



Universitat de Lleida

# The effects of transnational mobility and language on Japanese national identity in three groups: Japanese graduate students studying abroad, kikokushijo, and Nikkei Brazilians


Erik Van Dyke Fritz

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**Universitat de Lleida**

**TESI DOCTORAL**

**The effects of transnational mobility and language  
on Japanese national identity in three groups:  
Japanese graduate students studying abroad,  
kikokushijo, and Nikkei Brazilians**

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Memòria presentada per optar al grau de Doctor per la Universitat de Lleida  
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## Abstract

Japan's explosive GDP growth in the 1980s and 1990s created conditions for increased mobility of several groups of people, namely workers of Japanese companies that expanded abroad, workers from overseas that were needed in Japanese manufacturing and agricultural industries, and mostly students from newly middle class and wealthy families who had the financial means to study abroad. The workers who went abroad often stayed for several years and brought their families with them. The children of these workers, who eventually returned to Japan, are called *kikokushijo*, or returnees. The massive workforce that arrived after Japanese immigration law changes in 1990 are called *Nikkei-jin*, because Japan only allowed a large influx of immigrants with proven Japanese ancestral ties to enter Japan on special work visas. The largest *Nikkei* group that went to Japan to work was from Brazil. The number of study abroad students also increased dramatically during this time period, with about 25,000 students studying abroad in 1990 to more than 75,000 students in 2005. However, Japan's economy, especially after the 2008 financial crisis, has grown more slowly. The government has employed several measures to increase its global competitiveness in order to revitalize its economy, including supporting Japanese language schools abroad and special university entrance examinations for *kikokushijo*, creating goals to increase the number of study abroad participants, and new immigration laws targeting *Nikkei-jin*. How has this increased mobility and language learning affected the national identities of *kikokushijo*, *Nikkei-jin*, and study abroad students? My research goals, therefore, were to study the effects of language and transnational mobility on Japanese national identity in these three groups. No other study has combined these three groups to investigate these research themes. To conduct my research, I interviewed a total of 20 participants: 4 *Nikkei* Brazilians, 14 *kikokushijo*, and 2 long-term study abroad students. I focused mainly on the participants' language learning histories and their current use of English and Japanese as well as how the participants viewed their national identities in our interviews. I used positioning theory to analyze the data that was co-constructed in our interviews. It was found that some of my participants' Japanese national identities were affected by Japanese and English language learning and usage. Transnational mobility also seemed to have varied effects on my participants' Japanese national identities. The Japanese government's efforts to increase mobility of these three groups and its language promotion strategies will also be discussed.

## Resumen

El explosivo crecimiento del PIB de Japón en las décadas de 1980 y 1990 creó las condiciones para una mayor movilidad de varios grupos de personas, a saber, trabajadores de empresas japonesas que se expandieron en el extranjero, trabajadores del extranjero que se necesitaban en las industrias manufactureras y agrícolas japonesas y, en su mayoría, estudiantes de la nueva clase media y familias adineradas que tenían los medios económicos para estudiar en el extranjero. Los trabajadores que iban al extranjero a menudo se quedaban durante varios años desplazando frecuentemente junto a ellos a sus familias. Los hijos de estos trabajadores, que finalmente regresaron a Japón, se denominan kikokushijo o repatriados. La fuerza laboral masiva que llegó después de los cambios en la ley de inmigración japonesa en 1990 se llama Nikkei-jin, porque Japón solo permitió una gran afluencia de inmigrantes con visas especiales de trabajo en el caso de personas con lazos ancestrales japoneses comprobados. El grupo Nikkei más grande que fue a trabajar a Japón fue el de Brasil. El número de estudiantes en el extranjero también aumentó drásticamente durante este período, con alrededor de 25.000 estudiantes estudiando en el extranjero en 1990 a más de 75.000 estudiantes en 2005. Sin embargo, la economía de Japón, especialmente después de la crisis financiera de 2008, ha crecido más lentamente. El gobierno ha empleado varias medidas para aumentar su competitividad global con el fin de revitalizar su economía, incluido el apoyo a las escuelas de japonés en el extranjero y los exámenes especiales de ingreso a la universidad para kikokushijo, la creación de objetivos para aumentar el número de participantes en programas de estudios en el extranjero y nuevas leyes de inmigración dirigidas a Nikkei-jin. ¿Cómo ha afectado este aumento de la movilidad y el aprendizaje de idiomas a las identidades nacionales de kikokushijo, Nikkei-jin y los estudiantes japoneses en el extranjero? Por ello, mis objetivos de investigación fueron estudiar los efectos del idioma y la movilidad transnacional sobre la identidad nacional japonesa en estos tres grupos. Ningún otro estudio ha combinado estos tres grupos para profundizar en estos temas de investigación. Para realizar mi investigación, entrevisté a un total de 20 participantes: 4 brasileños Nikkei, 14 kikokushijo y 2 estudiantes de estudios de larga duración en el extranjero. Me concentré principalmente en las historias de aprendizaje de idiomas de los participantes y su uso actual del inglés y japonés, así como en cómo los participantes veían sus identidades nacionales en nuestras entrevistas. El análisis de los datos co-construidos en nuestras entrevistas se basa en la teoría del posicionamiento. Dicho análisis puso de relieve que algunas de las identidades nacionales japonesas de mis participantes se vieron afectadas por el aprendizaje y el uso del idioma japonés e inglés. La movilidad transnacional también pareció tener efectos variados en las identidades nacionales japonesas de mis participantes. El análisis también incluye una reflexión sobre los esfuerzos del gobierno japonés para aumentar la movilidad de estos tres grupos y sus estrategias de promoción del idioma.

## Resum

L'explosiu creixement del PIB del Japó a les dècades de 1980 i 1990 va crear les condicions per a una major mobilitat de diversos grups de persones, és a dir, treballadors d'empreses japoneses que es van expandir a l'estranger, treballadors de l'estranger que es necessitaven a les indústries manufactureres i agrícoles japoneses i, la majoria, estudiants de la nova classe mitjana i famílies adinerades que tenien els mitjans econòmics per estudiar a l'estranger. Els treballadors que anaven a l'estranger sovint es quedaven durant anys desplaçant normalment al costat d'ells les seves famílies. Els fills d'aquests treballadors, que finalment van tornar a Japó, es denominen kikokushijo o repatriats. La força laboral massiva que va arribar després dels canvis en la llei d'immigració japonesa el 1990 es diu Nikkei-jin, perquè el Japó només va permetre una gran aflluència d'immigrants amb visats especials de treball en el cas de persones amb llaços ancestrals japonesos comprovats. El grup Nikkei més gran que va anar a treballar a Japó va ser el de Brasil. El nombre d'estudiants japonesos a l'estranger també va augmentar dràsticament durant aquest període, amb al voltant de 25.000 estudiants cursant estudis a l'estranger el 1990 a més de 75.000 estudiants el 2005. No obstant això, l'economia del Japó, especialment després de la crisi financera de 2008, ha crescut més lentament. El govern ha emprat diverses mesures per augmentar la seva competitivitat global per tal de revitalitzar la seva economia, inclòs el suport a les escoles de japonès a l'estranger i els exàmens especials d'ingrés a la universitat per kikokushijo, la creació d'objectius per augmentar el nombre de participants en programes d'estudis a l'estranger i noves lleis d'immigració dirigides a Nikkei-jin. Com ha afectat aquest augment de la mobilitat i l'aprenentatge d'idiomes a les identitats nacionals de kikokushijo, Nikkei-jin i els estudiants japonesos a l'estranger? Per això, els meus objectius de recerca van ser estudiar els efectes de la llengua i la mobilitat transnacional sobre la identitat nacional japonesa en aquests tres grups. Cap altre estudi no ha combinat aquests tres grups per aprofundir en aquests temes de recerca. Per fer la meua recerca, vaig entrevistar un total de 20 participants: 4 brasilers Nikkei, 14 kikokushijo i 2 estudiants d'estudis de llarga durada a l'estranger. Em vaig concentrar principalment en les històries d'aprenentatge d'idiomes dels participants i el seu ús actual de l'anglès i el japonès, i com els participants veien les seves identitats nacionals a les nostres entrevistes. L'anàlisi les dades co-construïdes a les nostres entrevistes es basa la teoria del posicionament. Aquesta anàlisi va posar de relleu que algunes de les identitats nacionals japoneses dels meus participants es van veure afectades per l'aprenentatge i l'ús de l'idioma japonès i l'anglès. La mobilitat transnacional també va semblar que tenia efectes variats en les identitats nacionals japoneses dels meus participants. L'anàlisi també inclou una reflexió sobre els esforços del govern japonès per augmentar la mobilitat d'aquests tres grups i les seves estratègies de promoció de l'idioma.

## Table of Contents

Chapter 1 – Introduction	
1.0 – Prologue .....	1
1.1 - Research Strands & Questions .....	2
1.2 - Explanation of Chapters .....	5
Chapter 2 - National Identity and Mobility	
2.0 – Introduction .....	8
2.1 - The Rise of The Nation State .....	8
2.2 - National Identity .....	12
2.3 - Japanese National Identity .....	19
2.4 - Japanese National Identity and Language .....	25
2.5 - Post-national Identity & Mobility .....	31
2.6 – Summary .....	41
Chapter 3 - Methodological Approach	
3.0 – Introduction .....	43
3.1 - Positioning theory .....	43
3.2 - Data Collection, Interview & Analysis Methods .....	45
3.3 – Participants .....	50
3.4 – Summary .....	52
Chapter 4 - Analysis of Nikkei Brazilians	
4.0 - Introduction & Literature Review .....	54
4.1 - Presentation of Narrative Texts from Marcos .....	56
4.2 - Presentation of Narrative Texts from Daiki .....	61
4.3 - Presentation of Narrative Texts from Sofia .....	65
4.4 - Presentation of Narrative Texts from Bruno .....	68
4.5 - Narrative Positioning Analysis .....	72
4.6 – Discussion .....	75
Chapter 5 - Analysis of Kikokushijo	
5.0 - Introduction & Kikokushijo Literature Review .....	77
5.1 - Presentation of narrative texts from Minor Japanese National Identity group .....	84
5.2 - Presentation of narrative texts from Major Japanese National Identity group .....	94
5.3 - Presentation of narrative texts from Japanese National Identity group .....	104
5.4 - Presentation of narrative texts from No National Identity group .....	117
5.5 - Narrative Positioning Analysis .....	121
5.6 – Discussion .....	129
Chapter 6 - Analysis of Japanese Graduate Students Studying Abroad	
6.0 - Introduction & Long-term Study Abroad Literature Review .....	131
6.1 - Presentation of narrative texts from Takahiro .....	134
6.2 - Presentation of narrative texts from Saki .....	149
6.4 - Narrative Positioning Analysis & Discussion .....	167

Chapter 7 - Discussion & Conclusions	
7.0 – Introduction .....	177
7.1 - Rights & duties .....	177
7.2 - Conclusions - Answering my research questions .....	179
7.3 - Limitations and future research .....	185
References .....	187

## List of Figures & Tables

### Figures

Figure 1. Research strands .....	5
Figure 2. Children Pledge Allegiance to the Flag in 1899 in Washington D.C., Library of Congress .....	12
Figure 3. U.S. School Children Salute the Flag in 1915, Library of Congress .....	14
Figure 4. Registered Brazilians living in Japan per year .....	21
Figure 5. Kokoro no noto (心のノート) [Notebook for the heart], 2002 .....	26
Figure 6. Japanese Citizens Living Abroad (Translated from Annual Report of Statistics on Japanese Nationals Overseas 海外在留邦人数調査統計 from the Policy Section of the Consular Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018) .....	34
Figure 7. Where Japanese live abroad. (Translated from Annual Report of Statistics on Japanese Nationals Overseas 海外在留邦人数調査統計 from the Policy Section of the Consular Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018) .....	35
Figure 8. OECD Statistics on Japanese students studying abroad. MEXT, 2020 .....	40
Figure 9. JAOS Survey of Japanese Study Abroad Students, 2017 .....	41
Figure 10. Types of Participant Recruitment .....	51
Figure 11. Marcos' timeline .....	56
Figure 12. Daiki's timeline .....	61
Figure 13. Sofia's timeline .....	65
Figure 14. Bruno's timeline .....	68
Figure 15. Nikkei Brazilians' time spent in Japan and Brazil .....	72
Figure 16. Haruka's timeline .....	84
Figure 17. Gen's timeline .....	86
Figure 18. Yoko's timeline .....	89
Figure 19. Ayumi's timeline .....	91
Figure 20. Lisa's timeline .....	94
Figure 21. Rina's timeline .....	96
Figure 22. Ayako's timeline .....	99
Figure 23. Maya's timeline .....	101
Figure 24. Shiho's timeline .....	104
Figure 25. Kayoko's timeline .....	107
Figure 26. Yutaro's timeline .....	109
Figure 27. Ryo's timeline .....	112
Figure 28. Kana's timeline .....	114
Figure 29. Takashi's timeline .....	117
Figure 30. Kikokushijo participants' time spent abroad and in Japan .....	122
Figure 31. Takahiro's timeline .....	134
Figure 32. Saki's timeline .....	149
Figure 33. Japanese graduate students' time spent abroad and in Japan .....	167

## Tables

Table 1. Interview excerpt and commentary example .....	48
Table 2. Data collection and analysis procedures .....	52
Table 3. Summary of participants .....	53
Table 4. Interview highlights regarding Takahiro's national identity positioning .....	167
Table 5. Interview highlights regarding Saki's national identity positioning .....	171

## **Transcription Conventions**

- ... - indicates that the interlocutor's speech starts or ends mid-sentence.
- [ ] - indicates the author's words added after transcription conveying words omitted by ellipsis.
- ( ) - indicates a romanized version of a Japanese word or an English translation of a Japanese word. It may also indicate laughter or pausing.

