Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

TIME AND MEMORY IN KANT'S THEORY OF THE SELF

HECTOR LUIS PACHECO ACOSTA

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

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HECTOR LUIS PACHECO ACOSTA

SUPERVISORS

Dra. Silvia De Bianchi

Prof. Thomas Sturm

FACULTAT DE FILOSOFIA I LLETRES

DEPARTAMENT DE FILOSOFIA

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Directora de la tesis:

Dra. Silvia De Bianchi

Co-director:

Prof. Thomas Sturm

Doctorando:

Hector Luis Pacheco Acosta

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Silvia De Bianchi Thomas Sturm

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Wer im Gedächtnis seiner Lieben lebt, der ist nicht tot, der ist nur fern; tot ist nur, wer vergessen wird.

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Resumen

Facultat de Filosofia i Lletres
Departament de Filosofia
Doctorat en Filosofia

Tiempo y memoria en la teoría del Yo de Kant

escrito por Hector Luis Pacheco Acosta

En esta tesis analizo las diversas caracterizaciones de Kant acerca del yo, que pueden constituir una teoría del yo o "autoconocimiento", si son relacionadas coherentemente. Dicha teoría consiste en una forma particular de conocimiento del ser humano y se basa, principal aunque no exclusivamente, en la experiencia. Esta teoría tiene tres ejes: el primero se ocupa de la conexión entre el sentido interno, entendido como una condición por la cual el sujeto dirige la atención a su propia existencia, y el tiempo que organiza tanto las representaciones derivadas de la experiencia como aquellas que, una vez derivadas de la experiencia, son reproducidas por medio de la memoria. El segundo eje se enfoca en el contenido de la experiencia anterior y en los factores sociales que hacen posible el desarrollo de ese contenido. Finalmente, el tercer eje se ocupa de la memoria, en la medida en que esta última está comprometida con el almacenamiento y la recuperación de los materiales derivados de la experiencia propia del ser humano. Esta tesis, por consiguiente, se enfoca no solamente en las condiciones trascendentales que hacen posible la experiencia (interna) del ser humano sino también en los factores antropológicos que influyen en el desarrollo del contenido de esa experiencia. Sin embargo, la anhelada teoría del yo en Kant reconstruye no solamente un autoconocimiento sino también una forma de conocimiento que puede guiar al ser humano (considerado como un ser que actúa libremente) hacia su auto-perfección. En resumen, si consideramos la teoría metafísica kantiana de la experiencia junto con su teoría antropológica del ser humano, la visión del yo de Kant empieza a tomar forma de una manera clara y apremiante.

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Abstract

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Time and memory in Kant's theory of the self

by Hector Luis Pacheco Acosta

In this thesis, I analyse Kant's various characterizations of the self, which, if coherently related, may constitute a theory of the self or "self-knowledge". Such a theory consists of a particular form of knowledge of the human being and rests principally, although not exclusively, on experience. This theory has three axes. The first one deals with the connection between inner sense, understood as a condition by which the subject draws the attention to its own existence, and time, which organizes the representations derived from experience as well as those which, once derived from experience, are reproduced via memory. The second one focuses on the content of the latter experience and the social factors that make the development of that content possible. Finally, the third one is concerned with memory, as long as the latter is committed with the storing and retrieval of the materials derived from the human being's own experience. This thesis, therefore, focuses not only on the transcendental conditions that make human (inner) experience possible, but also on the anthropological factors that influence the development of the content of that experience. However, the yearned theory of the self in Kant reconstructs not only a self-knowledge, but also a form of knowledge that may address the human being (considered as a free-acting being) towards its self-perfection. All in all, if we consider Kantian metaphysical theory of experience in conjunction with his anthropological theory of the human being, Kant's picture of the self begins to take shape in a clear and very stimulating form.

INTRODUCTION

The present research investigates the role played by time and memory in what can be called Kant's theory of the self and tackles the following questions: What are the necessary conditions of self-consciousness? What is the relevance of the functions of time and memory in self-knowledge? My working hypothesis is that memory and time are necessary conditions of self-consciousness. I argue that there are two related strands in Kant's account of the self, one transcendental and the other empirical. The first is time, as form of inner sense, and the second one is the set of representations derived from experience. As a consequence, the 'self' will be a composite of a stream of temporal representations of its[1] inner and outer states, which express the existence of an *animal rationabile* that can make out of itself an *animal rationale*, by perfecting itself *in* social intercourse. And memory is a crucial faculty by which the human being extends backwards the consciousness to its past actions and thoughts.

Further, I examine Kant's account of the self, time and memory from an *anthropological* and *metaphysical* point of view, as long as to a certain extent both perspectives can be complementary. I do not confine the sources of my investigation to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*[2] (1781/1787) and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*[3] (1798), but I also appeal to his lectures on anthropology when they are consistent with, but amplify, views expressed in his published work.

In my view, Kant's CPR is mainly committed to explaining how the experience of external objects is possible. This explanation entails a transcendental framework in which

[1] Here and throughout the thesis the gender-unspecific reference (mind, subject, human being) is made with the pronoun 'it' and its cognates.
[2] References to Kant's works are by volume and page numbers of the *Akademie* edition (Ak) of *Kants gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin, 1900). References to the *Critique of pure Reason* use the standard notation (CPR) followed by the pages of its first (1781) and second (1787) edition (A/B). Translations are from the *Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*; it should be noted, nonetheless, that I have occasionally modified these translations. Where there is no reference to an English translation, the translation is my own.
[3] All references to Kant's *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view* (1798) will have this form (*Anthropology*).

the operations of sensibility, imagination and understanding are correlated in order to make possible our cognition of these objects. However, I do not suggest that the human being is an object that can be regarded as the subject-matter of natural sciences. Rather, I give some hints that facilitate the understanding of how this transcendental framework can be applied to inner experience. Furthermore, I do not argue that empirical self-cognition (i.e. self-knowledge) reached by the human being has exactly the same metaphysical framework demanded by cognition of objects of outer experience. On the contrary, I suggest that certain metaphysical aspects demanded by cognition of external objects can be taken for necessary conditions of self-knowledge. For instance, Kant regards time as a necessary condition of experience, which has the power to relate our representations according to *tenseless* (i.e. simultaneous and successive) and *tensed* (i.e. present, past, and future) series of time.

Accordingly, self-knowledge is characterized by a *form* that is given a priori (where its analysis constitutes the subject-matter of Kantian metaphysics), while its *matter* is derived from experience (where its analysis belongs to the field of Kant's pragmatic anthropology). It follows that this self-knowledge involves, on the one hand, "personal" components that rely on contingent, idiosyncratic empirical representations which are peculiar to every rational being (see Robinson, 1988, p. 165). On the other, this theory involves "impersonal"[4] components given *a priori* which are, therefore, the same for every rational being.[5] The latter components include not only time but also faculties as sensibility, imagination, memory and understanding, which are necessary conditions of experience.[6]

[4] The character 'impersonal' which is referred now to the empirical self-consciousness is also proposed by Pierre Keller but in a different way; for he considers that the empirical self-consciousness and the experience itself are subject to the demands of the transcendental self-consciousness (which he regards as 'impersonal' or 'transpersonal'), in as much as our ability to use concepts and make judgements or inferences in experience depends upon the transcendental self-consciousness, according to which the content of the representations in every judgement should *belong to* an individual consciousness and not to another. This demand of the transcendental self-consciousness is necessary for the possibility of the experience and is the same for every human consciousness (See Keller, 2001, p. 2). As a result, the concept of impersonal accounts for the fact that "when each of us refers to him- or herself by means of the representation "I," each of us refers to him- or herself in a way that could, in principle, apply to any one of us" (Keller, 2001, p. 3). I want to underscore that this "impersonal" character should not only be argued in favor of the transcendental self-consciousness, but also in favor of the empirical one.

[5] In this vein Forrest Williams suggests "the principles of Kant's philosophy in the first Critique, although resting on a certain analysis of subjective functions, take no concrete human nature for their foundation in any philosophically significant sense, but only the abstract structure of a transcendental reason and a formal sensibility" (Forrest, 1955, p. 173).

[6] In truth, the term 'experience' in Kant's philosophy is not something that can be understood with absolute precision. That task would demand an endless effort. Perhaps, no commentator of Kant has ignored the

It is far from Kant's view to consider that the human being is incapable of reaching, through empirical *self-consciousness*, a cognition of its changing inner states. Even the very term "consciousness" is defined as "a representation that another representation is in me" (Ak 9:33). He openly allows for the existence of *inner experience* and for the possibility of a cognition via that experience. I explore what the content of inner experience may be. It is a fact that the human being is capable of describing its mental states, for instance: "my current feeling of sadness is *caused* by the empirical representation of my friend's tomb", "my feeling of joy *interacts* with my memory of my favorite song", and so on. Indeed, the human being has access to a self-directed representational content i.e. a "cognitive content", which is derived from the empirical consciousness of its states. I suggest that for this cognitive content there must be a corresponding capacity by means of which this human being generates, possesses and arranges that content. I will not go deep into the "Paralogisms" in so far as the ongoing investigation does not take up the rational psychology's treatment of the "self", but rather the pragmatic anthropology's treatment of the "self". In other words, my investigation does not aim at a **theoretical** cognition of a non-empirical self, regarded as a *substance*, *simple*, *person* and *free*. Instead, this aims at a **pragmatic-anthropological** cognition, via inner and outer experience, of an empirical self that is understood as a *temporal being* which is not only capable of cognizing itself, but also of improving itself.

This investigation is relevant for four reasons: 1) I provide a new reading of Kant's theory of time, wherein I explain in a fairly detailed manner the functioning of an implicit distinction between tensed and tenseless properties or aspects of time. Both aspects are meant to be taken for necessary conditions of experience. 2) I show that Kant's reflections on the content of intuition of the self in *Anthropology* does not contradict but rather supplements the ideas that Kant developed about self-consciousness, self and time in the CPR. 3) Kant's account of memory has not yet received due attention, and this brings as consequence a lack of knowledge about the role of played by memory in self-knowledge from both the *transcendental* and the *anthropological* standpoint. Finally, 4) I reconstruct a coherent theory of the self that has integrated two grounding elements of Kant's

importance and difficulty of this term. For the sake of brevity, I want to point out Kant's well-known definition of *experience* in the *Prolegomena* as "the synthetic connection of appearances (perceptions) in a consciousness, insofar as this connection is necessary" (Ak 4:305). I think that this definition expresses an "accepted" reading of the term among Kant's texts and commentators, that is, *experience* refers to the influence of the synthetic activity of the mind on the raw material derived from our senses.

philosophy, i.e. "time" and "memory", into a *theory of the self* that is not fully *systematic* in the Kantian sense.[7]

In Chapter 1, I argue that inner sense and time are formal conditions by which the empirical components of the self-knowledge are formed. More particularly, I show the relation between inner sense, self-consciousness, apperception and time as a form of inner sense. Afterwards, I provide a detailed analysis of time, in which I point out that Kant's theory of time leans on an implicit working distinction between tensed and tenseless aspects of time which contribute to the possibility of experience.

In Chapter 2, I suggest that the material conditions of the self-knowledge consist of empirical representations derived from inner and outer experience, such as: feelings, desires and other representations. I also argue that those material conditions are to be regarded as empirical representations formed by the subject in connection with the world to which this belongs. I approach these representations from an anthropological point of view, in as much as Kant's pragmatic anthropology provides a framework according to which this empirical cognition of the self can be organized, systematically, to an extent.

Finally, in Chapter 3, I argue that memory is a faculty that has the power to preserve the formal and material conditions of the self-knowledge. In the first part, I contrast Hume's and Kant's view of memory from an empirical and a transcendental point of view; the transcendental function of memory means that this is a necessary condition of experience. In the second part, I contrast the *pragmatic* with the *physiological* approaches to memory. Afterwards, I explain Kant's account of memory operations on the empirical material acquired by the human being in the intercourse with others. These operations are concerned with the storing and retrieval of information. Furthermore, I suggest that memory has the power to store and reproduce the temporal configuration of all empirical representations. I claim that, according to Kant, self-consciousness is not a "transparent" act of the mind through which all representations of its states are uncovered; instead, it entails a set of obscure representations that have an influence on the human being's

[7] Robert P. Wolff is not so far off the track in claiming: "Kant tells us nothing about the connection between sensibility, understanding, imagination, and the other transcendental faculties, and the observable phenomena of perception, memory and reasoning. To a considerable degree, one's final judgment on the Critical Philosophy will rest on whether one thinks a coherent theory of the self in all its facets can be drawn from the pages of the three *Critiques*" (Wolff, 1963, p. 145).

thoughts and actions. Finally, I show that memory is a necessary condition for ascribing personal identity to the human being from a pragmatic perspective.

Chapter 1.

The form of the self-knowledge

> *"I really have the representation of time and of my determinations in it. It is therefore to be regarded really not as object but as the way of representing myself as object"*
> (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A37/B53-4)

> *"No one doubts that we could not equally make inner observations of ourselves and make experiences in this way, but if we dare now to speak of objects of inner sense (which as sense always provides appearances only) it is because we are able to reach only cognition of ourselves, not as we are, but as we appear (internally) to ourselves".*
>
> (Kant, *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*, Ak 7:398)

1.1. From the possibility of knowledge in general to empirical self-consciousness.

One of the fundamental questions of Kant's theoretical philosophy is undoubtedly what the conditions of the possibility of knowledge are. Although this question cannot be solved by means of a simple definition, it is possible to point out some necessary conditions of experiential 'cognition' (*Erkenntniß*). This demands the relation between *a posteriori* representations[8] (i.e. 'intuitions' *Anschauungen*)[9], which refer immediately to

[8] Kant's notion of representation is defined as a 'modification' or an 'inner determination' of the mind (CPR A99; A197/B242). Gerold Prauss identifies the concept of representation with that of 'empirical appearance' (*empirische Erscheinung*) which, under domain of empirical psychology, belongs to the subjective object of inner sense (see Prauss, 1971, p. 17; below section 2.1.1). The 'extension' (*Umfang*) of the concept *representation* is wider, because many things will be contained by the concept, but its 'content' (*Inhalt*) would be narrower, in as much as the properties contained by the concept will be few. For instance, the *extension* of the concept 'animal' is wider than the concept 'intuition' because lions, leopard, cows, humans, cats are contained in it; nonetheless, the *content* of 'animal' is narrower than the concept of 'leopard', because in the concept of 'leopard' only one thing contained, but it is endowed with more properties such as: mammal, carnivorous, member of the family Felidae, etc. (see Ak 10:95; Rosefeldt, 2000, pp. 18-19).

[9] Intuitions (*Anschauungen*) are regarded by Kant as the way by which a knowledge refers immediately (*unmittelbar*) to objects (see CPR B32/A18). Moreover, Kant's distinction between the intuition of our inner states of mind and of the external objects could be analogous to Wolff's concept of '*cognitio'*. In this sense Wolff says: "we are told that *to know* is when we are conscious of those things which occur in us, which we also represent as outside us. *Knowledge* is the act of the soul by which there is consciousness of oneself and of the other things outside it" (Wolff, 1968, §23) ("*cogitari* dicimur, quando nobis conscii sumus eorum, quae in nobis contingunt & quae nobis tanquam extra nos repraesentantur. *Cogitatio* est actus animae, quo sibi sui rerumque aliarum extra se conscia est"); there, it seems that the acts of *intuiting* and *knowing* are very similar. Further, empirical intuitions are reliable sources of knowledge which compel us

objects that affect our sensibility (see CPR A19/B33), and *a priori* representations (categories) that express "the thought of an object in general" and have a mediate relation to objects (see CPR B147, B304, A89/B122; Ak 28:673; see on this point also Carl, 1992, p. 27f.; Rosefeldt, 2000, p. 18).[10] This relation is achieved by the faculty of judging in order to form judgements, which are the fundamental acts of the mind (see CPR A69/B94; Hanna, 2005, p. 249). Cognition relies on the union between representations provided by the subject and representations derived from experience: "our experiential cognition is a composite of that which we receive through impressions and that which our own cognitive faculty (merely prompted by sensible impressions) provides out of itself" (CPR B1). As a consequence, cognition relies on two kinds of *conditions*, those which refer to *intuition* of an object and those which refer to the possibility of *thinking* a given object (see CPR A92/B125; Carl, 1992, p.37).[11]

Kant underlines that cognition cannot not be merely conceptual, without any relation to intuition, nor a set of intuitions bare of all unity provided by the concepts either, for "if every individual representation were entirely foreign to the other, as it were isolated and separated from it, then there would never arise anything like cognition, which is a whole of compared and connected representations" (CPR A97).[12] Hence, cognition of objects demands that we intuit objects through the receptivity of sensibility and that we think of

to admit the existence of objects outside us, as long as intuitions are nothing but the effect of the external objects upon our sensibility (see CPR B276-7; Ak 2: 393). As correctly Colin McLear notices, the notion of empirical intuition yields three notions: "first, that there is no inference, on the part of the subject, in the perceptual act of apprehension. Second, intuitions present their objects immediately in the sense that there is no mental intermediary to which the subject is related (…) Finally (…) that intuitions present their objects immediately in the sense that one cannot have the relevant intuition (be it inner or outer) without there being something which is thus intuited, and which is thereby made present to the subject's consciousness" (McLear, 2017, p. 86).

[10] Concerning to the identity between categories and the concepts of understanding Kant asserts: "the **categories** that have just been adduced are nothing other than the **conditions of thinking in a possible experience**, (…) they are therefore also fundamental concepts for thinking objects in general for the appearances, and they therefore have *a priori* objective validity" (CPR A111; see also CPR A96).

[11] As he puts it: "we say that we cognize the object if we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition" (CPR A105).

[12] I disagree with P. Guyer on the translation of *Verbindung* as 'combination' and I suggest the term 'connection', because *Verbindung* expresses a more general relation of items than the term 'combination' which entails qualitative or qualitatively different items (a particular form of connection). For the combination of qualitative and quantitatively identical items is, at least logically, doubtful. I consider that the term 'connection' has a denotation less restricted than the term 'combination' and, therefore, 'connection' would be more suitable for translation of *Verbindung*. What is more, in a footnote of the second edition of CPR, the term *Verbindung* (in Latin: *conjunctio*) does not point out any specific synthesis of the manifold, but is divided into two different synthesis, namely *Zussamensetzung* (in Latin: *compositio*) and *Verknüpfung* (in Latin: *nexus*) (see CPR B201 footnote).

them through spontaneity of the understanding (see also Ak 11:51-2).[13] Kant's distinction between sensibility and understanding is transcendental and not merely logical as it was for G. W. Leibniz who, according to Kant, believed to know the inner constitution of things by comparing all objects through the understanding and the abstract formal concepts. Leibniz found no other differences among concepts than those through which pure concepts are distinguished, and took sensibility for a confused mode of representation rather than as a separate source of *a priori* representations which makes cognition of objects possible (see CPR A270/B236; 7:140 footnote; 2:394).[14] In other words, understanding and sensibility are two genetically different sources of representations without entailing that sensibility is a logically inferior or confusing version of representations (see also Ak 7:143-4; Caygill, 2003, p. 184).

In my view Kant's theory of the self can reach the status of cognition (i.e. knowledge) in two different ways: first, in his *Lectures on logic*, Kant distinguishes among seven degrees of 'cognition' (*Erkenntniß*)[15]: i) to 'represent' (*vorstellen*) something; ii) to represent or 'perceive' (*wahrnehmen*) something with consciousness; iii) to 'be acquainted with' (*kennen*) something, namely to represent something in comparison with other things; iv) to 'know' (*erkennen*) or be acquainted with something with consciousness; v) to 'understand' (*verstehen*) or 'conceive of' (*concipiren*) something through understanding and by means of concepts[16]; vi) to 'have insight' (*einsehen*) into something; that is to say, to know something through reason and vii) to 'comprehend' (*begreifen*) something i.e. to know something through reason or *a priori* (see Ak 9:65).

Kant's theory of the self reaches the first five degrees of cognition (*vorstellen*) in as much as we have access to intuitions corresponding to our inner and outer states, and intuitions

[13] According to Kant, *cognition* should consist in the relation to some object of the experience (see CPR A77/B103, B137).
[14] Perhaps Kant is referring here to Leibniz's claim that: "since each perception of the soul includes an infinity of confused perceptions which embrace the whole universe, the soul itself knows the things it perceives only so far as it has distinct and heightened [*revelées*] perceptions; (…) confused perceptions are the result of impressions that the whole universe makes upon us" (Leibniz, 1989, §§ I3; see also *Monadology*, §§19-20).
[15] Kant achieved a similar classification in the CPR about the concepts of 'representation', 'perception', 'sensation', 'knowledge', 'intuition', 'concept', 'notio' and 'idea' (see CPR A320/B 376-7).
[16] Concerning the notion of 'conceiving', Kant indicates that we cannot comprehend a *perpetuum mobile*, whose impossibility is pointed out in mechanics, but we can still conceive of it.

are a particular form of representations (see CPR A22/B37, A33/B49).[17] The second degree (*wahrnehmen*) is reached, for his theory involves perceptions[18] of the "self", that is, the 'mind' (*Gemüt*)[19] represents itself and its inner states with consciousness, namely this is conscious of the fact that it has representations of inner and outer states (see CPR B155-6, B68, A38/B55). The third degree (*kennen*) is also reached because the mind can distinguish inner from outer phenomena (related to the human body) (see CPR A22/B37). The fourth degree (*erkennen*) is reached, because the mind is conscious of the characteristics that differentiate inner from outer phenomena; for instance, inner phenomena do not have spatial properties (see CPR A34/B50). Further, the fifth degree (*verstehen*) is reached, because intuition of the "self" (i.e. of our inner states) involves a unity or determination which can be provided only by the concepts of the understanding (see CPR B154, B158).[20]

As to the sixth degree (*einsehen*), it is important to clarify that the objects of the reason are mere ideas or *illusions* (*Scheine*), whereas the inner intuition of the "self" (i.e. inner states) have the same degree of actuality as the intuition of the outer sense (see CPR B69,

[17] Kant expresses in a fragment of *Reflections on Metaphysics*: "[*Crossed out*: The inner sense] Consciousness is the intuition of oneself. It would not be consciousness if it were sensation. All cognition, whatever it might concern, lies in it" (Ak 18:72).

[18] The term perception is defined in different ways in Kant's works: 1) "the representation with consciousness (*perceptio*)", taking *sensation* for "a **perception** that refers to the subject as a modification of its state" (CPR A320/B376); 2) a sensation given "which, if it is applied to an object in general without determining it, is called perception" (CPR A374); 3) "The first thing that is given to us is appearance, which, if it is combined with consciousness" (CPR A120); 4) "the consciousness of an empirical intuition" (Ak 8:217) and so on. I think that the use of the term *perception* of the self or, rather, of the human being's inner states is compatible with the definitions 1, 3 and 4.

[19] Following S. Kemp Smith, H. J Paton, P. Guyer, M. Caimi (among others), I adopt the term "mind" as translation of "*Gemüt*". However, it is not unproblematic which the most accurate term for its translation is; for instance, A. Mumbrú remarks that the term 'mente' expresses an excessively epistemological focus and it does not recognize the esthetical and moral focus of that term. Despite none of the Spanish terms 'alma', 'psiquismo', 'espíritu', 'mente' and 'ánimo' is the most precise term that unifies the set of faculties (intellectual or sense-affective) by which we are composed, Mumbrú recommends the use of the terms 'ánimo' or 'mente' to translate *Gemüt* (see Mumbrú, 2013, p. 6). At first blush, the term '*Gemüt'* (*animus* in Latin) points out a subjective and mental range without a specific psychological or metaphysical assumption (see Willaschek, M. (Ed.), Stolzenberg, J. (Ed.), Mohr, G. (Ed.), et al., 2015, pp. 749 f.). Certainly, this term encompasses our sensible and intellectual faculties (see CPR A50/B74, B67-8, A77/B102; 20:242), but its domain can also concern the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire (see Ak 7:399; Dessoir, 1924, p. 106). *Gemüt* (distinguished from 'substance') can also be regarded as a faculty that composes given representations and brings about the unity of empirical apperception (see Ak 12:32). Moreover, Kant admits in different places that we can know our mind through inner sense alone (see CPR A22/B37, A278/B334; Ak 7: 161, 153; see also below, section 1.1.3.3).

[20] "All synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories, and since experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are thus also valid *a priori* of all objects of experience" (CPR B161).

B55/A38).[21] Neither can this theory reach the seventh degree (*begreifen*); namely the self cannot be known *a priori* by means of reason, because we cognize ourselves as appearances, namely in the way we appear to ourselves (see CPR B158).

Second, *cognition*, roughly speaking, can be understood in Kantian terms as the synthesis[22] of intuitions under the pure concepts of understanding. In my view, this is a "restrictive" sense of cognition, in which the union between those two forms of representations is demanded. This "restrictive" sense can be distinguished from a "modest" one that demands only one of these representations.[23] According to the "modest" sense of cognition, the representations of sensibility and understanding can be *individually* considered as two *sources* of cognition (see CPR A50/74, B29, A294/B350) as well as two *kinds of cognition*: empirical (see CPR A102, A320/B376-7) and *a priori* (see CPR A131/B170, A87/B119, A135/B174).[24] I suggest that Kant's theory of the self can reach the status of *cognition*, i.e. self-knowledge, in both senses. For, on the one hand, self-knowledge involves a set of intuitions of our inner and outer states, which are grounded on sensibility (see also Ak 25:1476). On the other, Kant seems to allow for a self-knowledge that integrate both intuition and thought of the object cognized:

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[21] Intuition represents a form of cognition of things whose existence should be accessible to any finite creature: "knowledge is primarily intuition, i.e., a representing that immediately represents the being itself. However, if finite intuition is now to be knowledge, then it must be able to make the being itself as revealed accessible with respect to both what and how it is for everyone at all times" (Heidegger, 1990, p. 19).

[22] Kant defines the concept of synthesis as follows: "by **synthesis** in the most general sense, however, I understand the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition" (CPR A77/B103).

[23] This 'restrictive conception of knowledge' corresponds to the union between *matter* and *form* of knowledge: the *matter* of knowledge refers to objects that can be known and the *form* refers to the way in which we know these objects. In this case, the *form* of knowledge only focuses on the use of concepts and judgements, excluding the form of knowledge, which is referred to space and time. Hence metaphysics is concerned with the *matter* of knowledge, whilst logic is concerned only with its *form* (see Ak 9:33).

[24] I shall not discuss about the problem on whether or not categories are necessary conditions of the mere "ontological" possibility of empirical intuition. In this vein, some commentators support a "non-conceptualism" (Hanna 2005; Allais 2009), others "conceptualism" (Sellars 1978; McDowell 1994, 2009) and others support a "weak" or "moderate conceptualism" (see Gibbons 1994; Matherne 2015). Of course, Kant's view about this problem is dubious, for he states that categories are not necessary conditions of the very possibility of intuition (see CPR A89/B122, B67), but also claims that categories are necessary conditions of a *determinate* intuition (see CPR B154, B158, B162, B129-30). Wolfgang Carl argues for the second statement, since he identifies intuitions with appearances, which must necessarily be connected with objects of experience. Since our empirical knowledge of objects demands that all given representations should be related, through categories, to an object, then *categories* are necessary conditions for the possibility of *appearances* and, therefore, of *intuition* (Carl, 1922, pp. 57-9). Similarly, I argue for the second statement, in as much as the understanding, through categories, plays a significant role in affection of inner sense, by which inner appearances arise (see below section 1.1.3.). This isn't to say that all categories can be applied to the manifold of inner sense. For instance, Kant in the First Paralogism rules out any attempt to prove that the soul is a substance. The concept of substance is grounded on a persistence whose counterpart cannot be found in the flowing manifold given in inner sense (see CPR XLI-XLIV footnote, B275-9).

> The representation **I am**, which expresses the consciousness that can accompany all thinking, is that which immediately includes the existence of a subject in itself, but not yet any **cognition** of it, thus not empirical cognition, i.e., experience; for to that there belongs, besides the thought of something existing, intuition, and in this case inner intuition, i.e., time, in regard to which the subject must be determined. (CPR B277)

The human being has access to an empirical cognition of itself, which is characterized by intuitions of its inner states and by the thought which brings the empirical manifold of intuition the unity under the categories. That Kant takes empirical self-knowledge as cognition it is clear, but it is not so *how* that cognition is possible. I suggest that this cognition is grounded on a specific form of consciousness; he states in *Anthropology Mrongovius* (1775-6) that "consciousness is twofold, of oneself and of objects. Thus, often a human being who is conscious of objects outside himself, and is very occupied with these in thought, is not conscious of himself" (Ak 25:477). Of course, the human being is not only capable of forming representations of external objects but also of itself and this is possible via self-consciousness (i.e. self-awareness), through which the human being is posited as object of its own representations.[25]

Kant draws a distinction between *empirical self-consciousness* and *transcendental apperception*. The first one accounts for our capacity to be aware of "particular psychological states such as perceptions, memories, and desires. The study of it is what Kant called the physiology of inner sense" (Brook, 1994, p. 55). Kant ascribes various terms to this form of self-consciousness: *empirical consciousness of oneself*, *empirical apperception*, *inner perception* and *inner sense*. The second one accounts for our capacity to be conscious of "ourselves" as subject of cognition, not as object of cognition integrated by particular empirical states. This *transcendental apperception* consists of a unity of consciousness that not only precedes experience but also makes it possible (see CPR A107; AK 7:134 footnote).[26] I will return to it in section 1.3.

[25] Georg Mohr suggests that "intuitions as such do not provide with the determination that I am necessarily conscious of them, so the determination of >>consciousness *of something*<< does not correspond to them in the first place" (Mohr, 1991, p. 65) ("Anschauungen nicht *als solchen* die Bestimmtheit zukommt, daß ich mir ihrer notwendigerweise bewußt bin, ihnen also erst recht nicht die Bestimmtheit >>Bewußtsein *von etwas*<< zukommt").

[26] I agree with P. Keller on the fact that the analysis of Kant's theory of self-consciousness cannot be reduced to the problem of the empirical personal identity, because there are other fundamental problems connected with it, such as: impersonal and transpersonal representations of self, the ability to build and use concepts, intuitions, experience, etc. (Keller, 2001, pp. 1-2).

Finally, because of consciousness is possible to distinguish between two orders of mental states, namely a "first order of mental states" which contains the human being's state (pleasure, pains and other feelings) and a "second one" that seems to be the result of the human being's reflection on the "first order".[27] The second order elevates the human being over animals[28] and by means of this second order this considers itself as in particular condition, for instance, as being *happy* or *unhappy*: "we not only feel pain in our soul, but besides that we are distressed over this pain in our heart, and we not only feel a joy in our soul, but besides we take delight in the fact that we are joyful, in our heart" (Ak 25:474). In my view, consciousness allows the human being to progress from the *first* to the *second order of mental states*, in as much as through this realizes the existence of certain feelings in the *first* order and without that consciousness, representations in the second order could not arise (see also Ak 25:11-12).

1.2. Inner Sense

Now I shall focus on the following points: i) a contrast between Locke and Kant concerning inner sense; ii) some remarks on Kant's view of inner sense before CPR and iii) compatibility of metaphysical and anthropological approach to inner sense.

Sahabeddin Yalcin rightly claims that "Kant's concept of self-knowledge depends upon his notion of inner sense" (Yalcin, 2002, p. 182). Inner sense is still today a problematic subject-matter in philosophy[29], which even before Kant had been regarded as an accepted condition under which we can observe or "introspect" (see section 2.1) our own mental states.[30] In this vein, inner sense constitutes a source of knowledge of ourselves as individuals, namely of the human mind in general (see Thiel, 1997, p. 58). However, the

[27] A previous analysis of the aforementioned distinction can be found in T. Sturm (see 2008, p. 502), although I underline here the influence of consciousness on the relation between what he calls 'first' and 'second-order mental states'.

[28] Since animals do not have the power to reflect on their states, they cannot be regarded as happy, unfortunate or unhappy (see Ak 25:474).

[29] For current discussions on inner sense, see Shoemaker (1994), Lycan (1996), Carruthers (2011), Roche (2013), Picciuto & Carruthers (2014), among others.

[30] As far as the position of inner sense in history is concerned, Udo Thiel holds that "although (or perhaps precisely because) the belief that we are able to perceive our inner states and acts was an orthodoxy throughout the eighteenth century, there was very little examination of the notion of inner sense itself, at least until the late 1760s. Things improved in the 1770s, the heyday of German empirical psychology, through writers such as Meiners and Hissmann" (Thiel, 1997, pp. 59-60).

mere inner sense does not give a consciousness of such states as belonging to ourselves, for, according to Kant, "all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the **I think** in the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered. But this representation is an act of **spontaneity**, i.e., it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility" (CPR B132). Instead, we demand the representation "I think" by which all our representations are related to our consciousness (see CPR B132, 157; Mohr, 1991, p. 65; Howell, 2001, pp. 118-9, 138; Aquila, 1983, pp. 176-7).[31]

Often, Kant holds that it is the capacity of ascribing the representations to its *one*self what sets the human being above the beasts (see Ak 7:127; 28:276; 25:492, 473).[32] Indeed, the human being has not only a power of sensory *intuition* but also of *understanding*, which consequently brings "a total separation from the beasts, to whom we have no reason to attribute the power to say 'I' to oneself, and looks out upon an infinity of self-made representations and concepts" (Ak 20:270).

On top of that, Kant does not distinguish among different kinds of inner sense neither in the CPR nor in the *Anthropology*. He claims rather that "there is then only *one* inner sense, because the human being does not have different organs for sensing himself inwardly" (Ak 7:161; see also 28:673). Therefore, a detailed account of such distinction would not be prior to Christoph Meiners (1747-1810) and Michael Hissmann (1752-1784) (see Thiel, 1997, p. 65). [33]

[31] I think that Valaris is wrong in saying that "the role of inner sense is precisely to make the subject aware of its outer perceptions as its own in just this sense, and thereby becoming aware of *itself* in relation to the objects of its outer perceptions as well" (Valaris, 2008, p. 9). I think that he is mingling empirical and logical aspects of cognition, for the manifold provided by inner sense or empirical self-consciousness is grounded on *sensibility*, whereas the relation of representations to a consciousness is a *logical* function grounded on the understanding by means of the judgement "I think" (see CPR B132-3, A341-2/B399-400). Further, Ralph Walker rightly highlights the contribution of the unity of apperception to the self-consciousness, claiming: "in order to be self-conscious, I must ascribe to myself a whole set of experiences, as all covered by the same 'I think'. Otherwise there could be no awareness of *self*" (Walker, 2017, p. 215).

[32] As Strawson rightly notices, "it is not necessary, in order for different experiences to belong to a single consciousness, that the subject of those experiences should be constantly thinking of them as *his* experiences; but it is necessary that those experiences should be subject to whatever condition is required for it to be *possible* for him to ascribe them to himself as *his* experiences" (Strawson, 166, p. 98; see CPR B132).

[33] For instance, Michael Hissmann distinguishes in his *Psychologische Versuche ein Beytrag zur esoterischen Logik* (1777) among three types of inner sense: "apperception", the "feeling of the nature of our ideas" and "*Selbstgefühl*" (Hissmann, 1777, pp. 107, 128, 135; see also Thiel, 1997, p. 68 f.).

A. A contrast between Locke and Kant concerning inner sense

Before Kant, John Locke was one of the first philosophers who openly analyzed *inner sense*[34], claiming that all our knowledge is grounded on experience; our observation of the external objects and of the internal operations of our mind is what supplies our understanding with the materials of thinking (see ECHU 2.1.2, 121-2)[35]. Locke distinguishes between two 'fountains of knowledge': the first one corresponds to 'senses', they are that by which particular sensible objects convey several distinct perceptions of things into the mind in accordance with the way in which those objects affect senses. Because of them, we have the ideas of 'sensible qualities' such as yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, bard, bitter, sweet, and so on.[36] The second one is named by Locke as 'perception of the operations of our own mind'[37] and furnishes understanding with ideas (which could not arise without the external objects) of 'perception', 'thinking', 'doubting', 'believing', 'reasoning', 'knowing', 'willing' and the different acts of our own mind in general, all [38] of which we may be conscious:

> This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called *internal sense*. But as I call the other Sensation, so I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. (ECHU 2.1.4, 123-4)

[34] Descartes, nevertheless, admits the existence of inner senses whose object is feelings of pain, hunger, thirst, etc. (Descartes, 1984, pp. 53, 56), and holds that judgements grounded on internal and external senses may cause error in judgements; thus, "in these and countless other such cases, I found that the judgements of the external senses were mistaken. And this applied not just to the external senses but to the internal senses as well. For what can be more internal than pain? And yet I had heard that those who had had a leg or an arm amputated sometimes still seemed to feel intermittently in the missing part of the body" (Descartes, 1984, p. 53).

[35] All references to Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* will have this form (ECHU), followed by book, chapter, and section numbers and the pagination in Locke (1959).

[36] I deem correct H. Robinson's interpretation according to which, simple ideas (sense data) are regarded by Locke as 'sensory atoms' that possess a unity that is not accomplished by the subject's understanding but is passively received in sensation. In contrast, the sensory given (the manifold), for Kant, is a chaos, a blooming or a buzzing confusion and no unity can *be made* there, except by means of the understanding's application of categories to sensations (see Robinson, 1988, p. 172). However, I think that this interpretation to some extent overlooks the union of the manifold occurred *in* sensibility by means of space and time, as far as the latter is the form of inner sense (not the form of the understanding).

[37] Locke clarifies the term by claiming "the term *operations* here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from any thought" (ECHU 2.1.4, 124).

[38] Patricia Kitcher holds that the goal of Locke's list is "to make plausible a sensory descent for ideas of the recognized varieties of thinking" (Kitcher, 2011, p. 17); however, if it were a descent, it would not be clear why, in the order of that descent, the operation of 'doubting' would be closer to the sensory ideas than the operation of 'willing'.

Evidently Locke equates *inner sense* and *reflection* but he does not admit that inner sense is constituted by a passivity that can by affected; instead, inner sense is understood as the act (i.e. reflecting) whereby the mind apprehends its mental states, by considering its own operations and the manner in which they take place (see ECHU 2.1.4, 124).[39]

The understanding cannot get ideas from a different source, namely external objects furnish the mind with ideas of sensible qualities, while the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas about its own operations. That is to say, "in time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I call ideas of reflection" (ECHU 2.1.24, 141). Indeed, the subject is gradually furnished with a great variety of ideas through experience and this is capable of having 'plain' and 'clear' ideas of the operations of its mind, by paying attention to its thoughts and considers those operations *attentively* (see ECHU 2.1.7, 126). However, for Locke, human beings cannot think of something without being conscious of it:

> I grant that the soul, in a waking man, is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake. But whether sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man's consideration; it being hard to conceive that anything should think and not be conscious of it. (ECHU 2.1.11, 130).

It follows that there are not ideas explaining our experience of things of which we are not conscious. On the contrary, all our capacity of thinking presupposes the capacity for being conscious of it. Consciousness, on the one hand, is not only *inseparable* from but is *essential* to thinking, for when we see hear, smell, taste, feel or meditate, we know that we do so, so that our perception of things involves the perception of *perceiving* such things (see ECHU 2.27.11, 448-9). On the other hand, all consciousness of our actions, sensation, pleasure, pain and the concernment, which accompanies this consciousness, plays a significant role in personal identity, even regardless of intervals of unconsciousness which occur while we sleep (see ECHU 2.1.11, 130 and 2.27.10, 450). Indeed, self-consciousness cannot be separated from thinking and grounds its 'personal

[39] Udo Thiel suggests that Locke's use of the terminology of "reflection" for inner sense was shared by eighteenth-century philosophers in Britain. In contrast, Reflection was not identified with inner sense by Germans philosophers (such as Christian Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten, Nicolas Tetens, Ernst Platner, Christoph Meiner and others) who regarded *reflection* as an intellectual capacity of comparing ideas with one another, or considering them in relation to one another. *Inner sense*, by contrast, was regarded as capacity to be conscious of one's own representations (see Thiel, 1997, pp. 61-2).

identity', in as much as 'person' is regarded as "a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places" (ECHU 2.27.11, 448). The subject's self-consciousness constitutes what is called 'the self', which would be nothing else but consciousness that always accompanies thinking and thereby a subject is distinguished from all other thinking beings.[40] As a consequence, 'personal identity' is understood as the *sameness* of a rational being which rests upon the subject's consciousness of its past thoughts and actions, so that subject is now the same self that it was in the past.[41]

In my view, Locke's inner sense differs from Kant's in several respects; first Locke's description of inner sense is somehow focused on consciousness of mind's *operations* or *functions*, while Kant's analysis of inner sense focuses on empirical representations (i.e. appearances) of the subject's inner states and on the necessary conditions of appearances in general.[42] However, the latter idea demands a further reflection. For even though an empirical consciousness of a *transcendental* operations of the mind seems to Kant unlikely, he does not reject out of hand the possibility that we can be conscious, via inner sense, of not –necessarily- transcendental mental operations in our day-to-day life (*e.g.* we can be conscious of the fact that we are lying, deducing, or thinking in general etc.,) (see CPR A357-8). Second, for the English, inner sense necessarily constitutes the identity of the self by means of consciousness, while for Kant inner sense is only condition by which we may perceive our inner states, without entailing that identity. Finally, for Locke the self is perceived by the subject, by means of consciousness of the operations of the mind, as *it is*, as a unity; for Kant, there is not an inner perception of the

[40] Kant suggests that the human being's 'personality' (*Personalitaet*) relies on its capacity of making itself into an abject of thoughts with consciousness i.e. self-consciousness (see Ak 25:10).

[41] "As far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done" (ECHU 2.27.11, 449).

[42] This difference is recognized by Aquila as he says "one difference between Locke and Kant is that inner sense does not yield direct awareness of inner *activity* for Kant" (Aquila, 1983, p. 151). Like Aquila, S. Yalcin claims: "while internal sense for Locke is the source of a direct awareness of the passive aspect of the self. Kant reserves the pure awareness of the active self, which for Locke is provided by the internal sense, for his notion of transcendental apperception" (Yalcin, 2002, p. 185). However, Yalcin is incorrect in linking inner sense exclusively to "the passive aspect of the self", for inner sense is also a necessary condition of objects in general, whose form (time) constitutes a principle of relation of all appearances (see CPR A34/B50). More recently, Patricia Kitcher focuses on the contrast between Locke and Kant and claims: "alternatively, Kant's fundamental break with Locke comes in the restriction of inner sense to a faculty that can provide information about mental states and not information about both states and acts" (Kitcher, 2011, p. 23). Nonetheless, Kitcher suggests that around 1765 Kant's and Locke's inner sense were not contradictory (see Kitcher, 2016, pp. 347-8).

self as a unity, but rather there are many perceptions of inner states. The subject, according to Kant, has the power to perceive itself, not as *it is in itself* but as *it appears to itself*. I think, nonetheless, that Locke and Kant cannot be easily differentiated from a certain perspective: for Locke, *perception* means, on the one hand, that which senses convey into the mind with regard to particular sensible objects (see ECHU 2.2.3, 122) and, on the other, modes of thinking like remembering (see ECHU 1.3.21, 109). According to Kant, memory is a faculty that connects *perceptions* in time and its functions are mainly submitted to our consciousness (see Ak 7:182). I shall focus on it in the section 3.5).

Kant did not develop a conception of the "thinking I" before 1770, since he had not yet formulated the problem of a deduction of the concepts of the pure understanding (see Klemme, 1999, p. 508). However, the *Dissertation*, on the one hand, involves a comprehensive theory of human subjectivity[43], and, alternatively, is Kant's antecedent interest in the empirical knowledge of the soul (see Klemme, 1996, p. 50 and 1999, pp. 510-511; Dyck, 2016, p. 329).[44] In fact, Kant maintains there that the object of empirical psychology is nothing else but 'phenomena of inner sense' (*Phaenomena sensus interni*) (see Ak 2:397). Time is nothing but the form of inner sense and the ground of universal connection of subject's inner states, so that those states, subordinated to axioms of time, can only be simultaneous or successive: "all observable events in the world, all motions and all internal changes necessarily accord with the axioms which can be known about time" (Ak 2:401-2).[45]

[43] Klemme suggests that after 1770, the "I" became the epistemological ground of subordination and coordination, in as much as this was the Archimedean point from which all functions of order (including categories) arouse. . In other words, the "I-subject" became openly responsible for the order and relation among our representations (see Klemme, 1996, p. 59).

[44] Before the *Dissertation* there are some short references to inner sense, for instance, in the *Dreams of a spirit-seer elucidated by dreams of metaphysics* (I766), where Kant criticizes Schwedenberg's idea that corporeal beings have no substance of their own, for they exist in virtue of all spirits together. Thus, human body has an external sense which is related to matter and an inner sense that designates the forces of the spirit-world that dwell in that body. Accordingly, Kant admits that inner sense, which indicates the powers of the soul in virtue of which members of human body acquire its form, activity and permanency, is unknown to man (see Ak 2:364). For a remarkable study of Kant's critique of Mendelssohn's account of the soul, see R. Martinelli (2002).

[45] Kant distinguishes between the form of intuition and a formal intuition: "the **form of intuition** merely gives the manifold, but the **formal intuition** gives unity of the representation" (CPR B160-1 footnote). Space and, by analogy, time are formal intuitions (see Ak 8:222). In other words, the *form of intuition* contains all the un-synthesized possible spatiotemporal relations which can determine representations of sensibility (a manifold), whereas the *formal intuition* refers to the particular spatiotemporal configuration of certain representations (comprehension of the manifold) (see Newman, 1980, pp. 154-5).

It is noteworthy that soul is an immaterial thing that cannot subject to space and there can be no spatial representations of the soul, because this cannot be given as an object of outer sense (see Ak 2:419, 12:31-2). On this point, I deem correct Dyck's interpretation that phenomena investigated by empirical psychology are not the coordinating actions of the mind over sensed data but only representations of the soul's passively-received states. For, if such actions were known through sensible intuition, the synthesizing concepts would be empirical and not metaphysical (see Dyck, 2016, pp. 330-1).

B. Remarks on Kant's view of inner sense before CPR

As Karl Ameriks notices, "Kant's definition of inner sense undergoes considerable revisions over time, and there are a variety of interpretations of its ultimate critical meaning" (Ameriks, 1982, p. 242). For instance, *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* (1762) exhibits certain characteristics of inner sense which are not compatible with his treatment in the CPR. In the former text, Kant underlines the relevance of inner sense in the capacity of the understanding to judge and, therefore, in the subject's capacity to cognize in general (see Schulting, 2015, p. 94).[46] There, Kant explains that some animals may 'distinguish' (*unterscheiden*) some things from others (*e. g.* a dog can distinguish a piece of meat from a piece of bread) because different things produce different sensations. They cannot, nonetheless, 'cognize' (*erkennen*) the difference among things, since this cognition requires judgements which are absent in them (see Ak 2:59). In his own words,

> If one succeeds in understanding what the mysterious power is which makes judging possible, one will have solved the problem. My present opinion tends to the view that this power or capacity is nothing other than the faculty of inner sense, that is to say, the faculty of making one's own representations the objects of one's thought. This faculty cannot be derived from some other faculty. It is, in the strict sense of the term, a fundamental faculty; which, in my opinion, can only belong to rational beings. (Ak 2:60)

Animals are capable of a "physically distinguishing" two items, however they are not capable of "logically distinguishing" them (Ameriks, 1982, p. 242).[47] Thus oxen in their

[46] P. Kitcher suggests that "student lecture notes present Kant as continuing to believe that inner sense is essential to cognition and to the higher faculties at least through the middle 1770s" (Kitcher, 2011, p. 20).
[47] Kant proposes a difference between a *logical* and a *physical distinction*: "*diffirentiating logically* means recognising that a thing A is not B; it is always a negative judgement. *Physically diffirentiating* means being driven to different actions by different representations" (Ak 2:60).

representations of a stable may have a clear representation of their mark of the door or of the stable in as much as they 'represent' (*vorstellen*) the mark of those things. They, nonetheless, cannot have a distinct concept of stable because they cannot 'know' (*erkennen*) that this mark belongs to the stable, namely, they cannot form the judgement 'this door belongs to this stable' (see Ak 2:59). Therefore, in the early period of *The False Subtlety* Kant confesses that our power to think is based on our capacity to judge, which relies on inner sense that is the faculty through which we represent us to ourselves. But even afterwards, Kant maintains in the 1770's (*Metaphysik L*) that animals have outer sense but lack inner sense, so that they forgo a faculty that is fundamental to the capacity to cognize:

> Animals will have all the representations of the outer senses; they will forgo only those representations which rest on inner sense, on the consciousness of oneself, in short, on the concept of the I. Accordingly, they will have no understanding and no reason, for all actions of the understanding and reason are possible only insofar as one is conscious of oneself. (Ak 28:276)

Kant affirms in these *Lectures* that inner sense renders possible the consciousness of the self and since animals cannot be conscious of themselves they do not have reason nor understanding, for the operations of reason and understanding are grounded on this consciousness (see also Ak 25:859).[48] As a consequence, without this consciousness we would not have cognition through reflection, nor identity of the representations, nor connections of the representations according to ground and consequence or according to the whole and according to the parts (see Ak 28:276). Moreover, Kant suggests that inner sense is properly what distinguishes a rational being from animals:

> The consciousness of one's self, the concept of the I, does not occur with such beings that have no inner sense; accordingly no non-rational animal can think: I am; from this follows the difference that beings that have such concept of the I possess *personality*. (Ak 28:276; see also 25:492)

Kant clarifies that non-rational animals do not have inner sense, although one might attribute something analogue of reason (*analogon rationis*) to them. This "something" renders possible the connection of representations according to the laws of sensibility; the souls of such animals increase in their sensible faculties to the extent that they may have

[48] Before *Metaphysik L*, Kant held in *Collins* (1772-3) that "the I is the foundation of the capacity for understanding and reason, and the entire power of cognition, for all these rest on my observing and inspecting myself and what goes on in me" (Ak 25:10).

better phenomena in sensibility than we do (see Ak 28:276). In my view, Kant underlines in these *Lectures* the importance of inner sense with regard to cognition of outer objects, whereas in the CPR Kant underlines the importance of inner sense with regard to cognition of ourselves.

Around 1775 Kant defines perception as "position in inner sense", namely this is a representation of appearances existing in time, and this existence can be represented as successive or simultaneous to another (see Ak 17:659). Perception belongs to sensation and is connected with the apperception or self-consciousness, through which we become conscious of our own existence.[49] Certainly, Kant suggests that perception presupposes consciousness of the actions performed by our mind: "we are conscious of ourselves and of our own actions and of appearances insofar as we become conscious of the apprehension of them, either by coordinating them or by apprehending one sensation through the other" (Ak 17:662). In my view, the consciousness of inner and outer appearances depends upon our consciousness of the way in which we apprehend them. This form is nothing else but succession and simultaneity, according to which we relate all our representations in time (compare Stepanenko, 1994, p. 148 f.).

Moreover, perception is not only related to consciousness of our own operations but also to that which is given in inner sense, for "we perceive something only by being conscious of our apprehension, consequently of the existence in our inner sense (…) all observation requires a rule. The intellectual element of perception pertains to the power of inner sense" (Ak 17:667-8). In my opinion, inner sense is a fundamental component of our perception of objects, in as much as perception involves a determination of objects **in time** (as the form of inner sense) (see Ak 17:666). Even though the mind connects the manifold contained in the perception, perception still requires a conjugation permitted by the concept.

[49] Even, Kant later notes in a *Reflexion* on anthropology (from around 1783-4) that apperception is not a sense but that through which we are conscious of representations of both inner and outer sense (see Ak 15:85).

C. Comparing the metaphysical and anthropological approaches to inner sense.

I suggest that Kant's views on inner sense in the CPR and in *Anthropology* are consistent in certain respects. First, inner sense is understood in both texts as a receptivity through which the human being represents or intuits itself, and since the content (*matter*) of the representations of the self is derived from individual experience, then, this will be different in everyone:

> Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the soul itself, as an object; yet it is still a determinate form, under which the intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relations of time. (CPR A22-3/B37)

Inner sense constitutes a source of intuition[50] of ourselves. But it does not mean that because of inner sense the self is apprehended as **one** object but is presented rather as the temporal flow of empirical consciousness as it appears to us (see Aquila, 1983, pp. 162-3).[51] Inner sense is certainly a condition without which intuitions of our inner states would not be possible (see Mohr, 1991, p. 61). It is reasonable to say that neither inner nor outer sense can produce spontaneously a manifold on its own, in as much as these are *passive* faculties that belong to sensibility of the subject. The production of the manifold rests on the affection produced by something, that is, the manifold of inner and of outer sense can be produced when these are *affected* by the external objects (I return to this point in the section 1.4.). However, inner sense does not yield only an "outer" but also an "inner" manifold, which is concerned with our inner states. This inner manifold arises when inner sense is affected by the understanding and the manifold is connected in time by imagination to form an intuition (see CPR B154-5, B157 footnote, B158).[52]

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[50] It is worthy of note that Kant rarely uses the expression 'inner sensation' (see Eisler, 1994, p. 115; Schmitz, 2013, p. 1045), instead he uses the expressions 'inner intuition' (see CPR A33/B49-50), 'inner perception' (see CPR B155-6), 'inner experience' (see CPR BXL footnote, B277-8) and 'inner appearances' (see CPR A34/B50). He uses the expression '*innere Empfindung*' just in few places (see Ak 7:142). Sensation, then, seems to be a term mainly associated with the effect of the external objects upon our senses (see CPR A19-29/B34).

[51] Needless to say, soul cannot be given in outer intuition nor can be considered as simple, because it has no physical properties (see Ak 7:216; 12:31-35) and the simple nature of subject cannot be known through experience as it were a simple consciousness: "the thinking **I**, the soul (a name for the transcendental object of inner sense), is simple; nevertheless on this account this expression has no use at all that reaches to real objects, and hence it cannot extend our cognition in the least" (CPR A361).

[52] Concerning to the "phenomenality" of the knowledge of the object contained by inner sense, Kant claims in the 'Handschrift' of *Anthropology*: "an object of the (external or inner) sense, in so far as it is perceived,

Second, this mentioned definition of inner sense agrees with his conception of inner sense in the *Anthropology*, where he says that inner sense is described as a receptivity that rests on inner intuition and on the relations of ideas in time, so that the representations of our inner states can be successive or simultaneous (see Ak 7:161). In this vein, I consider that inner sense is, in Kantian criticism, the formal source of all temporal given appearances (see Monzel, 1920, pp. 427-8), because time is an *a* priori formal condition of all intuitions, while their 'matter' is a manifold empirically derived from experience. As a result, it seems right to hold that inner sense is "affected by something inside the subject, but nevertheless be responsible for the production of representations of outer appearances" (Schmitz, 2013, p. 1050).

Third, *sense* and *imagination* belong to sensibility (see Ak 7:153; CPR B151), which is regarded as the faculty of *intuitive* representations in the presence of an object.[53] *Sense* is divided into *outer* and *inner* sense. These are explained in parallel:

> By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space. In space their form, magnitude, and relation to one another is determined, or determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state. (CPR A22/B37; see also CPR A278/B334)

> But the senses, on the other hand, are divided into *outer* and *inner* sense *(sensus internus).* Outer sense is where the human body is affected by physical things; inner sense, where it is affected by the mind. (Ak 7:153; see also Ak 25:492[54])

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is called *appearance* (*phaenomenon*). Cognition of an object in appearance (that is, as phenomenon) is *experience*. Therefore appearance (*Erscheinung*) is that representation through which an object of the sense is given (an object of perception, that is, of empirical intuition), but experience or empirical *cognition* is that representation through which the object as such at the same time is thought" (Ak 7:398). In the CPR Kant points out that 'appearances' are "only representations of things that exist without cognition of what they might be in themselves. As mere representations, however, they stand under no law of connection at all except that which the connecting faculty prescribes" (CPR B164; Ak 7:398). A very detailed analysis of Kant's problematic notion of *Erscheinung* is provided by Gerold Prauss in *Erscheinung bey Kant.* Prauss suggests there that the word *Erscheinung* is used by Kant as a reference to both empirical and transcendental-philosophical appearances. According to him, the word ***Phaenomena*** is referred to things that count as things in themselves in empirical cognition (themselves regarded by transcendental-philosophical reflection as "*Erscheinung*"), while the word '***Erscheinung****'* is reserved for empirical appearances (see Prauss, 1971, p. 18f.).

[53] "*Sensibility* in the cognitive faculty (the faculty of intuitive representations) contains two parts: *sense* and the *power of imagination***. –** The first is the faculty of intuition in the presence of an object, the second is intuition even *without* the presence of an object" (Ak 7:153).

[54] I am aware of the fact that Kant's *Lectures on anthropology* are not verbatim transcriptions of Kant but rather student notes that are mostly copies prepared by hand, almost mechanically, from prototypes that were subsequently lost. These notes, nevertheless, describe circumstances that, just like any other past event, are accessible to historical research (see Stark. 2003, p. 17). Even though these notes "only reproduce Kant's own words in an attenuated or obscured way. Still, the notebooks *can* accomplish this much: through

The parallelism[55] suggests, on the one hand, that inner sense is a condition under which intuition of inner states is possible and, on the other, that inner sense along with outer sense provide a manifold that is to be connected in time according to relations of succession or simultaneity.

Fourth, according to CPR (A145/B185) and *Anthropology* (see Ak 7:134 footnote, 141, 153), inner and outer sense are nothing but a receptivity that, in the case of inner sense, is affected by the understanding and, in the outer sense, by outer objects. It is worth noting that outer affection is not identical with the inner one (see Aquila, 1983, p. 158). Inner sense can be affected by understanding i.e. by something that is already in possession of synthetic properties, whereas outer sense is affected by external objects that lack such properties. Outer affection provides a sensible manifold, whereas inner or self-affection provides no manifold, but this is already given in inner sense when is connected by the understanding (see also Conard, 1994, p. 323).[56] Kant holds that in both cases the effect of the 'affection' (*Affektion*) is an outer or inner intuition respectively, which (in the second case) arises when inner sense is affected by understanding:

> That which, as representation, can precede any act of thinking something is intuition and, if it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition, which, since it does not represent anything except insofar as something is posited in the mind, can be nothing other than the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity, namely this positing of its representation, thus the way it is affected through itself, i.e., it is an inner sense as far as regards its form. (CPR B67-8)

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them we can gain reliable information about the development of the philosophical intuitions, arguments, and thematic interests of the philosopher from Königsberg" (Stark. 2003, p. 19).

[55] Against Kant's parallelism between inner and outer sense H. Allison argues that inner sense cannot provide intuitions of the self in the same way outer sense provides intuitions of the external objects: "the I cannot cognize itself through the empirical predicates (representations) which it refers to itself in judgments of inner experience. Or, more precisely, it cannot cognize itself in the same way in which it cognizes outer objects through the predicates which it attributes to them in judgments of outer experience" (Allison, 2004, p. 279). According to Allison, even granting that through outer sense we 'cognize' objects as they appear, it does not follow that inner sense yields representations of the *self* as it appears (see Allison, 2004, p. 281). For other skeptical remarks on this parallelism, see also Vaihinger, 1892, pp. 125-6; Yalcin, 2002, p. 189; Schmitz, 2013, p. 1045). I think that indeed inner sense does not provides us with a representation of the *self* but with a flux of inner states. Kant, as Alouis Monzel notices, does not set up any absolute coordination or subordination between inner and outer sense (Monzel, 1920, p. 427).

[56] It seems that Kant uses the term *affecting* in two ways: in the first one, he speaks of 'things-in-themselves' which cause an empirical manifold; in the second one, he speaks of "our self as affecting our self", which does not entail necessarily that I produce the empirical manifold in myself but rather that I determine my inner sense by means of the transcendental synthesis (see Ewing, 1967, pp. 123-4). However, I consider right M. T. Conard's (see 1994, p. 324) interpretation according to which Kant himself does not distinguish between two kinds of self-affection as H. Allison does (see 2004, p. 283).

> Inner sense is not pure apperception, a consciousness of what the human being *does***,** since this belongs to the faculty of thinking. Rather, it is a consciousness of what he *undergoes***,** in so far as he is affected by the play of his own thoughts. (Ak 7:161)

Kant suggests that the affection of inner sense means that the subject posits its own representations in the mind, so that this is represented though inner sense as an appearance, as long as this has access only to an inner perception of the manifold in sensibility (see CPR B67-8). I agree with H. Allison (2004, p. 282), M. T. Conard (1994, p. 322) and others who consider that Kant equated self-affection with apprehension:

> If the faculty for becoming conscious of oneself is to seek out (apprehend) that which lies in the mind, it must affect the latter, and it can only produce an intuition of itself in such a way, whose form, however, which antecedently grounds it in the mind, determines the way in which the manifold is together in the mind in the representation of time. (CPR B68-9)

And,

> It [inner sense] rests on inner intuition, and consequently on the relations of ideas in time (whether they are simultaneous or successive). (Ak 7:161)

The affection of inner sense can be regarded as an apprehension of the manifold given in sensibility, which becomes whereby intuition of oneself as far as it is determined by relations of time. Richard Aquila casts rightly Kant's account of self-affection in terms of a kind of inner awareness that provides certain "material" that fills a temporal form, so that the material is not presented as it really is in itself, but only as it appears, that is, according to this particular form. Kant would be sympathetic to his interpretation, since he grounds the temporal relation of our inner states on self-affection: "the temporal features of our internal states, as we are aware of them, merely reflect the mode of our awareness of those states and not any aspect that is proper to them as such" (Aquila, 1983, p. 155). Further, Kant links affection to 'attention' (*Aufmerksamkeit*) as an empirical act by which the understanding determines inner sense through an empirical synthesis (CPR B156-7 footnote). In other words, when we pay attention to representations of ourselves, the mind makes *them* into an *object* of our representation (see also Allison, 2004, p. 284).

Five, Kant argues for a **phenomenal** self-knowledge (see Ak 4:337; 7:397), according to which we, as human beings, cognize ourselves in the way in which we *appear* to ourselves through inner sense, not as we *are* in ourselves:

> We must also concede that through inner sense we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected **by our selves**, i.e., as far as inner intuition is concerned we cognize our own subject only as appearance but not in accordance with what it is in itself. (CPR B156; see also B157-8, B66-8)

> Therefore I always cognize myself only through inner experience, as I *appear* to myself; which proposition is then often so maliciously twisted as if it said: it only *seems* to me *(mihi videri)* that I have certain ideas and sensations, indeed it only seems that I exist at all. (Ak 7:142)

In *Anthropology*, Kant claims that our human cognition of external objects and of ourselves does not pretend to go beyond what inner and outer experience provides us. It means that the object of our representation comprises the way in which we are affected by it and we can only cognize it as it *appears* to us, not as it *is* in itself (see Ak 7:397). Moreover, the sensible intuition, fundamental component of the mentioned cognition, depends not only upon the constitution of the object but also upon the constitution of the subject and its receptivity (after which thinking follows). The formal constitution of this receptivity, which is not derived from senses but given *a priori*, is nothing but **time** (see Ak 7:141).

However, I disagree with H. Allison who considers that there is no basis for distinguishing between the self as 'it is in itself' and as 'it appears to itself' in as much as the objects of inner sense would be nothing else but representations, namely, mental entities. According to H. Allison's interpretation, "the self regards itself merely as the substratum or subject in which these representations inhere" (Allison, 2004, p. 279)[57] and emphasizes that the previous distinction would not be significant:

> Nor does it seem to help matters very much if we take the objects of inner sense and inner experience to be the representations themselves, since, as mental entities, the latter are already ideal in the empirical sense. Either way, then, we seem to be without any basis for distinguishing between such an object as it appears and as it is in itself. (Allison, 2004, p. 280).

In contrast, I argue that the objects of inner sense are not actually representations but states of which we have representations. This leads to a parallelism, not between external objects and inner representations but rather between external objects and inner states (see

[57] Against Allison's reading, Markos Valaris holds rightly that the inherence of representations, as subjective states in the self is a mere *logical substrata* and cannot be an empirical knowledge of the subject, for the empirical self has to be an *appearance* (see Valaris, 2008, p. 6).

Schmitz, 2013, p. 1045). The reflection on the mental states leads the subject to the awareness of the represented object not of the representation itself, so that "the representation is simply the representational vehicle/medium by means of which we become aware of the object" (Bader, 2017, p. 127). Further, the self is represented via inner sense as an appearance (not as a *thing in itself*) which is related to other appearances in the world. On this basic point, I am in agreement with Valaris' claim that "if through inner sense the subject is aware of its own perspective on things, then by the same token, it is aware of *itself* as having a determinate location in the same space and time as the things it perceives" (Valaris, 2008, p. 6).

1.3. Apperception and Forms of self-consciousness

In this section, I argue that Kant distinguishes in the CPR and in *Anthropology* between *inner sense* and *apperception*; such a distinction allows him to establish different forms of self-consciousness. Needless to say, Kant did not invent the term "apperception" but probably he took it from G. W. Leibniz (see Ameriks, 2003, pp. 78-9).[58] Leibniz was probably who introduced "*l'aperception*" (i.e. "*la conscience*") into philosophical terminology early in the eighteenth century. He defined it, in *Principles of Nature and grace*, as "*consciousness*, or the reflective knowledge of this internal state" (1989, §§4; see also *Monadology*, §§14); that is to say, *apperception* is the consciousness of the presence of certain representations in our mind. However, Christian Wolff's treatment of this term produced a stronger impact on empirical psychology and epistemological discussions during the eighteenth century.[59]

[58] However, Dennis Schulting maintains that the influence of Leibniz and Wolff on Kant's development of his theory of *transcendental apperception* lies on the terminology, so that that theory is probably original to Kant himself. Schulting adds that Kant's conception of *transcendental apperception* occurs before his acquaintance, through Tetens, with Mérian's account of *original apperception*: "Kant's first use of the term 'apperception', whilst pointing out its epistemic grounding function that is later associated with its transcendental role, in the *Duisburg Nachlass* (Refl 4674, 17: 646 f. [1773–75]), predates his reading of Tetens. One of the very first occurrences of the term 'apperception' in the Kantian corpus is in Refl 4562 (17: 594), dated by Adickes between 1772 and 1776" (Schulting, 2015, p. 95).

[59] Udo Thiel suggests that "Leibniz had coined the French "l'apperception," but it was Christian Wolff who introduced the Latinized version of the term. And it was through Wolff's immense influence on eighteenth-century not only in the metaphysical debates on the human soul, but also in the developing discipline of empirical psychology and in epistemological discussions" (Thiel, 1996, p. 214). Baumgarten, by contrast, does use the term *apperception*, nor *apperceive* in his *Metaphysica* (see Schulting, 2015, p. 96).

Kant notices that in the systems of psychology, *inner sense* was identified with the faculty of *apperception* (see CPR B153). On his view, these must be distinguished, for the former (as a psychological consciousness) should constitute the subject-matter of psychology, whereas the second one (as logical consciousness) should be that of logic (see Ak 7:141; CPR A106-7, B132; Schulting, 2015, p. 92). At first glance, inner sense is mostly connected with the empirical consciousness of ourselves and of external objects (see CPR B139, B152-3), while apperception is related to the synthesis of what is given in inner and outer sense, or to the objective formulation of judgements, or even to a transcendental self-consciousness (see CPR B68, A105, B138-9, B142, B154, B157).[60] However, we shall see that Kant does not always carefully distinguish between the terms "inner sense" and "apperception" (see Ameriks, 2003, pp. 80-1).

On the one hand, Kant differentiated *apperception* from inner sense, by claiming that the latter is a consciousness of one's inner states while apperception is regarded, in some places, as the unity derived from the connection of the manifold of intuition under categories:

> Apperception and its synthetic unity is so far from being the same as the inner sense that the former, rather, as the source of all connection, applies to all sensible intuition of objects in general, to the manifold of intuitions in general, under the name of the categories; inner sense, on the contrary, contains the mere form of intuition, but without connection of the manifold in it, and thus it does not yet contain any determinate intuition at all. (CPR B154; translation modified slightly)

Accordingly, this synthetic unity is an effect of the **act** by which the understanding determines inner sense, connecting the manifold of intuition under categories. In other words, an empirical intuition contains a manifold that has already been connected by an act of the understanding (see CPR B129-30; Schmitz, 2013, p. 1054). Moreover, pure apperception is described as an *active* faculty grounded on understanding, while inner sense is a *passive* faculty, grounded on sensibility, which contains no determinate intuition without the concepts of the understanding (see also CPR B158; Ak 7:140-1). It is worth noting: Kant's account of self-affection, according to which the manifold of inner sense is determined by understanding, presupposes the connection between inner sense

[60] I think the term *apperception* is over-simplified by Michael D. Newman's claim that "apperception, as we have seen, is consciousness of the mind's activity, while inner sense is consciousness of the mind qua passive" (Newman, 1980, p. 154). As I have mentioned, apperception does not merely point out an empirical consciousness but also synthesis of the manifold of intuition.

and pure apperception: "that which determines the inner sense is the understanding and its original faculty of connecting the manifold of intuition, i.e., of bringing it under an apperception (as that on which its very possibility rests)" (CPR B153; translation modified slightly). As a result, the manifold of inner intuition can only become cognition through the synthesis provided by pure apperception.

Moreover, I think that the role played by apperception, in the connection of the manifold, cannot be distinguished from that of the "*objective* unity of self-consciousness". For, Kant defines the '*objective* unity of self-consciousness' as "that unity through which all of the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object" (CPR B139); thus, this self-consciousness is an a priori necessary condition for the possibility of experience because this makes the synthesis of intuition under the pure concepts of the understanding possible. In contrast, the '*subjective* unity of consciousness' consists in "**a determination of inner sense**, through which that manifold of intuition is empirically given for such a connection" (CPR B139; translation modified slightly). Because of the '*subjective* unity of consciousness' we represent consciously the manifold of our inner intuitions as given in temporal relations of succession or simultaneity. Therefore, the resulted unity of consciousness is empirical and contingent as it merely provides an association of representations corresponding to *appearances* already established as such (see CPR B140). Furthermore, the fact that the human being has the power not only of being conscious of its inner and outer states but also of employing judgements for describing those states (for instance: the judgements "I am sad", "I am curious", etc.) obeys to a link between this *subjective* unity of consciousness and the *indeterminate* use of logical forms of judgements.[61] As a consequence, the empirical material derived from inner sense, which is subject to relations of time and should be conceptualized, is valid for a particular consciousness, but perhaps is not valid for a consciousness in general (see Ak 4:304; Aquila, 1983, p. 155).[62] I see no reason to deny that the empirical manifold of inner sense

[61] Aquila makes this point, saying that "the formation of judgements referring to particular *instances* of concepts must therefore rest on a capacity that it is not itself purely conceptual, and inner sense accordingly involves *intuitions* of one's own interior (A22-23/B37) and not merely the formation of thoughts and judgements about it" (Aquila, 1983, p. 152).

[62] Seung-Kee Lee offers suggestive remarks about this use of judgements, for he suggests that Kant links the subjective unity of consciousness with an "indeterminate" way in which the logical forms of the judgement are employed: ""the subjective unity" of (or "empirical") consciousness involves that state of mind in which the understanding leaves undetermined, that is, fails to specify, fix, or determine, the manner in which the concepts in a judgment are to relate to one another (…) it is when the logical forms are employed merely indeterminately that a "relation" of representations that is merely "subjectively valid""(Lee, 2012, p. 235).

is determined by the concepts of pure understanding. However, I do not go along with Aquila's opinion that inner sense is a "function of the understanding as well as of sensibility" (Aquila, 1983, p. 202, footnote 15).

Kant identifies the *subjective unity of consciousness* with the *empirical unity of apperception* and *objective unity of self-consciousness* with the *original unity of consciousness*. The *original unity of consciousness* establishes that the empirical manifold of intuition is necessarily related to "the one **I think**" by means of the pure synthesis of the understanding. This original unity is universally valid and grounds *a priori* the *empirical unity of apperception*, which has only a subjective validity, for it consists of the empirical connection of representations under our consciousness (see CPR B140).

