the prime stimulus for the coup to take place, as this would relegate other internal factors to a position of irrelevance. However, it is poignant that the group of military conspirators who were to receive the United States' blessing and backing in 1964 were those from the *Sorbonne Group*. Due to their experiences in the FEB as well as high exposure to U.S. values in the ESG and training in the United States, this military elite were intimately aligned with Washington's strategic goals defended through the NSD doctrine. Their ultimate success and their ability to impose their will over other factions of conspirators after the coup meant that Washington did not need to impose anything, as it was to be naturally adopted and implemented by these generals<sup>438</sup>.

Even though the members of the *Sorbonne Group*, along with other elements of the Brazilian Armed forces in general, actively accepted and assimilated U.S. doctrines, it must also be stated that the United States explicitly strove to shore up its influence over the Brazilian military through assistance and training programmes. Documents from the years leading up to the coup demonstrate how U.S. officials recommended strengthening ties with the FA due to their concern with the chain of events. In a meeting with Kennedy on the 30th of July 1962, Gordon stated quite clearly that the United States needed "to strengthen the spine of the military. To make it clear, discreetly, that we are not necessarily hostile to any kind of military action"<sup>439</sup>. In this context, the ambassador went about solidifying pro-U.S. elements within the Brazilian military, in addition to attracting others to the United States' sphere of influence. Gordon tied great "political importance" to supplying the Brazilian military with

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<sup>436</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.55 the author mentions how "special institutional characteristics" can determine how "a particular military establishment shapes its response to influences coming from the political system". The question is whether U.S. influence on the group of ESG conspirators can be classified as a special institutional characteristic.

<sup>437</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.178

<sup>438</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.156

<sup>439</sup> White House, Transcript of Meeting between President Kennedy, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and Richard Goodwin, July 30, 1962. (Published in *The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises, Volume One* (W.W. Norton), edited by Timothy Naftali, October 2001.) National Security Archive.



equipment, stating that failure to do so would weaken otherwise good relations. With this in mind, in 1963, he personally pushed for the U.S. government to sign off on providing the Brazilian Air Force with C-130 Hercules aircraft<sup>440</sup>.

Vernon Walters also defended this need to fortify as well as increase pro-U.S. sentiment within the Brazilian Armed Forces. A recommendation made by the Army Attaché in 1963 suggested that Washington had to "greatly increase the number of Brazilian officers and non-commissioned officers visiting the U.S. and attending U.S. schools" in addition to giving "the Brazilian Army certain weapons which they want" but which were not necessarily of use to them. The Army attaché's reasoning was that these initiatives would "strengthen pro-U.S. elements"<sup>441</sup> as well as eliminate resentment towards the United States.

This section aims to demonstrate that, due to institutional characteristics, experiences and events, the pro-United States posture defended by certain elements of the Brazilian military as well as its adherence to certain U.S. doctrines formed part of a historical process. This evolution, which ended with the *Sorbonne Group* converting itself into a bridgehead, was the result of long-term imperialism, that is, the effects imperialism can have if it is implemented over a long period of time. Even so, the fact that the United States endeavoured to penetrate the Brazilian Armed Forces must not be overlooked. As we have briefly seen, key U.S. officials, such as Gordon and Walters, were very much conscious of the benefits of military training programmes along with assistance. The next part of chapter Three will firmly focus on how the United States made a concerted effort to indoctrinate the Brazilian military, and how this push would have inadvertent consequences on Brazil's future.

### **Counterinsurgency doctrines and Military Assistance Programmes; the Indoctrination of the Brazilian Armed Forces**

The traditional role of the military in addition to its historic ties to the U.S. only go so far to explain the initial ousting of Goulart. It does nothing to aid in the understanding of why the

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<sup>440</sup> Memorandum to Mr. Martin from Mr. Burton, *C-130's for Brazil and other South American Countries*, 31 Jan 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:594458/> [accessed 15 Jul 2021]

<sup>441</sup> Letter from Vernon Waters to Major General Alva R. Fitch, *Assessment of Anti-American Sentiment in Brazilian Army* 6 Mar 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:668977/> [accessed 11 Apr 2018] p.3

leading group of military conspirators decided to hold on to power and govern for themselves. For this reason, the analysis of the *Counterinsurgency Doctrine* (CI), which can be classified as part of the evolution of the NSD, is vital if we are to grasp what caused the Brazilian military to decide to govern the country themselves. It will also be necessary to discuss the effect of the United States *Military Assistance Programme* (MAP) along with overseas training courses. They were not only useful means of creating links between the armed forces of both countries, but they were also highly effective instruments for promoting counterinsurgency and indoctrinating large segments of the South American military.

At this juncture it is necessary to highlight that the U.S. was not ahead of its time when it came to CI. During the 1950s the ESG's most prolific strategic thinkers, for example General Golbery<sup>442</sup> and Coronel Augusto Fragoso<sup>443</sup> were already heavily interested in counterinsurgency and revolutionary war, while the United States was still more concerned with nuclear war. The reason for this was that the state of affairs in Brazil at that time "made fear of revolutionary war much more relevant" for Brazilian strategists than for their American counterparts<sup>444</sup>.

Yet by the 1960s the global context would firmly fix U.S. attention on revolutionary war and counterinsurgency necessities. "The characteristics of war material sent to underdeveloped countries" changed to focus on "light" equipment for "guerrilla warfare", along with these underdeveloped countries having to "take on an active military role", as it was "their responsibility to prevent/suppress revolutionary war within its borders" with the U.S. providing "orientation"<sup>445</sup>. This new interpretation of the Cold War would set a dangerous precedent, converting itself into the *raison d'être* of the different South American military dictatorships.

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<sup>442</sup>In both *Geopolítica do Brasil* and *Planejamento Estratégico* Golbery spoke of "the phenomena of insurrection, social-revolutionary or subversive war", which he viewed to be "techniques employed by" the Communist-Soviet bloc. On the threat this represented to underdeveloped nations he wrote that "communist ideology fulfils its principal role as an impalpable spearhead", which mobilised "a disciplined and fanatical minority of professionals in revolution to create an atmosphere of turmoil. By "deepening all dissensions and exploiting all resentments, in constantly fanning hatred towards the West, all in such a way as to promote, at the first favourable opportunity, the outbreak, as the case may be, of a coup d'état or an insurrection of the masses". p.235-236. Quoted in ASSUNÇÃO, Vânia Noeli Ferreira de. *Op. cit.* p.133

<sup>443</sup> FRAGOSO, Augusto *Introdução ao Estudo da Guerra Revolucionária*. Brasil: Departamento de Estudos, Escola Superior de Guerra, 1959. In 1959 the Brazilian Coronel wrote a study on revolutionary war, how it was fought, and what actions (referred to as counter-revolutionary action) could be taken to thwart it.

<sup>444</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.130

<sup>445</sup> ASSUNÇÃO, Vânia Noeli Ferreira de. *Op. cit.* p.134

The rise of counterinsurgency to its position of doctrinal dominance can be explained, by and large, as a consequence of the belief, held by many members of the Kennedy administration, that the USSR was no longer capable nor intent on invading South America. Rather, it was trying to spread communism by taking advantage of third world liberation movements. In the opinion of these *National Security men*<sup>446</sup>, revolutionary war in the Third World was international communism's latest strategy for global domination, and "behind all revolutionary phenomenon" was the hand of communism<sup>447</sup>. Examples such as Vietnam or the Cuban Revolution, along with Kennedy's obsession with it, only helped to confirm the existence of the Soviet Union's new strategy.

From the United States' viewpoint, the Cold War had taken on a new dimension, the U.S. needed the armed forces of South America to switch its focus away from hemispheric defence to anti-subversion psychological warfare<sup>448</sup>. The *Counterinsurgency Doctrine* was the weapon with which internal subversion and aggression would be fought. It would also be the way of assuring "U.S. political, social and economic objectives"<sup>449</sup>. The problem, however, was that this new interpretation of events in tandem with the *Truman Doctrine's* vision of the world, would cause the U.S. to perceive every Third World revolutionary movement through this prism.

Although the ESG was concerned with counterinsurgency before the 1960s, the United States take on it would have a lasting impact on those who were to form the military junta. The U.S. world view was to influence their understanding of internal events, and the national security state which they were to establish was infected by paranoia. Essentially, CI taught that the enemy's main weapon in revolutionary war was psychological action. In other words, the war was being fought with ideas, and by defeating them the military rulers believed they were destroying international communism. This, however, when applied to the reality of South

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<sup>446</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.120-21 Comblin uses this term to refer to the new breed of men that formed part of the new political elite. For a more detailed description see page 175.

<sup>447</sup> Idem p.43-45

<sup>448</sup> The U.S. had to convince "the Latin American military that their most patriotic role, their real role in the defense of the continent, was in the execution of a concept of 'defense through development". U.S. State Department. *A New Concept for Hemispheric Defense and Development*. Quoted in RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio *Op. cit.* p.248. Also RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.129 also talks of Washington's shift in focus on hemispheric defence.

<sup>449</sup> RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.248

America, would leave no room for distinction, everything from criticism or political opposition to guerrilla warfare or terrorism was to be classified as revolutionary war<sup>450</sup>.

As one author put it, "U.S. orientation conjured up a commie behind every plea for reform"<sup>451</sup>, and the crushing repression experienced throughout the dictatorship was a result of this. In essence, this zero tolerance stance towards even the slightest criticism would result in setting a dangerous precedent, and "in the Brazilian context" it "suggest[ed] the need to fight... all the forces that opposed the strategic project of the *elite*"<sup>452</sup>. This was to such an extent, that even criticisms of the United States, the maximum exponent of anticommunism and Brazil's top ally, were to be viewed as equivalent to subversion of Brazilian national security<sup>453</sup>.

The ideological construction of the national security state meant that not only was any form of disagreement seen as subversion, but that the state would do its utmost to close down all spaces where these could occur<sup>454</sup>. In this new phase of the Cold War, a nation's survival was dependent on the states' ability to reign supreme avoiding possible situations where ideological divergences could prevent it from guaranteeing the defence of *National Objectives*. It all came down to maintaining national security so that all the nation's resources could be focused on the fulfilling of these objectives.

More often than not, the *National Objectives* set out by the different South American military theoreticians were very vague as well as generalised, yet this was what made them so perfect for their role. They were designed to cover all aspects in addition to values of a society, granting them, along with those who would take on the task of achieving them, unlimited scope. Seeing that their fulfilment was indispensable for a nation's survival, *National Objectives* would take precedence over everything, and all means as well as practices were permitted in the defence or pursuit of them. In Brazil's case this was no different, its six all-encompassing *National Objectives* were: 1. *Territorial Integrity* 2. *National Integrity* (this referred to consolidating "the entire national community... thanks to a spirit of growing solidarity, free of prejudices of any kind, with a conscious and active participation in the

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<sup>450</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.47 and p.49

<sup>451</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.194

<sup>452</sup> OLIVEIRA, Eliézer Rizzo de *A DNS: Pensamento Político e Projeto Estratégico* in *Revista Política e Estratégia* (vol. VI nº 2). São Paulo, Convívio 1988. p.241. Quoted in ASSUNÇÃO, Vânia Noeli Ferreira de. *Op. cit.* p.135

<sup>453</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.232

<sup>454</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.74

common effort to preserve the values that characterise the traditionally Christian Brazilian cultural personality") 3. *Democracy* 4. *Progress* 5. *Social Peace* 6. *Sovereignty*<sup>455</sup>.

Another key element of CI which was fundamental in persuading the military elite to govern for themselves, was the elimination of the limits of the traditional military sphere of competence. Elemental to counterinsurgency thinking was the imperative to confront communist aggression and subversion with *Nation Building*. This was the "execution of social, economical, technical and political change so as to assimilate an underdeveloped nation with the United States"<sup>456</sup>. In addition to this, the Kennedy administration believed that by supporting visible development projects, it could combat the influence of political currents contrary to U.S. interests. Consequently, the *Counterinsurgency Doctrine* was to contain extensive content on economic development planning. It was vital to make South America's armed forces "see the relation of insurgency to socio-economic development", as defence against internal subversion required "a blend of political and military measures"<sup>457</sup>.

For the Kennedy government this meant that counterinsurgency training would have to include everything from combating guerrilla movements, crowd control in urban areas, psychological warfare and identification and elimination of subversives to economic initiatives such as land reform, infrastructure projects and community development programmes. As a result of this, U.S. policy makers saw in the Latin American military the only group competent enough to carry out reforms for nation building while maintaining internal security<sup>458</sup>. According to some scholars who were advising Kennedy, "military organisations could contribute to the social and economic development envisioned in the *Alliance for Progress*" while upholding order and security<sup>459</sup>. Another view was that the

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<sup>455</sup> AMARAL GURGEL, José Alfredo. *Segurança e Democracia*. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1967. p.75. Quoted in COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.51-52.

<sup>456</sup> Idem p.144

<sup>457</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.75 on p.74 the author explains that a Modernisation Institute was set up which was dedicated to elaborating training programmes on economic development planning and counterinsurgency tactics.

<sup>458</sup> RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.233 and p.236-237 "the basic argument was that business and political elites had failed to develop their countries, and that the military was the only group with the organisational skills and attitudes capable of generating changes. "The military formed a kind of vanguard, the most cohesive sector of the middle classes of an underdeveloped country. Not only were they able to provide the necessary leadership, but they were far removed from venality, corruption, nepotism and partisan rivalries that characterised the political groups in these countries. "Within the army, a strong sense of mission and national greatness... could define more clearly the elements capable of building the nation".

<sup>459</sup> CHILD, J. *The Inter American Military System*. Ph. D. The American University, 1978. According to the author, in 1965 at a hearing before Congress, the commander of SOUTHCOM (U.S. Southern Command) spoke of the link between the *Alliance for Progress* and the *Military Aid Program*: "the fundamental answer to many of the problems in Latin America is in the *Alliance for Progress*. Our military assistance programmes are

armed forces were seen to be "as competent as any other group concerned with national policy"<sup>460</sup>. Very present here was the contradictory hypothesis that real long-lasting change could be implemented while avoiding the necessary upheaval and disorder that comes with it.

A big part of this drive to get the military involved in national development was through the initiative of *Civic Military Action*. In addition to the indoctrination which was to take place during the various training courses at different U.S. institutes as well as bases, civic-action programmes were also instrumental in convincing members of Latin America's armed forces that they were the most adequate to govern. *Civic Military Action* envisaged the armed forces combining their traditional role of defence with a new one of building a nation. Through the construction of infrastructure the military would refurbish its image while "undermining the appeal of radicals"<sup>461</sup>. President Kennedy was particularly "enthused" by the initiative as he believed he had come across "a technique fundamental to conquering the hearts and minds of populations seduced by revolution"<sup>462</sup>.

The problem, however, was that the combination of counterinsurgency and *Civic Military Action* was conducive to the military taking control of the government. These two policies "implicitly encouraged the Latin American military to enter the political arena by linking security and development and urging the military to become deeply involved in all stages of society"<sup>463</sup> with the aim of defeating subversion. As one author put it, "civic action consisted in taking over government duties". As a result, "the military became convinced that only they were capable of organising and developing the country"<sup>464</sup>.

Whether *Civic Military Action* along with CI were intentionally implemented with the aim of inspiring the armed forces to enter into politics and establish military regimes, or whether they were simply misguided as well as poorly judged policies is a tricky question to answer.

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consistent with, and really a part of, the *Alliance for Progress*. The hope of this great region lies in the effort we are making equally through the *Alliance* and the MAP". Quoted in RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.250

<sup>460</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.128 The author mentions John J. Johnson, Lucian W. Pye, Max Millikan and Walt W. Rostow as some of the intellectuals who supported the idea that the military had a key role to play in modernising as well as developing the underdeveloped nations of South America. In RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.228-229 these intellectuals "shared enthusiasm" for the organisational abilities as well as the attitudes of the armed forces. They believed they could carry out social change effectively as they would be capable of maintaining the type of order necessary for development. In countries where communist guerrilla movements could be active, "it was up to the military not only to fight the enemy forces, but also to take part in the modernization process". "In order to defeat the guerrilla it was necessary to create the structure of a modern nation".

<sup>461</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.132

<sup>462</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.46

<sup>463</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.144

<sup>464</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.143

Over the following paragraphs, it is an issue that will be explored in more detail in an attempt to try and clarify better the Kennedy administrations application of the *Counterinsurgency Doctrine*.

In these circumstances, another factor which would persuade the armed forces that they were apt for governing was the limitless threat that the enemy posed to internal security. The doctrine preached that all forms of divergence from what the military considered to be ideologically acceptable were acts of subversion. Therefore, according to this logic, the ways in which the enemy could manifest itself were uncountable. It could subvert as well as penetrate all areas of national life, corrupting the values of the nation placing its survival in doubt whenever it had the opportunity.

Fearing that "the enemy was indefinite" and that it could "adapt itself to all environments, using all possible methods to achieve its objectives"<sup>465</sup>, counterinsurgency security measures would also have to be as far-reaching and applicable to society as a whole. In this sense, "both political and economic life, cultural or ideological life became problems of security"<sup>466</sup>. The traditional separation between politics and military was too disappear due to this need to preserve security by controlling everything. What was once civilian now had to be dominated by the national security inspired military.

In addition to this omnipresent enemy, NSD conceptualisations on *Total War* along with revolutionary war would also promote this tendency in favour of military rule. The basic premise was the assimilation of politics and war, as a nation's political policy was the pursuit of war objectives necessary for its survival. In other words, it was vital to establish a *National Strategy* capable of organising a nations resources in order to fulfil *National Objectives*<sup>467</sup>. This *Total War* perspective helped to convince the armed forces that they alone were capable of governing. As they saw it, they were the only ones who could be counted on to form a strong central government with sound economic planning up to the task of defending the country. Furthermore, who but the military elite would always put the security and wellbeing of the nation before ideological, personal or political interests<sup>468</sup>?

From this the leaders of coup drew another conclusion which would persuade them that military rule was crucial; the failure of the civilian dominated political system to defend the

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<sup>465</sup> Idem p.48-49

<sup>466</sup> Idem p.57

<sup>467</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.75-76

<sup>468</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.182

nation. If on the one hand the NSD taught them that a strong centralised government with an efficient *National Strategy* was vital to a country's survival, on the other it led the military elite to hold the view that corrupt, inept and mismanaged civilian governments had left the country in the dangerous situation it was in. The political past of the nation was judged to be "a failure" and the armed forces held the civilian governments responsible. It was their "demagoguery and corruption" along with their "incompetence" which had driven "the nation to the edge of the abyss". In their opinion, the extremeness of the war called for military rule, yet it was not just a simple task of "substituting a bad government for a good one". The civilian politicians had "corroded the structure of the nation, destroying it or leaving it in such disorder that, in a way, it was necessary to rebuild it from scratch"<sup>469</sup>. What the new military leaders had in mind was a regeneration of the nation so that it could stand the pressures and face up to the challenges of the war.

Some authors have been of the opinion that, for hegemonic needs, the U.S. also believed the South American armed forces to be the only elite capable of governing, actively indoctrinating them with negative conceptions of civilian rule as stated above. Due to the nature of individual South American political systems, politicians opposed to U.S. interests could get into power, and even friendly civilian administrations could not be trusted to keep the order and stability<sup>470</sup> necessary for the arrival of private capital envisaged by *Nation Building*. United States' officials were convinced that the underdeveloped South American political systems were the perfect target for communist subversion. According to one source "Kennedy had come to recognise that the military often represented more competence in administration" than any other group. Additionally, while the regimes which were born out of the coups were not democratic, they were "a key political actor that opposed extremism", serving as a "stabilising force"<sup>471</sup>. It has already been pointed out that as far back as 1962 Kennedy officials looked to strengthen the Brazilian Armed Forces in case they needed them to intervene<sup>472</sup>.

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<sup>469</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.75-76

<sup>470</sup> HUNTINGTON, S. P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968 p.224 The author claimed that the Goulart government allowed instability, as it advocated radical policies, and it permitted the participation of groups that the military preferred to exclude from politics. For this reason, the Brazilian Armed Forces acted to remove it.

<sup>471</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.123 and p.146

<sup>472</sup> See White House, Transcript of Meeting between President Kennedy, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and Richard Goodwin, July 30, 1962. (Published in *The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises, Volume One* (W.W. Norton), edited by Timothy Naftali, October 2001.) National Security Archive. NS Archive. p.2



In her book Jan Knippers Black puts forward evidence of certain members of the United States Armed Forces who were very much in favour of a military government in Brazil. For example, Major Douglas L. Weers stated in 1967 that while Branco's methods were not "democratic", they were "effective and necessary in order to stop the trend toward communism and disaster which the Goulart regime was following". Another official, Lieutenant Commander Dayton R. Hahne wrote that the civilian politicians could not provide "a strong, capable, constitutional and democratic government". As a consequence, the Brazilian Armed Forces took the action which they saw as "appropriate to achieve their desires"<sup>473</sup>.

General Robert Seitz even doubted that a communist coup was possible in 1964, "but he felt that the coup was necessary anyway for the purpose of stemming corruption and inflation". This general's "enthusiasm" for the coup had more to do with their being "greater efficiency in dictatorship" at getting "the government on the right course"<sup>474</sup> than with eliminating the threat that internal communist subversion represented. Even though these opinions did not represent official policy, it is curious to see how some high-ranking U.S. military personnel defended the military dictatorship along with its style of governing as necessary as well as a success.

It is noteworthy to mention that General Robert Seitz was a member of the Joint Brazilian United States Military Commission (JBUSMC), which as well as linking the "military establishments of two countries more closely" had incredible reach. For example, the JBUSMC agreement provided that the U.S. delegation could "maintain contact liaison... with appropriate Brazilian governmental departments and agencies, i.e., Ministry of Finance, Chief of Police, Director of Traffic, Post Office Department, Ministry of Foreign affairs, Inspector of Customs, Post Director and the Vehicle Registration Bureau, in order to facilitate JBUSMC interests within those agencies"<sup>475</sup>.

What must now be analysed are the ways in which the United States were able to penetrate the armed forces with their doctrine. As it has been stated, this process took on two forms, with the more traditional mechanisms of creating bonds in order to establish influence being examined in the previous section. Now it is necessary to study those techniques and tactics which aimed to indoctrinate the South American military so as to achieve short-term U.S.

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<sup>473</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.196

<sup>474</sup> *Idem* p.186-187

<sup>475</sup> *Idem* p.164-165

national security objectives (these being those related to revolutionary war and counterinsurgency).

The *Military Assistance Programme* was one such technique through which the United States exported its doctrines to the Brazilian Armed Forces. It was created in 1951 by the *Mutual Security Act* with the task of donating obsolete military equipment to the Third World, and to be eligible to receive assistance countries had to sign a pact of mutual assistance with the U.S.<sup>476</sup>. By way of the MAP, the United States was able to increase the influence it held over the military of developing nations, as it ultimately eliminated the competition from other industrialised western countries to supply the Third World<sup>477</sup>. In essence, through the donation or sale of material<sup>478</sup>, which required instructors to be sent in order to teach maintenance and usage, the MAP sought to "establish ties" in addition to "dependence"<sup>479</sup>.

Once a MAP was set up, a *Military Assistance Advisory Group* (MAAG) was sent to the country. In theory, the members of the MAAG that went to Brazil were sent to advise and train their counterparts on how to use as well as maintain their newly acquired equipment. However, the Kennedy administration's policy shift from hemispheric defence to internal security against the advent of revolutionary war, would change the focus of MAP donations. The South American military no longer needed tanks, artillery or warships, but rather riot gear and hardware to deal with disturbances along with helicopters, armoured vehicles, planes and corvettes for quick internal displacement<sup>480</sup>.

From 1961, the *Military Assistance Advisory Groups* role would be to give instruction on how to use the new equipment, as well as to export counterinsurgency tactics and to disseminate *Civic Action*. Where ever a MAAG went it "immediately acquired influence. It gained entry into the Ministry of War or General Staff of the army that received it, and from there, it ran operations". Speaking at the time Comblin said, "their function is not only technical: soon it becomes political"<sup>481</sup>.

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<sup>476</sup> COMBLIN p.138

<sup>477</sup> Kennedy, Charles Stuart, Melbourne L Spector, and A. Lincoln Gordon. Interview with A. Lincoln Gordon. 1987. Manuscript/Mixed Material. <https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000431/> [accessed 9 Jan 2020] p.35

<sup>478</sup> According to Roitmann the sale of weapons was not part of the MAP. It was conducted under the title of *Foreign Military Sales*. ROSENMANN, Marcos Roitman p.143

<sup>479</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p. 138

<sup>480</sup> ROSENMANN, Marcos Roitman. *Op. cit.* p.143-44 Also in Telegram from Rio de Janeiro to Secretary of State, *Embassy Comment on Depcirtel 230*, 21 Aug 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:684550/> [accessed 19 Sep 2019] p.3

<sup>481</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.138

In the case of Brazil, the MAP provided the perfect platform for the U.S. to push its doctrinal agenda onto what it considered to be "the nation's most significant anti-communist element". As Ambassador Gordon stated in 1962, very few units in the Brazilian Armed Forces were being supported by the MAP ("less than ten percent of the overall military forces of Brazil"), resulting in a lack of focus on internal security issues. Gordon claimed that, "neither military nor civilian elements in government would accept" that military spending on traditional defence be cut in order to finance economic and social projects. In his point of view, although the Brazilian military had "traditionally played a significant role" in development, further MAP involvement in Brazil was required as it "emphasise[d] civic action and internal security", which would "inspire them to play an even larger future role" in social and economic development<sup>482</sup>.

In March 1964, just a month before the coup, Gordon confirmed the progress the MAP in Brazil had made. Firstly, it had been "a highly important factor influencing [the] military to be pro-U.S. and pro-Western". Moreover, the ambassador reported that in regard to *Civic Action* "almost every unit is involved to a degree and some such as [the] Army Engineer Construction Battalion devote full time to" it. What is also curious about this document are the specific guidelines that Gordon gives on how to further improve relations with the Brazilian Armed Forces, he mentions that while "Brazilian Armed Forces are strongly conscious [of] their internal security role and their activities in constructive Nation Building", they also "resent being assigned a strictly police role" normally adopted by the military of smaller Latin American nations. As many Brazilian officers saw it, Brazil "was on the threshold of being a significant world power", therefore its military deserved a more fitting and prestigious role<sup>483</sup>.

Gordon, in addition to the MAAG present in Brazil, believed that by taking the correct course of action, the U.S. could "turn to [its] advantage" this "fundamental element in psychology of Brazilian military nationalism". He went on to recommend increasing MAP spending in Brazil to "20million per year" due to the fact that the "maintenance of pro-U.S. orientation [in] Brazilian military requires hardware availability consonant both with effective discharge

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<sup>482</sup> Telegram from Rio de Janeiro to Secretary of State, *Embassy Comment on Depcirtel 230*, 21 Aug 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:684550/> [accessed 19 Sep 2019]

<sup>483</sup> Telegram for Mann from Ambassador, *Role of Brazilian Military*, 4 Mar 1964. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:658069/> [accessed 8 Sep 2020] p.2 and p.5

critical [for] internal security role and with [the] sense of dignity of armed forces of [a] large nation"<sup>484</sup>.

If on the one hand the *Military Assistance Programme* after 1961 had promoted, through the expansion of *Civic Action*, a shift in focus from hemispheric defence to internal security, on the other special U.S. training courses, with heavy ideological content<sup>485</sup>, directly accompanied it, bringing about a change in attitude within the South American military<sup>486</sup>. The drive by the United States to indoctrinate the Latin American armed forces was such that by the year 1975, up to 71,651 members of the services had received training in a U.S. school<sup>487</sup>. Jan Knippers Black claims that, in addition to courses taking place in schools in U.S. bases in the Panama Canal Zone, there were "more than 140 military installations in the continental United States accommodating foreign military trainees in the mid-1960s". The most infamous of the U.S. institutes is the *School of the Americas* at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone, which was nicknamed the "coup d'état school"<sup>488</sup>, as by 1973 170 of its graduates were either "head of state, ministers, commanders-in-chief of the armed forces, or directors of the intelligence services in their respective countries"<sup>489</sup>.

Other institutes that deserve a mention for their notoriety are the *U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC)*, where General Ernesto Geisel studied, at Fort Leavenworth, the *Institute for Military Assistance*, which included courses on psychological operations, at Fort Bragg and the *Inter-American Defence College* for the highest-ranking officials in Washington<sup>490</sup>. Furthermore, there were also *Mobile Training Teams (MTTs)* which provided instruction to members of the South American armed forces in their own countries. One such MTT was made up of members of the *U.S. Eighth Special Forces Group*, also known as the *Green Berets*. On a possibly related note, Brazilian historian Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira stated that there were several training camps for counter-revolutionary paramilitaries and

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<sup>484</sup> Idem p.2 and p.3

<sup>485</sup> The "indoctrination of [South American] military personnel along lines favourable to U.S. interests" was paramount to counterinsurgency. *Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council*. Washington, Janeiro, 1961. FRUS. 1961-63. Volume IX. Foreign Economic Policy. Documento 84. Quoted in RIBEIRO, Ricardo Alaggio. *Op. cit.* p.247

<sup>486</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.126

<sup>487</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.140

<sup>488</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.170 and p.173

<sup>489</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.141

<sup>490</sup> In BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.171 and p.173 Also in COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.141

weapon storage in the northeast of Brazil. Under CIA orders, the *Green Berets* were in charge of preparing these paramilitaries for a possible guerrilla war<sup>491</sup>.

