

The European Politics on Language for Immigrant Integration

A multilevel comparative perspective

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Agraïments

“El món és un teixit de persones amb qui ens entenem millor o pitjor, i de persones que s’han entès amb les persones amb qui ens entenem. Allà on no arriben les vores d’aquest teixit de persones, cessa el món: o si es vol, el món cessa d’èsser nostre”. Amb aquestes paraules, del poeta català Gabriel Ferrater, encete aquesta tesi, pensada i escrita entre les ciutats de Barcelona, París i Brussel·les durant els darrers quatre anys. He volgut tornar als meus orígens, el País Valencià, per redactar aquestes reflexions.

Enfrontar-se a un full en blanc, ordenar idees, sistematitzar pensaments i traslladar-los al paper és una tasca apassionant de descoberta i d’endinsament no només acadèmic sinó també, i diria que sobretot, personal; un camí de gaudi i de creixement constant. Ha estat, també, un camí pedregós. L’esforç de dedicació, de constància i de disciplina durant aquests quatre anys de la meva vida han estat tot un repte de superació pròpia. Una fita que possiblement no hauria estat capaç sense eixe teixit de persones que m’envolten, amb qui m’he entès i que, durant aquests anys, han conformat el meu món.

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humà durant tot el camí. Hem sabut teixir una bona relació d'amistat. Gràcies per la teua dedicació i suport constant.

A través de tots dos directors – dels Departament de Ciències Polítiques i Socials i el de Traducció i Ciències del Llenguatge – he après sobre la necessitat real d'una interdisciplinarietat en l'anàlisi de les realitats socials que ens envolten. I com que crec que les institucions no són res sense les persones que les conformen, vull fer referència a dues persones clau: Nacho Lago, per convèncer-me a continuar la tesi des del Departament de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, i Cristina Gelpí, per donar-me el teu suport a la meua tasca docent en uns moments molt necessaris per a mi. No vull oblidar les persones del Grup d'Estudis del Discurs (GED-UPF), sobretot Montse González, que m'han acollit de manera excel·lent.

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Silvia Duerich, però sobretot Christine Barwick, que va fer que aquesta època fos especialment significativa i estimulant.

El teixit de persones que envolta una tesi no és només acadèmic. El pilar fonamental ha estat, i és, el meu teixit familiar, que sovint ha patit absències i aïllaments només comprensibles quan es fa un treball d'aquest tipus. Al llarg del treball, el meu teixit ha sofert la pèrdua d'un nus fonamental, l'àvia Ana, centre de gravetat de la família Ferrando, dona que irradiava positivitat a dojo. És una tesi per a tu, iaia! Paral·lelament a aquesta pèrdua, s'eixamplava el meu teixit de persones: naixien Mireia, Ariadna i Naiara, tres noves mirades innocents que només han fet que enriquir aquest teixit i donar-li un nou sentit més ple. La germana Ana, la mare Ana i Vicent i tiets i cosins apuntalen la solidesa d'aquest teixit, fort i cohesionat.

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costat en tots els moments, durant, abans i esperem que també després d'aquesta tesi. Marijke, la meua mentora intel·lectual, i vital, eurodiputada honorària del Parlament Europeu, gran amiga i confident de debats infinits sobre Europa, sobre immigració, sobre llengües, i molt més important, sobre la vida. Consells savis d'una gran dama com tu, feminista i socialista, com sempre has volgut denominar-te, amb una vida fascinant. Gràcies per haver-la compartit amb mi. He après no només de política europea – feina que desenvolupo actualment a Brussel·les – sinó de com lluitar per uns ideals en què un hi creu.

Amb moltes altres persones m'he entès, millor o pitjor, moltes altres persones s'han entès amb les persones amb qui m'he entès; però han estat aquestes les vores del meu teixit. Toca ara continuar teixint amistats, coneixences, experiències i il·lusions; toca fer camí, construir; toca continuar fent-se preguntes; toca, en definitiva, continuar sent crític cap a la realitat que ens envolta per provar de fer-la una mica millor. Continuem, doncs, eixamplant el teixit.

To Marijke Van Hemeldonck

“The world is a network of people with whom we get along better or worse; a network of people who get along with those with whom we get along. It is at the boundaries of this network of people that the world ends: of if you wish, the world ceases to be ours”. These words by the Catalan poet Gabriel Ferrater initiate this thesis, thought and written between the cities of Barcelona, Paris and Brussels over the past four years. I have wanted to return to my home country, Valencia, to draft these introductory remarks, which conclude this stage of my life.

Facing a blank paper, arranging ideas, systematizing thoughts and putting them on paper is a fascinating task of discovery

and knowledge, not only from an academic angle but also of self-knowledge. The process has been deeply enriching all along the way, something that I have very much enjoyed. No need to say that it has not all been wine and roses. The efforts, commitment, perseverance and discipline required when writing a thesis are high and have been the main challenge. A challenge that I would have been unable to overcome without that network of people that surrounds me, those with whom I get along; those who are part of my world.

Writing a PhD thesis is an autonomous task that requires constant guidance, which I have found in my thesis directors, Ferran Requejo and Montserrat Ribas. Admired as a professor, often read and one of the brightest academic minds in Catalonia, I have to thank you, Ferran, for your blind trust in me and your availability to turn this thesis into a reality. Montse, my professor at University almost 20 years ago, energetic and vital, thank you for your unconditional and constant support as well as your closeness all along the process. We have been able to create strong bonds and build a solid friendship.

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At a moment of abrupt professional change and in an adverse economic and political context to any intellectual or personal growth in Barcelona, my decision to travel to Paris to continue this research at the Center for European Studies at Sciences-Po Paris was the best decision taken from an academic, professional and personal angle. From an academic point of view, I learned the scientific rigor in research and the high support that PhD candidates have, as they are considered the future of research and progress of the country – an approach that other, more Mediterranean countries, should learn from – from a professional point of view, I learned new ways and angles of conducting interdisciplinary research; and from a personal point of view, I found the peace of mind necessary for my research. I must thank those people who made this stage a very rewarding one: Philippe Massiot, Gabriela Mendez, Paul Stephenson, Silvia Duerich, and especially Christine Barwick, for all those moments of joy, fun and support at the office and outside!

The network of people around this work has not only been developed in academia. The core of my network has been, and is, my family, which have often missed my presence at family gatherings. Along the way, I have lost an important element in the network, my grandmother Ana, center of gravity in the family and an outstanding woman. Parallel to this loss, new lives have illuminated the process: the birth of Mireia, Ariadna and Naiara, which has given a new dimension and sense to the family. My sister Ana, parents Ana and Vicent, uncles, aunts and cousins make up this solid network.

Colleagues and friends with whom I've shared endless discussions about my work, and about life beyond academia too – Mona Hemmaty and Juan Triviño – have also been an important part of the network. Colleagues that have helped me systematize the information – especially Guillermo Cordero – my good friend and excellent researcher Blanca Garcés and the constant support of Peter Kraus. Many other people that, despite being initially part of my professional network, they are now good friends: Mercè Solé and Ariadna Bello; Lorea Bilbao, Patxi Baztarrika, Araceli Díaz and Gregorio Ferreiro. Thank you for being there despite the complexity of our times!

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I have met and gotten along with many other people, better or worse. Many other people have gotten along with the people I get along. But these have been the boundaries of my network. It is now time for new friendships, new projects and new experiences. It is time to continue being critical and questioning the reality that surrounds us. It is time to widen the network.

Summary

This PhD thesis analyzes the conceptual frames underpinning discourses on language for immigrant integration to understand their rationale, evolution and structuring effects. Analyzed from a multilevel perspective – state and sub-state level – and taking France and Catalonia as case studies, it empirically demonstrates how, under the politically-accepted rhetoric of integration, the politics of language for immigrant integration are motivated by a variety of ideological-political goals. Whereas the French politics on language for immigrant integration have built a dominant frame in terms of problematization of immigration to legitimate the adoption of language measures as a gate-keeping mechanism for immigration control, the Catalan politics on language for immigrant integration have strategically built a frame of positive representation and incorporation of immigration to seek the empathy of migrants into the Catalan nation-building project. This PhD thesis constitutes, in sum, an effort to elevate the underlying, often implicit cognitive frames that affect language politics of immigrant integration, which have social, political, institutional and legal implications.

Resum

Aquesta tesi doctoral analitza els marcs conceptuals que sostenen els discursos sobre llengua i immigració amb l'objectiu de comprendre'n els objectius, l'evolució i els seus efectes estructurals. Des d'un enfocament multinivell – estat i sub-estat – amb França i Catalunya com a estudis de cas, aquesta recerca mostra com, sota la retòrica políticament acceptada d'*integració*, les polítiques de la llengua en un context migratori estan motivades per un seguit d'objectius ideològics-polítics estratègics. L'anàlisi mostra com els debats sobre llengua i immigració a França han construït un marc dominant que primerament problematitza la immigració amb l'objectiu de legitimar posteriorment mesures lingüístiques restrictives, que tenen com a finalitat el control migratori. En canvi, l'anàlisi sobre els debats a Catalunya mostren la construcció d'un marc estratègic que positivitza discursivament la immigració amb l'objectiu polític de captar l'empatia dels immigrants i incorporar-los al projecte de construcció nacional català. Aquesta tesi constitueix, doncs, un esforç per evidenciar els patrons discursius, sovint implícits, que es reiteren i activen els marcs cognitius en les polítiques de la llengua i la immigració, i que tenen conseqüències socials, polítiques, institucionals i legals.

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1. THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE FOR IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION. AN INTRODUCTION

1.1 General introduction

One of the defining characteristics of today's Western societies is the increasing migration flows, which are taking place at an unprecedented pace. There are few issues that have aroused the concern of electorates more than the prospect of rapid social change resulting from migration (Hepburn & Zapata Barrero, 2014). Against this backdrop, one of the most pressing concerns has been the integration of immigrants into host societies, broadly defined as “the process of becoming an accepted part of society” (Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014).

One of the key elements to “become an accepted part of society” is knowledge of the host society's culture, values and language(s) (see, e.g., Extra, Spotti & Van Avermaet, 2009; Hogan-Brun, Molinero & Stevenson, 2009). The underlying assumption is that knowledge of language will enable immigrants to function independently, which will result in easier acceptance by the host society (Van Oers, 2013). Linguistic proficiency has therefore emerged as one of the key conditions to measure integration and willingness to belong to the host society.

Evidence of the pivotal importance of language in the current immigrant integration policies is the growing number of compulsory language requirements being increasingly implemented across Europe. Immigrant integration and the acquisition of competence in the language(s) of the host country are a focus of political debate in a growing number of states, as highlighted by numerous scholars (see, e.g., Blackledge, 2009; Extra et al., 2009; Extramiana, Pulinx, & Van Avermaet, 2014) and further demonstrated by the findings of the periodic reports carried out by the Council of Europe's Language Policy Unit over the past years (2008-2016)¹ on this specific issue. The dominant trend shows a steady increase in the number of countries enacting legislation to make language proficiency a requirement for residence, citizenship, and in some cases entry (Hogan-Brun et al., 2009).

The changes observed in policy and discourse over the last decade show that a proliferation of language tests is spreading across Europe through *policy emulation* (Extramiana & Van Avermaet, 2011). Put

¹Council of Europe. *Project: Linguistic Integration of Adult Migrants*. Retrieved from <http://www.coe.int/en/web/lang-migrants/home> [last accessed 15 September 2015]

in other terms, while the rhetoric around the policy measures portrays language as a necessary element to become “an accepted part of society”, the political intentions differ from this discursive line, the ultimate goal being the political instrumentalization of language as a gate-keeping mechanism for immigration control. As pointed out by Joppke (2007) “the novelty of integration policy is its obligatory character, which has notably increased over time, and has even transmuted into a tool of migration control, helping states to restrict immigration” (p. 5).

The reflections on language for immigrant integration, however, have often been conducted at state level, with little attention has been paid at sub-state level. As pointed out by Hepburn & Zapata Barrero (2014, p. 5), immigration has rarely been examined from a multilevel perspective, including the sub-state view. The vast majority of works on immigration focus on the state level, and more recently on the European level. This should come as no surprise as immigration policies are commonly defined by the state. While it is true that immigration generally falls under the rubric of central-state control, certain aspects of migration policy – most notably immigrant integration – have been devolved to the sub-state level.

This sub-state approach to immigrant integration becomes even more important when there is an autochthonous language other than the state language spoken in the territory. This distinctive characteristic

of some territories means that immigrants are often presented with a challenge when moving to a particular region: integrating also through the minority language of the territory, which might be key for their participation in social, political and economic life of the region. Immigrants, however, tend to adopt the majority language as the best route for social mobility, which subsequently reduces the sub-state population speaking the minority language (Hepburn & Zapata Barrero, 2014). Against this backdrop, sub-state territories have attempted to gain sufficient competencies on immigrant integration to shape policies and discourses aimed at making the minority language an attractive element in the immigrant integration process.

This might become a potentially contentious issue, as sub-state territories seek to pursue greater autonomy to shape their language policies to support the minority language to demarcate who belongs to the sub-state community in a migration scenario. Often, these sub-state approaches to linguistic integration enter directly into conflict with central-state models, resulting in ideological tensions over policy competencies and the framing of integration policies (Hepburn & Zapata Barrero, 2014). The existence of multiple, often competing political identities presents a complex challenge where integration is concerned, especially if the central government and the sub-state territory promote different conceptions of citizenship and different nation-building projects through different languages (Banting & Soroka, 2012).

The goal of this PhD thesis is to analyze the discursive mechanisms through which language policies have been rhetorically framed and sustained in an immigrant integration context and to unveil the political motivations behind the accepted rhetoric of integration, participation and inclusion from a multilevel perspective. This multilevel perspective will include a nation-state – France – and a sub-state territory² – Catalonia. What is the rationale behind the dominant ideologies on language for immigrant integration at different levels? How are these ideologies discursively sustained, produced, (re)produced and modulated? How are they rhetorically shaped to become the dominant frame? What are the voices of opposition and contestation to the dominant approach on language for immigrant integration? This thesis seeks to provide a response to these questions. The foci of this PhD research is, therefore, to analyze and compare the precise discursive mechanisms by means of which linguistic symbolic resources are being produced, distributed, circulated and contested, and the values attached to these resources to achieve a range of goals in the politics of language for immigrant integration.

² As concepts are not cut in stone, there are several ways to refer to sub-state levels in multilevel governance and comparative territorial politics: *minority nations*, *stateless nations*, *sub-state nations* etc. Throughout this PhD thesis, I have used the concept of *sub-state territory* as the most descriptive – and possibly neutral – concept.

The aim of this work is neither to provide a descriptive overview of language measures nor to embark on a mere comparative assessment on language policies for immigrant integration at different levels. Rather, my goal is to *zoom in and interrogate the conceptual frames underpinning discourses on language for immigrant integration* in an attempt to understand their rationale, evolution and structuring effects. This approach is based on the fact that ideas, assumptions and conceptual frames, which create abstract reasoning templates and organize particular articulations, shape judgment and behavior which, in turn, translate into law making and policy output. Conceptual frames determine the questions, ideas and considerations that should be raised and those that are discursively absent, giving the impression that certain language policies and laws are necessary and self-evident, being the “natural” product that solves an existing problem, without questioning the political and ideological intentions behind them (Kostakopoulou, 2010).

My ultimate goal, therefore, is to analyze and compare how the conceptual frames on language for immigrant integration have been shaped and to trace how certain language-ideological tenets are progressively transformed into the *dominant habitus*, using Bourdieu’s (1991) classical notion, that is, the way people think, talk and behave and how these dispositions are reified as shared tangible habits of thinking, talking and behaving.

This thesis, therefore, engages with politics and political discourse on language for immigrant integration as it brings together empirical analysis and interprets such empirical evidence with the use of *policy and discourse analysis as methodological tools*, as further explained below and developed in chapter two. It constitutes, in sum, an effort to elevate the underlying, often implicit discursive frames that affect the language politics of immigrant integration, which have social, political, institutional and legal implications. It ultimately argues that the expression of discourse deserves our attention as the politics of language and the rhetoric that sustains it have substantial consequences for public life as it sets the tone and dominates the definition of the “common good”.

1.2 Delineating my PhD research and identifying the gaps

When delineating the research and going through the literature on the topical issue of language for immigrant integration, several conceptual and analytical gaps have been identified, defined in this thesis as *vertical* and *horizontal gaps*.

As immigrant integration policies are no longer an exclusive domain of states and are being rescaled across different levels, there is an urgent need to develop a deeper understanding of how immigrant integration is governed and framed across different levels (Hepburn & Zapata Barrero, 2014). This has important implications for sub-

state territories with a language different than the state language. In those cases, measures are geared towards ensuring that the minority language also plays a pivotal role in the politics of immigrant integration. However, the vast majority of works on immigrant integration still focus on the state level, and more recently on the European level (Hepburn & Zapata Barrero, 2014). This PhD research aims to cover this *vertical gap* by analyzing and comparing how language measures for immigrant integration have been discursively legitimated at different levels, contributing to a multilevel comparative perspective.

Similarly, given that the primary goal of this research is *to identify, analyze and compare the conceptual frames on language for immigrant integration and the precise discursive mechanisms that shape them and sustain them for a variety of political purposes*, my goal is to analyze the language politics for immigrant integration through the use of policy and discourse analysis as methodological tools, being at the crossroads of two disciplines: political science and language sciences. This is what I have referred to as the *horizontal gap*.

Language policy issues remain understudied by political scientists and scholarly debates on linguistic diversity issues often fail to consider multilingualism as a nuclear element of multiculturalism (Safran, 2010, as cited in Cardinal & Sonntag, 2015). This may help explain why, except for some normative thinking brought about by

political philosophers such as Kymlicka & Patten (2003) and few others, political scientists have left the field of language policy to social science disciplines such as sociolinguistics (Cardinal & Sonntag, 2015), even if there is a scholarly debate over the need of a broader use of discourse analysis as a methodology in political science. As already pointed out by discourse analyst Van Dijk (1997) “Few scholars are prepared to 'reduce' their field or their methods to those of another field. We must be able to show that problems in political science can also be thoroughly studied when it is realized that issues have an important discursive dimension” (p. 2).

This PhD research is therefore an attempt to bridge this *horizontal gap* by setting up a methodological framework for an important but missing academic dialogue between the different disciplinary approaches that analyze the language politics for immigrant integration. It is, therefore, a determinedly interdisciplinary study.

The novelty of this research lies therefore in the challenge of building a methodological frame as accessible as possible that covers an array of issues, often considered in very different ways by social and political scientists or linguistics. My effort has therefore been to make sense of the different conceptual terms around the topical issue of language for immigrant integration and translate them into a simple conceptual and methodological framework that enables a multilevel

analysis and subsequent comparison of the discursive legitimation of language policies for immigrant integration

1.2.1 The *vertical gap*: language and the re-scaling of immigrant integration policies

As pointed out above, there is an increasing number of scholarly and policy voices on the proliferation of language measures over the past few years in the form of compulsory language tests for immigrants. Discursively depicted as necessary, self-evident and logical under the rhetorical umbrella of “civic integration”, these measures require immigrants to prove knowledge of *the* language of the country to enter, reside, reunite and/or naturalize. The dominant frame on language for immigrant integration has been gradually transformed into a regulatory technique for the state to manage access by the immigrant to social inclusion and rights. The conditionality subsumed in this new version of integration paradoxically demands that foreigners demonstrate knowledge of language, values, culture and history of the receiving state as a *sine qua non* for integration (Carrera & Faure Atger, 2011).

A growing number of scholars from different disciplines have highlighted the increasing instrumentalization of language as a gate-keeping mechanism for immigration control, creating a new frame linking two previously separate domains: immigrant integration and immigrant control. These reflections, however, have emerged within

different bodies of literature, each of which under a different approach: from a sociolinguistics/discourse analysis approach, scholars such as Extra, Spotti & Van Avermaet (2009); Hogan-Brun et al. (2009); Milani (2008); Shohamy (2006a, 2006b, 2009); from a political science approach with scholars such as Carrera & Faure Atger (2011); Guiraudon (2008); Joppke (2007); from a legal perspective with authors such as Kostakopoulou (2010); Van Oers, Ersbøll, & Kostakopoulou (2010); or from a political philosophy point of view Van Oers (2013), among others.

Despite their difference in approaches, there is one common element that is systematically present across the board: the underlying assumption of state linguistic homogeneity in their analysis. The vast majority of the different scholarly reflections on language for immigrant integration reproduce what Blommaert & Verschueren (1998) have called the “dogma of homogeneity”, that is, an implicit view of society as intrinsically monolingual without inter-group differences. This dogma, also observed in the above-mentioned language policy reports of the Council of Europe, seems to be also reproduced as the dominant interpretative frame in the empirical analysis of language for immigrant integration in academia. As observed by Cardinal & Sonntag (2015) in their recent critique to the sustenance of such an interpretative frame by political scientists: “those who set the tone in political sciences still do not question the privileged position of working with dominant languages in societies

where a single language is likely to dominate. Political science has tended to adopt a majoritarian understanding of language” (p. 10).

This linguistic homogeneity as the dominant conceptual frame fails to account for the existence of territories within states with autochthonous languages other than the state language, many of which make claim to distinctive cultures and traditions that have evolved separately from state-building processes. Fearing that immigration erodes their linguistic identity, these sub-state territories have attempted to gain competencies on language and immigration policies and exercise significant political autonomy within the contours of the state to be able to shape their own models on (linguistic) integration and ensure that the minority language occupies a central position. If the minority community does not have sufficient competencies, the minority nation may become a minority within its own territory (Zapata Barrero, 2007, p. 12). This is why the management of immigration policies at sub-state level ranks high on the political agenda of minority nations (Banting & Soroka, 2012).

Given the existence of different integration models within an increasing number of States, some scholarly voices have noted the need to analyze units other than the state to provide an accurate empirical account of current practices, thus avoiding the illusion of state homogeneity (Gil Araujo, 2004). Recent academic reflections, however, have noted the scarcity of comparative research focusing on the multilevel approach on immigrant integration. As pointed out

by Hepburn & Zapata Barrero (2014) “this sub-state level has so far been almost absent in the field of comparative immigration studies, which has tended to focus on the nation-state or supranational level” (p. 10) and have noted the need to engage in comparative, multilevel empirical research taking the sub-state level into account. It is the regional and local level where immigrant integration policies are designed and implemented. Consequently, their responses on immigrant integration can complement, contradict or supplant the state policies. Regional policies, institutional settings and the prevailing public discourses, therefore, can importantly shape the pace, the intensity and level of immigrant integration into the public arena. (Giugni & Morales, 2011).

This PhD research intends, therefore, to fill this gap by analyzing the discursive legitimation of language measures for immigrant integration from a multilevel perspective, pointing out at the precise discursive mechanisms and chains of reasoning which, under the politically-accepted rhetoric of immigrant integration, participation and acceptance into the host society, seek to achieve a variety of different political goals at different levels. This is what I have referred to as the *vertical gap*.

1.2.2 The horizontal gap: the need for an interdisciplinary approach to study the politics of language for immigrant integration

The language measures for immigrant integration seem to have become a salient aspect in immigration debates and the social, political and economic conditions in today's increasingly interconnected world are calling for new conceptualizations of belonging and adscription to increasingly diverse societies. The reason also lies in the fact that the importance, or the alleged necessity, of proficiency in national languages seems to have become a dominant frame whereby liberal democracies officially respond to the linguistic diversity ensuing from enhanced human mobility in a globalized world (Milani, 2008).

This PhD research contends that language policy choices on immigrant integration not only have political consequences. They also have political origins and are aimed at achieving specific political goals. I therefore argue throughout this research that the analysis of language measures for immigrant integration must be embedded in a broader socio-political analysis. Political science, however, has not been at the forefront of scholarship and debates on language policies, despite the fact that public policy and start action, especially since the 1980's, have become a major area of research in the discipline (Cardinal & Sonntag, 2015). As pointed out above, political scientists have left the field of language policy to social science disciplines such as sociolinguistics. While political science

has developed a wealth of research on multiculturalism issues – developed in different sub-disciplines such as political philosophy or political theory (see, e.g., Gagnon, Guibernau, & Rocher, 2003; Kymlicka, 2001; Kymlicka & Patten, 2003; Patten, 2014), language policy issues remain understudied by political scientists and those scholarly debates working on linguistic diversity issues often fail to consider multiculturalism as including multilingualism (Safran, 2010 as cited in Cardinal & Sonntag, 2015).

As a consequence, two separate bodies of literature have emerged. On the one hand, there is a wealth of comparative assessment of migration and naturalization laws in Western European countries,

with recent³ (and forthcoming⁴) studies, anthologies and state reports such as the above-mentioned Council of Europe research studies as well as recent thesis (see, e.g., Van Oers, 2013) which comprehensively highlight the restrictive trends in migration and naturalization laws taking place across Europe and analyze their political consequences, without mentioning the discursive mechanisms and the rhetorical packaging used to create such a frame.

³See, e.g., Guiraudon, V. (2008). *Integration Contracts for Immigrants: Common Trends and Differences in the European Experience*. ARI 43/2008 - 7/5/2008. Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano; Joppke, C. (2007). Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 30(1), 1–2; Van Oers, R., Ersbøll, E., & Kostakopoulou, T. (Eds.). (2010). *A Re-definition of Belonging?: Language and Integration Tests in Europe*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. See also European Union Democracy Observatory: EUDO CITIZENSHIP. *The debate on integration tests*. Retrieved September 12, 2015, from <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/> ; Council of Europe. *Linguistic Integration of Adult Migrants (LIAM). Conferences (2008-2016)*. Retrieved September 12, 2015, from <http://www.coe.int/en/web/lang-migrants/conferences>

³Council of Europe. *Debates on The linguistic integration of adult migrants: lessons from research: Strasbourg, 30 March – 1 April 2016*. Retrieved from <http://www.coe.int/en/web/lang-migrants/home>, which will analyze the language and citizenship tests taking place across the CoE's 47 Member States.

The same conclusions on the gate-keeping effects of language measures are reached by a number of scholars⁵ working within the contours of language sciences and disciplines such as sociolinguistics or discourse analysis, which focus on the linguistic and discursive elements involved in these trends, without a thorough analysis of political rationale, intentions and effects of these practices.

This pattern is replicated at sub-state level, with two distinct bodies of literature developed also within the contours of political science and language sciences. From a political science point of view, there has been a wave of academic reflection on (regional) language policies for immigrant integration, which are embedded in broader discussions of minority nationalism, national identity, (minority) nation building, and the impact of immigration in minority nations⁶.

⁵See, e.g., Blackledge, A. (2009a). "As a Country We Do Expect": The Further Extension of Language Testing Regimes in the United Kingdom. *Language Assessment Quarterly*, 6(1), 6–16; Hogan-Brun, G., Mar Molinero, C., & Stevenson, P. (Eds.). (2009). *Discourses on Language and Integration: Critical Perspectives on Language Testing Regimes*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing; Milani, T. M. (2008). Language testing and citizenship: A language ideological debate in Sweden. *Language in Society*, 37(01), 27-59; Shohamy, E. (2001). *The Power of Tests: A Critical Perspective on the Uses of Language Tests*. New York: Longman.

⁶ See, e.g., Kymlicka, W. (2001). Minority Nationalism and Immigrant Integration. In *Politics in the Vernacular* (pp. 61-83). Oxford: Oxford University Press; Medda-Windischer, R., & Carlà, A. (Eds.). (2015). *Migration and Autonomous Territories:*

Similarly, language scientists have developed their theoretical and empirical reflections on demolinguistics, sociolinguistics and language ideologies from a minority nation perspective and the linguistic impact of immigration on these languages⁷.

The Case of South Tyrol and Catalonia. Studies in Territorial and Cultural Diversity Governance. Koninklijke Brill – Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden; Oakes, L., & Warren, J. (2009). *Language, Citizenship and Identity in Quebec.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Zapata Barrero, R. (2009). *Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations.* Bruxelles: P.I.E. Peter Lang; Zapata Barrero, R. (2007). Setting a research agenda on the interaction between cultural demands of immigrants and minority nations. *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 5(4), 1–25; Zapata Barrero, R. (2006). *Immigració i govern en nacions minoritàries: Flandes, el Quebec i Catalunya en perspectiva.* Barcelona: Fundació Trias Fargas.


⁷ See, e.g., Duchene, A., & Heller, M. (Eds.). (2008). *Discourses of Endangerment: Ideology and Interest in the Defence of Languages.* London: Continuum International Publishing Group; Pujolar, J. (2007a). Bilingualism and the nation-state in the post-national era. In M. Heller (Ed.), *Bilingualism: A Social Approach.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Pujolar, J. (2007b). The future of Catalan: Language endangerment and nationalist discourses in Catalonia. In A. Duchene & M. Heller (Eds.), *Discourses of Endangerment. Ideology and Interest in the Defence of Languages* (pp. 121–148). London: Continuum International Publishing Group; Woolard, K. (2005). Language and identity choice in Catalonia: The interplay of contrasting ideologies of linguistic authority. In *Workshop on Language Ideology and Change in Multilingual Communities. Institute for International, Comparative, and Area Studies, UC San Diego*; Woolard, K. (2008). Language and Identity Choice in Catalonia: The Interplay of Contrasting Ideologies of Linguistic Authority. In K. Süselbeck, U. Mühlischlegel, & P. Masson (Eds.), *Lengua, nació e identitat: la regulació del plurilingüïsmo en Espanya y América Latina* (pp. 303–323). Madrid: Iberoamericana Editorial.

These different bodies of literature, however, hardly make any cross-reference to the theoretical paradigms, conceptual frameworks and analytical tools developed within each discipline, often remaining within their own academic boundaries. An accurate, thorough comparative analysis of the conceptual frames that shape and sustain the discourses on language for immigrant integration, however, requires a nuanced theoretical framework that can fully capture not only the rhetorical devices used to achieve a variety of political purposes but also the historical, social and political dynamics of language policy making, thus accounting for the complex interrelationship and the fluctuating, evolving nature of texts, discourses, social and political actors that shape and sustain a specific cognitive frame in a particular historical and sociopolitical context.

This PhD research argues, therefore, that discourse analysis, developed in language sciences, and political science should inform one another because each provides us with important theoretical and methodological tools with which to make sense of the discursive legitimization of language measures for immigrant integration. With this multilevel, interdisciplinary approach, my ultimate goal with this PhD thesis is to set up a framework for an important but missing scholarly dialogue between the different disciplinary approaches on

language for immigrant integration. It argues that an adequate framework must go beyond the habitual theoretical and methodological rigidity that prevents the useful combination of different disciplinary perspectives. Figure 1 below provides a graphic overview of the main goals of this PhD research.

Figure 1. A graphic overview of the PhD research goals



1.3 About the case study selection: why France and Catalonia?

The two case studies selected to analyze the role of language in the politics of immigrant integration from a multilevel perspective are France and Catalonia but could be equally applied to any state and sub-state territory with a language other than the state language and with competencies on language and immigrant integration issues. I have, however, chosen France and Catalonia for several specific reasons.

France is traditionally featured in academic debates as the archetypical liberal, democratic civic nation-state. As pointed out by Dieckhoff (2005), the French idea of the nation is the civic, contractual, elective nation, conceptualized by the philosophers of the Enlightenment and realized by the Great Revolution. The French revolution synthesized these democratic values with a growing allegiance to the national community and the institutions set. France depicts itself as ethno-culturally neutral. As a Republican state, it promotes the notion that the state must not favor any particular ethnicity or culture within its boundaries. It claims to be based exclusively on political allegiances and not on language or culture. In the traditional literature on nationalism, this has been defined as the *Staatsnation* (political nation) as opposed to *Kulturnation*, popularized by German Historian F. Meinecke.

Behind this discursive line, however, the politics of language for immigrant integration have revealed a strong identity component, engaging over the past few years in controversial discussions about the loss of the French identity and failure of immigrant integration due to lack of language skills. It has installed compulsory measures geared towards immigrants in which language is at the core of the French identity.

I argue that this discursive frame requires an empirical analysis of the progressive instrumentalization of language to give a detailed account of real practices and discourses taking place today. The politically-accepted “civic integration frame” draws on nationalist ideology which, despite being rhetorically embedded in the notion of *civic integration contract*, it rests on an artificial homogenization and displays elements of paternalism and ethnocentricity, a process aimed at procuring conformity, discipline and migration control (Kostakopoulou, 2010). The analysis of France as a case study will allow us to trace the rhetorical devices and chains of reasoning deployed in the process of instrumentalizing language for this purpose.

Catalonia regards language as one of its main national symbols. Given the sharp increase in the number of immigrants arriving in the territory, from 3% to more than 15% over the last ten years as we shall see in chapter four, the linguistic identity question has been

placed at the forefront of political debates, given that one of the greatest fears of any territory with a language other than the state language is that immigration erodes their linguistic identity (Erk, 2003).

Against this backdrop, while language policy is already an exclusive competence of Catalonia, it has attempted over the past decade to gain sufficient competencies on immigrant integration to shape policies and discourses aimed at making the Catalan language an attractive element in the immigrant integration process. Consequently, and as highlighted above, it is the regional institutional settings and the prevailing public discourses at this level that can importantly shape the pace, intensity and level of immigrant integration (Giugni & Morales, 2011). It is worth pointing out that the other elements in the immigration process – border control and nationality – remain an exclusive power of the State.

Given its rapid demographic change, with important linguistic consequences, and the political attempts to gain increasing powers on immigration to be able to manage its corresponding policies, it has been considered as an interesting case study to analyze how, under the politically-accepted rhetoric of integration, participation and inclusion, Catalonia has attempted to shape a particular frame to capture the empathy of migrants vis-à-vis its national project.

1.4 The conceptual framework: Blommaert's *Language Ideological Debates*

Analyzing the politics of language for immigrant integration as a discursive process entails that it is not a mechanical or sequential process whereby actors formulate a goal, devise a political strategy to achieve this goal and attempt to shape a particular ideology. Rather, the different stakeholders involved draw on the existing cultural, historical, political, social and economic contexts to develop a set of ideas and insert them into the public domain. As a consequence, other stakeholders challenge these ideas and provide some alternatives, in constant interaction. These discursive interactions prompt them to continuously reshape, refine, reframe and reinterpret these ideas (Korkut et al., 2013).

I argue in this PhD thesis that the complexity of such a process, with a multiplicity of voices, located in specific cultural, historical, political, economic and social contexts, is captured under the conceptual framework of *Language Ideological Debates*, developed by Blommaert (1999) in his seminal work of the same name. In the field of politics, discursive struggle and contestation are generically captured under the label of *debate*. The political process develops through a series of exchanges involving a variety of social actors: politicians and policy makers, academic experts, associations – and

is reproduced through a variety of practices in social reproduction systems such as schools, advertisement or media, to name only a few. Debates are, politically-ideologically, the points of entrance for the society into policy making.

Language debates are patterns of interrelated discourse activities of which we only remember the highlights, the most intense and polarized episodes. Debates are, therefore, more or less historically locatable periods in which a “struggle for authoritative entextualization” takes place (Silverstein and Urban, 1996, as cited in Blommaert, 1999). Entextualization – inserting texts into a chosen metadiscursive context and hence indicating the preferred ways of “reading” these texts – is a strategic practice often aimed at the acceptance of a metadiscourse by a community.

The struggle for authoritative entextualization involves a variety of ideology brokers who claim authority in the field. The struggle develops usually over definitions of social realities: various representations of reality which are discursively pitted against each other with the aim of gaining authority for one particular representation, that is, to shape and sustain a particular dominant frame. For an analysis of the language debates, it is essential to identify the participants in such debates, as well as to question the *hows* and *whys* of the particular moment of occurrence and their outcomes. Some debates are key in shaping authoritative rhetoric and hegemonize the field while others remain inconsequential. All the

debates may be highly illustrative of political or ideological traditions in the field of language in a particular society at a particular moment. Hence the importance of embedding the analysis of the language debates in the broader social, historical and political context, as it is done in the empirical analysis of my case studies, chapters three and four of this PhD research.

As pointed out by Blommaert (1999), ideologies do not win the day overnight. They become dominant when they are constantly shaped and reproduced by a variety of institutional, semi-institutional and everyday practices: campaigns, regimentation in social reproduction systems such as schools, administration, advertisement, publications, media, and so on. These reproduction practices may result in *normalization*, that is, a hegemonic pattern in which the ideological claims are perceived as “normal” ways of thinking and acting, or using Bordieu’s term, the *dominant habitus* (1991).

I argue that adopting Blommaert’s *Language Ideological Debates* conceptual framework allows us to analyze the dynamic, often fluctuating process of hegemonization of certain ideologies and frames on language for immigrant integration over others. It is important to also analyze the means mobilized and the institutional muscle deployed in the (re)production of language ideologies.

The existence of a multiplicity of voices (or their absence) in shaping the debates might also be explained by the promotion of the necessary structures and channels of (immigrant) participation. This has been developed more in depth in the social and political sciences under the name of *Political Opportunity Structure (POS)*, defined as the access by immigrants to the institutionalized political system as well as the political framework that shapes particular approaches, attitudes and behaviors, most notably citizenship rights that open or close their access to the national community (Koopmans *et al.*, 2005, as cited in Giugni & Morales, 2011).

This concept, derived from the social movements and increasingly applied to the study of political participation and integration of migrants, can also be fruitfully inserted into the *Language Ideological Debates* conceptual framework (see Climent-Ferrando & Triviño, 2015). The analysis of discourses, but also the institutional settings and structures in which these discourses are framed, can importantly shape the degree of immigrant participation in the formulation of policies, and can greatly help explain the presence or absence of immigrant voices in the debates. In other words, their participation to sustain the dominant frame depends to a large extent on the degree of openness/closeness of the political context and the (absence of) opportunities for participation, that is, the degree of social closure, as we shall further explain in chapter two, which influences the discourses, attitudes and behaviors of both migrants and locals alike.

Including the *Political Opportunity Structure* reflections into the *Language Ideological Debates* conceptual framework is a useful example of how the analysis of the language debates on immigrant integration can be enriched by adopting an interdisciplinary approach. I argue in this PhD research that the practical combination of these concepts, often tackled separately without much dialogue between them, enables a sensitive analysis and subsequent comparison of the language debates on immigrant integration. By adopting a determinedly interdisciplinary nature in this PhD thesis, I intend to empirically convey the message that no theoretical paradigm owns a particular problematic niche.

1.5 The methodological framework: Thompson's *Depth Hermeneutics*

An accurate analysis of the language debates on immigrant integration requires a nuanced methodological framework that is able to capture the rhetorical devices and linguistic resources used to shape and sustain a particular dominant ideology on language for immigrant integration as well as the historical dynamics of language policy making, thus accounting for the complexity in the interrelationship between texts and discourses produced by a variety of stakeholders in a specific historical, institutional and sociopolitical context. The analysis of the language debates must move beyond linguistic discourse analysis to include a broader analysis that is not

(only) socially constructed but also historically, politically and institutionally constructed (Cardinal & Sonntag, 2015).

To analyze the complexity of the language debates on immigrant integration from a multilevel perspective, I have resorted to Thompson's *Depth Hermeneutics* approach (1984), developed in Discourse Analysis. Thompson develops a three-layered methodological approach through which the language debates can be analyzed: 1) the socio-historical analysis, 2) the formal or discursive analysis, and 3) and the interpretative analysis.

1. The socio-historical analysis refers to the analysis of the social, political, economic, historical and cultural conditions within which discourses are produced. As stated by Thompson (1984) "to suppose that the study of the discursive forms in which ideology is expressed could be detached from the socio-historical conditions of discursive production would be to lose sight of the relations in virtue of which discourse is ideological" (p. 134). In order to analyze the discursive legitimization of language requirements for immigrant integration, one needs to also analyze the historical, social, economic and political environment in which those measures are put in place.
2. The formal or discursive analysis of the linguistic features of discourse. As argued by Thompson (1984), discourse must be

viewed not only as socially or historically situated practices but also as linguistic constructions which display an articulated message. In this stage, the narrative features of the text are scrutinized in order to analyze ideology. This level of analysis includes the following elements:

2.1 Voices of the text: who are the speakers? Which ones are anonymous? The organization of voices in the text is key to organize the internal structuring of language according to authorial intent, including counter discourses.

2.2 Argumentative: the explanations and chains of reasoning in a discourse in their procedure of legitimization and dissimulation. This level of analysis would also include how the implementation of specific choices operates to bring about a specific interpretation (Verschueren, 2011).

2.3 Themes: looking at redundancy and repetitiveness in the text as a way to discover themes and the relation between themes. This would involve the analysis of the rhetorical devices around which the discourse on language requirements for immigrant integration is built. It involves the explicit reference to language but also its absence as well as the presence or absence of other voices in the language debates.

2.4 Genre of the article and its significance to the reader: how the genre of the report and the event organize the production and reading of the text.

3. Finally, the third phase of analysis is that of (re)interpretation, which is closely intertwined with the previous two, as it connects the second phase with the first. Thompson argues that this phase is vital if we are to argue confidently that certain forms of discourse are implicated in the sustenance and maintenance of particular ideologies.

These three stages should be regarded as analytical demarcations in a theoretical scheme and should not be seen as necessarily chronological. They are intrinsically intertwined and all involve a certain degree of interpretation in order to analyze the way in which particular conceptualizations are mobilized and articulated, paying attention to their specific construction and to their rhetorical organization, embedded in a specific historical, political and cultural context. The practical analysis, however, cannot be a systematic procedure in which all elements are always present in all three stages (Ribas Bisbal, 2000). When analyzing the role of language ideological debates, the interpretative aspect will be key in assessing the political-ideological intentions behind the language measures for immigrant integration.

As further developed in chapter two of this PhD thesis, I argue that Thompson's *Depth Hermeneutics* provides the necessary methodological tools through which to examine the ongoing dynamism and fluctuation, as it allows us to position the discursive interaction between language ideologies and the political rationale behind them, analyzed through the rhetoric, the political strategies and practices on the politics of language for immigrant integration.

1.6 Methodology and analytical tools. Why a comparative, multilevel analysis using qualitative methodology?

I argue that Thompson's approach is a useful one to analyze the language ideological debates on immigrant integration and, therefore, guides the general work of my analysis. I argue that Thompson's framework is highly useful as it allows us to account for the ongoing dynamism and variation in the way language is being instrumentalized in the politics of immigrant integration, to see how this relationship is taking shape and constantly evolving over time; it enables us to see the relationship in terms of an ongoing process operating in real historical, social, economic and political moments; and it allows us to trace the voices of opposition, silence and contestation used in the elaboration of a specific dominant frame.

To operationalize Thompson's approach, it is of paramount importance to use a variety sources of data and build a corpus that

gives account of the dynamism and fluctuation and to incorporate the multiplicity of voices in the debates. Individual texts or sources can never be regarded as a sufficient basis to claim general conclusions and the studied data must be as wide as possible when analyzing the process of shaping frames of reference. As pointed out by Verschueren (2011) one should abstain from focusing on single occurrences of linguistic features, or even on single texts; the final picture should be arrived at by paying attention to large numbers of interrelated details.

As the main goal of this PhD thesis is to analyze the discursive legitimation of language measures for immigrant integration and how particular discursive frames and ideologies are shaped and sustained over time, I have built an extensive corpus derived from six different sources and containing a wide variety of ideology shapers in the debates: 1) newspaper articles dealing specifically on language and immigrant integration in both case studies, 2) official speeches of ministers and high-level officials, 3) language measures and laws, 4) Parliamentary debates, 5) expert reports from advisory bodies and academia and 6) interviews with relevant stakeholders in both cases to further confirm the information obtained.

It can be claimed, therefore, that this PhD thesis adopts a determinedly multi-methodological approach. Table 1 below provides a bird's-eye view of all the material compiled for both case studies. Also, a thorough account of the corpus can be found in

annexes I to XIII, where the reader will find a detailed list of all the news items, discourses, political speeches, Parliamentary debates, reports and interviews compiled and analyzed in this PhD thesis.

Table 1. The language debates on immigrant integration in France and Catalonia. The corpus

FRANCE	CATALONIA
364 newspaper articles and debates in French media dealing specifically with language and immigration over the period 2005-2014. (Annex II)	335 newspaper articles and debates in Catalan media dealing specifically with language and immigration over the period 2005-2014. (Annex IX)
44 official government speeches on immigration, integration and language by French Ministers and Prime Ministers. (Annex III)	61 Parliamentary debates on language and immigrant integration at the Parliament of Catalonia (Annex X)
20 policy measures and actions representing the materialization of political discourses derived from the Parliamentary debates (<i>Assemblée Nationale</i>). (Annex IV)	19 policy measures and actions representing the materialization of political discourses (Annex XI)
12 official reports and recommendations linking language to immigrant integration policies, mainly from the governmental advisory body <i>Haut Conseil à l'Intégration</i> (HCI) (2005-2014). (Annex V)	10 Government Annual Reports on Language Policy (2005-2014) (Annex XII)
10 Government Annual Reports to the Parliament containing the	

strategic goals on immigration (2005-2014). (Annex VI)	
4 semi-structured interviews the head of integration unit within the Cabinet of the former Minister of the Interior and current Primer Minister, Mr. Manuel Valls and with senior government officials in the Language Policy Department, the Immigration Department (Interior) (Annex VII)	4 semi-structured interviews with the former Vice-president of Catalonia (J.Ll. Carod-Rovira), and senior officials in the Language Policy Department and the Immigration Department (Annex XIII)

Source: own elaboration

Such a wide variety of sources to analyze the discursive legitimation of language measures for immigrant integration will allow us to provide a detailed account of how particular frames have been discursively shaped, the rhetorical devices that have been mobilized, the institutional muscle deployed, the presence/absence of different voices in the shaping of particular ideologies as well as the voices of opposition and contestation.

The newspaper articles have been collected using the specialized search engine *Factiva*, which has allowed me to select only those articles that specifically deal with language for immigrant integration over the period 2005-2014. For our search, we have introduced the combination of different keywords *immigration, integration, language, test, French, Catalan, Spanish* (in French for the French case and in Catalan/Spanish for the Catalan case). In so doing, we have been able to obtain a highly accurate account on how media

have helped shape a particular view on language for immigrant integration promoted by a variety of stakeholders, such as political parties, immigrant associations, NGOs, bringing also to the surface the voices of opposition and contestation in the debates.

Newspapers reach a large audience and are, therefore, ideological sites through which particular frames of reference are progressively shaped and sustained and where different voices modulate and contest the language debates on immigrant integration (Hardman, 2008). The complete list of all the newspaper clippings, with their exact title of article, date of publication and name of the newspaper can be found in annex II (France, 364 articles) and annex IX (Catalonia, 335 articles).

Political speeches and policy reports have also been an important source of information in the analysis. Political speeches in the analysis allow us to capture the immaterial and symbolic dimension of public policies. In order to tease out the discursive structure of the language debates on immigrant integration, official public speeches have proven to be an important source of information to complement to policy documents, as the argumentation is framed in different terms. As pointed out by Bozez & Garcia (2010) “The content of the selected speeches generally refers to policy documents but the arguments used are mainly political rather than technical ones”. Annex III contains all the political speeches on language for

immigrant integration delivered by the French Ministers of Immigration over the period 2005-2014 (44 speeches). This pool of information has been gathered through the Ministers' Speech Archive Research Service of the French Government. Given that the Catalan government does not offer such a service, the regional minister's speeches have been collected through the Catalan Parliamentary debates, explained below.

A crucial site in the shaping of dominant ideologies is located in Parliamentary debates, which represent a pivotal part of my corpus. Parliamentary interaction is not just about problem-solving but also about constructing, shaping, challenging and contesting ideologies (see, e.g., Harris 2001; Wodak & Van Dijk, 2000). They represent the source of unfolding processes of discursive change. Annex X contains all the Parliamentary debates related to language for immigrant integration in Catalonia (66 Parliamentary debates). Unlike the Catalan Parliament, the Research Service of the French *Assemblée Nationale* does not offer the possibility of selecting specific Parliamentary debates on a concrete issue.

The policy measures and laws on language tests for immigrant integration have also been analyzed, which represent the tangible realization of the debates and help understand the conceptual frames underpinning the contemporary "civic" integration discourse and policy in an attempt to understand its rationale, origins, evolution and structuring effects. Annexes IV and XI contain the different language

measures for immigrant integration adopted in France (20 measures) and Catalonia (19 measures) respectively.

To further substantiate the validity of my analysis, I have conducted a total of 8 interviews with relevant stakeholders who have played a determinant role in shaping the language debates on immigrant integration in both cases. Despite not being the most used technique for this PhD research, these interviews have provided very useful information to get a sense of the insiders' point of view. I interviewed senior officials and Directors-General in the Language Department and Immigration Department of both France and Catalonia, who have provided me with in-depth information on the evolution of language tests/measures and the rationale behind them. Especially relevant is the information obtained from the cabinet of former Minister of the Interior and current French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, and the former Vice-president of Catalonia, J. Lluís Carod-Rovira, whose information has been highly valuable as it has allowed me to obtain information directly from the “ideology shapers”. Annex VII and annex XIII contains the list of interviewees in France and Catalonia respectively.

The period chosen for the analysis – 2005-2014 – is not ascribed to chance. Immigration has ranked high on the political agenda of both France and Catalonia. 2005 witnessed an outbreak of public reflection on the failure of immigrant integration due to the


unprecedented violent riots across France. Throughout this period, the lack of language skills has often been blamed as one of the reasons for integration failure. Language and migration issues have also ranked high in Catalonia over this period. As a consequence of the rapid population growth due to immigration, integration debates have revolved around the idea of inserting Catalan at the core of the debates and, as a result, a remarkable number of integration measures and laws have been adopted.

The practical and systematic analysis of such wealth of information has been carried out through the use of codification. This method, partly inspired by Glazer and Strauss' approaches of generating grounded theory, aims to construct concepts empirically (see Bozez & Garcia, 2010). I have first identified in the corpus those elements that are systematically present in the discourse, which are repeatedly used to shape a particular frame on the language politics for immigrant integration. Having identified the systematic chains of reasoning, rhetorical devices and themes, I have then created codes to facilitate the analysis. Codes have, therefore, been the vectors of comparison between and within the documents and have constituted the core of my analytical work. They have proven to be useful to systematize the analysis and to observe the patterns that are persistently present in the debates.

In the task of analyzing these codes, I have used the software package *Atlas.ti*, a qualitative content analysis software package that has

allowed me to systematize the information thanks to which I have been able to observe systematic patterns and dominant trends throughout the discourse. The codes referring to the same concepts and showing a relationship among them have then been grouped into broad categories, which are the main themes under which the language debates on immigrant integration are framed. The analysis has therefore followed an inductive qualitative interpretation of the documents that I made along the process of codification and, especially, during the process of setting categories for the codes. Annex I (for France) and annex VIII (for Catalonia) contain the full list of codes and categories generated as well as a detailed explanation of their meaning in the debates. In annexes II to XIII (see table 1 above), the different codes and categories have also been included for each of the text analyzed so that easy reference to individual texts and their corresponding codes can also be easily done. Table 2 below succinctly shows the analytical process followed in this PhD research.

Table 2. The analytical process of this PhD research



Source: own elaboration

While the use of *Atlas.ti* software has been extremely helpful to systematize the information and find the recurrent patterns and repetitive chains of reasoning in the discourse, it has not eliminated the interpretative task of the researcher. Whereas this type of codification work used to be made manually in its entirety in the past, with highlighters and tags, the existence of new computer software has facilitated the analysis by helping systematize the information but has never replaced the analytical or interpretative element, which is at the core of the empirical work of this PhD research.