## Frequently Used Japanese Words

- **Kikokushijo** (帰国子女) - Japanese children who lived abroad (usually for one year or more) and have returned to live in Japan
- **Kaigaishijo** (海外子女) - Japanese children currently living abroad (outside of Japan)
- **Nikkei / Nikkei-jin** (日系人) - Japanese people who have relocated overseas on a permanent basis, as well as their second, third, and fourth generation descendants, irrespective of current nationality and degree of Japanese ethnicity
- **Kaikan** (会館) - literally a meeting hall or assembly hall. In Brazil it can be used to mean a Nikkei community center.
- **Honne** (本音) - A person's true feelings, intentions, desires, and real reasons or motivations for doing something. Generally speaking, in order to preserve harmony and not offend others, these "real" feelings are usually left unsaid, or repressed, especially in public/group interactions. In this study, honne is used to refer to a kind of direct style of communication that is often used, for example, in the United States.
- **Tatemaie** (建前) - A person's outward or public-facing persona. Polite excuses and half-truths, for example, may be employed as a kind of social etiquette in order to preserve harmony in relationships. In this study, tatemaie is used to refer to a kind of indirect style of communication that is often used, for example, in Japan.
- **Kohai** (後輩) - A junior or lower-ranked/aged member of a group, school, company or organization.
- **Senpai** (先輩) - A senior or high-ranked/aged member of a group, school, company or organization

## Chapter 1 - Introduction

### 1.0 Prologue

I first arrived in Japan in September of 2006, two months after receiving my master's degree. My main motivation for coming to Japan was to pay off the sizable student debt I had incurred from graduate school. I applied to several jobs around the world to teach English, but the highest paying salaries were in Japan and Middle Eastern countries like the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. I thought about the long hot summers and decided a place with four seasons would be more pleasant. I was lucky to get a job right away teaching junior and senior high school students English at a private school in Nagoya. However, I had no Japanese language skills, no interest in Japanese culture, and a desire to work for only one to two years to pay off my debt. I chose an area of central Nagoya to live in, called Osu Kannon, because it seemed lively and full of energy when I was looking for apartments. Little did I know, this would be a fateful decision in my life. Osu Kannon, I would later learn, happened to be an area where many Brazilian Japanese, or Nikkei, congregated and were proprietors of several businesses. As I explored the *shotengai*, or rows of businesses on both sides of an arcade, there were many Nikkei businesses I frequented. There was a chicken restaurant that had whole chickens roasting on spits outside, with a little outdoor eating area filled with plastic tables and chairs. There was a shop full of Brazilian clothes, another one dedicated to Brazilian music and DVDs, and shops where one could buy large bags of beans and other Brazilian staples. I didn't realize how unique this was at the time. This area felt very familiar to me. I lived in Spain and Mexico and had friends from Latin America, and I spoke Spanish fluently. I felt immediately at ease in this environment where I could easily strike up a conversation with the Nikkei business owners and patrons. At that time I spoke only a few words of Portuguese, able to say a few greetings and smile. But it was the warm feeling I got from the whole micro environment of Osu Kannon that sustained me in those early months in Japan.

On the other hand, I was having a very difficult time adjusting to life in Japan, outside my Nikkei bubble. My feeble attempts at studying Japanese language proved woefully inadequate. I didn't have the internet at my home during that first year in Japan as I was trying to save money, so I had a difficult time learning about Japanese culture on my own. I enrolled in a Japanese language class at the YMCA, went to a Kabuki performance, and tried to talk to my Japanese coworkers. However, my language classes were teaching me very polite Japanese that I wasn't hearing often in everyday life. I was having a hard time understanding Japanese culture, and my coworkers were busy with their lives with the little free time they had after school. In addition, I was having a very difficult time teaching my junior high school students. I couldn't speak Japanese and they couldn't speak English, and I was the only teacher in the classroom. The school rules were onerous and the Japanese work schedule included many Saturday work days and after school club activities that we had to organize. I was feeling disillusioned with my life in Japan and exhausted just trying to accomplish basic tasks, like shopping for furniture for my apartment.

To escape the difficulties of my "Japanese life", I turned to my "Nikkei world" even more. I started dating a Nikkei I met in one of the shops close to my apartment. I started taking private Portuguese lessons every week. The lessons were held at a language school next door to a bar that many non-Japanese frequented. The language school partnered with the bar to host many

events, like an annual Halloween party, that I often went to. I eventually became friends with my Portuguese teacher, one of the Nikkei participants in this study, and talked often with the owner of the language school, another of my Nikkei participants. I would have dinner at the house of my girlfriend's parents and speak in Portuguese with them, since they spoke only in Portuguese at home. My Portuguese language skills improved, since Portuguese is so similar to Spanish. In contrast, my Japanese skills languished and my already low interest in Japanese culture waned further. I would finish my 1.5 year contract and, with my hefty student loans still not paid fully, I decided to work a few more years in Japan to reach my goal of paying off my loans. I applied for a university position in Chiba prefecture and got the job. The move to Chiba would totally transform my life, extracting me from my Nikkei world and thrusting me into a more Japanese existence. I started making more efforts to learn Japanese and integrate into Japanese culture. I started to make Japanese friends and understand Japanese culture more. My job was fantastic and I had an easier time communicating with my students. I ended up staying in Japan. I married a Japanese woman. I decided to start a family here in Japan. Almost 15 years later, I am still in Japan, currently writing this dissertation. For all these reasons, this research is very personal to me.

My life has been very mobile by choice. I have lived in four countries and have studied as many languages. I have often thought about my connections to the United States, the country where I was born and grew up in. Did I want to return to the US eventually to live and work? If I stay to work and eventually retire in Japan, should I renounce my US citizenship so I can become Japanese? If I have Japanese citizenship, I will be able to vote and I will be afforded more protections and privileges than I currently have as a permanent resident. But that would mean that if someone in my immediate family were sick and I needed to return to the US, I would have to do so with a tourist visa. I still had many questions before I could consider changing my citizenship. How do I define my national identity? Am I partly Japanese, even if unofficially, after almost 15 consecutive years living in Japan? Am I proud to be an American? What does it mean to be Japanese? Can a "foreigner" like me ever really be considered Japanese? How do national boundaries have an effect on my own identity and how I view myself? These thoughts and questions are constantly swirling around in my head as I navigate life as an immigrant in Japan, still with cultural and family ties to the United States. Thus, the impetus for conducting research for this dissertation arose from my own experiences, thoughts and connections in Japan. My own mobility prompted me to question my own national identity as I faced the question of whether I should change my citizenship. Next, I will discuss how I formulated my research questions.

## **1.1 Research Questions**

In my quest to understand more about Japanese national identity, I decided to focus on three mobile groups who all have cultural and family ties to Japan: Nikkei Brazilians, kikokushijo (returnees), and Japanese study abroad students. My principle research questions are as follows:

1. How does language learning and language use affect my participants' Japanese national identity?

## 2. How does transnational mobility affect my participants' Japanese national identity?

Regarding language learning and language use, I focus primarily on English, Japanese, and Brazilian languages, since these are the main languages my participants speak. Although some participants speak other languages to varying degrees, such as German or Taiwanese, English, Japanese and Brazilian languages are the main languages that my participants use in day to day life. For some participants living outside of Japan, they learned their “native tongues” at home with their parents and at Japanese schools on the weekends, while learning in English at American schools on the weekdays. Other participants struggled as adults to learn academic or even basic Japanese in Japan. Mother tongue and second language become fuzzy categories with some participants. In other participants, it is much clearer which language is the second language. It is here that I want to investigate to what degree language learning and use contributes to a greater acceptance of or distancing from Japanese national identity. I refer to Japanese national identity in this study as both those with Japanese heritage, but without Japanese citizenship, and Japanese nationals with Japanese citizenship. In addition, I will discuss how some of my participants distanced themselves from their Japanese national identities, and gravitated to non-Japanese national identities. All of my participants, except three Nikkei participants, have Japanese citizenship. The three Nikkei participants without Japanese citizenship, however, have Japanese heritage and ancestors and family members that once lived and continue to live in Japan. The fourth Nikkei participant is a dual citizen of Japan and Brazil.

With regard to transnational mobility, I mean the time spent living outside and inside of Japan. Some participants' transnational mobility was greater than others', but all of my participants have spent at least some time staying or living in Japan and also living outside of Japan. Also, by mobility, I don't just mean the actual movement from one place to another, but also the experiences that occurred in each place.

Having surveyed the literature, I have found no other studies that have a combined focus on how language and transnational mobility affects Japanese national identity in *kikokushijo*, Nikkei Brazilians, and Japanese graduate students studying abroad. Thus, this study contributes original research to the field of applied linguistics.

### **Origins of research questions**


My personal connections to Nikkei living in Japan sparked my curiosity about their lived experiences in Japan and Brazil. In 2010, I visited my Brazilian Portuguese teacher in an area of Brazil that has a high concentration of Nikkei. I stayed with his family and interacted with many Nikkei while on my trip. I also took an intensive Portuguese language course at a school in Sao Paulo and spent time in the Liberdade district in São Paulo, which is home to a large Nikkei community. All of these experiences made me further interested in how Nikkei view themselves, as Japanese and Brazilian. I was also interested in how their mobility back and forth from Brazil to Japan affected their identities. I was interested in how the Japanese culture they learned in Brazil was different and similar to the Japanese culture they experienced in Japan. I wanted to know how they were viewed and treated in Brazil and Japan. How did their level of Japanese proficiency affect how they positioned their own Japanese national identity?

Meanwhile, as a study abroad student myself in Spain and Mexico, as a Peace Corps volunteer in Central Asia for over two years, and as a long-term resident of Japan, I personally understand the trials and tribulations that occur during a long-term experience living abroad. I wanted to capture some of the experiences, therefore, of Japanese students as they navigated life abroad in the United States. How would the national identities of Japanese adults living abroad for an extended period of time be affected? What lived experiences contributed to their feelings and thoughts about their evolving identities? How were they viewed by others while abroad? And how did studying and learning academic English affect how they positioned their own Japanese national identities?

Finally, with *kikokushijo* (returnees), I have personally taught many throughout my 15 years of teaching and living in Japan. For the ones just returning to Japan after spending their high school years abroad, I always found it fascinating as a professor of first year university students to watch as these *kikokushijo* transitioned back to Japanese culture. Thus, I wanted to find out more about the national identities of children who had lived abroad during their formative years, when their initial identities were being formed, and eventually returned to Japan still as children or as young adults. What kinds of experiences occurred during their time abroad and back in Japan? How were they viewed in Japan versus abroad? How did English and Japanese language learning affect their Japanese national identities?

Because I am a student of applied linguistics and a significant portion of my adult life has been devoted to learning, teaching, and researching about languages, one of the strands in this research concerns the relationship my participants have with the languages they use on a daily basis. Part of mobility and living in new places is using language to function in daily life. Language can be a barrier or a key to understanding and accessing culture and institutions, as it was to me when I first arrived in Japan. All of my participants have connections to Japanese language and either English or Brazilian Portuguese. Which languages they used, with whom, and how these languages contributed to their national identity will be explored in this dissertation. Mobility and language use are intertwined; how my participants become fluent or struggle with their language studies is crucial to understanding their lived experiences. Thus, one of the principle strands in my research focuses on the languages used by my participants.

The other strand I am focusing on, but to a lesser extent, is choice. As opposed to the *Nikkei* and study abroad participants, most of the *kikokushijo* participants didn't choose to live abroad. They were taken abroad by their parents. Thus, mobility as a choice or an inevitability is also an area that I will explore in my research. How have the choices of my participants, their parents, and their relatives to become mobile affected their national identities? Having the ability to choose to become mobile and to choose to live in certain areas or schools over others also indicates the privileges and elite status most of participants hold. The privileged status to be able to choose their destinies and how they use their Japanese national identities will be a strand that runs through my research data for all three groups. The choice of which language to use, which language to study, and which country to live in are themes that inform both of my principle research questions. The following Venn diagram in Figure 1 depicts how my research strands are interconnected.



*Figure 1.* Research strands.

Language and choice are related to mobility and my research questions are concerned with how each strand informs and shapes one's national identity.

Lastly, although not a focus of my research goals, I do occasionally connect my research results to Japanese government policies in the discussion sections. These governmental policies and laws are sometimes directly and indirectly related to my participants' Japanese national identities. My discussions are not meant to be policy recommendations, but rather commentary on how each immigration or education policy is related to my participants' lives and their Japanese national identities.

## **1.2 Explanation of Chapters**

This PhD dissertation is organized in the following way. In this first chapter my aim has been to explain why I am conducting this research, outline my research questions, and briefly introduce my connections to the groups of participants I am interviewing. In Chapter 2, I begin by charting the rise of the modern nation state and then define national identity. I discuss Japanese national identity and language by providing several examples, including by giving a short history of Japanese emigration to Brazil and then the return of their Nikkei ancestors to Japan. I argue that the Japanese government's language and education policies are a form of neoliberal nationalism. Neoliberalism is defined by Davies (2017) in the following way:

Neoliberalism is a term which describes a broad collection of intellectual, political, and policy movements, which share the ambition to reinvent market liberalism in the changing context of twentieth- and twenty-first-century capitalism. Most crucially, it depends on an active state to re-engineer society in pro-enterprise ways. It also inculcates a new vision of the self and subjectivity, in which individuals act as entrepreneurs, constantly strategizing toward future goals.

The Japanese government, through its language and education policies, wants its citizens to help revitalize the country. After years of worrying about their reduced status and slumping economy, which was overtaken recently by their neighbor and rival, China, Japan has begun investing in its educational institutions to promote mobility and English language. Thus, kikokushijo and the Japanese who study abroad and then return to Japan are able to contribute to Japanese society with their new language skills, and other skills honed abroad. In addition, I argue that the Japanese government also employs neoconservative policies to further its goals of revitalization.

Japanese neoconservatism differed markedly from its analogues in the United States and England in that it came at the end of a century-long struggle to overtake those same industrial nations. Neoconservatism not only stressed the end of Japan's followership, it proclaimed the beginning of a new era in which the Japanese would be more culturally self-reliant. (Pyle, 2007, p. 67).

The acceptance of a large number of Nikkei immigrants with cultural and family ties to Japan in the 1990s was a way for Japan to meet growing demand for factory and agricultural workers while still maintaining some degree of ethnic homogeneity. Thus in Chapter 2, I explain how each of the three groups of participants in my study are connected to the Japanese government's efforts to revitalize itself.

In Chapter 3, I explain my methodological approach and my use of positioning theory to analyze my participants. I outline my interview process, data collection methods, and the tools I employ to conduct my analysis. In this chapter I also introduce how I recruited my participants for this study as well as provide some background information about the participants in each group.