Even though the courses taught concentrated on various areas of expertise for the different branches of the armed forces, they were all strongly focused on imparting information key to the Kennedy administration's *Counterinsurgency Doctrine*. Topics on maintaining internal security through counterinsurgency operations (whether against guerrilla movements or sporadic urban protests), intelligence (identification of subversives and communists), interrogation (instruction was often based on torture and other coercive measures<sup>492</sup>), *Nation Building* along with *Civic Action* and the military's role in civil affairs were all too common. Additionally, great emphasis was placed on ideological matters related to the struggle between "democracy" and communism. Reading material included titles such as "Communist Conquest and Colonisation", "How Communism Controls the Thoughts of the Nation", "How Communists Gain and Retain Power", "Communism versus Democracy" and "A Nation's Answer to Communism"<sup>493</sup>.

Undoubtedly, these "ideologically biased" courses "opened the door to the militarisation of society"<sup>494</sup>. As Comblin stated "the strategy that the Latin American officials learnt in those schools directly or indirectly lead them to take over political duties"<sup>495</sup> and the running of the nation. The Armed Forces saw themselves as the only elite capable of governing, and their lack of trust in civilian politicians meant they were unlikely to have relinquished power. Yet, the range of techniques taught in U.S. schools, in addition to the change in the type of military equipment supplied by MAPs, would ensure that the new military dictatorships were especially lasting and repressive. Through both training and MAPs the U.S. contributed to increasing the South American military's coercive abilities. In this sense, long-range bombers or "a warship would perhaps not intimidate a labour organiser or a peasant leader, but gas grenades and shotguns could be used to terrorise social activists"<sup>496</sup>.

Even back in 1961 Undersecretary of State, Chester Bowles, criticised the Kennedy government for "failing to build into our training programmes... an understanding of the values and practices of a democratic society". When referring specifically to Brazil, Bowles

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<sup>491</sup> BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *A Presença dos...* p.449 and p.459-460

<sup>492</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.143-147

<sup>493</sup> Idem p.172-174 and ROSENMAN, Marcos Roitman. *Op. cit.* p.142-143.

<sup>494</sup> ROSENMAN, Marcos Roitman. *Op. cit.* p.142 and p.146

<sup>495</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.141

<sup>496</sup> RABE, Stephen. G. *Op. cit.* p.144

questioned if through the military aid programme the U.S. was "creating trained armed forces capable of seizing power"<sup>497</sup>. Another criticism made in 1964 by two Chilean officials was that their American counterparts "seemed to be convinced that their mission was not only to defend the hemisphere against communists, but also against civilians"<sup>498</sup>.

The question that must be taken into consideration is where can the line be drawn on the U.S. policy being purely misguided as well as inexpertly thought out, or on it being a deliberate strategy to defend its hegemony by encouraging the military to take power? It is clear that from 1962 onwards, the United States perceived it to be imperative to strengthen the *Brazilian Armed Forces* in addition to consolidating its relationship with them as a sure-fire way of assuring democratic pro-U.S. tendencies. The hypothesis, then, that the U.S. truly believed that through its assistance it was instilling in the FA democratic values could be admissible. Kennedy officials at the time thought that the Brazilian military would acquire democratic values through mere contact with personnel from the U.S. Armed Forces<sup>499</sup>.

Another opinion, which would suggest the policy to be, more than anything, misguided, is that the United States had firm faith in the credence that it was using its power for the greater good, that its actions were justified as it was bettering the world<sup>500</sup>. This idea was born out of the *Manifest Destiny*, a key element of the American collective imaginary which professed the United States had a divine mission to expand territorially and spread ideals on democracy, liberty and equality<sup>501</sup>. In this regard, the NSD along with the *Counterinsurgency Doctrine* were legitimised by the fact that they were being employed to defend democratic principles and the cause of good.

In these circumstance, the repercussions of the *Counterinsurgency Doctrine* might not have been one hundred per cent expected by the United States. That said, were the many politicians, advisors, scholars and military along with intelligence officials, who all formed part of the process of creating and/or implementing the NSD and counterinsurgency, not aware of the hypothetical implications of teaching repressive doctrines as well as tactics and techniques to the military of Third World countries? Did they truly expect the same armed forces to respect democratic rule as well as values after receiving their counterinsurgency

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<sup>497</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.76-77

<sup>498</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.143

<sup>499</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.179

<sup>500</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.133

<sup>501</sup> RINKE, Stefan. *Op. cit.* p.57-58

training in addition to their MAP military hardware specifically created with the intention of cracking down on internal subversion?

Whatever the answers are to the questions posed above, the reality was that counterinsurgency was an innately undemocratic doctrine which espoused repressive tactics. It taught the Brazilian military to deal violently and ruthlessly with all forms of opposition; it convinced them that every individual was susceptible to communist subversion and, without credible evidence proving otherwise, was therefore a potential threat to national security; it instructed them to use violence as a means to submit the population, and as a way to impose its will on the nation<sup>502</sup>. While it is true that, due to their own anti-communist or pro-U.S. convictions, some members of the armed forces actively accepted as well as assimilated the doctrines that they were taught, many more were clearly indoctrinated.

The Brazilian national security state was the first of its kind, a "prototype... born in the interior of post Cuban revolution *National Security Doctrine*"<sup>503</sup>. Over the next decade other heavily U.S. indoctrinated armed forces from other Latin American countries would follow suit, setting up their own repressive regimes. The question of why the United States would be so interested in exporting this model of government when it so blatantly contradicted its own idealism is an easy one to answer. Quite simply, the NSD facilitated the Latin American military's acceptance of U.S. hegemony along with its integration in Washington's system. Through the NSD the elites of the different armed forces were given a position as well as a role of importance, it essentially persuaded them of the need to accept the United States' supremacy, its world order and the necessity to integrate themselves in it. It also gave them a model to follow, a reduced version of the metropolis' own doctrine adapted to their reality<sup>504</sup>. Equally, the adoption of the NSD by certain South American military elites assured them of Washington's support for their dictatorships. The new leaders of the military regimes would be well rewarded for their loyalty.

Finally, the concept of the 'threat' and the use of fear was also fundamental in convincing the Brazilian Armed Forces to act. The notion that Brazil's very existence and way of life were under threat from communism, in addition to other leftist tendencies, was integral in convincing the military, along with other sectors of Brazilian society, of the legitimacy of the coup. Through psychological warfare, the military takeover was made to seem defensive as

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<sup>502</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.221

<sup>503</sup> ROSENMAN, Marcos Roitman. *Op. cit.* p.134

<sup>504</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.104

well as democratic, as if the magnitude of the threat which confronted Brazil had obliged them to unselfishly act.

In this regard, the supporters of the coup d'état have often referred to it as a revolution and to its protagonists as the saviours of nation. In this next section, an analysis of some of the ways in which fear was manipulated and implemented will be explained. It is pertinent to mention that a large part of this fear based propaganda was orchestrated by the United States backed *Civic Action Groups*, such as IPES, IBAD and CAMDE. Therefore, it was not a campaign directly organised and controlled one hundred per cent by U.S. government officials. Furthermore, it could be argued that some of the propaganda from these Brazilian sources could have actually done the opposite, that is, to persuade U.S. officials about the 'imminent threat'.

The Cuban Revolution and the success of *Castrismo* have already been mentioned at an earlier point in the thesis, however here their re-examination is strictly related to the psychological impact they could have had on enhancing the climate of fear. For certain sectors of Brazilian society, the advent of the revolution in Cuba set the alarm bells ringing, and it was profoundly manipulated with this objective in mind. The way in which it had happened along with the far-reaching changes it had implemented, were coupled with the precedent it had set and the enormous influence it exerted over other leftist movements. The FA was particularly fearful of the events that had taken place in Cuba, as the revolution had destroyed the regular army replacing it with a popular militia<sup>505</sup>.

The possible *Cubanisation* of Brazil was a deciding factor in convincing many officers, including ones who were considered to be nationalists in favour of reform, to side with the coup plotters. It was believed that Castro-style communism and the triumph of the revolution would encourage the left to use violent tactics in its pursuit of change. Moreover, many conservative officers professed that communist agitators would actively look to infiltrate the armed forces, undermining its discipline and hierarchy with the ultimate goal of replacing the military with "a version of a red army"<sup>506</sup>. These ideas were seemingly corroborated by events such as the *Peasant League's* land invasions, the Sergeants Revolt in September 1963, the mass rally in favour of reforms on the 13th of March 1964 and the Naval Mutiny on the 26th of March 1964, which was widely supported by the trade unions.

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<sup>505</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.155

<sup>506</sup> *Documento LEEEX [Lealdade ao Exército]* quoted in STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.157



These events, which were construed as confirmation of the danger posed to hierarchy, discipline and the survival of military institution as a whole, were key to causing the nationalist-reformist elements in the armed forces to break with their civilian counterparts. It was this common fear for the future of the military institution which would assure the coup d'état of the necessary backing for its success; it created the necessary unity and cohesion for the armed forces to act jointly. For the sake of what was perceived to be institutional survival, political as well as personal differences were put aside, and officers, such as General Amery Kruel, who had once been close allies of Goulart and of his *nacional-reformista* policies ended up supporting the uprising<sup>507</sup>.

This 'threat', nevertheless, was not what it appeared to be. The reality was that the climate of fear, needed to convince the military to rise up against Goulart, was the product of effective psychological warfare. Essentially, "the perception that a threat was being made was as politically significant as the reality of any such threat". The conservative elite, which was representative of multinational and associated interests, mounted a propaganda campaign that disseminated false information on communist infiltration. Through the IBAD/IPES complex, all manner of resources, such as reports and charts, were created to spread this idea. They were then vastly distributed between members of the services, businessmen and professionals to demonstrate the threat that it posed to their interests<sup>508</sup>. In what was an "ideological bombardment", IBAD and IPES employed television, radio and a wide range of published material to specifically try "to mould opinions in the armed forces, instilling a sense of immediate destruction of the hierarchy, institutions and of the nation"<sup>509</sup>.

Of enormous interest are the claims that these U.S. backed conservative elites also made use of agent provocateurs<sup>510</sup> to give credit to their propaganda on communist infiltration. One such case that has come under special scrutiny is that of the Enlisted Men's Naval Mutiny in March 1964, as it was decisive in provoking "strong *Jangistas*" in the military to finally break with him<sup>511</sup>. On March 26th over a thousand sailors barricaded themselves in protest inside the Metalworkers' Union Building in Rio de Janeiro. They refused to obey the orders

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<sup>507</sup> Department of Defence Intelligence Information Report, *Tensions between Goulart and Kruel*, 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:726224/> [accessed 4 Feb 2020] On being replaced as War Minister, General Kruel told Goulart that he "deplored [Goulart's] yeilding to leftist forces", and "that he had not just lost a minister, but a friend".

<sup>508</sup> DREIFUSS René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.234-235

<sup>509</sup> Idem p.244-245

<sup>510</sup> Idem p.141

<sup>511</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.208 *Jangista* is in reference to supporters of Goulart, who was nicknamed Jango.

of the Navy Minister, Sílvio Motta, and effectively, mutinied until their demands were met. The situation became so tense that Motta requested the sending of twelve tanks along with five hundred soldiers<sup>512</sup>. What made matters worse was Goulart's handling of the situation. For fear of upsetting the bulk of his support, he refused to back the Navy Minister Motta, who sought to harshly punish the enlisted men. Rather, Goulart "vacillated" and "abdicated the decision" to the new Navy Minister, Paulo Mário, who granted an amnesty to those involved<sup>513</sup>.

The mutiny along with the perceived leniency shown to the sailors was a turning point, and it hurt Goulart's standing within the Armed Forces to such an extent that many consider it to have been "instigated by right-wing officers"<sup>514</sup>. In this regard, much has been made of the loyalties of the most important leader of the rebellion, José Anselmo dos Santos, Cabo (Corporal) Anselmo. It is now known that the Corporal worked as a double agent for Brazilian intelligence services during the 1970s, with his collaboration leading to the arrests and deaths of leaders of the *Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária* (VPR). Moreover, he participated in *Operation Condor* on the side of the Brazilian dictatorship, and he spent time in Chile working with the notorious DINA (*Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia*)<sup>515</sup>.

What remains unknown is when exactly Cabo Anselmo was recruited by Brazilian intelligence. One view is that it was not until 1971 when he was arrested in São Paulo. Apparently, he had joined the VPR and, after attending training in Cuba, was captured on his return and converted. Another claims that in 1964 he was already "a CENIMAR (*Centro de Informações da Marinha*) agent and steered by the CIA". Goulart was reputedly warned that Anselmo was a "CENIMAR-CIA plant", yet he did nothing about it<sup>516</sup>. The latter then "camouflaged his trail" alleging to have been arrested and tortured after the military takeover, enabling him to maintain his story and to continue to infiltrate leftist movements. Once his work for the military was concluded he underwent plastic surgery and was given a new identity<sup>517</sup>.

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<sup>512</sup> DULLES, John W. F. *Op. cit.* p.279-281

<sup>513</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.204-206 and DULLES, John W. F. *Op. cit.* p.280-285

<sup>514</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.206

<sup>515</sup> ROSE, R. S. *The Unpast Elite Violence and Social Control in Brazil, 1954-2000*. Athens (USA): Ohio University Press, 2005. p.77

<sup>516</sup> BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *O Governo João Goulart...* p.170

<sup>517</sup> Idem p.77 and GREEN, James N. *Exile within Exiles: Herbert Daniel, Gay Brazilian Revolutionary*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018. The author claims Anselmo's "biography remains clouded in ambiguities and contradictions, many of which he himself has created".

Whether the Navy Mutiny was orchestrated by conservative forces or not will remain a mystery unless previously unseen documentation can throw some new light on the event. What is evident is that the mutiny was pivotal in convincing the more moderate elements in the armed forces that the 'threat' was real. The IBAD/IPES indoctrination campaign was partially vindicated by events whatever Cabo Anselmo's allegiances were in 1964.



José Anselmo dos Santos, Cabo Anselmo, leader of the sailor's mutiny. Source: NENoticias (<https://www.nenoticias.com.br/cabo-anselmo/>).

## **Chapter Four - Orientation and Organisation**

Even though there were different factions who did huge amounts of work to remove Goulart, conspiring actively and aggressively against him, the need to explore the relationship that the United States maintained with these groups of great relevance. It is true that there is insufficient existing documentation to prove the full extent of U.S. involvement with these groups, and until this becomes available many doubts will continue to remain. That said, there is enough evidence to demonstrate that the United States, through different officials as well as agencies and departments, maintained close contact with all sorts of conspirators in addition to the various participants in the coup d'état. What is more, all of this was carried out behind the back of a government which, in theory, was considered to be an ally. Not once did the U.S. inform the Goulart administration of those conspiring to bring it down.

Therefore, in this chapter certain cases will be examined in order to demonstrate the level of assistance Washington provided to groups and individuals who aimed to overthrow a democratic government, which the U.S. supposedly recognised as legitimate. The title, Orientation and Organisation, is used here as it best describes what the doctoral student believes to be those acts which do not construe full on participation in the coup on the 31st of March 1964. In many scenarios, orientation or organisation could be perceived as liaison or support, with the former often coming in the form of financial, ideological, moral or material assistance. Moreover, when referring to liaison it must be stated that this does not only mean between the plotters and the United States, it also alludes to U.S. officials acting as an intermediary between the various anti-Goulart groups.

Finally, the doctoral student does not wish to suggest that the coming together of the conspiring anti-Goulart factions, and their eventual success was a solely a result of the liaison work carried out by U.S officials. As Brazilian historian Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta pointed out, by 1964 the nature of events meant that "the coup plotting, which had existed since the inauguration of Goulart, ceased to be confabulations of radical groups on the fringes of the political process, and began to involve "big people' from civil and military circles". He continued: "the conditions were in place and the main actors of the coup were prepared"<sup>518</sup>. In this sense, U.S. orientation and organisation of these groups, along with assurances of Washington's backing, would only help to spur them on. To not acknowledge this would be

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<sup>518</sup> MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.329-330

to ignore historical context, as well as to deny the Brazilians the ability to actively participate in their own history.

### **The Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática and the Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais**

When analysing the United States role in organising or orientating anti-Goulart opposition groups, IBAD and IPES are of primary significance. Firstly, while it must be stated that the vast majority of their operations as well as their day to day functioning were controlled by Brazilians, the way in which they were founded along with the vast sums of money that they received and managed confirm U.S. patronage. Additionally, the style of psychological warfare tactics employed by the two entities were carbon copies of those confirmed to be used by the CIA in its more infamous campaigns in Guatemala or Chile<sup>519</sup>.

Firstly, it must be stated that even though IBAD and IPES were separate institutes, the extreme intimacy of their activities as well as their members meant that they are alluded to simultaneously. It is for this reason that one leading expert referred to them as the IBAD/IPES complex<sup>520</sup>. That being said, they were quite different in setup, and operationally speaking they performed distinctive tasks. IBAD was founded in 1959 by Ivan Hasslocher, who also happened to be the director-president of *S.A. Incrementadora de Vendas*<sup>521</sup>, with the goal of "combating communist infiltration" and "defending democracy"<sup>522</sup>. At the time, Hasslocher was suspected of being the "intermediary between hidden financial groups and the visible executors of a plan of intervention in the political life of the country"<sup>523</sup>, as well as "liaison agent" for the CIA in Brazil, Bolivia and Equador<sup>524</sup>.

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<sup>519</sup> AGEE, Philip. *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*. New York: Bantam, 1976. The author confirms that IBAD was a CIA operation, yet while IPES is not mentioned, the similarities between it and other CIA operations (Agee talks of his involvement in operations in Ecuador and Uruguay) detailed throughout the book are too strong to ignore. LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p. 118-119 confirms CIA tactics implemented in Brazil were later used in Chile.

<sup>520</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *1964: a conquista do Estado. Ação política, poder e golpe de classe*. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1981.

<sup>521</sup> See Chapter Two, p.54

<sup>522</sup> LAMARÃO, Sérgio. *Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática*. In FGV CPDOC. <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/instituto-brasileiro-de-acao-democratica-ibad> [accessed 24 Nov 2018] and BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.72

<sup>523</sup> RELATORIO FINAL VOL. II ACERVO Comissão Estadual da Memória e Verdade Dom Helder Câmara p.48

IBAD operations basically consisted of providing funds to "ideologically compatible associations and individuals". In the 1962 legislative elections it was especially active. Hasslocher had created *Ação Democrática Popular* (ADEP), which acted as a channel to finance the campaigns of numerous ideologically committed candidates<sup>525</sup>. The aim was to fill parliament with enough anti-Goulart deputies so that national politics could be controlled. Additionally, ADEP aimed to achieve the election of like-minded state governors. These goals were to be achieved through a "broad ideological campaign, where vast financial and technological resources were mobilised to spread the idea of an imminent communist threat"<sup>526</sup>. As Motta stated, "during the Jango government the ADEP leadership became even more radical, transforming itself into one of the bastions of the conservative mobilization that led to the military coup"<sup>527</sup>

IBAD also had a monthly magazine, *Ação Democrática*, which was produced using expensive material and was distributed freely<sup>528</sup>. The publication was "dedicated to attacking communism, whether externally or internally", and most of its articles focused on highlighting communist infiltration in Brazil. Interestingly, the group's main "intention was to draw the attention of the Brazilian elites" to what IBAD considered to be "communist danger", and to convince them of the need to organize a defence against this threat<sup>529</sup>.

Nevertheless, due to the scale of its activities, which raised serious questions about the source of its funds, IBAD ran into problems. In 1962 it was investigated by a special parliamentary commission (*Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito*, CPI), which after certain deliberation and scandals alleging that some members of the CPI had also been beneficiaries of IBAD, concluded in IBAD's activities being suspended for three months<sup>530</sup>. At the time, the CPI was able to prove that most of IBAD's funds had come from foreign companies, especially from

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<sup>524</sup> VILLELA, Lucas Braga Rangel. *Os quinze ramos do IPÊS - Uma análise histórica dos audiovisuais do Instituto de Pesquisa de Estudos Sociais*. 2014. Dissertação (Mestrado em História) - Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis. p.96

<sup>525</sup> BLACK p.72-73 In order to receive economic support, candidates had to sign an ideological agreement to "place their loyalty to IBAD above loyalty to the party".

<sup>526</sup> COELHO, Fernando de Vasconcellos. et al. *Comissão Estadual da Memória e Verdade Dom Helder Câmara Relatório Final Volume II*. Recife: CEMVDHC, 2017. p.42

<sup>527</sup> MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.296

<sup>528</sup> Idem p.299 The author claims that the expensively produced, and freely distributed magazine was one of the factors that raised suspicion about the source of IBAD financing.

<sup>529</sup> Idem p.299

<sup>530</sup> LAMARÃO, Sérgio. *Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática*. In FGV CPDOC. <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/instituto-brasileiro-de-acao-democratica-ibad> [accessed 24 Nov 2018]

firms from the U.S.<sup>531</sup>. All forms of wrongdoing, however, were to remain secret due to the majority of the institutes documents being destroyed by fire<sup>532</sup>.

It was some years later that the true nature of IBAD was revealed. The institute had been set up in 1959 to "provide cover for American involvement in the Brazilian presidential elections of 1960". U.S. officials believed that, "when a CIA front such as IBAD did the preaching, it seemed to come from progressive Brazilians", giving the allusion they were helping themselves. Consequently, it was seen as a far more successful way to promote change than open "American preaching about Brazilian shortcomings"<sup>533</sup>. Furthermore, ex-CIA agent Philip Agee also corroborated that IBAD was "one of the Rio station's main political-action operations", and that in 1964 CIA operations in Brazil were facing certain difficulties due to the CPI investigating both IBAD as well as ADEP. Apparently, it had only been "the refusal of the *First National City Bank*, the *Bank of Boston* and the *Royal Bank of Canada* to reveal the foreign source of [IBAD] funds", which prevented the truth on the CIA's involvement from becoming public knowledge<sup>534</sup>.

Although IPES had existed since 1961, as a "small" discussion group<sup>535</sup>, it was not officially established as a formal research institute until February 1962. It was, in comparison to IBAD, a much larger and well structured organisation, which consisted of numerous hierarchical committees responsible for the institutes management. IPES was also far more secretive, hiding its activities behind various fronts, and keeping to a minimum its public exposure. IPES leaders strove to keep the organism in a "completely unattackable position"<sup>536</sup>. Having been set up by business men with links to the ESG<sup>537</sup>, IPES was to be a more ideologically

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<sup>531</sup> ROJAS, Robinson. *Estados Unidos en Brasil*. Santiago, Chile: Prensa Latinoamericana, 1965. Rojas named *Standard Oil of New Jersey*, *U.S. Steel*, *Texas Oil*, *Gulf Oil*, *Hanna Corporation*, *Bethlehem Steel*, *General Motors* and *Willys Overland*. p.151

<sup>532</sup> LAMARÃO, Sérgio. *Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática*. In FGV CPDOC. <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/instituto-brasileiro-de-acao-democratica-ibad> [accessed 24 Nov 2018]

<sup>533</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.65

<sup>534</sup> AGEE, Philip. *Op. cit.* p.273-74

<sup>535</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.72

<sup>536</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.231 Also in FILHO, Reinaldo Cardenuto. *Op. cit.* p.40 IPES decided to adopt this position of anonymity after meeting the leaders of another U.S. sponsored civilian entity on trips to both the United States and the Bahamas in 1962. According to the author, during these encounters the unspecified civilian group discussed how they had kept their involvement in a political organisation hidden from the public.

<sup>537</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.262-263 Otávio Marcondes Ferraz "played an important role articulating civilian and military elements". His home was used as "a centre of coordination". Júlio de Mesquita Filho, director of the newspaper *O Estado de S. Paulo*, was closely linked to more the military rightwing extremists.

orientated entity, with its operations firmly focused on indoctrination and psychological warfare.

The organisations leaders took it upon themselves to assume the role of an intellectual elite, or *elite orgânica*<sup>538</sup>. Their objectives consisted, on the one hand, of ultimately undermining national-reformism as well as discrediting the populist political system. IPES members were well aware that the success of the coup depended on "the degree of legitimacy ascribed to the executive and to the military". In this sense, much propaganda was dedicated to presenting military intervention as defensive instead of offensive. Goulart was presented as illegitimate and, therefore, it was claimed that action had to be taken against him to avoid chaos and bloodshed<sup>539</sup>. IPES leader Glycon de Paiva resumed the group's activities "as preparing civilians so as to assure an appropriate political climate for a military intervention"<sup>540</sup>.

On the other hand, IPES presented itself as a sort of think-tank which aimed to "promote cultural, social and civic education" in order to "fortify" and defend democratic institutions<sup>541</sup>. With this in mind, the organic elite looked to establish themselves as the defenders of the moderate centre, promoting their ideology on business and development<sup>542</sup> while, at the same time, attracting the middle classes to their cause by inciting fear of the organised masses. The politicisation along with further inclusion of the lower classes in politics was to be used as an important part of psychological warfare. It was manipulated and presented to other sectors of Brazilian society as evidence of the impending 'threat' that communist subversion and infiltration represented. In order to combat this, heavy emphasis

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<sup>538</sup> Idem Translated literally as organic elite, Dreifuss employs the term in reference to Antonio Gramsci's theories on superstructure and class hegemony. See VACA, Giuseppe. *Vida y Pensamiento de Antonio Gramsci: 1926-1937*. Madrid: Akal, 2020.

<sup>539</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.112 and p.90

<sup>540</sup> Idem p.229-230 Also in WEGNER, Felipe Henrique. *Op. cit.* p.97-98 These anti-communist activities could be resumed as the "right's search for the political center. The interaction and mutual intertwining of these efforts, which made use of a true campaign of moral panic, using anti-communism and religious values, blurred the lines that supposedly separated the liberal-democratic editorialist from the ultra-conservative military".

<sup>541</sup> PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.31-33

<sup>542</sup> MORAES, Dênis de. *A esquerda e o golpe de 64: vinte e cinco anos depois, as forças populares repensam seus mitos, sonhos e ilusões*. Rio de Janeiro: Espaço e Tempo, 1989. p.128 According to Moraes this was a "project of capitalist reorganization which basically implied the adoption of a strongly industrializing, associated capitalist model, with an economy centred mainly on a high degree of ownership concentration in industry, and which was to be strongly integrated with the banking system".



was to be placed on the defence of traditional values which idealised Western Christian democracy<sup>543</sup>.

A great deal of suspicion surrounds IPES due to its conduct along with its enormous expenditures, and it is believed that, just like IBAD, it had CIA origins. This theory has been defended by Ruth Leacock<sup>544</sup> who claims that, in 1962, IPES was "suddenly transformed" from an informal discussion group into an "organised research institute" with "a suite of offices in downtown Rio and eighty charter members", at a time when the CIA were establishing *Civic-action* groups all over South America. These civic organisations were being used by the CIA as fronts "for propaganda and as funding mechanisms for elections and other political action operations". Therefore, seeing how IPES operated and the tasks that it undertook, Leacock concluded:

*"The coincidence is too great to be entirely fortuitous. It was undoubtedly the CIA that contacted the businessmen's discussion group and suggested a somewhat more ambitious undertaking. It was the CIA that provided seed money for the new institute. The seed money probably came through IBAD. Relations between IBAD and IPES were close. The director of IBAD, Ivan Hasslocher, was a member of IPES."*<sup>545</sup>

Additionally, IPES was largely, although not ultimately, funded by U.S. companies as well as foundations<sup>546</sup>. The usage of conduits was a proven CIA strategy, and Niles Bond, U.S. Chargé d'affaires in Brazil, verified that, "U.S. funds were going into the IPES operation"<sup>547</sup>. Moreover, by examining the archives on IPES, available in the *Arquivo Nacional*, it is possible to corroborate these claims on IPES' financing. For example, the *Firemen's Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey* made a monthly contribution of CR\$8,000<sup>548</sup>.

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<sup>543</sup> PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.30 Presot wrote that at the beginning of the 1960s "the valued images of "Western and Christian" ideas were re-constituted and spread, especially through certain groups or institutions that showed themselves, in different degrees and according to different interests, increasingly concerned about the communist threat".

<sup>544</sup> The Brazilian historian Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira also defends the theory that IPES was linked to CIA in his book *O Governo João Goulart...* According to Moniz Bandeira, the CIA "gave them orientation, experience and also abundant funding, in an effort involving corruption and intrigue, to influence the [1962] elections, to impose directives on [the Brazilian] congress, to weaken the government and to overthrow a democratic regime" p.82.

<sup>545</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.72 and for confirmation as well as information on the CIA setting up *Civic-action* groups. Also see AGEE, Philip. *Op. cit.* p.247-48.