1.7 How is this PhD thesis structured?

This thesis is structured in six chapters including this introduction and the general conclusions. Whereas chapter two argues the suitability of *Discourse Analysis* and *Thompson's Depth Hermeneutics Approach* to interrogate the conceptual frames underpinning discourses on language for immigrant integration, chapters three and four provide the empirical analysis of the individual case studies, France and Catalonia, with the goal of analyzing the political motivations, evolution and structuring effects of language policies for immigrant integration. Chapter five is a comparative work that highlights the main rhetorical elements that are systematically observed in both cases whereas chapter six, the general conclusions, embeds the findings of this thesis in broader societal and political debates.

It is important to note that the empirical chapters of this PhD thesis can be read as self-contained essays as they have already been published in a peer-reviewed journal (chapter three) or are in the process of being published (chapter four). Chapter five, however, needs cross-reference to chapters three and four when setting the comparative analytical work. This is why some elements such as the methodological or conceptual frameworks are replicated in the different chapters so as to ensure that they can be read independently.

As pointed out above, chapter two has as its primary goal to find the suitable methodology and analytical tools to analyze the political-ideological motivation behind the increased salience of language in immigrant integration debates across Western societies. This chapter argues that Thompson's *Depth Hermeneutics* methodological framework developed within *Discourse Analysis* allows us to examine the ongoing dynamism and fluctuation of the precise discursive mechanisms by which linguistic symbolic resources are produced, circulated and contested to build a particular cognitive frame.

This chapter makes an original contribution to the study of the language debates on immigrant integration in two ways: first, it advocates for a determinedly interdisciplinary approach as the methodology proposed, developed in *Discourse Analysis*, is applied to the analysis of the politics of language for immigrant integration. In doing so, this chapter establishes a missing but much-needed dialogue between different disciplinary approaches to the study of language for immigrant integration as it argues that in a migration scenario, language is central as a target in which *political ideologies* to achieve specific *political goals* are articulated through discourses. It also argues that Thompson's approach can also be applied to other areas of public policy, which evidences the suitability of this methodology in the analysis of a whole array of social and political issues.

Second, the application of Thompson's approach to the comparative analysis of a nation-state – France – and a sub-state territory – Catalonia – is useful to break the methodological rigidity often observed in comparative works, in which, more often than not, the comparative units of analysis are either states or sub-state territories – often referred to in the literature as *minority nations* or *stateless nations*, with Catalonia, Quebec and Flanders being the most widely-compared units.

While acknowledging from the very outset the limitations of this type of comparative work – France being a state and having exclusive competences on the three main elements in the immigration process (entry, integration/residence, nationality) and Catalonia lacking competences on entry and nationality, its sole competence being integration – the methodologies developed in *Discourse Analysis*, and most specifically Thompson's approach, allows us to explore the political ideologies on language and how these are shaped, sustained and contested in a migration scenario, regardless of whether we have states or sub-state territories as units of analysis, given that the purpose of analysis is the multilevel comparison of the politics of language for immigrant integration.

This multilevel analysis, which has been absent until very recently in the literature as pointed out above, is also facilitated by making use of the analytical tools developed in *Discourse Analysis* such as

Thompson's approach. My main effort in this chapter has therefore been to make sense of the conceptual terms which constitute the medium of the language debates on immigrant integration in each case and translate them into a theoretical frame that might enable wider comparison with other cases.

These methodological reflections in chapter two are then empirically applied to the two case studies analyzed in chapters three and four, which provide a detailed account of the main rhetorical devices and chains of reasoning used in both cases to legitimate the increasing number of language measures for immigrant integration. As explained in chapter three on France, the language debates on immigrant integration in France have progressively mutated from immigrant integration to immigrant control, becoming the current dominant ideology and creating a linkage between these two previously separate domains. This chapter empirically demonstrates how the instrumentalization of language reveals strategic thinking by the French political elites to use a politically-accepted rhetoric – integration, participation and inclusion linked to the concept of French *citoyenneté* and *identité nationale* – to achieve potentially objectionable and discriminatory outcomes of exclusion and control.

This chapter contributes to the existing literature in two ways: first, it empirically confirms what a growing number of scholars have claimed on the obligatory character of civic and language tests for integration and how the notion of “integration” has transmuted into a

tool of migration control at the service of States (see, e.g., Carrera & Faure Atger, 2011; Hogan-Brun et al., 2009; Joppke, 2007; Kostakopoulou, 2010; Van Oers, 2013), an idea already pointed out above in this introduction.

Second, given this exclusionary trend, the different bodies of literature on language and immigration claim the “need to develop a fuller conceptual basis than is currently available for the widespread public discussion on the linguistic requirements being proposed as elements in the gate-keeping process in many EU member states” (Hogan-Brun et al., 2009, p. 1). My analysis of the French language debates on immigrant integration and of how the conceptual frame on integration has been progressively transformed into immigration control empirically contributes to these reflections.

Chapter four on Catalonia offers a detailed account on the role of the Catalan language in the debates on immigrant integration. Being a bilingual scenario – Catalan and Spanish being equally official – and against the background of rapidly increasing migration flows, with immigrants adopting the majority language, Spanish, the analysis has shown how the Catalan politics of language for immigrant integration have progressively shaped a positive discursive frame vis-à-vis the Catalan language in a migration scenario to capture the empathy of immigrants and include them in the Catalan nation-building process. The empirical analysis shows that the language debates on immigrant

integration in Catalonia are embedded in a wider socio-political process with two competing narratives promoting diverging conceptions of citizenship and different nation-building projects, the Spanish and the Catalan, two processes competing for the affection of immigrants in the national project, with language at the core of this strategy.

This chapter contributes to the existing literature in two different ways. First, the majority of academic works referring to immigration in Catalonia, which have sprouted over the past decade, focus on general approaches to immigrant integration. No entire work has been devoted to the role of language in the Catalan policies and politics in an immigration context. Similarly, existing works have not analyzed the political-ideological mechanisms used in Catalan politics to build a positive discursive frame vis-à-vis the Catalan language in a complex bilingual scenario with conflicting ideological debates and different national projects.

Second, the empirical analysis has also revealed the need to develop new conceptual and theoretical reflections on linguistic integration in bilingual contexts, which add to the complexity of linguistic integration. It has been observed that policy and academic approaches on language for immigrant integration often speak of “the national language”, neglecting the bilingual reality of many territories with a language different than the state language and, thus, adding to the complexity of the immigrant integration process.

Chapter five represents the multilevel comparative analysis of the language debates on immigrant integration by offering a comparative perspective and show how, under the same politically-accepted rhetoric of language requirements for integration, inclusion and participation – embedded in discourses of national identity and citizenship – the ideological-political intentions are remarkably different. This chapter ultimately demonstrates the contemporary validity of language and its political instrumentalization as a tool for exclusion and/or inclusion, that is, as a useful tool of social closure, confirming the theoretical postulates contained in chapter two.

Finally, the general conclusions of this thesis, chapter six, point at the main findings, both theoretical and empirical, its limitations and, most importantly, embeds the reflections of this PhD thesis in broader debates on language, immigration, citizenship and identity and how contemporary societies are reacting to an increasingly interconnected world. Table 3 below provides a bird's-eye view of this PhD thesis.

Table 3. An overview of this PhD thesis

Chapter 1. Introduction				
Thesis chapters	Chapter 2. In or out? The role of language in national debates on immigrant integration. A methodological framework	Chapter 3. The language debates on immigrant integration in France. Immigrant integration or immigration control?	Chapter 4. The language debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia. <i>E pluribus unum?</i>	Chapter 5. Analyzing the language debates on immigrant integration in France and Catalonia. A multilevel, comparative perspective
Approach	Theoretical	Empirical	Empirical	Empirical/comparative
Description	Interdisciplinary theoretical approach developed in discourse analysis to analyze the political ideological intentions of language measures for immigrant integration.	Analysis of the progressive discursive transformation of language measures for immigrant integration into a political instrument for immigration control	Analysis of the discursive legitimation of Catalan as the preferential language in immigrant integration policies and the conflicting political ideologies vis-à-vis Spain	A comparative, multilevel analysis of France and Catalonia on the construction of political-ideological intentions behind the language politics for immigrant integration
Contribution	Interdisciplinary approach: an interpretative framework developed in discourse analysis to be applied to the political-ideological analysis	Empirical confirmation of the instrumentalization of language for immigrant control under the politically-accepted rhetoric of integration.	Empirical analysis of the political-ideological tensions in the language debates on integration	An interdisciplinary, multilevel approach on the analysis of the current language debates on integration

	of language debates on immigrant integration	Reflection on the need to develop a fuller conceptual basis to give account to these language-ideological practices	Evidence for the need to develop new conceptual and theoretical reflections on linguistic integration in bilingual contexts.	
Presentation at international conferences	Graduate Network Conference (Paris February 2014)	<i>International Conference on Multilingualism and Interpreting in Settings of Globalisation: Asylum and Migration. Ghent, Belgium 2015</i> (MIAM 2015)	New Speakers in a Multilingual Europe. Opportunities and Challenges. Barcelona 2014 (COST Conf)	<i>Protecting and including “new” and “old” minorities: opportunities, challenges, synergies. Bolzano, Italy, 2015</i> (EURAC Conference)
Publication		Journal of Language & Law ISSN 2013-1453 Peer-reviewed Journal	In preparation to be sent to Journal of Language & Law Policy output Chapter transformed into the policy report. <i>The linguistic integration of migrants in Catalonia 2014</i> . (forthcoming 2016)	In preparation to be sent to the journal Language & Politics

Chapter 6. General conclusions

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2. IN OR OUT? THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN DEBATES ON IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION. A METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Les constructions dualistes ne sont jamais adéquates aux réalités de la vie sociale

M. Walzer (1997)⁸

2.1 Introduction

The salience of language in current national debates on immigrant integration has gained a powerful momentum across Europe. “Immigrants who fail to learn English may lose any right to unemployment benefits” (British Prime Minister, David Cameron, 2013)⁹; or “Immigrants must learn German and adopt Germany’s culture and values” (German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, 2010)¹⁰ are only some of the many examples found in political statements throughout Europe.

⁸ Walzer, M. (1997). *Pluralisme et démocratie*. Paris: Esprit

⁹ Migration Watch: Media Reports Archive: March 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.migrationwatch.org/media-reports-archive/2013-3> [last accessed 19 September 2015]

¹⁰ Speech delivered on October 18, 2010 at a Forum on the Conservative Democratic Union meeting.

In a context of rapidly increasing migration and human mobility, practically all Western societies are engaged in debates on immigrant integration. Glick Schiller & Wimmer (2002) have noted the increasing links between immigration and nationalism and claim that “in a recent historical *tour d’horizon*, we can see how this concept [migration] has developed in close interaction with nation building processes in the West and the role immigration and integration policies have played within them” (p. 301). The politics of nationalism, national identity and immigrant integration are increasingly interlinked (Carrera & Wiesbrock, 2009).

National strategies on immigration have been increasingly resorting to language requirements for immigrant integration across Europe. In their European-wide research study across the 47 states of the Council of Europe, Extramiana & Van Avermaet (2011) and Extramiana, Pulinx, & Van Avermaet (2014) confirm this trend. Along the same lines, and as pointed out in the introductory notes of this thesis, research conducted by the Council of Europe research unit (2013)¹¹ unveiled the increasingly tough standards required to immigrants: “not only has the use of civic tests increased

¹¹Strik, T. (2013). *Integration tests: Helping or hindering integration*. (Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, Netherlands - Doc, 13361(4)). Retrieved from http://www.assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2013/amdoc11_2013TA.pdf [last accessed 14 September 2015]

significantly, but the standards required have also gone up. Furthermore, alongside language, a range of citizenship issues, such as facts about history, knowledge of political institutions and society and values have been introduced in a number of countries” (p. 2).

The academic milieu has also paid increasing attention to this trend over the past few years. Joppke (2007, p. 1) noted an important reorientation of European states’ integration policies when he claimed that a shared feature of the models of civic integration and language tests is that liberal goals are pursued with illiberal means, making it an instance of repressive liberalism. Following the same path, Guiraudon (2008) has traced the evolution of the Dutch, French and British introduction of civic language tests and calls for an assessment of their effectiveness. Carrera & Wiesbrock (2009) note “the predominantly nationalistic and subjective nature of the concept of *civic* integration tests, which allows [European] member states to exercise even more discretion when deciding whether to grant rights and freedoms to immigrants” (p. 4).

From a theoretical and normative perspective, Oers, Ersbøll, & Kostakopoulou (2010) and Van Oers (2013) have discussed the issue of civic citizenship tests – in which language is an integral part – from the point of view of liberal, republican and communitarian theory. Van Oers (2013) follows the line adopted by Joppke (2007) and concludes that none of the civic citizenship tests can be justified

under the liberal, republican or communitarian models and can be regarded as discriminatory and exclusive.

Against this background, Hogan-Brun, Mar Molinero & Stevenson (2009, p. 1) have called for the need to develop a fuller conceptual and theoretical basis that is currently available for the widespread public discussion of the language and cultural requirements being proposed in the gate-keeping process leading to the achievement of citizenship in many EU member states, [rights] which are upon acceptance of national values and loyalty to the state.

Linking language to debates on immigrant integration, citizenship and national identity has not been an exclusive domain of nation-states. It has also ranked high on the political agenda of stateless national discourses and strategies on immigrant integration. “The Government of Catalonia will require that immigrants certify their knowledge of Catalan. Full integration and participation into our society requires knowledge of the language”¹² (Catalan Government spokesperson, F. Homs, 2013). This requirement of knowing Catalan to obtain the residence certificate became compulsory in November

¹² Press conference by F. Homs (2013, October 18) retrieved from <http://www.324.cat/noticia/1107246/politica/La-Generalitat-demanara-el-coneixement-del-catala-per-acreditar-larrelament-dels-immigrants> [last accessed 15 July 2015]

2014¹³. Along the same lines, immigrants are often referred to as “new citizens” [*nous ciutadans*] in Catalan public discourses, linking also immigration to the notion of citizenship.

A similar discursive tonality can be found in Quebec, where immigrants are “required to integrate through the mastery of French to fully use their professional competence and guarantee their active participation in society”¹⁴ (Quebec Immigration Minister D. De Courcy, 2013), linking immigration to participation into the host society. Referring to Quebec, Bouchard (2001) has noted how national strategies on immigrant integration have linked language to the concepts of identity, participation and citizenship by stating that “French is perceived as the language allowing all people living in Quebec to participate fully as citizens in the life of a nation, thereby contributing to a sense of common identity.” (p. 30).

Along the same lines, Zapata Barrero (2006) – summarizing Kymlicka (2001), Bauböck (2001) and Carens (2000) – argues that it is significant to note that the “argument claiming that language

¹³ Decree 150/2014 of 18 November 2014

¹⁴ Declarations of immigration minister Diane De Courcy (2013, August).

Montreal Gazette, retrieved from

<http://www.montrealgazette.com/life/Quebec+immigration+rules+emphasis+Fren+ch+skills/8737056/story.html> [last accessed 24 August 2015]

policies aim to ensure that immigrants have the same opportunities as the other citizens within the community. Language as a means of ensuring equal opportunities and participation in the public sphere on an equal basis is the main argument advocating for the language of the minority nation” (p. 15).

This succinct overview of the current academic reflections on language for immigrant integration highlights the systematic reference, both at state and sub-state level, to the notions of citizenship and national identity. Under the politically-accepted rhetoric of these notions, the ideological intentions behind their use in the politics of language immigrant integration may vary depending on the political goals to be achieved.

This chapter seeks to provide an empirically useful methodological framework to unveil the ideological intentions behind the politics of language for immigrant integration. It argues that the tools developed within the framework of Discourse Analysis, and more specifically Thompson’s *Depth Hermeneutics* methodological framework, can capture the intricate relationship embedded in the language-citizenship-national identity trinomial, explore its ideological underpinnings, grasp the permanent dynamism of this relationship and explain how it is embedded in particular social, political, economic and historical contexts.

The use of Thompson's framework represents an attempt to bridge the gap between different disciplines and insert the tools developed in Discourse Analysis to the study of the politics of language for immigrant integration. I argue, therefore, that this framework explores spaces of interdisciplinarity, accepting that our object of study – language – socially and politically situated and contextualized within the debates on immigrant integration, is intrinsically interdisciplinary. My main effort with this chapter has thus been to make sense of the concepts and terms in each discipline and transform them into an applicable framework that enables an analysis and comparison of the ideological intentions in the language politics for immigrant integration from a multilevel perspective.

2.2 The language-citizenship-migration trinomial

As pointed out in the previous section, the language debates on immigrant integration have often resorted to the idea of *citizenship*, a concept which up until very recently had been perceived as the exclusive domain of the state (Hepburn, 2011). The current world scenario – with changes to the structure of states resulting from *above* – globalization and European integration – and from *below* – state decentralization and increasing powers to regions on issues such as immigrant integration – have called for a reconceptualization of the concept, which is being increasingly used also by regions, as succinctly summarized above, especially those with determinant claims for language and nationhood (Hepburn & Zapata Barrero,

2014). Hepburn (2011) has referred to this approach as *regional citizenship*.

Given that immigration marks a distinction between members and outsiders of a political community, it is a key means of deciding who is allowed to *become* a citizen (Hepburn, 2011). Language has become the identifying element to mark who belongs to the polity – which might take the form of a nation-state or other – and who does not. Language is therefore closely intertwined with the concept of citizenship as it is an effective instrument to determine “the boundaries of citizenship” (Bauböck, 2007).

While the political use of the concepts of language and citizenship often revolves around the notion of *integration*, the concept itself presents multiple meanings and can have an exclusive or/and an inclusive status, becoming a powerful instrument of social closure (Brubaker, 1999). From a theoretical approach, the concept presents three dimensions: citizenship as a legal status, citizenship as a (political) activity and citizenship as identity (see, e.g., Brubaker, 1992; Bauböck, 2001; Carens, 2000; Cohen, 1999; Entzinger, 2005; Kostakopoulou, 2002; Oakes & Warren, 2007).

Van Oers (2013) summarizes the three different theoretical conceptions as follows: citizenship as legal status refers to nationality, which needs to be understood as a specific link between

a person and a state (Vermeulen, 2007, as cited in Van Oers, 2013). In its legal or political sense, it has to do with the state to which one belongs. Language, along values, culture and traditions are required for immigrants to officially become part of that state and also as a tool needed prior to entry to the state.

As activity, citizenship refers to being a citizen as an attitude (Pluymen, 2008, as cited in Van Oers, 2013). It concerns participation in the political, social and economic life of the community. Citizens must display the “participatory and civic virtues”, which Bauböck (2006) has defined as “the disposition of citizens to regard to common good of the polity as an important part of their own interests” (p. 31). Unlike the nationality dimension of citizenship – exclusive of nation-states – citizenship as activity encourages the learning of the language as an indispensable tool to integrate and participate in the polity, which might or might not take the form of a nation-state.

Citizenship as identity refers to the identification and membership of a particular polity. Carens (2000) has termed this “the psychological dimension of citizenship”. It focuses on issues regarding the loyalty and commitment to the culture, language and tradition of the society of which one forms part, which may or may not be a state. Under this dimension, language is encouraged in its “capacity for generating

imagined communities, building in effect particular solidarities” (Anderson, 1991, p. 133).

The legally consequential and ideologically-charged distinction between the inclusive and/or exclusive approach to citizenship – between those who are perceived as citizens and those who are not – has also been noted in the academic milieu (Brubaker, 1992, 1999). Under each of the three dimensions of the concept, language can potentially become a powerful instrument of inclusion and/or exclusion, a way to demarcate a symbolic barrier of “in” and “out”, of establishing who belongs as an “in group” or as an “out group”.

Confronted with immigration and integration, nationalism discourses have tended to redefine, reshape and reinforce the basic characteristics binding together the members of the “in-group” (Triandafyllidou, 2001), and language has proven to be an effective mechanism to achieve this goal. In this respect, language is increasingly important in defining the boundaries of political communities and the identities of political actors (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 212).

2.3 The “civic virtues” of language in the debates on immigrant integration

Along with the idea of citizenship, national discourses and strategies on immigrant integration have also linked language to the idea of

civicness and a broader set of requirements such as knowledge of society, values and institutions that fall under the term *civic integration programs* or *civic tests* (Carrera & Wiesbrock, 2009; Van Oers, 2013). In these *civic tests*, language is often depicted as a sine-qua-non condition for successful integration and participation in the public sphere.

The rhetoric used in discourses around the concept of *civicness* linked to language, migration and citizenship issues may lead to an idea of an open, inclusive and participatory approach to immigrant integration. As opposed to an ethnic approach, glossed as illiberal and inward-looking, the traditional conception of civic nationalism is based on voluntary participation and subscription of their members to a set of political principles. In a migration scenario, language – long ascribed to an ethnic account of nationalism – is depicted in political rhetoric as a *civic* element through which immigrants integrate, participate and become members of the host society.

Brubaker (1999, p. 58) alerts of the ideology behind the term *civic*, often used to distinguish one's own good, legitimate civic nationalism as opposed to an ethnic account of nationalism. Discourses on language requirements for immigrant integration have often depicted themselves as *civic*, inclusive, tolerant and participatory. This particular use of the term “*civic*” may be political rather than analytical and may speak more to the putative international respectability and legitimacy than to its empirical characteristics.

More recent academic discussions raise serious concerns about the use of language in immigrant integration debates and note, as pointed out above, that under the rhetoric of inclusion and participation – language and citizenship tests might be hindering integration or leading to exclusion (Hogan-Brun et al., 2009; Van Oers et al., 2010; Van Oers, 2013). In the 2013 above-cited study¹⁵, the Council of Europe highlighted the potential negative effects of language tests if they are conceived from an exclusionary approach. Along the same lines, the academic milieu has also pointed at the increasing language and culture requirements being proposed under the rubric of “civic citizenship” as elements in the gate-keeping process (see, e.g., Extra, Spotti, & Van Avermaet, 2009; Shohamy, 2006).

Concealed under the rhetoric of inclusivity, openness and tolerance, this “civic” mode of exclusion is exceptionally powerful and might be used to achieve the opposite effects. Given the negative connotations of ethnicity – glossed as illiberal, illegitimate and exclusive – the debates on immigrant integration have often tended to reproduce a self-legitimizing idea of an open, civic nationalism by linking language to the ideas of citizenship, participation and inclusion. From this approach, immigrant integration strategies and policies would be developed not merely as instruments of management but as part of a larger ideological process.

¹⁵ Op.cit. 3

This civic conceptualization of language requirements has often been replicated by a number of scholars, who have reproduced the political discourses without actually questioning the rationale behind or scrutinizing their purpose, concurring in what has been referred to as *methodological nationalism*, that is, the reproduction of national discourses, agendas, loyalties and histories without problematizing them or making them an object of analysis in its own right (Glick Schiller & Wimmer, 2002).

By replicating political discourses on the *civic* virtues of language for immigrant integration and not questioning them or making them an object of analysis, scholars have helped legitimize certain language ideologies, generating a number of taken-for-granted opinions and trends without contesting the facts. This “civic” mode of exclusion is probably far more important in shaping life chances and sustaining massive and morally arbitrary situations than is any kind of exclusion based on putative ethnicity. But it is largely invisible, because it is not questioned. It is taken for granted (Brubaker, 1999, p. 64).

What emanates from the above discussions is the close interlink between the politics of language, nationalism and national identity in a migration context. This link is portrayed in political discourses in a dual form: it calls upon the migrant to show adherence to national identity through the knowledge of the national language, and it uses

the rhetoric of inclusion and participation to require knowledge of the national language – in the form of compulsory language and citizenship tests or voluntary language courses – to *become* a citizen.

In the former case, integration would therefore not be regarded as a process of social inclusion but rather as a requirement for the migrant to melt into the homogenous national wholeness and a way to promote national identity and nationalism (Carrera & Wiesbrock, 2009, p. 5), while in the latter, the concept of citizenship would be used either as an instrument of inclusion and participation in the host society or as a hurdle and a tool for immigrant control rather than for immigrant integration (Joppke, 2007, p. 7).

2.4 Normative versus empirical debates: bridging the gap

As described in the above sections, the saliency of language in the politics of immigrant integration has witnessed an increasing amount of theoretical, normative and philosophical reflections, taking place mainly in two different bodies of literature: that of nationalism and that of citizenship studies.

For a long time, theories of nationalism have been mainly concerned about establishing ideal-type categorizations of nations and making dichotomous distinctions, the civic-ethnic dichotomy having greatest resonance in the academic milieu. Under this categorization,

language has been traditionally ascribed to an ethnic form of nationalism.

Contemporary scholarly debates have put the ethnic/civic dichotomy under scrutiny, questioning the ascription of language to a strictly ethnic conception of nationalism and moving beyond the prototypical, fixed typologies of nationalism (see, e.g., Brubaker, 1999; Schnapper, 1997; Seymour, 2000; Shulman, 2002; Smith, 1991; Zimmer, 2003). The debates have moved towards a more process-oriented, dynamic account of nationalism. Rather than being a static set of ideas, the current academic debates conceive nationalism as a set of processes. There seems to be a transition from content to process, a step moving beyond the conceptual monism of the civic-ethnic dichotomy (Thorpe, 2008).

The main scholarly criticism to this dichotomic theory has been that the civic versus ethnic distinction is considered as a static block without acknowledging that these conceptions and the symbols attached to them can be dynamic. National ideologies concerning the role of language for immigrant integration can therefore evolve over time and can be used distinctively. This evolution can be diachronic – different conceptions of the nation promoted at different points in time – or synchronic – different representations of the nation at a specific point in time.

While the normative and theoretical reflections on this issue abound, hardly any offer a systematic empirical connection to the rapidly-changing dynamics of current political practices, discourses and strategies of inclusion/exclusion in a context of immigrant integration. Proposals have been of philosophical nature – Seymour’s (2000) concept of *sociocultural* nation – remain on theoretical dichotomies – Brubaker’s (1999) proposal of *state-framed* v. *counter-state* nationalism, or fail to provide mechanisms to avoid what has been previously referred to as *methodological nationalism* (Zimmer, 2003).

This missing dialogue between contemporary political philosophy, political theory and the actual national discourses, ideologies and institutional practices on language requirements for immigrant integration have produced an empirical gap and call for the need to develop empirically useful tools and resources capable of analyzing the evolving the nature of the role of language in the politics of immigrant integration.

A way forward beyond the applied limitations of the normative reflections within the sphere of nationalism has been developed much more recently in the academic literature on language, migration and citizenship issues. These debates have been mainly developed from both a descriptive and a prescriptive angle: from a descriptive angle, as highlighted in the introductory lines above, scholars have recently noted the shift towards stricter language conditions in immigrant integration policies for citizenship purposes across European states

(Carrera & Wiesbrock, 2009; Hogan-Brun et al., 2009), while other scholars have tackled the issue from a sub-state territory perspective, often called minority nationalism perspective (see, e.g., Arrighi de Casanova, 2012; Hepburn, 2011; Jeram, 2012, Hepburn & Zapata Barrero, 2014). Despite being discursively similar, the academic literature on nation-states and minority nationalisms has run in parallel and without many academic spaces for interaction.

From a normative point of view, reflections have been aimed at analyzing a specific and concrete aspect of immigration – compulsory citizenship tests – from the point of view of liberal, republican and communitarian theory (Carens, 2000; Kostakopoulou, 2010; Van Oers, 2013) and question the justification of these tests under any of the above-mentioned theories.

This recently new focus has laid important descriptive and normative groundwork on the increasingly salient language-citizenship binomial in a migration context and its application through compulsory language testing regimes. I claim, however, that not all national debates on language, citizenship and migration are shaped in the form of compulsory testing. Language is present in a much broader range of political dynamics, discourses, institutional mechanisms, practices and instruments which need to be considered if we are to provide a full-fledged empirical account of the degree of inclusiveness/exclusiveness of language for immigrant integration.

As I shall argue below, it is by combining various disciplines and resorting to the analytical toolkits offered by the discipline of *Discourse Analysis* that we shall be able to provide a robust methodological framework to analyze the fluctuating nature of language in the politics of immigrant integration. National discourses and strategies on language – inserted in material practices of modulation and reproduction – can be ideological sites through which we can analyze the inclusive/exclusive approach to the politics of language for immigrant integration. It is with this understanding of the dynamic nature of discourses and strategies and their power of shaping ideologies that a more accurate account of the fine line between language, immigrant integration and citizenship can be provided.

An adequate framework for comparing the inclusive/exclusive approach to language in the politics of immigrant integration must go beyond the habitual theoretical and methodological barriers that prevent the useful combination of different disciplinary perspectives. By combining the tools of *Discourse Analysis* with the academic reflections on citizenship, migration and nationalism, I argue that a more suitable methodological framework may emerge. My ultimate goal, therefore, is to build a framework for an important but missing dialogue between these different disciplinary approaches aimed at providing an empirically useful framework capable of analyzing the process-like, evolving and fluctuating nature of national debates on immigrant integration and the role language occupies within them.

2.5 Building an interdisciplinary methodological framework for the language debates on immigrant integration

Throughout my previous discussion on the role of language in national debates on immigrant integration, the terms “discourse” and “ideology” have often appeared. The view I wish to develop is one whereby the relationship between language, citizenship, national identity and immigrant integration can be perceived as discursive. This is where I wish to bring in the concepts of “discourse” and “ideology”.

Given the unlimited discussions generated under the rubric of *Discourse Analysis*, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive view of the various approaches developed over time. Discourse is generally understood as “frames of reference within which we define, organize and regulate a particular sense of ourselves and in relation to others and our physical world” (Simon, 1992, p. 109). Discourses are social, define the meaning about our world and are always embedded in the particular dynamics of the moment.

Discourse has been identified by almost every major scholar as a site of *ideology*. Discourse and power: combine the two terms and we

think of ideology (Blommaert, 2005, p. 158). Despite the multiple meanings of the concept, ideology can be defined as a discursive process that requires material reality and institutional structures and practices of authority (Blommaert, 2005, p. 163). Isolated discourses *per se* do not define ideologies. They need to be inserted in material practices of modulation and reproduction thus becoming real agents of power and change. I argue that it is by analyzing the modulation and reproduction of discourses of language for immigrant integration and how these are related to practices, strategies and policies that we shall be able to offer an accurate account of the inclusive/exclusive approach to language for immigrant integration.

It is with this understanding of the intrinsically dynamic nature of discourses and their power of shaping ideologies that I wish to bring out the concept of *Language Ideological Debates*. The notion, firstly used by Blommaert (1999), inserts language analysis in more general socio-political processes; debates in which language is central as a target in which ideologies are being articulated through discourses. Language ideologies are beliefs about language that are connected to societal power structures (Woolard, 1992, p. 235).

What can be taken from this discussion is the emphasis on language and its location within social, political, historical and cultural relations. As succinctly summarized by Blommaert (2005):

“To the extent that we still believe that discourse is a linguistic object, the meaning of which can be tapped

by deploying the rules of linguistic analysis, we shall never get there. The phenomenology of our object – the contextualized nature of language – compels us to recognize that linguistics offers us just part of the answers. If we see the discourse as contextualized language, and take this dimension of contextualization seriously, we shall be forced to develop a linguistics that ceases to be linguistic from a certain point onwards and become a social science of language-and-society” (p. 235).

The methodological framework I intend to build – aimed at providing the tools to analyze the political-ideological intentions behind the rhetoric on language for immigrant integration – must therefore contextualize the historical, social, political and economic circumstances in which discursive practices and policies take place. The lack of focus on these circumstances within which the relationship between language, citizenship, nationalism and immigrant integration operates has been one of the main limitations of past theoretical debates.

The concepts and ideas around ideology and discourse have usually been tackled in the body of research known as *Critical Discourse Analysis* (CDA). The approaches to CDA vary considerably (see, e.g., Fairclough, 1985, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1995; Fowler, 1991, 1996;

Kress, 1990; Van Dijk, 1985a, 1985b, 1993; Weiss & Wodak, 2003; Wodak & Chilton, 2005; Wodak, 1989, 1990). Despite their difference in variation, they all share a view of discourse as instances of language use embedded within relations of social and political power. Analyzing the inclusive/exclusive use of language in national debates and strategies on immigrant integration is consequently inseparable from social, political or economic factors.

Numerous have been the scholarly attempts to offer an analytical framework that combines language analysis along broader social, political or economic analysis. Fairclough (1992, 1993, 2006, 2007), Blommaert (1999, 2005), Kress (1990), Van Dijk (1985a, b, 1992) or much more recently Verschueren (2012) spring to mind. Under these approaches, CDA is particularly useful to “help increase consciousness on how language contributes to the domination of some people by others” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 1); to “show the imbrications of linguistic-discursive practices with the wider socio-political structures of power and domination” (Kress, 1990, p. 85); or to analyze “the discourse dimensions of power abuse and the injustice of inequality that result from it” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 253).

I share their view of analyzing discourses within their historical, social, political and economic context. I argue, however, that their goals differ considerably from the methodological framework I am proposing to analyze the language politics for immigrant integration. Contrary to this specific approach of CDA to ideology – which might

suggest suspicious undertones prior to any analysis – my goal instead is to propose a methodological framework that grasps the politics of language for immigrant integration, its dynamism, the voices of opposition, silence and contestation, its evolving nature and, in sum, the political-ideological intentions behind.

I argue that departing from the preconceived idea of *injustice* or *inequality* when analyzing the politics of language for immigrant integration would be a biased approach as these assumptions cannot be taken as the starting point with no previous rigorous analysis. Similarly, it would be biased to systematically replicate national discourses without questioning the rationale behind them or making them an object of analysis, thus falling into the problems of *methodological nationalism* discussed above. It is only through a detailed analysis of discourses, practices, policies, strategies and institutional mechanisms that we shall be able to either prove the *domination, injustice* or *inequality* and/or the open, participatory approach in the language debates on immigrant integration.

As pointed out by Blommaert (2005), another critical debate on CDA points out at the tendency of scholars projecting their own political biases and prejudices onto their data, and analyze them accordingly. In the sphere of nationalism studies, this idea has also been expressed by scholars such as Brubaker (1999), who claims that “often, the scholarly accounting of nationalism – bestowing the imprimatur of

the civic on some states or movements, denying it to others – belongs to the sphere of nationalist politics itself. There is nothing new about this, for a century and a half, scholars have been participants in, and not mere observers of, nationalist politics” (p. 58).

Taking all of these considerations into account and with the goal of providing the necessary framework to empirically analyze the language politics for immigrant integration without any previous idea of domination, I find the methodology outlined by Thompson (1984) useful (as cited in Bokhorst-Heng, 1998). Thompson develops what he calls *Depth Hermeneutics Methodological Framework* consisting of three demarcated phases in the analysis: 1) Socio-historical analysis, 2) Formal or discursive analysis, and 3) Interpretative analysis.

1. The socio-historical analysis refers to the analysis of the social, political, economic, historical and cultural conditions within which discourses are produced. As stated by Thompson (1984) “meaning is a fluctuating phenomenon which is constituted as much by the conditions of production as by the conditions of reception” (p. 64). He argues the imperative need to contextualize discourses for their analysis: “to suppose that the study of the discursive forms in which ideology is expressed could be detached from the socio-historical conditions of discursive production would be to lose sight of the relations in virtue of which discourse is ideological” (p. 134). In order to give a detailed account on

how language is used in the politics for immigrant integration, the historical, social, economic and political circumstances in which the language debates take place must be analyzed.

2. Formal or discursive analysis of the linguistic features of discourse. As argued by Thompson (1984), “discourse must be viewed not only as socially or historically situated practices but also as linguistic constructions which display an articulated message. In this stage, the narrative features of the text are scrutinized in order to analyze ideology” (p. 136). He goes on to identify four levels of analysis:

- 2.1 Voices of the text: Who are the speakers? Which ones are anonymous? The organization of voices in the text is key to organize the internal structuring of language according to authorial intent (Bakhtin, 1986), including counter discourses.

- 2.2 Argumentative: the explanations and chains of reasoning in a discourse in their procedure of legitimization and dissimulation. For Verschueren (2012), this level of analysis would also include how implementation of specific choices operates to bring about a specific interpretation.

- 2.3 Themes: looking at redundancy and repetitiveness in the text as a way to discover themes and the relation between themes. This would involve the analysis of the rhetorical devices around which the discourse on

language requirements for immigrant integration is built. It involves the explicit reference to language but also its absence as well as the presence or absence of other voices in the imagining of the nation.

2.4 Genre of the article and its significance to the reader: how the genre of the report and the event organize the production and reading of the text.

3. Finally, the third phase of analysis is that of (re)interpretation, which is closely intertwined with the previous two, as it connects the second phase with the first. Thompson argues that this phase is vital if we are to argue confidently that certain forms of discourse are implicated in the sustenance and maintenance of particular ideologies.

As noted by Wetherell & Potter (1992) on Thompson's framework, these three stages should be regarded as an analytical demarcation in a theoretical scheme and should not be seen as necessarily chronological. They are intrinsically intertwined and all involve a certain degree of interpretation in order to analyze the way in which particular conceptualizations are mobilized and articulated, paying attention to their specific construction and to their rhetorical organization, embedded in a specific historical, political and economic context.

The practical analysis, however, cannot be a systematic procedure in which all elements are always present in all three stages (Ribas Bisbal, 2000). When analyzing the role of language in national discourses and strategies on immigrant integration, the interpretative aspect will be key in assessing either the inclusive and participatory and/or the exclusive, restrictive approach of at a specific point in time.

Thompson's approach provides the necessary methodological tools through which to examine the political-ideological intentions of the language debates for immigrant integration, how they are deeply entrenched in citizenship and nationalist discussions; and their ongoing dynamism and fluctuation, rather than fixed prototypes or dual categorizations, an outdated approach in the current world dynamics of human mobility and migration.

In the theoretical reflections on the degree of inclusion/exclusion of language in the debates on immigrant integration, I have often referred to the Weberian concept of *social closure*¹⁶, which combined with Thompson's model, is better suited to grasp and analyze the


¹⁶ See Brubaker (1992) for a thorough account of the concept of *social closure* linked to language, citizenship and immigration in Brubaker, R. (1992). *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press

rapidly-changing dynamics of today's politics on language for immigrant integration. Developed within the field of sociology – *social closure* refers to processes of drawing boundaries, constructing identities and building communities in order to monopolize scarce resources for one's own group, thereby excluding others from using them. As stated by Díez Medrano & Koenig (2005), social closure “posits that groups differentiate themselves from one another by the number of hurdles they set to those who want to become legitimate members of the community” (p. 136).

In the debates on immigrant integration, language can be used either as a hurdle and a gate-keeping mechanism for immigrants – which authors such as Hogan-Brun et al., (2009) Joppke (2007), Kostakopoulou (2010), among others, consider it an emerging tool for immigrant control rather than for immigrant integration, as pointed out above; and/or as a way to allow the newcomers to participate in the life of the collectivity.

It is, thus, by combining a specific set of tools developed in Discourse Analysis, and more specifically Thompson's Depth Hermeneutics, that a tentative framework to analyze the language politics on immigrant integration and how these are closely intertwined with citizenship and nationalism issues can emerge. Figure 2 below illustrates graphically this methodological framework.

Figure 2. A methodological framework for the language debates on immigrant integration



Own adaptation from Thompson (1984)

2.6 Concluding remarks

This chapter has pointed at the centrality of language in the current debates on immigrant integration and has proposed a framework aimed at empirically analyzing the evolving, fluctuating nature of language in the debates.

The core emphasis of the methodological framework has been on *Discourse*. I have argued that a specific set of tools developed within *Discourse Analysis*, Thompson's *Depth Hermeneutics Methodological Framework*, allows us to capture the fluctuation of the use of language in today's politics on immigrant integration; it allows us to account for variation in the way this relationship is taking shape and constantly evolving over time; it enables us to see the relationship in terms of an ongoing process operating in real historical, social, economic and political moments; and it allows us to account for voices of opposition, silence, and contestation.

Rather than looking for undue generalizations, static dichotomies or ideal-type blocks – as it has been the case for much of the 20th century with the civic-ethnic dichotomy– the discursive approach taken in the methodological framework proposed allows us to explain the political-ideological intentions in the language debates on immigrant integration.

It also allows us to analyze how different forms of language ideologies may operate in the same historical process, and that “differences between them may reflect differences in the social formations characterized by them, their purposes or their moment of occurrence” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 166). To see this relationship as discursive enriches our understanding of the dynamism of the relationship between language, immigrant integration, citizenship and national identity.

I have also argued that there has been no shortage of reflections over the past years within the field of nationalism studies to move beyond the traditional static civic-ethnic approach aimed at insufflating dynamism to theoretical debates. While representing advancement in the theorization of how national movements use different symbolic resources in their imagining of the nation in a migration context, they hardly offer a realistic empirical connection to the current political dynamics and practices revolving around language and its current centrality in the debates on immigrant integration. The new theoretical approaches have been developed either from the angle of political philosophy or theories of nationalism – elaborating proposals from a critical or ideal distance of political practices, with little room for application and comparison to real cases –.

It has been discussed that none of the approaches proposed so far has been immune to *methodological nationalism* and offer no

mechanisms to detect, and more importantly, to avoid the systematic reproduction of national discourses and agendas without problematizing them or making them an object of analysis.

I have argued that the reflections developed within the field of *Discourse Analysis* – and more specifically the *Depth Hermeneutics* approach developed by Thompson – can be an empirically useful tool to analyze national trends linking language to citizenship and immigrant integration. Rather than seeing this relationship as natural or common sense, rather than taking it for granted or seeking the universal characteristics of the relationship, the ultimate focus of my proposal has been to develop a methodological framework that grasps the permanent dynamism of this relationship within real circumstances and to explore its ideological underpinnings embedded in particular social, political, economic and historical contexts.

This framework has also been an attempt to bridge the gap between different disciplines and create an important but missing dialogue between discourse analysis and its application to the analysis of the politics of language for immigrant integration. The framework explores these spaces of interdisciplinarity, accepting that our object of study – language – socially situated and contextualized within national debates on immigrant integration, is intrinsically interdisciplinary. My main effort has thus been to make sense of the concepts and terms in each discipline and transform them into an

applicable framework that enables an analysis and comparison of how and why current national discourses are using language in their immigrant integration strategies.

The social, political and economic transformations in the world today continually push us towards revisions of our old, established methodological instruments. My ultimate purpose with this chapter has therefore been to provide the necessary tools for an empirical connection to current political practices linking language to issues of citizenship and nationalism and to come up with an analytically useful framework which is able to give account to the fluctuating and ongoing dynamism of the centrality of language in the current debates on immigrant integration. This framework will be applied to empirical analysis of the politics of language for immigrant integration in France and Catalonia, which is where I shall now turn.

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3. THE LANGUAGE DEBATES ON IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN FRANCE. IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION OR IMMIGRANT CONTROL?

Quiconque met en cause la République attaquerait les principes même de la Nation, fille de la Révolution française... C'est précisément à cette équation qu'il faut résister. Interroger certains fondements de la République ne peut que l'aider à se séparer d'un héritage qui la plombe.

Bancel, N., Blanchard, P.& Vergès, F. (2003).

3.1 Introduction

Immigrant integration has become one of the most recurrent debates in contemporary France, witnessing a remarkable number of intellectual reflections, political and media debates over the past few years. Integration is depicted as one of the country's greatest challenges and political leaders of all sides recurrently call for the reformulation of the politics of integration, placing it at the top of the political agenda.

In these debates, language has occupied a prominent position. Depicted in political discourses as necessary, often under the rhetorical umbrella of a new "civic integration agenda", the past few years have witnessed an explosion of measures aimed at making language compulsory to enter, reside, reunite or naturalize. An increasing number of scholars (see, e.g., Azoulai & de Vries, 2014; Carrera & Wiesbrock, 2009; Guiraudon, 2008; Hogan-Brun, Mar Molinero, & Stevenson, 2009; Joppke, 2007; Kostakopoulou, 2010;

Van Oers, 2013) have pointed out the instrumentalization of language as a gate-keeping mechanism for immigrant control, being transformed into a regulatory technique for the state (Carrera & Faure Atger, 2011).

This chapter traces the discursive evolution of the language politics for immigrant integration in France and the instrumentalization of language as a mechanism for immigrant control, analyzing the ideological underpinnings and the rhetorical devices used to legitimize this exclusionary role of language in the politics of immigrant integration. I will analyze how the alleged lack of language skills among the immigrant population has been artificially constructed by a particular party in power – the center-right UMP –, and discursively framed as a threat to the values of *la République* using the rhetoric inherent to the extreme right-wing party *Front National* (FN). The analysis will show how this exclusionary approach has progressively become the current dominant frame on immigrant integration and how the attempts by the current party in government, the Socialist party, to break this dominant ideology have failed, bringing to the surface the deep ideological cleavage on immigration in France.

3.2 Corpus and methodological framework

The analysis has been carried out through Thompson's Depth Hermeneutics, developed in Discourse Analysis and described in previous chapters, which allows us to provide a thorough analysis in three stages: 1) the socio-political analysis, which looks at the historical, political and social context in which debates are produced 2) the rhetorical devices and chains of reasoning used as legitimating strategies and 3) the interpretative phase, which is closely intertwined with the previous two.

As for the selection of empirical material, the corpus used for the analysis consists of six different sources, described in chapter one, succinctly summarized in table 1 above and explained in annexes 2 to 7:

- 1) Using the specialized search engine *Factiva*, I have gathered 364 newspaper articles and debates in French media dealing specifically with language and immigration over the period 2005-2014.
- 2) 44 official government speeches on immigration, integration and language by French Ministers and Prime Ministers.
- 3) 20 policy measures on language for immigrant integration.
- 4) 12 official reports and recommendations linking language to immigrant integration policies, mainly from the governmental advisory body *Haut Conseil à l'Intégration* (HCI) (2005-2014).

5) 10 Government Annual Reports to the Parliament containing the strategic goals on immigration (2005-2014).

6) Four semi-structured interviews with senior government officials and minister advisors from three departments, the Department of the Interior, the Cabinet of Manuel Valls – former Minister of the Interior and current Prime Minister – and the Language Policy Department of the French Government.

The analysis of such a considerable wealth of information has been facilitated by the use of the software programme *Atlas.ti*, which has allowed me to systematize the recurrent references on language in the politics of immigrant integration within my corpus. The analysis has allowed me to interpret how, inserted in material practices of modulation and reproduction over time, the language debates on immigrant integration in France have shaped a dominant ideology of immigrant control.

The period chosen for the analysis – 2005 to May 2014 – is not ascribed to chance: 2005 witnessed an outbreak of public reflection on the failure of immigrant integration due to the unprecedented violent riots across France. Along this period, lack of language skills has often been blamed as one of the reasons for integration failure. Not all political parties, however, have adopted the same rhetoric. Given that the period chosen has seen a party alternation in power –

center-right UMP and Socialists – the analysis will also serve to bring to the surface the political-ideological variation on the topic.

The paper is divided into three sections. Following Thompson's framework, section one analyzes the social and political conditions under which debates on language for immigrant integration are produced; section two provides an in-depth analysis of the rhetorical devices and chains of reasoning used and conceptual frames created in order to legitimate specific language measures in the politics of immigrant integration. Finally, section three highlights the main conclusions derived from the empirical analysis.

The results are expected to provide a thorough account on how, followed through in a determined way and shaped relentlessly over time, France has adopted an exclusionary approach on immigrant integration through the problematization of language, turning it into a gate-keeping mechanism for immigration control, transforming it into the dominant ideology and making it part and parcel of the current French public philosophy on immigrant integration.

3.3 A socio-political account of the role of language in the French debates on immigrant integration. Reinventing the Republican Myth

The role language occupies in French politics on immigrant integration today cannot be fully understood without a succinct overview of the political, economic and social context of the late 80's. In his masterfully written account of France's philosophy of integration, Favell (1998) attributes the passage from an unproblematic, pragmatic approach of immigrant integration to a discourse involving grand concepts of *la République*, national identity and values to two specific moments in the early 90's: the creation of the *Commission de la Nationalité* (1990-93) – established after an all-party recognition of the need to reflect on the new social, cultural and economic order of the 80's – and the setting up of the *Haut Conseil à l'Intégration* (HCI) in 1989, the official advisory body on immigrant integration issues.

According to Favell, this frame was created to build an interpretative scheme locating immigrant integration policies as the “natural” product of French particularisms. The French public philosophy on immigrant integration was depicted as if it had always been dealt with within the same parameters of the ideas of Republicanism and citizenship, a theory that, according to Favell (2001) is “at pains to mask the recentness and artificiality of its construction and the incompleteness of the question it focuses on” (p. 43).

Discourses were remarkably different before the 90's, where there was no automatic link between integration and the grand ideas of Republican citizenship or national identity and where debates revolved more around socio-economic issues. Favell (2001) attributes this passage from a pragmatic, socio-economic approach to a symbolic, highly ideological strategy to three different political events taking place during the mid-80's which laid the foundations of current discourses on immigrant integration: a) the growing power of regionalism, b) the decline of the nation as a source of social solidarity and c) France's growing engagement in the European Union, perceived as a threat to centralized France.

All these issues would not have been problematized and framed in terms of grand symbolism – Favell argues – had not been for the emergence of the *Front National*, the party that adopted a well-prepared rhetorical line on blaming immigrants for the political and economic malaise of the country, exacerbating fundamental questions on national identity, a line politically attractive enough which would be progressively confiscated by the UMP to capture the far-right votes, as we shall see in the empirical analysis below.

This is how the reconceptualization of the French community took shape. With the aid of periodic reports by the HCI and the support of en-vogue intellectuals disseminating the new terms of the debate in the media, the new philosophy of integration rapidly gained

ground. The new framework was mainstreamed, gaining pre-eminence in public debates on immigrant integration. As we shall see below, language was soon placed at the service of this new strategy.

3.3.1 The ideological underpinnings of the role of language in the French politics of immigrant integration. *À chaque parti son mot, à chaque mot son temps*

The infamous violent riots of late 2005 sparked an outbreak of public reflection in France on *le modèle français d'intégration* (Mucchielli & Aït-Omar, 2007), in which the lack of language skills was blamed as one of the main reasons for failure. The number of references attributing failure to lack of language skills and the subsequent legislative language measures skyrocketed over the period 2005-2014, as shown in table 4 below.