Chapter 4 contains my analysis of the Nikkei participants. In addition to the participants' timelines of time spent in Brazil and Japan I present highlights of the interviews, or narrative texts I co-created with my four Nikkei participants. I then present my narrative positioning analysis of the interviews, followed by a preliminary discussion of the findings. Relevant literature on Nikkei is also cited and discussed.

Chapter 5 contains my analysis of the kikokushijo participants. Following a similar pattern as Chapter 4, I include sections of narrative texts I co-created with my kikokushijo participants. However, in this chapter I place my 14 kikokushijo participants into 4 groups based on their distancing from or acceptance of their Japanese national identities. This will help to aid in the analysis of the data and the subsequent findings. Relevant literature on kikokushijo is also cited and discussed.

Chapter 6 contains my analysis of two Japanese graduate students who studied abroad in the United States. In the same style of Chapters 4 and 5, I present the narrative texts that address my research questions. However, because I interviewed them over 3 years, I will be able to include more in-depth analyses. Relevant literature on long-term study abroad will complement my analyses.

Finally, in Chapter 7, I summarize my conclusions and tie all of my research strands together. I

include a discussion of my research findings, their implications, and possible directions for future research. In addition, I present the limitations of this study.

## Chapter 2 - National Identity and Mobility

### 2.0 Introduction

My research focuses on the interaction of national identity and mobility. Most of the discussion around national identity among my research participants takes place in three nation-states: Japan, Brazil and the United States. Therefore, in this chapter I intend to provide detailed historical background information and examples from Japan, Brazil and the United States, which will help to illuminate the experiences of my research participants. In later chapters, I will draw on this relevant information to help complete and complement the analysis of my research participants. But first, in order to discuss national identity and nationalism, we must talk about how nations came about. I will discuss the rise of the modern nation-state that dominates our current geopolitical landscape in Section 1.1. I will show how Japan is rather unique in that it has managed to avoid colonization by Western European powers, who otherwise expanded their reach to most of the globe at one point or another. In section 1.2, I will broadly discuss the fluid nature of national identity and some of the rewards of belonging and punishments of being excluded. I will delve further into Japanese national identity in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, since Japanese national identity is the common current that runs through all of my research participants. In Section 1.3, I will introduce the Nikkei community, one of the three groups I interviewed for my thesis, and outline their history and ties to Japan. In section 1.4, I discuss how the English language is used by the Japanese government as a way to become prosperous and to compete in a globalized world, while still maintaining a strong national identity. In section 1.5, I will discuss the related concepts of post-national identity and mobility. In this section I will introduce the other two groups I interviewed for this thesis, kikokushijo, or returnees in English, and graduate researchers studying abroad in the United States. In the final section of this chapter, I will summarize how all these threads are connected, which will provide a framework to understand the analyses in the subsequent chapters where I will introduce my research participants and their narratives.

### 2.1 The Rise of the Nation-State

If we go back to the origins of democracy, the overthrow of the aristocratic oligarchy in Ancient Athens led to some of the democratic principles we can find in existence today, such as governing assemblies, voting populations and citizens having access to certain rights. In the classical city-state of Athens, by 440 B.C. all of the estimated 200,000 to 250,000 males born to Athenian citizens were eligible for all elected offices and could exercise their rights at the popular assembly (Fleck and Hanssen, 2006). Fleck and Hanssen (2006) note that, instead of seizing farmers' lands, which would have generated less revenue and investment, it was in the interest of the Athenian aristocracy to expand democratic rights because the farmers' assets and investments generated considerable wealth for the city-state. Although the aristocracy would persist in the Middle Ages, a different way of governing began to take hold. Before the advent of large-scale industrial agriculture and the rise of the modern nation-state, the seeds of representative democracy were planted in medieval Europe. In contrast to the participatory democracy of Ancient Greek city states, representation as a political concept came into practice in the late medieval period by imposition from the monarchy (Pitkin, 2004). However, monarchic rule was not absolute during this period.

The towns of the middle ages provided basic citizenship rights for their inhabitants that separated them from much of the villeinage outside the walls. Throughout the patchwork of kingdoms, duchies, and bishoprics were elective representative assemblies in which nobles, burghers, clerics, and sometimes even peasants shaped policy with the prince. The principle of royal subordination to law had been reasserted at Runnymede and elsewhere. (Downing, 1989, p. 214).

Downing (1989) argues that the protection of personal liberties and the establishment of representative bodies and local self-governments to provide checks and balances on the monarchy, although not fully democratic nor always fully accepted, laid the groundwork for what would become the liberal democratic modern nation-state centuries later. Wimmer and Feinstein (2010) examined 145 territories around the world from 1816 until 2001 to reveal when each made, or did not make, the transition to a nation-state and the mechanisms behind that transition. It is widely known that many nation-states have formed from empires - the decolonization of The British and French Empires in Africa starting in the 1950s and the dissolution of The Soviet Union in the 1990s are two prominent examples. The immense power and riches of the empires were not lost on the former colonized territories in their pursuit to independence.

These nationalist movements emerge through an imitation process driven by the extraordinary successes and global dominance of the first nation-states. Nation-states are subsequently created around the world wherever a power shift allows nationalists to overthrow or absorb the established regime, quite independent of whether domestic modernization processes have readied a society for nation-building. Our analysis shows that such a power shift is more likely when nationalists have had ample time to mobilize the population and delegitimize the old regime or when the established regime is weakened by wars (Wimmer and Feinstein, 2010, p. 785).

The authors liken the emergence of nation-states to a contagion spreading quickly through organized and mobilized political networks. Roeder (2007) argues that the alignment of key elements, namely identity, grievance, mobilization, and international recognition, are necessary for the formation of a nation-state. One example that illustrates the importance of nationalist movements and mobilization for independence is the block of five Central Asian Republics. This region did not have a history of defined statehood before the USSR. The Central Asian Republics were actually more inclined to stay in the Soviet Union, and were the last to leave, only declaring independence after the union was officially disbanded. A March 1991 referendum on the future of the Soviet Union showed that over 90% of voters in Central Asia wanted to remain in the Soviet Union, while voters from countries such as Armenia, the Baltics, and Georgia supported their countries' independence (Olcott, 1998). This is because of the weakness of the pro-independence movements throughout the region and because most people felt they had more opportunities within the Soviet Union and had it better off than people in other Muslim countries (Olcott, 1998). Thus, the lack of strength of the pro-nationalist movements in Central Asia made it difficult to establish their independence and form nation-states. Many people in Central Asia identify more with their clan than their country (Collins, 2003), although this may be changing as nationalism grows in this region of the world. Thus, a strong national identity may stem, at least

in part, from a strong nationalist movement. Moving on, I would like to explore the notions and origins of what it means to be a sovereign nation-state.

The treaties signed during the 1648 Peace of Westphalia are widely regarded as being the origins of modern international law, establishing key principles of international relations, namely that of a sovereign territory (Held, 2003; Straumann, 2008). Territoriality establishes the physical boundaries within which states can legitimately act, and is a geographical expression of power that is defined and enforced dialectically vis a vis other territories (Hassan, 2006). The definition of a nation-state encompasses not only a territorial jurisdiction, i.e. the state, but also the political communities within that jurisdiction, i.e. the nation (Roeder, 2007). Osiander (2001) argues that national sovereignty, as is currently understood, does not actually date to the 17th century Westphalian system:

The process by which the single society of medieval Europe, with its intertwining of multiple, 'heteronomous' political authorities evolved into neatly divided, 'sovereign' territorial states was a gradual one. But the most significant transition occurred with the French Revolution and the onset of industrialization, not with the Peace of Westphalia (Osiander, 2001, p. 281).

Pitkin (2004) also argues that it was only after the English Civil War and via the democratic revolutions in the 18th century, such as the French Revolution, that representation and democracy became linked. Croxton (1999) further elaborates on the search for the perceived origins of the sovereign nation-state:

The search usually leads to the peace of Westphalia, the name commonly used for the treaties of Munster and Osnabruck signed in 1648 to end the Thirty Years War after years of negotiation. Yet anyone who studies the treaties in detail comes away disappointed, without finding a clear statement of the principle of sovereignty (p. 569).

It was the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, Roeder (2007) argues, that really brought forth the era of nationalism leading to the creation of modern nation-states. Therefore, it can be argued that the modern nation-state, whose representative roots date to the late medieval period, was born from the struggles in the 18th century. If we think about Ancient Greek city-states that were operating thousands of years ago, it is striking to consider how recent and young the modern iteration of our current system of internationally recognized sovereign nation-states is. Given the Westphalian system's prominence in international relations discourse, and despite the contested nature of its meaning, it is necessary to further define the concept of the sovereign nation-state within this framework. Falk (2002) illustrates the Westphalian system in the following way:

As idea, Westphalia refers to the state-centric character of world order premised on full participatory membership being accorded exclusively to territorially based sovereign states. As process, Westphalia refers to the changing character of the state and statecraft as it has evolved during more than 350 years since the treaties were negotiated, with crucial developments as both colonialism and decolonization, the advent of weaponry of mass destruction, the establishment of international institutions, the rise of global market

forces, and the emergence of global civil society. As normative score sheet, Westphalia refers to the strengths and weaknesses, as conditioned by historical circumstances, of such a sovereignty based system, shielding oppressive states from accountability and exposing weak and economically disadvantaged states to intervention and severe forms of material deprivation (p. 312).

The Westphalian system connotes the equality of nation-states within an international framework of institutions, like the United Nations and non-profit organizations that promote treaties and global accords, yet also connotes the reality of a hierarchical structure of more powerful nation-states and less powerful nation-states. This system of power imbalances is, in part, directly related to European colonization.

One the eve of World War II, two-fifths of the world's land area and a third of its population were in colonies, dependencies or dominions of Western European colonizing powers. A further third of world territory had been colonized by these European powers sometime between the 15th and 19th centuries and had already emerged as independent nations. In many of the latter cases, however, it was not the once colonized peoples that became independent, but rather the descendents of colonizers, so that the process of colonization was never truly reversed (Ertan, Fiszbein, and Putterman, 2016, p. 166).

From Ancient Greece to Medieval Europe to European colonization, the impact of Western Europe on the current geopolitical landscape has been enormous. However, Japan was one of the few countries to never be controlled by a Western European power. One of the most powerful nation-states in the world today is Japan, ranked 7th most powerful out of 73 countries and 3rd best overall, according to a survey of 20,000 people from four regions of the world (U.S. News and World Report, 2020). After meeting certain quantitative thresholds like GDP and direct foreign investment, the 'best' 73 countries were determined by examining 65 attributes that could be qualitatively judged to determine their perceived excellence. The factors used for determining power rankings were the strength of a country's leadership and military, its political and economic influence, and its international alliances. Japan's victory over China in the First Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895, showed Japan's modernization success during its Meiji Restoration starting in 1868. However, most experts at the time believed that Japan would need to take on a European power to be fully recognized as a 'civilized nation' (Kowner, 2001). Russia, France, and Germany took measures to try to contain Japan's rapid expansion during this period. It was Japan's military victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, that transformed the balance of power in Asia and Japan henceforth became recognized as a powerful empire. Japan "has been seen as a model for countries fighting for cultural and political independence from Western superpowers" (Hashimoto, 2015, p. 25). In addition to its military might, one reason for Japan's success in maintaining a strong national identity is the belief in *wakon yosai* (和魂洋才). *Wakon yosai* means Japanese spirit (*wakon* - 和魂) and Western learning (*yosai* - 洋才), which denotes the ability to incorporate 'Western knowledge' while still maintaining fundamental Japanese values and attitudes, unaffected by integrating Western systems (Liddicoat, 2007). Later I will argue that the concept of *wakon yosai* is closely linked to Japanese nationalism. What happens, though, when a less powerful region wants to declare its independence?

Membership to our current system of sovereign nation-states is exclusionary in nature, and the emergence of new states depends on the strength or weakness of a nation-state to curtail the mobilization of nationalist movements for independence. For example, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in February of 2008, but 12 years later only about 50% of UN member states have diplomatically recognized Kosovo's sovereignty. The Spanish government is one of the UN member states who does not recognize Kosovo, perhaps due to its opposition to Basque and Catalan independence. Of course, even though Kosovo may not be officially recognized as a nation-state by all UN member countries, that does not preclude it from having a national identity or encouraging nationalism among its residents. Catalonia is another example of a long-held unofficial national identity occurring within an already recognized nation-state, Spain, with its own nationalism. Although 92% of Catalans technically voted for statehood in an unofficial referendum in 2017, only 43% of registered voters cast votes (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2017). In a more recent 2019 poll, a significant, but not-yet majority of respondents, 47.2%, wanted Catalonia to become its own independently recognized sovereign nation-state (El Pais, 2019, May 10). A referendum on independence has so far been denied by the Spanish government and the European Union has decided not to get involved. Even though there is a strong regional identity, promotion of Catalan language, and a robust political mobilization for independence, many Catalonians identify equally as Spanish and Catalan. A poll of 1,200 Catalonian residents in 2017 showed that the majority of respondents, 40%, identified equally as Spanish and Catalan (Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió, 2018). The percentage of respondents who answered that they only identify as Catalan was 20.5% (Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió, 2018). How does Spanish national identity still remain salient in a region where nearly half of the population wants to secede? In the next section I will discuss the formation of a national identity and define what elements comprise the sense of belonging to a nation-state.