On the other hand, Kant identifies (empirical) apperception with a certain form of self-consciousness in the CPR and in *Metaphysika Dohna* (1792-3) where he claims: "we name only one inner sense - the faculty of the consciousness of one's own existence - in time empirical apperception" (Ak 28:673). Indeed, Kant notices two different kinds of consciousness of the mind's activities, which take place in an empirical and transcendental[63] level. These are: i) *discursive* and *intuitive* self-consciousness, ii) *consciousness of oneself* divided into *reflection* and *apprehension* (see Ak 7:134 footnote), iii) *intellectual* and *empirical* consciousness of my existence (see CPR BXL footnote) and iv) *transcendental* and *empirical* apperception (see CPR A107).

First, Kant holds that "consciousness of oneself is either discursive in concept or intuitive in the inner intuition of time. - The 'I' of apperception is simple and binding" (Ak 7:143 footnote). In the *discursive* self-consciousness the 'I' is regarded as a simple representation, while in the *intuitive* consciousness the 'I' is regarded as a manifold of associated representations in time.[64] This *discursive* consciousness is nothing but a *reflection*, which is a consciousness of the activity in the compilation of the manifold of

[63] In this transcendental level, self-consciousness can be called *apperception*, which is "**pure** consciousness of the activity that constitutes thinking" (Ak 7:141; my emphasis).
[64] Kant equates this form of **self-consciousness** with (*discursive* and *intuitive*) **apperception**. These two forms of apperceptions represent 'a doubled consciousness of the I' (*ein doppeltes Bewußtseyn dieses Ich*); the former is the 'I' of mere *thinking*, which belongs to logic and has no content, while the latter is the 'I' of inner *perception* which belongs to anthropology and has a content provided by inner sense (see Ak 7:397-8; see also Dessoir, 1924, p. 109).

representation according to the rule of unity of that manifold (see also CPR B158-9; Ak 7:141). Moreover, *discursive* consciousness is regarded as a pure apperception of one's mental activity, so that "the "I" of reflection contains no manifold in itself and is always one and the same in every judgment, because it is merely the formal element of consciousness" (Ak 7:141). Therefore, Kant ascribes an epistemological function to this form of consciousness without which the synthetic power of the understanding, through concepts and judgements, would not connect the manifold of intuition.

Moreover, the *intuitive* consciousness is referred to the manifold of our inner states which is represented through our inner sense as related in time: "the **I** of apprehension is a matter of a manifold with representations joined to one another in the I as object of intuition" (Ak 7:143 footnote). Inner sense should not be identified with inner experience (see Monzel, 1920, pp. 429, 435); rather, the first should be regarded as a necessary condition of inner experience, because it contains the material of consciousness, namely a manifold of empirical inner intuition which is apprehended and represented as taking part of the 'I'. Under this form of consciousness the 'I' is regarded as an "object" of inner empirical intuition, that is to say the 'I' is affected inwardly by experiences according to successive or simultaneous relations of time (see Ak 7:141-2).

Second, Kant states that consciousness of oneself can be divided into *reflection* (consciousness of the understanding) and *apprehension* (consciousness of inner sense), that is to say, "inner activity (spontaneity), by means of which a *concept* (a thought) becomes possible, or *reflection;* and receptiveness (receptivity), by means of which a *perception* (*perceptio*), i.e., empirical *intuition*, becomes possible, or *apprehension*" (Ak 7:134 footnote). The first kind of consciousness provides us with the *simple* representation 'I' that lacks any intuitive content, whereas apprehension provides the 'I' that contains an empirical manifold which makes an inner experience of our states possible (see also CPR B408; Sturm, 2017, pp. 206-7).[65]

[65] Kant's view of *apprehension*, regarded as a condition for the possibility of empirical intuition, can be identified with the *synthesis of apprehension* performed by imagination, which is nothing but "the composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition, through which perception, i.e., empirical consciousness of it (as appearance), becomes possible" (CPR B160; B164).

Third, Kant maintains that the *intellectual* consciousness of our existence is concerned with the representation **I am**, which is no intuition at all but rather an intellectual representation that accompanies all our judgements and actions of our understanding (see CPR BXXXIX-XL, B277-8; Ak 7:134 footnote). This *intellectual* consciousness seems to be no other than the 'synthetic original unity of apperception' according to which "I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor **as** I am in myself, but only **that** I am. This representation is a thinking, not an intuiting" (CPR B157). In the early 1790s, Kant notices that we represent us to ourselves in every thought through the *intellectual* consciousness, albeit "I" cannot "cognize myself" by means of it. I only cognize, by means of it, that I am that which makes the act of the understanding, namely, that "I am" (see Ak 28:712). He, by contrast, describes *empirical* consciousness as that by means of which we are conscious of our existence in time.[66] This consciousness informs us of changes in our mind, which can only be determined, if we represent the existence of something persistent through outer sense. Kant emphasizes that "inner experience itself is consequently only mediate and possible only through outer experience" (CPR B277).

Fourth, Kant maintains in the first edition of CPR that *transcendental* apperception is an original and transcendental ground of "the unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, hence also of the concepts of objects in general, consequently also of all objects of experience" (CPR A106). In other words, this form of apperception is an objective condition of experience, because provides a unity of consciousness without which we cannot intuit nor think of objects (see Schulting, 2015, p. 91). On the contrary, concerning *empirical* apperception[67] Kant holds: "the

[66] Arthur Melnick contrasts the *empirical self* with the *transcendental self*; the first one is nothing but "the perceiving states that appear to me in inner attending", whereas the second one is the "intellectual thinking subject **I** am". He attacks those who, like Peter Strawson and David Carr, inflate the transcendental self to a noumenal a-temporal entity (see Melnick, 2009, pp. 123-4). Melnick's approach to the problem of inner attending starts by **not** considering as conclusive the claims: i) 'the self appeared to' is noumenal and ii) we are mere appearances with regard to our non-noumenal grasp of ourselves and our identity. He suggests that for Kant there is a third mode of existence which is neither noumenal nor phenomenal; this existence "grasps itself in transcendental self-consciousness, and which, through being thus appeared to, is fixed or identical or abiding. This existence is the accompanying intellectual action I am in determining (unifying) my inner attending and is itself determined (fixed through variation) by being the identical intellectual action that keeps up with the attending" (Melnick, 2009, p. 125; see also CPR B157). I do not see how this third mode of existence will help us to understand Kant's account of the self, since the majority of Kant's remarks on the self involves intuitions, relations of time and other items associated with appearances.

[67] This notion of empirical apperception is similar to Wolff's notion of *apperception*, by means of which we are conscious of those things that we represent in general: "apperception is attributed to the mind as long as it is consciousness of its own perception" (Wolff, 1968, §25) ("menti atribuitur *Apperceptio*, quatenus perceptionis suae sibi conscia est"). However, I disagree with U. Thiel's interpretation according to which "'"Bewußtseyn" can denote a relation to external objects as well as to one's own self and one's

consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our state in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it can provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances" (CPR A107; translation modified slightly).[68] Afterwards, Kant notes in his handwritten draft of the *Anthropology* that by means of empirical apperception, the subject attends to itself, i.e. it affects itself, and, as a result, certain representations related in time (simultaneously or in succession) are brought to consciousness (see Ak 7:399).[69] Kant consistently claims in *Metaphysik K2* that empirical apperception is "when I am conscious of myself by means of inner sense"[70] (Ak 28:712; my own translation).

To sum up, some forms of consciousness point out an oscillation between consciousness of the connection of the manifold and consciousness of the fact that all representations belong to the same subject in the *pure*, *discursive*, *objective* or *logical* levels of human cognition. Other forms of consciousness ('inner sense') point out an empirical consciousness of oneself in the *empirical*, *intuitive*, *subjective* or *psychological* levels of human cognition. The latter ones need not be thought of as a source of chaotic unrelated representations but as representations temporally related of our own existence, which are subject to synthesis of the understanding.[71]

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ideas or thoughts. "Apperceptio," by contrast, always denotes a relation to one's own self" (Thiel, 1996, p. 218). This interpretation presupposes a sharp and intuitively compelling boundary between apperception and consciousness, which is not advocated by Wolff. Instead, *apperception* is consciousness of perception regardless of what the "object" of perception may be, so that the notion of *apperception* holds for our consciousness of external objects (perception) as well as of ourselves (apperception). I believe, nonetheless, that 'knowledge' (*cogitatio*) is a broader concept than apperception, in as much as it contains both perception and apperception; thus, "we know, when we are conscious of those things which occur in us as well as those which are represented as outside us, *(§.22)*: *all knowledge involves perception as well as apperception*" (Wolff, 1968, §26) ("cogitamus, quando nobis conscii sumus eorum, quae in nobis contiguunt, & quae nobis tanquam extra nos repraesentantur, *(§.23): omnis cogitatio & perceptionem* (§.24), *& apperceptionem involvit* ").

[68] Kant suggests in the second edition of the CPR that the *empirical unity of apperception* is derived from the *transcendental unity of apperception* and cannot be necessarily and universally valid but it has merely a subjective validity, because it is concerned with an empirical association of representations that may differ in each person (see CPR B140).

[69] H. J. Paton suggests that empirical apperception is not only concerned with the consciousness of our mental states but also with the very possibility of cognition of external objects: "empirical apperception is said to be concerned with the states of mind, but it must at the same time be concerned, not only with the order in which these arise in our mental history, but also with the particular way in which (as appearances) they are combined in the object" (Paton, 1939a, p. 402) I deem problematic his interpretation in as much as it destroys Kantian boundary between empirical and pure apperception, that is, between the consciousness of a given representation in us and the *a priori* condition of that consciousness.

[70] "Wenn ich mir vermittelst meines innern Sinnes bewusst bin" (Ak 28:712).

[71] This seems to be borne out by Aquila's claim: "what Kant calls "empirical apperception," or "inner sense," is the awareness of oneself insofar as one is aware of particular stretches of intuited time "synthesizable" together with others into the right sort of whole" (Aquila, 1983, p. 175).

1.4. The paradox of inner sense

Kant's notion of paradox does not necessarily entail something negative. Instead, he notices that "paradox arouses the mind to attention and investigation, which often leads to discoveries" (see Ak 7:129). Kant suggests that inner sense contains a paradox:

> How this presents even ourselves to consciousness only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves, since we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected, which seems to be contradictory, since we would have to relate to ourselves passively. (CPR B152-3)

In my view, the paradox does not consists in the fact that we know ourselves (and outer objects) as we *appear* to ourselves, not as we *are* in ourselves (see Conard, 1994, p. 317; Howell, 2001, p. 118; Valaris, 2008, p. 1). For this only points out the fact that we have a phenomenal knowledge of external things and of ourselves. Against this interpretation, I hold that the paradox lies rather on the fact that when we cognize ourselves we must behave, at the same time, passively and actively with regard to ourselves. This would lead to two absurd consequences, either "two selves" or a "double personality".[72] In support of my interpretation Kant himself states:

> How therefore I can say that **I** as intelligence and **thinking** subject cognize my self as an object that is **thought**, insofar as I am also given to myself in intuition, only, like other phenomena, not as I am for the understanding but rather as I appear to myself. (CPR B155)

On Kant's picture, it is paradoxical to consider that the 'I' is a 'thinking subject' and simultaneously a 'thought object' or, in other words, the "I", which performs the action of cognizing, is *active* as **subject** and *passive* as long as the "I" is an **object** of cognition. Kant is faced with the paradox also in other works:

> The "I" appears to us to be double (which would be contradictory): 1) the "I" as *subject* of thinking (in logic), which means pure apperception (the merely reflecting "I"), and of which there is nothing more to say except that it is a very simple idea; 2) the "I" as *object* of perception, therefore of inner sense, which contains a manifold of determination that make an inner *experience* possible. (Ak 7:134 footnote)

[72] "We are not, however, referring thereby to a dual personality; only the self that thinks and intuits is the person, whereas the self of the object that is intuited by me is, like other objects outside me, the thing" (Ak 20:270).

> That I am conscious of myself is a thought that already contains a twofold self, the self as subject and the self as object. How it should be possible that I, who think, can be an object (of intuition) to myself, and thus distinguish myself *from* myself, is absolutely impossible to explain, although it is an undoubted fact. (Ak 20:270)

I think that Kant does not regard the human being as the composite of two subjects but rather he suggests two 'ways' (*Arte*) in which we can be represented to ourselves, so that the human being would be twofold according to the *form*, but not according to the *matter*. As he holds that "I as a thinking being am one and the same subject with myself as a sensing being" (Ak 7:142), his treatment of the paradox shows two different sides: the first one corresponds to the analysis of inner sense and the conditions by which 'I' can be an *object* of cognition (passive subject); the second one corresponds to the analysis of the understanding and the conditions by which 'I' can be a *subject* that cognizes itself (active subject).

First, inner sense, detached from the understanding, does not contain any **determinate** intuition but it provides both an empirical manifold and time as **form** of intuition (see CPR B154; Ak 7:397). Understanding provides a unity of consciousness in virtue of which the manifold of intuition is connected, including the intuition of inner sense through which we cognize ourselves (see Ak 11:51-2; see also Stepanenko, 1995, p. 154). Accordingly, we can cognize ourselves, if the manifold of inner intuition corresponding to our inner states is united by the synthetic unity of concepts, for "all cognition requires a concept, however imperfect or obscure it may be" (CPR A106).[73] Thus, the union of this manifold through -even imperfects- concepts allows us to become an *object* for our consciousness as well as to experience ourselves (see CPR A105; Ak 7:398; Mohr, 1991, p. 65). Needless to say, experience is not meant to be taken for a door to things-in-themselves, but to appearances united according to laws of the understanding: "in anthropology, experiences are appearances united according to laws of understanding, and in taking into consideration our way of representing things" (Ak 7:142; 397). As a

[73] I think that the possibility of intuition of our inner states is not undermined by Kant's claim "the subject, in which the representation of time originally has its ground, cannot thereby determine its own existence in time, and if the latter cannot be, then the former as a determination of its self (as a **thinking** being in general) through categories can also not take place" (CPR B422; my emphasis). Kant is not referring here to 'the I of intuition' but rather to 'the I of thought' (see B155, 7:134 footnote). In my view, he means that self-cognition is not possible, **if** it necessarily implies that the subject must apply the categories to the unity of thinking; this is not possible because such a unity cannot be intuited nor become an object of categories (see Howell, 2001, p. 122; Mohr, 1991, p. 70; below section 2.1.1). However, the ongoing analysis of the "self" is grounded on the 'I of intuition'.

consequence, Kant argues both in the CPR and the *Anthropology* for a phenomenal knowledge of the human being.

Second, functions of the understanding are rather circumscribed to connect representations (a manifold) by means of synthesis, so that the former, on its own, has no manifold of inner nor outer appearances. This manifold, by contrast, can only be brought by a receptive faculty like sensibility, that is to say "in us humans the understanding is not itself a faculty of intuitions, and even if these were given in sensibility cannot take them up **into itself**, in order as it were to combine the manifold of **its own** intuition" (CPR B153). As far as the self-knowledge is concerned, Kant admits that the human being cannot make up that which is perceived 'in itself' (*in ihm selbst*), but, this depends upon impressions (the matter of representation) derived from sensibility (see Ak 7:397).

However, one may ask how inner sense and understanding are articulated. I answer that inner sense and understanding are articulated by means of *consciousness*, without which a **determinate** intuition cannot arise. Indeed, Kant maintains that inner sense contains a manifold[74] and the **determinate** intuition "is possible only through the consciousness of the determination of the manifold through the transcendental action of the imagination (synthetic influence of the understanding on the inner sense) (…) the figurative synthesis" (CPR B154). Accordingly, the synthesis of the manifold of intuition demands the *figurative synthesis*, which is identified with the transcendental synthesis of the **imagination**; the latter synthesis is nothing but the effect of the understanding on sensibility. In this vein, any intuition of the "self" must rely on the figurative synthesis, which is nothing but an "exertion" of the understanding (see CPR B151-2; Schmitz, 2013, p. 1050). The synthesis of the understanding (named *transcendental synthesis of imagination*) is, therefore, the unity of the action through which the understanding *internally* determines sensibility. As a result, the manifold of sensibility is united by the understanding, when the latter affects inner sense (see CPR B153-4).

[74] I disagree with M. T. Conard who believes that "Kant gives no arguments (so far I can tell) for the thesis that inner has no manifold of its own" (Conard, 1994, p. 319). In contrast, Kant admits that inner sense contains both the *form* of intuition and the *manifold* that eventually could be a determinate intuition, if the manifold is connected by the understanding (CPR B154). Similarly, Kant claims in other passage that "the understanding therefore does not **find** some sort of connection of the manifold already in inner sense, but **produces** it, by **affecting** inner sense" (CPR B155; here I have modified P. Guyer's translation). Further, H. Allison holds that "since inner sense has no manifold of its own, there are no sensible representations through which the self can represent itself to itself as object" (Allison, 2004, p. 279; see also Valaris, 2008, p. 14).

The proposition ‘we cognize ourselves’ means that we are conscious of our inner states through determinate intuitions, which are the result of a synthesis (named ‘figurative’ or ‘transcendental synthesis of imagination’) produced by the understanding with regard to the manifold encountered in inner sense (see CPR B155). This synthesis is likewise regarded as an (empirical) apperception by which the manifold is connected through categories: “the consciousness of oneself is therefore far from being a cognition of oneself, regardless of all the categories that constitute the thinking of an object in general through connection of the manifold in an apperception” (CPR B158; translation modified slightly). As already indicated, the understanding cannot make up this manifold (i.e. *intellectual* intuition) but its function is to synthesize empirical intuition through by categories (see CPR B159). This is also expressed by Kant’s claim “if we had intellectual intuitions, then our understanding would have to be creative and produce the things themselves. Since that is not so, the things must produce the representations in us, and this through sensible intuition” (Ak 29:880).[75] Roughly speaking, the cognition of ourselves demands, on the one hand, an *intuition* that contains a manifold and, on the other, the act of *thinking* that brings the manifold to the unity of apperception through categories (see CPR B157-8 footnote). For the empirical manifold of the “sensory self” (the subject of perception) must be determined by the “intellectual self” (the subject of apperception) and the connection of both is compulsory for the self-consciousness (see Ak 20:270; Sánchez, 2012, p. 184).

As I have mentioned, the cognition of ourselves (self-knowledge) relies on the determination of our existence in conformity with the form of inner sense (i.e. time), so that we cognize ourselves not as we are but as we appear to ourselves (see CPR B157-8). Therefore, our existence is not *determined* by what is given in inner sense but by *being a subject* (an intelligence) which brings the manifold of inner sense into focus (“inner attending”), resulting the unity of the manifold (see Melnick, 2009, p. 119).

In my view, the core of the paradox arises because Kant presupposes the logical *unity* and *identity* of the self, “not as an object known but as itself a knower” (Paton, 1929, pp. 312-

[75] In this vein, M. T. Conard states correctly that “Kant clearly suggests in a number of places that both intuitions and concepts are necessary for knowledge, and I suppose this holds for self-knowledge as well” (Conard, 1995, p. 319).

3; Rosefeldt, 2000, p. 128).[76] Without the "mental" unity of the self (in contrast with the "personal" unity: see Kitcher, 1990, p. 127), the latter could not accompany all our representations and, therefore, these would not belong to **one** consciousness, "for only because I ascribe all perceptions to one consciousness (of original apperception) can I say of all perceptions that I am conscious of them" (CPR A122; see also B421-2). Certainly, perceptions rely on the connection of a manifold *via* different forms of synthesis that cannot belong to several "selves" inhabiting one human being but to 'a logically identical **I**.[77] For Kant emphasizes that the identity of "the consciousness of Myself" in different times is only a "formal condition of my thoughts and their connection, but it does not prove at all the numerical identity of my subject, in which - despite the **logical identity of the self** - a change can go on that does not allow it to keep its identity" (CPR A363; my emphasis). As a consequence, the paradox is motivated by a discrepancy between the "logical unity" of the self, where the latter is lasting and abiding, and the "empirical plurality" of the self, where the latter involves a flux of representations of ourselves (see CPR A123).[78] However, if these representations belong to several "consciousnesses" inhabiting one human being, the manifold of our representation could not be synthesised in the form of a cognition, but it would be a chaos of many disperse representations.

[76] This idea is also endorsed by Ronald, P. Morrison's claim: "for Kant, the unity of consciousness consists in having an identical *subject* of conceptual apperception. This identity, however, cannot be discovered in empirical consciousness" (Morrison, 1978, p. 184). N. Kemp Smith supports a similar idea: "though the self in being conscious of time or duration must be conscious of itself as *identical* throughout the succession of its experiences, this identity can never be discovered in those experiences; it can only be thought as a condition of them" (Kemp Smith, 2003, p. 251). Accordingly, a doctrine concerned with empirically applicable criteria of identity must relate to an object of inner or outer experience; but in treatment of the "I think", the "I" is not an object of experience (see Strawson, 1997, p. 262). For similar interpretations see also Walker, 2017, p. 217; Marshall, 2010, p. 8 *et al*.

[77] There is a discussion on whether the 'Transcendental Deduction' offers evidence of the unity and identity of the self. H. J. Paton holds that a series of appearances can only be known as *object*, if the existence of one consciousness and a concept under which these are united. Paton suggests that this *object* and the *unity of the self* are mutually dependent and he grounds memory on the self (see Paton, 1929, pp. 315, 324). Against this view, A. Brook argues that "unity of *consciousness* and *consciousness* of identity are what is required to connect past remembered representations to current ones, not unity of *the subject* or *actual identity*" (Brook, 1994, p. 184). In my view, Kant does not merely assume that the self **is** one and identical but also that this is **conscious** of its unity and identity in the act of apprehending appearances (see Ak 7:134 footnote; CPR A108; Paton, 1929, p. 317). My contention in this current investigation differs from Paton's by the fact I am interested first and foremost in the identity of the self as "something known" rather than as something "knowing" (see 1929, p. 316).

[78] Kant states that "the empirical consciousness that accompanies different representations is by itself dispersed and without relation to the identity of the subject" (CPR B133). From a *theoretical* perspective, empirical self-consciousness cannot provide the identity of the self. On the contrary, but the identity of the apperception of a manifold necessarily depends upon transcendental self-consciousness. I shall suggest that self-consciousness and memory ground the identity of the self from a *practical* point of view (see sections 2.2.2 and 3.2.4).

Kant's conception of the subject entails a unity that should not be sought in categories but in "that which itself contains the ground of the unity of different concepts in judgments, and hence of the possibility of the understanding, even in its logical use" (CPR B131). This unity is the *original* apperception that produces the representation 'I think' without which nothing could be represented nor thought in the subject, or, if something could be represented, it would be nothing for the subject. This representation is 'one and the same' (*ein* und *dasselbe*) in all consciousness and its unity is the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, by means of which any subject is conscious of the fact that its representations do not belong to other subjects but are *its own* representations, and belong to **one** consciousness (see CPR B132f.; Crone, 2012, pp. 134-5).

1.5. What does inner sense give us?

Any attempt to show the object of inner sense must deal with the difficulty that there is not a specific object but an array of different things that could be regarded as object of inner sense (see Mohr, 1991, p. 67f.). It is to an extent comprehensible Andrew Brook's claim: "Kant's doctrine of inner sense is a mess, and to sort it out would take more space than the task is worth" (Brook, 1994, p. 78). I think, nonetheless, that the analysis of inner sense is crucial for a better understanding of Kant's theory of the self. This difficulty is partly the result of an unsystematic treatment of inner sense in the CPR and Kant's customary statement that all appearances in general belong to inner sense (see CPR A98-9-, B67, A34/B50). The first point of the problem prevents us from noticing the specific function and limits of this faculty, whereas the second one prevents us from differentiating the representations of inner sense from those of other faculties. Thus, I shall focus in this section on the representations provided by inner sense, and particularly on those which are related to inner states of the human being.

Inner sense does not provide us with the intuition of **one** object given in experience, of which the terms of substance, one, abiding, identical over time are predicated. That is to say, we cannot obtain from experience of *ourselves* an intuition of the "unity of the self" but rather a cluster of intuitions, perceptions, imaginings, memories, and so on (see Brook, 1994, p. 78; Allison, 2004, p. 279). Therefore, the self would be rather a term we use for uniting many intuitions of our inner and outer states. Accordingly, inner sense,

through which we intuit ourselves, does not provide the representation of something numerically the same, nor abiding in us:

> The consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our state in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it can provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances, and is customarily called **inner sense** or **empirical apperception**. (CPR A107)

Granted that empirical self-consciousness cannot provide us with the intuition of a **subject** but rather with **appearances** as subjective occurrences governed by time, then a "fixed" and "abiding" self cannot be an object of this consciousness.[79] The manifold provided by such empirical self-consciousness is organized by a successive relation of instants (see Morrison, 1978, p. 184). In other words, the latter order is subject to *succession* as the dimension of time, so that no element within this successive series could be stopped (see CPR A31/B47; Ak 28:673; below section 1.4.6).

As we represent us to ourselves, we have access only to a 'stream' (*Fluss*) of inner appearances, in which no intuition of *numerical* identity can be found (see CPR A363-4; Brook, 1994, p. 187). P. F. Strawson offers suggestive remarks about this consciousness, claiming that "the self-knowledge we each have in empirical self-consciousness, i.e. empirical knowledge of the self as appearance, is not of any single, simple thing, but of a flux of inner representations, a succession of constantly changing, albeit connected, perceptions" (Strawson, 1997, p. 266). As far as the empirical concept of the soul is concerned, Kant holds: "it contains mere appearances of the inner sense and not yet the determinate concept of the subject itself" (Ak 8:154; see also 7:397); thus, inner sense can only inform us of relations among the representations of our inner states. I deem correct G. Mohr's interpretation that "concerning to different versions of the >>object<< of inner sense it follows that *not* the I *but* my thoughts and representations (my inner state) are the object of inner sense"[80] (Mohr, 1991, p. 71; see also p. 74).

[79] The flow of mental representations in empirical consciousness does not mean that time itself is a flow of consciousness (time is rather condition of such flow) nor a sort of psychological event (see CPR A36-7/B53). I agree with Mathew S. Rukgaber as he holds that "Kant must mean that the "form" of inner sense describes a structural feature of our perspective that *enables* determinate temporal extents like the flow of consciousness" (Rukgaber, 2009, p. 180).

[80] "Rückbezogen auf die verschiedenen Versionen des >>Gegenstands<< des inneren Sinns müßte daraus folgen, daß *nicht* das Ich, die Seele, *sondern* meine Gedanken, Vorstellungen (mein innerer Zustand) der Gegenstand des inneren Sinns sind" (Mohr, 1991, p. 71).

Since inner sense cannot provide us with intuitions of the unity of the self, this unity of cannot be an object of inner nor outer experience. Inner experience, nonetheless, contains the material of consciousness and a manifold of empirical inner intuition, namely the "I" of *apprehension* (see Ak 7:142-3).[81] A similar idea is expressed in the 'Handschrift' of *Anthropology*: "the I which has been observed by itself is a sum total of so **many objects** of inner perception" (Ak 7:399; my emphasis). It follows that we become conscious of the "plurality" of the self rather than of its "unity". I think that both David Hume and Kant are reluctant to admit that human being is capable of an 'intuition' or 'perception' of the unity or singleness of *its* self. On the contrary, what the subject perceives, for Hume[82], is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement" (*Treatise*, p. 252; see also Howell, 2001, p. 137).

Collin Marshall, nonetheless, argues that the Humean bundle view does not fit with Kant's view of the self and offers two arguments. First, Marshall thinks that the relation of the self to representations should be understood as it follows: "the self is the thing that *combines* representations in synthesis" (Marshall, 2010, p. 11); this relation, according to Marshall, simply cannot be admitted by Hume. Against this argument, I hold that Marshall misses the crucial distinction between the *empirical* and the *logical* self (see Ak 20:270; 7:134 footnote; CPR B407-8). Instead, he reduces Kant's account of the self to its logical expression as unity of consciousness, overlooking the empirical representations such as feelings, thoughts, desires, etc., by which the empirical self is constituted. Like Hume, Kant is reluctant to consider that the human being has access to an empirical intuition of the unity of the self.

Second, Kant underlines that we do not know ourselves as we are in ourselves but as we appear to ourselves. Marshall is certainly right this far. He goes on, however, to claim that "appearances are representations, so if we are bundles of representations, then there needs to be another level of representations that is the appearance of that bundle. But this

[81] I deem correct Aquila's claim that "Kant himself provides what might appear the most natural suggestion, if we assume that inner sense provides no direct awareness of the "self" or the "subject" of experience. In that case, it would seem, inner sense must provide an awareness of at least some of those items that we might regard as "determinations" of the self" (Aquila, 1983, p. 154). Aquila suggests that the list of these determinations includes not only *Vorstellungen* but also "feelings and inclinations and perhaps even in some sense "acts" of thinking and willing" (1983, p. 154).

[82] All references to David Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1978) will have this form (*Treatise*).

is clearly not Kant's view" (Marshall, 2010, p. 11). I do not see why he thinks that the Humean bundle view is suitable for Kant's account of the self, if an "appearance of a bundle" is presupposed. Marshall takes the bundle for an appearance. On my account, inner sense provides with a stream of representations of our states which, in themselves, are nothing else but empirical appearances (see Ak 7:398; Prauss, 1971, p. 17).[83] Thus, it seems there is no reason to reject that the empirical self is, for Kant, a bundle of appearances, which are not unarranged unrelated representations but rather representations related in time and determined by understanding through categories (see CPR B157-8). The important point is the use of *appearance* as a "limiting" term that distinguishes the empirical cognition of the self as it is given in experience from the unattainable cognition of the self as *it is in itself* (see CPR B164; Ak 7:398).[84]

On top of that, Kant states that outer objects in space appear next to each other and abidingly fixed, while inner sense "sees the relations of its determination only in time, hence in flux, where the stability of observation necessary for experience does not occur" (Ak 7:134).[85] As Aquila notices, there is no ground for postulating Kant's characterization of the material provided by inner sense (concerning ourselves) as to a parallel characterization of the material provided by outer sense (see Aquila, 1983, p. 153). The most notable asymmetry between outer appearances given in space and inner appearances

[83] Thomas Nagel is not too far from Kant's account of empirical self, claiming: "one of the conditions that the self should meet if possible is that it be something in which the flow of consciousness and the beliefs, desires, intentions, and character traits that I have all take place—something beneath the contents of consciousness, which might even survive a radical break in the continuity of consciousness" (Nagel, 1986, p. 45). However, Nagel takes the human brain for that "something in which…"; while Kant, from pragmatic point of view, would identify this "something" with the human being as a totality embedded in society (see below section 2.2.).

[84] I, nonetheless, agree with Henry E. Allison on admitting two essential differences between Hume and Kant: first, Kant distinguishes inner sense from apperception; such distinction implies the impossibility of intuiting the self as a unity; although it does not lead to reject the thought "I". Second, unlike Hume, Kant justifies the possibility of a *genuine* inner experience (see Allison, 2004, p. 274).

[85] I disagree with Rudolf Makkreel who claims: "the representations of inner sense cannot be made clear and determinately fixed. They constitute an **indeterminate** temporal stream" (Makkreel, 2014, p. 19; my emphasis). In contrast, I argue that the temporal relation of those representations constitutes already a kind of determination made by imagination, whose synthesis (*figurative*) submits the manifold of those representations under temporal rules of succession and simultaneity (see CPR B151; Carl, 1992, p. 33). On my view, Kant is rather underlining that those representations do not constitute "one object" but rather a stream of representations, so that when we are conscious of ourselves, we become aware of a stream or flow of states (e.g. thirsty, angry, etc.), in which no abiding state throughout our life is given.

given only in time[86] consists perhaps in the *abiding* character of the material given in the former and the "fleeting" character of the latter. As he puts it:

> Although both are appearances, the appearance before outer sense has something standing and abiding in it, which supplies a substratum grounding the transitory determinations, and thus also a synthetic concept, namely that of space and of an appearance in it; whereas time, which is the only form of our inner intuition, has in it nothing abiding, and hence gives cognition only of a change of determinations, but not of the determinable object. (CPR A381)

This passage suggests that we can only attain, via empirical self-consciousness, a cognition of the determinations of our mind (representations). These change in us, so that the cognition of a persistent enduring object is beyond our inner experience. I believe that Kant's claim "in that which we call the soul, everything is in continual flux, and it has nothing abiding" (CPR A381) need not preclude us from arguing for a "dynamic" theory of the self, which acknowledges the "self", or rather its states, as a living being that changes relentlessly (see Aquila, 1983, p. 162). Kant, nevertheless, holds that we can only determine the change in ourselves, if we have the perception 'of something persistent' (*von etwas Beharrlichem*)[87] in relation to which the change is determined (see CPR BXXXIX footnote). Considering that we cannot find the perception of something persistent[88] in ourselves, this perception then should come from the actual existence of outer things:

> The perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a **thing** outside me and not through the mere **representation** of a thing outside me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself. (CPR B275)

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[86] Ronald P. Morrison explains that "time change means a lack of unity in consciousness because the change is always from one absolute discrete moment to another. It is for this reason that the problem of the unity of consciousness boils down to accounting for a permanent subject" (Morrison, 1978, p. 185).

[87] Kant does not want to equate *a representation of the persistent* with a *persistent representation*. The *representations of the persistent* (*e.g.* representations of the matter) may be alterable or changing and they still refer to a persistent "outer thing" distinct from our representations (see CPR BXLI footnote). However, it is far from obvious to which extent the representation of the persistent objects could vary without affecting its capacity to refer to those objects. In this vein, Kant would probably say that we do not know whether the external objects persist during the time in which our representations of them have ceased.

[88] Perhaps the human living body, which changes a lot over time, is not as persistent as a mountain. One might, nonetheless, think that the spatiotemporal representations of our body have a certain level of persistency, by which we are conscious of our inner changes: "the persistence of the soul, merely as an object of inner sense, remains unproved and even unprovable, although its persistence in life, where the thinking being (as a human being) is at the same time an object of outer sense, is clear of itself" (CPR B415; see also Strawson, 1966, p. 164). Certainly, the human being is not merely a mind but also a body that can be an object of outer sense, that is to say it is a composite of the soul and the body whose connection is not relevant in Kant's anthropological agenda (see also A342/B400; Ak 20:308; 23:31-32 and below section 2.1.2).

Kant suggests that inner sense is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the empirical self-consciousness, for our empirical consciousness of our inner changes is not only linked but also permitted by outer experience (see CPR B275, BXL footnote, A205/B250; see also Mohr, 1991, p. 73). One of the most evident signs of Kantian interest for distinguishing himself from Descartes is the fact that, for Kant, self-consciousness relies on consciousness of outer objects, while for the latter the certainty of the subject's existence is prior and apart from cognition of external things. As Rockmore notices, Descartes "understands self-consciousness as immediate, not as mediated by consciousness of anything different from the self" (Rockmore, 2012, p. 307). Kant, by contrast, understands empirical self-consciousness as awareness of the flow of representations that can be conceptualized by reference to outer perception, namely to substances (see Aquila, 1983, p. 168).

However, Kant does not think that inner experience has less 'objective reality' (*objektive Realität*) than outer experience, for experience of external things and of ourselves consists of intuitions equally determined by time (see CPR A34/B51, A51/B34; see also following section).[89] In contrast to Béatrice Longuenesse, I strongly believe that empirical self-consciousness should not be reduced merely to a consciousness of "outside objects" or "the distinction between the temporal determinations of those objects and the temporal determinations of one's perceptions and experience of them" (Longuenesse, 2006, p. 302). Such a reading is implausible. For Kant is far from asserting that no acts of the mind can occur without reference to these external objects (see Ameriks, 1982, p. 244). Instead, I think that outer sense is a *necessary*, although not *sufficient*, condition of empirical self-consciousness. Indeed, the human being, by means of self-consciousness, is aware of a plentiful set of representations such as thoughts, memories, feelings which do not demand the actual presence of external objects (see also sections 2.1.5 and 2.1.6).

[89] Hoke Robinson suggests "at least one necessary condition of the intelligibility of inner-sense objects – determinable temporal order – derives from outer sense. And this alone would be sufficient to establish the priority of outer sense over *intentional* inner sense (with respect at least to temporal sequence)" (Robinson, 1988, p. 177). In my opinion, this priority must be nuanced, for it is a fact that, for Kant, all temporal positions of inner experience depend upon outer experience but he also holds that all appearances belong to inner sense (see CPR A98-9, B67). It means that everything that is given in outer sense should be represented through inner sense, if this is to be regarded as a temporal outer appearance.

Of course, Kant contradicts the "problematic idealism" approach to self-consciousness, by suggesting that in the consciousness of our existence the temporal relation among our inner representations depends upon our experience of external things of the world in which we live. Thus, we can be conscious of the fact that some thoughts or feelings take place regularly in our mind *after*, *before* or *during* other representations. We can also be conscious of the fact that those representations can be related in time with the occurrence of certain external events. However, the data of inner sense do not have a propositional structure (see Mohr, 1991, pp. 73-4), which, in my opinion, arises by means the language that we learn in the community with others in order to conceptualize all empirical data (see below section 2.2.1).[90]

1.6. Possibility and actuality of intuition of our inner states.

Kant holds that the determinations of 'inner appearances' (*innere Erscheinungen*) are ordered *in time* in the same manner as outer appearances, so that our cognition of objects and of ourselves is equally phenomenal, that is, conditioned to the way in which they appear to us (see CPR B156, Ak 7:142, 397). Indeed, Kant admits that objects of outer and inner sense have exactly the same degree of 'actuality' (*Wirklichkeit*), in as much as they both are representations linked to phenomena (see CPR A38/B55) and none representation is more actual than another.[91] Certainly, the 'validity' (*Gültigkeit*) of time and space is restricted to the field of objects as they appear to us, not as they are in themselves. It follows that inner intuitions of ourselves are as real as any other empirical object of outer sense, because we determine our existence in time (see CPR A34/B51-2).

I think it is necessary to analyze the 'possibility' (*Möglichkeit*) and 'actuality' (*Wirklichkeit*) of intuitions of the self, by taking into account the 'Postulates of empirical

[90] The human being has the capacity to formulate judgements concerning to its inner experience in which the relation between the I, as the subject, and some empirical representations, as predicates, is merely contingent. For instance, we say 'I am cold', 'I have a doubt', 'I feel ashamed', etc., (see Ak 18:186).

[91] In general, the "*äußere Objekte*" and the "*Selbstanschauung des Gemüts*" are something actually given in experience, not a mere illusion (see CPR B69). In the same way, the fact that space and time have an *a priori* nature, it does not imply that the phenomena are fictions but, on the contrary, it means that those forms are required by the possibility of experience in general (field in which their objective reality is manifest).

thought in general'.[92] Certainly, those 'Postulates' do not determine the application of pure concepts of the understanding to things in themselves but to intuitions (see CPR A219/B266-7). Needless to say, I am not arguing that the self *in itself* is a *possible* or *actual* object, but I argue rather that inner appearances are both *possible* and *actual*. As far as the postulate of possibility is concerned, Kant claims that "whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in accordance with intuition and concepts) is **possible**" (CPR A218/B265). Accordingly, something is 'possible', if it coincides with the formal conditions of experience, namely with space, time and the concepts of pure understanding. Nonetheless, space is not a condition for the possibility of inner appearances, which are related *in time* as simultaneous or successive (see CPR A182/B226), but only a condition of external ones (see CPR A34/B50).

Secondly, Kant indicates in the postulate of 'actuality' that "that which is connected with the material conditions of experience (of sensation) is **actual**." (CPR A218/B266). Therefore, that which is regarded as actual should not simply be free from self-contradiction, nor exist in the 'reproductive imagination'[93], nor merely agree with the formal conditions of understanding but it must affect our sensibility, so that we may have 'sensations' and 'perceptions' of it.[94] As a result, the actual 'character' (*Charakter*) of the existence of something must be determined exclusively *a posteriori* and, therefore, it is impossible that we have sensations that do not agree with the formal conditions of sensibility or understanding. Our 'perceptions' and 'sensations' of the objects are themselves an evidence of the agreement between intuitions and their formal conditions (see CPR A225/B273).[95] Despite of the fact that the CPR is not concerned with the *matter*

[92] It is quite probable that Kant's exposition of these 'Postulates' takes into account only the outer appearances, while the inner ones are neglected. I focus on the role played by 'Principles of the pure understanding' below.

[93] Kant distinguishes between the *productive* and the *reproductive* imagination: the first one is the "faculty for determining the sensibility *a priori*, and its synthesis of intuitions, **in accordance with the categories,** must be the transcendental synthesis of the **imagination**" (CPR B152). The second one, is concerned with a synthesis that "is subject solely to empirical laws, namely those of association, and that therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of cognition *a priori*" (CPR B152; see also Ak 7:167).

[94] It appears that Kant uses in this section the terms "*Wirklichkeit*" and "*Realität*" in a similar way, since he exposes the concept of *Realität* in the postulate of *Wirklichkeit* without introducing some difference in its meaning: "as far as reality is concerned, it is evidently intrinsically forbidden to think it *in concreto* without getting help from experience, because it can only pertain to sensation, as the matter of experience, and does not concern the form of the relation that one can always play with in fictions" (CPR A223/B270).

[95] It is plausible to sustain that what is actual is necessarily possible, but what is possible not necessarily is actual, in this sense Kant affirms: "I leave aside everything the possibility of which can only be derived from actuality in experience" (CPR A223/B270). A similar idea is found in the *Metaphysica* of A. G.

of inner intuitions but rather with the conditions of the possibility of an intuition in general (i.e. sensibility, inner sense, time, etc.);[96] he openly admits that we have access to 'perceptions' of our inner states, which are based on inner affections:

> We must also concede that through inner sense we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected **by our selves**, i.e., as far as inner intuition is concerned we cognize our own subject only as appearance but not in accordance with what it is in itself. (CPR B156)

Certainly, those inner states are given to us as a sensible manifold which needs to be related and synthesized in order to form *perceptions* of the self (see CPR B155-6), but this synthesis does not take place by our choice but it is a priori determined by time, which determines all appearances (both the inner and the external). Kant claims in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' that inner appearances are not less actual than the outer ones, in as much as they are based on perceptions that determine their actuality (see CPR B55/A38). One might still consider that their "possibility" could be problematic in so far as inner appearances would not satisfy some criteria described in the 'Analytic of Principles' concerning to the 'principle of possibility', namely a conformity with space and with the pure concepts of understanding. However, Kant's position throughout CPR is that our inner appearances are 'actual' (and therefore possible), so that nothing would hinder the application of categories and postulates of *modality* to inner appearances.

Indeed, Kant confesses a particularity of the categories of 'modality'[97] – absent in the other categories – which makes their application to inner intuitions possible: "the categories of modality have this peculiarity: as a determination of the object they do not augment the concept to which they are ascribed in the least, but rather express only the

Baumgarten who claims "*Everything actual is internally possible* (§54); or, when its existence is posited, its internal possibility is posited" (2013, §57).

[96] In this, I side with a hint of G. Hatfield who holds "the subject-matter of Kant's transcendental investigation is epistemic. In investigating the cognitive faculties, the form of intuition, the categories and the transcendental synthesis directed neither at the soul as a simple substance nor at the phenomena of inner sense" (Hatfield, 1992, p. 213).

[97] The postulate of the category of 'necessity' (*Notwendigkeit*) is not concerned merely with a 'formal' or a "logical" necessity in the connection of the concepts but rather with the "material" necessity in the existence of something (see CPR A226/B279). Nevertheless, this postulate and its corresponding category have not been taken into account here, since inner appearances do not constitute a *substance* whose *states* express causal relations. In contrast, Kant claims: "now there is no existence that could be cognized as necessary under the condition of other given appearances except the existence of effects from given causes in accordance with laws of causality. Thus it is not the existence of things (substances) but of their state of which alone we can cognize the necessity, and moreover only from other states, which are given in perception, in accordance with empirical laws of causality" (CPR A227/B279-280).

relation to the faculty of cognition" (CPR A219/B266). It means that these categories only point out how some appearances behave with regard to the understanding, namely, they declare only that appearances are *possible*, actually *existent* or *necessary*.

In fact, the application of those specific categories and their corresponding principles to inner intuitions does not demand that the self should be considered as a 'substance', a 'simple thing', a 'person' or as 'something related to external things' (see CPR A348-380). That is, inner intuitions do not constitute an external object that can be known as any external object of the experience (*e. g.* a rock, a plant, etc.), where its manifold is 'connected' (*verbunden*) by space and time, transcendental the 'schemata' (see CPR A137/B176) and the 'categories' according to their 'principles'. On the contrary, the manifold of inner intuition is related by time and its occurrence in time can be regarded as *possible* and *actual* in conformity with such categories and their principles. Thus, the aforementioned application only would entail that the self is to be considered as a set of *actual* inner intuitions, insofar as these occur in time and we are aware of their existence by means of empirical self-consciousness (see CPR A347/B405).

To sum up, Kant's account of self-knowledge relies on inner sense, through which we intuit ourselves, namely we regard our mind as an object of our own representations. Since the content of inner intuition is constrained by an *a priori* temporal form that conditions both inner and outer experience, it is necessary to assess the role of time in experience and, particularly, in the inner one.[98] In this vein, I think that H. Allison is thoroughly right as he claims: "since time is the form of the appearing of representations in inner sense, it follows that time must also be the form in which the products of its own activity appear to the mind in inner experience" (Allison, 2004, p. 285). Certainly, inner experience consists of inner appearances which are determined by time, which "is therefore to be regarded really not as object but as the way of representing myself as object" (see CPR A37/B53-4).

[98] On this basic point I am in agreement with Melnick's claim that "inner intuition then is a display or exhibition of one's reactive response accomplished by temporally "framing" that response (…) the manifold of inner sense is our own reactions, and the form of displaying them is to temporally them so as to call attention to them (Melnick, 1989, p. 21).

1.7. All phenomena belong to inner sense

Kant claims that all our representations, whether they rise from the influence of outer objects or from 'inner causes' (*innere Ursache*); in any case, they both are modifications of the mind and belong to the inner sense (see CPR A98-9, B67). Since intuitions of ourselves and of our inner states belong to inner sense and time is the form of inner sense[99], then all these representations will be 'ordered' (*geordnet*) and 'united' (*verknüpft*) in time and particularly according to temporal relations of succession and simultaneity[100]:

> The psychological self as empirical consciousness, is capable of being known in many ways, among which time, the form of inner intuition, is that which underlies *a priori* all perceptions and their connection whose apprehension (*apprehensio*) conforms to the manner in which the subject is thereby affected, i.e., to the condition of time. (Ak 20:270; translation modified slightly)

We can be conscious, for instance, of the fact that in our mind some representations are simultaneous or successive when, for instance, we are aware of the fact that an *empirical representation* of a song and a feeling of pleasure occur *at the same time* or the affect of grief may occur *after* an empirical intuition of a dead body. In this vein, we are not only aware of the fact that different representations occur at the same time but also of the fact that each one of these representations is constantly changing, going successively from one state to another and they never stop in experience (see CPR A189/B234).

To my knowledge, as Kant holds that 'all (inner and outer) phenomena belong to inner sense', it does not imply that all phenomena of inner sense are derived from outer sense. M. T. Conard, in arguing that Kant admits that the perception of something abiding given in outer sense is **necessary** to determine the change in the representations relating to our inner states, has described Kant as claiming that these states are necessarily **derived** from

[99] According to H. Vaihinger, Kant suggested, for the first time, that time is the form of inner sense in a letter to Marcus Herz, dated the 21st February 1772 (see Vaihinger, 1892, p. 128). Kant admits in the letter that changes are real according to the testimony of inner sense, and changes can only be possible, if time is presupposed (see Ak 10:134).

[100] For sake of the principle of contradiction Kant asserts that contradictory properties cannot exist in one object at the same time but through different moments, namely successively. Kant expresses a similar idea in his *Dissertation* (see Ak 2:401), where he argues that 'movement' is possible according to time-relations of succession; for if movement were regarded as a simultaneous phenomenon, it would be self-contradictory, in as much as the object would exist simultaneously in different places.

external objects (see CPR XL-I footnote). Certainly, Conard holds: "all my representations in inner sense are derived from outer sense" (Conard, 1994, p. 320). Despite the fact that Kant points out that the 'I', as object of inner sense, is called *soul* while the I, as object of outer sense, is called *body* (see CPR A342/B400), he is not concerned in the 'Aesthetic' nor in the 'Analytic' with the body but rather with inner states, in as much as our intuition of these states constitutes the main materials for empirical self-knowledge: "the soul (…) cannot perceive itself according to its position in space without committing a contradiction, since it would then intuit itself as an object of its outer sense, when it itself can only be the object of its inner sense)" (Ak 7:216). Valaris rightly makes the observation that "inner sense provides the subject with an awareness of its own perceptual states as a temporally ordered series" (Valaris, 2008, p. 14). Hence, inner sense provides the human being with representations of its inner states and the principle of relation of all empirical representations is time; thus, it will be necessary to examine time in detail now.

1.2. Time as formal condition of experience

The goal of this section is to clarify Kant's concept of time and to exhibit its connection with inner experience, through which intuitions of the self (i.e., inner states) are possible. Therefore, I will focus on two main questions that will guide this section: 1) what is the nature of time? 2) Are there implicit elements contained within Kant's doctrine of time?

To my knowledge, Kant retains the majority[101] of the ideas, exposed in his *Dissertation*, about time in the CPR and, specially, in the metaphysical exposition of time (see Melnick,

[101] Michael Wenish holds that the role played by time in the context of the first CPR is significantly distinct from the role it plays in the *Dissertation*, since there is a variation in the aspects of the critical philosophy which are related to time: "the first of these alterations is Kant's decisive elimination of the possibility of metaphysics or of any knowledge of things in themselves. By contrast, as we have seen, the possibility of metaphysics in the strict sense is something which Kant still countenances in the Dissertation. The second alteration in Kant's basic philosophy, having an intimate relation to his concept of time, is his articulation in the first *Critique* of the distinction between transcendental idealism and empirical idealism, and his adoption of the transcendental idealist position. While Kant clearly had already adopted an idealist perspective in certain respects in the Dissertation, his position is not yet developed as the transcendental idealism which is characteristic of his mature critical philosophy" (Wenish, 1997, p.119). I consider that Wenish's contrast of the two texts does not show a "significantly different role" of time but only an argumentative development of Kant's characterization of time through an exposition grounded on the transcendental idealism, which is not contradictory at all with the *Dissertation.* I consider that this "first alteration" may be rejected by taking into account that in 1770 Kant had already argued that cognition of

1989, p. 189). Kant is consistent in claiming the following ideas about time: a) it is *a priori* form of sensibility; b) it is a *necessary* representation that lies as necessary ground of all intuitions; c) it is a principle of relation of the inner and outer appearances as *simultaneous* or *successive*; d) it is the *form* in which we intuit ourselves and the outer objects and e) it is an 'infinite' (*uneingeschränkt*) representation whose "parts" are nothing but bounds of a unique infinite time. In short, time can be regarded as an a priori component of our cognition, by which we connect and order the manifold of representations concerning ourselves as well as the external objects. On Kant's picture, the position of our representations in time and space discloses not the passivity of the mind but rather its *activity* upon a given manifold (Ak 17:619; 2:406).[102]

1.2.1. *A priority* of time.

Probably one of the most fundamental consistent ideas of Kant in the CPR (A176/B219, A166/B207, CPR A172/B214, A182-3/B225-6) and in the *Dissertation* (see Ak 2:398-9) is that time cannot be perceived as an object of experience. There is, nonetheless, an ambiguity in claiming that time is not given in intuition, for it could mean that time cannot be, *first*, a self-existing thing of which we have intuitions; *second*, a property belonging to objects independently of our mind; *third*, the perception of an object, and *fourth*, the perception of a property present in an object.[103]

things in themselves is not possible. In contrast, he claims that time contains the universal form of all phenomena (*universalem phaenomenorum formam continere*), movements and occurrences of the sensible world, which can only be thought in time (see Ak 2:401).

[102] This position is endorsed by Melnick, who claims that "our interpretation of Kant's view of space and time as activities is essential to our entire representations of the Critique as providing a rule-theory of thought, since spatio-temporal activity, in effect, provides thought with something to rule or govern" (Melnick, 1989, pp. 189-190; see also Klemme, 1999, p. 516).

[103] I consider that Georg Schrader overlooked this distinction, provoking a confusion that prompts him to hold that "I have suggested that space and time are given in intuition and I mean to insist that they are, in this regard, on the same level empirically with intuited data" (Schrader, 1951, p. 528). He uses two passages to support the latter idea, but I consider that these have been misunderstood: in the first passage, mentioned by Schrader, Kant develops the exposition about the *transcendental ideality* and the *empirical reality* of space, according to which all empirical objects must be given in space and the latter would be nothing if the conditions of possibility of experience were removed (see CPR A28-9/B44); in the second passage, Kant holds that behind an empirical intuition lies a pure one (space and time) which not only **precedes** but also makes the 'actual appearance' (*wirkliche Erscheinung*) of objects possible (See Ak 4:284). However, it is not clear how both passages lead Schrader to hold that time is on the same level of the intuited data.

Kant rejects the **first** and the **second** option as he affirms "those, however, who assert the absolute reality of space and time, whether they assume it to be subsisting or only inhering, must themselves come into conflict with the principles of experience" (CPR A39/56). Accordingly, time is neither an empirical object nor an inherent property of it that might exist even when all the subjective conditions of intuition are removed (see also CPR A37/B54 footnote, A32/B49, A37/B53-4, A38/B55; Ak 4:341-2).[104] Time itself cannot be given in intuition as an object of experience, for it is not a *determined* element of intuition but a *determining* one that makes any empirical intuition possible (see CPR A182-3/B225-6; see also Hyslop, 1898, p. 79f.). Nevertheless, I consider that one may be **conscious** of the temporal determinations of our empirical intuition, that is to say, of the way in which our intuition of the objects is determined by time (see CPR A37/B54 footnote). I shall return to this idea soon.

Time is a condition for the possibility of perceiving objects and cannot be separated from the subjective conditions of the sensible intuition since, according to the 'transcendental ideality of time', it is nothing but an a priori form of our intuition. As Kant puts it: "if one removes the special condition of our sensibility from it [time], then the concept of time also disappears, and it does not adhere to the objects themselves, rather merely to the subject that intuits them" (CPR A37-8/B54). Hence time is not "real" as an object of experience but it is still *necessary* as a form of the empirical intuition, which is generated as sensibility is affected by objects. That is, time will no longer exist, if the subject disappears. Moreover, the **third** and **fourth** option are indirectly rejected by Kant's claim:

> Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state. For time cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a shape or a position, etc., but on the contrary determines the relation of representations in our inner state. (CPR A33/B49-50)

[104] Before Kant, G. W. Leibniz contradicted the Newtonian theory of an absolute space and time, according to which "space and time are like containers for bodies and events respectively. That is, if there were no bodies space would still exist; if there were no events time would still exist" (Jolley, 2005, p. 85). On the contrary, Leibniz proposes that time (and space) is not absolute but 'relational', namely, time is constituted by relations among events and is merely 'ideal' (see Jolley, 2005, p. 87). Indeed, Leibniz argued for the ideal character of time in his *Reply to Bayle's note L* (1702), where he affirms: "I hold that time, extension, motion, and in general all forms of continuity as dealt with in mathematics, are only ideal things; that is to say that, just like numbers, they express possibilities (…) but to speak more accurately, extension is the order of *possible coexistences*. Just as time is the order of *inconsistent* but nevertheless connected *possibilities*, such that these orders relate not only to what is actual, but also to what could be put in its place" (Leibniz, 1998, pp. 252-3).

Accordingly, time is not a determination of outer sense *as such* but rather a determination of its contents, as long as those contents necessarily are subject to the form of inner sense (see Kemp Smith, 2003, p. 294; Bader, 2017, p. 133). If, however, the form of inner sense (time) were derived from the perception of an external object or of one of its properties, it could not be the formal condition of inner and outer experience, so that we could not intuit temporally ourselves and, consequently, the manifold of the intuition of our inner states could not be related in time.[105] In contrast, time is a formal condition *a priori* of both inner and outer appearances, whereas space is only condition of the outer ones (see CPR A34/B50). Kant argues in *Dissertation* and in the CPR that neither space nor time can be properties ascribed to objects in themselves but to our intuition of them. It means that time cannot exist as a 'principle of relation' regardless of our empirical intuitions, nor in absence of a determinable manifold (see CPR A99-100, A102). Indeed, simultaneity and succession demand a manifold placed in this or that temporal "position".[106] Indeed, Kant rejects the idea of those (particularly "the English philosophers"[107]) who "assert the objective reality of time either conceive of time as some

[105] Melnick rightly suggests that "if time is temporizing behavior then it makes sense to say that it always pertains directly only to our own (active or passive) state, since we can temporize (delay, elongate) only what we do or how we respond" (Melnick, 1989, p. 23).

[106] Kant holds that time would be something imaginary without senses: "now, although time, posited in itself and absolutely, would be an imaginary being, yet, in so far as it belongs to the immutable law of sensible things as such, it is in the highest degree true. And it is a condition, extending to infinity, of intuitive representation for all possible objects of the senses" (Ak 2:401).

[107] J. Locke, I. Newton and G. Berkeley are presumably alluded there. Locke defines time as the measure of duration as he claims: "this consideration of duration, as set out by certain periods, and market by certain measures or epochs, is that, I think, which most properly we call *time*" (ECHU 2.14.17, 246). Accordingly, the ideas of succession and duration come from the fact that we notice that the ideas of our mind appear there one after another: "it is not then *motion*, but the constant train of *ideas* in our minds whilst we are waking, that furnishes us with the idea of duration" (ECHU 2.14.16, 245). Whilst Locke identifies time with duration and grounds the latter on the succession of our ideas, Kant, on the contrary, grounds the succession and simultaneity of our representations on time (see Ak 2:398-9; CPR A30/B46, B155). Similar to Kant, Locke is reluctant to measure time by means of the movement of great and visible bodies of the world. In contrast, he suggests that time should be the 'measure of motion' (see ECHU 2.14.22, 250; Ak 2:401). Moreover, Kant and Locke regard time as boundless and as a principle of relation among things of the world (according to Locke) or among our representations of the things (according to Kant): "time in general is to duration as place to expansion. They are so much of those boundless oceans of eternity and immensity as is set out and distinguished from the rest, as it were by landmarks; and so are made use of to denote the position of *finite* real beings, in respect one to another, in those uniform infinite oceans of duration and space" (ECHU 2.15.5, 261). Besides, Newton holds that *absolute* time is true, mathematical, whilst *relative* time is apparent and vulgar: "absolute, true and mathematical time, in itself and by its own nature, flows equally without any relation to something external and by another name is called duration: relative, apparent and common time is sensible and external measure (either exact or unequal) of duration through motion which is used by common people instead of true time; such as a hour, a day, a month, a year" (Newton, 1972, p. 46; my translation) ("Tempus absolutum, verum & mathematicum, in se & natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis, aequalibiter fluit, alioque nomine dicitur duratio: Relativum, apparens, & vulgare est sensibilis & externa quaevis durationis per motum mensura (seu accurata seu inaequabilis) qua vulgus vice veri temporis utitur; ut hora, dies, mensis, annus"). Some differences between Kant and Newton about time can be remarked: first, for Kant, time does not flow but *in it* we represent the

continuous flux within existence, and yet independently of any existent thing (a most absurd fabrication)" (see Ak 2:400). Time cannot be derived from outer experience nor from the succession of internal states, but it is rather an 'imaginary being' (*ens imaginarium*), in virtue of which our ideas are successive or simultaneous (see Ak 2:398-9). Certainly, time is a source of relations among our empirical representations, in as much as "it is a condition, extending to infinity, of intuitive representation for all possible objects of the senses" (Ak 2:401).

Kant also maintains that time and space can be *a priori* represented, not only as forms of the sensible intuition but also as *intuitions* that contain a manifold in them, namely they are represented *with* the determination of the unity of the empirical manifold in them (see CPR B160-1). In my view, such difficulty can be removed if we clarify that we cannot **intuit** time as an object, although we can be **conscious** of it as form of intuition, so that our experience of a certain inner or outer appearance would not involve the *intuition* of its particular temporal organization (i.e., its form) but rather the *consciousness* of it. However, I think that the acts of "intuiting time" and of "being conscious (aware) of time" are not properly distinguished by Patricia Kitcher as she deals with the capacity of humans to be aware of the alterations in their thoughts and perceptions, therein she asks:

> So are they [humans] aware of time through inner sense? Kant's answer has to be a firm: 'yes and no.' 'Yes,' because time is the form of inner sense and through inner sense one is aware of the succession of one's states. 'No,' because time cannot be sensed at all; a fortiori, it cannot be sensed by inner sense. (Kitcher, 2016, p. 349).

I disagree with Kitcher's ambiguous answer, for I would plead in favor of a distinction between "intuition of time" and "consciousness of time". Indeed, human beings are allowed to be aware of temporal relations embedded in inner appearances, through an act of empirical consciousness, without any implication that time itself is intuited (see CPR BXL, B139 and).

existence of objects as flowing or changing; second, Kant does not equates time and duration, but duration (*Dauer*) is rather a mode of time, i.e. a quantity of existence (see CPR A182/B225); third, for Kant time cannot be measured through movement, whilst according to Newton, time in astronomy is a "correction" or "equation" of the common time, in as much as the use of celestial motions for measuring time is more exact, instead of the use of "unequal" natural days (see Newton, 1972, p. 48). Finally, Berkeley, similar to Kant, thinks that time should not be regarded as something external to the mind: "time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind" (Berkeley, 1999, Part I, §98).

Moreover, it is fundamental to distinguish between the '*priority'* of time, according to which time is necessary for the possibility of the experience, and the '*a priority*' of time according to which time is not something derived from the experience but a source of cognition that precedes all empirical content and rests on the subject's mind.[108] As Kant notices, "time and space are accordingly two sources of cognition, from which different synthetic cognitions can be drawn *a priori*" (CPR A38-9/B55). If my reading is correct, his defense of time's *priority* does not seek to establish that time takes place regularly in human experience, but rather that time precedes it and renders it possible. Thus, objects of human experience are apprehended in intuition as simultaneous or successive, insofar as the representation of time is given *a priori* as ground of all appearances (see CPR A30/B46). In fact, time is a pure form of *sensibility* by which human beings obtain intuitions of objects; namely, time and space are **epistemologically** bound to the manifold of intuition, just as the form is bound to the matter and vice versa (see CPR A99-100, 102).[109] Nevertheless, the status of the matter and form of the representations relating to the subject is not the same, for the matter is contingent and varying in each experience, whereas the form is one, necessary, and unchanging. Of course, such a form, as it is given a priori, makes the actuality of appearances possible (see CPR A31/B46). In brief, time is one unchanging representation that synthesizes the manifold of all appearances given in sensibility (see CPR A31-2/B47, A37-8/B54).

Time constitutes an *a priori* knowledge, as long as it is universal and necessary, for universality and necessity are regarded by Kant as criteria of *a priori* knowledge (see CPR B4). However, it is precise to emphasize that this conception of time provides a

[108] In my view, Peter Strawson establishes a distinction about the expression *a priori*, which is similar – except in the third sense- to the preceding one but in terms of an 'austere' and a 'transcendental idealist' interpretation: "in the first, or austere, interpretation a concept or feature (element) could be called *a priori* if it was an essential structural element in any conception of experience which we could make intelligible to ourselves. In the second, or transcendental idealist, interpretation to call an element *a priori* was to claim that its presence as a feature of experience was attributable entirely to the nature of our cognitive constitution and not at all to the nature of those things, as they are in themselves, which affect that constitution to yield experience (…) the third sense is that expressed, in those old and picturesque debates regarding the origin of our ideas, by the word "innate"" (Strawson, 1966, p. 68).

[109] On this point I agree with G. Schrader who claims "space and time are nothing in themselves. Apart from the matter of sensation of which they are forms space and time would be nothing. The variable content of sensation is just as necessary for the possibility of experience as are space and time" (Schrader, 1951, p. 519). Charles S. Peirce similarly claims that space and time "do not consist of parts which have the matter without the form. And, therefore, the matter of cognition without its form is no part of space and time" (Peirce, 1993, p. 651).

necessary condition of experience but not a **sufficient** one, because the latter demands the manifold of appearances.[110] Therefore, neither the form nor the matter, individually considered, can produce the unity of intuitions for without the manifold, time and space would be 'empty' (*leere*) forms that cannot be perceived (see CPR A166/B207, A172/B214, A176/B219).

Furthermore, the *a priority* of time means that time (also space) may be **ontologically** considered as continuing to *exist*, if all objects of the world were removed (see CPR A31/B46). But if all these objects were removed, there would be no inner experience, nor empirical consciousness of it, because these demand the perception of something persistent in outer appearances (see CPR BXL-I footnote). Therefore, time would *exist* without outer and inner experience but it could not *operate*, so that we could not be aware of its existence.

1.2.2. Priority of time as a principle of relation of all representations

Time is a necessary representation insofar as it makes inner and outer appearances possible (see CPR A31/B46).[111] Indeed, Kant suggests that time is a necessary component of intuition and of all representations in general, for representations are nothing but determinations of the 'mind' (*Gemüt*) which belong to our inner state (see CPR A34/B50). And time is the form of inner sense. As a result, if inner and outer objects are intuited in time, then they will be necessarily under certain relations of time: "time is an *a priori*

[110] G. Schrader considers that space and time require a second proof to be demonstrated as necessary: "Does Kant offer this second proof in the Aesthetic and, if so, what form does this proof assume? He maintains that we could not recognize a change as a change without being aware of time. But in view of the fact that we could not be aware of time apart from change and alteration this is not a very convincing proof" (1951, p. 520). I admit that our "awareness" of time does not depend only on time but also on the manifold which exhibits all kind of changes (as form and matter are mutually dependent). Since time is simply a *necessary* condition for the possibility of empirical appearances but not a *sufficient* one, the manifold of the appearances is also demanded, so that the temporal unity of appearances can emerge only, if these two elements are bound together.

[111] Loren Falkenstain suggests that "Kant's argument for the necessity of space and time in the metaphysical expositions (…) only premises that we cannot imagine the removal of space and time from any of the objects we have so far experienced. That argument does not decide whether the necessity of space and time is strict or merely inductive" (Falkenstain, 2006, p. 147). Against this view, I think that the third point of the metaphysical exposition seeks to prove that the necessity of time is universal in as much as the axioms of time are not grounded on experience but they are *a priori* and, therefore, they must have 'universality' (*Allgemeinheit*) and 'apodictic certainty' (*apodiktische Gewißheit*). Those principles are not derived from an individual experience but they serve as rules according to which all appearances are possible (see CPR A31/B47).

condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances" (CPR A34/B50-1). As Ralf Bader notices, time is a *mediate* condition in as much as the processing of the manifold of outer intuition does not rely on time but on space (see Bader, 2017, p. 133). Kant stresses that "time cannot be a determination of outer appearances" (see CPR A33/B49-50) because he thinks that space is the form of outer sense. It means that the outer manifold can only be determined by time, if it is represented through outer sense. Time is, nevertheless, an *immediate* condition of inner appearances as long as the inner manifold is directly represented through inner sense.

Moreover, I agree with G. Schrader (1951) on considering that for Kant the necessity of time is not grounded on the physiological or psychological apparatus of the empirical subject, since it would bring about a contingent fruitless knowledge. On the contrary, Kant is concerned with the necessary and universal fundaments of human experience. The psychological necessity might be "inductively" described as a procedure according to which "I could examine my experience and determine that it is always spatial and temporal. I could inquire of others whether this is the case for them and, perhaps, conclude, that it seems to hold for all human beings" (Schrader, 1951, p. 515). Evidently, this procedure will not establish that space and time must be always necessary for the experience of all human beings but it would entail merely a sort of regularity by which the experience is spatiotemporal for any human being. [112]

Furthermore, Kant indicates the priority of time with regard to the possibility of 'alterations' (*Veränderungen*), since the alterations corresponding to outer and inner appearances are only possible, if time is presupposed (see CPR A36-7/B53). This idea was earlier suggested in the *Dissertation*, wherein time was portrayed as the ground of the principle of contradiction. That is, 'A' cannot be *simultaneously* 'not A', but it is necessary to introduce the change in time from one state to the other; namely both

[112] Georg Schrader holds that "the argument in the Aesthetic for the transcendental necessity of space and time as forms of the sensible manifold is only provisional. It demonstrates neither the universality nor the necessity of space and time as forms of appearances (…) in the Analytic Kant seeks to complete the argument of the Aesthetic by showing that space and time are necessary conditions of possible experience" (Schrader, 1951, p. 535). Against this idea, I hold that Kant does offer an argument for the necessity of time. This is an "indirect" argument, according to which our empirical intuition *is not possible*, if the temporal rule, which prescribes that the manifold of those intuitions can only be simultaneous or successive, is removed. This argument seeks to prove the universality of time, since time is not an element contained in the experience of someone but an *a priori* condition of all human experience.

opposite states are only possible, if they exist *one after another*. Thus, "it is only in time that the possibility of changes can be thought, whereas time cannot be thought by means of change, only *vice versa*" (Ak 2:401). Indeed, Kant underlies that 'alterations' cannot be ascribed to time itself but to appearances, namely time itself does not alter but rather all things experienced by us are altered *in time* (see CPR A42/B58).[113]

Time and space are conditions of sensibility, so that their 'limits' (*Grenzen*) are determined a priori; thus, space and time "apply to objects only so far as they are considered as appearances, but do not present things in themselves. Those alone are the field of their validity, beyond which no further objective use of them takes place" (CPR A39/B56). Accordingly, the 'empirical reality' of time establishes that all objects given in intuition are determined by time, so that all interaction among objects is grounded on the formal conditions of our experience, which do not determine objects themselves but only *the way* in which they appear to us.[114]

It must be made clear that the *priority* of time is not only with regard to the possibility of intuition but also with regard to the possibility of connecting the manifold of intuition with the categories. This connection is exposed by Kant in the 'Transcendental Schematism', wherein he affirms that the manifold of the empirical intuition can be synthesized by the unity of the concepts of the pure understanding only by means of the mediation of an *intellectual* and, at the same time, *sensible* representation (see CPR A138/B177). This representation is nothing but a 'transcendental schema'[115], namely, a product of the 'imagination' whose function is to enable the application of these concepts to intuition. Certainly, each category contains a particular temporal determination in its own schema, so that the understanding synthesizes the manifold of appearances through

[113] One might use an analogy to show that changes take place in time without entailing that time itself changes. Thus, I think that time can be regarded as the 'life' of the human being, for many things change in one's life, but our own life does not change. The change of the latter would be a change towards death; if that happens, things would not change in our life anymore.

[114] J. N Findlay correctly claims about Kant's account of space and time that "Kant can only allow them to provide a phenomenal connection among all mundane substances, which may indeed point to some common connective principle, but cannot itself constitute it" (Findlay, 1981, p. 83).

[115] Kant affirms that concerning the schema: "a transcendental time-determination is homogeneous with the **category** (which constitutes its unity) insofar as it is **universal** and rests on a rule *a priori*. But it is on the other hand homogeneous with the **appearance** insofar as **time** is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold" (CPR A138-9/B177-8).

the unity of the categories, according to the particular determination of the latter ones.[116] Therefore, the relation between the *manifold of intuition* and the *categories* through *time* entails the connection at the same time of understanding with sensibility through imagination.[117]

1.2.3. Is time the form by which we intuit ourselves?

Time is a condition by which we intuit our inner and outer states (those relating to our body), so that the form of both inner and outer appearances is temporal (see CPR A33/B49). Of course, time and the subject are mutually dependent, as long as the existence of time is grounded on subject (not on external objects) and the *existence* of the subject is *temporal* (see Stephenson, 2017, p. 110). Particularly, the 'empirical reality of time' is grounded on the temporal determination of outer appearances, whereas the 'subjective reality of time' is grounded on the temporal determination of inner appearances. Thus, time has "subjective reality in regard to inner experience, i.e., I really have the representation of time and of my determinations in it. It is therefore to be regarded really not as object but as the way of representing myself as object" (CPR A37/B53-4). It implies that we represent us to ourselves as an object of intuition in time (see also CPR A22/B37, B155).