Table 4. The language measures for immigrant integration in France (2005-2014)

	Date	Measure	Effect
1	January 2005	<i>Loi 2005-32 de la programmation pour la cohésion sociale</i>	Language proposed as a condition for residence
2	July 2006	<i>Loi 2006-911 du 24 juillet 2006 relative à l'immigration et à l'intégration</i>	Language becomes compulsory for residence through the signature of an integration contract (CAI)

3	May 2007	<i>Décret 2007-999 du 31 mai 2007 relatif aux attributions du ministère de l'immigration, de l'intégration, de l'identité nationale et du codéveloppement</i>	Creation of new ministry with the explicit task of setting language requirements for immigrants
4	November 2007	<i>Loi 2007-1631 du 20 novembre 2007 relative à la maîtrise de l'immigration, à l'intégration et à l'asile.</i>	Compulsory language requirements for family reunification
5	October 2008	<i>Décret 2008-1115 du 30 octobre 2008 relatif à la préparation de l'intégration en France des étrangers souhaitant s'y installer durablement</i>	Oral AND written compulsory language knowledge must be proven before entering France
6	December 2008	<i>Arrêté du 1 décembre 2008 relatif à l'évaluation dans leurs pays de résidence du niveau de connaissance, par les étrangers, de la langue française et des valeurs de la République</i>	Instructions on how to evaluate language knowledge in countries of origin
7	January 2009	<i>Circulaire NOR IMG900055 C: Dispositif de la loi 2007-1631 du 20 novembre 2007</i>	Instructions on how to apply the November 2007 law on compulsory language knowledge in countries of origin
8	November 2009	<i>Circulaire sur le Débat sur l'identité nationale (2 nov.)</i>	Language in national identity debates
9	March 2010	<i>Projet de loi 2400 du 31 mars 2010 relatif à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la nationalité</i>	Proposal to raise compulsory language standards to obtain French nationality
10	May 2011	<i>Circulaire du 31 mai 2011 relative à la maîtrise de l'immigration professionnelle</i>	Instructions to use language as a tool to keep immigrant workers (mainly foreign students) from working in France

11	June 2011	<i>Loi 2011-672 du 16 juin 2011 relative à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la nationalité</i>	Language standards raised to obtain French nationality
12	August 2011	<i>Circulaire du 24 août 2011 relative au contrôle de la condition d'assimilation dans les procédures d'acquisition de la nationalité française</i>	Instructions on being rigorous when granting nationality
13	October 2011	<i>Décret 2011-1265 du 11 octobre 2011 relatif au niveau de connaissance de la langue française requis des postulants à la nationalité</i>	Language standards raised to access French nationality
14	October 2011	<i>Décret 2011-1266 du 11 octobre 2011 relatif à la création d'un label de qualité « Français langue d'intégration »</i>	Specific language requirements needed to access French nationality
15	November 2011	<i>Arrêté du 25 novembre 2011 portant définition du référentiel du label qualité « Français langue d'intégration »</i>	Privatization of language testing
16	January 2012	<i>Décret 2012-127 du 30 janvier 2012 approuvant la charte de droits et des devoirs</i>	Charter requesting that immigrants know French to become a French citizen
17	May 2012	<i>Press release canceling the 31 May 2011 Circulaire</i>	Easing criteria to grant work permits
18	October 2012	<i>Circulaire NORINtV 1234497C du 16 octobre 2012</i>	Easing criteria to interpret the June 2011 Law on nationality
19	February 2013	<i>Report La Grande Nation : Pour une société inclusive</i>	Revision of France's integration policies

20	November 2013	Publication of 5 Reports:	New proposals on language for immigrant integration
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Source: own elaboration

Initiated by the UMP while in power, this “legislative frenzy” on language was an overt strategy to capture the *Front National* votes by adopting its rhetorical and ideological line of reasoning. The empirical analysis has shown that this evolution towards the exclusionary approach was achieved in three demarcated phases:

3.3.1.1 Inventing a new concept: *l'intégration républicaine* (2005-2011)

3.3.1.2 *L'assimilation*: towards the postulates of the *Front National* (2011-2012)

3.3.1.3 The failed proposal of a new term: *l'inclusion* (2012-2014)

3.3.1.1 Inventing a new concept: *l'intégration républicaine* (2005-2011)

Used since the early 90's as the consensus term by the mainstream French political parties, the term *intégration* began to be questioned in the early 2000's, giving birth to a new syntactic unit: *l'intégration républicaine*. Far from being a simple terminological mutation, the ideological implications of the new syntactic formula were simple: there is no conceivable integration other than the Republican one and, reciprocally, anything that is Republican is integrative. *L'intégration républicaine* expressed the dual obligation of integrating *and*

respecting the Republican values: *liberté, égalité, laïcité* (Lochak, 2006).

The *intégration républicaine* considered language as the center of gravity. Consecrated legislatively for the first time in the 2003 law on immigration, it would not be until 2006 that compulsory knowledge of language would be required to immigrants applying for residence within the framework of the compulsory *Contrat d'accueil et d'intégration* (measure 2 in table 4 above): “This contract is the essential element of the new *intégration républicaine* that I have always wished for France, in which language plays a pivotal role”¹⁷ claimed the then president of the Republic J. Chirac, a similar tonality of the then Immigration Minister, N. Sarkozy, who claimed that “*L'intégration républicaine* is about learning the French language, about respecting the laws and the values of the Republic”¹⁸.

The new politics on integration were the beginning of an ideological shift towards the postulates of the *Front National*, with a clear intention of occupying its electoral space. “My intention is to seduce the *Front National* voters. I will even attract them one by one... If the *Front National* has progressed, it's because we haven't done our job

¹⁷Statement by J. Chirac, 2006, June 26.

¹⁸Statement by N. Sarkozy, 2006, June 06.

properly”¹⁹. – overtly admitted N. Sarkozy in a press interview in 2006.

In the race towards this *lepenisation des esprits* (Geisser, 2007), referring to the then party leader Jean-Marie Le Pen), the instrumentalization of language as a gate-keeping tool became evident in the increasing number of measures justified under the constant invocation of *l'intégration républicaine*, aimed at making knowledge of language compulsory in all stages of the immigration process: residence (measure 2), family reunification (measures 4, 6 and 7), work permit (measure 12) and nationality (measures 9 and 11 in table 4 above).

Far from being a concealed objective, the utilitarian approach to language was an explicit goal: “France must have the right to choose its immigration, reinforcing the quality of its border control, installing a true *intégration républicaine* based on our language, culture, history, and the respect to our national identity”²⁰ claimed French Prime Minister F. Fillon after the approval of the 2007 law on making language compulsory for family reunification (measure 4).

¹⁹Sarkozy, N. (2006, June 29). J'irai chercher les électeurs du FN. *Le Nouvel Observateur*

²⁰Un "détail" lourd de symboles. (2007, October 08). *L'Humanité*

To the compulsory language requirements, we must add the measures raising language standards in the name of *l'intégration républicaine*. The 2008 law (measure 5) specified that compulsory measures would not only be oral but also written in the countries of origin. Despite the apparently minor change, this measure entailed a significant step towards greater discretion granted to the authorities in the immigration control process. Around 20% of immigrants in France are illiterate in writing even if their command of spoken French is high, as they come mainly from former French colonies²¹. Making *written* knowledge of language compulsory in the language tests made a remarkable number of immigrants non-eligible to enter the country.

3.3.1.2. *L'assimilation*: Towards the postulates of the *Front National* (2011-2012)

The race towards the votes of the *Front National* intensified exponentially in 2011. After the cantonal elections of April 2011, which witnessed a remarkable increase of the *Front National*, and a few months prior to the 2012 presidential elections, debates on language for immigrant integration skyrocketed in the public arena.

²¹Data provided by Immigration senior officials in the French Administration. See also Adami (2008)

The idea of *intégration républicaine* began to progressively fade to give way to *l'assimilation*, the exclusionary term rejected in the 90's by the mainstream political forces for being the choice of the *Front National*. In an editorial of one of the most widely-read newspapers in France, *Le Monde*, the then Minister for immigration C. Guéant, justified the discursive mutation in these terms:

“France must offer the right conditions for a successful *integration*, read *assimilation*. The learning of French, the history of France and the rules to live together and, in general, our identity, are the indispensable conditions to this integration which, over time, leads to a successful assimilation. I speak of *integration* to refer to those who do not foresee to settle in France... I speak of *assimilation* for the rest, for those who come in our country willing to settle permanently... Assimilating is going beyond, it's about embracing our culture, about full participation in the social and cultural French life... I am expressing a true political choice. This is the choice that we want for the France of tomorrow”²².

An overt declaration of intentions towards the ideological postulates of the *Front National*.

The mainstreaming of the term *assimilation* intensified over the months prior to the 2012 national elections, which witnessed an

²²Quelle France pour demain ? (2011, May 31). *Le Monde*

exponential increase in language measures – six in less than six months (measures 10 to 15 in table 4 above):

- a) Measure 10 on work permits, giving the instruction of “adopting a selective and quantitative approach” to immigration and instructing local authorities (*les préfets*) to grant work permits only if “sufficient knowledge of French was proven” – the word sufficient being left at the discretion of the authorities, instructed to be “rigorous in the selection process”.
- b) Measure 11 on nationality, modifying the evaluation system through which language knowledge is accredited. As pointed out by Lochak, (2013) “this system introduced a new obstacle to access French nationality, especially those with a low literacy level, making the process longer and more expensive” (p. 4).
- c) Measure 12 on nationality, instructing local authorities to carry out a rigorous control to grant nationality: “lack of linguistic assimilation can result in refusal of nationality”.
- d) Measure 13 raising language standards to obtain French nationality, from A1 to B1 in the European Common Framework of Reference.
- e) Measure 14 creating a new compulsory language diploma (*Français langue d'intégration, FLI*) to

access French nationality, managed now by private companies²³ and infuriating universities across France, which denounced the instrumentalization of language for ideological and electoral reasons.²⁴

- f) Measure 15, providing specific instructions on how to manage the FLI diploma.
- g) Measure 16, approving the Charter of Rights and Duties to become a French citizen, setting the rules with which immigrants must comply, including proof of knowledge of the French language.

The governmental discursive tonality became so close to that of the *Front National* that their discourse became indistinguishable during the 2012 presidential campaign.²⁵

²³See Daadouch (2013)

²⁴FLIC? Le français, langue d'une intégration contrôlée. (2011, November 09). *Press release by French Universities*

²⁵See the proposals by all the political parties: France/présidentielle: *Grandes propositions des candidats en matière d'immigration* (2012, April 22)

3.3.1.3 The failed proposal of a new term: *inclusion* (2012-2014)

The governmental change in 2012 entailed a major discursive break with the dominant ideology on language set by the former UMP government. Soon after being elected, the new Minister for Immigration, M. Valls (current French Prime Minister in 2016) announced the softening of the measures²⁶ to apply for nationality and withdrew²⁷ the 31 May Circular (item 11 in table 4 above), which instrumentalized language to keep immigrants from working in France. Similarly, two highly symbolic key events exemplified this ideological turn: the closing-down of the *Haut Conseil à l'Intégration*, the former government's conceptual blueprint, and the publication of an overarching report – *La Grande Nation: pour une société inclusive* (2013), also called the Tuot report (item 19 in table 4 above), – calling into question France's previous policies on immigrant integration, including language. Five other thematic reports followed this overarching report (item 20 in table 4 above).

Discarding the term *assimilation* as being associated to the ideological terrains of the *Front National*, the report also proposed to drop the term *intégration*– considered “too widely used with

²⁶See Ministry of the Interior (2012, November 28). *Circulaire NOR INTK1229185C*.

²⁷See Press release of 2012, May 31

negatively connotations and devoid of content”²⁸ – and adopt the term *inclusion*, which, according to the report, is linked to the idea of participation.

The terminological break also came along with an ideological one. While recognizing the central role of the French language for immigrant integration, the report explicitly mentioned the existence in France of multiple identities, cultures and languages – a radical discursive and ideological shift away from previous postulates which placed French, and only French, at the core of the debates. The public recognition of France’s diversity, however, would be rather symbolic as the report itself rejects the idea of providing any kind of active support: “France’s linguistic diversity needs to be recognized, without necessarily providing any contributory recognition. Just because they exist and simply because of their presence in national soil”²⁹.

These highly novel proposals breaking the dominant ideology were met with an intense contestation by the UMP and the *Front National*, which used the same discursive devices to attack the proposal. The UMP bluntly rejected the attempts by the Socialist to create a new policy framework on immigration: “The UMP will not allow the Socialists to break the Republic, our values, or culture and our

²⁸ Tuot, T. *La Grande nation: pour une société inclusive: Rapport au premier ministre sur la refondation des politiques d'intégration*. (2013, February 11). p.12

²⁹ *Report Connaissance – Reconnaissance* (2013, November). p. 4

language for ideological and political reasons... These proposals are an offence to Republican assimilation”³⁰ was stated in a press release, fully coinciding with the *Front National*’s ideological reasoning in their 2014 electoral program.³¹ Proposing this new term, *l’inclusion*, and recognizing France’s diversity of languages and cultures caused such a political stir in the French debates on immigrant integration that it was fastly dropped, failing to become the preferred term to refer to *immigrant integration*.

3.4 Analyzing the socio-political account of the role of language in the French politics of immigrant integration

Thrown strategically center-stage in electoral campaigns and depicted as a national problem, compulsory language requirements have shaped the dominant discourse on immigrant integration, becoming the obsession of past UMP governments. This ideology has become dominant, and the current socialist government has been unable to break the frame. The socio-political analysis has shown the utilitarian, exclusionary approach to language for immigration

³⁰UMP Press release (2013, December 17). Retrieved from <http://www.u-m-p.org/actualites/argumentaires-infographies/argumentaire-integration-la-gauche-ouvre-la-porte-au-102861812> [last accessed 19 July 2015]

³¹See electoral program (2014). Retrieved from <http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/autorite-de-letat/immigration/> [last accessed 13 September 2015]

control with the goal of winning the votes of the *Front National*, which has immigration as one of its founding principles. The sentence *À chaque parti son mot, à chaque mot son temps* succinctly summarizes the political dynamics of contemporary French policies on immigrant integration.

What emanates from this socio-historical analysis is the highbrow rhetoric and grand symbolism attached to language in integration debates, showing a remarkable gap between the dominant discourse and the empirical data. Despite being traditionally an immigration country, table 5 below shows that the influx of immigrants into France has been somewhat steady.

Table 5. Number of entries in France (2005-2012)

Year	Arrivals
2005	221 700
2006	223 100
2007	215 700
2008	218 700
2009	218 900
2010	229 100
2011	238 400
2012	250 800

Source: Report *Estimer le flux d'entrées sur le territoire à partir des enquêtes annuelles de recensement* (June 2014). Paris: French Institute for Statistics, INSEE.

In terms of knowledge of language, French has never been a major problem for immigrant integration. Table 6 below shows that, on

average, more than 75% of immigrants applying for residence already have sufficient knowledge of French, given that a significant number of immigrants come from former French colonies, where French is still an official language and the language of instruction in education.

Table 6. Evolution of the Integration Contract [*Contrat d'Accueil et d'Intégration, CAI*] (2007-2012)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number of audited people	101 770	104 336	99 402	103 574	105 109	104 401
Number of people signing contract	101 217	103 952	97 736	101 355	102 254	101 368
% of people signing the contract in relation to audited people	99,5 %	99,6 %	98,3 %	97,9 %	97,3 %	97,1%
Number of people registered in civic training	99 705	102 441	95 720	97 252	95 252	99 632
Number of language training registrations	26 121	22 338	21 802	24068	24 358	24365
% of language training courses followed by immigrants having signed the CAI	25,8 %	21,5 %	22,3 %	23,7 %	23,8 %	24,0%

Source: own elaboration. Data from French Ministry of the Interior (2013)


The grandiloquent discourses on language, depicted as one of France's greatest integration problems, do not therefore correspond to the factual data on real language needs by immigrants. Why has language become such a salient issue in the French politics on immigrant integration? What rhetorical devices have been used to instrumentalize language for immigration control? How has the new ideological paradigm been mainstreamed, legitimized and institutionalized, becoming the current public philosophy on immigrant integration? Why have the recent attempts to break the exclusionary dominant frame failed? Section 3.5 below seeks to provide answers to these questions.

3.5. Legitimizing ideologies on language for immigrant integration

The corpus compiled has allowed me to trace the discursive evolution of how the exclusionary approach on language has progressively taken shape as well as to identify the rhetorical devices and chains of reasoning and frames used as a legitimating strategy. Figure 3 below illustrates graphically this evolution, and contains information on three specific aspects: 1) the intensity of the debates, measured through the number of references appearing in media, official speeches and reports, showcased along the Y axis; 2) the tangible materialization of discourses: the 20 concrete language measures (numbers 1 to 20) further explained in table 4 above, and 3) the dominant topic thrown at specific periods, highlighted in different

colors in the graph, which provides a bird’s-eye view of how the different discursive elements have shaped the dominant discourse at specific moments. The graph also highlights the specific electoral periods in 2007 and 2012 so as to better illustrate the instrumentalization of language in (pre) election campaigns.

Figure 3. The discursive evolution of the language debates on immigrant integration in France (2005-2014)



Source: own elaboration

The dynamic, fluctuating evolution of language debates, modulated and reproduced over time, has allowed me to identify the five main narrative features that have been recurrently used in the dominant discourse to legitimize the instrumentalization of language for immigrant control:

3.5.1 The recurring idea of *integration failure* as a justification to legitimate language measures

3.5.2 *Contre l'immigration subie, pour une immigration choisie.* [Against suffered migration. Chosen migration]. The invented motto to instrumentalize language for immigrant control.

3.5.3 *Communautarisme*: Blaming immigrants' lack of language skills for their isolationism in French society.

3.5.4 Linking lack of language skills to a threat to *national identity*

3.5.5 The European Union rhetoric as a legitimating resource

3.5.1 The recurring idea of *integration failure* as a justification to legitimate language measures

“French people know that the violent riots in our *banlieues* last fall [referring to 2005] are linked to the failure of our immigrant integration policies... Allowing a large number of immigrants to enter France without giving them the necessary means leads to explosive situations. How can we expect them to integrate if they do not speak a word of French”³², stated Minister of the Interior Sarkozy to legitimate the first law making language compulsory for residence (item 2 in table 4 above).

³²Speech by N. Sarkozy (2006, May 02)

What began to crystallize was not so much the idea of *failure* itself, an argument often used in French discourses on integration³³, but linking failure to the lack language skills. Invoked for the first time to legitimize the 2006 Law making language compulsory, the notion would be constantly invoked to justify further measures on language in all stages of the immigration process.

Of particular relevance is the high number of references in press, official speeches and reports linking language to family reunification, depicted as necessary to avoid integration failure (see measure 3 in table 4 above): “The French integration system has failed... We must give a response to the French people, who are asking us to manage migration flows to preserve the balance of our national community... Language is the best tool for integration... Immigrants must not wait until they arrive in France to learn the French language”.³⁴

³³See epic speech of French Prime Minister on the Constitutional reform due to immigrant integration failure : *Déclaration de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, sur la réforme constitutionnelle pour le renforcement de la démocratie et des libertés locales, la réforme de l'Etat, le renforcement de l'égalité des chances à l'école, la politique de la ville, l'intégration sociale des immigrés et la lutte contre l'immigration clandestine, notamment avec la réforme du droit d'asile.* (2002, October 14). Retrieved from <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/027000276.html> [last accessed 12 September 2015]

³⁴Speech by Minister for Immigration, C. Guéant (2007, September 18)

Thrown in during the months prior to the 2007 electoral campaign, the number of references on language skyrocketed, as shown in figure 3 above. Along with the idea of failure, discourses revolved around mass migration pouring into France, immigrants being poorly qualified and unable to speak French, as stated by the then Immigration Minister Sarkozy: “Against any logic, we have accepted an increasing number of immigrants for family reunification purposes, which heavily unbalances our labor market, allowing foreigners in our country who are for the most part little qualified and poorly integrated...I want those immigrants applying for family reunification to take a language test in our consulates to prove proper knowledge of French”³⁵. The law was justified as necessary by UMP spokesperson, Y. Hugo, as “I witness on a daily basis the tragedies of hundreds of families in which one of the parents does not speak or practise French.”³⁶, an argument hard to sustain empirically as shown in table 6 above.

The idea of *failure* was discursively symbolized in the high unemployment rates among immigrants, attributed to their low level of French. This reasoning was used to justify the compulsory nature of measures and the raising of language standards, as succinctly summarized in the Minister’s 2009 speech on new immigrant integration guidelines:

³⁵Speech by Minister for Integration and subsequent Prime Minister, N. Sarkozy. (2007, March 05)

³⁶*Agence France Presse* (2007, July 04)

“The language level required in France is relatively low and this undoubtedly constitutes a real handicap to access the job market. This largely explains the fact that 93% of women who have applied for family reunification do not have any activity in France. This situation is unacceptable. I have asked the Directorate for Immigrant Integration and Citizenship to consider raising the language level in all four phases of the so-called *parcours d’intégration* [integration path]: in the countries of origin, within the framework of the CAI, to obtain the residence permit and in the naturalization process”³⁷.

Other than from an ideological standpoint, these tenets are hardly justifiable empirically. If language is compulsory for family reunification, residence and nationality – often becoming a triple hurdle – if language standards are raised and if more than 75% of immigrants applying for residence permits do not need any language provision, as shown in table 6 above, one wonders how the high unemployment rates among the immigrant population can be attributed to lack of language skills.

Resorting to the rhetoric of *failure* took a U-turn in 2012 with the new Socialist government in power. Rather than attributing it to the lack of language skills, the 2013 Tuot report revisiting France’s

³⁷Speech by Immigration Minister E. Besson (2009, January 21)

integration policies (item 19 in table 4) openly admitted *failure* but not due to lack of language skills by immigrants, but rather because of the erroneous attribution of failure to language, a non-existing problem: “Reducing integration to language has been one of our problems, both intellectual and operational, of the past politics of integration”.³⁸ The report overtly admitted that “language is not a problem. Even in the best years, it only concerned less than one third of the immigrant population”.³⁹ Despite these recommendations, however, the Socialist government has maintained the compulsory nature of language tests.

3.5.2 *Contre l’immigration subie, pour une immigration choisie.* The invented motto to instrumentalize language for immigrant control

“*Contre l’immigration subie, pour une immigration choisie.* [Against suffered migration, chosen migration]. France must be able to choose the number of immigrants it hosts, according to its objectives and conditions... *Immigration choisie* means, above all, the possibility to set the quantifiable objectives, and to determine the composition of migration flows in the best interest of France”.⁴⁰

³⁸ Tuot, T. (2013, February 11) *La Grande Nation: pour une société inclusive: Rapport au premier ministre sur la refondation des politiques d’intégration.* p. 50

³⁹ *Op.cit*

⁴⁰Speech by N. Sarkozy (2006, May 02)

The idea of selecting only immigrants that serve the interest of France was an overt objective of the UMP government from the very outset, discursively crystalized through the invention of the motto *Contre l'immigration subie, pour une immigration choisie*. Recurrently repeated to justify the legislative measures adopted, this utilitarian approach was found not only in government speeches but also in countless reports, commissioned by the government itself to “profoundly revisit the French immigration policy to better manage migration flows and favor *une immigration choisie*”⁴¹, which left no doubt as to the ideological path France had initiated: “a more efficient selection system distinguishing immigrants who are more determined to integrate in France must be put in place”⁴², proposed the influential Milhaud report.

If immigrant selection was the goal, language was the instrument: “we must select future newcomers, better prepared for integration and fewer in number, through language tests”⁴³, concluded the report. The official reaction to these recommendations was a clear declaration of intentions of what was to follow: “This report

⁴¹Government Mission Letter to expert C. Milhaud (2005, December 15)

⁴²Milhaud, Ch. (2006, September) Report: *L'intégration économique des migrants et la valorisation de leur épargne*. p. 12 Retrieved from <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/064000739.pdf> [last accessed 14 September 2015]

⁴³*Op.cit*

represents a decisive point in our immigration policy. Its application shall be one of the State grand priorities of this government in the field of integration.”⁴⁴ – stated the then Immigration Minister N. Sarkozy.

The instrumentalization of language to select immigrants was to be the main rationale in France’s integration policies over the period 2005-2012, becoming the dominant discourse through the persistent use of the motto. The new aspect in this discursive line was not so much the utilitarian approach to language, often used in immigration strategies of many states (see, e.g., Kostakopoulou, 2010; Van Oers, 2013) but the fact that reducing the number of immigrants through language measures was an explicit objective.

The idea of selecting migrants met with fierce opposition not only by the left-wing political spectrum, immigrant associations and NGOs⁴⁵ but also by the Catholic Church. During the months prior to its approval in 2006, the Church expressed serious objections to the law, labeling it as utilitarian, arguing that “the law considers immigrants as mere laborers and not human beings”⁴⁶. The intensity of the debates – illustrated in figure 3 in the high number of references around this measure (item 2) – forced the Minister of the Interior to

⁴⁴Speech by Immigration Minister N. Sarkozy (2006, October 05)

⁴⁵L'Assemblée rend obligatoire le contrat d'accueil et d'intégration (2006, May 04). *Agence France Presse*

⁴⁶Les Églises s'inquiètent (2006, April 25). *Sud-Oest*

state that “the Church is in its role to insist on the need to respect the dignity of people. I have therefore accepted to amend the draft bill and incorporate certain remarks”⁴⁷. This modification did not include, however, any modification on language, which remained compulsory.

The constant invocation of the motto served to legitimate further measures: “Our first goal is to manage immigration quantitatively. New instruments will allow us to better regulate migration flows. From now on, the Government will define each year in a report to Parliament the number of immigrants France wishes to host”⁴⁸. If bringing numbers down was the goal, language was, again, one of the main instruments: “our ultimate goal being to better manage family reunification flows, you have now two new tools at your disposal: DNA tests and language tests”⁴⁹ instructed Minister for Immigration B. Hortefeux to all ambassadors of France when presenting the 2007 family reunification law, a measure that sparked high controversy and contestation due to its discriminatory, utilitarian nature.

Invented to legitimize the 2006 law on residence and used exponentially to justify the 2007 law on reunification, the motto would also be the dominant narrative feature used to justify the

⁴⁷Speech by Immigration Minister N. Sarkozy (2006, May 02)

⁴⁸Speech by Immigration Minister N. Sarkozy (2006, June 06)

⁴⁹Speech by Immigration Minister B. Hortefeux (2008, August 28)

measures raising the language standards (items 9, 10, 11 and 12 in table 4): “We need to continue to better control access to French nationality...The level of French required to access nationality has been raised because naturalization consecrates, for those who wish so, the end of the integration and assimilation process into our society”.⁵⁰

It did not take long to achieve the expected results: family reunification permits went down by more than 35% (as shown in table 7 below), and the same trend followed the work permits, down by 26%, and nationality permits, down by 30% in 2012⁵¹.

Table 7. Evolution of family reunification permits (2005-2011)

Year	Family reunification permits
2005	22 990
2006	19 419
2007	18 950
2008	17 304
2009	15 166
2010	15 589
2011	14 998

Source: own elaboration. Data from the French Ministry of the Interior (2012)

This utilitarian line intensified during the 2012 election campaign, used indistinctively by the UMP and the *Front National*: “the idea is to go down to the immigration figures of the 90’s” stated Immigration

⁵⁰Speech by Immigration Minister C. Guéant (2012, March 03)

⁵¹*Le Jeudi* (2012, January 10)

Minister C. Guéant, an idea also highlighted by Prime Minister Sarkozy when he stated that “we must reduce the number of immigrants by half”⁵² in which reference to the idea of “sufficient knowledge of French” was recurrently invoked, the same rhetoric used by the *Front National* in their campaign⁵³.

Opposing this utilitarian approach, the new Socialist government withdrew the 31 May 2011 Circular limiting work permits⁵⁴ to foreign students (item 10) and eased the conditions to grant nationality (item 19), although it maintained, however, the compulsory nature of language tests.

3.5.3 *Communitarisme*: Blaming immigrants’ lack of language skills for their isolationism in French society

French rhetoric on immigrant integration has often used the term *communitarisme*, a French concept roughly translated as *isolationism* and coined in the mid 90’s by the *Front National* to portray immigrants’ unwillingness to assimilate. This term insufflates a certain ethno-nationalist ideology aimed at sustaining

⁵²*Le Point* (2012, March 6)

⁵³Retrieved from <http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/autorite-de-letat/immigration/> [last accessed 14 September 2015]

⁵⁴*Government Press Release* (2012, May 31)

the nation-state and serves to introduce any issue in public national debates on immigration under the threat of having the enemy inside (Dhume 2010: 1). This idea is fully captured in the statement of the Minister of the Interior: “Immigrant communities organize themselves against *l’intégration républicaine* to engage in endogamic practices”.⁵⁵

Portraying immigrants as the enemy inside and agitating fear through the idea of *communautarisme* was to become a recurrent narrative device in immigrant integration debates. The idea was simple: language must be compulsory to prevent immigrants from remaining isolated from *la République*, as shown in the speech by Immigration Minister to justify the 2007 family reunification law: “If we want to prevent immigrants from remaining isolated in their communities and in their languages of origin, we must give them the possibility to learn French when they decide to immigrate to France...Imposing a language test on family reunification candidates will help us fight *communautarisme* and compensate those immigrants willing to make an effort to really integrate. Those refusing to take the test or refusing to follow the training language courses will not enter France”.⁵⁶

⁵⁵Cited in Lochak (2006)

⁵⁶Speech by Minister for Immigration, C. Guéant (2007, September 18)

Language was depicted as necessary to “facilitate contact and access to an active life, rather than to remain isolated in their communities”⁵⁷ and measures were justified because of the “high concerns raised by the resurgence of certain *communautarismes*”⁵⁸. *Communautarisme* was the main argument claimed to call for a national debate on national identity in 2009, causing a public stir as shown in the high number of references around these debates (item 9 in figure 3 above). “The government wants a society in which there is no *communautarisme*. Immigrants in our country must adopt our customs and respect our laws. When immigrants do not regularly attend our language and integration programs, our legislation foresees sanctions”⁵⁹ was the discursive line used in the 2012 election campaign. Invoking constant fear was an extremely useful rhetorical device to legitimate the language measures.

In the legitimating process, the government also resorted to the rhetoric of the HCI to further legislate its actions making reference to *communautarisme*. In the 2010 report *The Challenges of Integration in Education* (2010) on integration and schooling, the HCI proposed the suppression of mother-tongue instruction in schools (the so-called

⁵⁷Le français obligatoire pour les candidats à l’immigration (2008, October 30). *Le Figaro*

⁵⁸ See Ministry of the Interior (2019, November 02). *Circulaire NOR IMIK0900089C*

⁵⁹Guéant prône l’assimilation (2011, November 18). *Le Parisien*

ELCO), as it considered to have negative consequences for children⁶⁰, concluding that “by promoting mother tongues, students risk becoming detached from the Republican values while the mission of schooling is to bring them closer to them. ELCO can lead to *communautarisme*... The HCI proposes the elimination of the teaching of languages and cultures of origin as they seem to go against the objective of integration⁶¹.”

The attempts by the new Socialist government – through the expert reports published in November 2013 – to break this dominant language ideology, not only by omitting reference to *communautarisme* but also recognizing France’s linguistic diversity, sparked a heated reaction (measure 20). The new government (Socialist) was accused by both the UMP and the *Front National* of attempting to dismantle *la République*. “This report breaks the Republican assimilation model and considers *communautarisme* as the new French model. I cannot accept that our language, French, be put at the same level as the rest of the languages”⁶² stated UMP spokesperson A. Jupé, the same discursive reaction as the *Front National* leader Marine Le Pen, who claimed that “this will mean the

⁶⁰Haut Conseil à l’intégration (HCI). (2010). *Les défis de l’intégration*. p. 27. Retrieved from <http://archives.hci.gouv.fr/-Rapports-.html> [last accessed 14 June 2015]

⁶¹HCI, *op.cit.*, pp. 29-30

⁶² Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP). (2013, December 13). *Press release*

end of the Republican model and the creation of an ultra-*communautarized* society”.⁶³

Representing an abrupt rupture of the dominant ideology, the ideas proposed in the reports caused such a stir in French politics – as perceived in the high number of references around the publication of the report (item 20 in figure 3 above) that the French President, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Immigration had to come up front stage to clarify the Government’s official position: “this is not the official Government position”⁶⁴ unanimously claimed the three members of government. The attempts to break the dominant discourse and introduce new elements such as the idea of multiple languages and identities in the public space had utterly failed.

3.5.4 Linking lack of language skills to a threat to National Identity

“We are the only country where a small intelligentsia considers that we have no right to talk about national identity... France is going through an identity crisis, and I don’t want the extreme right to

⁶³Vives réactions après l'exhumation d'un rapport sur l'intégration (2013, December 13). *Libération*

⁶⁴Intégration : «Pas du tout la position du gouvernement», tranche Hollande. (2013, December 13). *Le Parisien*

monopolize the national identity issue”⁶⁵. This is how, in the 2007 presidential election campaign, the Minister for Immigration and candidate to the Presidency of France, N. Sarkozy, tactically threw the issue of national identity into the public arena. While it is true that the subject had already been inserted in past discourses (Martigny, 2009), it adopted an unprecedented scale during the campaign, as exemplified in the remarkably high number of references in public debates shown in figure 3 during the 2007 campaign.

Throwing in the issue of national identity was justified as a need to break the monopoly of the *Front National* over this issue. As highlighted by Martigny (2009), “evoking the subject of national identity crisis was, up until then, to play by the rules of the *Front National*” (p. 23). The UMP strategically used this issue in the 2007 campaign, confiscating it from the *Front National* and inserting it in its ideological repertoire.

As pointed out above, the idea of using national identity as a legitimating tool and linking it to immigration debates had one single goal: winning the votes of the *Front National*, as expressed by the then candidate to the Presidency F. Sarkozy: “If we didn’t have the national identity issue, we would be behind Ségolène [Royal, the Socialist candidate to the Presidency], We have reached the *premier*

⁶⁵Identité nationale: Sarkozy persiste et signe (2007, March 14). *Le Figaro*

tour. If I have obtained 30%, it's because we have Le Pen's voters. If they leave me, we go down"⁶⁶.

The 2007 electoral promises soon translated into two ideologically charged actions: the creation of the Ministry for Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development in 2007 (item 3) and the creation of the Grand Debate on National Identity in 2009 (item 8 in table 4 above), two measures that met not only with the fierce contestation of the rest of the political spectrum⁶⁷, excluding the *Front National*, but also renowned scholars and members of the UMP themselves such as historical party leader Simone Veil.⁶⁸ An illustrative example of the heated debates is the remarkably high number of references during this period, as shown in figure 3 above.

Language occupied a prominent position in the legitimating strategy: "National identity is, above all, about language"⁶⁹, stated Immigration Minister B. Hortefeux. The idea of lack of language skills posing a threat to French identity was added to the government's argumentative repertoire to legitimate the compulsory nature of language in the 2007 law on Family Reunification (item 4)

⁶⁶Cited by Joffrin (2007)

⁶⁷Seriez-vous choqué par la création d'un ministère de l'Immigration et de l'Identité nationale? (2007, March 16). *Le Figaro*

⁶⁸Nouvelle provocation de Nicolas Sarkozy (2007, March 19). *L'Humanité*

⁶⁹Pourquoi un ministère de l'Immigration (2007, June 04). *News Press*

under the pretext of “preparing immigrants to better integrate them when they arrive in France as they need to respect France’s identity, history and values”⁷⁰, a highly controversial position, contested by the left political spectrum, immigrant associations and NGOs alike.

The same discursive line was replicated at the end of 2009, when the government launched the “Grand Debate on National Identity”⁷¹. From November 2009 to January 2010, 350 public debates across France were held, and an online platform was created, with some 750 000 visits and more than 58 000 contributions⁷², an idea heavily contested by all the other political forces⁷³, except for the *Front National*.

The results of the debates illustrate the high importance attached to language in these debates⁷⁴: “96% of those who participated considered language as one of the most important elements in the

⁷⁰Un « détail » lourd de symboles (2007, October 08). *L’Humanité*

⁷¹ See Ministry of the Interior (2009, November 02). *Circulaire NOR IMIK0900089C*

⁷²Fillon enterre l’identité nationale avec des mesurette (2010, February 08). *L’Express*

⁷³Of special relevance is the press release published by the Socialist Party denouncing the instrumentalization of *national identity* for electoral reasons on 03 November 2009

⁷⁴See Jeannot, Tomc, & Totozani (2011)

representation of France”⁷⁵, an idea confirmed by the TNS Sofres opinion poll, which concluded that “90% of French people consider that the level of French and of the Republican values required to acquire nationality must be raised”⁷⁶.

Used as a thermometer to measure the opinion of people and a legitimating tool, these opinion polls became the perfect excuse to continue legislating on tougher language measures: “I am going to propose that language play a determining role in acquiring French nationality”⁷⁷, the discursive line adopted by the then Minister for Integration E. Besson that soon translated into the subsequent 2010 Law on Nationality toughening language standards (items 9 and 11 in table 4 above). And “more measures will be proposed in the months that follow now that the question [of French national identity] is no longer a taboo”⁷⁸. The high number of measures passed in 2011, as shown in table 4, represents the tangible materialization of these ideological intentions.

⁷⁵Un séminaire gouvernemental autour du Premier ministre François Fillon pour un "point d'étape" dans le débat sur l'identité nationale (2010, February 08). *Bulletin Quotidien*

⁷⁶Vu de France, Le gouvernement cherche une porte de sortie (2010, February 08). *La Croix*

⁷⁷Interview to Immigration Minister M. Éric Besson (2008, February 08)

⁷⁸Associated Press. *Débat sur l'identité nationale: Fillon tente de prendre de la hauteur* (2010, February 08).

The strategy of discursively confiscating the subject of national identity from the *Front National*, skillfully mainstreaming it and placing it at the core of national debates on immigrant integration, and artificially elevating it to the category of “national problem” had been completed. The UMP invoked the highly symbolic and ideological questions of national belonging and the integrity of France, mixed with the idea of threat to French national values and language, which served to justify the creation of a Ministry linking immigration, integration and national identity, and later the setting up of a national grand debate on national identity.

The issue of national identity was not only dropped when the Socialists took power in 2012 but overtly criticized for “the constant invocation of grand concepts and supreme values”⁷⁹. It was deemed highly ideological and not corresponding to the need to tackle real integration problems. The UMP and the *Front National* would continue to resort to the same rhetorical line, continuing to depict immigrants’ lack of language skills as a threat to national identity in their 2014 election programs⁸⁰.

⁷⁹ Tuot, T. *La Grande Nation: pour une société inclusive: Rapport au premier ministre sur la refondation des politiques d'intégration*. (2013, February 11) p. 10

⁸⁰Retrieved from <http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/autorite-de-letat/immigration/> [last accessed 14 September 2015]

3.5.5 The European Union rhetoric as a legitimating resource

The attempts to use EU rhetoric and comparison to other countries to legitimate domestic policies has also been a recurrent strategy in the debates. This strategy can be broken into two main types of arguments:

3.5.5.1 Reference to individual European states where similar language measures have been adopted

3.5.5.2 Adopting an exclusionary interpretation of EU soft law within the framework of the French presidency of the Council of the European Union (second semester 2008)

3.5.5.1 Reference to individual European states

Comparing the French case to other European states with compulsory language measures has been systematically observed in French debates on immigrant integration as a political strategy to discursively legitimize domestic measures. The argument was simple: if other countries are adopting measures on language for integration, France must do the same: “In all Western European countries, immigrant integration is considered what it is: a major political issue...In these grand countries, the reform of their immigration policies has entailed a truly democratic and political

debate, which I also want it to take place in France, as the French people expect it”⁸¹.

However, systematic reference is only made to countries with a restrictive approach to language: Germany, Denmark and especially the Netherlands. Constant references to these three countries abound in reports, speeches and policy measures: the 2006 report comparing integration policies in the EU⁸² considers these three countries as a role model in terms of language measures, as well as the numerous HCI reports,⁸³ or the influential Milhaud report, which proposed that “it is advisable to be inspired by the experiences carried out in the Netherlands, where knowledge of language, tested through an exam, is the condition to obtain a long-term residence visa”⁸⁴.

Reference to the Netherlands would be recurrently used, especially to legitimize laws related to language for family reunification as it was one of the first countries to apply compulsory language

⁸¹Speech by N. Sarkozy (2006, May 02)

⁸² Report *Politiques d'intégrations des migrants dans l'Union européenne* (2006, December)

⁸³See *Haut Conseil à l'intégration (HCI)*. (2006, December). Report. *Analyse comparative de différents modèles d'intégration en Europe*

⁸⁴Milhaud, Ch. (2006, September) Report: *L'intégration économique des migrants et la valorisation de leur épargne*. p. 12 Retrieved from:<http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/064000739.pdf> [last accessed 11 September 2015]

knowledge in the countries of origin: “It is my wish to take the example of the Netherlands. Integration, in order to be successful, must be prepared in the countries of origin”⁸⁵ – stated Sarkozy during the 2007 election campaign.

3.5.5.2 Adopting an exclusionary interpretation of EU soft law within the framework of the French presidency of the Council of the European Union

In an attempt to Europeanize the exclusionary approach to language in immigrant integration policies, France used the 2008 European Presidency to impose its particular vision at EU level: “Language courses should be applied systematically, including before entry into Europe. The Integration Contract for third-country nationals must be encouraged throughout all Member States... This integration contract should be compulsory and should include the learning of the national language, national identities and European values”⁸⁶ – stated the Immigration Minister to present the French Presidency’s lines of action. The same domestic rhetoric, now elevated to EU level. The French proposal met with the fierce opposition of a remarkable

⁸⁵Immigration: le candidat de l'UMP hausse le ton. (2007, March 06). *Le Figaro*

⁸⁶Speech by Minister Hortefeux (2008, January 28)

number of European countries, which rejected⁸⁷ the proposal of making language compulsory at EU level.

In a similar vein, the European Commission published a report diplomatically suggesting that the already-existing European soft law – the Council Directive (2003/86/EC) on the Right to Family Reunification and the Council Directive (2003/109/EC) on the Status of Third-Country Nationals – which give Member States the possibility to require third-country nationals to adopt integration measures, ought not to be interpreted in an exclusionary way:

“A few Member States have introduced language as an integration measure into national legislation...The objective of such measures is to facilitate the integration of family members. Their admissibility under the Directive depends on whether they serve this purpose and whether they respect the principle of proportionality. Their admissibility can be questioned on the basis of the accessibility of such courses or tests, how they are designed and/or organized and whether such

⁸⁷Immigration: le contrat d'intégration, un « tout petit détail » (2008, June 05).
Agence France Presse

measures or their impact serve purposes other than integration”.⁸⁸

After intense negotiation with the European Member States, the compulsory nature of the French proposals was dropped. Instead, a much more watered down text was agreed, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, which did not include the term “compulsory”, and only stated that “the learning of the host society’s language is one of the essential factors for integration”, a similar idea contained in the final European document agreed by the EU Member States, the so-called Vichy Declaration.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification (COM (2008) 610 final) p.7

⁸⁹Council conclusions on Integration Policies in the European Union (2008, November 5)

3.6 Concluding remarks. The language debates on immigrant integration in France: problematizing a non-existing problem

The analysis of the language debates on immigrant integration in France has shown the progressive instrumentalization of language as a tool aimed at procuring conformity and immigration control, creating a linkage between these previously separate domains. I have traced the evolution of how language has been discursively problematized by a particular political party in power, the UMP, by adopting the discourse of the *Front National*, and how the opposition parties, mainly the Socialist Party, have been unable to break the dominant discourse.

This chapter has shown how the notion of *integration* has been gradually transformed into a regulatory technique of immigration control managed by the state. The conditionality subsumed in this new version of integration paradoxically demands that foreigners demonstrate knowledge on the way of life, values, culture, history and language of the receiving state as a *sine qua non* condition for integration (Carrera & Faure Atger, 2011). The new approach imposes the heaviest burden of proof on immigrants' shoulders to demonstrate their integration into a homogeneous framing which ideally exists at the foundation of the nation: *la République*.

The mandatory nature of language for integration implies that immigrants' failure to comply with this obligation justifies the application of sanctions by the state – which range from denying

access to the country to the non-granting of a visa/residence permit or non-renewal of the latter, falling into irregularity and/or the consequent expulsion from its territory. Language, in this case, far from being an instrument for integration, becomes an effective tool for immigrant control.

The combination of legislation along with formalized institutional structures – the HCI being the most remarkable one – on the one hand, and a constant invocation of idiosyncratic national myths, rituals and conventions, on the other, have built up the current dominant frame of the French politics for immigrant integration, in which language has strategically occupied a central role. The analysis has shown that it is not only the formal content of the public policy that counts but also the grand symbolism and the discursive packaging around the role of language, sustained through the rhetorical devices of *logos* – the innocuous-looking motto “*Contre l’immigration subie. Pour une immigration choisie*” – *pathos* – appealing to the people’s fears through the idea of *communautarisme* – and *ethos* –invoking French national identity – along with the constant invocation of *failure* to legitimize stricter policies on language.

The highbrow Republican rhetoric and the grand symbolism of the debates have shown a remarkable gap between discourses and the empirical data. While the lack of language skills among immigrants is discursively depicted as one of France’s greatest integration

problems, actual figures are far from this rhetorical line. The empirical analysis has shown that immigrant entries into the country have remained somewhat constant. Similarly, the data on language needs indicate that more than 75% of immigrants wishing to reside in France already have sufficient knowledge of French, as summarized in table 6.

Far from being a covert strategy, the ideological shift towards the instrumentalization of language for immigration control has been an explicit, systematic policy, producing the expected results: a remarkable decrease in permits for residence, family reunification or nationality, as highlighted in table 7.

The recent attempts by the Socialists, in power since 2012, to shape a new rhetoric by breaking the terms of the debate and the dominant frame – dropping the over-encouragement of grand symbolism, recognizing the multiple identities, cultures, religions and languages in France – have met with the frontal opposition of the right and the far right, considering it an offense to the sacrosanct *République française*.

The blunt opposition has not only brought to the surface the deep ideological cleavage over the terms of the debate between the UMP-*Front National*, on the one side, and the Socialists, other more left-wing parties, associations and NGOs on the other. It also showed the impossibility of breaking a well-forged exclusionary dominant ideology on language, constantly followed through in a determined

way, shaped relentlessly over time and skillfully transformed into a public philosophy.

During its time in government, the UMP imposed a language, epistemology and scheme on the role of language for immigrant integration, tenaciously sustained over time, which has become the current dominant ideology on language, discursively legitimated and justified after being previously problematized artificially. As pointed out by Favell (2001) “once established, the political forces that are invested in the current *status quo* by the political parties that have thrown it center-stage need to continually reaffirm and reproduce the policy framework. Against this background, adaptation is problematic because it cannot bring into question the overall framework without risking a renewed crisis” (p. 29) as the one sparked by the recent attempts by the Socialist government to de-problematize language.

Despite the deep party cleavage, this chapter has also shown the existence of an element that is persistently present across the political spectrum: the idea of *le parcours d'intégration*. Integration is depicted as a process, a path, a journey – *le parcours* – that immigrants must go through. In this *parcours*, knowledge of language, along values and identity play a pivotal role. Language alone, however, is not enough for *full* integration. Discourses and legislation alike focus on the concept of *nationality* –often used interchangeably with the concept of *citizenship* – as the final stage in

the *parcours*. The end of the journey, the finishing line in the integration process is to become “a French citizen”, that is, to obtain French nationality.

De l’immigré au citoyen [From immigrant to citizen]. This formula, coined by HCI advisor J. Costa-Lascoux, succinctly illustrates France’s approach on immigrant integration, regarded as a process with different steps along the way; a political formula that places all the weight at the “end” of the integration process, *le citoyen*, who must comply with all the norms of *la République* to become part of the polity.

Language is a core element, but citizenship is *only* achieved through nationality. In other words, for *full* integration, emphasis is placed mainly on the concept of citizenship as a legal status (nationality), and not so much on the concept of citizenship as political activity (participation) or citizenship as identity (loyalty to the country). Debates often link language to participation and identity but it is only when discussing the language-nationality binomial that the concept of citizenship appears. The empirical analysis has therefore shown that the political consensus reached over the French Republican public philosophy in the late 80’s based on the concept of citizenship – with a strong connection with the formal status of membership in the nation, spelled out in nationality law – remains as valid today as in the past.

Rather than addressing the real causes of integration failure – notably poverty, inequality and a declining welfare state – the French philosophy on immigrant integration continues to be dominated by grand, highly symbolic notions and endless terminological discussions on France’s philosophical peculiarities that in the current dynamics of increasing complexity, diversity and rapid social change, fail to provide effective policy responses. The French politics on language for immigrant integration: *plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose*.

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4. THE LANGUAGE DEBATES ON IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN CATALONIA. *E PLURIBUS UNUM?*

4.1 Introduction

Immigration has surged to the top of the political agenda throughout many contemporary societies over the past years, triggering intense debates about immigrant integration. Public debates have often portrayed immigration as a threat, raising concerns over immigrants not engaging in the civic and political life of the host society (Banting & Soroka, 2012). In these debates, language has become an increasingly salient issue, evidenced by the proliferation of language measures which place upon prospective immigrants “increasing and increasingly complex formal demands on knowledge of a/the national language” (Extra, Spotti, & Van Avermaet, 2009, pp. 18-19). As highlighted in previous chapters, an increasing number of scholars (Azoulai & Vries, 2014; Climent-Ferrando, 2015; Hogan-Brun, Mar Molinero, & Stevenson, 2009; Joppke, 2007; Kostakopoulou, 2010; Van Oers, 2013) have pointed out at the instrumentalization of language as a gate-keeping mechanism, transformed into a regulatory technique for the state (Carrera & Faure Atger, 2011).

Much of the scholarship on language for immigrant integration, however, has tended to overlook the existence of sub-state societies

– often referred to as regions, stateless nations or minority nations – with a language different than the State language. Immigrant integration raises concerns for the protection of minority languages in these societies, as immigrants often adopt the majority language, often with more prestige in the public sphere (Hepburn & Zapata Barrero, 2014). Not surprisingly, sub-state territories seek to contest such possibilities by attempting to shape their distinctive approach to immigration (Hepburn, 2009; Kymlicka, 2001; Zapata Barrero, 2009).

This chapter seeks to trace the evolution of language debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia and to analyze the discursive mechanisms used to legitimate the prioritization of Catalan vis-à-vis Spanish in the politics of language for immigrant integration. As a result of the rapid socio-demographic changes brought about by immigration, Catalonia has attempted to shape its own approach on immigrant integration, encouraging newcomers to develop a sense of belonging to the Catalan polity through a narrative of incorporation, social cohesion and citizenship attached to the Catalan language.

This chapter argues that, while recognizing the importance of mastering both Catalan and Spanish, both official languages⁹⁰, the

⁹⁰ Along with Spanish and Catalan, Occitan is also official in Catalonia but only spoken in the Aran Valley.

prioritization of Catalan in the language debates has been based on three discursive elements: a) an identity/symbolic element – developing a sense of *ownership* to Catalan, constantly referred in the debates as Catalonia’s *own language* or *llengua pròpia*, and a sense of *hierarchy*, placing Catalan in a preferential position vis-à-vis Spanish b) an element of shared commitment to the language by referring to Catalan as the *common language* or *llengua comuna* and c) a narrative of positive self-representation by attributing a higher social value to Catalan – labelled in the debates as *the* language of social cohesion, equal opportunities, participation and citizenship.

Constantly (re)produced by a variety of ideology brokers – academicians, NGOs and immigrant associations – through a variety of institutional practices – campaigns, social reproduction systems such as the education system, the Administration, media and a solid associative tissue – the language debates in Catalonia have resulted in the *discursive normalization* of Catalan as *the* language for immigrant integration. It is argued, however, that this is more a sociopolitical desirability as it differs substantially from the demolinguistic reality, in which Spanish continues to be the most-widely used language in Catalonia.

The chapter ultimately argues that language debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia are embedded in a wider sociopolitical process between two competing frames promoting diverging

conceptions of citizenship and different nation-building projects. In this sense, the politics of immigrant integration would be conceived as the politics of reconceptualization and redefinition of the community (Zapata Barrero, 2009) in which the prioritization of Catalan would be placed at the core of this strategy.

4.2 Corpus and methodological framework

To analyze the discursive evolution of the language debates on immigrant integration, I have resorted to Thompson's *Depth Hermeneutics* methodological framework, developed in Discourse Analysis and described in chapter two, which allows us to provide a thorough analysis in three stages: 1) the socio-political analysis, which looks at the historical, political and social context in which discourses and practices are produced, reproduced, modulated and contested 2) the formal and discursive aspects of the analysis – which looks at the narrative, the rhetorical devices and chains of reasoning used as legitimating strategies and 3) the interpretative phase, which is closely intertwined with the previous two.

As for the selection of empirical material, the corpus used for the analysis consists of five different sources: a) through the specialized search engine *Factiva*, I have gathered 335 newspaper articles and debates in Catalan media dealing specifically with language and immigration over the period 2005-2014; b) 61 Parliamentary debates from the Parliament of Catalonia obtained through the Catalan Parliament's specialized research service, which have allowed me to

capture the variation in modulation, reproduction and contestation in the debates; c) 19 policy measures and actions representing the materialization of policies; d) 10 language policy reports (2005-2014) on language measures for immigrant integration developed by the Government of Catalonia; and e) four semi-structured interviews with the former Vice-president of Catalonia, J. Carod-Rovira (2007-2010), the former Secretary-General for Immigration, O. Amorós (2006-2010), the current Director-General of Immigration, X. Bosch (2011-present), and the current Deputy-Director for Language Policy, M. Xirinachs (2012-present).