## 2.2 National Identity



*Figure 2.* Children Pledge Allegiance to the Flag in 1899 in Washington D.C., Library of Congress

## Teaching patriotism

Of course, national identity is not the only salient identity that people possess; multiple identities are present in each of us. Let's first look at how the modern-nation state can contribute, at least indirectly, to our own identity formation. Whereas medieval societies mainly operated on the basis of ancestral lineages, social strata and classifications determined at birth and offered fewer chances for individuals to construct and shape their own individual identities, the modern nation-state offers at least the illusion of the chance for individuals to construct their own unique identities. There are several caveats to this thinking. Arguably, gross inequality in some modern nation-states are 'medieval' in certain aspects, given that poverty, systemic racism and underperforming schools can be obstacles in the path of self-determination. One study found that in the United States a child from the bottom quintile of income distribution has only a 4.4% chance to reach the top quintile in adulthood in the city of Charlotte, North Carolina and a 12.9% chance in San Jose, California (Chetty, Hendren, Kline, & Saez, 2014). This indicates that the complete freedom to create one's own identity and shape one's personal narrative may depend on the levels of inequality present in a nation-state. To illustrate this point further, I introduce a study examining the effects of nutritional supplements given to people living in 29 poor villages near Hyderabad, India. Nandi, Behrman, Kinra, Laxminarayan (2018) examined 15 intervention villages where a nutritional supplement was given to mothers and their children in the first 3 years of life and 14 control villages where no nutritional supplements were given. The adults born in the intervention villages with the nutritional supplements were 9% more likely to complete secondary school, 11% more likely to complete graduate education, and 5% more likely to be employed (Nandi et al, 2018). If only relatively inexpensive nutritional supplements can have such a marked effect on educational improvement, then it calls into question the belief that individuals have complete control of their identities, personal narratives and life choices in modern democratic nation-states. Of course there are myriad ways that identity formation may be altered indirectly by nation states, one of which is discrimination. A Human Rights Watch (2000) report showed that among all convicted drug offenders sent to state prisons, 62.7% were Black and 36.7% were White, despite federal surveys and other data presented in the report showing that there is scant racial disparity in actual drug usage. Thus, it may depend on a modern nation-state's degree of commitment to reduce discrimination via laws, the existence of programs for reduction in poverty, guarantees of quality education regardless of postal code, and employment opportunities for marginalized communities, if there is any real chance for individuals to create their own unique identities unhindered from the effects of inequality and poverty. Now that we have briefly looked at ways the modern nation-state indirectly shapes our individual identities and personal narratives, let's examine more explicit ways the nation-state creates our national identities.

Billig (1995) defines national identity as embodied in the habits of social life, in everyday discourses, an identity that is situated physically, legally, and emotionally within the concept of a homeland. He calls this banal nationalism. By merely existing everyday, living our lives normally, we are bombarded with national symbols like when we walk by a storefront or courthouse and see a national flag waving in the wind. When we pay with cash to buy groceries, our money, both coins and bills, is infused with figures associated with national greatness and strength. We have cultural experiences related to our homeland like eating nationally popular dishes and regional foods or celebrating national holidays. We consume media that promote national interests. We use language, regional dialects and phrases that may be only found inside

the borders of one nation. Our discourses are highly localized. We have an emotional attachment to the land and sea and mountains in which we reside and vacation at. Most of our lives are experienced and lived within the defined borders of a nation-state, cementing our national identity with every passing day. This emotional attachment to our country can sometimes be referred to as patriotism, i.e. love and devotion to one's country. Although some scholars may try to separate nationalism and patriotism, I will treat patriotism as a type of nationalism throughout my dissertation.

According to Guibernau (2013), people have a need that can only be satisfied by the sense of belonging to a group, through sharing common interests, values and goals, that provides them with a sense of continuity in their lives and reduces feelings of isolation. National identity, she notes, can adeptly play this role of satisfying people's need to feel like they belong to a group, or in this case a nation-state. National identity has five dimensions, according to Guibernau (2004): psychological, cultural, territorial, historical, and political. For example, the Catalan Republic was an autonomous region in Spain that existed from 1931 until the start of General Franco's dictatorship in 1938. After the death of Franco and the transition from a monarchy to a democracy, the modern Spanish state's constitution was created in 1978 and in 1979 the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia was introduced. Only in 2006, with just 36% of Catalans voting and 50% abstaining, was the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia referendum passed into law. However, the Spanish government rewrote major portions of the statute in 2010, which inspired the most recent independence movement. Thus, Catalonia's psychological, cultural, historical, and political factors can be said to have created a national identity, even if not all residents share this unofficial identity. This is an important distinction, as we will see later in the analysis of my research participants, who sometimes possess an unofficial national identity, meaning they are not official citizens but still feel like they belong anyway. What are the characteristics of a nation state and how do they create culture?



*Figure 3.* U.S. School Children Salute the Flag in 1915, Library of Congress

## Shifting national identities

Nation-states have considerable power to inculcate a national identity in their citizens, to varying degrees of success. Let's take, for example, how nations use their national educational policies to shape, or at least attempt to shape, their citizens' national identity. In 1989, a survey of 1,163 Japanese high school students and 1,084 American high school students regarding their attitudes toward their respective flags and national anthems was conducted. While a majority of American high school students (57.3%) felt strongly attached to the image of the American flag, a majority of Japanese high school students (51%), conversely, did not feel anything when they saw their flag (Japan Youth Institute, 1989). Furthermore, on the topic of standing for their national anthems, 84.6% of American high school students stood up out of respect for their country, while only 25.6% of Japanese high school students responded that they stood upright while their national anthem was playing (Japan Youth Institute, 1989). Children in U.S. schools as early as 1892 started announcing their fealty to the flag by reciting The Pledge of Allegiance, which was written by Francis Bellamy (Crawford, 2015). I remember standing up from my desk, placing my hand over my heart, and pledging my allegiance to the United States flag every morning in elementary school along with my other classmates. We also learned the words to our national anthem (interchangeable with the Star Spangled Banner, which is the 1st stanza of the 4 stanza national anthem) at school and sang this song regularly, even outside of the classroom when, for example, we went to a baseball game or watched the Olympics at home. The official U.S. flag code states that during the U.S. national anthem people should, "face the flag and stand at attention with their right hand over the heart, and men not in uniform, if applicable, should remove their headdress with their right hand and hold it at the left shoulder, the hand being over the heart" (Legal Information Institute, 2008). As you can see from the photographs taken in 1899 and 1915 in Figures 2 and 3, there were several ways of saluting the flag before the process was codified in the 1942 U.S. Flag Code, after worries that the so called "Bellamy Salute" resembled the Nazi salute (Blakemore, 2016). Of course, I didn't need to look up the particulars of the U.S. flag code because I was taught this in school, as was every other American. When the national anthem came on during a baseball game at the stadium as a young kid I remember all the adults would stand up and take their baseball caps off and sing in unison. They weren't taking off their caps worrying about running afoul of the U.S. Flag Code; rather, they took off their hats to signal their respect for their country, because of intense social pressure to do so, and because it was what they were taught to do. In 2016, however, an NFL football player named Colin Kaepernick started kneeling during the national anthem on televised broadcasts of games as a peaceful protest to raise awareness of racism and police brutality. In September of 2017, President Trump said that, "For people to disrespect that by kneeling during the playing of our national anthem, I think, is disgraceful" (BBC News, 2017, September 26). In 2017, Kaepernick became a free agent and he was not able to sign a contract with any NFL team and thus was not able to play professional football. In May of 2018, the NFL Commissioner and all NFL team owners, with the exception of two abstentions, voted to require all players to either stand or stay in their locker room during the national anthem or risk disciplinary action. President Trump tweeted the following on July 20th, 2018: "Isn't it in contract that players must stand at attention, hand on heart? \$40,000,000 Commissioner must now make a stand. First time kneeling, out for game. Second time kneeling, out for season/no pay!" (West, 2018, July 20). In July of 2020, however, the NFL Commissioner officially apologized in the following partial statement:

We, the National Football League, condemn racism and the systematic oppression of black people. We, the National Football League, admit we were wrong for not listening to NFL players earlier, and encourage all to speak out and peacefully protest. We, at the National Football League, believe Black Lives Matter. I personally protest with you and want to be part of the much needed change in this country (Gaydos, 2020 June 9).

This apology by the NFL Commissioner came after the death of George Floyd and the national protests during the 2020 Black Lives Matters movement against racial injustice and police brutality. After having created a rule to stand or leave the field during the national anthem, which was punishable by disciplinary action, the aboutface apology and sight of coaches kneeling with players during the anthem was striking. It was now patriotic to peacefully protest the national anthem. Identity, of course, is ever changing and malleable. Once institutions change their stances and policies, usually through the result of hard-fought grass-roots movements, the notions of what is considered patriotic and unpatriotic can change with the cultural currents. From the human rights salute of the two Black gold medalists in the 1968 Olympics during the national anthem to Colin Kaepernick kneeling during the national anthem in 2016 to the 2020 protests, how national symbols like the national flag and national anthem should be treated and viewed has changed considerably. After Tommie Smith and John Carlos raised their fists in protest during the national anthem at the 1968 Olympics, a large majority of Americans condemned them for doing so (Hartman, 2019). In a July 2020 CBS News poll of 2,008 Americans, however, a majority of Americans, 58%, believed that kneeling during the national anthem was an acceptable act of protest (De Pinto, 2020, July 29). National identity, then, is not only shaped by the state apparatus and other prominent elite institutions, it is also shaped by the communities that make up the nation. There is a constant dialectic between the state apparatus and the polity to determine a national identity, even if that results in a variety of national identities. Let's examine further what happens when individuals refuse to participate in the practice of standing up and singing the national anthem, not within a privately owned organization like the NFL, but at a public school. Let us take the case of Japanese public schools and the Japanese national anthem.

### **The Japanese government's top-down approach**

Japanese teacher unions organized protests against being forced to pay respect to the Japanese flag, the "Hinomaru", or sing the national anthem, called the "Kimigayo". This prompted a 1986 legal battle in Kyoto that resulted in several lower courts and finally the Supreme Court in 1999 to uphold the enforcement of the singing of the Kimigayo in schools. The Court's reasoning was that "the national anthem did not clearly defame or slander the spirit of the Constitution" (Hanami, 2009-2010, p. 441). In 2012, the Japanese Supreme Court again rejected two suits brought by 375 teachers to ban the enforced singing of the national anthem. "The court ruled that ordering teachers to sing the Kimigayo did not violate their freedom of thought, which was the basis for the plaintiffs' claim" (Japan Today, 2012, February 25). Despite criticism that the flag and national anthem have ties to Japan's militarist and imperialist past, school authorities nevertheless disciplined 875 teachers across Japan, from 2000 to 2005, for refusing to stand and sing the Kimigayo (Young, 2009). In 2016, a Tokyo District Court rejected the appeal of three part-time school teachers because they had refused to stand and sing the Kimigayo, effectively confirming that it was acceptable to fire them for not standing and singing the national anthem.

Although it was reported that “a district court ruled that the Tokyo Metropolitan Government must pay a total of ¥537 million to 22 former high school teachers who were punished for refusing to sing the national anthem”, it is still a high risk for Japanese school teachers to take if they sit down and refuse to sign the Kimigayo (Kikuchi, 2017, April 26). Are these strong-arm efforts successful? Do Japanese people feel a strong sense of national pride and have a robust national identity? Before we answer these questions in the next section on Japanese national identity, let’s think about some of the benefits of group membership.

Guibernau (2013) explains that a person’s allegiance to a group or nation can offer in return a physical, virtual, or imagined space to share interests, values, principles and create projects together. In addition to this space, Guibernau (2013) refers to specific material assets and non-material assets that individuals can benefit from in return for their allegiance and support to a group or nation.

Material assets like admittance to events, access to information, documents with instrumental value such as a passport or a membership card that is restricted to members only. Non-material assets are exemplified by the emotional closeness, moral support and solidarity, which generally rise among members with a common goal (Guibernau, 2013, p. 28).

In the case of Black American athletes like Smith and Carlos in 1968 and Kaepernick in 2016, as well as Japanese school teachers, there was a price to be paid for stepping outside of the established norms and rules. That is, the stripping of those group membership benefits as punishment for protesting in some form the national anthem, and by extension, their nation-states. Both their material assets (e.g. their jobs and salaries) and non-material assets (e.g. emotional and legal support from their countries and institutions) were threatened because of their decisions to break with cultural norms, and thus create alternate narratives and alternate national identities. The breaking of norms in democratic societies can often lead to new national identities that grow in popularity, as we have seen in the case of protesting the U.S. national anthem. Now, let’s take a closer look at the content that is taught in schools to further illustrate how nation-states try to use their powers to shape national identity.

In order for a textbook to be used in a Japanese public school, there is a lengthy approval process conducted by the Ministry of Education to check the contents, facts and information being conveyed, which was established by the School Education Law enacted in 1947. The process was simplified in 1989, giving more leeway to the publishers, and even if there are requests for revisions, rejections are extremely rare according to MOFA, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA, 2005). However, in March of 2020, 4 out of 110 textbooks screened by the Ministry of Education were rejected and 5 were withdrawn (Kyodo News, 2020, March 25). Of the history textbooks accepted, the Takeshima Islets in the Sea of Japan (which are under control by South Korea, which calls them Dokdo), the Senkaku Islands (which China claims are theirs, calling them Diaoyu), and four islands near Hokkaido (which Russia controls) are described as inherently Japanese territories (Kyodo News, 2020, March 25). Since 1982, there have been several national and international controversies regarding the content of Japanese history textbooks (Fukuoka, 2011). In particular, the Japanese government is accused of altering historical memories surrounding the Nanjing Massacre, so called ‘comfort women’, coerced

labor, and compulsory mass suicides in Okinawa, which have prompted outcries by the Chinese government, the Korean government, and Okinawans (Masaaki, 2008). In 2007, Prime Minister Shizo Abe denied that comfort women were coerced by the Japanese military, despite substantial evidence that the military, in coordination with Japanese government, were systematically involved in a system that used comfort women (Hayashi, 2008). In addition, massive protests in Okinawa erupted after an announcement in March of 2007 that all references to the Japanese military's coercion of mass suicides during the Battle of Okinawa during World War II were to be omitted from textbooks (Masaaki, 2008). In 2008, perhaps due to strong public criticism, the following sentence was approved for history textbooks: "Many local residents were driven to commit mass suicides because of the military's involvement" (Masaaki, 2008). The struggles continued in 2013 when The Minister of Education issued its first corrective action order to compel the town of Taketomi, in Okinawa, to use a more conservative version of a junior high school history book, which was rejected by the school's superintendent two years in a row (Kyodo News, 2013, October 13). On the other side of the political spectrum, Nozaki and Selden (2009) note that Japanese right-wing nationalists have seriously attacked Japanese school history textbooks three times, from the 1950s to the 1990s, regarding how colonialism and World War II were depicted. On both sides of the political spectrum, thus, the impact of the content of Japanese history textbooks to socialize its youth has been the focus of many public debates. How much influence do history textbooks have, however, on the children studying them? Fukuoka (2011) interviewed 19 Japanese adults in their 20s regarding the impact of Japanese history textbooks on their 'historical consciousness'. Fukuoka (2011) found that among his participants, textbooks are generally not seen as a medium for enhancing historical consciousness and that the power of textbooks is less influential than originally assumed. This is because there are easily accessible websites like Wikipedia, TV documentaries, historical movies, comic books, news programs, academic journal articles, museums with historical artifacts and journals of first-hand accounts that have the collective power to create a fuller historical narrative. In essence, to be successful in completely changing a historical narrative, there would need to be complete control over all media and museum collections, and suppression of first-hand accounts that run counter to the official narrative of the state, which is not possible in a democratic society. That is not to say that changing historical narratives by omitting facts and altering events is not significant. The Genron NPO and the East Asia Institute conducted a poll of Japanese and South Koreans regarding their perceptions of each other in 2019. According to the poll, which had at least 1,000 respondents in both Japan and South Korea, 49.9% of Koreans had negative impressions of Japanese, an improvement since the survey began in 2013, when they were at 76.6%. About 50% of Japanese respondents had a negative impression of Koreans, which was worse than the 37.3% who felt so in 2013. The biggest reason cited, 52.1%, as to why Japanese had a bad impression of South Koreans is because of South Korea's continued criticism of Japan regarding historical issues (The Genron NPO, 2019). South Koreans' biggest reason, 76.1%, for their unfavorability rating of the Japanese was due to Japan's past wartime aggression and current territorial conflict over the Dokdo, known as the Takeshima Islets in Japan (The Genron NPO, 2019). Although it has been 75 years since World War II ended, tensions are still very high and relations are fraying between Japan and South Korea and China, in no small part due to how their shared history is being currently depicted and what actions each government is taking regarding these historical issues.