In fact, time is not a representation derived from some particular experience but rather an "impersonal" element, namely, a necessary and universal representation needed for the acquisition of other representations. Therefore, the impersonal character of time implies that the temporal conditions which govern the empirical representations of our inner and outer states are the same in every rational being.[118] Accordingly, the mind's capacity of

[116] Robert Pippin is right when he maintains that "this schema will explain the terms in which the categories can apply to appearances because it is both a necessary component of all sensible appearances, and yet is a purely formal feature of those appearances and is thus conceivable as the a priori method of categorial application. The categories are objective only as "affecting" inner sense, and since the form of the inner sense is time, they are only "modes of time consciousness"" (Pippin, 1976, p. 161)

[117] In my view, the 'Schematism' is committed to explain the possibility of applying categories to intuition in judgements and, particular to outer intuition (see CPR A138-9/B177-8). I believe that "Schematism" section is remarkably short and puzzling and therein Kant does not makes clear whether or not inner intuition can be schematized, nor does he explain how it would be possible. Thus, I will not focus deeply on Schematism.

[118] The characterization of time is intended to show that the latter is a condition of possibility of inner and outer phenomena. I see no reason to deny that the performance of a song is a common example that may help us to see how Kant's doctrine of time works. If one attends to a song performed by a string quartet, one may analyze the temporal conditions which determine the individual performance of the musicians; in

setting the manifold of intuition of the self under relations of succession and simultaneity is, in principle, invariable in every rational being. On the contrary, the *content* of these representations is different in each person, as long as they are derived from particular experiences.[119]

1.2.4. Time is an infinite magnitude

As earlier argued, time cannot be measured through movement or change, but inversely change in empirical phenomena in general can only be measured through time (see Ak 2: 401). Similarly, time cannot be thought of through change but, on the contrary, change can only be thought of *in time*, it does not matter if the change in these phenomena is simultaneous or successive. Kant points out in the *Dissertation* that time is a *continuous magnitude*, in which a composition of simple "things" exists. These "things" are moments, namely, 'limits' (*termini*) among which time always mediates (see Ak 2:399; CPR A32/B47-8). Accordingly, we can estimate the quantity of time or represent time *quantitatively* by binding successive times. As a result, we obtain an amount of moments (unities) which are nothing but bounds 'of the same one boundless time' (*unius eiusdem temporis immensi*). Kant suggests in *Dissertation* and in the CPR that our experience of objects is conditioned to the fact that we coordinate the sensed things, by represent them as existing *in* each one of those moments. The 'continuity' of the sensed things, then, is possible because we add successively one moment to the latter and so on (see Ak 2:399; CPR A162-3/B203). Despite the fact that we *represent* the sensed things as existing at the same moment or through different moments, time itself, by its very nature, *is* not necessarily subdivided according to those moments.

The foretold conception, exposed in the *Dissertation*, of time as 'one' and 'boundless' will be maintained in the CPR, wherein he claims that "different times are only parts of

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a broad sense one may claim that the experience of each musician is characterized at least by the next acts: listening sounds, *emitting* sounds in accordance with the performance of the other musicians and *pausing*. Those acts are possible according to a temporal configuration of the human experience which, according to Kant, is the same for all of them, it means that the formal conditions of the experience of the musicians is, in turn, in harmony with the experience the other musicians. Thus, when the temporal experiences of the musicians are gathered together, a musical unity emerges.

[119] In a similar sense, P. Keller regards space and time as impersonal representations. In his own words: "our concepts of space and time have "objective unity" insofar as they capture the way a self-conscious being would represent the world in the same way from any arbitrary standpoint in space and time and in any arbitrary psychological state that the representer might happen to be in" (Keller, 2001, p. 24)

one and the same time" (CPR A32/B47). This 'boundless' or endless character of time is preserved by Kant as he affirms: "the infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is only possible through limitations of a single time grounding it. The original representation, time, must therefore be given as unlimited" (CPR A32/B47-8). This quotation suggests that if we represent our experiences in a temporal order of moments, we need to regard those moments as boundaries subordinated to one (un-parted) time (compare Melnick, 1989, p. 199). I think that when Kant claims that time has parts, he means that we may represent time empirically, using it as a magnitude to measure our representations though duration, by which these acquire a quantity.

To my knowledge, time itself is an infinite representation that does not have parts. If it were the case, we would have to accept that it has an infinite number of parts or a plurality of parts whose extension is infinite; but none of those options is plausible as Kant regards time as an "entire representation" which lies as ground of all our intuitions (see CPR A32/B48). The first option would entail that the 'length' of every moment is universally determined, namely, that we should be able to know in which point a moment (as 'part') ends and another begins; the second is self-contradictory as well, because if one part of time is infinite, then this part will not let another start. In fact, Kant holds earlier in the *Dissertation* that if time is 'boundless', must be 'singular':

> *The idea of time is singular* and not general. For no time is thought of except as a part of the same one boundless time. If you think of two years, you can only represent them to yourself as being in a determinate position in relation to each other; and if they should not immediately succeed each other, you can only represent them to yourself as joined to one another by some intermediate time. (Ak 2:399)

Accordingly, the 'singularity' of time means that time is not an external place wherein all events of the world are related, nor a general representation of the subject where all the formed intuitions are located. In contrast, the singularity of time means that this is necessarily involved in the possibility of every intuition. In other words, each empirical intuition yields, from its arising, a temporal structure which rests on the sensibility of the subject. However, the order in which our empirical representations are succeed by others is determined by experience, so that the position of represented "elements" (two years, two days, etc.) in this succession cannot be deduced from the mere intellect, but it depends upon experience. It is my contention that without 'memory', we would not have access

to those representations that enable us to discern which representations of time are former or later (e.g. the activities I carried on during 2014, 2015, etc.).

1.2.5. Origin of time

Time has an *a priori* nature and, therefore, it could not be derived from our senses. However, a fundamental question still remains: is time innate? I argue that time, according to the *Dissertation*, is not derived from experience, nor is it innate, but rather I maintain that time is an 'original acquisition', which is derived from the mind's operations in its connection with experience.

First of all, Kant distinguishes between the *matter* and *form* of representations, namely, between what is derived from experience and that what is given *a priori* in the mind. Kant claims that the sensible in 'cognition' (*cognitio*) is generated by the modification of the subject in relation to the presence of objects and this modification constitutes a 'sensation' or the 'matter' of the sensible representations. This matter is nothing but *the various* (an empirical manifold) of the sensation which is coordinated and united by this form (see Ak 2:392-3).

However, the form of the representations is not an 'outline' (*adumbratio*) nor a 'schema' (*schema*) which belongs to objects, but rather a certain law 'located in the mind' (*menti insita*). This form is nothing but space and time, which are ***formal*** *principles of the phenomenal universe*, since they have the power to connect our sensations of all substances and their states which would constitute the same whole (a phenomenal world). In other words, space and time are an *a priori* ground of the universal connection among phenomena which we represent in experience as successive or simultaneously related (see Ak 2:398). However, Kant emphasizes that our experience of simultaneous or successive things does not produce time:

> *The idea of time does not arise from but is presupposed by the senses.* For it is only through the idea of time that it is possible for the things which come before the senses to be represented as simultaneous or successive. Nor does succession generate the concept of time; it makes appeal to it. And thus the concept of time, regarded as if it had been acquired through experience, is very badly defined, if it is defined in terms of the series of actual things which exist one *after* the other. (Ak 2:398-9)

Accordingly, I think that time is the form of our intuition, if our sensibility is affected by things. Thus, our representations of successive (or simultaneous) things do not produces time but these only "evoke" to relate the contents of our experience. Moreover, time is not a *substance*, nor its *accidents*, nor its *relation* but "rather the subjective condition which is necessary, in virtue of the nature of the human mind, for the coordinating of all sensible things in accordance with a fixed law. It is a *pure intuition*" (Ak 2:400).[120] Certainly, time is actual only, if it determines the manifold given in intuition, by coordinating substances and their accidents as successive or simultaneous:

> *Each of the concepts has,* without any doubt, *been acquired*, not, indeed, by abstraction from the sensing of objects (for sensation gives the matter and not the form of human cognition), but from the very action of the mind, which coordinates what is sensed by it, doing so in accordance with permanent laws. Each of the concepts is like an immutable image, and, thus, each is to be cognised intuitively. (Ak 2:406)

Accordingly, time is not an innate intuition, nor is derived from experience but it is rather a constitutive element of the mind (as given in the mind) which emerges in the 'act of the mind' (*actus animi*) through which it coordinates the sensed things (see Ak 2:401). On top of that, Kant points out in *On a discovery* (1790) that space and time should not be considered in the CPR as innate representations:

> The *Critique* admits absolutely no implanted or innate *representations*. One and all, whether they belong to intuition or to concepts of the understanding, it considers them as *acquired*. But there is also an original acquisition (as the teachers of natural right call it), and thus of that which previously did not yet exist at all, and so did not belong to anything prior to this act. (Ak 8:221)

Kant is reluctant to admit that the pure forms of intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding are innate representations. These are 'acquired' (*erworben*) from a certain act of our 'faculty of cognition' (*Erkenntnißvermögen*), not from our experience of objects. However, Kant holds that there must be a ground in the subject which makes possible the relation between the representations and the objects given in experience. This ground, indeed, is innate (see Ak 8:221-2). Therefore, the spatial representations cannot arise spontaneously, by themselves, but they require 'impressions' (*Eindrücke*) derived from the receptivity of the mind as it is affected, through sensation, by objects.

[120] Howard Caygill suggests that "the ineluctable temporal dimension of human experience is the basis of Kant's insistence on the subjective nature of time, and thus it brings together theoretical and practical issues" (Caygill, 1995, p. 398).

Kant does not rejects the presence of innate elements in his analysis of the formal principles of our knowledge of the phenomenal world in the *Dissertation*, for he admits that objects do not strike our senses through a specific form or 'species'. Instead, 'the various of the object' (*varia objecti*) can only be coalesced into a whole of a representation, if we presuppose an inner principle by which that 'various' (the manifold) is unified **according to** –not by- "stable and innate laws" (see Ak 2:393). In order words, these innate laws of the mind are fundamental conditions of cognition of objects, in as much as these enable the mind to join together spatiotemporally what is sensed, that is, 'the various' of objects (see Ak 2:406). As a result, Kant does not ascribe the innate character to the representations of space and time themselves, but rather to the 'formal ground' (*formale Grund*) of time and space, which makes the spatial-temporal sensations possible (see Ak 8:222). I consider that this formal ground is nothing but the 'receptivity'[121]of our mind, for he claims that

> The formal *intuition* called space, as an originally acquired representation (the form of outer objects in general), the ground of which (as mere receptivity) is nevertheless innate, and whose acquisition long precedes the determinate *concepts* of things that are in accordance with this form; the acquisition of the latter is an *acquisitio derivativa.* (Ak 8:222)

From the previous quotation one may infer that the form of our representations of objects, is neither innate nor derived from the objects, but only our capacity of being affected by objects is innate.[122] Space and (by analogy) time are *original*, in as much as these are not derived from the objects but from our own mind.[123] These are *acquisitions* as they arise only through the *act* of the mind which takes place when the *receptivity* is affected by the objects of the experience, arising thereby sensations whose form is spatiotemporal.[124]

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[121] Kant identifies 'receptivity' with sensibility: "*sensibility* is the *receptivity* of a subject in virtue of which it is possible for the subject's own representative state to be affected in a definite way by the presence of some object" (Ak 2:392; see also CPR A19/B33).

[122] The opposition between 'original' and 'derivate' is also found in Kant's *Opus Postumum*: "it [time] should be something external and different to the subject signifies nothing more than that this intuition is original, and not derived from perception; it signifies only the subjective element of the synthetic unity of the manifold, which precedes *a priori* the latter's formal relation in appearance" (Ak 22:433-4).

[123] This interpretations is also endorsed by Wayne Waxman who holds that "in saying they are both formal and original, one thereby denies that they are either themselves sensation or derivable from it. So, conferring upon space and time the status of forms of sensation is clearly tantamount to positing a *given* over and above sensation: something present in us completely distinct from and independent of sensation-a *formal* datum of sense" (Waxman, 1991, pp. 46-7).

[124] In this respect, Waxman suggests that the problem of the original acquisition of space and time in Kant involves three elements, namely, "(i) a nonrepresentational faculty ground so constituted as to enable the

In addition, Kant's consistently holds a no inborn conception of time in the *Dissertation* and in the CPR, since he claims in the former text that the concept of time "rests exclusively on an internal law of the mind, and is not some kind of innate intuition. Accordingly, the action of the mind in coordinating what it senses would not be elicited without the help of the senses" (Ak 2:401). Similarly, he affirms in the CPR that the 'synthesis of apprehension in intuition' is a condition for the possibility of time, "for without it we could have *a priori* neither the representations of space nor of time, since these can be generated only through the synthesis of the manifold that sensibility in its original receptivity provides" (CPR A99-100). It follows that the 'act of mind' which makes time possible in the *Dissertation* is afterwards considered in the CPR as the 'synthesis of apprehension'.[125]

In my opinion, if the *synthesis of apprehension* were regarded as chronologically previous to time[126], the acts of 'going through' and 'gathering together' the manifold of intuitions would be performed in a timeless way and therefore time would be given only after the unity is generated by that synthesis. However, I think that this option is not plausible because the act of "going" from one representation to another already requires the temporal relation of *succession* by which these representations are one after another. Even more, time is involved in the very concept of '*synthesis of apprehension'*, for Kant describes its unity as the union of two steeps ordered in succession, namely, it is necessary **first** to go through the manifold and **then** to hold it together (see CPR A99). This implies

cognitive faculty to yield pure (here called 'formal') intuitions of space and time (= *receptivity*); (ii) the presence of *sensations* (sense impressions) to determine the cognitive faculty to act; and (iii) the *act* of the cognitive faculty in and through which the original acquisition of space and time is effected" (Waxman, 1991, pp. 45-6). Accordingly, Waxman underlines that Kant's theory of space and time is outside the paradigm of innatism as long as these do not preexist the mentioned act of the mind. In brief, the mind cannot dispose of spatial and temporal representations in the absence of sensations of objects, for such a disposition arises alone with the presence of those sensations.

[125] One might suggest that not only 'time' is the product of an activity but also 'knowledge' is the result of it, for our cognitive faculty is to be awakened 'into **exercise**' (*zur Ausübung*) through experience; that is, it depends on *objects* that strike our senses, producing certain kind of representation (intuition) and on the *understanding* that compares, unites and separates those representations (see CPR B1).

[126] Kant maintains that the synthesis of *apprehension* is inseparably connected with *the synthesis of reproduction*, because the apprehended representations in intuition necessarily must be reproduced in order to be associated with the following representation (see CPR A102 and below section 3.2.2.). Kant even admits that without the 'reproducibility of appearances' (*Reproduzibilität der Erscheinungen*) established by the *synthesis of reproduction*, neither space nor time, as the purest and primary fundamental representations, could ever arise (see CPR A102). However this synthesis cannot be chronologically prior to time because the reproduced representations have already been ordered in temporal relations of succession. It seems to me that 'the syntheses' through which experience is possible and 'the form of the intuitions' (space and time) should be synchronic.

that experience, from its most elementary basis, is ruled by succession as a primary temporal series.

Certainly, if this 'synthesis' is a condition of time, it should not be regarded as chronologically earlier (entailing a vicious circle). Thus, neither the synthesis of apprehension can take place in timeless conditions nor time can take place as *form* of our intuition without the *matter*, i.e. the empirical manifold that is synthesized by time. It follows that the existence of this synthesis and that of time are mutually dependent, since the apprehension of the manifold given in the intuition takes place in time, namely, the synthesis unites the manifold through a temporal form.

The aforementioned codependence exposed in the first edition of the CPR between the synthesis of apprehension and time is afterwards highlighted in its second edition, where Kant defines the *synthesis of apprehension* as "the composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition, through which perception, i.e., empirical consciousness of it (as appearance), becomes possible" (CPR B160; see B201). In that composition of the manifold the *synthesis* should be always in conformity with time:

> We have **forms** of outer as well as inner sensible intuition *a priori* in the representations of space and time, and the synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always be in agreement with the latter, since it can only occur in accordance with this form. (CPR B160)

Accordingly, the connection of the manifold which takes place through the synthesis of apprehension must be a spatiotemporal connection of the manifold in intuition and, therefore, in perception of the synthesized manifold that is represented as appearance.

1.2.6. Time as *continuous magnitude* of the inner experience

Inner and outer appearances in general must be related in time, so that there are not timeless representations, nor temporal gaps in which representations, thoroughly disconnected from other representations, take place.[127] Kant holds in *Dissertation* and in

[127] W. H Walsh suggests that Kant is not only concerned with the *unity* but also with the *continuity* of time. For the possibility of experiencing something which endures through all time is conditioned to the fact that

the CPR that time and space are 'continuous quantities' which qualify experience in general as continuous in space and time, namely "*time is a continuous magnitude*, and it is the principle of the laws of what is continuous in the changes of the universe. For the continuous is a magnitude which is not composed of simples" (Ak 2:399). Accordingly, time does not have separated parts but all changes ascribed to phenomena *occur in* some temporal *termini* (*moments*) of an infinite quantity of possible *termini* and among those *moments* time also exists. Accordingly, phenomena and their changes occur in time, that is, in a continuous series of moments, in which one moment is succeeded by another in virtue of a 'metaphysical law of continuity' according to which,

> *All changes are continuous* or flow: that is to say, opposed states only succeed one another through an intermediate series of different states. For two opposed states are in different moments of time. But between two moments there will always be an intervening time, and, in the infinite series of the moments of that time, the substance is not in one of the given states, nor in the other, and yet it is not in no state either. It will be in different states, and so on to infinity. (Ak 2:399-400)

Kant states that time does not consist in separated unities by timeless places but it is rather an unlimited representation that is constituted by an infinite series of moments, i.e. times, which are continuously related, so that all phenomena and changes occur in some moments of that temporal series. However, the changes ascribed to appearances occur in moments that are not *opposite* states (*e.g.* moment > moment-less > moment) but rather in *diverse* states (*e.g.* moment > moment, etc.) (see Ak 2:399). Similarly, Kant claims in the CPR that space and time are continuous magnitudes:

> The property of magnitudes on account of which no part of them is the smallest (no part is simple) is called their continuity. Space and time are *quanta continua*, because no part of them can be given except as enclosed between boundaries (points and instants), thus only in such a way that this part is again a space or a time. (CPR A169/B211)

Indeed, time is a continuous magnitude, so if an appearance occurs, a "part" of time is given and, then, the preceding (past) and following (future) instants are given as limiting parts (times) of that time. In spite of instants are regarded as 'limits' (*Grenze*) or places of their 'boundary' (*Einschränkung*), these are not self-reliant limits but limits of

we suppose "a single, continuing time-system, as oppose to a set of particular temporal judgements which can be brought into no relationship with one another" (Walsh, 1992, p. 170).

something. These, by contrast, always presuppose intuitions, for instants are nothing but boundaries or limits of them (see CPR A169-170/B211).

Moreover, the mentioned magnitude is considered by Kant as 'flowing' (*fließende*), as long as it entails a synthesis whose generation is 'a progress in time' (*ein Fortgang in der Zeit*). It means that when we experience our inner and outer states, the corresponding experience is continuous, so that our representations of these states fill progressively places in time. In point of fact, the temporal determination of our existence is a flowing constant synthesis executed by the productive imagination.[128] Granted that time is both a continuous magnitude and the form of inner and outer appearances, then all appearances in general will be continuous. It follows that the appearances of our inner states are never interrupted but there is a constant relation among them in time (see CPR A170/B212). Accordingly, the synthesis of the manifold of these appearances is nothing else but an aggregate of many appearances, whose continuous magnitude flows in different but connected instants, through diverse boundaries of one single infinite time.

In addition, Kant not only establishes that appearances in general are a continuous magnitude but also that the 'alterations' (understood as the transit from a state to another in a thing) in appearances are continuous as well (see CPR A171/B212-213). Therefore, the alterations of inner appearances must be continuous in as much as time is a condition of any alteration:

> But if I or another being could intuit myself without this condition of sensibility, then these very determinations, which we now represent to ourselves as alterations, would yield us a cognition in which the representation of time and thus also of alteration would not occur at all. Its empirical reality therefore remains as a condition of all our experiences. (CPR A37/B54)

Accordingly, since the alterations in our inner states are related in time, these alterations must be continuous. Kant even maintains that the empirical consciousness of those states is 'alterable' (*wandelbar*) (see CPR A107), so that the act by which we are aware of a flux of inner appearances (not a steady lasting self) is empirical and contingent. Although,

[128] Kant claims about space and time: "magnitudes of this sort can also be called flowing, since the synthesis (of the productive imagination) in their generation is a progress in time, the continuity of which is customarily designated by the expression "flowing" ("elapsing")" (CPR A170/B211-212).

continuity, as a law that determines the flux of inner changes, is not contingent but is *a priori* given and necessary (see Ak 4:471).

1.3. Modes and the dimension of time.

Firstly, Kant maintains in the *Dissertation* that both simultaneity and succession are dimensions of time (see Ak 2:401 footnote) and afterwards shifts his position in the CPR, where he claims consistently that only succession is 'dimension' of time (see CPR A31/B47, A33/B50).[129] To my knowledge, Kant is not consistent in the CPR concerning what the 'modes of time' (*Modi der Zeit*) are, for he maintains five heterogeneous ideas: a) duration is a mode of time (see CPR A215/B262), b) change is a mode of time (see CPR A182/B225-6), c) succession and simultaneity alone are modes of time (see CPR A177/B219, A215/B262), d) 'simultaneity' is not a mode of time (CPR A182/B226) and e) 'persistency' is a *mode* of time (see CPR B67, A177/B219, A182/B226).[130] I shall argue that duration, change and persistency cannot be modes of time and, hence, only simultaneity and succession are modes of time. It is necessary, nonetheless, to analyze the concept of 'mode' which unfortunately is not defined by Kant in the CPR and, therefore, it must be considered according to the way in which it is used in several passages.[131]

Kant uses the term 'mode' in the 'Analytic of Concepts' where claims that Aristotle's table of the categories "included several *modi* of pure sensibility (*quando, ubi, situs*, as well as *prius, simul*,) as well as an empirical one (*motus*), which do not belong in this ancestral registry of the understanding" (CPR A81/B107). Accordingly, a moment in which something happens, the preceding or the simultaneous ones are nothing but

[129] Kant consistently argues for the uni-dimensionality of time in other texts (see Ak 4:471; 8:220; 20:286; 22:9, 13, 17, 27, 435, 533).
[130] In the *Dissertation* there is not reference to 'the persistent' (that what is simultaneous with which is successive) as a dimension or mode of time.
[131] In the pre-Kantian philosophy B. A. Baumgarten defines *modus* as a 'determination' (*determinatio*) of what is possible (see Baumgarten, 2013, §52, §63), namely, it is not the 'essence' (*essentia*) of an entity (*ens*) but rather the accidents that can be predicated (*predicabilia accidentia*) with respect to it (see §50). In fact, the mode of an entity is a determination that does not belong to its essence nor to its existence. In other words, its essence is not sufficiently determined by the mode (see §63-65). In a similar way, one might infer that, according to Kant, the temporal mode of a particular appearance or event does not "consume" time as a totality.

particular determinations of time, like a certain place is a particular determination of space. Kant uses this concept in a similar manner in the 'Transcendental Dialectic' where asserts that the consciousness of ourselves as *intuited* and the consciousness of ourselves as *thinking* are different 'modes' of self-consciousness (see CPR B406-7). These references suggest that Kant understands by mode a *particular* determination of something general that grounds the particular determination; thus, the particular determinations cannot exist completely independent of the general one.[132]

Succession and simultaneity are *modes* of time, so that *time itself* cannot be reduced neither to succession nor to simultaneity. And it is not time but a particular appearance what can be temporally represented as successive or simultaneous.[133] Therefore, if two appearances are said to be simultaneous, it means that they are given at the same time, but this time is not *time itself* but just an instant or a particular bound of *one* single time. Kant clarifies this point as he claims: "if one were to ascribe such a succession to time itself, one would have to think yet another time in which this succession would be possible" (CPR A183/B226). Therefore, given that time itself is *one*, it could not be successive nor simultaneous with another (see CPR A32/B47-8).

1.3.1. Duration and change in time

In my opinion, Kant's treatment of the term 'duration' (*Dauer*) is not internally consistent, since he holds in the CPR (A215/B262) that duration is a mode of time according to which the existence of appearances is determined. Duration, by contrast, is excluded from the modes of time in A177/B219 and A182/B226 and it is regarded only as a 'magnitude' (*Größe*) acquired by the 'existence' (*Dasein*)[134] in different parts of the temporal series through the persistent. In this vein, we can only determine the duration of the existence

[132] H. J. Paton suggests that in Kant's time the *mode* of something was sharply distinguished from its *essence*, its *attributes* and its *relations*: "the modes are inner determinations which have not their sufficient ground in the essence and are not derivative from it (…) According to this usage a mode is clearly a characteristic or determination of that of which it is the mode" (Paton. 1936a, p.164).

[133] A similar idea is suggested by H. J. Paton as he claims that "he [Kant] must mean on the contrary that only in time can appearances be conceived as permanent, successive, and simultaneous" (Paton. 1936b, pp. 164-5).

[134] Kant distinguishes between *Dasein* and *Existenz* when claims that *Dasein* and *Wechsel* in time are a mode of the *Existenz* of the persistent (see CPR A183/B227).

of some appearance, if we have the perception of something persistent (see CPR A183/B226).

Nonetheless, there is a consistent idea in Kant's treatment of 'duration' throughout the CPR, according to which duration is a *magnitude* that is always related to time. But, it does not entail that the concept of magnitude should be applied to *time itself.*[135] Instead, it should be applied to the existence of inner and outer appearances during certain instants, as long as this existence takes place in time, filling different parts (instants) of the temporal series (see Peirce, 1993, p. 653). Moreover, it is quite plausible to hold that 'time itself' cannot be measured through change (see Ak 2:401), nor can have a certain limited magnitude, for it is boundless:

> The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is only possible through limitations of a single time grounding it. The original representation, time, must therefore be given as unlimited. But where the parts themselves and every magnitude of an object can be determinately represented only through limitation, there the entire representation cannot be given through concepts (for then the partial representations precede) but their immediate intuition must be the ground. (CPR A32/B47-8)

Accordingly, it seems unlikely that 'time itself' has an unlimited or infinite *duration*, in as much as the duration of something precisely would presuppose the determination of its temporal limits.[136] I emphasize that duration is not a mode of time but rather a magnitude of the appearance's existence in time, as long as its existence fills several instants of time.[137]

Furthermore, 'change' (*Wechsel*) is said to be a mode of time in A182/B225-6 (CPR), but it is excluded from the modes of time in A215/B262, A177/B219, A182/B226 and B67

[135] With regard to the relation between duration and time, Klaus Düsing suggests: "time itself persists as identical fundament of reference for all elapsing in the order of succession of the one after the other, for simultaneity, and for duration as a combined temporal determination of persistence, elapsing and magnitude" (Düsing, 1980, p. 7; my translation) ("die Zeit selbst beharrt als identisches Bezugsfundament für alles Verfließen in der Reihenfolge des Nacheinander so wie für Gleichzeitigkeit und für Dauer als einer aus Beharrlichkeit, Verfließen und Größe kombinierte Zeitbestimmung").

[136] It seems that the impossibility of reducing time to duration will be present in Kant's final view of time, since he holds that time does not have duration but its being (now, future, simultaneous before, after) is only an instant (see Ak 22:5).

[137] Similarly, K. Düsing claims that "because of persistence one can also think of duration in elapsing, namely, as a phase of persistence of something in a continuous elapsing" (Düsing, 1980, p. 6; my translation) ("aufgrund der Beharrlichkeit kann man im Verfließen auch Dauer denken, nämlich als Phase eines Sichgleichbleibens von etwas im kontinuerlichen Verfließen").

(in this last passage Kant speaks of *relations* of time). I consider that this abundance of passages confirms that change is not a mode of time but is conditioned by time (see Ak 2:401). In the first place, change is not a pure concept nor can reach 'time itself'; rather, it is an empirical concept linked to outer appearances given in time (see Ak 2:401; CPR A81/B107). Certainly, change refers to appearances and particularly to some property of them, i.e. their persistence, for change expresses nothing but the way in which substances exist (see CPR A182-3/B226). In this vein, it is plausible to think that change is not a mode of time but rather a mode of the existence of appearances; thus, Kant maintains that "change does not affect time itself, but only the appearances in time (just as simultaneity is not a modus for time itself, in which no parts are simultaneous but rather all succeed one another)" (CPR A183/B226).

Moreover, it is necessary to clarify that if a substance is the substrate of change of appearances, then what changes is not the substance itself but its properties (i.e. accidents). Hence, this persistent character of substances enhances the application of the category of substance to the appearances (see CPR A184/B227). Moreover, change cannot take place in inner appearances, insofar as we cannot obtain, through inner sense intuitions of something persistent (i.e. a substance) in our inner states, according to which changes might be determined (see CPR A107). As a result, one might conclude that change cannot be separated from the persistent of outer appearances; change can only be known *a posteriori* and given that time is an *a priori* representation, it cannot be that which defines 'time itself'. Change, by contrast, is an empirical representation that *presupposes* and *is grounded on* time, so that our perception of the changes corresponding to outer appearances is only possible in time.

1.3.2. Simultaneity as a mode of time

In the *Dissertation*, Kant objects to G. W. Leibniz's view that time is something real, abstracted from the succession of our inner sense. Kant also attacked him for neglecting thoroughly that *simultaneity* is the maximum consequence of time.[138] On the contrary,

[138] The text reads: "they conceive of it [time] as something real which has been abstracted from the succession of internal states - the view maintained by Leibniz and his followers. Now, the falsity of the latter opinion clearly betrays itself by the vicious circle in the commonly accepted definition of time. Moreover, it completely neglects *simultaneity*, the most important corollary of time" (see Ak 2:400-1). Although the criticism is directed at Leibniz, it applies well to Hume's account of the acquisition of the

Kant states that time is an *a priori* representation, through which the things that come to our senses are represented as successive or simultaneous. He also claims that succession is a dimension of time, albeit he ambiguously adds simultaneity as another dimension of time when claims,

> Simultaneous things are not simultaneous because they do not succeed one another. For if succession is removed, then some conjunction, which existed in virtue of the series of time, is, indeed, abolished; but *another* true relationship, such as the conjunction of all things, does not instantly spring into existence as a result. For simultaneous things are joined together at the same moment of time, just as successive things are joined together by different moments. Accordingly, though time has only one dimension, yet the *ubiquity* of time (to speak with Newton), in virtue of which *all* the things which can be thought sensitively are at *some time,* adds a further dimension to the magnitude of actual things, in so far as they hang, so to speak, from the same point of time. (Ak 2:401 footnote).

Kant holds that time determines the relation of the existence of appearances as successive or simultaneous and explains the connection between succession and simultaneity, by using a geometric description.[139] Thus, Kant manifests that if we draw a straight line extended to infinity and another perpendicular line that crosses the former, in the points of time of the first line; the first one will represent succession and the second one will represent simultaneity:

idea of time: "the idea of time, being deriv'd from the succession of our perceptions of every kind, ideas as well as impressions, and impressions of reflection as well as of sensation, will afford us an instance of an abstract idea, which comprehend a still greater variety than that of space" (*Treatise,* 34-5).

[139] Kant in the first edition of CPR held that our representations are successive by virtue of the temporal series or simultaneous by virtue of the temporal extension; this sentence was modified in the second edition in which he expressed "all appearances are in time. This can determine the relation [*Verhältnis*] **in their existence** in two ways, insofar as they **exist** either **successively** or **simultaneously**. In the case of the former time is considered as **temporal series**, with regard to the latter as **temporal domain**" (CPR A182). A similar representation of time was proposed in the XIV century by Nicole Oresme (1323-1382), who considered that time was "duratio rerum successiva": "time of change was represented in the called «extensive line», whereas the intensity of the qualities that vary in change were represented in the perpendicular direction of the «intensive line» (García, 1989, pp. 40-1) ("el tiempo del cambio se representaba en la llamada «línea extensiva», mientras en la dirección perpendicular de la «línea intensiva» se representaba la intensidad de las cualidades que varían en el cambio. Tales representaciones constituyen el humus, del que irá brotando nuestra física, precisamente como estudio de ese cambio, o dicho en el lenguaje actual, como estudio de la variación de diversas cualidades (velocidad, temperatura, color...) en función del tiempo").



Figure 1. This horizontal line is extended to infinite and represents succession in time, while the vertical line represents simultaneity in time; substances are given in temporal succession, while accidents and substances exist simultaneously in time.

In the previous description, the line of *succession* indicates the occurrence of phenomena through a succession of different times, whilst the line of *simultaneity* indicates the occurrence of phenomena at the same moment (for instance, the concomitance of substances with their accidents).[140] According to Kant, the experienced phenomena are not reduced to simple, absolutely individual things, bare of any quality, relation, etc. On the contrary, these are phenomena simultaneously related in time and determined by the series of succession in which they flow *ad infinitum*. As a result, the combination of these two "dimensions" of time composes the 'phenomenal world' (*mundum phaenomenon*) (see Ak 2:401).

Kant himself admits in the CPR that the straight line is not a good analogy to represent empirically time, because when we draw that line its parts are given *simultaneously*, whereas those of time are given successively (see CPR A33/B50). Kant exposes the same analogy in another passage of the second edition of the CPR (see B156), although he adds the conjunction '*insofar as' we draw it* (*so fern wir sie ziehen*).[141] Thus, the analogy is

[140] I agree with Kemp Smith's on the fact that we represent empirically the "time-sequence" through a line, as an analogy which supplies the deficiency of inner sense of providing a shape of time: "such symbolisation [*sic*] of time through space is helpful but not indispensably necessary for its apprehension" (Kemp Smith, 2003, p. 135). However, I disagree with him on his interpretation of the "analogy", for he holds that "from the properties of this line, with the one exception that its parts are simultaneous whereas those of time are always successive, we conclude to all the properties of time" (2003, p. 135). Against this idea, I think that if the parts of the line are simultaneous, whilst the parts of time are always successive, there would not be analogy at all. I argue that in this analogy the line exemplifies that our representations are simultaneously related in time, but they are also conditioned to a broader temporal order of successive relations (see below section 1.3.5).

[141] Such addition has been discussed by Gerold Prauss who claims that "by means of this novelty Kant attempts for the first time to do justice to time as something essentially dynamic; namely, he attempts to

not based on the result of the action but rather on the act of *drawing* the line, that is to say, on the subject's act of adding elements successively (see Mohr, 1991, p. 78).

In spite of the concept of simultaneity does not variate in the *Dissertation* nor in the CPR, this notion is no longer regarded in the CPR as a *dimension* of time, but as a *mode* of time exclusively. Accordingly, the dimension and the mode of time are not the same, even one might think that in the CPR there is a hierarchy between those concepts, according to which all dimension of time is a mode time, but a not all mode of time is a dimension of time. Modes and dimension of time, nonetheless, are both principles of temporal relations among our representations.[142] With regard to simultaneity, Kant holds in the *Analogies of the Experience*:

> Things are simultaneous insofar as they exist at one and the same time. But how does one cognize that they exist at one and the same time? If the order in the synthesis of the apprehension of this manifold is indifferent, i.e., if it can proceed from *A* through *B, C*, and *D* to *E*, but also conversely from *E* to *A*. (CPR A211/B258)

According to Kant, we cannot claim that objects in themselves are simultaneous, but only that our representations of the objects are simultaneous. Besides, as Kant refers to our representations of things as existing "at one time", the expression "at one time" would mean that our mind goes from one thing to another and conversely, only if the existence of them persists in time. For instance, if I were bitten by a dog, I would perceive things as "simultaneously existing", if my mind can focus (forwards and backwards) on the perceptions: the dog, the leg, the blood, the wound, the pain, etc.

To sum up, I have claimed that Kant's position is not consistent with regard to whether simultaneity is a mode of time, for he holds that simultaneity is a mode of time (see CPR A177/B219, A215/B262) and also the opposite (see CPR A182/B226). In my view, simultaneity is a *mode of time*, because it is a temporal determination of inner and outer

find for time an "image" or "analogy" of something merely static" (Prauss, 2001, p. 155). Prauss argues for a dynamic nature of time, suggesting that Kant is not concerned with the line 'as it is already drawn' but, rather, with the 'drawing of a line'. That is to say, Kant would be focused on the 'process of drawing'. However, Prauss does not offer passages where Kant contradicts his idea that time does not change. In contrast, Kant's idea that in time all change is possible is spread all over the CPR (A32/B48-9, A41/B58, A144/B183, A182/B224-5, A183/B226).

[142] It is necessary to clarify that if time were excluded from all sensible manifold, it would be an empty representation that is neither successive, nor simultaneous. Hence, I do not argue that the concept of dimension has a privilege over that of mode because it defines in a better way what time *itself* is, i.e. its essence is, but because it expresses the temporal core of experience, namely succession.

appearances, namely, the matter of our intuitions of these appearances may be simultaneously related in time. Simultaneity is a *mode* of time as long as it is not a property that exactly defines 'time itself' (*die Zeit selbst*) but it is only a particular determination of appearances. The concept of simultaneity presupposes the existence of several elements, whereas time itself is one and infinite, so that it cannot be simultaneous to something else.

1.3.3. Is persistency a mode of time?

According to Kant, our mind is engaged with representations derived from outer sense, which are not unlinked, nor scattered but they are previously settled in time, for

> The time in which we place these representations, which itself precedes the consciousness of them in experience and grounds the way in which we place them in mind as a formal condition, already contains relations of succession, of simultaneity, and of that which is simultaneous with succession (of that which persists). (CPR B67)

I think that, at least, two questions emerge from the previous passage: What does Kant mean by *that which is simultaneous with succession*? And how *that which is simultaneous with succession* is connected with our capacity to relate temporally our representations? With regard to the first question, one may consider that the existence of one object (O^1) is *persistent* and *successive* in time, if it exists through a sequence of different and connected times (T^1, T^2, T^3, T^4). Thus, objects are persistent if they exist successively through time, although it does not entail a persistency in "space" nor "qualities", except those regarding their 'abiding' character in time. Accordingly, if a second object (O^2) is *simultaneous* to the first (O^1), it should exist through the same sequence of times (T^1, T^2, T^3, T^4) of the first.

Moreover, Kant equates *that which is simultaneous with succession* with 'persistency' (*Beharrlichkeit*) and claims that persistency cannot be found in the intuition of our inner states but in something existing outside our mind, i.e. in external objects.[143] Even,

[143] In support of this idea Kant says: "hence this I does not have the least predicate of intuition that, as **persistent**, could serve as the correlate for time-determination in inner sense, as, say, **impenetrability** in matter, as **empirical** intuition, does" (CPR B278; see also CPR A107).

according to Kant, we may perceive the changes in our inner states, if the experience of the external objects is presupposed (see CPR BXL footnote, A226/B278-9). However, our knowledge of the external objects is not a knowledge of things in themselves but rather in the way they appear to us (as *phenomena*). However, it does not mean that we, as rational beings, have access to "appearances" that exist in the world independently of our experience of them. On the contrary, it means that we only have access to the "world" as it appears to us, it is the world of the phenomena which composes the field of our experience.[144] The appearances are neither made by our reproductive imagination, but they are the "impressions" or the "footsteps" left by the external objects in our sensibility:

> Now which given intuitions actually correspond to outer objects, which therefore belong to outer sense, to which they are to be ascribed rather than to the imagination - that must be decided in each particular case according to the rules through which experience in general (even inner experience) is to be distinguished from imagination; which procedure is grounded always on the proposition that there actually is outer experience. (CPR BXLI footnote)

On the one hand, Kant attacks, what he calls, the "problematic idealism" of Descartes, according to which the existence of objects in space outside us is doubtful and indemonstrable. On the other hand, he rejects the "dogmatic idealism" of Berkeley, according to which the existence of objects in space outside us is false and impossible.[145] Instead, he holds that the outer experience is immediate and by means of it, we are allowed to determine our own existence in time (see CPR B276-7). If our immediate consciousness of the existence of external things were not real, we would have to suppose only the existence of inner sense and an 'outer imagination', ruling out outer sense. This is implausible, for something can only be given to senses, as existing in the intuition, if we are already in possession of an outer sense. This sense is thoroughly different from the spontaneity of the (reproductive) imagination, for the latter *makes up* representations

[144] The view of Hume and Kant about this problem is similar, for both philosophers would agree on the impossibility of showing how are possible the objects 'in themselves', that is, regardless of the subjective conditions by which we experience them. In this regard, Hume claims: "the farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos'd specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects." (*Treatise*, p. 68).

[145] "Idealism (I mean **material** idealism) is the theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be either merely doubtful and **indemonstrable**, or else false and **impossible**; the **former** is the **problematic** idealism of Descartes, who declares only one empirical assertion (*assertio*), namely **I am**, to be indubitable; the **latter** is the **dogmatic** idealism of Berkeley, who declares space, together with all the things to which it is attached as an inseparable condition, to be something that is impossible in itself, and who therefore also declares things in space to be merely imaginary" (CPR B274).

while outer sense is a necessary condition by which we are *affected* by external objects (see CPR B277).

In addition, Kant claims, in the *Analogies of the Experience*, that 'persistency' is a *mode* of time and constitutes a 'rule' (*Regel*) that enables us to relate *temporally* all appearances. Therefore, the existence of every appearance must be determined with respect to the unity of time which is not only *previous* to the experience but also *condition* for the possibility of it (see CPR A176-7/B219). Indeed, succession and simultaneity depend upon *persistency*, in as much as we cannot determine the manifold of intuition as successive or simultaneous without the intuition of something that lies as its ground: "**which always exists**, i.e., something **lasting** and **persisting**, of which all change and simultaneity are nothing but so many ways (*modi* of time) in which that which persists exists" (CPR A182/B225-6). That "something" is nothing but substances which are related to time by means of their persistency:

> That which persists is the **substratum** of the empirical representation of time itself, by which alone all time-determination is possible. Persistence gives general expression to time as the constant correlate of all existence of appearances, all change and all accompaniment. (CPR A182-3/B226).

In other words, the 'persistent'[146] is the *substratum* of the empirical representation of time through which we determine temporally the change of objects of experience.[147] Kant, nonetheless, claims that inner appearances are a continuous flux of representations where there is nothing steady nor persistent, so that persistency should be found necessarily in outer appearances (see CPR A107). Indeed, we can only represent persistency through substances given to us in the empirical intuition as outer appearances. Persistency is a property that can only be given in the matter of the appearances, i.e. *a posteriori*, then it cannot be an *a priori* representation. However, the persistent character of our intuition

[146] It is precise to clarify that by 'the persistent' is meant here not the *category* of substance nor its *schema* (what might be called the *form* of the persistency) which are both *a priori*, but rather what makes the external objects lasting through time (the *matter* of the persistency), which can only be found in the objects of perception, i.e. in outer appearances (see CPR A182/B225).

[147] On this point I agree with W. H. Walsh who claims that the persistence of substance means that nothing is created or annihilated, but it must exist unchanged in quantity: "substance, then, must be taken as permanent, because neither the creation nor the annihilation of substance can be experienced. It follows that we must suppose that everything that happens must belong to a single history, the history of eternal (phenomenal) substance" (Walsh, 1992, p. 173). So, a unitary system of temporal relations lies as ground of our experiences and without it, we would only have access to separate and unorganized histories.

of outer objects coincides with 'the persistent' character of time, according to which it cannot be altered.[148]

1.3.4. Succession as the dimension of time

According to the CPR, time has only one *dimension*. This term, nonetheless, has been used in different disciplines and one of them is geometry; for example, in classical authors the term 'dimension' was principally referred to line, surface and solid: "it appears however in substance in Aristotle, though Aristotle does not use the adjective *διαστατόν*, nor does he apparently use *διάστασις* except of *body* as having *three* "dimensions" or "having dimension (or extension) *all* ways (*πάντῃ*),"" (Heath, 1956, p. 158). Aristotle defined line as 'a magnitude divisible in one way', whereas 'surface' and a 'body' are divisible in two and three ways respectively (see Aristotle, 1957. 1016b25-7). Euclid in his *Elements* defines the term 'line' as a 'breadthless length' (*Γραμμὴ δὲ μῆκος ἀπλατές*) and uses it with reference to geometric figures. Afterwards, Proclus (412–485 C.E.) holds in his *Commentary on Euclid* that the definition given by Euclid is positive as long as introduces the first 'dimension' (*διάστασις*) but it is simultaneously negative, because it excludes the other dimensions (breadth and depth). Proclus provides an alternative definition of line as magnitude divisible in one dimension, namely, a magnitude extended one way (see Heath, 1956, p. 158). As a result, one might deduce that for these authors, *dimension* could be distinguished from *magnitude* and that the former was interpreted as *extension*, or, as the way in which something (*e.g.* a magnitude) is extended.

Isaac Newton in his *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* identifies the term of *dimension* with that of *measure*; both terms are used to measure bodies. Accordingly, absolute space "by its own nature and without relation to anything external, remains always similar and immobile. Relative space is the measure or the mobile dimension of this space, which is determined by our senses through its position to bodies"[149] (Newton, 1972, p. 46). Moreover Christian Wolff points out in *Der Anfangs-Gründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften* that by means of *dimensions* our understanding is

[148] Kant in the CPR establishes that time cannot be altered (see CPR A41/B58), nor elapse (CPR A144/B183), nor change (CPR A182/B224-5).

[149] "Spatium absolutum, natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis, semper manet similar & immobile: Relativum est spatii huius mensura seu dimensio quaelibet mobilis, quae a sensibus nostris per situm suum ad corpora definitur" (Newton, 1972, p. 46).

capable of focusing on particular aspects of things by distinguishing aspects (length, breadth and depth) which are undifferentiated in nature. Thus, these dimensions are useful in cases where "one needs to know only one dimension of a body, for example, the height of a tower without knowing its breadth nor its depth, the breadth of a river without knowing neither its depth nor its length"[150] (Wolff, 1738, §11, pp. 120-1; my translation). Similarly, Wolff's disciple A. G. Baumgarten (1714 - 1762) defines the term *dimension* as the act of measuring a line by thinking of another homogenous or similar line through which we measure the first one (see Baumgarten, 2013, §291). Baumgarten uses the term dimension to point out the ways in which a line can be extended, so that the line admits only one dimension, the superficies two and the solid three (see 2013, §292).[151]

Kant's use of the term *dimension* should be examined, by taking into account one of his most basic ideas, namely, that we do not know how things are in themselves but we only know them in the way they appear to us. It means that *dimension* cannot be described in Kantian terms as a property that belongs to objects in themselves. Kant maintains that external objects have three dimensions whereas the inner "object" (i.e. the set of inner states intuited by us) has only one. It does not imply that those objects *in themselves* have one or three dimensions, but rather that our intuitions of them do. Therefore, objects will appear to us in empirical intuition as qualified in one[152] or three dimension, so that the term dimension would belong to the form of our intuitions, namely, to space, which has three dimensions and to time that has only one (see CPR A31/B47; Ak 28:673).[153]

Kant suggests in the CPR that the term *dimension* refers to the 'coordinates' according to which the existence of something is extended. For instance, the temporal dimension of an

[150] "Man nur die eine Abmessung eines Cörpers erkennen will Z. E. die Höhe eines Thurmes ohne seine Breite und Dicke; die Breite eines Flusses ohne seine Tiefe und Länge" (Wolff, 1738, §11, pp. 120-1)
[151] Baumgarten holds that the human soul does not admit the triple dimension of extensive things (see 2013, §747).
[152] Kant claims that time itself is not an object of perception, but rather the system of active relations of driving forces (regarding the form) given a priori in three dimensions of intuition (see Ak 20:435).
[153] Kant identifies the term *Dimension* and with *Abmessung* in: Ak 1:23-25, Ak 2:378, Ak 4:284. This identification principally uses passages where Kant claims that space has three dimensions rather than passages where he speaks about the uni-dimensionality of time. Moreover *dimension* is defined in the *Kant-Lexicon* as follows: "by dimension or *Abmessung* Kant understands a property of a geometrical object. A straight line is unidimensional, the plane or curved surfaces of → space are two-dimensional and all spatial objects, which do not lie in the same plane, are three-dimensional" (Willaschek, M. (Ed.), Stolzenberg, J. (Ed.), Mohr, G. (Ed.), et al., 2015, pp. 424-5; my translation) ("Unter Dimension oder *Abmessung* versteht Kant eine Eigenschaft geometrischer Gegenstände. Eine Gerade ist eindimensional, die ebenen oder gekrümmten Flächen des → Raumes sind zweidimensional und alle räumlichen Gegenstände, die nicht in einer Ebene liegen, sind dreidimensional").

object is nothing else but the form in which our intuition of an object is extended in time. Intuition of empirical objects has a *successive* temporal dimension in as much as the manifold corresponding to those objects is apprehended in accordance with a temporal series of succession (see CPR A33/B50). As a result, it is plausible to regard the 'dimensions' of space and time as 'the coordinates' needed to specify the existence of an object in space and time.[154]

On top of that, Kant suggests in the 'Aesthetic' that *axioms of time* are nothing but a priori apodictic principles of relations among our representations in time. However, it is not completely clear whether the propositions "time has only one dimension" and "different times are not simultaneous but one after the other" constitute one or two axioms of time.[155] In any case, it is clear that succession is the dimension of time. As he puts it:

> This *a priori* necessity also grounds the possibility of apodictic principles of relations of time, or axioms of time in general. It has only one dimension: different times are not simultaneous, but successive (just as different spaces are not successive, but simultaneous). (CPR A31/B47)

According to time's dimension, a *previous* representation cannot occur *at the same time* or *after* the following representation, so that, all representations are linked in time. According to this link, the occurrence of one demands the occurrence of both the preceding and of the following[156], so that there are no temporal gaps but a continuous succession among representations. Indeed, we do not experience appearances of the world as a set of loose and unrelated representations of events, but according to a principle by which our representations are successively related. However, the dimension of succession is neither an "arbitrary", nor a "self-existing" rule of temporal determination of objects,

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[154] This meaning could be similar to a definition of the concept of dimension in mathematics, according to which: "the dimension of an object is a topological measure of the *size* of its covering properties. Roughly speaking, it is the number of coordinates needed to specify a point on the object. For example, a RECTANGLE is two-dimensional, while a CUBE is a three-dimensional (…) In fact, the concept can even be applied to abstract objects which cannot be visualized. For example, the notion of time can be considered as one-dimensional, since it can be thought of as consisting of only "now", "before" and "after". Since "before" and "after", regardless of how far back or how far into the future they are, are extensions, time is like a line, a 1-dimensional object" (Weisstein, 2002, pp. 735-6).

[155] Hans Vaihinger holds that they are two axioms (see Vaihinger, 1892, Vol 2, p. 383), whereas Gustav Bellermann holds that they are at the end one (see Bellermann, 1889, p. 7).

[156] The importance of succession in Kant's conception of time is not absolutely different from Hume's, for whom "'tis a property inseparable from time, and which in a manner constitutes its essence, that each of its parts succeeds another, and that none of them, however contiguous, can ever be co-existent. For the same reason, that the year 1737 cannot concur with the present year 1738, every moment must be distinct from, and posterior or antecedent to another." (*Treatise*, p. 31).

regardless of the cognitive activities of the human being but a universal, formal principle of experience.[157] Against this idea, W. H. Walsh claims that Kant is aware of the difference between statements of time referred to as "the objective world" and as a "record of what the particular person feels":

> The fact that *a* precedes *b* in my experience does nothing to show that *a* precedes *b* in reality. The special difficulties of the establishment of objective time-determinations are such, Kant believes, that we can make genuine temporal judgements only if the experienced world has a certain necessary form. (Walsh, 1992, pp. 168-9).

Indeed, Walsh distinguishes between an 'apparent' order of succession which occurs in the mind and a 'real' order of succession which occurs in 'the object' as long as the order of our apprehension does not correspond always to the objective order of "actual events".[158] I consider that Walsh's distinction between an 'objective' and an 'apparent succession' is misleading, because it presupposes that we have access to the objects *in themselves* (*noumena*) and that we may ascribe temporal relations to them.[159] In contrast, I believe that Henry E. Allison's interpretation is more satisfactory, for he maintains that the objective time is a *thought*, namely it is not *intuited* as something that belongs to things-in-themselves:

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[157] Kant holds in the CPR and in his *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* that *succession* is the only dimension of time (see Ak 18:381-2).

[158] Walsh does not only distinguish between "objective" conditions of possibility of reality ("what the world is really like") and "subjective" conditions ("how it merely appears to us"), but he also claims that the "objective" conditions serve as the ground of the apparent ones, namely "the subjective could become intelligible in the light of the objective, and not vice versa. The conception of appearance makes no sense unless we have first given sense to the conception of reality" (Walsh, 1992, p. 177). He also says that a 'subjective sequence' is arbitrary, because it consists in the connection of two ideas by association, whereas the 'objective sequence' is always necessary, in as much as it consists in the connection between two ideas by means of a judgement.

[159] This idea suggests that Walsh falls in the empirical realism rejected by Kant, for he ascribes a successive order to objects themselves; as a result, time-relations would be mere properties of the objects instead of the form in which we intuit objects (as Kant does consider). In other places of the text, Walsh holds that the judgements of knowledge are not referred to our experience of objects but to objects themselves: "that our experiences are orderly depends on the fact that the world of events is orderly, and the world of events must be separated sharply from the sphere of private perceptions" (Walsh, 1992, p. 176). I think that a similar putative distinction between subjective and objective time cannot satisfactorily agree with Kant's own theory of time. I, by contrast, agree with Klaus Düsing who claims that "although Kant, above all, goes to a new comprehension of the concept of objective time, in it [Kantian theory of time] neither the subjective time is derived from the objective nor the objective from the subjective; he rather thinks of them as independent determinations, which and whose relation to the other he grounds on critical-transcendental philosophical principles" (Düsing, 1980, p. 2; my translation) ("in dieser wird, obwohl es Kant vor allem um eine Neufassung des Befriffs der objektiven Zeit geht, weder die subjective aus der objektiven noch die objective aus der der subjektiven Zeit abgeleitet; vielmehr denkt er in ihnen selbständige Bestimmungen, die und deren Verhältnis zueinander er in den kritisch-transzendentalphilosophischen Prinzipien begründet"). In a broad sense, time could be regarded as *subjective* in as much as its existence depends upon the mind and as *objective*, insofar as it has the capacity of referring to the objects of experience (see CPR A35-6/B52).

> The objective temporal order is thought rather than intuited, which is a direct consequence of Kant's denial that time is a determination of outer appearances, that is, a quality of such appearances analogous to their size, shape, spatial position, and sensory properties. (Allison, 2004, p. 277)

In my opinion, such distinction "subjective"-"objective" is ambiguous, in as much as 'subjective' could mean that something is particular to an individual human being, although different in everyone (arbitrary), or particular to all human beings. Instead, I suggest that the aforesaid ambiguous distinction should be interpreted rather in terms of either an "impersonal" or "personal" succession. Thus, the "personal" (subjective) sequence is not to be considered as a deviation from an "objective" sequence belonging to the things in *themselves*, but rather as a deviation from the same order of succession which is experienced by every rational being. It implies that the "impersonal" temporal sequence of succession is not extracted from some particular experience, it does not belong to the objects in *themselves* neither, but is given *a priori* in every rational being as a condition of possibility of their experience. As a result, I do not believe there is a real distinction between subjective time and time as form of inner sense (see Monzel, 1920, p. 434). To my knowledge, the idea of an "objective" time would be a misunderstanding of Kant's theory of time, if this is meant to point out a temporal relation of objects which goes beyond our human experience.

Finally, Kant argues that simultaneity and succession are *a priori* principles of temporal relation among our representations, but they are not derived from our perceptions of the external objects. If those principles were derived from experience, they would be contingent and different in every rational being. On the contrary, Kant 'attributes universality' (*Allgemeinheit*) and 'apodictic certainty' (*apodiktische Gewißheit*) to those principles, because they are necessary conditions of experience (see CPR A31/B47).

1.3.5. Succession as primary temporal series

Despite the fact that Kant does not offer in the *Dissertation*, nor in the CPR an analysis of the terms 'dimension' and 'mode', I argue not only that they are different, but also that there is a hierarchy between them, according to which the temporal series of *simultaneity* is contained or subordinated to *succession*. Succession consists in a series of elements, in

which one element is succeeded by another, whereas simultaneity consists in a series of elements in which they exist at the same time.

Accordingly, if all our representations (including the simultaneous) are *ultimately* subordinated to a series of succession in which they all exist[160], the flux of the representations derived from the self-consciousness will be also ruled by succession: "I can, to be sure, say: my representations succeed one another; but that only means that we are conscious of them as in a temporal sequence, i.e., according to the form of inner sense" (CPR A37/B54 footnote). In my view, Kant is referring to a sequence of succession because he maintains that all our representations and our consciousness of these are equally determined by this universal law of succession.[161]

In addition, Friedman claims that "a manifold is not an unorganized mass awaiting organization. Rather it is an abstraction from certain conditions of experience" (1953, p. 383). He holds that time *is* a manifold and *contains* a manifold, and, I consider this idea to be problematic. As to the first point, he claims that "time is the most basic manifold that remains as representation" (1953, p. 384), for it "is the *possibility* of a representation" which lacks the sufficient conditions that make a representation actual. These conditions can only be provided by the impression (affection) left by the objects of experience. As to the second point, time is a representation that *contains* a basic manifold as long as it contains a pure sequence-series that lacks past-present-future elements.[162] I think that Friedman's distinction is implausible, because time *is* not a manifold. If this were the

[160] This superiority of succession over any relation of time is well expressed by Schopenhauer's claim: "every instant in Time is conditioned by the preceding one. The Sufficient Reason of Being, as the law of consequence, is so simple here, because Time has only one dimension, therefore it admits of no multiplicity of relations. Each instant is conditioned by its predecessor; we can only reach it through that predecessor: only so far as this *was* and has elapsed, does the present one exist" (Schopenhauer, 1903, p. 156; see also Schopenhauer, 1969a, p. 8).

[161] Georg Mohr thinks that it is difficult to determine whether succession is the universal law of the entire life of representation (regardless of we are or not conscious of them) or it only relates to the conditions by which we are conscious of our representations (see Mohr, 1991, p. 79). That all our representations and our consciousness of them are subject to succession it is a consequence derived from these two ideas: i) "I am just as certainly conscious that there are things outside me to which my sensibility relates, as I am conscious that I myself exist determined in time" (CPR BXLI footnote) and ii) time "has only one dimension: different times are not simultaneous, but successive" (CPR A31/B47).

[162] Friedman also rejects the idea according which these series 'must be' conceived in terms of the past, present, and future. He remarks that even in the common usage, those past-present-future elements do not let us distinguish actually our position in time. For instance, the concept 'now' does not refer to any special or individual point; on the contrary, it is an imprecise and universal concept, in as much as each moment in our lives can be equally portrayed as a 'now'. Hence, he concludes that "the objective locus of the individual consciousness must be sought somewhere outside the past-present-future complex" (Friedman, 1953, p. 384).

case, it would be necessary the existence of a higher ground of temporal connection of the manifold of time. However, Friedman's distinction enables us to argue that *succession*, as pure series, is a primary temporal series and the unique dimension of time, whilst simultaneity is a mode of time subordinated to it.

Kant claims in different places (CPR A77/B102, A111, B136 n., B160, A138/B177) that time contains a manifold, although the identification of which integrates that manifold remains elusive. In my view, this manifold should not be considered as the manifold derived from sensibility but as a manifold *a priori* given which belongs to the subject: "space and time contain a manifold of pure *a priori* intuition, but belong nevertheless among the conditions of the receptivity of our mind" (CPR A77/B102). Granted that "**space** and **time** contain the **conditions of the intuition** for the very same thing" (CPR A111), the manifold of time should be a necessary condition for the possibility of experience, i.e. of objects of experience.[163] Even more, the possibility of experience lies on this manifold, as it makes the temporal connection of our representations possible: "time, as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense, thus of the connection of all representations, contains an *a priori* manifold in pure intuition" (CPR A138/B177).

Even though Kant does not make explicit what are the components of the referred manifold contained in time, I consider that they are 'simultaneity' and 'succession'. These components are "located" in inner sense, ruling the temporality of intuition, so that the apprehended or intuited manifold in sensibility is represented as 'simultaneous' or 'successive'. This interpretation may be supported by the claim that time "already contains relations of succession, of simultaneity, and of that which is simultaneous with succession (i.e. of that which persists)" (CPR B67).

In my view, the temporal determination of the manifold of an empirical intuition, which is achieved by this '*a priori* manifold of time' (succession and simultaneity), is qualitatively distinct from the temporal determination achieved by the 'categories' through their 'schemata'. The difference between these two kinds of temporal determination can be noticed by the fact that Kant's characterization of time in the application of categories to intuitions contains more elements than his characterization of

[163] The text reads: "the *a priori* conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience" (CPR A111).

time in the generation of an empirical intuition. In other words, time is characterized in different ways, depending upon whether the determination takes place in the *generation* of the empirical intuition or in the *subsumption* of intuitions under categories by means of the schemata.[164]

However, the synthesis of the manifold of intuitions under categories by means of schemata does not imply that the latter connect two different kinds of timeless representations, i.e. intuitions and categories. On the contrary, schemata link intuitions, which contain already certain temporal determinations, with categories that in themselves and independently of schemata do not contain any temporal relation (see CPR A142/B181). Despite the fact that time is the form of inner sense wherein all representations exist and that all our representations must have a temporal form, all representations are not configured exactly in the same way. It is plain that the manifold is always **successively apprehended** in intuition (see CPR A99, A103, A182/B225, A201/B246, A163/B203), so that schemata deal with a manifold of the empirical intuition which already contains a prefigured temporal determination (i.e. succession).[165]

Schemata, as the product of imagination, constitute "*a priori* time-determinations" through which the categories are applied to intuitions (see CPR A140/B179, A141-2/B181). In this vein, imagination and understanding are collaborators for the role of our synthesizing faculty, as long as imagination connects the understanding with sensibility, providing categories with a correspondent intuition (see CPR B151; Bennet, 1966, p. 135; Gibbons, 1994, pp. 28-9). In parallel with the division of the categories, Kant suggests certain characters of time which determine the application of the categories to objects via schemata. Thus, Quantity is subordinated to the 'time-series' (*Zeitreihe*), Quality to the 'content of time' (*Zeitinhalt*), Relation to the 'order of time' (*Zeitordnung*) and Modality to the 'the sum total of time' (*Zeitinbegriff*) regarding all possible objects (see CPR A145/B184-5).[166]

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[164] Schemata are 'temporal determinations' (*Zeitbestimmungen*) that are homogeneous with categories in as much as they are *universal*, based on a rule *a priori* and *homogeneous* with appearances in as much as they express various temporal relations among appearances (see CPR A138-9/177-8).

[165] It is worth mentioning that the *simultaneity* is already involved in the schema which renders possible the application of the category 'community' ('interaction') to intuitions (see CPR A30/B46 and A144/B183-4).

[166] However, as Heidegger notices, "these characters of time are not so much developed systematically through and out of an analysis of time itself, but instead are fixed in it "according to the order of the categories" (Heidegger, 1990, p. 74).

I return again to the idea that succession is a 'primary temporal series' and I suggest that this can be endorsed by different passages of the A-edition of the *Transcendental deduction of the concepts of understanding*. This deduction aims to explain how the understanding can refer to objects as well as to prove that empirical objects can be thought only through the categories (see CPR A96-7). The *Deduction* also explains the subjective sources that constitute the *a priori* foundations of the possibility of experience. One of the most fundamental characteristics of experience is the connection among our representations and Kant explains such connection by stating the existence of three kinds of syntheses[167] by which the manifold of intuition stands under categories. These syntheses (*synthesis of apprehension in the intuition*, *synthesis of reproduction in the imagination* and *synthesis of recognition in the concept*) are meant to connect sensibility (receptivity) with understanding (spontaneity) (see CPR A97). If true, these syntheses must be considered as mutually dependent, for without an apprehension of a manifold it cannot be reproduced, and without such reproduction the apprehended manifold would be lost (see Gibbons, 1994, p. 20). Certainly, if the manifold were not apprehended nor reproduced, there would not be material to be recognized and, without this recognition, the unity of intuition under a concept simply would not be possible.

First, as far the *synthesis of apprehension in the intuition*[168] is concerned, Kant holds that we may represent the manifold of intuition as a manifold only, if we represent it in a temporal relation of succession.[169] According to this relation, we gradually 'run through'

[167] The relation among these three syntheses has been interpreted by some commentators in, at least, three different ways: Some suggest that the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction rely on the synthesis of recognition (see Paton, 1936a, p. 272; Kemp Smith, 2003, pp. 245-6). Others suggest that the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction occur prior to the synthesis of recognition (see Gibbons, 1994, pp. 25-6, 30-32; Allison, 2004, pp. 187-9; Hanna, 2005, pp. 249, 255-6). Other commentators, like A. C. Ewing, think that these syntheses are actually one "they [the three syntheses] are not, I think, to be regarded as distinct acts but only as different elements or moments in the one synthesis" (Ewing, 1967, p. 75; see also Paton, 1929, p.316). Heidegger holds a dubious position. Although he does not claim openly that these syntheses are actually one, he still believes that apprehension, reproduction and recognition reveal the "character" or "modes" of the synthes*is* as such. That is, this three-fold synthesis does not mean that "apprehension, etc. are subject to a synthesis nor that apprehension, or rather reproduction and recognition, consummate a synthesis. Rather, it means that synthesis as such has the character of either apprehension or reproduction or recognition" (Heidegger, 1990, p. 125).

[168] One might claim that the unity derived from this apprehension corresponds to the unity derived from the 'figurative' or '*speciosa'* synthesis (in the second edition of the CPR), which is *a priori*, *necessary* for synthesizing the manifold of the sensible intuition and *transcendental* insofar as it grounds the possibility of another knowledge *a priori* (see CPR B151). This identification is also suggested by Klaus Düsing (see 1980, p. 8).

[169] I think that Heidegger does not justice to the *successive* character of apprehension as he takes *simultaneity* for the guiding principle of the relation of the manifold in time (see CPR A182/B225). As he

(*Durchlaufen*) the "components" of the manifold of the impressions (see CPR A99). Kant openly holds that this synthesis springs forth from imagination.[170] Furthermore, we represent this manifold as an 'absolute unity' (*absolute Einheit*), only if we apprehend it successively and we hold it together, so that the union of these two acts constitutes the *synthesis of apprehension*.[171] It is, hence, well-grounded to assert that succession is a primary series of time, if we attend to the fact that we initially grasp the manifold as successively determined in time. In this vein, I agree with L. Friedman on considering that the series contained in the manifold cannot be *known* by something spread out in the same series, but by something outside of it. This "something" is nothing but a time-consciousness, which is capable of *comparing* and *relating* the elements of the series (see Friedman, 1953, p. 381). Accordingly when a representation occurs, its manifold (the most general form of consciousness) is grasped in a unitary awareness by means of "time-consciousness".

In my view, the unity derived from this *apprehension* is tantamount to the unity derived from the *figurative* or *speciosa* synthesis (in the second edition of the CPR). The latter synthesis is *a priori*, *necessary* for uniting the manifold of the sensible intuition, so that it grounds the possibility of another knowledge *a priori* (see CPR B151; see also Düsing 1980, p. 8). I suggest that imagination is the faculty that "goes through, takes up and binds together" the manifold of intuition. However, I really doubt that imagination is capable of "constituting an object in outer sense by producing its representation" (see Robinson, 1988, p. 178). In my view, imagination can only form temporally the manifold of a representation as *one* intuition, which is not yet an object of consciousness nor can be yet

puts it: "in distinguishing time, our mind must already be saying constantly and in advance "now and now and now," in order to be able to encounter "now this" and "now that" and "now all this in particular." Only in such a differentiating of the now does it first become possible to "run through" and collectively take up the impressions" (Heidegger, 1990, p. 126). Instead of reading Kant as saying that the "grasping" of the manifold takes place in the present and past relations of time, he regards mistakenly the presents as given at the same time.

[170] As he puts it: "there is thus an active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us, which we call imagination, and whose action exercised immediately upon perceptions I call apprehension. For the imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition into an image" (CPR A120).

[171] H. J. Paton affirms that the manifold cannot be represented as such by the mere sense (what could be called sensibility), but it is necessary to be aware of the fact that the manifold is unity and multiplicity and the mind is active as well as passive (see Paton, 1930 a, p. 357). That is to say, our mind is passive when the manifold remains as multiplicity and is active when the manifold, because of understanding's capacity, becomes unity –this last inference is mine-. Patton correctly claims: "passive sensibility, although it can be said to offer or present a manifold, cannot produce it *as a manifold*, that is, as contained *in one idea*, without the help of an active synthesis" (Paton, 1930 a, p. 359).

unified by the understanding as *an* object of experience, because the two other syntheses are demanded.

Second, by means of the *synthesis of apprehension* we connect the manifold in order to obtain one representation (intuition), but that representation is no longer a *current* but past, so that it does not exist "now". However, a phenomenon (appearance) can only be represented as a unity, if the "occurred" representation is associated somehow with the "following" one. This association is possible because the preceding representation is reproduced in imagination and related to the following one in order to form a complete representation; this association is the result of the *synthesis of reproduction in imagination*.[172] For instance, when the mind is furnished with a spatiotemporal impression, which is succeeded by another and so on, the *synthesis of reproduction* prevents the mind from dismissing the preceding impression when it goes to the next. Similarly, when we draw a line in our thought or we represent empirically time from the midday to the other or we represent a certain number, we must put each representation of the manifold after the other in our thought. Kant quotes what would happen if that reproduction does not occur:

> If I were always to lose the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of time, or the successively represented units) from my thoughts and not reproduce them when I proceed to the following ones, then no whole representation and none of the previously mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most fundamental representations of space and time, could ever arise. (CPR A102)

Those examples illustrate a successive aggregation of representations whose elements cannot be lost by our mind, so that there should not be gaps, nor missing representations, if experience is to be preserved. On the contrary, the unity of successive representations constitutes the complete representation of the line, the midday and the number.[173] It seems that the temporal relation of *succession* lies as ground of the *synthesis of reproduction in the imagination*, because this synthesis "guarantees" an uninterrupted transition among

[172] I consider that it is necessary to distinguish between to reproduce an occurred representation in *imagination* and to reproduce an occurred representation in the *sensibility*, that is, in the way it has occurred for the first time (see below section 1.4.5). The second kind of reproduction is impossible.

[173] Heidegger suggests: "if empirical synthesis in the mode of reproduction is thereby to become possible, the no-longer-now *as such* must in advance and prior to all experience have been brought forth again and unified with the specific now. This occurs in pure reproduction as a mode of pure synthesis" (Heidegger, 1990, p. 127).

units (representations) which are represented as *one after another*. Kant also admits that the *synthesis of reproduction in imagination* belongs to the 'transcendental' acts of the mind, in as much as it is necessary for the *reproduction* of appearances. Thus, this synthesis is an *a priori* ground of a necessary synthetic *unity* of them (see CPR A101-2). Granted that the temporal order of *succession* is involved in the mentioned synthesis, then *succession* will also form part of the transcendental conditions of experience.

Third, the *synthesis of reproduction in imagination* enables the mind to reproduce a preceding representation in order to keep a transition between the *past* representation and the *following* one. Although, it is still necessary that the mind becomes 'conscious' of the fact that the 'reproduced' representation is not different from the occurred one.[174] Thereupon, Kant warrants that if such 'consciousness' (*Bewußtsein*) does not take place, the manifold of the representations will never be represented as a whole. In his own terms:

> It would be a new representation in our current state, which would not belong at all to the act through which it had been gradually generated, and its manifold would never constitute a whole, since it would lack the unity that only consciousness can obtain for it. (CPR A103)

As a result, apprehension and reproduction of representations require that consciousness unifies the manifold of the representations which is 'gradually' (*nach und nach*) intuited. On the one hand, this consciousness connects 'the adding units' with the agent who performs the addition. For instance, if we forget, when we count from 1 to 10, that units are gradually added to each other by us, we could not know the production, namely the number of the 'amount' (*Menge*) (see CPR A103). As a result, only by means of this consciousness we become aware of the fact that the amount, which forms the complete representation, only takes place through an act by which we add units in a *successive* way, that is, by adding one unit to the other.

