From National Catholicism to Democratic Patriotism?

An Empirical Analysis of Contemporary Spanish National Identity

Jordi Muñoz Mendoza

TESI DOCTORAL UPF / ANY 2008

DIRECTOR DE LA TESI

Dr./ Dra. Francesc Pallarés i Porta

(Departament de Ciències Polítiques i Socials)

UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA

From National Catholicism to Democratic Patriotism?
An Empirical Analysis of Contemporary Spanish National Identity

Jordi Muñoz Mendoza
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2008

A l'Helena, per aquests anys.
I per tots els que estan per vindre…

iv

Agraïments

Fer una tesi doctoral és, com sap tothom qui ho ha fet, bàsicament un treball individual i, en ocasions solitari. Però, evidentment, al llarg del procés hi ha sempre un seguit de persones i institucions que fan costat al doctorand i sense les quals no seria possible culminar un treball d'aquesta naturalesa. És el suport en tres àmbits (acadèmic, econòmic i personal) el que permet d'afrontar, i acabar, un projecte de l'abast de l'elaboració d'una tesi.

Evidentment, el meu primer agraïment és per al director de la tesi, Francesc Pallarés. Per la confiança –des del principi fins al final-, pels comentaris i els valuosos consells, acadèmics i també de sentit comú, cosa que sovint és escassa en l'entorn acadèmic.

I, per suposat, també per a Juan Linz. El seu interés pel meu treball, malgrat les distàncies –generacionals i de tota mena, m'honora. Pel seu suport durant la meua estada a New Haven, l'atenta lectura dels capítols i esborranys, els savis comentaris i pel doll inesgotable de coneixements, del que vaig tenir l'enorme privilegi de poder fer-ne algunes glopades en unes vesprades que no oblidaré. I per suposat, no es pot parlar de Juan Linz sense parlar de Rocío, a qui estic molt agraït també.

I a Robert Fishman. Que un dia ja llunyà de l'any 2000 em va despertar la curiositat per la recerca social, i la preocupació per la metodologia. I que sempre m'ha esperonat a seguir. I sobretot, m'ha ensenyat el valor de la llibertat i la independència intel·lectual en l'acadèmia. I això no té preu.

El treball de camp del capítol 4 i el disseny del qüestionari els vaig compartir amb Eduard Bonet, Santiago Pérez-Nievas i Ivan Llamazares i per tant, el meu deute amb ells és enorme. Una part fonamental de la tesi es deu a la qualitat del treball que vam fer aquells mesos. I també a les aportacions als qüestionari de Joan Font i Mónica Méndez Lago, llavors responsables d'investigacions al CIS.

A més, en les diverses fases d'elaboració del treball he rebut també comentaris, consells i crítiques que han permés anar-lo millorant. En un moment o un altre hi han dedicat temps i esforços, i han aportat idees i consells Luís de la Calle, Nacho Lago, Klaus Jurgen Nagel, Javier Astudillo, Luís Ortiz, Ferran Requejo, Juan Díez Medrano, els participants dels seminaris del Departament de Ciències Polítiques i Socials de la UPF i dels congressos on hi he presentat fragments del meu treball. I Mariano Torcal, per la confiança. I d'altres que, segur, em deixe.

Més enllà dels qui han participat directament en aquesta tesi, al llarg d'aquest procés he rebut molts estímuls intel·lectuals que conformen la base de la formació necessària per a dedicar-se a aquest ofici. Per exemple, la Clara Riba i la Marta Fraile, responsables principals –junt a l'escola d'estiu d'Essex- del que he anat aprenent d'estadística. O F. Fernádez Buey, per les classes de filosofia política i pel suport quan tocava. I el professorat de la UPF, els que ja he citat i molts d'altres que han passat pel meu davant. Sense oblidar, clar, els integrants del departament de Ciència Política de Yale (Especialment a Stathis Kalyvas i Susan Stokes), on hi he aprés moltes moltes coses en uns seminaris excepcionals que m'han ajudat a pensar i llegir la ciència política d'una altra manera. Millor.

Abstract

Has a democratic Spanish patriotism substituted the Francoist national-Catholicism? This dissertation explores, through the analysis of the Spanish case, how established states foster, and shape, their citizens' national identity and how this is reflected at the individual level. It takes advantage of the recent transition to democracy, as well as the sub-national differences, as tools for gaining analytical leverage on the dynamics of change in national identity alongside changes on the political context. Throughout the dissertation, I use a wide variety of sources and reseach methods: analysis of documental sources and secondary literature, Q-methodology and statistical analysis of survey data from both existing surveys (ISSP, WVS, CIS) and an original survey conducted in January 2007 (CIS2667). Findings show how the evolution of the political discourses around Spanish nation have shaped citizens' attitudes in a process of incomplete reconstruction of Spanish national identity.

Resum

El nacionalcatolicisme franquista, ha sigut substituït per un patriotisme democràtic espanyol? Aquesta tesi explora, mitjançant l'anàlisi del cas espanyol, com els estats establerts promouen i dónen forma a la identitat nacional de llurs ciutadans, i com això es reflecteix al nivell individual. La tesi aprofita la recent transició a la democràcia i les diferències internes del cas com a oportunitats per guanyar possibilitats d'anàlisi de la dinàmica de canvi en la identitat nacional en paral·lel als canvis en el context polític. Al llarg de la tesi s'empra una àmplia varietat de fonts i mètodes de recerca: Anàlisi de fonts documentals i literatura secundària, metodologia Q i anàlisi estadística de dades d'enquesta provinents tant d'enquestes preexistents (ISSP, WVS, CIS) com d'una enquesta pròpia realitzada el gener de 2007. Els resultats mostren com l'evolució dels discursos polítics sobre la nació espanyola han condicionat les actituds dels ciutadans, en un procés de reconstrucció incompleta de la identitat nacional espanyola.

x

Preface

There is little discussion that identity politics is of paramount importance to understand the dynamics of contemporary Spanish society and politics. Political Scientists and sociologists have acknowledged its relevance and a remarkable amount of intellectual effort has been devoted the last decades to address the wide range of issues related to this question. However, a set of factors –internal and external, academic and ideological- have produced a fundamental imbalance in these studies: while the emergence, development, reproduction, discourse, social bases, repertoires of action and implications of alternative nationalisms have been throughoutly analyzed, the other side of the game –Spanish nationalism- has been, for long, largely neglected by the empirical literature, or simply treated as a residual category. Of course, there are significant exceptions to this tendency, but for the most part a review of the Spanish academic literature on national identities leaves the reader with a sense of incompleteness.

As I realized that there was this significant gap in the literature, of which I only become fully aware after reading an article on British national sentiment in the *British Journal of Political Science* by Anthony Heath and his colleagues (Heath et al., 1999) together with one by Kenneth Bollen and Juan Díez Medrano (1998) on Spain, I decided to address it and take the burden of working on a relatively unexplored and often controversial but otherwise fascinating topic.[1]

---

[1] Picking up a research topic for a doctoral dissertation is not an easy task at all. It has to be relevant (both from a political and academic point of view), include some puzzling elements, feasible and, especially, it has to engage the PhD student

In this dissertation, I address this issue from a specific point of view: my main focus is placed on the individual attitudes towards Spain as a nation and their political and social determinants. Since the beginning of the research process I was inclined towards the study of the interplay between elites and citizens in shaping national identities. And the Spanish case revealed as an especially appropriate one, as it provides a set of instances of comparison (across periods, across generations and across territories) that offer a wide range of possibilities for hypothesis testing. This was the ultimate reason that led me to rule out the option of a cross-country comparative analysis. However, I do not give up the task of reflecting and addressing some of the comparative implications of my arguments, and especially in chapter four I adopt an explicitly cross-country comparative stance to make the case for my theoretical and empirical options stronger.

Besides the choice of a research topic, a case and a level of analysis, the process of research design includes several critical choices. One of them is the selection of the specific questions to be addressed within the range of possible options offered by the selected topic. In this front, I opted for a quite classical approach: First, devote a substantial amount of the effort (part II of the dissertation) to the careful examination, definition and operationalization of the dependent variable (the Spanish national identity) and only after this task has been reasonably fulfilled, address the logically following one: exploring its determinants (part III). A hypothetical fourth part, concerned with the implications of the Spanish national identities (thus, using them as independent variables) to explain

in a such a way that makes sustainable an intense, continued work over a long period of time. Finding one is often, as it was in my case, a stroke of luck.

other questions is consciously left out of this project and kept as a future line of research.

Thus, this dissertation is placed within a reasonably well-developed tradition of empirical study of national identities in Spain but addresses a surprisingly overlooked topic: the Spanish national identity by itself, and not only as confronted to the alternative ones. Moreover, there is in this project a specific effort to connect the theoretical and historiographical literature on Spanish nationalism with the individual-level research. This option, determined by the theoretical stance adopted here, that considers national identity as an endogenous variable, conditions the research design and constitutes one of the main contributions this dissertation aims at making to the discipline.

Finally, in this project I have made an explicit option for methodological pluralism: while survey research is undoubtedly the main tool used here –as it is in the political science literature on individual attitudes-, it is complemented with additional data collection methods, such as the Q methodology or the analysis of documents and existing literature. The use of survey research here is based on both the secondary analysis of preexisting surveys and the primary exploitation of an original survey (CIS 2667) specifically devoted to the study of Spanish national identity.

My aim is that the combination of these aspects (adressing a significant gap in the literature, saliency of the topic, internal comparisons, comparative remarks, focus on the elite-mass linkages and methodological pluralism) add up to an interesting final product that contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of identity politics in democratic states, more specifically in new democracies and Spain in particular.

Table of contents

PART I: INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

PART III: CHANGE AND DIVERSITY IN THE DETERMINANTS OF SPANISH NATIONAL IDENTITIES: LONGITUDINAL AND CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS

xx

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

xxx

Chapter one

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

On the 10th of October 2007, two days before the Spanish national holiday the leader of the Popular Party issued a video, with an intentional institutional look, in which he called the Spaniards to celebrate the 12th of October in a *special way*:

> *"The day after tomorrow, 12th of October, we the Spaniards celebrate our national holiday. My desire is that this year, for reasons everybody knows, we the Spaniards celebrate this holiday in a special way.*
>
> *We are a nation, and we want to celebrate it, and attest that we are happy of being so. This is why we are going to honor and exhibit the symbol that, together with the Crown, better represents us: the flag we approved in 1978. The flag that is proudly displayed by our sportsmen. The one that covers our soldiers' coffins. The one that is respectfully greeted by the chiefs of State that visit our country. The symbol of Spain. The symbol of the free and democratic nation constituted by more than forty million of Spaniards. The flag of all of us, because we are all represented in it.*

I am proud of being Spanish. And I know that Spaniards are proud too. This is why I ask everyone, beyond any ideological divide, to frankly express it on the 12th of October. And to make a gesture showing that they keep it in their heart. At home or on the street, individually or with your family or friends. In order to let all the world know what we Spaniards feel about Spain. And that we know how to express it without exaggeration but with pride and with our head held high. And I already advance myself and say to every Spaniard: Happy day of the Spanish nation! Happy national holiday!" [2]

What does this episode tell us? We can safely assume that the conservative politician was expressing, through this public statement, at least three implicit ideas: one, that appearing as the representative of Spanish national pride would secure him political benefit. Two, that from his point of view, the institutional representatives of the State were somehow neglecting their duties and he had to *substitute* them in making such a statement. And third, that the Spanish patriotism was not explicit enough and there was a need to mobilize it.

The Spanish government, lead by the Socialist Party, responded to the discourse by arguing that the conservative leader was using the national symbols in a sectarian way and that he was, despite his words, willingly creating divisions among Spaniards by trying to identify himself with Spanish patriotism. In turn, Catalan, Basque

---

[2] A complete transcript of the discourse was published by 'El País' (10/11/2007), and the video can be found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JB6d1cLgGcc (retrieved, 05/30/2008)

and Galician nationalists denounced the proximity of the message with the Francoist rhetoric.[3]

This episode, as anecdotal as it might be, does indeed reflect some of the abnormalities of Spanish national identity, that pose some puzzles from an academic point of view. To start with, the fact that the opposition leader feels compelled at asking its followers to display the national flag and publicly express their national pride contrasts with the routine of national commemoration in most Western countries, where the national holiday is celebrated with an overwhelming presence of national flags that does not require any specific effort of mobilization besides, perhaps, a routine public address of the head of the State. So, from a comparative point of view, there are several puzzling elements in this story: 1) it was not the head of the State but the opposition leader that asked its followers, and all the citizens, to publicly display the flag in the national holiday; 2) He considers the general display of the flag to be a 'special way' of celebrating the national holiday; and 3) Such a call asking for a massive display of the official flag became a matter of controversy, not only between the state-wide parties and the so-called peripheral nationalists, but also between the two main state-wide Spanish parties.

These puzzles open a set of relevant questions: Is that episode reflecting a lack of consensus about Spanish patriotism? Is this patriotism, as the conservative leader seemed to imply, weakly *expressed* by Spanish citizens in comparison to what is common in most nation-states? Do Spanish institutions promote it? After thirty years of democracy, are there still deep ideological divisions in the understandings of Spain or, on the contrary, a widely shared democratic Spanish patriotism has emerged? Which is the

---

[3] See 'El País' (11/11/2007)

relationship between contemporary Spanish nationalism and the Francoist one?

In other words: the main research question addressed in this dissertation, as stated in its very title, could be written as *¿has a democratic Spanish patriotism substituted Francoist national-Catholicism?* By democratic patriotism in the context of this dissertation I mean a conception of the spanish national identity that a) is congruent with democratic principles and institutions; and b) is integrative and internally neutral from an ideological, religious, linguistic/cultural and territorial point of view. Certainly, this is a fairly specific and perhaps restrictive definition of democratic patriotism, but I have chosen it because, as I will show, this definition incorporates the main challenges Spanish nationalism faced in the period under consideration here, so it is an appropriate one in the context of this dissertation. I will deal with the specific definition of the Francoist national-Catholicism in chapter 2, where I discuss its ideological contents more in depth. Essentially, it is a deeply conservative, traditionalist conception of the Spanish nation as essentially attached to the Catholic religion, and build around a Castilian ethnolinguistic core.

While this question might be interesting only for those concerned about Spanish politics, it has certainly broader implications, and thus is closely linked to a set of more general questions that are relevant for a broader audience: How do established, democratic Western states foster, and shape the identification of their citizens with the 'nation' they claim to represent? How do these citizens acquire their sense of nationhood? Which are the effects of the varying nation-building policies over the individual attitudes towards the nation? (And more specifically: Are citizens' loyalties to political communities substantially stable or, on the contrary,

they are subject to change as a consequence of the evolving political environment?).

To address these questions I analyze the contemporary Spanish national identity. First, I review the basic discourses of the Spanish nationalism, from Francoism to democracy and how the changing institutional environment might have affected the spread and promotion of Spanish national identity.

Then, I concentrate on the individual level to explore, in the first place, the relevant varieties of national identity in Spain. I discuss, and empirically assess how they relate to the classic ethnic-civic dichotomy –and the variations developed by previous comparative research. I also develop, and test, a measurement model and set of instruments to capture them, so I offer a rather detailed picture of the main types of Spanish national identity, their shared components and their main differences.

Finally, in the last part of the dissertation, I turn into the analysis of the determinants of Spanish national identity. I assess how these determinants have evolved since the transition to democracy, and develop and explanatory model for the previously identified varieties.

The goals of this research design are, on one hand, deepen our knowledge of a fundamental aspect of contemporary Spanish politics and, on the other hand, make a contribution to our general knowledge of the processes of national identity formation and change by taking advantage of the analytical leverage offered by the Spanish case.

The main, basic theoretical argument this dissertation relies on is that national identity is a politically endogenous attitude that is

shaped to a great extent, by the elites' discourses and nationalizing policies. This theoretical stance conditions the research design and structure: In the first place I review the main discourses of Spanish nationalism and how they have been put into practice. I understand these discourses and policies as the inputs that citizens receive about which nation they should identify with, and how to think that nation and their belonging to it. Using the insights of this elite-level analysis, I then turn into the analysis of individual attitudes towards the Spanish nation. I explore how they relate to the elites' Spanish nationalism, if they are congruent or not, and how they have responded to the political and institutional changes that Spain has experienced in recent decades.

Prior to that, in the remaining of this introductory chapter, I develop more the theoretical foundations of my general argument, that lies at the crossroads between the theories of nationalism and the literature on individual political attitudes. I also discuss the selection of the case, and argue that besides its intrinsic political interest, the Spanish case has some specific features that provide useful instances for controlled comparisons (across time, among generations and among territories), that provide valuable analytical leverage to uncover the mechanisms of the relationship between the elites' nationalism and the individuals' national identity.

Then, I briefly discuss the methodology and research techniques applied in the course of this research. Finally, I present a more detailed overview of the whole dissertation, specifying the questions and hypotheses addressed in each of the remaining chapters.

1.2 From 'imagined communities' to national socialization: The micro foundations of nation-building

How do citizens acquire their national identity? Formulated in a more or less explicit way, this has been one of the main, constant concerns of the literature dealing with nations and nationalism. The traditional, romantic view conceived national identity as something naturally held by individuals that was sometimes hidden by some form of *false consciousness* and, thus, had to be uncovered –or 'awaken'. According to this essentialist perspective, holding a given set of ascribed traits (place of birth, ascendancy, language, ethnicity) naturally leads a given individual to hold a given national identity.[4]

However, this view has been, already for a long time, increasingly challenged by the studies on nationalism that, from various perspectives, have shown how the agency of political elites, or entrepreneurs, has historically been crucial for the development and spread of national identities, and that there is nothing in the individuals' inherited traits that predetermines them to share a given national identity. Any attempt to match ethnocultural traits with national identity is doomed to failure by a number of counter-examples of divided linguistic groups, multilingual nations, processes of identity change, etc. Today there is a widespread consensus around the idea that national identity is not something that we simply have, or inherit, as the color of our eyes but rather that it is the result of a process of one form or another of *social construction*. Indeed, often the primordialist account to be alive, in the academic debates, only to serve as a *straw man* against which

---

[4] For references and a classification of primordialism, see, for example, Smith (1999: 3-5). For its sociobiological extensions, see Van der Berghe (1978)

easily argue. While this might be, still, a politically important debate –because the primordialist view of national identities is still highly prevalent in the social and political 'common sense'-, by itself does not add much to our knowledge of the topic.

As the primordialist perspective was increasingly discredited in the academic sphere, the focus of the debate shifted towards the processes through which national identities, and nations *came into existence*. The dominant paradigm became the so-called 'modernism', that insists in the necessary linkage between the modernization process and the emergence and spread of nations and nationalism. From this perspective, the nation is a modern phenomenon that did not appear as such before the late 18th Century. The modernist paradigm insists in the political nature of nationalism: modern national identities did not emerge as a sum of cultural assets, historical myths and traditions, but rather linked to specific political projects (Breuilly, 1993; Gellner, 1983). The mechanisms that are given priority to in explaining the link between modernization and the emergence of nationalism vary from one author to another: the industrialization and its (cultural) requirements for an integrated and mobile workforce (Gellner 1983), the spread of social communication at a supra-local scale (Deutsch, 1966) of the rise of print-capitalism (Anderson, 1991)[5], etc. Although the modernist perspective became somehow the orthodoxy in the studies of nationalism, it has faced several challenges, such as the 'ethno-symbolist' approach (Smith, 1986; 1995). A.D. Smith claims that modern nations emerged drawing

---

[5] Benedict Anderson gives priority to the cultural foundations of nations rather than structural preconditions and that distances him from the modernist perspective. Many classify him as constructivist. However, his strong emphasis on the importance of print-capitalism for the emergence and spread of nationalism places him close to the other scholars in this list.

upon ties and shared cultural elements from pre-modern ethnic communities (ethnies).

This is, however, a debate that does not interest us here directly: regardless of the dating, and the importance of pre-modern cultural 'raw material' upon which nationalism is built, we are interested in the mechanisms of the process of national identity spread. Classic studies, like *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Weber, 1976) placed the state institutions at the center of the explanation while in other cases the *nationalist* intellectuals and movements were held responsible for the spread of a given national consciousness through mobilization of *the masses*.[6] In any case, the academic work has tended to underline, and analyze the conscious efforts to disseminate national identities and, often, also a unique national language and culture within a State, as they would play a central role in the reproduction of a common national identity.

Eric Hobsbawm summarizes this idea in a concise and oft-cited quote: "*nations do not make states and nationalisms, but the other way round*" (Hobsbawm, 1992). Taking this argument seriously, thus, should lead us to dismiss nations as the object of study and focus on nationalism as an ideology and, consequently, consider nations simply as categories of practice. As Brubaker has put it: '*to understand nationalism, we have to understand the practical uses of the category nation, the ways it can come to structure perception, to inform thought and experience, to organize discourse and political action*' (Brubaker, 1996: 10)

---

[6] For a reflecion on the role of intellectuals, see, for example, Kedourie (1993), Smith (1991) or, more specifically for the Catalan and Spanish cases, Guibernau (2002).

a) Banal nationalism, and beyond: Nationalizing democratic nation-states?

Since the mainstream debate on nationalism has largely been dominated by historians and historical sociologists concerned with the formulation of a general theory able to explain the raise of nationalism, it tends to focus on the moments of state-formation and, thus, the mechanisms of nation building that are underlined belong to the transition to the mass society, such as (compulsory) mass education, statewide printed media, geographic mobility or universal conscription. Indeed, the process dissemination of a state national identity is often implicitly assumed to be limited to their founding period. Once the goal of 'national integration' has been achieved and the "whole" population has transcended parochial identities, the general -albeit often implicit- assumption seems to be that the nationalizing efforts become unnecessary and will disappear unless awakened by internal or external threats, such as a war.[7]

By selecting a contemporary, established democratic nation-state as the case of study I want to challenge this view. This case selection leads us, necessarily, to rethink the mechanisms through which national identity is constructed. Most contemporary studies on nationalism have disproportionately focused on what Michael Billig (1995) calls 'the margins of the phenomenon': explicitly nationalistic authoritarian regimes, or sociopolitical movements seeking autonomy or secession. These nationalisms express themselves through explicit mobilization (for a review of how nationalism has been read as a social movement, see Máiz 2005).

---

[7] See, for this argument, Michael Billig's critique of Miroslav Hroch's developmental theory of nationalism, based on three stages that end once the nationalist movement has reached its goal of establishing a nation state (Billig, 1995: 43). Or, in the same vein, his critique of Michael Ignatieff's idea of the emergence of ethnic nationalism as the "return of the repressed" (p. 46)

However, in normal conditions, most established democracies do not engage in active, conscious nationalist mobilization of the population. Does that mean that nationalism, as an ideology seeking to promote national identity to make it congruent with the political borders, does not exist in such cases? If we are to argue, as I do, that this is definitely not the case, we have to specify how do state-led nationalisms act in these kind of situations.

Perhaps the most influential and comprehensive account is Michael Billig's model of Banal nationalism (1995). Billig's work is based on the modernist and constructivist theories of the nation, but points to an implication that has often been overlooked: if nations are not founded on a set of objective principles or cultural elements but, rather, have to be 'imagined' we have to turn our view to the continuous reproduction of nationhood in established states. As Billig himself puts it, in established nations people do not generally forget their national identity because there are mechanisms of continuous remembering (p.37). Although this remembering, as the very facto of having a nationality are often seen as 'natural', this is only by virtue of an ideological process of naturalization. This is a process, Billig argues, that requires as much remembering the nation as it requires *forgetting the present*: the mechanisms of remembering the nation in established nation-states operate on a routine and mindless way, so they cease to be recognized as examples of nationalism –not only in the common sense, but also in the sociological research, that tends to treat as examples of nationalism only those social movements and regimes that actively seek to mobilize the people around an explicitly nationalistic agenda.

However, as Billig argues, there is in established nation-states a set of identifiable daily mechanisms of reproducing them as nations. These are the mechanisms that grant a continuous presence of

national consciousness in democratic societies. The kind of nationhood reproduction Billig refers to is best represented by his well-known image of the unwaved flag, hanging in the outside of a public building as opposed to the *hot nationalism*'s consciously waved flag. This is a flag that often passes unsaluted and, even, unnoticed. But it is there and, in most countries, it is almost ubiquitous. And, although barely observed, the flag has a specific meaning and goal: it acts as a daily, continuous reminder of nationness.

While the unwaved flag is the best known, and the best synthetic representation of Billig's banal nationalism, in the book he discusses more banal mechanisms of nationhood reproduction. Maps, songs, banknotes or memorials continuously remind people who they are. But he especially emphasizes the use of linguistic markers in everyday language. By analyzing the British press he shows how a myriad of linguistic routines work to maintain our national awareness: the world is often divided between 'us' and 'them' (in national terms), the news are organized in national/foreign, the national sportsmen are presented as 'ours' and the weather reports 'naturally' refer to *the* country's weather without even mentioning it, as if it was self evident to pick up a nation-state as a climatic unit.

Also the political language is under analysis in Billig's book. Of course, Billig refers how often (US and British) politicians 'play the patriotic card' as to identify themselves and/or their actions with the nation's interests, and present themselves as being moved by a sincere 'love for the homeland' in taking their political decisions. But his argument goes well beyond the 'patriotic card' resource, and notes that even when they are not so explicit about their nationalist ideology, politicians use a myriad of linguistic reminders of the nation that frame their discourse in a perfectly set world of

nations within which their viewers are comfortably identified as 'co-nationals'.

Billig's model of Banal nationalism provides a theoretical tool to understand how nationhood is reproduced in contemporary nation-states. It is interesting to note how in his account it is not only the state institutions, but also a plurality of actors –the press, politicians, etc- that are involved in this process.

Beyond the set of 'banal' mechanisms reviewed by Billig, we could think on several additional examples of how established nation-states reproduce, and promote a given national identity. The Welfare State, to which many established democracies devote a huge share of their total public spending, is one of these examples. The relationship between welfare state and nationalism has been subject to debate and some empirical enquiry, but it would probably merit more attention. It is a complex question, as we can think of a bidirectional relationship: on one hand, national identity might reinforce support for the Welfare State, and on the other hand, the Welfare State itself might strengthen national identity. Arguments have been made of national identity as a prerequisite, or fundamental support for redistributive policies and taxation systems: according to these arguments, that mostly come from the so-called 'liberal nationalists', the sense of collective solidarity that is needed to sustain a redistributive welfare system is best provided by a common national identity (Miller, 1995: 50-80; Tamir, 1993; for an empirical test of the individual-level implications of this argument, see: Martínez-Herrera, 2004). However, the question can also be seen the other way round: a welfare system might act as a powerful boost for the collective solidarity upon which develop, or strengthen a sense of belonging to a national community (for previous intuitions in the same direction, see: Deutsch, 1966; McEwen, 2002). The mechanisms through which a welfare state

might reinforce national identity range from the rational perception of the nation-state as an essential service provider to the individual to the symbolic sense of community that the shared welfare experience provides, to the 'banal' reminders of the national dimension of the services present in many governments' welfare agencies.

Of course, this discussion of banal nationalism, and contemporary nationalization mechanism does not exclude the role of the traditional mechanisms through which nation-states have historically promoted national identity, such as the education system or (where it does exist) the universal conscription system. Probably, since they are no longer the only (or the main) means of relation between the state and its citizens, their role has changed and is *relatively* less important vis à vis the other set of mechanisms. However, there is little doubt that the contents of education still play an important role in transmitting a sense of national identity. The in-school celebration of national holidays and some rituals, the specific understanding of the national history that is taught or the promotion of a unified, standardized linguistic variety are some of the elements that make the education system still a very salient nationalization mechanism.

b) From structure to citizens: national socialization agencies and milieus

This discussion, as most of the literature, has been basically devoted to what, in a market metaphor, we could call the 'supply side' of the equation: how do the state and other actors promote national identity. However, there is another side of the equation –the 'demand' side- that merits more attention. Indeed, most of the literature (both the classic studies and more recent ones, acritically

assumes the reception of these stimuli by the citizens as automatic (Archilés, 2007), and there is a lack of reflection on how might these nationalist inputs actually shape citizens' identities and attitudes towards the nation.

In other words, if we are to overcome these limits, we should think on how contemporary nation-states act as *national* socialization instances, and how do citizens acquire and, eventually, change their national identities. Following previous works (Martínez-Herrera, 2005), we could state that contemporary nation states act at the same time as national socialization *agencies* and *milieus* (Percheron, 1982). The concept of socialization agency implies a proactive indoctrination; in this case an intentional transmission of a given national identity and a given understanding of it. In the examples above, the educational system or the universal conscription clearly play an agency role by actively transmitting the citizens a sense of nationhood.

On the contrary, when the literature refers to socialization milieus is thinking on the role that a given social, or institutional environment plays in defining the daily interactions and experiences of the individuals. These interaction settings are thought as having the ability to promote some sort of identification with the setting itself. In the case of a state, its normal operation over a territory, by itself, would over time contribute to the development among its citizens of 'at least a passive identification with it' (Hobsbawm, 1992: 86). Paying taxes to the same agency, receiving the same set of services, sharing rights and duties, voting in the same election, being embedded within the same media space and so on might be examples of the daily interaction processes determined by statehood that, without necessarily involving a conscious national indoctrination, may have a national identity-fostering effect.

At this point, however, it seems necessary to qualify the top-down perspective I have been developing here. The basic mechanism of national identity formation that the literature has identified is the induction from above through different channels that fit under the umbrella of nation-building processes. The idea of nation building is basically linked to the state institutions development and operation, although some scholars, such as Linz (1993) also use the term to refer to processes set up by alternative nationalist movements with no or little access to state power. In any case, the role of the elites is almost always placed at the center of the explanation. Does that mean that the elites will always be successful in spreading a national identity over a given population? Certainly, we could easily think of instances in which a given state has failed in its nation-building project over a part of its territory, or of failed alternative nationalist movements. And certainly the Spanish case constitutes a good example of a not entirely successful nation-building process, as I will argue in subsequent chapters. An essentialist account would predict that when the ascribed ethnocultural traits of the population are distinct from those that the nationalization elites promote, it will be more difficult for them to successfully transmit a sense of national identity to those populations. However, there are many examples of culturally distinct societies that have been subsumed into single political communities defined in national terms, and often this process has lead to the demise of this cultural distinctiveness through assimilation.

Linz argues that it is the absence of a well-structured civil society that makes it easy to develop a nation-building project (1993). Similarly, Breuilly considers that the preexisting political and economic arrangements existing in a country have to be conducive to a strong sense of national solidarity to grant success to the nationalization policies (Breuilly, 1993: 277). In reality, it seems

that the causes of the failure of state-led nation building that these scholars are referring to are, precisely, the success of alternative nation building. Indeed, we could think in two paths of failure for nation-building projects: on one hand, the resistance of a local population to assume any national identity at all, and thus the pervasiveness of parochial identities as the fundamental identification sphere for the individuals. On the other hand, the most common path in established nation-states is the growth of an alternative nationalist movement that challenges the national identity promoted by the state by defining and fostering an alternative one, through political mobilization. The first case does not seem to be really relevant in advanced democracies[8], and it might be argued if this is the case in developing countries. I any case, either if it is lead by the state ruling elites or *grassroots* nationalist political entrepreneurs that intend to mobilize the population against the state promoted identity, the process of nation-building follows similar paths. Obviously, the access to state-resources determines the tools that are available to the elites, and their repertories of political mobilization[9], but the underlying logics –the promotion of a given national identity- seems to be essentially the same.[10]

---

[8] There might be some exceptions to this rule, such as ethnic or religious groups that have strong internal ties limiting their openess to *alien* nationalization projects. One example could be the Gipsy communities in some countries, although even in these cases we can find evidence of penetration of state-led (and even alternative) national identities.

[9] This is partly why scholars, such as David McCrone, have introduced the concept 'neo-nationalism' to refer to those alternative nationalist movements that gain some access to state-like institutions, generally as a consequence of a devolution, or decentralization process (McCrone, 1998: chapter 7).

[10] For important qualifications to the often excessively simplistic top-down approach, see Smith (2000) and, especially, Whitmeyer (2002) that stresses the role of popular nationalism.

c) National identity as a political attitude. Processes of formation and change

If national identity is not something we naturally have, but rather the result of a more or less conscious process of construction driven by political (and cultural) elites, it is legitimate to question how do individuals effectively acquire it. Although the details of the psychological process are clearly out of the scope of this dissertation, it seems useful to refer to it. The basic socio-psychological understanding of how an individual acquires its national identity through a national socialization process is best summarized in the following quotation:

> *National socialization usually starts at an early age, when it catches the child with experiences of positive emotions during national rituals—in reality or via television. Positive emotions are then linked to national symbols. And these positive emotions are reiterated when individuals receive informative messages regarding their country and their people in conversations with their families (Seliktar, 1980) or via television programs. This socialization continues when the school (Ram, 2000), church (El-Wafi, 1993), other mass media (Deutsch, 1966), peers, people at the workplace, social networks, social movements, and politics serve as other sources of emotions and information (Dekker, 1991; Farnen, 1994, 2000; Wasburn, 1994).* (Dekker, Malova and Hoogendoorn, 2003: 351)

We can see how both an emotional and a cognitive dimension are present in the process of formation of national identity. I will return later to that, when dealing with the components of national identity. Moreover, we can see here the whole set of national socialization agencies and milieus influencing the individual. As it is clear from

this fragment, the emphasis is basically put on the early socialization, although the process seems to be presented as continuing through adulthood. This is precisely a crucial dimension of the question, because it has deep consequences on how do individuals adapt and react to changing nationalization environments. Indeed, this has been a central problem for the political culture literature.

What is the role of national identity in the political culture literature? While this literature has mostly been concerned with other kinds of dependent variables, such as institutional trust, support for democracy and so on, in the classic scheme of political support (Easton, 1975) the identification with the political community plays a central role. In those political communities defined in national terms, as it is undoubtedly the case of Spain, we can easily assimilate this concept to national identity.[11] Thus, we have to take insights from the literature on political attitudes to explain the formation and change of national identity at the individual level. My basic contention here is that national identity is a political attitude and we should treat it as such. Only from this perspective (and its methodological approach) will we be able to deal with national identity at the individual level and account for its processes of formation and change. We need, thus, the theoretical framework and the methodological tools developed in the studies of political attitudes to face the research questions I am posing in this dissertation.

A classic culturalist approach that deals with the issue of cultural reactions to structural changes is Harry Eckstein's (1988). Basically, he states that from a culturalist perspective, change is

---

[11] For a contrasting argument, and a defence of the concept of identification with political community as a more precise substitute of national identity for empirical research, see Martínez Herrera (2005).

difficult to account for, due to a set of postulates that lie at the core of the paradigm: the *postulate of oriented action* (actors respond to situations through mediating orientations), the *postulate of orientational variability* (the orientations that guide actions are variable) and, most importantly, the postulates of *cultural socialization* and *'cumulative' socialization*, that state that orientations form in the individual through a socialization process that is cumulative: early learning acts as a filter for later learning and there is a tendency to integrate all its pieces (affective, cognitive and evaluative) in a coherent whole. So, how does such an understanding account for change? If early learning is so fundamental in defining the orientations that will guide individuals' attitudes and behavior, the logical conclusion is an 'expectation of continuity' (Eckstein, 1988: 792).

Does that mean that cultural change is to be ruled out? According to Eckstein, there are several ways the cultural orientations respond, and adapt to contextual changes. One is the so-called pattern-maintaining change: "*changes in culture as adaptations to altered structures and situations",* in which the function of change is precisely "*to keep culture patterns in existence and consonant"* (p. 794). The other one, when modernization is involved, are changes towards flexibility: transformations in cultural predispositions as to adapt them to a rapidly changing environment typical of modern societies (p. 795). In both instances, however, cultural change is difficult and slow: "*the process of reformation of political cultures should be prolonged and socially costly"* (p. 798)*.* This is so because it operates mainly through the mechanisms of generational replacement. Younger generations grow up with modified orientations, and thus a transitional situation of age-related cultural differences occurs, because those generations that faced the structural changes during adulthood will not adapt to them, or will have more difficulties.

Thus, from this framework we should expect that a change in the main structural determinant of national identity formation –the nation-building agencies and milieus- will induce a slow change in individuals' orientations and attitudes towards the question mainly through generational replacement. We should expect, an age-specific identity differentiation in the period following the structural change. I will further develop the specific implications of culturalism for my case of study, and will have the opportunity to test some of them in chapters 6 and 7.

But is generational replacement the only, or the main mechanism of cultural change? Can an individual modify its cultural orientations and attitudes in the course of his life? The social psychological literature has dealt with this problem, and has basically proposed two hypotheses regarding the potential for attitude change: the first one, called the *increasing persistence hypothesis* states that it declines gradually and steadily throughout the life-cycle (which seems to be the most consistent with a straightforward reading of the cumulative socialization postulate), and the second one, known as the *impressionable years hypothesis*, contends that it is in early adulthood that individuals are more open to change, because it is in this period that their basic attitudes crystallize. After this period, susceptibility for change declined rapidly and remains very low for the rest of the individual's life (for a contrast of the two, and support for the latter, see Alwin and Krosnick 1989) (for a contrast of the two, and support for the latter, see Krosnick and Alwin, 1989)

Beyond the specific psychological mechanisms and sequence, there is a large body of research on political culture that argues that rational adaptation to changing environments and adult learning processes may result in quick cultural changes that go well beyond

the slow adaptation processes and generational replacement mechanisms postulated by the classic culturalist approach. These models, called by some 'rational-culturalists', argue that political attitudes can be endogenous to the political sphere, and that the performance of the institutions can, in the short term, modify the individuals' orientations towards them (see Mishler and Rose, 2001 for a confrontation of both models with respect to trust in democratic institutions in post communist countries). In other words, that political attitudes are endogenous to the outcomes of political institutions, and citizens have the ability of rationally reconstructing them in order to adapt to new institutional contexts (Evans and Whitefield, 1995; 1999).

This discussion is important in the context of this dissertation because, as I will argue below, the regime change and the territorial diversity of Spain are central to my analysis. The specific configuration of the case will allow me to address some hypotheses related to the question of the relationship between institutional change and attitudinal adaptation: I will study how a set of deep structural changes (democratization and decentralization) have affected the individual attitudes towards Spain as a nation. This is something I deal with specifically in chapter 6 and 7.

Summing up, I am proposing a basic model of understanding how citizens acquire their national identity that puts at the center of the explanation the nationalization policies and discourses set up by the elites and their transmission to the population through a set of national socialization agencies and milieus. However, there is more complexity to the process than a simple model might express: As I will argue and show for the Spanish case, these policies and discourses are not, at all, homogeneous within each time period, since almost every single nationalism is indeed a complex ideological field that hosts contrasting and even fiercely opposed

interpretations. And the exposition and effects of the myriad of nationalizing inputs that individuals receive throughout their lives is, of course, diverse and mostly conditional to other variables. Indeed, to account for the individual variation both in the intensity and contents of national identity we have to work with explanatory variables able to capture, to some degree, the differential exposure to the various socialization agencies and environments and, on the other, the political orientations that condition the reception of these inputs.

d) The relevance of the object of study: national identity and the political system

Why should we care about national identity in an established state? Although the role of nationalism and national identities in contemporary world seems difficult to exaggerate, it might be argued that in the case of stable and democratic nation-states, the need for strong national identities has been overcome. In this section I briefly review the theoretical arguments that have been advanced for the role of national identity as a fundamental piece of support for the political system.

The classic scheme of political support, as developed by David Easton (1965, 1975), decomposes the set of attitudes that lead to the perception of the political system as legitimate by distinguishing three main objects to which the support is to be directed: the political community, political regime and authorities. Support for the political community is the dimension of the Easton's scheme that has received less attention from the literature on political support, especially if we compare it with the extensive work on support for democracy, institutional trust and so on. The reason is probably that support for political community is often thought to be

unproblematic in democratic nation-states that are the cases of study of the majority of these studies. However, there are some relevant exceptions to this rule: those states whose unity is questioned in some parts of the territory or, more generally, that face problems of national integration (Kornberg and Clarke, 1992:3). We could cite the Canadian case (thoroughly analyzed by Kornberg and Clarke, 1992) or, of course, also Spain.

This relative lack of attention to support for political communities contrasts with the arguments that have been put forward about its implications: often it is considered that the more general the object is (and in this scheme the political community is the most general one) the more serious for the political system the implications of lack of support would be. The reason, as put by Dalton, is quite clear: "a strong emotional attachment to the nation presumably provides a reservoir of diffuse support that can maintain a political system through temporary periods of political stress" (Dalton, 1999: 72).

Identification with the political community is indeed thought to be independent from support for other objects: authorities and regime. This is what would allow a nation state to overcome processes of regime change, such as the transition to democracy that took place in Spain, or of bad economic performance without being questioned. The general assumption behind this idea seems to be that support for the political community is a stable attitude that does not easily change (Dalton, 1999: 74). However, this assumption has to be empirically assessed, and as I shall show, the reality is slightly more complex, as while this stability might be true for the basic identification with the political community, both its intensity and contents can be, and indeed are subject to change according to changing political environments: in some respects, throughout this dissertation (and especially in the longitudinal analysis carried out

in chapter 6) I will question the hypothesis of an absolute independence between support for political community and for the other objects.

Easton's scheme is relevant for a dissertation on national identity because support for political community is generally identified with national identity, and it has often been measured through indicators such as national pride (Klingemann, 1999; Dalton, 1999). To be sure, the same concept of support for the political community can be applied to political communities that are not necessarily defined in national nor state terms, such as supranational institutions (the EU), regions (Martinez-Herrera, 2005) or multinational states – state-nations- (Linz and Stepan, 1996). However, as long as we are dealing with a political community that explicitly defines itself as a nation, it seems rather obvious to assimilate both concepts. And this is, undoubtedly, the case of Spain.[12]

Thus, national identity represents a fundamental piece of the general scheme of support for a political system, since its independent nature from support for authorities and even the regime makes it a sort of life insurance for any political unit. However, it is not only in these cases of extreme stress that political communities seek support from their citizens, and indeed as we have seen in previous section, most established states –even if completely stable, continue to develop policies to foster their citizens' identification. But in a case such as the Spanish one, in which its status as a single political community is all but undisputed, and that has recently experienced the transition from an authoritarian and nationalist regime to a parliamentary democracy the importance of the question is self-evident.

---

[12] As stated by the 1978 Constitution, since its preamble.

Certainly, under the umbrella of 'support for the political community' we could think on a wide range of attitudes such as the sense of belonging, feelings of morale or support for specific understandings of the political community (Bollen and Díez Medrano, 1998; Martínez Herrera, 2005). Here I will focus on the affective attachment to Spain (national pride) that is the most widely used indicator of support for the political community but also, and especially, on the contents of national identity and their varieties.

Why focus also on the varieties? The meaning of the concept 'nation' is probably one of the subjects of most extensive (and unfruitful) debates, since it has been historically defined in several different ways. In line with Brubaker (2004) I consider the nationalism and national identities to be the relevant object of study, as the nation has to be considered and treated as a category of practice rather than a category of analysis. Thus, instead of contributing to the confusion of the unfruitful search for a definitive definition of 'nation', I will empirically research the socially relevant definitions of the Spanish nation. Why are the contents of national identity relevant? To be sure, holding one or another understanding of the nation does not preclude identifying with it, so the direct implications of the diverging concepts are not as serious for the stability and durability of the political system. However, the actual understandings of the nation are all but inconsequential. As I will show, they might have deep implications over a range of fundamental features of the political system, such as the inclusion or exclusion from citizenship of certain social groups (Brubaker 1992), attitudes towards immigration (Heath, 2005; Díez Medrano, 2005), the institutional role of religion, the foreign policy alliances or the territorial organization of the State. And often also on the range of political regimes that are considered acceptable by the

members of a political community. In chapter 3 I review and discuss the main typologies that have been proposed.

1.3 Theoretical aim and goals of the dissertation

Until now I have outlined the general theoretical framework from which I will derive the specific hypotheses. In this section I wrap up this part by summarizing the main theoretical goals of this project, and identifying the contributions I aim at making. How this framework will be translated into a set of working hypotheses and how will I operationalize the relevant variables will bee discussed extensively in subsequent chapters.

In this dissertation my focus is precisely on the process of reproduction of national identity in a contemporary, established and democratic nation State: Spain. As I will discuss when arguing for the relevance of the case of study, the internal challenges posed by alternative nation-building projects in some areas of the country, as well as the recent democratization provide useful analytical instances to deepen our understanding of how these processes work.

However, this is not a dissertation about Spanish nationalism as an ideology, nor a detailed analysis of the Spanish nationalization policies and strategies. Even if I devote some attention to this sphere, and its recent evolution, my main focus throughout the project is placed in the 'demand side' of the equation. I will focus primarily in the effects of these nationalizing efforts over the individuals. While the ideological discourses of Spanish nationalism have been, as I shall show, widely analyzed recently, their effects over individual attitudes have been much less studied and often are taken for granted. Indeed, this is not something specific about Spain, as the literature on nationalism has been mostly devoted to

the analysis of the elites' discourses or the macro historical processes. The micro focus, thus, is less common and even some scholars have questioned that individual level national identity constitutes a viable object of study, as it is too idiosyncratic and situational (Smith, 1992).

The dominant theory of nationalism, as Rogers Brubaker has recently pointed out, 'has stalled in recent years' in simply asserting 'that ethnicity, race and nationhood *are* constructed'. Instead of that, there is a need for facing the question on *how* they are constructed (Brubaker, 2004) and, I argue that through a properly deigned empirical research, we should be able to increase our understanding about how do the processes of national identity construction effectively work.

This is not to say, obviously, that there are no studies on national identity at the individual level. But they have been, with relevant exceptions that I will review, mostly dominated by a socio-psychological focus that tends to dismiss the political foundations of individual attitudes, by reducing them to psychological processes of individuals and groups with little or no reference to the role of nationalist ideologies that shape them.

I will focus, thus, at the crossroads between the macro and the micro level processes. To understand individual attitudes towards the nation we have to take into account how this nation is created, and reproduced at the collective level. And conversely, to understand the role of nationalism as an ideology we have to assess its effects over individual attitudes. The main goal of any ideology – and nationalism is not an exception- is to spread and promote among individual citizens a certain set of opinions and attitudes that will ultimately influence their behavior.

INTRODUCTION

My contention, thus, is that 'the major theories of nationalism necessarily make assumptions about individual attitudes' (Andersen, 2001: 1) and that we have the methodological tools to empirically assess some of these assumptions. As some scholars have pointed out, we can understand national identity as the contact point, or suture between the collective institutions, practices and myths and how the resonate at the individual level (Hall, 1996). Only through the connection between the literature that deals with the phenomenon at the collective level and the literature on individual political attitudes will we be able to approach the questions.

This strategy will also contribute to fill a certain gap in the political culture research, that has mainly dealt with other dependent variables (institutional trust, support for democracy, etc.) while often leaving identification with the political communities aside.

So if we are to work with national identity as the main variable of interest, there are two main theoretical questions to be faced: first, how does nationalism in established democratic nation states promote national identity among their citizens? And second, how do individuals respond to these stimuli and, thus, how do they acquire a sense of national identity? I opt for an integrated approach that explores the link between both levels and goes beyond the isolated survey analyses that not always take the political and historical context into account.

Furthermore, in my dissertation I want to introduce further complexity into the studies of nationalism and the basic constructivist argument, by stating that nationalism does not only tell individuals which nation have to identify with, but also how they have to think that nation. Thus, I will analyze not only the intensity but also the contents of national identity. Focusing on the

specific understandings of the nation that elites promote and the individuals, eventually share, forces us to recognize the complexity of every nationalism, than cannot be analyzed as a single, unitarian actor but rather as complex ideological field plagued by internal contradictions and often bitter confrontations. Although this might seem evident, very often in the studies of nationalism this complexity is ignored and reduced.

Summarizing, this dissertation basically aims at making three main contributions to the literature on national identity and nationalisms: First, the focus on an established democratic nation-state is, in the context of the literature, fairly scarce. Although there are relevant exceptions, as I have discussed in the previous section, the mainstream of the empirical studies have tended to focus on state-seeking nationalist movements, extremely nationalistic regimes, etc. The mechanisms of state-based national identity reproduction that operate in advanced democracies are necessarily very different from those other sets of cases, so its omission represents a bias in the literature. One of the aims of this study, thus, is to contribute to overcome this bias.

The second contribution this study can make is related to the fact that I will mainly focus in the micro level of analysis. Through a set of different research techniques, I will try to systematically test at the individual level some of the assumptions, or implications of the major theories of nationalism, that very often are left implicit or, at best, subject to debate with little or no empirical testing.

Finally, the third contribution is, as I have already discussed, the introduction of nuance and complexity in the basic *constructivist* argument. I will not limit myself to the analysis of how a given national identity is promoted and, eventually, acquired. I will also, and mainly, explore the contents of this identity and its relevant

varieties, their shared elements as well as their main differences. This has a number of implications over the selection of the appropriate research design, as well as the methodological instruments to be used as I discuss below.

1.4 Research design, an outline

The basic theoretical burden and stance that are at the core of this project have already been outlined in the previous section. As I have discussed above, I depart from the theoretical prior that national identity is constructed as a political attitude, and that in that process the state policies and political elites play a fundamental role on shaping citizens' identities and their contents. National identity is not naturally given, nor it is an immutable political attitude: its particular form and contents are subject to change and, again, the political and institutional context and discourses shape it over time.

While this is a fairly general theoretical standpoint, in this section I discuss how I have designed and conducted the research to address some of its observable implications in the Spanish case. I review the basic structure of the dissertation and discuss the rationale behind the selected strategy.

In order to address the set of general questions mentioned at the beginning of this introduction (related to the mechanisms through which established democratic nation-states and political elites foster and shape their citizens' national identity, and how do citizens respond to the stimuli) I conduct an in-depth study of the Spanish case, with a specific focus on the process of regime change and its consequences. Within this case, I take advantage of a set of comparison opportunities (across periods, generations and territories) in order to test some more specific questions that stem

from the general one: how does a regime change modify the patterns and bases of national identity? How are the relevant varieties of national identity constructed? Does exposure to alternative nation-building processes affect evenly the citizens' identities? To what extent do ethnocultural differences condition the responses to these national socialization efforts?

The dissertation has three different, albeit highly interdependent parts: in the first one, a part from this introduction, I present an overview of contemporary Spanish nationalism and trace the recent evolution of its main varieties. I also offer some insights on how they have been, and are transmitted to the population, in line with the theoretical discussion of section 2 of this chapter. The rationale behind chapter 2 is to offer an adequate –but synthetic- overview of the ideology and operation of Spanish nationalism. Nationalism is placed at the center of the explanation of why citizens' hold a specific identity and a set of attitudes towards the nation, so it is necessary to deal with it in a fairly nuanced way. This overview will then be used as a basis for designing adequate empirical research instruments, as well as for a better specification of the working hypotheses and a sharper interpretation of the results.

The second part is entirely devoted to the work with the dependent variable. I seek a precise definition, operationalization and measurement of the varieties of national identity. Developing a sound measurement requires some conceptual work about what are we going to measure, as well as a methodological effort to test proposed measurement instruments and develop an alternative that is congruent with the theoretical framework I am following here. The effort devoted to the dependent variable is essential for the explanatory analysis, as it grants that we are working with an appropriately defined and measured dependent variable. However, it does not have only a methodological interest: as the analysis of

chapters 4-6 will highlight, it has deep theoretical, as well as political implications.

In this part I deal with one of the main debates in both the theoretical and empirical literature on nationalism and national identity: the one about the possibility of distinguishing between ethnic and civic identities. Congruent with the general theoretical standpoint I have adopted, I will argue that, indeed, the relevant varieties of national identity we should find in each case are those that have been articulated by the relevant nationalist discourses, rather than a pair of fixed, predefined types. This is a relevant observable implication of the theory I have been outlining here and I will address it empirically through a set of methods and techniques, putting the Spanish case in comparative perspective.

In the third part of the dissertation I address a whole different set of hypotheses: those related to the individual determinants of national identity. While the research method used in this part -survey analysis- poses some important limits to the task of identifying the process of identity construction and change, it does allow for testing some observable implications of the theory. Through these tests, I will be able to offer some insights on the mechanisms at work. Taking advantage of the opportunities for comparison offered by the Spanish case, that I discuss in the next section, in the third part of the dissertation I develop some relevant tests on a set of hypotheses that derive from my theoretical framework: First, if as I argue, elites and state policies are the main agents in shaping national identity, a process such as a transition to democracy and democratic consolidation, that have deep implications over the public discourses and policies would have effects over individual attitudes, fostering change in a congruent direction. Second, if individuals share a given type of identity by virtue of the agency of specific political actors, we should also observe how their political (and

eventually religious) orientation, as well as uneven exposure to socialization contexts –due to generational, territorial or educational diversity- become powerful explanatory factors for the individuals' national identity. If national identity is primarily a political attitude, we should be able to explain its distribution across the society, at least in part, through political and socialization variables. I will also address the effects of ethnocultural traits in determining national identity, and try to discriminate between them and the effects of political and social context.

How will I be able to address this complex set of questions by focusing only in one case? As this is a reasonable concern, in the next section I discuss the relevance of the Spanish case, and specifically why some of its features make it suitable for my theoretical purposes, as it provides a set of opportunities to undertake controlled comparisons that will be very helpful to overcome, at least partially, some limits of a case study.

1.5 The Spanish case: Transition to democracy and internal plurality as opportunities for controlled comparisons

In this section I discuss the relevance of the case of study –the Spanish national identity. I argue that its relevance is twofold: on one hand, the study of the Spanish national identity has an intrinsic political interest related to the current, and enduring debates that it generates in Spain. These debates, moreover, might have important implications for other nation-states facing similar situations as Spain. On the other hand, some specific features of the case – territorial diversity, recent democratization- provide opportunities for controlled comparisons across time, generations and territories

that will give us analytical leverage to test some of the theoretical arguments discussed above.

a) The relevance of the case of study: identity politics and research in contemporary Spain

The importance of the so-called 'national question' in shaping contemporary Spanish politics is difficult to exaggerate. Since the turn of the century, the presence of relevant alternative nationalisms especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country, as well as the weaknesses and conflicts among the Spanish elites about the terms of the nation-building have deeply conditioned the political development in Spain (for a historical overview, see Linz, 1973). Indeed, the enduring nationalist claims put forward by certain groups within Spain have lead many scholars to label this case as an example of incomplete or uneven nation-building process. And is precisely this incompleteness that makes the so-called 'national question' a salient political issue within Spain. As I discuss in chapter 2, the national question was one of the main debates during the transition process, and it deeply conditioned the architecture of the democratic Spain. Still today, 30 years after the democratization, a big share of the political debate is devoted to a variety of issues related, in one way or another, to this question. While the relevance of identity politics for understanding contemporary Spanish politics is almost evident for any observator, the historical overview that I carry out in chapter 2 will make it even clearer, so it is not necessary to develop it further here.

Conversely, the various aspects of this national question have received a great deal of academic attention. Spanish political science in recent decades has had identity politics as one of its main fields of development. Certainly, the seminal works by Juan J. Linz

(1973, 1975, 1981, 1985, etc) had a deep influence in establishing the terms of the later debate.

Indeed, the lion's share of the scholarly literature has been devoted to the sub-state, alternative nationalist movements –mainly, the Catalan and Basque ones, and the internal heterogeneity within those two territories. The study of nationalist parties and the role of nationalism on citizens' electoral behavior have also received a great deal of attention.

But probably the most developed –and exported- topic of research on nationalisms and national identity in Spain is related to the interplay between state-wide and substate identities, and the question of their compatibility or incompatibility (Moreno 1992, 1997, 1998; Pérez Agote 1994, Giner and Moreno, 1990, etc) as well as the impact of institutional decentralization (and additionaly, also European integration) over citizens' identities (Safran and Máiz, 2000; Martínez-Herrera 2002, 2005; Moreno, 2002; Keating, 1998 etc).

This literature has enormously contributed to our understanding of identity politics in a complex polity such as Spain. But more surprisingly (or perhaps not: I will discuss this question in the next chapter), the Spanish nationalism and national identity have received, by themselves, much less academic attention. The disproportionate emphasis on Catalan and Basque nationalisms has configured a rather incomplete picture of identity politics in Spain. At most, there has been reflection on the impact of the peripheric chllenges for Spain as a whole, or the Spanish national identity has been treated as a sort of residual category defined in negative terms respect to the alternative identities. Without an in-depth analysis of the role, discourse, operating mechanisms and effects of Spanish nationalism, the picture lacks one of its main elements. Therefore,

this project, while recognizing and drawing on this previous empirical research tradition, is somehow distanced from its mainstream since its main aim is to contribute to a richer understanding of identity politics in Spain by introducing this crucial albeit largely missing element into the overall picture.[13]

b) Taking advantage of heterogeneity and change: substate comparisons within Spain

Besides its intrinsic interest, some features of the Spanish case provide a set of comparisons through which we should be able to test some theoretically relevant propositions. I will concentrate on three instances of comparison: periods, generations and territories. This comparisons are made possible, and relevant for two specific elements that concur in the Spanish case: The first one is its recent transition to democracy, which as I discuss in chapters 2 and 6, did imply a fundamental shift in the orientation of the state-led nation-building policies and discourses, evolving from a highly nationalist and right-wing regime to a democracy in which the nationalizing policies have been much less intense, or explicit. This institutional change, together with the (rather uncommon) availability of survey data that covers the transition and democratic consolidation processes, and includes cohorts that were socialized under deeply different regimes, will allow for the testing of some relevant hypotheses on the process of formation and change of national identities and the role of institutions and elites in shaping them.

The second element that favors the theoretical relevance of the case is its internal heterogeneity, both in cultural and linguistic and

---

[13] This is not to say, of course, that there are no relevant works on Spanish nationalism and national identity. There are many, and I will review them throughout the dissertation, but in any case they are scarcer than those devoted to alternative nationalisms and the center-periphery dialectics.

political terms. In Spain there are territories that share the majoritarian language, and others with distinct languages. Among the latter, we find both areas with strong alternative nationalisms and areas were these movements are weak and the Spanish identity is strong. Moreover, the territories with distinct languages are not homogeneous: as I will show, they have relevant percentages of Spanish-speaking population. I will take advantage of this variety to test some prominent theories on the relationship between ethnocultural traits, elite political mobilization and the spread of alternative and state-led national identities.

This set of features configures a complex reality within which I will undertake, in different stages of the dissertation, three relevant comparisons that will foster our understanding on the processes that lead a given individual to hold certain attitudes towards a nation. The first one is a comparison across time: the availability of data at different points of time, that span from the first years of the democracy to the current period, in which the democratic regime is fully consolidated allows for testing of some hypotheses on the effects of changing institutional settings and nationalizing policies and discourses over individual attitudes. How have the regime transition, and its implications in terms of state policies and elites' discourses, influenced the individuals' identification with Spain?

The second one is a comparison among generations. I will be working with samples within which we can find cohorts socialized under extremely different regimes and political environments. This will be useful to shed some light on the mechanisms behind the processes of change and should provide valuable insights on how certain national socialization agencies and milieus shape individuals' national identity across the life cycle.

And, finally, the third relevant comparison is the intra-state one. The significant differences across sub state units –and among linguistic groups within some of these units- provides several instances of comparison that I will take advantage of. The subnational comparative method (Snyder, 2001) does offer opportunities for controlled comparisons, given that we will be able to hold a number of variables constant. All those territories, despite their differences, share the same political history, have been influenced by, at least partially, the same state policies, mass media and political elites while in some of them, on the top of that, there are additional, alternative nation-building processes.

So the Spanish case is, a part from the political saliency of the national question, a potentially fruitful one to test some relevant hypotheses about the processes of national identity construction and change. I will specify and discuss them in detail in the corresponding chapters. However, it could still be argued that the specificities of the Spanish case might limit our ability to draw theoretical implications for a broader universe of established nation states from this case of study. My response is twofold. On one hand, the Spanish case cannot be seen as unique, as there are several relevant established democracies that face similar national challenges (UK, Belgium, Canada), and the experiences of regime change and their consequences over the state-wide nationalism have been a matter of debate also in other countries, such as Italy or Germany. On the other hand, the main theoretical interest of a study like the one I conduct here lies in the identification of the relevant mechanisms rather than in drawing valid causal inferences to a larger universe of countries, even if in some parts of the dissertation

I adopt an explicitly comparative perspective and address general questions.[14]

1.6 Methodology: an overview

In the course of the research, I have used three different data collection methods and a number of data analysis procedures and techniques. The general approach has been to use the best suited technique for every step of the research process, and not stick to a narrow methodological approach that might limit our ability to face such a complex and multifaceted phenomenon as nationalism and national identity. As for the data collection, I work here with three kinds of data: Documental sources, Q-methodological interviews and survey data from both preexisting and original surveys.

The chapter devoted to the analysis of contemporary Spanish nationalism is based on secondary literature, but I also use some primary documents, mainly for illustrative purposes. I collected those documents that are commonly used to represent the ideological positions of political parties and leaders: Party manifestos[15] and party documents, public addresses of leaders, legal documents, transcripts of key parliamentary debates, and relevant press news.

The remaining of the dissertation is focused on individual attitudes. I combine data from a Q-methodological study with survey data. In chapter 4 I explain and discuss in detail the Q methodology, its

---

[14] For a methodological discussion of the place of case studies in social science, see among others, George and Bennet (2005), Bennet (1999), Gerring (2004). However, even if this is a study referred to a single state, it includes several comparisons across 'cases' within the unit: points in time, generations, territorial units, linguistic groups, etc.

[15] I collected the manifestos of the three main statewide parties for the 1977-2004 period, although not all of them were equally informative.

theoretical foundations, practical applications, usefulness and limits. Here it will suffice to say that Q methodology is a research technique oriented towards the study of the subjectivity. It is based on a set of in-depth interviews to a reduced sample of individuals. In the interviews the individuals are given the opportunity of *building* their own point of view on a topic through the process of sorting a set of statements about it, according to a predefined scale (for example, of agreement/disagreement) and template (usually, a quasi-normal distribution). The statements are supposed to constitute a sample extracted from a theoretical universe of the opinions and arguments that exist in the interviewees' context. This is why the Q methodology is an especially suited technique to study the bond between the collective and the individual levels (Haesly, 2005a).

I use two types of survey data: on one hand I conduct some secondary analyses of existing surveys from various sources (International Social Survey Program, World Values Survey, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) and on the other hand, I use the data collected by the survey CIS2667. I participated in the design of the questionnaire and the survey sample, and used some of the insights of the Q methodological study to design a set of measurement instruments for the Spanish national identity.[16]

For the data analysis I rely on a wide array of statistical techniques. The descriptive part, in which I evaluate, design and propose a new measurement model and set of instruments uses, on one hand

---

[16] The whole process of data collection of both the Q methodological study and the CIS2667 survey were carried out by an interuniversity research group in which I took part together with three more researchers: Eduard Bonet, Santiago Pérez-Nievas and Ivan Llamazares. The decisions, as well as the data collection itself were collective, so this is a part of the dissertation work that I did not carry out entirely by myself. However, the analysis and interpretation of the results contained here are my own, exclusive responsibility.

descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations, cross tabulations and reliability tests (such as Cronbach's alpha), and on the other Exploratory Factor Analysis and Structural Equation Modeling (Confirmatory Factor Analysis). These two are the best-suited statistical techniques for identifying underlying latent variables that cannot be directly observed (such as the varieties of national identity) and testing hypotheses on the relations among them, and with the corresponding indicators. I use them to develop and test a reliable measurement of the dependent variable.

The Q-methodological data is analyzed through the statistical technique of factor analysis. The factor analysis procedure as it is conducted with Q-methodological data has some particularities that distance it from the common factor analysis used with quantitative data. The differences are wide, starting with the fact that we analyze correlations among individuals rather than correlations among indicators. In any case, will explain the technique, its rationale and implications in more detail in chapter 4.

Finally, for the explanatory analysis (part III), I rely on different techniques for both bivariate and multivariate analysis: cross-tabulations, two-way correlations, and multiple regressions. The regression models used vary depending on the nature of the dependent variable: when dealing with categorical variables I use logistic regression, while when working with continuous dependent variables, I use Ordinary Least Squares estimation. In any case, in each individual chapter I explain in detail the methodological decisions and the possible problems with the statistical procedures followed, so this general overview will be complemented by those specific discussions.

1.7 Plan of the dissertation

In chapter 2, as I have said, I review the main discourses set up by Spanish elites on the nation, and how they have been implemented into effective nationalizing policies by the state during the periods under which the samples I will be working with were socialized: the Francoism and the current democratic regime. First, I summarize the main components of Francoist Spanish nationalism, addressing the role of religion, history, language and other elements. I also discuss the main varieties of nationalism within the regime –the national-Catholic and the fascist-, and how the regime did operate a monopolization of patriotism. Then, I analyze how the regime downfall, considering that it had monopolized the Spanish patriotism for almost forty years, might have influenced the visibility and saliency of post-Francoist, democratic Spanish nationalism. I also discuss how the operating procedures of Spanish nationalism have evolved, and whether it has already become a fully "banal" nationalism as defined above. I focus on two elements that distance it from the general banal model: the pervasive divisiveness around national symbols, and its reactive nature with respect to alternative nationalisms. Finally, I analyze the contents of contemporary Spanish nationalisms. I conduct a separate analysis for the leftist and the rightist nationalisms, but I also show how the two share a common ground that I will call 'constitutional nationalism'.

In Chapter 3 I move to the individual-level analysis. In this chapter, departing from the classical ethnic-civic dichotomy and its main criticisms, I propose an understanding of the varieties of national attachment that takes into account the endogenous nature of identities. I argue that ethnic and civic versions of nationalism, if they are actually present in a society, are not exogenous, 'natural'

ways of identifying with one's nation but rather politically constructed visions and, thus, they may take different shapes in different contexts and be subject to change. I show that through a comparative analysis of a set of countries, using the ISSP 1995 and 2003 surveys.

In the second section of the chapter, I review the existing attempts to operationalize the contents of national identity and the ethnic-civic dichotomy at the individual level in Spain, and then test the validity and reliability of this measurement models. The conclusions to this chapter show the need for an alternative measurement instrument to capture the relevant varieties of Spanish national identity.

In order to advance this task, in chapter 4 I present an exploratory research based on 64 in-depth interviews conducted in four areas of Spain (Catalonia, the Basque Country, Madrid and Salamanca). As I have discussed in the previous section, this study was conducted using Q-methodology. In that chapter I discuss the methodology and specific research design, analyze the results of the study and discuss their implications. This process led to the identification of three main types of Spanish national identity, as well as a set of discriminating indicators.

In chapter 5 I present the work carried out to transform the results of the Q-methodological study into a set of survey questions that were applied in a mass survey (N=3000, CIS 2667). After discussing the selection of the indicators with which we intended to measure the varieties of Spanish national identity, I analyze the results of the survey. First, I conduct a descriptive analysis and an exploration of the relations among variables and then propose and test a measurement model based on two latent variables: traditional and constitutional Spanish identity. I compare how the

measurement model works across different territories, and finally test its external validity against a set of other conventionally used measures of national identity.