The analysis of such a considerable wealth of information has been facilitated by the use of the software program *Atlas.ti*, which has allowed me to systematize the information by assigning codes and categorizing the narrative devices and chains of reasoning used to legitimate the number of language measures for immigrant integration. This process has allowed me to analyze how, inserted in material practices of modulation and reproduction over time, the language debates on immigrant integration have been aimed at ensuring that Catalan occupies a hegemonic position.

The period chosen for the analysis – 2005-2014 – is not ascribed to chance. As a consequence of the rapid population growth due to immigration, integration debates have ranked high on the political agenda, crystalized in the *2005-2008 Immigration and Citizenship*

*Plan*⁹¹, the first Plan with an overarching political strategy on migration, as opposed to the previous plans, which were considered more technical in nature (Zapata Barrero, 2005). The demographic trend of this period, with skyrocketing figures up until 2010 and a more downward trend as a consequence of the economic crisis after 2010, as we shall see in the analysis below, also explain the salience of this issue.


The paper is divided into three sections. Following Thompson's framework, sections 4.3 and 4.4 analyze the political and social framework in which debates on language for immigrant integration are produced; section 4.5 provides an in-depth analysis of the rhetorical devices and chains of reasoning used to legitimate language measures to empirically show how the debates have been discursively framed. Finally, section 4.6 highlights the main conclusions derived from the empirical analysis.

⁹¹2005-2008 *Immigration and Citizenship Plan*. (2006). Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya = Government of Catalonia. Retrieved from http://benestar.gencat.cat/web/.content/01departament/08publicacions/ambits_tematics/immigracio/03publiforacoleccio/anteriors/08placiutadaniaimmigracio05-08/2006placiutadania05_08.pdf [last accessed 06 September 2015]

4.3 A socio-political account of the Catalan debates on immigrant integration: conflicting political and legal approaches over the terms of the debate

Over the past few years, Catalonia has experienced an unprecedented population growth derived from migration. In a very short period of time, immigration has gone from 2,9% in 2000 to 14,5% in 2014, or in absolute terms, more than 1.1 million people as shown in figure 4 below.

Figure 4. Immigration growth in Catalonia (2000-2014)



Source: own elaboration. Data from the Catalan Institute for Statistics (2015)

Migration, however, is not a new phenomenon. The Catalan demographic model has been traditionally characterized by population growth derived primarily from immigration (Solé &

Parella, 2008). Unlike previous migration flows, mainly from Southern Spain, however, the current migration patterns are characterized by three main features: intensity, going from less than 3% to around 15% in just a decade, heterogeneity – with a presence of over 150 nationalities and around 280 languages (Barrieras Angàs, 2013), and diversification, immigration extending throughout the Catalan territory and not just in the main urban areas (Climent-Ferrando, 2013).

The consequences of these migration patterns have been a source of concern for its effects on the Catalan language: “The arrival of immigrants might increase the social and instrumental deficits of the Catalan language” stated the *2005-2008 Immigration and Citizenship Plan* (p. 40). Immigration was perceived with hopes and expectations for the Catalan social and economic future but also with fear in terms of preservation and consolidation of the political, cultural and linguistic specificities of Catalonia (Zapata Barrero, 2007).

4.3.1 The effects of immigration on the Catalan language: demo-linguistic figures

Language has been one of the defining traits of Catalonia. Since the restoration of democracy in 1978 and the approval of the first Statute of Autonomy in 1979, the quest to obtain full competences over language to consolidate it socially, politically and legally has been at the forefront of public policies in Catalonia.

From a legal point of view, language protection has been discursively built on the relationship between the concepts of *own language* and *official language*, which hold highly ideological differences (see Riera Gil, 2013). Whereas Catalan is defined in the Statutes of 1979 and 2006 as Catalonia's *own language*, as well as an official language, Spanish is only granted official status. Along with the official status, Catalan was also introduced as the medium of instruction in education through the *Law 7/1983 for Linguistic Normalization in Catalonia*, in which Spanish is also taught as a subject, whose main goal is to “guarantee that all citizens have equal knowledge of both languages and ensure effective bilingualism at the end of compulsory education”, as preconized by the law.

As a result of the increasing migration flows initiated at the beginning of the 21st century, however, a changing demolinguistic paradigm began to surface. Over the past ten years, Catalan has experienced a downward trend as the primary language, as the language of personal identification and as the most frequently used language in Catalonia whereas Spanish has witnessed an increase in two of the three categories, as shown in table 8 below.

Table 8. Language knowledge and use in Catalonia (2003-2013)

	Language	2003	2008	2013
First language used	Catalan	36,2%	31,6%	31,6%
	Spanish	56,1%	55,0%	55,1%
	Both	2,5%	3,8%	2,4%
	Other languages	4,4%	9,3%	10,6%
Language of identification	Catalan	Not available	37,2%	36,4%
	Spanish	Not available	46,5%	47,6%
	Both	Not available	8,8%	7%
	Arabic	Not available	2,4%	2,1%
	Other languages	Not available	4,3%	5,9%
Most frequently-used language	Catalan	46%	35,6%	36,3%
	Spanish	47,2%	45,9	50,7%
	Both	4,7%	12%	6,8%
	Other languages	1,8%	6,5%	5,9 %

Source: *Enquesta d'usos lingüístics de la població 2013*. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya

The same trend is observed in the statistics on knowledge of the four basic language competences – understanding, speaking, reading and writing: whereas the vast majority of the population is able to

understand, speak, read or write Spanish, figures related to Catalan score significantly lower, as shown in table 9 below.

Table 9. Evolution of key language competences in Spanish and Catalan in Catalonia (2008-2013)

Competence	2008				2013			
	Underst.	Speak	Read	Write	Undst.	Speak	Read	Write
Spanish (%)	99,9	99,7	97,4	95,6	99,8	99,7	97,4	95,9
Catalan (%)	94,6	78,3	81,7	61,8	94,3	80,4	82,4	60,4

Source: *Informe de Política Lingüística* (2013). Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya

This increasing demolinguistic dominance of Spanish became one of the main concerns for the Catalan authorities: “One of the most important challenges to Catalan today is ensuring that immigrants integrate through the learning of Catalan”⁹², unanimously stated the five Director-Generals for Language Policy that have held power from 1983 until 2009. Immigration and the ostensible preference of Spanish as well as the fact that many Latin American immigrants already speak it natively were perceived as a threat to the Catalan

⁹² Interviews with 5 Director-Generals on Language Policy. 25 anys de la Llei de Normalització Lingüística en 5 entrevistes. (2009, April 2). *Vilaweb TV*. Retrieved from: <http://www.vilaweb.tv/25-anys-de-la-llei-de-normalitzacio-linguistica-en-5-entrevistes> [last accessed 7 September 2015]

language, which could endanger thirty years of language laws (Mercado, 2008).

The political desirability to reverse this demolinguistic reality became, for the first time, an overt goal in the *2005-2008 Immigration and Citizenship Plan*, which acknowledged the direct, strategic link between immigration and the Catalan language policy: “any immigrant accommodation policy is a language policy” (p. 40), stated the Plan. Unlike previous plans, the Plan overtly expressed concerns over immigrants embracing the majority language: “the arrival of immigrants in bilingual societies surfaces the power relations between languages, as they will tend to adopt the language with more social, economic and political weight. Many immigrants use Spanish, a reflection of the complex social situation existing in Catalonia”. For this reason, the Plan considered prioritization of Catalan as a pivotal issue: “knowledge and use of Catalan must be considered by the immigrant population as a strategic priority” (p. 41).

4.3.2 The quest for more competences on language and migration policies and the political and legal contestation

While the political intention was to prioritize Catalan, the need for more competencies was considered a pivotal issue to pursue this goal: “the current legal framework of the Spanish state hinders the Catalan approach on integration due to the current distribution of competencies. The Parliament of Catalonia will work towards a new distribution of competences” stated the *2005-2008 Immigration and Citizenship Plan* (p. 37). This would be the basis for the still unresolved tensions on “who does what” in the decision-making process (Hepburn & Zapata Barrero, 2014).

Powers on immigration were not discussed during the transition to democracy, and were therefore not included in the Spanish Constitution of 1978. Despite not having a clear-cut distribution of competences, immigration policies have been defined following a pragmatic approach. As pointed out by Zapata Barrero (2012) the management of territorial borders and immigration flows is the exclusive responsibility of the Central Government while issues related to integration are the responsibility of regional and local governments. Language being a key aspect of integration, tensions would arise over the hegemonic role of Catalan vis-à-vis Spanish in the language debates on immigrant integration.

The 2006 Catalan Statute of Autonomy sparked a series of debates over the language-migration binomial. The new Statute responded on the one hand, to the need to legally consolidate the Catalan language regime and, on the other, to extend it to other policies not included in the previous 1979 Statute, immigration being one of them (Pons Parera, 2011). Two main novelties on language were included: the concept of *preferential status* of Catalan in the Administration (art. 6.1) and the right *and duty* to know Catalan (art. 6.2). The idea, supported by more than 85% of the political groups of the Catalan Parliament (CiU, PSC, ERC and ICV) was politically legitimated on the grounds that language still needed special protection as it is still in a disadvantageous position. Along with language, the Statute also approved new competences on immigration (art. 138)⁹³.

Despite its broad political consensus over the terms of the debate, these elements were contested by the Spanish center-right People's Party (PP), taking the Statute to the Constitutional Court⁹⁴. To this we must add the ferocious criticism on the prioritization of language by the then recently created party Ciutadans (C's), which turned the language issue into its main bone of contention: "The Catalan Statute has been taken to the Constitutional Court. We don't want

⁹³ For a full analysis of the competences of the Statute, see Camas Roda (2010)

⁹⁴ Appeal number 8045-2006. Retrieved from <https://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut/index.htm> [last accessed 7 September 2015]

preferential languages, we want languages to be used socially. We will contest any ideology that attempts to make one language the preferential one and marginalize the other”⁹⁵ – stated C’s president Albert Rivera.

The Constitutional Court ruling on the Statute in 2010 left no doubt over the terms of the debate: the term “preferential” was declared unconstitutional on the grounds that “the concept of *preference* goes beyond the mere description of a linguistic reality and implies the dominance of Catalan over Spanish”⁹⁶. Article 138 on immigration was declared 'subject to interpretation'. While not removed from the statutory text, it was ruled that some sections would be analyzed as specific cases arise. As pointed out by Pons Parera (2011), “the ruling was based on an ideological *a priorism*. The ideological charge of the Constitutional ruling can be perceived in the adjectives applied to both languages: while the Catalan language is depicted as a “privative language”, Spanish is described as the “language shared with all the Autonomous Communities”, “common to all the Autonomous Communities” and the “only common Spanish language” (p. 1).

⁹⁵ Parliamentary debate (2010, January 01)

⁹⁶ Ruling *31/2010*, on 28 June 2010, BOE 172 § STC 031 (2010). Retrieved from <http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/Paginas/Sentencia.aspx?cod=16273> [last accessed 8 September 2015]

Despite this legal contestation, the political attempts to prioritize Catalan would be further developed in all subsequent policies on immigrant integration. The *2008 National Agreement on Immigration*⁹⁷, a consensus-based policy document defining the overall strategy on the politics of integration, placed Catalan in a hegemonic position on the grounds that it is Catalonia's own language and that it still is in a disadvantageous position while recognizing the utility for immigrants to gain "linguistic abilities both in Catalan and Spanish" (p. 24). The Agreement, subscribed again in 2012 by the same political forces, showed the wide consensus over the terms of the debate.

The Agreement, along with the subsequent *2009-2012 Immigration and Citizenship Plan*, served as political basis to approve the 10/2010 Law on Reception for Immigrants and Returnees to Catalonia⁹⁸ aimed at offering the basic integration tools at the initial stages of the immigration process, language occupying once again a pivotal role.

⁹⁷*2008 National Agreement on Immigration = Pacte Nacional per a la Immigració*. (n.d.). Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya = Government of Catalonia. Retrieved from

http://benestar.gencat.cat/ca/ambits_tematicas/immigracio/politiques_i_plans_dact_uacio/pacte_nacional_per_a_la_immigracio/ [last accessed 4 September 2015]

⁹⁸Llei 10/2010, del 7 de maig, d'acollida de les persones immigrades i de les retornades a Catalunya, DOC 5629 § 37720 (2010). Retrieved from <http://www.gencat.cat/eadop/imatges/5629/10126029.pdf> [last accessed 12 September 2015]

The law followed the same political postulates over the hegemonization of Catalan in immigrant integration policies: “language provision will be first delivered in Catalan. Having finished and successfully completed instruction in Catalan, Spanish provision will be offered only upon request by the migrant”⁹⁹.

Despite the legally-binding favorable opinion on the Law delivered by the Catalan Advisory Council on statutory matters (*Consell de Garanties Estatutàries*)¹⁰⁰, it was contested both politically and legally: the PP and C’s voted against the law arguing that “it is not intended to integrate immigrants but to protect the Catalan language and the Catalan nation”¹⁰¹ and legally by the Spanish Ombudswoman, who took the law to the Constitutional Court using the same legal reasoning used by the Constitutional Court against the 2006 Statute: “if the Constitutional Court ruled against the term *preferential* in the 2006 Statute of Autonomy, it must act accordingly with this law, which sets a priority of Catalan over Spanish, establishing an absolute preference of Catalan, imposing one language over the other, something that is unacceptable as both languages are official”.¹⁰²

⁹⁹*Op.cit.*

¹⁰⁰Legal opinion 6/2010. (2010, April 22)

¹⁰¹ Parliamentary debate (2010, April 24)

¹⁰² Appeal no. 2/2010

Pending a Court decision at the time of writing this thesis (beginning of 2016), the legal contestation sparked a heated reaction by the Catalan authorities as well as by an ample sector of the Catalan civil society: The Government of Catalonia confirmed that the law shall be applied regardless of the Court decision, highlighting that “Spain continues to have an imperialist dominant ideology”¹⁰³. The Parliament of Catalonia¹⁰⁴, the Immigration and Citizenship Board¹⁰⁵ – a deliberative government body in immigration matters comprising immigrant organizations created in 2008 – as well as more than 50 immigrant associations¹⁰⁶ and prominent language NGOs such as *Plataforma per la Llengua*¹⁰⁷, to name only a few, issued different

¹⁰³ Reacció unànime contra la decisió del Defensor del Poble (2010, October 18). *El Punt Avui*.

¹⁰⁴ Positioning available at http://benestar.gencat.cat/ca/ambits_tematicos/immigracio/legislacio/llei_dacollida_de_les_persones_immigrades_i_retornades_a_catalunya/posicionament_rekurs_i_nconstitucionalitat [last accessed 12 September 2015]

¹⁰⁵ Positioning available at http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsvp/AppJava/immigracio/notapremsavw/47666/ca/comissio-permanent-taula-ciutadania-immigracio-exigeix-defensora-pueblo-retiri-rekurs-llei-dacollida.do [last accessed 13 September 2015]

¹⁰⁶ Public Manifesto: *En defensa de la llei d’acollida de les persones immigrades i retornades a Catalunya*. Retrieved from <http://www.cnjc.cat/documents/manifest-en-defensa-de-la-llei-dacollida.pdf> [last accessed 16 September 2015]

¹⁰⁷ *Plataforma per la Llengua creu que el recurs contra la Llei d’acollida és una intromissió a la voluntat del poble català*”. (2010, August 18). Retrieved from <https://www.plataforma-llengua.cat/> [last accessed 11 September 2015]

manifestos in favor of the law and the prioritization of Catalan vis-à-vis Spanish.

To the political and legal contestation we must also add an economic one. The Immigrant Integration State Fund created in 2005 by the Socialist Party as the financial source for Autonomous Communities to apply integration policies was eliminated soon after the PP won the General Elections of 2011, as shown in table 10 below. This decision was contested by the Catalan Government as well as by an ample majority of the civil society. The Spanish government had transferred the competences on integration to regional and local levels but cut off the necessary financial resources.

Table 10. State budget for immigrant integration in Spain (2005-2015)

Year	€ Million
2005	€120
2006	€182
2007	€200
2008	€200
2009	€200
2010	€67
2011	€67
2012	€0
2013	€0
2014	€0
2015	€0

Source: Own elaboration from *Fondos de Apoyo a la Acogida e Integración*

■ Socialists in State power

■ People's Party in State power

Against this backdrop, the Government of Catalonia announced the elaboration of a draft bill¹⁰⁸ before the Spanish Senate to legislate the redistribution of the European Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) – the EU's current financial mechanism for Member States for the 2014-2020 period to support integration. As highlighted by the Catalan Director-General for Immigration in our interview, X. Bosch, “the Spanish authorities have already rejected the idea of transferring these funds to the regional and local level”.

¹⁰⁸CiU demana distribuir entre les comunitats autònomes els Fons Europeus per a la integració d'immigrants. (2010, August 28). *CiU Press Release*.

Following the 10/2010 Law on Reception for Immigrants and Returnees to Catalonia, the modification of the Spanish Law on Foreigner¹⁰⁹ in 2011 transferred the competencies to the Autonomous Communities to certify the degree of integration of migrants, including language. These new competencies allow the Communities to issue integration reports, needed when applying for residence permits and nationality, which is a State competence. The language issue became, one again, a matter of contention between Catalonia and Spain. As highlighted by the Director-General in our interview “whereas the Spanish authorities wanted to include the clause “sufficient knowledge of Spanish *or* Catalan”, the Catalan Government insisted that the wording should be “sufficient knowledge of Spanish *and* Catalan”. Even if this is not a compulsory requirement as the final saying belongs to the Spanish authorities, it was considered a major step for the Catalan language.

¹⁰⁹Decreto Real 557/2011, de 20 de abril, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social, tras su reforma por Ley Orgánica 2/2009. BOE 103 § 10599. (2011). Retrieved from <http://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2011-7703> [last accessed 14 September 2015]

Despite the pending Court ruling on the 2010 Law, the Catalan Government approved a decree in November 2014 specifying the mechanisms of compliance: third-country immigrants will need to prove knowledge of both Catalan and Spanish or follow a 90-hour course of Catalan first – and Spanish if they so wish after having completed Catalan language courses – to obtain the “First Reception Certificate”. When asked about the consequences of a potential adverse ruling, the Director-General was clear over the political intention: “the Catalan decree shall be applied no matter what”.

The *2009-2012 Immigration and Citizenship Plan* and the current *2013-2016 Citizenship and Migrations Plan* followed previous postulates on the central role of Catalan in immigrant integration policies. While recognizing the need for immigrants to master both languages, Catalan continues to be placed in a hegemonic position.

4.4 The politics of language for immigrant integration in Catalonia. An analysis

The socio-political analysis of the role of language in Catalan debates on immigrant integration has surfaced the political strategy of linking Catalan to immigrant integration policies, overtly expressed in the *2005-2008 Immigration and Citizenship Plan*. Aware that immigrants adopt the prestigious language in bilingual societies and that Catalan could see its number of speakers reduced, the Catalan

authorities have adopted the political strategy of prioritizing Catalan in the debates.

The number of measures on language for integration, compiled in table 11 below, summarize this political desirability of transforming the demolinguistic reality, characterized by three constant features: a high political consensus over the policy framework, the constant quest for more self-government claims, and the ongoing political, legal, and economic tensions over the terms of the debate.

Table 11. The language measures for immigrant integration in Catalonia (2005-2014)

	Date	Measure	Effect
1	June 2005	2005-2008 Immigration and Citizenship Plan	Explicit link between immigration and language policy
2	June 2005	Decree 11/2005 modifying the Catalan Advisory Council on Language	Incorporation of immigrant voices in the Government's advisory body on language
3	March 2006	National Agreement on Education	Catalan strengthened as vehicular language in the education system
4	July 2006	Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia	Two novelties on language and immigration policies: Catalan defined as <i>preferential</i> language in the Administration Extension of competencies on immigration

5	July 2006	8045/2006. Appeal of unconstitutionality to the Catalan Statute of Autonomy	Legal challenge against the main elements regarding language and immigration: Challenging the concept of <i>preferential</i> language Challenging the extension of competencies on immigration
6	June 2007	Language and Social Cohesion Plan	Catalan reinforced in the education system
7	April 2008	Decree 86/2008 on the Creation of the Immigration and Citizenship Board	Official participation channel for immigrants into the policy-making process on immigration policies
8	December 2008	National Agreement on Immigration	Catalan defined as <i>the common language</i> in Catalonia
9	July 2009	Law 12/2009 on Education	Catalan reinforced in the education system
10	December 2009	2009-2012 Immigration and Citizenship Plan	Continuation of the terms of the debate contained in previous Plans
11	April 2010	6/2010 Opinion of the Advisory Council of Legal and Constitutional Affairs on the prioritization of Catalan in the 10/2010 Law on Reception	Legally-binding opinion on the Constitutionality of prioritizing Catalan in the 10/2010 law
12	May 2010	10/2010 Law on Reception of Immigrants and Returnees to Catalonia	By law, language provision must start with Catalan. Spanish will follow only upon request by migrants.
13	June 2010	31/2010 Constitutional Court ruling against the language and migration competences in the 2006 Statute	a) The preferential use of Catalan is declared unconstitutional and the learning of Catalan is not considered a “duty”.

			b) Immigration competencies are considered “subject to interpretation”
14	August 2010	2/2010 Action of unconstitutionality by the Spanish Ombudswoman against the language regime of the 10/2010 Law on Reception	The Constitutional Court still to decide the constitutionality of the language regime of the 2010 Law on Reception
15	April 2011	Royal Decree 557/2011 Modification of Spanish Foreigner’s Law	New competencies on immigrant integration certificates, including knowledge of Catalan language, necessary for nationality (State competence). Non-binding
16	March 2012	Ratification of the 2008 NAI	Consensus over NAI renewed
17	June 2013	2013-2016 Migrations and Citizenship Plan	Policy continuity on language and migration
18	November 2014	Decree 150/2014. Law on Reception enters into force	Despite the pending Constitutional Court ruling over the language regime of the 2010 law on reception, the Catalan Government applies the law
19	2015	Draft bill on the distribution of the European Asylum, Immigration and Integration Fund	Proposal for the distribution of European funds among the Spanish Autonomous Communities for integration policies

Source: own elaboration

The broad political and social consensus over the prioritization of Catalan over Spanish in the politics of immigrant integration has been


met with fierce contestation from a political, legal and economic angle. Political contestation has been led by two specific political parties – C's and PP's – which have made the language issue their main bone of contention. Despite this, the socio-political analysis over the language debates on immigrant integration has traced the evolution on how Catalonia has been shaping its own political approach on language for immigrant integration. Consistently followed and shaped relentlessly over time, it has become the dominant ideology in the language debates, making it part and parcel of the current Catalan public philosophy on immigrant integration.

Section 4.5 below analyzes how this public philosophy on immigrant integration has been discursively sustained, creating a specific narrative and building a new interpretative frame to legitimate the increasing number of language measures on Catalan for immigrant integration. What have been the rhetorical devices and chains of reasoning deployed to ensure that Catalan occupies a hegemonic position in the language debates on immigrant integration? How has this paradigm been mainstreamed, legitimized and institutionalized to become the current public philosophy on immigrant integration? Why has language become such an important object of political and legal contestation in the debates on immigrant integration?

4.5 Legitimizing language ideologies for immigrant integration in Catalonia

The corpus analyzed has allowed me to trace the discursive evolution of the language debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia and to identify the main narrative features used to sustain discursively the prioritization of Catalan in the debates. Figure 5 below graphically illustrates this analysis, containing information on three specific aspects: 1) the intensity of the debates, measured through the number of references appeared in media, showing the saliency of the debate at certain specific periods and showcased along the Y axis; 2) the materialization of discourses – the 19 concrete language measures (numbers 1 to 19) explained in table 11 above and 3) the dominant topic at specific periods, highlighted in different colors in the graph, which provides a succinct analysis of the core subjects employed at specific moments. The different electoral periods are also included for contextual purposes.

Figure 5. The discursive evolution of the language debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia (2005-2014)



Source: own elaboration

The empirical analysis has allowed me to identify four main elements that are recurrently present in the language debates on immigrant integration and to trace the evolution on how these have been systematically used, creating a specific frame, that is, a particular interpretative scheme which defines, identifies and categorizes the Catalan language in a specific way, through which the language

policy measures have been discursively sustained. As we shall see below, the analysis will show the political desirability to construct a distinctive approach on language for immigrant integration. These four elements revolve around the overall strategy of *positive self-representation* of Catalan, assigning the language the attributes of participation and social cohesion as well as symbolic and civic membership to the Catalan polity:

4.5.1 The motto *Catalan Way of Integration* [*Via Catalana d'Integració*]. The systematic association of Catalan as the language for participation, social cohesion and opportunities

4.5.2 The concept of *resident citizenship* and its ideological implications

4.5.3 The *national identity* narrative in the language debates on immigrant integration

4.5.4 The concepts of *own language* and *common language* in the language debates on immigrant integration

4.5.1 The motto *Catalan Way of Integration* [*Via Catalana d'Integració*]. The foundations of the Catalan philosophy of integration

“Catalonia works towards the *Catalan Way of Integration*. The Government acknowledges that linguistic diversity is a fact and that managing it effectively is the new obligation of our society. The

Government respects the individual decision of being part of a community. This respect towards the individual right must be coupled with the duty of knowing and participating in a shared public culture. Cohesion and stability in a society must be given priority and attention. A cohesive society requires a minimal common vision, common elements and values: The Catalan culture and language.”¹¹⁰

This statement, uttered in 2007 by Catalan Minister for immigration issues, C. Capdevila, succinctly summarizes the content of the formula *Catalan Way of Integration*. Politically conceived for the first time in the *2001-2004 Immigration Plan*¹¹¹ and defined as a “model that finds a balance between respecting diversity and the feeling of belonging to one single community, having as a goal to ensure that immigrants become aware of the Catalan language while valuing and respecting their own” (p. 7), this formula would be systematically used in all the subsequent Immigration Plans and recurrently invoked in the Parliamentary debates. As graphically highlighted in figure 5 above, referring to the *Catalan Way of Integration* has been a constant narrative feature in the language debates on immigrant integration.

¹¹⁰ Parliamentary debate (2007, March 07)

¹¹¹ *Pla Interdepartamental d'Immigració: 2001-2004*. (2001). Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya = Government of Catalonia. Retrieved from http://benestar.gencat.cat/web/.content/03ambits_tematicas/05immigracio/03politiquespplansactuacio/antecedents/IMMIGR1.pdf [last accessed 14 September 2015]

Under this syntactic formula, Catalan is rhetorically depicted as *the* language of participation, *the* language for social cohesion and *the* language of opportunities, a pattern observed constantly throughout the analysis, as we shall see below. The ideological semantics underlying such lexical selection is not ascribed to chance. As pointed out by Blommaert (1999, p. 2) language ideological debates are often organized around issues of the “social” value and symbolic “quality” of some languages as opposed to others, the socio-political desirability of the use of one language over another, and other “values”, which are, in fact, socio-political ideals. In the Catalan debates, these socio-political ideals would be recurrently placed on the Catalan language whereas Spanish, while also deemed necessary for integration, is described neutrally or silenced in the debates.

4.5.1.1 Catalan: the language of immigrant participation

One of the defining traits of the *Catalan Way of Integration* is the constant invocation of the idea of *immigrant participation*, systematically associated to knowledge of the Catalan language. “Promoting Catalan among the immigrant population is a strategic element for real participation” stated the *2005-2008 Citizenship and Immigration Plan* (p. 47). The pattern of attributing participation to Catalan would be present all along the debates as a discursive strategy to depict Catalan as a useful and attractive language: The *2005-2008 Citizenship and Immigration Plan*, which states that “if Catalan

becomes the language of immigrant associations, this can contribute to their institutional recognition” (pp. 40-41). The 2008 National Agreement on Immigration has *participation* as one of the most widely-used concepts and states that “considering one of its primary goals to foster participation in public life and making Catalan the common public language” (p. 64). The same chain of reasoning is observed in the *2009-2012 Citizenship and Immigration Plan* and in the *2013-2016 Citizenship and Migrations Plan*, which claims that “while a fundamental aspect in the integration process is materialized in the learning of Catalan and Spanish, Catalan needs to continue being the language to be promoted as the language of participation” (pp. 44-45).

This idea would also be replicated in Parliamentary debates by those political parties giving support to the different Plans as well as by an ample sector of socio-economic agents, including immigrant associations¹¹². As highlighted by the then Catalan president in 2007 J. Montilla (Socialist) when presenting the main Government actions on immigrant integration “One of the participation channels in the social, professional and cultural integration is to be found in knowledge and use of the Catalan language”¹¹³ along the same lines of the President of the Catalan Parliament (ERC), who highlighted “the importance that immigrants perceive that Catalan is highly

¹¹² Parliamentary debate (2009, November 11)

¹¹³ Parliamentary debate (2007, September 26)

useful in their integration process...so that they can participate in public life. It is the Catalan language that must guarantee this”.¹¹⁴The exact same rhetoric would be replicated by Trade Unions and immigrant associations alike as observed in the words of G. Saliba, Immigration Secretary of CC.OO Trade Union who supported the 2010 Law on Reception by stating that the “Catalan language is a key factor in the integration process to have equal opportunities for participation and social promotion... Knowledge of Catalan must be a right to all the people in Catalonia, third-country nationals, EU citizens or Spanish citizens”¹¹⁵.

Immigrant participation, however, did not remain in the sphere of rhetoric. Political channels of participation were also put in place: the Social Council for the Catalan Language – the governmental advisory body on language policy issues – was modified by decree¹¹⁶ in 2005 (item 2 in table 11 above) to incorporate for the first time immigrant voices into the policy-making process regarding language, and the

¹¹⁴ Parliament of Catalonia, *Conference on the Catalan language*. (2009, February 06)

¹¹⁵ Parliamentary debate (November, 2009 17)

¹¹⁶ Decret *116/2005*, de 14 de juny, del Consell Social de la Llengua Catalana, DOGC 4407. (2005). Retrieved from <http://www.upf.edu/sintesi/2005/dj116.htm> [last accessed 14 September 2015]

Immigration and Citizenship Board was created¹¹⁷ in 2008 (item 7 in table 11) to encourage immigrant participation through this participation channel. As pointed out by Climent-Ferrando & Triviño (2015) “based on the ideological concept of the *Catalan Way of Integration*, the Government of Catalonia created an institutional framework that favored a type of integration in which immigrant associations themselves promoted the Catalan language among immigrants and acted as entities in a constant process of institutionalisation within Catalan channels of political participation” (p. 179).

4.5.1.2 Catalan: the language of social cohesion

“By approving this [2005-2008] Immigration Plan, the Government highlights the strategic commitment to Catalan as the language for social cohesion, because a social cohesion policy must also be a language policy”.¹¹⁸ This statement, uttered in 2005 by the First Deputy Minister of Catalonia, J. Bargalló, highlights the attribution of *social cohesion* to the Catalan language, a chain of reasoning systematically observed all along the language debates to legitimate the prioritization of Catalan, as derived from the corpus analyzed.

¹¹⁷ Decree 86/2008, de 15 d'abril, de la Taula de Ciutadania i Immigració. DOGC 5113. (2008). Retrieved from <http://www.upf.edu/sintesi/2008/da86.htm> [last accessed 14 September 2015]

¹¹⁸La Generalitat destina 69 milions per afavorir la integració dels immigrants. (2006, June, 28). *Europa Press*

While acknowledging the need to master both Spanish and Catalan, the debates assign the social cohesion attributes only to Catalan: The *2008 National Agreement on Immigration* (item 8 in table 11 above) states that “knowledge of Catalan generates trust, expresses a sense to belonging and contributing to social cohesion” (p. 69), along the same lines of the *2009-2012 Citizenship and Immigration Plan* (item 10 in table 11), which states that “against a backdrop of growing multilingualism in Catalonia, the Plan fosters the cohesive aspect of the public use of Catalan” (p. 146) or the 10/2010 Law on the Reception of Immigrants and Returnees to Catalonia (item 12 in table 11) which refers to the need to acquire language skills in both Catalan and Spanish, prioritizing Catalan for its social cohesion attributes.

4.5.1.3 The education system for social cohesion: a core channel of linguistic-ideological regimentation

The analysis has shown a persistent reference to the Catalan education system and the prioritization of Catalan as the vehicular language in school as the guarantor for social cohesion. Both the *2006 National Agreement on Education*¹¹⁹ (item 3 in table 11) and

¹¹⁹*2006 National Agreement on Education = Pacte Nacional per a l'Educació*. (2006). Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya = Government of Catalonia. Retrieved from http://www.gencat.cat/educacio/butlleti/PNE_06.pdf [last accessed 14 September 2015]

the Plan for Language and Social Cohesion (item 6 in table 11) acknowledge the need for the education system to guarantee full competence in both official languages but prioritize Catalan as the language for social cohesion: “Due to immigration, normalization of the Catalan language in social life is an element that requires special attention. It is necessary to consolidate Catalonia’s own language as a pivotal axis around a plurilingual educational project geared towards social cohesion” (p. 6).

The systematic attribution of the positive values of social cohesion to Catalan in education is systematically replicated in the Catalan Parliamentary debates by the majority of the political parties and supported by a wide variety of ideology brokers such as the Catalan Ombudsman,¹²⁰ language NGOs such as *Plataforma per la Llengua*, or trade unions such as UGT,¹²¹ to name only a few, showing a high consensus over the terms of the debate.

The prioritization of Catalan as the vehicular language in education, however, would also spark a deep political, social and legal contestation, led by the two political parties that turned the prioritization of Catalan as their main bone of contention C’s and PP: “When you talk about guaranteeing Catalan as the vehicular language in education to guarantee social cohesion, well, social cohesion is a

¹²⁰Parliamentary debate (2007, March 27)

¹²¹ Parliamentary debate (2009, September 16)

lot more than just one language”¹²² – stated PP Member of the Catalan Parliament López Rueda, along the same lines of C’s Member Robles Almeida, who contested the social cohesion narrative by claiming that “the concept of social cohesion is used to legitimize the prioritization of Catalan over Spanish. In any case, the problem in Catalonia is not the magic words through which we conform the reality but their interpretation. What do we understand by “social cohesion”? Do we mean pluriculturalism or assimilation? My perception of what is happening in Catalonia is assimilation”.¹²³

The political contestation was also matched by a Popular Legislative Initiative in 2007 against the prioritization of Catalan in the school system, led by the association for the defence of Spanish-speakers in Catalonia, *Convivencia Cívica Catalana*. On the grounds that “the Catalan school system discriminates Spanish speakers in Catalonia”¹²⁴, a petition for a legislative proposal, signed by some 50 000 citizens in Catalonia, was presented before the Catalan Parliament to modify the legislative framework.

Except for C’s and PP, all the political parties rejected the initiative invoking the social cohesion attributes of the Catalan language: “the political reasons for our school model are clear. If you want a

¹²² Parliamentary debate (2007, March 27)

¹²³ Parliamentary debate (2009, January 16)

¹²⁴ Parliamentary debate (2007, December 17)

cohesive society around one language, while respecting the languages spoken within the family and also the co-official status of Spanish, that is our current model.”¹²⁵ – stated CiU Member of Parliament I. Rigau, counting on the support of the majority of the political forces.

To this socio-political contestation we must add the legal battle against the prioritization of Catalan as the only vehicular language in school. A remarkable number of Court rulings¹²⁶ have introduced the possibility to use Spanish as a vehicular language at the request of parents. These rulings sparked a series of political, legal, social and academic counter-reactions to defend the vehicular role of Catalan in education, as graphically shown in figure 5 above, which highlights the intensity of the debates contesting the Superior Court of Justice ruling demanding that the Catalan Government complies with a previous Supreme Court ruling of December 2010 obliging the Government to introduce Spanish as a vehicular language at the request of parents.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Parliamentary debate (2007, December 17)

¹²⁶ For a thorough account on the Court rulings see *Greuges contra la llengua catalana. 2010-2013*. (2014). Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya. Retrieved from http://web.gencat.cat/ca/actualitat/detall/20150401_Greuges-contra-la-llengua-catalana [last accessed 07 September 2015]

¹²⁷ Court Ruling of 2 September 2011 demanding the Catalan Government to comply with a previous Supreme Court ruling of December 2010 including Spanish as a vehicular language if parents requested so. See a full account of contestation responses from both the Government and the civil society, available at

From a political standpoint, all the political parties, except for the PP and C's, unanimously expressed the importance of Catalan in the language education system as a guarantor for social cohesion in an immigration context. From a legal standpoint, the Government appealed all the Court decisions by claiming systematically that it is the Catalan immersion school model that fosters social cohesion.¹²⁸ From an academic standpoint, the Catalan universities published an overarching report in 2011 – *Language and Schooling in Catalonia: Facts and Fiction. Recent empirical research on the subject* – stating that “these attacks are not based on scientific criteria but on purely political motives” (p. 3). Finally, from a social standpoint, a remarkable number of civil society associations – organized around the education NGO *Som Escola* – organizations and institutions publicly expressed their support to the Catalan school model, replicating the positive attributes of social cohesion applied to the Catalan language in the school system.

<http://lengua.gencat.cat/ca/Declaracions-sobre-la-llengua/El-model-educatiu-de-Catalunya/> [last accessed 09 September 2015]

¹²⁸ For an account of the political and legal argumentation by the Catalan Government see *El model educatiu català*, available at <http://lengua.gencat.cat/ca/Declaracions-sobre-la-llengua/El-model-educatiu-de-Catalunya/> [last accessed 14 September 2015]

A closer look at the data evidences a remarkable gap between the political-ideological debates against the prioritization of Catalan in school and the factual, empirical data, which show the absence of a major linguistic and social conflict. In the latest annual report on language rights by the Catalan Ombudsman (2014), the role of Catalan as vehicular language in the education system does not rank as one of the main complaints, as shown in table 12 below.

Table 12. Language complaints in Catalonia (2008-2013)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Lack of Catalan	86	99	106	125	43	42	501
Complaints	20	14	29	76	18	19	176
Information requests	66	84	75	48	24	21	318
Lack of Spanish	141	52	54	53	27	20	347
Complaints	10	9	15	32	12	12	90
Information requests	131	42	39	21	15	8	131
Main topic of concern	Not avail.	Not avail.	Lack of Catalan in health system	Lack of Catalan in telephone services, transport and State Administration Lack of Spanish in road signs	Lack of Catalan in the judiciary Lack of Spanish in some web public info	Lack of Catalan in Court rulings Lack of information on bilingual services in Catalan Admin. Lack of Catalan in Barcelona civil registrar	

Source: own elaboration from *Informe sobre els drets lingüístics a Catalunya*. (2014). Síndic de Greuges de Catalunya

The political attempts to frame the Catalan education system in a narrative of conflict can also be contrasted with the empirical data within the education system itself. As shown in table 13 below, the number of parents requesting Spanish as the vehicular language in education, following the different Court decisions, is significantly low, showing that the political problematization of Catalan as the vehicular language in school does not represent the social reality.

Table 13. Requests for Spanish-immersion schooling in Barcelona (2010-2014)

School year	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014
Number of students	235	48	18	7
%	0,1%	0,02%	0,007%	0,003%
Average number of students	230,000			

Source: Own elaboration. From data from the Comissió Municipal d'Educació (2014). Barcelona City Council¹²⁹

To the empirical data we must add the explicit support of the Catalan Ombudsman to the immersion school system and the use of Catalan as overtly supported the prioritization of Catalan as a vehicular language and its key role for social cohesion: “the results over the last 30 years of the language immersion system in Catalonia is an

¹²⁹Només set alumnes de Barcelona han demanat estudiar en castellà. (2013, November 19). *Ara.cat*.

asset of the language regime as an instrument for social cohesion. All evidence available shows that in Catalonia, the level of Spanish attained by the school population is not lower than in any other monolingual Spanish region. The Catalan Ombudsman recommends the consolidation of this language regime in the future”.¹³⁰ This explicit support was considered to be ideologically based by C’s and PP: “We have harsh criticisms towards your task as an Ombudsman. You have become the Ombudsman for the Catalan language instead of the Ombudsman of citizens”¹³¹ – stated C’s Member of Parliament Robles Almeida.

The high political and legal controversy over language in the school confirms the relevance of the education system as a crucial channel for linguistic-ideological regimentation, as pointed out by a number of scholars (see, e.g., Blommaert, 1999; Bourdieu, 1994; Milani, 2008; Woolard, 2008). Assigning the benefits of social cohesion to the Catalan language while conferring a simple functional value to Spanish shows the struggle in the process of making Catalan the authoritative language. As pointed out by Woolard (2008), “in analyzing discourses about language policies in multilingual settings,

¹³⁰ Síndic de Greuges de Catalunya . *Informe sobre els drets lingüístics a Catalunya*. (2014), p. 6. Retrieved from http://www.sindic.cat/site/unitFiles/3708/Informe_drets_linguistics_OK_amb_cobertes.pdf [last accessed 29 August 2015]

¹³¹ Parliamentary debate (2007, March 26)

one crucial question is what makes languages authoritative in community members' eyes and ears" (p. 138). As shown in the analysis, the positive self-representation of Catalan by attributing a higher social value, that of social cohesion, with special emphasis in the education system, has been a key element in the throughout the language debates on immigrant integration in an attempt to make Catalan the authoritative language.

4.5.2 The concept of *resident citizenship* and its ideological implications

“An Ecuadorian in Madrid will always be an Ecuadorian whereas an Ecuadorian in Catalonia who speaks Catalan will automatically be a Catalan”¹³². This statement – uttered by former Vice-president of Catalonia, J. Carod-Rovira, to define the Catalan approach to immigrant integration, summarizes the emergence of a new concept and its linguistic-ideological implications: the concept of *resident citizenship*.

Introduced for the first time in the Catalan debates on immigrant integration in the *2005-2008 Citizenship and Immigration Plan*, it was consciously brought into the narrative to represent “a new

¹³²ERC critica les polítiques europees d'immigració pel seu "nacionalisme". (2006, June 28). *El Periódico*.

concept detached from the State concept of nationality” (p. 34). The strategy of detaching the concept of citizenship to that of nationality was conceived to contest the Spanish State by adopting an inclusive approach of citizenship, less legal and more emotional, developing a sense of belonging to the Catalan community, building a narrative of inclusion and civic belonging. This ideological strategy was overtly stated in the Plan: “Given the close link between citizenship and nationality, our approach on citizenship has a vindicatory approach vis-à-vis the State. We seek complicity within the Catalan society” (p. 36). As pointed out by Zapata Barrero (2005) “the definition of citizenship linked to residence questioned the monopoly held by the State over the definition of citizenship linked almost exclusively to nationality. By doing so, Catalonia was developing a strategic political action.” (p. 15).

The analysis has shown that the conceptualization of the term *resident citizenship* would be discursively materialized through the terms *new citizens*, *new residents* and especially, *new Catalans*, three terms that have systematically appeared in the empirical analysis all along the language debates to convey the message of inclusion, as depicted graphically in figure 5 above. The discursive representation of immigrants through these new terms had as its primary goal to insufflate a sense of symbolic inclusion and membership into the Catalan polity, building a cognitive frame aimed at portraying immigrants as members of the “in-group”, by considering them as

Catalans or *citizens*, putting them on an equal footing as the rest of Catalans, albeit symbolically.

While it is true that the concept of *resident citizenship* only required an administrative attachment to Catalonia – measured through the inscription to the municipal census – the emotional bonds associated to the concept would be channelled through the Catalan language. Linking knowledge of Catalan to the idea of *resident citizenship* was a well-planned discourse conceived as a political strategy to gain the empathy of migrants towards Catalonia, as acknowledged by the Vice-president during our interview: “nowhere in the world do you obtain the citizenship passport as easily as in Catalonia. You just have to speak Catalan.” – he claimed.

The language-citizenship binomial would be systematically replicated all along the language debates on immigrant integration, as highlighted graphically in figure 5 above. The empirical analysis has also shown that this symbolic link would only be applied to Catalan, as no traces of the concept applied to the Spanish are found in the analysis. “Catalan is pivotal for Catalonia to be one single people. The new Catalans must see Catalan as an element for full citizenship and as a way to be integrated”¹³³ – stated Catalan

¹³³ Montilla avala que el català sigui la clau de la integració. (2008, December 20). *El Periódico*.

President J. Montilla to legitimate the prioritization of Catalan in the *2008 National Agreement on Immigration*. Along the same lines, the hegemonic role of Catalan in the 2010 Law on Reception was justified by CiU as a way to “fully participation in the Catalan citizenry”,¹³⁴ along the same lines of ERC, one of the parties in the tripartite government, which claimed that the 2010 Law was aimed at “guaranteeing knowledge of the language of the country as a tool not just have workers but citizens”¹³⁵. The same framing can be observed in the *2009-2012 Citizenship and Immigration Plan* and *2013-2016 Citizenship and Migrations Plan*.

This binomial has often been referred to in academia as “linguistic citizenship” (DiGiacomo, 2004; Mercado, 2008; Stroud, 2001). Referring specifically to Catalonia, DiGiacomo (2004, p. 120) refers to linguistic citizenship as “a process that is continuously charged with a sense of resistance towards the State and Spanish dominance”. Following the same line of analysis, Mercado (2008) notes that immigration being perceived as a threat to Catalan language revitalization, linguistic citizenship emphasizes promoting, knowing, and using Catalan as a shared civic responsibility for all citizens as a way to protect Catalan language maintenance.

¹³⁴ Parliamentary debate (2009, December 01)

¹³⁵ Parliamentary debate (2009, November 17), statement by ERC MCP (Member of the Catalan Parliament Bosch i Mestres)

“Catalan is pivotal for Catalonia to be one single people. The new Catalans must see Catalan as an element for full citizenship and as a way to be integrated”¹³⁶ – stated Catalan President J. Montilla to legitimate the prioritization of Catalan in the *2008 National Agreement on Immigration*. Along the same lines, the hegemonic role of Catalan in the 2010 Law on Reception was justified by CiU as a way to “fully participation in the Catalan citizenry”,¹³⁷ along the same lines of ERC, the party in government, which claimed that the 2010 Law was aimed at “guaranteeing knowledge of the language of the country as a tool not just to have workers but citizens”¹³⁸. The same framing can be observed in the *2009-2012 Citizenship and Immigration Plan* and *2013-2016 Citizenship and Migrations Plan*. The empirical analysis shows that concept is attributed only to Catalan, whereas Spanish is silenced in the language-citizenship debates. As pointed out by Van Dijk (2006), positive self-representation is a well-known way to exhibit ideological structures.

¹³⁶ Montilla avala que el català sigui la clau de la integració. (2008, December 20). *El Periódico*.

¹³⁷ Parliamentary debate (2009, December 01)

¹³⁸ Parliamentary debate (2009, November 17), statement by ERC MCP (Member of the Catalan Parliament Bosch i Mestres)

4.5.3 Invoking *national identity* in the language debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia

“The defence of the Catalan language and the construction of a Catalan identity that is stronger, richer and more plural is one of the key strategies of the Government”. This statement, contained in the *2005-2008 Citizenship and Immigration Plan* (p. 40), highlights the relevance of national identity in the language debates on immigrant integration, systematically present in the narrative on immigrant integration, as shown graphically in figure 5 above: the *2008 National Agreement on Immigration* openly states that “the Catalan nation must continue to be the point of reference to all the people that live and work in Catalonia, one of the priorities being making Catalan the common language shared by all” (p. 43), an idea identically replicated in the *2009-2012 Citizenship and Immigration Plan* and *2013-2016 Citizenship and Migrations Plan* and recurrently present in the Parliamentary debates, which dates back to the first *Catalan Immigration Plan* of 1993, where it was already stated that “Catalonia must foster participation of immigration in the Catalan nation building project” (p. 61).

Rather than a close, inward-looking notion of identity, the idea discursively portrayed in the debates is that of incorporating immigrant voices into the national identity narrative. This strategy, systematically present along the debates, as seen in figure 5 above, has been praised by the Governmental Advisory Group on Social and Family Policies (CAPSiF, in Catalan), as a strategic approach to

capture the sympathy of migrants for nation-building purposes, linking it to knowledge of Catalan: “Catalonia has adopted an innovative approach to immigration by incorporating immigrants into its national project, as it has been done in the Statute, the National Agreement on Immigration and the 2010 Law on Reception, documents that strategically link immigration with the Catalan language policy”¹³⁹. As highlighted by a number of scholars (Gil Araujo, 2004; Solé & Parella, 2008; Zapata Barrero, 2005), Catalonia has followed a strategy of including immigrants in the nation-building process by considering them an integral part of their population. By framing the language debates in such a way, Catalonia has created a political discourse of incorporation of immigrant voices into the re-imagining of the nation.

The empirical analysis, however, indicates that consensus over the terms of the debates would not be complete among all the political forces. In a thought-provoking speech, the then Vice-president Carod Rovira introduced in 2007 a new concept to refer to national identity: *social patriotism*. “I speak in the name of a Government that works based on the idea of *social patriotism*, a country that does not base its identity only on language and culture but also on the well-being

¹³⁹ CAPSiF. *La situació del discurs polític sobre la immigració i la diversitat a Catalunya*. (Policy report 5). p. 3

of citizens.”¹⁴⁰ The idea followed an elaborated ideological strategy to detach the systematic reference to national identity in purely linguistic terms, embedding it in a broader set of issues related to social well-being, as confirmed during our interview with the Vice-president:

“The concept of social patriotism, and the ideology behind it, was extremely important to me. My thesis was the following: in a complex society such as ours, the elements for social cohesion cannot be only those from the past such as language or culture. If we want people to embrace a space which they must feel it also belongs to them, linked to the future, it must be positive, of good cultural, democratic and material well-being. This is what I meant when I strategically used the concept social patriotism”.

This novel ideological approach in the language-national identity binomial would shake the foundations of the political consensus over the concept of national identity. Whereas the left independentist ERC initiated a strategy to broaden the concept by adopting a different rhetoric over the role of Catalan in the language debates, the center-right CiU vehemently opposed this approach. In the words of former President of Catalonia, J. Pujol (CiU), “Catalonia cannot be the only nation in the world that does not adopt an identity approach to its

¹⁴⁰ Parliamentary debate (2007, January 17)

language”.¹⁴¹ These ideological tensions were further confirmed during the interview with the Vice-president, who claimed that “When I proposed this concept, I was heavily criticized by CiU. For them, patriotism was something else.”

This lack of consensus over the terms of the debate confirm Blommaert's (1999) postulates that the “hegemony of one ideology does not necessarily imply total consensus or total homogeneity. On the contrary, ambiguity and contradiction may be the key features of every ideology, and adherence to one ideology or another is often inconsistent or ambivalent” (p. 11).

The analysis has shown a consensus, however, in the active incorporation of immigrants into the nation building process. Immigrants’ cultures and languages would be recurrently depicted in the language debates as highly valuable, contributing to the shaping the Catalan national identity. The narrative around the public recognition of immigrants’ languages would not only remain in the sphere of rhetoric but would also be translated into concrete actions. As shown in table 14 below, the Department of Education has progressively increased mother-tongue instruction as a way to recognize the languages brought by migrants in the public sphere and

¹⁴¹Pujol demana "no recular ni un pam" en immersió lingüística” (2007, July 24).
Europa Press

also as a way to unlock the potential of having a multilingual workforce in Catalonia (Climent-Ferrando & Solè, 2015).