When a nation-state actively shapes their national identity, there are not only internal changes and struggles, but the repercussions can also be felt internationally. It is important to highlight the above examples of individuals and groups of people in Japan and the US actively co-constructing national identities along with their countries, since this is what occurred in my research participants. These examples also highlight the fluid nature of national identity, something changes over time. My research participants also experienced living in either Japan or the United States or both countries, and felt pressures to assimilate and adapt while also maintaining their own sense of self. Their national identities were not always constant throughout their journeys. Since my goal is to find out what effect living in multiple countries has on a person's national identity, the discussion above is informative regarding a state's efforts to inculcate identity and a person's reception to those efforts. In later chapters where I discuss my participants' experiences, we will return to the concept of material/nonmaterial assets, and how much each participant felt they belonged to a particular place. In the next section we will explore Japanese national identity and citizenship in more depth.

## **2.3 Japanese National Identity**

### **Reinventing national identity**

The cementing of national identity through the familiarity of a constant cultural landscape can possibly deceive us of our notions of what it means to be, for example, Japanese. Let's take the example of a national treasure, Japanese sushi, to illustrate how a 'unit' of national identity is formed and reformed. Japanese people may be forgiven for thinking that sushi hasn't had any 'foreign' influences given the strong association in many people's minds between sushi and Japanese culture. According to a survey conducted by the seafood company, Maruha Nichiro, salmon has topped the polls in the six years leading up to and including the year 2017 as the most popular kind of sushi (Loew, September 29, 2017). Salmon (46.3%) soared past tuna (34.2%) as the sushi of choice for most sushi connoisseurs (Loew, September 29, 2017). But it wasn't always this way. In fact, in the early 1980s, you would be hard pressed to find raw salmon used for sushi in any sushi restaurant in Japan. Pacific salmon was said to contain parasites that necessitated raw salmon to be cooked and this is the way Japanese people consumed salmon for hundreds of years. After Norway started commercially fishing salmon in the 1970s, they were looking for ways to expand their market. 'Project Japan' was launched in Norway in the mid 1980s to convince Japanese people to eat raw salmon. Although initially met with resistance and incredulity in Japan, eating raw salmon eventually took hold by using the English word, サーモン (samon), to distinguish it from the cooked version called 鮭 (sake or shake), through the use of advertisements and endorsements from celebrity chefs, and the introduction of a fatty version suited to the tastes of the Japanese public (Sollesnes, March 18, 2018). Instead of fears of cultural takeovers from Northern Europe and campaigns to encourage eating only traditional sushi like tuna and halibut, salmon was subsumed as part of Japanese culture. Commercials for kaitenzushi (conveyor belt sushi) restaurants on Japanese TV nowadays prominently feature raw salmon sushi and most grocery stores in Japan also sell raw salmon sushi regularly. So what does this say about the formation of national identity within sovereign national borders? To better understand Japanese national identity in the modern era, it is necessary to examine the profound changes that occurred at the start of the Meiji Era, when

Japan finally opened up to the world, or more aptly put, spread out into the world after a long period of isolation.

### **The start of a new international era for Japan: The Meiji Restoration and Emigration**

From 1633 until the start of the Meiji Era in 1868, the Tokugawa Shogunate forbade Japanese to travel to and from Japan, and limited foreign contact to a few Chinese and Dutch merchants that were able to trade in the city of Nagasaki. During the Meiji Era, 1868-1912, when Japan started opening up to more international contact, when industrialization and modernization began, and when direct imperial rule was reimplemented, many Japanese decided to emigrate abroad to seek better opportunities due to economic difficulties. The year 1885 marks the start of large-scale emigration out of Japan, when a boat leaving from the port of Yokohama sailed to Honolulu and with 945 Japanese emigrants aboard. Until 1894, when the agreement ended, a total of 29,132 Japanese emigrants settled in Hawaii (MOFA, n.d.), mainly to work on the island's sugar cane and pineapple fields. The endorsement and encouragement of emigration by the Japanese government prompted Japanese to emigrate abroad to, among other regions, North America and South East Asia. The numbers were so great, over 20,000 Japanese emigrated to the U.S. in one year alone, that Canada and the U.S. began to restrict the influx of Japanese emigrants in the early 1900s due to a burgeoning anti-Japanese sentiment (MOFA, n.d.). Because Japanese immigration to North America was now restricted, they began emigrating to South America, and in particular, Brazil. In 1908, the first boat, called the *Kasato Maru*, carried 781 Japanese emigrants to the port of Santos in São Paulo, Brazil. "Plagued by debt in the wake of Japan's industrialization, the migrants hoped for a new life working on South American coffee plantations that were facing a labor shortage" (The Japan Times, 2018, July 20). Although other countries received Japanese emigrants, the main channel of emigration flowed to Brazil from the end of the Taisho Era, 1912-1926, into the Showa Era, 1926-1989, totaling 188,985 until 1941 (Tsuchida, 1998). In 1924, the Emigration Council decided to focus their migration efforts on Brazil and so "the Japanese government assumed responsibility for making the Japanese aware of economic opportunities in Brazil, for the payment of transportation expenses to Brazil, and for arranging the employment and housing in Brazil" (de Carvalho, 2003, p. 5). This led to the 1927 Overseas Emigration Act, where prefectures in Japan created centers to provide guidance for emigrants, as well spurring private Japanese investment in coffee and cotton plantations, mining and other industries in Brazil (de Carvalho, 2003). Many families would only stay a few years on the coffee farms because of the harsh conditions, low pay, and the risk of dying from malaria and exhaustion. During the 1920s and 1930s, 70% of Japanese transitioned from working on the coffee farms to owning their own farms (de Carvalho, 2003). By the 1940s many Japanese had become more financially independent and established themselves as job creators, hiring locals to work on their farms. In 1973, the last boat of 285 emigrants to Brazil boarded the *Nippon Maru* and sailed to the port of Santos, marking an end to the Japanese diaspora (Kuwahara, 2005), although there was still some support of Japanese emigration to Brazil until 1993 (Lee, 2017). According to MOFA (2019), there are currently around 2 million Japanese descendants in Brazil, making it the largest community of Japanese descendants outside of Japan and one of the most "pro-Japanese" countries in the world. Signifying the importance of Japan's relationship with Brazil, Princess Mako made a 11-day trip in 2018, travelling around Brazil to commemorate the 110th anniversary of Japanese emigration to Brazil. Her purpose was to express gratitude to the Nikkei community and highlight the links between the two

countries and honor the estimated 250,000 Japanese nationals that have emigrated to Brazil since 1908 (The Japan Times, July 22, 2018). There is a term associated with the Japanese and their relatives who permanently emigrated to other countries during this period, which is Nikkei-jin (日系人), or simply Nikkei. The kanji literally mean Japan (日), lineage (系), and person (人), or roughly translated as a person of Japanese ancestry. A fuller definition is given by The Association of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad, who define the term Nikkei as broadly referring to, “Japanese people who have relocated overseas on a permanent basis, as well as their second, third, and fourth generation descendants, irrespective of current nationality and degree of Japanese ethnicity” (Who are Nikkei and Japanese Abroad, 2018). What does the Nikkei community have to do with modern Japanese national identity, now that it has been so long since that first cohort of Japanese emigrants? The answer lies in the next discussion regarding the wave of Nikkei migrants who entered Japan during the 1990s, after a immigration laws were relaxed in 1990. It is in the reconstruction of Japanese national identity, and through seeing and experiencing Japan for the first time as Japanese descendants, that the experiences of the Nikkei community are so instructive regarding the meaning of Japanese national identity.

### Registered Brazilians Living in Japan Per Year




Figure 4. Registered Brazilians living in Japan per year.

### The Nikkei community and the return to Japan

Just as Brazil had a labor shortage on their coffee plantations in the early 20th century, which necessitated immigrants from abroad, Japan also needed more cheap labor to work in manufacturing and construction in the mid 1980s. These factory and construction jobs, which were becoming less appealing to Japanese workers, were labeled the ‘3k jobs’ by the mass media: *kitsui* (demanding), *kitanai* (dirty), and *kiken* (dangerous) (Kuwahara, 2005).

Coincidentally, from 1980 until the early 1990s Brazil was affected by debt crises and high inflation, which had negative effects on the economy. In 1987, there were only 2,250 Brazilians living in Japan. Three years later in 1990 that number soared to 56,429 and nearly doubled to 119,333 just one year later in 1991. In response to a growing demand for non-Japanese labor for the so-called 3k jobs, the Japanese government changed its immigration law, called the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, in 1990 in order to allow those with ties to Japanese society. i.e. descendants of Japanese up to the third generation, to work in Japan. Originally enacted in 1951, the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act did not allow for so-called ‘unskilled labor.’ However, a new visa category, *teijusha* or ‘long-term resident’, was created in the 1990 revision of the law that allowed Nikkei (and their families through a separate family visa) to live in Japan and work without restriction to the kind of work they could obtain. Thus, they could work as unskilled labor in manufacturing and construction, fulfilling a need in the Japanese labor market and giving opportunities to people with Japanese ancestry in Latin America who were affected by troubled economies. Of the 21,501 people who entered Japan as long-term residents in 1998, for example, 58% were from Brazil (Ministry of Justice, n.d.). In the graph shown in Figure 4, the numbers of registered Brazilians living in Japan dramatically increased after the revision of the law and peaked in 2007 at 316,967. What happened when this Nikkei community arrived in Japan and why did their numbers fall precipitously after 2007? Next I will briefly discuss the conditions and experiences of the Nikkei community to highlight what it means to be Japanese, since the law provides renewable visas only to those with Japanese blood descent.

According to the 1990 revision to the immigration law, to enter Japan on the renewable long-term visa, a person needed to have their ancestor’s *koseki*, or the official document of Japanese family registry, which requires all Japanese households by law to be officially registered with the government. The *koseki* system, introduced in 1871, also records all births, marriages, deaths and family ties. Only Japanese nationals can be listed in the *koseki*. When a non-Japanese person marries a Japanese person, a new entry is created under the Japanese national’s name, and the non-Japanese person only has their name, date of birth and nationality listed. A separate *koseki* listing will not be created for a non-Japanese person, and Japanese citizenship does not allow for dual nationality. If children are born in a marriage to a Japanese and non-Japanese, they are listed under the Japanese national’s *koseki*. This is why *koseki* denotes ethnic membership, or *minzoku* in Japanese. By proving their ‘bloodline’ connection to Japan through their family trees and *koseki*, Nikkei were able to enter Japan as, at least partially, ethnic members of society. Sharpe (2010) argues that maintaining racial homogeneity was a major concern for the ruling Liberal Democratic party in 1989 and so “the initiation and maintenance of a de-facto guest worker program based on coethnicity...was presumed to be more palatable to the Japanese public and policy making community” (p. 361). Tsuda (2003b) notes that ethnic homogeneity was sought after by government immigration officials, who assumed that Nikkei would be similar to Japanese culturally, in order to avoid conflict and social disruption that was associated with non-Japanese immigrants. Perhaps one reason for this assumption is that before the changes to the 1990 immigration law, many Nikkei *dekasegi*, which refers to seasonal migrant workers from abroad or Japanese workers from rural Japan who migrated to the cities, had Japanese citizenship and spoke Japanese fluently (Nishida, 2018). From 1985 until 1999, Nikkei *dekasegi* in Japan would remit over \$2 billion per year on average back to Brazil, making them Brazil’s most valuable export ahead of coffee and iron ore (Kingsberg, 2015). The 1990 immigration law