On the other hand, this consciousness also connects the manifold of the intuition with concepts of the understanding. He, nonetheless, maintains that "the word "concept" itself

[174] The presence of **tensed** aspects of time in the *synthesis of reproduction* is also remarked by Samantha Matherne: "on Kant's view, the synthesis of reproduction is the process through which representations in the past are brought to bear on what we are representing right now. He sometimes makes this point in terms of associations: by associating the present representations with representations in the past, we can form a representation that reflects the aspects of an object we have perceived over time" (Matherne, 2015, p. 758).

could already lead us to this remark. For it is this **one** consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, and then also reproduced, into one representation" (CPR A103). Therefore, *the synthesis of the recognition in the concept* is concerned with the consciousness of the unity of the manifold of the representations and with the application of concepts to what we perceive (see Matherne, 2015, p. 759). In my opinion, this *synthesis of recognition* is also based on the temporal relations of succession, in as much as it relates representations that contain a manifold successively apprehended and reproduced, under the unity of concepts.[175]

In addition, Kant claims that we may only determine temporally the representations of ourselves and of external objects as successive (or simultaneous), if the persistent existence of objects (substances) is given to us: "that which persists, in relation to which alone all temporal relations of appearances can be determined, is substance in the appearance, i.e., the real in the appearance, which as the substratum of all change always remains the same" (CPR A181/B225). Intuitions of the objects are the empirical components of our knowledge, for they consist in the connection of a manifold which we apprehend successively, by binding one element of the manifold to the other. Furthermore, there are many passages (see CPR A183/B226, A189/B234, A198/B243, A201/B246, etc.) which describe our *apprehension* of the manifold of appearances always as *successive*, so that the mind acts upon sensibility grasping and relating the preceding representation to the following one.

Kant deals with the relation between succession and time in the 'Transcendental Dialectic' and particularly in the 'antinomy of pure reason'[176], where he claims that *time in itself* is a 'series' (*Reihe*) (see CPR A411/B438). I shall argue that Kant's

[175] Pedro Stepanenko suggests that consciousness always presupposes self-consciousness (apperception), in as much as our consciousness of phenomena relies on consciousness of the connection of the manifold of intuition by means of concepts. These concepts determine the way in which we go through this manifold, allowing the formation of series from chaotic, multiple representations (see Stepanenko, 1995, pp. 147-8). In my view, the term self-consciousness (*autoconciencia*) should be nuanced, for Stepanenko this term suggests the idea of 'consciousness of the mind's operations' rather than 'consciousness of the self' (as it were intuited as a unity; see above section 1.1.3.2).

[176] According to Eisler "an [antinomy] is a conflict between two different propositions, each appears to be right, true. The antinomy of pure reason are contradictions in which reason itself is involved as long as it strives for thinking (see there) the unconditioned" (Eisler, 1994, p. 26; my translation) ("eine A. ist ein Wierstreit zwischen zwei Sätzen, deren jeder als richtig, wahr, beweisbar erscheint. Die An der reinen Vernunft sind Widersprüche, in die sich die Vernunft selbst verwickelt, indem sie das Unbedingte (s. d.) zu denken bestrebt ist"). In Kant's own words: "I will call the condition of reason with regard to these dialectical inferences the **antinomy** of pure reason" (CPR A340/B398).

characterization of time in this section is partially incompatible with his characterization of time in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and the 'Transcendental Analytic'. Firstly, Kant claims that in order to enumerate the cosmological ideas with a systematic precision it is necessary to bear in mind that the pure transcendental concepts arise only from the understanding.

Reason, by contrast, does not generate any concept but only releases the concept of the understanding from the inevitable boundaries of a possible experience; thus, reason widens it beyond these limits, although still in connection with the empirical, converting the category (whose synthesis composes a series) into a transcendental idea (see CPR A408-9/B435-6). Consequently, the transcendental ideas are nothing but widened categories towards the unconditioned, in as much as reason demands the absolute totality through which it gives 'absolute completeness' (*absolute Völlstendigkeit*) to the empirical synthesis, by progressing towards the unconditioned that, nonetheless, cannot be found in experience but in ideas alone. Kant emphasizes that such demand of reason relies on a principle which establishes that "**if the conditioned is given, then the whole sum of conditions, and hence the absolutely unconditioned, is also given**, through which alone the conditioned was possible" (CPR A409/B436).

Kant's exposition of the activities of reason prompts him to elaborate a characterization of time which contains several ideas that counter ideas expressed in *Dissertation* and in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic'. For time is portrayed in the 'Dialectic' as something *given* to subject and as something that *elapses*. Certainly, the sum of all the conditions and, particularly, of the temporal ones, presupposes that a complete temporal totality is given: "one necessarily thinks of the fully elapsed time up to the present moment as also given (even if not as determinable by us)" (CPR A410/B437). Moreover, Kant connects the "tensed series" of the past, present and future with time, establishing an internal relation in which some of those temporal elements are "conditions" while others are "conditioned":

> As to the future, since it is not a condition for attaining to the present, it is a matter of complete indifference for comprehending the present what we want to hold about future time, whether it stops somewhere or runs on to infinity. (CPR A410/B437)

Accordingly, the present time is conditioned by the past one and neither past nor the present are conditioned by the future. Kant points out that, for reason, the present time is conditioned by totality, in other words, if the present time is regarded as the component n in the series k, l, m, n, o, p (taking into account that all the possible components before n are *past*, the following *future* and the preceding component is always condition of the following), then our reason shall consider that n can only be given, if all the past components (times) are given as well.[177] In other words, reason considers that the existence of n is conditioned to the existence of all the components i, j, k, l, m, etc., (as an ascending series), while the components o, p, q, r, etc. (a descending series) are not given but merely *dabilis* (see CPR A410-11/B437-8).[178]

Kant emphasizes that the cosmological ideas deal with the totality of the regressive synthesis of the series. This regressive synthesis, on the side of the *conditions*, goes from the nearest conditions with respect to appearance to the distant ones, in other words, it goes *in antecedentia* in as much as reason is tempted to aim to the unconditioned cause.[179] Indeed, our reason aims to the distant condition, because it aspires to the full comprehensibility of that which is given in appearance, so that it must deal with grounds of appearance rather than with its consequences (see CPR A411/B438). Time, for reason, is a series in which the present is represented as consequence of the past: "time is in itself a series (and the formal condition of all series), and hence in it, in regard to a given present, the *antecedentia* are to be distinguished *a priori* as conditions (the past) from the *consequentia* (the future)" (CPR A411-2/B438).

It is noteworthy that the table of the transcendental ideas does not regard time and space as properties that rely on objects themselves but as two 'original quantities' (*ursprüngliche Quanta*), which rely on our intuitions. The latter idea is consistent with

[177] Melnick suggests that "the arguments of the antinomy as usual turn not on a dispute over singular representation, but on the attempt to generalize so as to represent the full extent of states of a substance in past time" (Melnick, 1989, p. 346).

[178] I agree with Silvia de Bianchi on considering that the dialectic conflict does not arise with the descending series but with the ascending one: "notice that reason, as the faculty striving for the unconditioned assumes that since *n* is given (*datum*), its condition of possibility lies on the series of the totality of its conditions. When the totality of the conditions for a given *n* is assumed to be givable (*dabilis*) or not yet given, no conflict arises, but when it is taken as a given infinite totality an antithetic is generated, by assuming that also the complete series of the totality of its conditions is given (*datum*)." (De Bianchi, 2015, p. 2399).

[179] Kant distinguishes the 'regressive' from the 'progressive' synthesis. The later consists in the synthesis of the series, on the side of the conditioned, namely, from the nearest consequence to the appearance towards the most distant consequences (see CPR A411/B438).

my interpretation of Kant's theory of time, since it admits, on the one hand, that time is not a property belonging to objects and, on the other, that past, present and future are regarded as elements necessarily related to time. If the distinction between past (as antecedent) and present (as consequence) is not empirical but *a priori*, it would entail that such distinction is established by some act performed in experience but is determined by a transcendental faculty, that is, reason.

However, it must be emphasized that time is regarded in the 'Transcendental Dialectic' as subject to change, namely time changes from past to present and from present to future (see Mellor, 1998a, p. 32). However, the transcendental ideas are referred to all past time, in as much as they pretend to attain the totality of the series of conditions for a given conditioned: "according to the idea of reason, the whole elapsed past time is thought of as given necessarily as the condition for the given moment" (CPR A412/B439). In order words, reason reaches a totality in as much as the elapsed time can be given presumably to reason; this "give-ness of time" raises, nonetheless, problematic questions: the first one is to determine "where" time is given; the second one is to determine the extension of the elapsed time that is given to reason, namely, how far the "elapsed time" should be extended.

As to the first question, I consider that this "where" cannot be intuition because Kant maintains that time cannot be intuited but is rather a condition presupposed by intuition; perhaps, the "elapsed time" is given in pure reason. As to the second one, I think that this elapsed or past time is extended by reason beyond the empirical possibilities of the subject towards the field of mere ideas.

Despite the fact that Kant's exposition of time in the 'Dialectic' contradicts the majority of the ideas expressed in his 'Aesthetic', one may find a common point at the core of both expositions, namely, *succession*. Indeed, once Kant has evidenced the dissimilarity between space and time, as long as space cannot form a 'series' because it is an aggregate and all of its parts are simultaneously given, he recognizes that the parts of time only constitute a series, if succession is presupposed:

> I could regard the present point in time only as conditioned in regard to past time but never as its condition, because this moment first arises only through the time that has passed (or rather through the passing of the preceding time). (CPR A412/B439)

Certainly, the parts of space are ordered in relations of coordination so that one part is not a condition of the other, whereas parts of time are ordered in relations of subordination and, therefore, time in itself constitutes a series.[180] Nevertheless, I suggest that Kant's claims that "time is in itself a series" and "time constitutes a series" are not necessarily the same, as long as in the first idea time is a manifold of elements successively ordered, whereas in the second one time could be interpreted either as a series or as a condition for ordering a manifold successively.

To be precise, the idea that time is a series contradicts Kant's idea that time in itself, without the manifold derived from experience, is an empty representation (see CPR A172/B214), for if time were a manifold of elements it would require a higher representation to unite its manifold. Hence time is to be exposed in the 'Aesthetic' and in the 'Dialectic' in a dissimilar way. According to the first one, time is only the condition of a series and according to the second one, time is a series and the condition of all kinds of series, for when Kant claims time is a series, he immediately adds that it is 'the formal condition' (*und formale Bedingung*) of all series (see CPR A411/B438).

1.4. Implicit elements in Kant's doctrine of time

I argue that Kant's theory of time is grounded on implicit elements that unluckily have not been openly discussed in the *Critique of pure Reason*. These are: a) the existence of *tensed* properties of time according to which all our representations exist in the past, present or future and b) the existence of *laws* which establish the inalterability of the temporal conditions of our experience. As a result, the treatment of the implicit and

[180] Kant literally says "since the parts of space are not subordinated to one another but are coordinated with one another, one part is not the condition of the possibility of another, and space, unlike time, does not in itself constitute a series" (CPR A412/B439). The parts of space, in principle, are not subordinated one to another but one is limited by another. Our reason, nonetheless, in its efforts to attain the absolute unity of a regressive synthesis, conceives of reality (matter) in space as 'a conditioned' whose inner conditions are its parts and considers the parts of these parts as distant conditions. Thus, this absolute unity can only be attained through a complete division through which the reality of the matter either turns into nothing or disappears when it becomes 'the simple' (*das Einfache*), that is, what is no longer matter (see CPR A413/B441).

explicit elements will be fundamental for comprehending Kant's doctrine of time and the role played by time in the inner experience.

1.4.1. Tensed properties of time

According to Kant's theory of time, all our empirical representations of the objects are related in time, so that they occur in succession or simultaneity (B-series). In this vein, these representations can be regarded as belonging to a "tenseless" series of time, which does not involve specifically any reference to past, present or future. However, I hold that this theory also involves the presence of a "tensed series" in which all our representations are temporally related as past, present or future (A-series). Hence the temporal structure of human experience is composed by the connection of a tensed and tenseless series as two sides of the same coin.[181]

Ralph C. S. Walker is aware of the distinction and of the necessary but difficult connection between those elements in Kant's account of time, as he affirms: "like McTaggart, Kant would have held that it is only through this that we can understand the B-series, the series of events understood in terms of 'before', 'after', and dating systems". (Walker, 2017, p. 209). This distinction is also recognized by Lawrence Friedman, who suggests that "time may be artificially analyzed into two elements, one emphasizing the manifold which is grasped in a "point", the other emphasizing the *unextendedness* of the "point"" (Friedman, 1953, p. 382; see also Mellor 1998a). According, to Friedman, the first element refers to memory, namely to the grasped *extension* as *pure sequence* (one upon the other) and the second one refers to the *unextendedness* of the "point", that is to say, to "the momentariness of the knower" according to past, present and future elements. Hence momentariness of consciousness, according to Friedman, does not constitute a series but is rather a "perspective" because it makes reference to the point in which

[181] The articulation of tensed and tenseless properties of time, which I consider fundamental for human experience can be depicted through the concept of 'temporal experience' (*Zeiterfahrung*) suggested by Peter Bieri who claims "therefore, to experience time, in accordance with our approach, means that the events of reality are determined as ordered according to earlier-later and according to past, present and future through the temporal becoming and we acquire knowledge about it in some manner" (Bieri, 1972, p. 79; my translation) ("Dann heißt Zeit zu erfahren unserem Ansatz gemäß, daß die Erignisse der Realität nach früher-später geordnet und nach Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft sowie durch das zeitliche Werden bestimmt sind und wir auf irgendeine Weise davon Kenntnis bekommen"). This idea is in line with D. H. Mellor's claim that "to give only the B-times of my experiences, without saying which of them I am having *now*, is to leave out precisely what makes them experiences" (Mellor, 1998b, p. 40)

consciousness is making the "grasping". By contrast, R. Brandt is skeptical about these tensed properties of time, for he suggests that Kant's CPR does not focus on 'time of experience' (*Erlebniszeit*), that is, on past, present and future ("modal" time), nor on the experience of 'everyday life' (*Alltag*), but rather on the universal lawful natural science exclusively (see Brandt, 1999, p. 262; compare Friedman, 1953, p. 384). In my opinion, Brandt is correct in holding that Kant deals only with simultaneous, earlier, later relations ("relational" time) in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' but he overlooked the presence of these tensed elements in the 'Analytic of Principles'.

Peter Bieri rightly makes the observation that this 'tensed series' cannot be an object of empirical intuition (i.e. sensation), so that neither 'the simultaneous' (the tenseless series: B- series) nor 'the past' (tensed series: A-series) can be experienced as an object:

> One cannot describe the relation earlier-later as a sensible datum. Even if that which is related is always sensed or perceived, the relation itself is not. Certainly, every sensible experience orders its data with regard to it; however, it [the relation] is not an object of such experience but is presupposed in them. We have already seen earlier that this applies to the A-series.[182] (Bieri, 1972, p. 80; my translation)

Indeed, it seems that tenseless and tensed series should not be ascribed to objects themselves or to time *in itself* but rather to our experience, namely to our inner appearances which take place in the present, past and maybe future.[183] Certainly, for Kant, it would be controversial to support that time *is* present, past or future or that time *is in* the present, past or future. Accordingly, the first idea would imply that time *in itself* changes from one condition to the other, or, that there are many times, and some of them take place in the past, while others take place in the present and so on. The second idea is also problematic because it implies that time *in itself* (T^1) demands a higher kind of representations (T^2) *in which* the former occurs. Neither of these two ideas is plausible, because Kant does not think of time as a changing representation derived from experience but rather as an unchanging, one, boundless representation. To sum up, I shall argue that

[182] "Man kann die Relation früher-später nicht als ein sinnliches Datum bezeichnen. Zwar werden ihre Relata jeweils empfunden oder wahrgenommen, nicht aber die Relation selbst. Jede sinnliche Erfahrung ordnet zwar ihre Daten nach ihr; sie ist aber selbst nicht Gegenstand solcher Erfahrung, sondern in ihr vorausgesetzt. Daß dies auch für die A-Reihe gilt, haben wir schon früher gesehen" (Bieri, 1972, p. 80).

[183] David H. Mellor suggests: "the fact is that even if objects do have tenses, these are not properties we can perceive as we perceive the colors, shapes and temperatures of objects. My seeing an object as present, or as past, is always an interpretation, based on some feature of it that is perceptible, such as its being a glow-worm as opposed to a star. This being so, we have good reason to regard tense as transcendental in Kant's sense, even on a tensed view of time" (Mellor, 1998a, p. 38).

this *tensed series* is implicitly contained in Kantian theory of time exposed in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and in the 'Transcendental Analytic'.

1.4.2. Considerations concerning the distinction "tensed" and "tenseless"

The distinction between tensed and tenseless series of time is to be traced back to John Ellis McTaggart, who differentiates in his article "The unreality of time"[184] between *A* ('tensed') and *B series* ('tenseless'). I shall discuss some aspects of his distinction in order to hold the following two ideas: a) the core of his exposition of the "A series" is compatible with Kant's doctrine of time and b) his reflection on the "C series" contains a problematic idea that can be discussed from Kant's point of view (according to the *Analogies of Experience*); this idea can be expressed through the question: What determines the *order* of apprehension of the phenomena as long as they are temporally apprehended by us? With regard to the aforementioned distinction McTaggart claims:

> Positions in time, as time appears to us *primâ facie*, are distinguished in two ways. Each position is Earlier than some, and Later than some, of the other positions. And each position is either Past, Present, or Future. The distinctions of the former class are permanent, while those of the latter are not. If M is ever earlier than N, it is always earlier. But an event, which is now present, was future and will be past (McTaggart, 1908, p. 458).

Accordingly, the positions in time (also called moments) of the B series are permanent, so that the position of an event A in time will be earlier than the event B. For instance, if the event "drinking poison" is earlier than the event "being dead", then the event "being dead" will never be earlier than the event "drinking poison". On the contrary, the positions in time in the A series are not permanent; for example, the event "the day of judgement" which yesterday was future for the accused, is a present event today and it will be a past event tomorrow.

[184] It is important to point out that McTaggart makes interesting remarks about time which are relevant for this section. Particularly I will focus on his exposition of the A, B and C series, in order to explain my proposal more clearly. Therefore, I do not pretend to verify the success or failure of the central idea of his article according to which time is not real, because, according to him, the distinction of the terms past, present and future is essential to time but those terms are never true in reality: "our conclusion, then, is that neither time as a whole, nor the A series and B series, really exist. But this leaves it possible that the C series does really exist" (McTaggart, 1908, p. 473).

According to McTaggart, the A series is not only essential to time but also more fundamental than the B series because change is possible in it (for him, time involves change). On the contrary, "the B series indicate permanent relations, no moment could ever cease to be, nor could it become another moment" (1908, p. 460); It means that the B series would not be sufficient for time, since without the A series there would not be change at all. Certainly, McTaggart maintains that in the A series, an A event must be always earlier than B could be grounded. I think that this idea could be endorsed by Kant's doctrine of time, according to which succession is a dimension of time and, therefore, our apprehension of the appearances is always successive (CPR A189/B234; see below section 1.3.5).

Moreover, McTaggart considers that there is another series, called C series, which is not temporal because it does not involve change but only an 'order'. According to this series, "events have an order. They are, let us say, in the order M, N, O, P. And they are therefore not in the order M, O, N, P, or O, N, M, P, or in any other possible order" (1908, p. 462). The C series determines the 'order' of the B series from earlier to later, according to which the B series runs always as M, N, O, P. However, the C series cannot determine the 'direction' of the events, for "it [the B series] can run either M, N, O, P (so that M is earliest and P latest) or else P, O, N, M (so that P is earliest and M latest). And there is nothing either in the C series or in the fact of change to determine which it will be" (1908, p. 462). Despite the fact that McTaggart holds that a series, which is not temporal, has no particular direction but only an order, he offers an example of a series with order but without direction: "If we keep to the series of the natural numbers, we cannot put 17 between 21 and 26. But we keep to the series, whether we go from 17, through 21, to 26, or whether we go from 26, through 21, to 17" (1908, p. 462).

Accordingly, the C-series is grounded on simultaneous existence of the elements (17, 18, 19, 20, 21…), and because of this simultaneity two directions are possible with regard to the order of the elements, namely from 17 to 21 or from 21 to 17. Both Kant and McTaggart would agree on asserting that the C-series is not temporal, although they would be in disagreement on the grounds of that assertion. On McTaggart's picture, the C-series is not temporal because it does not involve change (see 1908, p. 462). Kant would be reluctant to consider this series as temporal because it would imply that many moments must take place at the same time. Such implication would undermine Kant's tenet that

succession alone is the dimension of time (see CPR A31/B47), in virtue of which the manifold of appearances is always apprehended successively and the contents of our experience flow through different and successive moments (see CPR A182/B225; A198/B243). Further, Kant would be sympathetic to admit that the direction of the series in the C-series is fixed, namely the temporal order, in which our representations of our inner states and of external objects are ordered, cannot be altered but it is thoroughly determined by the addition of one element to the other, as it happens with our apprehension of the manifold of appearances (see CPR A162-3/B203).

1.4.3. Tensed elements in the Anticipations of Perception

In the section 'Principles of the Pure Understanding', Kant deals with the conditions for the possibility of experience and suggests that those principles are not derived from experience but are conditions of its possibility. For all objects of experience are determined by the synthetic unity of the categories, which connects the manifold of the intuition in a possible experience.[185] These pure principles are, then, *rules* according to which all possible objects are necessarily subject to the categories, and in virtue of these principles our knowledge *of appearances* corresponds to a knowledge *of objects*. Of course, the *source* of the principles is nothing else but the pure understanding, which is the faculty of the rules (see CPR A158-9/B197-8). In my opinion, the 'Anticipations of Perception' provide philosophical elements for holding that the *tensed series* is an essential component of Kant's theory of time.[186]

Accordingly, Kant claims that the matter of intuition (i.e. the real of sensation) cannot be originated *a priori* but is necessarily derived from the sensations of the objects. This real content corresponding to the *matter* of all appearances has an *intensive magnitude* which

[185] "Experience therefore has principles of its form which ground it *a priori*, namely general rules of unity in the synthesis of appearances, whose objective reality, as necessary conditions, can always be shown in experience, indeed in its possibility" (CPR A156-7/B195-6).

[186] Klaus Düsing suggests correctly that there is no evidence of present, past and future elements in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic'. He, nonetheless, notices their presence in the Second analogy of experience: "It turns out that Kant in the "transcendental aesthetic" does not consider past, present and future as determinations of time, although he uses them in the cosmological reflection of whether temporal series is bounded or boundless" (Düsing, 1980, p. 5; my translation) ("Es fälllt auf, daß Kant in der „transzendentale Ästhetik" Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft als Bestimmungen der Zeit nicht in Erwägung zieht, obwohl er sie der kosmologischen Überlegung, ob die Zeitreihe endlich oder unendlich sei, verwendet").

is subject to variation (see CPR A166/B207-8). Therefore, the reality corresponding to our intuitions varies in degrees, from 0 degree of reality, through intermediate degrees, to a full degree of reality. Further, our apprehension of appearances provides us with intuitions of empirical qualities which have certain degree of reality depending upon the lack (negation of the phenomenon) or the sufficiency of sensation (*realitas phenomenon*) with regard to the instant at which they occur.[187]

Kant's view of *intensives magnitude* can be illustrated by taking into consideration our perception of the leaf of a tree whose prominent[188] green color varies and, therefore, also its degree of reality varies. Thus, in some instant our perception of the green color has a full degree of reality, while in another instant (when the leaf gets dry) the degree of reality of the green color starts to decrease and our perception of the yellow color starts to increase its reality; hereafter, our perception of the yellow has full reality while our perception of the green color decreases until 0 degree of reality. The latter example shows that our perception of the green color fills an 'instant' (*Augenblick*) which no longer exists (it is a *past* instant) and our perception of the yellow color takes place, by replacing the former one; therefore, that perception is past with respect to the perception of the yellow color which is now *present* and, necessarily, the perception of the yellow color will be past with respect to the brown color of the leaf.[189]

Accordingly, if the reality of one perception fills one instant, then many perceptions of the same appearance will fill many instants which should be related somehow in order to constitute the unity of the appearance as the *same* appearance *through* different instants. Thus, one might claim that those instants, in which those perceptions occur, should be related by taking into account their position in the past, present or future. As a result, the variation in our perception of the leaf's color will not entail the existence of different leaves but simply the changes of the same leaf from a past instant *to* a present one which is also replaced by another and so on. Indeed, our perceptions of the green, yellow and

[187] The texts reads: "apprehension, merely by means of sensation, fills only an instant (if I do not take into consideration the succession of many sensations)" (CPR A167/209).
[188] This example presupposes that the color of the leaf is totally uniform and without spots, so that the entire leaf has the same color.
[189] Heidegger links the synthesis of *apprehension* to the present, that of *reproduction* to past, and that of *recognition* to future: "if time is now the threefold-unified whole made up of present, past, and future, and if Kant now adds a third mode to both modes of synthesis which have now been shown to be time-forming, and if finally all representing including thought is to be subject to time, then this third mode of synthesis must "form" the future" (Heidegger, 1990, p. 128).

brown color corresponding to the *entire* leaf cannot have the maximum degree of reality at the same time, namely, filling the same instant. On the contrary, it is necessary that each of those perceptions fills one instant. Nevertheless, it is possible that we experience only the green color and afterwards the brown one, for according to Kant,

> The real in appearance always has a magnitude, which is not, however, encountered in apprehension, as this takes place by means of the mere sensation in an instant and not through successive synthesis of many sensations, and thus does not proceed from the parts to the whole; it therefore has a magnitude, but not an extensive one. (CPR A168/B210)

Consequently, our apprehension of the appearances need not be thought of as necessarily continuous. For in one instant our perception of the green color may be real and later, in another, our perception of the yellow color may also be real without entailing that we need to have the perceptions corresponding to all the intermediate grades of reality between the green and the brown color. Accordingly, the intensive magnitude is *flowing* because the synthesis (performed by the productive imagination), through which that magnitude is generated, is a progress **in** time (see CPR A170/B211-2). It means that in the act of synthesizing the manifold of appearances, representations are flowing in distinct instants of time and, therefore, the continuity (i.e. the reality of appearances during certain times) must flow as well.[190] It is plausible to claim that this 'flowing' character of our intuitions endorses the first *law of temporal determination* of our representations, according to which our empirical representations which *are occurring* cannot be stopped, for these flow *unalterably* in time (see below section 1.4.5).

Moreover, Kant admits that between reality and negation of perceptions there is an endless quantity of intermediate degrees but, in any case, if the perception of some appearance is to be considered as real, it must fill some instant (see CPR A172/B214).[191] At this point, he also makes clear that if -hypothetically- some perception or experience

[190] However, Kant points out that time and space are *quanta continua*, in as much as one part of them cannot be given without being limited by spatiotemporal boundaries, so that there are not (spatiotemporal) gaps among those parts. Time is exclusively constituted by times, that is, *instants* which serve as boundaries "within" one boundless time. However, those boundaries do not exist by themselves, independently of us or of our intuitions but, on the contrary, they presuppose intuitions, insofar as they are nothing else but determinations of our intuitions, which can only take place *at* instants of time (see CPR A169/B211).

[191] Kant stresses that *continuity* is the property of the magnitude by which its parts are not the smallest, wherein it would disappear, but small enough without losing its reality (i.e. filling one time) (CPR A169/B211).

showed a complete lack of reality, it could not prove the perception of an empty space or of an 'empty' (*leere*) time[192] (see CPR A172/B214). Accordingly, it would be contradictory to have real perceptions of appearances which lack reality, namely, appearances whose properties do not fill space or time.

Kant explains that the intensive magnitude of some appearance may be greater or smaller, albeit its extensive magnitude remains the same (see CPR A173/B214). Thus, when one looks at the leaf and perceives the alteration of color, the reality corresponding to the perception of some color increases, whilst the reality corresponding to the perception of other color decreases. Disregarding the former variation, the *extensive* magnitude is the same, insofar as the perception of the leaf has not ceased to fill space and time. Of course, Kant distinguishes what can be anticipated (*a priori*) in our experience of the appearances from what can only be given through the experience (*a posteriori*):

> The quality of sensation is always merely empirical and cannot be represented a priori at all (e.g. colors, taste, etc.). But the real, which corresponds to sensations in general, in opposition to the negation = 0, only represents something whose concept in itself contains a being, and does not signify anything except the synthesis in an empirical consciousness in general. (CPR A175-6/B217)

Accordingly, the reality corresponding to our perception of the leave's colors and the variation of its reality rely on the experience, so that, its reality can only be recognized *a posteriori*. On the contrary, the property of the perceptions by which they have certain degree of reality is recognized *a priori*, this property corresponds to space and time which, as subjective conditions through which perceptions may be real, render possible a synthesis of the appearances in relation to empirical consciousness (see CPR A176/B218).

[192] Kant uses the expression 'empty time' (*leere Zeit*) when he refers to time as separated from any empirical content (CPR A143/B182, A172/B214, A188/B231, etc.). As a result, if the manifold of the appearances were removed from time, time would be neither simultaneous nor successive but just an empty form of intuition that cannot be perceived as object.

1.4.4. Tensed elements in the Analogies of experience

I argue that tensed properties of time are involved in the 'First Analogy of Experience'.[193] Kant says there that only by means of experience we realize that the existence of some things is successive or simultaneous with respect to the existence of other things (*e. g.* our intuitions of the sun and of the light are simultaneous). However, the condition of *simultaneous* or *successive* cannot be ascribed to things in themselves but to our representations of them, i.e. to appearances. For, successive or simultaneous changes of appearances can only be thought *in time*, that is, as temporal determinations of those appearances (see CPR A182/B224-5). Indeed, the existence of all successive or simultaneous change of appearances is not to be regarded, so to speak, as *absolute* (independent of everything) but as *relative*; insofar as it is possible only in relation with something persistent which always remains in time i.e. substance.[194]

The inclusion of tensed elements in Kant's exposition of substance becomes clear as he affirms that this persistent object is the substratum of all temporal determination[195] of appearances that occur in *the past, present or future*:

> If that in the appearance which one would call substance is to be the proper substratum of all time-determination, then all existence in the past as well as in future time must be able to be determined in it and it alone. (CPR A185/B228).

Accordingly, substance constitutes the persistent existence of the subject of the appearances and, therefore, its occurrence in the *past* or *future* is a relevant factor of the temporal determination of change of the appearances.[196] Substances are those appearances whose existence is presupposed to last during all time, namely through the past, present and future. Further support for this idea can be provided by Kant's claim:

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[193] Particularly, Kant defines the Analogies of Experience as "principles of the determination of the existence of appearances in time, in accordance with all three of its *modi*: that of the relation to time itself, as a magnitude (the magnitude of existence, i.e., duration); that of the relation in time, as a series (one after another); and finally that in time as a sum of all existence (simultaneous)" (CPR A215/B262).

[194] Melnick rightly suggests that "the view of time that emerges from the First Analogy may be called a substance-based theory of time. As opposed to a relational theory among events or an absolute theory of moments, time is fundamentally the duration (lastingness, persistence) of reality. The basic mode of the past is the-past-of-S- where S is a substance" (Melnick, 1989, p. 72).

[195] Substance is also the substratum of the empirical representation of time, in as much as Kant claims that time remains and does not change, for is that in which all change takes place (see CPR A182-3/B224-6).

[196] According to Kant, substance is also the substratum of the empirical representation of time, because time remains and does not change, for it is that in which all change takes place (see CPR A182-3/B224-6).

"we can grant an appearance the name of substance only if we presuppose its existence at all time, which is not even perfectly expressed through the word "persistence" since this pertains more to future time" (CPR A185/B228-9). Indeed, Kant underlines the fact that the changes which are ascribed to the objects are nothing but perceptions of them, which depend upon the perception of something that persists not only in future but also in the past and in the present.

Indeed we have perceptions which inform us of alterations corresponding to some states of substances, although 'the arising' and of 'the removing' of substances cannot be an object of human perception and cannot be regarded as 'alterations' (*Veränderungen*) of substances (see CPR A187/B230). On the one hand, if the perception of 'the arising' of certain substance were possible, we should perceive its existence as space-less and timeless and, afterwards, we should perceive it while it is filling space and time. On the other, if the perception of 'the removing' of its existence were possible, we should perceive its existence as filling space and time and, afterwards, we should perceive its existence as space-less and timeless. Both ideas are impossible, because it undermines the spatiotemporal unity of the appearances:

> The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. (CPR B231-2/A188)

In fact, human experience is not possible apart from space and time as *a priori* conditions of its possibility. Therefore, if our perceptions of the 'alteration' of substances are real, they should inform us of changes in the way in which something persistent exists. Further, a certain 'way of existing' (*Art zu existieren*) of a substance is followed by another 'way of existing', so that substance is lasting and its *states* change, as long as its *determinations* cease or begin (see CPR A187/B230).

To my knowledge, the 'Second Analogy of Experience' provides additional support for the presence of tensed elements in Kant's theory of time. He starts the latter section from a conclusion reached in the 'First Analogy', according to which all 'change' (*Wechsel*) of appearances is nothing but *alteration* and, hence, the arising or the removing of substances will be excluded from his analysis of the conditions for the possibility of the

experience. In perceiving the changes in substances, one perception follows another, since the productive imagination has the capacity of relating two perceptions in time through the determination of inner sense, in such a way that the one precedes the other (see CPR A189/B233). Accordingly, the *synthesis of the imagination* is always successive and determines only that perceptions flow *one after the other*. Albeit, it does not establish what representations are earlier or later, or the direction in which they flow (from front to back or vice versa). Therefore, the order and the direction of the representations should be derived from the objects of the experience:

> if this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension (of the manifold of a given appearance), then the order in the object is determined, or, to speak more precisely, there is therein an order of the successive synthesis that determines an object, in accordance with which something would necessarily have to precede and, if this is posited, the other would necessarily have to follow. (CPR A201/B246)

In fact, our apprehension of an occurrence contains a manifold, whose *unity* is only possible, if the manifold is related in time. For, if we ascribe relations of cause and effect to the apprehension of an occurrence of which we have the perceptions "g, e, f, h, d, c", those perceptions should be mutually related by the imagination in accordance with some specific *order* (some as 'earlier' and others as 'later') and *direction*. The *order* and the *direction* according to which those perceptions flow in that succession are derived from experience, which prevents the *order* of our perceptions from being different from "c, d, e, f, g, h…" and their *direction* different from "starting with c and ending with h". However, the *objective relation* of the successive appearances, wherein some states are arranged as preceding or as following, cannot be ascribed to objects in themselves but only to our perceptions of them.[197] In this vein, the determination of the order among our representations is merely grounded on our perception:

> In the series of these perceptions there was therefore no determinate order that made it necessary when I had to begin in the apprehension in order to connect the manifold empirically. But this rule is always to be found in the perception of that which happens, and it makes the order of perceptions that follow one another (in the apprehension of this appearance) **necessary**. (CPR A192-3/B238; translation modified slightly)

[197] As to this point, Kant emphatically claims: "we have to do only with our representations; how things in themselves may be (without regard to representations through which they affect us) is entirely beyond our cognitive sphere" (CPR A190/B235).

Granted that our perceptions in the *successive synthesis* of appearances do not take place at the same time but one after the other, our perceptions can only flow temporally in one direction. As a result, the activity of the understanding focuses on applying the pure concept of cause to the earlier perceptions and the concept of effect to the later perceptions. It means that the necessary determination of a state as a cause or as an effect (in the succession) depends upon the application of the concepts of *cause* and *effect*, which is not achieved by the perception itself but by understanding through the categories (see CPR A189/B234). Again, Kant is reluctant to claim that we perceive causal relations in objects themselves independently of our experience, because such relations only work upon our perceptions of them (see CPR A194-5/B239-240).

In my view, the tensed series (relating to positions in the past, present or future) is involved in the tenseless series of the positions 'earlier' and 'later'. In holding that *experience is successive*, Kant observes that one perception exists at one time (posited in the *present*) but afterwards it has passed (becoming *earlier*) and a new one (becoming *later*) arises, replacing the former one. However, one may ask: can the past perception be abolished without causing any problem in our experience? What would happen if some perceptions corresponding to an occurrence, which involves causal relations, are forgotten?

As to the first question I claim that that abolishment would prevent us from representing appearances as a unity, for if the *earlier* perceptions were abolished, our experience would be a stream of constant new representations, which would be isolated and disconnected from other representations. Indeed, the application of the law of *causality* to appearances depends upon the existence of earlier (past) and later (future) perceptions required for the application of the concepts of cause and effect. As to the second question, I argue that to remember perceptions is essential to experience; this relevance can be illustrated through an example about the occurrence of an event that is composed by the following perceptions: *i)* a twist upon a bush, *ii*) the bush is strongly shaking and *iii)* the bush has changed its place.[198] Considering that experience has given us the order and the direction of the perceptions, one might conclude that *i*) is the cause of *iii*). Accordingly, if each

[198] It is enough to mention those perceptions but it is also possible to add more perceptions related to this occurrence; one might also conclude other causal relations in this occurrence, but none of those additions affect the argument here.

perception in that occurrence were individually considered as a present perception, neglecting the others, then, both the cause and effect of the occurrence would take place because the empirical intuition, required by the application of the category of causality, would disappear.[199]

However, one may ask: how can *earlier* perceptions, in our apprehension of the appearances, be real despite the fact that they are not as current in the present as the new ones? I consider that those *later* perceptions are real in the *present*, whilst the *earlier* ones become just representations in the *past*, although they can still be real. The reality of the *earlier* perceptions in the past should be grounded on memory, for without this we would forget the earlier perceptions and therefore it would be impossible to comprehend occurrences in terms of causal relations. Nevertheless, it does not mean that past, present and future exist as "things" in themselves but, rather, as temporal determinations which are inseparably linked to our perceptions. Again, Kant is reluctant to claim that we perceive causal relations in objects themselves independently of our experience, because such relations only work upon our perceptions of them (CPR A194-5/B239-240). Causal judgements are not contingent nor arbitrary but are grounded on an *a priori* law that is characterized by Kant as follows:

> I always make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective with respect to a rule in accordance with which the appearances in their sequence, i.e., as they occur, are determined through the preceding state, and only under this presupposition alone is the experience of something that happens even possible. (CPR A195/B240)

To be accurate, this synthesis is *subjective* because it does not belong to objects themselves but to our representations of them and *objective* insofar as it refers to objects that affect our sensibility. Therefore, when we experience that (C) occurs, we presuppose that something (B) has preceded it, from which (C) succeeds. The manifold of the representations is synthesized in such a way that those representations occupy certain places in time and the occurrence of the preceding determines successively the existence of the following and so on. Hence the order in which our perceptions flow is linked to their position in the past and present:

[199] Kant points out that our representations of cause and effect cannot be separated, for "that something happens, i.e., that something or a state comes to be that previously was not, cannot be empirically perceived except where an appearance precedes that does not contain this state in itself" (CPR A191/B236-7).

> There is an order among our representations, in which the present one (insofar as it has come to be) points to some preceding state as a correlate, to be sure still undetermined, of this event that is given, which is, however, determinately related to the latter, as its consequence, and necessarily connected with it in the temporal series. (CPR A198-9/B244)

Accordingly, the causal relation consists in a certain order among our representations, wherein the existence of a *present* representation (which becomes past) is the correlate or the consequence of an 'event' (*Eräugnis*) which was present but now is *past*. However, this correlate is not abolished but 'is given' (*gegeben ist*) in the past, for if the past representation were abolished, it could not determine the existence of the present one, and there would not be succession among our representations. Hence, if there were not a successive flux among our representations, experience would be a collection of separated representations, wherein no causal relations would be possible.

Kant emphasizes that the preceding time necessarily determines the following one, in as much as we can only reach the following time, if we have reached the preceding one. He considers that this determination comes from a *law of the empirical representation* of the temporal series according to which "the appearances of the past time determine every existence in the following time, and that these, as occurrences, do not take place except insofar as the former determine their existence in time" (CPR A199/B244). In fact, from certain *continuity* emerges the connection of times which cannot be empirically recognized in time alone but in appearances. However, Kant confesses that sometimes the cause can be simultaneous with the effect and exemplifies this possibility by considering that the *cause*: 'stove that is on' is *simultaneous* with its *effect*: 'the room is warm'. Namely, in the first instant in which the effect arises, it is simultaneous with its cause; if the cause had ceased, the effect would not have occurred (see CPR A202/B247-8).[200] Nevertheless, the law of succession still applies to this case as long as the succession of the effect happens because the *cause* cannot execute all its effect in just one instant. It means that there would be some places in the room which are warmed during the instants

[200] In my opinion, the way in which this example is presented suggests that our judgements of cause and effect are referred to as things in themselves rather than to appearances, for Kant does not explicitly use the concepts of perception and appearance there, as he does it in other passages (see also CPR A205/B250-1). Moreover, cause and effect can be successive in the example by taking into account that if we are in the room, submerged in a bathtub filled with cold water, our perception of the warm (the effect) could be earlier than the perception of the stove (*e. g.* if we have closed our eyes and perceive the warm in the first place) or vice versa; nonetheless, Kant's final position concerning the true foundation of our causal judgements is a discussion that does not form part of the ongoing argument.

after the cause is given. In conclusion, time is an *a priori* and necessary condition for the possibility of a continuous progress of that which exists (as it is given in the present) towards the following (as it is given in the future). Understanding, by contrast, is the *a priori* condition of the continuous determination of the 'places' (*Stellen*) that are filled by appearances in time, as long as they are subject to the series of cause and effect.

In addition, Kant claims in the third 'Analogy of Experience' that substances, which are perceived by us in space, exist in a reciprocal relation.[201] However, it does not mean that the succession of instants need to be thought of in terms of causal relations. This is impossible because time itself cannot be perceived as an object of experience, which is synthesized by the concepts of *cause* and *effect*; thus, the present instant cannot be taken for the effect of the past one, nor can the present one be taken for the cause of the future one (see CPR A211/B257). If we had no concept of *community*, our perceptions of substances would be completely isolated representations in an empty space and we could not determine whether a substance "perceived as earlier" follows or precedes *objectively* the substance perceived in another moment nor whether they are both simultaneous (see CPR A212/B259).

However, one may ask how it is possible that substances can be simultaneous, since our apprehension of them is always successive. Kant certainly claims that some representations are simultaneous only, if they occur *at the same time*, but it does not entail necessarily that they must occur *at the same instant*; they can occur in different instants (CPR A211/B257). Kant illustrates this form of simultaneity by means of the following example: we can direct our perception towards the moon (A) and afterward towards the earth (B). In the example, one notices that their coexistence does not demand some specific order among them but some length of time in their existence; namely, the duration of each perception should last enough to go from one perception to the other. As we perceive the moon and afterwards the earth, the perception of the moon (earlier), in the displacement from one perception to the other, must fill a distinct instant of time with

[201] "The relation of substances in which the one contains determinations the ground of which is contained in the other is the relation of influence, and, if the latter reciprocally contains the ground of the determinations of the former, it is the relation of community or interaction" (CPR B257-8/A210).

regard to the perception of the earth (later).[202] Kant affirms that this simultaneity can only be represented as objective by means of the application of the pure concept of community:

> A concept of the understanding of the reciprocal sequence of the determinations of these things simultaneously existing externally to each other is required in order to say that the reciprocal sequence of perceptions is grounded in the object, and thereby to represent the simultaneity as objective. (CPR A210/B257)

Those perceptions, which are synthesized by the concepts of 'community' (*Gemeinschaft*) or 'interaction' (*Wechselwirkung*), need to have the sufficient duration which is grounded on the duration of the influence of the objects upon our senses. Accordingly, the concepts of *community* or *interaction* connect all appearances and determine their place in time in order to form a whole (CPR A214/B261). It means that their connection in time is possible, if the times, in which they occur, are connected, so that the instant in which we perceive the moon is contiguous to the instant in which we perceive the earth. Nonetheless, if we have the experience of an appearance whose representations occur in the order of instants "A, B, C, D, E", neither the order of the representations nor the order of instants, in which they occur, can be inverted. In fact, our empirical perceptions cannot flow in the opposite order by the power of our will, but they are determined by one specific order:

> If they existed in time one after the other (in the order that begins with A and ends at E), then it would be impossible to begin the apprehension at the perception of E and proceed backwards to A, since A would belong to past time, and thus can no longer be an object of apprehension. (CPR A211/B258)

Accordingly, human experience is subject to a series of a successive relation of our representations and we cannot reverse the order in which the elements are related as before – after (see CPR A198/B243-4). Finally, Kant underlines that time is not something *in which* experience determines *immediately* the position of existence of everything. For time does not have an absolute existence and, therefore, cannot be considered as something given out there in the world, which needs to be filled by things.

[202] One might think of a different example, say, the event "I have been bitten by a dog". In this event the perceptions of the leg (A), the blood (B), the wound (C) and the pain (D) can occur at the same instant, if I focus on each one of them in any direction.

Time, by contrast, is an *a priori* condition of the reciprocal relation among appearances and the position of appearances in time is determined by the rules of the understanding.[203]

1.4.5. Laws of the temporal determination of experience

In this section I shall argue that Kant's theory of experience involves a set of "laws of inalterability of the temporal conditions of our experience" according to which the occurrence of intuition of inner and outer objects cannot be altered. Once empirical intuition takes place, it cannot be **stopped**, it has necessarily come into being and it cannot be **brought into** the present. It is also irreversible. Similarly, a possible future "intuition" which eventually could take place in the present, cannot be **anticipated**.[204] However, it must be made clear that the proposed laws establish the temporal inalterability of intuition, rather than the inalterability of time. Klaus Düsing's interpretation of Kantian conception of time makes a similar point:

> The elapsing and the sense of direction of the elapsing, the irreversibility of the succession do not belong, for Kant, to time itself. Such characterization of time –itself in the rudimental form in which is given in the "transcendental aesthetic" is alone possible, if the orders, in which the manifold for itself undetermined is brought through time and through relations in time, entail representations of well-ordered *unity*.[205] (Düsing, 1980, pp. 7-8; my translation)

Accordingly, the object that is determined by these rules is not time itself because, first of all, Kant claims that time is unchanging and cannot be stopped; second, the temporal determination of a past "intuition" as successive or simultaneous corresponds to

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[203] The text reads: "the rule of the understanding, through which alone the existence of appearances can acquire synthetic unity in temporal relations, determines the position of each of them in time, thus a priori and validly for each and every time" (CPR A215/B262).

[204] Lawrence Friedman analyses Kant's theory of time and suggests some similar ideas: "if we start our analysis from unanalyzed experience, which is the only way we can begin, our initial datum, with regard to time, will be the acquaintance with it, and what we will notice first in this acquaintance is the subjective feeling resulting from it. It may be a compound of associations regarding perishing, an impatience of duration, an anxiety about vanishing opportunity, a feeling of the inalterability of the past and the uncertainty of the future, together with the unavoidable, unconsciously lurking metaphors of the endless line and the relentless river" (Friedman , 1953, pp. 385-6).

[205] "Das Verfließen und der Richtungssinn des Verfließen, die Unumkehrbarkeit der zeitlichen Abfolge, für Kant nicht zur Zeit selbst gehören. Eine solche Charakterisierung der Zeit –selbst in der rudimentären Form, wie die „transzendentale Ästhetik" sie gibt- ist nur möglich, wenn die Anordnungen, in die das für sich unbestimmte Mannigfaltige durch die Zeit und duch die Verhältnisse in der Zeit gebracht wird, Vorstellungen von geregelter *Einheit* implizieren" (Düsing, 1980, pp. 7-8).

properties of time (modes of time) which do not disappear when the empirical intuition becomes past; third, Kant holds that the form of a future "intuition", i.e. space and time, can be anticipated. Therefore, that which cannot be stopped, nor brought to present –once it has occurred-, nor anticipated, is the occurrence of the *matter* of intuition, namely, the manifold of intuition or intuitions as a *whole* (as composed by matter and form). However the inalterability still leaves the possibility open that "intuition" as a whole can be reproduced in memory (through imagination) but as a different kind of representation with regard to the original one, that is to say as *remembrances* or as *imaginations*. Finally, the ongoing exposition of these rules will establish that the empirical intuitions cannot be stopped, reversed or anticipated. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify how these rules operate implicitly in Kant's theory of time, by showing their presence in his texts.

The **first** law determines that when we successively experience things, we cannot stop the *current* representation, but once this representation occurs, it becomes *past* and is succeeded by another representation, and so on. I suggest that this law is involved in the *Dissertation*, where Kant claims that all changes are continuous, or that they flow, in as much as the states of things succeed *temporally* other states through an intermediate series of diverse states. As he puts it:

> *All changes are continuous* or flow*:* that is to say, opposed states only succeed one another through an intermediate series of different states. For two opposed states are in different moments of time. But between two moments there will always be an intervening time, and, in the infinite series of the moments of that time, the substance is not in one of the given states, nor in the other, and yet it is not in no state either. It will be in different states, and so on to infinity. (Ak 2:399-400)

Indeed, our representations of changing things flow continuously, for they are constantly arising and passing away. Moreover, our representations of the change or of the persistent (such as substance) do not occur in one specific moment but in an infinite series of instants, namely, they are posited in diverse instants. As a result, all of our representations are not static in time, but **flowing in** a sequence of moments, although time itself does not change, for it is *in time* wherein all changes are represented by us as successive or simultaneous (see CPR A41/B58).

The **second** law determines that an occurred representation is a past representation and cannot be reversed as a present -current- representation (as it originally was).[206] The *synthesis of reproduction* does not contradict this law, for the reproduction does not take place in intuition, i.e. in sensibility, but rather in imagination (see CPR A100-1). The latter reproduces a past representation, forming a transit with the next representation whose result is a synthetic unity (see CPR A101-2). As the reproduction does not take place in sensibility but in imagination, the object does not affect sensibility as it occurred previously, so that the original representation cannot be reproduced. Accordingly, the reproduced representation is not the original representation, but a *quantitative* and *temporally* (in another instant) new one. Even the 'reproduced' representation in imagination needs, in the *synthesis of recognition in the concept*, to correspond to the 'apprehended' representation in sensibility, precisely because it cannot be the original one.

I consider that this second law should be assumed in the 'Axioms of Intuition'. Kant maintains in that section that all 'appearances' (*Erscheinungen*) are apprehended by the empirical consciousness as their manifold is synthesized and, as a result, we get a spatiotemporal representation of that manifold. Therefore, the synthesis of the manifold of the empirical intuition originates the perception of the object, whose spatiotemporal unity constitutes its *extensive magnitude* (see CPR A162/B203). Particularly, appearances have an extensive magnitude when the spatiotemporal representation of their parts makes the representation of them possible as a spatiotemporal whole, so that the representation of the object demands that we form it little by little in space *or* in time until the whole is formed:

> I cannot represent to myself any line, no matter how small it may be, without drawing it in thought, i.e., successively generating all its parts from one point, and thereby first sketching this intuition. It is exactly the same with even the smallest time. I think therein only the successive progress from one moment to another, where through all parts of time and their addition a determinate magnitude of time is finally generated. (CPR A163/B203)

[206] The core of this law was expressed by Leibniz as he holds in *Principles of Nature and Grace* that "the present is pregnant with the future; the future can be read in the past; the distant is expressed in the approximate" (Leibniz, 1989, §§ I3). A similar idea can be found in A. Schopenhauer's reflection on time: "in time each moment is, only in so far as it has effaced its father the preceding moment, to be again effaced just as quickly itself. Past and future (apart from the consequences of their content) are as empty and unreal as any dream; but present is only the boundary between the two, having neither extension nor duration" (Schopenhauer, 1969a, p. 7).

Again, the apprehension of objects is nothing but an *aggregate* wherein the present parts of time have been added to the past ones. Thus, when the temporal apprehension synthesizes the manifold of the intuition of objects, this intuition acquires its spatiotemporal form (see CPR A163/B203). That apprehension is not exposed by Kant as an activity that occurs in one instant, but is rather conceived of as an act that is happening, as a *successive synthesis* in which we must run through the different instants in which the object is exist*ing*. In this vein, our empirical consciousness of an object cannot apprehend *simultaneously* all of its temporal parts, because an instantaneous synthesis of all the spatiotemporal parts of the object in its present, past and future existence is not possible. On top of that, simultaneous apprehension of the manifold is not possible, since the *dimension* of time, in which they are represented, is not simultaneity but *succession*. Therefore, the apprehension entails a sequence of instants, wherein a present intuition is left in the past while a future one comes into the present (as intuition), which then becomes past, and so on.

In my opinion, this law is also involved in the 'Second Analogy of Experience'. Kant focuses there on the law of causality and holds that "in the synthesis of the appearances the manifold representations always follow one another" (A198/B243). This manifold is related in a sequence that is subject to the rule that if something happens, then something precedes it, so that the appearance acquires its temporal position in that relation. Kant suggests that there are two consequences: "first, that I cannot **reverse** the series and place that which happens prior to that which it follows; and, second, that if the state that precedes is posited, than this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows" (A199/B243-4; my emphasis). According to the law of causality, the temporal position of the occurrences cannot be altered, so that the event "being dead" will never be earlier than the event "drinking poison" or "the broken glass" earlier than "dropping the glass".[207] Human beings cannot deliberately change the order in the series of events once they have *taken place*, but our representations are subject to an irreversible order in which

[207] As he puts it: "if it is a necessary law of our sensibility, thus a **formal condition** of all perceptions, that the preceding time necessarily determines the following time (in that I cannot arrive at the following time except by passing through the preceding one), then it is also an indispensable **law of the empirical representation** of the temporal series that the appearances of the past time determine every existence in the following time, and that these, as occurrences, do not take place except insofar as the former determine their existence in time, i.e., establish it in accordance with a rule" (CPR A199/B244).

the present representation points to some preceding undetermined state as its correlate, which is the effect of that past state.

In addition, the **third** law states that those "quasi-intuitions" posited in a remote future (I^9) cannot be brought into the present, that is, they cannot been put between the present intuition (I^1) and a contiguous future "intuition" (I^2).[208] Otherwise, this would break the sequence of the successive apprehensions of appearances in experience. Certainly, our apprehension of the manifold given in sensibility is always successive (see CPR A198/B243), so that every intuition is succeeded by another and so on, establishing an ordered sequence that might be exemplified as "L, M, N, O, P". In this sequence, the past and future "intuition" are always connected with the present one in experience, thus, when we apprehend the manifold given in sensibility and we intuit M, it means that our following intuition cannot be Y. In other words, the intuition Y cannot take place before N, interfering between the intuitions M and N. For instance, when we plant a seed and we have in the present intuition M: 'ground covering the seed', the following "intuition" in the near future cannot be the intuition Y: 'the same tree with a length of 15 meters'. In my view, there is an indirect reference to these laws in the *Anthropology*, where Kant speaks of feelings:

> Time drags us from the present to the future (not the reverse), and the cause of our agreeable feeling can only be that we are first compelled to leave the present, without any certainty into which other state we shall enter, knowing only that it is definitely another one. (Ak 7:231)

Despite the fact that the context of the quotation does not correspond strictly to the field of metaphysics but rather to that of the pragmatic anthropology, I hold that this law fits into the metaphysical accounts of human experience. Further, Kant indirectly makes reference to the third law of time when he suggests in the 'Postulates of the empirical thought in general' that the human being cannot have access to the intuition of a future event. In this section, he claims that the concepts of cause and effect express *a priori* the relation among perceptions in each experience and, by means of this use, the

[208] According to Kant empirical anticipations are like predispositions grounded on the memory of the recurrences of a past event rather than scientific, rational cognition: "empirical foresight is the *anticipation of similar cases* (*exspectatio casuum similium*) and requires no rational knowledge of causes and effects, but only the remembering of observed events as they commonly follow one another, and repeated experiences produce an aptitude for it" (Ak 7:186).

transcendental truth of such concepts can be recognized (see CPR A221-2/B269). In this vein, cause, effect and all of the categories acquire the character of their possibility *a priori*, in as much as they are conditions for the possibility of experience. However, if we form new concepts of substances, forces or interactions by taking into account the material derived from perceptions, although ruling out experience, these concepts would be mere phantasies without a distinctive mark. For instance,

> A substance that was persistently present in space yet without filling it (like that intermediate thing between matter and thinking beings, which some would introduce), or a special fundamental power of our mind to intuit the future (not merely, say, to deduce it), or, finally, a faculty of our mind to stand in a community of thoughts with other men (no matter how distant they may be) - these are concepts the possibility of which is entirely groundless. (CPR A222-3/B270)

Indeed, the possibility of all these concepts would be groundless, because they do not refer to any object given in experience and, therefore, no application of the categories is possible. On the contrary, they constitute an arbitrary connection of thoughts which, although do not contain any self-contradiction, cannot have any pretension of objective 'reality' (see CPR A223/B270). In fact, future cannot be given in sensibility as an object of intuition and, therefore, it cannot be determined by categories.[209] It is rather an association of concepts which, without a ground in experience and regardless of the formal laws of the understanding, can only be "thought" or "imagined". Kant distinguishes therein between 'to intuit' the future and 'to deduce' it and shows that the principle of causality demands that the subject, based on an present state, is able to deduce a future state; that is to say, the subject might deduce a future event (effect) from a present one that is taken for its cause (see CPR A189/B234). Needless to say, our mind does not have any clairvoyant power to *intuit* future events as a whole composited by an a priori form and an empirical matter, since these events are not objects capable of affecting sensibility at present and, therefore, cannot produce any intuition. And if such "intuition" were possible, it would be a mere hallucination. In contrast, the concept of 'intuition'

[209] As was noticed earlier, Kant recognizes that the human mind is capable of anticipating future phenomena through the application of mathematics to nature, according to principles of possible experience which are nothing else but universal laws of nature (see Ak 4:306, 309-10; CPR A166/B207f.). However, even though the *formal* conditions (space-time) of a future object of experience can be anticipated, the anticipation of an *already* arranged future object, fitted with both the *formal* and *material* conditions of experience, is not possible. Two forms of anticipation can be distinguished. Indeed, in the former case that which is anticipated is, at the same time, condition of experience, whereas in the latter case, the anticipation would involve a possible future "spatiotemporal" event which is not a condition of experience, nor effectively based on it but it remains rather as something undetermined.

(*Anschauung*) contains a *tensed trace* of the present, in as much as it refers immediately ('*unmittelbar*') to something that is given now (see CPR A19/B33).[210]

In addition, one might be tempted to hold that the empirical intuition, through which the manifold is apprehended, is no longer an intuition when it becomes past, so that it cannot be referred to the same object. This is certainly a problematic situation, for to determine the actuality of intuitions it is necessary to determine whether the intuition of an object demands the existence of one or many intuitions. Such distinction entails a difference in the length of intuitions in time, so that the duration of the intuition in the former case is longer than in the second one. In my view, these options are not excluding, for when we intuit an object, we form a 'whole intuition' that is constituted by many intuitions which take place one after the other and they do it, therefore, *in* a succession of instants. Thus, each intuition takes place in each instant as a unity and the aggregation of these unities forms the unity of the appearance in time as a whole (see CPR A99).

Moreover, the empirical intuition is a certain kind of *representation* by which the mind refers immediately to an object (or to its states) which affects sensibility. By means of this affection we apprehend successively a manifold that can be either outer or inner, resulting from this a flowing intuition in time (see CPR A107, A169-70/B211-2). In this flux, some representations become past, insofar as they are succeeded by present representations which will become past, and so on. I suggest that when an intuition becomes past, it is no longer intuition, but only a 'representation' that operates as a remembrance of intuition. For, as the intuition of an object becomes past and is succeeded by the present one, the past "intuition" loses its *immediate* reference to the object and such a reference can only be preserved through a new present intuition. According to Kant, the recognition of the 'synthetic unity' (*synthetische Einheit*) of the appearances requires the reproduction of the past representation in imagination in order to associate a past representation with the present one i.e. intuition (see CPR A101-2). Similarly, the

[210] Kant in different places admits the relation between sensibility in general and the tensed-temporal relation of the *present*. For instance, in *Anthropology Mrongovius* he asserts that "the mental powers should be divided in an orderly fashion into those directed at the present, that is, the senses" (Ak 25:1277). Afterwards, he claims: "the entire power of cognition, with regard to time, is: 1. with regard to the past, recollection 2. with regard to the present, sensation through senses and 3. prevision or foresight" (Ak 25: 1289). In *Anthropology Busolt* he says that "there are three faculties of the mind, which are arranged according to time and all of them belong to the field of sensibility. Senses aim at *present* time" (Ak 25:1471; my translation) ("Es giebt drey Vermögen des Gemüths, die auf die Zeit Gestellt sind, und alle zum Felde der Sinnlichkeit Gehören. Die Sinne gehen auf die *gegenwärtigen* Zeit").

synthesis of recognition in the concept also demands that the matter (content) of the present representation coincides with the matter of the past reproduced representation (CPR A103). For, if the matter of the new representation differs from the matter of the past one, it would mean that the appearance or some of its states have ceased to affect sensibility in the same way that they did previously. This would imply that the matter of the present representation could refer to a different appearance, or to different states of that appearance.

To my knowledge, the 'Anticipations of Perception' do not contradict this rule by laying out that all appearances have intensive grades that are determined by the degree of influence of the objects on sense (CPR A166/B208).[211] However, the 'matter' of perception cannot be anticipated but it can only be known *a posteriori*, that is, it is derived from experience. Of course, the 'form' of perception can be anticipated as long as space and time are *a priori* forms of intuition which are not derived from experience:

> Since there is something in the appearances that is never cognized *a priori*, and which hence also constitutes the real difference between empirical and *a priori* cognition, namely the sensation (as matter of perception), it follows that it is really this that cannot be anticipated at all. On the contrary, we would call the pure determinations in space and time, in regard to shape as well as magnitude, anticipations of appearances, since they represent *a priori* that which may always be given *a posteriori* in experience. (CPR A167/B208-9)

Accordingly, granted that it is impossible to anticipate the matter of a future appearance but only its spatiotemporal conditions, inner and outer appearances as a *whole* cannot be anticipated, for they are necessarily constituted by form and matter (CPR A20/B34). It follows that the 'matter' of a future, undetermined and inexistent appearance of ourselves or of outer objects cannot be brought into the present. I suggest that even the empirical use of the categories of cause and effect relies on this third law. For instance, when we experience 'the uprooting of a small bush because of a twist', our **intuitions** of that event might be temporally ordered in the following manner: 'L': the intuition of the bush, 'M': the intuition of a twist upon the bush, 'N': the intuition of the shaking bush, 'O': the intuition of the bush moving through the air, etc. As a consequence, the intuition 'O' could not take place before the intuition L, insofar as this alteration would destroy the

[211] Kant also confesses this impossibility in *Metaphysik L*, where he claims: "although a future item makes no impression in me and thus no image, but rather only a present item does, one can still make in advance an image of future items, and imagine something in advance" (Ak 28:236). It means that a future representation would belong to imagination rather than to sensibility.

required sequence required by the formulation of a causal judgement (*judgement of experience*). Thus, if there were not a temporal relation among our intuitions, the order in which these occur would be always thoroughly unexpected and different, so that we could not formulate causal judgements.[212]

Moreover, this third rule has also an influence upon inner appearances, for when a young human being is conscious of its inner states, its understanding affects inner sense, resulting in the intuition of its inner states, which is successively succeeded by another, and so on (CPR B157 footnote). In that case, this rule would state that this boy cannot put an inner intuition, derived from the empirical self-consciousness carried out in its old age, within the flow of his current intuitions.[213] I think that the impossibility of breaking the sequence of successive apprehensions can be more easily evidenced in the outer appearances than in the inner ones. For in the former sequence, intuitions are related in time and space whereas, in the sequence of inner appearances, intuitions are only related in time.[214]

[212] Kant suggests that the causal relations attributed to experience are not grounded on a mere "regularity", as Hume believed (Hume, 1978), but on *necessity* and *universality* which is grounded on the *a priori* synthesis of the empirical manifold through the concepts of pure understanding, transcendental schemata and their corresponding principles of application (CPR A196/B241, A227/B280).

[213] Time is not an object of the experience but a subjective form of our intuitions which cannot be detached from our existence as human beings, namely, it cannot persist after we are dead. A similar interpretation is suggested by L. Friedman who claims about time that "it is contingent in just the way that consciousness is contingent. There need not have been any time if there were no consciousness, or rather no possibility of consciousness, i.e., no existence. Both are brute fact but necessarily interconnected" (Friedman, 1953, p. 385).

[214] For instance, if one goes for a walk in a Russian park during the winter, one intuits successively the path through which one is walking, and no *remote* future "intuition" of a coconut palm in Cuba can be located among the *proximate* intuitions of the path (except as a memory, which is not fully an intuition, or through a technological device that gives an "indirect" reference to the object).

Chapter 2.

The matter of the self-knowledge

> *"The sum total of pragmatic anthropology, in respect to the vocation of the human being and the characteristic of his formation, is the following. The human being is destined by his reason to live in a society with human beings and in it to cultivate himself, to civilize himself, and to moralize himself by means of the arts and sciences".*
>
> (Kant, *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view,* Ak 7:324-5)

2.1. Approaches to the self

In the first chapter of this text I have exposed the elements required by the inner experience, namely, inner sense, self-consciousness, representation of substances and so on. I also have pointed out implicitly that the content of inner experience should be: a) not *a priori* but derived from sensibility, b) not *noumenal* but rather *phenomenal*[215] and c) not timeless but ruled by a *tensed* and *tenseless* time that is related to the aforementioned three *Laws of the temporal determination of experience*. Now, the aim of this chapter is to determine the content of inner experience, by suggesting that the *form* of inner experience is 'pure' as long as it consists in time, while its *matter* is empirical, insofar as is derived from experience.

Since this chapter is concerned with the analysis of the *matter* of intuition of the self through the observation of human beings rather than with the analysis of the conditions for the possibility of experience, this analysis will not be metaphysical but rather anthropological (see Ak 10:145-6; Jacobs, 2003, p. 105). I suggest that this *matter* is constituted not only by representations, given in inner sense, of our inner states, but also by representations that arise from social development of the subject. The source of this

[215] The subject does not know itself in inner experience as it is *in itself* and the explanations about it do not belong to anthropology but to metaphysics, in as much as this has to do with the possibility of knowledge a priori (Ak 7:142-3; Sturm, 2017, p. 202).

anthropological analysis is Kant's *Anthropology*, which is the result of his lectures on anthropology given from 1772-3. These lectures were based principally on Christian Wolff's *Psychologia Empirica* and on the "Empirical Psychology" portion of Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* (see Klemme, 1999, p. 49; Wilson, 2006, pp. 18, 23; Frierson, 2014, p. 2). However, the important point is that "Kant *was* the first to introduce anthropology as a branch of study in German universities, and he took pride in the fact that these lectures were read at no other institution" (Van de Pitte, 1971, p. 3). Undoubtedly, Kant helped anthropology to become an academic discipline which is fed by his theoretical and practical philosophy (see Ak 10:145).[216]

Kant's *Anthropology*, as Reinhard Brandt notices, was not intended to be integrated into the system of transcendental philosophy, as it had the power to fill some gap or lack in the system. Rather, this can be conceived as an empirical discipline that stands on its own, although it might borrow relevant ideas from pure philosophy (see Brandt, 1999, p. 8). Indeed, some relevant ideas of the first book of the "Anthropological Didactic" match with some of the metaphysical ideas exposed in the CPR, such as time, self-consciousness[217], sensibility, inner sense, understanding, imagination, and others.[218] Thus, I think that Thomas Sturm is right in stating that anthropology and transcendental philosophy are *primarily* distinguished by their aims, specific methods, and the resultant status of their claims to knowledge rather than their overlapped subject-matter (see Sturm, 2017, p. 204).

Kant holds that anthropology, together with physical geography (whose Lectures began around 1756), are two 'sciences' that constitute 'knowledge of the world' (*Weltkenntnis*) (see Ak 7:122 footnote; 25:733, 9, 470, 1435, 1210).[219] This *Weltkenntnis* is divided into

[216] On the historical position of Kant's lectures of anthropology, Louden comments: "ANTHROPOLOGY was a new field of study when Kant first began offering lectures on it at Königsberg University in the winter semester of 1772—a product of the larger Enlightenment effort to emancipate the study of human nature from theologically based inquiries" (Louden, 2011, p. 78).

[217] T. Sturm suggests that the concept of pure self-consciousness, as it is treated in *Anthropology*, has a special *theoretical* function (see Sturm, 2017, p. 196f.).

[218] Frederick, P. Van de Pitte suggests that Kant's interest in discussing understanding, taste and practical interest in the *Anthropology* corresponds to the studies involved in the three Critiques. He also argues that there are anthropological material in the CPR and even that Kant had an anthropological interest as he wrote the CPR (see Van de Pitte, 1971, pp. 32-3).

[219] Kant suggests: "to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called *knowledge of the world*, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth" (Ak 7:119). In his *Plan and Announcement of a Series of Lectures on Physical Geography* (1757), he comments that his lectures include the explanation of "those tendencies of human

a ‘theoretical’ knowledge of ‘things in the world’ (animals, plants, minerals, races of the human being) and a ‘pragmatic’ knowledge of the human being as a free actor and potential citizen of the world (see Ak 7:120; Brandt, 1999, pp. 67-8; Sturm, 2009, p. 526). Thus, the term ‘pragmatic’ is opposed to the terms ‘speculative’, ‘theoretical’, ‘scholastic’, and ‘physiological’ (see Hinske, 1966, p. 424).

Finally, Kant points out the relevance of his lectures on anthropology in a letter to Marcus Herz, in which he declares that the aim of these lectures is “to disclose the sources of all the [practical] sciences, the science of morality, of skill, of human intercourse, of the way to educate and govern human beings, and thus of everything that pertains to the practical” (Ak 10:145; compare Ak 25:735). In my view, anthropology discloses the sources of sciences, because the diverse subject-matters of philosophy are encompassed in one academic discipline, that is, anthropology. This discipline does not overlook four crucial questions brought up by philosophy in a cosmopolitan sense: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? And –these questions relate to- What is man? (see Ak 10:24-5; 9:25; Louden, 2000, pp. 62, 199 footnote 3).

2.1.1. Rational psychology cannot constitute a right approach to the content of inner experience.

Before qualifying this content it is necessary to recognize what, according to Kant, should be excluded from it. First, this content cannot be derived from the investigation of the concept of the “I” insofar as it *thinks* itself but rather the investigation of the “I” insofar as it *intuits* itself.[220] Rational psychology erroneously takes the unity of consciousness for an intuition of the subject, as though that unity were an object of experience, trying to apply the concept of substance to it. As he puts it:

beings that are derived from the zone in which they live, the diversity of their prejudices and way[s] of thinking, insofar as all this can serve to acquaint man better with himself” (Ak 2:9).

[220] Kant points out that by means of the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, and therefore by means of the synthetic original unity of apperceptions, we can only be conscious of ourselves, not as we appear to ourselves nor as we are in ourselves, but rather we can only be conscious that *we are*. He also underlines that the consciousness of ourselves is a representation that should not be regarded as ‘an intuiting’ (*ein Anschauen*) but as ‘a thinking’ (*ein Denken*) (see CPR B157). This passage is not the only one in the CPR, where Kant admits a knowledge of ourselves apart from empirical. For he states that the human being can know itself as a purely *intelligible* object (see CPR A546-7/B574-5); this problem will not be explored here but it has been discussed by G. Hatfield (see Hatfield, 1992, p. 211f.).

