



TESI DOCTORAL UPF / 2020

Mapping press's political ideology
A content analysis of editorial articles from the most read Brazilian online newspapers



Jucinara Schena

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Universitat
Pompeu Fabra
Barcelona

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DOCTORAL THESIS UPF / 2020

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memento mori

∞

*We will need writers who can remember freedom.
The realists of a larger reality.*

— Ursula Le Guin

*to my mother Gessi Neusa Gnoatto Schena &
in memory of my father, Jorge Schena.*

Acknowledgements

Writing the acknowledgements is the last part to be completed in this work, although it is the first to appear. The order is justified now after the research work is accomplished, and it comes the singular moment to look back at these years of the PhD program. With no spare, I must express my gratitude to the ones walking with me this tortuous, nonetheless valuable and fruitful route. Without them, absolutely none of this would have been possible.

My mother may have no idea about the research as I wrote in all these pages, but she is present in every letter. She was prohibited from pursuing her studies when her dream was to be a teacher – she was able to go only until the 3rd year of primary school. And always said she would not make enough to leave me an inheritance, but she would make her best to help me to study whatever I decided for as long as I wanted. During the PhD, with 9,609 km in between, she thought I went a bit too far (literally!), especially considering the number of times cried on video calls saying I could not handle the task any longer – and I'll translate to her this acknowledgement probably crying again, now tears that I did it. She was with me, holding tight these over four years without meeting each other in person (immigration bureaucracy: here I am. Still fighting it).

When I was unsure about to enrol in a PhD program, Rodrigo de Oliveira Machado was by my side and encouraged me to breath and dive in. I am grateful for his undoubted support and his kind words for the time we shared.

In a field where we can presence situations of injustice and pressure against researchers, I wish I could mention everyone who is my inspiration because they are part of the search for a more balanced research environment and with more acceptable mental health conditions. Most of them my classmates during the master program. I am fortunate to have them in my life and call them friends: Sara Paz Suárez (and Pablo Scottol), Pablo Gómez-Domínguez, Lander Aspajo, Alicia Lin, Andrea Corral, Cristina Sánchez-Sánchez, Lucía García Carretero, Gemma Pala Navarro, Alexis Apablaza Campos, Jaqueline Herodek (and Guilherme Suedekum!). James Glass, special thanks for the attentive native speaker review and comments. From each one of you, in our particular relation, I learn a lot.

From Brazil, I have special friends (Carlos A. M. Moreira, Camila Frare, Élin Godois, Mariane Teixeira, Ana Luiza Betto, Gabriela de Oliveira Machado, Eduardo Schneider, Bernardo Petry, Jenifer Almeida, Carol Mascia, Amanda Strószak/Hanna Schwarz & Mariana Vieceli, Anelise De Carli,

Cleandra Gregório, Pedro Fonseca & Paulo Cruz, Samuel Nervo, Barbara Greggianin, Larissa Furini, Nicole Morás, Carol Lopes, Letícia Heger, Dilu Seppi, Nanda Dreier, Marcelo Petter, Fábio Erolí, Ivânia Trento), my family and teachers I had during Journalism (Demétrio Soster, Laura Glüer, Luciana Kraemer, Léo Flores, Lisete Ghiggi, Maria Lucia Melão, Mariceia Benetti, Maristela Franco, Militão de Maya, Valéria Deluca) sending me their best wishes and demonstrating support to get this thesis done.

By my side here in Barcelona amazing friends held my hand and opened their arms for me to rest along this process: Bruna de Oliveira Voltolini and Ana Humbert-Droz: you girls are the best; Sandra Parra, gracias por las dulces-fuertes palabras de siempre; Dominic Bahmani Fard, your words were crucial; Nagla Gaafar, Bianca Grisolia, Sina Kruska, Shqiponjë Ahmedi: flatmates to special friends, also feeding me, sharing drinks and making me laugh in good and bad days and nights; a super team of women friends I have around: Alice Hetzel, Eugenia Juárez, Ekaterina Erémina, Juliana & Taís Fornasier, Anna Goritskaya, Raffaella Sacco, Berta Molina Roger, Ana Metz, Marta Rodrigues, Raquel Marcato.

Crossing paths with Egle Rubio was a miracle. Since then she shares all her joy and care, also shares her amazing Catalan family: Joan & Carme, to whom I am incredibly grateful. A life-changing moment happened when I met Gerard Pastor & Marta Urzaiz and Andy Sanz del Puerto. Thank you for taking care of me, helping me beyond measure and for bringing the confidence to 'just keep swimming'.

Special people from all over the world, the magic of my life: Katia Lampe & Tobias Mugge (Jake and Fiiiiiiütz), Harry Ehrlich, Lisa Tangerine, Melissa Noventa, Davy Bozonnet, Carolina Gomes, Raul Suhett, Laura & Matt, Trevor & Erin, Brandon T., Pedro A. González, Jose Monsalve. Thank you to Jonathan Andrew Harris for his kind support.

Impossible not to think about long hours in the libraries, cafes and bars I've been sitting and trying to focus on this research. I am thankful for the unknown kind smiles and cheerful coffees I got from the hands of all these people I shared a glance.

Here at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, where I did my masters, and I am privileged to finish my PhD, I thank the staff support from the academic department. As a foreigner student, the attention and empathy I found at this Department of Communication were essential for the journey. Here I also had the opportunity to be part of the research project at USQUID Faculty of Communication led by Dr Carles Roca-Cuberes, with whom I gained an understanding of different research methods applied to investigate the aspects

of the superior education system. In addition, the contact with the teaching staff in the department was valuable and positive.

I am especially grateful I followed this program oriented by Dra Núria Almiron. She guided me with patience, along with my tough years and processes. She shared with me much more than her determination and dedication to research in communication. She offered her time to listen to my doubts, showed me that objectives must be reached with a plan, with organisation, objectivity and persistency. And, maybe without knowing, she battled with me my most terrible fears – not all growths result in publishing pieces.

Lastly, I would like to remember all the other immigrant students dedicating the energy of their lives in so many away-from-home countries, how close to a threat of terrorism the effort for education can represent and the various forms of institutional violence we have to handle in countries apparently inclusive, but where we mostly face traits of neocolonialist strategies.

Obrigada
Thank you
Gràcies
Gracias
شكرا
Grazie
Dankeschön
Merci
Спаси́бо
Faleminderit

Abstract

Aware of the well-studied non-neutrality of media and the challenge that represents to have mechanisms to objectively identify the ideological bias, this thesis provides a methodological proposal to assess the political ideology of newspapers. The model's originality lies on merging the contribution from political and communication sciences, as it is built considering the core values of political ideologies. The model is qualitatively inspired by the Critical Discourse Analysis perspective, and quantitatively by the traditional Content Analysis. It allows to compare samples according to an ideological framework and classify the outlets in four categories: elitism, egalitarianism, communitarianism and individualism. The model was applied to study the one-year time frame (2018) of editorial content (n=2,195) from the eight most read online newspapers in Brazil. The results show the feasibility of the model and draw a scenario dominated by a strong elitist discourse with only one off-key Brazilian newspaper leaning towards an egalitarian worldview.

Key words:

political ideologies, pluralism, content analysis, online newspapers, Brazil

Resumo

Consciente da já amplamente estudada não-neutralidade da mídia e do desafio que representa ter mecanismos para identificar objetivamente o viés ideológico, esta tese fornece uma proposta metodológica para avaliar a ideologia política dos jornais. A originalidade do modelo está na fusão das contribuições das ciências políticas e da comunicação, pois é construída considerando os valores das diferentes ideologias políticas. O modelo é qualitativamente inspirado na perspectiva da Análise Crítica do Discurso e quantitativamente na Análise de Conteúdo tradicional. Permite comparar amostras de acordo com uma estrutura ideológica e classificá-las em quatro categorias: elitismo, igualitarismo, comunitarismo e individualismo. O modelo foi aplicado para estudar o período de um ano (2018) do conteúdo editorial (n=2,195) dos oito jornais online mais lidos no Brasil. Os resultados mostram a viabilidade do modelo e traçam um cenário dominado por um forte discurso elitista, com apenas um jornal inclinando-se para uma visão de mundo igualitária.

Palavras-chave:

ideologias políticas, pluralismo, análise de conteúdo, jornais on-line, Brasil

Resum

Conscient de la no-neutralitat dels mitjans de comunicació i del repte que representen els mecanismes per identificar objectivament el biaix ideològic, aquesta tesi proporciona una proposta metodològica per valorar la ideologia política dels diaris. L'originalitat del model rau en fusionar la contribució de les ciències polítiques i de la comunicació, ja que es construeix tenint en compte els valors fonamentals de les ideologies polítiques. El model s'inspira qualitativament en la perspectiva de l'anàlisi crític del discurs i quantitativament en l'anàlisi de contingut tradicional. Permet comparar mostres segons un marc ideològic i classificar-les en quatre categories: elitisme, igualitarisme, comunitarisme i individualisme. El model es va aplicar per estudiar el termini d'un any (2018) de contingut editorial (n=2,195) dels vuit diaris digitals més llegits del Brasil. Els resultats mostren la viabilitat del model i dibuixen un escenari dominat per un fort discurs elitista amb un únic diari brasiler que s'enfoca cap a una visió del món igualitària.

Paraules-clau:

ideologies polítiques, pluralisme, anàlisi de continguts, diaris digitals, Brasil

Resumen

Consciente de la bien estudiada no neutralidad de los medios y del desafío que representa tener mecanismos para identificar objetivamente el sesgo ideológico, esta tesis ofrece una propuesta metodológica para evaluar la ideología política de los periódicos. La originalidad del modelo radica en fusionar la contribución de las ciencias políticas y de la comunicación, ya que se construye teniendo en cuenta los valores de las ideologías políticas. El modelo está inspirado cualitativamente por la perspectiva del Análisis Crítico del Discurso, y cuantitativamente por el Análisis de Contenido tradicional. Permite comparar muestras según un marco ideológico y clasificarlas en cuatro categorías: elitismo, igualitarismo, comunitarismo e individualismo. El modelo se aplicó para estudiar el plazo de un año (2018) del contenido editorial (n=2,195) de los ocho periódicos digitales más leídos en Brasil. Los resultados muestran la viabilidad del modelo y dibujan un escenario dominado por un fuerte discurso elitista con solo un periódico discordante inclinado hacia una cosmovisión igualitaria.

Palabras-clave:

ideologías políticas, pluralismo, análisis de contenido, periódicos digitales, Brasil

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1. INTRODUCTION

This first introductory section, the reader will find responses about the paths that led to the existence of the thesis and under what circumstances it was written. By the matter of organisation, the axes of the structure are described separately, although it is essential to remark that the processes were often in continuous interaction.

1.1 Theme presentation

Most modern theorists of ideology would agree that definitions of ideology typically – perhaps inevitably – risk manifesting the very phenomenon they seek to describe objectively.

Ideology, such thinkers argue, penetrates our thought processes so deeply that even the language and actions of would-be social critics betray affinities with the network of ideas that dominates their culture.

— James M. Decker (2004, 6)

Ideology keeps itself alive, as the legend of the Phoenix, by the energy dedicated by the ones who insist on burying the discussion related to the term and its contemporary uses. The dialogue around the sets of ideas making dominance in our recent history may cause discomfort – and fear - to the ones whose interest is ‘just’ to keep the profitable business running in their territory of power and freedom to conquer distant lands, not differently as the colonisation times. The colonisation by political ideologies plays significant role dissimulated by market blocks formation or the eruption of war – as the world is talking about while this paragraph is being written.

That said, by understanding the essence of ideology as a very important element of thought formation and disseminated mainly by many forms of discourse, the prime goal of this research – which stands in the Communication field – is to contribute with a proposal to assess the political-ideological bias of media outlets. Or, in a very elementary way, an effort to measure media discourse political ideologies.

This thesis understands ideology as a positive and constructive term. Furthermore, to prove this is not an island of the intention of this thesis, very recently, in 2019, Thomas Piketty published *Capital et idéologie*, vigorously advocating for the understanding of the basics about the concept of ideology for nowadays and mainly reformatting the discussion by using a pragmatic view. In the very essence, this thesis understands the necessity of overcoming the valley of bigotry to where the *term ideology* was thrown, precisely in a historical moment where the far-right-wing party (and religious) runs in Brazil by the figure of the president with substantial participation in House of Deputies and Senate. This military-conservative wave flourished using a discourse “no ideologies anymore” as a project of nation.

Ideologies as sets of ideas and discourses that offer support or offer some basis for structuring society existed and – with no fear to say – will exist. Nevertheless, the denial of ideology, the misconception – intentional or not – or the misrepresentation of it corresponds to another discussion, which it is kept in mind for critical reasons, but it does not take place in this work.

By acknowledging the existence of political ideologies, independent of the naming given by different scholars, this thesis sizes the media outlets as part of the structure where the fight for power, especially political power, takes place. Also considers, as it may be clear along with the discourse built in there, that the discourse these outlets present is intrinsically related to an arrangement of intentions – usually very less analogous to the values and beliefs of the journalists in charge that the neutrality-of-the-journalism current likes to accept.

Since there was the impossibility to find a reference model that could comply with the objective of this thesis to study the presence of political-ideological marks in written press content, a methodological proposal was built. The model was constructed in several phases considering the sets of political ideologies to operate proposed by Eatwell & Wright (1993), Schwarzmantel (1998), Eccleshall *et al.* (2003), Tower Sargent (2009), Vincent (2010), Heywood (2012), Freedon, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013), Ball, Dagger & O’Neill (2014) and Almiron, Cole & Freeman (2016) complemented by Nibert (2002) Singer (2003), and Weitzenfeld & Joy (2014).

The reason of using these sets relies on the need to reach a deeper comprehension of the representation of ideology in the media, while at the same time avoiding the problems raised using traditional categories of political ideologies. Thus, the aim is to figure out a tool which is as cross-cultural as possible – so it can be applied to media texts produced in Western democracies – conversely, at the same time, which is nourished by the productive theoretical modern work which has been done on political ideologies.

To study media in Brazil regarding the political position of the outlets by a perspective of political ideologies was considered seminal. At first, regarding scarce fruitful studies – specially dedicated to explore and compare a group of outlets as is the case of this research – and secondly, to magnify the necessity of decentralisation of the definitions regarding political ideologies in order to be useful and workable in a wide range of countries and their political peculiarities.

The theme has its accomplishment in a point where, after running the analysis through the methodological proposal specially constructed for this study, the most read online newspapers' political-ideological marks – or worldviews – position are objectively detected. Complementary and fortunately, the results can discuss in a great extension about to media bias in Brazil, Latin America and over the world as the literature review shows endeavours coming from many places and contexts.

1.2 Topic research justification

Doris Graber, a political science professor from Columbia University, and James Smith, from the University of Illinois-Chicago, stand in defence of a more connected relation between Political Science and Communication. She considers the political effects as an ordinary matter for both in the research field, but admittedly, not the case asserting that “in political science, political communication remains very much a sideline”, hence the reason that “marginality is common in interdisciplinary fields” (Graber 2005, 479).

This conviction – or debate, to leave it open for divergent opinions – outlines what results to be one crucial element for the topic justification on the present research. Due to this fact, it is considered that the conceptualisation of ideology, as well as the sets of political ideologies, was propitiously debated academically by the political philosophy and political science fields, with no flaw nor critics to add from this research's part.

For this thesis, the theoretical background, fortunately, is rich and extensive regarding the discussion around the conceptualisation of ideology and the political ideologies sets offered by scholars. This background supports the necessary knowledge to keep this investigation oriented, also encouraged to think further to question the possibilities and limitations when the objective is to study media political positions or media political bias, as some author also use.

Since the term ideology is well developed and discussed from the authors that need no introduction as Marx, Mannheim, Gramsci, Althusser and Žižek, the requisite was a practical tool to approach the research problem and to operationalise the work. Thus, probably this is the main contribution of this research, relatively speaking.

Another aspect justifying this thesis is the context of the research object, which corresponds to Brazil and the home country of the researcher in training who developed this investigation. Brazil has, in consonance with other countries in Latin America, a prolific position concerning the investigation that cannot be disregarded, especially in Social Sciences and Humanities. As commonly said among us, Latin Americans, “we always have a hand full of research problems right just at the opening of our eyes” considering, in some socio-economical aspects, the central and southern part of the American continent is still dealing with significant problems.

Even though, the studies exploring the media content from various Brazilian outlets giving special attention to the media concentration and power relations, there is a gap that can be filled with the possibilities of investigations considering a more significant sample and provoking more comparative studies. This marks another premise of this thesis, compose a consistent sample formed by more than two newspapers – which is commonly done regarding comparing outlets –

and by that, build a map of the political-ideological position of the country's most read online newspapers. Moreover, it is worth to mention, that this represents a lot, considering these newspapers produce and distribute the everyday content, as in the same way as there is bread on the morning breakfast table, the whole population of such enormous country consumes and form opinions about it.

Finally, imbricated in every aspect of this research work and the author herself, is the consciousness of ourselves as political beings in society – either we want to consider it or not –, how we can navigate it and put heart in making it a greater place, with the tools we have the ability to develop.

Finishing this justification as it started, wise Doris Graber orients: [...] my belief that scholars, as citizens of their country and the world, should prioritize research that holds the promise of improving political life. Others may have different goals. The important thing, it seems to me, as we move deeper into the 21st century is to collectively create a road map for more systematic research development, rather than leaving the outcome to chance. (Graber 2005, 498)

1.3 Research problems and research questions

As outlined previously in the introduction and in the research justification, the main research problem addressed in this thesis is regarding to use a reliable method to approach and define media outlets' political-ideological bias. In fact, as it will be presented along the theoretical background, many scholars dedicated their time to study media bias and contributed with significant insights to access it in communication studies.

Nevertheless, none of the alternatives found tackle consistently the guidelines orienting the present research problem:

- a) a method to empirically assess – quantitative and qualitatively – media written discourse their ideological position
- b) offering the possibility to replicate to study media outlets by other researchers

c) by being a conscious guide aware of the different contexts and the plurality of political-ideological characteristics of many countries, shifting the focus from North America and Western European countries

d) and making possible to compare a wider range of media outlets composing a map regarding their political-ideological bias.

Necessary to have an orientation to keep the focus on this research work, the questions proposed are:

RQ1: How the newspapers' political-ideological bias can be assessed considering the written content?

RQ2: How the Brazilian most read online newspapers can have their bias defined regarding the political-ideological worldviews of the methodological proposal?

RQ3: To what extent the pluralism of political-ideological positions are represented in the editorial columns published by the Brazilian most read online newspapers?

1.4 Research objectives

General objective proposed:

Contribute to communication studies with a proposal towards measuring the media political-ideological bias.

Specific objectives proposed:

1. Assess the most read Brazilian online newspapers by its written content regarding their position to a spectrum of political ideologies.

2. Trace in the editorial section in the sample of the eight most read Brazilian online newspapers the marks of political ideologies position.

3. Measure how the political ideology positions appear in the most read Brazilian online newspapers' editorial content according to the political-ideological set proposed (*Elitism, Egalitarianism, Communitarianism, Individualist*, and its possibilities of combinations).

4. Determine, according to the political-ideological discourse presented, the dominant position of the newspapers analysed regarding the political-ideological set proposed and generate a map as a visual support.

5. Identify the differences in the positions of the newspapers analysed regarding the different topics covered along the time frame defined.

1.5 Research motivation

*O Brasil não é para principiantes.¹
— Antônio Carlos Jobim*

It is the moment where the singular form of the first person reminds the human behind every single letter typed here. The part where, as a researcher, I get to talk directly. Even though I am a researcher in my basic formation and my native language is not English, nor one of languages this thesis is being presented. Although, inspired by Cortázar who, in 1966², wisely evokes the value of being original, the

¹Translation by the author from Brazilian Portuguese: “*Brazil is not for beginners.*” Jobim was a famous Brazilian poet, singer and songwriter, globally known for the song *Girl from Ipanema* he did together with Vinícius de Moraes.

² Cortázar lee a Cortázar, 1966. “*Más vale leer mal siendo uno mismo que pretender igualar a un buen lector profesional.*” YouTube video, 2’55”: <https://youtu.be/pPCTQtC5Oto>

readers will find here I rather write according to my possibilities and limitations – when I know the limits I get the sense of what I can improve – than to sound naive pretending to be a researcher with large experience; or to get frustrated by that and compromising the great opportunity to learn.

In the first years of Journalism School in Brazil, I had the opportunity to have inspiring teachers providing my first contact with critical studies in the field. The time went on, and my interest grew an exponentially. Years later, during the master, even though I had many doubts on where to focus my research, I was sure I would place myself into critical studies.

My very fundamental question, ever since the decision to study journalism, was related to what extent we, readers, news consumers and news producers, are effectively aware of the battle of interests behind the news production. Also, if we are skilful enough to access the hidden information in between the news lines, especially when biased to political views; considering the readers as individuals in constant transformation, as almost everything in the world, and with capacities to interpret, give meaning to it and allowing the news piece impact their lives. My primal curiosity input flourished with the contact with my present thesis director's interest and her research done so far.

We got united on the research possibilities on whether and how the news media exert power mainly throughout the written content, which represents the primary way we get informed: by reading. With the internet, the imagetic support took considerable dominance but I consider the subtler bias, the everyday dose of information hitting always the same keys, are still in the texts.

Fortunately, with excellent guidance, I got to educate myself about political ideologies – which is a complete and complex field of study itself – since it was necessary to understand how to connect it with media discourse I was interested in investigating. Also, clearing out the ideology term, which I got to understand it was – and surprisingly still is – more misused than I could even imagine. Now I see myself in a place where I can think about the central concept without the fear of the misusing the term and leading to a more definite way of thinking regarding it, useful beyond this research work and “connecting dots”

from my Anthropology courses and professional and personal experiences.

From there, the literature review about researchers' proposals and conclusions captivated by the same topic threw light on the direction to walk – either global initiatives and from Latin American countries sharing social, cultural and political resemblance with Brazil. In the same way, the literature review helped to understand we had something different to propose in order to study the media discourse and its bias-related specifically to political ideologies in the country.

Among many possibilities to structure the research, one way was chosen and one approach was designed, understanding that different investigations require different approaches, according to the specific questions and objects; and even proven and pertinent methodological tactics must be adjusted to the specific characteristics of the object and the specific design of the investigation. The result is, within the limits of this thesis, a methodological proposal to analyse media bias and hopefully contribute to the field, fundamentally aiming it to be socially significant.

Aiming the arrow very high, it holds the desire to get this information spread and more useful to news consumers as a questioning tool in order reduce the idealization gap regarding the news products as “holders the one and only truth”. Thinking on the readers, but also the news producers: to be mindful of our ideological implication in the results of our writings. Specially in Brazil, with the import of an impartial media idea from the United States decades ago that remains yet still.

Therefore, it is considered that all theoretical, epistemological and methodological discussion is essential for the formation of a research culture; and that a satisfactory management of diverse perspectives, concepts and approaches in this area is an integral part of every researcher's personal continuing education, consequently for the unfolding and constant revision of the topics in the Communication field. Nevertheless, here it is something else, closer, more urgent and more concrete – that is the opportunity to use their dissertation or thesis research as a field of practice, to build experience on ways to conduct research and to learn from their challenges.

This work, which I expect, to be solidly supported by exhaustive theoretical fundamentals and by extensive academic literature production along many decades of studies in Communication, is made possible by the privilege I had to get in touch – from a wide range of sources – with more critical views from theoretical-methodological order, and pertinent to the history of knowledge in the Human and Social Sciences.

In this space of developing this doctoral research, I did not do journalism, literature, art, or activism, but attempt to produce knowledge, although I do not take this scientific task naively as pure, absolute objective or neutral. As I do not take any content or product I get in contact with. In case it is possible – and the desirable –, if this work can forge thought-provoking interactions, I already consider the major objective of this thesis as achieved.

Thus, I am taking this opportunity to stand with a necessary distance from the research object, but also taking position and not contributing to the market oriented academic conjuncture – we all know it exists – such as “help us to better understand what is happening but, above all, say only what we want to hear”³ as Wolton (1997, 5) properly shares in his *Thinking the Communication* book.

1.6 Thesis structure

The structure of the thesis here presented follows the established models for the monographic presentation of research work. The backbone of the presentation follows the necessary order: an introduction, the research background, the state of the question and literature review, the methodology, findings and, lastly, the conclusion. Furthermore, when necessary, it was adjusted to better present the aspects considering the particularities of the research topic inside these master chapters’ division. The process of building the adjustments was

³ Translated from Portuguese from Portugal: “ajude-nos a compreender melhor o que se passa mas, acima de tudo, diga só aquilo que queremos ouvir.”

constant in attention to the evolution of the research as a live matter unfolding its potential and necessities.

The *introduction* had the duty of organising keywords of the research in an understandable and brief piece of text. It presents the research justification, or the reason for the existence of this thesis, together with the research motivation. United, these two points define the intersection where the researcher's figure and the research topic – with all its latent possibilities – meet. From this unique joint, the research problems are evaluated and organised, as well as the research objectives and the research questions are stated to guide the progress during the entire process.

The *theoretical background* was structured to start from the very basic: the concept of ideology. Since, ideology, in general along the history, attracted attention in profusion, the order followed a chronological reason to bring the main contributions from the authors who handled the study of this science of the ideas, as first stated by Destutt de Tracy. The richness of the contributions to the study of ideology was presented to overcome the limitations of length and objective of this investigation. However, the chapter intended to represent the construction around the conceptualisation given by the leading authors, highlighting the advances of each and, if the case, the divergent views. This chapter also includes the attention given by media studies to ideology, and some of the essential perspectives in the field. The bond of media and ideology appears mainly in authors acknowledging the bias existent and presented by media regarding one or another set of values.

The *state of the question* and the *literature review* contains the global scenario of media studies when talking about studies in media and politics, added by a subchapter where the same scope is taken but zooming into the Brazilian frame.

Following on to the *methodology*, the choice made to organise this chapter was first to make intelligible the two approaches combined as a methodological perspective to compose the methodological proposal: on one side, a Critical Discourse Analysis, and, my the other, a traditional Content Analysis. Therefore, the method designed for this research is profoundly described, step-by-step, followed by the

technical details of the research process, as well as the online newspapers from Brazil considered for the investigation, the time frame and the sample composition.

The *findings* are at first presented according to the quantitative aspects per newspaper: *Folha de São Paulo*, *O Globo*, *O Estado de São Paulo*, *Estado de Minas*, *O Tempo*, *Zero Hora*, *Valor Econômico* and *Correio Braziliense*. It mainly shows the dominant worldview found considering the total number of articles of each newspaper, the topics portrayed and the frequency. Furthermore, it is presented the occurrence of topics considering only the articles registered by what composed the dominant bias of a newspaper. Then the qualitative content analysis succeeds in the same newspaper order and remarks mostly the presence of the core values dominant in each newspaper and organises the characteristics of the content justifying the bias found. Both quantitative and qualitative, have a recapitulation of the results after each part on the presentation of the findings. This chapter ends with an overview that stands with the results complementarily.

The *conclusion* is where the findings are reviewed regarding the research questions proposed when this investigation was emerging, and the discussion rather opens to connections with other studies in the Communication field but not only.

Finally, in the *discussion* it was the moment to think about the whole research process, and the connections with other studies within the communication field, but not limited to it. Also, it was a moment to zoom out from this investigation and expand to build bridges with other theoretical and methodological aspects that may lead to other investigations and discussions, respectively.

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In the present chapter, the theoretical background summarises the content regarding the topic of this research and the research problems detected. This relevant background limits the scope of the topic investigated primarily in two key variables 1) the term ideology, its definition and evolution among authors along with the history, and 2) the definition of *political ideologies* and especially the sets of political ideologies proposed by the specialised literature – mainly from Political Science.

This theoretical background is crucial to navigate through of concepts and variables according to given definitions, it also supports the construction of specific viewpoints taken for further data interpretation, and finally, it is expected to build new key knowledge by validating or challenging theoretical assumptions.

2.1 Ideology

*The fact that theoretical systems have been superseded
does not mean they were not once valid.
— Terry Eagleton (1991, 118)*

2.1.1 Ideology was born

In the process of exploring the extensive writings about ideology, a critical warning was given by every single scholar on political philosophy consulted for this present research: the uniqueness of working with the concept. This advice was taken with special care, since this work, and especially the researcher behind it, are partly like a foreigner – from the Communication field – landing on the unfamiliar territory – Political Philosophy. A clarification is necessary here: the foreigner considers herself in a privileged place for having the opportunity to look at the world from different perspectives, also for the openness to keep learning in this process of questioning the

assumptions one makes about themselves, others and everything contained in this pale blue ball. Despite all of this, the newcomer is enlightened but fearless and moved by curiosity to dive deep in search of understanding about the history and the theories of *ideology* by philosophers, politicians, historians, anthropologists, psychoanalysts, social and political scientists over time. That said, it composes the objective of this section in order to develop grounded research in communication-related to the presence of ideological marks in written media content. It is also the centrepiece to develop, in section 2.2 the political-ideological sets proposed by a group of authors in the recent decades.

Ideology itself represents an important topic of interest in social science, especially in the fields of political science, sociology and linguistics (Fine and Sandstrom 1993). Any political theorist familiar with the literature on ideology would be perfectly aware of – and frustrated by – the proliferation of different conceptions of ideology in both the Marxist and the non-Marxist tradition (Williams 1988). The ramifications of it reach studies in other multiple fields concerned in the conditions of the human social existence, as stated by István Mészáros “yet, the plain truth is that in our societies everything is ‘soaked in ideology’, whether we realise it or not” (2005, 3).

The endeavour of building a coherent timeline among the vast theoretical writings about ideology along the history can be confusing and misleading work, especially in the effort of constructing a background within the precise delimitation for a PhD thesis.

Fortunately, for this task, reliable set sources were accessed and served as reference pillars. Scholars like the North American historian Emmet Kennedy dedicated time to this duty with great results. He is responsible for one of the most objective and consistent article-length texts written about the history of the term *ideology*, which was originated from the author’s thesis in Brandeis University (USA), in 1973. Published in *Journal of the History of Ideas* in 1979, Kennedy analysed in depth the course of the concept from its first proposal, by Destutt de Tracy, to Marx. Brian William Head is altogether a major contributor in the recompilation of Destutt de Tracy’s works in a study that began in his doctoral dissertation at the London School of Economics and

Political Science and ended as a printed book titled *Ideology and Social Science – Destutt de Tracy and French Liberalism* in 1985. Contemporary to Kennedy and Brian, Nestor Capdevila's work is of one of the most important recent books exclusively about the concept of ideology, published in French for the first time in 2004, and two years later its version to Spanish. It is important to remark that Capdevila can be highlighted and get the merit for writing in an accessible and fluid way without being shallow. Also, John Gerring, professor of Political Science at Boston University, in his *Ideology: a definitional analysis*, published in 1997, argues about the patterns of approaches in the study of ideology and builds a framework attributes regularly associated with ideology in contemporary discourse within social science. Lastly, and representing a fresh approach in the field, Jonathan Leader Maynard, researcher from the Department of Politics and International Relations of University of Oxford published, on the *Journal of Political Ideologies*, in 2013, an article titled *A map of the field of ideological analysis* where the author organises the study of ideologies chronologically. For this thesis – having in mind, it is not affiliated to the political science or philosophy department – to rely on such type of support is very important, in the sense of also giving a breath of hope on how such a dense theme can be operated in other areas.

In this theoretical background, in alignment with the literature about the history of the term, it is considered there is no wrong use of the concept of *ideology*, nor it is judged or censored. Instead, the standpoint is where everything comes sewed in the high texturized social fabric, and it composes a history of evolution instead. And not necessarily a harmonious one. The contextualized narrative about the term, theorists and researchers are respected in this chapter, and the most impacting changes and mutations of understandings and applications of the term *ideology* are exposed. Considering the intense *saga* it has, the attentive inspection through the history of the term is valid and necessary, as Decker argues:

Although media pundits of the latter half of the twentieth century tended to pursue a fairly uniform – and pejorative – definition of ideology, the term possesses a rich, contentious history that covers far more terrain than the

contemporary sound-bite version suggests. (Decker 2004, 3)

Starting with the term's coinage: the word *ideology* derived from ancient Greek *idéo* [ἰδέα] complemented by *logos* [λόγος] or its suffix *logie* [λογίᾱ] (Oxford Concise Dictionary of English Etymology 2000, 227; Online Etymology Dictionary⁴). The first, ahead recognisable, is translated as *idea* and the second is the base for nouns denoting *knowledge, the study of something, or the branch of knowledge of a discipline*, in this case, a study of the ideas. Both words are connected by *o*, according to the Greek rule when combining nouns.

Establishing a science of the ideas with origin in the senses was the main intention when the French soldier, politician, economist and philosopher Antoine-Louis-Claude Destutt de Tracy devised the term *ideology*. His most famous work, *Eléments d'idéologie*, was first entirely published in Paris in between 1817 and 1818 with a second and implement edition in 1824-1825. The opus composed by four volumes written separately in different times: *Idéologie proprement dite* (1801), *Grammaire* (1803), *Logique* (1805), and *Traité de la volonté et de ses effets* (1815) (Klein 1985, 54).

Therefore, some biographical details about Destutt de Tracy are necessary to elucidate the circumstances of the composition and publication of his writings, highlighting it with the political and philosophical debates and social problems of his time. In particular, the intellectual and political currents in France during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. As part of an elite, the counts of Tracy and popularly known as Destutt de Tracy, he was born in 1754 and died in 1836. In his 81 years of life, he actively participated in the political life in France, especially during the turbulent time of the French Revolution that broke out in 1789 and culminated with the end of the French monarchy and the rising of Napoleon dictatorships.

Destutt de Tracy's full works about ideology are composed in volumes in the order mentioned above because the author's aim was

⁴ From: <https://www.etymonline.com/word/ideology> Accessed 16th Dec 2018.

⁵ The attribution of 'dictator' title or not, as well as the nature of Napoleon Bonaparte's power is long exposed in Tulard 1995; and in Bluche, Rials and Tulard 1995.

“to teach lessons about how ideas are formed, deduced, combined and expressed” (Tellechea 2008), using the resources of firstly grammar, then logical thought and knowledge about will and moral. It was also planned to be applied in the newly founded *Institut National des Sciences et des Arts*, in which Destutt was a member altogether with most outstanding men in the sciences and the French arts.

Another strategy to consolidate the ideas that Destutt worked part of his life for, was the inclusion, in 1835, of the term *ideology* in the *Dictionnaire*, maximum publication of the French Academy (*l'Académie Française de la Langue*, founded in 1635). Strategically, Destutt was involved in the organisation of this edition (Kennedy 1979). The author himself explains the reason for his effort in a foreword, titled *Advertisement*, where he declares:

If I cannot flatter myself with the hope of bringing so important a work to perfection, I wish at least to contribute to it as much as is in my power; and I hope to contribute to it, perhaps even by the faults from which I shall not have been able to guard myself. My three first volumes of *ideology*, *grammar* and *logic*, compose the first section, or the history of our means of knowledge. (English translation by Thomas Jefferson in the 1817)

Living in such a full of commotion period was the breeding ground for Destutt de Tracy theorize about the formation, aggrupation and propagation of ideas (Welch 1984; Vartanian 1981) based in the senses – the joining point of the empirical theories. As pointed out by Head (1985), Destutt de Tracy would have said *Je sens, donc je suis* (I feel therefore I am), paraphrasing Descartes’ famous sentence *Je pense donc je suis* (I think, therefore I am), in reference to the mental representation of the external objects, even though Destutt was conscious about Descartes contributions with his observational methods.

For the French philosopher, ideology would be “a superscience that would tie political, economic, and social issues together through the universal application of its insights into human behaviour” (Terrell 1999, 2). His effort in organizing “an approach to understanding how ideas are formed” (Sargent 2009, 6) and “to establish a solid and unquestionable method by which correct ideas could be scientifically

identified” (Eccleshall *et al.* 2003, 3) made him academically known as the *father of ideology* (Eccleshall 2003; Kennedy 1979). Destutt’s project with the science of the ideas in an empirically verifiable basis had an even bigger purpose. With his fellow ideologists, Destutt also planned the incorporation of the science of ideas method as a doctrine in the French educational system. The objective was to promote a citizen formation for the French Republic and “to foster the use of reason in the governance of human affairs for the betterment of society as a whole” (Eccleshall *et al.* 2003, 3).

The bigger scenario in where Destutt de Tracy was immersed, the intense Age of Enlightenment, marks the origin of all inspiration to study society with more methodical tools, as the natural sciences. Condillac (Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, 1714-1780), in this way, is his primary reference (Hine 1979; Kennedy 1979; Head 1985; Klein 1985; Decker 2004). Destutt himself, in his retirement diaries, wrote, “Lavoisier led me to Condillac” (Head 1985, 9).

On his turn, Condillac is associated with a selected group of influential figures in the history of philosophy as the empiricist John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, and the Scottish philosopher David Humme. Despite Locke's declared empiricist vocation, his distinction between the interiority and externality of experience left an impression on Condillac, whose investigation was aimed at reducing to a single principle everything concerning the human understanding. Condillac’s main argument was that all the knowledge and human faculties come from the experience of the senses and it was adopted by Destutt de Tracy when planning the definition and the uses of the concept of *ideology*. Condillac also contributed to Destutt’s theories with his principles about language, defending it as the vehicle of the feelings experienced by the collective of the senses. For him, the structure of the language reflects the structure of the thought (Condillac 2001), and that is the reason why Condillac is more known in the linguistics field.

Another essential reference in Destutt’s life and ideas came from Cabanis (1757-1808), French scientist and materialist philosopher, and to whom he was a colleague in the National Assembly, a close friend and together with a member of intellectual groups in Paris at that time. To Cabanis, Destutt dedicated ones of the volumes of his works, and

in the opening letter of the third part, he speaks in the first person addressing directly to Cabanis. Destutt de Tracy writes:

The goal that I most desire is that my work might be regarded as a consequence of yours, and that you might see it as a corollary of the principles which you have expounded. Such a result would be extremely advantageous not only for me, but for the science itself which henceforth would be placed on its true foundation: for, if I deserve such praise, the intention of Locke is fulfilled; his great idea is realised; and in accordance with his wish, the detailed history of our intelligence is at last part and dependent of the *physique humaine*.⁷ (Destutt de Tracy 1805, viii)

Destutt de Tracy's effort is always remembered – and in recent times much less criticized than he was when alive:

Tracy was an important link in the chain of French liberalism in politics and economics; he was a methodological precursor of behaviouralist approaches to the human sciences; and he was a pioneer of new social concepts which became established in a variety of forms throughout the nineteenth century. (Head 1985, 1)

Facing the debate and critics his ideas were generating, Destutt de Tracy was trying to explain he did not have the intention of classifying as the same physical and social sciences, but instead, as Kennedy understands, the French philosopher had another approach:

Through observation and deduction, not calculus or geometry, one could discover the other propositions contained in the original truth, 'man is a sensitive being', and thereby reduce all the human sciences to a few basic truths. This science of observation and deduction, the "analysis of ideas," all ideas, not just mathematical ideas,

⁶ Italics by the thesis author. It highlights the name used at that time for the field.

⁷ In the original French text: "*c'est que mon Ouvrage puisse être regardé comme une conséquence de vôtre, et que vous même n'y voyiez qu'un corollaire des principes que vous avez exposés. Un pareil résultat serait extrêmement advantageous non seulement pour moi, més pour la science elle-même, qui dès lors se trouverait replacée sur ses véritables bases : car si je mérite cet éloge, l'intention de Locke est remplie ; sa grande idée est réalisée ; et suivant son desir, l'histoire détaillée de notre intelligence est enfin une portion et une dépendance de la physique humaine.*"

was “ideology” to which all the other sciences could be reduced. “Ideology” itself reducible to none, guaranteed the unity of the sciences. (Kennedy 1978, 50)

Following Locke’s empiricist vocation, for Destutt and the ideologists, the general principles of knowledge were not in this context the result of a purely speculative postulation. Understood from Destutt’s writings as a whole, it meant to be the result of an analysis of the human ability to experiment, where sensation and reflection were constituted as the ordering reference of all intellectual operation, denying the Christian explanation of men endowed in an innate way of ideas like the idea of God. As explain Head:

Tracy typified a particular strand of late eighteenth-century thought in which reason, truth, liberty and happiness became mutually entwined, as both the means and end of a progressive social and philosophical movement against the forces of ignorance, repression, habit and superstition. Tracy’s search for fundamental truths about the individual and society, led him back to an enquiry into the operations of the human intellect. (Head 1985, 16-17)

Apart from the considerations of the father of ideology about the human capacities – thoughts, sensibility and sensations, memory, willingness, desires, judgements – described extensively in the first chapter of the first volume of *Elements of Ideology* (1801), some fundamental elements are essential to comprehend the meaning of ideology to Destutt de Tracy. One of them is *society*, since, shared ideas require a group of humans living in an interconnected and somehow organised way. In his *Eléments d’Idéologie*, Destutt exposes his conception of society clearly:

Society is purely and solely a continual series of exchanges. It is never anything else, in any epoch of its duration, from its commencement the most unformed, to its greatest perfection. And this is the greatest eulogy we can give to it, for exchange is an admirable transaction, in which the two contracting parties always both gain; consequently, society is an uninterrupted succession of advantages, unceasingly

renewed for all its members.⁸ (English translation by Thomas Jefferson in the 1817 edition, page iii)

In his stance, for the society, he envisioned, “ideology sought to replace theology as the dominant unifying system” (Terrell 1999, 2) complementing by the substitution of royalism for republican ideals as the guides for the common good. Religion, in this case, is related to “the fact that it serves for the metaphysical justification of the existing despotism” (Karus 2013, 133).

Regarding the designation of the new science defended by Destutt de Tracy and other philosophers aligned with him, Capdevila (2006; 2008) explains that the principles of studying the origin of the ideas could be understood somehow as an extension of previous theories, from Bacon and Locke, as mentioned above. Furthermore, it would not justify the necessity of a new name. Although the ideologist doubted about to assign the name, they argued they wanted to avoid the metaphysical misunderstandings it could cause, and methodically clarifying the object of their studies – the ideas – in the name used (Capdevila 2006, 26-27). They did not intend to find a new philosophy but stipulate an interdisciplinary scientific matrix whose central concern aims to link a plethora of institutionally dispersed disciplines. As science among the sciences, its supremacy rests, precisely, on the power to unify in a general theory of human faculties, all observable facts, recognizing that social sciences were fundamentally different from physical sciences, but considering deductive methods should be applied in both.

The transition to term from the philosophical stance to the political can only be understood when seeing the particularities of the revolutionary vocation of those who professed ideology as a science. For that, Destutt de Tracy did not stand alone, he was part of a group pejoratively called by Napoleon as *ideologues*.

⁸ In the original French text: “Je ne crains point de le dire : La société est purement et simplement une série continuelle d'échanges ; elle n'est jamais autre chose dans aucune époque de sa durée, depuis son commencement le plus informe jusqu'à sa plus grande perfection ; et c'est là le plus grand éloge qu'on en puisse faire, car l'échange est une transaction admirable dans laquelle les deux contractants gagnent toujours tous deux : par conséquent la société est une suite non interrompue d'avantages sans cesse renaissants pour tous ses membres”. In Destutt de Tracy. *Éléments d'idéologie: Traité de la Volonté et des ses effets*. Quatrième et cinquième parties.

The French epistemologist and historian, Georges Gusdorf, reminds Napoleon's words in which the ideologists are accused as the cause of France's tribulation:

All the misfortunes of France must be attributed to the ideology, to this dark metaphysics that, seeking with subtlety the first causes, wants to base on these bases the legislation of the peoples, instead of adapting the laws to the knowledge of the human heart and to the lessons of history. Who has proclaimed the principle of insurrection as a duty? Who has flattered the people by proclaiming for him a sovereignty that he was unable to exercise? Who has destroyed the sanctity and the respect of the laws, making them depend not on sacred principles of justice, on the nature of things and on civil justice, but only on the will of an assembly composed of men alien to the knowledge of the civil, criminal, administrative, political and military laws? When we are called to regenerate a State, what we must follow are the constantly opposed principles.⁹ (Gusdorf 1978: 315)

The group's auto denomination was instead *ideologists*. The suffix *-logue*, appearing in many of French-derived words, added intentionally by Napoleon, gave the tone to "one who is immersed in" or "driven by" (Macherey 2006), in a manoeuvre to discredit the new tide of ideas and damage their reputation because, as politicians, some ideologists were members of the *États Généraux*¹⁰ or high positions

⁹ Translation by the author. In the original French text: "C'est à l'idéologie, à cette ténébreuse métaphysique qui, en recherchant avec subtilité les causes premières, veut sur ces bases fonder la législation des peuples, au lieu d'approprier les lois à la connaissance du cœur humain et aux leçons de l'histoire, qu'il faut attribuer tous les malheurs qu'a éprouvés notre belle France. Qui a proclamé le principe d'insurrection comme un devoir? Qui a adulé le peuple en le proclamant à une souveraineté qu'il était incapable d'exercer? Qui a détruit la sainteté et le respect des lois, en les faisant dépendre, non des principes sacrés de la justice, de la nature des choses et de la justice civile, mais seulement de la volonté d'une assemblée composée d'hommes étrangers à la connaissance des lois civiles, criminelles, administratives, politiques et militaires? Lorsqu'on est appelé à régénérer un Etat, ce sont des principes constamment opposés qu'il faut suivre."

¹⁰ At that time, in the political system of the kingdom of France, an extraordinary representative assembly would put together the three orders (the states) of the society: the nobility, the clergy and the third state (which was all the people not included in the other two, or the bigger majority of the population under such regime).

holders. As clarifies Freedon (2003), Napoleon, soon after getting in contact with ideologists' ideas, showed rejection because of the liberal project standing against his dictatorial egotistical plan. Destutt's concerns went in confrontation with autocratic Napoleon's regime and under his command, not denying his depreciation for opposite ideas, censorship to Destutt's books was applied (Macherey 2008). Also, in Europe, the tag applied by Napoleon worked discursively well, and from it, a "highly unflattering portrait of *ideologien*¹¹ emerged" (Head 1985, 1), which influenced subsequent interpretations.

Considering that explanation, a misuse of the term *ideologues*, as a curious example found in one of the reference books for this thesis, is found in *A new handbook of Political Science* edited by Goodin and Klingemann (1996). Mattei Dogan, the author of a chapter discussing the connecting and differentiating points between political science and other social sciences, states "debates between ideologues are possible, even if often sterile; but between methodological schools, they are inconclusive" (Dogan 1996, 109). Important to remember that in some cases in recent literature, *ideologists* and *ideologues* are used as synonyms, as appears in Durham and Kellner (2006) and Head (1985).

Since ideology's history is well supplied with many voices with different kinds of reservations, interpretations, reformulations and critics, the main ones are synthesized in this theoretical background. There are also scholars as István Mészáros (1930-1917), who raise one reasonable argument in favour of Napoleon's depreciative tag to the ideologists:

Napoleon was therefore quite right in criticizing the 'ideologues' for their abstract metaphysical projections and utter failure to take into consideration in their theories 'the human heart and the lessons of history'. This is how the 'positivist rot' (to which Marx later referred with well justified sarcasm) originated on the ruins of bourgeois Enlightenment. (Mészáros 2005, 382)

Being criticised and censored did not stop the term *ideology* of spreading and gaining followers much broader than in Europe. For the

¹¹ Italics by the author quoted.

good or the bad, as once ideas come out loud or come out printed, they fly, escaping human imposed boundaries for a destiny unknown. In this case, Thomas Jefferson was the one on the way, and as soon in contact with Destutt de Tracy's writings, he made the words of the French thinker cross the ocean. Unique contact of Jefferson with the European country was facilitated by his position as an ambassador of the United States in France from 1785 to 1789.

Jefferson was responsible for the English first translation in the United States of America of Destutt's *Commentary and Review of Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws* (1811) when it was censored in France by Napoleon. Most known as the author of the United States' Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson as a political philosopher, believed in confronting the colonisation from European powers to build a new society and Tracy's critics addressed to Montesquieu's defence of monarchy served as the reference for the American republicanism supporter. Also, six years later he was responsible for the translation to English and the publication of the multi-volume work *Elements of Ideology*, in 1817.

The connection between both statesmen was the sharp critics against monarchical authoritarianism and the concern about in which way the political organisation of a state can foment better living based on the purpose of regenerating society using rational knowledge. One, west across the Atlantic Ocean, wrote books and famous letters on his perception and critics addressed to monarchical regimes in Europe, as the letter from 1810, to then-Governor John Langdon, titled *On the Breeding of Kings*¹², where – in a very literate man's words – he calls many kings and queens crazy and fools. In his turn, the French ideologist had to deal with the critics related to his works regarding the elements of ideology. He was judged by the balance between his theoretical works – verified by the long explanations and revisions Destutt included in each sequent volume – and his position as a politician in the effervescence of the French Revolution, in Napoleon's mainly conflictive regime.

¹² Thomas Jefferson's complete archive of letters in http://archive.org/stream/lettersaddresses00jeffiala/lettersaddresses00jeffiala_djvu.txt Accessed 16th Dec 2019.

Moreover, it all came useful for Jefferson for justification, especially against the British regime and the colonies jurisdiction system. For the third president of the United States of America and an active participant in the previous presidencies, Destutt de Tracy's conception of society came serviceable to structure the solid base of Jefferson's ideal nation as an 'empire of liberty' (Tucker and Hendrickson 1992, ix).

Heading to the end of Destutt de Tracy's era in ideology, it is essential to mention a couple of puzzling facts about this first stage in the development of the term *ideology*. Two attributes that marked the uses of ideology and are useful to understand in its history to get the sense of what it is known nowadays.

One fact related to the time when ideology was just a novelty – underlining it was not by Destutt's proposal – is the shift of the term towards the plurality of ideas, or saying, the unfold towards the notion of the existence of more than one ideology. This way of taking ideology is the origin of ideology sets, and it brings us to the approach to our days that when people use the term, they are usually referring to a particular ideology, rather than the concept itself. As explains Kennedy (1979), during the general Malet's unsuccessful strategy of a coup to overthrow Napoleon, there was a rumour of a plan to bring back the Bourbons. At this moment, appeared written by Lemare, on a manifesto in Malet's defence that him “and his fellow conspirators continued to follow *another ideology*”, inferring the idea of royalism. It was the point where the association of ideology with politics happened and “the plurality and conflict of ideologies” (Kennedy 1979, 363) were first considered.

The second fact is related to the notion of left and right-wing, well-known and used more consistently from the beginning of the twentieth century, to compose a horizontal spectrum when classifying political ideologies. The intriguing fact is that left and right idea were born in the same context and around the same time as the term ideology, but they were not associated. Both representing the extremes of a linear scale, the nomenclature was coined initially referring to the physical seating arrangements of delegates during in the French National Assembly. The debate over how much authority King Louis

XVI should have, got the politicians divided in anti-royalist revolutionaries seated themselves to the presiding officer's left, while the conservative part and supporters of the monarchy gathered to the right side. The division was reinforced by the newspapers that adopted in their articles the classification to the progressive left and traditionalist right of the French assembly (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). The distinctions physically disappeared during the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte, but with the beginning of a constitutional monarchy in France in 1814, liberal and conservative representatives once again organised their posts on the left and right of the legislative chamber. By the mid-nineteenth century, *left* and *right* had solid ground in French vocabulary meaning opposing political ideologies. Political parties even began self-identifying as *centre left*, *centre right*, *extreme left* and *extreme right*. Nowadays is accepted the left-right political spectrum is a system to classifying political positions, ideologies and parties, from equality on the left to social hierarchy on the right. Finally, it comes very useful to understand the sets proposed by authors to name the various and different groups of thoughts, mainly connecting to political ideas but not only, as detailed in the following subchapter.

Along with the history, "Tracy and the ideologues have been forgotten and rediscovered several times", and the remembrance was more specifically related to certain themes in the ideologists' writings, for example, their "liberal republicanism, their anticlericalism, or their scientific pretensions" (Head 1985, 1). Also, complemented by other scholars' interest to "analyse the boundaries of thought" (Decker 2004, 16) started by the French ideologists. For Michael Freeden, a leading contemporary theorist about ideology, "Destutt de Tracy's intentions reflect the need that current scholars perceive for a professional and dedicated approach to the study of ideology" (Freeden 2003, 5).

The "ambiguous and controversial" (Stuart 1986, 63) term *ideology* just had its first chapter, and it goes straight to Marx' and Engels' hands. One of the most famous characters of the nineteenth-century philosophy which presence remains nowadays and keeps permanent influence in multiple studies and perspectives. Also, after springing from them, most of the debates were referencing the German duo of theorists. It is easy to find among younger scholars' works on

the theme a section (or sections) discussing their incompatibilities and critics or either their intersections with Marx and Engel's theory.

According to Decker (2004), one point that requires caution when working with Marx theories, and one such brings inconsistency involving Marx's conceptualization of ideology is, firstly, the different statements he makes about ideology at different points in his career. Secondly, he wrote a prolific amount over – since many writings were posthumously published – it explains why many scholars consider Marx's *early* and *mature* phases. That considered, the Marxist era is now about to be the subject.

2.1.2 Marx takes over on ideology

Karl Marx (1818-1883) is probably is the first theorist who comes up to our minds associated with the word *ideology*, and even nowadays it is common to find the term being used with – unfortunate – resemblance of one of the ways Marx understood it. As affirms Karalus “although they did not coin the term itself, it is commonly associated with Marxism and political left” (2013, 131), mostly because of set of manuscripts written in 1846, in partnership with Friedrich Engels, entitled *The German Ideology* (*Die deutsche Ideologie*, in German) giving a significant exposure. In this work, only entirely published for the first time in 1932, is where it is considered Marx detailed his materialist conception of history theory and for that reason one of the most known works of the German intellectual, born in the Prussian historic empire, altogether with the Communist Manifesto (*Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei*, in German).

Beginning with the most consistent excerpt where Marx and Engels lecture about *ideology*:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as

expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a *camera obscura*, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process. (Marx and Engels 2001, 31)

The text from *The German Ideology* – which is considered a product of Marx and Engel’s reaction to the philosophical and cultural environment both philosophers experienced in Germany – criticises the prevailing traditions of the far-from-the-real-world way of thinking, calling it ideology in connection with illusory thoughts. To explain this perception of they set the analogy of the *camera obscura*. By building such parallel, they meant that:

Ideology was an inverted mirror-image of the material world, further distorted by the fact that the material world was itself subject to dehumanizing social relations under capitalism. The role of ideology was to smooth over those contradictions by making them appear as necessary, normal, and congruous. That way social unity could be maintained and enhanced. Ideology was a sublimation – in its various guises such as morality, religion, and metaphysics – of material life. (Freedman 2003, 5)

Marx explained the origin of his understanding of *ideology* based upon his idea of *the base-superstructure* model of society. The *base* refers to the means of production of a society. The *superstructure* is placed on top of the base and comprises that society’s ideology, as well as its legal system, political system, and religions. For Marx, the base determines the superstructure, because, according to Morrice (1996) the ruling class controls the means of production, by that the superstructure’s ideology

and everything else in their lives will be determined according to what impregnates in the interests of the ruling class of given society. Marx saw through history the “exploitative social relations” (Eagleton 1991, 81) which are endorsed in legal, political and ideological terms, as a dominative force.

Marx’s critique of ideology is, thus, carried out as the critique of economics because, in Marx’s perspective, economic structure determines all forms of consciousness, including philosophy, religion, politics, and culture and accordingly, all cultural products serve as ideology. Therefore, the critique of ideology connects with a more prominent critique of economic systems, specifically the capitalist economy within the modernity.

Jane Bennet offers her explanation about the importance of the use of *modernity* in Marx in her chapter “Modernity and its critics”:

For Marx, modernity is ideology; it is a narrative that maintains the existing structure of power by obscuring or defending as legitimate its inherent inequalities and injustices. The just response to modernity qua ideology is modernity qua critique; that is, the clear-eyed unmasking of inequities that reveals them to be products of social choices that could be otherwise. (Bennet 2006, 219)

“Marxists were confident that truth would prevail and illusion recede”, as resumes Freeden (2001, 5) and the role of ideology, in this case, was to reinforce and to keep societies in a state of ignorance and suffering by manipulation. To that, they added the element of ideology and class, as appropriately elucidates Freeden:

They associated ideology and class, asserting that the ideas of the ruling class were the ruling ideas. Ideological illusions were an instrument in the hands of the rulers, through the state, and were employed to exercise control and domination; indeed, to ‘manufacture history’ according to their interests. (Freeden 2003, 6)

Nevertheless, despite discussions about Marx’s divergence or disagreements with Engels, many Marxists as Theodor Adorno, Antonio Gramsci, and Louis Althusser among them, argue that in *Capital. Critique of Political Economy* (*Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen*

Ökonomie, in the original title) Marx abandoned, or at least radically altered, what they perceive as a limited notion of ideology. In the first volume of *Capital* (1867), the only one published while alive, “Marx develops his theory of commodity fetishism, which many critics argue establishes the definitive Marxian paradigm for ideology” (Decker 2005, 8). The second and the third volumes were retrieved by Friedrich Engels after his friend’s death and published in 1885 and 1894 respectively. Marx used the term *ideology* in two ways, broadly referring to an entire superstructure, such as ideas, beliefs, institutions, laws, and social systems, built upon the economic base. However, another use pointed by authors (Seliger 1979; Vincent 2010) is to denote legal, social, political, religious, philosophical, and cultural ideas and thought.

From Marx’s direct words, by a widely known quotation, it is possible to get the sense of the importance of materialism in a life basis in his theory:

In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. (Marx and Engels 2001, 32-33)

Head (1985) sustains that Marx’s theory of ideology borrowed nothing from Destutt’s theory except the name. On his turn, Kennedy (1979) explains the connection of Marx with Destutt de Tracy’s work and affirms that Marx picked especially the sense of idealism of the term coined by the French philosopher’s thought. Also, that probably just a small part of the entire *Elémens d’idéologie* was read by Marx, not because of the interest in the word itself but because Destutt’s work but mostly following traces and references to discuss economic theory, as explains Decker (2004). Destutt de Tracy was then considered representing a liberal tradition by economists at that beginning of the nineteenth century.

Marx inherited the word ideology not from Hegel, who used the word once in reference to the French ideologists and therefore cannot be, strictly speaking, credited with an explicit theory of ideology, but only from the cumulative usages current in the 1830s and 1840s and specifically from Destutt de Tracy. (Kennedy 1979, 366)

Taking the critical Destutt de Tracy faced about building an elitist model where privileged intellectuals would be in a position to decide the adequate framework for a 'good society', Marx makes a move to sincere critics questioning the term from the elite. For the German philosopher, the nature of the French ideologists' civic vocation proposal, by which through the study of ideology values and knowledge are tools to reach social, political and economic progress, for Marx "it was the representation of the bourgeois class interest" (Kennedy 1979, 368). Kennedy, in the same article, also explains that because of Destutt's enthusiasm for the limitless division of labour, and his defence of private property led Marx to call Tracy a *fischblütige Bourgeoisdoctrinar*¹³.

Destutt de Tracy's understanding of the society as mere a continuous of exchanges seemed to bother Karl Marx and, in his turn, he made clear their consideration about what means *society* in his theory:

Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production. The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will. (Marx and Engels 2001, 30)

Tracing a comparative parallel, Head proposes that both authors had in common a "grand conception of social science as a body of

¹³ From German "fish blooded bourgeois doctrinaire", meaning that Destutt de Tracy had a temperament of a fish, known for its cold-blooded characteristic, and he was representing a doctrinaire from the elite.

explanatory laws governing social phenomena” (Head 1985, 207) what would be possible, in some extension, to analyse or to act in different forms of social organisation. A diverging aspect in their theories, also according to Head, is that for Marx “the obstacle to a free society was the power of the dominant economic class”, and for Destutt de Tracy “it was the institutionalisation of ignorance and prejudice which made possible the survival of oppression” (Head 1985, 208). Corroborating with this understanding of Marx’ theory, Eagleton (1978) explains that Marx saw in *ideology* what preoccupied him the most, which was the exposure of class values rather than a theory of knowledge (or how we come to know things).

With Marx other divisions happened, and the disjunction of the notion of ideology in a Marxist notion and a non-Marxist is vital to understand most of the author’s discussions surrounding the *ideology* issue (Mins 1966; Seliger 1979). Within the Marxist view, ideology is seen as the ruling ideas, or *false consciousness*, that the ruling class fosters to help perpetuate its dominance. Such concepts of ideology focuses on the materialistic origins, propagation and acceptance of the ideas in society. Thus, Freedman (2006) suggests that Marx’s notion of ideology is more useful if contrasted with the liberal notion because it calls for investigation of legitimation, mass media, education, religion as significant factors in building and perpetuating a political regime. As resumes Zhao (1993) there are, inside the Marxist view, other subdivisions related to different conceptions of the character of ideology:

From formulations that define ideology as systems of ideas and beliefs to Althusserian and Gramscian emphases on the material and institutionally embedded character of ideologies, by its nature (from false, partial ideas to naturalized ideas and reified consciousness), and its class belongingness (from rigid, systematic class consciousness to discursive elements without necessary class belongingness. (Zhao 1993, 71)

Marx’s analysis of ideology met with much criticism, even within Marxist theorist, which made possible a Neo-Marxist approach (von Weiss 1970; Holz 1972; Blackledge 2004). According to Seliger (1979),

the political echo of Marxism this new wave has raised in the last decade (author's writing year) has very little related to the scholars in truth committed to Marxist ideology.

This neo-Marxist proposal runs based on the premise of reviewing the critical points of Marx's classical theories and analysing society considering the political, technological, philosophical, cultural and social changes post-Marx. First, the neo-Marxist focus on tackling the problem derived by if all ideas are ideological, then Marxism per se is also a form of ideology (Cox 1987). Second, it deals with the critics addressed the notion of economic determinism and, taking a different approach. It is considered that human beings can be motivated by interests other than economic class interests. Neo-Marxists consider the diverse social, ethnic and religious groups who value unassociated or conflicting interests. Lastly, Marx's endeavour in change society by his thoughts is taken by the Neo-Marxists in a way to refute the thesis that the economic base determines the superstructure. Maybe this last aspect is the most criticised in Marx's theory and the feature that the theorist after had worked more.

The non-Marxist tradition composes an "even greater diversity than in Marxist tradition" (Morrice 1996, 25). *Ideology* in this branch consists mainly in the treatment of its connection with philosophy and science and has as one exponent the French philosopher Emile Durkheim (1858-1917). Durkheim sees the problem of ideology is related to that "before one can have a scientific analysis of any subject matter, one necessarily has certain pre-scientific conceptions of it" (Morrice 1996, 55). A shared thought among the non-Marxist approach to ideology is the concern that ideological analysis could not provide objective and unbiased results. Therefore, for Durkheim in particular, the solution is in social science, not in agreement with Marx by the detail of the materialism in Marxism.

Taking a moment just for a quick connection with present reality, the question *how could in lands where all people can be free and equal, as the Western usually proclaims itself, why some people achieve success or wealth while others live in the margins?* Marx with his theorisation that dominant ideology is the pillar supporting the capitalism (Abercrombie and Turner 1978) and the societies get organised according to its rules would

argue that these assumptions work to justify a reality in which a minimal class of people holds most of the authority within corporations, firms, and financial institutions. In this logic, these beliefs also justify a reality in which most people are simply workers within the system.

The story of the emergence of the concept of ideology under the Marxist perspective is complex, and maybe it can be said that still has not reached its conclusion. However, for sure it is possible to identify other three outstanding individuals from the twentieth century, Karl Mannheim, Antonio Gramsci, and Louis Althusser, “whose contributions to the range of meanings that the notion of ideology carried were of major consequence” (Freeden 2003, 12). With them, already in the twentieth century, the word ideology came closer to have a more neutral, transcending the outstanding pejorative use that Napoleon did and that Marx first employed.

Proceeding to the considerations by each theorist, the focus is primarily on how each author manages the concept of *ideology* in his theory, the differentiation that could be highlighted and their advances regarding previous authors. This strategy is taken to keep the theoretical framework’s objectivity, although it is known the extensiveness of their theories and contributions throughout the extent of the interest in this PhD thesis.

2.1.3 Mannheim and the nature of society

In Karl Mannheim (1893-1947), it is essential to understand that the use of the word *ideology* was moved to the identifying “ideologies as systems that endorsed the *status quo*” (Freeden 2001b, 3). For this, according to Morrice (1996), Mannheim provides the most essential and influential non-Marxist contribution to the theory of ideology. Hans Speier, when reviewing the first German version of Mannheim’s book *Ideology and Utopia* – dated of 1929 – stated that “rarely has a sociological study succeeded in arresting the attention of so wide a public” (Speier 1985, 183). The reviewers surprised by this, did not only consist of sociologists, but economists, historians, philosophers, and theologians, too, engaged in the discussion Mannheim’s theory of

ideology. Cardús i Ros (1993) complement asserting that the reading of Mannheim's book in that his current reading may be much more opportune than in the seventies.

Setting the historical and geographical context, Mannheim's life included the force to exile from Hungary to Germany, where he spent thirteen years and developing his work mostly during the inter-war period. From Hungary, he was mostly influenced by his intimate friend György Lukács (1885-1971) with whom he disagreed with because of Lukács' conversion to Communism.

For Mannheim, Francis Bacon's *idola* theory was considered as a precursor to the modern concept of ideology. Francis Bacon (1561-1626), who was a very critical British philosopher regarding the Aristotelian scholastic thought and proposed a new method for doing science, a method that demands to abandon all prejudices that were considered acting like *idols*, would prevent society from reaching scientific knowledge. Mannheim bases his conception of ideology on the notion of the social determination of knowledge, although he rejects what he sees as the rather narrow economic analysis of Marx (Speier 1985; Martin 2015). The evolution of the concept of ideology will then be framed within the sociology of knowledge since according to Mannheim, the thought is particularly sensitive to the social and cultural changes.

While is considered that Mannheim went beyond Marx's restrictive conception of ideology to a more radical approach (Stark 1958), or advancing to an inclusive conception of ideology (Freeden 2003), he "still wishes to establish a social science that can expose the limitations of ideology" (Morrice 1996, 53). Richard Cox, in his article *Karl Mannheim's Concept of Ideology*, takes the German scholar much more as a sociologist than a philosopher for "thesis concerning the historical emergence and nature of political science" (1979, 210) and adds that in Mannheim's work the social factor and social situation are interpreted as having certain determinants.

The very fact that every event and every element of meaning in history is bound to a temporal, spatial, and situational position, and that therefore what happens once cannot happen always, the fact that events and meanings in

history are not reversible, in short the circumstance that we do not find absolute situations in history indicates that history is mute and meaningless only to him who expects to learn nothing from it, and that, in the case of history more than in that of any other discipline, the standpoint which regards history as “mere history”, as do the mystics, is doomed to sterility. (Mannheim 1954, 83)

This construction implies that behind each social theory, there are forces expressed in the details of the individual creator, or, at least, of the group that the individual belongs. In this sense, it can be said that thinking about the social is always collective, and that, therefore, it is based on the social situation existing at a precise historical moment (Lundberg 2017). The emotional or evaluative element in individuals as social beings is part as much as the rational element, and in this way, the impossibility of isolating the social observer from these elements is deduced. In other words, there would be no neutrality in social science. Thus, it is seen particular conditions of the knowledge produced on the world as part inseparable of that same world. The difference would be how aware of these elements individuals and groups would be.

Enclosed in this flow of history, in Mannheim there are “three historical stages of political conflict”: the first stage is that of *pre-ideological politics*, the following, *ideological politics*, and the third, “the transformation of ideological politics into a politics guided by the science of politics” where a “the stage is set for a new and decisive development” (Cox 1979, 210). By another hand, Cox (1979), offers criticism on Mannheim’s implication of his thoughts, in where he essentially views philosophy “through the lens of the concept of ideology” (Cox 1979, 220), in the way of inverting the positions between two terms. This misplacement of ideology above philosophy would be a cause for a retrogress towards an ideological self-consciousness.

The sociology of knowledge, the field where Mannheim is mostly referenced, is concerned with the social or existential conditions of knowledge, considering the entire range of intellectual products – philosophies and ideologies, political doctrines, and theological thought (Woolgar 1988). In all these areas, explains Longhurst (1989), that the field attempts to relate the ideas it studies to the sociohistorical settings

in which they are produced and received, and it was born as an answer to the uncertainty provoked by the relativism in the intellectual context of Germany (Cardús i Ros 1993).

In Mannheim *ideology* can be understood as a system of ideas of a social group, following the interests of the group, that guide the performance of its members; can also be understood as a *false consciousness* – which has a Marxist origin – that distorts the understanding of reality. For him, the modern concept of ideology was born when Napoleon – as explained earlier in this section –, noting that a group of French philosophers were opposed to his imperial ambitions, called them contemptuously *ideologues*. Which for Mannheim's theory, is a conception in where the validity of the adversary's thought is dismissed as considered apart from reality. False consciousness is in Mannheim's argument:

The danger of *false consciousness* nowadays is not that it cannot grasp an absolute unchanging reality, but rather that, it obstructs comprehension of a reality which is the outcome of constant reorganization of the mental processes which make up our worlds. (Mannheim 1954, 84)

In *Ideology and Utopia*, the German scholar explains the connection in his theory between the two terms. Mannheim reserves for the first the function of justifying and positively judging the status of things that prevails or that has no possibility of changing, and the second, it is classified as being equal to a conception aware of a socially conditioned reality, and, considering the status quo negatively put the determination to change it. Other authors have designated Mannheim's conception of utopia under the term *counter-ideology* (Horowitz 1964; Parsons 1970).

Appreciating Mannheim's own words, from his most famous work, it is possible to grasp his way of building the explanation about such a complex construction:

The concept *ideology* reflects the one discovery which emerged from political conflict, namely, that ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination. There is implicit in the word *ideology* the insight

that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it. (Mannheim 1954, 36).

Eagleton (1991) offers a synthesis of his understanding of the meaning of ideology and utopia in Mannheim's work:

Truth for Mannheim means ideas adequate to a particular stage of historical development, and *ideology* then signifies a body of beliefs incongruous with its epoch, out of sync with what the age demands. Conversely, *utopia* denotes ideas ahead of their time and so similarly discrepant with social reality, but capable nonetheless of shattering the structures of the present and transgressing its frontiers. (Eagleton 1991, 109)

Mannheim argues that conflicts of interest and oppression generate opposite flows of thought. By denominating *ideology* to the justification of the existing situation, and *utopia* to the uprising expression of the oppressed ones, he sustains that both are determined by the situation, or the by the conditions of existence and the interests of their agents. Furthermore, in the upcoming exert, it is condensed what Mannheim means when using the word *utopia* – a term that, almost as ideology, has so divergent uses scholarly and informally that may lead to misunderstandings:

The concept of *utopian* thinking reflects the opposite discovery of the political struggle, namely that certain groups are intellectually so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it. Their thinking is incapable of correctly diagnosing art existing condition of society. They are not at all concerned with what really exists; rather in their thinking they already seek to change the situation that exists. Their thought is never a diagnosis of the situation; it can be used only as a direction for action. In the utopian mentality, the collective unconscious, guided by wishful representation and the will to action, hides certain

aspects of reality. It turns its back on everything which would shake its belief or paralyze its desire to change things. (Mannheim 1954, 36)

Complementary, there is his contribution to the view of reality and democracy. According to him, individuals deal with ideology, once in a new stage, within two perspectives: a total conception, and a particular conception (Sargent 2009, 7). Mannheim explains that *total conception* is related to beliefs shared by a group, and the *particular conception* is related to the point when one recognises others' beliefs as opposed to their own, not recognising their own ideas as ideological and classifying the others' beliefs as false (Mannheim 1954, 55).

Once the particular and general concepts of ideology come into being, they gradually become tools of political warfare. And the objects of political conflict are now subtly transformed: to the primat objects of defense or domination is added the object of undermining or annihilating the opponent's thought. In short, the ultimate political weapon is the theory of thinking, used to destroy the basis of an opponent's thinking. This joining of a political to an epistemological motive is the essence of ideology in fully developed ideological politics. (Cox 1979, 211).

Speier elucidates that in Mannheim, an ideology that was once adequate related to “the specific stage of the historical process at which it arose, may become obsolete or inadequate when it is no longer able to serve as an orientation to the “new” reality (Speier 1985, 186). As clarifies Eagleton, when using Marxism as “the scientific analysis of social formations” it leads to two different epistemologies, mainly diverging in the concept of consciousness. In one branch, consciousness is “essentially contemplative”, and in the other, it is a “part of social reality, a more a dynamic force in its potential transformation” (Eagleton 1991, 93).

It is undeniable that along with the history Mannheim's work was reviewed, implemented and criticised, in this last point forcefully done by Frankfurt School theoreticians. Mannheim had disapproval, especially, for his anti-philosophical declarations. His position had the

intentions to reinforce his historical-based view – within his sociological approach – but with “not clear” (Speier 1985, 189) and “imprecise” when Mannheim unite “thinking and ideology as belonging to an autonomous realm and does not show by what means they belong to and participate in the concrete conditions of life” (Vulpe 1993, 124).

2.1.4 Gramsci, ideology and hegemony

Moving forward on the course of authors thinking about ideology topic, the centre of attention now moves from Germany to Italy with another indispensable figure in political philosophy, especially in the sphere of Marxist thinkers. The politician, journalist and Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) had a very active political life and with substantial collaborations in political theory, sociology and linguistics, with primary interests in culture, politics and ideology. Early used by Vladimir Lenin, the comprehension of hegemony is a crucial term for Gramsci along with all his theory and represents a topic to be viewed with attention.

Gramsci came from a simple Italian family and was affected by several diseases during his life. The worst of them all was the Pott disease he had when a kid and that gave him irreversible curvature: a deformation in the spine making him hunchback for the rest of his short life. According to Germino, having a non-standard physical aspect also was a mark in Gramsci’s worldviews:

[...] his core experience, however, remained of someone on the fringes of social life. This basic feeling of exclusion, mixed with other personal qualities, helped him to notice and empathise with others who were pushed to society’s margin. (Germino 1984, 3)

The intellectual initiation of one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century is related to Gramsci’s elder brother who had been a soldier and was involved in socialist movements in Cagliari, a central city in the island of Sardinia (Davidson, 2016). Towards an academic formation by winning a scholarship, he moved from the “neglected and abandoned” (Femia 1981, 24) area in the south

of Italy, to the Northwest of the country, and entered in the University of Turin. He dropped out the university soon after but kept the life he had in Turin, where his contact with the intellectuals from the university and socialist circles made him an active participant involved in the education and politicisation of the workers' class. Seeing the process of industrialisation and the struggle situation of the less privileged at that time, in 1913 he joined the Italian Socialist Party.

As it seems to be a pattern with thinkers in our human history, Gramsci also suffered the consequences of thinking different in authoritarian regimes. Imprisoned in 1926 under the Italian Fascist dictatorship of Mussolini he remained in jail until 1935 and from these nine Gramsci wrote his most famous opus, the *Prison Notebooks*¹⁴ (*Quaderni del carcere*, originally in Italian). A “contribution to the political theory” Germino (1990, 24), of over thirty notebooks in more three thousand pages of this points of view about history and his analysis, unsystematically written in order to maintain himself lucid, as it is mentioned he explains (Jay 1984).

Gramsci, as a non-Marxist thinker, is mainly defined by his effort in offering a more developed theory of ideology to help explain why the revolution did not occur (Goldie 1989). As a Lenin follower, Gramsci is known for going “bit further by also emphasizing moral and intellectual leadership and the importance of non-economic relations between classes” compared to the former who emphasized the “political leadership of the working class in the class struggle” (Ramos 1982, 34). For Gramsci, Lenin has made a brilliant synthesis between the theoretical and the practical problems whose roots appeared in Marx, although the Leninist and Gramscian concepts of hegemony take different paths since the latter gives attention to the cultural and ideological direction.

The question that unites these latest authors mentioned in this theoretical background – Mannheim, Gramsci, and Lenin primarily

¹⁴ An online version of the Prison Notebooks is available, through the International Gramsci Society, in the following link: http://courses.justice.eku.edu/pls330_louis/docs/gramsci-prison-notebooks-voll.pdf “Selection from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci”. Edited and translated by Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith.

through Gramsci's thoughts – is related to *what becomes the relationship between superstructure and structure with the advent of the cultural industry?* As a response, it is possible to say that they all reflect on this relationship according to their reality and their social, economic, political and cultural context (Freeden 2003). As the founder of Marxist theory, Karl Marx did not live to see the growth of a new segment of the industry that no longer only produced material goods, but also cultural products. It is in this trail that came to the cinema, photography and radio where information and ideas started to be transmitted in a way and to a massive audience as never seen before. In this scenario, considering the rinsing of the media and its technologies, it was questioned the fundamental role it had in power relations. It is this prominent process that led authors to ask themselves about the role of the superstructure in power relations, or rather their influence on political and economic relations.

In Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony, it is considered that dominant ideology had a stronger hold on consciousness and society than Marx had imagined (San Juan 2009). Due to its conditions – especially the late industrialization – the relationship between structure and superstructure were perceived differently from what had been proposed by Marx, which influenced the “hegemonic features” in the *status quo* (Freeden 2001a, 5) identified by Gramsci. For him, the superstructure had an enormous influence on the structure; the intellectuals and the ideas they disclose change the way men relate to politics and the means of production. However, the proletariat, to achieve a stage of a revolution, had to conquer, too, the hegemony of ideas. Thus, ideology, understood in the Marxist perspective as the set of ideas of the ruling class plays a fundamental role in the relationship between classes. The potential of Gramsci's concept lies in recognizing that authority and its different forms of coercion involve far more sophisticated devices than violence (Jay 1984; Germino 1990).

Cultural hegemony is, therefore, a set of dominant ideas of a specific social, political, cultural and economic conjuncture. It is not permanent, but the state and its leaders, are the result of these forces in dispute. In this trade, the civil society and the political society are present and the two influence each other, resulting in the government

as representing the dominant ideas. According to Eagleton (1991), in Gramsci, hegemony is the set of functions of dominance and direction exercised by a dominant social class, over a period, over another social class and even over the whole class of society. As Freedman argues, this step was an attempt to put some light on questions Marx left unclear, as “what are the forms that ideological control takes?” (2003, 21).

The hegemonic view (Gramsci 1971) is composed of two functions: domain function and function of intellectual and moral direction, or function proper to hegemony. In Gramsci’s theory, the central role played by the social institution of education in spreading what he considers to be the dominant ideology, and by doing that maintaining the power of the ruling class, is a central feature. Educational institutions, Gramsci envisions, “teach ideas, beliefs, values, and even identities”, as explained in Seliger (1997, 114), that reflect the interests of the ruling class, and produce compliant and obedient members of society that serve the interests of that dominant class. This type of rule is what Gramsci called cultural hegemony.

