

Keeping Policy and Politics Apart: Integration Policies in Europe and the Politics of Citizenship in Spain and Italy

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Abstract

This thesis investigates immigrant integration policies paying special attention to the Spanish and Italian citizenship regimes. It hinges upon a multi-method research design and its results take the shape of a three-article structure. The first article addresses similarities and differences among European countries' integration policies and, by means of cluster analysis on MIPEX data, it identifies policy-models of integration characterizing the current European scenario. Two shared-configurations are captured, cutting across the East/West cleavage. The Eastern configuration is more restrictive than the Western one, especially in traditional areas of integration. The second and third articles concentrate on the domain of citizenship and they try to account for the puzzling continuity of nationality laws in Spain and in Italy by relying on the explanatory power of ideas. The Spanish case is treated in the second article whereas the third article compares such case to the Italian one. In both countries ideational factors prove to be crucial in driving the evolution of nationality laws; however according to distinct causal logic.

Resumen

La presente tesis investiga las políticas de integración de los inmigrantes prestando especial atención a los regímenes de nacionalidad español e italiano. Sigue un diseño de investigación de multhi-method y sus resultados se estrucutran en tres articulos.. El primer artículo aborda similitudes y diferencias entre las políticas de integración de los países europeos y, mediante un cluster análisis con datos MIPEX, identifica los modelos de policy que marcan el escenario europeo actual. Dos macro-configuraciones son identificadas, a través de la división este/oeste. La configuración del este es más restrictiva de la del oeste, especialmente en las tradicionales areas de integración. Los artículos segundo y tercero se concentran en el dominio de la ciudadanía y tratan de dar cuenta de la sorprendete continuidad de las leyes de nacionalidad en España y en Italia, confiando en el poder explicativo de las ideas. El segundo articulo trata el caso italiano, el tercero compara este con el caso italiano. En ambos países los factores ideacionales se demuestran cruciales en influenciar la evolución de las leyes de nacionalidad; sin embargo, según distintas lógicas causales.

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*“We’re all in the same boat. All of us inhabitants of our planet are
Other for Others - Me for Them, and Them for Me.”
(Kapuscinski 2005)*

INTRODUCTION

Preface

The present dissertation speaks to the debate of convergence versus divergence of national policies in the field of immigrant integration in Europe. The debate centres on the question as to whether and why countries develop similar (or different) integration policies over time. In the 1990s most of the literature agreed on identifying distinct models for immigrants' incorporation, which were attributed to divergent processes of nation-state formation and to different conceptions of the nation. Less than a decade later this theoretical apparatus no longer seemed to make sense, paraphrasing Joppke (2007). Some scholars started to call into question both its descriptive hold on the policy scenario and its path-dependent logic causation. They sustained that integration policies in Europe were increasingly converging, driven by the spread of liberal-democratic principles and the homogenizing effect of supranational institutions. The academic discussion between the national models and the converge arguments – as these are commonly known – has often taken the shape of a stiff dichotomy in which such arguments have been set against as mutually exclusive theses. Thenceforth the national models apparatus has gone through a careful conceptual refinement. Scholars have spelled out the multidimensional nature of the notion of models in the field of integration policies pointing out its various empirical domains of application. Increased conceptual clarity has allowed the scholarship to move beyond such framing of the debate: the contradiction between national modes and convergence arguments emerges when conceptual clarity is missing and, particularly, when the different domains that each argument embraces are inadequately specified.

The present dissertation keeps after this path of the academic debate and, accordingly, it distinguishes between the domain of “policy” and the domain of “politics”. More precisely hence, it speaks to the debate of convergence versus divergence of national policies in the field of immigrant integration in Europe, keeping the analytical spheres of policy and politics apart. Such distinction inspires the structure of the work, which is split in two parts, each of which points to one of the two domains of analysis and addresses a specific gap of the literature. The first part (article 1) is descriptive, geared towards the integration policies and rooted in the quantitative tradition; the second one (articles 2&3) has an explanatory character, focuses on the politics of citizenship in Italy and Spain, and follows the qualitative approach.

This introduction tries to enhance the inner coherence of the whole dissertation, which the multiple-paper design inevitably hinders.¹ The first section specifies the conceptual boundaries of the study, delving into the notions of “integration”, “integration policies”, “citizenship” and “citizenship policies”. The following section sifts through the study’s theoretical backdrop by sketching the debate of convergence versus divergence of national policies in Europe; firstly, as this took place in the wide research on public policy, and then as it unfolded in the branch of the scholarship concerned with immigrant integration. The second section ends by illustrating the epistemological approach followed in the second part to deal with causality, namely ideational-institutionalism. The third

¹ Three papers make up the core of the dissertation that you are about to read. Their format complies with the requirements set by the journals where every article was submitted. Despite each of them addresses distinct research questions and targets specific gaps of the literature, all of them speak to the broader debate in the literature on immigrant integration policies and share many of its representatives in terms of references. Therefore, some of their sections will look alike, especially those dedicated to the literature review and to the building of the theoretical framework. I apologize for such repetitions and I hope that the reading will be pleasant enough to merit your attention and critics.

section outlines the main gaps addressed and sets the aims of the study. The final section details the methodological arrangements taken on.

Conceptual boundaries

Immigrant integration and “its” policies

The piece by Kapuscinski that opens the dissertation nicely captures today’s concept of immigrant integration. The reciprocity of the "I-Other" relationship that the famous reporter refers to reflects indeed the bidirectional nature of the integration process. The “process of becoming part of an accepted society”, as Garcés-Mascreñas and Penninx, (2016, 14) define it, is a process of mutual adaptation that involves both the non-native population and the host society. Even if this way of conceiving it is as an undisputed fact among scholars, it took decades before taking hold. The origin of the concept of integration can be traced back to the assimilation theory and, more precisely, to the studies conducted by the Chicago School of urban sociology in the second half of the last century. At that time scholars spoke of immigrant settlement and incorporation and referred to a one-way and linear process of adaptation of immigrants to the culture of the destination country (Park and Burgess 1921; Warner and Srole 1945).

This one-side perspective of the integration process attracted several critiques. Some, as Glazer and Moynihan (1963), called into question the existence of a mainstream culture in the host society as a sort of homogenous and cohesive social environment in which immigrants assimilate to. Others, like Massey (1985) and Shibutani and Kwan (1965) emphasized the importance of structural inequalities, which were reputed to slow down or even prevent the integration of newcomers. The third kind of critique, which came from the segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou 1993), pointed to the plurality of integration processes,

linked to the heterogeneity of collective actors and contextual factors which may (or may not) come into play at destination (Lindo 2005).

These criticisms broadened the academic lens and steered the scholars' gaze towards the other side of the integration process. If, in the 1980s, integration was essentially investigated by looking at the immigrants, at their socio-demographic characteristics and achievements through a micro perspective, from the 1990s onwards researchers turned the attention to receiving societies, through meso and macro perspectives taking to account collective organizations (both of immigrants and natives) and structural factors at destination. The inclusion of the host society in the "integration equation" and the acknowledgement of the integration process' bidirectional nature represented the first crucial step in the evolution of the academic debate in this field of study.

The second step consisted in the recognition of its multidimensional nature.² Along with multiple reference populations scholars began to consider distinct processes occurring in different domains (Brubaker 2001). Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx (2016, 14) identify three distinct analytical dimensions "in which people may (or may not) become an accepted part of society: (i) the legal-political, (ii) the socio-economic, and (iii) the cultural-religious". The legal-political dimension captures the extent to which newcomers are regarded as fully-fledged members of the political community in terms of residential and political status and rights. Research in this domain have centred either on the immigrants' legal positions after their admission in the country or on their inclusion in the political community of the country (Bauböck 2006; Kofman 2002). The

² The third key step made in the evolution of the research agenda was the inclusion of the origin countries in the integration equation. Backed by the EU institutions and inspired by branches of studies on transnationalism (Faist 2000; Glick Schiller 1999) and migration and development (Stephen Castles 2009; De Haas 2010) an incipient wave of studies on the effect of countries of origin on the integration process at destination is emerging (Unterreiner and Weinar 2014). Still, this topic remains out of the scope the present research.

second dimension refers to the social and economic position of foreign residents. Empirical research on this topic has traditionally covered various fields – i.e. labours, education, housing and health – looking at immigrants’ social stratification and mobility vis-à-vis natives’ situation (Grand and Szulkin 2002; Malmusi, Borrell, and Benach 2010). The last dimension regards the immigrants-host society relationship in the domain of culture and religion, namely how the two parties position themselves, act and react to religious and cultural difference. Here the scholarship has usually been concerned with the accommodation and acknowledgement of different cultural and religious practices at destination (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). Each of these dimensions – and the whole integration process, if we consider them together – take place and, thus, have been analysed at different levels (at individual level, by focusing, for instance, on immigrants’ political participation or on their performance in the labour market); ii) at the level of organizations, ruled by both immigrant groups and natives; iii) and at the level of institutions, understood as standardized, structured, and common ways of acting in a socio-cultural setting (Garces-Mascareñas and Penninx 2016).

The multidimensionality of the process of integration makes necessary a complex and manifold response from the policymakers. Integration policies, simply put, cover the wide set of measures arranged at destination that guide and steer the process of immigrants’ integration. This includes both policies specifically and explicitly targeting immigrants, but also generic measures addressing the whole population living in the territory, such as labour market reforms or housing policies. Bringing the definition of policy provided by Knill and Tosun (2014, 336) to the domain of integration, immigrant integration policies can be understood as “government statements of what it intends to do or not to do, including laws, regulations, decisions or orders in regard to the integration of immigrants into host society.” Knill and Tosun’s definition

points to policy outputs. Yet, governing immigrants' integration it is not only a matter concerning the "rules of the games" (Knoepfel et. al (2007)). The outcomes of the integration process, namely immigrants' better or worse incorporation into the host society, also depends on how such policies are put into practice; that means how bureaucrats and administrators bring about their implementation given own goals and resources.

This aspect sheds the light on the multi-level and multi-actor nature of the governance of immigrants' integration. Garces-Mascareñas and Penninx (2016) identify two orthogonal axes along which such governance can be structured. The vertical axis captures the multitude of actors placed at national (e.g. central legislators), supranational (e.g. European Commission) regional and local levels (e.g. municipalities) (Bauböck and Guiraudon 2009). The horizontal axis captures instead the scope of actors involved in the governance. A useful way of classifying them is by referring to their institutional nature and thus to distinguish between state (e.g. administrative entities and bodies concerned with immigrant integration) and non-state actors (e.g. NGOs and immigrant associations). One of the main streams of inquiry in the study of integration policies has developed with the manifest intent of defining the role played by each of these actors, usually through comparative research designs (e.g. Entzinger and Scholten 2014; Scholten and Penninx 2016).

The intense proliferation of integration policies, occurred in the last two decades in most of western receiving countries, makes reasonable to speak of a policy sector of integration.³ Following Vollmer (2014) this can be understood as subdivided into different areas (or subfields), informing the way of grouping integration policies. So far, the spectrum of areas

³ Paraphrasing Burstein's (1991, 328) definition the policy sector of integration can be defined as a component of the political system organized around substantive issues concerning the incorporation of immigrants into the host society.

considered by scholars has varied substantially. In line with the evolution of the conception of the integration as an increasingly multidimensional process, latest contributions in the study of integration policies research have broadened the spectrum of the areas considered. Ten fundamental areas are commonly identified within integration policy: citizenship, labour, education, residence, family, political participation, culture and religion, antidiscrimination, housing and health.

The areas of citizenship, labour, and education are traditional key-domains of integration. Policies in these areas were among the earliest to develop in Europe and it is no coincidence that much of the empirical research is concentrated here. Measures in citizenship regulate the acquisition and the loss of nationality, those in the area of labour target immigrant incorporation in the domestic labour market, and those in the area of education address integration in the educational context. With the gradual settlement of immigrants and the growth of foreign population, immigrant integration got to the fore of national politics and new areas of policymaking emerged. The area of long-term residence, is one of the latter. This field covers laws and norms regulating the status of foreign residents. The areas of family, political participation, culture and religion, represent other new relevant domains. Family migration policies regulate the different forms of family migration (i.e. family reunification, marriage migration, and the migration of several members of the family) and of their incorporation into the host society, the area of political participation covers the framework of rights and opportunities ensuring the political participation of immigrants into their host society, and in the area of culture and religion we find measures addressing the accommodation of cultural and religious practices of ethnic minorities. The last areas to have gone through the lens of the scholars are those of housing, health and anti-discrimination. Despite being inherently transversal to the rest of the areas, the area of antidiscrimination has been widely recognized as a

distinctive area of policymaking, as testified by the issuing of the “Racial Equality Directive” implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (2000/43/C)

In the first part of the dissertation the lens of analysis is extended to the whole policy sector of integration. The second part instead focuses on the specific area of citizenship. This choice is taken because of two main reasons concerning the significance of and the ripeness of this subfield of policymaking within the broad sector of integration. Despite diverging visions on its meaning, some conceiving it the first step and others the last phase of integration, scholars agree on considering nationality acquisition a crucial stage in the process of immigrant incorporation into the host society (González-Ferrer and Cortina 2015). That of citizenship is probably the area of policymaking that better epitomizes policymakers’ action targeting integration and it is no coincidence that much of the research has centered on such field. Moreover, and this points to the second condition, in most of receiving countries, citizenship law-making has amply predated policymakers’ action in other areas of integration. Compared to those that might be carried out in other areas of integration, other things being equal, studying citizenship offers a border temporal perspective to address, a richer empirical material to rely on and, thus, a wider explanatory leverage.

Citizenship as nationality and “its” policies

Citizenship is a broad and complex theoretical construct. Its various meanings and dimensions make its boundaries hardly delineable. As suggested by Bauböck (2008) it is easier to define its center, which basically regards membership in a self-governing political community. This “essential” definition of citizenship is sufficiently open to capture the variety of meanings that the term has assumed over its long history and

wide application. Four dimensions related to the notion of citizenship are usually acknowledged by scholars (Bauböck 2008; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Shachar et al. 2017). The first one refers to citizenship as the formal status connecting an individual to a polity. This dimension includes the most classical understanding of citizenship as individual's belonging to a state (Costa 2005), but also newer connotations regarding relationships of belonging of the individual with other polities, above (e.g. European Union) and below (e.g. Municipality) the state (see, for instance, Gargiulo 2017, Strumia 2016). The second dimension conceives citizenship as a concrete bundle of rights and obligations. It is well known that being a citizen implies enjoying multiple civil and social rights, such as the right to vote in national or the right of education, but also complying with some obligations, such as paying taxes and respecting the constitution. The third dimension points to the sense of belonging and to the political community as a source of identity. With this respect Carens (2000) speaks of "psychological" dimension of citizenship. Finally, citizenship can be understood as a practice of civic engagement. This last dimension, which gets back to the republican tradition, refers to the way in which a person enacts its citizenship (Isin and Saward 2013), namely to the extent to which a person becomes a politically active citizen.

These dimensions have steered theoretical and empirical research, taking on form in several multidisciplinary debates. One of these regards the variety or, rather, the variation of citizenship as status. Other things being equal indeed, it goes without saying that material benefits are not the same for a citizen of a developed country and for a citizen of third world's country. Shachar (2009) addresses this topic in terms of global justice: since the great majority of the world population obtains citizenship by the accidental circumstances of birth and given the wide unequal distribution of wealth across countries, what citizenship means in terms opportunities and limitations hugely variates cross-nationally. Citizenship status does

not only varies horizontally across countries, but vertically too, given the multiplicity of polities a person may belong to. In an interesting exploration of multilevel citizenship in the European Union, Rainer Bauböck (2010) recognizes different citizenship constellations, including different layers of membership at local, national, and supranational levels. This line of inquiry came along with the use of new conceptual tools, such as those of supranational (Strumia 2013), transnational (Bauböck 1994) and cosmopolitan (Linklater 1998) citizenship. The existence of citizenship constellation, or multilevel citizenship to put it with Mass (2013), brings both the empirical issue of variation and the normative question of equality within the national boundaries too. In each European state, indeed, it is possible distinguishing among different categories of people according to their status. In Italy, as a way of example, an Italian (i.e. citizen), a Spaniard (i.e. EU citizen), and a Moroccan (i.e. third country national) residents do not share the same status, nor the same rights. The recent refugee crisis has reaffirmed the centrality of these questions steering new normative speculation about the moral legitimacy of such categories (Costello 2017). Research on citizenship “beyond the state” has not only looked “above the state” but also at practices “below it”, particularly at the local level (see, for instance, Gargiulo 2017).

That being said, as long as the nation-state keeps on representing the main authority over citizenship in the global political scenario (Frost 2009), citizenship within state’s boundaries remains one of the core topic of inquiry. Much of the research on the topic is centred on explaining differences across time and space of national citizenship regime, where key questions regard why, when and how, states decide to change their rules. Eventually the national models versus converge debate points to the same stream of inquiry. Other key themes of investigation regard naturalization (e.g. Goodman 2010) and, more recently, de-nationalization (e.g. Gibney 2013).

Despite not being an exclusive immigration-related matter (Shachar et al. 2017), national citizenship as a matter of inquiry “owes” much to the international migration phenomenon. In a fully static world the fundamental relationship between the state and its citizens would not be a matter of special concern for politics: all people born in a country would remain its citizens for their entire lives and the same would apply to their children, and so on for the subsequent generations. By creating a disconnection between the territory and the constituent population, international migrations tense the relationship between the individual and the state and trouble the politics of citizenship. The national legislator is called to answer fundamental questions regarding how to ensure the state’s intergenerational continuity; namely to decide about the modes of transmission of citizenship, the modes of its loss and the degree of its exclusivity (Vink and Bauböck 2013). This means, for instance, to decide whether to favour emigrants’ progenies over those of immigrants (and to what extent), to do the opposite, or to decide for both. It implies choosing the way to deal with immigrants willing to acquire the nationality and to decide if these must renounce to their previous one.

This is what makes the object of analysis of the second part of the dissertation that, to say with Bauböck (2010), focuses on the politics of citizenship as nationality. Among its various acceptations, in fact, this dissertation concentrates on the narrow one pursued in the field of migration studies, the one conceiving citizenship as the status (connected to rights and obligations) linking a state and its citizens. The area of citizenship as nationality covers all the measures that regulate the fundamental relation of belonging between the state and the individual. These, in short, regard the modes of transmission of nationality (i.e. by descent, via birthplace, and through naturalization), the modes of its loss, and the degree of its exclusivity (i.e. in which cases allowing/denying dual nationality)

Theoretical backdrop

The idea of grouping distinct elements of the political life – namely inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes, getting back to the Easton (1965) and Lowi's (1972) famous works – in distinct and enduring patterns gets back to the dawn of the Western thought. In the fourth book of *The Politics*, Aristotle suggests that differences in class structure (i.e. inputs) originate diverse constitutional orders (i.e. outputs), which have distinct consequences in terms of distributive justice (i.e. outcomes) (F. G. Castles and Obinger 2008). Nowadays, the patterning of relationships between some of those elements keeps representing a crucial concern for theoretical speculation. Academics in Political Science usually speak of “model building” (Arts and Gelissen 2010) or “typology construction” (Elman 2005) and for describing such patterns they refer to “worlds”, “regimes”, “families”, or “models”. In the discipline, the concern for modelling has taken hold in the early 1990s, after decades dominated by the functionalist theory (Almond 1960). Esping-Andersen's welfare worlds (Esping-Andersen 1990), Lijphart's patterns of democracies (Lijphart 1999) and Castles' families of nations (F. G. Castles 1993) probably represent the most renowned typologies of such research perspective. In *Patterns of Democracies*, basing on different institutional arrangements and government characteristics, Arendt Lijphart distinguishes between “consensus” and “majoritarian” democracies. Afterwards he evaluates these ideal-types' performance (in terms of policymaking efficiency and quality of democracy) in 36 real-world cases, concluding that the consensus democracies are generally preferable to majoritarian ones. A few years before *Pattern of Democracies'* first edition, Francis G. Castles edited *Families of Nations* (1993). Through a comprehensive analytical gaze covering cultural, linguistic, and historical inputs, political and institutional arrangements, as well as socio-economic

outcomes, the author develops a four-fold typology of family of nations including an English speaking family (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK and US), a continental family (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands), a Scandinavian family (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and a Southern family (Greece, Portugal and Spain). Due to common geographical, cultural and historical attributes between nations, countries in each family share the same public policy trajectory, which at the same time differs from the other families' patterns. The third eminent typology of the 1990s is that offered by Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) about three worlds of welfare capitalism. Differently from previous research on welfare, which sized welfare through aggregated levels of social expenditure, the author focuses on "the ways in which the values and standards attaching to particular welfare state programmes impact on individuals through rules governing eligibility, levels of income replacement and entitlements provided (Esping-Andersen 1990: 47,48). Hence, by means of "decommodification" indices built on programme specific-measures, he develops three ideal-types of welfare – liberal, conservative and social democratic – whose validity and reliability are then appraised in 18 Western cases. The author does not only make use of western models as dependent variable, he also employs them as independent variable to account for divergent socio-economic outcomes, abiding by the power resources approach. More generally, typologies do not fulfil a mere descriptive and/or classificatory function, they play a crucial explanatory role too. As long as they theoretical fundamentals of a typology have indeed a causal value, the categories identified also allow for predictions (Arts and Gelissen 2010; Elman 2005).

The search for models, regimes and families rapidly grew in the 1990s involving different policy matters and spreading across distinct policy domains. A wide variety of typologies and models' classifications

emerged including “varieties of capitalism” (Hall and Soskice 2001), “post-colonial families of nations” (Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz 2002), to mention other prominent examples. Yet, after years of discussion about models’ defining characteristics, quantity and country-prototypes, scholars began to wonder whether clustering conceptualizations still serve some purpose. Driven by the booming research industry on globalization and Europeanization (Knill 2005) theories of policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Radaelli 2000), policy diffusion (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005; Simmons and Elkins 2005) and convergence (Bennett 1991; Holzinger and Knill 2005) took hold. These called into question both the validity of former typologies as descriptive accounts and classificatory tools, as well as their predictive capacity in causal terms. Back then the diatribe between convergence versus divergence of national policies started taking shape, becoming one the major debates in the field of comparative public policy in the following years (Knill 2005). Over the last decade scholars in the field have striven for combing such different stands so that gradually more complex causal accounts and refined theories have come about (see, for instance, the “new interdependence approach” described by Farrell and Newman 2014). A careful treatment of this and other recent developments in public policy analysis goes beyond the scope of this research. These preliminary remarks aimed, more simply, at sketching the wide-ranging discussion on classifying national policies in which the more concrete debate on national models of citizenship and integration places itself. As the following pages clarify, indeed, the academic discussion on these specific kinds of public policies has followed a similar evolution.

The models of citizenship and immigrant integration

The first attempt to build a classification based on ideal models in the study of policies targeting immigrant integration, was offered in the famous book *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* by Roger Brubaker (1992). Following a classical historical-institutionalist approach, Brubaker maintains that the different citizenship regimes developed in these countries can be attributed to distinct idioms of nationhood or, to say with his words, to different “manners of thinking and talking about cultural and political belonging” (Brubaker 1992, 162). Inspired by Brubaker’s work, Adrian Favell (1998) prolonged the effort of classifying citizenship politics and policies focusing on the cases of France and the UK, a few years later. To sum up his argument, which moves towards sociological-institutionalism, the different sets of norms and institutions that regulate citizenship in France and the UK are the result of diverse public philosophies of integration. Following the same author (Favell 2006, 51), a public philosophy of integration, is a bi-dimensional construct combining “a kind of functionalist social theory of what it is that holds nations together, with a normative political philosophy that expresses nationhood in terms of abstract civic values (usually citizenship)”. If with these studies we could catch sight of citizenship/integration ideal-types, neither Brubaker (1992) nor Favell (1998) pointed at to them as such. The first scholars who plainly refer to models was Stephen Castles (1995), in his well-known article published in the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Here the author suggests a threefold typology of policy models of immigrant integration, associating each model to a specific pattern of nation-state formation.