Table 14. Mother tongue provision in Catalonia (2004-2012)

Year	Arab.	Tamz	Chin	Roman.	Dutch	Ukrai	Bengli	Port.	Urdu
04-05	981								
05-06	981	81	80						
06-07	1121	81	71		144				
07-08	1200	91	129	180	130				
08-09	1596	109	185	465	125	35			
09-10	1596	134	217	308	15	58	25	227	
10-11	1682	98	390	204	137	53	57	227	20
11-12	2409	49	199	210	137	42	30	300	20

Source: Department of Education. Government of Catalonia

It is worth highlighting the strategic role played by academia in linking immigrant languages to the Catalan nation building project. At the request of the Catalan government, a number scholars

elaborated a series of pedagogical materials¹⁴² linking the Catalan language to the main immigrant languages. It is worth noting that these materials have not been developed in Spanish. The pattern of establishing certain academic preferences on specific themes is familiar as an ideological strategy. As pointed out by a number of scholars (Blommaert, 1999; Heller, 1999; Milani, 2008; Shohamy, 2006) ideological preferences can be legitimized by expert activities and governments can make sure that experts remain within certain boundaries of research themes.

The discursive strategy of making the languages and cultures of immigrants visible, recognizing them and valuing them as part and parcel of the Catalan national identity was a political strategy aimed at seeking adherence among the immigrant population to the Catalan nation building project, making them discursively relevant stakeholders in the shaping of the nation. It was, in sum, an attempt to frame the narrative on language and national identity in an open, inclusive and participatory way, including the voices of immigrants in the identity narrative and seeking their empathy into the nation-building project of Catalonia, as confirmed by former Vice-president Carod Rovira:

¹⁴²See the *Language and Migration Collection*. Available http://llengua.gencat.cat/ca/serveis/informacio_i_difusio/publicacions_en_linia/aprenem_catala_des_de_col [last accessed September 7 2015]

“The strategy was to prioritize Catalan, not to sideline Spanish, which is different, and especially to set a direct communication channel with the new citizens. We could speak of sidelining Spanish only if the situation of Spanish in Catalonia was not normalized, which is not true. What is still anomalous is the situation of the Catalan language in its own territory. Our strategy was to give greater prestige to the Catalan language first and then to have direct communication with the diversity of languages. I wanted them to recognize and identify Catalan with the country where they had arrived at, and they all came with a different language, which we also identified. That was our strategy”.

The hegemonic role of Catalan in identity debates would be intensely contested by the same political parties opposing the immigration integration measures on the grounds that the Catalan language is being instrumentalized for nation building. When debating the 2008 NAI, C’s Member of Parliament Robles Almeida argued that the NAI was “designed so that immigrants internalize that Catalan is the only language in Catalonia, using them as raw material for nation building. The NAI considers them as mere objects subject to be converted into one, and only of the languages of Catalonia so that the Catalan nation becomes their existential reference”¹⁴³. The same tonality is perceived against the 10/2010 Law on Reception of Immigrants and Returnees to Catalonia which according to the PP “it is a law aimed

¹⁴³ Parliamentary debate (2008, July 17)

at creating nationalists”¹⁴⁴, along the lines of C’s, whose leader A. Rivera accused all the political forces supporting the 2010 Law of wanting to “utilize immigrants as an excuse for nation building, with the false premise of a national imaginary...What you are imposing with this law is an assimilation model with one single identity”.¹⁴⁵ The National Agreement on Education and the 2009 Law on Education, and more generally the education system, would be also contested by the same political forces on the grounds of the instrumentalization of Catalan in the education system for nation building.

4.5.4 The concepts of *own language* and *common language* in the language debates on immigrant integration

“Catalan must stop being the language of *Catalanism* to become the language of Catalans. A language that is only associated to one ideology is a language that is doomed to disappear”.¹⁴⁶ This statement – uttered by Vice-president Carod-Rovira in 2007 to announce the need for a novel approach on the Catalan language in an immigration scenario – was preceded by the idea to *de-politicize* the Catalan language. As pointed out by the Vice-president during his interview: “The goal was to get rid of the ethnicist elements attached

¹⁴⁴ Parliamentary debate (2009, April 28)

¹⁴⁵ Parliamentary debate (2009, April 28)

¹⁴⁶ Parliamentary debate (2007, January 17)

to the Catalan language. This was a conscious, well-planned strategy. I was aware that this statement would cause a political stir. The idea of *de-politicizing* the language was the most political strategy ever done for the Catalan language. I was surprised to see that not even the former president of Catalonia [J. Pujol] did not realize what I was doing. This showed that, in the end, there were still left-overs of an essentialist, ethnic national discourse.”

This ideological strategy of making one language – Catalan – the authoritative language in a bilingual context has been analyzed in the literature on linguistic ideologies as corresponding to two ideological complexes: that of *authenticity* and *anonymity*. Whereas the ideology of *authenticity* locates the value of a language in its relationship to a particular community, conveying this view of the worth of the language as private and particular, rather than public and generic, *anonymity* is defined as the common, unmarked standard public language or the “voice of nowhere” (Gal & Woolard, 2001).

The empirical analysis has shown that one of the main rhetorical devices used to legitimate the prioritization of Catalan has been the systematic reference in the social, political and legal sphere to the concept of *own language* [*llengua pròpia*] to define Catalan, corresponding to the theoretical notion of *authenticity*. As pointed out by Riera Gil (2013), over the past 30 years, the language policy of Catalonia has been consolidated over the concept of *own language*,

which has served as the legal and political argument to install the preferential use of Catalan over the other official language, Spanish.

The political desirability for Catalan to go from “the language of *Catalanism* to the language of all Catalans”, that is, to go from *authenticity* to *anonymity*, would materialize discursively in the introduction of a new term to refer to Catalan in the language debates on immigrant integration: Catalan, *the common language*. While it is true that the term had been used before to refer to Spanish at State level, the empirical analysis has allowed me to locate the systematic, continuous reference to the new syntactic unit in the language debates on immigrant integration at a specific period – April 2008 –, as illustrated graphically in figure 5 above¹⁴⁷, when the Catalan language NGO *Plataforma per la Llengua* and 24 immigrant associations adopted the motto “*Catalan, the common language*” in

¹⁴⁷ The systematization of data through the *Atlas.ti* software has allowed me to trace two isolated references to the notion of “common language” to legitimate the preferential use of Catalan in the 2006 Statute of Autonomy: on 30 September 2005, within the debates of the Statute, Socialist Member of Parliament M. de Madre used the term for the first time in debates by claiming that “we aspire that, in the new Statute, Catalan becomes the common language” (Parliamentary debate of 30 September 2005), an idea replicated by ERC Member of Parliament M. LLassana on 23 November 2005, who claimed that “with an increasingly cultural and linguistically heterogeneous population, it is important that the Catalan becomes the host language, the common language” (Parliamentary debate of 23 November 2005).

their manifesto to vindicate Catalan as *the* language for integration. Imported from Quebec, as shown by the intensity of the contacts between Catalonia and Quebec over the past years¹⁴⁸, the term would become customary in the in language debates on immigrant integration, as seen in figure 5 above.

The ideological approach to *anonymize* Catalan, following Woolard's terms, would be paradoxically legitimated by its condition of *authentic* language. Put in other terms, because Catalan is Catalonia's *own language* – so the argument goes – it must become the *common language*. Both notions are not, therefore, ideologically contradictory but complementary, *authenticity* being the ideological basis for its *anonymity*. As pointed out by Gal & Woolard (2001) “Although the projection of authenticity can oppose that of anonymity, it does not necessarily do so. The relationship is often far more complex. Strategic glimpses of authenticity may actually subserve the authority of the impersonal. The voice-from-nowhere may be constructed as the most authentic of voices competing for recognition as the embodiment of a particular community” (p. 7).

¹⁴⁸ In April 2005, the Catalan Language Policy Department and its Quebec counterpart signed a collaboration agreement on language and migration. In February 2007, the President of the Catalan Parliament travelled to Quebec to intensify contacts, and in May 2008, high level meetings between both governments were held to strengthen the bilateral cooperation in language and migration issues.

Applied to Catalonia, this argument is more ideological than empirical. As indicated in table 9 above, the demolinguistic reality shows that, if we were to choose one single language as the common language, it would be Spanish as it is the language shared by the majority of the population.

Thrown socially in the language debates by the language NGO *Plataforma per la Llengua*, and politically materialized for the first time in the *2008 National Agreement on Immigration*, it would be legally embedded in the 10/2010 Law on Reception of Immigrants and Returnees to Catalonia to justify the prioritization of Catalan as the language for first-reception services due to its condition of being Catalonia's *own language* and *common language*.¹⁴⁹ The increasing use of the term to justify the language measures prioritizing Catalan would be met by social, political and legal contestation. Socially, a number of immigrant associations expressed their reluctance to the prioritization of Catalan in both the 2008 National Agreement on Immigration¹⁵⁰ and the 10/2010 Law on Reception of Immigrants and Returnees to Catalonia,¹⁵¹ fearing that the concept would be used as a pretext to impose Catalan. To this we must add the public

¹⁴⁹ See Parliamentary debate (2010, April 28)

¹⁵⁰Una clàusula sobre el català divideix les entitats llatinoamericanes. (2009, September 9). *El Periódico*

¹⁵¹ See Parliamentary debate (2009, December 01)

manifesto of 2008 in Spain *El español, lengua común* [Spanish, common language], led by prominent intellectuals such as Nobel prize winner Mario Vargas Llosa, alerting the marginalization of Spanish in Catalonia. Politically, both the PP and C's vehemently opposed the language measures based on the notion of *common language*: “there is no such thing as a common language in Catalonia. There is no reference in our legal system to such notion. There are two official languages”.¹⁵² – stated PP Member of Parliament L. Rueda. Legally, the Spanish Ombudsman challenged the notion by taking the 2010 Law on Reception to the Constitutional court, as highlighted above, on the grounds that “it unbalances the Constitutional language regime of co-officialdom against Spanish”, placing all the emphasis on the concept of officialdom and refusing the concepts of *own language* and *common language*.¹⁵³.

The intensity of the ideological tensions can be graphically seen in figure 5 above. Contestation by the Spanish intellectuals on the role of Catalan as the common language was met by an intense social and political counter-contestation – corresponding in the graph to the period April-June period – emphasizing that the role of *common language* in the immigrant integration debates must be Catalan, evidencing the competing tensions in what was the beginning of the

¹⁵² Parliamentary debate (2010, April 28)

¹⁵³ See Appeal 6352/2010. Retrieved from

<http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2010/10/11/pdfs/BOE-A-2010-15512.pdf> [last accessed 09 September 2015]

creation of a new frame. The same ideological tensions would be replicated with the approval of the 2008 National Agreement on Immigration, as evidenced by the high peak in figure 5 above in December 2008, and during the period August-October 2010, when the Spanish Ombudsman took the 10/2010 Law on Reception of Immigrants and Returnees to Catalonia to Court, sparking a heated social and political reaction.

4.6 Concluding remarks. Conflicting ideologies over language in the debates on immigrant integration

The analysis on the language debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia has shown the persistent efforts of the Catalan authorities, supported by an ample majority of the political forces as well as by the Catalan civil society, to build a narrative aimed at giving a higher social and political prestige to the Catalan language. As a result of the rapid demographic change and fearing the possibility of migrants embracing the Spanish language, Catalonia has attempted to shape its own distinctive approach to immigrant integration, encouraging newcomers to develop a sense of belonging to the Catalan political community, Catalan being its most distinctive feature.

This strategy has been sustained through a particular frame containing specific discursive mechanisms, through the rhetorical devices of *logos*– *the Catalan Way of Integration* – systematically invoked to attribute the positive values of social cohesion, opportunities and participation to Catalan – *pathos*, seeking to capture immigrant’s empathy towards the Catalan community by considering them as *resident citizens*, referring to immigrants as the *new Catalans/new citizens*; and *ethos*, invoking national identity, portrayed as an open, participatory project that strategically incorporates immigrant voices into the nation building process, making them relevant stakeholders in the re-imagining of the nation.

Far from being a covert strategy, the idea of creating empathy towards the Catalan national project has been an explicit goal, tenaciously sustained all along the debates.

The analysis has shown the symbolic power of language and its ability to shape a social categorization in terms of inclusion and exclusion but, most notably, in terms of the values attached to different languages. It has systematically traced and analyzed the discursive frame of the language debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia, that is, the social construction of a social phenomenon – language – as a process of selective influence over the perception of the meaning attributed to different concepts to sustain the prioritization of Catalan in the debates. While the debates on immigrant integration recurrently recognize the need to master both Spanish and Catalan, the positive values are only attached to Catalan, showing the existence of language hierarchies, in which languages are *labelled* and *ranked* on the basis of a variety of criteria which have to do with the perceived “quality” of the language or with the degree of “*full languageness*” (Blommaert, 1999, p. 431).

Through the concept of *own language* – a concept that has allowed the possibility to sustain legally and politically the prioritization of Catalan over Spanish in language policies – the language “quality” has also involved issues of “ownership”. Catalan, as Catalonia’s *own language*, has been discursively depicted as having the legitimacy to become the language to be shared by the polity. The value located in

Catalan as the language of a particular community – the *authenticity value* in Woolard’s terms – is the legitimate language to become the *common language* – the language of *anonymity*. The condition of *ownership* – Catalonia’s *own language* – discursively legitimates the condition of (false) *anonymity* through the term *common language*.

Another systematic feature observed during the debates has been the recurrent presence of *expert voices*. The institutionalization of the prioritization of Catalan over Spanish has been accompanied by legitimizing and rationalizing discourses of scholars, especially in the field of education. Contestation by PP’s and C’s, and by a number of Court rulings over the prioritization of Catalan as the only vehicular language in the education system has been counter-contested with a wide support from academia based on the fact that the Catalan immersion school system guarantees full command of both languages. Similarly, institutional priority has been given to sociolinguistic work aimed at linking the Catalan language to the main migrant languages as a strategic way to establish direct contact with the communities and ensure that their point of reference is the Catalan nation and language. By referring to expert voices, that is, by referring to logic, rationality, theory and science, the ideology that is being shaped becomes softened or neutralized (Heller, 1999).

To these expert voices we must add a whole array of ideology brokers shaping the terms of the debate. Catalan-language NGOs, trade unions and a wide spectrum of the socio-economic agents have generally reproduced the rhetorical devices aimed at prioritizing

Catalan: as Catalonia's *own language*, as the language that is still in a disadvantageous position, Catalan must become the vehicular language in schooling, *the common language* in immigrant integration policies and the priority language in the different laws as a way to guarantee social cohesion, opportunities and participation – so the argument goes.

Despite this wide, general consensus over the terms of the debate, the analysis has also shown a lack of total discursive homogeneity. The idea of prioritizing Catalan as the common language in the 2008 and the 10/2010 Law on Reception of Immigrants and Returnees to Catalonia was met with reluctance by several Latin-American immigrant associations and perceived as a strategy to sideline Spanish. Similarly, the idea of “de-politicizing” the language launched by the Vice-president of Catalonia and extending the Catalan language-national identity binomial to a broader set of issues under the concept of *social patriotism* was criticized by the center-right CiU, which considered Catalan as *the* backbone of the Catalan identity. This inconsistency over the terms of the debate confirms Blommaert's (1999) postulates that “ambiguity and contradiction may be the key features of every ideology, and adherence to one ideology or another is often inconsistent or ambivalent” (p. 11).

The analysis has also shown that the language ideological debates for immigrant integration in Catalonia are part of a broader socio-

political process in which self-government claims have been at the core of the political agenda. Aware that language can only be managed with full competences, the Catalan authorities have been continuously engaged in a process of self-government claims, Catalan being at the core of the demands. A political strategy also suggested by academia as exemplified by the words of scholar Zapata Barrero (2006), “if we are to prioritize policies aimed at strengthening the link between immigration and self-government, we should prioritize three policies: language policies, educational policies and labor policies” (p. 10).

The quest for self-government claims has been coupled with the promotion of a distinctive nation-building project and a conception of citizenship that diverges from that of the state – *resident citizenship* – discursively portrayed as being more open in Catalonia than in the Spain – which conflates it with the concept of nationality. Tenaciously sustained over time, produced and reproduced, these distinctive features have framed Catalonia’s own philosophy of integration.

The language, epistemology and scheme on the role of Catalan for immigrant integration in Catalonia has been met with fierce political and legal contestation from two specific political parties representing around 15% of the Catalan political spectrum, which have turned the Catalan issue into their main bone of contention: C’s and PP. Considering that Spanish is sidelined and neglected as one of the

official languages in Catalonia, both parties have engaged in a systematic rejection of the prioritization of Catalan. Legal contestation has also been a constant feature. The quest for self-government claims and the attribution for more competences on language for immigrant integration sparked a series of legal reactions, considering that Catalonia was exceeding its legal competences. It is worth noting the ongoing legal battle in the educational sphere, with a considerable amount of Court rulings questioning the hegemonic role of Catalan as the vehicular language, igniting a heated social and political unrest among the defenders of Catalan. These contestation and counter-contestation debates confirm the importance of education as a crucial channel for linguistic-ideological regimentation.

Paradoxically, the political and legal battle has not been coupled with any social unrest over the role of Catalan as the language of instruction in education. As shown in the analysis, the number of language complaints over Catalan being the vehicular language in schooling does not rank as a major social concern, evidencing the lack of a social conflict, an idea also highlighted by the Catalan Ombudsman. Similarly, the Popular Legislative Initiative proposing that parents choose the language of instruction was not only rejected by the vast majority of the political forces but had a remarkably low social support. Despite the possibility of language choice offered by the different Court rulings, a remarkably small number of parents have chosen Spanish as the vehicular language in school, as shown

in table 13. These empirical data confirm the idea that the contestation over the hegemonic role of Catalan in immigrant integration measures is not based on educational or social criteria but purely on ideological reasoning, which evidences the political problematization of a non-existing problem.

At the time of writing this work, Catalonia is immersed in a political process of self-determination, in which language debates, and more specifically over the role of Catalan and Spanish in a hypothetical independent state, are an important element on the agenda. The terms of the debate leave no doubt over the continuation of the policy framework that has become the dominant ideology in the linguistic-ideological debates. The hegemonic role of Catalan as the national language, specific support for Spanish – still formulated in a rather ambiguous manner – and the explicit recognition, promotion and value of the existing societal multilingualism as an integral part of the Catalan people. The center-right CiU, which at the time of finalizing this chapter, split their longstanding coalition of two parties (Convergència and Unió), already announced the lines of action in the event of an independent State: “immigrants will need to certify knowledge of Catalan language, culture and history whereas Spanish-speakers will have their language rights guaranteed”¹⁵⁴.

¹⁵⁴El partit de Mas es prepara per a l’escenari postconsulta adaptant el seu projecte polític a la independència. (2014, March 14). *El Punt Avui*.

Spanish, while legally recognized, might not have equal official status as Catalan.

Looking strictly at demolinguistic facts, it is undeniable that the Catalan language is still in a disadvantageous position. The political desirability has therefore been to prioritize Catalan to reverse the demolinguistic reality by depicting Catalan as Catalonia's *own* language, as *the common* language and as *the* vehicular language in school, assigning all the positive attributes of participation, social cohesion and opportunities to Catalan, attributes not assigned to Spanish in a territory where the population has, paradoxically, a higher percentage of Spanish speakers.

The analysis has also surfaced a discursive mutation of the narrative on language, from a deep-seated linguistic duality and a framework of palliative recuperation of the Catalan language in a predominantly Catalan-Spanish bilingual society to an opening-up of the language debates to the broader concept of multilingualism, in an attempt to break the recurrent Catalan-Spanish confrontational debates which, as seen in the analysis, are not socially based but artificially and ideologically constructed in the political arena. What emanates from the analysis is that immigration has brought in new narratives and voices in the re-imagining of the nation, framing language not only as an identity and cultural trait but also defined in terms of social and political participation.

The attempts to create this new narrative and frame the language debates on immigrant integration in these terms, however, has not been devoid of criticism, not only from a political standpoint, as seen in the analysis above, but also from certain sectors within academia. In the words of renowned scholar Branchadell (2008) the current Catalan approach does not avoid the nationalist bind by which minority language advocates adopt the very nationalist frame – the one-nation one-language correspondence, Catalan – they are supposed to contest (2012). The same author cites Woolard (2008), who claims that “ironically, movements to save minority languages are often structured around the same received notions of language that have led to their oppression and/or suppression”.

The empirical analysis has shown, in sum, that the language debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia go far beyond *language* and must be analyzed as part of a larger socio-political process of conflicting conceptions of the political community immigrants are asked to join: while the Catalan debates are geared towards ensuring that immigrants adhere to the Catalan political community and build emotional attachment to Catalonia through the Catalan language, the political and legal contestation has come from the opposite direction, that is, from the conception of a single political community, Spain. Two competing frames promoting diverging conceptions of citizenship and different nation-building projects, which evidences, in sum, a process competing for the affection of immigrants in the national project, with language at the core of this strategy. The

language debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia: *E Pluribus
Unum?*

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5. ANALYZING THE LANGUAGE DEBATES ON IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN FRANCE AND CATALONIA. A MULTILEVEL, COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

“Comparisons on immigrant integration have often been made operational by the use of somewhat crude ideas of fixed national models or typologies... Existing works need to go on to make connections that need to be made between the politics of immigration and integration and wider questions of political economy, welfare, inequality and democracy in Europe”

Favell, A. *Philosophies of Integration* (2001).

5.1 Introduction

The increasing migration flows worldwide are bringing about major debates on immigrant integration across Europe. A particular challenge confronting Western societies is how to accommodate linguistically-heterogeneous migrants into the host societies' language(s), considered a pivotal element in the integration debates. As pointed out in the introduction of this thesis, and empirically analyzed in chapters three and four, evidence of the increasing importance of language for integration is the proliferation of language measures across Europe, discursively framed as necessary for successful immigrant integration. These measures have mainly taken place at state level – with an increasing number of reports¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵Parliamentary Assembly. Council of Europe Report. (2013). *Integration tests: Helping or hindering integration*. Retrieved from

and academic reflections from different disciplines (from a political sciences approach, see, e.g., Carrera & Wiesbrock, 2009; Guiraudon, 2008; Joppke, 2007; Van Oers, Ersbøll, & Kostakopoulou, 2010, or from a discourse analysis approach Hogan-Brun, Mar Molinero, & Stevenson, 2009; Milani, 2008) – but also at sub-state level (see, e.g., Bauböck, 2001; Carens, 2000; Kymlicka, 2001; Oakes & Warren, 2007; Zapata Barrero, 2009, or from a sociolinguistic approach Duchéne & Heller, 2007; Pujolar, 2010, among others) – in which minority languages face the challenge of ensuring that they are also present in immigrant integration policies.

The empirical research on language for immigrant integration, however, has predominantly taken states as units of comparative analysis and, to a much lesser extent, sub-state territories. Gil Araujo (2007) notes that given the existence of different integration models within an increasing number of States, it would be desirable to analyze units other than the nation-state to provide a better empirical account of current practices, thus avoiding the illusion of State homogeneity. Along the same lines, Hepburn & Zapata Barrero (2014) argue that “this [sub-state] level has so far been almost absent in the field of comparative immigration studies, which has tended to focus on the nation-state or supranational level, as pointed out in the

<http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=20481&lang=en> [last accessed 08 September 2015]

introductory chapter of this thesis. However, this level is crucial in understanding immigration because sub-state territories have become increasingly responsible for designing policies of immigrant integration, especially those territories with a language different than the state language” (p. 10). Language for immigrant integration would therefore not only be an important issue at the state level, but also a key concern for sub-state political units (Joppke & Seidle, 2012; Zapata Barrero, 2009).

This chapter seeks to compare the discursive legitimation of language measures in the politics of immigrant integration in France and Catalonia, the two cases empirically analyzed in chapters three and four above. This multilevel state/sub-state approach will allow us to compare the precise discursive mechanisms by means of which linguistic symbolic resources are being produced, distributed, circulated and contested, and the values attached to these resources to achieve a range of political goals at different levels.

The comparative analysis will show that, under the rhetoric of immigrant integration, both cases have systematically framed their language debates on two core elements: a *symbolic* element, with language as a symbolic attachment to the polity, that is, *national identity*; and a *civic* element, shaped within the malleable contours of the concept of *citizenship* as an administrative/formal attachment to the polity.

Despite this apparently similar discursive frame, the analysis will bring to surface the remarkably different rhetorical devices used to legitimate the increasing number of language measures for immigrant integration: Whereas the French language debates have progressively built an inflexible narrative on national identity and citizenship, framing the alleged lack of language skills by immigrants as a threat to the national identity and fixing the coterminous boundaries of French *citizenship* and *nationality*, imposing a peculiar and restrictive language on the public perception of immigration, the Catalan debates have built a porous, discursively open frame around the same concepts, actively promoting the incorporation of immigrants' voices into the re-imagining and reshaping of the nation.

The substantial difference in their rhetorical repertoires responds to the realization of different political goals: whereas the French case has built a dominant frame in terms problematization of immigration to legitimate the adoption of language measures as a gate-keeping mechanism for immigrant control, the Catalan language debates have strategically built a dominant frame of positive representation of immigration to seek the empathy of migrants into the Catalan nation-building project. Fearing that immigration can dilute the Catalan language in a bilingual context, as immigrants tend to adopt Spanish, the majority language, the Catalan language debates have systematically associated the positive values of participation, opportunities and social cohesion to the Catalan language.

The common underlying narrative in the language debates on immigrant integration is, however, similar: the discursive conception of a bounded national society through a national language, depicted as necessary if immigrants wish to enter and become members of the polity. What emerges from the comparative analysis is the systematic reference to the concepts of *national identity* and *citizenship* in both cases as core elements that sustain the cognitive frame of the language debates on immigrant integration through which immigrants can only experience a sense of full belonging to the polity – both symbolic and formal – through the national language.

5.2 A note on methodological framework and corpus

To compare the language ideological debates on immigrant integration in both cases, I have gathered two sets of corpus – analyzed in chapters three and four and explained in chapter one, which are also succinctly summarized in table 1 above and have been included in the annexes of this thesis for reference purposes. Such a wealth of information from a variety of sources has allowed me to capture the reproduction, modulation and evolution of discourses over time, the hegemonization of certain positions at specific periods and the voices of contestation and opposition, which have progressively shaped the different discursive frames.

As explained in chapter two, the different voices from such a wide range of sources are captured in this thesis under the label of *Language Ideological Debates*, following Blommaert (1999). As pointed out by the scholar, in the field of politics, discursive struggle and contestation are generically captured under the label of *debate*. The political process develops through a series of exchanges involving a variety of social actors: politicians and policy makers, academic experts and media – and is reproduced through a variety of practices – the Administration, regimentation in social reproduction systems such as schools, advertisement or media, to name only a few. Hence the importance of different voices, channels and sources – analyzed through the collection of an extensive corpus – to trace how dominant ideologies are constructed and how they are progressively shaped to build a particular, dominant frame.

The definition by Blommaert (1999) as “historically locatable periods in which a struggle for authoritative entextualization takes place” (p. 9) indicates that (language) policy making is a process involving a variety of stakeholders who stake claims in the field of language and thereby generate a multiplicity of texts (laws, newspaper articles, policy proposals, etc.), not produced in an historical vacuum, but embedded in different temporalities, that is, in particular social, political, economic, cultural and linguistic contexts. It is not only the formal content of the debates, or their symbolic form and rhetorical packaging that counts, but also the particular social,

political, economic, cultural and historical environment in which the debates are embedded.

To capture the full dimension of the language debates on immigrant integration, I have analyzed both cases through Thompson's *Depth Hermeneutics* methodological framework (1984), explained in chapter two, which has provided us with the necessary tools for this multilevel comparative analysis, demarcated in three stages: 1) the socio-political analysis, which looks at the historical, political and social context in which debates are produced, regardless of whether the unit of analysis is a state or a sub-state territory 2) the rhetorical devices and chains of reasoning used as legitimating strategies in the language debates of both case studies and 3) the interpretative phase, which is closely intertwined with the previous two. Thompson's *Depth Hermeneutics* has been a useful methodological framework to carry out the comparative research as it has allowed me to break the habitual rigidity in academia of comparing *either* states *or* sub-state territories as units of analysis, allowing me to carry out a multilevel analysis of how the language policies of immigrant integration are discursively justified at different levels.

Thompson's approach allows us to see the language debates as an ongoing process operating in real historical, social, economic and political moments, it allows us to account for variation on how the dominant frame on language, citizenship and national identity has

been shaped and evolved over time, and to detect voices of opposition, silence and contestation. In sum, Thompson's approach provides the necessary tools through which to examine the ongoing dynamism and fluctuation of the language debates on immigrant integration as it allows us to position the discursive interaction between the role of language as a symbolic and formal boundary and the political-ideological intentions behind it.

5.3 Framing the language debates around the issues of *national identity* and *citizenship*. The comparative analysis

The empirical analysis of the language debates on immigrant integration in France and Catalonia in the previous chapters has led me to identify a common thread systematically observed in the analysis to justify the increasing number of language measures: the concepts of *national identity* and *citizenship*. Used all along the debates, thrown in at specific periods, these two concepts have shaped the dominant frame over which the language debates have been discursively sustained. Both cases have mobilized a series of rhetorical devices invoking the peculiarities of their distinct national political cultures and policy competences, relying on a good deal of rhetorical packaging, idiosyncratic myths and conventions.

The systematic use of the concepts of *national identity* and *citizenship* represent the backbone of the language debates on

immigrant integration, as both concepts denote a certain adscription to a community – in both symbolic and formal terms – language being its tangible materialization in this “politics of belonging”. The analysis has shown how the language debates on immigrant integration are a nationally-bounded, context-specific response to the increasing movement of people in a global age and the proliferation of scales of governance – from supranational levels to regional and local levels – as well as the (re)conceptualisations of belonging and adscription to increasingly diverse and porous societies.

As we shall see below, whereas the French state has reacted to immigrant integration by mobilizing grand philosophical ideas, exacerbating its distinctive peculiarities on the notions of *national identity* and *citizenship* and building up a strong culturally-focused symbolic frame that instrumentalizes language as an element for immigration control, Catalonia has used the same notions to ensure that the Catalan nation and language become the point of reference for immigrants. The analysis has provided us with empirical material over the precise role played by language in these socio-political developments, empirically demonstrating that any comparative analysis must be set in the wider political-historical developments operating in *real* space and time, that is, in a specific sociocultural, politically-shaped space and time.

5.3.1 The role of *national identity* in the language debates on immigrant integration. A multilevel comparison

One of the pivotal elements in the language debates on immigrant integration has been the constant invocation of national identity. The debates around this notion are the product of reiterated acts through which the dominant ideology is framed as follows: within a unified territory – be it a state or a sub-state territory – the linguistic heterogeneity derived from migration must be made coherent, unified and manageable. The polity is represented as a “we-group” which must share one language, the national language, as a symbolic element that unites all of its members, regardless of origin, playing a central role in identity marking and, as a corollary, boundary setting. While the concept is systematically observed to justify the language measures for immigrant integration in both cases, the rhetorical devices and chains of reasoning used in the different debates vary substantially.

The empirical analysis of the French case has shown the progressive instrumentalization of language in the national identity debates as an element of social closure. The discursive frame created is that of a threat posed by immigration due to their alleged lack of language skills, intertwined with the idea of social crisis, integration failure and *communautarisme*, that is, conscious and willingness of immigrants to remain outside the polity, secluded in their languages and cultures of origin and unwilling to integrate. The empirical discursive analysis

has revealed the constant shadow of doubt systematically cast on the loyalty of immigrants towards the French national identity, which has been used as the legitimating ground to adopt tougher language measures and raising language standards for immigrant integration, with the sole purpose of instrumentalizing language for immigration control.

The analysis of the historicity of the debates has shown that the notion of national identity and language is not new in the French debates on integration. As sketched in chapter three and citing Favell (2001), the emergence of the extreme-right party of the *Front National* (FN) in the 80's and its good electoral results in the 2002 presidential campaign was exclusively based on the conscious elaboration of a discursive frame of the highly symbolic issue of national identity and belonging, the threat posed by immigrants to the linguistic and cultural integrity of France and its Republican values. The FN's breakthrough was to link immigration to national identity, discursively conceptualizing and framing immigration as a threat to the unity of the Republic.

Evoking the subject of national identity was, up until then, "to play the game of the *Front National*" (*faire le jeu du Front National*) and abandon the reasonable and consequently acceptable sphere of political practice" (Martigny, 2009, p. 23). The notion of national identity had been semantically confiscated by the extreme-right party

and its use in mainstream politics was considered as playing outside the democratic framework of French politics. The political pay-off from this new artificially created rhetorical line – symbolically powerful and electorally rich – was, however, attractive enough for the mainstream right-wing UMP to openly toy with the rhetoric of nationalist exclusion, language being the effective instrument through which this rhetoric was materialized.

The analysis has shown that, even if had been used before, it is in 2007 when the notion of national identity linked to the French politics of language for immigrant integration was fully blown into the public sphere. Three concrete actions at three specific political moments, as graphically shown in figure 3 above, have been identified in the analysis: a) the central role of national identity in the 2007 Presidential campaign b) the creation of a specific Ministry linking immigration, integration and national identity and c) the creation of a Grand Debate on National identity [*le Grand débat sur l'identité nationale*]. These specific events sparked dissenting reactions from a wide variety of ideology brokers – from opposition parties, academia and immigrant NGO's – criticizing the obsessive, manipulative link of language, immigration and national identity.

This is how the new discursive frame, based on a rhetoric of fear, threat and isolationism, tenaciously sustained over time, became deeply embedded in the debates on immigrant integration. The attempt to break this dominant framework did not succeed as it

brought into question what had already become the *dominant habitus*, using Bourdieu's classical notion (1991), that is, the way the French polity thinks, talks and behaves and how these dispositions are reified as shared tangible habits of thinking, talking and behaving, a habitus that has become the French public philosophy on immigrant integration.

The strategy of progressively extending the habitus of the far-right into the dominant habitus of the polity as a whole was successfully completed: national identity, the threat of immigrants' unwillingness to learn the language, culture and values of France is now deeply entrenched as the dominant frame through which the French people can both identify themselves within the imagined community and, at the same time, identify and position themselves in position to those who do not share the same habitus, creating a symbolic boundary through the alleged lack of language skills.

Language, based on a static, rigid and impermeable relationship with one nation and one culture, has become the symbolic boundary between a national community of "we", *les Franco-français*, and "they" – group of *les immigrés* – seen as suspiciously unwilling to become part of the polity, and who will never be unreservedly perceived as entirely fitting into the given common linguistic French norm, which is a prerequisite for access to the symbolic dimension of the nation as an imagined community (Anderson, 1991). The

empirical analysis of the politics of language for immigrant integration in France, thus, confirms what Blommaert & Vershueren (1998) have called the “dogma of homogeneity”, which considers one national language as a necessary condition to bind the polity together, an idea with special saliency in a migration context.

The Catalan debates on immigrant integration have also brought to surface the constant invocation of the symbolic boundary of *national identity*, which has also served to legitimate an increasing number of language measures aimed at prioritizing Catalan in a bilingual scenario. While the political goal of establishing *the* national language – Catalan – as the language of immigrant integration coincides with the French case, the discursive frame around which the language-national identity binomial has been built differs substantially.

In a different sociolinguistic and political scenario, Spanish being the majority language in terms of number of speakers and Catalonia only having competencies on immigrant integration but not on entry and nationality, which fall under the competencies of the State, the Catalan debates on national identity have had as a primary goal to ensure that the Catalan language and identity become the point of reference for immigrants. To achieve this political goal, the Catalan debates have strategically shaped a dominant frame of inclusion, depicting Catalonia as an open, welcoming nation, shaped throughout history thanks to the constant influx and influence of migrants,

offering an open and inviting rhetorical line in which immigrants are invited to take part in the re-imagining of the nation, a frame that has become the dominant habitus of the Catalan language debates on immigrant integration, as derived from the empirical analysis.

Unlike the French case, in which the notion of national identity has been thrown in the language debates by one party – the center-right UMP – using the rhetoric of the far-right FN to capture their votes, the Catalan case shows a consensus-based approach on Catalan as the national language of Catalonia, a dominant frame systematically sustained all along the debates – as seen in figure 5 of chapter four – and supported the vast majority of the political parties as well as by NGOs and academia. An analysis of the wider time span shows the pivotal role of national identity in the language debates on immigrant integration: with less than 1,5% of immigrant population, the first 1993 Catalan Immigration Plan already stated the need that the Catalan nation and the Catalan language must be the point of reference to all immigrants in Catalonia.

While acknowledging the need to master both Spanish and Catalan for successful integration, it is only through Catalan that the immigrant can cross the symbolic boundary of the nation. In a bilingual context, the political strategy to prioritize Catalan as the national language has been the social, political and legal

hierarchization of languages, discursively sustained through three rhetorical strategies in the debates on immigrant integration:

- a) A sense of collective *ownership* of the Catalan language, regardless of the language of origin. While both Spanish and Catalan are official languages on an equal footing in Catalonia, it is only Catalan that is attributed a sense of ownership, depicted as Catalonia's *llengua pròpia* or *own language*. This concept has not only sustained the hegemonization of Catalan in the politics of language for immigrant integration, but has consolidated the Catalan language policy since the restoration of democracy, serving as a social, political and legal argument to install the preferential use of Catalan over Spanish (see Riera Gil, 2013).
- b) A sense of *quality*. The empirical analysis shows that language is often more than “just” language. In the Catalan debates, languages are labelled based on their symbolic value. Whereas Spanish is discursively depicted in a neutral, purely pragmatic way, Catalan is considered as the language that allows you to symbolically enter the Catalan nation, the language that binds the polity together and the language that defines the nation.
- c) A sense of *language ranking*. It is the condition of Catalan as Catalonia's own language, as the language that allows you to enter symbolically the Catalan nation, as the language that defines the Catalan people, which empowers Catalan to occupy a dominant position in the

language debates. That is, positive self-representation of Catalan versus neutral or non-representation of Spanish in the language debates on immigrant integration.

The empirical analysis has confirmed the theoretical postulates highlighted in chapter two of this thesis, which noted the close interlink between the politics of nationalism, national identity and immigrant integration, language playing a pivotal role in the debates (Carrera & Wiesbrock, 2009). In this sense, the analysis has shown how closely intertwined nation-building processes and immigration are, confirming Glick Schiller & Wimmer (2002) postulates that “in a recent historical *tour d’ horizon*, we can see how this concept [migration] has developed in close interaction with nation building processes in the West and the role immigration and integration policies have played within them” (p. 301). As shown in this analysis, this holds true for both a nation-state, France, and also a sub-state territory, Catalonia, with a language different than the State language.

The respective discursive frames on national identity, and their political goals, vary considerably. The French debates portray immigration as an exogenous element to the identity of France, conflictual and a threat to the French Republican values, prompting the decline of social cohesion due, among other things, to lack of language skills, a rhetorical packaging geared towards the legitimization of the increasingly tougher language measures for entry,

residence, reunification and naturalization, that is, for immigration control. In so doing, the French discursive frame – and the habitus created – has progressively consolidated a discourse of exclusion and stigmatization of immigrants and their lack of allegiance to the French national identity. As succinctly summarized in table 6 of chapter three, the vast majority of immigrants come from former French colonies and more than 75% of migrants arriving in France already master French, which shows the absence of a real linguistic problem.

Conversely, and aware that immigrants adopt the prestigious language in a bilingual society, the Catalan debates have strategically built a discursive frame of inclusion, portraying immigration as an endogenous element of Catalonia, framed in the debates as a welcoming land continuously shaped by immigration, which has one language, Catalan, *the* national language, as the language that binds the polity, as a way to seek the empathy of immigrants into the nation building project of Catalonia. To this positive representation of immigration, we must add the construction of a discursive frame in which immigrant languages and cultures are not only recognized but overtly supported in the public sphere, portrayed as an asset and as part and parcel of the Catalan national identity.

A feature of the language debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia – non-existent in the French debates – is the systematic inclusion of immigrant voices into the collective re-imagining of the

nation through the setting up the necessary channels of participation (see Climent-Ferrando & Triviño, 2015). All along the debates, immigrants have been active stakeholders in shaping the narrative on immigration and have been able to voice their opinion through the different channels officially set up for the purpose. All the immigration plans and measures were approved after an extensive consultation process with immigrant associations with the goal of setting up a consensus over the terms of the debate.

This has been referred to in the literature as the *discursive opportunity structure* (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004), that is, the conceptualization of a particular discursive frame in public policies – language for immigrant integration in our study – as a way to influence the way these policies “resonate” within immigrants’ existing discursive repertoires. In other words, the positive representation of immigration in discourse, along with the creation of political opportunity structures for immigrants to participate in the policy-making process, influences the perceptions of immigrants and encourages them to become active agents in the re-imagining of the nation. Their languages, cultures and traditions are valued, recognized and supported in the dominant frame as long as they accept that it is through Catalan – the national language – that the nation is imagined. An efficient, consensus-based political mobilization with a broad social base built on the narrative of one language – Catalan – as Catalonia’s own language.

The empirical analysis has also confirmed the relevance of the education system as a crucial channel for linguistic-ideological regimentation and identity building, confirming the academic postulates of a number of scholars (Blommaert, 1999; Milani, 2008; Wodak, De Cillia, & Reisigl, 2009, among many others). Both cases depict their respective education models as key institutions that foster a sense of national identity and social cohesion, framed once again in different terms.

The French debates depict the role of the education system and the French language as a pivotal element to forge a stronger national identity among immigrants, an idea systematically repeated by key ideology brokers such as the *Haut Conseil à l'Intégration*, the government's advisory body on immigrant integration. The constant invocation of the French Republican values and the agitation of fear through the idea of *communautarisme* would be the legitimating ground to propose the elimination of mother-tongue instruction in the education system in extra-curricular activities, known as ELCO, installed in France in the 70's through different bilateral agreements with home countries, considering that the learning of mother tongues

“has negative consequences for children and goes against integration”¹⁵⁶.

The negative representation of immigrant languages – considered as a threat to the identity of the France – has been a recurrent discursive strategy in the language debates on immigrant integration. At the time of finalizing this comparative analysis (May 2015), the elimination of ELCO has been a hot issue in the French debates, thrown in the public sphere once again by the UMP, now as the opposition party, and included in its political programme as one of the main elements in their immigration policies: “mother-tongue provision has not fostered the feeling of belonging to the French nation but immigrant isolationism [*le repli sur soi-même*]. Immigrant children must know that their nation is the French nation, their culture is the French culture and their language is the French language”¹⁵⁷ – stated UMP Deputy Bruno Le Maire to propose the elimination of mother-tongue instruction in France. The problematization of linguistic difference, the positive self-representation of the national language as *the*

¹⁵⁶Haut Conseil à l’intégration (HCI) (2010). *Les défis de l’intégration*. Retrieved from <http://archives.hci.gouv.fr/-Rapports-.html> [last accessed 24 August 2015]

¹⁵⁷ See the recent Parliamentary debates at the Assemblée Nationale: *Question d’actualité au Gouvernement posée par Bruno Le Maire le 3 mars 2015 sur la suppression du dispositif ELCO (Enseignement des langues et cultures d’origine)*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qj0rtV4ZnNg> [last accessed 4 September 2015]

language for national cohesion and identity and the negative representation of the languages of migrants has progressively become the dominant frame in the language debates within the French education system.

Systematic reference to the education system is also observed in the Catalan debates on immigrant integration. The same ideas of national identity and social cohesion are recurrently observed in the Catalan debates but with a completely different discursive frame. The Catalan education system – which guarantees full command of both Catalan and Spanish but prioritizes Catalan as the vehicular language on the grounds that it is Catalonia’s own language – explicitly recognizes the increasingly heterogeneity of the student population. Immigrants’ cultures and languages are not only discursively represented positively in the debates but are also actively supported within the education system through mother-tongue provision, as shown in table 14 of chapter four. Unlike the French case, the languages of migrants are represented as an asset and an integral part of the Catalan identity, becoming part and parcel of the dominant cognitive frame.

The strategy of positive representation of immigrant languages observed in the debates responds to the progressive elaboration of a new discursive frame – the consolidation of one language, the national language, as the vehicular language of education in a migration scenario. Rather than framing the language debates on the traditional, politically-conflictual Catalan-Spanish bilingual

dichotomy, immigration – and the linguistic heterogeneity that has come along with it – has been skillfully used to frame the debates in broader terms – progressively shifting them from a bilingual dominant linguistic habitus to a multilingual one, Catalan being discursively the dominant language in the new multilingual scenario.

The path towards the discursive hegemonization of Catalan within the new discursive frame has not been devoid of political and legal contestation, still ongoing at the time of writing this PhD thesis. On the one hand, pro-Spanish political parties, which claim that Spanish is placed in a disadvantageous position in the education system, and on the other, the increasing number of Court rulings in favour of Spanish as a vehicular language in education for those who require so. As pointed out in table 12 of chapter four, such a political fuzzi over the language issue in education does not correspond to the reality: the possibility of choosing Spanish as a vehicular language has been requested by a remarkably low number of parents, showing that the discursive problematization of Catalan as the vehicular language in education is a non-existing social problem but a politically-created one which evidences, in turn, how the school system has become the battleground for language-ideological regimentation.

5.3.2 Language, citizenship and immigrant integration. A multilevel comparison

The language debates on immigrant integration in both cases have also shown a systematic reference to the notion of *citizenship*. Despite being intricately enmeshed in discourses on national identity, it has been observed that affiliation through national identity and through citizenship have been discursively built differently. While the language identification with the identity of the nation as an imagined community is defined in symbolic terms, membership to the French and Catalan polity, as a political body, is also defined in administrative and formal ways, with special emphasis on the idea of participation into the polity.

Before any comparative analysis on how the language debates on immigrant integration have been framed through the concept of citizenship in both cases, it is important to provide an account on the multiple semantic/ideological approaches to the notion of citizenship and their political implications in a migration scenario, succinctly described in chapter two. Under the ambit of citizenship studies, different – and separate – bodies of literature have emerged to highlight the notoriously polyvalent concept, with many meanings and applications. Despite this array of approaches, most definitions of citizenship still conceive it as “ineradicably political” (Joppke, 2010). This consensus over the focus on citizenship as the idea of membership in a political community takes on special importance in a migration scenario as it allows us to analyze the concept with

regards to immigrants, formally non-members of the polity, and how language policies are intricately intertwined with it to allow/exclude them from the polity.

It was the merit of Brubaker (1992) to broaden the notion of citizenship, making it a useful concept for the study of immigration. Brubaker (1992) was the first to warn of the boundary-setting effects of citizenship in a migration scenario, highlighting the duality of citizenship being “internally inclusive” – as it allows for equal membership status within a given society – and “externally exclusive” – which excludes from such equal membership status all foreigners, and suggesting that both are intrinsically related. In other words, being closely linked to the Weberian concept of *social closure* – as sketched in chapter two – claiming that citizenship works both as an “instrument” and as an “object” of social closure. As an instrument, citizenship allows the state to control access to its territory as only citizens have the right to enter under international law, and everyone else can be denied entry or expelled after entry. Citizenship is also an object of closure, access to which is limited by a state’s nationality laws (Joppke, 2010).

The focus on the state as the exclusive owner of citizenship has been questioned by an increasing number of scholars, who have called for a re-scaling of the notion as part of increasingly multilevel approach. The paradigm-setting work of Soysal (1994) proposed a more

universal model of membership anchored in a non-territorial notion of citizenship, arguing that migration has eroded the link between nationality and citizenship, leading to other forms of postnational citizenship. On a similar note, Benhabib has argued that globalization and migration have caused “the lines between citizens and residents, nationals and foreigners to shift, thereby creating new spaces for transnational citizenship” (Benhabib, 2005, as cited in Hepburn, 2011). Other scholars have also pointed to the European Union as the most robust supranational citizenship project (Jenson, 2007; Painter, 2008; Shaw, 2007). As a result of these changes, “while the state is clearly still *a* location for the rights of citizens, it is not the only one” (Jeffery, 2007, as cited in Hepburn, 2011).

Following a similar line of thought, it is argued that citizenship is not only about rights but also active engagement and participation in civil society (Bellamy, 2008). In decentralised states, this participation may be circumscribed at a regional and local level. An increasing number of scholars have argued that some regions have historically maintained a civil society distinct from the rest of the state, which forms the most important social and political community for citizens of that region (Guibernau, 1999; Hepburn, 2011; Hepburn & Zapata Barrero, 2014; Keating, 1996; Velten, 2006). Correspondingly, citizen participation in social and political processes may be achieved within a regional context and not the state.

This re-scaling of the notion of citizenship from below has received substantially less scholarly attention as forming part of a “multilevel citizenship” construct (Hepburn, 2011; Painter, 2008). While it is true that Kymlicka’s *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995) paved the way, from a political theory perspective, on minority rights and citizenship in a migration context, it has not been until much recently that this approach from below has received scholarly attention, and referred to in the literature as *regional citizenship* (Hepburn, 2009, 2011; Hepburn & Zapata Barrero, 2014).

This academic reflection on citizenship indicates that while the dominant approach on citizenship has been developed from a nation-state perspective, and often conflated with rights nationality, considering that the only “citizenship that is not just rhetorical and metaphorical but formal and institutional” (Joppke, 2010, p. 3), others have emphasized participation and membership as central components in the broader sense of belonging to a community (Bellamy, 2008; Hepburn, 2011; Jenson, 2007).

Adopting a holistic approach on the malleability of the concept of citizenship allows us to break the rigidity of the theoretical framework focused exclusively on the citizenship-nationality binomial and provides a broader frame to give an empirical account of how the concept of citizenship has been discursively shaped both from a state and a sub-state perspective. In a migration context from

a multilevel perspective, as it is our case, this becomes especially relevant if we want to an empirical analysis with regard to immigrants, and how language measures have been discursively legitimated at different levels through the notion of citizenship.

In a migration scenario, language marks a distinction between members and outsiders of a political community, it is a key means of deciding who is allowed to *become* a citizen and who is not (Hepburn, 2011). In this sense, language has become the identifying element to mark who belongs to the polity – which might take the form of a nation-state or other – and who does not. Language is therefore an effective instrument to determine “the boundaries of citizenship” (Bauböck, 2001). It is with this succinct overview of the concept of citizenship that we can provide a comparative analysis on the discursive frame that justifies the increasing number of language measures by referring systematically to the concept of citizenship.

5.3.2.1 Language and the Myth of Republican Citizenship. A French obsession

The empirical analysis on the French language debates on immigrant integration shows a constant, systematic invocation of the concept of citizenship. The increasing number of language measures are discursively justified under the need for immigrants to become *citoyens*. As sketched in chapter three and graphically highlighted in figure 3 above, the concept of citizenship becomes especially relevant when discussing language requirements for nationality and naturalization, setting a nationally-bounded citizenship by fixing the coterminous boundaries of French *nationalité* and *citoyenneté*.

The citizenship-nationality binomial in the language debates on immigrant integration in France lays the ground for the discursive justification of the compulsory language tests for citizenship. But knowledge of French, itself, is not enough to be granted the status of *citizen*. Integration is not and cannot be possible without the full, legal membership to the French state. This is, in sum, the political identity of a full integration as full *citoyenneté*. This idea is succinctly illustrated in the recurrently used concept of *parcours d'intégration* highlighted in chapter three. Integration is depicted as a process, a path, a journey – *le parcours* – that immigrants must go through. In this *parcours*, knowledge of language, along values and identity play a pivotal role but it is the final stage of this *parcours* what represents the end of the journey, the successful completion of integration,

which is to become “a French citizen”, that is, to obtain French nationality. Such a frame allows in the positing of a fixed ideal at the end of the integration process – the *citoyen* – who presumably embodies all the norms of the good citizen. Inevitably, reality falls short of this approach, closer to an ideal, as we have seen in the empirical analysis.