allowed three generations of Nikkei to enter on the long-term visa: *Issei*, or the first generation of Japanese immigrants who arrived and settled in Brazil; *Nisei*, or second generation born to their immigrant parents in Brazil, and *Sansei*, or third generation grandchildren. Due to the Japanese Issei living in so-called close-knit *colonias*, originally agricultural settlements and later implying Japanese communities, in the late 1980s only around 6% of Nisei were racially mixed, while 42% of the Sanseis were a mix of Brazilian and Japanese ancestry (Nishida, 2018). Most of the Sanseis, and their children, the *Yonseis* (fourth generation), who came to Japan in the 1990s did not have Japanese citizenship, were more racially mixed, and had less Japanese language ability, thus making it more difficult to assimilate. Although an ethnic minority in Brazil, the dekasegi Nikkei would remain a minority group in Japan. Tsuda (2003b) notes that the Nikkei changed from being positively viewed as “Japanese” in Brazil to being negatively viewed as “Brazilian” in Japan. There were many reasons for Nikkei not being viewed in a positive light in Japan, such as unfavorable views of mixed race individuals, their low status in society as factory workers despite some being college educated, and the prejudice of viewing their Issei relatives as poor migrants who abandoned and gave up on Japan (Tsuda, 2003b). The Japanese Constitution obliges all Japanese children to attend elementary and junior high school by law, but does not require children of Nikkei or other non-Japanese to attend public schools, even though they have the right to do so if they choose. In the city of Toyohashi in 1998, for example, around 400 Brazilian-Japanese school children were not attending school at all (Mainichi Japan, 2019, September 28). Some Nikkei families who planned to return to Brazil enrolled their children in the 86 Brazilian private schools in Japan in 2009, where they could maintain their Brazilian Portuguese language skills. However, many private Brazilian schools had several problems like unqualified school teachers and funding issues (Watanabe, 2010). In addition, few programs were set up to teach Japanese as a foreign or second language in Japanese public schools. Because of these issues, the Ministry of Education finally created a new education policy in 2010 for non-Japanese school children, and in particular for Nikkei, to help ease their transition into the Japanese school system. Nevertheless, in 2019, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) conducted a survey of international school children in Japan and found out that 17% did not attend school and 65% of municipalities had no specific services to help combat this problem (Mainichi Japan, 2019, September 28). Of the 124,049 school children of registered non-Japanese living in Japan, 21,701 were confirmed as not in attendance and 11,008 did not receive needed lessons in Japanese as a second language (Mainichi Japan, 2019, September 28). In addition to their children having difficulty learning Japanese in school, many Nikkei dekasegi worked long hours at factories and had little time or resources to be able to take Japanese classes. Despite some efforts to help, the general unpreparedness of the Japanese government and municipalities to support Nikkei together with the lack of a requirement for Nikkei children to attend Japanese schools may have contributed to the marginalization of the Nikkei community. Furthermore, after the 2008 global economic crisis, the Nikkei dekasegi were some of the first workers to be fired with as many as 47% unemployed in Hamamatsu, a city with a large Nikkei community (Lee, 2017). In fact, instead of trying to resolve these issues, one solution the Japanese government came up with was the 2009 Repatriation Support Program (*Kikoku Shien Jigyo*). The program gave 300,000 円 (or around \$3,000) and 200,000 円 (or around \$2,000 for dependents) to Nikkei to return to Brazil or Peru, for example, with the stipulation that they would not be able to reapply for a work visa, effectively ending their chances to return to Japan on a long-term basis. The Liberal Democratic Party politician in charge of the program, Jiro Kawasaki, was quoted as saying:

There won't be good opportunities for a while, so that's why we're suggesting that the Nikkei Brazilians go home... We should stop letting unskilled workers in Japan. We should make sure that even the three-K jobs are paid well, and that they are filled by Japanese. I do not think Japan should ever become a multiethnic society (Tabuchi, 2009, April 22).

The message could not have been clearer, even for those who spent more than a decade working as a Nikkei dekasegi in Japan: you're no longer welcome. According to the Cabinet Office, who oversaw this program, by 2013, 21,675 individuals took part in the repatriation program, 92.5% of whom were Nikkei Brazilian (Cabinet Office Policy Director, 2013). A favorable view of the government program would suggest that it was helping unemployed Nikkei who wanted to return to Brazil anyway. A more critical view might suggest that the majority of the Nikkei were never meant to be fully accepted in Japanese society and were always meant to "go home" eventually, since they were not offered citizenship, had difficulties assimilating in schools and in society, and were financially incentivized to leave Japan. By September of 2020, 6 months after the effects of the pandemic on the Japanese economy, nearly 50,000 non-Japanese workers had lost their jobs, many of whom were Nikkei that worked in automobile manufacturing in Aichi prefecture (Jiji Press, 2020, September 24). Once again, it was Nikkei, whose contracts were often reduced to three-month periods in case production levels decreased and companies needed to adjust their labor force, that were forced into a difficult position in Japan.

It was an experiment to see if the Nikkei would integrate into Japanese society, giving Japan the immigrant labor it desperately needed whilst maintaining some degree of ethnic homogeneity. As you can see from the graph in Figure 4, however, the experiment ended for many Nikkei when over one hundred thousand left Japan after 2009. Recently, a new program by the Japanese Ministry of Justice (MOJ) in 2018 was aimed at allowing Yonsei, or the fourth generation descendants who had previously been excluded in the 1990 immigration law, to enter Japan. However, according to the MOJ (2021), Yonsei who wish to enter Japan need to satisfy several requirements, namely passing the lowest level (N5) of the Japanese Language Proficiency Test (JLPT) and they need a sponsor who will provide support in Japan. The number of Yonseis permitted to enter is capped at 4,000 per year and if they want to stay in Japan past their 1st year they need to pass a higher level (N4) of the JLPT. For those applicants who want to stay until their fourth or fifth years they need yet higher Japanese language proficiency, N3 on the JLPT, and to have fully deepened their understanding of Japanese culture. Yonseis must leave Japan after 5 years. Given these requirements, it is unlikely that immigration to Japan from Nikkei communities abroad will significantly increase in the near future.

Although many Nikkei may have seen themselves as both Japanese and Brazilian, even the blood connection and Japanese heritage was not enough to be Japanese in Japan. Supposedly, Japan is a *jus sanguinis* country, where citizenship is attributed to blood lines, and not a *jus soli* country, where being born in a country determines citizenship. However, the Japanese government would have required the Nissei to choose either Brazil or Japan by the age of 20-22 according to the Nationality Act, since they were born to Japanese citizens. After growing up in Brazil, however, and with most familial and cultural ties not in Japan, this would be a difficult and perhaps painful decision for the Nikkei dekasegi. Referring back to Guibernau's notion of material assets, there

is a price to be paid for gaining membership, namely sacrificing a part of one's national and personal identity. Although around 75% of nation-states, or approximately 150 countries, who are members of the United Nations allow for dual citizenship or multiple nationalities, Japan requires a singular allegiance, which dates back to the prewar Meiji Constitution (Mainichi Japan, 2020, March 9). The reasoning for Japan not allowing dual citizenship is the following:

The Justice Ministry says holding dual citizenship may cause international conflict caused by a collision of diplomatic protection rights between two countries. It also says allowing dual citizenship causes identity confusion in multiple nations (Murai, 2016, September 7).

Although national identity confusion may indeed exist, having to choose between two countries may cause further confusion and anxiety. Instead of embracing the Nikkei community's Brazilian roots and culture by allowing dual citizenship, the Japanese government requires an extreme act of faith and show of allegiance, i.e. renouncing one's citizenship, to become Japanese. It appears, then, that Japanese national identity is more closely linked to its strict citizenship rules, rather than ethnic or blood ties. Some day, Japan may change its law to allow dual citizenship, perhaps in an attempt to once again make up for an acute labor shortage or as a way to counteract its rapidly declining population. Currently, however, national identity is firmly tied to citizenship, at least formally. Individuals, however, can still *feel* Japanese, despite the government's determination. Just as raw salmon sushi became Japanese, by being immersed and accepted in the culture, so too can individuals' national identities reformulate and strengthen. In order to fully understand the lived experiences of Nikkei, it is necessary to move beyond statistics and hear from Nikkei themselves. Later, in Chapter 4, I will focus on four interviews I conducted with members of the Nikkei community living in Japan and Brazil. In my analysis of these interviews I will talk more in depth about how these individuals formed their Japanese and Brazilian identities, not just their official citizenship statuses. Next I would like to talk about the connection to language and national identity.

## 2.4 Japanese National Identity and Language

### Inculcating a Japanese spirit

What kinds of language does the Japanese government use to describe and promote itself and how might that affect national identity? Let us look into an example of teaching materials that were freely distributed to all schools in Japan. When I first arrived in Japan in 2006, I started teaching at a junior high school. I was a homeroom teacher for one junior high class, and was required to provide moral education classes once a week with my fellow Japanese homeroom teacher. I didn't completely understand the goals of this program at the time, other than to help create moral, upstanding citizens. MEXT requires one unit per week, or 35 hours per year, of moral education classes for all elementary and junior high schools. According to the MEXT (2002) website, these lessons are supposed to, among other things, help students tell right from wrong, to learn to love oneself, to cherish and protect nature, and to care for others and be polite. There is also a section that outlines the goals for elementary and junior high school students to achieve, which are related to values and society:

To be aware of the roles and responsibilities attached to a member of society, to improve the collective welfare of society, to respect law and order, to be fair and just, to understand the importance of labor, to cherish homeland and soil, to work for the development of the homeland, to contribute to world peace and the happiness of mankind, etc. (MEXT, 2002).

This section details how being a morally upstanding citizen in Japan means respecting Japanese laws and cherishing and helping to improve Japan. In other words, developing and loving one's homeland is part and parcel of being a moral individual in Japan. In 2002, MEXT created and distributed the *Kokoro no noto* (心のノート) [Notebook for the heart] to all schools in Japan, an example of which can be seen in Figure 5. The teaching materials were designed with the principles outlined above. One section of the materials is outlined below:

ふるさとを愛する気持ちをひとまわり広げると  
それは日本を愛する気持ちにつながってくる。  
私たちが暮らすこの国を愛し  
その発展を願う気持ちは、ごく自然なこと。  
でも、私たちはどれほどこの国のことを知っているのだろうか。  
いま、しっかりと日本を知り、優れた伝統や文化に対する認識を新たにしよう。  
この国のすばらしさが見え、そのよさを受け継いでいこうとするとき  
国際社会の一員として、地球人の一人として  
日本を愛することが、狭くて排他的な自国讃美であってはならない。  
この国を愛することが、世界を愛することにつながる。



Figure 5. *Kokoro no noto* (心のノート) [Notebook for the heart], 2002

The translation is as follows:

When you feel more love for your hometown, it is connected to loving Japan.  
It is natural that we love the country where we live and have hope for its development.  
However, to what degree do we really know this country? Now let's get to know Japan well and renew our awareness of its excellent traditions and culture. Even when you see this country's greatness and inherit its goodness, you are still an international member of society and one person on earth, so loving Japan does not mean a narrow and exclusive pride of one's country. Loving Japan means that your love will spread to loving the entire world. (*Kokoro no noto*, 2002).

If we analyze this section, we can extrapolate that love of one's hometown, culture and traditions leads to patriotism, which then leads to internationalism. Patriotism, or *aikoku* (愛国) in Japanese, literally means love (ai - 愛) and country (koku - 国). And so to be a morally sound

individual and good citizen of Japan, one must love one's country first, i.e. be patriotic. This patriotism will then translate to an appreciation and love for other countries, according to the Kokoro no noto teaching materials. Rivers (2011) surveyed 401 Japanese university foreign language majors, 74% of whom were female, to understand more about the links between English education and culture and nationalism, patriotism and internationalism. He found that nationalism and internationalism had a positive impact on students' orientation toward English speaking culture and community, but that patriotism was a negative predictor of internationalism and orientation toward English speaking culture and community (Rivers, 2011). This makes sense when you look at English education from a transactional stance. Learning English can open up many new opportunities and allow for more interaction and sharing of culture with people around the world. English language and cultural knowledge can also help Japan to strengthen its international partnerships and expand its global reach via governmental institutions and multinational corporations. However, English language, and Western culture broadly, potentially pose a threat to beloved Japanese culture and traditions at home. An encroachment of different cultures and languages in Japan may signify changes to its long-standing traditions that are the pride of Japanese culture and closely tied to its identity. This may be why patriotism negatively impacted students' orientation toward English language and culture. The language used in the Kokoro no noto learning materials says that love of Japan will translate to love of other countries. It appears there may be conditions to that love. As long as Japanese culture has a 'safe amount' of foreign influence, English culture and language can be embraced. This, I will argue, is exactly what the Japanese government wants, to promote this kind of internationalism and transactional nationalism with regard to the English language in Japan. In fact, in other government publications and in statements from government officials, the government acknowledges that the promotion of English is a way to succeed in a globalized world, as long as it is kept at an appropriate distance.

In 1872, the first instance of a Japanese government official, Arinori Mori, promoting the use of English as a national language in Japan was revealed in a series of letters to a leading American linguist at Yale University, William Dwight Whitney, and in a book Mori wrote called *Education in Japan*. Mori was sent by the Japanese government as the first ambassador to Washington D.C. in 1870. He also proposed changes to the English language, such as making orthography phonetic, in order for Japanese to be able to learn English more easily. In his book, Mori explains his reasons to make English the national language of Japan:

The commercial power of the English-speaking race which now rules the world drives our people into some knowledge of their commercial ways and habits. The absolute necessity of mastering the English language is thus forced upon us. It is a requisite of our independence in the community of nations. Under the circumstances, our meagre language, which can never be of any use outside of our islands, is doomed to yield to the domination of the English tongues, especially when the power of steam and electricity shall have pervaded the land. Our intelligent race, eager in the pursuit of knowledge, cannot depend upon a weak and uncertain medium of communication in its endeavor to grasp the principal truths from the precious treasury of Western science and art and religion. The laws of state can never be preserved in the language of Japan. All reasons suggest its disuse (Mori, 1873, quoted in Joseph, 2011).

Mori's argument is that instead of inevitably being dominated by English speaking countries and their technological advances, it is better to co-opt English in Japan in order to assert its independence and survival. This is similar to the earlier mentioned concept of *wakon yosai*, or incorporating Western knowledge while still remaining inherently Japanese. The extreme measure of abolishing the Japanese language was pilloried at the time in Japan according to newspaper editorials (Joseph, 2011). Even so, Mori would later become Japan's Education Minister in 1884 and reform the Japanese education system based on Germany's educational model, after having spent time in Germany in the 1870s (Joseph, 2011). Although extreme at the time, nearly 130 years later a commission by the Japanese government to discuss Japan's future in the 21st century would propose making English a second language in Japan.

In March of 1999, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi established the Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century by appointing 16 experts initially, and 35 additional experts later in the year, in diverse fields to generate a report of recommendations for Japan's future. The Prime Minister specifically tasked the commission with the following request: "Japan needed to reorient its national goals from those that prevailed during the periods of modernization and industrialization wherein Japan tended to put primary emphasis on economic growth in its effort to catch up with the Western industrialized nations" (Cabinet Secretariat, 2000). Echoing Ambassador Mori's worries about falling behind Western countries, Prime Minister Obuchi wanted Japan to refocus its national goals in the new post-industrial era in order to become prosperous again after the so-called Lost Decade of economic stagnation in the 1990s. The report was released in January of 2000 and one of its recommendations came in the final and sixth chapter of the report, regarding the pursuit of a new 'enlightened national interest'. The report states:

English has become the international lingua franca, a process accelerated by the Internet and globalization. So long as English is effectively the language of international discourse, there is no alternative to familiarizing ourselves with it within Japan. Even if we stop short of making it an official second language, we should give it the status of a second working language and use it routinely alongside Japanese (Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, Chapter 6, p. 20).