<sup>546</sup> MORAES, Dênis de. *Op. cit.* p.129. Moraes claimed that IPES received its "resources" from around "300 American business".

<sup>547</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.83

<sup>548</sup> Fichas de associados/contribuintes do IPÊS e fichas de inscrição canceladas dos associados, Arquivo Nacional.

The scale of U.S. corporate financing was such that in a meeting in 1963 Glycon de Paiva "suggested that no member of the Institute inform that foreign companies were part of its membership. Such concern corroborates the thesis that heavy investment by American multinationals was conditioned to the guidelines of an anti-Goulart and anti-communist policy"<sup>549</sup>.

One final piece of evidence, which adds to the notion that IPES had been propelled by the CIA, is the *Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade*. The marches had been organised and promoted by IPES along with its offshoot CAMDE. Agee affirmed "the Rio station and its larger bases were financing the mass urban demonstrations against the Goulart government"<sup>550</sup>. It is not hard to imagine that the CIA provided funds for the marches through IPES.

The material examined in the previous few paragraphs helps to clarify the financial links as well of origins of the IBAD/IPES complex<sup>551</sup> with the CIA. It is also important to emphasise that the United States also offered IPES ideological support "based on liberalism, anticommunism, and the concept of liberal democracy"<sup>552</sup>. In this regard, IPES "quickly adopted the *Alliance for Progress* charter", which provided them with an ideological platform from which they could attack Goulart's nationalist economic policies<sup>553</sup>.

It is in the opinion of this doctoral student that by analysing IPES psychological warfare, U.S. involvement (most likely through the CIA) can be confirmed. This does not mean that the CIA was necessarily implicated in the day to day management of IPES, nor does it imply that it played an active role in IPES assignments. That said, the Brazilian institute employed intricate indoctrination tactics similar in some ways to that of Goebbels<sup>554</sup>, and the general nature of its psychological warfare tends to suggest that the businessmen's discussion group

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[http://imagem.sian.an.gov.br/acervo/derivadas/br\\_rjanrio\\_ql/0/ofu/0056/br\\_rjanrio\\_ql\\_0\\_ofu\\_0056\\_d0001de0005.pdf](http://imagem.sian.an.gov.br/acervo/derivadas/br_rjanrio_ql/0/ofu/0056/br_rjanrio_ql_0_ofu_0056_d0001de0005.pdf) [accessed 25 Jul 2020] p.9

<sup>549</sup> VILLELA, Lucas Braga Rangel. *Op. cit.* p.60

<sup>550</sup> AGEE, Philip. *Op. cit.* p.311

<sup>551</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.143. Dreifuss employs the term *complexo* in Portuguese to refer to the informal alliance between the two organisations. He wrote that the IPES/IBAD complex served as the strategic centre for political action of the powerful upper class business-military coalition.

<sup>552</sup> VILLELA, Lucas Braga Rangel. *Op. cit.* p.60 and p.101. Also on p.98 Villela talks of IPES promoting the *American way of life* and using symbols and ideas related to it in its propaganda.

<sup>553</sup> FILHO, Reinaldo Cardenuto. *Op. cit.* p.39

<sup>554</sup> Idem p.100

received some sort of guidance; "it was a sophisticated action group, well prepared and equipped"<sup>555</sup>.

At this point it is noteworthy to mention CIA psychological operations (also known as PP operations), which were "to be found in almost every CIA station", and included "propaganda (also known simply as media), work in youth and student organisations, work in labour organisations, work in professional and cultural groups and in political parties"<sup>556</sup>. In addition to PP ops, "action operations" consisted "of the control, guidance and support of individuals and organisations engaged in the battle against communism throughout the world", with "businessmen's organisations"<sup>557</sup> quoted as specifically receiving backing. In this regard, the IBAD/IPES complex could be considered as a CIA action operation, which aided in the execution of psychological operations.

One final aspect to bear in mind when analysing IBAD/IPES conduct is what has been dubbed as the CIA's *Era of Paramilitarism*, whereby the U.S. would use whatever tactic necessary so long as a disguise could "be credibly maintained" (this is related to *psychological warfare* which has already been examined in Chapter Three). These "dirty techniques" included sabotage, terrorism, mob action and the infiltration as well as corruption of a specific target nation, and they were applied to both allied and unfriendly countries. Furthermore, the operations were to be almost exclusively carried out by non-American agents so that the United States could maintain plausible deniability<sup>558</sup>.

In Brazil many of these more audacious dirty tactics were undertaken by IBAD/IPES affiliated organisations, such as CAMDE, *Mobilização Democrática Mineira* or the *Frente da Juventude Democrática*<sup>559</sup>. With the objective of intimidating leftists and reformists or "breaking up their meetings or demonstrations", these groups employed techniques which the

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<sup>555</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.185

<sup>556</sup> AGEE, Philip. *Op. cit.* p.53-54

<sup>557</sup> *Idem* p.27

<sup>558</sup> MORRIS, George. *Op. cit.* p.24-26

<sup>559</sup> At this point the doctoral student believes it is important to point out a theory explored in another thesis, which defends that the radicalisation of conservative groups helped to provoke right-wing extremist groups to employ violence as a political tactic. By analysing conservative press during the period in question, Felipe Henrique Wegner explores the relationship between the polarization of conservative opinion and the rise of right-wing terror organisations. As the author details, there was a growing acceptance and even encouragement for anti-communist violent actions as a result of growing frustration, which was born out of electoral failures, and the growing popularity of nationalist-reformist forces. In other words, there was "a naturalisation of the use of violence" by the right. Of especial importance to this thesis are the mentions of ties which IBAD and IPES, both backed by the CIA, shared with these terror groups. See WEGNER, Felipe Henrique. *Op. cit.* p.116 and p.131.

CIA classified as "disruptive activities" or *militant action*. Anything from organised hecklers or "goon squads" to the use of technical or chemical devices capable of provoking physical reactions were applied<sup>560</sup>. In October 1963 in São Paulo, Education Minister Paulo de Tarso had his speech at the Mackenzie University interrupted by "eight hundred of Adhemar's students". Although they started off heckling, the meeting quickly "became a brawl". Before a speech in São Paulo in March 1964, SUPRA director João Pinheiro Neto was "greeted by bombs and bursts of machine gun fire", which forced him to flee. Once again, Adhemar de Barros' students were involved along with state policemen. In July 1963 in Salvador, Bahia, a conference held by *The International Union of Students* was attacked by members of the *Frente da Juventude Democrática*. The militants used a technique they'd previously used, which consisted of adding "ingredients to the food, making participants in the seminar mildly ill"<sup>561</sup>.

While IBAD/IPES affiliates applied these more brazen CIA tactics, the former went about implementing the more "subtle and indirect forms of domination", characteristically associated with CIA psychological warfare. It is through analysing the scale and type of indoctrination employed by IPES that it is possible to see the connection with the CIA. This, however, does not mean that IPES was not without its own members capable of mounting an effective ideological campaign, but the resemblance in the techniques employed by IPES to those of the CIA hint at agency training, or involvement in their planning and implementation.

From their beginning the IBAD/IPES complex sought to indoctrinate Brazilian society through an array of techniques. If on the one hand the objective of this campaign was to gain

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<sup>560</sup> AGEE, Philip. *Op. cit.* p. 67 Agee specifies that "the Technical Services... makes a variety of weapons and devices for these purposes. Horrible smelling liquids in small glass vials can be hurled into meeting halls. A fine clear powder can be sprinkled in a meeting-place becoming invisible after settling but having the effect of tear-gas when stirred up by the later movement of people. An incendiary powder can be moulded around prepared tablets and when ignited the combination produces ample quantities of smoke that attacks the eyes and respiratory system much more strongly than ordinary tear-gas. A tasteless substance can be introduced to food that causes exaggerated body colour. And a few small drops of a clear liquid stimulates the target to relaxed, uninhibited talk. Invisible itching powder can be placed on steering wheels or toilet seats, and a slight smear of invisible ointment causes a serious burn to skin on contact. Chemically processed tobacco can be added to cigarettes and cigars to produce respiratory ailments".

<sup>561</sup>DULLES John W. F. *Op. cit.* p.217 and p.258-262. Dulles gives more examples on how these same tactics were used to sabotage other appearances of other politicians, such as Leonel Brizola and Miguel Arrais. LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.110 mentions how CAMDE employed the same disruptive strategies, often sending "bus loads" of its members to the meetings of various leftist/reformist politicians. VILLELA, Lucas Braga Rangel. *Op. cit.* p.65 details the work of paramilitaries in Minas Gerais who acted as "shock troops", breaking up and attacking any meeting or act minimally related to national-reformism.

civilian support for the coup, on the other the organic elite strove to impose its ideology in its bid to establish itself as the hegemonic class. IPES, having transformed itself from a simple discussion group, proved to be especially qualified and prepared to carry out this intricate task. The institute's ideological operations were divided into two categories, which focused on different aspects of what was hoped to be achieved by the indoctrination, and they were carried out by specially created departments: the *Doctrine Group (Grupo de Doutrina)* and the *Public Opinion Group (Grupo de Opinião Pública)*<sup>562</sup>.

*General indoctrination* concentrated on "instilling and strengthening traditional rightwing attitudes and points of view" in the general public, as well as "stimulating negative perceptions" of national-reformism. *Specific indoctrination* envisaged "moulding the consciousness and the organisation of the dominant sectors" and getting them to act as one united class, while "consolidating the political leadership of multinational and associated factions" over them. Additionally, *specific indoctrination* intended to unite the different social groups from the upper and middle classes in an "opinion movement with widely shared short-term objectives", such as "the destitution of João Goulart"<sup>563</sup>.

Whether it ultimately had the same effect on everyone or not, the range and scope of *general indoctrination* was such that it would reach all sectors of Brazilian society. Furthermore, this side of IPES psychological warfare would heavily employ black propaganda (see page 70), stoking fear and belief that the very existence of Brazil was under threat. As well as moulding public opinion in favour of IBAD/IPES values, this type of indoctrination aimed to provoke "a hysterical reaction" that would see military intervention as valid. *O Globo* would often publish news claiming it to be factual, but without indicating the source of the information. Some of these pieces of black propaganda would "cause great impact in public opinion"<sup>564</sup>.

In other publications directed at the armed forces, described as "the most vile example of psychological warfare", IPES depicted Marxism as a doctrine that promoted "mass murder", "the abolition of dignity" and "forced labour camps". Communist and leftist sympathisers were presented as the "most cherished, sincere and loyal of friends" who would one day "coldly stab you in the back". It was widely publicised that they "killed priests" and "raped nuns". Additionally, IPES made great use of "charts" and studies that "reported" as well as

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<sup>562</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. 1964: *a conquista do Estado. Ação política, poder e golpe de classe*. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1981.

<sup>563</sup> Idem p.231-232

<sup>564</sup> Idem p.233-34

demonstrated the level of communist infiltration in the military, in the government, in education and in the media. These more refined as well as scientific looking tables were reported to be quite effective<sup>565</sup>.

Similarly, accusations of communist infiltration were made by IPES linked politicians and public figures. For instance, in 1962 senator Calazans "named 33 Brazilian Air Force officers as communists" while giving a speech. These claims were then republished in an *Ação Democrática* pamphlet, even though they had been refuted and condemned as "unsettling" by Air Minister Reynaldo Joaquim Ribeiro de Carvalho Filho<sup>566</sup>. UDN President, Bilac Pinto, stated in an interview given to the press in 1964 that the Goulart government was "arming union members and dock and coastal workers". Pinto's accusations were, nevertheless, false and he had based them "on summation of [a] series of public and private notices". The UDN president was going to appear on *Pinga Fogo* and, as he had put himself in an "embarrassing position", he requested U.S. embassy officials "to furnish him with any information [the] Embassy might have available"<sup>567</sup>. It is not clear what course of action the embassy officials took, but Bilac Pinto appeared on *Pinga Fogo* which aired on *TV Tupi* controlled by IPES associate Assis Chateaubriand<sup>568</sup>.

Through its numerous contacts with national papers, radio and television, IBAD and IPES were able to "establish a synchronised assault on public opinion"<sup>569</sup>. Newspapers such as the *Estado de São Paulo*, the *Folha de São Paulo*, the *Tribuna da Imprensa* and *Globo* (which has already been mentioned due to its CIA links) were involved, and many top journalists as well as editors formed part of the *Public Opinion Group*. In addition to these distinguished papers, the IBAD/IPES complex would also set up new ones to assure its message would

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<sup>565</sup> Idem p. 236

<sup>566</sup> *Military Updates Relating to Reynaldo J. Ribeiro de Carvalho Filho*, 28 Mar 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:690980/> [accessed 20 Apr 2018]

<sup>567</sup> Telegram from Brasilia to Secretary of State, *Situation Report* 17 Jan 1964. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:360220/> [accessed 15 Dec 2019] In addition to this interview there was also "Deputy Bilac Pinto's parliamentary offensive" which "was equally decisive in stoking the anti-communist sentiment". "Acting as President of the UDN, Bilac Pinto made a series of violent speeches against the government, accusing Goulart of having become an instrument of the communists. According to the deputy, the President of the Republic had been giving persistent signs of collusion with revolutionaries, to whom he protected and handed over influential positions in the government. In addition to granting communists access to the state apparatus, Goulart was also suspected of tolerating infiltration in the unions and accepting and even encouraging the strikes. For the *Udenista* parliamentarian, this was sufficient evidence that the President was playing the game of the revolutionary war". See MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.321

<sup>568</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.233

<sup>569</sup> Idem p.233 and PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.33 IPES printed around "300,000 copies" of different books, in addition to "2.5 million pamphlets distributed in factories, businesses and student associations".

penetrate all social areas. For instance, *Noticias Populares* was established by Herbet Levy, federal deputy and IPES member, with the objective of influencing "intellectually and emotionally the industrial workers and lower middle classes". Another attempt at infiltrating as wide a public as possible would see texts meant for corporate and political consumption rewritten in "language understandable for housewives"<sup>570</sup>.

Similarly, IPES tried to disseminate its ideology among the vast illiterate public using cartoons, film and radio. Various leaflets and booklets containing cartoons which emphasised IBAD/IPES values such as "private enterprise", "productivity" and the rejection of reformist and socialist policies, were created and distributed to the lower classes. Special radio broadcasts were also created for the lower classes, presenting them with "the views of the organic elite" in a format acceptable to them. Programmes attacking the left and national-reformism as well as espousing anti-*trabalhista* opinions, included appearances from popular personalities among the masses in order to attract larger audiences. Before the coup it has been reported that a network made up of "over one hundred radio stations", and known as the "chain of democracy", broadcasted IPES programmes all over Brazil<sup>571</sup>.

In addition, with a view to reaching the wider public, a series of IPES produced films advocating the values of the organic elite were shown in cinemas all over Brazil<sup>572</sup>. In order to hide "their political and coupist actions under the cloak of democracy and education", IPES hired the French filmmaker Jean Manzon<sup>573 574</sup>. The idea was to make films that would

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<sup>570</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.233-34

<sup>571</sup> Idem p.248-250

<sup>572</sup> PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.34-35 The institute produced 15 films which, in general, dealt with the threats that Communism represented to Brazilian society and liberties. They also emphasised that by "opting for Western Christian democracy, Brazilian society would become richer and more balanced", while safeguarding institutions such as the family and church. For a detailed analysis of IPES propaganda and its usage in films see PRESOT, Aline Alves. *As Marchas da Família com Deus pela Liberdade e o Golpe de 1964*. 2004. Dissertação (Mestrado em História Social) - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro and VILLELA, Lucas Braga Rangel. *Os quinze ramos do IPÊS - Uma análise histórica dos audiovisuais do Instituto de Pesquisa de Estudos Sociais*. 2014. Dissertação (Mestrado em História) - Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis. Both authors extensively cover the techniques as well as manipulations employed by IPES in order to get its messages across

<sup>573</sup>FILHO, Reinaldo Cardenut. *Op. cit.* p.51-52 In his thesis the author details various IPES films as well as explaining the different imagery used in them with the objective of promoting their "coupist rhetoric" p.61. One example was *O Brasil precisa de você* (Brazil needs you), which through an array of images, such as soldiers marching and concentration camps, compared the USSR to Nazi Germany. The same was also done with leaders like Lenin and Fidel Castro being compared to Mussolini and Hitler. The film aimed to frighten the audience by exaggerating the threat that communism represented to Brazil, and to "summon them to arm themselves against the left" p.58-59. Another example is *História de um maquinista* (Story of a train driver) which directly attacked the Goulart government's management of certain industries along with infrastructure. The film promoted the idea that only through private capital could Brazil truly become a developed nation. p.62-63

"legitimise" IPES as a "patriotic" organisation that wanted to find "democratic solutions" to Brazil's crisis, which had been caused by Goulart and his basic reforms. By portraying the Brazilian president as being "incapable of undertaking a political and economic programme attractive enough for foreign capital to want to invest" in Brazil<sup>575</sup>, IPES hoped to create discord.

Conscious that many Brazilians could not afford to go the cinema, IPES made the most of its membership, mounting projectors on specially customised trucks and buses. These vehicles then went to the "*favelas* and poorest urban neighbourhoods" in Brazil's major cities, as well as to the rural interior to show the films for free. Finally, IPES friendly factory owners and managers allowed the institute into their premises to show its films to the workers<sup>576</sup>.

Through television, IPES worked to indoctrinate the middle and upper classes (those who could generally afford to own one). "In its campaign against the government, the left and *trabalhismo*, IPES made wide use of television broadcasting weekly programmes on the majority of the national and regional channels". Some of these included interviews with public figures giving pre-prepared answers on problems such as "democratic nationalism, economic progress and social justice, the armed forces and democracy and free enterprise"<sup>577</sup>. Additionally, these IPES productions "owed their techniques and ideological bases" to Cold War television programmes from the United States. IPES imported the idea that "to educate is to politically guide the citizen", which was key to the "origins" of U.S. television<sup>578</sup>.

Before the 1962 legislative elections, IPES produced a series of fourteen programmes, which were aired on *TV Tupi*, titled *Encontro de democratas com a nação*<sup>579</sup>. The objective of these productions was to "guide the nation's ideological choice", as well as to promote IPES political propaganda<sup>580</sup>. This series, in addition to other programmes<sup>581</sup>, aimed to achieve this

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<sup>574</sup> CORRÊA, Marcos. *O discurso golpista nos documentários de Jean Manzon para o IPES (1962/1963)*. 2005. Dissertação (Mestrado em Multimeios) - Instituto de Artes, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Campinas. p.61-69 details how Jean Manzon arrived in Brazil and his influential career there.

<sup>575</sup> Idem p.52

<sup>576</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.250 Dreifuss states that Mercedes Benz and CAIO were two companies that helped with the logistics of this operation.

<sup>577</sup> Correspondencia Recbida IPES. Arquivo Nacional. [http://imagem.sian.an.gov.br/acervo/derivadas/br\\_rjanrio\\_ql/0/cor/0001/br\\_rjanrio\\_ql\\_0\\_cor\\_0001\\_d0001d0001.pdf](http://imagem.sian.an.gov.br/acervo/derivadas/br_rjanrio_ql/0/cor/0001/br_rjanrio_ql_0_cor_0001_d0001d0001.pdf) [28 Jul 2020] p.2

<sup>578</sup> FILHO, Reinaldo Cardenuto. *Op. cit.* p.42 and p.49

<sup>579</sup> Literally translated as a meeting of democrats with the nation. A more accurate translation would possibly be a meeting between democrats and the nation.

<sup>580</sup> FILHO, Reinaldo Cardenuto. *Op. cit.* p.45





relationships between active and retired officers. The research institutes associates included integrants of the infamous *Sorbonne Group*, who through the ESG had come into contact with prominent IPES businessmen. Apparently, the plotters from the *Sorbonne Group* operated "under the aegis of IPES"<sup>586</sup>, and they also aided the organisation in infiltrating the armed forces. Retired officers, such as General Golbery, were recruited to gather intelligence on communist infiltration and distribute it "clandestinely" to key military officers. IPES spent "between \$200,000 and \$300,000 a year" on this ploy to "influence active military officers"<sup>587</sup>. It would appear, that as well as having its effect on the military, this strategy helped to radicalise other sectors of the dominant classes, and psychologically predispose them to accept the coup<sup>588</sup>.

This intelligence initiative was undertaken by the *Grupo de Levantamento da Conjuntura (Situation Analysis Group)*, which collected and analysed "information about social and political developments in all sectors, projecting [their] likely future impact... and drawing up plans to influence the emerging situation". Intelligence was gathered through a network of informants who had penetrated the military, student groups, the church, government agencies and business groups. The *Situation Analysis Group* even got its hands on the necessary equipment to set up an illegal wiretap operation. What is also interesting is that the level of professionalism and efficiency of the *Situation Analysis Group* was such that it would become "the nucleus of the post-coup" *Serviço Nacional de Informações (National Intelligence Service)*. General Golbery, who had lead the IPES intelligence unit during the years leading up to the coup, would be named head of the SNI<sup>589</sup>.

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<sup>586</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.182

<sup>587</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.154

<sup>588</sup> BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *Brasil-Estados-Unidos: A...* p. 66

<sup>589</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.112



General Golbery do Couto e Silva. Source: VIOMUNDO (<https://www.viomundo.com.br/voce-escreve/maister-da-silva-o-ministerio-do-silencio-ameaca-a-democracia.html>).

In addition to forging class consciousness within the elites and establishing IPES interests as the dominant ones, *Specific indoctrination* also strove to "isolate" João Goulart and "neutralise" national-reformist positions in the upper classes. This second type of indoctrination was to make great use of courses and seminars, which focused on disseminating IPES positions on questions such as security and development to members of those sectors considered to be elite. Through its links to the ESG, the organic elite were able to target members of the armed forces as well as of the business community with its propaganda. Seminars in the *Escola Superior de Guerra* were especially important, as they "intensified" the military's absorption of IPES corporate values. "The sense of shared values already established with the ESG were strengthened" by *specific indoctrination*, and the military became to be viewed as a "natural" political ally. Moreover, IPES would also organise for many of its courses to take place in sports and social clubs frequented by the São Paulo and Rio elites<sup>590</sup>.

Religious manipulation was another important element of *specific indoctrination*. In chapter Three IBAD/IPES links to the *Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade* as well as the employment of them to create opposition to the Goulart government has already been looked at. Many apparently inoffensive organisations, such as CAMDE or the *Associação Cristã de*

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<sup>590</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.252-254

*Moços* (ACM), were heavily involved in the marches, and were intimately linked to IBAD/IPES. The Church was "fundamental" for IPES ideological objectives as its structure offered the institute the perfect platform to spread its message to the middle and lower classes<sup>591</sup>. One example of this was in the rural Northeast, where peasant movements demanding change along with reform were making ground. To combat these rural popular movements, IPES utilized the activities of religious leaders, such as Padre Crespo and Padre Velloso, in addition to CIA agents who had flooded the region<sup>592</sup>.

Furthermore, the need to counteract reformist tendencies, which had gained ground in the Church and support from certain Catholic intellectuals, would also cause IPES to engage in this campaign of religious manipulation. Of special relevance here was the programme which aimed to convince the public of the "incompatibility of Socialism with the Social Doctrine of the Church"<sup>593</sup>. IPES propaganda, which intentionally confused national-reformism with Communism and other leftist positions, as it has already been seen, was a key part of IBAD/IPES psychological warfare. *Specific indoctrination* then proceeded to further the damage, exacerbating the belief that leftist ideologies, which the public was lead to believe included national-reformism, threatened the Church. In particular, *specific indoctrination* targeted intellectuals and the middle classes, organizing debates and seminars, accentuating the difficulties in coexistence between the left and Catholicism, at the *Pontificia Universidade Católica* (PUC). Additionally, IPES supported various academic magazines which focused on political, social and cultural questions in relation to the Church. One such publication, *Convivium*, was to serve as "the core for ideological elaboration and political indoctrination"<sup>594</sup>.

When examining IBAD and IPES during this period, one question that must be considered is to what extent were their CIA links entirely financial. The rapid rise of IPES, for example, from an informal discussion group to a research institute with the ability to reach all sectors of Brazilian society with its propaganda is, at the very least, suspicious. Bearing in mind that since July 1962 the Kennedy administration sought to provide itself with the option to stage a

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<sup>591</sup> Idem p.254

<sup>592</sup> Idem p.302-303 Also in VILLELA, Lucas Braga Rangel. *Op. cit.* p.269-71 With the rise of the different rural movements along with their calls for agrarian reform in the Brazilian North East, IPES became increasingly interested in assuring its vision for agrarian reform was widely propagated. Along with the work done by IPES linked religious leaders, films (such as *Nordeste, problema número 1*) and books focusing on how the region's socioeconomic difficulties could be solved through private capital and Christian ethics related to private property were widely circulated.

<sup>593</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand *Op. cit.* p.254

<sup>594</sup> Idem p.255

coup by strengthening anti-Goulart elements, it is not impossible to imagine the CIA played a role in organising IBAD/IPES. As it is already well known, the CIA was, at times, a rogue agency with unlimited resources as well as scope. It was able to infiltrate countries at all levels and orchestrate its plans, involving foreign nationals without the majority of them ever realising who they were working for or where the financial assistance was coming from<sup>595</sup>.

That said, this hypothesis of the CIA not only aiding the IBAD/IPES complex with funds but also in helping to orientate and organise them is based more on theory than on proof. The lack of documentation means that it is only possible to connect part of the puzzle. While it would not be historically correct to compare CIA operations which formed part of other historical processes (evidently, to directly compare the events in Brazil during the early 1960s with CIA campaigns in other parts of the globe during other decades would ignore or diminish structural differences which were defining to those individual processes), it does allow us to perceive how the CIA behaved and what tactics it could have employed in Brazil.

At this moment in time, however, the question is whether a repeat of those tactics, confirmed to have been used by the CIA in, for example, the conspiracy in Guatemala before the 1954 coup<sup>596</sup> or by the CIA against the USSR and international communism in Western Europe, by IBAD and IPES in the years leading up to the military takeover constitutes enough of a coincidence to consider CIA orientation a real possibility? What if we went further and CIA operations in Chile before the 1973 coup were compared with techniques employed in Brazil a decade earlier?

If it is ultimately viable or even practicable to compare and contrast or not, this doctoral student deems that there are enough coincidences or similarities to not overlook the premise that the CIA and, in this sense, the U.S. government played a much larger role in preparing Brazilian civilian opposition groups than traditionally accepted. On another note, the organic elite's endeavours to indoctrinate Brazilian society through *general* and *specific*

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<sup>595</sup> AGEE, Philip. *Op. cit.* p.54 and p225

<sup>596</sup>For a detailed account of the CIA activities in Guatemala before the coup against Jacobo Árbenz see CULLATHER, Nicholas. *Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala 1952-1954*. Washington D.C.: Centre for the Study of Intelligence, 1994. Many CIA tactics used in operation PBSUCCESS were similarly employed in Brazil ten years later. For useful information on CIA psychological warfare operations in Western Europe see SAUNDERS, Frances Stonor. *La CIA y la guerra fría cultural*. Madrid: Editorial Debate, 2001. The heavy use of civic action groups, front operations, magazines, radio, cinema and television to disseminate CIA propaganda and U.S. ideology were all key. WILFORD, Hugh. *Op. cit.* p.7-8 and p.168-186 the author explains how the CIA created fronts "capable of playing any propaganda tune". In South America a lot of these concentrated on themes such as development, and they frequently made use of Catholicism to get their message across.

*indoctrination* would have mixed results. They were unable to impose themselves and their ideology on society as a whole, however they did succeed in undermining the João Goulart government in addition to drawing together middle and upper class support for its overthrow. As General Golbery confirmed the IPES campaign essentially "connected the different conspiracies against Goulart"<sup>597</sup>.

## **Coup Plotting**

When analysing the years leading up to the coup d'état of 1964, it is important to keep in mind the existence of various factions of coup plotters both before Goulart assumed the presidency and throughout his years in charge. In Brazil, a consolidated movement which unified the diverse elements conspiring to overthrow the president did not exist, and even when the coup took place it could be said that there were four different groups taking part. As it would be expected from a modern superpower, the United States' intelligence apparatus kept itself well informed of the comings and goings of these movements<sup>598</sup>, whether through informants or by direct contact between U.S. officials and the conspirators

The four groups conspiring against João Goulart have been listed as the "historic" plotters, those who "had conspired against Vargas, Kubitschek and tried to bar Goulart from succeeding Quadros", the "trooper faction" lead by General Artur da Costa e Silva, the "extremist faction" under Air Force Colonel João Paulo Moreira Burnier and the *Sorbonne Group*. Initially guided by General Golbery, the *Sorbonne Group* has been described as the "best organised of the various coteries of military conspirators"<sup>599</sup>. General Castelo Branco, a favourite of certain U.S. officials and highly regarded and respected official in the Brazilian Army, was to assume leadership of the group a few months before the coup.

