What Holds a Multinational State Together? – The Political Stability of the Spanish "State of Autonomies"

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Many Ph.D. acknowledgments start with emphasizing the personal suffering, the desperate hours of night work and loneliness or the negative thoughts full of self-doubt about the possible intellectual irrelevance of one's work. Even if these feelings are not unfamiliar to me, usually, during the four years of writing I felt quite the opposite. I think that having the privilege of writing a Ph.D. thesis, with a degree of personal autonomy is priceless and one of the best parts of one's life cycle. This experience was possible especially due to two factors, first an excellent supervision and the support of my colleagues and second, the financial security given me by the relevant state institutions.

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Resum

En aquesta tesi doctoral responc a la pregunta: "Què manté un estat multinacional junt" mitjançant l'anàlisi d'esdeveniments polítics de l'Estat de les autonomies. La tesi es divideix en vuit capítols empírics, en els quals avaluo l'impacte de variables explicatives com la identitat nacional, la ciutadania, la confiança, el repartiment del poder, l'asimetria i la coerció a l'estabilitat política. Els resultats mostren que, a nivell individual, la identitat nacional "híbrida" dels ciutadans a les unitats nacionals/regionals és un factor important per a l'estabilitat política. Altres variables com la identificació amb l'Estat central i la seva constitució, així com la confiança en els ciutadans de la nació majoritària, i (la manca de) la confiança en les institucions de l'Estat central també són significatius. La major part dels aspectes institucionals com self-rule, la descentralització i l'asimetria tenen dos efectes - estabilitzadors i desestabilitzadors. Poden ser estabilitzadors durant un període, però noves demandes de les unitats nacionals / regionals poden convertir-los en factors d'inestabilitat, sobretot quan ambdós actors comencen a estar en desacord sobre el grau d'aquestes solucions institucionals. Quan la major part de les solucions institucionals estan fallant, l'estabilitat de l'Estat multinacional pot ser garantida pel poder coercitiu de l'Estat central. En un sistema d'autoritat multinivell com la UE, la importància de l'actor supranacional és crucial. Mentre la UE expressa la seva "negligència benigna" cap al "status quo" i les posicions de l'Estat central, l'autoritat de l'Estat central sobre les unitats nacionals / regionals és total. En aquest cas, el poder coercitiu pot ser identificat com un important factor d'estabilització.

Resumint, puc extreure del cas espanyol que l'estabilitat política en un entorn multinacional és una construcció complexa, mantinguda no per un, sinó per molts petits llaços. D'altra banda, l'anàlisi empírica mostra que la inestabilitat política a Espanya és més de caràcter polític que social.

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Resumen

En esta tesis doctoral respondo a la pregunta: "¿Qué mantiene un estado multinacional junto" mediante el análisis de los acontecimientos políticos del Estado de las Autonomías. La tesis se divide en ocho capítulos empíricos, en los cuales evaluó el impacto en la estabilidad política de variables explicativas como la identidad nacional, la ciudadanía, la confianza, el reparto del poder, la asimetría y la coerción. Los resultados muestran que, a nivel individual, la identidad nacional dual/"híbrida" de los ciudadanos en las unidades nacionales/regionales es un factor importante para la estabilidad política. Otras variables tales como la identificación con el Estado central y su constitución, así como la confianza en los ciudadanos de la "nación mayoritaria", y la (falta de) confianza en las instituciones del Estado central son también significativos. La mayor parte de los aspectos institucionales como self-rule, la descentralización y la asimetría tiene efectos tanto estabilizadores como desestabilizadores. Pueden aportar a la mejora de la estabilidad durante un período, pero las permanentes demandas de las unidades nacionales/regionales pueden convertirlos en factores de inestabilidad, sobre todo cuando ambos actores empiezan a estar en desacuerdo sobre el grado y profundidad de estas soluciones institucionales. Cuando la mayor parte de las soluciones institucionales están fallando, la estabilidad del Estado multinacional puede ser garantizada por el poder coercitivo del Estado central. En un sistema de autoridad multinivel como la UE, también la importancia del actor supranacional es crucial. Mientras la UE expresa su "negligencia benigna" hacia el "status quo" y las posiciones del Estado central, la autoridad del Estado central sobre las unidades nacionales/regionales es total. En ese caso, el poder coercitivo puede ser identificado como un importante factor de "estabilización".

Resumiendo, puedo extraer del caso español que la estabilidad política en un entorno multinacional es una construcción compleja, mantenida no solo por uno, sino por muchos pequeños lazos. Por otra parte, el análisis empírico muestra que la inestabilidad política en España es más de carácter político que social.

Summary

In this Ph.D. thesis, I answer the question: "What holds a multinational state together?" by analyzing the political developments in the Spanish "State of Autonomies". I divide the thesis into eight chapters, where I evaluate the impact of the explanatory variables like national identity, citizenship, trust, divisions of authority, asymmetry and coercive power on political stability. The results show that among the individual factors a dual national identification of citizens in the national/regional units, which I call "hybrid", could be considered as an important factor for political stability. Additional aspects such as identification with the central state and satisfaction with the constitution, as well as trust in the citizens of the majority nation, and the (lack of) trust in the institutions of the central state are also significant. Most of the institutional aspects like self-rule, decentralization, and asymmetry have both effects – stabilizing and destabilizing. They can be stability enhancing during a period, though permanent new demands of the national/regional units can turn them into destabilizing factors, above all when both actors start to disagree on the degree and depth of these institutional solutions. When most of the institutional solutions are failing, the "ultimate" instrument of the central state, its coercive power, can guarantee the stability of the multinational state. In this case, in a multi-level authority system like the European Union (EU), the behavior of the supranational actor is crucial. As long as the EU expresses its "benign neglect" towards the "status quo" and the positions of the central state, the authority of the central state over the national/regional units is total, and the coercive power can be identified as an important "stabilizing" factor.

Summarizing, I can extract from the Spanish case that political stability in a multinational setting is a complex construction, held together not by one, but by many little bonds. Moreover, the empirical analysis shows that political instability in Spain is more political than of a social nature. A certain degree of social cohesion within the political/social community is still given. It is the lack of political solutions, which makes the Spanish state unstable.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The theoretical question

1.1.1. The puzzle

Over recent decades, many multinational[1] democratic states have been showing signs of political instability. In Canada (Quebec), the UK (Scotland), Belgium and Spain (the Basque Country and Catalonia) some of the national/regional units[2], sometimes also labeled "minority nations" have expressed their preferences for a referendum on self-determination.

Such a referendum has been carried out in Canada (1980/1995) and Scotland (2014). The unionist position won all referenda, and both multinational states managed to survive. Belgium is another example of survival. After years of a serious political crisis without a government, the conflict between the Flemish and Walloons did not result in the dissolution of the country. Last but not least, also the Spanish "State of Autonomies", despite being confronted with Basque and Catalan self-determination demands, is still unified.

All these examples show that secession seems to be difficult in well-established liberal democracies (Dion 1996).[3] However, when analyzing the literature of political theory[4] we can state that we know little about the reasons for the longevity of multinational states. Even if there are many works in this field, which usually analyze the multinational state of Canada, different strains of the liberal theory have not convincingly answered or even addressed the question of what holds multinational states together. Is it the strength of the statewide identity? Or is the institutional framework responsible? Also, many other factors like, for example, the influence of the international actors, or the weakness of the separatist forces could be relevant.

Analyzing the few works, which asked the question about the longevity of multinational states, we can observe, that the answers given could be called at least cautious. With Will Kymlicka, perhaps the leading representative of the liberal

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[1] I consider Spain as a multinational state; I will explain the particularities of this concept in Chapter 2.

[2] In the following I will use the politically neutral term of "national/regional units" to describe Catalonia and the Basque Country. I will also explain this decision in more depth in Chapter 2.

[3] However, in 2006 Montenegro seceded from Serbia. Nevertheless, as will be shown, I claim that this was a case of a post-authoritarian break-up, and not of secession within a well-established liberal democracy.

[4] In this analysis, I will understand the political theory and political philosophy as one field, in spite of their differences.

nationalist approach claimed that "multinational federations appear to combine a weak sort of unity with a surprising degree of resilience" (Kymlicka 2001: 116). Kymlicka does not extensively specify this "weak sort of unity". However, in his work, he quotes classical authors who try to describe this special link. One of them is the constitutional theorist Albert V. Dicey (1967 [1885]) who insisted that the bond in the multinational state has to be strong, even if "they must desire union, and must not desire unity" (Quoted in Kymlicka 1995: 192). Charles Taylor (1991) puts emphasis on the good intentions of the citizens, who might "find it exciting and an object of pride' to work together to build a society founded on deep diversity, and so be willing to make sacrifices to keep it together" (Taylor 1991: 76). Nevertheless, he admits, that it remains an open question as to what bonds a multinational state together. Many authors coincide that a kind of in-between situation is the necessary condition for a multinational state to work.[5] At the same time that intermediate location is everything but stable. Apparently, some instability is a permanent feature of the multinational institutional construct.

Still, all these answers are rather speculative and are meant to be so. As Kymlicka (1995:179) has claimed, "[…] what then are the possible sources of unity in a multination state which affirm, rather than denies, its national differences I do not have a clear answer to this question. Indeed, I doubt that there are any obvious or easy answers available." And in fact, the normative and theoretical school has neglected this issue, apparently because of the difficulty of the analysis. Except for some pioneering articles (Dion 1996, de Schutter 2011, Bickerton 2014), this topic has remained largely unexplored. And not only has political theory failed to give an answer. To the best of my best knowledge, there is also no single positivist study, nor much comparative work or even a case study on this question. The reason for that could be that there is no empirical data, which could help to solve this puzzle. There is no longitudinal panel data on this topic. What is more, there is no single survey with multiple questions about the political stability of multinational states.

Nevertheless, I claim that some developments could help to shed new light on this question. The lifespan of multinational states is increasingly longer. This gives us not only a longer historical record but also some proxies in the form of longitudinal data,

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[5] Bednar (2009) confirms this in-between state, when analyzing the Canadian case: "Canadians manage crisis by endurance; at least their patience with perennial federal instability and constitutional uncertainty suggest as much…" (Bednar 2009:140). However, Bednar did not specifically analyze questions of instability in multinational, but in federal states.

which could help to analyze this question. Also, the growing number of (failed) referenda allows for new insights.

For all these reasons I would like to solve the multinational puzzle by answering the following research question:

"What holds a multinational state together?"

As the object of analysis, I have chosen the case study of the Spanish "State of Autonomies". In the following part of the introduction, I will define more clearly the research question. First, I will explain what the "holding together" of a multinational state means. For various reasons, I have chosen the term of political stability, which will be the variable to be explained. Second, I will explain the "what" in the research question. Here I will check which explanatory variables could help to address the research. I will also describe the methods, which link these variables and consider how reliable these methods are. Finally, in the last part of this introduction, I will define the most important concepts, which I use in this analysis.

1.1.2. Definition of the variable to be explained: Political Stability

In the following, I will approach the conceptualization of political stability from two angles: a normative/theoretical and an empirical angle. In the normative strand of literature, the discussion usually circles around questions of justice and how a just social contract could be made stable inside liberal democracies. This question has been principally asked in a nationally homogenous state, but recently it has also been analyzed in a heterogeneous multinational setting. A definition of political stability has usually been not offered. For that reason, I will also consult a more empirical strand of literature from the field of comparative politics, which will help in answering the questions of how to define stability, which types of stability there are, and if it is possible to measure that phenomenon.

1.1.2.1. Political Theory and Political Stability

Some of the most influential classical works of political theory have been written with the goal of defining the conditions of a durable social contract (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant). The long and rich debate about the adequate social contract during different periods of time has led to a normative and linguistic complexity in this field.[6] In most of these cases, aspects of stability are treated as important, but usually as a consequence of legitimacy.

To get a better grasp if and how modern liberal political theory addressed questions of stability, I go back to the "point zero" of liberal thought in the 20th century, when John Rawls developed his "Theory of Justice" (1971). Among the most important conditions of the Rawlsian social contract, we find that "the most reasonable principles of justice" should become "object of mutual agreement by persons under fair conditions". In his work Rawls develops a "set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining […] the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation" (Rawls 1971: 5).

The question of stability appears, when Rawls asks, in Part III of "A Theory of Justice", under which conditions this social contract could be stable. Rawls claims that it would be "a consideration against a conception of justice that in view of the laws of moral psychology, men would not acquire a desire to act upon it even when the institutions of their society satisfied it. For in this case there would be difficulty in securing the stability of social cooperation. It is an important feature of a conception of justice that it generates its own support" (Rawls 1971: 138). In a nutshell: for Rawls, the stability of modern democracies depends on the justice of its institutions, which should be recognized as just by its citizens.

Rawls has sharpened his former ideas in Part V of "Justice as Fairness" (2001), called "The Question of Stability"[7]. Rawls defines stability as a property of a conception of justice, and not as a property of a scheme of institutions, which Rawls sees a "different though not unrelated topic" (Rawls 2001:181). Rawls reaffirms his earlier

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[6] Requejo (2005) has distinguished between nine linguistic and normative poles: liberal, democratic, socio-economic, social order, national, cultural, federal, functional and post-materialist. All these factors influenced than the most important traditions of political theory like the liberal, communitarian, republican, or the conservative. However, in this work, I shall focus above all on the dominant liberal strand, even if not rejecting the influences of the other schools.
[7] We should take into account that Rawls could not finish this chapter.

ideas, claiming that "justice as fairness" as a liberal political conception "is not reasonable in the first place unless it generates its own support in a suitable way by addressing each citizen's reason, as explained within its own framework" (Rawls 2001:186). But how exactly should "justice as fairness" generate sufficient support for itself?

It is important to note that Rawls refuses the idea that this support should be built on sanctions or imposition/coercion. He claims that the stability of a democratic/political society[8] should be based on a voluntary concept of an overlapping consensus. Under this overlapping consensus, Rawls understands in the first place "citizens' sense of justice, [which] given their character and interests as formed by living under a just basic structure, is strong enough to resist the normal tendencies to injustice. (…) Stability is secured by sufficient motivation of the appropriate kind acquired under just institutions" (Rawls 2001:185).

Rawls outlines important requirements as to how this overlapping consensus could be established and maintained. First, in an overlapping consensus, each reasonable citizen should affirm "justice as fairness" as a common "element" from within its own perspective. Each person should support the political conception of justice for reasons internal to her own comprehensive doctrine, be it of religious, philosophical or moral nature. Second, all citizens should affirm this overlapping consensus "irrespective of the political strength of their comprehensive view[s]". Third, this support should stay stable, even if the power constellations of the different groups would change. For that reason, nobody should question the overlapping consensus due to a newer, stronger position.

As the consequence of this overlapping consensus, a just and fair democratic society would strengthen trust and confidence between citizens. The overlapping consensus would self-enforce due to the success of its political application. Parallel, its citizens would develop pride towards this democratic society and the overlapping consensus it is built on. Summarizing, we can state that Rawls sees an overlapping consensus

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[8] Rawls speaks about a society and rejects the notion of a community or an association: "Thus I believe that a democratic society is not and cannot be a community, whereby a community I mean a body of persons, united in affirming the same comprehensive, or partially comprehensive, doctrine. The fact of reasonable pluralism which characterizes a society with free institutions makes this impossible" (Rawls 2001:3). In another part of "Justice as Fairness" he argues: "Again, political society is not, and cannot be, an association. We do not enter it voluntarily. Rather we simply find ourselves in a particular political society at a certain moment of historical time" (Rawls 2001). Rawls also does not use the term political stability.

based on liberal-democratic principles as a feasible basis of democratic stability, which would be superior to a mere balance of power among citizens who hold contending worldviews or to stability, which would be guaranteed through coercive instruments from the state institutions.

However, also the latest work of Rawls is not favorably inclined towards the consideration of differentiated rights in the notion of democratic citizenship (Requejo 2005). Rawls apparently concentrated on a typical uninational state with a very low level of conflict. The conditions for legitimacy in a multinational state are different. That was one of the critics of Kymlicka (2002), who having a multinational state in mind criticizes Rawls' emphasis on just institutions by "assuming that if people share the same liberal-democratic principles, they will not question historic boundaries and jurisdictions" (Kymlicka 2002:256). Also, Requejo (2005) has claimed that the specific type of national pluralism in multinational societies poses new questions about the legitimacy of a multinational state.[9]

We have seen that while explaining the overlapping consensus, Rawls subordinates the question of stability under the norms of justice. This stands in clear contrast to a more classical approach - the Hobbesian stability (1969 [1651]). While Rawls claims that a sense of justice makes people cooperate, Hobbes argues that cooperation is best guaranteed if the subordinate fears its sovereign. Following Hobbes, a near-absolute sovereignty is needed to secure stability. With that stability comes at the price of justice.

Interestingly, to the best of my knowledge, the modern liberal political theory has barely addressed the relation between justice and stability. An exception is Norman (2001). He sees justice as a moral concept with normative implications and stability as a more descriptive construct. Normal also addresses questions of political stability. He argues that the term political stability has a strong congruence with the term unity. Both can be used interchangeably, defining "political stability as a function of the political system, and unity as a function of the integrity of the political community. But in practice […] the two will tend to go together or disintegrate together" (Norman 2001: 97).

In the literature on multiculturalism, Norman identifies a discussion regarding whether justice should be given up in favor of political stability in multinational

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[9] An alternative offered is a different way of liberal thinking including the particular characteristics of a multinational state, summarized under the "Liberalism 2" approach (Taylor 1992/Requejo 2005).

states: "In short, while there are certain considerations of justice that are relevant to the basic constitutional and institutional arrangements in a multination state, rarely can such arrangements be seriously discussed without considering the implications for political stability and national unity" (Norman 2001: 97).

After analyzing the case study of Canada/Quebec, he determines that what is important is not the degree of a trade-off between justice and stability, but the very concepts themselves. For example, the concept of liberal justice has quite a contested nature, what leads him to the conclusion that different conceptions of justice may lead to conflict and instability.

Besides that, Norman raises another important point regarding the rival demands of justice and stability. Usually within a multinational conflict one side makes suggestions in the language of justice, while the other makes the counterproposals in the language of stability. Usually, the minority uses the justice and the majority the stability argument. Both sides exploit the concepts, making an objective discussion difficult. Like still to be shown, these arguments are also used in the Spanish "State of Autonomies".

1.1.2.2. Comparative Politics and Political Stability

As shown, political theory concentrates on the normative questions around stability and on the conditions, which lead to it. However, it sidelines the very definition of stability. Usually, it does not even add the adjective "political" to this discussion. For that reason, and to derive a general concept of political stability, I will turn to the available definitions in the literature of comparative politics, which is especially rich in its subfield concentrating on modernization, ethnic conflict, and civil war.

In this literature, the definition of stability is built on the clear contrast with its antonym: instability. Both are defined as multifaceted concepts, depending on structural or conditional determinants.

Ake (1975) offers one of the basic definitions. He claims that a political system is stable when its structure does not alter. According to this view, as long as individuals restrict themselves to the rules of the game of the political system, there will be political stability. Huntington (1968) applied the concept of political stability/instability to modernizing states. According to Huntington, in this setting modernizing forces look for political participation, and should be absorbed by

political institutions if they want to secure political stability. If this condition is not given and the preferences for political participation outgrow political institutionalization, political instability increases.

Lijphart (1977) explained political stability as a multidimensional concept, which includes legitimacy, effectiveness, system maintenance and civil order. Hurwitz (1973) offered a taxonomy concentrating on five conditions, which could be seen as important for political stability: absence of violence, governmental longevity/duration, the existence of legitimate constitutional regime, the absence of structural change and multifaceted societal attribute. Riker/Lemco (1987) analyzed stability as a dependent variable and divided it into federal states following three types: stable, partially stable and unstable. They claim, that when a federation is threatened by separatism or secession, then they have to be coded as "partially stable". From this literature, we can derive a minimal definition of political stability, which could refer to the absence of domestic civil conflict and widespread violence. Additionally, following these definitions, we can also position political stability on an axis starting with the "weakest" definition in which small changes within the political system, such as a government crisis, could be interpreted as political instability. In the middle, we would find political instability as a constitutional crisis, where also some demands for self-determination could be articulated. At the end of the axis, we find the most extreme point of political instability as state failure due to actual secession or partition of the state through internal or external reasons.[10]

Figure 1.1. Possible interpretations of political instability

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          (a)                            (b)                             (c)
Governmental crisis            Constitutional crisis             State-failure
                               (Self-determination demands)      (Secession)
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
Source: own elaboration

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[10] However, this is only one interpretation of political stability in a multinational state. Political stability does not have to refer to the territorial question only; it can for example also lead to an authoritarian state within the old borders. There are also failed states without secession like Sierra Leone.

In this analysis, I will concentrate on the middle point of the axis, the constitutional crisis (b), although it is obvious that such a crisis has a much wider influence and permanently oscillates between a governmental crisis (a) and state-failure (c). Interpreting political stability as a constitutional crisis is only a minimalist definition, which I shall extend in the following steps.

There is a clear difference in how political stability can be guaranteed in authoritarian or a democratic state. Advocates of authoritarianism claim, following the Hobbesian argument that fear and coercion exercised by an authoritarian ruler better guarantee stability. An authoritarian ruler can combine an oppressive state apparatus with other patterns of legitimacy like common ethnic descent or religious faith of its citizens. Following this line of argument, democracy is seen as one of the conditions for instability.[11]

A democratic state could use similar instruments. Common ethnic decent or religious faiths of the citizens are also welcomed factors for cohesion when a state is democratic. It could also be built to some extent on the instruments of coercion and an oppressive state apparatus. However, the permanent accountability and the need for legitimacy make the government in a democracy use a different approach.

When analyzing this point, we should distinguish between all types of democracies and a special group of them, the liberal democracies. For example, when political stability collapses within young or modernizing democracies, they can turn into an authoritarian state. For that reason, the rules to guarantee political stability in these young democracies can be similar to an authoritarian praxis, at least at the beginning as a defense from the authoritarian specter.[12]

The guarantee of political stability is different within established liberal democracies, which may be labeled Western democracies. In these states tensions created by strong socio-economic or nationalist movements do not lead to an authoritarian turn through chaos and violence. Most of the conflicts are solved through political reforms and some form of political accommodation.

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[11]There was, for some time, agreement among certain scholars that dictators in Arabic countries can be seen as important factors for stability of these states.

[12] Linz (1990) has claimed that parliamentary democracies are more stable than the presidential ones. However, Cheibub (2007) has shown, that the higher instability of presidential democracies can be attributed entirely to its authoritarian legacy and has nothing to do with its constitutional structure.

The case being examined in this analysis, the Spanish "State of Autonomies", has usually been seen as a stable Western liberal democracy.[13] As such it has to deal with pressures resulting from different cleavage structures within the society. Like in all liberal democracies, to ensure the capacity of the government to enforce decisions, the government, the state or the regime must be accepted as "legitimate".[14]

Democratic states require this acceptance of legitimacy, with more or less intensity both within the majority, and also among the minorities. This is especially true if these minorities find themselves in opposition. Additionally, the permanence of that legitimacy also matters. Political instability can grow if a group that had accepted a regime/state as legitimate first afterward has withdrawn its support.

Weber (1947) developed a classification of polities as the basis on which their authority rests, distinguishing between a traditional, rational-legal and charismatic origin. We could call this legitimation approach *top-down*. But it is not only states or its elites who can plan how to guarantee stability. The citizens too can have different interests to stay within a community. This *bottom-up* approach can be found in other works of Weber (1978), who distinguishes three types of human behavior. The actions of the people may be affective (directly orientated to achieving values without calculation of costs: emotional, zealous), rational (based on ends-means or cost-benefit calculations) or habitual (past-oriented).[15] A permanent interaction between the top-down and the bottom-up legitimation approaches can be seen as essential for the stability of the state and will be central to this thesis.

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[13] There may be some doubts, however. The refusal of a referendum first in the Basque Country and then in Catalonia makes the differences between Spain and Canada or the UK, which allowed such referenda, more than obvious. The discussions about a possible referendum in Catalonia could be an excellent exercise to test the extent to which the Spanish state is an established Western liberal democracy. Maybe its practice is closer to the first cluster of young democracies mentioned earlier on page 9? Even if not seen as an essential part of this analysis, this question about the nature of the Spanish "State of Autonomies" will be present.

[14] To avoid theoretical confusion, in the following, I will use the term regime as a middle-level between the concepts of state and government. Fishman (1990) defines the difference as following: "A regime may be thought of as the formal and informal organization of the center of the political power, and of its relations with the broader society (…) Regimes are more permanent forms of political organization than specific governments, but they are less permanent than the state. The state, by contrast, is a (normally) more permanent structure of domination and coordination including a coercive apparatus and the means to administer a society and extract resources from it" (Fishman 1990: 428). In this dissertation, I will define the democratic elected Spanish governments between 1978-2016 as the political regime of this analysis.

[15] Offe (2006) developed similar ideas when claiming that: "Eighteenth-century political philosophers believed that there are three forces like human beings that shape all of social and political life: people have interests, reason, and "passions" (Offe 2006:23).

If the state is considered legitimate within the whole territory, then the probability of political stability is rather high. However, if a state were not to reach the necessary levels of legitimacy among the whole population, it would not automatically become unstable. There are some others possibilities to guarantee political stability.

First, the state could be economically effective and make its citizens better off. Second, even if the state has been economically ineffective, it could buy the support of the minority elites or even the whole population of the minority with costly benefits. Both "techniques" would build on the rational-legal legislation of the state and the rational behavior of the citizens.[16] Third, we could find some evidence that the pattern of habit stemming from the state being legitimate once could play a role in some parts of the population. That would be the traditional/habitual explanation. Last but not least, there are the already defined elements of coercion, which could become a kind of last resort when a state is unstable due to secessionist demands.[17] Some could interpret that praxis as authoritarian.

After this initial discussion, we can summarize that the political stability of a multinational state depends on many factors. Political instability appears if the central government is seen as increasingly less legitimate in the national/regional units. At that moment the strength of national/regional political parties is crucial. If they are in power, they can articulate demands for self-determination. Following this, I would like to enhance the former minimalist interpretation of political instability by introducing the following definition of political stability.

I define the political stability of a multinational state (on the territorial axis) - as the absence, on the part of the national/regional party governing an Autonomous Community, of either secession demands or calls for a referendum on self-determination.

We can define the periods of political instability as the periods when these parties have been in government, and their demands lead to a statewide, usually constitutional crisis (see also Figure 1.1.).

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[16] However, in moments of economic crisis, where financial resources are limited and "buying support" becomes complicated, multinational states could have a tendency towards greater instability.
[17] There could also be alien menaces to legitimate a state.

However, which parts of the multinational state should be seen as unstable? Does only the national/regional unit lose stability? Or does the whole multinational state become unstable? The degrees of instability seem to be different in the singular territorial units. For example, the citizens of the national/regional units can perceive the instability as permanent while citizens of other parts of the state can barely notice it. These questions are important when detecting the periods of political instability. For that reason, I will identify two periods of political instability in the Spanish "State of Autonomies". The first period is in the Basque Country following the development of the "Ibarretxe Plan" in the years 2003-2008. The second is in Catalonia after the negative ruling of the Constitutional Court on the Catalan statute in 2010. I will give more explanations for this decision in Chapter 6 on asymmetry.

Coming back to the theoretical questions about political stability, I should mention that I also found a more positivist one, which will become important above all in Chapter 7 when developing a game-theoretical model. Parsons (1951), building on the work of Max Weber, advanced a theoretical program of functionalist sociology looking for conditions of "equilibrium" and a "functional balance". Similar to that idea is the approach of rational choice institutionalists. The concept of equilibrium of institutions is central here. Shepsle (1989) claims that political equilibrium can be conceived as stable outcomes induced by relatively stable institutions in spite of potential instability and unpredictability of citizens and parties' interactions. North (1990) argues that institutions as rules would tend to reinforce themselves and produce long-term durable "equilibria". This is also the argument in most game-theoretic analyses. The system or game stays in equilibrium or in "balance", as long as the environment remains constant because then the players do not have the incentives to change their behavior unilaterally (Morrow 1994). This approach brings us full circle to the definition of Ake (1975), by claiming more or less the same: When things don't change, they are stable.

However, even after this intent of definition, we should keep in mind that stability while remains an imprecise concept. Filippov et al. (2004) explained the why while defining when a federal state should be considered as stable: " […] to be judged stable a state must meet the minimal requirement of allowing change under pre-established rules – generally, constitutionally prescribed rules. But because even constitutions can be amended or supplanted according to pre-established rules, because secession can be constitutional, […] stability must remain an ill-defined and poorly measured

concept. Somewhat vaguely, then stability here will be taken to require a "relatively" peaceful, constitutional, and democratic adaptation of a political system to changing circumstances" (Filippov et al. 2004:12). When these adjustments are not possible, we can talk of political instability.

1.1.3. Explanatory variables (independent variables)

Early liberal thinkers assumed that a liberal democracy could work efficiently and be stable even without very devoted citizens. These democracies would rely on their institutions, which would include checks and balances by separation of powers, a bicameral legislature or a federal system. Among other factors, it was this belief in state institutions, which lead Immanuel Kant to claim, that "[t]he problem of organizing a state, however hard it may seem, can be solved even for a race of devils, if only they are intelligent" (Kant 1963 [1795]: 112).

However, not all political theorists share this interpretation. Habermas (1992) points to a different direction claiming, "the institutions of constitutional freedom are only worth as much as a population makes of them" (Habermas 1992:7). Additionally, other authors have shown that even if institutions are important for a good and stable government, without a positive support of the political community of its citizens, they are not very effective. Commenting on Kant's quote, Kymlicka emphasizes that, "A liberal democracy may not be possible for a society of devils, but nor does it require a society of angels. It would be more accurate to say that liberal justice requires a critical threshold: there must be a sufficient number of citizens who possess these virtues to a sufficient degree" (Kymlicka 2002: 293).[18]

Habermas and Kymlicka agree that behavior and attitudes of the citizens are important. Kymlicka identifies identity, tolerance, political participation and economic or environmental responsibilities as important.[19] Similar ideas can be found in other fields of Political Science research.[20] In line with this view and the already

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[18] However, I should emphasize that Kymlicka speaks about liberal justice.
[19] Kymlicka claims that we should look at the citizens and their "sense of identity, and how they view potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from themselves; their desire to participate in the political process in order to promote the public good and hold political authorities accountable; their willingness to show self-restraint and exercise personal responsibility in their economic demands, and in personal choices which affect their health and the environment" (Kymlicka 2002: 285).
[20] Lipset (1959) has emphasized that states may never become real democratic states unless they build

presented ideas of Max Weber on page 10, when analyzing conditions for political stability we have to include not only the macro-level of analysis concentrating on institutions, which uses a top-down perspective, but also we should focus on the micro-level by analyzing the citizens, using a bottom-up perspective.

Including both perspectives, I have identified the following explanatory variables. On the individual level, I will investigate aspects of national identity, citizenship, and trust. On the institutional level, I will scrutinize aspects of the division of authority such as federalism, with its federal principles of shared-rule and self-rule as well as decentralization and asymmetry. Additionally, on the institutional level, I will also evaluate the coercive power of the central state adding the influence of the EU as an institutional framework.

However, I also had to exclude different variables on the individual and the institutional level for various reasons, most important of them being of the work regarding the size of the dissertation. One of them is the variable "habit", which could be interpreted as the conservative view of citizens as being against changes. Even if empirical data in the Scottish case points in the direction that habit is important in people voting against secession, we do not have much data on this aspect relating to the Spanish case.[21] I had to leave out additional variables on the institutional level, one of them being the institution of the welfare state, which has been seen as an important bond in some multinational states (Banting/Kymlicka 2006). Even if political parties are a permanent actor, I do not dedicate a particular chapter to them, but analyze many aspects of parties and party politics, above all in the chapter dedicated to the institutional solutions (chapter 5 and 6).

1.1.3.1. National identity

Most authors agree that national identity can facilitate social cohesion and political stability in multinational states. Among them are Will Kymlicka and David Miller. However, they do not agree on how these national identities are structured.

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reservoirs of popular support for democratic institutions. This finding has been confirmed by studies of Almond and Verba (1963) and Stepan and Linz (1978).

[21] Other individual psychological variables, which could have been included, is the "fatigue" of the separatists when not successful, although this is partly included in the coercion chapter. I also excluded questions outside of the "political spectrum" like economy, demography, mass media due to the permitted size of the dissertation.

Following Kymlicka (1995), a multinational state consists of different "societal" cultures, divided into a majority and a minority nation. Both can be identified on the statewide as well as on the national/regional level. These national identities are isolated. Kymlicka does not mention the possibility of a mixed national identity in a multinational state. This division causes a competition between the different national identities, which leads to instability rather than stability in a multinational state.

Likewise, Miller (2000) splits the multinational state into two various national groups, distinguishing between a dominant one and a dominated one. In difference to Kymlicka, Miller claims that even if "subcultures threaten to undermine the overarching sense of identity", the state could help developing "a common identity […] [of] citizens that is stronger than [their] separate identities as members of ethnic or other sectional groups" (Miller 1989: 237). He labels this dual identification, as "nested identities", which he considers as a possible stabilizing factor.

1.1.3.2. Citizenship

Rainer Bauböck (2002:37) criticizes Miller's assumption. He claims that "Miller fails […] to demonstrate that the identity that is shared by the various communities in multinational societies is itself a national one." Bauböck claims, that even if there is such a shared identity, it should be called differently, namely "federal citizenship". This bond cannot be as thick as a national identity but has the advantage of being a more realistic overarching and overlapping identity.

This citizenship-based shared identity is close to the Rawlsian concept of overlapping consensus, previously mentioned. However, Bauböck claims that there is one essential requirement for a citizenship-based shared identity in a multinational federation, which is different. Its citizens must not only respects their differences but also accept that the "constituent units can interpret their collective identities differently (as regions or nations) and can use their powers of self-government to promote their particular conceptions" (Bauböck 2002:38). Consequently, the citizenship-based shared identity is different from Rawls's idea of public reason that excludes appeals to controversial conceptions.

In a nutshell, we can identify a citizenship-based shared identity as something horizontal and political that unites citizens. Following these ideas citizenship can be

seen as a mere aspect of identification in the sense of law, where a person identifies as a citizen of this state because he/she is a member of it, which is confirmed by the documents issued. More abstract is the idea of "constitutional patriotism", where citizens are attached to a state through the satisfaction with and support for a constitution. Both elements could be seen as "thinner" versions of national identity and will be used as possible explanatory variables for political stability.[22]

Starting from a different interpretation of citizenship, Habermas (1996) has distinguished between a liberal and a republican version: "[Liberal] [c]itizenship is conceived along the lines of an organizational membership that grounds a legal statute…[I]ndividuals remain outside the state. In exchange for organizational services and benefits, they make specific contributions, such as voting inputs and tax payments, to the reproduction of the state. In the second [republican] interpretation, citizens are integrated into the political community like the parts of a whole. In such a way that they develop their personal and social identity only within the horizon of shared traditions and recognized political institutions" (Habermas 1996: 498).

I will include this republican approach in the second part of the citizenship chapter. It usually turns around the concept of the "civic virtue" of the citizens, which should supplement the creation of formal institutions designed to the attainment of a common good. When analyzing the republican aspects, I will concentrate on the participation of the residents of Catalonia, Basque Country, and Spain in the political process, but also interpret their involvement in their particular communities, following some findings in the "social capital" literature.

1.1.3.3. Trust

Besides behaviorists like Almond and Verba (1963) or "social capital" authors like Putman (1993) also political theory points to aspects of trust as being important for a stable democracy. Offe (1999, 2012) claims that neither civic nationalism nor liberal republicanism can guarantee the stability of the state, but that a special kind of trust, tolerance and solidarity is needed: "What we need in order to resolve the tension

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[22] However, we could derive from these ideas also a "citizenship as rights" approach, where citizenship means rights given to the different minorities to integrate/accommodate them within a multinational state. These ideas will be addresses in chapter 4 on citizenship, however, they will be analyzed in the chapters 5 and 5 on institutional solutions, following a different analytical approach.

between the desirable and the frightening aspects of popular sovereignty is trust – trust, that is, in the reasonableness, informed judgment and good intentions of our fellow citizens whom we recognize as legitimate co-authors of the law that eventually will bind all of us" (Offe 2012: 363). Also Weinstock (1999: 307) claims that: "in the case of societies for which secession is a real option, it is trust which in my view prevents societies from falling apart in times of crisis […]."

Trust, as a possible explanatory variable is also present in Rawls' work. Together with sentiments of pride towards a democratic society it is one of the possible conditions, which could stabilize the overlapping consensus. However, Rawls sees trust and pride as a result and not a precondition of a just institution or a just society. So what about the direction of causality? This question makes the inclusion of questions of trust in our analysis even more necessary. Following the recent discussion on trust, I will use social trust, which will be defined as the trust towards the political community, and political trust, which will be defined as confidence in the political institutions, as possible explanatory variables for the political stability of a multinational state.

1.1.3.4. Divisions of authority

That institutions matter for political stability has been widely confirmed not only by Kant (1963 [1795]), but also by many different schools of research. The literature, which analyzes the impact of institutions on the performance and stability of state, is more than voluminous. However, the many academic works focus on different aspects. Works in the tradition of political economy analyze the performance and accountability of the state or regime and barely tackle questions of national minorities and stability. It is the strand dealing with federalism, in the normative-constitutional tradition, which usually asks questions about the impact of shared authority on political stability. In this analysis, I will concentrate on three possible authority divisions: federalism as a recommendation; federal principles of shared rule and self-rule; and decentralization.

1.1.3.5. Asymmetry

Closely related to questions of federalism and decentralization are asymmetrical solutions, which are a subfield of decentralization. Compared with studies on federalism and decentralization there are much fewer analyses, which evaluate the impact of asymmetrical solutions on the political stability of multinational states. That said, most of the authors claim that asymmetry has some impact (Gagnon/Laforest 1993, Kymlicka 1998, Bauböck, 2000, 2002, Von Beyme 2005). Aspects of asymmetry can be found in its horizontal (between the different units) or its vertical version (between the central state and the regional or national/regional units). The influence of both will be analyzed in this dissertation. Asymmetry could be seen as a process, which brings a constitution to its limits. For that reason, as in the case of decentralization, a dynamic rather than a static analysis will be a better approach to answering the research question. The development or the lack of further asymmetrical decentralization can bring the central state and its national/regional unit into conflict, which can cause a constitutional crisis. At that moment the central state can use the instrument of coercion.

1.1.3.6. Coercive power

As already claimed in the conceptualization of political stability, when the usual legitimacy patterns such as common national identity or institutional decentralization do not work, even a liberal democratic state can fall back on elements of coercive power. This is an instrument that has been discussed ever since Hobbes' Leviathan (1969 [1651]). Even if it has not become a central concept of political theory, most authors acknowledge the importance of coercion. For example, Rawls claims, "political power is always coercive power backed by the government's use of sanctions, for government alone has the authority to use force in upholding its laws" (Rawls 1993:136). Taylor (2005) points to control over coercive power as an overlooked dimension, which impacts on the stability of a federal state[23].

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[23] His arguments have been built on Weber's classical account about the predominance of political power and can be applied to multinational non-federal states, too.

Within democracies, "coercive power" has usually been needed during the different phases of state-creation (Tilly 1992, Rokkan 1999). However, after the establishment of the state, this political instrument usually disappears. It reemerges again only in moments of political instability, when other sources of state legitimacy are no longer sufficient, for example, when the authority of the state is felt as unjust and no longer tolerated. When a state is close to state failure, coercive power can be used as an "ultimate" instrument of legitimation of that state.

However, whether a democratic state should use such power is open to debate (Buchanan 2002). It is also questionable, in which cases the international community would tolerate the use of that "ultimate" instrument. One deciding factor, which could determine its acceptance, could be the strength of the state in question or the support of its international allies. In the case of Spain, there is also an additional problem. Due to the European integration process, Spain is part of a multi-level governance system, which may influence the use of the coercive elements. Consequently, the EU is an additional actor, which will be added to the analysis in that chapter.

1.1.4. Concepts of the analysis: state, sovereignty, and regime

All too often scholars do not take the time to explain the concepts they work with, and simply assume that those will be automatically understood. This often leads to profound misconceptions of what is under examination.

In this dissertation, I will use the standard definition of the modern state based on Max Weber´s definition in "Politics as a Vocation". In this conference talk, Weber said that "the state is the form of a human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory – and this idea of "territory" is an essential defining feature" (Weber 2004 [1919]: 33).

In other works, where Weber offers a wider definition of the modern state, he adds additional aspects like the weight of the administrative support for the state or the authority not only over the citizens but also over the actions within that state. Still, he does not weaken his main argument, according to which a state is "a compulsory association with a territorial basis" (Weber 1947: 156).[24]

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[24] "It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized corporate activity of the administrative staff, which is also regulated by legislation, is oriented. This system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the

Nevertheless, when defining questions of authority, we should go beyond Weber´s definition. A state has the "ultimate" level of "coercive power" only when it is legally and politically independent from external control. This independence is usually called "sovereignty". Tilly (1975) is one of those who has included a restricted version of sovereignty in his definition of a state. He defines the state as an "organization which controls the population occupying a definite territory in a state insofar as (1) it is differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory; (2) it is autonomous; (3) it is centralized; and (4) its divisions are formally coordinated with one another" (Tilly 1975:40). Poggi (1990), building on Tilly's and Weber's account, claims that a state is sovereign as long as "it claims, and if necessary is willing to prove, that it owes to no other power its control over the population in question; that it responds to no other organization for the modalities and the outcomes of that control" (Poggi 1990: 21-22).

Krasner (1999:3) claims that the term sovereignty could be used in four different ways: as international legal sovereignty, as Westphalian sovereignty, as domestic sovereignty or as interdependence sovereignty. This study will focus primarily on the first two, where international legal sovereignty denotes the political measures connected with mutual recognition between territorial entities, which have some formal juridical independence, and Westphalian sovereignty defines a political organization which is founded on the omission of external actors from authority arrangements in a limited territory.

Krasner states, that "the exercise of one kind of sovereignty—for instance, international legal sovereignty—can undermine another kind of sovereignty, such as Westphalian sovereignty, if the rulers of a state enter into an agreement that recognizes external authority structures, as has been the case for the members of the European Union" (Krasner 1999:4). That aspect will become crucial when I analyze questions of coercive power within a multi-level authority system in Chapter 7.

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citizens… but also to a very large extent, over all action-taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory association with a territorial basis. […] The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous organization" (Weber 1947: 156).

1.2. Research design

In the following, I will explain the research design of this dissertation. First I will address the complexities of the interdisciplinary approach to this work. Afterward, I will tell which methods I have chosen and why. The application of these methods leads to some biases and problems, which will be addressed after that. Subsequently, I will justify the case-study approach and the choice of the Spanish "State of Autonomies". In the last part, I will outline the contribution of this dissertation.

1.2.1. The complexities of the interdisciplinary approach

To address an argument of political theory through empirical analysis is not new. In particular political scientists coming from the empirical/positivist school tend to verify parts of classical theoretical works, like Mill (1921 [1862]) or de Tocqueville (1835) and check its validity with statistical analysis (e.g. Filippov et al. 2004). However, due to the high methodological sophistication of their analysis, they tend to neglect the theoretical and conceptual parts.

The approach of this dissertation will be different. Even if using some empirical positivist methods, the analysis stays theoretical in core.[25] I will concentrate not only on answering the research question but also on clarifying the arguments around conflict and stability within a multinational state.[26] At the same time, I will not refrain from expressing normative implications of my analyses in the conclusions.

This analysis will address a question from the field of political theory, by using insights from other disciplines like sociology, psychology or economy.[27] However, this analysis will be more interdisciplinary than multidisciplinary in nature. In line with this approach, I will analyze for example the impact of economic or

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[25] I have been strongly influenced by ideas of Favell and Modood (2003) and Bauböck (2008) who claim that theoretical and empirical research should focus more on cross-fertilizing. Above all Favell and Modood criticize the way that researchers from the empirical/positivist side too often use ad hoc normative assumptions and scholars from the theoretical/normative part rely on intuitive assumptions instead of using available empirical evidence or interpreting quantitative studies without the necessary tools.

[26] Even if this is not a normative analysis, I will keep in mind Bauböck's warning that: "Normative problems can never be fully resolved through analytical explanation or hermeneutical interpretation, nor can deep disagreement within normative theory be overcome by testing the empirical presuppositions. The contribution of political theory to political debates is not to settle disputes but to clarify arguments and to highlight the values involved in political choices" (Bauböck 2008: 40).

[27] Here I refer to the widely accepted significant disciplines of social sciences.

psychological explanations emerging from the field of political economy or political psychology.

Different communities of scholars have analyzed the stability of multinational states. There are broad theoretical concepts within all the mentioned fields of political science, which could be used. However, every discipline attributes different meanings to the concepts. Even within the same theoretical frames, some concepts and results are not coherent or even contradicting and need some clarifications. For that reason, even if it is not necessary to develop completely new concepts while aiming at theoretical cross-fertilization, a summary and the following adjustment of the central concepts will be inevitable.

1.2.2. Methodology

In order to answer the research question "What holds a multinational state together", I will adapt my analysis to the ideas of Brady and Collier (2010), which by readopting some of the recommendations of King, Keohane & Verba (1994) agreed on the importance of inference and causality in social science analysis.

Previously, I have defined the variable to be explained (dependent variable) as well as six possible explanatory variables (independent variables), which will be conceptualized from a theoretical point of view. Then, its causality towards the dependent variable will be tested empirically. The quite high amount of explanatory variables obliges me to engage in a trade-off. Not each explanatory variable could be analyzed with the same analytical depth, something that would be possible if it were chosen as a single explanatory variable. However, I claim that this trade-off is necessary. I expect that only a conglomerate of different variables can explain the political stability/instability of multinational states, with some variables more salient than others.

I will use the approach of a middle-range theory, which explains large-scale processes by referring to general concepts and processes. Besides, this research will rely on a problem-driven instead of method-driven approach (Green and Shapiro 1994). It will also follow a trend in social science research, which mixes theoretical and empirical methods (Della Porta and Keating 2008: 350).

I will answer the research question in six empirical chapters using different quantitative or qualitative techniques; in the following, I will explain why I have chosen these methods.

The Chapters 2 to 4 focus on the micro–level of analysis, examining questions of identification, trust, and confidence in political institutions of Spanish citizens. Owing to the empirical approach of this dissertation, I will focus on quantitative data, which is the standard method to analyze these questions.

In chapter 2, while examining the impact of national identity on the political stability of a multinational state, I'm interested in the longitudinal development of national identification patterns in the Spanish "State of Autonomies". Here I will rely widely on available longitudinal survey data from a Spanish and a Catalan research institute: CIS (Center of Sociological Investigations/ Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) and CEO (Catalan Research Institute/ *Estudis* d' Opinió de la Generalitat de Catalunya). Besides developing some descriptive statistics, which will show the relevant developments in Spain and its national/regional units, I will also apply a multivariate regression analysis, to find out more about a specific group, persons with a "hybrid" identification. The available survey data is rich, and the analysis will widely benefit of this approach. Nevertheless, I will also point to some methodological shortcomings around the concept of "hybrid" identification, which should be taken into account in future research.

While addressing questions of citizenship in chapter 3, I will also use available Spanish survey data. However, like still to be shown, here the data availability is much more limited, nevertheless still the best method to measure not only the identification of citizens with the state or satisfaction with its constitution but also when examining aspects of good citizenship. In this chapter, I will give some recommendations, how questions of citizenship could be analyzed in the future.

I will analyze in Chapter 4 a possible influence of social trust and political trust on political stability. In this case, besides using the data collected by the already mentioned Spanish research institutes, I will also rely on comparative survey data from the World Values Survey (WVS) or European Social Survey (ESS). In this chapter, I will also be interested in the longitudinal development, which can be best offered by examining descriptive statistics.

In the chapters 5-7 I will switch from the micro-level to the macro-level of analysis. Above all in chapter 5 and 6 on shared-rule, self-rule, decentralization, and

asymmetry I will focus on the importance of institutions and institutional solutions on the stability of Spain. Here I will use qualitative instruments like path-dependency to examine the institutional development. Besides that, I will also use quantitative methods like Party Manifesto data to analyze the preferences of political actors. Moreover, I will use survey data, which will evaluate the satisfaction of the Spanish citizens with the institutional development.

A different methodological approach will be offered in chapter 7, where I focus more on the present situation and possible future outcome of questions of political stability in the Spanish "State of Autonomies". I will analyze the political conflict between the Spanish central state and the Catalan national/regional unit with a game-theoretical model. I claim that game theory is the adequate method to analyze this strategic interaction not only because it allows analyzing the preferences of different actors. It is also built around the notion of equilibrium. Like already mentioned, changes in the preferences of the actors can lead to changes in possible equilibria, which result in political instability. The relevant critics could be that game-theory is built on the rational-choice approach, which is not the main empirical approach of this analysis, for example, I do not claim in chapter 2-4, that the identification and preferences of the Spanish citizens are rational. However, in this game, I do not concentrate on individuals, but on institutional actors, which do act rationally.

1.2.3. Methodological problems

Kymlicka claims, that when answering questions of political stability in multinational states, the empirical approach is more appropriate than the normative one (Kymlicka in Bauböck 2002). However, applying an empirical rather than a normative approach in a political theory analysis makes the work relatively vulnerable for methodological criticism.

Following my research design, the theoretical part cannot be developed with the necessary depth and could be considered by some political theorists as too banal. Besides that, normative scholars may criticize that theoretical/normative questions should be answered by a more traditional approach. This criticism coming from the theoretical/normative corner could be easier to reject, not only because this research design makes it impossible to include and explain the most fundamental normative questions, but above all because it is not the main goal of the analysis.

The objection from the empirical/positivist field could address a more sensitive point: even if the study uses a large number of possible explanatory variables, the following analysis is not centered on a rigorous quantitative analysis.[28]

I would like to reject this possible intervention with arguments used by one of the fathers of the quantitative positivist approach, William Riker (1959), who has previously claimed, that macro-political processes are too large if we want to isolate cause and effect. Following that, a causal analysis between the different explanatory variables and political stability over a decade of nearly 40 years is methodologically impossible. And even if I would try to apply this positivist logic, the analysis would struggle with one big methodological problem, the lack of relevant data. There are for example no surveys asking questions about the political stability of multinational states. To resolve this issue at the individual level, I would have to design and conduct surveys, which, to be significant, should be designed as panel data.[29] However, even if I were to start to collect the data now, the research could begin only some years/decades later. For that reason, there would be no panel data from the first decades after the Spanish transition. With that, we would lose significant periods of analysis. Considering the institutional level, I could not operationalize institutions with evaluations of survey answers only. If I were to make a positivist institutional analysis, I would have to code the institutional development.

For all those reasons, when building my research design in the tradition of the middle-range theory, I have chosen to concentrate in the first place on longitudinal developments. I claim that even if this method could be considered as descriptive, it is the best possible approach. Besides that, where possible, I use the advances of scientific research like for example statistical regression in Chapter 2 on national identity or game-theoretical approach in Chapter 7 on questions of coercion.

However, there are also other methodological critics. Experts in the fields, which I will analyze in the different sections such as national identity (Chapter 2) or decentralization (Chapter 5), may claim that the corresponding chapter is not answered satisfactory and could go deeper. Here, I will have to point to the already

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[28] I use a multivariate regression in Chapter 2 for additional analysis about the "hybrid" identification. However, it is far from being the primary method in this thesis.

[29] Using panel data has many advantages. The first advantage is the opportunity to test causality with longitudinal linear models. This strategy helps to grasp the methodological problems, which, above all, many types of attitudinal studies have. Measurement of independent and dependent variables among the same "i" individuals and the same variables in "t-1" and "t1" permits a better approximation of causality among these variables to be established (Hsiao 1986).

mentioned trade-off between depth of analysis and number of possible explanatory variables and the allowed volume of this study.

Additionally, I expect difficulties with finding the right direction of vertical causation due to endogeneity between the individual and institutional level of analysis. Do the preferences of the citizens influence the political institutions, or do political institutions shape the preferences of the citizens? How does this causation affect the political stability of a multinational state? Even if this question cannot be addressed in this dissertation, we should take a possible influence of it on the final results into account.

1.2.4. Justification of the case study

Methodological discussions about the benefits and relevance of case studies in social science have been theorized by some authors including George and Bennet (2005), Bennet (1999) or Gerring (2004). In these works, the strengths and weaknesses of the case study approach are usually compared to those of the comparative method.

In this dissertation, the decision for the case study is part of the previously mentioned trade-off during the process of conceptualization. Due to the theoretical approach with six explanatory variables, some of which are divided into many other sub-variables, including more than one case would exceed the permitted volume of this dissertation. Additionally, when cases are to be compared, some of their characteristics would have to be straightened to fit the comparison. The choice of the case-study approach does not create this problem and allows for an in-depth analysis. However, I will not completely dismiss comparative parallels; nonetheless, they will be not central.

The research question analyzes the political stability in long-established liberal multinational democracies. For that reason, when looking for possible units of analysis among democratic multinational states, I decided to omit some states, which barely have the characteristics of a long established liberal democracy such as Russia, Malaysia or India. From the remaining countries of UK, Canada, Belgium or Spain, I choose the Spanish "State of Autonomy" for the following reasons.

First, there is obviously a gap in the literature on the Spanish case. Scholars of political theory have addressed questions of a multinational state in Canada (Taylor, Kymlicka) or the UK (Miller, Keating). Even if some critical works have been written on Spain (Requejo, Maíz, Caminal, Colino), the analysis of Spanish "State of Autonomies" within the field of political theory is still at its beginning. At the same

time, the question of political stability in Spain is very relevant at the date of writing. I will be able to include the latest developments, which have not been part of scientific analysis yet. As such, the choice of Spain as a case study could help to fill not only a theoretical but also enrich country studies.