These seminal studies set the stage for the emergence of what will be later known as the classical typology of national models of citizenship and immigrant integration (Castles and Miller 2009). In descriptive terms, the

typology takes the form of three ideal-types: i) the different exclusionist/ethnic model, favoring immigrants' inclusion into the labor market while hindering their incorporation into the democratic polity; ii) the assimilationist/republican model, with its emphasis on immigrant assimilation and a nationality regime rooted in *ius soli*; and iii) the "pluralist/multiculturalist" model, encouraging the maintenance and the public expression of ethnic group identities along with a shared national identity. Each of these models has been conventionally associated to one or some traditional countries of immigration. Hence, Germany has embodied the ethnic model, France the republican model, whereas the UK, Canada and the Netherlands have tended to be considered proto-types of the pluralist model. In explanatory terms, this typology hinges upon a path-dependent logic of causation according to which institutional development is attributed either to the historical process of nation state formation, emphasized by scholars closer to historical-institutionalism (e.g. Brubaker 1992), or to the understanding of nationhood and social cohesion that came into existence as a response to the emergence of the integration issue, for studies that draw in social-institutionalism (e.g. Favell 1998). Such explanatory logic, which from the domain of citizenship gradually extended to the larger sector of integration, has represented the main theoretical apparatus to account for citizenship and integration policies arranged by western states over the last decade of the 20th century (see Soysal 1994 for an alternative account). Mirroring the evolution of the wider academic debate on public policy, however, the national model typology was called into questions at the turn of the century.

The argument of policy convergence

As outlined by Finotelli and Michalowski (2012) three main kinds of critiques emerged. The first one points to the simplistic character of national models and to the related “peril” – as Bader (2007) warns, discussing models of religious governance – of using models as homogenous constructs hiding countries’ internal variation. The second critique draws attention to the risk of using models as normative stereotypes rather than as conceptual idea-types. Within the model perspective, as stated by Bertossi and Duyvendak (2012, 240) “countries must fall into clear-cut normative categories. This is usually justified as fitting into an ideal-typical approach. However, in many cases, ideal-types are simply instrumental for a series of moral judgments about what national value systems scholars find in one country.” The third kind of critique calls attention to models’ static nature, which is believed to undermine their utility as analytical tools to account for change (Joppke 2007). The policies changes occurred in most of the western countries at the turn of the century made this last criticism particularly challenging for the national models backdrop. For example, the “ethnic” Germany breached its traditional system of *ius sanguinis* by introducing conditional citizenship rights based upon birth; traditional “pluralist” countries as Britain and the Netherlands began a self-critical appraisal of their multiculturalist approaches and introduced policy measures heading toward civic integration; analogous measures were arranged in France, which came from a different tradition of integration. These, following Christian Joppke (2007, 2008), represented only a few examples of a wider “civic turn” occurring in most western receiving states where new measures aimed at civic integration (such as loyalty oaths, integration contracts, and tests of competences in the language, history and values of the host country) were spreading. The incipient isomorphic trend towards

civic solutions called into question both the validity of the national models typology as descriptive account of the international policy-scenario as well as the soundness of its underlying explanatory logic: if the choices and institutional arrangements of the past determine political responses of the present, as the concept of path dependency predicts, the convergence of different national models should be precluded (Winter 2014). While threatening the national models' grounds, the civic turn seemed leading the way for the affirmation of the convergence argument. Initially formulated by Yasemin Soysal (1994) and then reinstated by Christian Joppke (2007), this novel theoretical appraisal maintains that, instead of diverging in terms of national models, European states' integration policies are increasingly converging toward a civic model along the lines of Habermas' constitutional patriotism (Antonsich 2016)⁴. Scholars place drivers of convergence at both national and supranational levels (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012). Among the latter, it is emphasized the diffusion of human rights norms and the homogenizing effect of supranational institutions (Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes 2013). As for the former, it is stressed the role played by national courts and constitutional provisions (Joppke 2001, 2010) in spreading liberal-democratic principles within domestic political arenas.

The quest for convergence steered an emerging wave of scholarship carrying out cross-national comparison of integration policies by means of empirical indicators. Table 1, which gets back to the profound analysis of Helbling (2013), summarizes the main contributions offered by this line of inquiry.

⁴ Despite representing states' shared commitment to an individualized conception, for Joppke (2007), the civic turns' shared liberal purposes hide similar illiberal means.

Table 1. Integration policy indices, a review of the main contributions

Indices	Names	Timeframe	N (countries analyzed)	Main publications
LOI	Index of legal obstacles to integration	1995	Western Europe (8)	Waldrauch and Hofinger (1997)
ICRI	Indices of citizenship rights for immigrants	1980, 1990, 2002, 2008	Western Europe (5/10)	Koopmans et al. (2005), Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel (2012)
MCP	Multiculturalism policy index	1980, 2000, 2010	Western Europe, settler countries, Japan (21)	Banting and Kymlicka (2006, 2013)
MIPEX	Migration integration policy index	2004, 2007, 2010, 2015	EU Members, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA (38)	Huddleston, Niessen, and Ni Chaoimh (2010), Huddleston et al. (2015)
CPI	Citizenship policies index	1980, 2008	Eastern/Western Europe (27)	Howard (2009, 2010)
CIVIX	Civic integration index	1997, 2009	Western Europe (15)	Goodman (2010, 2012)
Barrier index	Legal barrier to naturalization index	1970-2005	Western Europe, settler countries (18)	Janoski (2010)
CITILAW	EUDO citizenship law indicators	2011	Eastern/Western Europe (36)	Huddleston and Vink (2015), Vink and Bauböck (2013)

Source: own elaboration based on Helbling (2013)

In line with a broad epistemological move away from methodological nationalism⁵ in social science (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002) convergence came about inherently in contradiction with national models in the debate on integration policies, so that the two arguments tended to be framed as mutually exclusive theses. In his famous article of *West European Politics*, Christian Joppke put it rather plainly: “I argue in this

⁵ As designed by Wimmer and Schiller (2002, 302), methodological nationalism is the “assumption that state/nation/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world”.

paper that a key feature of the policy solutions that have been offered in response to the integration crisis is the weakening of national distinctiveness, and a convergence with respect to the general direction and content of integration policy. The notion of national models no longer makes sense, if it ever did (Joppke 2007, 1-2).” The harsh critique suffered by the national models apparatus called for a conceptual reappraisal.

National models of integration, a conceptual reappraisal

Left behind the old question regarding the existence of national models as all-encompassing conceptual entities, scholars started to wonder about the possibility to readjust and refine the concept of integration models making these updated and useful analytical tools. The refinement of the conceptual construct of national models was developed along three different lines, regarding: i) its nature, ii) its domains of application and iii) its use in causal analysis.

Firstly, scholars acknowledged the multidimensional nature of the concept of national models. The construct of “citizenship configurations” provided by Koopmans et al. (2005) nicely illustrates this point. In trying to overcome the static and simplistic character of the traditional typology, these authors conceive citizenship as “a conceptual (and political) space in which different actors (which include nation-states, but also subnational actors such as political parties or civil society actors) and policies can be situated, and developments can be traced over time.” Such conceptual space is two-dimensional, they proceed, where the “equality of individual access to citizenship” and the “amount of cultural difference and group rights that citizenship allows” represent the constitutive axes (Koopman et al. 2005, 9). Moving from such ground the Koopmans and colleagues developed a four-fold typology of citizenship configurations, which is

then applied to compare the evolutions of the British, French, German, Dutch and Swiss citizenship regimes between 1980 and 2002. Sticking to their analysis, these cases present significant variations: some countries, such as France, prove to have stable citizenship regimes while other, as Germany, have undergone substantial change (Finotelli and Michalowski 2012). This is only one of several typologies that came about in 21st century abiding by a growing acknowledgment of the various dimensions that make up citizenship and integration concepts and relying on several quantitative indicators to empirically capture such multidimensionality (see, for instance, Goodman 2010; Mark Morjé Howard 2009b; Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012).

The second conceptual clarification regards the use of national model in building causal accounts. In their article opening the third issue of the 2010's *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, Finotelli and Michalowski (2012) clearly spell this out. While Bertossi and Duyvendak (2009), for instance, investigates models as dependent variable, Malmusi (2015) employed them as independent variables to account for integration outcomes. The scholarship has difficulty spelled out this point, so that so that the academic discussion has often resulted in a flawed debate in which descriptive interpretations of policy trends have blended in causal explanations (for remarkable insights to this regard see Michalowski and van Oers 2012).

Lastly, scholars have pointed out the different analytical domains covered by the concept of national models. Finotelli and Michalowski (2012, 236) identify three different “empirical fields where models come into play, namely political and public discourses, policies and institutions, and processes of social integration.” This conceptual clarification casted a new light on the dispute between the convergence and the national models arguments, allowing to grasp the inherent inconsistency of framing them as mutually exclusive theses. The contradiction between such theoretical

backdrops emerge indeed when the empirical fields, which each argument embraces, are inadequately specified. As conceptual constructs, the national models and convergence arguments are not mutually exclusive *per se*. As remarked by Borevi (2015) the Danish and Dutch states used civic integration tools to craft comparatively highly restrictive integration regimes whereas the UK and France employed the same instruments in much more permissive ways. Regardless we are dealing with discourses, policies or processes of social integration and whether we are doing so to make a descriptive or a causal claim, we cannot avoid making plain our perspective of inquiry.

The present research project takes the cue from such disposal. Yet different labels are employed. Rather than empirical fields of policy and institutions on the one hand and of political and public discourses on the other, I refer to the “domain of policy” and to the “domain of politics”, respectively, being the former circumscribed to policy outputs and the latter understood in its narrow acceptation referring to the political-administrative arena. In dealing with “politics” the second part of the dissertation turns to the world of ideas.

The epistemological and analytical approach of Ideational Institutionalism

When the politics of citizenship and integration have been the object of study, scholars have drawn richly from the institutionalist traditions. This especially applies to its rational-choice and historical variations, which have represented the dominant epistemological and analytical approaches in the field. Those by Green-Pedersen and Odmalm (2008) and Brochmann and Seland (2010) represent paradigmatic contributions of such competing theoretical standpoints. Both studies carry out a comparative analysis of the Swedish and Denmark naturalization policies;

yet whereas the former follows rational-choice institutionalism and explains variation based on different coalitional opportunities in the right-wing bloc, the latter argues that the different policies of the two countries can be attributed to dissimilar idioms of nationhood, according to a path-dependent logic of causation rooted in historical-institutionalism.

Rational-choice institutionalism explains political action by focusing on institutions, conceived as scripts that constrain the behavior of rational, relatively self-interested, and preferences-maximizing actors (Calvert 1985; Olson 1965; Shepsle 2008). Scholars in the field of study on integration policies have been particularly sensitive to the power-interest side of this wide-ranging approach, according to which – as put it by Knight (1992, 40) – “institutions are not created to constrain groups or societies in an effort to avoid suboptimal outcomes but, rather, are the by-product of substantive conflicts over the distributions inherent in social outcomes.” On such grounds they have geared their attention towards the distribution of power and the configuration of material interests that surround policymaking action targeting immigrant integration, emphasizing the importance of parties’ positions along the left-right spectrum (Howard 2010), the mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiments in the public opinion by right wing parties (Akkerman 2015) and strategic considerations regarding the formation of viable coalitions (Bale et al. 2009).

This said, if we had to identify a theoretical ground for the field of study, many would probably agree on historical institutionalism. This, rooted in classic works in comparative political economy (e.g. Moore 1966; Polanyi 1944), affirmed itself as a distinct approach of institutional analysis in the early 1990s (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). Historical institutionalists share an emphasis on “how temporally defined phenomena such as the timing and sequence of events generate formal and informal institutions and how their emergence and change impact public

policies and distributions of political authority” (Fioretos, Falleti, and Sheingate 2016). To the heart of historical institutionalists’ analyses lies the link between causality and temporality, often rendered through the concepts of “critical junctures” (R. B. Collier and Collier 1991) and “path-dependence” (Arthur 1994). Path-dependent dynamics, namely “historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties” to say with Mahoney (2000 507), have been particularly relevant in the study of integration policies. The work of Brubaker (1992), which paved the way for the introduction of the classical national models’ typology, is only the most famous proof of such affinity. As testified by more recent contributions by Borevi (2014), Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes (2012) and Mouritsen (2012), and despite the weakening distinction between the historical and the other institutionalisms, path dependency has remained a key instrument in the analytical toolbox for scholars in the field.

The present work leaves behind these mainstream approaches in the study of the politics and the policy of integration and turns to ideational-institutionalism. For the sake of clarity, this term is used as a common label embracing the most common one of discursive institutionalism by (Schmidt 2008, 2010) and constructivist institutionalism by Béland and Cox (2011) and Hay (2007). At the same time such “label” aims at stressing the analogous focus on ideas as key drivers of institutional evolution shared by both, leaving aside their different (ontological and epistemological) stands on discourse. Along with ideas, in fact, discursive institutionalism acknowledges the independent causal role played by “discourse”. While deeply relying on Schmidt’s contributions, this project

set her stand on discourse aside and circumscribes the analytical lens to the role played by ideational factors.⁶

Ideation-institutionalism came into existence to overcome the limits of the older forms of institutionalism, which explain action in institutions according to a rule-follow logic centered on external structures (Schmidt 2008). If, in fact, historical institutionalism focuses on the path-influence of enduring structures on the one hand, rational-choice institutionalism emphasizes the role played by material incentives on the other. In both perspectives the agency turns out to be subordinated to structure and institutional change is explained in terms of exogenous shocks altering structural conditions. To ride over these limits some scholars brought about the stance of a novel theoretical approach focusing on ideas, conceived as given structures influencing the action of political actors, as well as contingent entities resulting from the action of political actors. Consequently, institutional genesis and transformation are not the result of external pressures determined by structural conditions (however conceived), but rather they result from the interactive process between actors and structures in which a key role is played by ideas. Far from being the fixed structures postulated by historical institutionalists – which have been widely referred to for explaining citizenship and integration law-making – ideas in ideational institutionalism are simultaneously meaning structures and constructs internal to actors, in reciprocal interaction with other (non-ideational) contextual structures (Schmidt 2008).

To date there have been developed different constructs to define ideas as an empirical object of analysis: Sabatier (1987) advanced the concept of “belief system”, Hall (1993) spoke of “policy paradigm”, Katzenstein

⁶ Discourse is addressed only inasmuch it represents the medium thought which ideas flows – and so these can be analysed – but it is deprived of its own causal agency.

(1996) and Bleich (2003) opted for “frames” and more recently Vivian Schmidt (2008) introduced the concept of “background ideational abilities”. These are just a few examples of an expanding literature in which a broad variety of ideational factors are identified depending on their inner qualities and/or on their level of abstraction (Mehta 2011). Regardless of such conceptual heterogeneity, scholars embracing this approach share the belief that an endogenous explication based on ideas helps to explain how and why public actors bring about institutional change through public action (Schmidt 2010).

Ideational institutionalism is spreading in the study of citizenship and integration policies (Boswell and Hampshire 2017; Winter 2014) and, more in general, in the broader field of migration policies. Bonjour (2011) and Van Walsum (2011), for instance, pinpoint the key role played by moral considerations in the evolution of family reunification policies in the Netherlands while Vollmer (2014) illuminates on the archeology of ideas underlying measures targeting irregular migrants in Germany and the UK. In following ideational institutionalism, the second part of this dissertation places itself in this line of inquiry. While doing so it wants to contribute at filling one of its gap: the relatively scant attention paid to the south European countries. This is better clarified in the next section, which presents the gaps addressed by the dissertation while setting the aims of the study.

Setting the gaps, establishing the study aims

While keeping the domains of policy and politics apart, each part of the dissertation points to specific gaps that still characterize the current field of study on citizenship and integration policies, namely the lack of a configurational approach in the analysis of the policy sector of integration on the one hand and the relatively scant attention paid to the relationship

between ideas and the politics of citizenship in “new” immigration countries of southern Europe.

The idea of policy configuration, referring to the way in which policies articulate along the multiple areas of the integration sector has found little room in the field of research on integration policies, either because scholars have privileged an in-depth focus on specific areas of policymaking or, when concerned with several areas, because they have headed for synthesis. The first wave of studies (i.e. Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Favell 1998) provided brilliant insights about the depth reasons and dynamics linking politics and policies of immigrants’ inclusion, but did not offer a comprehensive account about the array of measures targeting the whole process of immigrant integration. In essence, because their analytical scope was circumscribed to the only sphere of citizenship. In spite of the broadening of the spectrum of policies considered that came along with the expansion of this field of study, the idea of configuration of policies remained at the margins of scholarship’s concern in more recent academic production too (see Baldi and Goodman 2015; Vink and Bauböck 2013 for remarkable exceptions). Again, the research scope has been often delimited to specific areas of integration (as for Goodman 2010; Howard 2009; Joppke 2007). When, on the contrary, several policy areas have been considered, contributions have favoured a synthetic outlook (e.g. Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Koopmans et al. 2012). The recent proliferation of indexes measuring integration policies says much to this regard (see Table 1). The notion of policy configuration pursued in this study is inherently antithetic to the quest for one and only measure synthetizing the whole range of integration policies.⁷ The first part of this dissertation aims at filling in

⁷ Not to mention that in several cases the analytical focus is not placed on policies *stricto sensu*. For example, Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel (2012) confine

this gap by introducing the notion of “configuration of integration policies” (CIP) and, afterwards, by exploring its empirical consistency through cluster analysis. The main goal of the article, which makes up the first stage of the project, is to investigate in which terms and to what extent European countries’ configurations of integration policies resemble and differ from each other. In doing so it tries to size the value of the national models and convergence arguments, as descriptive accounts of the current policy scenario in Europe. If we look at frameworks of policies targeting immigrant integration in Europe, to what extent and in which terms is it possible to speak of national models and of convergence? To what extent convergence trends have eroded national singularities as regard the use of specific policy tools? If a certain degree of variation persists across countries as pertains to policy solutions, does the traditional national models typology still apply to the current European scenario? Or, have new models of integration policies emerged? In trying to answer such questions, the first article places itself in the branch of the study on integration policies relying on synthetic measures.

The second part of the dissertation turns to the domain of politics and accounts for the puzzling stability of the Spanish and Italian citizenship regimes, relying on the explanatory power of ideas. In doing so it wants to contribute at filling in another important gap of the literature, the scant attention paid to the “new” immigration countries of southern Europe. Most of the time, when scholars have delved into the study of the politics of immigrant integration investigating the drivers of institutional change, the choice of the cases has fallen on countries with a lengthy experience with the immigration phenomenon, as Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian states. This is valid both for the historical analyses of the 1990s (Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998) as well as

their analysis to the sphere of rights, whereas Banting and Kymlicka (2013) conflates these with institutional provisions, media outputs and funds.

for more recent research centred on ideas (see, for instance, Borevi, Jensen, and Mouritsen 2017; Winter 2014). In the last decade, left behind historical and sociological institutionalisms, scholars have headed towards discursive (Schmidt 2008, 2010) and constructivist institutionalisms (Hay 2007), focusing on how ideational factors engage with existing institutions, structures, and political dynamics, and developing more complex framework to account for the institutional evolution of citizenship regimes. That said their geographical scope has remained rather limited. To date, when speaking of idioms of nationhood or of public philosophies of integration, to mention the most renowned terms, the attention has been given – again – to countries with a long-lasting experience with the phenomenon of international migration. The so called new immigration countries have remained mostly overlooked by such theoretical approach.

This applies, hence, to the cases of Italy of Spain addressed in the present research. The literature has paid careful attention to the similarities and difference shared by these countries in dealing with immigrant integration (see Baldwin-Edwards 1997; Calavita 2005; Finotelli and Ponzio 2017; Freeman 1995; Venturini 2004). Despite a rich variety of empirical inquiries on such countries, however, the analytical lens has remained rather distant to the world of ideas. Finotelli and La Barbera (2013) and Zincone and Basili (2013) provide interesting insights on the evolution of nationality laws in the Spain and in Italy, respectively, but their inquiries did not delve into an appraisal of the underlying conception of citizenship. Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo (2016) and Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli (2015) analyse the two countries getting back to the debate of integration models focusing on institutional frameworks and integration outcomes, respectively. Yet, ideas remain out of the scope of their analyses. On the other hand, when scholars have drawn near ideas, they have loosened their grip on the area of citizenship. Antonsich (2016)

offers a detailed and compelling account of the different conceptions of “civic-ness” held by the Italian political elite, however his inquiry regards the wider immigration matter, without specifying the ideational substratum underlying the area of nationality. Gil Araújo (2006) and Zapata-Barrero (2009) touch on ideas while discussing the existence of a Spanish philosophy of integration, but they refer to the broad sector of integration, barely mentioning the area of citizenship. Given a federal system in which regional governments are responsible for all key policy targeting integration (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011), their analyses have much more to do with conceptions of integration held by sub-state actors rather than with the understanding of citizenship held at the national level. The study by Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes (2012) represents the main perspective on the matter. Their analysis provides a sophisticated account of the Spanish citizenship law-making combining rational-choice and historical institutionalist insights. However, they leave ample room for empirical inquiry regarding the set of beliefs and values that lie beyond such area of policymaking.

Methodology

The two-fold gap and goal pursued in the present research translate to a double research design where the first part can be attributed to the quantitative tradition in social sciences, while the second one to the qualitative one, following the division provided by Brady, Collier, and Seawright (2004). Both resort to a comparative design, yet according to the specific way in which comparison is understood in each tradition: the quantitative tradition concentrates on large number of cases, regularities in behaviour and universal patterns; the qualitative focuses on context, complexity and difference (Della Porta 2008). In the same line, the first part relies on a large-N comparison centred on data-set observations

whereas the latter hinges upon a case-oriented design based on causal-process observations.

Each part represents a self-contained methodological unit. Even if both their findings speak to the broad debate on national models – and thus might allow for an overarching consideration on the topic – triangulation is precluded inasmuch as their objects of analysis and problems addressed differ.

The following table to sketch the structure of the methodological arrangements taken on, whose details are specified afterwards.

Table 2. Dissertation’s methodology

	First Part	Second Part
Aim	Descriptive	Explanatory
Tradition	Quantitative	Qualitative
Research approach	Variable-oriented	Case-oriented
Level of Analysis	State	Party
Object of analysis	Policy outputs	Ideational factors
Techniques of analysis	Cluster analysis	Content analysis
Source	MIPEX	Parliamentary debates
Type of observation	Data-set	Causal-process

First part, describing European countries’ integration policies

The methodology followed in the first part complies with the need of providing a picture of the integration policy-models present in Europe today and then, as secondary aim, to assess the extent to which – if at all – such models match with descriptive insights provided by the literature. The primary goal pursued in this part of the dissertation is, thus, essentially classificatory.

The idea of sorting similar things into categories is fundamental to most branches of science, from Astrology to Zoology where, for instance, stars and animals are grouped and named (i.e. categorized) according to their

characteristics. When classifications are derived by relying on numerical techniques such conceptual activity usually goes by the name of cluster analysis (Everitt et al. 2011). The term covers a wide variety of multivariate statistical procedures that “starts with a data set containing information about a sample of entities and attempts to reorganize these entities into relatively homogeneous groups” (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984, 7). Clustering methods developed after the publication of the *Principles of Numerical Taxonomy*, a 1963’s book by two biologists, Robert Sokar and Peter Sneath and, since then, have proliferated in both natural and social sciences (Everitt et al. 2011).

According to Everitt (1977), clusters can be understood as continuous regions of (a) space containing a relatively high density of points, separated from other such regions by regions containing a relatively low density of points. Following Filho et al. (2014) three general approaches can be distinguished to create clusters: 1) hierarchical clustering; 2) non-hierarchical clustering and 3) two steps or combined clustering.