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<sup>597</sup> *Recorte de fascículo do nosso século*, Arquivo Nacional. BR RJANRIO D7.0.DCO, TXT.1/18 [http://imagem.sian.an.gov.br/acervo/derivadas/br\\_rjanrio\\_d7/0/dco/txt/0001/0018/br\\_rjanrio\\_d7\\_0\\_dco\\_txt\\_0001\\_0018\\_d0001de0001.pdf](http://imagem.sian.an.gov.br/acervo/derivadas/br_rjanrio_d7/0/dco/txt/0001/0018/br_rjanrio_d7_0_dco_txt_0001_0018_d0001de0001.pdf) [accessed 23 Jul 2020] p.9

<sup>598</sup> In fact, its intelligence apparatus was so effective that the U.S. was able to record a private conversation held between War Minister General Jair Dantas Ribeiro and ex-president Juscelino Kubitschek on the 29th of March 1964, while the former was in hospital. Another private conversation between Goulart and Kubitschek is also reported to have been recorded. CORRÊA, Marcos Sá. *Op. cit.* p.59-61.

<sup>599</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.181-182



General Artur da Costa e Silva (left) alongside Castello Branco (right). In 1967 General Costa e Silva became the second president of the military dictatorship. Source: *Jornal Opção* (<https://www.jornalopcao.com.br/opcao-cultural/ha-50-anos-o-regime-militar-elegia-o-seu-segundo-presidente-e-a-linha-dura-ocupava-o-poder-88800/>).

U.S. relations with the Brazilian plotters as well as the differing levels of contact maintained with them provoke certain questions about the intentions of the United States. As it has already been mentioned<sup>600</sup>, the Kennedy administration gave its approval for the option of regime change back in July 1962, yet one problem that U.S. officials reported on in early 1963 was the "unorganised, scattered, unconnected character of those plotting against the regime"<sup>601</sup>. On more than one occasion, Ambassador Gordon advised that support for a premature coup would only serve to strengthen Goulart's standing<sup>602</sup>. Therefore, in many of these cases, the officials made sure they were well informed of proceedings, but they kept their distance and refrained from encouraging those they believed would end in failure.

In this regard, the United States was also very much aware that the success of the coup depended on the plotters being united. In a telegram from May 1963, Gordon explains that "current plotting is typically Brazilian in not being unified and in suffering from [the] presence [of] too many would be leaders". Yet, he goes on to clarify that "all groups... of

<sup>600</sup> See Chapter One page 40 and Chapter Two pages 57 and 66

<sup>601</sup> Report, *Retired Marshal Mendes de Moraes Speaks of Plots against President in the Armed Forces to prevent "Communization of Brazil"*, 17 Feb 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:717307/> [accessed 8 May 2018] p.3

<sup>602</sup> See chapter Five p.177

which we know, recognise [the] need for any such movement to be country-wide"<sup>603</sup>. This information is significant because it confirms that U.S. officials were often in touch with the different elements conspiring against João Goulart, before they were in contact with each other. In most scenarios this can be explained as the Brazilians involved in plotting informing of their plans, and hoping that "the U.S. in some way will solve their problem for them"<sup>604</sup>. It is also noteworthy because by analysing the conduct of an official, such as General Vernon Walters, it is feasible to state that many boundaries were overstepped and officials with diplomatic protection acted unacceptably. This will be examined further in the next section, but it is necessary to mention it now as it is a continuation of what is being discussed here.

By examining the evidence, it could be assumed then that while the United States' overall objective until late 1963 was not to overthrow Goulart, in part this was because a viable opposition group strong enough to carry out a successful coup did not exist. In fact, it would not be until 1964 that U.S. officials stationed in Brazil would recommend backing a plot. For instance, during a meeting in August 1962, the CIA was made aware that Admiral Heck, Marshall Denys and Brigadeiro Moss were conspiring against Goulart. The three claimed that Goulart would make "unconstitutional" moves, cancelling the 1962 elections if he perceived "his candidates" would not win. Once this happened, the three of them along with their followers would "have a military coup ousting the present government and setting up their own"<sup>605</sup>.

The U.S. official present at the meeting was the *American Legation, U.S. Naval Attaché* (ALUSNA). Whether or not he was a CIA officer working under the guise of ALUSNA is not clear, but he had contact with "officers on active duty in the Brazilian Navy" referring to four informants as "Rio 61-1, Rio 61-11, Rio 62-1 and Rio 62-2". These four sources along with ALUSNA cast doubt on the plot with Rio 62-2 explaining that Admiral Heck did not have "the support or power that he thinks he has and would not be successful in any military coup". The naval attaché discredited the plot stating that it was difficult for him "to comprehend how Admiral Heck (now out of power) and his followers could come close to

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<sup>603</sup> Telegram from Rio de Janeiro to Secretary of State, *Anti-regime Plotting in Brazilian Military*, 23 May 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:671214/> [accessed 26 Sep 2019]

<sup>604</sup> Report, *Retired Marshal Mendes de Moraes Speaks of Plots against President in the Armed Forces to prevent "Communization of Brazil"*, 17 Feb 1963. Brown Digital Repository. p.3

<sup>605</sup> Office of Naval Intelligence Information Report, *CIA Meeting with Sylvio Heck*, 06 Sep 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:725617/> [accessed 21 Jan 2020] p.1-2



doing anything comparable to what Admiral Heck thinks that they could accomplish". He would express his view to the three conspirators during the meeting<sup>606</sup>.

In March 1963 the CIA reported on "conservative elements of the Brazilian military... formulating plans for a possible effort to depose President João Goulart". The memorandum affirms that "the man behind what appears to be the best-developed plan is retired Marshall Odylio Denys", alluding to the fact that other less advanced conspiracies were in existence. Nevertheless, the document pours cold water on the plot stating that "Denys needs considerably more support than we can credit to him to bring off a successful coup". Furthermore, it cautions against a "premature coup" as it would "bring a strong reaction from Goulart and the cashiering of those officers who are most friendly to the United States"<sup>607</sup>.

It is also unclear whether this plan under Denys' leadership was linked to the coup plotting of Admiral Heck, mentioned in a meeting in 1962 in which Marshall Denys was also present. That said, the basic outline of the plan, which like Heck's envisioned Goulart acting unconstitutionally forcing the conspirators to act in order to save democracy, tends to suggest that it was effectively the same scheme.

Another example is from April 1963, when General Mourão Filho claimed he was preparing "to start a revolt against the present government by 15 May 1963". According to the CIA telegram, General Mourão sent an emissary to speak with and ask both Admiral Heck's movement along with a group of captains to "unite [their] antigovernment movement with" his. The telegram concluded with the verdict: "This is one of several anti-Goulart conspiracies which appear to be under way. It is difficult to see how the plotting groups could get together to stage a coup by mid-May"<sup>608</sup>. Once again it becomes clear that the major concern was not that a coup was being prepared against a legitimate government, but whether it would ultimately be successful. It is not evident if the CIA set forth its opinion to Mourão on this occasion, however no action would be taken by him.

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<sup>606</sup> Idem p.2-3

<sup>607</sup> CIA, Current Intelligence Memorandum, *Plotting Against Goulart*, 8 Mar 1963. National Security Archive. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%207%20Plotting%20against%20Goulart.pdf> [accessed 7 Jul 2020]

<sup>608</sup> Telegram Information Report, *Plans of General Olimpio Mourão Filho to Overthrow the Brazilian Government by 15 May 1963*, 30 Apr 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:671169/> [accessed 17 Oct 2019]

To claim that the U.S. organised or acted as an emissary between groups would be too farfetched. However, where the line is drawn on simple intelligence collecting is questionable. With all the personal contacts and relationships between the conspiring elite and U.S. personnel weighing in, would it be impossible to imagine that some officials gave advice in addition to passing on information? After all, the United States never once informed Goulart, the president of an allied nation, of any of these conspiracies. Most probably, this is due to the fact that their existence along with their development was strategically important to the U.S, as since the end of 1962, the option of a viable military coup, and the strengthening of it, was something which the Kennedy administration perceived as necessary<sup>609</sup>.

All in all, the confirmation that the United States had knowledge of these conspiracies and kept contact with those involved might not seem all that revealing at this stage. Nonetheless, over the next few sections the conduct of certain U.S. officials will be examined with a view to shedding more light on their involvement in the coup plotting. In the opinion of this doctoral student, it will become evident that the United States participated more actively in the planning of the coup than previously thought.

## **General Vernon A. Walters**

The roles as well as behaviour of particular individuals of significance are of unquestionable importance when analysing any historical process. In the years leading up to the coup d'état of 1964, two U.S. officials have been especially earmarked for their conduct during the period of time that preceded the military takeover. The first was the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, whose opinions as well as decisions were fundamental when it came to formulating U.S. policy in Brazil. However, due to the nature of his role and for reasons related to the structuring of this thesis, it would be more appropriate to explore this subject in the next chapter on participation.

The second official was General Vernon Walters, who arrived in Brazil as army Attaché (ARMA) in October 1962. Walters posting to Brazil occurred just after the Kennedy

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<sup>609</sup>White House, Transcript of Meeting between President Kennedy, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and Richard Goodwin, July 30, 1962. (Published in *The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises, Volume One* (W.W. Norton), edited by Timothy Naftali, October 2001.) National Security Archive. p.3-4

administration had determined that the Brazilian Armed Forces "represented the key to the future"<sup>610</sup>, and in its drive to strengthen the military option and demonstrate U.S. support for it, it was agreed that Walters would be sent as the new attaché. This decision was made during the same July 1962 meeting when President Kennedy, Richard Goodwin and Lincoln Gordon discussed the need to have a "military front" to possibly takeover<sup>611</sup>. As President Kennedy insisted "we gotta get somebody down there who can establish liaison quickly... you got to speak Portuguese"<sup>612</sup>.

For this option to be feasible, Gordon stated that the United States required "a new Army attaché badly", as out of the three Brazilian services the army "was the most important". It was, as the Ambassador put it, "the key fellow in the relationship"<sup>613</sup>, and the success of any possible movement against Goulart depended on improving liaison as well as ties in order to bolster the army's position. Walters close friendships with numerous Brazilian officers, which had been initiated during World War Two when Walters served as combat liaison with the FEB, in addition to his fluency in Portuguese<sup>614</sup> made him the perfect attaché for Washington's objectives.

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<sup>610</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.127

<sup>611</sup> White House, Transcript of Meeting between President Kennedy, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and Richard Goodwin, July 30, 1962. (Published in *The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises, Volume One* (W.W. Norton), edited by Timothy Naftali, October 2001.) National Security Archive. p.3

<sup>612</sup> The meeting started at 11.52am and finished at 12.20pm. *Interview with Gordon from the JFK Library*. 30 07 1962. Brown University Library. <https://library.brown.edu/create/wecannotremainsilent/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2014/04/interview-with-Lincoln-Gordon-from-JFK-Library.pdf> [accessed 5 Mar 2020]. p.21.

<sup>613</sup> *Idem* p.4

<sup>614</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.128



Ambassador Lincoln Gordon decorating Vernon Walters. Source: Folha de São Paulo, As Horas do Golpe (<https://aovivo.folha.uol.com.br/2014/03/30/3145-5-aovivo.shtml#page=5>).

Prior to arriving in Brazil and assuming his new position, Walters new assignment was clearly outlined when he was informed by someone "high in the Kennedy administration" that the President "would not be adverse to seeing the overthrow of Goulart's government if it were replaced with a stable, anticommunist government, aligned with the free, Western world"<sup>615</sup>. On Walters' arrival, Ambassador Gordon would also reaffirm this, specifying that as the new military attaché he had three crucial tasks to perform: to inform the Ambassador about what was occurring in military circles, to be in a position for Gordon to "be able to influence what was going on", and for there to be no surprises<sup>616</sup>. Evidently, the second of

<sup>615</sup> PARKER, Phyllis R. *Op. cit.* p.63 This information comes from an interview conducted by Parker with General Walters.

<sup>616</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.128 Also in WALTERS, Vernon A. *Silent Missions*. New York: Doubleday 1978. p.374-75

these three commands gives a clear indication of what was truly expected of him as the new military attaché.

Perhaps, the most complicated question to answer is not whether Walters played an active role or not in the conspiracy but, rather, to determine the extent of it<sup>617</sup>. His conduct during his time in Brazil went past simple liaison and entered a whole different terrain, yet for a man who enjoyed close personal relationships with many Brazilian officers was this to be expected? While it is not in the interest of this thesis to neither lay blame nor to distort reality in an attempt to cover up the behaviour of certain individuals, it is true that Walters' involvement presents a specific paradigm that must be taken into account.

For instance, a 1965 telegram from the United States embassy in Santiago de Chile strongly criticises Walters' behaviour, putting in doubt the character of the relationship he maintained with Castelo Branco. The complaint expressed in the telegram stemmed from lack of action taken by Walters to curb the Branco government's bad press of Chilean president Eduardo Frei. The author of the document declares that he "cannot believe" that Walters' relationship with Branco "is simply an intelligence gathering operation". The official contends that it is hard to accept that "there is no interplay of ideas or attempts to influence", and that "ARMA's relationship is highly political and either negatively or positively he influences President Castelo Branco"<sup>618</sup>.

Walters relationship with Branco is of particular importance<sup>619</sup> as it lends credibility to the hypothesis that the former's involvement was more far reaching than has necessarily been admitted. Their close friendship dated back to when Branco was Walters' "tent-mate"<sup>620</sup> during the campaign in Italy, with contemporaries describing the latter as "Branco's best

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<sup>617</sup> CORRÊA, Marcos Sá. *Op. cit.* p.100 After analysing hundreds of documents in the Lincoln Baines Johnson Library in Texas, the author pointed out another interesting fact in relation to Walters' role in the coup: that no matter how many documents there are "secret agents never abandon the shadows, not even in the most confidential documents". In this regard, and as a result of the secrecy surrounding Walters' persona, the "nature of the relationships" he maintained with different Brazilian informants are also undocumented. Or, as of today still unclassified.

<sup>618</sup> Telegram from Embassy Santiago de Chile to Secretary of State, *Conversation Between Arma and Castelo Branco*, 16 Aug 65. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:357434/> [accessed 12 Apr 2018]

<sup>619</sup> RELATORIO FINAL VOL. II ACERVO Comissão Estadual da Memória e Verdade Dom Helder Câmara. p.88. explains that the personal relationship established between Humberto Castelo Branco, future Marshal and President of the Republic, and Vernon Walters was a "notable one".

<sup>620</sup> Kennedy, Charles Stuart, and Niles W Bond. Interview with Niles W. Bond. 1998. Manuscript/Mixed Material. <https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000114/>. [accessed 1 Dec 2021] p.73

friend". The two "dined together frequently both before and after the coup", and the intimacy of their friendship had even led to Walters' mother and Branco's wife becoming very close<sup>621</sup>.

Their relationship was such that when the *Forças Armadas do Brasil* wanted to celebrate Branco's inauguration as president with a dinner party it is reported that he "politely declined, saying" he wanted "to have a quiet dinner". He then called Walters as he was "the only person he wanted to talk to", and the two of them "dined alone together the night" of Branco's inauguration<sup>622</sup>.



Vernon Walters with Marshall Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco. Source: História Mundi (<https://histormundi.blogspot.com/2013/12/images-historicas-14-castello-branco.html>)

In light of these sources, and bearing in mind that Walters enjoyed good relationships with numerous other officers, it is easy to see why Walters confirmed that he was "well informed

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<sup>621</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.44

<sup>622</sup> Kennedy, Charles Stuart, and Niles W Bond. Interview with Niles W. Bond. 1998. Manuscript/Mixed Material p. 73

on the plans for the coup"<sup>623</sup>. It is also possible to query where the U.S. military attaché drew the line between his professional duties and his personal allegiances. That said, his posting was the result of the Kennedy administration agreeing that a military option to depose Goulart needed to be prepared. It could be argued, therefore, that Walters was sent precisely because of his intimate history with the Brazilian top brass<sup>624</sup>, and that he was expected to employ it to ultimately influence the outcome of events. It would be no coincidence that with Walters as ARMA, the United States would favour the *Sorbonne Group's* plan for a coup<sup>625</sup>, in addition to actively supporting Branco's presidency.

Walters himself maintained a contradictory account of his involvement in the coup planning. On the one hand, he confirms that it was made clear to him that the Kennedy administration was open to a coup, what his orders from Gordon were, and that he was so well informed that some saw him "as a central figure in the conspiracy"<sup>626</sup>. In a telegram dated the 5th of April 1963, Walters half boasted that during a dinner his "old friend" First Army Chief of Staff Brigadier General Cunha Mello "was somewhat taken aback"<sup>627</sup> with the level of information that he possessed on certain topics.

On the other hand Walters tried to play down his knowledge of events, claiming, for example, that before the coup "Branco never so much as hinted to him" that he was involved in the plotting<sup>628</sup>. Quite some years later Lincoln Gordon would also declare that he found it "impossible to believe" that Walters "might have been actively involved"<sup>629</sup>. Nonetheless, documents from the period tend to corroborate that the U.S. military attaché was very much in the loop on the conspiracy.

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<sup>623</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.43

<sup>624</sup> When Walters arrived in Brazil he was taken by Bond to meet Goulart's military advisors, as the other U.S. attachés had "had no luck in penetrating" the group at all. When Walters entered the room they all jumped up, "ran up to him and hugged him". Bond states that "from then on he had access to the whole military". In Kennedy, Charles Stuart, and Niles W Bond. Interview with Niles W. Bond. 1998. Manuscript/Mixed Material. p.72-73

<sup>625</sup> Department of State Office of the Historian: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Brazil, eds. David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2004), Document 187. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d187> [accessed 1 Jun 2020]

<sup>626</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.44

<sup>627</sup> Telegram from OUSARMA to Secretary of State, *Federal Intervention Guanabara*, 5 Apr 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:670962/> [accessed 7 Oct 2019] p.1 Rumours of federal intervention in Guanabara state circulated after Governor Carlos Lacerda had insulted President Goulart.

<sup>628</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.44

<sup>629</sup> Kennedy, Charles Stuart, Melbourne L Spector, and A. Lincoln Gordon. Interview with A. Lincoln Gordon. 1987. Manuscript/Mixed Material. p.66

A report from the 17th of April 1963 details a conversation between Walters and retired Marshal Angelo Mendes de Moraes in which the latter affirmed there was "disorganised and unconnected" plotting, but that General Castelo Branco "could be counted on"<sup>630</sup>. To allege that Branco never once mentioned his participation in plotting is hard to fathom. Considering the close friendship that they enjoyed, they must have surely discussed it minimally once Walters had caught wind of it from another source?

The conversations held between Castelo Branco and Vernon Walters during their many private meetings will remain a secret as no official records of two old friends chatting were to be kept. Evidently, what was exactly discussed during these frequent luncheons and dinners will never be fully known. While Marshall Mendes de Moraes confirmed that Branco could be counted on, implying he was in contact with conspirators back in February 1963, another source claims that the "complot under General Castelo Branco's leadership started four months" before the coup<sup>631</sup>. Officially, Walters would not confirm Branco as leader of the coup until the 27th of March 1964, the same day when the Brazilian general would formally make his position known to the majority of the army officers.

This document related to Branco's acceptance of the leadership of the uprising helps to demonstrate that Walters was privy to sensitive information even before most Brazilians were. In the telegram from the 27th of March 1964, the U.S. military attaché reported that "Castelo Branco finally accepted leadership of forces determined to resist Goulart". Walters went on to explain that he had already been "given [a] copy" of a "cleverly written" questionnaire which had been "sent out [to] garrisons all over Brazil". This confidential document was not a questionnaire but "actually a series of suggestions... as to what steps they might take to put themselves and [their] unit in [a] state of readiness"<sup>632</sup>, and Walters was in possession of it before nearly all of the army troop commanders were.

Interestingly, in her account of U.S. involvement in the 1964 coup Jan Knippers Black asserted that "Vernon D. Walters had a great deal to do with prodding his close friend Castelo Branco into leading the 1964 coup". According to an interview she conducted with Goulart's Minister of Planning and celebrated Brazilian economist Celso Furtado, "U.S. military

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<sup>630</sup> Report, *Retired Marshal Mendes de Moraes Speaks of Plots against President in the Armed Forces to prevent "Communization of Brazil"*, 17 Feb 1963. Brown Digital Repository.

<sup>631</sup> Informex. Repercusión. *El Informador*, Guadalajara, México, 4 Apr 1964. In: <http://hemeroteca.informador.com.mx/> [accessed 10 Apr 2020]

<sup>632</sup> Telegram from OUSARMA to Department of State, *Branco Accepts Leadership*, 27 Mar 1964. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:360149/> [accessed 21 Nov 2019] p.1



personnel provided a network of communication whereby Brazilian officers could be drawn into the conspiracy without openly committing themselves and overplaying their hands prematurely". Walters was "the focal point of this communications network"<sup>633</sup>. This coincides with the suspicion that Walters was actually coordinating CIA operations in Brazil<sup>634</sup>. Apparently, the Goulart administration considered having him expelled as they believed that as a member of the Intelligence Section of the Defence Department, Walters "was in charge of the CIA and all covert operations in Brazil"<sup>635</sup>. Seeing as military attaché positions provided the perfect cover for CIA activities<sup>636</sup> these assertions are not entirely hypothetical.

Another instance of Walters intimate knowledge of events, was his reporting on tensions between João Goulart and General Amaury Kruel. The "information was obtained through talks with Lt Gen Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco; Brig Gen Floriano da Silva Machado; Col. Edson de Figueiredo; Lt Col Meira Mattos; Lt Col Mello Mattos, and others"<sup>637</sup>. It must be highlighted that General Kruel was to be a central figure for any eventual coup which was to take place. Due to his standing in the army along with his relationship with Goulart, it was perceived that the success of any coup attempt depended on Kruel's participation<sup>638</sup>. For those involved, this was very clear well before the coup was to be carried out. In February 1963, Walters commented that Kruel was "ambitious and responsive to flattery" with those opposing Goulart trying to "doing everything they can" to win him over and "instill in him a feeling of power and strength and ability to stand on his own feet"<sup>639</sup>.

However, the uncertainty over which course of action Kruel would take during the military uprising against Goulart caused Walters to conclude that the general's "irresolute past and frequent switches of allegiance combined with possible blackmail make it difficult to predict which way he will go"<sup>640</sup>. This doubt about who Kruel would ultimately side with is something that concerned the plotters, and it is the reason why Walters was informed of the

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<sup>633</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.220-21

<sup>634</sup> BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *A Presença dos...* p.460

<sup>635</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.286

<sup>636</sup> BLACK, Jan Knippers. *Op. cit.* p.220

<sup>637</sup> Department of Defence Intelligence Information Report, *Tensions between Goulart and Kruel*, 1963. Brown Digital Repository.

<sup>638</sup> DULLES p.310 and 318-20

<sup>639</sup> Department of Defence Intelligence Information Report, *Amaury Kruel Who's Who*, 13 Feb 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:726209/> [accessed 10 Apr 2018]

<sup>640</sup> Idem

falling out between Goulart and the general in June 1963. As Castelo Branco would claim, "without Krueel's adherence, all will be an *aventura* [hazardous adventure]"<sup>641</sup>.

When Krueel finally broke with Goulart, Walters was once again notified by his close friend Branco. In a telegram to the Department of State on the 27th of March 1964, the U.S. military attaché reported that General Krueel had "practically agreed to join resistance forces", and that through General Costa e Silva, he and Branco had "reconciled" a feud dating back to the Second World War. A certain amount of confusion surrounds Krueel's adhesion to the conspiracy as it is claimed that after the takeover started on the 31st of March, "Krueel was deciding what to do"<sup>642</sup>.

Nonetheless, this misgiving is easily explained: Krueel's initial hesitation to declare himself in rebellion was because the coup that started on the 31st was not the one being planned by the *Sorbonne Group*. More on this topic will be discussed in the next chapter, however in a cable to the White House on the 30th of March 1964 Walters confirmed that the coup to be led by Castelo Branco would most likely start the first week of April, and that Krueel would stand with them<sup>643</sup>. As ARMA reported "it had been decided to take action this week on a signal to be issued later". Walters then affirmed that he expected "to be aware beforehand of go signal"<sup>644</sup>. The U.S. Army Attaché was to be warned of when the military takeover was going to take place even before many of the units who were going to rebel.

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<sup>641</sup> DULLES, John W. F. *Op. cit.* p.318 *aventura* is translated as "hazardous venture".

<sup>642</sup> *Idem* p.319

<sup>643</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cable, [Military attaché Vernon Walters Report on Coup Preparations], Secret, March 30, 1964. National Security Archive. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%2013.pdf> [accessed 9 Jul 2020] p.1

<sup>644</sup> *Idem* p.3



General Amaury Krueel (left) was of incredible importance. The coup plotters knew that the success of the coup heavily depended on whether Krueel would eventually end up siding with them. Source: Folha de São Paulo, As Horas do Golpe (<https://aovivo.folha.uol.com.br/2014/03/30/3145-6-aovivo.shtml#page=2>).

An important part of this thesis is the impact certain individuals would have on United States strategy in dealing with Goulart. In addition to being privy to sensitive information surrounding the coup planning, Walters' own personal opinion would carry significant weight in moulding overall U.S. policy towards Brazil. It could be argued that Walters' attitude, expressed in his multiple correspondence, was instrumental in convincing the White House to back the plot headed by Castelo Branco. Walters own position regarding events in Brazil was conditioned by his values, beliefs and the personal relationships that he maintained with a number of Brazilians. The fact that he was so anti-Goulart, often expressing the same ideas as the *modernizante-conservador* elite about the then Brazilian president, can largely be explained by the company Walters kept.

That said, the fact that the biased opinions as well as badly informed judgements of U.S. officials would play such a vital role in deciding the fate of a nation is quite perplexing. As it has become evident over the years, and not just in the case of Brazil, U.S. officials failed to

establish relationships with those sectors of society whose convictions did not coincide with the interests of the United States. Instead, these officials would prefer to mix with those who held and defended the same points of view as well as values as them<sup>645</sup>. As a consequence of these new found acquaintances, the political enemies of their friends would soon become their adversaries, and middle of the road nationalists who advocated reform through means not in agreement with the interests of the U.S. nor the *modernizante-conservador* block would soon be classed as extreme leftists and/or communists.

This last concept points to a certain degree of irresponsibility on behalf of U.S. policy makers. By just examining some of Walters correspondence it is possible to see how similar his opinions of the Goulart government were to those of the IBAD/IPES complex. In a March 1963 letter to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Major General Alva R. Fitch, Walters dramatically claimed that those officers "following an extreme nationalist, socialist orientation" were looking to establish "a labour dictatorship". He went on to declare that infiltration of the Brazilian government by "Communists" or "pro-Communists" was such that "the fate of the whole South American continent [was] at stake". Bluntly, the military attaché warned that Brazil would become "another Cuba on an infinitely larger scale". Walters concluded the document; "I have coordinated this letter with no one. It is merely a frank expression of my views after five months in this country, 15 years after I left it"<sup>646</sup>.

Nevertheless, herein lies the problem: Walters was simply expressing his opinion, none of these allegations were based on evidence or facts. Yet despite this, his word was taken and his advice was followed<sup>647</sup>. It would be a common theme that throughout his tenure in Brazil, Vernon Walters would mistakenly accuse Goulart of eroding "democratic pro-U.S. position" within the FA so that he could "achieve dictatorial powers", even though he had "no confirmatory evidence as of" that moment<sup>648</sup>. The U.S. Military Attaché spent countless

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<sup>645</sup> Kennedy, Charles Stuart, Melbourne L Spector, and A. Lincoln Gordon. Interview with A. Lincoln Gordon. 1987. Manuscript/Mixed Material. p.46-47 The interviewer questions Gordon on the ability of U.S. staff to have ties with the Brazilian left. Gordon response leaves it clear that apart from some members of Congress his staff was never acquainted with the left. Gordon stated "certainly as a proportion of our total contacts, it was much easier for us to get along with the center and the center-right".

<sup>646</sup> Letter from Vernon Waters to Major General Alva R. Fitch, *Assessment of Anti-American Sentiment in Brazilian Army* 6 Mar 1963. Brown Digital Repository.

<sup>647</sup> Idem p.3 In the assessment Walters argued that aid to Brazil should be "cut off" if "performance" was not acceptable to the U.S., that "arms aid will strengthen pro-U.S. elements within the Army and to provide assistance to friendly elements who "would fight to prevent Brazil becoming another Cuba.

<sup>648</sup> Department of the Army Staff Communications Division, *João Goulart's Attempt at a Coup*, Aug 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:692929/> [accessed 3 Feb 2020]

hours informing his superiors of transfers along with promotions within the armed forces. Walters qualified many of these transfers to be "purges"<sup>649</sup>, which only affected "officers of an anti-Goulart pro-democratic" tendency. Promotions on the other hand were directly in favour of "leftists"<sup>650</sup> and "nationalists"<sup>651</sup>.

What Walters failed to realise, however, was that Goulart's decisions on transfers as well as promotions had, surprisingly, nothing to do with attacking U.S. hegemony in order to fulfil some global communist conspiracy. Rather, the Brazilian president was assuring support for himself and his reforms within the armed forces, as without the military's backing he would not be able to carry them out<sup>652</sup>. As it has become evident, those who objected to change and reform in Brazil were also those who were most friendly as well as supportive of the United States. By removing these elements, or weakening their standing, Goulart hoped to achieve his objectives. This topic of hegemony has been explored in Chapter One yet it is necessary to highlight how Walters' ill-founded perception of events led to him condemning a legitimate government.