According to Salamini (1974), Gramsci:

[...] did not minimize the importance of the infrastructure on the contrary, he sought to establish a just equilibrium between the economic and political processes. The relations of production do not evolve according to autonomous and self-generating laws, but act, are regulated or modified by the ‘human consciousness’. The economic moment of consciousness constitutes a negative phase (realm of necessity) in the historical ascendancy of subaltern classes toward political hegemony, which must be transcended and replaced by a positive phase (realm of liberty) characterized by the creation of a new proletarian *Weltanschauung*¹⁵ providing the masses with entirely new categories of thought. (Salamini 1974, 367)

¹⁵ Term used originally in Marx referring to a “wide world perception” and “framework of ideas and beliefs forming a global description through which an individual, group or culture watches and interprets the world and interacts with it” (Naugle 2002)

The concept of cultural hegemony for Gramsci always involves the relationship between the state, civil society, material forms of production, and ideological and legal-political structures. Commonly this concept involves a reflection on the role of intellectuals, mass culture and the cultural industry. The school function is much debated under the key to the concept of cultural hegemony. The concept is also used to discuss the role of media in contemporary societies, especially their power to produce hegemonic ideas and lifestyles.

However, the Gramscian studies have been reinforced by the appearance of the monumental *Dizionario Gramsciano* led by Guido Liguori and Pasquale Voza, that brings together in a refined way the essential elements in Gramsci. Similarly, a linguistic turn in interest in Gramsci's work as a forerunner of cultural studies and contemporary is connected to Pierre Bourdieu's work (Burawoy 2012) analysing the concepts of domination in the advanced capitalist societies.

2.1.5 Althusser and the apparatuses

Settling one more theoretical block in this construction, it is necessary to mention Louis Althusser (1918-1990) and his participation in more recent times to the theory of ideology. The French Marxist political philosopher – briefly already mentioned connected to Gramsci – is mainly known for essential concepts built in his theory: the state apparatus (SA) and post-materialism (Hawkes 2003; Karalus 2016). Both concepts are united under the idea that the last is a value-system related to the desire of material needs in a highly consumerist society, and the SA as a machine of reproduction of capitalism.

For scholars as Ferretter, revisiting Althusser's critical thoughts is essential to make sense of the society based on a capitalist economy we live in and where the state's role is as an apparatus. To understand that "goods are produced in order to be sold at a profit we will not be able to understand the literature and culture of that society without thinkers like Althusser" (Ferretter 2006, 2). Also, Hobsbawm in his *Revolutionaries*, showing great appreciation for Althusser's work, asserts that "a new generation of rebels requires a new version of

revolutionary ideology, and Althusser is essentially an ideological hard-liner, challenging the political and intellectual softening around him” (Hobsbawm 2011, 145).

In some strands, Althusser takes another direction and disagrees with Marx, for example proposing that the ideology is compared to a new reality and not as considered in Marx theory, a mask for an opaque layer of reality (Ferretter 2006). By another part, Althusser grants Marx’s theory as the fact of considering the “ruling ideology the role of ensuring the submission of the workers to the ruling class” (Freeden 2003, 25).

For Althusser, ideology does not relate to conscious thought and false knowledge about the social world, instead, ideology is understood as a social mechanism that produces subject positions (Levine 2003, 157). The reasoning that Althusser makes is that even our subjectivity is institutionally produced.

Louis Althusser, in *For Marx*, argues:

In a class society ideology is the relay whereby, and the element in which, the relation between men and their conditions of existence is settled to the profit of the ruling class. In a classless society ideology is the relay whereby, and the element in which, the relation between men and their condition of existence is lived to the profit of all men. (Althusser 1969, 235-236).

For Michael Freeden, in Althusser’s theory, it is possible to understand that the whole workers’ class was under the ruling class control because this last one had tools to use for:

[...] disseminating the rules of morality and respect required to uphold the established order. Official ‘apparatuses’ such as the state, the church, and the military practised control over the ‘know-how’ that was necessary to secure repression and ensure the viability of the existing economic system. (Freeden 2003, 25)

Ideology would never overcome since it plays an essential role in how we understand our place in the world, according to Althusser. Furthermore, progressive social change would involve standing against the bourgeois ideology, that is an ideology that equates freedom to the

pursuit of financial gain, with ideologies that promote the common good.

One last point to remark about Althusser's collaborations in the concept of *ideology* is that he established no distinction between the private family sphere and the broader civil sphere related to the penetration of ideology. For him, the political views were present in all spheres of one's life. However, it is important to remark in Althusser:

[...] ideology was plural only in its location in diverse social spheres. It was not plural in its functions, retaining only the Marxist function of exercising unified hegemonic power so as to maintain existing capitalist relations of exploitation. Althusser refused to be drawn into formulating a theory of particular ideologies, nor was he interested in aspects of ideology that were unrelated to oppressive power. (Freeden 2003, 26-27).

As *ideology* was treated under a sociologist perspective showed to be a crucial help the evolution of the studies and the movements on polishing the term, considering the moment when Sociology as a scientific branch was established.

2.1.6 Žižek and ideology for our days

In conclusion, one last theorist handling the term *ideology* is valid to be mentioned in this theoretical background: the contemporary philosopher Slavoj Žižek. He was born in 1949 in Slovenia, and from him, the world is in constant expectation of sharp critical thoughts related to the cultural discomforts of our days. Žižek is alive and very active refining his theories analysing the current world scenarios.

As a senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology at the University of Ljubljana, Žižek also holds the title of international director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities of the University of London. The prestige of his ideas makes him visiting professor at several universities in the United States and the United Kingdom, including Columbia University, Princeton, the New School for Social

Research in New York, the University of Michigan, and in the London School of Economics and Political Science. As argues Parker:

Žižek's academic performance has also drawn attention from a wider intellectual audience, and this has given him the opportunity to elaborate some complex conceptual machinery that can be applied to music, theology, virtual reality, and, it would seem, virtually any other cultural phenomenon. (Parker 2004, 2-3).

One first perceptible characteristic of Žižek writings is the perspicacious and penetrating form of narrating his line of thought. Although, reading Žižek requires intense attention, his capacity of expressing complex formulations include, in a fluid narrative, examples that build the necessary connection to one's life and makes possible the critical reflection through everyday details in contemporary societies. Parker (2004) alerts the author's preference and the extensive use of anecdotes and jokes. "Instead of being bewitched by him you can notice better how he puts together his performance for us" (Parker 2004, 2) signals in *Slavoj Žižek A Critical Introduction*.

His theories often go against traditional theoretical analysis, and it can lead to some confusion when fitting Žižek in a school of thought or current theory. His academic background in philosophy added to his later studies in psychoanalysis makes in Žižek "ideology and subjectivity an urgent cutting-edge character that throws received wisdoms into question and opens up a space to think and act against contemporary capitalism" (Parker 2004, 2).

In his first major work published in English, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (1989), edited by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Žižek was concerned with retrieving the concept of ideology and re-asserting its pertinence at a time when many were claiming that it had become a defunct or an irrelevant category. Žižek's Lacanian concept of ideology (Freedman 2003; Kay 2003; Parker 2004; Heywood 2012) provides a way of seeing policy and media representations as a confluence of fantasies and anxieties mobilised in the service of specific power relations and political strategies.

Inspired by Hegel and by Marx, Žižek is concerned that the renewal on a discussion about ideology:

[...] allow us “to grasp contemporary ideological phenomena (cynicism, ‘totalitarianism’, the fragile status of democracy) without falling prey to any kind of ‘post-modernist’ traps (such as the illusion that we live in a ‘post-ideological’ condition). (Žižek 1989, xxxi).

For him, the normative ideological model of capitalism, diluted in daily life, articulated the new forms of the conception of work. The sense that the struggle narrated by Marx between labour class and means of production’s owners no longer exists is, in Žižek’s thought, the sign of a great victory of capitalism. Capitalism for him not only can be articulated as an economic model but as a complex apparatus that it is deeply embedded in the culture.

Žižek, instead of understanding ideology as a problem of knowledge or the imaginary, ideology is thought to involve our beliefs and fantasies (1989, 33). Ideology attempts to assemble a coherent account of the social world by focusing on one aspect of things and taking one single pattern as if applicable for the whole, which causes a misplacement. For Žižek, the real conditions of social life under capitalism, such as economic and political inequality, are displaced and, according to him, this displacement takes many forms. The point in this instance is that ideology works by investing consumption with enjoyment – in a post-materialist understanding – and even though it is known that many groups in societies suffer and that exploitation is extensive in the world, the very system that produces this suffering remains unchallenged. Therefore, the “ideological censorship [applied by the system] is not intended to crush the uprising, but to crush any hope of changing the world” Žižek argued in a conference proffered in Madrid, in the *Círculo de Bellas Artes*, in 2017.

The point is not just that we must unmask the structural mechanism which is producing the effect of subject as ideological misrecognition, but that we must at the same time fully acknowledge this misrecognition as unavoidable - that is, we must accept a certain delusion as a condition of our historical activity, of assuming a role as agent of the historical process. (Žižek 1989, xxv).

Žižek, in the objective of his *Sublime Object of Ideology*, sums up the tree guiding points of his arguments regarding the recapture of ideology discussion and the revision under the features of globalization and the triumph of liberalism:

[...] the only way to ‘save Hegel’ is through Lacan, and this Lacanian reading of Hegel and the Hegelian heritage opens up a new approach to ideology, allowing us to grasp contemporary ideological phenomena (cynicism, ‘totalitarianism’, the fragile status of democracy) without falling prey to any kind of ‘post-modernist’ traps (such as the illusion that we live in a ‘post-ideological’ condition). (Žižek 1989, xxxi).

Žižek starts from the premise that the gradual abandonment of the concept of ideology is one of the main symptoms of contemporary capitalism. For him, the shift from the critique of the phenomenon of the class struggle to the struggles for rights in contemporary times is the significant symptom of our society (Žižek 1989). Furthermore, the struggle against oppression does not attack the oppression structures, which are the mechanisms of exploitation of labour by capitalism. He also suggests that conceptions of ideology that rely on normative representations suppress the critical subject-agent (Žižek 1994, 7) towards a more intelligent analysis of ideology in the social content. Žižek thus identifies a “new need for *postmodern* discussions of ideology that avoid the latent self-congratulatory methodologies of previous critiques” (Decker 2004, 181).

He adds to the basis of his arguments the term *violence*, which consists of the conceptual distinction between subjective and objective violence (Žižek 2009). The first is defined as the easily reprehensible individual or collective violent acts. The second is subtle, anonymous and engendered by the very heart system of existing relations, in an example, the economic crises, constant exploitation, symbolic violence of classes.

Subjective violence is experienced as such against the background of a degree of non-violence. It is perceived as a disturbance of the ‘normal’ and peaceful state of affairs. However, objective violence is precisely that inherent in

this 'normal' state of things. Objective violence is an invisible violence, since it is precisely this that sustains the normality of the zero level against which we perceive something as subjectively violent. (Žižek 2009, 14)

For the philosopher, it is due to the ideology underlying the liberal discourse that violence intrinsic to the capitalist system can be concealed and perceived as peace – ideology itself is a mode of violence. The metaphysics of the global market as an unquestionable law, a crisis that ruins millions of lives should be perceived as non-violence, as a necessary evil to be endured.

Although he is often described by being a scholar who does “inconsistent interventions around different issues”, also that “his theoretical position is contradictory” (Parker 2004, 2), Žižek can also be described as a more than prominent figure nowadays for his provocative way of analysing our global scenario.

Even though he has caused many controversies in various intellectual circles, in one of most recent books about Žižek’s thought, *Žižek reloaded*, is described as the heterodox materialist philosopher, acute reader and updater of Hegel; the impenitent comedian; the scourge of the emaciated capitalism that corrodes everything and the translator of what happens nowadays (Barroso and Lolas 2018). As an example, there is an excellent article Žižek wrote in Jacobin Mag responding to critics made by a reviewer of two of his books. Žižek, right in the opening affirms that such criticism was made after a “crude misreading” of his words, and proceeds giving in detail and with some extra irony refined answers, exerting fragment by fragment of the critics done.

The intellectual trajectory of the philosopher is marked by the continuous effort to problematize the discourses and practices that underpin the dizzying market power over the contemporary world. He is less interested in answering the questions posed in our time than in reformulating them, since “there are not only right and wrong solutions to problems but also right and wrong problems” says Žižek (2009, 213), paraphrasing Deleuze.

Different to all these movements narrated above in consideration to *ideology*, there were also theories related to the *end of ideology* rising in

the twentieth century — a term made famous by the American sociologist Daniel Bell in 1955 (Waters 1996). Bell also published the homonymous – and most famous – book in 1960. This theory specially appeared in the aftermath of World War II and the Cold War “both the right and the left had been equally discredited” (Jost 2006, 651), and that “a kind of exhaustion of political ideas” (Lane, 1962). Lane, in the same current of thought, wrote in *The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society* that the “criteria and scope of politics are shrinking while those of knowledge are growing” (1966, 662).

Frankfurt School theorists criticized Bell and his claim for the end of ideology and the coming of the era of scientific positivism for his *scientism* as dressed as an ideology itself. Eagleton explains that the supporters of the *end-of-ideology* idea tend to perceive ideology in “two quite contradictory ways, as at once blindly irrational and excessive rationalistic” (1991, 4). The presumption of ideological neutrality is the weak point where the most critics and disapproval aim.

For all pretences to ideological neutrality can only aggravate our problems when the necessity of ideology is inescapable, as indeed it happens to be today and must stay so in the foreseeable future as well. (Mészáros 2005, xiii).

In this context, the Frankfurt School representatives are defined as philosophers who earlier detected the frontiers of information, consumption, entertainment, and political boundaries caused by the media, as well as their harmful effects on the critical formation of society (Geuss 1981; White 1995; Finlayson 2005). Max Horkheimer (1895-1973) and Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969) are the leading names of the school, founded in 1924 at the University of Frankfurt, Germany. In the same place, a group of theorists, among them Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), Jürgen Habermas (1929), Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) and Erich Fromm (1900-1980), developed studies of Marxist orientation. For them, the question of ideology is one of the central themes of the critical theory, particularly regarding the interpretation of communicational processes.

In a classic text written in 1947, *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) defined the cultural industry as a political and economic system whose purpose is to produce cultural

goods – movies, books, popular music, TV programs – as commodities and as a strategy of social control. Within the author's theory, the receivers of the messages of the mass media would be victims of this industry. They would have a standardized taste and would be induced to consume low-quality products. For this reason, the cultural industry replaces the term mass culture, because it is not a popular culture represented in the content of the vehicles of communication, but an ideology imposed on people. Adorno and Horkheimer argue that ideology is increasingly devoid of meaning, reduced to an operative language, aimed at the concrete ends of the sale of products.

True to the appreciation of Marx's history, Adorno and Horkheimer affirm the existence of changes in ideology given "the spread of the capitalist logic" (Wiggershaus 1995, 29) promoted by monopoly capitalism. The constitution of the "cultural industry" (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 94) is a fundamental element of this dissemination, being responsible for the changes in the ideology. So, nothing more distant from Adorno and Horkheimer than Bell's argument about the end of ideologies mentioned above. Mainly, this critical perspective derived from Frankfurt School oriented the process of rethinking some of the assumptions from older characterizations of ideology, that is at the heart of contemporary approaches to the question of ideology.

For all these differences of focus drawn so far, however, it is finally considered that ideology thoughts and critiques understand the inherent *presence* of ideology, to the extent to which we find ourselves in a world where "ideology is a constantly present feature of social and political life" (Brooker 2003, 135). The value of theories of ideology is that they point to the contradictory processes involved in the maintenance of the dominant ideology. At its best, ideology critique will understand these contradictions and ambiguities as differently embedded at each level or stage in the circuit of cultural texts or the operation of culture industries, from their economic to their formal structure, reception and use.

After all this long route from ideology's origin, going through the relevant parts of its history and by chronologically organising the theories related term found in literature, it is possible to have a more

profound sense of complexity involving a term such *ideology*. Moreover, it is, perhaps paradoxically, also the emphasis that allows one to establish bridges between otherwise quite divergent approaches to the analysis of ideology. Hopefully, this effort will contribute to all of us aware of the theoretical work done when the word *ideology* comes up here and there, trivially pronounced over tables in bars, or written in undistinguishably in news content.

It now proceeds to focus the investigation on a group of distinguished contemporary political philosophers and their attempts to rethink the terrain of analysis traditionally associated with the theory of ideology. Also, aiming to investigate what they may contribute to our understanding by explaining the nature and the functions of political ideologies they consider, to keep unfolding the theoretical elements for present PhD research.

2.2 Political ideology/ies: nature and functions

*When some procedure is denounced as 'ideological par excellence',
one can be sure that its inversion is no less ideological.
— Slavoj Žižek (1994, 4)*

The very indeterminacy that relegated ideology to the side lines of political theory has come back in triumphant mode to vindicate and enhance the status of ideology [...]. For once we acknowledge politics as a permanent site of both reasonable and unreasonable disagreements, we alight on what ideologies have reflected, amplified, and attempted to manage, now and always. (Freeden 2006, 21).

The element *politics* was added to the line of thoughts here, and it is the word that brings delimitation for a new path drawn to go. The comprehension of what *politics* is comes synthesized by Heywood (2013), who explains that “politics is the activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live”

(Heywood 2013, 2). By that, the insight into the connection between ideology and politics in societies start to be drawn.

Therefore, when mentioning, in the previous chapter, the connection of *ideology* (in its beginning) pointing to a comprehension of *sets of ideas*, it was done with the intention to now articulate:

1. a conceptual mark on the nature of *ideology* considered in this research, and

2. the contemporary scholars explaining the nature and role or function of *political ideologies*.

For the study of political ideologies – the appropriate term to deal with a plurality of political oriented ideas existing in society – whether expressed in terms of the formation of conventions, paradigms, subjects, forms of representation or the symbolization forms more generally must be somehow organised. It is the reason why the political theory of ideologies, from where the foundations of this chapter are based, is considered “established sub-field of political theory, distinguished by a commitment to studying political ideas as they are found *in the wild*” (Finlayson 2012, 1). From this point of view, the task of the analyst of ideologies here is related to investigate those forms and to classify it in groups according to its cohesion of thoughts and purposes, towards an understanding of how it contributes shaping our world. Alternatively, “dealing with ideologies without talking about the nature and functions of socially shared ideas is theoretically unsatisfactory”, as van Dijk affirms (2006a, 731).

While authors, as Mészáros (2005), approximate to the topic by literally accessing a dictionary, and the author asks the reader “what should be more objective and *ideology-free*¹⁷ than a dictionary, be that a dictionary of synonyms?” (Mészáros 2005, 3). Mészáros explains how *Conservative*, *Liberal* and *Revolutionary* on the thesaurus he consulted are tagged. *Conservative* and *Liberal*, argues him, are presented with positives characteristics, and for *Revolutionary* words like extremism and fanaticism were applied. Which for Mészáros, it justifies the marks put in *ideology-free*, and at the same time the critics he aims to circumscribe by the example. Therefore, after reflecting and doing pertinent critics to

¹⁶ Italics by the author quoted.

¹⁷ Italics by the author quoted.

the various understandings about ideology, the Marxist political philosopher, asserts:

[...] ideology is not an illusion or a religious superstition of misdirected individuals, but a specific form of – materially anchored and sustained – social consciousness. Its stubborn persistence is due to the fact it happens to be objectively constituted (and constantly reconstituted) as the inescapable practical consciousness of class societies, concerned with the articulation of rival sets of values and strategies that aim at controlling the social metabolism under all its major aspects. (Mészáros 2005, 10)

By remarkably staying away of considering political ideology as a “mere propaganda” or just a “naked struggle for power” (Heywood 2012, 2) and accessing the topic by another route, John Gerring advances part of the work intended to do here and builds a sampling of contemporary definitions for *ideology* within a political theory scope. The researcher organises it chronologically as it is displayed in Table 1.

Table 1: Sampling of contemporary definitions by Gerring (1997):

An organisation of opinions, attitudes and values – a way of thinking about man and society. We may speak of an individual’s total ideology or of his ideology with respect to different areas of social life; politics, economics, religion, minority groups, and so forth. (Adorno *et al.* 1950, 2)

A consistent integrated pattern of thoughts and beliefs explaining men’s attitude towards life and his existence in society, and advocating a conduct and action pattern responsive to and commensurate with such thoughts and beliefs. (Loewenstein 1953, 52)

A particular elaborate, close-woven, and far-ranging structure of attitudes. By origin and usage its connotations are primarily political, although the scope

of the structure is such that we expect an ideology to encompass content outside the political order as narrowly defined...A highly differentiated attitude structure, [with] its parts...organized in a coherent fashion... Must be capped by concepts of a high order of abstraction... [must supply] a manageable number of ordering dimensions that permit the person to make sense of a broad range of events. (Campbell *et al.* 1960, 192-93)

A body of concepts [which]: (1) deals with the questions: who will be the rulers? How will the rulers be selected? By what principles will they govern?; (2) constitute an argument; that is, they are intended to persuade and to counter opposite views; (3) integrally affect some of the major values of life; (4) embrace a program for the defense or reform or abolition of important social institutions; (5) are, in part, rationalizations of groups interests – but not necessarily the interests of all groups espousing them; (6) are normative, ethical, moral in tone and content; (7) are...torn from their context in a broader belief system, and share the structural and stylistic properties of that system. (Lane 1962, 14-15)

System of belief that are elaborate, integrated, and coherent, that justify the exercise of power, explain and judge historical events, identify political right and wrong, set forth the interconnections (causal and moral) between politics and other spheres of activity. (McClosky 1964, 362)

A belief-system that includes: (1) a wide range of opinions; (2) high attitude consistency (aka “constraint” or “economy”); and (3) abstract conceptualizations (e.g., “liberal”, “conservative”) (paraphrase of Converse 1964)

Maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience. (Geertz 1964, 220)

The reflection of process and structure in the consciousness of those involved – the product of action. (Nettl 1967, 100)

A typical dogmatic, i.e., rigid and impermeable, approach to politics. Sartori 1969, 402)

A logically coherent system of symbols which, within a more or less sophisticated conception of history, links the cognitive and evaluative perception of one's social condition – especially its prospects for the future – to a program of collective action for the maintenance, alteration, or transformation of society. (Mullins 1974, 235)

Sets of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised social action, and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order. (Seliger 1976, 11)

A system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote, realise, pursue or maintain. (Hamilton 1987, 39)

An emotional-laden, myth-saturated, action-related system of beliefs and values about people and society, legitimacy and authority, that is acquired to a large extent as a matter of faith and habit. The myths and values of ideology are communicated through symbols in a simplified, economical, and efficient manner. Ideological

beliefs are more or less coherent, more or less articulate, more or less open to a new evidence and information. Ideologies have a high potential for mass mobilization, manipulation, and control; in that sense, they are mobilized belief systems. (Rejai 1991, 11)

Source: Elaborated by the author with information as in Gerring 1997, 958-959.

The objective of the sampling done by the scholar was to build a structure to analyse political ideologies and to compare the semantics of each deeply. For that, Gerring (1997) also mapped five conventional approaches in the study of ideology that were identified among writers in the social sciences he consulted. The author names the approaches as *operationalisation*, *terminological reshuffling*, *intellectual history*, *etiology*, and *multivocality* – which add to the study of political ideology itself but will not be deepened in here since it surpasses the field and the objective the research. On the other hand, Gerring inspires this research towards a core meaning mindful of context-dependent definitions while asking [...] how do ideologies originate, what shapes and sustains them, and what influences their transformation? These closely related questions have provided an intriguing and enduring puzzle for social scientists. (Gerring 1997, 963).

These quotations also forge in advance the appearance of expressions as *a set of values*, *categories*, *beliefs system* and *opposing beliefs and ideas* pointing the way *ideology* is intrinsically now associated with a pluralism of beliefs and with political positions independent of the itinerary the researchers chose to make.

Therefore, the similar sampling procedure was done highlighting a group of more recent authors explaining what *a political ideology* is and the differentiation between *political ideologies* (or *ideologies*¹⁸) as follows.

¹⁸ In in the Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, by Freedon, Tower Sargent and Stears (2013), *ideologies* and *political ideologies* are used interchangeably.

Table 2: Complementary sampling of definitions of political ideologies.

A political ideology is a relatively coherent set of empirical and normative beliefs and thought, focusing on the problem of human nature, the process of history, and socio-political arrangements. [...] are essentially the product of collective thought. (Eatwell and Wright 1993, 10)

Political ideologies provide central organising frameworks for political debate and action. Each ideology contains three elements: critique, ideal and agency. Political ideologies offer a criticism of existing society, which is condemned as imperfect and contrasted with some vision of 'the good society' that is to be attained. (Schwarzmantel 1998, 2)

Ideologies are patterns of thought that shape the political world. (Eccleshal 2003, 12)

A system of values and beliefs regarding the various institutions and processes of society that is accepted as fact or truth by a group of people. An ideology provides the believer with a picture of the world both as it is and as it should be, and, in doing so, it organizes the tremendous complexity of the world into something fairly simple and understandable. (Tower Sargent 2009, 2)

Ideologies are bodies of concepts, values and symbols which incorporate conceptions of human nature and thus indicate what is possible or impossible for humans to achieve; critical reflections on the nature of human interaction; the values which humans ought either to reject or aspire to; and the correct technical arrangements for social, economic and political life which will meet the needs and interests of human beings. Ideologies thus

claim both to describe and to prescribe for humans.
(Vincent 2010, 18)

An ideology is a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organised political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power. (Heywood 2012, 11)

Concepts and ideologies are developed by social actors to establish interpretative frameworks and to orient action. (Freeden, Tower Sargent and Stears 2013, 77)

A fairly coherent and comprehensive set of ideas that explains and evaluates social conditions, helps people understand their place in society, and provides a program for social and political action. (Ball, Dagger and O'Neil 2014, 5)

Source: Elaborated by the author based on Eatwell and Wright 1993; Schwarzmantel 1998; Eccleshal 2003; Tower Sargent 2009; Vincent 2010; Heywood 2012; Freedden, Tower Sargent and Stears 2013, and Ball, Dagger and O'Neil 2014.

The criteria sustaining the authors that were selected to ground the definition of *political ideologies* in Table 2 was:

1. authors with a strong background on the topic,
2. authors with proposals of a set of political ideologies made after 1950 – considering post-World War II for the incorporation of the political effects by political theories following,
3. authors who offered revised or complemented works, and were engaged in the discussion about their proposals, and
4. authors offering sets of political ideologies in consideration the diverseness of society in the world beyond the limits of Europe and North America.

This last point has a special meaning in this thesis since the intention is to keep pluralist regarding political ideologies around the world, avoiding – as it is usually found – proposals that would be


suitable only for societies from North America and Europe. For example, if standing with the dichotomy *liberalism* and *conservatism*, it would disregard such complexity in meaning and structure that fails to detect some important aspects of other currents of values and beliefs and their consequences for politics, as pointed by Feldman and Johnston (2013). Finally, it was considered their contribution in keeping the notion of ideology alive, in a balanced and perspicuous way, to build a constantly revised proposal related to political ideologies and a better comprehension of it in our days.

For Heywood, ideologies influence political life – understood as total complex of relations between people living in society – in what he sets basically in three points: by structuring the political understanding and setting objectives orienting to actions, by shaping the nature of political systems and acting as a “form of social cement” (2012, 3). Also, the author explains three features present to consider a group of beliefs and thoughts in a political ideology Heywood:

- (a) offer an account of the existing order (a worldview)
- (b) advances a model of a desired future (a good society)
- (c) explain how political change can and should be

As draws Heywood to illustrate his point (figure 1), in the intersection of the three features lays the core of a political ideology.

Figure 1: Features of ideology.



Source: Heywood 2012, 11.

An ideology, in this sense, is a system of thought that is composed of a set of ideas or principles on which rests a particular way of seeing and approaching reality and also articulating solutions to get from (b) to (c) as in Heywood's illustration. Hence it has application in the most diverse fields of human activity, such as politics, economics, religion or culture. It consists on one hand, of a theoretical base that includes the set of ideas, beliefs or principles through which one looks at reality and considers the aspects that need to be transformed in it; and, on the other hand, complement their theory with a program of action where they settle the steps according to the ideal aspired to be reached. Each kind of society is defined by given structural relations, and these relations are characterised by collective producing and reproducing their conditions of existence.

Also, ideologies are understood as based on a structure, or an "ideological schema" which works as an instrument to organise the beliefs of a determined ideology (Freeden, Tower Sargent and Stears 2013). van Dijk (1998, 69-70) proposes the following set of questions/categories to determine the structure of ideologies:

- *Identity*: Who are we? Who belongs to us? Who is a member and who can join?
- *Activities*: What do we (have to) do? What is our role in society?
- *Goals*: What is the goal of our activities?
- *Norms and values*: What are the norms of our activities? What is good or bad for us?
- *Group relations*: Who are our friends and our enemies?
- *Resources*: What material or symbolic resources form the basis of our (lack of) power and our position in society?

The political ideologies hold divergences in comparison to others – and that is the aspect that makes it plural – but there are foundational disputes of opposed core values that usually highlights the more prominent some values and not others. It is, therefore, the characteristics that put political ideologies in confrontation. There are three main foundational aspects of dispute: regarding the understanding of human nature (naturally good, cooperative or inherently flawed, dangerous), regarding the individual versus collective, as a normative choice, and last, the conception of freedom (Bourdieu and Eagleton

1994; Freedman, Tower Sargent and Stears 2013; Vincent 2010; Tower Sargent 2009; Heywood 2012).

It is essential to manifest that ideologies here are not taken as good nor bad, right or wrong, true or false, fair or unfair, they are taken as an “action-orientated system of thoughts” (Heywood 2012, 10). The view of ideologies as a guide to orient actions is present, and it draws to the definitions of functions developed by political ideologies. According to the *Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, there are four functions developed by ideology “for people who hold it: the (1) *explanatory*, (2) *evaluative*, (3) *orientative*, and (4) *programmatic* function” (Ball, Dagger and O’Neil 2014, 5). The explanatory function is related, as the name already suggests, to how ideologies perform a justification of social, political and economic scenario. The evaluative function can be described as offering tools for the assessment of social, political and economic conditions, articulating a set of values. By the orientative function it is defined that serves as a supply with orientation and sense of identity, to connect with the rest of people, to belong to a group, avoiding social disapproval or loneliness, to figure out our place and role among the others. Ideology, as an orientative tool, works for us humans “just as hikers and travellers use maps, compasses, and landmarks to find their way in unfamiliar territory” (Ball, Dagger and O’Neil 2014, 6). Finally, ideologies develop a political programmatic function with integrative capacity by prescribing a program of social and political action.

Ideologies are also differentiated by their composition in two levels: *fundamental* and *operative*. For Seliger (1979), the fundamental level is the theoretical foundation of ideologies, dealing with abstract ideas and theories, and mostly not clear to all members engaged in that ideology; while the operative level takes form commonly as political parties and movements. Objectively, those two levels fuse thought and actions. Vincent (2010) on his turn, alerts for the investigation about the roots of each political ideology and to understand its development and changes over history, even for the ‘new’ ideologies (Heywood 2012, defines new ideologies, i.e. *feminism*, *ecologism*) but also not expect to find explanations about each ideology as coherent, clear construct.

By connecting the four functions, it sets clear that political ideologies operate these roles because they try to link thought – ideas and beliefs – to action. “Every ideology provides a vision of the social and political world not only as it is, but as it *should* be, in hopes of inspiring people to act either to change or to preserve their way of life” (Ball, Dagger and O’Neil 2014, 6).

Since there is no human society without contradiction, there are no ideologies without divergent viewpoints. A few authors, as Eatwell and Wright (1993), Freedon (2001b; 2006) and Heywood (2012) explain about the consistencies and inconsistencies forming an ideology. The mutation of the concepts, the principles’ changing, the fusion with other ideology or a derivation from an ideology can make an ideology lose identity. In that sense, Heywood points that ideologies have in their central part the core concepts as the main beliefs and values making possible to distinguish from other ideologies, then adjacent and peripheral concepts, where concepts, ideologies can overlap with others (2012, 13-14). Also, in his point of view, the consequence is the blurred or fluid frontiers between some political ideologies or the appearance what Heywood calls “hybrid ideological forms” (Heywood 2012, 13).

And by analysing political ideologies from the 1980s, Heywood underlines three factors that cause, especially in the recent years, the emergence of new ideological perspectives regarding new beliefs, in consequence, to develop new required functions in society, and consequently bringing orientation to new actions (Heywood 2012, 18):

- the emergence of post-industrial societies and new social movements,
- the changing world order, and
- the rise of globalisation and cosmopolitan sensibilities

It is understandable that may be complicated to have explicit in mind the notion that when proffering words like *the society, social, groups*, etc., and mainly connected to ideologies it is meant to say that ideologies are in us all, it is not a characteristic detectable exclusively in other people or groups. “We cannot step completely outside these conceptions and compare or validate them with some definite external thing” asserts Vincent (2010, 21) but, once acknowledged the distinction between ideology and the elements offered by study of

ideology it is possible to be critical and make comparisons between ideologies, including to recognize and evaluate our own.

As a consequence of this distance or detachment, individuals can move themselves out of this scene. However, bringing down to the individual level, the capacity to understand the nature and functions of ideologies:

[...] can help us understand ourselves and what we believe. Self-identity – who we are and how we came to be who we are – is a question that most of us face at various times in our lives. (Tower Sargent 2009, xv)

So, far from witnessing the end of ideology, a “plethora of new ideologies has continued to emerge” (Freeden 2001b, 6) in a continuous movement of redefinitions, disappearances, mutations and arising of new ones. He also argues, convicted about the capacity to inspire and guide political action, that the period right before and right after the World Wars represented the time where the battle of ideas or what he calls “the battle of ideologies” were “revolving around a kind of Gramscian concept of hegemony over the world” (Freeden 2006, 7), what helps to understand that different ideologies engage in conflict regularly for the predominance of each ideology.

The effort of a coherent explanation about *ideology's* history towards a definition agreed to be used in this thesis was imperative to be reasonable and mindfulness of the authors dealing with the concept of ideology. The definitions of its nature and functions allow now to proceed with the presentation of the foremost contemporary sets of political ideologies used to articulate the methodological proposal for this research. As alerts Eagleton in his early writings to ideology, “not every rigid set of ideas is ideological” (1991, 5).

2.3 Contemporary classifications of political ideologies

One thing, however, that Marx and Engels appreciated about ideology was its inexorable linkage with politics.
— Michael Freeden (1998, 7)

In this section, the objective is to narrow down the approach started in the two previous sections. Earlier *ideology* was connected to political thoughts building *political ideologies*, this in turn represents a set of beliefs and a call-to-action for people identified with these set of beliefs.

In a way to understand the world, political scientists propose – according to their understanding of the world – a set of political ideologies, naming each, detailing its body values and with the exposition of each operative strategy.

The set of political ideologies appearing in this section is composed by a group of the eight most essential books proposing sets of political ideologies in the last fifty years, which are *Contemporary Political Ideologies* written by Roger Eatwell & Anthony Wright (1993), *The Age of Ideology* by Schwarzmantel (1998), *Political Ideologies An introduction* written by Robert Eccleshal, Alan Finlayson, Vincent Geoghegan, Michael Kenny, Moya Lloyd, Iain MacKenzie and Rick Wilford (2003) being Robe Eccleshal, Vincent Geoghegan, Alan Finlayson, Rick Wilford and Michael Kenny the authors responsible for theorising about the seven different political ideologies categorised in the book, *Contemporary Political Ideologies A comparative analysis* by Lyman Tower Sargent (2009), *Modern Political Ideologies* by Andrew Vincent (2010), *Political Ideologies An Introduction* written by Heywood (2012), the already mentioned *Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* edited by Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears (2013). Lastly, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal* from Terence Ball, Richard Dagger and Daniel O’Neill (2014), which the edition used is the ninetieth edition. These authors present their set of political ideologies grounded on two main criteria: their importance in the world today and the desire to present a broad range of political beliefs, which connects with the intentions guiding this whole research.

There are two crucial points to remark related to the proposals registered in literature and used for this research. The first one is that the political ideologies sets found can vary significantly in between each author, and it is noticeable that the authors’ working countries or regions influence on the units that are being considered in each set of

political ideologies proposed. In this research, the intention is to care with the dominant approaches – that is, traditional sets of ideologies suitable exclusively North American (the USA and Canada) and Western European contexts – in order of making it possible to use for other countries and regions, in this respect, narrow sets of ideologies are avoided. Even though the authors are North American and British mainly, they offer sets as far-ranging as possible. Unfortunately, there were no proposals found in literature within the criteria proposed given by scholars from other parts of the world. As mentions Rivera, “from the early stages of colonization of the Americas, political theories informed the actions of the Europeans settlers” (2013, 1,804). The second trait is that considering the eight books selected as a reference, not all the authors agree on one definitional set of political ideologies, hence a wide variation was found. However, some political ideologies are indicated by more than one author, as it will be illustrated on the continuity of this section.

The first set is proposed by Roger Eatwell & Anthony Wright (1993), and according to the authors, the political ideologies are *Liberalism, Conservatism, Social Democracy and Democratic Socialism, Marxism and Communism, Anarchism, Nationalism, Fascism, Feminism, and Ecologism*. They state, contradicting other authors, they do not classify *democracy* and *capitalism* as ideologies and justify that for them both are governmental and economical procedures and systems (Eatwell and Wright 1993, 6), explaining that United States, Japan, South Korea and Singapore are capitalists but preserve profound differences between each one of them.

The second set organised by John Schwarzmantel (1998) defines as political ideologies considering only four differentiations: *Liberalism, Socialism, Conservatism (The Right)*, and *Nationalism*. Schwarzmantel also wrote the book *Structures of Power: An introduction to politics, Socialism and the idea of the nation*, and *The state in contemporary society*. When proposing the set, the author argues that such set organisation aims to focus “on the contemporary crisis of the great ideological currents of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries” (Schwarzmantel 1998, 2) – the classical political ideologies – and analyse each regarding the importance to the political present scenarios. For

him, it can be only achieved by contrasting both group of ideologies: the ones of modernity with the analysis of what he calls postmodernity. Postmodernity, remarks Schwarzmantel, is related to “a range of explanatory theories that collectively suggest the world of modernity has been fundamentally transformed” (1998, 3). As saying, those that arose Enlightenment and the American and French Revolutions need to be carefully analysed in order not taking for granted conceptual appropriations which cannot serve fully holding the same values and guidance for social action as it did two hundred years ago, about industrial development or class struggle, for example. The challenging scene Schwarzmantel sees is that ideologies of modernity are equally confronted by postmodernism:

[...] meaning here the constellation of theories that in various ways celebrate difference and diversity, problematise the notion of the individual as a rational and autonomous subject of action, and question the notion of a collective agent as the bearer of emancipatory politics. (Schwarzmantel 1998, 3)

Also, for the author proposing this short set, the politics and the ideas composing these four political ideologies have core assumptions: “progress, rationality, the achievement of happiness in the human world, and the construction of political and social institutions” (Schwarzmantel 1998, 24) to make possible to build a good life in society.

The third classification is proposed by a group of political scientists Robert Eccleshall, Alan Finlayson, Vincent Geoghegan, Michael Kenny, Moya Lloyd, Iain MacKenzie and Rick Wilford (2003). According to them, the political ideologies are classified in *Liberalism*, *Conservatism*, *Socialism*, *Nationalism*, *Fascism*, *Ecologism*, and *Feminism*. The authors operate with classical but also consider the new political ideologies as Ecologism and Feminism following the pre-sets as previously Eatwell and Wright (1993) did. What Eccleshall *et al.* (2003) adds before proceeding to the explanation of each political ideology separately is an alert to not confuse the viewpoints of ideologues in each ideology, since they not adequate to offer a necessary differentiation of those “ideological views that are commonly held

within the political world from those that are the product of manipulative individuals trying to shape those commonly held views” (Eccleshall *et al.* 2003, 13). That orients each political ideology explanation regarding the richness and the complexity in the heart of any given ideology.

Chronologically, the fourth set is the one built by Lyman Tower Sargent (2009) – who also collaborates building another set altogether with Michael Freeden and Marc Stears – and from his point of view, the political ideologies in the world are *Nationalism, Globalisation, Democracy (democratic capitalism and democratic socialism), Conservatism, Liberalism, Feminism, Marxism, Anarchism, Libertarianism (minimalism), Fascism, National Socialism, and Environmentalism*. This set represents the second-largest classification among the eight authors and according to the author, the political ideologies considered by the criteria: (a) importance in the world today and (b) the desire to present a broad range of political beliefs.

For Tower Sargent, in the first category would be *Nationalism, Globalization, Democracy* and its two significant forms pointed as *Democratic capitalism and Democratic Socialism, Environmentalism* and *Feminism*. Moreover, Anarchism for the author fits into the second group of ideologies, since it “has never been dominant in any area for long, it still has many adherents and a continuing popularity” (Tower Sargent 2009, 13). For the author globalisation, together with anti-globalisation movements, are considered a new or “thin” ideology (2009, 49), in opposition to Eatwell and Wright (1993) and Heywood (2012 and 2013).

By the set of political ideologies proposed, Tower Sargent defends that each one of the ideologies appearing are fundamental for the constant analysis and to update the views of recent history, consequently, to be able to analyse the current events better. His book is specially known for clearly exposing the methods of analysis applied to classify and describe the political ideologies they considered. Since

[...] each ideology emphasizes different aspects of society and ignores other aspects stressed by another ideology, so ideologies need to be understood as they exist in the world, rather than on the basis of a formal model. Thus, each one

will be analysed as its nature dictates. (Tower Sargent 2009, 13)

The approach Tower Sargent finds adequate is the comparison. As he argues “through comparison, we discover both great differences and great similarities; we discover that differences often hide similarities” (2009, 13) and that by applying a comparison method it is possible to contrast other ways holding beliefs, seeing the world, doing things and finding guides for a better society. According to the author, it does not mean that all ideologies are opposites. Instead, the comparison method directs to the way of seeing “what both they and we believe” (Tower Sargent 2009, 13). Besides, the author offers a model of questions he uses to compare the political ideologies. According to Tower Sargent, by questioning (1) the human nature, (2) the origin of society and government or the state, (3) political obligation (duty, responsibility, law), (4) law, (5) freedom and liberty (rights – substantive and procedural), (6) equality, (7) community, (8) power (authority), (9) justice, (10) the end of society or government, (11) structural characteristics of government, and (12) the relationship between religion and government (Tower Sargent 2009, 14-15) in each ideology it is possible to achieve comparability. On another level, interactions among individuals, groups, and institutions in society are classified by the author according to five segments: value system, socialization system, social stratification and social mobility systems, economic system, and political system.

In the fifth set, the political ideologies classified are *Liberalism*, *Conservatism*, *Socialism*, *Anarchism*, *Fascism*, *Feminism*, *Ecologism*, *Nationalism*, and *Fundamentalism*. This classification proposed by Andrew Vincent (2010) is a revised third edition where the author explains some changes and, according to him, it goes towards a more sharpened way and adds new bibliography. Being a book designed for courses on ideologies, it follows a similar outline for each ideology beginning on the terminology, followed by the history of each familiarizing the reader with the genealogy of ideologies “at the more theoretical end of the ideological continuum” (Vincent 2010, 19). The scholar also makes possible to put together a philosophical background

of each ideology, and by another side, connecting to the “ordinary real-world discourse” (Vincent 2010, 18).

He also makes a statement about claiming what Vincent calls “purity of an ideology” (2010, 20), which for him is present in all the political ideologies by some member’s mentality proclaiming themselves inheritors of a valid doctrine and depreciating all other ideologies especially when the divergent theme is overlapping values or beliefs, the peripheral concepts as mentions Heywood (2012). Finally, Vincent, even though encouraging the study of a conflictive topic, argues that:

Studying ideologies is a process of encountering a number of such worlds, some of which are quite febrile and limiting, others of which are expansive. [...] In this context it becomes more problematic to speak of the truth or falsity of ideologies. Rather, some ideologies enrich us, some diminish us. Some appear to enable us to cope and function in the world; others less so. (Vincent 2010, 21).

The sixth classification used is proposed by Andrew Heywood (2012), based on the fifth edition of his book *Political Ideologies – An Introduction*. Since 1992, Heywood has been publishing this book with revised and significantly implementing the sets proposed. He is concerned about the transition of time and conscious about the social and political changes in the world. In the edition used, the author proposes *Liberalism, Conservatism, Socialism, Nationalism, Anarchism, Fascism, Feminism, Ecologism, Religious Fundamentalism, and Multiculturalism*.

One main characteristic of Heywood’s classification is the inclusion of new political ideologies along with each new edition of his book. This fifth edition used – even though there is in the market the sixth, launched in 2017 – brings as novelty *multiculturalism* and *religious fundamentalism* to compose the set. Heywood keeps with the classical political ideologies – liberalism, conservatism and socialism – and justifies the importance of mentioning them in the aspect of their capacity to reinvent themselves (Heywood 2011 and 2013). Nevertheless, he brings the new ideologies that arose from the classical derived from a new social order – like *feminism, multiculturalism* and *religious fundamentalism* – claiming attention to the importance of

determinants as “gender, locality, culture, ethnicity” (Heywood 2012, 20).

The author calls for attention – in agreement with the same idea as previous authors mentioned – to the misconception of political ideologies as scientific, not ideological (as in Marx). For example, the way many liberals “denied that liberalism should be viewed as an ideology, and conservatives have traditionally claimed to embrace a pragmatic rather than ideological style of politics” (Heywood 2013, 30). In conclusion, the approach used by the author serves as a recommendation to keep in mind the values and orientation of each political ideology.

The seventh set of political ideologies – and the one with more classification, 15 elements – is proposed by Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears (2013). *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* cites as political ideologies: *Conservatism, Christian Democracy, Liberalism, Social Democracy, Communism, Anarchism, Economic Libertarianism, Green Ideology, Ideology and Utopia (Utopianism), Nationalism, Fascism, Populism, Republicanism, Ideologies of Empire (Imperialism), and Feminism*. Different of the previous books and according to the characteristic of other *Oxford Handbooks* or *Encyclopedia*, this set embraces the classical political ideologies, the new ones and, from the author’s point of view, it was necessary to include variations of democracies – Christian and Social Democracy –, Utopianism and Imperialism. Even though contrasting with other author’s opinion (Eatwell and Wright 1993) that, for example, democracy is a theoretical and practical form of governing and Christian would be, according to Heywood (2012), a religious fundamentalist political ideology adopts a political model based on a democratic system or in a socialist system. The effort of the authors is credible and provides the most extensive explanation about each political ideology classified successfully, keeping a discourse understandable for any beginner reader interested in the topic.

The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies is the only one to cover openly with five separate sections of ideological families or traditions named as *Latin America Political Ideologies, Modern African Ideologies, Islamic Political Ideologies, Chinese Political Ideologies* and *South Asian and Southeast*

Asian Ideologies. For Latin America, the views are explained taking as a base the classical political ideologies being supplanted by the colonisers in their colonies. Mainly *Liberalism*, *Conservatism* and *Socialism* (this last derived from Latin followers of French intellectuals). By another hand, this reference adds *Nationalism* and *Populism*, and by what Rivera (2013) defines as *Neo-Indigenismo* and *Multiculturalism*, which tries to handle the number of minorities in such huge half-continent, at the same time within a compound of authoritarian regimes.

African political ideologies are described from the eighteenth century, and not randomly, long after the massive colonisation of the African countries mainly by European countries. Pre-colonial African societies briefly denominated as tribal, “a term that has been used to simplify and denigrate African political systems” lucidly pointed by Joy Hendrickson and Hoda Zaki (2013, 1,879). The authors also argue that the African population was one of the first to be exposed to the expansion of the rapacious European capitalism. The institutionalisation of slavery trade “separated millions from their communities and created an African Diaspora in Europe and the New World” (Hendrickson and Zaki 2013, 1,876) and consequently marked the historical sequence of social and political problems in the continent.

Related to the Islamic Political Ideologies, according to Browers “Islam’s comprehensiveness and its fundamentally political character” (2013, 1,938) rely on religion and state. When talking about societies from the Middle East commonly in the collective imaginary is the envisionment of the religion as unique guidance for the social organisation, as societies deprived of values and beliefs understood in the sense of a political ideology. Browers (2013) remarks that inside the Islamism – the political ideology not the religious movement which considers the last subordinate to the first – there are opposite forces, the radicals or revolutionaries, the women’s movement, liberals, conservatives and moderates acting as subdivisions articulating divergent points in the corpus of one more prominent set of values.

In China, the concept of political ideologies viewed as plural is dated after the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party and after the end of the empire ruled by “Confucian social and moral orders” (Jenco 2013, 1,991). The study of the Chinese political ideologies is

based on periods of ruling dynasties, which makes it intrinsically connected to the long and very particular history of the country. Even though China now is an economic superpower, it generally remains obscure to the rest of the world in many ways, consequently also to the understanding of the political ideologies in the country.

The South and the Southeast of Asia are described as countries with a “highly diverse and complex” (Bajpai and Bonura 2013, 2,044) scenario regarding the study of political ideologies in the region, very influenced by the European colonialism, the changes in the dynamics after the World War II and the marks left by the experience of communist politics.

Often subsumed within colonial, nationalist, and socialist frames, liberal ideologies in South and Southeast Asia have been more influential and innovative than is commonly believed, expressing distinctive visions of political modernity that have informed state-building as well as anti-state movements for civil and political rights [...] (Bajpai and Bonura 2013, 2,048)

These five sections strive to understand and give importance not only to a substantial geographical part of the world but tries to give an account of neglected societies according to the presence and the dynamics of political ideologies.

Lastly, the eight – and among the shortest classifications found – is the one proposed by Terence Ball, Richard Dagger and Daniel O’Neill (2014) and for them, the political ideologies are resumed in *Liberalism, Conservatism, Socialism, and Fascism*. The authors here maintain the classical set even though it is the newest book among the opus consulted and they essentially justify the use of these four arguing that “all ideologies and political movements have their roots in the past” (Ball, Dagger and O’Neil 2014, 3), referring to the moment in history when the idea of political ideologies existence was settled.

[...] to ignore and forget the past [...] is to risk repeating the mistake. If we are fortunate enough to avoid those mistakes, ignorance of the past will keep us from understanding ourselves and the world in which we live. (Ball, Dagger and O’Neil 2014, 4)

The authors examine those four political ideologies proposed in their set – *Liberalism*, *Conservatism*, *Socialism*, and *Fascism* – considering its historical background and stressing the role each ideology played in shaping and even severely changing, the political perspective.

For the matter of a better understanding of the use of the sets of political ideologies and the comparisons made, the information is put in a table (Table 3) as it follows:

Table 3: List of political ideologies classification by authors.

Eatwell and Wright (1993)	Schwarzmantel (1998)	Eccleshal et al. (2003)	Tower Sargent (2009)	Vincent (2010)	Heywood (2012)	Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013)	Ball, Dagger & O'Neill (2014)
Liberalism	Liberalism	Liberalism	Nationalism	Liberalism	Liberalism	Conservatism	Liberalism
Conservatism	Socialism	Conservatism	Globalisation	Conservatism	Conservatism	Christian Democracy	Conservatism
Social Democracy and Democratic Socialism	Conservatism (<i>The Right</i>)	Socialism	Democracy (<i>democratic capitalism and democratic socialism</i>)	Socialism	Socialism	Liberalism	Socialism
Marxism and Communism	Nationalism	Nationalism	Conservatism	Anarchism	Nationalism	Social Democracy	Fascism
Anarchism		Fascism	Liberalism	Fascism	Anarchism	Communism	
Nationalism		Ecologism	Feminism	Feminism	Fascism	Anarchism	
Fascism		Feminism	Marxism	Ecologism	Feminism	Economic Libertarianism	
Feminism			Anarchism	Nationalism	Ecologism	Green Ideology	
Ecologism			Libertarianism (minimalism)	Fundamentalism	Religious Fundamentalism	Ideology and Utopia (<i>Utopianism</i>)	
			Fascism		Multiculturalism	Nationalism	
			National Socialism			Fascism	
			Environmentalism			Populism	
						Republicanism	
						Ideologies of Empire (<i>Imperialism</i>)	
						Feminism	

Elaboration by the author.


Source: Eatwell & Wright (1993), Schwarzmantel (1998), Eccleshal et al. (2003), Tower Sargent (2009), Vincent (2010), Heywood (2004, 2011, 2012), Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013), and Ball, Dagger & O' Neill (2014).

In total, eight political ideologies had repetitions, as saying, appeared in more than one set proposed by the eight authors. *Liberalism* was the only one cited by all authors;

Nationalism (Eatwell and Wright; Schwarzmantel; Eccleshall *et al.*; Tower Sargent; Vincent; Heywood; Freeden, Tower Sargent and Stears), *Conservatism* and *Fascism* (Eatwell and Wright; Eccleshall *et al.*; Tower Sargent; Vincent; Heywood; Freeden, Tower Sargent and Stears; Ball, Dagger & O'Neill) comes in second cite by seven authors; *Feminism* (Eatwell & Wright; Eccleshall *et al.*; Tower Sargent; Vincent; Heywood; Freeden, Tower Sargent and Stears) is proposed in six out of eight sets; *Socialism* (Schwarzmantel; Eccleshall *et al.*; Vincent; Heywood; Ball, Dagger and O'Neill); *Anarchism* (Eatwell & Wright; Tower Sargent; Vincent; Heywood; Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears) appear in five sets; and finally *Ecologism* (Eatwell & Wright; Eccleshall *et al.*; Vincent; Heywood) are proposed in four classifications of political ideologies.

For a matter of quantification and better visualisation, the frequency of each political ideology cited was organised on a graphic (figure 2) as shown below:

Figure 2: Most cited political ideologies in literature.



Source: Schena, Almiron and Pineda 2018, 22.

Elaborated based on Eatwell & Wright (1993), Schwarzmantel (1998), Eccleshall *et al.* (2003), Tower Sargent (2009), Vincent (2010), Heywood (2012), Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013), and Ball, Dagger & O'Neill (2014).

From left to right the frequency of the most cited political ideologies, and the last block, 21 others, represents the nomenclatures appearing just once. Aiming to make clear which are those 21 political ideologies generally shown in figure 2, the table below (Table 4) organises the information with the name of the political ideology and the author or group of authors proposing the use of each.

Table 4: List of the 21 other political ideologies cited only one time each in the literature reviewed.

<i>Globalisation</i>	<i>Tower Sargent (2009)</i>
Christian Democracy	Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013)
<i>Social Democracy and Democratic Socialism</i>	<i>Eatwell & Wright (1993)</i>
Conservatism (The right)	Schwarzmantel (1998)
<i>Democracy (D. Capitalism and D. Socialism)</i>	<i>Tower Sargent (2009)</i>
Marxism and Communism	Eatwell & Wright (1993)
<i>Social Democracy</i>	<i>Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013)</i>
Communism	Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013)
<i>Marxism</i>	<i>Tower Sargent (2009)</i>
Economic Libertarianism	Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013)
<i>Green Ideology</i>	<i>Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013)</i>
Fundamentalism	Vincent (2010)
<i>Religious Fundamentalism</i>	<i>Heywood (2012)</i>
Libertarianism (Minimalism)	Tower Sargent (2009)
<i>Ideology and Utopia (Utopianism)</i>	<i>Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013)</i>
National Socialism	Tower Sargent (2009)
<i>Environmentalism</i>	<i>Tower Sargent (2009)</i>
Populism	Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013)
<i>Republicanism</i>	<i>Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013)</i>

Ideologies of Empire (Imperialism)	Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013)
<i>Multiculturalism</i>	<i>Heywood (2012)</i>

Source: Schena, Almiron and Pineda 2018, 23. Based on Eatwell & Wright (1993), Schwarzmantel (1998), Eccleshall *et al.* (2003), Tower Sargent (2009), Vincent (2010), Heywood (2012), Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013), and Ball, Dagger & O’Neill (2014).

Interestingly, and already mentioned above, the definition of the term *ideology* can be grounded on a plurality of views, including classical and modern approaches, the reference works used here are all grounded on the same humanistic liberal perspective. Since the mainstream approach in current political sciences is biased towards English-speaking academic regions grounded on humanistic and liberal values. Thus, it can be an enriching exercise to consider alternative views that may challenge this dominant approach. In the case of liberalism and its critics, Dryzek, Honig & Phillips affirm that “it seems certain that moves to reframe political theory in a more self-consciously global context will gather pace” (2006, 25). For instance, there is a strong current of thought challenging not only liberal views but also our human-centric approach to the world.

This criticism challenges anthropocentrism and has made a consistent claim of a new ideology leaning towards the culture that is entirely missed by the dominant liberal approach: *speciesism*. Speciesism is consistently defined by an increasing set of social scientists as an ideology based on a core idea: that it is justifiable to give preferences to beings simply because they are members of the *homo sapiens* species (Singer 2003).

The assumption that humans are superior to all other species of animals – and are, therefore, justified in exploiting them for their own use – has had enormous consequences for non-human animals as well as for the planet and humans themselves. For an increasing number of authors, speciesism, or more particularly speciesist anthropocentrism, represents the most pervasive and widely held shared beliefs in society (Nibert 2002), a complex of institutions, discourses and affects that structures human existence on a “false pathological reality” (Weizenfeld

& Joy 2014, 20-21). This “false, pathological reality” indoctrinates people in the rightness of exploiting the Earth and its non-human inhabitants for human interest alone and, according to the Marxian views in this field, it is the actual ideological cement that sustains modern capitalism (Best 2014). Because of the full acceptance of new ideologies (which are new not because the ideologies are new, but because they were not accepted as ideologies until very recently) that go beyond classical ideologies and include a more cultural, transversal impact, speciesism is a natural add-on in any updated list of political ideologies and of a critical expanded view of them, following feminism and environmentalism.

2.4 Power, discourse and media

As exposed previously, there is an agreement core about ideologies – political ideologies per extent – functioning to establish relations between individuals and society, which is part of a bigger picture: the broad structure of power within the social bases of politics (Lipset, 1959).

Appropriately questioned: *what is power exactly?*

Leaving personal interpretation and abstractions – knowing that the straightforward pronunciation of the term brings a lot to our mind – at this point, it comes useful to figure out the main concepts of power in social sciences. Starting by considering only as an essential element to the ability to achieve a goal; also, having in mind that it is more than a force or energy as in the natural sciences, even though the understanding as a force may influence in the general idea.

It is significant to remark that to define power is to deal with controversies and mainly to accept that power is a contested concept. Thus, the route taken here – as done previously with the definition of ideology – goes toward to feature its main concepts or understandings that are representative in media studies previously, and “acknowledging that no settled or agreed definition can ever be developed” as states Heywood (2004, 122).

That said, *power* is a concept elaborated in many theories along with the history, being the one from Thomas Hobbes' (1588-1679) eyes a widely known for its representability at its time and context. Within his pessimistic view of society and human beings, he conceptualizes power analogous to the idea of mechanical activity. "In that, it implies that power involves being *pulled* or *pushed* against one's will" explains Heywood (2004, 123) regarding the classical thought of Hobbes.

The interest related to power means and processes were developed under many areas, one of whose work has had a profound influence on both history and Western culture was Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), obviously as a consequence, in some extent to Communication research. The nineteenth-century German philosopher, poet, musician and philologist, disseminated ideas on the "will to power" (*der Wille zur Macht*) understood as the men's main motor (Nietzsche 1968), a term coined in 1883 in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and later organised as Nietzsche's personal written thoughts by his sister. In the book, published after his death, the philosopher describes the will to power as the human ambition to achieve desires, the demonstration of strength that makes ourselves mark our presence to the world, also as the domination of other humans as much as the exercise of control over one's environment. Nietzsche analyses the culture of the powerful which comprise those people in society with easy access to resources: as for the powerful, their culture seems obvious; for the powerless, on the other hand, it remains out of reach, elite and expensive.

The concept of will to power in Nietzsche's thinking has received many interpretations, the most debatable one being the appropriation and exploitation by National Socialism as the desire for passion and power. Power understood, in this case, as limited in the context of domination in culture. However, the concept was never systematically defined, the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche underlies much twentieth-century analysis of power.

From a Marxist line of thought and more consistently applied to early mass communication studies, Max Weber (1864-1920) is one of the most influential intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries considered one of the founders of Sociology and

known for scrutinizing about the concepts of power. The German scholar was interested in the concept of domination and its machinery in society, as for him the modern society is threatened by the growing phenomenon of concentration of power within institutions. Weber warned that in modern organisations, both private and state, tend to fall under the control of small but powerful political or financial groups.

About power, Weber affirms that it represents the “probability of imposing one’s will within a social relationship” (1978, xci), being purely structural, its concept involves both constriction and facilitation features, and his theory goes deeper in both directions. Stands out in his theory, also improving on the Marxian class analysis, the distinction Weber sets related to three kinds of domination or domain relationships, according to his typical claims of legitimacy. Finally, in the theory of Max Weber, although leaders are democratically elected with the best intention, on both sides, there is a tendency to integrate into power elites who are concerned with defending their own interests and positions. In other words, it could be said that at present we run the risk that elites – born in society through legal procedures – enter a process by which power increases and perpetuates itself by feeding back and producing, therefore, more power distributed unequally.

Many were the scholars interested in the imbricate mechanics of power in society, and Michel Foucault (1926-1984) stands out for his theory of power and the closer look to the relation of power and knowledge. For him, power “operates in a regime of truth” and the “discourse embraces a relatively bounded field of terms, categories, and beliefs expressed through statements that are commonsensical within the discourse” (Brown 2006, 72), and it is not taken simply as language or speech. Also, it was socially and academically representative during the twentieth century, Foucault’s insistence that power is everywhere, without but that claiming it is equally distributed to everyone, but the opposite.

Serving as a theoretical inspiration across a multitude of disciplines, Foucault’s understands power as a tool to construct and organise subjects, even in those spaces and situations in the ordinary sense that are imagined to be free of power relations (Hall, 2001).

[...] power [in Foucault's theory] is never fully tangible but, rather, is an effect of the norms issuing from particular orders of words and images, orders that are constructed as much by silences, blank spaces, and framing as by the words and images themselves. (Brown 2006, 72)

Consequently, in Foucault's (1982; 2001) line of thought in all power relations, there is, by definition, a constant and corresponding response as a resistance against the dominant power. In the case that this resistance does not exist, the author speaks of power as domination. There is differentiation proposed between *power* and *influence* offered by Heywood. The author explains that power *per se* in this comparison would be "capacity to make a formal decision" and influence "the ability to affect the content of these decisions through some form of external pressure" (Heywood 2004, 122). The idea is based on John R. P. French and Bertram Raven's studies, from 1959, where both social psychologists supported the argument that power should be distinguished from influence. In a sequent level, the exercise of power is classified in *intentionalist* and *structuralist* where

The former holds that power is always an attribute of an identifiable agent, be it an interest group, political party, major corporation or whatever. The latter sees power as a feature of a social system as a whole. (Heywood 2004, 122)

Related to the fact of using one or other term - and adding from the researcher in charge of the present thesis a modest drop of reasoning based on the readings - it can be said that influence is taken as enclosed – and not different – by power, as saying: the power of generating influence. Also, in the understanding of this research, *influence* can give an idea of a personified agent, reinforcing power exercised someone you can name, removing the perception power cemented or imbricated in structural forms – of government and institutions for examples – affecting a more significant scope of society, made possible by economic, political and cultural advantages or established superiority.

As Heywood exposes in a few years later in his later book, *Global Politics*, power in less tangible aspects "as leadership and skills" (Heywood 2011, 210) it remains as power. Adding to it, widely used in

the advertising and marketing areas nowadays, the word *influence* seems to carry less unwelcome impact and makes the discourse smooth to the ears “even though advertisers themselves may only be concerned about selling their products” (Heywood 2004, 122) doing their job to the companies which objective is to raise profits. So is the political party designing discursive strategies to *influence* a wider group of people, spread their ideas and expect more adhesion, support quantified in the form of votes.

More focused in communication, Jürgen Habermas, born in 1929, contributes to the research field and the perspective of power in the communicational process together with scholars from the Frankfurt School as Georg Lukács, Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse. Essentially – and resuming the range of his studies to keep the anchor on the topic here – Habermas is interested in the mass culture, and the public sphere concerned that while “Marxism has proved strong on its analysis of how class domination structured cultural exchange, liberalism has pointed to the need to limit the power of the state by establishing collectively held rights” (Stevenson 2002, 47).

Also, tracing the falling of the saloons as the stronghold of the bourgeois public sphere – moreover meaning money and power – due to “communication becoming increasingly organised through large commercial concerns” (Stevenson 2002, 49) mainly represented by the newspaper industry, which Habermas calls “hobbyhorses of the money aristocracy” (Habermas 1989, 182). Furthermore, Habermas mainly connects mass media and its power of influencing and driving masses’ opinion imbricated in “networks of social power” (Stevenson 2002, 3):

[...] since the end of the liberal era, which Habermas dates from the early 1870s, the emergence of monopoly capitalism has brought about the commercialisation of the press. Literary forms of representation were displaced by specialised journalists who were governed by the private interests of a proprietor. The search for the exposure of political domination by the use of reason was replaced by the imposition of an ideological consensus through the

mechanisms of economic and political manipulation.
(Stevenson 2002, 50)

Contemporarily, in the studies in media culture and the information society/network society (Castells 1997; Bell 1973), the questioning incorporates new elements – as development of internet technology, digital television and cyberspace – and, at the same time, remains interested in power as a transversal facet running its practices along the transformation of the communication in society and the prevalence of the capitalist system. As explains Stevenson:

The idea of a network society offers a different model of the capitalist economy, a rethinking of the link between communications and politics, and consideration of the changes taking place within our cultural life. (2002, 185)

Summing up arguments from different scholars, the author moreover explains the diverging perspectives on how these changes affect positively or negatively the societies, as Stevenson defines the “technological optimists or pessimists” (2002, 185).

Shortly after the end of World War II, another war fought with media weapons to legitimate, once and for all, the fourth power title given to journalism. Since then, many theories attempted to understand how journalistic discourses are created and how texts are interpreted that not only narrate the facts of history but also actively participate in the discourse creation.

Herbert Schiller (1919-2000), with his background in Economy, is an exponent in terms of the commodification of communication systems. Also, very critical to the use of communication and information as a tool in service of power, primarily related to the consolidation of the United States in the global economic scenario. For the North American scholar, media is an extension of the political and economic power as a “control process” (Schiller 1991, 8) weakening the democratic system, the plural expression and the exercise of counterbalance or social power. A constant in the author’s speech was the denunciation of the advance of private companies in the public space. He argues that it affects the freedom of expression and in the degradation of the cultural and media pluralism.

Clearly, above political power, it is economic power that has a decisive influence directly on the media agenda:

It utilises the education of journalists and other media professionals, built-in penalties and rewards for doing what is expected, norms presented as objective rule, and the occasional but telling direct intrusion from above. The main lever is the internalisation of values. (Schiller 1991, 8)

Especially in his book *Culture, Inc.: The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression*, Schiller examines the effects of fifty years of corporate growth on American culture. He argues that corporate control over such arenas of culture as museums, theatres, performing arts centres, and public broadcasting stations has resulted in a broad manipulation of consciousness as well as an insidious form of censorship.

In this sense, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) synthesises in his book *On Television* (1998) that the field of journalism is an arena of dispute around several symbolic capitals. Roughly speaking, the journalists do not write to the audience, but regarding the interest of the peers becoming mere instruments of reproduction of the dominant ideology, and their employers, seeking capital and profit. The corporate dynamics and rampant capitalist logic makes news as disposable products, and the journalist a mere pawn, all in a pursue of the golden capital of television: the audience, that represents just a currency for communication companies.

All that said around the topic that connects the triad: power, discourse and media, in Heywood's book, *Political Theory An Introduction*, a reasonable definition is found and becomes useful to clarify the point in this research:

Power is here seen as the capacity to make formal decisions which are in some way binding upon others, whether these are made by teachers in the classroom, parents in the family or by government ministers in relation to the whole of society. (Heywood 2004, 122)

Heywood, as an example, is one of the authors who openly embraces the mutualistic symbiosis of politics – understanding the actions of individuals as political within the societies we built – and power in his production, while also being an expert in political

ideologies. He affirms that “ideologies play a crucial role in either upholding the prevailing power structure or in weakening or challenging it” (Heywood 2012, 15). As in the philosophy of French Enlightenment, a range of problems later labelled as *ideological* was taken up from the perspective which concentrated on the role that ideas play in legitimizing socio-political order.

Along this evolution line considering ideology embedded in the way society makes sense of the word around and defines the social and political life through communication, the mastery of the discourses receives distinct attention. Diving into a more practical approach on how ideologies can operate as power, Ball, Dagger and O’Neill express that “the study of political ideologies is in many ways the study of words (2014, xiii).

Words filling newspapers’ page over page, organised for a speech on radio and television, complementing and supporting each on the context of the Internet. Words that can be delivered in different ways, verbalised or written, put together intentionally as a “package of information” (Tannen, Hamilton and Schiffrin 2015, 12) within a discourse context and carrying cognitive factors behind discourse structure.

There are several levels and possibilities for analysis in the broader discourse context, as the flow of thought, the communicative goals of the speaker, and the background knowledge of the audience. As for the audience, the mass media is a vehicle of discourse capable of reaching – as its name already sets explicitly – a considerable amount of people, disseminating its message in a one-to-many communication – which is the case of the newspapers, for the interest of this research.

The media messages compose a bigger casing where the study of discourse and its intentions is wrapped and where power in action “is absent of fists and weapons” (Gutsche 2017, 4). Messages are put together to orient or drive interlocutors in a way to keep, overtake or maintain power. Even though in our everyday life we do not usually think in detail, it represents a constant negotiation of power to get to do what we aim; “it takes power for me to convince you to do something as for me to do something you suggest”, intelligently exemplifies Gutsche (2017, 4).

The ideological nuances in media messages may not be hypnotic and irreversible as preached by the Hypodermic Theory of the Chicago School. However, they are never ignored (Wolf, 1999). In this logic, it can be understood that the communication vehicles linked to the journalistic practice have a decisive role in forming the opinion of a specific public on a particular subject.

To analyse media content with such critical approach, even though can often lead to frustration, it is also a step to a horizon with possibilities to uncover the still-so-present illusion about a neutral media, and especially, from there, to have a more realistic and conscious view regarding the information that is consumed:

Its richness comes in the first place from the fact that the media themselves are so varied, operate under so many different political and cultural systems, and have such ambiguous connections to their various audiences that there is ample opportunity for theory construction and testing [...]. (Fortner and Fackler 2014, xix)

There are three key analytical discourse frameworks which one is offered by Michel Foucault, with the articulation between power, knowledge, truth and discourse. As mentioned previously, to whom, discourse is conceived as social structure, and the discursive practice is a social practice (Barthes 1988). Moreover, the ones offered by Norman Fairclough (1941-) and Teun A. van Dijk (1943-). Among these two, being the prior more oriented to the method and its improvements, and the later works within a discourse-ideology interface where a “multidisciplinary theoretical framework is articulated by the fundamental triangulation of discourse, cognition and society” (van Dijk 2005, 9).

Mainly, the discourse analysis as interpretative and explanatory, unveil ideological work of discourse manufacturing society and culture and the challenging inequality in a variety of different contexts. As the author explains:

Critical discourse analysis is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and

resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. (van Dijk 2015, 466)

The inequities and injustices drawing attention to alternative power structures – considering that power relations are discursive – makes van Dijk the leader of an essential branch of critical studies nowadays related to the investigation of dominant ideologies in discourse. As well as his standpoint which is the cornerstone of the methodological perspective for the development of this research.

van Dijk resumes his field of interest:

Politics is one of the social domains whose practices are virtually exclusively discursive; political cognition is by definition ideologically based; and political ideologies are largely reproduced by discourse. (van Dijk, 2006b)

The contemporary Dutch linguist is committed to investigating in text linguistics, discourse analysis and especially in his interdisciplinary approach Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) addressing the emphasis to social problems, put into practice in a multitude of every day – sometimes imperceptible – actions.

Analogous to Stuart Hall framework of “discourse as a system of representation” (2001, 72) and exploring meaning under a formal semantics approach, van Dijk works with the concept of “mental models” referring to the discourse meaning that is “controlled by subjective interpretations” (van Dijk 2005, 16) by the users of a shared language. To illustrate the question of how language and ideology are imbricated:

Although the context and the event models are personal and subjective, the members of a community also share more general social beliefs, such as knowledge, attitudes and ideologies. These general beliefs control the construction of specific models and, consequently, also indirectly control the production and understanding of discourse. (Dijk 2005, 17)

In van Dijk’s theory, the group’s beliefs are characteristically ideological “in the sense that they are controlled and organised by underlying ideologies” (Dijk 1998, 79). By influencing the member’s

mental models, indirectly controls the structures of the discourse resulting in what van Dijk calls “biased models” (2005, 17).

The CDA practised by van Dijk covers a range of topics in the discourse, but specific attention is given to politics and its manoeuvres. In *Politics, ideology and discourse* (2006) as part of *The Encyclopedia of language and linguistics*, van Dijk explains that

[...] political ideologies not only are involved in the production or understanding of political discourses and other political practices, but are also (re)produced by them. In a sense, discourses make ideologies observable in the sense that it is only in discourse that they may be explicitly expressed and formulated. (van Dijk 2006, 732)

From van Dijk’s large academic production with his broad interest stands out for the topic of this research, the book *News as discourse* (1990) exploring the news production in press, considering all the actors involved. His point is that the news structures can be directly related to the social practices and with the ideologies behind the news production, as well to the institutional and the macro-sociological contexts of the press (van Dijk 1990, 9). Mainly, in his understanding, the structure of discourse is related to the structures of power with emphasis on this complex “communicative event” composed by “social context, featuring participants (and their properties)” and not ignoring the “production and reception processes” (van Dijk 1988, 2).

For van Dijk

[...] discourses also have more complex, higher-level properties, such as coherence relations between sentences, overall topics, and schematic forms, as well as stylistic and rhetorical dimensions. Both as monological, printed, or spoken, text and as dialogical interaction, media discourses thus receive an integrated account of their more general as well as their more distinctive organization. (van Dijk 1988, 2)

The whole point is how news discourse contributes in shaping biased discourse in benefit of a few members of our society – “news as commodities” as names Gutsche (2017, 60) – while intentionally blocking the flow of access to information integrally. Thus, making it

easier to take control and exercise the power of influence and keep the controlling group interests assured. As said, nothing better than well-informed voters for democracy well function (van Dijk1990, 20) but that would be rather utopic.

Media and its discourse are an essential part of the political and economic engine of hegemonic interests, as

The dominance of the economic system over other social spheres helps foster a culture of conformity rather than critique, of sensation rather than substance and technique rather than reflection. (Stevenson 2002, 186)

These theoretical and methodological reflections oriented the principal axes of problematising the power in our societies. Therefore, understanding power operates, both relationally and reciprocally, especially in media sociologists, speak of the balance of power. In this case, sociological examination of power concerns itself with discovering and describing the relative strengths – equal or unequal, stable or subject to periodic change – and analysing the relationships in which the power has a connotation of unilateralism.

As seen in the theories and studies quoted here so far, the argument that ideologies work in a way to employ power and uses media as a conductor of intentional ideas exist and are legitimate, but Decker among other author brings up an alert about the complexity of defining exactly this mesh of variables:

[...] one might define ideology as a reciprocal process wherein subjective, institutional, and political ideas operate within a power web of both the intended and the unanticipated. Under this definition, no ideology can be entirely conscious, for the concept is in constant flux as individuals, institutions, and politics influence one another. Ideology is thus – paradoxically – unstable even as it functions to produce power. (Decker 2004, 6)

While in this subchapter the effort was to clarify the concepts and its theories to gasp the grounds of *the power of media discourse*, in an upcoming chapter – number 4 – the relevant academic findings within the research in Communication-related to media, power and discourse is described.

Finally, the metaphor used by Jowon Park (2003) of a window offers one way of understanding as it is brought up when analysing the contrasts that could be found in television news reports in the United States related to the portrayal of Japan and Korea. In a way, his point of view helps to think about the power of media roles and presence of the range of ideologies embedded in it, which shares a point of view of the present thesis:

People only see the world within the frame of the window. If the frame of the window is too small, people will see only a small part of the world. If the window is on the west wall, people will only see the west. In other words, media may show only a small part of the world from a particular point of view. (Park 2003, 145)

Freely complementing the metaphor – since in the two previous sections the diversity of political ideologies existence were exposed – it is possible to imagine a dropdown list with specific features for each window, enriching the description and finally the deeper meaning of the position occupied by these windows. Therefore, the diversity of available frames could enlarge the view of the world, and the name of it would be *media pluralism*, which will be detailed from now on.

2.5 Media, pluralism and democracy

Every historical period has its godword. There was an Age of Faith, an Age of Reason, an Age of Discovery. Our time has been nominated to be the Age of Information. (...) Unlike “faith” or “reason” or “discovery”, information is touched with a comfortably secure, noncommittal connotation. There is neither drama nor high purpose to it. It is bland to the core and, for that very reason, nicely invulnerable. Information smacks of safe neutrality; it is simple, helping heaping up of unassailable facts. In that innocent guise, it is the perfect starting point for a technocratic political agenda that wants as

little exposure for its objectives as possible. After all, what can anyone say against information? (Roszak 1986, 19)

Being well studied and reported, the conditions of minority groups – definition by European Centre for Minority Issues¹⁹) – in all kinds of societies and contexts, with particular attention to democratic societies connecting several disciplines such as jurisprudence, political science, sociology and communication, from the far Oriental countries in Asia (Cao 2009) as China (Freedman 2000), Middle East (Bengio and Ben-Dor 1998), Europe (Bertossi 2007; Grillo 2008), Northern America (Kondo 2001; Naff 2001; Rose 2017) and finally Central and South America (Ruiz 2006; Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa 2015), it is possible to resume that the acceptance and equal representation of diversity is not a strand among human groups.


Democracy, which is designed to embrace the plurality of groups, majorities and minorities composing a society, originates from the ancient Greek δημοκρατία (*dēmokratía*) meaning the government of the people. It was created from δῆμος (*demos* meaning *people*) and κράτος (*kratos* translated as *power*) in the fifth century BC to denote political systems then existing in Greek city-States (Held 2006). Even though the classical political system in Greece was very selective – foreigners, slaves and women were excluded of any decision-making process (Ribeiro 2001, 6-7) – it is considered the base for the democratic model nowadays. Jumping to the recent history, as exposes Dahl (1989), most modern democracies lived significant changes through universal suffrage movements during ninetieth and twentieth centuries, and especially in the post-World Wars period (Dalla Corte and Dalla Corte 2018, 180).

Part of a democracy is the inherent possibility to question its quality and for that purpose of developing tools to audit and evaluate how effective the model is performing regarding the core of the democratic values. For the construction of the line of thought in this chapter, some recent results serve to throw light on aspects of

¹⁹ www.ecmi.de

democracies over the world, as well as narrowing it down with relation to the Brazilian context. Mainly, the Democratic Barometer (figure 3) works as a guide for developing methodologies to analyse a democratic system according to three strands: freedom, control and equality. And all of three can be applied to analyse media as freedom of the media – and freedom of expression in general – as the backbone of democracy, and in case there is control of it, the direct effect, with no regards to no solid ground for equality.

Figure 3: Democracy Barometer concept



Source: Democracy Barometer Codebook, September 2018.²⁰

Another instrument is *Democracy Index* developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU-UK) and applied since 2006. The last information, published on Pew Research Center FactTank edition²¹, dated by the end of 2017 measuring the conditions of democracy in 167 countries reports that 96 out of 167 countries (57%) were democracies of some kind; 21 (13%) were autocracies, and 46 (28%) exhibited elements of both democracy and autocracy. The share of democracies among the world’s governments has been on an upward trend since the

²⁰ Available in

http://www.democracybarometer.org/Data/Codebook_all%20countries_1990-2016.pdf

²¹ <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/14/more-than-half-of-countries-are-democratic/>


mid-1970s. The index is based on 60 indicators grouped in five different categories, measuring pluralism, civil liberties and political culture.