> The unity of consciousness, which grounds the categories, is here taken for an intuition of the subject as an object, and the category of substance is applied to it. But this unity is only the unity of **thinking**, through which no object is given; and thus the category of substance, which always presupposes a given **intuition**, cannot be applied to it, and hence this subject cannot be cognized at all. (CPR B421-2).

Rational psychology is in Kant's view a doctrine that "increases" our knowledge of the soul, on the basis of the representation "I think" (see Marshall, 2010, p. 6). To my knowledge, this unity corresponds rather to a logical function of the understanding which cannot be intuited but is instead entailed by the judgement 'I think'. This judgement is the vehicle of all concepts in general, namely an empty representation, or a mere consciousness that accompanies all concept and hence is transcendental (see Ak 4:542). Accordingly the 'I think' cannot produce any intuition of ourselves but it can only determine our existence that is given in conformity with time, as form of inner sense, by which the "intuiting ourselves" is possible.[221] Certainly, the judgement 'I think', according to Kant, is the object of rational psychology:

> The expression "I", as a thinking being, already signifies the object of a psychology that could be called the rational doctrine of the soul, if I do not seek to know anything about the soul beyond what, independently of all experience (which always determines me more closely and *in concreto*), can be inferred from this concept **I** insofar as it occurs in all thinking. (CPR A342/B400)

Again, rational psychology grounds its complete wisdom on the 'I think' and converts a mere logical function into an object whose predications are not empirical but transcendental, namely the soul is a 'substance', 'simple', 'numerically identical' and 'in relation to possible objects in space' (see CPR A345/B403).[222] From these elements arise all concepts of the pure doctrine of the soul which encloses four Paralogisms. This doctrine cannot constitute a pure science of the nature of our thinking being, because its foundation is nothing else but the empty representation 'I' that accompanies all concepts. Therefore, according to Kant, it would be circular to affirm that if we want to judge something particular about the 'I' that judges, we would need to use the representation of 'I' that judges. In other words, the consciousness 'I think' is in itself a representation that

[221] "The **I think** expresses the act of determining my existence. The existence is thereby already given, but the way in which I am to determine it, i.e., the manifold that I am to posit in myself as belonging to it, is not yet thereby given. For that self-intuition is required, which is grounded in an *a priori* given form, i.e., time, which is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable" (CPR B157 footnote).

[222] Sturm is correct that around 1777-8 Kant discards the theses that 'das Ich' is a persistent substance and it is ontologically independent from the body; afterwards, he sharply criticizes them in the 'Paralogisms' of the doctrine of the soul (see Sturm, 2017, p. 199).

does not determine the 'I' as a particular or distinct object from a representation, but as a form of representation through which the 'I' thinks of itself (see CPR A346/B404). In contrast, Kant elucidates that the **condition** under which the 'I think' in general is merely a *property of my subject* should not be considered as valid for every subject that thinks, because a universal judgement could not be grounded on an empirical proposition. Kant, nonetheless, does not claim that that condition should be considered as invalid, but rather that it is impossible to determine the validity of that proposition, since no subject may have a minimal representation, through the outer experience, about another *thinking* being. Instead, the subject may only have access to the representations derived from *its own* empirical self-consciousness (see CPR A346/B404).

Kant asserts that empirical psychology is not a *science of the soul* and it could hardly be regarded as a natural science. It is rather a natural doctrine of inner sense, because I) mathematics cannot be applied to the 'phenomena' (*Phänomene*) of inner sense, II) the manifold of inner observation can only be distinguished in thought; this cannot be arbitrarily separated and recombined in the way physical bodies are in chemistry, and III) self-observation is not a method in which the object investigated is given to us as it normally behaves, but the very act of observation by itself changes and displaces the state of the observed object (see Ak 4:470-1; 15:801). [223]

In this vein, one fundamental interrogation arises: mental states can be measured?[224] With regards to this question I follow Sturm in maintaining that "Kant not only provides examples of measurements of mental states, some of them regarding the intensive magnitude of such states, but also states some methodological considerations as to how the measurements are possible" (Sturm, 2006, p. 369). In fact, Kant deals with the lower limits of certain kinds of sensation, particularly those related to the sight (see Ak 28:1, 425f, CPR A179/B222) and to the ear (see Ak 25:909, 54, 276, 920). He even admitted measurements of mental states from an *ontological* point of view but he still doubted about the *methodological* conditions of such measurements. That is to say, it was far from

[223] For a more detailed analysis of the exclusion of psychology from *natural science* see also Leary, 1982, pp. 22-3, Hatfield, 1992, p. 220 f., Sturm, 2001, pp. 178-9.
[224] Measuring mental states corresponds to the goal of psychometry as it was initially developed by Christian Wolff, in as much as it studies the mathematical laws the soul obeys (see Sturm, 2006, pp. 359-60). For a quite detailed study of the introduction of measurement and quantification into the science of the soul in the Age of Enlightenment, see Vidal, 2011 p. 129f.

certain how the quantitative structure of these states *could* and *should* be measured. Kant rejected A. Baumgarten and N. Tetens' (1736-1807) version of introspectionism, which demanded the method of empirical psychology to be "inner" self-observation alone. This method functioned independently from any other source of knowledge, although it did not have the capacity to quantify the mental states (see Sturm 2006, pp. 371-2).

In addition, Kant's criticism of rational psychology establishes that it cannot be proved that the soul is simple and therefore that there is no reason to hold that the soul will resist 'disintegration' (*Zerteilung*) by which the self, or the human being, would persist after death:

> The persistence of the soul, merely as an object of inner sense, remains unproved and even unprovable, although its persistence in life, where the thinking being (as a human being) is at the same time an object of outer sense, is clear of itself; but this is not at all sufficient for the rational psychologist, who undertakes to prove from mere concepts the absolute persistence of the soul even beyond life. (CPR B415)

Kant's theory of the self, unlike rational psychology, states that the *thinking* being (the logical self) cannot be perceived through outer sense[225], but only the self (the empirical self) can intuit itself through inner sense (see Ak 7:216; 25:10; CPR B157). Despite the fact that Kant holds that no argument proving the persistence of the mind after death of human beings can be admitted, human beings are tempted to *infer* an "absolute" permanence of the soul *from* the persistence of soul presupposed in life of other persons (see also Sturm, 2001, p. 171). In my view, Kant does not claim that the soul disappears after death but he rather claims that it is absolutely impossible to know whether the soul remains after the material part of a human is dispersed. Particularly, he considers that the proof given by Leibniz and Christian Wolff about the immortality of the soul can be seen *a priori* as impossible, because inner experience, through which we know ourselves and experience in general, exist only in life, namely, when the soul and the body are united (see Ak 20:309).[226]

[225] As he puts it: "**I**, as thinking, am an object of inner sense, and am called "soul." That which is an object of outer sense is called "body." Accordingly, the expression "I," as a thinking being, already signifies the object of a psychology that could be called the rational doctrine of the soul" (CPR A342/B400). As J. Vogel notices, we should not confuse "the I known empirically through judgments of inner sense with the transcendental I which isn't known at all-where such confusion is the source of paralogisms" (Vogel, 1993, p. 881 footnote 18).

[226] Kant, nevertheless, admits that "from a moral point of view, however, we do have sufficient reason to assume a life for man after death (the end of his earthly life) and even for eternity, and hence the immortality of the soul; and this doctrine is a practico-dogmatic transition to the super-sensible" (Ak 20:309).

Kant stresses that the human soul should not be taken for something material that can be simple or composite, for it is impossible to explain how "*I am constituted as a thinking subject*" on the basis of **materialism.** This is because the soul cannot be related to a spatial representation. Instead, the proposition 'I think' is merely empirical. It does not entail that every thinking being exists but only that "**I exist** thinking". This contains only the determinability of the subject's existence with regard to its representations in time (see CPR B420). It does not mean that Kant admits that **spiritualism** is a satisfactory way of explaining the subject's existence, because the subject can only think of itself if it perceives something persisting (substance) and such perception can only be derived from outer sense.

Moreover, Kant warns that the inclusion of empirical elements in the foundations of rational psychology would convert it into the empirical psychology; the latter is concerned with the perceptions of the inner states of the subject, such as pleasure or displeasure, of which the subject is aware through self-consciousness (see CPR A343/B401).[227] Kant conceives of empirical psychology as a *physiology* of inner sense that is concerned with the observations of the play of our thoughts and with the natural laws that could arise from such a play (see CPR A347/B405; Ak 28:222, 224).[228] Empirical psychology, hence, would serve to explain appearances of inner sense, although does not have the power to reveal properties that lie beyond experience (*e.g.* the simplicity of soul and so on), nor the power to teach *apodictically* something about the nature of thinking beings in general (see CPR A347/B405-6).

[227] Despite some historians have traced the tradition of *rational psychology* and the tradition of empirical psychology to R. Descartes and J. Locke, it was Christian Wolff who first clearly distinguished, defined and established rational and empirical psychology as two different, although related, fields of intellectual inquiry (see Leary, 1982, p. 19, Dyck, 2016, p. 333, Richards, 1980, p. 227); a more detailed analysis of the development of Kant's psychology in the 1770's can be found in Sturm (2009), Dyck (2016) and Kitcher (2016). Afterwards, in the ML_1 (1770) Kant distinguished empirical from rational psychology by claiming that in the former the human soul is known through experience, whereas in the latter the soul is known *a priori* from mere concepts (see Ak 28:263).

[228] Gary Hatfield suggests that the term 'physiology' should be understood as a 'science of nature' (Hatfield, 1992, p. 206). According to Andrew Brook's interpretation, the physiology of inner sense studies 'empirical self-awareness' (EAS), which involves awareness of particular psychological states like perceptions, memories and desires. Moreover, that form of self-awareness is distinguished from 'apperceptive self-awareness' (ASA) which is not awareness of some states but rather awareness of oneself, namely , this awareness does not depend upon a particular kind of representation but, by contrast, any act of apperceptive representing makes it available (see Brook, 1994, p. 55).

In spite of having excluded the accounts of *rational psychology* from the current analysis of the content of inner sense, I consider that there is no reason to hold the same impossibility regarding *empirical psychology* that, in Kant's time, was concerned with the study of human nature. It has no distinguishing *a priori* principles but all of its content comes from empirical study (see Frierson, 2014, p. 49).[229] I think that it is fundamental to determine the similarities and differences between anthropology and empirical psychology regarding their subject-matter. However, I do not think that Kantian anthropology can be perfectly distinguished from all other disciplines (especially from empirical psychology, morals, history, etc.) with absolute clarity. Instead, I deem correct N. Hinske's interpretation, according to which anthropology is a discipline whose field is **insecurely** limited because this wants to go **beyond** the boundaries of a discipline that is rather concerned with **totality** (see Hinske, 1966, p. 426; Wolandt, 1988, p. 368).

First, Otto Casmanns (1562-1607) is considered to be the first who ascribes the name of *Anthropologia* to the doctrine of human nature, which was then divided into *Psychologia*, understood as the doctrine of the human mind and *somatologia*, regarded as the doctrine of the human body (see Brandt, 1999, p. 50; Lapointe, 1973, p. 145; Klemme, 1996, p. 32). Further, Heiner Klemme suggests that, for Christian Wolf, anthropology, psychology and pneumatology belong to the field of empirical and rational psychology. However, in c.1746, Johan Andreas Fabricius held that anthropology was a 'science' (*Wissenschaft*) of the first principles of the human being in general, while the soul is the object of psychology and spirit the object of Pneumatology. It seems that anthropology was, according to Fabricius, a more general science as long as it was not focused on a single characteristic of the human being, but its object was the human being as far as is tightly linked to the world, although different from other things, especially from animals (see Klemme, 1996, p. 33).

Furthermore, anthropology and empirical psychology are reciprocally related not only from a systematic perspective, but also from a historical-philosophical perspective, for

[229] This view is endorsed by Allen W. Wood who, regarding Kant's lectures, states: "though his earliest lectures on anthropology (1772-1773) appear to equate anthropology with empirical psychology (VA 25:8), he later refers to 'empirical psychology' as the part of anthropology that deals only with appearances of inner sense (VA 25:243, KrV A347/B405)" (Wood, 1999, p. 197; see also Louden, 2011, p. 79). Kant, as Wood notices, deemed it as wrong the way in which some of his predecessors dealt with empirical psychology and anthropology, for Kant refused to confuse the questions of empirical psychology with those of metaphysics or transcendental philosophy (see Ak 25:8, 243, 473; Ak 28:223-4, 541, 584; 29:756-7).

anthropology grew out from his lectures on empirical psychology (see Klemme, 1996, p. 14; Brandt, 1999, p. 62; Frierson, 2014, p. 48). [230] Kant, nonetheless, makes clear that empirical psychology is not yet rich enough to comprise a subject on its own, although it is still very important. Empirical psychology must be banned from metaphysics and, therefore, should have its place within a complete anthropology (see CPR A848-9/B876-7; Ak 28:223). As a result, Kant gradually replaced empirical psychology with pragmatic anthropology, as long as the knowledge and reasoning typically tackled by empirical psychology were incorporated into his anthropology (see Sturm, 2009, pp. 134-5).

Needless to say, Kant's view of empirical psychology and of pragmatic anthropology are not mutually exclusive, for he used the chapter on 'Empirical Psychology' from Alexander Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* for his lectures on anthropology (see Ak 25:1214; Kant, 2000. p. xvi; Kant, 2012. pp. 2, 4, 7; Sturm, 2009, p. 370; Frierson, 2014, p. 1). It seems necessary to take Baumgarten's own text (which evidently leans on Wolff's *Psychologia Emiprica*) into consideration in order to identify the subject-matter of empirical psychology that was *initially* tackled by Kant.

Baumgarten defines psychology as 'the science of general predicates of the soul' (*scientia predicatorum animae generalium*) (see 2013, §501) and, to be precise, empirical psychology is the science of the soul that is derived 'in a more proximate way' (*propius*) from experience (see §503). Baumgarten holds that the soul is conscious of other things and, therefore, is a 'representative force' (*vis representativa*) of the universe. Empirical psychology is concerned with the experience that we have of the accidents of the soul like *cogitationes* (see §505-7) and with the *commercium* of the soul and the body (see §512-13). In fact, Baumgarten points out that the human being (as any other animal) is constituted by the *commercium* between the human soul and the human body (see 2013, §740-1; Dyck, 2014, pp. 46-7).

[230] Fernando Vidal deals with the connection between psychology and anthropology in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from a general perspective and says that "the way psychology and anthropology switched roles is significant in this respect. Roughly until the end of the seventeenth century, anthropology was a branch of psychology, because psychology was the generic science of living beings (plants, animals, and man). The fact that in the eighteenth century psychology became a branch of anthropology was the sign of a profound transformation" (Vidal, 2011, pp. 243-4).

However, there is not an exact and consistent definition[231] of empirical psychology throughout Kant's works and at times not even in the same text. Certainly, (i) in the *Dissertation* (1770) Kant suggests that the subject-matter of empirical psychology consists in appearances of inner sense (see Ak 2:397); ii) in *Metaphysik L* (mid-1770) he says that this consists in the human soul cognized from experience[232] (see Ak 28:263) or in the cognition of the objects of inner sense, insofar as such cognition is obtained from experience[233] (see Ak 28:222); iii) in his *Lectures on anthropology* (*Parrow*, 1772-3) he points out that the subject-matter consists in appearances of our soul that constitute the object of inner sense (see Ak 25:243); iv) in the CPR (1781) he suggests that empirical psychology is a *physiology of inner sense* which could perhaps explain the appearances of inner sense (see CPR A347/B405); v) in *Metaphysical foundations of natural science* (1786) he holds that the empirical doctrine of the soul cannot become more than a natural doctrine of inner sense (see Ak 4:471); finally, vi) in the *Anthropology*, he claims that in psychology we investigate ourselves with regard to our ideas of inner sense (see Ak 7:134 footnote; 7:398-9).

As a consequence, I suggest that empirical appearances of inner sense[234] are often described as a particular subject-matter of empirical psychology (see also Frierson, 2014, p. 5; Svare, 2006, pp. 56-7). Even empirical appearances of inner sense have been discussed by empirical psychology as well as anthropology (see Brandt, 1999, p. 59). [235]

[231] Gary Hatfield holds that it is difficult to determine the explicit and implicit relation between Kant and psychology because "in Kant's time psychology was not an established science with an accepted body of doctrine, it was a science in the making, and its creators disagreed over how it should be made. Many authors, including Christian Wolff and his followers, treated psychology as the rational and empirical study of an immaterial, substantial soul; Kant began with this conception, but he ultimately supported a conception of psychology as a natural science, according to which all mental phenomena are subject to natural law" (Hatfield, 1992, pp.200-1). Moreover, G. Hatfield suggests in a note pertaining to his translation of *Prolegomena* that, in Kant's time, anthropology included topics that were also discussed in empirical psychology (Kant, 2002, p. 482, footnote 77).

[232] The same idea is subsequently found in his *Metaphysik Mrongovius* (1782-3) (see Ak 29:756, 876f.)

[233] In this lecture Kant points out that the issue of the *community* of the soul with the body belongs to empirical psychology (see Ak 28:590). There he holds under the label of empirical psychology that the powers of the human soul are the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure (see Ak 28:584). Similarly, in *Metaphysik Dohna* (1792-3) Kant claims that the second part of psychology is the feeling of pleasure and displeasure (see Ak 28:674).

[234] There are also places where Kant maintains that empirical psychology is focused on inner experience rather than on inner sense (see Ak 7:143; 4:255-6).

[235] Allen W. Wood provides a similar interpretation as he holds that, in Kant's earliest lectures on anthropology, anthropology and empirical psychology are equated; subsequently, empirical psychology is understood by Kant as the part of anthropology that deals with appearances of inner sense (see Ak 7:134 footnote, 142, 398-9; Wood, 2003, pp. 45-6). However, I do not think that in the first reference (see Ak 25:8) anthropology and empirical psychology are equated by Kant. Rather, Kant only points out a common point between them, namely that neither anthropology nor empirical psychology belong to metaphysics, in

In fact, Kant holds around 1775-6 that "the world as an object of outer sense is nature, the world as an object of inner sense is the human being" (Ak 25:469; see also Ak 25: 10, 244, 1241). He also claims in *Anthropology* that "knowledge of the human being through inner experience (…) is more important than correct judgment of others, but nevertheless at the same time perhaps more difficult" (Ak 7:143). Therefore, Kantian anthropology is concerned with both inner and outer sense, that is to say with behavior and actions of human beings (see Cohen, 2009, p. 57).

Moreover, Kant suggests that as far as knowledge of the human being through inner experience is concerned, "it is advisable and even necessary to begin with observed ***appearances*** **in** oneself, and then to progress above all to the assertion of certain propositions that concern human nature; that is, to *inner experience*" (see Ak 7:143; my emphasis). In my opinion, this methodological analysis seems to be derived from the empirical psychology proposed by Christian Wolff, who held that we can formulate general valid propositions for all human beings based on empirical observations of the human soul.[236]

In other passage, Kant explicitly maintains that perceptions of inner sense and inner experience in general constitute a subject-matter treated by empirical psychology and anthropology:

> Its perceptions [of inner sense] and the inner experience (true or illusory) composed by means of their connections are not merely *anthropological*, where we abstract from the question of whether the human being has a soul or not (as a special incorporeal substance); but *psychological*, where we believe we perceive such a thing within ourselves, and the mind, which is represented as a mere faculty of feeling and thinking, is regarded as a special substance dwelling in the human being. (Ak 7:161).

which there is no experiential knowledge. In the second reference (see Ak 25:243) Kant does not establish literally that empirical psychology is a part of anthropology but rather that it is a species of *natural doctrine* (next to physics, amongst others) which deals with appearances of the soul and, therefore, empirical psychology does not belong to metaphysics.

[236] Wolff claims: "*those things, among which we observe to exist in the mind, are collected by a proper reasoning and also inferred from these things; the same things that are also convenient for the mind*. *The same is also true for all other being.* Since those things along with those which we observe to inhabit the mind are collected by a proper reasoning and even they are inferred from those things which therefore are then collected properly; these things are demonstrated with regard to human mind" (Wolff, 1968, §27) ("*Quae ex iis, quae menti inesse observamus, legitimo ratiocinio colliguntur & quae porro ex his inferuntur; eadem quoque menti conveniunt*. *Idem valet de omni ente alio.* Etenim quae ex iis, quae menti inesse observamus, legitimo ratiocinio colliguntur, ac porro ex his, quae scilicet legitimo inde collecta sunt, inferuntur; ea de mente humana demostrantur"); (see also Richards, 1980, p. 228; Vidal, 2011, p. 128f.).

I deem Sturm's interpretation to be correct, according to which Kant admitted "**introspectionism**" in his anthropology until 1770s, but subsequently in the 1780s, he began to move away from this and show more interest in observation and interpretation of the public actions of human beings from a psychological framework of beliefs, perceptions, desires and feelings.[237] Since the act of observing one's interior is unreliable, the implementation of a purely *introspective* method in anthropology would make its epistemological basis quite arid and distorting (see Sturm, 2017, p. 201; Sturm, 2009, p. 202f. and below section 2.1.2.1). Kant underlines the difficulties arisen by introspection in different places of his lectures on anthropology, where he repeatedly suggests that the occupation and observation of oneself is "unnatural" (see Ak 25: 478, 220, 1220).[238]

It is important to notice that pragmatic anthropology incorporates psychological vocabulary ('acts of cognition', 'feelings' and 'desires'), which is relevant to investigate the human being as a free actor and possible citizen of the world (see Ak 7:286; Sturm, 2009, p. 526). However, empirical psychology and pragmatic anthropology can be differentiated regarding their *subject-matter* and their pursed *goals*.[239] First, anthropology (unlike empirical psychology) is not principally concerned with appearances of inner sense but with the human being as a unity of mind and body (see Ak 25:469-70; 2: 443 footnote; Svare, 2006, p. 56; Louden, 2000, pp. 65-6).[240] It means that anthropology investigates not only human faculties (*e.g.* understanding, memory, etc.) but also human action in a cultural context, in as much as the human being, as a citizen of the world, is engaged with other human beings in social intercourse (see Ak 25:624, 472, 856; 7:120;

[237] "Up until the 1770s, Kant also stuck to the view of the "inner sense" as the sole and independently functioning empirical source of psychological knowledge. He viewed introspection even as the method for his own anthropology, in which he incorporated much psychological knowledge of his times (e.g., II 397; XXV 7, 243, 473; XXIX 44). But, after the early 1780s, he increasingly rejected introspectionism. Introspectionism delivers, at best, hints; it does not provide an actual justification of empirical claims about the human mind" (Sturm, 2006, p. 372).

[238] In one of those places Kant explains that observation of oneself is unnatural because this "tires the mind exceedingly and ultimately renders it confused" (Ak 25:1218).

[239] T. Sturm (2009) believes that when Kant started to lecture on anthropology in 1772-3 he increasingly used "anthropology" rather than "empirical psychology" to describe the empirical science of human beings that he was developing (mentioned by Frierson, 2014, p. 47 footnote 52 –although he might not be right about the year-).

[240] T. Sturm suggests that "Kant understands empirical self-consciousness in the anthropological context not as [a consciousness] formed by representations of "inner sese" but, above all, as the rich practical concept of the self which is formed from increasing complex social interactions, which are possible by our reason" (Sturm, 2017, p. 218; my translation) ("versteht Kant das empirische Selbstbewusstsein im anthropologischen Kontext nicht etwa als eines, das durch die Vorstellungen des „inneren Sinns" gebildet wird, sondern als das reichhaltige, vor allem praktische Selbstkonzept, das sich vor allem aus zunehmend komplexen sozialen Interaktionen bildet, die durch unsere Vernunft erst ermöglicht werden").

Brandt, 1999, p. 70; Louden, 2000, p. 71; Sturm, 2017, pp. 201, 218).[241] Second, Kant develops an anthropology that integrates human diversity (*e.g.* diversity of sex, race, ethnicity, etc.) and historical material into the analysis of the human being (see Frierson, 2014, p. 48).

Furthermore, their goals are ultimately different, for empirical psychology, as a 'scholastic cognition'[242] (*Schulkenntnis*), looks after accounts of human mental states, which are relevant in an academic context alone (see Ak 25:855), while pragmatic anthropology, as a systematically formulated *Weltkenntnis*, looks after accounts of the human being which can be used more generally by anybody in life:

> Such a pragmatic anthropology is now our end. It should not be a theoretical anthropology, which merely poses questions and contains in itself only psychological investigations; on the contrary, we want to give instruction as to how through observation one might come to be acquainted with the constitution of human beings so as to be able to use them here to our end. (Ak 25:1436)

In fact, empirical psychology aims at a theoretical cognition of the human being, whereas anthropology aims at a practical cognition of it, through which human beings are taught to *use* this cognition for accomplishing their own goals (see Ak 7:119; 25: 470-1, 855; see also Frierson, 2014, p. 47; Wilson, 2006, p. 25). In this vein, I suggest that Kantian anthropological analysis is *descriptive* as long as it seeks to know the human being according to its species and, at the same time, is *prescriptive* because it enquires into how the human being *should* act in order to be prudent, knowing how it can use other persons to its own end (see Ak 10:145-6; 25:1436, 471, 1210; Ak 7:199, 271, 253; Van de Pitte, 1971, pp. 3-4). Certainly, Kant's anthropology is characterized by its experiential roots,

[241] I disagree with Rudolf A. Makkreel, who takes a more radical position, as he thinks that Kant's *Anthropology* excludes introspection and inner sense. Nonetheless, he suggests an "implicit self-consciousness" that is practically necessary in accordance with one's social context (see Makkreel, 2014, pp. 21, 25-6). One subject-matter of Kant's *Anthropology* is our 'cognitive faculty' (*Erkenntnißvermögen*) and inner sense is a cognitive faculty which relies on sensibility (see Ak 7:123, 153).

[242] Empirical psychology is regarded as scholastic cognition (see Ak 15:800, 1436). Moreover, Kant holds that, with regard to the term *Schulkenntnis*, "one has scholastic cognition if one can communicate one's information according to a certain system" (Ak 25:1435). 'Schulkenntnis' is in an adversarial relationship with 'Weltkenntnis', so that "he who makes a scholastic use of his knowledge is a pedant, he knows how to describe his concepts merely with the technical expressions of the school and speaks merely in scholarly phrases of expression" (Ak 25:853).

the inherent popularity of its subject-matter and its moral and even immoral[243] purposes (see Louden, 2000, p. 63; Erdmann, 1882, p. 54; Louden, 2011, pp. 69, 82).

In the eighteenth century, some philosophers of the movement *Popularität*[244] liked to think of themselves as the friends of the Enlightenment, for they "were extending rational discourse to all aspects of social existence, thus bringing to reflection distinctions that once were taken for granted" (Di Giovanni, 2005, p. 38). They criticized academic philosophy for being dogmatic, speculative, technical and useless for the human being (see Sturm, 2006, p. 292). For instance, Christian Garve criticized Kant's style, complaining that the latter philosopher was not capable of expressing the philosophical system contained in the CPR in a pleasing and popular style as it occurs in *Popularphilosophie.*[245] Kant replied to such critique in a letter to Christian Garve, dated 7th August 1783, that popularity cannot be demanded for studies of such high abstraction (see Ak 10:339; Delon, 2013, p. 1015). In Kant's view empirical psychology and physiological anthropology provide us with a *scholastic* knowledge (*Schulkenntnis*) of the human being, which is far from being *practical*:

> Knowledge of the human being is twofold. Speculative knowledge of the human being makes us skilled and is treated in psychology and physiology, but practical knowledge of the human being makes us prudent; it is a knowledge of the art of how one human being has influence on another and can lead him according to his purpose. One calls all practical

[243] For instance, a person who knows about emotional issues could use that knowledge to convince people in that condition to buy a product which cannot help them. Thus, that person would intentionally make a profit with something that evidently does not work. As Louden notices, the human being is led by a bidirectional inclination not only to form associations with the others, but also to compete and quarrel against each other (see Louden, 2011, p. 75)

[244] For instance, Denis Diderot claimed "let us hasten to make philosophy popular" in his *Pensée sur I'interprétation de la nature* (1754); such claim was echoed in the political and social reality of the European world and particularly in reforms and revolutions between the 1760 and 1770. This claims also had an influence on Johann August Ernesti, who held in *De philosophia populari Prolusio* (1754) that true philosophy should be in closer contact with society; such idea was very relevant for the German *Enlightenment* (see Venturi, 1991, pp. 454-5; Zammito, 2001, p. 392; Louden, 2000, pp. 64-5). However some of the popular philosophers were attacked by other non-popular philosophers; for instance, "Jacobi regularly referred to them contemptuously as "Messrs the Enlighteners." Hegel was to dub them "the gossipers of the Enlightenment"". (Di Giovanni, 2005, p. 37).

[245] Christian Garve claims in a letter to Kant about the CPR: "your whole system, if it is really to become useful, must be expressed in a popular manner, and if it contains truth then it can be expressed. And I believe that the new language which reigns throughout the book, no matter how much sagacity is shown in the coherence with which its terms are connected, nevertheless often creates a deceptive appearance, making the projected reform of science itself or the divergence from the ideas of others seem greater than it really is" (Ak 10:331-2). Not only Garve but other academics also connected which *Popularphilosophie*, such as J. G. H. Feder, H. A. Pistorius and J. A. H. Ulrich, who directed their objections at distinctions, drawn by Kant in the CPR, between "the thing in itself and appearances", "sense and understanding" and "understanding and reason" (see Di Giovanni, 2005, p. 49).

> knowledge of the human being 'pragmatic' insofar as it serves to fulfill our overall aims. (Ak 25:855)

In contrast, Kant suggests that the human being should not be studied in *speculative* terms but in *pragmatic* terms and, therefore, he did not want his lectures on anthropology to be neither very speculative nor shallow. Instead, these had to be very systematic, popular and pleasant to every reader, as long as they contained observations of ordinary life that allowed his readers and listeners to compare their experiences with Kant's own remarks (see Ak 10:145-6; 7:121-2; 25:470-1, 733; Hinske, 1966, p. 414). The term 'pragmatic' (*pragmatisch*), as Robert Louden notices, is used by Kant in at least four ways (see Louden, 2000, pp. 69-70; Ak 25:734-5): i) it refers to our talent of being skillful in the *use* of other human beings for one's purposes (see Ak 7:322; 25:1436);[246] ii) it refers to our capability to find efficient means to create our own happiness (see Ak 7:210, 276-7); iii) it refers to our capacity to set ends for ourselves freely and to act accordingly with them (see Ak 7:119; 6:444) and iv) it embraces moral concerns, as long as morality plays a significant role in social intercourse (see Ak 7:147, 151, 186). Certainly, these ways or features shape a pragmatic knowledge that is useful for ordinary human beings in the *school* as well as in *life* in general (see Ak 2:443).[247]

2.1.2. Pragmatic anthropology vs physiological anthropology

The ongoing exposition about the matter of intuition of the self does not focus on the physiological nor natural-scientific analysis of the human brain but rather on the constitutive elements of inner experience of the subject in the relation with others.

Kant, in conformity with his interest in the demarcation between different disciplines, distinguishes between a *physiological* and a *metaphysical* analysis of the mind. On the one hand, the *physiological* analysis is concerned with the matter that renders possible the union of all sensory representations in the mind, namely, that union is located in the 'brain water' (*Hirnwasser*):

[246] This use of the term *pragmatic* can be equated with that of the term *prudence*, as far as the later consists in "using other human beings for one's purposes" (Ak 7:201; 9:486).
[247] For a detailed study of Kant's use of the term 'pragmatic' see also: Kant, 2006, p. xix-xxii; Wilson, 2006, p. 20; Wood, 2003, pp. 40-2.

> But the *water* that is in the brain cavities can serve to mediate the influence of one nerve on another and, by the latter's reaction, can serve to tie up in one consciousness the corresponding representation, without these impressions becoming confused - as little as the tones of a polyphonous concert transmitted through the *air* are confused with each other. (Ak 12:41-2)

On the other hand, *metaphysical* analysis of the mind is not concerned with the matter that grounds the mind nor with a substance but rather with a faculty that has the power to unite representations, namely, this analysis "is concerned with the pure consciousness and with the latter's *a priori* unity in the synthesis *(Zusammensetzung)* of given representations (i.e., concerned with the understanding)" (Ak 12:32 footnote). Therefore, a *physiological* analysis of the mind is not possible but only of the brain. However, a *metaphysical* analysis of the brain is also not possible. This impossibility leads Kant to reject a "localization" of mental phenomena.[248] Instead, he accepts that the mind and its processes are the object of the inner sense whereas the brain and its processes are the object only of the outer one:

> It is the concept of a *seat of the soul* that occasions the disagreement of the faculties concerning the common sensory organ and this concept therefore had better be left entirely out of the picture, which is all the more justified since the concept of a seat of the soul requires *local presence,* which would ascribe to the thing that is only an object of the inner sense, and insofar only determinable according to temporal conditions, a spatial relation, thereby generating a contradiction. (Ak 12:31-2)

Accordingly, Kant rejects the formulation of the concept 'seat of the soul' (*Sitz der Seele*) because the representations of the mind by means of inner sense is not determined by space but only by time.[249] Thus, according to Kant it is contradictory in itself to consider that the unity of consciousness of oneself may be figured out in the spatial relation of the mind (or soul) to the organs of the brain, for the mind cannot have the same kind of existence as the material components of the world. The existence of the mind can only be *internally* intuited and a putative external intuition thereof would place mind outside of itself, which would be contradictory. The mind, hence, cannot be an object of outer sense like external things are:

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[248] This point is remarked by Kant as he claims that "the transition from the corporeal motion to the spiritual cannot be further explained, so Bonnet and various others are in great error when they believe they can infer with certainty from the brain to the soul" (Ak 25:9; see also Ak 2:325 footnote).

[249] Similarly, D. Hume took a skeptical view of the *local conjunction* of the soul with matter, because "'tis impossible any thing [sic] divisible can be *conjoin'd* [sic] to a thought or perception, which is a being altogether inseparable and indivisible" (*Treatise*, p. 234). As a consequence, neither thoughts nor perceptions can exist on the left or on the right hand side of an extended divisible body; neither can they exist on the surface nor in the middle of it.

> If I am to render intuitive the location of my soul, i.e., of my absolute self, anywhere in space, I must perceive myself through the very same sense by which I also perceive the matter immediately surrounding me, just as it happens when I want to determine my place in the world *as a human being*, namely I must consider my body in relation to other bodies outside me. (Ak 12: 34-5)

Accordingly, it appears that psychophysiological investigations of the brain and its relations to mental phenomena are not useful for Kant's pragmatic approach, which pursues practical goals.[250] Kant's endorses this idea in a letter to Markus Herz, towards the end of 1772, where he states that "the subtle and, to my view, eternally futile inquiries as to the manner in which bodily organs are connected with thought I omit entirely" (Ak 10:145). Therefore, human beings should not be fruitfully viewed in merely physiological terms, namely as mere links in a causal mechanism, but as free agents (see Wood, 2003, p. 40).

2.1.3. Methodological remarks on Kant's pragmatic approach to anthropology

It is fundamental to determine the particular position of anthropology with regard to other sciences in terms of its epistemological status and its method. First, the possibility of Kant's pragmatic anthropology claiming the status of science has been under question: Max Dessoir has a **negative** view about it, for he suggests that Kantian anthropology is just an impartial description of events and states of consciousness, which cannot reach the status of pure science (see Dessoir, 1924, p. 117). Similarly, Brian Jacobs holds that anthropology cannot claim the status of science in the formal science but it is rather a tenuous inquiry (see Jacobs, 2003, pp. 109, 111).

Allen Woods has a kind of **neutral** view, as he suggests that Kant was doubtful about the capacity of human beings to study human nature and therefore he has serious doubts about "the standards for scientific knowledge and the fact that the subject-matter of anthropology cannot meet them" (Wood, 1999, p. 197). H. L. Wilson works in a similar

[250] Thomas Sturm suggests that Kant never elaborates skeptical claims about the passage between physiological and mental processes and never argues against the possibility of a physiological anthropology and this is because "the issue of whether we have a more or less reliable psychophysiological knowledge is not high on his agenda when he reflects on the presuppositions of his pragmatic anthropology" (Sturm, 2008, p. 499; see, for instance, Ak 7:154).

direction, as he thinks that Kant simply does not pretend to convert his anthropology into a science, for "pragmatic anthropology (…) does not have the same pretensions to science as empirical or rational psychology do. It is not a science that seeks to explain, but rather to judge" (Wilson, 2006, p. 26).

Norbert Hinske has a more **positive** view and holds that Kant's anthropology is a science whose 'well-groundedness' (*Gründlichkeit*) is questioned and its position is subordinate (see Hinske, 1966, p. 410), while Nayak and Sotnak admit more strongly that anthropology is a science (see Nayak & Sotnak, 1995, p. 146). Frederick Van de Pitte emphasizes that anthropology is "an empirical science which, with physics, makes up empirical philosophy" (Van de Pitte, 1971, p. 2). Reinhardt Brandt thinks that this anthropology has the status of science, although this status is not grounded on critical-transcendental philosophy (see Brandt, 1999, p. 37). Similarly, Louden suggests that Kant hopes his anthropology will be a proper **empirical** science intended to help orient students even out of school, rather than a fragmentary groping ground. Louden, nonetheless, notices a conflict between an intended *systematicity* and the popular *Weltkenntnis* as it is not evident whether a systematic science can be entertaining to women getting dressed (see Louden, 2000, p. 66).[251] As a consequence, he suggests that "what Kant aspires to in his *Anthropology* lectures is an empirical science; albeit a much more informal, less rigorous one than was (and to some extent still is) popular in more positivistic and behavioristic circles" (Louden, 2000, p. 67).

The difficulties concerning the status of anthropology are partly motivated by the fact that Kant was not worried about the scientific status of his physical geography or pragmatic anthropology. He was neither worried about the epistemic foundations that allow anthropology to have the title of science (see Brandt, 1999, p. 38). Needless to say, anthropology cannot be a mathematical nor an experimental science, it does not contain *a priori* principles and mathematics cannot be applied to anthropology (see Ak 4:470, 13-

[251] Pauline Kleingeld maintains that often women are not included in Kant's use of the term 'humanity' (the human being); in Kant's view, they should not even participate in the legal sphere but their faculty and duty are related to moral action, so that they would not play the same relevant role in the final purpose of history as men do (see Kleingeld, 1995, p. 32f.). In my view, Kant holds that women as well as men are rational beings but establishes a different distribution of roles in society for women and men (see Ak 7:303). But even such unequal distribution prevents women from being excluded from humanity and the public of *Anthropology*. Notwithstanding, women are destined by nature in *Anthropology* to two goals: the preservation of the species and its refinement (see Ak 7:305-6; 25:1189; 25:701; Louden, 2000, pp. 83-7).

15; Brandt, 1999, pp. 37-8). However, I believe that anthropology claims the status of "pragmatic science"[252], in as much as it has systematic unity (see Ak 7:119, 121; 25:1435), which is a condition by which ordinary cognition is converted into science (see CPR A832/B860).[253] Therefore, pragmatic anthropology can be regarded as an empirical science that aims at a systematic knowledge of the human being (see Brandt, 1999, pp. 9, 43), as far as it is endowed with reason and free will:

> This knowledge of the world serves to procure the *pragmatic* element for all otherwise acquired sciences and skills, by means of which they become useful not merely for the *school* but rather for *life* and through which the accomplished apprentice is introduced to the stage of his destiny, namely, the *world.* (Ak 2:443).

Of course, *systematic unity* and *utility* are two fundamental features of a pragmatic anthropology that deals with the *observation* of human actions, the *participation* of human beings in social intercourse and the formulation of general rules, under which individual cases (*i.e*. behaviors, characters, ways of thinking, etc.) can be interpreted:

> An anthropology written from a pragmatic point of view that is systematically designed and yet popular (through reference to examples which can be found by every reader), yields an advantage for the reading public: the completeness of the headings under which this or that observed human quality of practical relevance can be subsumed offers readers many occasions and invitations to make each particular into a theme of its own, so as to place it in the appropriate category. (Ak 7:121-2)

In fact, anthropology is not an aggregate of many disperse observations of human beings (a "practical" component) but it contains a "theoretical" component, by which these observations can be systematically connected, according to a certain method (see Ak 25:1435-6). Since 1775 Kant suggests that knowledge of the world is a *theoretical* and *pragmatic* knowledge of the stage upon which human beings can apply all skill:

> The theoretical consists in our knowing what is required for certain final purposes and thus concerns the understanding. The pragmatic consists in the power of judgment to avail ourselves of all skill. It is needed to seal all our skill. The basis of pragmatic

[252] Kant said in a letter to Marcus Herz, dated the 20th October 1778: "since I make improvements or extensions of my lectures from year to year, especially in the systematic and, if I may say, architectonic form and ordering of what belongs within the scope of a science, my students cannot very easily help themselves by copying from each other" (Ak 10:242). Kant ascribes the label of *empirical science* to empirical psychology in *Metaphysik Dohna* (1792-3) (see Ak 28:656).

[253] Sturm holds that in Kant there is not a unique standard (criterion) of scientific character, nor a unique method that can simply turn a successful discipline into a science of human beings. Instead, Kant embraces a flexible concept of science, so that it is possible to improve particular disciplines, at different, levels by means of philosophical considerations (see Sturm, 2009, p. 526).

> knowledge is knowledge of the world, where one can make use of all theoretical knowledge. (Ak 25:469)

In my view, pragmatic anthropology demands the union of these two components, in as much as it makes the human being skillful and provides an idea of the dispositions, characteristic faculties by which human beings behave in a certain way (see Hatfield, 2014, p. 55). By means of pragmatic knowledge we become virtuous, by learning *how to use* it to our benefit regarding some circumstances, so that "in the end, all skill which one possesses requires knowledge of the way in which we are to make use of it. The knowledge basic to application is called knowledge of the world" (Ak 25:469). Therefore, Kant suggests that theoretical (speculative) knowledge of human beings would require a pragmatic knowledge by which the application of theoretical knowledge is possible (see Brandt, 1999, p. 68).[254]

Moreover, Kant's view of anthropology does not necessarily establish that *Weltkenntnis* and *Schulkenntnis* are mutually exclusive, for he admitted that since 1780[255] the first one presupposes the second one (see Sturm, 2009, pp. 294-5). The reliance of *Weltkenntnis* on *Schulkenntnis* can be traced out in his lectures on anthropology (as early as 1775 and probably until 1798), where *Weltkenntnis* is a subsequent state of *Schulkenntnis*, in as much as *Schulkenntnis* becomes popular and accepted. Accordingly, he claims *Menschenkunde* (1781-2) that "all sciences must be scholastic at the beginning, later they can also become popular in order to be accepted and made use of by mere admirers" (Ak 25:853). He later holds in *Mrongovius* (1784-5):

> The knowledge of the human being in general is called, under another name, anthropology; but it is further subdivided in two ways; either: 1. *Anthropologia pragmatica*, when it considers the knowledge of the human being as it is useful in society in general; or 2. *Anthropologia scholastica*, when one considers (treats) it more as a [kind of] school knowledge; the former is the application of the latter in a society. (Ak 25:1210-11)

Certainly, the idea of considering *Weltkenntnis* as the application of *Schulkenntnis* was fundamental, prevailing until Kant's *Anthropology*, where he claims that "such an

[254] Kant stresses the relation of *theory* to *practice* in morals, politics from a **cosmopolitan** perspective, namely "with a view to the well-being of the human race as a whole and insofar as it is conceived as progressing toward its wellbeing in the series of generations of all future times" (Ak 8:277).
[255] I, nonetheless, consider that the reliance of pragmatic knowledge on the theoretical one stems from 1775-6 (see above).

anthropology, considered as knowledge of the world, which must come after our schooling" (Ak 7:120). As a result, the reliance of *Weltkenntnis* on *Schulkenntnis* allows anthropology to be a doctrine of the human being **systematically** formulated.[256]

This systematicity can also be recognized by the fact that Kant developed categories that, emerging from individual observations, have the power to unite individual instances into a whole that leads us to 'the unity of the plan' (*die Einheit des Plans*). In other words, these categories express an anthropological "framework" that guides all anthropological observation and reflection on human beings, their actions and their relations with others.[257] This philosophical framework consists, on the one hand, in *mental faculties* (faculty of cognition, feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and faculty of desire)[258] by which the interior and the exterior of the human being can be cognized, and, on the other, in the *character* of the person, the sexes, the peoples, races and of species, by which the interior of the human being can be cognized from the exterior.

A. Difficulties involved in the cognition of the human being

Kant notices some **difficulties** concerning to what might be called the "external", "introspective" and "spatiotemporal" observation of the human being (see Brandt, 1999, pp. 77-9). On the one hand, he has doubts about the external observation of the human being as he claims that if a human being notices the fact "that someone is observing him

[256] Robert B. Louden holds that Kant's anthropology lectures explicitly aim to impart a kind of informal, popular knowledge (*Weltkenntnis*) rather than a formal, scholar knowledge; therefore, the discussion about technical points in ethical theory is very limited. Kant even admits the importance of this *Weltkenntnis* in moral anthropology, for the *Weltkenntnis* helps human beings to learn how to apply *a priori* laws to their own lives (see Louden, 2003, pp. 70-2).

[257] Sturm also defends the possibility that Kant's anthropology develops concepts by means of which actions of human beings are investigated. These human beings are not only passive products of an individual, social and historical development but also active producers of that development. That is why precisely Kant developed the concept of 'way of thinking-character' (*Denkungsart- Charakter*) which goes beyond the concept of spiritual faculties and that of their differential training (see Sturm, 2009, p. 525).

[258] Kant even confesses in a letter to Carl Leonhard Reinhold (dated December 28 and 31 1787) that the analysis of these three faculties of the mind allowed him to discover a 'systematicity' (*das Systematische*) that gave him ample and sufficient material for the rest of his life (see Ak 10:514). Kant had already established the distinction of these three faculties in his lectures on anthropology from 1772-3, and even more explicitly from 1775-6 (see Sturm, 2009, p. 372). Kant, as Hinske notices, not only adopted from Baumgarten the individual faculties but also the very conceptual determination of 'faculty' (*Vermögen*) (see Hinske, 1966 p. 416 footnote 15). Kant asserts that our mind is active and exhibits a **faculty** or it is passive and exhibits a **receptivity** (see Ak 7:140). Although Baumgarten had previously pointed out in his *Metaphysica* that all substance that acts 'has faculty' (habet (…) *facultatem*), or, if this undergoes, it 'has receptivity' (habet (…) *receptivitatem*) (see Baumgarten, 2013, §216).

and trying to study him, he will either appear embarrassed (self-conscious) and *cannot* show himself as he really is; or he dissembles, and does not *want* to be known as he is" (Ak 7:121; see also 25:1437). Kant, nonetheless, does not exclude categorically an external observation of human beings, but suggests that one should observe them without giving the appearance of *being an observer*, so that one should dissemble throughout a conversation (see Ak 25:857).

In fact, Kant admits "direct" and "indirect" external observations of humans. According to the first one, the relation observer-observed should not be regarded as an "active-passive" or "outside-inside" relation, in which the observer merely understands the world (see Ak 7:120). The observer should rather participate in the world, observing people's ordinary lives and participating in social intercourse (see Ak 10:145-6). According to the second one, "indirect" external observations include the reading of travel books, of the world history, of biographies, even of plays and of novels; these materials are regarded as the main *sources* of Kantian anthropological analysis (see Ak 7:120-1, 25:734, 1435, 857-8).[259] However, travels and travel books can broad the range of anthropology only, if one has acquired a knowledge of human beings at home by interacting with one's townsmen or countrymen (see Ak 7:120). History also has a great utility for anthropology if it is pragmatically considered, namely in as much as we can derive a practical knowledge (prudence) from it (see Ak 25:1436).[260] Kant stresses that anthropology is to be regarded, at the same time, as a source for historiographies, biographies, plays and novels (see Ak 25:858, 1212-3, 472, 4:417, 7:120-2).

On the other, Kant notices several difficulties associated with the "introspective" observation of the human being, in as much as the habit of observing oneself is to an extent unnatural and might lead us to an unfathomable depth in the exploration of human nature (see Ak 7:396-7; 25:1218; see also Erdmann, 1882, p. 69).[261] First, he holds that

[259] Although plays and novels do not provide us with a knowledge grounded on experience and their 'main features' are exaggerated in degree, they are still extracted from observation of the real actions of human beings and correspond to human nature in kind (see Ak 7:121). Kant accepts novels as a legitimate resort for anthropological material (see Ak 25:1212, 8), although he excludes them from education of children, on the grounds that these weaken memory (see Ak 7:208; 9:473; see also Louden, 2000, p. 201, footnote 21).

[260] The pragmatic approach to history was also adopted by Carl Friedrich Flögel (1729-1788), Salomon Maimon (1753-1800), Justus Christian Hennings (1731-1815), and others (see Klemme, 1996, p. 31).

[261] Thomas Rheid notices the difficulty of attending to our mental operations, for in this exercise we go contrary to acquired and reinforced habits: "from infancy, we are accustomed to attend to objects of sense,

"when the incentives are active, he does not observe himself, and when he does not observe himself, the incentives are at rest" (Ak 7:121).[262] It means that the mind's power to "observe" its own acts and representations is hampered by the rush of affects or even by the very experience of external objects; but without those 'incentives' (*Triebfedern*) nothing remains to be observed (see Ak 25:857). In my opinion, the problem roots from the ephemeral character of what is "observed", for through inner sense we have access to a stream of many empirical appearances that succeed to each other and there is not an abiding appearance. In other words, the observation lacks 'stability' (*Dauerhaftigkeit*) because the contents of inner sense (unlike spatial objects of outer sense) are not permanently fixed but they flow in time (see Ak 7:134; see also Dessoir, 1924, p. 116).

Second, from our experience of temporal and spatial circumstances emerges a habitus, that is, a "second nature" that varies in place and time. These circumstances "make it difficult for the human being to judge how to consider himself, but even more difficult to judge how he should form an idea of others with whom he is in contact" (see Ak 7:121). In other words, these circumstances make difficult to distinguish what is *natural* to the human being from what is artificial to it, insofar as the human being is constantly transformed by upbringing and other influences (see Ak 25:8-9).

In my view, Kant's anthropology aims at a useful knowledge not only for the citizen of Königsberg but also for the citizens of the world (Ak 7:293; Louden, 2000, p. 77; Cohen, 2009, pp. 54-5). Part of Anthropology's tasks is to convert a knowledge of the "first" (natural impulses, cognitive faculties, etc.) and "second" nature (kinds of people, persons, and cultural features) of the human being into a useful knowledge for the human being embedded in *given* circumstances (see Wolandt, 1988, p. 367). In fact, the identification of a general knowledge that can be applied to particular cases is possible, if the *character of the species* of the human being is pointed out. However, Kant confesses that the highest 'species concept' (*Gattungsbegriff*) of the human being may be that of a *terrestrial rational being*, although it is absolutely insoluble to indicate the character of the *human*

and to them only; and, when sensible objects have got such strong hold of the attention by confirmed habit, it is not easy to dispossess them" (Reid, 1785, p. 62).

[262] Thomas Reid, influenced by Hume, suggests that our attention to every operation of our mind causes an alteration in it as a counterpart, so that "when the mind is agitated by any passion, as soon as we turn our attention from the object to the passion itself, the passion subsides or vanishes, and by that means escapes our enquiry" (Reid, 1785, p. 63).

species. This is because the characteristic 'property' (*proprietas*), by which a species (A) is different from another (B), requires that we know the other species (B), in order to compare one with other. [263] Since we do not know other *non-terrestrial rational beings*[264] and, therefore, the comparison of two *species* of rational beings is not possible, we cannot know the character (characteristic property) of this *terrestrial rational being* among other rational beings in general (see Ak 7:321; Louden, 2000, p. 101).

Three, Kant claims that "he who investigates his interior easily *carries* many things into self-consciousness instead of merely observing" (Ak 7:143). He notices the unreliability of the act of observation in *Metaphysical foundations of natural science* where he claims that in the empirical doctrine of the soul the manifold of "inner observation can be separated only by mere division in thought, and cannot then be held separate and recombined at will (…) and even observation by itself already changes and displaces the state of the observed object" (Ak 4:471). On the one hand, we cannot combine and separate appearances in our mind with extreme precision and, finally, leave them as they were originally (see Sánchez, 2012, p. 184). On the other, Kant is aware of the fact that *observation* is not a naive transparent act, but rather an act that embroils an *alteration* in what is observed and, this stems from difficulties associated with the distinction between the subject and an object (tackled by Lacépède in 1795).

This problem is that when the human being wants to know itself, this "object" (of knowledge), which escapes its intelligence, is fused with the "subject" who observes the object, so that no clear difference can be detected between the observer and the object of observation (see Brandt, 1999, pp.77-8). As a consequence, the distinction object-subject should not be regarded as "ontological" but rather as "logical"; that is to say, the

[263] Kant holds in *Mrongovius* that "if I want to become acquainted with myself, I may only compare myself with other human beings, but I cannot compare humanity with any other rational creature because we are the only ones on earth" (Ak 25:1214). Alix Cohen disagrees with A. W. Wood on admitting that "Kant even thinks it is *impossible* to define what is peculiar to the human species" (Wood, 1999, p. 198). Cohen suggests that "Kant's works do offer a definition of the distinctive feature of humankind (…) what is true, however, is that Kant cannot do so by comparing that we think to be our distinctive features with that of other types of rational beings" (Cohen, 2009, pp. 155-6, footnote 2). Cohen maintains that even though we cannot give a definition of the human species because such comparison is not possible, it is plausible to think that Kant points out that our ability to use language in a loud and soundless way is to be regarded as a distinctive feature of human species (see Ak 7:332; Cohen, 2009, p. 37; below section 2.2.1).

[264] A. Cohen suggests that the study of these beings would be a sort of an "alienology" that (unlike anthropology) "is not interpretative insofar as it requires no interpretation or inference from behaviour to intentions and motives as the agents themselves articulate them" (Cohen, 2009, p. 45).

investigation of ourselves implies that "we" are the 'object' of investigation rather than an independent object.

2.1.4. Transition from the metaphysical account of the form of inner experience to the pragmatic anthropology's account of its matter

I shall argue in this section that Kant's theory of the self relies on *theoretical* philosophy, as long as time is a *formal condition* of inner appearances, and on *pragmatic* anthropology, in as much as the *matter* of inner appearances is extracted from a doctrine concerned with the knowledge of the human being (see Ak 7:119). Thus, a very comprehensive theory of the self can be accomplished by connecting Kant's theory of time with his *Anthropology*, where he interrogates *what human beings are*:

> However, that we only cognize ourselves through inner sense as we *appear* to ourselves is clear from this: apprehension *(apprehensio)* of the impressions of inner sense presupposes a formal condition of inner intuition of the subject, namely time, which is not a concept of understanding and is therefore valid merely as a subjective condition according to which inner sensations are given to us by virtue of the constitution of the human soul. (Ak 7:142)

In my view, the transcendental function of time exposed in the CPR is fundamental for comprehending the pragmatic observational doctrine of human nature in the *Anthropology* since human thought and action are grounded on time. It is plain that Kant does not focus on physiological anthropology, which concerns the investigation of the human being's *limitations* determined by nature, but on pragmatic anthropology that is concerned with the human being's *potentialities* as a free acting being (see Pappe, 1961, p. 47 footnote 2; Foucault, 2008, p. 64).[265] Indeed, Kant claims that "physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what *nature* makes of the human being; pragmatic, the investigation of what *he* as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself" (Ak 7:119). In other words, the subject-matter of anthropology corresponds to: i) a diagnostic of the human being's deeds, ii) the set of possibilities and capacities of its mind as well as the conditions of its nature and iii)

[265] I agree with Allen Wood on considering that Kant rejected a physiological analysis of the human being which deals with the way in which bodily organs are connected with the mind: "Kant's "pragmatic" approach is grounded on a repudiation of the idea that human beings can be fruitfully understood in merely physiological terms. Human beings must be viewed as free agents, not as mere links in a causal mechanism" (Wood, 2003, p. 40).

the tasks the human being, by its own reason, assigns itself (see Wolandt, 1988, pp. 365-6).

Even more, anthropology is pragmatic insofar as its knowledge is useful for students not only in university but also in their life out of it. Moreover, this *knowledge of the world* seeks to know the human being as a social being endowed with reason, whose final end is itself. Therefore, the goal of his anthropology will not be simply to know human beings but also allow them to transform themselves into citizens of the world, namely, insofar as they participate in social intercourse (see Ak 7:119-120; 25:469-472). It is also important to highlight that Kant was not confused about his critical philosophy and his anthropology. Instead, his CPR and *Anthropology* are simply two different projects (see Sturm, 2009, p. 292, footnote 36). We should, as G. Wolandt suggests, distinguish between *pure* and *applied* philosophy, in as much as the task (i.e. *"*what the human being as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself") of the latter cannot be carried out in the structure of a critical doctrine of elements. This applied philosophy, by contrast, has the peculiar feature of making use of systematic means, as long as it needs the concepts of reason and uses empirical sources according to the complex purpose of cognition (see Wolandt, 1988, pp. 362-3).

Moreover, Kant holds in the CPR that inner experience is possible because the mind is capable of behaving passively, so that the subject can be affected not only by outer objects but also by itself. The representations derived from both kinds of affection are equally 'sensible' (*sinnlich*) and grounded on passivity (receptivity) of inner sense (see Ak 7:140). Moreover, the affection of inner sense and the attendance to oneself constitute the source from which the content of inner experience emerges.[266] However, these should not be understood as in a successive temporal relation since they occur simultaneously. Furthermore, inner states are part of the object of empirical self-consciousness and by means of this self-consciousness, the subject brings about representations of its mind

[266] As Schulting (2015, p. 105) notices, Kant adopted Baumgarten's conception of inner sense within empirical psychology. Baumgarten holds that "SENSE either represents the state of my soul, which is then INTERNAL SENSE, or the state of my body, which is then EXTERNAL SENSE (§508). Hence sensation is either INTERNAL SENSATION, and actualized through an internal sense (consciousness, more strictly considered), or EXTERNAL SENSATION, and actualized through an external sense" (2013, §535). It seems that Baumgarten influenced Kant's doctrine of inner sense, insofar as for Baumgarten the investigation of the "thinking nature" in its empirical part should be performed exclusively through inner sense (see Sturm, 2001, pp.176-7).

according to temporal relations of succession and simultaneity, for *time* is the formal constitution of that receptivity (see Ak 7:141). However, inner sense need not be thought of as a source of representations of unity, identity, permanency, etc. Instead, the object of inner sense partly consists of a flux of temporally related perceptions of our inner states as well as of external objects (see Ak 7:134).

At one point Kant holds that *inner sense* and *time* constitute a totality in which all our representations are contained (see CPR A155/B194). He later takes inner sense for "the sum of all representations" (CPR A177/B220). It is precisely this wide range of notions contained by inner sense which has provoked a disagreement on what the matter of inner sense is. For instance, H. J. Paton suggests that the immediate content of inner sense is constituted by feelings, desires and the stream of ideas (see Paton, 1936a, p. 100). P. Kitcher holds that this matter is constituted by thoughts, perceptions and the temporal succession of thoughts and perceptions (see 2016, p. 346). According to C. Dyck, there are two objects of inner sense, namely thoughts (the mental states) and the subject itself (see Dyck, 2016, p. 339).[267] Aquila says that the "domain" or the "manifold" of inner sense can be constituted by the mind, its inner state, its inner determinations, its modifications, its alterations, thoughts, feeling, inclination, decision, representations, will, thoughts and thinking (see Aquila, 1983, p. 149).

2.1.5. Are feelings an object of inner sense?

Roughly speaking, if we admit that we intuit our inner states through inner sense (see CPR A38/B55) and that 'feelings' (*Gefühle*) are nothing but a state of the mind, we may

[267] Against the upper view, Yalcin declares that "thought", "desires", "willing" and "decision-making" are not an inner manifold and they do not belong to inner sense. They, by contrast, belong to "the active aspect of the self" (Yalcin, 2002, p. 185; see also Aquila, 1983, p. 149). On my account, Kant accepts that the human being is empirically conscious of its mental operations. Indeed, if it is so, then these operations would not only be representations of inner sense (empirical self-consciousness) but they would also be determined by time, as long as the latter is the form of inner sense (see CPR A33/B49, A357). This seems to be borne out also by J. Vogel's claim "there is a way to characterize or provide content to the notion of oneself: as the subject of one's various experiences, states and mental activities" (Vogel, 1993, p. 881).

argue that feelings[268] can be a particular object of inner sense (see Ak 7:231; 20:208[269], 230). However, some commentators suggest that feelings cannot be an object of inner sense; such a view must be examined in two steps: First, the objection that excludes feelings from inner sense seems to be borne out partly by the following claim:

> Everything in our cognition that belongs to intuition (with the exception, therefore, of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the will, which are not cognitions at all) contains nothing but mere relations, of places in one intuition (extension), alteration of places (motion), and laws in accordance with which this alteration is determined (moving forces) (…) the representations **of outer sense** make up the proper material with which we occupy our mind. (CPR A49/B66-7)

At first blush, this passage suggests that *feelings* and the *will* cannot reach the status of *intuition* and, therefore, they cannot be an object of inner sense. This has led some commentators to downplay inner sense, making the suggestion that only external objects are the object of inner sense (see Wolff, 1963, p. 200; Collins, 1999, p. 107; Longuenesse, 2006, p. 302). Against this reading, I hold that feelings are excluded from inner sense in that passage because Kant, in the CPR, has more interest for our cognition of outer objects than for the cognition of an immediate I-intuition in inner sense (see Klemme, 1999, p. 509). In other words, Kant restricts the material of inner sense to external objects because his "interests are primarily epistemological, and his account of our sensible faculties largely reflects that focus" (Valaris, 2008, p. 2).[270] By contrast, S. Yalcin seems to hold a more flexible position, since he admits both an "official view", according to which the manifold of inner sense is derived from outer sense and an "alternative view", according to which inner sense has its own manifold constituted by the mind itself and its inner states (see Yalcin, 2002, p. 184). I think that inner sense *per se* should not be reduced to either an outer or inner manifold, but its manifold depends upon the object of cognition, that is, ourselves or external objects.

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[268] Kant admits that in German there is not a term that expresses literally the sense of the term 'sentiment' as it is used by the English Nation, so that the term tends to be translated as 'innere Empfindung' (see Ak 25:397). In this vein, Klemme suggests that the term '*Empfindniß'* as translation of 'sentiment' (translation that can be traced back to Thomas Abbt in 1772) does not appear in the texts written by Kant himself nor in his letters but only in the *Anthropologienachschriften*. Thus, if Kant wants to express an experienced affective existence of the 'I', he uses in his works the term *Gefühl* rather than *Empfindniß* (see Klemme, 1996, p. 29, footnote 74).

[269] The text reads: "the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is only the receptivity of a determination of the subject" (Ak 20:208); P. Guyer claims that Kant modified "*des Subject*" for the phrase "*Gemüthszustandes*" in the fair copy and added the remainder of the sentence (see Kant, 2000, p. 12, footnote d).

[270] Kant maintains that the concepts of 'pleasure' (*Lust*) and 'displeasure' (*Unlust*), 'desire' (*Begierde*) and 'inclination' (*Neigung*) have an empirical origin and cannot belong to transcendental philosophy, which is concerned with the *a priori* conditions of cognition (see CPR A14-5/B28-9).

Kant explicitly declares that thoughts, consciousness, desires, etc., cannot be externally intuited, in as much as they belong to inner sense (see CPR A357). In the same way, feelings, inclinations or decisions are not contained by outer sense; instead, it is quite reasonable to deduce that these are contained by inner sense (see CPR A358). Whilst feelings belong to sensibility (see Ak 7:200; 6:211 footnote) and they provide our consciousness with a source of empirical representations of ourselves, they do not attain the status of *intuition*.[271] For feelings of pleasure and displeasure[272] are entirely related to the subject rather than to objects, and they cannot *provide* a cognition about outer objects:

> Any relation of representations, however, even that of sensations, can be objective (in which case it signifies what is real in an empirical representation); but not the relation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, by means of which nothing at all in the object is designated, but in which the subject feels itself as it is affected by the representation" (Ak 5:203-4; see also Ak 7:239-40; 20:206, 222, 5:189).

The feelings of pleasure and displeasure are not considered by Kant as a *sensation* but as effects of sensation. For they are *subjective* representations that express only states of the subject by reference to the representation of an object that might or not exist in experience (see Ak 6:211-2; CPR A29/B44; Kirchmann, 1869, p. 4).[273] I argue that even though feelings do not contribute to cognition of external objects, they still contribute to a pragmatic self-knowledge, by informing us the sort of effect (pleasant or displeasing) produced on ourselves by sensation of an object. This view is endorsed by J. H. V. Kirchmann who believes that self-perception, by its own nature, can only convert *existing* states of the soul into a knowledge that is composed by feelings, desires and different ways of knowledge, namely *existing* elements that are mixed in the human soul (see Kirchmann, 1869, p.30).

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[271] I think that Robert Howell is not right as he claims "through inner-sense **intuitions**, we are made aware of various of the properties of our mind - including our thoughts, feelings, sensations, and outer-sense intuitions - as being in time" (Howell, 2001, p. 118; my emphasis). Certainly through inner sense we are aware of all those items, but Kant does not regard feelings as intuitions.

[272] The concepts of pleasure and displeasure are defined by Kant as follows: "the consciousness of the causality of a representation with respect to the state of the subject, *for maintaining* it in that state, can here designate in general what is called pleasure; in contrast to which displeasure is that representation that contains the ground for determining the state of the representations to their own opposite (hindering or getting rid of them)" (Ak 5:220).

[273] Kant states that feelings cannot be explained by themselves *in abstracto*, since we can only point out the result they have in some circumstances, so that they cannot be *understood* but rather *felt* (see Ak 6:212; 20:232).

Furthermore I support H. J. Paton's reading that feelings are the material of inner sense. As puts it: "by inner sense we are immediately aware, not only of our feelings and desires, but also of the stream of ideas which, whatever else they are, are for Kant modifications or states of our minds" (Paton, 1936a, pp. 99-100). N. Kemp Smith works in the same direction, holding that the content of inner sense is double:

> On the one hand we have feelings, desires volitions, that is, states of the mind in the strict sense, subjective non-spatial existences. On the other we have sensations, perceptions, images, concepts, in a word, representations (*Vorstellungen*) of every possible type. These latter all refer to the external world in space. (Kemp Smith, 2003, p. 293).

Kant holds that feelings are the effect of sensation on the mind's states, namely that which forces the subject to leave a particular state is *disagreeable* to it, or, *agreeable* if it is forced to remain in a specific state (see Ak 7:230-1; CPR A29/B44). The acts of leaving or remaining in one state depends upon the change of sensation that occurs in time, for it entails a temporal sequence in the subject's thoughts and in the consciousness of such change:

> We are led along irresistibly in the stream of time and in the change of sensations connected with it. Now even if leaving one point of time and entering another is one and the same act (of change), there is still a temporal sequence in our thought and in the consciousness of this change; in conformity with the relation of cause and effect. (Ak 7:231)

Both the change in our feelings and the act of being conscious of such change –through inner sense- are conditioned to time. For all our representations are related as one after other in conformity with time's dimension (see CPR A31/B47). Life is a set of continuous opposite states in time[274] and any change in the mind's states is determined by a succession of tensed instants of time, in which an event can be present, past or future. In fact, the human being exists in the stream of time, wherein the present becomes past while the future becomes present now and each state of its mind, no matter whether it is pleasant or not, will change into a different indeterminate state. For instance, the correct combination between pain and enjoyments produces health in human beings; health does

[274] As Kant puts it: "enjoyment is the feeling of promotion of life; pain is that of a hindrance of life. But (animal) life, as physicians also have already noted, is a continuous play of the antagonism of both" (Ak 7:231).

not consist in a *continuously felt well-being* but in a set of *intermittent* agreeable feelings (see Ak 7:231).[275]

Second, Kant holds in *Anthropology* that "the latter [inner sense], as a mere faculty of perception (of empirical intuition), is to be thought of differently than the feeling of pleasure and pain" (Ak 7:153). This passage should be carefully interpreted, for Kant is not denying that feelings are object of inner sense, he is rather pointing out that inner sense cannot **be equated** with feelings. It is evident that they have a very different nature. For inner sense is fundamentally a receptive faculty of cognition that cannot produce spontaneously representations but is subject to the understanding, while feelings of pleasure and displeasure are particular modifications of the mind.

Further, Kant holds that if a determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is regarded as *sensation*, the latter "is related solely to the subject, and does not serve for any cognition at all, not even that by which the subject **cognizes** itself" (Ak 5:206). This statement is nuanced by Kant himself, who does not exclude feeling from inner sense but rather wants to differentiate *sensation* from *feeling* by appealing to a criterion of subjective-objective, according to which, feelings (unlike sensation) are merely subjective and cannot be objective representations of an object (see Ak 5:206). As a result, Kant's statement "the subject cannot cognizes itself" would mean that the subject can represent itself through feelings but these representations could not reach the status of "cognition" of its own self, because they do not constitute objective representations of itself.[276] However, it does not prevent us from reaching a subjective cognition of ourselves grounded on empirical self-consciousness.

[275] Some commentators exclude prematurely feelings from inner sense without noticing that Kant is concerned in that passage with knowledge of external objects rather than with the self and its inner states (see Allison, 2004, p. 278; Yalcin, 2002, pp. 185-6; Melnick, 2009, p. 112). Similarly, Friederike Schmitz suggests that the material "combined" in the figurative synthesis affecting inner sense consists mainly of sensations produced by the affection of outer sense (see Schmitz, 2013, pp. 1051-2).

[276] It is worth mentioning that Kant does not deal with 'self-feeling' (*Selbstgefühl*) in his theory of inner sense (Kant's use of this term is very fragmentary, see Ak 15:58, 689, 725), even though the term of "*Selbstgefühl*" was in 1770s discussions of inner sense and was probably introduced into philosophical terminology by J. B. Basedow in 1764, taken up from Basedow and by J. G. Feder later (see Thiel, 1997, pp. 62-3).

2.1.6. Sensations and perceptions as object of inner sense

Inner experience contains the material of self-consciousness, for it consists of representations of our states, which are related in time (see Ak 7:142). Inner and outer experience rely on inner and outer sense respectively, since they provide us with empirical representations of ourselves and of external objects (including our body).[277] According to Kant, empirical intuition is a representation that "is related to the object through sensation" (CPR A19-20/B34), while sensation is defined as "a **perception** that refers to the subject as a modification of its state" (CPR A320/B376). A sensation (*e.g.* color, sound, sharpness, etc.) is not yet intuition, nor an *a priori* condition of our knowledge of objects, nor an intrinsic property of objects in themselves.[278] This, by contrast, is a subjective representation that belongs to the particular constitution of sense in the subject, that is, it is merely a modification of our state (see CPR A28-9/B44; Matherne, 2015, p. 743). Kant divides 'senses of physical sensation' (*die Sinne Körperempfindung*) into *vital* and *organic sensation*:

> Sensations of warm and cold, even those that are aroused by the mind (e.g., by quickly rising hope or fear), belong to *vital sensation*. The *shudder* that seizes the human being himself at the representation of the sublime, and the *horror*, with which nurses' tales drive children to bed late at night, belong to vital sensation. (Ak 7:154)

Since sensation is a particular content of inner sense, these two kinds of sensations would belong to the content of inner sense. Inner sense, nonetheless, contains not only sensations but also intuitions and perceptions, i.e. empirical representations accompanied by our consciousness (see CPR B155-6, Ak 7:144). It is my contention that these representations do not arise by a purely "internalist" activity of the subject regardless of the influence of outer sense but these arise in social intercourse. That is, any play of ideas that may exist in inner sense without any reference to outer sense should not be considered as 'experiential knowledge' (*Erfahrungserkenntnis*) but as fiction:

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[277] A. Cohen suggests that "through one's inner experience, one can observe the play of motives, inclinations, desires, and intentions, and derive from it empirical knowledge of oneself" (Cohen, 2009, p. 52).