Finally, it is also of interest to note that during his time in Brazil Walters spent a great amount of time collecting intelligence on officers in the Brazilian Armed Forces. The vast majority of these documents, simply titled "Who's Who", contain basic biographic data on the officers' family, physical appearance, education, career, decorations, religion and, most importantly, politics<sup>653</sup>. From this documentation it is easy to see that the U.S. Military Attaché was profiling the Brazilians in an attempt to predict their course of action in the event of a coup d'état.

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<sup>649</sup> Department of Defence Intelligence Information Report, *Purge of Anti-Communist Officers Underway in São Paulo*, 21 Oct 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:725182/> [accessed 4 Sep 2020]

<sup>650</sup> "Osvinist" Colonels Due to be Promoted to General Rank, 25 Jul 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:693029/> [accessed 28 Jan 2020] p.1


<sup>651</sup> Department of Defence Intelligence Information Report, *Promotions of Future Generals on 25 July 1963*, 17 Jul 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:692944/> [accessed 17 Sep 2019] p.2

<sup>652</sup> STEPAN, Alfred C. *Op. cit.* p.81 Stepan explains how Brazilian presidents used the Armed Forces to generate support for their policies p.68-70. However, this tactic of generating backing within the military was risky as it involved placing as well as promoting allies to positions of importance, which could be interpreted as an attack against military hierarchy.

<sup>653</sup> In the Brown Digital Repository there are many examples of these biographical reports. For example *Amaury Krueel Who's Who* 13 Feb 1963, *Mourão Filho Who's Who* 3 Sep 1963 or *Italo Conti Who's Who* 27 May 1963

In a report on the biographic data of Second Army Commander, General Pery Bevilacqua, dated the 11th of December 1962, Walters commented that "the foregoing series of contradictions make it difficult to predict what General Bevilacqua will do". Apparently, the General was anti-communist and pro-U.S., but in addition to supporting Goulart along with his policies on social and economic development, he was seen as being firmly part of leftist/nationalist camp. Walters declared, nevertheless, that while Bevilacqua appeared "to be loyal to the Goulart government, if he were ever convinced that this would lead to a labour dictatorship, he might well be shaken in his loyalty"<sup>654</sup>.

Unsurprisingly, on the 11th of April 1963, just four months after Walters had predicted how Bevilacqua could be won over, an *Airgram* titled "Adhemar de Barros winning General Bevilacqua's allegiance" informed that the latter was moving "away from leftist nationalism". It appears that Bevilacqua had started to speak out "in public against the abusive practices of labour unions", and that there was "a conflict between his position and President Goulart's political base in the labour movement". Adhemar de Barros, being "a clever politician, a charismatic leader, and convincing preacher on the subject of democracy"<sup>655</sup>, was credited in part for this conversion. The coincidence is too suspicious to be ignored.



Governor of São Paulo, Adhemar Pereira de Barros. Source: Os Divergentes (<https://osdivergentes.com.br/outras-palavras/o-rouba-mas-faz-esta-de-volta/>).

<sup>654</sup> Intelligence Report, *Biographical Data on Peri Constant Bevilacqua*, 11 Dec 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:721739/> [accessed 21 Jan 2021] p.3

<sup>655</sup> Airgram from American Consul São Paulo to Department of State, *Adhemar de Barros Winning General Bevilacqua's Allegiance*, 11 Apr 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:721808/> [accessed 9 Apr 2018]



General Pery Bevilacqua. Source: Folha de São Paulo, As Horas do Golpe (<https://aovivo.folha.uol.com.br/2014/03/30/3145-5-aovivo.shtml#page=5>).

Another example of this task of profiling is a report from September 1963 detailing who held which role in the Brazilian Army. Using asterisks, Walters then went on to classify the officers on their political orientation: One asterisk stood for "hostile to the orientation of the Goulart administration", two was for "go along with Goulart", three meant "Ultra-Nationalist radical" and four signified "Far-leftist, may be crypto-Communist or Communist". As the attaché put it, he felt "qualified, through many talks with the officers themselves, classmates and contemporaries, to express a fairly accurate judgement as to their real political orientation"<sup>656</sup>. According to the political orientation these officers had been assigned by Walters, they could be expected to react positively or negatively to a United States backed coup.

While the army was the most important of the three services for a takeover to be successful, it is pertinent to mention that the United States was also profiling officers in the Brazilian Air Force as well as Navy. Walters liaison with the top brass of the army along with his role in

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<sup>656</sup> Department of Defence Intelligence Information Report, *Brazilian Army Roles*, 09 Sep 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:806256/> [accessed 30 Jan 2020]

events may have been the most prominent, but he was not the only U.S. attaché in Brazil. These documents can be found in the same repository as others on the army. Of particular significance is a report on Brazilian Air Force officers from October 1963 which not only classifies them as pro-U.S. or Communist, but states who "could be counted on to go against present government"<sup>657</sup>. Similar ones on the Navy also exist<sup>658</sup>.

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<sup>657</sup> Department of the Air Force Staff Message Branch, *Brazilian Air Force Officers*, 19 Oct 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:806346/> [accessed 28 Jan 2020]

<sup>658</sup> Department of Defence Intelligence Information Report, *List of Communist Nationalist, Anti-US Officers in Brazilian Navy*, 11 Dec 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:716671/> [accessed 28 Jan 2020]



## Chapter Five - Participation

*Participation* is the last of the subcategories outlined at the beginning of this thesis to characterise the stages of U.S. interference in Brazil. It is, in comparison to the others, one of the more difficult to define due to the number of dilemmas that it proposes. Questions such as what can be considered as participation, in addition to when exactly it can be seen as appropriate to deem certain events or actions as participation, must all be taken into full account when analysing this subject. Moreover, it is in the opinion of this doctoral student that new documentation tends to further complicate the matter of establishing a line between what can be perceived as active plotting, and tactics which aimed to undermine Goulart without necessarily forcing his exit.

In this regard, the conclusions of Brazilian historian Carlos Fico on planning for a possible coup must be taken into account. According to Fico, "the possibility of removing Goulart from the presidency of Brazil seems to have become an effective alternative for the U.S. government to work towards at the end of 1963". Before then, he affirms that there was a "destabilisation campaign" that began in 1962, and in that moment the option of regime change only existed "as a general hypothesis"<sup>659</sup>. This distinction between destabilisation and planning to overthrow Goulart is a necessary one, especially when analysing the role of domestic actors<sup>660</sup>. In this sense, when the IBAD/IPES complex initiated its propaganda campaign against Goulart it was designed to generate public opinion against him and *nacional-reformista* policies, but not to overthrow him<sup>661</sup>.

Notwithstanding, from a U.S. perspective, if in 1962 the strengthening of the military front was to be undertaken, with Walters being sent to achieve this, it must be asked what their objectives for the destabilisation campaign actually were. That is, by destabilising and undermining the Goulart administration, the U.S. would surely ascertain its objective of maintaining hegemony: Or the Brazilian president would recognise his position of weakness, deciding to yield and step in line. Or these destabilising tactics would allow U.S. allies in the

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<sup>659</sup> FICO, Carlos. *Op. cit.* p.86

<sup>660</sup> *Idem* p.76-77 Fico explains that the IPES destabilisation campaign was not initiated with a coup as an objective. This highly organised campaign aimed to undermine Goulart and weaken him along with his government. Back in 1962 a coup was not the only option on the table, it would have been just as desirable to prevent Goulart from seeking re-election.

<sup>661</sup> VILLELA, Lucas Braga Rangel. *Op. cit.* p.92

military to forcibly remove him from power once they were prepared. One way or another Washington would 'win'.

It is for the reason outlined in previous paragraph that the United States' overall policy toward Brazil seems to have been reckless and irresponsible. The limitless scope given to the defence of national interests by the *National Security Doctrine*, meant that Kennedy and Johnson government officials did not need to rationalise the decision to encourage or back a coup. It was simply another option which would serve to preserve national security. Therefore, even though it is true that it would not be until September 1963 when the U.S. would perceive a military takeover to be the only viable option for "arresting", what it termed as a "fairly rapid process of economic and political deterioration"<sup>662</sup>, the fact it had began preparation for it in 1962 makes participation a tricky concept to determine.

Another fact which cannot be ignored is that once Washington had decided to strengthen the military front, it also worked to discourage any movement it perceived to be destined to fail. As it has been examined in Chapter Two and Chapter Four, the fear was that the failure of a rashly organised movement to remove Goulart would actually lead to the strengthening of the Brazilian president's position. While it might seem a fairly obvious hypothesis, it could be argued that had there been a strongly supported, consolidated movement before 1964, the United States would have given it its backing to act then. A key element of this thesis is the view that in the U.S. quest to maintain its position of dominance, there was no limit to its policy in Brazil. Therefore, if possibility of a successful coup had been available back in 1963, Washington could have in all likelihood backed it.

In this doctoral thesis, participation is qualified as those actions which had to do with the coup d'état being carried out, or with its formulation. As it has been explained before, the failure of other policies that tried to keep Brazil 'free' - be it through pressure and/or infiltration - led U.S. strategists to see a coup as the only way out. On the 30th of March 1964 Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed Washington's mindset best, when referring to the Castelo Branco lead plot: "Our big problem is to determine whether this presents an opportunity which might not be repeated. In this case we would wish to make a major

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<sup>662</sup> Telegram from Embassy Rio de Janeiro to Secretary of State, *Analysis Brazil's Political and Economic Deterioration*, 25 Sep 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:678096/> [accessed 26 Sep 2019]

decision as to whether and by what means we might give additional impetus to forces now in motion"<sup>663</sup>. The United States was decided on playing its military front card.

### **The Mann Doctrine and Explicit U.S. Support for Military Coups**

In a discussion on the 18th of March 1964 with the chiefs of mission in South America, the then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann, outlined what were to be "the four core principles of U.S. policy in Latin America". These were: "the promotion of economic growth; the protection of the \$9 billion in U.S. direct investments; non-intervention in the internal affairs of Latin Americans; and anti-communism"<sup>664</sup>. For different reasons, Mann's address has been viewed as a defining moment as, on the one hand, "Kennedy partisans" dedicated to "developing a Kennedy legend"<sup>665</sup> claimed that the Mann-Johnson course of action for South America completely undermined the late president's policies on *Nation Building* as well as security enshrined in the *Alliance for Progress*.

On the other hand, what was soon to become known as the *Mann Doctrine* explicitly confirmed that, even though "the United States believed in democracy... [it] would not try to impose it on Latin America and would no longer respond to military *golpes* by suspending U.S. economic and military assistance"<sup>666</sup>. While a great deal was made of the talk, especially after it was leaked to the press and published in detail in the *New York Times*<sup>667</sup>, in reality Mann had not so much announced a shift in policy but, rather, a change "in style and sound"<sup>668</sup>. The Johnson administration only emphasised it was going to continue what Kennedy had already started<sup>669</sup>.

Probably, what had the biggest effect was not the *Mann Doctrine* itself, but the article published by the *New York Times*, which confirmed that the United States would refrain from

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<sup>663</sup> Department of State Office of the Historian: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Brazil, eds. David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2004), Document 194. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d194> [accessed 28 May 2020]

<sup>664</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op.cit.* p. 177

<sup>665</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth *Op. cit.* p.200

<sup>666</sup> RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.177-78

<sup>667</sup> *Idem* p.178

<sup>668</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.200

<sup>669</sup> As it has already been stated in Chapter Two, the Kennedy administration defended U.S. business interests in the ITT dispute as well as the AMFORP one. Moreover, it would also recognise the military dictatorships in both Honduras and the Dominican Republic towards the end of 1963 in LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.201

condemning right-wing military dictatorships. Whether it was intended or not, Mann's address and its subsequent filtration would occur just under three weeks before the *Sorbonne* lead plot was planned to take place. Once they had caught wind of Mann's words, the conspiring military leaders with aspirations of governing Brazil, would have undeniably felt hugely encouraged to further their plot and carry out the coup d'état.

Of noteworthy interest here is the significance that the *La Vanguardia* newspaper gave to the *Mann Doctrine*. Reporting on the 2nd of April 1964, the *La Vanguardia* correspondent in New York, Ángel Zúñiga, gave notable relevance to Mann's words. The subtitle to his article was: "The recent declarations of Mann could have influenced the attitudes of the rebel forces". Zúñiga then went on to opine that "the coup in Brazil cannot be determined by the announcement of said change of orientation towards what happens in the American continent, but there can be no doubt that it could and will still influence the future secret meetings in military barracks"<sup>670</sup>. Intentional or not, the *Mann Doctrine* becoming public knowledge undoubtedly helped to encourage the Brazilian plotters and, in this way, further U.S. objectives for regime change.

While this next case is not related to the *Mann Doctrine* nor Washington's policy toward South America, it has been included in this section of the thesis as it was an obvious attempt to justify to the world what was going to be immediate U.S. backing for the movement that would forcibly remove Goulart. On the 30th of March 1964, just a few days before the coup, an article from *Associated Press* (AP) on a report by the *House of Foreign Affairs Committee*, confirmed to the general public that "despite [the] critical situation [in] Brazil" there was "little prospect for [a] communist takeover there in [the] foreseeable future"<sup>671</sup>. In essence, the article contradicted the United States' misinformation campaign against João Goulart, undermining what were going to be Washington's arguments for supporting the coup d'état.

In what was a blatant example of press manipulation as well as censorship, the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, "gave a background briefing" to correspondents in Washington. The White House wanted to assure that the widely circulated AP article would not be "interpreted as encouraging to Goulart", therefore, Rusk made the following statement:

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<sup>670</sup> ZUÑIGA, Ángel. Expectación ante la confusa la confusa situación brasileña. *La Vanguardia*, Barcelona, 02 Apr 1964. <http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/1964/04/02/pagina-15/32679356/pdf.html> [accessed 21 Jan 2020]

<sup>671</sup> Department of State Telegram for Ambassador Gordon, 3 Mar 1964. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:360858/> [accessed 12 Nov 2019] p.1

*"The report was prepared in January. The situation in Brazil has steadily deteriorated in the intervening months. The extremist elements have taken additional measures which have indicated that the government is becoming increasingly subject to Communist influence. This is giving rise to deep concern over the future of representative and constitutional democracy in Brazil"<sup>672</sup>.*

The actions taken here were not necessarily conducive to the uprising occurring nor to its success. Nevertheless, they do constitute fairly conclusive evidence of the United States overall participation in the plan to overthrow Goulart. For what other reason would Washington strive to control the narrative of the story except to generate public support for its military option? From a domestic as well as broader international point of view, the U.S. government needed to provoke sympathy in addition to backing for the coup. Furthermore, it had to make sure that its decision to swiftly recognise the new Brazilian government would be viewed as benevolent and in the interests of everyone.

## **U.S. Plans for Open Intervention and The Premature Coup of March 31st**

From the United States point of view, the coup that eventually occurred on the 31st of March 1964 was not the one they were expecting to see materialise. For all the planning and preparation for Washington's military front, which had started with Walters' arrival toward the end of 1962, in the end it was the rash decision of General Olímpio Mourão Filho to start a revolt in the early hours of the morning that led to Goulart's downfall. However, this important yet simple fact, that the military coup was premature or, better said, was not the one that was anticipated, has led to certain confusion or misunderstanding when analysing the role of the U.S.<sup>673</sup>.

Firstly, it is essential to highlight that Washington had elaborated a contingency plan, which outlined how it would need to intervene in order to ensure victory for the rebelling factions. From the documentation available, this was plan known as *USCINCSO 2-61*, and *Operation*

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<sup>672</sup> *Idem* p.1-2

<sup>673</sup> CORRÊA, Marcos Sá. *Op. cit.* p.59 The authors explains that the United States "set up an intelligence network that was so efficient" they were able to "anticipate" the steps being taken by the conspirators. While this may be true, this version of events fails to mention that the Mourão coup was, in fact, unanticipated.

*Brother Sam*, which is historically better known, seems to have been a part of this broader contingency planning. Both *USCINCSO 2-61* along with *Operation Brother Sam* will be addressed later. However, they are mentioned here because not only do they demonstrate to what lengths the United States was willing to go to support Branco's coup, but also because for all its scheming the U.S. was caught off-guard by General Mourão; what was envisaged for the uprising, such as a naval task force as well as logistic support, was still being prepared.

The aforementioned has led to the belief that Washington was not involved in the long-term plotting, and that it only decided to act, throwing its weight behind the rebellion, once it had been initiated. However, the reality could not be more different. While *2-61* was originally elaborated with the aim of preparing for the possible development of any four given scenarios, it seems that once the military option started to consolidate itself around the *Sorbonne Group* the United States began to implement as well as follow the "desired"<sup>674</sup> scenario, outlined in the contingency plan.

Proof that the United States was readying itself to support the Branco coup is abundant. In the first place, Walters was in contact with Branco's "trusted man" General José Pinheiro de Ulhoa Cintra in order to coordinate *Operation Brother Sam*<sup>675</sup>. On the 30th of March 1964 Walters informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that General Cintra had reported to him that the plotters had "decided to take action" the first week of April. Walters then gave details on how the movement to oust Goulart would begin. Apparently, Castelo Branco was to "issue [a] denunciation to [the] nation" once he had been relieved as chief of staff. He was then to be airlifted from Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo with other coup leaders, such as General Cordeiro de Farias and Marshal Dutra, where they would establish a "central command of [the] movement". In the cable to Washington there is no mention of General Mourão, and General Cintra only talks about the Minas Gerais garrison because he was "confident" of its support<sup>676</sup>.

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<sup>674</sup> FICO, Carlos. *Op. cit.* p.89

<sup>675</sup> *Idem* p.94

<sup>676</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cable, *Military attaché Vernon Walters Report on Coup Preparations, Secret*, 30 Mar 1964. National Security Archive. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%2013.pdf> [accessed 9 Jul 2020]

Another document, albeit from the 13th of April 1964, also reports that the "decision had been made to move [at] dawn on [the] 2nd [of] April"<sup>677</sup> at the earliest. The last week of March, the U.S. was well aware the coup d'état was impending<sup>678</sup> but they were, in all likelihood, waiting for confirmation that the *Sorbonne Group* was ready to move. It is for this reason that Gordon was notified on the 26th of March that "defence [was] preparing list of materials required and other data on POL [Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant] tankers". Gordon's "on-scene assessment of total situation as basis for moving ahead" was requested for "shaping next steps vis-a-vis Brazil"<sup>679</sup>.

However, on April 30th, once General Cintra had relayed the necessary information, Gordon requested for tankers in the South Atlantic to be tracked "in case" they needed to be "openly diverted to [the] port of Santos"<sup>680</sup>. Evidently, the ambassador was unaware that in less than twelve hours from the sending of his telegram, General Mourão would commence the coup that was going to force Goulart from the presidency. Otherwise, he would surely have demanded the immediate diversion of said tankers and the naval task force would have been in the vicinity.

In a 1998 interview Gordon would acknowledge this himself stating: "If it all had been according to my plan, at least I would have had the naval task force handy by the time the Brazilian troops began to move, but it wasn't anywhere near; it was way up off the northern coast of South America"<sup>681</sup>. What Gordon failed to mention (whether intentionally or not) was that the task force did not set sail until after General Mourão's uprising on the 31st. Obviously, the task force's state of unpreparedness suggests it was awaiting something else. Consul general in São Paulo, Niles Bond, also affirmed in an interview given the same year

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<sup>677</sup> Department of Defence Intelligence Information Report, *Amaury Kruehl's Promise to Throw His Forces in with the Revolt*, 13 Apr 1964. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:726322/> [accessed 5 Feb 2020]

<sup>678</sup> CORRÊA, Marcos Sá. *Op. cit.* p.95 After receiving Walters' report on Coup preparations, the Department of State ordered all the U.S. consulates in Brazil to be on alert, and to report directly to Washington any "serious developments in relation to military resistance or to the policies of the Goulart regime".

<sup>679</sup> Department of State Telegram to Rio Embassy, *Limit Distribution for Ambassador Gordon*, 26 Mar 1964. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:342833/> [accessed 18 Nov 2019]

<sup>680</sup> Telegram from Rio Embassy to Department of State, *For Burton*, 30 Mar 1964. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:360103/> [accessed 27 Nov 2019]

<sup>681</sup> Kennedy, Charles Stuart, Melbourne L Spector, and A. Lincoln Gordon. Interview with A. Lincoln Gordon. 1987. Manuscript/Mixed Material. <https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000431/> [accessed 9 Jan 2020] p.83

as Gordon's that "the troops in Minas Gerais had jumped the gun. They were supposed to move twenty-four hours later"<sup>682</sup>.

A Department of State intelligence note, sent on the 31st after General Mourão had made his move, also helps to confirm that the U.S. expected the coup to happen at a later date. The author informed "action perhaps not coordinated with principal anti-Goulart military leaders. It is possible that Mourão Filho's actions are not being taken on orders of the principal leaders of the anti-Goulart sector in the Army, although the latter are reliably reported to be planning an all-out effort against the Brazilian President sometime this week". The message concluded "in view of the extensive preparations already made by anti-Goulart military figures, it seems unlikely that they will fail to grasp the opportunity presented by Mourão Filho's actions"<sup>683</sup>.

For however unexpected it was, the coup initiated by Mourão would serve U.S. interests by removing a disagreeable president, in addition to minimising its participation in events. In this regard, the United States' apparent lack of preparedness served as a cover up for what it really had been organising. Washington's move to hastily to recognise the illegitimate government, established even before Goulart had taken refuge in Uruguay, along with *Operation Brother Sam* have, more often than not, been perceived to be quick responses to rapidly evolving developments rather than elements of contingency planning focused on regime change. If anything, the rebellion on the 31st of March along with its success served to maintain plausible deniability<sup>684</sup>. How could the U.S. have been involved with a movement aiming to overthrow the legitimate president of an allied nation, when its boats were not even in position when the coup started?


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<sup>682</sup> Kennedy, Charles Stuart, and Niles W Bond. Interview with Niles W. Bond. 1998. Manuscript/Mixed Material. <https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000114/>. [accessed 1 Dec 2021] p.84

<sup>683</sup> Intelligence Note Department of State The Director of Intelligence and Research, *Military Move to Oust João Goulart Underway*, 31 Mar 1964. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:667910/> [accessed 7 Nov 2019]

<sup>684</sup> CORRÊA, Marcos Sá. *Op. cit.* p.51 An official document, dated April 3rd, from the Joint Chief of Staff highlighted the concern of maintaining plausible deniability. The document stated that it was "essential to take all the necessary precautions to cover up and quickly call back" all operations. The U.S. did not want to risk revealing its true plans for aiding regime change.





General Olympio Mourão Filho (left) accompanied by Governor of Minas Gerais, José de Magalhães Pinto. Source: Folha de São Paulo, As Horas do Golpe (<https://aovivo.folha.uol.com.br/2014/03/30/3145-6-aovivo.shtml#page=4>).

As it can be seen, the outcome of the premature coup would make overt participation by the United States unnecessary. That said, what the U.S. had in store for Brazil should not be ignored; its analysis helps to further understand as well as demonstrate the lengths to which Washington was willing to go to re-establish its hegemony. At this point, it is pertinent to return to the subject of the *USCINCSO 2-61* contingency plan and *Operation Brother Sam*. Historically, there has been an element of uncertainty when examining Washington's coup planning. Even today, after all the findings unearthed by other historians in addition to the more recent declassifications of previously censored material, it is still difficult to confirm with exactitude certain details surrounding *2-61* and *Operation Brother Sam*.

Firstly it is not entirely clear, when the U.S. decided to draw up a contingency plan for Brazil Phyllis Parker asserted that "declassified cables" suggested that the "*USCINCSO Contingency Plan 2-61*" was developed in 1961<sup>685</sup>, whereas Carlos Fico found a version of the plan which was typewritten on the 11th of December 1963. He then goes on to claim that the elaboration of the contingency was initiated during Kennedy's presidency<sup>686</sup>. As well as finding the same version as Fico, this doctoral student came across a memorandum on the Contingency Plan dated the 22nd of November 1963, which confirms that formulation of a strategy to intervene in Brazil started in the Autumn of 1963 at the latest. In the document the Director of the Office of Brazilian Affairs, Ralph J. Burton, asked Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin M. Martin, if he had seen "the Contingency Plan out of the Embassy covering three alternatives with a heavy emphasis on U.S. armed intervention"<sup>687</sup>.

Burton was referring to a top secret document titled "Contingency Planning - Brazil" dated the 4th of November 1963, which was presented as "a discussion of political, military and logistic considerations as they might apply to some of the situations which could develop in Brazil". In essence, the document was outlining the role the United States would play in assuring the success of a military coup against Goulart, with two of the scenarios coinciding in their suggestions for armed intervention. In the case of civil war or "heated combat" options two and three stated that "U.S. units will be required in sufficient force to insure

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<sup>685</sup> PARKER, Phyllis R. *Op. cit.* p.122

<sup>686</sup> FICO, Carlos. *Op. cit.* p.88 and p.116

<sup>687</sup>State Department Memorandum, *Embassy Contingency Plan, Top Secret*, 22 Nov 1963. National Security Archive.

<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%2010%20memorandum%20contingency%20plan%20november%2022%201963.pdf> [accessed 9 Jul 2020]

results favourable to the forces favourable to the U.S. national interests". Estimates of the size and types of units needed were also provided<sup>688</sup>.

While it is true that scenario three spoke of the possibility of "covert aid to friendly forces", the authors were, curiously, quick to disregard it. Apparently, this "covert aid could be afforded only by air or sea", yet the types of aircraft required in addition to refuelling stops meant "it would be practically impossible to maintain the covert nature of this assistance". Likewise, covert aid by sea was also deemed to be difficult as it would need "a lead time of at least 20 days". As a result, it "would be subject to the maximum degree of premature exposure and the resulting adverse reactions both in and outside of Brazil"<sup>689</sup>.

Throughout the document, the authors were eager to emphasise the positive psychological effect overt support would have. According to them, it "would have the advantage of rallying to the friendly forces considerable support from groups whose principal motivation would be a desire to be on the winning side". In addition, they stated that "it is believed that early manifestation of U. S. determination to assist democratically aligned forces would have a deterrent effect on the rendering of overt or covert assistance by communist powers". Finally, they concluded "it appears that U.S. support, both moral and material, may mean the difference between the establishment of a democratic, Western oriented Brazilian government or the strengthening and solidification of a clearly leftist oriented group"<sup>690</sup>. Effectively, the document in question presented Washington with two similar scenarios which both advocated for open intervention in Brazil.

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<sup>688</sup> Airgram from Rio Embassy to Department of State, *Discussion on political, military, and logistic considerations for situations that could develop in Brazil*, 4 Nov 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:671718/> [accessed 4 Oct 2019] p.1 and p.10. P.6 lists these units as necessary for a successful intervention: Army: 1 Special Forces Company, 1 Airborne Brigade - STRICOM Support, 1 Infantry Brigade - Naval Support, 1 Aviation Light Transportation Company - Naval Support, 1 MASH Naval Support, 1 Combat Engineer Battalion - Naval Support, 1 Modified Log Command Type A, 9 Provide initial training mission functions, Follow-up 1 Infantry Brigade. Navy: 1 Attack Carrier (with Carrier Air Group embarked), 1 Helicopter Carrier (with Army Aviation Transport Company, light, embarked), 6 Destroyers, 1 Command Ship (for communications, primarily), 1 Fleet Oiler, 1 Tanker (with J P - 4 for land based air forces), 1 Destroyer Tender, 6 APA assault shipping - Army requirement, 4 AKA. assault shipping - Army requirement, 8-10 LST assault shipping - Army requirement. Air Force: 2 Squadrons of F-105, 1 Squadron of B-66, 1 Squadron of RF-101 (composite), 3 Troop Carrier Squadrons, 1 Aerial Refuelling Squadron, 1 Carrier Air Group embarked, 1 Tactical control element, Miscellaneous maintenance, supply and support units.

<sup>689</sup> Idem p.9

<sup>690</sup> Idem p.11

One final piece of evidence which adds weight to the theory that Washington was more than willing to intervene militarily in Brazil was the presence of around 2000 U.S. soldiers on Brazilian soil. It seems that although these soldiers were "dressed up" as civilians (their visas were to this effect civilian), they were really preparing for a civil war<sup>691</sup>. Moniz Bandeira defended that these soldiers were *Green Berets*<sup>692</sup> and if "an uprising broke out in the Northeast, as the Pentagon and the CIA feared, or if Goulart turned decisively to the left, they would sustain pockets of resistance, or they would form guerrillas or anti-guerrillas". More significantly, this would justify "the landing of marines" if the request to "save the lives of US citizens" was made. In a nutshell, the presence of these soldiers would facilitate an armed intervention by the United States, as its soldiers were already preventively inside Brazil as a part of the *Counterinsurgency doctrine*<sup>693</sup>.