Brazil – a country that is geographic centre in this thesis –, is in the group of the countries entering in a democracy recently: by mid-1980s, after a military dictatorship that lasted 21 years (1964 to 1986). Complementary to the primary results, 38 countries were selected to interview the population to jointly evaluate how satisfied they were with democracy in their country.

In Brazil, the index shows (figure 4) that less than one-fourth of the interviewees (24%) trust the decisions of the national government and its capacity to rule for the good of the population; with a slightly better percentage, 28%, of the interviewees from Brazil are satisfied with democracy in the country. Lastly, it is representative of the percentage of respondents supporting a government ruled by the military, 38%.

Figure 4: Opinion on political systems in Brazil in 2017.

% in Brazil saying each of the following systems of government would be a good or bad way to govern the country.



In **Brazil**:

24%

trust the national government to do what is right for **Brazil**.

28%

are satisfied with the way democracy is working in **Brazil**.

Source: John Gramlich, Pew Research Center²².

²² Source: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/30/global-views-political-systems/>

Also as part of this study, which is complicated and broad, one alarming fact found in that “roughly one-in-five or fewer are committed to representative democracy in Latin America (median of 19%)” (Wike, Simmons, Stokes and Fetterolf 2017²³) making only above sub-Saharan Africa (18%) and the Asia-Pacific (15%).

Only with these numbers would be possible to mine relevant information about the social, cultural and political features making possible the current political scenario in Brazil, with the democratically elected extreme-right-with-military-background president last November 2018. However, the focus must be on a democratic system – which is our reality even though improvements are necessary –, its space for pluralism and the role that the media plays in this framework.

The concept of *democracy* and “democratic citizenship education is shrouded in controversy” (Carr 2008, 117). If by one hand, the word means *the government of the people*, on the other hand, it refers to a set of political institutions, in particular, the popular election for positions of power. The outcome is that in regimes that we generally accept as democratic, the people do not have direct ruling power, their influence on political decisions is filtered by intermediation mechanisms; which can be, and are usually, biased in favour of some interests and social groups and to the detriment of others. Pondering, while people are – by choice or not – in a shadow of political education, they do not see why and how to engage in a change.

The influence on political decisions is filtered by intermediation mechanisms, as explains Albuquerque including the media where not only open falsification and deliberate omission do not summarize the repertoire of forms of “media policy intervention” (2011, 91). Even more crucial is the power “to determine the agenda that will receive public attention, the agents and the relevant positions” (Valcke, Sükösd and Picard 2015, 4). There are cases of ostensive manipulation, but the most important is the systematic effect of the reduced plurality of the news.

²³ Source: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/10/16/globally-broad-support-for-representative-and-direct-democracy/>

As determines Cavallin (1997), refers to the multiplicity of opinions, groups, points of view, political, religious, ethical and even geographical attitudes. The author believes that pluralism has to do with a broad spectrum of political, social, cultural, information and interest values. Furthermore, media pluralism refers to as parameters or instruments to ensure this the representation of such plurality.

As the North American journalist and academic Eric Alterman states “lose newspapers and you lose your democracy”²⁴. Thus, democracy and pluralism are very connected. Democracy arises to place the citizen at the centre of the political system and in this sense, the media plays a fundamental role in the diffusion of currents of thought and opinions, and a balanced context, contributing to the free confrontation of ideas.

According to the official publication of United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), *Public Service Broadcasting: A Comparative Legal Survey* by the executive director of the Centre for Law and Democracy, Toby Mendel

The need for plurality flows from the right to seek and receive information and ideas. Central to this aspect of the right to freedom of expression is the idea that citizens should have access to a wide range of different perspectives and analyses through the media, in other words, access to a diverse media. It is through the availability of a range of viewpoints that individuals can exercise full citizenship, choosing between competing perspectives as they engage in public decision-making. As regards broadcasting, the airwaves are a public resource and they should be used for the benefit of the whole public, including people with minority views or interests. (Mendel 2011, 12)

The evolution of the written press as a reliable information vector for the people seems to be very slow, as it lingers in an environment of a tentacle of censorship and forms of information control in the news production, as ownership and monopolies of media groups. Journalistic

²⁴ From: <https://www.thenation.com/article/lose-newspapers-and-you-lose-your-democracy/>

institutions have been recognised as players in the political game, by taking positions and endorsing agendas (Cook 2006; Sparrow 2006) to a point where scholars define this media behaviour by the term “partisan media” (Levendusky 2013, 611).

This engine of controlled information in media – broadcasting, publishing, and the Internet regarded collectively – keeps running even in the so-called democratic societies and above the principles of pluralism making necessary the examination about if/how it contributes or not to an environment where all the voices are listened and valued the same. In particular, Matthew Levendusky explores the theme, and in an article published in *American Journal of Political Science* he questions if media polarize the audience and how they do it since the scholar affirms that

[...] as citizens move to the poles and harden their beliefs, it becomes more challenging to find consensus solutions, and compromise becomes more difficult and elusive. (Levendusky 2013, 611)

Investigations like those are necessary, and the question is pertinent as media exposure corroborate to reinforces attitudes (Klapper 1960; Bryant Oliver 2009).

About monopoly, one argument is that it is possible based on an economic model: capitalism (Fine and Murfin 1984; Foster 2014). While the North American lawyer, Louis Brandeis (1856-1941), once prophesied “we must make our choice. We may have democracy, or we may have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we cannot have both”²⁵, White (2005), who studies media power and ownership, adverts that monopolistic concentration of the media is the denial of space for pluralism. Brandeis was concerned to reconcile the developing powers of modern government and society with the maintenance of individual liberties and opportunities for personal development.

As Barnett and Townend expose in *Media power and plurality: from hyperlocal to high-level policy*:

The ability of powerful media proprietors like Rupert Murdoch and Silvio Berlusconi to dictate news agendas,

²⁵ Source: <https://www.brandeis.edu/legacyfund/bio.html>

influence public opinion, and engage in political power-broking (or, indeed, achieve elected political power) has animated debates in the UK, Australia and Italy, as well as alerting regulators and policymakers in other countries to the potential damage of allowing untrammelled power in the hands of individual media moguls. (Barnett and Townend 2015, 3)

Critics as the one offered by the French sociologist and director *Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique* (CNRS), the most prominent public centre of scientific research in France, Dominique Wolton came from a long dedication – over 35 years – to scientifically study the information and communication field with closely observing the media relations with public space, political communication, information and journalism, cultural diversity and globalization. And he conceives:

There is a wealth of information: we know everything about agents' strategies, about the constitution of multimedia groups, about new communication techniques, about the likes of the public, about the cost of the programs, without, therefore, manifested interest for analysis. The media have all created a specialized rubric and the result is paradoxical. Instead of favouring more abundant information, richer in diversity and analysis, we see the opposite phenomenon. As if the information were analysis.²⁶ (Wolton 1997, 61)

Again bringing the case of Brazil, an exclusive survey by the National Forum for Democratization of Communication (FNDC)²⁷ about country's television broadcasting networks, reveals that six of the leading private national communication networks – *Globo, SBT, Record, Bandeirantes, Rede TV!, CNT* – are linked, including

²⁶ Translated by the author from Portuguese: "*Há uma profusão de informações: sabemos tudo acerca das estratégias dos agentes, acerca da constituição dos grupos multimídia, acerca das novas técnicas de comunicação, acerca dos gostos do público, acerca do custo dos programas, sem que, por isso, a procura de análise se manifeste. Os média criaram todos uma rubrica especializada e o resultado é paradoxal. Em vez de se favorecer uma informação mais abundante, mais rica de diversidade e de análises, constatamos o fenómeno contrário. Como se as informações constituíssem análise.*"

²⁷ <http://fndc.org.br/>

both owned and affiliated channels, representing 263 of the 332 Brazilian TV broadcasters/channels. According to the data from the Ministry of Communications, two of these networks exceeds the permitted number of stations, radio and/or television, that can be owned, under the law (Biz and Guareschi 2005, 84).

How can it be accepted that Brazilian democracy consolidates – until now and so far – and that it continues to live with an academically named *mass media colonialism* (dos Santos and Caparelli 2004; Görden 2009; Quadros 2011) that (ab)uses the limits of the power concentration? Inconsistently, however, the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, defines in chapter 5 about Social Communication that “the media cannot, directly or indirectly, be subject to monopoly or oligopoly”²⁸ As one can easily verify: the constitution itself is usurped. *In such a scenario, why is media pluralism essential?*

As reflects Wolton (1997), who is also head of the French *Laboratory of Information, Communication and Scientific Implications*, pluralism is vital for bringing the idea that to ensure democratic conditions is essential. Thus, the mass media could be arranged in a plural structure to be able to reflect, if not all, at least the most important chains of ideological diversity, political and cultural life of society.

Pluralism can be classified into two forms related to media, internal and external, as explains Doyle (2002) and Valcke, Sükösd and Picard (2015). In both forms, the aspects of studying can be structural, performance-related or normative (Peruško 2010). The *Media Monitor* from The Netherlands²⁹ poses that external pluralism is related to the presence of a plurality of independent and autonomous media, while internal pluralism focuses on the political and cultural diversity of media contents, for example.

As supported by the authors so far, the consolidation of democracy requires a plurality of the media outlets, and in Brazil, we are still far from this reality. The history of the media in the country is

²⁸ Source: Brazil's Civil Constitution from 1988

http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicaocompilado.htm

²⁹ Available in: <https://www.mediamonitor.nl/english/the-concept-of-pluralism-media-diversity/#>

tangled with the history of regional oligarchies (Carone 1972), which have only been extended along nowadays. However, as explains Baquero (2008) it was thought that with the advancement of Brazilian democracy and the arrival of progressive rulers, the media would be democratised and regulated, in order to guarantee their plurality. However, as observes McQuail (1992, 152), part of the plurality is guaranteed by media system self-organization, and essential part plays the policy design, and that there are always gaps and inconsistencies.

Thus, speaking about Brazil the policies lack (Vogel 2003) in such a level that bypasses the Constitution, as mentioned above, and it is intrinsically connected to weak implementation of anti-concentration provisions (Albuquerque 2011, 94). Therefore, it represents a significant feature when studying the kinds of relationships between media and political systems in this big continental-sized country.

As argues, Neumann (2002) media pluralism is complementary to the right to access to information in a society, and undisclosed information is a key to democracy according to the author.

Knowledge is power, and transparency is the remedy to the darkness under which corruption and abuse thrives. Democracy depends on a knowledgeable citizenry whose access to a broad range of information enables them to participate fully in public life, help priorities for public spending, receive equal access to justice, and hold their public officials accountable. (Neuman 2002, 5)

As for Lake and Baum (2001) and Wimmer (2011 and 2012), offer access to information, it is not a privilege but a public service, a fight for better levels of transparency and accountability. Contributing to that, the general increase in the level of knowledge, the investment on education in modern democracies, as a positive dynamic, has been a tool for the promotion of critical thinking, with pluralism also helping to raise questions and scepticism. In this sense, the role of the media is the openness to participation as a mechanism of mass democracy, as affirms Bucy (2001) among with the authors offering a more positive perspective of media in society.

Twentieth-century Italian thinker like Vilfredo Pareto argued that democracy was illusory and served only to mask the reality of elite rule.

Indeed, they argued that elite oligarchy is the inflexible law of human nature, primarily because of the apathy and division of the masses (as opposed to unity, initiative, and unity of elites), and that democratic institutions would not do rather than changing the exercise of the power of oppression to manipulation. Both the press and the evolution of other media, especially with the advances of technology, represent the great utopia that we can be free to think and express ourselves. Resuming the core of the inquiries by the authors consulted, it takes to look at the bigger picture of cultural, social and political traits in a historical context to understand media and its actions in corroboration or not with the promotion of democracy.

Arguing on how mass media would support political accountability, Besley, Burgess and Prat propose an example which helps to understand why the information generated by media is also valuable:

Suppose, for example, that in a region of a country containing 50 villages only 1 village is hit by a flood. Without the media only those directly affected can observe the government's actions; however, mass media enable citizens in all 50 villages to observe whether the government is responsive. This raises politicians' incentives to respond, because citizens in the other 49 villages may use this information in their voting decisions. (Besley, Burgess and Prat 2002, 45-46)

Therefore, considering that it is impossible to find or to build mass communication vehicle capable of holding all the perspectives and being neutral as we would like to believe, it is more realistic to search for ways of keeping the communication system pluralistic as well as trustworthy information tools for the sake of the democratic system and its constant need of improvements.

Finally, since the internet as a space for journalism is a mainstay for the researcher behind this thesis in a more significant scenario, the question that remains is: is it the internet bringing diversity to journalism and is journalism participating positively in this online environment?

3. STATE OF THE QUESTION

*Não existe imparcialidade.
Todos são orientados por uma base ideológica.
A questão é: sua base ideológica é inclusiva ou excludente?*³⁰
— Paulo Freire

In this chapter, are featured the relevant studies previously done exploring the vast universe of aspects regarding the relations between media and politics in different contexts, countries and perspectives, thus with a universal objective. The works that are cited serve as a contribution to the present thesis. In one level – and broader frame – systematising researches from the Communication field in general, and after narrowing it to research methods and results of studies having the Brazilian media and politics context as the background.

3.1 Media and politics

In the field of communication research, the interest of studying media and its connection with politics in recent times are mainly based in the increasing complexity of the modern societies (Vogel 2003; Norris 1997 and 2000) especially under the capitalist global mindset (Przeworski 1986). This research field is found to be a collaborative multidisciplinary scenario connecting communication studies with other areas, especially the political philosophy. It solidly composes a scenario filled with perspectives – and its nuances – that support the view of media as powerful instrument imbricated with the politic arrangement – along the time as well as nowadays –, and the influence on the public sphere is undeniable.

Substantial theoretical and methodological expertise is presented here concerned with the relationship between media, politics and the

³⁰ Translation by the author from Brazilian Portuguese: “*There is no impartiality. We are all oriented on an ideological basis. The point is: is your ideological basis is inclusive or excluding?*”

public sphere in a democratic system (as a form of government); notably, a system which is depending heavily on the media for legitimising power as mentioned previously through control and criticism. Studies wisely question and examine the media role as providing or not a forum for the competition of ideas and interests, enabling or not social inclusion, civic participation and responsible action of the citizens, as well as its relations with politics, its influences in the social life in general and the effects for the audiences.

Since Walter Lippmann's book from 1922, *Public Opinion* came out and marked the history of studies related to how media behave to help shape the reality for the audience, especially in those first decades of the twentieth century where political forces were complex and very tense. As making his living as a newspaper columnist, the pessimism of Lippmann's perspective was easily spread throughout the United States, his home country, and to the world. Remarkable for the entire history of the political philosophy is his debate about democracy with the American John Dewey (1859-1952). Their intense essays, building on each other's thoughts, were essential to understanding the political theory at the beginning of the twentieth century. The political commentator's thoughts shaping his democratic theory and the philosopher and educational reformer's ideas composing his democratic theory contributed to a ground level to the leading democratic aspects discussed yet in the twentieth-first century. For example, how to prepare the citizens – if there is a way or if it should be done at all – to be conscious about their place in the social structure, and how their apparently unpretentious actions affect the whole group.

Here, for the matter of narrowing to the topic of this thesis, focusing in Walter Lippmann (1889-1974) and his most famous book, the American author is concerned with the viability of democracy and the role of a free press in it. He argues that the public was vulnerable to propaganda, and his suggestion to orient society was to install a mechanism or an agency to protect them from the manipulative intentions of propaganda. In his most peculiar formulation, with a socialist tone as was Lippmann himself, the control of information gathering and distribution should be the responsibility of a technocratic system, that by using scientific methods, would sort facts from fictions

and orient the information the population should receive; as saying, an intelligence office that would carefully evaluate information and supply it to other elites for decision making.

His approach can sound absurd from where we stand now, but at that time Lippmann was living, about a hundred years ago, it made sense, and he also became a known voice speaking about ideal standards for the press in favour of democracy. His famous phrase preaching that “for a dollar, you may not even get an armful of candy, but for a dollar or less people expect reality/representations of truth to fall into their laps” is a perfect explanation about his theory. It is the equivalent to say that those pertinent facts are never provided completely and accurately by media and that the audience always reinterprets the biased information from the media outlets adapting it to the pseudo-environment that aligns with their model and conveying this to the public, knowingly or not, to suit their own private needs. Lippmann observed, back in 1922, that the scope of the world the citizenry is expected to have intelligent thoughts on politics is global and forged by an enormously complex system. If not somehow simplified down in stereotypes for everything, imbricated by each one’s peculiar social formation, we would not be able to signify and make decisions. Here almost committing a crime for summing up so briefly Lippmann’s years of reflections, it is possible to say that the previous statement about stereotypes is the main ingredient for Lippmann to think about the power of media discourse (delivered by vehicle of language as a crude and narrow thing itself) corroborating in forming standardisation about everything around us.

Previous to the publication of media models theory with Daniel Hallin, Paolo Mancini edited with David Swanson the book *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy*, in 1996. The work brings together an outstanding group of international scholars who looked at the state of electoral politics around the world in the 1990s. The idea is that many elements of the North American model of election campaigning – or *Americanisation*, as the authors define – have been adopted in many countries in recent years as the use of mass media, the personalization of campaigns, use of public opinion polls, and a general

professionalisation of campaigns, and their argument is related to the conditions that had favoured the spread of that model.

Since the volume is made possible by many contributors speaking from different countries, the book goes beyond the North America-West Europe axis. It includes the analysis from a cross-section of democracies, as the United States, Britain, Sweden, Germany, Russia, Poland, Spain, Israel, Italy, Argentina, and Venezuela. Therefore, the book builds a background for studies coming later, also for the proposal of models of media and politics by Hallin and Mancini (2004 and 2011).

Kathleen Jamieson and Karlyn Campbell (1997) *The interplay of influence: News, advertising, politics, and the mass media* dedicate a book to dig into the persuasive strategies of journalists, advertisers, and politicians, this text examines the power of the mass media to influence the perceptions and actions of the public. It also reveals how the public exerts its influence on the mass media in turn. After an introductory chapter on the nature and use of the mass media, the authors examine in turn journalism and advertising, with separate chapters on the definition, persuasive strategies, and interactive influence. In the final two chapters, they turn to the world of politics, noting how politicians use both news and advertising to get their points across to the public.

Later in 2003, Jamieson works together with Paul Waldman on a book titled *The press effect: Politicians, journalists, and the stories that shape the political world*, and they scrutinise “negotiations and battles” over the political narrative on the press, also they investigate where journalists succeed and fail to explain that:

Just as politicians sometimes succeed in deceiving the public, journalists sometimes fail in their task of discovering and describing the knowable, relevant information at play in public discourse. (Jamieson and Waldman 2003, xiv)

While searching in detail for patterns from both sides – politicians using media and media reporting political facts – during the election times in the United States, Jamieson and Waldman emphasize press discourse and the role of words used:

Because the terms we use to describe the world determine the ways we see it, those who control the language control

the argument, and those who control the argument are more likely to successfully translate belief into policy [...] (Jamieson and Waldman 2003, xiv)

Based on research conducted in Britain and the US, *The Making of Citizens* by David Buckingham traces the dynamic complexities interpretations of news specifically by young people, and their judgements about how critical social and political issues are represented.

Rather than adopting an argument of bemoaning young people's ignorance, Buckingham (2000) argues that it is necessary to rethink what counts as political understanding in contemporary societies. He suggests that new forms of factual reporting must be built, as well as media accountability and transparency that will engage more effectively with young people's perceptions of themselves as citizens and part of the democratic process. Regarding the studies in mass media and politics, the book offers a significant contribution to the study of media audiences and timely intervention in contemporary debates about citizenship and political education.

Organising the information from the British context at the end of the twentieth century, Bill Coxall, Lynton Robins and Robert Leach (1998) in *Contemporary British Politics* dedicate a chapter to write over mass media relations and politics in Britain. Mainly, the authors considered the mass media to "provide most of the electorate with a framework for understanding past, present and future events" (Coxall, Lynton and Leach 1998, 156). In this point, the authors analyse the media, in the British context, as part of democracy but also with an essential role in the democratic process setting the political line-up. For them, the democratic scenario is an arrangement of interplaying elements like politicians, the public, parties and other organisations, along with the media.

It is remarkable the objective perspective Coxall, Lynton and Leach take when stating that:

The mass media cannot be neutral or impartial since they are a product of Britain's culture, a culture that is biased like any other culture, with assumptions and prejudices of its own. The imposition of this cultural framework is seen in

what is referred to as the ‘social manufacture’ or ‘social production’ of the news. News does not ‘just happen’, rather ‘it is made’. (Coxall, Lynton and Leach 1998, 159)

Complementing studies of media and politics in Britain, Neil Gavin (2007) in *Press and Television in British Politics: Media, Money and Mediated Democracy* offers a research-based exploration of the way the media portrays a range of political and economics-related topics and assesses the likely impact of that coverage. Using both quantitative and qualitative techniques, Gavin explores the implications over journalism and the study of journalism, and British and European democracy and politics:

There is also a distinct sense that broadcasting and print media are subject to a range of pressures, constraints and imperatives which are now threatening to undermine their positive contribution to informed and participatory democracy. (Gavin 2007, 3)

From the end of the 1990s, also speak Timothy Cook (1998) and his concerns about media as a political institution. In *Governing with the news: The news media as a political institution*, Cook takes as definitive the partiality of media and states as a fact that news media plays a role as a political institution integral to the day-to-day operations in the governments. By analysing news production and the political actors in the United States, Timothy Cook suggests that newsmaking and governing are inseparable, at least in the country, since early days of the republic when political parties sponsored newspapers. Offering another perspective – not accurately naming mass media a political institution – Barry (2005) advocates that institutions are a “key to the realisation of social justice” since they “play a role in providing people with different life-chances”, and for that the institutions should be observed strictly at how they engender “individual rights, opportunities and resources” (Barry 2005, 17).

The investigation around the political biases and influences of the news is extensive. It is observable a higher production in the last decades of the twentieth century, as well as maintaining a balanced academic outcome until now. Murray Edelman, influenced by previous studies in media power and ownership, brings, in *The politics of*

misinformation published in 2001, an examination of how concentrations of social and economic power in result in public languages of politics. The author argues about the elite's behaviour in maintaining "power, status and financial resources" (Edelman 2001, 19) by keeping the maximum control as possible of the mass communication. Also, Edelman investigates around the buzz talking around changes in benefit of most the population in democracies nowadays but ends up being only rhetorical, since the power forces, which includes media, is not open to alterations of the rules. Instead, they are just "reinterpreted to permit the continuation of previous practices and conditions" (Edelman 2001, 20). As a result, the author affirms, that public discourses of democracy tend to be populist, emotional, and likely to emphasize images of progress rather than structural inequalities in their formulations of public problems.

Along the same line of thought, Mark Rozell edited in 2003 *Media Power, media politics* going to the core of critical American political institutions and branches of the government structure, and their specific ties to media described in chapters, as the Supreme Court, the Presidential bureau and the Congress and the "institutionalised engagement in media to direct public opinion" (Rozell 2003, 1). For Rozell the justification for such a study is

The media are a pervasive influence in American society and politics. The study of modern American politics thus requires an examination of the role of the media in legitimizing issues, framing debates, and even altering outcomes. Many journalists insist that their role is not to influence the political process, but merely to report events. Few any longer truly believe that the media are such neutral actors. (Rozell 2003, vii)

His concern is that even though many books explored the topic about the impact of media and politics and the effort of so many scholars in communication and mass media studies dedicating to keep the criticism eye opened, there is still one fact that deserves attention: the media losing the public trust (Rozell 2003, viii). Moreover, for Rozell that represents a critical point not only for the professionals in communication but for democracy, since "healthy democracies occur

when all citizens have the necessary information to make informed decisions” (Rozell 2003, 323), but people must rebuild the conviction biased media are not misinforming them.

In 2014, contributing to *The Handbook of media and mass communication theory*, Rozell co-works with Jeffrey Crouch in a chapter dedicated to audiences, social construction and social control. The authors argue that mass media contribute significantly to perceptions of political polarisation in the United States. In *The Media’s Impact on Perceptions of Political Polarization* Crouch and Rozell analyse the contributions of the mass media to the belief that the USA is deeply divided. The argument is not that the polarisation does not exist, but instead “mass media’s tendency is to portray politics as a contest of winners and losers such as a war, a horserace, or some other zero-sum event” (Crouch and Rozell 2014, 288). In particular, the professional practices in journalism, as the vicious cycle of “novelty, negativity, and conflict, which attract readers and viewers and, ultimately, advertising dollars”, affect the entire process of offering a better quality of information the society needs in such convoluted times.

For Geoffrey Craig, the belief that the media plays a central role in a functioning democracy anchors the examination the author offers about the constant give-and-take between politics and the media. The variety of themes addressed includes opinion polls and public opinion, how the media shape national identity, and the loss of public trust in politicians. Also, studying from the perspective of the United States, the author reflects the growing influence of American political and media practices on nations and media outlets across the world is emphasized. In *The Media, politics and public life*, Craig starts by taking the “public life as a mediated phenomenon” (2004, viii) and within a historical framework. Going further than just presenting criticisms about media and political relations and the quality of public debate, the author puts together “a more balanced appraisal of the contribution of the media to the political process and to public life”, since he argues that “a value hierarchy that views tabloid and lifestyle journalism as singularly trivial and inconsequential does not comprehend sufficiently the functions of contemporary media in the production of knowledges and identity formation” (Craig 2004, ix)

It is essential to highlight the author's contribution to think and encouragement to first understand the intricate terrain where the interactions of news outlets and politicians happen, to after map the consequences in the public life and the public feedback to, considering it is not a one-way road.

Part of this difficulty resides in the sheer complexity of the field of the media, politics and public life: power relations occur within and across institutions and organisations, myriad acts of communication from voluminous governmental reports through to corridor gossip undergo complex processes of transformation into news stories and images, a plethora of divergent individual opinions stand in contrast to the solidity of 'public opinion'. (Craig 2004, vii)

Therefore, Craig is positive in his perspectives, arguing that "the quality of our public life will be improved by a greater understanding of the communicative work of journalists and politicians" (2004, viii).

In *The Psychology of media and politics*, published in 2005, George Comstock and Erica Scharrer contribute to the studies of media and politics proposing questions around how the media shapes the news, in which cases and scenarios news can drive political decision making, also discussing what the effect on the future of society is. Comstock and Scharrer (2005) the choice of how to frame the news is typically made to solicit viewership and high ratings rather than to convey accurate and meaningful information. By reviewing recurrent methodologies to analyse media impact – like framing, priming, limited effects and agenda setting – the authors offer some necessary corrections to that knowledge based on other academic research especially considering the new media. Even though the topic goes around the media, politics and public relation in the United States, some insights are decisive to consider in advance when studying other countries. Mainly, what Comstock and Scharrer put on the table is an update of the contemporary news media, and it is "tight hold on the reins of American politics, dictating the pace, the form, and the content of the election: (2005, 68). Lastly, it is remarkable the discussion the scholars have about the intermedia behaviour and how it contributes to a unified voice on

the news coverage instead of a pluralist view to offer to the readers/viewers:

This intermedia agenda setting entailing the use of one news outlet (usually a well-respected one such as the *New York Times* but sometimes any competing outlet) in the formation of the agenda of another [...] The phenomenon of pack journalism is testament to the long-standing practice of news organizations to monitor coverage in other outlets. (Comstock and Scharrer 2005, 180)

Methodologically, the studies in media bias and media engagement in politics can vary from the analysis of news production processes and environments to the political economy of media, also complemented in some extension to media consumption and media effects approaches. Robert Entman, for example, integrates the features of framing, priming and agenda-setting to propose a systematize effort to understand media bias and the implications in political power and consequently in a so-called democratic society.

Entman's (2007) significant contribution with his article *Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power* is firstly setting clear that *bias* per se is yet to be defined demonstrably in order to be less vague when applied in mass media studies. The author offers three principal meanings: distortion bias, content bias, and decision-making bias. And he complements:

Sometimes, it is applied to news that purportedly distorts or falsifies reality (distortion bias), sometimes to news that favors one side rather than providing equivalent treatment to both sides in a political conflict (content bias), and sometimes to the motivations and mindsets of journalists who allegedly produce the biased content (decision-making bias). This essay argues that we can make bias a robust, rigorous, theory-driven, and productive research concept by abandoning the first use while deploying new, more precisely delineated variants of the second and third. (Entman 2007, 163)

Moving the centre of the studies published about media and politics to Europe, Corey Ross (2008) studies explicitly mass media

apparatuses in Germany during the late nineteenth century to the Second World War. He puts together a general account of mass media expansion in the tense German political ambient examining how the rise of film, radio, recorded music, popular press, and advertising fitted into the broader development of social, political, and cultural life. Also, putting into perspective the groups of researchers who made history by their interest in mass culture phenomenon, as the Frankfurt School. Even though it is concerned with keeping the historical timeline and facts, Ross (2008) traces the social impact caused by mass media expansion and how it changed under different political and economic circumstances.

Gathering the influences of North American and European media studies, Elizabeth Fox and Silvio Waisbord edited *Latin politics, global media*, in 2009, bringing some necessary light over aspects of the media markets in Latin American countries in the intersection with globalisation and democratisation processes that many countries went through along the twentieth century. With an expertism from collaborators from different countries, the book offers in-depth analyses of the interaction of local and global dynamics in media industries and these dynamics in the analysis of media policies. Brazil is no exception among the countries studied regarding the concentration of media. Moreover, accordingly to Fox and Waisbord's (2009) report globalisation only favours it. In Brazil, according to them:

[...] the media essentially reproduces larger social inequalities. The widening gap between rich and poor is crystallized in the information society. Rather than helping to ameliorate pre-existing divisions, the so-called digital divide represents the deepening of differences in access to information. A central good in today's society, information is available only to those who can afford it [...] (Fox and Waisbord 2009, xii)

Even worst features are presented in the scenario of the new technologies:

Moreover, the coming of new technologies has not unsettled power structures as "old media" companies have quickly prevailed by incorporating the new media into their

business. While elites have more access to information, the vast majority is still limited to the old media. (Fox and Waisbord 2009, xii)

The possibilities of exploring the topic seem never-ending with credit given to continuous changing in media and politics. The aspect that does not change is the agreement that media do oil the wheels of politics and public opinion. In *Conditional press influence in politics*, Adam Schiffer (2009) also works with the framework of new media as a political institution, and he resumes “the influence of the press comes from its ability to shape the universe of political phenomena into a discrete news product” (Schiffer 2009, 2). Schiffer, as a political science professor, is interested in the role media plays, since he advances that from the political science studies there is a gap in the field of taking mass media power seriously and its impact in society. By developing such work, Schiffer (2009) contributes to the mass communication studies by proposing a conceptual framework focusing on the variable: the factors that set the press’s agenda. Schiffer argues that “the filtration process is important to understanding the press’s influence in politics, and deserves more careful explication in political science studies that utilize news content” (2009, 8). Finally, the author also catalogues the “most important norms, patterns, and routines from which the news media derive their power over other political actors and processes” (Schiffer 2009, 5). Round the same outline authors as Alison Dagnes (2010) and Joseph Uscinski (2014) are interested mainly in the effects of twenty-four-hour just news channels and the press, politics and the demands of capitalism. From the European context, Jan Zielonka (2015) edited a book on the dynamics of media and politics in a comparative proposal among new democracies in the continent.

Among the theoretical writings from this century, it is impossible not to mention the ideas from Manuel Castells, in extraordinary the book *Communication power* (2009) is where the Spanish sociologist focuses on “understanding the power relationships in the global network society” (Castells 2009, 50). Paying particular attention to the digital age regarding the cultural change facing the technological advances, Castells argues that the power relation has changed in two ways: the arrangements in networks, not in units and articulating

between global and local, and not only local as in the past (Castells 2009, 50-51). The author also points the sources of social power, which for him are violence and discourse, coercion and persuasion, political domination and cultural framing, in connection of aspects, already mention in this thesis.

The internet has generated enormous interest in whether and how digital platforms, including Social Media, have any impact on the political sphere. As a result, today, an increasing body of research address the multiple relations between Social Media and politics from different perspectives. The *Media Pluralism Monitor* (MOM is a model adopted by other countries or regions to collaboratively gather information about media and make it publicly available for the population. The project fostered by the European Union and contemplated within the European Parliament budget to include the monitoring of the digital environment is an essential tool facing media performance problems already mentioned here and the challenges in democracy improvements.

Pier Luigi Parcu (2019), professor of the European University Institute and director of The Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), works precisely with the threats to media plurality in the digital era, or the “digital threats to media pluralism” (Parcu 2019, 1) as the researcher defines. And Parcu argues:

Nonetheless, this unprecedented abundance of information, concerns about the health of media pluralism and the quality and diversity of news, have increased in recent years. This is not a paradox. (Parcu 2019, 1)

So far, the fact is that the internet has created new channels of communication that have dramatically changed the flow of information compared with the known traditional media. Also, social media play a crucial role in circulating news through multimedia platforms, beyond national borders, across social, cultural and political niches. By focusing on the role that circulation of information has in increasing political knowledge and therefore enhancing political participation, Vogel (2003) reinforces the consideration for more in-depth reflection about the central role played by the media in modern democratic societies, in a

process increasing the influence of digital platforms on the political sphere.

On the contrary, the scarce understanding of this phenomenon significantly compromises the reflection developed by these theorists, who do not consider it necessary to incorporate the media in their work, since they consider that the formation of citizens' preferences fits in the private sphere and that the political process is merely the aggregation of these preferences.³¹ (Vogel 2003, 107)

Heading to the end of this subchapter with a positive insight from Vogel's questioning:

[...] would it not be the case to increase the “institutional arrangement” of “really existing democracies” by incorporating new forms of organization and regulation of the media in contemporary societies? Would such a change not increase the pluralism of political debate by increasing the manifestation and understanding of different points of view in dispute?³² (Vogel 2003, 108)

Finally, it is known that all the efforts to study media and politics mentioned in this chapter are only a few standing out from a much bigger and fertile research field that grows in a collaborative strategy advancing progressively the knowledge available to access, test with different variables and discussions. That may be one of the most positive points in the area. Thus, it helps to keep the motivation to do such research.

³¹ Translation by the author from Brazilian Portuguese: “Ao contrário, a escassa compreensão desse fenômeno compromete, de forma significativa, a reflexão desenvolvida por esses teóricos, que não julgam necessário incorporar os meios de comunicação em seus trabalhos, pois consideram que a formação das preferências dos cidadãos acontece na esfera privada e que o processo político é apenas a agregação dessas preferências.”

³² Translation by the author from Brazilian Portuguese: “nao seria o caso de incrementar o “arranjo institucional” das “democracias realmente existentes” incorporando novas formas de organização e regulação dos meios de comunicação social nas sociedades contemporâneas? Tal modificação não aumentaria o pluralismo do debate político, incrementando a manifestação e a compreensão de diferentes pontos de vista em disputa?”

3.2 The singular case of Brazil

If everybody is thinking alike, then somebody isn't thinking
— George S. Patton

As it happens in other countries it is impossible to talk about Brazilian history and its formation – post-Portuguese invasion – without mentioning two factors: the social inequality and the role of the press connected with elites and politicians. Media in Brazil is an intrinsic result of these inequalities, as well as playing a role of reproduction of it (Bucci 2015). Features that are included in democratic failures in societies are based on popular participation and representation (Frowein and Bank, 2000).

Condensing some of the substantial information to have a real dimension of it, Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world in total area, with over 8.5 million square kilometres, equivalent to 47% of the South American territory. By its social formation, Brazil, until then was inhabited by indigenous people and their first contact with Europeans in 1500 CE with a Portuguese expedition group. After the Treaty of Tordesillas, part of the Brazilian territory, the East Coast, was the segment of the American continent that corresponded to the kingdom of Portugal – another and significant part was shared with Spain –, and from whom Brazil obtained its independence on September 7th of 1822. Thus, the country went from the exploitation by many European countries along the centuries, it was a central part of the kingdom of Portugal, and went from an empire, to finally become a republic. Its first official capital was Salvador de Bahía, which was replaced by Rio de Janeiro until a new capital, Brasília, was built in 1960. This relatively recent geographical relocation of the national capital did not change the economic, political and cultural centre well-established in the South-East, mainly Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

Its current constitution, formulated in 1988, defines Brazil as the presidential Federative Republic, politically formed by the Federal District (Brasília), 26 states, five regions (North, Northeast, Midwest, Southeast and South.) and 5,565 municipalities. Although its more than

208 million inhabitants make Brazil the sixth most populated country in the world, in general, it has a low population density index, due to most of the population being concentrated along the coastline, by the Atlantic Ocean with its 7,491 km. At the same time, substantial demographic gaps still mark the interior of the territory.

The Brazilian economy holds a privileged ninth position related to GDP (Gross Domestic Product) according to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from 2018³³, only behind economic potencies in the world as United States, China, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, India and Italy, among the 192 countries listed.

Not being misguided with expressive economic data, in recent decades even though there are positive results of managing to reduce the poverty rate – especially during Lula’s centre-left oriented government (2003-2011) –, it remains an unequal country from the economic and social point of view. With descending prognostics with the actual extreme-right national government. The six most enormous fortunes in the country accumulate a wealth equivalent to the resources of the poorest 100 million inhabitants, according to a report published by Oxfam International³⁴.

Therefore, in Brazil, poverty exposes the concentration of wealth. The wealthiest 10% accounted for 43% of total resources. At the other end, the poorest 40% hold only 12% of the total. Blacks and browns are the majority in this group, according to IBGE³⁵ data of 2017 (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics). On the ranking of countries with population living in poverty, meaning lack of both money and basic needs, Brazil appears close to the African countries with 4,8% of the population surviving with less than 1,90 US dollars a

³³ Source: <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php>

³⁴ Source: <https://www.oxfam.org/en/even-it-brazil/brazil-extreme-inequality-numbers>

³⁵ <https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/multidominio/condicoes-de-vida-desigualdade-e-pobreza.html>

day, 9,6% with less than 3,30 US\$ and 21% with maximum of 5,50 US\$ according to data from 2017 published by World Bank³⁶.

For much of the twentieth century, democratic failures in the country involved long periods of authoritarian government or dictatorships, a coup – like in 1964 and a claimed coup in 2017 through an impeachment process against Dilma Rousseff³⁷ –, the lack of governmental representation of country's minorities and the constant denounced abuse of power as structural social debility, among many other processes in which democracy gradually gets damaged.

In a socially and culturally plural country such as Brazil, composed by the miscegenation of various ethnic groups (Fausto and Fausto 1994; Buarque de Holanda, Eulálio and Ribeiro 1995; Alencastro 2000; de Carvalho 2005; Mello e Sousa 2006; de Mello and Novais 2009), with substantial economic discrepancies between their regions, it became a mark of the country the existence of several minority group issues and huge vulnerable groups.

Pluralism is one of the aspects that characterize the model of Brazilian democratic society. Diversity is part of the social environment in which we live and is an essential element for the development of the community. Based on this reasoning, one can observe the importance of protecting minorities and vulnerable groups [...] (Guerra 2013, 226).

Guerra speaks pluralism in this case related to cultural and social aspects. Also, he points out that it is necessary to differentiate terminologically minorities and vulnerable groups. Minorities are numerically inferior groups when compared to other groups, groups that could, in specific circumstances, be under the risk of losing their identity because processes of control victimise them, homogenisation or invisibilisation, complements Carmo (2016, 203). That is, in the

³⁶ Source

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.LMIC?locations=BR> Accessed December 15th 2017.

³⁷ Documentary *Democracia em vertigem* (*The edge of democracy*, the title in English) by Petra Costa represents the end of the military dictatorship until the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff and the elections of 2018.

minority are those who occupy a position of non-dominance in the country. Vulnerable groups, on the other hand, are inferior and deprived of power and visibility in most of the instances of the social structure, such as poor people, black people, queer groups, immigrants, women, children and the elderly. There is very little political representation for these groups to break the barriers that prevent the projection of their voices and their needs. In this scenario, the media should represent a way to overcome the prejudice and indifference to which they are subjected, but that is not precisely what happens.

In the *Brazilian Magna Carta*, in its first article defends that all power emanates from the people, who exercise it through elected representatives or directly, under the terms of this Constitution. It is perceived that Brazilian democracy combines elements of direct participation and representativeness. Representative democracy prevails the strength of the largest number of people, majority, on the strength of the small number, minority. Accordingly, it follows the principle of interests of the largest number of people should be preferred to those of the smallest number, causing the vulnerability of this in the face of the decisions taken by the majority. However, given the tremendous ethnic, cultural and social diversity that marks the Brazilian nation, such representability is often the object of criticism and discredit, considering that many minority and/or vulnerable groups are left out of the decision-making process.

Such a scenario is alarming and puts the Brazilian representative system in a delicate situation. “As a major dilemma that hangs above all in recent democracies in Latin America and emerging countries” (Guerrero 2015, 212) is the context that leads the democratic regime to be constantly subject to criticism and questioned about its legitimacy.

The Brazilian representative state organisation itself does not represent the diversity of such a big country. As shows the survey conducted by the Brazilian National Congress, in 2015 out of the 81 Brazilian senators only eight were women and two declare themselves as black or brown, none representing the indigenous origins and its remaining population nowadays. In the Chamber of National Deputies, out of the 513 deputies, only 46 are female, 43 are Afro-descendants, and only one is openly gay. The numbers show an imbalance of

representativeness, especially when considering the presence of these groups in the national electorate. According to information from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE, standing for *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*, in Portuguese) for example, women represent 51.3% of the electorate. However, in the elections for municipal councillors in 2014, out of the 463 thousand registered candidates, only a little more than 130 thousand were women, equivalent to 31%³⁸. Moreover, among the total number of candidates, only 8.64% declared themselves as black, and 0.35% declared as indigenous. In a country where according to the IBGE's National Census of 2010³⁹ (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), more than half of the Brazilian population (54%) is black or brown, and every ten people, three are black. Representing the level of vulnerability, prejudice and invisibility in the country, seven out of ten people murdered in Brazil are black, according to the report from the United Nations from 2015⁴⁰, in a study related to the evolution of the violence between 1980 until 2014 covering the entire country. Still in this tone, data released by the Inter-Parliamentary Union⁴¹ indicate that the participation rate of women in Brazilian politics is well below the world average. Countries with a Muslim majority, in which gender inequality is a stark reality, are in a better position than Brazil. Countries such as Jordan, Syria, Somalia, Libya, Morocco, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and even Saudi Arabia are over.

As affirms Castells “all institutional systems reflect power relations (2007, 239). The information brought is just a glimpse of social problems experienced by the country and brings light to the dominant ideologies currently fuelling the engines. Thus, media neither represent the diversity of the social, cultural and ethnic groups of the country fairly nor is pluralist in its composition within the media scenario.

Brazil has a long history of concentration of power in the hands of few. Hervieu, Pacete and Pinto (2013) reveal on a publication

³⁸ Source: <http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/estatisticas/estatisticas-eleitorais>

³⁹ <https://censo2010.ibge.gov.br/>

⁴⁰ Source: http://www.mapadaviolencia.org.br/pdf2016/Mapa2016_armas_web.pdf

⁴¹ Source: <http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>

organised by *Journalists Without Borders* (*Repórteres Sem Fronteiras*, in Portuguese) that ten big economic groups share the whole media market in the country. The report titled *The country of the thirty Berlusconi* (*O País dos trinta Berlusconi*, in Portuguese) is a concise but objective and updated guide about the media owners and the freedom of the press in the country.

The investigation concludes that the general mechanism of media in Brazil hinder the free circulation of information and blocks the possibilities for pluralism. Ten large economic groups, corresponding the same amount of powerful families, share the mass communication market. The audio-visual spectrum is dominated by the *Globo* group, based in Rio de Janeiro and owned by the *Roberto Marinho* family. Following are *SBT* (*Sistema Brasileiro de Televisão*, *Sílvia Santos* group), *Rede Bandeirantes* (Saad group) and *Record* (detained by evangelical Protestant bishop *Edir Macedo*). In the written press, the *Globo* group also occupies a privileged place, thanks to the daily newspaper under the same name. Its main national competitors are the *Folha de São Paulo* (*Frias Filho* family), *O Estado de São Paulo* (*Mesquita* family) groups and, in the magazine segment, *Editora Abril* and its weekly *Veja* magazine.

As points *Görgen*, *Globo* as a television network had a great advantage of the national security policy during the military dictatorship period to form a vast network of political relations with regional groups in all Brazilian states. The structure designed by *Globo* in the late 1960s became the preferred configuration of all networks that came after (2009, 70). *Globo* group nowadays maintains partnership in all the Brazilian states, since TV is the most popular media in the country still with a penetration of 98% in Brazilian households.

Specifically, in the case of the *Globo Group*, the perception is that they are untouchable and uncontrollably assuming the absolute control of almost all communication vehicles. With 383 vehicles, 69 of their property, *Globo* stand out as the leading conglomerate of the Central Media System of Brazil. There are 40 affiliated groups together holding 111 television stations, 168 commercial radios, one community radio, 37 newspapers, 27 magazines, nine cable TV operators, and 17 TV pay-per-view programmers. Speaking in percentage terms, the group distributes content to 26% of television generators, 4% of radios and

3.6% of newspapers in the country. Besides, it controls the largest television network in Brazil and three radio stations, including the largest AM radio and the largest FM radio, and a television retransmission system with 3,305 stations, or 33% of the installed base until 2008 (Görgen 2009, 101).

Regarding this scenario, Hervieu, Pacete and Pinto's (2013) report presents urgent decisions to be taken in order to prompt a pluralist, equal and safer ambient regarding the media in Brazil. The document includes: (1) a profound review of the current outdated legislative corpus of media regulation; (2) inclusion of provisions in this new legislation regarding the allocation of TV and radio concessions and the space to be reserved for the community sector, under-represented in the current legal spectrum; (3) a necessary legislation that includes, in particular, strict clauses on the ownership of the media and their financing through official publicity; and (4) the prohibition by the federal legislative power of any kind of censorship contrary to the 1988 Brazilian Constitution (Hervieu, Pacete and Pinto 2013, 13). Also, in equal importance, the establishment of full protection to journalists, since Brazil in 2012 was the fifth deadliest countries for journalists (Hervieu, Pacete and Pinto 2013, 2).

Relative to the media system perspective proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004) classifying the media systems – mainly West Europe and North America – according to three models based on media and political relations. In the book *Comparing Media System Beyond the Western World*, edited by the Hallin and Mancini in 2011, as an updated version of the framework proposed at the beginning of the 2000s, the effort is to offer new models, concepts, and approaches to understand non-Western media systems and regarding particularities of political transitions in each country. Afonso de Albuquerque writes, in this last edition, the chapter about the Brazilian media system offers a better understanding of the imbricated influence of politics in media formation in the country and the media behaviour related to the political systems Brazil went through. According to Albuquerque, Brazil has traits of the Polarized Pluralist model proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004), as the media market structure, but leaves behind other important and peculiar characteristics of the Brazilian media system-related

especially to the political parallelism (Albuquerque 2001, 73). Also, it is remarkable the influence of the American model in the Brazilian structure of media markets and the formation of the professional role of the journalists.

Related to the details of political ties along with history, the author explains:

Until the 1950s journalism was thought of mainly in terms of a “publicist” role, and most journalists came from the lower ranks of the oligarchy. Political commentary, notes in honour of powerful people, and above all editorials were valued journalistic genres [...] (Albuquerque 2011, 80)

Among the exhaustive analysis done by Albuquerque, the role of the state as a subsidiary protecting “the economic life of the media organisations” deserves highlight, since it is a characteristic of the Brazilian media system to have “state-owned companies” as responsible for considerable amount of advertising in media revenue, specially television and printed media, as newspapers (Albuquerque 2011, 86). Albuquerque’s work is outstanding since it features the Brazilian media system case in a publication that serves as a reference within the Communication studies. Also, his understanding goes toward a contemporary media system thinking and considers structural features of media interdependence generating the discursive power (Jungherr, Posegga and An 2019, 405).

Eugenio Bucci, Brazilian journalist, lawyer and professor at the School of Communication of the University of São Paulo is also one of the scholars intrigued by the media arrangement in the country, and he aims his critics to the manipulation of the information by few empires of communication groups and the impact in the society. Bucci affirms that:

The greatest challenge for the Brazilian citizen to conquer and ensure democratic life and freedom of expression must be the constant change of a political culture, a mentality that has always lived comfortably with censorship, with the idea of obedience and suffocation of critical thinking. (Bucci 2015, 128)

In addition, his point is that in markets where there are no democratic regulatory frameworks for broadcasting, freedom is weakened and the chances of power interference in programming increase dramatically (Bucci 2015, 187).

In consonance with that, Susy dos Santos, a Brazilian researcher, professor of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and Director of the Group for Political Research and Economics of Information and Communication, works mainly tracing the ties of politicians to the media, the intersection of the media system and political system. For her, this intersection is precisely where politicians figure with the straight association – as owners, associates, commentators, as member of the family owner, and many other possibilities – in newspapers, television, radio and internet vehicles.

The researcher seeks to understand how these ties influence the agenda in newspapers, as well as in the decisions taken in the national Congress. Santos explains in an interview for *The Intercept* about the politicians connected to mass media control in Brazil:

What is said in the media passes through the sieve of the party and the scrutiny of the elites. They are mostly governed by corporate interests, not by social interests; letting alone the historical interests or social change in Brazil. So, if you look at programming, it is interesting to see how the speech is articulated to a single voice. The Brazilian media system, for a long time, has a hegemony of a voice almost in unison. Sometimes competing companies compete for the audience. And this speech is not exclusive to journalism. Entertainment makes sense in a much more subtle and much deeper way. (Susy dos Santos 2017⁴²)

⁴² Translation by the author, from the original in Brazilian Portuguese: “*O que é dito nos meios de comunicação passa pelo crivo partidário e pelo crivo das elites. São majoritariamente pautados pelos interesses empresariais, não pelos interesses sociais, menos ainda pelos interesses históricos ou de mudança social no Brasil. Então, se você olha a programação, é interessante perceber como se articula o discurso para uma voz única. O sistema midiático brasileiro, há muito tempo, tem uma hegemonia de uma voz quase em uníssono. São concorrentes às vezes, empresas que competem pela audiência. E esse discurso não é exclusivo do jornalismo. O entretenimento produz sentido de uma forma muito mais sutil e muito mais profunda.*” Available in:

Although the polarisation of the Brazilian press is smaller than in its South American neighbours (Guerrero 2015), this is a scenario of “almost incestuous relations between political, economic and media powers” (Hervieu, Pacete and Pinto 2013, 4). Concentration and local pressures and censorship are the foundation of a system that has not been remodelled since the end of the military dictatorship (1964-1985). These same groups came to terms with the dictatorship and took advantage of the support of their governments to install the fourth power empire. These groups, nowadays, have difficulty accepting the conquest of Brazilian political citizenship. Only with new clothing, they keep holding significant control, even though the internet made possible to emerge some alternative online-only newspapers according to *Agência Pública*⁴³, an independent association mapping the independent media initiatives in the country. The generals may have disappeared, but the colonels remain, and from this figure of landowners in a mainly agricultural country, the researchers use the term *mass media colonelism* (Bucci 2000).

Susy dos Santos explains how deeply the colonelism is imbricated in the cultural imaginary in Brazil being reproduced by the soap operas (Campadelli 1980; de Lopes 2003) – one of the super products of the television in the country crossing many levels of history and culture:

The colonel as character is very rich. First, it rescues and retains the image of a great authoritarian leader. But the colonel is never a villain in *Globo* soap operas. [Since redemocratization], we did not have a colonel who died because he was bad, or who was very bad and who was imprisoned. The colonel is always humanized. He is almost the grandfather of us, a half-retarded gentleman, but always with the tonic of humour, always a great lover, always very attached to the family. The actors are always gallanting or people who do not associate with evil: Antônio Fagundes,

<https://nucleopiratininga.org.br/grupo-de-pesquisa-da-ufrj-lista-politicos-ligados-a-midia/> From 14th of December of 2017.

⁴³ <https://apublica.org/mapa-do-jornalismo/>

Osmar Prado, Paulo Gracindo, Lima Duarte⁴⁴. The colonel is a guy, deep down, nice. (Santos 2017)

The interesting fact is that this portrayal of the colonel is punctually given without observing the terrible brand that it has in Brazil: the superior boss, the amount of slave labour bound up with the colonels that still exist today, the amount of violence they perpetuate in their communities, the concentration of power, the patrimonial use of them which is public by these figures.

Facing that, as exposes *Journalist Without Borders*, since the year 2012, two Brazilian journalists known for their knowledge of public security issues have also had to exile themselves. The report also explores another obstacle to freedom of information: the proliferation of lawsuits accompanied by censorship orders against media. As the very known case in Brazil of the newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo*, whose reports bothered the interests of the family of former president José Sarney and the newspaper openly suffered retaliation (Bragança and Cundari 2010). Also, the judicial gag increasingly affects the internet and the Brazilian blogosphere, while net-citizens are eagerly awaiting the adoption of a new regulatory framework that guarantees internet neutrality. Facts that add to the fact of non-acceptance of voices that could risk the ideological hegemony with these conservative elite roots still present the country.

Focusing in Latin America and opportunely written Brazilian Portuguese, the book by Dênis de Moraes, Ignacio Ramonet and Pascual Serrano, *Mídia, Poder e Contrapoder – da Concentração Monopólica À Democratização da Informação* (Media, Power and Counterpower - From Monopoly Concentration to Democratization of Information, in English) describe as an “essential struggle of the twenty-first century” the forces against the “rotten powers of the mainstream media in its infinite capacity to manipulate, distort and ideologise objective reality”, meaning around the interests and privileges for significant capital (de Moraes, Ramonet and Serrano 2013, 4).

Apart from all the foundational references in communication studies the authors present, they are concerned about media as a

⁴⁴ Famous Brazilian soap opera actors.

corporate system. Furthermore, for de Moraes, Ramonet and Serrano (2013) mass media in this context exploits a range of enterprises and services that have become convergent and synergetic by digitisation. Their main argument is that the implementation of the convergence implies the reorganisation of relations between global groups and regional, national and local audience, through marketing actions that guarantee a more heterogeneous and mixed supply of products, in line with stratified and de-territorialized news consumption dynamics (2013, 65).

By looking to media corporations and news production in Latin America, the scholars argue that the power of business giants incorporates, merger and hybridises with features of countries and regions in order to adjust to the demands of specific clientele but dismissing the objective of promoting democracy, and proclaim:

We should not underestimate the risk of short-circuiting cultural sovereignty with the trans-nationalisation of business, especially because of the fragility of mechanisms for regulating audio visual and capital flows that cross borders in satellite and in electronic networks. (de Moraes, Ramonet and Serrano 2013, 64)

Similar to the project in media monitoring in the context of the European Union, in Brazil, there was a project name *Os donos da mídia* (The media owners) conceived in the 80s by the Brazilian journalist Daniel Herz to document the great liberation of grants of radio and TV promoted during the government of the then-president José Sarney. In 1994, Herz's research was deepened by the work of the also journalist Célia Stadnik. The project became public only in 2002, with the popularization of the Internet, which made possible to disseminate the data freely and unrestrictedly. The works of Herz and Stadnik were updated and published online by the Institute of Studies and Research in Communication (EPCOM). With the death of Herz in 2006, the project was led by the journalist James Görden, scholar already mentioned in here. Since 2017, after the closing of *Os donos da mídia*, *Reporters Without Borders* and *Coletivo Vozes* launched the *Media*

*Ownership Monitor*⁴⁵ (MOM) in the country publishing periodic reports with names of politicians with shared ownership of media vehicles, regarding the states in the country, the party they belong and the ideologies of each. The survey also indicates that the profile of group owners is mostly men, white and Christians and the exceptions are in the *SADA Group*, *Record* and in *SBT*, where executive positions are already under the management of the owners' daughters and wives.

After analysing 50 outlets in four segments (TV, radio, printed media and online), owned by a total of 26 communication groups, the MOM alerts that in Brazil, the results of media ownership trigger a red alert. The system is reported to have a high concentration of audience and ownership, high geographic concentration, lack of transparency, besides religious, political and economic interference.

Therefore, it seems that the consensus about media power and the erosion of democracy in Brazil (Santos 2012) is related to a long term vicious relationship between media and politics, one serving each other, with media using various mechanisms to condition the political and electoral legitimacy of the democratic processes in the country according to the interests of an elite.

The question remains: how to regulate the mass media market in a society where information is a commodity appropriated by private companies with political interests in order to preserve the democratic potential of the media while at the same time preventing abuses of power from the media itself? Essentially, the challenge is to give voice and visibility to all the groups and ideologies composing the Brazilian society schema and their ideas for the consolidation of a pluralistic, efficient and coherent democracy.

⁴⁵ <https://brazil.mom-rsf.org/en/>

4. LITERATURE REVIEW

*And when you trust your television
What you get is what you got
Cause when they own the information, oh
They can bend it all they want*

— John Mayer,
Waiting on the World to Change lyrics
from the album Continuum (2006)

In this chapter, the focus is to point the empirical research advances contributing to the present academic investigation. Firstly, from a global consideration – mainly found from North American context – but also the efforts coming from other countries and contexts around the globe, followed by the literature review centred in Brazil and the findings of mass media and political ideologies in the country.

4.1 On political ideologies and media discourse

Typically, scholar fields build knowledge about their phenomenon of interest in a three-stage process (Miller & Nicholson, 1976) and during the stage of inquiry, it focuses on integrating findings from the literature to consider for the new research propositions related to similar or same research questions. As James Potter stimulate, to develop academic work based on “better questions and help researchers construct better conceptualisations, better measures, better methods, and more valuable findings” (2014, 95). In this way, grounded research generates better tentative of explanations when it considers the enterprise previously achieved.

In this subchapter are considered the researches in Communication addressed to partisanship, unwitting bias, ideology and propaganda, and oriented by questions about media political bias – either by misinformation, sensationalism, story selection or placement, omission, media bias through labelling, spin – according to each author

and their conceptualisation of bias, or the traces of political ideologies in media, in particular in discourse. Also, to the assessment found in media discourse about social and political facts which are possible to correlate to the media positioning and the effects perceived in society (Moy and Scheufele 2000), to be able to understand the media environment in a given country or context as pluralist or not. Each research does its contribution theoretically or methodologically to this thesis, and the result is a collaborative research since much less, or nothing here would be advanced without the consistent and reliable research literature published thus far.

When in 1988 Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman explained their propaganda model theory (Herman and Chomsky 2002) advocating the systematic bias of corporate mass media and how consent for economic, social, and political policies are manufactured for the public sphere due to media content, caused a considerable impact. Consolidated as one of the most important works on media bias, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* postulates five general classes of variables that offer a way to determine the biases found in news media. Initially considering United States but, according to the author, able to extrapolate to countries sharing similar social and political conditions as the country in North America, they propose *concentration of media ownership, media funding sources, sourcing mass media news, flak and other enforcers, and anti-communism or fear ideology* as the five filters to analyse media outlets. Attentive to the fast transformation in the political scenario, after 9/11, the *fear of ideology* was updated to *counter-terrorism* (Finnegan 2007), as both social researchers kept on their critical standpoint, as well as serving as inspiration for a vast range of studies that followed. Finally, it is famous the declaration attributed to Chomsky resuming the critics related to their study: “any dictator would admire the obedience and uniformity of the U.S. media” (Finnegan 2007, 38).

Even though there are investigations as from Stocking, Holly and Gross (1989), published under the title *How do journalists think? A proposal for the study of cognitive bias in newsmaking*, searching for insights on the journalist’s ideologies and how they articulate in the discourse they produce, most of the studies focus on the content. As W. Lance Bennett

(1990), in *Toward a theory of press-state relations in the United States*, denounces the “safeguarding of the business climate in which media conglomerates operate” (Bennet 1990, 103) in the United States, where this kind of study seems more prolific. Bennett concludes that the press ideology is related to the government in rule and interaction established with media outlets. The author considers it a vicious relation and working like indexing which “constitutes a quick and ready guide for editors and reporters to use in deciding how to cover a story” (Bennet 1990, 107), especially about political affairs, paying respect to the imbricate deals of support or not to the government — by that, justifying an “passive press” and going against the “journalistic responsibilities” in “public opinion” (Bennet 1990, 109). The results came after the analysis of 2,148 pieces – news articles and editorials – from *The York Times*, the leading news organisation at the time. At the end of the study here cited and summarised, the researcher affirms:

The overriding norm of contemporary journalism seems to involve compressing public opinion (at least law-abiding, legitimate opinion) to fit into the range of debate between decisive institutional power blocs. In this ironic twist on the democratic ideal, modern public opinion can be thought of as an “index” constructed from the distribution of dominant institutional voices as recorded in the mass media. (Bennett 1990, 125)

When listing the literature contributions, it is essential to state that in a broader sense, the recent work of Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini *Comparing media systems beyond the Western World*, published in 2012 – as a revised and amplified version of *Comparing media systems Three models of media and politics* (2004) – is a reference for the present thesis. Both scholars, one from the Political Science field and other from Communication, accredit an in-depth knowledge of media and political systems in today’s world and propose an original type of interdependence analysis. Important to mention, other efforts were done to analyse media markets diversity and pluralism as in Hill (2006) who worked on a diversity index project; Hardy (2010) who offers a survey-based comparative media analysis addressing the economic, social, political, regulatory and cultural aspects of Western media

systems; and Karppinen (2010) who focuses towards to a critical perspective and paradigms of the existent models.

The comparative nature of Hallin and Mancini's work proposes the mapping of the similarities and differences in the communication system 18 countries – declared under a democratic system – in Western Europe and North America, in the first edition. Even though not articulating with a spectrum of political ideologies, the authors insist that the fundamental purpose of their theory is to make a well-founded theoretical synthesis and offer a framework for comparative research on the relationship between political systems and media systems. Beholden it makes an understructure to organise other studies substantially. Since its first version, Hallin and Mancini's work generated a sequence of productive debate and fruitful academic research grounded on those first insights, especially related to the fact that the authors pointed out that these models could not be extrapolated to countries of other latitudes. Thus, in the 2012 version, decentralising from Europe and North American, the theory establishes the base to understand the media models in the world beyond written by native and specialised researchers, including analysis from a variety of countries/regions, specifying the singularities in a broader sense than on the previous version. Also, the upgraded publication could cope with some of the transformations that have occurred in the first ten years of the century we are in and put forward an excellent analysis, especially from Brazil.

From Hallin and Mancini (2004 and 2012) and their collaborators, it is worthy to note the propose of theoretical synthesis and a framework for comparative research on media and political systems by stablishing four main analysis dimensions that allow them to establish these comparisons. The dimensions consist in a) the press circulation and the structure of the media markets; b) the degree of connection, or political parallelism, between the mass media, political parties and other civil institutions, such as trade unions or religious groups; c) the level of professionalism existing in journalism, and d) the presence, forms and degrees of state intervention in mass media communication. Thus, according to the crossing of these four levels of analysis, the output is a

list of three models of media models: 1) polarized pluralist model; 2) democratic corporatist model, and 3) liberal model.

Media institutions have developed over time, and the authors understand that considering the evolution media achieved and the remarkable capacity to influence the social system already (studied in Communication) and the political system – to the point that, on certain occasions, it is possible to associate the political logic as a hostage of media logic. The theory developed by Hallin and Mancini is widely cited, reviewed, adapted and applied considering its limitations and pointing new aspects for discussion. It can be understood in consonance to what Altheide proposes to future studies: “less global version of hegemony” and “empirically grounding” (1984, 487) the researches considering social and political variables internal and external to news production processes.

That said, different proposals of political ideologies spectrum have been articulated – according to what research found adequate to the context of analysis – by a range of perspectives by researchers in Communication when questioning mass media positioning regarding ideologies, mostly from critical studies. Theoretical and methodological approaches have been built, adapted and projected to test and uncover the so-proclaimed neutrality and objectivity of media discourse, also to approach the aspects of media pluralism (or not) in a determined scene involving mass media vehicles.

Among the most relevant empirical approaches in media, where the focus is given to the ideologies behind the media roles, the Australian-born media entrepreneur Rupert Murdoch represents an interest in investigations. Firstly, for his take over on media business in several continents, and after for the discourse of his media vehicles under his control associated with libertarian right ideology, as studied developed in by McKnight (2003) and Sinclair (2016). Also, Murdoch’s oriented changes shift to a right-wing discourse (within the North American understanding) the newspaper *The New York Post*, from 1977 after his acquisition – which was previously under a liberal-oriented view, as explains David Brock (2005) in his book *The Republican Noise Machine: Right-Wing Media and How It Corrupts Democracy*.

Groseclose and Milyo, in 2005, published an academic paper with the results of their investigation measuring media bias according to a scoring system of political party bias in the United States. Mainly, in the method the scholars structured to apply, the tag *liberal* was based on quantitative analysis of news reporting (TV and printed press, and considering news content exclusively, not editorial or opinion articles). It was used to count how many times *liberal* and *conservative* think tanks were cited, or particular sentences were used that depict partisan statements, and then compared to “with the times that members of Congress cite the same groups” (Groseclose and Milyo 2005, 1,191). The study’s outcome was a strong liberal bias found in American news outlets. Except for the *Fox News’ Special Report* and the *Washington Times*, and the “most centrist media outlets were *PBS NewsHour*, *CNN’s Newsnight*, and *ABC’s Good Morning America* (Groseclose and Milyo 2005, 1225).

The study is very like the one developed five years earlier by Dave D’Alessio and Mike Allen when researching about the media bias in presidential elections since 1948 in the United States. Contradictorily, through the meta-analysis of 59 quantitative studies, D’Alessio and Allen found “no significant bias” (2000, 149) in the newspaper industry. They considered as bias “gatekeeping bias, which is the preference for selecting stories from one party or the other; coverage bias, which considers the relative amounts of coverage each party receives; and statement bias, which focuses on the favourability of coverage toward one party or the other” (D’Alessio and Allen 2000, 136-138), justified, according to the scholars, by the academic literature.

Brock (2005) – motivated by his background as a trained journalist interested in journalism and democracy – also studies American newspapers by methodically crossing information of media ownership and content analysis regarding the left-right political-ideological spectrum. His book is a reference of the power, and the influence of the right-wing political ideas highjacked press, television and radio in the United States and exposed the conservative media onslaught.

Nevertheless, related to press in United States, Brian Goss (2005), in the article *Jeffersonian Poetry: an ideological analysis of George F. Will’s*

editorials (2002–2004), present the results after studying 196 editorials published between July 1, 2002, and July 8, 2004, by George F. Will, one of the most read writer and commentators in America. Goss grounds the argument on van Dijk’s critical discourse analysis tradition and the scholar conception of ideology in media content by identifying a list of “*ad populum* narratives” (Goss 2005, 421) that Will manifests discursively by “de-legitimation of groups, “criticism to social institutions” or also “naturalising concomitant superiority manifested in criminal acts” (Goss 2005, 423-424).

Also, from the United States and the country bi-partisanship landscape, Gentzkow and Shapiro, in 2006, compared the discourse of *Fox News*, *The New York Times* and *Al Jazeera* (the English version). In each story, a different cut on the events was found, with the researchers inferred selective omission of the facts according to different reporters. *The New York Times* reported the battle as instigating further hostility by Iraqis against Americans, along with statements discussing the negative implications of U.S. involvement in Iraq, both reflecting liberal views of the war in Iraq.

In 2007, Hoffman and Wallach published a paper with the results after administrating a questionnaire to 67 college students who expressed strong liberal or conservative political views. Participants were asked to complete a survey that included questions about the type of media outlet they use to obtain information on current events and their view of current events. *The effect of media bias*, as was titled the paper by Hoffman and Wallach (2007) found that after participants were exposed to photographs and short articles relating to a presidential debate between President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry (in 2004) and answering about their opinion about the candidates, it was verified a statistical significance within groups before and after exposure to the newspaper clippings.

There would be many more examples of efforts in mapping media bias from the United States and many valuable insights to gather. Thus shifting to literature investigating other countries and contexts – which represents a particular interest in this thesis – it is possible to cite Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad (2000) studying the influence of dominant ideology on news framing on the article *Framing Beijing*

Dominant Ideological Influences on the American Press Coverage of the Fourth UN Conference on Women and the NGO Forum. Also, the effort of Rotimi Taiwo (2007) on *Language, Ideology and Power Relations in Nigerian Newspaper Headlines.*, who studied three hundred Nigerian headlines from six randomly chosen newspapers from the country in order to unveil hidden ideological meanings. The research-based on Critical Discourse Analysis found that “beyond the generally observed rhetorical and graphological devices employed in newspaper headlines, there are also hidden ideological meanings behind those written words” (Taiwo 2007, 243).

Sylvia Fernández and Lourdes Molero de Cabeza (2007) contributed to decentralising the studies with the paper *Ideología y Prensa en Venezuela: Construcción discursiva de las noticias de la sección política.* They argue that in Venezuela, print media are, in their entirety, private and that in several occasions, they have been accused of responding to the economic and political interests of the business groups that run them and have been subject to censorship and state controls. The scholars articulate the analysis of the Venezuelan printed press based on a model proposed by Jean-Michel Adam (1992) in order to know the different textual typologies, forms of elocution or discourse. Fernández and de Cabeza (2007) analysed *Panorama* and *El Nacional* newspapers, all the news published in three months (December 2002-February 2003) that coincide with the duration of the civic strike led by the opposition against Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez was taken as a population. From these two newspapers, an intentional sample was gathered collecting pieces produced by the five most representative editors of each newspaper during the period studied. After the systematic analysis, the authors conclude that journalists selected ways of ranking information that do not fulfil the essential functions of journalism: inform the most relevant aspects of the journalistic event. Also, that the news analysed demonstrates, through its discursive organisation, a communicative purpose under the strategic functions of “ideological discourse: legitimise one sector and delegitimise the other” (Fernández and de Cabeza 2007, 518).

Dieter Rucht, who in 2013 published in *Protest movements and their media usages*, collaborating with the book *Mediation and protest*

movements that investigates and publishes the results exploring the nature of the relationship between protest movements, media representation, and communication strategies and tactics in Prague. Rucht (2013) argues that newspapers became more relevant in mediating with the public sphere, remembering the successful media manipulation techniques used during the German Nazi movement. Within a spectrum, Rucht considers the left-right length, either for politics and newspapers ideology on his study. He observes that the “old” left always had less access to media and “on the other hand, they developed their own independent means of communication” and “as far as media were concerned, the New Left basically relied on intellectual journals, brochures and books” (Rucht 2013, 254). To analyse the media coverage on protests organised to disrupt the meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Prague, in 1990, Rucht (2013) used the labels *abstention*, *attack*, *adaptation* and *alternative*. The researcher proposes it in order to classify the selection and description biases of established mass media when reporting the event. Then, correlating with the analysis of media content in four aspects found on news reports about the protest: (1) size of the protest, i.e., the number of people participating; (2) degree of disruptiveness or radicalness; (3) creativity or newness of the form of action and its accompanying symbolic elements, and (4) the political weight or public prominence of individuals and groups supporting or participating in the protest (Rucht 2013, 257).

The ideological analysis of the press was also practical to study the revolutionary press, as from the French Revolution to current anti-capitalist Spanish newspapers, such as *En Lucha*. Luis Zhu (2011) reviews the importance of the revolutionary press to change the world, its relationship with alternative media and approaches the new digital social networks. Zhu (2011) criticises that the mass media are still – or now more than ever – in the hands of a few capitalists and that under the capitalist system, it all functions as any other company where workers exploit to obtain the maximum possible economic benefit. At the same time, the author points out that the media also represent one of the primary forms of transmission of ideology; in this case, the ideology that interests of the powerful.

Finally, the study done by the researchers in Communication Antonio Pineda and Nria Almiron come to compose the most recent and fruitful attempt to study media bias regarding a defined set of political ideologies as they put together a methodological proposal to study the online-only Spanish newspapers. Previously, in 2006, Almiron published *Pluralismo en Internet: el caso de los diarios digitales espaoles de informacin general sin referente impreso* (*Internet pluralism: the case of Spanish digital newspapers with general information without a printed reference*). The article represented the roots concerning the study the bias of native digital newspapers in Spain and fostered the interest to study Brazilian online-only newspapers. However, it was not practically possible for logistics reasons found along with the research design of this thesis.

Pineda and Almiron (2013), in *Ideology, politics, and opinion journalism: a content analysis of Spanish online-only newspapers*, improve the study of political-ideological bias by investigating 18 Spanish digital-native newspapers and the opinion articles found during a four weeks time frame in 2011. As the objective was to define how the newspapers can be defined regarding their political ideology, ideological values were put together in a coding structure, “such as freedom, equality, solidarity/brotherhood, individualism and collectivism” (Pineda and Almiron 2013, 562). It is essential to notice the research design considered to quantified columns according to the main themes found on the content, to determine whether or not they were related to ideological-political issues. Using the left-right ideological spectrum (extreme-left, left, centre-left, centre, centre-right, right, extreme-right), the authors found that “the right-wing has a higher frequency of positive or neutral mentions than the left-wing” (Pineda and Almiron 2013, 565).

Following the same line of thought, the doctoral dissertation of Samira Allani (2015), from the Department of Philology of Universidad Complutense de Madrid, designs a cross-cultural investigation. She analyses the ideological structures in the discourses produced by foreign policy experts about the Iraq war found in ten American and ten Arab newspapers. The thesis *Estructuras del discurso ideolgico en los artculos de opinin: estudio cultural comparativo* (*Structures of ideological discourse in opinion articles: comparative cultural study*) adopts a critical discursive approach,

classifying in stages as analysis of discursive constructions, analysis of the construction of context and analysis of the ideologically driven manoeuvring strategies performed by the newspapers in the sample. The conclusion shows that the “patterns in the discursive practices of each group of policy experts indicate ideologically-biased strategies prompted by the power positions of their respective nations” (Allani 2015, 110).

By advancing a methodological proposal to assess media bias through content, Esteban Zunino, a researcher from Argentina, is worth mentioning from the studies compiled during the literature review for this thesis. Zunino (2016), in the article *The assessment of political news in the media agenda: a methodological proposal for more extensive content analysis* is worth mentioning here despite not dealing closely with political ideologies provided an interesting quantitative approach to analyse the evaluative tone of political press news. The method aims to integrate processes that have been used in several agenda-setting studies with some concepts that are held within appraisal theory. Specifically, Zunino proposes to disaggregate valences and create a more useful, expansive assessment index that is composed of various complementary variables. Nevertheless, disagreeing with the assessment system proposed, it is useful the idea of different evaluative components to comprehend a single article, and it acknowledges the complex set of tensions playing within topics in written news content. Moreover, Zunino carefully considered the varied positions regarding direction or intensity that can be found, not only within a single outlet but also within a single piece of news.

Within ideology and politics, recent researches, figures the study by Aurora Labio and Antonio Pineda (2016) titled *Leftward Shift, Media Change? Ideology and Politics in Spanish Online-Only Newspapers After the 15-M Movement*. In that scenario of political change, from 2011 to 2014, the scholars considered the launching of “alternative left-leaning online-only newspapers” (Labio and Pineda 2016, 2661) as part of a social and political reorganisation in the country, mainly provoked by the economic crisis. By analysing a sample of 541 editorial articles from 10 online-only newspapers – since in Spain there is an official tool cataloguing the native digital newspapers, OJD – during the time frame

of 2011 to 2014, through Content Analysis, Labio and Pineda concluded that “Spanish left-wing digital opinion seems to be more political than ideological” (2016, 2676). Regarding the aim to explore the political-ideological bias, it was found that the newspapers in Spain are, moreover, politically partisan (Labio and Pineda 2016, 2676).

From the same line of digital-native newspaper ideological analysis and with Antonio Pineda in collaboration with Elena Bellido-Pérez and Bianca Sánchez-Gutiérrez titled *Prensa online-only Española e ideología: análisis de elementos sociales y educativos* (*Spanish online-only press and ideology: analysis of social and educational elements*) which is part of the book *Voces alternativas: investigación multidisciplinar en comunicación y cultura*, edited by Ana María Ortega Pérez and Victoria García Prieto, in 2017. The research published by scholars from Universidad de Sevilla, in Spain, is one of the most recently in the field and aims to empirically delineate the ideological profile that the Spanish online-only press manifests in the treatment of some elements related to society and education. The research questions proposed by the study are an excellent example for the present thesis and the research questions guiding this doctoral investigation: *What socio-cultural elements are the most frequently addressed in the opinion columns of the online-only press? What ideological assessment is made of the socio-cultural elements in the opinion columns of the online-only press?* (Bellido-Pérez, Sánchez-Gutiérrez and Pineda 2017, 321).

Lastly, Mohamed Douifi, in 2018, published the results of a study analysing press discourse in Britain related to warfare. The article titled *Language and the Complex of Ideology: A Socio-cognitive Study of Warfare Discourse in Britain*. The scholar from the University of Algiers, Algeria, he has a strong background in ideology and discourse analysis, in specific the discursive construction of war, like in Iraq, in Anglo-Saxon press. Douifi analyses a combination of British newspaper’s articles and a set of political speeches to explore Britain’s involvement in the Iraq War (2003). Also, he critically assesses the language practices which constructed a pro-war ideology under Tony Blair’s premiership. From Douifi’s study, it is important to remark the appropriation of concepts from van Dijk’s socio-cognitive model and the used of qualitative and quantitative analysis. Furthermore, conceptualises discourse as a

nonlinear, highly discursive and socio-cognitive phenomenon and Communication Studies.

4.2 On press, politics and pluralism in Brazil

Regarding the theoretical and empirical academic research in communication and politics concerning mass media discourse in Brazil, it is possible to affirm that the background supporting the investigation questions is very connected to the study remarks pointed out the previous sub-chapter. Although, Brazilian researchers are interested in the particularities of the Brazilian mass media and its connection to the political systems aspects and its particular dynamics. The contribution made by such investigations primarily in the recent two decades is enormous, marking a new type of intellectual ideal with the development of the academic journalism degrees and with it the growth of university research centres⁴⁶ (Marques de Melo 99).

For the reach of this thesis, it is reasonable to mention the contribution as of Patricia Birman and David Lehmann's (1999) research on the strategies used by an influential neo-Pentecostalist church battling for ideological hegemony in Brazil, since this church federation is known for the strategic approach to own communication vehicles. In this scenario, the neo-Pentecostalist churches appear to take over the traditional Catholic church in Brazil, also to compete with the established TV Globo network in the media market. By analysing the characteristics of the Catholic church and its cultural and political predominance in country's formation and comparing to the emergence of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (the outstanding among the other neo-Pentecostals) and the strategies of gathering the crowds and aiming political power. This last one, by using mass communication not adherent to the pillars of journalistic practices, the researchers analyse how both religious groups built a conflict plural in

⁴⁶ Until the 90s there was one university (USP) in São Paulo with a Journalism department oriented to research.

its interests and developed under media footlight. The researchers analysed and classified discursive strategies of both sides involved in the conflict, and as the core of results, they detect that “what appears at one level as a religious conflict is at another level conflict over political power” (Birman and Lehmann 1999, 145).