[278] The text reads: "the subjective constitution of the kind of sense, e.g., of sight, hearing, and feeling, through the sensations of colors, sounds, and warmth, which, however, since they are merely sensations and not intuitions, do not in themselves allow any object to be cognized, least of all a priori" (CPR A29/B44).

> The tendency to retire into oneself, together with the resulting illusions of inner sense, can only be set right when the human being is led back into the external world and by means of this to the order of things present to the outer senses. (Ak 7: 162)

Accordingly, the content of inner experience which is concerned with ourselves does not consist in a set of imaginary nor *a priori* representations but they rely on the material derived from sensibility. Notice that Kant claims consistently in the CPR and *Anthropology* that the materials of sensibility must be ruled by time. In my view, the *tensed series* of time plays a fundamental role in the anthropological reflection on the human being and their actions.[279] Indeed, Kant claims that our capacity to consider something as future is based on our 'faculty of prevision' (*Vorhersehungsvermögen*), which is 'sensible' (*sinnlich*) in as much as relies on imagination (see CPR B151; Ak 7:153). Kant describes this faculty in particular as an association of representations of the future state of subject with the present one. Those representations, nonetheless, are not necessarily perceptions but rather 'states' (*Zustande*) of the subject. These future representations are necessary for uniting perceptions in time, that is, "that which is not yet" with "that which is present" in a connected experience. Thus, in virtue of our 'faculty of divination' (*Divinationvermögen*) we are conscious of those representations that may be found in a future state (see Ak 7:182).

Likewise Kant admits that the human being's capacity to make up future representations is essential with reference to its actions, for the faculty of divination "is the condition of all possible practice and of the ends to which the human being relates the use of his powers. Every desire contains a (doubtful or certain) foresight of what is possible through it" (Ak 7:185-6). So, when human beings recall the past, they do it with the intention of foreseeing the possible future, although this foresight is not *a priori* but empirical insofar as it merely consists in the *expectation of similar cases*. Such expectation does not require a rational knowledge but only the remembrance of observed occurrences that generally follow one another, so that repeated experiences produce an *aptitude* for it (see Ak 7:186).

[279] I agree with K. Düsing as he holds that the daily experience of subject materializes through the temporal determinations of the past, present and future. Although, the subject does not have any sensation with regard to the future but only the expectation of similar cases, i.e. 'fore-expectation' (*Vorhererwärtung*) towards experience (see Düsing, 1980, p. 20). I believe that Kant's theoretical and anthropological view can be connected, so that those tensed temporal determinations are not only contained in the possibility of experience but they also determine the practical –and not merely the cognitive- performance of subject: "the subject, in its daily praxis, is interested above all in the future in order to carry out its purposes with endeavor" (1980, p. 20; my translation) ("für das Zukünftige interessiert sich vielmehr vor allem das Subjekt in seiner alltäglichen Praxis mit dem Bestreben, Zwecke zu verwirklichen"; my translation).

However, Kant does not admit that human beings have a proved ability to develop 'premonitions' (*Ahndungen*), for he argues that human beings are not capable of 'sensing' (*empfinden*) what does not exist yet. Premonitions are thus a 'chimera' (*Hirngespenst*), motivated by fear or anxiety, which has *physical* causes (see Ak 7:187). Premonition of facts presupposes the existence of destiny and if it is so, human beings would not be determined by the use of their free choice but by their destiny, excluding human beings from the control of their actions, which would contradict Kant's premises of pragmatic anthropology:

> All prophesies that foretell an inevitable fate of a people, for which they are themselves still responsible and which therefore is to be brought about by *their own free choice***,** contain an absurdity - in addition to the fact that the foreknowledge is *useless* to them, since they cannot escape from it. For in this unconditional fate (*decretum absolutum*) there is thought to be a *mechanism of freedom,* by which the concept contradicts itself. (Ak 7:188-9)

Accordingly, Kant's anthropology is not concerned with human beings that are "foretold" a set of inevitable facts, namely beings that lack free choice and are not responsible for their deeds. Rather, his anthropology is concerned with what human beings, as free-acting beings, make of themselves (see Ak 7:119). Notwithstanding, Kant admits that human beings can be aware not only of sensations and feelings but also of *sensationless* representations that compel them to do any activity: "even if no positive pain stimulates us to activity, if necessary a negative one, *boredom***,** will often affect us in such a manner that we feel driven to do something harmful to ourselves rather than nothing at all" (Ak 7:232-3). The human being tends to leave the state of boredom, insofar as the latter produces a fearful oppressive difficulty in its interior.

In fact, when the human being attends to the relation between its life and time, it undergoes the oppressive and frightening arduousness of boredom. In my view, Kant is speaking of a "phenomenal"[280] time, namely of time in the first-person experience, where the human being at times wishes to jump from one moment to another in order to avoid

[280] This notion of phenomenal time is compatible with Anita Kasabova's view of time: "all we can measure and objectify is our time-sense and this objectifying endeavor presupposes an observer's position and the distinction between past, present and future. With regard to autobiographical memory, we are not examining clock-time but phenomenal time, that is, internal time or time in first-person experience and the time of objects as they appear in my personal recollection" (Kasabova, 2009, p. 94).

unpleasant experiences: "this pressure or impulse to leave every point of time we are in and pass over into the following one is accelerating and can grow until a man makes the resolution to end his life" (Ak 7:233). Indeed, the human being avoids to perceive 'the empty of sensations' (*Leere an Empfindungen*) in itself, as it produces a presentiment of a slow death, which is taken for more painful even than death. In contrast, things that shorten time are regarded as enjoyments.[281] Therefore, the quicker human beings make the time pass, the more refreshed they will feel (see Ak 7:233-4). As a conclusion, even though Kant does not think, from a *theoretical* perspective, that time can be perceived, he would argue for a "phenomenal time" from a *pragmatic* perspective. That is to say, he analyses in the *Anthropology* the way in which the human being experiences time.

2.2. The self is embedded in society

According to Kant's theory of the self, inner sense is a *receptivity* and a necessary condition by which we obtain certain contents of ourselves. Kant consistently suggests that the matter of inner sense is composed by the 'I', thoughts, consciousness, desires, inclinations, decisions, etc., namely elements that cannot be represented through outer sense (see Ak 28:265; 25:244, 474; CPR A357-8). In my view, these notions merely express the *form* or the kind of representations contained by inner sense, but their *content* still seems elusive. As already indicated, those contents do not arise in isolation of the human being but from social development of the subject, so that social intercourse will have an influence on *what* is given in inner sense and *how* it is given.[282] I disagree with R. Brandt's claim "Kant has not developed a theory about the relation between both concepts of experience [the self and the world]"[283] (Brandt, 1999, p. 263; my translation).

[281] J. A. Robinson focuses on the effect of inactivity on our experience of time and suggests that the human being does not experience *time* as the succession of uniform units of duration but rather as an *action*: "when we have no prescribed activity to perform, as during vacations or in retirement, we may lose track of time or experience a sense of timelessness. Time and action codefine each other, and both are organized through the institutions of society" (Robinson, 1986b, p. 159). It is noteworthy that, for Robinson, inactivity produces rather, so to speak, an emptiness of *time* whereas, for Kant, it produces an emptiness of *sensation*. Robison's idea would be pointless as far as Kant, as I have mentioned, rejects that the human being can perceive *time* or, even worse, an *empty time* (see CPR A172/B214).

[282] Dieter Sturma offers suggestive remarks about self-consciousness. In his view, self-consciousness, from a personal perspective, cannot be separated from the existence of a conscious person, for it is a structure of reference related, at least indirectly, to the world of outer reflection. Accordingly, 'a self-conscious person' (*eine selbstbewußte Person*) is located in a spatiotemporal place, on which it focuses. Thus, self-consciousness should be interpreted as an experiential perspective *in* the world, in as much as it is always practical (see Sturma, 2003, pp. 275-6).

[283] "Kant hat keine Theorie des Verhältnisses der beiden Erfahrungsbegriffe entwickelt" (Brandt, 1999, p. 263).

On the contrary, I think that the *Anthropology* provides this theory since pragmatic anthropology is concerned with the observation of inner life and with the outer expressions of this inner life (see Wilson, 2006, p. 24).

In my view, social intercourse is useful for identifying not only the intended content but also some issues in people's mind caused by issues in inner sense. Kant claims that 'mental derangement' (*Verrückung*) constitutes a degradation (most of the time incurable) attributable to nature and such condition does not correspond to the object of anthropology, which is concerned with what the human being as free-acting being *is* and *makes* of itself (see Ak 7:119; Sturma, 2003, pp. 269-70).

Furthermore, Kant recognizes that inter-subjectivity plays an important role in the identification of some derangements like '*vesania*' (*Aberwitz*) that is defined as the sickness of a deranged reason, in which "the mental patient flies over the entire guidance of experience and chases after principles that can be completely exempted from its touchstone, imagining that he conceives the inconceivable" (Ak 7:215). Thus, the human being that undergoes this sickness is quite calm, in as much as it is removed from rage; thus, because of the self-sufficiency produced by its 'self-enclosed speculation', it disregards all the difficulties of its enquiry, in which it tries to comprehend the incomprehensible (*e.g.* the squaring of a circle, perpetual motion, etc.). Kant stresses that this sickness is not only a deviation from the rule of the use of reason but also constitutes a 'positive unreason' (*positives Unvernunft*), or another rule, which transfers the patient to a different 'standpoint' (*Standpunkt*) from which it sees things differently from the *sensorio communi*. In other words, the deranged mind forms an "alien" or external standpoint that differs from a non-sick standpoint guided by that *sensorio communi*:

> The soul does not feel or see itself in another place (for it cannot perceive itself according to its position in space without committing a contradiction, since it would then intuit itself as an object of its outer sense, when it itself can only be the object of its inner sense). (Ak 7:216)

Kant thinks that both reason and unreason are forms into which objects can be fitted and, therefore, they are dependent upon the universal (see Ak 7:218). It means that this different 'standpoint' is caused by the powers 'of the unhinged mind' (*des zerrütteten Gemüths*), which arrange themselves into a subjective system in virtue of nature's effort

to bring a principle of unity into unreason. Thus, the mind ends up working *subjectively* for the purpose of animal life, instead of working *objectively* towards a true knowledge of things (see Ak 7:216). In that case, the patient loses *common sense* (which is inter-subjectively acquired) and develops its *logical private sense* according to which it sees or hears something that no other person does. As a consequence, it would undergo madness, since the universal characteristic of madness is the loss of *common sense*. In my view *common sense* is a basis for the characterization of the content of inner experience, in as much as that content should not be taken from "supersensible intuitions" that only exist in few people.[284] On the contrary, healthy human beings are capable of intuiting themselves in relation to their intercourse with other individuals:

> It is a subjectively necessary touchstone of the correctness of our judgments generally, and consequently also of the soundness of our understanding, that we also restrain our understanding by the *understanding of others***,** instead of *isolating* ourselves with our own understanding and judging *publicly* with our private representations, so to speak. (Ak 7:219)

Kant is claiming that we have the subjective need of seeing whether our understanding agrees with the understanding of others, and this fact rests on the very soundness of the understanding, in its public use. Kant warns that if we disregard the understanding of others, an illusion emerges by which we take something merely *subjective*, like habits or inclinations, for something *objective* (see Ak 7:219). As earlier argued, the content of inner sense does not arise in isolation of the subject, for Kant conceives of the human being as a citizen of the world who is capable of living with others (see Ak 7:325). Hence, these representations related to desires or to feelings of pleasure and displeasure will be different in each subject and the "identity" of the representations of inner experience in each subject will be *subjectively* conditioned by the presence of other subjects. The contrast among subjectivities in isolation seems "logically" impossible. In fact, Kant suggests that "isolation" steals the greatest and useful means of correcting our own thoughts in public by means of the understanding of others,

> He who pays no attention at all to this touchstone, but gets it into his head to recognize private sense as already valid apart from or even in opposition to common sense, is

[284] This point is indirectly suggested by Kant when he affirms: "the person who *talks aloud* to himself or is caught *gesticulating* to himself in his room falls under the suspicion that something is not right with his head, - The suspicion grows even more if he believes he is blessed with inspirations or visited by higher beings in conversations and dealings" (Ak 7:218-9).

> abandoned to a play of thoughts in which he sees, acts, and judges, not in a common world, but rather in his own world (as in dreaming). (Ak 7:219)

On Kant's view, the content of inner experience should not contradict *common sense* and too much observation of one's own mind may lead to madness (see Ak 7:132, 218-9; 25:477-8, 1218). The content of inner experience cannot be known only introspectively by my means of inner sense but also, although imperfectly at times, by means of the "outer sense observation" of others. In other words, the subject can have access to its inner states by paying attention to its own **actions** in society: "our vocabulary of representations, thought, feelings, passions traits of personal character, and so on, is intimately connected to a careful observation of human action and human life as it occurs and as it can be observed, especially in society" (Sturm, 2001, p. 175). In my view, traits of human life and actions in society *form* and *are formed* by 'common sense'. For they are crucial to obtain the proper vocabulary through which the subject observes its inner states and they are also important as criterion according to which mental illnesses are identified, for "psychological phenomena" can be open to public observation to an extent.

It is important to underline that pragmatic anthropology searches for a knowledge of human social interaction and this knowledge is useful for human social life. As a result, anthropology does not regard human beings as passive beings who have representations of themselves, as mere "spectators" of themselves but as "agents" who interact with others and *make* themselves *in* and *through* society (see Ak 15:799-800).[285] This distinction expresses the difference between *to know the world*, proposed by the scholastic approach, and *to have the world* sought after by Kant: "the expressions "to *know* the world" and "to *have* the world" are rather far from each other in their meaning, since one only *understands* the play that one has watched, while the other has *participated* in it" (Ak 7:120).

Accordingly, the human being acquires an anthropological knowledge through the analysis of social intercourse with others and can use that knowledge to make itself (see

[285] Maurice Merleau-Ponty remarkably asserts: "I cannot conceive myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a mere object of biological, psychological or sociological investigation. I cannot shut myself up within the realm of science. All my knowledge of the world, even my scientific knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of view, or from some experience of the world without which the symbols of science would be meaningless" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. viii).

Ak 8:56; 15:800).[286] For instance, a human being may learn, through pragmatic anthropology, that human beings regard their perfection or imperfection in their social intercourse, according to "negative" affects such as anxiety, horror, cowardice, timidity etc., or according to "positive" affects such as courage, patience, intrepidity, etc. (see Ak 7:256-8). [287] Moreover, I agree with A. Wood (see 2003, p. 43) on considering that Kant's analysis of interaction among human beings presupposes freedom from a *practical* standpoint, even though no empirical proof of a *transcendental* freedom can be given (see CPR A533/B561, A801-2/B829-30, Ak 4:447-8; 6:221).

Moreover, the subject is not only able to perceive its inner states but also to represent the way in which it would like to be viewed by others in society. This ability of the subject to cause a good impression on others' mind is acquired by habit and can be observed when prudence limits our egoism and we, in pursue of a favorable opinion about us, avoid talking at length about ourselves. We prefer, at times, to recognize other people's point of view, although this act would not be natural but *artificial* and forced (see Ak 25:474-5). On the contrary, when one shows oneself as one is, without paying attention to outer appearances this behavior is *natural* but criticized (see Ak 25:1221).

It is evident that there is a great difference among human minds and, therefore, the way each human being looks at the same object cannot be the same. Nature is responsible for the infinite variety of human beings who, as observers of their inner states, produce frictions, unions and separations (see Ak 7:228). In this variety there is a class of thinkers who have the ability to take certain maxims for unalterable commands that lead to wisdom, namely *to think for oneself, to think oneself into the place of every other person* in communication with human beings and *always to think consistently with oneself* (see Ak 7:228-9). In my opinion, such maxims exhibit Kant's interest in showing that citizens of the world can benefit from pragmatic anthropology, because the social success of human beings, as far as they are embedded in social dynamics, depends upon our capacity to consider the viewpoint of other human beings as citizens of the world (see Sturm, 2008, pp. 502, 504).

[286] I consider pretty appropriate Allen Wood's interpretation according to which "the "self-making" of the human being denoted by "pragmatic anthropology" must be taken to include the way each of us is (and out to be) made through the actions of others and the influence of society" (Wood, 2003, p. 41)

[287] Kant highlights the importance of inner sense in the arising of certain affects like *intrepidity*, which is understood as a strength of inner sense (*Ataraxia*), by which we are not put in fear (see Ak 7:256).

Admittedly, human beings, as embedded in a civil order, develop talents, concepts of justice and morality for they want to perfect themselves and eventually every human being becomes important to the other: "the judgment of others has a great influence on him [the human being], and from this arises the concept of honor; he becomes inspired to undertake a great deal, not only with regard to his needs, but with regard to the common good of life" (Ak 25:680). Indeed, Kant's anthropology seeks to contribute to the moral development of the subject. For instance he claims in *Mrongovius*:

> Anthropology is pragmatic, but is of service for the moral knowledge of the human being, for one must create the motives for morals from it, and without it morals would be scholastic, not at all applicable to the world, and not agreeable to the world. (Ak 25:1211; see also 25:735)

Anthropology is linked to morals as the former leads us to a knowledge of humanity through which we determine the proper influence of feelings, desires and passions on ourselves. These are conditions that may hinder human beings or help them to act in accordance with moral rules (see Ak 25:471-2; 27:244; Louden, 2000, pp. 72-4). As a consequence, Kant's *Anthropology* provides us with a practical knowledge of ourselves which not only allows us to be in society but also to live peacefully in it and such a goal would be impossible without a moral commitment that guides our actions in relation to other humans.

2.2.1. Self-consciousness is conditioned by language

I argue that language plays a fundamental role not only in the act of thinking but also in the consciousness of our inner and outer states. Firstly, Kant suggests that when human beings are regarded in a very basic and crude condition, their first skills are walking and speaking. Speech has not been given by nature to humans, but rather it has been learned through experience and practice and, therefore, it has been gradually invented. Of course, Kant argues against an *innate* nature of language. Instead, he holds that humans learn to speak, birds learn to sing, dogs learn to bark and so on; thus, speech arose in human beings particularly from the necessity to express their feelings through sounds. Speaking and walking are primordial steps towards their perfection as species rather than as individuals,

insofar as development of humanity is possible only through social intercourse (see Ak 7:324; 25:1195-6, 1417; 8:20).

On top of that, language not only shapes the matter of inner states but also allows human beings to communicate those states to others and, finally, is essential for the cognition of the others' inner states, by observing their behavior.[288] Kant claims that our *capacity* of having representations of ourselves is which distinguishes us from all other 'living beings' (*lebende Wesen*) on earth, so that language is at the basis of the development of self-consciousness:

> It is noteworthy that the child who can already speak fairly fluently nevertheless first begins to talk by means of "I" fairly late (perhaps a year later); in the meantime speaking of himself in the third person (Karl wants to eat, to walk, etc.). When he starts to speak by means of "I" a light seems to dawn on him, as it were, and from that day on he never again returns to his former way of speaking. - Before he merely *felt* himself, now he *thinks* himself. (Ak 7:127)

In fact, the word 'I' has the power to unify mental and physical existence of the subject and by means of it the subject is conscious of itself, namely, this recognizes itself as subject and differentiates itself from animals (*Thiere*) by means of that word (see also Ak 25:473). In a similar way, the word 'I' or rather 'the representation I' is a necessary condition of self-consciousness and, therefore, it is a fundamental element for the act of *thinking of oneself*, which constitutes a progress with respect to the mere act of *feeling oneself*.[289] When human beings start to use the concept 'I' they start to *think* of themselves; thus, they cannot only be the object of their 'feelings' but also of their 'thought' by means of the use of the concept 'I' that expresses their 'I-hood' (*Ichheit*) (see Ak 7:127; 25:10).[290] As a consequence, this representation allows us not only to be aware of the contents of **our** inner experience, by thinking of ourselves, but also to

[288] Kant analyses the possibility of knowing 'the interior' (*das Innere*) of a human being through external characteristics. Such analysis belongs to the field of physiognomy that is understood as "the art of judging a human being's way of sensing or way of thinking according to his visible form; consequently, it judges the interior by the exterior" (Ak 7:295). Physiognomy is not a science because inner states of other human beings cannot be accurately inferred from their involuntary signs. However, this could be regarded as an art of cultivating taste in morals, manners and customs, in order to promote human relations and to provide us with a useful critique for knowledge of human beings (see Ak 7:296-7).

[289] Kant notices the existence of languages in which the pronouns 'Ich' nor 'Du' are not distinguished in relation to verbs (see Ak 15:662; see also Brandt, 1999, p. 112; Howell, 2001, pp. 130-1).

[290] It seems that, in Kant's view, thought and language do not have independent existences, so that one *thinks* of oneself in virtue of language and *speaks* of oneself in virtue of thought.

develop new capacities and possibilities of action (see Ak 25:10; Sturm, 2017, p. 211; Longuenesse, 2006, p. 304).

Indeed, the 'I' is a representation that can be *thought* and *expressed* through different *languages*. The word 'I' is useful, on the one hand, to make explicit "the personal reference" of the subject and, on the other, to represent its inner and outer states as a unity.[291] However, even those who do not have in their language the word 'I', they still have the self in their thoughts, namely they can achieve such awareness or self-reference without using the word 'I' (see Ak 7:127). Language is fundamental not only because it helps our thought to get a signification but also because it is a *vehicle* through which we can understand ourselves as well as other human beings (see Makkreel, 2014, p. 35). As Kant notices, the human being can be both the subject and the object of language in two different ways: i) when A (subject) speaks to B (object) and ii) when A speaks to itself:

> All language is a signification of thought and, on the other hand, the best way of signifying thought is through language, the greatest instrument for understanding ourselves and others. Thinking is *speaking* with oneself (the Indians of Tahiti call thinking "speech in the belly"); consequently it is also *listening* to oneself inwardly (by means of the reproductive power of imagination). (Ak 7:192)

It follows that language is a condition of thought and thinking which relies on the acts of speaking and listening to oneself. This brings as a consequence that the subject behaves, on the one hand, as a subject and, on the other, as a listened *object* or as an *object* to "which" one speaks.[292] It means that the self, in the self-understanding, is "objectified" by language, in as much as it is taken for an object that is understood through language.[293]

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[291] R. Howell suggests that the "concept [I] does not thereby relate specifically to our self alone, and its relation is not of the propertyless, designative sort that Kant attributes to the *I*. Moreover, application of the concept to the manifold of inner sense then yields a relation to the self with all its inner-sense-knowable properties rather than such a designative relation" (Howel, 2001, p. 149 footnote 45). In Kant's view, the concept I has an indexical relevance but it also plays a role in the contents of our inner sense. I do not find incompatible both ideas in Kant.

[292] Perhaps Kant is referring to the dialogue structure typical of external language 'subject-object'- and suggesting that in a monologue (in which the subject speaks with itself) the dialogue structure is very similar. Lev Vygotsky explains this phenomenon as an internalisation, in which the subject incorporates properties of the social processes (external language) into its intrapsychological plane (internal language), although this internalisation entails a modification of that which is incorporated (see Martí, 1996, p. 67f.).

[293] I am in agreement with Frederick F. Van de Pitte who maintains that "it is this power to objectify the self which constitutes him as a person, and provides the unity of consciousness so necessary in a moral agent. At a certain stage in the development of a child, perhaps a year after he begins to speak, this objectification manifests itself in speech, and from that point on, man is pre-eminently concerned with the self" (Van de Pitte, 1971, p. 18).

Kant's account of the *faculty of using signs* involves a tensed **temporal** structure of inner experience which is relevant for the characterization of the object of inner experience. With regard to this faculty, Kant claims: "the faculty of cognizing the present as the means for connecting the representation of the foreseen with that of the past is the *faculty of using signs*" (Ak 7:191). It means that when the subject cognizes what is given in the present, its mind uses signs whose meaning has already been established in the past.[294] These signs can be connected with others in order to cognize what may occur in the future. Kant's analysis of the *faculty of using signs* also involves the use of *symbols* and *characters*:

> Forms of things (intuitions), so far as they serve only as means of representation through concepts, are *symbols;* and cognition through them is called symbolic or *figurative (speciosa). - Characters* are not yet symbols; for they can also be mere mediate (indirect) signs which in themselves signify nothing, but only signify something through association with intuitions and then leading through them to concepts. (Ak 7:191)

On the one hand, *symbols* are indirect signs that lead us to a *symbolic-intuitive cognition*, as long as they constitute sensuous intuition through which the concepts of the understanding obtain their meaning. Symbols are the presentation of an object for it, they entail a minimum level of "abstraction" and keep a very close reference to objects of experience. In fact, Kant underlines that those who always express themselves only through symbols have few concepts of the understanding, therefore the 'lively presentation' (*lebhafte Darstellung*) of savages is nothing else but poverty in concepts and in the words to express themselves (see Ak 7:191). On the other, *characters* are indirect signs that do not mean anything, if they are not already associated with intuition. This kind of signs leads us to a *discursive cognition* in which "the character accompanies the concept merely as guardian (*custos*), in order to reproduce the concept when the occasion arises" (Ak 7:191). It seems, that characters entail a high level of "abstraction", in as much as they form associations of signs, without a necessary reference to objects.

Finally, language plays a crucial role in the formation of the human being's interior and in his capacity of being prudent. Indeed, Kant suggests that our capacity of thinking *aloud*

[294] More recently Ferdinand de Saussure suggests in *Cours de linguistique générale* that 'language' (*langage*) has both an individual (*parole*) and social side (*langue*). Language is an established system and an evolution at the same time, for it is an existing institution as well as product of the past (see De Saussure, 1995, p. 24).

and of thinking *soundlessly* is a distinctive feature of human beings without which, neither prudence nor distinction between the human being's interior and its exterior would be possible.

> It could well be that on some other planet there might be rational beings who could not think in any other way but aloud; that is, they could not have any thoughts that they did not at the same time *utter,* whether awake or dreaming, in the company of others or alone. (Ak 7:332)

Kant illustrates two different things through this "thought-experiment": first, if this feature were real, all mental contents of the human being would be known by everybody as soon as they appear in the mind, so that its interior could not be differentiated from its exterior. Second, that feature would change the behaviour of our human species in a very critical way because humans are not pure angels and if dissimulation does not exist, we could not live in peace (see Ak 7:332). Needless to say, if we were incapable of concealing our own thoughts, we could not be *prudent*; namely, we could not use the others for our own purposes, for our intentions would be discovered beforehand by them (see Cohen, 2009, pp. 37, 40-1).

In my view, the private or public use of language is not only at the basis of the distinction between 'being' and 'seeming', but it also illustrates a social being that is integrated by *what the subject A* ***is*** *for itself* and *what A* ***seems to be*** *to others*. These items are far from being alike, for the subject conceals the first item and wants people to think that the second item corresponds with the first one (see Ak 7:151-2; Cohen, 2009, pp. 43-4). In order words, Kant's concept of prudence presupposes two sides of the self, namely a "private" and "public" side. Because of the "public" self, the subject is capable of feigning respect for social conventions in order to reach the actual goals of its "private" self (see Ak 7:332).

2.2.2. *Unity* and *sameness* of the self from a pragmatic point of view

In paragraphs on the Third Paralogism, Kant refuses to admit that the *objective persistence* or the *numerical identity* of the self can be inferred, either from any empirical intuition, or from the "logical identity of the **I**" (understood as the unity of self-consciousness) (see CPR A363). If the concept of "person" relies on consciousness of the

numerical identity of the self, then we cannot demonstrate from a **theoretical** standpoint that the soul is a person (see CPR A361-2).[295] Kant, nevertheless, thinks that "the concept of personality, just like the concepts of substance and of the simple, can remain (…) and to this extent this concept is also necessary and sufficient for practical use" (CPR A365-6). The question of whether the self *as thing in itself* is identical over time surpasses the boundaries of experience, for in our experience, by contrast, we *appear* as a stream of various states (see Brook, 1994, pp. 184, 7; Powell, 1990, pp. 56-7). It does not necessarily mean that we cannot use the terms personality and self in the same proposition.[296] Instead, we can and we ought to do it, although from a **pragmatic** perspective. In brief, I suggest that Kant supports the unity and identity of the self from a pragmatic and biological[297] point of view.

Certainly, Kant points out that the *consciousness of oneself* is an elevated act of human beings, but even though consciousness has *degrees* (see CPR B414-5), we cannot reach a degree in which we can have consciousness of abiding intuitions of the unity (*quantitative identity*) and sameness (*qualitative identity*) of ourselves (see CPR A350). Kant *presupposes* the unity of the self at best (see above section 1.1.4), but rejects any proof in favor of its identity (see CPR B419). Neither our judgement about objects nor the unity of consciousness demanded by the judgement can be taken for a perception of the unity of the subject, because we would fall into a paralogism (see Ak 18:223; CPR A365). In other words, it is a mistake to confuse the *unity of experience* with the *experience of unity*; according to the first one, experience rests on a unity derived from the effect of the understanding on empirical intuition and the ascription of these representations to one consciousness (see CPR B131-3). And according to the second

[295] P. F. Strawson makes this point: "when a man (a subject of experience) ascribes a current or directly remembered state of consciousness to himself, no use whatever of any criteria of personal identity is required to justify his use of the pronoun "I" to refer to the subject of that experience" (Strawson, 1966, p. 165).

[296] Sturma distinguishes among five domains of capacities of a person in Kant: 1) the connection between sensibility and understanding, 2) the identity of self-consciousness over time, 3) the accessible identity to the external observer, 4) autonomy and, finally, 5) self-purposiveness (Sturma, 2003, p. 281). I believe that Kantian anthropological approach to the person is not committed with the fifth domain, because his pragmatic anthropology precisely aims at a cognition of the human being which can be useful for any interested citizen.

[297] This "biological" unity of human beings refers to the fact that, according to Kant "all human beings on the wide earth belong to one and the same natural species because they consistently beget fertile children with one another, no matter what great differences may otherwise be encountered in their shape" (Ak 2:429-30). In several texts, it is possible to find that Kant's concept of human species is monogenetic, not polygenetic (see Ak 25:1187, 1195; 15:782, 1187; 8:110; see also Louden, 2000, pp. 103-4).

one, we would have the perception of an immaterial object, i.e. a unitary subject of all those experiences (see Strawson, 1966, pp. 162-3).[298]

Despite the fact that both rational and 'a-rational' (*vernunftlose*) beings have representations of things they experience, only human beings are capable of having the 'I' in their representations (see Ak 7:127; 25:244; 20:270). The representation 'I' is not given *a priori* but is empirical and it has a synthetic function insofar as it serves to unite several representations of a human being who is constantly changing in time. Despite the fact that we do not have access to an empirical intuition of the unity of the 'I', Kant holds that we can be conscious of the *changes* that occur in us, only if we *represent* us to ourselves as one and the same:

> To ask, given the various inner changes within a man's mind (of his memory or of principles adopted by him), when a person is conscious of these changes, whether he can still say that he remains *the very same* (according to his soul), is an absurd question. For it is only because he represents himself as one and the same *subject* in the different states that he can be conscious of these changes. (Ak 7:134 footnote)

It is worth stressing that Kant defends in the CPR that our consciousness of change in us is conditioned to the permanency of outer objects (see CPR XXXIX-XL footnote, A205/B250, B275-6), whereas in *Anthropology* he suggests that such condition is to be found in the unity and sameness of the subject. Of course, Kant is aware of the fact that in practice (in social intercourse) each human being is tempted to represent itself and the others as having a unity of consciousness, by which this becomes a *person*:

> The fact that the human being can have the "I" in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a *person,* and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person. (Ak 7:127; 25:859)

Accordingly, Kant admits that the human being does not think of itself as many diverse persons because of different changes in time (see Sturm, 2017, p. 207). The difficulty here lies in conciliating two apparently opposite ideas: *inner states of a human being are many and diverse* with *each human being is one and the same through its life*, that is, through time. This problem can be solved if we take sameness and unity for an "absolute"

[298] Somme commentators have argued that the mind, for Kant, is embodied (see Cassam 1993; Falkenstein 1995; Svare 2006; Hanna 2006 and Rukgaber 2009).

or a "relative" term; according to the first one, the human being regards itself as the "same" and "one", if it intuits internally itself in time; according to the second one, the human being regards itself as both diverse and the same, one and many at the same time as long as the intuitions, through which it represents itself, are changing in time. Although in this second perspective, *one self* is recognized by the human being and by society.[299] In my view, Kant admits the unity and sameness of human beings from the *relative* sense, since the very concept of inner sense, understood as a means by which we intuit our inner states (see CPR A22/B37), excludes the existence of one and the same state through time.

Again, outer experience provides us with representations of other human beings and external objects, whereas inner experience provides us with representations concerning to our internal states. But, even those representations would be nothing for human beings without a *voluntary consciousness of one's representations*, through which we are able to pay attention to the representations of our inner states, separating them from representations of external objects.[300] In fact, Kant distinguishes between 'noticing' (*bemerken*) oneself and 'observing' (*beobachten*) oneself; the first one is more basic than the second one, in as much as the latter is a methodical compilation of perceptions made in ourselves (see Ak 7:132).

Kant's anthropology is concerned with the observation of all our acts of representing and such observations are useful for logic and metaphysic. He also maintains there that anthropology should summon all the representational contents of our mind, which are given to us as an object of inner experience, although these should not be involuntary contents (see Ak 7:133). Certainly, the *Anthropology* is only focused on those representational contents under our control, excluding those contents that appear

[299] Kant holds in his *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* that "inner sense must endure uninterruptedly [*crossed out:* although] (according to sensation), although it is interrupted according to the consciousness of reflection. So, it proves the constant personality in this life regardless of all alterations endured by the nature of the soul through the body" (Ak 17:594; my translation). ("Der innere Sinn muß ununterbrochen fortdauren ~~obgleich~~ (der Empfindung nach), obgleich das Bewustseyn der reflexion nach unterbrochen ist. Also beweiset die beständige Persohnlichkeit in diesem Leben ohnerachtet aller Veränderungen, daß die Seelennatur den Korper überstehe").

[300] Kant holds that the acts of 'paying attention' (*Aufmerken*) to a representation and of 'turning away from a representation' (*Absehen von eine Vorstellung*) are determined by the same endeavor of the subject to become conscious of that idea; both acts demand that the subject should be conscious of the object of attention and of the object at which one turns away from (see Ak 7:131).

involuntarily or *spontaneously* in us by means of 'the play' (*das Spiel*) of the compositional unintentional power of imagination (see Ak 7:133-4).[301]

In addition, Kant declares that the conditions under which something is represented in inner and in outer experience are not the same, in terms of their temporal character, i.e. of their duration. Thus, objects of outer experience appear next to each other, lasting and fixed, whereas objects of inner experience are constantly flowing: "inner sense sees the relations of its determination only in time hence in flux, where the stability of observation necessary for experience does not occur" (Ak 7:134). In virtue of inner sense we get different views of the same "object" (the mind) in different moments. Phenomena of the mind are in a permanent flux and the idea of flux presupposes the idea of succession. Since those phenomena are nothing but inner perceptions of the mind, which are always coordinated according to their relation in time, they flow successively as a continuous alteration of states. As a result, the human being appears to itself as a being subject to alterations, wherein some states appear while others disappear. In fact, Kant elucidates that the 'human being' (*Mensch*) can be conscious of the different inner alterations of its mind only, if this represents it to itself as *the very same* subject in different states.

> To ask, given the various inner changes within a man's mind (of his memory or of principles adopted by him), when a person is conscious of these changes, whether he can still say that he remains *the very same* (according to his soul), is an absurd question. For it is only because he represents himself as one and the same *subject* in the different states that he can be conscious of these changes. (Ak 7:134 footnote)

Kant's effort to show the influence of opposite characters in human nature (alteration and sameness) can be recognized in the dependence of our consciousness of inner alterations on the representations of singleness and sameness. However, these particular representations do not demonstrate the existence of an empirical intuition of unity and sameness of the self. In contrast, it shows only an empirical necessity of the subject who needs the representation of something *one* and the *same* for observing and apprehending the alterations of its own inner states. Kant draws a distinction between two ways of

[301] It means, on the one hand, that obsessive thoughts associated with traumata should also be excluded and, on the other, that sometimes imaginings are inserted in those phenomena, so that invents produced by imagination would be taken falsely for inner experience: "inner sense is subject to *illusions*, which consist either in taking the appearances of inner sense for external appearances, that is, taking imaginings for sensations, or in regarding them as inspirations caused by another being that is not an object of external sense. So the illusion here is either *enthusiasm or spiritualism*, and both are *deceptions* of inner sense. In both cases it is *mental illness*" (Ak 7:161).

consciousness of oneself: the first one is *reflection* and it is described as consciousness of inner activity by which a concept is possible; the second one is *apprehension* and it corresponds to consciousness of receptivity by which a perception or an empirical intuition is possible (see Ak 7:134 footnote). Such distinction would entail that the 'I' is double according to the *form*, not according to the *matter* (see Ak 7:134 footnote; see also CPR B152-3). I shall set aside the "I as subject of thinking" for the investigation of the content of inner experience, because it is just a logical self, which is inaccessible to a concrete empirical consciousness (see CPR A350, B157, B277, A345-6/B404; Crone, 2012, pp.131, 137-8).[302] Certainly, I focus on the "I" in the second sense (as *subject of perception*) alone because it contributes to the identification of the empirical content of the self. To the best of my knowledge, inner experience can be described in terms of an organized set of empirical representations related in time which informs us of different inner alterations of the mind which we notice when we attend to the representations of our own inner (and outer) states.

In my view, the former quotation does not explain at length the relation between memory and inner alterations occurred in the mind. However, Kant recognizes that memory is related to these alterations. Indeed, the relation of inner alterations to the subject's representations of itself as *one* and the *same* is conditioned to memory's function of storing representations of its inner states. In my view, the subject can be conscious of inner alterations in its mind only, if it is capable of retaining them *through time* and evoking them afterwards. Of course, the subject represents itself as being 'the very same', 'one', or the 'same' because its mind is not absorbed by all inner alterations. Instead, the mind, far from being another alteration, is capable of providing the subject with those representations (one, the same, etc.), which do not fade out but are retained in memory and evoked afterwards.

[302] With regard to the self in the first sense, Kant confesses that "it is absolutely impossible to know anything further as to what sort of being it is, or what its natural constitution may be; it is like the substantial, which remains behind after I have taken away all the accidents that inhere in it, but absolutely cannot be known any further at all, since the accidents were precisely that whereby I was able to know its nature" (Ak 20:270).

2.2.3. The subject's development of character

In this section I shall argue that the human being has the power to make a *character* in social interaction. Kant underlines that human beings do not behave merely like animals, i.e. instinctively, but we also endeavor to be rational citizens of the world, by making a *character* within a social environment (see Ak 8:17). As far as the 'character' of the human being is concerned, Kant holds:

> The human being (…) has a character, which he himself creates, insofar as he is capable of perfecting himself according to ends that he himself adopts. By means of this the human being, as an animal endowed with the *capacity of reason (animal rationabile*), can make out of himself a *rational animal* (*animal rationale*). (Ak 7:321)

Pragmatic anthropology does not conceive of the human being as a *rationabile animal* that can become a *rationale animal*. That is to say, it is a reasonable animal that has the capacity to direct its life rationally, by creating a character through which it perfects itself according to its own ends (see Ak 7:321; 8:17). However, Kant does not pretend to enhance the subject's character in isolation but rather in social relations with other individuals, as these play a meaningful role in the pursuit of its self-perfectibility (see Van de Pitte, 1971, p. 18; Sturm, 2017, p. 216). As a consequence, the human being "first *preserves* himself and his species; secondly, trains, instructs, and *educates* his species for domestic society; thirdly, *governs* it as a systematic whole (arranged according to principles of reason) appropriate for society" (Ak 7:321-2). Indeed, Kant suggests that while the other animals, left to themselves, reach their complete "destiny", only human beings reach their moral destiny (i.e. a continual progress to the better) as long as they constitute a *species*. It follows that human beings can only participate in progress towards perfection through a series of many generations (see Ak 7:324, 333; 7:79; 7:84; see also Louden, 2000, pp. 104-5). [303]

Moreover, Kant clarifies that the character of a human being is the mark that distinguishes one human being from another, and even from other kind of being. To be precise, the *character* of a person is divided into *natural aptitude*, *temperament* and *character* (the

[303] I deem correct F. P Van de Pitte's interpretation according to which "Kant goes on to show that in spite of the inadequacies of the individual, man is unwittingly involved in a process of development which promises eventual fulfillment. Man is seen as good, not in terms of his essential nature, but in the perspective of his destiny" (Van de Pitte, 1971, p. 27).

way of thinking). According to the first two, the human being is regarded as a natural being constituted by natural predispositions encountered in them (as an animal); according to the second one, the human being is regarded as a free being endowed with will (see Ak 7:285, 25:1530; compare Louden, 2000, pp. 80-81). It is quite clear that pragmatic anthropology specially deals with the subject's character in the second sense because this aims at a practical-useful knowledge of the human being (see Ak 25:858).

Furthermore, I believe that Kant's notion of *character* shows the importance of *autonomy* in his *Anthropology*. According to him, character ought to reveal traces of an autonomous self insofar as this refers to what the human being, as a free person, makes of itself, namely something good or bad: "to have a character signifies that property of the will by which the subject binds himself to definite practical principles that he has prescribed to himself irrevocably by his own reason" (Ak 7:292).[304] However, it does not matter whether those principles are false or incorrect, what really matters is 'the formal aspect of the will' (*das Formelle des Wollens*) in general, namely the fact that this subject freely acts according to firm principles.

Needless to say, Kant does not deny the influence of primitive instincts on human beings. However, a cognition of inevitable natural determinations of the human being is of no use for pragmatic anthropology. Kant is interested in human character (unlike heart) because the human being's actions are not merely guided by instinct but also by principles (see Ak 25:628). Indeed, humans do not simply accept what occur but we also consider what ought to occur, insofar as we have the power to make ourselves (see Jacobs, 2003, pp.121, 123). This "ought" is grounded on the moral aspect of character by which we modify our drives and desires according to laws of the will that constitute a second nature, wherein we are free to pursue moral ends:

> The determination of human character depends not on his drives and desires, but rather solely on the manner *in which he modifies these*. We thus ask only about how the human being uses his powers and faculties, to which final end he applies them. In order, therefore, to be able to determine the character of the human being, one must be acquainted with the ends laid in him by nature. The characters of human beings are all moral, for morals is precisely the science of all the ends that are *established through the*

[304] To my knowledge, Kant's notion of *autonomy* of the will belongs not only to the "intelligible world", in which a person represents itself as "*Intelligenz zur Verstandeswelt*", but it is also a grounding element of the constitution of the person in pragmatic anthropology (see Sturma, 2003, pp. 273, 278).

> *nature of the will* and that prescribe the objective laws of the will, and according to which we direct and exert our faculties. (Ak 25:438)

Accordingly, Kant relates the notion of character to that of *law* (see also CPR A538/B567), but in this context he refers particularly to a *human law* rather than to a *natural* one. Moreover this law shows Kant's opposition between the *arbitrium liberum*, in which one has "a faculty of determining oneself from oneself", independently of sensible impulses, and the *arbitrium brutum* that belongs to non-rational animals that cannot form a rational reflective character and their will is merely pathological (see CPR A534/B562, Ak 25:1385; Sturm, 2017, p. 218; Jacobs, 2003, p. 120).

In my opinion, human beings can modify their character with a specific configuration, according to the circumstance and convenience; thus, Kant holds that from the day that human beings begin to speak by means of the word 'I', their egoism progresses relentlessly insofar as they display their 'beloved self' (*geliebtes Selbst*) wherever they are permitted. However, we progressively learn to dissimulate such an egoism through social intercourse (see Ak 7:128; 25:474-5). This egoism, which is presumably rooted in human nature, is dissimulated through a "mask" shaped by social rules in order to achieve one's goals: "in general, people in the civilized state play a role, and human society in the civilized state is a theatrical society, and in a society the individual is always in a state of constraint" (Ak 25:504). Human beings hide the natural matter of their own inner state, adopting an artificial matter shaped by others, in virtue of which we conduct ourselves modestly and we choose what also pleases others. As a result, social intercourse is riddled with illusions that make life pleasant for human beings in as much as these force people to have respect for one another and convert human life and its activities into a game whose roles everyone becomes accustomed to (see Ak 25:504, 1220).

Admittedly, Kant notes that the more civilized human beings are, the more we become actors. Thus, as we play different roles the human beings, we adopt the illusion of affection, modesty, unselfishness, and respect for others. But, since everyone knows that those bearings are not sincerely meant, they are not *deceived* but rather they come under an *illusion* that is also chosen by them in their own social intercourse (see Ak 7:151). On my view, the distinction between delusion and deception implies that human beings have the capacity to distinguish a "sincere" from an "artificial" matter of our and others' inner

states, so that everyone is socially induced to demand and bring out artificial inner states (*e.g.* modesty), which lead to certain bearings. Kant, nonetheless, clarifies that if the subject plays certain roles for a considerable amount of time, those "artificial" roles may actually produce virtues in the subject (see Ak 7:151; Makkreel, 2014, p. 28). In this vein, before human beings are civilized and enter into a human society, we are nothing but savages and our sincere uncivilized inner states are crude. Despite of the fact that nature in some way has made human beings evil, we are still considered from a *pragmatic* viewpoint as *free* beings who can agree on the necessity of a moral constraint of decency (see Ak 25:1197-8, 1353; Ak 7:328).

Kant points out that the human being, according to its **intelligible** character, is *good* as long as this is "subject to a law of duty and to the feeling (which is then called moral feeling) that justice or injustice is done to him or, by him, to others" (Ak 7:324). However, the human being, according to its **sensible** character, is *evil* as long as there is a tendency in humans to actively desire what is unlawful (see Ak 7:324, 327, 331). Kant, as noted earlier, holds that human beings are not only determined by natural laws but we also have the power to make up laws that rule social intercourse. Thus, Kant suggests the existence of a *second nature* made up by human beings, which relies on habits produced by constant circumstances of place and time. Human beings sometimes place themselves under certain conditions (*e.g.* like and adventurer who enters into a different nation) and sometimes these conditions are placed by their "fate" (see Ak 7:121). As a consequence, these laws are self-made rather than given by nature, so that humans are not merely products but producers of their own development (see Sturm, 2008, p. 503).

Besides, Kant suggests that freedom is essential for *personality* of human beings and holds that even though most of animals have a propensity towards freedom, only human beings can reflect on it. *Freedom*, regarded as the inclination to determine oneself according to one's own inclination (see Ak 25:1355), is the first thing that is demanded by human beings.[305] However, we also demand *means* (i.e. the possession of the ways of

[305] I deem correct A. Cohen's interpretation, according to which "for Kant, from the pragmatic perspective of human action, there is no doubt that we do have access to, and an experience of, freedom, and that our rational and moral capacities are empirically exercised rather than happening in some timeless inaccessible world" (Cohen, 2009b, p. 133).

satisfying our inclinations) and, as far as we know how to use our freedom, we will find our fortune and happiness in it.

In contrast, if we direct ourselves according to the inclinations of others, we will not reach freedom, happiness nor *personality*, for freedom is a condition of the latter (see Ak 25:1354). In this vein, Kant distinguishes *civil freedom* from *barbaric freedom*; the first one refers to freedom under laws, namely under limitations that condition our freedom to exist together with freedom of others; the second one is regarded as a state of animality and belongs to savages:

> Laws are limitations under the condition that our freedom exists with the freedom of others. – We very much want the freedom of others to be limited to the benefit of our own, but we do not want to have our own freedom limited. – But that is unreasonable. There is after all always an advantage to the laws. (Ak 25:1355)

Freedom of savages and nomads has no laws nor force, it cannot create equality among them, so that the human being among them is always in danger of losing its freedom (see Ak 25:1424). On the contrary, laws are advantageous for the possibility of *civil freedom*. Kant notices that under this freedom, human beings are constrained by the laws of social intercourse, fashion and by judgements of others in cities. However, he emphasizes that even in that society regents must let their subjects have an opinion of freedom, preventing that some of them oppress and elevate themselves above the others (see Ak 25:1355).[306] Granted that freedom is involved in Kantian notion of *character*, then that which nature conveys to the human being (e.g. predispositions, natural aptitude, temperament or physiognomy) does not constitute its proper character (see Ak 25:1384-5). In this vein, character is regarded as an originality (absent in imitators) in the way of thinking, which is derived from free behavior of the person. Character, hence, cannot be the effect of active forces on a dominated subject (see Ak 7:293).

[306] I believe that Kant's "anthropological" and "political" notions of freedom in *On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice* (1793) are compatible. He takes freedom (together with equality and independence) for a principle of civil condition of human beings, according to which the establishment of a state is possible. With regard to the *freedom* of every member of the state as Kant says: "no one can coerce me to be happy in his way (…) instead, each may seek his happiness in the way that seems good to him, provided he does not infringe upon that freedom of others to strive for a like end which can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a possible universal law (i.e., does not infringe upon this right of another)" (8:290).

On top of that, the human being is capable of being conscious of the fact that it has a character in its way of thinking and that this character is not given by nature but is acquired.[307] Accordingly, the grounding of character is a rebirth in which the human being is self-produced in relation to other human beings and this self-production is nothing but a 'transformation' (*Umwandlung*) that constitutes the beginning of a new epoch, or, a temporal event that cannot be forgotten by human beings (see Ak 7:294).

Kant indicates that education, examples and teaching lend abruptly principles of one's character (which guide behavior) *firmness* and *persistence*; this fact is the result of society's 'weariness' (*Überdruß*) at an unstable state of one's instinct. Thus, human beings want to become better humans in all respects, in as much as the grounding of their character is nothing but an absolute unity of inner principle of conduct (see Ak 7:294-5). Kant, nonetheless, is not only concerned with the *unity* of the human being in relation to its improvement through the influence of education on its conduct but also with "internal" transparency of the human being with regard to itself and to other human beings (see Ak 9:455).

The fact that a human being has consciousness that has *a character* is something that can only be proved when this *takes* truthfulness, in the core of its confessions to itself as well as in its behavior toward everyone else, *for* its supreme maxim. In this vein, to be truthful to oneself and to others constitutes the maximum of inner worth of all human beings, i.e. of the human dignity. Kant believes that the most common human reason is capable of being a 'man of principles' (*ein Mann von Grundsätzen*) who could become superior in talent and worth (see Ak 7:295).

2.2.4. Education in the formation of the self

Kant's anthropology involves an educational component that can be amplified with his *Lectures on Pedagogy*[308], where he maintains that 'humanity' (*Menschheit*) is not actually

[307] As he puts it: "the human being who is conscious of having character in his way of thinking does not have it by nature; he must always have *acquired* it" (Ak 7:294)
[308] These *Lectures* arise from a course on practical pedagogy, which was four times taught by Kant in the years 1776-7, 1780, 1783-4 and 1786-7 respectively at the University of Königsberg.

a gift provided by nature to humans but it is rather acquired by means of discipline. For the human being "can only become human through education. He is nothing except what education makes out of him. It must be noted that the human being is educated only by human beings, human beings who likewise have been educated" (Ak 9:443). Kant suggests that human beings are the only creature that must be educated, because this discipline or training can *change* animal nature *into* human nature. Unlike other animals, human beings are not all that they can be, but because of their own intelligence they can be perfected through **education** (see Ak 9:441).[309]

Kant thinks that it does not matter how great the 'animal tendency' may be, we are destined to make ourselves 'worthy of humanity' (*der Menschheit würdig*). But we can only reach this status, if we are educated to the good, so that we can struggle against those impulses derived from the crudity of our nature (see Ak 7:325). Education and instruction are means to acquire a character, whereby we act according to principles and not merely moved by our instincts (see Ak 25:1172-3; 7:285; Louden, 2000, pp. 75-7). Certainly, education "consists in bringing forth the *good* which the human being has not intended, but which continues to maintain itself once it is there, from *evil*, which is always internally at odds with itself" (Ak 7:328). This internal struggle is regarded by Kant as an **antagonism**, or, the 'unsociable sociability' (*ungesellige Geselligkeit*) of human beings, according to which we have a *propensity* to enter into society but also a *resistance* that threatens to break this society (see Ak 8:20).[310]

Education is a fundamental component of the subject's formation, by means of which this becomes citizen of the world. In this vein, nature has suited human beings for the use of reason, which drives them to live in society:

> The sum total of pragmatic anthropology, in respect to the vocation of the human being and the characteristic of his formation, is the following. The human being is destined by

[309] According to him, education contains care, discipline and instruction together with formation. The importance of the use of one's own intellect in the practical use of anthropological knowledge is also recognized by A. Wood who claims "as pragmatic, Kantian anthropology even emphasizes those very features of human life that he takes to be empirical manifestations of freedom – the development of new capacities, the variability of ways of life, the progress of human culture, the development of reason and the historical phenomenon of Enlightenment" (Wood, 2003, p. 44).

[310] As Kant states in the *Religion within the boundaries of mere reason*: "the human being must make or have made himself into whatever he is or should become in a moral sense, good or evil. These two [characters] must be an effect of his free power of choice, for otherwise they could not be imputed to him and, consequently, he could be neither *morally* good nor evil" (Ak 6:44).

> his reason to live in a society with human beings and in it to *cultivate* himself, to *civilize* himself, and to *moralize* himself by means of the arts and sciences. (Ak 7:324-5; see 15:800)

The human being by means of a good education can be free and live together with the freedom of others, who may have different and even opposite ways of thinking, in a civil society (see Ak 8:22). Furthermore, the human being becomes a social being through science, because the latter represents a form of culture that ennobles humanity (see Ak 7:325). Since education partly *teaches* the human being something and partly *develops* something within the human being, Kant recognizes that it is not evident how far the natural predispositions of the human being will reach (see Ak 9:443-4). For instance, 'minority' (*Unmündigkeit*) in some humans is an *inability* to make use of their own understanding, although this inability is not necessarily derived from a lack of the understanding but from a *self-incurred* minority caused by a lack of resolution and courage to use it without guidance of others (see Ak 8:35; 7:229).

In this vein, Kant points out that "the inner perfection of the human being consists in having in his power the use of all of his faculties, in order to subject them to *his free choice*" (Ak 7:144). Of course, those practices through which human beings are educated do not demand that the latter should abandon the use of their own understanding. Instead, the teacher helps the student to make judgements concerning philosophy and the problems of life (see Wilson, 2006, p. 26). As a result, the teacher should pursue a 'revolution' (*Revolution*) from within human beings, by helping them to leave their self-incurred immaturity and not letting others think for themselves (see Ak 7:229; see also Makkreel, 2014, p. 36-7).

2.2.5. Kant's conception of human nature in *Anthropology*

In this section I shall indicate what conception of nature is *explicitly* defended by Kant in *Anthropology*. After this, I shall argue that Kant presupposes an *implicit* conception of nature in his analysis of the human being.

First, Kant distinguishes between two kinds of nature, the first one is related to a natural constitution that determines our existence in certain way as human beings; for instance, our mental faculties, the constitution of sleep, horror at the thought of having died, etc.,

(see Ak 7:119, 189, 167). The second one is related to circumstances of space and time which produce habits in humans (see Ak 7:121, 151). However, since Kantian anthropology is interested in what human beings make of themselves, the second kind of natures is more relevant for pragmatic analysis of the human being. Kant recognizes both the influence of natural constitution of the human being and the power of the understanding as a "rule-maker":

> The understanding composes the entire *higher* faculty of cognition in itself, then the rules are not to be understood as those according to which nature guides the human being in his conduct, as occurs with animals which are driven by natural instinct, but only those that he himself makes. (Ak 7:197)

Kant points out that human beings are agents endowed with the capacity to make use of their own understanding and, thereby, capable of making *rules of habituation* in order to improve themselves, while they achieve their goals as citizens of the world (see Ak 7:199, 149, 119, 197-8). As human beings are regarded as agents who can make a **free** use of their understanding and they are unpredictable, the ideal of establishing universal rules concerning the human being finds no place in Kant's *Anthropology* (see Ak 7:119; 25:1437, 856).[311] Anthropology cannot provide a necessary and universal knowledge like natural sciences does, nor establish imperatives concerning human nature, since this is not grounded on *pure* but on empirical principles (see Ak 25:856-7; 25:1436; Hinske, 1966, p. 414; Sturm, 2008, pp. 503-4).[312] In my opinion, this second kind of nature is contrasts with a conception of human nature expressed in the *Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim* (1784), according to which human actions, as *appearances* of the freedom of the will, are natural occurrences subordinated to universal laws of nature (see Ak 8:17). Indeed, this second nature is a central feature of *Anthropology*, which leads us to consider that *what* the human being makes of itself cannot be explained as any physical phenomenon of natural sciences, for this is determined by contingent circumstances of the world.

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[311] Some commentators move in this direction, for instance: Greenberg, 2001, pp.151, 175; Westphal, 2005, p. 229, Reath, 2006, p. 17; Wood, 2003, p. 44, Louden, 2011, p. 109, among others. Sturm is correct that we, as human beings, are natural beings but also have a particular nature by which we are not completely determined by laws of nature but we also give ourselves rules of action and we judge about means and purposes, in virtue of which we can act freely (see Sturm, 2009, pp. 478-9, 523).

[312] I agree with B. Jacobs on considering that anthropology is a 'tenuous enquiry' that cannot reach certainty at least in the same degree of natural science does: "Kant is essentially claiming that experience of oneself and another is on an order altogether different than that of the natural sciences –an insight that the hermeneutical and phenomenological traditions would develop a century later" (Jacobs, 2003, p.111).

Second, Kantian anthropology presupposes the existence of a determinism or destiny (*fatum*)[313] within his account of human nature. If that is so, then it will not be evident how human freedom would fit in such determinist account. On the one hand, there is a basic naturalist determinism in passages where Kant admits that the human being is determined by a "**biological condition**" expressed by natural needs, impulses, tendency, etc., (see Ak 7:267, 220, 223-4, 245).[314] On the other, there is a confluence of a "theological" and a "secular determinism" in passages where he suggests that the human being's "**moral destiny**" is determined by the *will of nature* and occasionally by *Providence* (I focus now on the second one). This second sort of determinism can be evidenced in the *Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim* (1784) where Kant holds:

> Individual human beings and even whole nations think little about the fact, since while each pursues its own aim in its own way and one often contrary to another, they are proceeding unnoticed, as by a guiding thread, according to an aim of nature, which is unknown to them, and are laboring at its promotion, although even if it were to become known to them it would matter little to them. (Ak 8:17; see also 8:27, 29)

Such "determinist" ideas are not exclusive to *Idea for a universal history* but they are present in *Anthropology* as well. In this vein, R. Brandt notices that anthropology from the beginning of 1772-3 is determined by a 'general finalism' (*durchgängigen Finalismus*) (see Brandt, 1997, p. XLV).[315] For Kant suggests that a "moral destiny" determines what human race should do, since the latter can only reach a 'complete destiny' (*ganze Bestimmung*) through the progress in a series of many generations, while

[313] I use the term *fatum* to point out that all occurrences are ruled by a known or unknown plan and none occurrence or event constitutes an exception of this plan.

[314] For instance, Kant holds: "we cannot very well assume that the Creator, simply for the sake of curiosity and to establish an arrangement on our planet that pleased him, was so to speak just playing. Rather, it seems that it must be impossible for organic creatures to come into being from the matter of our world through reproduction in any other way than through the two sexes established for this purpose" (Ak 7:177 footnote).

[315] Andrew Reath suggests that Kant's descriptions of the Highest Good vary throughout his works: "the theological version is more prominent in the **earlier** works, such as the first and second *Critiques*, while the secular version is predominant in the third *Critique* and **later** works. This allows us to conclude that historically, Kant's thought about the Highest Good develops in the direction of the secular conception, even though the teleological version is never completely dropped" (Reath, 1988, p. 601; my emphasis). Against this view, R. Louden suggests that the theological version is also persistent in later works (see Brandt, 2000, pp. 227-8 footnote 42). In my view, Kant's reference to "the good" in *pragmatic* anthropology involves moral elements, although there he is not committed to provide a cognition of a thoroughly "unselfish moral end" nor "the highest good" within the purest morality (see Ak 8:279; see also Kant's note). Instead, his characterization of the human being is intended to show an "impure" pragmatic moral cognition that helps the human beings to reach their own goals without undermining peace of their community (see Louden, 2011, pp. 65-6).

other animals can reach it individually (see Ak 7:324; 8:20; see also Louden, 2000, pp. 104-5, 204 footnote 50). Thus, the human being can deviate from its 'destiny' (*Bestimmung*) without a convenient education (see Ak 7:325-6).[316]

At times destiny is identified with nature, in as much as the latter has the 'intention' (*Aibsicht*) and even 'wisdom' (*Weisheit*) of letting the child come into the world with loud cries in order to preserve the species (see Ak 7:327 footnote; compare Louden 2000, pp. 83, 101).[317] He also admits that a civil constitution is the highest degree of artificial improvement of the human species with regard to 'the final end of its destiny' (*Endzweck ihrer Bestimmung*) (see Ak 7:327; 8:22). Even, civil or foreign war is a 'mechanical device of Providence' (*ein Maschinenwesen der Vorsehung*) which allows us to move from the crude state of nature to the civil state (see Ak 7:330). I think that these passages show that in Kant's *Anthropology* the human being is regarded as a free acting being and all its progress is determined by 'plan of nature' (*Plane der Natur*), while the opposite to progress seems to be the result of its crude nature (see Ak 7:322, 303-4; Ak 8:19). In both ways, the power of nature has a significant influence on the human being regarded both as an individual and as race.

I am tempted to consider that Kant takes a "compatibilist" position, according to which Kantian *metaphysical* view of freedom has no implication for his view of human freedom from a *pragmatic* perspective (see Wood, 2005, pp. 97-98; Cohen, 2009b, p. 133). The important point is that Kant admits in his *Anthropology* that human beings can be *free* and simultaneously *determined* by nature. Certainly, it is in virtue of the **will** of nature that we, unlike the *purposeless* condition of savages (see Ak 8:25), have the power to go beyond the mechanical arrangement of our animal existence and instincts, in order to participate in happiness and perfection which lean on the use of our reason (see Ak 7:323, 329-30; 8:19). It means that, the human being should not be a passive spectator who merely asks nature or the Providence for happiness; instead "the human species should and *can* itself be the creator of its good fortune" (Ak 7:329). In other words, nature has

[316] As Louden notices, the word *Bestimmung* can be translated as "vocation", "destiny", and "determination", and it is not completely evident in which cases each of these meanings is used by Kant.
[317] Kant claims in *Menschenkunde*: "actually the intention of nature appears to have been this, that the human being might disperse itself around the earth, which would not have occurred if human beings had lived together peacefully" (Ak 25:1197).

provided us with our own reason and *talents* in order to make our own moral predispositions, through which **we** can, to some extent, *free* us from our instinctive impulses derived from our natural condition. Certainly, Kant claims that human beings deserve an honorable place among animals, only because there is a moral predisposition in us (an innate demand of reason) which works against an evil propensity that hinders us from a progress toward the good (see Ak 7:332-3; 8:21).

Chapter 3.

Memory and the Self

> "*One disdains the memory, especially when one possesses it only to a small degree. But sciences cannot at all be learned without memory, and understanding itself cannot subsist without memory. Memory is the repository of materials for thinking*"
> (Kant, *Anthropology-Mrongovius*, Ak 25:1273)

> "*The saying, tantum scimus, quantum memoria tenemus is certainly correct, and that is why the culture of the memory is quite necessary. All things are such that the understanding only follows upon the sensuous impressions, and the memory must retain these impressions*".
> (Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, Ak 9:472)

3.1. Hume and Kant on memory

Human experience does not occur in an eternal present but rather in a succession of instants, in which our representations (those which are not present anymore) can persist, only if we suppose certain faculty of the mind, which contributes to the unity of experience (see Paton, 1936a, p. 363).

In this section I provide a contrast between Hume's and Kant's account of memory, arguing that for Hume memory plays a crucial role in knowledge from an *empirical* point of view, as long as this faculty uses data drawn from experience to form and increase our knowledge. Conversely, I suggest that in Kant's account of memory evidence can be found for claiming that memory is a faculty that plays an "unconscious" fundamental role in human self-knowledge.[318] Particularly, I suggest that memory is a *no empirical* structure of our faculty of cognition which grounds inner and outer experience and, thereby, achieves a "transcendental" function.[319]

[318] Recently, William F. Brewer has recognised that an experimental psychologist who wants to study human memory in terms of an *autobiographical* memory should sketch out a position on the nature and organization of the self (see Brewer, 1986, p. 27). In brief, *autobiographical* memory consists of memory of information related to the self, so that Brewer grounds cognition of memory on cognition of the self —while I do the opposite—.

[319] Tom Rockmore argues for an analysis of unconscious activity of the mind from a "transcendental" perspective: "if we cannot study the unconscious empirically, the correct way to study the unconscious activity of the mind is transcendentally, that is indirectly through analysis of the so-called necessary conditions of knowledge" (Rockmore, 2012, p. 310).

a. Hume on the empirical function of memory in knowledge

I shall first examine David Hume's conception of memory as his exposition constitutes a fundamental antecedent of Kant's view on memory. However, both agree on the meaningful role of memory in knowledge in general:

> Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him. (Hume, 2007, p. 30).

And Kant holds,

> Memory is the most wonderful of all *powers of the human* soul. The ancients said tantum scimus, quantum memoria *tenemus*, for the proper wisdom is based on memory; thus the human being has much of it in memory and remembers every part of it, only on occasion; if in that occasion it does not remember, one believes that it is completely empty.[320] (Ak 25:974-5; my translation; see also Ak 25:1273, 147)

Hume and Kant admit that memory is not only important with regard to "theoretical" knowledge but also with regard to our very existence in the world. However, Hume's theory of memory is not unproblematic, for it contains some issues that we must treat. In the first place, Hume seems to hold a dubious position concerning the status of memory contents, for they could be impressions or ideas (see Loeb, 2002, p. 202, footnote 26). Both impressions and ideas are perceptions, although the former are "perceptions that enter into our thought with most force and violence" while the latter are the faint images of impressions "in thinking and reasoning" (*Treatise,* p. 1). I think, nonetheless, that, for Hume, memory contents have an intermediate position between an idea and an impression, which arise when impressions have been present to the mind and they appear again as a new appearance that retains a considerably degree of its first vivacity (see *Treatise,* p. 8). As the text suggests, memory contents and impressions seem to be identified as he claims that the mind in its reasoning about causes or effects must never lose sight of objects while reasoning upon its own ideas, instead it must take into account impressions or at least ideas of the memory, "which are equivalent to impressions"

[320] "Unter allen *Kräften der menschlichen* Seele ist das Gedächtniß das wundersamste. Die alten sagten: tantum scimus, quantum memoria *tenemus*; denn im Gedächtnisse besteht das eigentliche Wissen, daß der Mensch so unbegreiflich viel im Gedächtniß hat, wo er sich jedes Stück nur bei Gelegenheit erinnert, und wenn diese Gelegenheit sich nicht erignet, so glaubt man, er sey ganz leer". (Ak 25:974-5)

(*Treatise*, p. 82). Thus whenever we infer effect from causes, we have to establish the existence of these causes by an immediate perception of our memory, senses or by an inference from other causes. It follows that memory and sense impressions are both immediate perception and without these, we would carry on our inferences *in infinitum* (see *Treatise*, pp. 82-3, 107-8).

Hume asserts that both memory and imagination borrow their simple ideas from impressions, however memory, in virtue of a peculiar property, preserves the original order and position of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes them as it pleases (see *Treatise*, pp. 85, 110). However, this difference does not suffice to distinguish accurately between operations ascribed to memory or those ascribed to imagination[321], for it is impossible to recall the past impressions in the memory in order to compare them with the present ideas and to determine whether their arrangement is exactly similar. A more precise difference should be found for distinguishing these two faculties in their operation. This is owed to the fact that ideas of memory have a superior force and vivacity, while ideas of imagination are fainter and more obscure. However, it is observable that the more recent the memory is, the clearer the idea is, so that after a long period of time that idea loses its force and vivacity to such a degree that it may be obliterated or taken for an idea of imagination (see *Treatise*, pp. 85-6). As a result, these experiential observations show that ideas of memory have a changing existence determined by their temporal position with regard to their first occurrence in memory. Hume, nonetheless, admits that

> An idea of the imagination may acquire such a force and vivacity, as to pass for an idea of the memory, and counterfeit its effects on the belief and judgment This is noted in the case of liars; who by the frequent repetition of their lies, come at last to believe and remember them, as realities. (*Treatise*, p. 86)

[321] I deem right Jeffrey K. McDonough's example to show that a complete "isomorphism" is not necessary nor sufficient condition for taking a representational state for a memorial content rather than for an imaginary one: "A musician somewhere in Siberia hums a simple tune that happens to be isomorphic with the Beatles's 'Yesterday'. Surprisingly enough, however, the tune she is humming is in no other way related to the famous song with which it is isomorphic. The tune, as it were, just popped into her head one day. In such a case we may be tempted to say that the musician reinvented, or perhaps even rediscovered 'Yesterday,' but what we cannot say is that she remembers 'Yesterday'" (McDonough, 2002, p.74). McDonough believes that a better criterion could be a *causal* relation rather than an *isomorphic* relation among representations, so that although the representation of the musician is isomorphic with the Beatle's song, is not *causally* related to it and, therefore, it cannot be a memory of that song.

Like Kant, Hume admits that imagination contents can be stronger than memory contents (see Ak 15:147). So, since neither isomorphism nor force and vivacity are sufficient criteria to differentiate a remembered idea from an imagined one, some commentators have suggested that Hume admits that humans do not need such a criterion but we are able to distinguish a memorial representation from an imaginative representation by immediate introspection (see McDonough, 2002, pp. 81, 83; Pears, 1990, p. 42). It is completely reasonable to think that Hume was fully aware of this skepticism with regard to memory, which is even discussed nowadays. It is also evident that memory is at the basis of our inferences of cause-effect, for we can only infer the existence of one object from that of another by means of *experience*. In other words, we direct our attention to objects whose existence is always posited in a regular order of contiguity or succession. Thus as we remember their constant contiguity, we are tempted to make inferences.

For instance, when we remember the constant connection between a glimpse of a *flame* as well as a sensation of *heat*, we believe that the first one is a cause of the second, so that the cause-effect relation is generated by a remembered constant union of those sensations (see *Treatise*, pp. 87, 107). However, we have no justification for establishing causal connection in experience, for we have no experience of any *necessary* connection between causes and effects. Instead, experience allows us to form sequences of ideas which repeat themselves, so that it is well-grounded to assert that "in regarding the sequences as causal, and so as universally constant, we make an assertion for which experience gives no support, and to which no amount of repeated experience, recalled in memory, can add one jot of real evidence" (Kemp Smith, 2003, p. 599).

Moreover, whatever is present to the memory, unlike imagination, may have a vivacity which resembles an immediate impression. Even, memory constitutes a system of impressions corresponding to external and internal perception and therefore is a condition of reality, or in his own words:

> Of these impressions or ideas of the memory we form a kind of system, comprehending whatever we remember to have been present, either to our internal perception or senses; and every particular of that system join'd, to the present impressions, we are pleas'd to call a *reality*. (*Treatise*, p. 108)

Memory represents a system that renders possible experience in as much as any impression derived from experience would fade out without a faculty capable of preserving every acquired impression. However, since there is a greater degree of assurance in the memory of a recent experience than in the memory of a remote experience, therefore an argument on a certain matter of fact that we remember will be more or less *convincing* depending upon whether the fact remembered is recent or remote. Thus, the degree of confidence in *memory beliefs* tends to diminish gradually over time, so that this variation changes the authority of the same argument according to different times in which it is proposed.[322] The same shall apply to causal inferences based on memory, for the degree of vivacity of memory contents decreases over time, so that those judgements progressively will not be convincing (see *Treatise*, pp. 143-4).

Besides, Hume recognizes that memory is involved in our opinion of the *continued existence* body, such opinion arises when we have become accustomed to observe a constancy in certain impressions. For instance, he observes that "we feign the continu'd existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption; and run into the notion of a *soul*, and *self*, and *substance*, to disguise the variation" (*Treatise*, p 254). Thus, we are inclined to regard these interrupted perceptions as the same because of their resemblance, regardless of their discrepancies. Hume explains that we remove such interruption, which undermines that identity, by supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence, so that this supposition acquires force and vivacity from the memory of these broken impressions (see *Treatise*, p. 199).