Chapter 6 moves into the explanatory analysis, and explores the determinants of Spanish national pride and how they have evolved as a consequence of the transition to democracy. This chapter adopts a dynamic perspective in order to trace the consequences of the regime change on the structure of Spaniards' identification with Spain. I do that by merging several different surveys that cover a twenty-year period. This must help us to uncover the relationship between deep changes on the institutional setting, the nation-building policies and discourses on one hand, and the citizens' attitudes towards the nation on the other. In other words, it is intended to shed light on the dynamics of national identity change.[17]

In chapter 7, departing from the typology of national identities developed in chapter 5, and using the survey conducted, I analyze the social bases of the varieties of Spanish national identity, trying to approach the process of construction of such identities. First, I replicate the analysis of the previous chapter for the year 2007, and explore the relationship between the dependent variable used in chapter 6 (national pride) and the varieties identified previously. I analyze how the explanatory model set up in chapter 6 works for each of the varieties of Spanish national identity, and add some more variables to the analysis, that will allow for the test of some relevant hypotheses about the acquisition of national identity, such as the role of education and language. Finally, in this chapter I also conduct a comparison between different territories of Spain, as to test whether the same explanatory models travel well across the

---

[17] In that chapter, as I will explain, I cannot use the scales that stem from the work carried out in the previous chapters as my dependent variables, because they are only available for a single point in time.

country, and to see the influence of some cultural and political variables that vary across regions. The eighth, and final chapter summarizes the main findings of the dissertation, and goes through their theoretical as well as political implications.

Chapter two

AN ANATOMY OF CONTEMPORARY SPANISH NATIONALISM

2.1 Introduction

In the introduction, I have argued against the practice of conducting isolated analyses of individual data without placing them into a historical context in order to explain the formation and varieties of national identity. Such an analysis would be incomplete because it would lack the understanding of the main inputs received by citizens in the form of a nationalist ideology that is at the center of the explanation of the individual national identity. If we are to take the basic constructivist hypotheses seriously and test them at the individual level, we should also attend to the link between the elites' agency and the citizens' attitudes, so both sides of the story should be present in any account seeking completeness.

The basic claim of the previous chapter is that nationalism creates the citizens' national identity. In other words: elites' discourses and state policies do shape and frame citizens' views on the nation through various sorts of socialization agencies and milieus. Thus, only through a review of the historical, and contemporary expressions of Spanish nationalism will I be able to derive

meaningful hypotheses and make sense of the individual data about the Spanish citizens' national identity that I have collected.

This is precisely the task I want to fulfill in this chapter. Here, I present an overview of the recent historical evolution of Spanish nationalist ideology that will provide a necessary context to the individual data analysis and will be very useful in the interpretation of the results. I must say that I do not pretend, at all, to develop an in-depth study of Spanish nationalism. Such a task falls beyond the scope of this dissertation that is mainly concerned in the analysis of the Spanish national identity at the individual level. As I will show, other scholars have already carried it out recently. Thus, in this chapter I present a general overview of the main contemporary expressions of Spanish nationalism, mainly based on the analysis of secondary literature, complemented with some primary sources when necessary.[18]

Considering the goal of this chapter, I will restrict the analysis to the periods under which the cohorts I will be working with in my empirical research were socialized. This means that I will focus on the Francoist dictatorship and the current democratic regime, leaving aside other previous periods except for some side references when necessary. Another limit of the present analysis is its scope: I am interested in nationalism as linked to mass politics and fuel for nationalizing policies that, in turn, shape individuals' attitudes towards the nation. This is why I will not devote the analysis to a fine-grained account of the subtle debates among (nationalist) intellectuals, but rather to a general overview of the main,

---

[18] As it is often the case in the studies of nationalism, in the Spanish case the line between secondary literature and primary, ideological texts gets blurry, as very often the *scholars of nationalism* tend to be nationalists (or strong critics) themselves and write their analyses with evident ideological goals. However, the treatment of both kinds of sources must be different, and an effort has to be made to discriminate between them.

politically salient, varieties of Spanish nationalism in the aforementioned period, as well as to provide some sense on whether, and how the varying conceptions of Spanish nationhood might have been transmitted to the general population.

The chapter is organized as follows: the first section presents a brief summary of the varieties, contents and evolution of Francoist nationalism. Then, I discuss the consequences of the regime downfall for the Spanish nationalism and its public visibility. In the third section, I analyze the main varieties of the contemporary Spanish nationalism. First, I discuss the nationalism of the right, then the one of the left and finally, address the question of whether there is, in contemporary Spain, a shared core of a consensual nationalism that goes beyond the ideological divides.

2.2 Fascism, Catholicism and the military: The Francoist nationalisms

The Francoist was a complex regime, and indeed there have been longstanding historiographic debates about its nature and historical place. However, there is a substantial academic agreement about the central role of Spanish nationalism in the configuration of the Francoist 'ideology', or 'mentality' (Linz, 1970). However, even if the centrality of nationalism for the understanding of the regime seems difficult to exaggerate, most historiographic accounts have almost neglected it, or at least diminished its role when trying to define the contours of the regime's ideology. This is true for the historians within the Marxist tradition that, obviously, were more preoccupied by the structural foundations of the regime, but also for many other analysts of the regime's ideological bases: As Ismael Saz points out, often the nationalist component was either absent or

just one more element in an amorphous list that included several other ideological ingredients of the regime (Saz, 2003: 49-50).

This approach has generally neglected the fact that the Francoist regime was, in the first place, 'the greatest nationalizing effort of the 20th Century' (Saz, 2003: 50). This neglect is not surprising in the general context of scarcity of studies about Spanish nationalism. Indeed, since the beginning of the rebellion against the Spanish Republic in 1936, the nation was one of the main legitimizing elements of the insurgents' discourse. The loyalists were identified with a foreign conspiracy against the Spanish nation, lead by the communist Russia. Moreover, the antiseparatism would soon become a central leitmotiv for the rebels. As Nuñez-Seixas has pointed out (Nuñez Seixas, 2005; 2007b), the war was often portrayed as a national crusade against the internal and foreign enemies of Spain. In some sense, the war, as most wars, at the same time took advantage and fueled popular nationalism in both sides. The fact that both the rebels and loyalists made an intense use of patriotic discourses as a mobilizing tool clearly shows the spread of the Spanish national consciousness at the time. Moreover, the war itself played an important role in strengthening these patriotic feelings among the combatants and the general population, as it is often the case with armed conflicts.

The regime that stemmed from that war was, obviously, extremely nationalistic in many respects. Since the establishment of the new ruling regime, the whole legitimating basis was essentially nationalistic. The fierce repression against the opposition, the economic policy of autarky during the first years of the regime (Richards, 1996) and the ideological control of the population through the educational system or the media was justified in nationalistic terms.

The regime soon established a set of nationalist rituals and holidays (not without tensions between its various components, as shown by Zira Boix, 2007), and the presence of the national symbols in the public sphere was intense. Conversely, as I argue below, the regime put a strong effort in the cultural assimilation of the population of linguistically distinct areas, as a mean of eliminating the alternative nationalist sentiments that were, during the pre-war years very spread in Catalonia and the Basque Country.

But since the first stages of the rebellion against the Republic, the complexity and contradictions within the rebels' nationalism would emerge. As Ismael Saz (2003) has extensively argued and documented, we can basically identify two main versions of the Spanish nationalism: the Falangist one and the traditionalist national-Catholicism.

The Falangist idea of the nation was close to the purely fascist view, even if the nature of the coalition that was build around Franco (and, to some extent, also the sociological configuration of many of the rebels' strongholds in rural Castile) would necessarily imply a certain reformulation of the fascist principles of the Falange into a more traditionalist and Catholic fashion. However, there was a core group of fascist thinkers (such as Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, Giménez Caballero or J.A. Primo de Rivera) that developed it. It was a strongly projective nationalism, based in the idea of the national decadence and resurrection –palingenestic ultra nationalism (Griffin, 1991)-. The nation, after its deep disaster and decadence, should reborn from its own ashes and be guided by the Falange towards a brilliant future. The very image of the 'unity of destiny in a universal plane' would be central to the Falangist nationalism, expressing both the projective nature and a strong unitarianism, based around its Castilian ethnic core (Saz 2003).

But the purely fascist view would remain secondary within the Francoist coalition, and eventually tend to disappear. The dominant version of the regime's nationalism was the so-called national-Catholicism. We could define it, in its core, as the identification of the nation with the Catholic faith and church. The Spanish reactionary Catholicism had been, for most of the 19th century, reluctant to the very idea of nationalism, often seen as a liberal, and stranger ideology linked to popular sovereignty that would harm the traditional order. But soon the contradiction would be solved in the national-Catholic synthesis: a narrative of the Spanish nation as essentially catholic. This identification is clearly expressed in the often cited paragraph of Menéndez Pelayo (1880), that acts as somehow the founding statement of national-Catholicism: *Spain, evangelizer of half the globe; Spain hammer of heretics, light of Trent, sword of Rome, cradle of Saint Ignatius...This is our greatness and this is our unity. We have no other".*

The national-Catholic version was, then, much more attached to the tradition than oriented towards the future. It sought to retrieve the 'true' soul of Spain by means of a complete identification with the Catholic faith and a deeply essentialist view of the Spanish history. Catholicism was a constitutive factor of the nation's political and ethnic unity and, of course, there was in this ideology the consideration of the Spanish people as 'chosen' by God to carry out an exceptional task, related to the imperial past and the preservation of the pure Catholic faith (for an analysis of the national-Catholic ideology, more focused on its theological dimension, see Piñol, 1993: 87-107). Franco himself often expressed this idea of 'chosen people': *Spain is God's favorite nation; its great services to the Church, never matched by any other people, could not pass without*

a reward; this is why in the midst of its great crises [Spain] never lacked its help.[19]

Beyond the religious dimension, the Francoist conception of the Spanish nation was heavily influenced by an organicist conception. The homeland was often represented as a living organism, often with anthropomorphic traits (mostly feminine, as a mother). Closely related to the organicism, the homeland's unity is a highly salient, and enduring issue within the Francoist national narrative. Indeed, the struggle against secessionism was one of the *leitmotivs* of the war. This strong unitarianism was mixed with some regionalist concessions and recreations –especially, but not limited to the foralists in Navarra and Araba- (Núñez Seixas, 2007) that, however, would tend to disappear. However, the unity as a key theme of Francoist nationalism, was not only referred to the preservation of its territorial integrity but also as a tool against any opposition or pluralism, that were seen as weakening the nation:

> *"The homeland is not only the geographic space in which our life passes (…), it is the historic projection of our nation in the universal plane; this is why in our concept of homeland there is no room for separating particularisms; its spiritual unity, its social unity ad its historical unity conform its unity of destiny"*[20]

This is the core of the antiliberalism of the Francoist discourse. The multiparty democracy, as well as any sort of class identity was represented as a threat for the nation: "*no one has the right to use its freedom as a tool against the homeland's unity, strength and freedom*".[21] In this vein, the regime's 'social policy', or social

---

[19] Franco, 1942. Cited by Arbós and Puigsec (Arbos, 1980: 69)
[20] Franco, 1943 cited by Arbós and Puigsec (1980: 67)
[21] Franco, 1938 cited by Arbós and Puigsec (1980: 72)

propaganda was justified also as a tool of strengthening the national sentiment and commitment to the homeland defense.

If the nation's territorial, political and social unity were key concepts in Francoist nationalism, the Second Republic and its followers were represented as a 'cancer' for this organism that threatened its very existence as a nation. Thus, the need for a *shock treatment* was the core legitimizing argument for the war. Indeed, the war as a sort of 'national crusade' directed towards the regeneration of the nation's soul was central to the self-understanding of the rebellion and the extreme post-war violence and material deprivation fueled by the first, economic policy of the regime oriented towards autarky, or self-sufficiency (Richards, 1996).

The ideological roots of this regenerationism were multifaceted: to be sure, the Catholic idea of redemption played a crucial role. Spain, through the war and the post-war toughness was redeeming its sins, that had lead it to deviate from its 'natural' path under the influence of foreign ideologies, such as communism or liberalism, at the root of the country's decadence. But the regenerationism of the 1898 generation did play a salient role in Francoist rhetoric too. Indeed, writers such as Unamuno, Azorín, Baroja or Maeztu had among their main themes the regeneration of the homeland through the retrieval of its immanent essence. The nationalism of the 98 generation would prove flexible enough to serve antagonistic projects later on, from the liberal-republican nationalism in the 1930's to the fascist ultranationalism of the Falange (Saz, 2003: 74).

However, the divisive, extremely aggressive components of this regenerationism tended to soften as the regime opened itself, from the mid-50's. The regime did not seek just its legitimacy as "the savior of an imperiled national tradition, but as the agent and

guarantor of orderly economic growth" (Boyd, 1997: 284). This new legitimacy did not fit very well with their classical opposition of Spain as a 'spiritual reservation' and the rest of Europe, caught in the materialistic trap. However, as Carolyn P. Boyd (1997) argues, the formal national-Catholic discourse never lost its 'official' status and was substituted, not by an alternative interpretation of Spain's history, but by a sort of neglect (272).

Of course, the nations' unity was represented as having ancient roots. Indeed, Franco insisted in the praise of the Catholic Kings as architects of the national unity. Ramón López Facal (2007: 334-5) synthesizes the core historical narrative of the traditionalist Spanish nationalism: departing from the ancient Iberian settlers, that already showed some of the basic traits of the 'Spanish character' –best represented in their 'resistance to foreign invasions' there is a basic continuity of the Spanish nation. The Roman Empire, even if at first is considered a foreign influence, is evaluated as it configured the first political unification of 'Spain' and was a fundamental tool in the expansion of Christianity. But it is the Visigoth kingdom and, especially, the historical process or 'Reconquest' that concentrate the historical destiny of the nation, culminated by the definitive expulsion of the Islamic settlers and the complete unification by the Catholic Kings. The centrality of this episode in the Francoist rhetoric is basically driven by the regime's self-portray as a sort of replication of the Catholic Kings' historical task, especially in the first stages of the war and the post-war, as we have seen.

There is in the Francoist rhetoric a constant presence of the concept of Empire. However, the real meaning of the concept was ambivalent, as it often referred to a sort of spiritual and historic stage rather than an actual geographic expansionist project. In any case, the use of the term varied greatly depending on the evolution of the international context: until the end of World War II became

clear, the regime had some fairly explicit territorial aspirations – basically in Northern Africa- (Saz, 2003: 275; Arbós i Puigsec, 1980: 138). The ambivalence and indefinition of the Spanish imperialism was, thus, related to the regime's foreign policy priorities and needs, but also to the ideological divides within the regime itself: while for the Falangist nationalism the materialization of the imperialist project implied the participation in the World War with Germany and Ital, and benefit form the victory of the Axis powers (Saz, 2003: 275), the national-Catholic idea of Empire was much less concrete and material.

Which were the main national markers of this nationalism? How was the Spanish people defined? As we have seen, the ancient roots of the Spanish nation, and the historical essentialism were a core defining element of the Spanish people. The geographical isolation –Spain was often portrayed as an island protected by the sea and the Pyrenees- and the internal movements and exchanges would have configured a specific *Volksgeist*. In its definition, the Catholic religion and the traditional values had a key role. These historic, geographic, religious and ideological elements, together with a set of personality traits often represented in the Castilian peasants (austerity, individualism, love for independence, loyalty, etc) would configure what the regime referred to as *La Raza.* Indeed, this was a recurring concept in the Francoist national rhetoric, and even the national holiday, 12th of October, was called *Día de la Raza.* The concept of race was, thus, more ambivalent than in common language and its explicitly biological component was, at best, secondary.

There is yet another central element in the Francoist nationalism that should be underlined: the project of linguistic and cultural assimilation carried out in those territories with distinct language. After the Francoist victory, the autonomous institutions were

suppressed, and this absolute centralization of the State implied also a strongly assimilationist policy towards the culturally distinct territories. Although the role of Castilian as one of the bases of the Spanish state and nation building has certainly deeper roots, Francoist nationalism exacerbated this trend. The public presence of the other languages was banned and, although the degree of tolerance with some minor expressions of Catalan, Basque or Galician culture varied during the course of the regime, the basis of the Francoist nationalism was the building of a unitarian, monocultural integrated Spanish nation. The regional diversity was reduced to folkloristic expressions and the distinct languages were often referred to as dialects. The only language allowed in public life was Castilian, and the Catalan, Basque or Galician linguistic and cultural heritage were relegated to the private sphere or directly considered as dangerous expressions of *separatism* and thus subject to fierce repression.[22]

2.3. Invisible nationalism? On the consequences of the regime downfall over Spanish nationalism

If, as Ismael Saz has argued, the regime was the most intense nationalizing effort of 20th Century Spain, which were its achievements and limits? How did the enduring nationalist dictatorship impact the post-Francoist Spanish nationalism? Most academic works dealing with contemporary Spanish nationalism tend to underline, as one of its central features, its invisibility both in the public discourse and the academic sphere, especially if we compare the attention it receives with to the so-called peripheral nationalisms, that have been, and still are, much more often

---

[22] For a documented compilation of the legal prosecution of the Catalan language, see Ferrer i Gironés (1985) or the extensive work by the historian and leftist and catalanist politician Josep Benet (1973; 1995)

analyzed and discussed by scholars, analysts and commentators in general. The say that Spanish nationalism is invisible has become something similar to a common place that is present in almost every reference to it, academic or not.

However, in the scholarly dimension we can safely say that as of 2008, this invisibility has already been overcome to a great extent. As Diego Muro and Alejandro Quiroga (2005) already noted, there is since the 1990's, a growing academic interest in the subject that has resulted in an increased level of scholarly production devoted to the topic. The academic debate has been basically dominated by historians, and traditionally focused on the contrasting interpretations of the origins of the Spanish nationalism and the intensity of the nationalization of the masses during the 19th century (Álvarez Junco, 2001; de Riquer, 1993; Archilés and Martí, 2004; etc). However, more recently there is a growing body of research devoted to the contemporary expressions of the phenomenon, basically referred to the transition and the current democratic regime. This research has recently experienced a substantial development, and includes general overviews (Muro and Quiroga, 2005; Núñez Seixas, 2001; Balfour and Quiroga, 2007; etc), as well studies focused on specific issues, such as the nationalist bases of the 1978 constitution (Bastida, 1998; 2007), the linguistic nationalism (Moreno Cabrera, J. C., 2008; 2007), the right wing nationalism (Balfour, 2008; Nuñez Seixas, 2007a), the historical interpretations on which Spanish nationalism draws (Pérez Garzón, 1999), the politics of national commemoration (Aguilar and Humlebæk, 2002) or the teaching of history in contemporary Spain (López Facal, 2007).

If the academic debate is rich and growing, the question of the invisibility of Spanish nationalism in the public discourse is certainly more complex. Behind the common complaint of

invisibility, there are indeed diverging interpretations of the problem: while some complain of its weakness (Uriarte, 2002; Béjar, 2008), others tend to consider that despite its evident saliency, there is too little discussion about it. Indeed, the Spanish nationalism has often only been named as such, and dealt with, by its opponents. Why does that happen? Why is Spanish nationalism invisible?

While most of its practitioners would simply respond that it is invisible because it is either non existent or confined to marginal far-right groups, the dominant interpretation in the academic sphere attributes this invisibility to the consequences of *"the 'appropriation' and monopolization of Spanish nationalist discourse by Francoism and the antidemocratic right wing"*, that would have *"had a significant impact on the entire spectrum of Spanish nationalism, particularly when it was forced to present a democratically legitimized face in the last years of Francoism and during the democratic transition"* (Núñez Seixas 2001: 721). The identification of Spanish nationalism with the dictatorship would have lead, the argument goes, to its self-restraint and almost disappearance from public life after the return of the democracy in Spain especially because of the attitude of the Spanish leftist leaders and intellectuals. However, some argue that the right wing did also hide its nationalism, in order to avoid the identification with the regime and gain its democratic credentials (Uriarte 2002:122).

Indeed, the identification of the Spanish nationalism with the Francoist regime, that was the result of a conscious effort of the regime, has been described more generally by Daniel Bar-Tal, who named this phenomenon as the 'monopolization of patriotism". It is defined as a process by which the dominant group or regime elaborates a version of nationalism that "*demands unquestionable loyalty not only to the nation and state, but also unquestionable*

support of the particular idea". This way, the regime *"defines the boundaries of patriotism, harnessing it for the complete support of the dominant ideology, practiced policies, and governing leadership"* (Bar-Tal, 1997).

What are the consequences of this process of monopolization of patriotism? Bar-Tal names a few of them, such as the delegitimation and marginalization of those that do not share the idea, that are commonly categorized as traitors to the homeland. This extremely negative categorization often implies the repression of the dissent. Once the opponents have been labeled as enemies of the homeland, they become an easier target for repression. They are also often used as scapegoats, and they are assigned the responsibility for all the country's problems. These processes tend to promote the generalization of consent, and eventually the emergence of some form of totalitarianism.

There can be little doubt that Francoist rhetoric and practices do fit in Bar-Tal's model of monopolization of patriotism. The fierce repression of the opposition and the official reading of the Spanish civil war as a fight between Spain and the 'anti-Spain', supported by a foreign coalition of Spain's enemies is a clear example of the attitude towards the nation described by Bar-Tal (for an analysis of the nationalist rhetoric in the Francoist, as well as the Republican sides during the war, see Núñez Seixas, 2005). The Spanish one, thus, constitutes an appropriate case to study this phenomenon, and especially a specific aspect not directly addressed by Bar-Tal: what happens when the monopolist regime falls down or looses its hegemony? The dominant version of the official nationalism is attached to the fallen group, so the new ruling elites must develop a new interpretation of the nation that has to be congruent with the new situation. The paradigm of these processes of redefinition is probably the post-World War II Germany. The deep collective

trauma of the war and the Holocaust lead to a deep depression of every expression of German nationalism, and a complex process of reconstruction of the past was needed to overcome it. Still today, survey indicators show how in Germany levels of national pride are consistently lower than in any other country (Smith and Jarkko, 1998). The development of the so-called 'constitutional patriotism' (Habermas, 1989; Sternberger, 2001) is an attempt to rebuild the identification with Germany on a completely different basis, based on an essential antifascist consensus and defined in strict political and allegedly universalistic terms.

What happened in Spain after Franco's death? When the monopolistic regime fell down, any explicit Spanish nationalism was somehow linked to the old regime's ideology. Thus, it was difficult for most democratic political actors –especially in the left- to fully assume it and, according to some interpretations, they tended to partially support some of the claims put forward by the alternative, peripheral nationalisms. This process resulted in the current decentralization that configures Spain's institutional apparatus.

The specificity of the Spanish case lies, as argued by Núñez Seixas, lies in the absence of a common reading of the recent past. The lack of a universal rejection of the civil war initiators and the Francoist regime, shared by the whole spectrum of political forces would have prevented the reformulation of Spanish patriotism on the basis of a new foundational myth, such as the Italian or German antifascism. This inability for reformulation would have constrained the Spanish nationalism to a certain degree of invisibility. The left felt compelled to accept some of the principles of alternative nationalisms, while the right often would find itself between a hardly defendable national-Catholicism and the self-restraint from explicit nationalistic affirmations. Below I will analyze in more

detail the different reactions and strategies of the various political camps, but now it is important to underline that this process did lead to a certain anomaly in Spain: the relative scarcity of public celebrations and representations of the Spanish symbols and national myths.

However, as recent research has pointed out, it would be extremely misleading to conclude that Spanish nationalism disappeared from the Spanish political realm. Indeed, part of the invisibility might simply be the result of its assimilation with most democratic state nationalisms, that adopt a set of expression channels that differ sharply from those used by authoritarian regimes and/or state-seeking nationalist movements. When analyzing established nations' nationalism, the most commonly used concept is Michael Billig's 'banal nationalism' (1995). As I have discussed in the previous chapter, banal nationalism is mainly characterized by its continuous reproduction through everyday life's mechanisms: a complex of practices, habits, beliefs and signs grant the existence of nation-states as such beyond the explicit nationalist inflammation.

Often, this kind of nationalism tends to hide and do not recognize itself as such, and certainly the Spanish one is not an exception to this rule. A basic component of banal nationalism is what Billig calls "sociological forgetting", a process through which established nation's nationalism gets to pass unnoticed: "*it ceases to appear as nationalism, disappearing into the 'natural' environment of 'societies'* ". In these context, Billig argues, nationalism is often '*defined as something dangerously emotional and irrational*' that is projected on to '*others*' (Billig, 1995: 38). Once the established nations' nationalism is no longer described as such, the concept itself is only identified with its 'extreme', or 'dangerous' manifestations. Billig best describes that process through the metaphor of the waved and unwaved flag: Banal nationalism is

represented by the national flag that hangs, most often unnoticed and unsaluted, in the outside of public buildings. It is part of the everyday landscape, but is not consciously waved as a nationalist symbol. This type of unwaved nationalism often 'disappears' also from the academic and intellectual realm, and gets to pass unnoticed even within the studies on nationalism.

Even if this is the case, and the invisibility of Spanish nationalism is simply an effect of its assimilation to Western democratic state nationalism, certainly the delegitimizing effects of this past identification between the Spanish nationalism and Francoism remain important, as to shape its current discourse and practices. At least in a certain direction: its reluctance to consider itself as such. Although, as I discuss below, in recent years Spanish nationalism has evolved from self-restraint to a more unashamed stage, it is still mostly a *nationalism in denial* (Resina, 2002) that has tended to avoid the label 'nationalism', and has constantly looked for alternative denominations, such as 'constitutionalism', patriotism, 'constitutional patriotism' and even 'non-nationalism'. [23]

2.4 Is Spanish nationalism fully banal? Symbolic divisiveness and reactive nationalism in contemporary Spain

But does Spanish nationalism completely fit this model? Is Spain's case simply one more example of the cases dealt with by Billig, or there is something specific to Spanish nationalism's invisibility that, thus, should be explained through Spain's' specific historical developments, as suggested by Núñez Seixas (2001)? My response is twofold. On one hand, it is certainly true that Billig's argument

---

[23] There are some relevant exceptions to this rule. See for example Edurne Uriarte (2002), claiming for the legitimacy of the term Spanish nationalism.

about the forgetting of banal nationalism constitutes a fairly good explanation of the invisibility of Spanish nationalism that I have discussed in the previous section. Indeed, banal mechanisms of nationhood reproduction are essential for understanding contemporary Spanish nationalism and, thus, Billig's argument does explain a great deal of what has been going on in Spain since the end of the Francoist dictatorship. If Spanish nationalism became 'invisible' after the transition to democracy, it is partly due to its transformation towards the banal model. The explicit, aggressive nationalistic rhetoric and practices of the previous regime were mostly substituted by subtler and more implicit ways of recreating the Spanish nation. Moreover, the dominant public discourse, for a long time, has argued that Spanish nationalism is either non-existent or exclusively relegated to the minoritarian far-right groups, in a process of self-denial that fits comfortably in the model of banal nationalism.

However, we can identify two specific elements that separate Spanish nationalism from Billig's model. They might seem contradictory, because apparently work in opposite directions, but they are both present in the Spanish case and have common determinants. The first one is the relative scarceness of everyday public display of Spanish symbols, and the other one is the explicit articulation of Spanish nationalism as a political ideology in the context of its conflicts with the Catalan and Basque nationalist movements, that goes well beyond the banal model of nationalism. The common causes of both elements are to be located, as I shall show, in the lack of a universal consensus in Spain about the core elements of any nationalism: the national status of the territory, and the national symbols.

First, as I have discussed above, the legitimacy crisis that affected Spanish nationalism after the end of the Francoist dictatorship,

together with the inability to build a shared interpretation of the past (Nuñez Seixas, 2001) –and the limits of the consensus around the national symbols- have lead to a relative scarcity of public display of the Spanish symbols compared to what is common in other western democratic countries. This is perhaps especially clear in the case of the flag that is hardly displayed beyond its presence in the façades of public buildings, as regulated by a specific law.[24] The Spanish flag has not reached the position of a ubiquitous symbol that Billig discusses for the case of the United States, and Spain is probably one of the Western countries in which the everyday presence of the official flag is scarcer.

What prevents a more *normal* display of the Spanish national symbols?[25] Why the Spanish flag has not been able to reach the widespread public presence that other national flags have across the advanced democracies? Probably the response lays basically in the enduring divisiveness of the symbols. Although the consensus reached during the transition to democracy is, as of 2008, fairly consolidated and the explicit questioning of the national symbology, beyond those territories with relevant alternative nationalisms is

---

[24] The 39/1981 Law (28th of October) states that the Spanish flag will hang outside of any public building of any kind of administration (central, autonomic or local), alone or in a privileged position, as well as in diplomatic buildings and vehicles abroad, and any kind of Spanish boat or ship.

[25] It is worth mentioning, however, that there are specific instances in which the public display of the Spanish national symbols is generalized and looses, to a great extent, its divisiveness. They are informal events such as the international sports (mainly soccer) competitions that have become the main context for shared public expression of Spanish nationalism, in a sort of *informal nationalization* (Núñez Seixas, 2001: 743). This is less the case in Catalonia and the Basque Country, were there are strong movements that reclaim their own national sports teams. According to my data, that I will discuss later, over 70% of the Catalan and Basque citizens agree that they should have the right to have their own national sport teams.

scarce, its public display is still matter of political debate even in the rest of Spain (Núñez Seixas, 2007: 161).

The deep political divisions within the Spanish society that were reflected and exacerbated by the 1936-39 civil war and the dictatorship had also their reflection in the choice of national symbols. While the Spanish Republic had instituted a red-yellow and purple flag (commonly called the 'tricolor'), the Francoist army and regime chose the bicolor red and yellow flag. This lack of consensus around the flag (that also affected other symbols, such as the anthem) would be one of the problems to be addressed during the transition to democracy. The acceptance by the democratic opposition of the bicolor flag would allow for a new symbolic consensus that was meant to overcome past divisions. The, at the time, main actor of the opposition, the Communist Party, decided to accept the bicolor flag and, thus, renounce to the republican one the 14th of April of 1977[26]. The gesture has traditionally been interpreted as a response to its legalization five days before and especially meant to calm down the Spanish military, whose chiefs had expressed their deep disagreement with the legalization of the Party. The other big party in the left, the Socialist Party, would maintain its formal preference for the republican symbols until the discussion of the Constitution, in 1978 although didn't put a strong emphasis in this issue and its 'republican amendment was generally considered basically rhetoric-. However, there are some limits to this consensus, and the formal assumption of the official symbols has not always meant a comfortable and widespread use of them, as for many they did not loose their divisive nature with all of a sudden in 1977, or 1978.

---

[26] The leader of the PCE, Santiago Carrillo justified the adoption of the symbol precisely in these terms: "*Being a part of that State, its flag cannot be the monopoly of any political fraction, so we could not abandon it to those that want to prevent the peaceful passage to democracy*" (El País, 16/4/1977).

I will discuss the individual opinion data in more detail in subsequent chapters, but here it is interesting to mention that only around 50% of the respondents in a 2007 survey disagrees with the statement that 'the Spanish flag does not generate any emotion in me'. This percentage fells down to 33% in the case of Catalonia, and 23,5% in the Basque Country. There is, thus, a considerable group of citizens that does not express any emotional reaction to the Spanish flag. It is important to underline that this does not mean explicit rejection of the symbol, but just a lack of emotional attachment with it. It is, however, highly significant of the limits of the formal national symbols to act as powerful nationalization instruments.

The reference to some specific episodes and debates related to the public display of the Spanish national symbols might illustrate the problems that the Spanish national symbols have for becoming fully consensual and, thus, ready to be used as effective signs of banal nationalism. The episode presented at the opening of the introduction, in which the right-wing opposition leader issued a formal call to every Spaniard to publicly display the flag in the national holiday of the 12th of October 2007 is a clear example of this. The fact that the opposition leader felt the necessity, or the convenience, to call the citizens to display the official Spanish flag as a conscious political act is, by itself, a clear manifestation of this particularity and marks a distance from banal nationalism: the individual display of national symbols in the national holiday, in Spain, is not yet a conventional act as described by Billig but a conscious political act. The responses offered to the statement by the statewide left wing representatives, accusing the opposition leader to divide the Spaniards are clear enough of the non-banal character of the call.

Another recent episode that might be useful to illustrate these problems is the political debate generated by the decision of the former Spanish president, José María Aznar, to place a 294 square meter Spanish flag in the Columbus Square in Madrid. Aznar wanted to celebrate the 12th of October 2001 by waving "*the flag of all the Spaniards in the Reign's capital city, through a pole in which it could hang at the maximum possible height*".[27] This initiative was read by the main statewide opposition party, as an unfortunate attempt to use politically a common symbol. When, one year later, the defense ministry and Madrid's town council (both controlled by the right) announced the establishment of a monthly homage to the flag, with the participation of the Spanish military, the debate was even more intense[28] and the arguments were similar to those used in the previous example. The main leftist party considered the act as a divisive initiative and asked for self-restraint and consensus in the use of Spain's national symbols.

There is yet a third case that might illustrate the divisiveness of the symbols, that leads to the scarcity of their public display. The national anthem was not formally regulated until 1997 when a government decree established the so-called 'Marcha Real' as the official Spain's national anthem. However, the common practice since the establishment of the democracy had been the use of this song (the same one established as national anthem during the dictatorship) but without its lyrics. The lack of lyrics in the anthem has often been interpreted as an abnormality to be corrected, since it would be reflecting the inability of the democratic Spain to define, unashamedly, a symbolic representation of itself. Indeed, during the PP government, Jose María Aznar commissioned a group of poets and writers to elaborate a lyrics proposal. However, it did not even

---

[27] See 'El País', 3/10/2002
[28] See 'El País' 4/10/2002

reach the Ministers council or the Parliament for approval due, precisely to the lack of consensus. Again, in 2007 the Spanish Olympic Committee (COE) decided to incorporate a text to the anthem so the Spanish athletes could sing it during the 2008 Olympics. The COE appointed a board of experts[29] and opened a public contest in order to select a text for the song. The lyrics selected were formally announced, but a few days before its scheduled official presentation, the Olympic Committee decided to withdraw it and abandon the project, due, again, to a lack of consensus. The selected lyrics had been strongly criticized, especially by the left, that considered it to be 'old fashioned' and too similar to one of the versions used under the Francoism, written by Jose María Pemán.[30]

The second element that distances contemporary Spanish nationalism from Michael Billig's model of banal nationalism is closely related to the lack of consensus around the national symbols and the relative scarcity of their public display, although it might seem to be acting precisely in the opposite direction. The consistent presence of strong alternative nationalisms in Catalonia and the Basque Country (and, to a minor extent, in Galicia and other territories) that question the national status of Spain has prevented the Spanish nationalism to become merely 'banal', as it is

---

[29] The board was composed by Emilio Casares, musicology professor at the Complutense University of Madrid, Theresa Zabell, vicepresident of the Olympic Committee, Juan Pablo Fusi, a contemporary history professor (author of several books on Spanish nationalism and a strong, well-known critic of Basque nationalism), Manuel Jiménez de Parga, the former president of the Constitutional Court, Tomás Marco, composer and member of the 'San Fernando' Fine Arts Academy and Aurora Egido, professor of Spanish literature and member of the 'Real Academia de Buenas Letras'.

[30] *El País, 11/01/2008.* According to his son, the text of José María Pemán was written in 1928 by commission of Miguel Primo de Rivera (http://www.libertaddigital.com//opinion/jose-maria-peman/el-himno-nacional-41451/, retrieved 09/15/2008).

consistently, and consciously articulated in an explicit way as a political ideology that fits Gellner's definition of seeking congruence between the state and the nation (Gellner, 1983). Contemporary Spanish nationalism cannot be interpreted only as a routinely reproduced banal nationalism: it is also a political and social movement that, following Billig's metaphor, consciously waves the flag in an active way through a variety of political expression and participation channels. We can say that Spanish nationalism has become more and more explicit since the 1990s (Balfour, 2007: 308). This feature distances the Spanish case from most Western democratic countries, in which there are no explicit manifestations of nationalism as a political movement beyond some minority segments of the far right that often use the nationalist rhetoric to put forward anti-immigration (or euro-skeptical) agendas. If Spanish nationalism has not become fully banal is precisely because of the enduring presence of politically relevant alternative nationalisms that in some parts of the territory question Spain's national status and advance their own nation-building projects. This is why often this active Spanish nationalism has been expressed in reactive terms, as a response to the demands and policies of alternative nationalisms. This has been the case basically in two crucial issues: language policy and institutional reforms.

Summing up, we can say that contemporary Spanish nationalism responds, in many respects, to the model outlined by Michael Billig of banal nationalism. However, there are some relevant elements that distance it from the ideal model, related to the divisiveness of the national symbols and the subsequent scarcity of its public display, and the existence of an active and explicit nationalist movement, fueled by the reaction against the alternative nationalist demands and policies.

2.5 Spanish nationalisms meet democracy. The reconstruction of the Spanish nation after Franco

Once I have briefly discussed how does Spanish nationalism express itself, the next step to complete this overview is to analyze its ideological contents. In this section I analyze the contents of the main varieties of contemporary Spanish nationalism. First, I will address separately the nationalism of the Spanish right and the one of the left. The goal is to provide a summarized overview of the main elements that conform both discourses and to explore their differences and commonalties. This constitutes a useful exercise for the design of the individual level research that I carry out in the rest of the dissertation.

Most accounts of contemporary Spanish nationalism coincide in separating the analysis of the left-wing's nationalism from the right's. This is an analytically useful, and necessary procedure in order to structure the research. However, I contend that often this strategy of analysis has lead to an overestimation of the differences and the underestimation of the commonalties shared by the Spanish leftist and rightist nationalisms. Despite the enduring, and deep, differences in their conceptions of Spain in the framework of the 1978 Constitution it has emerged a consensual version of the Spanish nationalism that I will call, following Xacobe Bastida (1998), *constitutional nationalism.* Probably the degree of consensus is underestimated because the logics of the political competition between the two main statewide parties contribute to the exaggeration of differences. While I will go through these differences, assess them and analyze the distinct features of the main varieties, I will also show how there is a fundamental consensus build around the basic principles that inform the 1978 constitution. This is a consensus that bonds together the statewide

left and right wing, but from which the alternative nationalism remain largely distanced.

a) The nationalism of the Spanish right, continuity and change

The history of the right-wing Spanish nationalism since the transition to democracy is basically a long, but certainly non-linear, process of change and adaptation to the new circumstances that stemmed from the transition process: multiparty competition, decentralization of the State as stated by the 1978 Spanish Constitution, incorporation of Spain to the European Union and, later, the effects of the globalization process, basically those related to the mass immigration from Northern Africa and Latin-America. The traditional asset of Francoist national-Catholic ideology was no longer suited to the new context, so the right-wing elites slowly adapted it. However, there are some limits to this adaptation process, mainly related to the endurance of the traditionalist understanding of the Spanish history, as well as the lack of a deep reassessment of the recent past that would have allowed the building of an antifascist consensus similar to the German or Italian cases. I will fist go through the elements of change and then address its limits.

Perhaps the deepest change that the right had to face is the decentralization of the State and the building of the so-called 'State of the autonomies'. This was a process that implied a deep redefinition of the architecture of the Spanish state, and created a whole set of newly established autonomous governments, that started to acquire more and more power. This is a fundamental change from the traditional centralist articulation of the state in Spain, and lead to the establishment of a whole set of political elites

at the autonomous level that also modified the power structure and balance within the state-wide parties (including the Popular Party) and, indirectly, some elements of their national discourse.

This is especially true in those autonomous communities with a distinct language and weak alternative nationalist movements, where the Spanish right wing deepened its regionalist discourse: Galicia, the Balearic Islands, Navarre and Valencia. This increased regionalism in the Spanish right wing has served basically two purposes: on one hand, it has provided a legitimizing framework for the increased demands of conservative regional elites of power devolution to the governments that they control, and on the other hand it has often put limit to the expansion of regionalist conservative parties[31], as well as alternative nationalisms in these areas. This is a regionalism that often has been expressed through the demand of more (but limited) power devolution, justified as a more efficient way of organizing the state but also as a limit to the endless demands of alternative nationalists.

However, it has also included some symbolic recreation of 'regional' culture, such as the foralism in Navarre (and, later, also in Valencia). Probably the clearest example of this trend is Galicia, where, as Núñez Seixas (2007:181-3) points out, the Galician branch of the Popular Party developed an intense campaign of regional identity promotion, linked to the traditional and folkloric expressions of Galician culture. This emphasis in regional identity lead the Galician conservatives to even reinterpret for their own

---

[31] With some of these parties, the PP has had some sort of temporary or permanent agreement, while in other cases it has managed to absorb some of their elites and a big share of their electorate. The case of UPN, in Navarre is the clearest example of the collaboration strategy. UPN has become the regional brand of the PP in that autonomous community. In Valencia, the PP managed to absorb the electorate and a huge share of the elites of its former ally, the anti-catalanist Unió Valenciana.

means some of the historic figures of Galician nationalism, and in the last instance it supported the claims for deepened devolution. It is an interesting case, given that in Galicia this process was lead b the charismatic leadership of Manuel Fraga, the leader of AP during the transition years and a former minister in Franco's cabinet. Fraga himself was reluctant to the autonomous state itself during the constituent process.

But it would be extremely misleading to interpret this right-wing regionalism as some form of proto-nationalism. On one hand, regionalism is not a new feature of the Spanish right wing (for the Valencia case, see Archilés and Martí, 2001), although some scholars such as Sebastian Balfour (2007) consider that it goes beyond the traditional regionalism of the Spanish right. And on the other hand, this regionalism has always been linked to explicit praises of loyalty to the Spanish nation, and has been seen as a useful alternative to minority nationalisms. Finally, in Navarre and Valencia, that share language with the Basque Country the former, and Catalonia the latter, and where there are weak pro-Basque and pro-Catalan nationalist movement, this regionalism has adopted an often explicit anti-Catalan and anti-Basque positions. In these cases, a part from serving the local elites to legitimize their increasing accumulation of political power, this regionalism has also served to a containment strategy: by channeling the symbolic elements of the traditional local identities through an ideology that does not question at all the Spanish nation, its politization in alternative terms would have been prevented. [32]

Beyond the specific role of these regional elites, how did the Spanish right wing assume the deep decentralization of the State?

---

[32] For extensive analyses of the anti-catalanist valencian regionalism, see Cucó (2002), Bello (1988) and Viadel (2006).

Xacobe Bastida (1998) argues the crucial influence of Ortega y Gasset in the conformation of a doctrine that, while completely intransigent with the unicity of the national sovereignty and the objective existence of Spain as a nation, assumed that the so-called 'regional problems' couldn't be completely solved but patiently managed.[33] The autonomous communities would have been, thus, a way of managing these problems without questioning the essentially unitarian nature of the Spanish state.

If the adaptation to the decentralization of the State and the new autonomism is a crucial change in the right wing Spanish nationalism, the increasing influence of alternative nationalisms in Catalonia and the Basque Country has fostered a substantial evolution of its discourse. I have argued how the activity and demands of these nationalist movements has prevented the Spanish nationalism to become full banal, given that it has been constantly dealing with the questioning of the basic principle of Spain as a united, sovereign nation. Indeed, the main leitmotiv of the new Spanish nationalism has been its confrontation with the alternative nationalist demands. The delegitimized inheritance of Francoist national-Catholicism forced the Spanish right to search for a renewed framework of opposition to the Catalan and Basque nationalisms and affirmation of the Spanish nation with little references to the Francoist rhetoric, replaced by a mix of old and new elements that conform the ideological core of the new right wing Spanish nationalism.

---

[33] Surely, the influence of Ortega y Gasset goes well beyond this element. In X.Bastida (1998) there is a whole discussion of his influence over the terms of the 1978 Constitution, and in Ninyoles (1997) and Saz (2003) we can find different interpretations of the Falangist nationalism's relationship to Ortega, often read as a liberal.

The main ideological core of this nationalism is the defense of the 1978 Spanish Constitution as the guarantee of a united and democratic Spain. Despite the initial doubts, the mainstream Spanish right soon became a great advocate of the integrity and literality of the Constitution, and a specific, centralist interpretation of the text. The constitution is understood as a historic reconciliation among Spaniards and has to be preserved, considering that it helped to overcome the deep political divisions that affected the country during the whole 19th and, especially, 20th century.[34]

The double role of the constitution as defining a democratic regime *and* a united Spanish nation makes it a useful tool for the identification of both. A united Spain is the guarantee for democracy, respect for individual rights, equality and solidarity among Spaniards. On the contrary, any attempt to modify it, or to question the unity of Spain is portrayed as a threat to democracy and freedom. The alternative nationalist movements are, thus, portrayed as antidemocratic (even, totalitarian) attempts to violate citizens' rights and break the framework of freedom defined by the constitution. This is not a subtle connection, but a rather explicit one. As an example, in 2005, the leader of the PP, Mariano Rajoy, in a parliamentary debate about the Basque proposal for reform of the Autonomy Statute (commonly known as the *Ibarrtexe Plan*), said:

---

[34] The statewide right wing considers that the system defined in the 1978 Constitution should be interpreted as the final point of the decentralizing path, so the further claims for more decentralization should not be satisfied. Only recently, some voices within the right increasingly call for a reform of the constitution, but in a recentralizing direction. They argue that some legal reforms are necessary to definitely close the system as it is now (Vidal Quadras et al, 2008).

The Constitution we share, that gives sense to this session, does not admit anything to raise above the individual's rights, nor a people to have more rights than a citizen (...) any reform aimed at cutting citizens' freedom invoking the indefinite rights of a metaphysic people will encounter many difficulties in this chamber (...)[35]

The 16th national convention of the Popular Party (2008), in its main political document, included several statements that summarize the core of this argument in a very illustrative way:

6. -We consider that the Spanish nation is a historic project that has its origin in a secular common history that culminates in the 1812 Constitution –origin of our political modernity- and in the 1978 Constitution. We believe that the current constitution is the best guarantee for the preservation of rights, progress, peace, welfare, education and freedom of all the Spaniards, of all of us.

7. -The 1978 Constitution is probably the best of our history and reveals an extraordinary vitality and future projection

8. -It is not a peace of the past, as some pretend, neither a transit station towards a supposedly better or different future, as others advocate. As stated by our Constitution, the national sovereignty belongs to the Spanish people, from whom emanate the State powers

Here we can see clearly how the 1978 Constitution is used as a 'national myth' or a place of memory (Humlebaek, 2004). This is not, as we will see, a privative interpretation of the Spanish right, but it is perhaps in this political camp that it is more explicit. This reification of the 1978 constitution, as the necessary link with the unity of the nation and the democratic rights and freedom is at the basis of the attempts, by the Spanish right, to formulate a

---

[35] Congreso de los Diputados, Diario de Sesiones. February 1st, 2005, VIIIth Term, n. 65, pg. 3097

'constitutional patriotism', adapting the German proposal defined by Sternberger and Habermas. In 2002 the national convention of the Popular Party approved a political document with the explicit title 'constitutional patriotism', written by the, at the moment, leaders of the party in Catalonia (Josep Piqué) and the Basque Country (María San Gil).

The identification of the 1978 Constitution with democracy and freedom, and with the national unity at the same time makes it easier to categorize those that question as antidemocrats. The existence of ETA in the Basque Country and the political violence exerted against members of the main statewide parties and the State apparatus is also a great help to this identification that requires some sort of association between ETA and the democratic nationalisms. In the same 2008 document there is a fairly explicit one:

> *83. The PNV condemns terrorism, but at the same time all their actions contradict what they say. Their attitude towards the antiterrorist fight is always stonewalling. We can't say that the PNV supports ETA's violence, but we can state that they do not cooperate in its defeat. (PP, 2008b)*

The basic opposition, thus, is between a particular interpretation of 1978 Constitution, the Spanish national sovereignty, democracy and individual rights on one hand, and ethnic (Basque and Catalan) nationalisms, based on collective rights and antidemocratic practices on the other. This opposition has acted as the main legitimizing tool for the new Spanish nationalism of the right. Indeed, it is often presented as a necessary response to the violence and endless claims of alternative nationalisms.

However, it would be misleading to identify this nationalism with a purely civic or political one, or a genuine adaptation of the German

constitutional patriotism as defined by Habermas and Sternberger. There are, at least, three elements that distance it from these models: an ambivalent relationship with the previous authoritarian regime, the role of the language in the definition of the national identity and an essentialist understanding of Spanish history.

I will not analyze in detail the position of the Spanish right towards the Francoist regime, because it is a topic that exceeds the scope of this chapter. In 2002 the Popular Party signed a parliamentary resolution with the compromise to recover the memory of the Francoism's victims. However, it was an internally criticized decision, and since then the party has formally defended the preservation of the forgetting sanctioned by the transition. Indeed, when the Socialist government promoted in 2007 the approval of the so-called 'Historical memory law'[36] the leader of the Popular Party accused the government of 're-opening past wounds'. When the senate definitely approved the law, a PP parliamentary declared: "*This law is a hit below the water line of the Transition. There was not a pact for forgetting, it was a conscious forgetting: we didn't want to repeat the elements that had lead Spain to failure. Our country passed from dictatorship to democracy with an exemplar pact. We do not have to become obsessed with other models, like Germany, because we are a model to follow.*"[37] The official discourse of the party was, thus, to call for the preservation of the so-called transitional spirit, consisting in an amnesty and forgetting of the previous crimes.

---

[36] Formally known as *Ley por la que se reconocen y amplían derechos y se establecen medidas en favor de quienes padecieron persecución o violencia durante la Guerra Civil y la Dictadura*

[37] Manuel Atencia, *El País, 14/12/2006.*

However, at the same time, some conservative media started to promote the theses of a group of non-professional historians lead by Pío Moa, that presented an actualized reinterpretation of the traditional Francoist historiography: shared responsibility of the left in the Civil war onset, relativization of the Francoist repression, the theory of a communist conspiration, etc. (Núñez Seixas, 2007:179-180). In any case, there is little doubt that the attitude of the Spanish right towards the authoritarian past is far from the critical memory that lies at the core of Habermas' proposal.

Moreover, the cultural contents of the Spanish conservative nationalism keep it far from the universalist foundations of the constitutional patriotism. Indeed, the Spanish language is still, "the determinant cultural marker of the national identity" (Núñez Seixas, 2007: 181), despite the assumption of the officiality of the other languages spoken in Spain (Catalan, Basque, Galician). The role of the Spanish language in the nationalist discourse has been, again, basically channeled through its opposition with the minority languages and the language policies of the autonomous governments, especially in the case of Catalonia. The extension of the public use of Catalan (and, to lower extent, Basque and Galician) has been seen as an imposition over the Castilian-speaking communities in these territories, and a threat to the role of Spanish as the 'common language' of the Spanish nation. The so-called program of 'linguistic immersion' in Catalonia, where the primary education is almost entirely taught in Catalan is considered a violation of linguistic rights of Spanish-speakers.

The core of this discourse is the consideration of Castilian as *the* common language for all the Spaniards, independently of their mother tongue. The universal knowledge of Spanish, as well as the constitutional provision that states the duty of knowing it for all the citizens is presented as the main arguments in favor of an

asymmetry in the treatment of the various Spanish languages. Although the linguistic plurality is recognized and positively evaluated, the Spanish right sets a limit: the role of Spanish as a prevalent, common language has to be preserved. In the 2008 electoral manifesto, the PP said:

> *We are proud of the cultural and linguistic plurality of the Spanish nation, and we want this diversity to continue to be compatible with the Constitution, that recognizes without limits the right of all the Spaniards to use the common language (PP, 2008a: 38)*

In the 2008 national conference, the party incorporated a set of amendments to its political document, asking for a constitutional reform oriented, towards others, to granting the possibility of receiving instruction in Castilian:

> *The use of Castilian, or Spanish, in the whole national territory should also be granted, as the common and official language of the State, both in the citizens' relations with the public administrations and in the educational system and the toponomy, notwithstanding the coofficiality of the rest of Spanish languages in those territories in which they are spoken. I any case should that affect the right of the students to receive the education in Spanish as the main language (Vidal-Quadras et al., 2008:10).*

The other component of this 'linguistic nationalism' is the consideration of the Spanish language as the main contribution of Spain to the universal culture, and as a universal language that should be promoted as a mean of influence and power in the world. The insistence on the universal dimension of the Spanish language

favors a strong sense of pride in the Spanish language, and makes it a powerful element of national affirmation.[38]

The historical background of the democracy's right nationalism is more complex to analyze in a synthetic way because of its essentially ambivalent nature: on one hand, the traditional understanding of Spain's history remains essentially unquestioned, while on the other hand the emphasis is more often put in the transition to democracy than in the remote past. However, within the Spanish right, the traditionalist historical canon is, in general, widely shared, and there are often references to the ancient roots of the Spanish nation and its status as an objective fact.

Balfour and Quiroga define the conservative nationalism's historical perspective it in the following way: *two dominant assumptions underlie most of its narrative about the past, one teleological—that is, a belief in historical purpose or destiny—and the other organicist, the principle that the nation is a living organism, a perennial force of nature irrespective of time and the identities of those who have lived within its supposed borders* (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007: 101). The strong influence of Ortega y Gasset, that insisted in the *objective* nature of the nation, is clearly present in this unquestioned organicism (Balfour, 2007: 306).[39]

Perhaps the canon of this conservative view of the Spanish national history is to be found in the collective volume *España como nación* ('Spain as a nation'), edited by the Royal Historical Academy. The

---

[38] Not only has this insistence on the universality of the Spanish language served as a tool for fostering national pride, but also as a much more practical instrument to promote Spain's international influence in both economic, cultural and political terms. The special relations with Latin America, has lead also to the increased investments by Spanish companies in several of those countries. These investments were often linked to the privatization of public companies.

book constitutes an exercise of historical nationalism, that locates the origins of the Spanish nation under the roman empire and establishes an unquestionable continuity even under the 'Islamic domination', when some 'Spaniards' with clear consciousness of being so would have patiently awaited during eight centuries for the re-conquest. The union in the 15th century of the Catholic kings is depicted as the culmination of an inevitable process of restoration of the unity of the Spanish nation. The epilogue of the volume is quite explicit about the underlying goal of the book's narrative: "(…) *expose, with intellectual rigor, reliable documentation and professional honesty, the feelings of the Spaniards with respect their homeland and the common opinion of the Europeans when they referred to Spain: its undeniable condition of nation. Of how this feeling developed during the middle ages and culminated with the marriage between Isabel of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon* (…)" (Real Academia de la Historia, 2000: 251). This is a historical narrative that, while being clearly identifiable with the traditional national-Catholicism, has remained unchallenged by the contemporary Spanish conservatism. However, it should be noted how in the volume there are no references to the civil war or the Francoist dictatorship.

An especially relevant element of this narrative is its treatment of the Islamic domination of the Iberian Peninsula as the 'loss of Spain' and the expulsion of the Arabs as the culmination of the historic destiny of reunification of the nation. It is significant because it serves the construction of the relevant 'other' of the Spanish nation, to be located in the Islam. Recently, with the emergence of the international terrorism and the growing immigration from Northern Africa, this construction of the nation's enemy has gained political saliency. Indeed, as Balfour and Quiroga rightly mention, the former president J.M. Aznar, in a 2006 address on the war on terror, perhaps ironically, noted that his country "*had*

been occupied by the Muslims during eight centuries and no one has apologized".[40] This constitutes a sort of reedition of the traditional national-Catholic identification between the Spanish nation and the Western, Christian values. [41]

Despite these continuities, there is in the Spanish right an attempt to develop a nationalist vocabulary that is distanced from the traditional national Catholicism, that includes the search for a renovated historical legitimacy for the national project, to be found in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century liberals, from Cánovas del Castillo to Joaquín Costa, Ortega y Gasset or Unamuno. Aznar even tried to claim the heritage of the republican president Manuel Azaña (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007: 108).

This is perhaps an episode that illustrates the tensions of the contemporary right wing nationalism, between continuity and change. The emphasis on the 1978 Constitution, the individual rights and the democratic, modern and European character of today's Spain cohabits with a deeply organicist and teleological reading of Spain's history with evident continuities with the national-Catholic doctrine. But perhaps the most salient feature of the new rightist nationalism in Spain is its construction in opposition to the alternative nationalisms, that conditions its discourse and practice.

---

[40] *El País, 23/09/2006*. In the same address, Aznar declared to be an ardent supporter ('enthusiast') of the Catholic Kings Ferdinand and Isabel.

[41] Indeed, the role of the Muslims as the relevant other for Spanish nationalism has deeper roots. For an extensive analysis, see (Zapata-Barrero, 2006). However this has not always been as straightforward: Franco developed a policy of friendliness with Arab countries, sustained through a myth of "traditional Hispanic Arab friendship." A detailed analysis of the historic, and contemporary relationship between Spanish nationalism and the Arab worlds exceeds the scope of this overview but constitutes a key task to be faced in order to obtain a complete picture of the Spanish nationalism.

b) The nationalism of the Spanish left

While the history of the Spanish right wing nationalism during the democracy can be traced through its complex and often contradictory relationship with the Francoist nationalism, the ideological antecedents of the leftist Spanish nationalism might appear as less evident, since the forty year-long caesura represented by the regime makes it more complex tracing them. However, this does not, obviously, mean that there are no historical antecedents of a progressive Spanish nationalism. Indeed, as shown by Álvarez Junco (2001, 2002), while for most of the 19th Century Spanish traditionalism and Monarchism was reluctant to the modern idea of nation –as it was linked to liberal concepts such as popular sovereignty-, it was the liberal revolutionaries that first promoted the idea of Spanish nation.

Later in the century, with the consolidation of the moderate liberal canon of an essentialist and unitarian nation, the republicans and left-wing liberals defended a federal constitution that, while based on the unity of the Spanish nation, attempted to incorporate internal diversity (Muro and Quiroga, 2004:22). While these formulations enjoyed extremely limited success in the 19th Century, their legacy was certainly influential over the whole 20th Century, and especially evident during the transition years (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007: 46). Also among the regenerationism of the 1898 we are to find some of the direct historical antecedents of contemporary left-wing Spanish nationalism: the importance of the legacy of Ortega y Gasset is hard to exaggerate (see, for example, de Blas Guerrero, 1989 or Bastida, 1998). For example, the socialists explicitly considered the European integration as the culmination of a long-lasting national project (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007:65).

But it is probably in the Second Republic (1931-36) where we find the clearest antecedents of contemporary progressive Spanish nationalism. The modernizing, democratic and open to decentralization, albeit clearly unitarian principles underlying the 1931 Constitution and, especially, the heritage of the liberal-republican Manuel Azaña have had a deep impact in how the contemporary Spanish left has thought and still thinks the Spanish nation.

But beyond its historical antecedents, here I place the focus on the post-Francoist period: It is among the statewide left that the self-restraint of Spanish nationalism as a consequence of its monopolization by the Francoist regime was most evident. While the right, although showing in some moments, some degree of self-contention, has always articulated an explicitly nationalistic discourse and has placed the nation's unity at the top of its priorities, in the left this has not always been the case.

Many analysts (Balfour 2007, Núñez Seixas 2001) have pointed out how most of the leftist intellectuals and political leaders, during the late Francoist period and the transition to democracy assumed some, or many of the postulates of alternative nationalism. Probably this assumption has been overstated, given that although the leftist parties did articulate an anti-centralist and pro-autonomy discourse, already in the 1977, and especially the 1979 electoral manifestos of the two parties in the left (the Socialist and the Communist party) we can see clearly the basis of a national discourse not identifiable with the peripheral nationalists' positions. Indeed, the often cited defense of the right of self-determination of the so-called 'historical nationalities', that is supposed to be the best example of this identification between the state-wide left wing and the alternative nationalists, was never in the electoral manifestos of the PCE or

PSOE, as it was not a political priority for these parties. It is true, however, that the defense of the autonomy for 'nationalities and regions', as well as a sharp criticism of the centralist state – identified with the Francoist regime- did play a central role in their discourse, and they tended to obviate any reference to Spain's national character.

The 1977 PSOE electoral manifesto defended "the right of autonomy for all Spain's peoples" and attacked the "ineffective and corrupting centralism". At the same time, defended the "unity of the Spanish state" that, however, should not be sustained by force but by a freely agreed constitutional arrangement, open to the differences among the various nationalities and regions" (PSOE, 1977:6). Two years later, after the approval of the 1978 Constitution, the Socialist Party had changed the terms of the discourse, and while still defending the development of the autonomy statutes, the emphasis was increasingly put in "strengthening solidarity among the various Spanish peoples" as well as the "preservation of the Spanish nation's unity" (PSOE, 1979:13). Notice the difference between the 1977 expression (unity of the Spanish State) and the 1979 one (Spanish nation).

The Communist Party, in its 1977 manifesto, just mentioned the "autonomy for the nationalities, regions, and peoples that compose the State" as a principle to be granted by a constitution. In 1979 its position was more precise, and asked for the development and deepening of the process of autonomy, considering that the "autonomous development of each nationality and region and (...) the democratic articulation of all of them with the central power [were] the only possible way for the true Spain's unity" (PCE, 1979:8).

As it was also the case with the PSOE, the Communist Party in 1979 did put a strong emphasis in the need of solidarity among regions. Indeed, the solidarity among Spain's regions has been, and still is one of the main (if not the main) argument of the Spanish left in advocating for Spain's unity and the preservation of power by the central state. Both this interterritorial solidarity and the equality of rights and duties of citizens across the whole territory of Spain have been central in the construction of the national discourse of the left. It is around the interpretation and practical implementation of these principles that we find the deepest deep differences between the Spanish left and the alternative nationalisms. Often these differences have divided also the statewide parties themselves, mainly between their Catalan and Basque federations, on one hand, and those from central and southern Spain on the other.

Although behind this debate there is, of course, a conflict of interests around the levels of interterritorial monetary transfers through the centralized taxation system, it also reflects a deeper conflict about the conception of Spain. To put it in Balfour and Quiroga's terms: there is a clash between those, in the left, that adhere to the idea of Spain as a 'nation of nations' or, even, a multinational state, and those that consider it to be primarily a nation of citizens, without any intermediate sphere of sovereignty.

The latter position has been primarily defended by the sector of the Socialist Party close to the former vice president Alfonso Guerra (so-called 'guerrism') and the charismatic traditional regional socialist leaders from Castilla la Mancha (José Bono), Extremadura (Juan Carlos Rodríguez Ibarra) and, partly, Andalusia (M. Chaves). These leaders have been the main advocates of the preservation of central state power share under the arguments of an absolute equality of rights and duties of all the Spanish citizens, and solidarity among regions.

Generally the state-wide left is satisfied with the decentralized state as set up by the 1978 Constitution, although in some moments it has accepted to reform the system and grant more power to the Autonomous Communities, mainly because of the pressure of its federations in Catalonia. However, this is not to say that there has always been consensus around the institutional arrangements that should be done to accommodate the internal diversity. The main confrontation has been about the level of symmetry or asymmetry of the arrangement. The Catalan, and to some extent also the Basque and Galician socialists have argued for an asymmetric federalism to match the actual differences among these territories and the rest of regions, that do not have salient alternative national identities and in some were cases newly defined and established as a consequence of the 1978 Constitution.

There is yet, within the Spanish left, a minor group that goes beyond the consideration of Spain as a nation, or a nation of nations and simply considers it to be a multinational state and, while mostly advocating for a federal, or confederal solution, recognize the right of self-determination for the historical nationalities. This is mostly represented in the post-communist coalition Izquierda Unida, although it is not a unanimous position within the coalition. Officially, it claims for a federal solution for the Spanish state. But the position on the most convenient institutional arrangement for the state is not the only component of the Spanish left's nationalism. We have to refer, at least, to four more elements that define it:

Modernization and Europeanism. Especially since the Socialist party's victory in 1982 and its arrival to power, the party implemented a modernization program that was also meant to favor the development of a renewed Spanish national consciousness based on the country's progress. The economic growth and the

modernization, not only in material terms but also in the habits and social structure were often presented as a new source for national pride. The access to the EU, presented as the normalization of Spain within Europe, was also presented as a crucial component of the country's modernization. These elements did connect the mainstream's left nationalism with the *fin de siècle* liberal Spanish nationalists, with whom they shared an Europeanist and regenerationist program. Overcoming the historic backwardness was, thus, a national goal.

Transition and constitution The elevation of the transition to democracy and the 1978 Constitution to places of memory, or new national myths has not been as intense among the left as among the right. However, the basic narrative was based on a positive reading of the events and a proof of the ability of Spaniards to overcome past divisions and establish a stable democratic system. It is coherent with the modernization project developed by the socialist governments in the 80s and early 90s.

Language The mainstream Spanish left has tended to favor, to a greater extent, the development of the public use of Spain's minority languages and only a reduced sector of the socialists does share the discourse of the Spanish right against the normalization of the minority languages. The mainstream discourse has been a celebration of the linguistic and cultural diversity of Spain. However, there are some groups in the Spanish left that have assumed the criticism against the language policies, that are see as violating individual rights.

An example of this trend within the left might be party 'Unión, Progreso y Democracia' that in the 2008 parliamentary election gained a seat in the district of Madrid. The leader of the party, Rosa Díez, is a former member of the socialist party in the Basque

country. This has been a party that has run basically on a reactive platform against the continued decentralization and the language policies, not only in Catalonia and the Basque Country, but in other territories as well.

Not only from outside the PSOE we find this linguistic nationalism. Some top members of the party share the view of the right with respect to the need to preserve the use of Castilian in all the territories and to put a limit to the language policies in Catalonia and other territories.

Besides this explicit, reactive linguistic nationalism, there is also within the left an insistence in the consideration of Castilian as a 'universal' language, and as a common heritage and source of pride for all the Spaniards. This had a clear reflection in the official efforts by the Socialist governments in the international promotion of the Castilian language through the creation in 1991 of the *Instituto Cervantes*, modeled on the Goethe-Institut, the Institut Française or the British Council.

Summing up, we can say that the Spanish left was more affected by the post-Francoist self-containment of Spanish nationalism than the right. However, the alleged identification with the alternative nationalist principles is weaker than implied by some analysts. The Spanish left has articulated a nationalist discourse that justifies the preservation of the unity mainly on the basis of the interterritorial solidarity and the radical equality of rights and duties of all citizens. The modernization and integration in Europe, as well as the myth of the Transition are also essential pillars of this nationalism. However, it does also have relevant cultural, linguistic and historicist components.

c) Beyond left and right: a new constitutional nationalism?

Until now I have presented, separately, the nationalism of the Spanish right and left. This is the logic analytical strategy that has been followed by the previous literature. Through this summary, we can already identify some important differences between the two. However, there is a risk in this strategy, as it could contribute to exaggerate the differences and obscure the commonalties shared, across the ideological divide, by the mainstream Spanish nationalism. Indeed, while these commonalties are often overlooked, they are relevant because they constitute the core of the new Spanish nationalism that emerged from the transition to democracy and the national consensus set up during that process (Bastida, 2007; Taibo, 2007).

In this section I will briefly summarize the main elements of this new national consensus. I call this nationalism 'Constitutional Spanish nationalism', following Xacobe Bastida (1998, 2007). The rationale behind the use of the term is not related to the constitutional patriotism as proposed in Germany by Dolf Sternberger and developed by Jurgen Habermas (I have already discussed the deep differences between this proposal and the Spanish nationalism), but rather to the fact that the core components of this nationalism are those contained in the 1978 Spanish Constitution and, especially, because its main feature is a strong commitment to this specific text. However, as we have seen, some of its proponents have tried to identify their nationalism with the German constitutional patriotism, because it serves as a legitimizing tool. In any case, as pointed out by a number of scholars (Núñez Seixas, 2007; Bastida, 2007; Balfour and Quiroga, 2007) there are deep differences between the contemporary Spanish nationalism

and the German proposal, mainly referred to the relationship with the authoritarian past, the role of history in the definition of the nation and its cultural components.