In contrast to Ambassador Mori's extreme proposal to abandon Japanese for English, the commission made a more pragmatic recommendation of adding English as a second working language, perhaps modeling Singapore or Hong Kong. They were careful not to attack Japanese language:

Lest there be any misunderstanding, we stress that Japanese is a wonderful language. We should nurture culture and cultivation, sensibility and thinking power, by treasuring Japanese and acquiring good Japanese language skills... If we treasure the Japanese language and culture, we should actively assimilate other languages and cultures, enriching Japanese culture through contact with other cultures and showing other countries the attraction of Japanese culture by introducing it in an appropriate fashion in their languages (Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, 2000, Chapter 6, p. 20).

Thus, like the *Kokoro no noto* teaching materials, the commission makes the argument that loving Japanese language and Japanese culture means loving other cultures and languages, and even allows for the spread of Japanese culture and language to other nations. In the report the commission stresses the need to internationalize its society in order to not be left behind by other countries (Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, 2000). Internationalism and English education are seen as a means to an end, with the end being a more prosperous and powerful Japan. Similar to nationalism, we can again see the presence of the concept of *wakon yosai*, or incorporating Western knowledge while maintaining Japanese uniqueness. Hashimoto (2015) argues that, since 1985, the Japanese government has helped Japanese school children maintain their Japanese identity while learning English, by promoting Japanese-style individuality, or individuals contributing their knowledge and skills to the group in order to foster group harmony and strength. This is in contrast to Western-style individualism, where countries with more individualistic cultures are associated with competition and self-reliance in lower-income countries, and higher tolerance of outsiders in higher-income countries (Binder, 2019). The Japanese government has “emphasized that the negative aspect of Western individualism must be made explicit in the first instance to ensure that Japanese learners of English have an established Japanese self and that the unwelcomed elements of English language and culture have been excluded” (Hashimoto, 2015, p. 28). Long before 1985, however, there has been a strand running through Japanese history, that it is necessary to preserve Japan's unique cultural and racial homogeneity.

The term *Yamato-damashii*, first appearing in the Tale of Genji in the 11th century, means the spirit/soul (*damashii* - 魂) of the ancient Japanese people, or Yamato (大和). *Yamato-damashii* originated over a thousand years ago in the Heian period as a counterpoint to Chinese learning and scholarship, and has been incorporated more recently by ultra-nationalists (Carr, 1994). In the Edo period, 1603-1868, the Japanese scholar, Norinaga Mortori, gave *Yamato-damashii* the meaning of ‘unique Japanese spirit’ (Japanese-English Bilingual Corpus, 2011). This idea that the Japanese are unique is exemplified in the genre of texts, television and radio programs that focus on Japanese cultural and national identity, called *nihonjinron* (日本人論) or theories about the Japanese. *Nihonjinron* theorists claim that the Yamato race, i.e. excluding Japanese ethnic groups like the Ainu in Hokkaido and the Ryukyuan people of Okinawa, are the sole owners of its culture and heritage (Sugimoto, 1999). Liddicoat (2007) notes that a key element of *nihonjinron* is that Japanese people are a linguistically and culturally homogenous group in a racially unified nation, with distinctive characteristics. Although there is an absence of empirical, scientific studies, over 700 books in the *nihonjinron* genre were published between 1945 to 1978 (Kazufumi and Befu, 1993). In a 1987 survey of 944 Japanese adults, around 80% of the respondents were interested in the *nihonjinron* genre, 49% agreed that Japanese is a unique culture, and 38% agreed that Japanese are a homogenous people (Kazufumi and Befu, 1993). The authors define four key tenets, based on 21 popular books, of the *nihonjinron* genre:

1. Homogeneity: Japanese are a homogeneous and unique people (*doshitsu shakai*, *tanitsu minzoku*, and *yuniiku na bunka*).
2. Blood: Japanese "blood" is essential for mutual communication, mutual understanding, understanding of the culture and appearance as Japanese.
3. Cultural competence: Foreigners are incapable of fully understanding Japanese culture or mastering the language.

4. Social participation: The sociocultural territoriality of Japan should be defended and foreigners excluded in the areas of marriage, employment, teaching, and political and artistic leadership. (Kazufumi and Befu, 1993, p. 94).

Nihonjinron, wakon yosai, Yamato-damashii, Japanese patriotism (aikoku) are all types of nationalism, some more extreme than others, that attempt to further the national interests of Japan and protect its cultural, and linguistic heritage. To further Japan's national interests in an even more globalized world since Mr. Mori proposed abandoning the Japanese language in the 1870s, English language is seen by the Japanese government as a way forward to prosperity. In 2013, the Japanese Minister of Education (MEXT) wrote the following in an article regarding internationalizing Japan's universities:

In Japan, the falling birthrate and aging population are resulting in a decreasing working-age population, and in regional areas, maintaining communities and their vitality are presenting great challenges. Faced with these issues, both global and domestic, Japan has no other course than to enhance the capabilities of each and every citizen through education if it wants to continue to grow as an affluent nation and keep its position within the world. For this, it is of paramount importance for Japan to ensure that its system of higher education, particularly through the internationalization of its universities, fosters highly capable people with a global perspective who can play active roles in many fields. This will be crucial for strengthening Japan's international competitiveness (Shimomura, 2013, September 2).

Worries about losing its place as a powerful nation, as noted earlier, has prompted Japan to embrace so-called internationalization in order to remain competitive and affluent. The Minister goes on to cite "the inward-looking passivity of Japanese youth" and their "weakness in English" as a reason Japanese students studied abroad less and less (Shimomura, 2013, September 2). Similar to the 2000 report from the Commission on Japan's goals in the 21st Century, the Japanese government is focused on revitalizing the nation via English language education and internationalization efforts. In addition to the effects from the Lost Decade still being felt in the 2010s, now Japan had to deal with a new double-headed problem, population decline and a rapidly aging society. Japan's population peaked in 2008 at 128,084,000 people and has shrunk by about 1.6 million people in the 12 years since the peak. In addition, Japan has one of the largest populations of people over 65 in the world, at 28.4% of the total population in 2019, and is projected to grow considerably higher in the next few decades. One of the solutions by the Japanese government to confront these issues is through internationalization and increased English education. Internationalization, Hashimoto (2015) argues, is Japan's buzzword for not only exporting Japanese culture to the world, but also its strategy to maintain and bolster its economic might and culturally unique character, and that teaching English is central to the promotion of these goals. As Kubota (2015) notes, "the Japanese government and business associations have promoted English language teaching to bolster economic competitiveness" while the "neoliberal promotion of English is complemented by neoconservative emphasis on national identity" (p. 1). Now that we have covered Japanese nationalism and its links to English education and the internationalization of its society, we can turn to a key construct in my research, mobility, and how it is related to the discussions we have had so far regarding national identity.

## 2.5 Postnational Identity and Mobility

### What is postnationalism?

Some scholars believe that national citizenship is being replaced by local identities, global human rights and regional affiliations (Soysal, 1994) and that transnational migration is making national membership, and in particular citizenship, less salient since many rights are afforded to residents, not just citizens (Jacobson, 1996). Bosniak (2000, 2006) argues that citizenship should be treated as a political idea that signifies and embodies practices and institutions that are outside of the traditional confines and boundaries of the nation-state, a kind of denationalization that reduces the nation-state's role as the only legitimate source of citizenship. In an appeal to disassociate citizenship from the nation-state, Shachar (2009) proposes an alternative way of determining citizenship, *jus nexi*, in contrast to the two methods mentioned earlier, through *jus sanguinis* (bloodlines) or *jus soli* (birthright). Through a genuine connection to a society and active participation in a community, one could be afforded citizenship, according to Shachar, 2009. Some people may contend that, with globalization, European citizenship, international treaties, the United Nations, and permanent residency being offered in most nation-states, the so-called cosmopolitan or postnational era may have already begun. Postnationalism is a sociological concept that refers to changing patterns of global capitalism and migration that challenge the nation-state model to be redefined under new modes of political participation and social action (Maronitis, 2020). Maronitis (2020) argues that, rather than the end of nationalism, postnationalism signals the struggle of the nation-state in a globalized world to maintain control over its society, economy and culture. Sassen (2000) notes that the overlapping trends of globalization, deregulation, and privatization will inevitably force the citizenship model based exclusively on the nation state to change to something more postnational in nature. Hansen (2009) notes that, although it is not a new phenomenon,

postnationalisms make an important point about rights and identity - one's identity may be local, regional, international; it might be based on sexuality, language, membership of a particular religious or other group; and it might be only secondarily or not at all tied to the nation-state (p. 15).

In a postnational world, an individual's identity may be more salient than their citizenship status, even if they are mismatched. Of course, the nation-state is still the ultimate guarantor of rights and privileges. There is an emotional, political, and bureaucratic struggle that can occur with highly mobile individuals, something that we will see later in the analysis of my research participants. The question becomes, then, if economic, social, civil, and sometimes political rights are afforded on the basis of residency and not just citizenship, then why would individuals need to naturalize (Jacobson, 1996)? The problem with this assumption is that not all individuals are privileged to be able to secure permanent residency status, or even short-term residency status. In addition, not all nations offer permanent residents enough protections and rights, compared to the rights offered to citizens. Let's take, for example, the differences in the rights offered to permanent residents and citizens in Japan. After living in Japan for 10 consecutive years I was finally able to apply for permanent residency. Some of the benefits of permanent residency in Japan are being able to renew one's visa every seven years, instead of more frequently, being afforded the opportunity to apply for a home mortgage at a Japanese bank, and

the psychological benefit of feeling like a more ‘permanent’ part of Japanese society. However, this feeling of being a part of Japanese society can shift depending on a variety of factors. One controversy that has left Japan’s legal residents feeling like they are outsiders has been the treatment of said group during the 2020 pandemic. On April 3, 2020, the Japanese government decided to ban entry of legal residents with valid visas and permanent residents from, what would later expand to be, 159 countries, with some exceptions, from entering Japan. Japan was the only member of the G7 countries, which include Canada, France and Italy, to bar long term and permanent residents from entering the country. The government claims this was done to help curb the spread of the virus, but still allowed Japanese citizens to leave and reenter the country (Osumi, 2020, August 28). Japanese nationals were only required to get a PCR test when arriving in Japan and told to self-isolate for two weeks without any penalties for non compliance, even though many reports showed that several Japanese nationals arriving in Japan tested positive for COVID-19 (Osumi, 2020a, August 27). By mid August of 2020, there were still 192,000 foreign nationals that were outside of Japan, 90,000 of whom left before the entry ban was initiated, waiting for a decision by the Japanese government on when it would grant them access to return (Osumi, 2020b, August 28). After much pressure from international business organizations and lobbying from other countries, the Japanese government decided to finally allow residents to return in early September of 2020. After nearly 6 months of waiting, some residents were finally able to return if they took and passed a virus test and got approval to return to Japan from their local Japanese embassy beforehand. Despite paying all the same taxes as Japanese citizens, and still having to pay rent and utilities while they were banned from entering their country of residence, legal non-Japanese residents were effectively treated as second class citizens while Japanese citizens were afforded the right to enter Japan. In fact, the Japanese constitution is clear about its distinctions between non-Japanese and Japanese, even after the major changes that were instituted by Americans to the constitution after World War II. According to MOFA (1999), “Foreign residents in Japan are also guaranteed fundamental human rights under the Constitution except the rights which, owing to their nature, are interpreted to be applicable only to Japanese nationals.” The Supreme Court of Japan, for example, ruled in 2014 that non-Japanese residents do not have a right to access the Japanese welfare system, even if they present a legitimate case and paid taxes into that welfare system (Jones, 2014, August 6). Thus, although some scholars may predict or hope for a postnational reformation and devaluing of the individual nation-state model of citizenship, the reality is still far from a cosmopolitan citizen-of-world model. In practice, citizenship, depending on the nation-state, can be the crucial element that provides access to those material assets, like being able to enter a country or receive welfare, and to those non-material assets, like the feeling of belonging to a group. Just like the Nikkei community who arrived in Japan to work and prosper in the 1990s, and were encouraged to leave at the first sign of economic troubles, we have learned that non-Japanese are not always welcome in Japan. In Chapter 4, I will discuss the interviews I had with four members of the Nikkei community, three of whom are not Japanese citizens. However, the other two groups that I interviewed, kikokushijo, and the graduate students studying in the US, all have Japanese citizenship. In Chapters 5 and 6, I will discuss how transnational mobility affects their Japanese national identities. Now, let’s look at mobility and what it means in this globalized era.

Tracing the history of the Japanese diaspora and the Nikkei communities’ return to Japan has illuminated many different aspects of Japanese national identity as we have seen in our earlier discussion. Pennycook (2012) notes that “travel, movement and mobility are essential for an


understanding not only of the contemporary world but also how our contemporary conditions came to be” (p. 17). Inherent in the notion of mobility are two key concepts, the sociopolitical factors that give rise to mobility, and the power and privilege that allow, or do not allow, people to choose when and where to become mobile. Refugees fleeing war-torn countries may have little choice but to become mobile in order to survive, and may have few options where they end up, if they can reach a safe destination alive. From 2014 to 2019, more than 18,000 migrants and refugees lost their lives crossing the mediterranean sea (Reuters, 2019, October 1). And if they are lucky enough to survive, “judgments in law courts, educational systems, asylum tribunals, job interviews, or hospital waiting rooms are brought to bear on their language use”, which the discriminatory state apparatus is ill-equipped to handle (Pennycook, 2012, p. 24). The Japanese emigrants at the turn of the 20th century were faced with economic difficulties in Japan and searched for a better life, just as the Nikkei community sought out Japan as a refuge from a troubled economy in Brazil in the 1980s and 90s. They once again faced a tough economy in 2008 and many returned to Brazil. Their stories of mobility are typical of migrants everywhere, searching for opportunities where they arise. Business people who work abroad and students who choose to study abroad, on the other hand, have more stable and predictable sojourns, and have many linguistic resources and other forms of institutional support at their disposal. For my thesis, I interviewed kikokushijo, or returnees, and graduate students in doctoral programs, who were part of the latter mobility group of privileged and socioeconomically advantaged individuals. Tracing their journeys will also yield information about their national identities, language use, and about Japanese nationalism. Now I would like to introduce some of the background and history of Japanese who live abroad, and in particular kikokushijo.