Binenbojm (2003) studies mass media regarding the variables of pluralism and deliberative democracy and with these contrasting Brazil and the United States. Essentially, the author brings the legal aspects of media pluralism and democracy prescribed in the Constitution of both countries. This research contributes to the present thesis by clarifying how the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 was inspired on the US Constitution of 1787 regarding the two dominant conceptions of free speech and media freedom within the Libertarian theory and the Democratic theory. This theoretical work is fundamental to understand the discussion about the role of the state facing the two conceptions mentioned.

The effort of Binenbojm (2003) suggests is to demonstrate that freedom of expression and media freedom have a double dimension since they are presented simultaneously as defensive liberal guarantees (negative freedoms protected against external interventions) and as positive democratic guarantees (positive freedoms of participation in collective deliberation processes) (Binenbojm 2003, 378). For him, the state plays a decisive role, either by respecting the external freedom of expression limits or by regulating the pursuit of meaningful activities to promote the improvement of the quality of public debate, towards including as many social groups and points of view as possible in the media discourse.

Thus, it agrees with the idea that the guiding axis of this double role of the state must be the progressive and unfinished construction of a society. A social organisation where citizens are not only passive recipients of messages conveyed in the mainstream media, but as moral agents capable of formulating their conceptions and actively express them in the various forums in which public dialogues are held.

In *Media, education and citizenship: all you need to know about the media*, the prominent researcher in communication in South America Pedrinho Guareschi together with Osvaldo Biz argue in general about how the

media build reality with values, set the agenda for public discussions, and powerfully influence the construction of our subjectivity. Guareschi and Biz (2005), in this dossier about media in Brazil, agree with previous studies regarding the media development and power relations and propose a more enlarged vision of how press not only affirms what exists – and, consequently, what does not exist because it is not showed – “but gives a connotative value to the existing reality” (Guareschi and Biz 2005, 24). Important to remark that the work mentions *values* when talking about media description of the reality, as these values, according to Guareschi and Biz (2005), are impregnated in media discourse. Practically, they classify five values in order to analyse media position – equality, diversity, participation, solidarity and freedom – which are articulated in qualitative studies by them to examine a given media outlet.

Pointing towards media democratisation considering pluralism of voices as essential, the authors place the urge of civil society organisation to transform media in a democratic ground. Democracy implies popular sovereignty and the equitable distribution of powers. Moreover, since for the authors cited and many others quoted in here, the media are part of these powers. Thus, for democracy endure in society, democracy must also exist in the exercise of the power to communicate.

When Marialva Barbosa, back in 2006, did the accurate study about the central role of the media in Brazil after 1930, she emphasised the historical view as central to the formulation of issues involving the media development in this period also regarding press and power relations. This historical approach for Barbosa (2006), as for Berger (2002), is fundamental to the approximation to cultural issues as the ones that brings media as part of – not as something aside, above or detached, but in constant interplay. The researcher argues that the sociological basis was decisively favouring the cultural view in communication studies, where often the subject can appear de-historicized, relegating to the background, crucial for example, considering the interest in studying media and ideological issues. In case the investigation lacks the historical perception, the subject can often be vague, most seriously, it will excel in generality; and the conclusions

of such analysis point to a kind of universal aspect to questions, answered as if they were valid for any social formation since each social space has a historical conformity and a particular trajectory.

Barbosa (2006) advances – with extremely reliable historical, social and cultural comprehension – the moment in Brazil the media gained prominence and following with detailed coverage of more than 70 years of media history in Brazil. As her investigation affirms, that media acted in the diffusion of the state ideology, fundamental for the shaping of conservative thought, and helped to cement with a massive reach along the end of the first half of the twentieth century.

The year 1930 is marked by a political scenario that shaped the media in the country. Although there has been some expropriation of some newspapers, persecution of many others due to the instauration of an authoritarian government, there were more closeness, agreements and mutual relations between the men of government and the men of the press, than disagreements. It represented the strategy to reach an audience now identified as mass, and the leaders of the major publications were also aligned with the regime (Barbosa 2006, 220).

The study highlights that in during the 60s movement to build the autonomy of the journalistic field concerning the literary field, fundamental for the self-construction of the legitimacy of the profession – with the main ingredient of mythical neutrality imported from the United States – and more importantly, the self-entitlement of the press as the only support to “spell out the truths of official events and constitute the factual record *par excellence*” (Barbosa 2006, 223). Thus, the media vehicles act as the top driving force being emblematic joint of the press to the political field and its recognition as a superior governing force, even if for specific purposes, they are linked to one or the other group.

Lastly, Barbosa (2006) after studying almost a century of documents about media in the country and based on previous results of investigations about discursive media role, concludes that in the Brazilian case, journalists as the whole media outlet are historically co-opted by the state to be organic intellectuals – regarding the Gramscian understanding – of the ruling groups or spokesmen of the hegemonic classes, historically linked to big capital.

In 2008, Dalpiaz's work enlightened the field by studying the content of British newspapers related to the 2006 Brazilian national elections, in order to identify discursive tendencies and the ideological meaning of the representations produced by the British newspapers about the Brazilian political life. The article analyses news articles produced by leading British newspapers – *The Guardian*, *The Independent* and *The Times*, and describes that the universe of guidelines published about Brazil contributed to illustrate how a political phenomenon can be represented and distributed in different ways by the international media, as well as the critical role of the correspondents in the social construction of the news. The study discusses journalistic features related to journalistic style and news content to identify how British journals are addressing Brazilian themes to their audiences. It brings contributions as Hall – and how to think about ways to address news, a concept that served as an analysis tool – and from Fowler (1997) who studies specifically ideologies in Latin America – using the spectrum *right* and *left* regarding the appearance in the studied articles. The conclusion is that British newspapers ideologically articulate their representations of Brazil according to, on the one hand, politics and capital and, on the other, their readers (Dalpiaz 2008, 74).

A year later, Power and Zucco (2009) in *Estimating ideology of Brazilian Legislative parties, 1990–2005: a research communication* published what is the closest to a complete map of the ideological position considering the Brazilian parties at the time. Important to focus the attention in this study when the researchers, by one side consider the background information on what is already known about the ideology of Brazilian political players – and the agreement in ordering of parties on a standard left-right dimension – and by other side Power and Zucco (2009) give equal importance to perceptual data gathered from surveys with legislators to understand their ideological perception.

Another demonstration of the interdisciplinarity in media studies is the contribution from Law field done by Fernandes (2009), addressing the aspects of media pluralism in Brazil by the perspective of legal regulation of ownership – which also contributes to studies in the political economy of media. In outline, the author bases the analysis on the Brazilian Constitution and the reality of the concentration and

political power maintained by the Brazilian media sector. Within this set, the pluralism of ideas in the public sphere and the vitality of democracy are evaluated, as well as the democratic values and the constitutional principles serving as the basis for the construction of a critical view of the concentration structures existing in the media sector.

Flavia Briol (2011), to discuss the relationship between media and the creation of types from an analysis of the concept of stereotypes, adds to a theoretical analysis of media stereotypes, understanding them as moral and ideological artefacts. The analysis includes the meanings of that definition, taking into account the tensions and ambiguities present in the dynamics of reproduction and overcoming of stereotypes in journalistic discourse. Wisely understanding the critics from of contrasting arguments, as the hypodermic theory Briol does not mean to put aside the “asymmetry between production/diffusion and reception of media content” (2011, 88) nor does not mean to diminish the importance of concentrating media ownership and professional journalism routines in the standardization of media content, and in particular in news. The point is that this does not stem from a set of images and information that converge on a single understanding or worldview, nor can a standard impact of the content be conveyed on different segments, reminding that it is necessary to consider the nuances “without losing sight of the weight that the media has in shaping the shared representations of the social world (Briol 201, 89).

Moving toward studies which the object are online media, media discourse and political positions there are a few worth mentioning as Bailey and Marques (2012) when dedicating time to analyse and draft down the tensions, symbiosis and independency between mainstream news organisations in Brazil and the news blogs. The study was published in the Willey’ *Handbook of Global Online Journalism* and it is a reference to understand the monopoly of online media by the traditional media groups in the country and the characteristics of alternative online news initiatives. Bailey and Marques’ work is the key to understand the most read online newspapers studied in the present thesis are with no exception products from big communication groups: financing model, power from the ownership and the cultural trait of validation of traditional media behind the online platform. Noteworthy

in this case is the large empirical research background by Jamil Marques about many aspects of media bias and positions regarding political events in Brazil.

Canalli Bona and Carvalho (2018) address the topic of alternative media, which is mainly online, in Brazil and the pluralism regarding the voices being heard. On the paper, the authors present the partial results of the research that started in 2015 and aimed to understand how alternative journalism can be understood in the digital sphere in Brazil. Canalli Bona and Carvalho (2018) discuss the concept of alternative journalism in according to the context, and the main possible characteristics handled by this type of journalism. By considering four types of sources: officers, officers, experts and testimonials, the study maps 33 websites nationally and then doing Content Analysis of eight (8) of them. Even though the news websites considered in this study do not coincide with the ones used for this thesis, it supports the validity of Content Analysis.

Considering media position, Mundim (2018) analyses the media bias during the coverage of presidential elections is 2002, 2006 and 2010 in three (3) relevant printed newspapers in Brazil – which all coincide with the newspapers included in the empirical study on this thesis – *Folha de S. Paulo*, *O Estado de S. Paulo* and *O Globo*. The results published in the Brazilian Journal of Political Science argues how there was a “systematic bias” (Mundim 2018, 8). After running quantitative coverage bias index inspired by the work of Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn (2006) and statistics tests, it was considered the sum of positive and negative news published, respectively, about a candidate and his main competitor. After, applying a qualitative analysis dividing the informative and opinionative articles from the same newspapers, the conclusion is that there was a considerable anti-PT (Workers’ Party) position found consistently along the election times. It was demonstrated how on opinionative articles the sympathy for the candidates representing the right position in the country’s political spectrum spares the candidates representing the left-leaning. However, the most important information presented by data is the “rejection of the null hypothesis about the homogeneity of journalistic coverage”

(Mundim 2018, 33) and that by ‘playing’ with emphasis or conceal media can influence voters’ political behaviour and attitudes.

Considering in 2016 the then first women Brazilian president was impeached by a process opened in the Federal Chamber of Deputy and approved decisively by the House of Senates, Marques, Mont’Alverne and Mitozo (2018) researched how two printed newspapers – *Folha de São Paulo* and *O Estado de São Paulo* – presented the impeachment process on their editorials published in between 2015 and 2016. By using a Content Analysis to scrutinise 507 editorial pieces, the authors argue both newspapers discursively mentioned the impeachment process even before its institutional beginning, as well as both, are “concerned about constructing the impeachment’s legitimacy but use diverse arguments to justify it” (Marques, Mont’Alverne and Mitozo 2018, 240).

Other from explaining the characteristics of media formation, structure and relations in the country, the last studies make the most relevant grant when studying specific newspapers in Brazil, as well when comparing discourses and frames of the country’s political affairs and actors mapped in the national printed or online media.

Recently, the work of Herscovitz (2019) deals with the idea of Brazilian leading newspapers as political actors. The author uses organizational and ideological levels of analysis proposed by Pamela Shoemaker and Stephen Reese’s hierarchical model of influences on media content (1996) together with model of political parallelism by suggested by Hallin and Mancini (2012). After analysing over 20 studies regarding every national election since 1995, the findings reveal the Brazilian news media seeking to further their own interests and reinforcing the power of elite groups.

Although, looking through all these investigations, it was possible to acknowledge the alignment of Brazilian’ studies in Communication with research problems orienting investigations in other regions in the world. Nevertheless, from specific literature review emerges that there are still questions open to exploring – and there will always be, as this intrinsically forms part of the constantly-changing sophisticated level of society we are part. Also, media aspects and relations with other

instances always calling for our persistent thoughts, analysis and discussion in all levels crossing the academic borders.

5. METHODOLOGY

*The aim of argument, or of discussion,
should not be victory, but progress.
— Joseph Joubert*

In the chapter starting here, it is primarily clarified how the methodology is inspired critically by the Critical Discourse Analysis, and empirically by the traditional Content Analysis.

The designed method combines quantitative and qualitative approaches since the Critical Discourse Analysis by itself was considered not sufficient enough to offer the empirical character intended, an ability to assess political ideologies in media written content properly. Therefore, it is presented in an original quantitative analysis model, adapting this last approach.

Complementary, there is information about the sample composition, the characteristics of the newspapers composing the study, and the time frame defined for the editorial articles' compilation.

5.1 Methodological perspective

5.1.1 Critical Discourse Analysis perspective

The interest of research in communication with a focus on ideological marks – in this thesis organised by the classification of political ideologies – has a long history, as already mentioned in chapter 3 and 4. Teun van Dijk is the most known and cited contemporary research with a strong background in Linguistics and shares different ways of conceiving discourse. Thus, discourse can be considered a

verbal or written communicative event that takes place in a specific situation – in terms of time and place – in which social actors hold with different roles, such as speaker or listener, as reader or writer. On the other hand, discourse also has a more restricted meaning, which it is conceived as the result or product of a given communicative act, that is, the content result as it is presented to the interlocutors. In that sense, the speech is called conversation or text (Bardin 2011).

Exposed in the theoretical background in chapter 2, the studies in ideology have the roots mainly in Marx and subsequent to him. From Marx it is assumed, in the critique of ideology, what is called linguistic fetishism. Linguistic uses obliterate the complex network of sense production in the same way that trade obscures the process of commodity production. As the logic by which the commodity fetishism alienates the subject from apprehending the social process of determining the value of objects. And for Critical Discourse analysts, it may resemble the functioning of language, which operates by making social, historically determined meanings meaning natural. This is the traditional way of conceiving ideology, in its relation to the phenomenon of language, which inspired a series of transformations in the various domains of critical linguistic studies, especially from the 1960s and 1980s. The Critical Discourse Analysis (ADC) is emphasised in here by its virtue of placing ideology as a reason for its critical determination and its effort in tracing the relationship between text and process since this linguistic background combined with a critical approach makes it a tool for the study of the ideological processes that mediate relations of power and control in society.

For this research, it is understood that discourse, as a semiotic code, can be understood as a form of social and political interaction between groups (van Dijk 2006). It is a public act, a symbolic action and a communicative practice that is exercised concerning the interests of social groups. From this definition of discourse, it is inferred that ideologies are formulated, acquired and reproduced through discourse. van Dijk argues:


Our vast knowledge about the world is constituted by such socially and culturally shared beliefs. These are usually located in what cognitive psychology calls ‘semantic

memory'. However, we shall speak of social memory, since not all of this knowledge has to do with the general meanings of words, and hence need not be called 'semantic' in any standard meaning of that term. (van Dijk 1998, 29)

In line with the approach of van Dijk (1998), detailed in his book *Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach*, it is a cliché to affirm that there are other semiotic codes such as films, graphics, paintings, symbols or badges that also transmit ideologies. However, one quality that makes discourse unique is that it allows groups of people to construct, directly, general meanings about social facts. It also makes it possible to represent and, more importantly, to prescribe and proscribe, through orders, mandates and judgments, the behaviours and the way of thinking and acting that must be adopted. For van Dijk (1998), the discourse is the possibility of unleashing references that endorse an ideology that is reproduced through the material product of discourse, namely, text and conversation, which are carried out by specific actors in specific situations and with a defined purpose.

Even though it is known that van Dijk manages another approximation to study the linguistic manifestations, denominated Critical Discourse Analysis, his understanding and advocacy of the discourse as generated by social practices are shared in the construction of this investigation. As van Dijk explains in a figure, shown below (figure 5), the connection he sees on ideologies and the “actual social practices that construct or implement such ideologies” (van Dijk 1998, 86).

Figure 5: Teun van Dijk Mental Model.



Source: Teun van Dijk (1998, 87).

This figure represents the following sequence of thought according to the author:

[...] first that ideologies must be based on a system of cultural common ground, featuring shared general knowledge and attitudes and their underlying principles, such as values and cultural truth criteria. Groups select from this cultural base specific beliefs and evaluation criteria, and construe these, together with other basic principles of their group, as systems of specific group beliefs that are organized by underlying ideologies. These representations of the social mind monitor the formation of the social dimension of personal mental models in episodic memory. Models that are controlled by group

beliefs may be called ideologically 'biased'. (van Dijk 1998, 86)

The British linguist Norman Fairclough, member of the Critical Discourse Analysis field, in his book *Language and Power* (1989) affirms that a critical analysis is necessary "to correct a widespread underestimation of the significance of language in the production, maintenance, and change of social relations of power" (Fairclough 1989, 1). He is also interested in how social practices are discursively exercised, as well as the subsequent discursive effects of social practices. Both authors, van Dijk and Fairclough, are particularly interested in the connections between language use and unequal relations of power and the ways to systematise the study of such multifaceted phenomenon.

For van Dijk, the ideology has structures and strategies within a framework of its cognitive functions in society and, based on that, he mainly asks:

Which contexts, situations, participants, institutions, groups and group relations, or other micro or macro social structures are involved in this 'practical accomplishment' of ideologies in discourse, and hence in the everyday enactment and reproduction of ideologies? Which relationships of power, dominance, resistance, competition or conflict constrain or occasion such ideologies? (van Dijk 1998, 12)

From van Dijk's perspective, ideologies are generally recognised as socially shared representations and viewed as cognitive structures organizing knowledge about the world. The author insists that a theory that deals "with ideologies without talking about the nature and functions of socially shared ideas is theoretically unsatisfactory" (van Dijk 2006, 731). This approach to the analysis of discourse in the media adds insight into the strength and complex interaction between discourse and its ideological implications.

Another element in Critical Discourse Studies is the importance of the group relations, according to position, power and domination, struggle for hegemony and the ideological conflicts. In van Dijk's (1998) point of view:

Conversely, although ideologies often imply struggle and conflict, this implication does not always hold: ideologies that are in conflict do not necessarily lead to, or emerge from, social struggle and conflict, but may also be needed to manage diversity. (van Dijk 1998, 171)

In this line of thought, the ideologies can be detectable because it is only in discourse that they are formulated and expressed:

Indeed, political ideologies not only are involved in the production or understanding of political discourses and other political practices, but are also (re)produced by them. (van Dijk 2006, 732)

Since the purpose of this research is to explore the variables of political-ideological marks in the written press content, this investigation is, by all the reasons justified above, oriented by critical perspective from van Dijk (1998; 2006a; 2006b) as a central reference to whom all discourse parts from an ideological ground and everywhere is ideological territory, and also by the interests and curiosities of Fairclough (1989; 1995; 2013), made possible by the methodological approach from Krippendorff (2004) and Bardin (2011).

5.1.2 Content Analysis perspective

Since the interest of the investigation is to empirically perceive the marks of political ideologies bias found in the written content on the most-read Brazilian online newspapers, it was essential to consider the methodology and the technique suitable for such work.

This research organisation follows qualitative Content Analysis inspired in the North American professor Klaus Krippendorff, to whom Content Analysis is a research technique for obtaining valid and replicable inferences of the data in their context aiming to “recognise meaning” (Krippendorff 2004, 21).

The origins of the Content Analysis date back to eighteenth-century Sweden. Notably, when the church conducted analyses of written documents of the time to identify elements contraries to the religion (Santos and Pinto 1989). Content Analysis – also shown as CA

for short – emerged with the status of a technique in the early twentieth century in the United States to analyse journalistic material. An impulse occurred between 1940 and 1950 when scientists began to become interested in political symbols, and this contributed to its development. Between 1950 and 1960 the AC extended to several areas.

Interestingly, at that time, represented the period post World War II and the use of content analysis increased as points Bardin, “25% of the empirical studies that underlie the content analysis technique belong to political research” (2011, 22). For a long time, content analysis was associated with pragmatic and interventional objectives, modified with the Allerton House Congress in 1955, with the participation of psychologists, sociologists and linguists (Caregnato, Aquino and Mutti 2006). As explains Newman, Benz and Ridenour (1998) the method was already considered one of the most common in empirical research by different human and social sciences at the beginning of the '80s.

As points Graber and Smith (2005), Content Analysis represents still one of the most used methods to approach media discourse related to political positioning and assessment of socio-political facts and affairs. They affirm the method is applied “mirroring practices in the social sciences and humanities” (Graber and Smith 2005, 491) nowadays complemented with content-analysis digital protocols and machine learning studies under development.

Berelson (1952) offers his classical definition: “content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (1952). However, Klaus Krippendorff's understanding encompasses those of Lasswell *et al.* (1965), Berelson (1952) and his quantitative orientated method, also Holsti (1969) with an encoding/decoding approach.

For Berelson (1952) content analysis is a quantitative, systematic and objective technique that describes the manifest content of a communication. Harold Lasswell on his turn, influenced by the pragmatism of the Chicago School in the first decades of the twentieth-first century, tries to perceive the formation of the media agenda setting and for so he carried out studies on the content of the propagandistic message and the radio contents. To this end, the analysis of content was used, and the method was popularized in 1927 when his classic

study: *Propaganda Technique in the World War* was published. Thus, from the study of propaganda of the war to the study of electoral propaganda was a step. The Lasswell model (1963) very known in journalism, defines content analysis as a technique that emphasizes the quantification of the *what* the message communicates and presents its classic formulation: *who says what to whom with what effect*. But according to Krippendorff, the Lasswell model

[...] fails to acknowledge the analyst's own conceptual contributions to what constitutes the appropriate reading of the analysed texts and the relevance of this reading to a given research question. (Krippendorff 2004, 21)

One of the most recurrent references of the phenomenon is the work of Ronal Rice and William Paisley (1981), who analysed the debate between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy in the presidential elections of 1960. From a count of the words most used by the candidates, the investigator verified that the political speeches reproduced a certain tone and discursive sense. It is important to note that the 1960 United States presidential election was the first to have television coverage, which conveyed the four debates of the electoral campaign. From this point on, the television has since assumed a decisive role in the political debate.

Content Analysis, as a set of communication analysis techniques, has been reformulated over the years since the first precepts of the classical Content Analysis studies proposed by Klaus Krippendorff to the present days, with a more contemporary analysis. Also, the work of French researcher Laurence Bardin has an anchorage which is consistent with the orientation to an in-depth understanding of the method and, at the same time, brings a multifaceted path that characterises Content Analysis as a method (a group of techniques) that historically adds diversity to the academic world.

Academically, there is the debate about the qualitative aspect of the technique which can be more than quantitative and descriptive, considering that the inference – overcoming the strict frequency observation – becomes a significant aspect in the development and application of the Content Analysis, usually associated to other techniques as Discourse Analysis.

Scholars use content analysis in several studies, and according to Bardin (2011), it offers a set of communication analysis techniques that by using systematic and objective procedures for the description of the message content, besides, to be rigorous as a way of not getting lost in the heterogeneity of the object. With the evolution of the method, the function or the objective of Content Analysis is understood as in a level of inference. The analytical description is the first phase of a systematic procedure described by Bardin (2011) but does not constitute an exclusive element of the method, as well as the qualitative analysis does not invalidate the aspects related to quantification.

The qualitative aspect of this kind of research now encompasses a transdisciplinary field, involving the human and social sciences, assuming traditions and theories of analysis derived from positivism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, Marxism, critical theory and constructivism, and adopting research methods for the study of a phenomenon situated in the message content. The qualitative term implies a dense concern with people, facts and places that intrinsically constitute part of the research objects. Moreover, it is the extract of the latent meanings that are only perceptible with sensitive attention that leads the researcher to interpret and translates the exposed or hidden meanings from the research objects.

Different traditions of research use the qualitative title, sharing the underlying assumption that the investigation of human phenomena, always saturated with reason, freedom and will, are possessed of specific characteristics: they create and attribute meanings to things and people in social interactions, and these can be described and analysed, without statistical quantification. Many are the authors that refer to qualitative, differentiating themselves by theoretical or technological assumptions, research techniques or research objectives. They are generally opposed to the quantitative as it uses quantification as the only way to ensure the validity of a generalisation, presupposing a unique model of research, derived from the natural sciences, which starts from a guiding hypothesis, only admits external observations, follow an indirect path to establish laws, through objective checks, supported by statistical frequencies.

The value of a Content Analysis depends on the quality of the conceptual elaboration made *a priori* by the researcher, the accuracy with which it will be translated into variables, the analysis scheme or the categories and, finally, the agreement between the reality and these categories to be analysed.

According to Klaus Krippendorff (2004), in *Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology* – which serves as a manual when applying qualitative Content Analysis – it is necessary to establish criteria for the treatment of data for this technique. The author recommends three aspects he for the codification of Content Analysis: (a) sample unit, (b) unit of registration and (c) the unit of context. Explained as:

(a) The *sample unit* is the action of selecting from the material to be scrutinised according to the objective of the investigation, defined period by the researcher. They are the portions of observed reality (Krippendorff, 2004: 82). At this stage, the units that will constitute the analytical corpus are set and justified the reason for such assemble.

(b) The *registration unit* is specifically based on the mechanism allowing the complex analytical material to be decomposed. They are concrete elements that are categorised, that is, they can be registered (Krippendorff, 2004). In order to select these units, the words (or family of words), the themes, the concepts, the symbols are determined, as well the establishment of the criteria where the sample will be made or what journalistic discourse will be contemplated and in what precise location of the newspapers.

(c) The *context unit* forces the researcher to see the information on a broader reading than the cut-out text. The analysis of data in context aims to infer the meaning of the data with validity criteria (Krippendorff, 2004), that is, the real meaning cannot be perceived isolated out of the unit since it can only be analysed because it was extracted from a given framework. For Krippendorff, the texts “acquire significance” in the context of the uses, which for him is “meanings, contents, symbolic qualities, and interpretations” (Krippendorff 2004, 33).

Content Analysis is by default multidimensional because it requires to the researcher for a social, historical and political

understanding of the subject considered. After decomposition of the phenomenon into registration units, to be able to observe it critically, it is necessary to reconstruct the pieces – like a puzzle – again so as not to fall into the error of partial and segmented readings.

As argues the author:

Every content analysis requires a context within which the available texts are examined. The analyst must, in effect, construct a world in which the texts make sense and can answer the analyst's research questions. (Krippendorff 2004, 24)

In his conceptualisation of Content Analysis, Krippendorff (2004) also highlights six elaborate on six features of texts that are relevant to our definition of applying content analysis as a technique. The first is that the text does not have meaning by itself. Instead, it is an instrument inviting for reading, as “a text does not exist without a reader, a message does not exist without an interpreter” (Krippendorff 2004, 22). Therefore, from the texts, messages and data will only be visible when someone interacts with it. Second, is that texts do not have one exclusive meaning, so different researchers must run the analysis. The third feature is that “the meanings invoked by texts need not be shared” (Krippendorff 2004, 23), can be understood that the purpose of a Content Analysis should investigate a deeper and exceptional level of understanding. A fourth feature is related to see in the meaning/content more than what is just written, but the responses that it can cause to the reader – change of thinking, feelings, behaviours, “the conceptions and actions the texts encourage” (Krippendorff 2004, 23). Fifth, texts are relative to particular contexts which the content analysis must be aware since varying messages. As explains the scholar, “once content analysts have chosen the context within which they intend to make sense of a given text, the diversity of interpretations may well be reduced to a manageable number, sometimes to one” (Krippendorff 2004, 23). Furthermore, the last comes the drawing specific inferences from the body of texts. In Krippendorff's view:

[...] content analysts infer answers to particular research questions from their texts. Their inferences are merely more systematic, explicitly informed, and (ideally) verifiable

than what ordinary readers do with texts. Recognizing this apparent generality, our definition of content analysis makes the drawing of inferences the centrepiece of this research technique. (Krippendorff 2004, 25).

Similar to Krippendorff, for Bardin (2011), there are different phases of Content Analysis which are organised around points or steps. Bardin, who has long experience in applying Content Analysis in psycho-sociological research and mass communications studies, proposes three: (a) the pre-analysis, (b) the exploitation of the material, and, finally, (c) the treatment of results: inference and interpretation (2011, 121). The pre-analysis, first phase the Content Analysis organisation aims at systematisation so the analyst can conduct the successive analysis operations. In an initial plan, the mission of this first phase is, besides the choice of documents to be submitted for analysis, the formulation of hypotheses for the elaboration of indicators, in preparation for the final interpretation.

The subject of analysis aligned with the objectives of the research and indications raised from the researcher's contact with the object studied (Bardin 2011). Concerning the manifest (or explicit) content, it is the first step only considering the content as it is manifested and not *speaking through* (or implicit). However, it is often heard that what is written is not always what the speaker meant. As well, as what is written has an implicit intention and the researcher comes to the crossroads where the meanings are expressed with clarity; where objectivity ends, and the symbolic begins. For the qualitative researcher, such a moment has utmost importance, and where the balance and the coherent research design can face denial or misunderstanding of human subjectivity or, on the other hand, fall for the imposition of the researcher's values. In any case, these extremisms should be avoided, not reissuing the false conflict between quantitative and qualitative methods, but instead considering them as complementary.

The evidence of the units of thematic analysis, which are cut-outs of the text, is achieved according to a dynamic and inductive process that requires constant attention in considering the explicit messages and sometimes non-apparent meanings. What can represent a difficulty at this point, is related to outline with absolute transparency the reasons

for choosing one or another fragment without taking into consideration that the relationship process between the researcher and the researched material is in an intense interdependence. For this purpose, the objectives of the work and the theories are used first guides, but it is not possible to abstain from the use the analyst's cognitive and intuitive resources – the background of the researcher as points Krippendorff – that often transcend the postulated questions and are necessary for such analysis. Nevertheless, it is possible to affirm that the choice for one or another thematic unit is a conjunction of interdependence between the objectives of the study, the explanatory theories adopted by the researcher and, why not say, the own intuitive personal theories of the researcher – always that coherent and justifiable.

In this way, the Content Analysis should not be extremely tied to the text nor to the technique, which impairs the creativity and the intuitive ability of the researcher, nor can be so subjective, leading to impose their own ideas or values, in which the text starts to function merely as confirmatory of these. Another critical point still within the contents, and that these tend to be valued as they are interpreted, considering the social and historical context conditions under which they were produced.

The figure of the content analyst is significant, and Krippendorff (2004) dedicates an entire chapter to explain the abilities the coders – as the author commonly calls the researchers working with Content Analysis. For him, it is essential for the researchers involved in processes to have the proper background, a part of being capable of understanding and following the rules “consistently throughout an analysis” (Krippendorff 2004, 127). And the alerts, in case of researchers would naively choose Content Analysis thinking it is simple:

Recording is a highly repetitive analytical task that requires strenuous attention to details. Not everyone is capable of maintaining consistency under these conditions. (Krippendorff 2004, 127)

Literacy is another sense of understanding that coders must rely on in order to carry on a reliable Content Analysis throughout its first steps to the inference point. The familiarity of the researcher with the object, “similar histories of involvement with texts, similar education,

and similar social sensitivities” (Krippendorff 2004, 128) is what completes the requirements for a proper research result.

The two requirements that categories should be *exclusive* and *exhaustive*, making sure they do not overlap, because for Krippendorff “coders must be able to conceptualise clearly what they read” and data must “represent all recording units, without exception” (2004, 132). According to Lynch and Peer (2002), the categories build in a Content Analysis design may be balanced enough act between having a too-short set of categories that can produce problems in coding, and having too many and not necessary that can confuse.

As a component of a Content Analysis, there is the process of development of a codebook. The book serves as the guide to the ones that will be applying it to analyse texts. According to Krippendorff (2004), the codebook must be organised and written clearly and objectively, with all the recording instructions, detailed to a level to make it understandable for someone who did not participate in the recording construction, which for the author is the ideal situation.

After considering the features of the texts, the orientation about the categorisation and data organisation, as well the qualification for the researchers using Content Analysis, the next topic to complete this methodological perspective goes down to the centre of interest of this investigation in looking for political-ideological marks in the press content. In this way, Tower Sargent (2009) – conscious about where ideologies are present and how they manifest – connects the word units and the primary point of this research:

[...] how do we identify an ideology? The most obvious way is through particular words that are associated with the ideology. [...] Most ideologies use such words, and a major clue to changes in an ideology is disagreements over, or changes in, such words. (Tower Sargent 2009, 2)

Even though the use of specific words composes the marks of political ideologies on a written piece, but it not restricted to it. Meaning, for example, the high occurrence of the word *anarchism* in an article or group of articles analysed does not infer that the tone of the content as a whole, or the position of the articles, is pro-anarchism, because, in opposition, it can be against and represents an influential critic to it.

Thus, it is necessary to consider the analysis in textual units, justified by Krippendorff where “context units are units of textual matter that set limits on the information to be considered in the description of recording units” (Krippendorff 2004, 101).

The efforts to structure a study of ideology in the media offering a replicable methodological proposal have been lacking, coming upon problems regarding objectivity or not meeting the possibilities to at least adapt it for different political contexts. This research aims to contribute to the systematisation of the study of ideology in the media by suggesting an alternative method to analyse political ideologies in media texts through Content Analysis, handing quantitative as well as qualitative results. The objective is to offer a method which is replicable and offers possibilities to qualitatively analyse media written content according to the researcher necessity and context, by adapting the code sheet used proposed in this thesis.

The literature compiled shows researchers addressing three main problems when trying to build a catalogue of political ideologies to categorise media outlets. First, classical ideological categories have different meanings for different societies. By way of example, the same word *liberal* means ‘progressive’ in the United States, ‘centre-winged’ in the United Kingdom, and ‘centre-right-wing’ but also ‘progressive’ in Brazil. Second, ideologies are in permanent evolution and do not represent homogeneous sets of beliefs. For example, *socialists* traditionally endorsed radical democracy – with high degrees of popular participation and the desire to bring economic life under public control –, however, many modern social democrats are firmly committed to structures of market capitalism. Third, new sets of beliefs have been added to the classical ones. Heywood (2012), for instance, includes feminists, ecologists, multiculturalists and religious fundamentalists. Which, in its turn, are not only homogeneous either, but structurally overlapping with some classical ideologies.

Therefore, it is in the journalistic discourse that the marks of political-ideological positions can be found. The intention with this process of treating the material for analysis is vital to lead to the objective of discovering how newspapers refer to the political-ideological spectrum and how they position themselves when facing key

themes – defined a priori under news section also pre-defined to be used in this project. The complete explanation about the structure of the methodological proposal built and the research design is the next section.

5.2 Method

5.2.1 Quantitative approach

Thus, trying to build a catalogue of ideologies to classify the media according to classical labels may fail by reproducing cultural biases, and end up with an impractical or overlapping list of ideologies and categories. Therefore, the suggestion in this model is to focus on a reduced set of four universal values (*individualism, communitarianism, egalitarianism* and *elitism*) and to categorise the media outlets according to them. These values follow the main categories and theme cores of political ideologies without being constrained by them. The model is based on an adapted version of Douglas and Wildavsky's (1982) worldviews labelling the media as *elitist, egalitarian, individualist* or *communitarian* – or a combination of these).

Briefly explaining, Mary Douglas, as an anthropologist, started to develop the grid/group model at the beginning of the 50s as a result of her intentions to elaborate a theoretical mechanism that could be useful to compare different societies and how best classify it. After the publication of her PhD in Oxford about matrilineal *Lele* people in Congo, she worked intensely in the ideal of the social expression of the classification system, which Douglas calls the *grid dimension*, on the one hand, and the type of pressure exerted by people along with group life and called *group dimension*.

In collaboration with Aaron Wildavsky, the model was reformulated several times, along with the studies adopting the method and the feedbacks of its uses. In 1990, Wildavsky included the Grid/Group theory when publishing the book *Culture Theory*, with

Michael Thompson and Richard Ellis. With two-axis, the diagram proposed by Douglas and Wildavsky, it is possible to obtain a map that allows to place, in a related way and following the same essential criteria, the social organizations and worldviews that are put in comparison (Wuthnow 1981; Mamadouh 1999; Wuthnow *et al.* 2009). The first version of the cultural map of grid and group generated by the authors was not definitive and, in later texts, also with contributions from other scholars, and it suffered modifications and adaptations.

The Grid-group Cultural Theory is a model of analysis of the cultural preferences of individuals and the social context in which they are immersed (Thompson, Grendstad and Selle 2005). The terms “refer to two dimensions of sociality which structure that map” and these dimensions “are constructed which are claimed to be able to account for cultural diversity in the most parsimonious way possible” (Mamadouh 1999, 396). Mamadouh, when writing one of the most consistently analytical article about the grid/group cultural theory, affirms that it exists and can be applied in in two forms: a “soft” as a theoretical framework, or a “hard” version as a “full explanatory theory” (Mamadouh 1999, 396). Also, making possible the distinction in mainly three analytical levels: relations, biases and behaviours.

According Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) and Wildavsky and Dake (1990) it is possible to formulate a proposal following the two social dimensions arguing that any social unit (group, organisation, society) can be thought of in terms of two kinds of societal controls: incorporation within bounded social groups (group), and constraint by externally imposed rules (grid).

1. *Structure (grid)*: indicates the spread and coherence of the structure of norms and values, that is, the classification system in its social dimension, which manifests itself mainly in social roles. It can be described as a scale from public to private, passing through zero, which is the absence of structure.
2. *Incorporation (group)*: the degree of relationship between the group and the individual, in its social dimension. It can be defined as a scale from strong to weak. Incorporation refers to the integration of the individual into the group; it can be strong, where the group presses according to the type and amount of

interactions, or weak, where the individual has no ties with the group.

These dimensions, according to Schwarz and Thompson address “two central and eternal questions of human existence: ‘who am I?’ and ‘how should I behave?’” (1990, 6).

The adaption of the cultural grid/group map for the present research is the result of an analysis which includes the core themes and categories of the sets of political ideologies proposed by the authors consulted – but not restricted to them – and the working procedure is fully explained in the next section. The format step-by-step was chosen in order to rationalise the sequence of thought until reaching the labels proposed.

5.2.1.1 Step by step method construction

Step 1: Deconstruct political ideologies

From the literature review, the work done identified the most widely accepted old and new political ideologies from their core frames and the ideological markers or critical issues embedded in the core frames. The aim was to build on the productive theoretical scholarly work conducted mostly in political science, to gather a comprehensive source of ideas.

For this purpose, the set of political ideologies organised by Heywood (2012) was considered suitable. On the one hand, this choice is justified by the author’s scope of selection, which includes both a balanced combination of major ideological traditions – shared by most outstanding political scientists – and, more recently, recognised ideologies accounting for the increased complexity of political concepts in the contemporary world. On the other hand, Heywood’s selection is convenient because it considers and emphasises the intersectional points between political ideologies, observing the blurred lines between some of them. Finally, Heywood’s regular review and update of the most representative set of political ideologies over thirty years of research makes his set a widely recognised proposal.

From this set, the aspects that may be more easily traceable in the press output were chosen and added a political ideology which was missing in his categorisation. As a result, the model includes the traditional political ideologies of: *liberalism*, *conservatism*, *socialism*, *anarchism*, *nationalism* and *fascism*, as well as new systems of thought like *feminism*, *ecologism*, *religiousfundamentalism*, *multiculturalism* and *speciesism* – the latter being an add-on that complements Heywood’s humanistic-liberal bias. At the same time, this approach agrees with Schwarzmantel (1998), who considers it necessary to understand political ideologies and their transformations to handle the diversity of political ideas over time.

Following Heywood, this work agrees with the fact that for each political ideology it is possible to identify several *core themes* or *core frames*, since “ideologies seek to prioritise certain values over others and to invest legitimacy in particular theories or sets of meanings” (2012, 15). Thus, each political ideology structures its mental map to explain the social world. These core themes or values are the elements that appear in the political discourse and differentiate each political ideology, thus working as the analytical categories that feed our model. As explained by Van Dijk, “discourses make ideologies observable in the sense that it is only in discourse that they may be explicitly expressed and formulated” (2005, 732). The core themes of political ideologies are the analytical construct that enables us to observe the expression and formulation of ideological stances in the press.

Recalling the idea that ideologies are understood as belief systems socially shared by members and that mostly operate through discourse, it is used the core themes for each ideology, and each is in the sequence disaggregated into a more extensive list of key issues aligned with each ideological frame. These key issues work as specific markers that are easily traceable in the press discourse. Accordingly, they are called *ideological markers*. These markers work as the empirical concretion of the core frames that underlie each political ideology, as summarised in Table 5 below. The selection of terms included in the column “ideological markers” is extracted from the description of each political ideology found in the specialised literature.

Table 5: Political Ideologies, Core Frames, and Ideological Markers.

Political Ideology ¹	Core Frames ²	Ideological Markers ³
Anarchism	anti-clericalism, anti-statism, economic freedom, utopianism	chaos and disorder, direct action, free, autonomous human beings, natural social order, no economic control, no management, no political authority, no regulation, perfect society, radicalism, respect, social solidarity, stateless society, unnecessary state, unregulated market economy, voluntary agreement
Conservatism	authority, hierarchy, human imperfection, organic society, tradition, property	common morality, faith in God, family traditions, family values, functionalism, guidance for social actions, hierarchical society, individual tendency for corruption, national identity, national loyalty, paternalism, pragmatism, search for security, social gradation, social justice, social obligations, social order, social principles, state authority, strong criminal regime, strong government, traditional mores, traditional practices

Ecologism	conservation, ecology, environmental ethics, holism, sustainability	air pollution, biodiversity, climate change, ecological balance, ecosystems, environmental organisations, environmental protection, global warming, natural disasters caused by human interventions, natural resources, non-human life, preservation, renewable sources, restoration and/or improvement of the natural environment, social balance and harmony, soil and water pollution, sustainable growth, waste management
Fascism	anti-rationalism, elitism, leadership, state socialism, struggle, ultra-nationalism	anti-capitalist, anti-communist, anti-conservative, anti-immigration, anti-intellectualism, anti-liberal, authority, commitment and faith, competition natural for human progress, corporatism, duty, heroism, honour, patriarchy, power, progress, self-sacrifice, state worship
Feminism	equality and difference, redefining 'the political', patriarchy, sex and gender	abortion, anti sex oppression, anti-subordination, body autonomy and integrity, child sexual abuse, deconstructing gender identities, equal opportunities, equal rights within marriage, female sexual autonomy, gender equality, gender violence, human rights, LGBT movements, male dominance, maternity leave, male privileges, patriarchy, patriarchy dictatorship, prejudice against women, rape, reproductive rights, sex reassignment surgery, sexual division of labour, sorority, women's emancipation, women's oppression, women's rights

Liberalism	freedom, individualism, justice, reason, tolerance	autonomous associations, autonomy, civil liberty, constitutional rules, defined state role (domestic order and diplomatic/external relations protection), economic liberalism, electoral democracy (competitive elections), free market, free trade, independent trade unions, laissez-faire, limited government, majoritarianism, meritocracy, minimal state, personal development, private property, self-realisation
Multiculturalism	culture and identity, diversity, minority rights, politics of recognition	affirmative action, citizenship, collective identity, communitarianism, diversity within unity, equality of opportunity, ethnic politics, ethnic and cultural nationalism, formal equality, group self-determination, growing cultural diversity, identity politics, multicultural public policies, particular group needs, political liberation, politics of recognition, politics of rights, right of minority groups
Nationalism	culturalism, organic community, self-determination, the nation	chauvinism, cultural identification, cultural unity, ethnicity, general will, imperialism, militarism, nation-state, national spirit, patriotism, racialism, separatism, shared values and traditions, xenophobia

Religious Fundamentalism	anti-modernism, fundamentalist impulse, militancy, religion as politics	body of unchangeable principles, human world as divine project, orthodoxy, political position according to religious hierarchy, rejection of public-private division, religious-political project, religious organising principles, religious personal conduct, religious totalitarianism, religious traditions, social regeneration, theocracy
Socialism	class politics, community, common ownership (collectivisation), cooperation, equality (egalitarianism)	capital accumulation, collective activity, cooperative ownership, economic bubbles, economic efficiency, financial industry, fraternity, importance of social bonds, material inequalities, nationalisation, non-productive industries (use-value), progressive taxation, public ownership, social classes, social democracy, social justice, social revolution, wealth distribution, working class
Speciesism	anthropocentrism, human-animal dualism, human-centrism, human exceptionalism/supremacism	animal activists framed as radicals, terrorists, extremists; humans exploiting other animals framed as care providers, animal lovers, victims, conservationists; human use of other animals framed as normal, natural, equated to progress, needed for economic growth, human health and ecological balance; other species framed as commodified or objectified, dependence of humans, less able, dangerous, a problem; suppression of the animal's perspective, of the impact on the environment of animal exploitation, of the intersections with other forms of oppression

¹ Source: Schena, Almiron and Pineda 2018, 33-35.
² Set of political ideologies and core frames by Heywood (2012) except speciesism (Nibert, 2002; Singer, 2003; Weitzenfeld & Joy, 2014).
³ Ideological markers for each political ideology organised based on Eatwell & Wright (1993), Schwarzmantel (1998), Eccleshall *et al.* (2003), Tower Sargent (2009), Vincent (2010), Heywood (2012), Freedon, Tower Sargent & Stears (2013), Ball, Dagger & O'Neill (2014) and Almiron, Cole & Freeman (2016).

Following the alphabetical order of ideologies (as presented in the table 5 above), it is possible to see that *anarchism* is embodied with the core frames of anti-statism, utopianism, anti-clericalism, and economic freedom. This ideology, representing one of the worldviews with greatest critical contestation (Vincent 2010), synthesises the rejection of state power at all levels through the anti-statist theme, and specially its instance of authority. It is characterised by the ideal of a society without any form of subordination to power and coercion by any group over another or over anyone (Tower Sargent 2009). Based on the same idea, the rejection of the power held by the church explains the anti-clericalism value. The ideological marker terms proposed for anarchism are closely related to the denial of these power instances. Particularly, the economic vision of anarchists is one cluster that is somewhat of a misfit because, even though it envisions economic freedom, anarchism took different approaches related to an economic proposal both on the far left and the far right of the political spectrum. Anarchism also appears in variations combining different views of other political ideologies, and forming derivative denominations such as collectivist anarchism, anarcho-communism, or anarcho-syndicalism (Franks 2013).

Tradition, human imperfection, organic society, hierarchy and authority, and property are the core frames or themes for *conservatism*. For this classical political ideology, dating from the fourteenth century, tradition represents “keeping something intact” (Vincent 2010, 56). Vincent (2010) points out that the use of the term as a simplification of conserving is inappropriate and unhelpful to its comprehension. Tradition is framed here as respect for the previous generations and their social contribution. Even though conservatism has religious roots,

some versions of conservatism have lost the argumentation about divine origins throughout history. Contrary to liberalism, conservatism frames the human nature as limited (human imperfection), vulnerable and morally imperfect, hence justifying the importance of a superior social order representing security for the group (O’Sullivan 1993). Consequently, the ideological markers of this political ideology give importance to the construction of an organic society maintained by the role of each component. To provide such social stability, hierarchy and authority are frequently used terms. “Social equality is therefore rejected as undesirable and unachievable; power, status and property are always unequally distributed” as explained by Heywood (2012, 75). Finally, property ownership is reinforced in conservatism as a positive ideal and an action to be encouraged —also as a value to be pursued in order to support the structure for hierarchy and authority.

Newer among the political ideologies set, *ecologism* is framed by ideas like ecology, holism, sustainability, environmental ethics, and the “from having to being” concept. Ecology is the main core frame because it represents the understanding of living organisms in relation to other organisms and the environment. The ideological markers point at seeking balanced ecosystems and humans being responsible for this endeavour. It provides a less anthropocentric vision about the place of humans on Earth, which represents an “ethical challenge in contemporary political life” (Kenny 2003, 152). Connected to ecology, holism is a core value oriented to see the natural world (the ecosphere) as “an interrelated system” (Vincent 2010). Sustainability is a term used to frame the human responsibility for a non-exploitative attitude and, complementary to it, environmental ethics as an orientation to an ethical system where humans are still privileged, but hold a greater concern for the destruction produced by the anthropocentric dominant view. The “from having to being” concept is concerned with the limited availability of natural resources, and embeds a strong critique of materialism and consumerism (Ball, Dagger & O’Neil 2014).

Fascism is described through the core frames of anti-rationalism, struggle, leadership and elitism, (state) socialism, and ultra-nationalism. Anti-rationalism is one of the main values of the fascist political project, and refers to the will to impulse social action on the one hand, and deny

the importance of intellectualism, on the other. The notion of struggle finds its inspiration in “martial values: loyalty, duty, obedience and self-sacrifice” (Heywood 2012, 205) which complements anti-rationalism view and leads to a Darwinist-inspired sense of competition. Neglecting equality, fascism promotes elitism and the need for an absolute “supreme leader” (Ball, Dagger & O’Neil 2014, 199). The socialist element is oriented to build a strong nation above all, referring to social unity and also to economics. The ultra-nationalism value is explained by an ultimate, even fanatic, sense of national unity frequently expressed in the “us vs. them” dichotomy, and consequently “them as enemies” (Wilford 2003, 121). It is important to point out that extreme political projects arose from the ultra-nationalist Fascist model, Nazism being a well-known case.

Included in the group of new political ideologies, *feminism* has the idea of redefining ‘the political’, patriarchy, sex and gender, equality and difference as core frames. The main claim of the feminist proposal is a new understanding of public and private politics that redefines ‘the political’. The rationale behind this is that the private sphere is highly influenced by a dominant political programme in which women are ignored, excluded or given a secondary role in all major ideologies (Ball, Dagger & O’Neill 2014, 246). Patriarchy, in turn, defines men’s superior power in relation to women, negatively framing sex dominance (men over women) deeply rooted in family and religious traditions. The traditional justification of “natural” gender division is also denied in the feminist political-ideological scheme. It re-establishes the notions of sex and gender: the first is understood as given biological characteristics, and the second as a social and political construct (Bryson 1993, 199). Feminism has different projects according to variations in the understanding of certain values, equality and difference being amongst the main causes of splitting within feminist groups. It can basically be understood as the pursuit of political and economic equality regarding representation, rights and power, and also the desire to “liberate women from difference” (Heywood 2012, 236).

For *liberalism*, the core frames proposed are individualism, freedom, reason, justice, and tolerance. Inspired by the Enlightenment, the notion of the individual provides a "conception of human beings as

fundamentally rational individuals” (Ball, Dagger & O’Neil 2014, 45) and refers to personal autonomy and the importance of human nature over the social group, although maintaining moral truth as the ideal guidance. Freedom, in turn, refers to the practice of individual freedom of choice, “the choice of where to live, for whom to work, what to buy and so on” (Heywood 2012, 29). The ideological markers related to freedom embrace the hard core of liberalism. Reason is also part of the Enlightenment project and it represents the trust in human capacity to understand the world, and make it evolve devoid of religious views (Vincent 2010). As to justice, it has its markers connected to the notion of individualism, each human being born equal (moral worth) or rights being applied without discrimination (by gender, class, religion, etc.). And lastly, by suggesting balance between the role of individuals and the idea of freedom, tolerance is an important value for liberalism in order to support pluralism.

The core themes of *multiculturalism* are the politics of recognition, culture and identity, minority rights and diversity. With its origins in Canada, multiculturalism emerges mainly concerned with the rights of minority groups. This political ideology has blurred lines with the major political worldviews, but by means of the politics of recognition it claims legal and political rights for marginalised cultural groups. Culture and identity are the elements that identify and organise social group tenacity. Culture for multiculturalists is “the core feature of personal and social identity” and the tool used for “strengthening their [people’s] sense of cultural belonging” (Heywood 2012, 318). When considering minority groups, the ideological markers are related to promoting minority rights. On diversity, multiculturalism approximates to nationalism on the shared understanding of “capacity of culture to generate social and political cohesion” (Heywood 2012, 323).

One of the oldest and most powerful forces in politics is *nationalism*, rooted in the thirteenth century. It is oriented by the core frames of nation, organic community, self-determination, and culturalism. As its name suggests, the nation is “the central principle of political organisation” (Heywood 2012, 173) for the nationalist project. Shared language, religion and history are the elements that compose the group’s identity, and the ideological markers are oriented to affirm

identity as primordial for civic order, leading to an organic community. Culturalism, in turn, is connected to the traditions shared by a group as part of their identity, but without surpassing the supreme importance the nation has in this worldview. Self-determination is understood within nationalism as the ideal of common will or “the right to form their own state based on the integrity of their putative nation and to be free from the interference of others” (Finlayson 2003, 100).

Religious fundamentalism is characterised by religions and politics, the fundamentalist impulse, anti-modernism and militancy. The nature of this ideology is the notion of parity between politics and religion. It means that a social group that shares a religious fundamentalist political ideology is organised by belief in a divine or transcendent element, and by the social practices and instances being normalised. The distribution of power in a religious fundamentalist society is also given by a “supreme being” (Heywood 2012, 284). The fundamentalist impulse is understood in the sense of “keeping faith with the original or classical ideas” – in this regard, all political ideologies “contain certain elements of fundamentalism” (Heywood 2012, 287). The anti-modernism value implies that some overlaps occurs with conservatism, regarding its shared notion of non-sympathy for modern ideas. Lastly, a distinctive value of religious fundamentalism is the encouragement towards militancy and commitment attributed to the members, an attitude that sometimes causes conflicts with other religious or non-religious projects. It is important to remark that fundamentalism is not restricted to Islamism, as it is commonly portrayed; on the contrary, there are different religions oriented by this political-ideological scheme.

Socialism, which derives from the Latin word *sociare*, has community, cooperation, equality, class politics and common ownership as core frames. The idea of community is understood as the “implication of the communal and fellowship understanding of the word ‘social’” and offers an idea of unified human beings (Vincent 2010, 83) embodying a collective effort to build and organise society in a fraternal way. Cooperation represents this desirable collective engagement by means of which social bonds, instead of competition, are developed (Geoghegan 2003). Social and economic equality is the value that gives distinctiveness to socialism, and it represents the basis

for justice in opposition to the capitalist project of competition and selfish behaviour. Important ideological markers for studying traces of socialist leanings on media content are the ones oriented to the idea of common ownership as a means to achieve equality and redistribution. Redistribution in this case is implemented by the state – the organisation that holds the power to organise the collective and to prevent conflict and instabilities emerging from inequalities (Ball, Dagger & O’Neill 2014). Lastly, class politics positively frames the representation of unifying class action by mutual identification. This last core frame lost its importance by “consequence of deindustrialisation” and specially because of the narrowing of divisions between classes (Heywood, 2012, 107).

Finally, the core frames of *speciesism* that have been selected for our model are anthropocentrism, human-animal dualism, human-centrism, and human exceptionalism or supremacism. The main frames of this ideology are related to the denial of any moral consideration to individuals that are not human, and therefore considered inferior. Speciesist anthropocentrism has largely benefited human beings (Nibert 2003) and denies any need to change how humans treat individuals from other species. This treatment obviously produces huge suffering in billions of non-human animals but also a long list of negative impacts on human society and the environment that are at the roots of current capitalist big failures (Best 2014). To identify speciesism in the press, the suggestion as ideological markers depictions that negatively frame animal activists, that positively frame humans exploiting animals and the exploitation of other animals in general, that forget about non-human animals’ interests and objectify them and represent them as dependent on humans (Almiron, Cole & Freeman 2016).

Step 2: Identify what distinguishes political ideologies

From the previous set of political ideologies, the next task was to identify the most relevant opposed/binary *core values* emerging from them, as expressed bellow on Table 6. The aim was to gather the core issues distinguishing ideologies. The list includes the main elements

highlighted from the authors in the literature review as contrasting amongst ideologies.

Table 6: Opposed core values in political ideologies.

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hierarchical views <i>vs.</i> Egalitarian views 2. Authority viewed positively <i>vs.</i> Authority viewed negatively 3. Freedom as an individualistic value <i>vs.</i> Other conceptions of freedom 4. Democracy ‘from above’ <i>vs.</i> Democracy ‘from below’ 5. State viewed positively <i>vs.</i> State viewed negatively 6. Economy for the individual <i>vs.</i> Economy for the community 7. Society viewed within the egalitarian-elitist framework <i>vs.</i> Society viewed within the individualist-collectivist framework 8. Nation viewed positively <i>vs.</i> Nation viewed negatively 9. Gender viewed as a division <i>vs.</i> Gender not viewed as a division 10. Religion viewed positively <i>vs.</i> Religion viewed negatively 11. Culture viewed positively <i>vs.</i> Culture viewed negatively 12. History as progress <i>vs.</i> History as absence of progress 13. Human-centred view of nature <i>vs.</i> Non-human-centred view of nature 14. Self-centred view of human nature <i>vs.</i> Non-self-centred view of human nature
<p>Source: Schena, Almiron and Pineda 2018, 36; drawing mainly from Heywood’s core themes (2012), and refined with the literature review (Eatwell & Wright 1993, Schwarzmantel 1998, Nibert 2002, Singer 2003, Eccleshall <i>et al.</i> 2003, Tower Sargent 2009, Vincent 2010, Freedon, Tower Sargent & Stears 2013, Ball, Dagger & O’Neill 2014, Weizenfeld & Joy 2014, Almiron, Cole & Freeman 2016).</p>

Step 3. Classify core themes within the opposed core values

For each set of opposed core values, different categories or core themes are listed (Table 7) considering that the coder may effectively find in the news. Although these categories aim to be comprehensive, they should be taken as a reference to identify the value under assessment.

Table 7: Main core themes by opposed core values.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hierarchical view 1.1. Natural inequality 1.2. Social inequality 1.3. Political inequality 1.4. Gender inequality 1.5. Speciesist inequality 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Egalitarian view 1.6. Natural egalitarianism 1.7. Social egalitarianism 1.8. Political egalitarianism 1.9. Gender egalitarianism 1.10. Non-speciesist egalitarianism
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Authority viewed positively 2.1. Authority from below 2.2. Authority from above 2.3. Authoritarian charismatic leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Authority viewed negatively 2.4. Authority as oppression
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Freedom as an individualistic value 3.1. Positive freedom 3.2. Negative freedom 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Other conceptions of freedom 3.3. Communitarian/collectivist freedom 3.4. Inner freedom 3.5. Absence of individual freedom
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Democracy ‘from above’ 4.1. Elitist democracy 4.2. Authoritarian democracy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Democracy ‘from below’ 4.3. Participatory democracy 4.4. Radical democracy
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5. State viewed positively 5.1. State as a guarantee of social order 5.2. State as the embodiment of the common good and social welfare 5.3. Authoritarian state 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5. State viewed negatively 5.4. Ruling class state 5.5. Patriarchal state 5.6. State as evil
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Economy for individuals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Economy for the community

<p>6.1. Restricted capitalist economy</p> <p>6.2. Unrestricted capitalist economy</p> <p>6.3. Corporatist economy</p>	<p>6.4. Community economy</p> <p>6.5. Green economy</p>
<p>7. Society viewed within the egalitarian-hierarchy framework</p> <p>7.1. Classist society</p> <p>7.2. Patriarchal society</p> <p>7.3. Plural society</p> <p>7.4. Non-plural society</p>	<p>7. Society viewed within the individualist-communitarian framework</p> <p>7.5. Private society</p> <p>7.6. Public society</p> <p>7.7. Natural society</p>
<p>8. Nation viewed positively</p> <p>8.1. Nations as moral entities</p> <p>8.2. Nations as sources of cohesion</p> <p>8.3. Nations as the source of meaning</p> <p>8.4. Nations as religious entities</p>	<p>8. Nation viewed negatively</p> <p>8.5. Nations as artificial divisions</p> <p>8.6. Nations as tools of oppression</p>
<p>9. Gender viewed as a division</p> <p>9.1. Gender as a positive division</p> <p>9.2. Gender as a negative division</p>	<p>9. Gender not viewed as a division</p> <p>9.3. Gender as irrelevant</p>
<p>10. Religion viewed positively</p> <p>10.1. Religion as a civil right</p> <p>10.1. Religion as a source of cohesion</p> <p>10.3. Religion as essential</p>	<p>10. Religion viewed negatively</p> <p>10.4. Religion as a distraction</p> <p>10.5. Religion as oppression</p> <p>10.6. Religion as a competitor</p>
<p>11. Culture viewed positively</p> <p>11.1. High culture as a source of self-development</p> <p>11.2. Traditions as a source of cohesion</p>	<p>11. Culture viewed negatively</p> <p>11.5. Culture as part of the political superstructure</p> <p>11.6. Culture as a reflection on gender inequality</p>

11.3. Organic monoculture as a distinctive trait 11.4. Multiculturalism as a source of social cohesion	
12. History as progress 12.1. History as progress 12.2. History as tradition	12. History as no progress 12.3. History as decay
13. Human-centred view of nature 13.1. Capitalist view of nature 13.2. Conservative view of nature 13.3. Nature as a model 13.4. Idyllic view of nature 13.5. Holistic view of nature 13.6. Divine view of nature	13. Non-human-centred view of nature 13.7. Non-speciesist view of nature
14. Self-centred view of human nature 14.1. Humans as unique individuals 14.2. Humans as social creatures 14.3. Humans as part of the ecosystem	14. Non-self-centred view of human nature 14.4. Non-speciesist view of human nature
Source: Schena, Almiron and Pineda 2018, 37-38 drawing mainly from Heywood's core themes (2012), and refined with the literature review (Eatwell & Wright 1993, Schwarzmantel 1998, Nibert 2002, Singer 2003, Eccleshall <i>et al.</i> 2003, Tower Sargent 2009; Vincent 2010, Freeden, Tower Sargent & Stears 2013, Ball, Dagger & O'Neill 2014, Weizenfeld & Joy 2014, Almiron, Cole & Freeman 2016).	

The following (Table 8) are descriptions for categories with the objective to help coding each set of core values. The labels in brackets are set as a reference to check that all classical and new political ideologies are represented in the categories. However, they are not to

be used, since to define what category or categories do apply to is very controversial for the reasons explained previously.

Moreover, a 0 category is included, that coders can decide whether to code or not, since it is not a core value, but it might make sense to be analysed in case found in the texts when running the analysis.

Table 8: Informative descriptions for categories and its core values.

0. Current approaches to ideology

Approaches to ideology	<p>0.1. Ideology as repression: Ideology viewed as claiming monopoly of a truth (<i>liberals, conservatives</i>).</p> <p>0.2. Ideology as class power: Ideology as the creation of the ruling class (<i>socialists</i>).</p> <p>0.3 Ideology as super-ideology: All conventional political doctrines are considered part of a super-ideology of industrialism (<i>ecologists</i>) or of male domination (<i>feminists</i>).</p> <p>0.4. Ideology as dry systematisation: Ideology as a dry and intellectualised failed form of political understanding, based on mere reason rather than passion and the will (<i>fascists</i>).</p> <p>0.5. Ideology as religion: Ideology as the revealed word of God (<i>religious fundamentalists</i>).</p>
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1. Hierarchy vs. Equality

Hierarchical view	<p>1.1. Natural inegalitarianism: Society is viewed as naturally hierarchical and thus equality is dismissed as an abstract and unachievable goal (<i>conservatives</i>).</p> <p>1.2. Social inegalitarianism: Humankind is marked by radical inequality, both between leaders and followers and between the various</p>
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	<p>nations or races of the world (<i>nationalists, fascists</i>).</p> <p>1.3. Political inequality Political equality is not understood as an equal and/or absolute right to personal autonomy (<i>conservatives, nationalists, fascists, religious fundamentalists</i>).</p> <p>1.4. Gender inequality: Sexual equality is not understood as an equal right neither related to equal opportunities nor to social or economic power (<i>conservative, fascists, religious fundamentalists</i>).</p> <p>1.5. Speciesist inequality: Human species is viewed as innately superior to other species (<i>anarchists, conservatives, ecologists, fascists, feminists, liberals, multiculturalists, nationalists, religious fundamentalists, socialists</i>).</p>
Equality view	<p>1.6. Natural egalitarianism: Human beings are born equal in the sense they are of equal moral worth (<i>liberals</i>).</p> <p>1.7. Social egalitarianism: Social equality is a fundamental value, essential to ensuring social cohesion and fraternity, establishing justice or equity, and enlarging freedom in a positive sense (<i>socialists</i>).</p> <p>1.8. Political egalitarianism: Political equality is particularly important, understood as an equal and absolute right to personal autonomy, implying that all forms of political inequality amount to oppression (<i>anarchists</i>).</p> <p>1.9. Gender egalitarianism: Sexual equality means equal rights and equal opportunities (<i>liberal feminism</i>) or equal social or economic power (<i>socialist feminism</i>) irrespective of gender.</p>

	1.10. Non-speciesist egalitarianism: Non-human species are viewed as having equal moral interests than the human species (<i>non-speciesist</i>).
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2. Authority viewed positively vs. Authority viewed negatively

Authority (positive view)	<p>2.1. Authority from below: Authority arising from below is viewed as rational, purposeful and limited (legal-rational authority granting public accountability) (<i>liberals</i>).</p> <p>2.2. Authority from above: Authority arising from above is viewed as a natural necessity by virtue of the unequal distribution of experience, social position and wisdom. It fosters respect and loyalty and promotes social cohesion (<i>conservatives</i>).</p> <p>2.3. Authoritarian charismatic leadership: Authority viewed as a manifestation of personal leadership or charisma, a quality possessed by enlightened individuals (<i>fascists, religious fundamentalists</i>).</p>
Authority (negative view)	2.4. Authority as oppression: Authority viewed as implicitly oppressive and generally linked to the interest of the powerful and privileged (<i>socialists</i>), as unnecessary and destructive, equated to oppression and exploitation (<i>anarchists</i>).

3. Freedom as an individualistic value vs. Other conceptions of freedom

Freedom as an individualistic value	3.1. Positive freedom: Freedom as a supreme value which means self-mastery or self-realisation, the achievement of autonomy or the
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	<p>development of human capacities (<i>liberals, socialists, traditional conservatives</i>).</p> <p>3.2. Negative freedom: Freedom as an absolute value which means the absence of external restrictions or constraints on the individual, allowing freedom of choice within capitalism (<i>neoliberal conservatives, individualist anarchism: libertarians, anarcho-capitalists</i>).</p>
Other freedom	<p>3.3. Communitarian/Collectivist freedom: Negative freedom but rejecting capitalism and preference for the collective ownership of wealth, economic self-management, and the communal organisation of social life (<i>socialists, collectivist anarchism: mutualism, anarcho-syndicalism, anarcho-communism</i>).</p> <p>3.4. Inner freedom: The oneness or absorption of the personal ego into the ecosphere or universe (<i>ecologists</i>) or freedom as an inner or spiritual quality meaning conformity to the revealed will of God (<i>religious fundamentalists</i>).</p> <p>3.5. No individual freedom: True liberty means unquestioning submission to the will of the leader or the absorption of the individual into the national community (<i>fascists</i>).</p>

4. Democracy ‘from above’ vs. democracy ‘from below’

Democracy ‘from above’	<p>4.1. Elitist democracy: Democracy is viewed as a constraint against abuses of power with a particular concern on preventing majoritarian tyranny (<i>liberals</i>) and property and traditional institutions from the untutored will of ‘the many’ (<i>conservatives</i>).</p> <p>4.2. Authoritarian democracy: Genuine democracy is an absolute dictatorship where</p>
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	the leader monopolises ideological wisdom (<i>fascists</i>).
Democracy 'from below'	4.3. Participatory democracy: Democracy based on popular participation and the desire to bring economic life under public control (<i>socialists, ecologists</i>). 4.4. Radical democracy: Direct democracy, call for continuous popular participation and radical decentralisation (<i>anarchist, socialists, ecologists</i>).

5. State viewed as positive vs. State viewed as negative

State viewed as positive	5.1. State as a guarantee of social order: State as a neutral arbiter among the competing interests and groups in society (<i>liberals</i>) or linked to authority and discipline to protect society from chaos and disorder (<i>traditional conservatives</i>). 5.2. State as the embodiment of the common good and social welfare: State as a means of ameliorating class tensions (<i>socialists</i>). 5.3. Authoritarian State: State as a tool that serves the race, nation, religion (<i>fascists, nationalists, religious fundamentalists</i>).
State viewed as negative	5.4 Ruling Class State: The State is viewed as an instrument of class ruling (<i>Marxist socialists</i>). 5.5. Patriarchal State: State as an instrument of male power (<i>feminists</i>). 5.6. State as evil: State as an unnecessary evil (<i>anarchists, neoliberal conservatives</i>).

6. Economy for the individuals vs. Economy for the community

Economy for the individuals	<p>6.1. Restricted capitalist economy: Strong preference for a market economy based on individualistic property competition and material incentives but recognising the limitations of the market and thus accepting pragmatic, limited intervention/economic management (<i>liberals, traditional conservatives, social democrat socialists</i>).</p> <p>6.2. Unrestricted capitalist economy: Strong preference for a market economy favouring laissez-faire capitalism but not recognising the limitations of the market and thus rejecting any form of economic control or management (<i>neoliberal conservatives, libertarians, anarcho-capitalists</i>).</p> <p>6.3. Corporatist economy: Economy is organised into corporations and subordinate to the state, workers and employers are organised into industrial and professional corporations serving as organs of political representation (<i>fascists</i>).</p>
Economy for the community	<p>6.4. Community economy: Preference for a common ownership and absolute social equality (<i>Marxist socialists, anarcho-communists</i>).</p> <p>6.5. Green economy: Economics must be subordinate to ecology, and the drive for profit at any cost must be replaced by a concern with long-term sustainability and harmony between humankind and nature (<i>ecologists</i>).</p>

7. Society viewed within the egalitarian-hierarchy axis vs. society viewed within the individualistic-communitarian axis

Society viewed within the	7.1. Classist Society: Society understood in terms of unequal class power, economic and property divisions being deeper and more
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<p>egalitarian-hierarchy axis</p>	<p>genuine than any broader social bonds (<i>socialists</i>).</p> <p>7.2. Patriarchal society: Society seen in terms of patriarchy and an artificial division between the 'public' and 'private' (<i>feminists</i>).</p> <p>7.3. Plural society: Society seen as a mosaic of cultural groups, defined by their distinctive ethnic, religious or historical identities (<i>multiculturalists</i>).</p> <p>7.4. Non-plural society: Society is viewed in terms of cultural or ethnic distinctiveness (<i>nationalists</i>) or its membership is restricted to national or racial grounds (<i>fascists</i>).</p>
<p>Society viewed within the individualist-communitarian axis</p>	<p>7.5. Private society: Society as a collection of individuals (<i>liberals</i>).</p> <p>7.6. Public society: Society as an entity held by bonds of tradition, authority and a common morality (<i>conservatives</i>).</p> <p>7.7. Natural society: Society as an unregulated and natural harmony based on the natural human disposition towards cooperation and sociability of humans (<i>anarcho-communitarians</i>).</p>

8. Nation viewed as a positive tool vs. Nation viewed as a negative tool

<p>Nation as a positive tool</p>	<p>8.1. Nations as moral entities: Subscribe to a 'civic' view of the nation that places as much emphasis on political allegiance as on cultural unity, nations are moral entities in the sense that they are endowed with rights, notably an equal right to self-determination (<i>liberals</i>).</p> <p>8.2. Nations as sources of cohesion: The nation is regarded as an organic entity, bound together by a common ethnic and a shared history, it is</p>
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	<p>the most politically significant of social groups because it is the source of social cohesion and collective identity (<i>conservatives</i>).</p> <p>8.3. Nations as the source of meaning: The nation is an organically unified social whole which gives purpose and meaning to individual existence (<i>nationalists, fascists</i>).</p> <p>8.4. Nations as religious entities: Nations are communities of believers (<i>religious fundamentalists</i>)</p>
Nation as a negative tool	<p>8.5. Nations as artificial divisions: The nation is an artificial division whose purpose is to disguise social injustice and prop up the established order; political movements should therefore have an international, not a national, character (<i>socialists</i>).</p> <p>8.6. Nations as tools of oppression: The nation is tainted by its association with the state and therefore with oppression. The nation is thus seen as a myth, designed to promote obedience and subjugation in the interests of the ruling elite (<i>anarchists</i>).</p>

9. Gender viewed as a division vs. Gender not viewed as a division

Gender viewed as a division	<p>9.1. Gender as a positive division: Gender is one of the factors that gives society its organic and hierarchical character, sexual division of labour is natural and inevitable (<i>conservatives</i>), gender is a fundamental division within society (<i>fascists</i>) and a God-given division (<i>religious fundamentalists</i>).</p> <p>9.2. Gender as a negative division: Gender is a politically significant category, gender division usually reflects, and is sustained by deeper</p>
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	economic and class inequalities (<i>socialists</i>) or a manifestation of male power (<i>feminists</i>).
Gender not viewed as a division	9.3. Gender as irrelevant: Gender is not a politically significant category, differences between women and men are traditionally regarded as being of entirely private or personal significance, gender is as irrelevant as ethnicity or social class, individualism is ‘gender-blind’ (<i>liberals</i>).

10. Religion viewed positively vs. Religion viewed negatively

Religion viewed positively	<p>10.1. Religion as a civil right: Religion is a distinct ‘private’ matter linked to individual choice and personal development, religious freedom is thus essential to civil liberty and can only be guaranteed by strict division between religion and politics and between church and state (<i>liberals</i>).</p> <p>10.2. Religion as a source of cohesion: Religion is a valuable (perhaps essential) source of stability and social cohesion, as it provides society with a set of shared values and the bedrock of a common culture (<i>conservatives</i>).</p> <p>10.3. Religion as essential: Religion is a body of ‘essential’ and unchallengeable principles, which dictate not only personal conduct but also the organisation of social, economic and political life (<i>religious fundamentalists</i>).</p>
Religion viewed negatively	10.4. Religion as a distraction: Religion is portrayed as a diversion from the political struggle (<i>socialists</i>).

	<p>10.5. Religion as oppression: Religion is portrayed as a form of ruling-class ideology (<i>Marxists socialists</i>) or an institutionalised source of oppression (<i>anarchists</i>).</p> <p>10.6. Religion as a competitor: Religion is viewed as a rival source of allegiance or belief (<i>fascists</i>).</p>
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11. Culture viewed positively vs. Culture viewed negatively

<p>Culture viewed positively</p>	<p>11.1. ‘High’ culture as a source of self-development: Culture, particularly ‘high’ culture (arts and literature) not popular culture, is viewed as a manifestation of, and stimulus to, individual self-development, so it is valued only when it promotes intellectual development (<i>liberals</i>).</p> <p>11.2. ‘Traditions’ as a source of cohesion: Culture is very beneficial because it strengthens social cohesion and political unity, and culture is strongest when it overlaps with tradition (<i>conservatives</i>).</p> <p>11.3. ‘Organic’ monoculture as a distinctive trait: Organic culture, which embodies the spirit or essence of a people, often grounded in blood is considered of profound importance in preserving a distinctive national or racial identity and in generating a unifying political will which promotes monoculturalism (<i>fascists</i>).</p> <p>11.4. Multiculturalism as a source of social cohesion: Culture is the core feature of personal</p>
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	and social identity, giving people an orientation in the world and strengthening their sense of cultural belonging. Different cultural groups can live peacefully and harmoniously within the same society because the recognition of cultural difference underpins rather than threatens, social cohesion (<i>multiculturalism</i>).
Culture viewed negatively	<p>11.5. Culture as part of the political superstructure: Culture is conditioned by the economic 'base' and thus it is a reflection of the interest of the ruling class, its role being primarily ideological, it is part of the ideological and political 'superstructure' (<i>Marxist socialists</i>).</p> <p>11.6. Culture as a reflection of gender inequality: Patriarchal culture reflects male interests and values and serves to demean women, reconciling them to a system of gender oppression (<i>feminists</i>).</p>

12. History as progress vs. History as no progress

History as progress	<p>12.1. History is progress: Each generation advances further than the last through the accumulation of knowledge and understanding (<i>liberals</i>), social development (<i>socialists</i>) and conflict (<i>Marxist socialists</i>).</p> <p>12.2. History is tradition: History is understood in terms of tradition and continuity allowing little scope for progress; the lessons of the past provide guidance for present and future conduct (<i>conservatives</i>).</p>
History as no progress	12.3. History as a decay: History is viewed as a material decay (<i>ecologists</i>), a perpetuation of gender inequality (<i>feminists</i>) or a spiritual decline from a past 'golden age' although there can be

	cyclical rebirths (<i>fascists</i>) and regeneration (<i>religious fundamentalists</i>).
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13. Human-centred view of nature vs. Non-human-centred view of nature

<p>Human-centred view of nature (elitists)</p>	<p>13.1. Capitalist view of nature: Nature and all other species inhabiting the planet are viewed as a resource to satisfy human needs and rarely question human domination over it. Nature is invested with value only when it is transformed by human labour or when it is harnessed to human ends (<i>liberals, socialists, anarchists</i>).</p> <p>13.2. Conservative view of nature: Humans may be seen as part of nature within a ‘great chain of being’ but their superiority is not questioned and are considered having a status of custodians of nature, which is viewed as threatening, even cruel, characterised by an amoral struggle and harshness that also shapes human existence (<i>conservatives, ecologists</i>).</p> <p>13.3. Nature as a model: ‘Nature’ reflects harmony and growth, offers a model of simplicity and balance which humans would be wise to apply to social organisation in the form of social ecology (<i>anarchists</i>); or ‘nature’ reflects darkness and mysticism stressing the power of instinct and primal life forces, nature being able to purge humans of their decadent intellectualism and a model of brutal struggle and cyclical regeneration (<i>fascists</i>).</p> <p>13.4. Idyllic view of nature: The beauty, harmony and richness of nature helps to human fulfilment through a closeness to nature in some romantic and pastoral views (<i>socialists</i>), nature is creative and benign and women, by</p>
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	<p>virtue of their fertility and disposition to nurture, are closer to nature and in tune with natural forces (<i>feminists</i>).</p> <p>13.5. Holistic view of nature: Nature is an interconnected whole, embracing humans and non-humans as well as the inanimate world and thus ecosystems must be prioritised when protecting ‘nature’. This still implies a hierarchical view since in this holistic view nonhuman interests are less important than human interests (<i>ecologists</i>).</p> <p>13.6. Divine view of nature: Nature is an expression of divine creation; what is ‘natural’ is thus God-given (<i>religious fundamentalists</i>).</p>
Non-human-centred view of nature (egalitarian)	<p>13.7 Non-speciesist view of nature: Human species should not give greater weight to its own species when dealing with ‘nature’ and the rest of beings inhabiting the planet. Rather, they should apply the principle of equal moral consideration (<i>non-speciesist</i>).</p>

14. Self-centred view of human nature vs. Non-self-centred view of human nature

Self-centred view of human nature (elitists)	<p>14.1. Humans as unique individuals: Human nature is regarded as a set of innate qualities intrinsic to the individuals which can be considered self-seeking and largely self-reliant creatures (<i>liberals</i>) or more limited and security-seeking creatures (<i>conservatives</i>).</p> <p>14.2. Humans as social creatures: Humans are regarded as social creatures, their capacities and behaviour being shaped more by nurture than by nature, particularly by social imposition (<i>feminists</i>), creative individual labour (<i>socialists</i>), by cooperative effort (<i>anarcho-</i></p>
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	<p><i>communists</i>), by self-interest but rationally enlightened (<i>anarcho-capitalists</i>) or by social belonging focused on nation or race (<i>nationalists, fascists</i>).</p> <p>14.3. Humans as part of the ecosystem: Human nature is viewed as part of the broader ecosystem, even as part of nature itself, still this view is not egalitarian since nonhuman interests are not considered equal to human interests (<i>ecologists</i>).</p>
Non-self-centred view of human nature (egalitarians)	<p>14.4. Non-speciesist view of human nature: Human nature is not viewed as unique and thus is not privileged and the exploitation of other sentient beings is not justified.</p>

Source: elaborated by the author.