Even if the constitutional nationalism represents a fundamental consensus that cuts across the ideological spectrum, there are some relevant limits to this consensus. The main one is, as I have already pointed out, the persistence of alternative nationalisms that are especially strong in the Basque Country and Catalonia. These movements do not share any version at all of Spanish nationalism, so they are, structurally, far from any sort of consensus that includes at its core, the consideration of Spain with its current borders as a nation rather than a multinational state. Of course, there are also relevant issues that separate the Spanish left and right in their understanding of Spain. Several scholars (Balfour, 2007; Núñez Seixas, 2001) have pointed to the conflictual interpretations of the recent past (the civil war and the Francoism) as the main obstacle for the emergence of a new, fully consensual Spanish nationalism as it happened in other countries after a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. In any case, I will address this question in the conclusions to this chapter.

However, despite these obstacles I contend that the common elements are important and probably stronger than what the previous literature has suggested. What are, thus, the main components of the consensual contemporary Spanish nationalism? Of course, the first element we have to refer is the one that gives name to this nationalism: the role of the 1978 Constitution as a sort of national myth that provides a basic, shared framework for defining and understanding Spain. The identification with the Constitution, in turn, implies the full embrace of the political process that lead to its adoption, the transition to democracy. The transition process is commonly interpreted as the moment in which

a new national consensus emerged to overcome past divisions. The main actors of this consensus were the so-called reformists of the regime and the mainstream democratic opposition (Linz, 1992).

The 1978 constitution, thus, constitutes the main element around which the new Spanish nationalism is defined. However, this has not always been the case, and the fact that today the constitution is undisputed by the mainstream left and right forces seems to be an outcome of the consolidation process. Indeed, during the first years of the democracy, the celebration of the Constitution as a sort of new national myth was somehow limited to the left, while the right insisted that the Spanish nation was deeply rooted in the history and, thus, the 1978 Constitution was not as important as a national landmark. The attempts by the Socialists, at the beginning of the period, to institute the commemoration of the Constitution (6th of December) as the national holiday were rejected by the centre-right government, arguing that Spain's history was longer and had deeper roots than that, and the 1978 constitution constituted just one more step in the historical development of the Spanish nation. Thus, the right favored the 12th of October (anniversary of the 'discovery' of America) as the Spain's national holiday. Interestingly enough, when the Socialist party arrived to the government in 1982, did not insist in his own project, and even in 1987 officially instituted the 12th of October as the national holiday (for an analysis of this process, see Aguilar and Humbalaek, 2002; and Humbalaek, 2004). But despite this initial doubts, the 1978 Constitution has increasingly become the representation of the transition myth, that expresses not only the Spaniard's ability to reach a new national consensus to ensure a peaceful coexistence, but also sanctions the beginning of the consolidation of Spain as a modern, democratic and European nation (Humbalaek, 2004: 208).

In this vein, the 1978 constitution would have become, as Joan Ramon Resina put it, '*a fetish that freezes the moment of its mythical foundation*' (Resina, 2002: 379). But beyond the role of the 1978 Constitution as the materialization of the transition to democracy, the Spanish constitutional nationalism is, obviously, defined by the contents of the text itself. What is the concept of Spanish nation that stems from it? Xacobe Bastida (1998) has analyzed it extensively through the study of the contents and the debates that lead to the formulation of the 2nd article of the Constitution, in which the nation is defined[42]. According to his interpretation, the constitution defines an essentialist nation, understood as an objective reality that precedes the constitution itself, and is loaded by cultural components. He identifies the influence of J. Ortega y Gasset as crucial to understand how the Spanish nation was defined in the text. That includes, a part from this objectivist and culturalist components, a certain recognition of the internal plurality of Spain, that while should never question the fundamental unity and the indivisible sovereignty, has to be managed in order to grant the cohesiveness of Spain. The key concept, according to Bastida, was the use of the distinction set up by Friederich Meinecke (1970) between cultural and political nations. That conceptual tool allowed for the recognition if the internal plurality without any questioning of the unitarian and indivisible sovereignty of the preexisting Spanish nation, and lead to the famous formula of 'nation of nations': Spain would be a unitarian and indivisible (political) nation composed by several, albeit undefined 'nationalities' (allegedly, an equivalent for 'cultural nations').

---

[42] See Bastida's works (1998, 2007) for a detailed history of the process that lead to the final wording of the article, and the decisive influence of the military, as explained also by one of the so-called 'fathers' of the Constitution, Solé Tura (1985)

In the core of this consensual, constitutional nationalism, undoubtedly, the Spanish language plays a central role. As we have seen, both in the left and the right wing narratives abut the Spanish nation, there is an implicit linguistic hierarchy, reinforced by the status of Castilian as a common language. Indeed, the Constitution itself sanctions this hierarchy, by establishing Castilian as the official language and the duty, to all Spaniards, to know it and the right to use it (CE 1978, Art. 3.1). The other languages spoken in Spain will be official in their communities according to their respective Statutes (3.2). Thus can say, in a way, that the Spanish Constitution recognizes the linguistic diversity of the state, but the other languages have not been incorporated in the core Spanish identity, as shown by their absence from any state-wide institution.

According to this situation, there is a corresponding (nationalist) discourse based on the consideration of Castilian as a common, and thus *supraethnic*, language. It does not belong to any particular group, as it is certainly the case of the other languages spoken in Spain, but on the contrary, constitutes a common heritage that acts as a powerful unifying tool for the whole national community (Moreno Cabrera, 2007: 358). The common use of the term 'Spanish language' instead of Castilian is meant to reinforce the status of the language as *the* Spanish language. Furthermore, in order to legitimize the role of Castilian as a common language, its expansion must be presented as a natural process (Moreno Cabrera, 2008: 65-7).[43]

---

[43] Perhaps a paradigm of the discourse of the diffusion of Castilian as a natural process can be found in a well-known 2001 public address by the King Juan Carlos I, that said: *'Nunca fue la nuestra lengua de imposición, sino de encuentro; a nadie se obligó nunca a hablar en castellano: fueron los pueblos más diversos quienes hicieron suyos, por voluntad libérrima, el idioma de Cervantes'* [Ours was never a language of imposition, but of encounter; nobody was never forced to speak Castilian: the most diverse people, by their completely free will, made Cervantes' language become their own language] (*El País, 25/04/2008*). However, in this case the king's discourse (prepared by the

As we have seen, the 'universal' dimension of the Spanish language is another crucial element of this Spanish linguistic nationalism. The number of its speakers, as noted by Moreno Cabrera (2008: 147-50), is subject to political use, and the rapidly growing numbers are used to reinforce the pride in the language. Its international diffusion, channeled through the *Instituto Cervantes* is a priority cultural policy for the Spanish state. Paid by the culture ministry, the institution, as stated in its own website, is devoted to the 'promotion and teaching of the Spanish language and the diffusion of the Spanish and Hispanic American culture'.[44] To be sure, the institute does also claim to be devoted to the teaching of the coofficial languages of Spain, but they appear to be in a marginal position in the institute's activities and priorities.

Summing up, the contemporary Spanish nationalism, despite its divisions, shares a wide common ground, mainly based on the adherence to the 1978 Constitution and the principles established by the text. The elements of consensus are, basically, a recognition of the internal plurality without any questioning of the indivisible and unitarian nature of the Spanish nation; the consideration of the nation as preexisting to the current institutional framework, the role of the transition and the 1978 Constitution as the most relevant 'national myths' and the status of Castilian as the common Spanish language, that does not preclude the tolerance towards the other languages within their territories.

Ministry of Culture, at the time controlled by the Popular Party) went far beyond the consensus and collected strong criticisms, both from the alternative nationalisms, some Latin-American leaders and several Socialist Party officials.

[44] http://www.cervantes.es/sobre_instituto_cervantes/informacion.htm, retrieved 09/14/08

From the argument about the existence of such a consensual nationalism, a legitimate question might arouse: If there is such a wide space of consensus in contemporary Spanish nationalism, why do we still find sharp conflicts between the statewide left and right about the question? Despite the coincidences, there are still deep differences between both, and the conflict is precisely related to these differences. Basically, we could name the approach towards the relationship and proposed management of the alternative nationalisms (much more consensual within the left than within the right), the aim for a more intense symbolic display and a much more traditionalist reading of Spain's history among the right.

2.5 Conclusions

In this chapter I have reviewed the main formulations, and the recent historical development of the Spanish nationalism. I have shown how it has evolved from the authoritarian national-Catholicism towards a more diverse and complex nationalism. I have also devoted some attention to the consequences of the regime downfall for the Spanish nationalism. The general interpretation, with which I only partially agree, states that, having lost a great deal of its legitimacy because of its identification with the regime, the Spanish nationalism became invisible after the return to democracy in Spain. I have argued that this is partly due to its assimilation into the 'banal' model of democratic statewide nationalisms, but also that Spanish nationalism does not completely fit this model and that in recent times it has become more explicitly articulated as a reactive social and political movement. I have also analyzed the main ideological contents of contemporary Spanish nationalism from both the left and the right and shown how, despite the deep transformation, there are some static elements that resist the change. I have discussed the differences between the democratic left and

right nationalisms and argued that, beyond these, there is a wide shared ground that constitutes the core of what I call 'Spanish constitutional nationalism'.

The summary carried out in this chapter serves to put the individual analysis that constitutes the core of this dissertation, in its historical context. The samples of individuals I will be working with were socialized in concrete, and extremely changing political environments, and both the intensity and the contents of the nationalist *inputs* they have received have also been changing and contradictory. The analysis carried out here is a necessary, previous step in order to be able to derive meaningful hypotheses and interpret the results of the individual-level analysis.

These nationalist ideologies are transmitted to the population through the various mechanisms of national socialization I have made reference to in the previous chapter. To what extent is this national socialization successful? What are the determinants of this success or failure? This is precisely the object of inquiry in the rest of the dissertation. The extent to which the Spanish citizens' conceptions of Spain are consistent with Spanish nationalism's ideology, conditional to context, will be the indicator of the success or failure of the various national socialization agencies and milieus in providing the Spaniards with a specific sense of nationhood.

Chapter three

ON THE VARIETIES OF SPANISH NATIONAL IDENTITY: BEYOND THE ETHNIC-CIVIC DISTINCTION

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I have discussed the main varieties and expressions of contemporary Spanish nationalism. As I have shown, the elites' discourses are very heterogeneous, and the recent political changes experienced by Spain have also deeply affected both the intensity and the contents of the mainstream Spanish nationalisms. In this chapter, and the remaining of the dissertation, I shift my attention to the individual-level analysis. As I argued in the introduction, the main theoretical point of interest is precisely the micro-macro linkage in the construction of national identities, so in the first place I face the issue of the varieties of national identity at the individual level, and their relation to the elite nationalist discourses and nationalizing policies.

Are there distinct varieties of the Spanish national identity? Which are the main types, and what are their differences and the commonalties they share? Although the lion's share of the public debate within the Spanish nationalism has been devoted to the challenges posed by peripheral nationalisms and, thus, the unitarian or pluralistic conceptions of Spain, there are other relevant issues

that merit our attention: the role of the Spanish language, the ideas and relevance of the historical narratives that structure the popular conceptions of Spanishness, the weight of Catholicism as a defining element and, in general, the criteria of demarcation of the national collectivity.

These are the questions I want to face in the following chapters. As we have seen, in the recent literature there are some attempts of tracing this typology, but they have faced the question from the elites' discourse point of view, be it the political and historic thought (Muro and Quiroga, 2005; Núñez Seixas, 2001; Pérez Garzón, 1999), the parliamentary discourse (Grad Fuchsel and Martín Rojo, 2003), the Monarch's public addresses (Maddens and Berghe, 2003) or the 1978 Constitution itself (Bastida, 1998). Perhaps the work by Sebastian Balfour and Alejandro Quiroga (2007) is the main attempt of offering a general synthesis of these debates. However, the attempts to approach this question from the ordinary citizens' point of view are scarce (Bollen and Díez Medrano, 1998; Jiménez, Enríquez and Biencinto, 2003; Jiménez, 2003).

This scarcity is more surprising if we consider that a significant portion of the recent literature on national identity at the individual level has been devoted to the identification of qualitatively different types of national identity. This debate has echoed to a great extent the classical distinction between ethnic and civic nationalisms, and indeed many of the works that have addressed the issue do claim, to some extent, that there is a correspondence between the classical dichotomy and the attitudes found at the individual level. This increasing acceptance of the distinction stands in sharp contrast with the fact that, during the same period, it has been subject to growing criticism in the theoretical and historical-sociological literature (Blank, Schmidt and Westle, 2001).

As I said, in this chapter I want to face the question of whether we can identify different conceptions of the Spanish national identity, and that leads me to the question of whether the ethnic-civic dichotomy is a useful tool for this purpose. Thus, prior to the empirical analysis of Spanish data, I review the theoretical debate around the dichotomy, to propose an understanding of the varieties of national identity that takes into account the endogenous nature of identities, in congruence with the theoretical framework sketched in a previous chapter. I argue against the idea that civic and ethnic identities are somehow 'natural' ways of identifying with one's nation and contend that the various conceptions of national identity are, necessarily, politically constructed and thus dependent upon the agency of political actors. In other words, the actual discourses set up by the political elites will contribute decisively to shaping the structure of individual attitudes towards the nation.

This chapter is organized as follows. In the first section I review the theoretical debate around the ethnic-civic distinction and its main criticisms. In the second one, I discuss its applications to the individual-level research, underlining the conceptual and empirical flaws that we find in some of them. Then, I develop an argument for a more nuanced view of the problem, and illustrate it with some comparative empirical analysis of the ISSP data. The fourth section is devoted to a more detailed analysis of the Spanish data in order to assess whether we do find in Spain a structure of individual attitudes that is congruent with the ethnic-civic scheme. I also test, through Confirmatory Factor Analysis, the validity and reliability of the existing survey-based measurement devices and proposed models to conclude that they are not well designed to identify the relevant varieties of Spanish national identity. In the final section of the chapter, I discuss the results and how they relate to the theoretical argument.

3.2 A contested dichotomy

The classical distinction between ethnic and civic types of nationalism had became something similar to a 'common sense' standard in the studies of nationalism, and has even generalized in the common language beyond the academic sphere. It is based on the idea that civic nations are basically active, self-determined political communities that are bonded on their members' free adherence to a set of political principles and institutions. On the other hand, ethnic nations are passive cultural communities defined, not by any kind of free adherence, but by certain ascriptive ethnocultural traits such as language or ethnic descent, that could potentially be objectively identified.

Although we could trace back its origins to Ernest Renan's conception of the nation as a 'daily plebiscite', the first systematic attempt to develop a typology is probably Friedrich Meinecke's distinction between Staatsnation and Kulturnation. Perhaps the most influential formulation is Hans Kohn's work The Idea of Nationalism (1944) in which he further develops the dichotomy by identifying each type of nationalism with a particular geographical area (civic nationalism with the Western countries and ethnic one with Eastern Europe and Asia). Kohn also advances a historical explanation for that: roughly speaking, while in Western countries the nation emerged simultaneously (or later) with the development of the state structures, in the East the nationalist movements emerged inside the great multinational empires with the goal of adapting the political borders to the ethnic divisions. This is why in such a context, the national identity could not be based on the

membership of a political structure, but in an idea of volk defined by ascriptive, ethnocultural traits.[45]

The basic structure of the dichotomy, albeit with further nuances, has also been persistently dominant in more recent studies on nationalism such as Rogers Brubaker's (Brubaker, 1992) influential study on citizenship regimes in France and Germany, or A.D. Smith's National Identity (Smith, 1991). As I discuss below, though, Smith introduces further refinements and, while assuming to some degree the historical sequence and geographical arguments, he contends that every nationalism include ethnic and civic components in varying degrees (1991: 13), so we should understand the dichotomy as ideal-typical extremes of a continuum in which locate our cases of study. National identity, Smith says, is a multidimensional phenomenon.

However, many scholars on nationalism have increasingly contested the classical dichotomy in the last years. The lines of criticism are just as multifaceted as the uses that the literature has done of the dichotomy itself. I will summarize the main ones, with a special focus on those that are more relevant for the individual-level analysis.

The geographical link, set up by Hans Kohn, between the civic nationalism with Western countries and ethnic one with Asia and Central-Eastern Europe has been one of the most criticized implications of the dichotomy. This link has been labeled as a kind of 'ethnocentric caricature' (McCrone, 1998: 8-10), especially because it equates a series of contrasts (ethnic versus civic, West

---

[45] Certainly, Kohn's argument is much more complex, and I do not intend to completely summarize it here. The Enlightenment ideals and the size and role of middle classes vis à vis the *intelligentsia* in nationalist movements are two of the key variables in it.

versus East, rational versus emotive, good versus bad, ours versus theirs) that should 'set off alarm bells' (Yack, 2001: 102-18) or 'easily acquire a neo-orientalist flavor' (Brubaker, 2004: 133). Taras Kuzio, in his criticism to Rogers Brubaker's concept of 'nationalizing states' because of its resemblance with Kohn's scheme, asserts that 'the number of Breton speakers has declined from one million in 1900 to a quarter of a million today' yet, he argues, "France only escapes being defined as a 'nationalizing' state presumably because it is not in the East" (Kuzio, 2001: 137).

However, the geographical correlate of the dichotomy in not the primary usage of the conceptual pair, at least within the recent scholarly literature. Thus, using it as the main argument against the ethnic-civic dichotomy may easily lead us to a sort of the 'straw man' fallacy. Even beyond the East/West opposition, we can find the ethnic/civic dichotomy used to label whole nationalist movements. This has lead to heavily biased accounts. Often, supporters of a given nationalist movement tend to label its cause as 'civic' while its opponents underline its 'ethnic' features.

But, as Rogers Brubaker (2004:136) states, the most relevant use of the dichotomy today considers ethnic and civic nationalism as ideal types, or extremes in a continuum to be used as analytical tools when analyzing a concrete case. Anthony Smith has been one of the main proponents of this approach, that assumes that nations 'blend two sets of dimensions, the one civic and territorial, the other ethnic and genealogical, in varying proportions in particular cases' (Smith, 1991: 15). This approach assumes that virtually every nationalism includes ethnic elements, because nations would be 'inconceivable without some common myths and memories of a territorial home' (Smith, 1991: 40). Indeed, several critics have tended to underline the empirical impossibility of finding a purely civic nation, self-defined exclusively in terms of shared political principles without

any reference to some common cultural inheritance. As Bernard Yack has put it, 'No matter how much residents of the United States might sympathize with the political principles favored by most French or Canadian citizens, it would not occur to them to think of themselves as French or Canadian' (Yack, 1999: 106).

So, the argument goes on, we should only retain the dichotomy as an ideal-typical analytical tool to structure our analysis of concrete nationalisms, without aiming at finding a 'pure' case of neither civic nor ethnic nationalism. A brilliant example of this use of the dichotomy can be found in the Zubrzycki's analysis of the Poland's constitutional debates (2001), as well as in some of the already mentioned Spanish case-studies (Muro and Quiroga, 2005; Grad Fuchsel and Martín Rojo, 2003).

However, even when applied in this way, there seem to be some analytical ambiguities in the dichotomy, as several authors have pointed out. The demarcation of both concepts and the problematic placement of culture within the scheme are some of the most frequently raised issues (Brubaker, 2004; Nielsen, 1999; Yack, 1999; Shulman, 2002). Perhaps the most insightful review is Oliver Zimmer's (2003) unfolding of the dichotomy. He identifies three oppositions conflated within the ethnic-civic dichotomy that, he argues, should be analytically separated: the first one opposes 'civic voluntarism' versus 'organic determinism': an adscriptive conception of the belonging to a nation, based on a deterministic link between ethnic descent and nationhood on one hand, and a voluntaristic one, that places human will at the center of the inclusion criteria, on the other hand.

The second opposition would be what Zimmer labels 'state-centeredness' versus 'culture-centeredness': civic nations are generally conceived as being based upon the political institutions of

the modern state while 'ethnic' nations are those whose legitimacy claims rely on a common cultural background. This idea supports the temporal sequence argument made by Kohn, who argued that civic nationalism could only emerge in those cases in which the statehood preceded, or was simultaneous to the rise of nationalism, while in those cases in which a nationalist movement emerged without a corresponding political structure –such as the central and Eastern European ones-, it relied on cultural, and ethnic elements. [46]

Finally, the third dichotomy is the 'modernist' versus pre-modern one. Namely, civic nationalists are primarily concerned with the national development in the present, and tend to look for their founding myths in the modern revolutions, linked to the emergence of the 'sovereign people' as a political agent. On the contrary, ethnic nationalism would tend to look way back in history, as they conceive the nation as an 'organism that develops slowly and more or less continually in the course of history's evolution' (Zimmer, 2003: 177).

The conflation of these three oppositions in a single dichotomy, Zimmer argues, would have proven very problematic for the study of national movements, especially for those studies that pretend to focus on the evolution and change of nationalisms. As a response, Zimmer proposes an analytical distinction between "the [boundary] mechanisms which social actors use as they reconstruct the boundaries of national identity at a particular point in time; and, on the other hand, the symbolic resources upon which they draw when they reconstruct these boundaries' (2003: 178). He proposes, then, to retain the first of the three underlying dichotomies (the organicist versus voluntarist conceptions of national identity) while

---

[46] This argument has been used as the basis for the equation of state-led nationalisms with civic nationhood and state-seeking movements with ethnic nationalism.

acknowledging that the remaining two (state-centeredness vs. culture-centeredness, and modernist versus pre-modernist) refer to contingent strategies of nationalist movements that build a given idea of nationhood through the resources that are available and more convenient to them in each given moment. These resources can be used, or filtered, through constructivist/voluntaristic or determinist lenses. As he puts it, "what matters with regard to the construction of national identities is less what resources political actors draw upon than how they put these resources to practical use" (Zimmer, 2003: 181).

Zimmer illustrates his argument with an analysis of the role of the territory in the construction of Swiss national identity, but perhaps the two more clear-cut examples of what we could term as the 'contingency' of national markers are language and citizenship. As Zimmer himself discusses, language has historically served as the basis of the romantic, organicist nationalism (both in France and Germany) and more inclusive, voluntaristic conceptions of nationhood. Indeed, one could consider the national language as a reflection of the immanent soul of a national community or, on the contrary, as a proof of the willingness to integrate in it and a 'facilitator of civic virtue' (Jones and Smith, 2001a: 106). For example, fluency in the national language(s) is a standard requirement for immigrant integration in many countries –be it in the form of a formal requirement for residence or citizenship or of a fundamental part of integration policies. The underlying logic of these integration policies is that learning the national language is a matter of choice rather than an ascribed trait of individuals. A famous statement often attributed to Sabino Arana, considered as the 'founding father' of Basque nationalism, might illustrate this potential ambivalence of language as a national marker:

> *"In Catalonia, every element coming from the rest of Spain is Catalanized, and it pleases them that even Aragonese and Castilian city policemen of Barcelona speak Catalan; here we suffer greatly when we see the name Pérez at the bottom of a poem in Basque, or we hear a Riojan teamster, a linen salesman from the Pas Valley, or a gypsy speaking our language."*[47]

This ambivalence is also clear in the case of citizenship: the main formulations of the civic/ethnic dichotomy have tended to consider it as a purely civic marker, mainly because its internal inclusiveness and purely political nature. Indeed, citizenship, in its classic liberal formulations was primarily an inclusive institution devoted to granting all the members of the state –of the nation- an equal set of rights and duties. However, this inclusive nature of citizenship has its reverse side: 'although citizenship is internally inclusive, it is externally exclusive' (Brubaker, 1992: 21). As Brubakers' analysis shows, the institution of citizenship is not linked to a specific conception of the nation, but rather it can serve to extremely different purposes. In a context of growing foreign immigration, when the relevant out-groups of many nationalisms are non-citizens, citizenship may serve organic conceptions of the nation by acting as a tool of exclusion of non-native inhabitants of the country.

The list could continue. Take history, for example. Although virtually every nationalism relies somehow in history to seek legitimacy, they develop a conscious process of selection of certain episodes of the country's history to commemorate. This process is, obviously, not neutral, as certain episodes of the history can serve

---

[47] Sabino Arana, 1894 (Translation of my own). This position does not represent the actual Basque nationalism, mainly devoted to the extension of Basque language among all segments of Basque citizens, regardless their origin.

different purposes. Even the same historical episode, depending on how it is framed, could be useful to an organic boundary-making or a voluntarist one. This is not to say that every marker is equally elastic. Some markers are more open to be framed in various ways than others, and some of them, such as ancestry, seem to be necessarily linked to an organicist version of nationhood.

What this framework tells us is, mainly, that we should consider the political actors' agency in framing the main conceptions of nationhood. Ethnic and civic identities are not 'natural' or preexisting ways of identifying with one's nation, but rather historical constructions and, as such, subject to change. In the next section I discuss the applications of the ethnic-civic dichotomy to the individual level research. Through a review and replication of the main results, I will show how the scheme proposed by Zimmer seems to be more adjusted to the empirical findings than the traditional dichotomy.

3.3 The ethnic/civic dichotomy in the individual-level research: a confusing scene

It can be said that until the late 1990s, the research on qualitatively different forms of nationhood, and especially the civic/ethnic dichotomy was restricted to historians, political theorists and historical sociologists. Also the criticisms of the dichotomy, as we have seen, have tended to come from theoretical and/or macro-sociological perspectives that focus primarily on the collective level of national identities, reflecting the dominant approach to studies on nationalism.

Nevertheless, in recent years there has been a growing interest in empirically determining whether the classical formulations –mainly

the civic/ethnic dichotomy- did actually match the patterns of national identities at the individual level or it was, simply, a theoretical construct that did not have a correspondence at that level.[48]

However, when applying this dichotomy to micro-sociological studies based on survey research, some problems do emerge. One is theoretical, and the other one empirical, although both are closely related. The theoretical problem emerges from the lack of reflection on why should we assume that citizens' beliefs and attitudes correspond to the scholarly community distinction. The empirical literature on individual attitudes towards the nation has not always been aware enough of the complexity of directly translating concepts and categorizations formulated at the collective level to the individual level, and vice versa. The direct translation of the ethnic-civic dichotomy to the individual level research cannot be done without a theoretical argument to answer that question. In any case, the connection between both levels of identity remains a relatively unexplored field that should attract more attention from scholars on national identities.

As for the empirical problem: it is related to the inconsistencies between the theoretical scheme, the actual findings and the interpretation of these findings that we find in most of the literature. Many of the recent empirical works that have addressed, at the individual level, the distinction between qualitatively different varieties of national identity do actually find, up to some extent, a correspondence between the classic ethnic/civic dichotomy and actual individual attitudes (Blank, Schmidt and Westle, 2001; Jones

---

[48] This growing line of research owes a great deal to the 1995 and 2003 wave of the ISSP survey, devoted to national identity. These surveys have allowed for the development of systematic comparative research.

and Smith, 2001a; Jones and Smith, 2001b; Heath and Tilley, 2005; Domm, 2001). This, as Blank et al. state, may be seen as a paradox, because this increasing acceptance of the scheme at the individual level runs parallel to the increasing criticisms at the theoretical level.

In fact, if we review the empirical works written in the last ten years on the issue, we will see how many of them claim to have found that the ethnic/civic types of national identity do correspond to the actual structures of attitudes held by the citizens. However the specific structure and contents of the attitudes are different in almost every work and in every case. But, as I argue below, most scholars have not paid attention to these differences, and that lack of interest has lead to a quite confusing scene.

This survey-based empirical research mainly relies on factor analysis techniques applied to two batteries of indicators included in the 1995 (and 2003) ISSP: one (Q3) related to the importance of different criteria for being a member of the nation (Jones and Smith, 2001a; Jones and Smith, 2001b; Heath and Tilley, 2005; Díez Medrano, 2005), and the other one (Q5), relative to specific sources of national pride (Domm, 2001; Blank, Schmidt and Westle, 2001; Smith and Jarkko, 1998). I reproduce the 2003 version of the questions. The 1995 one was slightly different: it did not include the item on ancestry, an omission that had been criticized by some scholars (Shulman, 2002; Janmaat, 2006).

Q3. Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is...?
　1. *to have been born in [Country]*
　2. *to have [Country nationality]*
　3. *to have lived in [Country] for most of one's life*

   4. *to be able to speak [Country language]*
   5. *to be a [Country religion]*
   6. *to respect [Country] political institutions and laws*
   7. *to feel [Country nationality]*
   8. *to have [Country nationality] ancestry*

Q5. How proud are you of [Country] in each of the following?
   1. *the way democracy works*
   2. *its political influence in the world*
   3. *[Country's] economic achievements*
   4. *its social security system*
   5. *its scientific and technological achievements*
   6. *its achievements in sports*
   7. *its achievements in the arts and literature*
   8. *[Country's] armed forces*
   9. *its history*
   10. *its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society*

Besides the fact that the criteria of group boundary definition (Q3) seem to be more adjusted to the lines of the theoretical debate on ethnic and civic forms of identity, the use of the sources of pride (Q5) as a measure of the content of national identity presents some problems that are not easy to overcome: the main one is that pride in a specific "object" is a function of both the importance the respondent attributes to it as a feature of its nation and its evaluation of the actual performance of it. For example, pride in the country's social security system (that is supposed to be an indicator of civic identity) may depend both on the kind of attachment to the nation of the respondent and its evaluation of how the social security system in that country works. Blank, Schmidt and Westle (2001) acknowledge this problem, but still use the measure based on pride: as they state, it would very difficult for a civic Russian patriot to be proud of a virtually non-existent social security system while the

114

same individual in Germany or Sweden would find it much more easy to express pride in it. The same holds for achievements in sports, arts, economy, the way democracy works and so on: it is easy to think that after an international success in sports (such as, for example, winning a world soccer championship) we will find more pride in the country's achievements in sports. And that would not tell us anything about a change in the national identities. For this reason, I will concentrate on the works that have used the group boundary markers and will myself use this operationalization to address the issue in this chapter.[49]

Among this set of works, the most remarkable attempt to cross-nationally identify the underlying dimensions are Jones and Smith's contributions (Jones and Smith, 2001a; 2001b) that, using a (rotated) factor analysis identify two dimensions, that they label as the adscriptive/objectivist (including the items born, citizenship, lived, and religion) one and the civic/voluntarist one (laws, feel and language). Even if the authors underline some differences of these dimensions with the classical ethnic/civic dichotomy (related to the role of language and territory), they argue that they closely resemble each other. Jan Germen Janmaat (Janmaat, 2006: 56) has explicitly noted this incongruence between the theoretical constructs and the empirical findings.

Perhaps even more interestingly, these incongruencies between the ethnic-civic dichotomy and Jones and Smith's factors are not constant across countries: although they tend to underline the

---

[49] This is not to say that this operationalization does not have its own limitations and problems: while the most common complaint (the absence of ancestry in the 1995 version) has been corrected, the wording of the question does not perform very well in discriminating among respondents, as it seems to favor the *yeah-saying* tendency: on most items, on most countries, around 80 or 90 percent of the responses are located on the top two answer options (very or fairly important). Perhaps a different wording would be more useful.

common patterns, both their work and most of the case studies that address the issue do actually find diverging patterns of national identity among different countries (Shulman, 2002; Heath and Tilley, 2005; Díez Medrano, 2005; Janmaat, 2006; Nedomová and Kostelecký, 1997). These findings reinforce the idea of the contingent role of national markers: the same markers do play different roles –and serve to substantially diverse conceptions of nationhood- depending on specific contexts. We do not always actually find two different factors, and even when the expected two factors do appear, they are not always directly interpretable under the civic/ethnic scheme. And if we turn our view to the role of single markers, the picture becomes even more confusing: some of them do play apparently opposed roles in different contexts.

Moreover, by further refining the analysis to adapt it to the complexities of each case, we can see how the same marker, depending on its specific role and the discourses attached to it, can serve different conceptions of nationhood within a single country. For example, the study on national identity in Israel conducted by Noah Lewin Epstein and Asaf Levanon (2005: 17-9), in which they separate the analysis for 'veteran Jews', recent immigrants from the former USSR, and Arab citizens of Israel shows that the resulting structures are different for each of the three groups. Some markers do play opposite roles for different groups, such as language (Hebrew), that is conceived as a 'voluntaristic' marker by veteran Jews while the other two groups (that are not universally able to speak it) perceive it as an organicist marker. But this is not the only 'swing' marker: feeling Israeli, an apparently paradigmatic voluntaristic marker, groups with organicist markers in the case of the Arabs. The authors interpret this as a result of the fact that 'Israeliness is strongly tied to the Jewish character of the Israeli state'. This interesting result, that reinforces the thesis of the contingent role of national markers, shows that even the apparently

116

most connotated markers can be ambivalent depending on the political discourses and institutional frameworks that condition them and their role in a given context. The Israeli case, while being certainly specific, is not the only one in which we can find that some markers, including some of the traditionally considered as being the 'core' of civic or ethnocultural identities, do indeed play a contingent role that varies across groups.

Juan Díez Medrano (2005: 5) complains that most of the preceding literature has not paid attention to these differences, and it is true: most scholars simply assign the ethnic and civic labels to the emerging factors without any further reflection on their actual content, and their congruence or incongruence with the theoretical constructs. Instead, I contend that inter-country differences and incongruencies between the empirical results and the theoretical constructs do constitute a 'puzzle' that should be treated as something to be theoretically accounted for, and not merely as a sort of 'uncomfortable' deviation from our expectations (or desires).

To illustrate this, I have reproduced the analysis carried by Jones and Smith for the 1995 ISSP module, but using the 2003 one, that introduces ancestry among the criteria of group boundary definition, thus solving the main flaw that the literature has pointed to the 1995 one. To foster comparability, I have applied the same technique used by Jones and Smith (principal components extraction and Varimax –orthogonal- rotation of the factors).[50] In the following table, I present the results (rotated factor loadings, Eigen values and share of variance accounted for) of a factor analysis in order to

---

[50] I exclude Asian, African and Latin-American countries from the analysis to concentrate in the areas in which the dichotomy has been used, even if this restriction may favour homogeneity of patterns (and thus, work against my argument). Israel is also excluded from the analysis because of its complexities, which have already been analyzed in detail by Noah Lewin Epstein and Asof Levanon (2005).

identify the underlying dimensions of the individual's responses. For the shake of clarity, I only print those factor loadings above 0,4:

Table 3.1*: Factor analysis ISSP 2003 - 25 countries*

	Australia		West Germany		East Germany		Great Britain		Finland	
Factor	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*
Born	0,85		0,76		0,80		0,83		0,85	
Citizenship		0,64	0,62	0,44	0,68		0,49	0,45	0,53	0,48
Lived	0,82		0,67	0,42	0,74		0,73		0,70	
Language	0,47	0,45		0,81		0,70	0,45	0,52		0,65
Religion	0,63		0,68		0,51		0,67		0,70	
Respect		0,78		0,71		0,84		0,87		0,73
Feel		0,65	0,48	0,59	0,58	0,49	0,39	0,68		0,64
Ancestry	0,85		0,85		0,76		0,85		0,86	
Eigenvalue	3,38	1,25	3,55	1,17	3,56	1,11	3,72	1,09	3,40	1,16
% of variance	0,42	0,16	0,44	0,15	0,44	0,14	0,47	0,14	0,42	0,14

	USA		Austria		Hungary		Ireland		Norway	
Factor	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*
Born	0,84		0,82		0,81	0,84		0,82		0,81
Citizenship	0,60		0,73		0,83	0,60		0,73		0,83
Lived	0,84		0,75		0,77	0,84		0,75		0,77
Language	0,57		0,40	0,50		0,57		0,40	0,50	
Religion	0,64		0,66		0,55	0,64		0,66		0,55
Respect		0,90		0,92	0,34	-0,03	0,90		0,92	0,34
Feel	0,44	0,62	0,57	0,54		0,44	0,62	0,57	0,54	
Ancestry	0,77		0,84		0,36	0,77		0,84		0,36
Eigenvalue	3,64	1,09	3,90	1,01	3,06	3,64	1,09	3,90	1,01	3,06
% of variance	0,45	0,14	0,49	0,13	0,38	0,45	0,14	0,49	0,13	0,38

Table 3.1 (continued): *Factor analysis ISSP 2003 - 25 countries*

Factor	Sweden		Czech Republic		Slovenia		Poland		Bulgaria	
	1	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*
Born	0,84		0,57	0,52	0,77		0,80		0,85	
Citizenship	0,49	0,52	0,70		0,54	0,53	0,84		0,82	
Lived	0,78		0,69		0,55	0,51	0,80		0,58	
Language		0,53	0,75			0,76	0,80		0,60	0,47
Religion	0,64			0,86	0,79		0,59	0,66	0,62	
Respect		0,83	0,53			0,70	0,48	0,77		0,73
Feel		0,45	0,75			0,71	0,71	0,49		0,84
Ancestry	0,86		0,46	0,51	0,80		0,74	0,45		
Eigen value	3,26	1,19	3,46	0,99	3,56	1,16	4,25	0,87	3,24	0,95
%of variance	0,41	0,15	0,43	0,12	0,45	0,15	0,53	0,11	0,46	0,13

	Russia		New Zealand		Canada		Spain		Latvia	
Factor	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*
Born	0,81		0,86		0,84		0,78		0,85	
Citizenship	0,68		0,58		0,47	0,54	0,81		0,82	
Lived	0,70		0,80		0,81		0,80		0,73	
Language	0,65			0,60		0,44	0,67		0,52	0,54
Religion	0,56			0,42	0,61			0,95		0,44
Respect		0,85		0,83		0,80	0,69			0,83
Feel		0,75		0,46	0,43	0,62	0,80			0,79
Ancestry	0,66		0,85		0,84		0,61	0,53		
Eigen value	3,46	0,97	3,10	1,26	3,20	1,22	4,37	0,91	2,67	1,45
% of variance	0,43	0,12	0,39	0,16	0,40	0,15	0,55	0,11	0,38	0,21

Table 3.1 (continued): *Factor analysis ISSP 2003 - 25 countries*

Factor	Slovak Republic		France		Portugal		Denmark		Switzerland	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Born	0,83		0,81		0,50	0,62	0,84		0,80	
Citizenship	0,84		0,48	0,46	0,59	0,53	0,72		0,68	
Lived	0,73		0,60		0,64		0,74		0,70	
Language	0,63			0,68	0,81		0,43	0,54		0,74
Religion		0,60	0,70			0,81	0,67		0,68	
Respect		0,87		0,73	0,68			0,84		0,82
Feel	0,76			0,73	0,79		0,48	0,47	0,54	0,50
Ancestry	0,74		0,83			0,76	0,86		0,82	
Eigen value	3,90	0,97	3,04	1,27	4,11	0,88	3,53	1,10	3,39	1,25
% of variance	0,48	0,12	0,38	0,16	0,511	0,11	0,44	0,14	0,42	0,16

The first thing to note is that as Jan Germen Janmaat (2006) and Anthony Heath and J. Tilley (2005: 6) have already pointed out, there is a positive correlation among every item independently of which factor they belong to. This must lead us to reconsider the relationship between organicist and voluntaristic forms of national identity at the individual level. We cannot consider them as a dichotomy nor two competing ideal-typical ends of a continuum, but rather as two complementary ways of conceiving ones' belonging to a political community defined in national terms that tend to be cumulative.

These results show the complexity of the picture, just as the 1995 ones did. The most generalized pattern is the emergence of two factors, the first of them -that is the one with more explanatory power in almost every country- being roughly identifiable with some sort of organicist or adscriptive conception of nationhood, and the second one with a more voluntaristic one. However, a closer

look is needed, and it reveals –as previous analysis did- some relevant 'deviations' from the classical civic/ethnic scheme:

First, not in every country we do find two clear factors (with Eigen values greater than one), so we can not be sure that the two-factor model makes sense for every country: In the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Spain, Slovakia and Portugal, the second factor has an Eigen value lower than one. More interestingly, in these countries the second factor, when forced to emerge, is not identifiable with the voluntaristic dimension. It mostly includes religion as a distinctive marker, in some cases together with ancestry (in Portugal and the Czech Republic) and/or born, so it may be indicating a diverse –perhaps stronger- conception of organicist group definition. In Poland and Slovakia, however, religion would go together with 'respect for the country's institutions and laws' in a dimension that does not fit at all with the traditional scheme.

But even in the cases in which the two factors emerge, the role of specific markers shows some interesting irregularities. Let's concentrate on two of them: language and citizenship. Language, despite being commonly considered as an example of an ethnocultural marker, groups with voluntaristic markers in a majority of the cases (West Germany and East Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Norway, Sweden, Slovenia, New Zealand, Canada, France, Portugal, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, Latvia and Finland),[51] while it appears to be closer to organic markers only in the USA, Ireland, Bulgaria, Russia, Poland, Spain and Slovakia. Conversely, long-term residence and citizenship –the traditional, democratic, paradigm of a civic political community marker- seem

---

[51] In some of these cases, the role of language is not so clear-cut and it is located at a median point between the two factors, slightly closer to the voluntaristic one (Austria, Latvia, Great Britain and Denmark).

to group with adscriptive markers (such as born, ancestry and religion). Only in a reduced number of countries citizenship loads with the voluntaristic criteria: Australia, Norway, Sweden, Canada and France (and in most of these countries it appears to be located somewhere in between the two factors, albeit mostly closer to the voluntaristic one).

To sum up, despite a generalized common pattern, there are relevant inter-country differences in the structures of citizens attitudes towards their nations and, especially, in the role played by certain national markers. Why are these differences –interpreted by others as being of little relevance- important? I argue that, since they represent important deviations from the theoretical model –at least, they indicate its contingent nature-, they constitute a puzzle that should lead us to re-think the model: when the empirical findings do not fit the theoretical expectations, we should revisit out theory or, in some instances, the measurement instruments. In this case, as I shall explain, it is both of them that are to some extent flawed.

Even if a detailed account for each one of the irregularities in these results falls well beyond the scope of this discussion, it is worth paying closer attention to the role of certain markers. Language, as we have seen, clusters with voluntaristic markers in most of the cases analyzed. This is not necessarily striking, since we have already discussed how language can play –and indeed often plays- the role of a 'facilitator of civic virtue' (Jones and Smith, 2001b: 106) rather than that of a fixed ethnic or cultural marker. For example, fluency in the national language(s) is a standard requirement for immigrant integration in many countries –be it in the form of a formal requirement for residence or citizenship or of a fundamental part of integration policies. Learning the national

language is a matter of choice rather than an ascribed trait of individuals.[52]

However, in some of the cases, language clusters with apparently more adscriptive, or organicist markers. These countries are the USA, Ireland, Bulgaria, Russia, Poland, Spain, Slovakia and, up to some extent, Latvia. In Spain, Poland and Slovakia there is no such a thing as a clearly voluntarist factor, so language could not group with it. But even in those cases, the role of the language as an organic marker seems to deviate from the norm. How should we interpret it?

Following Zimmer's framework, we should consider it as a consequence of a process of politization of language, that in certain contexts is explicitly used as tool of conflictual differentiation from relevant out-groups and, thus, more prone to be associated with an organicist conception of nationhood. National markers have the main function of differentiating members of the in-group from relevant out groups, so we have to interpret these results in relation to this crucial issue: is language used as an inclusive tool or as a mean of exclusion?

Except Poland, the USA and Ireland, the other countries in this group do have significant language-defined national minorities within them with diverse degrees of conflict with the nation-state and/or the majority group, that has developed projects of assimilation or segregation of these minorities: Catalans, Basques and Galicians in Spain, Turks in Bulgaria, Hungarians in Slovakia, Russophones in Latvia, and several groups in Russia -up to twenty-seven with official status, about 100 according to Ethnologue 2005

---

[52] Probably, the wording of the question ('being able to speak...') favors this interpretation of language as a vonluntaristic marker. A different wording, such as "speaking..." or "being a ...-speaker" could have produced different results.

(Gordon and Grimes, 2005). So we could think that the national language as a requirement of national membership in those countries is used as a tool of confrontation with those –often challenging- groups: conflictual language politics are, or have been recently present in all these countries.

However, other countries in the dataset do have the same kind of relevant language-defined national minorities and language does still seem to play the role of a civic marker (mainly francophones in Canada and Swedes in Finland). But in these cases the questionnaire did not ask only for fluency in the majoritarian language as a national marker, but on both of them (English and French in Canada, Finnish and Swedish in Finland). The very formulation of the question may be, itself, reflecting a different approach to the language issue, and perhaps a less conflictual management of language politics.

The Irish case is quite exceptional, because the questionnaire asked by Irish Gaelic and not by English. The Irish language is spoken only by a tiny minority of the population and thus candidate for being claimed as a relevant marker only by essentialist Irish nationalists, as shown by Camille C. O'Reilly's (2001) analysis on attitudes, discourses and symbolic meanings associated to the Irish language. It is in Ireland where language finds lower average consensus as a relevant national marker (2,27 vs. the general average of 3,48).

Perhaps the most puzzling case is that of the USA: in a traditional immigration country, often seen as a paradigm of the use of language as an integration tool, language appears as an organicist marker grouped with ancestry or born. Why this is so? Is it related to the growing Hispanic immigrant population with an often-deficient command of the English language? Or perhaps it could be

the result of the 'English-only' movement and the consequent politization of language politics in the USA? It is difficult to establish this relationship without specific data on the issue, but the studies on the social bases of the support for the movement and its legislative proposals seem to suggest that explicit emphasis on the language as a national marker, in the context of the USA, is correlated with support for 'neo-Americanization' efforts (Zubrzycki, 2001; Schatz, Staub and Lavine, 1999). In fact, as Carol L. Schmid states –and the data seem to confirm-, 'In the American context, controversy over Official English and bilingualism is about competing models of Americanism' (Schmid, 2001).

Summing up, the previous analyses seem to reinforce the idea of the contingent role of national markers. Even if there might be an effect of the indicators used, it seems pretty clear that we cannot expect the same structure to emerge in every country. Even if the emerging picture is confusing enough for not attempting to fully account for it, for the purpose of this chapter it is enough by stating that we cannot expect the structure of individual attitudes to be a direct translation of the classical ethnic-civic dichotomy. Indeed, it seems more reasonable to expect a structure reflecting the actual contents of the main nationalist discourses in each case and, complementarily, the effective role played by the marker in a specific context with respect to its ability to exclude or include relevant out-groups from the 'nation'.53 For example, in a country with a substantial number of foreign immigrants and strict naturalization procedures based on ancestry, the importance placed on citizenship as a criterion of inclusion might perfectly reflect an organicist conception of the nation.

---

[53] The relevance of out-groups in the definition of the in-group is a fundamental thesis of the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), from which I partially derive my hypothesis.

3.4 Varieties of national identity in Spain: testing the ethnic-civic models

Why is the previous discussion relevant for the analysis of the Spanish case? The exploratory factor analysis has shown that the structure of attitudes in the Spanish case is clearly deviant from the 'general' pattern if there is such a thing. Previously to the discussion of the 'Spanish anomaly', it is worth to develop a much more detailed analysis of the Spanish data. This analysis must help us to evidence to what extent the various versions of the ethnic-civic dichotomy that we find in the literature actually apply, or not, to the Spanish case.

I organize the analysis as follows: first, I present the descriptive statistics and the correlation among the eight indicators included in the Q3 battery of the 2003 ISSP survey. Then, I apply an internal reliability test (Cronbach's alpha) to the data, followed by an exploratory factor analysis. The next step is the testing of the various structures that emerge from the relevant literature through a Confirmatory Factor Analysis. This is the technique that allows as for an explicit test of rival hypotheses about the fit of the proposed models to the actual data. Finally, I also present an external validity test, based on the relationship among variables. If the indicators capture what they are supposed to capture, we should find that they are related to other variables in the same way as the literature has predicted.

As I have already argued, I will mainly work with the survey items that assess the importance of several criteria for being considered truly Spanish. The items refer to several national markers such as birth, long-term residence, citizenship, language, religion, respect for the laws and institutions, national feeling and ancestry. In the

next table I show the frequencies of responses and the main descriptive statistics:

Table 3.2: *Inclusion criteria, ISSP 2003 (Spain). Frequencies and descriptive statistics*

	Birth	**Citizen**	**Resid**	**Lang.**	**Religion**	**Respect**	**Feeling**	**Ancestry**
Not at all important	3,01	2,6	2,18	3,6	28,57	1,6	2,77	5,63
Not very important	8,6	9,14	11,16	12,24	27,39	6,93	8,9	15,22
Fairly important	50,67	51,51	54,45	50,46	30,08	56,76	51,55	54,5
Very important	37,73	36,74	32,21	33,7	13,95	34,71	36,78	24,64
N	1198	1192	1192	1193	1190	1184	1191	1189
Average	*3,23*	*3,22*	*3,17*	*3,14*	*2,29*	*3,25*	*3,22*	*2,98*
Std. Dev.	*0,73*	*0,72*	*0,70*	*0,76*	*1,03*	*0,65*	*0,72*	*0,79*

In this table we can see how all the variables do have similar distributions, with a great share of the responses located in the top two categories. The only clear deviant case is religion, which proves clearly less accepted as a national marker. Not only has a lower mean, but also a higher standard deviation, that shows how the degree of consensus around it is clearly lower than for the rest of the items.

But what we have to focus on, in order to identify the attitudinal structure, are the relationships among the various markers. These relationships will let us assess whether these indicators are indeed measuring two underlying factors more or less related to the ethnic-civic dichotomy. Table 3.3 shows the bivariate correlations among the eight indicators:

Table 3.3: *Inclusion criteria, ISSP 2003 (Spain). Bivariate correlations*

	Birth	Citizen	Resid	Lang	Religion	Respect	Feeling	Ancest
Birth	1,00							
Citizenship	0,68	1,00						
Residence	0,59	0,65	1,00					
Language	0,49	0,57	0,61	1,00				
Religion	0,28	0,28	0,27	0,32	1,00			
Respect	0,41	0,45	0,43	0,41	0,20	1,00		
Feeling	0,60	0,58	0,60	0,47	0,24	0,51	1,00	
Ancestry	0,54	0,57	0,57	0,44	0,43	0,36	0,58	1,00

Here we can see how all the indicators have positive correlations. All of them are statistically significant at the 99,9% level. Most of them are over 0,5 with the exception of, again, religion. Religion as an inclusion criterion is only weakly correlated with the rest of the variables (between 0,2 and 0,32, with the only exception of ancestry, which is 0,43). Again, we have some indication that the importance of being catholic has some differences with the rest of the indicators that seem to show a pretty similar pattern with the partial exception of ancestry, which seems to be located in a middle ground between the two.

If all these items were indeed indicators of a one-dimensional underlying scale, as suggested by Juan Díez Medrano (Díez Medrano, 2005), we should expect a high internal consistency. One way of assessing this unidimensionality is conducting a reliability test based on Cronbach's alpha for a scale with every item. The following table shows the results:

Table 3.4*: Inclusion criteria, ISSP 2003 (Spain). Cronbach's alpha*

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-test correlation	Item-rest correlation	Inter-item covariance	Alpha if deleted
Birth	1198	+	0,780	0,699	0,258	0,840
Citizenship	1192	+	0,805	0,734	0,255	0,837
Residence	1192	+	0,799	0,729	0,257	0,837
Language	1190	+	0,736	0,639	0,261	0,846
Religion	1193	+	0,568	0,377	0,279	0,888
Respect	1184	+	0,624	0,520	0,287	0,859
Feeling	1191	+	0,769	0,688	0,260	0,842
Ancestry	1189	+	0,777	0,689	0,252	0,840
Test scale					*0,264*	*0,865*

The overall result (0,865) is high, and according to standard cut points in social sciences we could a priori accept that these items are indeed part of a single dimension. However, if we look more closely to the correlation of each item and the overall scale (item-test), with the rest of indicators (item-rest) and the Cronbach's alpha if the item was deleted, we can see how the religious item has a lower correlation with the scale and the rest of items. Indeed, it actually worsens the reliability and internal consistence of the scale: if deleted, the Cronbach's alpha would be even higher (0,888).

An exploratory factor analysis can provide further indications of the idea suggested by the previous analyses: all the items, except religion, are part of a single dimension. The following table shows the factor weights for the rotated factors and the Eigen value for each factor.[54]

---

[54] I repeat here the same analysis of the previous section.

Table 3.5: *Inclusion criteria, ISSP 2003 (Spain). Exploratory Factor Analysis*

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Birth	0,797	-0,106	0,353
Citizenship	0,832	-0,118	0,294
Residence	0,823	-0,101	0,313
Language	0,734	0,009	0,462
Religion	0,460	0,839	0,085
Respect	0,633	-0,269	0,527
Feeling	0,793	-0,186	0,337
Ancestry	0,766	0,249	0,352
Eigen value	*4,369*	*0,908*	

I have extracted two factors, although according to the standard rule of extracting only those factors with an Eigen value greater than one, I should have extracted only one factor. However, the second factor's Eigen value is very close to one, and forcing the extraction of two factors will allow us to check the correspondence between the results and the ethnic-civic dichotomy.

As I had already advanced in the previous section, the 'classic' structure of two factors does not hold. Indeed, in Spain it even seems to be difficult to identify a clearly voluntaristic factor whatsoever. We have found that in Spain there is only one clear factor mixing up every kind of marker, except religion –and, partially, ancestry- that seems to constitute a separate dimension in itself. The first dimension mixes up national markers traditionally conceived as ethnocultural and civic-political.

However, in order to assess that this structure represents the dimensions of Spanish national identity, and that it is superior to the other proposals, we have to develop a Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) that allows for testing rival hypotheses. I test the

measurement models that stem from the literature I have reviewed in the previous section. I will test the following models:

1.-Single factor model, equivalent to a reliability test of a single scale of the eight indicators. It represents the credentialist-postnational model proposed by Juan Díez-Medrano (2005).[55] Figure 3.1 graphically represents this model

2.-Two factor model, in which the first dimension groups all the indicators except religion, and the second one is conformed only by it. This is the model suggested by the exploratory analyses. Figure 3.2 represents it.

3.-Two factor model, similar to the previous one but with ancestry in the second factor. We have seen in the exploratory analyses that ancestry seemed to be located between the two factors, as represented by figure 3.3.

4.- Jones and Smith's (2001a; 2001b) two-factor model: the first one being described as adscriptive/objectivist (birth, long term residency, religion) and the second one being the civic/voluntaristic one (institutions and laws, national feelings and fluency in the national language), shown in figure 3.4. This model does not include ancestry as a marker because it was absent in 1995 ISSP and, thus, Jones and Smith did not use it in their work.

5.-'Traditional' two-factor model. This is the model we could interpret as reflecting the classic dichotomy. The first factor would

---

[55] Díez Medrano also suggests an alternative grouping of the markers in five groups: republican criteria (long-term residency, sense of belonging and citizenship), political criteria (respect for institutions and laws), territorial (birth), cultural (language and religion) and ancestry. It is a very complex model that cannot be tested due to identification problems (too many parameters to be estimated with too few variables).

be the 'ethnocultural' nationalism, and would comprise birth, language, religion and ancestry. The second one would be the civic or political one, linked to citizenship, long-term residency, respect for institutions and laws and sense of belonging (figure 3.5).

6.- Three-factor model, as proposed (but not empirically tested) by Stephen Shulman (2002). It tries to incorporate the mainstream theoretical criticisms to the classical dichotomy, that tend to underline the need for a third, cultural, factor separated from the strictly ethnic one. The cultural factor would be composed by language and religion, the ethnic one would be restricted to ancestry and the rest of them, including birth, would constitute the civic-political identity.

7.- Three-factor model, equivalent to model three but with a third factor that separates the most clearly voluntaristic markers (feeling and respect) from the main political factor.

In figures 3.1 to 3.7 I represent graphically each of the models, as to make the differences between them visually evident. I use the standard representation rules for latent variable models, in which the squares represent observed variables, the circles latent ones. Red arrows indicate fixed parameters (for technical purposes) and black ones the parameters to be estimated.

Figure 3.1: *Inclusion criteria, ISSP. Measurement model I*	**Figure 3.2:** *Inclusion criteria, ISSP. Measurement model II*

Figure 3.3: *Inclusion criteria, ISSP. Measurement model III*

Figure 3.4: *Inclusion criteria, ISSP. Measurement model IV*

Figure 3.5: *Inclusion criteria, ISSP. Measurement model V*

Figure 3.6: *Inclusion criteria, ISSP. Measurement model VI*

Figure 3.7: *Inclusion criteria, ISSP. Measurement model VII*

I tested each of the proposed models separately, as to have a sense on which one does do a better job in accounting for the actual attitudinal structure we find in the Spanish case. A comparison of the fit indices will allow us to discriminate among models and identify the one that works better. Table 3.6 shows the main fit statistics for each of the tested measurement models. I include the main indices generated by the program EQS:

Table 3.6: *Inclusion criteria, ISSP 2003 (Spain). Fit statistics, measurement models*

Model	Chi2	p	df	RMR	Chi2 Sat-Bent	p	RMSEA	GFI	AGFI
I	485.851	.000	20		112.2002	.000			
II	485.851	.000	19	.045	105.0591	.000	.145	.917	.843
III	337.133	.000	19	.032	74.7203	.000	.120	.937	.881
IV	477.231	.000	19	.044	110.0902	.000	.144	.918	.844
V	470.159	.000	19	.047	110.3602	.000	.143	.919	.846
VI	470.460	.000	18	.044	104.7026	.000	.147	.917	.835
VII	220.850	.000	16	.026	22.6007	.125	.105	.957	.902

Every single model returns high Chi-square values, so we can say that none of them has a good fit with data. However, the third and seventh models clearly stand out as the best fitting ones, performing significantly better than the rest of the models.

Among them, I take the third one as a reference, given that it is the one that best combines fit and parsimony –the two evaluation criteria for this kind of models-. It is, as we have seen, a two-factor model. The first factor includes political, territorial and cultural markers, while the second one comprises religion and ancestry –it is the model that we could identify with more clearly organicist identity.

Figure 3.8: *Inclusion criteria, ISSP. Measurement model VIII*

Table 3.7: *Measurement model VIII, Coefficients*

Coefficients									R^2
Birth	V1	=	.847	F1	+	.532	E1		(.717)
Citizenship	V2	=	.884	*F1	+	.467	E2		(.782)
Residence	V3	=	.865	*F1	+	.502	E3		(.748)
Language	V4	=	.770	*F1	+	.638	E4		(.593)
Religion	V5	=	.534	F2	+	.845	E5		(.285)
Respect	V6	=	.661	*F1	+	.751	E6		(.437)
Feeling	V7	=	.825	*F1	+	.566	E7		(.680)
Ancestry	V8	=	.997	*F2	+	.083	E8		(.993)

This model is close to the results suggested by the exploratory analysis. Even if it shows a poor fit with the actual data, it is by far the best parsimonious measurement model we can extract with these data.[56]

How should we interpret the lack of fit of the various versions of the dichotomy to the Spanish data? The (exploratory) analysis of the Spanish data has led Juan Díez Medrano (2005) to argue that perhaps in Spain the relevant structure of national identity is simply a continuum between the more inclusive and the more credentialist conceptions of nationhood, without any qualitative distinction among national markers. But I have shown in the analysis that the two-factor model does indeed improve the fit with the data, compared to the single factor model suggested by Díez Medrano. So we can safely assume that there are indeed qualitatively different varieties of the Spanish national identity.

However, it seems clear that these two factors do not correspond to the classic ethnic-civic dichotomy. The mainstream identity appears to be separated from the traditional identification between the Spanish nationhood and the Catholic religion and, partially, from a

---

[56] The Langrange multiplier test suggests some modifications that could improve the fit of the model. However, I prefer to stay with the simpler model.

purely biological conception of the national community, but the fact that the main factor does conflate political markers with cultural and adscriptive ones (such as language or birth), sheds doubts about the existence of a strictly civic-political variety of the Spanish national identity. In the next, and final section, I discuss with greater detail the implications of these results for the design of the following chapters of the dissertation, both in terms of data collection strategies and the kind of analysis carried out.

3.5 Conclusions and discussion

The exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses developed in this chapter have shown that the structure of attitudes in the Spanish national identity does not fit well under the ethnic-civic scheme, although we have been able to identify at least partially two qualitatively different varieties of it. The mainstream conception of the Spanish national identity conflates political and voluntarist, but also cultural and adscriptive criteria of membership. Speaking Spanish or having been born in Spain are widely shared requirements for being considered a true Spaniard that go together with other criteria that traditionally have been conceived as landmarks of the 'civic' version of nationalism: sense of belonging, respect for institutions and laws, or holding citizenship. It is, then hard to identify any of the two factors that have emerged as a clearly voluntaristic one.

Indeed, the results that stem from this analysis are congruent with the conclusions of the main recent analysis of the Spanish nationalist discourses, in which the mixture of 'ethnic' and 'civic' elements is seen as a constant across the entire ideological spectrum of contemporary Spanish nationalism, as I have shown in a previous chapter. As Núñez Seixas has put it: "*Spanish 'patriotic'*

discourses (...) also include an appeal to supposedly objective elements such as history, culture and even language, which are reputed to be the basic founding elements of the Spanish nation" (Núñez Seixas, 2002: 10). Diego Muro and Alejandro Quiroga agree in arguing that '*some ethnic elements lie underneath the constitutional patriots' version of Spain*' (Muro and Quiroga, 2005: 23), while the religious component would be retracting and confined almost exclusively to the conservative versions of the Spanish nationalism. The point is, then, that even the apparently less organicist versions of Spanish nationalist discourses do include strong cultural and historical elements in the definition of the nation. In this context we could hardly find, at the popular level, a strictly 'civic' conception of nationhood.

These results, that might be puzzling for the defenders of applying the traditional dichotomy to the individual-level research, are not surprising if we take into account the analytical framework that I have sketched in the first part of this chapter and the introduction to the dissertation. In congruence with the previous discussion, only if the mainstream nationalist discourses within Spain had reproduced this scheme should we expect to find it in the citizens' attitudes. As long as the terms of the debate have not been adjusted to the traditional ethnic-civic dichotomy, it is not surprising that we have not found it in the survey responses.

The main implication of this analysis is that if we want to identify the relevant and distinct varieties of the Spanish national identity we should design our measurement instruments in a way that they are able to capture the actual debates and the main discourses around the question, because they might shape the citizens' attitudes. Otherwise we would be assuming that the individual attitudes towards the nation are formed in a vacuum and not as a result of the political process. In a case study as this one, there is a need for a

more precise set of indicators able to capture the terms of the actual discourses of the Spanish nationalism.

It should be clear that I am not arguing that the development of a generalizable classification of national identities is impossible. My argument simply states, in line with Oliver Zimmer, that the ethnic-civic dichotomy conflates several separable underlying distinctions, and that some of them are historically contingent and linked to the specific set of cases on which it is based. I have shown how, when we try to make this dichotomy travel beyond that set of cases and, even more, when we try to apply it to the individual and within-case analysis, the results are extremely unsatisfactory.

The established classificatory scheme, thus, should be reviewed to make it more suitable for individual analysis. Probably Oliver Zimmer's proposal, based on the need of unfolding the dichotomy and retaining only the basic opposition between voluntarist and organicist boundary mechanisms is more suited for these tasks as it allows for greater generalization and is less dependent from the specific context (and less normatively loaded). We have seen how the specific resources that a given nationalism uses to define the boundaries of the national group are contingent and vary across time and cases. I have also shown how the same national marker can be put to work in opposite directions.

However, since the aim of this dissertation is not the development of such a generalizable classification, I will not follow this path. My goal is to identify and measure the relevant varieties of a specific national identity: the Spanish one. And for that aim, the most logic and congruent strategy is to depart from the analysis of the ideological discourses of Spanish nationalism to develop the proper measurement instruments.

This is precisely the task I want to carry in the two following chapters. The next one is developed to an in-depth analysis with a reduced sample of 70 individuals that will provide a fine-grained sense of the actual contents of the various varieties of the Spanish national identity, their 'areas of consensus' and their main disagreements. This analysis and the conclusions that stem from it will then be applied to the development of a set of indicators to be used in a representative sample across the whole Spanish territory, which I analyze in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter four

EXPLORING THE CONCEPTIONS OF SPANISHNESS. A Q-METHODOLOGICAL STUDY OF SPANISH NATIONAL IDENTITY

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I pointed out the limits of the ethnic-civic framework for understanding the varieties of national identity at the individual level. My basic argument is that we cannot think of this conceptual pair as 'natural ways' of identifying with one's nation to be found everywhere in the same way. The empirical analysis carried out has convincingly shown that in different countries we actually find different structures of attitudes towards the nation and that the certain markers, such as language or citizenship seem to acquire different meanings depending on the context: while in some cases they are inclusive requirements, in others they act as tools for exclusion from the national group. I have also shown how in the case of Spain, the existing indicators do not perform well at identifying the relevant varieties of the Spanish national identity and that, in any case, the ethnic-civic scheme is not very helpful for understanding the results we get from the analysis of these indicators.

My understanding of this question relies on the basic argument about the development of national identities of the so-called 'constructivist' line of though: the nationalist ideologies, shaped and spread by the political and social elites through a process of 'national socialization' will actually shape the mainstream individual conceptions of the nation. Thus, the actual varieties of the Spanish national identity that we will find at the individual level should reflect to some extent, if this argument is correct, the actual discourses of the Spanish nationalism.

The consequence of this theoretical standpoint is a different empirical strategy from the one that has been followed until now to identify and measure the varieties of national identity: we have to depart from an analysis of the nationalist ideologies and test whether, as expected, we can actually find their correspondence at the individual level.

This is precisely the task I carry out in the following two chapters. Departing from the overview of the mainstream formulations of the Spanish nationalism that I have presented in chapter 2, I develop an in-depth, two-stage empirical analysis. First, the analysis of 64 individual interviews (based on the Q-methodology) will provide a fine-grained account of the main varieties of Spanish national identity, their actual contents, the commonalities they share and the differences that separate from one another. The rich picture that stems from the analysis of the interviews was, then, used to develop a meaningful set of indicators to be applied in a representative survey (N=3000) throughout the territory of Spain. The second stage, thus, is the analysis of the survey results that should allow me to draw inferences about the actual structure of attitudes towards the Spanish nation. I will identify the relevant types and test the validity of the resulting constructs.

Through this research, I identify three relevant groups defined by their conception of Spain. I call them 'non-Spanish', 'constitutional Spanish', and traditional Spanish. These groups, as I discuss in this chapter, reflect the main discourses set up by the Spanish (and alternative) nationalisms. The relationship of the groups defined here to the classical dichotomy of ethnic and civic nationalisms is complex, as I discuss below.

4.2 The Q-methodological study

Congruent with the conclusions of the previous chapters that underlined the limited usefulness of the existing survey indicators, and the need to take into account the elites' discourses and policies in identifying the different types of Spanish national identity, in this chapter I develop an in-depth, exploratory analysis of the individual conceptions of Spanishness. This study relies on the analysis of the main discourses of the Spanish nationalism that I have developed in chapter 2, in order to trace the correspondence of these discourses with citizens' attitudes. For this purpose, I rely on the so-called Q-methodology, which is well suited for empirically researching the subjectivity.

My main goal in this chapter is, thus, exploring the main types of Spanish national identity, their conforming elements and the elements of consensus and dissent among them. This exploratory analysis is a useful step in the elaboration of a typology of individual attitudes towards Spain and its national identity.

I proceed as follows. The first section of the chapter discusses the details of the Q-methodology and its applications to the study of national identities. In the second one I present the research design

(statement sampling, selection of individuals, forced distribution of responses, etc) and the data analysis procedures. The third section is devoted to the presentation and analysis of the results and the fourth one summarizes the main conclusions of the chapter.