Additionally, we find in Spain not only one, but also two of the so-called national/regional units, in the form of Catalonia and the Basque Country. That allows for more variance than for example in the case of Canada, where we could analyze only the case of Quebec. Additionally, Spain is like the United Kingdom (UK) but unlike Canada, part of the European Union. This allows for an additional analysis regarding if and how the supranational level influences the stability of a multinational state. This question has yet to be sufficiently addressed.

Furthermore, the internal heterogeneity of the Spanish case offers an excellent opportunity for empirical work. Spain has a decentralized territorial organization with 17 regional governments (Autonomous Communities) that are periodically elected in regional elections. Its territorial organization allows for checking the influence of federal principles of shared-rule and self-rule as well as decentralization. We find Autonomous Communities, which have significant political, cultural, and linguistic differences. Some of them share the majoritarian language, while others use different national/regional languages. We find areas with strong alternative nationalisms and parallel nation-building projects and regions where these movements are weak.

In a nutshell, these characteristics make the Spanish case an excellent object of analysis. However, critics could still argue that the particular characteristics of the Spanish "State of Autonomies" could be a problem for drawing generalizations, which is crucial for scientific research. Nevertheless, I claim that the arguments behind the case-selection have shown that this criticism can be rejected easily. The Spanish case is particular, but not unique, and there are some other liberal multinational democracies, which have the same problem of political stability. For that reason, the model developed in this thesis can be tested and compared in other multinational settings than the Spanish "State of Autonomies" in future research.

1.2.5. Outline of the Dissertation - Organization of chapters

This thesis will answer the research question in eight chapters. The first and last one will be dedicated to the introduction of the argument and its conclusions. In this first, introductory chapter I have concentrated on the puzzle from which I have derived my research question. Also, I have offered a conceptual explanation of the variable to be explained: political stability. In a next step, I have presented the explanatory variables I have chosen and have explained my choices. After clarifying the research design, the methods and techniques to be used, I have justified why I have chosen a case study approach. After this point, I will show the possible contribution of this Ph.D. thesis.

The Chapters 2-7 will be dedicated to a theoretical discussion and the empirical analysis of the explanatory variables, where I will focus on national identity (2), citizenship (3), trust (4), different divisions of authority within the state (5), the offered asymmetric solutions (6) and finally the coercive power of the central state in a multi-level system (7).

Most of these six empirical chapters will follow the same structure. First, I will analyze the relevant concepts. Then, a literature review will show if and how scholars evaluated the influence of this particular variable on political stability. As a third step, I will empirically analyze the influence of this variable on the political stability of Spain. In Chapter 2 on national identity, I will outline the discussion on how national identity is conceptualized, first in a one-state/one-nation and then in a multinational state setting. Then I will evaluate how these questions can be interpreted in the Spanish "State of Autonomies", and what influence a "hybrid" identification has on Spain's stability. In Chapter 3 I will analyze aspects of citizenship. First, I will examine "passive" citizenship as membership and then "active" citizenship as participation. Considering the second, I will check the participation in the political process and the involvement in different communities. Somewhere in between lies, the other concept analyzed in this chapter, "constitutional patriotism". Questions of trust will be examined in Chapter 4. Here I will first consider issues of social trust between the different communities. In a next step, I will analyze political trust, which can also be described as confidence in the institutions.

In Chapter 5 I analyze how the different divisions of authority like federalism, shared-rule, and self-rule as well as decentralization influence the stability of the Spanish

state. Closely related to questions of federalism and decentralization are aspects of asymmetrical solutions, which will be analyzed in Chapter 6. When arguments about the division of authority cannot be solved within the existing institutional framework, both units – the central state and the national/regional unit can enter into a political conflict. In that case, the national/regional unit may articulate claims for self-determination, while the central state may answer with coercion. This political conflict will be analyzed in Chapter 7, which is meant to give a better understanding of how conflicts over autonomy are usually solved in a multi-level authority system. As a conceptual tool, I will use a game-theoretical model. By identifying the existing options and establishing the preferences of both actors, it should help to clarify the possibilities of political stability or change in a multinational state. In the last chapter, I will draw the conclusions of this work. I will also reiterate its contribution to state of the art and draw some normative conclusions.

1.2.6. Contribution

The question of contribution is central to every Ph.D. thesis. I claim that there are some points within this work, which could improve state of the art. In general, this thesis will address an open question in the field of political theory. By answering the question of "what holds a multinational state together", I can help to close a gap in the literature. I will also deliver a contemporary analysis of the Spanish "State of Autonomies", which has, until now, been scarcely offered by scholars of political theory. The interest lies in the change of perspective. I focus not on the aspects of what divides a multinational state, but on what "holds it together". Additionally, there are other contributions, which I will shortly address here.[30] First, the question of political stability is hardly analyzed in different kinds of literature; surprisingly there is also no standard definition of what political stability means. To the best of my knowledge, its normative discussion and its empirical application have not been contrasted. I hope to close this gap. In Chapter 2 I will analyze the question of national identity, and point to some new aspects of a "dual" identification, which have not been part of empirical scrutiny yet. I will develop a new concept of "hybrid" identification, which could fit better into the political theory literature when analyzing multinational states.

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[30] A longer evaluation of the contribution of this thesis can be found in the last chapter.

In Chapter 3 I want to analyze if additional aspects of the concept of citizenship should be taken more into account in the future analysis. "Citizenship as membership" as well as "constitutional patriotism" could have greater explanatory potential as an additional measurement of the alignment with the state than expected. Also, political participation might explain stability.

The analysis of social and political trust in Chapter 4 has big potential and could help to clarify many questions around the political stability of the multinational state.

Chapter 5 deals with different divisions of authority. Spain has been put under scrutiny many times but usually asking if it is federal or decentralized. The focus on the distinction between shared-rule, self-rule and explicitly decentralization could bring new and interesting results.

In Chapter 6 I hope to offer a new division of asymmetry, dividing it into four parts: as a) "de facto" asymmetry and "de jure" asymmetry in the form of b) institutional recognition, c) symbolical recognition and d) "ultimate" asymmetry. In the literature, the asymmetrical recognition of minority rights is usually theorized from the point of view of political theory and normative, comparative federalism. The process of asymmetrical dynamics is generally analyzed by quantitative comparative politics or game-theoretical political economy. Both approaches barely talk to each other. By bridging this literature, I hope to give new interesting insights in the chapter on asymmetry and in the following chapter 7 on coercion, where I will analyze authority structures in a multi-level authority system.

The analysis of authority structures of a multinational state in a multi-level authority system has been barely offered in theoretical political research yet. The inclusion of the EU as an additional actor in a two-level political conflict is new. I expect that it could be a strong explanatory variable for the stability of a multinational state.

CHAPTER 2: NATIONAL IDENTITY

2.1. Introduction/Conceptualization

As already mentioned in the introduction, national identity (Kymlicka 1995, Kymlicka 1998) or "nested" national identity (Miller 2000) have been identified as possible explanatory variables for the political (in-) stability of a multinational state. In the following chapter, I will analyze a possible causation between these variables. I take into consideration that a two-side effect cannot be excluded. National identities could be a precondition of stability or its result.

Within the field of political theory, there is a debate about the importance of nationhood. Some scholars claim that nationhood is a necessary condition of the liberal democratic state (Kymlicka 1995, Canovan 1996, Miller 2000), while critics argue that there are other possibilities in the form of a post-national version, which would be better suited to guarantee social cohesion (Tamir 1993, Habermas 1993). While the latter arguments will be addressed in chapter 3 on citizenship, in this section, I will examine the former argumentation and check if particular national identities matter for political stability.

The topic of national identities has triggered an enormous quantity of research and intellectual debate, which has tended to be normative or historical in character. More recent developments show not only a growth of empirical quantitative analysis of national identities but also that normative scholars have adopted a more empirical approach (Miller/Ali 2014).

While answering the research question, this chapter will also address some additional problems and issues, which will be important pillars for the following analysis. First, the importance of national identity and the term "nation" will be deliberated. This chapter will show that the symbolic value of the recognition of "nation" could be crucial for the understanding of stability in a multinational state. Additionally, when analyzing the issue of national identities, the question of a dual identification will be conceptualized. I claim that in most of the contemporary analysis, problems around dual identification are not adequately addressed.

National identity is closely related to concepts like nations, nationality or nationalism. The definition of these concepts has always been challenging. Seton-Watson (1977:3)

has claimed that "many attempts have been made to define nations, and none have been successful." Long before that, already Weber (1978 [1919]) disputed the concepts of nation and nationality, describing them as ambiguous and having no academic foundation.[31] Nevertheless, multiple definitions of concepts surrounding the term nation have been presented since.

Figure 2.1. Nation, Nationality, Nationalism, National Identity And Citizenship

Source: Google Books Ngram Viewer[32]

A quantitative overview (Figure 2.1) of the use of the terms nation, nationality, national identity and citizenship reveals that the term nation has been dominant over the 20th century, reaching two peaks after the two World Wars and at the end of the 1960s. The use of the concept of national identity only emerged quite recently. The graph shows a constant growth since the 1990s; however, it is still not as frequently used as other seemingly more classical concepts like citizenship, nationalism or nationality.[33]

The term "nation" derived from the Latin word "nasci" (to be born) and was used in the Roman Empire as a derogatory term to describe a "community of strangers" (Greenfeld 2001). In the medieval universities, the word "nation" was applied to

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[31] Weber claimed that "the concept of 'nationality' shares with that of the 'people' (Volk) – in the 'ethnic' sense – the vague connotation that whatever is felt to be distinctly common must derive from a common descent. In reality, of course, persons who consider themselves members of the same nationality are often much less related by common descent than are persons belonging to different and hostile nationalities" (Weber 1978:395).

[32] This Google Books Ngram Viewer displays a graph showing how often the phrases have occurred in a corpus of books in the English over the selected years 1900-2008.

[33] Smith (1998) remembers us that Rousseau and Herder talked about a "national genius" or a "national character", and that because of collective awaking of some nations in the 19th century "national consciousness" became the relevant term.

communities of students who were organized according to the places where they were born. These communities were labeled "nations." The question of when "nation" and "people" become equated and when the word "nation" became common property has subsequently received a lot of attention from scholars (Nagel 2009).

2.1.1. Nationalism and national identity

In addition to national identity and nations, nationalism will be another basic analytical concept in this study. Nationalism means different things to different people. Nevertheless, we can find similarities between the various definitions.

Smith (1991:72) finds five usages of nationalism: a) as a process of forming and maintaining nations; b) as a consciousness of belonging to the nation; c) as a language or symbolism of the nation; d) as an ideology (including the cultural doctrine of nations); and e) as a social and political movement to achieve goals of the nation and realize the national will.

Breuilly (1993) reduces this number and distinguishes between three usages; a) as ideas, developed by intellectuals and elites, b) as sentiments – the consciousness that characterizes a culture and c) as actions by an organization or movement, whose goal is to assert the national interests.

Gellner (1983) summarizes nationalism into two clusters - as a sentiment or as a movement: "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind."[34] Gellner's interpretation puts nationalism clearly before the nation: "It is

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[34]Bauböck interprets Gellner's definition more widely: "Contrary to a widespread assumption, nationalism is not always aiming for congruence between national-cultural boundaries and state borders. Nation-building may be confined to substate territories (without ever crossing the threshold to secessionism), and it may extend beyond state borders by attempting to bind together populations in a homeland territory and abroad (without trying to remove the borders between them or to bring external kin populations back into the homeland)" (Bauböck 2010:311).

nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round" (1983 [2006]: 54).[35]

Gellner's interpretation of nationalism is firmly sociological, but at the same time widely quoted by scholars of political theory and nationalism studies. His definition of nationalism will be of crucial importance for this work, which will follow Gellner's interpretation of nationalism as a sentiment and as a movement based on a nationalist principle. We should note that both views have a different impact on its interplay with national identity. If seen as a sentiment, nationalism has a strong congruence with the concept of national identity. However, when seen as a movement, then nationalism understands national identity as a value to be achieved or defended.

2.1.1.2. Nationalism as a movement: Nation-building

In its form as a movement, nationalism aims at starting or strengthening some nation-building project. That nation-building project is usually directed by the state or/and its elites, aiming at the creation of new loyalties in the form of a nation with its national identity. At the same time nation building is based on nation-destroying or in other words, the breaking-up of old feudal or national loyalties (Connor 1994). Furthermore, nation-building may take place against the state.

The term nation-building has been seminally defined by the works of scholars like Deutsch (1957), Bendix (1977), Tilly (1975) or Rokkan (1999[1967]. In Rokkan's (1999 [1967]) concept of system building, the author distinguishes between four processes in the political foundation and consolidation of nation-states in Western Europe. First, a political center penetrates a territory (state-building). Second, this territory is culturally standardized (nation-building). In a third step, citizens' rights to political participation are extended (democratization) and as a fourth step, the economic resources are politically distributed (creation of a welfare state). However, not every system building process has followed this chronology. For that reason we should keep in mind that the term nation-building could be potentially misleading because this term is widely used in political science to mean, in effect, "state building", i.e. putting in place the necessary institutions of a modern sovereign state.

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[35] A similar argument is made by Hechter (2000), however defining nationalism as a collective action: "nationalism is better defined as collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit" (Hechter 2000:7).

That said, in this analysis, we will use nation-building following Rokkan as a cultural standardization of the population on a particular state territory.

2.1.1.2. Nationalism as a sentiment: National identity

Focusing on the second meaning of nationalism as a sentiment, it can be seen as very close to the concept of national identity. Before starting with the conceptualization of "national" in national identity, we will first scrutinize the concept of identity. The term "identity" is very close to the term "identification", and both will have the same meaning in this analysis.[36]

Analyzing the academic discussions regarding identity, Brubaker, and Cooper (2000) claim that the present concept of identity is hopelessly vague and in a state of definitional anarchy. They argue that it has obscured more than it has revealed.

A good starting point to clarify the concept of identity for this analysis would be the emphasis on the difference between individual and collective identity. While individual self-identity puts emphasis on its unique characteristics, a collective identity looks for common attributes among group members. Collective identities connect with the idea that a group of people acknowledges the essential resemblance that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Therborn 1995).

Following this interpretation, national identity could be seen as a collective identity, which is based on three pillars. The first pillar is the *self-awareness* of the community to consider itself as a nation with some associated attributes, which would simplify the capacity for self-recognition. The self-awareness can be constructed through aspects of a common origin (Smith 1986), and sometimes even through a common national goal like a "special mission" (Horowitz 1985).

Closely connected to this *self-awareness* of the community is the second pillar, which emphasizes the emotional psychology of *perceived kinship ties* – the nation as the fully extended family over space and time (Connor 1994). A psychological basis is also the origin for Benedict Anderson's argumentation in "Imagined Communities" (1983), where he defines a nation as "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson 2006 [1983]: 6). The

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[36] However, we should keep in mind that identity can be seen as a thing, while identification is closer to be a perception.

members of a nation are not able to meet each other in person, and therefore their social cohesion has to be imagined. Two political theorists have used a similar argument. David Miller claims that: "National communities are constituted by belief: a nationality exists when its members believe that it does (Miller 1993: 6). Hugh Setson-Watson argues, "a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one" (Seton-Watson 1977:5).

The third pillar of the collective national identity is its *demarcation* against an "Other", in brief: the ability to detect, recognize and acknowledge who are the other national identities. Barth (1969:167) emphasized this line of thinking, by claiming that it is the "ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses". Bhabha (1990) uses a similar argument, by directing attention to the outsider and stranger in defining group identity.[37]

2.1.3. National identity: old or invented?

An important question when conceptualizing national identity is the continuity of a national identity through time. When for example does a national, regional or ethnic identity start to be a national identity? This question may be crucial for the current analysis, because in a multinational state a "statewide" or majority nation may claim to be the only one and that peripheral identities are only regional versions of it. This part of the analysis is strongly related to the first two pillars (*self-awareness* and *perceived kinship ties)* on which the national identity is built. When claiming "national" existence, the continuation of a community for centuries is a strong argument.

However, the scholarship is divided on the point of whether national identities are a feature of modernity or whether they are an older phenomenon based on a change of ethnic communities, which through *self-awareness* have become a nation.

When analyzing the aspect of "novelty", nations and national identity are frequently used as the same unit of analysis. Above all, nationalism studies have given interesting insights whether nations and national identities were created (or not) and

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[37] This argumentation can also be found the literature of social psychology. "Social Identity Theory" (SIT) claims that the central causal process in behavior comes from in-group and out-group differentiation, not the roles or identity traits per se that are attributed to In-groups and Out-groups.

on the role, nationalism played in this process. Scholars distinguish between at least three approaches: an "ethnic-symbolic" approach, a "modernist" or "constructivist" approach and a "*perennialist*" approach.[38]

The outstanding scholar of the "ethnic-symbolic" approach has been Anthony D. Smith (1986). Smith claims that "modern political nationalisms cannot be understood without reference to earlier ethnic ties and memories, and, in some cases, to pre-modern ethnic identities and communities" (Smith 1996: 358).[39] Smith denies that we can separate the new elements of a "pure invention" from a "rediscovery" of "pre-existing elements" (1991: 357).[40] According to Smith, ethnic origins of nations explain why nationalist movements succeeded in mobilizing people for their nation-building project. Nationalist elites created with this pre-modern "ethnic nucleus", a feeling of togetherness, which gave and gives the nations some stability.

However, alternative "modernist" or "constructivist" interpretations define nations not as a unit rooted in some "ethnic" past, but in the Weberian sense as modern phenomena. In their definitions, Gellner (1983) and Anderson (2006 [1983]) significantly reduce the impact of "pre-existing elements" and concentrate exclusively on "modern" factors. Gellner, analyzing nationalism in the 19th century, saw nationalism as a necessary condition to accomplish the change from an agricultural to a modern society.

Even if being a "modern" nation in the 19th century may be sufficient to claim national continuity nowadays, no nationalist movement rejects a longer period of continuity. Spain, Catalonia and Basque Country all claim national existence from the Middle Ages. However, due to data availability, I will primarily analyze how far Basques and Catalans have auto-identified as a nation before and after the transition to democracy in 1978 (see 2.3).

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[38] The "perennialist" approach had the weakest influence and had been mainly treated as an easy concept to argue against. As an example of the "*perennialist*" approach, we could introduce the work of Hasting (1997), who claims that ethnicity, nationalism, and nation-states pre-date the modern period, and go back to the 11th century.

[39] Smith traces national consciousness back to the 14th century to the wars of the Scottish, English and French and the traditional nationalism, even if rather in its religious version, in the Puritan Netherlands and England. Smith (1992: 60) defines a nation as: "a named human population sharing a historical territory, common memories and myths of origin, a mass, standardized public culture, a common economy and territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties for all members of the collectivity."

[40] Before Smith, Levi-Strauss (1966) developed the term *bricolage*. To "construct", the "constructor" always has to use the available material, and for that reason, construction can never be pure invention.

2.1.4. National identity in a multinational state

The application of the concept of national identity is partly different when used within the multinational context. One problem that we find in a multinational state is that national minority groups have to be defined against other groups within the same state, which does not consider the minorities as different nations. When aiming at distinguishing or dividing groups, ethnic or civic arguments may be preferred.[41] Besides that, when analyzing the development of different national groups or questions of dual identification in multinational states the classical works of nationalism studies like e.g. Gellner (1983), usually don't give answers for contemporary problems.[42]

A modern approach, which could help us with these shortcomings, is the concept of "banal nationalism", where Billig (1995) claims that today nationalism expresses itself as an unemotional everyday presence of the state and its national symbols. Following Billig, there is a permanent, quite invisible state nationalism, which could also be interpreted as a permanent statewide nation-building.[43]

The question of coexisting nation-building projects has been analyzed wider in political theory, which concentrates on the majority and minority distinction connecting it to the issues of justice. In a multinational setting, we find two different nation-building projects: a majoritarian and a minoritarian one. The majoritarian nation-building process happens almost automatically and could be compared with the practices described by Billig in a mononational state. The liberal state claims that

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[41] A national identity has often been analyzed through the ethnic-civic dichotomy, which formally was used to distinguish between different nationalist movements in the 19th century. That distinction goes back to Kohn (1967 [1944]) and Meinecke (1970 [1907]) who advanced the opposing concepts "Staatsnation" (nation of the state) to "Kulturnation" (nation of the culture). Kohn developed the dichotomy by classifying each type of nationalism in a particular geographical area (civic nationalism in the Western countries and ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe and Asia). Following Kohn's historical explanations, civic nationalism emerged in Western states, because the nation emerged parallel (or later) to the development of the state structures, while the Eastern nationalism emerged inside the great empires and pursued the adoption of the political borders to the ethnic divisions.

[42] Following Gellner (1983), if groups, which become disadvantaged during the process of industrialization, were not culturally homogenous with the ruling group, then they maybe will opt for an exit. With that, nationalism as a movement can ask for separation from the majoritarian state. Arguably, Gellner's theory of nationalism cannot explain contemporary nationalisms in long-time industrialized countries like Spain. Likewise, nationalism arising out of "post-materialist values" in "post-industrial" societies (Inglehart 1997) is clearly different from nationalism resulting from industrialization. I will address most of these questions in the empirical analysis.

[43] Billig argues, "nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition" (Billig 1995:6). However, in other parts of his work Billig argues that nationalism can become virulent quickly.

it reacts to different kinds of ethnic and national differences with a sort of a "benign neglect'" and for that reason stays neutral (Glazer/Moynihan 1975: 25). That practice and its justification have been criticized by scholars like Kymlicka (1995). Following Kymlicka, there is no way to have a complete "separation of state and ethnicity", and the idea of "benign neglect" of a liberal state is a myth: "The state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others" (Kymlicka 1995:106).[44] Additionally, the state has at its disposition not only institutions but also some degree of coercion and time.

Kymlicka (1995) claims, that the culturally different units have the right to ask for some forms of autonomy or self-government to guarantee their survival as a distinct society with own cultural traits. With that, the exact degree of autonomy is a permanent challenge for the central state. It cannot be "too little" and also "too much" autonomy bears its risks, because the political elites of the different units can use it for their nation-building project.

When we analyze these parallel nation-building projects, we can see that they are not symmetric. Both nation-building projects coincide only on the territory of the culturally different unit. The main argument of the majority is to emphasize the common factors between both groups and downplay the differences. The project of the minority aims at the opposite as it puts importance on the dissimilarities between both (Bauböck 2002). A consequence of these parallel nation-building projects is that persons in this territory can develop or strengthen some exclusive or a dual identification.[45] The strength of these different identification patterns can be seen as an important explanatory variable for the stability of a multinational state.

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[44] "The idea of responding to cultural differences with 'benign neglect' makes no sense. Government decisions on languages, internal boundaries, public holidays, and state symbols unavoidably involve recognizing, accommodating, and supporting the needs and identities of particular ethnic and national groups." (Kymlicka 1995:106).
[45] However, we should keep in mind, that there are many different cleavages within a multinational state and the nationalist one is only one of them. Besides that, we cannot be sure, that the elites of the national/regional units pursue parallel nation-building projects.

2.2. Empirical analysis of national identities in Spain

2.2.1. Measurement - The Linz-Moreno question[46]

The analysis of national identities in political theory or nationalism studies has been only hesitantly contrasted with empirical evidence. One of the reasons could be that scholars of nationalism like Anthony D. Smith have pointed to the fact, that "attitude questionnaires" are not useful in the areas of cultural values and meanings (Smith 1992: 57).[47] However, this did not stop the empirical strand of other academic fields to conduct this research. These scholars usually regard national identity as a stable political factor that does not quickly change, at least in the short term.[48]

Many academic works use different methods to measure national identity; however, only a few studies compare and test which method is the most effective. Given the availability of data, this lack of research is at least surprising. The few academic works on that topic claim that self-identification surveys like the Linz-Moreno question are the best possible approach. Among these scholars, we find Mendelsohn (2002), who analyzing the Canadian case, warns against using the terms "identity", "attachment", "sense of belonging" or "sense of nationhood" interchangeably in national surveys. He shows that national self-identification explains changes in identity formation better than questions of "attachment", "warmth" or a thermometer towards geographical units.

Also Sinnott (2006), who in a study of national and European identity distinguishes between three types of measures of identity, claims that identification ratings based on an anchored ranking scale in type of the Linz-Moreno question are superior to proximity rankings like "feel close to" or "feel attached to" but also to identification rankings with a partial ranking without a scale. As an optimal solution, he considers a categorical identification question "Do you think of yourself as…" followed by an answer on a ranking scale. Additionally, he discusses an additional measurement of

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[46] The term, which is usually used, is the "Moreno question". However, Luis Moreno himself, claims that initially Juan Linz designing the question, for that reason I will call it in this analysis the Linz-Moreno question.

[47] It is not only difficult to measure the intensity of identity or identification. Additionally, we find the problem that questions of identification depend not only on self-identification but also on identification by others.

[48] Eckstein (1988) claims that visible effects of important cultural changes can be seen in at least two decades ("a generation") since the introduction of the self-government institutions.

the strength of self-identification on a nationalist scale (for example of Spanish or Catalan nationalism) as useful.

However, there are also some critics. Authors like Guinjoan/Rodon (2015) show important shortcomings of this approach e.g. in questions like Spanish identity, intensity, and preferences, which over-represent the dual identity. Similar to Sinnott (2006), they strongly recommend adding a measure of nationalist self-identification to the Linz-Moreno question within the analysis of national identities. However, the lack of such longitudinal data in the Spanish case frustrates such an approach.[49]

Also for that reason, in the analysis of national identities in the Spanish "State of Autonomies", there seems to be no alternative to the use of the "Linz-Moreno question" (Medrano and Gutierrez 2001, Lago and Montero 2009, Serrano 2013, Muñoz and Tormos 2015, Hierro 2015). Without a doubt, the biggest reason is the data availability. Most of the Spanish research institutes use that question. Therefore, I will follow the already established paths and use survey data of CIS (Center of Sociological Investigations/ *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*) between the years 1979-2015. In some specific cases, I will use as an alternative the survey data of CEO (Catalan Research Institute/ *Estudis* d' Opinió de la Generalitat de Catalunya).[50]

The Linz-Moreno question distinguishes between five answers about national self-identification: "I feel only national", "I feel more national than AC/gentilic "I feel as national as AC/gentilic", "I feel more AC/gentilic as national", and "I feel only AC/gentilic.[51] Two of the options in this question are exclusive: "I feel only national" and "I feel only AC/gentilic". What undoubtedly best approaches an overlapping dual identity is the "as national as AC/gentilic" answer. More complicated is the classification of the second and fourth solution. Within both categories that express some duality, we could look for aspects of solidarity or of ultimate national loyalty.

When searching for aspects of solidarity, usually applied in order to support federalist or centralist claims, we usually find the following division: *Exclusive identity* ("Only national" and "AC/gentilic" and *Dual Identity* ("More AC/gentilic than national", "As much AC/gentilic as national", and "More national than AC/gentilic"). But when we

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[49] At the same time, it remembers us that we should be cautious when interpreting that kind of data.

[50] There is a permanent discussion around the question, which institute produces better results. Usually, the CIS is criticized by the national/regional units while the CEO by the central state as being too "optimistic" towards their institutions. I will not enter this discussion here, also because the differences between both are usually not too large when considering most of these questions.

[51] There was some change in the answers for this survey. In some series, the offered question and answer differ - in some surveys "more Spanish than gentilic", while in others "more Spanish than AC".

want to measure "ultimate" national loyalty – an argument often used by the autonomist/separatists forces, we usually find the following division: *National identity* ("Only national" and "More national than AC/gentilic"), *national/regional identity* ("Only AC/gentilic" and "More AC/gentilic than national") and *dual identity* ("As AC/gentilic as national"). I will address this problem more broadly when analyzing the question of loyalty of overlapping dual identities.

2.2.2. Interdisciplinary problems: Political Theory and Data

Before proceeding, it is important to address potential problems when mixing political theory research with data on national identity/national identification in Spain. The most important of them is that political theory uses concepts that are not based on empirical evidence. They are built on a more abstract level. That leads to confusion when contrasting these concepts with empirical data. As an example, I will use the classical works of Will Kymlicka (1995) and David Miller (2000).

In his seminal work "Multinational Citizenship" Kymlicka (1995) distinguishes between a majority and a minority culture (or several). He also develops the contrast between a majority nation and a minority nation (or several) in a multinational state. He refuses the idea of a dual identification. In later work, Kymlicka (1998) distinguishes between the central state on the one side and the Regional-Based Units (RBUs) and the Nationality-Based Units (NBUs) on the other. While the RBUs are the administrative divisions of the majority nation, the NBUs have their national character. Considering the term "national" Kymlicka positions himself clearly, claiming that the regions with a nationalist movement, have a national character.

David Miller instead prefers to leave this question open: "[…] I have deliberately side-stepped a terminological question that usually carries with it major political ramifications: shall we call the larger community a nation and the subgroups something else - national minorities, for instance - or shall we say that Catalonia, Wallonia and Scotland are nations, in which case what term shall we use to describe Spain, Belgium and Britain? The label matters because of the power of the idea of national self-determination. Once it is conceded that a territorial community genuinely constitutes a nation, we seem already to have shown that there is good

reason for the community in question to be granted political autonomy" (Miller 2000: 130).[52]

These conceptual problems are left open in the most positivist analysis. Works coming from that last tradition - while usually analyzing fiscal decentralization - tend to ignore the theoretical debate around the symbolic importance of the terms "nation" and "national" and often use the term "sub-national units" or "sub-national identification". Even if the principal goal of this analysis is not to solve this complex dispute within the literature of political science, in search of neutrality, I suggest using the term national/regional unit and national/regional identification. By using the words national and regional in one concept, it allows including all groups of residents. Putting the national before the regional emphasizes a strong local identification of many of the inhabitants of this unit, which is national. At the same time, it makes the term "sub-national identification" obsolete, which travels fine in purely regional units, but is clearly biased in units, with a possible double national identification.

An additional problem appears, when we have to define, which terminology to use for the dual identifications. One of the most dominant concepts in the literature of political theory is the term "nested identities". Miller (2000), among others, talks about "split" identities and "nested" nationalities.[53] Following this approach, the national identity is positioned over or "nested" above the national/regional identity. Even if this approach might work quite well in Great Britain with its overlapping British identity, it could be misleading in other contexts like for example in Canada or Spain. For example, in Spain, we don't find something like a Spanish identity, which includes a Castilian and a Catalan identity. For that reason, in the following analysis, I will also test which of the answers, "More Spanish than Catalan" or "Spanish as Catalan" can be considered as nested in the Spanish case. I will come back to this and other questions in part 2.2.5.

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[52] Miller touches on a critical point, but I would even go a step further and connect this problem to self-determination demands. If only Spain is considered a nation, then only Spain can be the relevant demos for national self-determination. However, if Catalonia is to be considered a nation, then Catalonia would be the relevant demos.

[53] "We find nested nationalities when two or more territorially based communities exist within the framework of a single nation so that members of each community typically have a split identity. They think of themselves as belonging both to the smaller community and to the larger one, and they do not experience this as schizophrenic because their two identities fit together reasonably well" (Miller 2000:129).

2.2.3. Measuring national identities in Spain – Literature review

Even before the transition to a "State of Autonomies" Juan Linz wrote, "Spain is a state for all Spanish citizens, a nation-state for a large part of the population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities" (Linz 1975: 423). Moreover, he added that there is a small minority that rejects this state and seeks independence.

The development of national identities in Spain has been a topic of many studies since. Many of these studies in the early years of the Spanish "State of Autonomies" have analyzed only very short periods of time and their results can be seen as preliminary only.

For example, López-Aranguren (1983) assessed the strengthening of a "regional conscience". Analyzing the identity dynamics in the 1980s, López-Aranguren/Ferrando (1991) found a remarkable growth of the nationalist/autonomist sentiments in Basque Country and Catalonia, while Moreno (1998a) emphasized the existence of dual identities. Afterwards Moreno (2001) analyzed data on self-identification in the Autonomous Communities (AC's) (1990-1995), and labeled the Basque Country as an "exclusivist" AC with a higher level of single national/regional identity and Catalonia as a "balanced" one – where both national/regional and statewide identities were at the same level.[54] Linz/Stepan (1992) stated that the presence of dual identities facilitated state building and the consolidation of the transition to democracy in the 1970s. For Martínez-Herrera (2002: 441) "identification with autonomous communities has risen, albeit moderately, through time, with a move from principally Spanish to equally Spanish/regional or mainly regional identity." Martínez – Herrera/Miley (2010:21) discover that "by the mid-2000s, in comparison with the late 1970s, the proportion of citizens refusing to identify themselves with Spain has dramatically dropped in the Basque Country and, after a temporary decrease, has remained the same in Catalonia." Looking for aspects of solidarity in dual identities, Stepan/Linz/Yadav (2011:31) identify that "exclusive and competing identities turn out to be the exception, not the rule."

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[54] Moreno (2001) identifies as a result of "dual identities" also the tendency to tactical voting in the form of a switch between the two big parties CiU (*Convergència i Unió*) and PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de *Catalunya)* depending on AC or national elections.

2.2.4. Development of national identification in Spain

As the following step, I would like to reexamine some of the result mentioned in the literature review and at the same time extend it for the longest period possible. In the early surveys of the years 1980 and 1989, there have been only three answers to the question on national self-identification. To make the data as longitudinal as possible, I have to hold on to this format.

The "dual" identity will be captured by the "as Spanish as AC/gentilic" answer. However, we should keep in mind that aspects of "dualism" can also be found in the other categories where exclusive identification is summarized e.g. with "more Spanish than AC/gentilic" and "more AC/gentilic than Spanish" as well as the "Don't know/No Answer" category. Even if during the analyzed period there has been a small change in the question asked in the survey [55], we can draw important conclusions from this graph.

Figure 2.2. Development of national identity in Spain 1980-2013 (whole territory)

Source: CIS

The self-identification of Spaniards in the period 1980 – 2013 indicates that a degree of "dual" identification was expressed by around 38% of Spaniards in 1980. Since then it has grown and stabilized in a margin between 50% and 60%.[56] We might

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[55] In some series the offered answers differ – to choose one example, sometimes it is "more Spanish than gentilic", while in others "more Spanish than AC".

[56] Like still to be analyzed, other data shows that there are some differences between "nationalities" and regions, e.g. Navarre, Canary Islands, Asturias, and Galicia more people claim a dual identity. See table 2.3.

expect "dual" identification to be stronger when measured with a different categorization, e.g. when also adding answers like "more Spanish than AC/gentilic", and "more AC/gentilic than Spanish" to the equation.

The "primary Spanish" identification (Only Spanish or more Spanish than AC/gentilic) shows the strongest decline. It decreased between the years 1980 and 1998 by 10 % and stabilized then between the years 1998 – 2013 at around 20 - 25%. In the CIS surveys the "Don't Know/No answer" answers are surprisingly low. It seems as though many Spaniards have a clear view about their national self-identification.[57]

I claim that the analyzed identification patterns do not show mainly a reduced identification as primary Spanish national, but rather a strengthening of regional identification, which could have to do with the acceptance of a more decentralized form of state organization. In this case, regional identification could be seen as complementary and not opposite to national identification.

However, I expect that in some Autonomous Communities (AC), which could be considered as national/regional units, regional identification can be complementary and conflicting at the same time. To identify where these conflicting identification patterns are met, I will consult another survey question, which asks about the self-identification of the citizens of a given AC as a member of a different nation (Figure 2.3). After applying historical differences (aspects of self-government) or linguistic differences (different language) as a filter category, I will analyze the following cases: Catalonia, Galicia, Basque Country, Canary Islands, Balearic Islands and Andalusia.[58]

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[57] The only exception has been the Basque Country. A possible explanation could be that ETA *(Euskadi Ta Askatasuna)* terrorism and a climate of confrontation have elevated this category.
[58] Unfortunately, the data is available between 1992-2005 only.

Figure 2.3. Identification as "Nation" in Autonomous Communities (AC)

Source: CIS

In this graph, we can detect that in Catalonia, and the Basque Country between 35% and 45% of persons identify their AC as a different nation. In Galicia, which represents the third region with a nationalist movement, around 15% of its citizens considers Galicia as a nation.[59] In contrast, an overwhelming majority between 70-80% perceives Galicia as a region. The analysis of this longitudinal data shows that if looking for conflicting regional identification, we could disregard Galicia and concentrate on the cases of Catalonia and the Basque Country, even if with strong precautions. In both Autonomous Communities, a floating half of the population sees its AC's as a nation, while the rest interprets it as a region.[60] There is also some dynamic in this development between 1992-2005, which shows if these units become more national or regional for their residents.

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[59] While the percentage of Galician's who define Galicia as a nation is rather low, territorial identification is high and has relevant differential aspects (vernacular language, folklore, etc.) - see e.g. Máiz & Losada (2000).
[60] The option "nation" is unconstitutional, but there is an option "nationality", which is constitutional but not asked in these surveys.

Figure 2.4. Identification of Catalonia as a "Nation" or a "Region"

Source: CIS

In Catalonia, we can identify a growth of the "nation" option. In 1992 over 58% of the Catalans recognized Catalonia as a region and this answer remained the majority option between 1992 and 2002.[61] That said, beginning in 2002 we can identify changes. The identification of Catalonia as a nation started growing while the support for the region option has been declining. In 2005 more respondents considered Catalonia as a nation than as a region.

Figure 2.5. Identification of Basque respondents as a "Nation" or a "Region"

Source: CIS

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[61] However, we cannot entirely exclude that some Catalans saw themselves as a nation, but Catalonia as a region, or that some consider Catalonia as part of the "Nation" of the Catalan countries.

In the Basque Country during the period 1992 – 2005 the "region" answer is usually being the majority option; this option varies in these years between 38.4% and 50%. The percentage of Basques viewing their Autonomous Community as a "nation" has persisted at an average of between 36% and 39%.[62] In general, the answers of the citizens of the Basque Country can be considered as quite stable.

2.2.5. Definition of national identification in a national/regional unit

After choosing Catalonia and the Basque Country as the units of analysis, I would like to come back to the question, how to address the problem of competing/conflicting or complementary regional identification. We may assume that if asked the Linz/Moreno question some respondents in these AC consider their regional identification as national/regional, while others as regional only. We may find problems within the answers of the Linz/Moreno question, also inside the overlapping "dual" identification. In the literature, on national identities, scholars use many alternative terms for describing the phenomenon of a "dual" identification. Besides dual, we also find concepts like double, overlapping, mixed, multiple or shared identities. I have already mentioned the concept of a "nested" identity before.

Dual identities in regional Autonomous Communities, which Kymlicka defines as regional-based units (RBUs) are easy to define and grasp. If someone refers to the AC/gentilic answer, he usually refers to a region.[63] However, there appears a problem in national/regional units like Catalonia and Basque Country, where dual identification can be not complementary but competing/conflicting. Above all, within the qualitative analysis, some scholars from the national/regional units tend to claim that the AC/gentilic identification is a national one, while authors inclined more towards the central state interpretation claim it to be regional. If the academics do not agree, also the respondents of the surveys can have different visions.

Until the researchers specify that distinction in the survey questions, we cannot be sure if e.g. the Catalan and Spanish identities are competing/conflicting or complementary. If we don't control for this difficulty by using other survey questions,

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[62] There may be groups that see the Basque Country as a region inside Euskalherria, including Navarra and the French Basque Country, even if this group could be of quite limited importance.

[63] Even if this analysis shows, that also in some regional AC there are a few respondents, which claim to be part of an Andalusian or Balearic nation (see Figure 2.2).

like the type or strength of identification, the results can get fuzzy.[64] For that reason, I would like to propose to use term "hybrid"[65], when defining "dual" identification in the national/regional units. Following my definition, the term "hybrid", would include a possible competing/conflicting, but also complementary identification. I would like to use it as an alternative to the term dual, which usually describes a complementary regional identification.

2.2.6. National identification in Catalonia and Basque Country

Having clarified that conceptual question, I will now come back to the empirical analysis. First, I will analyze the development of the national identities in Catalonia and the Basque Country. I will ask the following questions: Do we find variation in the longitudinal descriptive statistics? Can this variation be interpreted as a factor, which strengthens or weakens the political stability of a multinational state? I will examine if citizens with "hybrid" identification could be seen as a stabilizing or a destabilizing factor within Catalonia and the Spanish "State of Autonomies". Additionally, I will analyze the main characteristics of persons with this "hybrid" identification to categorize better this group.

During the Franco rule, there was barely any empirical analysis or data collecting on national identification. Even in the first years of the democratic rule, the availability of data was still scarce.[66] Among the few exceptions we find Díez-Medrano (1995), who reproduced survey data elaborated by Juan Linz and his collaborators in 1969 showing that at that period, Catalan respondents were more nationalist than the Basque respondents.[67]

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[64] An additional problem concerns not the self-identification, but the identification of others. For example, even if a respondent in a national/regional unit relates to a national identification, a member of the regional unit could read it as a regional identification in the first place.

[65] "Hybrid" is a term coming from biology. A hybrid plant or animal is the result of mixing different breeds, varieties or species.

[66] The data from the surveys during the first years of transition have to be used with caution and only scarcely as empirical evidence. First, the categories used did not correspond to the categories, which were used after the establishment of the Spanish "State of Autonomies". The results show high variation, not only because of the beginnings of a new democratic state. For example in the Basque Country the terrorist organization ETA blackmailed people that they could make their voting behavior public. Also for that reason, we find that Basque respondents give more often no answer or answer with "I don't know". Linz (1986) connected this attitude to a "spiral of silence", which is caused by the fear of nationalist repression.

[67] Díez-Medrano (1995) argues that this fact could be explained by the larger involvement of the Basque elites with the Franco regime. Being more strongly connected with the center; the Basque elites

The lack of data shows that most of the question raised in the theoretical part of this chapter, as the question of the continuity of nations or if national identities are old or invented (2.1.3) are impossible to answer with data. We do not know how reliable the data was after the end of an authoritarian regime and how the national identities have developed since then.

Additionally, we should keep in mind, that the Spanish "State of Autonomies" has been founded after a period of large inner Spanish migration. The massive industrialization of Spain between the years 1960-1975 triggered migrations from the poorer to the wealthier regions. Between 1941-1980 as many as 1.655.149 migrants moved to Catalonia (Miguélez/Solé 1987). In 1975, 38.3% of Catalan residents had been born outside of Catalonia. Other data from the year of Franco's death in 1975 show that 25 % of the Catalan residents considered themselves as members of a different region, other than Catalonia (Ferrando 1982). Not surprisingly, these identification patterns have changed over the years.

Figure 2.6. Development of national identities in Catalonia (1979-2015)

Source: For 1979, Díez-Medrano (1995): 175, Rest: CIS

In 1979, 38% of Catalan residents expressed a primary Spanish identification (Spanish only and more Spanish than Catalan), 33% of Catalan residents identified themselves as equally Spanish and Catalan, and 25% expressed a primary Catalan identification (Catalan only or more Catalan than Spanish).

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did not use Basque nationalism as an instrument of political mobilization. When the terrorist organization ETA challenged the Spanish state in the 70s, these identification patterns underwent a reversal. Rapidly, the Basque identification with their region became stronger and overtook the Catalan classification.

In the following years, the primary Spanish identification fell from 38% in 1979 to 15% in 1985. This development lost strength in the second period from 1987 on, where the primary Spanish identification continued to decline, but at a much slower pace. Nevertheless, in 2010 only 10,8 % of the Catalan respondents expressed their primary Spanish identification.

Parallel to this development we can observe a strengthening of the "hybrid" identification. This identification grew strongly, up to 50% in the first years after the establishment of the AC and its government, the Generalitat. After 1987 we can confirm the stabilization of the "hybrid" identities in the long term. Even if these identities lost some strength at the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s, they regained their dominant position from the 90s up to 2010.

In the opposite direction, the primary Catalan identification grew at the end of the 80s, and at the beginning of the 90s and remained stable at around 40 % up to 2010. From this longitudinal descriptive data, we can derive three preliminary results. First, the primary Spanish identification is shrinking. Second, we might expect that the "hybrid" identities seem to develop at the cost of the primary Spanish identification group. Third, the important division in Catalonia does not exist between the primary Spanish and primary Catalan identification groups, but between primary Catalan identification and the group of persons with a "hybrid" identity.

Figure 2.7. Development of national identities in Basque Country (1979-2012)

Source: For 1979, Díez-Medrano (1995): 175, Rest: CIS

The development of national identities in the Basque Country reveals two results. First, similar to Catalonia we can observe a decline in the prior Spanish identification (Only Spanish and more Spanish than Basque). It started with 28.3% in 1979, declined up to 21.1% in 1988 and sank again to 7.3% in 2012. Second, the category "hybrid" identities has grown stronger, from 23.9% in 1979 and 27.3% in 1991 up to 38.6% in 2012. However, since the establishment of the "State of Autonomies" the dominant identification has been the Basque one (only Basque + more Basque than Spanish). On average this identification lists around 50% with deviations between 43.5% and 55.7% between 1996 and 2012.

After the analysis of this longitudinal descriptive data I can conclude that apparently the parallel nation-building projects, but also surely some migration flows, have changed the national identification in the Spanish "State of Autonomies". Nevertheless, from a methodological point of view, it is difficult and maybe even impossible, to identify the exact factors, which are responsible for these changes.

In general, in both national/regional units, we find two main groups: one with a primary Catalan or Basque identification and the second one with a "hybrid" identification. In both, we find growth in identification with the national/regional unit, which could be interpreted as an aspect of instability. However, the longitudinal descriptive data also reveals that the weakening of the prior Spanish identification has usually been caught up by the growth of the "hybrid" identity. Nonetheless, we have to analyze first, if it could be seen as a stabilizing factor.[68]

2.2.7 Loyalty of the "hybrid" identity group

Even if we can confirm the strengthening of "hybrid" identities, we still cannot be sure if this identity constellation helps to stabilize the multinational state. An interesting moment to test that relation could be to analyze the voting intention in a possible referendum on self-determination. We might expect that citizens with "hybrid" identification have difficulties when both nation-building projects ask for their loyalty.

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[68] Additionally, it is not clear whether the growth of "hybrid" identities is a success for the Catalan/Basque nation-building because apparently, it includes the "inner-Spanish immigrants", or of the Spanish nation-building, because it prevents immigrants and their offspring from self-defining as primarily Catalans.

In academic research, questions of loyalty are usually analyzed in a mono-national setting. At the beginning of the 21st century, most of the Western liberal democracies do not require much loyalty from their citizens. Citizens are expected to express their loyalty with normal civil obedience practices like obeying laws, paying taxes or participating in the obligatory education.

There are without doubt parallel loyalties, which can be related to religion, class, gender or even age group. These loyalties can sometimes stand in conflict to each other and even to a national loyalty. However in a "one-nation/one-state" setting the national loyalty is usually not challenged by another national loyalty.[69]

Questions of loyalty are different in multinational states. For example, in a possible referendum on self-determination citizens with a "hybrid" identification have to choose one frame of reference and declare their loyalty either to the national or national/regional unit.

But how can loyalty be defined? Guibernau (2013) established a distinction between three kinds of loyalties. First, "loyalty by choice" as the outcome of a free personal decision that impacts upon the individual's self-identity. Second, an "instrumental loyalty", which could also be called "short-term" loyalty. It consists of a temporary commitment to a specific cause, generally regarded as an investment or as a strategy for self-profit. The third type would be "authoritarian loyalty", a type of loyalty emerging from coercion.

In this analysis I will understand loyalty as "loyalty by choice", that is to say, the outcome of a free personal decision. However, we cannot reject the possibility this loyalty to be also "short-term", because we definitely cannot disregard instrumental preferences like, for example, preferences for economic profits influencing such types of referendum. In the Catalan case Muñoz and Tormos (2015) show that besides identity and partisanship, economic considerations play an important role for the recent change in the support for independence. Those economic reasons are above all important for citizens with ambivalent identity positions. At the same time, the expression of loyalty during a referendum seems to be "ultimate", because if successful, it cannot be taken back. For that reason, I would like to define it as the

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[69] There are some exceptions, which come to mind. First, there are also questions of double loyalty e.g. immigrants and their offspring. Second, one would be treason during a military conflict. In this case betraying of the state, which is equal to the nation, can be seen as one of the biggest crimes. Third, there are also different degrees of loyalty to political entities like between Europe and the member state or in federations.

"ultimate loyalty".

Questions of loyalty lead to polarization because national groups worry about the group's future. If a national group notices that its group could break up due to a national disloyalty, they are likely to react decisively against such behavior. The majority may consider the minority group as an internal enemy, one who threatens the unity of the state and the nation.

Furthermore, the national/regional side does mobilize in that conflict. Mendelsohn (2002) shows that in the Canadian case the polarization after the failure of the Meech Lake Constitutional Accord led to a higher identification with the national/regional Quebecois unit, but has declined after the end of that polarized moment.

The polarization of both groups makes the question of "ultimate" loyalty even more complicated. Considering the research question of this work we have to ask, which "ultimate" loyalty might we expect? Bearing in mind that we know so little about the characteristics of the "hybrid" group and its "ultimate" loyalty, let us first take a closer look at what usually happens in the case of conflict and when this conflict calms down. In the chosen Autonomous Communities Basque Country and Catalonia, we identify two periods of conflict. In the Basque Country, we detect one between 2003 and 2008, with the introduction of the "Ibarratxe Plan". During this time a referendum was planned, but in the end not carried out. The Catalan period of conflict started with the Catalan mobilization between the years 2010-2012, which (until now) has culminated in establishing a regional election in 2015, which was considered as a quasi-referendum, and the creation of a separatist government between CDC *(Convergència de Catalunya)*, ERC *(Esquerra Republicana de Catalonia)* with the support of nationalist-leftist CUP *(Candidatura d'Unitat Popular)*.

2.2.8. Questions of loyalty in Basque Country

To assess in the Basque Country when and how exactly persons with "hybrid" identity change in the case of nationalist conflict[70] I will use survey data of CIS between the years 1996-2012.[71] I redefine the term of what has been earlier identified

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[70] At least, in theory, such changes in identification may be either reason or the result of conflicts.
[71] Some of the Basque data (Euskobarometro) about national identity is usually not available for academic scrutiny.

as a primary Basque identification (Only Basque + More Basque than Spanish) to the term loyalty to the Basque Country. The same change will be applied to the Catalan case.

Figure 2.8. Loyalty orientation during nationalist conflict in the Basque Country

Source: CIS

Even if the CIS data does not offer many surveys for the selected period between 2002 and 2008, we can deduce from this longitudinal study that in the Basque Country in the moments of confrontation the "hybrid" identification decreases. At the peak of the conflict, we identify the period after the refusal of the "Ibarretxe plan"[72] In the Spanish parliament in February 2005 and the following Basque debate about a unilateral Basque referendum up to 2008. The "ultimate" loyalty seems to move towards the Basque Country by just a small degree (29.4 in 2005 and 35.4% in 2007), and much larger part of the variation has been caught up by the "No answer/No comment" category (3.6% in 2005 and 8.7% in 2007). This change could be due to two factors. First, like already shown, it could be coherent with Linz`s thesis about the "spiral of silence". Second, it could also be an indication that in the case of conflict

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[72] The Ibarratxe Plan (IP) was announced in 2001, presented 2003 and approved by the Basque Parliament in 2004. There are different interpretations of it because it has been presented as a plan for the reform of the Statute. Within this plan, the government of the Basque Country requested the right of the Basque Country for self-determination, which could merge in a free state – association. Besides that, the IP asked for the recognition of the symbolic *de jure* asymmetry, the recognition of the Basque nation. It wanted to introduce a kind of a double nationality with Basques and Spanish passports for every citizen of the Basque Country (Nagel 2010b).

the persons who possess a "hybrid" identity do not declare an "ultimate" loyalty, but rather tend not to take part in the political confrontation. At the same time, we can deduce one more element from the data, which still cannot be analyzed in the Catalan case. After the confrontation, the national identification falls back to their pre-confrontation levels.

2.2.9. Questions of loyalty in Catalonia

The analysis of the Basque conflict suffers from a lack of data. However, in the Catalan case, we can switch from the CIS data to a bigger database from the Catalan research institute CEO. Since 2005 CEO carries out three surveys a year including the Linz/Moreno question.

Figure 2.9. Loyalty orientation during nationalist conflict in Catalonia

Source: CEO

In the Catalan case, we can see that in the first years of the discussion between 2005-2010 the Catalan loyalist and the "hybrid" identities have a similar strength. In 2010 the "hybrid" identification even reached a peak of 45.1%.

Most scholars agree that since 2010 the conflict between Spain and Catalonia has become more salient because of the negative ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal on the "Catalan Statute" (Nagel 2015). The Catalan mobilization reaches its maximum level with the national celebration of "La Diada" in the years 2012-2015.

In the graph, we can see a steady growth of the Catalan loyalty from 42.7% in 2010 to 58.2% in 2013. In the next two years, it declines but still stays at the level of 2012

around 50%. At the same period, the "hybrid" identities fall from 45.1% in 2010 to 31% in 2014 and only slightly recover in the next two years. The Spanish loyalty group diminishes after 2010 but improves after 2014.

Both graphs show that during the nationalist conflict the "hybrid" identities are declining. But in what direction would the "ultimate" loyalty of this "hybrid" identities go? To check this assumption, I use CEO data from the years 2012 and 2013. Later surveys from 2014 on do not include this question anymore. I analyze the changes in the variable of voting in the case of a referendum.[73] I expect persons with Catalan loyalty to support independence if confronted with a decision between the current Spanish and the future majority state.[74] But how do the voting patterns of the other categories change?