In fact, Hume states that memory informs us of the existence of many objects but this information does not extend beyond their past existence, for neither senses nor memory can actually give any testimony to the continuance of their being (see *Treatise*, p. 196). Accordingly, present phenomena of experience are comprehended by us, by taking into account their previous existence in memory in virtue of which we suppose their continued existence. Or, in his own terms: "I am naturally led to regard the world, as something real and durable, and as preserving its existence, even when it is no longer present to my

[322] This interpretation is endorsed by L. E. Loeb who holds: "doxastic states produced by memory are unstable in that they have a tendency to change gradually with respect to the degree of assurance with which they are held. This tendency to change is entirely the result of the associationist mechanism that sustains the memories" (Loeb, 2002, p. 202).

perception" (*Treatise*, p. 197). As a result, human beings are accustomed to suppose the *continued existence* and *identity* of objects, by connecting their past appearances, which are stored in memory, with present appearances derived through senses (see *Treatise*, pp. 197, 209 and 261). The case is similar with regard to the "self", as long as it is a bundle of various successive perceptions.

Memory not only preserves a considerable part of past *perceptions*, but also the *frequent placing* of resembling perceptions in the chain of thought. This preservation easily conveys imagination from one link to another, making the whole seem like a continued object (see *Treatise*, pp. 260-1). On Hume's picture, the human mind is "a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other" (*Treatise*, p. 261). This means that the subject endures changes in its character, disposition, impressions and ideas without losing its *identity*, since all these changes are connected by the relation of causation. Memory is demanded for preserving the existence of the items involved in that relation. Thus, "as memory acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be consider'd, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity" (*Treatise*, p. 261). However, Hume notices that since there are episodic lacks of memory concerning ourselves, we are compelled to extend the same chain of causes and, therefore, the identity of ourselves beyond our memory. As a result, we comprehend times, circumstances and actions, which actually have been forgotten, in order to maintain our own "identity" (see *Treatise*, p. 262).

It seems that both Hume and Kant had an interest for the relation between memory and personal identity. Both admit that we lack impression or empirical intuition of the "continuity", "identity" and "unity" of ourselves (see *Treatise*, p. 251; CPR BXXXIX – XLII footnote, A107, A350). Personal identity of our *thought*[323] is, according to Hume, derived from memory's contribution to the customary relations of resemblance and causation, through which we associate the whole train of perceptions in imagination (see *Treatise*, pp. 159-161). In other words, *personal identity* is explained in terms of an empirical association of those perceptions that have been preserved by memory. Kant, by contrast, focuses on the "logical identity" of the self as a condition by which we can

[323] Hume distinguishes between "personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves" (*Treatise*, 253).

ascribe perceptions to *our consciousness*: "the identity of the consciousness of Myself in different times is therefore only a formal condition of my thoughts and their connection, but it does not prove at all the numerical identity of my subject" (CPR A363). This has led A. Brook to consider that Kant did not reject Hume's story about the mind, but rather he had supplemented it. Hume's account of personal identity "is radical inner-sense empiricism: what we can know about our persistence is what we can infer from the flux and flow of representations, memories in particular. To this, Kant adds just one point: we also have a unified consciousness" (Brook, 1994, p. 103).

According to Kant, memory is a repository of changing representations that only belong to the subject, if the unity of consciousness is presupposed "for it is only because he represents himself as one and the same subject in the different states that he can be conscious of these changes" (Ak 7:134 footnote). On Kant's picture, our inner sense, from a *theoretical* perspective, only provides us with a stream of various representations of our states (see CPR A107, A381). I argue, in contrast, that for the latter philosopher we are entitled to represent us to ourselves as identical over time from a *pragmatic* perspective. In both perspectives, all our perceptions, memories and representations in general must belong to one consciousness (see CPR A365).[324] I focus on this point in sections 2.2.2 and 3.4.

b. Kant on the "transcendental" functions of memory in experience

Gordon Nagel rightly makes the observation that "one of the striking "omissions" in Kant's theory of experience is any significant role of memory in cognition. Memory, which figures so large in Locke and Hume, does not figure at all in the Critique" (Nagel, 1983, p. 215). In the very few explicit references to memory in the CPR, Kant claims that memory constitutes an *empirical* condition under which our understanding is exercised (see CPR A52-3/B77). I suggest, nevertheless, some basic ideas about the

[324] A. Brook correctly suggests: "all representational states, memories included, must belong to this single consciousness if they are to be 'something to us', and the memories within this unified consciousness do give us a sense that the single common subject we are aware of in ASA [apperceptive self-awareness] has persisted, and persisted as itself, for some time" (Brook, 1994, p. 193).

"transcendental"[325], although "unconscious"[326] functions of memory in experience. For memory would partake implicitly in three different *a priori* syntheses that, according to the 'A-Deduction of Categories' (TD), are necessary conditions of experience. These are *synthesis of apprehension*, *synthesis of reproduction* and *synthesis of recognition in the concept* (see CPR A98-A110; see also above section 1.3.5).[327]

Few commentators have explored in detail the possible role of memory in the *a priori* conditions of experience; those who have directly been faced with this issue, have considered this role as possible or impossible. For instance, G. Nagel is reluctant to acknowledge the transcendental functions of memory in experience. Instead, he reduces memory to an empirical function of storing or accumulation of sense materials which cannot be integrated into development of knowledge, regarding memory as unnecessary, on the grounds that "the manifold of appearance" occupies the same place as memory (memory taken for a *reconstruction*).[328]

The abandonment of memory is partly motivated by a "self-sufficient" reading of the concept "appearance", according to which "appearances are the stable correlates of the flux of sensory input. The buildup of knowledge is not the accumulation of sensory fact upon sensory fact, but the continual addition of details to a structure that obtains a priori" (Nagel, 1983, p. 215). In my view, the replacement of "accumulation" with "continual addition" does not mean the superfluous character of memory, because what I am precisely arguing is that memory is that *a priori* structure that prevents the appearance

[325] In Kant's own terms: "I call all cognition **transcendental** that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our a priori concepts of objects in general" (CPR A11-12/B25).

[326] I am not arguing that this transcendental function of memory can be an object of empirical consciousness. Instead, I mean that memory functions are "unconscious" mental acts of the mind which contribute to our cognition of empirical objects. Despite Kant unfortunately offers no openly-discussed metaphysical account of memory's functioning, such idea is not incredible, since Kant maintains in several places that some operations of our mind take place, regardless of whether or not we are conscious of them (see CPR B130, A78/B103, A141/B180-1; Rockmore 2012; Sánchez 2012; Kitcher (2012); Crone 2012; Svare, 2006, pp. 111, 202-3).

[327] I am in agreement with A. Brook's claim: "in TD, he [Kant] hardly mentions memory (his discussion of the synthesis of recognition is a rare exception and even there memory appears only by implication)" (Brook, 1994, p. 186), although he admits that "many, perhaps all acts of TA [transcendental apperception] make use of memory, of course (…) to have certain sorts of representations we must be able to retain earlier representations and/or their objects, bring them forward, and synthesize them with current ones." (1994, p. 186).

[328] Nagel distinguishes among three sorts of memory: vivid experience, the production of arbitrary information and reconstruction (see Nagel, 1983, p. 216). The first one arises as a vivid recollection of the past, the second produces information without a logic and the third one produces information but is also capable of integration of the stored information. In my opinion, Nagel's account of memory leans on his own ideas rather than on Kantian texts that deal with memory.

from losing (forgetting) every added "detail" in the flux of the sensory input. Further, Nagel ascribes a purely "passive" role of memory to Kant, by declaring that "the manifold of appearance is an active file, rather than an attic crammed with memories. It is under constant revision" (Nagel, 1983, p. 215).[329] I argue, by contrast, that memory plays an active role in experience, via imagination, by storing and reproducing necessary items for experience.

A more positive view on the role of memory in Kant's account of experience is provided by P. F. Strawson, who suggests a mutual dependence between memory and experience in a short reference to memory: "if experience is impossible without memory, memory also is impossible without experience. From whatever obscure levels they emerge they emerge together" (Strawson, 1966, p. 112). Strawson says that memory is involved in "experience, recognition, consciousness, of identity of self through diversity of experience" (Strawson, 1966, p. 111). However, he does not explain how memory and these elements are connected with experience.

A more detailed analysis of memory is provided by H. J. Paton's article "Self-Identity" (1929) in which, in my understanding, he suggests that experience relies on *one* synthesis that demands memory functions. Here he emphatically asserts about the three-fold synthesis: "there is really only one synthesis—which we are describing here in fragments (*abgesondert und einzeln*). I doubt also whether it is necessary to speak of a reproduction in imagination. All that we require is memory" (Paton, 1929, p. 316). Unfortunately, Paton's article is not focused on Kant's account of memory but rather on other authors (such as Bertrand Russell or Charlie Dunbar Broad).[330] Paton later, in 1936, defended the role of memory in the *synthesis of recognition*, whereby the manifold of intuition is "combined" into one object (see Paton, 1936a, pp. 375, 481). He even suggests that all knowledge of objects demands not only to *reproduce* but also to *remember* a "series of

[329] Yes, he says: "the question is whether storage is an accurate metaphor for the accumulation of knowledge. The alternative is to regard knowledge not as a file in which the past is kept, but as an ongoing project of making the indefinite more definite" (Nagel, 1983, p. 217). But his alternative has no other purpose than replacing memory with an *operative* notion of appearance.

[330] Since that Paton is mainly discussing Broad's and Russel's ideas on memory rather than Kant's own, I find at least problematic to attribute (as A. Brook did it) to Patton the idea that "he thinks that Kant argued, both in TD and in his attack on the Third Paralogism, that for memory to play the role it plays in synthesis, the subject who had an experience now remembered and the subject who now remembers it must be one and the same subject" (Brook, 1994, p. 185).

given appearances", in terms of the order in which these appearances were given to the mind (see Paton, 1936a, p. 401).

Howard Caygill, who endorses the relevance of memory only for the syntheses of *apprehension* and *recognition*, argues in the same direction:

> Memory is implied in two of the three syntheses of the 'transcendental faculty of imagination' presented in the deduction of CPR: in the 'synthesis of apprehension' where it informs the consistency of appearances, and in the 'synthesis of recognition' where it is implied in the continuity of the consciousness of appearances. (Caygill, 1995, pp. 290-1).

However, Caygill's study of memory is too brief and cannot explain in detail how memory and imagination are connected in experience. Andrew Brook also admits the importance of memory in the *synthesis of recognition*: "in order to synthesize earlier representations with current ones, we must be able to recall the earlier representations and recognize their relation to current ones" (Brook, 1994, p. 186).[331] In Brook's view, the act of "recalling" is only possible with the aid of memory, albeit the memory of the earlier representation should belong to the same consciousness as the current representation. Otherwise, we would not have access to each particular representation. In a similar sense, Angelica Nuzzo argues for the seminal role of memory in the third synthesis:

> To this extent, memory is crucial to the application of concepts, that is, to the constitution of the cognitive synthesis. (…) The consequence is that in the first CPR, Kant transcendentally deconstructs the function of memory. Now memory (i) somehow acquires a transcendental function in connection with the imagination (already in constituting the cognitive synthesis). (Nuzzo, 2015, p. 190).

Disregarding the incompleteness of the latter attempts, they are thoughtful in as much as they focus attention on the transcendental role of memory in experience. Unfortunately, these attempts overlook Kantian anthropological description of memory, so that they cannot show how memory is involved in the development of experience. As already indicated, I argue for the relevance of memory in the three syntheses:

First, Kant emphasizes that all representations belong to inner sense and, therefore, these should be brought into relations of time, because time is the form of inner sense. An

[331] A. C. Ewing outlines scarcely the relation between the *synthesis of recognition* and memory (see Ewing, 1967, p 75-6).

empirical intuition is nothing but the effect of the *synthesis of apprehension*. It means that the manifold given in sensibility is apprehended as an "intuition" only, if we distinguish the time of that manifold, by *going through* it and *taking* it *together* (see CPR A99). It is well-grounded to assert that the act of *taking the manifold together* would not be possible, if each element of the manifold (through which we *go through*) were forgotten, as we are successively apprehending them. Precisely, the very term apprehension entails the mind's power to *retain* these empirical data, which would not be possible without a sort of "corporeal" or "sensitive"[332] memory.

Second, Kant states that all successive *apprehension* of the manifold given in sensibility requires that each one of the apprehended representations should be reproduced, so that the preceding representation can be associated with the following one by means of a *synthesis of reproduction in imagination* (see CPR A101-2; text cited above). But, how could that representation be reproduced without presupposing a faculty capable of retaining it in the mind? The answer is, in a way, sketched by S. Matherne, who notices the importance of the human being's capacity of preserving empirical data in the *synthesis of reproduction*:

> In order, for example, to produce a representation that reflects the different aspects of the champagne flute, if by the time I am representing its curviness I have forgotten all about its glint, then I cannot produce an image of it. On Kant's view, the synthesis of reproduction is the process through which representations in the past are brought to bear on what we are representing right now. (Matherne, 2015, p. 758)

Despite the fact that Kant is not much concerned with the "retention" of those representations but merely with their *reproduction*, it is plain that without a capacity to

[332] Kant, influenced by Wolff, admits in *Collins* (1772-3) the existence of a 'sensitive memorizing' (*sensitive Memorieren*) and in the *Anthropology* holds that memory and the faculty of foresight are 'sensible' (*sinnlich*), meaning that these belong to sensibility (see Ak 25:92; 7:182). Christian Wolff says in his *Psichologia Rationalis*: "I name sensitive the memory that draws out what has been originated by sense" (Wolff, 1972, §279) ("sensitivam appello, quae a sensu ortum trahit") and adds that this kind of memory belongs to animals as well: "*animal memory or sensitive consists in apperception of the same idea contained, so to speak, in several series of perceptions*" (1972, §280) ("*memoria animalis seu sensitiva in apperceptione eiusdem ideae tanquam in diversis perceptionum seriebus contentae consistit*"). However, the distinction between corporeal and intellectual can be traced back, at least, to Descartes, who claimed in a letter (1640) to Mersenne: "I think that it is the other parts of the brain, especially the interior parts, which are for the most part utilized in memory. I think that all the nerves and muscles can also be so utilized, so that a lute player, for instance, has part of his memory in his hands (…) but besides this memory, which depend on the body, I believe there is also another one, entirely intellectual, which depends on the soul alone" (Descartes, 1991, p. 146; see also Joyce, 1997, p. 375). Afterwards, in the *Conversation with Burman* (1648) Descartes holds that the function of the *intellectual memory* is to recall universals, while that of the *corporeal memory* is to recall particulars (see Descartes, 1991, pp. 336-7).

store and to evoke those representations, there would be no stuff to be reproduced.[333] On this basic point, I am in agreement with Heidegger's claim that "the being experienced earlier would constantly be lost completely with each now, if it were not in general retainable" (Heidegger, 1990, p. 127). Indeed the association of representations leans on their possible reproduction, namely, on the presence of the proper representations involved in the association. Thomas Powell offers further suggestive remarks about the function of memory in the *synthesis of reproduction*, saying that "experience itself would be impossible if individual representations were not such that they could be reproduced in memory, synthesized in thought under object-concepts, or synthesized in some other way or ways" (Powell, 1990, p. 28). Powell correctly notices that the successive addition of parts in the apprehension depends upon the successive "resonance" of the reproduced part, that is, the constitution of a series is impossible, if each *added* part were forgotten.[334]

What is the status of a preceding representation in the successive series of apprehension? I answer that that representation cannot be given as an *intuition* (nor as *perception*, see Ak 7:182) in sensibility but rather as a particular *memory*. For the persistence of a past representation in sensibility over time would make the reproduction of that representation useless. Instead, it is precisely the fact that the representation (intuition) no longer exists in sensibility, which makes the reproduction in imagination necessary (see Wolff, 1963, p. 128).[335]

The apprehended representation in the *synthesis of apprehension* is reproduced as a "remembrance" in the *synthesis of reproduction in imagination* and it persists until it is determined by the *synthesis of recognition*. As a result, considering that memory partakes in the conditions that render experience possible, it is well-grounded to say that *intuition* and the *remembrance of an intuition* should have a similar status. This status could be named "intuitive remembrances" as long as it retains an almost immediate reference to

[333] Tom Rockmore notices barely the relation between memory and the synthesis of reproduction: "Kant appears here to conflate the unconscious activity through which the synthesis of reproduction occurs with the problem of conscious memory" (Rockmore, 2012, p. 317).
[334] "Actually, Kant can make his point even more strongly: if I am incapable of holding a thought for more than a moment, I could not relate it to another thought at all, since it would not be present in thought to relate" (Powell, 1990, p. 28).
[335] Michael Bruder proposes a different relation between the *synthesis of reproduction* and memory, according to which reproductive imagination is that synthesis which facilitates the association of ideas, sensations and memories. He asserts that reproductive imagination has the power to elicit stored representations in memory (see Bruder, 2005, p. 10).

these immediate impressions.[336] A. C. Ewing suggests that memory is capable of "supplementing present representation" in the *synthesis of recognition* (see Ewing, 1967, p. 77).[337] Since memory is grounded on imagination and "***imagination*** is the faculty for representing an object even **without its presence** in intuition"[338] (CPR B151), memory contents would be a *quasi-intuition*. This has led Andrew Stephenson to claim that

> Imaginational episodes—as occur, for example, in memory, dreams, and hallucination—involve the intuition of objects that are not, in the relevant sense, present (…) Intuition therefore does not require the existence or presence of its objects and is in no substantial sense object-dependent. (Stephenson, 2017, p. 105)

Stephenson characterizes memories as imaginational episodes, which are related to cognitive states like belief and knowledge (see Stephenson, 2017, p. 119). He nonetheless, is not committed with a study of memory as a necessary condition under which experience is possible. On my account, memory stores and reproduces the stuff that is involved in the action of the understanding through the synthesis of recognition. The memory's power to preserve the mentioned quasi intuitive remembrances rests on imagination, which is an internal condition under which the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and

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[336] According to C. McLear, these "intuitive remembrances" would be incompatible with a "Strong Presence-Dependence" account of intuition that demands "an actually existing object which is present to one in the intuition of it" (McLear, 2017, p. 89). However, these could be compatible with a "moderate Presence-Dependence" one, according to which "an intuition only depends on the actual presence of an object *for the initial intuition*, but not necessarily for subsequent ones" (McLear, 2017, p. 90). These intuitive remembrances are precisely produced by empirical objects which are not present now.

[337] It is noteworthy that for J. Locke, memory has the power to perceive: "for, to remember is to perceive anything with memory, or with consciousness that it was perceived or known before. Without this, whatever idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembered" (ECHU I.3.21, 109); he also claims that it is this consciousness which distinguishes remembering from other ways of thinking and whatever idea in the mind, which is not actually in view, must be in memory and if it cannot be encountered in memory, then it cannot be encountered in the mind at all (see ECHU 1.3.21, 111). Locke´s definition of memory corresponds to *experiential* memory, which "consists in the evocation of parts of the original experience in imagination, allowing to relive or re-experience the original situation and going over what it was like" (Bernecker, 2009, p. 14). Similarly, Baumgarten maintains that both *to hold in memory* and *to forget* are concerned with perceptions: "If a perception recurs, either I am able to recognize it clearly and then I am said to HOLD its object in MEMORY, or I am not (§10), and I HAVE FORGOTTEN its object. Hence the inability to recognize reproduced perceptions is FORGETTING". (Baumgarten, 2013, §582). The opposite view is advocated by Aristotle who maintains in *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* that by 'perception' (*αἴσθησις*) the human being cannot know 'the future' (*τὸ μέλλον*) nor 'the past' (*τὸ γενόμενον*) but only 'the present' (*τὸ παρὸν*) (see Aristotle, 2007, 449b10; see also 449b24).

[338] As A. Stephenson suggests (2017, pp. 112-4), this ambiguous sentence leaves two interpretations open: i) imagination represents an object that is not given in intuition and ii) imagination represents in intuition an object that is not given, that is, imagination introduces a representation to intuition. Both are plausible. I advocate for the second interpretation, because it is coherent with the suggested cognitive role of memory through imagination. Kant emphasizes the **cognitive** role of productive imagination in experience as he holds that "the imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself" (CPR A120 footnote; on this point see Matherne, 2015, p. 738f.; Hanna, 2005, pp. 266-7; Waxman, 1991, pp. 259-261). Further, Heidegger suggests that the transcendental power of imagination is the root of sensibility and understanding (see Heidegger, 1990, p. 124-5).

recognition are possible. In other words, the role of memory in experience can be deduced from the relation of two ideas. First, sensibility has two parts: *senses* that generate intuitions of existing objects and *imagination* that generates intuitions even in the absence of an existing object (see Ak 7:153, 167; CPR B151; Ak 18:619). Second, memory functioning is grounded on imagination (see Ak 7:182; 25:1289, 1464 and below section 3.2.1.C). It follows that memory and imagination are tightly connected in the retention and retrieval of the stuff involved in the three-fold synthesis.

Further, Kant holds in the CPR that "from the fact that the existence of outer objects is required for the possibility of a determinate consciousness of our self it does not follow that every intuitive representation of outer things includes at the same time their existence" (CPR B278). Kant is asserting here that even if our cognition of the existence of outer objects involves empirical intuition, we can also possess intuitive representations of them, without assuming the current existence of an object in sensibility. Again, these intuitive representations are based on imagination's power of achieving a sensory reproduction (see Hanna, 2005, p. 267).[339] That is to say, this possession "is possible merely through the reproduction of previous outer perceptions, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the actuality of outer objects" (CPR B278). Therefore, memory can provide intuitive representations whose existence is involved in the three-fold synthesis.[340]

However, I am in disagreement with A. Brook's view that the synthesis of *reproduction* does not require memory, as long as this is just "a matter of retaining earlier intuitions" in such a way that it allows a transition between the later and the earlier representation (see Brook, 1994, p. 127). I think that he misses the fundamental question of why an "earlier intuition" should be still regarded as "intuition".[341] He suggests that "such

[339] In support of this idea, Kant suggests that the *power of imagination* is the substitute of the senses, so that this can be "the faculty of intuitions in the absence of objects". In this vein, imagination *is* memory as long as it has the power to reproduce the past absent objects (see Ak 28:673-4).

[340] Since memory is involved in synthesis of reproduction that constitutes a transcendental action of mind (see CPR A102), then one might say that memory is a hidden transcendental-working faculty. However, as Kant is not very interested in the act of storing representations but in their reproduction, he claims that reproduction takes place in imagination and insofar as this is an a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances, so that synthesis of reproduction in imagination belongs to transcendental actions of the mind (see CPR A102).

[341] The problem of the status of a the reproduced "intuition" in the synthesis is noticed by Harold Arthur Prichard, who claims that "what Kant normally describes as the process of synthesis is really the process by which we construct an imaginary picture of a reality in nature not present to perception, i. e. by which

transitions are simply the result of acquiring an association (which, moreover, could be entirely nonconscious). This is not memory and does not even require memory" (Brook, 1994, p. 127). Unlike Brook, I believe that the association is not an association of the same elements (for this would entail a tautology), namely the "intuition A" with the "intuition A" but rather the "intuition A" with the "remembrance of the intuition A". Since the reproduction (remembrance) of A is not achieved by sensibility but by memory[342], then, the association must depend upon memory's power to preserve and reproduce "the intuition A" through imagination.

Third, the *synthesis of recognition in the concept* declares that all *reproduction* in the series of representations (*synthesis of reproduction*) would be futile without the 'consciousness' (*Bewußtsein*) of the fact that the reproduced representation in imagination is not different from the manifold that has been *apprehended* as intuition. It is reasonable to ask whether the reproduced representation could coincide with the apprehended one without presupposing memory as a faculty that preserves the existence of the former, during the act by which the mind recognizes that these representations belong to the same object. I do not think that this is possible. On the contrary, memory is required for the *synthesis of recognition* and Kant is aware of that condition as he warrants that we **should not forget** the added units in the 'composing' of intuitions, for

> If, in counting, I forget that the units that now hover before my senses were successively added to each other by me, then I would not cognize the generation of the multitude through this successive addition of one to the other, and consequently I would not cognize the number; for this concept consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis. (CPR A103).

The synthesis of a manifold through a concept is tantamount to the consciousness of its unity and without such consciousness, provided by the concept, neither the apprehension, nor the reproduction could provide representations of objects "for us" (see Gibbons, 1994, p. 27). To my knowledge, the consciousness of the fact that the (past) reproduced and the

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we imagine to ourselves what it would look like if we were present to perceive it" (Prichard, 1909, p. 239). He emphasizes that the reproduced representation is not the object of past perception but rather a mental image which reproduces it via memory, which leads us to assert hastily that we are really aware of the reality (see 1909, p. 240 footnote 2).

[342] I support J. Dennet's idea that imagination could be identified with memory in the *synthesis of recognition*: [recognition of *appearances* in a concept has to do] with our knowing that we are doing this correctly. Imagination, then, is closely connected-if not identical with intellectually disciplined memory; and Kant is here expounding his view that the rational grasp of one's present experience requires the relating of it with remembered past experience" (Dennet, 1966, p. 136).

(present) apprehended representations are "identical" relies on memory, in as much as it preserves the existence of the reproduced representations sufficiently to make the consciousness of this identity possible.[343] Only, by means of the consciousness of this identity, the manifold of the representations becomes a 'whole' (*Ganzes*) or a 'unity' (*Einheit*) (see CPR A103). In contrast, if we do not presuppose the existence of memory, all the representations, which are reproduced, would be forgotten and hence experience would be a merely set of "new" unrelated representations.[344] In strict sense, one must conclude that without memory there would be no intuitions in plural, as long as plurality would entails the recognition of the past representation as different from the present one. This recognition, hence, would demand the preservation of representations whose comparison leads us to recognize the difference or identity among representations. On this basic point, I agree with Nuzzo's claim:

> The third synthesis implies first the memory of past representations, and second the recognition that earlier and later representations are related as representations of the *same* object; and this requires the concept as a rule, which allows memory to repeat its orderly recalling and comparing of past representations. (Nuzzo, 2015, p. 190)

The synthesis of recognition involves the consciousness of both the unity and identity of the manifold of our empirical representations; thus, this consciousness must always be found, even if it lacks conspicuous clarity (see CPR A104). Kant goes on to claim that the transcendental condition of the unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions is the *transcendental unity of apperception* (see CPR A106-7).[345] Furthermore this unity of consciousness is grounded on the consciousness of the **identity** of the function by means of which the empirical manifold is synthetically connected into one **cognition.** This leads Kant to claim: "the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts" (CPR

[343] The text reads: "without consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain. For it would be a new representation in our current state" (CPR A103).

[344] Kant suggests in *Anthropology Bussolt* (1788-9) that "this [memory] is the ground of all human sciences. And if we had no memory, everything which we are now acquainted with would be new again after some time" (Ak 25:1462; my translation) ("Es ist der Grund aller Menschlichen Wissenschafften. Und wenn wir daß Gedachtniß nicht hátten. So würde alles was wir jezt guth einsehen, nach einiger Zeit wieder neu seyn").

[345] As he puts it: "now no cognitions can occur in us, no connection and unity among them, without that unity of consciousness that precedes all data of the intuitions, and in relation to which all representation of objects is alone possible. This pure, original, unchanging consciousness **I** will now name **transcendental apperception**" (CPR A107).

A108). What this suggests is that self-consciousness is meant to be a condition of our cognition of objects (see Schulting, 2015, p. 91).

Again, memory plays a quasi-*transcendental* role, insofar as it is necessarily involved in the transcendental syntheses of *apprehension, reproduction* and *recognition*. Thus, our knowledge of appearances in general would not be possible without memory, for it demands a synthetic unity of the apprehended manifold in intuition.[346] However, this apprehension does not suffice to guarantee the existence of this knowledge but it requires the *a priori* reproduction of the manifold and also the presence of concepts in which that manifold is unified (see CPR A105).

Yet in spite of skeptical view of A. Brook on the role of memory in the first and second synthesis, he is optimistic about the role of memory in the third one, by recognizing memory and consciousness as two components of the *synthesis of recognition*:

> Synthesis by recognition requires two things. One is memory — true memory, that is to say, recovery and recognition of past representations as past, not just associative reproduction. The other, of course, is 'consciousness', that is to say, recognition — something in the past representations must be recognized as related to present ones. (Brook, 1994, p. 129)

Appearances can only constitute an object of cognition, if our mind is capable of unifying their disperse components, whose existence is preserved by our *memory*, through the *consciousness* of the identity of those components. For "[a merely reproduced] manifold would never constitute a whole, since it would lack the unity that only consciousness can obtain for it" (CPR A103). Cognition, according to Kant, demands a synthesis of representations related in time and this would not be possible, if our mind were not capable of remembering and, therefore, recognizing the connection between *earlier* and *later* representations. Brook emphasizes that only when our mind recognizes that the earlier and later representation represent the same object, we use "a concept of number, a

[346] Mary B. Howes suggests that "one important implication for memory of Kant's model is that experience is interpreted or *constructed*. This means that our cognition is not simply a copy of perception, of reality coming directly from outside. What we know is largely generated from the way that we can think. Thus, the interpretation of events or stimuli at even higher levels is likely to occur and likely to play a critical role in all forms of mental life, including memory" (Howes, 2007, p. 8). I think that Howes' interpretation states nothing but an analogy between Kant's notion of experience and memory, according to which the subject does not find or uncover but rather "constructs" or produces what it knows (see Rockmore, 2012, p. 325). However, she does not analyze in detail the possibility of taking memory for a faculty that grounds human cognition at an *empirical* and *transcendental* level.

concept of quality, a concept of modality, and, of course, the specific empirical concept for the object we are cognizing" (Brook, 1994, p. 129).

Finally, if we take into account that, according to Kant, memory leans on imagination (on which I will focus later) and memory plays a transcendental role, imagination's power to *reproduce* representations will be a transcendental act of the mind. For the acts of storing and reproduction of representations are demanded by the three-fold synthesis, which is a necessary condition of experience. As already indicated, memory needs to be regarded as a necessary condition of inner experience and, therefore, of the empirical material of which the human being is aware through self-consciousness. I hope that I have been able to add elements to the discussion about the controversial "transcendental" role of memory. The account I have described about memory raises a number of interpretive and philosophical questions, including: does reproductive imagination achieve transcendental functions? Is productive imagination concerned with reproductive functions? Why does Kant distinguish between reproductive and productive memory, but ascribes a reproductive function to productive imagination? Do reproductive and productive acts of imagination belong to the same faculty? These question require a further investigation.

3.2. The *pragmatic* analysis of memory and "self-perfection"

I argue that Kant's pragmatic anthropology describes memory as a fundamental faculty not only for the human being's "self-knowledge" but also for its "self-perfection". Thus, such description discloses not only what the human being *is* but also what this can *become*, insofar as it is capable of 'perfecting' (*perfectioniren*) itself (see Ak 7:321). It is noteworthy that Kant's analysis of memory has its own place in the majority of his lectures on anthropology between 1772-3 and 1789 (*Collins*, Ak 25:87; *Friedlander* Ak 25:521; *Pillau*, Ak 25:757; *Menschenkunde*, Ak 25:974; *Mrongovius*, Ak 25:1272-3); this analysis is quite scattered in *Parrow* (1772-3). Even, he attaches a distinctive place to memory in the book I 'On the cognitive faculty' in the *Anthropology* (see Ak 7:182). However, Kant's lectures on anthropology do not exhibit a monolithic description of

memory but this description changes over the years, encompassing similar and different ideas.[347]

Kant does not pretend to develop a *physiological* but rather a *pragmatic* analysis of memory, as long as he aims at a knowledge that can be used by the common human being (see Ak 15:801). On Kant's picture, physiological knowledge of human nature lies outside of the scope of pragmatic anthropology because the former describes a set of facts that cannot be changed by the subject, who would be then a mere observer of what takes place in its mind. In this vein, Kant holds:

> He who ponders natural phenomena, for example, what the causes of the faculty of memory may rest on, can speculate back and forth (like Descartes) over the traces of impressions remaining in the brain, but in doing so he must admit that in this play of his representations he is a mere observer and must let nature runs its course, for he does not know the cranial nerves and fibers, nor does he understand how to put them to use for his purposes. Therefore all theoretical speculation about this is a pure waste of time. (Ak 7:119)

Kant, as R. Brandt notices, is not committed to explain how unavailable representations, although contained by the faculty of remembrance, are *physiologically* deposited in consciousness (see Brandt, 1999, p. 65). Kant was certainly acquainted with physiological process which are at the basis of memory, albeit that knowledge was not relevant for his *Anthropology* (see also Ak 15:749; 2:345; 29:908-9).[348] Kant's acquaintance with Descartes's view of (*corporeal*) memory[349] leans partly on what he stated in the *Passions of the soul*:

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[347] I shall analyze Kant's official view of memory in *Anthropology*, contrasting it with the treatment of memory developed during his years as lecturer on anthropology.

[348] In times of Kant there were available physiological inquiries of memory proposed by Johann Theodor Eller (1689–1760), Johann Gottlob Krüger (1715–1759), Ernst Platner (1744 - 1818), among others (see Sturm, 2008, p. 496). From a broader perspective, Julien Offray la Mettrie, Diderot, Le Comte de Buffon, Albrecht von Haller, and Charles Bonnet took a physiological approach to understanding of the human being (see Kant, 2012, p. 2; Brandt, 1999, p. 65). For instance, Bonnet held that memory, through which we retain the ideas of things, is connected with the body (Bonnet, 1770, §57, p. 42). Kant himself wrote about this physiological approach to human nature in texts such as *Essay on the Maladies of the Head* (1764), *Review of Moscati's "On the Essential Corporeal Differences between the Structure of Animals and Human Beings"* (1771), *Note to Physicians* (1782), "From Soemmerring's *On the organ of the soul* (1796) and the third essay in *Conflict of the Faculties*" (1797) and so on. Kant was acquainted with physiological and even with medical accounts of memory (see Ak 25:85-6). Before his lectures on anthropology, he wrote in the *Essay on the maladies of the head* (1764) that the 'disturbed faculty of remembrances' (*das gestörte Erinnerungsvermögen*) is a particular form of the reversedness of the head and the appearances caused by such illness are described as chimerical representations of previous states that never existed (see Ak 2:267). Brandt suggests that the role of the brain were essentially stronger in the early years of Kant's lectures than in the later versions of anthropology (see Brandt, 1999, p. 65).

[349] As I have mentioned earlier, Descartes introduces the notion of *intellectual* memory (in opposition to *corporeal* memory) during the spring 1640 in his letter to Mersenne (see Descartes, 1991, pp. 146, 148,

> When the soul wants to remember something, this volition makes the gland lean first to one side and then to another, thus driving the spirits towards different regions of the brain until they come upon the one containing traces left by the object we want to remember. These traces consist simply in the fact that the pores of the brain through which the spirits previously made their way owing to the presence of this object have thereby become more apt than the others to be opened in the same way when the spirits again flow towards them. (Descartes, 1985, article 42, pp. 343-4).

To remember something, it is necessary to find the traces (pores of the brain) left by the impressions of objects, so that the spirits easily can go through those traces and the more they go through them, the easier it will be the act of remembering.[350] Images are stored in memory akin to the lines left by a folded and unfolded piece of paper; this is pointed out by Descartes in a letter (1640) to Meysonnnier: "for the impressions preserved in the memory, I imagine they are not unlike the folds which remain in this paper after it has once been folded; and so I think that they are received for the most part in the whole substance of the brain" (Descartes, 1991, p.143).

These spirits are nothing but a very fine air, contained by little tubes (nerves) coming from the brain, which transmits information through the nervous system (see Descartes 1985, article 7, p. 330; 1985, p.100).[351] The act of finding something in memory is connected with the *pineal gland*, which is "*where the seat of the imagination and the*

233). To my knowledge, Kant mainly focuses on Descartes' *corporeal* memory in his *Anthropology*. Accordingly, I deem correct Emanuela Scribano's claim that "a theory of "intellectual" memory not only surfaced in the year 1640, but, and above all, it was given a central role in human memory—even if that role was not specified. In any case, in 1644 memory still seems to be "intellectual" because it concerns thoughts not produced via brain traces, thoughts representing immaterial things" (Scribano, 2016, p. 142). However, the fact that there is no reference in the *Passions of the soul* to intellectual memory, it has been interpreted by John Morris as a sign that Descartes was not yet ready to defend the doctrine of intellectual memory in public (see Morris, 1969, p. 457). Against the latter interpretations see: Kessler, 1988, pp. 509-518, Sutton, 1998, pp. 64-5, and others.

[350] Recently, Sven Bernecker supports a *causal theory of memory*, according to which "a past representation and its subsequent recall are connected by a causal process involving memory traces" (Bernecker, 2010, p. 9). Those memory traces can be explained from a "non-physical" and a "physical" standpoint: "on the intentional level of explanation, traces are dispositional beliefs or subdoxastic states – depending on whether their content is conceptual or non-conceptual. On the computational level, traces are formulae in the language of thought or patterns of activation in a neural work – depending on whether one assumes the classical or the connectionist approach" (Bernecker, 2010, p. 10).

[351] Indeed, these spirits are extremely small bodies which move very quickly, just like the jets of flame which come from a torch (see Descartes: 1985, article 10, pp. 331-2). Concerning the concept of 'animal spirit' John Cottingham claims that "Descartes' 'animal spirits' are purely physical items. In his physiology, they play the role which is today filled by neuro-electrical impulses: they are the medium for the transmission of information throughout the nervous system" (Cottingham, 1993, p. 13). Similarly, Locke holds that external objects can produce ideas in us, if some motion goes from the object to our sense-organs, which is continued by our nerves (named *animal spirits*) by some parts of our body to the brain (see ECHU 2.8. 12. 171-2; 2.9.3. 183-4).

'common' sense is located" (Descartes, 1985, pp. 106; see also pp. 340-1). Namely, the soul and the body interact with each other in the *pineal gland*. Memories, nonetheless, are not exclusively received on the gland but are also retained in different areas of the brain (see Sutton, 1998, p. 63). Descartes' "pneumatic" explanation of the nervous system invokes nothing more than mechanical micro-events that are explained in the same way as any other physical phenomenon.[352] However, his psychophysiological ideas do not pretend to locate memory's seat but rather to model the mechanism of retention and storage (see Sutton, 1998, pp. 52-3).

Needless to say, some of Descartes' ideas concerning to memory had a big influence on his contemporaries[353] and on subsequent philosophers like John Locke who believed that memory was grounded on processes occurred in the brain. He believed that the constitution of the body could affect memory, just like diseases (even fever) can strip the mind of all its ideas (see ECHU 2.10.5. 196-7; Brandt, 1999, p. 64; Sutton, 1998, p. 170). For instance, Locke explains why sleeping thoughts are forgotten, claiming that "the memory of thoughts is retained by the impressions that the memory of thoughts is retained by the impressions that are made on the brain, and the traces there left after such thinking" (ECHU 2.1.15. 134). Locke argues that when an 'awaking man' thinks, the materials of the body are employed whereas when a man sleeps, its soul thinks apart, making no use of the organs of the body, no impression is left on the brain, and, therefore no memory of these thoughts remains.

In contrast, Kant's analysis of memory in the *Anthropology* does not pretend to explain what physiological brain process are at the basis of the faculty of remembrances (see Ak 7:176; 15:801; see also Svare, 2006, p. 87).[354] He, by contrast, is concerned with the

[352] On this point, see also J. Cottingham (1993, pp. 13-4). Richard Joyce has a more ambitious interpretation according to which "Descartes held that a purely mechanistic, soulless system is capable of having a memory faculty" (Joyce, 1997, p. 376).

[353] Joyce suggests that "one trend in the Renaissance was toward placing more weight on physiology and an organic conception of the soul, and many naturalistic works were published in the spirit of the Alexandrian revival of the fifteenth century, more in line with the materialistic account of memory favored in Descartes's published works" (Joyce, 1997, p. 381, footnote 17).

[354] J. G. Krüger (1715–1759), a close student of Wolff and professor of medicine and philosophy at Helmstedt, provided a physiological analysis of memory. He holds that certain movements in the brain are at the basis of the power of imagination and given that memory relies on imagination, then, memory and remembrance are conditioned by the occurrence of such movements (see Krüger, 1756, §69, p. 213). Moreover, Krüger maintains that an excessive numbness in the fibers of the brain may cause not only the lack of memory but also paralysis in arms and feet; this numbness also accounts for the fact that memory is weaker in old age than in the youth (see §69-70, pp. 213-4, §74, pp. 220-1).

identification and application of the knowledge (*e.g.* perceptions) that might hinder or stimulate people's memory:

> If he uses perceptions concerning what has been found to hinder or stimulate memory in order to enlarge it or make it agile, and if he requires knowledge of the human being for this, then this would be a part of anthropology with a *pragmatic* purpose, and this is precisely what concerns us here. (Ak 7:119)

Kant does not regard memory as a subject-matter of natural sciences, nor does he pretend to develop a purely speculative analysis of memory.[355] He claims rather that "there is no *mnemonic art (ars mnemonica*) in the sense of a general doctrine" (Ak 7:184) and by 'doctrine' (*Lehre*) he probably understands an investigation that aims at the amplification of our cognition —in opposition to the *transcendental critique*— (see CPR A11-12/B25). Kant does not contradicts knowledge of the human being in general, but he favors rather the kind of knowledge which is *useful* for ordinary human beings in their social life. For instance, special tricks like rhymes or maxims in verse (*versus memoriales*) become a great advantage to the mechanism of memory, so that these tricks may constitute a useful tool for Kant's pragmatic analysis of the human being (see Ak 25:1282, 762). Thus all (pragmatic) acquired knowledge and skills derived from cultural progress should have no other goal than the use for the world, that is to say, they are pursued by us in as much as we may benefit from them (see Ak 7:119).

In a section of *The metaphysics of morals* titled "A human being's duty to himself to develop and increase **his natural perfection**, that is, for a pragmatic purpose" Kant

[355] Frances A. Yates suggests that "the art of memory is a clear case of a marginal subject, not recognized as belonging to any of the normal disciplines, having been omitted because it was no one's business. And yet it has turned out to be, in a sense, every one's business" (Yates, 1966, p. 389). However, he states that the art of memory in the seventeenth century turned "from a method of memorizing the encyclopedia knowledge, of reflecting the world in memory, to an aid for investigating the encyclopedia and the world with the object of discovering new knowledge (…) the art of memory survives as a factor in the growth of scientific method" (Yates, 1966, p 368-9). In this vein, Yates maintains that the art of memory was incorporated in *scientific methods* during the seventeenth century and underlines the interest of Francis Bacon in the art of memory and its utility for the investigation of natural science. Yates also mentions Descartes, who wished to reform the art of memory by means of a rationalization of an occult memory (see Yates, 1966, pp. 370-4) and Leibniz, who emerged out of the Renaissance tradition, that is, of the effort to combine Lullism with the classical art of memory (see Yates, 1966, pp. 382). I think that Baumgarten takes mnemonics as a form of science, because *aesthetics* is a science of perception which deals with sensible objects (see Baumgarten, 1954, §§115-6). Given that mnemonics belongs to aesthetic, it would follow that mnemonics is a form of science that prescribes rules for perfecting memory: "the mnemonics of sensitive memory (§579) is the part of aesthetics (§533) that prescribes the rules for extending, confirming, conserving, exciting and restoring a larger and more faithful memory (§586, 585)" (Baumgarten, 2013, §587).

maintains that the human being looks after its own perfection: "a human being has a duty to himself to cultivate (*cultura*) his natural powers (powers of spirit, mind, and body), as means to all sorts of possible ends" (Ak 6:444). It means that the human being, as a rational being, should work on its natural predispositions and capacities which are demanded by its own reason.[356] Even, the improvement of memory is meant to be an object of education, because the latter seeks to promote the *general* and *particular culture of the powers of the mind*. The improvement or "culture" of memory belongs to the *particular culture*, as long as memory is a cognitive faculty that belongs to the *lower powers* of the understanding (see Ak 9:475).[357]

Memory (as a *power of soul*) is a crucial faculty for the self-improvement, since it is a disposal of the understanding and of the rule which is used by human beings in order to fulfill their purposes. The analysis of the forms of memorizing is one of the most evident signs of Kantian interest for the human being's self-development. Certainly, he seeks to identify what can *enlarge* or make memory *agile*, in order to reach a more effective use of memory in the daily experience (see Ak 7:119, 183; Svare, 2006, p. 56). As a result, a more effective use of memory can contribute to the human being's fulfillment of its duties with itself and with the others, for "quite apart from the need to maintain himself, which in itself cannot establish a duty, a human being has a duty to himself to be a useful member of the world" (Ak 6:445-6). Kant is concerned with the cognitive role of memory in his *pragmatic* study of the functioning of memory and of the way in which certain social practices can enhance the human being's memory. As Helge Svare notices, pragmatic anthropology seeks to identify what promotes or impedes memory, and that is why the study of human behavior in context becomes central. That study focuses on:

> Exploring what either promotes or impedes memory, we have to look at the practices entertained by people trying to learn, for instance, a certain method or technique. Or we may look at the pedagogical institutions where the art of making students remember what is being taught is cultivated in the form of didactic practices. (Svare, 2006, p. 87)

[356] Kant emphasizes that the human being uses its powers according to the freedom by which this determines its scope. However, the human being should not develop its capacities *for* the advantages involved in their cultivation but rather *for* a command of a *morally* practical reason (see Ak 6:445).

[357] Kant distinguishes in *The Metaphysics of Morals* between 'powers of spirit' (*Geisteskräfte*), whose exercise is possible only through reason, 'powers of soul' (*Seelenkräfte*), which involve *memory*, *imagination* (and others) and 'powers of the body' (*Leibeskräfte*) (see Ak 6:445). P. Guyer suggests that powers of the mind are "powers to reason *a priori* from principles" (as in mathematics and logic), whereas powers of the soul are more empirical mental capacities (see Guyer, 2006, p. 254).

The contribution of memory to the self-perfection is also linked to the field of education as the human being must look after the cultivation of memory as well as of the understanding, even from a very early age. For instance, memory can by cultivated by remembering the names in stories, by reading and writing texts that should be understood by the child, in languages that the children should be taught first by hearing while they are in social intercourse, even before they can even read (see Ak 9:474-5).

3.2.1. Empirical functions of memory in cognition

According to Kant's *Anthropology*, memory has fundamentally two distinct functions, namely to *store* and to *reproduce* representations.[358] These functions are based on experience and reveal the importance of memory in human cognition. In general terms, the capacity of people's memory (without mental deficiencies nor illnesses) to achieve these two acts varies according to their interest. That is to say, the more *interesting* an object is for the human being, the easier it will be to store it and to reproduce it afterwards (see Ak 25: 1463, 522, 757, 92, 1484). Kant suggests that "one must occupy the memory only with those things which for us are important to remember and which have a relation to real life" (Ak 9:473). Thus we should not memorize speeches or things that we learn for a short time (like a future examination), but we should rather memorize things that lead us to a self-improvement.

A. Storing function of memory

Firstly, the *storing function* of memory consists in the capacity to preserve the existence of different kinds of representations over time; in his own words, "to grasp something *methodically* (*memoriae mandare*) is called *memorizing*" (Ak 7:183). Particularly, Kant's distinction between 'to memorize' (*memorieren*) and 'to study' (*studieren*) is at the basis

[358] This distinction can be traced back to Plato in terms of 'possessing' (*κεκτῆσθαι*) knowledge and 'having' (*ἔχειν*) it; the first one refers to the power of getting something under one's control, while the second one points out the effective act of having it (see Plato, *Theaetetus* 197b-198a, in Cooper, 1997). Moreover, he argues in *Meno* that true opinions, acquired at some other time, can be recalled when the human being is interrogated (*anamnesis*): "if the truth about reality is always in our soul, the soul would be immortal so that you should always confidently try to seek out and recollect what you do not know at present" (Plato, *Meno* 86b). This distinction has been more recently expressed, although not exclusively, by A. W. Melton in terms of 'retention' (*i. e.* trace storage) and 'recall' (*i. e.* trace retrieval) (Melton, 1963, p. 3f., in Cooper, 1997). Similarly, E. Tulving and E. Pearlstone suggest the existence of mental contents that are *available* in the memory storage but not *accessible* for retrieval (see Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966, pp. 381-2).

of the difference between learning philosophy and learning to philosophize (see Ak 25:278). To learn *philosophy* means to learn thoughts or to *imitate* the judgements of others by memorizing them[359], whereas the human being who learns to *philosophize* ought to be *led*, not to be *carried*. The human being should be helped to walk on its own in the future and to exercise its understanding by using its own understanding. In fact, Kant thinks of *philosophy* from a practical point of view not as 'learning' (*Gelehrsamkeit*) i.e. "the sum total of the *historical* sciences" (Ak 5:138 footnote) but rather as the science of the final ends of human reason (see Ak 2:306; 25:978; 24:698, 9:25, CPR A838/B866).[360]

Of course, Kant recognizes that learning can be involved in the act of understanding something and storing it in memory as he holds that *catechist* and *historical* knowledge, most of the times, is simply "assimilated" (see Ak 24:117, 149-50, 844), while mathematical knowledge involves a more active role of the understanding: "it is thus possible to learn according to both types of knowledge. That is to say, it is possible to impress either on the memory or on the understanding that which can be presented to us as an already complete discipline" (Ak 2:307).[361] Kant favored the second kind of knowledge, holding that philosophy is not a complete discipline to be memorized but a discipline that aims to extend the capacity for the understanding of the young people, by means of the method of *enquiry*, to the extent that they are able to acquire a more mature 'insight' (*Einsicht*) of their own (see Ak 2:307, 28:531, 534, 25:1037). However, this second type of knowledge does not exclude memory as long as it entails a comprehension of what is memorized. In this vein, Kant does not disregard the role of memory in knowledge but suggests rather that the act of storing representations should be accompanied by the use of the understanding (see Ak 25:1274, 979, 555).

[359] J. Rousseau similarly claims "in this way the most exact reasoner, if he is not inventive, has to stop short. So what is the result of this? Instead of our being made to find the demonstrations, they are dictated to us. Instead of teaching us to reason, the master reasons for us and exercises only our memory" (Rousseau, 1979, p. 145).

[360] "Nothing is more unfortunate and ruinous for the understanding, e.g., than to pick up a Wolffius, or a Crusius, or others, to commit his *definitiones* to memory, to impress them there, *strictissime* and word for word, and to prize them as stars of the first magnitude, but to value oneself at nothing [;] instead, one must learn to think for oneself, to judge for oneself, to reflect on objects oneself, and, in order to be able to become and to be a philosopher, to learn to philosophize" (Ak 24:188-9).

[361] As correctly notices Allen Wood, "in teaching ethics, he [Kant] opposes the "catechistic" method, which tests only the pupil's memory, and favors the "erotetic" (Socratic) method, which develops the pupil's own reason" (Wood, 1999, p. 151). As already indicated, Kant does not defend a conflict between memory and cognition. R. Louden notices that "Kant does not faithfully adhere to the memory/reason dichotomy in his discussions of the methods of moral catechism and dialogue. Perhaps his point is simply that at the level of catechistic teaching the pupil's answers are to be written down and then committed to memory" (Louden, 2000, p. 197 footnote 44).

Both Rousseau and Kant defend the crucial role of memory in human cognition, for the former holds that "although memory and reasoning are two essentially different faculties, nevertheless the one develops truly only with the other" (Rousseau, 1979, p. 107). Similarly, Kant suggests that "the use of reason is very necessary. For in order to learn, one needs memory and understanding, to apply what one has learned one needs judgment" (Ak 25:1481). In other words, Kant does not rejects the storing of information but rather he suggests that such storing is a necessary condition for developing our human cognition properly (see Ak 25:1274). [362] This storing, nonetheless, should be accompanied by an appropriate use of the information by choosing, through the faculty of the power of judgement, the most proper knowledge according to every particular case. On Kant's picture, pragmatic anthropology seeks to help the human being at the *practical* and *theoretical* level, by increasing one's capacity for *memory*. On this point, I am in agreement with Holly L. Wilson's claims that "insofar as the anthropology teaches students how to increase their skills, it contributes to the useful development of the technical predisposition. Anthropology can also tell one what one ought not to do" (Wilson, 2011, p. 168). Kant's approach to different ways of memorizing seeks the improvement of the human being's cognitive faculty, which is essential for its life in community with the others. Overall, psychologists usually suggest four ways by which some kinds of memory can be distinguished: 1) *short* or *long-term memory* that is obviously related to the length of time the information is stored; 2) *unconscious, dispositional, partially conscious,* or *conscious memory* which refers to the degree of awareness the subject has of the stored information; 3) memories that arise from either "explicit commands" or from "spontaneous triggers" which operate as internal or external triggers that prompt the retrieval of information and, finally, 4) the kind of information (content) that is stored; psychologists differentiate -within this way of classification- a *declarative memory* (divided into *semantic* and *episodic* memory), which refers to the memories that the subject can express, from a *non-declarative memory* (divided into associative and non-associative learning), which refers to memories that the subject

[362] Kant highlighted Pico Mirandola (1463-1494), Julius Caesar Scalider (1484-1558), Angelus Politianus (1454-1494) and Antonio Magliabecchi (1633-1714) as prodigies of memory, who should not be disdained but rather should receive the merit for carrying in the mind many books that contain material for sciences: "it is already merit enough to have produced the raw material abundantly, even though later on other heads must come along to process it with *judgment (tantum scimus, quantum memoria tenemus)*" (Ak 7:184; see also Brandt, 1999, p. 266).

cannot express, which, nonetheless, can be demonstrated, i.e. *practical* memory (see Bernecker, 2009, pp. 11-13). Of course, this taxonomy of memory is not definitive, although it yields some aspects that were already present in Kant's characterization of memory. In particular, I think that his account of three forms of memorizing involves linguistic elements that can be interpreted as contents ruled by *semantic* memory.[363]

B. Forms of memorizing.

Kant claims in *Anthropology Mrongovius* that "memory is like an *archivarius*. A memory can be artfully organized if one places all representations in certain scientific fields where they belong; this is *memoria localis*" (Ak 25:1273; see also 24:683). Memory is not merely a passive receptacle in which our representations are stored but is actually responsible for different functions associated with the storing and retrieval of data.[364] Kant points out that to memorize is to 'impress' (*einprägen*) something in memory and distinguishes in *Anthropology* among three different forms of memorizing (i.e. of impressions): *mechanical*, *ingenious* and *judicious* (see Ak 7:183; 25:976).

Accordingly, the *mechanical* memorizing is based on the frequent 'literal' (*buchstäblich*) repetition (see Ak 7:183). That is, when one performs the same action frequently, such action tends to form particular contents that are stored by memory in the same order in which they were experienced.[365] This form is evident in the traditional way of learning multiplication tables and it is also relevant in sciences, principally in history of epochs (see Ak 25:1463). To this form of memorizing belongs the recitals of poems, the set of

[363] Bernecker describes *semantic memory* thus: "semantic memory is the store of general knowledge about the world, concepts, rules, and language. The characteristic feature of semantic memory is that it can be used without reference to the events that account for its formation in the first place" (Bernecker, 2009, p. 13).

[364] Locke takes memory for a repository, albeit emphasizes that "this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory signifies no more but this, — that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it has once had (…) in this sense it is that our ideas are said to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually nowhere" (ECHU 2.10.2, 194; see also Sutton, 1998, p. 167-8). Like Locke, Kant thinks of memory as an *archivarius* or a "repository". But this idea should be metaphorically interpreted, for Kant shows no interest for a physiological basis for memories in the *Anthropology*.

[365] I disagree with Rudolf A. Makkreel on considering that "the first method is rejected as too cumbersome and the second as unreliable. What is needed is a remedial third method of *judicious* memorising" (see Makkreel, 2014, p. 34). I think that Kant is not formulating a *prescriptive* judgement, according to which the first two ways should be vanished; instead, Kant is *describing* different ways in which memory works. Indeed, Kant does not deny that *mechanical* memorizing plays a relevant role, for instance, in our ability to recite poems, neither that *ingenious* memorizing always makes more difficult the act of recalling (for instance, when we associate someone's name with a familiar object in order to recall it more easily).

procedures demanded by a plane's regular take-off and other actions, in which one must learn or store information with an exact order. Further, mechanical *storing* of contents in memory may have its counterpart in the mechanical *reproduction* of memory contents. It is a fact that memory has the power to reproduce or evoke contents with great accuracy, without a comprehension of what has been stored:

> What he merely learns, and thus entrusts to his memory, he performs only mechanically (according to laws of reproductive imagination) and without understanding. A servant who has merely to pay a compliment according to a definite formula needs no understanding, that is, he does not need to think for himself. (Ak 7:197)

Kant suggests that common people often make use of this kind of memorizing, when they entrust various things, as lined up, to their minds, so that they can remember them and carry them out in succession. Thus, the order in which representations are memorized makes easier the preservation of the order in which they are reproduced, because no reasoning interferes with it.[366] That, according to Kant, is why the scholar people let many of his tasks or domestic affairs escape through distraction because they have not caught them with enough attention. However, if there is not a good mechanical reliable memory, the art of *writing* can compensate for this deficiency as the latter has the power to recover precisely and without effort everything that should have been stored in the head (see Ak 7:184-5; see also Krüger, 1756, §73, pp. 218-9).

Kant shows the positive and the negative sides of this form of memorizing for the "biological development" of the human being. On the one hand, this form of memorizing is not highly recommended in young people, in as much as it hinders the participation of the understanding in learning (see Ak 25:976). In this case, the understanding cannot act nor 'make concepts' (*Begriffe machen*) but is merely inactive. On the other hand, this form of memorizing is not merely useful to obtain historical knowledge but as the human being ages, this form of memorizing becomes indispensable for the human understanding, since the former provides the stuff in which the understanding occupies. So, if memory is not well furnished, the **understanding** will be 'poor' (*arm*) and will not have any stuff,

[366] Kant points out in the *Blomberg Logic* (1770s) that memory is concerned with no rational cognition, namely representations in which reason is not applied, but it is not on that account irrational either. For "when I know into what countries Europe is divided, I do not use reason for this but only memory, and on this account it is not a rational cognition. But what is not a rational cognition is not then irrational, but rather this holds only for that which is against reason" (Ak 24:47).

provided by senses nor *reproduced* by memory, to work (see Ak 25:976, 92).[367] Memory of young people, by contrast, can retain more easily than old people's one, as long as it is more receptive (see Ak 24:522; 816).[368]

To sum up, this form of memorizing involves the following essential characteristics: i) the subject is fully aware of the memorized representations, ii) the stored representations are short-term memories, iii) these do not demand comprehension of what is stored[369], iv) these contain practical information that has a relatively immediate application and v) these contain linguistic properties, in so far as most of the Kant's examples are related to word for word repetition.

The *second* form of memorizing is called 'ingenious' (*ingeniös*), by means of which we store a representation, by associating it with others already stored: "*ingenious* memorizing is a method of impressing certain ideas on the memory by association with correlative ideas that in themselves (as far as understanding is concerned) have no relationship at all with each other" (Ak 7:183). This memorizing does not consist in a mere storing of representations for it entails an association of representations in which we match the newly-stored representation with other similar previously-stored representation, by means of their "comparison". For instance, we memorize more easily someone's name by associating it with the name of a quite known song or of a certain familiar object (see Ak 25:977).[370] Moreover, Kant holds that ingenious memorizing is not a 'ruleless procedure' (*regelloses Verfahren*) of imagination but it involves rather a method according to which we pair together things that are not contained by the same concept in

[367] Kant points out in different lectures that the understanding as well as its functions lean on memory: "mechanical memorization has great utility. It is the foundation of the assessment of cognitions. If this were not the case, we would have no cognitions for the understanding" (Ak 25:521; see also Ak 25:1273).
[368] The memory decrements in elderly people was also investigated by Nicolas Tetens, according to whom "a major problem in memory performance of older people is not one of storing the memory trace but one of retrieval, that of reaching the "enveloped" memory material or making it conscious. The ideas are not forgotten, they are just enveloped by other ideas" (Surprenant, Bireta & Farley, 2007, p. 111).
[369] I think there is an asymmetry in the fact that the storing of memory contents does not demand that those contents should be comprehended via understanding. However, the existence of representations in the understanding presupposes that these representations are stored by memory even for a short time.
[370] Kant's own example reads: "in his history of images, Buno has a kind of ingenious memorizing, but it is ridiculous. For example, to remember Erasmus, he paints a mouse because *eras mus* makes up the name." (Ak 25:1274; see also 29:757-8). Kant refers to Johann Buno (1617–1697), German theologian and pedagogue, who wrote *Tabularum mnemonicarum historiam universam cum profanam tum Ecclesiasticam Simulacris & heiroglyphicis figuris delineantium Clavis elaborata* (1647), *Tabularum mnemonicarum, Quibus Historia Universalis, Cum Sacra Tum Profana, a condito Mundo Per Æras nobiliores & QuatorMonarchias ad nostram usque ætatem deducta Simulacris....* (1664), *Memoriæ corporis juris civilis, tam institutionum, quam Pandectarum, Codicic, Novellarum et Feudalium* (1674), among other texts.

order to catch something in memory more easily (see Ak 7:183).[371] In my opinion, this form of memorizing exhibits the following essential characteristics: i) awareness of the already stored representations and of the representations that are to be memorized, ii) a comparison of stored and storable representations and iii) linguistic properties, in as much as Kant explicitly holds that these representations require the association of sounds of language.

The third form of memorizing, called 'judicious' (*judiciös*), is not much concerned with the way in which certain representations are memorized but rather with the kind of information stored.[372] According to this form, we memorize a system by enumerating and retaining its linked parts, so that if one of these parts were forgotten we could recall it by remembering the connection of that forgotten part with others still retained in memory:

> *Judicious* memorizing is nothing other than memorizing, in thought, a *table* of the *divisions* of a system (for example, that of Linnaeus) where, if one should forget something, one can find it again through the enumeration of the parts that one has retained; or else through memorizing the *sections* of a whole made visible (for example, the provinces of a country on a map, which lie to the north, to the west, etc.). (Ak 7:184)

This form of memorizing does not involve isolated representations but representations located in certain relations, for this consists in the storing of the specific *relation* among some representations.[373] For instance, we remember the place of a book more easily, when we classify all books according to a framework for universal concepts (called *common places*) and we put them under certain labels (see Ak 7:184).[374] Kant holds that *judicious*

[371] Kant, nonetheless, notices that sometimes this procedure makes the memory work more difficult (see Ak 7:183 footnote).
[372] Simonides (556-468 BC), considered as the inventor of the system of 'memory-aids', thought that "memory could be improved by selecting places and forming mental images of things to be remembered in those places" (Morris, 1994, p. 2).
[373] This form of memorizing can be traced back to Simonides, the pre-Socratic Greek Lyric, who was considered by Cicero, Consultus Fortunatianus and Martianus Capella as the inventor of the *art of memory*, regarded as a technique for remembering (see Carruthers & Ziolkowski, 2002, p. 18). Indeed, Simonides thought that our memory of a fact can be more reliable as we remember orderly its arrangement. That is to say, we should select *localities* and form *mental images* of the fact, then we have to store those images in the localities, so that the images of the fact will designate the fact themselves, while the arrangement of the localities will preserve the order of the facts (see Cicero, *De oratore* 2. 86. 353-4). It is worth of mentioning that the classical art of memory "belonged to rhetoric as a technique by which the orator could improve his memory, which would enable him to deliver long speeches from memory with unfailing accuracy. And it was as a part of the art of rhetoric that the art of memory travelled down through European tradition in which it was never forgotten, or not forgotten until comparatively modern times" (Yates, 1966, p. 2).
[374] Eckart Förster points out that the classificatory systems of natural history, such as that of Linnaeus were not *natural* but rather *artificial* systems for memory in the tradition of the classical "memory trees" and "memory theaters" (Förster, 1993, pp. 258-9 footnote 15).

memorizing requires functions of the understanding which are useful for imagination. Therefore, if some representations are stored via this form of memorizing, they will exhibit the following essential characteristics: i) they require the activity of the understanding and of imagination, ii) they are useful for an immediate-practical activity as well as a theoretical one (*e.g.* useful for botanic), iii) they are long-term memories and iv) they involve linguistic properties, in as much as the latter two characteristics presuppose an enduring classification through a framework for general concepts.

C. Reproductive function of memory

Kant's view of the relation between memory and imagination is quite problematic and needs to be sort out. Particularly I hope to help make better sense of this issue, by distinguishing three possible forms of relation among them: "opposition", "identification" and "dependence". I am inclined to think that the third option is Kant's final position.

First, Kant, under the influence of Wolff, defines the 'power of imagination' (*Einbildungskraft*) as "a faculty of intuition without the presence of the object" (Ak 7:167; see also CPR B151).[375] As already indicated, Kant distinguishes between *productive* and *reproductive* imagination. Productive imagination is a faculty of the *original* presentation of the object, which not only precedes but also makes experience possible and conditions space and time. Reproductive imagination, by contrast, is concerned with a *derivative* presentation of empirical objects (see Ak 7:167; CPR A120 footnote, B152).[376] Reproductive imagination contains *fantasy* and *memory*, in as much as both of them

[375] Wolff holds: "the faculty of producing perceptions of sensible absent things is termed *faculty of imagining* or *imagination*. For the soul is also capable of reproducing ideas of absent things" (Wolff, 1968, §92) ("Facultas producendi perceptiones rerum sensibilium absentium *Facultas imaginandi* seu *lmaginatio* appellatur. Quoniam itaque anima rerum absentium ideas reproducere valet"). Besides Wolff distinguishes between *sensitive* and *intellectual memory*. The first one is the faculty of recognizing **confusedly** reproduced ideas and things represented through these ideas; the second one is the faculty of recognizing **distinctly** the reproduced ideas (see Wolff, 1972, §279). Furthermore, it seems that imagination and memory are not at the same level but imagination occupies a lower "part" of the soul than memory (see Mei, 2011, p. 104). R. Brandt suggests that Wolff only admitted the *reproductive* imagination but he did not distinguish between memory and fantasy *within* the reproductive imagination as Kant did it (see Brandt, 1999, p. 245). These two kinds of memory were preserved by Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* (see Baumgarten, 2013, §579). Kant uses, the term *intellectual* (see Ak 15:148) and *sensitive memory* (see Ak 25:92, 319-20), although he does not explain their meaning. Brandt suggests that Kant replaces the sensitive memorizing with the mechanic one (see Brand, 1999, p. 264).

[376] Kant draws the same distinction in the CPR where he claims: "insofar as the imagination is spontaneity, I also occasionally call it the **productive** imagination, and thereby distinguish it from the **reproductive** imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, namely those of association (…) and on that account belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology" (CPR B152).

demand the act of recalling representations. Thus fantasy, understood as an 'inventive' (*dichtend*) power of imagination, produces images, based on 'sense representation' (*Sinnenvorstellung*), which were previously given to our faculty of sense (see Ak 7:167-8; Ak 25:981). Unlike memory, imagination may relate representations in a temporal order that does not necessarily correspond to the temporal order in which the events were experienced (see Ak 29:881).[377] On this basic point, I am in agreement with R. Bader on considering that "the memory is what one is aware of and which exists NOW, whereby the memory has representational content consisting in a temporally ordered sequence of remembered mental episodes" (Bader, 2017, p. 134). Indeed, Memory allows us to make causal judgements about past episodes in our life, by connecting some earlier events (cause) with other later ones (effect). For instance, I can infer via memory that the angry behavior of a friend is caused by an earlier negative comment expressed by me.

On Kant's picture, remembrances and imaginary ideas (*fictions*) can be differentiated actually by the faithful or unfaithful character of their content rather than by the way in which they appear in the mind (see also Dietrich, 1991, p. 95). Indeed, in both cases some representations appear in the mind as soon as they are recalled:

> The power of imagination is richer and more fruitful in representations than sense, when a passion appears on the scene the power of imagination is more enlivened through the absence of the object than by its presence. This is evident when something happens that recalls the representation of an object to the mind again, which for a while seemed to be erased through distractions. (Ak 7:180)

Imagination contents are initially extracted from experience but afterwards they are associated in different ways to form "new" representations (see also Ak 28:236; 29:884); thus if we imagine a stove with ears, we associate two or more images received from experience. Kant underlines that "no matter how great an artist, even a sorceress, the power of imagination may be, it is still not creative, but must get the *material* for its images from the senses" (Ak 7:168-9; see also CPR B278). It follows that a person who was born blind cannot make any colors comprehensible, because its imagination does not

[377] However, we can, for instance, recall the latter episodes of our adult pet and afterwards recall episodes of its first months of life. Paton is aware of this possibility as he claims: "the order of the appearances is in such a case the same as the order of our perceivings, but it is not the same as the order of our rememberings; for we can remember a later event and then remember an earlier event" (Paton, 1936b, p. 171). I think that this "alteration" do not lead us to believe that the "old pet episode" was actually earlier than the "young pet episode", for we can recognize a "subjective" or "objective" order in our memories (1936b, p. 172). Such alteration in the order of our memories seems to be grounded on imagination rather than on memory.

have the power to produce a representation without using the material that was given previously to the faculty of sense (see Ak 7:167). Of course, Kant is aware of the fact that these images of imagination do not have reference necessarily to an actual external object, but they are remembrances of empirical intuitions, which can hardly be universally communicated.[378]

Memory must be distinguished from imagination, understood as fantasy, by the fact that memory contents should be faithful and should reproduce intuitions ("intuitive remembrances") as they were arranged in the original conditions:

> Memory is distinguished from the merely reproductive power of imagination in that it is able to reproduce the former representations *voluntarily***,** so that the mind is not a mere plaything of the imagination. Fantasy, that is, creative power of imagination, must not mix in with it, because then memory would be *unfaithful***.** (Ak 7:182; see also Ak 25:980).

Accordingly, *forgetfulness* is not considered as kind of an unfaithful memory; "unfaithful" means rather to remember falsely something, that is to say, to remember the occurrence of something that never happened (see Ak 25:1463). Again, memory should preserve the same temporal order of the originally stored representations.

Second, Kant in *Anthropology Mrongovius* regards memory as tantamount to the 'power of imagination' (*Einbildungskraft*) that aims at present time (see Ak 25:1277); in *Anthropology Busolt*, he claims that "memory is the faculty of the power of imagination" to reproduce representations which one already has (see Ak 25:1462). In the CPR, nonetheless, he confesses that it is unclear whether these faculties are identical:

> Initially a logical maxim bids us to reduce this apparent variety as far as possible by discovering hidden identity through comparison, and seeing if imagination combined with consciousness may not be memory, wit, the power to distinguish, or perhaps even understanding and reason. (CPR A649/B677).

This confusion concerning the boundaries between memory and imagination is comprehensible, as long as Kant's descriptions of memory and imagination share similar aspects. For instance, both are tightly connected with sensibility and they are capable of

[378] The text reads: "these images, according to the memories formed of them, are not so universally communicable as concepts of understanding" (Ak 7:168-9).

forming associations among empirical representations. This has naturally led John Llewelyn to claim that

> Kant's singling out of reproduction as a power specifically of imagination reflects the already mentioned duality in the history of philosophy, according to which memory is sometimes listed as a faculty in its own right and sometimes subsumed under imagination as one of the ways in which the latter represents something absent. (Llewelyn, 2000, p. 107)

As Llewelyn notices, both imagination and memory rely on material derived from senses, although they are engaged with representations that do not demand actual objects given in sensibility.[379] I suggest that the compelling boundary between memory and imagination does not consist much in the **act** through which the mind generates memory and imagination contents, but rather in the *formal* (temporal order) and *material* (material derived from senses) character of their content.

Third, I argue that Kant distinguishes in several places of his lectures on anthropology between memory and imagination and suggests that memory's functions depend upon imagination (see Ak 7:182; 25:1289, 1464, 511, 974, 1023; see also Stephenson, 2017, footnote 27).[380] Memory is described as a faculty that, only *via* imagination, has the power to achieve three actions (*Handlungen beym Gedächtniß*) in the reproduction of representations, namely to *grasp* something, to *retain* it and to *remember* it (see Ak 25:89).