4. 3 Methodology and research design

The limited usefulness of the existing survey indicators for the identification of the varieties of Spanish national identity lead me to develop a more in-depth study of the individual opinions and attitudes. The methodological instrument used is the so-called Q-methodology. The results of the Q-methodological study became the basis for the design of a set of survey questions, which were applied in a mass survey (CIS 2667, December, 2006). The survey allows the contrast of the results obtained through the Q-methodology with a random representative sample of the Spain's population. I discuss this question in the next chapter. In this section I briefly present the method used, discuss its applications to the study of national identities and, finally, present the details of the research design and the data analysis procedures that were followed.

a) Q-methodology: a tool for the study of subjectivity

The method known as Q-methodology was originally proposed in 1935 by the psychologist and physician William Stephenson (1902-1989). His proposal consisted of a set of principles and techniques aimed at studying subjectivity in a systematic way. It is based on the theoretical assumption that subjectivity is a real fact that can be measured if this is made carefully (Brown, 1980) and tries to address the issues raised by a common critique of most measurement instruments in survey research: namely, that

researchers define the meaning of the survey items and simply assume, acritically, that subjects do share the same understanding.[57]

In practical terms, the Q-methodology is usually based on the sorting by the respondents of a set of stimulus, that usually take the form of statements about a given topic. The subjects order them on the basis of a predefined scale, such as the degree of agreement or disagreement with them. This process is known as *Q-sorting*

The stimuli, or statements, presented to the respondents constitute a sample designed by the researchers that, theoretically should be representative of the whole universe of opinions or judgments about a given topic that are present in the society. The universe is known as *concourse*. Usually this sample is selected through the extraction of a number of sentences from the media (editorials, letters to the editor, etc.) and/or previous interviews or focus groups. The goal is that the stimuli represent the actual inputs that citizens receive about a given issue in a given social context. The selection of the final sample (usually around 40 to 70 sentences) can be structured or unstructured, depending on the priors or theoretical hypotheses of the researcher.

These statements are presented to reduced samples of individuals, known as the P-sample, that are not selected as to constitute a representative, random sample of the population. This has been pointed out as a limit of this methodology that would hinder our ability to draw inferences from our results. However, the logics of the Q-methodology are slightly different. It is the statements that

---

[57] This is especially interesting in this context, because in the previous chapter I have shown how the same survey items seem to acquire different meanings depending on the context where they are applied to, so being able to empirically test them will help avoiding this kind of misunderstanding.

should constitute a representative sample of the whole universe of relevant opinions about a given topic. The goal is the identification of the relevant types of individuals that exist in a given context, but not drawing any inference about the relative incidence of each type in the population. A random selection of individuals is, thus, not appropriate. The goal of P-sampling is to obtain enough variety of respondents to identify the main types. This is why the selection is based on a set of theoretical arguments about the relevant variables for each case. The sample of individuals relies, thus, on a combination of these theoretically relevant variables.

In the interviews, the selected respondents are presented with the sample of statements that have to be ordered to shape their point of view about a given topic. The sorting of the statements (known as *Q-sorting*) is the main exercise of the whole process, and is driven by a set of instructions defined by the researcher. These guidelines define the meaning of the continuum on which the statements are to be ordered. Usually represents an agreement/disagreement scale, but it can also be a closeness or saliency scale, for example. The instructions also define the shape that the distribution of statements will take. The researcher designs a template that will constrain the sorting of the statements, as to force all the respondents to develop the same exercise. Usually the distribution is quasi-normal: more statements to be placed in the central positions of the scale and less of them in the extremes.

This process is usually supplemented with the collection of some basic data of the respondent, as well as a follow up interview in which the researcher can ask the respondent to further discuss her decisions. This follow up can also be used to test some assumptions on which the selection of statements relies and gain confidence about the right interpretation of the respondents' choices.

The final step is the analysis of the results, based on a factor analysis carried out over a matrix of correlations among individuals –that is, among the various Q-sortings. We extract a set of factors that do not represent clusters of variables, as in the most common applications of factor analysis, but groups of individuals. With these factors it is possible to compute the relationship of each statement to each factor, and find the *ideal* patterns of response that would correspond to each factor. This process will allow us to identify the main types, their relationship with each statement, and the statements that allow us to discriminate among types. It is, thus, a methodology oriented towards the empirical (inductive) determination of ideal types.

b) Q methodology and the study of national identities

The study of national identities is one of the application fields of Q-methodology, especially since the empirical research has become increasingly concerned with the identification of qualitatively distinct varieties of national identity. The works that use Q methodology for this purpose tend to focus on a single case, or two, and are useful for disentangling the specific attitudinal structures that in the large-N comparative research are often overlooked. A relevant example is Richard Haesly's work on Scotland and Wales (Haesly, 2005a), in which he works with a sample of 79 Scottish and 54 Welsh citizens to identify different kinds of relationship with the Scottish and Welsh national communities (*civic*, *nationalistic* and *proud-insular* in the former, and *civic*, *proud-insular* and *superficial welsh* in the latter). In a parallel study (Haesly, 2005b) he deals with the varieties of identification with Great Britain in these countries. While in Scotland the resulting structure is a three—factor one basically identifiable with a single dimension of acceptance or refusal of the British identity (*pro-British*, *Anti-*

British and *Ambivalent British*), in the Welsh case there seem to be two intertwined dimensions: one of them internal to the British identity, that opposes the *Chauvinistic British* and the *Civic British* identities, and the other, external, that would oppose these two types to the third, *Anti-British* one.

There are also works that deal with other cases, such as the one that addresses the American patriotism (Sullivan, Fried and Dietz, 1992), in which the authors distinguish five different types of patriotism; or the one that refers to the Taiwanese national question (Wong and Sun, 1998), in which the authors identify five types of attitudes (*Taiwanese nationalism, Chinese nationalism, status-quoism, Taiwan prioritism* and *confused identity*). There is also a work that has applied the Q-methodology to the Basque case (Davis, 1999) that, basically distinguishes two types of relationship with the Basque Country as a nation: one that can be identified with the Basque nationalism and one that is not associated with it.

These works, despite their differences, constitute examples of the usefulness of the Q-methodology for the identification of qualitatively distinct types of national identity. And this is, still, one of the main questions that the empirical research on national identities faces.

c) Research design

In order to identify the relevant varieties of Spanish national identity, we selected 47 statements from several sources: on-line discussion boards of the main newspapers' websites, letters to the editor in printed newspapers, editorials, previously used survey questions, existing qualitative research, etc.

To structure the sampling process, we defined nine different thematic fields that structure the national discourses in Spain. The selection of the thematic fields is congruent with the main debates and discourses about the Spanish nation. Within each of them, we tried to select statements that represent the widest diversity of positions. The selected fields are:

1. Centralism – Unitarianism/alternative nationalisms
2. Language(s)
3. Immigration
4. Religion
5. History
6. Symbols
7. Europe
8. Constitutionalism, political institutions and identity
9. 'Spain is different' (way of life, character…)

The participants in the research were instructed to sort the 47 selected statements[58], which were extracted from a previous sample of over 200 statements. The respondents were instructed to order the statements according to their degree of agreement with them, in 11 categories ranging from maximum disagreement (-5) to maximum agreement (+5). The sorting process was further constrained by the quasi-normal forced distribution, as shown in fig. 4.1.

A part from the Q-sorting, the interviews included a set of questions referring to the reasons for the placement of statements in the extremes of the distribution, as well as some survey questions about the socio-demographic indicators, the use and knowledge of

---

[58] For a full list, see Appendix A.

languages and several traditional indicators of national identity, ideology and vote.

We conducted 58 interviews in four Autonomous Communities: Catalonia, the Basque Country, Madrid and Castilla y León. The selection of respondents was based on indirect or secondary contacts and the snowball technique. The interviews took place between October and December 2006.

Figure 4.1: *Distribution template, Q study*

| -5 | -4 | -3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 |

Strongly disagree   Strongly agree

Although the goal is not the extraction of a representative sample of individuals, we tried to grant enough variety in our sample as to find the main types of national identity in Spain. This is why in the selection of respondents we used several variables to define quotas. The relevant variables were: Autonomous Community, gender, age group (youth, adults and senior), educational level (with an without college degree) and ideology (left-wing and right-wing). This strategy is intended to grant the variety in the sample.

d) Data analysis procedure

Once the respondents have ordered the statements and, thus, each statement has a numeric value for each respondent, the next step is to analyze the resulting matrix. The technique used is the factor analysis of a matrix in which the statements are placed in the rows and the individuals in the columns –the reverse than the conventional factor analysis. However, this technique cannot be considered as a simple transposition of the data matrix, because in this case all the "variables" have the same measurement unit. The Q-factor analysis compares the response patterns of the individuals instead of comparing the variables, as in the conventional factor analysis.

The factor analysis is run on a correlation matrix among the Q-sortings (individuals). These correlations represent the degree of likeness among the various viewpoints expressed b the respondents. Once we have this correlation matrix, the factor analysis is essentially the same used in other kinds of data analysis. The logic of the analysis, thus, is to identify groups of individuals with the most similar sortings within them, and the most different among groups. Factor analysis is a data reduction technique that is usually applied to the summary of a group of variables into a reduced set of factors that capture the highest share of the variance of the original variables. In this case, thus, could be read as a summary of a group of individuals into a set of ideal types that summarize the original variance.

The extraction of the factors can be done through different methods. In the Q-methodological studies the centroid extraction is still prevalent, although the more common principal components analysis is also used. Several studies (ref) show that in this case the

selection of one or another method does not have a huge impact on the results. Usually, the extracted factors are rotated. The rotation can be based on statistical criteria (for example, the Varimax rotation, that forces perfect orthogonality among factors) or substantive criteria. We used the principal components extraction and the Varimax rotation, in order to define the most clearly different ideal types.

The next step is computing a factor loading for each Q-sorting. This factor loading measures the degree of closeness between each individual and each ideal type. Each factor, thus, represents a group of individuals whose points of view about the topic are highly correlated among them but not correlated with the rest. We also calculated the factor scores, which constitute weighted averages of the scores attributed to each statement by the individuals that define each factor. The average is weighted using the individuals' factor loadings, so those individuals whose Q-sortings are closer to the factor have a higher contribution to the calculation of the average factor scores. These values (Z-scores) relate the statements with the factors and allow to define the ideal types of individuals that each factor represents: how would have sorted the statements an individual with perfect association with each factor. These ideal types do indeed constitute the basis for the analysis.

4.4 Results: identifying the varieties of the Spanish national identity

Following the method presented above, we extracted three factors or ideal types of Spanish national identity. The criteria for the factor extraction are based on the analysis of the screeplot of eigenvalues. After the third factor, the differences among the subsequent Eigen

values are very small. The three factors jointly explain 46,88% of the total variance.

Table 4.1 shows the statements that discriminate between each factor and the rest. For each statement, it shows the placement that an individual ideally representing each type would have attributed. This table constitutes a useful summary of the main results. We can see the three identified types and their contents, so we can label them.

I call the first factor 'non-Spanish'. Its main feature is the high level of agreement with every sentence expressing alienation from the Spanish national identity, especially from its more traditional version. I will refer to the second factor as 'constitutional Spanish', while it does reject the 'non-Spanish' statements, it is also far from the traditionalist conception of Spain. The third factor will be called 'traditional Spanish', and can be identified with a strongly unitarian and organicist traditional version of the Spanish national identity.

Table 4.1: *Discriminant Statements*

		Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
	Statement	**Non-Spanish**	**Constit-utional**	**Traditional Spanish**
2	A nation as such has to have only one culture and language. This is why Spain is not a nation, but rather a complex set of nations.	1	-2	-4
4	One can be a Spanish citizen and do not feel Spanish	5	1	-2
6	We should not be surprised that the Catalans or Basques want to have their own sports federations, as in the case of Scotland or Wales.	3	0	-3
10	Spain has to remain united to grant the equality among all citizens and	-1	2	5

	solidarity among the various autonomous communities.			
11	Catalans, Basques and Galicians are Spaniards, even if they do not like it.	-2	0	3
20	In the past, the Spanish nation was identified with Catholicism. This is something that today does not have any sense and that should be avoided.	4	2	-2
24	I fell very proud of Spain's history	-3	-1	3
29	Countries have their own character, a kind of soul that is manifested in their history's deeds: in the case of Spain they are the Cid, the Catholic Kings and the discovery of America, among other.	-1	-3	1
30	Spain's flag is my flag and I respect it, but it does not create an emotion in me.	2	0	-2
31	When I listen to Spain's national anthem and see Spain's flag wave I fell something special, I feel that I am part of a community I am proud of.	-5	-1	2
35	I would feel much more comfortable if the official flag was the tricolor, republican flag.	2	-1	-5
42	Even if my documents are issued by Spanish institutions, I do not consider myself a Spaniard.	2	-3	-5

The three groups are mainly defined by their attitudes towards the internal plurality of Spain, the emotional identification with Spain's national symbols, the role of Catholicism and the understanding of Spain's history. This is not very surprising, given that arguably these tend to be the main issues of public debate in Spain. The apparent divisiveness of the symbolic and affective elements (at least 6 of the 12 most discriminant statements belong to his dimension) is also interesting, and reveals the nature of the divides that separate these groups. The saliency of affective divisions

among Spanish citizens that we observe here is indicative of the terms in which the national debate is located in Spain.

In this table we can already appreciate a structure of relationships among the groups: the constitutional Spanish is located somewhere in between the other two groups, and shares some elements with each of them. Below I analyze this in more detail through the inspection of the commonalties and differences between the constitutional Spanish factor and each of the other two groups. But first I present and analyze in more detail the contents of each factor. In order to have a complete sense of the actual meaning of each of them, I analyze the complete distribution of the statements that an 'ideal' individual would produce. In tables 4.2 to 4.4, I show the scores for the 47 statements that an ideal representative of the 'non-Spanish' group would have produced. Table 4.2 shows those statements that receive a negative score in the ideal non-Spanish respondent:

Table 4.2: *Non-Spanish ideal type, rejected statements*

	Statement	Score
17	Even if immigrants come to live to Spain, it is better that they do not mix with Spaniards, because that way we will all be more calm and comfortable	**-5**
31	When I listen to Spain's national anthem and see Spain's flag wave I fell something special, I feel that I am part of a community I am proud of.	**-5**
19	It is better that we receive immigrants from Latin America rather than Africa or the Maghreb: they speak Spanish and are Catholics like us.	**-4**
26	If at the time the moors and Jews had not been expelled, Spain could not have existed as a cohesive nation.	**-4**
44	As Spanish citizens, we should leave aside our personal opinions and never protest against Spain's position in international organizations.	**-4**

14	Even if they speak Spanish correctly and respect our country's laws, the immigrants will never be true Spaniards.	-3
16	We cannot admit that immigrants do not know the Spanish culture. The immigrants that have just arrived to Spain should take an exam, or at least follow a course on our culture.	-3
24	I fell very proud of Spain's history	-3
25	Spain has been a nation for more than 500 years, while Catalonia and the Basque Country have never been nations.	-3
5	The unity of Spain, or the Spanish nation do not really worry me, by I feel very upset when the Catalans or Basques claim for a different treatment from the rest of Autonomous Communities	-2
7	Only Spain is a nation. The rest are municipalities, provinces or administrative regions	-2
11	Catalans, Basques and Galicians are Spaniards, even if they do not like it.	-2
21	Spain has always been a Catholic country: Catholicism is very important in our identity.	-2
34	In Spain we have been able to transform a Middle Age institution, the Monarchy, in something modern and useful for our country.	-2
1	As long as most people living in Spain feels Spanish, Spain will continue to be a nation	-1
10	Spain has to remain united to grant the equality among all citizens and solidarity among the various autonomous communities.	-1
27	I am proud of how the transition to democracy was done in Spain, and of the Constitution we have because of that.	-1
29	Countries have their own character, a kind of soul that is manifested in their history's deeds: in the case of Spain they are the Cid, the Catholic Kings and the discovery of America, among other.	-1
38	If everything gets globalized, Europeanized, the Spanish identity could be lost and this is something we have to avoid. We have to preserve how we are and our way of life.	-1
43	An important problem we have as Spaniards is that we do not respect our own country and we are not proud of it.	-1

In this table we can see how most of the statements that concentrate the sharpest refusal from this ideal type are those related to the immigration: five of the nine more clearly rejected statements are

different versions of anti immigration and/or xenophobic statements. A part from that, among the most rejected statements we find one related to symbols (31), one that embraces blind patriotism (44) and two related to acritical and traditional readings of Spain's history (24-25). Also rejected, albeit with less intensity, are statements related to the unity of Spain, its national status, the role of Catholicism or the monarchy, among others.

Table 4.3: *Non-Spanish ideal type, neutral statements*

	Statement	Score
3	The political discussions that have taken place recently around the modification of the Autonomy Statue of Catalonia worry me because they are about issues that do not really matter to citizens and they are creating an unpredecedented tension.	0
23	Spain has historically been an open and tolerant country, this is why despite the tensions that might arise, the Spanish society is prepared for integrating new religious minorities	0
32	You do not have to follow any particular sport to be happy of the international achievements of Spanish sportsmen (Fernando Alonso, Rafael Nadal, the basketball national team).	0
36	Here we have been very lucky of being in Europe, otherwise, considering how we the Spaniards are, we would be in the same situation as the American-American countries.	0
40	The most important thing for being a good Spaniard is not culture or language, is fulfilling with the duties we have as citizens: follow the laws, respect the democratic institutions, pay taxes, etc.	0
41	In Spain, a Tuesday evening you find people in the bars or the street. This is not the case in Europe. This is the big difference: the culture of work. That explains why they are better off economically but live worse than us.	0
46	I value positively the Constitution because it has been a very useful instrument to keep the country united.	0

Those statements that are placed in the neutral category by the non-Spanish ideal type are, generally, expressing low-intensity or modern Spanish national identity, based on sports, the Constitution and laws, the Spanish alleged way of life, etc. These statements do not produce a rejection as strong as the traditionalist justifications of Spain as a nation, but still are placed in the neutral category by this ideal-type.

Table 4.4 shows those statements that would receive a positive score by this theoretical respondent ideally representing the non-Spanish ideal type:

Table 4.4: *Non-Spanish ideal type, embraced statements*

	Statement	Score
2	A nation as such has to have only one culture and language. This is why Spain is not a nation, but rather a complex set of nations.	**1**
8	Spain is a nation of nations: Spain is the state, and its parts are nations and regions according to their citizens' decision.	**1**
9	Spain is a state and not a nation	**1**
12	The Spanish language is a basic element of our identity	**1**
28	The history of Spain that we share, with its good and bad things, is what makes all of us Spaniards	**1**
33	Neither the Spanish anthem nor the flag concern or move me at all. What I am really proud of is of living in a democracy.	**1**
30	Spain's flag is my flag and I respect it, but it does not create an emotion in me.	**2**
35	I would feel much more comfortable if the official flag was the tricolor, republican flag.	**2**
37	If we want Spain to be a good country, the model we should follow is that of the best countries in Europe and not the US one.	**2**
42	Even if my documents are issued by Spanish institutions, I do not consider myself a Spaniard.	**2**
47	What distinguishes Spaniards from Europeans is our character:	**2**

	we are more open, nice and friendly. We give much more importance to family and friends.	
6	We should not be surprised that the Catalans or Basques want to have their own sports federations, as in the case of Scotland or Wales.	3
13	Maybe Castilian is the majority's language, but Galician, Catalan or Basque are also Spanish languages that we have to support.	3
39	I think that a country can maintain its culture, traditions and way of life, and be all Europeans anyway. It is not contradictory.	3
45	Patriotism, well understood, implies that when you think the actions of your country are wrong, you have to say it.	3
18	If they work in Spain and pay their taxes as everyone else, immigrants should have the right to vote.	4
20	In the past, the Spanish nation was identified with Catholicism. This is something that today does not have any sense and that should be avoided.	4
22	The Spanish state is secular and should not favor any religion over the rest. Therefore, it should not fund the Catholic church.	4
4	One can be a Spanish citizen and do not feel Spanish	5
15	The arrival of immigrants enriches Spain's culture.	5

Again, among the statements with higher positive scores, we find those that express positive attitudes towards immigration. We also find a strongly secularist conception of the State (22) and a clear rejection of the core of national-Catholicism (20). Moreover this group's members favor a pluralist idea of Spain, as composed by various cultures and identities (13, 6). They also embrace a critical conception of patriotism (45), and hold pro-European (39) and somewhat anti-American (37) attitudes.

Summarizing, this group favors the incorporation of immigrants, rejects the identification of Spain with the Catholic religion, and favors a pluralist view of Spain. It does also explicitly reject the Spanish national identity and symbols, and this is why I have labeled it as 'non-Spanish'. However, this is a moderate refusal and

other types of attitudes, such as the ones related to immigration, are more salient within their distribution of responses. This, indeed, seems to suggest that this group might be composed not only by alternative nationalists but also by a segment of citizens that, while feeling Spanish, support an openly pluralistic or multinational conception of Spain, so this ideal type would be conflating two underlying, distinct, sets of attitudes. I will come back to this issue later.

Now I turn to the analysis of the second ideal type, the one that I call 'constitutional Spanish'. Tables 4.5 to 4.7 show the scores that an ideal representative of this second group would have attributed to each statement. Again, I start by analyzing those statements that would be placed in the negative side of the distribution by this ideal-type:

Table 4.5: *Constitutional Spanish ideal type, rejected statements*

	Statement	Score
17	Even if immigrants come to live to Spain, it is better that they do not mix with Spaniards, because that way we will all be more calm and comfortable	-5
44	As Spanish citizens, we should leave aside our personal opinions and never protest against Spain's position in international organizations.	-5
14	Even if immigrants come to live to Spain, it is better that they do not mix with Spaniards, because that way we will all be more calm and comfortable	-4
19	It is better that we receive immigrants from America-America rather than Africa or the Maghreb: they speak Spanish and are Catholics like us.	-4
26	If at the time the moors and Jews had not been expelled, Spain could not have existed as a cohesive nation.	-4
7	Only Spain is a nation. The rest are municipalities, provinces or administrative regions	-3
21	Spain has always been a Catholic country: Catholicism is	-3

	very important in our identity.	
29	Countries have their own character, a kind of soul that is manifested in their history's deeds: in the case of Spain they are the Cid, the Catholic Kings and the discovery of America, among other.	**-3**
42	Even if my documents are issued by Spanish institutions, I do not consider myself a Spaniard.	**-3**
2	A nation as such has to have only one culture and language. This is why Spain is not a nation, but rather a complex set of nations.	**-2**
16	We cannot admit that immigrants do not know the Spanish culture. The immigrants that have just arrived to Spain should take an exam, or at least follow a course on our culture.	**-2**
25	Spain has been a nation for more than 500 years, while Catalonia and the Basque Country have never been nations.	**-2**
38	If everything gets globalized, Europeanized, the Spanish identity could be lost and this is something we have to avoid. We have to preserve how we are and our way of life.	**-2**
41	In Spain, a Tuesday evening you find people in the bars or the street. This is not the case in Europe. This is the big difference: the culture of work. That explains why they are better off economically but live worse than us.	**-2**
1	As long as most people living in Spain feels Spanish, Spain will continue to be a nation	**-1**
24	I fell very proud of Spain's history	**-1**
31	When I listen to Spain's national anthem and see Spain's flag wave I fell something special, I feel that I am part of a community I am proud of.	**-1**
34	In Spain we have been able to transform a Middle Age institution, the Monarchy, in something modern and useful for our country.	**-1**
35	I would feel much more comfortable if the official flag was the tricolor, republican flag.	**-1**
36	Here we have been very lucky of being in Europe, otherwise, considering how we the Spaniards are, we would be in the same situation as the American-American countries.	**-1**

The first thing to note is a coincidence with the previous group in the strong rejection of the statements that more clearly express anti immigration and xenophobic attitudes (17, 14, 19, 26), blind patriotism (44), national-Catholicism (21), a traditionalist understanding of Spain's history (29) and a strictly unitarian conception of Spain (7). However, the distance to the previous group is already evident in the fact that they also reject those statements that deny the status of nation to Spain (7), and imply a clear rejection of Spanish identity (42).

Table 4.6: *Constitutional Spanish ideal type, neutral statements*

	Statement	Score
5	The unity of Spain, or the Spanish nation do not really worry me, by I feel very upset when the Catalans or Basques claim for a different treatment from the rest of Autonomous Communities	**0**
6	We should not be surprised that the Catalans or Basques want to have their own sports federations, as in the case of Scotland or Wales.	**0**
11	Catalans, Basques and Galicians are Spaniards, even if they do not like it.	**0**
23	Spain has historically been an open and tolerant country, this is why despite the tensions that might arise, the Spanish society is prepared for integrating new religious minorities	**0**
30	Spain's flag is my flag and I respect it, but it does not create an emotion in me.	**0**
43	An important problem we have as Spaniards is that we do not respect our own country and we are not proud of it.	**0**
47	What distinguishes Spaniards from Europeans is our character: we are more open, nice and friendly. We give much more importance to family and friends.	**0**

By inspecting the statements placed at the center of the distribution, shown in table 4.6, we can easily see the somehow ambivalent

nature of this group: among them we find both statements that express distance from traditional Spanish nationalism and Spanish national symbols (6, 30) and statements that represent it (11, 43). The statements that are clearly embraced by this group, shown in table 4.7, will help us complete the picture of this group:

Table 4.7: *Constitutional Spanish ideal type, shared statements*

	Statement	Score
3	The political discussions that have taken place recently around the modification of the Autonomy Statue of Catalonia worry me because they are about issues that do not really matter to citizens and they are creating an unpredecedented tension.	1
4	One can be a Spanish citizen and do not feel Spanish	1
9	Spain is a state and not a nation	1
12	The Spanish language is a basic element of our identity	1
28	The history of Spain that we share, with its good and bad things, is what makes all of us Spaniards	1
32	You do not have to follow any particular sport to be happy of the international achievements of Spanish sportsmen (Fernando Alonso, Rafael Nadal, the basketball national team).	1
8	Spain is a nation of nations: Spain is the state, and its parts are nations and regions according to their citizens' decision.	2
10	Spain has to remain united to grant the equality among all citizens and solidarity among the various autonomous communities.	2
20	In the past, the Spanish nation was identified with Catholicism. This is something that today does not have any sense and that should be avoided.	2
33	Neither the Spanish anthem nor the flag concern or move me at all. What I am really proud of is of living in a democracy.	2
37	If we want Spain to be a good country, the model we should follow is that of the best countries in Europe and not the US one.	2

22	The Spanish state is secular and should not favor any religion over the rest. Therefore, it should not fund the Catholic church.	**3**
27	I am proud of how the transition to democracy was done in Spain, and of the Constitution we have because of that.	**3**
40	The most important thing for being a good Spaniard is not culture or language, is fulfilling with the duties we have as citizens: follow the laws, respect the democratic institutions, pay taxes, etc.	**3**
45	Patriotism, well understood, implies that when you think the actions of your country are wrong, you have to say it.	**3**
15	The arrival of immigrants enriches Spain's culture.	**4**
18	If they work in Spain and pay their taxes as everyone else, immigrants should have the right to vote.	**4**
39	I think that a country can maintain its culture, traditions and way of life, and be all Europeans anyway. It is not contradictory.	**4**
13	Maybe Castilian is the majority's language, but Galician, Catalan or Basque are also Spanish languages that we have to support.	**5**
46	I value positively the Constitution because it has been a very useful instrument to keep the country united.	**5**

Again, in this table we can see how the positive statements referring to immigration are placed at the top of the distribution (15,18), as well as those that express a secular conception of Spain (20, 22). A part from that, this group does embrace a plural (13, 8), pro-European (39, 37), critical (45) and mainly political (40, 33) conception of Spain and the Spanish national identity. In any case, they also place great importance to the preservation of Spain's unity, but justified by the principles of solidarity and equality (10). The most salient feature is, perhaps, the high scores received by the statements that express positive evaluations of the Constitution and the transition to democracy (46, 27). This is why I have labeled it 'constitutional Spanish': The patriotism they advocate for is

strongly identified with the core concepts of the Spanish constitutional nationalism: 1978 constitution, Europeanism and pride in the transition to democracy and the resulting democratic regime.

Finally, I analyze the third factor extracted from the analysis, and the ideal distribution of responses that best represents it. As I have said, I will call this ideal type "traditional Spanish". Tables 4.8 to 4.10 display what would be the ideal Q-sorting of this group. As in the other two cases, I start by the discussion of the statements placed in the negative end of the distribution:

Table 4.8: *Traditional Spanish ideal type, rejected statements*

	Statement	Score
35	I would feel much more comfortable if the official flag was the tricolor, republican flag.	**-5**
42	Even if my documents are issued by Spanish institutions, I do not consider myself a Spaniard.	**-5**
2	A nation as such has to have only one culture and language. This is why Spain is not a nation, but rather a complex set of nations.	**-4**
8	Spain is a nation of nations: Spain is the state, and its parts are nations and regions according to their citizens' decision.	**-4**
17	Even if immigrants come to live to Spain, it is better that they do not mix with Spaniards, because that way we will all be more calm and comfortable	**-4**
6	We should not be surprised that the Catalans or Basques want to have their own sports federations, as in the case of Scotland or Wales.	**-3**
9	Spain is a State and not a nation	**-3**
19	It is better that we receive immigrants from America-America rather than Africa or the Maghreb: they speak Spanish and are Catholics like us.	**-3**
44	As Spanish citizens, we should leave aside our personal opinions and never protest against Spain's position in	**-3**

international organizations.

4	One can be a Spanish citizen and do not feel Spanish	-2
14	Even if they speak Spanish correctly and respect our country's laws, the immigrants will never be true Spaniards.	-2
20	In the past, the Spanish nation was identified with Catholicism. This is something that today does not have any sense and that should be avoided.	-2
26	If at the time the moors and Jews had not been expelled, Spain could not have existed as a cohesive nation.	-2
30	Spain's flag is my flag and I respect it, but it does not create an emotion in me.	-2
5	The unity of Spain, or the Spanish nation do not really worry me, by I feel very upset when the Catalans or Basques claim for a different treatment from the rest of Autonomous Communities	-1
16	We cannot admit that immigrants do not know the Spanish culture. The immigrants that have just arrived to Spain should take an exam, or at least follow a course on our culture.	-1
33	Neither the Spanish anthem nor the flag concern or move me at all. What I am really proud of is of living in a democracy.	-1
36	Here we have been very lucky of being in Europe, otherwise, considering how we the Spaniards are, we would be in the same situation as the American-American countries.	-1
38	If everything gets globalized, Europeanized, the Spanish identity could be lost and this is something we have to avoid. We have to preserve how we are and our way of life.	-1
41	In Spain, a Tuesday evening you find people in the bars or the street. This is not the case in Europe. This is the big difference: the culture of work. That explains why they are better off economically but live worse than us.	-1

The first thing to note from this group is that some of the anti-immigration statements –those more overtly xenophobic (17, 19)- are also placed at the negative extreme of the distribution. There is no group, thus, that is willing to openly express a strong anti

immigrant set of attitudes, even if the picture with the less explicit statements is more complex.

Besides that coincidence, that is probably to be attributed to the selection of the statements, the rest of the distribution is clearly different from the other groups. We see how almost all the statements that receive strong and negative scores are those that reject the Spanish national identity or that question the status of Spain as a nation (42, 2, 8, 9, 6) and, interestingly, they also reject with emphasis the statement that expresses preference for the Republican flag (45). This distribution of negative responses provides a clear hint on the actual content of this group's set of attitudes. However, it is worth it to continue inspecting the rest of the distribution of this ideal traditional-Spanish respondent.

Table 4.9: *Traditional Spanish ideal type, 'neutral' statements*

	Statement	Score
3	The political discussions that have taken place recently around the modification of the Autonomy Statue of Catalonia worry me because they are about issues that do not really matter to citizens and they are creating an unpredecedented tension.	**0**
15	The arrival of immigrants enriches Spain's culture.	**0**
18	If they work in Spain and pay their taxes as everyone else, immigrants should have the right to vote.	**0**
22	The Spanish state is secular and should not favor any religion over the rest. Therefore, it should not fund the Catholic church.	**0**
34	In Spain we have been able to transform a Middle Age institution, the Monarchy, in something modern and useful for our country.	**0**
37	If we want Spain to be a good country, the model we should follow is that of the best countries in Europe and not the US one.	**0**
43	An important problem we have as Spaniards is that we do	**0**

not respect our own country and we are not proud of it.

Table 4.9 represents the statements towards which this group's members did not express either a positive or a negative attitude. Among this varied set of statements we find some that express positive evaluation of the immigration, the Monarchy or those that express greater sympathy towards the European countries that the US. In any case, to complete the analysis, we must definitely attend to the positively scored statements, shown in table 4.10.

Table 4.10: *Traditional Spanish ideal type, shared statements*

	Statement	Score
1	As long as most people living in Spain feels Spanish, Spain will continue to be a nation	1
21	Spain has always been a Catholic country: Catholicism is very important in our identity.	1
23	Spain has historically been an open and tolerant country, this is why despite the tensions that might arise, the Spanish society is prepared for integrating new religious minorities	1
25	Spain has been a nation for more than 500 years, while Catalonia and the Basque Country have never been nations.	1
29	Countries have their own character, a kind of soul that is manifested in their history's deeds: in the case of Spain they are the Cid, the Catholic Kings and the discovery of America, among other.	1
40	The most important thing for being a good Spaniard is not culture or language, is fulfilling with the duties we have as citizens: follow the laws, respect the democratic institutions, pay taxes, etc.	1
7	Only Spain is a nation. The rest are municipalities, provinces or administrative regions	2
13	Maybe Castilian is the majority's language, but Galician,	2

	Catalan or Basque are also Spanish languages that we have to support.	
27	I am proud of how the transition to democracy was done in Spain, and of the Constitution we have because of that.	**2**
31	When I listen to Spain's national anthem and see Spain's flag wave I fell something special, I feel that I am part of a community I am proud of.	**2**
47	What distinguishes Spaniards from Europeans is our character: we are more open, nice and friendly. We give much more importance to family and friends.	**2**
11	Catalans, Basques and Galicians are Spaniards, even if they do not like it.	**3**
24	I fell very proud of Spain's history	**3**
32	You do not have to follow any particular sport to be happy of the international achievements of Spanish sportsmen (Fernando Alonso, Rafael Nadal, the basketball national team).	**3**
45	Patriotism, well understood, implies that when you think the actions of your country are wrong, you have to say it.	**3**
28	The history of Spain that we share, with its good and bad things, is what makes all of us Spaniards	**4**
39	I think that a country can maintain its culture, traditions and way of life, and be all Europeans anyway. It is not contradictory.	**4**
46	I value positively the Constitution because it has been a very useful instrument to keep the country united.	**4**
10	Spain has to remain united to grant the equality among all citizens and solidarity among the various autonomous communities.	**5**
12	The Spanish language is a basic element of our identity	**5**

Interestingly enough, this group's members also embrace those statements belonging to the 'transitional consensus' that shaped the contemporary constitutional nationalism: consideration of the 1978 Constitution (46) and the transition to democracy (27) as the new national myths, sense of compatibility between the Spanish identity and the integration into the European Union (39), stress in the preservation of Spain's national unity (10, 11). They also attribute

an important role to Spanish language (12) and history (28, 25) in shaping national identity, and express emotional attachment to the Spain.

However, this traditionalist understanding of the Spanish identity is not linked to blind patriotism (Schatz, Staub and Lavine, 1999; Staub, 1997), as shown by their positive evaluation of the item '*Patriotism, well understood, implies that when your country's actions are wrong, you should say it*.' There is an ongoing debate in the literature about whether the conceptual pair blind/constructive patriotism is associated with other dichotomies such as the ethnic-civic nationalism (Rothi, Lyons and Chryssochoou, 2005; Schatz and Staub, 1997). In the Spanish case it does not seem to be the case: the traditional identity does not embrace, as of 2006, the belief that true patriotism is acritical (45). We could think that the deep divisions that have shaped Spanish politics in the 20th century might have prevented the development of a sense of blind patriotism. This is, however, a point that should be addressed more in depth.

4.5 Consensus and dissent in the Spanish national identity

To gain a deeper understanding of what these groups are really expressing, it is useful to inspect the similarities and differences among them. The identification of the shared elements among groups, as well as those that separate them from each other will provide useful insights about the groups. The groups 'traditional Spanish' and 'non-Spanish' have the most different structures. Thus, I focus on the differences and similarities of the groups that are close to each other: the 'traditional Spanish' versus

'constitutional Spanish' on one hand, and 'non-Spanish' vs. 'Constitutional Spanish' on the other.

a) Constitutional versus traditional Spanish identity

I have selected those statements in which the ideal score attributed to each of these two groups is either most different or more similar. This exercise will allow me to easily identify the elements of consensus and dissent between the traditional Spanish group and the constitutional one. In table 4.11 we can see these statements, alongside with the score they receive from each group and the difference between them.

Table 4.11: *Traditional and constitutional national identity: Dissent*

Statement		Constitu-tional	Traditi-onal	Diff.
	Dissent			
8	Spain is a nation of nations: Spain is the state, and its parts are nations and regions according to their citizens' decision.	2	-4	**6**
7	Only Spain is a nation. The rest are municipalities, provinces or administrative regions	-3	2	**-5**
9	Spain is a state and not a nation	1	-3	**4**
12	The Spanish language is a basic element of our identity	1	5	**-4**
15	The arrival of immigrants enriches Spain's culture.	4	0	**4**
18	If they work in Spain and pay their taxes as everyone else, immigrants should have the right to vote.	4	0	**4**
20	In the past, the Spanish nation was identified with Catholicism. This is something that today does not have any sense and that should be avoided.	2	-2	**4**

21	Spain has always been a Catholic country: Catholicism is very important in our identity.	-3	1	**-4**
24	I feel very proud of Spain's history	-1	3	**-4**
29	Countries have their own character, a kind of soul that is manifested in their history's deeds: in the case of Spain they are the Cid, the Catholic Kings and the discovery of America, among other.	-3	1	**-4**
35	I would feel much more comfortable if the official flag was the tricolor, republican flag.	-1	-5	**4**

The items that generate more differences between these two groups are those related to the unitarianist or pluralistic conception of Spain. There are two clearly divergent views of the Spanish nation: while the traditionalist one rejects any pluralistic idea of Spain as a group of nations or even a 'nation of nations', the constitutional one seems to share this view.

Although this is the issue that separates both groups most clearly, there are also substantial differences in the contents of the identity, mainly related to the role of Catholicism, the Spanish language or Spain's history as foundations of national identity. The traditional group seems to support an idea of the Spanish nation that mainly relies on cultural bases, while the constitutional one rejects the consideration of Catholicism as a core element of the Spanish national identity, as well as a traditionalist reading of Spain's history. The role of the Spanish language does also separate both groups, but in a different way: the constitutional group shows a relative indifference, without an explicit refusal while it is a priority issue for the traditional one.

Among the statements that separate the two groups there are also those that express a positive evaluation of foreign immigration and

an open attitude towards the incorporation of immigrants to Spain's political community. In this case, however, the differences are not primarily due to the explicit refusal expressed by the traditional group but rather an intense approval by the constitutional group. Finally, the issue of the flag appears also as a divisive issue: the strong refusal of the republican flag by the traditional group is sided by an indifference of the constitutionalists towards the issue. Probably this is an accurate reflection of the way in which the transitional consensus around the national symbols was constructed in Spain: the right wing's preference for the current flag was much more intense than the left's attachment to the republican one.

Table 4.12: *Traditional and constitutional national identity: Consensus*

Statement		Constitu-tional	Trad.	Difference
	Consensus			
3	The political discussions that have taken place recently around the modification of the Autonomy Statue of Catalonia worry me because they are about issues that do not really matter to citizens and they are creating an unpredecedented tension.	1	0	1
5	The unity of Spain, or the Spanish nation do not really worry me, by I feel very upset when the Catalans or Basques claim for a different treatment from the rest of Autonomous Communities	0	-1	1
16	We cannot admit that immigrants do not know the Spanish culture. The immigrants that have just arrived to Spain should take an exam, or at least follow a course on our culture.	-2	-1	-1
17	Even if immigrants come to live to Spain, it is better that they do not mix	-5	-4	-1

	with Spaniards, because that way we will all be more calm and comfortable			
19	It is better that we receive immigrants from America-America rather than Africa or the Maghreb: they speak Spanish and are Catholics like us.	-4	-3	-1
23	Spain has historically been an open and tolerant country, this is why despite the tensions that might arise, the Spanish society is prepared for integrating new religious minorities	0	1	-1
27	I am proud of how the transition to democracy was done in Spain, and of the Constitution we have because of that.	3	2	1
34	In Spain we have been able to transform a Middle Age institution, the Monarchy, in something modern and useful for our country.	-1	0	-1
38	If everything gets globalized, Europeanized, the Spanish identity could be lost and this is something we have to avoid. We have to preserve how we are and our way of life.	-2	-1	-1
41	In Spain, a Tuesday evening you find people in the bars or the street. This is not the case in Europe. This is the big difference: the culture of work. That explains why they are better off economically but live worse than us.	-2	-1	-1
46	I value positively the Constitution because it has been a very useful instrument to keep the country united.	5	4	1
36	Here we have been very lucky of being in Europe, otherwise, considering how we the Spaniards are, we would be in the same situation as the American-American countries.	-1	-1	0
39	I think that a country can maintain its culture, traditions and way of life, and be	4	4	0

	all Europeans anyway. It is not contradictory.			
43	An important problem we have as Spaniards is that we do not respect our own country and we are not proud of it.	0	0	0
45	Patriotism, well understood, implies that when you think the actions of your country are wrong, you have to say it.	3	3	0

The elements of consensus between these two views of Spain are related to the transitional consensus around the new Spanish constitutional nationalism: pride in the transition to democracy and the 1978 constitution –that seem to play the role of the main national myths-, a clear sense of compatibility between the Spanish national identity and the European integration process, and a positive/optimistic view of Spain. They also share the refusal to the most clearly xenophobic statements about immigrants, and a tendency towards the so-called 'constructive patriotism', which expresses a disposition towards the critique of one's country.

b) Constitutional Spanish vs. Non-Spanish identities

These two groups seem to share many elements, although we can also find some notable differences among them, especially those referred to the self-identification as Spaniards, or the attachment to Spain's national symbols. The 'non-Spanish' group shows a strong refusal of Spain's national symbols, while the constitutional one tends to be indifferent. The republican flag is more accepted by the non-Spanish group than the constitutional Spanish. What is more relevant, though, is the sharp contrast between the two groups in their evaluation of Spain's democratic transition and the resulting Constitution. The constitutional group expresses a marked enthusiasm towards these issues, and apparently they have incorporated them to the core of their idea of Spain, while the non-

Spanish group is more reluctant, although, generally, without a strong refusal. Other issues, such as the possibility that Catalonia, the Basque Country or Galicia acquire their own national sports teams is also a matter of dissent between the se two ideal types.

Table 4.13: *Constitutional Spanish and non-Spanish. Dissent*

	Statement	Non Spanish	Constitu- tional	Difference
46	I value positively the Constitution because it has been a very useful instrument to keep the country united.	0	5	**-5**
27	I am proud of how the transition to democracy was done in Spain, and of the Constitution we have because of that.	-1	3	**-4**
31	When I listen to Spain's national anthem and see Spain's flag wave I fell something special, I feel that I am part of a community I am proud of.	-5	-1	**-4**
10	Spain has to remain united to grant the equality among all citizens and solidarity among the various autonomous communities.	-1	2	**-3**
40	The most important thing for being a good Spaniard is not culture or language, is fulfilling with the duties we have as citizens: follow the laws, respect the democratic institutions, pay taxes, etc.	0	3	**-3**
2	A nation as such has to have only one culture and language. This is why Spain is not a nation, but rather a complex set of nations.	1	-2	**3**
6	We should not be surprised that the Catalans or Basques want to have their own sports federations, as in the case of Scotland or Wales.	3	0	**3**
35	I would feel much more comfortable if the official flag was the tricolor, republican flag.	2	-1	**3**

4	One can be a Spanish citizen and do not feel Spanish	5	1	**4**
42	Even if my documents are issued by Spanish institutions, I do not consider myself a Spaniard.	2	-3	**5**

The consensual statements between these two groups are mainly referred to the issue of immigration: both of them show intense patterns of rejection of any kind of intolerance or xenophobia. The constructive understanding of patriotism is another shared element, as well as a certain negative evaluation of the US and an indifference towards some statements, probably due to a somewhat confusing wording.

Table 4.14: *Constitutional Spanish and non-Spanish. Consensus*

	Statement	Non Spanish	Constitutional	Difference
	Consensus			
26	If at the time the moors and Jews had not been expelled, Spain could not have existed as a cohesive nation.	-4	-4	**0**
28	The history of Spain that we share, with its good and bad things, is what makes all of us Spaniards	1	1	**0**
12	The Spanish language is a basic element of our identity	1	1	**0**
9	Spain is a state and not a nation	1	1	**0**
37	If we want Spain to be a good country, the model we should follow is that of the best countries in Europe and not the US one.	2	2	**0**
1	As long as most people living in Spain feels Spanish, Spain will continue to be a nation	-1	-1	**0**
45	Patriotism, well understood, implies	3	3	**0**

	that when you think the actions of your country are wrong, you have to say it.			
17	Even if immigrants come to live to Spain, it is better that they do not mix with Spaniards, because that way we will all be more calm and comfortable	-5	-5	**0**
19	It is better that we receive immigrants from America-America rather than Africa or the Maghreb: they speak Spanish and are Catholics like us.	-4	-4	**0**
18	If they work in Spain and pay their taxes as everyone else, immigrants should have the right to vote.	4	4	**0**
23	Spain has historically been an open and tolerant country, this is why despite the tensions that might arise, the Spanish society is prepared for integrating new religious minorities	0	0	**0**
44	As Spanish citizens, we should leave aside our personal opinions and never protest against Spain's position in international organizations.	-4	-5	**1**

4.6 Discussion and conclusions

The results obtained here suggest the existence of three basic types of attitudes towards Spain as a nation: one that expresses a relative alienation from it, and two that while sharing adherence to the idea, understand it in sharply different ways. While one does favor a pluralistic and civic conception of Spain, the other one expresses a more traditional identity, with strong organicist, (uni)cultural and religious components.

It is a structure of attitudes strongly congruent with the typologies defined by the historians and political scientists that have analyzed the Spanish nationalism (Muro and Quiroga, 2005; Núñez Seixas, 2001; Balfour and Quiroga, 2007). These scholars tend to identify, besides a traditionalist Spanish nationalism, a liberal-progressive one with strong civic components a part from, obviously, the alternative (mainly Catalan and Basque) nationalisms that express with varying degrees of intensity, their refusal of the Spanish national identity. Apparently, these nationalist discourses have their reflection in the attitudes of individual citizens and the main identity types that have emerged in this analysis reflect these different traditions. The nature of the Q-methodological analysis allows for a detailed account of the specific traits of each of these types, and the role that the various national markers play in each of them.

The group that I have labeled 'constitutional Spanish identity' reflects a national identity open to the incorporation of immigrants as well as to a certain recognition of Spain's internal plurality. It also shows a fairly explicit rejection of those unitarianist and organicist conceptions of the traditional Spanish nationalism. In this group we can identify some of the main components of the liberal Spanish nationalism, and especially of the left-wing national discourse since the transition to democracy: the Europeanist enthusiasm, the modernization faith, the solidarity principle as the main argument for preserving Spain's national unity, the defense of laicism and the raise, to the category of new national myths, of the transition to democracy and the 1978 Constitution that become fundamental sources of national pride, although history still plays an important role. In this group we can also appreciate the prevalence of a positive view of Spain. This points to an overcome of the traditionally negative view that the left wing has had about Spain and its history, as suggested by Balfour and Quiroga (2007: 153-55).

The traditional Spanish group, on the other hand, seems to reflect what has been labeled by Nuñez-Seixas as the *unfulfilled renovation* of Spanish nationalism. They express a strong rejection of the pluralist understandings of Spain and, therefore, advocate for an unitarianist and organicist view of Spain. The national symbols have a deeper emotional impact over this group, whose identity is based on elements such as language, history and, although to a lesser extent, also Catholicism.

However, there are some elements in the traditional Spanish identity that point to a certain transformation of the traditional conservative Spanish nationalism. Some political elements, such as the sense of pride on 1978 Constitution or the transition to democracy, as well as endorsement of the principles of equality and solidarity among citizens as a main reason for Spain's unity. There are other signs of this transformation, such as the compatibility between the European integration and the Spanish identity or some relatively open attitudes towards immigration (though to a lesser extent than the constitutional group).

We find, thus, two versions of Spanish national identity that share some key elements that conform what I have called the basic consensus of the contemporary Spanish national identity. As I have argued when analyzing the discourses of contemporary Spanish nationalism in chapter 2, the new national myths (Balfour and Quiroga: 155-69) mainly promoted by the Socialist governments of the 1980's and 1990's and assumed by the mainstream right wing: the transition to democracy, interpreted as a model of consensus and reconciliation, and 1978 constitution.

Side by side with this basic consensus, there are some clear lines of dissent, mainly around the unitarianist or pluralistic view of Spain.

The public debate about Spain's national status has been devoted to this issue, mainly as a response to the challenges posed by the alternative nationalisms. It is, thus, hardly surprising that this is the main source of dissent among the various understandings of the Spanish national identity.

There is a third group that has emerged from our analysis, comprising those respondents that expressed, with varying degrees, some sort of refusal or alienation from the Spanish national identity. This group, as we have seen, shares some common elements with the constitutional Spanish such as the positive attitudes towards immigration, but they are deeply different with respect to other issues, especially those that belong to what I have called the basic consensus of contemporary Spanish nationalism (pride in the transition and Constitution, defense of Spain's unity), that is not shared by the 'non-Spanish' group. This distance in the key elements of contemporary mainstream Spanish identity might explain the enduring conflicts between alternative and Spanish nationalisms that were not resolved during the transition to democracy in a stable way.

The strong correspondence between this structure of individual attitudes and the elites' discourses that I have outlined in chapter 2 opens room for a more detailed analysis of how a given conception of the nation is reproduced at the individual level. I will address this question in subsequent chapters, especially through the analysis of the results of the survey developed using the insights of the Q-methodological study.

The typology that I have defined in this chapter summarizes two different dimensions: the sense of belonging, or not, to the Spanish nation on one hand, and the diverse conceptions of Spain on the other. This is why, if we want to compare these results with the

classical dichotomy that classifies nationalisms in ethnic, or ethno cultural, and civic we should isolate this second dimension, and take into account only the traditional and constitutional identities. In order to develop a similar analysis of the alternative national identities (Catalan and Basque), we would need a very different statement sample. However, it should be underlined that in general terms the non-Spanish group is closer to the constitutional one in issues such as the openness towards immigrants than the traditional one.

Since its formulation by Friederich Meinecke and its further development by Hans Kohn (1944) the distinction between civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation has become an analytical tool with a very widespread usage in nationalism studies. Although the specific definitions of the two concepts vary greatly from one author to another, if we are to summarize them, we should say that the ethnic national identity relies on genealogic linkages, common history, and shared cultural traits and habits as constitutive elements of the nation. On the contrary, civic national identity is based on the existence of a political community and the legal and political equality of its citizens.

Considering the results obtained here, it seems pretty straightforward to trace a limited parallel between and the traditional Spanish and the ethno cultural identity, on one hand, and the constitutional and civic identities on the other. However, simply assimilating them to the classic dichotomy would be overtly simplistic. A detailed inspection of the results obtained here suggests a more complex picture. In the traditional group, together with history, language or religion, we find other national markers that play a salient role and are based on political institutions, such as the Constitution or the principle of equality and solidarity among citizens. This group's national identity is, thus, a sort of mix

between the ethno cultural and civic types of identity, that relies on a combination of different kinds of markers. On the other hand, the constitutional group has also some (weak) elements that belong to the ethno cultural type of identity, such as history or language.

The picture that emerges is, thus, more complex than what a simplistic translation of the ethnic-civic dichotomy would suggest. This complexity seems to support some of the critiques that have been formulated against the strictly dichotomous understandings of the ethnic-civic framework. For example, Bernard Yack's (1999) argument about the impossibility of a purely civic national identity, based only on universalistic principles without no references to a common cultural heritage as the basis of the sense of belonging to a national community. Perhaps our results fit better in A.D. Smith's (1991) understanding of ethnic and civic national identities as the two competing extremes of a continuum rather than a pure dichotomy. Following Smith, we should expect ever nationalism to include, in varying degrees, both political and ethno cultural elements. Here I have defined two ideal types that summarize the positions and understandings expressed by my respondents, and as we have seen, both are located in intermediate positions of a theoretical ethnic-civic continuum as defined by Smith. This is especially the case for the traditional version of the Spanish national identity, for which the role of political elements is very salient.

Finally, I want to underline that the goal of this exercise was the identification of the main types of Spanish national identity and the outline of the defining elements of each of them. However, the nature of the methodology and the reduced number of interviews, do not allow me to draw inferences from the results extracted and commented in this chapter. They should be understood as a set of guidelines or hypotheses to be tested in further research. However, it is a valuable exercise because it has provided a detailed

understanding of the main conceptions of Spain and allows for a more refined design of further research.

In the next chapter I show how the basic results obtained here were used to develop a set of survey questions to be applied in a mass survey (CIS2667). The survey results will allow me to test whether the typology defined here does indeed hold in the Spanish population, and evaluate the relative prevalence of each of the groups defined here. Moreover, in a latter chapter I will use the survey to approach the variables that explain why a given citizen holds, or not, a given type of national identity. This will provide more insights on how the ideas of the nation are spread in contemporary democratic nation states.

Chapter five

CONSTITUTIONAL AND TRADITIONAL SPANISH IDENTITIES: DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF A MEASUREMENT MODEL AND INSTRUMENT

5.1 Introduction

After having discussed in chapter 3 the limits of the traditional ethnic/civic scheme and the instruments that have been used in cross-national surveys to measure it, in the previous chapter I have provided detailed insights on the question of the varieties of the Spanish national identity. I have shown, through the study of a small sample of respondents based on the Q-methodology, how we can distinguish, basically, three types of attitudes towards Spain among its citizens. I have identified three groups of citizens, defined by their attitudes towards Spain. I have called them 'traditional Spanish', 'constitutional Spanish' and 'non-Spanish'. The interviews have allowed me to identify the contours of each of these types, their contents and the elements of consensus and dissent among them.

The 'constitutional identity' that has emerged in the interviews has, at its core, the consideration of the 1978 Constitution and the

transition to the democracy as the main sources of national pride. It is also rooted in history and has some linguistic component, although they are made compatible with a certain degree of openness to the internal plurality of Spain and to the incorporation of foreign immigration. It has a positive view of Spain and is strongly committed to the Europeanization process.

The traditional Spanish identity is defined mainly by its strongly unitarianist and organicist component, as well as the emotional attachment to the national symbols. The Spanish language, Spain's history and, to a lesser extent, the Catholic religion play very salient roles as the bases of this identity. The organicist-unitarian conception of Spain, the role of Catholicism and the national symbols are the main elements that separate this group from the constitutional one.

However, both groups share some core components that define a basic consensus within Spain: the pride in the 1978 Constitution and the transition to the democracy, the importance granted to the national unity (justified through the need of internal solidarity) and a sense of compatibility between the Spanish national identity and the European integration.

I have identified a third group, referred to as 'non-Spanish'. Although they share some elements with the constitutional Spaniards, such as a positive view of the immigration or Europe, they do not share the main *national consensus* build around the positive evaluation of the transition to democracy, the 1978 constitution or the need for preserving the national unity, in order to grant the internal solidarity among citizens and territories. Although the degree of alienation from Spain varies within this group, they seem very detached from the main national myths of the contemporary Spanish national identity. Indeed, I have been treating

it as a sort of residual category but a closer look to this group –that would require an expansion of the analysis that falls beond the scope of this work, would show what is alread evident in the work carried out so far: this group conflates on one hand alternative nationalists and on the other hand a small portion of the respondents in the rest of Spain that are associated with leftist positions and that, while not feeling alienated from the very idea of Spain, do not share the basic elements of Spanish nationalism in either of its current mainstream forms.

In the conclusions to the previous chapter I have discussed how these types roughly correspond to the main the main discourses of the Spanish and sub-state nationalisms within Spain, as outlined in chapter 2. This congruence, I have argued, provides some insights on how the discourses around the national identity are reproduced at the individual level and support the idea that the study of the contents and varieties of national identity has to take into account these discourses and incorporate them into the research design, rather than simply trying to identify, at the individual level, a reflection of the analytical dichotomy that distinguishes between ethnic and civic identities. As I have discussed, the relationship between the typology I have identified in the Spanish case and the classical dichotomy is complex and nuanced. Below, I address this issue in more detail.

However, the results presented in the previous chapter, as interesting as they might be, do not allow us to draw inferences to the whole Spanish population. Indeed, they do open a new set of questions that I want to address in this chapter: Do these three types correspond to the actual population's structure of attitudes? How prevalent is each of them? What are the relations among them?

In order to answer these questions, in this chapter I use the previous results as the key insights to develop a set of survey questions[59], and apply them to a representative random sample of the Spanish population (n=3192)[60]. The 12 questions selected for the survey were designed by adapting the most discriminatory statements in the Q-methodological study, so they should be useful for measuring the three types of Spanish national identity and testing the resulting model. Working with a representative sample will allow me to test the validity of the conclusions that stem from the interviews and make inferences about the relative prevalence of each type in the society and their determinants.

This chapter is organized as follows. In the first section I discuss the selection of the indicators and the process of adaptation from the Q-methodological study to the survey. In the second section I present the descriptive statistics and frequencies in order to give a sense of the general patterns of response. I also analyze the patterns of non-response and the problems they reveal about the quality of the selected indicators.

Then, I turn into the question of the structure of relationships among the indicators, that is the basis for the development of an empirically accurate typology of respondents. The third section provides an overview of the relationships among the variables and discusses the basic typology that emerges. As I will show, this typology is roughly identifiable with the one that I extracted from

---

[59]As in the case of the Q-methodology interviews, the design of the survey questions was developed within a research team composed by myself, Santiago Pérez-Nievas, Eduard Bonet and Iván Llamazares. Again, the analysis and interpretations are my own responsibility.

[60] The sample of 3192 is not proportional across the whole territory, as it includes independent samples for four Autonomous Communities (Catalonia, the Basque Country, Madrid and Valencia) plus a statewide sample. Appropriate weighting will correct for these imbalanced sample design.

the Q methodological analysis, although with some differences that I address extensively below.

These three factors, however, tap two different questions: On one hand, the opposition between the alternative and the Spanish identities, and on the other the differences between the main versions of Spanish national identity. These two questions are different from each other, and since the main focus of this dissertation is the second one, in the fourth section I take some steps to separate them empirically and devote a more detailed analysis to the comparison between the traditional and constitutional Spanish identities. First, I reduce the set of indicators used to those that were designed to capture and discriminate between the two, leaving aside the ones that were conceived for tapping the other question. I analyze, and test the typology that emerges from the restricted set of indicators through a variety of statistical procedures, and finally, construct two scales that measure these types in order to use them in further analyses.

In the fifth section, I address the issue of the differences within Spain. I test whether the same structure of attitudes makes sense when applied to Catalonia and the Basque Country, and if the meaning of the different indicators and scales is constant across territories. The presence of strong alternative nationalisms in these areas deeply influences the dynamics of identity politics there, so the separate analysis minimizes the confounding effects of alternative national identities and provides more sense of how what the typology is actually capturing.

The sixth section is devoted to a series of tests of external validity of the typology and scales defined, in order to be sure that they are meaningful both from a substantive and an empirical point of view.

To do so, I compare the scales developed with the more common indicators of national identity in Spain.

The seventh and last section is devoted to the discussion of the results and a general conclusion of the last three chapters, underlining the insights they have provided on the structure and contents of the Spanish national identity, and the implications of this analysis for further comparative work. I discuss the general meaning of the typology and the implications of the results obtained for the understanding of Spanish nationalism, but also for the general question of the varieties of national identity at the individual level and the micro-foundations of the processes of nation building by contemporary democratic states.

5.2 Developing indicators of the varieties of the Spanish national identity

In this section I briefly present the procedure followed for developing the set of indicators that constitute the basis of the analysis in this chapter. These indicators intend to capture the relevant varieties of the Spanish national identity. As I have already said, we used the results of the Q-methodological analysis as the departing point. In order to develop the indicators, we chose 12 out of the 42 statements that we had applied in the Q-interviews. The selection criteria were mainly based on two considerations: First, we chose those indicators that had been more useful for discriminating among types of respondents, and second we tried to preserve the variety in the topics covered b them, as we did in the original selection of 47 statements for the Q methodology.

Table 5.1 reproduces the original statements, and their scores in each of the factors, as well as the differences between pairs of

factors. This table provides a sense of the ability of the statements to discriminate among types of respondents. It can be seen how most of the selected statements selected did well in discriminating among types of respondents. We can see how some statements are especially useful in discriminating between the constitutional and traditional Spanish identities and some of them between the constitutional and what I called non-Spanish.

Table 5.1: *Discriminating statements, Q-methodology*

	Statement	F1 Non-Spanish	F2 Constitu-tional	F3 Traditi-onal	Differences F1-F2	Differences F2-F3
2	A nation as such has to have only one culture and language. This is why Spain is not a nation, but rather a complex set of nations.	1	-2	-4	3	2
6	We should not be surprised that the Catalans or Basques want to have their own sports federations, as in the case of Scotland or Wales.	3	0	-3	3	3
10	Spain has to remain united to grant the equality among all citizens and solidarity among the various autonomous communities.	-1	2	5	3	3
12	The Spainsh language is a basic element of our identity	1	1	5	0	4
13	Maybe Castilian is the majority's language, but Galician, Catalan or Basque are also Spanish languages that we have to support.	3	5	2	2	3
20	In the past, the Spanish nation was identified with Catholicism. This is something that today does not have any sense and	4	2	-2	2	4

that should be avoided.

28	The history of Spain that we share, with its good and bad things, is what makes all of us Spaniards	1	4	4	3	0
29	Countries have their own character, a kind of soul that is manifested in their history's deeds: in the case of Spain they are the Cid, the Catholic Kings and the discovery of America, among other.	-1	-3	1	2	2
30	Spain's flag is my flag and I respect it, but it does not create an emotion in me.	2	0	-2	2	2
31	When I listen to Spain's national anthem and see Spain's flag wave I fell something special, I feel that I am part of a community I am proud of.	-5	-1	2	4	3
42	Even if my documents are issued by Spanish institutions, I do not consider myself a Spaniard.	2	-3	-5	5	2
46	I value positively the Constitution because it has been a very useful instrument to keep the country united.	0	4	4	4	0

In order to make the statements useful for being applied in a closed questionnaire, they had to be adapted, made shorter and their complexity reduced. In this process, the contents of some of the statements remained basically unchanged, while in other cases the adaptation did modify the contents of the original statements.

As I will discuss below, this process might have lead to some problems with the meaning of the indicators and their ability to

capture what we originally intended to measure. This points to a limit of the use of Q-methodology as a basis for developing survey questions, at least in the way we applied it, as I will also discuss in more detail in this chapter.

Table 5.2 compares the original wording of the statements in the Q-methodology to the indicators actually used in the survey. I maintain the original Spanish version in order to allow the reader to fully evaluate the procedure as it was conducted. Below I offer an English translation of the indicators as they were applied to the survey.[61]

As it can be appreciated in this table, most of the indicators were adapted in a pretty straightforward way, while some of them suffered deeper modifications. The reasons behind these changes were basically related to the need of simplicity inherent in any mass survey questionnaire, in which there is no interaction between the researcher and the respondent and there are more time constraints.

Table 5.2: *From Q-statements to survey indicators*

Statements used in the Q-methodology	Statements used in the survey CIS-2667
Adapted without substantial variation in contents	
España debe mantenerse unida para garantizar la igualdad entre todos los ciudadanos y la solidaridad entre las distintas Comunidades Autónomas (10)	España debe mantenerse unida para garantizar la igualdad entre todos los ciudadanos y la solidaridad entre las C.C.A.A.
Respeto la bandera de España, pero no despierta ninguna emoción en mí (30)	La bandera de España no despierta ninguna emoción en mí

---

[61] For a translation of the Q methodology statements, see Appendix A.

Cuando escucho el himno nacional de España y veo ondear la bandera de España siento algo especial, siento que formo parte de una comunidad de la que me enorgullezco (31)	Cuando escucho el himno nacional de España, siento que formo parte de una comunidad de la que me enorgullezco
Aunque mis documentos oficiales estén expedidos por instituciones españolas, yo no me considero español (42)	Aunque mis documentos oficiales son españoles, yo no me considero español
La historia de España que compartimos, con sus cosas buenas y malas, es la que nos hace a todos españoles (28)	La historia que compartimos, con sus cosas buenas y malas, es la que nos hace a todos los españoles
Quizás el castellano sea la lengua de la mayoría, pero el gallego, el catalán o el vasco también son lenguas españolas que debemos apoyar (13)	Quizás el castellano sea la lengua de la mayoría, pero el gallego, el catalán o el euskera también son lenguas españolas
El idioma español es un elemento básico de nuestra identidad (12)	El idioma español es un elemento básico de nuestra identidad
Valoro positivamente la Constitución porque ha sido un instrumento muy útil para mantener unido el país (46)	Valoro positivamente la Constitución, porque ha sido un instrumento útil para mantener unido el país
Los países tienen un carácter propio, una especie de alma, que se manifiesta en las gestas de su historia: para España son el Cid, los Reyes Católicos, el descubrimiento de América, entre otros (29)	Los países tienen un carácter propio que se manifiesta en episodios de su historia: para España podrían ser el Cid, los Reyes Católicos, el descubrimiento de América, entre otros.

Adapted with some variation in contents

Una nación como tal debe tener una sola cultura y un solo idioma, por eso me parece que España no es una nación sino una agrupación compleja de naciones (2)	España es un Estado y no una nación
No debe extrañarnos que los catalanes o los vascos quieran tener federaciones de deporte propias, como sucede por ejemplo en Escocia o Gales (6)	Cataluña, el País Vasco y Galicia deberían poder tener selecciones deportivas propias, si así lo desean sus ciudadanos
En el pasado se identificó la nación española con el catolicismo. Esto es algo que hoy no tiene sentido y habría que evitar (20)	El catolicismo es muy importante como parte de la identidad española

So we have twelve indicators in the survey aimed at capturing the various dimensions of the Spanish national identity. As I have said, we tried to preserve the variety in the topics covered by the indicators, following the scheme used in the design of the Q-methodological study. There, we defined nine subtopics: Unitarianism/pluralism, languages, immigration, religion, history, symbols, Europe, civic principles and lifestyle. Here we preserve most of these topics, and only leave aside those that proved completely consensual (Europe, lifestyle) or that could be thought as measuring a different set of attitudes (immigration). In table 5.3 I present the wording of the indicators and an English translation:

Table 5.3: *Survey indicators. Original, and English translation*

		Original wording	**English translation**
1	State-nation	España es un Estado y no una nación	*Spain is a state and not a nation*
2	Language	El idioma español es un elemento básico de nuestra identidad	*The Spanish language is a basic component of our identity*
3	Documents	Aunque mis documentos oficiales son españoles, yo no me considero español	*Even if my official documents are Spanish, I do not consider myself a spaniard*
4	History 1	Los países tienen un carácter propio que se manifiesta en episodios de su historia: para España podrían ser el Cid, los Reyes Católicos, el descubrimiento de América, entre otros	*Countries do have their own character that is made evident in episodes of their history. For Spain they could be the Cid, the Catholic Kings, the discovery of America, among others*
5	Anthem	Cuando escucho el himno nacional de España, siento que formo parte de una comunidad de la que me enorgullezco	*When I hear to the Spanish national anthem, I feel that I am part of a community which I am proud of*
6	Other languages	Quizás el castellano sea la lengua de la mayoría, pero el gallego, el catalán o el euskera también son lenguas españolas	*Maybe castillian is the majority's language, but galician, catalan and basque are also Spanish languages*

7	United	España debe mantenerse unida para garantizar la igualdad entre todos los ciudadanos y la solidaridad entre las distintas CA.	*Spain has to remain united in order to guarantee the equality among all citizens and the solidarity among autonomous communities*
8	Flag negative	La bandera de España no despierta ninguna emoción en mí	*The Spain's flag does not create any emotion in me*
9	Catholicism	El catolicismo es muy importante como parte de la identidad española	*Catholicism is very important as a part of the Spanish identity*
10	Constitution	Valoro positivamente la Constitución, porque ha sido un instrumento muy útil para mantener unido el país	*I value in a positive way the Constitution because it has been a very important tool for keeping the country united*
11	Sports	Cataluña, el País Vaso y Galicia deberían poder tener selecciones deportivos propias, si así lo desean sus ciudadanos	*Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia should be able to have their own sport national teams if that's what their citizens desire.*
12	History 2	La historia que compartimos, con sus cosas buenas y malas, es la que nos hace a todos españoles	*The history we share, with its good and bad things, is what makes us all spaniards*

The general aim of these indicators was to capture the different types of national identity we identified. It is worth, however, discussing with some more detail the relationship between the indicators and the concepts they intend to measure and, thus, how each of them is expected to relate to the relevant types of national identity.