Given the exploratory aims that inspire the first article, the analysis will rely on hierarchical clustering. As pointed out by Castles and Obinger (2008), one of the main the advantages of this clustering method is that the researcher does not have to predetermine the number of clusters. If the goal is to identify clusters as they occur (or fail to occur) in the real world, hierarchical clustering is therefore a well-suited analytical tool. In practice, the selected data will empirically determine the number and the type of policy configurations, as well as which countries belong to each of them. In this way, clusters of countries, each one corresponding to a shared policy configuration of integration, can be investigated. In particular, the analysis will rely on the Ward method, which computes the sum of squared distance within clusters and aggregate clusters with the minimum increase in the overall sum of squares.

The main disadvantage with hierarchical clustering is the identification of the “proper” number clusters, which ultimately depends on researcher’s evaluation. While in other clustering methods the number of clusters (K) is theoretically inspired by prior knowledge and, thus, set before performing the analysis, exploratory studies relying on the hierarchical method have to establish the correct number of clusters. To this aim scholars can rely on different “stopping rules”. For deciding the numbers of clusters, this study will hinge upon a combination of the Calinski–Harabasz and the Duda–Hart rules, widely used for Ward method. Distinct clustering is characterized by large Calinski–Harabasz pseudo-F values, large Duda–Hart $Je(2)/Je(1)$ values, and small Duda–Hart pseudo-T-squared values.

The analysis will be carried out on MIPEX data. The set of indicators elaborated by the Migration Policy Group (MPG) in collaboration with the Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB) is consistent with the definition of integration policies held in this study (i), circumscribes the conceptual scope to policy-outputs (ii) and represents one of the most wide-range dataset on integration policies (iii). Three more reasons justify the decision to rely on MIPEX: it is largely acknowledged as one of the most reliable dataset on integration policies (Ruedin 2011, 2015), its indicators are highly correlated to others provided by the literature (Helbling 2013), and its transparency and availability of the disaggregated data allows for fine-tuned adjustments according to the aims of the study. The original dataset will be indeed revised indeed, in order to avoid missing values – which would make the clustering procedure unfeasible – and reduce volatility related to episodic changes of policies. The concrete details of the dataset revision as well as a deeper assessment of the main limitations related to use of MIPEX data will be discussed in the first article.

Second part, explaining the politics of citizenship in Italy and Spain

The second part of the research turns to the domain of politics and tries to account for the puzzling continuity of citizenship law-making in Italy and in Spain.

The Italian and Spanish citizenship regimes, two puzzling cases

To date Italy and Spain are the only two major destination countries that have not reformed nationality laws vis-à-vis their new immigration reality (Huddleston et al. 2015). Over the last two decades all the major receiving countries in Europe have gone through a profound revision of their norms regulating the acquisition and the loss of citizenship as a response to the challenges posed by immigration. Some, with time-honored jus sanguinis systems, have carried out liberalizing steps towards immigrants' access to citizenship by introducing citizenship rights based upon birth in the territory. This is the well-known case of Germany that, with the 2000 Citizenship law, has lowered residency requirements for naturalization and introduced jus soli for children of foreign permanent residents. Others have headed toward the opposite direction. Ireland, for instance, has limited previous unconditional jus soli so that, now, children born in the country can obtain citizenship only on the condition that one of their parents has resided in the UK for three of the previous four years. Such wide changing tendency makes Italy and Spain's steadiness rather surprising. This is even more the case if we think of the intense policymaking activity carried out by respective legislators in other areas related to the management of immigration. According to the DEMIG POLICY database (DEMIG 2015) about one hundred policy changes in the sectors of immigration and immigrant integration have been adopted in each country from 2000 to 2013. However, of such measures only two

in Italy and five in Spain have had to do with citizenship. What lies behind the Italian and Spanish enduring stability of nationality laws? Why, when it comes to citizenship, the Italian and Spanish policymakers opt for continuity, seeming to ignore the new immigration reality?

Italian and the Spanish citizenship regimes' continuity does not represent only an empirical exception in a changing international context, it stands as a theoretical puzzle too. If we abide by the main theoretical insights provided by the literature, indeed, such stability looks unexpected. On the one hand, given the different nation-building projects and related national identities of these two countries (Cook-Martín 2013; Gagnon and Tully 2011), the insights gatherable from national models theories (Brubaker 1992; Stephen Castles 1995; Favell 1998) made reasonable to expect the emergence of different citizenship regimes as a response to the growing immigrants' settlement. On the other, insights coming from party politics (Akkerman 2015; Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008; Marc Morjé Howard 2010) point to diverging evolutions too: while the Spanish favorable attitude towards immigration (Arango 2013) and the lack of a right wing party in national politics (Rubio Marín et al. 2015) pointed towards a more permissive regime, Italians' public hostility toward immigrants (Ambrosini 2013) and the key role played by the xenophobic *Lega Nord* (Geddes 2008) seemed paving the way for a citizenship backlash. How are such akin law-making trajectories possible then?

Research-strategy and designs

An empirical puzzle centered on processes rather than outputs, with almost no variation on the dependent variable, make a clear case for case-oriented research (Munck 2004). Differently from variable-oriented research – such the one that will be carried out in the first article – case-oriented research points to detailed and in-depth contextual knowledge of the cases selected.

Causal inference aspired to in this part of the dissertation is not primarily focused on covariation between the dependent and the independent variable, but rather on law-making process and political decisions. To this end it will be relied upon causal process observations, namely on rich pieces on information providing in-depth knowledge on context (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004). The strength of causal process observations does not lie in the breadth of coverage, but in the depth of insight.

These methodological arrangements take the shape of different research design in each paper. On the one hand the second article delves into the analysis of the Spanish case according to a classical within-case analysis (McKeown 2004), concerned with internal evidence about causation that are brought to bear on explaining a single, overall outcome within that case; that is institutional stability in the area of nationality. On the other the third article sets the Spanish case against the Italian one mirroring the traditional comparative-historical analysis, combing a sustained comparative analysis of a well-defined set of national cases, a focus on the unfolding of causal processes over time, and the use of systematic comparison to evaluate explanations of outcomes (Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright 2004). The ultimate goal of the last paper will be to make inference not only about the hypotheses considered (and about the extent to which each of them works across cases), but also about the paths through which ideas (the main explanatory variable) bring about institutional stability in each case.

Given the specific area of policy (citizenship) and explanatory driver (ideas) considered in the second part of the dissertation, a few additional methodological remarks are needed.

Focusing on citizenship: broadening the reference population, limiting the political arena

Compared to the other domains of policymaking concerned with immigrant integration, that of citizenship presents significant idiosyncrasies, two of which are particularly worth of attention for setting the analysis. The first one regards its reference population and the second one the scope of its politics. As for the former, citizenship's target-group embraces the full spectrum of international migration made of both foreigners residing in the countries as well as emigrant citizens living abroad. To say with Vink and Bauböck (2013, 628), one of the few contributions in the study of integration policies acknowledging this aspect: "As no democratic state withdraws citizenship automatically as a consequence of emigration, the resident population is not an adequate reference unit for provisions regulating citizenship acquisition, retention or loss among extraterritorial populations. We thus argue that in addition to the resident population, populations of former citizen residents, their descendants, as well as broader ethnoculturally conceived kin populations need to be taken into account when analyzing citizenship regimes." Such warning is, hence, duly considered in the empirical analysis. As for the second reasons, it is worth emphasizing that, unlike other integration measures, nationality laws are essentially a matter of central state decision-making. On the one hand, supranational influences are screened by International law, which recognizes the autonomy of every state on nationality matters (de Groot 2006). On the other, despite their increasing participation in the broad governance of immigrant integration, the role of sub-national actors in nationality law-making is significantly circumscribed (see the contributions in Zincone, Penninx, and Borkert 2011) This is no surprise after all: by ensuring state's intergenerational continuity, citizenship lies at the very core of the state sovereignty. It stands to reason, hence, that its politics are primarily a national politics.

Therefore, it is here – namely in the national policymaking arena – where the lens of analysis is placed in the second part of the study. Finally, it should be noted that studying the politics of citizenship in the cases selected appears particularly challenging.

Dealing with ideas: methodological expedients and techniques of analysis

The striking continuity of the Italian and Spanish nationality law-making is examined by digging into the ideational substratum that lie behind citizenship matters. That means that, in each country, it is analyzed the way(s) in which the political elite think about the fundamental relation between the state and its citizens, the boundaries of the political community and the quality of its openness.

A causal argument of citizenship evolution based on ideas is an explanatory account that explicates policy-choices by reference to the ideational factors that come into play during the policymaking process targeting nationality matters. Consequently, for each case, the core analytical goal is to demonstrate that a given ideational substratum has ensured institutional continuity. The matter at stake in empirical terms is to find evidence that a specific set of ideational elements is held by the political actors when dealing with citizenship matters (i.e. measurement of the independent variable, to use a more positivistic jargon) (i), that such ideational elements are causally linked to the policy stagnation (i.e. verification of the causal mechanism) (ii) and that they are not reducible to other contextual conditions surrounding the politics of citizenship (i.e. exogeneity of the independent variable) (iii).

To face these challenges each article draws on a methodology combining techniques of content analysis with process tracing strategies. The political discourse constitutes the empirical substratum through which gather ideas held by the policy actors and so, by means of content analysis, to capture both whether a rather dense and stable set of ideas “on

citizenship” exist in each country (i). To reduce the risk of strategic behavior – namely that what is said does not reflect what is genuinely thought – the analysis centers on the coordinative discourse (Schmidt 2011) that takes place inside the parliament. In such context political discourse can serve not only as a measure of the independent variable, but it can also provide significant insights as regard the underlying causal mechanism. This is addressed thorough inductive process tracing strategies (Beach and Pedersen 2013) aimed at disentangling the evolution of nationality debate and policymaking process while placing these within the broader political context of each country (ii). Lastly, in order to minimize the risk of multicollinearity between ideational factors and other contextual variables, the analysis of political discourse and action is stretched over extended period of time (iii). Because ideas are relatively resistant to change it is reasonable to expect evidence of relative stability over time in both actors’ ideational commitment and in the decisions that are hypothesized to result from them, even as structural conditions change (Jacobs 2015). For each case, hence, the lapse of time considered covers the history of the country from the origin of its citizenship regimes, as set by the last comprehensive reform (1982 in Spain and 1992 in Italy) to the present days (June 2017).

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1. CONFIGURATIONS OF INTEGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPE. AN EXPLORATORY APPRAISAL

Abstract

Today, in all European countries it is possible to identify a framework of policies addressing the integration of immigrant population. By considering the various areas of policies concerned with such phenomenon, the present study identifies the existence of shared models of policy responses across countries. This is done introducing the concept of configuration of integration policies (CIP) and relying on a hierarchical cluster analysis. The analysis identifies two main shared-configurations for dealing with immigrant integration cutting across the East/West cleavage, with the Eastern configuration more restrictive than the Western one, especially in the areas of labour, education, political participation and citizenship; they are instead closer to each other as pertain to family, residence, and antidiscrimination; namely in policy areas concerned with salient human rights issues and targeted by European directives. These evidences speak to the broad debate in the field of study of immigrant integration policies, paving the way for further research and theoretical speculation.

1.1 Introduction

Over the last decades, European countries have experienced an intense growth of migratory inflows, especially from non-EU countries. The subsequent process of immigrants' settlement has gradually become the target of a specific sector of policymaking, covering a widening spectrum of policy areas. Initially circumscribed to citizenship regimes and

naturalization procedures, immigrant integration policies have firstly concerned the field of labour, as a consequence of the workers' migration of the second half in the 20th century, and then spread to others, after the gradual settlement of immigrants in receiving societies. Today, with the affirmation of immigration and diversity as structural dimensions of most societies, integration policies cut across the whole range of action of national legislators, from the area of education to those of family and culture. To this regard the European scenario is quite heterogeneous: measures vary substantially through states, depending on the specific area taken into account. Family reunification is easier in new immigration countries as Italy and Spain than in traditional one as France and the UK. The inclusion into the labour market is promoted in Sweden and Norway while it is strongly constrained in Poland and Slovakia. Naturalization procedure is simple and fast in Portugal whereas in Switzerland is long and problematic.

Such variation, unevenly distributed over different areas of policy, makes one wondering about the existence of distinct and shared configurations of responses across countries. Do European states' frameworks of integration policies resemble to each other? If so, to what extent? Is it possible to identify shared configurations of policies, considering the various areas involved in the sector of integration? The present study points to answer such questions by relying on the concept of configuration of integration policies (or CIP). This is conceived as *a stable arrangement of integration policies, articulated along the multiple areas of the integration policy sector*. The concept of CIP captures the way in which states' policies distribute over the policy areas concerned with the incorporation of immigrants into the host society and, in doing so, it makes special reference to their levels of restrictiveness.

Such theoretical construct gets back to a specific acceptation of the wider concept of "models" well-known in Political Science. The idea that the

politics and the policies of nation-states can be distinctively grouped according to enduring affinities is “as old as type construction in comparative political inquiry” (Castles and Obinger 2008, 321). As explained by the same authors, this broad concept has three main variants: one conceiving policy affinities as closely associated with aspects of territoriality; another where such similarities are seen as being informed by unchanging structural characteristics; and the last one that outlines affinities only in terms of policies, with no references to underlying explanatory rationales. The CIP draws on the latter and, in doing so, it intends to fill a gap in the literature on integration policies, which has overlooked such acceptance of model to date.

The next section clarifies the set of policy areas underlying the concept of CIP and illustrates how this is operationalized while setting the aims of the study. The third part goes through the literature this study refers to, with the twofold objective of: i) pinpointing some its gaps and ii) building the hypotheses that will drive the analysis. Despite giving almost no attention to the idea of policy configuration, the literature on integration policies offers indeed valuable insights for inspiring our prior expectations both about the kinds of policy frameworks possibly characterizing the current European scenario as well as about their distribution among countries. The fourth section presents the methodological choices underlying the research. The subsequent part shows the results of a hierarchical cluster analysis carried out on MIPEX data. Evidences gathered are then set against theoretical expectations. Finally, concluding remarks concerning the value, the scope and the limitations of the study are provided.

1.2 Operationalizing the CIP and setting the aims of the study

The intense proliferation of integration policies occurred in most European countries makes reasonable to speak of a *policy sector of integration*. This is, adjusting Burstein's general definition (Burstein 1991, 328), a component of the political system organized around substantive issues concerning the incorporation of immigrants into the host society (see also Freeman 1985). Following Vollmer (2014), the policy sector of integration can be understood as subdivided into different *policy areas*, or fields. Despite the different interpretations about their number and kinds, a general agreement is found in the literature (see, for instance, Bilgili et al. 2015; Koopmans 2013; Koopmans et al. 2012; Huddleston et al. 2015; Unterreiner & Weinar 2014) on ten main areas:

- Citizenship
- Labour
- Education
- Residence
- Family
- Political participation
- Culture and religion
- Health
- Housing
- Antidiscrimination

These areas inform the way of organizing integration policies and, therefore, identify the constitutive dimensions of the CIP. Unfortunately, the operationalization procedure cannot comply with such conceptual scope. Up to now, there is no set of data covering the full spectrum of fields considered. The widest and most comprehensive resource to this

regard is the dataset linked to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which was therefore chosen. MIPEX indicators measure the degree of which national integration policies ensure equality of rights and opportunities to immigrant residents.⁸ The set of indicators elaborated by the Migration Policy Group (MPG) in collaboration with the Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB) is one of the most accredited sources of quantitative information on immigrant integration policies (see Ruedin 2011; Ruedin 2015), providing ready tools for measuring the degree of restrictiveness of policies in most of the areas of the integration sector. The MIPEX dataset covers all the main areas scrutinized by the literature with the exception of the one of culture and religion. This, along with constraints posed by missing values across waves regarding the areas of health and housing, circumscribe the empirical scope of the CIP to seven policy fields (matching the areas of expertise organizing MIPEX indicators): labour, family, education, political participation, residence, citizenship, antidiscrimination.

Complying with a narrow understanding of integration policies, the range of indicators considered was restricted to those addressing policy-outputs. Following Knill and Tosun (2014, 336), integration policies are considered as “government’s statements of what it intends to do or not do (including laws, regulations, decisions or orders) in regards to the incorporation of immigrants in the host country.” Since the main concern is about “government’s statements” of the central legislators and not about its application, the indicators referring to policy-implementation were omitted. After all policy-outputs and implementation actions represent distinct theoretical and empirical entities. The former concerns “the rules

⁸ The target group of these policies includes the broad spectrum of immigrants however defined – i.e. foreigners, foreign-born people, people with a foreign background – and of different generations. In practice, within the European context, which is the focus of the present study, most of the measures aim at the first-generation of non-EU immigrants.

of the game” (Knoepfel et al. 2007) and pertains to the sphere of formal legal rules whereas the latter refers to concrete realization of the policy and embrace the external actors of the political-administrative subsystem (see Gest et al. 2014 for more details on this matter).⁹

Engaged with the empirical reality, the concept of CIP can describe both a single state’s framework of integration as well as a configuration shared by a set of countries, if similarities allow it. The present study points precisely to the latter and, specifically, it pursues two main goals: firstly, it explores the existence of shared configurations of integration policies in the current European scenario; then, if common models of policies are identified, it assesses whether these match with theoretical insights. The grouping of countries sharing akin configuration of integration policies should not be expected to be causal, indeed. Two hypothetical states traditionally committed to neoliberal principles over equality concerns and holding strong ethnic conceptions of national identities could be reasonably assumed to share the same kind of framework favouring labour market inclusion while restricting family migration policies and naturalization. The branch of research on comparative integration policies offers valuable – and competing – descriptive insights to this regard, as clarified in the next section. By reviewing the main contributions of the literature on integration policies, the following paragraphs also show how the notion of “models” has been widely employed by the scholarship in the field, however not in the concrete acceptance addressed by this study.

⁹ Furthermore, this decision complies with the latest methodological clarifications provided in the study of migration and integration policies (see Bjerre et al. 2015; de Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2015; Helbling and Vink 2013).

1.3 Configuration of integration policies, a theoretical appraisal

Research on integration policies dates back to the early 1990s, when in most of the so called “old immigration countries” it was possible to identify a framework of policies addressing the integration of foreign-born population in the host society. All these measures, ranging from the modes of citizenship acquisition to the tools targeting immigrant inclusion into the labour market, became the specific object of inquiry of an emerging field of research. At the outset scholars’ approach, mainly rooted in historical institutionalism, focused on differences and took shape what will be later known as the “national models argument” (as labelled by Goodman 2010; Joppke 2007; Mouritsen 2011). Initially formulated by Roger Brubaker (1992) in his inspiring book “Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany” it was later developed and enhanced by Castles, Miller and Favell (Castles and Miller 1993; Castles 1995; Favell 1998). Despite significant differences characterizing authors’ approaches, their propositions share some fundamental traits, which can be pieced together in one central claim: nation-states provide different responses to the issue of immigrant integration, according to the specific pattern of nation-state formation and to their understanding of nationhood and social cohesion.

In trying to account for policy decisions and institutional evolution, these authors highlight a path-dependency logic of causation rooted in “national history and political culture, therefore resistant to change over time” (Koopmans et al. 2012, 1206). In descriptive terms, the national models’ apparatus¹⁰ takes the form of a classification including three different

¹⁰ The typology of national models has come about forged by different contributions among which, it is undisputable, those by Brubaker (1992), Castles (1995) and Favell (1998) provided the core fundamentals. Their studies rely on different theoretical grounds which, however, share a path-dependency explanatory logic of causation. In the light of such differences, but given their

ideal-types: the assimilationist (or republican) model, the pluralist (or multicultural) model, and the differential exclusionist (or ethnic) model, each of which has been conventionally associated to some traditional immigration countries. The first one, embodied by France, follows a one-sided conception of integration according to which immigrants are expected to turn into citizens, assimilating mainstream culture and values of the host society (Castles 1995). The pluralist model shares with the former a civic conception of nation, but differs from it in the recognition of diversity. Immigrants are not expected to give up their cultural values and the public expression of ethnic and cultural diversity is endorsed along with a shared national identity (Castles and Miller 1993). The Netherlands, Sweden and the UK have been usually recognized as eminent examples of such model (Hooghe and Reeskens 2009). The differential exclusionist model, traditionally represented by Germany, incorporates immigrants in certain spheres of life but exclude them from others (Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo 2016). Following a labour-oriented approach combined with an ethnic conception of the nation, this approach to integration favours immigrants' inclusion in the labour market, but precluded their incorporation into the democratic polity.

At the turn of the century the adequacy and usefulness of the national models was called into question. Scholars criticized its excessive rigidity and its incapacity to account for policy change (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012; Joppke 2007). The apparent civic turn undertaken by most of Western countries¹¹, geared scholarship's concerns towards alternative

analogous stands on causality, rather than of “national model theory” *tout court*, speaking of “national models apparatus” seems more appropriate.

¹¹ The “ethnic” Germany breached its traditional system of *ius sanguinis* by introducing conditional citizenship rights based upon birth on its territory; traditional “pluralist” countries as Britain and the Netherlands began a self-critical appraisal of their multiculturalist approaches and introduced policy measures heading toward civic integration (Mouritsen et al. 2015); analogous measures were arranged in France, which came from a different tradition of

explanatory rationales, consistent with the evolution of neo-institutionalisms in Political Science. Some authors retained the idea that policy evolution follows national traditions (Howard 2009; Jacobs and Rea 2007; Winter 2014), but put more emphasis on conjectural political variables, such as electoral competition (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008), strategies of anti-immigrant parties (Marc Morjé Howard 2010) and the size of immigrant electorate (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012). Others, turned the attention from differences to similarities and paved the way for establishment of the “convergence thesis”. Drivers of convergences are located both at national and supranational levels. Among the latter, scholars emphasize the spread of human rights norms and the homogenizing effect of supranational institutions (Hollifield 2000; Sassen 1996), with special emphasis on the crucial influence exercised by European ones on member states (Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes 2013; Menz 2015). As for the former, they underline the role played by the spread of liberal-democratic principles within domestic political arenas, driven by national courts and constitutional provisions (Joppke 2001, 2007). Initially sketched by Soysal (1994) and then refined by Christian Joppke (2007), this theoretical appraisal maintains that instead of diverging in terms of national models, states are increasingly converging towards less restrictive integration policies.¹² The idea of an isomorphic trend towards similar policy solutions across Western countries, called

integration. More generally, along the first decade of this century most Western receiving countries have implemented similar integration “tools”, including loyalty oaths, integration contracts, and tests of competences in the language, history and values of the host country.

¹² This formulation of the convergence thesis goes back to Koopmans et. al (2012, 1205) who maintain that: “The convergence perspective makes two central descriptive claims about trends in immigrant citizenship rights. The first is that changes have gone toward more encompassing rights and away from cultural assimilation requirements. The second is that country differences have declined over time because of shared normative commitments that pull countries toward liberalization.” According to Joppke (2007) such liberalizing tendency hides an instance of “repressive liberalism”.

into question both the validity of the national models thesis as a descriptive account of the international policy-scenarios and the soundness of the path-dependency as explanatory logic of policy evolution. The quest for convergence steered political scientists towards a quantitative assessment of integration policies¹³ so that various projects were settled comparing a large range of countries with the aim of evaluating trends of convergence vis-à-vis the resilience of national models. The study carried out by Waldrauch and Hofinger (1997) inaugurated this novel stream of research, but it is especially since the mid-2000s that scholars multiply their efforts to measure and to compare integration policies by means of synthetic indices. Howard's Citizenship Policies Index (Mark Morjé Howard 2009), Goodman's Civic Integration Index (Goodman 2010), Koopmans et al.'s Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012), the CITLAW indicators used by Vink and Bauböck (2013), and the Multiculturalism Policy Index developed by Banting and Kymlicka (2013), represent the most prominent examples to this regard.