Step 4. Fit core themes and values into a simple ideological grid

Finally, it was built the grid of simple categories in which all the core values and themes fit. For this reduced set of general values, Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) grid was slightly adapted as explained before.

Therefore, the four significant values suggested are *individualism*, *communitarianism*, *egalitarianism* and *elitism*. The aim was to find a grid on which all the traditional and new political ideologies and their core themes could fit, to build a comprehensive, but at the same time, functional and easy to remember framework of analysis.

For each set, different categories that can be effectively found in the news have been identified. It has been done following the authors’ core themes and ideological markers (mostly Heywood as already explained, but not only). Although these categories try to be comprehensive, they should serve as references to identify the value under assessment.

Step 5. Build the main analytical dimensions or worldviews into the grid/group model

The previous 14 sets of core values and 74 subcategories are now classified within a grid/group typology of worldviews by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1982), adapted as follows on table 9:

Table 9: Analytical dimensions and worldviews.

<i>ELITISM</i>	<i>EGALITARIANISM</i>
1.1. Natural inegalitarianism	1.6. Natural egalitarianism
1.2. Social inegalitarianism	1.7. Social egalitarianism
1.3. Political inegalitarianism	1.8. Political egalitarianism
1.4. Gender inegalitarianism	1.9. Gender egalitarianism
1.5. Speciesist inegalitarianism	1.10. Non-speciesist egalitarianism
2.2. Authority from above	2.1. Authority from below
2.3. Authoritative leadership	2.4. Authority as oppression
4.1. Elitist democracy	4.3. Participatory democracy
4.2. Authoritarian democracy	4.4. Radical democracy
5.1. State as a guarantee of social order	5.4. Ruling Class State
5.2. Authoritarian state	5.5. (non) Patriarchal State
7.1. Classist society	7.3. Plural Society
7.2. Patriarchal society	9.2. Gender as a negative division
7.4. Non-plural society	10.4. Religion as a distraction
8.3. Nations as the source of meaning	10.5. Religion as oppression
8.5. Nations as artificial divisions	11.4. Multiculturalism as a source of social cohesion
8.6. Nations as tools of oppression	11.5. Culture as part of the political superstructure
9.1. Gender as a positive division	11.6. Culture as a reflection of gender inequality


<p>10.6. Religion as a competitor 11.2. Traditions as a source of cohesion 11.3. Organic monoculture distinctive trait 12.2. History is tradition 13.1. Capitalist view of nature 13.2. Conservative view of nature 13.3. Nature as a model 13.4. Idyllic view of nature 13.5. Holistic view of nature 13.6. Divine view of nature 14.2. Humans as social creatures 14.3. Humans as part of the ecosystems</p>	<p>12.1. History is progress 13.7 Non-speciesist view of nature 14.4. Non-speciesist view of human nature</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>INDIVIDUALISM</i></p> <p>3.1. Positive freedom 3.2. Negative freedom 5.6. State as Evil 6.1. Restricted capitalist economy 6.2. Unrestricted capitalist economy 6.3. Corporatist economy 7.5. Private society 8.1. Nations as moral entities 8.2. Nations as sources of cohesion 8.3. Nations as the source of meaning 9.3. Gender as irrelevant 10.1. Religion as a civil right 10.2. Religion as a source of cohesion 10.3. Religion as essential 11.1. 'High' culture as source of self-development</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>COMMUNITARIANISM</i></p> <p>3.3. Inner freedom 3.4. No freedom 5.2. State as the embodiment of common good 5.6. State as Evil 6.4. Community economy 6.5. Green economy 7.6. Public society 7.7. Natural society 8.4. Nations as religious entities</p>

11.3. History as a decay	
14.1. Humans as unique individuals	

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Outlined as a diagram, the labels are positioned vertically and horizontally and as opposing extremes. This typology has been chosen because it represents two straightforward sets of opposed worldviews that embrace all classical and new political ideologies, as shown in the figure below (figure 6).

Figure 6: Political ideology and worldviews grid.



Source: Schena, Almiron and Pineda 2018, 39.

Step 6: Application of suggested ideological labels to press

From the previous step – table 9 and figure 6 – subcategories that we suggest therefore to summarise into a very simple approach that defines press according to their marks of *elitism*, *egalitarianism*, *individualism* and *communitarianism* found in their discourse.

It means to say that the content from media outlets are analysed applying the in model above are labelled as:

- *Individualists*
- *Communitarians*
- *Egalitarians*
- *Elitists*

Or any of the various combinations possible amongst the four core values. This analysis makes possible to analyse the general orientation of a newspaper by the doing the percentages of each label found in the articles from the same newspaper. Meaning, for example, the confirmation that 70 out of 100 articles analysed from one given media outlets are found to be labelled as egalitarian. Conversely, it also gives the possibility to contrast written content from different sections of a newspaper (i.e., opinion columns, economic, culture, international, politics, editorials, etc.), according to the researcher's research question.

For instance, in this two-dimensional plane, the intersection of the communitarian and egalitarian dimensions can be understood, in classical ideological terms, as an *anarcho-communist* stance, while the label of *neoliberal conservatism* can be placed at the point where individualism and elitism converge). It will always be available to the researcher, at his/her discretion, to apply the labels of political ideologies following his/her own worldview.

5.2.1.2 Coding procedure

By the means of this analytical model, it is established a coding procedure that subjects the sample to be analysed according to the following questions:

1. Which is the worldview which dominates? (for instance: *elitism*)
2. Which core values/frames can be identified from this worldview? (for instance: *hierarchical view*)
3. Which core themes are present for each core value/frame identified? (for instance: *social inegalitarianism*)
4. Which empirical ideological markers frame the core values through the core themes? (this refers to the exact words used in the sample analysed matching the ideological markers from table 5)

5. Which ideological label can accordingly be applied to this article? (for instance: *elitism*, if elitism is confirmed or a combination of elitism and another worldview, as *anti-egalitarianism* when finding in the texts marks of critics to egalitarian values)

And only as a complement, not necessary:

6. Which classical labels could be applied when inferred?

These orientative questions are transferred to a code sheet that is detailed in the following section (4.2.3).

The point is to collect the textual examples that include ideological markers which are pointing at the core themes and core values and that allows the coder to identify a dominant worldview which can, in turn, be qualitatively scrutinised and deconstructed. Thus, it ends with a rather detailed approach to the ideological stance of pieces of news which can contribute to more objective analysis and understanding. If so desired, after this procedure, the coder can apply a more specific political ideology label fitting the core values and themes (e. g. *neoliberal conservatism*, or *anarcho-communism*) to the analysed sample. However, this runs the risk of narrowing the effort for the reasons stated at the beginning of this section.

5.2.1.3 Coding sheet

With the purpose of organising the study, a set of two coding sheets were built, and both are meant to be used for each piece of the sample analysed.

The first sheet – as shown in table 10 below – contains the necessary general data about the media outlet and the article (part A), as well information to be filled when proceeding the textual analysis (part B).

Table 10: Coding sheet 1 – General data

A. GENERAL DATA
0. Article Reference: (<i>code applied for each piece analysed according to coder's</i>

choice)

1. Coder's Name:
2. Coding date:
3. Newspaper name:
4. Country:
5. Article's title:
6. Publication date:
7. Section (in the newspaper):
8. Topic (according to the coder):
9. Genre:
10. Author/s (in case stated, also optional use):

B. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

1. Worldviews appearing in the article (*may be one or many of the four: individualism, communitarianism, egalitarianism, elitism*)
2. Core values (*may be one or many in the 14 pairs identified*)
3. Categories (*related to the core values*)
4. Ideological markers (*related to the categories, the same categories are including the ideological markers of our former table, but in a smaller number, so easier to manage*)
5. Ideological stance (*according to the worldviews*)
6. Standard political ideology label (optional)

RECOMMENDATION for Coding:

The point is not to find as much categories and markers as possible in the text but only to collect the textual examples which include clear markers (for example, those keywords that are in the same category's name or definition in the coding book) which can be clearly attributed to some categories.

The second sheet (table 11) serves specifically to fill with information gathered from each media outlet’s piece and considered adequate to proceed with the analysis – in the case of this research, a sample of articles from Brazilian online newspapers. Therefore, each article collected will have the two sheets filled with the full necessary information about each piece.

Table 11: Coding sheet 2 – Ideological markers

Text	Description	Categories and ideological markers	Classical ideologies (in case of applying)
<i>[sample unit from the article]</i>	<i>[translation to English and comments (when necessary) about the unit’s meaning – useful specially in case of metaphors or relations with facts and themes not explained openly in sample]</i>	<i>[registration unit – categories of ideological markers from table 9 appearing in the unit]</i>	<i>[in case the coder chose to apply from the list of classical political ideologies shown in the section 4.2.1, Step 1, table 5 (classical labels)]</i>

5. Ideological stances:	<i>(registering all found after running the analysis: individualism, communitarianism, egalitarianism, elitism + the “antis”)</i>
6. Classical labels:	<i>(optional)</i>

Source: Schena, Almiron and Pineda 2018, codebook.

For better visualisation, the code sheet is displayed in annex 2 exactly as used to analysis each one of the 2,195 editorials composing the sample.

5.2.2 *Qualitative approach*

The results achieved after running the methodological model explained previously represents the quantitative part of the approach, and it is where the quantifiable data offers the possibility to conclude the political-ideological position of a newspaper. As to say, if a media outlet is oriented to *elitism*, *egalitarianism*, *communitarianism* or *individualism* – or the possible combinations – and to which level or percentage. Thus, the data managed is useful to develop predictions, since it provides margin to be enriched by a qualitative approach whereby inductive method data is explored. Complementarily, since the code sheet proposes a section to add information regarding the topic of each article, this section was used as a source to run extra aspects to the quantitative content analysis.

The topic classification was done inductively and for each article was added one or two words defining the subject matter of each. The topics emerged from the texts in the primary and secondary readings, and, as possible, a standard was kept, although the classification tags were open to include new topic marks when necessary.

When the text extended the possibility to add two topics, it was done regarding the dominant topic and a secondary topic. For example, *politics*, *education* refers to the main topic is related to political affairs in the country, and as a second argument comes *education* (school system or issues related to education rankings, primary, secondary or superior education, etc.). The topic marks are also used to build a correlation in the second level of analysis. The result of political position of the editorial content of each newspaper is analysed related to the topics. Alternatively, in which topics the newspaper shows its political-ideological position.

Reaching the end of the methodological proposal construction, the sample and the corpus of the analysis are described in the next section.

5.3 Research design

After the criteria to define the Brazilian online newspapers considered for this research was detailed, and the time frame to collect the articles was justified, finally, comes the theoretical supported explanation of what kind of written content was gathered and prepared to be analysed. The schema composes what Krippendorff (2003, 83) calls *data-making* or the preparation of data to conduct the research.

Exploration of the news employs human coding and it is based on a triangulation of qualitative and quantitative techniques. The section 5.2.1.2 *Coding procedure* and 5.2.1.3 *Coding sheet* illustrate how the method was used to perform a content analysis of the editorial articles corpus.

5.3.1 Newspapers selected

Open access to circulation and audiences have been overshadowed increasingly in Brazil in these last years, not only identified in the process of this thesis but denounced by Brazilian professionals and researchers. One example is the research of Ricardo Resende Campos, a native lawyer who studies public law and mass media theory at Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main, in Germany, in his article from 2017 for the Brazilian Press Observatory⁴⁷. Also, years earlier the doctoral thesis of a Brazilian Communication researcher,

⁴⁷ Source: <http://observatoriodaimprensa.com.br/liberdade-de-informacao/ao-permitir-censura-brasil-tropeca-na-desinformacao/>

Ivan Paganotti, “evaluates how censorship mechanisms have changed after the end of Brazil's military dictatorship and the constitutional prohibition of censorship, in 1988”⁴⁸. Until 2014, when this research started to take shape it was still possible to find open information directly from trustworthy sources as *IBOPE-Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística* (Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics, now *Kantar Media*), and *IVC-Instituto Verificador de Comunicação* (*Communication Verification Institute*).

IVC does not offer any longer any public data about the media they verify, probably as a market-driven attitude since media companies pay a subscription to be audited. The audition is used mainly as an tool for advertisement selling, and it represents a vast arena of dispute in the country among the few giants of media owners. IVC also used to have more data for public access, and since 2016 it is only possible to find the list of the media audited and the frequency the audition is done.

The *National Newspaper Organisation* used to publish every year the ranking of the media – TV, radio, newspaper and online newspaper – but the rankings from 2015 are the last one published, in 2016.

Thus, the sample for this study is from the 2015 Ranking ANJ *Associação Nacional de Jornais* (*National Association of Newspapers*) that uses data from IVC – data from Jan 1st until Dec 31st, 2015 measuring online newspaper subscriptions.

The list was initially composed by 34 online newspapers (full list in Annex 1) which, in order to analyse the content, a cut was made to the first ten newspapers in the ranking, as show in the table 12 below:

Table 12: 2015 Ranking of most read online newspapers in Brazil by ANJ.

NEWSPAPER	REGION/STATE	OWNER
1. <i>Folha de São Paulo</i>	SP	Grupo Folha
2. <i>O Globo</i>	RJ	Grupo Globo


⁴⁸ Thesis title *Ecos do silêncio: liberdade de expressão e reflexos da censura no Brasil pós-abertura democrático*. Available in <http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/27/27152/tde-26062015-163043/pt-br.php>

3. <i>O Estado de São Paulo</i>	SP	Grupo OESP
4. <i>Super Notícia</i>	MG	O Tempo
5. <i>Estado de Minas</i>	MG	Grupo Diários Associados
6. <i>O Tempo</i>	MG	O Tempo
7. <i>Zero Hora</i>	RS	Grupo RBS
8. <i>Extra</i>	RJ	Grupo Globo
9. <i>Valor Econômico</i>	SP	Grupo Globo
10. <i>Correio Braziliense</i>	DF	Grupo Diários Associados

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Since the newspapers considered for this research are all from a continental-sized and diverse country, it is considered essential to offer visual support exposing where the ten most-read online newspapers in Brazil are geographically located. The map below (figure 7) illustrated it.

Figure 7: Geographical distribution of the 10th ANJ's most read online newspapers in Brazil from 2015.



Source: Elaborated by the author using *mapchart.net*.

The origin of the newspapers featured on the ranking cover 1,160bi square kilometres, and it means only 13.69% of the Brazilian territory⁴⁹. It also shows how centralised the news production are in Brazil – in the Southeast and South – which also happen to be the most industrialised and economically developed region (IBGE 2018⁵⁰).

One observation that emerges from the illustration is the correspondence to the Old Republic (1889-1930) time in Brazil, a

⁴⁹ Source IBGE: <https://www.ibge.gov.br/geociencias/organizacao-do-territorio/estrutura-territorial/23701-divisao-territorial-brasileira.html?=&t=downloads>

⁵⁰ Source IBGE: <https://www.ibge.gov.br/explica/pib.php>

period that started in 1983 and lasted more than 30 years. This resemblance is not by any chance, a coincidence.

The *café au lait* – as it was called – policy was an agreement between the state oligarchies and the federal government during the Old Republic to have the presidents chosen from the politicians of São Paulo and Minas Gerais alternatively. In this agreement, the president in one turn would be from São Paulo and next from Minas Gerais and so on alternatively. The name of this agreement was an allusion to the economy of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, significant producers, respectively, of coffee and milk. Besides, they were very populous states, politically influential and cradles of two of the leading republican legends: the *Paulista Republican Party* and the *Minas Gerais Republican Party*.

Following the research design of analysing editorial articles published on each newspaper within the time frame defined, it was found that two (2) newspapers among the ten do not featured editorial sections, then *Super Notícia* and *Extra* dropped from the list. It is important to remark that both newspapers are the only ones with an evident popular orientation (Figueiredo and Luz 2010⁵¹).

Thus, the final group of newspapers from which the editorial articles were gathered is shown in table 13:

Table 13: Final group of newspapers used on this research.

NEWSPAPER	RANKING POSITION	REGION/STATE⁵²	OWNER
<i>Folha de São Paulo</i>	#1	SP	Grupo Folha
<i>O Globo</i>	#2	RJ	Grupo Globo

⁵¹ Complete information and recent analysis of Brazilian popular newspapers: <http://www.intercom.org.br/papers/regionais/sudeste2010/resumos/r19-0183-1.pdf>

⁵² SP – São Paulo; RJ – Rio de Janeiro; MG – Minas Gerais; RS – Rio Grande do Sul; DF – Distrito Federal/Brasília.

<i>O Estado de São Paulo</i>	#3	SP	Grupo OESP
<i>Estado de Minas</i>	#5	MG	Grupo Diários Associados
<i>O Tempo</i>	#6	MG	O Tempo
<i>Zero Hora</i>	#7	RS	Grupo RBS
<i>Valor Econômico</i>	#9	SP	Grupo Globo
<i>Correio Braziliense</i>	#10	DF	Grupo Diários Associados

Source: Elaborated by the author.

In addition, to help the reader to be familiar with the newspapers here analysed, this research presents a contextualisation regarding each company and its context in the country.

Folha de São Paulo, which for short is known in Brazil as *Folha*, was founded in 1921 by two journalists, Olival Costa and Pedro Cunha, and it was born with the aspiration to be the opposition to the newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo*. The counteraction was to a well-established rural elites, conservative and traditional stances that *O Estado de São Paulo* represented at that time.

The newspaper was planned to be out late in the afternoon, from there comes its first name *Folha da Noite*. It started featuring more news, fewer articles, shorter texts and space for sports and the target was the middle-class urban population at that time.

The newspaper reached success, making the profit for the company to overgrow, and more than that, making history by the establishment of a news company for the first time in the country (Taschner 1992), and bringing innovations in the work process of the journalistic sector by building an industrial plant with modern rotary press printer. With this structure, they were also able to launch the publication two other daily newspaper with morning and afternoon edition – *Folha da Manhã* in 1925, and *Folha da Tarde* in 1949 – and along these years the news company was sold and bought by different businessmen, always ranging from landowners, coffee farmers, lawyers,

politicians and right-hand man of foreign industrialist who at that time were prohibited to own media companies.

The newspaper mainly dedicated attention to political facts and in some occasions was the centre of episodes of political dispute, in particular during Getúlio Vargas' coup in 1930 when the newspaper headquarters was invaded and destroyed by partisans of *Aliança Liberal* (Pilagallo 2012) since the then owner Olival Costa was opening pro-republicans. Also, during the military dictatorship, the newspaper was, by one side trying to keep 'exempt and pluralist' in order to survive the censorship, but was also accused of supporting the barbarism of those repressive times. Even more severe were the accusations – denied by the directors and owners – of lending cars so that police officers from DOI-Codi (the dictatorship's repression special department) to make a watch, follow and arrest militants they would consider leftist, or more appropriate: everyone presenting any opposition to the regime.

The online version of *Folha de São Paulo* was launched in 1995, and soon the *Grupo Folha* created the portal UOL where all the content produced by all the media outlets from the group is hosted. Related to online content, *Folha de São Paulo*, again, leaves its mark in political history by promoting in 2010 the first online political debate with the candidates running for president at that year. It was viewed by 1,4 million (da Costa Machado 2011, 12) people in the country.

Nowadays, *Folha* is the centre of a range of activities in the communications industry: daily printed newspapers, magazines covering all topics, databases, market and opinion polling institutes, news agencies, real-time information and entertainment services, complemented by printing and shipping businesses.

O Globo on its turn was founded in 1925 in Rio de Janeiro by the journalist Irineu Marinho, who earlier in 1911 founded the newspaper *A Noite*, in the same city where the country's capital used to be at the time. The newspaper was the cornerstone of a communication group that grew immensely along the first half of the twentieth century, always under the ownership and management of the Marinho family, generation after generation. Nowadays, *Grupo Globo* is the most

prominent media conglomerate in Brazil, with revenues reaching 4.4 billion (2017)⁵³ and among the biggest in the Americas.

The biggest expansion came in the 40s with the purchase of a radio station and later obtaining new radio concessions, benefits originated by the close relationship with the government – Getúlio Vargas and his *Estado Novo* political regime oriented by centralization of power, nationalism, anti-communism and authoritarianism. As points Silva (2009), Roberto Marinho, son and heir Irineu Marinho, was Roberto Marinho was one of the newspaper owners who benefited the most from state grants through loans and advertisements during this regime. This regime strategically sought the support and collusion of the media, notably the newspapers, which needed government resources to impose themselves in the journalistic field. The direct consequence of that is a press with limitation and considered mere instruments of diffusion of official ideas, serving as means of ideological legitimization of the new regime (Silva 2009, 105).

As Valentini (2008) explains, *O Globo* was the first to associate the November 1935 armed uprisings from parties against Vargas' regime with the presence of Soviet communists in Brazil. Thus, the newspaper became an essential element, as the government could have at hand legal and ideological mechanisms to blame and punish the insurgents.

The media group kept expanding, making a profit and supporting the military dictatorship that started in 1964 with a coup. Around this time, the television broadcast business started, and it is until nowadays the most-watched TV channel reaching all the Brazilian territory, except where there is no power to plug a TV. It was only in 2013 that the media group officially assumed the underwrite to the military regime in an official article⁵⁴ 'regretting it'.

The *Globo* headquarters are still located in Rio de Janeiro representing the largest media set for television content production complex and infrastructure in Latin America – known as Projac –, with a total area of 1.73 million square meters. The content for newspapers

53 Source: https://www.valor.com.br/sites/default/files/upload_element/16-03_globo_comunicado_balanco_6x49_c.pdf

54 Source: <https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/apoio-editorial-ao-golpe-de-64-foi-um-erro-9771604>

and radio are also produced in offices in São Paulo and Brasília (the federal capital).

O Estado de São Paulo – commonly called just *Estadão* – is part of *Grupo Estado* of communication and it is based in São Paulo, competing with *Folha de São Paulo*. The newspaper started the activities in January of 1875, at this time Brazil was still under Portugal’s empire and governance. Its history in news making in the country is narrated as strong and stable (Carvalho 2012; Sá 2019), as a business that consolidated along the years with Mesquita family running the affairs.

This newspaper openly and widely supported the military dictatorship in Brazil, (1964-1985), and it is known for its conservative position (Carvalho 2013). Not surprisingly, its editorial titled *Notas & Informações* (Notes and information) is the oldest section feature on the printed newspaper – and kept on the online version – and it is already reported as the core of the right-wing company’s political expression (Biroli 2004). Currently, the printed version ranks the fourth on daily circulation in the country⁵⁵.

O Estado de Minas is a newspaper part of the *Diarios Associados* media group, which is the third biggest media conglomerate in Brazil owned by Assis Chateaubriand, one of the most influential men in communication and politics in the history of the country (Barbosa 2006). This newspaper completes the historical political block from the *Coffee and Milk Republic* mentioned previously since it is edited in the state of Minas Gerais.

Chateaubriand has this idea of building a communication empire strong and with power enough to make its influence in politics. Lima mentions that the pages of *O Jornal* and *Diário da Noite*, his first acquisitions, “were already privileging friends and condemning disaffected people, paving the way for what would be a common practice” (2001, 3) among the newspapers belonging to the group.

⁵⁵ Data from 2017. Source: <http://www.abi.org.br/em-3-anos-jornais-perdem-520-mil-exemplares-no-brasil/> with information from the Brazilian Press Association.

Boritza (2011) notes that the influence of Assis Chateaubriand as a figure was outstanding, even more than that was the newspapers itself which explains his title of ‘baron of the press’ in Brazil. *Chatô*, as how he is known for short, approached lawmakers ranging from mayors to presidents, directly interfering in various chapters in the country’s history. He participated in *coups d’état*, fraudulent elections, revolutions and used his ferocious tongue to exalt his candidates and repeatedly threatened opponents with lying news that made scandalous headlines (Morais 2016). The great Brazilian scholar in the field of journalism, Bernardo Kucinski, resumes Chateaubriand with the “ability of his newspapers to build or destroy political careers” (1998, 167) at the same time Kucinski analyses the construction and functions of the public space configured by the mass media in Brazil, highlighting the behaviour of journalists in this process, with analysis of the role played by self-censorship in the performance and shaping of the self-image of the Brazilian journalist during the twentieth century.

The newspaper followed the example of the ones from São Paulo in timing to put up its online version, in 1995. Until nowadays it is suggested by scholars that *O Estado de Minas* keeps its discourse impregnated with marks of nationalism (Morais 2016) and a trait of opulence by still reporting with emphasis content related to the life of landowners and traditional families ruling the state (Boritza 2011).

O Tempo is another newspaper with a daily printed version from the state of Minas Gerais. It was founded in 1996 by an Italian businessman, writer, politician and philosopher, naturalised Brazilian citizen in order to own a media vehicle – prohibited in Brazil for non-citizen or foreign investors. The migrant went to Brazil in 1976 to invest in the country’s transport sector. He holds until the end of 2020 the function as mayor of Betim, a city in the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais’ capital and biggest city.

Nowadays, the newspaper is under direction of Mediolli’s wife, Laura, and it is part of SADA Group, owned by Mediolli who owns more than 30 companies and as well he is active in various segments of the economy, with emphasis on road freight transport, logistics, steel, graphic and editorial sector, auto parts manufacturing, vehicle’s selling,

agricultural (forestry and reforestation), biofuel production and cogeneration of power (combined cycle power plant).

Zero Hora is the first one in the ranking of the most read online newspapers to represent the region of the country out of Southeast. Zero Hora has a daily printed version, and it was founded in 1964 by the journalist Ary de Carvalho. It was only in 2007 that *ZeroHora.com* website went online, which features 24/7 news updates by a composition content coming from an integrated newsroom. The newspaper is part of RBS Group, a media group owned by the famous Sirotsky family. The Jewish family with Russian origins who migrated to the south of Brazil at the beginning of 1900 bought in 1970 the equity control from Carvalho, who was in financial crisis. By the time, the Sirotskys already owned a radio station and a TV channel. From that on, the media group growth reached a point where, in 2006, the company went through a public request for a report regarding their public TV and radio diffusion concessions. The group presented documents manifesting they hold only two concessions for sound and image broadcasting (TV) services - Canal 12, in Porto Alegre and Canal 8, in Caxias do Sul (the second-largest city in the Southernmost of Brazil). Besides it reports stating that *RBS Rádios Participações S.A.* has three indirect permissions, two FM and one medium wave (OM), the company's website affirm the media group is the owner or primary holder of 18 broadcasters (12 in Rio Grande do Sul and 6 in Santa Catarina), in addition to two community TV broadcasters and one segmented broadcaster, focused on agribusiness (21 in total, therefore, in both states). RBS presents itself as "the largest regional TV network in the country with 18 broadcasters distributed in RS and SC, with 85% of *Rede Globo* programming and 15% directed to the local public" (Guareschi 2013, 72). They also have 25 radio stations, eight daily newspapers, four internet portals, a publishing house, a print shop, a record company, a logistics company, a marketing and youth relationship company, a stake in a mobile marketing company and a

social responsibility foundation, according to FNDC (National Forum for the Democratisation of Communication⁵⁶).

Among many cases of the media conglomerate's political ties, is very known the case when back in 1996 RBS won the public bid for the privatization of 35% of the *Riograndense Telecommunications Company* (CRT), within the economic program of the then-governor Antonio Britto and former RBS employee, through the *Telefonica do Brasil* consortium⁵⁷.

Valor Econômico is the youngest publication among the newspapers in this sample with only 20 years in circulation. The newspaper was created in a joint venture by the *Folha* group and *Globo* group, in 2000. In 2016, the partnership was undone and since then Globo runs full control of the newspaper. The newspaper defines its editorial guideline claiming to be “the best and most qualified content of economic journalism in the country”⁵⁸ according to the institutional website. *Valor Econômico* quickly became the leader in the print segment on the economy, finances and business keeping a measured design, a more severe format and data-oriented in its content.

Even though the printed version has a small market penetration, the online version is very known in the country and abroad. There is an English version of the news since the emphasis is to offer financial information to the global market interest.

Regarding academic studies contemplating *Valor Econômico* or *Gazeta Mercantil* (the other newspaper with the same economic orientation) is very sparse within the Communication field. Although the research by Murcia and Borba (2005) incorporates the newspaper *Valor Econômico* in a study interested in how the accounting scandals in Brazil involving companies like Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat and Bombril, from 2001 to 2004, have raised questions about the reliability of accounting reports, and consequently it affected the

⁵⁶ Source: <http://fndc.org.br/noticias/formacao-de-monopolio-da-rbs-em-sc-sera-questionada-90776/>

⁵⁷ Source: <https://www.cartamaior.com.br/?/Coluna/Historia-da-RBS-revela-como-nascer-e-crescer-monopolios-da-midia/19897>

⁵⁸ Source: <http://www.publicidadeeditoraglobo.com.br/>

newspaper's reputation. Interesting to highlight that Murcia and Borba's (2005) research analyses exclusively the content from the online version. The research design quantifies the number of articles published according to keywords – defined by the scholars related to the fraud topic; in a second level analysing the actors mentioned – mainly the companies involved in frauds – and the terms used to explain the fraud situation in order to protect or judge determined companies.

Correio Braziliense is part of *Diários Associados Group* (Associated Daily Newspapers), and it is known as the first newspaper of Brasília (Brazil's capital) born together with the new federal capital on April 21, 1960 (until then the national capital was Rio de Janeiro). The newspaper took the name of *Correio Braziliense* from Hipólito José da Costa, a journalist who wrote from London between 1808 and 1822 (Periotto 2004). The inaugural edition had 108 pages, most of the content featuring all the details of the city's inauguration. Juscelino knew he needed significant news mobilisation in order to prove and convince everyone in the country of his magnificent project, since the plan to change a fixed capital dating back the Portuguese court was an ambitious move.

Its birth was strategically planned through a political deal between the then-president Juscelino Kubitschek – who decided to build a city from zero that would become the new capital of the Republic – and the owner of the *Diários Associados*, Assis Chateaubriand. Chateaubriand, although sceptical of the magnitude of the venture, accepted the deal with the promise that if the construction was completed on schedule, a newspaper concession would be given to Chateaubriand's media conglomerate, and it would be positioned as “the newspaper of the new capital” (Antezana 2004, 32). The new newspaper would, in fact, become the main printed diary of the *Diários Associados Group* as it maintains its importance and representativeness nowadays.

Correio Braziliense's circulation, which in 1963 was 1,500, reached 24,500 in 1969. In the 1980s, the increase in the capital's population was accompanied by an increase in the newspaper's circulation, which exceeded 30,000 daily. In 2008, the average daily circulation reached 53,000 copies, and an average of 92,000 copies on

Sundays, according to the Circulation Checker Institute (IVC). *Correio Braziliense* thus consolidated its position as the leading newspaper of Brasilia, and became the most widely circulated daily newspaper in the Midwest of the country, as well as one of the 20 largest daily newspapers in Brazil.

The proposal to occupy the space in a still-raising market that would expand over the years was accompanied by an identification between the newspaper and the city of Brasilia. Initially, issues related to the establishment of the new capital were featured in the pages of the newspaper. Later, topics such as preservation and alterations of the city's urban design and issues related to population growth, such as housing problems and city traffic, were highlighted. The weight of government workers in the capital's economy and politics was replicated by the prominence given to matters relating to functionalism, which made up an important segment of the newspaper's readers.

5.3.2 *Sample*

The sample used was composed by one (1) year time frame gathering all the content specifically under the editorial section of each one of the eight (8) online newspapers ranked as the most read in Brazil. Such an interval was defined in an effort of having a larger corpus to analyse the bias, minding diversity of topics that are found in the lap of one year. That decision overtook the option of gathering a sample filtered by a shorter time or around one even in specific.

It is essential to mention that all the articles were extracted manually, one by one, from the newspapers composing the samples. *Factiva*, from Dow Jones & Company, was technically available for students of this university, but unfortunately, it was not working correctly and with minimal features available by the time – March and April 2019 – the sample was on schedule to be collected.

Apart from one newspaper, *Zero Hora*, all the other newspapers required a paid subscription in order to access the content. In one specific case, *O Estado de São Paulo*, it was necessary to pay extra to

access the digital archives, since the regular reader subscription offers only content access in one-month retrospective.

The process of manually gathering defined a few of the sample's characteristics, for example, the download of the content directly from the newspaper version, once confirmed the newspaper published in the online version the same editorial content as in the printed version. Relying on each newspaper search engine represented a challenge, and, above all, a detection that most of them do not perform correctly or reasonably good for the task needed. Although, the newspaper publishing supports (i.e., FlipHTML5, VisionLink, Joomag) are more reliable and designed to perform with a broader range of variables, consequently offering better results. Because of that, in this phase of research the work doubled unexpectedly by the necessary time to confirm that the editorial appearing on the printed version (accessed in the digital archives) was also published on the editorial section online.

5.3.2.1 Time frame

The time frame defined to collect the editorial articles from all the eight newspapers was one year, from January 1st of 2018 until December 31st of the same year. The criteria were to collect all articles found during this period from the eight online newspapers.

2018 was an intense year in Brazil, as shown in the timeline built below (figure 8), with corruption scandals and the economy in recession mainly due to the politically unstable scenario derived from the then-president Dilma Rousseff impeachment – a process that started in 2015 and that ended in August 2016. Also, the national election happened in October (first round) and November (second round) 2018 culminating with the rise of the extreme-right reaching the highest positions of political power in the country. Apart from those events that had many unfoldings, happenings related to the global economy and politics in other countries, as the economic issues between United States and China, were topics discussed by the editorials, and in with less interests the topics in our neighbouring countries in South America.

Figure 8: Timeline of important moments in Brazil in 2018.

JAN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - For the first time in history, the IBGE recorded that the number of people working on their own or informal jobs (34.3 million) surpassed that of those who have a formal job (33.3 million). - Clashes in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. - Alerts for new cases of yellow fever. In Minas Gerais the number of deaths from the disease rose to 11. Rio de Janeiro now counts three fatalities. - 15. The Federal Police indicted the former mayor of São Paulo, Fernando Haddad (PT), on suspicion of box 2 in the 2012 campaign, when he was elected mayor. The investigation is an offshoot of Lava Jato and deals with the payment of a debt of R \$ 3 million. - 31. Datafolha survey shows the approval by the population of the government of the President of the Republic, Michel Temer (PMDB), by the population as low as 6%. The worst in the country's history. - 31. The same survey heard from respondents that they would vote in the first round of the 2018 presidential election. Lula has 37%, Bolsonaro 16%, Alckmin 7%, according to one scenario.
FEB	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 15. Maduro threatens to go to the Summit of the Americas even without an invitation. - 22. The deputies voted on the decree that authorizes federal intervention in security in RJ. - Defense Minister, Raul Jungmann, authorized security actions in RJ with collective search and seizure warrants to cover not just specific addresses, but larger areas, such as streets or entire neighborhoods. - With federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro, the process of pension reform is suspended in the Deputy Chamber.

MAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 14. Marielle Franco, councilwoman of Rio de Janeiro, also feminist and human rights activist, was murdered in Rio de Janeiro. - 15. Federal judges mobilized nationally to maintain housing assistance in 7 states and the Federal District. - 22. Supreme ministers decided that the analysis of the defense's request to avoid Lula's arrest before April 4, the final date of the trial. - U.S. Trade Representative, Robert Lighthizer, says Brazil will stay out of steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump, along with the European Union, South Korea, Argentina and Australia.
APR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Trade war: Dispute between USA and China worries markets; China imposes 25% tariffs on 128 U.S. products, and Trump threatens to overcharge another US\$100 billion in Chinese products. - 7. Former President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva was arrested in São Bernardo do Campo, São Paulo. Lula was convicted on July 12, 2017 by judge Sérgio Moro, who found the former president guilty of receiving undue advantages from the contractor OAS, in the case involving a triplex apartment in Guarujá. A few days later, the defense of the ex-president appealed to the second instance, the Regional Court of the 4th Region (TRF4), based in Porto Alegre. - 27. North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un and South Korea's president Moon Jae-in have pledged to sign a peace agreement to end the war on the Peninsula during the first Inter-Korean summit in more than 11 years.

MAY

- 1. After a fire that started on the fifth floor and spread throughout the construction, the Wilton Paes de Almeida building, which was occupied by the Social Movement of Struggle for Housing (MSLM) collapsed, leading to the death of adults and children who lived there.
- 5. Deadline for Brazilians to register to vote or update their existing voter registration.
- Petrobras resumes position as the largest company on the stock exchange in market value
- 20. National elections were held in Venezuela. Nicolás Maduro was re-elected with 67,7% of the valid votes to govern for another 6 years.
- 21. Truck drivers start a strike that paralyzed roads for 11 days across the country; economy was impacted.
- 27. The first round of elections was held for the post of President of Colombia.

JUN

- 12. U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met in Singapore and sign a denuclearization agreement.
- 18. Day the government releases the total value of federal funding for political campaigns. As these are the first federal and state elections in which private companies will be banned from financing political campaigns, this federal fund is designed to be the main source for campaigns and divided among parties according to their representation in Congress.
- Petrobras reduces diesel prices at refineries, with a freeze for 60 days.
- After Petrobras' response to the strike, the company's president, Pedro Parente, resigns; company shares plummet on the stock exchange.
- Government releases PIS-Pasep Fund withdrawals for beneficiaries of all ages.

JUL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 16. The President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, had a meeting at the Presidential Palace of Finland. On the agenda, issues such as trade, nuclear weapons and relations with China. - <i>July 20 to August 15.</i> Period for political parties and coalitions to nominate and register their candidates. The Workers' Party (or PT) has kept the jailed ex-president as its candidate but could end up nominating someone else, such as former São Paulo Mayor Fernando Haddad, or supporting the candidate of another party on the left. - Number of people without work and who gave up looking for a job breaks a record; market recovery continues to be driven by the increase in informality - Number of defaulters in Brazil breaks record, according to Serasa.
AUG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 6. End of the public hearing at STF ending the debate on decriminalization of abortion in Brazil. - 9. Bandeirantes presidential debate. - 17. REDETV! Presidential debate. - <i>16 to Oct 2.</i> Period during which political campaigns can run publicity. - Trade war: the threats and announcements of protectionist measures between China and the United States continue, also affecting other countries; however, Trump eases steel surcharge and benefits Brazil. - The freezing period ends and Petrobras announces a 13% price increase of diesel at refineries.

- *August 31–September 29.* Free radio and television airtime for campaigns, allotted according to each party's number of congressional seats, starts. The programs, known as *horário político*, broadcast nationally in segments for a total of 60 minutes each day.
- 2. Fire hits National Museum of Rio de Janeiro. The National Museum of Rio gathered a collection of more than 20 million items of the most varied themes, collections of geology, paleontology, botany, zoology and archeology.
- 9. Date by which all campaigns must file campaign finance reports.
- 17. Brazil's Supreme Electoral Court will judge all parties' candidacies, possibly barring candidates who were convicted of crimes from running. If kept by PT as their presidential candidate, Lula, who is now in jail, could be declared ineligible to run, as could other politicians have ensnared in the Lava Jato corruption probe.
- 22. Starting on this date through the end of his or her campaign, no candidate can be arrested, unless caught in the act of committing a crime.
- 26. SBT presidential debate.
- 30. Record TV presidential debate.
- Dollar breaks historic record on the real, sold at BR\$ 4.19; tourism dollar reaches BR\$ 4.36.
- Auctions of oil exploration areas yield almost BR\$ 18 billion to the government.

- 4. Last day for debates, rallies, and public meetings.
- 5. TV Globo presidential debate.
- 7. General Elections - More than 147 million people were eligible to vote for state and federal posts. Gubernatorial and presidential runoffs take place in the case that winning candidates fail to snag more than 50 percent of the votes.
- 8–27. Free radio and television airtime for president and gubernatorial runoff campaigns.
- 11. Bandeirantes presidential debate.
- 15. REDETV! presidential debate.
- 17. SBT presidential debate.
- 21. Record TV presidential debate.
- 26. TV Globo presidential debate.
- 28. Runoff Elections. Extreme-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro won 55% of the votes against 45% for the left's Fernando Haddad. In a sign of voter dissatisfaction, the runoff involved the largest abstention rate in 20 years. In total, 42 million people didn't choose any of the candidates and over 31 million people decided not to show up at the polls at all.
- Gasoline price reaches highest value of the year, and average per liter hits BR\$ 4.725.

- 1. Buenos Aires G20 summit.
- 8. Accepted the complaint against former presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff and former ministers Antonio Palocci and Guido Mantega for criminal organisation, the case known as “Quadrilhão do PT”. According to the complaint, the accused participated in a bribery scheme that worked between 2002 and 2016. It is the first time that former President Dilma becomes a defendant in a criminal action.
- 17. Cuba announced that, after five years, it will withdraw from the Mais Médicos program due to “threatening and disparaging” statements by President-elect Jair Bolsonaro. Cuban doctors gradually leave the program by December 12.
- 30. Federal judge Sérgio Moro, responsible for Operation Lava Jato in the first instance, accepted the invitation of President-elect Jair Bolsonaro (PSL) to assume command of the Ministry of Justice.

- Ibovespa reaches its historic high, with the market reflecting a “temporary truce” in the trade war between the USA and China.
- Chinese executive Huawei’s arrest at US request raises doubts about truce; markets react.
- 14. Temer decides to extradite Battisti. Italian convicted of four murders is considered a fugitive by the Federal Police after the Supreme Minister ordered arrest.
- 15. After withdrawing from Brazil, Chile will host COP-25. Announcement was made during the current edition of the UN climate conference. Invitation made by Brazil in 2017 was withdrawn after pressure from Jair Bolsonaro.
- 17. Marielle was killed by militiamen, says Rio de Janeiro security secretary. According to General Richard Nunes, the militia believed that the councilwoman’s performance could hinder business related to land grabbing in the west side of Rio de Janeiro. Crime completed nine months.

Jan 1st, 2019 Inauguration.

Source: Elaborated by the author based on the newspapers composing the sample of this research.

5.3.2.2 Sample composition

According to the time frame applied to gather the editorial articles from the newspapers, the sample is composed and distributed as shown below, in table 14:

Table 14: The sample by its composition – number of article from each newspaper.

NEWSPAPER	TOTAL OF ARTICLES	REPRESENTATION % IN THE CORPUS
<i>Folha de São Paulo</i>	365	16,63
<i>O Globo</i>	356	16,23
<i>O Estado de São Paulo</i>	344	15,67
<i>Estado de Minas</i>	119	5,42
<i>O Tempo</i>	353	16,08
<i>Zero Hora</i>	97	4,42
<i>Valor Econômico</i>	240	10,93
<i>Correio Braziliense</i>	321	14,62
Total	2,195	100%

Source: Elaborated by the author.

A few notes on the newspapers and the sample composition:

1. The *Folha de São Paulo* published two articles per day under the editorial section, and other three to four – it varies according to the day – of opinion articles signed by known commentators and writers. The editorial section is titled *Editoriais* (in Brazilian Portuguese) and was published every day along the entire year.

2. *O Globo* also published two articles per day under its editorial section, combined with the publication of once a week an editorial section composed by one article from the vehicle, and one signed article. To this format of the editorial was given the name of *Tema em discussão* (*Topic in discussion*, translating to English) and offers two different opinions about one same topic, confronting different opinions. In the days this format happened, it was only considered the article from *O Globo*, titled *Nossa Opinião* (Our opinion).

3. The *O Estado de São Paulo*, on its turn, published three articles per day under the editorial section. The section has a sub-name, *Notas e Informações*. In this case, only one article per day was considered for the analysis.

4. The *Estado de Minas* published the editorial articles online under the tag *Opinião* (Opinion) and mixed with the opinion articles signed by commentators, editors and other writers. On the printed version, the same article is under the editorial section, not using *Opinião* title for the section. Also, the newspaper does not publish editorial every day, but an average of every three days. Also, commonly there are more than one article – varying between three and four – published during the same day. In such cases, all the articles published were collected. For a technical reason due to the newspaper search engine's limitation it was only possible to access articles precisely six months back. The corpus of articles from *Estado de Minas* is composed by all the articles published during October, November and December 2018.

5. *O Tempo* published one editorial article a day, the same article is online and on the printed version. The sum is 353 articles regarding the fact that in some months the archives of the 31st could not be accessed (an error of the newspaper's website probably).

6. *Zero Hora* was the only newspaper in the sample to publish exclusive editorial articles on the online version, among articles also featured on the printed newspaper. The editorial online section has a frequency of new content every 3,7 days during the one-year time frame.

7. *Valor Econômico* on its turn, publishes online the same editorial content as featured on the printed version. The sample gathered is composed of 240 articles since there is no circulation on weekends and national holidays.

8. Finally, *Correio Braziliense* names its editorial pieces as *Visão do Correio* (*Correios' Vision*) and published one article per day as the same content as in the printed version, including Saturdays and Sundays.

There is a gap in the content, from August 8th to September 19th, 2018, that was inexistent in the archives.

6. FINDINGS

*To find who rules over you,
Simply find out who you are not allowed to criticise.
— Voltaire*

In this chapter, the results of the Content Analysis are presented following the procedure as detailed on 5.2.1.2 and the code sheet on 5.2.1.3. The results cover the analysis of 2,195 editorial articles gathered from the eight most read online newspapers from Brazil, from January 1st to December 31st, 2018 classified according the four analysis categories/worldviews – *Elitism*, *Egalitarianism*, *Communitarianism* and *Individualism* – and its combinations or oppositions. The analysis of the sample was executed from May 2019 through December 2019.

The results displayed below, in the quantitative and qualitative subchapters, are kept in the same order as the ranking position of each newspaper, as in table 14.

For each newspaper, the results are illustrated first in a table with an outline of worldviews found – from higher occurrence to lower –, the correspondence in number of news pieces, and the representation in percentage considering the sample of the newspaper.

Complementary to that, each set of results includes:

- a) a figure ranking of all the topics covered by the newspaper, and
- b) a figure with the frequency of topics registered considering only the articles composing the dominant worldview detected in the newspaper.

After presenting the results per newspaper, there is a subchapter with the comparative results, which paves the way to understand the mapping of the political-ideological position which is build considering all eight newspapers.

Lastly, the tables containing analysis' details and results per article and per newspaper can be consulted in annex 3. The tables are presented per newspaper and display the following information:

- a) the article's code
- b) the publication date

- c) the title of the article
- d) the worldview defined after running the analysis

6.1 General quantitative results

6.1.1 Folha de São Paulo

The editorial columns' content featured by the online version of the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, the predominance of worldview detected was *Elitism*, found in 76.71% of the articles analysed. And in second place, with a considerable difference of 64.94%, the combination of the worldviews *Elitism / Individualism*, as shown in the table 15 below.

Table 15: Final outline of Folha de São Paulo's worldviews.

Worldviews	Number of news articles	%
<i>Elitism</i>	280	76.71
<i>Elitism / Individualism</i>	43	11.77
<i>Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism</i>	28	7.68
<i>Anti-elitism</i>	10	2.75
<i>Egalitarianism</i>	2	0.55
<i>Anti-egalitarianism</i>	1	0.27
<i>Individualism</i>	1	0.27

Total:

365

100%

Source: Elaborated by the author.


The editorial content from the newspaper Folha de São Paulo was registered as highly oriented to an *Elitist* view – in 280 articles out of 365 –, and that is apprehended mainly when the article was dedicated to discussing politics. The second-most repeated topic is elections – considering in 2018 there were national elections, for president, national deputies, senators and state governors.

Important to observe that *politics* as the topic of classification for this research refers to Brazilian politics; thus, when stated *international politics* or *international economy*, it is understood regarding other countries affairs.

The first graphic (figure 9) corresponds to all the topics covered by the newspaper Folha de São Paulo considering the total amount of articles. The second graphic (figure 10) represents the topics covered regarding exclusively the articles marked as elitist-oriented.

It is important to clarify that when it occurs to register a combination of topics (elections + politics, economy + politics, politics + economy) it was taken in to account the discursive emphasis interpreted considering the article's reasoning as a whole. In that, one article can have as a main reasoning a fact or event regarding the political scenario in general and its connection with it – as cause or consequence – with the upcoming, ongoing or with the results of the national elections, since all these stages took place in 2018-time frame. Conversely, registering the topic follows the significance emerging from each article. Furthermore, it standardises the topic classification for the entire sample.


Figure 9: Topics frequency in the editorials of Folha de São Paulo.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Out of 280 articles registered an *Elitist* bias was detected, the topics are centred in discussing *politics*, followed by *elections* and *economy*, as shown in the figure 10 below.

Figure 10: Topics covered regarding exclusively the dominant political-ideological position – *Elitism* – in Folha de São Paulo's content.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

6.1.2 O Globo

Regarding the editorial content in columns published by the online version of O Globo during 2018, the predominance of

worldview found was *Elitism*, registered in 66.85% of the articles analysed (figure 16). In the second place, the combination of *Elitism / Individualism*, following the results found in the case of Folha de São Paulo, just by differences in percentages.


Table 16: Final outline of O Globo's worldviews.

Worldviews	Number of news articles	%
<i>Elitism</i>	238	66.85
<i>Elitism / Individualism</i>	64	17.98
<i>Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism</i>	32	8.99
<i>Anti-elitism</i>	13	3.66
<i>Egalitarianism</i>	7	1.96
<i>Anti-egalitarianism</i>	2	0.56
Total:	356	100%

Source: Elaborated by the author.

That is marked according to the observation of the number of articles dedicated to *politics*, as illustrated in the figure 11. The second most-repeated topic is *economy* and in third place, *elections*.


Figure 11: Topics frequency in the editorials of O Globo.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Considering separately the 238 articles registered as *Elitist*, the topics are centred in discussing *politics*, followed by *economy* and *elections*, as shown in the figure 12 below. In the case of O Globo, the topic elections had a smaller occurrence than in the top one of most read online newspaper, Folha de São Paulo.

Figure 12: Topics covered regarding the dominant political-ideological position – *Elitism* – in O Globo’s content.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

6.1.3 O Estado de São Paulo

O Estado de São Paulo showed a preponderant *Elitist* worldview, registered in 77.9% of the articles studied. Moreover, showing similarity

with the previous newspapers, the marks for *Elitism / Individualism*, was found.


Table 17: Final outline of O Estado de São Paulo's worldviews.

Worldviews	Number of news articles	%
<i>Elitism</i>	268	77.9
<i>Elitism / Individualism</i>	44	12.79
<i>Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism</i>	26	7.56
<i>Anti-egalitarianism</i>	3	0.88
<i>Individualism</i>	2	0.58
<i>Anti-elitism</i>	1	0.29
Total:	344	100%

Source: Elaborated by the author.

The third on the ranking of the most read online newspapers in the country, O Estado de São Paulo, dedicates its editorial columns to mainly discuss *politics*, as the newspapers occupying the two previous positions. Although, Estadão puts considerable more emphasis, with 147 dedicated to politics than O Globo with 103 articles, and Folha de São Paulo with 112 articles.


Figure 13: Topics frequency in the editorials of O Estado de São Paulo.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

The figure 14 (below) displays the results when considering only the portion of articles marked as *elitist*, 268 articles the most covered topic was *politics* (107), followed by *economy* (33) and *elections* (31).

Figure 14: Topics covered regarding the dominant political-ideological position – *Elitism* – in O Estado de São Paulo’s content.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

6.1.4 Estado de Minas

In the content of the editorial columns featured by Estado de Minas the dominant worldview registered was *Elitism*, found in 48.74% of the articles analysed.

In other instance, with a smaller difference, it was found that *Elitism / Individualism* were characterising the content of the media outlet from the centre region of Brazil.


Table 18: Final outline of Estado de Minas' worldviews.

Worldviews	Number of news articles	%
<i>Elitism</i>	58	48.74
<i>Elitism / Individualism</i>	28	23.53
<i>Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism</i>	18	15.13
<i>Egalitarianism</i>	5	4.20
<i>Communitarianism</i>	1	0.85
<i>Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism</i>	1	0.85
Total:	119	100%

Source: Elaborated by the author.

The Estado de Minas also demonstrates to be overall concerned with *politics* and secondly to *economic* affairs in the country. Although, when analysing exclusively the articles where an elitist worldview was registered, the concern shifts to *economy*, and in second place *economy* and *politics*.


Figure 15: Topics frequency in the editorials of Estado de Minas.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

When considering only the segment of articles showing *Elitism* as their bias in content (figure 16), 58 articles, the topics is firstly dedicated to *economy*, followed by *economy and politics*, and *politics and economy*, representing a narrow connection between the two topics for the content makers of Estado de Minas.

Figure 16: Topics covered regarding exclusively the dominant political-ideological position – *Elitism* – in Estado de Minas’s content.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Important to remark the figure 16 is shortened to put in evidence the higher frequency of topics, especially displaying the top three ranking positions.

6.1.5 O Tempo

Summarising the information in the table 19, in the editorial columns published by O Tempo the predominant worldview registered was *Egalitarianism*, found in 41.93% of the articles. In the second place, it was registered *Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism* as the marks of the newspaper’s political-ideological position.

Table 19: Final outline of O Tempo's worldviews.


Worldviews	Number of news articles	%
<i>Egalitarianism</i>	148	41.93
<i>Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism</i>	109	30.88
<i>Anti-elitism</i>	69	19.54
<i>Elitism</i>	9	2.54
<i>Egalitarianism / Anti-individualism</i>	8	2.28
<i>Anti-individualism</i>	4	1.14
<i>Elitism / Individualism</i>	3	0.85
<i>Individualism</i>	2	0.56
<i>Egalitarianism / Communitarianism</i>	1	0.28
Total:	353	100%

Source: Elaborated by the author.

On its turn, the newspaper O Tempo dedicates the total number of editorial articles (353) firstly to *politics* and secondly to *social affairs*, followed by *elections*, as show in figure 17 below.

Although, contrary to the results found in the previous four newspapers, the online news outlet is oriented to an *Egalitarian* worldview.

Figure 17: Topics frequency in the editorials of O Tempo.




Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 17 had to be shortened for the matter of fitting in the results shown here, alternatively, it is presented as a table in annex 4.

Regarding the topics covered exclusively considering the articles registered within an *egalitarian* bias (148), the focus was *social affairs*, *politics* and *environment*, in this order as displayed in figure 18.

Figure 18: Topics covered regarding exclusively the dominant political-ideological position – *Egalitarianism* – in O Tempo’s content.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

The newspaper presents a significant variety of topics, especially regarding the society and its social aspects, as *urbanism*, *public health*, and *public safety*.

In Brazil, since the country has one of the most developed public healthcare system in the world⁵⁹, the topic is frequently discussed. Also, public safety is constantly a point of interest considering the country figures, unfortunately, among the countries with higher levels of violence⁶⁰.

⁵⁹ Information from World Bank. Source:

<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/15801>

⁶⁰ The most recent Map of the violence in Brazil, from IPEA (Institute of Applied Economic Research). Source: <http://www.ipea.gov.br/atlasviolencia/>

6.1.6 Zero Hora

In the content analysed from Zero Hora, the dominant worldview registered was the combination of *Elitism and Individualism*, found in 34.02%, as displayed in the table 20. In the second place, appears *Elitism* and third *Elitism/Anti-egalitarianism* as the marks of the newspaper's political-ideological position.

Table 20: Final outline of Zero Hora's worldviews.

Worldviews	Number of news articles	%
<i>Elitism / Individualism</i>	33	34.02
<i>Elitism</i>	31	31.96
<i>Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism</i>	13	13.4
<i>Egalitarianism</i>	11	11.34
<i>Individualism / Anti-egalitarianism</i>	4	4.12
<i>Anti-elitism / Egalitarianism</i>	2	2.06
<i>Elitism / Anti-communitarianism</i>	2	2.06
Total:	97	100%


Source: Elaborated by the author.

The only online newspaper representing a zone out of the centre of the country, Zero Hora, dedicates the articles primarily to discuss *politics* considering the global number of articles.

As *elitist*, the content editorial featured by the Southern newspaper the emphasis was writing about *politics*, and in second place,

about *politics and elections*, and in third place *economy and politics*, as shows figure 19.


Figure 19: Topics frequency in the editorials of Zero Hora.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

If considering the topics registered exclusively as *Elitism / Individualism*, which is the dominant in Zero Hora's content, 33 articles put emphasis on discussing *politics and elections* (8), secondly *politics* (7), and *economy* (3), as presented in the figure 20.

Figure 20: Topics covered regarding exclusively the dominant political-ideological position – *Elitism / Individualism* – in Zero Hora’s content.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

6.1.7 *Valor Econômico*

In the editorial columns of *Valor Econômico* during the extent of 2018, the predominance of worldview found was *Elitism*, registered in 71,91% of the articles (table 21). In the second place, *Elitism / Individualism* was the worldview registered in 17.08% of the articles from this newspaper.

Table 21: Final outline of Valor Econômico’s worldviews.

Worldviews	Number of news articles	%
<i>Elitism</i>	175	72.91
<i>Elitism / Individualism</i>	41	17.08
<i>Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism</i>	22	9.17
<i>Egalitarianism</i>	1	0.42
<i>Individualism</i>	1	0.42
Total:	344	100%


Source: Elaborated by the author.

The newspaper that has openly focused on *economy* – national and international – Valor Econômico devotes its editorial articles essentially to talk about the *economy*, considering the total number of articles (240) analysed in this research. In the second place, it is registered the *international economy* topic.

Having in mind the newspaper is part of O Globo Group, the publication demonstrates alignment with O Globo newspaper, also analysed previously. Valor Econômico is elitist-oriented, as O Globo and considering the topics filtered exclusively registered as elitists, the emphasis of the topics was also *economy* and *international economy*. Furthermore, in this case, considering the third more frequent topic appear *elections*, as above mentioned, it is related to the 2018 political dispute in Brazil.

Important to remark the limitations in the topics covered by the newspaper, which possibly is due to the content focus of the publication *per se*.


Figure 21: Topics frequency in the editorials of Valor Econômico.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

As it was foreseen, the topics covered when looking to only the articles registered as *elitist* (175) are the same, as shown in figure 22. With a difference of the third place, to *elections and politics*, while *economy* and *international economy* kept the first and second position in both scenarios.

Figure 22: Topics covered regarding exclusively the dominant political-ideological position – *Elitism* – in Valor Econômico’s content.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

6.1.8 *Correio Braziliense*

In the editorial content of *Correio Braziliense*, the dominant worldview registered, in 78.82% of the articles, was *Elitism* (table 22). Secondly, the combination of *Elitism* and *Individualism*.

Table 22: Final outline of *Correio Braziliense*’s worldviews.


Worldviews	Number of news articles	%
<i>Elitism</i>	253	78.82
<i>Elitism / Individualism</i>	40	12.46

<i>Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism</i>	12	3.74
<i>Egalitarianism</i>	8	2.49
<i>Anti-elitism</i>	4	1.25
<i>Anti-egalitarianism</i>	1	0.31
<i>Anti-elitism / Individualism</i>	1	0.31
<i>Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism</i>	1	0.31
<i>Individualism</i>	1	0.31
Total:	321	100%

Source: Elaborated by the author.

The content of the editorial columns of *Correio Braziliense* is in general classified as oriented to an *elitist* worldview, with high emphasis in *politics* exclusively, also, in the second place to *economy and politics* combined, as shown by figure 23 below.


Figure 23: Topics frequency in the editorials of Correio Braziliense.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

When filtered exclusively by articles registered biased as *elitists* (253), the highest number of articles are discussing *politics*, in second place *elections*, followed by topics concerning *economy and politics* combined, as presented in figure 24.

Figure 24: Topics covered regarding exclusively the dominant political-ideological – *Elitism* – position in *Correio Braziliense*'s content.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

These were the results assembled above in tables and figures by newspapers, and it represents the quantitative aspects intended to be compiled in this phase.

It was presented according to the importance regarding the research objectives, that mainly proposes to uncover the dominant political-ideological bias of each newspaper composing the sample and subsequently looking through the topics presented, the frequency, and its variety.

After it is rendered the comparative tests considering the eight online newspapers in order to analyse how the most read media outlets can be understood in relation to each other.

6.2 Comparative results

To comparatively illustrate the quantitative global results, in the table below (table 23) the top row presents the eight newspapers – always respecting the ranking position – and in the first column, the worldviews registered are displayed in alphabetical order. Complementary, the total amount of articles analysed per newspaper are shown, the predominant worldview that is registered for each and the frequency. Alternatively explained, the first column and the first worldview: *Folha de São Paulo* had just one article where *anti-egalitarianism* marks were registered, *O Globo* on its turn has two, *O Estado de São Paulo*, three, *Estado de Minas* has none. In the same table, is it marked in bold the numbers corresponding to the number of articles that finally defined the political-ideological position of each newspaper in the sample.

Primarily, considering the eight most-read online newspapers from Brazil, three categories of political-ideological position was found, *Egalitarianism*, *Elitism* and *Elitism/Individualism*. Moreover, two of them – *Elitism* and *Elitism/Individualism* – congregate seven of the newspapers analysed:

Folha de São Paulo
O Globo
O Estado de São Paulo
Estado de Minas
Zero Hora
Valor Econômico
Correio Braziliense

Only one newspaper presents itself differently by a strong emphasis in *Egalitarianism* political-ideological bias found in its editorial content:

O Tempo.

Table 23: Comparative worldviews registered and number of articles published by newspapers analysed.

	Folha de São Paulo	O Globo	O Estado de São Paulo	Estado de Minas	O Tempo	Zero Hora	Valor Econômico	Correio Braziliense
<i>Anti-egalitarianism</i>	1	2	3	-	-	-	-	1
<i>Anti-elitism</i>	10	13	1	-	69	-	-	4
<i>Anti-elitism / Individualism</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
<i>Anti-individualism</i>	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-
<i>Communitarianism</i>	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
<i>Egalitarianism</i>	2	7	-	5	148	11	1	8
<i>Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism</i>	-	-	-	1	109	2	-	1
<i>Egalitarianism / Anti-individualism</i>	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-
<i>Egalitarianism / Communitarianism</i>	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
<i>Elitism</i>	280	238	268	58	9	31	175	253
<i>Elitism / Anti-communitarianism</i>	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
<i>Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism</i>	28	32	26	18	-	13	22	12
<i>Elitism / Individualism</i>	43	64	44	28	3	33	41	40
<i>Individualism</i>	1	-	2	8	2	4	1	1
<i>Individualism / Anti-egalitarianism</i>	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Since there are differences between the number of articles collected from each newspaper (as previously presented in table 14), a percentage of worldview registered is calculated within the sample of each newspaper, shown in table 24. Therefore, simplifying, it can answer *how elitist a newspaper is*.

Among the eight online newspapers studies, *Correio Braziliense* is the one that reinforces the elitist view in its discourse, followed, with slight differences, by *O Estado de São Paulo*, *Folha de São Paulo* and *Valor Econômico*.


Table 24: Representation regarding the dominant worldview found in each newspaper.

Newspaper	Predominant worldview	%
Correio Braziliense	Elitism	78.82
O Estado de São Paulo	Elitism	77.90
Folha de São Paulo	Elitism	76.71
Valor Econômico	Elitism	72.91
O Globo	Elitism	66.85
Estado de Minas	Elitism	48.74
O Tempo	Egalitarianism	41.93
Zero Hora	Elitism / Individualism	34.02

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Complementary to this data, the graphic below (figure 25) does a comparison regarding the frequency of worldviews registered in number of articles per newspaper provides the apprehension of *O Tempo* standing alone offering the readers an *egalitarian* and *anti-elitist* political-ideological position. The other seven newspapers compose a unison of *elitism*, *anti-egalitarianism*, *anti-communitarianism*, *individualism*, and the possible combinations. Moreover, with no occurrence of conflictive worldviews marks in any article, from any newspaper.


Figure 25: Comparative graphic regarding the frequency of worldviews registered in number of articles per newspaper.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Finally, accomplishing a critical moment of this research, it is presented (figure 26) the map of the political-ideological position found in the sample of the eight newspapers considered for this study.

Figure 26: Map of the political-ideological position of the most read online newspapers from Brazil.



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Closing this quantitative chapter of the results, what was mainly presented was:

- a) the political-ideological positions found in each newspaper considering the total articles grouped, and from that, highlighting the dominant bias detected, but also displaying all the other positions found
- b) the frequency of the topics per newspaper

c) the topic focus considering only the dominant political-ideological position per newspaper, which presented some variation of the general topic frequency

d) the results considering the dominant political-ideological position from each newspaper in comparison with each other, offering the glimpse of a broader picture regarding these media outlets in Brazil;

e) the quantitative extent of each dominant political-ideological bias, or among the *elitists* how elitist one is in comparing to another or in relation to the group

f) the map of the political-ideological position putting together the eight online newspapers considered over the grid proposed in the method built for this research.

6.3 General qualitative results

Considering the written discursive practices in the journalistic scope (Casamiglia and Tusón 2012), the qualitative analysis is organised considering the units of analysis selected and sorted in the coding sheet, as the ones considered to present categories of political-ideological bias. The examples of the discursive strategy is displayed by relevance unveiling how the units of analysis mentioned in each newspaper can present an extremist discursive approach: the repetition of specific marks, the criticism to a mark that consequently supports a different core value, the portrayal of actors, the repetition of ideas related to an actor or an event.

In another words, for each newspaper the qualitative analysis was oriented in a first level by the dominant bias registered, and secondly by the description interpretation and narration of how such bias is manifested in the articles analysed.

The information in between the box brackets refers to the article's code and the units of analysis are represented in translation to English, since the articles are originally in Brazilian Portuguese. The translation is a free format by the author of this research, complemented by some

explanation when necessary, as some units are essentially understood if having a background about Brazilian actors and events. The timeline displaying the main events of 2018 presented in the section 5.3.2.1 supports the understanding of the agenda covered by the editorial articles.

6.3.1 Folha de São Paulo

The most-read online newspaper in Brazil is found in the results of this research work to be biased towards an *elitist* worldview while covering topics mainly regarding national *politics* and *elections*, which was indisputably the most prominent topics all along the year in many instances in Brazil, to a great degree in media.

The editorial adopts a voice of orientation speaking to the masses, as a spokesperson of guidance. The editorial discourse is identified to have a communicative function that presents oppositions and orients to assertiveness based on the information that the speaker – in this case, the newspaper as an institution and the discursive subject – holds and offers to the public.

The discourse of Folha de São Paulo is throughout the year very insistent picturing a specific political party, Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, the Workers Party) in every hostile way as possible, while the mentions regarding the other parties are almost inexistent. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva – one of the leading figures of PT who in 2018 was under a process accused of corruption which ended with a trial that took him to jail – was one of the main actors that Folha de São Paulo explored discursively.

Right in the first day of 2018, the editorial attacks indirectly the Workers Party affirming that since the year has started with promising perspective in the economic sector but subject to high political uncertainty and “the risk of setback” [FOLHADESP20180101]. The expectation demonstrated by the editorial was “an advance after the deceptive marketing of the last dispute” [FOLHADESP20180421]. This risk takes the reader to understand the setback is PT winning the

national presidency position and affect the economy plan as during Dilma Rousseff's mandate, when she was hugely criticised.

The same editorial makes clear to whom the discourse refers when it states “the price of the victorious mystifications in 2014 is still being paid” [FOLHADESP20180101] or “after the 2014 election fraud” and “the political and economic crises that stemmed from it” [FOLHADESP20180421] since in 2014 Rousseff won the election with Michel Temer as the vice-president.

The year also started with a violence crisis in Rio de Janeiro, where the militias rule vast regions and dispute for drug trafficking control over regions (slums and group of slums). The topic is not considered to involve civilians living in those areas – which are the majority; but just a duality of power, the good and the bad, the policeman and the crook. Moreover, in this polarity, there are three actors, according to the newspaper: the State, the policemen and the “delinquents”. The “delinquents” are portrayed as being extremely dangerous they could run an “eventual cooptation of the military” which “would be an institutional catastrophe that the country would hardly be able to overcome” [FOLHADESP20180104 – Não apenas falta às Forças vocação para atuar no patrulhamento de ruas e na repressão à delinquência. Ainda mais perigoso é expor seus membros ao contato com o crime organizado – uma eventual cooptação de militares seria catástrofe institucional que o país dificilmente conseguiria superar.]

In this military intervention that took months in Rio de Janeiro, to kill several civilians is justified by the government as a public security matter. For that the editorial of Folha de São Paulo moderately criticises Michel Temer and add praise to his work: “it must be recognised that the Temer government courageously led an agenda as harsh as it was essential in the economy” [FOLHADESP20180219].

The economic aspect, as just stated in the unit of analysis above, is an essential element in the equation for Folha de São Paulo, since social instability does not represent a good scenario for the investors and these investors represent a group of power. As in another example, it appears in a piece about a month earlier that adds that “the expected recovery of the economy, due to this reasoning (ruling with security and serenity), strengthens more conservative and predictable names”

[FOLHADESP20180112]. It indirectly recognises Michel Temer for his work regarding the economy, and it can be described as very elitist biased supporting a future conservative government – which can be inferred that is the right-wing candidate. It can be connected to the worldviews of an elitist or authoritarian democracy, which as about traditional political ideologies are in the range of fascism and liberalism.

Apart from the discourse place of the newspaper, which already represents a unidirectional route, the existence of authoritarian voices is present. As in one editorial about new rules for public workers in state banks affirms: “professionals imbued with the spirit of serving the public should not oppose significant resistance to rectifying changes” [FOLHADESP20180708 – os profissionais imbuídos do espírito de servir ao público não deverão opor resistência significativa a mudanças retificadoras].

The editorial also makes clear through its discourse the position oriented to liberal ideas regarding economy when criticising previous presidents (Lula and Dilma) by using “interventionist government” [FOLHADESP20180127] to characterise their model political plan. The messages adopted by Folha de São Paulo also addresses the private sector and privatisation as elements of their discursive agenda, for example, when in the editorial appears: “competition and efficiency in the private sector are also essential” [FOLHADESP20180331 – competição e eficiência no setor privado são também imprescindíveis].

The economic problems in the country are frequently portrayed as being caused by the “profound inefficiency of the Brazilian State” [FOLHADESP20180216] which is frequently described as “huge” [FOLHADESP20180216; FOLHADESP20180413; FOLHADESP20180506] and “it is possible to distinguish an essential consensus – the current situation in the country demands reforms in the functions of the State and public spending” [FOLHADESP20180421 – é possível distinguir um consenso essencial – a atual situação do país demanda reformas das funções do Estado e do gasto público].

Besides, one article affirms more specifically that “the main threat to state financial health is the increase in its expenses with retirees and pensioners” [FOLHADESP20180211] as a situation that will “worsen

in the coming years, with the double pressure of budget restrictions and an ageing population” [FOLHADESP20180826]. Although, nothing is mentioned regarding the inequality of the retirements and pensions systems the country has since the politicians and the military are part of the section getting a big slice in this unfair share.

The criminal investigation named Lava Jato (Car Wash, in English) developed by the Federal Police that started in 2014, and that had as a main actor Justice Sergio Moro, focused firmly in Lula’s judgement and arrest, especially in 2018. The editorial of Folha states the target by “it is not just the PT that finds itself caught up in such problems (corruption)” but “only Lula is in danger of being left out of the dispute because of the Clean Record Act” [FOLHADESP20180118]. The Clean Record Law is a Brazilian act approved by the National Congress that turns any possible candidate who judicially accused of crimes ineligible to hold public office for eight years.

Folha de São Paulo’s editorial seems not to forget the former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the trial that the politician went through was a full plate for the elitist newspaper. From January to December, Lula was depicted with specific vocabulary building a “character” with “dimensions” that “broke the limits of reasonable” [FOLHADESP20180124 – *dadas as dimensões do personagem, a politização do processo rompeu os limites do razoável*]. For the first time, in opposition to Lula, one unity brings together the candidate who months later would become the president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro: “while the right can bear the name of deputy Jair Bolsonaro (PSC-RJ), and the left awaits an outcome for the postulation of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT)” [FOLHADESP20180225].

The founder and foremost politician of the Workers’ Party is described in the same editorial as “petist leader” who “mixed the defence of his biography and the intention to run for president again” [FOLHADESP20180225]. He is since the beginning condemned by the editorial’s judge position with a hint of irony: “the former president credibly stages the role of victim” [FOLHADESP20180225], and Lula is put in a position with no unacceptable defence since everything related to him is a “Lulist version” that “all goes down to political

persecution against a leader of working-class origin” [FOLHADESP20180407].

Often tagged with words related to a state of insanity, Lula “inflates militancy with the crazy theory that he is the victim of a conspiracy plotted by the legal-police institutions and the press” [FOLHADESP20180225]; “develops improbable conspiracy theories”; “invests in delusional versions”; “seems out of touch with reality, but at the same time feels reality in his favor” and “covers himself with ironic coherence” [FOLHADESP20180302].

When for the presidential elections Lula was still a possible candidate following the Workers’ Party political strategy, the editorial once again acted minimising the party by affirming that “PT pantomime with Lula would be just another party relapse into infantilism” [FOLHADESP20180816].

Regarding the day that Lula was judged and sent to prison, on April the 7th, the editorial pictured the opinions against the decision as “manifestations of its most dissatisfied supporters” or “a small number of militants, taken over by nonconformity or hate”, and as a mass which “the sense of unreality configures attitude” based on a “persecutory euphoria” [FOLHADESP20180407]. Lastly, in the same piece, Folha affirms that the supreme justice ruled and “Lula’s arrest follows a republican protocol that transcends ideological meanings and party passions that are attempted to put on him” [FOLHADESP20180407].

Just fourteen days later, the article affirms that “the first signs” of the electoral debate “offer some hope for improvement” [FOLHADESP20180421], since the candidate with the primary voting intention according to the polls was arrested. And the persecution was openly described in one sentence: “it is not difficult to consider the possibility of a PT representative being elected President of the Republic and having the opportunity of forgiveness to the party members convicted in Lava Jato, including Lula” [FOLHADESP20180816 – Não é difícil cogitar a hipótese de um representante do PT eleger-se Presidente da República e colocar-se diante da oportunidade de perdão aos companheiros de partido condenados na Lava Jato, incluindo Lula.].

After September and through the election rounds, the dualism portraying the two primary candidates was evident. Bolsonaro was a “victim of an abominable knife attack” [FOLHADESP20181008] with a “a conservative (government, platform, in politics, economics or mores)” that “is legitimate and perfectly compatible with democracy” [FOLHADESP20180919]. The Workers’ Party was described as having a candidate who is “supported exclusively on the prestige of the legendary and immutable leader of the legend (Lula)”, a party that the “conservatives advance against” [FOLHADESP20181008], with “improvised patches” and “a party concerned with preserving the spirit of militancy and the command of the opposition” [FOLHADESP20181024].

The popular movements contrary to Lula’s imprisonment is described as “as usual”, “violent acts”, “exalted militants” and “organised associations” [FOLHADESP20180418], these organisations are named by the article “Movement of Landless Rural Workers (MST) and Movement of Homeless Workers (MTST) [FOLHADESP20180418]. The crimes of the “protestants” are “blocks roads and toll” as “demonstrations of truculence and intolerance that have nothing to do with the democratic exercise of the right to protest” [FOLHADESP20180418]. There was no mention in any article or single piece of information among the total number of articles about the excluded minorities these organisations represent in an unequal social scheme as in Brazil.

Among the elitist biased media in a country where the landowners are powerful, to criminalise the Movement of Landless Rural Workers in every opportunity shows questionless to whom the newspaper gives support. Statements as “agribusiness are undoubtedly vital for the generation of income in the country” and “ideological polarisation between environmentalists and ruralists [FOLHADESP20181022] helps to understand.

In Brazil, the political system allows a pluralism of parties as long as the group is legitimate under the national constitution to compose to be registered as a political party, which is one of the constructive aspects of such a plural society as in Brazil. Although, in Folha de São Paulo’s editorial the elitist bias appears in fragments of disapproval when

mentioning that most of the parties “in which the (Brazilian) political system has fragmented are unable to dispute a trophy such as that of the Presidency of the Republic” [FOLHADESP20180410 – A maioria das siglas em que o sistema político se fragmentou não tem condições de disputar um troféu como o da Presidência da República]. The president’s position is described as representing a reward more than an important job position with a high duty to society. Complementary, the same article reinforces the idea using the expression “pulverisation of power” [FOLHADESP20180410 – a pulverização do poder no Parlamento terão consequências para o atual governo] and affirming that it will have consequences in the government, since it represents a non-unanimous agenda, considering the parties hold different core values.

In a global scenario, the orientation comes from referents as the United States, for example, when the topic was the diplomatic and historic meeting of members from the two Koreas. The event is described under the guidance of the doubts imported from the North American country as “already duly expressed by the White House and the other actors accustomed to dealing with Pyongyang” [FOLHADESP20180428].

The elitist core value related to the State as the tool for social order serves for classes considered as an amorphous mass where the State should be present to control violence, as in Rio de Janeiro. Since in the newspaper’s point of view, the State in Brazil is a “huge machinery” also because the “health, safety and education obligations imply high costs” [FOLHADESP20180916].

6.3.2 O Globo

Another representant of the centre region of the country, O Globo shows extensive traits to be classified as *elitist*, regarding the axis proposed by this method. With 238 articles presenting marks aligned this elitist core values, the newspaper dedicates attention to discuss *politics* and *economy* mainly. There was also a high frequency

of *elections* among the trend topics since 2018 was restless in the political events and it all was, at least in the discourse constructed, connected to the national elections.

Comparable to the communicative behaviour of Folha de São Paulo, O Globo adopts a direct discursive style, characterised by a clear message that represents the confidence of the speaker defending something, a point of view.

When the editorial of O Globo discusses the economy, it was registered a high occurrence of mentions advocating that the incentives to the private sector as essential for the national economic growth. As well as the non-intervention of the State in regulating the companies' actions and the privatisation of state-owned companies. As in this example, criticising the PT's political plan as an interventionist: “the world crisis in 2008/9 served as a pretext to apply the old interventionist recipe always defended by the PT until they landed on the Planalto (name of the government headquarters, Palácio do Planalto” [OGLOBO20180108]; or “Rousseff's populist interventionism” [OGLOBO20180421]. Also, as the units show, it is frequent the attribution to the economic problems exclusively to Lula and Dilma Rousseff and their political decisions during their time as the head of the national government. As in these two different constructions:

[OGLOBO20180101] [Para chegar ao crescimento do PIB de 7,5% em 2010, taxa colocada na vitrine para maravilhar o mundo, os governos Lula e Dilma começaram a contratar a crise que viria depois] [*To achieve GDP growth of 7.5% in 2010, a rate placed on the window to marvel the world, the Lula and Dilma governments began to contract the crisis that would come later*]

[OGLOBO20180101] [A crise em si, porém, foi provocada por apostas insensatas, populistas, e, é certo, de má-fé] [*The crisis itself, however, was caused by senseless, populist bets, and, of course, with lousy intention*]

O Globo is perceived to be more insistent in the discourse that defends a program of privatisation of State companies. For the newspapers, “the sign of changes in investment evolution” is dependent of “the action of factors that induce and increase the private participation” [OGLOBO20180117 – A mudança de sinal na evolução

dos investimentos coincide com a ação de fatores que induzem o aumento da participação privada no suporte financeiro aos projetos], and “the sale of control of the state-owned company (...) is necessary” [OGLOBO20180421 – não se discute que seja necessária a venda do controle da estatal, desequilibrada de forma de forma estrutural pelo intervencionismo populista da presidente Dilma Rousseff]. Two other expressions frequently used were “investment program” and “attract private groups” [OGLOBO20180421 – a necessidade vital de atrair para o setor elétrico grupos privados em condições de arcar com um programa de investimentos pesados e constantes]. Alternatively, to O Globo, both “Lula and Dilma” and their economic policies “helped to deteriorate expectations towards Brazil and led investors further back” [OGLOBO20180108].