1. - The 'state-nation' indicator (*Spain is a state and not a nation*) is intended to capture the 'non-Spanish' type of citizens: those that do not consider Spain to be a nation. It is directly related to the well-known summary of the mixed feelings of Spanish citizens by Juan J. Linz "Spain ... is a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large part of the Spanish population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities" (Linz, 1973). This indicator will also be useful to qualify some claims (Béjar, 2008) that argue that

the mainstream of the new Spanish nationalism does consider Spain as a state but not a nation.

2. - 'Documents' (*Even if my official documents are Spanish, I do not consider myself a Spaniard*) is, again, focused on discriminating between those that share a Spanish national identity from those that do not consider themselves to be Spaniards despite their legal status as Spanish citizens.

3. - The language indicator (*The Spanish language is a basic component of our identity*) that did separate between the so-called constitutional and 'traditional' conceptions of the Spanish national identity in the Q-methodological analysis, is intended to capture a cultural and conception of Spanishness, that we mainly attributed to the traditional Spanish identity.

4. -'History 1' (*Countries do have their own character that is made evident in episodes of their history. For Spain they could be the Cid, the Catholic Kings, the discovery of America, among others*): It was designed to capture the degree of consensus around the traditionalist, organicist conception of Spain's history that, as I have discussed elsewhere, is a central feature of the Spanish nationalism's discourse.

5. -We include another indicator referring to history, labeled 'History 2' (*The history we share, with its good and bad things, is what makes us all Spaniards*), that aims at capturing a critical and more nuanced conception of Spain's history as a source of national identification and, thus, it is expected to be less biased towards the traditionalist Spanish identity while addressing the claim that also the constitutional Spanish nationalism relies heavily in history as one if its core legitimizing instruments.

6/7. -'Anthem' (*When I listen to the Spanish national anthem, I feel that I am part of a community which I am proud of*) and 'Flag negative' (*Spain's flag does not create any emotion in me*) were intended to measure the intensity of the identification with the official symbols of Spain, related to both an affective dimension of the Spanish national identity and the degree of consensus around two symbols that have been extremely divisive in the past, and that despite being included in the Constitution or the current legal system, are not fully consensual yet.

8/9. -'Constitution' (*I value in a positive way the Constitution because it has been a very important tool for keeping the country united*) and 'United' (*Spain has to remain united in order to guarantee the equality among all citizens and the solidarity among autonomous communities*) are two indicators that aim at capturing the new discourse in which the 1978 Constitution and the need solidarity among regions or equality among citizens are central arguments for defending the Spanish national unity. These two are the core elements of the constitutional Spanish nationalism.

10/11. - 'Other languages' (*Perhaps Castilian is the language of the majority, but Galician, Catalan and Basque are also Spanish languages*) and 'Sports' (*Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia should be able to have their own sport national teams if that's what their citizens desire*) are meant to capture the unitarianist-plural dimension that separates, not only the Spanish national identity from the alternative ones, but also the traditionalist and constitutional versions of the former.

12. - Finally, we included an item on Catholicism (*Catholicism is very important as a part of the Spanish identity*). The role of religion has been especially divisive through the history of the Spanish nationalism, and Catholicism as a foundation for national

identity has emerged in previous analysis as representing a separate dimension in itself.

5.3 Analysis: Frequencies, descriptive statistics and patterns of non-response

I start the analysis of the survey results by inspecting the distribution of responses to the twelve indicators, as well as some basic descriptive statistics. This preliminary analysis will provide a sense of the overall degree of consensus that each statement generates among our respondents.

Table 5.4: *National identity batteries. Frequencies and Missing cases*

	State-nation		Documents		United		Constitution	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Strongly agree	313	12.2	122	3.91	1,162	38.67	820	27.22
Agree	826	32.19	287	9.2	1,217	40.5	1,593	52.87
Nor agree nor disagree	364	14.19	178	5.71	245	8.15	278	9.23
Disagree	705	27.47	953	30.55	270	8.99	236	7.83
Strongly disagree	358	13.95	1,579	50.63	111	3.69	86	2.85
Total	2,566	100	3,119	100	3,005	100	3,013	100
Missing	*628*	*19.66*	*75*	*2.35*	*189*	*5.92*	*181*	*5.67*

	Language		Other Languages		History 1		History 2	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Strongly agree	1,187	38.33	569	20.23	569	20.23	686	23.25
Agree	1,464	47.27	1,493	53.08	1,493	53.08	1,603	54.32
Nor agree nor disagree	150	4.84	335	11.91	335	11.91	319	10.81

Disagree	217	7.01	305	10.84	305	10.84	267	9.05
Strongly disagree	79	2.55	111	3.95	111	3.95	76	2.58
Total	3,097	100	2,813	100	2,813	100	2,951	100
Missing	*97*	*3.04*	*381*	*11.93*	*381*	*11.93*	*243*	*7.61*

	Anthem		**Flag Negative**		**Sports**		**Catholicism**	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Strongly agree	526	17.06	372	11.95	448	16.13	330	10.86
Agree	1,152	37.37	669	21.48	820	29.53	997	32.81
Nor agree nor disagree	487	15.8	456	14.64	328	11.81	476	15.66
Disagree	574	18.62	995	31.95	584	21.03	729	23.99
Strongly disagree	344	11.16	622	19.97	597	21.5	507	16.68
Total	3,083	100	3,114	100	2,777	100	3,039	100
Missing	*111*	*3.48*	*80*	*2.5*	*417*	*13.06*	*155*	*4.85*

In table 5.4 we can appreciate how most items produced a relatively high consensus rate, be it positive or negative, depending on the direction of the indicator. We can say that the Spanish national identity is, in general terms, widely shared among Spanish citizens. The general consensus, though, presents some variations that are worth exploring. In the following table (5.5) I have aggregated the response categories in order to simplify the presentation and the interpretation: I show the percentage of respondents that had placed themselves in the top two and the bottom two categories, while keeping the *neutral* category separate from the rest.

Table 5.5: *National identity batteries. Frequencies and descriptives*

1 State-nation		2 Documents		3 United	
SA+A	44.39	SA+A	13.11	SA+A	79.17
Neutral	14.19	Neutral	5.71	Neutral	8.15
D+SA	41.42	D+SA	81.18	D+SA	12.68
Mean	*3.01*	*Mean*	*4.12*	*Mean*	*4.01*
Std. Dev.	*1.28*	*Std. Dev.*	*0.96*	*Std. Dev.*	*1.08*

4 Constitution		5 Language		6 Other languages	
SA+A	80.09	SA+A	85.6	SA+A	72.67
Neutral	9.23	Neutral	4.84	Neutral	9.07
D+SA	10.68	D+SA	9.56	D+SA	18.27
Mean	*3.94*	*Mean*	*1.85*	*Mean*	*3.70*
Std. Dev.	*0.96*	*Std. Dev.*	*1.12*	*Std. Dev.*	*1.13*

7 History 1		8 History 2		9 Anthem	
SA+A	73.31	SA+A	77.57	SA+A	54.43
Neutral	11.91	Neutral	10.81	Neutral	15.8
D+SA	14.79	D+SA	11.63	D+SA	29.78
Mean	*3.75*	*Mean*	*3.87*	*Mean*	*3.31*
Std. Dev.	*1.02*	*Std. Dev.*	*0.96*	*Std. Dev.*	*1.26*

10 Flag negative		11 Sports		12 Catholicism	
SA+A	33.43	SA+A	45.66	SA+A	43.67
Neutral	14.64	Neutral	11.81	Neutral	15.66
D+SA	51.92	D+SA	42.53	D+SA	40.67
Mean	*2.73*	*Mean*	*2.98*	*Mean*	*2.97*
Std. Dev.	*1.32*	*Std. Dev.*	*1.42*	*Std. Dev.*	*1.29*

Here we can clearly see how in most variables there is a group of 70% or more of the sample concentrated in a pair of categories, be it in the positive (Strongly agree+agree) or negative (strongly disagree+ disagree), depending on the direction of the question. However, five of them do not show this pattern of consensus, and the respondents appear more divided in their reactions to the statements, which is also reflected in higher standard deviations.

These are 'state-nation', 'anthem', 'flag negative', 'Catholicism' and 'sports'. Two of these variables ('state-nation' and 'sports') do also show a high number of non-responses that might be indicating some problems. I discuss this issue below.

It is important to note that the two variables related to the identification with the national symbols generate relatively low levels of consensus: around 50-55% of the sample declares positive reactions to them, while around 15% is neutral and over 30% expresses negative reactions to the Spanish constitutional symbolic assets. This is an interesting result that merits some more discussion, and is probably related to the contested nature of the Spanish national symbols.

The relatively low levels of consensus with Catholicism as a foundation of the national identity are congruent with the results obtained in chapter 3 in showing that National-Catholicism is a divisive view of the Spanish national identity. However, over 43% of the sample did agree with the importance of Catholicism as a foundation of the Spanish national identity, which is still a significant percentage not to be dismissed.

In the following sections I will analyze the implications of these divergent overall patterns of response and the relationships among the indicators for the definition and measurement of the varieties of Spanish national identity. But first I briefly discuss the patterns of non-response, because they are very important to assess the quality of the indicators.

Non-response and missing cases
In developing survey questions, one of our main concerns must be minimizing the non-responses in order to get as close as possible to a representative sample. A high level of missing cases severely

distorts the sample, as it was designed to be representative in its integrity. This might lead to biased results, especially because often the cases are not missing at random but follow some clear patterns. Table 5.6 shows the absolute number of missing cases and the percentage of the total sample they represent.

Table 5.6: *National identity indicators. Missing cases*

		Missing cases	**Percent**
1	State-nation	*628*	*19.66*
2	Language	*97*	*3.04*
3	Documents	*75*	*2.35*
4	History 1	*381*	*11.93*
5	Anthem	*111*	*3.48*
6	Other languages	*205*	*6.42*
7	United	*189*	*5.92*
8	Flag negative	*80*	*2.5*
9	Catholicism	*155*	*4.85*
10	Constitution	*181*	*5.67*
11	Sports	*417*	*13.06*
12	History 2	*243*	*7.61*

Here we can see how three of our indicators present some problems as reflected by the high share of non-responses: State-nation (19,66%), Sports (13,06) and History 1 (11,93). These high percentages are probably related to the conceptual complexity (in the case of State-nation), their complex wording (History 1) or to the fact that they address issues whose saliency is not uniform across Spain (Sports).

An indication that the complexity of the wording might be introducing some bias in the sample through uneven levels of non-response across educational groups can be clearly seen in table 5.7, which compares the percentage of missing cases in each category of educational levels:

Table 5.7: *Missing cases by educational attainment*

	State nation	Soul	Sports
Primary or less	30.55	21.65	24.46
Secondary	19.66	11.49	9.89
High secondary	14.38	6.65	7.87
Short tertiary	13.38	7.02	9.03
Tertiary	8.91	3.05	6.36
Total	19.66	11.93	13.06

Even if some unbalance in the levels of non-response across educational groups is quite common in most survey questions, the magnitude of the differences and the overall levels of missing cases should be a matter of concern, given that they are potentially introducing a severe bias in the sample. After deleting these cases, the resulting analysis would be based on a sample biased towards the highly educated segments of the population.

I have suggested that the number of missing cases in the 'sports' variable might be due to its uneven saliency across different autonomous communities. Indeed, this has been a matter of intense public debate in some places, such as Catalonia, while in some others it has not been as important. The following table shows the percentages of non-response in this variable across autonomous communities:

Table 5.8: *"Sports". Missing cases by Autonomous Community*

Autonomous Community	Missing cases	Percentage
Andalucía	44	16.79
Aragón	9	20.00
Asturias	17	43.59
Baleares (Islas)	3	11.54
Canarias	14	25.00
Cantabria	12	60.00

Castilla La Mancha	6	9.38
Castilla y León	19	21.35
Cataluña	43	7.33
Valencia	66	11.00
Extremadura	12	32.43
Galicia	25	25.25
Madrid	59	9.95
Murcia	8	18.18
Navarra	5	23.81
País Vasco	73	12.17
Rioja (La)	0	0.00
Total	*417*	*13.06*

There are indeed relevant differences across Autonomous Communities. A Chi-square test for independence between the two variables in this table (missing/non missing and Autonomous community) shows that the differences we observe are statistically significant at the 0.001 level). It should be noted, for example, that in Catalonia only 7% of the sample did not respond the question, while in several other communities the rate was well above 20%.

This brief review evidences the potential risks of the non-responses in terms of biasing our sample. The overall levels and distribution of missing cases in some variables should be taken into account when conducting the analyses, and might also lead us to rethink some of the indicators that we developed.

The most problematic variable seems to be 'state nation', that shows a very high and unbalanced level of non-response. The complexity of the conceptual distinction between 'state' and 'nation' seems to be excessive for an important segment of the population, that finds it hard to distinguish between both concepts. This might also explain the higher levels of dispersion in the responses to this question compared to most of the others.

5.4 Relationships among variables: towards a typology

I now turn to the analysis of the relationships among the indicators that will give us the clues of the varieties of national identity that the indicators are measuring. The first step in this analysis is to check a table of correlations among the 12 variables. Table 5.9 shows the correlations that are statistically significant (at the .05 level).

A first inspection of the table shows that in most cases there are relatively strong correlations among the variables, over +/- 0.4 in most cases, although State-nation and Catholicism appear to be less correlated with the rest of the indicators. The only exception is the variable 'other languages', that is almost uncorrelated with the rest of the indicators. To summarize these results in table 5.10 I have computed the correlation between each variable and an additive scale constructed with the rest of them (also known as item-rest correlation).

Table 5.10: *National identity indicators. Item-rest correlations*

Item	Item-rest correlation
State-nation*	0.35
Language	0.62
Documents*	0.60
History 1	0.44
Anthem	0.65
Other languages	*-0.005*
United	0.68
Flag negative*	0.62
Catholicism	0.30
Constitution	0.57
Sports*	0.51
History 2	0.56

Table 5.9. *National identity indicators. Bivariate correlations*

	State-nation	Language	Documents	History 1	Anthem	Other lang	United	Flag neg.	Catholicism	Constitu-tion	Sports
State-nation	1.00										
Language	-0.24	1.00									
Documents	0.28	-0.59	1.00								
History 1	-0.17	0.41	-0.33	1.00							
Anthem	-0.31	0.50	-0.52	0.40	1.00						
Other lang	0.04	0.08	-0.09	0.07		1.00					
United	-0.29	0.59	-0.59	0.35	0.56	0.05	1.00				
Flag neg.	0.32	-0.44	0.50	-0.32	-0.65	0.05	-0.53	1.00			
Catholicism	-0.17	0.23	-0.15	0.25	0.37	-0.05	0.25	-0.31	1.00		
Constitution	-0.22	0.51	-0.50	0.32	0.45	0.13	0.58	-0.42	0.21	1.00	
Sports	0.29	-0.43	0.45	-0.24	-0.46	0.13	-0.49	0.48	-0.17	-0.35	1.00
History 2	-0.21	0.48	-0.47	0.41	0.46	0.11	0.53	-0.41	0.22	0.50	-0.34

Table 5.10 shows in a clearer way what the previous one suggested: most items do have moderately high correlations with the rest of the battery, except for 'other languages', that for some reason does not seem to work well. Probably the final wording of the item is too ambiguous: when adapting it from the Q-methodological statement it lost half of it content, that expressed the need for support for the other languages. Apparently that created some interpretation problems. I will not use this item for the calculation of the typologies.

The correlation matrix is the basis for a further inspection of the data. To check if these eleven variables are indeed capturing what I intend them to capture (the three types of identity that I have defined) or not, the first thing to do is to conduct an exploratory factor analysis.

To check whether the resulting structure conforms to my predictions or not, I perform a Principal Components Analysis with all the variables except 'other languages'. This will provide a sense on the underlying dimensions that these variables are measuring. Table 5.11 shows the Eigen values of the computed components:

Table 5.11. *National identity indicators. Principal Components Analysis (I)*

Component	Eigen value	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Comp1	*4.7235*	*3.71371*	*0.4294*	*0.4294*
Comp2	*1.00979*	*.0673737*	*0.0918*	*0.5212*
Comp3	*.942419*	*.145445*	*0.0857*	*0.6069*
Comp4	.796974	.102863	0.0725	0.6793
Comp5	.694111	.0760871	0.0631	0.7424
Comp6	.618024	.0482624	0.0562	0.7986

Even if the standard practice is to consider those components with Eigen values greater than one, here I will analyze the results obtained by extracting three components, given that the third one has an Eigen value very close to one (.94). I show the factor loadings of the rotated components.

I use an obliquous, oblimin rotation in order to allow the factors to be correlated among them, given that I do not have any theoretical reason to impose the restriction of orthogonality. On the contrary, considering what I have argued in chapter 2 -and the results of the analysis carried out in chapter 3- it seems reasonable to expect that on one hand the constitutional Spanish identity and the traditional one will be positively correlated, and on the other the non-Spanish identity will be negatively correlated with them. Indeed, it seems that the reasonable expectation is that the constitutional and traditional versions of the Spanish national identity will be 'cumulative': probably most people will share the first one and only some of them do hold the second one, as suggested by Anthony Heath for the British case (Heath and Tilley, 2005).

Table 5.12 shows the factor loadings for the three rotated components. I print in bold the higher factor loading for each variable, even if some of them fall below the standard cut points (usually 0.4).

In this table we can appreciate the basic structure of attitudes that our eleven indicators seem to capture. It does indeed correspond relatively well to our theoretical expectations. The first factor, that we could label as 'Constitutional Spanish identity' includes a positive relationship with the items 'Language', 'United', 'Constitution' and 'History 2', as well as a strong, negative relationship with 'documents'. This factor reflects a conception of Spain that places a strong emphasis in the unity, based on the

current 1978 Constitution and the need for solidarity among autonomous communities. It also expresses a strong rejection of the negation of the Spanish identity ('Documents') and embraces a critical understanding of the common history as a basis for national unity and cohesiveness (History 2).

Table 5.12: *National identity indicators. Principal Components Analysis (II)*

	Comp1	**Comp2**	**Comp3**	**Unexplained**
State-nation	0.0324	0.0467	**0.8213**	.2493
Language	**0.3956**	-0.0689	-0.0174	.3926
Documents	**-0.3828**	0.1546	0.1166	.3989
History 1	0.2283	**0.3363**	0.1990	.5498
Anthem	0.2386	**0.3050**	-0.1731	.3468
United	**0.3936**	0.0069	-0.0242	.3377
Flag neg.	-0.1909	-0.2671	**0.2784**	.4134
Catholicism	-0.0584	**0.8176**	0.0422	.196
Constitution	**0.4372**	-0.1523	0.2074	.412
Sports	-0.2127	0.0037	**0.3087**	.5817
History 2	**0.3945**	-0.0080	0.1544	.4463

The second factor, that fits quite well in a traditional/symbolic dimension of the Spanish national identity, comprises Catholicism as an important source of identity as well as a strong identification with the national anthem. The organicist interpretation of the Spanish history through its main nationalist myths (History 1) is also a part of this traditional factor. It reflects, thus, a more traditional conception of the Spanishness, linked to the national-Catholicism and with a greater affective-symbolic load.

Finally, the third factor that we have identified in the analysis is congruent with a conception of Spain as a State but not as a nation. It is also related to the lack of emotional identification with the Spanish flag and with the idea that Catalonia, the Basque Country

and Galicia should be able to have their own national sports teams. This third factor could be reflecting the non-Spanish factor we identified in the Q-methodological study or, rather, a pluralistic conception of Spain shared by some segments of the Spanish population that, while do not necessarily reject the Spanish identity, they do not consider it to be a unique nation embracing all the territory (this would be congruent with the 'multinational federalism' conception of Spain prevalent among some segments of the Spanish left, as defined by Núñez Siexas (2001).

So far I have been able to empirically identify a typology of attitudes towards Spain and the Spanish national identity that is congruent with both the findings of the Q-methodological research and the basic typology of elite discourses that I have discussed in chapter 2. Below, I discuss in greater detail these relationships and their implications for my overall argument.

However, as I have already discussed, it is important to refine the analysis by separating the question of the alternative identities from the question of the main types of the Spanish identity, which indeed constitute my object of study. In the next section I take some steps for doing that, starting from the reduction of the set of indicators upon which the typology is based.

5.5 Traditional and constitutional identities: testing the measurement model

The three types identified until now reflect two analytically different dimensions: the center-periphery divide (that separates those that do share the Spanish national identity from those that do not consider themselves nationally Spaniards) and another one that reflects different conceptions –traditional and 'constitutional'-

within the Spanish national identity. This dissertation is focused on the second dimension, so in this section I will try to isolate it from the first one to sharpen the analysis and make it clearer.

In order to focus only on the *internal* dimensions, and get rid of the center-periphery one, we should work with those indicators that were though in the first place for capturing the traditional-constitutional divide within the Spanish national identity. I have selected the eight indicators that were designed to give us some information on the position of individuals within this conceptual pair. So I will exclude the variables 'Sports', 'State-nation' and 'Documents', that were conceived for capturing the position of the citizens in the Spanish vs. alternative identities dimension, rather than the traditional-constitutional Spanish identity. The structure we should expect, with the eight selected indicators, according to the theoretical basis and the exploratory results is represented in the following figure:

Figure 5.1: *National identity indicators. Measurement model*

The first step is to replicate the exploratory factor analysis, as I did with the full set of indicators, to have a sense of the underlying structure.

Table 5.13: *National identity. Restricted Principal Components Analysis (I)*

Component	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Comp1	*3.77677*	*2.79603*	*0.4721*	*0.4721*
Comp2	*.980743*	*.20853*	*0.1226*	*0.5947*
Comp3	.772213	.120096	0.0965	0.6912
Comp4	.652117	.0899947	0.0815	0.7727
Comp5	.562122	.0494698	0.0703	0.8430
Comp6	.512652	.122365	0.0641	0.9071
Comp7	.390287	.0371926	0.0488	0.9559
Comp8	.353094	.	0.0441	1.0000

Table 5.14: *National identity. Restricted Principal Components Analysis (II)*

Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Unexplained
Language	0.4432	-0.0738	.409
History 1	0.2477	0.1875	.6495
Anthem	0.2713	0.3814	.3311
United	0.4429	0.0083	.342
Flag negative	-0.2284	-0.3913	.4205
Catholicism	-0.0956	0.7816	.2434
Constitution	0.4656	-0.2028	.4183
History 2	0.4409	-0.0933	.4286

The results we get are basically the expected two-factor structure, of 'constitutional' and 'traditional' identity. The constitutional identity includes the conception of the Spanish language as an important source of identity, as well as a positive evaluation of the Spanish Constitution, the need for unity and solidarity among territories and a historicist, albeit critical, foundation for the Spanish identity. The traditional one includes the symbolic dimension (anthem and flag)

together with Catholicism as a relevant marker. Interestingly, the organicist understanding of Spain's history as reflecting the immanent character of the nation appears now divided between the two factors, loading even slightly more in the constitutional one. The correlation between these two factors is, as expected, positive and strong (0,50).

Finally, in order to confirm the results, I conduct a Confirmatory Factor Analysis that provides a test of the fit between the model and the data. I will test first the theoretically ground model, as represented in figure 5.1:

Table 5.15: *National identity. Measurement model, Fit indices*

Model	Chi^2	p	df	RMR	RMSEA	GFI	AGFI
2 factor	139.394	.000	19	.052	.051	.976	.954

These results provide partial support for the proposed model. Although the Chi-Square test is significant –and, thus, suggests a poor fit of the model, the other fit indices show reasonably good values. Given the Chi-square sensitivity to big samples, we must check other fit indices to test whether we can trust the model. The other indices reported, both the RMSEA and RMR on one hand, and the GFI and AGFI on the other hand, seem to provide enough confidence that the model fits the data reasonably well.[62]

Table 5.16 represents the structure of relations between latent variables and indicators. As we can see, the model performs relatively well, even if the R^2 of the 'Catholicism' variable is low

---

[62] The standard cut point for RMR and RMSEA is 0.05, while for GFI and AGFI a value larger than 0.9 or 0.95 indicate good fit. The other fit indices reported by EQS consistently show a good fit of the proposed model (Gerbing and Anderson, 1993; For a general discussion of the various fit indices in the CFA, see, among others, Marsh and Balla, 1994).

(.16), which implies that this variable's variance is not well explained by the two-factor model.

Table 5.16: *National identity. Measurement model, coefficients and R-squared*

Coefficients (standardized solution)						R squared
Language	.697	F1	+	.717	E2	.486
History1	.523	F2	+	.852	E4	.274
Anthem	.826	F2	+	.563	E5	.683
United	.796	F1	+	.605	E6	.634
Flag neg.	-.729	F2	+	.684	E7	.532
Catholic	.405	F2	+	.915	E8	.164
Constitution	.655	F1	+	.756	E9	.429
History 2	.685	F1	+	.729	E11	.469

*F1 stands for 'constitutional Spanish identity' and F2 for the traditional one.

The Lagrange Multiplier test suggests a modification of the model that would improve its fit: adding an extra parameter linking the 'soul' indicator to the constitutional factor. This is indeed the same modification that was suggested by the exploratory factor analysis. This variable seems to be located somewhere in between the two factors. As we can see in table 5.17, adding this parameter of the model would improve the overall fit, with a significant drop in the Chi square (even if it would still remain significant):

Table 5.17: *National identity. Modified measurement model, Fit indices*

Model	Chi^2	p	*df*	RMR	RMSEA	GFI	AGFI
2 factors, History 1 in both	95.013	.000	18	.036	.042	.984	.968

However, I prefer to stay with the more parsimonious and clear model that is theoretically meaningful. In any case, this ambivalent

position of the 'soul' indicator is interesting and should be taken into account in the discussion and interpretation of the results.

So far I have defined and tested a measurement model for the varieties of the Spanish national identity, based on two underlying dimensions: the constitutional and traditional Spanish identities. It is important to note that these two variables do not constitute the two extremes of a single continuum but rather two separate, albeit highly correlated latent variables.

In order to test the external validity of the constructs, we have to compute two scales that account for these latent variables. For doing so there are basically two strategies: either calculating the scores for each extracted component in the factor analysis or simply working with an additive scale of each set of indicators. The first option implies retaining only the commonalties shared by the indicators and getting rid of the 'noise' produced by the unique variance of each of them. It also weights each indicator according to its correlation with the underlying factor. The disadvantages are mainly two: on one hand the interpretation of the resulting variables becomes less clear and, thus, it is hard to communicate. On the other hand, getting rid of the unique variance of the indicators might introduce some bias and especially, loss of information. This is basically why I will work with the more straightforward solution of additive scales of each set of indicators, although I will reverse those items that were formulated negatively in the questionnaire (in order to avoid the so-called 'yeah-saying' bias). However, I will check the correlation between the resulting scales and the scores for the extracted principal components:

Table 5.18: *Principal components. Correlation*

	Sum scale constitutional	Sum scale traditional
Scores for component 1 "constitutional"	0.9780	
Scores for component2 "traditional"		0.9210

Here we can see how these two different options are indeed very similar, so choosing the additive scales for further analysis does not really imply a substantial loss of information with respect to the scored components. The scales, thus, are constructed by simply adding the values of the corresponding variables. The constitutional scale comprises the variables Language, United, Constitution and History 2. The traditional scale comprises History 1, Anthem, Flag negative and Catholicism.

Table 5.19: *Constitutional and Traditional Components*

Constitutional	Traditional
Language	History 1
United	Anthem
Constitution	Flag negative
History 2	Catholicism

Once the scales have been clearly defined, I now turn to the analysis of the basic descriptive statistics of both variables:

Table 5.20: *Constitutional and Traditional identity scales. Descriptive statistics*

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Scale constitutional	2738	16.62	2.68	4	20
Scale traditional	2665	13.88	3.39	4	20

As we can see, both scales range from 4 to 20. In this table we can already note some interesting things. The first one is that, not surprisingly, the mean is substantially higher for the constitutional scale that for the traditional one. Moreover, the standard deviation is also higher in the latter that in the former. If we link this with the fact that both scales are positively correlated (.66) that gives us a first sense of the actual relationship among them. It seems that the constitutional Spanish identity is very widely shared by the Spaniards, and that those that embrace the traditional identity are a subset of the first group. To put it in other words: the constitutional identity is not necessarily contradictory with the traditional one, but rather complementary. Many people embrace both, while others only hold the first one. The group of those that express a strong traditional identity but reject the constitutional one is, apparently, very small. Only 7,01% of the sample has a higher value on the traditional scale than in the constitutional one.

Table 5.21 might help clarify this relationship. I have converted both scales into dichotomous variables, in which all the individuals with a value lower that 16 are categorized as 'low' and those with values higher than 16 are counted as 'high'[63]

Table 5.21: *Traditional and Constitutional identity. Dichotomous variables*

	Low traditional	**High traditional**	**Total**
Low constitutional	19.95	1.48	21.43
High constitutional	43.85	34.73	78.58
Total	63.8	36.21	100

Here we can clearly see in which way these two variables relate to each other: the percentage of those that have a high traditional

---

[63] [16] would be the value of someone 'agreeing' in the four items of the scale

identity and a low constitutional one is very small (1,48%), while the reverse is not true: 43,8% of the whole sample has a low traditional identity and a high constitutional one.

This confirms the idea of a cumulative relationship between the two types of national identity. And shows how the constitutional identity is a consensual one (78,58) while the traditional one appears to be more divisive (21,43%). That must lead us to disregard the conception of this conceptual pair as competing extremes of an underlying continuum. I will discuss this finding in more detail in the conclusions of this chapter.

An important implication of this finding for the rest of the empirical analysis is that a part of working with the two scales as separate variables on their own, I will create a typology out of the previous table, distinguishing four groups: high constitutional and low traditional, high traditional and low constitutional (a very small group), high traditional and high constitutional and low traditional and low constitutional. The criterion for dividing the groups is very restrictive: only those individuals with an average of 4 in the four indicators (that is, 'agree') will be coded as high traditional or constitutional. However, given the overall pattern of consensus in the indicators it seems reasonable to use a restrictive standard that avoids a heavily eschewed distribution.

5.6 Territorial variation in the varieties of Spanish national identity: A comparison of the Basque Country, Catalonia and the rest of Spain

In chapter 3 I have argued that the structures of attitudes might be different in different countries. I have shown how a given marker can work in different ways depending on the context. It seems

reasonable to apply the same logic to the analysis within Spain. Certain territories have their own distinct media and party systems that constitute distinct environments in which the dynamics of identity politics and the common understandings of Spain tend to be different.

Therefore, I separate the analysis conducted in those areas with strong peripheral nationalisms from the rest of Spain. I only separate Catalonia and the Basque Country, because they are the autonomous communities with stronger alternative nationalist movements –the Catalan and Basque nationalisms have governed the autonomous institutions for almost the whole democratic period, and have carried out alternative nation building policies that are likely to have impacted on the individuals' attitudes. Moreover, I have representative samples in these communities (N=600) that will allow the separate analysis. I do not imply at all that in Catalonia and the Basque Country there are no citizens that consider themselves Spaniards and share one or another type of Spanish identity. Indeed, as I will show, there are many. But I will analyze them separately, because the dynamics of the identity politics in those areas are completely different from the rest of Spain. Therefore, the separate analysis of the 'rest of Spain' will allow me to identify with greater clarity the structure of attitudes within the Spanish national identity with less interference of the center-periphery dimension.

To have a general sense of the patterns of response, it is useful to examine, prior to the other tests, the descriptive statistics of the eight indicators in the territorial units I have defined. In table 5.22 I show the absolute and relative frequencies for these indicators, as well as the mean and standard deviations for the three territorial units. I have summarized the frequencies by collapsing categories to gain clarity, but the summary statistics are calculated from the

original variables (ranging from 1 'strongly disagree' to five 'strongly agree').

Table 5.22: *Frequencies and descriptives. Territorial analysis*

	Rest of Spain	Catalonia	Basque Country		Rest of Spain	Catalonia	Basque Country
Language	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	**History 1**	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*
SD+D	2.5	17.8	25.9	SD+D	9.1	21.6	26.7
Neutral	3.0	5.8	10.3	Neutral	10.0	9.9	20.4
A+SA	94.5	76.4	63.8	A+SA	80.9	68.5	53
Total	100.0	100.0	100	Total	100.0	100.0	100
Mean	*4.4*	*3.8*	*3.51*	*Mean*	*3.9*	*3.6*	*3.3*
Std. Dev.	*0.69*	*1.08*	*1.24*	*Std. Dev.*	*0.88*	*1.14*	*1.17*

Anthem	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	**United**	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*
SD+D	17.2	45.8	58.1	SD+D	3.5	23.4	35.6
Neutral	14.7	15.9	19.7	Neutral	4.9	11.1	17.2
A+SA	68.1	38.3	22.1	A+SA	91.7	65.5	47.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100	Total	100.0	100.0	100
Mean	*3.7*	*2.86*	*2.43*	*Mean*	*4.4*	*3.57*	*3.16*
Std. Dev.	*1.1*	*1.31*	*1.19*	*Std. Dev.*	*0.76*	*1.18*	*1.29*

Flag	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*	**Catholicism**	*Percent*	*Percent*	*Percent*
SD+D	65.6	33.4	23.6	SD+D	38.8	44.9	43
Neutral	14.1	13.0	18.1	Neutral	15.9	12.1	18.5
A+SA	20.2	53.5	58.3	A+SA	45.3	43.1	38.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100	Total	100.0	100.0	100
Mean	*2.3*	*3.27*	*3.55*	*Mean*	*3.0*	*2.86*	*2.85*

Std. Dev.	1.17	1.33	1.21	Std. Dev.	1.28	1.31	1.31

Constitution	Percent	Percent	Percent	**History 2**	Percent	Percent	Percent
SD+D	4.5	15.8	27.7	SD+D	5.3	18.1	26.9
Neutral	6.0	9.4	20.7	Neutral	7.6	12.6	20.1
A+SA	89.5	74.8	51.6	A+SA	87.0	69.3	52.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100	Total	100.0	100.0	100
Mean	4.2	3.74	3.28	Mean	4.1	3.66	3.34
Std. Dev.	0.78	1.02	1.15	Std. Dev.	0.78	1.08	1.12

The first thing to notice from this table is that there is a clear pattern for all the indicators: they generate more consensus in the rest of Spain than in Catalonia or the Basque Country. Between these two autonomous communities, the consensus is generally stronger in the former and weaker in the latter. Unsurprisingly, beyond any qualitative distinction, Spanish national identity is weaker in Catalonia and, especially, the Basque Country than in the rest of Spain. In the next chapter I will discuss this pattern in more detail, and will try to figure out what individual variables, if any, account for these aggregate differences.

The bigger differences between the rest of Spain, on one hand, and Catalonia and the Basque Country on the other, are to be found in those variables related to the symbolic dimension, as well as in the indicator that expresses the need for preserving Spain's national unity.   This shows a general lower level of identification with Spain's national symbols in these territories, as well as less agreement around the idea of a united Spain. The indicator that produced more similar results across the three territories is the one that relates Catholicism to the Spanish identity. The percentages of positive and negative responses are similar, and that might indicate

some problems with the interpretation of its wording. In any case, this is a question that we will have to analyze in more detail.

In every case, the average Catalan and Basque respondent is located somewhere around the neutral category (3), except for some of the indicators (Language, History 1, Constitution and History 2), for which the Catalan average is slightly closer to 4, that represents the category 'agree'. Three of these indicators are part of the constitutional type of Spanish identity as I have defined it here, so this might be indicating that this view of Spain is more widely shared in Catalonia than the traditional one, in relative terms.

To have a sense of how the constitutional and traditional identities are distributed across these territories, we should calculate the scales that I have defined for each of them separately. However, as a previous step, it is necessary to check if the same measurement model works in these regions. In chapter 3 I have argued against the automatic translation of the ethnic-civic typology to a variety of contexts without paying attention to its empirical and theoretical plausibility. I have shown how the same national marker seems to play different roles in different contexts. Thus, it might well be the case that the structure of relations among the indicators is different in Catalonia and the Basque Country. For example, in these territories where there are distinct languages, the variable that relates language to Spanish national identity might cluster with the traditional rather than the constitutional type.

To test the equivalency of structures, I replicate the same Confirmatory Factor Analysis I conducted when testing the typology for the whole territory of Spain, but separated for the three geographical units: Catalonia, the Basque Country and the rest of Spain. This will provide a sense of the fit of the model to each of the subsamples. Table 5.23 shows the fit indices of the models:

Table 5.23: *Measurement model cross-territory comparison. Fit*

2 Factor Model	Chi^2	p	df	RMR	RMSEA	GFI	AGFI
Catalonia	50.827	.00010	19	.084	.060	.967	.937
Basque Country	38.504	.00512	19	.061	.050	.973	.949
Rest of Spain	90.657	.0000	19	.046	.049	.975	.952

The indices reported show that the model does actually fit the data in the three territorial units. Indeed, the Chi-square statistic is lower in Catalonia and the Basque Country than in the rest of Spain. However, we know that $\chi2$ is sensitive to sample size, and with large samples its values are inflated and might erroneously report a poor model fit (Schumacker and Lomax, 2004). The other fit indices reported here are roughly similar in the three territorial units. There is no apparent reason, then, to work with different models in each territory. This evidence allows us to safely compare the three areas on the basis of the same typology.

Table 5.24: *Identity typology. Catalonia, the Basque Country and Rest of Spain*

	Catalonia	Basque Country	Rest of Spain
Low traditional, low constitutional	43.8	61.22	12.74
High traditional, low constitutional	1.28	1.22	1.54
High constitutional, low traditional	36.11	24.88	46.5
High traditional, high constitutional	18.8	12.68	39.23
N	*468*	*410*	*1583*

Table 5.24 shows the differences among these territories in the distribution of their citizens across the categories of the typology. The main difference lays in the higher shares of citizens that are located in the low/low category both in Catalonia (43,8%) and,

especially, in the Basque Country, where the 61% of the sample is concentrated in this category. These results confirm that the Spanish national identity, in whatever version, is significantly weaker in Catalonia and the Basque Country than in the rest of Spain, being the Basque case the clearest one.

However, there is also another relevant difference among these territories, related to the proportions of citizens with strong traditional identity over those with constitutional Spanish identity. Both in Catalonia and the Basque Country there are almost 2 respondents in the former for each one in the later, while in the rest of Spain the proportion is 1,2. Although both types of Spanish identity are less prevalent in these territories, the traditional one is especially weak in Catalonia and the Basque Country compared to the rest of Spain. In other words: those Catalan and Basque citizens that do hold a Spanish identity tend to favor a non-traditional version in higher shares than their counterparts in the rest of Spain.

In this section I have shown how the same typology defined for the whole territory of Spain is meaningful when applied to Catalonia and the Basque Country. The differences, thus, lay more in the distribution of the types rather than in the types themselves. In the next section I test the external validity of the typology by contrasting it with the more common indicators of national identity in Spain. I will keep the separate analysis by territories in order to check if these relations are the same everywhere.

5. 7 The measurement of Traditional and Constitutional Spanish identities: external validity

After having defined and tested the typology of Spanish national identity and the two scales constructed, it is necessary to test its

external validity by contrasting it with a set of commonly used indicators of national identity in Spain that were applied in the same survey we conducted. This exercise will provide a clearer sense of what is actual measuring the typology, and will allow us to be confident that it is actually meaningful from a substantive point of view.

The first comparison to be refers to the widely used subjective national identity indicator (SNI), also known as the Linz question. It was designed to tap precisely the dimension I have consciously left out from the construction of these two scales, namely the center-periphery one. However, the relationship between my two scales and the SNI will be useful to approach the relationship between the constitutional and traditional versions of the Spanish national identity with the center-periphery dimension. The straightforward expectation would be to find the individuals with low values in both scales to be located towards the AC end of the SNI scale, while those individuals with traditional identity to be more concentrated towards the Spanish extreme of the scale.

Table 5.25: *Identity typology and Subjective National Identity. Column %*

	Low traditional and low constitutional	**High constitutional, low traditional**	**High constitutional, high traditional**	*Total*
Only Spanish	3.97	9.02	13.24	9.52
More Spanish	7.95	13.39	15.94	13.31
As Spanish as AC	37.77	57.33	57.53	53.54
More AC	31.67	17.58	12.16	18.39
Only AC	18.64	2.68	1.12	5.23
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*

In this table we can see how the differences among the groups of my typology are not very important in terms of their self-placement in the SNI scale. Although the Chi-Square test suggests some association, the most prevalent category among all groups is the dual identity. The group with low Spanish identity shows a stronger tendency to concentrate in the more *peripheral* categories of the scale, while the group with high levels of both identities is slightly more eschewed towards the only Spanish category of identification. However, the differences are not very important. We must keep in mind that this data refer to whole territory of Spain. The sense of belonging to the AC has not been framed as opposed to the Spanish identity in most parts of Spain, so the association between the typology and the SNI scale should be stronger in those areas with relevant alternative identities that in the rest of Spain. Where there is no relevant alternative nationalist movement, the SNI indicator should be understood as a measure of localism rather than national identity. In table 5.26 I show the distribution, separated by territories.

Table 5.26: *Identity typology and Subjective National Identity, Rest of Spain. Col. %*

Rest of Spain	Low traditional, low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	*Total*
Only Spanish	7.25	8.81	11.96	9.89
More Spanish	13.12	13.7	15.66	14.54
As Spanish as AC	50.44	57.72	58.17	57.08
More AC	23.74	17.14	13.11	16.17
Only AC	5.45	2.64	1.1	2.32
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*

Table 5.27-28: *Identity typology and Subjective National Identity, Catalonia and the Basque Country. Column. %*

Catalonia	Low traditional and low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	*Total*
Only Spanish	0.99	10.49	22.09	8.33
More Spanish	2.48	11.11	17.44	8.33
As Spanish as AC	26.73	55.56	54.65	42.11
More AC	41.58	19.75	4.65	27.19
Only AC	28.22	3.09	1.16	14.04
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*

Basque Country	Low traditional low constitutional	High constitutional low traditional	High constitutional high traditional	*Total*
Only Spanish	0.41	6.19	33.33	6.35
More Spanish	4.56	13.4	21.57	9.14
As Spanish as AC	22.41	55.67	39.22	32.99
More AC	33.2	22.68	3.92	26.65
Only AC	39.42	2.06	1.96	24.87
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*

These tables confirm the expectations: the relationship between the typology and the SNI scale is stronger in Catalonia and the Basque Country than in the rest of Spain. While there is some relationship in all the cases (the Chi-square test is highly significant in the three cross tabulations), Cramer's V clearly shows that the relationship is stronger in Catalonia (.35) and the Basque Country (.39) than in the rest of Spain (.09). In the rest of Spain, the category of dual identity is the most prevalent among all the categories of the typology, but in Catalonia and the Basque Country this is not the case: in the low/low category, the *only Basque* and the *more Catalan than Spanish* are the most common categories. Around 70% of the individuals with low Spanish identity are concentrated in the

alternative identity categories in the two territories. Conversely, among those individuals with high constitutional and traditional Spanish identity, the categories *only Spanish* and *more Spanish than AC* are more prevalent in Catalonia (39,5) and the Basque Country (54,9) than in the rest of Spain (27,6%). The polarization, in both directions, across the SNI scale is more marked in these areas than in the rest of the country, where the centre-periphery divide has not the same meaning or importance.

In the questionnaire we also included a direct measure of Spanish nationalism ('españolismo') measured through a 0-10 scale in which the individuals were asked to self-position themselves. We should expect this measure to capture both types of Spanish identity, but in a cumulative way: those individuals with high levels of traditional identity should be more nationalists than those with only high levels on the constitutional scale which, in turn, should be more nationalists than those with low values in both scales. This is so because the concept 'españolismo' has been identified mainly with the traditional versions of the Spanish nationalism –but not only-. In table 5.29 I compare the means and standard deviation of the Spanish nationalism scale across the categories of the typology.

Table 5.29: *Identity typology. Descriptive statistics, by territory*

	All Spain			Rest of Spain		
	Mean	**Std. D.**	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**Std. D.**	**Obs.**
Low traditional, low constitutional	4.06	2.97	672	5.00	3.00	226
High constitutional, low traditional	6.71	2.53	981	6.87	2.45	718
High constitutional, high traditional	8.25	2.04	726	8.31	1.99	590
Total	*6.73*	*2.88*	*2421*	*7.21*	*2.59*	*1565*

	Catalonia			Basque Country		
	Mean	**Std. D.**	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**Std. D.**	**Obs.**
Low traditional, low constitutional	3.11	2.77	203	3.09	2.13	243
High constitutional, low traditional	5.95	2.85	167	5.06	2.13	96
High constitutional, high traditional	7.85	2.38	86	6.80	1.80	50
Total	*5.08*	*3.29*	*462*	*4.06*	*2.47*	*394*

The same predicted pattern is repeated in every territorial unit. The highest average levels of Spanish nationalism are to be found among the individuals with both constitutional and traditional identities. This seems to confirm that Spanish nationalism is still identified with the traditional understanding of Spanishness. However, the differences between this group and the individuals with strong constitutional but low traditional identity are moderate. At the same time, there is a marked difference between these groups and the individuals with weak Spanish identity that suggests that, somehow, the Spanish nationalism scale is capturing both types of identity. Even if it is slightly biased towards the traditional one, this relationship might be understood as, somehow, a certain normalization of the concept 'españolismo', that is not only linked to the traditional conception of the Spanish nation but also to the constitutional one.

The territorial distribution shows that in Catalonia and the Basque Country, the average values in the Spanish nationalism scale are significantly lower than in the rest of Spain. Thus, not only the distribution of the categories in the typology is very different in these Autonomous Communities, but also its relationship with

Spanish nationalism. Spanish nationalism is weaker in Catalonia and the Basque Country in every category of the typology. Even those that express strong Spanish national identity –even if it is traditional- are more reluctant to declare themselves to be Spanish nationalists. In the public discourse of these territories, the idea of 'españolismo' is probably framed in a more negative way than in the rest of the country, having a 'stronger', or more extreme meaning that prevents large groups of the population to declare high levels of Spanish nationalism.

The next comparison to be made is with national pride. This is an interesting comparison because in chapter 6 I use national pride as my dependent variable. There I expressed my concerns that it could be capturing primarily the traditional variety of the Spanish national identity and leaving aside the other ways of identifying with Spain, and that might have been introducing some bias in the results presented there. Alongside the process of constructing the scales and the typology we have found some indications that this might be the case, because those variables that express affective attachment with the Spanish nation through its symbols do actually belong to the traditional scale. National pride expresses an affective component of national identity, so I expect it to be closely related to the traditional identity as I have defined it here, given that it does actually capture the emotional identification with the national symbols.

Table 5.30 shows how, indeed, Spanish national pride is somewhat biased towards the traditional identity: while those individuals in the high/high category are heavily concentrated (70%) in the highest category of national pride ('very proud'), the group high constitutional/low traditional is evenly distributed across the top two categories –very and fairly proud (46% in each). Those individuals with low values in both the traditional and the

constitutional scale are more likely to be 'not very proud' (18,4%) or 'not at all proud' (11,3%) than the rest. However, even in this group, the category 'fairly proud' is the most populated one, with a 52% of the sample. This is something I analyze more extensively in chapter 7.

Table 5.30: *Identity typology and national pride, by territory*

National Pride	Low traditional and low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	Total
All				
Not at all	16.14	0.98	0.09	3.47
Not very	27.17	5.93	0.35	7.99
Fairly proud	42.56	50.87	30.18	42
Very proud	14.12	42.22	69.38	46.54
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*
Rest of Spain				
Not at all	9.23	1.05	0.09	1.65
Not very	18.01	5.37	0.35	4.97
Fairly proud	52.85	49.91	29.98	42.35
Very proud	19.91	43.67	69.57	51.04
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*
Catalonia				
Not at all	20.77	0.61	0.00	8.86
Not very	38.8	7.93	0.00	19.32
Fairly proud	31.15	54.88	28.74	40.00
Very proud	9.29	36.59	71.26	31.82
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*
Basque Country				
Not at all	31.60	0	0	18.51
Not very	32.55	14.89	1.96	23.76
Fairly proud	32.08	64.89	50.98	43.65
Very proud	3.77	20.21	47.06	14.09
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*

Finally, I compare the typology with an indicator of the preferred territorial organization of the State. The respondents were given four options: a centralized state without any kind of decentralization, a state with Autonomous Communities as now, a State in which the Autonomous Communities had more autonomy and, finally, one in which the Autonomous Communities had the right of secession. Thus, it could be understood as an ordinal indicator of the degree of centralism.

We should expect the traditional identity to be more biased towards the unitarian state. However, the current organization of the State in Autonomous Communities is barely challenged from a centralist perspective, and it is only challenged by those that advocate for a deeper decentralization or, in some cases, the secession of some territories. Thus both the 'high constitutional, low traditional' and the 'high constitutional, high traditional' groups should be heavily concentrated in the *status quo* category while among the individuals with low Spanish identity the decentralizing options should be more prevalent.

Table 5.31: *Identity typology and centralism, by territory.*

Centralism	Low traditional and low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	Total
All				
Unitarian	3.13	11.63	19.09	12.64
AC as now	31.17	61.22	65.78	56.79
AC with more autonomy	32.15	23.68	14.16	21.99
AC w/the right of secession	33.56	3.47	0.97	8.59
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*

Table 5.31 (continued): *Identity typology and centralism, by territory.*

Rest of Spain	Low traditional and low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	Total
Unitarian	4.44	12.07	18.41	13.79
AC as now	49.16	64.07	68.11	63.77
AC with more autonomy	27.85	20.82	12.63	18.35
AC w/the right of secession	18.55	3.03	0.85	4.09
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*

Catalonia	Low traditional and low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	Total
Unitarian	2	10.78	26.74	9.8
AC as now	11.5	44.31	43.02	29.63
AC with more autonomy	37.5	38.92	27.91	36.38
AC w/the right of secession	49	5.99	2.33	24.18
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*

Basque Country	Low traditional and low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	Total
Unitarian	1.22	0	9.62	1.99
AC as now	18.29	60	67.31	35.57
AC with more autonomy	33.74	36	23.08	32.84
AC w/the right of secession	46.75	4	0	29.6
Total	100	100	100	100

The results basically show the expected distribution. Overwhelmingly, those individuals with strong Spanish identity of either type defend the status quo of the current autonomic regime

defined in the 1978 constitution. Among those with high traditional identity the unitarian option is more prevalent, especially in Catalonia (26%). The only group that is not as strongly committed to the status quo is the low traditional, low constitutional one. These citizens appear evenly divided among the status quo, more autonomy and right of secession categories. In Catalonia and the Basque Country this group is more heavily biased towards this latter category, while in the rest of Spain the dominant option is the status quo. This seems to support the idea of a dual composition of this group, that in Catalonia and the Basque Country is composed by alternative nationalists and in the rest of Spain represents individuals with weak national identity whatsoever.

Summing up, we can conclude that the set of tests support the validity of the typology of Spanish national identity that I have defined. Its relationship with these indicators runs in the expected directions, and has proven able to discriminate among different types of citizens with respect to their attitudes towards national identity, so we can be confident that the typology is indeed measuring what it was designed for. Moreover, I have shown how, although the same typology is valid in Catalonia and the Basque Country, its meaning and relationship with other indicators, such as the Spanish nationalism scale, is distinct from the pattern in the rest of Spain. The differences across territories, thus, are not limited to the percentages of respondents in each category but also to their profiles.

5.8 Conclusions

In this chapter I have developed a typology of the conceptions of Spain through the adaptation, to a mass survey, of the results obtained in the previous chapter with the 70 Q methodological

interviews. Using 11 indicators of the contents of the Spanish national identity, I have shown how we can indeed find evidence that the three-factor structure that emerged when analyzing the Q-methodological interviews is supported by the survey data.

However, in order to refine the analysis, I have separated the constitutional and traditional dimensions from the 'non-Spanish' one, so I have defined two factors within the Spanish national identity. However, I have shown how these two components cannot be understood as a dichotomy or extremes in a single continuum, but rather as two compatible ways of conceiving Spain. I have demonstrated that, while the constitutional identity is widely shared by Spanish citizens, only a fraction of this population does share the traditional identity. While almost all those with strong traditional identity do share the Constitutional one, the reverse is not true. They are, thus, cumulative understandings of Spain, rather than contradictory, at least for a significant portion of citizens.

The constitutional factor that I have defined comprises the consideration of the Spanish language and history (understood in a critical way) as important foundations of the Spanish identity, as well as a positive evaluation of the 1978 Constitution in its unifying role, and the justification for the national unity under criteria of solidarity and equality. It is evident, then, that this is not a reflection of the Constitutional Patriotism as defined by German thinkers Dolf Sternberger and Jürgen Habermas, but rather a version of what Xacobe Bastida (1998) has called 'constitutional Spanish nationalism". While the German constitutional patriotism proposes an understanding of the national identity based on the adherence to the universalistic principles and a deep coping with the past, the Spanish nationalism based on the 1978 constitution has strong cultural –linguistic and historical components and values, overall,

the ability of the 1978 Constitution for granting a national unity that is indeed rooted in the past.

It is important to underline that this understanding of the Spanish nation is widely shared across the political spectrum, and expresses the basic consensus among a majority of Spanish citizens. The conflicts between the Spanish right-wing and left-wing about, for example, the degree of centralization or the public role of the non-Castilian languages does not prevent a common ground that conforms today the mainstream Spanish nationalism that is reflected in the popular attitudes. This wide consensus, however, is not universal and we have already seen that especially (but not only) in the Basque Country and Catalonia there is a relevant segment of citizens that do not share this identity

A part from this consensual version of the Spanish nationhood, I have shown that there is a more divisive one that reflects the ideological components of the traditional Spanish nationalism. The main components of this version are the emotional attachment to the nation through the national symbols (flag and anthem), as well as the importance granted to Catholicism and to the traditionalist understanding of the national history as foundations for the Spanish national identity. It reflects the pervasiveness of the main elements of the once hegemonic national-Catholicism, namely, an identification of the Spanish nation with Catholicism and an organicist understanding of the Spain's national history.

The fact that the emotional attachment to Spain through its main national symbols is a part of this variety of identity merits some more attention. The official flag and anthem are the product of the transitional consensus, and were accepted by most of the political elites. However, these symbols have been historically contested, mainly because the Spanish Republic (1931-39) adopted a different

set of symbols (the tricolor flag and the anthem called 'Himno de Riego') that were confronted to the current ones in the course of the 1936-39 civil war. The adoption of the current symbols by the Francoist regime, and their assumption, with minor changes, by the current democracy have not completely erased their divisiveness. It might still be argued that any other set of symbols would be even less consensual, as suggested by the reactions to the statement about the republican flag in the Q-methodological interviews discussed in chapter 4. However, in our survey, only around 50% of the respondents declared to feel positive emotions when confronted with the Spanish flag and anthem. This traditionalist bias of the Spanish national symbols is probably the reason behind the scarceness of their public display in Spain, in contrast to what is common in other countries.

This structure of the conceptions of Spanish national identity is congruent with the terms of the debate at the elite level that I have outlined in chapter 2. The fact that we are able to identify, at the popular level, a structure of attitudes that runs parallel to the main terms of the ideological debate within Spanish nationalism supports the main theoretical claim advanced in chapter 3: that, in order to understand the popular conceptions of nationhood, we must turn our view to the elites' discourses and policies, because they are the main agents of the national identity construction. If we are to take the constructivist arguments seriously, we must acknowledge that these elites, not only promote a given national identity, but also shape how citizens think about their belonging to it. The simple translation of the abstract analytical constructs such as the classic ethnic-civic dichotomy to the individual level has proven of limited usefulness to account for the actual varieties of the Spanish national identity. A scheme rooted in the actual ideological framework set up by the various versions of the Spanish nationalism is more

accurate representation of how do Spaniards actually conceive and understand their belonging to the Spanish nation.

Chapter six

NEW REGIME, NEW NATIONHOOD? DEMOCRATIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL PRIDE (1981-2000)[64]

6.1 Introduction

In chapter 2 I discussed the evolution of Spanish nationalism and its discourses, especially since the end of the dictatorship. Here I keep this dynamic perspective, but turn my focus to the individual level: have these transformations in the nationalist discourses had an effect over how do individual citizens identify with Spain? I other words: have the changes at the collective level had a correspondence at the individual one?

To answer this question, in this chapter I trace the evolution of the social determinants of the Spanish national pride from 1981 to 2000. I want to test whether the democratization and democratic consolidation processes have modified them. The interest of tracing

---

[64] This chapter is a somewhat expanded version of the article *From National Catholicism to Democratic Patriotism? Democratization and reconstruction of national pride: The case of Spain (1981-2000)* to be published by *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (2008, currently available on-line).

this evolution lies in that it can shed light on the nature and dynamics of change of the citizens' attachment to the nation: Attachment to one's nation is usually considered as a substantially stable attitude, able to grant support for a state beyond political cycles. However, here I argue that it is a political attitude and as such is, up to some extent, endogenous to the political process: A deep political change, such as a regime change, may require the reconstruction of the nationalizing policies and discourses set up by the elites, that will, in turn, modify the individuals' attitudes towards the nation. [65] Spain is a clear case, as I have discussed in chapter 2, in which the new democratic elites had to adapt the contents of the State-led nationalism in order to accommodate it to the new context, given the strong ideological, religious and cultural biases of the previous regime's nationalism. Here I test the other part of the argument, related to the evolution of individual attitudes.

Integrating the analysis of the evolution and change of Spanish nationalism and national identity at both the elite and the individual level will help us to understand the relationships between both levels, and approach the process through which they relate to each other. It is precisely the interaction between the two levels that constitutes the main focus of theoretical interest for this dissertation.

In the first section I discuss the relationship between regime change, nationalizing policies and discourses and individual attachment to the political community. Through this discussion, I advance some theoretical arguments that support my hypothesis. In the second one, I briefly review the Spanish case, and discuss why the

---

[65] This is not to deny, however, that popular movements and public opinion are strong determinants of the shifts in elite discourses that acquire a special relevance within the context of democratization.

theoretical argument developed in the previous section might apply to Spain. In the third section, I further refine the hypothesis and discuss the research strategy and the causal mechanisms that link each of my main variables of interest with national pride. In the fourth, I present the data, variables and measurement instruments used in the analysis, and finally the next one is the empirical analysis itself. The sixth section is devoted to the discussion of the results and the presentation of the main conclusions that stem from them.

6.2 From institutions to individuals: Regime change, nationhood reconstruction and national identities' shift

There seems to be a general agreement on the literature around the idea that identification with the political community is an essential attitude for a country, as long as it may provide "reservoir of diffuse support that can maintain a political system through temporary periods of political stress" (Dalton, 1998: 19).[66] This is so because it grants support for the state beyond the institutional setting of a given moment and, thus, could be the basis for loyalty to the state despite a regime change.[67]

---

[66] Dalton even goes beyond this general statement and underlines the fact that in Czechoslovakia the levels of national pride in 1990 (three years before its split) were remarkably low. For similar arguments, see also Norris (1999) or the seminal work by Almond and Verba (1963).

[67] Here I draw on the distinction between State and regime as set up by Robert Fishman (1990). To put it in his words: "*A regime may be thought of as the formal and informal organization of the center of the political power, and of its relations with the broader society (…) Regimes are more permanent forms of political organization than specific governments, but they are less permanent than the state. The state, by contrast, is a (normally) more permanent structure of domination and coordination including a coercive apparatus and the means to administer a society and extract resources from it*" (Fishman, 1990:428)

Therefore, the development of a generalized affective attachment to the nation must be (and, indeed, has been) a primary concern of any State wishing to last for long. The wide literature on nation-building processes has clearly shown how the states have developed nationalizing policies in order to grant this diffuse support from its citizens, acting as active agencies of national socialization. The mechanisms used by these policies are educational systems, presence of national symbols in everyday life, development and spread of national languages, etc. In normal conditions, consolidated democracies do not engage in explicitly nationalistic mobilization of the population, but even in those cases, there are several daily mechanisms to reproduce nationhood, that have been labeled as "banal nationalism" by Michael Billig (1995).

However, a deep change in the social or institutional structure of a country (such as a regime change or a massive settlement of immigrants, for example) may imply a shift in the orientation of the nationalizing policies, in order to adapt them to the new context. This new orientation of the policies and discourses, alongside with the changes in the object itself (the nation), are aimed at modifying citizens' perception and attitudes towards it. Two well known examples of (successful or not) similar processes may be the post-War (and post-unification) debates on the German nationhood that lead to formulations such as Dolf Sternberger's and Jurgen Habermas' 'constitutional patriotism' or the much more recent claims that, at the roots of the 2005 riots in the French 'banlieues', there was a failure of the dominant French version of nationhood in incorporating second generation immigrants into Frenchness. This need for re-elaboration of the nationalizing policies and discourses set up by the states in order to adapt them to new social and/or political conditions is, as I discuss below, closely linked to the role

of state-led nationalism as a fundamental tool of granting social cohesion and legitimacy for the State, at least during the 20th century.

This may seem incongruent with the idea that attachment to the nation is a sort of reservoir of support for the state beyond the specific institutional setting of a given moment. But we must consider that States and elites do not limit themselves to telling their citizens *what* nation they have to identify with, but also aim at influencing people on *how* they have to think that nation and their belonging to it. In normal democratic conditions, the 'official' version of nationhood tends to be constructed in such a way that it can accommodate, at least, the mainstream of the ideological spectrum of the country; but this is not the case in most authoritarian regimes, that tend to monopolize the patriotism.[68] The monopolization of patriotism is a process of identification between the ruling group (the regime) and the nation in itself (Bar-Tal, 1997) that therefore implies a close linkage between attachment to the nation and conformity with the *monopolistic* group or regime.

When the *monopolistic* regime breaks up, the new institutions and elites must reconstruct patriotism in order to adapt it to the new context. The basis of attachment to the nation can no longer be linked to the old regime's ideology, and if the new regime is a democracy these bases should be as inclusive as possible, in order to grant stability to the state. Specially when there are relevant

---

[68] This is not to say that in democracies the conceptions of nationhood are constant and immutable. In some cases, there are groups within democracies that aim at monopolizing the patriotism, just as authoritarian regimes do (some examples could be the Israeli religious right-wing, the McCarthyism in the USA of the BJP's *Hindutva* in India). But also when there are no such monopolistic attempts, social or political changes (such as integration in supra-national structures or massive settlement of immigrants) may lead to substantial changes in the dominant versions of nationhood.

actors that call into question the continuity of the state itself (as it was the case in Spain), the monopolization of patriotism implies a severe risk for it, so revisiting the 'official' version of nationhood becomes a central concern for the new ruling elites.

As I have discussed in the introduction, it is important to keep in mind that nationalism as an ideology has as its main goal influencing individuals' attitudes towards the nation by fostering attachment with a given nation, and a given nationness. So, in addition to the studies on the elites discourses and motivations, research on nationalism must turn its view to the individual level in order to capture the effects of these shifts in the nationalizing discourses and policies in actually transforming individuals' attitudes towards the nations. The general hypothesis that stems from that is that different regimes will develop different kinds of nationalizing policies and discourses, that will exert varying influences on the configuration of the citizens' attitudes towards the nation.

This can be easily illustrated in the case of the members of cultural and national minorities inside a state, that can be recognized, assimilated or marginalized by different models of nationalizing policies and discourses. Confronted to these alternative nationalizing models, the members of the minorities will develop different attitudes and strategies, that we could summarize in the famous Hirschman's trichotomy of exit, voice and loyalty (Hirschman, 1970). This may also hold for other kinds of groups and, in general, the population of a state: despite a general identification with, or sense of belonging to the nation, the degree of affective attachment with it will depend on the specific foundations of these policies and discourses. For example, if they include ideological or religious biases, we must expect these biases to be reproduced at the individual level, and, therefore citizens with

congruent religious or ideological backgrounds will develop more intense attachment to a nation defined in these terms. If this is true, then, when the contents of the discourses and policies change, so will do the citizens attitudes. This is precisely the process that I aim at empirically reconstructing in this chapter.

6.3 Transition to democracy and redefinition of nationhood in Spain

How does this discussion apply to Spain? Spain has experienced deep social and political changes in the last decades. The authoritarian and strongly nationalist regime of Franco was followed by the consolidation of a democratic regime that took the form of a constitutional monarchy and a highly decentralized institutional setting, as stated in the 1978 Constitution. The new Spanish democracy adhered less than one decade later to the EEC. Since then, Spain has experienced the longest democratic period in its history, and an increasing convergence with Europe in terms of economic development.

A central issue faced by the Spanish transition to democracy was, undoubtedly, the so-called 'national question', that had also been crucial during the second Republic and the 1936-39 civil war. In parallel with the democratization process, the definition of the Spanish nation had to evolve from the traditionalist national-Catholicism of the regime towards a new, democratic and inclusive conception of nationhood: after forty years of strong nationalist dictatorship, the common wisdom stated that the democratization of Spain and the resolution of the conflicts with peripheral (mainly Catalan and Basque) nationalisms were intimately united. The

recognition of the internal diversity of Spain, and the decentralization of the State required a deep redefinition of the Spanish nationhood in itself. The long-lasting debates on this issue during the constituent period are enough to assess its crucial role during the transition years (for a detailed account, see Bastida 1998). In chapter 2 we have seen how, after the regime change, both the left and the right-wing's Spanish nationalism experienced deep transformations, and that a new understanding of Spain replaced the old, Francoist, one.