Even though the juxtaposition between the theories of national models and convergence has marked the unfolding academic debate, in the last years scholars have tried to go beyond such framing, bringing about more complex explanatory backdrop (see, for instance, Koopmans and Michalowski 2016; Manatschal and Bernauer 2016) and advancing novel typologies that try to capture the current Europe scenario of integration policies (see Zincone 2011). The contributions gathered in the book edited by Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx (2016) are especially worth of attention to this regard. Among them, for the aim of the study, it is considered the one offered by Doornik and Bruquetas-Callejo (2016),

¹³ Such disposition towards a “quantified” knowledge of policymaking outputs has not been confined to the study of integration policies, but concerns the broad field of study dealing with migration policies (see Bjerre et al. 2015; de Haas et al. 2015).

who offer a compelling and up-to-date categorization of European countries' integration models. By relying on empirical consideration regarding the welfare system, the historical trajectory, the geopolitical context, and the immigration experience of member states, the authors expand the traditional typology of national models and distinguish between Southern, Central-Eastern, and North-Western regimes of integration.

Despite the extensive use of "model" the literature has hardly considered its acceptance as configuration of policies.¹⁴ This has found little room both in the historical comparisons of the 1990s as well as in most recent waves of inquiries. The national models ideal-types that emerged from the first wave of studies (i.e. Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Favell 1998) did not embrace the array of integration measures because their analytical scope was mainly circumscribed to the sphere of citizenship. Besides, in line with the 90s' broader tradition of model building in Political Science (see Arts and Gelissen 2010, Collier et. al 2008 and Knill 2005), such typology captures distinct and enduring patterns linking political traditions and institutional arrangements. The classical formulation of the ethnic, republican and pluralist ideal-types chains the empirical domain of ideas and discourses and that of policy and institutions, to say with Finotelli and Michalowski (2012).¹⁵ Contrariwise the notion of models addressed in this study only operates in the domain of policy. Those studies provided

¹⁴ The recent methodological controversies regarding the conceptualization and operationalization of integration policies have further hampered the possible development of the research agenda in such direction. Until now, there is no full scholarship's agreement on the matter, neither on the concrete boundaries of the domain of integration (what is about integration and what is not?), nor about the very concept of policy (what does policy mean, empirically?). For more on this issue see the works of Helbling (2013), Helbling and Vink (2013), and Koopmans (2013).

¹⁵ In this regard the authors point out the need for more conceptual clarity to avoid "situations where allusions to a model in political discourse may be mistaken for a proof of its existence in policy" (Finotelli and Michalowski 2012, 236).

brilliant insights about the depth reasons and dynamics linking politics and policies of immigrants' inclusion, but did not offer a comprehensive account of the integration policy sector. In spite of the broadening of the spectrum of policies considered that came along with the expansion of the field of study (see Baldi and Goodman 2015; Vink and Bauböck 2013 for remarkable exceptions) the idea of configuration of policies remained at the margins of scholarship's concern in more recent academic production too. Again, the research scope has been often delimited to specific areas of integration (as for Goodman 2010; Howard 2009; Joppke 2007). When, on the contrary, several policy areas are considered, contributions have favoured a synthetic outlook (e.g. Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Koopmans et al. 2012). The recent proliferation of indexes measuring integration policies says much to this regard. The quest for one and only measure synthesizing the whole range of integration policies is inherently antithetic to the idea of configuration of policies here introduced.¹⁶

That being said, the theoretical inheritance offered by the literature may be still fruitful for accompanying the exploratory aim of this study. The theoretical strands considered offer a rich theoretical ground inspiring our prior expectations about the configurations of policies that we might expect to characterize the current European scenario.

Working hypotheses

Moving from the operational characterization of CIP offered in the second section, it is possible to convert the general insights gathered from the literature into more precise working hypotheses. These do not point to the explanatory logic that each stream of theory implies, they simply refer to

¹⁶ Not to mention that in several cases the analytical focus is not placed on policies *stricto sensu*. If Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel (2012) confine their analysis to the sphere of rights, Banting and Kymlicka (2013) conflates these with institutional provisions, media outputs and funds; just to mention two notable examples.

the latter's capacity to describe the policy scenario; any causal claim is left aside yet. More precisely hence, given the descriptive nature of this study, the assumptions consist in descriptive predictions regarding: i) the grouping of countries sharing similar configurations of policies, ii) the policy areas with greater affinities, and iii) the degree of restrictiveness of such areas.

The first set of hypotheses derives from the national models apparatus. If its ideal-typical characterization still holds, different CIP are expected to be found: a CIP, matching the assimilationist model, marked by a favourable access to nationality while limiting other civic and political rights¹⁷; another CIP, corresponding to the pluralist model, characterized by open policies in all the policy areas concerned with integration, and a last CIP, consistent with the ethnic model, favouring labour integration while restricting access to the polity in terms of access to both citizenship and political rights. (Hypothesis 1). Despite the sharp critique received of being too simplistic (Finotelli and Michalowski 2012) and stereotyped (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012) and notwithstanding the classical country-prototypes (e.g. Germany and France) have experienced important policy changes, it cannot be ruled out the possibility that the typology applies to other cases. What is at issue, in other words, is a possible new correspondence between the “old” ethnic, assimilationist, and pluralist ideal-types with “new” country-prototypes.

The second set of hypotheses gets back to the typology of “regional regimes” offered by Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo (2016), who focus on structural variables. If their account holds true, different shared configurations of policies are expected to be found along the geographical

¹⁷ By definition access to nationality remains the main way of ensuring political participation, allowing naturalized immigrants to participate in the general elections. This said, it is possible to identify a different set of policies, such as those granting the rights to vote in local elections, targeting the political participation of immigrants that remains outside the citizenry.

lines dividing Southern, Central-Eastern and North-Western regions of Europe (Hypothesis 2). Note that this hypothesis does not necessarily contradict the former.

Finally, and partially in opposition to the former hypotheses if the theory of convergence applies, little variation and open policies are expected to mark policy configurations present in Europe today (Hypothesis 3). The hypothetical case of maximum convergence would coincide with a scenario of one-and-only CIP common to all countries, sharing the same kind of policies in all the areas. More realistically, if different policy configurations can be expected, two more detailed assumptions can be envisaged. Firstly, given the relevance attributed by this theory to the influence of the EU institutions, the distinction between CIP is expected to follow the evolutionary process of inclusion into the European Union, with “early” members distinguished by “new” one (Hypothesis 3a). Then, more open policies and attenuated differences between policy configurations, are expected to be observed in the areas where human rights issues are at stake as well as in those targeted by European directives, namely: labour, family, residence and antidiscrimination (Hypothesis 3b).¹⁸

¹⁸ The area of family is covered by the directive 2003/86/EC, the area of antidiscrimination by directive 2000/43/EC, and the area of residence by the directive 2003/109/EC. Multiple normative tools addressed the area of labour, including directives, 2009/50/EC, 2011/98/EU, 2014/36/EU, and 2014/66/EU. Note that Hypothesis 3b could have been split in two sub-hypotheses, one regarding the “human rights factor” and covering all European countries, and another related to European directives targeting only EU members. That said, considering that the study does not pursue any causal account about drivers of policy evolution, and given that such sub-hypotheses would refer, in practice, to the same policy areas and the same set of countries, they are considered in conjunction. Finally, given that great majority of countries considered are also EU members, and taking the logic of the hierarchical cluster analysis into account, no working hypothesis was developed regarding the distinction between EU and non-EU members.

1.4 Methods and data

Given the exploratory aim of the study, hierarchical cluster analysis¹⁹ appears as the best-suited analytical tool for examining shared configuration of policies. Using this technique, it is possible to evaluate the degree of similarity between various countries' frameworks of integration policies. "The advantage of hierarchical cluster analysis compared to non-hierarchical k-means cluster analysis is that we do not have to predetermine the number of clusters" (Castles and Obinger 2008, 328). The clustering obtained is data-driven and, thus, matches with the underlying purpose of this article to identify clusters as they occur (or fail to occur) in the real world. The analysis employs MIPEX data. In practice, MIPEX indicators empirically determine the number and the type of policy configurations, as well as which countries belong to each of them. In this way, clusters of countries, each one corresponding to a shared policy configuration of integration, can be investigated.

The original set of data includes 167 policy-indicators, organized in 8 areas of expertise, for 36 countries. If the aim is of capturing the latest picture of shared configurations of policies over the broadest range of areas, in the widest set of countries, MIPEX is probably the most appropriate dataset for it. Three main reasons justify the choice of this dataset: it is largely acknowledged as one of the widest, up-to-date, and most reliable dataset on integration policies (Ruedin 2011, 2015), it is highly correlated to other indexes (Helbling 2013), and its transparency and availability of the disaggregated data allows for fine-tuned adjustments according to aims of the study.

As for the latter, the original dataset was revised limiting the number of countries to European ones and reducing the number of indicators

¹⁹ In particular, the analysis will rely on Ward method, which computes the sum of squared distance within clusters and aggregate clusters with the minimum increase in the overall sum of squares.

excluding missing values. Besides, provided that the definition of CIP refers to “stable configuration of policies”, in order to avoid volatility due to episodic changes of policies, comparable waves of data were averaged together (i.e. 2012, 2013, 2014).²⁰


The revised version of the dataset covers 32 cases and includes 114 indicators, organized in 7 policy areas. For each policy area, a synthetic indicator was calculated and used as variable in the analysis. Such decision abides by the need to reduce the ratio of variables/case required by hierarchical clustering. In the building of the policy areas' indicators, the simple logic of averaging was followed, in line with MIPEX methodology. A *t*-test was computed in order to identify which variables contribute most to the distinctiveness of the clusters identified by the analysis. For $p \leq .05$ the test indicates that the policy area is significant for discriminating among clusters. Lastly, for the sake of robustness, the result obtained were contrasted with the outcomes of additional cluster analyses performed with 2012, 2013, and 2014 waves, considered individually.

²⁰ This applies apart from indicators referring to Croatia and Iceland, for which only the wave of 2014 and those of 2013 and 2014 were respectively available.

1.5 Findings


Based on the cluster analysis covering 7 policy areas' indicators, two-distinct configurations can be identified, consistent with statistical tests²¹ (Figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1. Configurations of integration policies in Europe. Countries' belonging to clusters



²¹ For deciding the numbers of clusters it was relied upon the Calinski–Harabasz and the Duda–Hart rules, widely used for Ward method. Distinct clustering is characterized by large Calinski–Harabasz pseudo-F values, large Duda–Hart $Je(2)/Je(1)$ values, and small Duda–Hart pseudo-T-squared values. The conventional wisdom for deciding the number of groups based on the Duda–Hart stopping-rule table is to find one of the largest $Je(2)/Je(1)$ values that corresponds to a low pseudo-T-squared value that has much larger T-squared values next to it. This strategy, combined with the results from the Calinski–Harabasz results, indicates that the two-groups solution is the most reliable for this hierarchical cluster analysis.

Figure 2. Configurations of integration policies. Constitutive areas.



CIP #1 covers 13 countries, all of which are located in the Eastern part of Europe: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Turkey. These states share a general restrictive strategy to deal with integration, especially as regard the areas of education, political participation and citizenship. On the other side, CIP #2 captures the strategies deployed by 19 countries. With exception of Estonia, all of these are located in different regions of Western Europe: Mediterranean region (i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), the “Mittle”-region (i.e. Austria, Germany, Switzerland), North-Western region (i.e. Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, UK), and Scandinavian region (broadly conceived including Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland). This configuration describes a more favourable strategy of integration

across all the areas, particularly committed to labour market incorporation.


At first sight, CIP #1's low scores on citizenship and political participation may suggest certain resemblance with the ethnic model. Yet, the lack of open policies targeting labour market makes reject such option. As understood by the national model argument, this model provides immigrants for an easy access to the labour market, granting them most of related social rights. A depiction that contrasts the strategy associated to the first cluster. This seems rather to match with the Central-Eastern regime depicted by Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo (2016). According to their argument, most of the states in this region share analogous historical trajectories, marked by a soviet past and small percentages of foreign population. In these countries, till the recent refugee crisis, immigrant integration did not represent a political issue in need of an articulate legislative response. Consequently, policy frameworks addressing integration may have remained likewise backward. That given, the theory of convergence could inspire an alternative interpretation. It should be noted, indeed, that the majority of countries of CIP #1 share the same timing of admission into the EU, settled by the Treaty of Accession in 2003. Yet, given the descriptive nature of this inquiry, it is hard to say whether the internal consistency of the Eastern model is attributable to a "delayed" entrance into the European Union, to geopolitical affinities characterizing this part of Europe, or to a combination of the two factors.

As for the second cluster, this seems to confute the descriptive predictions derived by the national model apparatus either. If the labour-oriented focus characterizing CIP #2 might resemble a distinctive feature of the ethnic model, the inclusion into the political community is not impermeable as such ideal-type would require. Countries in this cluster provide viable paths to naturalization while granting certain political rights to immigrants national residing in their territories. The classical

distinction between assimilationist, pluralist and ethnic regimes is far from evident. Their value as analytical tools for describing the current European scenario looks vanished both considering the whole set of countries, as well its classical representatives. France, the Netherlands, and Germany are classified in the same cluster: as pertain to their policy frameworks these countries seem to have more in common than elements distinguishing them. Note that for the cases of France and Germany, this applies even taking the three-clusters solution into account.²² Furthermore, considering the dimensions related to the inclusion into the political community – which was the original focus of scholars concerned with national traditions – France and Germany appear surprisingly closer to one another (Figure 3). Despite traditionally depicted as holding antipodal conceptions of nationhood, these countries show scores in the areas of citizenship and even more similar as regard political participation.

²² Although less reliable according to the Calinski–Harabasz and the Duda-Hart rules, this solution provides further evidence in rebuttal of the resilience of national models’ ideal-types in the current European scenario.

Figure 3. Focus: inclusion into the political community. Countries' distribution as for political participation and citizenship, over CIP of belonging




On the other hand, the existence of a “Western bloc” challenges the idea of regional regimes as designated by the literature. No significant differences distinguish Northern and Southern European countries. If we abide by the result of the clustering procedure, the typological distinction between Southern and Northern countries does not hold. Considering the whole set of policies targeting the incorporation of immigrants into their societies, Mediterranean and Scandinavian countries share more affinities than differences vis-à-vis the rest of the countries. A look at the cases of Sweden and Portugal, which present two of the most akin frameworks of integration (cf. Figure 5 in appendix), allows capturing such finding.

On the whole, the West/East cleavage emerges as a key outcome of the analysis. Other things being equal immigrant integration is easier on the left side of the Europe than on its right.

By looking further into differences between clusters, other interesting evidences come out. The variation between policies is unevenly distributed among policy areas (Figure 4). As pertains to the areas of family, residence and antidiscrimination, the two configurations are more similar to each other. This provides further support to the homogenizing pressures stressed by the theory of convergence. As for that of labour, it is precisely in the fields of policymaking covered by Community Directives and concerned with human rights issues where differences between CIPs vanish and more positive scores are found. Still, again, it is hard to say whether such results follow the legislative actions of the European institutions, a human rights commitment, or the joint effect of both drivers.

Figure 4. Countries scores' mean value and distribution according to areas, by CIP



The main differences among clusters pertain, instead, to the areas of labour, education, political participation and citizenship. In these areas the Eastern strategy is significantly more restrictive than the Western one. These evidences take into account both the mean value in every area, but also the distribution of countries' scores in each cluster. As confirmed by the *t*-test, the four areas where the main differences are found, are also those statistically significant for grouping countries in the Western and in the Eastern clusters (see Table 1 and Figures 5 in the appendix). This applies, especially, for the areas of citizenship and political participation. The chances to participate in the political life of the host country, whether ensured through an easy access to nationality or through the granting of other political rights (as the right to vote in local elections) are, for instance, greater in Portugal than in Turkey, and in Spain rather than Slovakia.

The theoretical expectations informing the study finds different responses from the empirical ground. National models seems to have lost its hold on the reality of the current European scenario. Differences between configurations of integration policies follow an imaginary geographical line separating Eastern countries from Western ones. This, on the one hand, confirms part of the typology described by Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo (2016), which is albeit contested by the absence of a North/South cleavage. On the other hand, it provides support for the theory of convergence. Except for Estonia, the West/East division may also be interpreted as a separation between early and new members of the European Union. Further endorsement to the hypotheses of isomorphism come from evidences regarding fields of policy: in the areas covered by European directives and where major human rights concerns are at stake, differences between policy configurations fade away.

Finally, it is worth to notice that the results emerged from the analysis match, almost entirely, with those gathered from cluster analysis carried out on single years (i.e. 2012, 2013, and 2014). Small changes are only observed in 2014. Whereas the West/East cleavage is confirmed, in this year the clustering procedure allocates France, Austria, Greece and Estonia to the “Eastern bloc”. Policy changes occurred in the last year look as plausible justifications for the “shift” of such countries in 2014.²³ On the whole, the supplementary analyses carried out with single waves of data provide valuable robustness checks, increasing the overall reliability of the study.

²³ In the main analysis France, Austria, Greece and Estonia are the countries of the Western cluster closest to Eastern one (cf. Figures 5 in appendix). This makes them “borderline cases” more susceptible of changes in the clustering procedure.

1.6 Discussion

The current scenario of integration policies in Europe is rather heterogeneous, measures vary substantially between countries and depending on the area taken into account. The present study has addressed such variation keeping a holistic view on the policy sector of integration. This was done by introducing the idea of configuration of integration policies, an analytical tool that captures the levels of restrictiveness of policy frameworks deployed by host countries. The ultimate purpose of the study was to employ such theoretical construct to assess similarities among states' strategies of integration.

The hierarchical cluster analysis carried out on the latest MIPEX waves shows that, today, there are two main strategies of immigrant integration in Europe. These strategies are shared by different number of countries on the Western and on the Eastern part of Europe. Each of them represents a distinct way of incorporating immigrants into the host society. The Western configuration stands for a broad positive approach, particularly propitious towards labour market incorporation. The Eastern one represents a more restrictive strategy, especially as pertains to the areas of citizenship and political participation: here, tough naturalization paths and few political rights keep immigrants out of the host political community. Foreigners' admission into national polity appears as one of the core dimensions for distinguishing between strategies of integration in Europe. The traditional question of the democratic boundaries of membership seems, still, to divide states' ways of approaching integration. Further important differences pertain to the spheres of labour and education, the two other classical cornerstones of integration. It is in the areas of policy addressing such dimensions of the integration process in which most of the variation between CIPs is observed. The West/East division could be attributed to several competing drivers, among which stand the historical

experience with the phenomenon of international migration as well as the dynamics of European enlargement. In this regard, the Eastern CIP appears marked by relevant contradictions. While in many of its policy areas it is possible to catch sight of the “liberalizing” effect of the European directives, strictly linked to the inclusion of Eastern countries in the European Union, its restrictive approach in other core areas of integration seems to reflect the lack of “maturity” with immigrants’ incorporation.

Despite its synchronic character made impossible a thoughtful evaluation of the explanatory rationales of the theoretical strands considered – all which rest on the temporal dimension – the analysis allows shedding light on the margins and the directions of theoretical refinement. A cross-national “picture” taken at given moment in time still provides interesting intuitions in this regard: national models ideal-types seem to have made room for new regional one, cut across by isomorphic trends of convergence.

The contribution of this study does not lie in its probative value, though. Its main contribution lies, instead, in offering a new analytical standpoint for assessing integration policies in comparative terms. To date, research in the field has tended to follow approaches either focused on single areas of policies or oriented towards synthesis. However, the increasing diversification of integration policies seems requiring a different perspective. If the multidimensionality of the process of integration makes necessary a complex and manifold response from the legislators, the study of this response should be consistent with such complexity. This calls for a holistic approach considering the various areas of policymaking concerned with integration. By introducing the concept of CIP, this study wanted to move a first step in this direction.

This said, the potential applicability of the CIP may go beyond the scope of this study, centred on the “rules of the game” set at national level. By

means of more ambitious operationalization procedures, indeed, the conceptual scope might be stretched to include areas of policymaking remained outside the operationalization procedure followed (i.e. culture and religion), others almost underexplored by the literature (e.g. health or housing), or by taking into exam measures arranged at different levels of governance (widening the spectrum of political actors covered). On the same line, the boundaries of the reference population could be extended by considering policies targeting asylum seekers, refugees, and/or irregular immigrants. These possible developments are as promising as challenging, given that they would imply combining and rescaling disaggregated data coming from different sources.

These remarks point to some of the limitation of the current research regarding the dataset employed in the analysis. The MIPEX dataset has indeed a few hidden flaws related to its construction. Firstly, it is based on expert survey, which is a source that might raise objections for relying on subjective assessments. A second drawback concerns the lack of a theoretically informed weighting scheme: MIPEX follows the simplest logic of averaging between indicators' scores and this has crucial implications for the outcomes of the analysis. Finally, it is worth noticing its normative essence: indicators do not merely capture policies' level of restrictiveness, but rather the extent to which they enable "equal" integration to immigrants, compared to rights and opportunities of the native population. While circumscribing the scope of the present study, all this seems to indicate that the room for improvement the quantitative assessment of immigrant integration policies is still wide.

The other and most important limitation of the present research pertains to its static character. While outlining shared policy configurations, indeed, the study does not say nothing about their evolution. Have CIPs evolved over time? Or, contrariwise, have they remained substantially unvaried? If some changes have taken place, do they head toward more or less

convergence across countries? In which policy areas convergence is taking place and where, on the contrary, national distinctiveness is observed? Such questions leave wide room for a variety of empirical replies, either relying on the same dataset or heading towards other sources of data. Given the low degree of comparability across the whole set of MIPEX waves, and being the latter the broadest dataset available, both kinds of responses would thus imply a significant reduction of the number of cases and of policy indicators. The trade-off between the range of cases and the time span appears as another crucial tasks for future research concerned with the quantitative comparison of integration policies.

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







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Appendix









Table 1. Configurations of integration policies in Europe. Characterizing features

		Labour	Family	Education	Pol.Part.	Res.	Citi.	Antid.
CIP #1 (BG CY CZ HR HU LT LV MT PL RO SI SK TU)	mean	47.521	58.547	26.690	19.316	52.137	31.061	58.618
	sd	14.396	12.254	12.255	11.016	11.431	11.862	17.365
	min	16.667	35.417	4.545	0.000	27.778	8.333	33.333
	max	63.333	84.028	40.909	33.333	63.889	59.091	88.889
CIP #2 (AT BE CH DE DK EE ES FI FR GR IE IS IT LU NL NO PT SE UK)	mean	72.632	59.795	54.585	56.959	59.747	49.960	61.940
	sd	16.692	16.223	16.004	18.918	10.662	17.553	22.906
	min	36.667	34.028	27.273	20.000	38.889	11.364	0.000
	max	96.667	89.583	81.818	81.667	83.333	81.818	100.000
	<i>T</i> - test	0.0100 *	0.8159	0.0000*	0.0000*	0.0636	0.0020*	0.6615






Figure 5. Countries' distribution per policy areas, over CIP of belonging



● CIP #1 ▲ CIP #2 ○ mean #1 △ mean #2



● CIP #1 ▲ CIP #2 ○ mean #1 △ mean #2



● CIP #1 ▲ CIP #2 ○ mean #1 △ mean #2

2. ASSESSING THE SPANISH CONCEPTION OF CITIZENSHIP. IDEAS AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN SPAIN

Abstract

The long-lasting continuity of its citizenship regime makes Spain a puzzling case for the literature on immigration and immigrant policies. The present article accounts for such puzzle by looking at the ideational substratum held by the ruling political elite. The analysis shows that the areas of meaning in which parties' views overlap have represented the tracks driving the evolution of country's nationality laws. By focusing of ideas this study offers a new analytical and less deterministic perspective on the politics of citizenship in Spain, complementing the explanatory backdrop offered by Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes (2012) in their IMR contribution.