The setting up of such cognitive frame not only purports to explain how the language measures for immigrant integration should work but also creates an interpretative scheme that depicts these policies as necessary, framing them as a “natural” element of French historic particularisms, becoming the dominant frame. The language debates, which frame the concept of citizenship as the only means of civic incorporation and participation into the French polity – cannot be fully analyzed without taking into account the historicity of the debates and the social, political and historical context in which they are embedded.

As pointed out above, a series of challenges in the late 80’s such as the declining solidarity of the nation-state or France’s growing engagement in the European Union, challenging the coherence of certain nationally-bounded state policies prompted the FN to frame the debates in terms of high symbolism on the integrity of the nation as cultural and a political entity, trumpeting the grandeur of modern French self-definition. A rhetorical line that was progressively used by the mainstream right as a political strategy to capture the votes of

the FN, as masterfully depicted by Favell (2001) and highlighted in chapter three of this thesis.

Before the end of the 80's, the debates were discursively framed and politically managed in very different terms. The dominant frame in which language debates were embedded were more socio-economic in nature. Insertion functioned precisely because the policies aimed at managing immigration were not framed in terms of grandeur and rhetorical symbolism but rather on a collection of specific, grassroots-level practices. Policies on immigrant integration were aimed at ensuring immigrants' basic welfare and social needs and immigration was not framed as a national problem (Favell, 2001, p. 47). The policies were pitched rather at a local level, specifically in those areas with a high concentration of immigrants with special needs, including language provision.

Once the immigrant integration ceased to be framed in social and welfare terms and embedded gradually in a highly ideological, symbolic frame of self-interrogation of the grand concepts of Republican citizenship, immigration started to be discursively portrayed as a central *problématique*, as observed in the debates, challenging the one and indivisible French nation. The debates have shown the peculiar and restrictive language in which the debates have been framed, problematizing a non-existing problem – lack of language skills – which has served to legitimate the increasing and

increasingly tough language tests in the name of la *citoyenneté Républicaine*, a rhetorical frame for specific political purposes: language tests for citizenship as a gate-keeping mechanism for immigration control.

As the language debates on immigrant integration become more detached from the reality, less responsive to the real integration problems and more ill-suited to provide an effective answer to them, their *raison d'être* can only be justified on rhetorical grounds. The debates have ceased to be reasoned to become exclusively ideological. The analysis has shown that the inflation of this high rhetoric in the debates on immigrant integration and Republican citizenship only masks the absence of pragmatic responsiveness to give account to the linguistic reality. Politicians of the center-right UMP and the far right FN know that they can still trade in the strong nationalist ideological dimension of this cognitive frame by criticizing the apparent integration failure of integration as a way to impose increasingly tough hurdles to deter immigration.

The attempts to break this dominant cognitive frame and terms of the debate by steering clear of the highly ideological and symbolic stands and pay close attention to identifying the facts and to realistically conceptualize appropriate policies by building a new cognitive frame has utterly failed. As we have been able to see from the empirical analysis in chapter three, touching the sacredness of the sacrosanct concepts of *citizenship* and *national identity* in the language debates

on immigrant integration, that is, touching the dominant frame, the dominant habitus tenaciously built over time, ignited such a political turmoil that any re-shaping of the dominant frame has now become a political taboo to be avoided.

5.3.2.2 The Catalan language: the *passport* to Catalan citizenship

While the French debates on immigrant integration have built a rhetorical frame around the concept of citizenship that fixing the ideal on the on the formal/legal status, the Catalan debates on immigrant integration have used the same concept to build a more pragmatic cognitive frame aimed at seeking the complicity of migrants into the Catalan nation-building project. To achieve this political goal, the discursive strategy has been to adopt a more emotional and pragmatic approach, materialized in the discourses through the idea of *resident citizenship*, emphasizing participation and language as central components in the broader sense of belonging to a community.

Unlike in the French case, which places all the emphasis at the very end of the immigration process – when an immigrant is granted nationality – the analysis of the Catalan debates has shown that the concept of *resident citizenship* is systematically invoked at the very moment immigrants arrive in Catalonia and register in the municipal census. The political goal through this discursive strategy is to build a cognitive frame aimed at depicting the Catalan approach to

citizenship as welcoming, more inclusive, open and participatory than that of the State, which automatically conflates it to nationality and imposes a legal boundary to the non-members of the polity.

While it is true that the *Catalan resident citizenship* only entails a mere administrative requirement – subscription in the municipal census – it is knowledge of the Catalan language what allows the immigrant to enter the *Catalan citizenry*. Put in a comparative perspective, while the French debates have been exclusively framed within the legal status as the element that allows immigrants to participate and prove successful integration, crossing the border from *l'immigré to citoyen*, language being one element but not the only one to achieve successful integration, the Catalan discursive frame has placed all the emphasis on the Catalan language for immigrants to enter the Catalan citizenry, as the element that transforms mere co-habitants into Catalan citizens.

The overall aim of the Catalan language debates on immigrant integration has been to craft a civic, participatory cognitive frame wherein immigrants gain civil rights such as participation into the polity if they assume certain linguistic responsibilities, or bluntly put, if they adopt Catalan as the language of public use. Applied to Catalonia, this strategy has been defined in the literature as *linguistic citizenship* (DiGiacomo, 2004; Mercado, 2008, 2015), defined as a “universalized sense of belonging based on a shared duty towards a

language, which seeks to surpass difference based on heritage, origin or territory” (Mercado, 2015, p. 192)

As highlighted above, the systematic adscription of the Catalan language to the concept of citizenship has constructed a dominant frame which expands the traditional Catalan-Spanish debates into a wider, more multilingual polity, through a commonly shared sense of civicness, participation and social cohesion through the public use of the Catalan language. Immigrants are framed in the debates as equal citizens – constantly referred to as *new citizens* or *new Catalans* – contribute on an equal footing to the revitalization of the Catalan culture and language, framed in the debates as plural, inclusive and universal.

This discursively positive representation of immigrants as an integral part of the Catalan citizenry is coupled not only with a discursive opportunity structure, as highlighted above, but also with the creation of real political opportunities for immigrants to shape the language policies for immigrant integration. The language debates show the conscious construction of a framework that has allowed immigrants to participate in both discourse and in the decision-making process through a governmental channel (consultative politics), and non-governmental channels (immigrant associations) by encouraging their active participation, becoming an active voice in the language debates (Climent-Ferrando & Triviño, 2015). This construction of

such a participatory and open frame is symptomatically absent in the French language debates, in which immigrant voices are absent in governmental channels and are only expressed through different immigrant associations, having therefore less capacity to influence and shape the dominant frame.

The discursive and the institutional framework set by the Catalan authorities has created conditions under which consultation through institutionalized spaces is predominant, inserting a civic, participatory environment as the dominant frame. Rather than focusing on the legal status of citizenship— on which Catalonia has no competencies and is therefore unable to do so, as highlighted throughout this thesis— the approach has been to build a dominant frame focused on the participatory and symbolic dimensions of citizenship, language being the key element in these dimensions. This approach has been referred to in the literature as the *Political Opportunity Structure*, defined as the access by immigrants to the institutionalized political system as well as the political framework that shapes particular approaches, attitudes and behaviors, most notable citizenship rights that open or close their access to the national community (Koopmans et al., 2005, as cited in Morales & Giugni, 2011).

This concept, derived from the social movements and increasingly applied to the study of political participation and integration of migrants (see Morales & Giugni, 2011), can also be fruitfully applied

to the study of the language debates on immigrant integration, as pointed out in chapter two. Discourses, but also the institutional settings in which discourses are framed, can importantly shape the degree of immigrant participation in the shaping of policies, and can greatly help explain the presence or absence of immigrant voices in the debates. In other words, their participation to sustain the dominant frame depends to a large extent on the degree of openness/closeness of the political context, which influences discourses, attitudes and behaviors of both migrants and locals alike.

Whereas the language debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia have consciously built a cognitive frame aimed at incorporating immigrant voices into the Catalan citizenry both by creating a discursive opportunity structure and a political opportunity structure, the French debates continue the over-zealous use of historical justification around the grand concepts of Republican citizenship, creating an inflexible dominant frame, both discursive and political, away from the real facts and figures of the real languages needs.

5.4 Concluding remarks

Discourses and the power of ideas – the rhetoric used to identify and conceptualize the framework of public issues – are powerful mechanisms to create public perceptions and shape public opinion. Framed under the label of *Language Ideological Debates*, this chapter has compared the discursive mechanisms through which language measures for immigrant integration have been legitimated in France and Catalonia, adopting a multilevel, comparative perspective. The comparative analysis has shown that both levels have framed their language debates around the concepts of *national identity* and *citizenship*.

Despite an apparent discursive similarity around these two notions, the cognitive frames shaped in both cases have varied considerably, as an indicator of the different political goals to be achieved. The French debates have shown the conscious elaboration of a dominant frame around the idea of national identity and Republican citizenship, identifying the legal definition of formal citizenship and naturalization procedures as the core question at stake. Language is a key element in the integration process, which only finishes successfully in the formal idea of associative membership within the political space which, by setting the legal boundaries of in/out between citizens and foreigners – nationality status – establishes the shape, unity and identity of the French state. As pointed out by Favell (2001) ” the argument is taken to be equally applicable to the present

day as to the 19th century in the construction of the nation-state: laying a heavy stress on the exclusively national boundaries, belonging and identity in maintaining social, political and moral order". (p. 45).

The cognitive frame on the language debates on immigrant integration highlight the obsessive focus on rhetoric and the big symbolic questions of belonging, depicting the lack of language skills as a challenge in the order and identity of the nation. Immigrant integration is framed as a fundamental problem and the mainstream political debates are framed in terms of loss of national identity, integration failure and immigrant isolationism due, in large part, to the lack of language skills. The alleged destabilizing nature of these concerns have served, in turn, to ignite the progressive reconceptualization of the debates, carried away from the social, welfare management into big ideas of national identity and citizenship. This rhetorical shift has served as a political strategy led by the mainstream right UMP to benefit politically from the populist concerns of the extreme right FN, a dominant frame that has become the current dominant habitus at the cost of perpetuating the ideology of conflict, fear and uncertainty in the language debates on immigrant integration and, within the broader aspect, on immigration in France. In other words, what was once a social issue – language provision for immigrant integration – has been turned into a major national problem, which therefore requires – so the argument goes – a national solution.

The cognitive frame that was once exclusive of the FN is pulled towards the center, mainstreamed as the new dominant frame in which the language debates on immigrant integration are embedded. In this sense, it could be claimed that the language, epistemology and conceptualization currently used in the French debates on immigrant integration have been forged by the agenda of the FN. The FN and its remarkable presence in today's French politics reflects the extent to which the language and conceptualizations used in today's (language) debates on immigrant integration – that is, the dominant habitus – have been forged by their agenda.

The language of *citizenship* and *national identity* is progressively taken up by mainstream politicians and strategically used to provide the core focal point for a new rhetoric on the language debates on immigrant integration. It (re)invents a historical myth of the past – Republicanism and the French national identity – and turns them into the dominant frame in which the language debates must be located. This is the way the politics of (language for) immigrant integration have been entextualized in the French context, that is, skillfully inserted into a chosen metadiscursive context and indicating the preferred way of *reading* the reality, which has been referred to in the literature on political discourse as “the politics of representation” (Blommaert, 1999).

The political consequences and the unrepresentativeness of the language measures adopted under such a cognitive frame should not be underestimated: the dominant concern in the language debates – the need of immigrants to master the French language – does not match up the facts of the situation as graphically shown in table 6 of chapter three. Similarly, the social problems, the numbers involved and the symbolic artifice on which the justification of language measures is built up do not correspond to the empirical, factual reality.

At the time of writing this comparative analysis, the UMP is immersed in a deep internal change with profound ideological and symbolic implications. In an attempt to revamp the party before the 2017 French general elections, the former President Sarkozy has rebranded the UMP party, which from May 2015 onwards has taken the name of *les Républicains*. This apparently innocuous change represents a skillful strategy to attribute the core pillars of the French nation and its values – *la République* – to the newly renamed party. By using the classical rhetorical figure of metonymy, that is, a new concept – *les Républicains* – is named after an already-existing concept – *la République* – with all the symbolism and the positive values attached to it, the former UMP channels the commonly shared, dominant habitus around the concept of *la République* towards its party, making a direct association between the whole – the country – and the part – the political party.

In the party's founding speech in May 2015, its leader N. Sarkozy resorted once again to immigration as a top priority for the “new” party, framing the debates in the same old symbolic artifice around the issues of national identity, values and citizenship, language being a key element in these trinomial. “One is not a citizen because you live in France and work in France. You are a citizen if you share one language, one culture, a common morale and a way of life. The values of the French civilization are of paramount importance. It is immigrants who need to adapt to the Republic and not the Republic that needs to adapt to them”¹⁵⁸ – stated Sarkozy. The more things change, the more they remain the same.

The opposite discursive strategy is perceived in the Catalan debates on immigrant integration around the issues of *national identity* and *citizenship*. To achieve the political goal of making Catalan the priority language – as opposed to Spanish – in a migration scenario, the Catalan debates have combined a rhetorical line with a high degree of symbolism with an eminently pragmatic approach. To do so, the debates have strategically built a cognitive frame of inclusion, participation and openness, which has systematically included

¹⁵⁸ Closing speech at the Foundational Congress of *les Républicains* (2015, May 30). Retrieved from <http://lci.tf1.fr/videos/2015/on-n-est-pas-citoyen-francais-seulement-parce-qu-on-habite-en-france-8615547.html> [last accessed 15 September 2015].

immigrants in the making and shaping of discourse and policies, setting up both discursive and political opportunity structures through which immigrants can voice their opinion. As already noted by Branchadell (2012) it could be claimed that Catalan nationalism is in a transition phase between the construction of a community based on cultural traits towards a culturally diverse community defined in terms of social and political participation.

In this new frame that stretches and reconceptualizes the concept of citizenship “from below”, however, it is one language – the national language, Catalan – the language that guarantees full membership into the polity. Paradoxically, this expresses more a political desirability than a sociolinguistic reality as the most widely spoken language in Catalonia continues to be Spanish, as shown in chapter four.

The analysis of the language debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia has shown how immigration has become an important mobilizing issue that has restructured the cognitive frame in which language debates were traditionally embedded. The dominant frame has been transformed from the perennial Catalan-Spanish conflictual debates to be currently framed in multilingual terms. It has consciously built a discursively porous framework – extending the boundaries of belonging, stretching the malleable contours of the concept of *citizenship* and including immigrant voices into the

shaping of Catalan identity – upon the condition of embracing one language, Catalan, as the language that allows you to cross the boundaries of belonging and join the polity on an equal footing.

The invocation of the concepts of *citizenship* and *national identity* in the language debates on immigrant integration in both cases, and their component roots of participation, civicness, and belonging, are not only the evidence of the continued relevance of these ideas in a migration scenario today, as highlighted in chapter two. The framing of immigrant integration debates in these terms establishes a normative language on everyday politics that can have mixed effects on actual practical outcomes.

The evidence from this analysis has been two-fold: on the one hand, the regressive effects of framing the debates around highbrow rhetoric and ideas of *grandeur* to manage real problems such as language provision for immigrant integration. In the French empirical analysis, we have seen the mobilization of an inflexible, restrictive framework, through the obsessive defense of a nation's core virtues and traditional values, mystified and detached from the empirical facts with the political intention of instrumentalizing language for immigration control. As for the Catalan case, we have been able to analyze the invocation of a strategically pragmatic approach attributing all the positive values around the concepts of citizenship and identity to one language – Catalan – as a way to

ensure that Catalan nation becomes the immigrants' point of reference.

The language debates on immigrant integration must be analyzed within the broader picture of international developments. The dynamics of contemporary debates about language, migration, identity and citizenship have developed a powerful momentum across Europe and also worldwide, all the more so in the current refugee exodus. As highlighted in the introductory part of this chapter as well as of this PhD thesis, a number of academic voices have pointed out at the increasing number of language and citizenship tests whose main goal is to act as gate-keeping mechanisms for state immigration control. Parallel to these developments, the same notions citizenship and national identity are being reconceptualized from below to insulate a sense of participation and belonging to the regional polity: the same terms to pursue different political goals.

Despite the remarkable different goals, the underlying narrative in the language debates on immigrant integration is strikingly similar: the discursive conception of a bounded national society through one national language, defined by its rules of membership (formal and/or symbolic, more or less inclusive) which, for functional and social cohesion reasons – so the argument goes – imposes social closure to non-members and requires a certain socialization through the use of the national language (Favell, 2001).

The construction of a dominant frame around the concepts of language, citizenship and identity must be traced back to the nation-building processes of the late 19th century European nation-states. It was a frame created to design nation-states as bounded, container-like homogeneous units in which populations had to be homogenized for greater efficiency (Gelner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990, as cited in Hogan-Brun et al., 2009).

The current human mobility patterns and the new stage of globalization in which we are currently immersed are rapidly changing. Societies are less and less rigid, social and linguistic bonds are increasingly loosened, individuals are increasingly mobile, both physically and virtually in relation to their national societies, as well as their social and linguistic identities, which are increasingly multilingual. In light of these events, it seems reasonable to question whether framing the language debates through the concepts of citizenship and national identity – malleable, flexible and semantically stretchable as they may be – might be suitable to account for the rapidly evolving nature of today's immigration and settlement patterns, constantly changing and more mobile than ever.

While debates on post-national citizenship, multiple identities and cosmopolitanism are echoed in academia and are common within intellectual settings, with discourses on hybridity and multiple

belongings, the contextually determined, nationally-bound perceptions on language for immigrant integration continue to consider language – *the* national language – as the pivotal element of social closure, that is, as an instrument to decide who is in and who is out. The expression of discourse, both through the myriad of rhetorical mechanisms and the formal institutional frameworks built for the purpose deserve our attention as the language policies and the political rhetoric on citizenship and national identity, embedded in a migration context, can have substantial consequences for public life.

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6. THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Concluding remarks

This thesis has engaged with the politics on language and political discourse that relate to and qualify immigrant integration in Europe. It has brought together empirical analysis of the language policies for immigrant integration both topically and contextually, interpreting such empirical evidence with the use of policy and discourse analysis as methodological tools. It has shown how discourses and the power of ideas – the rhetoric used to identify and conceptualize the framework of public issues – are powerful mechanisms to create public perceptions and shape public opinion. Thematically, it has focused on how discourse and language operate in the politics of immigrant integration and has analyzed from a multilevel perspective how conceptual frames underpinning discourses on language for immigrant integration have been shaped in France and Catalonia. The empirical analysis has provided an insight of their political-ideological rationale, evolution and structuring effects.

Contrary to views widespread in various strands of linguistics and sociolinguistics research, in which language is often portrayed as an organic body and as an object impervious to human agency

(Blommaert, 1999, p. 425), the analysis of the language debates on immigrant integration have proven to be the story of social and political actors who use them, instrumentalize them, name them and shape them at specific periods through a variety rhetorical devices to achieve different goals. This thesis has contended that language policies for immigrant integration not only have political consequences, but also political origins. The foci of this PhD research has been precisely to analyze discursively these political origins and consequences.

Under the politically-accepted rhetoric of integration, inclusion and participation, the comparative analysis of the language debates on immigrant integration in France and Catalonia have revealed remarkably different political goals. While the French analysis has shown the gradual transformation of language as a regulatory technique of immigration control managed by the state, creating a new cognitive frame on integration closely related to border control, the Catalan case has shown that, in a bilingual scenario, the Catalan politics on language for immigrant integration have revolved around seeking the empathy of migrants to adhere to the Catalan political community and build emotional attachment to Catalonia.

A thread running through both language debates on integration – highlighted in chapters three and four and fully developed from a comparative perspective in chapter five – has been the systematic reference to the notions of *citizenship* and *national identity*. Despite

an apparent discursive similarity around these two notions, the cognitive frames shaped in both cases have varied considerably, as an indicator of the different political goals to be achieved, as analyzed in chapter five.

The French politics on language for immigrant integration have framed the debates around a focus on grand rhetoric and symbolic questions of belonging. The alleged lack of language skills by immigrants is framed as a challenge to the identity of the nation, a fundamental problem that only creates integration failure and immigrant isolationism. The integration process only finishes successfully when immigrants obtain the nationality – embedded in the French debates under the term *citoyenneté* – that is, the formal idea of associative membership, which sets the legal boundaries of belonging between citizens and foreigners and which, in turn, establishes the shape, unity and identity of the France.

The construction of such a cognitive frame has served to progressively reconceptualize the debates, carried away from the social, welfare management of integration policies into big symbolic ideas of national identity and citizenship, language being instrumentalized for this purpose. As the policy frame becomes less responsive and more ill-suited to give account to the real issues of immigration – poverty and increasing inequality – the analysis has shown how language policies on immigrant integration can only be

justified on rhetorical grounds, becoming more ideological and less reasoned. The inflation of rhetoric around the grand notions of national identity and citizenship has only masked that, in the absence of pragmatic approaches to immigrant integration, the language debates on immigrant integration have become less able to do anything except symbolic talk, trading in the strong nationalist ideological dimension of such a cognitive frame.

The opposite discursive strategy is perceived in the language debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia around the same notions of *national identity* and *citizenship*, as depicted in chapter four. To achieve the political goal of making Catalan the priority language in a bilingual scenario, the Catalan debates have combined a pragmatic rhetorical line with a high degree of symbolism. To do so, the debates have strategically built a cognitive frame of inclusion, participation and openness, which has systematically included immigrants in the making and shaping of discourse and policies, setting up both discursive and political opportunity structures through which immigrants can voice their opinion. Following the empirical analysis, it could be claimed that Catalan nationalism is in a transition phase between the construction of a community based on cultural traits towards a culturally diverse community defined in terms of social and political participation (Branchadell, 2012), language being instrumentalized for that purpose.

In the politics of immigrant integration, language has proven to be an effective instrument of social closure – defined in chapter two as the process of drawing boundaries, constructing identities and building communities in order to monopolize scarce resources for one’s own group, including or excluding the “outsiders” according to the political intentions to be achieved. As stated by Díez Medrano & Koenig (2005), social closure “posits that groups differentiate themselves from one another by the number of hurdles they set to those who want to become legitimate members of the community” (p. 136). This thesis has demonstrated that in the politics of immigrant integration, language has been instrumentalized as a hurdle and/or as an element of inclusion depending of the political goal to be achieved.

6.2. What has been the contribution of this thesis?

The politics on language for immigrant integration have been featured in a variety of studies, anthologies and country reports and from different disciplines, as succinctly summarized in the introduction of this PhD research. Scholars will also continue to analyze the restrictive trends in migration and naturalization laws and the role of language to achieve these goals. Hence, this thesis contributes to the existing scholarly work on the language policies on immigrant integration and the underlying politics and discourses that are fundamental to these issues.

However, given that the objective of this PhD research has been to *interrogate the conceptual frames underpinning discourses on language for immigrant integration* to understand their rationale, evolution and structuring effects, it has taken the debate further on several fronts: a) the study of language politics for immigrant integration from a multilevel perspective and b) the interdisciplinary approach adopted, using discourse analysis, developed in language sciences, applied in the study of the politics of language for immigrant integration.

- a) As fully developed in chapter one of this thesis, a remarkable number of scholars tend to reproduce in their studies on language politics for immigrant integration what Blommaert & Verschueren (1998) have called the “dogma of homogeneity”, that is, an implicit view of society as intrinsically monolingual without inter-group differences. As observed by Cardinal & Sonntag (2015) in their recent critique to the sustenance of such an interpretative frame by political scientists: “those who set the tone in political sciences still do not question the privileged position of working with dominant languages in societies where a single language is likely to dominate. Political science has tended to adopt a majoritarian understanding of language” (p. 10).

This linguistic homogeneity as the dominant conceptual frame fails to account for the existence of territories within states with autochthonous languages other than the state language, many of

which make claim to distinctive cultures, languages and traditions that have evolved separately from state-building processes. These sub-state territories have attempted to gain competencies on language and immigration policies and exercise significant political autonomy within the contours of the state to be able to shape their own models of (linguistic) integration and ensure that the minority language occupies a central position.

Given the existence of different integration models within an increasing number of States, some scholarly voices have noted the need to analyze units other than the state to provide an accurate empirical account of current practices, thus avoiding the illusion of state homogeneity (Gil Araujo 2004). However, recent academic reflections have noted the scarcity of comparative research focusing on the multilevel approach on immigrant integration. As pointed out by Hepburn & Zapata Barrero (2014) “this sub-state level has so far been almost absent in the field of comparative immigration studies, which has tended to focus on the nation-state or supranational level” (p. 10).

This PhD research has filled this gap by analyzing the discursive legitimation of language measures for immigrant integration from a multilevel perspective, which I have referred to in the introductory part of this thesis as the *vertical gap*.

- b) This thesis has also contended that the politics of language for immigrant integration not only has political consequences. It also has political origins and are aimed at achieving specific political goals. However, political scientists have left the field of language policy to social science disciplines such as sociolinguistics (Cardinal & Sonntag 2015). As developed in the introduction of this PhD research, the different bodies of literature within the language and political science disciplines, however, hardly make any cross-reference to the theoretical paradigms, conceptual frameworks and analytical tools developed within each discipline, often remaining within their own academic boundaries. I have argued that an accurate, thorough comparative analysis of the conceptual frames that shape and sustain the discourses on language for immigrant integration, however, requires a nuanced methodological framework that can fully capture not only the rhetorical devices used to achieve a variety of political purposes but also the historical, social and political dynamics of language policy making.

This PhD research has argued that discourse analysis, developed in language sciences, and most specifically Thompson's *Depth Hermeneutics*, can be applied to the study of the politics of language for immigrant integration. It has advocated the need for these disciplines to inform one another because each can provide us with important theoretical and methodological tools with which to make sense of the discursive legitimation of language measures for immigrant integration. With this interdisciplinary

approach, my ultimate goal has been to set up a framework for an important but missing scholarly dialogue between the different approaches on the analysis of the politics of language for immigrant integration. This is what I have referred to as *the horizontal gap*.

6.3 What are the limitations of this thesis?

Researchers often face different challenges that limit the reach of the expected findings. In the case of this PhD research, several methodological and empirical limitations have been identified.

Referring to the *empirical limitations*, the object of this study, the politics of language for immigrant integration, is not an isolated policy area that only occurs in Parliamentary debates or Ministers' speeches and voiced in the media. Integration and immigration in general is a multilevel, cross-cutting and transversal field that involves the interaction of a wide array of actors in supranational, national, regional and local settings (Scholten, 2013, p. 217). Moreover, immigration involves vertical and horizontal relations with multiple institutional and non-institutional actors (Zincone, 2011, p. 427).

When building my corpus for the analysis, I have attempted to capture such multiplicity of voices of the debates to give account of

the dynamism and fluctuation as well as to incorporate voices of opposition/contestation. However, other territorial levels which might also shape the discursive frame on the politics of language, most notably the European Union but also the local level through immigrant associations, for example, have not been thoroughly analyzed. In chapter three on France, reference to the EU as a key stakeholder in the French debates on language for immigrant integration appears in the discourses as France held the Presidency of the EU council. However, despite being also a discourse shaper in Catalan politics, it has not surfaced remarkably in the analysis. The inclusion of the supranational and local voices could be a subsequent subject of analysis to complete the multilevel analysis of the language politics for immigrant integration.

As for the *methodological* limitations, there are two interconnected elements that need to be highlighted: the choice of my case studies and the (non)-generalizability of the findings.

In terms of the case selection, both France and Catalonia attach high importance to their language. Scholars have often cited France as one of the birthplaces of linguistic nationalism, an archetype for the one-nation-one-language model (Cohen, 2003, p.165). Similarly, Catalonia has always attached a high symbolic value to the Catalan language as one of the defining traits of their people. In both cases, immigration has ranked high on the political agendas as migration

flows, especially in Catalonia, have rocketed over the past decade, going from 3% to more than 15% in a decade.

The findings of this PhD research on how France and Catalonia have shaped the conceptual frames underpinning discourses on language for immigrant integration, however, cannot be generalized across all other European cases (States and sub-state territories with languages other than the State language). As I have repeatedly pointed out throughout all the chapters of this thesis, an accurate, comparative analysis must take into account the historical, social and political dynamics of (language) policy making in that concrete territory, thus accounting for the complex interrelationship and the evolving nature of texts, discourses, and social actors that shape and sustain a specific cognitive frame in a particular historical and sociopolitical context.

6.4 What lines can be drawn for further research?

The analysis of the conceptual frames underpinning discourses on language for immigrant integration from a multilevel perspective opens the scope for further research in two ways: by including sub-state, local and supranational levels in the empirical analysis of the language politics of immigrant integration and by adopting an interdisciplinary methodology to the general study of public policies.

As pointed out in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the multi-level approach on the (language) politics for immigrant integration, including the sub-state level has been so far almost absent in the field of comparative immigration studies, which has tended to focus on the nation-state or supranational level” (Hepburn & Zapata Barrero, 2014, p. 10). Given that regional policies, institutional settings and the prevailing public discourses also shape the pace, the intensity and level of immigrants’ integration into the public arena (Giugni & Morales, 2011), this PhD research wishes to note the need to engage in comparative, multilevel empirical research taking the sub-state level into account.

Similarly, the adoption of Discourse Analysis and Thompson’s *Depth Hermeneutics* approach to the analysis of the politics of language for immigrant integration could also be applied to the analysis of a much broader spectrum of public policies. As seen in this PhD research, political discourse can be analyzed for its descriptive and prescriptive force, which has an effect in creating the political “reality” of the situation. Many of the ideas and justifications given to uphold particular policies often refer to conceptualizations, abstract principles, myths and invented traditions and claims about the functioning of society. Applying Discourse Analysis to the study of public policy issues can greatly help understand how specific conceptualizations come about and how policies are justified. This

thesis wishes to advocate for *further interdisciplinary approaches in the analysis of public policies*.

6.5 Which policy recommendations can be drawn from the PhD thesis?

The multilevel analysis of the politics of language for immigrant integration and how these have been discursively framed allows us not only to speak in methodological, analytical or empirical terms but also translate the findings into concrete policy proposals and recommendations.

As we have seen in the analysis, language has become a pivotal element in the debates on immigrant integration. As an instrument of inclusion and/or exclusion, as a way to demarcate a symbolic barrier of “in” and “out” and a site of ideology, language defines the boundaries and identities of political communities, becoming an effective tool to “determine the boundaries of belonging” in a migration context (Bauböck, 2007) or as pointed out in the introductory notes of this thesis, the element “to become an accepted part of society” (Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014).

France has built a cognitive frame by obsessively resorting to grand Republican rhetoric and symbolism, conceptualizing immigration as a problem. By problematizing a non-existing problem and framing

the debates through a discourse dominated by symbolic, identity notions and endless terminological discussions on France's philosophical and Republican peculiarities, France has not fully addressed the real causes of integration failure, which is not language as most immigrants come from former colonies, as seen in chapter three, but poverty, increasing disparities, inequality and a declining welfare state. The language politics for immigrant integration in France has been dominated by a strong nationalist ideological dimension and by the attempts of winning votes by agitating the fear of immigration and invoking the sacrosanct myths and conventions of the French Republic. By adopting such an exclusionary political discourse and policy action, the foundation of legitimacy at the policy level, which must combine pragmatic responsiveness to real problems and the deliberative democratic building of public consensus, has been lost.

Igniting the fear among the population in times of economic uncertainty and social unrest and blaming immigration for the country's malaise can be extremely dangerous and must be avoided at all costs if a society is to remain cohesive. As pointed out above, there are few issues that have aroused the concern of electorates more than the prospect of rapid social change resulting from migration (Hepburn & Zapata Barrero, 2014).

Contrary to this approach, and while the political goal has been to make Catalan the priority language in the politics of immigrant

integration, the Catalan language debates have strategically built a discursively positive frame of inclusion, participation and openness, which has systematically included immigrants in the making and shaping of policies, setting up both discursive and political opportunity structures through which immigrants have been able to voice their opinion. A strategy aimed at capturing the empathy of migrants into the Catalan nation-building project. Despite constantly referring to language and national identity in symbolic terms, the idea of participation of all members of society, regardless of place of origin and nationality, has always been present in the debates.

This pragmatic approach to the politics of immigrant integration – which has not framed immigration in a negative, exclusionary way as the political intentions are remarkably different – might help explain why there have been no major social episodes of unrest, xenophobia, despite a skyrocketing immigrant population going from 3% to more than 15% in less than a decade. These have been the general conclusions drawn from the chapter on the language debates for immigrant integration in Catalonia, which are in the process of being transformed into the policy report *The Linguistic Integration of Migrants in Catalonia 2014. An overview*, to be published in 2016.

In sum, this PhD research has offered a portrayal of the public philosophy that emanates from how political and social actors approach the politics of language for immigrant integration and, in

turn, the politics that affect the functioning of immigration systems as a result. It has ultimately shown how the expression of discourse, through a variety of rhetorical mechanisms, the formal institutional frameworks built for the purpose and the contextual specificities deserve our attention as the politics of language can have substantial consequences for public life.

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ANNEXES

ANNEXES RELATED TO FRANCE

ANNEX I. Analytical codes and categories derived from the French corpus

Codes	Categories
<p>CHM: [chômage] Unemployment The high unemployment figures among immigrant population is due to lack of language skills, among other issues.</p> <p>PBL: Problem Lack of language skills by immigrant population is considered as one of the main problems of integration failure</p> <p>PRC: Parcours de l'intégration The integration process [parcours] has failed due to lack of language skills</p>	<p>ECH: Integration failure [échec de l'intégration]</p>
<p>QFO: Quantitative objective [Objectif quantitatif de l'immigration] Language test must be used to set the number of immigrants that are able to enter into the country</p> <p>LIS : Langue, instrument de sélection Language tests must be used to select the number of migrants in the country</p> <p>MIQ : Managing Immigration Quotas Language tests must be used to set and manage yearly immigration quotas</p>	<p>CHS : Contre l'immigration subie. Pour une immigration choisie. Motto used to refer to the need of selecting immigrants rather than suffering the consequences of migration</p>
<p>SCL: Seclusion Immigrants seclude themselves because of lack of language skills</p>	<p>COM : Communautarisme [Isolationism]</p>

<p>ISL: Isolation Immigrants remain isolated because of lack of language skills</p>	
<p>THR : Threat Immigration depicted as a threat to the history, values and language of the Republic</p> <p>VLS: Values Values attached to French as the national language</p> <p>DNG : Danger Immigration depicted as a threat to the history, values and language of the Republic</p>	<p>IDN : National Identity Reference to the importance of language to the French National Identity</p>
<p>EUR: Reference to the European Union Reference to EU soft law on language for immigrant integration to elevate the compulsory nature of language tests to EU level</p>	
<p>CNT: Contestation Opposing views to the above notions attributed to the Catalan language</p>	

ANNEX II. The French language debates on immigrant integration in media

Ref	Day	Month	Year	Title	Media	Codes	Categories
1	13	1	2005	France/Immigration - Sarkozy réclame des quotas	Reuters	MIQ; PBL	CHS; ECH
2	25	4	2005	Intégration. De nouvelles règles pour obtenir la nationalité française	Le Progres	PRC; VLS	ECH; IDN
3	28	7	2005	Ministère de l'Intérieur - Réunion du Comité interministériel de contrôle de l'immigration	News Press France	MIQ	CHS
4	29	11	2005	Immigration: les principales mesures adoptées	Associated press	PRC	ECH; CHS

5	29	11	2005	Villepin veut porter de un à deux ans le délai de demande de regroupement familial	Associated press	QFO	CHS
6	29	11	2005	Premier Ministre - Intervention à l'issue du Comité interministériel de contrôle de l'immigration	News Press France	QFO	CHS
7	29	11	2005	Villepin durcit le contrôle de l'immigration en France	Reuters	QFO	CHS
8	30	11	2005	l'immigration. Revue de presse	Nouvel Observateur	PBL; QFO	CHS; ECH
9	01	12	2005	Immigration : Abidjan assouplit les règles, Paris durcit le contrôle	All Africa France	PBL; QFO	CHS; ECH

10	08	12	2005	Problématique de l'immigration en France : la France se barricade pour se protéger contre des "amis gênants"	All Africa France	PBL; QFO	CHS; ECH
11	03	01	2006	Immigration-Huit associations dénoncent le projet de loi Sarkozy	Reuters	PBL; QFO	CHS; ECH; CNT-CHS
12	12	01	2006	Sarkozy privilégie les "cerveaux" au détriment des "immigrés subis"	Agence France Presse	PBL; QFO	CHS; ECH
13	12	01	2006	Immigration: Nicolas Sarkozy présentera son projet de loi en "février"	Associated press	PBL; QFO	CHS; ECH

14	13	01	2006	Choisir et contrôler les immigrés	Libération	PBL; QFO	CHS; ECH; CNT-ECH
15	13	01	2006	Clandestins: Sarkozy confirme qu'il veut supprimer la régularisation après 10 ans	Agence France Presse	PBL; QFO	CHS; ECH
16	18	01	2006	IMMIGRATION - Immigration : Sarkozy précise son projet	Nouvel Observateur	PBL; QFO	CHS; ECH
17	01	02	2006	Politique. Nicolas Sarkozy oeuvre pour une « immigration choisie ». Le projet de loi sur l'immigration sera examiné le 9 février lors d'un comité interministériel.	La Croix	PBL; QFO;	CHS; ECH; CNT-CHS
18	09	02	2006	Immigration - Villepin se veut patron d'une "politique moderne"	Reuters	PBL; QFO	CHS; ECH

19	09	02	2006	Etrangers bienvenus si souhaités	Libération	PBL; QFO	CHS; ECH; CNT-CHS
20	10	02	2006	Le gouvernement veut choisir ses migrants	Charente Libre	PBL; QFO	CHS; ECH; CNT-CHS
21	29	03	2006	Sarkozy : "J'irai chercher les électeurs du FN"	Nouvel Observateur	PBL; VLS	IDN; ECH
22	01	04	2006	L'"intégration", portier de l'Europe	Libération	LIS	CHS
23	20	04	2006	Dossier. La loi sur l'immigration. D'une « immigration subie » à une « immigration choisie ». La philosophie du projet de loi de Nicolas Sarkozy qui sera débattu le 2 mai repose sur une maîtrise quantitative de l'immigration.	La Croix	QFO; MIQ	CHS

24	24	04	2006	Immigration. Le gouvernement veut renforcer l'intégration. Le comité interministériel sur l'intégration qui se réunit aujourd'hui devrait créer une « journée de la fraternité ».	La Croix	QFO; MIQ	CHS
25	24	04	2006	Villepin pour une intégration "volontariste et exigeante"	Reuters	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS
26	25	04	2006	Dominique de Villepin veut faire du français le « moteur » de l'intégration	Les Echos	QFO; MIQ	CHS
27	25	04	2006	Un contrat pour devenir français	Libération	PRC	ECH
28	25	04	2006	Les Eglises s'inquiètent	Sud Oest	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS

29	28	04	2006	En Europe, la tendance est au durcissement en matière d'immigration (DOSSIER, SYNTHÈSE)	Agence France Presse	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS
30	01	05	2006	Les « bons » immigrés et les « mauvais »	Alternatives Économiques	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS
31	02	05	2006	Non à l'immigration jetable	Libération	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS
32	02	05	2006	Dossier. Le projet de loi sur l'immigration. L'immigration « choisie » passe au crible des députés. Les députés examinent cette semaine le projet de loi controversé de Nicolas Sarkozy. Le texte promeut l'immigration de travailleurs et d'étudiants qualifiés au détriment de l'immigration familiale.	La Croix	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS

33	02	05	2006	Ministère de l'Intérieur et de l'Aménagement du Territoire - Présentation du projet de loi relatif à l'immigration et à l'intégration	News Press France	QFO; MIQ; PBL; VLS	CHS; ECH; IDN
34	03	05	2006	Immigration : le tour de vis de Sarkozy	All Africa France	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS
35	04	05	2006	L'Assemblée rend obligatoire le "contrat d'accueil et d'intégration"	Agence France Presse	QFO; MIQ; PBL; ISL	CHS; CNT-CHS; ECH; COM
36	04	05	2006	Les députés durcissent les conditions d'entrée et de séjour des étrangers (PAPIER GENERAL)	Agence France Presse	QFO; MIQ	CHS;

37	04	05	2006	Les députés adoptent le «contrat d'accueil et d'intégration»	Le Figaro	QFO; MIQ	CHS;
38	04	05	2006	Immigration. A l'Assemblée, Nicolas Sarkozy estime son texte « équilibré ». Les députés examinent jusqu'à demain le projet de loi sur l'immigration choisie, qui suscite un profond clivage droite-gauche.	La Croix	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS
39	04	05	2006	France/Immigration - Les députés dans le vif du sujet	Reuters	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS
40	05	05	2006	L'éducation civique et linguistique adoptée	Libération	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS

41	05	05	2006	Un « contrat d'accueil et d'intégration » pour les immigrés primo-arrivants	Le Progres	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS
42	06	05	2006	Immigration : les députés votent des mesures sur l'immigration familiale	Agence France Presse	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS
43	08	05	2006	Immigration: les députés durcissent les conditions du regroupement familial (PAPIER GENERAL)	Agence France Presse	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS
44	08	05	2006	Immigration choisie !	All Africa France	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS
45	17	05	2006	Immigration: les mesures clés du projet Sarkozy II	Associated press	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS

46	09	05	2006	Les limites de l'immigration choisie	Le monde	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS
47	27	06	2006	"La circulaire Sarkozy, c'est surtout de la poudre aux yeux"	Libération	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS
48	29	06	2006	Chirac - Devenir Français est un honneur et un engagement	Reuters	QFO; MIQ; VLS	CHS; CNT-CHS; IDN
49	30	06	2006	Immigration: le Parlement approuve la loi Sarkozy II	Associated press	QFO; MIQ; VLS	CHS; CNT-CHS; IDN
50	30	06	2006	Jacques Chirac valorise la naturalisation.	France Ouest	QFO	CHS

51	24	08	2006	Tourner la page Sarkozy	Liberation	QFO; MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS
52	04	12	2006	Dossier. Elections présidentielles 2007. Droite. Sarkozy, Bayrou comparons les programmes.	La Croix	QFO	CHS; CNT-CHS
53	20	02	2007	2007. Ce qui doit changer. Dossier. Un autre accueil de l'immigré; Ce que proposent les candidats	La Croix	VLS	IDN
54	23	02	2007	Immigration: les principales propositions des candidats	La Croix	VLS	IDN
55	05	03	2007	Regroupement familial: Sarkozy pour un "test d'intégration" préalable	Agence France Presse	PBL; PRC	ECH

56	05	03	2007	Sarkozy évoque une "arrivée probable" au printemps de clandestins africains	Le Figaro	PBL: PRC; VLS	ECH; IDN
57	05	03	2007	- Immigration - Sarkozy propose un "test d'intégration"	Reuters	PBL: PRC; VLS	ECH; IDN
58	06	03	2007	Regroupement familial : Sarkozy veut un « test d'intégration »	Les Echos	PBL: PRC; VLS	ECH; IDN
59	06	03	2007	Immigration : le candidat de l'UMP hausse le ton	Le Figaro	PBL: PRC; VLS	ECH; IDN
60	06	03	2007	IMMIGRATION; Sarkozy pour des tests d'intégration.	La Croix	PBL: PRC; VLS	ECH; IDN

61	06	03	2007	Sur l'immigration, Sarkozy fait face à Le Pen	Midi Libre	PBL: PRC; VLS	ECH; IDN
62	09	03	2007	FRANCE 2. Annonce création Ministère identité nationale	France 2	PBL: PRC; VLS	ECH; IDN
63	09	03	2007	Sarkozy veut un ministère de l'identité nationale	Libération	PBL: PRC; VLS	ECH; IDN
64	13	03	2007	Sarkozy défend l'identité et la culture françaises	Reuters		
65	14	03	2007	Identité nationale : Sarkozy persiste et signe	Le Figaro	PBL: PRC; VLS	ECH; IDN

66	15	03	2007	Dossier. Présidentielle 2007. L'identité nationale, une longue histoire. Comment se construit l'identité nationale.	La Croix	PBL: PRC; VLS	ECH; IDN
67	16	03	2007	Seriez-vous choqué par la création d'un ministère de l'Immigration et de l'Identité nationale ?	Le Figaro		
68	19	03	2007	Nouvelle provocation de Nicolas Sarkozy	L'Humanité	PBL: PRC; VLS	ECH; IDN
69	22	03		Immigration - Canaliser le flux	L'Express	PBL: PRC; VLS	ECH; IDN
70	28	03	2007	Texte intégral du projet de Nicolas Sarkozy, candidat à l'élection présidentielle - 2ème partie	La Tribune	PBL: PRC; VLS	ECH; IDN

71	30	03	2007	De plus en plus de pays européens imposent des tests de langue aux étrangers (ENCADRE)	Agence France Presse	PBL; PRC; VLS;	ECH; IDN
72	02	04	2007	La sécurité: "élément de préoccupation" dans la campagne présidentielle (Baroin)	Agence France Presse	PCR; PBL	ECH
73	03	04	2007	Sarkozy, adepte de la sélection culturelle	Libération	MIQ; VLS	CHS; IDN
74	03	04	2007	Nous sommes passés à une racialisation de l'identité française	Libération	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
75	03	04	2007	Les examens de langue et de culture ont la cote	24 heures	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN

76	04	04	2007	Immigration : non à un ministère du passé	Libération	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
77	04	04	2007	Rivarol, nous voilà !	Libération	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
78	19	04	2007	Issy-les-Moulineaux : Intervention de Nicolas Sarkozy	News Press France	MIQ; VLS	CHS; IDN
79	26	04	2007	« Je ne vais pas trahir 11,5 millions d'électeurs »	Midi Libre	MIQ; VLS	CHS; IDN
80	09	05	2007	Elections présidentielles 2007. Dossier. Les quinze chantiers prioritaires de Sarkozy; Immigration. Durcir les règles du regroupement familial	La Croix	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CNT-IDN; CHS

81	10	05	2007	JUSTICE-AFFAIRES INTÉRIEURES : RÉUNION MINISTÉRIELLE INFORMELLE SUR L'INTÉGRATION DES IMMIGRANTS	Europe Information Service		
82	10	05	2007	Ma France par Nicolas Sarkozy	L'Express	MIQ; VLS	CHS; IDN
83	16	05	2007	Durcir les conditions du regroupement familial	Sud Oest	MIQ; VLS	CHS; IDN
84	18	05	2007	Immigration et identité nationale: une «confusion» et une «régression»	Libération	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CNT-IDN; CHS
85	18	05	2007	La question de l'immigration en suspens	Le Progres	LIS	CHS

86	21	05	2007	Dossier. Un gouvernement resserré et déjà au travail. Brice Hortefeux, le premier « sarkozyste » à l'immigration.	La Croix	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CNT-IDN; CHS
87	01	06	2007	Immigration, identité, développement : trois missions étroitement liées	Le Figaro	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CNT-IDN; CHS
88	02	06	2007	Hortefeux persiste et signe	L'Humanité	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CNT-IDN; CHS
89	04	06	2007	Brice Hortefeux : "Pourquoi un ministère de l'Immigration ?"	News Press France	VLS; MIQ; ISL; SCL	IDN; CHS; COM
90	11	06	2007	Immigration: Hortefeux renforce encore les obligations d'intégration et de maîtrise du français, selon "Le Figaro"	Associated press	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS

91	12	06	2007	Le regroupement familial sera bientôt durci	Le Figaro	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS
92	12	06	2007	Projet de loi de durcissement du regroupement familial, selon Le Figaro	Agence France Presse	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS
93	12	06	2007	REGROUPEMENT FAMILIAL. La loi coup de frein	Le Figaro	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-IDN; CNT-CHS
94	12	06	2007	Immigration - Le texte d'Hortefeux au Conseil d'Etat	Reuters	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS
95	12	06	2007	Immigration: le projet de loi transmis au Conseil d'Etat, les associations condamnent (PAPIER GENERAL)	Reuters	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS

96	13	06	2007	Tour de vis sur le regroupement familial	Libération	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
97	13	06	2007	Un projet de loi durcit le regroupement familial	Sud Oest	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
98	13	06	2007	Immigration familiale : le gouvernement souhaite de nouvelles restrictions	Les Echos	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
99	13	06	2007	L'accueil des étrangers se durcit	Sud Oest	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
100	13	06	2007	Société; Le projet de loi sur l'immigration critiqué	Charente Libre	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS

101	13	06	2007	IMMIGRATION - Le retour des charters	Le Nouvel Observateur	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
102	13	06	2007	Durcissement en vue pour le regroupement familial	Midi Libre	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
103	13	06	2007	Le gouvernement veut encadrer les « droits et devoirs » des parents étrangers.	La Croix	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS
104	13	06	2007	Un projet de loi durcit le regroupement familial.	Ouest France	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS
105	13	06	2007	Immigration : le projet de loi transmis au Conseil d'Etat Le projet de loi visant à durcir les conditions du regroupement familial qui sera discuté cet été au parlement a été présenté hier au Conseil d'Etat.	L'Indépendant	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS

106	14	06	2007	Les conditions draconiennes du regroupement familial	L'Humanité	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS
107	27	06	2007	Immigration : la France met en place la barrière de la langue	Libération	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
108	28	06	2007	Immigration. « Une rupture radicale avec ce qui a fait la France »	L'Humanité	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
109	03	07	2007	Immigration: Hortefeux présente mercredi son projet de loi en Conseil des ministres	Agence France Presse	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS;

110	03	07	2007	François Fillon trace les grands axes de sa législature	Les Echos	VLS; MIQ; ISL	IDN; CHS; CNT- CHS; COM
111	04	07	2007	Durcissement des conditions du regroupement familial	Reuters	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS;
112	04	07	2007	Brice Hortefeux veut stimuler l'immigration économique	Reuters	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS;
113	04	07	2007	Fillon annonce une réforme des institutions. Le gouvernement veut instaurer un contrat d'accueil pour les parents étrangers	La Croix	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS;
114	04	07	2007	Un « bon » immigré est un travailleur sans famille	L'Humanité	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT- CHS

115	04	07	2007	La pratique du français, "préalable à une intégration réussie"	Agence France Presse	VLS; MIQ; PRC	IDN; CHS; ECH
116	05	07	2007	Familles sous contrôle	Sud Oest	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
117	05	07	2007	Le mur de la langue	L'Indépendant	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
118	05	07	2007	Réussir l'intégration	Ouest France	VLS; MIQ; PRC	IDN; CHS; ECH
119	05	07	2007	Pas d'immigration choisie pour les familles	Ouest France	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
120	06	07	2007	Les conditions d'une immigration choisie	News Press France	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS

121	11	07	2007	Brice Hortefeux devant deux classes d'apprentissage de la langue française	Libération	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS
122	12	07	2007	Le ministre défend son test de maîtrise du français	Le Parisien	VLS; MIQ; ISL	IDN; CHS; COMM
123	27	07	2007	Ma vision de l'identité nationale	Libération	VLS	IDN
124	13	09	2007	Préfets français convoqués pour déficit d'expulsions	Le Temps	MIQ	CHS
125	16	09	2007	Le projet de loi sur l'immigration discuté mardi par les députés	Agence France Presse	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS

126	16	09	2007	Nouveau projet de loi sur l'immigration, la gauche très critique	Reuters	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
127	17	09	2007	La droite veut imposer les tests ADN et le fichage ethnique	L'Humanité	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
128	18	09	2007	Les députés se penchent sur le projet de loi controversé sur l'immigration	Agence France Presse	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
129	18	09	2007	Immigration-Hortefeux présente son texte controversé aux députés	Reuters	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
130	20	09	2007	L'Assemblée nationale adopte le projet de loi sur l'immigration	Agence France Presse	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS

131	21	09	2007	Immigration : les députés adoptent les tests ADN et l'apprentissage du français	Les Echos	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
132	21	09	2007	Interview télévisée du président de la République	Agence France Presse	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS
133	24	09	2007	La France et le regroupement familial	All Africa France	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
134	08	10	2007	Un « détail » lourd de symboles	L'Humanité	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS

135	10	10	200	La Cité de l'immigration ouvre ses portes sur fond de polémique	Le Point	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
136	23	10	2007	Parlement : adoption du projet de loi sur l'immigration	Agence France Presse	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
137	23	10	2007	La loi sur l'immigration adoptée, tests ADN compris	Reuters	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
138	12	11	2007	Immigration: Sarkozy renouvelle son message de fermeté	La Presse Can	VLS; MIQ	IDN; CHS; CNT-CHS
139	20	11	2007	Hortefeux veut "réguler l'immigration"	Le Figaro	MIQ	CHS

140	05	12	2007	Les Français hésitent à voir l'immigration comme un atout/	Reuters	PBL; VLS	ECH; IDN;
141	27	05	2008	Le devoir d'un gouvernement n'est pas de cautionner l'illégalité	Libération	MIQ	CHS
142	29	05	2008	Pacte pour l'immigration: la France négocie intensément avec ses partenaires	Libération	MIQ	CHS; EUR
143	05	06	2008	Immigration : le contrat d'intégration, un "tout petit détail" (Hortefeux)	Agence France Presse	MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS; EUR
144	18	06	2008	Un pacte de fer contre les migrants	L'Humanité	MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS; EUR

145	24	06	2008	analyse; Les dégâts de la politique du chiffre	Libération	MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS; EUR
146	27	06	2008	Compromis hispano-français sur la politique européenne d'immigration	Agence France Presse	MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS; EUR
147	07	07	2008	Accord sur le pacte européen sur l'immigration	Reuters	MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS; EUR
148	07	07	2008	Les quatre propositions de la France	Sud Oest	MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS; EUR
149	07	07	2008	L'Espagne accepte le pacte sur l'immigration de la France	Reuters	MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS; EUR

150	08	07	2008	Union européenne; Pour séduire les Européens, Paris adoucit son "pacte d'immigration"	La Tribune	MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS; EUR
151	08	07	2008	Le gouvernement présente le pacte européen pour organiser une immigration légale	Agence France Presse	MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS; EUR
152	08	07	2008	Certaines dispositions aménagées	L'Humanité	MIQ	CHS; CNT-CHS; EUR
153	08	07	2008	Hortefeux: "le contrat d'accueil et d'intégration" a posé problème dans les négociations du pacte européen Les candidats à l'immigration vont être obligés d'apprendre le français	Associated press Le Point	MIQ; VLS	IDN: CHS; CNT-CHS; EUR

154	30	10	2008	Les candidats à l'immigration vont être obligés d'apprendre le français	Le Point	MIQ; QFO;VLS	IDN; CHS
155	30	10	2008	Le français va devenir obligatoire pour les candidats à l'immigration	Le Point	MIQ; QFO;VLS	CHS; IDN
156	30	10	2008	Le français obligatoire pour les candidats à l'immigration	Le Figaro	MIQ; QFO;VLS	CHS; IDN
157	30	10	2008	Regroupement familial : Français obligatoire dès le pays d'origine (Figaro)	Agence France Presse/Figaro	QFO; MIQ; VLS	CHS; IDN

158	02	11	2008	Français obligatoire : c'est officiel	Presse Océan	QFO;MIQ; VLS	CHS; IDN
159	03	11	2008	Hortefeux privilégie la langue et l'emploi pour intégrer les immigrés	Figaro	PBL; PRC; CHM	ECH; MIQ;
160	03	11	2008	Des parents immigrés pourront poursuivre leur scolarité dans 12 départements (Hortefeux)	Agence France Presse	PBL; PRC;	ECH; MIQ;
161	03	11	2008	Brice Hortefeux appelle l'Europe à "relever le défi de l'intégration"	Le Parisien	VLS; PBL	IDN; ECH; EUR
162	04	11	2008	Brice Hortefeux a clôturé la conférence européenne de Vichy sur l'intégration en obtenant l'accord unanime de nos partenaires	Press release	VLS; PBL	IDN; ECH; EUR

163	04	11	2008	Brice Hortefeux annonce la création d'une « boîte à outils » pour favoriser l'intégration des immigrés en Europe	Agence Europe	VLS; PBL	IDN; ECH; EUR
164	04	11	2008	LA LANGUE DU PAYS D'ACCUEIL AU C UR D'UNE CONFÉRENCE SUR L'INTÉGRATION	Europolitique	VLS; PBL	IDN; ECH; EUR
165	04	11	2008	IMMIGRATION : PARIS VEUT DES SOLUTIONS À L'ÉCHEC DES POLITIQUES D'INTÉGRATION	POLITIQUES D'INTÉGRATION	PBL; ISL	COM; ECH; EUR
166	05	11	2008	Langue, travail... : les outils pour bien intégrer	Midi Libre	CHM; VLS	ECH; EUR

167	05	11	2008	Quand intégration rime avec humiliation	L'Humanité	PBL; ISL; QFO; LIS	COM; ECH; CHS; CNT- CHSEUR
168	05	11	2008	IMMIGRATION : L'UE SE DOTE D'UNE BOÎTE À OUTILS SUR L'INTÉGRATION	Europolitique	PBL; QFO	ECH; CHS; EUR
169	05	11	2008	Les Vingt-Sept font de la maîtrise de la langue un préalable à l'intégration	Les Echos	PBL; QFO	ECH; CHS; EUR
170	05	11	2008	L'état d'Hortefeux pour les migrants	Libération	PBL; QFO	ECH; CHS; EUR
171	05	11	2008	Hortefeux veut enseigner la Marseillaise aux migrants	Presse Océan	VLS	IDN

172	05	11	2008	Brice Hortefeux annonce des mesures pour l'intégration	La Croix	PBL; QFO	ECH; CHS
173	06	11	2008	Declaration ministres immigration. Vichy Présidence FR	Conseil UE	PBL	ECH; EUR
174	13	11	2008	Hortefeux prône « le volontarisme républicain »	Le Figaro	VLS	IDN
175	08	12	2008	« L'EUROPE ÉCHOUE AUJOURD'HUI SUR L'INTÉGRATION CULTURELLE	Europolitique	PBL; QFO	ECH; CHS
176	11	12	2008	Sondage tricolore	L'Express	PBL; VLS	IDN; ECH

177	11	12	2008	La querelle de l'identité nationale	Le Point	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
178	17	12	2008	Document. Brice Hortefeux écrit de nouveau aux évêques.	La Croix	PBL	ECH; CNT-ECH
179	08	01	2009	« L'immigration choisie » de Nicolas Sarkozy	La Tribune	QFO; LIS	CHS; CNT-CHS
180	10	01	2009	Dossier. La loi sur les tests ADN se fait toujours attendre	La Croix	QFO	CHS; CNT-CHS
181	16	01	2009	Immigration - Besson veut concilier fermeté et humanité	Reuters	VLS	IDN

182	25	03	2009	Notre gouvernement veille particulièrement à concilier humanité, fermeté et rigueur	All Africa France	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
183	31	03	2009	lettre de mission Sarkozy et Fillon	Nouvelle politique integration	QFO	EUR: CHS
184	07	04	2009	Sarkozy pour une "nouvelle politique d'intégration" débattue au Parlement	Agence France Presse	VLS	IDN
185	07	04	2009	Les nouveaux objectifs d'Éric Besson	Le Point	VLS	IDN
186	08	04	2009	Le président de la République demande à M. Eric BESSON, ministre de l'Immigration, de l'Intégration, de l'Identité nationale et du Développement solidaire,	Bulletin Quotidien	VLS	IDN

				d'organiser l'action de son ministère autour de cinq priorités			
187	27	10	2009	Les filières d'immigration irrégulière entravent le projet européen	Le Figaro	QFO	CHS
188	27	10	2009	Identité nationale : Besson fait le coq	Libération	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
189	28	10	2009	Boutin (PCD) craint "un dérapage" du débat sur l'identité nationale	Agence France Presse	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
190	02	11	2009	Dix questions autour de l'identité nationale	Le Point	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN

191	03	11	2009	Press release: Socialist party against debate on national identity	Press Release	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
192	03	11	2009	Le PS juge "irrecevable" l'"injonction" d'un débat sur l'identité nationale	Agence France Presse	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
193	04	11	2009	Inventer une société où chacun trouve sa place	L'Humanité	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
194	05	11	2009	La langue française au cœur du débat sur l'identité nationale	Vigile	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
195	06	11	2009	Tribune du Premier ministre : "Réflexion et convictions sur l'identité de la France"	News Press France	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN

196	13	11	2009	Sarkozy : la gauche a «peur» de l'identité nationale	le Figaro	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
197	12	11	2009	Nicolas Sarkozy justifie le débat sur l'identité nationale	Le Nouvel Obs	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
198	25	11	2009	Travailleurs sans-papiers: une circulaire aux critères "trop restrictifs" pour les syndicats	Associated press	QFO	CHS
199	29	11	2009	Plusieurs milliers de personnes défilent à Paris pour la régularisation des sans-papiers	Associated press	QFO	CHS
200	03	12	2009	Bon alors finalement c'est quoi l'identité nationale ?	Le Conservateur	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN

201	08	12	2009	Nicolas Sarkozy : "Respecter ceux qui arrivent, respecter ceux qui accueillent"	Le Monde	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
202	16	12	2009	Identité nationale : le débat embarrasse aussi à droite	Le Figaro	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
203	17	12	2009	Le ministre de l'Intérieur Brice HORTEFEUX se dit favorable à une loi d'interdiction du voile intégral dans les services publics	Bulletin Quotidien	VLS	IDN
204	18	12	2009	Oui au débat sur l'identité nationale !	Le Figaro	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
205	21	12	2009	Sondage identité nationale	Sondages en France	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN

206	23	12	2009	La France sarkozyste au service de l'extrême droite	Résistances	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
207	21	12	2009	« Nous débattons jusqu'à fin 2010 »	Le Parisien	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
208	04	01	2010	Débat sur l'identité nationale : bilan d'étape	Le Nouvel Observateur	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
209	05	01	2010	Débat sur l'identité nationale : le vrai bilan et la carte des ratés	Le Nouvel Observateur	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
210	07	01	2010	Identité nationale : le débat s'est bien focalisé sur l'immigration	Le Monde	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN

211	10	01	2010	Sarkozy soutient de nouveau Besson	Les Echos	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
212	07	02	2010	Le gouvernement cherche une porte de sortie	La Croix	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
213	08	02	2010	Contrat d'accueil et d'Intégration et charte des droits et devoirs des étrangers	Agence France Presse	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
214	08	02	2010	Identité nationale: Fillon annonce une "commission de personnalités" chargée d'approfondir le débat	Associated press	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
215	08	02	2010	Débat sur l'identité nationale: Fillon tente de prendre de la hauteur	Le Figaro	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN

216	08	02	2010	Un séminaire gouvernemental autour du Premier ministre François FILLON pour un "point d'étape" dans le débat sur l'identité nationale	Bulletin Quotidien	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
217	08	02	2010	Vu de France; Le gouvernement cherche une porte de sortie	La Croix	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
218	08	02	2010	France - Fillon prend en main le débat sur l'identité nationale	Reuters	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
219	08	02	2010	Fillon enterre l'identité nationale avec des mesurette	L'Express	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
220	09	02	2010	A l'issue du séminaire gouvernemental sur l'identité nationale, le Premier ministre François FILLON annonce une "première série de mesures", dont la	Bulletin Quotidien	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN

				mise en place d'une "commission de personnalités" chargée d'approfondir le débat			
221	09	02	2010	Débat sur l'identité nationale : François Fillon joue l'apaisement	Les Echos	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
222	09	02	2010	Sarkozy s'exprimera en avril sur l'identité nationale	Reuters	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
223	31	03	2010	Conseil des ministres: Besson durcit les conditions d'entrée en France	Agence France Presse	PRC; VLS	ECH; ID
224	01	04	2010	Le ministre de l'Immigration Eric BESSON présente un projet de loi relatif à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à	Press Release	PRC; QFO	ECH; CHS

				la nationalité durcissant les conditions de séjour en France			
225	10	05	2010	L'identité nationale, Vichy et Brice Hortefeux	Mediapart	VLS	IDN: CNT-IDN
226	24	06	2010	Conférence sur les politiques linguistiques immigrants	Conférence	VLS	IDN: CNT-IDN
227	31	07	2010	Nationalité : des amendements pourraient être ajoutés à une loi en voie d'adoption (ministère)	Agence France presse	PRC; QFO	ECH; CHS
228	07	08	2010	Éric Besson : « Je revendique le droit à la nuance »	Le Figaro	QFO; LIS	CHS

229	05	09	2010	Nationalité: idée d'une "période d'essai", pas "conforme à notre tradition" (Besson)	Agence France Presse	QFO; LIS	CHS
230	30	09	2010	Tabous et clichés	Le Point	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
231	01	10	2010	Projet de loi Besson : les évêques rappellent les exigences du bien commun	Liberté Politique	QFO	CHS; CNT-CHS
232	29	10	2010	Cette France nouvelle qui reste à réinventer	Le Figaro	QFO	CHS
233	16	11	2010	L'identité Nationale, vie morte à un ministère contesté	Le Figaro	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
234	12	04	2011	Guéant confirme vouloir réduire l'immigration légale	Le Figaro	QFO	CHS

235	12	04	2011	Pour Guéant , l'intégration passe par la maîtrise de la langue française	Le Figaro	QFO; LIS	CHS
236	12	04	2011	Guéant confirme vouloir réguler flux migratoires pour mieux intégrer	Agence France Presse	QFO; LIS	CHS
237	13	04	2011	De meilleurs cours de français pour les immigrants	Le Parisien	QFO; LIS	CHS
238	13	04	2011	Vers moins de permis de séjour	Sud Oest	QFO; LIS	CHS
239	14	04	2011	Immigration : le pays d'origine en statistiques ?	Le Figaro	QFO; LIS	CHS

240	22	05	2011	Immigration/travail. C'est ce qu'a déclaré le ministre de l'Intérieur Claude Guéant...	Le Figaro	QFO; LIS	CHS
241	24	05	2011	François Baroin : "Réduire l'immigration de travail est un constat de bon sens"	le Point	QFO; LIS	CHS
242	31	05	2011	Immigration: obtenir un titre de séjour n'est pas une fin, avertit Guéant	Associated press	QFO; LIS	CHS
242	31	05	2011	Quelle France pour demain ?	le Monde	VLS	IDN:CNT-IDN
243	31	05	2011	La France "n'a pas vocation à accueillir des étrangers pour en faire des chômeurs"	Le Point	CHM; LIS	ECH; CHS

244	31	05	2011	Le ministre de l'Intérieur en remet une couche sur l'immigration...	20 Minutes	QFO	CHS
245	10	06	2011	Décision du Conseil constitutionnel sur la loi relative à l'immigration	News Press France	QFO	CHS
246	24	08	2011	"Je veux que l'identité de la France soit respectée	L'Express	VLS	IDN
247	24	08	2011	Guéant souhaite un niveau de français de fin de collège pour les immigrés	Agence France Presse	QFO; VLS	CHS; IDN
248	24	08	2011	Immigration: l'offensive de Claude Guéant	LE Parisien	QFO; VLS	CHS; IDN

249	14	09	2011	Immigrés L'UMP tire la langue	L'Express	QFO; VLS	CHS; IDN
250	15	09	2011	Le ministre s'inquiète d'un risque de repli communautaire	Le Figaro	ISL; SCL; VLS	COM; ID
251	13	10	2011	Les naturalisés devront prouver leur maîtrise du français	la Voix du Nord	PRC	ECH
252	13	10	2011	Maîtrise du français : Guéant y voit le gage de "naturalisations réussies"	Le Point	PRC	ECH
253	13	10	2011	Un diplôme de français pour devenir français	Le Figaro	PRC	ECH

254	15	10	2011	Patrick Weil: «L'immigration n'est pas une chance, c'est un fait»	Mediapart	VLS; PBL	ECH; CNT-ECH; CNT-IDN
255	09	11	2011	Flic? Le français, langue d'une intégration contrôlée	Mediapart	LIS	CHS; CNT-CHS
256	10	11	2011	Quand Guéant met la langue sous contrôle	L'Humanité	LIS	CHS; CNT-CHS
257	16	11	2011	Français langue d'intégration (FLI): réponse des acteurs de terrain, des scientifiques et des universitaires qui y sont descendus	Mediapart	LIS	CHS; CNT-CHS
258	16	11	2011	France : les naturalisés auront des droits et des devoirs	Le Monde	PRC	ECH

259	17	11	2011	Explication; Nationalité française, nouveau mode d'emploi	La Croix	PRC	ECH; CNT-ECH
260	17	11	2011	Guéant en banlieue de Paris pour plaider contre le communautarisme	Agence France Presse	ISL; SCL; VLS	COM; ID
261	18	11	2011	Guéant prône l'« assimilation »	Le Parisien	ISL; SCL; VLS	COM; ID
262	28	11	2011	Immigration: Guéant à l'offensive, 60% des Français pour le vote des étrangers	Agence France Presse	PBL; QFO	ECH; CHS
263	08	12	2011	Claude Guéant : « Avant chaque élection, le Parti socialiste agite cet épouvantail »	Le Figaro	QFO	CHS

264	22	12	2011	Du communautarisme à l'assimilation: Sarkozy vire de bord	Mediapart	ISL; SCL	COM
265	23	12	2011	Les mots du FN dans la bouche de l'UMP: l'inventaire	Mediapart	VLS; ISL; SCL; PBL	ECH; COM; CHS
266	28	12	2011	Nationalité française: acquisition plus difficile, maintien du droit du sol	Agence France Presse	PCS	ECH
267	03	01	2012	MESURES DRACONIENNES POUR LES POSTULANTS À LA NATURALISATION : La France dresse la barrière linguistique	L'Expression	PCS	ECH
268	10	01	2012	guéant et ses chiffres record	Le JDD	PCS	ECH

269	25	01	2012	Les migrants pris au piège de l'intérieur	Libération	PCS	ECH
270	12	02	2012	Guéant et les «civilisations» : du «bon sens» pour Sarkozy	Le Parisien	VLS; ISL; SCL; PBL	ECH; COM; CHS
271	05	03	2012	Guéant veut des Français « de souche »	Plein droit	VLS	IDN; CNT-IDN
272	06	03	2012	Sarkozy : "Je n'ai pas fait de cadeau aux riches"	Le Point	LIS	CHS
273	07	03	2012	Immigration : les propositions des candidats	Le Parisien	VLS; ISL	IDN; COM
274	07	03	2012	Régulation de l'immigration légale	Le Parisien	QFO	CHS

275	05	04	2012	principales propositions du projet électoral de Sarkozy	France Presse		
276	06	04	2012	M. Nicolas SARKOZY détaille son programme dont il résume la philosophie dans une lettre adressée	La Correspondance économique	VLS; QFO	IDN; CHS
277	09	04	2012	Sarkozy, franco de peurs	Libération	VLS; QFO	IDN; CHS; CNT-IDN
278	22	04	2012	grandes propositions des principaux candidats en matière d'immigration	French News	VLS; QFO	IDN; CHS

279	25	04	2012	Etrangers : des lois en cascade depuis 2007	Les Echos	VLS; QFO; PBL	IDN; CHS; com
280	04	05	2012	100.000 étrangers par an Immigration	L'Est Republicain	QFO; VLS	IDN; CHS; COM
281	16	05	2012	Naturalisation : le parcours du combattant	Libération	PCS; QFO; VLS	IDN; CHS; ECH
282	27	07	2012	Guéant : « Valls va porter atteinte à la cohésion sociale »	Le Figaro	VLS	IDN; CHS; CNT- IDN
283	27	07	2012	Naturalisation : l'UMP dénonce les projets de Manuel Valls	Le Figaro	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS

284	29	09	2012	En CDD et Français à durée indéterminée	Libération	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
285	01	10	2012	Manuel Valls veut relancer les naturalisations	La Croix	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
286	18	10	2012	Naturalisations : Manuel Valls veut assouplir les critères	Le Parisien	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
287	18	10	2012	Ciotti (UMP): "vouloir brader la nationalité française est irresponsable"	Agence France Presse	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
288	18	10	2012	Valls veut relancer les naturalisations d'étrangers	Agence France Presse	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS

289	19	10	2012	Valls veut augmenter le nombre de naturalisations	Le Figaro	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
290	19	10	2012	Refus de la nationalité française : comment ça marche ?	Reuters	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
291	22	02	2013	Remis il y a peu au premier ministre Jean-Marc Ayrault, le rapport de ce conseiller d'État pointe les ratés de trente ans de politiques d'intégration	L'Humanité	CNT-QFO; CNT-VLS	CNT-CHS; CNT-IDN
292	11	04	2013	Les pistes du gouvernement Ayrault pour réformer l'immigration professionnelle	Mediapart	CNT-QFO; CNT-VLS	CNT-CHS; CNT-IDN

293	11	04	2013	L'impact des cours de français pour les nouveaux migrants	Étude		
294	07	05	2013	Patrick Weil : « Les socialistes ont un problème de rythme et de méthode »	Mediapart	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
295	07	05	2013	Égalité des droits: les étrangers attendront	Mediapart	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
296	10	06	2013	Reprise des flux migratoires mais les immigrants sont victimes de la montée du chômage	OECD	CHM	ECH
297	14	07	2013	Notre enquête; Le patriotisme est-il mort ?	La Croix	VLS	IDN

298	6	07	2013	Immigration : Valls imprime sa marque	Europe1	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
299	12	08	2013	Le HCI, astre mort du sarkozysme	Mediapart		
300	16	08	2013	La négation du facteur culturel ne peut mener qu'à l'échec des politiques d'intégration	Atlantico	CNT-PBL	CNT-ECH
301	28	08	2013	Manuel Valls continue de faciliter l'accès à la nationalité française	Agence France Presse	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
302	28	08	2013	French citizenship to become more accessible	France 24	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS

303	28	08	2013	La nationalité française plus facile à obtenir	France Internationale	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
304	28	08	2013	Manuel Valls veut relancer les naturalisations, le FN s'indigne	Reuters	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS; CNT-CNT-CHS
305	28	08	2013	Manuel Valls a également présenté un décret "parachevant" sa réforme de l'accès à la nationalité.	Europe 1 France	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
306	28	08	2013	Les naturalisations repartent à la hausse	Europe 1 France	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
307	29	08	2013	Manuel Valls continue de faciliter l'accès à la nationalité française	France 24	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS

308	29	08	2013	Accès à la nationalité française: ça repart à la hausse	Mediapart	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
309	02	09	2013	Naturalisations: Valls veut rattraper le retard français	RFI Accents d'Europe	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
310	10	10	2013	Ces musulmans poussés à dissimuler leur foi	Le Temps Monde	VNT-VLS	CNT-IDN
311	13	10	2013	Avec les Roms, refaire la France	Libération	PBL	ECH
312	22	10	2013	Immigration en France : ce qu'il faut savoir	La Croix	PBL	ECH

313	23	10	2013	Droit du sol, naturalisation... Où en est l'Europe ?	My Europe	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
314	26	10	2013	Le droit du sang ? Non M.Copé le droit, le droit tout court et rien que le droit !	Atlantico	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
315	27	10	2013	Identité malheureuse	Ouvrage	VLS	IDN
316	05	11	2013	On a soumis les idées reçues sur l'immigration à celui qui a mouché le FN	Reuters	CNT-VLS	CNT-IDN
317	13	11	2013	Le déficit d'immigration qualifiée de la France rejaillit sur sa compétitivité»	Libération	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHSS

318	21	11	2013	Immigration, l'enquête qui dérange	Le Point	VLS	IDN
319	11	12	2013	Municipales 2014 : Copé veut remettre l'immigration au coeur de la campagne	Le Parisien	QFO	CHS
320	13	12	2013	Immigration : les 41 propositions de l'UMP pour "reprenre le contrôle "	Les Echos	QFO	CHS
321	13	12	2013	Valls appelle la droite à « l'humilité »	Les Echos	CNT-VLS	CNT-IDM
322	12	12	2013	Reprenons le cotrôle	Document Travail UMP	QFO	CHS

323	12	12	2013	L'UMP dévoile sa politique "décomplexée" sur l'immigration	Le nouvel observateur	QFO	CHS
324	13	12	2013	Intégration : les propositions du rapport-choc	Le Point	CNT-VLS; CNT-PBL; CNT-QFO	CNT-ECH; CNT-CHS; CNT-IDN
325	13	12	2013	Déclaration de Jean-François Copé	UMP Press release	QFO; VLS	CHS; IDN
326	13	12	2013	sur le rapport sur l'intégration remis au Premier Ministre	Huffington Post France	QFO; VLS	CHS; IDN
327	13	12	2013	Vives réactions après l'exhumation d'un rapport sur l'intégration	Libération	QFO; VLS	CHS; IDN

328	13	12	2013	Intégration : «Pas du tout la position du gouvernement», tranche Hollande	Le Parisien	CNT-QFO; CNTVLS	CNT-CHS; CNT-IDN
329	13	12	2013	Une véritable police de la pensée	Le Figaro	QFO; VLS	CHS; IDN
330	17	12	2013	Rapport sur l'intégration : "On sert la soupe aux islamistes"	Le Point	VLS	IDN
331	31	01	2014	Politique d'immigration. Bilan et perspectives 2014	Gouvernement	CNT-VLS	CNT-ID
332	31	01	2014	Immigration. Intégration. Repères	Le Figaro	VLS	IDN

333	07	02	2014	Feuille de route pour l'intégration: assimilation des Français aux immigrés	Novopress	VLS	IDN
334	11	02	2014	Intégration des immigrés : le gouvernement dévoile sa feuille de route	Atlantico	CNT-VLS	CNT-IDN: CONT-CHS
335	12	02	2014	Le Pen et Estrosi favorables à un référendum sur l'immigration	Libération	VLS; QFO; PBL	ECH; IDN; CHS

ANNEX III. Official government speeches on language and immigrant integration (2005-2014)

Ref.	Day	Month	Year	Speech	Delivered by	Codes	Categories
1	11	07	2005	1ère conférence préfectorale et consulaire sur l'immigration	N. Sarkozy	PBL; ISL	ECH; COM
2	19	09	2005	Ouverture du Colloque "La laïcité française dans son contexte international : singularité ou modèle ?"	N. Sarkozy	VLS	IDN
3	26	10	2005	Un défi républicain : la discrimination positive à la française	N. Sarkozy	CHM	ECH
4	28	11	2006	Discours devant les préfets	N.Sarkozy	ISL	COM
5	02	05	2006	Présentation du projet de loi relatif à l'immigration et à l'intégration	N. Sarkozy	VLS; ISL	COM; IDN

6	06	06	2006	Projet de loi immigration et intégration	N. Sarkozy	CHM; PBL; ISL	ECH; COM
7	05	10	2006	Remise du rapport de M. Charles MILHAUD	N. Sarkozy	LIS; MIQ; QFO	CHS
8	23	11	2006	Congrès des Maires et des Présidents de Communautés de France	N. Sarkozy	PBL	ECH
9	11	12	2006	Conférence de presse sur l'immigration	N. Sarkozy	ISL; CSL; PBL	COM; ECH; IDN
10	05	03	2007	3ème rencontre préfectorale et consulaire sur l'immigration	N. Sarkozy	MIQ; VLS	CHS; IDN
11	13	03	2007	Discours de Besançon	N. Sarkozy	VLS	IDN
12	18	09	2007	Déclaration de M. Brice Hortefeux, ministre de l'immigration, de l'intégration, de l'identité nationale et du codéveloppement, sur le projet de loi relatif à la maîtrise de l'immigration, à l'intégration et à l'asile, et sur les amendements portés au débat, dont le recours au "test ADN", Paris le 18 septembre 2007.	B. Hortefeux	VLS; ISL; PRC	NID; CHS: COM; ECH

13	17	01	2008	Réunion des experts nationaux sur le multilinguisme	Xavier North DG à la langue française et aux langues de France	VLS	IDN; EUR
14	23	01	2008	Discours de Brice Hortefeux devant la Délégation de l'Union européenne à l'Assemblée Nationale	B. Hortefeux	VLS	IDN; EUR
15	27	05	2008	Press Interview to B. Hortefeux within the framework of the French Presidency of the European Union	B. Hortefeux	PRC	ECH; EUR
16	19	06	2008	Discours de B. Hortefeux à la presse	B. Hortefeux	VLS ; PRC ; CHM	IDN ; ECH
17	03	07	2008	Discours de Brice Hortefeux lors de la remise des Prix de l'intégration et du codéveloppement	B. Hortefeux	CHM	ECH
18	28	08	2008	Discours de Brice Hortefeux lors de la XVIe Conférence des ambassadeurs	B. Hortefeux	CHM ; QFO ; LIS	ECH ; CHS

19	21	01	2009	Allocution de M. Eric Besson. Ministre de l'Immigration, de l'intégration, de l'identité nationale et du développement solidaire	E. Besson	VLS ; QFO ; LIS ; CHM	IDN ; CHS ; ECH
20	05	02	2009	Discours de M. Eric Besson lors de la signature du premier accord cadre en faveur de l'emploi des immigrés, le jeudi 5 février 2009	E. Besson	CHM ; VLS	ECH ; NID
21	21	01	2009	Allocution de M. Eric Besson à l'ANAEM	E. Besson	VLS ; PRC	IDN ; ECH
22	15	06	2009	Conference on Indicators and Experiences in Monitoring Integration Policy.	Robert Djellal (on behalf of E. Besson)	PBL ; VLS	ECH ; IDN
23	29	06	2009	Allocution de M. Eric Besson - FORUM OCDE sur les MIGRATIONS - Discours d'ouverture,	E. Besson	PBL	ECH
24	29	06	2009	Allocution de M. Eric Besson - FORUM OCDE sur les MIGRATIONS - Discours de clôture,	E. Besson	PBL	ECH

25	09	11	2009	Intervention d'Eric Besson lors de la présentation de l'allocation « Parcours de réussite professionnelle », lundi 09 novembre 2009	E. Besson	VLS	IDN
26	25	11	2009	Intervention de M. Eric Besson - Conférence de presse « Lutter contre l'emploi des étrangers en situation irrégulière », mercredi 25 novembre 2009	E. Besson	PBL	ECH
27	04	01	2010	Intervention de M. Eric Besson lors du point d'étape du grand débat sur l'identité nationale, le lundi 4 janvier 2010	E. Besson	PRC ; VLS ; CHM ; PBL	ECH ; IDN
28	05	02	2010	Intervention de M. Eric Besson lors de la conclusion de la 1ère étape du grand débat sur l'identité nationale, le vendredi 5 février 2010	E. Besson	VLS	IDN
29	02	03	2010	Intervention de M. Eric Besson lors de la signature du 500.000e Contrat d'Accueil et d'Intégration, mardi 2 mars 2010	E. Besson	VLS ; PRC	IDN ; ECH
30	20	04	2010	Discours d'Eric Besson lors de la remise des Labels Diversité, le mardi 20 avril 2010	E. Besson	VLS	IDN

31	21	04	2010	Discours d'Eric Besson lors de la remise des premières bourses récompensant des efforts exceptionnels d'intégration, le mercredi 21 avril 2010	E. Besson	PRC	ECH
32	18	05	2010	Discours d'Eric BESSON lors de la signature de la Convention entre l'OFII et Pôle Emploi, le mardi 18 mai 2010	E. Besson	CHM ; PBL ; PRC	ECH
33	27	05	2010	Discours d'Eric BESSON lors de sa visite de l'association AFAVO à Argenteuil, le jeudi 27 mai 2010	E. Besson	CHM ; PBL	ECH
34	21	06	2010	Discours d'Eric BESSON, à l'occasion de la « Journée mondiale du réfugié », le lundi 21 juin 2010	E. Besson	PBL ; PRC	ECH
35	05	07	2010	Discours d'Eric BESSON lors de l'accueil de 93 réfugiés bénéficiaires de la protection internationale à Malte, le 5 juillet 2010	E. Besson	VLS ; PBL	IDN ; ECH
36	13	07	2010	Discours d'Eric BESSON lors de la remise officielle du rapport du Cabinet Deloitte : La promotion de la diversité : les bonnes	E. Besson	PRC	ECH

				pratiques en entreprises en France et à l'étranger, le mardi 13 juillet 2010			
37	07	07	2010	Eric BESSON a signé la Charte de la diversité dans les médias, le mercredi 07 juillet 201	E.Besson	PRC	ECH
38	28	09	2010	Discours d'Eric BESSON lors de la présentation du projet de loi relatif à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la nationalité devant l'Assemblée nationale, le mardi 28 septembre 2010	E. Besson	VLS ; PBL	IDN ; ECH
39	14	04	2011	Déplacement dans le Val d'Oise - Claude Guéant : "Le premier vecteur de l'intégration, c'est la langue	C. Guéant	PRC	ECH
40	10	06	2011	Ouvrir l'école aux parents : maîtriser le Français pour mieux s'intégrer	C. Guéant	PRC	ECH
41	13	10	2011	Déplacement sur la réforme du contrôle de la connaissance de la langue française par les candidats à la nationalité	C. Guéant	PRC	ECH
42	03	10	2011	Remise des labels diversité, le 3 octobre 2011	C. Guéant	PRC	ECH

43	19	10	2012	Accueil des nouveaux citoyens Français	M. Valls	PRC	CNT-ECH
44	04	02	2014	Politique d'immigration 2013-2014 : bilan et perspectives	M. Valls	VLS	IDN

ANNEX IV: Language measures for immigrant integration in France. 2005-2014

	Date	Measure	Effect	Codes	Categories
1	January 2005	<i>Loi 2005-32 de la programmation pour la cohésion sociale</i>	Language proposed as a condition for residence	PBL	ECH
2	July 2006	<i>Loi 2006-911 du 24 juillet 2006 relative à l'immigration et à l'intégration</i>	Language becomes compulsory for residence through the signature of an integration contract (CAI)		
3	May 2007	<i>Décret 2007-999 du 31 mai 2007 relatif aux attributions du ministère de l'immigration, de l'intégration, de l'identité nationale et du codéveloppement</i>	Creation of new ministry with the explicit tasks of setting language requirements for immigrants	VLS; PNL	IDN; ECH

4	November 2007	<i>Loi 2007-1631 du 20 novembre 2007 relative à la maîtrise de l'immigration, à l'intégration et à l'asile.</i>	Compulsory language requirements prior to entry into the country (family reunification)	LIS; MIQ; QFO; PBL	CHS; ECH
5	October 2008	<i>Décret 2008-1115 du 30 octobre 2008 relatif à la préparation de l'intégration en France des étrangers souhaitant s'y installer durablement</i>	Oral AND written compulsory language knowledge must be proven in the countries of origin if immigrants wish to settle in France	LIS; MIQ; QFO; PBL	CHS; ECH
6	December 2008	<i>Arrêté du 1 décembre 2008 relatif à l'évaluation dans leurs pays de résidence du niveau de connaissance, par les étrangers, de la langue française et des valeurs de la République</i>	Specific instructions on how to evaluate language knowledge in countries of origin (compulsory since 2007 before entering France)	LIS; MIQ; QFO; PBL	CHS; ECH
7	January 2009	<i>Circulaire NOR IMG900055 C: Dispositif de la loi 2007-1631 du 20 novembre 2007</i>	Specific instructions on how to apply the 20 November 2007 law on compulsory language	LIS; MIQ; QFO; PBL	CHS; ECH

8			knowledge in countries of origin		
	Nov. 2009	<i>Circulaire sur le Débat sur l'identité nationale (2 nov.)</i>	Language in national identity debates		
9	March 2010	<i>Projet de loi 2400 du 31 mars 2010 relatif à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la nationalité</i>	Proposal to raise compulsory language standards to obtain French nationality	LIS; MIQ; QFO; PBL	CHS; ECH
10	May 2011	<i>Circulaire du 31 mai 2011 relative à la maîtrise de l'immigration professionnelle</i>	Instructions to use language as a tool to keep immigrants (mainly addressed to foreign students) from working in France	LIS; MIQ; QFO; PBL	CHS; ECH
11	June 2011	<i>Loi 2011-672 du 16 juin 2011 relative à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la nationalité</i>	Language standards raised to obtain French nationality	LIS; MIQ; QFO;	CHS; ECH

12	August 2011	<i>Circulaire du 24 août 2011 relative au contrôle de la condition d'assimilation dans les procédures d'acquisition de la nationalité française</i>	Instructions on being rigorous when granting nationality	LIS; MIQ; QFO; PBL	CHS; ECH
13	October 2011	<i>Décret 2011-1265 du 11 octobre 2011 relatif au niveau de connaissance de la langue française requis des postulants à la nationalité</i>	Language standards are raised to access French nationality	LIS; MIQ; QFO; PBL	CHS; ECH
14	October 2011	<i>Décret 2011-1266 du 11 octobre 2011 relatif à la création d'un label de qualité « Français langue d'intégration »</i>	Definition of specific language requirements needed to access French nationality. Privatization of language testing	LIS; MIQ; QFO; PBL	CHS; ECH
15	November 2011	<i>Arrêté du 25 novembre 2011 portant définition du référentiel du label qualité « Français langue d'intégration »</i>	Privatization of language testing	LIS; MIQ; QFO; PBL	CHS; ECH

16	January 2012	<i>Décret 2012-127 du 30 janvier 2012 approuvant la charte de droits et des devoirs</i>	Symbolic signing of a Charter requesting that immigrants know French to become a French citizen	LIS; MIQ; QFO; VLS; PBL	CHS; IDN; ECH
17	May 2012	<i>Press release canceling the 31 May 2011 Circulaire</i>	Easing the criteria to grant work permits	QFO	CHS
18	October 2012	<i>Circulaire NORINtV 1234497C du 16 octobre 2012</i>	Easing the criteria to interpret the June 2011 Law on immigration, integration and nationality	CNT-QFO	CNT-CHS
19	February 2013	<i>Report La Grande Nation : Pour une société inclusive</i>	Revision of France's integration policies	CNT-QFO; CNT-VLS	CNT-CHS; CNT-IDN
20	November 2013	<i>Publication of 5 Sector Reports: Connaissance, Reconnaissance ; Faire société commune ; Mobilités sociales, Protection Sociale ; Intégration Habitat</i>	Concrete proposals on language for immigrant integration	CNT-QFO; CNT-VLS	CNT-CHS; CNT-IDN

ANNEX V. Advisory reports on language for immigrant integration in France (2005-2014)

Ref.	Year	Report	Issued by	Codes	Categories
1	2005	Le Bilan de la politique d'intégration	HCI	CHM; PBL; QFO, LIS	ECH; CHS
2	2006	L'intégration économique des immigrants	C. Milhaud	CHM; PBL; QFO, LIS	ECH; CHS
3	2009	Études et intégration. Faire connaître les valeurs de la République	HCI	VLS	IDN
4	2010	Les défis de l'intégration à l'école	HCI	VLS	IDN
5	2011	La France. Sait-elle encore intégrer les immigrants?	HCI	VLS	IDN
6	2012	Une culture ouverte dans une République indivisible. Les choix de l'intégration culturelle	HCI	VLS	IDN
7	2013	La Refondation des politiques d'intégration. La Grande Nation. Pour une société inclusive	Thierry Tuot	CNT-VLS; CNT-PBL	CNT-ECH; CNT-CHS

8	2013	Rapport Connaissance, reconnaissance dans le cadre de la « Refondation de la politique d'intégration »	Chantal Lamarre, Murielle Maffessoli	CNT-VLS; CNT-PBL	CNT-ECH; CNT-CHS
9	2013	Rapport Faire société commune dans une société diverse dans le cadre de la « Refondation de la politique d'intégration »	Ahmed Boubeker and Olivier Noël	CNT-VLS; CNT-PBL	CNT-ECH; CNT-CHS
10	2013	Vers une politique française de l'égalité Rapport du groupe de travail « Mobilités sociales » dans le cadre de la « Refondation de la politique d'intégration »	Fabrice Dhume and Khalid Hamdani	CNT-VLS; CNT-PBL	CNT-ECH; CNT-CHS
11	2013	Rapport du groupe Protection sociale dans le cadre de la « Refondation de la politique d'intégration »	B. Madelin, D. Gential,	CNT-VLS; CNT-PBL	CNT-ECH; CNT-CHS
12	2013	Rapport : L'habitat. Facteur d'intégration dans le cadre de la « Refondation de la politique d'intégration »	C. Khirouni and C. Thalland	CNT-VLS; CNT-PBL	CNT-ECH; CNT-CHS

ANNEX VI. Government reports to the Parliament on immigration (2005-2012)

Ref.	Year	Report
1	2005	Premier rapport au Parlement. Les orientations de la politique d'immigration
2	2006	Deuxième Rapport au Parlement. Les orientations de la politique d'immigration
3	2007	Troisième rapport au Parlement. Les orientations de la politique d'immigration
5	2007	Quatrième rapport au Parlement. Les orientations de la politique d'immigration
6	2008	Cinquième rapport au Parlement. Les orientations de la politique d'immigration
7	2009	Sixième rapport au Parlement. Les orientations de la politique d'immigration
7	2011	Septième Rapport au Parlement. Les orientations de la politique d'immigration
8	2011	Huitième Rapport au Parlement. Les orientations de la politique d'immigration
9	2011	Neuvième Rapport au Parlement. Les chiffres de la politique de l'immigration et de l'intégration. Année 2011

ANNEX VII. Semi-structured interviews

Ref.	Person	Post	Date and location
1	Christine Candide	<p>Head of unit responsible for the French language for integration.</p> <p><i>Responsable des dispositifs d'apprentissage du français dans le cadre du français langue d'intégration. Bureau de l'accueil en France et de l'intégration linguistique.</i></p>	<p>19 November 2013 at</p> <p>Direction générale des étrangers en France.</p> <p>Ministère de l'intérieur</p> <p>3-5, rue Barbet de Jouy, Paris</p>
2	Fadéla Benrabia	<p>Advisor to former Minister of the Interior and current Prime Minister Manuel Valls on Language and Integration issues</p> <p><i>Conseillère d'intégration et d'asile du Ministre de l'Intérieur. Cabinet du Ministre de l'Intérieur Manuel Valls.</i></p>	<p>5 and 13 December 2013 at the Minister of the Interior offices, Place Beauvau. Paris</p>

3	Claire Extramiana	<p>Head of unit on language for education.</p> <p><i>Chargée de mission auprès du délégué général pour la maîtrise de la langue et l'action éducative.</i></p>	<p>29 November 2013</p> <p>Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication</p> <p>Délégation générale à la langue française et aux langues de France</p> <p>6, rue des Pyramides</p> <p>Paris</p>
4	Valérie Brisset-Hautchamp	<p>Diplomat in charge of the European dimension on immigration</p> <p>Ministère des affaires étrangères et européennes. Direction de l'Union européenne</p>	<p>04 October 2013, telephone interview.</p>

ANNEXES RELATED TO CATALONIA

Annex VIII. Analytical codes and categories derived from the Catalan corpus

Codes	Categories
<p>NCT: Nous Catalans [new Catalans]</p> <p>NCD: Nous ciutadans [New Citizens]</p> <p>CTR: Ciutadans residents [Resident Citizens]</p> <p>NVG: Nouvinguts [Newcomers]</p> <p>Terms used to refer to immigrants as the new members of the polity to insufflate a sense of inclusion into the Catalan nation. Linked to the notion of Resident citizenship (see category)</p>	<p>CDR: Ciutadania resident</p> <p>[Resident citizenship]</p> <p>Concept of citizenship in which any person in Catalonia who registers in the municipal census (Administrative requirement) and attempts to learn Catalan (symbolic dimension) is a citizen of Catalonia. Detached from the concept of nationality.</p>
<p>CHS: Social cohesion</p> <p>While acknowledging that Spanish is the most-widely used language, it is also the knowledge of Catalan that provides</p>	<p>VCI: Via Catalana d'Integració [Catalan Way of Integration]</p>

the social bonds allows you to *fully* participate in the host Catalan society

PTP: Participation

While acknowledging that Spanish is the most-widely used language, it is the knowledge of Catalan that allows you to *fully* participate in the host Catalan society.

OPP: Opportunities

While acknowledging that Spanish is the most-widely used language, it is also the knowledge of Catalan that provides you with work opportunities

PMS: Social Promotion

While acknowledging that Spanish is the most-widely used language, it is also the knowledge of Catalan that allows you to be socially integrated and promoted as a full member of society.

The definition of the Catalan authorities to their own philosophy of immigrant integration, which incorporates immigrants into the policy-making and institutional structures

LNP: Llengua pròpia [Autochthonous Language]

Term used to refer to Catalan as the autochthonous language of Catalonia to legitimate its preferential use as first language

LCM: Llengua comuna [Common Language]

Term used to refer to Catalan as the language to be shared by all residents of Catalonia, regardless of their first language or place of origin.

LAC: Llengua d'acollida [Host Language]

Term used to refer to Catalan as the preferential language in an immigrant integration context.