Why the redefinition of the Spanish nationhood was so crucial to the transition process? As I argued in chapter 2, we can safely state that the Francoist regime had operated, during 40 years, a 'monopolization of patriotism' (Bar-Tal, 1997) by imposing a specific view of the Spanish nation as the unique, truly patriotic, conception of it, as shown by the systematic stigmatization of the opposition as the 'anti-Spain'. This monopolization was based on a specific version of the Spanish nationalism that had as its main features the identification of the nation with Catholicism, and a traditionalist and organicist view of the nation. It emphasized the identification of Spain with its Castilian 'ethnic core' and rejected any recognition of its internal plurality, mainly by reducing the cultural differences to mere folkloristic expressions of regional specificities (Saz, 2003; Muro and Quiroga, 2005).[69]

But, again, National-Catholicism as the official ideology of the state was incompatible with the development of a democratic regime, and

---

[69] The nature of Francoist Spanish nationalism is certainly more complex, as discussed in chapter 2, and two main versions (the falangist and the national-Catholic) coexisted within the regime. However, as the hegemonic one was the national-Catholic, for modeling purposes in this chapter I will simply consider it as *the* regime's nationalism.

the incipient Spanish democracy looked for renewed bases of national legitimacy in order to grant Spaniards' loyalty to the nation beyond the regime change. So a deep redefinition of Spain's nationhood was needed, in order to overcome a profound legitimacy crisis, linked to increasing peripheral nationalist demands, but also to the preferences of democratic forces, that claimed for a secular, modern and decentralized conception of the Spanish nation.

The reconstruction of the Spanish nationalism has been extensively analyzed by several scholars, focused on the parliamentary debates held during the constituent process (Bastida, 1998) or on the main theoretical formulations of the 1975-2000 period (Núñez Seixas, 2001; Muro and Quiroga, 2005). This literature shows that the terms of the debate were heavily influenced by the nature of the democratization process: It was not a break-up of the regime, but rather a compromise between its reformist wing and the mainstream democratic opposition (basically constituted by left-wing Spanish forces and the moderate Basque and Catalan nationalists). The need for compromise between both groups of actors was the main constraint to this bargaining, that left many unsolved issues in this field, as shown by the enduring conflicts between the centre and the peripheral nationalists. That is what Núñez Seixas (2001) has labeled the 'unfulfilled renovation' of the Spanish nationalism. In the Spanish case there is a growing literature that tracks this reconstruction at the elite level but, more striking is the fact that much less attention has been paid to the individual bases of attachment to Spain and its transformations –even if there are significant exceptions, the most outstanding one being the article by Kenneth Bollen and Juan Díez Medrano (1998) that, however, do not adopt a longitudinal perspective.

In this chapter, thus, I want to focus on this level of analysis in order to check whether the process of reconstruction, in more democratic terms, of the mainstream Spanish nationalism as reviewed in chapter 2, has effectively transformed the determinants of the individuals' affective attachment with Spain. I contend that, at the end of the Francoism, religion, ideology and territory influenced the individual levels of national pride as a result of the specific contents of the, until then, dominant version of Spanish nationalism. My goal here is to test this assertion but, more crucially, to check whether there has been a reduction on the intensity of these biases due to the transformation, in a more integrative and democratic sense, of the Spanish nationalist discourses.

6.4 Hypotheses and mechanisms: a dynamic model of pride in Spain

I have so far argued that we should expect certain deep political changes, such as regime changes, to modify the contents of the state-led nationalist policies and discourses, and that this was the case in Spain after the Francoist regime. I want to test if, as I expect, these changes had a correspondence at the individual level in modifying citizens' attitudes towards the nation.

Ideally, we would use a direct measure of the contents of the Spanish national identity such as the one developed in chapters 4 and 5, and trace its evolution throughout the transition and democratization process. However, we are constrained by the lack of such data covering the whole period. As there is no way to empirically trace the contents of Spanish national identity in a dynamic perspective, so I use an alternative strategy to assess the evolution: First, I take an indicator of attachment to Spain –national

pride- that is available through a series of surveys covering most of the period of interest, with some limits that I discuss below.

As I have discussed above, the Francoist nationalism was clearly biased towards the traditionalist, Castilian, right-wing and Catholic segments of the Spanish society, while the renewed, democratic Spanish nationalism had to promote attachment to the nation among all the citizens beyond their religious, ideological or territorial backgrounds. Thus, to capture this process at the individual level I focus on the influence of ideology, religious identification and territory of residence over the levels of national pride: By studying the evolution of the coefficients linking each of these variables to Spanish national pride, I will be able to reasonably approach the effects of the transformation of national pride at the individual level.

I have two basic hypotheses: ***At the beginning of the democratic period*** I expect a significant influence of these variables on Spaniards' national pride: ***right-wing identifiers, Catholics and residents in regions without a distinct cultural background are expected to show higher levels of pride*** (H1). And, if an integrative version of Spanish nationalism had successfully developed affective attachment among its citizens, we should also find a ***progressive reduction in the impact of these variables on the degree of national pride*** as the time goes on and the Spanish democracy becomes progressively consolidated (H2).

The basic model I suggest, then, might be expressed as follows:

$$pride_{ti} = b_0 + b_1\ ideology + b_2\ catholicism + b_3\ region + b_4\ cohort \quad (1)$$

$$b_{1,2,3} = b_0 - b_1 time \quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad (2)$$

The argument expressed by the formula is that I expect national pride to be a function of ideology, religion, region and cohort, but – and this is my main point here-, I also expect the coefficients that link ideology, Catholicism and region with national pride ($b_{1,2,3}$) to progressively weaken, as an effect of a renovation of the mainstream Spanish nationalism.

However, the mechanisms underlying the relationship among these explanatory factors and national pride may not be so simple, and we should also consider alternative explanations that may be affecting it. We cannot assume the influence of ideology, religion and region on national pride to be exclusively due to 'domestic' mechanisms related to the specific configuration of Spanish nationalism.

On one hand, a certain bias of the right towards nationalism, and the left towards 'internationalism' may be a more general phenomenon. On the other hand, majoritarian religion as a tying bond among members of a nation has been an important criterion of in-group demarcation in many countries, given that religion may act as any other cultural marker used to distinguish among members and non-members of the group. So my expectation is not a complete extinction of the impact of ideology and religion on national pride, but rather a significant weakening of it.

The case of the culturally distinct regions is even more complex. Several comparative studies have established that members of minority ethno-national groups do not tend to develop strong tights with the state (Smith and Jarkko, 1998), especially when it is controlled by a "titular" group that alienates minorities from it, as it was the case with the Francoist Spain, that could be labeled as a 'nationalizing state' (Brubaker, 1996). The decentralization of the state and the official recognition of minority languages had, as one

of its main aims, the goal of integrating the minorities in the "new" Spain, but there are two phenomena that make me to be cautious about this expectation: on one hand, the continuous conflicts between peripheral nationalisms and the state that give a sense of incompleteness of this process of redefinition. Some scholars (Muro and Quiroga, 2004; Núñez Seixas, 2001) have interpreted these conflicts as an enduring trait of the Spanish nationalism.

On the other hand, alongside with the reinstauration of democracy, the process of decentralization in Spain permitted the institutionalization of the alternative minority nationalisms, that in Catalonia and the Basque Country soon reached the control of the newly established autonomous governments, and developed certain policies leading to an 'alternative nation-building' process, opposed to the Spanish one (Linz, 1973). These alternative nation-building processes, if successful, will make residents in these territories (especially younger cohorts) to feel less attached to Spain as a nation than their counterparts in the rest of Spain (Martínez-Herrera, 2002). This process could counter-balance, up to some extent, the integrative effects of a new version of Spanish nationalism *vis à vis* national minorities. So there are, at least, two processes going on simultaneously that may be affecting the relationship between the variables in opposed directions, that could counter-balance each other.

To understand the dynamics of change and formation of national pride, I include an additional variable in the analysis: generation. Through cohort analysis, I intend to approach the issue of how –and when- national pride is constructed and to what extent it is a stable or unstable attitude. The reconstruction of nationhood at the elite level may have not been able to modify attitudes towards the nation among older generations, but it may produce substantially different

patterns of attachment among younger generations, as predicted by the famous 'impressionable years' hypothesis, that states that "individuals are highly susceptible to attitude change during late adolescence and early adulthood and that susceptibility drops precipitously immediately thereafter and remains low throughout the rest of the life cycle" (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989).

Thus, I expect older generations to show more intense affective attachment to Spain, given that they were socialized in a strongly nationalist environment. Younger cohorts, -those that reached adulthood during the regime's crisis, the transition or the democracy- will show lower levels of pride: as I have said, the intensity of state-led nationalism substantially decreased after the end of the dictatorship. The increasingly important presence of competitors to the nationalist regime, since the beginning of the protest cycle of late Francoism, may have contributed to a progressive depression in levels of pride among younger cohorts and, furthermore, a lower national pride among younger cohorts is a phenomenon already observed by comparative research (Smith and Jarkko, 1998).

6.5 Data, variables and measurement

In order to reconstruct the evolution of the Spanish national pride, I use data from the World Values Survey from the years 1981, 1990, 1995 and 2000. The first available survey is from 1981. This may be a limit, given that Franco had died six crucial years before, and the Constitution had been put in force in 1978. It could be argued that the process of reconstruction of Spanish national pride may already have been accomplished by then, so we would be missing the crucial years of the transformation. However, it seems difficult

to argue that the institutional transformation of the state would have had immediate, direct effects on the citizens' attitudes towards the nation. So I treat 1981 as the starting point of the analysis, and assume that the situation by then imperfectly reflects the consequences of Francoism.

a) The dependent variable: National pride

The dependent variable measures pride in being Spanish. It is measured in a 4-point scale, ranging from "Very Proud" to "Not Proud at all". There are more sophisticated measures of attachment to the nation, but they are not available for such a long time period in Spain, and this is an essential feature of my design. Moreover, some tests have concluded that this question is a quite good measure for affective attachment to the nation -it approaches reasonably well the results of more sophisticated indicators (Heath, Tilley and Exley, 2005). It is also a commonly used measure of affective attachment to the nation by the previous literature as well as b the main international surveys. This ensures comparability and opens the possibility of new research and the extension of a similar analysis to other countries.

Equating 'pride in being Spanish' with national pride could be somewhat misleading given that certain (mainly leftist and alternative nationalist) groups seem to hold a multinational conception of Spain and, then, by declaring their pride in being Spaniards, could be expressing pride in a (multinational) state rather than national pride. However, the consideration of Spain as a nation, as stated by the 1978 Constitution, is widely shared among Spaniards, so I assume -as the literature has done until now- that the question 'how proud are you to be Spaniard?' is measuring national pride.

Another objection that could be done to the use of national pride as a measure of attachment to the nation is that it may also be affected by period effects, given that it does not only measure the affective attachment to the nation but also, up to certain degree, an evaluation of the effective performance of the 'object'. If this is true, we should expect certain contexts (such as economic cycles, political events or sports successes, for example) to depress or exacerbate pride in one's nation, or even alter the relationship among our variables of interest and national pride. However, by asking about general national pride (and not, as in other instances, about pride in specific *objects* such as the army, sports teams or the social security system), the affective (and supposedly more stable) component of pride gains prominence *vis à vis* the evaluation of the nation's performance.

b) Independent variables: ideology, religion, territory and generation

The variable measuring ideology is the usual ten-point scale ranging from far left (1) to far right (10). Measuring the religious identification is more complex, and there are various approaches to the issue: some surveys use frequency of attendance to religious services, others ask about the importance of religion in one's life, etc. However, I opt for using a simple question that asks whether the respondent identifies as a Catholic, a non-believer, or a member of another religious group. Using this approach may be problematic to some extent, mainly by two reasons: it is a less fine approach to the issue (we are not able to discriminate among degrees of identification with Catholicism) and, moreover, the variation is quite reduced (on average, around 84% of Spaniards identify themselves as Catholics in the surveys used). However, I contend

that using this straightforward measure is useful and interesting because it captures the subjective identification with a cultural trait that has been used as one of the main national markers by Spanish nationalism. In other words: it is not the socializing experience of church attendance that I am capturing with this variable but rather the effect of a generic self-identification as Catholic, regardless of its intensity or practical effects.

For the sake of clarity, and given that, by the moment, the proportion of people that identifies as members of non-catholic religious groups is negligible in Spain, I dichotomize this variable in two groups: Catholics and non-Catholics.

To cover the regional differences, I just use dummies for those autonomous communities with a different from Spanish official language, given that it is a strong marker of cultural distinctiveness.[70] Using territorial location instead of individual traits may lead to somewhat biased results if we intend to infer the effect of cultural distinctiveness: Some of those regions are internally heterogeneous and have huge shares of immigrants from the rest of Spain. In any case, it must be clear that, by using territory as explanatory variable I aim at estimating the role of those regions as differentiated socialization contexts, rather than the effect of individual ethno cultural traits, that would imply the assumption of an essentialist view on the formation of national identities that has been extensively discredited by the literature.

The cohort analysis is based on the cohort division proposed by Montero, Torcal and Gunther (1998: 36). Using relevant events or periods of Spanish political history and the age of entrance into

---

[70] Despite its lack of a distinct language, I also include a dummy for the Canary Islands, given their specificities (geographic distance, presence of movements with an anticolonialist rhetoric during a certain period, etc).

political maturity as criteria, they differentiate among six cohorts: the oldest one (Cohort 1) comprises those born before 1922, that arrived to political maturity during the end of the Alfonso XIII monarchy, the Republic or the civil war. The next one (Cohort 2) is the autarchy cohort, comprising those born between 1923 and 1937. Cohort 3 includes those born between 1938 and 1952, that arrived to political adulthood during the years after the autarchy and the first years of economic development of the regime (the "regime consolidation cohort"). Cohort 4 (born between 1953 and 1962) arrived to maturity during the regime's crisis years, and cohort 5 (1963-1967) represents the so-called "transition generation". The youngest cohort (cohort 6), is the democracy one, and comprises those citizens born after born after 1968.

6.6 Analysis

First of all, in Table 1 I show the distribution of frequencies among the four categories in each year. As we can see, the levels of national pride in Spain are quite high, with around 80 per cent of the sample in the top two categories. There seems to be no specific trend, towards a decline or increase in aggregate levels of national pride, even if some variations may be indicating the influence of certain period effects, as I was expecting above. We must take this into account and see whether this period effects do alter the relationship among our variables of interest.

In order to assess whether national pride in Spain has become less dependent on ideology, religion and region or not, I proceed in two steps: first, I jointly use three waves of the WVS survey in order to determine whether the profile of proud Spaniards is significantly different at the end of the analyzed period or not. Then, I analyze

separately all the surveys in order to have a richer picture of the trends and evolution patterns.

Table 6.1: *Frequencies of National Pride (1981-2000)*

Year of survey	1981	1990	1995	2000	Total
Not at all proud	4,41	4,87	3,13	2,21	4,01
Not very proud	8,73	8,06	4,66	5,19	7,41
Quite proud	36,20	41,65	26,76	30,27	37,62
Very proud	50,67	45,42	65,45	62,33	50,96
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Mean	*3,33*	*2,28*	*3,54*	*3,53*	*3,35*

I assume that the four-point scale of national pride is measuring a latent, continuous variable that represents intensity of pride in one's country. However, I do not use Ordinary Least Squares regression to model pride, because the four-point scale is not a continuous variable and, thus, in doing so I would be violating one of the assumptions of OLS regression. To face this problem, and given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, I use the ordinal logit model, that is suited for these kind of variables and, furthermore, it does not force me to assume that the distances among the points in the scale are equivalent.

So I model national pride in the following equation as the log odds ratio: *Yi = 1, 2, 3*, or *4*. In the function

$$p(Y_i = Y) = a + b_1 X_{1i} + b_2 X_{2i} + b_3 X_{3i} + b_4 X_{4i} + e_i,$$

"i" indicates respondent i, Y = respondent i's national pride, X_{1i} = respondent i's religious identification, X_{2i} = respondent i's

ideology, X_{3i} = respondent's cohort and X_{4i}, his or her region of residence.[71]

Table 6.2: *Ordinal logit regression models. Dependent Variable: National Pride.*

	Model 1 **1981/2000**	**Model 2** **1981/1990**	**Model 3** **1990/2000**
Catholicism	0,447 (0,168) ***	0,886 (0,099) ***	0,433 (0,169) ***
Ideology	0,169 (0,040) ***	0,156 (0,018) ***	0,166 (0,040) ***
Birth Year	-0,015 (0,002) ***	-0,020 (0,002) ***	-0,021 (0,002) ***
Year	-2,236 (0,280)***	-1,045 (0,207) ***	-1,240 (0,241)***
Catholic*Year	0,818 (0,237) ***	0,350 (0,191) *	0,454 (0,196) **
Ideology*Year	0,132 (0,049) ***	0,138 (0,034) ***	-0,010 (0,044)
_cut1	-32,983 (4,796)	-39,992 (3,619)	-43,699 (3,880)
_cut2	-31,634 (4,794)	-38,786 (3,618)	-42,568 (3,878)
_cut3	-29,549 (4,789)	-36,642 (3,612)	-40,374 (3,872)
Pseudo R^2	0,076	0,064	0,0601
MK/Z R^2	0,146	0,153	0,142
LR Chi^2 (7df)	390,430	624,460	490,430
N	2471	4413	3812

NB

- p<0,1 **p<0,05 *** p<0,01
- Year is a dummy variable with value 1 for the first year of each model and 0 for the last one.
- McKelvey and Zavoina's R2 is the measure of goodness of fit that, in ordinal logit models, better approaches actual R2 in an OLS regression model on the underlying latent variable (Long and Freese 2001, p. 148)

Table 6.2 shows three merged models, that include several interaction terms to test the hypotheses on the evolution of the impact of religion and ideology on national pride (this method is

---

[71] Cohort and region are actually introduced in the model as dummy variables for each value.

fully described in Firebaugh, 1997). The first one compares the situation in 1981 with that of 2000, the second one compares 1981 and 1990 and the third one, 1990 and 2000. These models do not include variables on regions because the 1981 WVS survey did not use the autonomous communities criteria and thus, they are not comparable.[72] Moreover, instead of using dummies for cohorts, for the shake of clarity, I use the birth year as a continuous variable, in order to easily introduce interactions with year.

These three models show several interesting results.[73] The first one is that Catholicism, ideology and birth year exert a highly significant influence on national pride in the expected direction for all the models: there is a religious, ideological and generational bias in the Spanish national pride. We have to take into account that the coefficients for the constitutive terms that are also present in the interactions are not expressing unconditional, or average effects but rather the effect of the variable when the modifying variable (in this case, year) is 0 (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). Thus, the positive and strong coefficients for Catholicism and Ideology of these models express how these variables affected national pride the last year of the pair in each model (2000 for models 1 and 3, and

---

[72] This is a limit, given that the first year in which we are able to test the effect of living in a culturally distinct region is 1990, more that a decade later of the autonomous governments' establishment. I will test the effects of regions in the separate analysis.

[73] Several variables in the models do violate the parallel regressions (proportional odds) assumption. However, I have run a Generalized Ordered Logit model, that does not impose this assumption, and no substantive result changed: certainly, the coefficients for some variables tend to be greater (and more significant) for the extreme categories (this model computes a separate regression for each Pr (y≤m)|Pr (y>m) comparison). For the shake of clarity, I go ahead with the ordinal logit models. The same stands for the rest of the models in the article.

1990 for model 2).[74] Thus, these coefficients indicate how the processes of de ideologization and secularization of Spanish national pride, if they exist, are incomplete.

Moreover, the coefficients of year indicate that, controlling for the other variables in the model, the overall levels of pride have been increasing in these twenty years, despite the substantial reduction in the intensity of the state-led nationalism. This may be reflecting the integration of previously alienated segments of the society.

However, in order to test the main hypotheses, we have to look at the interactions between year and the two main variables of interest in these models, because they express the evolution. The coefficients of the interactions tell us how the effect of the main constitutive variables is modified when year is 1. In other words: how different the impact of religion and ideology over national pride was in the first year of each model with respect to the last one. Thus, that will show us if, as expected, the impact of Catholicism and ideology has decreased during the time period considered in each model.

In the first model we see a highly significant, positive relationship between national pride and the interaction of year and Catholicism, that indicates that the effect of self-identification as a Catholic on national pride was stronger in 1981 than in 2000. The same thing stands for ideology. Indeed, these results seem to confirm my main hypotheses concerning the progressive (but not complete) *secularization* and *de ideologization* of national pride in Spain.

---

[74] This is why the coefficients for Catholicism and Ideology in models 1 and 3 are almost identical.

In the second and third models I divide this 20-year period in two 10-year periods in order to approach with more detail the dynamics of change. The impact of religion on national pride seems to have been continuously decreasing for the whole period. On the contrary, we see how the *deideologization* process is located in the 1981-1990 period, while in the second decade the effect of ideology on national pride has not changed significantly: it could have reached its limit or, more interestingly, it could be showing a reverse tendency in the last years: if we divide the 1990-2000 period in two five-year periods, we see that between 1990 and 1995 the impact of ideology on national pride continued to decrease (the interaction term has a significant coefficient of .086, with a standard error of .043), while between 1995 and 2000 it increased slightly (-.097, standard error of .055, significant at the 0,1 level). Below I discuss the implications of this finding.

So this first analysis seems to roughly confirm my main hypotheses. However, in order to have more details on what is going on under these results and test the other hypotheses referring to region and cohort, I have also run a separate regression for each year for which there is an available survey. Table 6.3 shows the coefficients, standard errors and some statistics of fit for each of the models run for each year.

Table 6.3: *Ordinal logit regression models. Dependent Variable: National Pride (1981-2000) Coefficients (and standard errors)*

Year	1981	1990	1995	2000
Catholic	1.260***	0.824***	0.719***	0.442**
	(.171)	(.101)	(.201)	(.178)
Ideol	0.300***	0.130***	0.044	0.148***
	(.030)	(.019)	(.042)	(.043)
Cohort1		1.026***	1.267***	0.619
		(.173)	(.411)	(.378)
Cohort2	-0.331 **	0.975***	0.980***	0.852***
	(.161)	(.135)	(.253)	(.218)
Cohort3	-0.267*	0.526***	0.606***	0.525***
	(.161)	(.127)	(.222)	(.202)
Cohort4	-0.743***	0.101	-0.012	0.311
	(.156)	(.128)	(.229)	(.206)
Cohort5	-0.240	-0.024	-0.166	-0.006
	(.484)	(.144)	(.240)	(.251)
Catalonia		-1.063***	0.109	-1.308***
		(.106)	(.408)	(.188)
Basque C.		-2.247***	-2.195***	-2.673***
		(.170)	(.399)	(.362)
Galicia		-0.749***	0.093	-0.190
		(.136)	(.322)	(.295)
Valencia		-0.421***	-0.333	-1.357***
		(.127)	(.255)	(.216)
Navarra		-1.323***	-1.704***	0.019
		(.318)	(.522)	(.687)
Balears		-0.627**	0.202	-0.175
		(.256)	(.540)	(.550)
Canarias		-1.195***	-1.268***	-1.326***
		(.194)	(.202)	(.342)
_cut1	-1.110 (.240)	-1.945 (.166)	-2.910 (.336)	-3.333 (.319)
_cut2	.281 (.230)	-.723 (.157)	-1.887(.301)	-2.029 (.266)
_cut3	2.325 (.240)	1.647 (.158)	.180(.285)	.401 (.248)
Pseudo R^2	0.085	0.096	0.0852	0.104
MK/Z R2[1]	0.196	0.219	0.180	0.212
LR Chi2	286.9	614.23	126.10	176.55
N	1536	2877	837	935

These results show a quite complex picture. Religion[75] is highly significant and has a considerable influence on national pride during the whole period, being one of the most relevant factors to explain variation in pride. However, as shown by the previous models –and the coefficients of these models-, its strength has tended to weaken progressively. To clarify the results, in the next table I show the predicted probabilities of pride for Catholics and non-Catholics, holding the other variables constant at their means.

Table 6.4: *Predicted probabilities of pride in Spain for Catholics and non-Catholics*[76]

	1981		1990	
	Non Catholic	**Catholic**	**Non Catholic**	**Catholic**
Not at all	0,10	0,03	0,07	0,03
A little	0,21	0,08	0,14	0,07
Fairly	0,47	0,38	0,53	0,45
Very	0,23	0,51	0,25	0,44
	1995		2000	
	Non Catholic	**Catholic**	**Non Catholic**	**Catholic**
Not at all	0,04	0,02	0,02	0,01
A little	0,06	0,03	0,05	0,03
Fairly	0,37	0,25	0,40	0,32
Very	0,52	0,69	0,53	0,64

In this table we can see how being catholic increases the probability of being very proud of Spain: in 1981, it was more than twice for

---

[75] I have also run the model using a variable that measures intensity of religious practice given that it is a more refined measure of religiosity. However, when using this variable I find only significant differences among those that never attend religious services and those that do attend mass, but not among different frequencies of attendance.

[76] I used the prtab Stata command to compute these and the rest of predicted probabilities in this chapter (Long and Freese 2001, p. 148).

Catholics than for non-Catholics. The differences have decreased but still remain significant in 2000, as expressed by the models. Due to the concentration of an overwhelming majority of the sample in the top two categories, the relevant differences are located between them, so the probability for the three lower categories is always greater for the non-Catholics.

In figure 6.1 I represent the difference between the predicted probabilities of being very proud in Spain for Catholics and non-Catholics. This graph shows how the ideological polarization of Spanish national pride has decreased throughout the period analyzed here, but it has not disappeared at all:

Figure 6.1: *Predicted probability very proud, difference Catholic-Non-Catholic 1980-2000*

The relationship between ideology and pride is more complex: it was very strong and significant at the beginning of the period (1981), in 1990 it was still significant (albeit apparently weaker) and in 1995 it had lost its significance. Later on, in 2000 it retrieved its influence on national pride. These results are congruent with

those obtained in the merged models, and seem to suggest that period effects mediate this relationship. I will discuss it later on. Again, the table of predicted probabilities will make it clearer (I show only the extreme and central points in the left-right scale to reduce the size of the table and make it more interpretable):

Table 6.5: *Predicted probabilities of pride in Spain by left-right self-placement*

	1981			1990		
	1	**5**	**10**	**1**	**5**	**10**
Not at all	0,10	0,03	0,01	0,06	0,04	0,02
A little	0,21	0,09	0,02	0,12	0,08	0,04
Fairly	0,47	0,40	0,16	0,52	0,47	0,36
Very	0,22	0,48	0,81	0,30	0,41	0,57
	1995			2000		
	1	**5**	**10**	**1**	**5**	**10**
Not at all	0,03	0,02	0,02	0,03	0,01	0,01
A little	0,04	0,04	0,03	0,06	0,04	0,02
Fairly	0,30	0,27	0,24	0,43	0,32	0,20
Very	0,63	0,67	0,72	0,48	0,63	0,78

Here we can see how the left has increased its levels of national pride throughout the period. This evolution, congruent with my story, shows how previously alienated social groups become progressively integrated into the Spanish national identity as the democratic consolidation process progressed. However, we can also see how it has not been a linear process: while from 1981 to 1990 the increase was sharp and continuous, from 1995 to 2000 we see a reversal of the tendency, that coincides with the arrival to the government of the right.

As for the (extreme) right wing, we see how from 1981 to 1990, indeed, the tendency was exactly the opposite: the probability of an extreme rightist to feel very proud of Spain actually declined. After

this first decline, that coincides with the decade in which the Socialist Party was in power and the right had little or no option to compete for government, there is an inversion of the tendency from 1990 on. The 1990-1995 growth is previous to the right-wing arrival to power, and it might be explained either by the intense mobilization strategy of the right -that was about to reach power after more than a decade- or, perhaps, certain period effects By 2000, when the right-wing had been in office for one full term already, the increase is sharper.

Figure 6.2, in which I represent the evolution of the difference between the predicted probability of being 'very proud' in Spain for the extreme left (1) and the extreme right (10), summarizes this process, and shows with clarity how the ideological polarization of Spanish national pride is indeed subject to short-term political influences.

Figure 6.2: *Predicted probability very proud, difference extreme left-extreme right 1980-2000*

Now I turn my view to territorial differences, that as shown by the regression models, are especially strong and consistent in the case

of the Basque Country, were we have seen how strong and highly significant coefficients emerging during the whole period –indeed, the Basque Country dummy is, by far, the variable with a stronger relationship with national pride in the models-. Residence in Catalonia also depresses Spanish national pride, but its impact is consistently lower than in the Basque case, and in 1995 it had disappeared. Also residents in the Canary Islands do show lower degrees of pride during almost all the period. The other regions in the analysis show more uneven patterns, although the general tendency is to present negative coefficients, that indicate a negative relationship with Spanish national pride. This suggests that cultural distinctiveness exerts some negative influence on affective attachment with the nation-state, but this impact appears to be consistent only in certain cases, after a process of politization of differences. These processes have only been successful in Catalonia and the Basque Country (and partly in the Canary Islands), where minority nationalist parties have been ruling autonomous institutions since they were re-established in 1979. Table 6.6 shows the predicted probabilities of national pride for residents in Catalonia, the Basque Country, and the rest of Spain. The other variables in the model are held constant.

Table 6.6: *Predicted probabilities of pride in Spain by territory*

	1990			1995		
	Rest of Spain	**Basque C.**	**Catalonia**	**Rest of Spain**	**Basque C.**	**Catalonia**
Not at all	0,03	0,22	0,08	0,02	0,16	0,02
A little	0,06	0,27	0,15	0,03	0,19	0,03
Fairly	0,43	0,42	0,53	0,26	0,46	0,24
Very	0,47	0,09	0,24	0,68	0,19	0,71

Table 6.6 (continued): *Predicted probabilities of pride in Spain by territory*

	2000		
	Rest of Spain	**Basque C.**	**Catalonia**
Not at all	0,01	0,14	0,04
A little	0,03	0,23	0,09
Fairly	0,27	0,50	0,50
Very	0,69	0,13	0,37

In this table it can clearly be appreciated that residence in these two territories substantially depresses pride in Spain. This is especially true in the Basque Country, where the probability of being "very proud" of Spain has never been greater than 0.2, while in the rest of Spain, it has ranged among 0.47 and 0.69. The case of Catalonia is less pronounced than the Basque one, but it still shows huge differences with respect to the rest of Spain.

As I have said, we could think of two forces working in opposite directions, in the relationship between residence in Catalonia and the Basque Country and Spanish national pride. On one hand, the democratization and decentralization of Spain, and the increased recognition of internal diversity could have had an integrative effect. On the other hand, the institutionalization of Autonomous Governments, with partial powers over policy areas such as education and public broadcasting could have created a new and powerful socialization milieu and agencies devoted to the erosion of attachment to Spain, as they have been controlled by nationalist parties (Martínez-Herrera, 2002).

Even if I am not able to directly evaluate here these two opposing hypotheses because the 1981 survey does not include data on the specific autonomous community of the respondent, we could think on some observable implications to be tested. If the role of the

autonomous communities as socialization agencies was relevant, we should find those cohorts socialized in Catalonia and the Basque Country when the autonomous governments were already in place to have diminished their levels of pride with respect to the older cohorts at a higher rate than those in the rest of Spain. In other words: Everywhere younger generations have lower levels of Spanish national pride than older ones, but in Catalonia and the Basque Country we should expect the differences to be more pronounced because of the additional effect of the alternative nation-building processes set up by their respective governments.

Figure 6.3 shows the average values of national pride in 2000 for each cohort by territory. Here we can see how in the case of Catalonia, the trajectory is basically parallel to that of the rest of Spain, except for the first cohort that might be more influenced by the civil war (however, the small N for this group prevents further interpretation).

Figure 6.3: *National pride by cohort and territory (Average). 2000*

In the Basque Country the evolution is different, with a sharp decrease between the regime crisis and the transition generations that does not exist in the other cases. The sharp drop in the Basque case, though, is coincident with the final decades of the regime that, in the Basque Country, saw the spread and radicalization of the anti-Francoist opposition that became heavily linked to the radical nationalist and pro-independence movement. However, the graph does not seem to be reflecting the effect of the Autonomous Government as a socialization agency: we do not find a similarly sharper decrease in the case of the democracy cohort, that is the first group to reach adulthood under the newly institutionalized autonomous governments.

I will devote more attention to the impact of the institutionalization of autonomous governments over Spanish national identity in other chapters of this dissertation. However, here we have an indication that the direct effect of the autonomy should not be overstated. The mechanisms of nationalization held by the centre are more powerful than those of the autonomous communities. If they work in opposite directions, as we could argue happened to some extent in the Catalan and Basque cases, the autonomous institutions do not appear to have an additional impact over the depression of Spanish national identity.

Cohort analysis

Cohort analysis, despite some irregularities (that might be due to the reduced N of some cohorts), suggests that cohorts that reached adulthood during the regime's crisis, the transition or after the establishment of democracy show lower levels of national pride than the older ones. A quite linear tendency emerges, each cohort being less proud that the previous one. Those generations that were socialized under the Francoist regime, in an intensely nationalistic

environment, express more national pride. This is especially true for those cohorts that grew up under an uncontested hegemony of national-Catholic ideology. The generation that reached adulthood during the years of the regime's crisis, when the levels of popular protest skyrocketed, tends to show more similar patterns to those of the younger cohorts.

Due to the well-known age-period-cohort (APC) specification problem, we cannot be completely sure that this effect is not due to social ageing rather than political generations. However, a mechanism linking national pride and social ageing is much less plausible than the cohort effects. The differences among cohorts in levels of national pride have usually been interpreted as the product of different socialization contexts rather than a general effect of ageing, as shown by the nonlinearities found in some cases (Heath, Tilley and Exley, 2005).

It is interesting, though, to analyze more in depth the differences among cohorts, by adopting a dynamic perspective and taking advantage of the 20 year long series that we have. How do cohorts behave across the time? Do they tend to converge, diverge or the differences among them remain stable? Do cohorts have a tendency of increasing their levels of national pride as they age?

Following the impressionable years hypotheses we should expect the intergenerational differences to remain stable: once the attitudes of a generation have crystallized, they tend to be stable and resist change. However, as I have shown, the patterns of association between national pride and other variables are not stable, and the political changes have modified them. If we were to expect some change, it would be reasonable that, as Spanish national pride is less defined in Francoist terms, younger cohorts should feel more

comfortable with it and, thus, differences with the older generations should tend to decrease.

Figure 6.4 provides a first approximation to the underlying tendencies. Here we can see some slight tendency towards increased national pride and even some convergence among cohorts. This might point to the existence of certain life-cycle effects: apparently, as one ages, tends to express more national pride. However, it is not a clear-cut tendency, nor it is linear: the ups and downs that we find, especially among younger cohorts, seem to suggest the presence of period effects that might be distorting the results. While older cohorts show a somewhat more linear pattern, younger ones present a more irregular evolution:

Figure 6.4: *National pride by cohort (SA+A). 1980-2000*

We can test the evolution of the differences among generations by replicating the models of table 6.2, but introducing a new interaction term, between birth year and year of survey. The inclusion of this term in the models allows for the test of the convergence/divergence hypotheses.

Table 6.7: *Ordinal logit regression models. Dependent Variable: National Pride. Coefficients (and standard errors)*

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
	1981/2000	**1981/1990**	**1990/2000**
Catholicism	0,44 (0,17)***	1,27 (0,17)***	0,45 (0,17) ***
Ideology	0,17 (0,04)***	0,30 (0,03)***	0,17 (0,04)***
Year of Birth	-0,02 (0,00)***	-0,01 (0,00)***	-0,02 (0,00)***
Year	-6,03 (9,73)	-15,58 (7,58)**	9,74 (8,79)
Catholic*Year	0,83 (0,24)***	0,39 (0,19)**	0,43 (0,20)**
Ideology*Year	0,13 (0,05)***	0,15 (0,03)***	-0,01 (0,04)
Birth*Year	0,002 (0,00)***	0,01 (0,00)*	-0,01 (0,00)
_cut1	-35,26 (7,57)	-44,93 (4,45)	-35,52 (7,59)
_cut2	-33,91 (7,57)	-43,72 (4,45)	-34,38 (7,59)
_cut3	-31,83 (7,57)	-41,58 (4,45)	-32,19 (7,59)
Pseudo R^2	0.076	0.064	0.060
MK/Z R^2	0.172	0.154	0.142
LR Chi^2 (7df)	390.58	628.13	491.98
N	2471	4413	3812

The interactions are also statistically significant but in the opposite direction: at the beginning of the period, the effect of birth year over national pride was stronger than by the year 2000. This result suggests that the disparities between cohorts have been slightly eroded throughout the period under analysis here. However, the coefficient is very small, so the change is not a dramatic one but rather a subtle one, as we could already appreciate in the graph. So we can say that the cohorts have some tendency to converge but it is a weak tendency and for the most part cohort differences in national pride have tended to remain wide. Neither the democratization process nor the ageing, have substantially eroded the differences among generations.

6.7 Discussion and Conclusions

So the results have roughly confirmed my hypotheses: the influence of religion and ideology on Spanish national pride significantly declined during the analyzed period. However, not all the variables behave exactly in the same way and the general picture is rather complex: the details are much more nuanced, and this transformation is not complete (as I had already predicted), nor homogeneous.

We have observed a constant tendency towards a progressive *secularization* of Spanish national pride through a reduction of the impact of Catholicism on national pride. This tendency is congruent with the marginalization of the explicit national-Catholic discourse from the public sphere (Núñez Seixas, 2001) since the end of the Francoist dictatorship. However, in the year 2000, we still find a significant impact of religion on national pride, that may be indicating that Catholicism acts as a stable cultural marker for in-group definition in Spain, and thus it is not exclusively related to changes in the public discourse. The identification of Spanish nation with Catholicism has deep roots, and national Catholicism has been a very important component of contemporary Spanish nationalism since its origins in 19th century, even among its liberal exponents (Álvarez Junco, 2002).

When Spaniards are explicitly asked by the importance of religion as a national marker, less than a half of respondents consider it important or very important.[77] This may reflect that the explicit identification between Catholicism and nationhood in Spain is

---

[77] 46.7 per cent in ISSP 1995 and 43.2 per cent in ISSP 2003 consider "important" or "very important" to be a Catholic for being "truly Spanish".

slowly disappearing from the public discourse, but it still remains an important marker for individual attachment with Spain. The growing diversity, in religious terms, of the Spanish population (due to the increasing settlement of immigrants and the process of secularization) may contribute, in the near future, to a further loss of impact of religion on national pride. However, some explicit links of the official catholic church with the unitarianist Spanish nationalism, such as the recent consideration, by a significant sector of the Spanish bishops, of the national unity as a 'moral good'[78] may act as a counter-balancing factor and help to maintain a certain degree of religious bias in the Spanish national pride.

On the other hand, the evolution of the relationship between ideology and national pride in Spain seems to be more complex. From 1981, to 1990 (and 1995) the process of reduction of the influence of ideology on national pride was constant, reaching a point in which it had lost its significant impact. The long-lasting left-wing governments (1982-1996) may have contributed to this process, by fostering attachment to the nation among left-wing identifiers and, perhaps, also reducing it among rightists.

However, since 1995, ideology retrieved its influence on national pride, and in 1999 and 2000 it was quite strong. This change of tendency coincides with the arrival to the government of the Popular Party, that may have reverted the deideologization of Spain by identifying its right-wing government with the defense of the nation, opposing both external threats (for example, the Moroccan 'invasion' of the islet of Perejil in front of the Spanish-ruled northern-African city of Ceuta during the summer of 2002) and internal conflicts with peripheral nationalists, that were possibly

---

[78] See, for example, *El País* 24/06/2006 p.25

more intense in the 2000-2004 period than ever before since the return to democracy in Spain.

This reversal of the tendency seems to indicate that certain period effects, related to changes in the mainstream nationalist discourses following short-term political changes, mediate the relationship between ideology and national pride. This somewhat surprising result opens room for further research on attachment to the nation that is usually seen as rather autonomous from short-term political changes.

Finally, residence in culturally distinct territories has an uneven influence on national pride: only in the cases of Catalonia and the Basque Country (and the Canary Islands) it significantly reduces pride in Spain. In the other cases (Valencia, Galicia, Balearic Islands) the influence is lower, or there is no influence at all. Although the lack of data for every time-point on specific cultural practices, such as minority language usage makes it impossible to estimate the effects of this individual traits, the results suggest that the mechanism that links residence in those territories and lower levels of pride in Spain is not linguistic or cultural distinctiveness by itself but rather the existence of relevant peripheral nationalist elites that have set up alternative nation-building projects, that may hinder attachment to Spain. If the Basque and Catalan cases are commonly referred to as examples of failure of the Spanish nation-building process, the Galician, Valencian and Balearic ones should be considered, at least partially, as examples of successful Spanish nation-building despite the presence of distinctive languages.

These results seem to support the idea that national identities are politically and socially constructed (or 'deconstructed'), and do not derive directly from some *objective* ethno cultural traits of individuals. The lack of data on autonomous communities for 1981

does not allow us to test the hypotheses on the evolution of the relationship between residence in Catalonia and the Basque Country and Spanish national pride. However, the data on 1990-2000 are clear enough in showing that, regardless of the previous evolution, this variables do exert a strong influence in depressing the average levels of pride in Spain being –especially in the Basque case- by far, the strongest predictor of national pride in the models.

We still can not be sure whether the lower pride in Spain of residents in Catalonia and the Basque Country is the product of a Spanish nationalism that, by defining in ethno cultural terms the Spanish nation, alienates them from feeling attached to it, or rather the result of the alternative nation-building set up by Basque and Catalan autonomous governments. Further research would be needed to determine the influence of the distinct forces in shaping the individual attitudes of Catalans and Basques towards Spain. In any case, we have shown that the negative relationship between residence in these territories and pride in Spain has not disappeared at all after more than twenty years of democracy and decentralization of Spain.

Despite the different paths, by the year 2000 the ideological, religious and territorial biases on national pride were still strong and significant. How should we interpret these results? Are them reflecting an unfulfilled, or precarious, process of redefinition of the Spanish nationalist discourse after the end of the Francoism? Or simply indicate that the process of change, at the individual level, is slower –and less linear- than predicted? Or has Spain simply reached a 'normal' situation in which the majoritarian religion acts as a national marker just as in other countries, and the relationship between ideology and attachment to the nation is mediated by intervening political variables?

285

Further research would be needed to provide a satisfactory answer to these questions, and probably all these options are partially true. In any case, in this chapter I have shown that national pride is not completely autonomous from the political sphere, and that deep political changes such as a transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy do modify people's attitudes towards their nation. Attachment to the nation is a political phenomenon and, as such, it is socially and politically constructed (and reconstructed): the agency of the elites, and the institutional settings, do exert a strong influence in shaping individual attitudes towards the nation, even in the short term.

There is yet another question to be addressed: how do these results relate to the typology defined in the previous chapter? Since in the first term I chose to use national pride as a dependent variably and trace the evolution of the impact over it of a set of variables as a substitute for the absence of data measuring the varieties of Spanish national identity throughout the period, it seems a reasonable concern to question whether this is an adequate substitutive strategy. It might well be that national pride does reflect just the traditional Spanish identity and thus, extracting conclusions from the analysis in this chapter for the whole identity might be misleading. I address this question in next chapter, by replicating the analysis for 2007, exploring the relationship between national pride and the identity typology and, finally, conducting separate analyses with the same independent variables used in this chapter for each type of Spanish identity: the constitutional and the traditional.

Chapter seven

THE SOCIAL BASES OF SPANISH NATIONAL IDENTITIES

7.1 Introduction

In chapter 6 I have shown how, despite its decline, in 2000 there were, still, strong and statistically significant religious, ideological, territorial and generational biases[79] in the Spanish national pride. Although at the beginning of the democratic period the influence of Catholicism and ideology on the individual levels of national pride was certainly stronger than in 2000, in the recent years we still find a statistically significant influence of these factors, together with the territory of residence and the generation of the respondents, on national pride. In general, we find stronger national pride among those individuals that self-identify as Catholics, as well as those located in the right wing of the ideological spectrum. Older generations, and inhabitants of monolingual autonomous communities are also more prone to express high levels of national pride.

---

[79] While it might seem normatively loaded, I use the term 'biases' to refer to the influence of ideology, religion and territory of residence on the Spanish national identity to indicate the fact that they represent 'deviations' from a theoretical, neutral and integrative national identity.

However, in the conclusions to that chapter I also expressed my concerns that the observed biases might be driven by a poor definition of the dependent variable. National pride, I argued, could be measuring only a certain version of the Spanish national identity (namely, the traditional one) and, thus, when trying to infer from our results general conclusions about the Spanish national identity as a whole we might be incurring in a certain bias. Here I will face these concerns by taking advantage of the work carried out in chapters 3, 4, and 5 that have been entirely devoted to a precise definition and measurement of the dependent variable, with the goal of defining a theoretically and empirically consistent typology of Spanish national identity. Through the typology proposed in the chapter 5, that distinguishes between constitutional and traditional varieties of Spanish identity, I have developed a methodological instrument that will allow me to face this issue and test whether the biases identified in chapter 6 are actually affecting both versions of the Spanish identity or, on the contrary, they only refer to the traditional one.

In this chapter I want to address this question, by replicating the analysis carried out in chapter 6, but taking advantage of the nuanced definition and measurement of the dependent variable that I have elaborated and set up, in order to test whether my concerns were well-founded, and the observed biases refer only to the traditional version of Spanish national identity and not to the constitutional one or, on the contrary, the conclusions of chapter 6 can be applied to both types of identity. Unfortunately, it is not possible to adopt here the dynamic perspective of chapter 6, given that there is no prior data to determine the types of identity that I propose, so I will limit the analysis to a single point in time.

However, this chapter is not only limited to the expansion of the analysis carried out in chapter 6. I also address the more general

question of the social basis of the Spanish national identity here. By introducing other independent variables in the analysis, I test, at the individual level, some observable implications of the theoretical framework I have discussed in the introduction, related to relevant debates in the theories of nationalism. The general goal is to gain a more nuanced understanding of the social determinants of Spanish national identity and thus, strengthen our understanding of the process through which it is constructed and reproduced, as to gain a deeper understanding on how do citizens acquire and shape their national identities in democratic established nation-states.

7.2 Biases in national pride, 2007 as 2000?

Prior to the modification of the analysis and the work with the new dependent variable, it is useful to replicate the very same analysis carried out in chapter 6 with the data of the survey CIS2667, in order to see if the conclusions for 2000 are still valid in 2007. Moreover, this replication will serve as a directly comparable reference point when working with the new dependent variables, as

I will work with the same CIS2667 survey. I, thus, assess in this section the impact of Catholicism, ideology, region and generation on national pride. The reasonable expectation is that there will not be a significant change with respect to 2000.[80] We could think that the arrival of the Socialist party to the Spanish government might have softened the ideological biases as it happened during the 1980's and early 90's. However, the harsh conflict with the Popular

---

[80] The fact that the survey CIS2667 was carried out by a different research institute, with different sample designs, measurement instruments and guidelines to the interviewers prevents me to merge it with the 2000 WVS, so I will not be able to fully assess the evolution of the coefficients in this period. However, the cross-sectional analysis for 2007 will provide enough insights to approach the question.

Party during the 2004-08 term about the reform of the Autonomy Statute of Catalonia, and other issues related to the national identity might have counterbalanced the effect by strengthening the association between right-wing ideology and Spanish nationalism. Moreover, the participation of the Catholic hierarchy in the conflict by explicitly aligning itself to the Popular Party's theses might also have slowed down the progressive and sustained decline in the religious polarization that we observed for the 1981-2000 period in chapter 6.

To address these questions, I proceed as follows. First I briefly review the bivariate associations between my independent variables of interest and national pride. Then I develop the multivariate analysis to jointly test the effects of these variables and uncover potentially spurious relationships. The first variable to inspect is Catholicism. As I did in chapter 6, I use a dummy variable to measure it. It takes the value 1 when the respondent identifies herself as a Catholic and 0 otherwise. 78% of the weighted sample lies in the category 1 and only 21% does not identify as Catholic.

Table 7.1: *National Pride and Catholicism, 2007. Column %*

National Pride	Non Catholic	Catholic	Total
Not proud at all	13.40	3.10	5.62
Not very proud	21.82	8.34	11.65
Fairly proud	39.09	42.44	41.62
Very proud	25.69	46.12	41.11
Total	100	100	100

In table 7.1, we can appreciate the differences between Catholics and non-Catholics in their levels of national pride. While among

Catholics the percentage of those located in the top category (very proud) is almost 50%, only a 29% of non-Catholics is placed in this category. The reverse is true for the low categories, where non-Catholics are more concentrated. Indeed, despite being only a 21% of our weighted sample, non-Catholics are the majority group among those that declare to be "not proud at all" (62,6%) and "not very proud" (50,21%) of being Spaniard.

In chapter 6 I already explained the reasons for choosing a dichotomous operationalization of religion instead of the more common one that uses frequency of attendance to religious services as an indicator of religiosity. The mechanism linking Catholicism and Spanish national pride that I propose is not related to a direct effect of church attendance as a socialization experience but rather to the self-identification with the mainstream religious group of Spain, and the one that has been identified by the traditional Spanish nationalism as representing the *true* values of the homeland.[81] However, it might be useful to explore the relationship between church attendance and national pride because it might shed some light on the actual mechanisms at work in this relationship.

Table 7.2 displays the average value of national pride[82] by each category of church attendance. Here we can see how, while there are some differences between categories, the main gap is to be found between the non-Catholics and the rest. This reinforces the idea already expressed in chapter 6 that the relevant mechanism linking Catholicism and Spanish national pride is the self-identification as a Catholic rather than frequency of attendance to religious services.

---

[81] For a full discussion of this question, see chapter 2.

[82] Where 1 is 'not proud at all' and 4 'very proud'.

Table 7.2*: National Pride and Religious Practice.*

	Mean national pride	Observations
Non catholic	2,90	785
Catholic, almost never	3,38	982
Several times a year	3,43	573
Some times a month	3,40	269
Almost every Sunday and holiday	3,49	357
Several times a week	3,51	39
Total	3,30	3005

However, there are still some differences among the different levels of practice. Indeed, if we regress national pride against a set of dummies for each category of religious practice, leaving the weekly attendance as a reference[83], we get negative and statistically significant coefficients for the rest of the categories, indicating that, indeed, there is an effect of the intensity of religious practice over national pride. It could still be argued that this variable is actually capturing the intensity of the self-identification as a catholic rather than a direct effect of the church as a socialization agency, so it is difficult to adjudicate between these two mechanisms with the data we have.

The relationship between ideology and national pride is, as we have seen, more volatile than the case of religion. I have already discussed why should we expect the relationship between ideology and national pride to remain strong in 2006/07, despite the return of the Socialist Party to the government in 2004. Table 7.3 shows the

---

[83] For an ordered logistic regression (not shown). I collapsed the top two categories of attendance, given the reduced number of cases in the 'several times a week' category.

distribution of national pride levels across five ideological groups, as well as the average values for each group:

Table 7.3*: National Pride and Ideology. Column % and Average*

	Left	Center-left	Center	Center-right	Right	Total
	(0-2)	*(3-4)*	*(5)*	*(6-7)*	*(8-10)*	
Not at all	11,51	4,78	1,94	0,71	0,74	4,06
Not very	17,13	13,01	6,38	2,27	1,77	9,08
Fairly	40,69	48,79	45,97	43,34	25,83	43,82
Very	30,68	33,42	45,71	53,69	71,66	43,04
Average	*2.90*	*3.12*	*3.35*	*3.50*	*3.68*	*3.25*
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00	100

Here we can see how the average values of national pride increase as we move towards the right of the ideological spectrum. Again, we have some indication that the ideological biases in Spanish national pride remain in place in 2006. In the multivariate analysis I will test the statistical significance of this relationship, while controlling for other factors, such as generation, that might be influencing the relationship.

Table 7.4*: National Pride by Generation. Column % and Average*

	War + Autarchy	Consoli-dation	Regime crisis	Transition	Democracy	Total
Not at all	4,14	2,94	5.37	4.55	8.70	5.87
Not very	6,54	8,32	12.19	15.91	14.09	11.65
Fairly	36,60	39.15	44.21	43.83	42.96	41.51
Very	52,72	49.59	38.22	35.71	34.26	40.98
Average	*3.47*	*3.46*	*3.29*	*3.22*	*3.17*	*3.30*

Indeed, the differences among generations, as shown in table 7.4, are also clear and run in the expected direction. Older generations tend to show higher levels of national pride than younger ones. However, the differences are not as big as those that we found among ideological groups.

Finally, in chapter 6 I showed how residence in certain autonomous communities acted as the most powerful determinant of the level of national pride in 2000. This was especially the case for Catalonia and the Basque Country, but also, albeit to a lesser extent, for some other territories with distinct languages such as Galicia.

Table 7.5: *National Pride by Autonomous Community. Average*

Autonomous Community	Mean national pride	Standard deviation
Catalonia	2,96	0,93
Basque Country	2,53	0,91
Valencia	3,4	0,69
Balearic Islands	3,27	0,67
Navarre	3,00	0,93
Galicia	3,19	0,54
Canary Islands	3,34	0,73
Rest	3,44	0,70
Total	**3,30**	**0,85**

In table 7.5, we can see how all the linguistically distinct autonomous communities have lower average values of Spanish national pride than the monolingual Spain. However, as predicted, the difference is greater in the cases of the Basque Country and Catalonia than the rest of the inspected territories. I will analyze below this distribution in more detail, but already in this table we can observe another interesting result: the levels of internal

polarization, as expressed by the Standard deviations, are significantly greater in Catalonia, the Basque Country and Navarre (where they are above 0,9) that in the rest of Communities, where the standard deviations are around or below 0,7. This points to greater internal divisions of the population, and suggests that the lower average is explained by these divisions rather than a lower consensus.

The bivariate analysis has shown some indications that the associations we found in chapter 6 still exist in 2007. However, some of these relationships might be spurious: perhaps the apparent relationship between Catholicism and national pride is due to the generational differences in both national pride and religiosity. The same might stand for ideology. To test for those potential confounding effects, I develop a multivariate analysis, parallel to those conducted with the WVS data in chapter 6, to jointly assess the effect of each of these variables on Spanish national pride.

The variables included, as in the previous analyses, are: 'Catholic', which is a dummy variable with value 1 if the respondent identifies herself as a Catholic, 'Ideology', a 0-10 left-right scale; Cohort – several dummies for the cohorts as defined in chapter 6, based on the Gunther, Torcal and Montero (1998) scheme[84]. I also include dummies for the territories with distinct language, plus the Canary Islands. The model is, given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, an ordered logit regression, with robust standard errors. [85]

---

[84] Here I have collapsed cohorts 1 (pre-war and war) and 2 (Autarchy) given the reduced number of individuals in the first cohort, so the scheme is a 5-cohort one rather than the 6-cohort classification defined by Gunther, Torcal and Montero.

[85] As in chapter 6, this model does violate the parallel regressions assumption. The effects of several independent variables are stronger for the extreme categories. A generalized ordered logit, however, does not suggest any major change in the overall results.

Table 7.6: *Ordinal logit regression models. Dependent Variable: National Pride. Coefficients (and S.E)*

Ordinal logit, National Pride			
	Coef.	Std. Err. (robust)	P>z
Catholic	0.75	0.12	0.000
Ideology	0.23	0.03	0.000
Cohort 2, Regime consolidation (born 1938-52)	0.12	0.18	0.500
Cohort 3, Regime crisis, economic dev. (1953-62)	-0.20	0.19	0.279
Cohort 4, Transition (1963-67)	-0.32	0.20	0.105
Cohort 5, Democracy (Born after 1968)	-0.57	0.16	0.000
Catalonia	-1.27	0.14	0.000
Basque Country	-2.42	0.13	0.000
Valencia	-0.18	0.11	0.122
Balearic Islands	-0.62	0.51	0.222
Navarre	-1.47	0.43	0.001
Galicia	-0.99	0.18	0.000
Canary Islands	-0.50	0.33	0.128
/cut1	-2.88	0.24	
/cut2	-1.37	0.23	
/cut3	1.29	0.23	
Pseudo R^2	*0.1138*		
MacKelvey and Zavonia R^2	*0.251*		
Wald chi2(3)	*611.83****		
N	*2402*		

This model confirms some of the findings of the bivariate results, as well as those of chapter 6. Both religious identification and ideology have a significant effect in the predicted direction. Those individuals that identify themselves as Catholics, as well as those located in the right of the ideological scale are more prone to express higher levels of Spanish national pride.

If we are to compare these results with the previous chapter models, we must state that both the religious and the ideological polarization in Spanish national pride are stronger in 2007 than in 2000. Indeed, if we calculate the predicted probabilities of being 'very proud' in Spain for Catholics and non-Catholics, the difference is 0,15 (while in 2000 it was 0,11). As for ideology, the distance in the predicted probability of being very proud between extreme left and extreme right is 0,47, while in 2000 it was 0,3. We have to interpret this direct comparison very cautiously, because the surveys do not have the same design nor fieldwork institution, and some of the scales (such as ideology) are different in the CIS2667 than in the World Values Survey. However, even if cautiously, we have seen that the general tendency towards the erasing of the differences might have been reverted in this period. It is not a very surprising result, given that during these years there have been in Spain sharp conflicts between the state-wide right and left with respect to the national question, mainly related to the reform of the Catalan Autonomy Statute, carried out between 2004 and 2006. The Catholic church has also taken part in these debates, so it might have contributed to this increased polarization.

The cohort differences are not as clear as expected. I have left the group one (that merges cohorts 1 and 2 in the Torcal-Montero scheme) as the reference category. In the previous analysis we had seen significant difference at least between the three younger cohorts and the three older ones. The reduction of the differences might be indicating a certain life-cycle effect. As cohorts age, they tend to converge with the older ones. That would explain why only the youngest cohort, that is not bounded and, thus, continuously receives new incorporations, is the only one to remain significantly distinct to the rest. The youngest group shows lower levels of national pride.

As for the territorial differences, we see how the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent, Navarre and Catalonia, have significantly lower levels of national pride than the monolingual autonomous communities. Galicia has a negative and significant (but small) coefficient too, while the other communities are not significantly distinct from the rest of Spain. This analysis has shown that the biases on Spanish national pride that we identified are still working in 2007 and for some respects they have even increased. However, as I said at the beginning of the chapter, in order to correctly interpret the implications of these results it is important to sharpen the definition of the dependent variable. In the next section I explore more systematically the relationship between national pride and the typology of national identities I have defined in previous chapters and then repeat the analysis with new dependent variables.

7.3 National pride, constitutional and traditional identities

A first, relevant test of whether the relationship between religion, ideology and national pride I have identified does reflect a consistent pattern across types of national identity is to explore the relationship between national pride and the typology I have defined in previous chapters. In chapter 5, when comparing the typology with national pride, we already had some indications that, indeed, it is more closely related to the traditional identity than to the purely constitutional one. While 70% of the individuals in the high constitutional/high traditional category did declare to be very proud of being Spaniards, this was only the case for 42% of the high constitutional/low traditional individuals.

Here I explore this relationship in a more systematic way, by regressing national pride against the categories of the typology as I

have defined them in chapter 5. Table 7.7 displays the results of an ordered logistic regression:

Table 7.7: *Ordinal logit regression model. National Pride and identity typology.*

Ordinal logit, National Pride						
	Model 1			**Model 2**		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
High constitutional, high traditional	*(refer)*			3.24	0.17	0.000
High constitutional, low traditional	-1.14	0.11	0.000	2.10	0.16	0.000
High traditional, low constitutional	-1.40	0.42	0.001	1.84	0.43	0.000
Low traditional, low constitutional	-3.24	0.17	0.000	*(refer)*		
_cut1	-5.12	0.15		-1.87	0.13	
_cut2	-3.63	0.12		-0.39	0.11	
_cut3	-0.85	0.09		2.39	0.15	
Pseudo R^2	0.131			0.131		
MK/Z R^2	0.289			0.289		
Wald chi2(3)	365.97***			365.97***		
N	2354			2354		

In the first model, we can see how, indeed, there is a statistically significant difference in national pride between the high constitutional/high traditional identity groups. Thus, it confirms a closer association of national pride with traditional identity. However, that does not mean that there is no association between national pride and constitutional identity. Indeed, in model 2, where I leave as a reference the low/low category, we can see how the difference between this group and the one with only high constitutional identity is also significant, and strong. Moreover, this

is not a result driven exclusively by the effect of Catalan and Basque citizens within the model. On the contrary, if we repeat the analysis excluding these territories, the results prove stable.

In any case, these results suggest that we must be cautious in the interpretation of the results obtained in chapter 6 as applying to the Spanish national identity as a whole: they might be driven by the closer association of national pride with traditional identity. In other words: it might well be that the constitutional Spanish identity is a neutral type of identity, and the observed biases in national pride are based on its closer association to the traditional understanding of the Spanish identity. However, we have seen that national pride also appears to be related to the constitutional identity, as shown by the significant coefficient of the "high constitutional, low traditional" dummy in model 2. Thus, the results obtained in chapter 6 should not just be dismissed as representing only the traditional Spanish national identity. Therefore, the challenge remains to empirically assess the validity of these results for all the types of national identity I have defined or, on the contrary, reduce the scope of the findings of chapter 6.

7.4 Unfolding the biases: Generation, ideology, religion, territory and the Spanish national identities

How should we expect ideology, religion, cohort and territory to relate to the typology? The reasonable expectation is that the traditional version of Spanish national identity, by its definition and advocates, will be closely associated with Catholicism, right-wing ideology and older generations, socialized under the Francoist dictatorship -in the periods previous to the crisis of legitimacy of the regime. We have also seen, in chapter 6, that the traditional Spanish nationalism is closely associated by a unicultural

conception of Spain, despite some degree of acceptance of cultural diversity by the Spanish right, so we should also find lower levels of traditional identity in those autonomous communities with distinct languages or, more precisely, with relevant alternative nationalisms.

The relationship of these independent variables with the constitutional identity is more complex to predict. In the way I have defined it chapter 5, it comprises a unitarian idea of Spain based on 'universalist' principles and the embracing of the 1978 constitution as a fundamental mean to preserve Spain's unity. However, it also comprises cultural elements, such as the Spanish language –that is a central identity marker- or an unitarianist, albeit critical reading of the Spanish history. My understanding of it is that this idea of Spain reflects the 'constitutional nationalism' that arose from the 'transitional consensus'. If this is true, we should expect the constitutional identity to not be biased in ideological or religious terms, but rather be an all-embracing conception of Spanishness except, perhaps, for some small sectors of the Spanish far-left (and perhaps, of the far-right) that openly question the transition process and its outcomes and, more importantly, for Catalan and Basque nationalists.

It is worth, then, exploring the association of each of the independent variables I have been discussing until now with the Spanish national identity typology I have defined. I will start by analyzing the cross-tabulations for each of them, and then move to a multivariate analysis in order to jointly assess the effect of these variables on the varieties of the Spanish national identity.

In table 7.8 and figure 7.1 we can see the distribution of these varieties across generations. There is indeed a clear relationship between cohorts and the Spanish national identity. Older cohorts are

303

especially drawn towards the traditional Spanish identity (high/high category), that is the modal category for the oldest two cohorts, while the constitutional -non traditional one becomes progressively more relevant among cohorts socialized in the last period of the regime and the post-Francosim. Also the low/low category is substantially higher for younger cohorts, especially the youngest one although the constitutional non-traditional one is by large the majority category in this group too.

Table 7.8: *National identity typology, by generation*

Typology	Prewar&war + Autarchy	Conso-lidation	Regime crisis	Transition	Democracy	Total
Low traditional, low constitutional	9.37	13.92	21.38	20.1	25.27	19.95
High constitutional, low traditional	29.27	35.92	**42.37**	**50.76**	**50.57**	**43.85**
High constitutional, high traditional	**58.57**	**48.11**	33.97	28.17	23.51	34.73
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Percent	*15.59*	*19.49*	*16.08*	*10.21*	*38.64*	*100*

These trends can be clearly appreciated in figure 7.1, where the progressive erosion of the once hegemonic traditional Spanish identity and its replacement by a growing constitutional, non-traditional identity is made evident. However, we also observe a growth of the low-low category among younger generations. Among the cohorts socialized under the democracy, the percentage of those displaying low Spanish identification is 25%.

Figure 7.1: *National identity typology, by generation*

Spanish national identities, by generation

Again, we face the problem of the distinction between life cycle and cohort effects. We might think of rejection of the national symbols that constitute an important part of how the traditional identity has been defined, to be somehow related to the life cycle. However, most likely, the dominant effect here is a generational one. The younger cohorts have not been socialized under an environment in which the Spanish symbols play a salient role in public life, as discussed in chapter 2. The other components of the traditional identity are Catholicism and the traditionalist reading of Spanish history, which is roughly identifiable with the one that was extensively transmitted through the Francoist educational system. The well-documented secularization process in Spain (Pérez-Agote 2007), operating mainly through a generational replacement mechanism, might also be driving the observed relationship between the traditional identity and generations.

Indeed, as shown by table 7.9, younger cohorts are far less religious than older ones. While among the oldest cohort, the percentage of non-Catholics is 7,9%, among the democracy cohort it raises up to

35,7%. Those that declare to attend the church almost every Sunday drop from 33,7% in the oldest cohort down to 3,8% among the youngest one.

Table 7.9: *Religious practice, by generation*

	Prewar&war + Autarchy	**Conso-lidation**	**Regime crisis**	**Transi -tion**	**Democracy**	*Total*
Non Catholic	7.89	12.01	21.26	24.43	35.72	*23.2*
Almost never	18.88	25.70	37.44	38.75	36.57	*32.0*
Several times a year	18.99	25.32	20.21	21.55	20.39	*21.2*
Several times a month	14.04	13.39	11.69	8.95	3.85	*9.08*
Almost every Sunday	33.72	21.44	8.82	6.10	3.39	*12.7*
Several times a week	6.50	2.14	0.58	0.23	0.07	*1.57*
Total	100	100	100	100	100	*100*

An implication of the previous discussion is that traditional identity will be related with Catholicism. It is reasonable to expect that, if traditional Spanish identity is related with the idea that Catholicism is important for defining the Spanish nationhood, those individuals with stronger catholic identification will be more likely to hold this type of identity. We can check this implication by crossing the indicator of religiosity with the identity typology.

Table 7.10: *National identity typology and religious practice*

	Non Catholic	Almost never	Several times a year	Several times a month	Almost every Sunday	Several times a week	*Total*
Low traditional, low constitutional	38.22	16.51	13.90	11.18	11.61	3.15	*19.99*
High constitutional, low traditional	**51.14**	**49.54**	39.99	39.76	28.53	8.87	*43.95*
High constitutional, high traditional	9.91	33.74	**43.16**	**45.84**	**57.14**	**87.98**	*34.58*
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*
Percent	*27.35*	*32.40*	*18.49*	*8.92*	*11.59*	*1.26*	*100*

In table 7.10 I compare the joint indicator of religious identification and practice to the identity typology. The high constitutional, low traditional identity is, by far, majoritarian among non-Catholics and non-practicing Catholics, while those groups with various degrees of practice are more concentrated in the high traditional, high constitutional category. The low/low category follows the same pattern as the constitutional with the relevant difference that the main gap is to be found between the non-Catholics and the rest, rather than between non-practicing and practicing Catholics. This is interesting because it shows a link between self-identification as catholic and Spanish national identity that is independent from the traditional identity (that has some religious component in its definition). Moreover, it reveals that in this case religious identification plays a more important role than church attendance. The distance between non Catholics and non-practicing Catholics in the low/low category is big enough as to consider plausible that belonging to the majority religion does foster Spanish national

identity in general, and not only its traditional version. In any case, the multivariate analysis will provide more insights on this question.

As for the ideological divide, I have agued that the traditional version of the Spanish national identity should be closely linked to the right wing, while the constitutional identity should embrace the entire ideological spectrum except, perhaps, some segments of the far-left, as well as the peripheral nationalists. Table 7.11 gives some indications about the relationship. The link between traditional identity and the right side of the ideological spectrum seems clear, while the constitutional one is less biased, except for the far-left category, in which the percentage of low/low is almost 40%.