Table 2.1. Prediction of Vote of "Hybrid" Identities in a Hypothetical Referendum

HYBRID	YES	NO	ABSTENTION	OTHER	N (Sample)
2012	14,6%	43,4%	34,6%	7,3%	1060 (2500)
2013	12,0%	48,9%	26,6%	12,5%	665 (2000)

Table 2.2. Prediction of Vote of "Spanish Loyalty" in a Hypothetical Referendum

LOY SPA	YES	NO	ABSTENTION	OTHER	N (Sample)
2012	8,2%	51,3%	37,0%	3,4%	146(2500)
2013	3,8%	73,8%	20,7%	1,5%	130(2000)

Table 2.3. Prediction of Vote of "Catalan Loyalty" in a Hypothetical Referendum

LOY CAT	YES	NO	ABSTENTION	OTHER	N (Sample)
2012	75,8%	5,6%	12,7%	5,8%	1232 (2500)
2013	86,5%	1,3%	7,7%	4,4%	1157 (2000)

Source for Table 2.1, 2.2. and 2.3: CEO/REO 677 (2012); CEO/REO 723 (2013)

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[73] We choose as the years of comparison 2012 and 2013. If we compared 2013 with 2010, the variation would be stronger. However, we can see that in the year 2010 the "hybrid" identities reached the highest figure in the last decade and for that reason, the results could be inaccurate. As a compromise we choose the values from the year 2012, which should represent a better average (see figure 2.9.).

[74] However, scholars from the rational-choice approach could claim, that voters vote according to their profit expectations and they would only vote for independence if they thought that it would be profitable to them. I cannot easily reject this interpretation.

The analysis shows that in moments of political instability in Catalonia, parts of the slightly reduced group of "hybrid" identities tend to pass their "ultimate" loyalty to the central Spanish state (43.4% in 2012 and 48.9% in 2013).[75]The number of persons who would abstain decreases from 34.6% to 26.6%. Also, the "yes" vote drops from 14.6% to 12%. The group with the Spanish loyalty radicalize as well. In 2012 51.3% would vote "no" in 2012, but 73.8% in 2013. Additionally, the abstention group diminishes from 37.0% to 20.7%. With that, the choice of the persons with "hybrid" identities is much closer to the Spanish than to the Catalan loyalty group. When we scrutinize the group of Catalan loyalty, we realize that even if there was already strong support for the "yes" vote in 2012 (75.8%), this preference becomes more active in 2013 (86.5%).

Nevertheless, these results should be taken with caution. First, the analyzed data are no panel data, for that reason we compare different individuals. The group of persons with "hybrid" identity decreased by over 6.5% between 2012 and 2013, and we can only speculate, to which group these persons went. That said, the numbers indicate that probably there has been a tendency to switch to the Catalan loyalty group, leaving the persons with a stronger connection with Spain in the "hybrid" group.[76] Unfortunately, we cannot test a longer period because the subsequent CEO surveys did not include this question anymore.

2.2.10. Characteristics of the "hybrid" identity group in Catalonia

Analyzing the foreseeable vote in a hypothetical referendum helps to explain the final loyalty of the persons with "hybrid" identity. However, I would also like to analyze which characteristics, which in the following I will define as independent variables, increase (or decrease) the likelihood of having a "hybrid" rather than a Catalan identity. For this reason, I have chosen to compare the two CEO samples (677/2012) and (733/2013).

After running a Chi-Square-Test on pooled data with the dummy variable "YEAR", I have found that the differences between two samples are significant (see Appendix

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[75] In this analysis, I do not distinguish between immigrants and not-immigrants and their vote intention. More on the question of immigrants in national/regional units see Franco-Guillén (2015).
[76] Additionally, most of the respondents were convinced that a referendum would be rejected, something, which could also have some effect on the answers.

2.1.). Due to this significance, I have decided to run a multinomial logistical regression. As the dependent variable, I have used the national identification based on the Moreno-question. I reduce the identification groups to three categories: Spanish loyalty, "hybrid" identities and Catalan loyalty.[77] Following the analysis of a foreseeable vote in a hypothetical referendum (Tables 2.1 – 2.3), I presume that the characteristics of persons with the "hybrid" identity should be much closer to the Spanish than to the Catalan loyalty group. For that reason, I use as the reference category the stronger contrast group: the Catalan loyalty (the answers 4 and 5 of the Moreno question).

Considering the theoretical nature of this paper I will not build a specific hypothesis for the statistical analysis, but this study will use the advances of the literature to find out which independent and control variables I could use for this descriptive analysis.

As the first independent variable, I will run the variable, "vote for independence". As the second independent variable, I choose "interest in politics", because questions of national identification could be more important for people interested in politics than for persons who prefer another social identification such as e.g. "father" or "sportsman".[78] As already mentioned, choosing the "as national as AC" answer could also draw on the logic that, for example, people feel embarrassed to choose the "don't know/no answer" option. I also might expect that persons with "hybrid" identity may try to avoid a decision of their "ultimate" loyalty in the form of abstention.

Additionally, I expect that persons with "hybrid" identities will have less interest in politics than the Catalan or Spanish loyalty group, which are highly mobilized due to the nationalist conflict.

Moreover, I add the standard variables identified by the literature. For example, Moreno et al. (1997) identified the following factors, which influence identity formation in Catalonia. Due to the importance of immigration, "Place of birth" appeared to be the most relevant variable concerning Catalans' self-identification. To control the results, I also check for the "place of birth of the father".[79] Another

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[77] I take into account that the strength of identification of the "more Catalan as Spanish" or "more Spanish as Catalan" category is not as strong as the exclusive Catalan or Spanish identification and the results should be considered with caution.

[78] This variable would follow the assumption from other disciplines like sociology or psychology, that national identities are not the primary form of identification, and some people reject a national identification during a nationalist conflict.

[79] I could have also chosen the place of birth of the mother, in both surveys, the figures show practically no differences.

important variable has been "Education." Citizens born in Catalonia are over-represented among high educational levels. Those born outside Catalonia finished more often in the low levels of the education system. Moreno et al. (1997) define the variable "Age" as important. Following that, older people tend to have a "hybrid" identity, which the authors define in the broader sense of solidarity (answers 2,3,4 of the Linz/Moreno question) and not "ultimate" loyalty. Recent works like Muñoz/Tormos (2012) state that young Catalans educated in Catalonia have the tendency to hold a more exclusive Catalan identity and claim that generational effects are responsible for that development. This result could support, that people with "hybrid" identity can be found, not in the younger, but in the older age groups. Solé-Tura (1967) states that early Catalan nationalism (*Catalanisme*) was driven by the Catalan bourgeoisie and was widely supported by the middle class. Even if this thesis has been contested, I will test it expecting that not only "education", but also "class" may be significant. I would then expect that there is a tendency that people with "hybrid" identity are to be found in "lower" social classes. Moreover, Catalan nationalism has historically been strongly connected to the use of Catalan language. For that reason, I can expect that people with "hybrid" identity tend to consider two languages, Catalan and Castilian, as their own. In addition to these independent variables, I will run the control variables sex/gender.

Table 2.4. Characteristics of Persons with "Hybrid" Identity in Catalonia

	2012	2013		2012	2013
HYBRID IDENTITIES (ref. Catalan loyalty)			SPANISH LOYALTY (ref. Catalan loyalty)		
Sex	-0,127 (-0.96)	-0.356* (-2.00)	Sex	0,0116 (-0,05)	-0,399 (-1.43)
Age 35-49 (1)	0,0285 (-0,16)	-0,198 (-0.82)	Age 35-49 (1)	-0,287 (-0.84)	-0,269 (-0.66)
Age 50-64	0,243 (-1,24)	-0,261 (-1.01)	Age 50-64	-0,197 (-0.51)	-0,335 (-0.75)
More than 64	0.492* (-2,35)	-0,272 (-1.01)	More than 64	0,571 (-1,45)	-0,0862 (-0.19)
No interest in politics	0.599*** (-4,32)	0.588** (-3,22)	No interest in politics	1.241*** (-4,69)	0.684* (-2,25)
Birth: Rest of Spain (2)	0.529* (-2,2)	0.807* (-2,57)	Birth: Rest of Spain (2)	1.429*** (-3,92)	1.949*** (-4,58)
Birth Father: Rest of Spain (3)	0.494** (-3,01)	0,0193 (-0,08)	Birth Father: Rest of Spain (3)	0,252 (-0,71)	-0,342 (-0,83)
Middle Education (ESO etc.)	0.569** (-2,59)	-0,334 (-1.00)	Middle Education (ESO etc.)	0,308 (-0,91)	-0.859* (-1.98)
Higher Education	0,244 (-0,94)	-0,713 (-1.88)	Higher Education	-0,355 (-0.80)	-1.831** (-3.29)
Castillan (4)	1.876*** (-9,54)	1.898*** (-7,42)	Castillan (4)	3.122*** (-8,34)	3.748*** (-7,37)
Both	1.432*** (-5,9)	0.939** (-3,05)	Both	-0,293 (-0.27)	1.723* (-2,43)
Middle Class (5)	-0,132 (-0.95)	0,214 (-1,130	Middle Class (5)	0,174 (-0,71)	0,167 (-0,57)
Higher Class	0,0729 (-0,25)	0,509 (-1,37)	Higher Class	0,703 (-1,45)	1,055 (-1,66)
Vote "No" Independence	2.203*** (-14,96)	2.842*** (-14,1)	Vote "No" Independence	2.618*** (-6,75)	3.380*** (-6,52)
Abstencion Independence	3.194*** (-16,95)	4.495*** (-16,57)	Abstencion Independence	4.133*** (-10,34)	5.421*** (-10,33)
_cons	-3.788*** (-9.03)	-2.855*** (-5.15)	_cons	-8.416*** (-9.57)	-6.496*** (-6.54)
N	2120	2120		1612	1612

(1) Ref: AGE 18 -34
(2) Ref: BIRTH CAT
(3) Birth Cat
(4) Catalan
(5) Lower Class
(6) VOTE "YES" INDEPENDENCE
***p< 0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1

Source: own elaboration

With this statistical logit regression, I was trying to estimate how each independent variable increases (or decreases) the likelihood of having a "hybrid" identity, rather than Catalan identity in the years 2012 and 2013. The table also shows the results for the third category: "Spanish loyalty". The first numbers after every independent or control variable are the coefficients measuring the effect of each covariate on the log-odds of having a "hybrid" identity.

The results show that language is a powerful variable. Considering Catalan and Castilian as their language increases the possibility of the Catalan residents to fall into the "hybrid" identities category, even if this group loses in 2013 significance compared to 2012. The fact of considering Castilian as single "own" language has the highest level of significance in both years. Also, the prediction of voting "no" and "abstention" in the referendum on independence is a strong predictor of having a "hybrid" identity.

Another good indicator of having a "hybrid" identity has been to have "no interest in politics", with the strongest level of significance of 1% in 2012. However, the strength of this tendency loses a level of significance in 2013. These variables are the most significant, while the variable "Place of birth" is less important. Birth in the "Rest of Spain" seems to become more important in 2013, even if at the 10% significance level. On the other hand, the "birth of the father in the rest of Spain" loses, in 2013, the 10% significance level, which it had in 2012.

We can discover a similar pattern with the variable "Education". In 2012 people with middle education fell into the group of "hybrid" identity at the 5% significance level. This variable became not significant in 2013. Gender starts to be significant at the 10% level in 2013. For a man, there is greater likelihood to have a "hybrid" identity. Age is less important than expected. When older than 64, there is only, in 2012, a small probability to fall into the "hybrid" identity category, even if at the 10 % level of significance.

An additional finding is that the "hybrid" identity group has many overlaps with the category "Spanish loyalty" in variables like "no interest in politics", "considering Castilian as own single language" or "voting no in the referendum on independence". From these overlaps, we can confirm the observation from the preliminary analysis of the vote on independence. When confronted with conflict in the Catalan-Spanish context, the reduced group of the "hybrid" identities in 2013 is more likely to choose Spain/central state as its mark of reference.

Considering that both surveys do not rely on panel data, and we are analyzing different respondents, we cannot give exact tendencies, but it seems that before the "hybrid" identity group fell from 42.4% to 35.9%, more people with parents born in the rest of Spain, more people with middle education, and more people with a tendency to consider Catalan and Castilian as their language tended to be in this group.

2.3. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have asked the question of how the identification of citizens in national/regional units could influence the stability of a multinational state, building on the finding in the literature, which stronger national/regional identification correlates positively with support for self-determination. In my empirical analysis I have found that, apparently due to the different nation-building projects, there are changes in the identification patterns over time. First, there is a growth of identification with the national/regional unit. At the same time, there is a growth of persons with a "hybrid" identification. The primary Spanish identification is diminishing.

Even if identification with the central state is falling, it does not have to mean that it destabilizes the multinational state, because of the parallel growth of the "hybrid" identification. I have identified the "ultimate" loyalty of that group as crucial to answer the research question.

Analyzing the voting intention in a possible referendum on self-determination, I have found, that in the Catalan-Spanish context the reduced group of the persons with "hybrid" identity in 2013 is more likely to choose Spain/central state as its mark of reference (43,4% in 2012 and 48,9% in 2013). In an additional analysis, I have found, that the "hybrid" identity category has many overlaps with the category "Spanish loyalty" in variables like "no interest in politics", "considering Castilian as only own language" or "voting "no" in the referendum on independence".

Additionally, to answer the research question, I have addressed some theoretical problems, which are usually not accurately dealt with in the research on multinational states. First, considering questions about how to call units with a significant nationalist movement, I suggest using the terms of national/regional unit, which

includes all the complexity around the term but at the same time, rejects the more biased "sub-national" unit.

Besides that, I suggest using the term "hybrid" instead of "dual" identification in these national/regional units. Because of the parallel nation-building projects some of the answers of the Linz-Moreno question considering the AC identification are above all conflicting/competing and not only complementary.

The term "hybrid" can include different degrees of regional or national/regional identification, but can also include other aspects, like for example respondents who do not want to make a decision due to ideological or personal reasons.

These caveats have already been suggested in the research on the left-right identification. Some scholars analyzing the left–right axis claim that the center category may also attract respondents that do not feel committed to a response, due for example to the lack of political sophistication (Knutsen 1998, Rodon 2014). In considering the "As Spanish as Catalan" and "as Spanish as Basque" answer, we could draw on the same logic, for example, that people feel embarrassed to choose the don't know/no answer option. We also might expect, that persons, who have a "hybrid" identity could try to avoid a decision about their national identification, because they identify as cosmopolitan or decline national identification at all. They could also give an answer that they think that is expected because it is positively connotated.

Considering the question if the term "nested" is still an adequate one in political theory, I found that Miller argumentation holds partly empirical scrutiny, at least in the Spanish case. Even if admittedly the "more Spanish than Catalan" answer would fit better Miller's concept, which is based on the superiority of the state-wide identification, we have seen that also in the case of the "as Spanish as Catalan" answer, in times of conflict nearly half of the people with identification in this category, express their loyalty to the center state. It is the biggest group, and this finding does not contradict Miller's argumentation.

CHAPTER 3: CITIZENSHIP

3.1. Introduction

Citizenship is a core concept of liberal democracy. However, after decades of its theoretical application, the concept appears to be immensely overstretched and blurred. It has become exceedingly difficult to distinguish what it means. Citizenship is many things to many people. Therefore, before beginning to evaluate how citizenship might influence the political stability of the Spanish "State of Autonomies", I will first give a short overview of the most relevant uses of the concept. I will principally concentrate on two aspects. The first focus is on citizenship as a social bond, in the form of attachment to the state or the satisfaction with its constitution. Second, I will address questions of citizenship as participation, which can be directed into two directions: towards a state or community. All these aspects will be connected and discussed against the background of liberal, republican and communitarian approaches to citizenship.

3.1.1 Taxonomies of citizenship

In the following, I will focus on the classifications of citizenship in political theory by presenting the most influential authors. After that, I will discuss the particular distinctions, which are drawn in the literature. The goal is not only to provide a basic overview of the different uses of citizenship but also develop a deep conceptual framework for the following analysis.

The concept "citizenship" usually refers to membership in a political community as a state, and therefore defines a relationship between the state and the individual. Any idea of citizenship, therefore, takes into account both ends of this relationship.[80]

Broadly speaking, political theory builds upon three broad approaches when analyzing questions of citizenship. There is the communitarian approach which puts importance on a common way of life; secondly, a civic republican approach with an

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[80] Kymlicka adds, "Different models of citizenship rest upon different images of the nature of the state, and/or on different images of the nature of the individuals who belong to it" (Kymlicka 2003: 147).

emphasis on political participation and thirdly the liberal nationalist approach emphasizing a common nationhood.

Citizenship has featured in the work of some prominent authors and has changed many times over the 20th century. In an interesting essay, Joppke (2010) explained how the concept of citizenship had been influenced by scholars like Schmidt (1932), Marshall (1950), Brubaker (1992), Soysal (1994) or Kymlicka (1995).[81] Without a doubt, out of all these authors, the ideas of Marshall (1950), summarized in a short book called "Citizenship and Social Class", have been the most influential. According to Marshall, citizenship should ensure that every member of a society is treated as an equal and full member of it. To guarantee a sense of membership the state should give citizens a growing number of citizenship rights. Nearly all works on citizenship are built on different aspects of this Marshall's model, usually referred to as the "citizenship-as-rights" approach.

Many of Marshall's arguments are also relevant for this analysis. One of them is that including basic social rights, such as education or health care can help promoting a shared sense of national membership and identity. Hence extending citizenship can become a tool of nation building.[82]

Some part of literature finds in Marshall definition also other aspects like citizenship as participation. Following that, many of the rights associated with citizenship give citizens opportunities to participate, and it is on the citizens if they take advantage of them or not. With that, aspects of participation in political life or the association with others in voluntary organizations are an essential bond for a flourishing civil society.

[81] Joppke concludes that most of these concepts were relevant at the time of their writing, however, lost their significance very shortly after. Following Joppke, Schmidt's approach, which is built on a Hobbesian account, does not survive the "transformation of the Western world from a Hobbesian zone of war into a Lockean zone of trade" (p.6). Marshall's attention on the Welfare State was not timeless "because we live in a different world today, beyond the welfare state." (p.13). Brubaker "attributes inertia to nationally divergent citizenship laws that do not really exist." (p.19), and also "just about Soysal […] deemed national citizenship on the way out, states rediscovered it as a tool of integration. (p.22) The only account, which survives this line of criticism, is Kymlicka's concept of "Multinational Citizenship".

[82] Following Marshall's account, the English working class would become English/British and not Communist. From this point of view, citizenship can be seen as an identity, an expression of one's membership in a political community, even if that community has been divided on questions of class and not nationality.

Table 3.1: Conceptions and dimensions of citizenship

	CONCEPTIONS thin ⟷ thick		
DIMENSIONS	Legal positivism Libertarianism	Civic republicanism	Nationalism Communitarianism
Membership	**Legal status**	**Political identity**	Cultural identity
Rights	Negative liberties	Rights as obligation	Moral duties
Practices	Passive citizenship	**Civic virtues**	Heroic virtues

Source: Bauböck (2001), Recombinant citizenship, pp. 21

Most of the mentioned ideas from Marshall's work are included in a taxonomy offered by Bauböck (2001). In his classification, Bauböck positions on the horizontal axis a "political theory continuum" which goes from a thin to a thick conception of citizenship starting with legal positivism/libertarianism, moving to civic republicanism and finishing with nationalism/communitarianism. On the vertical axis, Bauböck positions different dimensions of citizenship such as membership, rights, and practice. This account shows all the complexity of the concept of citizenship, which we should be aware of before starting the analysis.[83] In the following, I will focus above all on the dimension of membership that includes questions of legal status and political identity, and on some of the practices like the civic virtues.

Besides taxonomies, in the literature, we also find many other divisions of the concept of citizenship. One of them is the distinction between passive citizenship and active citizenship. The former is also called "private" citizenship, because it concentrates on passive rights, and renounces any requirement to participate in public life. In this interpretation citizenship means "the right to have rights".

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[83] Bauböck's taxonomy is obviously one of many. For example, Bloemraad et al. (2008) offer a taxonomy emphasizing four elements of citizenship: status, rights, participation, and identity. Also Joppke (2010) identifies three blocks of citizenship as central to the analysis of citizenship: status, rights, and identity. However, Bloemraad et al. and Joppke have built it as a conceptual framework having migration in mind. Bauböck's taxonomy is more helpful, because it can be applied to questions of national/regional units and minority nations.

Besides some duties[84], active citizenship usually turns around two pivots. The first one is the "politics of the common good" and the second one is the question of the "good citizen". Both are often summarized with the concept of "civic republicanism", which usually turns around the questions of participation in the political community. Considering the "politics of the common good", the literature distinguishes two aspects: voting and public debate. Voting is seen as an active but private act, while deliberation is active and public.

Summarizing this conceptual reasoning, when defining citizenship as a possible explanatory variable, we could concentrate on many aspects, on the classical "citizenship as rights" approach, on citizenship as membership in the sense of legal or political identity, or on questions of "civic virtues" in the "civic republican" sense.

In the first part of this chapter, I will analyze citizenship as membership. This approach will concentrate less on "the power of the passport", which is a topic in the migration studies, and focus more on aspects of identification with the state than with the dominant nation in a multinational state.

In the second part, I will concentrate on other aspects of a possible identification with the state, in the form of "constitutional patriotism", which has often been labeled as a post-national identification.

In the third part, I will analyze the "civic republican" version of citizenship, concentrating on its vertical connection between the citizens and the state through voting, public debates or political action. In a fourth part, I will analyze civic virtues towards the community, above all in the form of voluntary organizations.[85]

The boundaries between citizenship as membership and citizenship as participation can be seen as fluid. However, all these approaches will be analyzed in different sub-chapters, each with their short conceptualization and (as far as possible) empirical analysis of the Spanish "State of Autonomies". Where existent, I will also include the relevant literature.

I will not analyze the "citizenship as rights" approach in this chapter. It might seem surprising, since I have shown that Marshall's account is the dominant one and most

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[84] Considering the duties, we can observe, that their amount has been notably reduced in recent decades. One of the quite unpopular duties - the obligatory military service - has been disappearing from most of the Western liberal democracies. Compulsory education or paying taxes is sometimes seen as citizen duties in the sense of state coercion, but can also be seen as an aspect of a Welfare state.
[85] However, this seemingly quite communitarian analysis will not be completed in this chapter, because the most important ingredient of social capital in the form of social and political trust will be analyzed in the 4th chapter.

others accounts, even if are not directly derived, are at least connected to it.[86] Additionally, since the works of Taylor (1992) and Kymlicka (1995), questions of citizenship rights in multinational states are also dominant in the political theory literature. Both authors show that in multinational states the different policies of accommodation are based on group-specific rights given to the national/regional minorities. These citizenship rights can be established on the multinational, national/regional, regional or even local level. The most important minority rights, which can be identified as citizenship rights on the national/regional level are usually closely connected to aspects of cultural autonomy such as language rights. As shown in Chapter 2, the establishment of linguistic rights can lead to a strengthening of a parallel nation-building project based for example on a different language. It could have an opposite influence on the multinational state than citizenship as an identity, namely a more destabilizing one.

As mentioned in the introduction, conferring minority rights in a multinational state may be seen as a request from the minority. However, the state institutions of the center offer it in the form of decentralized or asymmetric solutions. For that reason, instead of analyzing these aspects from the viewpoint of the "citizenship as rights" approach, I will address these questions in the chapters 5 and 6, when analyzing institutional solutions within a multinational state.

3.2. Citizenship as membership of a community

3.2.1. Conceptualization

The first sub-chapter 3.2 concentrates on aspects of citizenship as membership. It will be based on some of the insights from chapter 2, building on the differences of belonging to a national group or belonging to a state. I claim that above all in a multinational state this type of citizenship as membership could be seen as a possible substitute for a common national identity among the different national and national/regional units.

The idea that this standard concept of citizenship could be important for the stability of a multinational state is not new. Bauböck, among others, claimed that in a

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[86] Even if Marshall's view, which was drawn from a focus on post-war Britain in the 1950's, obviously did not take into account modern multinational states.

multinational federal democracy: "majorities and minorities have developed common interests and identities as citizens of a multilevel polity, in which all constituent units enjoy autonomy and in which all citizens are directly represented in federal government" (Bauböck 2002:45).[87]

In the following I will use a minimalist definition of citizenship, referring to polity membership. A person is described as having, for example, Spanish citizenship, and with that, he or she is formally a member of the state of Spain and can identify with that state.

At the same time, citizenship in this form is quite static. Carens (1992) has compared this type of citizenship to a feudal contract: "It is assigned at birth; for the most part it is not subject to change by the individual's will and efforts; and it has a major impact on that person's life chances" (Carens 1992: 26).[88]

When considering aspects of citizenship as membership, a comparison with the former chapter on national identity might sharpen the conceptual distinction. We should distinguish between national identity and nationality as well. For example, international law uses the term nationality rather than citizenship to indicate the legal relationship between a person and a state. In this context, the term citizenship defines the totality of legal rights and duties of individuals, which are attached to nationality under domestic law. However, in other fields of Social Sciences nationality can embrace other meanings. For example, in nationalism or ethnic studies, the term nationality can imply membership to an ethnic group, which can, but does not necessarily mean citizenship. The term nationality is also used, for example in the Spanish context, to distinguish the different national and national/regional units in a multinational state.

There are many similarities and dissimilarities between national identity and citizenship. While national identity is assigned to a nation, citizenship is assigned to a state. The nation can but does not have to be congruent with a state. It can also cross state borders. Usually, we can explicitly say who is a citizen of which country, just by checking objective factors like, for example, an ID card or a passport.

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[87] Bauböck principally takes aim at Miller (2000) with this quote, which according to Bauböck puts too much emphasis on the importance of national identity for social cohesion.

[88] Carens' account is built on the narrative of a single and homogenous territorial state-based citizenship, which is still dominant in citizenship studies. However, the essence of citizenship changes permanently and citizenship closely connected to the nation-state could also be seen as something temporary and not a rule.

The national identity is instead a purely subjective phenomenon, which can change permanently and is usually expressed by the holder of the identity itself. Additionally, even if a person feels like a member of a national community, other members need to confirm his belonging. If they refuse this confirmation, be it due to a different race, color of skin, language or even a different accent, the existence of this national belonging can become quite problematic.

Membership in a state does not create this problem; the other group members do not have to confirm one's citizenship, this is the task of the state. This is why citizenship as membership becomes an interesting instrument not only for the inclusion of immigrants into the political community[89], but also for the accommodation of national minorities.

National identity and citizenship can mean the same in a mono-national setting. However, there are enormous differences between both in its multinational version. In a multinational state, there are individuals, who can hold at least two identities, which might be referred to as national: one statewide national identity and a national/regional (sub-state) identity of the national/regional unit. In a multi-level system like the EU, we could add a third, a supranational identification. The strength of these identities can differ and change over time.[90]

In contrast, dual citizenship of a national and a national/regional (sub-state) unit within a state does not exist from the Weberian viewpoint.[91] Even if some people might claim some "imagined" citizenship of the sub-state, in the real world these persons can use the documents of the "real" state only.[92] An extension of this form of citizenship to the national/regional (sub-state) units is quite improbable in the future. In this instance, citizenship would become an instrument of disunity, rather than

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[89] Due to limits of this dissertation, I will not deal in depth with questions of immigration in Spain or the national/regional units. There is, however, a rich literature on this topic, see for example Zapata-Barrero (2012; 2013).

[90] Good examples are the measures, which are analyzed with the Linz/Moreno question in chapter 2.

[91] However, we can find transnational or dual citizenship, which is held by citizens of two different states.

[92] An exception is surely the supranational citizenship of the European Union, however, also here citizenship is based on the rules of the nation-state. We may see some dual aspects in the citizenship as rights approach; however, this approach does not fit the Weberian definition, which focuses on state membership.

cultivating unity in the face of increasing social diversity.[93] Also, EU citizenship is usually based on the national citizenship.

Additionally, the strength of citizenship cannot alter over time. Bauböck (2006:19) reminds us that citizenship is "a binary concept […] than one that allows for gradual changes."

However, despite this modern universalistic rhetoric, citizenship has always been a group concept, which has never been expanded to all members of any polity. Furthermore, how one becomes a member of a state differs sharply. Citizenship rights can be given due to the "ius sanguinis" practice (right of blood) or the "ius soli" practice (right of soil), or to some hybrid of both. The applications of both tend to differ from time and country (Joppke 2010, Honohan 2010). For example, the "ius sanguinis" practice gives the community the possibility to connect through aspects of ethnic nationalism or ethnic, national identity. This citizenship practice gives priority not to residents in a state, but to persons with a similar ethnic ancestry, which may even live for generations outside the state.[94]

However, if there are some national minorities inside the state, which are ethnically different, they automatically get their citizenship rights, above all because the central state wants to bind the territory and the community of the minority to the central state. Those usually excluded are the immigrants, who do not belong to the ethnic groups or minority nations, which lived there when establishing the multinational state. It is because of the exclusion of immigrants and not of national minorities that the "ius sanguinis" principle is considered an exclusive concept.

In contrast, when citizenship is assigned due to the "ius soli" practice based on birth in a country, scholars consider it as a "civic" and inclusive concept. However, even here this difference primarily affects immigrants, as they benefit from this practice.[95]

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[93] Many scholars claim, that if a "sub-national" citizenship would be made possible, it would no longer provide a common legal status or a shared experience. Demands for some particular citizenship would directly contradict the liberal ideal of equality before the law (Offe 1999).

[94] This practice can include many problems. One of the more salient examples is that after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 so-called ethnic Germans from Poland and the ex-Soviet Union received German citizenship almost automatically, even without speaking German and giving up their old citizenship, while Turkish or Greeks living in Germany in the second or even third generation were not able to get German citizenship, without renouncing the other. This changed first with the *Staatsangehörigkeitreform*s in 2000 and 2014, (nationality/citizenship reform in 2000, when elements of the "jus sanguinis" practice was complemented with elements of the "jus soli" practice.

[95] An interesting point in the debate on "ius sanguinis" and "ius soli" was introduced by Kostakopoulou (2008), who developed the idea that citizenship should be based on the *ius domicilii*-basis, where the membership of residents changes automatically when they move to a different territory.

Members of the national majority or the national minority get citizenship status automatically, independent of either of these practices.

I claim that Brubaker's (1992) account of citizenship, as being both internally inclusive but externally exclusive, is still valid. For example, the "ius sanguinis" and "ius soli" practices are both exclusive towards groups of citizens of other states. Citizens of one state cannot usually get the citizenship of another state if they don't live there or have had some ethnic ties with this state in the past. With that, the concept of citizenship as membership draws very clear the boundaries between a state "in-group" and a state "out–group". This should be emphasized when coming back to our research question.

In a nutshell: Citizenship as membership referrers to individuals, who conceive themselves as members of the state collectivity. In a multinational state, this allows integrating two additional groups, which for different reasons are not conceived as part of a nation: immigrants and national minorities. This aspect of citizenship as membership can be seen as an element of unity, which can be enforced due to a clear distinction between a political in-group within the state and a different political out-group within other state borders. For that reason, I expect that high levels of identification with the state may be a possible condition for the stability of the political community by allowing for bridging elements of national or national/regional identity.

3.2.2. Empirical analysis

I have been influenced to address the questions of identity with the state by the already mentioned quote of Linz, where he claims that "Spain is a state for all Spanish citizens, a nation-state for a large part of the population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities"(Linz 1975: 423). In the following part, I will focus on the persons for whom Spain is a state, but not a nation.

Before starting with the empirical analysis of citizenship as membership in the Spanish "State of Autonomies", I would like to acknowledge that the empirical study suffers from a considerable lack of data. For that reason, it is nearly impossible to analyze empirically its strength and its changes, or even its existence.

In the available surveys, I have only found questions, which are not precisely formulated. They do not ask exact questions about identification or belonging to the state and for that reason should be used only as proxies. There is data measuring the pride in being Spanish. However, it opens the question if it measures the pride at being a member of a state or rather, like in chapter 2, the fact of being a member of a national group. There are also other conceptual problems. For example, Joppke (2007:44) differentiates between the actual views the citizens have about their citizenship, and the official views spread by the state. Scholars like Miller-Idriss (2006) have found that ordinary Germans adopt astonishingly non-primordial, civic views of legitimate citizenship, in which some traits, such as "honesty" and "hard work", counted more than ethnic pedigree (see also the following sub-chapter 3.4) For that reason, we have to be cautious with the conclusions of this sub-chapter. However, as with every pioneering work, I hope that this analysis will point to some problems, which could be included more consistently in future surveys and analysis.

3.2.2.1. Pride in being Spanish

First I will analyze how strongly Spaniards identify with being a national of contemporary Spain. I will mainly look at the longitudinal development of this identification. The data that I have been able to locate ask questions about the extent of pride that one takes in being Spanish.

Figure 3.1. Pride in being Spanish - Spain

Source: CIS

This data shows that around 50% of the Spanish citizens feel "very proud" to be Spanish and between 30-40% feel "quite proud". Even if we identify a weak decline in strong feelings of national pride, from 66% (1987) to 46% (2012), this is partly compensated by the growth in moderate feelings of national pride 25% (1987) to 34% (2012). The categories "just a little proud" and "not proud at all" represent the fewest responses options, barely reaching 10%, and frequently closer to 5%. As such, the overwhelming majority of Spaniards (around 80%) have sentiments of being Spanish.[96] For that reason, even if we are not sure whether our measure is more the pride in the nation or of the state, we can conclude that the longitudinal development has been stable. In a next step, I will analyze how Catalan respondents answered this question.

Figure 3.2. Pride in being Spanish – Catalonia

Source: CIS

The respondents in the national/regional unit of Catalonia have similar feelings to the rest of Spain regarding pride in being Spanish. Even if since the start of the political confrontation in 2010 these feelings started to decline, there is still a majority who has feelings of pride. In 2012 30% felt "quite proud", while 24.4% felt "very proud". Nevertheless, in the case of Catalonia, we can see that this option, at least at the

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[96] The data on "Proud of being Spanish" of the World Value Index confirms this development at least since 1995/1996.

margins, is not very stable. The option "Not proud at all" won about 10% in just two years, jumping from 11.3% to 19.5%.[97]

Figure 3.3. Pride in being Spanish – Basque Country

Source: CIS

Like in many other identification questions, the Basque citizens are also quite divided when asked about their attachment to the Spanish state/nation. The patterns in the Basque Country differ from Spain and Catalonia. In general, it can be said that in the Basque Country there is a steady and permanent decline of the option "not proud at all". Additionally, the pride in being Spanish is growing. For two decades the primary option has been "Quite proud", which lay permanently between 30% and 40%. That tendency may indicate a growing acceptance of the Spanish state.

3.2.2.2. Identification with Spanish documents

In a next step I would like to analyze a question from a CIS survey in 2006, which should react to the statement: "Although my official documents are Spanish, I do not consider myself Spanish". I am aware of the fact that we probably measure an in-between situation with regards to the national identity and citizenship, because the

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[97] We cannot know from the survey which context of pride is meant (sports, culture, economy, democracy, institutional, military or history).

question could be understood as including two concepts, citizenship, and national identity. There is also another caveat. The question has been built around the negative aspects of identification, even though the citizens have the Spanish documents. This graph is not longitudinal and has been taken in a moment, which I have identified in Chapter 2 as a time of political instability in the Basque Country, however not in Catalonia.

Figure. 3.4. Spanish documents and identification

Source: CIS (2006)

In this figure, we can observe that in 2006 the majority in both national/regional units considered itself to be somewhat Spanish. 21.3% of the respondents in Catalonia and 31.2% of the interviewees in the Basque Country do not consider themselves Spanish, even though their official documents are Spanish. These persons can be seen as citizens who reject not only the Spanish nation but also the state.

Even if the data show that there is some pride in being Spanish and in having official Spanish documents, we are using in both cases a proxy, and these results should be taken with a lot of caution.

3.2.2.3. "What does Spain mean for you?"

In a next step, I would like to add another CIS-survey from the year 2012, which has asked the question: "What does Spain mean for you?" The possible answers were: "My country", "The state I'm a citizen of", "A nationality/nation I feel a member of",

"A state consisting of different nationalities and regions" and "A foreign state that my country is not part of". I have to emphasize that the offered answers could be seen as confusing. Above all the inclusion of the term "country" introduces an in-between concept, which can be positioned between the terms of state and nation. Additionally, the respondents could give only one rather than multiple answers, something, which could be considered as a problem. The answers are shown in Spain, the Basque Country, and Catalonia.[98]

Figure 3.5. "What does Spain mean for you" (2012/comparative chart)

Source: CIS

This comparative chart shows various interesting findings, albeit ones which could be difficult to interpret. Around 59.8% of Spaniards see Spain as their country. In the national/regional units, 31% of the Catalans and the 23.7% of the respondents in the Basque Country give the same answer. The answer "The state I'm a citizen of", which could be considered as the closest to a "citizenship identity", was given by 14.5 % of Spaniards, 16.4% of Catalans and 24.7% of Basques.

Most of the differences between Spanish and Catalan respondents are not so relevant. However, the disagreements between both and the Basque Country could be interpreted as interesting. The answer "A nation I feel a member of", which could be seen as the closest to an exclusive national identification shows no significant differences between the three units. Apparently, the respondents in the whole of Spain

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[98] We should keep in mind that the column of Spain also includes the answers from the Basque Country and Catalonia.

prefer the term "my country" than "a nation I feel a member of", and only a few respondents in all three units feel primarily as members of the Spanish nation.

We find the biggest differences response: "A state consisting of different nationalities and regions". 8.4% of respondents in all Spain give this answer, but 25.7% in Catalonia and 24.1% in the Basque Country. Apparently, around ¼ of the interviewees in the national/regional units interpret Spain as a multinational state. However, this answer is not connected to questions of membership.

The last answer: "A foreign state that my country is not part of", is maybe the most confusing because it mixes the concepts of state, country, and nation. However, it is a good indicator to measure the alignment of the respondents in the national/regional unit from the Spanish state. These people may entirely reject Spain. I will address this question further when analyzing the longitudinal development of this category in the Spanish "State of Autonomies".

Figure 3.6. "What does Spain mean for you" (Catalonia)

Source: CIS

The longitudinal development of the five answers in Catalonia shows some changes. From 1996-2012, increasingly fewer Catalan respondents consider Spain as their country. The answer "The state I'm a citizen of" has risen in the 2000s. The answer "A nation I feel a member of" has stayed stable between 10% and 12%. This is similar to the number of people who identify exclusively with the Spanish identity in Chapter 2.

The fourth answer: "A state consisting of different nationalities and regions" declined from 33.6% in 1996 to 21.8% in 2010 and had risen after that. However, the more surprising development has been the growth of the fifth answer: "A foreign state that my country is not part of." It had steadily grown from 2.8% in 1996 to 13.7% in 2012. It reveals the growing alienation of significant parts of the Catalan society away from the Spanish state.

Figure 3.7. "What does Spain mean for you? " (Basque Country)

Source: CIS

The figure analyzing the Basque Country illustrates more stability than the Catalan case. However, there are also some significant changes. Apparently, the number of respondents who consider Spain as their country is growing, even if this is a small number. The second and third answers: "The state I'm a citizen of" and "A nation I feel a member of" decline at first and later recover to the level shown in 1996. The fourth answer: "A state consisting of different nationalities and regions" shows increases at first and then declines. The fifth answer: "A foreign state that my country is not part of" has been quite stable, 12.4% in 1996 and 9.8% in 2012. Consequently, the Basque views on Spain could be considered stable.

Summarizing, I claim that the most significant finding of this sub-chapter 3.1 is not empirical, but rather theoretical in nature. The positive evaluation of membership of a state could be seen as an essential condition when evaluating the political stability of the multinational states. However, it has been completely neglected by research until now. Attachment to a state is not assessed in survey data as an independent variable.

Usually, it is mixed up with measures, which assess national identification. Especially in the multinational state, a different approach to measurement would enrich the debate.

Due to these measurement problems, it is nearly impossible to draw conclusions. The available data can be seen only as proxies. However, we find that in Catalonia there is some pride in belonging to a Spanish state/nation, albeit defined as a multinational state. That said, these levels of attachment/identification have been declining since the end of the 2000s. In the Basque Country, the numbers with high sentiments of attachment/ identification have been much lower. Basque respondents have shown lower levels of pride and less attachment to the Spanish state/nation. However, and in contrast to Catalonia, these levels have begun to grow following a period of stability. It seems that the dynamics in both national/regional units have been developing in different directions over recent decades.

3.2. Citizenship as "Constitutional Patriotism"
3.2.1. Conceptualization

In the following step, I will analyze the impact of a possible "constitutional identity" on the stability of the multinational state. This concept has usually been called "constitutional patriotism" in the literature. It has frequently been interpreted as a concept that does not neatly fit the theories of liberal nationalism or republican patriotism.[99] "Constitutional patriotism" is more often understood as "a post-national, universalist form of democratic political allegiance" (Müller 2006: 278).[100]

The idea that the Constitution is the focal point of democratic loyalty is central to this concept. The historical development of this concept is rooted in post-war Germany.[101] One of the first scholars to articulate some of the core questions was the Catholic philosopher Karl Jaspers (1946) in "The Question of German Guilt". However, it was Dolf Sternberger (1982), who is seen as the intellectual father of this concept. Sternberger saw "constitutional patriotism" as a possible key to ensuring political

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[99] I could begin to conceptualize with a discussion on citizenship as participation, something that will feature the next section. However, because I will highlight the question of identification, rather than of deliberative discourse, I prefer to leave the conceptualization of the participative aspects for later.

[100] There is an interesting discussion in the literature on whether citizenship as a membership should be seen as a national (Brubaker 1992) or a post-national concept (Soysal 1994). [100]

[101] In the following part, I strongly rely on the works of Jan-Werner Müller (2006; 2009).

stability in Germany after the Nazi regime. In line with Sternberger's "constitutional patriotism", German citizens should not use the pre-war German identity, but start to identify with the democratic state and defend it against internal and external threats. As such, "constitutional patriotism" concentrated in the sense of "militant democracy" on the defense of democratic institutions.

When Habermas advanced his version of constitutional identity, he was initially reacting to the so-called "historians" debate in Germany. During this intellectual dispute, some conservative German historians tried to compare National Socialism and the Holocaust to Stalinism and the Gulag. Habermas warned against this attempt to normalize the German history. Furthermore, Habermas was looking for ways to replace the problematic national identity, something he found in the battery of citizenship: "Democratic citizenship need not be rooted in the national identity of a people. However, regardless of the diversity of different cultural forms of life, it does require that every citizen [should] be socialized into a common political culture" (Habermas 1996:500). Habermas (1996:500) found the USA and Switzerland to represent successful examples: "As the examples of multicultural societies like Switzerland and the United States demonstrate, a political culture in which constitutional principles can take root need by no means depend on all citizens sharing the same language or the same ethnic and cultural origins. A liberal political culture is only the common denominator for a "constitutional patriotism" (Verfassungspatriotismus) that heightens an awareness of both the diversity and the integrity of the different forms of life coexisting in a multicultural society."[102]

Habermas based his version of "constitutional patriotism" on his previous work on changes in the individual identity formation.[103] For Habermas, the collective identities are renegotiated and revised in a public sphere, which should be as permeable as possible. Open-ended communication is, therefore, a fundamental requirement for

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[102] The choice of USA and Switzerland is problematic. In the USA the Constitution is indeed seen as an important aspect of a collective identity, but this identity is the national identity, something that Habermas wants to overcome. Some scholars like Deutsch (1976) consider that Switzerland is also built on a national identity, one that overcomes the different linguistic public spheres.

[103] In the Habermasian theory, a dynamic and complex process of identity formation replaces old patterns of an unconditional and unreflective identity formation, which has been built on the "traditional" values of conventional society. The "old-type" citizens accepted their identity without questioning it. The "new-type" citizens developed it following open-ended political and legal learning processes. According to Habermas, the "how" is more important than the "what". Therefore he emphasized the "post-conventional" identity formation. In contrast, the object of identification was not fixed. For that reason new and reflective citizens could easily express their loyalties towards different subjects, for example, a constitution or a nation.

what Habermas has termed the "rationalization of collective identities". The general character of a society and also its sense of attachment can emerge from a collective learning process (Müller 2006). [104]

Thus, citizenship consists of effective access to a communication process among equal and free citizens and is more than an inherited nationality. In this communication process, citizens should define who they want to be and how they want to relate to its past. As such, identity could be based on a public interpretation of universalist norms rather than any pre-established criteria.

In a nutshell, "constitutional patriotism" can be seen as a "radical" theory of democracy that seeks a reasonable justification for citizens' attachment to their constitution. Many scholars see it as a redefinition of the concept of civic nationalism, mainly because "constitutional patriotism" looks for the legitimacy of the state when legitimacy on a common national identity basis is difficult. This concept has frequently been applied to not only to the German, but also the European context (Ungureanu et al. 2011, Castiglione 2004, Nanz 2007).

The Habermasian concept received criticism from many sides. Miller (1995), for example, claimed that being a "constitutional patriot" makes a citizen a liberal rather than a fascist or anarchist. However, it does not say much about the national belonging, something which still decisive in drawing borders. According to Miller, this can only be offered by a political identity in the form of nationality. [105]

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[104]According to Habermas, post-conventional identities were most likely to appear where national identities had been put decisively under question and where citizens felt acutely ambivalent about affirming historical continuities. The model for this thinking was Germany, were historical identities have been replaced by rights and democratic procedures. Consequently, West Germans could develop an "abstract patriotism" based on even more abstract universalist forms of political belonging (Müller 2006).

[105] "I believe, however, that we should be skeptical about 'constitutional patriotism' as a substitute for nationality of a more familiar sort. It is important not to confuse the idea that a constitution can be valuable as an explicit statement of a nation's political principles, or the idea that the enacting of a formal constitution can be an historic act that plays a very significant role in national history (as in the American case), with the claim that constitutional loyalty alone can serve as a substitute for national identity. A constitution usually contains a statement of principles and a delineation of the institutions that will enact them. The principles themselves are likely to be general in form, more or less the common currency of liberal democracies. Subscribing to them marks you out as a liberal rather than a fascist or an anarchist, but it does not provide the kind of political identity that nationality provides. In particular, it does not explain why the boundaries of the political community should fall here rather than there; not does it give you any sense of the historical identity of the community, the links that bind present-day politics to decisions made and actions performed in the past" (Miller 1995:163)

3.3.2. Empirical analysis

To analyze if and how aspects of "constitutional identity" in the form of "constitutional patriotism" have an influence on the political stability of the Spanish "State of Autonomies" I will refer to available empirical data.

I will first examine the discourse of the main political parties looking for aspects of "constitutionalism" within their party manifesto. Then I will analyze with survey data at hand, how Spanish citizens evaluate the Constitution. Here, I will highlight the support for and reform of the constitution in the national and national/regional parts of the Spanish "State of Autonomies".

Looking at the concept of "constitutional patriotism" as possible glue for a multinational society in Spain is not new. Some authors have identified it as a central element of Spanish nationalism based on the democratic nature of the Spanish state, the decentralized structure of the state and the acceptance of the King (Muro and Quiroga 2005).

However, we should be aware of the conceptual problems when connecting "constitutional patriotism" to the Spanish case. Should we analyze the theoretical Habermasian body of work and apply it to a multinational state? Or should we rely on what the author himself says about its application? Considering the former approach, we will face some problems with its use, above all, aspects of "deliberative democracy".

First, the Spanish constitution has not come about as the result of public discourse. Rather, it was a series of partially secret negotiations between the old authoritarian state forces and parts of the emerging new democratic elites. Discussions took place in an atmosphere of terrorist fear (ETA) and under pressure from the military. There were no deliberative and public debates about the nature of the Spanish state. The two statewide parties Partido Popular (PP) and Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) have developed Spanish nationalism (see also Chapter 5).

Habermas developed the concept of "constitutional patriotism" as a post-national identity for the German state and later as a possible suggestion for the European Union. There were no provisions for accommodating national minorities.

Moreover, once the leftist intellectuals introduced the concept of the "constitutional patriotism", it was also taken over by the right-wing Partido Popular (PP), a

development, which surprised also Habermas: "I cannot possibly imagine that it became suddenly a concept of the right, when its origin is a leftist idea, and it is directed against the nationalist conception" (Habermas 2003:1).

3.3.2.1. Political parties and constitutionalism

To examine the stance of statewide parties on constitutionalism, I will analyze their discourse, relying on Party Manifesto Data[106], which measures political preferences of parties across time and space for over thirty years. The party manifesto project measures the support for the Constitution, defined in the following manner: "Support for specific aspects of the constitution; use of constitutionalism as an argument for policy as well as general approval of the constitutional way of doing things. "

Figure 3.8. State-wide parties on constitutionalism

Source: PMD (Party Manifesto Data)

The Party Manifesto Data shows that, up to 1982, the leftist parties covered constitutionalism. Above all, in 1979 2.5% of the discourse of the Socialist Party can be interpreted as direct support of the Constitution. The Communist PCE used 3.5 % of its discourse for that endeavor. The AP/PP started to use a discourse on Constitution in 1982. Once the AP/PP embraced the Constitution, it began to support it at an even a stronger level than the PSOE. Starting in 1986 the discourse on the support of the Constitution become weaker among all parties and has subsequently declined. In the 1990s and 2000s, the discourse on constitutionalism has not gone

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[106] The PMD is the most systematic analytical tool used to examine the existence and subsequent development of discourse on constitutionalism.

beyond 1% threshold. What once has been an essential aspect of the party discourse, changed once democracy became widely accepted.

Figure 3.9. All parties on Constitutionalism

Source: PMD (Party Manifesto Data)

When we add to the analysis the national/regional parties, we can see a similar pattern. The nationalist parties demonstrated similar degrees of constitutionalism in the first decade of the "State of Autonomies" but have since withdrawn that support. Above all, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and Catalan Republican Left (ERC) have emphasized, during some periods, the negative aspects of constitutionalism in their party programs. Just before the elections in 2012, this negative discourse is silenced, and these parties adjust their position to that of the statewide parties.[107]

In a nutshell, we can conclude that discourse on constitutionalism has been principally used particularly often in the years of the transition to a parliamentarian monarchy. Once this goal was accomplished, the discourse was strongly reduced. At the same time, some of the nationalist parties have used questions of constitutionalism as a negative rhetoric against the Spanish state.

3.3.2.3. Citizens and constitutionalism

Habermas has argued that the German Constitution is something the Germans should be proud of and that the Spanish Constitution probably has the same quality because it is based on the German model (Habermas 2003). In the following, I will evaluate if

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[107] The data on 2015 is not available yet.

Spanish citizens have developed some pride in or satisfaction with their constitution and which values they attach to it. In seeking an answer, I encounter some difficulties. Firstly, we have to ask the question(s): how to measure support for a constitution? Should we measure a constitution itself or its values? If these values do not change, how should we evaluate a possible reform of a constitution?

I will start my analysis with the question of how Spaniards evaluated the content of the Constitution. The CIS Institute asked the question: "Whose ideas and interests do you think are represented in the Constitution?"

Figure 3.10. Constitution: Whose ideas and interests?

Source: CIS

This figure shows that the Spanish respondents see the Constitution as the result of a compromise. Between 37% and 63% of the interviewees gave the answer: "The values are from everybody and nobody in particular", while fewer than 10% said that the Constitution included ideas from either the right, from the left or the center. This consensus was growing until the year 2000 when the survey institute (CIS) stopped asking the question. The CIS also asked the Spaniards about the key contributions of the Constitution.

Figure 3.11. Key contributions of the Constitution

Source: CIS

The Spaniards see the guaranteeing of freedom as the key contribution of the Constitution. This answer was given by, on average, between 34% and 43.4% of respondents in the years 1984 and 2012. From 1984, the second option, "That it allows resolving conflicts by peaceful means", lost some of its support and declined from18% to around 11.6% in 2012. On the other hand, the response which has risen the most during the period of study was: "That it was approved by the agreement of almost everyone", with growth from around 14% in 1984 up to 18.5% in 2012. The answers: "that it restored the monarchy, "that it is limiting the powers of the government", and that "it recognized the right of autonomy for the nationalities and regions", have not featured heavily and remained well below 10% for the whole period.

It is important not only to evaluate the perceptions of the Constitution but also the actual knowledge of it. In the following graph, people were asked if they think: "that Spaniards know the constitution well, above the average, very little or nearly nothing". With that, this question is not a direct auto-evaluation, but more an evaluation of all the Spaniards as fellow citizens. To give a better overview, I have summarized the answers "We know it well" and "above the average" in one group and "very little" and "nearly nothing" in a second group.

Figure 3.12. Evaluation of how well the Spaniards know the Constitution

Source: CIS

This data shows that the majority of the Spaniards believe, that Spaniards know "very little" or "nearly nothing" about their Constitution. This development is quite stable with 56.6% in 1998 and 76.3% in 2012. In 1998, 36.8% answered that the perceived knowledge of the Constitution was as "above the average". However, usually, this number is much lower, for example, 24% in 1988 and 20.5% in 2012.

These three survey questions give us interesting insights into the perception of the Constitution. The majority of the respondents have the perception that the Constitution is a compromise between parties. Its main contribution is to guarantee freedom, resolve conflicts peacefully and that it was approved by almost everyone. However, most of the respondents believe that the Spaniards know very little or nearly nothing about the Constitution. All these trends have remained quite stable for almost three decades.

With these perceptions of the Constitution in mind, I will turn to analyze the satisfaction of the Spaniards with the Constitution. The question asked was the following: "To what extent are you satisfied with the Constitution: very satisfied, satisfied, not very satisfied, or not satisfied at all with the constitution?" Here I have also summarized the "very satisfied" and "satisfied" in one group and coded it as positive evaluation. The other group, coded as negative evaluation, includes the answers "not very satisfied" and "not satisfied at all".