Even in topics about education, the economy was the primary concern, offering the notion that acquiring knowledge is directly connected to occupying a role in the society of production and consumption. One editorial, published in March, regarding the results of a study about the educational level in the country mentions an effect of “economic disengagement” that “impacts directly the economic production” [OGLOBO20180309 – estudo (sobre jovens os níveis de educação no Brasil) alerta que “desengajamento econômico” tem impacto direto na produtividade da economia].

In O Globo’s editorial pieces, a year-long wave of criticism addressed to the Workers’ Party was built in topics regarding the economy and the elections scenario, likewise the first newspaper in this study.

The discursive structured seeing through the analysis showed the use of specific words to characterise the previous centre-left governments of Lula and Dilma. “Populist”, “interventionist” [OGLOBO20180101] and “anti-democratic” [OGLOBO20180127] are found along with the sample of articles. Also, picturing the former presidents as warlords for Lula, and naïve and jumbled for Dilma Rousseff: “PT and legends that made up the alliance that sustained Lula and Dilma in power” [OGLOBO20180108]. No such references were found describing politicians from the conservative and economically liberal side.

The Workers' Party is portrayed using a term commonly used for organised criminal groups, which is "factions" (faccões in Brazilian Portuguese) [OGLOBO20180127] in Brazilian press when talking about groups of drug trafficking control. Also, politicians members of the party are addressed as rioters: "there must be concerned PT politicians because they want to be re-elected in October, and the way to do that is not to build barricades across the country" [OGLOBO20180127] [Deve haver políticos petistas preocupados, porque querem se reeleger em outubro, e o caminho para isso não é erguer barricadas pelo país afora].

About Lula's process, O Globo follows similar communicative behaviour as Folha, and openly condemns the former president: "this sentence" which puts Lula in jail "spoils the plan to retake a well-known Lulopetism power project – it was to finance it that Petrobrás was plundered [OGLOBO20180202] [esta sentença estraga o plano de retomada de um conhecido projeto de poder do lulopetismo – era para financiá-lo que a Petrobrás foi saqueada].

In contrast, there were units endorsing president's attitude, expressing the achievement of "important advances, for example, in labour reform" [OGLOBO20180204] [governo Temer acumula avanços importantes, por exemplo, na reforma trabalhista]. Michel Temer questionably replaced Dilma Rousseff representing the Brazilian right and did not consider a call for new elections when the impeachment happened, in 2016.

There were inconsistent marks found, as shown below, regarding the duty of the state in dissonance to the dominant discourse of unrestricted capitalist economy: "if the distribution market is oligopolist, there are state agencies that deal with the problem. [OGLOBO20180529] [se o mercado de distribuição esta oligopolizado, há organismos de estado que tratam do problema]

The newspaper also adopts an egalitarian-leaning position, in one specific unit, about the military dictatorship in Brazil, as exemplified in this unit: It is crucial to be aware of the differences concerning that past, also for society to be able to reject any authoritarian proposal that comes from the right or the left" [OGLOBO20180512 – É crucial ter consciência das diferença em relação àquele passado (da ditadura militar

no Brasil), também para a sociedade poder rejeitar qualquer proposta autoritária que venha da direita ou da esquerda]. The discourse of O Globo makes sure to mention “right” and “left” even though in the country is very clear who is the left, the Workers’ Party, and the right has no exact reference.

At the same time, O Globo publishes a discourse attributing to the society – which in this construction works similar to a definition of class – for empty financial difficulties in stabilising the pension system. In the discourse, the editorial void mentioning the discrepancy of benefits between workers and the ones occupying high positions, especially former politicians and military:

[OGLOBO20180309] [A sociedade rejeita o compromisso que teria de haver entre as gerações. A atual esta quebrando o Tesouro, sem qualquer atenção a filhos e netos] [*Society rejects the compromise that would have to be made between generations. The current one is breaking the Treasury, without any attention to children and grandchildren*]

Again, when discussing education, together with marks or social egalitarianism supporting the public education, comes associated the purpose of the education: occupy a job position: “everyone deserves equivalent conditions to enter the job market” [OGLOBO20180702]. There were no marks of presenting it as a tool for personal growth, for example.

O Globo, like other newspapers registered as elitists, presented similar discursive characteristics when discussing the social security system reform, mainly leaning towards the application of authority from above. The discursive construction is built emphasising how “urgent”, “inevitable” and “evident” [OGLOBO20180204] or how it is “the only way to guard against volatile times” [OGLOBO20180207] to reformulate the system. For so, the population must agree with it risking not to receive the benefit. The cause is summed up in “the possibility of retirement due to a period of contribution allows the formation of a large contingent of retired middle-aged adults, with an additional life expectancy beyond 80 years of age” [OGLOBO20180204 – a possibilidade da aposentadoria por tempo de contribuição permite a formação de um grande contingente de adultos de meia idade

aposentados, com uma expectativa de vida adicional para além dos 80 anos].

Groups claiming for popular consultation regarding the reform is portrayed as “a group represented by union members who protest on behalf of the “people” [OGLOBO20180204 – um grupo representado por sindicalizados que protesta em nome do “povo”]. The word “union” here has another inference that connects directly with Lula, since he formed the party after years leading the union of metallurgical industry workers in São Bernardo do Campo, São Paulo metropolitan area.

The proposal of a reformulation regarding the national labour law consolidated was a predominant topic in O Globo’s content. The reform mainly is a result of a group work of the companies to reorganise the autonomous regime instead of having employees with contracts. The whole argument of the newspaper can be resumed in this unit:

[OGLOBO20180926] [perguntou também se as pessoas preferiam trabalhar como autônomos, sem benefícios da CLT (Consolidação Nacional das Leis Trabalhista), porém ganhando mais e pagando menos impostos, ou terem os benefícios da carteira assinada, com salário menor. E quem pretende revogar a reforma precisa se acautelar, porque 50% dos eleitores preferem trabalhar à margem da CLT] [*(a pole) also asked if people preferred to work as freelancers, without CLT (National Consolidation of Labour Laws) benefits, but earning more and paying less taxes, or having the benefits of a formal contract, with a lower salary. And whoever wants to revoke the reform needs to be careful, because 50% of voters prefer to work outside the CLT*]

Furthermore, in this specific unit it is clarified the beneficiaries of such reform when the reform was approved “putting an end to the legal uncertainty of employers” [OGLOBO20180926]. As in other cases mentioned when the discourse is structured supporting without any reservation the interests of groups with power.

6.3.3 O Estado de São Paulo

The third most-read online newspaper in the country does not present a considerable difference compared to the previous two outlets. O Estado de São Paulo, or Estadão, primarily dedicates its editorial columns to discuss *politics, economy* and the national *elections*.

Since the year of 2018 started with the events around Lula's trial – and court negotiations to put him in prison or not in the second stance of the decision by the judges – the content in the first months is concentrated in criticism to Lula, Dilma and the Workers' Party. Very close to the direct discursive style as the other newspapers, naming the same actors as responsible for economic problems and for the “crisis” or “the breakdown” that “Mr Lula da Silva established in the country” [OESTADODESP20180103]. Here “Mr.” is used as a discursive mechanism of negative courtesy forming the social image of the former president and has a negligible tone, detachment and indifference since “mister” could be any other person. In another article, an informal and diminutive term is used: “Luloca” [OESTADODESP20180320] in a similar way.

In the same tone, Lula is addressed “PT big boss” [OESTADODESP20180325] and as “tribe chief” who “moves intensely to return to power” [OESTADODESP20180103] and the time he was the president is “legacy left by Lulopetism” that has to be “overcome” [OESTADODESP20180103 – o cacique petista movimentou-se intensamente para voltar ao poder, desde já prometendo desmontar tudo o que foi feito no atual governo para superar a herança maldita deixada pelo lulopetismo]. The use of “tribe chief” is already a sign of despicable way to address to the autochthonous people. The current Brazilian indigenous population, according to preliminary results of the Demographic Census carried out by IBGE in 2010, is 817,963 indigenous people. This Census revealed that in all States of the Federation, including the Federal District, there are indigenous populations. This population, in its great majority, has been facing an accelerated and complex social transformation, needing to search for new answers for their physical and cultural survival and to guarantee to the next generations better quality of life. Indigenous communities are

facing concrete problems, such as invasions and territorial and environmental degradation, sexual exploitation, enticement and drug use, labor exploitation, including child labor, begging, disorderly exodus causing a large concentration of indigenous people in the cities⁶¹. As well as the application of “lulopetism” is frequently mentioned, even though it is an informal term reproduced by media to refer to the political leftist practices of former Brazilian president. Also, it is described as a strategy as in these units:

[OESTADODESP20180115] [deriva de um processo de recrudescimento do discurso político que foi espertamente pensado e implementado durante os governos lulopetistas] [*derives from a process of renewed political discourse that was cleverly thought and implemented during the Lulopetist governments*]

[OESTADODESP20180304] [A derrocada do lulopetismo, marcada pelo impeachment de Dilma Rousseff e pela recente confirmação da condenação de Lula da Silva por corrupção] [*The collapse of Lulopetism, marked by the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff and the recent confirmation of Lula da Silva's conviction for corruption*].

The decision of the Justice to arrest Lula is assured and supported as it would represent the extermination of a dangerous figure and the beginning of time “opportunity for the country to recover from the folly of populist governments and the path of economic, social and political development” [OESTADODESP20180304].

From the former president judgement, the discourse is oriented to the next elections, and the message is clear: it is about time to take the “responsibility for the country’s future” that “must lead” the “non-populist political parties to unite around a candidate with real chances of winning” [OESTADODESP20180103]. According to the Estadão, “more than a decade under governments that of a party divided the country between “us” and “them” and whose leaders never got off the podium was enough to know the harm that this does” [OESTADODESP20181028] [Mais de uma década sob governos que de um partido que dividiu o País entre “nós” e “eles” e cujos líderes

⁶¹ FUNAI (Indigenous National Foundation):
<http://www.funai.gov.br/index.php/servicos/publicacoes>

nunca desceram do palanque foi o bastante para saber o mal que isso faz].

Noteworthy is this last unit published the second-round national election day, at the end of October. The discourse structured around this constant criticism addressed to one specific party goes until the election period, in October 2018:

[OESTADODESP20181025] [Por mais que o PT tenha se esforçado para fingir que o seu candidato [...] não é um mero preposto de Lula da Silva, há algo que nenhum truque de marketing será capaz de mudar: o PT sempre foi e continuará a ser infinitas vezes menos que o ego de Lula] [*As much as the PT has tried to pretend that its candidate [...] is not a mere representative of Lula da Silva, there is something that no marketing trick will be able to change: the PT has always been and will continue to be infinitely less than Lula's ego*]

Regarding the economy, Estadão also presents the typical marks of the unrestricted capitalist economy while the state can figure as a tool to keep the social order. This combination seems to forge the discourse consistently among the newspapers registered as biased to an elitist worldview.

The economy is presented as the essential system in the country, in a simple equation disregarding other elements. When the discussion around the economy is combined with politics, reaching the end of the year, the scenario pictured is very promising oriented to the privatisation of state companies presupposing the government will “operate with less pressure” [OESTADODESP20180223], which is aligned with the president elected political plan. Also, “improvement in business will be facilitated in 2019 and the years to come [...] by the private sector” [OESTADODESP20181220].

As Folha and O Globo, O Estado de São Paulo also reminds the audience – that they seem entitled to educate – the importance of the agribusiness in the economy as “the country is an agricultural power and one of the leaders in the global trade of various products” [OESTADODESP20180109], as indirectly safeguards the ruralist bench.

The economy, according to the newspaper has to be “solid fundamentals, guaranteed by adjustments and reforms” (social security

and labour reforms) as it would consequently “provide the best defence against external (economic) impacts” [OESTADODESP20180209]. Moreover, a stable political and economic scenario has an impact for society as a whole resumed by: “with the prices contained, families had more room in their budget to consume more” [OESTADODESP20180111].

The support verified through the presence of marks referencing government project of Bolsonaro follows even discursive expression used by the candidate, as ‘the reconstruction of Brazil’, ‘take back the development path’, ‘a country without ideologies’, ‘democratic values’ to ‘put an end in corruption’. The scenario pictured by the editorial is promising as the “the balance sheet for the first year of term will be positive” as the government “will have the strength to continue the effort of adjustment and reforms in the following years [OESTADODESP20181226].

Voices representing a powerful sector of society were brought previously to compose the next-president garrison. The units below are from an editorial published in March that quotes Army and the Church, as expert references discussing regarding the ‘political and economic crisis’ affecting the country and bring a message to orient the readers (who in the majority are voters⁶²): “voters will have to separate those who are willing to do what needs to be done and, thus, lead Brazil back towards a prosperous future” [OESTADODESP20180304]. The editorial affirms as a good example of candidate “a leadership genuinely imbued with public spirit and committed to liberal and democratic values” [OESTADODESP20180304].

By putting the words into a source mouth, the Army commander, the editorial explains that “as trivial risks for democratic institutions the trivialization of corruption and impunity and the transformation of national problems into ideological issues” [OESTADODESP20180304].

The units below published in October keep resemblance to the units of the editorial above published in April.

⁶² To vote in Brazil is mandatory for Brazilian citizen over 18 and under 70 years old, subjected to penalised in case of non-compliance.

[OESTADODESP20181009] [O candidato a presidente Jair Bolsonaro e seu partido, o PSL, são os principais beneficiários de um movimento desorganizado e espontâneo que ansiava por alguém disposto a liderá-lo em seu desejo de castigar o Lulopetismo e sanear o País] [*The candidate for president Jair Bolsonaro and his party, the PSL, are the main beneficiaries of a disorganised and spontaneous movement that yearned for it; someone willing to lead him in his desire to punish Lulopetism and sanitize the country*]

When the topic is related to the social security system and the reform designed to be voted, a repeatedly discursive structure appears. In essence, the reform is urgent, it must be voted by the congressmen as soon as possible, and there is no mention of informing the population in detail, neither it is considered a public consultation about the proposal, supporting an elitist democracy. The discourse changes the pronoun that builds a persuasive strategy when includes itself in the group affirming that “we all want to live in a stable and level playing field. Stability, however, has a price, and we all need to be willing to pay it if we want to see our dreams come true” [OESTADODESP20180115].

The anti-pluralist relevance of such debate is declared in:

[OESTADODESP20180131] [É certo que não se deve perder tempo com parlamentares que são contrários à reforma de previdência por razões puramente ideológicas, pois estes não estão preocupados com o país] [*It is true that one should not waste time with parliamentarians who are opposed to pension reform for purely ideological reasons, as they are not concerned with the country*].

Being contrary to the reforms is to “deny the need to reform the unfair and anachronistic Brazilian social security system” [OESTADODESP20180115] as the approval “of pension reform, it will permit to retake the consolidation of public finances” [OESTADODESP20180209]. Lastly, the message reaches a tone reaches close to intimidation, in an easy-to-repeat argument: “therefore, more than ever, it must be clear that there are no choices but to approve pension reform later this year, as this may depend on the state's ability to pay everyone's retirement” [OESTADODESP20180131] [Por isso, mais do que nunca, deve ficar claro que não há escolhas senão aprovar

a reforma da previdência ainda este ano, pois disso pode depender a capacidade do estado de pagar a aposentadoria de todos].

O Estado de São Paulo is primarily registered as elitist for also presenting marks of individualism and anti-egalitarianism core values as below by describing the collective rights as “overrated” within the society “at the expense of individual rights and duties” [OESTADODESP20180120].

Finally, it is worthy to mention the article published in April titled *Messages of hope*. This article presents very similar units as already mentioned above from an article of March, also referencing the Church and the Army:

[OESTADODESP20180421] [É digno de nota que no mesmo dia, duas das mais importantes instituições do País, o Exército e a Igreja Católica, tenham se manifestado à respeito da eleições vindouras] [*It is noteworthy that on the same day, two of the most important institutions in the country, the Army and the Catholic Church, spoke about the forthcoming elections*]

[OESTADODESP20180421] [Deve-se perseguir “o bem maior do País, para além de ideologias e interesses particulares” (citação de carta aberta da Confederação Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil (CNBB))] [*One must pursue “the greatest good of the country, in addition to particular ideologies and interests” (quote from an open letter from the National Confederation of Bishops of Brazil (CNBB))*]

[OESTADODESP20180421] [ambas mensagens, do Exército e da Igreja, são poderosos documentos sobre a gravidade da crise] [*both Army and Church messages are powerful documents on the seriousness of the crisis*].

6.3.4 Estado de Minas

If the online newspaper Estado de Minas on one hand had limitations to gather the sample as mentioned previously, the regularity and the high occurrence of the *elitist* marks offer the reliability of the

results found. As well, the editorials follow a structure of global text organisation that always manifest certainty and bringing the points of view as absolute truth.

The newspaper follows the same elitist referents regarding the economy giving the same dualist solution: “support for the continuation of the privatization projects” [ESTADODEMINAS20181019] as the “there is no other alternative for the new president and governors” [OESTADODEMINAS20181019] or “the only way for the sector to get out of the puddle in which it finds itself” [OESTADODEMINAS20181019]. The newspaper brings examples of how efficient the private sector is, in this sense leaving “no doubt” that the “highways managed by the private sector are of a much higher quality than those operated directly by the government (federal and state governments)” [ESTADODEMINAS20181019] [também não deixa dúvidas de que as rodovias administradas pela iniciativa privada são de qualidade muito superior às operadas diretamente pelo poder público (governos federal e estaduais)].

Less intensely attacks the Workers’ Party – considering Lula’s trial and imprisonment was part of the past, and the results of the elections was a present topic – the editorials draw the figure of a new president the country needs as “a man who climbs the highest positions has the duty to be guided by moderation and rationality” [ESTADODEMINAS20181026].

The future is constructed positively and derived from the results of the elections. An “era” is over as stated “the era of the taking over, and the exchange of personal favours is doomed to be a turning point in the country’s republican life” [ESTADODEMINAS20181106 – A era do toma lá dá cá e da troca de favores pessoais está definitivamente condenada a ser página virada na vida republicana do país].

Since Bolsonaro is officially the president elected, the new government has “a chance to start reversing the current situation” and “needs to act by putting everyone on the same page” [ESTADODEMINAS20181113] showing the leaning to an authoritarian desire from the new “statesman” [ESTADODEMINAS20181106]. In the discourse of Estado de Minas, the economy is essential as well and according to the editorial’s

prediction “the financial market and businessmen have signalled positively regarding the future Jair Bolsonaro (PSL) management [ESTADODEMINAS20181119].

The part of the population that was not in accordance to Bolsonaro’s government ideas and did not cast the vote for him are represented as being part of “the other side” and the “opposition”: “in an election marked by antagonisms and strong polarization, every act of the elected president has been the subject of strong criticism, with special endorsement and exaltation by the defeated opposition” [ESTADODEMINAS20181125_2 – numa eleição marcada por antagonismos e forte polarização, todo ato do presidente eleito tem sido motivo de fortes críticas, com especial endosso e exaltação pela oposição derrotada]. Such opposition is simply devired from the loss of “privileges resulting from an oversized state structure” [ESTADODEMINAS20181125_2] [privilégios decorrentes de uma estrutura estatal superdimensionada].

Some editorial pieces are used entirely to advocate for one specific politic, as the Senator from Minas Gerais Antonio Anastasia (PDS-MG). The propagandist article elevates the Senator to “profile of an authentic statesman, able to carry out even higher missions” [OESTADODEMINAS20181106] and a figure “remains, therefore, as a reference and mirror for the exercise of the noble public mission and our entire society” [ESTADODEMINAS20181106].

In very few situations the editorial of Estado de Minas remembers that the Brazilian society is composed of other groups. When a variation appears is mentioned as a portrayal of “the poorest” that must “get opportunities outside of crime” [ESTADODEMINAS20181113], as inferring that the being part of a low-income group is directly choose the crime as a way of surviving.

Not enough, the rural “population” is described as a mass that “left the countryside for the cities in search of free bread and circus” [ESTADODEMINAS20181114_2]. The population is also described as an uncharacterised “army of workers looking for work” [OESTADODEMINAS20181119].

In a rare article where marks of anti-elitist are found, the editorial constructs its discourse criticising, in general, the politicians as

a “caste living in privileged castles” [OESTADODEMINAS20181109]. Moreover, such recognition of privileges represents a “true affront to the Brazilian population” [OESTADODEMINAS20181109]. The fact motivating the criticism is concerning the salary readjustment approved in the Federal Senate for the ministers of the Supreme Federal Court.

Also, one editorial advocate for the “freedom of expression” as a topic that should “not (be) discussed, especially in universities, an ideal place for the free exchange of ideas and thought” and the “the preservation of university autonomy” [OESTADODEMINAS20181102]. The egalitarian core value appears after the troops of the national police was called to “control” [OESTADODEMINAS20181102] protests in a few universities, and it is connected historically with “scenes that take us back to the lead years of the military dictatorship” [OESTADODEMINAS20181102].

The newspaper presents a considerable number of articles mentioning the Catholic entity as a reference for a set of moral codes to live by. Interestingly, after Bolsonaro’s election and reproducing an expression represented by “without ideologies” used by him throughout all his campaign, Estado de Minas publishes in the first days of December an article which title is “The gospel without ideologies”. The discursive tone is a sequence of moral orders offered to the readers as a guide that is better explained according to these examples of units highlighted which compose the whole argument:

[OESTADODEMINAS20181207_3] [Os valores cristãos inspiram a cidadania do reino de Deus e, conseqüentemente, a cidadania civil, de modo a qualificá-la] [*Christian values inspire citizenship in the kingdom of God and, consequently, civil citizenship, in order to qualify it*]

[OESTADODEMINAS20181207_3] [Os discípulos de Jesus têm o compromisso insubstituível de testemunhar, com a vida, a sua fé] [*Jesus' disciples have an irreplaceable commitment to witness, with their lives, to their faith*]

[OESTADODEMINAS20181207_3] [a tarefa missionária de todos é cultivar um jeito de ser que esteja em sintonia com a condição humana de filhos de Deus] [*everyone's missionary task is*

to cultivate a way of being that is in tune with the human condition of children of God]

[OESTADODEMINAS20181207_3] [Dedicar-se às sagradas escrituras revela uma certeza: a palavra de Deus é maior que ideologias] [*Dedicating oneself to the sacred scriptures reveals a certainty: the word of God is greater than ideologies*]

[OESTADODEMINAS20181207_3] [Os cristãos não podem permitir que o evangelho de Jesus, límpido e cristalino ensinamento, seja confundido, misturado, substituído ou negociado, para se adequar a qualquer tipo de ideologia] [*Christians cannot allow the gospel of Jesus, clear and crystalline teaching, to be confused, mixed, replaced or negotiated, to suit any type of ideology*]

[OESTADODEMINAS20181207_3] [A partir dessa realidade, pede-se a cada cristão, diante da ideologia de gênero, de ideologias político-partidárias ou culturais, para resistir, na força do testemunho de fé] [*From this reality, each Christian is asked, in the face of gender ideology, political party or cultural ideologies, to resist, in the strength of the testimony of faith*]

[OESTADODEMINAS20181207_3] [Quem se dedicar a esse exercício, diariamente, viverá um processo contínuo de purificação, livre de ideologias, acima delas] [*Whoever dedicates himself to this exercise, daily, will live a continuous process of purification, free of ideologies, above them*]

... for the new era under a new national government openly declared religious whose campaign motto was “Brazil above everything, God above everyone”.

6.3.5 O Tempo

The newspaper from Minas Gerais, located country’s economic central region, is the only one expressing a different bias compared to the other media outlets in this sample. The other newspaper from Minas Gerais, Estado de Minas, is in opposition, elitist.

The dominant worldview of O Tempo is *Egalitarianism*, and its editorial columns discursively mark the bias in 148 articles. It is

demonstrated when supporting political-ideological core values related to support social, political and gender egalitarianism, participatory democracy, denouncing the authority as oppression, as well as some marks of non-speciesist egalitarianism, which was not found in any other newspaper. It is possible to understand the omission of the other newspapers regarding discussion concerning the human and non-human species as evidence of a human-centred view of nature, the mark of the elitist worldview.

The newspaper stands in an *anti-elitism* bias in several occasions and related to different topics. The *anti-elitist* position is often constructed by criticism to elitist core values combined with marks of support to an *egalitarian* set of values. As exemplified in the units of analysis below, it displays a political responsibility when mentioning that “Brazilian politicians have not shown that they are up to their position” [OTEMPO20180419] and nominating groups attributing the responsibility for inequalities: “at the top, the big businessmen, who keep the best part of the State, sometimes through corruption: subsidies, exemptions, financing. Oligarchies and corporations get the best share” [OTEMPO20181223 – No topo, os grandes empresários, que ficam com a melhor parte do Estado, às vezes por meio da corrupção: os subsídios, as desonerações, os financiamentos. As oligarquias e as corporações ficam com a melhor parte].

Also, the newspaper presents a broader range of topics related to social aspects and supports a critical understanding of the social dynamics with the focus to the ones generating inequalities.

For example, the issue of the incarceration rate⁶³ and the characteristics of the population submitted to it, one of the highest in the world and its precarious conditions, topics related to social inequalities due to the unfair wealth distribution and capital concentration, the precarious conditions of the health care system without political interest to address its problems, as other in examples of units presented below:

[OTEMPO20180105] [Na verdade, apesar de ter a quarta população carcerária do mundo, o país não tem uma política

⁶³ Source: <https://www.prisonstudies.org/country/brazil>

pública para a questão] [*In fact, despite having the fourth prison population in the world, the country does not have a public policy on the issue*] [OTEMPO20180105] [E prender e construir presídios só serve para dar uma satisfação à sociedade] [*And arresting and building prisons only serves to satisfy society*]

[OTEMPO20180210] [Todas as guerras têm uma propriedade comum: rebaixar os seres humanos à máxima indignidade] [*All wars have a common property: to lower human beings to maximum indignity*]

Regarding the abuse of power by the police⁶⁴, which marks the criticism to authoritarianism and the view of authority as oppression, is expressed by “little while, they (the military police responsible for the intervention in Rio) will be invading houses” [OTEMPO20180226], and the discourse connect the abuse of power to the events in the Brazilian history: “to begin with, there is the trauma of military intervention in 1964” [OTEMPO20180226 – para começar, existe o trauma da intervenção militar de 1964].

In topics dedicated to environment, the discourse addresses the agribusiness industry as in the unit of analysis below. Moreover, the newspaper position makes the connection between agribusiness and food production and hunger:

OTEMPO20180324] [A produção de alimentos é mais do que suficiente para suprir as necessidades de cada um dos 7 bilhões de indivíduos da população mundial. A deficiência está nos sistemas de produção e distribuição dos alimentos] [*Food production is more than enough to meet the needs of each of the 7 billion individuals in the world population. The deficiency is in the systems of production and distribution of food*]

O Tempo is the only one to present mark of non-speciesist view of nature, core value of egalitarian worldview and mentions that “after the practical ethics of Peter Singer and Tom Regan, respect for animal rights is indispensable” [OTEMPO20181115].

Registered in different editorial pieces, it the marks of anti-elitist worldview appears by a discursive formulation that criticises a capitalist view of nature, especially when talking about the Amazon forest “it

⁶⁴ <https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0811es.pdf>

generally refers to the increase in deforestation in the region, which is growing under pressure from the advance of the agricultural frontier” [OTEMPO20180317]. Furthermore, as expressed, it confronts a powerful sector of the economy in the country.

In the same structure, O Tempo’s editorial mentions the side effects of the agribusiness expansion to a minority group, the original people, — “displacement of indigenous populations and internal migrants” [OTEMPO20180317] — often forgotten by the public policies, especially in Bolsonaro’s plan of government.

The right of a place to live is found as a mark supporting the social egalitarianism core value, reporting firmly by the use of “there should be” followed by the description of a social, political and economic model that leave people “thrown into remote peripheries” without offering “housing solution in abandoned buildings for homeless people, close to their workplace” [OTEMPO20180503]. The reality is denounced when the editorial affirms the “in the capital several buildings are waiting for a fire to expel its residents [OTEMPO20180503 – na capital, existem várias construções aguardando um incêndio para expulsar seus moradores].

Regarding the same topic, the discursive construction portrays a social reality in Brazil: “the occupation of abandoned buildings in urban centres” has a central cause the real estate companies “making the fortunes of the construction companies”. The understanding of the interconnected way of responsibilities and consequences by the editorial discursive construction takes in consideration the natural environment destruction when it mentions “at the expense of the destruction of nature” [OTEMPO20180503 – a ocupação de prédios abandonados nos centros urbanos é resultado da expansão das cidades, que crescem para os lados, fazendo a fortuna das construtoras, à custa da destruição da natureza].

O Tempo expresses the denouncement of “femicide” openly – “...increased by 15.5% in ten years and was higher among black women” [OTEMPO20180607] – of the violence caused by social inequalities and the violence that kills in a higher amount the black population. Also, the abortion not as a crime, but instead connected social and economic inequalities resulting in women’ deaths – since it is

not legal in Brazil – and the poorer are most affected. The decriminalisation of abortion is supported when an article mentions that “when discussing abortion” the woman “is placed, in Brazil, in the position of a criminal” [OTEMPO20180804]. Moreover, the newspaper shows a broader perspective to understand the reality when it suggests that “those who have more money can pay to have abortions in expensive clandestine clinics, better equipped than those in the backyard, an option for majority poor and black women” [OTEMPO20180804 – quem tem mais dinheiro pode pagar para fazer aborto em clínicas clandestinas caras, equipadas mais adequadamente que as de fundo de quintal, opção das mulheres pobres, a maioria negra].

The “map of violence” is mentioned in reference to a common expression used by media to present the regions with higher number of murders and other violent acts in the country, but in this construction, O Tempo’s editorial present a rereading of this map, affirming that such map “is a reflection of the country’s extreme economic and social inequality. The poor are the main victims” [OTEMPO20180607] added by the denouncing that “young people constitute the largest contingent of Brazilians who die violently among us” [OTEMPO20180607].

Important to observe the use of the pronoun ‘us’ in the construction above and the inclusive speaker place where the discourse puts itself. Moreover, the newspaper’s discourse is guided by a propositional communicative function, in contrast to previous newspapers that offered a polarised and dual perspective of the facts or events discussed.

Regarding politics, the newspaper presents a broader perspective of understanding and differentiating forms of populism, as it can be a trait of both sides of the left-right spectrum – which are the most used terms. According to the elitist newspapers studied, populism is only attributed to the left, corresponding automatically to the Workers’ Party.

The newspaper also seems to foresee the political events driving along the year until the elections: the rising and consolidation of an authoritarian right-wing candidate:

[OTEMPO20180124] [O atual desprestígio dos políticos, personificado hoje no presidente Michel Temer, vai se refletir nas próximas eleições, quando poderão emergir alguns líderes populistas antidemocráticos] [*The current discredit of politicians, personified today in President Michel Temer, will be reflected in the next elections, when some undemocratic populist leaders may emerge*]

[OTEMPO20180124] [Esses escândalos alimentaram um populismo de direita] [*These scandals fueled right-wing populism*]

[OTEMPO20180419] [Os cidadãos estão percebendo que a corrupção está na raiz de nossas desventuras] [*Citizens are realizing that corruption is at the root of our misfortunes*]

In the unit below, appears the units marking the consideration of the voters as humans endowed with cognitive abilities: “the voter from Minas Gerais is thirsty for participation in the direction of politics” and “and, is able to differentiate and recognise the channels in which, more than being informed, they can get involved, question and make themselves heard” [OTEMPO20180901]. The newspaper portrays the voters as not merely a mass that needs guidance; and the editorial is not a manual presenting instruction, as the elitist newspapers.

Finally, O Tempo shows consistently throughout its discourse the memory of the military dictatorship period and its consequence marking the not so old Brazilian history. It can be understood as enlightenment denouncing the extreme-right discourse that, often and in public, defends the authoritarian actions practiced during that time as manly and noble for the nation:

[OTEMPO20181006] [Em três meses, não obstante a apologia da ditadura militar feita pelo presidenciável mais bem-colocado nas pesquisas, o apoio à democracia cresceu 12 pontos] [*In three months, despite the apology for the military dictatorship made by the best-placed presidential candidate in the polls, support for democracy grew 12 points*]

[OTEMPO20181006] [Em crise econômica, política e moral, o país experimenta uma onda conservadora] [*In economic, political and moral crisis, the country is experiencing a conservative wave*]

The newspaper mentions the candidate and his supporters preaching a discourse of “sympathy for authoritarian and populist

regimes, supposedly competent to pave the way for better days, grew in the country” [OTEMPO20180916] as a threat to the advances built during the second period of democratisation (after the first democratically elected government in 1989), after over twenty years of the dictatorial regime in the country. Furthermore, tying up loose ends by affirming that “in that speech is the call for military intervention” [OTEMPO20180916], and “the old politics, however, as it has shown, does not give up power” [OTEMPO20181223].

6.3.6 Zero Hora

The newspaper from the South of Brazil presents elitism/individualism biased worldview in its editorial content analysed. Such marks are mainly found in articles covering topics like politics, elections and economy and mostly follows the choir with the previous elitist online newspapers.

Zero Hora reinforces its elitist traits when referring to the economy isolated as the engine of the state as a territory. At the same time the state, as a politically organised body, is frequently represented as a mechanism that can always uphold the private sector interests, as demonstrated in this construction “the gaucho”⁶⁵ government needs to encourage and welcome private investments” [ZEROHO0020180201] since in this line of thought, the content points to that “it is up to the State not to stifle entrepreneurship” [ZEROHO0020180201].

Regarding the economy, the newspaper focuses its content on covering mainly the information to the extent of the state territory and many times recalling identity – represented by the gaucho – characteristics leaning to the argument of the nation as the source of meaning, at the same time nations are moral entities, as marks the individualist worldview. “The spread of protectionist measures” is presented as a bad condition for the state economy and “trade opening is seen as a path to growth” [ZEROHO0020180313].

⁶⁵ Gaucho is a word to name the inhabitant Rio Grande do Sul.

Considering the national economy, the argument refers as the other elitist newspapers, the “general incompetence in the public sector” as according to Zero Hora “limits investments” since the conditions are “even less chance to reduce the tax burden (to attract private investors) at this time” [ZEROHO0020180521].

As regards to the economy and politics together, it appears to broaden to a national level, nevertheless keeping the idea of authority from above, as saying, justified as a natural necessity to organise society:

[ZEROHO0020181231] [O Brasil precisa ser apresentado a uma relação saudável do país público com o privado. Por obra e graça de antagonismos ideológicos, mas também pelos desvios do capitalismo de compadrio, incentivou-se no Brasil a noção de que os empresários devem viver atados ao Estado] [*Brazil needs to be introduced to a healthy relationship between the public and the private country. Due to the work and grace of ideological antagonisms, but also due to deviations from crony capitalism, the notion that businessmen should live tied to the State was encouraged in Brazil*]

In the articles analysed, Zero Hora presents variance between marks of a restricted capitalist economy and unrestricted, thus varying from a conservative to a liberal view. Such discourse aligns with the neoliberal economy approach supported by many parties, like the one of the now-president while combined with Christian faith and morality and conservative view of society based on tradition and cohesion over the rule of the elite.

The sentences are usually marked by a discursive structure inferring orders, as what the state must do, how it must act, how institutions should proceed, what is a duty and of whom. By that arguing that “combating crime is a duty of the State” [ZEROHO0020180611] the outlet is portraying elitist core values such as state as a guarantee of social order

In 2018 was, among of other events, the year that the former president Lula was put into jail, after many conflictive decisions between the defence lawyers and the Judiciary. The editorial content of Zero Hora, as other elitist newspapers studied, used a discursive structured severely criticizing Lula for the corruption crimes he was

being judged on and, connected to that, criticizing or discrediting the party's supporters.

Commonly the voters aligned with PT are described using words as allies, followers and fans, while in comparison, the result of the elections giving the national higher chair to the extreme-right was a choice by merely using the word voters. This discursive construction points to an elitist view of democracy typical of conservative perspectives where democracy serves to keep from the will of many the property and the traditional institutions, as well as social inequality.

Zero Hora also dedicates time to construct the image of Workers Party supporters' as following "a mirage the distorted speech of allies of the political leader (Lula)" [ZEROHO0020180406]. Moreover, Lula's trial was an opportunity to affirm that "the followers" of Lula were using the moment "as a pretext to weaken institutions, which are above that" [ZEROHO0020180213].

The argument building "them" in the discourse is portrayed with expressions of the frequency to reinforce what could be "their" normal behaviour: "used to denouncing "coups"⁶⁶, the PT even tried to promote the idea of a "democratic front" [ZEROHO0020181022] [Habitado a denunciar "golpes", o PT tentou inclusive emplacar a ideia de uma "frente democrática"].

A few days previous to the final election round, one editorial spear prediction for the future after the election results that implicitly presents the Haddad (PT's candidate on the run) as the defeated person. The discursive construction anticipates "eventual challenges (by Workers Party and its affiliates)" such as those "that are starting to rehearse now" and according to the newspaper "it shows, in the final analysis, a lack of appreciation for democracy" [ZEROHO0020181022].

There are also discursive characteristics showing the support to the president elected and a right-wing candidate for state governor. Especially in the case of the president, that remarks the 'renewal'

⁶⁶ The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016 argues for being a coup. The theory is attributed to PT supporters, not considering that the argument is grounded and a topic of studies by experts in law and government systems.

discourse very frequently and that builds Bolsonaro's campaign, referring to a promising period after the years of the Workers Party were in this position, with Lula and Dilma Rousseff.

The editorial article featured in the closing of 2018 was an open letter of support to Bolsonaro even though after the elections, as demonstrated by the units of analysis below:

[ZEROHO0020181231] [É promissor que, diante da opção dos eleitores por renovação, tanto em âmbito federal quanto estadual] [It is promising that, given the option of voters for renewal, both at the federal and state levels]

[ZEROHO0020181231] [brasileiros que elegeram os novos governantes deram-se conta de que as mesmas coisas feitas das mesmas maneiras geram os mesmos resultados – no caso do Brasil, muito aquém do que se espera] [Brazilians who elected the new rulers realized that the same things done in the same ways generate the same results - in the case of Brazil, well below what is expected]

6.3.7 Valor Econômico

Looking at Valor Econômico, it is entirely dedicated to the economy, and its content is consistently oriented to the elitist worldview. Primarily, the newspaper presents economy undoubtedly as the essential feature of a nation, responsible for progress and evolution, also featuring other countries' economies (often using the term *developed* as a reference) as role models to follow.

The newspaper content focus is not a mark for criticism. Although some elements in the newspaper's content are neglected continuously, even though it is part of economic structures, which generates a biased representation of the reality. Nevertheless, the capital is always present and showing its superior power in Valor Econômico's discourse. As in the call to "promote the development of human capital is therefore urgent" [VALOREC20181016] shows how the citizens are united under the term "human capital", precisely in one article arguing

about the necessity to update educational standards by applying successful international models, as in Germany.

The discourse is highly centred in putting in comparison the Brazilian economy with other countries: either related to growth or decline in international parameters to measure the economy. Moreover, it is oriented by the United States, Europe and China, and their policies in the economy: “despite record trade surpluses, Brazil maintains a timid presence in international trade” [VALOREC20180109 - apesar dos saldos comerciais recordes, o Brasil mantém presença tímida no comércio internacional].

As in the unit displayed below, specific social situations as it was the case of the truck drivers’ strike is carelessly associated with the causes of exportation’s recession: “although, in general, the increase in exports is a factor that pulls domestic activity, in the current case this effect is insufficient to compensate for the loss of dynamism of the economy caused by the external shock, electoral uncertainties and paralysis of truck drivers” [VALOREC20180709] [Embora, em geral, o aumento das exportações seja um fator que puxa a atividade doméstica, no caso atual esse efeito é insuficiente para compensar a perda de dinamismo da economia causada pelo choque externo, incertezas eleitorais e paralisação dos caminhoneiros]. It is careless in the sense that no more profound understanding is offered, for example, covering the reasons for the strike and how companies were obtaining huge benefits from the strike.

Another example of this is how workers’ rights are attacked by describing it as a problem for the State and its capacity of investment, continually reinforcing the importance of economy and politics for everyone and that any opposition to this idea compromises the progress.

In the unit below, the amount destined to social security is described as “public resources” that are “increasingly absorbed by the expenses” with “the payment of social security benefits and payroll, limiting investment capacity” [VALOREC20180112]. The communicative construction does not put any effort to mention that one the obstacle is precisely the unequal distribution of social security

benefits, again keeping the privilege of insulting benefits to people who had higher positions in public service, and the military.

In line with the discourse about the social security system is the discourse built around the “necessary reformulation” of it as “postponing the pension reform prolongs the situation” [VALOREC20180112]. It was especially interesting to observe that in 2018 – the period of these articles – there was a dominant argument in media discourse putting pressure to the vote in the Brazilian Congress for the reform proposal since pension reform “is the second most important step to fix public accounts” (after the spending maximum) [VALOREC20180222].

At the end of 2019 effectively, after months of discussions, the reform was approved. The only effect was the cut in the benefits of the already deprived classes, while nothing touched the routine of the elites.

It was even mentioned that the delay in social security reform was the excuse holding private investments in the country: “the climate of insecurity also has an impact on the retraction of private investments” [VALOREC20180112], which favours, by one side a social and political inegalitarianism, and by the other, an unrestricted capitalist economy.

Moreover, the arguments evidencing the right given to the private sector to regulate the economy over a participatory process of decision is evident. Especially considering the debate regarding the exploration of fossil fuel reserve, the Pre-Salt layer in the Brazilian coastline, Valor’s discourse affirms that “the hope now is that the private sector will expand investments in transport, energy, telecommunications and basic sanitation” [VALOREC20180130 – a esperança agora é que o setor privado amplie os investimentos em transporte, energia, telecomunicações e saneamento básico]. A source is referenced in one editorial article, “private investment sector source said”, “) that there are private groups interested in infrastructure, with investment and fundraising capacity in the domestic and foreign markets” [VALOREC20180130].

In 2018, the auction of several lots of the reserve happened followed by the approval voted in the National Congress and the House of Senate. It was described by Valor Econômico’s editorial as “a breakthrough was the presence of foreign companies, interested in

investing in oil and gas in the country” and it was successful because, according to the newspaper, similar auctions in other parts of the world “did not show equal attraction power” [VALOREC20180403]. The column puts itself as an advocate of the companies and their needs in this scenario: “more stability in policies for the sector” [VALOREC20180403].

Despite the revindication of many groups and entities for popular deliberation regarding the privatisation or full public control by Petrobras. Moreover, about the auction, the discourse was biased to an unrestricted capitalist economy:

[VALOREC20180403] [Para os investidores estrangeiros e analistas, a 15ª Rodada de licitação marcou a volta do Brasil ao jogo internacional. Para as autoridades brasileiras, foi a melhor de todos os tempos, um verdadeiro “sucesso”] [*For foreign investors and analysts, the 15th Bidding Round marked Brazil's return to the international game. For the Brazilian authorities, it was the best, a real “success”*]

Another point of debate in Brazil is the tax system reform, mainly articulated by lobby groups pursuing interests of national and international companies for a flexible system of private investment and benefits. The newspaper point of view is similar in discourse as presented by other newspapers in this analysis: “it will be difficult to find someone against a reform of the tax system” [VALOREC20180821]. Valor Econômico’s discourse composes a unison with the other major elitist newspapers. It evokes the inexistence for disagreements or questions around the delicate topic. Since according to the editorial, it represents “one of the culprits over the years for the decline of the potential Gross Domestic Product (GDP), loss of the country’s competitiveness and increasing inequality” [VALOREC20180821 – será difícil encontrar alguém contra uma reforma do sistema tributário, um dos culpados ao longo dos anos pelo recuo do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) potencial, perda da competitividade do país e aumento da desigualdade].

According to Valor Econômico discourse, politics is primarily a tool for economic advances and negotiations for the country and “the two problems” are “the social security imbalance and Rio de Janeiro

security” which are described as “are very serious” [VALOREC20180222]. As well as the State is the primary source of social order calling the Army to “in charge of the police and prisons in Rio” [VALOREC20180222].

Finally, the newspaper kept a certain distance of supporting candidates. Although, while building the economic discourse as presented above, the newspaper indirectly supports one specific candidate aligned with this economic approach which was the candidate who ended up winning the run.

Finally, in the last article of 2018, the president elected is pictured positively as the figure who will bring order to the nation: “as the State is bankrupt and the main challenge that Bolsonaro will face is to put an order in public finances” [VALOREC20181228 – como o Estado está falido e a principal desafio que Bolsonaro irá enfrentar é o de colocar ordem nas finanças públicas]. Again, it is biased towards an elitist democracy leaning to an authoritarian democracy, which explicitly is the ideology of the extreme-right president running the country since January 2019, an open wistful of the military dictatorship period in Brazil.

6.3.8 *Correio Braziliense*

The editorial content of *Correio Braziliense* is registered to be biased to an elitist worldview, as presented in the quantitative results, and here are presented the units of analysis marking such position detected in the articles. Primarily, the newspaper that was born as part of a political strategy together with the national capital dedicates attention to topics discussing *the economy*, *elections* and *economy and politics* combined, as it was foreseen by all the previous analysis presented here.

The discourse build by *Correio Braziliense* reproduces elitist core values as the unrestricted capitalist economy argued when in the content appears propositions like slow economic growth “inhibits the competitiveness” [CORREIOBRAZ20180106 – freando o crescimento econômico e inibe a competitividade]; that the country needs “well-

structured projects, with sufficient economic rationality and volume to attract capital” [CORREIOBRAZ20180106 – é a falta de projetos bem estruturados, com racionalidade econômica e volume suficientes para atrair capital], and that “for a nation to continue” economically “it is necessary to maintain a constant pace of investments” [CORREIOBRAZ20180106]. The discursive strategy offers a dualism for the read: the argument that is either what is being posed by the editorial, or terrain of uncertainties, a failure, chaos in society.

As the topic is not news, Correio Braziliense’s editorial content also features arguments for the privatisation of State properties. It mentions data from research sponsored by the National Federation of Transportation that “the ten best highways in the country are managed by the private sector and all pass through São Paulo, the most developed state in the country” [CORREIOBRAZ20181019 – O que chama a atenção na pesquisa patrocinada pela CNT é que as 10 melhores rodovias do país são administradas pela iniciativa privada e todas passam por São Paulo, o estado mais desenvolvido do país]. Consequently, the recommendation for the government is that “there is no other option” than “to unlock the chains of the highway concession program” [CORREIOBRAZ20181019].

Within Correio’s arguments, the “size of the State” also characterises the Legislative as “inefficient” and “one of the most expensive in the world” [CORREIOBRAZ20180426].

Conflicting ideas are not welcome and are portrayed as causes for economic and political instability. In the event of the truck drivers’ strike in the country, the message is: “the country cannot be held hostage by a professional category responsible for supplying the entire production chain” [CORREIOBRAZ20180529 – O país não pode ficar refém de uma categoria profissional responsável pelo abastecimento de toda a cadeia produtiva].

According to the newspaper discourse, politics is a regulative stance about what the editorial continuously affirms recommendations and expectations as “what is expected of a senator of the Republic is” [CORREIOBRAZ20180119], “ministers must bear this historical moment in mind and, as supreme guardians of the Federal Constitution” [CORREIOBRAZ20180204] and as in “parliamentarians

do not commit themselves to formulate public policies” [CORREIOBRAZ20180215].

Finally, the position change to “our” in “our democracy needs serenity, without activism, and qualified debate, without personalism” [CORREIOBRAZ20180204 – nossa democracia necessita de serenidade, sem ativismos, e debate qualificado, sem personalismos] and since the responsibility for the democracy is the whole collective, “we must” follow these instructions for the sake of the democracy.

Even though these orientations supporting a democratic system, in another article the editorial remarks that “it is worth remembering that, between 1950 and 1980, Brazil was the country that grew the most in the world” [CORREIOBRAZ20181231 – Não custa lembrar que, entre 1950 e 1980, o Brasil foi o país que mais cresceu no mundo]. This period corresponds mostly to the military dictatorship in the country.

Neither Correio Braziliense had something different to express about the Workers’ Party. Once again the discourse is built around the problem that represented while the party was ahead of the national government: “it was precisely the lack of commitment to the balance of public accounts in PT governments that pushed the country into one of the most serious recessions in history” [CORREIOBRAZ20180107 – Foi justamente o descompromisso com o equilíbrio das contas públicas nos governos petistas que empurrou o país para uma das mais graves recessões da história]; “PT and its followers act in an anti-democratic way”, “the hostility unleashed by PT supporters” and “it is useless for the Workers’ Party and its minions to distribute threats to all sides” [CORREIOBRAZ20180119 – De nada adianta o Partido dos Trabalhadores e seus asseclas distribuírem ameaças para todos os lados]. Furthermore, the term “ideology” also comes to scene in a way to judge the party, as in “ideology came on the scene and what could be a leap in development turned out to be a sandcastle” [CORREIOBRAZ20181231 – A ideologia entrou em cena e o que poderia ser um salto no desenvolvimento revelou-se um castelo de areia].

The other newspaper that mention abortion does it conservatively, criminalising the woman. When affirming that by not having an abortion “the woman will not commit any crime; on the

contrary, his attitude will be understood as an expression of respect for the life that pulsates in the womb” [CORREIOBRAZ20180215 – ela não precisa apelar para o aborto nem para o abandono do recém-nascido] the newspaper exposes its position.

Combined with the editorial mentioning the Catholic Church as a moral stance, Correio makes even more apparent the discourse criminalising the practice, as in “time to reflect and practice forgiveness, as Jesus did in his last moments of life” [CORREIOBRAZ20180401 – tempo de refletir e praticar o perdão, a exemplo do que fez Jesus em seus últimos instantes de vida]. In the same article, politics and elections are brought together in this Easter editorial. It reinforced the “renovation” discourse, as it is part of Bolsonaro’s campaign that in this time is being prepared: “renewal is a transversal desire in the country, especially with the elections coming” [CORREIOBRAZ20180401 – a renovação é um desejo transversal no país, sobretudo com a proximidade das eleições]. The editorial brings a specific authoritarian demand: “it is essential to act, transform and monitor” [CORREIOBRAZ2018040 – é imprescindível agir, transformar e vigiar].

Authoritarianism is a common strand in Correio’s discourse when the solution proposed by the editorial for the truck drivers’ strike is that it “should be considered illegal and the Army put on the streets [CORREIOBRAZ20180529 – Por este motivo, a greve deveria ser considerada ilegal e o Exército colocado nas ruas]. Moreover, since economic system is not a subject that can be reviewed, the orientation is that “the moment is for going back to work, not for delusional outbursts” [CORREIOBRAZ20180529 – o momento é de retomada do trabalho, e não de arroubos delirantes]. In the case of disobedience, the communicative action offers a consequence that “under the current rule, good creditors pay for sinners” [CORREIOBRAZ20180426 – pela regra vigente, os bons credores pagam pelos pecadores]. Interestingly, this “getting back to work” is the official discourse of Bolsonaro under the COVID-19 pandemic.

Regarding the discourse built by Correio Brasiliense in relation to the candidate they were supporting along the year, the alignment of keywords with Bolsonaro’s political ideas and political figure:

[CORREIOBRAZ20180107] [Optar por retrocessos resultará em nova crise, impondo um custo elevadíssimo à população. Ninguém quer esse filme de volta.] [*Choosing setbacks will result in a new crisis, imposing a very high cost on the population. No one wants that movie back*]

[CORREIOBRAZ20180529] [A hora é de apoio irrestrito ao governo, que vem sendo tachado de frágil em momento tão delicado] [*The time is for unrestricted support to the government, which has been described as fragile in such a delicate moment*]

[CORREIOBRAZ20181003] [o presidente da República precisará levar em conta o bem comum dos cidadãos, independente de gênero, etnia, idade ou origem] [*the president of the republic will need to take into account the common good of citizens, regardless of gender, ethnicity, age or origin*]

[CORREIOBRAZ20181003] [o ocupante do Palácio do Planalto tenha equilíbrio e disposição para governar também aos que não o elegeram] [*the occupant of the Planalto Palace has balance and willingness to govern also those who did not elect him*]

[CORREIOBRAZ20181003] [O Brasil precisará de gestão eficiente e espíritos desarmados para reencontrar o caminho da prosperidade e da esperança] [*Brazil will need efficient management and unarmed spirits to rediscover the path of prosperity and hope*]

[CORREIOBRAZ20181019] [E ao próximo presidente da República dar todo o seu apoio para a continuidade dos projetos de privatização, única forma de o setor sair do atoleiro em que se encontra] [*And to the next President of the Republic to give all his support for the continuation of the privatization projects, the only way for the sector to get out of the puddle in which it finds itself*]

[CORREIOBRAZ20181231] [Bolsonaro assumirá o governo em 1o de janeiro não apenas com a missão de retomar o crescimento econômico sustentado. Terá de reinserir o Brasil no grupo das nações mais importantes do planeta] [*Bolsonaro will take over the government on January 1, not only with the mission of resuming sustained economic growth. It will have to reinsert Brazil into the group of the most important nations on the planet*]

6.4 Overview

The results of the editorial articles put together in this sample offer the understanding that a profound contact with the content provokes the reader's abilities and nurtures the critical potential. It even makes challenging the task of organising the results focused to answer the research questions.

Considering the results of the political-ideological position registered for each one of the eight newspapers, it was possible to categorise the outlets based on the intensity they demonstrate their bias.

The higher percentages were found among the newspapers marked as *elitists* in the following order: Correio Braziliense 78.82%, O Estado de São Paulo with 77.90%, Folha de São Paulo with 76.71%, Valor Econômico with 72.91%, O Globo with 72.91%, and the last one among the elitists, Estado de Minas with a 48.74% of its articles leaning to this worldview. After these six newspapers, there is O Tempo standing alone oriented by *egalitarianism* as its worldview, with 41.93% of its content categorised accordingly. Lastly, there is Zero Hora, presenting 34.02% of its content biased toward a combination of worldviews, *egalitarianism and individualism*.

By the qualitative description, more than understanding that economically and politically – two main features defining societies – the majority of newspapers (7 out of 8) studied are highly biased towards an *elitist* view. Essentially, it presents the society viewed within the individualist axis supporting private society as a core value, and subscribing to the society and the state roles within, sometimes restricted and sometimes unrestricted capitalist economy model. This group of newspapers support in many ways an elitist democracy related to property and the in the hands of whom will the power of managing the institutions be, and in some cases setting exaggerated sympathy to an authoritarian state.

According to the 2018 events timeline, the newspapers followed predominantly the economic and political agenda, especially a sequence of events regarding the same topic, for example the trial stages of Lula which took months, and the negotiation between parties in the National Congress around the workers' laws and the social security reform.

Through the content in the editorial column – which is opinionative and considerably more susceptible to manifest marks of bias – it is possible to identify the traits of social division between the ones exercising power in almost a clear stance, an elite of decision-makers over a typically described ‘mass of voters’ or ‘workers’, almost portrayed as opinionless.

Also, it is demonstrated that the conservative and authoritarian view of political and economic power are present in these elitist biased newspapers, making the results considerable regarding the representation of them in the country, and the range of public that they reach direct and indirectly.

Furthermore, as mainly identified in Estado de Minas, direct mention of Catholic religion and predominance of its festivities and rituals, even though the newspaper declares itself neutral and non-religious. On the other side, the newspaper O Tempo, by its content, shows an egalitarian position emphasising topics broadening the social groups, mentioning and considering minority groups and showing the comprehension of more variables imbricated in the problems faced in Brazil, not ingenuous formulating simple and easy-to-repeat sentences diffusing that the problems will be solved by strong – conservative – politicians and a neoliberalist economy.

7. CONCLUSION

*Quando você tem a ilusão de ler um texto que não é ideológico,
isso simplesmente quer dizer que o texto
tem a mesma ideologia que você:
logo, que a ideologia do texto é invisível.⁶⁷
— Alex Castro*

In this chapter the results found will be discussed within the qualitative and quantitative approaches considered integrated. The results of the analysis composed by a sample of 2,195 editorial articles published by eight online newspapers from Brazil in one-year time generated quantitative results that can be only explained by the qualitative analysis.

The work on this research reaches its resolution. In a retrospective, it is time to step back, look at the work done in each step, and organise the accomplishments regarding the objectives aspired when this investigation was yet a project.

The research questions retrieved from now on will be associated with the findings and grounding of each.

RQ1: How the newspapers' political-ideological bias can be assessed considering the written content?

This first research question corresponds to the motivation of this research and to the general objective of contributing to the communication studies with a proposal towards measuring the media political-ideological bias.

The core of this thesis is the method built to analyse media bias explicitly related to political ideologies since it was known that a reliable method was necessary. Moreover, since no method was found to be

⁶⁷ Translation by the author from Brazilian Portuguese: *“When you have the illusion of reading a text that is not ideological, it simply means that the text has the same ideology as you: therefore, the ideology of the text is invisible”* Available in: <https://alexcastro.com.br/ideologia/>

replicated and performed accordingly to answer the question to the scope of this research, a new proposal was shaped.

The methodological proposal detailed in this research piece is sustained by a theoretical background that had a closer look at the sets of political ideologies discussed by important political theorists in the last 70 years. Also, the method kept oriented to be as plural as possible in consideration the diversity of political systems and the media systems in the world. In the contemporary political ideologies set a broader spectrum was found to supply this gap.

Understanding that values and beliefs compose ideologies and they are expressed mainly through discursive forms was a starting point to elaborate, on one side, which set of political ideologies could be articulated – if any – and a core of values for the each political ideology that could be used, and, on another side, the method and techniques that could reach the marks in the texts.

After discussing the method in order to adjust and polish it, run the tests – with editorial pieces from Spanish online-only newspapers – and apply it to a larger sample – from Brazilian online newspapers –, the response for this first question is that the objective was satisfactorily achieved.

The fact that the methodological proposal was submitted to a journal, reviewed by specialised scholars and approved, offered more conviction as to be in a proper investigation path. Among many advances of the pre-test phase to write the article was the understanding that two worldviews could find cohesion; for example, one article can present *egalitarian* and *anti-elitist* core values. Another scenario visualised is that the marks could be conflictive. Even though the opposing marks were not found it served to design how to proceed in such case – discard the article from the quantitative approach and/or explain the information separately emerges from the content where it appears. This option can be elucidating since there is a universe of variables depending on the context of each newspaper and the society it belongs.

RQ2: How the Brazilian most read online newspapers can have their bias defined regarding the political-ideological worldviews of the methodological proposal?

Once the methodological proposal was prepared and tested, this research focused the interest to the media from Brazil, as mentioned before, representing the background of the researcher and, most importantly, the researcher's native language. To be as familiar as possible with the language the texts are written is essential to assess the messages having a full understanding of it.

It is important to remember that there is no reliable public data of circulation covering all media outlets in the country and IVC is an on-demand private service used by several media groups to support their market share for advertising negotiations. The sample was defined by the ranking of the most-read online newspapers from Brazil announced by IVC for the last time publicly in 2016 and by a time frame of one year considering relevant to study content as recent as possible. The effervescent scenario of 2018 in Brazil, with national elections included, was found to be relevant for the study and with valuable potential to be explored.

Even though unplanned difficulties were faced regarding the work of gathering the sample composed by editorial columns from the newspapers determined to be studied – *Folha de São Paulo* (365), *O Globo* (356), *Estado de São Paulo* (344), *Estado de Minas* (119), *O Tempo* (353), *Zero Hora* (97), *Valor Econômico* (240) and *Correio Braziliense* (321) –, 2,195 news pieces were downloaded and coded.

Applying the method that was born to answer the previous question, the sample was analysed, and the marks of political-ideological positions were registered. By the prevalence of core values found in each editorial column – marked as units of analysis – the articles could fit according to one of the possible worldviews proposed: *elitism*, *egalitarianism*, *individualism* and *communitarianism* (or the opposition to them).

The organisation of the quantitative results, as detailed in 6.1, answered this second research question and unveiled that six of the newspapers are biased to an *elitist* worldview. The newspapers registered as elitists were: *Correio Braziliense*, *O Estado de São Paulo*, *Folha de São Paulo*, *Valor Econômico*, *O Globo* and *Estado de Minas*. Only one newspaper is classified as biased towards an egalitarian worldview, which is *O Tempo*. Lastly, *Zero Hora* presents a bias in a combination of

two worldviews, *individualism* and *elitism*, which aligns with the previous six elitist newspapers.

The qualitative results permitted to understand the core values marking each particular newspaper bias and, how it was expressed in the written content of the editorial columns. In the case of the newspapers classified as elitists, the marks found were: social inequality, political inequality, speciesist inequality, authority from above, elitist democracy, state as a guarantee of social order, traditions as a source of cohesion, history as a tradition, and capitalist view of nature values.

RQ3: To what extent the pluralism of political-ideological positions are represented in the editorial columns published by the Brazilian most read online newspapers?

When thinking about the questions to be answered in this research, it was inevitable that it had to address the pluralism of the Brazilian media outlets. Although in this research, not every Brazilian newspaper could be analysed, the results render a valuable perspective of how diverse the values and beliefs are present.

The pluralism can be introduced when talking about one newspaper and the percentage of each worldview – *elitism*, *egalitarianism*, *individualism* and *communitarianism* – is found in the collection of content; also, the comparison between the newspapers considering the frequencies of the dominant worldviews found. This quantitative feature allows the zooming in and out because, depending on the case and the objective, the frequencies of worldviews can be quantified by considering just one piece of article. Probably, in the case of considering only one article, the experience with the method until now shows that less variance can be found, is more useful to assess long-form, for example.

The answer for this last question was reached by calculating the dominant worldview registered for each article, and the representation of the repetition regarding the total amount of articles from the newspaper. According to that, the Brazilian online newspapers were classified from less pluralist to more pluralist, and the outcome was, in

this order: *Correio Braziliense*, *O Estado de São Paulo*, *Folha de São Paulo*, *Valor Econômico*, *O Globo* and *Estado de Minas*. These newspapers consistently present elitist marks with very little presence of other marks which would represent that the newspaper is, at least, publishing content offering to the reader other perspectives. *Zero Hora* stands from an *elitist-individualist* and *O Tempo* as *egalitarian*.

Considering that neutrality is a utopia in journalism, at least the newspapers could distribute the spaces in a more balanced way, or they could try not to be as biased as the results prove in this thesis. Furthermore, these newspapers form a potent block publicising a non-plural worldview, contradictorily to one of the most diverse countries in the world.

The research questions were very oriented to the structure of the method. Nevertheless, the theoretical background was always present. From the exploration of the sample emerged the connection with Destutt de Tracy's necessity to organise or catalogue the ideas back in time, and with efforts of all other authors around the same objective. The history shows the political ideologies being socially constructed – even before to have such classification – to be addressed to a group of people since there is no political system of one person.

Considering it serves precisely to organise the clusters of social life for the human experience, the theories and the understanding of ideologies evolved, the classifications changed, and it was critical to grasp as much as possible of this process. There is much more to read and study about the concept of ideology in particular.

7.1 Research limitations and further work

As in most investigations, there are limitations, considering especially within the social sciences field. The distinction is how overall the limitations can explain the peculiar conditions of each research process that serve awareness for scholars reading or replicating it. Also, being conscious about the fragile aspects and register it, can guide future investigations. It makes it reasonable to present both together as done in this last part of this thesis presentation.

One limitation faced was related to the concentration of coding the articles by one researcher. Considering the size of the sample gathered to run the analysis along with the fact that this is a PhD investigation that was developed as a monography by a single researcher while not forgetting the limitation of time to complete it, a review by another coder was not incorporated. Despite that, three coders ran the tests after the methodological proposal was assembled. The results were published in an article – *Mapping press ideology. A methodological proposal to systematise the analysis of political ideologies in newspapers* – along with the proposal in a peer-reviewed journal, in 2017.

Another perception of restraint in the present work comes from the fact that this research could have been more open to contributions in order to refine details. The object of this investigation, the development stages and advances during the years of the doctorate program, for example by participating in congresses or getting involved in activities with the wider academic community, were not explored sufficiently. More discussions with diverse perspectives and the contributions from different academic opinions could polish details and improve the final work.

Looking at the smaller representation of the sample from one online newspaper, Estado de Minas, due to the limitation imposed by search engine design of the website, the solution was to collect as many editorial articles as possible since the newspaper publishes more than one editorial article a day on its online platform. In this case, the results were very homogeneous and consistently representing elitist marks. However, it is necessary to be aware that this situation could also lead to inconsistent results which would either affect the results or disqualify the newspaper for study.

Conversely, a sample composed by different categories of news pieces – not only narrowing to editorial articles – could bring a broader understanding of the appearance of the political-ideological marks of a media outlet, because, as already mentioned, in editorial columns the newspapers' worldview is usually magnified by the opinionative trait of it. To limit the sample was the option in detriment of including other news sections and shortening the time frame. To preserve the one entire year time frame was essential for a consistent lengthwise observation.

This last strand offers a compelling direction for further investigation applying this method to a sample of articles from different news sections, i.e. environment, science, technology, health, business. As justified in the research background and especially in the methodological perspective inspired in Critical Discourse Analysis, ideologies impregnate all discursive forms, and it is intrinsic to any content. An additional study considering various news sections can also offer complementary information on how the marks of political-ideological position can emerge in informative news content, comparatively to opinionative columns as analysed in the present research.

Another possibility that can contribute significantly to this research is the triangulation with research methods and techniques that could cover to approach the political-ideological position from the inside, as observing in the newsrooms or interviewing actors responsible for the content published. Also, the investigation focusing on online-only newspapers, which was the first intention, would be interesting, especially regarding the gap of studies about native digital newspapers in Brazil.

Considering the number of articles analysed for this research and the time frame defined, the content accessed offers immense possibilities to study the evolution of some topics or consistent discourses. For example, the discursive construction supporting the extreme-right bias which in the end won the national elections and rules the country at the moment, by mentioning a relevant future investigation detected when in contact with the amount of content and the number of newspapers used. On the same line, there is a wide range of other topics that could be explored, as the bias towards Lula's trial and arrest warrant, the discussion around the social security reform and the labour reform. In these cases, the studies can be the scope of an article.

Lastly, to keep investigating in this topic, one intention is to understand how it could be automated using tools, and probably in collaboration with other areas of studies as machine learning and natural language processing (NLP) techniques.

Innate to the development of this research there was the objective to educate and prepare a researcher, and, consequently that this apprentice could, at least, modestly contribute with a piece of original work to the studies in Communication. The first objective is somehow challenging to evaluate since it is a human attribute always to look forward and seek how we can improve. In this sense, there is a lot to learn, a lot to be reviewed and rebuilt to reach a thoughtful progress. However, this thesis was all along an incomparable learning process far beyond what can be read in these pages. Regarding the second objective, a small-scale contribution hopefully was put together and it represents a beginner's piece of source research work open to the opportunities to be improved.

8. DISCUSSION

*Eres optimista?
No mientras se castigue el espíritu crítico.
— László Lovász⁶⁸*

Over three and a half years after, this research reaches the stage of closing the results and welcomes the discussion for a few considerations regarding the main investigation topic and the findings but principally in connection with the broader reality.

After over than nine months of immersion in the content, reading and running the analysis, it seems too abbreviated to say that seven out of eight most-read online newspapers in Brazil present strong elitist-oriented worldview. The classification that was done according to a grid composed by two axes drawing the four possible worldviews to classify the media outlets – according to *elitism*, *egalitarianism*, *individualism* and *communitarianism* – each one encompassing a set of core values holds in itself the essence of this work but also offers significant points of discussion. The results found and the elitists' values cannot be dissociated from the country's political history and the media behaviour always dependent or submissive to political decisions, parties and inherently, power.

The dictatorial regime – scar in our recent past – marked a time of fast media reorganisation. The regime of 64 by installing, with Institutional Act number 5, the control the media and the censorship and by forcing the dissolution of communication companies identified with the former PTB or that made opposition to the regime (Hervieu, Pacete and Pinto 2013) forged a new era of media in the country. A new setting for media owners seeking for mutual help that draw new lines for what is understood as freedom of the press in Brazil even though decades after the end of the regime. As explains Görden (2009), the most influential media conglomerates currently had significant

⁶⁸ “*Are you optimistic? Not while critical thinking is punished.*” In an interview given to the Spanish newspaper LAVANGUARDIA, in Feb 11th 2019.

expansion during the military dictatorship. The expansion was paid in support as a currency. Between 1964 and 1980, when the television was massified in the country, companies received vital support from the state, especially with direct and indirect subsidies and, and the insertion in the interconnected communications, allowed the formation of national networks following the North American model (Albuquerque 2011).

This scenario, already approached in a state of the question – 3.2 *The singular case of Brazil* –, is predominantly the background of the newspapers studied in this research. Seven out of eight are born from these conglomerates and are oriented by taking their communication platforms in their business folder as a bargaining tool. Even less worth having an informed reader with a critical sense. Since, as well explained by Marialva Barbosa (2006) through a historical review, Brazil presents a media formation that intentionally obstructs the pluralism in all forms, and it is part of a bigger picture.

In this sense, the result of this investigation itself had very little to contribute, and such endeavour would lack innovation considering all the prolific literature detailing about media and power relations in Brazil. Instead, the main objective was to investigate the core values regarding political ideologies detected in these newspapers and to provide a methodological model for other searchers to be able to do the same in other countries. The results achieved here for the Brazilian case are in alignment with the works mentioned in the literature review. Their investigations faced results detecting how powerful vehicles from these groups are, and that the information for these media owners is business more than it is a public service. Even though, all the journalists can do their best to be as neutral as possible, the stances of interests are negotiated at a higher level and it comes explicitly in news pieces as the editorials.

The contribution of this research is the fact of prompting to investigate the discursive bias of some of these newspapers and study it with other perspectives and tools. Moreover, by using an original replicable method composed by quantitative and qualitative approaches inspired by the Critical Discourse Analysis and the traditional Content Analysis, this thesis ventures the possibility to compare an unlimited

number of media outlets assessing the written content from any country or region to identify the political-ideological bias.

Moreover, it advances a process of understanding the political ideologies by its centre of values, or the values that are differentiated from the other worldviews. The decomposition work that was done with each set of political ideologies and each political ideology *per se* guided the way to comprehend that the method should be straightforward and easy to be interpreted and manipulated by the coders. That is when the grid/group technique presents itself as a practical option, although the coders need training on the core values featured under each worldview.

In case of comparing the results of this research to similar investigations, a similarity is found with Guareschi and Biz (2005) when the scholars used the values equality, diversity, participation, solidarity and freedom were assessed using qualitative content analysis. When analysing the presence of these values, the reality was a predominant opposition to all of the values, except solidarity, which had smaller frequency. The values articulated by Guareschi and Biz (2005) has a resemblance to the core values of the four worldviews proposed in this thesis, although their research does not directly mention the values are connected to political ideologies.

The study of Pineda and Almiron, in 2013, is similar in many aspects regarding the objectives, assigning values for the political ideologies – using left-right spectrum – and the intention to compare a more significant number of newspapers. Although Spain has a different media model according to Hallin and Mancini (2011), the results obtained after examining 18 native digital newspapers from Spain also showed anti-left bias and dominance of right-winged bias. In the results from Brazilian online newspapers, the right-wing are under the elitist and anti-egalitarianism worldview.

The cases of partisan media in Latin America can be found in a considerable amount of studies, that is an unexpected fact to find results opposed to cases of elitist or right-wing in dominant media in these countries (Kitzberger 2009). However, the differences are imbricated in how the bias is exposed in addition to the political context aspects in each country that in many instances come along with the complaint of

cases of violation of the press' right of expression in Latin American, according to the latest report⁶⁹ by Repórteres Sem Fronteiras (RSF), from 2019. The research presents scenario authoritarianism and disinformation that is accentuated by the deterioration of press freedom in the region, where journalists are still often faced with violence, political and economic pressures and state censorship. Brazil fell three positions in the ranking, occupying 105th place in 2019.

As the articles analysed in this study already presented, 2018 was a particularly turbulent year, marked by four murders of journalists in Brazil and increasing vulnerability of independent reporters covering topics related to corruption, public policies or organised crime in small and medium-sized cities across the country. Above all, the election of Jair Bolsonaro in October 2018, in a coalition formed by heterogeneous conservative, religious and right-wing groups, mostly supporting authoritarian agendas after a campaign marked by hate speech, disinformation, attacks on the press and contempt for human rights (Lum 2019⁷⁰), the scenario ahead is a harbinger of a dark period for democracy, freedom and pluralism

Pitching himself as the answer to violence and corruption, Bolsonaro's victory has drawn human rights concerns due to his use of bigoted language and nostalgia for the period of military rule. Aside from marking a hard shift to the extreme-right (alternatively proposed to be denominated *neofascist*⁷¹, according to Boito Júnior (2018), his win also saw a radical change from what 's been traditional in Brazilian politics since the start of the country's democratic era. The fact is that the PSL representant did not win through coalitions with larger parties or television time but with the help specific groups, of social media and fake news.

⁶⁹ Source: <https://rsf.org/pt/ranking-rsf-2019-autoritarismo-e-desinformacao-acentuam-deterioracao-da-liberdade-de-imprensa-na>

⁷⁰ Article's online source: <http://monitoracism.eu/the-rise-of-bolsorano/>

⁷¹ Translation by the author from Brazilian Portuguese: "*What is common between classical fascism and Brazilian neo-fascism is the break with the values of bourgeois democracy, the stigma on party politics and parliamentary play, the aspiration for the elimination of the left through authoritarian measures, racism and ostensive and politicized machismo, the apology for armament and violence, as well as the presence - which was not seen in the military dictatorship governments of Latin America - of an active mass base formed by the intermediate layers of society.*"

The consequences of a year of harsh political dispute marked by “we” and “them” in the editorials, in Brazil, the effects are being measured. Instituto Ipsos observed in a survey that was carried out in 2019 with 19,700 respondents between 16 and 64 years old in the countries where the institute operates. The conclusion regarding Brazil is that the political polarisation has reached a high level of intolerance that exceeds the international average among the 27 countries other countries studied.

A perceptible theme in the daily life of Brazilians in recent years, especially after Lula and Dilma, the radicalism that involves political party discussions was the aspect measured in the research. The survey showed that respondents in Brazil are less likely to accept differences. 39% of Brazilian respondents believe that people will not change their opinion even when contrary evidence is presented; besides, 34% agree with the sentence: *who has a political vision different from me does not care about people like me.*

The fact that the political debate is discouraged is terrifying for the future of the country, since in 2018 elections the voting intention has to do with the ‘anti-oppositor’ vote. The respondents did not support and cast their vote according to a cause they believe in, but to the *anti*, and the positive points of other projects remain unknown or are not recognised. This attitude maintains and reinforces intolerance.

This polarisation was embodied steadily in the editorial discourse from most of the newspapers composing this research. Although, there is no intention to denounce the newspapers as the blameworthy – as the tone of the elitist editorials – for this social phenomenon. Wiser is to look at it as part of a picture on the anatomy of power that highlights the importance of understanding the surroundings and the peculiarities in the country. In parallel, it is important to interject that, luckily, in Brazil there is alternative media – as *The Intercept Brazil*, led by Glenn Greenwald and *Nexo* – doing a remarkable work with a plural and democratic approach to journalism in the digital age (Fenton 2010).

Whitin all these aspects of the discussion regarding the results there are the studies of the editorials columns purpose itself in Brazil. Academic researches lead by Francisco Paulo Jamil Marques from the Department of Political Science of the Federal University of Paraná

integrated with the Department of Language and Communication of the Federal University of Technology (Curitiba) and the Faculty of Communication from the Federal University of Bahia, try to understand the links between news' and opinionated sections' agendas in the main Brazilian newspapers applying quantitative and qualitative Content Analysis. In accordance to what was found in the present research, Marques *et al* (2019) work with the idea that the coverage is based on the premise that the media strive to establish political agendas. Also, Marques *et al* (2019) and Marques and Mont'Alverne's (2019) research also put emphasis is studing ordinary coverage rather than compare news related to single events. Lastly, Marques' and the team of researchers resume well the scenario:

Since editorials are elite-oriented texts and front-cover stories draw readers' attention, the newspapers' goals when they choose specific agendas may not necessarily be to simply state a position, but to persuade the decision-makers and opinion leaders, what influences the role that journalism plays in democracies. (Marques *et al* 2019, 16)

Facing all that, does it make sense to ask if there is something cultural? Do we have cultural behaviours that discourage dialoguing ideas? The fact is that the space for open and fruitful dialogue is commonly narrow in the family shape, in the educational context and in the hierarchy of companies. A conjunction of institutional factors that date back from the military dictatorship and its repression can offer one possible explanation (Amaral 2007) since, in this period, massive reform in the educational system in Brazil was consummate.

The space for exposing and contemplate different ideas is suppressed by power applied differently, present in all the spheres. The media outlets, as part of this web commonly shows to be unprepared to expose a debate further than the equation based in two different ideas, one is correct and is defended, and the other is wrong and is condemned, and the result is a superficial understanding of the facts and events or a discourse of commands.

Regrettably considering present is to face a president democratically elected who uses in his daily public life aggressive

political rhetoric based on hate speech towards blacks, indigenous people, women and LGBTIQ. Bolsonaro presents himself as the defender of traditional Christian moral values (Anderson 2019), gaining enthusiastic support from leaderships of Brazilian two most prominent Pentecostal denominations – Assembly of God and the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God – as well as from some members of the Catholic Church. It is possible to understand why the lack of spaces for different opinions able to nurture constructive dialogue is what concerns the most regarding the media in Brazil nowadays.

Moreover, in 2020, the debate is still related to online media and the possibilities of pluralism (Axford and Huggins 2001; Busarello and Ulbricht 2014) when the pieces of evidence point towards a dominant and absolute not plural media environment. It is all within the limited economic and political plan of government where prevails a liberal thinking that can be summarized in a few lines as freedom for those who have money (power) and subordination for those who do not.

Even though the perspective could be enthusiastic, the route wisely signs to be more conscient about the lack of pluralism in the grounds of decision making in media and power relations in Brasil, since its occupation by Europeans. As recognising the processes that continually leads to mistakes is the first step of a stage of genuine improvement. At the same time that Brazil represents the most of social plurality in the world – for good and the bad – and it seems that the media in the country will predominantly plural when the whole society recognises its value in its profusion.

Coming to the end, the results presented in this investigation give its respectful contribution to the studies in media bias, political ideologies and pluralism, and intend to potentialize interexchange around similar objectives attending the conviction that media has to be continuously explored and discussed grounded in interdisciplinarity.

The final comment from the researcher behind this work, coming as risk of drafting a recommendation for us all, is to keep in mind the bigger picture and the people. Since the wider utility of it is not exclusively the methodology, but about ways of seeing and understanding the world as we humans are able of doing, in a constant and endless process. As well, as pursue this construction for democratic

spaces in mass media even though it takes time and it is, undoubtedly, a challenge for all of us in the Communication field. In with holistic perspective, oriented to equality and justice – believed to be grounded on education – the expansion of citizenship processes can be our best decision as a society.