Table 7.11: *National identity typology and ideology*

Typology	Left	Center-left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Total
Low traditional, low constitutional	39.29	24.07	16.79	12.20	4.38	21.15
High constitutional, low traditional	**46.34**	**50.24**	**49.44**	37.51	16.07	44.51
High constitutional, high traditional	14.13	24.46	32.09	**49.10**	**75.68**	32.94
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Percent	*17.47*	*29.48*	*29.73*	*15.12*	*8.20*	*100*

Perhaps this relationship can be better perceived through a graph in which we plot the fitted values of the two scales of traditional and constitutional identity against the values of the ideological scale. Both types of identity, as we have seen, are positively correlated with the left-right scale, but we should expect the traditional

identity to be more closely related to ideology than the constitutional one.

Figure 7.2: *Constitutional and Traditional identity, expected values by ideology*

Figure 7.2 shows that the expected relationships do indeed hold. The slope of the fitted line relating the traditional Spanish identity to ideology is clearly higher. However, the slope of constitutional identity is clearly positive, so apparently there is an empirical relation between both kinds of Spanish identity and left-right self-placement. We could think of the relationship between the constitutional identity and ideology as being non-linear and driven mainly by the effect of the far-left. However, through a visual non-parametric analysis via lowess smoother (not shown) we can determine that indeed the relationship is quite linear.

This result suggests that the biases we found in the analysis of the Spanish national pride are affecting both types of identity.

However, this might be driven by the influence of other variables or, simply by the positive correlation between traditional and constitutional identities. In the multivariate analysis I will separate the effects on both scales.

Finally, it is useful to inspect the territorial distribution of the varieties of the Spanish national identity across autonomous communities. Congruent with the previous analysis we should expect a lower average level of Spanish national identity in those territories with distinct languages, especially in the Basque Country and Catalonia, where the alternative nationalist movements have been, and are strong. Moreover, the role that Spanish language as a defining trait of the constitutional Spanish identity might have a certain depressing effect over the population of those autonomous communities with distinctive languages.

Table 7.12: *National identity by Autonomous Community*

Autonomous Community	Low traditional, low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	*Total*	*N*
Catalonia	**43.80**	36.11	18.80	*100*	*587*
Basque C.	**61.22**	24.88	12.68	*100*	*600*
Valencia	20.40	**44.35**	30.60	*100*	*600*
Balearic Islands	21.74	**56.52**	17.39	*100*	*26*
Navarre	29.41	**52.94**	17.65	*100*	*21*
Galicia	15.79	**51.32**	32.89	*100*	*99*
Canary Islands	6.25	37.50	**52.08**	*100*	*56*
Rest	10.69	**46.47**	41.97	*100*	*1205*
Total	*19.95*	*43.85*	*34.73*	*100*	*3194*

This table shows how there is, indeed, a consistently lower penetration of both types of identity in Catalonia and the Basque Country than in the rest of Spain, as I already showed in chapter 5. In the case of the other linguistically distinct autonomous communities the differences are not even closely similar, but still there are some important differences, especially referred to the traditional identity. In any case, the multivariate analysis I conduct in the next section will, again, provide more rigorous testing of the statistically relevance of these differences and whether they are due to a specifically territorial factor or simply to different ideological, generational and/or religious composition of the population of these territories.

Multivariate analysis

It is necessary to integrate these analyses in a unified multivariate analysis in order to control for possible spurious relations. Until now, I have been mainly working with the typology defined through the dichotomization and cross tabulation of the two scales of Spanish identity. This strategy has been useful to illustrate the patterns and explore the kinds of relationships between the relevant independent variables and the types of identity. However, in the multivariate regression I use the scales by themselves as dependent variables, as to not loose nuance and the variation within the two groups I have defined for each scale. I conduct a separate analysis for each type of identity, with the same independent variables, in order to see if the explanatory variables are the same or not. As I have discussed, we should expect ideology, generation and religion to exert a strong influence on the traditional Spanish identity. As for the constitutional one, it more consensual nature might lead us to hypothesize that the effect of these variables will not be as strong.

However, the positive correlation between the two might influence the results. I deal with this issue below.

In table 7.13 we can see the model referring to the traditional identity. As expected, all variables are statistically significant, and relate to the dependent variable in the expected direction. Traditional Spanish national identity is, thus, strongly related to right-wing ideology, Catholic religion, generation and territory of residence. Overall, these variables account for 42% of the total variance of the dependent variable, which indicates a very good fit, considering that the model only includes the theoretically relevant variables with no additional controls.

Table 7.13: *OLS regression, Traditional Spanish identity*

	Beta Coef.	Std. Err. (robust)	P>z
Ideology	0.29	0.04	0.00
Catholic	0.28	0.17	0.00
Cohort 2 (born 1938-52)	-0.05	0.23	0.05
Cohort 3 (1953-62)	-0.10	0.25	0.00
Cohort 4 (1963-67)	-0.14	0.27	0.00
Cohort 5 (Born after 1968)	-0.26	0.21	0.00
Balearic Islands	-0.04	0.49	0.04
Canary Islands	-0.05	0.46	0.07
Catalonia	-0.24	0.18	0.00
Valencia	-0.05	0.15	0.00
Galicia	-0.11	0.30	0.00
Navarre	-0.07	0.35	0.00
Basque Country	-0.21	0.19	0.00
R^2	*0,42*		
N	*2197*		

Both ideology and religion seem to have a similarly strong relationship with traditional Spanish identity. As for the generations, we observe a linear relationship: each generation has lower levels of traditional Spanish identity than the previous one, as suggested by the bivariate exploratory analyses. Ever coefficient compares a given generation to the baseline one, which is the oldest group. Each coefficient, though, is higher than the previous one, but there is a significant increase between the cohorts 4 (transition) and 5 (post-1968). This shows how those citizens socialized under the democracy, independently of their religious or ideological affiliation, tend to share less this traditional understanding of the Spanish national identity.

Residence in a linguistically distinct autonomous community does also have a depressing effect over the traditional Spanish national identity. However, there are relevant differences between these territories: while the coefficients for the Basque Country and Catalonia are strong (almost as strong as those of ideology or religion), this is not the case for the other autonomous communities, for which the coefficients are closer to zero and thus, the effect is smaller. This is again an example of how the relevant effect is not linguistic diversity *per se* but its political saliency through the presence of relevant alternative nationalist movements. Below I will explore this issue in more detail.

Overall, these results show how the traditionalist version of the Spanish national identity is a highly divisive understanding of Spain, linked to a specific ideology and religious identification as well as more widely shared in the culturally Spanish territories than in those with a distinct language. The generational effect is also strong and significant, which shows how this is a version of the Spanish national identity that is progressively being eroded through generational replacement.

Does the constitutional identity follow the same pattern? So far, I have interpreted this view of Spain as the expression of the transitional consensus that I call Constitutional Spanish nationalism. If this is true, we should not observe the same kind of ideological, religious and generational biases that stand for the traditional identity. However, the alternative nationalisms, as I have shown, have remained largely out of this consensus and some segments of the Spanish left have also tended to advocate for a multinational understanding of Spain, with varying degrees of intensity. If this structure that I have described at the elite level is to be reproduced in the case of the Constitutional Spanish identity at the individual level we should observe basically the persistence of the territorial bias –again, mainly in Catalonia and the Basque Country- while the religious, generational and ideological ones should not exist.

In the table 7.14 I present two regression models with the Constitutional identity as the dependent variable. Both models have the same set of independent variables that I have been discussing until now. The difference between them is that the second one includes, as an additional variable, the control by traditional identity. This is meant to 'clean' the model out of the confounding effects that the traditional identity might have over the results. We have seen that both types of identity are positively correlated, so holding constant the traditional identity will allow the *unique* effects of the Constitutional identity to emerge. In other words: by introducing traditional identity as a predictor in the model, the results that come out are those that relate each of the independent variables to constitutional identity assuming a given level of traditional identity. The question we will be able to answer, then, is: if we hold the degree of agreement with the traditional identity scale, how do these variables affect the constitutional scale?

Table 7.14: *OLS regression, Constitutional Spanish identity*

	Coef.	Robust SE	P>z	Coef.	Robust SE	P>z
Traditional identity				*0.52*	*0.02*	*0.000*
Ideology	**0.16**	**0.03**	**0.000**	0.01	0.03	0.545
Catholic	**0.14**	**0.14**	**0.000**	-0.01	0.14	0.776
Cohort 2 (1938-52)	0.03	0.18	0.331	0.04	0.19	0.086
Cohort 3 (1953-62)	-0.04	0.20	0.127	0.01	0.20	0.604
Cohort 4 (1963-67)	-0.03	0.21	0.202	0.03	0.20	0.258
Cohort 5 (Born after 1968)	**-0.09**	**0.18**	**0.004**	0.03	0.18	0.349
Balearic Islands	**-0.08**	**0.44**	**0.000**	**-0.06**	**0.42**	**0.006**
Canary Islands	**-0.06**	**0.27**	**0.003**	-0.04	0.29	0.063
Catalonia	**-0.34**	**0.18**	**0.000**	**-0.22**	**0.17**	**0.000**
Valencia	**-0.10**	**0.13**	**0.000**	**-0.07**	**0.13**	**0.000**
Galicia	**-0.11**	**0.18**	**0.000**	**-0.05**	**0.19**	**0.002**
Navarre	**-0.05**	**0.42**	**0.018**	-0.02	0.35	0.300
Basque Country	**-0.31**	**0.22**	**0.000**	**-0.21**	**0.20**	**0.000**
R^2	*0,30*			*0,46*		
N	*2258*			*2056*		

The results shown by the first model are similar to those of the traditional identity, although with some relevant differences. The first one is a significantly lower R^2 (0,30 vs. 0,42) that points to a poorer fit of the model. Overall, the included variables are less able to account for the variation of the dependent variable in this case than in the traditional identity. That is, in itself, a relevant finding: constitutional Spanish identity is indeed less determined by ideology, religion and territory than the traditional one. However,

these variables still explain around one third of the overall variance, which is not negligible.

We see how both ideology and religious identification are still significant predictors of constitutional national identity, in the same direction as in the case of the traditional one, although the coefficients are smaller. Generational differences are, in this case, less clear than in the traditional identity. Only the democracy cohort has significantly lower levels of constitutional identity that the war and postwar ones. Among the other cohorts there are no significant differences. On the contrary, the territorial effects are consistent and follow the same pattern: while they are very important in the cases of Catalonia and the Basque Country, they are not as relevant in the rest of the linguistically distinct territories. Living in Catalonia or the Basque Country, indeed, emerge as the most powerful predictors of constitutional Spanish identity, even more than in the case of traditional identity and twice as powerful as ideology or religion.

However, these results might be driven by the hidden effect of traditional identity that correlates positively with the constitutional one. This is why in model 2 I include traditional identity as a control, in order to hold it constant and estimate the effect of the relevant variables on the constitutional identity without its influence. As table 7.14 shows, the inclusion of this variable changes the results we obtain in several ways. The first one is a sharp increase in the R^2, that rises from 0,3 up to 0,46. Second, we see how the effects of the main explanatory variables disappear after controlling for traditional identity. Indeed, both ideology and religion, as well as generation, are no longer related to constitutional identity if we take out the traditional component of it. The dramatic increase in the R^2, though, points that traditional

identity not only captures the effect of these variables, but incorporates additional explanatory power to the model as well.

Interestingly, the only variables that keep their effects after controlling for traditional identity are the territorial dummies, except for the case of Navarre. The depressing effect of living in linguistically distinct communities (mainly Catalonia and the Basque Country) that we observed in the previous model was not mainly due to a lower penetration of the traditional Spanish nationalism in these territories. Indeed, the coefficients here are even higher than in the model for traditional identity. This is a clear indicator that the main integration problem for the contemporary Spanish nationalism in either of its versions, relies in these two territories.

7.5 Reproducing the nation: the social bases of the Spanish national identities

Until now I have been focused on the effects of a limited set of variables over the two types of Spanish national identity that I have defined. These variables were intended to capture what I have called the 'biases' of Spanish national identity that I identified in chapter 6, linked to the particular history of Spanish nationalism through the last decades. The main mechanism I have identified is related to the effects of the Francoist monopolization of Spanish national identity and its slow evolution after the transition to democracy. However, we have seen how the territorial disparities in the strength of identification with the main principles of Spanish nationalism go beyond the traditional identity and are strong and significant in the case of the constitutional identity as well.

In the remaining of this chapter I go beyond the work with these variables and try to estimate the effect of other individual variables over the Spanish national identities. I deal with variables that have been identified in the literature as relevant for explaining the formation of national identities.

a) Education

Education is perhaps the first variable we should consider. Traditionally, education systems have been considered one of the key instruments through which nation-States promote their citizens' national consciousness as well as a specific understanding of the national collectivity and its defining traits, through national rituals held in schools, or through the transmission of a set of ideas about the national history, geography or society. During the processes of nation building, the education system was the main instrument through which the states could reach the whole population of a country, and transmit them a set of ideas and beliefs that included allegiance to 'the nation' that the State claimed to represent.

Probably the contemporary role of education systems is less salient, as it is no longer the only, or the main mean through which the State can reach all its citizens. However, its importance as a socializing experience should not be dismissed, especially in an age of mass immigration, when the diverse origins and backgrounds of the pupils might bring the education back to a relatively prominent place in the set of national socialization agencies.

However, its use as an individual variable to explain variation in the attachment to the nation is, at a first glance, less useful as the universalization of primary education makes the exposure to the basic socialization a constant across the population. In our survey,

only a 3,9% of the respondents declares to not have attended school, and even in those case we can think of many socializing experiences –from military conscription to exposure to mass media- that may substitute it. The variation is to be found at other, post-obligatory levels of education, when the dimension of the socializing experience of education decreases its importance vis à vis the knowledge transmission. So, as of 2007, it does not seem appropriate to use a survey variable of education to capture the role of the educational systems in promoting national identities.

However, we can think of the impact of education on our dependent variables in other ways. Ronald Inglehart, when studying support for European identity (Inglehart, 1970) makes reference to what he calls 'cognitive mobilization', as a powerful explanation for its spread. Cognitive mobilization, in Inglehart's scheme, is the wide distribution of resources and capacities needed to face a wider political community. It is, thus, understood as one of the components of Deutsch's concept of social mobilization (Deutsch, 1961), precisely the component that as of 1970 would still be evolving. The causal mechanisms that links cognitive mobilization and support for European integration, in Inglehart's scheme, is that the most educated citizens have more facility to absorb messages related to a 'remote' political community. While he is referring to Europe, Inglehart considers that the same mechanism is at work when dealing with national political communities: "both levels tend to work as a cosmopolitan communication network, rather than different competing networks" (Inglehart, 1970).

How does Inglehart's argument apply to this case? If we think of Spanish national identity as a cosmopolitan identity, we should conclude that cognitive mobilization –and, thus, educational attainment- does foster its development. Indeed, in some works (Moral, 1998) it is treated as such. However, Juan Díez Medrano

and Kenneth Bollen (1998) derive the apparently opposite hypothesis. They consider that, in today's Europe, identification with regions or nation-states does reflect a relatively paroquial identity orientation, while the role of cosmopolitan identification has been taken over by supranational identities, mainly the European one. They argue, thus, that indeed a higher educational level would weaken the Spanish national identity rather than reinforce it. Indeed, as I will show, Díez Medrano and Bollen's hypothesis is more congruent with the empirical research in social psychology about the relationship between education and national identity.

What is the theoretical argument behind their hypothesis? While their hypothesis might appear as contradictory to Inglehart's (or, for that matter, Deutsch's), given that both explicitly argue that social or cognitive mobilization reinforce national identity, Bollen and Díez Medrano seem to suggest an interesting argument: we are, currently, in a different historic moment, in which national identity has universally reached all the European populations through the development and consolidation of the type of processes theorized by Deutsch and, mainly, mass communications and universal, compulsory primary education. Thus, the educational level would not be relevant as a variable to explain the *ability* of citizens to develop attachment to the national political community. Moreover, due to the emergence of wider political communities that transcend it, national identity would have become a paroquial identity and, thus, the more educated social groups would tend to dismiss it in favor of supranational identities. We are in a new context, where sovereignty is divided across multiple spheres, and the straightforward relationships as postulated in the 60's or the 70's have experienced deep transformations that should be taken into account. Bollen and Díez Medrano's, thus, must be seen as an

adaptation rather than a revision of Inglehart's and Deutsch's perspective.

Moreover, the literature linked to the social identity theory supports the idea of a negative association between educational level and national identity. While this research has been mainly devoted to the influence of education on the consideration of out groups, it has also found a negative association between education and what they call *in-group favoritism*, or the feelings of superiority of the own ethnic or national group (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003).

We can identify, following Coenders and Scheepers, three main theoretical interpretations of these relationships: First, those that consider that the key mechanism is related to the cognitive resources acquired through education. From this point of view, the ethnocentric views derive from simplistic stereotypes that are broken through the cognitive resources transmitted by the educational systems. Second, there are more psychological explanations, that relate this relationship to variables such as self-esteem, in line with classic works such as *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Nevitt Sanford, 1950). And, finally, the socialization theories, that argue that education does not only transmit cognitive resources but also value systems, norms and behavior models that, in the case of democratic countries, tend to be universalist sets of values that would weaken ethnocentric attitudes.

As the reader might have already noted, these works tend to refer to a different dependent variable, *ethnocentrism* that does not necessarily correspond to national identity. However, we could think of some empirical association (Muñoz, 2008) especially in the case of traditional Spanish identity. In any case, the most convincing argument seems to be Bollen and Díez Medrano's, so

we can expect a negative influence of education on Spanish national identity, that will be weak in the case of the constitutional identity and stronger in the case of the traditional one.

Indeed, in table 7.15, we can observe how the bivariate association suggests that the relationship runs in the expected direction: The category that concentrates a higher share of individuals with high educational attainment is the low/low one.

Table 7.15: *National identity typology and educational level.*

Education	*Low traditional, low constitutional*	*High constitutional, low traditional*	*High constitutional, high traditional*	*Total*	*N*
Primary, or less	15.18	19.98	34.87	23.58	*580*
Compulsory secondary	23.07	29.62	29.17	27.64	*680*
Post-compulsory secondary	29.64	26.41	17.77	24.51	*603*
Short degree	12.99	9.44	7.46	9.76	*240*
College degree	19.12	14.56	10.72	14.51	*357*
Total	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*	*2460*

At the same time, we find that it is among those with high traditional identity that the less educated are more prevalent (34,8% versus the average 23,5%, and only 15,18% in the low/low group). In the high constitutional, low traditional group the distribution is somewhere in between the other two groups, and is more similar to the average of the population. Table 7.16 shows the same two variables, but it displays the row percentages rather than the columns:

Table 7.16: *National identity typology and educational level.*

	Low traditional, low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	*Total*
Primary, or less	17.93	34.31	44.31	*100*
Compulsory secondary	23.24	43.38	31.62	*100*
Post-compulsory secondary	33.67	43.62	21.72	*100*
Short degree	37.08	39.17	22.92	*100*
College degree	36.69	40.62	22.13	*100*
Total	*27.85*	*40.49*	*29.96*	*100*

Here the negative relationship between educational attainment and Spanish identity is more clearly represented. Among the less educated, the high traditional/high constitutional category is the most populated, with a 44,3% of the sample, while it represents a 29% of the whole population according to our survey. Among the other groups, the modal category is the high constitutional/low traditional, and in the case of those with a college degree, the low/low category is almost as populated as the former.

There are, thus, strong signs that the relationship does exist and runs in the expected direction. However, it has to be checked in a multivariate analysis controlling for potentially confounding factors such as age, that is related to education and, as we have seen, does also exert a significant influence over the intensity and type of Spanish national identity.

b) Language

There are, yet, other variables that we should consider in the attempt to account for the formation of Spanish national identity.

Until now, to capture the effect of alternative nationalisms in depressing Spanish national identity, I have only considered the residence in certain territories. The choice of a purely territorial variable is consistent with the theoretical framework of my dissertation: it is intended to account for the effect of the alternative nation-building projects set up by the autonomous governments and/or nationalist movements. However, these alternative nationalization projects do not have a constant effect across the whole population of the territories over which they are implemented, so we have to refine the analysis to capture individual variation. Moreover, we have to consider that over these territories there is an overlapping of two different, and often contradictory nationalist projects. As we have seen, the Spanish nationalism does affect the whole territory of Spain, while in certain territories there is, in addition to it, an alternative one that competes for the same population. How do these nationalisms affect the population of linguistically distinct territories?

The choice of an individual variable able to capture differential exposure to the different nationalizing projects is not easy or evident. We cannot use, as a proxy, any variable that measures the effect of this selective exposure (such as, for example, vote choice or identity itself), as it would be endogenous to my dependent variable. We must look, thus, for an exogenous variable to act as a proxy for this differential exposure[86]. Language seems to be the most appropriate choice. The population of the territories with alternative nationalist movements is linguistically heterogeneous, and this linguistic diversity might well serve as a good proxy for differential exposure to alternative nationalization projects. These

---

[86] This is not to say that the differential exposure is completely exogenous to the predisposition of the individuals. This is a difficult question with no easy solution except, perhaps, an experimental approach that, in any case, falls well beyond the scope and possibilities of this dissertation.

movements place great importance to the promotion of the non-Castilian languages and often use them as their communication vehicle, in a rather symmetric way to what the Spanish nationalism does with the Spanish language.

However, introducing language as a predictor in the scheme requires a careful reflection about the mechanisms that may link it with national identity. Methodologically, it is relevant because the theoretical arguments about the relevant mechanisms at work in this relationship must guide the selection of the indicators to be used in the empirical analysis. In working with language as an independent variable we have, basically, two possible indicators to choose: On one hand, there is the language self-identification of the individual (whether the respondent declares to be Spanish-speaker, bilingual or Catalan/Basque/Galician-speaker). On the other hand, we could choose the respondent's mother tongue –the one spoken at home when she was a kid-. The selection of the indicator is not trivial, because each of them captures different phenomena. While the language spoken at home reflects basically the primary socialization environment (and, thus, it is limited in scope), the language self-identification might also be reflecting a conscious choice by the individual that might introduce some endogeneity to the analysis.

Moreover, there is a need to elaborate the theoretical argument behind the inclusion of language because it risks appearing as an embracement of the essentialist argument, which claims a correspondence between the individuals' ethno cultural traits and their national identity. This is obviously not the case here. I will not claim this relationship to be perfect, nor necessary. If I am not embracing an essentialist argument, why should we expect language to determine the individuals' attitudes towards the Spanish nation? The first, most obvious answer is that language determines a set of social relations that might have an effect over the formation of

national identity. Language influences school choice[87], as well as consumed media selection and, especially, it biases the individuals' social networks, which are often heavily determined by language (see Enparantza 'Txillardegi', 2001 for a formalization of this phenomenon). Obviously, we may expect being rooted in a certain social/communication network to influence the individuals' national identity choice.

If we are to take the social networks story as the main mechanism linking language and national identity, it seems that the home language indicator will be the most appropriate one. However, it has a clear limit, in that it only reflects the primary socialization environment (and only the family) leaving aside any possible posterior language choice decision made by the individuals.

Language choice is important from our point of view because Spanish nationalism, as we have seen, has historically promoted linguistic assimilation of those populations with non-Castilian languages as a core element of its nationalizing project (Laitin, 1998; Ferrer i Gironès, 1985). More recently, also the alternative nationalisms have developed active policies seeking to counterbalance the effects of the Spanish language policy, and retrieve the public use of minority languages. Conformity or resistance (in the form of language shift or maintenance) to either of this processes might be due to explicitly political attitudes or, on the contrary, to the limits of the ability of the Spanish/alternative nationalism to fully penetrate this populations with their nationalization projects. In both cases it will have some reflection on the individuals' national identity. However, language as a conscious choice by the individuals, when it is politically relevant, might be endogenous to

---

[87] At least in those territories in which there is a linguistically segregated school network, such as Valencia, the Basque Country or Navarre.

national identity. Depending on her attitudes towards the nation, the individual will choose to use –or report the usage- one language or another. Using the childhood's home language eliminates this problem, so I will favor it over the language self-identification despite the limits that I have already discussed.[88]

There is also another plausible, more direct mechanism linking language and Spanish national identity. As I have already discussed, the Spanish language promotion and extensions has played, and still plays, a central role in of Spanish nationalism. It is, thus, reasonable to expect the Spanish-speakers to be more prone to share the Spanish identity than the speakers of the other languages (the reverse would be true for the alternative nationalisms and Catalan/Basque or Galician speakers). Sharing an ideology that promotes a given language is more probable if the language promoted is your own. In this vein, we have to consider that, while Spanish language is a part of the core constitutional Spanish identity, traditional Spanish nationalism has historically been even less open to language diversity. Summing up, it is reasonable to expect that *having a different language will depress both types of Spanish identity, but the relationship will be stronger in the case of traditional identity than in the case of the constitutional one.*

Table 7.17 shows the bivariate association between the language spoken at home when the respondent was a kid and the typology of Spanish identity I have defined. The table is constructed by using the data for the Autonomous Communities with a distinct language (Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, Valencia, Galicia, the Basque Country and Navarre), and displays the row percentages just to offer a general idea on the relationship.

---

[88] Unfortunately, we did not include more indicators of language behavior in various contexts in the survey questionnaire.

Table 7.17: *National identity typology and family language.*

	Low traditional, low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	Total
A.C language	53.12	27.64	17.31	100
Both	50.76	31.82	17.42	100
Castilian	31.13	42.45	23.70	100
Total	*39.45*	*36.82*	*21.45*	*100*

Here we can see how, indeed, there is a negative association between having been raised in a non-Castilian speaking home and declaring a strong Spanish national identity of whatever type. More than half of the respondents that grew up in a Catalan/Basque/Galician-speaking home, are located in the low/low category, while this is only the case for a 31,1% of those raised in Spanish-speaking households. So, at least in the bivariate analysis, the first part of the prediction is clearly confirmed. But is the relationship stronger for the traditional identity than the purely constitutional one, as predicted? The answer does not seem to be very clear in this table. Both the high constitutional/low traditional, and the high/high categories are less prevalent among the respondents that were raised in non-Spanish-speaking households. The differences among language groups appear to be roughly similar for both types of identity. This is, thus, an issue that I will pay closer attention to in the multivariate analysis, to check if the second part of the hypothesis holds –i.e., if language has a stronger influence over traditional identity that over the constitutional one. Finally, it is worth mentioning that at least in this joint table, the distribution of individuals raised in bilingual households is much closer to the Catalan/Basque/Galician speaking ones than to the Spanish-speaking homes.

There are yet two additional questions that I will be able to face by including the language variable in the analysis. The first one is whether this relationship between language and Spanish identity works in the same way in all the territories with a distinct language. If the mechanism linking language and identity is not automatic -as an essentialist account would predict-, the answer is not straightforward. I have argued that this relationship is strongly mediated by a politization process that makes language become a national identity marker in certain contexts. I other words, it is the agency of political actors that makes language influence the individuals' national identity. If my argument holds, the relationship should not be constant across territories: language will have a greater impact over national identity in those communities in which there are relevant nationalist movements that have made it become a politically salient issue (Catalonia and the Basque Country) than in those in which these movements are less salient, such as Valencia or the Balearic Islands.

Table 7.18 shows the cross-tabulation between family language and Spanish identity, but split by Autonomous Community. I only show those communities for which I have independent representative samples (Catalonia, Valencia and the Basque Country) plus Galicia, although in this latter case results should be interpreted cautiously due to the extremely reduced sample size.

Table 7.18: *National identity typology and family language, by territory. Row %s*

	Low traditional, low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	*Total*	*N*
Catalan	66.28	24.42	8.14	*100*	*172*
Both	64.86	24.32	10.81	*100*	*37*
Castilian	25.71	45.31	27.35	*100*	*245*
Total	*43.80*	*36.11*	*18.80*	*100*	*468*
N	*205*	*169*	*88*	*468*	

	Low traditional, low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	*Total*	*N*
Valencian	26.15	37.69	32.31	*100*	*130*
Both	22.22	44.44	33.33	*100*	*45*
Castilian	17.65	47.43	29.04	*100*	*272*
Total	*20.40*	*44.35*	*30.60*	*100*	*451*
N	*92*	*200*	*138*	*451*	

	Low traditional, low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	*Total*	*N*
Galician	21.21	42.42	36.36	*100*	*33*
Both	14.29	57.14	28.57	*100*	*14*
Castilian	10.71	57.14	32.14	*100*	*28*
Total	*15.79*	*51.32*	*32.89*	*100*	*76*
N	*12*	*39*	*25*	*76*	

	Low traditional, low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	*Total*	*N*
Basque	87.50	9.72	1.39	*100*	*72*
Both	88.57	11.43	0.00	*100*	*35*
Castilian	52.38	31.50	15.38	*100*	*273*
Total	*61.22*	*24.88*	*12.68*	*100*	*410*
N	*251*	*102*	*52*	*410*	

These tables show how different patterns hold in the various autonomous communities. In all the cases, the low/low category is clearly more prevalent among those raised in Catalan/Basque/Galician, or bilingual homes than among those from Spanish-speaking families. However, both the absolute percentages and the differences are clearly higher in Catalonia and the Basque Country, where the language polarization seems to be stronger than in Galicia and Valencia. It is especially the case in the Basque Country, where we find that almost 90% of those raised in Basque-speaking or bilingual households are located in the low/low category.

Also in the distribution between the high constitutional/low traditional and the high/high categories the patterns are different across territories. While in Valencia and Galicia the share of individuals in the high traditional category is higher among the Catalan/Galician speaking than among those grown in Spanish-speaking homes, in Catalonia and the Basque Country it is clearly lower. This might be due to the confounding effect of other variables (such as age or education) or to the different political dynamics that operate in these territories.[89] The patterns of distribution of those raised in bilingual homes are also different: while in Catalonia and the Basque Country they are more similar to the Catalan Basque households, in the case of Valencia and Galicia they are located in a more balanced position between the two extremes. Unfortunately, the small sample size does not allow me to go beyond this assertion.

---

[89] This actually points to a possible bimodal distribution of catalan-speakers in Valencia, that appear to be divided between two groups: one with weak Spanish identity and the other one with strong, traditional identification with Spain. This bimodal distribution, indeed, fits quite well with the political dynamics in this territory, were a strongly Spanish nationalist regionalism is opposed to a more or less pro-Catalan, progressive nationalism.

Finally, the last question about language to be addressed is: Will language *erase* the influence of residence in Catalonia/Basque Country over the Spanish national identity? In other words, once we control for the minority language effect, will still the inhabitants of these territories show a distinct identity pattern, or the 'territorial' effect we have observed is completely explained by language distinctiveness? This is important because it will provide crucial insights, not only about the role of language, but also about how the alternative identities work in the territories in which they are strong. One way to check this is to see if the Spanish-speaking inhabitants of the autonomous communities with a distinct language are significantly different from the inhabitants of the rest of Spain. Table 7.19 shows the distribution of respondents from Spanish-speaking families by autonomous community (in the rest of Spain I assume the whole population to be Spanish-speaking).

Table 7.19: *Spanish speaking population. National identity typology by territory.*

	Low traditional, low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	Total
Catalonia	25,71	45,31	27,35	100
Valencia	17,65	47,43	29,04	100
Galicia	10,71	57,14	32,14	100
Basque Country	52,38	31,5	15,38	100
Rest	11,32	45,67	42,13	100
Total	19,95	43,85	34,73	100

Here we can see how the low/low category is more prevalent among Basque and, to much lesser extent Catalan respondents raised in Spanish-speaking households than in the rest of Spain, including Galicia and Valencia. However, there are some relevant differences between the patterns shown by Catalonia and the Basque Country:

while among Spanish-speaking Catalans it is mainly in the high/high category that we find significant differences with the rest of Spain while the high constitutional/low traditional one shows roughly equivalent prevalence, among the Spanish-speaking Basques both types of identity are clearly less prevalent than in the rest of Spain.

Summing up, we have seen that language spoken at home does indeed exert an influence over the respondents' Spanish identity. Those that were raised in non-Castilian speaking households tend to have weaker identification with Spain. However, this effect does not seem to be stronger for the traditional than the constitutional identity, as I predicted. Moreover, it is not a constant effect across all the territories with distinct languages: while it is very strong in Catalonia and the Basque Country, it is much less so in those territories where there are not such as strong alternative nationalisms. However, these conclusions are only based on bivariate analyses that are, necessarily, partial and might be misleading. In the next section I conduct a set of multivariate analyses that will allow me to confirm, or not, these findings and extract more substantive conclusions about this relationship.

c) Primary socialization: parents

Cohort analysis in this chapter and the previous one show consistent evidence that one of the mechanisms of change in the structure of Spanish national identity is, indeed, generational replacement. Older cohorts show consistently distinct attitudinal patterns than younger ones, and they are much more prone to the traditional Spanish identity as well. This age structure of the attitudes is suggesting, and we should not overlook it, that for a large part, that primary socialization does play a salient role in shaping individual attitudes

towards Spain as a nation, and that the impact of this period is a long lasting one.

In this section I want to address this issue more directly, and try to estimate the relative importance of this factor in the overall determination of the dependent variables. Introducing primary socialization directly into the models run on survey data is complex, and the best solution we usually are able to come up with is the use of some proxies for the socialization context such as generation or territory of residence. However, it is obvious that these are very rough proxy and in reality there is much more variation to primary socialization contexts than indicated by those variables. Perhaps a survey carried out with households, a part from individuals, as the unit of analysis could provide more fine-grained detail and allow for sharper estimation of primary socialization effects. However, since we do not have these data, we have to work with indirect measures or proxies that give us some sense on the individuals' socialization environment.

Since a central institution of socialization is the family, we came up with an indicator that intends to approach the respondent's parents' national identity by asking the respondent herself to place her parents within a scale intended to measure, basically, the intensity of their parent's Spanish identity. We introduced two exactly equal questions, one directed to the father and the other one to the respondent's mother:

> *P26/P27. Would you say that your father (or tutor)/ mother (or tutor)…*
> *-Felt Spanish, and that was very important to him / her*
> *-Felt Spanish, but this was not specially important to him /her*
> *-Did not feel Spanish*
> *-Did not have national sentiments of any kind*

Of course, this approach has several limitations, the most evident of which being the risk that respondents will project their own attitudes to their parents, as to make them look congruent.[90] This would definitely introduce some endogeneity problems into the model. However, despite these limitations, this is the only indicator through which we are able to capture some variation in the primary socialization contexts

Table 7.20 shows the distribution of responses for father and mother. As we can see, they have a very similar distribution, with slight differences: in the case of the mother, the option of low saliency is slightly more prevalent than among fathers

Table 7.20 *National identity, parents*

	Father		**Mother**	
	Freq.	**Percent**	**Freq.**	**Percent**
Felt Spanish, and that was very important to him / her	1589	49,79	1479	46,35
Felt Spanish, but this was not specially important to him /her	929	29,11	1022	32,04
Did not have national sentiments of any kind	173	5,43	196	6,14
Did not feel Spanish	143	4,48	131	4,11
Total Valid	**2.834**	**88,81**	**2.828**	**88,64**
Not pertinent	70	2,18	66	2,05
N.S.	267	8,38	278	8,71
N.C.	20	0,63	19	0,6
Total	3191	100	3191	100

---

[90] Unfortunately, we did not include in the questionnaire the equivalent scale for the respondent herself, and thus I am not able to directly compare the respondents own placing to their parents'. I will address this issue by using roughly similar indicators that are present in the survey.

A part from having similar distributions, if we cross tabulate the two variables, we will see how most respondents tend to attribute the same category to both their parents: 86,8% of them do project identity congruence to their families. To what extent this responds to reality or is the effect of the projection, remains impossible to know with the data we have.

How should we expect this variable to relate with the identity typology? Since the scale we used for classifying parents is only related to the presence/saliency of the identity, and does not say anything about the contents, we should expect it to be equally related to both scales of constitutional and traditional identity. However, we have already had some indications that indicators of intensity are somehow more related to traditional identity. Tables 7.21 and 7.22 show the distribution across categories of the identity typology for both father and mother's identities

Table 7.21 *National identity father and typology, column %*

Father	Low traditional, low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	Total
Felt Spanish, and that was very important to him / her	17,12	49,27	79,14	50,02
Felt Spanish, but this was not specially important to him /her	41,2	41,69	19,29	34,34
Did not have national sentiments of any kind	14,7	6,89	1,43	7,22
Did not feel Spanish	26,98	2,15	0,14	8,42
Total Valid	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*

Table 7.22 *National identity mother and typology, column %*

Mother	Low traditional, low constitutional	High constitutional, low traditional	High constitutional, high traditional	Total
Felt Spanish, and that was very important to him / her	14,89	42,92	75,85	45,90
Felt Spanish, but this was not specially important to him /her	42,88	47,79	22,02	37,98
Did not have national sentiments of any kind	17,48	1,85	6,91	8,19
Did not feel Spanish	24,76	2,38	0,28	7,93
Total Valid	*100*	*100*	*100*	*100*

In these tables we can actually see how there is a relationship that runs in the expected direction. In both cases the chi-square, that measures association, is statistically significative, and the Cramer's V, that indicates its strength is 0,33, which is a quite strong relationship.

As expected, those individuals with high constitutional and high traditional identities declare overwhelmingly (75 to 79 %) to have parents that felt Spanish and that conceded great importance to their national identity. In the case of those with high constitutional and low traditional identity, the parents appear to be more or less evenly divided between those that conceded great importance to their Spanishness and those that, while still feeling Spanish, did not consider it to be very important. It is the low/low group the one whose parents were more varied: while around 40% are located in the "Felt Spanish, but this was not specially important to him /her"

category, about 25% did not feel Spanish, 14-17% did not have national sentiments of any kind and, again, 14-17% did feel Spanish and attributed great importance to their identity.

Summing up, we have seen how, indeed, there is a clear relationship between the identity that respondents attribute to their parents and their own placement within the typology I have defined. I will integrate this analysis in the multivariate one that I conduct in the next section, although I will still be cautious due to the possible endogeneity problems I have discussed.

7.6 Multivariate analysis: an explanatory model of traditional and constitutional Spanish identities

In this section, thus, I incorporate education, language and parental identity to a global explanatory model of the varieties of Spanish national identity. This inclusion will result in the expansion of the models developed in section 4 of this chapter. Expanding the models by including this set of variables must improve their explanatory ability and clarify the actual relations between the independent variables and the varieties of identity.

The strategy of analysis is essentially the same as in the previous models: I will work with separate models for each of the types of Spanish identity that I have defined, and will use OLS regression models to estimate the parameters. I introduce language and education as a set of dummies for each category, leaving one as the reference point: primary or less in the case of education, and Spanish-speaking household for language. This is done to have more detail on the actual relationship, that might not be exactly linear (as it was the case with generation). The variable on parental identity is introduced as a continuous variable, since the scale was

thought to represent a continuous underlying variable that ranges from refusal to enthusiastic embracement of Spanish identity. I will use the variable for the father because in exploratory analyses it has shown more predictive power than the mother. However, I repeat (although do not show) all the analysis with the variable that refers to the respondent's mother. If there is any significant difference, I will comment it but generally they behave almost exactly in the same way. The first model, shown in table 7.23, corresponds to the traditional Spanish identity scale.

Table 7.23: *Traditional Spanish Identity, OLS Regression model*

	Beta Coef.	Std. Err. (robust)	P>z
Ideology	0,25	0,03	0,000
Catholic	0,21	0,17	0,000
Identity Father	-0,31	0,09	0,000
Cohort 2 (born 1938-52)	-0,06	0,22	0,018
Cohort 3 (1953-62)	-0,12	0,26	0,000
Cohort 4 (1963-67)	-0,12	0,28	0,000
Cohort 5 (Born after 1968)	-0,21	0,24	0,000
Secondary	0,00	0,19	0,855
Post-compulsory Sec	-0,06	0,21	0,028
Short college degree	-0,06	0,26	0,016
College degree	-0,05	0,24	0,022
AC-language household	-0,08	0,19	0,000
Bilingual household	-0,03	0,30	0,063
Balearic Islands	-0,02	0,47	0,256
Canary Islands	-0,06	0,45	0,022
Catalonia	-0,11	0,19	0,000
Valencia	-0,03	0,17	0,055
Galicia	-0,04	0,32	0,107
Navarre	-0,04	0,51	0,011
Basque Country	-0,11	0,20	0,000
	,	0,34	0,000
R^2	0,52		
N	2008		

Here we see little changes with respect to the previous model with the same dependent variable (table 7.13). The new independent variables introduced here do have an independent, significant effect on the traditional identity that does not overrule the effect of ideology, religion or generation. The story for the Autonomous Community dummies is more complex, and I discuss it below.

Education has been introduced through a set of dummies representing the various educational levels in Spain (with primary education, or less, as the reference category). All the dummies, except the one for compulsory secondary education do appear significant in the regression, and all of them work in the expected direction: they tend to depress the traditional Spanish identity. However, the size of the coefficients is rather small, so the overall effect of education on national identity, once we have controlled by generation and other variables, appears to be weak.

The language spoken at home does also have an effect. The negative, significant coefficients express a negative relationship between having been raised in a Catalan/Basque/Galician-speaking household and the strength of the traditional Spanish national identity. The category of reference is a Spanish-speaking household. The coefficient for bilingual households is relatively small, but still highly significant while the one for the Catalan/Basque/Galician-speaking households is bigger (-0,08). There is thus, an important, independent effect of language.

As for the father's projected identity, it emerges as the single, most powerful predictor of the respondents' position in the traditional identity scale. Without this variable the R-squared of the model would be 0,44 so we can say that by itself does explain a great share of the dependent variables' variance. It appears, thus, that there is

an important effect of primary socialization. However, we still must take into account the possible problems related to the projection effect: if, as we could reasonably think, some respondents project their own ideas on their parents, this variable suffers from endogeneity and, probably, the effect is exaggerated. In any case, the introduction of this variable does not have dramatic effects on the other variables' coefficients: they tend to diminish in a rather homogeneous pattern but with no substantial modifications.

It is interesting, though, to observe the effect of the introduction of language and father's identity variables on the coefficients of the autonomous community dummies. As I have already discussed, these dummies, that were meant to capture exposition to alternative national socialization environments, might just have come up as significant due to the effect of other more precise variables such as language. If this is the case, by introducing these new variables into the analysis, the effect of territory should disappear. However, here we can see that it has only disappeared in those autonomous communities in which the effect was already weak in the previous model (Galicia and the Balearic Islands). However, it has weakened in the rest of territories –including Valencia- and only Catalonia and the Basque Country keep a strong independent territorial effect that goes beyond what family language or parents' identity do capture.

As for the constitutional Spanish identity (table 7.24), we get similar results than in the previous case except for the fact that, in this case, education does not appear to have any statistically significant effect except for some dummies (secondary and short degree). In these cases the effect is extremely weak. What is more surprising is that it runs in the reverse direction: it seems that higher educational level slightly increases the agreement with the items in the Constitutional identity scale. However, the effect is so weak that it seems more reasonable to conclude that there is almost no effect.

Table 7.24: *Constitutional Spanish Identity, OLS Regression*

	Model I			Model II		
	Beta Coef.	Robust S.E..	P>z	Beta Coef.	Robust Std. Err	P>z
Traditional identity				*0,43*	*0,02*	*0,000*
Ideology	0,11	0,03	0,000	0,01	0,03	0,610
Catholic	0,09	0,15	0,000	0,00	0,14	0,844
Identity Father	-0,29	0,08	0,000	-0,16	0,09	0,000
Cohort 2 (1938-52)	0,00	0,19	0,996	0,03	0,19	0,309
Cohort 3 (1953-62)	-0,09	0,22	0,001	-0,04	0,22	0,154
Cohort 4 (1963-67)	-0,07	0,23	0,011	-0,02	0,23	0,465
Cohort 5 (after 1968)	-0,12	0,20	0,001	-0,03	0,20	0,318
Secondary	0,06	0,16	0,018	0,06	0,16	0,024
Post-compulsory Sec	0,03	0,17	0,315	0,04	0,17	0,088
Short college degree	0,04	0,22	0,097	0,06	0,21	0,010
College degree	0,03	0,20	0,273	0,04	0,19	0,063
AC-language household	-0,19	0,19	0,000	-0,15	0,19	0,000
Bilingual h.	-0,06	0,30	0,007	-0,03	0,32	0,200
Balearic Islands	-0,05	0,44	0,037	-0,03	0,46	0,122
Canary Islands	-0,05	0,31	0,007	-0,04	0,34	0,113
Catalonia	-0,17	0,18	0,000	-0,13	0,17	0,000
Valencia	-0,03	0,15	0,038	-0,02	0,15	0,175
Galicia	-0,01	0,23	0,684	0,00	0,24	0,904
Navarre	-0,01	0,56	0,716	-0,01	0,46	0,716
Basque Country	-0,21	0,21	0,000	-0,17	0,21	0,000
	,	0,27	0,000	,	0,43	0,000
R^2	*0,42*			*0,50*		
N	*2050*			*1886*		

Language, instead, does seem to work in the same way here as it did for the traditional identity. Having grown in a Catalan/Basque or Galician-Speaking household does depress both types of Spanish national identity pretty much in the same way. And, again, father's identity emerges as the strongest and statistically significant predictor of Constitutional identity.

The inclusion of education, language and father's identity in the analysis favors a sharp increase in the R^2 of the model with respect to the one in table 7.14 (from 0,30 to 0,42). However, if we do not include the variable on fathers' identity, language and education by themselves do only produce a slight increase of 0,04 in the R^2 with respect to the first model (from 0,30 to 0,34). This is probably due to the fact that language is actually capturing part of the variance explained in the previous model by the territorial variables, and only adding a little additional explanatory power to the model. This can be clearly seen in the fact that the coefficients of the territorial dummies have decreased significantly, up to the point that in some cases (Navarre and Galicia) they are no longer statistically significant, while in other cases they are very small. The exceptions to this rule, again, are Catalonia and the Basque Country. The depressing effect over the Spanish national identity of living in these territories is relatively independent from the language spoken at home or, even, father's identity, especially in the Basque case.

Cohorts experience the reverse process than territories: after controlling for education, language and father's identity, the differences among generations emerge as statistically significant, with slightly stronger coefficients than in the model without these variables. Especially the youngest cohort shows a strong negative coefficient, indicating a certain distance across generations in the strength of this type of identity.

Once we introduce a control for traditional identity and thus, clean up the model from the effect of the other type of identity, we get a similar result as when we did so in the model without education and language: the main explanatory variables loose their power and most of the variance is accounted for the traditional identity variable. However, some of the variables in the model –father's

identity, AC-speaking household and residence in Catalonia and the Basque Country- do have an independent effect over constitutional identity that is not cleared by the introduction of the traditional identity as a predictor in the second model. Moreover, the control for traditional identity makes the R^2 of the model grow up to 0,50.

Summarizing, the expansion of the models by introducing variables referred to family language, education and parent's perceived identity has improved their explanatory power, and the R^2 of the new models are considerably high, over 0,40 –which for survey data is a remarkable threshold. All three variables appear to have a strong independent effect over the traditional version of Spanish national identity, while in the case of the constitutional identity this is true only for home language and parents' identity.

7.7 One or several Spains? A sub-state comparison of Catalonia, Valencia, Madrid and the Basque Country

The analyses conducted so far reveal the set of relationships between the relevant independent variables and the types of Spanish national identity I have defined. However, these types of analyses have some limitations, especially in such a diverse state as Spain. We cannot be sure that the structure of relationships between our independent and dependent variables is constant across the whole territory. The dynamics of identity politics vary deeply across Spain, and we have seen that in some autonomous communities the patterns of distribution across the categories of the typology are highly distinctive. Therefore, we should pay some attention to the differences among territories. I have already discussed this point when elaborating the typology in chapter 5, so it is a logical consequence of that discussion to repeat the separate analysis here.

Are the intergenerational differences that we have observed equally important everywhere? Do the ideological and/or religious biases have the same relevance in every Autonomous Community? Does the home language determine to the same extent the identification with Spain in every linguistically distinct Autonomous Community? These are the kind of questions that the separate analysis will help us to answer to some extent. There are some limitations to the analysis, though. Basically, they are related to the data: we only have independent samples for four Autonomous Communities, and even there the sample sizes are reduced (around N=600)[91] so the conclusions to be extracted will be limited. However, we chose the four Autonomous Communities in which to conduct additional interviews with the idea to tap different types of territories. On one hand, we have the two territories in which there are strong alternative nationalist movements, Catalonia and the Basque Country. On the other hand, we have one linguistically distinct Autonomous Community without a strong alternative nationalism, Valencia, and finally we have the capital-city AC, Madrid, with no language distinctiveness and, obviously, no alternative nationalism at all.

Tables 7.25 and 7.26 show the regression models for the four Autonomous Communities with traditional Spanish identity as a dependent variable. They include the variables that were present in the models of the previous section, except for the case of the Madrid autonomous community, where there is no language variable because the population is basically monolingual.

---

[91] For a 95,5% confidence level (two sigma), and under the assumption of P = Q, the real sampling error for Catalonia, the Basque Country, Madrid and Valencia is ±4%.

Table 7.25: *Traditional Spanish Identity, OLS Regression models. Catalonia and Valencia.*

Traditional Spanish Identity	Catalonia			Valencia		
	Beta Coef.	**Std. Err.**	**P>z**	**Beta Coef.**	**Std. Err.**	**P>z**
Ideology	0,23	0,07	0,000	0,31	0,07	0,000
Catholic	0,20	0,31	0,000	0,27	0,33	0,000
Identity Father	-0,39	0,15	0,000	-0,23	0,22	0,000
Cohort 2 (born 1938-52)	-0,08	0,49	0,122	-0,16	0,47	0,010
Cohort 3 (1953-62)	-0,12	0,56	0,029	-0,12	0,51	0,056
Cohort 4 (1963-67)	-0,16	0,59	0,005	-0,20	0,58	0,001
Cohort 5 (after 1968)	-0,19	0,52	0,006	-0,32	0,49	0,000
Secondary	0,02	0,45	0,721	0,03	0,39	0,615
Post-compulsory Sec	-0,08	0,49	0,186	0,00	0,43	0,990
Short college degree	-0,03	0,58	0,502	-0,06	0,52	0,200
College degree	-0,04	0,53	0,375	-0,05	0,49	0,308
Catalan-speaking household	-0,10	0,33	0,026	-0,05	0,28	0,223
Bilingual household	-0,05	0,53	0,215	-0,03	0,46	0,418
	,	0,64	0,000	,	0,66	0,000
R^2	0,49			0,44		
N	388			369		

In these tables we can basically see how the proposed explanatory model for the traditional Spanish identity works in a relatively homogeneous way in the four territories analyzed here. The explanatory capacity of the model, as measured by the R^2, is similar across the four cases: the territories for which the model has higher explanatory capacity are, in this order, the Basque Country (0,52), Catalonia (0,49) Madrid (0,48) and Valencia (0,44).

Table 7.26: *Traditional Spanish Identity, OLS Regression models.*
Basque Country and Madrid

Traditional Spanish Identity	Basque Country			Madrid		
	Beta Coef.	**Std. Err.**	**P>z**	**Beta Coef.**	**Std. Err.**	**P>z**
Ideology	0,14	0,09	0,000	0,26	0,06	0,000
Catholic	0,14	0,33	0,001	0,32	0,32	0,000
Identity Father	-0,45	0,16	0,000	-0,26	0,22	0,000
Cohort 2 (born 1938-52)	-0,11	0,52	0,069	-0,08	0,52	0,161
Cohort 3 (1953-62)	-0,10	0,59	0,093	-0,06	0,58	0,274
Cohort 4 (1963-67)	-0,12	0,67	0,025	-0,08	0,60	0,137
Cohort 5 (after 1968)	-0,17	0,57	0,030	-0,20	0,53	0,006
Secondary	-0,03	0,46	0,625	-0,06	0,51	0,251
Post-compulsory Sec	-0,09	0,47	0,126	-0,07	0,51	0,278
Short college degree	-0,02	0,58	0,641	-0,02	0,59	0,728
College degree	-0,04	0,56	0,468	-0,08	0,51	0,210
Basque-speaking household	-0,19	0,42	0,000			
Bilingual household	-0,08	0,49	0,033			
	,	0,77	0,000	,	0,67	0,000
R^2	*0,52*				*0,48*	
N	*353*				*404*	

The variables included in the basic model –ideology, religion and generation- as well as parents' identity do have a more or less constant, strong effect over the dependent variable across the four territories. On the contrary, the dummies for educational level do not have a statistically significant effect in any of the partial models. This might be due to the reduced sample size of the models and the small number of individuals in the '1' category of the dummies. Indeed, if we repeat the model with education treated as a continuous variable, it has a significant, albeit weak, effect in Catalonia and Valencia, but no effect either in Madrid or the Basque Country.

One of the main, theoretically relevant specific questions that the separate models for each territory can address is whether language has a constant effect over Spanish national identity across all the linguistically distinct territories. I have argued that the relationship between language and identity is not automatic, as an essentialist understanding of national identity might lead us to predict, but rather a politically mediated one. Only when there are powerful political actors able to politicize the language distinctiveness and make it become a relevant identity marker, will this relationship hold. In this case, the relevant comparison, thus, is between a linguistically distinct territory with no strong alternative nationalisms –Valencia-, and the two autonomous communities with distinct languages and powerful nationalist movements – Catalonia and the Basque Country-.

And this comparison does confirm my hypothesis: while having been raised in a Catalan/Basque-speaking or bilingual household does have a strong, negative effect over the traditional Spanish identity in Catalonia and, even more so, the Basque Country, this is not the case in Valencia. In this autonomous community, those respondents that grew in Catalan-speaking or bilingual environments do not show significantly distinct identity patterns from those raised in Spanish-speaking families. At least, regarding the traditional Spanish identity. Thus, we can see how language distinctiveness does not have an effect by itself: it requires the presence of a mobilizing agent to become an effective identity marker.

Now I turn into the analysis of the other type of Spanish identity that I have been working with: the constitutional identity. I have shown how, except for the role of language, there were no big differences in how the same explanatory model applies to the four

autonomous communities that I am analyzing separately. Is this the case for the other, more consensual, type of identity as well? Tables 7.27 to 7.30 show the results of the replication of the same models for each of the territories analyzed here. As I did with the state-wide models, here I conduct two analyses for each territorial unit: one with the set of independent variables that I have been discussing until now, and the other one with the same set of predictors but controlling by the other identity scale that I have defined –the traditional identity. The goal is, as I have already argued, to show the effect of the independent variables purely over the constitutional identity without the confounding effects of the traditional one.

Table 7.27: *Constitutional Spanish Identity, Catalonia*

	Beta Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	Beta Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Traditional identity				*0,47*	*0,05*	*0,000*
Ideology	0,21	0,07	0,000	0,11	0,07	0,008
Catholic	0,11	0,34	0,008	-0,17	0,17	0,000
Identity Father	-0,38	0,17	0,000	0,03	0,32	0,444
Cohort 2 (1938-52)	-0,02	0,54	0,704	0,01	0,50	0,829
Cohort 3 (1953-62)	-0,07	0,59	0,205	-0,02	0,56	0,743
Cohort 4 (1963-67)	-0,04	0,64	0,497	0,01	0,59	0,785
Cohort 5 (after 1968)	-0,18	0,57	0,012	-0,11	0,53	0,092
Secondary	0,04	0,49	0,542	0,03	0,45	0,591
Adv. Sec	-0,06	0,54	0,342	-0,02	0,50	0,722
Short college	0,02	0,64	0,661	0,05	0,59	0,241
College degree	0,02	0,58	0,678	0,04	0,54	0,470
Catalan-speaking household	-0,19	0,36	0,000	-0,15	0,34	0,001
Bilingual household	-0,05	0,58	0,202	-0,03	0,53	0,452
	,	0,73	0,000	,	0,99	0,000
R^2	*0,46*			*0,56*		
N	*381*			*360*		

Table 7.28: *Constitutional Spanish Identity, Valencia*

	Beta Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	Beta Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Traditional identity				**0,43**	**0,05**	**0,000**
Ideology	0,24	0,07	0,000	0,11	0,07	0,040
Catholic	0,06	0,31	0,220	-0,07	0,33	0,204
Identity Father	-0,08	0,21	0,123	0,03	0,22	0,552
Cohort 2 (1938-52)	-0,06	0,43	0,442	0,04	0,45	0,590
Cohort 3 (1953-62)	-0,15	0,48	0,048	-0,09	0,49	0,232
Cohort 4 (1963-67)	-0,17	0,55	0,016	-0,09	0,55	0,249
Cohort 5 (after 1968)	-0,24	0,46	0,011	-0,11	0,48	0,250
Secondary	0,10	0,36	0,135	0,07	0,36	0,327
Adv. Sec	0,14	0,40	0,045	0,10	0,41	0,136
Short college	-0,01	0,49	0,899	-0,01	0,49	0,868
College degree	0,08	0,47	0,174	0,07	0,46	0,228
Catalan-speaking household	-0,14	0,26	0,004	-0,10	0,26	0,037
Bilingual household	0,02	0,43	0,651	0,08	0,43	0,102
	,	0,60	0,000	,	0,92	0,000
R^2	0,14			0,25		
N	349			389		

Table 7.29: *Constitutional Spanish Identity, Basque Country*

	Beta Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	Beta Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Traditional identity				0,50	0,06	0,000
Ideology	0,10	0,09	0,009	0,03	0,09	0,418
Catholic	0,05	0,38	0,194	-0,03	0,36	0,412
Identity Father	-0,50	0,18	0,000	-0,28	0,19	0,000
Cohort 2 (1938-52)	-0,06	0,56	0,281	-0,04	0,55	0,494
Cohort 3 (1953-62)	-0,14	0,67	0,023	-0,11	0,64	0,053
Cohort 4 (1963-67)	-0,05	0,75	0,397	-0,02	0,72	0,721
Cohort 5 (after 1968)	-0,15	0,65	0,043	-0,11	0,62	0,139
Secondary	0,02	0,52	0,709	0,03	0,49	0,476
Adv. Sec	0,02	0,53	0,729	0,06	0,50	0,236
Short college	-0,03	0,67	0,519	-0,02	0,62	0,723
College degree	0,01	0,63	0,861	0,02	0,59	0,653

Basque-speaking household	-0,20	0,46	0,000	-0,08	0,45	0,045
Bilingual household	-0,21	0,55	0,000	-0,15	0,52	0,000
	,	0,84	0,000	,	1,15	0,000
R^2	0,54			0,65		
N	343			312		

Table 7.30: *Constitutional Spanish Identity,. Madrid*

	Beta Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	Beta Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Traditional identity				0,56	0,03	0,000
Ideology	0,08	0,04	0,103	-0,07	0,04	0,129
Catholic	0,13	0,24	0,018	-0,04	0,23	0,428
Identity Father	-0,28	0,16	0,000	-0,15	0,16	0,003
Cohort 2 (1938-52)	-0,02	0,39	0,774	0,05	0,36	0,436
Cohort 3 (1953-62)	-0,07	0,42	0,349	0,02	0,40	0,780
Cohort 4 (1963-67)	-0,03	0,45	0,631	0,03	0,41	0,605
Cohort 5 (after 1968)	-0,15	0,40	0,091	0,01	0,37	0,928
Secondary	0,03	0,36	0,614	0,05	0,35	0,400
Adv. Sec	0,06	0,36	0,396	0,08	0,35	0,276
Short college	0,08	0,43	0,209	0,06	0,41	0,344
College degree	0,06	0,36	0,385	0,08	0,35	0,278
	,	0,51	0,000	,	0,70	0,000
R^2	0,18			0,34		
N	409			382		

The first thing we can notice from these models is that their explanatory power, as expressed by the R-squared, is much stronger in Catalonia (0,46 for the model without traditional identity, and 0,56 for the one with that variable) and the Basque Country (0,54 and 0,65) than in Valencia (0,14 – 0,25) or Madrid (0,18 – 0,34). Why do we find such a difference in the ability of the models to explain the variation in the dependent variable? The answer is, probably, twofold. On one hand, it is due to the effect of language that, as we have seen in the previous case, is a good predictor of

351

Spanish identity in Catalonia and the Basque Country, but not in Valencia or, obviously, Madrid. Also parents' identity is a much stronger predictor of constitutional identity in the Basque Country and Catalonia than in Madrid or, especially, Valencia –where it does not have a statistically significant effect-. Even if in these models having been raised by a Catalan-speaking family does have a significant effect in Valencia too, it is weaker than in the other two cases. Indeed, if we repeat the same regression analyses without the language and parents' identity variables, we get much more similar R-squared values in the models without traditional identity: 0,22 in Catalonia; 0,15 in the Basque Country, 0,12 in Valencia and Madrid. Excluding language from the analysis, thus, would produce a sharper drop in the R-squared in Catalonia and the Basque Country than Valencia, what indicates the stronger predictive power of family language in these two territories.

However, if we introduce the traditional identity scale in the models without language, the difference in R-squared becomes strong again. This points to the second reason why the models perform better in Catalonia and the Basque Country than in Madrid or Valencia: the association between the two types of Spanish identity is closer in the territories with alternative nationalisms than in the rest of Spain. Indeed, the bivariate correlation between the two is clear: the coefficient for Catalonia (0,67) and the Basque Country (0,74) is clearly higher than the one for Valencia (0,45) and Madrid (0,55). Why this is so? Does the existence of alternative nationalisms reduce the polarization between the two types of Spanish identity? Probably, in Catalonia and the Basque Country, where Spanish identity is, overall, less prevalent, those that hold it tend to be a more compact, homogeneous group than in the rest of Spain.

A part from the differences in the R-squared, the general performance of the models and the set of relationships they reveal is fairly constant across the four territories. In every case the strong effect of ideology and religion disappears when we introduce the control for traditional identity in the model, with the partial exception of Valencia and Catalonia, where there is some degree of ideological polarization that 'resists' the control. However, it is a relatively weak effect. As for language, as I have already said, while in this case there is a significant effect also in the case of Valencia, it is much weaker and contributes less to the overall explanatory ability of the model than in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Perhaps, the fact that the scale of constitutional identity includes a question specifically focused to language does generate this slight effect.

Summarizing, thus, the explanatory models developed in this chapter tend to work in a similar way across the various territories of Spain. The differences are basically related to the role of cultural distinctiveness that where has been successfully politicized as an identity marker by political agents, becomes a strong predictor of Spanish identity that boosts the predictive power of the models. Also the predictive power of parental socialization seems to act as a stronger predictor in those environments in which there are relevant alternative nationalisms, pointing to an interaction between primary socialization and political dynamics. Where there is a polarized political context, the effect of inheritance seems to be stronger than in those cases in which there is no relevant questioning of the Spanish national identity. In general, thus, we can say that these results tend to confirm the idea that the crucial variables to explain the citizens' national identities are to be located in the political sphere, although primary socialization definitely plays a highly salient role that should not be dismissed.

7.8 Conclusions

In this chapter I have extended the analysis carried out in previous sections of the dissertation to develop a comprehensive explanatory model able to account for a relevant part of the variation in the Spanish national identity. I have shown how the ideological, territorial and religious biases identified in chapter 6 for the 1981-2000 period, are still in place in 2007. However, here I have gone beyond this assertion and addressed the concerns, expressed in chapter 6, that this might be reflecting the patterns of variation of one of the relevant types of Spanish national identity –the traditional one. It would have been, thus, misleading, to infer from those results, a causal relationship for the Spanish national identity as a whole. To avoid this problem, I have used the typology and its measurement instruments developed in chapters 3-5 to test whether the influence of ideology, religion and territory of residence over national pride did actually refer only to the traditional Spanish identity or, on the contrary, affected the whole Spanish national identity. Additionally, in this chapter I have also expanded the models to include three relevant variables that had been identified by previous literature as influencing individuals' national identity: education, family language and parents' perceived national identity intensity.

The main findings of the chapter are that the ideological and religious biases affect in a more intense way the traditional Spanish identity that appears as a fairly divisive conception of Spain. However, also the Constitutional Spanish identity is somehow affected by these biases basically because it is strongly correlated to the traditional one. Once we control for traditional identity, we do not find an ideological or religious divide: there is, thus, a part of the constitutional Spanish identity that is ideologically and

religiously neutral in its social determinants. However, the territorial dimension behaves in a different way: even after controlling for traditional identity, residence in certain territories – especially Catalonia and the Basque Country- does depress the constitutional identity, as well as the traditional one.

The relevance of these findings is related to how well they represent the political process I have reviewed in chapter 2. From my empirical analysis it emerges that, clearly, the traditional Spanish national identity is a strongly divisive conception of Spain that carries on the ideological, as well as religious biases of the Francoist regime. It represents a one hegemonic view of Spain that today is progressively being eroded by the consequences of democratization and the generational replacement, as shown by the cohort analysis carried out here.

If traditional Spanish identity is being eroded, the view of Spain I have labeled as Constitutional identity seems to be its natural replacement. It represents, as I have already discussed, a reflection of what I called constitutional Spanish nationalism in chapter 2. It is, without doubt, a much more consensual conception of Spain that, while being also shared by almost all of those that are still stuck to the traditional identity, goes partially beyond the ideological and religious divides we have observed. The cohort analysis has shown that while traditional identity is clearly being eroded through generational replacement, this is not the case of the constitutional one. While younger generations tend to express less intense national identity of whatever type, the distance among generations is not nearly as wide as in the traditional identity case. Indeed, holding constant the traditional identity, there is no such a generational divide.

Do these results mean that, with constitutional nationalism, Spain has definitively found an interpretation of its national identity able to overcome past conflicts and become the basis for a full, solid national integration? The answer is, shortly, no. There are three main reasons for this. One, that also the constitutional Spanish identity has to some degree this ideological and religious biases. Two, that an important segment of the Spanish population does not seem to be willing to renounce to the traditional Spanish nationalist principles, as divisive as the might be. Even if this is a shrinking social sector, it is relevant enough as to prevent us to predict the end of the intra-Spanish tensions over its national status and nature. But this is just the first reason.

The third, and more important one, is reflected in my regression models by the pervasiveness of the territorial divides, especially for Catalonia and the Basque Country. The constitutional Spanish identity is not a useful tool to erase the depressing effect of living in these territories over the Spanish national identity. Basques and Catalans are significantly less prone to share the main elements of the Spanish identity, and there is no sign of weakening of this effect. Moreover, as I have shown here, this is not only related to language distinctiveness. Speaking a non-Castilian language is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for feeling alienated from the Spanish national identity: it is, indeed, a much more complex phenomenon.

In the next, and last chapter I further develop the reflection on the implications of the findings I have come up with during the whole dissertation.

Chapter eight

CONCLUSIONS. MAIN FINDINGS, POLITICAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

8.1 Summary of main findings

The main theoretical question that I have been addressing through the whole dissertation has been how do citizens acquire their national identity. The basic argument I have developed is that national identity is a political attitude endogenous to the political process and that political elites and institutions play an active role in shaping and promoting it through a set of national socialization agencies and milieus.

While this is a general question, I have derived a set of observable implications of this argument that could be, to some extent, tested in the Spanish case. The specific features of the case, as I have argued in the introduction, offer opportunities for testing several implications of the general argument, mainly related to the effects of regime change and/or the internal territorial diversity. Here I first review and summarize the findings and arguments developed in each chapter, and then reflect on how do they relate to the theoretical questions. Finally, I will also discuss the political implications of the dissertation's main findings, and potential avenues for further research on the topic.