2.1 Nationality laws in Spain, a puzzling case

The Spanish migratory profile is unique: in about three decades this country has moved from being an emigration country to an immigration one. From mid of the 18th century to the 1970s a few millions of Spaniards left the country, first following the colonial route to Latin America and then, since the 1960s, favoring European destinations. Thereafter Spain's net migration rate has steadily grown: gradually in the 1980s and rapidly after the mid-1990s, fueled by the arrival of people coming from non-EU countries. In the first decade of the 21st century the country experienced one of the largest waves of immigration in world, which raised its foreign

population from 2% (2000) to 12% (2010). Increasingly in the limelight of the public and political concern, immigration became the target of an intense proliferation of policy measures (Zapata-Barrero, Gonzalez, and Sanchez-Montijano 2008). According to the DEMIG POLICY database (DEMIG 2015) from 2000 to 2013 the Spanish legislator has put into effect 104 measures addressing that phenomenon, covering a widening spectrum of areas. However, some areas have received less attention than others, such as in the case of citizenship.²⁴

Spain's citizenship regime was set by the Law 51/1982. This reform of the civil code affirmed *jus sanguinis* as the core principle ruling the acquisition of nationality, *de jure* prohibited double nationality, and established a general requirement of ten-year residence for naturalization. The law also provided certain elements of *ius soli*, which is granted both to those born in Spain if one at least one their parents is also born in Spain and to those at risk of statelessness (i.e. parents are stateless, the former nationality is not automatically transmitted, or when filiation is unknown). At the same time the reform identified three privileged foreign-groups: emigrants (and their progenies), citizens of the former colonial empire (i.e. Ibero-American countries, Andorra, Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, Portugal) and Sephardic Jews. All of them enjoy a favorable treatment in the acquisition and loss of Spanish nationality. Compared to the standard requirements, for instance, emigrants' descendants can rely on easier conditions for the recovery of Spanish nationality whereas people coming from former colonies and Sephardic Jews are asked only two years of residence to apply for naturalization against the general condition of ten years. From then on, the area of nationality has presented a high degree of stability (Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes (2012). Main changes were

²⁴ In the period 2000-2013 five policy-measures on nationality have been approved (see the Laws 36/2002, 40/2006, and 52/2007) added to which it is worth noticing the other issued in 2015 by the Law 12/2015 and the Law 19/2015.

introduced by the Law 18/1990, which reduced the residence requirement to 5 years for refugees and restricted the conditions for residence-based naturalization through marriage. On the whole yet, the system has remained strongly anchored in its emigration past and colonial history (Rubio Marín et al. 2015), keeping *ius sanguinis* at its core and preserving (or even fostering in some cases) the preferential regulation for emigrants and their descendants, for citizens of the former colonial empire and for Sephardic Jews.

Policy stagnation in the area of nationality is quite puzzling vis-à-vis the increasing foreign population living in the country and given the expanding policymaking activity in the broad sector of immigrant integration. In their *IMR* contribution Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes (2012) – to date the main empirical inquiry on the matter – trace this fact down to a “political culture” inherited from the past which “while expanding an ethno-nationalistic view of Spanish citizenship, pays little attention to citizenship rights for immigrant population” (Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes 2012, 650). However, while offering a sharp account of Spanish citizenship laws, their work did not delve into the meaning of such political culture.

This study aims at filling this gap by investigating the *Spanish conception of citizenship*. That means assessing the ideational substratum underlying the way in which political elite think about the fundamental relation of the state with its citizens (and thus with non-citizens), the boundaries of the political community and the quality of its openness (those favored to be included and those not). This set of ideas will be appraised in its evolution over time and looking at differences across parties, identifying its role in influencing political stasis. In doing so the article speaks to the broad debate by the scholarship concerned with immigration policies, contributing to its emerging stream of research on ideas (e.g. Antonsich 2016; Boswell and Hampshire 2017; Vollmer 2014). In the enduring

discussion on national models the so-called new immigration countries still deserve further empirical inquiry and theoretical speculation. A careful inspection of beliefs and values that “make up” the Spanish conception of citizenship contributes at fillings these gaps while offering a dynamic way of thinking about continuity in the Spanish politics of citizenship in the country, complementing the historical account offered by Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes (2012).

The following section goes through a review of the literature on citizenship and integration policies, clarifying the contribution of the study in this regard. Section three presents the methods and techniques of analysis followed as well as its epistemological underpinnings. The empirical results are outlined in the fourth section. Here parties’ views on citizenship are evaluated comparatively and diachronically. The conclusive remarks reflect on the theoretical and empirical value of the study.

2.2 Ideas and the politics of citizenship

“Citizenship”, in everyday language and in the legal jargon, designates an individual’s belonging to a state (Costa 2005).²⁵ In a fully static world such relationship would not be a matter of special concern for national politics: all people born in a country would remain its citizens for their entire lives and the same would apply to their children, and so on for the subsequent generations. A scenario that has nothing to do with contemporary reality marked by high trans-national mobility. By creating a disconnection between the territory and the constituent population, international migrations tense the relationship between the individual and the state and trouble the politics of citizenship. The national legislator is

²⁵ Notwithstanding the variety of meanings and uses of the terms “citizenship” and “nationality”, this research treats them as synonyms and in the narrow sense of a legal status linking the individual to the state.

called to answer fundamental questions regarding how to ensure the state's intergenerational continuity; namely to decide about the modes of transmission of citizenship (i.e. by descent, via birthplace, and through naturalization), the modes of its loss and the degree of its exclusivity (Vink and Bauböck 2013). This means, for instance, to decide whether to favor emigrants' progenies over those of immigrants (and to what extent), to do the opposite, or to decide for both. It implies choosing the way to deal with immigrants willing to acquire the nationality and to decide if these must renounce to their previous one.

Historically, the answers given by the states to these questions varied substantially and, despite recent trends of convergence (Goodman 2010; Joppke 2007), today there is still substantial cross-national variation of citizenship regimes (Vink and Bauböck 2013). To account for such variation scholars have often turned to the explanatory power of ideas, broadly referred to as political elite's values and beliefs on the boundaries of the political community and about how to cope with the diversity that immigration implies (Goodman 2012; Rubio Marín et al. 2015).

In the field of study on citizenship and integration policies, scholars' approach to ideas has traditionally followed historical and sociological institutionalisms, stressing the role played by self-reinforcing historical paths and all-defining cultural norms (Schmidt 2008). Brubaker, one of the main proponents of historical institutionalism, put forth the notion of idiom of nationhood to explain differences between nationality laws in France and Germany. On such basis, Adrian Favell (1998) elaborated the concept of philosophy of integration and clarified the diverse evolutions of citizenship regimes in France and the UK. Following the author, closer to sociological institutionalism, these two similar-cases bring about different institutional models of immigrant integration due to different sets of beliefs about what holds the nation together. These seminal studies introduced what will be later known as the classical national models

typology (Castles 1995; Jacobs and Rea 2007) according to which: Germany embodies the “ethnic model”, due to its blood-based citizenship regime excluding long-term permanent foreigner residents from naturalization; France stands for the “republican model”, with its emphasis on immigrants’ assimilation and a citizenship regime rooted in *jus soli*; and the British and the Dutch cases represents the “pluralist model” encouraging multiculturalism along with a shared national identity (Castles and Miller 2009). Despite it has kept on enlarging its conceptual spectrum – as, for instance, with Mouritsen’s (2012) “Leitkultur” or Brochmann and Seland (2010) ideas of nationhood – the national model argument was called into question by the turn of the countries towards analogous civic solutions occurred at the turn of the century.

Germany breached its system of *jus sanguinis* by introducing conditional citizenship rights based upon birth on its territory, while pluralist countries began a self-critical appraisal of their multiculturalist approaches and introduced policy measures heading toward civic integration. Analogous measures were arranged in France, which came from a different tradition. These are only the most renowned cases of a broader tendency among Western states to implement similar “civic tools” for incorporating immigrants, including loyalty oaths, integration contracts, and tests of competences in the language, history and values of the host country. As described by its main proponent, Christian Joppke (2007; 2008) the “civic turn”²⁶ is the result of states’ retreat from multiculturalism and assimilation and their shared commitment to liberal

²⁶ The civic turn represented a moment of deep academic reflection and proliferation. The quest for convergence steered political scientists towards a quantitative assessment of integration policies so that various projects were settled comparing a broad range of countries with the aim of evaluating trends of isomorphism vis-à-vis the resilience of national models. The contributions provided by Banting and Kymlicka (2013), Goodman (2010), Howard (2009), and Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel (2012) represent the most prominent examples to this regard.

values and to an individualized conception of citizenship deprived of its ethnic content. This goes along with a transformation of the nation from an ethno-cultural into a civic construct along the lines of Habermas constitutional patriotism (Antonsich 2016). While gearing their concern from differences towards similarities scholars have not taken leave of ideas, still under the guise of classical institutionalisms. Drivers of convergence are thus located both at national and supranational levels (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012). Among the latter, it is emphasized the diffusion of human rights norms and the homogenizing effect of supranational institutions (Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes 2013; Hollifield 2000; Sassen 1996). As for the former, scholars underline the role played by the spread of liberal-democratic principles within domestic political arenas, driven by national courts and constitutional provisions (Joppke 2001; 2010).

Disputing Joppke's claim latest research has pointed to national distinctiveness in the adoption of similar policy measures, investigating how national idiosyncrasies as regard the way of making and thinking policies tap into wide dynamics of isomorphism of an increasingly interconnected world. While two states can decide to adopt the same policy tools different rationales could justify such decisions. Britain, for instance, has used civic integration tools to craft a higher restrictive regime of integration while Germany has used the same instruments in more permissive ways (Goodman 2012). The heterogeneity of rationalities that lie beyond the adoption of similar measures, again, is attributed to different system of beliefs, ideas and values held by the ruling political elite in dealing with immigrants' incorporation. All this has come along with the emerging acknowledgement of ideas as an empirical subject to be studied in its own right. Left behind historical and sociological institutionalisms, at least in their conventional acceptations, scholars have headed towards discursive (Schmidt 2008; 2010) or constructivist

institutionalism (Hay 2007), focusing on how ideational factors engage with existing institutions, structures, and political dynamics, and developing more complex framework to account for the institutional evolution of citizenship regimes (see, for instance, Winter 2014). Scholars' propinquity to ideas goes beyond the area of citizenship and covers the full set of policies targeting immigration (Boswell and Hampshire 2017). Bonjour (2011) and Van Walsum (2011), in their brilliant historical analyses, pinpoint the key role played by moral considerations in the evolution of family reunification policies in the Netherlands. Bleich (2003) demonstrates that frames best account for race policies in Britain and France whereas Vollmer (2014) illuminates on the archeology of ideas underlying measures targeting irregular migrants in Germany and the UK.

This said, "the geographical scope" of such growing field of study does not match with the breadth of its conceptual spectrum. To date, when speaking of idioms of nationhood or of public philosophies of integration, to mention the most renowned terms, the attention has been given to countries with a long-lasting experience with the phenomenon of international migration, namely central and northern European countries along with Canada and the US. The so called new immigration countries, especially those of southern Europe, have remained mostly overlooked by such theoretical approach. The present study contributes at filling this gap by focusing on the case of Spain.

If, as the national model argument maintains, nation states develop and mobilize certain national imaginaries in response to the increase of the foreign population and to the need to regulate its relationship with the national political community, it is compelling to wonder what is about the imaginary of one of the countries that has experienced the most intense growth of immigration in the last decades. Two additional reasons make the Spanish case even more interesting. Firstly, a conception of citizenship

that would difficulty draw upon a shared and dense national identity; as, on the contrary, the literature has found in old immigration countries (Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998). Despite the construction of a Spanish identity in the 19th and 20th centuries, Spain has indeed remained a multinational country (see Gagnon and Tully 2011; Requejo 2005). The claim for independence recently asserted by the regional government of Catalonia it is sufficient to understand that is still hard to speak of a common national identity in the country. The crucial question is, thus, about which other ideational elements will make up for such “lack” in the imaginary of the ruling political elite when citizenship is at stake. To this regard, it is worth noticing that the regionalist parties, which hold competing national-building projects and distinct views on immigrants’ integration (Hepburn 2009; Franco-Guillén 2016), play a key role in national politics and their role has often resulted indispensable for forming government (Magone 2008). The second issue pertains to the recent adoption of civic tools for regulating the path to naturalization. The Law 19/2015 reformed the old procedure, in which the loosely defined “degree of integration” was assessed through interviews by the local judges, making room to compulsory tests evaluating knowledge of Spanish, the constitutional norms, and the culture of the country. Following the insights offered by Joppke (2008; 2010), the “Spanish civic turn” makes reasonable to wonder about a possible de-ethnicization of citizenship and, thus, about a potential turn in the “political culture” described by Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes (2012).

To date these puzzling matters related to the Spanish conception of citizenship have remained almost overlooked in the literature. The few empirical contributions on the politics of citizenship in Spain have remained rather distant to the world of ideas. Or, when have drawn near it, they have loosened their grip on the area of nationality. On the one hand Finotelli and La Barbera (2013) provide interesting insights on the

evolution of nationality laws in the country, but their inquiry does not delve into an appraisal of the underlying conception of citizenship. On the other, Gil Araújo (2006) and Zapata-Barrero (2009) touch on ideas while discussing the existence of a Spanish philosophy of integration, but they refer to the broad sector of integration, barely mentioning the area of citizenship. Given a federal system in which regional governments are responsible for all key policy targeting integration (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011), their analyses have much more to do with conceptions of integration held by sub-state actors rather than with the understanding of citizenship held by the national political elite. The study mentioned in the introduction by Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes (2012) represents the main perspective on the matter. According to them, the lack of parties' interests in reforming nationality and a "political culture" derived from Spain's colonial past account for the high degree of stability of its citizenship regime. Drawing on rational-choice and historical institutionalisms' underpinnings, their analysis provides a sophisticated account of the parties' structure of incentives regarding nationality laws and of the stringent logic of path-dependency underlying its evolution over time. However, almost nothing is said about how the boundaries of the political community and the relationship between the state and its demos are discussed and shaped. My intention is to make a step further in this sense delving into the meaning of such political culture and, while spelling out its ideational substratum, offering a more dynamic account of continuity in the Spanish politics of citizenship.

2.3 Methodology

To comply with such challenges the study followed a ideational-institutionalist approach to the study of policymaking (Campbell 2002;

Parsons 2016; Schmidt 2008; Schmidt 2010; Jacobs 2015).²⁷ Accordingly, policymaking is understood as a social practice with a discursive basis: eventually it is through written and spoken words that actors carry out such process and it is by means of discourse that they legitimize and justify their decisions. The scope of analysis covers coordinative political discourse (Schmidt 2008) that takes place in the national parliament, which represents the empirical substratum thorough which gather ideational elements characterizing the Spanish conception of citizenship (Jacobs 2009). The policymaking process is thus circumscribed to its stages of agenda-setting, policy formulation and decision-making (Jann and Wegrich 2007): from the moment in which a political matter is acknowledged to the moment in which policymakers take a decision about the course of action to undertake (usually coinciding with the parliamentary approval/refusal of a concrete measure). The lapse of time considered covers the history of the country from its transition to democracy, ratified by the approval of the Constitution (1978) to the present days (June 2017). This broad temporal perspective allows a careful assessment of the evolution of Spanish political elite's way(s) of thinking nationality along both its path to emancipation and its shift from being an emigration country to an immigration one, capturing shared and contrasting elements across political parties.

The corpus of texts considered is made of the transcriptions of all parliamentary debates concerned with citizenship matters.²⁸ Table 1

²⁷ This term is used as a common label embracing the most common ones of discursive institutionalism, by Schmidt (Schmidt 2008, 2010), and constructivist institutionalism by Hay (2007) and Béland and Cox (2011). It is worth noticing that, while pursuing theoretical clarity, the juxtaposition of ideational-institutionalism *versus* older institutionalisms does not do justice to the contributions mentioned, which often embrace distinct approaches.

²⁸ Over the first decade of the 21st century Spain has introduced visa requirements for citizens of several Latin American countries. Despite linked to nationality matters, such policy changes aimed at inflows control and were arranged within the broad visa harmonization called by European Union (Ayuso and Sanchez-

provides a list of the bills proposals and laws considered. All documents were analyzed by using inductive conventional qualitative content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Winter 2014) to identify the most important themes brought forth in the debate as well as similarities and differences among parties' rhetorical strategies. In all the bill-cases in which the empirical material gathered through the debates in the Congress was believed insufficient to meet the aims of the analysis, Senate debates were considered. The analysis covers all political parties' view on citizenship. Still, special attention is paid to the two main parties of the country: the right-wing party *Partido Popular* (PP, Popular Party) and the center-left party *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers' Party).

Table 1. Nationality Laws and Bills in Spain, 1978 – 2017

Approval	Incumbent	Proponent	Measure	Reference
1981	PP	PP	Law 51/1982	<i>Ley 51/1982 de reforma de los artículos 17 al 26 del Código Civil (Nacionalidad)</i>
1990	PSOE	PSOE	Law 18/1990	<i>Ley 18/1990 sobre la reforma del Código Civil en materia de nacionalidad</i>
1995	PSOE	PSOE	Law 29/1995	<i>Ley 29/1995 de por la que se modifica el Código Civil en materia de recuperación de la nacionalidad</i>
1996	PP	IU	Proposed bill (rejected)	<i>Proposición de Ley de modificación del Código Civil en materia de nacionalidad (122/000018)</i>
1996	PP	PSOE	Proposed bill (rejected)	<i>Proposición de Ley sobre modificación del Código Civil en materia de nacionalidad. (122/000048)</i>

Montijano 2012). For these reasons parliamentary debated related to such measures have been excluded from the corpus.

1996	PP	IU	Proposed bill (removed)	<i>Proposición no de Ley relativa a la concesión de la nacionalidad española a los excombatientes de las Brigadas Internacionales. (161/000081)</i>
1999	PP	IU	Proposed bill (rejected)	<i>Proposición de Ley de modificación del Código Civil en materia de adquisición y recuperación de la nacionalidad (122/000232)</i>
1999	PP	PSOE	Proposed bill (rejected)	<i>Proposición de Ley sobre modificación del Código Civil en materia de nacionalidad. (122/000246)</i>
2000	PP	PSOE	Proposed bill (rejected)	<i>Proposición de Ley sobre modificación del Código Civil en materia de nacionalidad. (122/000003)</i>
2001	PP	PSOE	Proposed bill (removed)	<i>Previsiones acerca de presentar un Proyecto de Ley que regule la materia de la nacionalidad. (181/000504)</i>
2001	PP	BNG	Proposed bill (approved with modification)	<i>Proposición no de Ley sobre la adopción de medidas para facilitar la obtención o recuperación de la nacionalidad española de los emigrantes españoles y sus descendientes [...] (161/000434)</i>
2002	PP	BNG	Proposed bill (rejected)	<i>Proposición no de Ley relativa a visado de los descendientes de emigrantes. (161/001444)</i>
2001	PP	PP	Law 36/2002	<i>Ley 36/2002 sobre modificación del Código Civil en materia de nacionalidad.</i>
2006	PSOE	PSOE	Law 40/2006	<i>Ley 40/2006 del Estatuto de la ciudadanía española en el exterior.</i>
2007	PSOE	PSOE	Law 52/2007	<i>Ley 52/2007 por la que se reconocen y amplían derechos y se establecen medidas en favor de quienes padecieron persecución o violencia durante la Guerra Civil y la Dictadura.</i>
2011	PSOE	PSOE	Law 20/2011	<i>Ley 20/2011 del Registro Civil.</i>

2014	PP	PP	Law 12/2015	<i>Ley 12/2015 en materia de concesión de la nacionalidad española a los sefardíes originarios de España.</i>
2015	PP	PP	Law 19/2015	<i>Ley 19/2015 de medidas de reforma administrativa en el ámbito de la Administración de Justicia y del Registro Civil.</i>

2.4 The Spanish conception of citizenship, an empirical appraisal

The political discourse analyzed shows substantial uniformity over the period considered. Parties' views of citizenship have remained essentially untouched by the important socio-demographic transformation of the country and, moreover, they resemble in several dimensions. Resistant to change, such common traits emerge as the constitutive elements of the Spanish conception of citizenship: a dense and stable way of thinking the relationship between the Spanish state and its citizenry.

The former and foremost of those elements regards the framing of citizenship as mainly a diaspora-related matter. This, in terms of discourse, does not only take the shape of the memories of the Spanish past as an emigration country, but it includes also explicit references to the future: migrants are considered a “key social capital on which building the future of the country” (Law 40/2006). All the parties share a firm concern for safeguarding emigrants' needs, favor their return and strengthen state's link with them; and the area of nationality represents the domain of policymaking in which such concerns are believed to deserve an answer in terms of policy.

“The Popular Party clearly defines an objective when it wants to modify the Civil Code on issues related to nationality. [...]

We believe that our essential commitment, which I think is well-founded too, is with emigration and its descendants.” (Muñoz Uriol, PP - Congress, 5 February 2002, 6801)

"We [think about] establishing a procedure allowing nationality acquisition to those emigrants' descendants that were not taken into consideration by the laws.” (Silva Rego, PSOE – Congress, 20 November 2014, 70)

Regionalist parties²⁹ tend to share this view and, in some cases, they have even been the leading proponent of reforms aimed at easing emigrants' access to citizenship.

“[Targeting emigrants' progenies by] the way of Immigration Law is alienation, it's like considering grandchildren as strangers to the State, while what we request, and for what we proposed amendments during the whole processing, is to considers them as proper citizens.” (Uría Etxebarria, PNV – Congress, 24 September 2002, 17990)

The prominence of the emigration-nationality nexus inside the political discourse hinges upon an institutional architecture particularly sensitive to emigrants' claims. This refers on the one hand to the discursive space “reserved” for them inside the parliamentary arena. A quick look at the time dedicated to the interventions of emigration's representatives in the proceedings of the Law 40/2006 on the Statute of Spanish Citizenship Abroad³⁰ is sufficient to have an idea of such fact. On the other hand, those claims also resonate within parties' organizational structures, which

²⁹ This is particularly the case of *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV, Basque Nationalist Party), *Bloque Nacionalista Galego* (BNG, Galician Nationalist Bloc, BNG) and *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC, Republican Left of Catalonia).

³⁰ The full list of interventions and their content at: http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Iniciativas?_piref73_2148295_73_1335437_1335437.next_page=/wc/servidorCGI&CMD=VERLST&BASE=IWI8&FMT=INITXLSS.fmt&DOCS=1-25&DOCORDER=FIFO&QUERY=%28121%2F000075*.EXPO.%29 [Accessed March 1, 2017]

often include a branch dedicated to emigration. This is the case of the Law 18/1990, whose proposal was developed by the Secretary of Emigration of the Socialist party canalizing emigrants' demands.

Quite surprisingly, while immigration was affirming itself as a structural dimension of the country, policymaker's stand on nationality has remained essentially unvaried. Most of the parties have been rather indifferent to the growing relevance of the immigration phenomenon, keeping it away from the meaning of citizenship. Despite favorable stances to promote foreigner inclusion into the host society, the process of integration has little to do with the boundaries of the citizenry in the political imaginary.

“One thing is the phenomenon of immigration and another thing is the debate on nationality; they are not two concepts that necessarily have to come together ... To ground a reform of nationality on [im]migration phenomenon does not seem to us to be right”. (Jordano Salinas, PP - Congress, 14 December 1999, 15072)

Such general attitude of the legislator goes along with an enduring preference for *jus sanguinis* over *jus soli*. The idea of ensuring the continuity of the state looking first at kinship cuts across the parliamentary arena and typically involves giving priority to the rights of blood over the rights of soil, especially when the latter comes to restrain the former.

“Nationality requires a relationship with the State, which we consider insufficient in the cases of birth in Spanish territory from legal resident parents” (Silva Sanchez, CiU – Congress 20 June 2000, 565).