Figure. 3.13. Satisfaction with the Constitution

Source: CIS

This figure shows much more variation than the graphs on the content of the Constitution. During more than two decades the positive evaluation of the Constitution was dominant. Between 48.7% (1994) and 69% (1989) of Spanish respondents gave a positive evaluation. Nevertheless, this tendency has changed since 2005. In 2012 a negative assessment became the dominant option.

As there is no similar longitudinal data, which analyses the difference between Spanish respondents and the members of the national/regional units, I have to use a one-off survey performed in the year 2006. As already shown, this period can be seen as a moment of political instability in the Basque Country and Spain, due to the Spanish/Basque conflict. Alternatively, at this time there is still no salient nationalist conflict in Catalonia. The participants in that survey were asked if they: "welcome the Constitution because it has been a useful tool to keep the country together".

Figure 3.14. Constitution as a tool for cohesion – Spain, Catalonia, Basque Country

Source: CIS

This graph shows that a vast majority of Spaniards (82.3%) and Catalans (70.8%) welcomes the Constitution because it has been a useful tool to keep the country together. An important difference that we can find is that in the Basque Country only 46% strongly agreed or agreed with that statement. Nevertheless, this represents the most frequent option. Some 18.5% of the Basques have answered, "neither agree nor disagree", while 24.7% disagree or strongly disagree with that statement.

These two graphs show that for decades the Constitution has been positively evaluated across Spain. Even though in the Basque Country the support was weaker, it was still the most frequent answer. However, since 2008 we observe a tendency towards being unsatisfied with the Constitution. For that reason, I would like to analyze now which aspects the Spaniards criticized and which aspects were proposed for reform.

Figure 3.15. Reform of the Spanish Constitution

Source: CIS

If we exclude a survey conducted in 2001, which could be seen as an outlier, the decade after 1987 is marked as a period in which Spaniards had a relatively stable view as regards to the need to reform the Spanish Constitution. Around 40% thought that reform is needed, while around 30% said that the "no reform is needed" and between 20 and 30% did not know. In 2000, the majority said that no reform was needed, however, since then the numbers favoring reform have grown. In 2012 nearly 60% of the Spaniards stated that the "Constitution needs reform", and only 20% answered that "no reform" is needed.

We can understand the pressure for a reform of the Constitution better when we analyze which parts were proposed for reform. We found available data in 2005. To arrive at better understanding of the data, in this survey I will introduce a new actor. Besides the common view of the Spanish, Catalan and Basque citizens, I introduce the average view of the members of the majority nation - this means Spanish citizens without the citizens of the Minority Units, Catalonia and Basque Country.[108]

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[108] I define as majority nationalism all Spanish AC except the Basque Country and Catalonia. Therefore I exclude from the surveys the answers of the Basques and the Catalans from the statewide Spanish numbers. I am aware that this only partly solves the problem of majority and minority nationalism, because, as already shown in Chapter 2, in the national/regional units we find persons who identify uniquely or partly with Spain.

Figure 3.16. Aspects of the Constitution that should be reformed (2005)

Source: CIS/Barometro Autonomico I (2005)

This graph shows that, when talking about the need for reform, the majority and minority groups were seemingly talking about something different. When we split the answers along the majority and minority axis, we observe that when the majority nation talks of reforming the Constitution, they had, in the first place, the succession of the crown in mind. The reform of the "Statute of Autonomies" comes in the second place, just a little above preferences for a "Reform of the Justice" or "Securing social rights".

The picture is completely different in the national/regional units. Note that Basques are merely interested in questions related to the reform of the "Statute of Autonomy" and the "right for self-determination." For the Catalans, the first and most important preference has been the reform of the "Statute of Autonomy". "Securing social rights" and the "Succession of the Crown" are much less important. Nevertheless, there is a common denominator for all four groups; the first answer in all four cases was the "I don't know" answer, which means that even if the participations had a presumption about the need of reform, most people did not exactly know what's wrong with the Constitution.

In a preliminary summary, I can state that the Spanish Constitution was not connected with nor developed "constitutional patriotism". At least at the beginning, the Constitution was seen as a kind of compromise between all political parties and Spanish citizens. Back then; the Constitution could be described as the glue, which had held the Spanish "State of Autonomies" together. Coherent with that

interpretation would be that at the moment when the political parties stopped referring to the Constitution and the most citizens saw a need for reform, the Spanish state became less stable. For all these reasons, evaluations of different aspects of the Constitution could be seen as an interesting instrument to measure the stability of this multinational state.

3.4. Citizenship as participation

In the following, I will conceptualize the question of citizenship as participation. I will try to investigate if and how civic participation affects the political stability of the multinational state. However, I should state that such an empirical approach has its problems. As already stated in the introduction of this dissertation, to answer the research question, we have to concentrate on an empirical rather than a normative analysis. However, most of the work on "citizenship as participation" up to now has been normative in nature. Not many convincing empirical articles have been written during these decades.

Most of the normative discussion is based on the "republican" and to a lesser degree also on the "communitarian" tradition in political theory. The former builds on the notion of the "common good", which can be reached by participating in public life. The latter concentrates on aspects of community and the duty of the citizens to actively engage in it. Both traditions argue that the "common good" should be guaranteed by the "civic virtue" of the citizenry. This kind of citizenry has been commonly described in both approaches as the "good citizens". Most of these aspects are analyzed through the school of "civic republicanism", which has been based principally on Republican, but also some communitarian aspects.[109]

Most authors argue that some level of political participation of the citizens is necessary for the political stability of a state. In the civic republican tradition, most of these ideas are connected to the approach of "deliberative democracy" by authors like Habermas (1996) and Barber (1984).[110] Following this type of argumentation in the very moment when citizens become essential elements of the state, their participation

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[109] Interpretations on "civic republicanism" differ. Kymlicka (2002) sees civic republicanism as a natural evolution of communitarian concerns with social unity.

[110] Both developed their argument relying on the ideas of Rousseau and Kant, who claimed that the authority of a state should not be set up in the Hobbesian sense as a contract between people and a government, but that power should be based on the self-legislation of the people.

seems to start to influence the quality of this state. Taylor (1989: 179) sees participation as a kind of self-rule: "Full participation in self-rule is seen as being able, at least part of the time, to have some part in the forming of the ruling consensus, with which one can identify along with others. To rule and to be ruled in turn, means that at least some of the time the governors can be "us", and not always "them"".

However, a good democratic citizen should not only participate in political life. Shklar (1991:5) describes him/her as the following: "The good democratic citizen is a political agent who takes part regularly in politics locally and nationally, not just on primary and election day. Active citizens keep informed and speak out against public measures that they regard as unjust, unwise, or just too expensive. They also openly support politics that they see as just and prudent. Although they do not refrain from pursuing their own and their reference group's interests, they try to weigh the claims of other people impartially and listen to their arguments. They are public meeting goers and joiners of voluntary organizations who discuss and deliberate with others about the politics that will affect them all, and who serve their country not only as taxpayers and occasional soldiers but by having a considered notion of the public good that they genuinely take to heart. The good citizen is a patriot."

This long description has mentioned nearly all aspects, which are usually associated with a good citizen. The importance of this kind of "good citizen" is strongly influenced by Tocqueville (2000) [1835], who emphasizes on associations or clubs, where citizens develop civic virtues. These activities help to bridge important social differences and cleavages and can become like a bond of social cohesion.

Questions of good citizenship have also been asked in the literature on "social capital". Putman's (1993) main finding was that the differences between the different "social capitals" in Northern and Southern Italy are responsible for different performances in both parts. A society with rich "social capital" is more likely to produce an active community than a society builds on a hierarchical or familial basis, which is more likely to produce a vicious circle of distrust.

Some of the scientific research has pointed into the direction, that different levels of civic participation could make a difference. Considering our research question, we might expect that if there are differences between the levels of involvement in the national and national/regional units, this may have an impact on the stability of the multinational state.

Higher participation in regional rather than national elections could be demonstrative of a kind of disconnection with the central state. However, we also cannot exclude that it could mean satisfaction with the political situation on the central level.

Regarding civic attitudes, we would have to decide how to interpret higher levels of participation between these two types of units. For example, different levels of participation could show that there are various political or civic communities, which are disconnected from each other.

Moreover, I could also analyze, if "bridging" associations between both units could act as a stabilizing factor. The aforementioned questions could fill a whole dissertation, and for that reason, I can only tackle some fundamental aspects. However, I hope that this research can give some significant indications, which can be dealt with in future analysis.

In a first step, I will analyze: "which aspects of the personal life are important for the Spaniards". Among the possible answers, we find: "politics" and "associations and other clubs", which are the concepts that the civic republicanism and "social capital" literature has defined as the salient characteristics of the good citizens and its civic virtues.

The CIS-survey in 2002 asked the questions in the two national/regional AC Catalonia and the Basque Country; the AC Madrid; and in the "Rest of Spain". That allows us to make an interesting comparison, which could be a good preliminary analysis if there is a trend towards differences between the national and national/regional units.

Figure 3.17. "Which aspects of personal life are important for you?"

Source: CIS (2002)

This data shows that the most important aspects for all Spaniards are: "family" (more than 9 points), "friends", "leisure", and "work" (all around 8 points). The importance of "associations and other clubs" is at a similar level to "religion" (between 4 and 5 points). In the last position, we find "politics" with values between 3 and 4 points.

We cannot identify important differences between the AC. Respondents in Catalonia give less importance to "religion" and respondents in the AC Madrid give more importance to politics. However, even here the differences are lower than 1 point. The longitudinal analysis of the question shows that between 2002 and 2015, the evaluation of the importance of "politics" and "associations and clubs" did not change in Spain (see Appendix 3.1.)

In another question from the same survey, the CIS Institute asked: "To consider yourself a good citizen, what importance do you give to the following activities?"

Figure 3.18: Activities of the "good citizen"

Source: CIS (2002)

This graph shows that the aspects, which are usually emphasized by civic republicanism, are not the most important ones for the Spaniards. The most relevant aspects are "being in solidarity with people who are worse off than you" and "always comply with the laws and regulations". "Voting in elections", with around 7 points, is an important value, being fifth in the ranking. "Participating in organizations and associations" is the least important aspect, with a little less than 6 points.

These differences confirm what the studies on the political culture of Spain have argued (Vazques Garcia 2010). When Spaniards are asked about the prototype of a good or virtuous citizen, then they usually point to compliance with the law rather

than the social, participative aspects. Regarding this national and national/regional units are not different. Therefore, conceptions of "good citizen" in the different regions in Spain are similar.

The same survey also asked questions about the efficiency of some activities, which are usually connected with aspects of political/civic participation.

Figure 3.19. "What degree of efficacy would you give to the following activities?"

Source: CIS

The data gives interesting insights. Spanish respondents believe that the most efficient activity is "voting in elections", followed by "collaboration in organizations and voluntary associations". Both are seen as superior to "participating in some manifestations" or "contacting a politician". "Participating in illegal protest" has been identified as a less effective activity. In the literature on participation, these last two activities tend to be seen as the most effective. As in our other questions, in this question, we cannot detect any significant differences between the different national or national/regional units.

This short overview reveals some interesting aspects. First, when analyzing important aspects of personal life, Spaniards identify "politics" and "associations or other clubs" as being much less important than, for example, family or leisure. Contrary to what is claimed in the "civic republican" literature, "Voting in elections" and "Participating in organizations and associations" are aspects, which are not strongly correlated with being a good citizen. However, both aspects become important when Spaniards are asked about the efficacy of participative activities. There are almost no differences among the evaluations featured in these questions when we compare the national and the national/regional units. Besides that, there seem to be quite similar political

cultures in the national and the national/regional units.

I will divide the following section into two parts. The first part will focus on the vertical participation of the citizens within the state. A possible causality between political participation and political stability is not counterintuitive. I claim that low levels of political participation could be an expression of political instability, above all, if we find high levels of participation in the national/regional units, but not in the central state.

The second one will analyze questions of participation within the community, including aspects of social capital and voluntary organizations.[111] I will connect these aspects to the question of political stability in a multinational state, as until now research has not theorized the ways if at all, participation or growth of "civic virtues" of the citizenry influences stability in this context.[112]

3.4.1. Political participation

3.4.1.1 Conceptualization

Following Galston's (1991) account, Kymlicka (2002) has identified two aspects which distinguish citizenship in a liberal democracy from citizenship in a non-liberal democracy: a) engagement in public discourse about matters of public policy and b) the ability and willingness to question political authority. Interestingly, also Almond and Verba (1963: 337f.) in their ground-breaking work "Civic Culture" presented a similar design, even if they claimed that citizens should not only be politically interested, active, loyal, trusting, and deferential, but at the same time self-conscious. However, the exact amount of the necessary participation remains a matter of debate. Most of the civic republicanism debate turns around that question. An "Aristotelian" strand of literature claims that participation in the political process is the highest of

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[111] However, this part of the analysis will not be completed in this chapter. The most important ingredient of social capital in the form of social and political trust will be analyzed on its own in the 4th chapter.

[112] I do not expect a direct relationship. However, the relevant literature established that rich civic life produces trust, which can influence the stability of a multinational state. And it is this social trust, and not the voluntary organizations, which has been seen as the bond for the social cohesion of a multinational state.

possible satisfactions (Herreros 2006). However, empirical research finds evidence, that there is a decline in political participation[113] (Torcal 2014).

Important possibilities for participation include voting and public discourse. Both are strongly interconnected. Barber (1984) and Cohen (1989) claim that voting should follow a process of "thoughtful interaction and opinion formation". Some authors from the rational-choice school present an alternative view. Building on Riker (1980) who argues in "Liberalism versus Populism" that elections should serve to control the elected and not be a "populist" expression of the public will. From this perspective, voting is simply the aggregating of given personal preferences. However, voting can also be understood in a different manner. Elections can be considered as ways to select "good types" of politicians. Some authors like Herreros (2006) claim that authors from the field of civic republicanism interpreted elections in that sense.[114]

An additional aspect, also widely connected to voting, is the question of public debates advocated by, among others, Habermas (1996), who based his ideas on citizenship on elements of "deliberative democracy". In his framework, citizenship should be seen as intersubjective enterprise between citizens, which by creating discursive spaces could address matters of common concern.[115] This formation process should occur spontaneously without the control of formal systems from the center to the periphery and should allow channels of communication in the other direction: from the periphery to the center.[116]

Besides political participation in the form of voting and public debates, there are additional ways to express political interest and to participate in the state through political action. These alternative forms of political participation go beyond the party system and electoral processes and consist of expressing specific demands for reform using non-institutionalized forms of work. This set of tactics may include signing petitions, working or collaborating in a political party, boycotting, petitioning or

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[113]. Some of the authors interpret it as the loss of interest in public issues. This claim is rejected by Kymlicka (2002) who emphasizes another aspect - the growth of satisfaction with the private life: "Our attachment to private life, I believe, is the result, not (or not only) of the impoverishment of public life, but of the enrichment of private life."

[114] "They viewed elections as a means to select what they often called the "natural aristocracy", virtuous political leaders who would pursue the common good" (Herreros 2006: 415).

[115] Habermas (1996:499): "The republican model of citizenship reminds us that constitutionally protected institutions of freedom are with only what a population accustomed to political freedom and settled in the "we" perspective of active self-determination makes of them. The legally institutionalized role of citizens must be embedded in the context of a liberal political culture."

[116] There are many practical objections to the concept of "deliberative democracy". One of them is mentioned by Beiner (2006) who claims that endless conversation about the public good would not generate "public happiness" (Hannah Arendt) but frustration with "too many meetings" (Oscar Wilde).

wearing a campaign badge (see e.g. Hooghe and Marien 2012; Braun and Hutter 2014). The data about political action is widely available and easily comparable and will be included into this analysis.

3.3.1.2. Empirical analysis

Some of the conceptualized aspects of political participation such as voting in elections or participation in political action are easy to operationalize, in part due to the availability of survey data. This task is much more difficult when we try to operationalize deliberation in public debates. Should we try to count the number of neighborhood meetings? How could we measure the democratic content of the public debates? Given the difficulties of operationalizing it correctly, I will include voting and political action but will exclude public debates from the empirical analysis.

The introductory analysis has shown that there does not seem to be much difference between the levels and interpretations of political participation in the regional AC and the national/regional units. In the following step, I will delve deeper into these questions. First, I will analyze voting. The following graph shows the participation in the general elections in the whole of Spain, in the Basque Country and Catalonia. We have already seen that Spaniards see voting as the most effective political/civic activity.[117]

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[117] One wonders whether such data measures civic aspects of political participation or only some rational reasoning. This is the argument that Putman (1993) makes when analyzing Italy, claiming that in some periods when voting was obligatory, party organizations had an incentive to influence elections and electoral turnout depends on party organizational strength and activity and additionally that in some places voting for some people is dependent on personal benefits. For that reason, Putman prefers to look at referenda to see the "civic aspects" of elections. However, in the Spanish case, we only find two statewide referenda in 1986 on NATO and 2005 on the EU, which are not enough to give sound empirical results.

Figure 3.20. Participation in general elections in Spain

Source: Spanish Electoral Board, infoelectoral.es

The first notable finding is that there is some stability regarding the participation of Spaniards in general elections to the Spanish Parliament (*Congreso de Diputados*). Apparently, there are no big differences in the levels of participation in the different national or national/regional units. The participation in the Basque Country is just a little bit below the participation in Spain or Catalonia, which are almost the same.

Figure 3.21. Participation in general and regional voting

Source: Spanish Electoral Board, infoelectoral.es

When we compare the participation in the Spanish general elections and the regional/autonomous elections in Catalonia and the Basque Country, some exceptions notwithstanding, more people participated in the general than in the regional elections. In the Basque County, participation in the regional/autonomous elections

has been higher than in the general elections twice, although not in the same year. The participation in the Catalan elections has always been below the general elections until 2015 when more people participated in the regional than in the general elections. One of the reasons must surely be the referendum character of these elections, something that was accepted by nearly all actors (see Chapter 7).

Besides the hard data on participation, we can also analyze the evaluations of the citizens when asked about the importance of the elections. We find such data in the national/regional unit of Catalonia, where the Catalan Institute CEO analyses the period between 2008-2016.[118]

Figure 3.22. Importance of elections in Catalonia

Source: CEO

This data show two important changes in these eight years. First, from 2008 to 2011 the elections to the Spanish parliament have been considered as more important. This changed after 2011 when the Catalans respondents started to consider the Catalan elections as the most significant ones. We can find a new trend from the beginning of 2014. Apparently, the Catalan respondents started to consider both elections as equally important. There are many possible interpretations of these results.

One would be that after the electoral victory of the PP in 2011 and with the next elections not taking place before 2015, the Catalan respondents lost interest in the general elections and regained it one year before the 2015 elections.

Another interpretation could be that much more was at stake in the regional elections in 2012 and then again in 2015, when the Catalan government tried to legitimate its separatist politics by these elections. In 2015 not only the supporters of the

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[118] There is no data on time before 2008.

independence claims but also their opponents went to the polls. The other interpretation could be, that Catalans partly disconnected from the Spanish state and started considering the Catalan elections and government more and more as their new framework of reference.

These results are nothing more than speculative. However, we can draw from this analysis that the participation in the Spanish elections in all three analyzed units has always been at least around a middle/high level. Spaniards, as well as the Basques and the Catalans, take an active part in the political electoral process.

In a next step, I would like to analyze the development and differences in the political action. The analysis of these aspects of political participation is a quite new phenomenon. I have found relevant data for Spain in the European Social Survey (ESS) for the years 2002-2014.[119]

Figure 3.23. Participation in Political/Civic Action in Spain (2002-2014)

Source: ESS

The Spanish chart shows some stability in the political action taken by Spaniards. However, as the crisis unfolded, especially in 2014 more people participated in semi-institutional forms of work compared to the preceding years.

The most traditional political action is to sign a petition, between 18% in 2010 and 27% in 2014. Also boycotting certain products can be seen as quite popular, with around 13% in 2010 and 23% of Spaniards having taken this kind of political action during the surveyed period. On average, 15% of Spaniards worked in "another

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[119] The survey asked the following question: "Here are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have you ... ...signed a petition?"

organization or association." Between 12% and 15% of Spaniards contacted a politician. Around 5% of them took part in a lawful public demonstration, and even fewer worked in a political party or action group.

We can summarize that, when we exclude the answer "Signing a petition", the level of political actions in Spanish society is low. Spaniards seem to participate in the political life through elections and rarely by political action.

In a next step, I would like to compare the levels of participation between the national and the national/regional units. Some authors like Torcal, Montero and Teorell (2006) have already asked this question. These authors, building on the CID data set (Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy) from the years 1999-2002 and they find nearly no differences between the national or national/regional units. However, they find slightly more political participation in the AC Madrid. The authors associate this to the fact that Madrid is the capital. They also find slightly lower levels of participation in the Basque Country. There is no newer data; so different units cannot be compared. However, the Catalan CEO Institute has also conducted the question "What kind of political action you have conducted in the last 12 months?" during recent years (2014-2016).[120]

Figure 3.24. Participation in Political Action in Catalonia (2014-2016)

Source: CEO

This graph shows that in Catalonia political action seems to be more commonplace. Just as in the statewide context, the most popular action is "signing a petition", with well above 30% of the participants having given that answer over the surveyed two years. A very popular action is "taking part in a lawful public demonstration" with

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[120] It analyzes the first and second wave of 2014, the 3rd wave of 2015, and the first wave of the year 2016.

around 35% of the Catalan respondents participating. Around 25% of Catalans have "worked in another organization or association"; while between 15% and 20% of the Catalans have worn a campaign badge/sticker. Also, around 15% have collaborated with some civic action group, and over 15% boycotted a product. The levels of political action towards or within the institutions of representative democracy are among the lowest. Only around 10% of the Catalans have contacted a politician and little more than 5% of them collaborated with a political party.

In a preliminary summary two aspects stand out. First, Spaniards tend to participate in politics mostly through elections, which are considered the most effective actions. They usually do not use other channels, although there are exceptions in some years like mass manifestations in 2003 against the Iraq War or the "indignados" movement in 2012 (Portos 2016).

Second, the respondents living in Catalonia are much more active than the statewide respondents. From this, it would seem that Catalan society is much more vivid. However, this point needs more nuance. First, the analyzed surveys were conducted during a period of political instability in Catalonia. There are no data on Catalonia before 2010. Second, most of the political action can be connected to the nationalist mobilization, which has a strong civic component. The massive participation on the Catalan national day, "La Diada", between the years 2012-2015 could explain both the number of persons, which participated in a lawful demonstration and the quite high numbers, compared to the Spanish average, of wearing a campaign badge/sticker or collaborating with some civic groups. At least, in this case, it seems political dissatisfaction has a strong effect on mobilization and individual potential to participate in political protests.

3.3.2. Participation in a community
3.3.2.1 Conceptualization

The right of citizens to assemble and unite in associations is often recognized as a precondition for democracy. This view is found not only in civic republicanism, when concentrating on aspects of political participation but also in the communitarian approach in political theory. It can be found among others in the works of Sandel (1998). Following this scholar, citizenship should be seen as more than a right, principally as the responsibility to participate and actively engage in one's

community. As such, the communitarian view emphasizes the idea of active participation in social life as the core element of "good citizenship" (Walzer 1989).

The importance of this kind of "good citizenship" has been present in the works of Tocqueville (2000) [1835], who saw the tendency of Americans to unite in associations. He claimed that this fact should attract more attention: "In democratic countries the science of association is the mother science; the progress of all the others depends on the progress of that one" (2000) [1835]: 492).[121] Tocqueville distinguished civil associations, including intellectual and moral associations, from political associations. Nowadays, the literature usually connects his ideas with the term "voluntary associations", even though Tocqueville did not use this term.

In line with classic republicanism, Cohen and Rogers (1992) or Hirst (1992, 1994) argue that participation in associations has an intrinsic democratic value; through the associative experience citizens acquire information for public participation, deliberation and self-government.

To the best of my knowledge, there are no works, which connect the participation in such an organization to the political stability of a state. I claim that it is also impossible to draw any causality from these voluntary organizations to political stability. Involvement with and participation in the local community may have all sorts of benefits for both the community and its individual members, but we cannot discover any link to stability, in significant part owing to lack of data. In this regard, our results cannot answer to what extent the stability of a multinational community rests upon a vibrant community life.

Involvement in associations is usually related to democratic attitudes and orientations or participatory behavior. Therefore associations have often been portrayed as "schools of democracy" which help to develop positive feelings towards other social and political institutions (political trust, interest in politics) or towards other individuals (social trust), which could be summarized with the term "trust" (Morales/Geurts 2007).[122] And it is this social trust, which can be connected to political stability.

As we have seen, it is not clear just what it is that people understand to be the integral concept of a "good citizen". Spaniards link "good citizenship" with aspects like

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[121] Volume Two, Part Two, Chapter Five. However, we should not forget, that de Tocqueville (2000) [1835] was emphasizing the necessity of voluntary organizations, above all because of the absence of the state, while comparing the democratic US to the aristocratic France.
[122] Questions of trust will be examined in the following chapter 4.

"solidarity with others" or "to comply with the law". Aspects of "participation in organizations or associations" have been identified as the less relevant for being a "good citizen".

When analyzing participation in a community, we have to take into account that not all participation has to do with "civic" virtues. For that reason, we should ask the extent to which being a member of a sport, cultural or other organization can be seen as an expression of "good citizenship". Self-interest and not the care for others can be the driving force behind joining nearly every association. It seems that only unpaid voluntary organizations with an altruistic background, like for example associations helping homeless people, are regarded as "virtuous activities". However, we should keep in mind, that in its original conceptualization, de Tocqueville did not put emphasis on the necessity of an altruistic motivation for being a member of these civic associations.

In line with this argumentation, it 's hard to draw the right conclusions regarding membership in associations/organizations and its two-ways causality with civic virtues. Most of the data focus on organizations and only a few scholars ask about the voluntary aspects. In a nutshell, these aspects tend to be mixed and difficult to identify.

When we approach the question from the field of social capital, we can add additional aspects. The social capital literature claims that voluntary associations help to create a civic culture. However, this proposal has been questioned, with authors suggesting that associations are a mere reflection of the political culture of a state in a given time (Roßteutscher 2002).

An additional approach for the analysis of participation in a community would be to differentiate between different types of associations like bridging and bonding associations. This distinction goes back to the works of social capital, which distinguishes between the effects of "bridging" versus "bonding" social capital (Paxton 2002, Putnam 2000). This approach focuses on levels of participation in these associations. I would like to go one step further and also introduce some institutional aspects into the analysis. I expect that not only the participation in these associations but also these associations in their form as institutions is essential for political stability.

Usually, the literature agrees on defining bridging associations as unifying units that crosscut social cleavages. [123] Typically, they are linked to associations within the larger community, which in a multinational state would connect a national/regional unit with the national unit. The bridging associations include different citizens with diverse attitudes and opinions. By their interaction bridging social capital produces wider identities (Putnam 2000).

Bonding associations are built on a different logic. First, they are isolated and oriented to the interior. Second, their members are more similar, and therefore their interaction with other groups intensifies their feeling different. For example, we could claim that national/regional associations concentrating on its cultural particularities, also expressed in their national/regional language, would attract only a few members that do not speak at least that language. Bonding groups, then, can give social and psychological support for ethnic minorities; however, they could also be seen as an obstacle for relations outside the ethnic subgroup and a factor for political instability of the superarching state.

But which associations are usually perceived as bridging and which as bonding? Albacete (2010) analyzing the Spanish case used the distinction by Zmerli (2003), who distinguished bonding and bridging capacities in more than 20 types of voluntary associations. In their final taxonomy, she located three groups: bonding groups, bridging groups, and interest groups. As for bridging groups, we find Sports clubs, Cultural associations, Parents' associations, Charity associations, Humanitarian associations, Housing associations, Religious associations, Political parties, Youth clubs, Environmental organizations, Hobby clubs, Animal rights associations, Consumer associations. Zmerli defined as bonding associations: pensioner's associations, car assistance clubs, women's associations, patients' associations and associations for disabled persons. She also introduces a third category of interest groups, where we find unions, professional organizations, business associations or farmer associations. Zmerli (2002) claims that interest groups can be seen as part of the bonding category. However, they have to be categorized separately, because of their political ambitions.[124]

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[123] We should keep in mind, that when these concepts were developed, the authors did not have a multinational state in mind, but states with all possible economic, religious or linguistic cleavages.

[124] Moreover, even if other groups are seen as bonding because of their fortification of exclusive group identity, interest groups struggle for individual material goods (Zmerli 2002). Like other classifications

In the following analysis, I will concentrate on those associations with larger membership numbers and certain data availability. Consequently, I will put emphasis on Sports clubs, Cultural associations, Religious associations or unions and professional organizations. Most of them have been defined as bridging organizations. Only Unions are described as interests groups, which, following Zmerli, are in their essence bonding groups.

In brief, the following empirical analysis focuses on two aspects. First, I will check how much civic involvement we can find in Spain and if there are differences between the national and national/regional units. Second, I will examine the participation in some bridging and bonding associations, and additionally analyze their role as institutions for the political stability of the Spanish "State of Autonomies"

3.4.2.2. Empirical analysis
3.4.2.2.1 Participation in associations in Spain

Research on nationalist movements has shown that voluntary associations had a significant bearing on the emergence of modern nationalist movements (Hroch 1985), also in Catalonia (Brunn 1978). Quiroga (2015) claims that some associations like the Catholic Church, mountaineering associations or the football club F.C. Barcelona have been important for the diffusion of Catalan identities under the dictator Primo de Rivera.

Under the Franco dictatorship the environment was much more repressive, and Catalanism survived primarily in the cultural associations (Núñez Seixas 2008), while F.C. Barcelona stayed an important symbol of Catalanism (Lago et al. 2016). Linz (1971) has stated that organizational life was not very developed in Spain by the end of Francoism. This did not change much in democracy.

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also this one is questionable. An important caveat in using this distinction is that the one which Zmerli used in the German section of the "Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy" data. One advantage is that her divisions can be easily replicated with the Spanish data. However, maybe the particularities of these associations are different when start to ask about the inclusion of immigrants, but the differences between national and national/regional units.

Data availability changed a lot in recent decades.[125] In the following, I will rely on data collected by the "Citizenship, Participation and Democracy" survey, which shows that Spain has had quite low levels of participation in associations.

Figure 3.25. Participation in associations in Europe (1999-2002), in %

Source: Citizenship, Participation and Democracy (CID-Project)

In this European comparison, Spain is positioned far behind the Scandinavian countries. Citizens in Slovenia and Portugal participate more. Spain scores low in all the analyzed categories including: "some participation", "membership", "activities", "donations" or "voluntary work". Spain is only ahead of Russia, Romania, and Moldova.

But how did the membership in these associations develop? In the following, I will present the development of membership in associations in Spain, the Basque Country, Madrid, and Catalonia.

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[125] After the publication of Putman's "Making Democracy Work" in 1993, research surveys increasingly included more questions about participation in associations. Most of the available data, which is sometimes very detailed and rich, come from this period between 1995-2010. However, in contrast to questions of political participation, which allows for some longitudinal analysis, there have rarely been any follow-ups in most of these surveys.

Figure 3.26. Development of membership in associations in Spain

Source: CIS, Morales/Mota (2006) and own elaboration[126]

The data show that at least at the beginning there were differences between the different territorial units. Morales/Mota (2006) who elaborated the data for the years 1980-2002, claim that membership in some associations grew by 10% over the period. They show that the participation in associations in Catalonia and Madrid has also increased, while the numbers have declined in the Basque Country, also because membership in associations has been seen as "dangerous". Since 2002 we do not have so much data points, however, we know that participation in associations has subsequently been in decline.

This trend of a decline of associational life can be confirmed by the World Value Survey (WVS), which examined questions of civic participation in Spain for a longer period between 1995 -2011 in the waves 3 (1995), 5 (2007), and 6 (2011).

Figure 3.27. Membership or participation in different organizations or associations (WVS)

Source: World Value Survey: Waves 3, 5, 6

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[126] The data elaboration for this graph has been tough and may suffer from a too small N, and the mixing of different questions and surveys see also Morales/Mota (2006), p. 82 and 104.

The longitudinal WVS data shows that the membership in all types of associations has been declining since 1995 to a very low level in 2011. The strongest decline has been noticed within the church and religious organizations. Here, the membership numbers went from 15% in 1995 to 7% in 2011. Also, art, musical, educational groups, environmental organizations or professional organizations are weakening slowly towards the point of insignificance. Membership in politicized organizations has not dropped as much.

The CIS dataset "Citizenship, Participation and Democracy" distinguished between different forms of activity in various organizations or associations like: "active membership" – I'm an active member in one (or several), "passive membership" – I'm a member, but I'm not actively involved, "former membership" – I was formerly a member, but not now and "no membership" – I was never a member in any of these groups.

Figure 3.28. Membership or participation in different organizations or associations (CIS)

Source: CIS (2002)

This data shows that, at least in 2002, Spaniards usually were not involved much in any organizations or associations. When Spaniards are active members of an association, then usually it is in a "sport, cultural or entertainment" group. In 2002,

that number reached 14.6%. Additionally, around 9.6% of Spaniards are "passive" members and 17.4% are "former" members. The other important finding is that around 75 % of Spaniards have never been a member of workforce related, religious or another type of voluntary association.

In a next step, I would like to analyze the differences in the density of associations in Spain. Morales/ Mota (2006) have analyzed the differences in density of associations in Spain. They have used CID-data measuring the density of associations on a European level in a study of 25 municipalities/territories (2001-2003).

Figure 3.29. Associations in Europe – study of 25 municipalities/territories (2001-2003)

Source: CID data

In this data different Spanish municipalities have been summarized into three regions: Catalonia, Basque Country, and Madrid. Catalonia shows the highest density of associations with 7 associations/1000 inhabitants. Below that we can find the Basque Country with 6.2 associations/1000 inhabitants. Surprisingly, in Madrid, we find the lowest number of associations with 3.9 associations/1000 inhabitants. In international comparison, the density of the associations in Spain is quite low. For example, the municipality of Aalborg in Denmark has a density of 12.2. Also, Aberdeen in Scotland has a higher density of associations than the Spanish regions.

However, the fact that we find a higher density of associations in Catalonia than for example in Madrid does not mean that the Catalans are more participative. In the following, we will analyze the different types of participation in associations on the

national and national/regional level.

Figure 3.30. Which kind of involvement?

Source: CID data

This data distinguishes between different types of participation such as "some participation", "membership", "activities", "donations" and "voluntary work".

There are differences between the communities, where the citizens of the AC Madrid seemingly participate more in associations than Basques and the Catalans, while there are nearly no differences between Catalonia and the Basque Country.

The same survey has asked the Spanish respondents about the time dedicated to civic involvement in the last month using the following question: "How long, would you say, you spend in total for involvement in associations to meet with groups of people or to help others?"

Obviously, this question measures much more than involvement in associations. For that reason, we may find the answers also other aspects of "good citizenship". Also, this dataset distinguishes between the national and national/regional units.

Figure 3.31. Time dedicated to civic involvement

Source: CIS (2002)

Nearly half of the respondents in all units, except Madrid, answered that they dedicated no time to activities in associations. Between 2.5% (Catalonia) and 4.7% (Madrid) of the respondents declared that they dedicated less than 1 hour for civic involvement. Around 20% of the respondents in all units dedicate "between 1 and 4 hours" and "between 5 and 10 hours" - a dedication which could be summarized as "low civic involvement". Only a few respondents have expressed a "middle/high level of involvement". There are differences between the different units. On the one side, we find 4.9% of respondents in the Basque Country and on the other side 9.6% of respondents in the AC of Madrid, which have dedicated between 11 and 20 hours for this type of activities. On average 13.6% have dedicated more than 20 hours a month, which would be a little less than 5 hours a week. I claim that only the last two groups, which together represent 19.5% of the Spanish respondents, can be seen as active members of the Spanish community life. However, we find that respondents in Madrid seem to invest the largest amount of time, followed by the Catalans and the Basques.

Summarized, we can observe that only a very small part of Spaniards take an active part in associations and most of the citizens who do so, do not spend a lot of time there. It seems like the levels of involvement in the civic life has never been high on the Spanish "State of Autonomies". This has even been declining further in recent decades. However, we barely find data, which would allow for a robust comparison of these aspects in the Spanish and the Catalan or Basque context. The density of associations has been higher in the national/regional units than in Madrid. However,

when analyzing the amount of time dedicated to engagement, then the respondents in the AC Madrid are the more involved in civic associations. Montero, Font and Torcal (2006) conclude in their volume "Ciudadanos, asociaciones y participación en España", that the differences between the AC Madrid, Catalonia and Basque Country are smaller than usually suspected and most of the stereotypes like, for example that the civil society in Catalonia is much more developed than in other parts cannot hold empirical scrutiny. My analysis, which is based on the same or similar data, confirms this finding. For that reason, the claim that the Catalan associational life in itself is the reason for the growth of self-determination demands and a reason for political instability cannot hold.

3.4.2.2. "Bridging" and "bonding" organizations

As already mentioned in the previous section, I would like to analyze the influence of the bridging and bonding organizations on the political stability of the Spanish "State of Autonomies". To not overstep the size limits of this dissertation, I will choose two associations. On the one hand religious associations, which have been defined by Zmerli (2003) as bridging organizations and on the other hand, labor unions, defined by Zmerli as "interest groups" and which are seen as bonding groups. In both cases I will include two aspects. First, I will look at levels of participation in them. Second, I will analyze the potential of these associations in their role as institutions.

3.3.1.3.1. Churches and religious associations

In a first step, I would like to analyze the religious associations. Here I will concentrate in particular on churches, which De Hart/Dekker (2005) have defined as voluntary associations that are contributing to democracy in their form as a public voice, but also as a source of social and political involvement. On the individual level, persons, who participate in religious acts or participate in religious organizations, show higher levels of participation in public life (Morales, Mota, Pérez-Nievas 2006). Some studies claim that religious practice is linked with higher levels of participation in many countries (Halman and Pettersson 1999).

In Spain, we find an overwhelming majority of Catholics in all territorial units. In 1996 in Spain we find that 81.9% of respondents self-identified as Catholic. In Catalonia, only 68.8 % have identified as such. During the Franco dictatorship, Catholicism was part of the statewide Spanish identity, and the Catholic Church was seen as the pillar supporting that regime.

However, the role of the Catholic Church in Catalonia is quite complex and changing. During the Franco regime, a part of the Catholic Church supported Catalan claims for autonomy, while others rejected such claims. After the transition, parts of the Church supported a more autonomous Catalonia. But when the Catalan nationalist mobilization started, and in October 2012 over a million Catalans marched for a "new state of Europe", the Permanent Commission of the Spanish Episcopal Conference (*Conferencia Episcopal Espanola/CEE*) insisted on the defense of the unity of Spain as a moral good of obligatory protection. However, Catalan bishops seemingly voted against this declaration (Nagel 2014).

Figure 3.32. Different types of membership in religious organizations

Source: CIS

The membership numbers in religious associations in the whole of Spain are going down. They took a strong decline between 2004 and 2009, and since then they seem to have stayed stable. The tendency is similar for all three types of membership: "active", "passive" and "former" membership. For example, the active membership, which was around 9% in 2009, declined to 4.2% in 2015.

There are no surprising differences between the national or national/regional units as regards to religious identification. In Catalonia, we can find less religious practice and a higher percentage of agnostics and atheists. Also here, the numbers of active and passive members in religious associations are falling.

The CIS Institute has designed one interesting question for our analysis, asking if "Catholicism is a very important part of the Spanish identity".

Figure. 3.33. "Is Catholicism a very important part of the Spanish identity?"

Source: CIS 2006

The Spaniards tend to agree on not being sure if Catholicism is a very important part of the Spanish identity. More than 40% in Spain and Catalonia and 35% in the Basque Country answered that they "strongly agree" or "agree" with this statement, while 43.1% of the Catalans and 39.5% of the Basques, said that they "disagree" or "strongly disagree". As such a very slight majority of the Spaniards agrees with that statement, while a small majority of persons in the national/regional units claims the opposite.

Catholic identifiers prevail in parties on the political right, even in Catalonia. In a hypothetical referendum on independence, Catholics who attend mess would be more inclined to vote "no", even though this may also be explained by the variable "age" (CEO 2012-2015).

Following this basic analysis, it seems that Catholicism, even if it could be a major bond of the multinational state, is considered as such only to some extent. Catholicism could be bonding because it includes members of national and national/regional units.

3.3.1.3.2. Trade unions and business organizations

In the following, I would like to analyze if there is some influence of trade unions and business associations in their form as bridging or bonding associations on the political stability of Spain.

Academic analyses show that trade unions are losing importance worldwide. In a recent study Hassel (2014) confirms the decline of the unionization labor market and the weakening of trade unions. The Spanish CIS-survey confirms that trend in the Spanish context.

Figure 3.34. Membership and participation in trade unions or business associations

Source: CIS

Between 2004 and 2015 the membership and participation in unions or business associations went down. In difference to the Catholic Church, the different categories of membership developed differently. "Active membership" went down from 6% in 2004 to 4% in 2006, but has stayed stable since. "Former membership" has fallen from 12% to 8%, but has grown again later.

However, one should question if the membership in trade unions is the right way to measure its strength. Alós R., Beneyto P. J., Jódar, P., Molina, O., Vidal, S. (2014) claim that labor relations in Spain have been set on the basis of a representation of workers and not on affiliation. With that, not only membership in the Unions but above all participation in elections could be seen as important indicator for the

strength of the trade unions. The following table analyzes the participation of workers in electoral processes to designate their representatives.

Table 3.2. Participation in trade union elections

	2003	2007	2012
Electors	6.018.163	6.655.027	6.766.220
Voting	4.292.728	4.688.777	4.596.023
Participacion	71,30%	70,50%	67,9

Source: Alós et al. (2014)

The analysis of trade union elections reveals a relatively high and stable participation of workers. In 2003, 71.3 % of the electors voted, in 2007 70.5%, while in 2012 the number declined to 67.9%. We could claim that the union representation in Spain combines a limited active participation and low commitment of workers in affiliate terms with high participation in union elections.

Historically, trade unions usually developed parallel to social-democratic parties. In Spain, the statewide social-democratic PSOE has had some proximity with UGT at least in the first two decades of democracy (Astudillo Ruiz 2001). However, in Spain, the "left" has its particularities. In the national/regional units, we can find leftist-nationalist parties like Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), which define themselves as nationalist forces. Most of them, like the ERC, don't have a strong influence on the trade unions.

Traditionally trade unions are concerned with class interests. They protect statewide welfare requirements and legal framework of labor law at the level of the central state; however, they also support the decentralization of active labor market policies (Keating 2014). Usually, they are quite homogenous and situated on the left side of the socioeconomic cleavage.[127] Nevertheless, in multinational states, the workers can be divided along the nationalist cleavage (Wets 2000). It depends on the trade union whether this challenge is considered an opportunity or as a problem. In a multinational context, trade unions could use the socioeconomic unity to counterbalance the nationalist cleavage. Unions can act as bridging associations, trying to include all national groups and refocus their attention on the class conflict. Nevertheless, they can also develop into homogenous bonding associations, including only one of the national groups or even becoming an active part in the nationalist conflict.

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[127] Even if in South Europe they are organisatory weak and ideologically divided.

The influence and structure of trade unions in Spain is complex. Considering their territorial structure, we find regional differences in Spain.[128] In the Basque Country, we find the following trade unions: *Euskal Langileen Alkartasuna* (ELA) (Basque Workers Solidarity) and *Langile Abertzaleen Batzordeak* (LAB) (Patriotic Workers' Union), which compete with the Spanish *Comisiones Obreras* (CCOO) and *Unión General de Trabajadores* (UGT) on the same territory. The Basque trade unions connect industrial and nationalist militancy, and they are committed to Basque independence. The statewide trade unions like CCOO and UGT, by contrast, recruit more workers who are non-Basque (Keating 2014). The two main Basque nationalist trade unions garnered around 66% of the work council members. Strong national/regional unions did not develop only in the Basque Country, but also in Galicia, where around 33% of the work-council members belong to a nationalist trade union or the Canary Islands with 8% (Alós, R. at al. 2014).

Catalonia's development has been different. From the outset, Catalan employers rejected the creation of an autonomous Catalan labor organization for independent action. They preferred the formation of statewide organizations while opposing the creation of a specifically Catalan framework of labor relations. All that was influenced by the fear of the intervention of a possible socialist and communist dominated autonomous government. Consequently, the trade unions in Catalonia have been from the beginning affiliated to the Spanish federations like the CCOO and the UGT (Jordana/Nagel 1998, Balcells 1996).[129]

When comparing both, the Catalan branch of CCOO seems to accept the Catalan frame of reference. The UGT also includes both groups. However, the framing of that organization appears to be more Spanish than Catalan. [130] Both recognize to some extent the national question. However, they are not "nationalist". The effort to

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[128] Keating claims that: "Following the Second World War (and in Spain, the transition to democracy), unions supported the development of the welfare state, which was a centralizing process based on equal provision irrespective of place of residence. Local traditions and particularities, however, have remained". The same author further argues that: "Faced with a loss of influence at the state level and in the work place, they have sought new arenas for action, including the emerging regional level. Catalonia and the Basque Country, some unions and other social interests have seen in the minority nation as a new focus for social solidarity, and as a complement to, if not a substitute for, the old state level" (Keating 2014: 330).

[129] Nevertheless, we can find the Catalan version of the CCOO, the CONC, which is de facto more autonomous than the other regional or national/regional units.

[130] Apparently, that was different before the nationalist mobilization. Greer (2012) claims that members of the Unions in Catalonia, always stress their organization's "catalanitat", but their demands usually don't ask for more competencies for the Generalitat. They have considered the Generalitat as a minor player, a provider of social services, and a possible useful territorial lobbyist.

accommodate workers who identify with Catalonia or with Spain makes them a bridging "association".

Can we find the same patterns in business organizations? In Spain, business interests are organized on a statewide level. However, there is some decentralization in questions, which are constitutionally devolved. The employers founded a single, all-embracing polity-wide organization, the *Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales* (CEOE, Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organizations). Under its roof, we find all business sectors regardless of size, region, and field of activity. In the AC of Catalonia or Valencia, we find exceptions from this dominant pattern. For example, in Catalonia, we find some business confederations like the Petita i Mitjana Empresa de Catalunya (PIMEC), which is separated from the statewide CEOE (Pallares, Astudillo Ruiz, Verge 2015).[131]

Business has many interests in the field of territorial politics and sometimes these interests are contradicting. On the one hand business associations follow political tendencies. The Catalan business associations worry about the extensive social transfers between the different AC and are for a "fiscal pact", which asks for more fiscal autonomy for Catalonia. Also, the Basque business associations support the particular Basque fiscal system, the "*concierto economico*".

On the other hand, big business, usually in the hands of international concerns, is concerned about the preserving the "status quo". A constitutional change could lead to political instability, which they consider as counterproductive. Secessionism could also mean a menace to the unity of the single European market. The interest if these international corporations are usually well incorporated into central decision-making and they fear that this influence could radically diminish in the case of independence or extreme decentralization (Keating 2014).

The primary concern of these companies is the customer. For that reason, in Catalonia and the Basque Country, where we find a national/regional identity, they tend to respect the national/regional particularities, above all in linguistic/cultural terms, as a condition for doing business there. They do not join any sides, afraid of alienating customers and losing market shares.

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[131] Keating (2014) claims that the main federations of Basque and Catalan employers' are divided between supporters of PP or Basque Nationalist Party in Basque Country and CiU in Catalonia. These party politics can affect the elections to their governing councils.

But how do these bodies behave in case of nationalist conflict? The Catalan *Foment de Treball* is a traditional Catalan institution, which recaptured its independence after Franco's death. It was involved in founding the Spanish employer's organization (Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales/CEOE) and become a prominent part of it. The other organization, the Círculo de *Economía,* is a group of business people and academics, which recall the historical goal of the Catalan bourgeoisie of "catalanization" of Spain. In the Basque Country, we find *Confebask,* an employers' body, which is an integral part of the CEOE.

Considering the self-determination claims in both national/regional units, the Catalan *Foment de Treball* supports the Catalan push for a referendum, even if this does not imply support for secession. After some internal discussion *Foment de Treball* refused to sign the National Pact for the Right to Decide. However, other organizations like *Círculo de Economía* or PIMEC or two smaller bodies affiliated to Foment, *Fepime (Federació d'Empresaris de la Petita i Mitjana Empresa)* and *Cecot[132],* did sign that pact (Keating 2014).[133]

Also, the *Cercle Català de Negocis* is an assembly of businesspersons supporting the independence of Catalonia. Smaller and middle companies have different markets and costumers, and maybe also for that reason they reaction has been more flexible.

When summarizing this short and very basic analysis, I can claim that the influence of the trade unions/associations on the political stability of Spain is not clear, even if there is a tendency towards contributing more to stability than to instability, above all in Catalonia. The statewide unions could be seen as bridging associations, which officially take a neutral stand on independence, even if their members may be divided. In the Basque Country, the nationalist trade unions have more members. Consequently, in the Basque Country trade unions could be seen more as an instrument of nationalist confrontation in the form of "bonding association", even if in the last years they were interested in supporting the maintenance of the special fiscal regime of the Basque Country than in demanding independence.

With regards to the business associations, big business, above all, is afraid to back the wrong horse. Instability and uncertainty are bad for business, and these bodies opt for

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[132] Cecot is an organization based on the small firms. It has its origins in medieval guilds.

[133] Sometimes we find differences between the leaders and the employers that associate in these organizations. In Catalonia, we find data of the members of the small business organization PIMEC (2012), where more than 60% were for independence, with more support among those only trading locally (Keating 2014). However, we should take into account that in this survey we find a response rate of only 2224 out of 19.000.

the "status quo". The small companies in Catalonia are more for independence, usually because of the local markets.

However, we should keep in mind that too much of statewide associations could also be a reason for instability. Recognition of associational diversity and access to consensual politics may do much more for stability than institutional or organizational monism.

3.5. Conclusions

This chapter has covered such different aspects of citizenship as the identification with the Spanish state up to participation in unions. Consequently, the concept of citizenship has been more overstretched than usual and in particular, in the last parts of this chapter has functioned as a common reference point only. At the same time, it shows its strength and explains why citizenship is becoming one of the dominant concepts in Social Sciences.

The conclusions of this chapter are less consistent than in other chapters for various reasons. First, I have left out one aspect of citizenship, the citizenship-as-rights approach, which seemingly has an enormous impact on the stability of the multinational state. However, these questions will be analyzed as part of the institutional analysis in chapter 5 on the divisions of authority and above all in Chapter 6, when analyzing asymmetrical solutions. I also postpone another aspect, which is connected with the communitarian version of citizenship, the question of trust.

Among the analyzed features of citizenship, I have concentrated on questions of citizenship as membership, which could be seen as an additional bond, complementary to a common Spanish national identity. I have additionally scrutinized the question if and how aspects of "constitutional patriotism" influence the political stability. Finally, I have analyzed questions of citizenship as participation, analyzing issues of political participation and participation in a community.

Considering questions of citizenship as membership/nationality I did not find relevant data, and I approached the problem by using some proxies, which has the downside of not being completely sure if they measure the identification with the state or nation or a hybrid of both. The results of this part suffer from a lack of data, and maybe the

most important finding has been that we should start collecting such kind of data on state identification within multinational states. More robust are the findings considering the Spanish Constitution. The empirical analysis shows that the decline in the satisfaction with the constitution and the growing preference for its reform in the national/regional units could be seen as one of the reasons for the political instability of the Spanish state, even if we cannot be sure about the direction of causality.

Considering questions of citizenship as participation, I have concentrated on two aspects. Studying the political participation, I can summarize that the respondents living in Catalonia are politically more active than the statewide respondents. I could claim that the Catalan society is much more active. However, I have to take into account that this may be influenced by the part of the civil society that claims independence and participates in mass demonstrations.

In general, the Spanish population participates in the political process steadily only through voting, the rest of time it has been quite passive. I did not find many differences between the national and national/regional units. However, maybe we find changing voting patterns in the regional elections in Catalonia. If that tendency could be confirmed in future elections, it could be seen as a point of alienation with the Spanish state.

The analysis of "good citizenship" shows that it is not only difficult to find out what it is and how to operationalize it, but also that at least membership in voluntary organizations is not an aspect that has a significant influence on social cohesion. I did not find major differences in civic participation between the different units. All associations, whether they are bridging or bonding, are losing members. After analyzing religious associations in the form of the Catholic Church and the trade unions/business associations I claim that their influence on political stability seems to be relevant, however, should be analyzed in more depth in future analysis.

In a nutshell, it is easy to connect the many aspects of social cohesion to citizenship; however, it is quite difficult to relate all these elements to the stability of a multinational state. This leads us to another important finding of this chapter. Questions of citizenship in multinational states have rarely been analyzed empirically. For that reason, we not only miss an empirical framework and have problems with the operationalization of this concept, but there is also a big problem with data availability analyzing all aspects of citizenship. Besides the previously mentioned problems with the measurement of citizenship as membership/nationality, the

empirical analysis of citizenship as participation revealed that when analyzing participation in political life, we could examine participation in voting or political action only. This type of data is widely available. However, aspects of "deliberative democracy" are difficult to operationalize, and there is less data on the topic. Furthermore, questions around membership in voluntary organizations have been by and by neglected and right now they barely appear in empirical analysis. In a nutshell: it seems that different aspects of citizenship in multinational states matter, but we still don't know exactly in what way. That opens many interesting possibilities for future research.

CHAPTER 4: TRUST

4.1. Introduction/Conceptualization

Questions of trust have a growing importance in the literature of political science. In recent decades nearly all authors from the "social capital" school claimed its significance upon social cohesion. However, latest research tends to use trust increasingly as a concept in its right. The following chapter explores the impact of social and political trust on the political stability of the Spanish "State of Autonomies".