Hopefully, we will live to see advances towards a pluralist media becoming a reality. Where people can see themselves and their reality portrayed, where the topics can serve as a push to a broader horizon, an invitation to think about the social fabric and our place in it – not isolated but with everything existing with us – our differences and what makes us unique, but not more important than any other being.

Hopefully, we will be here to see more new outlets doing respectful journalism – based on crowdfunding is a plus – bulldozing the faltering power controlling communication established along the centuries and be steppingstones for critical thinking, offering discourses that propose dialogue not pre-cooked speeches for conflicts.

Hopefully, the debates will be as plural as possible, and the academic stance will not be excused from perhaps being part of the problem we denounce.

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ANNEXES

Annex 1: Original and full list of the 34 most read online newspapers from Brazil. Published by IVC in 2016.

RANK	TÍTULO	UF	MÉDIA DE CIRCULAÇÃO DIGITAL	VARIACÃO 2014-2015
1	FOLHA DE S.PAULO	SP	146.641	
2	O GLOBO	RJ	118.143	
3	O ESTADO DE S.PAULO	SP	78.410	
4	SUPER NOTÍCIA	MG	49.332	
5	ESTADO DE MINAS	MG	48.284	
6	O TEMPO	MG	46.015	
7	ZERO HORA	RS	44.749	
8	EXTRA	RJ	25.941	
9	VALOR ECONÔMICO	SP	18.291	
10	CORREIO BRAZILIENSE	DF	17.429	
11	CORREIO*	BA	17.350	
12	A TARDE	BA	11.368	
13	DIÁRIO CATARINENSE	SC	10.936	
14	JORNAL DO COMMERCIO	PE	10.468	
15	PIONEIRO	RS	5.446	
16	GAZETA DO POVO	PR	4.938	
17	DIÁRIO DE SANTA MARIA	RS	3.000	
18	A NOTÍCIA	SC	2.811	
19	HOJE EM DIA	MG	2.680	
20	A GAZETA	ES	2.405	
21	JORNAL DE SANTA CATARINA	SC	2.226	
22	CORREIO DO POVO	RS	1.600	
23	DIÁRIO DE PERNAMBUCO	PE	1.426	
24	FOLHA DE LONDRINA	PR	1.253	
25	JORNAL NH	RS	1.229	
26	LANCE!	RJ	1.061	
27	A TRIBUNA	ES	931	
28	DIÁRIO DE CANGOAS	RS	873	-
29	O DIA	RJ	667	
30	JORNAL VS	RS	480	
31	O POPULAR	GO	260	
32	O DIÁRIO DO NORTE DO PARANÁ	PR	144	
33	TRIBUNA DO PARANÁ	PR	122	
34	NOVO JORNAL	RN	9	

Annex 2: Code sheet format as used for the analysis of each editorial article in this study.

<p>0. Article Ref:</p> <p>1. Coder's Name:</p> <p>2. Coding date:</p> <p>3. Newspaper name:</p> <p>4. Country:</p> <p>5. Article's title:</p> <p>6. Publication date:</p> <p>7. Section (in the newspaper):</p> <p>8. Topic (politics, economy, culture, etc.):</p> <p>9. Genre:</p> <p>10. Author/s:</p>	<p>B. Textual analysis</p> <table border="1"><tr><td>1. Worldviews appearing</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2. Core values appearing</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>3. Categories</td><td></td></tr></table>	1. Worldviews appearing		2. Core values appearing		3. Categories	
1. Worldviews appearing							
2. Core values appearing							
3. Categories							

IDEOLOGICAL MARKERS

Text	Description	Categories & ideological markers	Classical ideologies which apply

5. Ideological stance	
6. Classical labels	

Annex 3: Content Analysis individual results per article.

3.1 Folha de São Paulo

Newspaper: FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO			Total articles: 365
Article's code	Pub. Date	Article's Title	Worldview/s found
FOLHADESP20180101	01/01/2018	<i>Ano decisivo</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180102	02/01/2018	<i>Escolhas de Doria</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180103	03/01/2018	<i>Drogas e realismo</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180104	04/01/2018	<i>Insegurança estadual</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180105	05/01/2018	<i>Devaneio perigoso</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180106	06/01/2018	<i>A conta da corrupção</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180107	07/01/2018	<i>Fazer o quê?</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180108	08/01/2018	<i>Beabá orçamentário</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180109	09/01/2018	<i>Sem fim, sem fins</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180110	10/01/2018	<i>Falar sobre Bolsonaro</i>	Anti-elitism
FOLHADESP20180111	11/01/2018	<i>Território albeio</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180112	12/01/2018	<i>Gravidade</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180113	13/01/2018	<i>Sucessão de erros</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180114	14/01/2018	<i>Segunda divisão</i>	Elitism

FOLHADESP20180115	15/01/2018	<i>Campanha de embuste</i>	Egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180116	16/01/2018	<i>Contas melhores</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180117	17/01/2018	<i>Atrito infeliz</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180118	18/01/2018	<i>Enrolados</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180119	19/01/2018	<i>Embargos de exaltação</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180120	20/01/2018	<i>Um ano com Trump</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180121	21/01/2018	<i>Ajuda indefensável</i>	Anti-elitism
FOLHADESP20180122	22/01/2018	<i>Temer em campanha</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180123	23/01/2018	<i>Custosa desinformação</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180124	24/01/2018	<i>Lula, 2a instância</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180125	25/01/2018	<i>Condenado</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180126	26/01/2018	<i>O mercado e as eleições</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180127	27/01/2018	<i>Passo correto</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180128	28/01/2018	<i>A ficha de Lula</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180129	29/01/2018	<i>A urna como arma</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180130	30/01/2018	<i>Lucro mal tributado</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180131	31/01/2018	<i>Incógnita mantida</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180201	01/02/2018	<i>Teto para iniciantes</i>	Elitism

FOLHADESP20180202	02/02/2018	<i>Sem maioria</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180203	03/02/2018	<i>Credito à economia</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180204	04/02/2018	<i>Arrepiando caminho</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180205	05/02/2018	<i>Privilégios da casta</i>	Anti-elitism
FOLHADESP20180206	06/02/2018	<i>Subestimando o risco</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180207	07/02/2018	<i>Quanto maior a altura</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180208	08/02/2018	<i>Renovação e desespero</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180209	09/02/2018	<i>Para quem o juro cai</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180210	10/02/2018	<i>Deveres na saúde</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180211	11/02/2018	<i>Sem alívio</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180212	12/02/2018	<i>Outras reformas</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180213	13/02/2018	<i>Juros, mitos e fatos</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180214	14/02/2018	<i>Ordem e folia</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180215	15/02/2018	<i>Emergência social</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180216	16/02/2018	<i>Bolsa furada</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180217	17/02/2018	<i>A renovação é outra</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180218	18/02/2018	<i>Facebook</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180219	19/02/2018	<i>Desgoverno</i>	Elitism / Individualism

FOLHADESP20180220	20/02/2018	<i>Caixas-pretas</i>	Individualism
FOLHADESP20180221	21/02/2018	<i>Não é Plano B</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180222	22/02/2018	<i>Devaneios autoritários</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180223	23/02/2018	<i>Sem juízo</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180224	24/02/2018	<i>Miséria venezuelana</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180225	25/02/2018	<i>Candidatos a candidato</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180226	26/02/2018	<i>Fantasma de volta</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180227	27/02/2018	<i>Os donos do dinheiro</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180228	28/02/2018	<i>O reinado de Xi</i>	Anti-elitism
FOLHADESP20180301	01/03/2018	<i>Passos incertos</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180302	02/03/2018	<i>Piruetas de Lula</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180303	03/03/2018	<i>Tentação eleitoral</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180304	04/03/2018	<i>Sete anos perdidos</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180305	05/03/2018	<i>Farra federal</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180306	06/03/2018	<i>É a estupidez</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180307	07/03/2018	<i>Obscurantismo</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180308	08/03/2018	<i>Lula e a loteria do STF</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180309	09/03/2018	<i>1964, o ano que acabou</i>	Elitism

FOLHADESP20180310	10/03/2018	<i>Os donos dos botões</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180311	11/03/2018	<i>Deseducação à paulista</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180312	12/03/2018	<i>Investigar Temer</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180313	13/03/2018	<i>Corporativismo nota 10</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180314	14/03/2018	<i>Você está demitido</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180315	15/03/2018	<i>Greve imoral</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180316	16/03/2018	<i>Quem matou Marielle?</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180317	17/03/2018	<i>Fora dos limites</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180318	18/03/2018	<i>A democracia de Putin</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180319	19/03/2018	<i>Mais uma batalha</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180320	20/03/2018	<i>Feudo tucano</i>	Anti-elitism
FOLHADESP20180321	21/03/2018	<i>Tribulações federais</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180322	22/03/2018	<i>O Supremo e Lula</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180323	23/03/2018	<i>Pouco e tarde</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180324	24/03/2018	<i>Desgaste em série</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180325	25/03/2018	<i>Esperança e realidade</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180326	26/03/2018	<i>Economia na balança</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180327	27/03/2018	<i>Pretensão presidencial</i>	Elitism

FOLHADESP20180328	28/03/2018	<i>Uma brecha a menos</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180329	29/03/2018	<i>Na idade da pedra</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180330	30/03/2018	<i>Cerco ao presidente</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180331	31/03/2018	<i>Bancos em débito</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180401	01/04/2018	<i>Refazenda</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180402	02/04/2018	<i>Adiando o inadiável</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180403	03/04/2018	<i>Fantasma sindical</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180404	04/04/2018	<i>Não se trata de Lula</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180405	05/04/2018	<i>Desserviço militar</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180406	06/04/2018	<i>Dois atitudes</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180407	07/04/2018	<i>Cumpra-se a lei</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180408	08/04/2018	<i>Alckmin, o discreto</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180409	09/04/2018	<i>O pós-Lula</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180410	10/04/2018	<i>Camisas trocadas</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180411	11/04/2018	<i>Risco orçamentário</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180412	12/04/2018	<i>Tucanos na mira</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180413	13/04/2018	<i>Risco de retrocesso</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180414	14/04/2018	<i>Miséria brasileira</i>	Elitism

FOLHADESP20180415	15/04/2018	<i>A eleição sem Lula</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180416	16/04/2018	<i>Trump ataca</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180417	17/04/2018	<i>Aécio na justiça</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180418	18/04/2018	<i>Truculentos e pueris</i>	Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180419	19/04/2018	<i>Renovação à cubana</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180420	20/04/2018	<i>Em lugar nenhum</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180421	21/04/2018	<i>Ensaio eleitorais</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180422	22/04/2018	<i>Elefantes na sala</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180423	23/04/2018	<i>Mares revoltos</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180424	24/04/2018	<i>Combate ao crime</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180425	25/04/2018	<i>Foro em cascata</i>	Anti-elitism
FOLHADESP20180426	26/04/2018	<i>Ainda que tarde</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180427	27/04/2018	<i>A regra da incerteza</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180428	28/04/2018	<i>No limite das Coreias</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180429	29/04/2018	<i>A saúde do SUS</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180430	30/04/2018	<i>Mal-estar</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180501	01/05/2018	<i>Insjustiças no IR</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180502	02/05/2018	<i>Relatos do desastre</i>	Elitism / Individualism

FOLHADESP20180503	03/05/2018	<i>Tempo perdido</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180504	04/05/2018	<i>Dificuldades à vista</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180505	05/05/2018	<i>Cotas de aço</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180506	06/05/2018	<i>Carência imóvel</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180507	07/05/2018	<i>Retomada difícil</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180508	08/05/2018	<i>Temer no telhado</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180509	09/05/2018	<i>Menos imprevisível</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180510	10/05/2018	<i>Fantasmas argentinos</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180511	11/05/2018	<i>Mais Bolsa Família</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180512	12/05/2018	<i>Ordens superiores</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180513	13/05/2018	<i>Reformar o STF</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180514	14/05/2018	<i>Temer, 2 anos</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180515	15/05/2018	<i>Lobby do carimbo</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180516	16/05/2018	<i>A eleição e a economia</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180517	17/05/2018	<i>Cronologia do atraso</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180518	18/05/2018	<i>Sobreviventes</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180519	19/05/2018	<i>Dias turbulentos</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180520	20/05/2018	<i>A urna não decide</i>	Elitism

FOLHADESP20180521	21/05/2018	<i>Reforma em curso</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180522	22/05/2018	<i>Abismo chavista</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180523	23/05/2018	<i>Debate envenenado</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180524	24/05/2018	<i>Preço não faz acordo</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180525	25/05/2018	<i>Quem pode mais</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180526	26/05/2018	<i>Reação tardia</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180527	27/05/2018	<i>Perdas e vexames</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180528	28/05/2018	<i>Saídas racionais</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180529	29/05/2018	<i>Cobrar o acordo</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180530	30/05/2018	<i>Custos do desgoverno</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180531	31/05/2018	<i>Agora os petroleiros</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180601	01/06/2018	<i>Sem acelerar</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180602	02/06/2018	<i>Parente fora</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180603	03/06/2018	<i>Há soluções</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180604	04/06/2018	<i>Fora da ordem</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180605	05/06/2018	<i>Causa própria</i>	Anti-elitism
FOLHADESP20180606	06/06/2018	<i>Lições orçamentárias</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180607	07/06/2018	<i>602.960</i>	Elitism / Individualism

FOLHADESP20180608	08/06/2018	<i>Tudo a definir</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180609	09/06/2018	<i>O custo do medo</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180610	10/06/2018	<i>Menos cenários</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180611	11/06/2018	<i>Em busca de trabalho</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180612	12/06/2018	<i>Com um pé atrás</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180613	13/06/2018	<i>Trump e o amigo Kim</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180614	14/06/2018	<i>Ainda um mistério</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180615	15/06/2018	<i>Pior sem um teto</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180616	16/06/2018	<i>Lacuna na lei</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180617	17/06/2018	<i>Censura travestida</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180618	18/06/2018	<i>No purgatório</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180619	19/06/2018	<i>Despesa invisível</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180620	20/06/2018	<i>Medos globais</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180621	21/06/2018	<i>Delação não basta</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180622	22/06/2018	<i>O enigma das vacinas</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180623	23/06/2018	<i>O senhor da Rodoanel</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180624	24/06/2018	<i>Juízes sem teto</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180625	25/06/2018	<i>Álcool livre</i>	Elitism

FOLHADESP20180626	26/06/2018	<i>Causa contra o erário</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180627	27/06/2018	<i>Delação investigada</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180628	28/06/2018	<i>Suprema divisão</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180629	29/06/2018	<i>Metas duvidosas</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180630	30/06/2018	<i>Olhos na copa</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180701	01/07/2018	<i>Canetada estatal</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180702	03/07/2018	<i>Eleitores na mira</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180703	04/07/2018	<i>Futuro incerto</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180704	05/07/2018	<i>Saúde cara</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180705	06/07/2018	<i>Rejeição à urna</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180706	07/07/2018	<i>PIB atropelado</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180707	08/07/2018	<i>Brasil fora</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180708	09/07/2018	<i>A serviço do público</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180709	10/07/2018	<i>Internet cerceada</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180710	11/07/2018	<i>Várzea jurídica</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180711	11/07/2018	<i>Perto da guerra</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180712	12/07/2018	<i>Dados sob proteção</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180713	13/07/2018	<i>Pilhagem do erário</i>	Elitism

FOLHADESP20180714	14/07/2018	<i>Modelo de risco</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180715	15/07/2018	<i>Sem provas</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180716	16/07/2018	<i>Corda esticada</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180717	17/07/2018	<i>Sinecura patronal</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180718	18/07/2018	<i>Com voto, sem aliado</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180719	19/07/2018	<i>Escalada autoritária</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180720	20/07/2018	<i>Bolsonaro e a CNI</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180721	21/07/2018	<i>O peso do centrão</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180722	22/07/2018	<i>Mobilidade travada</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180723	23/07/2018	<i>Desafio ao gigante</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180724	24/07/2018	<i>Projeções sombrias</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180725	25/07/2018	<i>Programa evasivo</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180726	26/07/2018	<i>A conta da eleição</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180727	27/07/2018	<i>Aposta na ignorância</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180728	28/07/2018	<i>Ameaça das facções</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180729	29/07/2018	<i>Concerto da máquina</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180730	30/07/2018	<i>Arbitrio à solta</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180731	31/07/2018	<i>Aborto em pauta</i>	Egalitarianism

FOLHADESP20180801	01/08/2018	<i>Apagão informativo</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180802	02/08/2018	<i>As últimas janelas</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180803	03/08/2018	<i>Provocação barata</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180804	04/08/2018	<i>Sem alarmismo</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180805	05/08/2018	<i>O que incentivar</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180806	06/08/2018	<i>Saída pela direita</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180807	07/08/2018	<i>Mais uma ditadura</i>	Anti-elitism
FOLHADESP20180808	08/08/2018	<i>Partido do governo</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180809	09/08/2018	<i>Teto expiatório</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180810	10/08/2018	<i>Acinte federal</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180811	11/08/2018	<i>Debate tutelado</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180812	12/08/2018	<i>O básico do ensino</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180813	13/08/2018	<i>Uma boa proposta</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180814	14/08/2018	<i>Retrocesso na saúde</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180815	15/08/2018	<i>Orçamento eleitoral</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180816	16/08/2018	<i>A farsa da fraude</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180817	17/08/2018	<i>Fantasma ministerial</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180818	18/08/2018	<i>Ponto de equilíbrio</i>	Elitism

FOLHADESP20180819	19/08/2018	<i>Brasil inseguro</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180820	20/08/2018	<i>Não são todos iguais</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180821	21/08/2018	<i>O velho, de novo</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180822	22/08/2018	<i>Tristes fenômenos</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180823	23/08/2018	<i>Lugar-comum</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180824	24/08/2018	<i>Frustração no Rio</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180825	25/08/2018	<i>O cerco a Trump</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180826	26/08/2018	<i>Pior sem ele</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180827	27/08/2018	<i>Vai-e-vem de Bolsonaro</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180828	28/08/2018	<i>Olho no Congresso</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180829	29/08/2018	<i>Ficção de campanha</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180830	30/08/2018	<i>Panaceia militar</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180831	31/08/2018	<i>Destruição do futuro</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180901	01/09/2018	<i>Viés de baixa</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180902	02/09/2018	<i>Ela tem salvação</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180903	03/09/2018	<i>Verborragia perigosa</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180904	04/09/2018	<i>Museu de cinzas</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20180905	05/09/2018	<i>Decepção tucana</i>	Elitism

FOLHADESP20180906	06/09/2018	<i>Bizarras ordenações</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180907	07/09/2018	<i>Repúdio geral</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180908	08/09/2018	<i>Crepúsculo de Temer</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180909	09/09/2018	<i>Salvação da lavoura</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180910	10/09/2018	<i>Uma nova crise?</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180911	11/09/2018	<i>Após a facada</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180912	12/09/2018	<i>Imprudência fardada</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180913	13/09/2018	<i>Quem Haddad será?</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180914	14/09/2018	<i>Sem mordança</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180915	15/09/2018	<i>Funil eleitoral</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180916	16/09/2018	<i>Opções paulistas</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180917	17/09/2018	<i>Gerir a berança</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180918	18/09/2018	<i>Inflexões petistas</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20180919	19/09/2018	<i>A faca e a urna</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180920	20/09/2018	<i>Força centrífuga</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180921	21/09/2018	<i>O superimposto</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180922	22/09/2018	<i>O centro de FHC</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180923	23/09/2018	<i>Como vota o paulista</i>	Elitism / Individualism

FOLHADESP20180924	24/09/2018	<i>Assembleia apagada</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180925	25/09/2018	<i>Como se fazem leis</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180926	26/09/2018	<i>Como elas votam</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180927	27/09/2018	<i>Tempo escasso</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180928	28/09/2018	<i>Líderes e rejeitados</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180929	29/09/2018	<i>Universo paralelo</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20180930	30/09/2018	<i>Besteirol eleitoral</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181001	01/10/2018	<i>Censura de toga</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181002	02/10/2018	<i>Ele não, ele sim</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181003	03/10/2018	<i>Fantasmas petistas</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20181004	04/10/2018	<i>Constituição, 30</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181005	05/10/2018	<i>Melhor em 2 turnos</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20181006	06/10/2018	<i>A tarefa inadiável</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181007	07/10/2018	<i>Ela merece respeito</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181008	08/10/2018	<i>Brasil à direita</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181009	09/10/2018	<i>Haverá oposição</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181010	10/10/2018	<i>Sem Constituinte</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181011	11/10/2018	<i>Quem é quem</i>	Elitism

FOLHADESP20181012	12/10/2018	<i>Terra de ninguém</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181013	13/10/2018	<i>Cacoetes estatistas</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181014	14/10/2018	<i>Governo incerto</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181015	15/10/2018	<i>Imprevidentes</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181016	16/10/2018	<i>O preço do voto</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181017	17/10/2018	<i>Ele não debate</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181018	18/10/2018	<i>Frente esvaziada</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181019	19/10/2018	<i>Mentira que prolifera</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181020	20/10/2018	<i>Baixo nível à Paulista</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181021	21/10/2018	<i>Sem começar do zero</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181022	22/10/2018	<i>Temores ambientais</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181023	23/10/2018	<i>Quartelada retórica</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181024	24/10/2018	<i>Encruzilhada petista</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20181025	25/10/2018	<i>Bolsonaro e militares</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181026	26/10/2018	<i>Reta final</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181027	27/10/2018	<i>Chance desperdiçada</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181028	28/10/2018	<i>Defesa da democracia</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181029	29/10/2018	<i>Bolsonaro e a esfinge</i>	Elitism

FOLHADESP20181030	30/10/2018	<i>Qual PSDB?</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181031	31/10/2018	<i>Acostume-se</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181101	01/11/2018	<i>A guinada do juiz</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181102	02/11/2018	<i>Superministros</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20181103	03/11/2018	<i>Desdesarmamento</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181104	04/11/2018	<i>Teste na previdência</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20181105	05/11/2018	<i>Vaiém ambiental</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181106	06/11/2018	<i>Escola sem sentido</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181107	07/11/2018	<i>Embaixada polêmica</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181108	08/11/2018	<i>Recado a Trump</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181109	09/11/2018	<i>Em benefício da casta</i>	Anti-elitism
FOLHADESP20181110	10/11/2018	<i>Nova CLT, 1o ano</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20181111	11/11/2018	<i>De juiz a ministro</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181112	12/11/2018	<i>Rouanet sem mitos</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181113	13/11/2018	<i>Ensaio de otimismo</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181114	14/11/2018	<i>O caixa do BNDES</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181115	15/11/2018	<i>Redes de escuridão</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181116	16/11/2018	<i>Linha-dura estadual</i>	Elitism / Individualism

FOLHADESP20181117	17/11/2018	<i>As teses do chanceler</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181118	18/11/2018	<i>Frente esvaziada</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20181119	19/11/2018	<i>Reforço aos cofres</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181120	20/11/2018	<i>Servidores custosos</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181121	21/11/2018	<i>As caravanas</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181122	22/11/2018	<i>Pelas beiradas</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181123	23/11/2018	<i>Vícios de origem</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181124	24/11/2018	<i>Energia desperdiçada</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181125	25/11/2018	<i>Ambição liberal</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181126	26/11/2018	<i>Incertezas à distância</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181127	27/11/2018	<i>Haja elite</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181128	28/11/2018	<i>Conxavo vexatório</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181129	29/11/2018	<i>Avaliar os médicos</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181130	30/11/2018	<i>Obras minguantes</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181201	01/12/2018	<i>O limite do perdão</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181202	02/12/2018	<i>Cabide estatal</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181203	03/12/2018	<i>Trégua pelo comércio</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181204	04/12/2018	<i>Submundo eleitoral</i>	Elitism

FOLHADESP20181205	05/12/2018	<i>Brasília como ela é</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181206	06/12/2018	<i>Fatia mínima</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181207	07/12/2018	<i>Ainda mais pobres</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181208	08/12/2018	<i>Em família</i>	Anti-elitism
FOLHADESP20181209	09/12/2018	<i>Moro contra o crime</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181210	10/12/2018	<i>Limites abaixo do céu</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181211	11/12/2018	<i>Ambiente tenso</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181212	12/12/2018	<i>Diploma de populista</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20181213	13/12/2018	<i>Fechou-se o atalho</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181214	14/12/2018	<i>Balaio partidário</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181215	15/12/2018	<i>Medos ancestrais</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181216	16/12/2018	<i>O lado da receita</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181217	17/12/2018	<i>Ideia de para-choque</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181218	18/12/2018	<i>Máquina engessada</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181219	19/12/2018	<i>Relações ideológicas</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
FOLHADESP20181220	20/12/2018	<i>Presepada suprema</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181221	21/12/2018	<i>A faca e o Sistema S</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181222	22/12/2018	<i>Recaída no vício</i>	Elitism

FOLHADESP20181223	23/12/2018	<i>Futuro incerto</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181224	24/12/2018	<i>Otimismo com juros</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181225	25/12/2018	<i>Reforma paulistana</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181226	26/12/2018	<i>O social sob o teto</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181227	27/12/2018	<i>A versão de Queiroz</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181228	28/12/2018	<i>Ainda exorbitantes</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181229	29/12/2018	<i>Líderes em declínio</i>	Elitism
FOLHADESP20181230	30/12/2018	<i>Agenda retomada</i>	Elitism / Individualism
FOLHADESP20181231	31/12/2018	<i>A prova de Doria</i>	Elitism

3.2 O Globo

Newspaper: O Globo			Total articles: 356
Article's code	Pub. Date	Article's Title	Worldview/s found
OGLOBO20180101	01/01/2018	<i>Rio de Janeiro pode aprender com os erros</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180102	02/01/2018	<i>Não faltam motivos</i>	Anti-elitism
OGLOBO20180103	03/01/2018	<i>Reformas para além da previdência</i>	Egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180104	04/01/2018	<i>O desserviço que o candidato Meirelles presta</i>	Anti-elitism

OGLOBO20180105	05/01/2018	<i>Privatização da Eletrobrás não pode ser barganhada</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180106	06/01/2018	<i>Penitenciárias são esquecidas na crise da segurança</i>	Egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180107	07/01/2018	<i>Multa da Petrobrás reafirma o crime do Petrolão</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180108	08/01/2018	<i>Sem autocrítica</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180109	09/01/2018	<i>Princípio da regra de ouro é intocável</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180110	10/01/2018	<i>Febre amarela é caso de emergência no Rio e em São Paulo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180111	11/01/2018	<i>A tarefa de manter a economia em recuperação</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180112	12/01/2018	<i>Moralidade deve contar nas nomeações</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180113	13/01/2018	<i>Nota rebaixada pode ser apenas o começo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180114	14/01/2018	<i>Aumenta a necessidade da reforma tributária</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180115	15/01/2018	<i>Socializar prejuízos</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180116	16/01/2018	<i>PT é o responsável pela segurança em Porto Alegre</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180117	17/01/2018	<i>O positivo avanços de bancos privados na infraestrutura</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20180118	18/01/2018	<i>Temer foi leniente com a Caixa Econômica</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180119	19/01/2018	<i>Políticas resistem a se afastar da Caixa</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180120	20/01/2018	<i>Caso da Caixa reforça necessidade de privatizações</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180121	21/01/2018	<i>O problema sem fim da habitação popular</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180122	22/01/2018	<i>Demagogia pura</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180123	23/01/2018	<i>Provável agressão a Garotinho é um descalabro</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180125	25/01/2018	<i>A maior derrota de Lula</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180127	27/01/2018	<i>Rejeitar sentença é insurgir-se contra a Carta</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180128	28/01/2018	<i>Crise no Facebook é por falta de critérios do jornalismo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180130	30/01/2018	<i>É casuismo STF voltar agora ao tema da segunda instância</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180131	31/01/2018	<i>Não é sustentável a melhoria fiscal</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180201	01/02/2018	<i>A esquerda diante da aventura lulopetista</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180202	02/02/2018	<i>Atacar a justiça é característica do autoritarismo</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20180203	03/02/2018	<i>Ensino médio agoniza à espera da reforma</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180204	04/02/2018	<i>A farsa da campanha contra a reforma da Previdência</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180205	05/02/2018	<i>Barreira necessária</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180206	06/02/2018	<i>A moralização do auxílio-moradia e outros</i>	Anti-elitism
OGLOBO20180207	07/02/2018	<i>Mercados mundiais alertam o Congresso brasileiro</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180208	08/02/2018	<i>Violência ultrapassa todos os limites no Rio</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180209	09/02/2018	<i>Falta complementar o profundo corte de juros</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180210	10/02/2018	<i>Com menos verbas, escolas valorizam criatividade</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180211	11/02/2018	<i>Adiar a reforma é garantir que ela será mais dura</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180212	12/02/2018	<i>Nova legislação trabalhista - Avanço essencial</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180213	13/02/2018	<i>Gastos com saúde pública - Não existe mágica</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180214	14/02/2018	<i>As distorções do foro privilegiado - Defesa corporativista</i>	Anti-elitism

OGLOBO20180215	15/02/2018	<i>Diretor-geral da PF não tem credibilidade</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180216	16/02/2018	<i>A longa jornada da baixa produtividade</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180217	17/02/2018	<i>Intervenção no Rio - Decisão inevitável para restaurar o estado de direito</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180218	18/02/2018	<i>Crise humanitária na Venezuela já afeta o continente</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180219	19/02/2018	<i>Reforma política - Por mais avanços</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180220	20/02/2018	<i>Intervenção é oportunidade para sanear instituições</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180221	21/02/2018	<i>Nada substitui a reforma da previdência</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180222	22/02/2018	<i>Rebelião sindical contra a reforma trabalhista</i>	Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180223	23/02/2018	<i>O passo em falso do sonho eleitoral de Temer</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180224	24/02/2018	<i>Magistratura é incompatível com sindicalismo</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180225	25/02/2018	<i>A ilusão de uma bonança econômica duradoura</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180226	26/02/2018	<i>Organização do Carnaval no Rio - Tarefa da prefeitura</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180227	27/02/2018	<i>Foco do Banco Central precisa ser</i>	Elitism

		<i>a inflação</i>	
OGLOBO20180228	28/02/2018	<i>A missão do Ministério da Segurança Pública</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180301	01/03/2018	<i>Novo Código Comercial induz à burocracia</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180302	02/03/2018	<i>O mal do preconceito contra a intervenção</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180303	03/03/2018	<i>E economia em busca de um crescimento equilibrado</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180304	04/03/2018	<i>STF faz apaziguamento jurídico no campo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180305	05/03/2018	<i>Intervenção federal no Rio de Janeiro - Medida necessária</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180306	06/03/2018	<i>Uma contribuição do STF ao combate à violência</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180307	07/03/2018	<i>STJ aproxima desfecho da condenação de Lula</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180308	08/03/2018	<i>Cresce o risco para o combate à corrupção</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180309	09/03/2018	<i>Um país sem preocupação com o futuro</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180310	10/03/2018	<i>A irresponsável elevação do salário no Rio de Janeiro</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180311	11/03/2018	<i>Falta avaliação de gastos e de políticas</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20180312	12/03/2018	<i>Regulamentação de aplicativos de transporte - Concorrência saudável</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180313	13/03/2018	<i>O direito de o Estado investigar o presidente</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180314	14/03/2018	<i>A grotesca privatização do Ministério do Trabalho</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180315	15/03/2018	<i>Avanços no enfrentamento da corrupção</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180316	16/03/2018	<i>Assassinato de vereadora afronta a democracia</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180317	17/03/2018	<i>Sectarizar morte de Marielle é um desserviço</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180318	18/03/2018	<i>Sem a reforma, governadores padecem com a Previdência</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180319	19/03/2018	<i>Causa dos déficits da Previdência - Falta de visão</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180320	20/03/2018	<i>Descabidas pressões em torno da prisão de Lula</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180321	21/03/2018	<i>O melhor é legalizar o jogo para regulá-lo</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180322	22/03/2018	<i>Facebook em novo caso de manipulação eleitoral</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180323	23/03/2018	<i>De onde partem as pressões sobre o Supremo</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20180324	24/03/2018	<i>Ares antirepublicanos no Supremo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180325	25/03/2018	<i>A queda dos juro não chega aos guichês</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180326	26/03/2018	<i>Julgamento do Código Florestal no STF - Segurança jurídica no campo</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180327	27/03/2018	<i>Lula ficha-suja garante pressão sobre a Lei da Ficha Limpa</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180328	28/03/2018	<i>Do futuro de Lula depende a impunidade de muitos</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180329	29/03/2018	<i>Tiros em caravana e ameaças no STF atingem a democracia</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180330	30/03/2018	<i>Temer mais uma vez sob cerco</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180331	31/03/2018	<i>Falhas prejudicam intervenção na segurança no Rio</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180401	01/04/2018	<i>A crise dos Correios - Situação precária</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180402	02/04/2018	<i>Política educacional - Batalha ideológica</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180403	03/04/2018	<i>Ação sobre Temer reforça pressão no STF por Lula</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180404	04/04/2018	<i>Lula no STF representa impunidade</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism

OGLOBO20180405	05/04/2018	<i>Rosa Weber dá fôlego ao combate à corrupção</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180406	06/04/2018	<i>A justiça vale para todos - Prisão de Lula reforça o estado de direito</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180407	07/04/2018	<i>A frágil defesa do fim da prisão na segunda instância</i>	Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180408	08/04/2018	<i>Necessária reciclagem do BNDES</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180409	09/04/2018	<i>Extinção do imposto sindical - Rumo à representação</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180410	10/04/2018	<i>Garantida a normalidade na prisão de Lula</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180412	12/04/2018	<i>Recuo descredenciação sobre segunda instância</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180413	13/04/2018	<i>O Estado como indutor da concentração de renda</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180414	14/04/2018	<i>Nova derrota da impunidade no Supremo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180415	15/04/2018	<i>Inflação abre uma janela de oportunidade</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180416	16/04/2018	<i>Privatização de estatais - Universo sem controle</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180417	17/04/2018	<i>Rio ensaia repetir desperdício dos royalties</i>	Elitism / Individualism

OGLOBO20180418	18/04/2018	<i>Aécio convertido me réu abala teoria persecutória do PT</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180419	19/04/2018	<i>Lei para reforçar a segurança jurídica</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180420	20/04/2018	<i>Em defesa do princípio da Ficha Limpa</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180421	21/04/2018	<i>Privatização da Eletrobrás está moribunda</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180422	22/04/2018	<i>Reforma trabalhista passa pelos primeiros testes</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180423	23/04/2018	<i>Ajuste na remuneração dos servidores - Apoio ao privilégio</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180424	24/04/2018	<i>Novo foro requer prisão na segunda instância</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180425	25/04/2018	<i>Candidatos têm de se posicionar sobre a previdência</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180426	26/04/2018	<i>Em nome da segurança jurídica</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180427	27/04/2018	<i>A colaboração que Palocci pode dar</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180428	28/04/2018	<i>Supremo precisar retormar julgamento das drogas</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180429	29/04/2018	<i>A reforma para melhorar o gasto público</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180430	30/04/2018	<i>Jurisprudência da prisão na segunda instância - Em</i>	Elitism

		<i>defesa da elite</i>	
OGLOBO20180501	01/05/2018	<i>Delação de Duque é a nova ameaça a Lula e ao PT</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180502	02/05/2018	<i>Projeto Segurança Presente - Para salvar vidas</i>	Egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180503	03/05/2018	<i>Quando a política prejudica a economia</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180504	04/05/2018	<i>Começa, enfim, a ser reduzido o privilégio do foro</i>	Anti-elitism
OGLOBO20180505	05/05/2018	<i>Facetas urbanas do drama habitacional</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180506	06/05/2018	<i>Temer e família diante da República</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180507	07/05/2018	<i>Barreiras legais para conter gastos - Traço cultural</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180508	08/05/2018	<i>Os calotes da diplomacia terceiro-mundista</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180509	09/05/2018	<i>Governadores não aprendem lição da crise fiscal</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180510	10/05/2018	<i>Saída de Joaquim pressiona por definições</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180511	11/05/2018	<i>STF precisa conter ímpeto em súmula sobre foro</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180512	12/05/2018	<i>Para que se entenda o que são golpe e ditadura</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180513	13/05/2018	<i>Herança maldita que se perpetua</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20180514	14/05/2018	<i>Decisão do Supremo sobre foto privilegiado - Ajuste necessário</i>	Anti-elitism
OGLOBO20180515	15/05/2018	<i>Candidato não pode fugir de perguntas difíceis</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180516	16/05/2018	<i>Apesar da agenda, governo Temer está paralisado</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180517	17/05/2018	<i>Escândalo no INSS é retrato do Estado brasileiro</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180518	18/05/2018	<i>Parada nos juros é sinal para futuro governo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180519	19/05/2018	<i>Calendário da economia e da política não coincidem</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180521	21/05/2018	<i>Prisão na segunda instância - Leitura mecânica</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180522	22/05/2018	<i>Armadilla fiscal à espera do Rio de Janeiro</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180523	23/05/2018	<i>A insanidade de se repetir o mesmo erro nos combustíveis</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180524	24/05/2018	<i>Problema dos impostos também é da burocracia</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180525	25/05/2018	<i>Impostos são um dos problemas nos combustíveis</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180526	26/05/2018	<i>Greve de caminhoneiros sequestrou a sociedade</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism

OGLOBO20180527	27/05/2018	<i>É preciso aprender com a tragédia do chavismo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180528	28/05/2018	<i>Revisão da anistia - Em favor da democracia</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180529	29/05/2018	<i>É urgente restabelecer o abastecimento</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180530	30/05/2018	<i>A greve traz mais Estado e mais gastos</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180601	01/06/2018	<i>O futuro da Eletrobras - Sem sustentação</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180602	02/06/2018	<i>A ameaça da volta do imposto sindical</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180603	03/06/2018	<i>Ganhos e perdas em 30 anos da Constituição</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180604	04/06/2018	<i>Os preços dos combustíveis - Modelo da falência</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180605	05/06/2018	<i>Mais competição no mercado de combustíveis</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180606	06/06/2018	<i>A obsessão dos políticos por subsídios</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180607	07/06/2018	<i>Violência em estágio de emergência nacional</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180608	08/06/2018	<i>Intervenção em preços caminha para novo fracasso</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180609	09/06/2018	<i>O dólar de hoje não é o mesmo que o de 2002</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20180610	10/06/2018	<i>Protecionismo pouco visível atrasa o país</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180611	11/06/2018	<i>O fim do imposto sindical - Mais representativos</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180612	12/06/2018	<i>A falsa segurança fiscal das verbas extraordinárias</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180613	13/06/2018	<i>Tabelar frete é peça de ficção</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180614	14/06/2018	<i>O reencontro da política com o futebol</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180615	15/06/2018	<i>Falta transparência aos custos da saúde</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180616	16/06/2018	<i>Lava-Jato enfrenta mais um obstáculo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180617	17/06/2018	<i>Comperj é retrato da corrupção que abalou a Petrobras</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180618	18/06/2018	<i>O nacional-populismo na América Latina - Conserto do danos</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180619	19/06/2018	<i>Acordo de leniência não é para quebrar a empresa</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180620	20/06/2018	<i>Padrão colonial no setor de petróleo</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180621	21/06/2018	<i>Se todos perderão, deve-se evitar uma guerra comercial</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180622	22/06/2018	<i>Fatores internos condicionam o Banco Central</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20180623	23/06/2018	<i>A busca inútil pela tabela do frete</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180624	24/06/2018	<i>Mecanismo de injustiça - Usinas de concentração de renda</i>	Anti-elitism
OGLOBO20180625	25/06/2018	<i>Descriminalização do aborto - Uma postura laica</i>	Egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180626	26/06/2018	<i>Baixa cobertura de vacinas é ameaça para o país</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180627	27/06/2018	<i>O retrocesso com a volta do imposto sindical</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180628	28/06/2018	<i>Sobe pressão no STF para a libertação de Lula</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180629	29/06/2018	<i>Decisões judiciais desinformadas</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180630	30/06/2018	<i>Supremo garante a modernização sindical</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180701	01/07/2018	<i>Governo e políticos não avançam em ajuste</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180702	02/07/2018	<i>Prorrogação das cotas raciais no Rio de Janeiro - O mérito em questão</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180703	03/07/2018	<i>A questão central da inelegibilidade de Lula</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180704	04/07/2018	<i>Nova oportunidade para as ferrovias</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180705	05/07/2018	<i>É essencial mobilizar para a vacinação</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20180706	06/07/2018	<i>Embraer valida um modelo industrial</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180707	07/07/2018	<i>Gestão precisa ser considerada nos planos de saúde</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180708	08/07/2018	<i>Eleições com um outro padrão</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180709	09/07/2018	<i>Privatização de empresas estatais - Verdadeiros donos</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180710	10/07/2018	<i>Justiça passa por um teste no caso de Lula</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180711	11/07/2018	<i>Fim de um governo fraco estimula festival de gastos</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180712	12/07/2018	<i>É preciso disciplinar decisões individuais de juízes</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180713	13/07/2018	<i>Frustrada tentativa de manipulação da Justiça</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180714	14/07/2018	<i>Agenda do próximo governo fica mais difícil</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180715	15/07/2018	<i>Crise dos refugiados - êxodo forçado de populações desafia o Humanismo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180716	16/07/2018	<i>A nova legislação de agrotóxicos - O papel da tecnologia</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180717	17/07/2018	<i>Judiciário não equacionará questão dos planos de saúde</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20180718	18/07/2018	<i>É essencial a Eletrobras privatizar distribuidoras</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180719	19/07/2018	<i>Debate econômico na campanha precisa ter foco</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180720	20/07/2018	<i>Vacinação no Brasil em estado de emergência</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180721	21/07/2018	<i>A espúria negociação de uma aliança</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180722	22/07/2018	<i>Os pesadelos que habitam o Minha Casa Minha Vida</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180723	23/07/2018	<i>Modernização da legislação trabalhista - Atrás do tempo perdido</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180724	24/07/2018	<i>PIB lento reduz margem de erro do próximo governo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180725	25/07/2018	<i>Uso político adultera agências reguladoras</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180726	26/07/2018	<i>Nicarágua é um peso sobre o PT na campanha</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180727	27/07/2018	<i>Bilhões de gastos por falta de controle</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180728	28/07/2018	<i>O mundo dos monopólios digitais</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180729	29/07/2018	<i>Legislação cria coronéis nos partidos políticos</i>	Anti-elitism
OGLOBO20180730	30/07/2018	<i>Ilusões populistas podem agravar a crise em 2019</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20180801	01/08/2018	<i>Recuo da ANS recoloca questão dos planos</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180802	02/08/2018	<i>Nada justifica a revisão da Lei da Anistia</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180803	03/08/2018	<i>O aborto deve ser tratado como questão de saúde</i>	Egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180804	04/08/2018	<i>Crise e Estado adoecem a população</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180805	05/08/2018	<i>Brasil começa a ficar velho antes de se desenvolver</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180806	06/08/2018	<i>Recuperar a confiança dos eleitores</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180807	07/08/2018	<i>Convenções têm suspense, sem maiores surpresas</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180808	08/08/2018	<i>Programa do PT retoma filosofia do governo Lula II</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180809	09/08/2018	<i>Um modelo de corrupção para driblar controles</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180810	10/08/2018	<i>A verdadeira discussão sobre salários do STF</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180811	11/08/2018	<i>Efeito dos salários do STF piora o cenário para 2019</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180812	12/08/2018	<i>Ato do Facebook é censura com outro nome</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180813	13/08/2018	<i>Candidatos devem propostas sobre os gastos com pessoal</i>	Elitism / Individualism

OGLOBO20180814	14/08/2018	<i>Estados precisam da reforma da Previdência</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180815	15/08/2018	<i>Violência não será combatida com mais armas</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180816	16/08/2018	<i>A vitimização de Lula na manobra da candidatura</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20180817	17/08/2018	<i>A necessidade de diálogo depois das eleições</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180818	18/08/2018	<i>Eleição depende de desfecho rápido no caso Lula</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180819	19/08/2018	<i>Pressão de facções sobre eleitores tem de ser combatida</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180820	20/08/2018	<i>Crise mundial impõe urgência às reformas</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180821	21/08/2018	<i>Letalidade em operações expõe a população</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180822	22/08/2018	<i>Ativismo e má gestão prejudicam vacinação no país</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180823	23/08/2018	<i>A tragédia do sistema socioeducativo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180824	24/08/2018	<i>Concessão de reajuste pela Alerj é irresponsável</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180824	24/08/2018	<i>Perseguição à etnia uigur revela truculência do regime chinês</i>	Anti-elitism
OGLOBO20180825	25/08/2018	<i>Embate é essencial entre liberais e conservadores</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20180826	26/08/2018	<i>Cleptocracia venezuelana flerta com o perigo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180827	27/08/2018	<i>Candidatos precisam debater o déficit nas estatais</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180828	28/08/2018	<i>É preciso abrir a caixa-preta da Fetranspor</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180829	29/08/2018	<i>O modelo das UPPs precisa ser recuperado</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180830	30/08/2018	<i>Estradas do país estão cada vez mais precárias</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180901	01/09/2018	<i>O poço sem fundo do ensino brasileiro</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180902	02/09/2018	<i>TSE confirma que Lei da Ficha Limpa vale para todos</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180903	03/09/2018	<i>Congresso ainda está devendo a reforma do SUS</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180904	04/09/2018	<i>Tregédia do Museu reflete má política de gastos</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180905	05/09/2018	<i>Ensino médio continua a ser grande desafio</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180906	06/09/2018	<i>Museus precisam de autonomia na administração</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180907	07/09/2018	<i>Políticos precisam combater o clima de intolerância</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180908	08/09/2018	<i>Manipulação eleitoral pela web é visível</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20180909	09/09/2018	<i>Favelização é parte da agenda do governador</i>	Anti-elitism
OGLOBO20180910	10/09/2018	<i>O inventário da violência na política</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180911	11/09/2018	<i>É claro que limites da Carta valem para os militares</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180912	12/09/2018	<i>Lula mais uma vez impõe sua vontade ao PT</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180913	13/09/2018	<i>Haddad precisa ser claro diante da crise fiscal</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180914	14/09/2018	<i>O voluntarismo e a crise dos estaleiros</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180915	15/09/2018	<i>Toffoli acerta ao propor conciliação na posse do STF</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180916	16/09/2018	<i>Educação avança, mas de forma insatisfatória</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180917	17/09/2018	<i>Universidades públicas precisam se reinventar</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180918	18/09/2018	<i>A impossível renovação do Congresso</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180919	19/09/2018	<i>Para evitar uma crise institucional nas eleições</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180920	20/09/2018	<i>Haddad entra na corrida rumo ao centro</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180921	21/09/2018	<i>Fantasma da CPMF volta a assombrar</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180922	22/09/2018	<i>Expectativa de inflação baixa pode ser ilusória</i>	Elitism / Individualism

OGLOBO20180923	23/09/2018	<i>Violência cobra envolvimento do governo federal</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20180924	24/09/2018	<i>IDH reflete a importância destas eleições</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180925	25/09/2018	<i>É preciso não banalizar o risco do golpe</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180926	26/09/2018	<i>Defesa da CLT não ecoa junto a todos os eleitores</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180927	27/09/2018	<i>Folha salarial dos servidores é outra ameaça à espreita</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180928	28/09/2018	<i>Museu requer administração especializada</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180929	29/09/2018	<i>Leilão do pré-sal confirma acerto da nova regulação</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20180930	30/09/2018	<i>O cenário da explosão fiscal está pronto</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181001	01/10/2018	<i>Falta de empenho para reduzir a burocracia</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181002	02/10/2018	<i>Não é possível convocar uma Constituinte</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181003	03/10/2018	<i>Lewandowski e Moro avançam o sinal</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181004	04/10/2018	<i>Haddad diante de movimento antipetista</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20181005	05/10/2018	<i>O que sinalizam altas taxas e rejeição</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20181006	06/10/2018	<i>Reformas no 30o aniversário da Constituição</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181007	07/10/2018	<i>Voto é renovação de compromisso com a democracia</i>	Egalitarianism
OGLOBO20181008	08/10/2018	<i>Segundo turno precisa discutir, enfim, programas</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181009	09/10/2018	<i>A renovação no Congresso feita pelo eleitor</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181010	10/10/2018	<i>O bem-vindo compromisso democrático</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181011	11/10/2018	<i>Eleitor dá o troco a ações políticas contra a Lava-Jato</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181012	12/10/2018	<i>Candidatos têm de ajudar a conter a violência</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20181013	13/10/2018	<i>O que de fato pensam os candidatos</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181014	14/10/2018	<i>A agenda pesada que espera o novo presidente</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181015	15/10/2018	<i>É urgente o debate sobre a verdade orçamentária</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181016	16/10/2018	<i>A simbólica perda de votos do PT na classe C</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20181017	17/10/2018	<i>Efeito benéfico da democracia sobre os candidatos</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181018	18/10/2018	<i>Limites no combate à criminalidade</i>	Elitism / Individualism

OGLOBO20181019	19/10/2018	<i>Fracasso da frente é incentivo à autocrítica do PT</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181020	20/10/2018	<i>Estagnação tecnológica vulnerabiliza país</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20181021	21/10/2018	<i>Saneamento básico ao largo das eleições</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181022	22/10/2018	<i>Má gestão na saúde amplia as desigualdades</i>	Egalitarianism
OGLOBO20181023	23/10/2018	<i>Atacar o STF e a imprensa é agredir a democracia</i>	Anti-elitism
OGLOBO20181024	24/10/2018	<i>O autoritarismo surge no combate às fake news</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181025	25/10/2018	<i>Meio ambiente não é questão secundária</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181026	26/10/2018	<i>Democracia modera discursos de candidatos</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20181027	27/10/2018	<i>Todos precisam trabalhar para a pacificação</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181028	28/10/2018	<i>Eleição é uma etapa num processo de mudança política</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181029	29/10/2018	<i>A hora do rodízio democrático no poder</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181030	30/10/2018	<i>Primeiro discurso formal define os alvos corretos</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181031	31/10/2018	<i>Reforma da Previdência requer pressa</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism

OGLOBO20181102	02/11/2018	<i>Moro na Justiça reforça o combate ao crime</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181103	03/11/2018	<i>A cobrança de Mano Brown e Capão Redondo</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20181104	04/11/2018	<i>Senado semeia incerteza com veto à privatização</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181105	05/11/2018	<i>Eleição testa pesos e contrapesos da democracia</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181106	06/11/2018	<i>Incêndio em hospital expõe crise na saúde</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20181107	07/11/2018	<i>Segurança é uma zona de risco para o próximo governo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181108	08/11/2018	<i>Eleitorado limitou o poder e a agenda de Donald Trump</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181109	09/11/2018	<i>Está na hora de reformar estrutura de governo do Rio</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181110	10/11/2018	<i>Leniência levou 18 estatais a ampliar folha em 124%</i>	Anti-elitism
OGLOBO20181111	11/11/2018	<i>Crise nos estados poder surpreender novos governantes</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181112	12/11/2018	<i>Segurança precisa prever cooperação com outros países</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181113	13/11/2018	<i>É um erro crasso adiar uma real reforma da Previdência</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181114	14/11/2018	<i>O que o BNDES ganha com a chegada de Levy</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20181115	15/11/2018	<i>Barganha sobre auxílio-moradia é coporativista</i>	Anti-elitism
OGLOBO20181116	16/11/2018	<i>Responsabilidade Fiscal precisa ser de fato exercida</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181117	17/11/2018	<i>Política externa é campo aberto ao radicalismo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181118	18/11/2018	<i>É uma farsa o objetivo do Escola Sem Partido</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181119	19/11/2018	<i>Senado manobra para mudar Lei da Ficha Limpa</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181120	20/11/2018	<i>Abertura da economia não pode demorar</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20181121	21/11/2018	<i>Privatização é o melhor caminho para abater dívida</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20181122	22/11/2018	<i>Volta a ilusão de usar royalties para evitar ajuste físcal</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181123	23/11/2018	<i>A montagem de um governo sem o toma lá dá cá</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181124	24/11/2018	<i>O principal objetivo do Mais Médicos</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181125	25/11/2018	<i>Chance para universidade pública paga</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181126	26/11/2018	<i>Acordo com Chile é referência para abertura comercial</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181127	27/11/2018	<i>Segurança precisa ter prioridade na pasta de Moro</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20181128	28/11/2018	<i>Ameaças renovadas à Lava-Jato</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181129	29/11/2018	<i>Novo governo precisa manter a prevenção à Aids</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20181130	30/11/2018	<i>O combate à cultura criminosa da política do Rio</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20181201	01/12/2018	<i>Indulto impõe reflexão sobre criminalidade</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181202	02/12/2018	<i>O ajuste do BB e na CEF precisa ser último</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181203	03/12/2018	<i>Redução de verbas ameaça prevenção contra enchentes</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20181204	04/12/2018	<i>Moro acerta ao propor investigar recursos repatriados</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181205	05/12/2018	<i>O perigo da reforma feita por etapas</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181206	06/12/2018	<i>Há reformas importantes além da Previdência</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181207	07/12/2018	<i>Cabe veto a projeto que premia má gestão municipal</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181208	08/12/2018	<i>Nova escaramuça política contra privatizações</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181209	09/12/2018	<i>Estado tem várias formas de concentrar renda</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20181210	10/12/2018	<i>Indefinição deixa Brasil em risco na guerra comercial</i>	Elitism

OGLOBO20181211	11/12/2018	<i>Falta definir coordenação política</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181212	12/12/2018	<i>Federação quebra sem reformas da Previdência</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OGLOBO20181213	13/12/2018	<i>Não podem pairar suspeitas sobre Bolsonaro</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181214	14/12/2018	<i>Continuam os erros na questão dos caminhoneiros</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181215	15/12/2018	<i>Farra de parlamentares é ameaça fiscal</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181216	16/12/2018	<i>'Petropropinas' mostram corrosão do modelo estatal</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20181217	17/12/2018	<i>Odebrecht une latinos contra a corrupção</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181218	18/12/2018	<i>Expostas fraudes de gabinete no Legislativo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181219	19/12/2018	<i>Oportunidade de passar o Sistema S a limpo</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181220	20/12/2018	<i>Funcionalismo também é parte da crise fiscal</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181221	21/12/2018	<i>Ministros têm de defender a imagem do STF</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181222	22/12/2018	<i>A recepção de corporações ao governo Bolsonaro</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181223	23/12/2018	<i>Um pacto de governadores pelas reformas</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OGLOBO20181224	24/12/2018	<i>Novo Congresso precisa mudar o</i>	Elitism

		<i>sistema partidário</i>	
OGLOBO20181225	25/12/2018	<i>É preciso mudar regras dos acordos de leniência</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181226	26/12/2018	<i>Judiciário caro ajuda a consolidar casta de servidores</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181227	27/12/2018	<i>Legislativo critica Judiciário, mas transfere decisões</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181228	28/12/2018	<i>Queiroz precisa contar tudo ao Ministério Público</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181229	29/12/2018	<i>Desvincular o Orçamento deve ser prioritário</i>	Elitism
OGLOBO20181230	30/12/2018	<i>Frágil na ética, Temer consegue debelar crise</i>	Elitism

3.3 O Estado de São Paulo

Newspaper: O ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO			Total articles: 344
Article's code	Pub. Date	Article's Title	Worldview/s found
OESTADODESP20180101	01/01/2018	<i>Agora, o desafio fiscal de 2018</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180102	02/01/2018	<i>Firmeza de propósito</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180103	03/01/2018	<i>A responsabilidade dos partidos</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180104	04/01/2018	<i>As contas difíceis de 2018</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20180105	05/01/2018	<i>A ajuda aos municípios</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180106	06/01/2018	<i>Regra de ouro e reformas</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180108	08/01/2018	<i>O descompasso das eleições</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180109	09/01/2018	<i>Brasil, país poupador de terras</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180110	10/01/2018	<i>O preço de um grave erro</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180111	11/01/2018	<i>Menos inflação, mais negócios</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180112	12/01/2018	<i>É preciso resgatar a Embrapa</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180113	13/01/2018	<i>O Brasil reprovado de novo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180114	14/01/2018	<i>A conta do Estado de bem-estar</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180115	15/01/2018	<i>O preço das estabilidade</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180116	16/01/2018	<i>A animadora prévia do PIB</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180117	17/01/2018	<i>Uma chance para o Legislativo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180118	18/01/2018	<i>O desvario do PT</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180119	19/01/2018	<i>A fonte dos déficits</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180120	20/01/2018	<i>A responsabilidade do eleitos</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180121	21/01/2018	<i>Um vazão a ser preenchido</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20180122	22/01/2018	<i>A política do ressentimento</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180123	23/01/2018	<i>O respeito à lei</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180124	24/01/2018	<i>O julgamento de Lula</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180125	25/01/2018	<i>Acima de qualquer dívida</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180126	26/01/2018	<i>Lula passa dos limites</i>	Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180127	27/01/2018	<i>Uma lei só para Lula?</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180128	28/01/2018	<i>O Brasil de volta, segundo Temer</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180129	29/01/2018	<i>A esquerda e o esquerdismo</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180131	31/01/2018	<i>Perigo real e imediato</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180201	01/02/2018	<i>A nova afronta de Lula</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180202	02/02/2018	<i>A responsabilidade do judiciário</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180203	03/02/2018	<i>A parte de cada um</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180204	04/02/2018	<i>Acima do bem e do mal</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180205	05/02/2018	<i>Sem estouro por enquanto</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180206	06/02/2018	<i>Uma questão de escolha</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180207	07/02/2018	<i>Mensagem clara</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20180208	08/02/2018	<i>Horizonte estreito</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180209	09/02/2018	<i>Os juros e a reforma travada</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180210	10/02/2018	<i>Previdência e democracia</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180211	11/02/2018	<i>O cansaço do povo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180212	12/02/2018	<i>O importante e o fundamental</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180213	13/02/2018	<i>O consumo e a normalização</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180214	14/02/2018	<i>O desafio da tecnologia</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180215	15/02/2018	<i>O suspense continua</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180216	16/02/2018	<i>A hora da coragem histórica</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180217	17/02/2018	<i>A intervenção injustificável</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180218	18/02/2018	<i>Acordos ainda frágeis</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180219	19/02/2018	<i>A recuperação vai se consolidando</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180220	20/02/2018	<i>Coleção de improvisos</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180221	21/02/2018	<i>Nem Previdência nem Plano B</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180222	22/02/2018	<i>Uma reação estranha</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180223	23/02/2018	<i>Sai a reforma, ficam as contas</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180224	24/02/2018	<i>'Eu não sou candidato'</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20180225	25/02/2018	<i>O que se espera da intervenção</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180226	26/02/2018	<i>Por que as reformas não avançam?</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180227	27/02/2018	<i>Setor externo continua firme</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180228	28/02/2018	<i>Os juros do Fed</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180301	01/03/2018	<i>Distribuir para crescer</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180302	02/03/2018	<i>PIB maior e mais vigor</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180303	03/03/2018	<i>A reconstrução do Brasil</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180304	04/03/2018	<i>Um farol para a reconstrução</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180305	05/03/2018	<i>Um chamado à razão</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180306	06/03/2018	<i>Juros, de novo o suspense</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180307	07/03/2018	<i>A consolidação da indústria</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180308	08/03/2018	<i>Washington, a capital dos riscos</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180309	09/03/2018	<i>O Supremo diante de Lula</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180310	10/03/2018	<i>A inflação e a pauta dos juros</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180311	11/03/2018	<i>A Constituição peculiar</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180312	12/03/2018	<i>Devolver o dinheiro ao dono</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20180313	13/03/2018	<i>Honorários e privilégios</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180314	14/03/2018	<i>A 'vontade popular'</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180315	15/03/2018	<i>O STF como corte penal</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180316	16/03/2018	<i>Encruzilhada histórica</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180317	17/03/2018	<i>O assassinio da vereadora</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180318	18/03/2018	<i>Petrobrás em faxina e reforma</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180319	19/03/2018	<i>Autonomia e responsabilidade</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180320	20/03/2018	<i>Sem casuísmos</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180321	21/03/2018	<i>Operação sem fim</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180322	22/03/2018	<i>O périplo do condenado</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180323	23/03/2018	<i>Um poder que não se respeita</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180324	24/03/2018	<i>A trégua belicosa de Trump</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180325	25/03/2018	<i>O Supremo genuflexo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180326	26/03/2018	<i>Investimentos em São Paulo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180327	27/03/2018	<i>A imagem do STF</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180328	28/03/2018	<i>Lula, o 'ficha-suja'</i>	Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180329	29/03/2018	<i>Violência inadmissível</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20180330	30/03/2018	<i>Mais impulso ao crescimento</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180331	31/03/2018	<i>Que Supremo é este?</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180401	01/04/2018	<i>Limites ao Poder Judiciário</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180402	02/04/2018	<i>Quem paga esse rombo?</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180403	03/04/2018	<i>O reino do arbítrio</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180404	04/04/2018	<i>A hora escura do Supremo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180405	05/04/2018	<i>O bom senso volta ao Supremo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180406	06/04/2018	<i>A manobra fracassada</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180407	07/04/2018	<i>A força da Laja Jato</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180408	08/04/2018	<i>Um olhar para o futuro</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180409	09/04/2018	<i>Cerco ao ajuste fiscal</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180410	10/04/2018	<i>Mais uma tentativa de manobra</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180411	11/04/2018	<i>Ficha no 70004553820</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180412	12/04/2018	<i>Inflação de país sério</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180413	13/04/2018	<i>O futuro começa pelo governo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180414	14/04/2018	<i>Pior para quem mais sofre</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20180416	16/04/2018	<i>A bomba fiscal e a LDO</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180417	17/04/2018	<i>O desafio das eleições</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180418	18/04/2018	<i>A necessária segurança jurídica</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180419	19/04/2018	<i>Inépcia</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180420	20/04/2018	<i>Dívida explosiva</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180421	21/04/2018	<i>Mensagens de esperança</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180422	22/04/2018	<i>Liberdade e democracia</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180423	23/04/2018	<i>O resgate da confiança</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180424	24/04/2018	<i>O nó do funcionalismo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180425	25/04/2018	<i>Um ornitorrinco econômico</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180426	26/04/2018	<i>Rota do desperdício</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180427	27/04/2018	<i>Legado a ser preservado</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180428	28/04/2018	<i>Uma articulação bem-vinda</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180429	29/04/2018	<i>A hora da conciliação</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180430	30/04/2018	<i>Respeitar para ser respeitado</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180501	01/05/2018	<i>O escândalo pelo escândalo</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism

OESTADODESP20180502	02/05/2018	<i>Para destravar o Brasil</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180503	03/05/2018	<i>Faltou trabalhador</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180504	04/05/2018	<i>A truculência vence até agora</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180505	05/05/2018	<i>De olho nos juros americanos</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180506	06/05/2018	<i>Constituição à la carte</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180507	07/05/2018	<i>A prevalência da lei</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180508	08/05/2018	<i>Terra sem lei</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180509	09/05/2018	<i>Contra a guerra comercial</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180510	10/05/2018	<i>A recuperação da Petrobrás</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180511	11/05/2018	<i>A previdência nos Estados Unidos</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180512	12/05/2018	<i>O valor dos partidos</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180513	13/05/2018	<i>Em compasso de espera</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180514	14/05/2018	<i>A desídia do congresso</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180515	15/05/2018	<i>O risco-chave, segundo o FMI</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180516	16/05/2018	<i>Soa o alarme do dólar</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180517	17/05/2018	<i>No PIB, o custo da incerteza</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180518	18/05/2018	<i>O BC escolheu a segurança</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20180519	19/05/2018	<i>Uma questão de Estado</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180520	20/05/2018	<i>Mobilização pela democracia</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180521	21/05/2018	<i>A apatia do eleitor</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180523	23/05/2018	<i>Os passos da política</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180524	24/05/2018	<i>Pela manutenção do rumo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180525	25/05/2018	<i>O caos como arma</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180526	26/05/2018	<i>Irresponsabilidade generalizada</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180527	27/05/2018	<i>Informação clara ao eleitor</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180528	28/05/2018	<i>A velhíssima política</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180529	29/05/2018	<i>Fraqueza perigosa</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180530	30/05/2018	<i>Perigos da democracia</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180531	31/05/2018	<i>Aposta no caos</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180601	01/06/2018	<i>A dívida e o ralo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180602	02/06/2018	<i>Mais uma vitória do atraso</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180603	03/06/2018	<i>Rumos para o crescimento</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180604	04/06/2018	<i>Dependência do Estado</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180606	06/06/2018	<i>O PCC ameaça a democracia</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20180608	08/06/2018	<i>Os vazamentos da Lava Jato</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180609	09/06/2018	<i>A sensatez e o radicalismo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180610	10/06/2018	<i>Os avestruzes</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180611	11/06/2018	<i>Os riscos da desconfiança</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180612	12/06/2018	<i>O mau humor do brasileiro</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180613	13/06/2018	<i>Fake news e a censura</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180614	14/06/2018	<i>Os estragos da greve</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180615	15/06/2018	<i>O peso da renúncia fiscal</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180616	16/06/2018	<i>Propostas consistentes</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180617	17/06/2018	<i>A hora da esperança</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180618	18/06/2018	<i>Corrupção como medida de tudo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180620	20/06/2018	<i>O grande mal e a grande vilã</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180621	21/06/2018	<i>Apenas delações</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180622	22/06/2018	<i>Derrota do arbítrio</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180623	23/06/2018	<i>Sangue-frio, mas com cautela</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180624	24/06/2018	<i>Abuso de autoridade</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180626	26/06/2018	<i>Prosperidade com armadilhas</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20180627	27/06/2018	<i>A incerteza batem no BC</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180628	28/06/2018	<i>O Supremo vacila</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180630	30/06/2018	<i>Trilhões de dívida sem freio</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180701	01/07/2018	<i>Fuzúê</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180702	02/07/2018	<i>Militância antiprivatização</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180703	03/07/2018	<i>Mediocridade com otimismo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180704	05/07/2018	<i>Limites do poder monocrático</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180705	06/07/2018	<i>Uma pauta de modernização</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180706	07/07/2018	<i>Bloqueios contra os pobres</i>	Individualism
OESTADODESP20180707	08/07/2018	<i>O resgate da coesão nacional</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180708	09/07/2018	<i>A hora da responsabilidade</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180709	10/07/2018	<i>O plantonista amigo</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180710	11/07/2018	<i>Simplesmente vergonhoso</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180712	12/07/2018	<i>Ainda há juízes isentos em Brasília</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180713	13/07/2018	<i>Novos ataques ao tesouro</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180715	15/07/2018	<i>Os custos da farra</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20180716	16/07/2018	<i>Caminho para a estabilidade</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180717	17/07/2018	<i>Desrespeito contumaz</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180718	18/07/2018	<i>Congresso desmoralizado</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180719	19/07/2018	<i>O povo como problema</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180720	20/07/2018	<i>O jogo do 'centrão'</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180722	22/07/2018	<i>De olho na dívida brasileira</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180723	23/07/2018	<i>Pensamento mágico</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180725	25/07/2018	<i>Voto de cabresto</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180726	26/07/2018	<i>O Brasil em busca de acordos</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180727	27/07/2018	<i>Ressocialização pelo trabalho</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180728	28/07/2018	<i>Juros, câmbio e risco político</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180729	29/07/2018	<i>Novo patamar de transparência</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180730	30/07/2018	<i>As transformações no campo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180731	31/07/2018	<i>O ralo do dinheiro público</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180801	01/08/2018	<i>Um retrato dos partidos</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180802	02/08/2018	<i>Melhoranco a herança</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180803	03/08/2018	<i>Um poder desmedido</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20180804	04/08/2018	<i>O eleitor desencantado</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180806	06/08/2018	<i>Partidos que são feudos</i>	Individualism
OESTADODESP20180807	07/08/2018	<i>A 'viagem lisérgica' do PT</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180808	08/08/2018	<i>Dúvidas e certezas na eleição</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180809	09/08/2018	<i>Preços calmos, por enquanto</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180811	11/08/2018	<i>Erro e consequência</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180812	12/08/2018	<i>Irresponsabilidade eleitoreira</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180813	13/08/2018	<i>A trégua das agências de risco</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180814	14/08/2018	<i>Um voto irracional</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180815	15/08/2018	<i>Contra a vigarice, a lei</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180816	16/08/2018	<i>Futuro jogado fora</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180818	18/08/2018	<i>As condições para o superávit</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180819	19/08/2018	<i>Voracidade e ineficiência</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180820	20/08/2018	<i>Nada de novo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180821	21/08/2018	<i>O preço da procrastinação</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180822	22/08/2018	<i>Bolsonaro e a imprensa</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180823	23/08/2018	<i>Mistificação</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20180824	24/08/2018	<i>Bons sinais para preços e juros</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180825	25/08/2018	<i>O Brasil no clube dos frágeis</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180826	26/08/2018	<i>Mais um ano de Lava Jato</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180827	27/08/2018	<i>O eleitor como freguês</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180828	28/08/2018	<i>A encruzilhada nacional</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180829	29/08/2018	<i>A pax americana de Trump</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180830	30/08/2018	<i>Um recuo desastroso</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180831	31/08/2018	<i>Quem paga essa conta</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180901	01/09/2018	<i>Federalismo distorcido</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180902	02/09/2018	<i>Normalidade restituída</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180903	03/09/2018	<i>Um país exausto</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180904	04/09/2018	<i>Atentado à soberania</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180906	06/09/2018	<i>Segue a farrá dos privilégios</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180907	07/09/2018	<i>O perigo da anomia</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180908	08/09/2018	<i>O atentado contra Bolsonaro</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180909	09/09/2018	<i>A urgência da política</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180910	10/09/2018	<i>A calmaria da inflação</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20180912	12/09/2018	<i>O candidato posição</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180913	13/09/2018	<i>A 'Paixão' de Lula</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20180914	14/09/2018	<i>O desastre antecipado</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180915	15/09/2018	<i>A grandeza do Supremo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180916	16/09/2018	<i>O desafio do liberalismo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180917	17/09/2018	<i>Um pacote de modernização</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180918	18/09/2018	<i>Surpresa na prévia do PIB</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20180919	19/09/2018	<i>A antecipação do 'voto útil'</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180920	20/09/2018	<i>O ressurgimento do monstro</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180921	21/09/2018	<i>As eleições parlamentares</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180922	22/09/2018	<i>Pacto pela governabilidade</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180923	23/09/2018	<i>A hora do compromisso</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180925	25/09/2018	<i>A insensatez das elites</i>	Anti-elitism
OESTADODESP20180926	26/09/2018	<i>A responsabilidade dos omisso</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180927	27/09/2018	<i>Teste inconstitucional</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20180929	29/09/2018	<i>O PT quer 'tomar o poder'</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism

OESTADODESP20180930	30/09/2018	<i>Eleição na Terra do Nunca</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181001	01/10/2018	<i>O dia seguinte</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181002	02/10/2018	<i>Individualidades exuberantes</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181003	03/10/2018	<i>O aviso está dado</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181004	04/10/2018	<i>Números do desastre petista</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20181005	05/10/2018	<i>O ajuste fiscal e a falácia petista</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181006	06/10/2018	<i>Um voto de confiança na política</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181007	07/10/2018	<i>Por um pacto nacional</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181008	08/10/2018	<i>Uma escolha muito difícil</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181009	09/10/2018	<i>A vitória do cansaço</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181010	10/10/2018	<i>Alerta do FMI aos candidatos</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181011	11/10/2018	<i>A renovação do Congresso</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181012	12/10/2018	<i>Mais um engodo petista</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181013	13/10/2018	<i>Desconectados da realidade</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181014	14/10/2018	<i>A cautela dos partidos</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181015	15/10/2018	<i>O programa que evapora</i>	Elitism / Individualism

OESTADODESP20181016	16/10/2018	<i>A prepotência petista</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20181017	17/10/2018	<i>A longevidade do real</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181018	18/10/2018	<i>Os militares e a política</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181019	19/10/2018	<i>Desespero</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181020	20/10/2018	<i>Brasileiro: cético e com medo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181021	21/10/2018	<i>Muito além da economia</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181022	22/10/2018	<i>Uma campanha diferente</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181023	23/10/2018	<i>Acordo comercial com o Chile</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181024	24/10/2018	<i>Reforma inevitável</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181025	25/10/2018	<i>O ego de Lula</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181026	26/10/2018	<i>A hora da Previdência</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181027	27/10/2018	<i>A liberdade de informação</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181028	28/10/2018	<i>Sem terceiro turno</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181029	29/10/2018	<i>Salto no escuro</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181030	30/10/2018	<i>Desarmando os espíritos</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181031	31/10/2018	<i>Oposição leal</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181101	01/11/2018	<i>Disposição bem-vinda</i>	Elitism / Anti-

			egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20181102	02/11/2018	<i>Sergio Moro na Justiça</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181103	03/11/2018	<i>O desemprego e a transição</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181104	04/11/2018	<i>Os desesperados</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181105	05/11/2018	<i>Cada vez mais urgente</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181106	06/11/2018	<i>A Lava Jato e a política</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181107	07/11/2018	<i>Hesitação perigosa</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181108	08/11/2018	<i>O diálogo e a 'prensa'</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181109	09/11/2018	<i>Desempregados racharão a conta</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181110	10/11/2018	<i>Fim da mordça</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181111	11/11/2018	<i>As razões para o veto</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181112	12/11/2018	<i>A Constituição e os Poderes</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181113	13/11/2018	<i>A radicalização nas universidades</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20181114	14/11/2018	<i>Uma questão de postura</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181115	15/11/2018	<i>Bombas contra desempregados</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181116	16/11/2018	<i>Corporação insaciável</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181117	17/11/2018	<i>Um alerta para os políticos</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20181118	18/11/2018	<i>Questão de moralidade</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181119	19/11/2018	<i>A ordem e a lei</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181120	20/11/2018	<i>A jurisprudência e a lei</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181121	21/11/2018	<i>Nem bala de prata nem bondades</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181122	22/11/2018	<i>Bom sinal</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181123	23/11/2018	<i>O simbolismo de um acordo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181124	24/11/2018	<i>Inflação, bom sinal para 2019</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181125	25/11/2018	<i>Estabilidade com bem público</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181126	26/11/2018	<i>O foro dos juízes</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181127	27/11/2018	<i>Apostas a favor do novo governo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181128	28/11/2018	<i>A força das corporações</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181129	29/11/2018	<i>Enfim, controle dos incentivos</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181130	30/11/2018	<i>Um plano ainda sem Trump</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181201	01/12/2018	<i>O clima e a soberania do País</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181202	02/12/2018	<i>Prudência e temperança</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181203	03/12/2018	<i>A 'refundação' do Brasil</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181205	05/12/2018	<i>Albeamento da realidade</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20181206	06/12/2018	<i>O pacote de segurança do BC</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181207	07/12/2018	<i>A irresponsabilidade avança</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181208	08/12/2018	<i>Clareza na articulação política</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181209	09/12/2018	<i>Crescimento com civilização</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181210	10/12/2018	<i>Bom cenário na inflação</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181211	11/12/2018	<i>Mais uma intervenção federal</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181212	12/12/2018	<i>O perigo da democracia direta</i>	Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODESP20181213	13/12/2018	<i>É hora de punir crimes fiscais</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181214	14/12/2018	<i>Os alertas de Guardia</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181215	15/12/2018	<i>Lições do AI-5</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181216	16/12/2018	<i>Derrota e pragmatismo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181217	17/12/2018	<i>O agro e o risco diplomático</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181218	18/12/2018	<i>Devagar, mas em movimento</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181219	19/12/2018	<i>Os juros e as boas expectativas</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181220	20/12/2018	<i>Confiança para crescer</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181221	21/12/2018	<i>Deboche no Supremo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181222	22/12/2018	<i>No gasto, o Brasil parece rico</i>	Elitism

OESTADODESP20181223	23/12/2018	<i>O papel de cada instituição</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181224	24/12/2018	<i>Bombas nas contas de 2019</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181225	25/12/2018	<i>O real peso do Brasil</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181226	26/12/2018	<i>Um bônus para o governo</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181227	27/12/2018	<i>Distorções do fundo partidário</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181228	28/12/2018	<i>Quando todos ganham</i>	Elitism
OESTADODESP20181229	29/12/2018	<i>A separação dos poderes</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181230	30/12/2018	<i>País conectado</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODESP20181231	31/12/2018	<i>Burocracia maior e mais cara</i>	Elitism

3.4 O Estado de Minas

Newspaper: O ESTADO DE MINAS			Total articles: 119
Article's code	Pub. Date	Article's Title	Worldview/s found
ESTADODEMINAS20181019	19/10/2018	<i>Privatizar é a solução</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181019_2	19/10/2018	<i>Voltar aos princípios</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODEMINAS20181020	20/10/2018	<i>A economia frente as questões</i>	Individualism

		<i>ambientais</i>	
ESTADODEMINAS20181021	21/10/2018	<i>Por que a política afasta as pessoas?</i>	Egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181022	22/10/2018	<i>Cuidado: o amanhã está ali na esquina</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181023	23/10/2018	<i>Eleição 2018 : divisor de águas</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181024	24/10/2018	<i>Sobre o lulopetismo</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181026	26/10/2018	<i>O alerta que vem de for a</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181027	27/10/2018	<i>Prioridades e o futuro do Brasil</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OESTADODEMINAS20181028	28/10/2018	<i>É hora de união pelo bem do país</i>	Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181029	29/10/2018	<i>Ao vencedor, os desafios</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181030	30/10/2018	<i>Alvo errado</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181030_2	30/10/2018	<i>A maturidade da educação no Brasil</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181031	31/10/2018	<i>Os primeiros movimentos</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism

ESTADODEMINAS20181031_2	31/10/2018	<i>Acordo Mercosul-UE</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181031_3	31/10/2018	<i>Por que preservar a democracia ?</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181101	01/11/2018	<i>O barato pode sair bem caro</i>	Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181101_2	01/11/2018	<i>Equilíbrio climático, uma bandeira apartidária</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181102	02/11/2018	<i>Vitória da democracia</i>	Egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181102_2	02/11/2018	<i>A sabedoria dos ciclos</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181102_3	02/11/2018	<i>E agora, presidente Bolsonaro?</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181103	03/11/2018	<i>Certidão de óbito atualizada ?</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181104	04/11/2018	<i>Encômios ao jornalista</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181105	05/11/2018	<i>Imprensa, recados de uma eleição</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181106	06/11/2018	<i>A hora da autocrítica</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181107	07/11/2018	<i>Revolução digital do voto</i>	Elitism

OESTADODEMINAS20181108	08/11/2018	<i>Direitos x privilégios</i>	Elitism
OESTADODEMINAS20181109	09/11/2018	<i>Uma decisão equivocada</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OESTADODEMINAS20181110	10/11/2018	<i>Economia circular muda o consumo</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181110_2	10/11/2018	<i>Corrupção endêmica</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181111	11/11/2018	<i>Trum, o prepotente, cria oposições</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181111_2	11/11/2018	<i>País sem excelências</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181112	12/11/2018	<i>HC de Lula e o oráculo de Sergio Moro</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181112_2	12/11/2018	<i>Meio ambiente e agropecuária juntos?</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181113	13/11/2018	<i>Desafios da segurança no novo governo</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181114	14/11/2018	<i>Bomas-reglógio são armadas</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
OESTADODEMINAS20181114_2	14/11/2018	<i>O Império Romano é aqui</i>	Elitism