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[379] Kant recognizes that a 'disturbed' (*gestörte*) faculty of remembrance, in some cases, deceives the afflicted person through chimerical representations of previous states that actually never happened (see Ak 2:267).

[380] The reliance of memory on imagination was also supported by others. For instance, Descartes held in the 'Rule 12' that the corporeal memory, which is similar to the one which animals possess, is **no different** from imagination (see Descartes, 1985, p. 43). Similarly, Hume claimed: "the memory, senses, and understanding are, therefore, all of them founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas" (*Treatise*, 265). Furthermore, Krüger claims "with and the power of imagination are the parents that have given rise to memory [...] there can be no doubt that the power of imagination is required by memory because one, who is incapable of representing that which previously has been sensed, grabs no memory" (see 1756, §68, p. 212; my translation) ("der Wiß und die Einbildungskraft die Eltern sind, von welchen das Gedächtniß erzeuget worden [...] die Einbildungskraft zum Gedächtniße erfordert werde, daran wird niemals zweifeln, weil man niemanden ein Gedächtniß zueignet, welcher unvermögend ist, dasjenige, was er ehemals empfunden hatte, sich vorzustellen"). However, J. G. Krüger also points out that if we were only in possession of imagination alone, without the faculty of remembrances nor of memory, we still could represent the past occurrences, although it would be impossible to know whether these effectively occurred or they are a 'mere imagination' (*bloße Einbildung*), nor it would be possible to distinguish between truth and dreams (see 1756, §72, p. 217).

Memory is not a self-sufficient power of the human being, but is linked to the 'recollective' (*zurückrufend*) power of imagination which brings back to the mind representations that it had previously (see Ak 7:167). Kant stresses that imagination and, therefore, memory, are determined by 'choice' (*Willkühr*). That is, we determine voluntarily our imagination to reproduce information on past time: "insofar as (…) our imagination is based on our choice, we employ it in order to represent clearly ideas of previous states to ourselves, this is memory"[381] (Ak 25:974; my translation). It means that when we want to remember *memory*, our choice enhances imagination to recall representations. On the contrary, *fantasy*[382] involuntarily brings back to the mind previous images, just like a stream of images which flows incessantly (see Ak 25: 521,314, 87; 7:174-5, 180; 15:126; 28:237).[383]

Furthermore, memory leans on the *reproductive* imagination, as long as the latter contains certain characteristics that are relevant for memory processes. In this vein, **reproductive** imagination is nothing but "a faculty of the derivative presentation of the object (*exhibitio derivativa*), which brings back to the mind an empirical intuition that it had previously" (Ak 7:167). It means that memory via *reproductive* imagination recollects representations that we had previously (see also Ak 25:974, 1464, 521). However, imagination's power to reproduce past representations does not happen by chance but is conditioned by contingent laws of *association* among our representations (see Ak 28:236; 29:883; CPR B152; Ak 25:1272-3; *Treatise*, p. 85). This law of *association* states that "empirical ideas that have frequently followed one another produce a habit in the mind such that when one idea is produced, the other also comes into being" (Ak 7:176).[384] For instance, when we

[381] "Insofern [...] unsere Imagination in unserer Willkühr steht, so daß wir sie aufbieten können, uns Ideen aus dem vorigen Zustande klar darzustellen, ist dies das Gedächtniß" (Ak 25:974).
[382] Concerning the influence of the representations recalled by fantasy, Kant holds that "the play of fantasy with the human being in sleep is called dreaming, and it also takes place in a healthy condition; on the other hand if it happens while the human being is awake, it reveals a diseased condition" (Ak 7:175).
[383] In a similar way, Locke believed that "the appearance of those dormant pictures depending sometimes on the *will*. The mind very often sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea, and turns as it were the eye of the sun upon it" (ECHU 2.10.7, 197). Hume says in physiological terms: "as the mind is endow'd with a power of exciting any idea it please; whenever it dispatches the spirits into that region of the brain, in which the idea is plac'd" (*Treatise*, 60-61).
[384] Perhaps Kant's idea that *memory is subject to the law of association* was taken from Baumgarten, who held: "recollection is memory (§582, 579), and it follows this rule: *I remember reproduced perceptions by means of associated ideas* (§580, 516). Recollection recalled through associated ideas of place <*loci*> is LOCAL MEMORY, and that through associated ideas of time <*aetatis*> is SYNCHRONIC MEMORY" (Baumgarten, 2013, §583). This law of association can even be traced back to Aristotle's associating principles of *resemblance*, *contrariety* and *contiguity*, by which we recollect something (Aristotle, 2007, 451b18-20; see also Kallich, 1970, p. 15 footnote 10).

look at scars of one's body, we tend to reproduce, through the reproductive activity of imagination, memories or images of the circumstances in which these scars happened (see Ak 25:1023; 7:176). This has led P. Kitcher to take memory for an example of "synthetic connection between states, since the contents of the later depend upon those of the earlier state. By contrast *transcendental* syntheses are those syntheses governed by *nonassociative* rules that are necessary for knowledge." (Kitcher, 1990, p. 254 footnote 14). This "synthetic connection" is certainly an empirical act performed by imagination which differs from the transcendental synthesis achieved by understanding.

Kant maintains in *Anthropologie Mrongovius* that memory is nothing but "the capacity to avail oneself of one's reproductive power of imagination voluntarily" (Ak 25:1273; see Ak 7:167-8). Although, the reliance of memory on imagination is already recognized in *Friedländer* (1775/1776), wherein he holds that memory is a faculty of imitation ("reproductive image formation") which produces images (see Ak 25:511). In brief, memories are images, reproduced by imagination, of the previous state of an object. The images derived from the apprehension of the state of the object are stored in memory and are reproduced by means imagination; however, the remembrances of that previous state do not necessarily correspond to the current state of the changing object. In other words, we form images[385] of what (objects) strikes the senses through the faculty of sensation, and these images become current remembrances[386] of past states of the object, which may no longer exist.

Furthermore, Kant endorses the reliance of memory on imagination in *Metaphysik L*, holding that the 'faculty of imitation' (*Vermögen der Nachbildung*) produces representations of past time (Ak 28:235). Matherne offers suggestive remarks about the relation memory-imagination by claiming: "in memory (…) the imagination forms or

[385] S. Matherne emphasizes that *image* is a necessary component of perception. In her view, Kant holds in "the Metaphysics Lectures and [in] the A Deduction that in order to *perceive* something, we must not just intuit it, but engage in a synthetic act through which we form an image of it. For Kant, then, perception requires more than us having intuitions in the narrow sense; it requires images" (Matherne, 2015, p. 754)

[386] There is no conflict between the temporal positions of a *memory* in the present and of *its content* in the past. Thus A. Brook suggests rightly that "memories, however, are current representations, not past ones; I am not now directly aware of earlier stages of anything" (Brook, 1994, p. 186). Ralf Bader also makes this point, suggesting that "we can, however, see that no conflicts arise. This is because the different temporal attributions apply to different things. In particular, NOW applies to the phenomenal representation (e.g. a memory), whereas what is represented by this phenomenal representation (e.g. what is remembered) is placed in the extended temporal framework" (Bader, 2017, p. 136).

'imitates' representations of objects we have encountered in the past, e.g., when I form a representation of my last birthday cake" (Matherne, 2015, p. 748).

In the *Logik Blomberg*, Kant shows an outstanding interest for the key role of memory in cognition, as he points out that a large part of our cognitions (historical, geographical, physical, etc.) arises through *belief*, without which we would have no greater cognitions than those of the *time* in which we live or of the *place* where we live (see Ak 24:245). Thus cognition would be limited by our immediate experience. In contrast, our historical cognition leans on: a) the very experience of other people insofar as these people should not be in an extensive deception of the senses but these should be reliable, b) their non-defective **memory**, because we would not believe those whose imagination brings forth other images that cannot be evidenced by memory, c) their capability for communicating their past experiences, so that these people should express themselves and communicate their experiences rightly and, finally, d) their honorability and their inclination toward truth (see Ak 24:245-6).

To my knowledge, Kant's view of memory underlines the key role of memory for the human being in the *theoretical* and *practical* sphere, otherwise his analysis would not be *pragmatic*. For as H. L. Wilson has suggested, "what makes anthropology pragmatic is the use that it brings with it. It is useful to have more memory (…) knowing how to use a mnemonic device will increase one's capacity for memory" (Wilson, 2011, p. 168). Memory becomes a crucial faculty of the human being, which is enhanced by didactic practices developed by education, through which the human being can be cultivated in conformity with its moral aspirations (see Svare, 2006, p. 87).

3.2.2. Memory and time

I argue that memory is a storing-reproducing faculty that preserves the formal-material conditions of inner experience. Thus the human being's memory *stores* and *reproduces* experienced episodes or events as well as temporal relations contained in these events.[387]

[387] I have used some aspects of Endel Tulving's characterization of *episodic* memory, which are in line with Kant's account of memory (see Tulving, 1972, p. 385). L. Squire and Y. Shrager characterize the relation between memory and time through episodic memory thus: "unlike semantic memory, episodic memory stores spatial and temporal landmarks that identify the particular time and place when an event occurred" (Squire & Shrager, 2009, p. 19). Later, Russell argues for Kantian roots of a current account of *episodic*

Kant suggests, in different places, that memory involves **tensed** temporal series, for it constitutes a mental power directed at the *past* (see Ak 25:1277, 1289, 1471; 15:816). For instance, he admits in the *Anthropology* that the 'faculty of remembrance'[388] (*Erinnerungsvermögen*) is a sensible faculty by which human beings are capable of bearing in mind the past through imagination:

> The faculty of deliberately visualizing the past is the *faculty of memory,* and the faculty of visualizing something as taking place in the future is *the faculty of foresight.* Provided that they belong to sensibility, both of them are based on the *association* of representations of the past and future consciousness of the subject with the present; and although they are not themselves perceptions, as a connecting of perceptions *in time,* they serve to connect in a coherent experience what *no longer exists* with what *does not yet exist* through what *presently exists.* (Ak 7:182)

In my view, the quoted passage still entails some difficulties derived from an ambiguous expression, for it is not clear whether it is the faculty of remembrance or the past, present or future state of the subject what cannot be a kind of perception. In my view, this impossibility should be admitted with regard to the faculty of remembrance, for nowhere Kant maintains that a particular kind of perceptions[389] can be a faculty. Instead, they are mainly understood as representations grounded on authentic faculties (e.g. sensibility, imagination, etc.).

At first blush, the faculty of remembrance has the power to associate the representation of a past 'state' (*Zustand*) of the subject with that of its present state. Granted that this

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memory, particularly with regard to Kant's account of space, time and the synthetic unity of experience (see Russell & Hanna, 2012, pp. 32-4). Unfortunately, he does not deal particularly with Kant's account of memory. More recently, James Russell argues that "Kant's analysis of the spatiotemporal nature of experience should constrain and positively influence theories of episodic memory development" (Russell, 2014, p. 391).

[388] It is noteworthy that Robert B. Louden translates the expressions *Erinnerung* and *Gedächtnis* as 'memory', whereas Paul Guyer translates *Erinnerung* as 'remainder' in the CPR (A30/B45, A98) and *Gedächtnis* as 'memory' in the CPR (A53/B77). Henceforth I shall translate, on the one hand, *Gedächtnis* as 'memory' and *memorieren* as 'memorize' (both related to our capacity of **storing** mental contents) and, on the other, *erinnern* and *Erinnerung* as 'to remember' and 'remembrance' (related to related to our capacity of **evoking** mental contents) (see also Ak 7:182). Moreover, Louden translates *Zustand* there as 'consciousness' while I keep translating it as 'state'.

[389] The term *perception* is regarded in different places as an empirical representation accompanied by consciousness (see Ak 7:144; 9:65; CPR B160, B207). Notice that the term perception in Locke contains similar characteristics to Kant's own term; in fact, Locke maintains that whatever impressions are made in the body of the subject, if they do not reach the mind and if subject does not take notice of them, there will be no perception. For perception demands a certain degree of consciousness (he literally says 'observation of the mind') of what affects the sense organs (see ECHU 2.9.3-4. 183-4).

faculty has the power to unite perceptions in time, an interrogation arises: What perceptions is Kant referring to? The passage apparently suggests that perception is constituted by a set of items that differ by their temporal condition[390], namely 'what no longer exists' (the past), 'what does not yet exist' (the future) and 'what presently exists' (the present):

> Although they [the faculty of memory and that of foresight] are not themselves perceptions, as a connecting of perceptions *in time*, they serve to connect in a coherent experience what *no longer exists* with what *does not yet exist* through what *presently exists*. (Ak 7:182)

Memory is a necessary faculty for the connection of perceptions in a 'coherent' (*zussamehängende*) or *connected* experience.[391] to my knowledge, 'what *no longer exists*' expresses the *form* of a representation evoked by memory, namely the tensed temporal determination of a representation by which the latter exists in the *past*. This representation expresses also the *matter* of a representation, that is, that which no longer exists and can only be previously derived from sensibility, such as color, figures, flavors, sounds, etc. Therefore, the power of memory includes the reproduction of the *form* of perceptions as well as of their *matter*, so that perceptions or similar kinds of representations ("intuitive-remembrances") can also be reproduced by memory (see below section 3.2.2.).

The relation between tensed aspects of time and memory is also indicated by Kant's claim that "they are called the faculties of *memory* and *divination,* of respicience and prospicience (if we may use these expressions), where one is conscious of one's ideas as those which would be encountered in one's past or future state" (Ak 7:182; see also Ak 25:974).[392] Accordingly, memory is a *reproductive* power of imagination through which

[390] I think that the formulation of these three items involves an ambiguity, for 'what no longer exists' could mean the *form* of a perception, the *matter* of a perception or the composited of the last two items. Granted that Kant suggests that the union of these items takes place *in a connected experience*, which could not be possible in absence of either the form or the matter of appearances, thus, 'what no longer exists' will be the composited of form and matter.

[391] R. Brandt suggests that *Anthropology*, in the quoted passage, proves to be a complementary work to CPR, although *Anthropology* deals in particular with "the connected I- and the world-" ("life experience"), so that this is a science "of the unscientific self- and knowledge of the world". He maintains, therefore, that the transcendental-philosophical level is epistemologically nothing but the prerequisite for the anthropological experience (see Brandt, 1999, p. 263). I certainly believe in the *transcendental* basis of Kant's *Anthropology* and I suggest that memory should be understood as a condition of experience in both texts.

[392] J. G. Krüger also connects memory with our capacity of being conscious of something, as he suggests that "to remember is that with which it is to be denoted nothing else but the form produced by the power of imagination, the form of a thing that we have previously sensed" (Krüger, 1756, §68, p. 212; my translation)

we can be conscious of ideas that, according to its temporal aspects, are posited in the past and, according to its content, represent perceptions derived from sensibility (see Ak 29:881). Thus, it seems reasonable to assert that "a memory is an inner appearance that has temporal content (i.e., what the memory represents is temporally ordered)" (Bader, 2017, p. 133)

As was noticed earlier, memory has the power to **reproduce** voluntarily former representations, and this prevents the mind from being a mere plaything that has no control of its functions. This reproduction involves three different acts that constitute the formal perfections of memory[393]: 'to *grasp'* (*fassen*) something rapidly in memory, 'to recollect' (*besinnen*)[394] it easily and 'to *retain*' (*behalten*) it for a long time (see Ak 7:182).[395] The first act means that memory representations must be processed in order to identify the pursued one, among several representations, and once this representation is identified, is certainly caught up. The second one refers to the *effort* or the act by which the representation is brought to the consciousness (see Ak 25:521). Finally, the third one consists in retaining the yearned representation for a sufficient time, so that we do not lose it. [396]

("dieses ist das Erinnern womit man nichts anders anzeigen will, als daß man sich bewust sey, es sey das von der Einbildungskrafft verfertigte Bild, das Bild einer Sache die wir ehemahls empfunden haben").

[393] Ernst Platner suggests a very similar description of memory according to which memory is composed by three effects: i) 'receptivity' (*Empfänglichkeit*), that is, the capacity to catch something; ii) 'to retain' (*Behalten*) something and iii) 'remembrance' (*Erinnerung*) understood as the activity through which the retained ideas can be brought back and represented to the soul with the consciousness that we had them previously (see Platner, 1772, §336-7, p.104). Needless to say, these acts pointed out by Kant do not explain how certain mental contents are stored in memory but rather how they are reproduced.

[394] There is no agreement in the Cambridge Edition concerning the translation of the term *bessinnen*, for R. Louden translates it as to 'recall'(see *Anthropology* Ak 7:182), while G. Felicitas Munzel and Robert R. Clewis (*Mrongovius* 25:1276) do it as to 'recollect' (see *Friedländer* Ak 25:521). For sake of the homogeneity, I choose the term recollect. Similarly Louden translates *zurückbringen* as to 'bring back' while Felicitas as to 'recollect' (I use to bring back).

[395] The classification of these acts changes slightly through Kant's lectures on anthropology; thus in *Collins, Parrow, Friedländer* and *Mrongovius* these are: i) to grasp something in memory, ii) to retain it and iii) to remember it easily (see Ak 25:89, 315, 521, 1273; 15:147). In *Menschenkunde* these are: i) to grasp something in memory, ii) to retain it for a long time and iii) to retain it immediately (see Ak 25:975). The same classification does not appear in *Pillau* and *Busolt*. Moreover, Kant holds that to *grasp* takes place according to laws of imagination, to *retain* occurs through the connection with the understanding and to *remember* occurs in conformity with inclination (see Ak 15:147; Erdmann, 1882, p. 102).

[396] Augustin suggests a similar idea in *Confessions* (Book X, 19) where he claims "when memory itself loses something, as occurs when we forget and we seek to remember it; where do we seek it at the end if not in memory itself? But if something, different from that which want to seek, is presented by chance –as may happen-, we reject it until that which we search is encountered. And when it is encountered, we say 'this is it' but we would not say this if we do not recognize it and we do not recognize it, if we do not remember it" (O'Donnell, 1992, p. 130).

Kant, nonetheless, confesses that these acts do not appear always together, for sometimes one believes that one has something in memory but one cannot bring it to consciousness, namely one cannot 'remind'[397] (*entsinnen*) it (see Ak 7:182). It remains unclear whether these three acts or 'properties' (*Eigenschaften*) are performed specifically by memory or by some other faculty like imagination, understanding, etc. As already indicated, I suggest that memory is a faculty[398] in which many representations are stored, and it uses reproductive imagination to evoke them (see Ak 25:511, 7:182; see also Bruder, 2005, p. 10). In other words, the act of remembering demands consciousness of the stored representations, which is only possible if the reproductive function of imagination is presupposed (see Ak 15:805).[399]

The functioning of memory is described thus: to remember something we need to catch it from memory, then we must recollect it by means of imagination and finally we have to retain it in consciousness. However, Kant's pragmatic account of memory includes not only an *observational* knowledge but also a *practical* one that is meant to help our memory:

> The effort to remember the idea, if one is anxious about it, is mentally exhausting, and the best thing to do is to distract oneself for a while with other thoughts and from time to time look back at the object quickly. Then one usually catches one of the associated representations, which calls it back to mind. (Ak 7:182-3)

[397] I disagree with R. Louden on translating the term *entsinnen* as 'remembering' (see Ak 7:182) and I suggest the term 'remind', for as Kant distinguishes between *entsinnen* and *besinnen* ('recollect'), he relates *erinnen* to *besinnen* not to *entsinnen*: "to remind signifies to know that something can be well-found and one has it *parat* in memory. To recollect signifies to remember something easily" (Ak 25:1462; my own translation) ("entsinnen heißt, wissen daß etwas wohlgefunden werden könne und das man es im Gedächtniß *parat* habe. Sich besinnen heißt, sich leicht an etwas errinnern"). Therefore to *remind* means that we are conscious of the fact that we have something in our memory, while to recollect points out the **act** of bringing something stored in memory to consciousness, namely the *means* by which we remember (see Ak 25:521; 15:146; see also Erdmann, 1882, p. 102). Therefore, the recollection is subordinated to the act of remembering and the latter to memory for "the faculty of remembering is based on memory" (Ak 25:521; my translation) ("Zum Gedachtnis berüht das Vermögen zu erinnern").

[398] Professor A. Loisette (unlike Locke, Hume, Kant and others) stated in 1896: "memory is not a *separate faculty* whose office it is to carry the recollective burdens of the other faculties—but that Memory is a Physiological and Psychological property of each mental act, and that such act retains the traces and history of its own action, and that there are as many memories as there are kinds of mental action" (Loisette, 1896, preface). Loisette is considered as a pioneer author who achieved experimental research on memory by providing "technics for locating and classifying associations between items to increase their memory" (Morris & Gruneberg, 1996, p. 43).

[399] "*This reproductive power of imagination is that which lies as ground of memory, these are differentiated only by the fact that consciousness must come in addition; then, memory does not produces anything but only repeats it*" (Ak 25:1464; my translation) ("*Diese reproductive Einbildungskraft ist die, welche dem Gedächtniße zu Grunde liegt und ist von derselben in weiter nichts unterscheiden als daß das Bewustseyn hinzu kommen muß, und dann wird sie Gedächtniß Sie bringt nichts hervor sondern wiederholt nur*").

It follows that when too much attention is focused on what we try to remember, the "remembering" turns out more difficult, instead we should focus on other representations associated with that which is to be remembered, in order to bring it to our consciousness more easily (see also Ak 25:975).

Furthermore, Kant suggests that our experience of the world often involves a reference to the past (and to the future). For instance, in our daily experience, we can observe that if we stare at a particular street, this empirical intuition somehow triggers our memory, reproducing a past representation associated with the intuition. As a result, our mind "draws forth the representations of the senses from previous times, and connects them with the representations of the present" (Ak 28:236).

The aforementioned example entails a form of consciousness, for "in the intuiting of the present we always look at the past and the future. We put it into connection in this way and we become conscious of it"[400] (Ak 25:87; my translation). It follows that, we can be conscious of what has been *stored*, of what is recently *apprehended* and of the *connection* between both of them.[401] This connection is determined by the law of association in as much as the empirical intuition should be similar with the reproduced past representation. The recalled representations can be images, sounds, concepts, etc., which express a past episode of our life associated with what we are experiencing.

In current approaches to the problem of "autobiographical memory"[402] it has been also suggested the importance of linking memory to time. That idea was already visible in

[400] "Beym Anschauen des gegenwärtigen sehen wir stets aufs vergangene und aufs künftige. Dadurch bringen wir es in Verbindung, und werden es uns bewußt" (Ak 25:87).

[401] Kant also deals with the association of representations in memory, particularly in his lectures on metaphysics (in the mid-1770s), where he takes the faculty of reproductive imagination as the faculty of imitation, "according to which my mind draws forth the representations of the senses from previous times, and connects them with the representations of the present. I reproduce the representations of past time through association, according to which one representation draws forth another, because it had been accompanying it" (Ak 28:236).

[402] John A. Robinson defines *autobiographical* memory as "the memories a person has of his or her own life experiences" (Robinson, 1986a, p. 19); this definition is compatible with Anita Kasabova's definition as "the ability to orient ourselves to the past and bring back an experience that occurred at an earlier time" (Kasabova, 2009, p. xi). In this vein, *autobiographical* or *episodic* memory is a memory system that involves conscious recollection in which "the subject thinks about, attends to or is otherwise occupied with organizing his experiences. Episodic memory enables recording and retrieval of personal experiences and their temporal relations to one another" (Kasabova, 2009, p. xiv).

Kant's philosophy. Like H. J. Paton, Anita Kasabova maintains that memory is a consciousness of the past that comes in two steps, that is, retention and recollection.[403] Concerning the latter, she claims:

> Recollection (…) is the reflective level of recalling not only the past object, but recalling it as past. In order to do that, we have to recall the elapsed act as well as the elapsed object so that what is not now present once more appears before us. (Kasabova, 2009, p. 92)

Accordingly, both Paton and Kasabova stress the difference between to recall a past object and to recall the *tensed* temporal cues which posit the object in the past and not in the present. Such distinction can be supported by Kant's *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie* where he claims that "there is a distinction [*crossed out:* itself the] between to have the learned in memory and to remember the time in which we receive these representations"[404] (Ak 15:148; my translation; see also Erdmann, 1882, p. 103). It means that, for instance, when we remember the first time we rode bicycle, we do not remember only the representations associated with the event but also their "position" in time as past. As a result, the remembrance of the tensed temporal position prevents us from regarding the presence of the past object as a new object in the mind but rather as a remembrance.[405]

For Kant, the representations of our inner states are ordered according to *tenseless* temporal relations of succession or simultaneity, so that our autobiographical recollection involves the temporal relations, according to which our past representations can be 'earlier', 'later', or 'simultaneous' to others. However, since the dimension of time is *succession* and all our representations of ourselves are related in time, then our autobiographical memory involves a successive time-span of discrete episodes of our own life. This interpretation to certain extent agrees with Kasabova's view of autobiographical recollection, as she claims that "recollection presentifies the past and constructs a temporal continuity of discrete episodes as 'earlier' and 'later': its sequences are arranged as the part in a literary work. If we read it, events unfold in a successive time-span" (Kasabova, 2009, p. 92). Kasabova is not concerned with our memory of time alone but

[403] "Memory is not merely the recalling of a past event, but the recollecting of it as past, that is, as having a position more or less definite in the past time, and therefore (since we cannot perceive time itself) as coming before some events and after others" (Paton, 1939b, pp. 171-2).
[404] "Es ist ein Unterschied, ~~sich der~~ das Gelernte im Gedachtnis zu haben und sich der Zeit zu erinnern, da wir diese Vorstellungen empfingen" (Ak 15:148).
[405] This possibility is ruled out by the second "law of the temporal determination of experience" (see above section 1.4.5.)

also, like Kant, with the way the human being experiences time (see Kasabova, 2009, p. 94). Furthermore, I suggest that Kant admits in the *Anthropology* the possibility of experiencing time and depends upon the experience of one's life:

> How are we to explain the phenomenon that a human being who has tortured himself with boredom for the greatest part of his life, so that every day seemed long to him, nevertheless complains at the end of his life about the *brevity* of life? (Ak 7:234)

Kant answers that the thought of such brevity is motivated by the fact that the various and different tasks of the last part of an old person's life produce in its memory the deceptive conclusion that this part has been a **longer**-travelled lifetime than what it actually was. In contrast, the emptiness of the major part of its early lifetime generates 'little remembrance' (*wenig Erinnerung*) of what has happened in its life, producing the illusion that this (early) part of its lifetime has been **shorter** that what it really was (see Ak 7:234).[406] In other words, the illusion of such *brevity* is produced by both the "memory scarcity" of events occurred in the early part of an old person life and the "rich memory" of events occurred in the last part of its life.[407] I suggest that in this example an old person experiences the brevity of its life as brevity of time in terms of the present, past and future, for "to feel one's life, to enjoy oneself, is thus nothing more than to feel oneself continuously driven to leave the present state (which must therefore be a pain that recurs just as often as the present)" (Ak 7:233). As a result, the abolishment of a person's life brings as consequence the abolishment of time and vice versa.

In addition, Kant indirectly points out the relation between self-consciousness and tensed series of time in the "Leningrad *Reflexion* on Inner Sense", where he says that time contains the way in which we appear to ourselves. Therefore, the cognition of ourselves is determined by the way in which we appear to ourselves in time. Kant mentions there

[406] More recently, H. B. Green, influenced by Whitrow, underlines that the experience of time has both quality and quantity. For instance, "the child will experience as very long the time it takes to fill a pail at a well, or to wait and then run at a traffic stop light. This is time's extent. Habituation changes later changes this childhood perception of time by levelling certain aspects and sharpening other aspects, thus altering its quality. The self grows with these time changes" (Green, 1975, p. 2).

[407] H. B. Green focuses on the connection between the development of the self and certain forms of organization of time: "the self forms in a progression of stages, each of which involves a previous organization of time, grows out of a problem in that time organization, and is resolved by reaching a new and more complex level of time orientation (…) the lifespan of the self-in-time can be divided into stages, each one normally occurring within an age-range when the new self *first* begins to change through a new time orientation" (Green, 1975, p. 3). Similar to Kant, but on different grounds, he points out that for old people (beginning about 65) "time passes quickly rather than slowly both because it is filled with associations and because even small changes require effort and small rests" (Green, 1975, p. 12).

the typical distinction between *pure* (transcendental) and *empirical* apperception: "the first merely asserts **I am**. The second that I was, I am, and I will be, i.e., I am a thing of past, present, and future time" (Ak 18:623). As was noticed earlier, pure apperception refers to intellectual consciousness that, in strict sense, provides no cognition of ourselves, because the proposition "I am" is not an experiential position but, rather, a formal one.

In contrast, empirical apperception emphasizes the *temporality* of the self, insofar as this is capable of obtaining an empirical cognition of its past mental states. This has led J. Bennet to claim that "when Kant speaks of 'the determination in time' of my existence he means the establishment of the empirical facts about me-of what my states have been-at the various stages in my history" (Bennet, 1966, p. 205). Of course, the subject has access to those past states, that is, to a knowledge of its own mental history in virtue of its memory (compare Strawson, 2004, p. 290). The empirical apperception, termed also "cosmological apperception", enhances the self to consider its existence as a magnitude in time and in relation to other external things: "I am immediately and originally conscious of myself as a being in the world and only thereby is my own existence determinable as a magnitude in time" (Ak 18:623). In this vein, Kant does not deal with the self in "isolation", but as a being posited in time relations of the present, past and future. Thus, these relations rule both its self-experience and its experience of other things.[408]

3.2.3. Obscure representations in self-consciousness

I argue in this section that the existence of obscure representations is relevant for Kant's account of the self on the grounds that the access to our own mental contents through self-consciousness is not "complete" nor "transparent" (see Rockmore, 2012, pp. 308-9). Needless to say, the analysis of the emergence of unconscious mental content is not a discovery of Kant but has its sources in the Leibnizian theory of the *petites perceptions*, which was probably known by Kant himself (see Kitcher, 2012, pp 10-11; Sánchez, 2012, p. 193).

[408] Merleau-Ponty rightly makes the observation that "all our experiences, inasmuch as they are ours, arrange themselves in terms of before and after, because temporality, in Kantian language, is the form taken by our inner sense, and because it is the most general characteristic of 'psychic facts'" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 365).

As Leibniz claims, "an *obscure* notion is one that is not sufficient for recognizing the thing that it represents" and adds an example: "I once saw a certain flower but whenever I remember it I cannot bring it to mind well enough to recognize it, distinguishing it from other nearby flowers, when I see it again" (Leibniz, 1989, pp. 23-4). Thus, *clear ideas* are those which, even as memories, represent the objects themselves with accuracy, while *obscure ideas* (*notions*) lack the original exactness, or have lost any of their fresh freshness, and are faded by time (see *New Essays*, II. 29. 254. §2). I show that Kant's view of an obscure representation is slightly different from Leibniz's own, albeit both take into consideration the existence of obscure notions and memory.[409]

Kant states in the CPR that 'the faculty of being conscious of oneself' (*das Vermögen sich seiner bewußt zu sein*) and other faculties, like memory, vary in *degrees* (see CPR B415 footnote; see also A175/B217). In this vein, Kant denies that clarity is the consciousness of a representation, namely, the less consciousness of a representation we have, the more obscure the representation is. He, by contrast, holds that "a representation is clear if the consciousness in it is sufficient for **a consciousness of the difference** between it and others" (CPR B415 footnote). We have representations in memory of which we have a certain degree of consciousness which, nonetheless, is not sufficient for the remembrance, that is, sufficient to be remembered (see Svare, 2006, pp. 202-3).

However, even though we are not conscious of these representations, we can still make a distinction in the connection of obscure representations, just like we do it with the marks of some concepts. It means that neither the *consciousness*, nor the *distinction* of the presentation (from others) prevents a representation from being **obscure** (as Leibniz believed). For this can only be "clear", if we are *conscious of its difference* from other representations.[410] For instance, we usually make a distinction between the concepts of right and equity, but we have no consciousness of the distinction between those concepts.

[409] As P. Kitcher notices (see 2012, p. 9), Leibniz grounds the self-identity on the train of *petites perceptions* of which we are not conscious. These, nonetheless, are guarantee of the connection among the perceptions of our past existence: "[an spirit] retains impressions of everything which has previously happened to it (…) but these states of mind are mostly too minute to be distinguishable and for one to be aware of them (…) It is this continuity and interconnection of perceptions which make someone really the same individual" (*New Essays*, II. 27. 239. §14; see also *Monadology*, §§20, 23).

[410] For Wolff holds in *Vernunftige Gedanken von von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt* that we can be *conscious* of things, if we can *distinguish* these from others, and the more we distinguish these things from others, the *clearer* these will be (see Wolff, 1983, §729-30).

Likewise, a musician who hits many notes simultaneously when improvising is not necessarily conscious of the distinction among the different hit notes (see CPR B414-15 footnote).

These obscure representations, nonetheless, are not meant to be taken as an innate stock that reflects the world in its entirety in a metaphysical context (see Oberhausen, 2002, pp. 133-4). Instead, these should be regarded in general as representations derived from experience, which are stored in memory and have an influence on our thoughts and actions. Kant even remarks that there are representations which we cannot be fully conscious of, so that we cannot, even by the most strenuous self-examination "get entirely behind our covert incentives, since, when moral worth is at issue, what counts is not actions, which one sees, but those inner principles of actions that one does not see" (Ak 4:407; see 6:43, 51; for this point, see also Rockmore, 2012, p. 309).

Kant's anthropology lectures (including the *Anthropology*) have always stated the existence of unconscious representations, albeit his reflections on them change over time (see Kitcher, 2012, p. 13). I am concerned with a side of this topic, namely the relation between obscure representations and memory.[411] One of the most evident signs of the Kantian anchoring of obscure representations in memory is the claim in *Anthropology Busolt* (1788-9) that memory is "the field of obscure representations" (Ak 25:1439-40). In other words, the mind is not totally transparent to itself as our memory encloses representations of our own mental states, which are not always "visible" to us. Instead he remarks that

> One can represent the human soul as a map, whose illuminated parts are the clear ones, especially bright, the distinct ones, and the unilluminated parts signify the obscure representations. Obscure [ones] occupy the biggest place, and are the ground of the clear ones. Human beings are often become a play of obscure representations. (Ak 25:1440)

Kant's example reveals that the human being is not conscious of all its mental processes but is also capable of noticing those in a different way (see also Ak 25:867-8). Like Leibniz, Kant argues against Locke that there are effectively obscure representations,

[411] For a thoughtful study of the role of unconscious representation in Kantian theory of cognition, see Kitcher (2012).

whose existence we are not directly conscious but only through their *effects*.[412] Concerning to the existence of *obscure* representations in the mind, Kant illustrates: "the field of sensuous intuitions and sensations of which we are not conscious, even though we can undoubtedly conclude that we have them; that is, *obscure* representations in the human being (and thus also in animals), is immense" (Ak 7:135; see 2:266). In this regard, mental processes demand that some of our representations should happen in our consciousness, while others should be kept in our memory in order to avoid an "overcrowding" of representations that hardly could be associated properly: "if I wanted to become conscious in an instant of all obscure representations all at once, then I would necessarily be very astonished at myself. Thus what lies in my memory is also obscure and I am not conscious of it" (Ak 25:480). Accordingly, I find controversial Nuria Sánchez's claim:

> The discovery of the predominance of obscure regions of the mind does not supply an instrument to reveal the most concealed human thoughts either, since it cannot break the resistance which human beings can oppose, in order to keep their thoughts hidden". (Sánchez, 2012, p. 178)

I think that this interpretation leads to problems; first, because it would entail that there no means of knowing these obscure representations, which is contrary to Kant's suggestion that these can be cognized by means of *inferences*. Second, if the human being were capable of choosing, among many thoughts, those which need to be hidden, then these would not be contained in obscure regions, namely the human being would be conscious of them.[413]

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[412] Locke claims "I do say, he [a man] cannot *think* at any time, waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to anything but to our thoughts; and to them it is; and to them it always will be necessary, till we can think without being conscious of it (…) it being hard to conceive that anything should think and not being conscious of it" (ECHU 2. 1. 10-11, 129-130). Leibniz objected: "I am surprised that it has not occurred to you [Locke] that we know an infinity of things which we are not aware of all the time, even when we need them; it is the function of memory -to store them, and of recollection to put them before us again" (Leibniz. 1996. I. 1. 76-7. §5). Of course, Leibniz is here referring to *mémoire* as one of the three kinds of memory, i.e. *mémoire*, *réminiscience*, and *souvenir*. The first one is concerned with retention of contents, the second one with the recurrence (remembrance) of a sensation without the return of its object and, finally, the third one refers to the knowledge of the fact that we are in possession of a certain notion (see 1996. II. 19. 161. §1). The *souvenir*, as Marc Elliott Bobro notices, is a reflexive memory, for "my reflexive or apperceptive memory of *x* involves not only the memory of *x*, but also the awareness that it is *my* memory" (Bobro. 2004, p. 23) while *réminiscience* is a non-reflexive memory, because it does not involve the awareness that *x* is mine.

[413] It is a fact that the external observation of human beings makes them behave in a different way (hiding or changing behavior) as they feel observed. However, this difficulty is not explained by Kant as a phenomenon brought about by obscure representations but by a desire of disguising (see Ak 7:120-1).

Kant suggests at times that most of the human soul's acts are carried out in obscurity, and despite we are not always conscious of obscure representations through *senses*, we could be conscious of their existence through *inferences*: "obscure representations are those of which we are conscious not immediately, but rather through their effects. Everything contained in our memory lies in the field of obscure representations" (Ak 25:1439-40). He also sets out two similar examples of the existence of obscure representations:

> If an individual reads, then the soul attends to the letters, for if it spells [the words] out, then it reads, [and] then it attends to what it reads. The individual is not conscious of all this. The musician who is improvising must direct his reflection upon every finger he places, on playing, on what he wants to play, and on the new he wants to produce. If he did not do so, then he also could not play, but he is not conscious of this. (Ak 25:479)

Accordingly, the musician man's reflection on the performed and on the pretended movements of his fingers is, on a certain level, obscure. For he is not conscious of every single movement of his fingers, which is involved in the more general act of improvising (see Svare, 2012, p. 203).[414] Even more, Kant maintains that "the greatest store of cognitions exists in obscurity", so that the cognitions of the soul depend upon philosophical reflections along with judgements that arise from obscure representations already prepared beforehand in obscurity (see Ak 25:479).[415] In this vein, human beings judge universally and such judgements are based on reason, although at times one is not aware of them and, thereby, their basis exist in obscurity:

> For example, a drunken man is more tolerable than a drunken woman. Everyone judges this way. What is the basis? Women are subjected to impugnment. Why does one shake hands with a stranger with one's right hand? The right hand is [our] active one, thus we leave it free for him. Why do we put the most distinguished among three [persons] in the middle? Because he can then converse on both sides. (Ak 25:480)

[414] Motoric activities are regarded as belonging to *implicit* memory that contains a processing of information which does not enter awareness. Indeed, some psychologists and neuropsychologists suggest a contrast between *implicit* ("nondeclarative" or "without awareness") and *explicit* ("declarative" or "with awareness") memory: "implicit memory appears to divide into a larger number of subgroups. There is procedural memory, which involves knowledge of how to perform actions (either motoric or cognitive-processing activities), classical conditioning, priming, and implicit learning" (Howes, 2007, p. 274).

[415] Andrew Brook suggests a parallel between Kant's and Freud's model of the structure and function of the mind. Brook holds that the model of the mind is tripartite according to Kant and Freud, i.e. sensibility, understanding and reason. He also defends the existence of the unconscious in both of them: "like Freud, Kant thought that a large and in many ways the most important part of the operation of the mind is 'unconscious' – not open to introspection, not conscious in Freud's sense of the term" (Brook, 2003, p. 21)

Indeed, the existence of *obscure* representations relies on the fact that the human being does not lose ever everything that has come to its mind. Some of those contents remain obscure in memory.[416] These representations lie in the mind, although one cannot be conscious of all of them *in an instant*. We are conscious of some of them only, if something, in the community with others, occasions them (see Ak 25:868).[417] Kant underlines that it is difficult to draw such representations out of obscurity in as much as one cannot inspect them *directly*. For when one is supposed to narrate something obscure, one can think of nothing, whereas if one simply were to narrate everything one knows, abundant representations would come to light indirectly. However, these obscure representations, stored in memory, can make the understanding fall into error, as they have a great influence on the human being. It seems astonishing the fact that, according to Kant, human beings are themselves *a play of obscurity* (see Ak 25:481-2, 869).

The study of the secret processes of the soul is very important and still today controversial, insofar as obscure representations like feelings, superstitious ideas, prejudices, etc., can determine human being's judgements (see Ak 25:869).[418] For it is common to observe that at times human actions or decisions are not determined by a judgement formed with consciousness, through a careful weighing of the pros and cons, but rather these are guided by a preliminary unconscious judgement (see Ak 25:481).[419] However, even though these obscure representations have an influence on our actions, these cannot simply be withdrawn thereby from our will (see Brandt, 1999, p. 150).

[416] At times Kant's analysis of memory in *Mrongovius* overlaps with that of 'imagination' (*Einbildung* or *Imagination*), so that the "place" of obscure representation is memory, namely imagination: "it is assumed that the power of imagination has a repository, where all previous representations are located in obscurity and are not extinguished. We cannot have insight into how that might work. Memory is like an *archivarius*" (Ak 25:1273).

[417] Nuria Sánchez correctly holds that "if we do not enter *into the world*, the obscure representations will have serious difficulties to be conveniently identified" (Sánchez, 2012, p. 200).

[418] This idea is visible even in recent approaches to memory research. For instance, Mary B. Howes maintains that "it has also been found that information can be retained in memory— in some form— even when we cannot recall it. The unavailable information may nonetheless influence our behavior. We may feel an emotional response, for instance, and yet be unable to identify why we feel as we do" (Howes, 2997, p. 11).

[419] For instance, some people, endowed with particular physical, religious and cultural characteristics in general, are mistreated by others who would refuse to recognize themselves as intolerant prejudiced persons. Nuria Sánchez suggests: "we notice that we must rely on the others in order to extract fragments of our unconscious thought. Precisely this unexpected request of exteriority, which is arisen from the most hidden regions of the mind, leads to the other side of the obscure representations, namely, to the specifically unconscious one" (Sánchez, 2012, p. 216).

In my view, the goal of Kant's analysis of obscure representations is not merely to *report* their existence but also to *help* us to get rid of them, since "obscure representations are that which produces, in one human being more, in the other fewer, *follies*. The human being is rational as long as this can considerate itself superior to the influence of obscure representations"[420] (Ak 25:870; my translation). Accordingly, the human being is not only capable of making clear the existence of obscure representations in its mind but also it has the power to overcome these, replacing them with representations guided by the free use of its own reason.

Kant holds that there are also obscure representations of which we are conscious. Although, sometimes we do not make them explicit in contexts where we consciously express obscure ideas that seek to be clarified by the others' mind. Thus, the hidden and oblique modes of speech prove that human beings take pleasure in letting their mind wander in obscurity and the interest in clarifying certain obscure representations provides the human being with a great amenity and delight. For instance, it occurs in an art exhibition wherein the author conceals certain ideas that should be discovered by the viewer on his own (see Ak 25:480-1).

Moreover, Kant links in his *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* the problem of personality to obscure representations, where he claims that the identity of the person does not consist in the 'consistency' (*Übereinstimmung*) of apperception but rather in the 'continuation' (*Continuation*) of this. This continuation, nonetheless, is an obscure representation because one is not always conscious of oneself, nor of one's all –mental- actions. Instead one is only of those that are currently present or those that we remember (see Ak 17:594). Finally, Kantian examination of obscure representations does not pretend only to make people aware of the fact that humans have obscure representation, which lie as ground of prejudices and fake common beliefs about death, sex and so on (see Ak 7:136-7; Sánchez, 2012, pp. 217-221). This examination, by contrast, enhances the human being's *courage* to use its own understanding without another's guidance, so that it is well-grounded to assert that Kantian anthropology prescribes that the human being should abandon prefigured-obscure representations that guide its behavior. Instead, the human being

[420] "Dunkle Vorstellungen sind, das was be idem einen Menschen mehr, be idem andern weniger *Thorheiten* hervorbringt. Der Mensch ist vernünftig, so lange er sich des Einflusses der dunklen Vorstellungen überheben kann" (Ak 25:870).

should play an active role as a civilized perfectible agent, who freely strives to leave its *self-incurred* minority (see Ak 7:144, 322; 8:35).

3.2.4. Personal identity and memory

In what follows, I will investigate how the notion of personal identity is related to the notion of memory in Kant. I focus on the following questions: What would be the effects of removing memory on the human self-consciousness? Does personal identity rely on memory? I shall not prove, or even attempt to prove, that memory can indeed provide an adequate criterion of personal identity. However, I shall assemble some indications about the contribution of memory to personal identity from a pragmatic perspective. As to the first question, I answer that there is a positive and negative effect.

On the one hand, Kant argues that the existence of many gaps in memory upon awakening, derived from inattention to neglected interconnected ideas, is a necessary condition for dreaming.[421] That is to say, without these gaps every night we would dream again just where we were the night before, so that there would be a continuity not only in our waking life but also in our sleep states, whereby we would live in two different worlds. Certainly, these gaps of memory prevent us from being in a *diseased* condition in which we take the stories we sleep as revelations from an invisible world (see Ak 7:175-6).

On the other hand, Kant's holds that 'forgetfulness' (*Vergeßlichkeit*), contrary to memory, is a misfortune in which "the head, no matter how often it is filled, still remains empty like a barrel full of holes" (Ak 7:185). Being oblivious of remote or near past events can be caused by old age or by habits that some persons have. This second case takes place, according to Kant, in persons who read fiction books and have the freedom to create things according to the drift of their imagination. For instance, human beings' occupation in fantasy and in all the ways of killing time undermines memory, rendering a human being useless for the world. Memory is weakened by fantasies that distract the human

[421] The importance of dreaming is pointed out by Kant as he holds: "dreaming is a wise arrangement of nature for exciting the power of life through affects related to involuntary invented events, while bodily movements based on choice, namely muscular movements, are in the meantime suspended" (Ak 7:175).

being, turning the absent-mindedness, i.e. a lack of attention to the present, into something habitual (see Ak 7:185).

Kant warns against the potential risks of reading novels, suggesting that we should not read something in general with the aim of forgetting it in the future. Unfortunately, most of the people do not read novels with the aim of retaining them but simply to amuse themselves (see Ak 25:1275, 979, 523) so that, the more people neglect retaining things, the weaker the memory will be (see Ak 25:1462). However, Kant's observation of problems related to memory is not merely descriptive but it is also intended to help the human being to overcome them. For example, he suggests that to suspend our judgement may be helpful, if the human being wants to avoid a mistake derived from the eventual faults in our memory (see Ak 25:1273).

Kant does not regard memory as an inalterable faculty but as a faculty whose capacity fluctuates over time; thus, in old age it is harder to grasp something in memory, although it is easier to extend it. Perhaps this happens because ideas, so to speak, have no more place for new information (see Ak 25:1462, 522; 29:912). For instance, often old people can remember what they did as they were young but cannot remember what they did the last night (see Ak 7:185; 15:147, 149). Young people, by contrast, have a 'capable' (*capax*) memory rather than 'tenacious' (*tenax*) one, as far as they grasp quickly but they forget very soon (see Ak 25:1462).

Despite the fact that Kant does not preserve the complete characterization of memory elaborated by Baumgarten, his analysis of memory still contains some elements of this characterization.[422] For instance, he says that *melancholic*[423] people have a vast and faithful memory, while *choleric* people have a faithful but not a vast memory (see Ak 25:1276); *sanguine* people easily grasp something (*capax memoria*) but they cannot

[422] Baumgarten suggests that memory may be *good* with regard to extension or intensity. According to the first one, memory is vast and according to the second one, it is firm, tenacious, capable, vigorous or ready. Only some elements of this taxonomy exists in few places of Kant's lectures on anthropology, although most of them are excluded from the *Anthropology* (see Ak 25:975, 1462; 21:443).

[423] Melancholia is defined as a defect of the cognitive faculty, namely a mental illness (see Ak 7:202); in Kant's own words: "melancholy (*melancholia*) can also be a mere delusion of misery which the gloomy self-tormenter (inclined to worry) creates. It is itself not yet mental derangement, but it can very well lead to it" (Ak 7:213).

retain it for a long time, and *phlegmatic* people grasp something with difficulty but they retain it for a long time (*tenax memoria*) (see Ak 25:975, 1273).[424]

Moreover, I deem it important to ask the following question: Is self-observation, according to Kant, possible only in the form of a remembrance? I answer that it is not. However, some philosophers like Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Hobbes and even Leibniz believed that self-observation was only possible in the form of a remembrance. R. Descartes, by contrast, thought that this self-observation could be 'at once' (see Kulstad, 1994, pp. 32-4; Brandt, 1999, p. 82; Bobro, 2004, p. 26). In my view, Kant would be closer to the first view than to the second one, because all of the representations, which are reached through a "synchronic" (simultaneous) empirical self-consciousness concerning our inner states, must be stored by memory as soon as they appear in our consciousness. Even though a "synchronic" empirical self-consciousness is admitted, it does not entail that the representations of ourselves are static or permanent, but they flow successively in time and cannot be stopped (see above section 1.1.5.). Thus, we can only be conscious of past representations, if memory stores and reproduces these representations; thus, memory grounds the connection of the present representations of our inner states with the past ones.

In my view, Kant nowhere states that memory is a necessary condition of self-consciousness, so that human beings could be conscious of the representations that take place while being conscious of, say, inner states. However, all these representations are not static nor fixed but rather these *flow* successively in time, so that these representations can only have continuity, if memory's functions of storing and reproducing are presupposed. In other words, if memory were torn from the self-consciousness, the human being would be conscious of a set of completely new representations. As a result, memory is not a necessary condition of empirical self-consciousness but rather a condition of the *continuity* of the representations derived from an empirical self-consciousness.[425]

[424] This characterization is not completely homogeneous throughout Kant's lectures on logic (see Ak 25:980).

[425] A more recent support for this idea is provided by H. B. Green's claim that "people who are disoriented in their former relation to time are maladjusted, for they have no past time. Amnesia for time cripples the self, causing it to feel empty and unable to function in the present (…) cultures which have had their past forcibly cut off from their present existence — such as the American Indians or the ex-slave Blacks — experience a loss of identity" (Green, 1975, p. 2).

With regards to the second question, I argue that the unity and sameness of the self is grounded on memory, from a practical point of view. This idea is problematic. For, as A. Brook notices, it is difficult to find even "a *prima facie* argument for personal identity in the role of memory or other kinds of retention of representations and/or their objects in synthesis" (Brook, 1994, p. 187). Even some commentators argue that personal identity cannot be justified *via* memory but, on the contrary, hold that memory is grounded on synthesis and on the unity of consciousness (see Brook, 1994, pp. 179, 186; Paton, 1929, p. 324; Kitcher, 1990, pp. 124-6; Powell, 1990, pp. 158-9; Kemp Smith, 2003, p. 251). In other words, memory *implies* the notion of personal identity, so that the former should not be used to *define* personal identity. I believe, nonetheless, that these two claims are compatible, namely *personal identity* depends upon memory's power to reproduce earlier experiences of our mental states (*e.g.* belief, desire, etc.) whose synthetic unity has been previously submitted to the unity of consciousness.

It is worth highlighting Hume's claim that the nature of personal identity "has become so great a question in philosophy, especially of late years in *England*, where all the abstruser sciences are study'd with a peculiar ardour and application" (*Treatise*, p. 259).[426] For instance, for Locke, memory is a necessary condition of personal identity of the personal self:

> As far as any intelligent being *can* repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions, that it is *self to itself* now, and so will be the same self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come. (ECHU 2.27.10, 451)

We can see that memory is not the only component of personal identity but it is mandatory to understand such identity as a whole integrated by memory, consciousness, time and action (see Powell, 1990, p. 155). Locke's view of memory, albeit not unproblematic[427], provides elements that are compatible with Kant's own view. For I

[426] Of course, the reliance of personal identity on memory was also an attractive idea for D. Hume (Treatise, p. 262), J. J. Rousseau (1979, p. 283), D. Diderot and D' Alembert (1769/1964, pp. 155-6), amongst others.
[427] For the reception of Locke's account of personal identity, see Sutton, 1998, p. 160f; Powell, 1990, pp. 152-157; Ameriks, 1982, pp. 149-151; Kitcher, 1990, pp. 123- 127. The *circularity objection* to the memory criterion of personal identity can be traced back to E. Joseph Butler (1692-1752), who claimed that personal identity is not *constituted by*, but *presupposed in* our consciousness of the past, i.e. recollection. On his picture, if our consciousness of the past were a condition of personal identity, it would imply erroneously that "a person hast not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon" (Butler, 1896, p. 388). Accordingly, the "remembering our experience of

argue that personal identity, from Kantian anthropology, relies to an extent on our consciousness of the *past* thoughts and actions.

On Leibniz's picture, personal identity is secured by continuity of consciousness or memory (see Kitcher, 2012, pp. 8-9). Indeed, Leibniz held in *New Essays in Human Understanding*[428] that "the existence of real personal identity is proved (…) by present and immediate reflection; it is proved conclusively enough for ordinary purposes by memories across intervals and by the concurring testimony of other people" (*New Essays*, II. 27. 237. §237). Leibniz believed that consciousness was a necessary condition of personal identity and memory is involved in the consciousness of our mental states, in as much as *consciousness* is nothing but a form of memory. It obviously means that if a human being were stripped of all sense of its past existence beyond the power of ever retrieving it again, this could not be the *same person* anymore (see *New Essays*, II. 27. 238-9 § 13-14).

Similarly, Baumgarten grounds *personality* on intellectual memory: "Reason (§640) is the faculty for perspicuously perceiving the correspondences and differences of things distinctly (§572, 579), and hence it is intellectual wit and acumen (§575), intellectual memory or PERSONALITY" (Baumgarten, 2013, §641). He also grounds *personality* on the spirituality of the human soul: "the human soul is a spirit (§754). Therefore, it has freedom (§755). And since spirituality, intellectuality, personality" (Baumgarten, 2013, §756); thus, a human soul that cannot conceive of something distinctly nor determine itself (according to its preferences), and which loses all of its personality and freedom, is merely a chimera.

In my view, Kant also proposes a relation between memory and personal identity. He integrated Jean-Jacques Rousseau's claim that "what I know surely is that the identity of the I is prolonged only by memory, and that in order to be actually the same I must remember having been" (Rousseau, 1979, p. 283) into his early lectures on anthropology in 1772–3 (see *Collins Anthropology*, Ak 25:12). Kant confesses that the identity of the

X" does not prove our personal identity, which arises rather from the fact that "we are the same while we are experiencing X", so that our "remembering of X" presupposes the idea of personal identity (see Butler, 1896, p. 389; see also Bernecker, 2009, pp. 47-8).

[428] All references to Leibniz's *New Essays in Human Understanding* will have this form (*New Essays*), followed by book, chapter, the pagination and section numbers in Leibniz (1996).

person cannot be demonstrated, the human being does not have access to an empirical intuition of such identity but rather to a stream of many representations: "with the human soul we cognize nothing perduring, not even the concept of the I, since consciousness occasionally disappears. A principle of perdurability is in bodily substances, but in the soul everything is in flux" (Ak 28:764; see also CPR B415; 29:1038). Kant identifies the notions "the identity of the person" with "intellectual memory" and emphasizes that even though we cannot demonstrate this identity, we are allowed to assume its existence: "with respect to the identity of the person, intellectual memory <*memoria intellectualis*>, no one comprehends its necessity, and also cannot demonstrate it, although its possibility can be assumed" (Ak 28:764).[429] Kant maintains that *intellectual* memory consists in the consciousness of oneself in a psychological sense and that it is concerned with personal identity (see Ak 29:1036-1038). Certainly, it does not seem right to ascribe personal identity to a human being who lacks intellectual memory and suffers from amnesia that prevents it from reproducing memories of its personal life, past experiences, and so on ("autobiographical" memory). In my view, the necessity of this identity is real from a pragmatic point of view, as long as we *use it* all the time in our daily life. That is, we think of ourselves and others as creatures tied to the past, that is, as agents as having a personal identity constituted by a set of past social characteristics (collective and individual).[430]

I believe that according to Kant, *personality* is what makes the human being rational, for this idea can be inferred from a passage in which he comments that the best proof of the immortality of the human being (particularly of its soul) demands for the "future" life: the perdurability of the soul as substance, as a living being with representations and the

[429] This identification can also be found in *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie* where he states that "memoria intellectualis [is] the identity of the person in its consciousness" (Ak 15:148; my translation) ("Memoria intellectualis — Identität der Person in ihrem Bewustseyn"). Locke says in a similar manner that "since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now that it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that was done" (ECHU 2.27.11, 449). Passages like this have provoked criticism from some of Locke's commentators who assumed that, for Locke, remembering doing something was both a necessary and sufficient condition of personal identity, considering also that memory could not constitute personal identity because memory already presupposes personal identity (see Sutton, 1998, p. 174-176).

[430] Richard Wollheim makes this point, claiming: "*if experiential memory is criterial of personal identity, it is so just because it is also creative of personal identity.* In experiential memory the past affects us in such a way that we become creatures with a past: creatures, that is, tied to the past in the way peculiar to persons" (Wollheim, 1979, p. 224).

survival of its *personality*. Kant underlines that without personality "one cannot say that human beings will exist in the future as rational beings. — Perduring memory <*memoria perdurabilis*>, connection of both states with the consciousness of the identity of the subject, without this the person is dead" (Ak 28:688). Despite the fact that the latter passage is extracted from an ontological rather than anthropological or scientific context, it still serves to show that, for Kant, *personality*, the *status of rational being* and *memory* are tightly connected.

As early argued, memory cannot guarantee an uninterrupted psychological continuity of intentions, beliefs, character traits, values, etc. It is plain that the human being is not conscious of all events of its life, but, as notices Brook, "we have countless representations of self of which we are not aware — memories of oneself, for example" (Brook, 1994, p. 151). Memory, hence, cannot provide the human being with an *absolute* continuity of all events relating to its existence but only with a *relative* one that involves the memory of an indeterminate number of events. This relative and partial identity, which could be called a "pragmatic identity" (see CPR A365-6; above section 2.2.2.), has been interpreted by A. Brook in terms of an *illusion*. He declares that

> Kant was able to do something no one else has done. He was able to diagnose why memories of a certain kind, namely, of having had experiences and having done actions, as well as some other representations represented as past, generate an illusion that the earlier subject whose experiences and actions one represents as having been had or done is guaranteed to be oneself (Brook, 1994, p. 179).

Accordingly, the relation between identity of the subject and memory is explained by means of a relation between "looseness in persistence" and "tightness in the unity of one's consciousness across time" (see Brook, 1994, p. 180). If my reading is correct, personal identity is possible, only if this relation is "displayed in memories of having had experiences and having done actions" (Brook, 1994, p. 180). Thus, Brook seems to suggest that personal identity, which is usually regarded as grounded on memory, is actually grounded on the unity of consciousness (see Brook, 1994, pp. 183-4, 193).[431] In a sense, this is correct. For the empirical representations of *myself* can only be *my* representations, if transcendental apperception is presupposed (see above section 1.3).

[431] This idea was anticipated by P. Kitcher's claim that "actual memory is an unrealistically strong criterion, and memory is, in any case, too superficial. Memory rests on synthesis, for the state to be remembered can represent some state of affairs only through the operations of synthesis" (Kitcher, 1990, p. 124).

Kant even seems to leave open the possibility of an organization of memory content via *apperception*, insofar as memory is grounded on the reproductive power of imagination (see Ak 29:884).

I believe that memory is a source of representations of mental states, external objects, events, etc., which provides the human being with the past materials *in which* this unity of consciousness is displayed. Indeed, Kant notices the relevance of empirical material for the judgement "I think". As he puts it: "only without any empirical representation, which provides the material for thinking, the act I think would not take place, and the empirical is only the condition of the application, or use, of the pure intellectual faculty" (CPR B423). Whilst Kant does not refer there to memory, it is reasonable to consider that memory is concerned with the storing and retrieval of empirical material on which this pure faculty is applied. In brief, if memory is impossible without unity of consciousness, unity of consciousness also is impossible without a memory that provides a potential unified material (see Strawson, 1966, p. 99).[432]

On top of that, human consciousness of personal memories constitutes a *conditio sine qua* the human being could not represent itself as being the same. Even though humans cannot reach an empirical intuition of our personal identity, it seems that any form of personal identity could only arise from the set of changes that constitutes the human being. This identity, which should be explained from a *pragmatic* perspective, is not only recognized by the subject, but also by other human beings in social intercourse. The relation between the human being's self-consciousness of the representations of its lifetime and memory, as the faculty that has the power to preserve these representations, constitute a basic condition for personal identity. Nuria Sánchez correctly points out that "the inner sense alone cannot yield any fruitful observation, because it is an uninterrupted flow of representations" (Sánchez, 2012, p. 184); thus, without the "autobiographical" memory, the human being would not have access to the stream of the past representations of its own existence.

[432] I am in agreement with Bernecker's claim: "memory only contingently guarantees identity. When I seem to remember an experience it is merely an assumption I make that I am identical with the person who had the experience, an assumption justified by the contingent non-prevalence of quasi-memory" (Bernecker, 2009, 60).

However, this stream of representations must be somehow subject to a form of *apperception*, by which these are connected by "my" consciousness as *my* memories (see Ak 29:884). To my knowledge, P. Kitcher points out a similar practical use of the term apperception, as she holds: "identical apperception is both necessary and sufficient for the practical use of the concept of personality. And, given human epistemic limitations, that is all that can be used" (Kitcher, 2011, pp. 186-7). Thus these memories not only belong to one and same the human being but rather to various consciousness or "selves". Indeed, Kant's concern for a knowledge of the human being as embedded in the *world* can be perceived more evidently in the *Anthropology* than in the CPR. For, as Foucault notices, "the task of directing us toward a *Weltkenntniss* is now the sole responsibility of an anthropology which encounters nature in no other form than that of an already habitable Earth (*Erde*)" (Foucault, 2008, p. 33). Thus the self-knowledge involves a set of cognitive factors such as memory, time and consciousness, which are crucial for the knowledge of *what* the human being is and for *what* it, as a free agent, can become.

Conclusions

Kant's theory of the self requires us to harmonize *inner sense, time, social intercourse* and *memory*, so that the relation among these elements accounts for the fact that we are able to think of ourselves in terms of "object" of cognition. Therefore, I want to conclude this investigation with a final reflection with regards to the contribution of these four elements to Kant's theory of the self.

First, intuitions spring forth from outer and inner sense, but it does not imply that two symmetrical intuitions arise. For by means of the former we apprehend persistent abiding objects, whereas by means of the latter we apprehend a flow of successive empirical representations, wherein nothing abiding can be found. However, this flow of representations is far from being unarranged, but it is subject to time relations of succession and simultaneity and of the past, present and future, as any outer object. Further, self-knowledge leans not only upon inner sense, through which we are aware of intuitions of our inner states, but also upon the outer one which provides us with a persistent perception, according to which the change in our inner representations can be determined as such. In any case, both inner and outer sense do not provide a cognition of external objects *in themselves* or of ourselves *in ourselves*, but rather according to the way in which these appear to us, that is, as an abiding external object or as a set of flowing inner states.

Second, the temporal conditions of experience are coherently provided by Kant's *Anthropology* and CPR, so that both the external objects and our inner states (empirical self) are given in experience according to the same temporal framework. The analysis of the relation between experience and time has led us to notice a distinction between the statements "time exists in me" and "I exist in time". These statements are not necessarily excluding, but these can be integrated into Kant's account of time. For the first one means that time is not an external object which can be perceived through our senses, but rather is a subjective necessary condition of human experience, which pertains directly to our own state, not to objects of experience. Again, the human being is not capable of a "timeless" experience, as long as time is involved in the formation of the basic ingredients

of experience. The second one implies that those mental acts, through which we obtain representations of the world and of ourselves, as well as those through which we are aware of the latter representations, take place in time. Time, thus, grounds all our empirical representations and experiences, so that the changing nature of ourselves and of the experienced world can only be represented as such by reference to time. Needless to say, time does not change but it is rather the existence of the alterable that changes *in* time.

Furthermore, the statements "time of experience" and "experience of time" do not necessarily contradict one another, but they belong rather to either the epistemological or the pragmatic domain. The first statement refers to the temporal conditions which makes human experience possible. Accordingly, as I argued earlier, these conditions yield explicit claims as well as assumptions, since Kant openly claimed in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' that all of our representations are organized in temporal relations of succession and simultaneity (*tenseless* series), privileging succession over simultaneity as the unique *dimension* of time and, therefore, as a primary temporal series.

I declared that, were it not for two basic assumptions, Kant's account of the temporal ground of experience would crumble. On the one hand, Kant integrated temporal relations of the present, past and future (*tensed* series) into the temporal framework of experience, especially in the 'Analytic of Principles'. On the other, this framework also entails three *laws of the temporal determination of experience*, which determine the inalterability of the temporal conditions of experience. Accordingly, as I argued earlier, the apprehension of the manifold is always successive and the temporal *direction* according to which the elements are apprehended cannot be modified by our will. As long as we are alive, awake, and fully conscious of the "reality", we cannot stop the flow of representations coming from inner and outer experience; we cannot stop, nor reverse, or anticipate these flowing empirical representations that come into our mind. Of course, we can empirically remember past representations but such reproduction cannot be exactly equal to the original one. Similarly, we can imagine to an extent what future representations could happen, but such anticipation cannot capture the abundance of formal (*a priori* conditions) and material (empirical conditions) features encountered in the current representations (intuitions). In brief, we cannot stop, reverse, or anticipate an intuition exactly in the same way this arose originally.

The statement "experience of time", by contrast, means that human beings are allowed to get a perception of time from a *pragmatic* (anthropological) point of view. Kant does not contradict himself claiming in the CPR that time cannot be perceived as an object of experience. These two views of time reveal two distinct approaches to time rather than a wretched entanglement of Kant's view of time. As far as Kant is regarded as an anthropologist, who integrates time into his anthropological agenda, he is committed to report the common ideas about time. According to his anthropological approach, the most notorious character of the perception of time consists in its *duration*, namely we are conscious that in certain circumstances, time seems longer or shorter than in other circumstances. However, these epistemological and anthropological approaches to time are compatible in a certain respect, for in both cases time puts order into experience. On the one hand, time allows us to represent some events as successive or simultaneous and, on the other, it allows us to represent some of them as given in the past, present or future.

Third, Kant's contrast between the *logical* and *empirical* self suggests that the first one is an identical persistent representation that accompanies and unites all representations, making possible the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts. Granted that this self is a logical function, it has no empirical content and, therefore, cannot become an object of empirical consciousness. In contrast, the empirical self is not, from a theoretical perspective, an individual or identical "thing" but rather a flow of successive states; thus, neither unity or identity of the self finds its correlation in experience. However, the empirical self is, from a pragmatic perspective, *one* free human being, who is not only capable of being conscious of what its feelings, thoughts, desires, fears, etc., are (which form its *identity*) via language, but it is also capable of realizing itself *in* and *through* society, as long as it is an *animal rationabile* that is capable of cultivating its faculties, forming its own character, and making use of its own understanding by means of education. Kantian anthropology provides the formal and material cognition of the self, not in abstract terms but as a human being, whose life develops in the community with others.

I have argued that the identity of the self, from a pragmatic point of view, does not demand an intuition of an abiding continuous self over time. That is to say, we do not ascribe identity to ourselves based on an uninterrupted internal or external perception of ourselves, but rather we do it by assuming that both change as well as something elusive

and unalterable, to a certain extent, exists within us. Of course, some of these changes are up to our will, while others are not; Kant's anthropological interest focuses mainly on the former ones. Kant himself acknowledged that the human being, regarded as a rational, free, responsible, moral agent, is prone to forget a big set of representations and this is a natural constitution of the human being, which can only be mitigated to a certain extent via memory.

Fourth, I have explored the role of memory in Kant's philosophy, stressing the relevance of memory for his account of the self from two perspectives. According to the first one, memory is a necessary condition of inner (and outer) experience, because the three-fold synthesis that makes experience possible leans implicitly on the memory's power to recall representations which are *apprehended* in intuition, *reproduced* in imagination and finally *recognized* in the concept. To my knowledge, this transcendental function of memory can be justified by the fact that the latter, according to his lectures on anthropology, leans on imagination. As I have shown earlier, *productive* imagination is a faculty of a synthesis *a priori* of the manifold of appearance and, therefore, it is a necessary condition of experience. As a consequence, granted that memory is a condition of inner experience through which we intuit our inner states, this is an *a priori* condition of self-knowledge.

According to the second one, memory is a faculty responsible for the storing and recalling of representations of our inner and outer states, of which we are aware via empirical self-consciousness. Granted that those representations are not unarranged but related in time, memory has the power to preserve their temporal configuration. On top of that, Kant argues for the existence of *obscure* representations in memory, so that it is well-grounded to assert that empirical self-consciousness should not be taken for a transparent act, through which every representation existing in our mind becomes always "observable". On the contrary, our mind yields some representations whose existence can only be indirectly inferred, although they have an influence on our thoughts and actions. Accordingly, memory plays a crucial role in the problem of personal identity, since it preserves the set of representations which forms the particular past life of each human being. Memory, regarded from a pragmatic point of view, does not only contribute to the constitution of the self-identity but also to the human being's interest for perfecting itself.

In this vein, memory is a condition of both the matter of the self-knowledge and the self-perfection of the human being.

Finally, Kant's theory of the self raises a number of interpretive and philosophical questions for further investigation, including: does Kant provide further analysis of how the manifold of our inner states, which is given in inner sense, is determined by understanding through categories? Do the *tensed series* and the *laws of temporal determination of experience* belong to the *a priori* conditions of experience, or to things in themselves or to something different? Is the character of these latter *laws* phenomenal or noumenal? What other assumptions are involved in Kantian anthropological metaphysical analysis of human experience? Why did not memory receive due attention by Kant in the CPR, despite its connection with imagination? To search for the answer to these questions could lead us to a deeper understanding of the epistemological roots of Kantian theory of the human being, which encompasses the temporal structure of experience, the human being's self-consciousness, and memory's capacity of storing and reproducing experiences.

GLOSSARY

This glossary is a guide to the translation of philosophically significant terms and the majority of cognates are omitted.

German-English

Aufmerksamkeit	attention	*Gelehrsamkeit*	learning
Ausdehnung	widening	*Größe*	magnitude
Begebenheit	occurrence	*Handlung*	act
Besonder	peculiarity	*Inbegriff*	sum
Beziehung	relation	*Realität*	reality
Behalten	retain	*Reihe*	series
Beharrlich	persistent	*Nach einander*	one after the other
Besinnen	recollect		
Bleibend	lasting	*schöpferisch*	creative
Beschaffenheit	constitution	*Stoff*	material
Beständig	constant	*Verläufen*	elapse
Dichtend	compositional	*Verbindung*	connection
Eigenschaft	property	*Verhältniss*	relation
Einfluss	influence	*Verknüpfung*	union
Einprägen	to impress	*Vermögen*	faculty
Einschränkung	boundary	*Verwändlung*	alteration
Empfänglichkeit	receptivity	*Verändung*	alteration
Entsinnen	remind	*Vereinigen*	unificate
Entschließung	decision	*Wechsel*	change
Ereignis	event	*Wechselwirkung*	interaction
Erinnerung	remembrance	*Willkühr*	choice
Erwartung	expectation	*Wirklichkeit*	actuality
Fähigkeit	capacity	*Zussamenhang*	connection
Fassen	to catch	*Zussamensetzung*	composition
Folge	sequence	*Zussamenhängen*	connect
Fortgang	progress	*Zussamenstellung*	compilation
Gedächtnis	memory		

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