The question of whether and how trust matters go back to the classical works about social contracts. Thomas Hobbes stated in "De Cive" that: "Where's no trust, there can be no Contract" (Hobbes 1983 [1642]).[134] The Hobbesian subjects best obey an absolute ruler. Locke (1980 [1689]) holds that if a governor loses the confidence of his people, he should no longer have the right to govern them. The dominant interpretation of Locke's conception of trust has been that the legitimacy of a government is built upon the trust of the people. Trust represents the projection of popular sovereignty (Dunn 1985). Locke's use of trust was vertical. It was Tocqueville (2000) [1835] who concentrated more on the horizontal aspects of trust. In his classical work "Democracy in America" he claimed that the democratic state was built among other aspects upon mutual trust and the association of its people.

Simmel (1950: 326) has stated that trust is "one of the most important synthetic forces within society". He claims that trust is the foundation of solidarity and cooperation and trust and trustworthy behavior are likely to grow in times of harmony. On the other hand, distrust can deteriorate the moral stability and thus the sense of trust. Distrust and untrustworthy behavior can grow in times of conflict, be it due to rapid social change or disruption (Simmel 1950).

Miller (1995) has concentrated more on aspects of voluntary cooperation: "Much state activity involves the furthering of goals which cannot be achieved without the voluntary cooperation of citizens. [...] For this activity to be successful, the citizens

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[134] In some parts of Hobbes work the use of trust was more abstract, connected to the servant/master relationship, which includes mutual trust, a permanent exchange of benefits in the form of protection for service and obedience (Baumgold 2013).

must trust the state, and they must trust one another to comply with what the state demands of them" (Miller 1995, 91-92).[135]

Miller's quote points to two aspects of trust which I will deal with in this analysis: trust between citizens and trust towards the institutions of the state. The first aspect has a more horizontal orientation and focuses more on the individuals, while the second has a vertical institutional emphasis. This distinction can be found in most of the literature, which distinguishes between two dimensions of trust: political trust and social trust. Zmerli (2007:57) claims that: "It is interesting, that, where social trust is concerned, it is attachment to the social unit, the community that matters: but for the political measure of confidence, it is attachment to the political unit, the municipality that counts". Following this interpretation, social variables like trust between persons are more important for social trust, while political variables like the evaluation of political institutions have been more important for political confidence (Newton 2001, Anderson and LoTempio 2002). Moreover, social trust is a feature on the community level, while political trust analyzes feelings or positions towards political institutions and political leaders (Newton 1999).

Within the field of Political Science, there are different taxonomies of trust. Trust in people, which we know is called "particularized trust" and is different from "generalized trust" in people, which we do not know. However, both are subcategories of social trust, which is different from political trust (Putnam 1995, Newton 1999, Uslaner 2002).

The distinction between political and social trust has been widely accepted by the empirical literature on trust (Giddens 1990, Seligman 1997, Offe 1999, Zmerli, Newton, and Montero 2007). I will build this chapter to a large extent on this division. The conceptualization of trust is a difficult task. Among other things, Newton (2007) has claimed that theoretical and empirical research on trust is controversial and often inconclusive. Besides that, there is still no general theory of trust (Delhey & Newton 2005).

The conceptual definition of trust shows that it permanently interconnects and overlaps with other concepts like reciprocity (Mauss 1923, Kolm 2008), empathy or solidarity. Levi (1998:79) claims that "trust is not one thing and it does not have one

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[135] Miller (1995) also points to the relation between trust and national identity. He claims that national identity increases the probability that people will place trust in their fellow citizens: "Trust requires solidarity not merely within groups but across them, and this, in turn, depends upon a common identification of the kind that nationality alone can provide" (Miller 1995: 140).

source, it has a variety of forms and causes." For that reason, we cannot be sure how all these concepts are interrelated and if trust or a combination of those mentioned alternatives is the best explanatory variable.[136]

The literature defines trust in two ways. The first is the social cohesion argument, where trust is seen as the glue that holds societies together. The second argument is that trust is the lubrication that helps these societies work more effectively. The first argument can be found in the literature of political theory and is closely linked to questions of political stability. The latter argument has usually been used by the rational-choice school, which searches to explain better governance and economic growth within the analyzed states.[137]

This theoretical discussion reveals many possible problems for the analysis. Similar to the already analyzed variables on the individual level like national identity or citizenship, trust is an explanatory variable, which 's hard to operationalize empirically. Furthermore, there are many questions about its causal role. If we were able to isolate trust as an important variable, how are we to decide the direction of causality? Does trust generate a social outcome or vice versa?[138]

The relevant macro-theory of trust has been built on the supposition that trust in political institutions is a consequence of an active civil society, voluntary associations as well as high levels of trust between citizens. Scholars usually claim that social and political trust is correlated (Putnam 1993, Inglehart 1997). However, other authors like Brehm & Rahn (1997) argue that political trust can affect interpersonal trust as much or even more than social trust can affect trust in political institutions.

It was not until the works of Zmerli et al. (2007) that association between social and political trust could be confirmed on the individual level. These authors show that in contrast to the previous works, there is a statistically significant correlation between social trust and confidence in institutions of government.[139] Denters et al. (2007) also confirm that social trust is a strong explanatory variable.

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[136] The causation could also go the other way, and for example, nationalism could explain trust.

[137] In this literature, North (1990) enhances the role of the state as enforcer of contracts. The state lowers personal investment and provides the assurances, which generate the trust, which lubricates cooperation. Not only the former but also the latter feature apparently has an influence on the stability of multinational states.

[138] An important question of research is if there is a connection between social trust and political trust and which direction of causality we can find between both. Mishler/Rose (2001) claim that even if there is a link between political and interpersonal trust, we cannot be sure about the direction of this relationship, which has been questioned by new empirical evidence.

[139] They claim that the prior results are due to a combination of poor indicators and short rating scales.

4.2. Social trust

4.2.1 Definition

The enormous importance attached to social trust is matched by fundamental disagreement about what it means (Misztal 1996:9). Herreros/Criado (2008) show that academic literature has used three types of social trust: moralistic trust (Uslaner 2002), altruistic trust (Mansbridge 1999) and rational-choice trust (Coleman 1990, Hardin 2002). In this interpretation, the first two usages relate more to the idea of trustworthiness than the notion of trust.[140]

The rational-choice version of trust is different. Coleman (1990: 99–100) defines trust as "a decision to cooperate under uncertainty". Consequently, trust is a bet on the trustworthiness of the other person. From this perspective, a threat is a sub-category of risk, which can be defined by calculation of probabilities. At the same time trust opens up possibilities for action by providing the basis for risk reduction (Luhmann 1979)

Hardin (2002:3) sees trust as encapsulated interest: "I trust you because your interest encapsulates mine, which is to say that you have an interest in fulfilling my trust." For Hardin, trust is an expectation. The choice between trust and distrust is entirely understandable as a product of rational behavior not only for the "truster" but also for the "trustee".

In a nutshell, interpersonal trust always involves a relationship of dependency between one individual, the "trustor" which makes herself vulnerable by placing resources at the disposal of another party, the "trustee" (Gambetta 1988, Coleman 1990). Following this line trust involves personal weakness caused by vagueness about the future behavior of others.

The other important topic in the research on social trust is the so-called "circles of trust" (Fukuyama 1999). In a nutshell, when talking about social trust, the size of groups is important. The literature on trust did not find a common denominator about the thresholds between these groups.

The standard distinction is one between "particular trust" and "general trust".

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[140] Herreros/Criado (2008:54-55) claim that the "'moralistic' or 'altruistic' truster is certainly trustworthy, because, for whatever reason, she will always honor the trust placed in her, but it is more difficult to consider that her way of forming expectations about other people's trustworthiness is well grounded."

"Particular trust" is based on repeated cooperation and interactions within a relatively small group such as a family, clan or members of a limited social group. In this case, due to the personal knowledge of individuals, there are low levels of risk. "Particular trust" can also be called "commitment" (Cook/Emerson 1978), "familial trust" (Fukuyama 1995) or "assurance" (Yamagishi/Yamagishi 1994).

The other concept is "general trust" or "generalized trust", which is common in modern societies and which goes beyond face-to-face interaction, as people permanently engage in relationships with strangers (Uslaner 2002).[141] We can find "general trust" among ethnic and national groups, where despite a supposed common bond; people do not know each other in person. The essential idea beneath the distinction between "particular trust" and "general trust" is that in different contexts, each person trusts others at various levels of generalization, expressing a different radius of trust (Fukuyama 1995; Delhey et al., 2011).[142]

We can connect to the same debate with an argument about "thick" vs. "thin" trust.[143] In this debate "thick" trust is personal, particular "face-to-face" trust while "thin" trust is impersonal and general. Mishler/Rose (2001) emphasize that the "thick" trust of face-to-face interaction of a preindustrial society has been transformed into "thin" impersonal ties, which are already for a longer period a solid bond of community.

4.2.2. Literature review

Empirical research shows that people locate their trust on different levels. People tend to trust others who are similar to them in some significant characteristics. In this case, group membership provides information on other's likely trustworthiness. Surprisingly there is not much scientific work on the influence of social trust on the political stability of states. Most of the recent literature concentrates on ethnic groups (Habyarimana et al. 2009) and overlooks developments in Western liberal

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[141] This argument is similar to Anderson's (2006 [1991]) reasoning on "Imagined Communities" in Chapter 2.

[142] Stolle (2002) finds that besides this traditional dichotomy one could find a person between these two groups, like a stranger with whom he shares a common identity. This kind of trust could be called identity trust or group trust. This idea brings Freitag/Bauer (2013) to contest the standard dichotomy and distinguish between three forms of trust, namely, particularized, generalized, and identity-based trust. These new insights from the Swiss case should be better suited for the analysis of a multinational state.

[143] With that questions of the "circles of trust" and strong or weak ties of social cohesion can be connected to other debates, e.g. about the ethnic and civic national identity or of citizenship in modern, large-scale, heterogeneous, and impersonal societies, where weak ties are the role.

democracies. While not explicitly analyzing the impact of trust, this research has described the impact of heterogeneity as problematic, claiming that it produces conflict that is not easy to resolve and, therefore, political systems are unstable (Dahl 1971, Horowitz 1985, Weingast 1997).[144] To the best of my knowledge, there is no academic work from this strand of macro-theoretical work that deals with the influence of trust on the Western liberal multinational state.

New research focusing on the individual level, claims that increased diversity connected to older ethnic groups or recently arrived emigrants is associated with lower social capital and lower trust (Delhay and Newton 2005, Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). Nevertheless, they do not connect their research to national/regional units or "minority nations", but to increased diversity, such as different ethnic groups or migration. Herreros/Criado (2008) looking on how the states promote social trust have found that the levels of social trust for minoritarian groups increase with rising levels of state efficacy by a small amount, whereas the effect for the majoritarian groups is much larger. They find that institutions undoubtedly matter for social trust and that efficient states create more trusting societies.

In a large-N study, Anderson/Paskeviciute (2006) show that ethnic heterogeneity has different effects on trust in established democracies. In general, they find that linguistic heterogeneity matters more than ethnic heterogeneity.[145]

But what about trust between the different territorially concentrated national and national/regional groups? We might expect that higher levels of general social trust between both could be important glue for a multinational society. There is not much work on this question, and we have to look for some insights in works, which does not deal exclusively with this problem.

The empirical analysis of social trust in the Spanish "State of Autonomies" stands at its beginning. There are very few empirical studies, and normative/theoretical debates are in its infancy. Additionally, empirical research has to address better several questions. For example, the Spanish Autonomous Communities can be seen as closed

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[144] I will come back to these questions in Chapter 6 on federalism and decentralization.

[145] Anderson/Paskeviciute (2006) also mention that "the impact of linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity on two structural indicators of citizenship behavior – political discussion frequency and organizational membership – and two cognitive indicators of citizenship – political interest and interpersonal trust. It leads to higher levels of some citizenship behavior while diminishing others. Individuals living in linguistically more heterogeneous societies are more likely to belong to voluntary associations and express an interest in politics. In contrast, linguistic heterogeneity diminishes peoples interest in politics in established democracies" (Anderson/Paskeviciute (2006: 797-798).

regional entities. However, as has already been shown in chapter 2, in at least two of them (Basque Country and Catalonia), we can find a big national cleavage. The existing studies analyzing questions of national/regional conflict find evidence that there is not a significant difference in social trust between members of the national and national/regional unit.

Criado, Herreros, Miller, & Ubeda (2015) test effects of co-ethnicity on trust and reciprocity in an experimental setting and find no effect of linguistic differences on trust. However, they find significantly more reciprocal behavior in Catalonia among Catalan speakers.

Torcal/Martini (2014) analyze among other factors the levels of social trust between different cultural groups in Spain. In an experimental design, they analyze on the one side Basques and Catalans, which I have identified as members of a national/regional unit and on the other side Madrilenians and Andalusians, whom nearly all identify with the Spanish nation only.[146] Torcal/Martini find that trust among members of the same cultural groups tends to be higher than trust between different ones. However, the differences in trust levels between the national and national/regional groups are not large. In the played trust-game the respondents trust in-group members more, however only slightly.[147] Also the authors' claim that "cultural belonging" is only the third of four possible effects on social trust in Spain, after partisanship and ideology, but before class.

In the comparative literature, we discover more evidence. Delhey/Newton (2005) find that ethnic homogeneity, protestant religious traditions, good government, wealth and income equality characterize high trust countries.[148] Following that, the Spanish "State of Autonomies" would offer a divided sketch. On the one hand, it is a heterogenic society with a mostly Catholic religious tradition.[149] On the other hand, it

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[146] The members of these groups are chosen following the place of living.

[147] The participants were sending around 0.2 reward points more on a 5-point-scale to the in-group members. Torcal/Martini also find that the national/regional cleavage favors discrimination towards the other group, even if they don't conclude that on the other hand, it is bonding trust among co-members. Additionally, persons who live in a more urban environment show lower discrimination in national/regional terms. Moreover, these authors find that the trust discrimination between regional identities becomes more severe when people feel closer to their AC, but it is significantly stronger among people who identify with regional parties, which are responsible for more divisive positions in territorial terms.

[148] General research shows that the rich, successful and educated are more trustful. Besides that, trusting people are often happier and more satisfied with their life than the non-trusting people.

[149] See also Chapter 3.4. on Catholic Church.

is a quite wealthy country, and it ranges in the middle of the rankings of income inequality like the Gini Index.[150]

4.2.3. Empirical analysis
4.2.3.1. Measurement

In this empirical part, I will carry out a descriptive longitudinal analysis. I am interested in the differences between the levels of social trust in Spain and Catalonia. I cannot analyze the other national/regional unit, the Basque Country because there is no data available. I will also observe the levels of social trust between the members of the national and the national/regional groups analyzing survey data.[151] Then I will scrutinize if and how these results could have influenced the political stability of the Spanish "State of Autonomies". In this chapter, the emphasis of my analysis does not focus on the establishment of causal claims between the different variables. I am primary interested in identifying longitudinal trends.

An additional question in this empirical part is: "Can we trust trust?" (Gambetta 1988). Besides the conceptual questions of whether trust matters for cooperation, there are also some problems with its measurement. Most surveys and academics build on the same subject to measure social trust.[152] The question is the following: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Even if there has been a discussion about the question whether the measure works well, Uslaner (2002) among others has found that the Noelle-Neumann question places heavy emphasis on trust in strangers, and concludes that the question does indeed measure generalized trust. There are two possible ways to answer this question, which one depends on the research institute. The first one is a dichotomous measurement scale with two possible answers: "You can trust most people" and "You can never be too careful when dealing with other".

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[150] Spain scored 35.9 in 2011 on the Gini-index. It has occupied rank 87 among 144 countries, with rank 144 being closest to an equal income distribution in a country.

[151] When we cannot design and carry out our survey, we have to rely on questions, which were planned by others. For that reason, there is a discontinuity with the conceptual chapter. Some of the problems emphasized in the conceptualization are not included in these graphs. However, having that caveat in mind, I will try to connect them to the relevant research problems.

[152] Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann invented that question in 1948, which was used since that in Germany. After Almond and Verba (1963), included it in The Civic Culture study, before long this question was used all over the world (van Deth et al. 2007).

This design has been widely used by leading surveys like the World Value Survey/European Value Survey or Latinobarometro.

Nevertheless, this answer set has received some criticism (Delhey et al. 2011, Sturgis and Smith 2010). Delhey et al. (2011) claim that even if the term "most people" in the standard question predominantly connotes out-groups, the radius of "most people" varies considerably across countries. Nevertheless, they claim that the problem seems to function well in Western democracies.[153]

The second way to answer is on an 11-answers scale, which is used by the European Social Survey (ESS). In this scale 0 means that "you can't be too careful" and 10 means, "most people can be trusted." Because of the descriptive character of this analysis, I will use both in the following discussion.

4.2.3.2. Social trust in Spain

Most of the recent research has argued that, regarding social trust, Spain is a low-trust country (Torcal/Montero 1999, Newton 1999).[154] However, this finding cannot be confirmed in the last wave of the ESS data (2012).[155]

Figure 4.1. Social trust in European Countries in 2012 (11-answers scala)

Source: ESS Round 6 (2012) [156]

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[153] Other authors like Miller & Mitamura (2003) additionally criticize the contaminating presence of the trust versus causation dimension in the measurement scale.

[154] Torcal and Montero (1999: 172) have found that "Spain constitutes an example of low-intensity equilibrium with low levels of interpersonal trust. These low levels of trust have not changed across different generations, an attitudinal continuity that seems to be due to a certain cultural legacy transmitted from generation to generation and has proved resistant to the major economic, social, and political changes of the last few decades."

[155] In the following I will contrast this result with other European countries, the majority of them being EU members.

[156] ESS warns that "users, who are interested in combining data for groups of countries (e.g. EU

This graph shows that considering levels of social trust, Spain ranks 9th among 23 European countries. In the lead in the social trust rank are the "usual suspects" in the form of Scandinavian countries, with Denmark having a mean of 7.0 on the first rank. Even if we have to take into account that this wave included Central – and Eastern European countries, which were usually excluded before the 2000s, Spain ought to be positioned within the group of middle-level trust countries.

Turning the focus to other multinational states, which are the comparative units of this analysis, the graph shows other interesting results. While Switzerland occupies rank 6 with a mean of 5.7. Spain, with 5.1 points, lies between United Kingdom (5.4) and Belgium (5.1). All four European countries, which are usually conceptualized as multinational, can be found in the "Top Ten". Even if I cannot offer a causal regression analysis of this phenomenon, we could claim that social trust is usually well developed in multinational states. The first speculative hunch is that having many different national or national/regional groups does not mean that these states have low levels of social trust.

Considering the longitudinal development of social trust, survey evidence shows a mixed pattern. We can judge this from the available sources, which even if not completely contradictory paint a different picture. Nevertheless, most of the longitudinal data about social trust in Spain shows that social trust seems to be a stable attitude.

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member states or accession countries) should note that this was not the primary aim of the ESS design which instead intended to facilitate comparisons across individual countries. The population size weights enable the estimation of these "combined totals", but users should note that these estimates might have relatively high margins of error. We would generally advise checking the margins of error associated with such estimates before drawing conclusions."

Figure 4.2. Social trust in Spain (dichotomous measure)

Source: CIS

When we analyze the national CIS data, we find that most of the respondents in the years 1996-2013 believed that "You can never be too careful in dealing with others". The lowest value of this answer was reached in 2004 with 58.2%, while the highest (66.5%) was in 2007. Logically, the opposite value "You can trust most people" reached 29.8% in 2007 and 37.5% in 2009.

Figure 4.3. Social trust in Spain (11-answers scale)

Source: ESS

The stability of social trust in Spain can be confirmed in the ESS data (ESS/Waves 2002-2012), which is based on the 11 points answer scale. In the first wave in 2002,

the mean of this scala was 4.86%, and it grew to 5.14% in the year 2010. We can find very small variation within this data, even if its salience must be reduced when including the average standard error in all six rounds of around 0.05.

The only survey institution that shows a different development is the World Values Survey (Waves 2-6), which measures a longer time series from 1989-1993 to 2010-2014. Indeed, it analyses the longest period of all three institutions.

Figure 4.4. Social trust in Spain (two answers-scala)

Source: World Values Survey (Waves 2-6)

Following the WVS data, we can claim that Spaniards have become less trusting over time. The WVS shows a decline of the "You can trust most people" answer from 32.7% in Wave 4 (1999-2004) to 19% in Wave 6 (2010-2014). In contrary to the CIS data it places the differences in the development of trust in the years 1999-2004 to 2005-2009. With that, we find a small mismatch between the different survey institutes, where one claims stability, while the other a decline of social trust in Spain. On the other hand, all three survey institutes show that in general Spaniards tend to distrust more than trust.

4.2.3.3. Social trust in Catalonia

In the following, I will analyze the development of social trust in Catalonia.[157] I will use CEO data, which recently introduced the social trust question in the year 2012.

Figure 4.5. Social Trust in Catalonia (two answers-scale)

Source: CEO

The development of social trust in Catalonia shows high volatility. Regarding the period 2012-2015, between 38% and 48.5% of respondents answered that "you can trust most people". In the second wave of the CEO survey in 2015 (2/2012), we find a period where Catalan respondents answer that they tend to trust more than to distrust. Even if we only consider a very short period of measurement, these results are surprising.

There seems to be some empirical evidence that Catalans have higher levels of social trust than Spaniards.[158] I could also speculate that translated into the ESS-survey data, it would position Catalonia among the most trusting European states. Accordingly, when we compare the Spanish and Catalan levels of social trust independently, we find some disparity. But what about the difference in trust between members of national and national/regional groups? There is no survey data on trust of Spaniards

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[157] I analyze only Catalonia, and not the Basque Country because there are no available data on this question in the Basque Country.
[158] Even if this difference could be due to different survey institutes, the margin of error between CIS and CEO data cannot be so large.

directed towards their fellow citizens in Catalonia and Basque Country.[159] However, CEO has just recently started with a trust question distinguishing between different groups, which could be identified as "most people". That allows us to compare the groups that the Catalans tend to trust the most.

Figure 4.6. Trust towards different groups in Catalonia

Source: CEO

In this figure, we analyze the means of an 11-point answer scale. The available data is not longitudinal yet. There is only data from the years 2014 and 2015. However, also this limited data reveals surprising results. Analyzing the data from the point of view of my research question and considering social trust as glue for the political community of a multinational state, it is worth noting that we find only a small difference between trust in citizens of Catalonia (6.3) and the trust in citizens of Spain (5.7). The trust levels between both groups diminished with 0.5 points compared to 2014. This small difference during a time of high political polarization could be considered unexpected. The big difference in trust levels is not between the Catalans and Spaniards, but between "familiar trust", which means trust in your family (9.1) and trust in your friends (8.2), and other types of trust groups starting with trust in the neighbours (6.5) down to trust in the citizens in the world (5.6).

In Fukuyama's (1999) terms, we can claim that the radius of trust in Catalonia is short, including the family and close acquaintances. However, it does not exclude

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[159] However, there is a proxy with a question about "sympathy" in the CIS data. It claims that Spaniards have fewer feelings of sympathy towards Basques and Catalans than towards members of other regional AC. It 's hard to say if the shown differences should be considered small or large (see Appendix 4.1-4.3).

others entirely. The levels of "identity trust" and "general trust" are not low and there are no big differences between them.

We can summarize that Catalans have higher levels of social trust than Spaniards, and the important distinction is between the closer family/friends circle and non - familiar people. Even if these results are nothing more than preliminary and invite to a much deeper causal analysis, it seems to confirm the works of Torcal/Martini (2014) or Criado et al. (2015) that there is no excessive amount of distrust between respondents in the national and the national/regional unit. I claim that these lacking levels of "social distrust" could be seen as one of many factors, which could make the "Spanish "State of Autonomies" stable.

4.3. Political trust

4.3.1. Definition

Political trust is the other relevant concept in trust research. As has already been shown before, while social trust has a horizontal direction and is usually measured towards fellow citizens, political trust is directed in a vertical direction towards the political institutions which decide and rule over those citizens. Some scholars use the term institutional trust instead of political trust.

Gamson (1968) has claimed that political trust relates to citizens' attitudes towards the essential institutions and key actors of the political regime or system. Hardin (1998) states that trust in institutions is a declaration by citizens of whether institutions are reliable. This conceptual definition of the verticality of political trust is clear and convincing.

Easton (1965) provided one of the first conceptual frameworks for this kind of analysis by differentiating between political support for the community, the regime, and the authorities. Additionally, this author has claimed that confidence in political institutions should measure a deeper commitment than volatile measures of trust in particular political leaders or the government of a particular year.

The question of operationalization of political trust has always been problematic. Torcal (2014) claims, that due to the original Conceptualization of the concept of political trust in the 1960s (American National Election Studies), political trust has been linked to trust in the government, making both concepts interchangeable. This

mix-up leads to fuzzy results, which sometimes do not clearly distinguish between political trust in the system and the satisfaction with incumbents.

Considering the problems with the operationalization of political trust, many scholars have proposed that when evaluating survey data, we should distinguish between concepts like "trust in the institutions" and "satisfaction with the government".

This division offers an interesting starting-point, but this work suggests that a deeper refinement of categories is necessary since there are significant theoretical and empirical differences within the concept of political trust.

Some authors claim that people can only trust other people, and for that reason when analyzing "institutional trust", we should say that people have "confidence" in institutions. Among others, Newton and Norris (2000:53) claim that "confidence in institutions … [is] the central indicator of the underlying feeling of the general public about its polity". Additionally, when we have "confidence in institutions", we believe that they are fairly and effectively organized (Newton 2007). Levi (1998) emphasizes this point when claiming that only individuals can trust or be trusting. However, when talking about institutions, we should concentrate on their trustworthiness.

All these conceptual caveats are probably true. However, most scholars still continue to use the concept of institutional trust instead of institutional confidence or institutional trustworthiness. Additionally, survey data have not always followed this conceptual discussion. Sometimes they formulate questions using the term confidence, sometimes using the term trust. For that reason, I will use both concepts of "political/institutional" trust and "political/institutional" confidence. Additionally, this dissertation will focus on citizens' trust in the basic institutions of political representation and will distinguish it from the evaluations of performance of the political system, support for the government or satisfaction with democracy.[160]

4.3.2. Literature review

Many authors observe that most political scientists perceive a decline of political trust in the last decades (Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999; Torcal/Montero 2006). This is apparently bad news because nearly all scholars claim that trust is vital for democracy. Trust strengthens legitimacy by connecting citizens to representative

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[160] Questions of evaluations of performance of the Spanish "State of Autonomies" will be addressed in Chapter 5 when analyzing aspects of decentralization.

institutions (Bianco 1994). The political trust also improves the effectiveness of democratic government (Braithwaite/Levi 1998).

As already shown in the first part of this chapter, there is some empirical evidence that political systems and institutions which are recognized as just and fair animate social trust (Levi 1998, Rothstein 2000, Rothstein and Stolle 2003, Zmerli et al. 2007). The opposite applies to unjust institutions, which help to develop untrustworthy behavior. Pharr, Putman, and Dalton (2000) summarized this evidence within the "rainmaker hypothesis", claiming that the functioning of governmental institutions affects all citizens in a country to some extent. When citizens do not trust their co-citizens and their representatives, the belief that they will accept the shared rules is not high (Della Porta 2000).[161]

High political trust/confidence in political institutions could create greater social trust among co-citizens. Parts of the normative/theoretical (Offe 2006) and empirical/positivist literature agree that high political trust/confidence in political institutions has a positive influence on the political stability of a state.[162] However, Fukuyama (1999) notes that stable democracies can be found in both low-social trust as well as high-social trust cultures. Apparently, a high level of political trust is not a *conditio sine qua non* for political stability.

When people trust in the institutions, they trust differently in different types of institutions. Denters et al. (2007) distinguish between three types of them. First, these authors identify trust in *political actors,* like political parties and politicians. Second, they identify trust in the *institutions of liberal democracy*, like the parliament and the cabinet. Third, they identify trust in the *institutions of the state of law* (Rechtsstaat), like the civil service, the courts, and the police. Denters et al. (2007) show that the courts and the police are the institutions in which citizens consistently display the highest levels of trust, while political actors receive the lowest levels of trust.

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[161] However, besides this top-down phenomenon, which suggests that trust is influenced by the nature and operation of social and political institutions, there is substantial evidence that trust is also affected by a bottom-up phenomenon, which relies on patterns of childhood socialization and life experiences of individual citizens (Newton 2005). These two aspects seem to work together.

[162] Besides that, in states with higher levels of political trust, there is more democratic development more rule of law; social and economic equality; and more economic development and belief in democracy (Inglehart 1997, van der Meer/Dekker 2011). However, some authors agree that the state does not generate trust, but actually, tends to replace it. The state reduces the necessity of citizens to trust each other and facilitate cooperation by solving the essential information, monitoring, and enforcement problems. Oorschot/Arts (2005), who analyze European cases, claim that the welfare states could also replace the necessity of trust.

There are several discussions in the literature on political trust. The first discussion is the question of whether there are short-time changes in the trust levels. Most of the traditional authors claim that institutional trust is immutable after early socialization is concluded (Almond & Verba 1963, Citrin, McClosky, Shanks, Sniderman 1975, Easton 1965). However, newer research claims that even if the pace of attitudinal change is not fast, short-term changes are not the exception but the rule (Mishler/Rose, 2001, Torcal/Magalhaes 2010; Zmerli/Newton 2011).

Mishler/Rose (2001) have offered an interesting taxonomy, claiming that the origins of political trust can be explained along two dimensions: by macro vs. micro theories and cultural/exogenous vs. institutional/endogenous theories.[163] Following this line, the origins of political trust can be found in national culture, individual socialization, government performance and individual evaluations.[164] These explanatory variables are not exclusive, but complementary.

The literature identifies the following conditions as possible conditions for the decline of the levels of political trust. First, citizens might feel unrepresented (Alesina/Wacziarg 2000, Torcal 2014). This interpretation is based, among others, on the work of Miller (1974), who claims that the lack of trust in the institutions of government could be the consequence of prolonged periods of frustrated expectations, resulting from inadequate institutional performance. Second, citizens may consider institutions as economically not effective (Clarke, Dutt, & Kornberg 1993, McAllister 1999). Following this line of thought, declining levels of trust are the result of the deterioration of economic conditions. Third, citizens might consider political institutions as corrupt. Here many authors argue that political scandals have, or could have, contributed to the deterioration of political trust (Lipset/Schneider 1983, Nye

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[163] In their view, cultural theories see trust as exogenous. Trust has an elementary character and is learned early in life, while institutional theories see trust as a consequence of institutional performance. The authors make an additional distinction within the cultural and institutional theories, explaining the other dimension of macro-oriented and micro-oriented theories. From this perspective, the macro version claims that trust is a group property, which is shared with other fellow citizens. Micro theories concentrate on the individual and argue that there are strong differences between individuals considering their level if different social, political and economic factors.

[164] Mishler/Rose (2001) explain in four hypotheses, what they understand by these points: a) National culture, where trust in political institutions varies between countries rather than among individuals according to historically rooted, national experiences embedded in interpersonal trust, b) Individual socialization, where trust in institutions varies within and across countries according to individuals' trust in others as shaped by their places in the social structure, c) Government performance, where trust in institutions varies across, rather than within, countries, in proportion to the success of government policies and the character of political institutions and d) Individual evaluations, where trust in institutions varies within and across countries in accordance with both individual attitudes and values and the social and economic positions individuals occupy.

1997). Widespread perceptions of corruption are harmful to trust in parliament (van der Meer 2010). When we invert these research results, we would expect to find high levels of political trust in a state where citizens feel represented, where the political institutions are economically effective and where there is no perception that the institutions are corrupt. That assumption should also hold in the multinational setting, to which I shall now turn.

When applying the concept of political trust in a multinational state, I expect interesting results. Authors like Levi (1998) argue that minorities tend to distrust the central/federal government and their fellow co-citizens who are members of the majority. They are said to be afraid that, without institutional protections, the majority can nearly always outvote the minority.[165] However, as we have found in the analysis of social trust, we did not find any evidence that the trust levels between members of national and national/regional units are very different. In what follows I will check if this assumption holds when analyzing political trust.

To the best of my knowledge, there is no case study analyzing the effects of political trust on political stability in the Spanish "State of Autonomies". If that topic is analyzed in Spain, then it is usually in comparative terms, with a focus on analyzing the independent variables, which influence political trust.[166]

Historical experience has shown that in multinational states', past actions may have destroyed most of the trust between members of national and national/regional units. It's rebuilding requires extraordinary efforts. The Franco dictatorship, which prohibited expressions and practices of the Catalan culture, has been seen by most Catalans as a foreign government, with very low levels of political trust. The new democratic state tried to rebuild that trust through including elements of autonomy into the Constitution (see Chapter 5). However, has this been enough to establish or re-establish trust?

Before starting with the empirical analysis of political trust, I assume the following. First, if there is high political trust/confidence in the institutions of the central state within the national and the national/regional units, then the multinational state should

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[165] This argument is very close to Kymlicka's claim for "minority rights" in Chapter 2.

[166] In one of these studies, Torcal (2014) finds that Spain is among the countries in Europe with the most significant decline in institutional trust between 2008 and 2012, even if its original levels of trust were already low (Torcal/Magalhaes 2010). Also, Torcal claims that the decline of institutional trust for this period is not identical for all institutions: the representative institutions lose the most, while institutions of the state of law tend to be stable.

be more stable. However, if there is a significant discrepancy in political trust between the institutions of the central state and the national/regional or local institutions, this could obviously be one of the reasons of political instability of the center. If people trust alternative national/regional institutions, the distance to go towards the break-up of the state is no longer so far.

In the following research, I will also address additional questions. For example, how should we interpret the decrease of political trust in different units of the state? Could we, for example, explain the loss of trust in corrupt national/regional institutions as a reason for political stability of the center? What about a reverse dynamic?

4.3.3. Empirical analysis

4.3.3.1. Measurement

As an empirical indicator for the measurement of political trust almost all studies use a research design with the following question: "Please look at this card, and tell me for each item, how much confidence you have in them." Then, different political institutions are presented. Some research institutes like the CIS or the ESS ask the respondents to answer on an 11-point scale. Other research institutes like the World Values Survey and Eurobarometer use a four-point scale. In this case, the offered answers are: "A great deal", "Quite a lot", "Not very much" and "None at all".[167]

Most scholars claim that the longer scales are better suited for empirical analysis. For example, Krosnick and Fabrigar (1997:144) claim that "There are various reasons to believe that more scale points will generally be more effective than fewer . . . More scale points permit a researcher to make more subtle distinctions among individuals' attitudes towards the same object. Thus, longer scales have the potential to convey more useful information". Moreover, different answer scales can sometimes give contradicting results.

4.3.3.2. Political trust in Spain

In a first step, I compare Spain with other European countries. I want to find out if in international comparison the level of political trust in Spain could be considered as

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[167] The exact wording in the WVS is: " I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?"

high, middle or low. I will compare the levels of political trust into national parliament. As the data source, I have selected the ESS data. From the possible seven waves, I chose the 5th wave from 2008, which is not affected by the economic recession in Europe.[168]

Figure 4.7. Political trust in different European Countries (11-answers scale)

Source: ESS Survey, Wave 5 (2008)

The pre-crisis data shows that the levels of political trust in Spain were above the European average. Spain scores a mean of 4.8 points and is positioned behind the Nordic countries, but ahead of other established liberal democracies like Germany, France or the United Kingdom. Before the crisis, Spain had quite stable trust levels. However, as shown in the longitudinal data, this development has come to an end with the economic crisis of 2008. Torcal (2014) shows, that in the last ESS wave, Spain fell to among the lowest places in the ranking, considering all three types of political trust. The reasons cannot be analyzed here.

In a next step, I will analyze the longitudinal development of political trust in Spain. I will use the World Values Survey data, which is based on the question "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?" There are four presented answers. I reduce two of them, "A great deal" and "Quite a lot", into a positive evaluation cluster, and the other two, "Not very much" and "None at all", into a negative evaluation group.

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[168] Waves 6 and 7 are strongly different because of the decline of levels of political trust in Spain (Torcal 2014).

In the following graph, I present the evaluations for two institutions of the "Rechtsstaat", the police and the justice system/courts, then the assessments of *institutions of liberal democracy*, like the parliament and the government and finally the evaluation of political parties. I analyze the waves 2-6 because Spain did not take part in the first wave 1981-1985.

Figure 4.8. Evaluation of confidence in political institutions

Source: World Values Survey (Waves 2-6)

The WVS data show two patterns. First, trust in the political institutions grows steadily in the waves 2-5 and then declines in the last 6th wave. Spaniards trust most in the institutions of the Rechtsstaat, followed by the institutions of liberal democracy. They trust less or have less confidence, in political actors like the political parties.

This result confirms the comparative findings presented by Denters et al. (2007). The most resistant to changes is trust in police, which has been the most stable since the 3rd wave in 1995. Apparently not considered a political institution it is immune to variations in the last 6th wave. The biggest decline is shown in the trust in the central government, which loses 24% of positive evaluations between 2007 and 2011.

In difference to the WVS, the CIS data analysis covers a slightly different period, starting four years later. The last available data are from the year 2015. Additionally, there are also other surveys during this period additional to the four waves of the World Value Survey. Even, if the Spanish word "confianza" can mean both things,

trust and confidence, the question asked is the same as in the other surveys.[169] The answers are given on the 11-point scale, and the presented results are as a mean. The categories go from the 0-points on the scale meaning "no confidence at all" to 10-points in the scale meaning "a great deal". I had to exclude from the analysis the organizations/institutions Police and Justice System/Courts, because in the CIS survey they are evaluated in a different way, on a 4-point scale. As a substitute, I take trust in the Constitutional Court, which is closest to the conceptualized term of institutions of the *Rechtsstaat.*

Figure 4.9. Trust in Parliament, Political Parties and Central Government (Spain)

Source: CIS

The results are similar to the others presented by the WVS. The trust levels in the different institutions take a very similar development between the years 1994-2015. The trust in the Central Government and Parliament grows until 2000 when it reaches an average of 5.9 (Central Government). "Trust in Parliament" reaches its peak in 1998 with a value of 5.6 and then starts to decline. The analysis of trust in political parties begins in 2002, and after a rise at the beginning, it stays stable up to 2012. Since 2012 we can observe an adamant fall of trust levels for all three representative institutions, which did not recover until 2012. In 2013 the Parliament reached a trust level of 2.5, which is 2.1 points less than in 1998. The trust in the Central Government reaches an all-time low of 2.4, losing more than the half of its trust levels since 2000. The trust in political parties falls back to 1.8 in 2013, which is the lowest

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[169] The question in the original language is the following: "A continuación, me gustaría que me dijese el grado de confianza que tiene Ud. en una serie de instituciones, utilizando una escala de 0 a 10 en la que 0 significa que no tiene Ud. 'ninguna confianza' en ella y 10 que tiene 'mucha confianza'".

level in the whole survey. Respondents tend to trust the Spanish Parliament (Cortes) at nearly the same level as the Central Government. The Spanish Parliament achieves a trust level of 4.2 points and the Central Government a trust level of 4.3. Spanish respondents trust the Political Parties much less, at a level of 3.2 points.

It would be interesting to analyze which independent variables could be responsible for the decline of these trust levels. These very basic descriptive statistics do not explain the reasons for this development. However, I take a look at additional data. The Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer in the year 2013 shows that 39% of Spaniards considered that the corruption in the country increased in the last two years "a lot", 28% said that it increased "a little", while 29% claimed that it stayed the same. Political parties (83 %) were identified by Spaniards as the most institutions, followed by the parliament/legislature with 67%, and 51% for the judiciary.

4.3.4. Political trust in Catalonia

To answer the research questions, we also have to analyze the development in Catalonia. In this part of the analysis, I switch from the CIS to the CEO data. The data on political trust is available for Catalonia for the period 2009-2015. It scrutinizes political institutions at different authority levels. In this part, I am especially interested in the changes in trust levels in the Spanish and the Catalan institutions by Catalan respondent. As an additional variable, I introduce "Trust into the Local Government", in this case, the "Ayuntamiento" (City Hall), which gives the analysis a multi-level dimension.

Figure 4.10. Political trust in Catalonia (2009-2015)

Source: CEO

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
The CEO data show that the levels of trust in all institutions were at a similar level when this survey question was introduced in the year 2009. The trust in the Central Government stood at 4.1 and the trust in the Spanish parliament at 4.4. The institutions of the Autonomous Communities scored higher, but not much. The trust in the Catalan government can be found at 4.8 points, while the trust in the Catalan parliament at 5.0 points.

Like in Spain, in Catalonia we also find a change in the subsequent years. We find the strongest decline in the trust in the central Spanish government, reaching a low of 2.2 in 2013. However, as already addressed in the conceptual discussion, we have to be cautious with these data. What could have been evaluated is the confidence in the particular government (between 2011-2015 in the form of PP), rather than in the central state institutions. For that reason, we should compare it with another institution of the liberal democracy, the Spanish Parliament. On doing this, the trend can be confirmed. Trust in the Spanish Parliament declines, at an even slower pace, reaching its low of 2.9 points in 2013.

The trust into the Catalan institutions does not show so much variation. The trust in the Catalan parliament lies in this period between 4.6% and 5.0%, while the trust in the Catalan government lies between 4.4% and 4.8%. Interestingly, trust in the local government grows from an already a high 4.9 points to 5.4 points in 2015.

These results are a significant finding. While trust in the institutions of the central state has taken a strong decline, the trust levels into the autonomous institutions have barely changed. Trust at the local level has even grown. Catalans increasingly trust more in the local and autonomous institutions than in the central ones. That development could be one of the reasons for political instability in the Spanish state. However, we cannot be sure about its causality, nor if the political crisis influenced the loss of trust in the central state or the loss of trust in the central state is the reason for political instability. A two-side causality cannot be excluded.

4.4. Conclusions

We have warned about the need to be careful with the survey data and cautious with the conclusions. Moreover, in this chapter, different studies fail to agree with each other. Additionally, this analysis suffers from lack of data, especially of time-series

figures for the early years after the transition. We are completely missing the development of trust in the 1980s. However, I can conclude this chapter on trust with two important findings. While social trust seems to be the glue, which holds the multinational state together, political trust has developed differently within the Spanish and the Catalan unit, at least within the period, which I have identified as political instability in the years 2012-2016.

While analyzing social trust, I have found that respondents in the national/regional unit of Catalonia have higher levels of interpersonal trust than in the rest of Spain. I find the biggest variation within the Catalan society between circles of a close family/friends circle and unknown people, rather than between Catalans and Spaniards. What is more, the data show no big variations in trust towards different groups of strangers, be it Catalans, Spaniards, Europeans or even citizens of the world.

When analyzing political trust, I find that before the economic and political crisis in Spain the levels of political trust have been stable. However, since then, the level of trust in the representative institution of the central state has dramatically fallen. This dynamic can be found in Spain as well as in the AC of Catalonia. However, in Catalonia, we find that there are no similar changes in the trust in autonomous or local institutions. While the trust in autonomous institutions has nearly stayed stable, the trust in the local level has even grown. We can observe a change in the trust levels between the different levels of multi-level authority. However, we should take the data in the Catalan context very cautiously. The survey questions have been introduced recently, and we cannot analyze longer time-series. Nevertheless, the analysis of trust points into the direction that the recent political problems are more political than social.

The results of this chapter are suggestive. I claim that even if they point in one direction, we will still need further systematic analyses. I have mainly used descriptive longitudinal data in this chapter, which could be not enough to confirm my findings. This analysis is missing the central question, whether trust matters for political stability. However, research on trust in the Spain is in its infancy it is difficult to compare these basic findings with more sophisticated empirical/statistical research. Nevertheless, this chapter confirms that trust is maybe important and should be included in future analysis on the political stability of a multinational state.

CHAPTER 5: DIVISIONS OF AUTHORITY

5.1. Introduction/Conceptualization

Discussions about the distribution of powers across various levels of government have been at the vanguard of political inquiry since the beginning of the modern state. They are also relevant in contemporary multinational states. In this chapter, I will analyze if and how different divisions of authority structures influence the stability of the political system. As authority structures, I identify federalism; shared-rule; self-rule; and decentralization.

In a first step, I will show the most significant differences between these terms. I will start with the conceptualization of the different terminologies within the definition of "federalism"[170], which is fairly difficult due to the "absence of a theoretical core and common terminology" (Erk 2006:116). The analysis of the beginnings and dynamics of federalism has been subject to alterations, echoing changes in the scholarly approach to the subject. The initial, more normative and constitutional, analysis has been added to by a more positivist approach of political scientists and economists (Beramendi 2007).

In the former normative/constitutional strand, some authors see federalism as a normative concept, while others as an analytical category. In the normative strand King (1982) has claimed that federalism represents a normative political philosophy that recommends the use of federal principles, specifically by combining joint action and self-government. Burgess (1993) has used a similar argument. He sees federalism as an ideological position, philosophical statement and empirical fact. In later work, Burgess describes federalism as "the recommendation and (sometimes) the active promotion of support of federation" (Burgess 2006: 2).

Watts (2008) distinguishes in his analysis between three terms: federalism, federal political systems, and federations. While he sees federalism as a normative term, he

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[170] By 1978 Davis (1978: 204) had already found more than forty-four adjectives preceding the term federalism: "Dual, orthodox, classic, polis, traditional, cooperative, bargaining, integrated, interdependent, creative, new, permissive, functional, pragmatic, organic, pluralistic, monarchic, perfect, imperfect, direct, private, 'picket-fence,' coercive, competitive, centralized, decentralist, peripheralized, fused, corporate, national, social, oligarchic, unitary, constitutional, international, military, political, monistic, polar, total, partial, contract, feudal-functional, incipient". That list could be extended. For example, the terms "ethnic", "plural" or "plurinational" federalism were not even included.

recommends using the terms federal political systems and federations when referring to different forms of political organization.

But not all authors agree with the normative interpretation of federalism. Elazar (1987) sees both concepts federalism and federation as descriptive, with federalism being a political organization and federation a sub-unit of federalism. Elazar has also developed a different analytical definition, claiming that federalism should be interpreted as the exercise of "shared-rule" and "self-rule": the amount of "shared-rule" at the central level and the level of "self-rule" in the regional communities.

The use of both federal principals can be very helpful in empirical analysis. "Shared-rule" as well as "self-rule" travel well and can be applied across a wide range of states and periods. It is no wonder that this distinction has been widely integrated into the normative/constitutional strand of federalism, and that both concepts have been used as domains of authority in the field of comparative politics (Hooghe et al. 2010).

When the term federalism is used, then the term decentralization is usually not far away. However, how decentralization relates to federalism and federalization has been the subject of academic disagreement. Most of it has to do with a quite liberal interpretation of Riker's work, mostly used in empirical and quantitative studies.[171]

Riker (1975:101) defines federalism as "a political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions".[172] However, in the same volume Riker acknowledges the superiority of the national government versus the regional one. No wonder that Riker saw equilibrium within these authority structures as difficult. He distinguished between centralized and peripheralized federalism, with the former having a long-term tendency towards a unitary state and the second having a tendency towards state break-up.

Elazar (1976) was one of the first pointing to the weaknesses of analysis provided by some parts of scholarship, which treated federalism and decentralization as synonymous. He insisted on putting the emphasis on the use of the term non-centralization. Within this concept, Elazar (1987) defines federations as non-

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[171] Riker's short definition of federalism is widely used by political economy literature, and it has also found wide application in studies on political parties. It is also used as an analytical tool to decide if a state should be considered federal.

[172] Lijphart (1979:503) emphasizes that in Riker's definition the component units are described as regional governments, which is in agreement with the view that "federalism is usually defined as a spatial or territorial division of power in which the component units are geographically defined."

centralized in contrast to decentralized, mainly because that implies a horizontal division of powers among multiple centers and not a vertical division from the center to the regional/local level. The former division would imply hierarchy, the latter Following Elazar decentralization implies a "matter of grace": "Non-centralization is not the same as decentralization, though the latter term is frequently-and erroneously-used in its place to describe the American system. Decentralization implies the existence of a central authority, a central government. The government that can decentralize can recentralize if it so desires. Hence, in decentralized systems the diffusion of power is actually a matter of grace, not right, and, as history reveals, in the long run, it is usually treated as such" (Elazar 1976:13).

The approach of Riker (1975) emphasizing the superiority of the national government along with Elazar's objections (1987) requesting a balanced division of power in a multi-tiered entity dominate the literature. Even if Elazar's complaints are taken into account, the term "non-centralization" has barely found application in empirical analysis and the term decentralization is dominant.[173]

The puzzle around centralization, non-centralization is only a part of the conceptual confusion around federalism and decentralization. The other part of the perplexity turns around the question: Is decentralization a segment of federalism or federalism a part of decentralization?

Elazar (1987) and Lijphart (1999) claim that decentralization can be seen as a characteristic of federalism. Every state has some vertical hierarchy between different levels of authority. For that reason, the existence of several levels of government is a

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[173] I should also address an additional distinction offered by Lijphart. His conceptual framework is different and one of the leading in the study of comparative politics. It is based on non-concentration of power, which can take two basic forms of "sharing of power" and "division of power". However, at the beginning of his academic career Lijphart (1979/1985) has focused more on aspects of "sharing of power" and the idea that some states such as Belgium, accepted consociative institutional mechanism to channel the demands of the different national groups within them. However, in 1993 Belgium also adopted a federal structure, though with strong consociative instruments. Lijphart (1979) sees federalism (the division of power) and consociationalism (sharing of power) as closely related. He claims for example "that (1) federal theory contains a number of important consociational, or at least proto-consociational, principles, that (2) federalism can be a consociational device, and that (3) under certain conditions, a federation can be a consociation and vice versa." Nonetheless, this consociative model has been criticized from many sides. Elazar (1987) criticized that consociational democracy may be a necessary, but insufficient condition to obtain a certain level of stability in multinational states. For that reason, it should be complemented with federalism. In "Patterns of Democracy" Lijphart (2012) distinguishes between a majoritarian and a consensual instead of consociative model of democracy. Even if the author put some more emphasis on the federal aspects, his model did not change much. He does not only consider the consensual model as superior to the majoritarian version, but he also recommends the consensual model for all states with strong linguistic, cultural or religious cleavages.

necessary, yet not sufficient condition for federalism. However, in a federal state, we can find a constitutional guarantee of the established division of powers (Dahl 1983, Watts 1999). Usually, they are secured through a formal declaration in the constitution, the presence of a strong judicial review and a second chamber. These powers cannot be taken away from the subnational units without a constitutional reform.

In a unitary state, the sovereignty remains at the center. The national/regional units have only those powers, which the center transfers to them. The central state has the right to withdraw these powers at any time. This transfer of political powers to a regional unit has been called devolution (Requejo 2001a, Sturm 2002).[174] Though, sometimes this devolution process has also been simply called decentralization, which has been one of the reasons for the conceptual confusion. Following that, there is also a "de jure" difference how unitary and federal states guarantee this division of power. Many scholars consider this as a salient characteristic of federalism.[175]

However, there are some objections to this approach. "De facto", the difference between unitary and federal states could be smaller, because a unilateral removal of autonomy rights would probably trigger great instability even in a unitary state. Besides that, this distinction based on the guarantee of the division of powers helps to distinguish unitary systems from federations. Nevertheless, in practice, there is an enormous variation among federations in the extent of the powers across the levels of government.

Political economy takes another approach and treats federalism and decentralization as equal (Beramendi 2007) or conceives federalism as a degree of decentralization (Treisman 2007). In many cases, this has much to do with the different meanings attached to the term decentralization. For example, Falleti (2005) subdivides the term decentralization and analyses how many fields of authority transfer it covers.

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[174] That makes the conceptual definition of a unitary state relatively sharp, even if a unitary state can take on many different forms like centralized unitary (Greece, Portugal) or decentralized unitary states (The Netherlands). Also, a Union like the United Kingdom is a particular type of a unitary state.
[175] Elazar (1994b: xv) states that: "In distinguishing federation from other forms of state organization most commentators consider it as a decentralized political system possessing a constitutional government in "which constituent territorial units are involved in a politics of accommodation. The nature and scale of the divisions of powers between the centre and the region can be distinguished from other forms of political devolution by virtue of the fact that regional autonomy and representation are not only more devolved but are constitutionally guaranteed."

Following this approach, we can distinguish between three types of decentralization: administrative, fiscal and political decentralization.[176]

Administrative decentralization refers to the range of policies that has been transferred to the sub-national[177] governments in the form of social services like education, health or social welfare.[178] Fiscal decentralization refers to the set of policies, which have been designed to increase the revenues and fiscal autonomy of subnational governments. Political decentralization has been defined as "a set of constitutional amendments and electoral reforms designed to open new - or activate existing but dormant or ineffective - spaces for the representation of subnational polities" (Falleti 2005: 329). Many scholars of political economy have principally described this third type – the political decentralization - as federalization or federalism (Treisman 2007).

As a consequence of this theoretical confusion, I decide to use an alternative approach. I will use the term federalism following King and Burgess in its form as a political recommendation, while the empirical analysis will be based on the federal principles of shared-rule and self-rule. Following this distinction, the characteristics of shared-rule will be closer to the analysis of the central level, while the self-rule will be connected to questions of decentralization.[179] This approach has some strength. First, not only the normative approach, but also the empirical one can relate to it, and for that reason, I don't have to reject insights from any of these approaches. Additionally, the federal principles of shared-rule and self-rule can be applied to many different state forms, which are not federal, but have some federal aspects, like for example the Spanish "State of Autonomies".

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[176] However, if we consider most of the works on federalism, we would have to state that there is a strong congruency between these concepts of political, fiscal and administrative decentralization. On their development see also Schneider (2003).

[177] The political economy literature nearly always uses the term sub-national unit, also because it does not distinguish between national and national/regional units.