This mention of the United States employing its military might in Brazil leads onto the next point of contention when examining U.S. preparation for the military rebellion. Over the years, the lack of documentation has caused a general belief that *USCINCSO 2-61* Contingency Plan and *Operation Brother Sam* were the same. As a result, Washington's strategy to support the coup was accepted to be those outlined in *Operation Brother Sam*. These were: the sending of a naval task force with "nuclear capability"<sup>694</sup> made up of the *USS Forrestal* heavy attack aircraft carrier and supporting destroyers (two with guided missiles) in case armed intervention was required, as well as offering logistical support through the delivery of 110 tons of arms and ammunition. These were to be delivered by an airlift<sup>695</sup> that included "7 C135 transport aircraft, 8 fighter aircraft, up to 8 tanker aircraft, 1 communications aircraft and 1 airborne command post". POL tankers were to be loaded in Aruba with petrol, jet fuel, aviation fuel, diesel and kerosene<sup>696</sup>.

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<sup>691</sup> VILLELA, Lucas Braga Rangel. *Op. cit.* p.59

<sup>692</sup> See p.118 for more information on the *Green Berets* in Brazil.

<sup>693</sup> BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *O Governo João Goulart...* p.138-39

<sup>694</sup> GREEN, James N; JONES, Abigail. Reinventando a história: Lincoln Gordon e as suas múltiplas versões de 1964. *Revista Brasileira de História*, São Paulo, v. 29, nº 57, p. 67-89, 2009. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239579091\\_Reinventing\\_history\\_Lincoln\\_Gordon\\_and\\_his\\_multiple\\_versions\\_of\\_1964](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239579091_Reinventing_history_Lincoln_Gordon_and_his_multiple_versions_of_1964) [accessed 14 Feb 2019]

<sup>695</sup> CORRÊA, Marcos Sá. *Op. cit.* p.43 The 110 ton package of arms and ammunition was to be held at McGuire airbase "pending Ambassador Gordon's determination of whether Brazilian military forces or state police" required early support.

<sup>696</sup> PARKER, Phyllis R. *Op. cit.* p.76, FICO, Carlos *Op. cit.* p.98 and CORRÊA, Marcos Sá. *Op. cit.* p.15 writes that they were four tankers: The *Santa Inez*, the *Chepacket*, the *Hampton Road* and the *Nash Bulk*.



The USS Forrestal at sea in 1962. Source: Naval History and Heritage Command (<https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/numerical-list-of-images/nara-series/kn-series/KN-00001/KN-4507.html>).

Nevertheless, a telegram from the 31st of March 1964 states that the "nickname Brother Sam is assigned to logistic operations in support of appendix 3 to annex J USCINCSO OPLAN 2-61"<sup>697</sup>. Therefore, *Operation Brother Sam* was actually a part of *USCINCSO 2-61*. By examining the contingency plan it is also possible to see that there was far more to U.S. strategising than just the naval task force<sup>698</sup>. In theory, as a contingency plan *USCINCSO 2-61* was meant to outline different possible scenarios as well as to provide the United States with the necessary intelligence to anticipate the unfolding of various situations, and information on what course of action should be taken in each case.

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<sup>697</sup>Incoming Telegram Department of State, *Brother Sam* 31 Mar 1964. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:360060/> [accessed 19 Nov 2019]

<sup>698</sup>FICO, Carlos. *Op. cit.* p.87

That said, the document in question "was in reality the defence of an established point of view, of an option already chosen by the author"<sup>699</sup>. It was Carlos Fico who put forward this hypothesis, declaring that "the absurdity" of the first and fourth contingencies in addition to "the similarity" between the second and third meant that Gordon "offered no alternatives to his government". The ambassador "only described his evaluation", as well as the only scenario which "would be effectively considered"<sup>700</sup>.

The four contingencies presented in *USCINCSO 2-61* were: "A. An Extreme Leftist Revolt", "B. Democratic Revolt Against Excesses of Regime", "C. Removal of Goulart by Constructive Forces" and "D. Gradual Extreme Leftist Takeover". Option A was "the least likely" to happen due to the "improbability that any significant element of the military would support such an attempt", and D could also be discarded as scenarios B and C would impede its taking place. In reality, no specifics were given on D, the document merely claimed "the difficulty of contriving an effective policy for this contingency adds to the importance of doing everything to prevent it"<sup>701</sup>.

Alternatives B and C were, therefore, the chosen ones. They outlined how the United States should react to "democratic forces" revolting against Goulart, and it was option B which spoke of Washington providing "covert or even overt support, particularly logistical (POL, food, arms and ammunition)" (what would later be referred to as *Operation Brother Sam*). In scenario B the authors also wrote that in order to legitimise the coup, "a significant part of the national territory" would need to be held by "the democratic forces", so that they could form "an alternative provisional government". They spoke of a confederation of democratic states that would break with the federal government<sup>702</sup>. This way, the U.S. would be able to recognise it and, as a result, justify all backing given to it. In this regard, the option to "intervene with forces" was a real possibility. Scenario C presented the removal of Goulart "in a variety of ways" with "President of the Chamber of Deputies Ranieri Mazzilli

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<sup>699</sup> Idem p.89

<sup>700</sup> Idem p.89-90

<sup>701</sup> Department of State Memorandum to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, *Political Considerations Affecting U.S. Assistance to Brazil, Secret*, 7 Mar 1963. National Security Archive. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%205%20political%20considerations%20affecting%20us%20assistance%20to%20brazil.pdf> [accessed 2 Feb 2020] p.4-7

<sup>702</sup> BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *O Governo João Goulart...* p.144-151 details a plan elaborated by the Johnson administration which was based on the allied states of Minas Gerais, São Paulo and Guanabara revolting. According to Moniz Bandeira, Washington would immediately recognise these states as the legitimate government of Brazil. It seems that Vernon Walters made a series of visits de Belo Horizonte to meet with Governor Magalhães Pinto and General Carlos Luis Guedes, whom Walters assured of U.S. support.

constitutionally succeeding him". "An interim military takeover"<sup>703</sup> was also on the table here.

In what is of utmost importance to this investigation, the course of action suggested in alternatives B and C was "curiously what effectively to took place"; "The coincidence between the directives defined in the plan", which was redacted toward the end of 1963 at the very latest, with "what the Brazilian conspirators carried out at the end of March 1964" was surprising to the say the least<sup>704</sup>. Although the uprising on the 31st of March was premature, the revolting forces made sure they established themselves in Minas Gerais, and they went about forming a provisional government<sup>705</sup>. Moreover, along with the armed forces creating the *Comando Supremo da Revolução* (Revolutionary High Command), which "would make the important decisions", in the early hours of the 2nd of April Mazzilli would assume the position of Acting President of Brazil<sup>706</sup>. The Johnson administration did not hesitate, almost immediately recognising the new government.

The coincidence between *USCINCSO 2-61* and the events of 1964 are too great to ignore, albeit it is impossible to confirm one hundred percent that the Brazilian plotters implemented the contingency plan or if they were even privy to it. That said, the information offered in this section presents a series of conclusions along with hypothesis that are impossible to deny. The first of these is confirmation that as far back as the autumn of 1963, the United States was preparing for its involvement in regime change. Official documents disguised this as contingency planning, but what Washington had in store for Brazil is exposed in scenario B and C. While events took a different course and, for example, a civil war did not break out like the contingency plan warned<sup>707</sup> (Goulart's decision to not fight for his position avoided bloodshed), this should not cover up that the U.S. was willing to intervene militarily to achieve its objectives.

Next is the question of what would have happened if General Mourão had not jumped the gun. If events had gone to plan, that is, what General Cintra explained to Walters on the 30th

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<sup>703</sup> Idem p.5-6

<sup>704</sup> FICO, Carlos. *Op. cit.* p.91

<sup>705</sup> DULLES, John W. F. *Op. cit.* p.312

<sup>706</sup> Idem p.338-339

<sup>707</sup> Department of State Memorandum to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, *Political Considerations Affecting...* On p.4-5 the authors of the document warn of "civil war or at least a clash".

of March, surely U.S. involvement would have been far more obvious<sup>708</sup>. The naval task force would have been in position or at least closer to Brazil, the POL tankers would have been diverted as well as loaded with the correct supplies and the plans to airlift small arms along with ammunition would have been more advanced. For this reason, it is of vital importance to understand that U.S. planning was based on the *Sorbonne Group* leading it. When Walters was informed that the rebellion would start on the 2nd of April, Washington put into motion its preparations with this in mind. General Mourão's movement was unforeseen, however its ultimate success along with events, such as Goulart's wish to avoid a civil war<sup>709</sup>, meant U.S. overt involvement was unnecessary.

This whole section helps to confirm that the United States' participation in the military takeover was much greater than it has historically been accepted, however this does not mean that Brazilian participation or leadership should be minimised. Evidently, the ultimate success of any movement to overthrow Goulart depended on Brazilian prominence. In any event, one question that must be considered is whether the Brazilian plotters would have taken action without U.S. support? If the *Sorbonne Group* had not been informed of the naval task force along with Washington's plans to provide them with arms in addition to other supplies<sup>710</sup>, would they have carried out their planned coup on the 2nd of April?. In this regard, the *Sorbonne Group* was well aware of its U.S. backing, giving it a massive psychological boost. Its decision to act on the 2nd of April, or thereabouts, was profoundly influenced by this.

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<sup>708</sup> CORRÊA, Marcos Sá. *Op. cit.* p.137 states that "the task force remained until the afternoon of April 3, when a simulated manoeuvre covered up and disguised the entire operation", which had been cancelled.

<sup>709</sup> PRESOT, Aline Alves. *Op. cit.* p.15

<sup>710</sup> FICO, Carlos. *Op. cit.* p.94 and p.117 Although Walters contact with General Cintra has been explained, Fico provides evidence that the Brazilian general was also to be in charge of communicating the needs of the rebelling troops to Walters on the day of the coup.



## **Bias of Opinions and Dislike for Goulart From The Beginning: How Individuals Such as Ambassador Lincoln Gordon Moulded Washington's Policy Toward Brazil**

For many years now, certain questions have been raised about the role as well as conduct of Lincoln Gordon along with other U.S. officials in the process that culminated in the military takeover of 1964. The declassification of documents from the period in addition to Gordon contradicting and changing his version of events with the passage of time, have lead to the Ambassador coming under increasing scrutiny. This next section will focus on Gordon's time in Brazil and his participation in the downfall of the Fourth Brazilian Republic. While much research and work has already been done regarding Gordon's role, this doctoral student believes that an analysis of it is indispensable to understanding the shaping of U.S. policy toward Goulart. Any new documentation presented here only helps to demonstrate the pivotal role that Lincoln Gordon played.

While it is not an easy task, nor one that is necessarily appropriate for this doctoral thesis, a vital part of examining Lincoln Gordon's behaviour is comprehending what factors might have caused him to act as he did<sup>711</sup>. This section aims to neither demonise the ambassador nor justify his actions, rather to present them in a clear and concise manner so as to facilitate the analysis of the subject of this study. In this sense, it is important to emphasise that Gordon was a product of his time and, as a result, he was influenced by the historical events he had lived through as well as by his own personal experiences. For example, his time studying in Oxford during the rise of Fascism in Europe in addition to the horrors of the Second World War, had taught him that any threat to Western Civilisation had to be annihilated. With the advent of the Cold War he applied the same theory to Communism<sup>712</sup>.

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<sup>711</sup> The doctoral student believes it is important to highlight a point which was emphasised in another thesis about the use and analysis of testimonies, and which must be remembered when examining Gordon's various testimonies from over the years: "using them as empirical data or comparing them to academic analyses as if both have the same nature and purpose may be foolhardy. It should be taken into account that the interviewees were not making an analytical effort to understand the conditions that led to the coup and which sectors of society articulated it, but rather, in general, they were seeking to legitimise their own participation in this process". SANTOS, Clarissa Grahl dos. *Das armas às letras: os militares e a constituição de um campo memorialístico de defesa à ditadura empresarial-militar*. 2016. Dissertação (Mestrado em História) - Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis. p.23

<sup>712</sup> GREEN, James N; JONES, Abigail. Reinventando a história... p.73

Gordon's stance during his time in Brazil has led to him being described as "a product of the Cold War"<sup>713</sup> who believed his mission was to avoid Brazil from turning communist, as well as a "Cold War warrior"<sup>714</sup>, albeit with more ironic undertones. Whichever of these depictions is more correct is up for debate, yet Gordon's mindset during his ambassadorship was firmly influenced by the struggle for survival between West and East, and between what he believed was good and evil. The U.S. ambassador was also to have his decision making strongly impacted by his own position of privilege as one of Kennedy's "National Security men". These were those men who came from the "best families" from the Eastern States and who had studied in the best Universities. They were to form the new elite of technocrats "who were to access power without ever being elected, acting in the shadow of the President without ever being submitted to any type of criticism"<sup>715</sup> or control.

This new national security elite exchanged jobs in big banks, multinationals and top universities for positions in government due to their connections. They would take over the task of formulating strategies along with official policies, and advised presidents on what course of action to follow. These new government officials were also characterised by "an arrogance"<sup>716</sup> that arose not only from their position of power and privilege, but from the belief that the United States only employed its immense military force for good. In this regard, these National Security men saw themselves as guardians of liberty, and the United States as the defender of freedom and peace. They would not hesitate to use violence to defend these values where ever and however they saw fit. Over the years, and even after all the atrocities committed by the military dictatorship, Lincoln Gordon would continue to justify his role in the coup and support for it as necessary for the greater good<sup>717</sup>.

Gordon was from New York City and he attended Harvard University. He was to immediately gain access to the U.S. government working for the *War Production Board* during the Second World War before moving on to work for the State Department as Director of the mission for the *Marshall Plan*. In 1961, after having spent some years researching and visiting South America, Gordon was chosen to form part of Kennedy's task force for Latin America, and he helped to create the *Alliance for Progress*. According to Gordon, "the

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<sup>713</sup> Idem p.72

<sup>714</sup> FICO, Carlos. *Op. cit.* p.87

<sup>715</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.120-121

<sup>716</sup> Idem p.121

<sup>717</sup> GREEN, James N; JONES, Abigail. *Reinventando a história...* p.80-84

substance" for Kennedy's famous speech to launch the Alliance was provided by him<sup>718</sup>. While accompanying the U.S. delegation to the second meeting of the *Inter-American Development Bank*, Gordon was presented with the opportunity of becoming Ambassador to Brazil. Apparently, he was asked to take the position as he understood what the *Alliance of Progress* was all about, and he was "capable of dealing with economic issues"<sup>719</sup>.

Another factor which would heavily influence Gordon's conduct as well as judgement and decision making, was his links to the Brazilian elite. Before becoming ambassador, Gordon's prior trips to Brazil had lead him to become fairly well acquainted with certain members of the Brazilian elite. Once he had assumed his position in Rio de Janeiro, Gordon went about developing these contacts as well as initiating new ones. The concepts of psychological warfare and indoctrination through propaganda are key to this doctorate, therefore it is necessary to remember that a crucial part of U.S. imperialism in Brazil (and in many other countries) was the specific targeting of elites<sup>720</sup>.

While this is not to suggest that Gordon's efforts to forge ties with members of the upper classes was carried out with the aforementioned in mind, his actions (along with those of many other U.S. officials) nevertheless would aid in co-opting members of the elite, especially those who were already favourable to the United States for specific ideological and material reasons<sup>721</sup>.

One idea that must be kept in mind here is that Lincoln Gordon would also have been susceptible to ideas along with opinions espoused by the Brazilian elite. What is meant by this is that when it comes to individuals, the process of influencing is not one way. Ideas, values, ethics and opinions travel in both directions. In this sense, ambassador Gordon was influenced and co-opted by the Brazilian elite just as much as he did them. In her book, Ruth

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<sup>718</sup> The speech was made on March 13th 1961 in the presence of ambassadors from all over South America

<sup>719</sup> Kennedy, Charles Stuart, Melbourne L Spector, and A. Lincoln Gordon. Interview with A. Lincoln Gordon. 1987. Manuscript/Mixed Material. <https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000431/> [accessed 9 Jan 2020] p.1-19. For more biographical information on Lincoln Gordon see SMITH, Bruce. L. R. *Lincoln Gordon: Architect of Cold War Foreign Policy*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015.

<sup>720</sup> See Chapter 1 Bridgeheads

<sup>721</sup> It is pertinent to mention here that making contact and establishing bridgeheads was carried out by all the members of staff of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Brazil. However, it is also of extreme importance to point out the role the U.S. business community played in penetrating the Brazilian elite. The importance of multinational corporations in furthering the reach as well as dominance of U.S. imperialism is undeniable. By forming part of a multinational a foreign worker comes into contact with the values and ethics specific to that company. As a result of the material benefits afforded by the employment in the foreign company, the worker will adopt these values and ideals. His or her own interests will be identified with those of the company. Effectively, the worker will become denationalised. See GALTUNG, Johan. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism". *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no.2 (1971).

Leacock dedicated a chapter, titled "Convincing Lincoln Gordon"<sup>722</sup>, to this process. Nevertheless, to treat Gordon's role in undermining a government and in encouraging regime change as a consequence of a sort of transformation or conversion, ignores certain facts.

First of all, one biography, which unfortunately tries to justify the ambassador's behaviour, interestingly points out that Gordon's strong dislike of Goulart was because of their contrasting personalities. Apparently, Gordon reflected on how he and Goulart "were as different as one could possibly imagine. Gordon was rational, direct, secular and unpretentious - an intellectual with a slightly moralistic streak. He was something of a Victorian gentleman with an ethic of hard work. Jango, on the other hand, was a politician not interested in or comfortable with long technical arguments, a man steeped in Catholicism of the reformist variety, with an almost mystical sense of his own destiny as an embodiment of the Vargas tradition". Consequently, these differences were "a recipe for a troubled relationship"<sup>723</sup>.

Secondly, from fairly early on Gordon would express his disapproval for Goulart and his government on multiple occasions<sup>724</sup>. However, the ambassador's initial aversion (during 1962-1963) to a coup d'état was really more down to the belief that it would not succeed<sup>725</sup>.

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<sup>722</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.103

<sup>723</sup> SMITH, Bruce. L. R. *Lincoln Gordon: Architect of Cold War Foreign Policy*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015.

<sup>724</sup> Telegram from Rio Embassy to Department of State, *Brazil-U.S. Relations*, 19 Jul 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:684382/> [accessed 24 Feb 2020] on p.5 Gordon stated that he saw "little evidence" that Goulart and his allies talk of social reform was "more than demagoguery". Gordon also questioned whether there was "still any hope of genuinely effective cooperation between U.S. and Goulart". Also in Telegram from Rio Embassy to Department of State, *Present Thoughts on Strategy*, 20 Nov 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:683572/> [accessed 24 Sep 2019] p.2 Gordon recommended the sending of a presidential emissary. If Goulart failed to listen the U.S. had to "consider all possible means [to] promoting regime change" as Brazil would be "well on down [the] road which Cuba went". Finally, in Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, *The President's appointment with Gordon*, 30 Jul 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:684415/> [accessed 13 Mar 2020] The background paper to the meeting between the two claimed Goulart's manoeuvring to regain presidential powers could "open the way for a leftist though probably not orthodox communist takeover".

<sup>725</sup> See Chapter Two - *The Draper Commission and its Consequences*. Also in Memorandum for the National Security Council Executive Committee, *U.S. Short-term Policy Toward Brazil*, 11 Dec 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:672105/> [accessed 2 Jul 2020] p.2 regime change was rejected as there was no "effective" opposition to "act promptly". In Department of State Office of the Historian: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, Brazil*, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiel Schwar and W. Taylor Fain III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), Document 235. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d235> [accessed 11 Jan 2020] Gordon advised President Kennedy that the option of a coup was not viable: "*The Embassy has sought to appraise carefully the strength of center and right wing opposition to Goulart and the likelihood of a successful coup against him. Our present view is that, in the absence of overtly unconstitutional action*

To say that he was convinced by the Brazilian elite to back a military takeover would ignore this, and the fact that since the end of 1962 the Kennedy administration went about strengthening the military front.

Last but not least, Lincoln Gordon arrived in Brazil with his own opinions, values and ideological points of view which caused him to see as well as analyse the world in a determined way. Rather than being convinced by members of the Brazilian elite, Gordon was ideologically predisposed to agree with them on a number of issues from their shared abhorrence of communism and leftist anti-capitalist tendencies, to those related to development through private initiative or liberal social reform which would afford the necessary conditions for private capital to flourish. Furthermore, like the *modernizante-conservador*, elite Gordon blamed the politicisation of the masses and their rise as a strong political actor on communist infiltration. He wrongly associated the elites loss of political power with communist subversion<sup>726</sup>.

In addition to Cold War doctrines, which caused the Ambassador to behave as he did<sup>727</sup>, Gordon joined the *modernizante-conservador* block in its opposition to national-reformist policies, sharing the view that it was simple demagoguery or that Goulart was permitting communist subversion in order to install a Vargas like dictatorship, in part due to his own personal convictions formulated as a result of his background, experiences, education, etc. In this regard, Gordon's close relationship with many members of the Brazilian elite along with his acceptance of their version of events were, in all likelihood, consequences of a shared global vision of happenings<sup>728</sup>, rather than him being co-opted by them.

As the ambassador recollected at a later date, he in addition to other U.S. officials developed relationships with the certain individuals as it was much easier for them to get along with

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by Goulart himself there does not now exist in Brazil adequate leadership, organization, or strength to carry out such a coup successfully".

<sup>726</sup> DREIFUSS, René Armand. *Op. cit.* p.140 also see p.32

<sup>727</sup> There is no wish here to enter into a debate on the motives that lead to Gordon acting as he did, but other investigators have suggested that he was motivated by a desire to form part of the Cold War conflict actively. As if he wanted to have a prominent role in the struggle against Communism. See FICO, Carlos. *O Grande Irmão - Da Operação...* and PARKER, Phyllis R. *Brazil and the...*

<sup>728</sup> MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Em guarda contra...* over the course of his book, the author points out that the left and the right "had different perceptions" of the political struggle which took place during the period in question. For the right "it was between the democrats, committed to safeguarding freedom and the homeland, against the communists and their populist and authoritarian allies". "For the left, it was a clash between nationalists and defenders of social progress against reactionaries, fanatical anti-communists and *entreguistas*".

conservative elements<sup>729</sup>. Two good examples of Gordon's companionship with members of the elite, are the ties he shared with Carlos Lacerda as well as Walther Moreira Salles. Lacerda was the Governor of Guanabara, and during the period in question, a close relationship had developed between him and Gordon<sup>730</sup>. The Ambassador thoroughly backed Lacerda and claimed he "would be [an] excellent" president<sup>731</sup>.

Walther Moreira Salles<sup>732</sup> was a leading banker (owner of *Unibanco*) who during the 1950s had been the Brazilian ambassador in Washington, and later would serve as Secretary of the Treasury during the Goulart Government<sup>733</sup>. Gordon "had come to know" him while he was working on research into Brazil, and they "had formed a cordial personal relationship", which included lunches and parties in the presence of other "leading Brazilians"<sup>734</sup>. Interestingly, Moreira Salles was also a member of IPES<sup>735</sup>, and during the months that lead up to the coup he acted as a sort of representative for Goulart on "sounding out" missions with contacts in the U.S., while maintaining Gordon informed. For instance, during a lunch meeting between Moreira Salles and the Ambassador in November 1963 the former gave details on what he had discussed with President Goulart after one of these trips to Washington<sup>736 737</sup>.

These types of relationships might not seem so dubious and they obviously had legitimate intelligence collecting objectives. That said, the lack of contact with those elements who did

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<sup>729</sup>Kennedy, Charles Stuart, Melbourne L Spector, and A. Lincoln Gordon. Interview with A. Lincoln Gordon. 1987. p.47

<sup>730</sup> Memorandum for General Maxwell D. Taylor, *Concerning Brazil*, 5 Sep 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:334263/> [accessed 17 Sep 2019].

<sup>731</sup> Department of State Office of the Historian: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Brazil*, eds. David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2004) Document 185. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d185> [accessed 24 Jan 2020]

<sup>732</sup> Moreira Salles was not just a banker but an important diplomat with famous and powerful friends from all over the world. See NASSIF, Luis. *Walther Moreira Salles: O banqueiro-embaxador e a construção do Brasil*. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 2019.

<sup>733</sup> VILLELA, Lucas Braga Rangel. *Op. cit.* p. 42

<sup>734</sup> Kennedy, Charles Stuart, Melbourne L Spector, and A. Lincoln Gordon. Interview with A. Lincoln Gordon. 1987. p.18

<sup>735</sup> VILLELA, Lucas Braga Rangel. *Op. cit.* p.42

<sup>736</sup>American Embassy Rio de Janeiro, Confidential, *Conversation with Walther Moreira Salles*, 26 Nov 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:956338/> [accessed 11 May 2020]

<sup>737</sup>GASPARI, Elio. *A Ditadura Escancarada*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002. p.239 The author mentions the relationship between Gordon and Moreira Salles, providing a specific example of one such meeting between the two: "within a 48-hour period (between the 12th and 13th of December 1963), he met with Gordon (mentioning the few chances of a coup, or a counter-coup) and then with Goulart himself (dealing with an exchange of letters with the White House), then he phoned the ambassador with a summary of the meeting with the president and arranged a lunch for the next day".

not form part of the conservative elite is quite surprising. In order to collect reliable intelligence, which would be used to mould policy, they must have surely needed a variety of contacts? Yet officials from the United States failed to culture relationships with those who did not think as they did<sup>738</sup>. Additionally, and what provoked a further misinterpretation of events, only the opinions and analysis of friendly conservative elements were taken into consideration. "In passing judgement on Brazilian politicians, American intelligence specialists tended to ignore the context... the charges made by the embittered foes of Vargas and his political heirs were simply accepted"<sup>739</sup>.

In relation to this, the subject of the overall irresponsibility and recklessness of United States policy toward Brazil once again returns to the fore. In his role as ambassador, Gordon was expected to provide situation analysis which was to be key to guiding policy formation. However, the relationships maintained by Gordon and other staff with those who plotted<sup>740</sup> to oust Goulart clearly distorted their vision of events. Not only did they relay intelligence to Washington without providing any proof<sup>741</sup>, but they ironically backed as well as encouraged the overthrow of what they claimed to be defending: democracy and constitutional rule.

The reliance that Gordon, along with other U.S. officials, had on the opinions of certain contacts when informing on developments in Brazil is quite astounding. For example, the idea that Goulart was going to use support from the left to carry out his own coup in order to establish a Peron/Vargas inspired "syndicalist republic" was a reoccurring accusation levelled

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<sup>738</sup> Kennedy, Charles Stuart, Melbourne L Spector, and A. Lincoln Gordon. Interview with A. Lincoln Gordon. 1987. In the interview Gordon was questioned as to why officials from the United States failed to have liaison with the "left". Gordon replied that they did, but his reply made clear that it was insufficient. Also in Kennedy, Charles Stuart, and Niles W Bond. Interview with Niles W. Bond. 1998. Niles Bond tends to confirm that the majority of U.S. contact was with "Brazilian conservatives". p.69-71

<sup>739</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.58-59

<sup>740</sup>CORRÊA, Marcos Sá. *Op. cit.* p.80 Highlights that the niece of opposition leader and key IPES member, Herbert Levy, was married to the Councillor of the U.S. embassy in Brasilia, Robert Dean. The exact nature of Levy and Dean's relationship is not revealed, and the fact that the latter was married to the Brazilian deputy's niece does not imply they enjoyed a close relationship. That said, Correa draws attention to the fact that they were in contact. On March 30th 1964, Levy informed Dean that the military was united against Goulart. More than anything, this information is another example of the links between U.S. officials and the Brazilian elite who plotted against Goulart

<sup>741</sup> The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) evaluated Gordon's recommendations but concluded that the chances of Goulart establishing an authoritarian regime in Brazil was unlikely. On the contrary, the INR declared that the evidence available led to believe that he simply intended to finish his term. See GREEN, James N. and JONES, Abigail. *Op. cit.* p.75 and Memorandum for General Maxwell D. Taylor, *Concerning Brazil*, 5 Sep 1963. Brown Digital Repository. This memorandum included a forwarded copy of the INR's evaluation.

at the Brazilian president<sup>742</sup>. Yet, even though the rationale to back up this claim was lacking<sup>743 744</sup>, it quickly began to influence U.S. thinking.

Already in 1962, Gordon was warning that "one cannot discount entirely as an ultimate objective of Goulart, given his temperament, history and ambitions, the establishment of a so-called syndicalist republic". The Ambassador's reasoning for making such a serious allegation was that "some Brazilians with memories reaching back to Vargas" claimed it was Goulart's intention"<sup>745</sup>. In a memorandum to the President in March 1963, Gordon presented the view of "a few conservative Brazilian political leaders" and "some U.S. businessmen" that Goulart was "absolutely untrustworthy" and was "consciously or unconsciously inclined toward putting the country either under outright communist control or under some form of national-socialist, Peronist, syndicalist dictatorship"<sup>746</sup>.