CMP:Competencies. Attempts to gain new competencies on language and integration

PJN: National Project

Term used to refer to the role of language for the Catalan national identity

PTS: Social patriotism

Term used to refer to the idea of national identity defined also in social terms and not only in cultural and linguistic terms

CNC: National Construction [construcció nacional de Catalunya]

Term used to refer to the nation-building project and the role of Catalan within this framework

IDN: National Identity

The role of language in the Catalan identity debates on immigration

VLS: Values attached to the Catalan language	
<p>LVH: Vehicular language: The use of Catalan as the only vehicular language in the education system, including in the so-called <i>Aules d'Accollida</i>, <i>the initial classes address to migrants in which Catalan is the immersion language</i></p> <p>IMM: Immersion schooling The use of Catalan as the only vehicular language in the education system</p>	<p>EDC: Education The role of the Catalan language in education as the language of instruction</p>
<p>CNT: Contestation Opposing views to the above notions attributed to the Catalan language</p>	

ANNEX IX. The Catalan language debates on immigrant integration in media

Ref	Day	Month	Year	Title	Media	Codes	Categories
1	13	April	2005	L'Estatut permetrà a la Generalitat "codecidir" en les polítiques migratòries i la fixació de quotes	Europa press	VLS	IDN
2	26	April	2005	La Generalitat impulsa un pla per afavorir la integració dels immigrants i el seu accés a càrrecs	Europa press	CHS	VCI
3	28	April	2005	El secretari de Política Lingüística signarà un acord de cooperació amb el Govern del Quebec	Prensa Gencat	CMP	
4	28	April	2005	Els instituts fan fins a un 40% de les classes en castellà a Catalunya	Europa press	LVH	EDU

5	2	May	2005	Catalunya i el Quebec intercanviaran informació sobre l'ensenyament del català i el francès als immigrants	Europa press	CMP	
6	3	May	2005	Intercanvi Catalunya Quebec sobre llengua i immigració	Europa press	CMP	
7	4	May	2005	Catalunya s'alia amb el Quebec, Gal·les, Flandes i Euskadi per crear una xarxa d'agències de promoció internacional	Europa press	CMP	
8	14	June	2005	La Generalitat incorpora la veu dels immigrants al Consell Social de la Llengua Catalana	Europa press	PTP	VCI
9	16	June	2005	Un estudi proposa mesures per fomentar l'ús del català entre l'alumnat immigrant	Europa press	LVH ; IMM	EDU
10	26	June	2005	La Generalitat destina 69 milions per afavorir la integració dels immigrants el 2005	Europa press	CHS ; OPP ;	VCI

11	30	June	2005	La immigració cosa de tots	El Periódico	CHS; PTP	VCI
12	30	June	2005	Aprovat el Pla d'Immigració de la Generalitat	Europa press	CHS; PTP; NVG; NCD; VLS;	CDR; IDN
13	30	June	2005	La Generalitat compta amb un nou pla d'immigració	Europa press	CHS; PTP; NVG; NCD; VLS;	CDR; IDN
14	14	July	2005	L'ús del català en supermercats i hipermercats va caure un 13% entre el 2000 i el 2004, segons la	Europa press	CHS	VCI
15	3	November	2005	Obrirem el debat del vot dels immigrants"	El Periódico	PTP	VCI

16	10	November	2005	Tres models fallits	El Periódico	PTP	VIC
17	16	November	2005	Catalunya multiplica per onze les ajudes locals per a acollida i integració d'immigrants el 2005	Europa press	CHS ; OPP ;	VCI
18	21	November	2005	ERC reivindica un respecte "escrupolós" per la identitat d'origen de la immigració	Europa press	VLS	IDN
19	16	December	2005	No sols en llengua materna	El Periódico	VLS	IDN
20	21	December	2005	El mitjà estatutari	El Periódico	CMP	
21	1	January	2006	Maragall urgeix un acord per evitar beneficiar els contraris al text i no minar la moral	Europa press	CMP	
22	13	January	2006	Iceta (PSC) espera tenir avui un "principi" d'acord sobre el 80% del text estatutari	Europa press	CMP	

23	16	January	2006	El PSC presenta 21 "observacions" a l'últim document del PSOE i demana definir els temes	Europa press	CMP	
24	31	January	2006	Més enllà del bilingüisme	El Periódico	LPR	
25	18	April	2006	Carod torna a l'activitat denunciant la "madrilenyització" de la vida política catalana	Europa press	VLS	IDN
26	16	May	2006	La Generalitat manté el contingut de les campanyes pactades amb ERC malgrat la seva sortida	Europa press	VLS	IDN
27	9	June	2006	Josep Antoni Duran Lleida SECRETARI GENERAL DE CiU : "Molts bisbes votaran 'sí' a l'Estatut"	El Periódico	CMP	
28	10	July	2006	L'origen de Montilla	El Periódico	VLS	IDN

29	10	July	2006	Aproximadament 50.000 estrangers aniran aquest any a cursos de català per a adults	Europa press	LVH	EDC
30	6	August	2006	Pelegrí (UDC) creu que "no té sentit" que els immigrants votin a Catalunya sense parlar català	Europa press	VLS	IDN
31	19	August	2006	Fernández Díaz (PP) acusa el PSOE de pretendre convertir la immigració en un "gueto electoral"	Europa press	CNT-VLS	CNT-IDN
32	19	August	2006	CiU agita la por a la immigració com a eix de la campanya electoral	El Periódico	VLS; CNC	IDN
33	20	August	2006	Saura diu a Mas que corregeixi les paraules "xenòfobes" de Duran	El Periódico	VLS	IDN
34	28	August	2006	ERC presentarà iniciatives legislatives al Congrés per recuperar les competències "perdudes"	Europa press	CMP	

35	29	August	2006	ERC critica les polítiques europees d'immigració pel seu "nacionalisme"	El Periódico	VLS	IDN
36	5	September	2006	Mas denuncia l'"absolut descontrol" i la falta de lideratge d'Espanya a la UE per resoldre la crisi	Europa press	VLS	IDN
37	20	September	2006	Saura promet una llei que amplii a tres mesos la primera acollida d'immigrants a Catalunya	Europa press	CHS	VCI
38	20	September	2006	ERC demana que Múgica comparegui al Congrés per explicar "les raons jurídiques" del recurs	Europa press	CNT-CMP	
39	26	September	2006	Piqué exigeix que els immigrants aprenguin "moltes coses més" que català perquè "no és l'únic mecanisme d'integració"	Europa press	CNT-VLS	CNT-IDN ; CNT-VCI

40	26	September	2006	El PP més enllà del català a les polítiques d'immigració	Europa press	CNT- OPP	CNT- VCI
41	22	October	2006	Puigcercós acusa CiU i PSC de portar la immigració als "guetos"	Europa Press	OPP	VCI
42	22	October	2006	ERC i la immigració	Europa press	CHS ; OPP ; NVG ; VLS	CDR ; VCI ; IDN ; LNP
43	23	October	2006	Premis a la integració?	El Periódico	CHS ; OPP ; NVG ; VLS	CDR ; VCI ; IDN ; LNP
44	11	November	2006	El PP augura una "confrontació" lingüística perquè ERC voldrà "imposar el monolingüisme" a les institucions	Europa press	CNT-VLS	CNT- IDN
45	18	November	2006	Hi ha ganes i voluntat de no ensepegar a les mateixes pedres	El Periódico	LNP	

46	24	November	2006	Montilla defensa polítiques de "discriminació positiva" del català i admet que el seu és "millorable"	Europa press	CHS; OPP	VCI; LNP
47	24	November	2006	Carod justifica el pacte de govern per la necessitat d'actualitzar el catalanisme	Europa press	VLS	IDN
48	25	November	2006	El 40% dels veïns del centre històric de Lleida són immigrants	El Periódico	CHS ; OPP ; PTP	VCI
49	6	December	2006	Benach demana mantenir en aquesta legislatura "l'esperit del 30 de setembre" amb "generositat" del Govern i l'oposició	Europa press	CMP	
50	12	December	2006	Pujol afirma que identitat nacional i justícia social són inseparables i demana no fer "de saltimbanqui"	Europa press	VLS	IDN
51	14	December	2006	Pujol aprova fer un test als immigrants	El Periódico	VLS	IDN

52	17	December	2006	La consellera d'Acció Social anuncia un Pacte Nacional per a la Immigració	Europa press	CHS; OPP; PTP; PMS	VCI
53	10	January	2007	Montilla defensarà bonificacions fiscals per a la inversió en R+D+I	Europa press	CMP	
54	12	January	2007	Carod proposa "un gran pacte" per fomentar l'ús del català	El Periódico	CHS; PTP; PMS	VCI
55	20	January	2007	Carod exhibeix a Madrid el nou estil d'Esquerra	El Periódico	VLS	IDN
56	20	January	2007	Carod-Rovira proposa un gran Pacte Nacional per a la Immigració	Europa press	CHS; OPP; PTP; PMS; NVG	VCI;CD R

57	27	January	2007	Treballarem per un gran pacte del català però la llei és per complir-la	El Periódico	CHS; OPP; PTP; PMS; NVG	VCI;CD R
58	31	January	2007	Martorell elabora un pla d'acollida d'immigrants	Europa press	CHS ; PTP	VCI
59	2	February	2007	Mas farà una "qüestió de principi" de la seva presència a la comissió estatutària sobre finançament	Europa press	CMP	
60	9	February	2007	Una delegació de la Mesa es reuneix amb líder del Partit Quebequès i cap de l'oposició	Parlament canal	CMP	
61	11	February	2007	La Generalitat rastrejarà entre els immigrants a la recerca de talents	El Periódico	OPP	VCI
62	28	February	2007	Carod renuncia a imposar el català en pro de la normalitat	EL Periódico	CHS; OPP	VCI

63	1	March	2007	CARTES DE PROP Mig ple i mig buit	El País	VLS	IDN
64	1	March	2007	La salut del català	El Periódico	CHS	VCI
65	9	March	2007	El punt de vista	El Periódico	CMP	
66	18	April	2007	Duran defensa que l'Estatut ha estat com una "màquina llevaneu" que obre el camí a la resta de reformes	Europa press	CMP	
67	28	April	2007	Fernández Díaz (PP) critica que Hereu "no descarti" un altre esdeveniment com el Fòrum i que Trias apel.li al vot d'ERC	Europa press	CNT-LVH; CNT-IMM	CNT-EDU
68	7	May	2007	Carod diu que una gran presència local d'ERC donaria "més capacitat de resposta" davant d'una retallada de l'Estatut	Europa press	CMP	

69	12	May	2007	Josep-Lluís : L'optimisme tranquil	El Periódico	VLS	IDN
70	17	May	2007	Mayol proposa una aliança amb empresaris per promoure l'ús del català entre treballadors	Europa press	OPP; PMS	VCI
71	20	May	2007	Carod resitua ERC entre ICV i la dreta sobre immigració	El Periódico	VLS	IDN
72	21	May	2007	Nova Renaixença	El Periódico	CHS ; VLS	VCI ;ID N
73	23	May	2007	El PP prefereix els estrangers d'"arrel hispana"	El Periódico	CNT- VLS; CNT- OPP:	CNT- VCI; CNT- IDN
74	24	May	2007	El PP ofereix la lliure elecció de la llengua d'escolarització	El Periódico	CNT- LVH; CNT- IMM	CNT- EDU

75	26	May	2007	Buba Jammeh : "APRENDRE EL CATALÀ ENS DÓNA MILLORS OPCIONS D'INTEGRACIÓ"	El Periódico	OPP ; NVG	VCI ; CDR
76	24	July	2007	Pujol demana "no recular ni un pam" en immersió lingüística i denuncia que en el Govern "hi ha a qui li incomoda"	Europa press	VLS	IDN
77	28	July	2007	Immigració i catalanisme	El Periódico	VLS ; CHS ; NCD	IDN ; VCI ; CDR
78	31	July	2007	Treballadors immigrants i empresaris de l'hostaleria creuen "imprescindible" parlar català	Europa press	OPP ; NVG	VCI ; CDR
79	1	October	2007	La Generalitat oferirà als immigrants cursos de català, inserció laboral i d'estrangeria a partir del 2009	Europa press	OPP ; PTP	VCI
80	2	October	2007	Els immigrants milloraran la integració amb cursos	El Periódico	OPP ; PTP ; NCD	VCI ; CDR

81	23	October	2007	Pujol qualifica de "penosa" la campanya 'Dóna corda al català' i reclama un "sobreesforç" lingüístic	Europa press	PTP	VCI
82	26	October	2007	Contorns del català	El Periódico	LNP	
83	28	October	2007	ERC crea grups de seguiment d'infraestructures, finançament i educació i vol mostrar millor la feina que fa al Govern	Europa press	CMP	
84	15	November	2007	La llei d'acollida a punt d'entrar al Parlament	Migracions notícies	LNP; LAC; LCM	
85	21	November	2007	Montilla adverteix que el català tornarà a patir "atacs" com el de Rajoy fins a les generals	Europa press	CMP	
86	13	January	2008	La Comissió de Nous Catalanoparlants titlla de "trampós" el vídeo del PP i assegura que l'escola	Europa press	NVG; NTD	CDR

87	17	January	2008	Montilla augura que hi haurà tensions amb el futur govern per l'Estatut	El Periódico	CMP	
88	17	January	2008	Tres municipis tindran 'aules' de recepció d'immigrants aquest any	El Periódico	IMM ; LVH	EDU
89	29	January	2008	Cabrera creu que la immersió lingüística "no ha generat problemes" a Catalunya i constitueix un pilar de convivència	Europa press	IMM; LVH; CNT- IMM; CNT_LV H	EDU; CNT- EDU
90	21	February	2008	Herrera equipara les tesis de CiU sobre immigració a les del PP	El Periódico	VLS	IDN; CNT- IDN
91	22	February	2008	9-M.- Nadal (PP) advoca perquè el castellà sigui obligatori per als extracomunitaris però no el català	Europa Press	CNT- NVG; CNT- CHS	CNT- CDR; CNT- VCI; CNT-ID

92	27	February	2008	9-M.- CiU i PP vinculen el coneixement de la llengua i costums a l'obtenció del permís de residència	Europa Press	CNT-VLS	CNT-IDN
93	1	March	2008	9-M.- La Coordinadora d'Associacions per a la Llengua Catalana demana reflexionar el vot	Europa Press	CHS; PTP; CHS	VCI
94	6	March	2008	9-M.- Duran defensa que el vot de l'immigrant arribi amb la nacionalitat o si és recíproc amb el país	Europa Press	VLS	IDN; CMP
95	9	March	2008	La Generalitat fomenta l'ús del català entre el col.lectiu xinès	El Periódico	CHS; OPP; PTP	VCI
96	27	March	2008	Creen el portal 'immi.cat' com un espai de trobada entre la comunitat immigrant i la catalana	Europa Press	PTP	VCI ;
97	14	April	2008	Diversitat i cohesió	El Periódico	CHS ; PTP ; NVG	VCI ; CDR

98	21	April	2008	Sant Jordi.- La Plataforma per la Llengua i entitats d'immigrants reivindicaran l'ús del català	Europa Press	LCM ; LNP	
99	1	May	2008	El 34,4% dels xinesos que viuen a Catalunya entenen el català i només el 26,3% coneix el castellà	Europa Press	PTP	VCI
100	21	May	2008	El català és un tresor que hem de poder compartir	Europa Press	VLS	IDN
101	22	May	2008	Carod-Rovira constata les diferències sobre política migratòria entre Espanya i Catalunya	Europa Press	PTP; CHS; OPP; NVG	CDR;
102	5	June	2008	Campanya sobre català i immigració	Europa Press	LCM; LNP; CHS; PTP	VCI; LCM; LNP;
103	23	June	2008	Manifiesto por la lengua común	El País	CNT-LCM	

104	23	June	2008	Savater presenta hoy un manifiesto en defensa del castellano	La Voz de Barcelona	CNT-LCM
105	23	June	2008	Un manifiesto que debe movilizar a todos los demócratas	Europa press	CNT-LCM
106	23	June	2008	Manifiesto por la lengua común	La Voz de Barcelona	CNT-LCM
107	24	June	2008	Parlar o pensar?	El Periódico	CNT-LCM
108	24	June	2008	Novament, la foguera de la llengua	Avui	CNT-LCM
109	24	June	2008	Perills estranys	El Punt	CNT-LCM
110	25	June	2008	Puigcercós (ERC) invita els signants del manifest a favor del castellà a anar a Catalunya	Europa Press	CNT-LCM
111	25	June	2008	De llengües assetjades	El Periódico	CNT-LCM

112	25	June	2008	El manifiesto	La Vanguardia	CNT-LCM	
113	26	June	2008	Text i context	Avui	CNT-LCM	
114	26	June	2008	El català, "llengua compartida"	El Periódico	CNT-LCM	
115	29	June	2008	Res amenaça el castellà	El Periódico	CNT-LCM	
116	4	July	2008	Un manifest nacionalista	Público	CNT-LCM	
117	5	July	2008	La ponència és ambigua amb la llengua i dura amb la immigració	El Periódico	CNT-LVH; CNT-IMM	CNT-EDU

118	7	July	2008	Amorós assegura que està demostrat "empíricament" que qui sap català sap castellà i no al contrari	Europa Press	CNT-LVH; CNT-IMM	CNT-EDU
119	11	July	2008	Manifest de Plataforma Per la Llengua: "El Català llengua Comuna	Vilaweb	CNT-LCM	
120	22	July	2008	Manifest de la Federació Galeusca arran de la publicació del 'Manifiesto por una lengua común'	GALEUSCAT	CNT-LCM	
121	22	July	2008	Els joves immigrants manifesten una actitud "positiva" envers el català, segons un estudi	Europa Press	PTP ; OPP	VCI
122	22	July	2008	La Generalitat destinarà 200 milions d'euros a integrar immigrants	El Periódico	PTP	VCI
123	5	August	2008	Estudi de la Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC) publicat al maig sobre el català	La Vanguardia	PTP; CHS	VCI

124	22	October	2008	La tasca dels EBE abraça tant els nois com les seves famílies, a les quals proporcionen informació	El Periódico	LVH	EDU
125	11	November	2008	El vicepresident del Govern destaca el paper de la llengua com a eina útil de cohesió social des d'una actitud de "dignitat i respecte	Press release	CHS	VCI
126	21	November	2008	Protegir el català	El Periódico	VLS	IDN
127	4	December	2008	Finançament.- Puigercós proposa una manifestació si l'1 de gener no s'ha resolt el nou model	Europa press	CMP	
128	4	December	2008	Pujol alerta del "perill" de la immigració	Europa press	VLS	IDN-

129	12	December	2008	Duran (UDC) constata que el tripartit català s'equivoca alhora de "prioritzar" el dret a vot dels immigrants	Europa Press	PTP; VLS	VCI; IDN-
130	15	December	2008	Carod demana que es "prengui nota" de l'informe del Consell d'Europa sobre immersió lingüística	Europa Press	IMM; LVH	EDU
131	18	December	2008	Capdevila confia que CiU signarà el Pacte per a la Immigració	Press release	LCM	
132	19	December	2008	Avanç.- Montilla defensa el català com a llengua d'"acollida" i punt de trobada entre immigrants i autòctons	Europa Press	LAC; LCM	
133	19	December	2008	El català serà ineludible per obtenir els papers	Europa Press	LAC; LCM; LPR; CRD	
134	19	December	2008	El PP català augura que el Pacte per la Immigració es convertirà en "paper mullat" perquè no aborda	Europa Press	CNT-LCM; CNT- LAC;CDR	

135	20	December	2008	Alberto Fernández (PP) critica el Pla Nacional per a la Immigració perquè "prima la llengua i el vot	Europa Press	CNT-LCM; CNT-LAC;CDR	
136	20	December	2008	Els reptes de la immigració	El Periódico	LAC; LCM; LPR;CDR	
137	20	December	2008	Montilla avala que el català sigui la clau de la integració	El Periódico	LAC; LCM; LPR;CDR	
138	22	December	2008	Entrevista amb Oriol Amorós	Vilaweb	CHS ; PTP ; OPP	VCI ; LCM ; LAC
139	23	December	2008	Arcadi Oliveres : "La immigració és econòmicament molt rendible per a Catalunya"	El Periódico	PTP; OPP	VCI
140	12	January	2009	La Generalitat comença una campanya publicitària per donar a conèixer el Pacte per la Immigració	Europa Press	LCM; LAC; LPR	
141	22	January	2009	Jordi Pujol i Quim Monzó critiquen la salut del català, també en els mitjans públics	Europa Press	VLS	IDN

142	30	January	2009	Montilla diu que els immigrants són un actiu per a la recuperació econòmica	Europa Press	PTP	VCI
143	31	January	2009	Montilla advoca per no donar tantes voltes al catalanisme	El Periódico	PTS	IDN
144	6	February	2009	Benach demana la implicació de catalanoparlants i nouvinguts per fer del català "la llengua real del país"	Parliament press release	NVG; CTD	CDR
145	8	February	2009	La nova immigració constitueix el principal factor de canvi	La Vanguardia	NVG; NCD	CDR
146	19	February	2009	Jordi Pujol demana resistir i defensar la identitat catalana, especialment la llengua	Europa press	VLS	IDN
147	22	February	2009	Alguns discursos del PP, Ciutadans i UPD reforcen els que aposten per la independència de Catalunya	El Periódico	CMP	

148	24	February	2009	CDC busca parella lingüística a la seva militància	El Periódico	CHS; PTP;	VCI
149	9	March	2009	Immigrants sud-americans s'oposen a que català sigui la seva 'llengua pública comuna	Directe.cat	CNT-LCM	
150	9	March	2009	Educació estén a tota la primària la immersió lingüística en català	El Periódico	IMM; LVH	EDU
151	9	March	2009	Una clàusula sobre el català divideix les entitats llatinoamericanes	El Periódico	CNT-LCM	
152	17	March	2009	Jordi Pujol afirma que l'actual Govern "fa bé" d'impulsar una llei de cinema en català	Europa Press	VLS	IDN
153	2	April	2009	VILAWEB 5 entrevistes sobre la situació en català	Vilaweb	CHS; PTP; VLS; NVG; NCD	CDR; VCI; IDN

154	26	April	2009	Montilla destaca que el tripartit treballa amb l'horitzó de com a mínim fins al 2020	Europa Press	CHS	LCM; VCI
155	2	June	2009	El Govern donarà un certificat de coneixement de català i realitat social als immigrants	Europa Press	CHS ; PTP ; OPP	VCI
156	10	June	2009	La política lingüística de Catalunya és un fracàs	El Periódico	VLS	IDN
157	6	July	2009	Qüestió de llengües	El Periódico		
158	9	July	2009	Més de mig miler d'alumnes estrangers estudiaran el català durant l'estiu	Europa Press	IMM ; LVH	EDU
159	1	August	2009	Més de 600 treballadors del sector de la restauració participen en els cursos de català	Europa Press	OPP	

160	16	October	2009	El PP català presenta recurs d'inconstitucionalitat contra la LEC	TV3	PTP; OPP; VLS	VCI; IDN
161	20	October	2009	La Generalitat impulsa grups de conversa de català entre immigrants	Europa Press	LVH	EDU
162	9	November	2009	La Generalitat ofereix cursos d'alfabetització a més de 800 immigrants de 64 municipis	Europa Press	LVH	EDU
163	9	January	2010	Pionera en l'acollida	El Periódico	LAC	
164	21	January	2010	Vic.- Mas retreu al Govern que demani als ajuntaments els seus "deures" i no faci els seus	Europa Press	CMP	
165	3	February	2010	Pujol retreu als catalanoparlants que no utilitzin la llengua amb els immigrants	Europa Press	VLS	IDN-

166	23	February	2010	La immigració s'apunta com a clau del retrocés del coneixement del català;	Bages	VLS	IDN
167	27	March	2010	la llei d'acollida: qüestió de país	Regió 7	VLS	IDN; LAC
168	3	April	2010	ERC vol que es doni la nacionalitat espanyola després de 5 anys de residència, sense importar	Europa Press	NCD	CDR
169	5	April	2010	Estatut.- Òmnium Cultural liderarà una "resposta" popular si el TC fa retallades	Europa Press	CMP	
170	9	April	2010	Col·lectius de nouvinguts fan una crida a la participació a la consulta; Sis col·lectius d'immigrants	Regió 7	NVG	CDR
171	22	April	2010	El Consell de Garanties Estatutàries avala el Projecte de llei d'acollida	Press release	LCM ; LAC ; LNP	

172	22	April	2010	Sant Jordi.- Govern i entitats promocionen el català per la diada	Europa Press	CHS ; OPP ; PTO	LCM ; LAC ; LNP ; VCI
173	22	April	2010	Acollir els immigrants en català és constitucional segons el Consell de Garanties Estatutàries	Agència Catalana Not.	LCM ; LAC ; LNP	
174	22	April	2010	Consell de Garanties avala el català com a llengua d'acollida de la immigració	Europa Press	LCM ; LAC ; LNP	
175	24	April	2010	Una gimcana acostava els nous catalans; Un seguit de jocs permeten a persones no catalanoparlants conèixer la llengua i la diada de Sant Jordi a Berga d'una forma lúdica.	Regió 7	NVG; OPP; PTP	CDR; VCI
176	28	April	2010	La Generalitat acreditarà la integració d'immigrants perquè obtinguin la nacionalitat	Europa press	LAC ; LCM ; LPR	
177	29	April	2010	Catalunya aprova la primera llei d'integració d'immigrants	El Periódico	LAC ; LCM ; LPR	

178	30	April	2010	Els immigrants que superin un curs de català tindran més facilitat per als permisos;	Diari de Girona	LAC ; LCM ; LPR	
179	3	May	2010	El tripartit i CiU posen la base per acotar el debat sobre la immigració	El Periódico	CNT-LAC; CNT-LCM	
180	5	May	2010	Estatut.- Puigcercós insta a crear una "legalitat" catalana si el TC el retalla	Europa Press	CMP	
181	1	June	2010	Quan prens posició pots equivocar-te, però no et pots quedar sempre en el gris	Regió 7	VLS	IDN
182	28	June	2010	Estatut.- El TC qüestiona les competències d'immigració	Europa press	CNT-CMP	
183	28	June	2010	El TC sentència l'Estatut i certifica la fi de l'etapa autonomista		CNT-CMP	

184	29	June	2010	El Constitucional espanyol retalla l'Estatut, els partits catalans preparen la resposta	Nationalia	CNT-CMP	
185	29	June	2010	Anàlisi de les retallades	Vilaweb	CNT-CMP	
186	29	June	2010	Contra la retallada de l'Estatut	CCOO	CNT-CMP	
187	30	June	2010	Cronologia d'una retallada històrica	Regió 7	CNT-CMP	
188	5	July	2010	El segrest de la sobirania popular	Avui	CNT-CMP	
189	2	July	2010	Quatro años de política lingüística (o no)	El Periódico	CHS; PTP	VCI; CNT- LCM

190	10	July	2010	Un millón de personas inundan Barcelona en una histórica manifestación de rechazo a la sentencia contra el Estatut	La Vanguardia	CMP	
191	2	July	2010	El TC admet les vegueries només si són un simple canvi de nom	El Periódico	CMP	
192	29	July	2010	Els «bilingües» s'han multiplicat per tres en els últims sis anys	Blogosfera	CHS	VCI
193	17	August	2010	Huguet (ERC) titlla de "falangista" el Defensor del Poble per recórrer contra la llei d'acollida	Europa Press	CNT-LAC	
194	17	August	2010	La Defensora del Poble recorre al TC la llei d'acollida d'immigrants pel català	Europa Press	CNT-LAC	
195	17	August	2010	Amorós afirma que s'aplicarà la llei d'acollida "digui el que digui el Constitucional"	Europa Press	CNT-LAC	
196	18	August	2010	La llei d'acollida d'immigrants, al Constitucional pel català	El Punt/Avui	CNT-LAC	

197	18	August	2010	Huguet alerta de "conflictes juridicopolítics" entre Catalunya i Espanya per la Llei d'acollida	Europa Press	CNT-LAC
198	18	August	2010	El Defensor del Poble torna a atacar l'ús del català tot i la sentència del TC	El Periódico	CNT-LAC
199	18	August	2010	La Defensora del Poble recorre la Llei d'acollida d'immigrants	Regió 7	CNT-LAC
200	19	August	2010	La Defensora del Poble recorre al TC la Llei d'acollida	Empordà	CNT-LAC
201	19	August	2010	Defensora del Poble recorre la Llei d'acollida d'immigrants; María Luisa Cava presenta un recurs davant del Tribunal Constitucional per la qüestió del català; Després de la sentència	Diari de Girona	CNT-LAC
202	19	August	2010	La Llei d'acollida s'aplicarà tot i el recurs al Constitucional; El secretari d'Immigració diu que la Llei	Diari de Girona	CNT-LAC

203	19	August	2010	La Defensora del Poble recorre la llei d'acollida d'immigrants; María Luisa Cava presenta un recurs	Diari de Girona	CNT-LAC	
204	20	August	2010	L'Ajuntament rebutja el recurs al TC en contra de la Llei d'acollida;	Empordà	CNT-LAC	
205	20	August	2010	Capdevila atribueix el recurs a la llei d'acollida al desig de "notorietat" de la Defensora del Poble	Europa Press	CNT-LAC	
206	22	August	2010	Entitats d'immigrants preparen un acte de suport a la llei d'acollida; La Defensora del Poble assegura	Diari de Girona	CNT-CNT-LAC	
207	2	September	2010	Associacions d'immigrants defensen la llei d'acollida i el català com a llengua preferent	Europa Press	CNT-CNT-LAC	
208	6	September	2010	El PP exhibeix "la Catalunya plural" en una campanya centrada en les coses que uneixen els catalans	Europa Press	CNC	IDN
209	6	September	2010	Llengua i discriminació	El Periódico	CNT-CNT-LAC	

210	20	September	2010	Mas retreu al PSC que fomenti el «vot de la por» contra CiU	El Periódico	VLS	IDN
211	22	September	2010	Rebuig al recurs contra l'ús del català en el procés d'acollida dels immigrants		CNT-CNT-LAC	
212	19	September	2010	Rajoy aparca la immigració i crida a combatre el secessionisme	El Periódico	LVH; IMM	CNT- EDU
213	6	September	2010	El PPC reparteix un test sobre el rebuig als immigrants	El Periódico	CNT-LCM	
214	28	September	2010	El Govern presenta una pàgina web amb recursos per a l'acollida lingüística d'immigrants	El Periódico	LAC	
215	1	October	2010	L'Ajuntament de Barcelona consensuarà criteris per abordar el debat sobre immigració	Europa Press	LAC	

216	4	October	2010	El TC admet a tràmit el recurs del Defensor del Poble contra la llei catalana d'immigració	Europa Press	CNT-LAC	
217	4	October	2010	La nova cara de Catalunya	El Periódico	VLS	IDN
218	5	October	2010	El Tribunal Constitucional espanyol accepta el recurs contra la Llei d'acollida d'immigrants	La Vanguardia	LAC	
219	7	October	2010	El Govern defensa el català com llengua d'acollida a Nova York	Europa Press	LAC	
220	14	October	2010	Mas segueix adormint la campanya i evita contendir amb els seus rivals	El Periódico	IMM; LVH	EDU
221	25	October	2010	198 persones s'inscriuen als cursos de català per a adults a Esparreguera	Regió 7	LVH	EDU

222	27	October	2010	Hereu diu que acataran la sentència del TSJC sobre l'ús del català però que hi recorreran	Europa Press	CNT-CNT-LAC	
223	27	October	2010	El PPC aplaudeix un revés judicial a l'ús institucional del català	El Periódico	CNT-LAC	
224	28	October	2010	El dret a no saber català	Regió 7	CNT-CMN; CNT-LAC	
225	29	October	2010	Hereu exigeix al PP que no utilitzi la llengua i la immigració per confrontar	Europa Press	CNT-CNT-LAC	
226	30	October	2010	Montilla planteja un pols a Mas pel lideratge de la defensa del català	El Periódico	VLS	IDN; LNP
227	13	November	2010	El PP assegura que 'és el primer dia del canvi'; Rajoy fa una crida als votants del PP a les generals	Diari de Girona	LVH	EDU

228	15	November	2010	Puigercós (ERC) es compromet a ensenyar català a un milió d'immigrants en deu anys	Europa Press	CHS ; PTP	VCI ; CDR ; LNP
229	16	November	2010	ERC promet oferir cursos de català a 400.000 immigrants	El Periódico	LAC	
230	16	November	2010	Llengua pròpia; A estones	Regió 7	LNP	
231	17	November	2010	Canvien les tendències?	El Periódico	CNT- LVH	CNT- EDU
232	20	November	2010	28-N.- Mas crida els immigrants a assumir els "valors de la catalanitat" i la llengua per aconseguir la seva integració	Europa press	VLS	IDN
233	20	November	2010	28-N.- Herrera (ICV-EUiA) es reivindica com a l'únic candidat que defensa la tasca de "tot" el Govern	Europa press	VLS	IDN; LAC; CNT- LAC

234	21	November	2010	Mas demana als immigrants que assumeixin els valors catalans	Diari de Girona	VLS	IDN
235	23	December	2010	Mas certifica que coincideix amb el PP en economia malgrat la seva distància en autogovern i llengua	El Mundo	CNT-LVH	CNT-EDU
236	29	December	2010	CiU rebutja el "bonisme" amb la immigració i considerarà el contracte d'integració del PP	El Pais	LAC	
237	29	January	2011	L'Estat finançarà cursos de català per a més de 1.200 persones a Salt (Girona)	Europa Press	LAC	
238	30	January	2011	El Govern agilitarà els tràmits dels immigrants que facin un "esforç d'integració"	Europa Press	LAC	
239	1	February	2011	Creixen un 20% en 5 anys els estrangers que estudien català; El Consorci per a la Normalització	Diari de Girona	LAC	

240	1	February	2011	BCN calcula que la meitat dels immigrants han estudiat català	El Periódico	LAC	
241	7	March	2011	El contracte d'integració és un instrument que està donant molt bons resultats a França i altres països de la UE	Parliament TV channel	LAC	
242	15	March	2011	El català serà "determinant" per certificar la integració dels immigrants	Europa Press	LAC	
243	16	March	2011	La llengua serà vinculant per certificar el nivell d'integració	Europa Press	LAC	
244	16	March	2011	Els partits retreen l'actitud d'Homs davant la immigració;	Diari de Girona	VLS	IDN : LAC
245	17	March	2011	Pels estrangers l'exigència del català és "electoralista"; A alguns immigrants els sembla molt positiu	Diari de Girona	LAC	

246	17	March	2011	El Govern aclareix que el català és un aspecte més de la integració	El Periódico	LAC	
247	17	March	2011	L'alcalde convergent del Vendrell subratlla que integrar-se és un «deure»	El Periódico	VLS	IDN; LAC
248	18	March	2011	Chaves critica que el certificat d'arrelament depengui del català	Diari de Girona	CNT-LAC	
249	4	April	2011	Que el català només sigui llengua preferent d'ús pel 35% dels catalans deu omplir de joia	El Mundo	LVH	EDU
250	6	April	2011	Jordi Pujol acusa l'Estat d'ofegar financerament Catalunya	Europa Press	CMP	
251	7	April	2011	Caldria fer en altres àmbits el mateix procés d'immersió que es fa a l'escola	Regió 7	LVH; IMM	EDU

252	19	April	2011	La Generalitat celebra que el nou reglament d'estrangeria li dóna més pes de gestió	Europa Press	CMP ; LAC	
253	10	May	2011	22-M.- Portabella aposta pel català com a llengua d'acollida d'immigrants a Barcelona	Europa Press	LAC	
254	13	June	2011	Rubalcaba assumeix que el Govern no s'ha fet entendre a Catalunya	El Periódico	CMP	
255	3	July	2011	Les entitats llatines s'allunyen del PSC i ja coquetegen amb CiU	El Periódico	ÑAC	
256	5	September	2011	Manifestació a Girona a favor de la immersió lingüística	Diari de Girona	LVH; IMM	EDU; CNT- EDU
257	6	September	2011	La manifestació de l'11 de setembre defensarà el model d'immersió lingüística	BCN TV	LVH; IMM	EDU; CNT- EDU

258	7	September	2011	Camacho avisa Mas que el problema sobre la immersió el té amb la Justícia i no amb el PP	Europa Press	LVH; IMM	EDU; CNT- EDU
259	8	September	2011	Cleries destaca el català com "el més preat" per aconseguir la cohesió social	Europa Press	CHS	VCI
260	11	September	2011	Diada.- Anglada (PxC) afirma que el problema de Catalunya no és la llengua, sinó la immigració	Europa Press	VLS-	IDN-
261	11	September	2011	La polèmica per la llengua provoca la manifestació de la Diada més massiva dels darrers anys	ARA	LVH; IMM	EDU; CNT- EDU
262	11	September	2011	Català a l'atac visca la llengua viva. Acte de Marius Serra per Commemorar Diada	Acte institucional	LVH; IMM	EDU; CNT- EDU

263	13	September	2011	Milers de persones defensen al carrer la immersió lingüística	Europa Press	LVH; IMM	EDU; CNT- EDU
264	18	September	2011	El I congrés de 'llatins catalanistes' de CDC reconeix la cohesió social de la immersió	Europa Press	LVH ; IMM ; CHS	EDU ; VCI
265	30	September	2011	Llengua o passaport?	El Periódico	CHS ;IM M ; LVH	EDU ; VCI
266	1	October	2011	El discurs del PP ha evitat que Anglada estigui al Parlament	El Periódico	CNT- LVH	CNT- EDU
267	11	November	2011	Nous catalans, vells dilemes	El Periódico	NVG ; NCD	CDR
268	13	November	2011	20N.- El PP prioritzarà en la contractació col·lectiva d'immigrants els millor qualificats	Europa Press	LVH ; IMM	CNT- EDU
269	14	November	2011	La llengua en campanya	El Periódico	LVH ; IMM	CNT- EDU

270	21	December	2011	L'ús del català creix en parlants, tot i la nombrosa immigració	Europa Press	CHS ; PTP	VCI
271	22	December	2011	Ja són un total de 10 milions les persones que afirmen que saben parlar el català	Diari de Girona	PTP; CHS	VCI
272	22	December	2012	La llengua catalana guanya mig milió de parlants en set anys	El Periódico	PTP; CHS	VCI; LNP
273	13	February	2012	Govern publica una autoguia d'aprenentatge del català per a hispanoparlants	Agència EFE	LVH	EDU
274	6	March	2012	Immigració desplegarà aquest any llei d'acollida a 24 comarques i 8 municipis	Agència EFE	LAC	
275	12	April	2012	Pujol acusa sectors estatals de voler que la immigració dilueixi Catalunya; CAT-IMMIGRACIÓ	Agència EFE	VLS	IDN
276	23	May	2012	Jordi Pujol insta parlar en català als immigrants integrats	Agència EFE	VLS	IDN

277	27	June	2012	Jordi Pujol lamenta la "nova ofensiva" contra el català i insta a reaccionar	Europa Press	CNT-LVH; CNT-IMM	EDU
278	12	October	2012	Sánchez-Camacho defensa Wert i acusa Rigau de voler fomentar el nacionalisme amb el sistema educatiu	TV3	CNT-LVH; CNT-IMM,	CNT-EDU; CNT-IDN
279	3	October	2012	Jordi Pujol defensa que a Catalunya "hi cap tothom" amb o sense independència	Europa Press	LCM	
280	15	November	2012	Immigrants donen suport al projecte de Mas a ritme de sardanes i "hip-hop"; CAT-ELECCIONS	Europa Press	CHS	VCI
281	4	December	2012	Pujol demana una "reacció patriòtica" davant l'"ofensiva" contra el català; CAT-	Agència EFE	CNT-LVH; CNT-IMM,	CNT-EDU; CNT-IDN

282	5	December	2012	Escoles concertades avisen que no faran "cap pas enrere" en la immersió lingüística	Europa Press	CNT-LVH; CNT-IMM,	CNT-EDU; CNT-IDN
283	16	December	2012	Immergir-se en la diversitat inclusiva	El Periódico	CNT-LVH; CNT-IMM,	CNT-EDU; CNT-IDN
284	17	December	2012	Aquesta llei és una manca de respecte i una desconsideració important per a molta gent de Catalunya;	Diari de Girona	CNT-LVH; CNT-IMM,	CNT-EDU; CNT-IDN
285	19	March	2013	Promouen un programa d'alfabetització en català a Tarragona	Agència EFE	LVH	EDU
286	25	April	2013	Les reflexions de Jordi Pujol	El Punt/Avui	CNT-LVH; CNT-IMM,	CNT-EDU; CNT-IDN

287	29	April	2013	LA GALERIA ; Immersió o assimilació	El Punt/Avui	CNT-LVH; CNT-IMM,	CNT-EDU; CNT-IDN
288	5	June	2013	L'actitud socialista cap al fet nacional sempre ha estat marcada per una certa tebior	El Punt/Avui	PJN;CNC	IDN
289	13	June	2013	Les reflexions de Jordi Pujol	El Punt/Avui	LAC	
290	18	June	2013	Benestar Social i Família ha tramitat gairebé 60.000 informes d'estrangeria en els darrers dos anys	Press Release	LAC	
291	18	June	2013	El rebost del català	El Periódico	LNP	
292	25	June	2013	Uns 612.000 castellanoparlants s'han incorporat a territoris de parla catalana;	La Vanguardia	OPP	VCI

293	11	July	2013	Temps Difícils	El Punt/Avui	CNT-LVH; CNT-IMM,	CNT-EDU; CNT-IDN
294	21	July	2013	Vull un país que no té por d'un panorama plurilingüe ; Llengua i estat	El Punt/Avui	LAC; LNP; LCM	
295	1	August	2013	No anem endavant amb el català; estem estancats	El Punt/Avui	LVH	EDU
296	4	August	2013	La Federació d'Entitats Llatinoamericanes de Catalunya s'encarrega d'assessorar els immigrants en qüestions laborals i de llengua	El Punt/Avui	OPP;	VCI
297	11	August	2013	La maquinària de l'Estat s'ha mobilitzat per frenar-nos o esclafar-nos"	El Punt/Avui	CMP	
298	21	August	2013	El DEBAT en els darrers mesos ha consistit A perfilar el règim lingüístic del futur estat català ; La	El Punt/Avui	LVH; IMM	CNT-EDU

299	19	September	2013	Les reflexions de Jordi Pujol	El Punt/Avui	LVH; IMM	CNT- EDU
300	10	October	2013	L'estratègia catalana per obviar la llei Wert	ARA	LVH; IMM	CNT- EDU
301	31	October	2013	Les reflexions de Jordi Pujol ; Europa ha d'admetre que li cal immigració legal	El Punt/Avui	LVH; IMM	CNT- EDU
302	31	October	2013	La Generalitat desbloqueja la llei d'acollida	ARA	LAC	
303	1	November	2013	Catalunya consolidarà "en pocs mesos" el sistema propi de certificats d'arrelament d'immigrants	Europa press	LAC	
304	1	November	2013	La Generalitat desbloqueja la llei d'acollida	ARA	LAC	
305	1	November	2013	Desbloquejada la llei d'acollida	El Punt/Avui	LAC	

306	15	November	2013	Ferran Mascarell resalta el bon moment que viu el català	Agència EFE	CHS;	LNP; LAC; VCI
307	22	November	2013	La pregunta que no es fa	El Punt/Avui	LNP	
308	26	November	2013	Creix l'ús del català excepte en l'àmbit de la justícia	La Vanguardia	OPP	VCI
309	27	November	2013	La bona salut del català	La Vanguardia	OPP	VCI
310	6	December	2013	Les reflexions de Jordi Pujol	El Punt/Avui	OPP	VCI
311	6	January	2014	La política lingüística no espera	El Periódico	CHS; OPP;	VCI
312	1	February	2014	Cop judicial Atac al català	ARA	CNT- LVH; CNT- IMM	CNT- EDU

313	9	February	2014	Un 13% d'escoles utilitzen la llengua castellana com a vehicular i molts professors de l'ESO la fan	La Vanguardia	CNT-LVH; CNT-IMM	CNT-EDU
314	12	February	2014	Preservar el contracte cívic	La Vanguardia	OPP ; CHS ; PTP	VCI
315	15	February	2014	la continuïtat del model no ha de dependre dels directors de centre	El Punt/Avui	LVH	EDU
316	1	March	2014	Català i estadístiques	El Punt/Avui	LVH	EDU
317	25	March	2014	CiU demana distribuir entre les comunitats autònomes els Fons Europeus per a la integració d'immigrants	Press release	CMP	
318	21	March	2014	Benestar Social i Família reclama a l'Estat que distribueixi el Fons Europeu d'Asil, Migració i Integració entre les comunitats autònomes	Press release	CMP	

319	1	April	2014	No a la manipulació del vot de la immigració Montoro, suspens Tres opcions	ARA	CNT-LVH	CNT-EDU
320	4	Aoril	2014	Pujol creu que el gran èxit català és que hi hagi "chonis" i Fernández sobiranistes	Europa Press	CHS; OPP	VCI
321	7	October	2014	Xavier Bosch exposa al Parlament les claus del nou Pla de ciutadania i de les migracions	Press release	CHS ; VLS ; NVG ; NCD	CDR ; IDN ; VCI
322	18	November	2014	Xavier Bosch exposa al Parlament les claus del nou Pla de ciutadania i de les migracions	Decree announcement	CHS ; VLS ; NVG ; NCD	CDR ; IDN ; VCI
323	18	November	2014	DECRET 150/2014, de 18 de novembre, dels serveis d'acollida de les persones immigrades i de les retornades a Catalunya	Press release	LAC	

324	18	November	2014	El Govern aprova el decret que regula els serveis d'acollida de les persones immigrades i de les retornades a Catalunya per promoure'n l'autonomia i la igualtat d'oportunitats	Vilaweb	LAC
325	18	November	2014	El Govern aprova el decret que regula els serveis d'acollida de les persones immigrades i de les retornades a Catalunya	Xarxa legal	LAC
326	18	November	2014	DECRET 150/2014, de 18 de novembre, dels serveis d'acollida de les persones immigrades i de les tornades a Catalunya	Xarxa jurídica	LAC
327	18	November	2014	El Govern aprova el decret que regula els serveis d'acollida de les persones immigrades i de les retornades a Catalunya per promoure'n l'autonomia i la igualtat d'oportunitats	Govern.cat	LAC
328	20	November	2014	Josep Antoni Duran Lleida SECRETARI GENERAL DE CiU : "Molts bisbes votaran 'sí' a l'Estatut"	Plataforma per la Llengua	LAC

ANNEX X. The Parliamentary debates on immigrant integration in Catalonia (2005-2014)

Ref.	Day	Month	Year	Title	Codes	Categories
1	17	March	2005	Plenary Session	CHS; PMS	VCI; CNT-IDN
2	12	May	2005	Plenary Session	PTP; OPP; CHS	VCI
3	15	June	2005	Culture Committee	IMM;	EDU; CNT-EDU
4	28	September	2005	Plenary Session	NVG;	LNP; CDR
5	30	September	2005	Plenary Session	CHS; PTS	IDN; VCI
6	11	October	2005	Permanent Committee on the EU	LNP	
7	23	November	2005	Plenary Session	CHS; NVG	LCM; VCI
8	20	April	2006	Plenary Session	CHS; IMM	CDR; VCI; EDU; EDU-CNT
9	23	November	2006	Plenary session	CHS; NVG	VCI; CDR
10	24	November	2007	Plenary session	PJN; LVH	IDN; LNP; EDU; CNT-EDU
11	17	January	2007	Institutional Affairs Committee	PMS; OPP; PTP; IMM; NVG	EDU; VCI; CNT-EDU; CDR

12	31	January	2007	Plenary session	PJN; LVH; IMM; NCD	IDN; LNP; EDU; CDR; CNT-EDU
13	7	March	2007	Social Welfare and Immigration Committee	CHS; PTP; OPP NCD	CDR; IDN; CDR
14	26	March	2007	Ombudusman Committe	LVH; CHS; IMM; CNT-CHS	EDU; VCI; CNT-EDU; CNT-VCI
15	13	June	2007	Plenary Session	LVH; IMM, PJN	EDU; CNT-EDU, IDN; CNT-IDN
16	28	June	2007	Plenary Session	IMM; LVH; CHS	VCI ;EDU; CNT-EDU; LNP; LAC
17	11	July	2007	Plenary Session	LVH	EDU; CNT-EDU
18	26	September	2007	Plenary Session	NVG	CDR
19	27	September	2007	Plenary Session	CHS; NVG, LVH	VCI; CDR; LAC; EDU; CNT-EDU
20	15	November	2007	Plenary Session	CHS	LCM; VCI
21	19	December	2007	Plenary Session	LVH, IMM, CHS; CNT-CHS	EDU; CNT-EDU; VCI; CNT-IDN
22	30	January	2008	Culture Committee	PJN; CHS	VCI; CNT-IDN

23	6	February	2008	Plenary Session	CNT-LVH;CNT-IMM; CHS	CNT-EDU; VCI
24	7	February	2008	Plenary Session	IMM, LVH	EDU;CNT-EDU
25	21	February	2008	Plenary Session	CHS; LVH; NVG	EDU; VCI; CNT-EDU, CDR
26	7	May	2008	Plenary Session	IMM, LVH	CNT-EDU
27	10	June	2008	Representatives from the Ibn Batuta association on immigration. Hearing	OPP; CHS	LNP; VCI
28	16	July	2008	Plenary Session	LVH;NVG	CNT-EDU, CDR
29	17	July	2008	Plenary Session	CHS; NCD; LVH	LNC; LNP; CNT-LNP; VCI; CDR
30	30	September	2008	Plenary Session	NVG; CHS	CDR; VCI; LAC; LNP
31	1	October	2008	Plenary Session	LVH; IMM; CHS	EDU; CNT-EDU; LAC; CNT-LAC; IDN
32	13	October	2008	Plenary Session	LVH; IMM	EDU; CNT-EDU
33	13	November	2008	Hearing on the Government's proposal for education reform on host classrooms for immigrant children	LVH; IMM; CHS	EDU; CNT-EDU; VCI
34	16	January	2009	Committee on Education. Draft on education bill	LVH; PJN; CNC	CNT-EDU; CNT-IDN

35	18	February	2009	Plenary Session	LCM	
36	18	March	2009	Plenary Session	LVH; IMM; CNT-CNC	CNT-EDU; CNT-LNP; CNT-IDN
37	29	April	2009	Culture Committee	LNP	
38	17	June	2009	Plenary Session	LVH	CNT-EDU
39	14	July	2009	Immigration Committee	NCD; OPP; PTP	CDR; LCM; LAC; VCI; CNT-LAC
40	17	November	2009	Immigration Committee	LVH; NCD	CNT-EDU; CDR; CNT-LAC
41	20	November	2009	Immigration Committee	LAC; CNT-LAC; LNP; LCM	
42	24	November	2009	Immigration Committee	LAC; CNT-LAC; LNP; LCM	
43	21	January	2010	Parliamentary question to government on local management of immigration	OPP; PMS	VCI; LNC; LAC; CNT-LCM; CNT-LAC
44	19	April	2010	Ombudsman Intervention	PJN; LVH	LNP; IDN; CNT-ID; CNT-LNP
45	28	April	2010	Plenary Session	LAC; LCM; CNT-LAC; CNT:LCM	

46	12	May	2010	Plenary Session	PJN; CHS; OPP	ID; LNP; CNT-LNP; CNT-IDN
47	13	May	2010	Plenary Session	LAC; CNT-LAC; CNT-LNP	
48	1	July	2010	Plenary Session	LAC; CNT-LAC; CNT-LNP	
49	20	December	2010	Plenary Session	CNC; LVH; CHS; CNC	IDN; EDU; LNP; VCI; LNC; CNT-EDU
50	22	December	2010	Plenary Session	CNC; LVH; CHS; CNC	IDN; EDU; LNP; VCI; LNC; CNT-EDU
51	23	March	2011	Plenary Session	LVH; CNT-LVH; CHS	CNT-EDU; CNT-LAC; VCI
52	14	April	2011	Plenary Session	CHS	LNP; VCI; CNT-LNP; CNT-LAC
53	4	May	2011	Plenary Session	LVH; IMM	EDU; CNT-EDU; LAC; CNT-LAC
54	14	July	2011	Interior Committee	LNP; CNT-LNP; LAC; CNT-LAC	
55	3	November	2011	Official Journal	LVH; IIMM	EDU
56	6	March	2012	Immigration Committee	NCD; OPP	LAC; VCI; LNP; CDR

57	14	March	2012	Plenary Session	NCD; CNC	CDR; IDN
58	28	March	2012	Plenary Session	LAC; CNT-LAC	
59	30	April	2013	Children's Committee	CHS; LVH	VCI; LCM; EDU
60	22	May	2013	Plenary Session	IMM; CNC	EDU; IDN
61	18	June	2013	Immigration Committee	NCD	CDR; LAC; CNT-LAC

ANNEX XI. Language measures for immigrant integration in Catalonia

	Date	Measure	Effect	Codes	Categories
1	June 2005	2005-2008 Immigration and Citizenship Plan	Explicit link between immigration and language policy	NCT; CDR; NVG; CHS; OPP; PTP; LNP; PJN; IMM; LVH	CDR; VCI; IDN; EDC
2	June 2005	Decree 11/2005 modifying the Catalan Advisory Council on Language	Incorporation of immigrant voices in the Government's advisory body on language	PTP	VCI
3	March 2006	National Agreement on Education	Catalan strengthened as vehicular language in the education system	IMM; LVH	EDC
4	July 2006	Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia	Two novelties on language and immigration policies: Catalan defined as the <i>preferential</i> language in the Administration	LVH; IMM	EDC

			Extension of competencies on immigration		
5	July 2006	8045/2006. Appeal of unconstitutionality to the Catalan Statute of Autonomy	Legal challenge against the main elements regarding language and immigration: Challenging the concept of <i>preferential</i> language Challenging the extension of competencies on immigration	CNT-LVH; CNT-IMM	CNT-EDU
6	June 2007	Language and Social Cohesion Plan	Catalan reinforced In the education system	LVH; IMM	EDC
7	April 2008	Decree 86/2008 on the Creation of the Immigration and Citizenship Board	Official participation channel for immigrants into the policy-making process on immigration policies	PTP	VCI
8	December 2008	National Agreement on Immigration	Catalan defined as <i>the</i> common language in Catalonia	LNP; LCM	

9	July 2009	Law 12/2009 on Education	Catalan reinforced in the education system	LVH; IMM	EDU
10	December 2009	2009-2012 immigration and Citizenship Plan	Continuation of the terms of the debate contained in previous Plans	NCT; CDR; NVG; CHS; OPP; PTP; LNP	
11	April 2010	6/2010 Opinion of the Advisory Council of Legal and Constitutional Affairs on the prioritization of Catalan in the 10/2010 Law on Reception	Legally-binding opinion on the Constitutionality of prioritizing Catalan in the 10/2010 law	CNT-LAC	
12	May 2010	10/2010 Law on Reception of Immigrants and Returnees to Catalonia	By law, language provision must start with Catalan. Spanish will follow only upon request by migrants.	LNP; LCM; LAC	
13	June 2010	31/2010 Constitutional Court ruling against the language and migration competences in the 2006 Statute	c) The preferential use of Catalan is declared unconstitutional and the learning of Catalan is not considered a “duty”.	CNT-LNP	

			Immigration competencies are considered “subject to interpretation”		
14	August 2010	2/2010 Action of unconstitutionality by the Spanish Ombudswoman against the language regime of the 10/2010 Law on Reception	The Constitutional Court still to decide the constitutionality of the language regime of the 2010 Law on Reception	CNT-LAC	
15	April 2011	Royal Decree 557/2011 Modification of Spanish Foreigner’s Law	New competencies on immigrant integration certificates, including knowledge of Catalan language, necessary for nationality (State competence). Non-binding	LAC; LCM; LPN	
16	March 2012	Ratification of the 2008 NAI	Consensus over NAI renewed	LCM, VCI; IDN	
17	June 2013	2013-2016 Migrations and Citizenship Plan	Policy continuity on language and migration	NCT; CDR; NVG; CHS; OPP; PTP; LNP	VCI; CDR

18	November 2014	Decree 150/2014. Law on Reception enters into force	Despite the pending Constitutional Court ruling over the language regime of the 2010 law on reception, the Catalan Government applies the law	LAC	
19	2015 (pending proposal)	Draft bill on the distribution of the European Asylum, Immigration and Integration Fund	Proposal for the distribution of European funds among the Spanish Autonomous Communities for integration policies	CHS; PTP; OPP	VCI

Annex XII. Governmental Language Policy Reports (2005-2014)

Ref.	Year	Report	Issued by
1	2006	Secretaria General de Política Lingüística. Informe de Política Lingüística 2005	Government of Catalonia
2	2007	Secretaria General de Política Lingüística. Informe de Política Lingüística 2006	Government of Catalonia
3	2008	Secretaria General de Política Lingüística. Informe de Política Lingüística 2007	Government of Catalonia
4	2009	Secretaria General de Política Lingüística. Informe de Política Lingüística 2008	Government of Catalonia
5	2010	Secretaria General de Política Lingüística. Informe de Política Lingüística 2009	Government of Catalonia
6	2011	Secretaria General de Política Lingüística. Informe de Política Lingüística 2010	Government of Catalonia

7	2012	Direcció General de Política Lingüística. Informe de Política Lingüística 2011	Government of Catalonia
8	2013	Direcció General de Política Lingüística. Informe de Política Lingüística 2012	Government of Catalonia
9	2014	Direcció General de Política Lingüística. Informe de Política Lingüística 2013	Government of Catalonia
10	2015	Direcció General de Política Lingüística. Informe de Política Lingüística 2014	Government of Catalonia

ANNEX XIII. Semi-structured interviews

Ref.	Person	Post	Date and location
1	Josep Lluís Carod-Rovira	Former Vice-president of the Government of Catalonia (2007-2010)	26 November 2014 Càtedra Diversia. Universitat Pompeu Fabra-Barcelona. Passeig Pujades 1, Barcelona
2	Xavier Bosch	Director-General for Immigration. Government of Catalonia (2012-present)	24 November 2014 Directorate-General for Immigration. C/Calàbria 147, Barcelona

3	Marta Xirinachs	Deputy Director-General. Directorate-General for Language Policy (2012-present)	25 November 2014 Directorate-General for Language Policy. C/Portal de Santa Madrona, 6. Barcelona
4	Oriol Amorós	Former Secretary-General for Immigration (2006-2010)	15 March 2013. Donostia-San Sebastian. Interview within the framework of the conference “Managing Diversity in Catalonia and the Basque Country”.