[178] Falleti emphasis as an important point: "Administrative decentralization may entail the devolution of decision-making authority over these policies, but this is not a necessary condition. Policies such as unfunded administrative decentralization make subnational executives more dependent on the national government for fiscal resources" (Falleti 2005: 329).

[179] However, I will take into account some additional questions. Is there any shared rule in a decentralized state? Where is the share of the regions in the governing of the central state?

5.2. Literature overview: Impact of Shared Authority on Political Stability

To say that the literature, which analyzes the impact of institutions within multinational states, is voluminous would be an understatement. However, considering the question of political stability, there is a significant difference between the works on decentralization and the literature on federalism. The former, usually in the tradition of political economy, analyzes the performance and accountability of the political system and barely tackles questions of national minorities and stability. On the other hand, it is the strand of works on federalism in the normative-constitutional tradition, which usually asks questions about the impact of shared authority on the political stability.

5.2.1. The paradox of federalism

The discussion about the impact of federal solutions on political stability is usually presented as a contest between two groups of academics. One group sees federal solutions as clearly positive, while the other group underlines its negative influence on stability. However, a closer analysis reveals that just a few authors give clear answers and ambiguous answers are more common. They range from modest optimism to absolute skepticism.

The contradicting evaluation can be partly explained by the before mentioned different concepts, used by the different "schools". Additionally, scholars have different approaches and goals. Normative scholars of political philosophy look at norms of justice, accommodation, and democracy, distinguishing between mononational and plurinational states. Scholars of comparative politics or ethnic conflict concentrate on how to manage conflict and establish or maintain political stability.

An important result of the scientific research has been the discovery of a "paradox of multinational federalism" (Kymlicka 1995) or simply of a "paradox of federalism" (Erk/Anderson 2010). This line of research claims that federalism has a paradoxical side. On the one hand it helps to accommodate national minorities, but on the other hand, it gives them the tools to consolidate the difference and even go alone. Simeon

(1995) makes a similar argument and claims that federalism is Janus-faced: "federalism entrenches, perpetuates, and institutionalizes the very divisions it has designed to manage. It is Janus faced; its virtues are also its vices" (Simeon (1995:257).

Partly connected to these ideas is the concept developed by Stepan (2001), who distinguishes between "coming-together" and "holding-together" federalism.[180] The logics between both types are different. The "coming-together" type relates to two categories of states. First, some sub-units or states federate because of an external threat or an expansion request of the federated units. This was Riker's argument (1964). Second, sub-units or states federate to create or join a larger common market. The first reason, the external threat, has diminished during the last decades. The creation and success of multi-level governance or supranational organizations like the EU or NAFTA indicate that sub-units don't federate on a national, but collaborate as states rather on a supranational level. The second argument, at least for the states in the EU has lost some of its *raison d'être,* too.

The other logic is the "holding-together". A multinational state becomes unstable because of the request or necessity to accommodate national minorities and establish federalism. This type should be analyzed differently because it builds more on centrifugal than centripetal forces. Belgium and Spain are good examples.

We start the overview with evaluations of the most influential scholars of federalism like Elazar and Watts. Both conclude their analysis with different results. Elazar (1994a) states that several forms of political solutions using the combination of self-rule and shared rule are essential for the maintenance of peace. However, he considers ethnic nationalism as a possibly insurmountable obstacle to the success of federalism in multinational states. Further, having the numerous failures of multinational federations in mind, Elazar says that confederations and not federations could be a more successful tool to accommodate minorities.

Watts (2007) gives a more positive evaluation. He claims that: "multinational federations have generally been more difficult than other forms of federations to sustain, but that in practice under certain conditions they have worked" (Watts 2007: 230).

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[180] However, this is only one of the possible taxonomies.

5.2.2. The importance of democracy

The field of comparative politics shows us the importance of democracy for political stability. We should keep in mind that some evaluations of success or failure of federal solutions were heavily influenced by the political events in the times of their writing. It was the process of decolonization, which made scholars like Tarlton (1965) claim that federalism leads to state failure. In this period Duchacek declared, "The temptation to secede and form an independent territorial unit had assumed epidemic proportions" (Duchacek 1970: 69). Also, Nordlinger (1972) rejected federalism as a conflict-regulating method.

Two decades later it was the dissolution of communist states, which strongly influenced the evaluations. In this case, some scholars build their analysis on the premise that federalism can exist not only in democratic states but also in authoritarian regimes. Consequently, they used the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as their key case studies and claimed that both states disintegrated because of its federal design (Roeder 1991, Snyder 2000). Surprisingly, also Horowitz (1998) has been skeptical about federalism for the same reasons. Basing his evidence on the authoritarian state of Yugoslavia, Horowitz considered federalism as an undesirable form of multinational accommodation.

However, there are scholars like Lijphart (1977, 2012), who see democracy as a *conditio sine qua non* for the distribution of power and as an indispensable condition for federal solutions to work. As already mentioned, for Lijphart federalism is a useful tool for managing ethnic conflict, as a division of power. However, the division of power is only one part, the second instrument being the sharing of power. An important part of the consensual system is the proportional electoral system, which allows for a multiparty system.

Filippov et al. (2004) raise a similar point by claiming that in federations the inclusion of the regional political elites in an integrated party system matters because it creates political and distributional incentives to channel their demands within the system. When this possibility is not given, conflicts about the rules of the game in the constitution are possible and political crisis the consequence.

McGarry/O'Leary (1993) further developed the idea of consocionalism as a tool of ethnic conflict solution. They claim that "democratic federations have broken down

throughout Asia and Africa", but "genuine democratic federalism is clearly an attractive way to regulate ethnic conflict, with obvious moral advantages over pure control" (McGarry/O'Leary 1993:34-35). They see democracy as a necessary condition for stability.

The distinction between democratic and non-democratic states has been crucial when evaluating the failure of these states. Many of the federal countries broke apart because they could not develop a "coming-together" dynamic. They did not come voluntarily into the federation but were forced into it, be it by a colonial power or by a totalitarian state.

This explanation is also one of the arguments of Linz (1997), who argues for a sharp distinction between those states where state institutions and the rule of law were consolidated before the transition to democracy and those states in which they were installed later. Following Linz, the pre-existence of a federal structure fosters rather than prevents regime failure. However, if federalism has been installed later, it could display its capacity to accommodate contending national identities. This is confirmed by Bermeo (2004), who claims that federations, which are a legacy of an authoritarian regime, are less successful than federations emerging from a contractual agreement or decentralization. Hooghe et al. (2010) claim that democracies are more receptive than autocracies to the political demands for regionalization.

Following these arguments, we can identify at least four main explanations of the break-up of multinational federal states. First, we can identify "early" (Sub-Saharan Africa Francophone West and Equatorial Africa, in British East Africa) and "late" (Eritrea, South Sudan) effects of decolonization. Second, we can identify "early" (e.g. the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia) and "late" dissolutions of a totalitarian state (e.g.. Serbia - Montenegro).[181]

For that reason, many of the countries where federalism did not work as a possible solution for multinational states are what McGarry (2007) calls "false negatives". These cases lead some scholars to affirm the adverse effects of federalism, even if few of the federal principles - be it democratic shared-rule or self-rule - were applied. Historical examples of the Soviet Union or other totalitarian or authoritarian states show that a pseudo-constitution has a very limited value (Linz/Stepan 1996, Lijphart 1977).

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[181] The dissolution of Serbia-Montenegro could be interpreted as the (until now) last step of the break-up of Yugoslavia.

Most of the positivist literature, quantitative in nature and searching for a large N-sample, mixed full democratic, hybrid and "non-democratic" states as one unit of analysis. For that reason, some of these results have to be taken with caution. Cohen (1997) finds that federalism increases protest but reduces rebellion, without distinguishing the regime type. Saideman et al. (2002) who do not distinguish between ethnic and non-ethnic federalism claim that federalism has no significant effect on democracies, but it increases protest and decreases violence in non-democracies.[182] Roeder (2000) analyzed more than 132 states and 632 ethnic groups between 1955 and 1994. He gives credit to democracies, claiming that they "are less likely than autocracies to see ethno political conflict escalate to ethnonational crises" (Roeder 2000:31). Nevertheless, he argues that his results show that "both asymmetrical federalism that grants a special status to the homelands of ethnic minorities and symmetrical federalism lead to significant increases in the likelihood of ethnonational crises" (Roeder 2000: 32).

Questions of stability were also addressed by scholars who tried to establish the conditions under which federalism becomes self-enforced (De Figueiredo and Weingast 2005, Bednar 2009, Filippov et al. 2004). De Figueiredo and Weingast (2005) have designed federalism as an equilibrium in which both the center state and the (regional) units have preferences in fulfilling the federal contract. Bednar (2009) theorizes federalism as a multifaceted problem of public good provision in an institutional environment, which is favorable to opportunistic behavior. Filippov et al. (2004) approach stability as a distributive conflict among electorally motivated elites.

5.2.3. How many federal units?

Among scholars, there is no agreement on size or number of the federal units is better for political stability. The tendency leans towards "as many units as possible". Horowitz (1985), while analyzing Nigeria, claimed that the bigger units should be divided into smaller parts and that would prevent ethnic conflict.[183]

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[182] Iff (2013) has interpreted the results differently, claiming that until now the wrong answer has been asked. We should not ask, if federalism is the best solution for ethnic conflict, but rather if federal countries indeed have used the existing federal mechanisms to resolve the problems within the multiethnic structure.

[183] Even if in praxis this did not prevent these kinds of conflicts in Nigeria and Russia.

Riker/Lemco (1987) see a close association between stability and longevity, on the one hand, and a large number of constituent units, roughly equal in size, on the other hand. But, they are "far from certain that this association is causal, though there is some rationale that this feature encourages stability" (Riker/Lemco 1987: 114). Considering the number of federated units, Hale (2004) argues, that ethno federalism works unless it is structured in a way that creates a core ethnic region, in which case that ethno-federal state would probably collapse. However, a partly opposite view has been offered by O'Leary (2001), who claims that "the absence or near absence of a Staatsvolk does not preclude democratic federation, but a democratic federation without a clear or secure Staatsvolk must adopt (some) consociational practices if it is to survive" (O'Leary 2001:291).

This review shows that there is no agreement on the effects of federalism on the political stability and survivor of states. This fits well with the main tendency over the evaluation of federalism. Beramendi (2007: 759) claims, that "the political and economic effects of federalism are complex, multidimensional, often contingent on a number of factors, and by no means positive. As a result, it is far less straightforward to establish what the actual consequences of federalism are."

However, it seems that if a multinational state is democratic, the federation was voluntary and it is based on many units; then federalism can make this state more stable. Additionally, nearly all analysts of multinational solutions coincide, that it is the constitutional arrangement, which finally makes the difference (Stepan 2001, Watts 2008, Kymlicka 1998, McGarry/O´Leary 2009, Erk/Anderson 2009, Lijphart 2004).

5.2.4. Shared-rule, self-rule, and decentralization

In this analysis shared-rule and self-rule are used in their form as federal principles. With that, they could be described as part of the definition of federalism. For that reason, an evaluation of their influence on stability has been already partly delivered in the former part. However, some authors analyze the impact of shared-rule and self-rule also separately.

For example, the idea that "shared-rule" has significant implications for the political stability of a federal state can be found among others in the work of Hechter (2000).

He claims that institutions "which increase the central state's accountability to national minorities should reduce the demand for sovereignty, and hence the potential for nationalist conflict" (Hechter 2000: 136). In his former work, Hechter (1975) focused on the elites of the multinational states, claiming that accommodation hinders secession because withdrawal claims are more moderate when elites in such regions are adequately appeased. If accommodated, these elites benefit from the autonomy and the shared wealth of the central state. As a consequence, they defend this kind of autonomy before the secessionists.

These regional political elites can be accommodated through a regional/second chamber usually called the Senate[184], or also within the national/first chamber, usually called the parliament. This standard distinction of political institutions is important in federal and unitary states.

In federal states, the second/higher chamber usually represents the regions, and the discussions rise around the question of asymmetry of powers between the two chambers or how many represents each region should have in the Senate.

However, in a unitary state, the discussion is more basic and deals more with the power and resources of this chamber. It also asks what this chamber should represent.

The Senate in a unitary state can be non-existent, not representing the relevant regional units or have only a symbolic character. In this unitary system, political choices are set by preferences of the majority of citizens translated by the electoral system. If there is no representation in the second chamber, then the national/regional unit can influence the politics only in the parliament. The regional parties usually are not strong enough to build a government. However, they can join a coalition. They may also give temporary support for a minority government.

An important evaluation not only of "shared-rule", but also of the "self-rule" is offered by Hooghe et al. (2010) when developing the Regional Authority Index (RAI). They conceived shared-rule as referring to the authority a regional government (co-) exercises in the country as a whole. On the other hand, self-rule indicates in the coding of these authors to the authority of a regional government over those living in the region. This explicit evaluation of "self-rule" is barely offered in political research. Usually, authors analyze aspects of decentralization, when talking about the regional powers in regional territory.

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[184] The regional/second chamber is often called the Senate, particularly if elected. Otherwise, it is often called Council.

Hooghe et al. (2010) found that introducing shared-rule requires the backing of supermajorities. For that reason, shared-rule is established when a regime is created and usually not extended afterward. The barriers to reform of self-rule are lower than those for shared-rule. They may not need a change in the constitution. Generally, the competencies of a regional government can be extended by national legislation, that is, by normal majorities. However, while the shared rule apparently enhances the stability of the federal state and its final manifestation is the co-existence of regions in a federal polity, the consequences of self-rule are theoretically more troublesome. The final manifestation of self-rule could be the break-up of old structures and the creation of a new independent state. With that Hooghe et al. (2010) seem to explain, albeit with a different logic, the "paradox of federalism".[185]

These findings of self-rule partly contradict Horowitz (1991), who claims that that, "early, generous devolution is far more likely to advert then to abet ethnic separatism…Unfortunately, a good many governments have proceeded on the opposite assumption – that devolution feeds centrifugal forces" (Horowitz 1991: 224). Regarding decentralization, we cannot be sure about its effect on political stability. Treisman (2007:274) giving an overview of most of these analyses concludes that the analysis of "decentralized government in a particular place and time is very much a leap in the dark".

Apparently, the more scholars find out about federalism and decentralization, the more difficult it becomes to evaluate their effect on political stability. Seemingly comparative research does not shed enough light on the topic. Also for that reason in the following analysis, I will use the case–study approach and analyze the effects of divided authority in one case: the Spanish "State of Autonomies." As already shown in the introduction (1.2.3. Justification of the case study), this approach could give better results.

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[185] While shared-rule usually only accommodates diversity, self-rule can accommodate but also strengthen diversity. In the same analysis, Hooghe at el. (2010) discovered that self-rule is less path-dependent than shared rule.

5.3. Positioning of the case study: Spanish "State of Autonomies"

The degree to which Spain is a federal state continues to be an object of debate and discussion (Holesch/Nagel 2012). In the discussion, some authors use the high level of autonomy or self-rule of the seventeen Spanish Autonomous Communities as an argument for a federal interpretation. Nowadays, the AC are the principal actors in general government spending, which for many authors is enough to describe a country not only as decentralized but also as federal. Let us remember, that for Riker a federal state is to be found where "(1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some [constitutional] guarantee . . . of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere" (Riker 1964:11). According to Riker's definition, Spain could be classified as federal. Watts (2008) argues with similar arguments that Spain has structural attributes typical for a federal political system like two levels of government, constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue resources, a Constitutional Court, which arbitrates disagreements, and institutions that can ease intergovernmental cooperation. Many scholars like Burgess (2006), Rodden (2006), Moreno (2001) and Sala (2013) use similar arguments when defining Spain as federal. Colomer (1998) calls Spain a "non-institutionalized federalism", while Lijphart (2012) tends to a more neutral position and describes Spain as semi-federal.

On the other hand, there are numerous academics like Elazar (1987), Filippov et al. (2004), Nagel (2006, 2008, 2010b) or Requejo (2007a) who doubt or refuse to define Spain as federal, mostly because of the lack of shared-rule.

In the following part, I will take up this debate. I will analyze how much federalism, shared rule, self-rule, and decentralization we can find in the Spanish "State of Autonomies". This more static analysis will help us define the institutional nature of the object of analysis. If some or all of these institutional characteristics are present, we will analyze their development. Institutional analysis apart, I will dedicate a part of this chapter to the standpoint of political parties on decentralization and how Spanish citizens evaluate the decentralization measures and the Spanish "State of Autonomies."

5.3.1. Federalism as a recommendation

I have determined that I will use the term federalism in its sense as a recommendation. In Spain, words like federalism or federation barely appear in the Spanish Constitution, and if they do, than only in order to emphasize that "a federation of the Autonomous Communities will be not admitted in any case".[186] If federalism appears in political discourse, then as a recommendation of political parties, above all in the proposed constitutional reforms of the Socialist party (PSOE). As already mentioned, there is much more "federalism" in the academic literature, which has published many works on the question of whether Spain is federal or not. The frontiers between decentralization measures and federalism are unclear, for example when Montero (2005) talks about "fiscal federalism." In a nutshell, I claim that there is a discrepancy between the political reality and the academic work, federalism is not present in the first, but it is existent in the latter.

5.3.2. Shared rule

Following the academic debate, the biggest hindrance to define Spain as federal is the lack of shared-rule. A representation of the states in the upper house and their influence over constitutional reforms are usually considered necessary checks of the degree of federalism.

Which aspects of shared-rule do we find in Spain? The AC are not constituent units, and they are barely involved with the institutions of the central state. The Spanish upper house, the Senate, is no chamber of the AC, as three-quarters of the senators represent administrative sub-units of the central state, the 50 *provincias*, which are also the electoral districts of the lower house.[187] The *provincias* depend heavily on the center. There is empirical evidence that the *provincias* should be considered more as an element of central state than of regional influence (Holesch/Nagel 2012).

The Senate is less powerful than Congress. Among the most important tasks, some refer to the lawmaking process. The Senate can amend or veto a proposal of the lower house. However, the parliament can override these objections by an absolute majority

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[186] See Art 145.1 of the Spanish Constitution: "En ningún caso se admitirá la federación de Comunidades Autónomas."
[187] There are also some islands, which are represented in the Senate. However, they are not electoral districts of the lower house.

vote. The organic laws, which regulate the regional devolution, need an absolute majority of both chambers. The Senate can appoint some constitutional posts like that of some judges of the Constitutional Court. It also has some shared disciplining instruments towards the AC level, it co-decision is needed when suspending the regional authority (Art.155).

Nevertheless, the Senate can be described as a weak and surely not AC-based institution and is a permanent candidate for reforms.[188] Besides that, the central power maintains its hegemony through basic framework and constitutional laws (leyes de bases y leyes organicas). Judicial power is structured like that of a unitary state.

A particular type rule of shared-rule is the participation of nationalist/regional parties at the central level, not in the federal, but in the national chamber. Since a grand coalition in Spain between PP and PSOE has not been an option in the Spanish politics (until 2016), national/regional parties have a chance to assert their interests, namely when their votes are needed by a minority government in Madrid. In this situation parties claiming to defend particular minority nations like the former party coalition *Convergència i Unió* (CiU), or other parties like the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC), *Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (BNG)*, *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV) or the *Coalición Canaria* have some opportunities to influence the shared-rule on the central level. And in fact, to give recent examples, between 1992-1996 and then 1996-2000, first PSOE and then PP needed the support of national/regional parties. During these periods they effectively influenced central state politics.

When looking for other aspects of shared-rule, maybe outside the conventional "federalist" definition, we could examine the careers of national/regional politicians. Here we could distinguish between the direction of political careers in the multi-level system and more symbolic participation of the national/regional politicians in aspects of shared-rule like leading roles in the statewide political parties or the Spanish government.

Considering the former point, the question usually asked is, how regional positions influence the way to the national parliament (Stolz 2003, Botella et al. 2011, Stolz 2011, Dodeigne 2015, Astudillo Ruiz 2015). However, contrary to conventional wisdom, career ambitions of professional politicians in multi-level systems are not

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[188] For a more exhaustive analysis of the shared rule elements, we could also analyze the prerogatives of the Senate in some issues and the reform processes of the statutes.

necessarily directed towards the national arena (Borchert/Stolz 2011). Stolz (2011) shows that Catalan politicians change regularly and without a preference of direction within a highly integrated career arena including both regional and national institutions, what he calls a pattern of "integrated careers".[189] For that reason, it is difficult to analyze its impact on the political stability of Spain.

We can state that since the beginning of the "State of the Autonomies", we cannot find Spanish prime ministers who were born in Catalonia or the Basque Country. The Socialist Party PSOE has had since the beginning a strong Andalusian "accent" with figures such as the former Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez or Alfonso Guerra, who was the vice-president of the government.[190] Politicians from Galicia, which I have identified as another unit with strong national/regional characteristics (see Chapter 2) have some influence in the PP. The best example is Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy (2011-2016), born in Galicia.

However, the literature on the direction of the careers shows, that we cannot be sure if the lack of the national/regional politicians at the head of government or statewide parties is due to the rejection by the central level or to the missing ambitions of those politicians on the national level. The "Ciudadanos" party, born in Catalonia provides an example that a Catalan party has some possibilities in the national area, however maybe because the unity of Spain is one of their most important principles. Besides that, it is no longer a non-statewide party (NSWP).

After this discussion, as a next step, I would like to introduce some empirical data measuring the amount of shared-rule in Spain. I will rely heavily on the analysis of Hooghe et al. (2010) contrasting it with the analysis of Requejo (2007a).

Hooghe et al. (2010) coded aspects of shared-rule and self-rule in 42 democracies in the period of 1950-2006, including Spain. They analyzed the shared-rule of Spain using the following attributes: a) Law making – The extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation, b) Executive control – The extent to which regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings, c) Fiscal control – The extent to which regional representatives co-

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[189] With that, the Catalan case is different than the Spanish one, where Montero (2007: 590) claims that: "Politicians with extensive subnational experience do go to the [Parliament] Congreso, but they finish their careers there and only rarely return to subnational office subsequently".

[190] The influence of the Basque socialism was also significant, Txiqui Benegas was the secretary of the organization. However, also the Catalans had their quotas, the Catalan politician Narcis Serra has become vice-president of the government.

determine the distribution of national tax revenues and d) Constitutional reform – The extent to which regional representatives co-determine constitutional change.

Following their coding, the AC score 0.5 out of 2 points in a) law making, because *regional governments can designate representatives in the legislature* and 1 out of 2 points on c) the fiscal control, where *regional governments or their representatives in the legislature negotiate over the distribution of tax revenues, but do not have a veto*. In the other categories like b) executive control, they score 0, above all because *there are no routine meetings between central and regional governments to negotiate policy*. They also score 0 d) *constitutional reform – the AC have no influence on constitutional change and the central government and/or national electorate can unilaterally change the constitution*. However, here in the Spanish case, we find a particularity, even if the AC cannot veto the constitutions, they can veto the Statutes.[191] However, we could also claim that a Statute is more an expression of self-rule than shared-rule.

Finally, the AC score only 1.5 of possible 9 points on the shared-rule scala. There are also no changes in this score during the democratic period. The provinces score 2.0 higher than the AC and seem to be better integrated into the shared-rule structures without being a part of the regional authority.

Requejo (2007a), when analyzing and measuring shared-rule, distinguishes 13 different aspects of what he calls "Constitutional Federalism". Spain scores 6.5 out of 20 points, scoring in aspects like Constitutional guarantee of self-government (1 out of 1), Executive/Legislative Dualism (1 out of 2), Judicial Dualism (0.5 of 1), Fiscal Dualism (0.5 of 2 – does not refer to the Basque Country and Navarre), Upper chamber: nomination by institutions of the federated entities (0.5 of 1), Powers of the upper chamber (0.5 out of 2), Constitutional/High Court (2 of 2), Nomination of judges by federated entities (0.5 of 2).[192] With that, both indexes show the low level of "shared-rule" in the Spanish "State of Autonomies".

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[191] "The lack of collective comunidad control over the constitution of the Spanish state is somewhat balanced by the fact that each comunidad has a veto over amendments to its own statute. A revised statute requires a supermajority in the comunidad's assembly (two-thirds to three-fifths depending on the comunidad) and a majority in the Cortes, as well as ratification by regional referendum. This is not reflected in the scoring since Spanish comunidades are conceived as asymmetrical regions rather than special autonomous regions" (Hooghe et al. 2010:223). However, we should take into account, that the ratification through a regional referendum is possible only in 4 or maybe 5 cases.

[192] It does not score at all at "Polities as constituent units", "Agreement of major of federated entities (directly or indirectly) for Constitutional Reform", "Upper Chamber: number of senators of the federated entities regardless of the population", "Non-allocated powers" and "Right of Secession."

5.3.3. Self-rule/Decentralization

When Spain is defined as federal, this is usually done because of the high level of autonomy of the seventeen Spanish Autonomous Communities. The second argument is that the Spanish AC are the principal actors in general government spending. However, one may ask whether there is any exclusive power and if the AC are the last decider. Therefore, in this part I would like to talk about the degree of self-rule some authors find in Spain. I will also ask how much "self-rule" there is in Spanish "self-rule" or if most aspects of these issues should not be summarized under the term of "decentralization".

Like in the previous point on shared-rule, I will concentrate on the analysis of Hooghe et al. (2010) and Requejo (2007a).

Hooghe et al. (2010) code self-rule as follows: a) institutional depth – the extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated, b) policy scope – The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible, c) fiscal autonomy – The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population and d) representation - the extent to which a regional government is endowed with an independent legislature and executive.

In all these categories the "State of Autonomies" scores high. Considering a) the institutional depth, the ACs score the maximum 3 out from 3. Following the authors they are *non-deconcentrated, general–purpose, administration not subject to central government veto*. Considering point b) the policy scope, they reach 3 out of 4 points, *the ACs have authoritative competencies in at least two areas above, and in at least two of the following: residual powers, police, authority over own institutional set–up, local government*. However they do not have authority over immigration or citizenship, what would give the maximum 4 points.

It is important to note c) Fiscal Autonomy, where we not only find key changes but also aspects of asymmetry. The AC score 2 from 1978-1996, where *regional government sets base and rate of minor taxes*. However, for the period 1997-2006, they score 3 – *the regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax*. The two AC with a special fiscal regime Basque Country and Navarre score the maximum 4 out of 4 for the entire period 1978-2006, where *the regional government sets base and the rate of at*

least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax.

The next point is d) *the representation as the capacity of regional actors to select regional office holders*. Here all AC score the full points 4 of 4, 2 of 2 for assembly and 2 of 2 for executive, since the first regional elections, which elected regional parliaments.

The final score of the AC varies. Most of the AC, score 8 points out of 15 in 1982, 12 between 1983-1996 until they get their regional parliaments and 13 points out if 15 from 1997-2006 after an additional financial reform.

Catalonia has with 13 points the same amount of points like the others AC, the only difference is, that it got it already since 1980. The biggest difference we find in the other national/regional unit the Basque Country (and in Navarre), which score 14 out of 15 points. This asymmetrical difference, which appears small in Hooghe's et al. analysis, has introduced instability into the system, which will be analyzed in the next chapter on asymmetry. The results show, that the amount of self-rule in the Spanish "State of Autonomies" is close to the maximum score. This finding can be confirmed in figure 5.1 when comparing with the regional authority of other countries.[193] Considering the self-rule Spain's regional actors have more autonomy than the countries, which are seen as the examples of a federal state like Switzerland or the US. However, Spain scores much weaker on the shared-rule scale and is located closer to Italy than for example Germany.

Figure 5.1. The dimensions of shared-rule and self-rule following RAI

Source: Hooghe et al. (2010) and politicon.es

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[193] In this graph, the results for all the regional layers of Spain (provinces + AC) are summarized.

The score indicating the strong self-rule within the Spanish "State of Autonomies" confirms part of the literature, which defines Spain as one of the most decentralized countries in the world. However, it contradicts other literature, which questions, if the AC has such an amount of self-rule, above all considering full autonomy in some policy fields. However, when we take a closer look, this question can be easily explained. First, not all decentralized countries have some national/regional units. Second, Hooghe at al. (2010) analysis has a comparative character and many of the questions or the coding, where developed to include the biggest number of cases possible. Also for that reason, some trade-offs had to be made. The authors have mentioned some of the problematic points in their analysis. Following their distinction, a government has different degrees of formal authority, one of them being the authority over certain spheres of action. Hooghe et al. (2010:5-6) claim "regional government has some degree of formal authority over certain actions in a particular jurisdiction. It is, therefore, necessary to specify (A) the territory over which a regional government exercises authority; (B) the depth of that authority; and (C) the spheres of action which it exercises authority." In that case, four policy areas are of particular importance: financial resources, authority over citizenship, the exercise of legitimate coercion and the control of the rules of the game.[194]

Requejo (2007a) takes a slightly different approach by questioning the amount of real "self-rule" from the beginning. When analyzing "self-rule, he uses a different definition and coding. He calls it "constitutional decentralization" and includes four categories with a maximum of 20 points.

The categories "Legislative power" and "Fiscal/expenses decentralization" are more relevant and countries can score 8 points. "Legislative power" is divided into four parts. Spain scores in "Economy/Infrastructures/Communications"; "Education & Culture" and "Welfare" always 1 out of 2. However, in "Internal Affairs/Penal-Civil-

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[194] The following attributes are being connected to the four concepts. First, provision of financial resources, which depends on a regional government's capacity to tax those living in the region or claim a share of national taxation. Second, authority over citizenship that allows determining the members of the community. Third, the exercise of legitimate coercion that allows for constituting the core of (national) sovereignty. Fourth, the control of the rules of the game that allows a government to project authority into the future. As we have seen in the analysis, only the first is met in the case of Basque Country and Navarre. Besides that, the AC has no say on central questions of authority. Additionally, it could be asked if the AC (besides Basque Country and Navarre) do have an area of action, where they act as last decider. That should at least reduce the score for the institutional depth – the extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated and possibly also for the b) Policy scope – The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible.

Law/Others" it scores 2 out of 2. In questions of Fiscal/expenses decentralization, it scores 3.5 out of 8. Requejo gives less relevance to two categories. Spain scores 1.5 out of 2 points in "Executive powers", 0.5 out of 2 points in "Foreign policy".

In total, Spain scores 10.5 out of 20 points and is ranked 12 out of the 18 analyzed countries. The differences between the interpretations of the depth of autonomy in both analyses are striking and should be taken more into account in future analysis. What we should hold on to in this analysis is that apparently the amount of "self-rule" in Spain could be smaller as widely expected.

5.4. Empirical analysis

5.4.1. Institutional development of the Spanish "State of Autonomies"

The analysis has shown that in the Spanish case we find federalism mostly in scientific study and not in political practice. We have found not a lot of shared-rule, while on the other hand quite substantial amount of decentralization, part of which could be called self-rule.

Following the recommendations of historical institutionalism in this part, I will distinguish between the origins and the evolution of the devolution of authority, which following the findings of the former part could be best described as having its ups and downs as a decentralization process. I will analyze how and if this development has influenced the stability of the multinational state.

5.4.1.1. The Spanish Constitution – development of path-dependence rules?

A constitution sets the formal rules of the game, which among others regulate power relations across territories. These rules of game hinder big shifts in the distribution of authority. In the Spanish case, the preparation of the Constitution was lead in the atmosphere of political optimism, but also of fear and terror (Aja 2003). The political confidence came from the hope for a possible democratization of the country. However, the possible return of the civil war and the state-destabilizing activities of the Basque terror organization ETA made all actors acts very cautious.

There were numerous cleavages, which had to be addressed within the Constitution: The political cleavage between democratic and authoritarian options, the religious cleavage between the Church and the advocates of a laic state, the institutional cleavage between the supporters of monarchy and the supporters of republicanism or the socio-economic cleavage between the Right and the Left. There was also the territorial cleavage between the center and the periphery, strongly connected with the national/regional cleavage between members of Spain and the Basque Country and Catalonia.

5.4.1.2. The Actors and the Satisfaction of its Preferences[195]

Already before the negotiations about the form of future state the first Suarez government (1977-1979) established two pre-autonomies in Catalonia and the Basque Country. It was then applied to the whole Spanish territory. In this process, most of the administrative frontiers (14 except Cantabria, La Rioja, and Madrid) of the future "State of Autonomies" were drawn. The formation of the pre-autonomies had a significant impact on the development of the state. It somehow implied that decentralization would be applied to the whole territory (Aja 2003).

It is widely known, that the decisive organ to define central points of the Constitution was the Constitutional "Committee" (*Ponencia constitucional)*.[196] Its seven members represented the major parliamentary groups, which were elected in the 1977 elections. There were three members from the governing UCD (*Unión de Centro Democrático*/J.M. Pérez Llorca, M. Herrero de Miñon, G. Cisneros) one from PSOE (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*/G. Peces-Barba), one from PCE (Partido Comunista Español/ J. Solé-Tura), one of AP (Alianza Popular/Manuel Fraga) and one from Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya (PDC/M. Roca Junyent). Only the last mentioned represented a non-statewide party.

Following Colomer (1995) during the discussion about the territorial future of Spain, there were three issues to be solved. First, the maintenance or abolishment of the

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[195] I will draft the development of the Constitution following two authors: Riker and Colomer. One of the main contributions of Riker (1975) has been to focus on politicians' incentives when analyzing the establishment of a federal institution. This approach positioned the basis of all succeeding analyses of the origin and stability of federations in the rational – choice tradition (Filippov 2005).

[196] In this point, I will rely on the analysis of Colomer (1995). We should emphasize that the relevant actors have been the political parties and not an assembly of representatives of national and national/regional units.

provinces, second some administrative decentralization or even federalization following a general formula and third a particular autonomy, above all for Catalonia and the Basque Country. During the discussions, the parties had the following preferences. The AP wanted to maintain the provinces and favored some administrative decentralization, but not for all regions. The PDC wanted decentralization, but with a special level of asymmetry for Catalonia and the Basque County and the abolishment of the provinces. For both parties (AP and PDC) the voting on the territorial issue was their first constitutional preference.[197] Among the parties that gave only secondary importance to the territorial issue, the most confusing was the position of the UCD. The ruling party wanted a kind of a unique formula for Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia, but because of Andalusian pressure, the UCD changed its preferences and chose to promote some general administrative decentralization later. The PSOE and PCE due to their pact within the Franco opposition with the parties of the national/regional units were not opposed to some special autonomy. Formally their platforms even advocated the right of self-determination, even if not secession. Nevertheless, some general decentralization and federalization formula was closer to their party identity based on solidarity, autonomy, and democracy.

Finally, many possible options were on the table, from an "asymmetrical, organic quasi-federal and/or confederal" up to a more "decentralized, symmetrical and rationalist federal" approach (Martinez-Herrera/Miley 2010).

Colomer (1995) claims that due to the change from sincere preferences to sophisticated voting, not only elements of asymmetry in the form of a special autonomy for Catalonia and the Basque Country but also a general decentralization formula were adopted. Moreover, the provinces were maintained. (Table 1) This quite paradoxical and contradictory result had a significant impact on the development of the territorial dynamics since.

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[197] For other parties, the decentralization issue has been the second or the third preference. For UCD maintaining the monarchy and free enterprise were more important. The preferences of the PSOE and the PCE were directed towards the constitutional recognition of civil rights and socio-economic issues (Colomer 1998).

Table 5.1. Voting on the territorial future of Spain

	Sincere preferences			Sophisticated voting		
	Provinces/ Adm. Decentral.	Particular Autonomy	General formula	Provinces/ Adm. Decentral.	Particular Autonomy	General formula
AP-1	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
UCD-3	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
PDC-1	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
PSOE-1	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
PCE-1	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Result	YES 4:3	NO 4:3	YES 5:2	YES 7:0	YES 6:1	YES 6:1

Source: Colomer (1995: 97)

When we consider the satisfaction of the actors involved in this bargaining, we can see that all actors besides the Catalan representative satisfied two of their three possible preferences. The PDC got what they wanted in questions of a particular asymmetric autonomy, but had to change its preferences on two other aspects, among others the contradictory general formula for decentralization. In comparison with the Catalans, the non-present Basque Nationalists of the PNV[198] did not accept any formula that would introduce a perspective of symmetrical competences for all the future Autonomous Communities. The Basques insisted on asymmetry, which was part of the Basque self-understanding. Their principal objective was the introduction of "the historical right of the old lands" into the Constitution.[199]

Considering the way to autonomy the Constitution established two paths with different requirements, which the different nationalities and regions could use. The "extraordinary" track (Art.151) was foreseen for two types of regions, first, the historical nationalities which had realized or planned a referendum during the Second Republic (Catalonia, Basque Country or Galicia). Second, this track was also open to regions that showed a strong will of "self-rule", expressed through a majority of the

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[198] The PNV officially did not qualify to the Ponencia due to the weak representation in the national elections but was together with PDC were in favor of asymmetric deals.

[199] Many authors see the Basque opposition to the Constitution as a tactic to get their first preference: a special fiscal treatment in the form of the reestablishment of the fueros. Unlikely Navarre, which collaborated with Franco during the military uprising, only one of the three Basque Provinces took Franco's side (Álava). The other two (Biscay and Gipuzkoa) defended the Republic and were punished by Franco with the suspension of their special fiscal regime (which in the Basque case weren't exactly the fueros). Paradoxically, on the edge of democracy, it was not Franco collaborators, but Franco adversaries that worried about getting back their rights lost in the Civil War. This confirms that the Spanish way to democracy, at least at the beginning was more a slow transition than a "pacted rupture".

municipalities and the ratification of the decision through a referendum. The "normal" way to autonomy was through Art.143, which had to be ratified by smaller majorities - for example, it did not have to pass a referendum.[200] The decisions made at the *Ponencia Constitutional* level with a concurrent impact on the quite contradicting "general formula" and "particular autonomy" aspects, but also the two tracks to autonomy show that the established "path-dependency" consisted in allowing autonomy claims by nearly all actors. Both the statewide parties SWP and the regional non-statewide parties (NSWP) would subsequently use that uncertainty in that process. The Constitution laid the groundwork for an extensive decentralization process, which broke with the Spanish tradition. In doing so, the constitutional framers pursued three controversial and contradictory goals, namely the improvement of efficiency, democratization, and the accommodation of desires for national recognition, especially in the Basque Country and Catalonia (Nagel/Requejo 2007).

5.4.2. Political parties and their preferences towards decentralization

To evaluate how self-rule/decentralization has influenced the political stability of the state, additional data is needed. In the following two parts I will evaluate the preferences of political parties towards decentralization and the evaluations of some aspects of decentralization by Spanish citizens.

The question of whether parties influence the preferences of the voters or if the voters decide the program of the parties has been under a permanent debate in political science (Sartori 1978, Dalton 1996). When evaluating decentralization, I will not address these questions. By analyzing the descriptive statistics, I will look for trends and changes in the preference of the Spanish citizens towards decentralization. With that, I can analyze if some changes could have influenced the political stability of the Spanish "State of Autonomies".

During the transition, the decentralization process was from the beginning seen by the actors of the central state as one of the aspects of democratization, efficiency or accommodation of national minorities. Before starting the negotiations on the Constitution, a system of pre-autonomies had been established already. With that, the pressure for decentralization was very significant, but with different preferences, as shown above.

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[200] There is also the way to autonomy through the Art.144 for the Autonomous Cities Ceuta and Melilla.

In the following inquiry, we will use Party Manifesto Data (PMD), analyzing the discourse of the statewide (SWP) and non-statewide parties (NSWP) on decentralization. Even if the utilization of the Party Manifesto Data has many limitations, it allows a reliable longitudinal analysis. In the PMD "decentralization" is coded as following: "Support for federalism or decentralization of political and/or economic power." That may include: "favorable mentions of the territorial subsidiary principle; more autonomy for any sub-national level in policy making and/or economics, including municipalities; support for the continuation and importance of local and regional customs and symbols and/or deference to local expertise and favorable mentions of particular consideration for sub-national areas. Centralization is coded as following: "General opposition to political decision-making at lower political levels and support for the unitary government and for more centralization in political and administrative procedures."

Figure 5.2. Statewide parties and discourse on decentralization

Source: Manifesto Project. The Party Manifesto Data, it is calculated by the percentage (%) of the discourse on decentralization – (minus) the percentage (%) of discourse on centralization.

The data analyzing the discourse of the three statewide parties shows that in 1977 the PSOE was the first party to express their preferences for decentralization during the transition.[201] Subsequently, the support went down and stabilized between 1% and 3% in 1986 – 2004. In 2008 the decentralization discourse reached 4% after the first Zapatero mandate. However, since 2008 it has diminished again. The other big

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[201] I should add that PSOE has expressed their preferences for decentralization already since 1918.

statewide party AP/PP had a very stable discourse on decentralization, close to 2% between 1977 and 2004. We have to take into account that the AP majority opposed the Constitution in 1978 because of the article VIII, which dealt with decentralization; while under Prime Minister Jose-Maria Aznar (1996-2004) it considered the Constitution including the Article VIII as the main symbol of the Spanish nation (see also Chapter 3.2 on "constitutional patriotism"). Similar to the PSOE, the PP reduced its discourse on decentralization by about 1% since 2008, while at the same time they increased their arguments on centralization.[202]

Among the statewide parties, the PCE/IU has been the strongest supporter of decentralization usually around 5% and reaching an 8% of support for decentralization measures in 2000. However, the former communists have also reduced this discourse since 2004 dramatically, staying only slightly ahead of PP and PSOE. Summarizing, we can claim that PCE/IU had the biggest interest in decentralization. Between the two statewide parties, which have alternated in the government, the PSOE lays just a little above the AP/PP. An important finding is that all three parties seem to have lost interest in decentralization since 2008.

Figure 5.3. Discourse on decentralization (all parties)

Source: Party Manifesto Data is calculated by the percentage (%) of the discourse on decentralization – (minus) the percentage (%) of discourse on centralization.

When we compare the manifestos of the statewide and regional/nationalist parties, we discover that questions of decentralization are much more present in the party manifestos of the latter. Decentralization is on the top of the agenda of the regional/

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[202] Of all three parties, it was the AP/PP that showed elements of decentralization but also elements of discourse on centralization.

nationalist parties, and they use that discourse far more in their party manifestos. In average between 10% and 25% of their manifestos deal with questions of decentralization, which differs strongly from the range between 1% up to 5% of PSOE and PP.

Above all the former CiU coalition strengthened their discourse on decentralization since 2008, from 13.5 to 18.8%.[203] The Catalan *Esquerra Republicana* (ERC) led for decades, with a high of 27.3% in 2004, but has since reduced its discourse.[204] Also, the importance of decentralization for the Basque conservatives (PNV) has been robust and growing up to 20.3% in 2004. When contrasting all parties, the proximity of the three SWP parties becomes more salient and above all the similarity of content between the PSOE and AP/PP programs can be confirmed.[205]

Considering our research question we can state that the differences between the statewide and the non-statewide parties are increasing and that could be one of the reasons for the demands for self-determination of the national/regional units. This finding could be significant if it were to be confirmed by the attitudes of the Spanish citizens.

5.4.3. Evaluation of the decentralization process by Spanish citizens

As a next step, we will analyze survey data on how Spanish citizens have evaluated different aspects of decentralization. Taking into account the available data, I will evaluate the surveys on the creation and development of the State of Autonomies (a), on the assessment of "the performance of the organization of the State into Autonomous Communities" (b), and on the preferences between different alternatives of the territorial organization of the state (c). Besides that, we will contrast the perceived with the preferred decentralization between the Spain, regional ACs and nationalist/regional AC (d).

I will use available CIS data and compare the statewide evaluations with the assessment of the Catalan respondents. Data for the Basque Country are not available in these CIS surveys.

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[203] However, questions of a possible secession of Catalonia and not decentralization were responsible for the end of the CiU coalition in 2015.
[204] One reason could be that independence is not coded as decentralization.
[205] The data on the newly emerged parties like *Podemos* or *Ciudadanos* (even if it existed before in Catalonia under the name *Ciutadans*) is not available in the PMD yet.

5.4.3.1. Creation and development of the State of Autonomies

Figure 5.4. Creation and development of State of Autonomies: Spain

Source: CIS

Considering the evaluation of the creation and development of the "State of Autonomies" the longitudinal data show that Spanish citizens initially expressed a positive evaluation. Between 1996 and 2005 the answer "Rather positive" had a support of between 61.6% and 68,3%. In 2005 only 15.2% of Spaniards saw the creation and development of the Spanish "State of Autonomies" as something negative. This tendency has since changed. In 2010 there was a much weaker support (47.9% vs. 26.4%), and in 2012 this consensus broke up with the respondents being divided with 39.9% seeing it as rather positive and 37.1% as rather negative.

Figure 5.5. Creation and development of State of Autonomies: Catalonia

Source: CIS

In Catalonia, we can see a very similar development. There is a high support for the creation and development of the "State of Autonomies" from 1996 to 2005 lying around 70%. Little more than 10% of the Catalans saw it as rather negative. There was a huge advance in "rather negative" category between the years 2005 and 2012. Both positions get very close lying around 40%.

5.4.3.2. Performance of the organization of the state into AC

Figure 5.6. Performance of the organization of the state into AC (Spain)

Source: CIS

A similar question is the assessment of the quite complicated term: "Performance of the Organization of the State into Autonomous Communities". Considering its longitudinal development, we can distinguish between two phases. First, between 1996 – 2005 around 80% of the Spaniards said that the State of Autonomies functioned "good" or "regular", however, since 2005, we can see a drastic decline of the "good" option and a high rise of the "bad" option. This graph confirms the former evaluation, the widely positive evaluation of the "State of Autonomies" switched after 2005, but this increased after 2010 to an even more polarized evaluation.

Figure 5.7. Performance of the organization of the state into AC (Catalonia)

Source: CIS

A very similar development can be detected in the Catalan case, although the change is more radical. Until 2005 the performance has been evaluated mostly as "good" or "regular". However, even if "regular" has still been the first answer in 2012, we also see a stronger shift towards the "good" and "bad" options. The evaluation as "bad" grew from 10% in 2005 to 31% in 2012 and became the second-chosen option in 2012.The evaluation as "good" falls dramatically from 47.5% in 2005 to 11.1% in 2012. We can see that the evaluation of the Spanish "State of Autonomies" is going down and people even if not hostile, show a growing disaffection with it. But if the Spanish citizens are increasingly unhappy with the institutional form of the State, which are the other options which might be preferable? To address that question, we will switch to the survey of the preferred institutional/territorial form of the Spanish state.

5.4.4.3. Territorial preferences in Spain and Catalonia

We will analyze the development of territorial preferences between 1984-2014; however, we should take into account that there has been a change in the set of the survey answers. Between 1984-2009 four answers were offered. Since 2009 a fifth answer "a state with less powers for AC" has been included. This distinction is important because after 2009 respondents who wish more centralization can choose between two options.

5.4.4.3.1. Spain

Figure 5.8. Preferences for the territorial organization of Spain

Source: CIS[206]

The support for "a state with AC like now", has been the preferred option since 1984, however with necessary changes. Starting at 31%, it rose to 57.4% in 2007. Since then it has gone down to the levels of the 80s - between 35.7% and 42.7%. The answer "a state with more powers for the AC" which expresses the preference for more decentralization, started with 20%, went up to 26.5%, then went down to between 11.9% to 15.2% in the last years (2010-2015). The option "a state which recognizes the possibility for the AC to become independent" has consistently been the least favored option, with fewer than 10%. Nonetheless, it gained strength in the last five years, and we can suppose that this is due to a substantial rise in Catalonia.

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[206] This survey question has become a standard question since 2009. For that reason, it was asked many times during a year. In this analysis, I have always chosen the first survey of every year, from January.

The most interesting finding is the development of the centralization options. The answer "a state with one central government without the AC" started with 29% in 1984. Since then it went permanently down to around 10% at the beginning of the 2000s. However, since 2005, it gained on strength again, reaching a peak of 24.2% in 2013.

Since 2009 a new answer "A state with less powers for AC" has been offered. It was chosen by between 9% and 19.8% of respondents and confirmed the strengthening trend towards more centralization. These data seem to confirm that the preferences towards the territorial organization of the state are permanently changing. However, to confirm that finding, we will reduce the answers to three options: "More decentralization, a state with AC like now and more centralization."

Figure 5.9. Preferences for the territorial organization 2009-2015 (summarized to 3 options)

Source: CIS + own design

When we reduce the options for the territorial organization in the years 2009-2015 to three, we observe an increase of those wanting more centralization, and a decline of respondents preferred the status quo. In 2011, 27.4% of the respondents wanted a more centralized state, and this number has grown in the following years. It peaked in 2013 with 38.7%. However, this tendency soon changed, reaching in 2015 around

30.7%. The option "a state with AC like now", which had fallen from 42.7% in 2011 to 32.1% in 2013, recovered to around 35.7 in the following years. [207]

This interpretation can be strengthened by the development of the citizen's preferences after the crisis has weakened. The conflict between the central state and national/regional unit persisted, the preferences for decentralization and the status quo have risen again.

5.4.4.3.2. Catalonia

In a next step, I would like to analyze the territorial preferences of the Catalan respondents.

Figure 5.10. Preferences for the territorial organization of Spain (Catalonia - 3 options)

Source: CIS

When analyzing the preferences for the territorial organization of Spain among the Catalan respondents, we find that the preferred option for the Catalans has been "more decentralization" from the very beginning of this survey in 1992. After a stable

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[207] When looking for reasons, a closer analysis of CIS data shows that the change of the Spanish preferences does not relate in the first place to the Catalan self-determination demands and the following territorial debate, but to the economic crisis. Many citizens blamed the regional layer for the economic problems as the Autonomous Communities applied many cuts to the public services. Corruption scandals could also be responsible for this development (see also chapter 4 on trust).

period up to 1998, this preference grew to 68.7% in 2005 and stayed at that level until 2015, with one exception in 2010. The answer "A state with AC like now" has been the second-ranked answer during the whole period. It started with 33%, had a peak in 1988 with 40.8%, however, it declined afterward to 17.1% in 2015. The option for more centralization has always been minoritarian. It was supported by 11% in 1992, 4,5% in 2005 and 10,6% in 2015.

These data show the strengthening of the preference for decentralization from 1998 onwards, which went apparently at the cost of the status-quo option. The preference for recentralization barely plays a role. In the next graph with five answers, we will take a closer look at the "more decentralization" answer.

Figure 5.11. Preferences of the territorial organization of Spain (Catalonia - 5 options)

Source: CIS

Comparing five answers, we discover not only the strengthening of the decentralization option but also a radicalization of this territorial preference.

The satisfaction with the "State with AC like now" was the first option from 1992-1998. However, it was replaced with the option "State with more powers for the AC" from 2001 on. These preferences stayed more or less stable until 2010, since when the option "A state which recognizes the possibility for the AC to become independent" has risen from more 22,9% to 41,4% in 2012 and stayed at this level in 2015.

5.4.3.4. Perception and preference for decentralization

After analyzing the preferences of the Spanish and Catalan respondents, we find that in the past their preferences have been similar and quite stable or even approaching each other. However, at the end of 2005, this situation changed and their preferences seem to diverge. I would like to analyze this divergence with the data collected by CIS in the years 2010 and 2012, which shows the changes of the "decentralization" question during this period. In the 0-10 scale, 0 means a preference for centralization, while 10 means a preference for decentralization.

Figure 5.12. Perception of Decentralization (2010) in Spain

	BASQUE COUNTRY	CATALONIA	SPAIN
■ Perceived Decentralisation	4,6	4,6	5,4
■ Prefered Decentralisation	6,8	6,4	5,0

Source: CIS, Barometro Autonomico II (2010)

These data show that in 2010 the perception of decentralization differed significantly between the respondents in Spain and Catalonia or the Basque Country. While the Spanish respondents perceived that the decentralization went further than they would prefer (5.4% to 5.0%), in the case of the Basque Country and Catalonia, we can state that citizens from both AC perceived less decentralization than they would prefer, in the Basque Country 4.6 points to 6.8 points and in Catalonia 4.6 points to 6.4 points.

Figure 5.13. Perception of Decentralization (2012)

	BASQUE COUNTRY	CATALONIA	MADRID	VALENCIA	SPAIN (1-2012)
Perceived Decentralisation	5,0	4,0	6,0	5,5	5,4
Prefered Decentralisation	7,0	6,9	3,7	4,2	4,9

Source: CIS, Barometro Autonomico III (2012).

The same question was asked two years later in 2012. It shows a strengthening of the different preferences in the national and national/regional units. In the Basque Country the perceived decentralization scores around 5 points and the preferred decentralization scores around 7 points. Compared to 2010, this perception grew stronger in Catalonia, with a perceived decentralization of 4 points and a preferred decentralization of 6.9 points. In this survey (*Barómetro Autonómico* III - 2012), there was no information about all Spanish respondents, for that reason I introduce data from another survey of the same year (CIS 1/2012). To control also for other AC, I take from the Barometro Autonómico III one Castilian speaking AC Madrid and the AC Valencia, which has its linguistic regime. The comparison shows that the difference between perceived and preferred decentralization is above all high in the AC Madrid. The perceived decentralization scores 6 points and the preferred around 3.7 points. But also in Valencia, we can find a discrepancy, a perceived decentralization of 5.5 and a preferred decentralization of 4.2.

This analysis confirms that the citizens in Spain and the national/regional AC have a different perception of decentralization. The citizens in the regional AC, who identify with the central state, expressed themselves in 2012 for less decentralization. The citizens in the national/regional units not only perceive the decentralization differently than the other regional units, but they also want more of it. This tendency has been stable for already a decade now and shows that the unresolved paradox around decentralization has become a new problem for the Spanish "State of Autonomies".