As time passed, Gordon's own assessment of the situation would grow even more radical and pessimistic<sup>747</sup>. By the end of 1962, when commenting on strategy for Brazil, he proposed the option of promoting regime change, asserting that democracy in Brazil was being undermined by Goulart's nomination of "extreme nationalist leftists" to key positions<sup>748</sup>. By

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<sup>742</sup> Carlos Lacerda explained to Gordon that he did not "wholly rule out idea" of a Goulart coup against congress in Telegram Department of State from Rio de Janeiro, *Goulart and Coup*, 14 Aug 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:684510/> [accessed 13 Mar 2020] Walther Moreira Salles claimed Goulart "would like Peronista coup if he could safely manage it" in American Embassy Rio de Janeiro, Confidential, *Conversation with Walther Moreira Salles*, 26 Nov 1963. Brown Digital Repository Marshall Angelo Mendes de Moraes informed Gordon that "Goulart and Communists" were "working [to] establish syndical state, one step before Communist take/over" in Telegram Department of State from Rio de Janeiro, *PSD Deputy Statement on Goulart*, 6 Jul 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:684305/> [accessed 29 Sep 2019]

<sup>743</sup> See page 164 Department of the Army Staff Communications Division, *João Goulart's Attempt at a Coup*, Aug 1963. Brown Digital Repository.

<sup>744</sup> During the last few years certain Brazilian historians have debated whether the threat of a coup by Goulart and/or the left was one of the key factors behind the coupists rationale to take action. These authors believe that there exists a joint responsibility for the military takeover as, to a some extent, it was defensive see FERREIRA, Jorge Luiz; DELGADO, Lucilia de Almeida. *O Brasil Republicano...* and VILLA, Marco Antonio. *Jango: um perfil (1945-1964)*. São Paulo: Globo, 2004. According to this interpretation, it could be argued that there was substance to Gordon's warnings about Goulart. That said, it has been pointed out that, despite the military dictatorship's brutal repression, not one piece of empirical evidence supporting this view has come to light. In other words, there is still no proof to uphold Gordon's allegations. See TOLEDO, Caio Navarro de. 1964: Golpismo e democracia. As falácias do revisionismo. *Crítica marxista*, [s. l.], v. 19, p. 27–48, 2004 quoted in WEGNER, Felipe Henrique. *A nação que salva...*

<sup>745</sup> Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, *The President's appointment with Gordon*, 30 Jul 1962. Brown Digital Repository. p.3

<sup>746</sup> Department of State, Memorandum to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, *Political Considerations Affecting U.S. Assistance to Brazil*, 7 Mar 1963. National Security Archive. p.9

<sup>747</sup> CORRÊA, Marcos Sá. *Op. cit.* p.109

<sup>748</sup> Telegram from Rio de Janeiro to Secretary of State, *Present Thoughts on Strategy*, 20 Nov 1962. Brown Digital Repository. Also in Memorandum to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, *Political Considerations Affecting...* Gordon



1963, Gordon informed Washington that "Goulart's interest in basic reforms" was "wholly cynical" and focused on the "promotion of class warfare"; that he would look to place blame on the U.S. for economic deterioration along with possible debt default, and use it as an "argument for closer aid and trade ties with the Soviet bloc"<sup>749</sup>; that Goulart was on a "secular drift toward populist authoritarianism", and that the "syndicalist authoritarian regime" he was working to establish would "in the course of time become bloc-orientated and Communist-dominated". Apparently, Goulart's "tolerance of" and "support for the Communists" had magnified "a hundred-fold" their power. Communist infiltration was such that in an authoritarian regime they "might well be in a position to force [Goulart] to step aside"<sup>750</sup>.

Curiously, and in an effort to support his damning verdict, Gordon declared that "to look for a sufficient number of overt members of the Communist Party to govern Brazil would be a grossly misleading way to assess the danger here", and "instead of trying to count Communist noses", one had to look "at the permeation in leftist and other circles of state socialist ideas and the acceptance of a whole string of Communist-promoted sophisms"<sup>751</sup>. Common for the Ambassador during the years leading up to the coup, was this tendency to force his opinion and his analysis of events on others. At times, this meant that he would provide feelings and judgements instead of facts, or he would go against any information which did not coincide with his opinion. This is a subject that will be examined further ahead in this chapter.

By October 1963, the Kennedy government's preparation of contingency plans for possible situations, which would see Goulart's removal, was underway. During a meeting on the 7th of October the possibility that the Brazilian President would not "last the two-and-a-quarter years that his constitutional term has left" was being discussed by Lincoln Gordon and President Kennedy in the presence of other U.S. officials<sup>752</sup>. The Ambassador declared that

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floats the idea of a coup, but says that the desirable course was to support Goulart on a short-term basis as there was not a consolidated plot. p.9-10.

<sup>749</sup> The subject of the *Política Exterior Independente* and the danger it posed to U.S. hegemony has been explored in Chapter 1. It has also been pointed out that the USSR was not particularly interested in Latin America to the point that it would not have actively aimed to create a rift between a country, such as Brazil, and the U.S. See RABE, Stephen G. *Op. cit.* p.136-138.

<sup>750</sup> Department of State Airgram, *Political Trends and Contingencies in Brazil* 22 Aug 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:679009/> [accessed 28 Feb 2020]

<sup>751</sup> *Idem* p.8

<sup>752</sup> Also present were Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman; Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin; U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon; US Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator David Bell; Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Marshall Carter; CIA Director of Covert Operations Richard Helms; Special Assistant to the President Ralph Dungan

by his "own guessing" there was "a fifty-fifty chance that by early" 1964 Goulart would "no longer be" in charge. He then went on to depict two "categories of contingencies"<sup>753</sup>.

The first of these was labelled "Comforting Contingency Requiring Rapid Response", which foresaw Goulart either "dropping out the picture" in a peaceful way or being "pushed out involuntarily". In other less ambiguous words, this second option meant through a coup d'état. It was at this moment, when questioning how the United States should react to the ousting of a legitimate government<sup>754</sup>, that Gordon unequivocally made clear his support for regime change in Brazil:

*"He might be pushed out involuntarily. This would then raise the question as to what we do... Do we suspend diplomatic relations, economic relations, aid, do we withdraw aid missions, and all this kind of thing—or do we somehow find a way of doing what we ought to do, which is to welcome this?"<sup>755</sup>*

In the same meeting President Kennedy asked the Ambassador if he saw a situation where the U.S. "might find it desirable to intervene militarily". The latter responded that the "Dangerous Contingency Possibly Requiring Rapid Action" was being prepared with the *U.S. Southern Command* in Panama. Here Gordon was alluding to the contingency planning on the United States intervening military in Brazil<sup>756</sup>.

Towards the end of João Goulart's time in power, Gordon's condemnations of both him and his government grew stronger. In a memorandum from Gordon Chase of the *National Security Council Staff* to McGeorge Bundy, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the former informed of Ambassador Gordon's perspective on the recent

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<sup>753</sup>Excerpts from John F. Kennedy's conversation regarding Brazil with U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon on Monday, October 7, 1963 (tape 114/A50, President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston). National Security Archive. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%209%20brazil-jfk%20tapes-100763-revised.pdf> [accessed 7 Jul 2020].

<sup>754</sup>In theory, the JFK administration refused to recognise those governments installed by military coups. For instance, in the cases of Honduras and the Dominican Republic, the U.S. initially refused to recognise the *golpista* governments. In Ecuador, however, the opposite happened. Evidently, Ambassador Gordon advocated for the same in Brazil. In RINKE, Stefan. *América Latina...* and in RABE, Stephen G. *The Most Dangerous Area...* there is more information on this initial policy of the JFK government.

<sup>755</sup>Excerpts from John F. Kennedy's conversation regarding Brazil with U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon on Monday, October 7, 1963 (tape 114/A50, President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston). National Security Archive.

<sup>756</sup>See p.169 Airgram from Rio Embassy to Department of State, *Discussion on political, military, and logistic considerations for situations that could develop in Brazil*, 4 Nov 1963. Brown Digital Repository.

situation in Brazil. According to Chase, the Ambassador had depicted Goulart as "an incompetent, juvenile delinquent, who represents a minority of Brazilians". In fact, "the majority of voters [were] upset. They would like to throw out Goulart". Furthermore, Gordon alleged that he "would probably like a Peronista-type revolution, with a lot of corruption at the top and support from the working classes", and that "a Communist takeover [was] conceivable"<sup>757</sup>.

Finally, on the 28th of March 1964, Ambassador Gordon ultimately sentenced Goulart to his fate in a dramatic telegram, which urged his superiors to back the Branco lead military takeover. Gordon affirmed that it was his conclusion that Goulart was "definitely engaged in [a] campaign to seize dictatorial power, accepting the active collaboration of the Brazilian Communist Party". Allegedly, the chances of achieving a "peaceful outcome through constitutional normalcy", which was the elections in 1965, seemed "a good deal less than 50–50". Gordon claimed that if Goulart were to succeed with his plan "it is more than likely that Brazil would come under full Communist control"<sup>758</sup>.

The damning verdict of João Goulart was accompanied by recommendations to support Castelo Branco's movement when it finally decided to act. In effect, as Ambassador, with a key role to play in offering situation analysis, Gordon convinced his superiors that ensuring the success of the military takeover was the only way to guarantee U.S. national security interests. The other option of a more pro-U.S. president being elected in 1965 was, as the Gordon put it, less than fifty per cent. Therefore, he wrote to his superiors:

*"Unlike the many previous anti-Goulart coup groups who have approached us during the past two and one half years, the Castelo Branco movement shows prospects of wide support and competent leadership. If our influence is to be brought to bear to help avert a major disaster here — which might make Brazil the China of the 1960s — this is where both I and all my senior advisors believe our support should be placed"*<sup>759</sup>.


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<sup>757</sup> Department of State Office of the Historian: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Brazil*, eds. David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2004) Document 185.

<sup>758</sup> Department of State Office of the Historian: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Brazil*, eds. David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2004) Document 187. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d187> [accessed 22 Jul 2019]

<sup>759</sup> Idem Point 11

In the same telegram, he also dramatically requested for weapons to be dropped "just south of Santos" (in São Paulo) at night by a submarine. Apparently, it was "the best means of delivery" and it might help to "secure victory for friendly forces without any overt" U.S. intervention. In the case the United States needed to intervene militarily, due to the possibility of "Soviet action" to aid the "communist-leaning side", Gordon also appealed for "the early detachment of a naval task force for manoeuvres in [the] south Atlantic", which would bring "them within a few days' steaming distance of Santos"<sup>760</sup>.



President General Castelo Branco with Ambassador Lincoln Gordon. Source: Unisinos ([http://unisinos.br/blogs/ndh/files/2013/04/castelo\\_branco01\\_lincoln\\_gordon1.jpg](http://unisinos.br/blogs/ndh/files/2013/04/castelo_branco01_lincoln_gordon1.jpg)).

As it has already been mentioned in this section, the U.S. diplomatic staff failed to forge relationships and maintain contact with elements outside of their comfort zone. Another problem also seemed to be the attitude toward those Brazilians who defended opinions or positions different to those held by the friendlier pro-U.S. allies. This is not to say that

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<sup>760</sup> Idem point 13 and 14

officials from the United States arrived in Brazil with some sort of pre-established bias, but the general negative attitude toward those classified as nationalist-reformist-leftist does raise certain questions on their ability to provide accurate, impartial intelligence. When referring to Goulart in an interview in 1976 Chargé d'affaires, Niles Bond stated "I didn't like the sonuvabitch"<sup>761</sup>. With this in mind, would he have been able to provide reliable information?

In this regard, after a meeting between a U.S. official and a Brazilian national had been conducted, the way in which the information obtained from the talk was relayed to Washington took on one form or another. For instance, when passing on information from a chat with José Nabantino Ramos, a São Paulo lawyer and director of the business that controlled the *Folha de São Paulo* newspaper, the Minister Consul General, Daniel M. Braddock, presented the former as having a "reputation" as "a well-informed and intelligent observer", who made "salient points"<sup>762</sup>.

Other examples include a talk with John Keppel, the Counsellor for Political Affairs, and Brazilian journalist and professor, Paulo Pinto Carvalho, who claimed Goulart had "no interest in real reforms", and that he "definitely" had "aspirations for establishing a dictatorial regime". Keppel, never once questioned his opinions, and advised him that as a journalist he had to use his "skills to try to awaken the Brazilian people to the existing dangers and expose the demagogic policies being pursued by some of the country's leaders"<sup>763</sup>.

In another document from February 1964, Niles Bond spoke of the atmosphere of "tension" in São Paulo provoked by Goulart's "intention to perpetuate himself in office illegally". While Bond provided no names of his sources, all of his information had come from "articulate" and "informed Paulistas"<sup>764 765</sup>. Finally, it is also pertinent to bring up Vernon

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<sup>761</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.52

<sup>762</sup> Airgram from Embassy Rio de Janeiro to Department of State, *Interview José Nabantino Ramos Concerning Brazilian Political Situation*, 13 Sep 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:334241/> [accessed 11 Oct 2019]

<sup>763</sup> Airgram from Embassy Rio de Janeiro to Department of State, *Memorandum of Conversation with Paulo Pinto Carvalho*, 29 Aug 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:333942/> [accessed 11 Oct 2019]

<sup>764</sup> Airgram from Consul General São Paulo to Department of State, *São Paulo not as calm as it sounds*, 07 Feb 1964. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:358098/> [accessed 02 Oct 2020]

<sup>765</sup> Other examples of U.S. officials favouring the views of conservative anti-Goulart elements are: Airgram from Embassy Brasilia Office to Department of State, *Conversation with João Sarney (UDN-Maranhão)*, 12 Sep 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:353309/> [accessed 16 Oct 2019]; Airgram from Embassy Rio de Janeiro to Department of State, *Conversation with Dr. Gastão Vidigal*, 24 May 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:671235/>

Walters' contrasting opinions of those military officers who were considered to be pro-U.S. or not<sup>766</sup>.

Gordon's general attitude toward members of the elite was also very positive, and their credibility along with the information they provided him with was never once doubted by the Ambassador. On this matter, Gordon even disagreed with his own government when the State Department negatively assessed Lacerda "as an irresponsible reactionary"<sup>767</sup>. The *Bureau of Intelligence and Research* (INR) effectively classified Carlos Lacerda as "a political chameleon" whose most "effective modus operandi [was] that of irresponsible agitation against whatever national government [was] in power"<sup>768</sup>.

The INR did not doubt his work as Governor of Guanabara, but it highlighted that this positive view of him was based on "the close contacts which [had] developed between the Embassy and Lacerda". Effectively, the INR did not want to minimise "his many negative qualities, the degree of controversy that surrounds him in Brazil, and the risk we run in being too closely identified with him in the public"<sup>769</sup>. Gordon responded that he was "disturbed by the assessment", as Lacerda's "intemperate political language and rather sharp manoeuvre are the going norm. At least Lacerda has courage and integrity and is a competent administrator, all of which is rare in Brazil". He concluded "he is a progressive democratic reformer and not a reactionary"<sup>770</sup>.

The relevance of the prior information is not to start a debate on what type of politician governor Lacerda was. What can be said is that he was "a militant politician who actively participated in three violent changes of government"<sup>771</sup>, yet whether he was or was not a

[accessed 16 Oct 2019]; Confidential Airpouch from Embassy Brasilia Office to Department of State, *Conversation with Deputy Herbert Levy on President Goulart's Political Strategy*, 12 Sep 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:819482/> [accessed 16 Oct 2019]

<sup>766</sup> See p.156-157

<sup>767</sup> Department of State Airgram, *Political Trends and Contingencies in Brazil* 22 Aug 1963. Brown Digital Repository. p.3

<sup>768</sup> Memorandum for General Maxwell D. Taylor, *Concerning Brazil*, 5 Sep 1963. Brown Digital Repository. p.14

<sup>769</sup> Idem p.14

<sup>770</sup> Department of State Airgram, *Political Trends and Contingencies in Brazil* 22 Aug 1963. Brown Digital Repository. p.3

<sup>771</sup> Declaraciones a la revista 'Visão'. Lacerda considera necesario derrocar inmediatamente al Gobierno Brasileño. *La Vanguardia*, Barcelona, 02 Sep 1966. <http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/1966/09/02/pagina-11/32659326/pdf.html> [accessed 21 Feb 2020] Also in MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. *Op. cit.* p.259-60 the author points to Lacerda as one of the key politicians who helped to stoke tensions and radicalise political opinion on the right. On the left, Leonel Brizola was the main culprit. Motta claims that they did this to further their political ambitions as well as claims to leadership of their respective sides of the political spectrum.

reactionary is of little interest to this study. Gordon's defence of him stemmed from their personal relationship in addition to the certain points of view as well as beliefs which they shared. Whether the information Lacerda, or in fact any other pro-U.S. Brazilian, contributed was credible or not seemed not to matter to the Ambassador nor to other U.S. officials<sup>772</sup>.



Carlos Lacerda, journalist and Governor of Guanabara State. Source: Folha de São Paulo, As Horas do Golpe (<https://aovivo.folha.uol.com.br/2014/03/30/3145-6-aovivo.shtml#masthead>).

In stark contrast to this was the treatment afforded to those individuals who did not necessarily see eye to eye with U.S. staff. Robert Eakens, the United States Counsellor for Economic Affairs, concluded that Minister and Assistant Secretary General for Economic Affairs, Jaime de Azevedo Rodrigues, held "extreme leftist, if not worse, views" after the former had explained his position on nationalisations and agrarian reform. Throughout the

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<sup>772</sup> In GREEN, James N; JONES, Abigail. Reinventando a história... the authors point out that while Lincoln Gordon claimed to have evidence that Goulart aimed to establish a dictatorship styled on Perón and Vargas, as the years went on he confirmed that many of his accusations were based on rumours circulating Brazil. p.78-80

memorandum, Eakens version of events hinted towards Rodrigues being radical and even a little unhinged. In fact, his reason for informing Gordon of the conversation was because he believed Rodrigues's "views [would] be of interest in Washington". He stated "the fact that a person holding such views continues to be given important positions in the Goulart Government ... in the writer's opinion, should be a matter of continuing concern to us"<sup>773</sup>.

When reporting on his conversation with Samuel Wainer, publisher of the leftist newspaper *Ultima Hora* and close contact of João Goulart, Gordon declared his assessment of events to be "so surrealistic that one's initial inclination is to regard it as the fanciful vapourings of Wainer's imaginative brilliance". The Ambassador then went on to accuse of Wainer of having "consistently fostered some sort of popularist authoritarian coup thinking in Goulart's mind, hoping to be the political brain trust of such a regime"<sup>774</sup>. Evidently, whether Wainer was giving valid information or not was of no interest to Gordon. The Ambassador's opinion of the him blocked his ability to analyse coherently, obscuring any possible useful intelligence.

The Second Sub-Chief of the President's Civil Household, Pinto de Godoy, had his version of events surrounding Goulart's request for a state of siege scorned in a similar fashion. According to de Godoy, the Brazilian President wanted to declare a state of siege so that he could confront the difficulties facing the country without needing full congressional approval. Reporting on this conversation, Political Officer, Harry Weiner, declared that de Godoy's description was "so spurious that in less important circumstances it might be comic". Weiner also alluded to the Goulart administration trying to achieve "near-dictatorial powers"<sup>775</sup>.

A fair amount of what has been examined in this section has been exposed in other studies related to the military takeover of 1964. That said, it is in the view of this doctoral student that the roles of certain individuals, such as Lincoln Gordon, are of extreme importance when investigating not only a coup d'état, but also imperialism. Notions of imperialism as a dominance structure wherein one state effectively reaps the rewards of being more powerful

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<sup>773</sup> Airgram from Embassy Rio de Janeiro to Department of State, *Jaime Rodrigues Gives Vent to His Radical Views on AMFORP and Agrarian Reform*, 02 Aug 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:679065/> [accessed 23 Sep 2020]

<sup>774</sup> Telegram from Embassy Rio de Janeiro to Department of State, *Telegram Regarding Wainer's Assessment of Goulart*, 02 Nov 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:671650/> [accessed 24 Sep 2019]

<sup>775</sup> Confidential Air pouch Embassy Brasilia Office to Department of State, *Conversation with Pinto de Godoy on State of Siege Request*, 07 Oct 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:843210/> [accessed 04 Oct 2019] p.3



than another, often lead to the practice of treating it as an impersonal, faceless machine. Yet (and the hope is that it has been made clear over the last few pages), U.S. policy toward Brazil as well as any other country, was and is heavily influenced by specific actors.

In the period of time leading up to the coup, all the faucets of their individual personalities and mindsets would be pivotal in conditioning their analysis of events. As a result, all the correspondence sent to Washington, containing intelligence along with evaluations, and which had the objective of helping to mould policy, was influenced by this. However, the dilemma which arises here is not so much related to the behaviour of each U.S. official in Brazil<sup>776</sup> but, once again, with the reckless indifference in the way the United States went about directing its policy toward the South American country.

As it has been highlighted, mechanisms, such as the INR<sup>777</sup> existed to guarantee that the correct decisions on policy were made. In this regard, after analysing Gordon's telegram to Secretary of State, Dean Rusk<sup>778</sup>, the *Bureau of Intelligence and Research* concluded that the conclusion and "overall estimate" included in the telegram were "of questionable validity". According to the INR report, they were not "substantiated by the evidence adduced in their support, which is incompletely or inaccurately portrayed in several important respects and also omits numerous positive factors in the Brazilian situation". The INR declared that the "available evidence" justifies "a much less pessimistic outlook"<sup>779</sup>. A further example of governmental checking was when the *National Security Council* sensibly questioned

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<sup>776</sup> At the end of the day, a cold and emotionless analysis, which aims to ignore the debate on the grave mistakes they made, could conclude that Gordon, Walters or Bond (to mention the three named in this study) were conditioned by their own past.

<sup>777</sup> As stated on the U.S. Department of State website: "The INR's mission is to deliver and coordinate timely, objective intelligence that advances U.S. diplomacy". <https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/secretary-of-state/bureau-of-intelligence-and-research/>

<sup>778</sup> For logistical reasons the doctoral student has not been able to gain access to this source. However, through other documents, it has been possible to verify the content of the telegram. In it Gordon warned that "*weighing the evidence as objectively as possible, it seems to me increasingly clear that Goulart's objective is to perpetuate himself in power through a repetition of the Vargas coup in 1937, establishing a similar regime to Peronism, with its extreme anti-American nationalism. The danger of the communists taking power stems from the total incompetence of Goulart to understand or solve serious economic, administrative, or any other problem. In the case of Goulart serving as a front man to establish an authoritarian regime, he could easily be sidelined, like General Naguib in Egypt, and make way for some communist Nasser*". Ambassador Lincoln Gordon to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 21 August 1963, No. 373, Brazil: August 1963, National Security File, John F. Kennedy Library in GREEN, James N; JONES, Abigail. Reinventando a história... p.74 and p.87

<sup>779</sup> Memorandum for General Maxwell D. Taylor, *Concerning Brazil*, 5 Sep 1963. Brown Digital Repository

Gordon's logic<sup>780</sup> and refused his request for a submarine to make a weapons drop as well as for the naval task force to be sent on the 28th of March 1964<sup>781</sup>.

Nevertheless, the findings and conclusions of the INR were evidently ignored when Washington formulated its policy toward the Goulart government, and Brazil's fate was ultimately decided by the irrational and erroneous information sent from the embassy in Rio de Janeiro. Over the years, this point has become more evident with Ambassador Gordon changing his version of events in order to justify his support for the coup<sup>782</sup>. The fears expressed in 1963 and 1964 of a Goulart syndicalist dictatorship being taken over by communists were cited when it seemed to be convenient. In 1998 the ex-ambassador proclaimed:

*"I did not believe that Goulart was a communist, but I was convinced that he was a very weak president. Unlike Vargas or Peron, he would not be an effective dictator. He might turn out to be the Naguib who would be followed by some solidly left-wing Nasser. I never identified a particular person for that role"*<sup>783</sup>.

Even so, in another interview given to the *Folha de São Paulo* newspaper in 2007, Lincoln Gordon contradicted himself declaring "Goulart did not have the courage to be a dictator". Gordon believed that he "personally wasn't dictatorial" but his brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, was. He then went on to state that what worried him was Goulart confirming that Juan Perón was one of his heroes. For the ex-ambassador this was a "peculiar" choice of hero

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<sup>780</sup>In relation to the submarine drop "The group agreed that this was a puzzling request". They also "questioned Ambassador Gordon's request for the early detachment of a naval task force". NSC Memorandum of Conversation, *Brazil, Top Secret*, 28 Mar 1964. National Security Archive. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%2011%20brazilnscdocument.pdf> [accessed 09 Jul 2020]

<sup>781</sup> Idem

<sup>782</sup> GREEN, James N; JONES, Abigail. Reinventando a história... The article explores the evolution of Gordon's justifications for supporting the coup in 1964. If in 1963 Gordon had evidence Goulart was going to establish a syndicalist dictatorship, which would then be followed by a communist takeover, by 1976 he was claiming his main concern was a situation where an equally divided Brazil would be consumed by civil war. There was no mention of Goulart aiming to stage a coup which would then be supplanted by a communist regime. In the 1990s and early 2000s Gordon was once again defending the theory that Goulart wished to install himself as a dictator, which would have been succeeded by a communist coup against him, yet he was now admitting his position was based on rumours and speculation instead of evidence.

<sup>783</sup> Kennedy, Charles Stuart, Melbourne L Spector, and A. Lincoln Gordon. Interview with A. Lincoln Gordon. 1987. Manuscript/Mixed Material p.84

for the president of "a supposedly democratic country". Gordon believed that for Goulart to be inspired by this type of figure "was not good for near-democratic future of Brazil"<sup>784</sup>.

In light of all of this evidence, the fact that the United States conducted its business in such an irresponsible way when it had the instruments to do otherwise, provokes certain questions as well as conclusions. The victory of what can be considered irrational (the opinions of Gordon along with other U.S officials) over rational (the findings of the INR) adds to the argument that in the paranoia constructed Cold War mindset, a military takeover was far more attractive from a U.S. policy makers perspective. The rise of the masses and Goulart's support for their demands of far-reaching democratic reforms in addition to years of economic instability had caused Washington to see regime change as the only feasible option. Why risk waiting to see what would happen in the 1965 elections?

At the end of the day, U.S. national security interests were all that mattered. The need to defend as well as further its hegemony caused it to see João Goulart as an obstacle that had to be overcome. Essentially, whatever its policy was, U.S. imperialism was not going to fail in the pursuit of its goals. For an imperialist power such as the United States, this stance is no big surprise. Yet, with the documentation that is available today it is possible to see that this was achieved in a irresponsibly. From Washington's point of view, it did not matter how it was going to solve its Brazilian problem Therefore, not only was a legitimate president overthrown, but the course of an entire nation was changed forever due to the United States decision to act on unreliable intelligence.

### **U.S. Official Reaction to The Coup d'état: Recognition of an Unconstitutional Government.**

On the 30th of March 1964 Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that the U.S. government was not going to be "paralysed by theoretical niceties" after it had decided that regime change was the best policy option for U.S interests<sup>785</sup>. What was important, however, was choosing

<sup>784</sup> DÁVILA, Sérgio. Brazil poderia virar uma Cuba, diz Gordon. *Folha de São Paulo*, São Paulo, 15 Jun 07. <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc1507200713.htm> [accessed 22 Sep 2019]

<sup>785</sup> Department of State Office of the Historian: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Brazil*, eds. David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2004) Document 194 <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d194> [accessed 15 Oct 2019]

the correct moment to act as well as the right plot to back. The military takeover initiated in the early hours of the morning on the 31st of March was not the one expected of the Branco lead plotters, but the U.S. government was quick to react, throwing its support behind it once it realised it presented a unique opportunity<sup>786</sup>. However, in accordance with the concern discussed in its contingency planning about portraying the coup as democratic and legitimate, Washington acted hastily and recognised an illegal government.

In this sense, this next section deals with how the United States concluded its policy of interference against the Goulart government. The attempts by the United States to subvert order in Brazil through psychological warfare along with other tactics to (re)impose its hegemony formed part of a policy which evolved to bring about regime change through what it termed its military front<sup>787</sup>. Although General Mourao Filho took the U.S. by surprise, Washington's chosen course of action was not a kneejerk reaction. Rather, it followed revised guidelines which were put into effect in accordance with the voluminous flow of intelligence coming out of Brazil<sup>788</sup>, and which were designed to ensure the success of its regime change policy. As detailed in *USCINCSO 2-61*, the recognising of an interim government had the ultimate objective of justifying open intervention by Washington in the case it was needed.

Writing at around 1pm on the 31st March, Lincoln Gordon informed the Department of State that his "present judgment is that" Mourão's coup "might not be last opportunity, but well might be last good opportunity to support action by anti-Goulart group which still occupies large proportion [of] strategic military commands and direction [of] state-level forces in cohesive region states accounting for over half [the] population and all industry". He then went on to urge Washington to back the uprising: "I believe your major decision should be in

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<sup>786</sup> CORREA, Marcos Sá. *Op. cit.* The author explains that when the U.S. knew a coup was going to take place it quickly prepared itself. For this reason, when General Mourão Filho moved on the 31st it had already set up "a bureaucratic apparatus capable of launching a naval operation in support of the revolutionaries, directing an agenda for a meeting in Washington to prepare a special program of economic assistance to the new regime, once it had been installed, and defining the exact moment when the U.S. should recognize the new government" p.125.