“We believe that to maintaining the concept of *ius sanguinis* in our order is predominant with respect to *ius soli*.” (Muñoz Uriol, PP - Congress, 20 May 2002, 15910)

“If we want to open the doors to the Spaniards’ grandchildren and granddaughters to opt for [Spanish nationality], we will have to remove the requirement of being born in Spain because almost all of them, children of emigrants, were born outside our country.” (Villarubia Mediavilla, PSOE – Congress, 20 May 2002, 15915)

Parties’ views on citizenship also coincide in their interest for two “historical groups”: foreigners coming from former colonies, mostly represented by Latin Americans, and Sephardic Jews; both acknowledged as having a special relationship with Spain. In the former case, such tie is usually assumed as a core and legitimate pillar of the country’s citizenship regime without explicit mention to historical and cultural affinities. The notion of *Hispanidad*, a term rooted in the colonial past of the country (Alvarez Rodriguez 2010) embracing cultural proximity, common religious roots, and historical ties between newly independent Latin American countries and Spain (Zapata Barrero and Garcés Mascareñas 2010) finds no room in the corpus of text analyzed.³¹ The special bond tying Latin Americans and Spain looks more like a legacy of the past taken for granted, rather than a proper political concern. When it comes to the latter, rhetorical strategies change: identity and cultural elements are better spelled out, often along with precise historical connotations. Despite certain variation as pertains to the number of historical groups deserving a privileged treatment – PSOE and IU have often stood up for Morisco and Saharan populations – all the parties acknowledge the need to honor and reward Sephardic Jews for the injustices suffered during the *Reconquista*.

“We want this law recognizing nationality to Sephardic Jews to be approved to solve a historical injustice with the Spanish Jews. We want it to be approved. We believe it is a just

³¹ Only one reference was found, by Cabanilla Gallas (PP), and it dates back to the first reform of civil code in 1982.

cause.” (Silva Rego, PSOE – Congress, 20 November 2014, 71)

“The sense of the law is, in some way, to recognize, to honor, to accommodate among us, all those who, in a truly incredible way throughout the centuries, and despite having been so unjustly excluded from living among the Spaniards, have maintained their traditions, have maintained the language, have maintained their cultural roots, have maintained the spiritual bond with Spain.” (Elorriaga Pisarik, PP – Congress, 25 March 2015, 13)

On the whole, the idea of “special link with Spain” (*especial vinculación con España*) emerges as the key concept underlying the Spain conception of citizenship. This is transversally mobilized by political parties to justify privileges in the access to nationality, whether to diasporas or to specific historical communities.

Beyond this common ideational ground lie competing parties’ views, where the one of *Izquierda Unida* (IU, United Left), stressing the relevance of nationality as a tool for accommodating diversity and for favoring immigrants’ integration, represents the most liberal and plural:

“You [...] have to understand that Spain is plural, is broad and increasingly *mestiza*; that Spain is white, black, Asian, mulatto; that Spain is Christian, agnostic, Muslim, Hebrew; that Spain is homosexual, heterosexual, bisexual. This must be understood vis-à-vis some very delicate and current matters [...] as are the issues of immigration and nationality in this moment.” (Alcaraz Masats, IU - Congress, 5 May 2002, 6803)

By contrast PP’s vision represents the most restrictive and backward looking, focused on the emigration-nationality nexus, often including security concerns. Somewhere in between these two, certainly closer to IU’s stand, we find PSOE’s view, sensitive to the new immigration reality

(particularly for European foreigners) and inclined to use nationality as a tool to compensate for the injustices of the Francoist period.

“This new reality has to be addressed by promoting the participation and the development of civil and social rights, avoiding exclusion and fostering integration along with collective well-being, enhancing tolerance and accepting the plurality and the dignity of the people. [...] Nationality rules represent an area that [...] has still to be developed.”
(Villarrubia Mediavilla, PSOE – Congress, 14 December 1999, 15067)

This said, PSOE's proximity to IU's stands must be qualified. These parties' views on nationality get much closer indeed when both sat in the opposition than when the former is in government. In the 1990s, when both were opposition parties, they have put forward similar bill-proposals aimed at liberalizing naturalization (all of which were rejected by the PP ruling majorities). However, when the Socialist party takes office, its concern for *jus soli* seems to fade away and the party's view turns back to the mainstream interest for emigrants. It is no coincidence that the reforms of nationality brought about by a Socialist government with IU's support have had always to do with diaspora. The so called “Law of Historic Memory” (Law 52/2007), which ensured citizenship rights to the progenies of Spanish exiles who fled during the Civil War and the dictatorship, is probably the most famous legislative output in this regard. This looks like the core evidence emerging from the analysis: policy changes in nationality laws have always concerned the shared elements of the Spanish conception of nationality. That is: a favorable attitude towards diasporas – testified by measures issued by both center-left (i.e. Law 18/1990, Law 29/1995, Law 40/2006, Law 52/2007) and right-wing governments (i.e. Law 51/1982, Law 36/2002) and a special concern for particular historical communities – which finds a response, for instance, in

the recent law (Law 12/2015) addressing Sephardic Jews. What is done in terms of policies accords with what is shared in national politics in terms of values and beliefs. In this sense, the areas of meaning in which different parties' views overlap seem to drive the development of the country's citizenship regime.

A final remark deserves the latest reform introduced by the Law 19/2015. The Seventh final provision of the bill introduced compulsory language and civic tests for naturalization, substituting the previous system based on local judges' interviews. While in other countries, such as in the well-known cases of France, Germany and the UK, the introduction of civic tools has generated public and political debates (Carrera 2006; Mouritsen 2012) in Spain a similar reorganization of the naturalization path has passed almost unnoticed. Opposition parties have not brought the issue to the attention of the public opinion when the Popular Party tried to introduce this provision during the amending of the bill addressing Sephardic Jews (Law 12/2015). And then, when few months later this was eventually approved as part of an extensive reform of the civic registry (Law 19/2015), they have criticized it rather quietly.³² The introduction of civic tools in Spain happened without any throughout discussion of its underlying meaning and of its possible implications for the people willing to acquire Spanish nationality. What can be considered the "Spanish civic turn" does not come along with a de-ethnicization of the concept of citizenship as the suggested by Joppke (2008), nor it hides an ethno-centric rationale shared in nation-politics, as the critics of the "liberal-

³² To this regard, it is worth noticing that the very fact of introducing this provision during the discussion of the amendments reduces the space for debating it. The need of a more thorough discussion of the matter was indeed the justification given by the Popular Party for retiring the amendment in the discussion of the Law 12/2015. Finally, such discussion has never taken place and the provision was re-presented, and then approved as amendment in the Law 19/2015.

convergence” thesis maintain (see, for instance, Goodman 2012; Mouritsen 2011). It simply seems to respond to the need of streamline administrative procedures and ensure homogeneity of treatment by means of a digital and more agile system to face the high number of applications of naturalization.

“The fact that the procedure for obtaining nationality by residence shifts from a special law to another one concerning a reorganization in the area of the Justice Administration [...] was precisely the reason that led the Government to such change, to bring this new procedure into a new project whose object is, from our point of view, much better in line with the proposed reform.” (Arias Navia, PP – Senate, 8 July 2015, n/s)

Here citizenship is addressed through a formal and procedural approach, which gets back to a general approach observed in both center-left and center-right parties when holding office.

2.5 Discussion

As thoroughly attested (Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 2009; Favell 1998), the rise of immigration and its affirmation as structural dimension bring about, in host societies, a reorganization of the system of rules regulating the acquisition and the loss of nationality. This is not the case of Spain where the large and fast growth of foreign population did not lead to any significant changes of its citizenship regime. The present article addressed such puzzle by looking at the ideational substratum underlying the politics of citizenship in the country.

The Spanish conception of citizenship, as I called the latter, has remained untouched by the extraordinary demographic transformation experienced by country from mid of the 1990s. The way in which the ruling political elite think about the fundamental relationship between the state and its

citizens has hardly had anything to do with immigration. The boundaries of the political community are still being conceived along bloodlines and looking instrumentally at the diaspora. Nationality laws are a mean to guarantee emigrants and their descendants an easy access to the citizenry while reinforcing their bound with Spain. Often, they also take the meaning of a reward for the injustices suffered by “special” groups of foreigners, such as for political exiles’ progenies targeted by the Law of Historical Memory, or in the case of Sephardic Jews addressed by the Law 12/2015. The idea of a special link with Spain represents the key conceptual construct around which is built the Spanish conception of citizenship, mobilized by parties to address emigrants and groups of foreigners considered “worth of being Spanish”. Such view stretches across different and ideologically opposed parties and, for more than thirty years, has remained essentially steady.

Its success does not seem to be a mere echo of the past, the simple reaffirmation of an old vision of Spain as an emigration country. It rather seems to be the result of an active and shared way of thinking citizenship. If, during the first decade of the 21st century – the time of the steepest immigration growth – have been thought, debated, and approved reforms of nationality targeting diaspora, it is not for a legacy of the past. It is due to a political elite’s view that, while facing the challenges of the present, has kept on understanding this area of policy as basically concerning Spaniards abroad. The areas of meaning in which parties’ views overlap have represented the tracks driving the evolutions of country’s citizenship regime. More than no change whatsoever, hence, such stability has meant continuity: the original framework set with the 1982 reform was in fact renewed more than once. The point is that this was done always looking at citizens living outside the country rather than at non-citizens living inside. Policy continuity in the area of nationality is not, thus, the simple consequence of the stringent logic of path-dependency emphasized by

Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes (2012), but rather it is the result of an “ideational hegemony of an entire policy sector” to say with Schmidt (2011, 100).

By focusing on ideas, this study offered a new analytical – and less “deterministic” – perspective on the politics of citizenship in Spain, complementing the explanatory backdrop developed by the research on the Spanish case so far. In doing so it makes a step further in the emerging branch on the role of ideas in immigration policymaking and it contributes to filling its “geographical gap” on new immigration countries.

The politics of citizenship in Spain are not a merely ideational matter though. The Spanish conception of citizenship taps into institutional structures – as traditional neo-institutionalists would say it – favourable to institutional stability. These regard parties’ incentives structures, their organizational setting as well as normative constraints. The ambivalent discourse, and behaviour of the Socialist party points to the former, suggesting that parties’ strategic considerations, related to the possible exacerbation of the immigration issue, matter when citizenship is at issue. By providing a fertile ground for the unfolding of a political discourse centered on the emigration-nationality nexus, parties’ organizational architecture seems to matter too. Lastly, the fact that citizenship continues to find place inside the civil code, rather than being the core matter of a dedicated law, represents a further impediment for a change of perspective linking citizenship to the immigration phenomenon.

These are only brief empirical cues gathered in the analysis regarding non-ideational conditions, unfortunately. The strain to offer an endogenous account capturing the details of the ideational substratum underlying the politics of citizenship in Spain has gone to the detriment of the broader structural context surrounding such politics. This, on the other hand, abided by the aim of bridging a gap in state-of-the-art on this case study: so far studies on nationality law-making in Spain have focus on

external institutional drivers while paying scant attention to the role of ideas. The time seems ripe, thus, for blending such approaches in more comprehensive and refined explanatory backdrops. A key challenge for future empirical inquiry lies here; namely, in delving more deeply into the mutual interactions between ideational and non-ideational conditions. This will be desirable both to have a more accurate empirical account of the politics of citizenship in Spain as well as to grasp the margins of complementarity between different institutionalist traditions.

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3. THE POLITICS AND POLICIES OF CITIZENSHIP IN ITALY AND SPAIN, AN IDEATIONAL ACCOUNT

Abstract

The article accounts for the puzzling stability of citizenship regimes in Italy and Spain relying on the explanatory power of ideas. This is done by drawing upon a methodology combining process tracing methods with qualitative content analysis. In both countries ideational factors prove to be crucial in driving the evolution of nationality laws, still according to distinct logic. In Spain it is the agreement, the sharing of a dominant citizenship conception across parties, that ensures policy continuity. When the Spanish legislator wonders about state's intergenerational continuity, it does so by looking at the diaspora and its progenies, overlooking foreigners settled in the country. Contrariwise, in Italy it is the lack of agreement that ensures institutional stability. Beneath the Italian citizenship debate lies a heterogenous political imaginary where different views quarrel over the way to adapt the actual system to the new immigration reality. These evidences provide for the scant attention paid to new immigration countries in the research on comparative citizenship regimes, while speaking to the broader debate in Political Science on the role of ideas in public policymaking.

3.1 Changing societies, fixed political communities? A puzzling comparison

When it comes to citizenship³³, Italy and Spain are similar puzzling cases. Table 1 sets against the key features of their respective frameworks for nationality acquisition (and regarding dual nationality). Despite some differences the Spanish and the Italian citizenship regimes share clear-cut affinities: the predominance of *jus sanguinis* over *jus soli* (i), a system of privileged naturalization granted to descendants of the diaspora and to a delimited set of foreigners (ii), and the acceptance of dual citizenship, *de jure* in Italy and *de facto* in Spain (iii).

³³ Notwithstanding the variety of meanings and uses of the terms “citizenship” and “nationality”, this research treats them as synonyms and in the narrow sense of a legal status linking the individual to the state.

Table 1. The Italian and Spanish regimes of citizenship acquisition

ITALY		SPAIN	
<p>Born of one Italian parent (<i>ius sanguinis</i>)</p> <p>Born in Italy of unknown or stateless parents</p> <p>Born in Italy reached the lawful age [18], provided uninterrupted legal residence (<i>ius soli</i>)</p>	<p>Born of one Spanish parent (<i>ius sanguinis</i>)</p> <p>Born in Spain of unknown or stateless parents (<i>ius soli</i>)</p> <p>Born in Spain of one parent born in Spain too (double <i>ius soli</i>)</p>	<p>Requirement of legal residence for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 years (general requirement) • 5 years for Refugee / Adopted adult / Stateless person / Functionary • 4 years for EU nationals • 3 years for: i) people with Italian origins (Italian parents/grandparents) (<i>external ius sanguinis</i>), ii) third-country nationals born in Italy 	<p>Requirement of legal residence for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 years (general requirement) • 5 years: refugee • 2 years: Latin-American countries, Andorra, Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, Portugal, and Sephardic Jews • 1 year: Born in Spain of foreign parents; Married/Widow with/of a Spaniard; Born abroad whose (grand)parents - born abroad too - were originally Spanish by origin (<i>external ius sanguinis</i>)
Residence (<i>ius domicili</i>)	Residence (<i>ius domicili</i>)	<p>Provided positive integration and language tests</p>	<p>Provided positive integration and language tests</p>
By Marriage	<p>• If the applicant reside in Italy: provided 1 year of legal residence after the marriage if the couple has natural/adopted children, 2 years in the absence of children)</p> <p>• If the applicant reside abroad: provided 18 months after marriage if the couple has natural/adopted children, 3 years in the absence of children).</p>	"Carta de Naturaliza"	<p>Discretionary procedure due to exceptional circumstances, ruled through Royal Decree by the Government. (e.g. Sephardic Jews)</p>
External <i>ius sanguinis</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proof of "significant Italian ancestor" who emigrated and never renounced to Italian citizenship (no generation limits) • Special cases: Descendants of former Italians who lost the Italian nationality residing in Istria, Fiume, Dalmatia between 1940 and 1947 (provided co-ethnic ties) 	By Option	<p>Targets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Those who are or have been subject to the custody of a Spaniard - Person whose parent was a Spanish born in Spain (<i>external ius sanguinis</i>) - Person whose determination of parentage or birth-in-Spain occurs the lawful age [18] - Adults adopted by a Spaniard
Special merit	<p>Granted by the President of the Republic to those who have rendered distinguished services to Italy or due to an exceptional interest of the state</p>	Status	<p>Target: Person who owned and used the nationality for ten years, on a continuous basis and in "good faith"</p>
<p>Double nationality: <i>de jure</i> allowed, except for express quit-claim</p>		<p>Double nationality: <i>De jure</i> set by reciprocity agreements with foreign countries (i.e. Latin-American countries, Andorra, Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, Portugal). <i>De facto</i> by emigration</p>	

That said, it is not their normative affinities to be thought-provoking. What is “similarly puzzling” is their parallel stability over time. Since their origin, set by the Law 51/1982 in Spain and by the Law 91/1992 in Italy, the Spanish and Italian citizenship regimes have indeed remained almost untouched (Rubio Marín et al. 2015; Zincone and Basili 2013). To date only few changes have been carried out, most of which followed the original co-ethnic rationale centered on *ius sanguinis*. Table 2 (included in the appendix) sketches all the normative measures related to nationality – approved, rejected and still under discussion – carried out in both countries. Policy stability comes into view looking both at the reforms finalized, most of which consolidate the original normative structures, and at the bills rejected, most of which aimed at altering such frameworks.³⁴

The stability of the Spanish and the Italian citizenship regimes, legacy of these countries’ emigration pasts (Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes 2012; Tintori 2009), clashes with the countries’ reputation as top immigrant destinations. And it looks even stranger considering both the proliferation of integration policies carried out in these two countries over the last two decades, as well as other states’ evolution of nationality laws. To date, Italy and Spain are the only two major destination countries in Europe that have not reformed nationality legislation vis-à-vis the “new” immigration reality (Huddleston et al. 2015). Since the mid-1990s, all the European states have gone through a profound revision of their norms regulating the acquisition and the loss of nationality as a response to the challenges posed by immigration. Some, as Germany, have carried out liberalizing steps towards immigrants’ access to citizenship by introducing citizenship rights based upon birth in the territory. Others, as Ireland, have headed toward the opposite direction by restraining *jus soli* rights.

³⁴The most relevant changes regarded the acquisition of nationality “through” marriage, which was restricted in both countries (Spanish Law 18/1990, Italian Law 94/2009) and the introduction and civic and language tests in Spain (Law 19/2015).

Regardless of the path taken, whose neat direction is often difficult to determine given contrasting dynamics in each country (Baldi and Goodman 2015; Goodman 2012; Vink and de Groot 2010), such wide changing tendency makes Italy and Spain's steadiness challenging.

Prima facie, the main theoretical strands in the literature are not of much help in such regard. Given the different nation-building projects and related national identities of these two countries (Cook-Martín 2013; Gagnon and Tully 2011), the traditional "national models" theories (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Favell 1998) made reasonable to expect the emergence of different citizenship regimes as a response to the growing immigrants' settlement. Insights coming from party politics (Akkerman 2015; Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008; Howard 2010) point to diverging evolutions as well: while the Spanish favorable attitude towards immigration (Arango 2013) and the lack of a right wing party in national politics (Rubio Marín et al. 2015) pointed towards a more permissive regime, Italians' public hostility toward immigrants (Ambrosini 2013) and the key role played by the xenophobic *Lega Nord* (Geddes 2008) seemed paving the way for a citizenship backlash.

How are such akin policy trajectories possible then? What lies behind the Italian-and-Spanish distinctive stability of nationality laws in a changing European scenario? Why, when it comes to nationality, Italian and Spanish policymakers opt for continuity both "overlooking" the new immigration reality?

The present study answers these questions gearing the lens of analysis to the world of ideas, conceived in the form of frames (Bleich 2003; De Bruycker 2017; Chong and Druckman 2007). The key argument maintained is that their stagnation in the area of nationality can be attributed to ideas and values held by respective ruling political elites at national level despite, in each context, according to different dynamics. By providing an endogenous account based on ideas, the study offers a

novel viewpoint in the study of citizenship policies, traditionally anchored in exogenous explanations rooted in rational-choice and historical institutionalisms.

The following section sets the theoretical framework of the study. In line with the “second-generation agenda” on ideas in public policy (Parsons 2016), it theorizes about the causal role of ideas in policymaking and on the modes of such influence in interaction with non-ideational conditions. Section three illustrates the methods and the techniques of analysis chosen to prove such influence. The empirical proofs are outlined in the fifth section, where the unfolding of the Italian and the Spanish politics of citizenship are traced and then comparatively assessed, paying special attention to the role played by citizenship frames in respective political arenas. The conclusive remarks reflect on the theoretical value, the empirical scope and the main limitations of the study.

3.2 Institutional stability and the politics of citizenship vis-à-vis immigrant settlement: an ideational account

The policy area of citizenship covers all the measures regulating the fundamental relation of belonging between the state and the individual (Costa 2005). These, in short, regard: the modes of transmission of nationality (i.e. by descent, via birthplace, and through naturalization), the ways of its loss, and the degree of its exclusivity (i.e. in which cases allowing/denying dual nationality) (Vink and Bauböck 2013). Differently from other domains of policymaking targeting international migration, which encompass a variety of actors located at different levels of governance, that of citizenship is an exclusive matter of central-state (de

Groot 2006).³⁵ Eventually it is here, namely in the national policymaking venue, where the lens of the scholarship has been geared so far. The main explanatory accounts concerned with the politics and the policies of citizenship have either drawn on theoretical insights coming from rational-choice institutionalism emphasizing parties' interests and strategies, or looked at institutional legacy, according to historical institutionalism. Those by Green-Pedersen and Odmalm (2008) and Brochmann and Seland (2010) represent paradigmatic contributions of such competing theoretical standpoints. Both studies carry out a comparative analysis of Swedish and Denmark naturalization policies; yet whereas the former explains variation on the basis of different coalitional opportunities in the right-wing bloc, the latter argues that the different policies of the two countries can be attributed to dissimilar idioms of nationhood.

Grounded on the power-interest epistemological bedrocks (Knight 1992), scholars following the former theoretical strand account for policymaking outputs relying on the distribution of power and on the configuration of material interests that surround the policymaking process. As pertains to nationality measures, they argue for the importance of: parties' positions along the left-right spectrum (Howard 2010), the mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiment in the public opinion by right wing parties (Akkerman 2015) and strategic considerations regarding the formation of viable coalitions (Bale et al. 2009). On the other hand, scholars following sociological and historical institutionalisms (e.g. Borevi 2014; Brochmann and Seland 2010) emphasize the role played by self-reinforcing historical paths in line with the seminal work of Brubaker (1992). His contribution paved the way for the introduction of the classical national models

³⁵ This is not to say that the policy area of citizenship is exempt from transnational dynamics of policy transfer and learning. The 21st century's convergence in the use of similar "civic tools" (Goodman 2010; Joppke 2007) speaks for itself with this regard.

typology – distinguishing between the “ethnic” Germany, the “assimilationist” France, and the “multicultural” Netherland and UK (Castles 1995; Castles and Miller 2009; Jacobs and Rea 2007) – built upon the assumption that nation-states respond to the issue of immigrant integration according to their pattern of nation-state formation and to their understanding of nationhood and social cohesion (Borevi 2014; Mouritsen 2012). Contributions in this branch of the literature have often turned to the explanatory power of ideas (Brochmann and Seland 2010), yet tending to conceive them as steady and path-dependent entities that coerce political action.

Notwithstanding their distinct analytical standpoints such theoretical approaches share somehow an analogous epistemological perspectives on causality emphasizing an external rule-following logic of causation, whether conceived as “an interest-based logic of calculation” or “a history-based logic of path dependence”, to say with Schmidt (2008, 314). The clash, sketched in the introduction, between the theoretical expectations gathered from these approaches with the actual evolution of nationality laws in Italy and Spain, call thus for a different outlook on causality.

For this aim the present the present study looks at citizenship policies through the endogenous-lens of ideational-institutionalism³⁶, a renewed analytical approach in public policy that investigates how ideational factors engage with actors’ strategies and existing institutional contexts, bringing about change or ensuring continuity (see, among the latest contributions, those by: Boswell and Hampshire 2017, Carstensen and

³⁶ This term is used as a common label embracing the most common ones of discursive institutionalism, by Schmidt (2008, 2010), and constructivist institutionalism by Hay (2007) and Béland and Cox (2011). It is worth noticing that, while pursuing theoretical clarity, the juxtaposition of ideational-institutionalism *versus* older institutionalisms does not do justice to the contributions mentioned, which often embrace distinct approaches.

Schmidt 2017). Far from being the fixed structures postulated by historical (and sociological) institutionalists, ideas are conceived simultaneously as meaning structures-and-constructs internal to actors and in reciprocal interaction with other (non-ideational) contextual structures (Schmidt 2008). Seen through the prism of ideational institutionalism the akin stability of Italian and Spanish nationality laws is an empirical puzzle to be solved by gearing the analytical lens towards the meaning of citizenship, by looking at beliefs and values that held in respective policymaking arenas when nationality is at issue.