ESTADODEMINAS20181115	15/11/2018	<i>País refuta a radicalização</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181115_2	15/11/2018	<i>Novo pensar e julgar</i>	Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181115_3	15/11/2018	<i>A 4a revolução industrill</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181119	19/11/2018	<i>De números e sentimentos</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181122	22/11/2018	<i>Abertura comercial</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181123	23/11/2018	<i>Princípio ético do bem</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181124	24/11/2018	<i>Triste realização de uma cidade</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181124_2	24/11/2018	<i>Agronegócio do governo Bolsonaro</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181125	25/11/2018	<i>Compromisso do Brasil com o mundo</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181125_2	25/11/2018	<i>Fim do Ministério do Trabalho</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181126	26/11/2018	<i>O futuro do Mais Médicos</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181126_2	26/11/2018	<i>Tudo em ordem. A desordem é</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism

		<i>local</i>	
ESTADODEMINAS20181127	27/11/2018	<i>Dividendos da inclusão</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181127_2	27/11/2018	<i>Desigualdade estagnada</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181127_3	27/11/2018	<i>Formação cívica e a educação</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181128	28/11/2018	<i>Tenebrosas transações</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181128_2	28/11/2018	<i>O comércio exterior e o Brasil</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181129	29/11/2018	<i>O Brasil avança contra a AIDS</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181129_2	29/11/2018	<i>Gestão da água no Brasil</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181129_3	29/11/2018	<i>A produção industrial inteligente</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181130	30/11/2018	<i>Combate à corrupção</i>	Elitism
OESTADODEMINAS20181130_2	30/11/2018	<i>Eficiência dos gastos públicos</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181201	01/12/2018	<i>País volta a crescer</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181201_2	01/12/2018	<i>Transformações digitais</i>	Elitism

ESTADODEMINAS20181202	02/12/2018	<i>Corrupção tóxica</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181202_2	02/12/2018	<i>Dignidade humana e ideologia de gênero</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181202_3	02/12/2018	<i>A cláusula da barreira</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181203	03/12/2018	<i>Preservar os direitos</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181203_2	03/12/2018	<i>Lufada conservadora</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181203_3	03/12/2018	<i>Temer não aproveitou. Diminuiu, não cresceu</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181204	04/12/2018	<i>Uma pausa na guerra comercial</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181205	05/12/2018	<i>Estímulo às exportações</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181205_2	05/12/2018	<i>Os avanços na reforma trabalhista</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181206	06/12/2018	<i>A urgência da reforma</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181206_2	06/12/2018	<i>O caminho do voluntariado</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181206_3	06/12/2018	<i>Tempos de superação</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181207	07/12/2018	<i>Erradicar a pobreza</i>	Egalitarianism

ESTADODEMINAS20181207_2	07/12/2018	<i>As lições deixadas pela crise</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181207_3	07/11/2018	<i>Evangelho sem ideologias</i>	Communitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181208	08/12/2018	<i>Dragão sob controle</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181208_2	08/12/2018	<i>O benefício da dívida</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181209	09/12/2018	<i>Contra a intolerância</i>	Egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181210	10/12/2018	<i>Omelete sem quebrar ovos</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181210_2	10/12/2018	<i>Talvez o capitalismo</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181210_3	10/12/2018	<i>O valor da água</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181211	11/12/2018	<i>Meio ambiente é algo muito sério</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181211_2	11/12/2018	<i>Homenagem à um antigo pós-moderno</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181211_3	11/12/2018	<i>O trabalho no futuro</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181212	12/12/2018	<i>Palavras de união</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181212_2	12/12/2018	<i>Política de comércio exterior</i>	Elitism

ESTADODEMINAS20181212_3	12/12/2018	<i>2019, o ano do compliance no Brasil</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181213	13/12/2018	<i>Congresso joga contra o país</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181213_2	13/12/2018	<i>Brasil aberto para negócios</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181213_3	13/12/2018	<i>Solução para a falta de acesso à remédios</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181216	16/12/2018	<i>Alavancas para o crescimento</i>	Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181218	18/12/2018	<i>Cenário internacional: Brasil e Chile</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181218_2	18/12/2018	<i>Smart cities</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181220	20/12/2018	<i>Brasil aprova Sistema S</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181221	21/12/2018	<i>Uma medida inoportuna</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181221_2	21/12/2018	<i>O esperado 'feliz 2019'</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181222	22/12/2018	<i>O ajuste inadiável</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181222_2	22/12/2018	<i>E evolução da TV digital</i>	Elitism

ESTADODEMINAS20181223	23/12/2018	<i>Combate à violência</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181223_2	23/12/2018	<i>Dezembro vermelho é do bem</i>	Egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181223_3	23/12/2018	<i>Cuidados com as armadilhas fiscais</i>	Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181223_4	23/12/2018	<i>A continuidade de Portugal no Brasil</i>	Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181224	24/12/2018	<i>Violação de intimidade na escola</i>	Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181225	25/12/2018	<i>Coesão e consenso</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181225_2	25/12/2018	<i>Por que não podemos comparar bitcoins às tulipas?</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181225_3	25/12/2018	<i>Manga arregaçada e mão na massa</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181226	26/12/2018	<i>A liberdade de morrer</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181226_2	26/12/2018	<i>Redução de juros trará efeitos aos consumidores</i>	Elitism

ESTADODEMINAS20181227	27/12/2018	<i>Pró-Confins dará novo impulso a Minas</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181227_2	27/12/2018	<i>As vendas na Era 4.0</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181227_3	27/12/2018	<i>O STF e a (in)segurança política</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181227_4	27/12/2018	<i>Uma máquina contaminada</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181228	28/12/2018	<i>Comércio externo sem as ideologias</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181228_2	28/12/2018	<i>Um novo mandato e mais Deus</i>	Elitism / Individualism
ESTADODEMINAS20181229	29/12/2018	<i>Desarmamento e charlatanismo</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181230	30/12/2018	<i>Inteligência artificial e humanismo</i>	Elitism
ESTADODEMINAS20181230_2	30/12/2018	<i>Ânsia pelo crescimento</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ESTADODEMINAS20181230_3	30/12/2018	<i>A Rússia, sempre potência</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism

3.5 O Tempo

Newspaper: O TEMPO

Total articles: 353

Article's code	Pub. Date	Article's Title	Worldview/s found
OTEMPO20180102	02/01/2018	<i>Mínimo mínimo</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180103	03/01/2018	<i>Linhas tortas</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180104	04/01/2018	<i>Letra morta</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180105	05/01/2018	<i>Problema de todos</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180106	06/01/2018	<i>Salve-se quem puder</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180107	07/01/2018	<i>O que deu certo</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180108	08/01/2018	<i>Segurança solidária</i>	Elitism
OTEMPO20180109	09/01/2018	<i>Alerta para a febre</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180110	10/01/2018	<i>Travessia necessária</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180111	11/01/2018	<i>A maioria ofendida</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180112	12/02/2018	<i>A moridado do leão</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180113	13/01/2018	<i>A derrota do Brasil</i>	Elitism
OTEMPO20180114	14/01/2018	<i>A fonte da sangria</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OTEMPO20180115	15/01/2018	<i>O fim do mundo</i>	Elitism / Individualism
OTEMPO20180116	16/01/2018	<i>Problema crônico</i>	Elitism
OTEMPO20180117	17/01/2018	<i>O nome do malfeito</i>	Elitism / Individualism

OTEMPO20180118	18/01/2018	<i>Boca no trombone</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180119	19/01/2018	<i>Junto e misturado</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180120	20/01/2018	<i>Prova de fogo</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180121	21/01/2018	<i>O dilema do estado</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180122	22/01/2018	<i>O MEI em questão</i>	Individualism
OTEMPO20180123	23/01/2018	<i>Males do trabalho</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180124	24/01/2018	<i>Sorte ou azar</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180125	25/01/2018	<i>Vitória na derrota</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180126	26/01/2018	<i>Incúria e improviso</i>	Egalitarianism / Communitarianism
OTEMPO20180127	27/01/2018	<i>A vitória do público</i>	Elitism
OTEMPO20180128	28/01/2018	<i>A reforma enxuta</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180129	29/01/2018	<i>Ocaso de um programa</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180130	30/01/2018	<i>A visão dos mineiros</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180131	31/01/2018	<i>Direção temerária</i>	Elitism
OTEMPO20180201	01/02/2018	<i>Corrida pelo tempo</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180202	02/02/2018	<i>Escola à mingua</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180203	03/02/2018	<i>Falta de imaginação</i>	Egalitarianism

OTEMPO20180204	04/02/2018	<i>Dura lex, sed lex</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180205	05/02/2018	<i>O moral e o ilegal</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180206	06/02/2018	<i>Andando para trás</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180207	07/02/2018	<i>A reforma impossível</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180208	08/02/2018	<i>O mal pela raiz</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180209	09/02/2018	<i>O SUS e os planos</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180210	10/02/2018	<i>O lobo do homem</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180211	11/02/2018	<i>Desafio do momento</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180212	12/02/2018	<i>Sem retrocesso</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180213	13/02/2018	<i>Não ao ódio</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180214	14/02/2018	<i>Outro carnaval</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180215	15/02/2018	<i>Bebidas demais</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180216	16/02/2018	<i>Tragédia esperada</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180217	17/02/2018	<i>Além da repressão</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180218	18/02/2018	<i>Uma nova chance</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180219	19/02/2018	<i>Avanço importante</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180220	20/02/2018	<i>Demanda sem futuro</i>	Egalitarianism

OTEMPO20180221	21/02/2018	<i>A sina do Brasil</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180222	22/02/2018	<i>Íntegros e corruptos</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180223	23/02/2018	<i>Mais armas, mais mortes</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-individualism
OTEMPO20180224	24/02/108	<i>A verdade nua e crua</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180225	25/02/2018	<i>Direito de esperar</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180226	26/02/2018	<i>Antes que nos calem</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180227	27/02/2018	<i>Jogada arriscada</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180228	28/02/2018	<i>Chuvas e destruição</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180301	01/03/2018	<i>Direito de construção</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180302	02/03/2018	<i>Cedo para comemorar</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180303	03/03/2018	<i>A opinião pública</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180304	04/03/2018	<i>No meio do caminho</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-individualism
OTEMPO20180305	05/03/2018	<i>Ganhar o máximo</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180306	06/03/2018	<i>Problema recorrente</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180307	07/03/2018	<i>Tolerância sem limite</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180308	08/03/2018	<i>Farol baixo</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180309	09/03/2018	<i>Sem saída</i>	Egalitarianism

OTEMPO20180310	10/03/2018	<i>Sete anos de guerra</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180311	11/03/2018	<i>A cena eleitoral</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180312	12/03/2018	<i>Não mais a cidade-jardim</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180313	13/03/2018	<i>Choque de realidade</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180314	14/03/2018	<i>Em causa própria</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180315	15/03/2018	<i>Reparar os prejuízos</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180316	16/03/2018	<i>O desafio do crime</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180317	17/03/2018	<i>Problemas, problemas</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180318	18/03/2018	<i>Irritação geral</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180319	19/03/2018	<i>Gestão conjunta</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180320	20/03/2018	<i>Questão de autoridade</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180321	21/03/2018	<i>O verde e o cinza</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180322	22/03/2018	<i>Fraude eleitoral</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180323	23/03/2018	<i>Renúncia, o remédio</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180324	24/03/2018	<i>Fome e pobreza</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180325	25/03/2018	<i>A ilha de minas</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180326	26/03/2018	<i>Direito de existir</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-individualism

OTEMPO20180327	27/03/2018	<i>Rede de intrigas</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180328	28/03/2018	<i>Crise de cidadania</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180329	29/03/2018	<i>O diálogo necessário</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180330	30/01/2018	<i>Violência a galope</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180401	01/04/2018	<i>Desafios da democracia</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180402	02/04/2018	<i>Certezas na incerteza</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180403	03/04/2018	<i>O poder do sistema</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180404	04/04/2018	<i>Supremo: hora e vez</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180405	05/04/2018	<i>A justiça na berlinda</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180406	06/04/2018	<i>Supremo: presente</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180407	07/04/2018	<i>A dor vai passar</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180408	08/04/2018	<i>O último discurso</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180409	09/04/2018	<i>Na vida do crime</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-individualism
OTEMPO20180410	10/04/2018	<i>Afirmção da justiça</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180411	11/04/2018	<i>A última instância</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180412	12/04/2018	<i>A dimensão do problema</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180413	13/04/2018	<i>O Brasil mais pobre</i>	Egalitarianism

OTEMPO20180414	14/04/2018	<i>No meio do caminho</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180415	15/04/2018	<i>Real politik</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180416	16/04/2018	<i>Um mês sem Marielle</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180417	17/04/2018	<i>Riscos do FIES</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180418	18/04/2018	<i>A opinião pública</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180419	19/04/2018	<i>A última instância</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180420	20/04/2018	<i>As águas do Brasil</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180421	21/04/2018	<i>A cidade envelheceu</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180422	22/04/2018	<i>Cuba e a história</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180423	23/04/2018	<i>O fim do foro</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180424	24/04/2018	<i>O impasse social</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180425	25/04/2018	<i>A regra e a exceção</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180426	26/04/2018	<i>Salve-se quem puder</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180427	27/04/2018	<i>Os fugitivos</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180428	28/04/2018	<i>O rato que ruge</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180429	29/04/2018	<i>Duas faces do poder</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180501	01/05/2018	<i>Dia do trabalho</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism

OTEMPO20180502	02/05/2018	<i>Tragédia anunciada</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180503	03/05/2018	<i>Miséria brasileira</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180504	04/05/2018	<i>Direito à moradia</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180505	05/05/2018	<i>Pequeno passo</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180506	06/05/2018	<i>O papel do Legislativo</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180507	07/05/2018	<i>Rodovia da morte</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180508	08/05/2018	<i>Realismo tarifário</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180509	09/05/2018	<i>O revés dos Correios</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180510	10/05/2018	<i>O lixo da história</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180511	11/05/2018	<i>Sem perdão</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180512	12/05/2018	<i>De entre os mortos</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180513	13/05/2018	<i>A força da história</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180514	14/05/2018	<i>Sufrimento dos jovens</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180515	15/05/2018	<i>Política de força</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180516	16/05/2018	<i>Dois anos de Temer</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180517	17/05/2018	<i>Coalizão e corrupção</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180518	18/05/2018	<i>Quase parando</i>	Egalitarianism

OTEMPO20180519	19/05/2018	<i>Terrível realidade</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180520	20/05/2018	<i>As veias abertas</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180521	21/05/2018	<i>O custo não importa</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180522	22/05/2018	<i>A faca no peito</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180523	23/05/2018	<i>Geração perdida</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180524	24/05/2018	<i>O estado de direito</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180525	25/05/2018	<i>No limiar do caos</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180526	26/05/2018	<i>Hora de conversar</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180527	27/05/2018	<i>Problema de todos</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180528	28/05/2018	<i>Movimento sem dono</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180529	29/05/2018	<i>Economia e política</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180530	30/05/2018	<i>O país pede uma trégua</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180601	01/06/2018	<i>O Brasil que segue</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180602	02/06/2018	<i>Mais competição</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-individualism
OTEMPO20180603	03/06/2018	<i>O mundo de olho</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180604	04/06/2018	<i>Direitos humanos</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180605	05/06/2018	<i>O recado do crime</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism

OTEMPO20180606	06/06/2018	<i>Não vai dar certo</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180607	07/06/2018	<i>Suicídio coletivo</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180608	08/06/2018	<i>Negociação desastrosa</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180609	09/06/2018	<i>Fora de controle</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180610	10/06/2018	<i>Contra o estado</i>	Elitism
OTEMPO20180611	11/06/2018	<i>Olhem bem a serra</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180612	12/06/2018	<i>Adeus às armas</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180613	13/06/2018	<i>Tábua de salvação</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180614	14/06/2018	<i>Hora da remissão</i>	Elitism
OTEMPO20180615	15/06/2018	<i>Impasse a superar</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180616	16/06/2018	<i>Sucessão das máfias</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180617	17/06/2018	<i>A violência e a pobreza</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180618	18/06/2018	<i>Último lugar</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180619	19/06/2018	<i>Terreno movediço</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180620	20/06/2018	<i>O Brasil na lona</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180621	21/06/2018	<i>Guerra de fronteiras</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180622	22/06/2018	<i>Somando as forças</i>	Egalitarianism

OTEMPO20180623	23/06/2018	<i>A conta que cbega</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180624	24/06/2018	<i>Destruição do Estado</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180625	25/06/2018	<i>Pedido de socorro</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180626	26/06/2018	<i>Pedagogia argentina</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180627	27/06/2018	<i>Presença do Estado</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180628	28/06/2018	<i>Justiça partida</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180629	29/06/2018	<i>Geografia do desastre</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180701	01/07/2018	<i>O STF na berlinda</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180702	02/07/2018	<i>O retrato do Estado</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-individualism
OTEMPO20180703	03/07/2018	<i>Remediar custa mais</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180704	04/07/2018	<i>Aposta temerosa</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180705	05/07/2018	<i>Riqueza e miséria</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180706	06/07/2018	<i>Negócios, negócios</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180707	07/07/2018	<i>Quase uma máfia</i>	Elitism
OTEMPO20180708	08/07/2018	<i>Menos uma copa</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180709	09/07/2018	<i>Saúde animal</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180710	10/07/2018	<i>A crise do Judiciário</i>	Anti-elitism

OTEMPO20180711	11/07/2018	<i>A revolta dos robôs</i>	Elitism
OTEMPO20180712	12/07/2018	<i>Gastos a rodo</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180713	13/07/2018	<i>Prêmio ou castigo?</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180714	14/07/2018	<i>Tiro pela culatra</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180715	15/07/2018	<i>Contra abusos</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180716	16/07/2018	<i>Subsídio à doença</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180717	17/07/2018	<i>Questão de compaixão</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180718	18/07/2018	<i>Relação de equilíbrio</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180719	19/07/2018	<i>Operação de risco</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180720	20/07/2018	<i>O drama da Nicarágua</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180721	21/07/2018	<i>Salve-se quem puder</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180722	22/07/2018	<i>Faltou inteligência</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180723	23/07/2018	<i>Morte de crianças</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180724	24/07/2018	<i>O ovo da serpente</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-individualism
OTEMPO20180725	25/07/2018	<i>Lei morta</i>	Individualism
OTEMPO20180726	26/07/2018	<i>Sinais do futuro</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180727	27/07/2018	<i>A segura do clima</i>	Egalitarianism

OTEMPO20180728	28/07/2018	<i>Selva de pedra</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180729	29/07/2018	<i>Notícia ou opinião?</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180730	30/07/2018	<i>O olhar do estrangeiro</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180801	01/08/2018	<i>O impasse do trabalho</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180802	02/08/2018	<i>Saúde e consciência</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180803	03/08/2018	<i>A velha política</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180804	04/08/2018	<i>O crime do aborto</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180805	05/08/2018	<i>Qual crime é pior?</i>	Anti-individualism
OTEMPO20180806	06/08/2018	<i>Cada dia mais difícil</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180807	07/08/2018	<i>Política de improvisos</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180808	08/08/2018	<i>Pelo fim do silêncio</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180809	09/08/2018	<i>Desistência precoce</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180810	10/08/2018	<i>Recorde indesejado</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180811	11/08/2018	<i>"Pega na mentira"</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180812	12/08/2018	<i>Geração canguru</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180813	13/08/2018	<i>Até quando esperar?</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180814	14/08/2018	<i>Só em causa própria</i>	Anti-elitism

OTEMPO20180815	15/08/2018	<i>Do status ao pânico</i>	Anti-individualism
OTEMPO20180816	16/08/2018	<i>Virada inesperada</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180817	17/08/2018	<i>Imprensa livre</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180818	18/08/2018	<i>Faltou conteúdo</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180819	19/08/2018	<i>Desemprego adocece</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180820	20/08/2018	<i>Déficit sem saída</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180821	21/08/2018	<i>Caos nosso de cada dia</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180822	22/08/2018	<i>Tiro no pé</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180823	23/08/2018	<i>Dilemas sem solução</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180824	24/08/2018	<i>Por trás do mi-mi-mi</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180825	25/08/2018	<i>Pequenos atiradores</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180826	26/08/2018	<i>A morte na sala de casa</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180827	27/08/2018	<i>Direto na fonte</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180828	28/08/2018	<i>Caixa-preta da suplência</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180829	29/08/2018	<i>Dólar sem freio</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180830	30/08/2018	<i>Desafio do futuro</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180901	01/09/2018	<i>Democracia ao vivo</i>	Egalitarianism

OTEMPO20180902	02/09/2018	<i>Como será o amanhã</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180903	03/09/2018	<i>Uma nova vigilância</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180904	04/09/2018	<i>Não foi fatalidade</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180905	05/09/2018	<i>Só mais do mesmo</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180906	06/09/2018	<i>Além da imaginação</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180907	07/09/2018	<i>Atentado à democracia</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180908	08/09/2018	<i>O SUS de cada um</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180909	09/09/2018	<i>O limite da corrupção</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180910	10/09/2018	<i>Mulher não é objeto</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180911	11/09/2018	<i>Comoção não vira voto</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180912	12/09/2018	<i>Conta do descaso</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180913	13/09/2018	<i>Câncer da sociedade</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180914	14/09/2018	<i>Falta diversidade</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180915	15/09/2018	<i>Retrato sem retoque</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180916	16/09/2018	<i>O pendos autocrático</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180917	17/09/2018	<i>Crime não compensa</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-individualism
OTEMPO20180918	18/09/2018	<i>Não ao preconceito</i>	Egalitarianism

OTEMPO20180919	19/09/2018	<i>Vida à mingua</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180920	20/09/2018	<i>O trânsito somos nós</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180921	21/09/2018	<i>Depressão e trabalho</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180922	22/09/2018	<i>A vida vale a pena</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180923	23/09/2018	<i>Apelo à sensatez</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180924	24/09/2018	<i>Doenças e cidadania</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180925	25/09/2018	<i>Violência à mulher</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20180926	26/09/2018	<i>O quadro eleitoral</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180927	27/09/2018	<i>O choro na Argentina</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180928	28/09/2018	<i>À margem da eleição</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20180929	29/09/2018	<i>Legal, mas imoral</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181001	01/10/2018	<i>Capitães do mato</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181002	02/10/2018	<i>A hora que tarda</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181003	03/10/2018	<i>Em pleno vigor</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181004	04/10/2018	<i>Aviso aos navegantes</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181005	05/10/2018	<i>A justiça na berlinda</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181006	06/10/2018	<i>Fé na democracia</i>	Egalitarianism

OTEMPO20181007	07/10/2018	<i>O jogo está feito</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181008	08/10/2018	<i>O voto da razão</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181009	09/10/2018	<i>Suicídio tucano</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181010	10/10/2018	<i>Ensino à distância</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181011	11/10/2018	<i>Show para surdos</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181012	12/10/2018	<i>Volta à barbárie</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181013	13/10/2018	<i>Questão de cidadania</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181014	14/10/2018	<i>A justiça calada</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181015	15/10/2018	<i>Mundo selvagem</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181016	16/10/2018	<i>A história ameaçada</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181017	17/10/2018	<i>A culpa do verão</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181018	18/10/2018	<i>A ilusão da vontade</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181019	19/10/2018	<i>Violência e medo</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181020	20/10/2018	<i>Justiça fiscal</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181021	21/10/2018	<i>O valor de uma vida</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181022	22/10/2018	<i>A ameaça das chuvas</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181023	23/10/2018	<i>Mais democracia</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism

OTEMPO20181024	24/10/2018	<i>Estranho encontro</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181025	25/10/2018	<i>Semente da violência</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181026	26/10/2018	<i>Whatsapp na berlinda</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181027	27/10/2018	<i>Agressão à liberdade</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181028	28/10/2018	<i>Decisão difícil</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181029	29/10/2018	<i>A paz, não a guerra</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181030	30/10/2018	<i>Frustração histórica</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181101	01/11/2018	<i>O discurso da vontade</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181102	02/11/2018	<i>Aposta de risco</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181103	03/11/2018	<i>Balão de ensaio</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181104	04/11/2018	<i>O avanço de ENEM</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181105	05/11/2018	<i>Tudo ou nada</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181106	06/11/2018	<i>Dívida impagável</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181107	07/11/2018	<i>Falta de tato</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181108	08/11/2018	<i>Crise no trabalho</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181109	09/11/2018	<i>Como funciona</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181110	10/11/2018	<i>Um dia a casa cai</i>	Anti-elitism

OTEMPO20181111	11/11/2018	<i>O futuro da cidade</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181112	12/11/2018	<i>O trabalho ameaçado</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181113	13/11/2018	<i>A dívida dos brasileiros</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181114	14/11/2018	<i>Pedido de socorro</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181115	15/11/2018	<i>Prática brutal</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181116	16/11/2018	<i>Outro lado da moeda</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181117	17/11/2018	<i>Cidades mortais</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181118	18/11/2018	<i>Brasil profundo</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181119	19/11/2018	<i>Uma cidade sem carros</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181120	20/11/2018	<i>A questão racial</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181121	21/11/2018	<i>Medida paliativa</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181122	22/11/2018	<i>O custo da mudança</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181123	23/11/2018	<i>Chaga nacional</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181124	24/11/2018	<i>Sucesso comercial</i>	Anti-individualism
OTEMPO20181125	25/11/2018	<i>A barreira da desigualdade</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181126	26/11/2018	<i>Os rios da morte</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181127	27/11/2018	<i>Busca de uma saída</i>	Egalitarianism

OTEMPO20181128	28/11/2018	<i>Toma lá dá cá</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181129	29/11/2018	<i>O crime organizado</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181201	01/12/2018	<i>Melhora a economia</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181202	02/12/2018	<i>Fora da festa</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181203	03/12/2018	<i>Causa cultural</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181204	04/12/2018	<i>No meio do caminho</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181205	05/12/2018	<i>Mais um passo</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181206	06/12/2018	<i>O país mais pobre</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181207	07/12/2018	<i>O drama do SUS</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181208	08/12/2018	<i>A cidade ameaçada</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181209	09/12/2018	<i>A reforma impossível</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181210	10/12/2018	<i>Bode expiatório</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181211	11/12/2018	<i>Regional e desigual</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181212	12/12/2018	<i>Morte à espreita</i>	Anti-individualism
OTEMPO20181213	13/12/2018	<i>Os mais honestos</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181214	14/12/2018	<i>Crime e castigo</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181215	15/12/2018	<i>O recuo do crime</i>	Egalitarianism

OTEMPO20181216	16/12/2018	<i>Erro histórico</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181217	17/12/2018	<i>Mundo sem fronteiras</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181218	18/12/2018	<i>Tiro no pé</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181219	19/12/2018	<i>Festa de arromba</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181220	20/12/2018	<i>O paraíso na terra</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181221	21/12/2018	<i>Falta de juízo</i>	Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181222	22/12/2018	<i>Serviços e preços ruins</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181223	23/12/2018	<i>O velho e o novo</i>	Egalitarianism
OTEMPO20181224	24/12/2018	<i>Solução simplista</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181226	26/12/2018	<i>BR381: na estaca zero</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181227	27/12/2018	<i>Ainda falta clareza</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181228	28/12/2018	<i>Balanço duvidoso</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181229	29/12/2018	<i>Confissão de fracasso</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
OTEMPO20181230	30/12/2018	<i>A reforma é urgente</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism

3.6 Zero Hora

Newspaper: ZERO HORA		Total articles: 97	
Article's code	Pub. Date	Article's Title*	Worldview/s found

ZEROHO0020180103	03/01/2018	UM SOPRO DE LIBERDADE PARA O IRÃ	Anti-Elitism / Egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180105	05/01/2018	Dos males, o menor	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180113	13/01/2018	MAIORIA SILENCIOSA	Anti-Elitism / Egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180116	16/01/2018	MELHORA NA SEGURANÇA	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180119	19/01/2018	FERMENTO PARA A ECONOMIA	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180123	23/01/2018	UM BOM COMEÇO	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180201	01/02/2018	INJEÇÃO DE ANIMO	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180213	13/02/2018	HORA DE PONDERAÇÃO	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180215	15/02/2018	LENIÊNCIA NO TRANSITO	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180217	17/02/2018	O ÚLTIMO RECURSO	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180219	19/02/2018	OS GANHOS NAS ESTATAIS	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180223	23/02/2018	O ALERTA DA ESTIAGEM	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180228	28/02/2018	OS ENTRAVES DA BR-116	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180301	01/03/2018	TROCA ACERTADA	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180313	13/03/2018	AMEAÇA AO LIVRE COMÉRCIO	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180321	21/03/2018	RISCO DE CASUÍSMO	Elitism / Anti-communitarianism

ZEROHO0020180322	22/03/2018	LICÇÕES DE INCIVILIDADE	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180324	24/03/2018	DESPERDÍCIO NAS OBRAS	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180327	27/03/2018	PARCERIAS PARA ESTRADAS	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180403	03/04/2018	A REFORMA INACABADA	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180406	06/04/2018	A PRISÃO DE LULA	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180409	09/04/2018	Faltou algo no palanque	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180410	10/04/2018	AS ELEIÇÕES E A ESTABILIDADE	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180413	13/04/2018	OS DESVIOS NOS FUNDOS DE PENSÃO	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180514	14/05/2018	TRANSPARENCIA NAS COLIGAÇÕES	Egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180521	21/05/2018	REMÉDIO AO PRODUTOR RURAL	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180523	23/05/2018	O IMPASSE NOS COMBUSTÍVEIS	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180524	24/05/2018	DESPERDÍCIO SOBRE TRILHOS	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180526	26/05/2018	OS PREJUÍZOS DA INTRANSIGÊNCIA	Elitism

ZEROHO0020180528	28/05/2018	HORA DA SENSATEZ	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180601	01/06/2018	SOBROU PARA A MAIORIA	Individualism / Anti-egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180604	04/06/2018	LABIRINTO TRIBUTÁRIO	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180605	05/06/2018	REAJUSTE INOPORTUNO	Egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180611	11/06/2018	TECNOLOGIA CONTRA O CRIME	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180612	12/06/2018	O RISCO DA INDEFINIÇÃO	Egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180613	13/06/2018	KIM SOBREVIVERIA SEM A SUA NARRATIVA NUCLEAR? UM ACENO PELA PAZ	Individualism
ZEROHO0020180618	18/06/2018	SENSAÇÃO DE ABANDONO	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180620	20/06/2018	QUANDO A CULPA NÃO É DO GOVERNO	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180621	21/06/2018	GAIOLAS HUMANAS	Egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180625	25/06/2018	SINAL PROMISSOR	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180703	03/07/2018	A CONTA QUE NÃO FECHA	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180711	11/07/2018	A ECONOMIA ATROPELADA	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180712	12/07/2018	FORA DA REALIDADE	Egalitarianism

ZEROHO0020180717	17/07/2018	COLIGAÇÕES INTERESSEIRAS	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180719	19/07/2018	EXCELENCIA UNIVERSITÁRIA	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180720	20/07/2018	O PESO DA INADIMPLÊNCIA	Individualism
ZEROHO0020180723	23/07/2018	O LOTEAMENTO DA REGULACÃO	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180725	25/07/2018	A PIORA NAS CONTAS DO ESTADO	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180726	26/07/2018	TRUCULENCIA NA NICARÁGUA	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180727	27/07/2018	SERVIÇO PELA METADE	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180802	02/08/2018	O DESCASO COM A FREEWAY	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180807	07/08/2018	RECUO PREOCUPANTE	Individualism
ZEROHO0020180808	08/08/2018	ACORDO PELA SEGURANÇA	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180809	09/08/2018	VALORIZACÃO DO VOTO	Egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180811	11/08/2018	O AVANÇO DA VIOLENCIA	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180816	16/08/2018	A CAMPANHA NAS RUAS	Egalitarianism

ZEROHO0020180817	17/08/2018	O PRIMEIRO DEBATE	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180818	18/08/2018	PROTAGONISMO ELEITORAL	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180821	21/08/2018	AS PRIORIDADES DOS GAÚCHOS	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180822	22/08/2018	O CUSTO DA INCERTEZA	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180823	23/08/2018	O RIO GRANDE E OS VENEZUELANOS	Egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180824	24/08/2018	CRISE NA APRENDIZAGEM	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180825	25/08/2018	O SHOW DO CAMPO	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180828	28/08/2018	UM SÍMBOLO DO RIO GRANDE	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180831	31/08/2018	APRENDIZADO INSUFICIENTE	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180903	03/09/2018	CAMPANHA SEM FOCO	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180904	04/09/2018	TRAGÉDIA ANUNCIADA	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180908	08/09/2018	O DESCONTROLE VENEZUELANO	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180912	12/09/2018	A ESCOLA DO AMANHÃ	Elitism / Individualism

ZEROHO0020180914	14/09/2018	LICÇÕES NA ÁREA DE SEGURANÇA	Elitism / Anti- egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180915	15/09/2018	UM VOTO DE CONFIANÇA	Elitism
ZEROHO0020180917	17/09/2018	A GUERRA DA DESINFORMA ÇÃO	Elitism / Anti- egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180921	21/09/2018	A SEGURANÇA DA URNA ELETRÔNICA	Egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020180922	22/09/2018	A INSPIRAÇÃO QUE VEM DA CULTURA	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180924	24/09/2018	SIMPLIFICAÇÃO O TRIBUTÁRIA	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180925	25/09/2018	OS DOIS LADOS DA INFLAÇÃO	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020180927	27/09/2018	DISTORÇÕES NO SERVIÇO PÚBLICO	Elitism / Anti- egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020181003	03/10/2018	CLAREZA PELO RIO GRANDE	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020181004	04/10/2018	O TESTE DAS INSTITUIÇÕES	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020181005	05/10/2018	A VALORIZAÇÃO DOS LEGISLATIVO S	Elitism
ZEROHO0020181006	06/10/2018	DEPOIS DAS URNAS	Egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020181008	08/10/2018	HORA DE DESARMAR ESPÍRITOS	Elitism

ZEROHO0020181009	09/10/2018	O NOVO MAPA POLÍTICO	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020181010	10/10/2018	O CLIMA DO SEGUNDO TURNO	Elitism
ZEROHO0020181015	15/10/2018	A VALORIZAÇÃO DOS PROFESSORES	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020181022	22/10/2018	RESPEITO À VONTADE DOS ELEITORES	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020181023	23/10/2018	A DEFINIÇÃO PARA O PIRATINI	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020181103	03/11/2018	AS FUSÕES NOS MINISTÉRIOS	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020181114	14/11/2018	OS CONSENSOS NECESSÁRIOS	Elitism
ZEROHO0020181115	15/11/2018	EMERGENCIA NO MAIS MÉDICOS	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020181116	16/11/2018	O ALERTA AOS NOVOS GOVERNADO RES	Elitism
ZEROHO0020181201	01/12/2018	O CRIME, SEM OXIGENIO	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020181208	08/12/2018	RESPONSABIL IDADE FISCAL AMEAÇADA	Elitism / Individualism
ZEROHO0020181211	11/12/2018	ESTADOS SEM CAIXA	Individualism
ZEROHO0020181217	17/12/2018	A VOLTA DE CESARE BATTISTI	Elitism / Anti-communitarianism

ZEROHO0020181218	18/12/2018	A CORAGEM DE DENUNCIAR	Egalitarianism
ZEROHO0020181231	31/12/2018	DESEJO DE MUDANÇA	Elitism / Individualism

3.7 Valor Econômico

Newspaper: VALOR ECONÔMICO			Total articles: 240
Article's code	Pub. Date	Article's Title	Worldview/s found
VALOREC20180102	02/01/2018	<i>Incerteza política conduzirá a economia até às urnas</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180103	03/01/2018	<i>Expectativa de turbulência eleitoral desafia o Tesouro</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180104	04/01/2018	<i>Mercados iniciam o ano sob signo de expansão global</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180105	05/01/2018	<i>Petrobras resolve problema nos EUA e causa outro no Brasil</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180108	08/01/2018	<i>O foco precisa ser o controle das despesas públicas</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180109	09/01/2018	<i>Refreada da economia deve refrear o superávit comercial</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180110	10/01/2018	<i>Riscos para o Brasil com a economia mundial aquecida</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180111	11/01/2018	<i>Queda da poupança, mais uma herança da crise</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20180112	12/01/2018	<i>Os limites para a expansão da taxa de investimento</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180115	15/01/2018	<i>Pré-campanha eleitoral exige o pior da política</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180116	16/01/2018	<i>Problemas dos Estados parecem longe do fim</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180117	17/01/2018	<i>Surto de febre amarela expõe os limites do sistema de saúde</i>	Individualism
VALOREC20180118	18/01/2018	<i>Sem a reforma da Previdência, os ganhos serão desfeitos</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180122	22/01/2018	<i>Julgamento de Lula é um divisor de água na eleição</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180123	23/01/2018	<i>Títulos brasileiros surfam na onda da liquidez internacional</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180124	24/01/2018	<i>Diversidade nas empresas aumenta a competitividade</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180125	25/01/2018	<i>Quem deve receber as indenizações da Lava Jato</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180126	26/01/2018	<i>A pior derrota de Lula e do Partido dos Trabalhadores</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180129	29/01/2018	<i>Fiscal melhora, mas não afasta risco da insolvência</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180130	30/01/2018	<i>Capital privado pode apoiar retomada da infraestrutura</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180131	31/01/2018	<i>Dúvidas sobre benefícios da desoneração da folha</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20180201	01/02/2018	<i>Trump ainda pouco disposto à colaboração multilateral</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180202	02/02/2018	<i>Investimento estrangeiro pode garantir transações correntes</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180205	05/02/2018	<i>Os estrados dados fiscais publicados pelo governo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180206	06/02/2018	<i>Indústria dá sinais de que começou a retomada</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180207	07/02/2018	<i>Inflação ameaça voltar à cena e intranquiliza mercados</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180208	08/02/2018	<i>Benesses para o Judiciário pesam nas contas públicas</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180209	09/02/2018	<i>Selic pode se manter no piso histórico por um bom tempo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180214	14/02/2018	<i>Venezuele exporta crise humanitária para vizinhos</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180215	15/02/2018	<i>Declarações impróprias põem em xeque o comando da PF</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180216	16/02/2018	<i>Arranjos pré-eleitorais ampliam a desorganização partidária</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180219	19/02/2018	<i>Dividido, Copom faz o ajuste fino da política monetária</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180220	20/02/2018	<i>Sem medidas fortes não é possível deter o caos no Rio</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20180221	21/02/2018	<i>Pressão renovada para baratear o custo do crédito</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180222	22/02/2018	<i>Agenda alternativa do governo preenche o vazio até as eleições</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180223	23/02/2018	<i>Expansão pressiona por ajustes nas políticas do Fed e do BCE</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180226	26/02/2018	<i>É preciso reorganizar a base para privatizar a Eletrobras</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180227	27/02/2018	<i>Acesso à internet ainda falha e prejudica competitividade</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180305	05/03/2018	<i>Os desafios fiscais continuam iguais apesar do otimismo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180306	06/03/2018	<i>Em novo rompante, Trump flerta com guerra comercial</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180307	07/03/2018	<i>Eleição na Itália mostra rejeição ao projeto europeu</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180308	08/03/2018	<i>Para Banco Mundial, modelo brasileiro precisa ser alterado</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180309	09/03/09	<i>Recursos para o ambiente caem com recessão e crise fiscal</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180312	12/03/2018	<i>Dividido, o centro sofre ameaça real dos dois extremos</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180313	13/03/2018	<i>Banco público perde espaço e reduz participação no crédito</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20180314	14/03/2018	<i>No comércio, Trump põe mundo na defensiva</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180315	15/03/2018	<i>Trump muda sem parar, e para pior, sua equipe de governo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180316	16/03/2018	<i>Rede de benefícios une o corporativismo estatal</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180319	19/03/2018	<i>Indústria infante ou infantilização da indústria?</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180320	20/03/2018	<i>Pressão por resultados no Rio cresce com a morte de Marielle</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180321	21/03/2018	<i>Regras tributárias colocam o Brasil em desvantagem</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180322	22/03/2018	<i>Fed aumenta a taxa de juros e mantém o ritmo de ajustes</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180323	23/03/2018	<i>Trump dà início à escalada comercial contra a China</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180326	26/03/2018	<i>Decisões confusas do STF criam insegurança jurídica</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180327	27/03/2018	<i>Há espaço para melhorar a segurança hídrica</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180328	28/03/2018	<i>Crédito retoma expansão e bancos elevam margens</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180329	29/03/2018	<i>É preciso blindar os cofres públicos no ano eleitoral</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180402	02/04/2018	<i>BC entra em uma nova fase do ciclo de corte de juros</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20180403	03/04/2018	<i>15o Rodada abre caminho a novos leilões de petróleo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180404	04/04/2018	<i>Economia caminha devagar no primeiro trimestre</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180405	05/04/2018	<i>EUA e China falam alto e buscam negociações</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180406	06/04/2018	<i>Dividido, Supremo sela o destino político de Lula</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180409	09/04/2018	<i>Do paliativo ao estrutural na regra de ouro</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180410	10/04/2018	<i>FMI relativiza a perda de empregos na indústria</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180411	11/04/2018	<i>Troca-troca partidário mostra avanço do centrão</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180412	12/04/2018	<i>Inflação segue em regressão com recuperação lenta</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180413	13/04/2018	<i>Risco em alta com promessa de ataque dos EUA à Síria</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180416	16/04/2018	<i>BC se prepara para conter volatilidade no ano eleitoral</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180417	17/04/2018	<i>Desigualdade persiste, mesmo com a reação da economia</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180418	18/04/2018	<i>Candidatos de centro ficam para trás nas pesquisas</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180419	19/04/2018	<i>Economia global cresce mais, assim como os riscos</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism

VALOREC20180420	20/04/2018	<i>Brasil fecha brechas legais e avança combate à corrupção</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180423	23/04/2018	<i>Cadastro positivo é vital para reduzir os juros bancários</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180424	24/04/2018	<i>Elevação das commodities põe expectativas em xeque</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180425	25/04/2018	<i>Reforma trabalhista tem boa estreia e desafios no caminho</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180426	26/04/2018	<i>Agenda do governo se esvai em meio ao jogo eleitoral</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180427	27/04/2018	<i>Um incômodo ponto de interrogação sobre a Lava-Jato</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180430	30/04/2018	<i>Congresso aprova medidas para controlar as despesas</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180502	02/05/2018	<i>Estragos de depreciação do dólar são hoje menores</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180503	03/05/2018	<i>Depreciação do dólar volta a desafiar a Argentina</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180504	04/05/2018	<i>EUA dão ultimato e impõem cotas para aço brasileiro</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180507	07/05/2018	<i>Ao restringir fora, Supremo deixa muitas dúvidas no ar</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180508	08/05/2018	<i>Indústria vacila e põe ritmo de recuperação em dúvida</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180509	09/05/2018	<i>Crise cambial leva Argentina a pedir socorro ao FMI</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20180510	10/05/2018	<i>Trump amplia riscos globais ao romper acordo com Irã</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180511	11/05/2018	<i>BC deve seguir seu curso e reduzir mais uma vez o juro</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180514	14/05/2018	<i>Reforma tributária parece inevitável no próximo governo</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180515	15/05/2018	<i>Renúncia fiscais representam 4% do PIB e podem crescer</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180516	16/05/2018	<i>Pressão por desvalorização do real tende a continuar</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180517	17/05/2018	<i>Nas pesquisas, um cenário eleitoral confuso e inquietante</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180518	18/05/2018	<i>Economia segue na rota do baixo desempenho</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180521	21/05/2018	<i>Contra o discurso demagógico da violência nas campanhas</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180522	22/05/2018	<i>Desemprego persiste e abre espaço a severas distorções</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180523	23/05/2018	<i>BC vai manter política de estímulos monetários</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180524	24/05/2018	<i>Greve desafia a política de preços livres de combustíveis</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180525	25/05/2018	<i>Greve dos transportes põe em xeque governo Temer</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180528	28/05/2018	<i>Nó do setor portuário está bem de longe de ser desatado</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20180529	29/05/2018	<i>Governo faz todas as concessões e greve não acaba</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180530	30/05/2018	<i>Cenário desfavorece uma retomada vigorosa do crédito</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180601	01/06/2018	<i>PIB avança devagar, mas expectativas se deterioram</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180604	04/06/2018	<i>Mercado de crédito cresce com bases mais sustentam</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180605	05/06/2018	<i>Destino da política de preços da Petrobras é incerto</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180606	06/06/2018	<i>Greve dos caminhoneiros impacta balança comercial</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180607	07/06/2018	<i>Desvalorização contínua do real pressiona os juros</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180608	08/06/2018	<i>Trump amplia as chances de uma guerra comercial</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180611	11/06/2018	<i>Ambição e vaidade imobilizam o centro</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180612	12/06/2018	<i>Violência segue crescendo e seu custo chega a 5% do PIB</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180613	13/06/2018	<i>Pesquisa mostram que o cenário eleitoral não mudou</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180614	14/06/2018	<i>Fed eleva juros e aponta para mais duas altas no ano</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180615	15/06/2018	<i>Acordo entre Trump e Kim é ainda só uma intenção</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20180618	18/06/2018	<i>Lições da eleição de 2002 para a campanha de 2018</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180619	19/06/2018	<i>Distribuidoras da Eletrobras testarão interesse estrangeiro</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180620	20/06/2018	<i>Argentina espera o dinheiro do FMI para sustentar o peso</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180621	21/06/2018	<i>Trump coloca o mundo mais perto da guerra comercial</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180622	22/06/2018	<i>Sob pesadelo fiscal, governo e Congresso distribuem receitas</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180625	15/06/2018	<i>Congresso não respeita regra constitucional ao criar despesa</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180626	26/06/2018	<i>Nova lei de recuperação judicial empaca no Congresso</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180627	27/06/2018	<i>BC olha riscos e deixa em aberto próximas decisões</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180628	28/06/2018	<i>Divisão no STF caminha para o caos decisório</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180629	29/06/2018	<i>Anatomia de uma recuperação que foi perdendo o folêgo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180702	02/07/2018	<i>STF instável é motivo de preocupação nas eleições</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180703	03/07/2018	<i>Supremo sepulta de vez a contribuição obrigatória</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180704	04/07/2018	<i>Fraqueza do emprego reduz previsões de crescimento</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20180705	05/07/2018	<i>EUA inicia guerra tarifária que pode se tornar global</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180706	06/07/2018	<i>Questão dos combustíveis ainda fica longe de uma solução</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180709	09/07/2018	<i>Deficit externo será menor devido a frágil economia</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180710	10/07/2018	<i>Queda da indústria contamina expectativa para o PIB do ano</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180711	11/07/2018	<i>Cenário para a inflação segue tranquilo, apesar da alta</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180712	12/07/2018	<i>Turbulência pressiona custos e prazos da dívida imobiliária</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180713	13/07/2018	<i>Creise nos parceiros comerciais desacelera as exportações</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180716	16/07/2018	<i>Mais um 'jeitinho' para adiar a solução de um problema</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180717	17/07/2018	<i>IBC-Br cai e reforça previsões pessimistas para a economia</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180718	18/07/2018	<i>Guerra comercial entra de vez nos cenários de curto prazo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180719	19/07/2018	<i>Convenções partidárias tentam delimitar o xadrez eleitoral</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20180720	20/07/2018	<i>PL que facilita aprovação de pesticidas é desnecessário</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180723	23/07/2018	<i>A fraqueza do debate sobre privatizações na campanha</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180724	24/07/2018	<i>Contas públicas seguem ainda no roteiro de déficit</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180725	25/07/2018	<i>É preciso blindar as agências contra as indicações partidárias</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180726	26/07/2018	<i>Atacar a crise fiscal não é consenso entre candidatos</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180727	27/07/2018	<i>Censo mostra progressos e atrasos no meio rural</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180730	30/07/2018	<i>Investimentos diretos caem com a demora nas concessões</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180731	31/07/2018	<i>Mudança demográfica torna urgente reforma da previdência</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180801	01/08/2018	<i>Fundos públicos estimulam a artificialidade dos partidos</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180802	02/08/2018	<i>Sucessos e fragilidades da Lava-Jato quarto anos depois</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180803	03/08/2018	<i>Partidos dão últimos lances na pré-campanha eleitoral</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180806	06/08/2018	<i>Chegou a hora de definir as prioridades orçamentárias</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20180807	07/08/2018	<i>Indústria se recupera, mas projeção não melhoram</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180808	08/08/2018	<i>FMI aponta que Brasil precisa acelerar ajuste fiscal</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180809	09/08/2018	<i>Campanha eleitoral do PT soma contradições</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180810	10/08/2018	<i>Expectativas se deterioram com início da guerra comercial</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180813	13/08/2018	<i>Uma decisão que pode ter inviabilizado o teto de gastos</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180814	14/08/2018	<i>Congresso trava projetos de ajuste, mas turbina os gastos</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180815	15/08/2018	<i>Mercados põem em xeque a política econômica de Erdogan</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180816	16/08/2018	<i>Reavaliação de riscos pode levar a crise a mais emergentes</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180817	17/08/2018	<i>Criticado, teto de gastos não tem substituto à altura</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180821	21/08/2018	<i>Reforma tributária sai da gaveta e volta ao debate</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180822	22/08/2018	<i>Governo Maduro tenta deter a hiperinflação com pirotécias</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180823	23/08/2018	<i>Pesquisas ressaltam baixa previsibilidade das eleições</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180824	24/08/2018	<i>Peso das dívidas diminui o ritmo do crescimento</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20180827	27/08/2018	<i>Riscos no cenário eleitoral são piores do que os de 2002</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180828	28/08/2018	<i>Fôlego do investimento direto diminui até julho</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180829	29/08/2018	<i>Trump consegue cindir Nafta e impor negociação bilateral</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180830	30/08/2018	<i>Peso desaba e Macri pede ao FMI que antecipe recursos</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180831	31/08/2018	<i>Temer ignora crise fiscal e dá reajuste aos servidores</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180903	03/09/2018	<i>Falta de responsabilidade de PSDB e PT abre caminho a Bolsonaro</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20180904	04/09/2018	<i>Retratos terríveis saem das avaliações da educação</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180905	05/09/2018	<i>A prioridade dos gastos e a tragédia do Museu Nacional</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180906	06/09/2018	<i>Recessão e inflação alta dominam a cena argentina</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180910	10/09/2018	<i>Até o fim das eleições, mais turbulências à frente</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180911	11/09/2018	<i>Crescem as dificuldades para a campanha de Bolsonaro</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180912	12/09/2018	<i>'Esqueletos' já jogam bilhões nas contas de energia</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180913	13/09/2018	<i>Instabilidade previsível e ainda moderada nos</i>	Elitism

		<i>emergentes</i>	
VALOREC20180914	14/09/2018	<i>Vendas em queda mostram perda de ímpeto da economia</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180917	17/09/2027	<i>Ações em período eleitoral expõem Judiciário e o MP</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180918	18/09/2028	<i>Recessão derrubou todos os indicadores sociais</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180919	19/09/2029	<i>EUA e China ampliam guerra comercial com mais tarifas</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180921	21/09/2031	<i>BC mantém juro e indica que ajuste futuro será gradual</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180924	24/09/2032	<i>O risco de um novo estelionato eleitoral</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180925	25/09/2033	<i>Destravar a infraestrutura é vital para a retomada</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20180926	26/09/2034	<i>Petróleo tem maior cotação em 4 anos e fôlego para subir mais</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180927	27/09/2035	<i>Fed aumenta juros e sinaliza uma nova alta no fim do ano</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20180928	28/09/2036	<i>Acordo da Argentina com o FMI traz duro ajuste recessivo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181001	01/10/2018	<i>Soluções ainda insuficientes para conter o déficite público</i>	Elitism / Individualism

VALOREC20181002	02/10/2018	<i>Rodada mostra acerto e nova política para o petróleo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181003	03/10/2018	<i>Trump agora insinua uma ofensiva contra o Brasil</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181004	04/10/2018	<i>Primeiro turno antecipou a polarização do segundo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181005	05/10/2018	<i>Mercados se agitam sobre a alta dos juros nos EUA</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20181008	08/10/2018	<i>Bolsonaro e Haddad vão ao 2o turno em busca do centro</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181009	09/10/2018	<i>Renovação no Congresso foi feita com o avanço da direita</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181010	10/10/2018	<i>Alguns desafios urgentes à espera do novo governo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181011	11/10/2018	<i>FMI vê crescimento global menos vigoroso e equilibrado</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181015	15/10/2018	<i>Mercados continuam inquietos com os rumos dos juros nos EUA</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181016	16/10/2018	<i>Velhas fragilidades da educação no novo índice do Banco Mundial</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181017	17/10/2018	<i>Aquecimento desafia o ritmo da agenda ambiental</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181018	18/10/2018	<i>Brasil está pouco preparado para a economia do futuro</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20181019	19/10/2018	<i>Alguns esboços sobre o programa de Bolsonaro</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181022	22/10/2018	<i>Decreto do Portos passou ileso por investigação da PF</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181023	23/10/2018	<i>Problemas fiscais em série aguardam novos governadores</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181024	24/10/2018	<i>Os Bolsonaro atacam a imprensa e a democracia</i>	Egalitarianism
VALOREC20181025	25/10/2018	<i>Mais ondas de instabilidade nos mercados globais</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20181026	26/10/2018	<i>Desorientado, PT subestima sua rejeição e a atração de Bolsonaro</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20181029	29/10/2018	<i>Desafio de Bolsonaro é moderação no poder</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181030	30/10/2018	<i>Bolsonaro deve ter apoio no Congresso a seus projetos</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181031	31/10/2018	<i>Pautas-bomba põem em alerta equipe do novo governo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181101	01/11/2018	<i>Discussão sobre o uso de reservas é extemporânea</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20181105	05/11/2018	<i>Cenário melhora após a eleição, mas Compom mantém cautela</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181106	06/11/2018	<i>Um roteiro para começar a melhorar a economia</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20181107	07/11/2018	<i>Palpites de Bolsonaro na área externa criam instabilidade</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20181108	08/11/2018	<i>Democratas ganham a Câmara e Trump resiste no Senado</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181109	09/11/2018	<i>Indecisões preocupantes sobre a reforma da previdência</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181111	11/11/2018	<i>O mundo olha aos passos do Bolsonaro na questão do clima</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181113	13/11/2018	<i>Aumento do SFT é nova fonte de pressão nas contas públicas</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181114	14/11/2018	<i>Situação financeira dos Estados vai de mal a pior</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181116	16/11/2018	<i>Partidos se articulam para a nova relação de forças no Congresso</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181119	19/11/2018	<i>Constituição já permite demitir servidor estável</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
VALOREC20181121	21/11/2018	<i>Cuba deixa Mais Médicos, que precisa ser ampliado</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181122	22/11/2018	<i>Política externa poderá ser muito alinhada à dos EUA</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181123	23/11/2018	<i>Cenário externo sugere urgência para reformas</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181126	26/11/2018	<i>Nomeações para AGU e CGU ajudam a consolidar leniência</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181127	27/11/2018	<i>Disputa por receita do pré-sal pode atrapalhar o ajuste</i>	Elitism / Individualism

VALOREC20181128	28/11/2018	<i>Disputa EUA-China põe em xeque o destino da OMC</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181129	29/11/2018	<i>Temer cede ao Judiciário e sanciona reajuste de salários</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181130	30/11/2018	<i>Fed indica que ciclo de alta dos juros não será longo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181203	03/12/2018	<i>Agenda de reformas do BC deve seguir no novo governo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181204	04/12/2018	<i>Fica para 2019 uma reação mais vigorosa da economia</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181205	05/12/2018	<i>Disputa EUA-China vai além do comércio e pode durar anos</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20181206	06/12/2018	<i>Bolsonaro ainda não sabe o que quer mudar na previdência</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181207	07/12/2018	<i>Bolsonaro precisa de mestres em coordenação política</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181210	10/12/2018	<i>Disputas políticas engoliram o debate da cessão onerosa</i>	Elitism / Individualism
VALOREC20181211	11/12/2018	<i>Indicadores sociais acentuam desafios do futuro governo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181212	12/12/2018	<i>Crise fiscal se aprofunda com desrespeito à LRF</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181213	13/12/2018	<i>Bolsonaro monta ministério sem definir programa de ação</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181214	14/12/2018	<i>Ampla maioria espera que Bolsonaro faça bom governo</i>	Elitism

VALOREC20181217	17/12/2018	<i>'Pautas-bombas' existem porque não se cumpre a lei</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181218	18/12/2018	<i>Aquecimento global exige metas mais ousadas das CoPs</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181219	19/12/2018	<i>Criar emprego é o grande desafio do novo governo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181220	20/12/2018	<i>Após 40 anos de reformas, China enfrenta grandes desafios</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181221	21/12/2018	<i>Os avanços ambientais têm sido pendulares no mundo</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181227	27/12/2018	<i>Correção dos ativos e ruídos políticos assustam investidores</i>	Elitism
VALOREC20181228	28/12/2018	<i>Reforma da previdência será o batismo de fogo de Bolsonaro</i>	Elitism

3.8 Correio Braziliense

Newspaper: CORREIO BRAZILIENSE			Total articles: 321
Article's code	Pub. Date	Article's Title	Worldview/s found
CORREIOBRAZ20180101	01/01/2018	<i>61.619: guarde este número</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180102	02/01/2018	<i>Saneamento, dívida social</i>	Egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20180103	03/01/2018	<i>Parece brincadeira, mas não é</i>	Egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20180104	04/01/2018	<i>Acordo tácito</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20180105	05/01/ 2018	<i>O piso salarial do magistério</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180106	06/01/ 2018	<i>Gargalo nos investimentos</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180107	07/01/ 2018	<i>Compromisso com a responsabilidade</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180108	08/01/ 2018	<i>Abominável preconceito</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180109	09/01/ 2018	<i>Insegurança até quando?</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180110	10/01/ 2018	<i>Ingerência inaceitável</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180111	11/01/ 2018	<i>Basta de violência</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180112	12/01/ 2018	<i>Impedir um novo surto</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180113	13/01/ 2018	<i>Sinal de alerta</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180114	14/01/ 2018	<i>Xenofobia americana</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180115	15/01/ 2018	<i>Mudanças climáticas</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180116	16/01/ 2018	<i>Bons sinais no horizonte</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180117	17/01/ 2018	<i>Vacinação prioritária</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180118	18/01/ 2018	<i>Soluções ignoradas</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180119	19/01/ 2018	<i>Colocações fora de hora</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180120	20/01/ 2018	<i>Desrespeito e impunidade</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20180121	21/01/2018	<i>Na dúvida, é preciso apurar</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180122	22/01/2018	<i>As florestas preservadas</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180123	23/01/2018	<i>Descaso e insegurança</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180124	24/01/2018	<i>Um rombo assustador</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180125	25/01/2018	<i>Sentença contundente</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180126	26/01/2018	<i>País refuta a radicalização</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180127	27/01/2018	<i>Energias renováveis</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180128	28/01/2018	<i>Entendimento, em vez de muros</i>	Anti-elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180129	29/01/2018	<i>Chegou a 4a Revolução Industrial</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180130	30/01/2018	<i>Muito longe da comemoração</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180131	31/01/2018	<i>Apelo ao bom senso</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180201	01/02/2018	<i>O poder tem limites</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180202	02/02/2018	<i>Educação a passos lentos</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180203	03/02/2018	<i>Inovação necessária</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180204	04/02/2018	<i>Supremo desafio</i>	Anti-elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180205	05/02/2018	<i>Uma faxina necessária</i>	Anti-elitism / Individualism

CORREIOBRAZ20180206	06/02/ 2018	<i>Fisco mais rigoroso</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180207	07/02/ 2018	<i>A hora é de contenção</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180208	08/02/ 2018	<i>Orçamentos espalham as omissões</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180209	09/02/ 2018	<i>Apostar na inteligência</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180210	10/02/ 2018	<i>Promessas não vingam</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180211	11/02/ 2018	<i>Ciclo virtuoso</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180212	12/02/ 2018	<i>Cartéis na mira do governo</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180213	13/02/ 2018	<i>O Brasil está cansado</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180214	14/02/ 2018	<i>Igreja contra a violência</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180215	15/02/ 2018	<i>Lugar de bebê é no berço</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180216	16/02/ 2018	<i>Compromisso humanitário</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180217	17/02/ 2018	<i>Ato extremo e acertado</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180218	18/02/ 2018	<i>A reestruturação do Estado</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180219	19/02/ 2018	<i>Momento impróprio</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180220	20/02/ 2018	<i>Recessão do passado</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180221	21/02/ 2018	<i>Crédito de confiança</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20180222	22/02/2018	<i>Mudar exige mais coragem</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180223	23/02/2018	<i>Uma afronta inaceitável</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20180224	24/02/2018	<i>Iniciativa acertada</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180225	25/02/2018	<i>A verdadeira autonomia do BC</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180226	26/02/2018	<i>Internet para todos</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180227	27/02/2018	<i>União barra a violência</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180228	28/02/2018	<i>Energia de um novo mundo</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180301	01/03/2018	<i>Desemprego para de crescer</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180302	02/03/2018	<i>Ameaça perigosa</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180303	03/03/2018	<i>Ainda há um longo caminho a percorrer</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180304	04/03/2018	<i>Riqueza esquecida</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180305	05/03/2018	<i>Acima de tudo, é preciso respeito</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180306	06/03/2018	<i>Indústria: pouco a comemorar</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180307	07/03/2018	<i>Prevenção contra a brutalidade no futebol</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180308	08/03/2018	<i>Serenidade e seriedade</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180309	09/03/2018	<i>Injustiça fiscal é atraso</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20180310	10/03/2018	<i>Enigma norte-coreano</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180311	11/03/2018	<i>Retaliar na medida certa</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20180312	12/03/2018	<i>Descompasso na educação</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180313	13/03/2018	<i>Não às armas</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180314	14/03/2018	<i>A reação de Temer</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180315	15/03/2018	<i>Honestidade, antes de tudo</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180316	16/03/2018	<i>Paralisação inaceitável</i>	Anti-egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20180317	17/03/2018	<i>É preciso unir forças</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180318	18/03/2018	<i>A água na mira do mundo</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180319	19/03/2018	<i>Combatendo o tráfico humano</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180320	20/03/2018	<i>Rússia first</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180321	21/03/2018	<i>O fantasma de Mariana</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180322	22/03/2018	<i>Água: a crise anunciada</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180323	23/03/2018	<i>Repúdio à xenofobia</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180324	24/03/2018	<i>Sem duas medidas</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180325	25/03/2018	<i>Facebook e a Hidra de Lerna</i>	Elitism / Individualism

CORREIOBRAZ20180326	26/03/2018	<i>Colbendo os resultados</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180327	27/03/2018	<i>País sem excelências</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180328	28/03/2018	<i>Nação sub judice</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180329	29/03/2018	<i>Terremoto jovem</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180330	30/03/2018	<i>Educação e emprego</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180331	31/03/2018	<i>Concursos em xeque</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180401	01/04/2018	<i>É hora de renovação</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180402	02/04/2018	<i>Juros acima da realidade</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180403	03/04/2018	<i>Decisão exemplar</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180404	04/04/2018	<i>O poder das manifestações</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180405	05/04/2018	<i>Decisão republicana</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20180407	07/04/2018	<i>Agressão à democracia</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180408	08/04/2018	<i>A lei é para todos</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180409	09/04/2018	<i>A violência e a economia</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180410	10/04/2018	<i>Foro privilegiado volta ao debate</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180411	11/04/2018	<i>O horror das armas químicas</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20180412	12/04/2018	<i>Universidades em risco</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180413	13/04/2018	<i>Combater a desigualdade</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180414	14/04/2018	<i>O protesto das juízas</i>	Egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20180415	15/04/2018	<i>Crise hídrica e as suas lições</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180416	16/04/2018	<i>Tempo de decisões</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180417	17/04/2018	<i>Ataque não muda a situação na Síria</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180418	18/04/2018	<i>Parceria para o sucesso</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180419	19/04/2018	<i>Saúde antes de mais nada</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180420	20/04/2018	<i>A pena e o risco</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180421	21/04/2018	<i>Brasília, 58 anos</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180422	22/04/2018	<i>Desafios de Cuba</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180423	23/04/2018	<i>A natureza tem pressa</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180424	24/04/2018	<i>Paraguai e Brasil</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180425	25/04/2018	<i>Manifestações e a população</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180426	26/04/2018	<i>O país não pode parar</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180427	27/04/2018	<i>Um ranking vergonhoso</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20180428	28/04/2018	<i>Encontro histórico</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180429	29/04/2018	<i>Vacina sem financiamento</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180430	30/04/2018	<i>O país está mudando</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180501	01/05/2018	<i>Pouco a comemorar</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180502	02/05/2018	<i>Foro nas mãos do Supremo</i>	Anti-elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180503	03/05/2018	<i>O déficit e as estratégias</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180504	04/05/2018	<i>Encruzilhada do comércio</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180505	05/05/2018	<i>Um passo a mais contra a impunidade</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180506	06/05/2018	<i>A aposta na ciência</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180507	07/05/2018	<i>Assédio sexual na berlinda</i>	Egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20180508	08/05/2018	<i>Lições para os candidatos</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180509	09/05/2018	<i>Desvios na aposentadoria</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180510	10/05/2018	<i>Blindagem só com reformas</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180511	11/05/2018	<i>Concessões emperradas</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180512	12/05/2018	<i>As famílias do campo</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180513	13/05/2018	<i>Maioria oprimida</i>	Elitism / Individualism

CORREIOBRAZ20180514	14/05/ 2018	<i>Crédito e crescimento</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180515	15/05/ 2018	<i>Tempo de Copa, hora de denúncia</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180516	16/05/ 2018	<i>Conflito histórico</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180517	17/05/ 2018	<i>Propostas concretas</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180518	18/05/ 2018	<i>O perigo do terror</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180519	19/05/ 2018	<i>Retrato do desemprego</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180520	20/05/ 2018	<i>Os dois lados da moeda</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180521	21/05/ 2018	<i>Construção aquecida</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180522	22/05/ 2018	<i>Venezuela nos estertores</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180523	23/05/ 2018	<i>Momento de cautela</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180524	24/05/ 2018	<i>Lição para repetentes</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180525	25/05/ 2018	<i>Apostar no bom senso</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180526	26/05/ 2018	<i>Medida necessária</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180527	27/05/ 2018	<i>A culpa do Congresso</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180528	28/05/ 2018	<i>Impostos na ordem do dia</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180529	29/05/ 2018	<i>O Brasil quer tranquilidade</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20180530	30/05/2018	<i>O caos não interessa ao país</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180531	31/05/2018	<i>Sabotagem agrava a crise</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180601	01/06/2018	<i>O custo da inércia</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180602	02/06/2018	<i>Incertezas sem fim</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180603	03/06/2018	<i>Lição digital</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180604	04/06/2018	<i>Só o brasileiro salva o Brasil</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180605	05/06/2018	<i>Mobilidade urbana</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180606	06/06/2018	<i>Violência sem fim</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180607	07/06/2018	<i>Extermínio</i>	Egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20180608	08/06/2018	<i>Amarga posição</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180609	09/06/2018	<i>Equidade e respeito</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180610	10/06/2018	<i>Informação combate a falsa notícia</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180611	11/06/2018	<i>A agonia do São Francisco</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180612	12/06/2018	<i>Educação infantil</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180613	13/06/2018	<i>Encontro histórico</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180614	14/06/2018	<i>É necessário avançar mais</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20180615	15/06/2018	<i>Governadores no Supremo</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180616	16/06/2018	<i>Menos regalias e mais reforço na segurança</i>	Anti-elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180617	17/06/2018	<i>Não ao aumento de juros</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180618	18/06/2018	<i>Novo capitalismo</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180619	19/06/2018	<i>Congresso paralisado</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180620	20/06/2018	<i>Um país em guerra</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180621	21/06/2018	<i>Delação viciada</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180622	22/06/2018	<i>Vacinação é negligenciada</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180623	23/06/2018	<i>Tragédia humanitária</i>	Egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20180624	24/06/2018	<i>Deficit de civilidade</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180625	25/06/2018	<i>O embate de dois gigantes</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180626	26/06/2018	<i>Tocantins acende a luz amarela</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180627	27/06/2018	<i>O dilema argentino</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180628	28/06/2018	<i>Em primeiro lugar, a vida</i>	Egalitarianism / Anti-elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180629	29/06/2018	<i>Uma decisão equivocada</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180630	30/06/2018	<i>Abuso na saúde</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20180701	01/07/ 2018	<i>Olhar de solidariedade</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180702	02/07/ 2019	<i>Sindicatos têm de mudar</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180703	03/07/ 2018	<i>Os rumos do México</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180704	04/07/ 2018	<i>Cautela com o comércio externo</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180705	05/07/ 2018	<i>A América caminha para trás</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180706	06/07/ 2018	<i>Reflexos de uma greve</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180707	07/07/ 2018	<i>Desvio de função</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180708	08/07/ 2018	<i>A hora da verdade</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180709	09/07/ 2018	<i>Inovação no campo</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180710	10/07/ 2018	<i>A isenção da justiça</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180711	11/07/ 2018	<i>Incertezas econômicas</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180712	12/07/ 2018	<i>Na rota do retrocesso</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180713	13/07/ 2018	<i>Judiciário vigilante</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180714	14/07/ 2018	<i>Um surto de irresponsabilidade</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180715	15/07/ 2018	<i>Educar pela paz no trânsito</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180716	16/07/ 2018	<i>Apostar na inovação</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20180717	17/07/2018	<i>Trump desagrada aos americanos</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180718	18/07/2018	<i>A vitória da saúde</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180719	19/07/2018	<i>Beleza exige precauções</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180720	20/07/2018	<i>Estradas da morte</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180721	21/07/2018	<i>O voto de valor</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180722	22/07/2018	<i>Sem espaço para promessas vazias</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180723	23/07/2018	<i>Mais equidade nas eleições</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180724	24/07/2018	<i>A reforma inevitável</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180725	25/07/2018	<i>Combate à gripe</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180726	26/07/2018	<i>Desequilíbrio preocupante</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180727	27/07/2018	<i>O morticínio na Nicarágua</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180728	28/07/2018	<i>As lições do Facebook</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180729	29/07/2018	<i>Mercosul e o Pacífico</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180730	30/07/2018	<i>Um país fragilizado</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180731	31/07/2018	<i>Pobre país em educação</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180801	01/08/2018	<i>Uma história de determinação</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20180802	02/08/ 2018	<i>Alento no mercado de imóveis</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180803	03/08/ 2018	<i>Respeito à Lei Eleitoral</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180804	04/08/ 2018	<i>Pesquisa e ciência são imprescindíveis</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180805	05/08/ 2018	<i>Ato extremo</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180806	06/08/ 2018	<i>Exportações ameaçadas</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180807	07/08/ 2018	<i>O país espera um projeto de nação</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180808	08/08/ 2018	<i>Um país humano</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180919	19/09/ 2018	<i>À espera de justiça</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180920	20/09/ 2018	<i>Guerra sem vencedores</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180921	21/09/ 2018	<i>Desafio trilionário</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180922	22/09/ 2018	<i>Sem luz no fim do túnel</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180923	23/09/ 2018	<i>Sensatez</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180924	24/09/ 2018	<i>Arte do bom combate</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180925	25/09/ 2018	<i>Combinou com o Congresso?</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180926	26/09/ 2018	<i>Desafio para a escola pública</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20180927	27/09/ 2018	<i>Campanha pela vida</i>	Egalitarianism

CORREIOBRAZ20180928	28/09/ 2018	<i>Legado inegável</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180929	29/09/ 2018	<i>Desafios da longevidade</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20180930	30/09/ 2018	<i>Efeito Orloff</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20181001	01/10/ 2018	<i>Ensino superior em declínio</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181002	02/10/ 2018	<i>Exercício de democracia</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181003	03/10/ 2018	<i>Menos ódio, mais reflexão</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181004	04/10/ 2018	<i>Na tevê, sem maquiagem</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181005	05/10/ 2018	<i>30 anos de liberdade</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181006	06/10/ 2018	<i>Voto: pessoal e intransferível</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181007	07/10/ 2018	<i>Dia de escolhas</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181008	08/10/ 2018	<i>A força da democracia</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181009	09/10/ 2018	<i>O recado das urnas</i>	Elitism / Anti- egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20181010	10/10/ 2018	<i>Hora da verdade</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181011	11/10/ 2018	<i>O eleitor enganado</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181012	12/10/ 2018	<i>Elas são maioria</i>	Elitism / Anti- egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20181013	13/10/ 2018	<i>Educação desafia os presenciáveis</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20181014	14/10/ 2018	<i>Um basta ao discurso do ódio</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181015	15/10/ 2018	<i>Valorização do professor</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20181016	16/10/ 2018	<i>Olhar para o mundo real</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20181017	17/10/ 2018	<i>O combate à falsidade</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181018	18/10/ 2018	<i>Atitude covarde</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181019	19/10/ 2018	<i>Privatizar é a saída</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181020	20/10/ 2018	<i>Violência na escola</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181021	21/10/ 2018	<i>Mazela anunciada</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181022	22/10/ 2018	<i>Vacina: avanço civilizatório</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181023	23/10/ 2018	<i>Sub-representação feminina no poder</i>	Egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20181024	24/10/ 2018	<i>Emprego é desafio para novo governo</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181025	25/10/ 2018	<i>Moderação e equilíbrio</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181026	26/10/ 2018	<i>O alerta que vem de fora</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181027	27/10/ 2018	<i>Confiança em queda</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181028	28/10/ 2018	<i>É hora de união pelo bem do país</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181029	29/10/ 2018	<i>Ao vencedor os desafios</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20181030	30/10/ 2018	<i>Alvo errado</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181031	31/10/ 2018	<i>Movimentos de esperança</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181101	01/11/ 2018	<i>O barato pode sair bem caro</i>	Elitism / Anti- egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20181102	02/11/ 2018	<i>Vitória da democracia</i>	Elitism / Anti- egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20181103	03/11/ 2018	<i>Eleição no meio do caminho</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181104	04/11/ 2018	<i>Enem, 20 anos</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181105	05/11/ 2018	<i>A relevância do Mercosul</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181106	06/11/ 2018	<i>Onde está o Itamaraty?</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181107	07/11/ 2018	<i>Em defesa da Constituição</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181108	08/11/ 2018	<i>Medidas necessárias e esperadas</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181109	09/11/ 2018	<i>Uma decisão equivocada</i>	Elitism / Anti- egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20181110	10/11/ 2018	<i>Combate à corrupção endêmica</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181111	11/11/ 2018	<i>País sem excelências</i>	Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20181112	12/11/ 2018	<i>Os estados em alerta</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181113	13/11/ 2018	<i>Crônica da tragédia anunciada</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181114	14/11/ 2018	<i>Vacinação não pode esperar</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20181115	15/11/ 2018	<i>O desafio do saneamento</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181116	16/11/ 2018	<i>Balanço positivo</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181117	17/11/ 2018	<i>Prevenir é necessário</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181118	18/11/ 2018	<i>Menos médicos</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181119	19/11/ 2018	<i>De números e sentimentos</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181120	20/11/ 2018	<i>Estragos da chuva, de novo</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181121	21/11/ 2018	<i>Barragens sob risco</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20181122	22/11/ 2018	<i>Educação à distância</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181123	23/11/ 2018	<i>Abertura sem pressa</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181124	24/11/ 2018	<i>A agenda da Previdência</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20181125	25/11/ 2018	<i>Contemporaneidade: desafio da educação</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20181126	26/11/ 2018	<i>Privatizar e reformar</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181127	27/11/ 2018	<i>Desigualdade estagnada</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181128	28/11/ 2018	<i>Tenebrosas transações</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181129	29/11/ 2018	<i>Brasil avança na batalha com a Aids</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181130	30/11/ 2018	<i>Combate à corrupção</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20181201	01/12/ 2018	<i>País volta a crescer</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181202	02/12/ 2018	<i>Corrupção tóxica</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181203	03/12/ 2018	<i>Preservar os direitos</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181204	04/12/ 2018	<i>Uma pausa na guerra comercial</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181206	06/12/ 2018	<i>A urgência da reforma</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20181207	07/12/ 2018	<i>Erradicar a pobreza</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181208	08/12/ 2018	<i>Dragão sob controle</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181209	09/12/ 2018	<i>Contra a intolerância</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181210	10/12/ 2018	<i>O valor da água</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181211	11/12/ 2018	<i>Meio ambiente é coisa muito séria</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181212	12/12/ 2018	<i>Palavras de união</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181213	13/12/ 2018	<i>Pauta-bomba do Congresso une o país</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181215	15/12/ 2018	<i>Os jovens e o crime</i>	Elitism / Individualism
CORREIOBRAZ20181216	16/12/ 2018	<i>Alavancas para o crescimento</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181217	17/12/ 2018	<i>Contagem regressiva</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181218	18/12/ 2018	<i>A preocupante volta da sífilis</i>	Elitism

CORREIOBRAZ20181219	19/12/ 2018	<i>Deficiência comprovada</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181220	20/12/ 2018	<i>Decisão expõe racha do STF</i>	Elitism / Anti-egalitarianism
CORREIOBRAZ20181221	21/12/ 2018	<i>Uma medida inoportuna</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181222	22/12/ 2018	<i>O combate ao Aedes aegypti</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181223	23/12/ 2018	<i>Combate à violência</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181224	24/12/ 2018	<i>Estímulo ao emprego</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181225	25/12/ 2018	<i>Coesão e consenso</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181226	26/12/ 2018	<i>Agricultura do futuro</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181227	27/12/ 2018	<i>Uma máquina contaminada</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181228	28/12/ 2018	<i>Comércio externo sem ideologias</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181229	29/12/ 2018	<i>A última (e maior) esperança</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181230	30/12/ 2018	<i>Ânsia pelo crescimento</i>	Elitism
CORREIOBRAZ20181231	31/12/ 2018	<i>Rumo ao protagonismo</i>	Elitism

Annex 4: O Tempo's complete list of topics.

Topic	Repetition
politics	74
social affairs	54
elections	22
elections, politics	19
international politics	17
economy	11
environment	10
education	9
politics, economy	8
politics, social affairs	8
economy, politics	7
social affairs, politics	7
public health	6
social affairs, events	6
urbanism	6
feminism	5
economy, social affairs	4
immigration, human rights	4
public safety	4
events	3
feminism, social affairs	3
public health, policies	3
public safety, policies	3
public safety, politics	3
social affairs, politics	3
social affairs, policies	3
health, social affairs	2
immigration	2
international politics, immigration	2
politics, policies	2

politics, public safety	2
politics, urbanism	2
traffic	2
traffic, public health	2
traffic, social affairs	2
animal rights, policies	1
culture	1
culture, social affairs	1
economy, agribusiness	1
economy, civil rights	1
economy, international economy	1
economy, policies	1
economy, public health	1
elections, social affairs	1
environment, economy	1
environment, politics	1
environment, urbanism	1
events, culture	1
events, elections	1
events, public health	1
human rights	1
infrastructure, politics	1
international economy	1
international politics, social affairs	1
policies, international politics	1
politics, education	1
public health, public safety	1
social affairs, health	1
social affairs, urbanism	1
sports, social affairs	1
technology	1
technology, elections	1
technology, politics	1
technology, social affairs	1

technology, traffic	1
technology, urbanism	1
traffic, policies	1
urbanism, civil rights	1
Total:	353