<sup>787</sup> During a meeting on the 30th of July 1962 the Kennedy administration first spoke of strengthening the Brazilian military in case it needed it to act See page 34.

<sup>788</sup> CORREA, Marcos Sá. Once the United States government had been informed on the 30th that during the following days the coup was to take place, it immediately went about setting up an intelligence apparatus that was "so precise that it was able to anticipate the steps that the conspirators were going to take" p.99.

affirmative and [I] will be preparing recommend[ation] [of] means giving resistance forces additional impetus"<sup>789</sup>.

During the very early stages of the coup, the Ambassador was also concerned with achieving legitimacy which would have paved the way for the United States being able to justify internationally its open support for a coup d'état. In the same telegram to the Department of State, Gordon specified how he had "taken action to get to key governors [a] message on [the] vital importance colour of legitimacy", stressing the political significance of having the majority of congress against Goulart. In the case "congressional coverage [was] not available" Gordon's "intermediaries" were inquiring how the Governors' group could "handle [the] critical question [of] mantle of legitimacy and position as defenders of [the] constitution"<sup>790</sup>.

With the embassy in Rio de Janeiro exploring ways for the revolting movement to be recognised as legitimate, Washington went about putting the rest of the contingency plan into effect<sup>791</sup>. On being informed that Gordon had given a period of twelve hours to decide what course of action to follow, President Johnson responded "we need to take every step that we can, do everything we need to do". Ball responded that they were "canvassing all the possibilities" to see how the events would play out before making any specific movements when the President bluntly stated "I'd get right on top of it, and stick my neck out a little"<sup>792</sup>.

Effectively, that is what the U.S. government did. Only a eighteen hours after Chamber of Deputies President, Ranieri Mazzilli, had been unconstitutionally declared Acting President

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<sup>789</sup> Department of State Office of the Historian: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Brazil*, eds. David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2004) Document 197 <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d197> [accessed 14 Oct 2019]

<sup>790</sup> Idem

<sup>791</sup> White House Audio Tape, *President Lyndon B. Johnson discussing the impending coup in Brazil with Undersecretary of State George Ball*, 31 Mar 1964. National Security Archive <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/LBJ-Brazil.mp3> [accessed 12 Jul 2020]. Undersecretary of State, George Ball, informed President Johnson about the sending of the naval task force. Because it would take ten days to arrive it would be possible to observe developments and see whether it would be ultimately needed or not. Ball confirmed it could "be done in a way that doesn't create any public stir". POL tankers from Aruba were also sent and the weapons shipment, which was to be airdropped, was being prepared.

<sup>792</sup> Idem. Also in CORREA, Marcos Sá. *Op. cit.* Along this same line of sticking their neck out to back the anti-Goulart coup, the Department of State confirmed it was already planning for a new government on the 1st of April. Even before the coup could be declared a success, a telegram was sent to the Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, to confirm that it had set up an "inter-agency economic taskforce on assistance to possible and acceptable post-coup Brazilian government". The concern was that the new government was going to inherit serious economical problems, and that it would need immediate help in order to achieve a minim level of stability P.75-76

of Brazil<sup>793</sup>, and with Gordon and Ball both being fully aware of the illegality of his appointment<sup>794</sup>, the Johnson administration sent a message of recognition to him. The contentiousness of this decision and its subsequent repercussions were highlighted by some news outlets at the time<sup>795</sup>. With this message, and due to how the whole situation unravelled, Washington's Goulart problem had efficiently been solved without it needing to overtly intervene in the coup. Where other strategies had failed over the years to defend the United States' hegemony, what it had referred to as "the military front" had not.

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<sup>793</sup> PARKER, Phyllis, R. *Op. cit.* "The Brazilian constitution provided automatic forfeiture of office if the president left the country without congressional permission" p.83. However, Goulart was still in Brazil when Mazzilli assumed the role of acting president, he did not leave Brazil for Uruguay until the 4th of April. Mazzilli was declared president at 2.20am on the 2nd of April. See DULLES, John W. F. *Op. cit.* p.338

<sup>794</sup> CORREA, Marcos Sá. *Op. cit.* According to the author, on the 2nd of April 1964 the Department of State, which had "an extensive network of agents" following Goulart, informed the ambassador twice that the ex-president was still in Brazil p.97.

<sup>795</sup> VILLAR-BORDA, Carlos J. Delicado Problema Puede Plantear lo de Brasil. *El Informador*. 3 Mar 1964. <http://hemeroteca.informador.com.mx/#> [accessed 6 Apr 2020] the article highlighted the illegality surrounding Mazzilli's appointment, questioning the Johnson government's recognition of it. The author asked whether there had been "a change in U.S. government policy regarding the recognition of de facto governments". Another article from the same day stated the "concern" that Johnson's recognition had created in the rest of South America. It seemed that there were "coups that deserved special treatment... the U.S. was willing to make a classification of good and bad governments to determine its policy of recognition and continuation of economic and military aid" in Continúan las Relaciones. *El Informador*. 3 Mar 1964. <http://hemeroteca.informador.com.mx/#> [accessed 6 Apr 2020] Also ZUÑIGA, Ángel. Johnson envía un mensaje de 'buenos deseos' al grupo militar brasileño. *La Vanguardia*. 04 Apr 1964. <http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/1964/04/04/pagina-5/32679900/pdf.html> [accessed 17 Feb 2020] The author also emphasised the importance of Johnson's message calling it a "clear sign of approval". "Washington's satisfaction with the solution to the crisis in Brazil, is one of the most obvious signs in a policy change that will surely have other repercussions".

## Chapter Six: Expectations

What the United States hoped to achieve in Brazil is not a too difficult question to answer. In general, simplified terms, the U.S. aimed to maintain the hegemony as well as increase the influence it already enjoyed, in addition to opening up the Brazilian market and further integrating it into the capitalist system. Nevertheless, the long-term ideological struggle against Brazilian nationalist-reformist tendencies, which openly acted against and undermined U.S. interests, was very much at the fore during this process. As political heir to Getúlio Vargas, who enjoyed the backing of many of the different nationalist pro-reform factions, João Goulart's rise to power represented a serious threat to Washington's ambitions<sup>796</sup>. It is for this reason, that expectations have to be measured through this ideological as well as geopolitical prism. A straightforward question could be; What did the U.S. expect to achieve from its policy toward the Goulart government?

One argument could be that the United States aimed to use pressure and psychological warfare to weaken the Goulart government as well as support for it (and for what it stood for) sufficiently so that it would be forced to accept U.S. directives in order to remain in power until the next elections. By complying with U.S. guidelines, Goulart should have been able to muster enough backing from conservative groups, who would have accepted Goulart's replacement by legitimate constitutional succession as more desirable than a coup as long as he toed the line. For the U.S. this would also have been beneficial as its interests, on the whole, would have been respected, and its continued anti-national-reformism propaganda could have lead to the victory of a much more favourable candidate in the 1965 elections.

As it has been demonstrated, documents during 1962 and early 1963 tend to uphold the theory explained above. To say the United States was trying to overthrow Goulart from the beginning of his mandate would be unfounded<sup>797</sup>. That said, many of these same sources also

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<sup>796</sup> For a detailed analysis of what can be considered to be the consolidation of national-reformism as a political current see WEGNER, Felipe Henrique. *Op. cit.* p.47. In relation as to why Goulart presented specific problems to U.S. hegemony as Getúlio Vargas' political heir, Wegner highlights that while the Vargas' government failed in its attempt to construct an *industrial-trabalhista* block capable of enacting an industrialisation process, it did provoke political polarisation, and an increase in popular support for nationalist policies. In this regard, the campaign to establish state monopoly over petrol, which would lead to the foundation of *Petrobras* in 1953, was incredibly important. However, and which would be of great concern to the United States, was the rise in anti-imperialist rhetoric that also accompanied this process, and the consolidation of national-reformist ideology during the 1950s.

<sup>797</sup> In his book *O Grande Irmão - Da Operação Brother Sam aos Anos de Chumbo - O Governo dos Estados Unidos e a Ditadura Militar* Carlos Fico makes this point clear. The author differentiates between destabilisation and active plotting.

reiterated time and again that the option to support Goulart on a limited or, "short-leash basis"<sup>798</sup>, was because there was no effective pro-U.S. opposition group in a position where it would be capable of orchestrating a successful takeover until 1964<sup>799</sup>. Furthermore, United States' officials advised, on repeated occasions, that these conservative elements (especially those in the armed forces) needed to be strengthened, in case they were needed to act. From July 1962, Washington went about bolstering friendly forces in the military who would "keep Goulart on the rails", or overthrow him if need be<sup>800</sup>. The above points raise certain questions about the United States policy in Brazil.

From the evidence available it is clear that U.S. policy until the end of 1963 was not directed toward regime change. However, what the U.S. hoped to achieve from its destabilisation campaign against the Goulart government, and the strengthening of conservative opposition is intriguing. In theory, up until the end of 1963 the United States was primarily interested in convincing the Goulart administration to adopt U.S. approved measures which, from Washington's point of view, would promote economic as well as political stability<sup>801</sup>. The way it went about achieving this, however, seemed to be more conducive toward a scenario where a coup or some sort of attempt against the constitutional order could potentially thrive.

For instance, the sabotaging of Dantas's visit, which was to discuss support for an economic stabilisation plan that had been approved by U.S. staff in Brazil, but turned into a semi-trial on supposed communist infiltration, attests to this<sup>802</sup>. So too does the struggle between SUDENE and U.S. authorities to carry out reform in Brazil's Northeast<sup>803</sup>. In this case, the

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<sup>798</sup> See p.58

<sup>799</sup> In addition to the documentation used throughout this doctoral thesis which exposes this concern held by certain U.S. officials, Lincoln Gordon conceded in an interview in 1965 that "he had sought to discourage those who had wanted to precipitate an uprising but who had seemed unable to carry it through. He had felt that it would be dangerous to start something the Goulart government could put down; an unsuccessful revolt might give an excuse for the Goulart government to act successfully against its enemies". DULLES, John W. F. *Op. cit.* p.324

<sup>800</sup> See p.40

<sup>801</sup> The Department of State declared in its *Guidelines for Policy and Operations* in Brazil that two of its objectives were assisting "Brazil to move toward economic and social progress under a democratic system", and aiding "Brazil in the development, under conditions of financial stability, of a modern, dynamic competitive economy, which will form a solid foundation for democracy". Department of State, *Guidelines for Policy and Operations Brazil*, Jan 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:857522/> [accessed 28 Apr 2020]. In *US Short-term policy toward Brazil* tactics which would "influence President Goulart toward a more moderate and more constructive political course" were advocated. Memorandum for the National Security Council, *US Short-term policy toward Brazil*, 11 Dec 1962. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:672105/> [accessed 2 Jul 2020]

<sup>802</sup> See p.65-66

<sup>803</sup> This is discussed in Chapter Two



Kennedy administration initially supported SUDENE plans for the region, however that all changed when Goulart came to power. By early 1962 President Kennedy was insisting United States' funds be used for projects to enhance the image of those politicians who opposed the Goulart government<sup>804</sup>.

The two examples provided above exemplify a key trait of U.S. imperialism that exists even today. Where compromise could have been made and certain agreements reached, Washington went all out to ensure its hegemony. The defence of the metropolis' interests along with the protection of the system were total objectives no matter how big or small the threat was. In this sense, the United States perceived (as it still does) the world to be divided between those who stood with them or against them. There was no middle ground<sup>805</sup>. This world view most certainly caused the U.S. to implement policies which caused Goulart's demise.

A point which was made in official documents during the period was that if Goulart was unable to obtain backing from moderate political forces, he would have to rely more and more on the left if he wished to push ahead with certain policies<sup>806</sup>. If the U.S. knew that this would happen why did it act against its own interests of the Goulart administration having a more centrist side to it? Contradictorily, U.S. efforts would, more than anything, help to marginalise Goulart from moderate elements, forcing his slide to the left in the search of backing.

This win at all costs mentality not only demonstrates the ruthlessness or even reckless nature of decision making, but also the banality that surrounded it. For the U.S. it did not make a difference how it achieved its goals nor at what cost. It was simply going to, even if that meant condemning Brazil to a brutal military dictatorship, whose effects are still felt today. The discussion to prepare the military front in case it was needed demonstrates this absolute

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<sup>804</sup> LEACOCK, Ruth *Op. cit.* p.122 "As early as February 1962" Kennedy "pressed" USAID director, Fowler Hamilton, for a project that "could produce a favourable impact on the October [legislative] elections".

<sup>805</sup> GARY, Brett. *Op. cit.* p.44-45 The author highlights the ideas of H.I. Hayakawa on the *two-valued orientation* "propaganda device", which is the "most common technique used by those selfishly interested in dividing the world into false categories". Essentially, it "suggests things can be seen in two values only, affirmative and negative, good and bad, hot and cold and so forth". In this sense, "there is no middle-ground".

<sup>806</sup> A Special National Intelligence Estimate, titled *The Character of The Goulart Regime in Brazil*, suggested back in February 1963 that "if it appeared to him [Goulart] that he was losing his basic support on the left without gaining any reliable compensatory support at the centre, he would be likely to revert to a leftist, ultra-nationalist course". Special National Intelligence Estimate, *The Character of the Goulart Regime In Brazil*. 27 Feb 1963. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:665857/> [accessed 5 Apr 2018]

stance of all or nothing, as well as the triviality of U.S. policy toward Brazil. The coup was not the favoured strategy back in 1962, it was just another option the U.S. could turn to if others failed. This is exactly what happened. Others failed and Goulart reacted accordingly. In this regard, the military coup was just an extension of policy toward Brazil, it was simply another option. If they could have gotten rid of Goulart constitutionally in 1965 they would have, but in 1964 it was decided that enough was enough. As it has been demonstrated, many factors lead to this with the roles of certain individuals being particularly important.

The above sheds light on the style and nature of U.S. imperialism and how it dominated its Brazilian satellite. Once its hegemony was threatened it went about re-imposing it, and there were no limits on how it would achieve this. The National Security Doctrine provided the U.S. with an ideology which equated and legitimised all tactics as well as means which could be employed to defend its national interests. The U.S. would act ruthlessly as a result of Cold War geopolitics and the total war vision of the world. Therefore, there was no difference between applying diplomatic or economic pressure or preparing a military coup if it meant national interests and supremacy could be assured. The NSD also supplied the United States with the rationale to launch pre-emptive strikes against possible threats. João Goulart, with his alleged dictatorial syndicalist ambitions, presented such a hypothetical threat to U.S. interests. Consequently, the pre-emptive use of force against him was legitimised<sup>807</sup>.

In these circumstances, the U.S. was never going to fail in obtaining what were its immediate objectives toward the Goulart government: Those being obedience and adherence to U.S. policies along with directives or, in the event these were not feasible, the promotion of regime change. Whether Washington achieved all its goals related to indoctrination is maybe a bit more difficult to answer. Even though psychological warfare had been highly successful in bringing about Goulart's downfall and, therefore, guaranteeing U.S. national security interests, the ghost of Brazilian nationalism, and long-standing target of U.S. propaganda, would come back to haunt the United States during the Costa e Silva presidency. Albeit, this would be in a far less radical form from a U.S. perspective, but enough to prove that its long-term infiltration through propaganda had not produced the desired results.

Concerning imperialism as power structure, and here it must be made clear there is no intention whatsoever to condone in any way the United States' intervention in Brazil, it could be argued that how it solved its short-term Goulart problem was, from a purely structural and

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<sup>807</sup> COMBLIN, Joseph. *Op. cit.* p.56

systemic point of view, highly successful. By this, we mean that the U.S. was able to achieve its short to mid-term objectives without having to rely on its massive military power. It is true that a navy task force was sent, but the coup succeeded without the U.S. disembarking a single soldier or even firing a single bullet. In part, this was due to Goulart's decision to avoid bloodshed by not mounting any resistance to the rebelling military<sup>808</sup>.

When it came to carrying out the coup, the pro-U.S. conservative Brazilian elite did all the visible heavy lifting. In other words, the denationalised elite from the periphery nation defended the interests of the elite in the centre nation<sup>809</sup>. The superpower did not need to use force to safeguard its hegemony, rather it relied on the elite, who had assimilated the values and interests of the former, to protect the imperial system.

In fact, in the initial aftermath of the coup the only significant drawback from Washington's point of view, seemed to be that of negative public opinion toward it. As could be expected, a military takeover, which enjoyed swift recognition by the U.S., against a reformed-minded president was always going to be met with a certain level of repudiation. What the military junta set about doing after its victory only aided in confirming what many already suspected. Lincoln Gordon's half protest to General Costa e Silva after episodes of censorship as well as the ransacking of some foreign press offices, echoed the United States fear of what sort of image the Brazilian coup was generating<sup>810</sup>. The Ambassador explained to the General that "the influence of the press on public opinion was great and we did not want anything to give the impression to the U.S. public that this was an old-fashioned reactionary Latin American coup"<sup>811</sup>.

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<sup>808</sup>LEACOCK, Ruth. *Op. cit.* p.213 The author explains that Goulart realised "resistance would be useless since the United States was prepared to intervene militarily".

<sup>809</sup> See p. 18-20

<sup>810</sup> In an opinion article in the *La Vanguardia* newspaper Luis Romero attacked the coup, stating that the members of the coup were worse than Goulart as they defended the status quo and inequality, whereas the ex-president advocated reform. The author pays special attention to the subject of agrarian reform as it was a key matter in many South American countries. He accuses the Brazilian military of aiding the communist cause, as they championed democratic and progressive politics. ROMERO, Luis. *Compañeros de Viaje. La Vanguardia*, Barcelona, 17 Apr 1964. <http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/1964/04/17/pagina-11/32681884/pdf.html> [accessed 20 Feb 2020] An article in the *El Informador* charged that militarism does not save a country, rather it condemns it to a dictatorship with the loss of liberties. The author compared military coups with communism for this reason. Finally, the United States was criticised for recognising such a regime. *Otro Golpe Militar, El Informador*, Guadalajara, México, 6 Apr 1964. <http://hemeroteca.informador.com.mx/#> [accessed 10 Mar 2020]

<sup>811</sup> Airgram to Department of State, *Memorandum of conversation General Costa e Silva*, 07 Apr 1964. Brown Digital Repository. <https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:329715/> [accessed 24 Apr 2018]

Nonetheless, this public opinion glitch would prove to be of little importance. In strategic terms, the United States had succeeded in re-affirming its dominance, and at a very low cost to itself. Furthermore, the U.S. experience in Brazil and the triumph of its interventionism would strongly influence its policy toward the rest of South America. In a nutshell, United States' imperialism had started to perfect a way to assure its supremacy over the entire continent. Over the next two decades, national security inspired military regimes rose to power with Washington's explicit backing.

In light of all of what has been examined in this thesis, a better formulated question would be how the U.S. was going to achieve its policy toward the Goulart government, rather than what it expected to achieve from it. Essentially, hegemony or influence were the overriding reasons behind the ever-evolving U.S. policy in Brazil. However, the different tactics implemented between 1961 and autumn 1963 with the goal of forcing Goulart's obedience failed to produce the desired effects and, on more than one occasion, aggravated the situation. Inevitably, these mishaps caused the United States to view regime change as the only viable way of solving its Goulart problem. Yet, and this last point is of great importance, to say these failures caused the U.S. to consider regime change as an alternative would be incorrect. In effect, the decision to prepare a coup was made in July 1962 while other strategies were being followed. During the whole period in question, the United States knew what it wanted to achieve, but until late 1963 it did not know how it would do it.

## Conclusion

Throughout this doctoral thesis the primary objective has been to detail and analyse the conduct of the U.S. during this period in history in order to clarify the role the United States played in the downfall of the Fourth Brazilian Republic. That said, the nature of the study in addition to certain aspects that have been explored often give rise to more questions and hypothesis (which in turn require further investigation) than conclusions. On this matter, to declare that the United States participated actively and decisively to bring about regime change would be correct, yet this statement would also ignore numerous elements, nuances and facts, which ultimately made possible the civilian-military coup. For this reason, a key theory to this thesis that must not be forgotten is that during the whole period in question while the United States knew what it wanted to achieve, it did not know how it would do it until late 1963.

What is meant by this last statement is that the United States' policy toward Brazil during the Goulart government was solely focused on defending as well as reinforcing its hegemony<sup>812</sup>. However, the strategy for accomplishing this policy was something far less rigid and often prone to changes. It was dependent on a wide range of variables such as the global geopolitical context; different departments of the U.S. government which all had their own agenda to push; individuals with their own beliefs, opinions, interests and goals; and the consequences or reactions to other tactics which had been employed with the aim of fulfilling policy objectives. Hence, an examination of these variables is of utmost importance if we are to fully understand U.S. involvement in the process which culminated in the coup d'état.

Following on from the previous paragraph, one hypothesis that this thesis hopes to make clear is that while in hindsight it seems that the course of action taken by the United States, during the years leading up to the military takeover, followed a determined and logical path, it in fact did not. Just by analysing certain events, such as Robert Kennedy's visit and the Dantas' mission, election meddling, or how the U.S. government dealt with the ITT and AMFORP cases, Brazil's relationship with Cuba and the clash on development in the *Nordeste*, it is clear to see that they pursued a style of strategy based on zero sum tactics which could provoke various possible outcomes.

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<sup>812</sup> See page 196 on expectations

The need to correct and condition Goulart's behaviour in favour of U.S. interests was of utmost importance, yet the win at all costs nature of their tactics, which also seemed to be established on a trial and error logic, led to scenarios where it was difficult to predict reactions. The fact that the Kennedy government began preparing the military option back in the summer of 1962 tends to attest to this. The situation was somewhat unforeseeable, therefore, by initiating preparatives for a military coup, the Kennedy administration made sure it had all options on the table as it could not control how João Goulart would respond to other tactics of coercion and pressure.

When it comes to analysing the way the United States confronted its Goulart problem, the Kennedy government's decision back in 1962 to start preparing what it referred to as the military front, really marks a moment of extreme significance. It essentially highlights the lengths to which the U.S. was willing to go to achieve its objectives, while at the same time demonstrating that it did not know, or, was not sure how it was going to actually do this. Furthermore, it brings to the fore the irrationality and reckless banality that was involved in the decision making process.

In this regard, from Goulart's inauguration in 1961 until around late 1963, the U.S. implemented tactics (such as economic and diplomatic pressure, propaganda and psychological warfare, election meddling, etc.) which were meant to convince or force the Brazilian president to fall in line and adhere to Washington's directives. Carlos Fico correctly referred to this process as a destabilisation campaign<sup>813</sup>, and he emphasised the need to differentiate it from the active conspiracy, which started toward the end of 1963, to overthrow Goulart. That said, the campaign to destabilise was carried out at the same time the U.S. went about preparing its military option and, from the evidence seen, it is clear that not only did they often overlap, but the destabilisation campaign was actually conducive to a scenario where a military coup, or some sort of break with the constitutional order, could take place.

This is not to suggest that the destabilisation campaign was undertaken with the aim of creating a situation where a military takeover would be possible, however the logic and rationale behind U.S. policy must be looked into. Considering that the United States was the hegemonic nation in a dominance relationship, its objectives in Brazil were reasonably logical, especially in the context of the Cold War. The problem, however, was in its

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<sup>813</sup> See page 168

execution, and it is here that it is possible to observe how U.S. policy produced adverse side effects. For instance, propaganda was implemented with the aim of undermining *nacional-reformista* ideology and promoting U.S. values, yet, psychological warfare was carried out with very different objectives in mind. Even when the United States was not in favour of carrying out regime change, psychological warfare was employed as a tool for generating support for a coup d'état.

Patrick Peyton was sent to Brazil in 1962 in order to promote and strengthen anticommunist values, and a direct consequence of his campaign was the *Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade*, which actively strove toward generating public opinion favourable to regime change. The same can be said of IPES and IBAD, both with undeniable links to the United States in financing as well as origin, who were at the centre of indoctrination activities focused on creating backing for a coup. Finally, what can be made of U.S. attempts to indoctrinate the Brazilian Armed Forces? Not only did this play a part in persuading them to oust Goulart, but it convinced certain elements from the military elite to hold on to power and run the country as they were the only group capable of doing so.

Pivotal to understanding what could be described as irrationality, recklessness and the inconsistencies that surrounded U.S. policy, are the roles that individuals played. In fact, key to this thesis is the hypothesis that if the conduct of certain figures had been different, or if they had not formed part of the decision making process, the outcome could have been different. It should also be taken into account that for all the United States' bureaucracy and mechanisms to ensure the correct course of action was followed, in the end it was these individuals, who had not been elected or chosen on merit yet held positions of power, who ultimately made the final decision. As it has been previously identified, individuals who lacked the necessary knowledge (for example, the analysis given by officials on military promotions, political alliances, trade unionism and the politicisation of the masses) or who were plagued by bias (the majority of U.S. officials only maintained relations with likeminded Brazilians from the elite) and their own opinions (dominated by the logic of the Cold War) helped mould the policy toward Goulart.

With a view to highlighting the influence that irrational individual actors exert in these processes, the historical figures of Lincoln Gordon and Vernon Walters have been put under the spotlight. Of special prominence was Ambassador Gordon, an economist with no prior diplomatic experience, however whose conduct was fundamental in pushing Washington

towards a policy that backed a coup. From the beginning, Gordon (along with other U.S. officials) demonstrated a dislike and a distrust for Goulart, constantly doubting his motives as well as his objectives. The reason why the U.S. diplomatic mission in Brazil had such contempt for a leader who, albeit with differences, upheld the main principles of Kennedy's nation building policy is curious.

For this reason, the significance, in a process such as the one examined here, of the attitudes and opinions of those who relayed vital information and intelligence to Washington have been emphasised. The fact that Gordon or Walters were men of their time constricted by past experiences in addition to Cold War thinking, should not conceal the deciding role they played in the establishment of a military dictatorship. Furthermore, it should not be underestimated that the United States was and is the world superpower, however decisions as important as killing democracy in a country such as Brazil rested on the shoulders of individuals behaving irrationally because of their beliefs and convictions, or biases which resulted from personal relationships.

Finally, and related to this last point on the impact of individual interventions, is the level of indifference and banality that surrounded the decision making process. In this regard, many important decisions on how to proceed when dealing with Goulart were made in meetings that lasted barely an hour, and which were dedicated to a wide range of subjects other than Brazil. The July 1962 meeting where the fate of an entire country was decided in what could have been less than thirty minutes<sup>814</sup>, attests to the triviality and coldness with which U.S. officials implemented policy. Right until the end, when President Johnson opted to back General Mourão's Coup, the United States intervened against Goulart in a manner which only seemed to be consistent in its pursuit of total objectives.

In an attempt to better understand U.S. intervention in Brazil, this doctoral thesis has tried to emphasise the need to avoid the debate on to what extent the United States was the driving force behind the coup's taking place. This is mainly because a study of this type, centred on if the military takeover was Washington's fault, would hinder an impartial analysis of U.S. interference. Additionally, it would be solely focused on deciding the level of guilt and,

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<sup>814</sup> The meeting started at 11.52am and finished at 12.20pm. *Interview with Gordon from the JFK Library*. 30 07 1962. Brown University Library. <https://library.brown.edu/create/wecannotremainsilent/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2014/04/interview-with-Lincoln-Gordon-from-JFK-Library.pdf> [accessed 5 Mar 2020].



consequently, actions along with facts would be judged as being designed and employed in order to produce specific results.

Rather, the goal has been to characterise the United States' participation as well as to lay bare the key elements of it in a bid to better understand how American imperialism reacted to a threat against its supremacy. The hope is that it has become clear that its intervention in Brazil was not systematic but, instead, fraught with error and miscalculations, which produced results along with reactions that radicalised positions. This led to a situation where Washington saw a coup d'état as its last remaining resort if its national security interests were to be defended.

With this in mind, and in order to judge U.S. intervention in Brazil in the larger Cold War context, it would be incorrect to compare the way the United States dealt with Goulart with how it reacted toward Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, in 1954, or against Salvador Allende's government in Chile in 1973. In both these cases, Washington worked systematically and ruthlessly over a prolonged period toward achieving its objective of regime change. In Brazil, preparations for a coup were initially undertaken in the event it became necessary to oust Goulart. Even when it was decided, toward the end of 1963, to overthrow the Goulart government, this eventually happened in an uncontrolled and accidental manner; for all its willingness and contingency planning, Goulart's removal took place without the U.S. being able to have its preparations in place to possibly take part.

Essentially, the United States' policy in Brazil can be summarised in the following manner: at the beginning of João Goulart's mandate in 1961, the United States did not intend to bring about a coup, however it was exactly because of the way in which it interfered that one eventually became possible. It could be said that if U.S. had not used an 'all or nothing' strategy, and had instead utilised one of logic and rationality, which was based on negotiation and compromise, the military option would not have been necessary. That said, when it comes to dealing with adversaries, U.S. imperialism does not compromise in the pursuit of its interests. In this regard, what occurred in Brazil is an example of implacable, zero sum imperialism at work.

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