5.5. Conclusions

By analyzing federalism, shared rule, self-rule/ decentralization I claim the following: First, federalism as a philosophical/theoretical concept has no practical relevance in the Spanish "State of Autonomies". It emerges only once in the Constitution and in a negative context, besides that, the Spanish politicians describe federalism as one of possible future solutions only. However, federalism has some influence in academic works, which usually analyze Spain through the federal lens. Many scholars define Spain as federal or at least federal "in praxis". Considering the federal principle shared rule, the analysis has confirmed the finding in the literature that the participation of the national/regional units on the central level is not very salient. The Spanish AC have weak representation, and the Senate has only weak powers. However, the national/regional AC can participate indirectly within the lower chamber, the Parliament, when a minority government needs their votes.[208] The literature on political careers of national/regional politicians shows that the state-level has not been considered as superior, maybe due to the few possibilities to participate in the shared rule in one of the two chambers. Politicians from Catalonia and the Basque Country have not become Spanish prime ministers yet.

One of the most significant findings of this chapter is that the amount of real self-rule, where the AC could make autonomous decisions is much smaller than claimed by other analysis. Without a doubt, since its foundation, the Spanish "State of Autonomies" experienced a process of decentralization. However, it could be better described as a strongly decentralized state with some possibilities for self-rule, without the AC becoming the "last decider". The national/regional units have not welcomed the resymmetrisation of decentralization. The always-stronger decentralization could be seen as a reason for political instability, even if maybe for different reasons than expected (see also Chapter 6 and 7). Additionally, the nature of regional financing is unstable, central government and regions are not capable of agreeing on a durable model (León-Alfonso 2007). Apart from the open nature of the territorial organization of the state, the decentralized system of the Spanish "State of Autonomies" is characterized by a prominent role in bilateral negotiations and asymmetries in fiscal and policy responsibilities across regions, which will be analyzed in the next chapter on asymmetry.

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[208] Domination of one of the SWP could also be an option for bigger AC.

The analysis of self-rule has also led to an interesting methodological finding. Until now questions of self-rule have always been operationalized by including aspects of decentralization. A distinction between both concepts has rarely been made. However, maybe in future analyses, it may make more sense to separate both. After concluding the institutional analysis, I have analyzed data on the preferences of the parties. I have found that statewide parties have lost interest in the topic of decentralization, while the non-statewide parties maintain or even strengthen the importance of decentralization in their party manifests. The development of conflicting preferences can be confirmed by the analysis of preferences of Spanish citizens, who supported decentralization until 2005. However, since then, their preferences have changed. The support for the Spanish "State of Autonomies" has declined. One of the reasons has been the economic crisis. Spanish citizens turned their preferences towards more centralization, even if for a short period. On the other hand, Catalan respondents asked for further decentralization, radicalizing their preferences towards the option that Spain should allow a national/regional unit to become independent.

What about the perspectives? Spain will not become federal without a constitutional reform. But there is no tendency to give the national/regional units more shared-rule on the central level. Considering aspects of self-rule and decentralization, I claim that the Spanish central state has seemingly got to a red line, which it is not willing to cross. Statewide parties and Spanish citizens have no further interest in decentralization. However, this could become different when a new government would like to limit the self-determination demands of the national-regional units by offering some more asymmetry (Chapter 7). The dissatisfaction with the depth of the decentralization process and the missing possibilities of shared-rule at the center, the dependence on the revenues of the central state to finance the decentralized policies and the intrusion of the central state through framework legislation can be seen as important reasons for the political instability of the state. Or better said: in this context, institutional solutions, which have meant to be stabilizing, turned out to be a destabilizing force. Particular attention should be given to the claims for stronger revenues powers for Catalonia. Some national/regional units have different fiscal powers than others and the Spanish "State of Autonomies" is in that point asymmetrical. This asymmetry could be crucial for the political stability of the Spanish "State of Autonomies". That aspect will be addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6: ASYMMETRY

6.1. Introduction/Conceptualization

Compared to the conceptualization of the different divisions of authority, the conceptual development of the term "asymmetry" is less complicated. I identify asymmetry as a subfield of decentralization, which means that is it difficult to find asymmetrical solutions without a parallel process of decentralization. Requejo and Nagel (2011) claim that there is a link between resymmetrization and deepening decentralization, simultaneously arguing that asymmetry should not be paired with a lower level of decentralization.[209] "Asymmetry" and "decentralization" are strongly congruent and if used as a unit of analysis, there are difficulties in disentangling both. Also for that reason, this chapter relies strongly on the analysis and findings of the former. Nevertheless, the complexity and importance of the asymmetric solutions within the Spanish "Spain of Autonomies" pushed me towards dedicating it its chapter.

The first author to theorize asymmetry was Tarlton (1965: 979). For Tarlton asymmetry "expresses the extent to which component states do not share […] common features". Tarlton and later Duchacek (1970) showed that some degree of asymmetry is a feature of all compound units in federal political systems and agreements, even if according to the wording of most of their constitutions these units should be equal. Tarlton distinguished between symmetrical and asymmetrical federalism.[210] In the symmetrical version, the smaller units are more or less copies of the bigger unit whereas the asymmetrical units differ from the country as a whole. Tarlton has compared how the political boundaries between the component units of the federation and the social boundaries among the ethnic groups are drawn. If both coincide, then the heterogeneity is transformed into a high degree of homogeneity.

The literature identifies two types of asymmetry. The first type is usually of cultural, social, economic or geographic nature and is commonly termed, leaning on Elazar

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[209] They argue that when defining asymmetry, we should take into account several caveats. Theoretically, we can also have more asymmetry in shared rule without further decentralization. We can also find decentralization in the whole territory, or only in part.

[210] Lijphart (2012) when explaining Tarlton's ideas, instead of using the term "symmetrical", used the term "congruent" and instead of "asymmetrical", the term "incongruent".

(1987), as "de facto" asymmetries. Duchacek (1970: 280) called these "de facto" asymmetries "power ingredients". They have to be distinguished from the second type, the "de jure" asymmetries, which deal with the authority that a constitution or a law of a federal state or a unitary state assigns to a regional unit or the asymmetry that this regional unit enjoys by law or in practice with regard either to self-rule or shared-rule or both (Agranoff 1999a, Watts 1999). However, the "de facto" and "de jure" distinction is not the only typology possible. Webber (1994), Watts (1999) and Requejo (2001b) distinguish between political and constitutional asymmetry. The concept of political asymmetry is very similar to the "de facto" asymmetry.

Burgess/Gress (1999) offer a different taxonomy, which in addition to *de facto* factors identifies socio-economic and cultural-ideological *pre-conditions* of asymmetry like territoriality, social cleavages, political cultures and traditions, socio-economic factors and demographic patterns.

Agranoff (1999b) concentrates on the conditions and outcomes of asymmetry. Following this author, the conditions of asymmetry relate to the *de facto* factors like wealth and ethnicity, while the outcomes are aspects of how good these conditions are reflected in the federal system. Watts (1999) identifies four aspects of the impact of varying degrees and kinds of asymmetry: as secession potential, as decision-making, as democratic process and as protection of minorities.

Bauböck (2002:3) has focused on *de jure* asymmetry and distinguished between three types: (a) a horizontal relation between the powers of different constituent units; (b) a vertical comparison of powers between institutions of federal and of constituent unit government; (c) and the consensual arrangement between different institutions at the federal level, such as a symmetric distribution of powers between the two chambers of a bicameral parliament (c). I will build on this distinction between the (a) horizontal and (b) vertical asymmetry, which is central to the question of political stability in Spain. I will only sporadically analyze the power-sharing arrangements (c).

6.2. Literature review - Influence of Asymmetry on Political Stability

Compared with the studies on federalism or decentralization there are much fewer analyses, which evaluate the impact of asymmetrical solutions on the political

stability of multinational states. Tarlton (1965) claims too much "de facto" asymmetry in a federal system could increase elements of coordination or even coercion from the central states. Having in mind the Afro-American minority in the Southern US, he claims that the "secession potential" (Tarlton 1965: 874) can be determined by the extent of asymmetry in a federal system. As a solution, Tarlton recommends centralization and symmetrization. Duchacek (1970:278) warns that aspects of "de facto" asymmetry mixed with linguistic, ethnic, racial or religious differences could lead to intrafederal hegemony or explosion. Elazar (1993) argues that asymmetrical solutions limit stability. In his seminal work on civil conflict, Horowitz (1985) alerts that asymmetry inevitably raises the potential comparison between the different units within a state, and with that, is converted into a potential conflict-causing factor.

After these specific evaluations, in the two recent decades, many more works have concentrated on questions of asymmetry. Agranoff (1999b), Watts (1999, 2005) or Palermo et al. (2007) have analyzed it from the federal angle. Ghai (2000), McGarry/O'Leary (2009) or Weller/Nobbs (2010) examined effects of asymmetry from the viewpoint of ethnic conflict.[211] Occasionally also positive evaluations of asymmetry appeared. Having in mind the positive experiences in Northern Ireland, McGarry (2007) has claimed that: "Asymmetrical autonomy is not without its difficulties, and […] there are clear limits to how far a state can pursue asymmetrical arrangements while remaining a state, but […] the dangers of asymmetry should not be exaggerated." (McGarry 2007:106)

Linz et al. (2011:9) also give a positive evaluation of asymmetrical solutions, however, explicitly in multinational federations: "For most polities in a multilingual context (…) the least conflictual state structure would be asymmetrical federalism, in which some cultural prerogatives are constitutionally embedded for sub-units with salient and mobilized territorial cultural identities". However, Burg/Chernyha (2013) contest these results by claiming that asymmetrical solutions are an unstable option for managing ethnoregionalism.

In addition to this, political theorists such as Kymlicka (1998), Bauböck (2002) and Gagnon (1993) joined the debate about the effects of asymmetry. They usually consider asymmetry as complicated. Kymlicka (1998:137) sees asymmetrical

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[211] At the same time, this question is strongly connected with the issues of self-rule and shared-rule.

solutions as a "stepping-stone to secession". Bauböck (2002) connects asymmetry with federalism and claims: "Even if a multinational federation appears to be relatively stable, it may well be that excessive asymmetry is an inclined plane on which federations will glide downwards towards eventual dissolution" (2002:1). Building on arguments of justice and not stability, Gagnon (1993, 2001) proposes asymmetrical federalism as a political solution to changing political conditions and is also intended as a model of empowerment.

6.2.1. The problems with asymmetric solutions

From the literature, we identify at least three problems with asymmetrical solutions, which could be summarized using the terms: "paradox"; "spiral of demands"; and a "representation question".

Turning first to paradox, in this chapter we identify a "paradox of asymmetry". The argument is similar to the "paradox of federalism". When asymmetrical solutions are applied, they have two contradicting effects. An asymmetrical solution can accommodate the difference between two units, but at the same time confirm and strengthen the sense of being different that the minority receives from the asymmetrical treatment. As such, applying these solutions bears a particular risk.

Second, asymmetrical solutions create a "spiral of demands". There are problems with asymmetry in its dynamic form as a process. On the one hand, asymmetric solutions are usually applied to the claims of the minorities for an upgrade of powers.[212] On the other hand, there are "spill-over" or "catching-up" responses to asymmetrical solutions (Zuber 2011, Moreno 2001, Giordano and Roller 2004) or destabilizing effects of the following resymmetrization attempts (Agranoff 1999b, Requejo and Nagel 2009; Maíz et al. 2010; Requejo and Nagel 2011).

The concept of resymmetrization has been seen as an instrument of the central government to "water down the distinctive institutional position of ethno-national communities" (Agranoff 1999b: 107–112). Other authors like Requejo and Nagel (2009, 2011) reverse the orthodox connection between decentralization and asymmetry, which claims that the resymmetrization process is related to a process of centralization, and show that resymmetrization can also take the form of an increased

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[212] However, there are also states like Belgium where the majorities ask for asymmetry.

degree of decentralization. Consequently, asymmetry can provoke, limit or even reverse processes of decentralization.

Asymmetry stabilizes the "federal bargain", above all from the point of view of the minority.[213] But the majority may ask for a resymmetrizating decentralization, which may be answered by the minority with new claims for more asymmetry or "symmetrization by secession". This upward "spiral" meets an always stronger minority. This kind of requests could finally end up in the "exit" of the minorities. This development has also been identified in the Spanish case (Linz/Montero 1999; Balfour/Quiroga 2007; Maíz/Beramendi 2004; León-Alfonso 2007).

The third problem, the "representation question", has to do with the accountability of asymmetrical solutions. This problem is known as the "West Lothian question" in the unitary system of the UK. If the sub-state units decide exclusively about some aspect of legislation in their territory, the "West Lothian question" asks if they should be excluded from decision-making in that field at the center. According to McGarry (2007:113): "This is a genuine problem, and it can give rise to difficulties, which are particularly likely to be serious if the asymmetrical autonomous region represents a considerable share of the state's population and if the scope of asymmetry is significant."

However, this question matters not only in unitary but also in federal systems. A feeling of exclusion in legislative matters could strengthen the request for secession among the minorities. When solved, this accountability problem could add difficulty to the already quite complicated issue of multinational states. For this reason, Kymlicka claims that the success of a multinational state is based on the refusal or ignorance of these sorts of solutions (Kymlicka 2011: 296).

Even if asymmetry itself is a neutral governance practice, some authors cannot agree which emotions it triggers among political actors. For Agranoff (1999b), the perceptions of asymmetry have a pejorative meaning or at least negative aftertaste. However, Burgess/Gress (1999:56) express the contrary view, claiming that asymmetry is "regarded in a positive vein, bordering on virtue, linked to issues of legitimacy, participation, and political stability."

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[213] Nevertheless, the majority might also prefer this contract, for example, to avoid high costs of repression or by accepting it as fair.

6.2.2. Normative arguments for asymmetry

The unclear answer of the literature on asymmetry's impact on political stability is one of the problems. Also, scholars draw attention to the fact that it is not easy to establish a just asymmetrical model in a federal state. In the following, I will be dealing only with asymmetry in multinational states.[214]

The majority nation, be it through the center state or the regional-based units (regions with a populations which identified with the majority nation) have the position that a horizontal difference of powers between federal units, even if in the sense of a symbolic recognition, hurts one of the basic principles of federalism: the equality of the diverse units (Ghai 2000, Kymlicka 1998). Apparently, asymmetry in a unitary state can be easier.

Nevertheless, scholars who support the Liberalism 2 approach make normative claims for asymmetry. Kymlicka (2001) sees the institutional and symbolic "de jure" aspects as the best possible solutions; something which even if applied might not be enough to accommodate the minority nation. According to him, it is not asymmetry, but the refusal of asymmetry, which is a destabilizing factor. Kymlicka also argues that asymmetry should not be based on the desires of the minority for more decentralization, but on the wish of the majority for more centralization.[215] Requejo (2005:63) argues that "a possible escape route towards a more stable federal regulation in societies with multinational demos is provided by the introduction of confederal and asymmetrical agreements that break with the stateist nationalism of the traditional uninational federations." Gagnon (1993) and Laforest (2005) have also argued in that direction.

Miller (2000) claims that the dominant group "should recognize the separateness of the nested nationalities, and give practical expression to this recognition in the shape of asymmetrical political arrangements… while continuing to affirm its national identity at the level of the state as a whole" (ibid: 138).

In a multinational state, we can identify a problem with the right understanding of asymmetry between the different units. Kymlicka (1998) distinguishes between Nationality-Based Units (NBUs) where the national affiliation is different from the

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[214] For example, the constitutional asymmetry of Germany has not been justified on these grounds.
[215] I have found the empirical evidence for this claim in the analysis of perceived and preferred decentralization (chapter 3).

statewide majority and the Regional-Based Units (RBUs), which are sub-national parts of the statewide majority. For the NBUs the multinational state is a federation of nations. For the RBUs, which are sub-national parts of the statewide majority, is has always been a federation of territories/states. When the NBUs ask for asymmetry, they do request not only an additional power but also a symbol of recognition of their being different. While de facto asymmetry arises from the most trivial reasons like economic development or growth of population, de jure asymmetry usually occurs due to deeply rooted historical factors, which were in place when federations (or multinational states) were formed (Watts 1999). The importance of the historical difference is also emphasized by scholars like Keating (2001c:123): "So far as asymmetries reflect historical rights and traditions, then to suppress them would be to violate the acquired rights of citizens in those territories. To extend them to the whole state would equally violate historic practice and would impose on the rest of the state a system that evolved for the minorities". However, we should distinguish between the question of historical rights and the question of recognition.

6.2.3. The question of recognition

One of the first to raise the issue of recognition in the classical political theory has been Hegel (1807), who developed the phrase „struggle for recognition" (german: *Kampf um Anerkennung*). His ideas have been picked up by Charles Taylor (1994), who claims that recognition is closely connected to questions of identity: "The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being" (Taylor 1994:25). According to Taylor, national minorities can choose between assimilation or resistance in the form of nationalism. The dignity of the individual is connected to its group. For that reason during processes of state modernization the individual can experience some stigmatization, which finally leads to a "call to difference".

Within multinational states, historical rights are usually part of the institutional asymmetry, while questions of recognition are part of the symbolic asymmetry. Although institutional accommodation is usually offered, symbolic recognition is nearly always refused.[216]

Usually, the Nationality-Based Units do not feel fully accommodated until both aspects, the institutional and symbolic, are included into the constitution. If one, or both have been permanently refused by the central state, then the minority can request an "ultimate" asymmetry: a constitutional recognition of their right for self-determination. It is difficult to imagine that the central state would agree to the "ultimate" asymmetry, but not to the "symbolic national recognition" demands. Therefore, when talking about asymmetry in a multinational setting, I would like to take into account its particularities and offer a new taxonomy distinguishing between four types of asymmetry.

a) *De facto* asymmetry, which includes territorial, economic and cultural differences. This *de facto* asymmetry usually establishes a power structure, which the national and subnational actors are aware of and within which these actors act.

b) Institutional *de jure* asymmetry, which contains the recognition of a minority language or a different financial system (institutional recognition).

c) Symbolic *de jure* asymmetry, which relies on the "need of recognition", usually of the status of a Minority Unit as a "nation" (symbolic national recognition)

d) Ultimate *de jure* asymmetry, which accepts the right of self-determination including secession.

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[216] In his writing on asymmetry Bauböck (2002) mentions the second kind of symbolic asymmetry, the recognition of the minority language, something that all minority nations can hope for: "The argument from cultural minority disadvantage provides us with a strong justification for political autonomy but seems to require only a very limited extension of special powers. A symmetric devolution that gives all provinces rights to their flag and the use of regional languages in public education and provincial government would be a sufficient response. This is all the Quebecois, and Catalan governments need and can expect to get in order to fight against linguistic assimilation. Further claims such as the right to collect federal taxes or a veto against constitutional changes that do not affect cultural policies, let alone a right to unilateral secession cannot be plausibly argued on the grounds of cultural disadvantage."

6.3. Positioning of the case study: Spanish "State of Autonomies"

Even if the majority of the literature finds some aspects of asymmetry in the Spanish "State of Autonomies", not all scholars agree on their importance. On the one hand, authors like Maíz/Losada (2011) or Conversi (2007) see Spain as asymmetric because of the asymmetry installed in the Constitution. On the other hand, authors like McGarry (2007), after analyzing the resymmetrization process, claim that Spain has a symmetric structure.

6.3.1. Asymmetry in the Spanish Constitution

In the following I will draw the main asymmetries in the Spanish system, the most important of them will be analyzed in depth after this enumeration. In Spain, we find an asymmetric dual taxation system, in the form of different fiscal systems for the Basque Country/Navarre and a differentiated regime for the Canary Islands. The Spanish Constitution allowed for different access to autonomy, different electoral periods in some AC, and a political asymmetry in the form of the different party systems (Lago-Peñas 2004, Linz/Montero 1999, Pallarés/Keating 2003).

Besides this, it is important to emphasize that the Spanish Constitution recognized the following "Historical Differences" *(hechos diferenciales)* in the Constitution. In Article 2 we find an asymmetry between the territorial units called "nationalities" or "regions". In Article 3 the permission to establish co-official languages, in Article 141.4 it gave the permission to establish island self-administration in the form of "*cabildos*", in Article 149.1.8 the civil law *(legislación civil)*, be it foral or special, and in article 149.1.29 the issue of the autonomic police.

These historical differences were "translated" in the following manner into the historic-geographical panorama of the Spanish "State of Autonomies". For the Basque Country: the historical territories, language, foral civil law, autonomic police and own fiscal rules *(concierto fiscal)*. In Catalonia: the language, special civil law and autonomic police. In Galicia: language and own foral civil law. In Navarra: own fiscal rules *(concierto foral)*, foral civil law, autonomic police and Basque language, where Basque-speaking minority. In the Canary Islands: Cabildos (isular government) and special fiscal regime. In the Balearic Islands: language, Consejos Insulares, special

civil law. In the Valencian Community: language and civil law and finally in Aragon: civil law.[217]

In the Constitution most of the asymmetries have been open for all AC, due to possible opt-ins, for example in questions of "nationality" or police forces. However, some exceptions were included. A very important exception was the *"Disposición Adicional Primera"*, which embedded the historical rights of the foral territories (three Basque Provinces and Navarra) and the *"Disposición Adicional Tercera"*, which introduced fiscal and economic regulation for the Canary Islands. Specific AC were only mentioned within the "Additional dispositions". Considering the territorial and administrative asymmetries, we find further difference between multi-province AC, one-province AC and "Autonomous Cities" in Africa.[218]

This quite long catalog of asymmetric exceptions shows that the asymmetry in Spain was introduced due to the historical particularities of different regions[219], and not due to the Basque or Catalan nationalism. Questions of symbolic recognition of these national/regional units have not been recognized in the Constitution.[220]

6.3.2. Fiscal institutional *de jure* asymmetry

The Spanish "State of Autonomies" distinguishes between a dual taxation system, divided between a "special regime" and a "common regime". This fiscal asymmetry is based on exceptions made due to the historical *fueros*.[221]

The three Basque Provinces got a financial deal from the Spanish monarchy, allowing them to collect their taxes in the form of a *concierto economico*. After the Civil War,

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[217] There is also a constitutionally established asymmetry for shared rule, including senators for the Spanish Islands, or special treatment for the Autonomic Cities Ceuta and Melilla.

[218] We also find de jure asymmetries introduced by differences between the AC statutes, which were mostly resymmetrized afterward.

[219] Andalucía, Aragon, Asturias, the Balearic Islands, Galicia, Navarre or Valencia usually had a different identity than the Castilian one. Also, the geographic distant Canary Islands often felt a kind of estrangement from the center. During the Habsburg reign, many of these regions (Aragon, some provinces of the Basque Country, Catalonia, Navarre, and Valencia) had the opportunity of self-rule or a special taxation system. What distinguishes the two NBUs from the RBUs are two facts, the first being earlier economic differences. Catalonia and the Basque Country were, from the 19th century, economic centers and they had to act against a poorer agricultural core, consisting of Castile, Andalucía, and Estremadura, which exercised the political control. Second, a further political difference was the existence of a politically organized national movement in the NBUs since the end of the 19th century.

[220] However, we could also argue that, at least in some cases, it was a step to downgrade the otherness of Catalans and Basques or not except this as national otherness.

[221] *Fueros* were the charter of rights, which regulated some aspects of local governance.

the dictator Franco had maintained one of these exceptions (+ Navarra), in the cases of Navarra and Alava, but had suspended it for Vizcaya (Bizcaia) and Guipúzcoa (Gipuzkoa), which he considered as rebel provinces.

The *disposición adicional primera* of the Constitution became an essential part of the Basque Statute of Guernica, which also incorporated the concerts of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa. The Spanish government proclaimed in 1981 that the Basque Country could maintain, establish and regulate its fiscal system within the territory of the AC. The Economic Agreement (*Acuerdo Economico)* with Navarre was created in 1982. Both AC became part of a "special regime". They can collect all taxes except the ones on petroleum products, tobacco and customs duties. They submit a so-called *cupo*, a formula-based amount that is negotiated with the central government to compensate the center for their share of national expenses. Another exception is the Canary Islands, which could be considered an in-between case. There are minor tax concessions like harbor and petroleum taxes, and the Canaries are not subject to the EU value added tax.

All other AC operate under the "common regime" system. They get their funding from central taxes as well as through tax sharing and central state grants. In the discussion on asymmetry, many authors claim that Catalonia received some greater regulatory and operational control over its financial institutions. Nevertheless, these fiscal exceptions are not specific for Catalonia (Nagel 2010b).[222]

6.3.3. Linguistic institutional *de jure* asymmetry

Article 3 of the Constitution states that Castilian is the official language in all parts of Spain. Besides that, the other Spanish languages can be official ones in the respective Autonomous Communities. These include Catalan, *Euskara* (Basque language), Galician and Valencian (the last one usually considered a variety of Catalan).[223]

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[222] All statutes of the "common regime" may have the same content, if claimed by the AC and ruled so by the central parliament. Therefore, these asymmetries are not necessarily limited to Catalonia, while the Basque or Navarra fiscal system is limited to the Basque Country or Navarra. The fiscal asymmetry introduces an aspect of horizontal asymmetry, which is crucial for the stability of the political system in Spain.

[223] However, in some AC there are additional applications. For example, in the Statute of the Balearic Islands, Catalan has been defined as co-official. There are also AC that grant, by Statute or law, some official status in parts of their territory: Navarra for Basque, Catalonia for Aranese and Aragon for Lapapyp (Aragonese language) and Lapao (the Aragonese version of Catalan).

There is an essential difference between the fiscal and the linguistic asymmetry. Probably, most of the richer AC would ask for a financial "special regime", but only the AC with a different language can ask for an asymmetrical solution.[224] With that, we can distinguish between AC with their languages and the Castilian-speaking AC. The linguistic asymmetry is of particular importance in questions of education. Contrary to the Majority Units with a different language (RBU with historical particularities), NBUs like Catalonia, but also the Basque Country and Galicia, use teaching in their language as part of their parallel and alternative nation-building project.

6.3.4. Symbolic *de jure* asymmetry

Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution deals with questions of "national" recognition, which I will call symbolic *de jure* asymmetry. Its development was highly problematic. As already shown in Chapter 5, Colomer (1995) claims that it was a veto of the government and not the *Ponencia Constitutional*, which decided the outcome. In the beginning, the Basque Country, in particular, pushed for a symbolic recognition as a "nation", which was refused by actors like *Alianza Popular* and the Army. As a kind of settlement, the term "*nacionalidades*" had to be adopted for Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country. But even this compromise was after a short period too "risky" for the actors of the central state. During the negotiations, the government handed in a hand-written sheet adding the phrases of "common and indivisible Fatherland" and "indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation" to the previous draft. The term "*nacionalidades*" was not removed but framed in this in constitutional law nearly unique resilient formulation. It should exclude all future discussions about the term nation. In a nutshell, the final product was an extremely ambiguous and "hybrid" design with a "right of nationalities and regions" to "self-government."

6.4. Empirical analysis

As has already been stated by Tarlton (1965) and Duchacek (1970), all states have some asymmetrical aspects, at least in the field of "de facto" asymmetries. The

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[224] The intent to define Andalusian as a vernacular language has failed.

Spanish state is no exception. Besides the analysis of "de facto" asymmetry, I will also examine the institutional development of the *de jure* asymmetries and how they influenced the stability of the multinational state.

6.4.1. Development of the "de facto" asymmetry

6.4.1.1 Population and territory

Considering the territorial divide, the biggest AC is Castile-Leon with 94.225 km2. On the other side of the continuum, we can find the Balearic Islands with 4.992 km2. Andalusia (87.599 km2) is nearly three times as big as Catalonia (32.112 km2). Madrid (8.028 km2) and the Basque Country (7.234 km2) are between the smallest AC.

Table 6.1. "De facto" asymmetry: Territory and population

	Territory (km2)	Population (1981)	% in 1981	Population (2011)	% in 2011
SPAIN	505.990	37.636.201	100	46.651.079	100
Castile and Leon	94.224	2.582.043	6,7	2.540.188	5,4
Andalusia	87.599	6.429.151	17,1	8.371.270	17,9
Castile -La Mancha	79.461	1.647.876	4,4	2.106.331	4,5
Aragon	47.720	1.196.430	3,2	1.344.509	2,9
Extremadura	41.634	1.064.289	2,8	1.104.499	2,3
Catalonia	**32.113**	**5.948.177**	**15,8**	**7.519.843**	**16,1**
Galicia	29.575	2.809.201	7,5	2.772.928	5,9
Valencia	23.255	3.642.816	9,7	5.009.931	10,7
Murcia	11.314	953.852	2,5	1.462.128	3,1
Asturias	10.604	1.128.986	3,0	1.075.183	2,3
Navarre	10.391	508.679	1,3	640.129	1,4
Madrid	8.028	4.679.696	12,4	6.421.874	13,7
Canary Islands	7.447	1.364.616	3,6	2.082.655	4,4
Basque Country	**7.234**	**2.139.860**	**5,7**	**2.185.393**	**4,7**
Cantabria	5.321	512.579	1,4	592.542	1,3
La Rioja	5.045	254.201	0,7	321.173	0,7
Balearic Islands	4.992	655.134	1,7	1.100.503	2,3

Source: own elaboration based on INE Instituto Nacional de Estadística/National Statistics Institute

Considering the number of inhabitants in 2011, the most populated AC is Andalusia with 8.371.270 habitants. The two identified national/regional units; Catalonia and the Basque Country differ considerably in the size of their population. Catalonia, with over 7.5 million inhabitants, is the second largest AC, even if it has far less territory than, for example, the more populated Andalusia. The Basque Country, with it nearly 2.2 Million inhabitants, is in the middle of the Spanish population ranking. While the Spanish population has grown strongly between 1981 (37.636.201) and 2011

(46.651.079) and so have the populations of AC, the differences in population size between the different AC have not changed considerably. Catalonia's share of the population in the Spanish territory grew by 0.3%; in Madrid, we can discover a rise of 1.3%. The population in Basque Country has grown in absolute numbers but went down 1% when compared to the national average. Apparently, the largest changes were during the different immigration waves between the 1950 and 1970s (see also chapter 2).

6.4.1.2. Economic Powers: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the Autonomous Communities

Table 6.2. GDP/capita (2010) and share of GDP of the AC

	GDP per capita (2010)	Share of GDP (2012)
Average / General	22691	100%
Basque Country	**30156**	**6,2**
Madrid	29578	17,9
Navarre	28866	1,7
Catalonia	**26635**	**18,9**
Aragon	25330	3,2
La Rioja	25276	0,8
Balearic Islands	24039	2,5
Cantabria	22160	1,2
Castile and Leon	22001	5,2
Asturias	21209	2,1
Galicia	20625	5,4
Valencia	20150	9,5
Canary Islands	19494	3,9
Murcia	19003	2,6
Castile -La Mancha	18144	3,4
Andalusia	17229	13,4
Extremadura	15857	1,6

Source: Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda, INE, own elaboration.

When analyzing economic strength, we use the region's share of the national GDP.[225] Catalonia leads with 18.9% followed by Madrid with 17.9% and Andalusia with

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[225] The author is aware of the imperfections of this method. However, he uses it due to good data availability of this topic.

13.2%. Due to the size of its population, the richest AC in GDP/Capita terms, the Basque Country, contributes only 6.2% to the national GDP.

Table 6.3. Development of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Spain between 1980 – 2012 (in %)

	GDP/Capita (1980)	GDP/Capita (2012)
SPAIN	100	100
Basque Country	**130,5**	**134,8**
Balearic Islands	124,7	105,8
Madrid	122,9	129,7
Navarre	122,5	127,8
Catalonia	**119,9**	**118,5**
Canary Islands	109,7	84,9
Valencia	106	87,4
Murcia	99,4	80,9
La Rioja	99	113,0
Cantabria	96,2	97,3
Aragon	95,3	111,2
Castile and Leon	83	98,7
Castile -La Mancha	83	79,4
Asturias	82	93,6
Galicia	81,9	91,2
Andalusia	77	75,1
Extremadura	51	67,9

Source: Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda, INE, own elaboration.

Within Spain, income disparities have diminished due to fiscal equalization, EU structural funds, and central government investments. Above all, Extremadura (51% to 67.9%) could progress. Nevertheless, there are winners and losers of the economic development. We can see that the two Autonomous Communities with a fiscal "special regime", the Basque Country (130.5% to 134.8%) and Navarre (122.5% to 127.8%) increased their GDP/capita compared to the Spanish average. However, there are big disparities within the "common regime". While Madrid improved (122.9% to 129.7%), Catalonia's (119.9% to 118.5%) GDP/capita diminished, even if not in absolute terms, however. As such a big part of Catalans, the second most-populated AC with the most significant contribution to the Spanish GDP perceives itself as a loser of the economic development in the democratic period. The economic

discrepancy between both MiU (Basque Country and Catalonia) has grown, and Catalonia blames it on its type of fiscal regime.

Besides that, there are other fiscal issues. Catalonia claims more investment from the central state and complaints about the drain of companies towards Madrid.[226] This perception is important when analyzing the Catalan requests in this and the following chapter.

6.4.2. Development of "de jure" asymmetries
6.4.2.1. Constitutionally compliant accommodations of asymmetry

Many questions of asymmetry are regulated through reform or change of the "Statutes of Autonomy". These Statutes determine the contents of powers and usually establish high thresholds for revision in the Spanish and regional parliament.[227] Statute reforms are originated and approved by the corresponding AC parliaments with a qualified majority[228]; the final text is written and passed in Madrid. Then the text is ratified either by referendum (Catalonia, Andalusia, Basque Country, Galicia, and Valencia) or by the regional parliaments (Requejo/Nagel 2007).

The development in the years 1977-1983 was strongly influenced by discussions on how the different regions could reach autonomy. The logic behind these two tracks expressed not only the diversity of the Spanish regions. It also took their preferences to reach self-rule into account. But though the Constitution gave a direction, their development seemed initially open; it could have taken many directions (see also Chapter 5).

The special treatment is given to Basque Country and initially to Catalonia was challenged from the beginning by Galicia and Andalusia.[229] Galicia was finally treated like Catalonia and the Basque Country and derived its competencies directly from a "Statute of Autonomy". In the case of Andalucía, the government wanted the

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[226] A good example is the so-called Mediterranean Corridor, which could connect the Mediterranean coast not only by a high-speed train but also allow for a larger number of freight traffic. The central government has permanently postponed this investment.

[227] The ruling of the central state through Organic Laws could be considered another instrument. There are several more tools like the use of constitutional clauses on interterritorial solidarity, equivalence of living conditions, a broad interpretation of constitutionally reserved terms favoring the central state. All these instruments are backed by the sentences of the Constitutional Court (Nagel/Requejo 2007).

[228] In some cases it is also approved by a regional referendum.

[229] Considering Galicia, the UCD government wanted the establishment of autonomic powers to come not via a statute, but to be delegated by a state law - a mechanism also called "*clausula competencial*". After one year of discussions, the plan was abandoned.

AC to use the "normal" way to autonomy. Andalusia was also set to receive the lower level of competencies initially. However, by mobilizing its social actors in order to show the strength of its "self-will" (Art.151), it finally obtained the maximum level of competencies in 1981.[230] Also, other AC had their upgrade ambitions. The Autonomic Pacts (APA/*Pactos autonomicos*) and the projected LOAPA (*Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico)*[231] tried to reestablish asymmetry.

The APA was based on the consensus of the two leading parties in the year 1981, UCD and PSOE. They decided to define the autonomic map, choosing the regions, which finally would become AC. The APA maintained the two levels of competencies and decided that all the pending Statutes would be ratified by the "normal" way.[232] By 1983 all 17 statutes had been approved, seven AC achieved a higher level of competencies (Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, Andalusia, Navarre, Valencian Community and Canarias) and the others initially got a lower level of competencies, susceptible to upgrade after five years. The decisive actors were the two leading statewide parties PP and PSOE, which undertook with the Autonomic Pacts an important and general resymmetrisation.

After five years some AC with a lower level of competencies like Aragon, Castile, and Leon, Baleares, and Asturias used the article 148.2 for their upgrade. The governing PSOE was reluctant to give up further powers; also the Minority Units governed at that time by regional NSWP (PNV/Basque Country and CIU/Catalonia) were against a further resymmetrisation in the form of more "café para todos".

Following Art. 150.2 of the Constitution, in 1992 the PSOE government unilaterally upgraded the ten AC that had established their statutes by article 143 CE. They obtained nearly the same powers as the higher-level AC. The PSOE, even if it did not

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[230] Andalusia failed the first referendum (Almeria had not delivered) and was given a second chance by the central state, which adopted the rules in order to achieve the desired results.

[231] LOAPA foresaw a harmonization of the autonomy process, but was partly declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court (CC); CAT and BC submitted the suits. The CC emphasized that no state law should limit the Statutes of the AC. With that, the CC confirmed that there couldn't be any state law between the Constitution and the Statutes, a sentence which has taken on an almost constitutional l character (Aja 2003). However, there is the exception in the form of the Organic Law LOFCA about the financing of the Autonomous Communities *(Ley Orgánica de financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas)*.

[232] An exception was made for the Canary Islands and Valencian Community, which started the "faster way", following article 151 before the ratification of APA. But, in order to follow the new rules, it was finally decided that both would take the "normal" way, even if they would obtain the highest level of competencies.

need the support, decided to include the biggest opposition party, the PP, into this part.

Further Statute upgrades followed.[233] In this stage of the process, the "benign" central state, represented through both SWP parties combined with a persistent preference for the regional Majority Units for resymmetrisation has been the decisive factor for the reduction of asymmetry. In this period nearly all AC achieved the same competencies in the field of education or health. This resymmetrisation process was criticized by the AC governed by the non-state wide parties (NSWP).

This resymmetrisation process was accompanied by another instrument - the additional framework legislation of the central state in the form of Organic Laws, which defended the unity and equality of Spanish citizens.

Both, the resymmetrisation through the upgrading of the Majority Units and the important weakening of the whole decentralization process through the framework legislation led to renewed requests from the Minority Units for stronger asymmetry. This asymmetry was offered when the ruling party at the center needed the peripheral votes of the Minority Units. This happened when the governing parties of the Minority Units (CiU, PNV, Coalición Canaria) gave periodic voting support to the minority governments of PSOE (1993/1996) and PP (1996-2000) and in doing so won the necessary leverage for further asymmetry requests, which both SWP finally delivered.

Considering the development of territorial dynamics between 1978-2004 the following statements can be made:

- Institutional fiscal *de jure* asymmetry: the fiscal decentralization was based on bilateral negotiations, but all Autonomous Communities of the "common regime" got the same treatment. The distinction between a "special" and a "common regime" did not change. The Catalan government did not demand an upgrade to a "special" regime until 2010, after when the Statute reform had failed.

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[233] In 1996 new Statute reforms came on the table, following the initiative of Aragon, an AC which had started autonomy in the "normal" way, changed its statutes in 1994 to incorporate the additional powers approved by the *Pactos Autonomicos* of 1992. In that case, the AC proposed the reform by resolution of the regional parliament and there was also a necessary consensus between PP and PSOE in the Spanish parliament. Aragon in 1996, Castile - La Mancha in 1997, Murcia, Cantabria and Madrid in 1998 and Asturias, La Rioja, Islas Baleares, Castile and León and Extremadura in 1999, reformed in that way their Statutes. Further reforms concentrated on improving the previously transferred competencies and the working of regional parliaments (Aja 2003: 91). The central state led by minority governments, be it the PSOE (93-96) or the PP (96-2000), allowed this resymmetrisation. We can find the rule that all Statute reforms were passed when both statewide parties agreed. For a report on the period see Nagel/Requejo (2007).

- Institutional linguistic *de jure* asymmetry was important since the beginning of the democracy but become again important when the powers over education were transferred to all AC in the 1990s. The central government challenged this through a framework legislation, which defended the unity and equality of Spanish citizens. This asymmetry strengthened the tension between the Majority and Minority Units.

- Symbolic *de jure* asymmetry: the term nationality has been watered down because of the symbolic upgrade of some of the Majority Units like Aragon, Andalusia or Canary Islands to "*nacionalidades*". This could be one of the reasons why the Minority Units asked for an upgrade as nation.[234]

6.4.2.2. Constitution-destabilizing influence of "ultimate" asymmetry

It was not until the 2000s when two national/regional units challenged the Statutes of Autonomies to such extent that if ratified, would imply not only a reform but also the introduction of elements of "ultimate" asymmetry into the Statute. The starting point was surely the Ibarretxe Plan (IP), proposed by the Basque *Lehendakari* Juan Jose Ibarretxe (PNV). It was announced in 2001 and approved by the Basque Parliament in 2004. It requested the "ultimate" asymmetry in the form of the right of the Basque Country for self-determination, which could end up in a free state – association with Spain). On top of this, the IP asked for the recognition of the symbolic *de jure* asymmetry, the recognition of the Basque nation. It asked for a double nationality with Basque and Spanish passports for every citizen of the Basque Country (Nagel 2010).

The Ibarretxe Plan, even if formulated as a Statute reform, was seen by the central government and by both parties, the PP or PSOE as a plan, which aimed to break with the Spanish Constitution. The Spanish Corts just refused to discuss it.[235] In the case of the Ibarretxe Plan the Spanish government did not react with resymmetrisation tactics, but with a refusal to discuss it, above all because the "ultimate" asymmetry of the Ibarretxe Plan was seen as constitution-destabilizing and could not be

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[234] We should keep in mind that a part of the Minority Unit always used the term "nation" in order to define them.

[235] After the prohibition of the Basque referendum on self-determination, which was announced by the Basque government after the refusal by the central state, the Basque government called an election in order to get a stronger mandate, but in the end lost power to a coalition of the two state-wide parties PSOE and PP.

counterweighted by any resymmetrisation processes anymore. It could be considered as a case of rejected re-asymmetrization. [236]

Following the Ibarretxe Plan, another important process started: the Catalan Statute reform.[237] Looking for the support of Catalan voters, the opposition party at that time, the PSOE, made an electoral promise - a possible reform of the Catalan Statute and a federalization of Spain.[238] After the PSOE victory in 2004, the Catalans started to prepare their new Statute. But they asked for more than the PSOE expected. First, they requested a fiscal regime with some similarities to the Basque and Navarra "special regime".[239] Catalonia also asked for the recognition of the symbolic *de jure* asymmetry, the recognition of the Catalan nation and armoring competencies against encroachment by Organic Laws. The Catalan referendum on the Statute reform was successful, 73.2 % of the voters voted in favor. On the other hand, there was also a high abstention rate, with only 48.8% of the Catalans participating. Consequently, about 1/3 of the Catalans voted in favor.[240]

The Catalan nationalist mobilization started some years later than their Basque neighbors for several reasons. [241] Even before the referendum, the PSOE was watering down the possible constitution-destabilizing parts of the Statute before the Spanish Parliament. However, even this "Statute-lite" has been challenged by the institutions of the central state. Some of the regional units have contested the Catalan Statute while the opposition party, PP, and some Socialist politicians wanted it curtailed. The objections were raised against the symbolic *de jure* asymmetry (nation/cultural heritage) and the lack of a "solidarity between regions" principle in questions of fiscal and cultural decentralization (education). When the PP failed in dismissing the

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[236] I would like to emphasize that the final text of a Statute is a Madrid law, formulated by the Spanish parliament alone, which could have rewritten the proposal, as it did in the Catalan case later.

[237] The contents of the Basque and the Catalan plan were different. Moreover, the Ibarretxe Plan had no support of any SWP, not even in the Basque Country, while the Catalan one had the support of the PSC.

[238] This latter issue was promised by the PSOE for the first time in 1918 (and more explicitly than in 2003).

[239] It was similar and not identical because they suspected that the Constitution does not allow for transferring the recognition of the "historical rights" of the *disposición adicional primera* to territories other than Navarra and the three Basque provinces.

[240] This could be interpreted in different ways. First, that the territorial upgrade might be not a salient issue for the Catalans at that period or that the Catalans were frustrated, among other reasons because the ERC helped to develop the Catalan version of the text. However, it later asked not to ratify the version of the Spanish Parliament.

[241] We also find a high level of Spanish "street" mobilization against the Catalan Statute, led by PP and the rightist mass communication media.

text due to a lacking majority in the Parliament, the PP and some socialists brought the Statute before the Constitutional Court.

At the same time, the central government again used the mechanisms of resymmetrisation. Between 2003 and 2007 the Statutes of Autonomy of Valencia, Catalonia, Andalusia, Aragon, Balearic Islands and Castile-Leon were reformed.[242] The first region to revise its Statute was Valencia. Its president Camps were keen to guarantee that if in the subsequent reforms the national/regional units were to exceed the level of competences given to Valencia, the Valencian Community could upgrade up to the same level. This was guaranteed by a mechanism in the revised Valencian statute called the "Camps' clause" or "the most favored AC" clause. After identifying parts of the Catalan Statute as unconstitutional, the central government (PSOE) started to cooperate with the regional branch of the PP, which governed in Valencia. The central state presented the Valencian reform as an "ideal type" of institutional change, which accommodated the more federal project of the PSOE as well as the more unitary one presented by the PP.[243]

Finally, in 2010 the Constitutional Court finally pronounced its sentence on the Catalan Statute. It interpreted some of its articles as unconstitutional. Some were declared null; much more received compulsory interpretations by the court. Article 5 of the Catalan Statute regarding historical rights was said not to be equivalent to the *disposición adicional primera* of the Constitution. As such it did not give the Catalan government the right to justify the same institutions as the Basque Country. Of importance too was the clear rejection of Article 8, which dealt with the symbolic *de jure* asymmetry. In the interpretation of the CC, the Catalan statute cannot speak of a Catalan nation, but only of *nacionalidad,* which should not question the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation".[244] From this point, Catalonia adopted a confrontational path and started to ask not only for aspects of fiscal and symbolic asymmetry but also for issues of "ultimate" asymmetry, the recognition of its right for self-determination.

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[242] Madrid changed its Statute in 2010 and Extremadura in 2011. Galicia and Canarias abandoned the project before sending it to Madrid, Castile - La Mancha (2011) abandoned its one shortly before ratification. Again we can observe that everywhere where both dominant SWP agreed, the statutes were reformed.

[243] At the same time, some parts of the media presented the Valencian Statute as the "good statute" in contrast with the "bad" ones like the Basque or the Catalan.

[244] Moreover, the sentence said that the Statute couldn't bind different Spanish state attributes like for example the justice system. As a consequence, the Statute loses much of its character as a small Constitution for Catalonia and arguably closes the way of Spain towards federalism and ends the openness of the Constitution.

This opened a new phase of conflict that will be drawn in the next chapter analyzing another possible condition for the stability of a multinational state: The use of the coercive power by the central state.

Regarding the asymmetrical development, which has been summarized in the following table, we can observe not only the permanent conflict within the Spanish state but also the polarization of conflict with always smaller number of actors.[245]

In the first phase, which I have called the "Constitutionally compliant accommodations of asymmetry"; the conflict did not shake the political stability of the Spanish State, which reacted through resymmetrization. However, since the Basque demands in phase 2, and the Catalan change of preferences in phase 3, these demands can be better described as constitution-destabilizing, above all because of the inclusions of elements of "ultimate" asymmetry. The central state has not been willing to react to these requests and reacted with a complete rejection. With that, the development of the Spanish "State of Autonomies" arrived at a dead-end.

Table 6.4. The asymmetric development in the Spanish "State of Autonomies"

1. Phase 1978-2003		
Central state (UCD or PP or PSOE) vs.		
Basque Country and Catalonia (more asymmetry and decentralization) *Inside Constitution*	Majority Units (request of catch-up) *Inside Constitution*	
2. Phase 2004 – 2009/2010		
Central state (PSOE + CC) vs.		
Basque Country (Sovereignty/Association) *Outside Constitution*[246]	Catalonia (symbolic + financial asymmetry) *Inside Constitution*	Majority Units (cooperate with central state in the form of units of resymmetrization) *Inside Constitution*
3. Phase 2010 – 2016		
Central state: (PP + CC) vs.		
Basque Country: OUT	**Catalonia (referendum - Sovereignty/Association)** *Outside Constitution*	Majority Units: OUT

Source: own elaboration[247]

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[245] The regional-based units (RBU) are not taking part in the conflict anymore.

[246] , I should add, that, that while the statewide actors might see these demands as outside the Constitution, the national/regional actors could have another opinion.

[247] For an alternative, see Nagel/Requejo (2007).

6.5. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have analyzed if asymmetrical solutions help to stabilize the Spanish "State of Autonomies". Building on the standard distinction between "de facto" and "de jure" asymmetry I have distinguished within the latter group between institutional, symbolic and "ultimate" asymmetry.

Spain has significant "de jure" asymmetries, the different fiscal system being the most important. The Basque Country and Navarra can collect the taxes and pay afterward, whereas Catalonia has to follow the common "regime" under the leadership of the central state. This aspect of horizontal asymmetry is fundamental in order to understand Spain. It is one of the reasons, why the national/regional units took on a different economic development in the nearly four decades of democracy. While the economy of the Basque Country has grown, the GDP of Catalonia compared to the Spanish average has diminished compared to the national average. For that reason, Catalonia considers itself as the loser of the current fiscal system.

The other aspects have to do with vertical asymmetry. In this case, the key player is the central government, usually one of the two SWP parties. The central government has granted the national/regional units some asymmetrical powers well aware of its available mechanisms to block it. During the period, which I have called "the constitutionally compliant accommodations of asymmetry" it had some possibilities to influence the asymmetry dynamics. First, it could resymmetrizise the "Autonomic State" through upgrade of the Regional Based Units (RBU). Second, the central state could use Organic Laws and other constitutional devices to stop more asymmetry for the NBU. Third, the Constitutional Court usually helped to refuse the constitution-destabilizing aspects of asymmetry with its strict interpretation of the Constitution.

However, when after a long period of upgrade demands Basque and Catalan governments finally asked for "ultimate" asymmetry, which brought the Spanish "State of Autonomies" to its limits (Figure 6.1.). It changed the political setting. Since now, the Regional-Based Units are permanently out of the process; they cannot ask for the same constitution-destabilizing aspects as the national/regional units. Because also the Basque Country is (temporarily?) out of this process[248], the asymmetric territorial dynamics can be reduced to two actors. We find in the period 2012-2015 at

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[248] At least in the period, which I have identified as political instability in Catalonia 2012-2016, the Basque government did not express any demands for "ultimate" asymmetry.

central state level a majority PP government and in Catalonia a minority CiU government, an NSWP-party. The reduction to only two actors allows us for a game-theoretical modeling, which will be delivered in the next chapter.

The analysis of this chapter has drawn attention to two additional problems. Both are more of theoretical nature. The former question has to do with the analysis of asymmetry. As shown, stability in an asymmetrical constellation seems impossible. For that reason, we should ask if asymmetry ought not to be conceptualized as an institutional arrangement in permanent movement, and under constant construction. In that case, we could, for example, calculate the permanently changing costs of separation (see following Chapter 7).

The latter aspect touches upon questions of our understanding of democracy. We should ask what it meant when a new Statute - that has been promised by the governing party in Spain and then passed with more than 80% of the MPs in the Catalan Parliament - was first watered down, then still voted for in a referendum and then weakened again by the Constitutional Court. This process could be seen additionally as a "legitimacy" conflict (popular vote versus tribunal decision), which triggers feelings of powerlessness and disempowerment of the "demos", at least in the Catalan AC.

CHAPTER 7: COERCIVE POWER

7.1. Introduction/Conceptualization

The political stability of states has been threatened by conflicts over autonomy throughout history.[249] Demands for self-determination have the greatest destabilizing potential. The central state has usually responded those with non-recognition and coercive power. Currently, we face in Catalonia or Scotland the emergence of a new phenomenon: self-determination requests within the framework of the EU.

In this chapter, I will examine this new theoretical problem and ask how these self-determination dynamics influence the political stability of a multinational state when expressed in a multi-level authority system. I will also analyze if maybe the EU is holding Spain together. For that reason, I will examine not only the impact of self-determination demands and the response in the form of the coercive power of the central state but also the EU as a supranational/institutional framework and as an actor.

As already shown, Rawls (2001) refuses in "Justice as Fairness" the idea that the support for his liberal political conception should be built on sanctions or imposition/coercion. At the same time, Rawls defines political power as the coercive power of citizens as a corporate body.[250] "Political power is, of course, always coercive power backed by the state's machinery for enforcing its laws. But in a constitutional regime, political power is also the power of equal citizens as a collective body: it is regularly imposed on citizens as individuals, some of whom may not accept the reasons widely believed to justify the general structure of political authority (the Constitution); or when they do accept that structure, they may not regard as well grounded many of the laws enacted by the legislature to which they are subject" (Rawls: 2001:182). With that coercive power could be interpreted as the

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[249] Riker (1964) has claimed that clashes between national and regional authorities have almost inevitably ended either in complete centralization or disintegration of the state. However, some federations like the US are quite stable.

[250] Also, other authors of political theory analyzed how coercion relates to political power. Hannah Arendt (1970) claimed that political power should not be associated with force and violence. Both are instrumental in coercing others to act affording to someone's will, whereas political power shows the capacity of a society for collective action. For that reason, political power is naturally in need of legitimation.

pressure of the majority, in different institutional forms, to keep the individuals and minorities inside that social contract of a state.

Following Weber, "the state is the form of a human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory (Weber 2004 [1919]: 33). During history, this monopoly of coercive power has always been an important instrument during the different phases of state-creation (Tilly 1992, Rokkan 1999).[251] Nevertheless, when the state has become stable, coercive power was less visible. It reemerges again in moments of political instability, for example when the state has lost other sources of legitimacy. If a state is close to state-failure, "coercive power" has usually been used as an "ultimate" instrument of to secure state stability.

If a regional/national unit wants to emancipate itself from the monopoly of power of the central state, asking for an autonomy upgrade is usually not enough. The regional/national unit has to raise self-determination requests (Keating 2001c, Keating and McGarry 2001).