In chapter 2 I reviewed the main discourses and reproduction mechanisms of contemporary Spanish nationalisms, covering the time frame in which the samples I have been working with in subsequent chapters were socialized. I have started by analyzing the ideological contents of Francoist Spanish nationalism, and argued that it was a strongly conservative, catholic (for the most part) unitarianist, essentialist and assimilationist nationalism. Then, I have discussed how the regime's downfall and the transition to democracy have transformed the mechanisms through which Spanish nationalism is reproduced and, more specifically, to what extent the Spanish case conforms to the model of Banal nationalism (Billig, 1995). I have argued that, while the transition from an authoritarian regime to a parliamentary democracy have deeply changed the mechanisms of social reproduction of Spanish nationalism, there are some key features that distance it from the banal nationalism model: the persisting divisiveness of the national symbols, that has lead to a relative scarcity of their public display and the reactive nature of contemporary Spanish nationalism, confronted to the alternative nationalist movements.

After that discussion, I have turned my attention to the ideological contents of post-Francoist Spanish nationalisms. I have analyzed first the right-wing nationalism, and shown how it is best defined by a tension between continuity with the Francoist national-Catholicism and change into a democratic direction. The emphasis on the 1978 Constitution and the transition to democracy as new national myths, the rhetoric of individual rights and the modernization discourse coexist with pervasive features of traditionalist nationalism: historic organicism, saliency of the Spanish language (and, to a lesser extent, also Catholicism, as key national markers and a certain persisting tendency to monopolizing patriotism. As for the leftist nationalism, I have argued that, while it

was more affected by the post-Francoist self-restraint, its identification with the alternative nationalist movements was weaker than what often is argued. Its main defining traits are its modernizing and Europeanist inspiration, the pride on the transition to democracy and its achievements. It supports the decentralization of the State but also insists on the importance of the solidarity across autonomous communities and the equality of rights and duties of citizens. At the same time, the leftist Spanish nationalism while recognizing the linguistic diversity as a constitutive feature of Spain, has also devoted many efforts to the promotion of Spanish language within Spain and abroad.

Finally, I have argued that beyond the ideological divides, in the last decades in Spain it has emerged a more consensual, widely shared understanding of the Spanish nation that I have called 'constitutional nationalism'. This new national consensus, while having important limits is more important than most analysts have implied and what the daily political debates might seem to suggest. Its main element is a strong commitment to the 1978 Constitution, its principles and institutional arrangements, including the monarchy and the autonomous communities' regime. The combination of decentralization and unitarianism, the consideration of the Spanish as the only (political) nation constitute the core of this nationalism, that is also committed to the Spanish language as *the* national language and to an understanding of the Spanish nation as rooted and legitimized by history. The main limits to this consensus come from the pervasiveness of alternative nationalisms that overtly question it, as well as from the conflictual interpretations of the authoritarian past and the remnants of the past that persist in the conservative nationalism, that have proven politically divisive.

Table 8.1: *Main conclusions, part I*

1	The transition from Francoism to democracy has changed Spanish nationalism, and made it evolve towards the 'banal nationalism' model. However, there are two elements that separate it from the model: the persisting divisiveness of the national symbols and the relative scarcity of their public display, and the reactive nature of Spanish nationalism, confronted to the alternative nationalist movements.
2	Despite the differences between the left and the right's nationalisms, in the last decades it has emerged a consensual understanding of the Spanish nation. I have called it 'constitutional nationalism' because it is based on a strong commitment to the 1978 Constitution and its principles.

In chapter 3 I shifted my focus to the individual analysis. In that chapter I have analyzed how the classic ethnic-civic dichotomy might apply to classify the individual attitudes towards the Spanish nation. To carry out this task, in the first place I have reviewed the terms of the dichotomy, as well as its main criticisms. I have discussed, following Oliver Zimmer (2003) how under the umbrella of the ethnic-civic dichotomy there are often several underlying oppositions: voluntarism –organicism, state-centeredness-culture centeredness and modernist- pre-modern. Often conflating the three oppositions is problematic, as for example a single (cultural or political) marker (such as language or citizenship) can serve voluntarist or organicist conceptions of the nation. Keeping this critique in mind, I have reviewed the applications of the dichotomy to the individual-level research and shown how, despite the claims that the dichotomy does actually explain the structure of attitudes found by survey research, the actual findings are less clear-cut. I have replicated the analysis for a set of 25 countries and shown important inter-country differences that are often overlooked and, specifically, how certain markers do play different roles according to the context.

After this general review of the dichotomy and its applications to individual-level research, I have thoroughly tested how it might apply to the Spanish case. Through exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis of 2003 ISSP data, I have shown the limited usefulness of the classic dichotomy to classify the Spaniards' attitudes towards the nation. This has leaded me to argue for the need of a different empirical strategy, and the development of indicators and measurement models that are congruent with the actual relevant nationalist discourses. Otherwise, we are trying to find evidence of ethnic and civic identities as if they were somehow natural ways of identifying with the nation instead of politically constructed (and, thus, contingent) national discourses.

In chapters 4 and 5 I have developed this strategy by combining two different methodological approaches: Q-methodology and survey analysis. In chapter 4 I have presented the Q methodological study conducted to identify the relevant varieties of Spanish national identity. The goal of this stud was twofold: on one hand, contribute to the development of a set of survey indicators and on the other hand get a more fine-grained account of the contents of the relevant varieties than the one we will be able to get through survey analysis. The results of the Q-study reveal the existence of three basic types of attitudes towards Spain as a nation. I have called them non-Spanish, constitutional Spanish and traditional Spanish. The structure of attitudes that we identified through the analysis is highly congruent with the typologies that previous studies of the elites' Spanish nationalism had came up with as well as the one I have traced in chapter 2, including the consensual elements between the two, that correspond to the core of what I have called 'constitutional Spanish nationalism'.

This congruence indeed confirms that the raw application of the civic-ethnic scheme is insufficient to understand the actual varieties

of Spanish national identity and that we need to take into account the discourses that have been set up by political elites on the topic. While we could certainly identify some resemblance between the identified varieties and the classic dichotomy, the two schemes do not fit perfectly at all. Indeed, there are many 'political' or 'civic' elements within the traditional Spanish identity (such as the reliance on the 1978 Constitution or the principles of equality and solidarity as justifications for Spain's unity) and, at the same time, many cultural and historicist elements in the 'constitutional identity', linked to the historicist understanding of the Spanish nation and the role for the language as a salient national marker.

In chapter 5 I have presented how the results of the Q methodological study were used to develop a set of survey indicators applied in the CIS2667 survey, by selecting and adapting those statements that had proven more useful to discriminate among types of Spanish identity. From this set of indicators, I selected a subset to focus only on the internal differences within the Spanish national identity, and leave aside the external dimension that distinguishes those that feel Spanish from the 'non-Spanish' group. With this subset of indicators, I have developed and tested a measurement model based on two types of Spanish identity: the constitutional and the traditional one. The former includes language and history as basic elements of defining of the Spanish identity. Moreover, it includes two core elements of the new consensus: the positive evaluation of the 1978 constitution, and the equality and solidarity arguments for preserving Spain's unity. The traditional identity comprises the affective attachment to national symbols, a traditionalist reading of Spain's history and Catholicism as a constitutive element of Spanish identity.

Moreover, I have also shown that these two types are indeed highly correlated. This correlation, however, holds in one direction: almost

all the respondents with high values in the traditional identity scale hold high values in the constitutional one as well. The reverse is not true: expressing strong agreement with the constitutional identity scale does not presuppose a strong value in the traditional one. I other words: the relationship between these two types is cumulative, and while the constitutional Spanish identity constitutes a widely shared consensus, the traditional one is more divisive.

Table 8.2: *Main findings, part II*

3	The ethnic-civic dichotomy is of limited usefulness to understand the varieties of Spanish national identity at the individual level: when we apply the commonly used indicators, we do not get a clear reflection of the dichotomy.
4	There are two, main relevant types of Spanish national identity: the traditional and the constitutional ones. The former is characterized by affective attachment to national symbols, a traditionalist reading of Spain's history and Catholicism as a constitutive element of Spanish identity. The latter, by language and history as basic elements of defining of the Spanish identity, the positive evaluation of the 1978 constitution and the equality and solidarity arguments for preserving Spain's unity.
5	These two types are not exclusive nor competing extremes of an underlying continuum but rather two complementary, cumulative views of Spain: the constitutional identity is held by a wide share of the population, and the traditional one only by a subset of the first group.
6	The distribution of respondents across the categories of the typology varies greatly across Spain. In Catalonia and the Basque Country a big share of the respondents have low values in both (traditional and constitutional) scales, in the rest of Spain this group is only a 12%. Also the prevalence of the traditional identity relative to the constitutional one is substantially weaker in Catalonia and the Basque Country.

In chapter 5 I also explored the territorial variation, in two different ways: on one hand, I tested whether the developed measurement model is valid also for those territories with strong alternative nationalisms, and on the other I compared the distribution of individuals across the categories of the typology in those territories

and the rest of Spain. The analysis has shown that we can safely work with the same typology in all the territories but also that the distribution of respondents is sharply different: while in Catalonia and the Basque Country between 40 and 60% of the sample has low values in both (traditional and constitutional) scales, in the rest of Spain this group is only a 12%. Also the prevalence of the traditional identity with respect to the constitutional one is substantially weaker in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Finally, I concluded by conducting a set of external validity tests through the comparison of the scales to the common indicators of national identity and related attitudes (national pride, Spanish nationalism scale, Subjective National Identity and centralism) showing that indeed the typology is able to correctly discriminate among respondents and that the relationships that emerge fit the expectations.

Chapters 6 and 7 constitute the third, and last part of the dissertation in which I have explored the determinants of Spanish national identities from a longitudinal and a cross-sectional point of view. In chapter 6 I have traced the evolution across time (from 1981 to 2000) of the relationship between ideology, religion and territory on one hand, and Spanish national pride in the other. The theoretical aim was to explore how the process of democratic consolidation and the transformation of the Spanish nationalism's discourses have modified these relationships. The results have shown a constant, albeit unfinished process of secularization of Spanish national pride: while its influence has clearly diminished, being Catholic still acted at the end of the analyzed period as a powerful determinant of Spanish national pride. However, the steady decline is congruent with the predictions, and responds to the evolution of Spanish nationalism showing, thus, how the changes in the public discourses influence individual attitudes. The case of ideology has proven more complex: while its influences has, on average clearly

diminished during the analyzed period, the decline has not been linear and steady but rather discontinuous, showing responsiveness to short-term political factors –mainly changes in government- that point to a reconsideration of national pride as a stable attitude that should be explored more in depth.

I also explored the effect of living in a culturally distinct territory on national pride, and shown how only in the cases of Catalonia and the Basque Country, where at the top of a distinct language there is an influential political movement that questions the Spanish nation, we find relevant differences in the levels of national pride, showing that it is not cultural distinctiveness per se, but rather its politization that determines the results. Chapter 6 also included a cohort analysis that has shown significant differences among generations, with older ones being more proud than younger ones. However, I have shown how the intergenerational differences do not show the same pattern everywhere: While the general pattern is a steady decline from one generation to the next, in the Basque Country there is a much more pronounced gap between the cohort that reached adulthood during the regime's final years (when contestation spread widely) and the older ones. Finally, in the dynamic analysis I have shown a slight tendency of convergence among cohorts across time: as generations get older, more segments of the population grow up having been socialized under the democratic regime and the mainstream Spanish nationalism distances itself from the Francoist national-Catholicism, the intergenerational distances with respect to the emotional attachment to Spain tend to slightly weaken.

Chapter 7 can be regarded as the culmination of the work developed during the whole dissertation. In it, I have developed a set of explanatory models for both types of Spanish identity. The process departs from the models set up in chapter 6, which have been in the

first place replicated for 2007 to show that ideology, religion, generation and territory continue to influence national pride today. Then, I have substituted national pride for the scales of traditional and constitutional identities developed in chapter 5 as to gain a more nuanced understanding of how the political, religious and territorial, as well as generational differences influence the two main varieties of Spanish national identity. As expected, I have shown that traditional Spanish identity is heavily linked to the right-wing, Catholic and older segments of the society while this is less clear for the constitutional one: while the models show strong influence of these variables also over this type of identity, once we control for traditional identity (and, thus, clean up the models of its effect), the ideological and religious biases disappear and Constitutional Spanish identity reveals as a more ideologically neutral understanding of Spain. However, the same does not happen with the territorial differences, that remain strong also in this case, indicating a sharp divide between Catalonia and the Basque Country on one hand, and the rest of Spain on the other.

But in chapter 7 I have also expanded the models to include a set of predictors that the literature on national identity and/or political attitudes had found or suggested to be relevant: education, language and parents' projected identity. While education, once we control for other variables, does not appear to be a powerful predictor of Spanish national identity in either of its types, family language and parental identity do have a strong significant effect over both types of identity. This is especially the case for parent's projected identity, and shows that primary socialization does have a strong influence on the conformation of an individuals' national identity. However, contrarily to what might be expected, the inclusion of the variables related to the linguistic and identity family background do not erase the strong effect of residence in Catalonia and the Basque Country, suggesting thus that the territorial divide goes well beyond

cultural distinctiveness and is primarily political. These same conclusions hold for both types of identity: the traditional as well as the constitutional one.

The last section of the chapter has been devoted to an intra-country comparison of four different territorial units: one without any cultural distinctiveness (Madrid), one with a distinct language but with weak alternative nationalism (Valencia) and two that have both cultural distinctiveness and strong nationalist movements (Catalonia and the Basque Country). The comparison has shown that the models tend to work in a rather similar way across Spain, and the established relationships hold in all the analyzed territories. However, the comparison has evidenced some relevant inter-territorial differences: on one hand, having a non-Castilian family language acts a strong depressor of Spanish identity only in those contexts in which it has been successfully framed as an alternative identity marker by a political movement, showing an interesting interaction between cultural and political variables. Parents' identity, while having an effect everywhere, did also appear as stronger in those territories with strong alternative nationalisms. That points to an interaction between national identity inheritance and polarization of the population that is worth mentioning.

The basic findings of this final chapter, thus, show a strong predictive power of political variables that, however, does not override the effect of those variables more related to primary socialization on citizens' national identities. Moreover, except for the linguistic and territorial effects, the constitutional Spanish identity has proven far more neutral and consensual than the traditional one.

Table 8.3: *Main findings, part III*

7	Between 1981 and 2000, there has been a constant, albeit unfinished process of secularization of Spanish national pride: while its influence has clearly diminished, being Catholic still acted at the end of the analyzed period as a powerful determinant of Spanish national pride.
8	The ideological biases of Spanish national pride have also weakened, but have followed a more complex evolution: the decline has not been linear, and shows responsiveness to short-term political factors.
9	Older cohorts are significantly more proud in Spain than younger ones, but there has been a slight process of generational convergence between 1981 and 2000.
10	Generational differences do not follow the same pattern everywhere: in the Basque Country the decline is especially sharper in the case of the regime crisis' cohort
11	Traditional Spanish identity is heavily linked to the right-wing, Catholic and older segments of the society. These biases do not hold in the case of constitutional identity.
12	Residence in Catalonia and the Basque Country heavily depresses Spanish national identity of whatever kind. This does not happen in the rest of linguistically distinct territories
13	While political variables are good predictors of national identity, primary socialization has also a strong effect
14	Linguistic and identity family background do not erase the strong, depressing effect of residence in Catalonia and the Basque Country over Spanish national identity.
15	Non-Castilian family language is only a strong predictor of weaker Spanish identity where language has been successfully politicized by a political movement.

Finally, it is appropriate to provide here as a conclusion, a general, syntethic response to the core research question as posed in the introduction of this work: *has a democratic Spanish patriotism substituted Francoist national-Catholicism?* Keeping in mind that I defined democratic patriotism as a conception of the spanish national identity that a) is congruent with democratic principles and institutions; and b) is integrative and internally neutral from an

ideological, religious, linguistic/cultural and territorial point of view, the answer to this question has to be necessarily balanced and nuanced. Certainly, we have seen through the analysis carried out here how an alternative to the traditional Spanish identity has emerged and is substituting it. However, the process of substitution, or transformation of Spanish national identity is not complete, since a) a significant segment of the population is still strongly attached to the traditional Spanish national identity, that carries deep ideological and religious biases; b) emotional attachment to Spanish national symbols (and to Spain) is closely linked to the traditional identity and thus still carries its biases; and c) the alternative conception of Spain, that I have called constitutional Spanish identity, although has essentially overcome the ideological and religious biases, has not proven as integrative with linguistic and cultural diversity, especially in those cases in which this diversity has been politicized in nationalist terms by salient political and social movements.

In the reminder of these conclusions I discuss the implications of these findings, in two different ways: on one hand, I reflect on how they relate to the theoretical questions posed at the beginning of the dissertation and the general debates on the construction of national identities; on the other hand I discuss their implications for the Spanish political process.

8.2 Theoretical implications

How are these findings relevant for our knowledge of national identities beyond the specific Spanish case? What are their implications for the general debates I have been referring to? There are basically three points that the results presented here can

contribute to support, or at least to keep some debates open and question some commonly held assumptions.

The first one is related to the translation of the ethnic-civic typology to the individual level. I have shown how certain markers, such as language or citizenship can serve deeply different conceptions of nationhood depending on the context and on how they are framed by the nationalist discourses: in some cases, they act as organicist markers and in other ones as voluntaristic inclusions criteria. This points, in line with Oliver Zimmer's (2003) proposal, to the need of separating the three underlying dichotomies that are conflated under the ethnic-civic scheme: organicism/voluntarism, culture/state centeredness and modern/premodern identities. In other words: some political markers act as organicist markers, while the reverse is also true: some cultural markers can indeed be understood as voluntaristic inclusion criteria depending on how they are framed.

I have also shown how the classical dichotomy does not necessarily represent the actual structure of attitudes about the nation that we find in each country and, thus, that we cannot consider ethnic and civic identities, as commonly defined, to be natural ways of identifying with the nation. On the contrary, I have shown how they are indeed contingent understandings of nationhood and that the actual structure of relevant varieties is dependent on the specific ideological discourses set up by each nationalism. In the case of Spain, for example, we have seen how the typology identified in the empirical study, that distinguishes between constitutional and traditional Spanish identities responds to the specific discourses of the various versions of Spanish nationalism rather than to the classic dichotomy: in both types of identity we have found some cultural elements, such as language, to play a salient role. The same holds true for some political bases of the nation that have proven relevant for both traditional and constitutional identities. Finally, the

372

positive, cumulative relationship between the two types (that we found both in Spain and the comparative analysis carried out in chapter 3) indicates that we cannot think of them as two competing ideal-typical extremes of an underlying continuum but rather two complementary ways of understanding the nation. In the Spanish case I have shown how one of them proves highly consensual, since it is shared by a majority of the respondents (the constitutional one) while the second one is only shared by a subset of those.

The general implication of this discussion is that, for the work of identifying qualitatively different types of national identity at the individual level to advance, we must take into account several issues: first, the concepts to be used should be precisely set up, because there is a great deal of confusion in the use, for example, of the ethnic-civic dichotomy, that has proven so flexible that is not of much utility. A promising path, I have argued, is the unfolding of the dichotomy proposed by Oliver Zimmer. And second, we need a theoretical explanation on how we expect citizens to acquire and develop their views on the issue, rather than assuming that these views will naturally conform to a scholarly distinction.

The second relevant theoretical implication of the dissertation's findings stems from the relationship between regime replacement and the transformation of national identities identified in chapter 6. Despite the stability generally attributed to national pride as a reservoir of diffuse support for a state, we have seen how a regime change and a shift in the mainstream discourses can transform the relationship between national pride and its political and cultural determinants. Specifically, we have seen how the end of the publicly explicit national-Catholicism of the Francoist era has lead to a progressive secularization of Spanish national pride by diluting (though not erasing) the influence of religious identification as an explanatory variable. However, the observed evolution of the

relationship between ideology and national pride, much less straightforward and more linked to short-term political events, must lead us to reconsider the consideration of national pride as a stable attitude and think of it (at least in the way we measure it) also as dependent on the specific political environments of each moment: when there has been polarization between left and right around the national question we also find significant divisions in the individual levels of pride in Spain across the ideological spectrum.

Also the dynamics of intergenerational differences that I have observed provide interesting insights on the processes of acquisition and change of national identities' contents and understandings. The persistent differences among generations point to the 'impressionable years' hypothesis: the political environment when a cohort reached adulthood seems to condition in the long term its attitudes towards the nation. This is why younger cohorts, especially those that reached adulthood in the regime's crisis years and later, show significantly lower levels of national pride. The specific dynamics of the Basque Country, where the contestation was sharper and more widespread, are also reflected in the cohort analysis and tend to support this idea of long-lasting attitudinal consequences of the early adulthood's context. However, the slight convergence observed among cohorts also points to a qualification of this hypothesis and shows some lifelong evolution that should not be dismissed.

Among the theoretically relevant implications of the findings we must also refer to the terms of the relationship between cultural background and national identity uncovered in chapters 6 and 7. In the first place, we have seen how residence in a culturally distinct territory, per se, does not have an influence on national identity: this is only the case in those territories in which cultural distinctiveness has been successfully politicized. Indeed, having been raised in a

household with a non-Castilian language does only have a significant depressing effect over Spanish national identity in those territories with relevant alternative nationalisms. This points to an interaction between the agency of political movements and cultural distinctiveness in explaining lower levels of national identity rather than a direct effect of distinct language or culture per se, in line with most theories of nationalism that have deeply questioned the automatic relationship between cultural background and nationness.

Finally, we have also seen how both political and primary socialization variables do play a very relevant role in determining the citizens' national identity. However, intergenerational differences (both in the intensity and prevalence of types of identity), as well as the relevant role of political variables point to a necessary synthesis between those explanations of political attitudes that attribute a great weight to primary socialization and those that focus on the influence of political context, lifelong learning and rational adaptation to the context. Inheritance should not be dismissed, but strongly qualified by the effect of the political events and evolution during the individuals' youth as well as adulthood.

8.3 Political implications

Beyond the academic debates, what are the implications if this dissertation's findings for the understanding of the national question in Spain? What does this analysis tell us about the dynamics of identity politics in the Spanish case? Since I have justified in the introduction the selection of the case, among other reasons, for the political significance the national question has in Spain, it is important to reflect on how the analyses carried out here might contribute to our understanding of those processes. Although we

could extract more conclusions, I will focus on three main issues that are the crucial findings of the research.

First, I have demonstrated how the evolution of Spanish nationalism since the Francoist national-Catholicism has had a reflection also at the level of ordinary citizens' conceptions of Spain. Specifically, the results point to the emergence and consolidation of a new, more consensual understanding of the Spanish national identity. This new spanishness is determined by the historical context in which emerged and consolidated: the transition to democracy and democratic consolidation, and especially the years of Socialist rule in the 80's and early 90's, including the accession to the European Union (at the time, EEC).

As I have shown, this 'constitutional' Spanish identity has consolidated as a wide consensus that reaches beyond the traditional ideological boundaries. We can safely state that what has emerged in these years is not a leftist Spanishness opposed to the right wing's conception of Spain but rather a shared understanding of the Spanish nationhood that has at its core the pride in the 1978 Constitution, that has become a sort of new national myth. It is a strongly unitarianist idea of Spain that tends to favor arguments related to equality and interregional solidarity to support the need for preserving the unity. But as we have seen, it also includes two essentialist elements in the core of its conception of the Spanish nation: a very salient role of the Spanish language as a central national marker, and an objectivist-historicist foundation for the consideration of Spain as a nation. Probably the combination of these democratic, political elements with the strong unitarianism and the role of language and history is what makes this constitutional Spanish identity able to be assumed also by the mainstream Spanish right.

Considering Spain's modern history, in which the mainstream left and right have often fought over contrasting conceptions of the nation, the consolidation of this constitutional identity must be interpreted as a positive sign for any Spanish nationalist. However, it would be naive to interpret the results obtained here as indicating a complete overcoming of the differences and conflicts between the opposing understandings of Spain, since throughout the analysis I have also identified a wide range of fundamental limits to this consensus that, indeed, explain the political dynamics that has dominated Spanish politics in recent years, in which we have seen sharp conflicts about the national question both between the two main state-wide parties and between them and alternative nationalists. The limits to the consensus come fundamentally from two sources: one, the persistence of a traditional, and divisive conception of Spain and the other, the reality of territories with relevant alternative nationalisms especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country.

The traditional Spanish identity, as we have seen, is related to the traditionalist and essentialist reading of Spain's history as well as an especially divisive issue: the role of Catholicism as a constitutive element of Spanish identity. These are two themes that lie at the core of the conservative conception of the Spanish nation and that in different moments have been activated by the right in order to mobilize its followers and, thus, reinforced the divisiveness. There is yet another element in the traditionalist Spanish identity that is, perhaps, more specific of Spain: the emotional attachment to the formal national symbols (flag, anthem) clusters with the former elements to conform the traditional Spanish identity. This differential identification with the national symbols, that for many respects continue to be part of the right wing's heritage, represents a challenge for the consolidation of the new, constitutional Spanish identity. To be sure, we have not seen a widespread frontal rejection

of the symbols in most parts of the country, nor any consensus around an alternative but simply a lack of emotional attachment to them among important segments of the Spanish citizens. This ideological divisiveness of national symbols, that we have found to be in place also with respect to national pride (although very softened compared to the beginning of the democratic period) indicate an important limit in the emotional attachment to the Spanish nation and probably must be attributed to the heritage of the previous regime and its appropriation and monopolization of the national symbology and the Spanish nationalist discourse. Moreover, this ideological and religious divide in the levels of emotional attachment with Spain and its symbols is not something that belongs only to the cohorts socialized under the authoritarian regime but that we find also among the younger cohorts. If the symbolic divisiveness, as I argued in chapter 2, is one of the elements that distances Spanish nationalism from the Banal nationalism model.

The second, relevant limit to the consensus around Spanish national identity comes, unsurprisingly, from the segment of the population that especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country, do not share either of its two varieties. Despite the evolution, Spanish nationalism has not been able to develop a fully integrative understanding of Spain able to accommodate the relevant segments of the population that have alternative national loyalties and question Spain's national status. We have seen in chapter 4 that this group has some common ground with a minoritarian conception of Spain as a multinational state rather than a nation. However, the mainstream Spanish constitutional nationalism, with its unitarianism and insistence on the Spanish language and a specific reading of history as foundations for Spain's unity leaves aside important segments of the population in some parts of the territory. This is what have been often labeled as the unevenness or

incompleteness of Spanish nation building, and neither the aggressive Francoist nationalism nor the new constitutional version of Spanish national identity that has emerged in the last three decades have been able to complete it. The challenges, thus, remain open.

8.4 Limits and directions for further research

Although in the conclusions of every individual chapter I have already made some references to their limits and the directions for further research they suggest, it is useful to include a additional, concluding section presenting a more systematic reflection on this question. As stated in the introductory chapter, the topic addressed in this dissertation, as such, had been scarcely researched, from an empirical perspective, by previous literature. Thus, instead of focusing on a highly specific topic or offering an additional piece of evidence to an already existing debate, I have elaborated here a fairly general argument and empirical contrast, and have devoted a substantial portion of the efforts to the definition and operationalization of the concepts needed to address the questions posed by this project, as well as to methodological issues. While this certainly makes the research process more challenging and fruitful from the researcher's perspective, it entails serious limits to the strength and scope of the conclusions that the project is able to reach.

Indeed, this dissertation, rather than providing close answers, opens a set of new research questions and, hopefully, has contributed to the discipline's ability to address them by providing the necessary research instruments, both conceptual and methodological, to successfully face these new questions. Among the further research questions it is of paramount importance the connection of my

findings to the well-established research tradition in Spain about the multiple identities, and the complex intertwining relations between the sub-state, state-wide and supranational spheres of identification (Linz, Moreno, etc). While I have made some references to this question when contrasting the scales with existing indicators (chapter 5) or in the context of the Q-methodological study (chapter 4), a systematic discussion and empirical contrast of how the traditional and, especially, the constitutional Spanish identity relate to the sub-state identities and to the identification with the emerging supranational structure of the European Union would certainly provide crucial insights, especially to the political implications of the findings described here.

Another necessary extension of the work carried out here is related to the definition of the typology and the measurement instruments proposed in chapter 5. While the measurement model has proven robust to the reliability and external validity tests carried out in that chapter, and the concepts have been carefully elaborated and respond to the terms established in theoretical literature, certainly further analyses of the robustness of the scales of traditional and constitutional identity would be extremely important. Further tests of alternative models or, especially, the application of the measurement instruments to new surveys would be very helpful to further validate the work carried out here. Also further debate and even theoretical challenge to the concepts as developed here would make the contributions outlined here more solid and enduring.

Probably the main limit of the research as developed here has to do with the process of identity reproduction and identity change. The methodological tools and approach used here have proven useful to test some observable implications of the underlying theoretical arguments as developed in the introductory chapter of the dissertation. The results presented here undoubtedly provide

valuable insights on these processes. However, survey research and even Q-methodology have serious limitations and probably a more in-depth qualitative study or even alternative uses of survey research could provide further insights on a complex process of which we can suspect that we have only scratched the surface here.

Furthermore, an extension of the work carried out in chapter 2 would be a logical continuation of the research. While, as I have discussed, there are several recent comprehensive volumes on contemporary Spanish nationalism, a more sociological study of the specific mechanisms through which Spanish national identity is currently reproduced, such as systematic analyses of the media contents, or the school textbooks in the various autonomous communities would certainly widen our knowledge of the topic and be useful for deriving new observable implications and hypotheses to be tested also at the individual level.

And of course a logical extension of the research would be its extension to a comparative project of nationhood reproduction and reconstruction in recently democratized countries. The patterns of evolution observed here, especially in chapter 6, with the corresponding modifications in the hypotheses and measurement instruments, should be in one way or another generalizable to other cases that have experienced similar processes of monopolization of patriotism and subsequent democratization. Extending this analysis to other similar cases would make the conclusions reached here much more robust, since the underlying processes identified here are not *a priori* valid only for a specific case but should be common to all the cases with similar paths.

Even beyond the set of recently democratized countries, an extension of the analysis carried out in chapter 6 to a broader set of cases would provide valuable insights on the patterns of penetration

of national pride across the population. Presumably, it would reveal a substantial variation in the presence, and depth of ideological, linguistic and religious biases across countries and, thus, provide a fruitful field for testing several hypotheses on the causes of this variation. Following the basic argument used here, we would expect the biases to be present and be deeper in those cases in which the dominant public nationalist discourse is indeed biased in one of the aforementioned dimensions.

Moreover, even if in chapter 3 I have already presented some comparative evidence supporting the argument developed there about the need of overcoming some of the shortcoming of the classic ethnic-civic dichotomy, I have left such task clearly unfinished. Since my interest here was to develop a specific, informative, reliable and valid measurement model and instrument for the Spanish case, I have not further developed the issue of a generalizable alternative to the existing indicators for the varieties and content of national identity as used in comparative survey research. However, I have shown how these indicators, and the dichotomy itself have important limits when applied to individual-level research. Therefore, chapter 3 clearly opens a line for future research that should lead us to develop a new conceptualization and measurement of the national identity relevant varieties more adapted to the needs of individual-level research.

And finally, perhaps the most obvious line for future research is the use of the dependent variables defined thorghout this project as indpeendent variables or explanandums for other projects. Assessing the impact of Spanish national identities over a set of attitudes and behaviours (such as attitudes towards immigration, electoral behaviour, etc) would certainly make the case for the relevance of the findings made here much stronger.

CONCLUSIONS

APPENDIX A: Q-METHODOLOGY STATEMENTS

SPANISH ORIGINAL	ENGLISH VERSION
Nation, unitarianism, alternative nationalisms	
Mientras la mayoría de la gente que viva en España se sienta española, España seguirá siendo una nación.	As long as most people living in Spain feels Spanish, Spain will continue to be a nation
Una nación como tal debe tener una sola cultura y un solo idioma, por eso me parece que España no es una nación sino una agrupación compleja de naciones.	A nation as such has to have only one culture and language. This is why Spain is not a nation, but rather a complex set of nations.
Las discusiones políticas que ha habido últimamente en torno a la modificación del Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña me inquietan porque tratan de temas que no importan realmente a los ciudadanos y están provocando una crispación y un malestar sin precedentes.	The political discussions that have taken place recently around the modification of the Autonomy Statue of Catalonia worry me because they are about issues that do not really matter to citizens and they are creating an unpredecedented tension.
Uno puede ser ciudadano español y no sentirse español.	One can be a Spanish citizen and do not feel Spanish
A mí la unidad de España o la nación española no me preocupan lo más mínimo, pero me siento muy molesto cuando los catalanes o vascos reclaman un trato especial diferente al de las demás Comunidades Autónomas.	The unity of Spain, or the Spanish nation do not really worry me, by I feel very upset when the catalans or basques claim for a different treatment from the rest of Autonomous Communities
No debe extrañarnos que los catalanes o los vascos quieran tener federaciones de deporte propias, como sucede por	We should not be surprised that the Catalans or Basques want to have their own sports federations, as in the case

ejemplo en Escocia o Gales.	of Scotland or Wales.
Solo España es una nación. Todo lo demás son municipios, provincias o regiones administrativas	Only Spain is a nation. The rest are municipalties, provinces or administrative regions
España es una nación de naciones: España es el Estado, y sus distintas partes son naciones y regiones según decidan sus ciudadanos.	Spain is a nation of nations: Spain is the state, and its parts are nations and reions according to their citizens' decision.
España es un Estado y no una Nación.	Spain is a state and not a nation
España debe mantenerse unida para garantizar la igualdad entre todos los ciudadanos y la solidaridad entre las distintas Comunidades Autónomas.	Spain has to remain united to grant the equality among all citizens and solidarity among the various autonomous communities.
Los catalanes, vascos, o gallegos son, les guste o no, españoles.	Catalans, basques and galicians are Spaniards, even if they do not like it.
Language	
El idioma español es un elemento básico de nuestra identidad	The Spainsh language is a basic element of our identity
Quizás el castellano sea la lengua de la mayoría, pero el gallego, el catalán o el vasco también son lenguas españolas que debemos apoyar.	Maybe Castilian is the majority's language, but Galician, Catalan or Basque are also Spanish languages that we have to support.
Immigration	
Aunque lleguen a hablar bien el español y respeten las leyes de nuestro país, los inmigrantes nunca serán españoles de verdad.	Even if they speak Spanish correctly and respect our country's laws, the immigrants will never be true Spaniards.
La llegada de inmigrantes enriquece la cultura de España.	The arrival of immigrants enriches Spain's culture.
No podemos admitir que los inmigrantes no conozcan la cultura española. Los inmigrantes que acaban de llegar a España tendrían que hacer un examen, o al menos seguir un curso, sobre nuestra cultura.	We cannot admit that immigrants do not know the Spanish culture. The immigrants that have just arrived to Spain should take an exam, or at least follow a course on our culture.

Aunque los inmigrantes vengan a vivir a España es mejor que no se mezclen con los españoles porque así todos estaremos más tranquilos y a gusto.	Even if immigrants come to live to Spain, it is better that they do not mix with Spaniards, because that way we will all be more calm and comfortable
Si trabajan en España y pagan sus impuestos como los demás, los inmigrantes deben tener derecho al voto.	If they work in Spain and pay their taxes as everyone else, immigrants should have the right to vote.
Es mejor que vengan inmigrantes latinoamericanos que magrebíes o africanos: ellos hablan español y son católicos, como nosotros.	It is better that we recieve immigrants from latin-America rather than Africa or the Magrib: they speak Spanish and are Catholics like us.
Religion	
En el pasado se identificó la nación española con el catolicismo. Esto es algo que hoy no tiene sentido y habría que evitar.	In the past, the Spanish nation was identified with Catholicism. This is something that today does not have any sense and that should be avoided.
España ha sido siempre un país católico: el catolicismo es muy importante en nuestra identidad.	Spain has always been a Catholic country: catholicism is very important in our identity.
El Estado español es laico y no debe favorecer a ninguna religión frente a las demás y no debería, por tanto, financiar a la Iglesia Católica.	The Spanish state is secular and should not favor any religion over the rest. Therefore, it should not fund the Catholic church.
España ha sido históricamente un país abierto y tolerante, por eso, a pesar de las tensiones que puedan surgir, la sociedad española está preparada para integrar a nuevas minorías religiosas.	Spain has historically been an open and tolerant country, this is why despite the tensios that might arise, the Spanish society is prepared for integrating new religious minorities
History	
Me siento muy orgulloso de la historia de España	I fell very proud of Spain's history
España es una nación desde hace más de 500 años, mientras que Cataluña o el País Vasco no han sido nunca naciones.	Spain has been a nation since more than 500 years ago, while Catalonia and the Basque Country have never been nations.
Si en su momento no se hubiese	If at the time the moors and jews had

expulsado a los moros y a los judíos, España no habría podido existir como una nación cohesionada.	not been expelled, Spain could not have existed as a cohesive nation.
Me enorgullece cómo se hizo la transición a la democracia en España y la Constitución que tenemos gracias a ella.	I am proud of how the transition to democracy was done in Spain, and of the Constitution we have because of that.
La historia de España que compartimos, con sus cosas buenas y malas, es la que nos hace a todos españoles.	The history of Spain that we share, with its good and bad things, is what makes all of us Spaniards
Los países tienen un carácter propio, una especie de alma, que se manifiesta en las gestas de su historia: para España son el Cid, los Reyes Católicos, el descubrimiento de América, entre otros.	Countries have their own character, a kind of soul that is manifested in their history's deeds: in the case of Spain they are the Cid, the Catholic Kings and the discovery of America, among other.
Symbols	
La bandera de España es mi bandera y la respeto, pero no despierta ninguna emoción en mí.	Spain's flag is my flag and I respect it, but it does not create an emotion in me.
Cuando escucho el himno nacional de España y veo ondear la bandera de España siento algo especial, siento que formo parte de una comunidad de la que me enorgullezco.	When I listen to Spain's national anthem and see Spain's flag wave I fell something special, I feel that I am part of a community I am proud of.
No hace falta ser aficionado a ningún deporte en concreto para sentir alegría por los triunfos internacionales de los deportistas españoles (Fernando Alonso, Rafa Nadal, la selección de baloncesto).	You do not have to follow any particular sport to be happy of the international achievements of Spanish sportsmen (Fernano Alonso, Rafael Nadal, the basketball national team).
Ni el himno español ni la bandera me preocupan o me conmueven lo más mínimo. De lo que realmente me siento orgulloso es de vivir en una democracia.	Neither the Spanish anthem nor the flag concern or move me at all. What I am really proud of is of living in a democracy.
En España hemos sabido transformar una institución de la Edad Media, la	In Spain we have been able to transform a Middle Age institution, the

Monarquía, en algo moderno y útil para el país.	Monarchy, in something modern and useful for our country.
Me sentiría mucho más cómodo si la bandera oficial fuese la bandera tricolor, la republicana.	I would feel much more comfortable if the official flag was the tricolor, republican flag.
Europe, globalization	
Aquí hemos tenido mucha suerte de estar en Europa porque, si no, tal y como somos los españoles estaríamos en la misma situación que los países latinoamericanos.	Here we have been very lucky of being in Europe, otherwise, considering how we the Spaniards are, we would be in the same situation as the latin-American countries.
Si queremos que España sea un buen país el modelo que tenemos que seguir es el de los mejores países de Europa y no el de los Estados Unidos.	If we want Spain to be a good country, the model we should follow is that of the best countries in Europe and not the US one.
Si todo se globaliza, se europeíza… la identidad española se podría perder y esto es algo que debemos evitar. Hay que preservar nuestra manera de ser y de vivir.	If everything gets globalized, europeanized, the Spainsh identity could be lost and this is something we have to avoid. We have to preserve how we are and our way of life.
Creo que cada país puede mantener su cultura y tradiciones y manera de vivir y ser todos europeos igualmente. No es contradictorio.	I think that a country can maintain its culture, traditions and way of life, and be all Europeans anyway. It is not contradictory.
Constitution, institutions	
Lo más importante para ser un buen español no es la cultura o la lengua, es cumplir los deberes que tenemos como ciudadanos: seguir las leyes, respetar las instituciones democráticas, pagar impuestos…	The most important thing for being a good spaniard is not culture or language, is fulfilling with the duties we have as citizens: follow the laws, respect the democratic institutions, pay taxes, etc.
Aunque mis documentos oficiales estén expedidos por instituciones españolas, yo no me considero español.	Even if my documents are issued by Spanish institutions, I do not consider myself a Spaniard.
Valoro positivamente la Constitución porque ha sido un instrumento muy útil para mantener unido el país.	I value positively the Constitution because it has been a very useful instrument to keep the country united.

FROM NATIONAL CATHOLICISM TO DEMOCRATIC PATRIOTISM?

Patriotism, pride	
Un problema importante que tenemos los españoles es que no respetamos nuestro propio país y no nos enorgullecemos de él.	An important problem we have as Spaniards is that we do not respect our own country and we are not proud of it.
Como ciudadanos españoles, deberíamos dejar de lado nuestras opiniones personales y nunca protestar contra la posición de España en organismos internacionales.	As Spanish citizens, we should leave aside our personal opinions and never protest against Spain's position in international organizations.
El patriotismo, bien entendido, implica que cuando crees que las acciones de tu país son erróneas, debes decirlo.	Patriotism, well understood, implies that when you think the actions of your country are wrong, you have to say it.
Spain is different	
En España un martes por la noche encuentras gente en los bares o en la calle, En Europa no. Esta es la gran diferencia: la cultura del trabajo. Eso explica por qué ellos son mejores económicamente pero viven peor que nosotros.	In Spain, a tuesday evening you find people in the bars or the street. This is not the case in Europe. This is the big difference: the culture of work. That explains why they are better off economically but live worse than us.
Lo que nos distingue a los españoles de europeos es nuestro carácter: somos más abiertos, más simpáticos, y más sociables. Damos mucha importancia a la familia y los amigos.	What distinguishes Spaniards from Europeans is our character: we are more open, nice and friendly. We give much more importance to family and friends.

APPENDIX B: CIS 2667 QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Technical specifications

Scope: Statewide

Universe: Spanish population, both genders, 18 and more years old

Sample size:

Designed: 3.213 interviews. Distributed in the following way:

Catalonia:	600 interviews
Valencia:	600 interviews
Madrid:	600 interviews
Basque C.:	600 interviews
Rest of Spain:	813 interviews

*Effective***:** 3.192 interviews. Distributed in the following way:

Catalonia:	587 interviews
Valencia:	600 interviews
Madrid:	593 interviews
Basque C.:	600 interviews
Rest of Spain:	812 interviews

Sampling points: 261 municipalties in 46 provinces

Sampling procedure: Multi-stage, cluster sampling. Selection of the primary (municipalties) and secondary (sections) sampling units with probability proportional to their size, and of the last units (individuals) by random routes and sex/age quotas.

The clusters were conformed by cross-tabulation of the 17 autonomous communities and the habitat size, divided in 7 categories: 2.000 inhabitants or less; 2.001 to 10.000; 10.001 to 50.000; 50.001 to 100.000; 100.001 to 400.000; 400.001 to 1.000.000, and 1.000.000 inhabitants or more.

The questionnaires were administered through personal interviews in the household, January 1 to 5, 2007

Sampling error: With a 95,5% confidence level (two sigma), and P=Q, the real error is ±1,77% for the whole sample under the assumption of simple random sampling. For Catalonia, Valencia, Madrid and the Basque Country, under the same assumptions, the real sampling error is ±4%.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J. and Nevitt Sanford, R. (1950) *The Authoritarian Personality.* New York: The Norton Library.

Aguilar, P. and Humlebæk, C. (2002) 'Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy', *History and Memory,* 14 .

Almond, G. A. and Verba, S. (1963) *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.* Boston: Little, Brown & Co.

Álvarez Junco, J. (2002) 'The formation of Spanish Identity and Its Adaptation to the Age of Nations', *History and Memory,* 14 (1/2), 13-36.

Álvarez Junco, J. (2001) *Mater Dolorosa : la idea de España en el siglo XIX.* Madrid: Taurus.

Andersen, R. (2001) *National Identity and Independence Attitudes : Minority Nationalism in Scotland and Wales.* Oxford: Centre for Research into Elections and Social Trends.

Anderson, B. (1991) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* London and New York: Verso.

Arbos, X. (1980) *Franco i l'espanyolisme.* Barcelona: Curial.

Archilés, F. and Martí, M. (2001) 'Ethnicity, region and nation: Valencian identity and the Spanish nation-state', *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 24 (5), 779-797.

Archilés, F. and Martí, M. (2004) 'La construcció de la regió com a mecanisme nacionalitzador i la tesi de la dèbil nacionalització espanyola', *Afers.Fulls De Recerca i Pensament,* XIX (48), 265-326.

Archilés, F. (2007) '¿Experiencias de nación? Nacionalización e identidades en la España restauracionista (1898-c.1920)' in J. Moreno Luzón (ed). *Construir España. Nacionalismo español y procesos de nacionalización.* Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y constitucionales, pp. 127.

Balfour, S. (2008) 'Continuidades y discontinuidades en los discursos nacionalistas conservadores desde la transición' in J. Moreno Luzon (ed). *Construir España. Nacionalismo español y procesos de nacionalización.* Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y constitucionales, pp. 303-316.

Balfour, S. and Quiroga, A. (2007) *España reinventada. Nación e identidad desde la transición.* Barcelona: Península.

Bar-Tal, D. (1997) 'Monopolization of Patriotism' in D. Bar-Tal and E. Staub (eds). *Patriotism in the lives of individuals and groups.* Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, pp. 246-269.

Bastida, X. (2007) 'La senda constitucional: la nación española y la Constitución' in C. Taibo (ed). *Nacionalismo español. Esencias,*

memoria e instituciones. Madrid: Los libros de la Catarata, pp. 113-158.

Bastida, X. (1998) *La nación española y el nacionalismo constitucional.* Madrid: Ariel.

Béjar, H. (2008) *La dejación de España. Nacionalismo, desencanto y pertenencia.* Madrid: Katz editores.

Bello, F. (1988) *La pesta blava.* València: Tres i quatre.

Benet, J. (1973) *Catalunya sota el règim franquista.* París: Edicions Catalanes de Paris.

Benet, J. (1995) *L'intent franquista de genocidi cultural contra Catalunya.* Montserrat: Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat.

Bennett, A. (1999) 'Causal Inference in Case Studies: From Mill's Methods to Causal Mechanisms', .

Billig, M. (1995) *Banal Nationalism.* Sage Publications.

Blank, T., Schmidt, P. and Westle, B. (2001) 'Patriotism: A Contradiction, a Possibility or an Empirical Reality?', *Paper Presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops "ECPR Workshop 26: National Identity in Europe" 6-11 April, 2001, Grenoble (France),* .

Bollen, K. and Díez Medrano, J. (1998) 'Who Are the Spaniards? Nationalism and Identification in Spain', *Social Forces,* 77 (2), 587-622.

Boyd, C. P. (1997) *Historia Patria: Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain, 1875-1975.* Princeton University Press.

Brambor, T., Clark, W. R. and Golder, M. (2006) 'Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses', *Political Analysis*, 14 (1), 63-82.

Breuilly, J. (1993) *Nationalism and the State.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Brown, S. R. (1980) *Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q Methodology in Political Science.* Yale University Press.

Brubaker, R. (2004) *Ethnicity without Groups.* Cambridge, M A.: Harvard University Press.

Brubaker, R. (1992) *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany.* Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.

Brubaker, R. (1996) *Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Coenders, M. and Scheepers, P. (2003) 'The Effect of Education on Nationalism and Ethnic Exclusionism: An International Comparison', *Political Psychology,* 24 (2), 313-343.

Cucó, A. (2002) *Roig i blau: la transició democràtica valenciana.* Valencia: Tàndem.

Dalton, R. J. (1998) 'Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies', *Center for the Study of Democracy, UC Irvine., .*

Davis, T. C. (1999) 'Revisiting Group Attachment: Ethnic and National Identity', *Political Psychology,* 20 (1), 25-47.

de Blas Guerrero, A. (1989) *Sobre el nacionalismo español.* Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.

de Riquer, B. (1993) 'L'espanyolisme durant el segle XIX' in *IIIes Jornades de debat. Orígens i formació dels nacionalismes a Espanya.* Reus: Centre de Lectura de Reus, pp. 245-261.

Dekker, H., Malova, D. and Hoogendoorn, S. (2003) 'Nationalism and Its Explanations', *Political Psychology,* 24 (2), 345-376.

Deutsch, K. W. (1966) *Nationalism and Social Communication.* Cambridge USA and London: The M.I.T. Press.

Deutsch, K. W. (1961) 'Social Mobilization and Political Development', *The American Political Science Review,* 55 (3), 493-514.

Díez Medrano, J. (2005) 'Nation, Citizenship and Immigration in Contemporary Spain', *International Journal on Multicultural Societies,* 7 (2), 133-156.

Domm, R. (2001) *An Empirical Examination of National Pride, Identity, Nationalism and Racism using ISSP Data.* Florence: European University Institute.

Easton, D. (1975) 'A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support', *British Journal of Political Science,* 5 435-457.

Eckstein, H. (1988) 'A Culturalist Theory of Political Change', *American Political Science Review,* 82 (3), 789-804.

Enparantza 'Txillardegi', J. (2001) *Hacia una Socio-Lingüística Matemática.* Donostia: Euskal Soziolinguistika Institua Sortzen.

Evans, G. and Whitefield, S. (1995) 'The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies', *British Journal of Political Science,* 25 (4), 485-514.

Fishman, R. (1990) 'Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy', World Politics, 42 (3), 422-440.

Ferrer i Gironès, Francesc. (1985) *La persecució política de la llengua catalana: història de les mesures preses contra el seu ús des de la Nova Planta fins avui.* Barcelona: Edicions 62.

Firebaugh, G. (1997) *Analyzing repeated surveys.* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.* MIT Press.

Gerbing, D. W. and Anderson, J. C. (1993) 'Monte Carlo evaluations of goodness-of-fit indices for structural equation models' in K. Bollen and J. Scott Long (eds). *Testing Structural Equation Models.* London: Sage, pp. 40-65.

Gerring, J. (2004) 'What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?', *American Political Science Review,* 98 (02), 341-354.

Giner, S. and Moreno, Luís. (1990), "Centro y periferia: La dimensión étnica de la sociedad española", in: Giner, S. (ed.), *España. Sociedad y política.* Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 169-197

Gordon, R. G. and Grimes, B. F. (2005) *Ethnologue: Languages of the World.* SIL International.

Grad Fuchsel, H. and Martín Rojo, L. (2003) '"Civic" and "ethnic" nationalist discourses in Spanish parliamentary debates', *Journal of Language and Politics,* 2 (1), 31-70.

Guibernau, M. M. (2002) *El Nacionalisme català franquisme, transició i democràcia.* Barcelona: Pòrtic.

Habermas, J. (1989) *Identidades nacionales y postnacionales.* Madrid: Tecnos.

Haesly, R. (2005a) 'Identifying Scotland and Wales: types of Scottish and Welsh national identities', *Nations and Nationalism,* 11 (2), 243-263.

Haesly, R. (2005b) 'Rue britannia or rule britannia? British identities in Scotland and Wales', *Ethnopolitics,* 4 (1), 65-83.

Hall, S. (1996) 'Introduction: who needs ''identity''?' in P. Du Gayl and S. Hall (eds). *Questions of Cultural Identity.* Sage Publications Inc.

Heath, A., Taylor, B., Brook, L. and Park, A. (1999) 'British National Sentiment', British Journal of Political Science, 29 (01), 155-175.

Heath, A. and Tilley, J. (2005) 'British national identity and attitudes towards immigration', *International Journal on Multicultural Societies,* 7 (2), 119-132.

Heath, A., Tilley, J. and Exley, S. (2005) *The decline of British national pride.*

Hirschman, A. O. (1970) *Exit, voice, and loyalty: responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Hobsbawm, E. (1992) *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality.* Cambridge University Press.

Howell, S. (1986) 'Candidates and Attitudes: Revisiting the Question of Causality', The Journal of Politics, 48 (2), 450-464.

Humlebaek, C. (2004) 'Searching for a New National Holiday in Post-Franco Spain' in K. RUCHNIEWICZ and S. Trobest (eds). *Dik-taturbewältigung und nationale Selbst-vergewisserung.* München: Oldenburg Wissenschaftsverlag, pp. 209-213.

Inglehart, R. (1970) 'Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity', *Comparative Politics,* 3 (1), 45-70.

Janmaat, J. G. (2006) 'Popular conceptions of nationhood in old and new European member states: Partial support for the ethnic-civic framework', *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 29 (1), 50-78.

Jiménez, A. M. R. (2003) 'National and European Identities of Spanish citizens. A quantitative analysis of survey research', .

Jiménez, A. M. R., Enríquez, C. G. and Biencinto, J. (2003) 'National and European Identities of Spanish Citizens. A Qualitative Study of Interviews and Focus Groups', Project report (D6) prepared for the EURONAT .

Jones, F. L. and Smith, P. D. (2001a) 'Diversity and commonality in national identities: an exploratory analysis of cross-national patterns', *Journal of Sociology,* 37 (1), 45-63.

Jones, F. L. and Smith, P. (2001b) 'Individual and Societal Basis of National Identity. A comparative Multi-Level Analysis', *European Sociological Review,* 17 (2), 103-118.

Keating, Michael (1988), *State and Regional Nationalism. Territorial Politics and the European State*. Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Kedourie, E. (1993) *Nationalism.* Blackwell Publishers.

Kohn, H. (1944) *The Idea of Nationalism: A study in its origins and Background.* New York: MacMillan.

Krosnick, J. A. and Alwin, D. E. (1989) 'Aging and Susceptibility to Attitude Change', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 57 (3), 416-425.

Kuzio, T. (2001) ''Nationalising states' or nation-building? a critical review of the theoretical literature and empirical evidence.', *Nations and Nationalism,* 7 (2), 135-154.

Laitin, D. D. (1998) *Identity in Formation. The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad.* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Lewin-Epstein, N. and Levanon, A. (2005) 'National Identity and Xenophobia in an Ethnically Divided Society', *International Journal on Multicultural Societies,* 7 (2), 90-118.

Linz, J. J. (1970) 'An Authoritarian Regime: Spain', *Mass Politics,* 251–83.

Linz, J. J. (1973) 'Early State-building and late peripheral nationalisms against the state: the case of Spain' in S. Rokkan and S. N. Eisenstadt (eds). *Building States and Nations. Analysis by region.* Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 32-116.

Linz, Juan J (1975) "Politics in a Multilingual Society with a Dominant World Language" in: Savard, J.G and Vigneault, R. (eds): *Les États Multilingues: problèmes et solutions /Multilinual States: Problems and Solutions*, Quebec: Presses de l'Université de

Laval

Linz, Juan, J (1981) "La crisis de un Estado unitario: nacionalismos periféricos y regionalismo" In: Acosta, R *et al.* (eds.): *La España de las autonomías: pasado, presente y futuro*. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe

Linz, Juan J. (1985) 'From Primordialism to Nationalism' in Tiryakian, EA, Rogowsky, R (ed). New nationalisms of the developed West: Towards explanation. pp. 203-253.

Linz, J. J. (1992) 'La transición a la democracia en España en perspectiva comparada' in R. Cotarelo (ed). *Transición Política y Consolidacion Democratica. España (1975-1986).* Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas

Linz, J. J. (1993) 'State Building and Nation Building', *European Review,* 1 (4), 355-369.

López Facal, R. (2007) 'La historia enseñada en España' in C. Taibo (ed). *Nacionalismo español. Esencias, memoria e instituciones.* Madrid: Los libros de la Catarata, pp. 329-350.

Maddens, B. and Berghe, K. V. (2003) 'The identity politics of multicultural nationalism: A comparison between the regular public addresses of the Belgian and the Spanish monarchs (1990-2000)', *European Journal of Political Research,* 42 (5), 601-627.

Máiz, R. and Safran, W. (2000) *Identity and territorial autonomy in plural societies*. F. Cass.

Maiz, R. (2003) 'Nacionalismo y movilización política' in A. Smith and R. Maiz (eds). Nacionalismos y movilización política. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, pp. 43-101.

Marsh, H. W. and Balla, J. (1994) 'Goodness of fit in confirmatory factor analysis: The effects of sample size and model parsimony', *Quality and Quantity,* 28 (2), 185-217.

Martínez-Herrera, E. (2005) 'The Effects of Political Decentralisation on Support for Political Communities. A Multivariate Longitudinal and Cross-Sectional Comparison of the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, Quebec and Scotland', .

Martínez-Herrera, E. (2004) 'Liberal-Nationalist Theory, Political Confidence, and Support for the Welfare State. Evidence from Britain', .

Martínez-Herrera, E. (2002) 'From nation-building to building identification with political communities: Consequences of political decentralisation in Spain, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, 1978-2001', *European Journal of Political Research,* 41 421-453.

McCrone, D. (1998) *The Sociology of Nationalism.* London - New York: Routledge.

McEwen, N. (2002) 'State Welfare Nationalism: The Territorial Impact of Welfare State Development in Scotland', *Regional and Federal Studies,* 12 (1), 66-90.

Meinecke, F. (1970) Cosmopolitanism and the national state. Princeton University Press.

Menéndez y Pelayo, M. (1880) *Historia de los heterodoxos españoles.* Madrid: Victoriano Suarez, editor.

Miller, D. (1996) 'On Nationality', New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 210 pp.

Mishler, W. and Rose, R. (2001) 'What are the Origins of Political Trust?', *Comparative Political Studies,* 34 (1), 30-62.

Montero, J. R., Torcal, M. and Gunther, R. (1998) 'Actitudes políticas de los españoles hacia la democracia', *Revista Española De Investigaciones Sociológicas,* 83 .

Moral, F. (1998) *Identidad regional y nacionalismo en el Estado de las Autonomías.* Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
Moreno, Luis (1988), 'Identificación dual y autonomía política', *REIS*, 42, 155-174.

Moreno, Luis (1997), La federalización de España. Poder político y territorio. Madrid: Siglo XXI.

Moreno, Luis (2002) "Global y local: Identidades territoriales y mesogobiernos", in: William Safran and Ramón Máiz (eds.), *Identidad y autogobierno en sociedades multiculturales*. Barcelona: Ariel, 97-111

Moreno Cabrera, J. C. (2008) *El Nacionalismo Lingüístico. Una ideología destructiva.* Barcelona: Península.

Moreno Cabrera, J. C. (2007) 'El nacionalismo lingüístico español' in C. Taibo (ed). *Nacionalismo Español. Esencias, memoria e instituciones.* Madrid: Los libros de la Catarata, pp. 351-376.

Muñoz, J. (2008) 'Minority Nationalism and attitudes towards immigration: Catalonia and Basque Country' in A. Bhattachrya (ed). *Dissemi-nation or Termi-nation: Discourses on Nationalism and its Future in an Era of Globalization.* Mumbai: ICFAI, .

Muro, D. and Quiroga, A. (2004) 'Building the Spanish Nation: The Centre-Periphery Dialectic', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 4 (2), 18-37.

Muro, D. and Quiroga, A. (2005) 'Spanish nationalism: Ethnic or civic?', *Ethnicities,* 5 9-29.

Nedomová, A. and Kostelecký, T. (1997) 'The Czech National Identity. Basic Results of the 1995 National Survey', *Czech Sociological Review,* 5 (1), 79-92.

Nielsen, K. (1999) 'Cultural Nationalism, neither Ethnic, nor Civic' in R. Beiner (ed). *Theorizing Nationalism.* Albany: The State University New York Press, pp. 119-130.

Ninyoles, R. L. (1997) *Mare Espanya. Una aproximació al nacionalisme espanyol.* València: Tàndem edicions.

Nuñez Seixas, Xosé Manoel. (2007a) 'Conservadores y patriotas: el nacionalismo de la derecha española ante el siglo XXIL' in C. Taibo (ed). *Nacionalismo español. Esencias, memoria e instituciones.* Madrid: Los libros de la Catarata, pp. 159-192.

Nuñez Seixas, Xosé Manoel. (2007b) 'La nación contra sí misma. Nacionalismos españoles durante la Guerra Civil (1936-1939)' in C. Taibo (ed). *Nacionalismo español. Esencias, memoria e instituciones.* Madrid: Los libros de la Catarata, pp. 75-111.

Nuñez Seixas, Xosé Manoel. (2005) *Nations in Arms Against the Invader: On Nationalist Discourses During the Spanish Civil War.* Cambridge University Press.

Núñez Seixas, Xosé Manoel. (2001) 'What is Spanish nationalism today? From legitimacy crisis to unfulfilled renovation (1975–2000)', *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 24 (5), 719-752.

Núñez Seixas, X. (2002) 'Patriots and Democrats: On Spanish Nationalist Discourse after Franco (1975-2002)', *Unpublished Paper, presented at the Pompeu Fabra University* .

O'Reilly, C. (2001) *Language, Ethnicity and the State.* Palgrave.

Partido Comunista de España. (1977) 'Programa electoral'

Partido Comunista de España. (1977) 'Programa electoral'

Partido Popular. (2008) '16 congreso. Ponencia Política'

Partido Popular. (2008) 'Las ideas claras. Con Rajoy es posible. Programa de gobierno'

Partido Socialista Obrero Español. (1979) 'Programa electoral'

Partido Socialista Obrero Español. (1977) 'Programa electoral'

Percheron, A. (1982) 'The Influence of the Socio-Political Context on Political Socialization', *European Journal of Political Research,* 10 (1), 53-69.

Pérez-Agote, Alfonso (1994), 'Un modelo fenomenológico-genético para el análisis comparativo de la dimensión política de las identidades colectivas en el Estado de las Autonomías', in Beramendi, Justo G.; Máiz, Ramón y Núñez, Xosé M. (eds.), *Nationalism in Europe. Past and Present*. Santiago de Compostela: Universidad de Santiago, pp.307-323.

Pérez Garzón, J. S. (1999) 'El debate nacional en España: ataduras y ataderos del romanticismo medievalizante', *Ayer,* (36), 159-176.

Piñol, J. M. (1993) *El Nacionalcatolicisme a Catalunya i la resistència, 1926-1966 1993.* Barcelona: Ajuntament de Barcelona Edicions 62.

Pippa Norris. (1999) 'Introduction: The Growth of critical citizens?' in Pippa Norris (ed). *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, .

Real Academia de la Historia. (2000) *España como nación.* Barcelona: Planeta.

Resina, J. R. (2002) 'Post-national Spain? Post-Spanish Spain?', *Nations and Nationalism,* 8 (3), 377-396.

Richards, M. (1996) 'Constructing the Nationalist State: Self-Sufficiency and Regeneration in the Early Franco Years' in C. Mar-Molinero and A. Smith (eds). *Nationalism and the nation in the iberian peninsula. competing and conflicting identities.* Oxford - Washington D.C.: Berg, pp. 149-167.

Rothi, D. M., Lyons, E. and Chryssochoou, X. (2005) 'National Attachment and Patriotism in a European Nation: A British Study', *Political Psychology,* 26 (1), 135-155.

Saz, I. (2003) *España contra España. Los nacionalismos franquistas.* Madrid: Marcial Pons.

Schatz, R. T. and Staub, E. (1997) 'Manifestations of Blind and Constructive Patriotism: Personality Correlates and Individual-Group Relations' in E. Staub and D. Bar-Tal (eds). *Patriotism in the lives of individuals and groups.* Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, .

Schatz, R. T., Staub, E. and Lavine, H. (1999) 'On the Varieties of National Attachment: Blind Versus Constructive Patriotism', *Political Psychology,* 20 (1), 151-174.

Schmid, C. L. (2001) *The Politics of Language. conflict, Identity and Cultural Pluralism in Comparative Perspective.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schumacker, R. E. and Lomax, R. G. (2004) *A Beginner's Guide to Structural Equation Modeling.* Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc Inc.

Shulman, S. (2002) 'Challenging the Civic/Etnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of Nationalism', *Comparative Political Studies,* 35 (5), 554-585.

Smith, A. D. (2000) *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates About Ethnicity and Nationalism.* London: Polity Press.

Smith, A. D. (1999) *Myths and Memories of the Nation.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, A. D. (1995) *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era.* London: Polity Press.

Smith, A. D. (1992) 'National Identity and the Idea of European Unity', *International Affairs,* 68 (1), 55-76.

Smith, A. D. (1991) *National Identity.* London: Penguin Books.

Smith, A. D. (1986) *The Ethnic Origins of Nations.* Blackwell Publishers.

Smith, T. W. and Jarkko, L. (1998) *National Pride: A cross national Analysis.* National Opinion Research Center/University of Chicago.

Snyder, R. (2001) 'Scaling Down:The Subnational Comparative Method', *Studies in Comparative International Development,* 36 (1), 93-110.

Solé Tura, J. (1985) Nacionalidades y nacionalismos en España: autonomías, federalismo, autodeterminación. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.

Staub, E. (1997) 'Blind versus constructive patriotism: Moving from embeddedness in the group to critical loyalty and action' in D. Bar-Tal and E. Staub (eds). *Patriotism in the lives of individuals and groups.* Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, .

Sternberger, D. (2001) *El patriotismo constitucional.* Bogotá: Universidad de Externado de Colombia.

Sullivan, J. L., Fried, A. and Dietz, M. G. (1992) 'Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988', *American Journal of Political Science,* 36 (1), 200-234.

Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. C. (1986) 'The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour' in S. Worchel and W. G. Austin (eds). *Psychology of Intergroup Relations.* Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, pp. 7-24.

Tamir, Y. (1993) *Liberal Nationalism.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Uriarte, E. (2002) 'Nación española y nacionalismo español', *Revista De Occidente,* (248), 109-132.

Van den Berghe, P. L. (1978), "Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective", *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (1:4), 401-411.

Viadel, F. (2006) *No mos fareu catalans: història inacabada del blaverisme.* Barcelona: L'esfera dels llibres.

Vidal-Quadras, A., Abascal, S., Delgado, C., Fraga, L., Nasarre, E. and de la Quintana, Vicente. (2008) 'Enmiendas a la ponencia política del XVI Congreso del Partido Popular', 12.

Weber, E. (1976) *Peasants Into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914.* Stanford University Press.

Whitefield, S. and Evans, G. (1999) 'Political Culture Versus Rational Choice: Explaining Responses to Transition in the Czech Republic and Slovakia', *British Journal of Political Science,* 29 (01), 129-154.

Whitmeyer, J. M. (2002) 'Elites and popular nationalism*', *The British Journal of Sociology,* 53 (3), 321-341.

Wong, T. K. Y. and Sun, M. T. W. (1998) 'Dissolution and Reconstruction of National Identity: The Experience of Subjectivity in Taiwan', *Nations and Nationalism,* 4 (2), 247-272.

Yack, B. (2001) 'Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism', *Political Theory,* 29 (4), 517-536.

Yack, B. (1999) 'The myth of the civic nation' in Beiner Ronald (ed). *Theorizing Nationalism.* Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 103-118.

Zapata-Barrero, R. (2006) 'The Muslim community and Spanish tradition: Maurophobia as a fact, and impartiality as a desideratum' in *Multiculturalism, Muslims and citizenship: a European approach.* London: Routledge.

Zimmer, O. (2003) 'Boundary mechanisms and symbolic resources: towards a process-oriented approach to national identity', *Nations and Nationalism,* 9 (2), 173-193.

Zubrzycki, G. (2001) '"We, the Polish Nation": Ethnic and civic visions of nationhood in Post-Communist constitutional debates', *Theory and Society,* 30 (5), 629-668.