Among the various kinds of ideas explored in the literature (Mehta 2011; Schmidt 2011), this study focuses on frames for their policy-specific nature (Chong and Druckman 2007). According to Bleich (2003), frames are sets of cognitive and normative elements that orient an actor within a concrete policy domain. As cognitive maps, they contain descriptive and causal assumptions that identify the salient dimensions of an issue. As normative maps, they offer the moral assessment of events, problems as well as alternative (policy-) solutions. A causal argument grounded on frames traces policymaking outputs and institutional evolution back to the way in which ruling political elites think about – i.e. “frame” – a specific policy domain. Accordingly, the main assumption held for the cases selected is that their *institutional stability of nationality laws is attributable to the role played by citizenship frames held by the ruling political elite (H1)*.

That being said, the main issue at stake for scholars concerned with ideas is not much about whether these matter, but rather about how they matter (Béland and Cox 2011); which brings in the need of a more specific claim concerning the way in which frames exert their influence ensuring institutional continuity. Therefore, holding true the main hypothesis, two alternative framing logic can be assumed: policy stagnation can, in fact, be either the outcome of the willful policymakers’ action, or the accidental

consequence of the lack of agreement on the concrete direction (of change) to take. The first logic points to *coalition building dynamics* (Sabatier 1987). By definition ideas that allow the formation of coalition stretch across different actors and agendas (Blyth 2002). Their power as “coalition magnets” (Layne 2006), to ensure a durable consensus on a given issue across parties, lies in their multivocal (Goddard 2009) or polysemic character (Béland and Cox 2016), which makes it attractive and feasible to groups that might otherwise have different interests. If this applies to the Italian and the Spanish cases, what we expect to find in the empirical material is an ideational substratum, shared among the ruling political elite, capable of both living through the alternating colors and majorities in government as well as resisting to competing ideas (which can be reasonably supposed to have emerged at some time in consequence of the striking growth of the immigrant population). In other words, if the main hypothesis holds through coalition building dynamics, *the institutional stability of nationality laws will be the consequence of a dominant citizenship frame held in the national political arenas* (H1bis). This, to make a step further in such theoretical speculation, may lead one to think of the emigration shared-legacy of the countries, and particularly to the respective myths of *L'altra Italia* (Zincone and Basili 2013) and *Hispanidad* (Alvarez Rodriguez 2010), which might have induced the perception of nationality as exclusively a diaspora-related issue. Such ideational factor would have allowed “preserving” the area of nationality from both restrictive and liberal instances towards immigrants while justifying favorable diaspora policies in both countries.³⁷

³⁷ It is hard to move forward in the conjectures on the substantive content of frames marking each country, which is ultimately an empirical matter. What should be added is that exists the possibility that countries’ dominant frames differ in terms of content but they anyway produce analogous effects on the policymaking process.

The second logic points to *parties' ideological differences*. As thoroughly testified (Alonso and Fonseca 2012; Bale et al. 2009), the immigration-issue is a very sensitive topic often dividing parties' stances more and beyond the left-right partition. In the same line, Italian and Spanish missed reforms of nationality can be thought of resulting from the protracted lack of parties' consensus on the concrete way to reform it, resulting in the maintenance of the status quo. If this second alternative holds, taking again the main hypothesis as valid, thus: *the institutional stability of nationality will be the result of irreconcilable frames held in the national political arenas* (H1tris). This time, the empirical footprint that we might expect to find is the existence of contrasting ways of conceiving citizenship dividing parties when nationality is at issue. It is worth noticing that, in this case, frames do not take the broad shape of public philosophies or programmatic beliefs shared across parties (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Berman 1998; Campbell 2002) – as they will if H1bis applies – but the more specific one of parties' visions.

Policymaking is not only a matter of ideas though. By claiming that ideas can exert an influence of their own, ideational institutionalism does not mean to say that they do it by *themselves*, paraphrasing Biernacki (1995, 35). Non-ideational conditions do exist, are empirically distinguishable from ideas and, despite being in dynamic interaction with the latter (Schmidt 2008), may wield a distinct causal effect on institutional evolution (Parsons 2016). Further speculation is thus necessary. More precisely, two additional conjectures integrate the main hypotheses of the study, one concerns parties' strategic behavior and the other focuses on the institutional setting.

By postulating interests as subjective responses to material reality (Hay 2007; Schmidt 2010), ideational institutionalists do not close the door on actors' utilitarian calculi stressed by rational-choice institutionalism (Schmidt 2008). Notwithstanding their ideational commitment, political

parties may in fact follow, anyway, an instrumental reasoning in compliance with incentive structures (De Bruycker 2017). That is to admit that, beyond their genuine conception of citizenship and regardless their degree of agreement about its meaning, parties' action may still respond to electoral pay-offs and/or coalitional dynamics (Green-Pedersen and Odman 2008, Bale 2008). Enlarging the theoretical scope to strategic behavior means, hence, acknowledging the possibility that *the institutional instability of nationality laws may be the result of parties' incentive structures surrounding the politics of citizenship (H2)*.

The last assumption, near to the tradition of historical institutionalism, leaves political actors behind and turns to the institutional setting surrounding their agency. Namely, to the organizational architecture and rules that serve as guides to public actors for what to do and/or as sources of justification and legitimation for what can and should be done (Carstensen and Schmidt 2017). Even though according to an ideational approach these kind of institutional structures are the outcome of ideas crystallized over time (Pierson 2004) it is still theoretically relevant – and empirically crucial – to distinguish between the way in which political actors think about a policy issue and the historical context restraining such way of thinking (Schmidt 2016). Taking the institutional setting seriously, thus, implies not ruling out the chance that *the institutional instability of nationality laws may be the consequence of institutional constraints surrounding the politics of citizenship (H3)*.

Each hypothesis focuses on a different causal driver and identifies a distinct causal effect: an ideational effect (captured by H1, H1bis, and H3tris) an instrumental effect (defined by H2) and an institutional effect (designed by H3). Rather than mutually exclusive such effects are, at least on paper, complementary. By spelling out the way in which new austerity designs were backed by neo-liberal principles crystallized in the architecture of the European institutions, for instance, Schmidt and

Thatcher (2013) illuminated on the joint effect of ideas and institutional structures. More generally, as widely acknowledged by recent scholarship (Béland 2016; Blyth, Helgadóttir, and Kring 2015; De Bruycker 2017), ideas, strategic reasoning and institutional design can play in tandem and/or at different moments in time to influence policy evolution. The key issue at stake in empirical terms is, therefore, about how distributing the burden of explanation among such drivers, about the extent to which each effect contributes to account for the empirical object taken into exam. This said the focus of the study remains primarily on ideas: H1, H1*bis* and H1*tris* are taken as the main hypotheses driving the inquiry. Such broad empirical goal takes, hence, the more concrete shape of identifying the causal role played by frames exploring their interaction with non-ideational conditions, with the ultimate purpose of advancing sound explanatory logic.

3.3 Methodology

To meet this aim, it is followed a comparative design combining process tracing methods with qualitative techniques of data gathering and analysis. For each case, inductive process tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013) is applied to disentangle the nationality law-making process while placing this within the broader political context to identify the main external constraints surrounding the politics of citizenship. Abiding by an ideational ontology, policymaking is understood as a social practice with a discursive basis (Campbell 2002; Schmidt 2010; Jacobs 2015). Accordingly, the causal role of ideational factors is appraised through the careful examination of political discourse. More precisely, the coordinative political discourse (Schmidt 2008) that takes place in the national parliament represents the empirical substratum thorough which gather ideational elements underlying the politics of citizenship in each

country. The corpus of texts considered is made of the transcriptions of all parliamentary debates concerned with nationality matters (see Table 2 in the appendix)³⁸. All documents are analyzed by using conventional qualitative content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Winter 2014) to identify the most important themes brought forth in the debate as well as similarities and differences among parties' rhetorical strategies. The analysis covers all political parties' view on citizenship; still, special attention is paid to the main parties of each legislature. The lapse of time considered covers the evolution of nationality legislation from the last comprehensive reform (i.e. 1982 in Spain and 1992 in Italy) to the present days (June 2017). Such broad temporal perspective allows a scrupulous assessment of the unfolding of nationality laws along with its underlying ideational substratum held by the ruling political elite in each country.

3.4 Nationality law-making in Spain and in Italy

a) The Spanish nationality laws: not an immigration matter

Most of the current setting of the Spanish citizenship regime took shape in 1982 with the law 51 reforming the civil code. This (re)affirmed *ius sanguinis* as the core principle regulating citizenship, set a general ten-year requirement for naturalization through *ius domicile*, and designated a privileged treatment for the acquisition and loss of nationality for emigrants and their progenies, citizens of the former colonial empire (i.e. Ibero-American countries, Andorra, Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, Portugal) and Sephardic Jews. Such reform responded to the legislator's spirits of the age and to the mandate of the 1978 Constitution, acknowledging the Ibero-American community of nations and concerned

³⁸ For the case of Italy laws proposals not discussed in the Assembly have been excluded from the analysis.

with the return of former emigrants (Rubio Marín et al. 2015). At that time, it was impossible to predict the demographic transformation that would have marked, shortly thereafter, the Spanish society. In the first decade of the 21st century, Spain experienced one of the largest waves of immigration in world, which raised its foreign population from 2% (2000) to 12% (2010). Increasingly in the limelight of the public and political concern, immigration became the target of an intense proliferation of policy measures (Zapata-Barrero, Gonzalez, and Sanchez-Montijano 2008). Yet, nationality laws remained at the margin of such socio-political transformation. The latest reform (law 19/2015) – which will be dealt with in a few paragraphs – is the only policy output in the area of nationality addressing the immigration phenomenon; all the others have to do with diaspora.³⁹

The “anomalous” policy evolution of nationality legislation responds to a precise and enduring conception of nationality that cuts across the parliamentary floor. All the parties share indeed a steady attention for the diaspora and its progenies, and the area of nationality represents the policymaking domain in which such concern is believed to deserve an answer in terms of policy. It is no coincidence that similar reforms, aimed at ensuring emigrants’ descendants an easy access to the citizenry and at reinforcing their bond with Spain, were carried out by both center-left (i.e. law 18/1990; law 29/1995; law 40/2006; law 52/2007) and center-right governments (law 51/1982, law 32/2002), habitually with the wide support of regionalist parties. When it comes to diaspora, Popular Party and Socialist party’s stances are closer than their different ideological traditional would suggest:

³⁹ These include: the law 18/1990, the law 29/1995, the law 32/2002, the law 40/2006, the law 52/2007, and the law 20/2011. Apart from these measures, it should be reminded the law 12/2015 addressing Sephardic Jews.

“The Popular Party clearly defines an objective when it wants to modify the Civil Code on issues related to nationality. [...] We believe that our essential commitment, which I think is well-founded too, is with emigration and its descendants.” (Muñoz Uriol, PP - Congress, 5 February 2002, 6801).

"The horizon of a country as ours cannot be other than that of guaranteeing the full equality of rights, benefits and opportunities of those living abroad in comparison with those residing in the State". (Rubial Cachorro, PSOE – Senate, 21 November 2006).

Regionalist parties⁴⁰ tend to share this view and, in some cases, they have even been the leading proponent of reforms aimed at easing emigrants' access to citizenship.

“[Targeting emigrants' progenies by] the way of Immigration Law is alienation, it's like considering grandchildren as strangers to the State, while what we request, and for what we proposed amendments during the whole processing, is to consider them as proper citizens.” (Uría Etxebarria, PNV – Congress, 24 September 2002, 17990)

These quotes date back to the first decade of 21st century when immigration was everything but unfamiliar. The first national plan for immigrant integration (PECI), indeed, would have been issued one year after the law 40/2006 on the Statute of Spanish Citizenship Abroad by the same center-left government. Still, in the national political imaginary of the time, nationality kept on being framed as a separate matter exclusively related to diaspora. As the quotes above suggest, such conception does not merely hinge upon a deep-rooted vision of Spain as an emigration country – as maintained by other scholars (Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes

⁴⁰ This is particularly the case of *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV, Basque Nationalist Party), *Bloque Nacionalista Galego* (BNG, Galician Nationalist Bloc, BNG) and *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC, Republican Left of Catalonia).

2012; Rubio Marín et al. 2015) – but takes the shape of an active and shared way of framing citizenship in which emigrants’ descendants are considered a “key social capital on which building the future of the country” (Law 40/2006). In looking at the diaspora the Spanish political elite does not draw upon to the traditional concept of *Hispanidad*, but think about the future of the country. The evolution of the Spanish nationality laws is not a mere path-dependent legacy of the past, but the consequence of a (pro)active and shared way of thinking citizenship. The concern for diaspora represents the area of meaning on which building a transversal political consensus and carrying out policy reforms: what is done in terms of policies matches with what is shared in national politics in terms of beliefs and values.

The same logic applies to some specific “historical groups” and, in negative terms, to immigration. On the one hand, parties’ views on citizenship coincide in their concern for foreigners coming from former colonies, mostly represented by Latin Americans, and Sephardic Jews; both acknowledged as having a special relationship with Spain. More in general, the idea of “special link with Spain” (*especial vinculación con España*) emerges as the key concept underlying the Spain conception of citizenship. This is transversally mobilized by political parties to justify privileges in the access to nationality, whether to diasporas or to specific historical communities.⁴¹ On the other hand, parties’ stances concur in their disinterest for immigrants’ needs when nationality is at stake. Despite favorable stances to promote foreigner inclusion into the host society, the process of integration has little to do with the boundaries of the citizenry in the common political imaginary. Most of the parties have

⁴¹ For instance, the need to honor the Sephardic Jews for the injustices suffered during the *Reconquista* finds response in the law 12/2015 ensuring them a favorable naturalization procedure and backed by most of the Parliament.

been rather apathetic to the growing relevance of the immigration phenomenon, keeping it away from the meaning of citizenship.

“One thing is the phenomenon of immigration and another thing is the debate on nationality; they are not two concepts that necessarily have to come together”. (Jordano Salinas, PP - Congress, 14 December 1999, 15072)”

The steady indifference of nationality laws to the immigration phenomenon emerges, therefore, as the consequence of the enduring lack of acknowledgement of immigration-citizenship nexus inside the national political arena.

This said, such view finds a fertile ground on to develop in both parties’ pragmatism and institutional constrictions. The former gets back to the Socialist Party’s “two-faced” stand: calling for liberalization of *ius soli* when sat in opposition⁴² and turning back to diaspora when holding office, in order to prevent the politicization of nationality matters in relation to the immigration issue (Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes 2012). The latter refers to their normative constraints.

The fact that citizenship continues to find place inside the civil code, rather than being the core matter of a dedicated law, represents a further impediment for a change of perspective linking citizenship to the immigration phenomenon while contributing at emphasizing an instrumental and procedural understanding. The recent Spanish civic turn, abides by such logic. The law 19/2015 introduced compulsory language and civic tests for naturalization, substituting the previous system based on local judges’ interviews. Differently from other countries (Carrera 2006; Mouritsen 2012), the introduction of civic tools in Spain happened without any throughout discussion of its underlying meaning and of its

⁴² In the 1990s, when the Socialists were an opposition party have indeed put forward several bill-proposals aimed at liberalizing naturalization, all of which were rejected by the center-right ruling majorities.

possible implications for the people willing to acquire Spanish nationality. Neither ethnic nor civic rationales (Goodman 2012; Joppke 2008), hence, lie beyond the Spanish civic turn, but simply the need to ease and standardize administrative procedures.

b) The Italian nationality laws: an irreducible immigration matter?

Notwithstanding the normative affinities and an alike policy-evolution, the Italian case hides very different dynamics of politics. Since the very constitution of the current nationality regime, set by the law 91/1992, the Italian legislator has been concerned with immigration when it comes to citizenship. While in Spain the main political concern is about diaspora and its progenies, in Italy the fundamental relationship between the state and its citizenry is predominantly an immigration-related matter.⁴³ The first bills aimed at liberalizing the regime were not much long to come (e.g. Congress bills 7245/2000, 1463/2001). In the following years reform proposals have multiplied and more restrictive bills by center, center-right and right-wing parties have joined the liberal ones advanced by left and center-left parties. All the Italian parties recognize the necessity to readjust nationality legislation according to the new immigration reality of the country, albeit according to different visions and policy-solutions. In this regard, the analysis of the parliamentary debates reveals three different and stable frames.

The *ethnic-securitarian frame*, shared by center-right and right-wing parties, conceives citizenship as both a status of belonging to the ethnic-

⁴³ The diaspora-nationality nexus is not absent from the Italian political discourse and, as in Spain, finds favourable stances by all parties, as testified by the approval of the laws 396/2000 and 124/2006 recognizing the right to Italian citizenship to descendants of the Italians who had resided in former Austro-Hungarian Empire and Yugoslavia. That being said, it remains a marginal issue of the political debate analysed.

national community and a tool to prevent immigration flows. Such vision reiterates the centrality of *ius sanguinis* and calls for restrictive tests ensuring immigrants' full cultural assimilation.

“Citizenship has to be understood as a status and, therefore, as a legal situation linked to concrete facts and non-treatable requirements [...]. On these grounds, it is clear why citizenship as a status is acquired and transmitted through *jus sanguinis* and why *jus soli* must have a marginal and always carefully pondered corrective function.” (Raffaele Volpi, LN – Chamber of Deputies, 1 July 2009)

At the opposite end of the ideational spectrum lies *the civic-integrative frame*, which conceives citizenship as a right and as a valuable tool to foster immigrant integration. Shared by left and center-left parties, this frame embraces an interculturalist stand on integration and emphasizes the need to expand *ius soli* and to cultivate integration by means of preparatory courses.

“Belonging to the nation does hinge upon the ethnic bond, which [...] ultimately refers to land and blood ties, but implies the voluntary acceptance of civic and constitutional values of our state community.” (Gianclaudio Bressa, PD - Chamber of Deputies, 18 March 2009)

In between these two extremes we find *the cultural frame*, which characterizes the approach to nationality of center-catholic parties as well as those of some center-right factions. This last conception of citizenship gathers together a heterogeneity of views sharing the belief that nationality is a sort of “prize-right” to be eased for immigrants' inclusion on the condition of a sufficient degree of cultural integration.

“The nation is not an ethnic community, it is a culture community, and if somebody has an ethnic origin other than

mine, but shares my culture, it is an Italian citizen like me. [...] Of course, we also must engage with his [culture], but the acceptance of the Italian culture, with its history and even with its limits, is an essential requirement for being truly Italian citizens. [...] confident that we will be able to build a valuable dialogue with those who come, to let them become citizens and teach us to be better Italians too.” (Rocco Buttiglione, UCD - Chamber of Deputies, 8 October 2015)

While fairly capturing the spread of the ideational spectrum over the parliamentary arena, this distribution of frames among parties remains an oversimplification. Often, in fact, MPs belonging to the same party advance contrasting stands on nationality and/or combine elements of different frames. The case of the right-wing party *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN) is emblematic in this regard. Over the period of time considered the party headed by Gianfranco Fini, in his progressive repositioning towards the center of the political spectrum (Zincone 2011), leaves the ethnic stands behind to embrace a more liberal standpoint closer to the civic and cultural frames.⁴⁴

Embedded in a fragmented party-system (Bardi 2007; Wilson 2009), which has always required the formation of broad coalitions to rule (Bartolini, Chiaramonte, and D'Alimonte 2004), the existence of dense and distinct frames of citizenship have played a key role in hindering the evolution of nationality laws. The crucial fact is that, till the current legislature, governing coalitions have always assembled parties with contrasting frames on nationality, slowing down or preventing the achievement of a consensus. Such dynamic has affected both center-left and the center-right ruling coalitions.

⁴⁴ That of citizenship has been one of the burning issues of the party's internal crisis in 2010. This ended up with the scission of *Alleanza Nazionale* and the formation of a new political actor *Futuro e Libertà per l'Italia* (FLI, Future and Freedom for Italy), led by Gianfranco Fini and made up by former AN and FI's members.

During the XV legislature (2006-2008) the Amato's bill and then Bressa's one, both advanced by *Democartici di Sinistra* (DS) of the center-left ruling alliance, got stretched by critics coming from both sides of the coalition. The proposals pointed at setting conditional right of soil and a more favorable naturalization path for long-term non-EU immigrants and their children (educated in Italy) while introducing criteria of integration and loyalty based (as certain level of income, the knowledge of Italian language and the acceptance of shared civic values). Left wing parties opposed to the naturalization requirements while those from the center called for wider and stricter ones. The lack of agreement prolonged the legislative procedure, which afterwards was interrupted by the Prodi government's fall.

The debate on nationality proceeded in the XVI legislature (2008 – 2011) and, this time, it's the center-right ruling coalition to fall apart. The bone of contention within the alliance is the Sarubbi-Granata bill, a bipartisan reform proposal advanced by center-left MP of the opposition along with an AN's MP. The bill, which aimed at policy-solutions like Bressa's one, rose harsh critics from the rest of the center-right majority and brought about a cabinet crisis. In this case divergences of views on citizenship tap into strategic considerations within the ruling majority. Despite sharing more affinities with the AN's discourse on nationality indeed, *Forza Italia* (FI) – the main coalition party – strategically decided to back Lega Nord's (LN) stand, given its popular consensus as regard immigration matters (Geddes 2008) and its pivotal role in the coalition (Zincone 2010). In line with such decision the Sarubbi-Granata bill was dismissed in favor of a more restrictive one, the Bertolini bill, closer to LN's ethnic-securitarian frame.

The different views on citizenship held by factions grow dim when the debate turns to children. A liberalizing move in this sense, concerning *ius soli* and/or naturalization procedures, engages with both the civic frames

as well as the cultural one, finding transversal support from (left and center-left) parties, broadly concerned with a citizenship liberalization, and (center and center-right) factions, which appeal to the value of the family. It is no coincidence that the Bertolini bill was finally sent back for further examination in search of a broader consensus on the specific issue of minors.

Such agreement is about to be reached in the current legislature, where a broad-based majority led by the center-left *Partito Democratico* (PD) is backed by center and center-right parties. For the first-time parties holding compatible frames of nationality hold office together. The civic frames held by the former and the cultural one embraced by the latter meet in the concern for minors, and the legislative impasse on nationality on the turn to change. On October 13, 2015, the Chamber of Deputies has approved a unified text aimed at easing nationality acquisition for foreign minors. Its key points regard the admittance of a qualified *ius soli* (on the condition the one of the parents hold a long-term residence permit) and the introduction of an easier naturalization channel for foreign minors entered by the age of 12. The reform proposal is currently under examination by the Senate.⁴⁵ The main obstacle for a reform of the citizenship regime, namely a government coalition carrying irreconcilable frames on citizenship, is vanished. Backed by the multiple pressures coming from local actors and immigrants' associations (Tintori 2013) along with the committed support of the former Italian President, Giorgio Napolitano (Zincone and Basili 2013), the Italian citizenship regime has never been so close to be liberalized.

⁴⁵ This occurred along with, and despite, the harsh obstruction of the opposition, especially by the LN.

c) Similar continuities resting on different ideas

Both in Italy and in Spain the continuity of nationality regimes has to do with the way in which respective political elites frame the citizenship issue. When citizenship is at stake ideational factors prove to be crucial in driving political action in both countries. The effect of ideas, however, takes different causal paths in each of them. In Spain it is the agreement, the sharing of a dominant citizenship conception across parties, that ensures policy continuity preventing the opening of a political discussion on nationality as part of the immigration debate. When the Spanish legislator wonders about state's intergenerational continuity, it does so by looking at the diaspora and its progenies, overlooking foreigners settled in the country.