It can ask for the *recognition* of a right for self-determination in a state's constitution or the sub-state constitution. There is also the *practice* of that right in a possible referendum. However, a state wins independence not by merely declaring it, but because of its recognition by the international actors. For that reason, the referendum needs to be not only successful in the national/regional unit, but also internationally recognized so that the regional/national unit can become a state and exercise its monopoly of coercive power.

The *recognition* of the right for self-determination can trigger political instability because of the confrontation between the national and the regional/national units. It establishes the possibility of this *practice* through a referendum on self-determination, which could represent the first step towards a possible dissolution of the state. However, the *recognition* of that right does not have to be interpreted as only instability provoking. It could also be understood as an instrument of accommodation of the regional/national unit and as such be a stabilizing factor.

Also the second type, the *practice* of the right of self-determination can have both effects, even if maybe state destabilizing could prevail. Calling for a referendum has serious consequences. The debate on the referendum divides the political community

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[251] I have already explained these concepts in Chapter 1.

of a state. Even if the secessionists lose the vote, the referendum leaves behind a polarized society. If that polarization cannot be reduced by the central state, the secessionists will probably push for a new referendum quickly. In both cases, a victory for secessionists would probably lead to a breakup of the state, which on the other hand may be better than permanent instability within the structures of the former state.

Conversely, self-determination requests can be raised with two different goals. They can be articulated with the goal to reach a real secession, but they can also be formulated as a threat in order to change the institutional design in favor of the national/regional unit. In both cases, the self-determination demands strongly affect the political stability of the multinational state, however by different "degrees".

The two principal actors, the central state, and the national/regional unit deal differently with the self-determination requests. The central state, knowing about the destabilizing potential of these demands, wants to avoid their inclusion and may propose to launch a process of institutional change instead. The national/regional unit, which knows about the potential of self-determination requests as a threat, can ask for the *recognition* of this right or even its *practice*, even if it is primarily interested in an upgrade of its autonomy in the form of institutional change. With that, the bargaining over self-determination and institutional change can be seen as two different strategies in the "autonomy" conflict, which is played by two actors and can be presented as a game-theoretical model.

The "self-determination" requests of sub-national units do not take place in an international vacuum. Questions of self-determination have usually been ratified within the framework of international legal sovereignty (Krasner 1999). In the first part of the 20th century, these issues were addressed during the peace conferences after the two World Wars. In the second part of the 20th century, self-determination requests were usually dealt with in the context of the decolonization processes and the breakdown of the Soviet Union.

There are international rules for the recognition of new states under the framework of United Nations, which follow clear rules.[252] The fast recognition by the UN is crucial

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[252] The procedure is the following: a) The State submits an application to the Secretary-General and a letter formally stating that it accepts the obligations under the Charter. B) The Security Council considers the application. Any recommendation for admission must receive the affirmative votes of 9 of the 15 members of the Council, provided that none of its five permanent members — China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United

for all states, but especially for new unstable states, which emerge after a civil war. International legal sovereignty can be downplayed as not so essential when liberal democracies allow a *practice* of the right of self-determination as has occurred recently in the case of Canada (1980/1995) or Scotland (2014). In both multinational states, secession would probably have followed a negotiated exit plan.

However, there are also in-between cases like the Spanish ¨State of Autonomies". Here, self-determination requests are not only rejected by the central state, but they also have been articulated in a state, which is embedded in a multi-level authority system like the EU. In such cases, it is not only the recognition by the UN but also the support of the multi-level authority system that may be crucial.

As stated in the introduction (Chapter 1), the monopoly of coercive power and sovereignty has been defined as an essential characteristic of the modern state. However, due to the European integration process, these traditional authority structures in their "pure form" are no longer valid. The EU it is a highly complex and multifaceted "sui-generis" political system, which has been in permanent transition. The EU has never described the end goal of its integration process, defining itself primarily as an "ever closer Union among the people of Europe."[253]

When comparing the EU to the modern state by analyzing authority structures between both actors, the EU seems to be in the balance between a supranational law and intergovernmental decision-making (Weiler 1999).

When seen from the viewpoint of EU Law, the supranational EU is the sovereign holding ultimate elements of coercion. There is the primacy of EU law with EU jurisdiction applying to the whole territory, but the reach of that sovereignty is limited to the policy areas where the EU's responsibility is recognized. With that the EU can monopolize governance and exercise coercion towards the introduction of EU laws in some political areas, which were transferred towards a supranational frame, however, even then it is highly dependent on the states for policy enforcement. The EU is highly involved in core state powers such as fiscal and monetary policy, taxation or

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States of America — have voted against the application. C) If the Council recommends admission, the recommendation is presented to the General Assembly for consideration. A two-thirds majority vote is necessary in the Assembly for admission of a new State. D) Membership becomes effective on the day when the resolution for admission is adopted. (Original Text from United Nations Website, http://www.un.org/en/members/about.shtml, retrieved on 15.12.2015.)

[253] Article 1 Treaty of Lisbon: This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the people of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizens.

policing (Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 2014). However, questions of state sovereignty and self-determination are largely decided on an intergovernmental basis.

For that reason, considering the analysis of this topic, the first idea would be to apply the state-centric approach advanced by the intergovernmental view, which is based on the assumption that states are the key players in EU politics.

However, despite not having factual powers over sovereignty questions like self-determination, the EU has a very strong influence on the decisions and preferences of the national and national/regional actors. Recent developments in Scotland or Catalonia show that both units have looked permanently for the approval and the acceptance of their actions by the EU. They permanently refer to the EU or its integration process. Following that the EU could be seen as a new actor in that conflict. Additionally, the EU can be considered as a nested framework or an interconnected arena, where states rather share than monopolize control over activities which take place in their respective territories (Hooghe/Marks 2001).

7.2. Literature review

The literature review on the impact of coercive power, self-determination demands and the EU on the political stability of multinational states will be shorter than in the former chapters. Usually, coercive power is seen as state stabilizing, while self-determination demands as state destabilizing.

Conflicts over autonomy between the national and regional or regional/national actors have been subject to a significant amount of research already (Riker 1964, Lijphart 1977, Dahl 1982, Horowitz 1985, Ghai 2000, Bauböck 2002, Cornell 2002, Amoretti/Bermeo 2004, Siroky/Cuffe 2015). The topic of self-determination demands has also been put under profound scrutiny (Buchanan 1997, Buchanan 2003, Margalit/Raz 1990, Young 1995, Kymlicka 1998, Moore 1998). These authors see self-determination demands *in se* as destabilizing political stability. There are many caveats against that most of the secession demands in the literature on political theory, with Buchanan (2002) being one of the most prominent opponents. However, authors like Kymlicka (1998) see the recognition of these preferences for accommodation, for example in the form of the right of self-determination as an important stabilizing factor. In the normative literature, we also find the discussion whether secession should be constitutionalized (Sunstein 2001, Weinstock 2001b, Norman 2003).

Questions of national/regional self-determination demands within the European multi-level authority structures have been barely featured, even if some works have partly touched on this topic. Caplan (2005) has looked at the EU and the recognition of new states in Yugoslavia. Hepburn (2010) has analyzed territorial party strategies in a multi-level system. Tierney (2013) has examined among others the influence of the EU on the legal issues surrounding the referendum on independence in Scotland. Bourne (2014) has undertaken a qualitative study examining the impact of the EU on discourses and tactics mobilized by pro - and anti-independence movements in the UK and Spain. However, none of these papers has developed the conceptual discussions nor raised empirical claims on how the European level of government may affect the political stability at the national and national/regional (or sub-national) level of Member States.

7.3. Empirical analysis

7.3.1. A game-theoretical approach to the conflict on "self-determination"

Game theory as part of the rational choice approach can explain and elucidate complex political situations. Its mathematical structure provides a rigorous and consistent method for formulating and analyzing strategic problems. Within that approach the concept of equilibrium of institutions is central. Shepsle (1989) claims that political equilibrium can be considered as stable outcomes provoked by relatively stable institutions despite possible instability and unpredictability of citizens and parties' interactions. Also North (1990) argued that institutions as rules would tend to reinforce themselves and produce long-term durable "equilibrium institutions".

Filippov et al. (2004:31) draw a comparison between equilibria and stability when talking about federal design: "The notion of stability […] along with that of an institutional equilibrium, must be treated cautiously and with the understanding that both allow for ongoing modifications in institutions and intergovernmental relations. Stability then is an empirical dual of an institutional equilibrium whereby formal rules and individual motives generally and over time remain in agreement."

Formal rules and individual motives are central in most game-theoretic analyses. They focus on equilibrium in order to predict the behavioral consequences of

institutionally encouraged incentives. The system or game stays in equilibrium or in "balance", as long as the incentive environment remains constant because then the players do not have the incentives to change their behavior unilaterally (Morrow 1994).

When choosing a course of action, a player compares the costs of an action with its potential benefits. Usually, citizens or organizations benefit from using existing institutions. Institutional advances offer increasing returns, however interchanging those institutions is connected to a certain cost. The question to be asked is, whether the costs of substituting the present institutions are lower than the disadvantages of playing by the existing rules. For example, a player changes its behavior, if the supplementary advantage from any nonconformity (marginal benefit) is higher that the expected punishment from the added noncompliance (marginal cost) (Brams 2003).

When we "translate" these anticipations into the framework of a multi-national state, we can argue the following: If a state or a national/regional (or sub-national) unit can exploit all or some of the revenues from controlling a territory, it gets the revenue (R). If there is some decentralization, the national/regional unit in a multinational state can receive the revenue (R) after subtracting the share of the central state (S). If the sub-national unit were to secede, then that would lead to a full payoff (R). However, secession does not come for free and has some cost (C). Following that equation, when a national/regional unit cooperates with the central state in a multinational state its payoff is R – S, and if it were to secede its payoff would be: R – C. Cooperation would be a superior strategy for the national/regional unit only when:

$$R - S > R - C$$

The size of R-S is mostly contested in the political arena. Most of the conflict arises around this question. The empirical analysis shows that the national/regional units are permanently interested in reducing the state-share. The central state has the opposite interest either trying to get a bigger state-share (S) or at least maintaining the same one. At the same time, the central state wants to keep the cost of secession (C) high. A possible method to keep it high can be to accentuate not only the costs of the secession of the nation-state framework but also the economic costs of leaving the structures of the multi-level system. This calculation has been one of the reasons for

the political instability of the multinational state (Bednar et al. 2001, Bednar 2009, Zuber 2011).[254]

The "self-determination game" is not a zero-sum game over authority (game of pure conflict), where what one player loses what the other player gains. On the contrary, we can identify the game as nonconstant-sum or variable-sum, because the sum of payoffs (or ranks) at every outcome is not constant but variable. For that reason what one player wins, the other player does not necessary lose. Therefore, both players can be more interested in some outcomes than in others.[255]

There are also other factors, which should be taken into account in such a conflict. For example, polarization can change the cost calculation, even if polarization has been determined by symbolic rather than economic actions. Nevertheless, these symbolic actions have economic consequences: they can create fear and even hate between parts of the central state and the sub-national unit. With that, they can reduce the influence of the economic factor, because of a non-rational idealistic behavior (Young 2004).

Additionally, polarization can make future cooperation more difficult and consequently increase the secession costs. Translated into game-theoretical terms, we have to ask if the "self-determination" game is a single game or an iterated game. Scholars using game theory claim, that the decision to cooperate or defect may not be the same, if a player is involved in a single occasion to interact with unknown people or if he is going to continue to interact with the same group (Axelrod 1984). In repeated games, it makes sense to try to cooperate in order to receive the cooperation of the others in the future.[256] The repetition in these games allows for threats, or more specifically, for the threat of non-cooperation in the future, if one partner fails to cooperate in the present.

An institutional setting within a multinational state is one where everybody is expecting to interact for a longer period. For that reason, usually, the games between the national and subnational units are pretty consistent independent of which political party is in charge. The demands of the sub-national unit are usually permanently

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[254] Following that calculation, there is no surprise that Bednar claimed: "Many federal agreements have collapsed in the face of centrifugal forces when provincial entities decided that the benefits of membership in the federation were not worth the cost" (Bednar et al. 2001:224).

[255] These games are games of partial conflict, being opposed to the (constant-sum) games of total conflict (Brams 2003)

[256] Usually, the logic applied is the "tit for tat" logic in a "prisoner's dilemma", where one player subsequently replicates an opponent's previous action (Axelrod 1984).

equal: it wants a larger revenue (R) and a smaller state-share (S). Following that logic, it would be an iterated game.

However, the self-determination game shows other features. Cooperation may not be based on the logic of repeated games if the regional/national unit plays its last game. The incentive to cooperate in repeated games may vanish if the participants know that when the game is going to finish, as then, they cease to be members of the same community sharing the same common interests. The last play of an iterated game is then like a single game because there will be no future opportunity to reply to any defection.

7.3.1.1. First game: "Self-determination game" without a credible threat

After preparing the conceptual framework and drawing the most essential characteristics of the game, a real-world setting, the Spanish "State of Autonomies", will be studied in detail. I will analyze the conflict between the Spanish central state and the Catalan regional/national unit in the years 2010-2016.

In the Spanish "State of Autonomies", negotiations between the two levels of authority normally have taken the form of bilateral agreements between the central state and the particular Autonomous Community (AC). The ongoing institutional and asymmetrical demands of the sub-national AC were contrasted with upgrade requests from the regional AC, which identify themselves with the majority nation. That produced a competition between the different units, which created an always-widening "spiral of demands" (Linz/Montero 1999; Moreno 2001, Maíz/Beramendi 2004, Maíz, Caamaño & Azpitarte 2010, Requejo/Nagel 2013, Burg/Chernyha 2013). Like already shown in Chapter 6 about asymmetry, I can start the analysis with the electoral campaign preceding the 2004 elections when PSOE proposed to federalize Spain and to recognize the plural character of the Spanish state.[257] When the PSOE candidate José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was elected, Catalonia started to elaborate the relevant reform suggestions. The Catalan requests were built on the demands for an economic and a symbolic institutional upgrade. First, Catalonia requested a fiscal

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[257] This electoral offer was approved by the PSOE in the so-called "Santillana Pact" in 2002, (Orte/Wilson 2009).

solution similar to the "special regime" of the Basque Country and Navarra,[258] which would give Catalonia the opportunity to raise its taxes, and transfer than for the services offered by the central state a particular amount of money in the form of a quota or „cupo." Second, Catalonia asked for more symbolic *de jure* asymmetry in the form of the recognition of the Catalan nation. Both requests did not have to be included in the Constitution but the Catalan Statute of Autonomy.

The reformed Statute was approved by a referendum, with 73.2 % of the voters voting in favor. However, there was also a high abstention rate, with 48.8% of the Catalans participating, something which could suggest that the territorial upgrade was necessary, but not a salient issue for the Catalans during that period.[259]

The crucial event was the 2010 judgment of the Constitutional Court, which interpreted some of the articles of the Catalan Statute as unconstitutional. Some were declared null; others received compulsory interpretations by the court.[260]

When using a game theoretical approach, we usually define the game as a triplet, which consists of a set of players, a set of strategies and a set of preferences with payoffs for each player. Their strategies and preferences with payoffs are influenced by the characteristics of the game. Accordingly, before playing the "self-determination" game, we have to establish the preferences of the actors with their payoffs. These payoffs will be ranked ordinal, where the figure "4" symbolizes the best outcome from the perspective of a player and the number "1" as the worst possible outcome.

Considering the preferences of the actors, we can claim, that after the verdict of the Constitutional Court, the Catalan government was principally pushing for a change in the fiscal regime in the form of a financial upgrade. I will identify this first-order

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[258] It was similar but not identical, because they suspected that the Constitution does not allow transferring the recognition of "historical rights" of the *disposición adicional primera* to other territories than Navarra and the three Basque provinces.

[259] However, between 2006 - 2010 the Catalan Statute was challenged by nearly all political actors, even if for different reasons. There was the outright opposition of the *Partido Popular* (PP). The Socialist party *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) promised to accept any Statute approved by the Catalan Corts, however later around 80% of the text was amended by the parliament in Madrid. The Catalan *Esquerra Republicana (ERC)* while initially supporting the process, in the end, did not accept Madrid's amendments (Colino 2009).

[260] Article 5 of the Catalan Statute about the historical rights was said not to be equivalent to the *disposición adicional primera* of the Constitution. With that, it did not give the Catalan government the right to claim the same institutions like the Basque Country. Another important feature was also the clear refusal of the Article 8, which dealt with the symbolic de jure national asymmetry. The interpretation of the CC cemented the institutional Status Quo, the Catalan statute cannot speak of a Catalan nation, but only of nacionalidad, which should not question the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation".

preference as Institutional Reform (IR). However, between 2010 and 2012 we can also observe a radicalization of the preferences of the Catalan voters in the territorial dimension, which were driven by economic demands as well as by questions of identity.[261] In the 2012 elections, the secessionist party ERC had huge wins at the expense of the more moderate CiU (*Convergència i Unió*). Also, the civil society organized itself within the structures of the ANC (Catalan National Assembly). These political and civic actors mobilized parts of Catalan society in mass demonstrations during the Catalan national holiday "La Diada" in the four following years 2012-2015.

I claim that since the beginning of the nationalist mobilization in 2012 Catalonia has changed its tactics. Instead of pushing officially for its first-order preference of Institutional Reform (IR), it introduced the option of a referendum on self-determination (REF) into its preferences set and enlarged its strategy space.[262] Following that, the formal first preference (IR) has become apparently a second-best choice and could be much easier to achieve. The mere fact of calling for a referendum, which is not officially allowed in the Constitution, would redefine the rules of the whole game.[263] I can identify two main preferences on the Catalan side: Institutional Change (IC) and Referendum (REF). The central government in the form of the governing party PP opted for the Status Quo (SQ) as the first-order preference, and it has not been interested in any change of the institutional setting during 2010-2016. Besides that, the PP articulated that maybe not more decentralization, but centralization should be the right answer to the self-determination claims. Accordingly, we can claim, that the central government had the following preferences: Status Quo (SQ) and Centralization (C). In short, we get the following preferences of both actors.

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[261] A CEO survey (2/2013/2a onada 2013, question 39 a1) asked about the main reasons to support independence, and the most popular answer was economic in nature: 29.4 % of respondents referenced the "capacity and desire of economic self-management" 18.8 % state that "Catalonia would improve"; 14.7 % say a "feeling of incomprehension", 13.5 % declare "earning decision capacity, level of autonomy"; and 12.2 % refer to an "identity feeling".

[262] That would also confirm the empirical results in the literature (Qvortrup 2014) that usually referendums on ethnic and national issues have been held for strategic and not for idealistic reasons.

[263] With that, this conflict can be interpreted as what Tsebelis (1990) calls a case of a "nested games institutional design." A similar argumentation can also be found in Riker's (1996) "The Art of Political Manipulation" with his insistence on the art of political innovation or "heresthetics", which is an art opposed to science. Riker argues that its laws are unknowable.

REF: Referendum

IR: Institutional Reform

SQ: Status Quo

C: Centralization

The order of rank of the Catalan preferences can be easily drawn: Referendum (REF), followed by an Institutional Reform (IR), the Status Quo (SQ) and Centralization (C). The central state's first preference has been the Status Quo (SQ), followed by Centralization (C), Institutional Reform (IR) and "Referendum". The ranking of the preferences "Centralization" and "Institutional Change" could be questioned. However, empirical data shows that since 2010 many Spaniards expressed a growing disappointment with the Spanish "State of Autonomies" and the preferences for the centralization have grown massively (CIS 2010-2014). These surveys also show that the largest share of the PP voters was against any asymmetric accommodation of the Catalan preferences. For that reason, I argue that Centralization has been the second-best preference for the central government, even before an Institutional Change (IR) in favor of the sub-national units. I suppose that in the period 2012-2015 the Spanish State would consider the possibility of holding a referendum (regardless of the results) as a loss. The state elites probably found themselves, as too weak to convince the Catalans in a possible referendum campaign, and aware of their power in the form of coercion, were not eager to take any risk. They may also fear a loss of votes in Spain if admitting the referendum.

CS: SQ>C>IR>REF

CAT: REF>IR>SQ>C

In game theory strategies are the sources of action (or sequences of moves) available to the players. Each player has two strategies. The central government as the row player chooses between upper and lower row, the Catalan government as the column player between the left and the right column.

When playing the "self-determination" game, the dominant strategy for the Catalan government is "defect", choosing the preferences REF/SQ. The dominant strategy for the central government is also "defect" choosing the preferences C/SQ. We find as the

equilibrium of the game the Status-Quo (SQ) option. With that equilibrium, the central state gets its first-order preference and Catalonia the third-order preference.

Figure 7.1. The "self-determination" game without a "credible" threat

		Catalan government	
		Cooperate	Defect
Central government	Cooperate	IR (2/3)	REF (1/4)
	Defect	C (3/1)	**SQ (4/2)**

Source: own elaboration

But what are the reasons for this equilibrium? According to Figure 7.1. the Catalan player can express some threat potential by making defection its dominant strategy. The central government can avert the REF outcome by own defection because the SQ is an exploitative equilibrium to the benefit of the central government. Even if the referendum option is included and present, this threat can be counterbalanced by the central state and for that reason is not effective. This decisively influences the outcome of the game.

7.3.1.2. Second game: The "self-determination" game with a credible threat

I claim that the best strategy for the sub-national unit to improve its pay-offs would be to change the available preferences set by creating a credible threat. Following Schelling (2006), a threat should manipulate another player by articulating an intention to perform a costly act in the future. Building on Schelling's work, Meadwell (2011) defines three points, which must be present in a threat: an expressed intention in some form; that intention must describe a costly act to be performed in the future, and the other party must be convinced that the actor will perform this act if a demand is not met. If the second and third points are met, then the threat is credible. Nonetheless, if the act is not costly than we can talk about an intention only.

In the Catalan case, we could distinguish between a threat and threat-supporting instruments. As a threat, I will describe civic or institutional disobedience, be it in the form of a mass strike or the creation of parallel state structures. As a threat-supporting instrument, I will understand a wide support of the Catalan citizen for independence or a referendum on self-determination. Most of the normative literature on self-determination requests claims that a vast support for self-determination should not be ignored by the host state and the international community (Kymlicka 1998, Bauböck 2000).

Usually, the measured support of Catalans for independence is strong but barely majoritarian. It has varied in the years 2012-2015 between 35-55%, depending not only on the type of the Research Institute conducting the survey like CIS or CEO but also on the question asked or the answers/choices offered. For that reason, the Catalan government had problems convincing the other actors, that it was following the preferences of the voters. As such the existing support for independence has only a limited value as a threat-supporting instrument.

The support for a referendum can be seen as a better threat-supporting instrument. A pacted Catalan referendum is supported on average by more than 80% of the Catalan voters (CEO 2013-2015). The Catalan government has used above all the latter threat-supporting instrument in order to raise its pay-offs. It called for a non-binding referendum in November 2014. However, nearly all-state actors challenged it. So far their demand has been widely refused not only by the governing party PP but also by the main opposition parties like PSOE or Ciudadanos. On top of that, the Constitutional Court declared it as illegal. At the same time, it was also widely ignored by the international community. The Catalan government did not express any credible threat, which would follow the referendum, for that reason the results of the referendum have been considered by the central state as "cheap talk."

Because of the failed attempt of the referendum option, the Catalan government gave the regional elections in September 2015 the character of a plebiscite on self-determination. The Catalan population had a divided view if those elections could be seen as a plebiscite,[264] However this time nearly all actors, also some politicians of the state-wide parties, did not reject all characteristics of its plebiscitary character, for

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[264] Following CIS data slightly more than 50% of the voters said it does not have a referendum character.

example, they were eager to measure if the support for the independence is or is not majoritarian.

In those regional elections, two separatists list *Junts pel Si* and *CUP* won a majority for independence in seats (72 from 135), but not in votes (47.7%). Shortly after, the Catalan parliament declared the start of a process of detachment from Spain, which has been declared as illegal by the central state and Constitutional Court.

That electoral result has been used to strengthen the intention of the separation from Spain, however, in order to be credible, it would have to be connected with a costly action, such as political and civic disobedience of the Catalan society. Civic disobedience could help to show the determination of the separatist forces. Among the Catalans, the support for civic disobedience is strong (35 % in favor), but the majority is against performing such an action (52 % against) (GESOP 2015).

Nevertheless, political or civic disobedience also includes some provocation potential. The sub-national unit could try to provoke the agents of the state to retaliate with its "coercive power". With that, the sub-national unit could show the state power as a "naked coercive force" performing an "unjust" action. That "unjust" action could raise the support for independence. It may also be used as a credible accusation within the multi-level governance structures (and before the international community), which due to the weak position of the sub-national unit are of central importance. [265]

7.3.1.2.1. A credible threat in a multi-level system

Brams (2003:30) claims that "although the issue of coalition formation is irrelevant in two-person bargaining games, under some of the procedures to be analyzed a third party […] can influence the agreement between the bargainers. This third party, however, is never a player in the sense of being an actor who has preferences and makes strategic choices, though its actions may be informed (e.g. by certain information) or constrained (e.g. by limited resources or self-imposed restrictions) in certain ways." Even if Brams related this idea of an appraiser to an economic

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[265] See f.e. the theories on 'remedial right only', following which secession is justified only when facing "persistent and serious injustices". The right to unilateral secession is not understood as primary, but rather only after the violation of other, more basic rights (Buchanan 1997).

buyer/seller setting, I will borrow the idea of a third player and apply it in a political multi-level authority setting.

As already stated in the conceptual analysis, we could interpret the EU not only as a supranational actor but also as an arena and a framework. Considering the first argument, the EU has been defined as an arena where national actors can harmonize interests and policy preferences (Magnette 2005). However, even if there were some reforms within the "Europe of Regions" approach (Nagel 2004), we can state that until now regional units do not have equivalent representation and influence on EU policies and politics, and for that reason, this characteristic can be omitted in our analysis.

I claim that within the "self-determination" game we can oscillate between seeing the EU as an institutional framework or/and as an additional political actor. An institutional framework usually supplies incentives, opportunities, and constraints (North 1990). As one of the relevant examples of incentives and opportunities, we can see the economic and monetary framework of the EU.

The economic framework guarantees the free movement of goods, capital, services, and people in the form of a Single Market. The monetary framework offers fiscal stability, even if it takes away some of the regulatory tools of fiscal policy from the central states. The European framework replaces in both areas the framework of the nation-state and the sub-national units benefit automatically from participating in them.

By using the supranational framework, the sub-national units have growing incentives to skip the national framework. This could partly explain the rise of sub-national self-determination demands (Alesina/Spolaore 2003, Colomer 2007). Consequently, the EU as a framework could be seen as secession supporting.

However, the institutional framework of the EU does not regulate questions of self-determination. Even more, the absence of EU rules on how to deal with "within EU – secession" could be seen as an important secession constraint. Accordingly, we claim that a regional/national unit, which claims exit, would not only need the EU as a substitute framework, but it would also need the support of the EU as a political actor, which could back its political ambitions first and then support the recognition of a possible new statehood (Caplan 2005).

The EU can act like such an actor above all through its supranational institutions: the European Commission, European Parliament or European Court. So it is essential whether these actors see internal secession as EU stabilizing or destabilizing.

The European Parliament is usually ruled by a grand coalition between a center-right European People's Party (EPP) and a center-left party, the Party of European Socialists (PES), which have a negative stand on nearly all initiatives, which destabilize and weaken the EU integration process. The European Court of Justice serves as an arbiter in the EU, but it has developed into an "engine of integration" (Pollack 2003), which in the case of doubt rules in favor a stronger community.

The three presidents of the European Commission such as Romano Prodi, José Manuel Durão *Barroso* or *Jean-Claude Juncke*r expressed their private and not institutional opinion that after a sub-national part secedes from a Member State, it would have to leave the European Union and reapply for membership. Interestingly, they usually expressed their opinion on the permanence of the seceding sub-national unit in the EU, and not if the EU would recognize the new state, which is more an international issue and connected to the decision-making in the United Nations (UN).

In a nutshell, we can claim that the supranational institutions try to make a neutral stand on questions of self-determination. However, in praxis, these opinions usually slow down the self-determination dynamics.

The intergovernmental institution - the European Council, does not decide over the exclusion but would decide about the re-inclusion of the possible candidate. It would have to support the application unanimously. In 2016 the applicant would need 28 of 28 votes, including the vote of the old host state. That possible veto could be a significant constraint not only for the re-entry but also for the exit of the state from the EU. With that, the "threat" of vetoing EU membership can change the preferences of supporters of secession; however, I would like to raise the question, if the consequences of the exit of the EU are not at least exaggerated in that discussion.[266]

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[266] What would be at stake, if a national/regional unit leaves the European Union? Could it for example slide into an economic depression? The most relevant argument is that by leaving the European Union, the state would also have to leave the Economic and Monetary Union. Both arguments had some weight in the self-determination debates. However, considering the economic frame, the impact could be reduced by temporary membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which is included in the European Economic Area (EEA), which is part of the EU Single Market. With that, the country would benefit from the size of the Common Market, even if it would lose some voice. The transaction costs of leaving the monetary Union could be higher; however, the old national/regional unit could be included in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), which uses the common currency as a reference point. With that, the new currency with its exchange rate would be

It seems like the EU will not change its stand on that question. However, there are certain conditions like a substantial rise of the support for independence, or an "unjust" or inadequate action from the central state like the suspension of the Catalan autonomy or even a military intervention, under which we could expect a change. In that case, its position towards a unilateral Catalan declaration of independence could alter to one of "benign neglect".[267]

If the EU as an actor were to support the sub-national unit, the Spanish state would find itself in a much weaker position.[268] With that, the EU as an actor would reinforce the credibility of the Catalan intention and would convince the central state, which the Catalan government would be able to perform the costly act of a unilateral declaration of independence. With that, the threat would become credible.

In comparison with the first game, the set of preferences would change. Within the preferences set the "Centralization" option could be removed, and a new preference "Institutional Instability" (II) could be introduced. I define the preference "Institutional Instability" as the uncertainty of the central government regarding how the EU and other international partners would react in the case of a unilateral declaration of independence of Catalonia. We introduce "Institutional Instability" and not Unilateral Declaration of Independence because we argue that the EU would try to act as the advocate of the negotiations between both sides, but would never support only the sub-national actor against its Member State.

REF: Referendum

IR: Institutional Reform

SQ: Status Quo

II: Institutional Instability

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tied to within 2.25% of the euro. If not, a possible monetary agreement with the EU could be possible. Following that argumentation, the aspect of losing EU citizenship would not be problematic, because most significant benefit, the freedom of movement, would be already guaranteed within the European Economic Area. What this summary shows, is that the costs of leaving the EU may have been exaggerated, what apparently would be costly would be the divorce between the national and the national/regional units.

[267] Additionally, there is the valid argument that the EU has a restricting influence on the national actor. I can imagine that due to the polarization of the conflict for example in the case of national/national-regional disobedience, only the pressure within the multi-level system would prevent the central state from using its still present monopoly of coercive power.

[268] A valid argument would be that the Spanish state could play the same game with the EU. Also, they could threaten the EU to exit if the EU sides with Catalan separatists, even if that threat could be not very credible.

Following that line of argument, when including a credible threat, the ranking of the preferences would change as following: Catalonia would choose "Referendum" (REF), followed by "Institutional Reform" (IR), the "Institutional Instability" (II) and the "Status Quo" (SQ). We are aware that in this preference enumeration it could be questioned if the Institutional Instability (II) option would come before the Status Quo (SQ) or vice versa. We claim that the uncertainty and possible high transition costs could count against the option of the "Institutional Instability", however, the international support would give the Catalan player confidence that future bargaining with the Spanish state, would at least end up with an institutional change in favor of Catalonia. Due to this particular critical juncture, Status Quo (SQ) would become the preference with the lowest payoff.

Also, the central state's first preference should change under the inclusion of a credible threat. The possibility of secession under the "benign" approval of the EU would automatically put the Institutional Reform (IR) option as the first preference, which would then be followed by the Status Quo (SQ). The preferences Referendum (REF) and Institutional Instability (II) option would come next. We claim that the central state would prefer the Referendum (REF) option, because it could see more possibilities to convince the voters in the referendum campaign, than in dealing with a unilateral declaration of independence. The negotiations with the international partners within the Institutional Instability (II) option would be far more costly.

CS: SQ > IR > REF > II

CAT: REF > IR > II > SQ

Figure 7.2. The "self-determination" game with a "credible" threat

		Catalan government	
		Cooperate	Defect
Central Government	Cooperate	IR (3/3)	**REF (2/4)**
	Defect	SQ (4/1)	II (1/2)

Source: own elaboration

In this "self-determination" game with a credible threat, the dominant strategy for Catalonia would be to "defect". The central state does not have a dominant strategy but would choose the strategy with the higher payoff: to cooperate. For that reason, the outcome of this game would be the Referendum (REF) option.

If Catalonia were able to call a referendum, it would get its first-order preference in the game. The experience from other multinational countries within the EU like Scotland shows that, during the referendum campaign, the central state is eager to give some concessions to the voters of the national/regional unit in order to make the Union option appear more attractive. Following that, even if the national/regional unit loses the referendum, it can still get some concessions, which they wanted in the first place. The national/regional unit can expect even bigger concessions if it wins the referendum vote. If the Catalans won the bargained and official referendum, the central state would be more eager to guarantee not only a special fiscal regime but aspects of national recognition and the constitutionally guaranteed right for self-determination. However, it would be probably too late. Historical evidence shows that once a referendum was won by the secessionists, usually the national/regional unit chooses to go alone. To the best of my knowledge, there is also no case, which after a break-up this unit voluntary reunified with the old host country.

7.4. Conclusions

In this chapter, I raised the question of how coercive power, self-determination demands and the European level of government may affect the political stability of multinational states.

First I model the Spanish "self-determination" game. In this scenario, we identify only one strategic interaction between the national/regional and the central government level while the EU (both as a framework and an actor) is a static part of the strategic environment. In that game, the national/regional unit did change their preferences set after 2012. It introduced the threat of a Referendum (REF) and its former first-preference Institutional Reform (IR) altered into a sub-optimal outcome. However, expanding its strategy space did not help Catalonia to achieve even the sub-optimal outcome. The outcome of the game is the Status Quo (SQ) because the

Spanish government does not take a Catalan threat serious and with that can counterbalance the Catalan intention of a referendum.

In the second part, I analyze how this game would look like if the Catalonia could make a credible threat and which instruments it could use. In this context, I analyze internal and external factors.

Considering the former I find that the Catalans do not support political and civic disobedience and for that reason, Catalonia is restricted in its ability to carry out these costly actions, and with that cannot mount a credible threat.

A bigger potential could offer the external support of the EU as an actor, which would be central to making a Catalan threat credible. In the first game, the EU in its form as a framework can be seen as secession supporting, however, in its form as an actor, the EU is more secession restricting. Following EU treaties, questions of monopoly of "coercive power" seem to be clearly a responsibility of the national state. However, in the second game, we consider the option that the EU (as an actor) could support secession. The outcome of this game shows that in this case, the national/regional unit gets its former first order preference in the form of referendum (REF).

This analysis has shown that the multi-level authority system has a strong influence on the "self-determination" game, and if the EU wanted, it could probably change the outcome of that game.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS

8.1. A summary of the theoretical framework

During the analysis of the political theory literature, I have found that the question: "What holds a multinational state together?" has still not been answered. By putting the Spanish "State of Autonomies" under scrutiny, I addressed this problem in six empirical chapters, where I evaluated the impact of the explanatory variables like national identity, citizenship, trust, divisions of authority, asymmetry and coercion on political stability. I have defined the political stability of a multinational state on the territorial axis - as the absence, on the part of the national/regional party governing an AC, of either secession demands or calls for a referendum on self-determination. From this definition, I identified two periods of instability in Spain between 2003-2008 in the Basque Country and between 2012-2016 in Catalonia.

8.2. Answering the research question - Empirical findings

In the following, I would like to summarize the empirical findings of this dissertation and explain which explanatory variables can be seen as stabilizing or destabilizing the Spanish "State of Autonomies" (see also Table 8.1.).[269]

In chapter 2 I have asked the question as to how the development of the identification patterns in national or national/regional units influences the stability of a multinational state. The descriptive analysis of longitudinal surveys has confirmed most of the findings in the literature.

Even if the identification with the central state is falling, we don't know if it is actually destabilizing the state, because of the additional growth of "hybrid" identification. To solve this puzzle, I analyzed the "loyalty" of the citizens with "hybrid" identification in Catalonia. By using the intention to vote in a possible referendum on self-determination as a proxy, I have found, that in the Catalan-Spanish context the reduced group of the "hybrid" identities is more likely to direct their loyalty towards Spain/central state. Additionally, I have found in a multivariate regression analysis that the "hybrid" identities category has many overlaps with the group of people with Spanish identification. This finding points not only in the

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[269] I would like to emphasize that I consider stability as a neutral concept, which means that I do not claim that instability should be seen as a less preferable alternative.

direction that national identities matters, but also that in times of political conflict between national and national/regional units, the group of "hybrid" identities can be seen as a stabilizing factor of the multinational state. However, it does not go so far to confirm Miller's concept of a "nested" identification. There is a tendency towards the central state, however not among all members of the group with a "hybrid" identification.

Table 8.1. The impact of the explanatory variables on political stability

Variable	Relevant?	stabilizing?	destabilizing?
Ch. 2 - National identity	very relevant		
Exclusive national/regional identity	very relevant		strengthens an alternative nation-building
"Hybrid"identity	very relevant	mostly identification with central state	
Ch. 3 - Citizenship	in parts		
As Membership	relevant	yes, if high levels of identification with state	
As Constitutional Patriotism	maybe	yes, if high levels of identification with constitution	
Political Participation	maybe	probably, if high participation	
Voluntary Associations	not relevant		
Participation in bonding or bridging organizations	relevant	when bridging	when bonding
Ch. 4 - Trust	relevant		
Social trust	relevant	yes, if high levels	yes, if low levels
Political trust	very relevant	yes, if high levels into state institutions	if discrepancy between trust into state and AC institutions
Ch. 5 - Divisions of authority	very relevant		
Federalism as recommendation	not relevant		
Shared-rule	very relevant	yes, if there is shared-rule	if there is no possibility for shared-rule
Self-Rule/Decentralisation	very relevant	can have both effects	can have both effects
Ch. 6 - Asymmetry	very relevant	can have both effects	can have both effects
Ch. 7 - Coercion	very relevant	yes, but to some extent	if too much visible coercion, violence
EU	very relevant	if supporting central state, or being neutral	if supporting a possible referendum

Source: own collaboration

In Chapter 3 I have analyzed the impact of "citizenship as membership". This analysis suffers from the lack of data. However, there is some evidence that it is a possible bond within a multinational state. The same could be said about aspects of "constitutional patriotism". The empirical analysis shows that the decline of satisfaction/support for the Constitution could be seen as one of the reasons for political instability, even if we cannot be sure about the direction of causality.

When addressing other questions of citizenship from the "civic republican" approach, I find substantial problems with regards to its operationalization. I analyze the participation in the political process or membership in voluntary bridging or bonding organizations.

Analyzing voting participation does not give us any new findings. Even if the growing participation in autonomous elections in Catalonia might be interpreted as estrangement of the central state, this finding is nothing more than speculative. Furthermore, there are no relevant differences in forms of associationism in Spain and the national/regional units. More important for political stability could be participation in bridging organizations like the Catholic Church or trade unions. Nearly all the findings in Chapter 3 are preliminary and should be addressed in future research.

In chapter 4 I analyze the impact of trust, where I distinguish between social and political trust. There is some empirical evidence that high levels of social trust between members of the different units might be seen as an important bond of the multinational state. In the Spanish case, even if we do not find much data, some surveys points in the direction that, at least, there are no high levels of distrust between Catalans and Spaniards in Catalonia.

Still, aspects of political trust seem to be more relevant. In a period, which I have identified as a moment of political instability in Catalonia (2012 - 2016) the levels of trust in the representative institutions of the central state have fallen dramatically both in Spain as well as in the AC of Catalonia. However, in Catalonia, we do not find a similar loss of trust in the autonomous or local institutions. It seems that the decline of political trust into the central state matters, even if also here we cannot be sure about the direction of causality.

In the chapters 5-7, I have focused on explanatory variables, which are connected to the institutional approach. I have analyzed different structures of authority and institutional solutions as well as aspects of coercive power in a multi-level authority system.

In chapter 5 I have concluded that different divisions of authority influence the stability of the Spanish "State of Autonomies", however to different degrees. First, federalism, as a theoretical concept has no practical relevance in the Spanish conflict and the divisions of authority, should be analyzed by a different approach, using the distinction between the shared-rule and self-rule.

Regarding "shared-rule", I have discovered that the possibilities of participation of the national/regional units on the central level are not very salient. The AC have weak representation in the Senate, which moreover has barely any decision-making powers. Nonetheless, the national/regional AC can participate in national decision-making through the lower chamber: the parliament, particularly when a national minority needs the votes of the non-state wide parties. Apparently, political careers have no impact. The permeability between Spanish and Catalan political elites has been very weak, and there is no clear direction of political careers, nor from the national/regional to the central level or vice versa.

One of the most significant findings of chapter 5 is that in Spain we can confirm substantial decentralization, but without deep self-rule. There are only a few areas in which the AC act as ultimate deciders. For that reason, it is difficult to evaluate the impact of self-rule. It seems like self-rule leads to the "paradox of federalism", which while helping to accommodate the national/regional units, also strengthens their being different. However, we do not know which degree of self-rule could be interpreted as stabilizing. Also a deeper self-rule in the sense of the "ultimate decider" could have both - stabilizing and destabilizing effects.

Regarding questions of decentralization, I find that there is no consensus between the actors in national and national/regional units how deep that decentralization should be. Party manifesto data show that statewide parties have lost their interest in the topic of decentralization, while the national/regional parties maintain or even strengthen the importance of decentralization. These developments can also be found on an individual level. While the Spanish citizens are satisfied with the current levels of decentralization, the citizens of national/regional units push for more. It seems that since 2010 the development of decentralization in the Spanish "State of Autonomies" arrived at a particular end-point. While neither the central state nor Spanish citizens have an interest in more decentralization, we find different preferences in the national/regional unit of Catalonia. These preferences regarding the decentralization process seem to be no longer compatible and are one of the main reasons for political instability.

I claim that special attention should be given to the horizontal and vertical asymmetry in the Spanish "State of Autonomies", which I analyze in Chapter 6. On the one hand, the horizontal fiscal asymmetry between Basque Country/Navarra and Catalonia could be seen as a reason for the instability of the Spanish "State of Autonomies". On

the other hand, also vertical asymmetry is important. In the period between 1978-2003, we can find constitution compliant accommodations of asymmetry. During this period the central government gave the national/regional units some asymmetrical powers while being aware of their available mechanisms to block it. However from 2003 onwards, first the Basque and then from 2012 the Catalan requests for the right of "self-determination" brought the development of the constitutionally compliant accommodations of asymmetry to its end. The central state is not willing to reform the Constitution to give more asymmetry, and for that reason, I have labeled the requests for the right to self-determination or the recognition as a nation as "constitution non-compliant" asymmetrical demands. Consequently, the effect of asymmetry is difficult to evaluate. To some extent it can help to stabilize the state, but once passed a threshold, it starts to become destabilizing. It seemingly can have both effects at once. The findings of chapter 7 on coercion in multi-level authority structures are similar. Some coercion, for example, to prohibit a referendum on self-determination can be seen on the one hand as state stabilizing. However, on the other hand, it also has the opposite effect. It creates political instability, and the central state has to "measure" cautiously, how much coercive power it is willing to use. Too much coercion from the central state connected with a successful national/regional nation-building project can strengthen the secessionists' forces.

Chapter 7 has also shown that the multi-level authority system has a strong influence on the "self-determination" game, and if the EU wanted, it could change the outcome of that game. As a framework, the EU can be seen as secession supporting, however, as an actor, the EU is more secession restricting as long as it supports the central state or stays neutral. Nonetheless, support for a referendum for self-determination could be used as a threat by the national/regional units, change the game and "destabilize" the state, outweighing even the coercive power of the central state on the national level.

In a nutshell, the "hybrid" national identification of many citizens in the national/regional units seems to be the most relevant factor of stability. Additional factors such as identification with the state and satisfaction/support for the Constitution, as well as trust in the citizens of the majority nation, and trust in the institutions of the central state are also important. Aspects of self-rule, decentralization, and asymmetry have both effects. They can be stability enhancing during a period. However permanent new demands of the national/regional units can

make a multinational state unstable when both actors start to disagree on the necessary degree of these institutional solutions. At that moment another stability enhancing argument comes into play, the coercive power of the central state is one of the most relevant elements. However, if that multinational state is part of a multi-level authority system, the supranational level should back that coercive power.

We can extract from the Spanish case that political stability in a multinational setting is a complex construction, hold together not by one, but by many little bonds. The empirical analysis shows that political instability in Spain is more of a political than of social nature. It is the lack of political solutions, which makes the state unstable; a certain degree of social cohesion is still given.

8.3. Theoretical Contributions

After summarizing which explanatory variables may be responsible for the political stability/instability of Spain, I will now proceed to the theoretical and methodological findings of this dissertation.[270] I will also address some problems, which should be treated with more detail in future analysis, as they have not been accurately dealt with in the research on multinational states yet.

With regards to terminology, in this thesis, I propose to use the term national/regional unit, or national/regional identification when labeling units with a significant nationalist movement instead of the biased concepts like sub-national units or identification. The term national/regional explains the same complexity, but at the same time remains neutral.

As for the problem of how to define dual identification, I have developed the concept of "hybrid" identities, which better meets the complexities of identification in a national/regional unit than for example the term "nested identities", which seems to claim the superiority of the national identification. The term "hybrid" identity meets better the criteria of a neutral category. It additionally includes other respondents, like for example people who do not want to make a decision about their national identification due to ideological or personal reasons.

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[270] I would like to emphasize, that in this work I have concentrated on political stability and not on questions of justice. For that reason, even if building on some of the Rawls's work in the introduction, I could not analyze if an overlapping consensus with just institutions could be the bond, which makes a state stable.

When addressing questions of political stability in a multinational state, citizenship in different forms could matter. I claim that identification with the state is an additional bond, which holds a multinational state together, even if because of the lack of data it is not more than intuition. Also, the analysis of satisfaction with or support for the constitution could be a good proxy for the stability of the multinational state. A significant finding is that there is a lack of data on most of the questions regarding citizenship and we should start collecting such kind of data as soon as possible.

Considering the question of trust, there is some empirical evidence that it matters; however, there is not much data and also a lack of consensus on how to measure it. Even though, the quantitative/empirical field is much more developed. In the theoretical/normative literature, there is barely a discussion about the importance of social trust between the different national groups for stability or justice. However, this question could be of enormous relevance and should be investigated further.

I have shown, that even if we can expect a stabilizing effect of shared-rule, the evaluation of self-rule as stability enhancing or reducing could be much more relevant but at the same time more challenging. One of the most significant findings is that the amount of real self-rule in Spain is much smaller than that found in most other academic analysis. Moreover, the different divisions of authority like self-rule and decentralization are highly interconnected and it is very difficult to disentangle both. This problem should be taken into account not only when analyzing the political stability of a state but in every institutional analysis.

I have shown that vertical asymmetry could be stability enhancing but to some extent. When asymmetry demands start to be "ultimate" and constitution-destabilizing, the multinational state can become profoundly unstable. Permanent stability in a decentralized asymmetrical constellation may be impossible, and we should accept instability as a permanent feature. For that reason, we should ask if asymmetry ought not to be conceptualized as an institutional arrangement in continuous movement and under constant construction.

I have confirmed that conflicts over authority are not developed in an international vacuum. Moreover, when a state is a member of the European Union, the conflict is even more complicated. When the EU does maintain its "benign neglect" towards the "status quo" and the positions of the central state, the authority of the central state over the national/regional units is total. However, if the EU were to change its position, this could open a window of opportunity for the national/regional units.

Even if the nature of this work is theoretical in nature, closing an open gap in the political theory literature invites to some additional thoughts. They are based on some implications of the interdisciplinary approach used in this work when mixing political theory analysis with some insights of the political economy literature. To connect both lines of argumentation is crucial to grasp and maybe solve this problem.

Both disciplines analyze questions around a possible referendum on self-determination in a multinational state from a different analytical approach. The political theory literature connecting more to issues of justice, asks if the refusal of a referendum on self-determination can be seen as coherent with the fundamental values of a Western liberal democracy. The differences between Canada and the UK, which allowed such referenda to take place and Spain, which first in the Basque Country and then in Catalonia has forbidden it, are more than obvious. That question has not been crucial in this analysis; however, it could shed new light on the nature of democracy in the Spanish state, which in some moments appears to rely more on coercion than on the free will of some parts of its citizens.

But a possible referendum can also be seen from the point of view of political economy, based on the strategic calculations of rational actors. Following that approach, self-determination demands are a tool to get a better payoff in a permanent conflict over authority. In the Spanish case, it would not be rational for the central state to allow for such a referendum.

Mixing political theory with political economy also helps when analyzing aspects of rationality and symbolism in multinational states. While political economy literature usually rejects explanations, which are not rational, this analysis has revealed, that symbolism is an important part of the multinational game. As shown in chapter 6 on asymmetrical solutions, the symbolic recognition of a national/regional unit as a nation is crucial. The central state considers this recognition as potentially comprising the decisive domino stone, which could lead to the collapse of the whole multinational state. Excluding those aspects of symbolism in rational-choice literature can give only partly accurate calculations.

The analysis revealed further questions about our understanding of democracy. We could ask what it meant when the Catalan Statute - that was promised by the governing party in Spain and then passed with more than 80% of the MP of the Catalan Parliament - was first watered down, and then after being ratified by a popular vote in a referendum, was weakened again by the Constitutional Court. This

process could be seen additionally as a "legitimacy" conflict (popular vote versus tribunal decision), which triggers feelings of powerlessness and disempowerment of the "demos", at least in the Catalan AC. All these issues could be included in a future empirical analysis. They might also represent a good starting point for supplementing future survey or creating panel data within multinational states.

8.4. Generalization of research

I hope that this thesis has provided a coherent theoretical framework that can be used in future comparative work. First, by analyzing political stability and its challenges we can test the research question in different multinational states. To qualify for this comparison, a state should have experienced moments of political instability as defined in this work. We could compare the six chosen explanatory variables not only following the case-study approach but also in a comparative small-N study. Second, as I have argued above, instability can be seen as a permanent condition of the multinational state. Future research could tackle the research question from that side, seeing the trade-off between stability/instability and the costs of secession as the central column of the analysis. Additionally, it could base the analysis not on stability, but on the many particularities of instability, which has been analyzed in this thesis only narrowly.

8.5. Perspectives on the political conflict in the Spanish "State of Autonomies"

Regarding the perspectives of political stability in the Spanish "State of Autonomies" I claim that if factors like the support for secession, the lack of will to proceed to civil disobedience by citizens in national/regional units as well as the role of the EU remains stable, only a change in the central state level can change the "status-quo".
A possible strategy for the national/regional unit could be to win the support for such a referendum among the whole Spanish population. Survey data from the years 2012-2015 show an important jump in that direction. If the Spanish population were to support the referendum option, the Spanish parties might follow those preferences. Also, an electoral victory of a statewide party, which is in favor of a referendum on

"self-determination" like *Podemos* could change the stalemate of the last years, as long as they do not renounce this position in a possible coalition agreement.

Seemingly, Spain will not become federal without a constitutional reform, and without such a reform the national/regional units will not have much saying on the central level. While more shared-rule could be a suitable manner to counterbalance the refusal of more or better self-rule for the national/regional units, the chances for operationalizing such a change remain low.

APPENDIX

Appendix 2.1. Crosstabulation

DUMMYRS * IDENTITY2 Crosstabulation

Count

		IDENTITY2			Total
		NESTED	LOY SPA	LOY CAT	
DUMMYRS	,00	642	120	1200	1962
	1,00	974	150	1318	2442
Total		1616	270	2518	4404

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	25,053[a]	2	,000
Likelihood Ratio	25,148	2	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	24,989	1	,000
N of Valid Cases	4404		

a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 120,29.

Appendix. 3.1. Importance of personal aspects of life (Spain 2002-2015)

Source: CIS

Appendix 4.1. Sympathy levels in Spain

Sympathy: All AC towards other AC

Andaluces	Aragoneses	Asturianos	Baleares	Canarios	Cántabros	Castellano-leoneses	Castellano-manchegos	Catalanes	Extremeños	Gallegos	Madrileños	Murcianos	Navarros	Riojanos	Valencianos	Vascos
7,48	7,08	7,2	6,77	7	6,87	7,04	6,97	5,53	6,87	6,98	6,81	6,66	6,85	6,9	6,8	5,82

Source: CIS

Appendix. 4.2. Sympathy levels – Catalans towards other AC

Sympathy: Catalans towards other AC

Andaluces	Aragoneses	Asturianos	Baleares	Canarios	Cántabros	Castellano- leoneses	Castellano- manchegos	Catalanes	Extremeños	Gallegos	Madrileños	Murcianos	Navarros	Riojanos	Valencianos	Vascos
7,64	7,47	7,45	7,48	7,28	7,28	7,14	7,1	8,67	7,06	7,06	6,51	6,99	7,36	7,27	7,11	7,15

Source: CIS

Appendix. 4.3. Sympathy levels –Basques towards other AC

Sympathy: Basques towards other AC

Andaluces	Aragoneses	Asturianos	Baleares	Canarios	Cántabros	Castellano- leoneses	Castellano- manchegos	Catalanes	Extremeños	Gallegos	Madrileños	Murcianos	Navarros	Riojanos	Valencianos	Vascos
6,92	6,91	6,95	6,73	6,86	6,59	6,96	6,84	6,25	6,73	6,76	6,11	6,65	7,58	7,18	6,71	8,67

Source: CIS

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