The Italian case reveals a completely different story. When dealing with citizenship, the Italian legislator thinks of immigration at once.⁴⁶ Still, it does so in the lack of a shared ideational ground. Beneath the citizenship debate lies a heterogenous political imaginary where different parties' views quarrel over the way to adapt the actual system to the new immigration reality of the country. Given a highly fragmented party system, ethnic, civic and cultural frames have always coexisted within the ruling majorities, hindering the achievement of a shared reform. The current legislature appears as the exception that proves the rule: with the first bipartisan majority embracing factions with closer stands on citizenship, nationality regimes seem one step away from a significant liberalization. If this happens, it will also be for the realignment of the political debate, from the wide-ranging discussion on "nationality vis-a-vis immigration" to the narrower one concerning nationality for foreign

⁴⁶ The number of reform proposals on the matter is revealing if compared with the Spanish context.

minors; a confined issue that finds the agreement of parties holding different citizenship frames.⁴⁷

Having said that, in none of the cases nationality law-making is simply a matter of ideas. Parties' action does not merely mirror their genuine stands on citizenship, it is rather the result of how such ideational elements melt into strategic reasoning given the existing political contingences. In Spain, this dynamic characterizes center-left and center-rights parties, both worried about the electoral cost of the potential politicization of nationality matters. The ambivalent approach of the Socialist party, which leaves its call for *ius soli* liberalization when holding office, and the low-profile attitude of the Popular party, which does not flaunt the introduction of firmer civic tools, represent analogous conservative strategies in this sense. Parties' utilitarian calculi is found also in the Italian case and, particularly, in the speculative strategy of Forza Italia. In a context where the citizenship is already a politicized immigration-related matter, Berlusconi's party chose to back Lega Nord's stance for building consensus among a public opinion adverse to immigration.

An institutional effect comes into play too. Yet, it takes different shapes and forces through opposite directions. Whereas in Spain a legislative tradition of hosting nationality rules inside the civil code has helped preventing the development of a political debate linking nationality and immigration, in Italy a wide-ranging institutional network (including non-state, state and local actors) supporting the *ius soli* liberalization for foreign minors, has represented the fertile ground on which the recent reform agreement has taken shape.

⁴⁷ Such possibility would add further empirical weight to the power of ideas as coalition magnet, but this is theorizing beyond the scope of the study.

3.5 Discussion

The main hypothesis of the study is confirmed in both cases: the puzzling continuity of the Italian and Spanish citizenship regimes rests on an ideational basis. However, in each case such ideational effect abides by a distinct logic. For the case of Spain, it is the agreement, the sharing of a dominant citizenship frame across parties, that ensures policy continuity (corroborating *Hibis*). In the Italian case goes the opposite. Here it is the lack of agreement, due to the existence of discordant citizenship frames cutting across the parliamentary majorities, that ensures institutional stability (confirming *Hltris*). By offering an endogenous account based on ideas, the present study helps at disentangling the puzzling continuity of nationality laws in Italy and Spain, an empirical challenge that appeared unsolvable according to the main explanatory backdrops in the literature. In doing so it contributes too at obviating the scant attention paid to southern European countries in this field of study on citizenship and integration policies.

At a more theoretical level, it makes a step further in the broader academic debate on the role of ideas in public policy making, a stream of research that, to date, has been more worried about explaining change than continuity. As these pages have clarified, ideas can also represent blank wall to change. Institutional evolution is not just an ideational matter tough: instrumental and institutional effects come into play too. The former helped to ensure stability in both countries, fully corroborating the second hypothesis. The latter instead only applies to the case of Spain, where a long-lasting normative tradition contributed at keeping nationality detached from immigration matters, serving the maintained of the status quo.

Where ends its empirical and theoretical scope begin the limits of the study. An inner-approach focused on the national policymaking arena

loses sight of what occur at its margins, particularly as regard other actors, touched on by the analysis only to the extent that they were involved in the national debates. As pertain to bottom-up pressures coming from pro-immigrant associations, for instance, the literature suggests two different approaches for the cases selected. In Italy, pro-immigrant groups aim at integrating immigrants “through” citizenship liberalization (Tintori 2013; Zincone and Basili 2013) In Spain this does not happen. As suggested Martín-Pérez (2004) and Toral (2010), pro-immigrant associations point to immigrants’ integration “in spite of” citizenship liberalization. Such matters related to another important limit of the present research: a lens of analysis circumscribed to area of nationality. A narrow focus on citizenship laws leaves indeed the rest of the integration policies overlooked. Yet, given the deep and tough tie linking them (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010), research on the politics of citizenship seems unable to leave an insight on integration aside. Some preliminary steps in such direction have already been done (see, for instance, Finotelli, La Barbera, and Echeverría 2017; Huddleston and Vink 2015) but there is a long way to go in this sense. All these matters pave the way for future empirical inquiry and theoretical speculation, as challenging as fascinating.

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Appendix

Table 2. Nationality Laws and Bills in Spain (a) and in Italy (b), 1978 – 2017

The column regarding “content” outlines the key features of the item. For the case of Italy, given the elevated level of fragmentation of the party system, synthetic labels are applied for the incumbent party and the party proposing the bills/acts; consolidated acts go with the name of their main speaker.

a) Spain

Year	Incumbent	Proponent	Item (output)	Content
1981	PP	PP	Law 51/1982	Setting of the citizenship regime
1990	PSOE	PSOE	Law 18/1990	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies Easing residence-based naturalization for refugees Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
1995	PSOE	PSOE	Law 29/1995	Favouring nationality recovery for emigrants and their progenies willing to return
1996	PP	IU	Bill 122/000018 (rejected)	Liberalizing both <i>ius soli</i> and residence-based naturalization
1996	PP	PSOE	Bill 122/000048 (rejected)	Liberalizing both <i>ius soli</i> and residence-based naturalization
1996	PP	IU	Bill 161/000081 (removed)	Liberalizing both <i>ius soli</i> and residence-based naturalization
1999	PP	IU	Bill 122/000232 (rejected)	Liberalizing both <i>ius soli</i> and residence-based naturalization
1999	PP	PSOE	Bill 122/000246 (rejected)	Liberalizing both <i>ius soli</i> and residence-based naturalization
2000	PP	PSOE	Bill 122/000003 (rejected)	Liberalizing both <i>ius soli</i> and residence-based naturalization
2001	PP	PSOE	Bill 181/000504 (removed)	Call for nationality reform
2001	PP	BNG	Bill 161/000434 (approved with modification)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2002	PP	BNG	Bill 161/001444 (rejected)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2001	PP	PP	Law 36/2002	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for Spaniards' descendants in Spain and abroad
2006	PSOE	PSOE	Law 40/2006	Ensuring the equality social, economic, and political rights to emigrants residing abroad
2007	PSOE	PSOE	Law 52/2007	Favouring recovery of nationality for Spaniards' descendants emigrated due to civil war or dictatorship
2011	PSOE	PSOE	Law 20/2011	Extending nationality by option for descendants of exiled Spanish women
2014	PP	PP	Law 12/2015	Facilitating naturalization path for Sephardic Jews
2015	PP	PP	Law 19/2015	Introducing civic and language tests for naturalization

b) Italy

Year	Incumbent	Proponent	Item (output)	Content
1992	Grand coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Law 91/1992	Setting of the citizenship regime
2000	Center-left coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Law 379/2000	Favoring nationality recovery to descendants of Italians who resided in the former Austrian-Ungaric empire
2000	Center-left coalition	***	Decree of the President of the Republic no. 396/2000	Easing nationality related procedures
2001	Center-right coalition	Opposition party	Bill 204 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i>
2001	Center-right coalition	Opposition party	Bill 974 (consolidated)	Introducing full <i>ius soli</i> Easing residence-based naturalization
2001	Center-right coalition	Opposition party	Bill 1463 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Easing residence-based naturalization Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2003	Center-right coalition	Opposition party	Bill 4237 (consolidated)	Easing residence-based naturalization
2003	Center-right coalition	Opposition party	Bill 4388 (consolidated)	Easing naturalization provided language integration
2003	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 4396 (consolidated)	Restricting naturalization through language and integration test
2003	Center-right coalition	Opposition party	Bill 4492 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Easing residence-based naturalization Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2003	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 4562 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means
2004	Center-right coalition	Opposition party	Bill 4678 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means
2004	Center-right coalition	Opposition party	Bill 4722 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, housing Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2004	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 4966 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Easing residence-based naturalization provided language
2004	Center-right coalition	Various	Bertolini Consolidated Act (rejected)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2004	Center-right coalition	Various	Law 124/2006	Favoring nationality recovery for descendants of former Italians residing in Istria, Fiume, Dalmatia between 1940 and 1947 (provided co-ethnic ties)
2006	Center-left coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 24 (dropped)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means
2006	Center-left coalition	Opposition party	Bi 908 (dropped)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2006	Center-left coalition	Opposition party	Bill 909 (dropped)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2006	Center-left coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 938 (dropped)	Introducing full <i>ius soli</i> Easing residence-based naturalization
2006	Center-left coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 1297 (dropped)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2006	Center-left coalition	Opposition party	Bill 1462 (dropped)	Restricting naturalization through language and integration test

Year	Incumbent	Proponent	Item (output)	Content
2006	Center-left coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 1529 (dropped)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Easing residence-based naturalization provided economic means Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2006	Center-left coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 1570 (dropped)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2006	Center-left coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 1607 (dropped)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2006	Center-left coalition	Opposition party	Bill 1653 (dropped)	Restricting <i>ius soli</i> Restricting naturalization through language and integration course Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2006	Center-left coalition	Opposition party	Bill 1001 (dropped)	Easing nationality revocation for security reasons
2006	Center-left coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 1661 (dropped)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2006	Center-left coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 1686 (dropped)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Favouring nationality acquisition for minors Easing residence-based naturalization Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2006	Center-left coalition	Opposition party	Bill 1693 (dropped)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2006	Center-left coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 1727 (dropped)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2006	Center-left coalition	Opposition party	Bill 1744 (dropped)	Easing nationality revocation for security reasons
2006	Center-left coalition	Opposition party	Bill 1821 (dropped)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2006	Center-left coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 1836 (dropped)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2006	Center-left coalition	Opposition party	Bill 1839 (dropped)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided integration and economic means Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2007	Center-left coalition	Opposition party	Bill 2143 (dropped)	Easing nationality revocation for security reasons
2007	Center-left coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 2253 (dropped)	Favouring nationality acquisition for special merits
2008	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 103 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2008	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 104 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2008	Center-right coalition	Opposition party	Bill 1 457 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional <i>ius soli</i> Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage

Year	Incumbent	Proponent	Item (output)	Content
2008	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 566 (consolidated)	Easing nationality revocation for security reasons
2008	Center-right coalition	Opposition party	Bill 718 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2008	Center-right coalition	Opposition party	Bill 995 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2008	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 1048 (consolidated)	Restricting ius soli Restricting naturalization through language and integration course Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2008	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 1592 (consolidated)	Restricting naturalization through language and integration test
2008	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 2006 (consolidated)	Limiting ius sanguinis Easing the nationality loss Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2008	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 2035 (consolidated)	Easing nationality revocation for security reasons
2009	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 2431 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality recovery for descendants of former Italians residing in former Yugoslavia
2009	Center-right coalition	Bipartisan	Bill 2670 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2009	Center-right coalition	Opposition party	Bill 2684 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Easing residence-based naturalization provided language and integration
2009	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 2904 (consolidated)	Restricting ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Restricting naturalization through language, integration, economic and work requirements
2009	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 2904 (consolidated)	Restricting residence-based naturalization
2009	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Bertolini (A) Consolidated Act (rejected)	Restricting ius soli Restricting residence-based naturalization through language, integration, economic and housing requirements
2009	Center-right coalition	Opposition party	Bressa (A bis) Consolidated Act (rejected)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means Restricting nationality acquisition through marriage
2009	Center-right coalition	Party of the ruling coalition	Law 94/2009	Introduced preliminary indirect requirements to naturalisation: integration agreement and a language test required for the long stay permit. Restricted nationality acquisition through marriage
2011	Grand coalition (Cabinet of Experts)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 4236 (dropped)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education
2011	Grand coalition (Cabinet of Experts)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 4836 (dropped)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education
2012	Grand coalition (Cabinet of Experts)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 5274 (dropped)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education
2012	Grand coalition (Cabinet of Experts)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 5556 (dropped)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education
2012	Grand coalition (Cabinet of Experts)	Opposition party	Bill 5570 (dropped)	Introducing conditional ius soli

Year	Incumbent	Proponent	Item (output)	Content
2012	Grand coalition (Cabinet of Experts)	Regional initiative	Bill 5537 (dropped)	Introducing conditional ius soli
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Popular initiative	Bill 9 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided economic means Easing nationality acquisition through marriage
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 200 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 250 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided economic means Easing nationality acquisition through marriage
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 273 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 275 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 349 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 369 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Opposition party	Bill 404 (consolidated)	Easing nationality revocation for security reasons
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 463 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 494 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 525 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided economic means
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 604 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrated women and their progenies
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 606 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrated women and their progenies
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 647 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 707 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Limiting ius sanguinis Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 794 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrated women and their progenies
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 836 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 886 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for descendants of Italians who lived in the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian empire
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Opposition party	Bill 945 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli

Year	Incumbent	Proponent	Item (output)	Content
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Opposition party	Bill 1204 (consolidated)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 1269 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrated women and their progenies
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Opposition party	Bill 1443 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrated women and their progenies
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Opposition party	Bill 2376 (consolidated)	Restricting ius soli Restricting residence-based naturalization through language, integration, economic and housing requirements
2014	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 2495 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided language and integration
2014	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Various	Bill 2794 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2015	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 3264 (consolidated)	Favouring nationality acquisition for minors
2015	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Various	Fabri Consolidated Act (approved and passed to the Senate)	Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 17 (under consideration)	Introducing full ius soli Restricting ius sanguinis
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Opposition party	Bill 202 (under consideration)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors Easing residence-based naturalization Easing nationality acquisition through marriage
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 255 (under consideration)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided language, integration and economic means
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 271 (under consideration)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 330 (under consideration)	Introducing full ius soli Restricting ius sanguinis Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided language and integration
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 604 (under consideration)	Introducing conditional ius soli
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 927 (under consideration)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education Easing residence-based naturalization provided economic means
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Various	Bill 967 (under consideration)	Introducing conditional ius soli
2015	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Various	Bill 2092 (under consideration)	Introducing conditional ius soli Favouring nationality acquisition for minors provided Italian education
2015	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Opposition party	Bill 2394 (under consideration)	Restricting naturalization through language and integration exam
2013	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 579 (deferred)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2015	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 687 (deferred)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrated women and their progenies
2015	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 994 (deferred)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrated women and their progenies
2015	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 1759 (deferred)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrants and their progenies
2015	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 1819 (deferred)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrated women and their progenies
2015	Grand coalition (Center-left Government)	Party of the ruling coalition	Bill 2003 (deferred)	Favouring nationality acquisition and recovery for emigrated women and their progenies

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has spoken to the debate of convergence versus divergence of national policies in the field of immigrant integration in Europe. Abiding by some of the main conceptual clarifications provided by the scholarship on the notion of integration models (Finotelli and Michalowski 2012) it has moved by addressing such debate keeping the domain of policy of and the domain of politics apart. By identifying the different conceptual and empirical domains in which both the national models argument and the argument of convergence operate it is possible to overcome their apparent contradiction.

Moving from these considerations, the first article of the dissertation kept and addressed the national-models versus convergence dispute as pertains to the ground of policies. In doing so it followed a configurational approach, to say with Vink and Bauböck (2013), still overlooked in the emerging wave of studies comparing integration policies through quantitative synthetic measures. To date, scholars have tended to focus either on the single area of the integration sector or, when broadening their scope, to measure the whole set of measures through one and only index. The conceptual construct of configuration of integration policies (CIP) introduced, hence, provided a new analytical tool to compare policies targeting immigrant integration. The cluster analysis carried out on MIPEX data offered the latest and widest picture of configuration of integration policies present in the European scenario at the time (2015), capturing similarities and differences among them. Basing on these, it was possible to evaluate (albeit in purely descriptive terms) the actual grip of the national models vis-à-vis convergence trends, as well as that of more recent theoretical sparks indicating the emergence of new integration regimes. The picture portrayed two macro policy configurations splitting the European map in two along the West/East line: on the left, countries

with a prolonged experience with the phenomenon of immigration characterized by more liberal frame of policies; on the right, countries that have intensively experienced immigration only in the last years, marked by more restrictive policies. The results collected in this first stage of the project challenged the traditional typology of integration models, brought at the level of policy, in favour of a new two-fold typology of regional regimes, crossed by dynamics of isomorphism. In this respect, the European institutions seem to have played a key role. The variation between the East and West configurations decreases in the areas covered by EU specific legislation, such as in those of residence and antidiscrimination. It is in the traditional areas of integration where greatest variation was observed; particularly in that of citizenship: the classical question of the democratic boundaries of membership seems, still, to divide the ways of approaching integration.

The second stage of the research narrowed the lens of analysis to this area of integration and turned to the domain of politics. Here the purpose was not descriptive, as in the first article, but explanatory. And, more precisely, it was to illuminate on the causal relationship tying the politics of citizenship and the puzzling continuity of nationality laws in Spain and in Italy. In approaching these case studies, I kept on following the conceptual premises setting the domain of policy and that of politics a part. The second and the third article dealt with this matter and they looked at it through the prism of ideational-institutionalism. That is, by examining the set of ideas underlying the politics of citizenship. The second paper centred on an in-depth case analysis of the Spanish case while the third one compared the Spanish evolution of nationality law with the Italian one. Their results demonstrated that ideas “of” citizenship, the ways in which the national ruling elites think about citizenship, played a key role in ensuring institutional continuity of the nationality regimes. At the same time, however, they pointed out two very different political

imaginaries. When the Spanish legislator thinks about citizenship he keeps looking at the diaspora with the manifest intent of facilitating access to nationality to emigrants' descendants. These evidences clash with the conclusions reached by other authors (e.g. Baldi and Goodman 2015; Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes 2012), who agree in seeing Spain ready for reforming its nationality regime. The conception of nationality as a tool for the diaspora and, at the same time, as an area of policymaking unrelated to the governance of the integration process, lasts for over thirty years, substantially shared across the political spectrum. Notwithstanding that what is done does not always go after what is thought, Spain seems still far from reforming its citizenship regime. Italy, in comparison, looks to be further ahead in its reforming trajectory. The Italian policymaker has long been acknowledging the need to revise the 1992 nationality regime according to the new immigration reality of the country. A common direction to undertake has still to be agreed upon though. The fragmented and fast-changing party system is cut across by three main conceptions of citizenship – i.e. ethnic, civic and cultural – that have marked governing coalitions since the “Second Italian Republic”. The differences between the two contexts do not only concern the content of ideas, but also the dynamics through which these brought about institutional stability. In the case of Spain, it is the presence of a dominant and shared system of beliefs and values related to citizenship, a kind of “philosophy of citizenship” paraphrasing Favell’s renowned definition, that prevented the opening of nationality rules to immigrants. All parties agree that citizenship is essentially a diaspora-related matter, not a means of fostering the immigrants’ incorporation into the Spanish society (to which other integration measures are devoted). In the Italian case, there is no such a kind of philosophy: every party has its own distinct stand on citizenship. In this case a different blocking dynamic applies. Here it is the presence of irreconcilable frames within the coalitions in power that has

jammed the liberalization of nationality. The current parliamentary majority seems to represent an exception in this regard: by gathering together parties with closer stances on citizenship (and the concrete focus on foreign minors) citizenship liberalization appears more plausible than ever.

The second and the third article provide a response to the need of the field of study on integration policies, marked by a scarcity of endogenous explanations on citizenship policies, while broadening its scope by analysing two cases that have hardly found in-depth assessment to date. Most of explanatory accounts in this literature can be ascribable to either rational-choice, sociological or, above all, historical institutionalism. Taken together these approaches provided for a valid and compelling theoretical apparatus to account for policymakers' action on integration, but there still seem to be further room for improvement. Despite the variety of factors identified, causal explanations offered by scholars share the same standpoint on causality, emphasizing an external rule-follow logic of causation. More concerned with the constraints that bound choice rather than with the content of choice itself, scholars' lens of analysis tended to be kept outside the core of the policymaking process. Clearly external factors do have an influence on the policy-decision, but they represent only a part of the story. As proved by the present research, policymaking in the sector of immigrant integration is also very much about ideas: beliefs, expectations and moral assumptions held by political actors have a crucial effect in determining the concrete character of the policy and its evolution over time.

At the same time these findings speak to the broad debate on ideas in Political Science contributing at filling one of its gaps. To date, in trying to overcome the limits of the older neo-institutionalist approaches, scholars have turned to ideas mainly to explain the change. There is an expanding literature on how (different types of) ideas interact with

political and institutional contexts generating change (see, for instance, Boswell and Hampshire 2017; Carstensen and Schmidt 2017). Yet, much less has been said about how ideas can prevent such change, a matter that tends to be approached in terms of path-dependency in line with historical institutionalism. The second part of the project has thus contributed at bridging this gap by shedding light on the features and modes of action of ideas as drivers of institutional continuity.

The contribution of this study ends where begin its limitations. These have already been dealt within each article. In the first one it was mentioned the lack of a longitudinal perspective as well as the methodological flaws of the database employed. The second and the third one, which share a qualitative approach and the focus on ideas, lack both a deeper and more compressive assessment of the role played by non-ideational factors, which have just been touched on in the analysis, along with a careful consideration on how citizenship policies tap into, and relates to, other integration policies (particularly as regard residence measures, strictly linked to naturalization procedures).

The politics and the ethics of immigration

To conclude I would like to devote the last thoughts and words of this dissertation looking back to the past when, at the outset of my doctoral path, I approached the study of immigration policies with the aim of combining the perspective of Political Science – which then I pursued – with that of Political Philosophy – which then I left aside. Even if the present research places itself entirely within the boundaries of the former, I believe that it can still provide food for thoughts for the latter. The study of ideas does not only enlarge the horizons of empirical research in the field of immigration policies, it can also offer a pragmatic basis on which developing applied ethics' reflections.

Over the last decades, the broad philosophical debate on immigration and its politics has moved from an “open versus closed borders” between liberal cosmopolitans (such as, Barry 1986; Beitz 1979; Carens 1987; Cole 2006; Kukathas 2005) and liberal communitarians (such as, Meilaender 1999; Miller 2005, 2008; Walzer 1983; Wellman 2013) – where the main bone of contention regarded the right of a sovereign state to act towards non-citizens – to a more pragmatic discussion on how immigration should be governed according to liberal democratic principles as well as to real-world circumstances – where the most important issues pertain to the actual criteria arranged by the states to regulate the slip across its borders as well as rights’ distributed to non-citizens within its territory (Zapata-Barrero and Pécoud 2012). In trying to “bring” normative inquiry closer to praxis scholars (Bader 2012; Carens 2008a, 2008b; Ruhs 2012; Zapata-Barrero 2012) began to look at ethics from a different point of view, that is, by looking at moral rationales underlying current policies. In what probably represents the most exhaustive ethical assessment of migration and its politics, Carens (2013) makes the case for a political theory of immigration “from the ground up”, which relies on the principles driving existing policies deployed by nation-states. The most interesting aspect of his work regards precisely the shift of perspective from an assessment based on theoretical principles, to another one that takes also into consideration concrete rationales underlying policies. Yet, in considering actual moral reasoning underlying admission and integration policies, the author limits his analysis to a subjective understanding of existing laws, without any explicit reference to empirical evidences. This is just an eminent example that points to a wider gap of the so-called field of “ethics of migration studies” (Zapata-Barrero and Pécoud 2012): despite its recent turn toward praxis, this is still a field of inquiry that shows outstanding gaps concerning framework of analysis (Zolberg 2012). What is lacking is some analytical tool

allowing scholars to assess normative principles and moral evaluations that lie behind and drive existing policies. The approach of ideational-institutionalism may provide the tools for making up with such gap. The analysis of belief, values and assumptions held by policymakers, according to which immigration policies are chosen and legitimised, may represent an empirical basis on which building applied normative speculation. That is, a normative assessment of existing policies that in evaluating the complying of polices with principles of liberal theories takes into account also the concrete criteria followed by political actors that “made” such policies. Putting in contact two domains of knowledge that, so far, have proceeded along separate paths in the study of immigration policies, will pave the way for a refined understanding of the relationship between ethics and politics in the governance of immigration.

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