### **Privileges of Going Abroad: Kikokushijo**

Post World War II Japan saw many changes in all aspects of life, including a rapid expansion of the economy starting in the mid 1950s. According to the World Bank, in 1960 for example, Japan’s GDP per capita was \$479 USD and grew to \$40,246 USD in 2019 (The World Bank, 2019). As living standards rose and the economy heated up, companies started expanding abroad and sending their workers outside of Japan to live temporarily for work assignments. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or MOFA (2018), for example, there were 35,134 Japanese affiliated companies or corporate branches operating overseas in 2005. By 2017 that number had increased to 75,531 companies operating abroad, representing an 87% increase over 12 years (MOFA, 2018). Approximately 70% of those companies and branches were located in Asia in 2017, and around 20% were in North America and Western Europe (MOFA, 2018). Thus, opportunities for employees from Japanese companies to work abroad have increased greatly since the 1960s and particularly so in the last 30 years.

Although there are no exact numbers of how many Japanese workers there are living abroad, the government does publish an array of statistics about their citizens living abroad. In 1989, for example, there were just 586,972 Japanese citizens living abroad, or about 0.5% of the overall population. Over the last 30 years, the number has more than doubled to 1,390,370 Japanese citizens living abroad in 2018, or approximately 1% of the total Japanese population (MOFA, 2018). Figure 6 shows a graph of the number of Japanese citizens living abroad from 1989 to 2018. The year 2018 shows the highest number of Japanese citizens living abroad since they began collecting records.


## Japanese Citizens Living Abroad



*Figure 6.* Japanese Citizens Living Abroad (Translated from Annual Report of Statistics on Japanese Nationals Overseas 海外在留邦人数調査統計 from the Policy Section of the Consular Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).

For comparison, although there are no precise numbers, the U.S. Department of State estimates that there are currently 10 million Americans living abroad, representing about 3% of the total population (US Department of State, 2020). As indicated in Figure 6, most Japanese citizens living abroad are so-called long-term stays (長期滞在者 - choki taiseisha). Long-term stays are a separate visa category from permanent residents, and are defined by the Japanese government as anyone staying longer than three months abroad. Included in this long-term stay visa category are students, researchers, and temporary workers at Japanese company satellites abroad. In 2018 there were 876,620 Japanese citizens on long-term stays compared to just 513,750 permanent residents living abroad according to Figure 6. North America was the most popular place for Japanese living abroad, accounting for 36.7% of the total number of Japanese abroad. Figure 7 shows the percentages of Japanese living in various regions of the world. North America and Asia account for nearly two thirds of the total population of Japanese living abroad.

## Where Japanese Live Abroad (2017)



*Figure 7.* Where Japanese live abroad. (Translated from Annual Report of Statistics on Japanese Nationals Overseas 海外在留邦人数調査統計 from the Policy Section of the Consular Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).

Thus, the number of Japanese living abroad has increased and many who go abroad live in North America, where most of my *kikokushijo* research participants lived. Let's break these numbers down further based on gender and age.

At first, men usually went abroad alone, leaving their wives and children in Japan until returning, but as time went on more families started going abroad together (Goodman, 2012). In 2017, for example, women accompanying men on their overseas assignments accounted for 15% of long-term residents living abroad (MOFA, 2017). The children accompanying their parents on long-term assignments abroad came to be known as *kaigaishijo* and those children who returned to Japan were called *kikokushijo* (Fry, 2007). The term *kikoku* (帰国) means to return to one's country and *shijo* (子女) means sons and daughters or children. Similarly the term *kaigai* (海外) means foreign, abroad or overseas and *shijo* (子女) has the same meaning of children. Although there are terms for temporarily living outside of one's native country in English, i.e. expatriate or living-, studying- or working abroad, there are few widely known terms in English for people who return to their homelands. The use of the terms returnee, sojourner, and third culture kids has been used, but mostly as labels in academic communities and research.

Actually, the term *kikokushijo* is a government-recognized label and category, something that separates returnee children from other countries without a special distinction. There is a definition of *kikokushijo* given by The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and

Technology, known as MEXT in English or Monbu Kagaku-sho (文部科学省) in Japanese. According to an organization called Japan Overseas Educational Services, or JOES, MEXT uses the term kikokushijo if Japanese children meet the following three criteria: 1) they have spent one or more years living outside of Japan, 2) they are at the primary or secondary school level, and 3) they have returned to live in Japan within the last year (JOES, 2017). As opposed to third culture kids or sojourners, which could mean children of missionary workers, members of the military, and parents traveling for experience abroad, kaigaishijo and kikokushijo are almost always, with the exception of diplomats and members of the Japanese royal family, children of professionals working at multinational corporations who are assigned to an overseas post for one year or more.

JOES was founded in 1971 with the approval of MEXT and the funding from Japanese corporations to help educate Japanese children living abroad, i.e. kaigaishijo, in concordance with Japanese government education policy (JOES, nd.). Given the fact that workers knew that they would eventually come back to Japan after their sojourn abroad, there was a need to maintain their children's education in Japanese language in order to have a smooth transition upon return. Classes include mathematics, Japanese writing lessons and Japanese history. The first Japanese school created for such efforts was established in Bangkok, Thailand in 1956 and outside of Asia in Sydney, Australia in 1969 (Tsuneyoshi, 2011). According to JOES, in 2018, there were more than 76,000 kaigaishijo living abroad with their parents on overseas work assignments (JOES, nd). This means that currently only around 5% to 6% of Japanese living abroad are kaigaishijo, or children of Japanese working abroad.

Although only a small percentage of the total Japanese population living abroad, there was a need to develop schools to educate all of these kaigaishijo. As of 2018, there were 88 full-time Japanese schools (Nihonjin gakko) and 204 weekend supplementary schools, called hoshūko (補習校), around the world (JOES, nd). It would appear that no other educational system for primary and secondary schools based on governmental education policy rivals the extent of this Japanese overseas educational system. In comparison, the US Department of State, as of July 2020, had 160 schools operating in 11 foreign countries with 69,688 students of military personelle (DODEA, 2020). Without the presence of the US military in so many countries around the world, there would be few government-sponsored US schools abroad. In contrast, the Japanese government has made it a priority to maintain these schools abroad despite its lack of overseas military bases. These Japanese schools, then, are crucial to keeping Japanese children's language and educational standards up to par, not to mention providing a link to Japan itself. Going to a supplementary school on the weekends, for example, is a constant reminder to kaigaishijo that they are preparing for an inevitable return to Japan. Unlike immigrants, who move permanently to another country, the kaigaishijo understand that their existence abroad is time-limited.

Once kaigaishijo return from abroad, children are counted as kikokushijo for the first year after they return by the government. This distinction of kikokushijo, however, can persist unofficially even though children are not officially recognized as kikokushijo by the government after one year living in Japan. Many kikokushijo identify themselves as such long after they return to Japan (Goodman, 2012). As you will see in later chapters, all the participants spoke about their kikokushijo identity and how much they felt it was a part of them. For some, living abroad at a

young age is the defining experience of their lives and for others it is just something that happened in their lives, more like a part of their timeline of events.

MEXT has been keeping yearly statistics on kikokushijo since 1977. The numbers of kikokushijo steadily increased until the peak of 1992 when there were 13,218 kikokushijo. The numbers have been above 10,000 ever since, with the exception of 2011 when they dipped below 10,000. In the four years preceding 2016 the numbers have risen to about 12,000 kikokushijo in 2016 (JOES, 2017).

Another way kikokushijo are different from third culture kids and sojourners from other countries, is the special privileges allowed for students entering university. Officially it is called kikokushijo tokubetsu senbatsu (帰国子女特別選抜), or kikokushijo special selection. Several public and private universities allow for kikokushijo just returning from abroad to apply to Japanese universities through a special system designed for kikokushijo. One requirement, other than recent arrival in Japan, is that in order to qualify for the special exam, many universities require Japanese citizenship. If students are non-Japanese, they may have to take a completely different entrance examination specifically created for international students.

An explanation of the Japanese university entrance system is warranted. High school students usually take two different university entrance exam tests, one created by the government called the National Center Test (大学入試センター試験) and one created by the university a student wishes to enter. A combination of high school grades and the results of these two entrance exams is usually how most students, 56.6% or 339,414 students in 2014, enter a university in Japan (MEXT, 2014). However, there are other ways to enter a Japanese university. The next most popular method, 34.4% or 205,849 students in 2014, is what is known as the school or teacher recommendation system whereby top students from schools are given special recommendations to attend universities (MEXT, 2014). The third most popular category, 8.6% or 51,362 students in 2014, is referred to as AO in Japan, or special skilled students (MEXT, 2014). The final category, 0.4% or 2,609 students in 2014, includes students from vocational high schools, comprehensive high schools, working adults, Chinese repatriates and kikokushijo (MEXT, 2014). The number of students in the final category including kikokushijo was much higher in the year 2000, with 6,827 examinees, or 1.1% of the total (MEXT, 2014). Although only a very small percentage of students enter university via the special kikokushijo status, the fact that the Japanese government and most universities in Japan allow for this special status shows the uniqueness Japanese society places on kikokushijo. Let's have a look at more precise numbers of kikokushijo taking special entrance exams.

Kikokushijo apply and are admitted to both public and private universities in Japan via the special selection university entrance exam system. In 2006, for example, 399 universities allowed 1,303 students to enter via the kikokushijo special selection entrance exam (MEXT, 2007). In 2010, the numbers of kikokushijo entering university via this system dropped to 1,140 (MEXT, 2012). According to government statistics, in 1978 the percentage of officially recognized kikokushijo who took the special selection entrance exam at public universities was only 0.8%, but increased to 68.2% in 1997. At private universities in 1997, the percentage of officially recognized kikokushijo who took the special selection entrance exam was 54.1%. Therefore, kikokushijo used their officially recognized status from the government to take this

special entrance exam, which can help them enter exclusive universities. Many of Japan's elite universities, like the University of Tokyo or Keio University, allow kikokushijo to take the special entrance examination. Each university has its own special kikokushijo entrance examination. Generally, the special kikokushijo entrance exam is different because students can sometimes take the test year-round, and they can write English essays or be interviewed, and use American SAT scores, or TOEFL and International Baccalaureate scores. The number of Japanese subjects kikokushijo have to take are usually fewer than for the regular entrance exam. Many juku, or cram schools, like Edubal, specifically prepare kikokushijo to enter top universities. This is from Edubal's website regarding preparation for the kikokushijo entrance exam:

帰国子女枠は対策をしっかりとすれば、難関国立大(東京大学)、上位私立大(早稲田、慶應、上智)、MARCH(明治/青山学院/立教/中央/法政)等、実際の学力より2~3ランク上の大学に合格できます。

Translation: If you take the special kikokushijo entrance exam at universities with kikokushijo quotas, you can enter a top national university (University of Tokyo), or top private universities (Waseda, Keio, Sophia), or the so-called MARCH universities (Meiji, Aoyama Gakuin, Rikkyo, Chuo, Hosei) that are 2 to 3 ranks above your academic abilities (Edubal, n.d.).

The school acknowledges in their advertising that kikokushijo are able to get into universities that they normally would not be able to enter because of their special status as kikokushijo. Kanno (2003) in her dissertation and later book describes a conversation with her four research participants, all kaigaishijo that she taught at hoshūko schools abroad, and later followed until they became kikokushijo attending universities in Japan. The following is the conversation her research participants have regarding the special kikokushijo entrance exam:

Rui wrote that he was uncomfortable when a non-kikokushijo student at Tsukuba university asked him, quite innocently, why kikokushijo can get into top universities. Kikuko responded by saying that whenever she encountered such a question, she settled the matter by answering that kikokushijo get a separate entrance exam because they are too stupid to take the regular kind. Kenji, on the other hand, expressed his contempt at such a self-deprecating attitude. He wrote, "I wonder if we kikokushijo must live with a sense of inferiority complex in Japan. Are we behind? Are we inferior to the regular Japanese because we have been educated differently?... I think you guys could have a little more self confidence." Sawako, too, said that she felt vindicated when she heard her father explain the nature of the kikokushijo exam to his friend, by saying, "[In the kikokushijo exam] you have to write [an essay] about what you've read in the newspaper or what you've learned abroad. So just like Sawako could not do well on the regular exam. It would be difficult for them" (Kanno, 2003, p. 118).

This passage illustrates the complex layers of privilege the kikokushijo are experiencing, namely feelings of guilt, inferiority, uniqueness, and how they are not like 'regular Japanese.' Later in my interviews with kikokushijo, we will find out that some kikokushijo took advantage of this system to enter top universities and knew that they were being given a leg-up by this preferential

system. The material assets and benefits, as well as the struggles of being a kikokushijo will be discussed later. Mobility for the privileged can equal even more privilege. Nevertheless, kikokushijo did not choose to go abroad. Their families took them abroad in order to stay together, or sometimes with the purpose of exposing their children to a new culture and language, precisely because the parents knew how valuable English language skills are in Japan. Thus, some of the struggles kikokushijo endured, arose from the fact that they did not choose to upend their lives and learn English in a new country. They were still required to maintain their Japanese skills knowing that one day they would return to Japan. I will cover these issues in my analysis in Chapter 5. The final group of individuals I have interviewed for my thesis, in contrast to my kikokushijo participants, purposefully chose to live abroad in adulthood.

### **Study abroad and Internationalizing Japan**

Transnational mobile students are part of Japan's efforts to internationalize and maintain its global competitiveness. Both sending students abroad and accepting international students are key elements of its plan to revitalize Japan. In June of 2010, the Japanese government issued its so-called 'New Growth Strategy' that details plans for 'revitalizing Japan' by 2020 (The Cabinet, 2010). One of the several goals to revitalize all aspects of the country's economy deals with increasing highly skilled non-Japanese, study abroad and international students:

We will expand the pool of foreign talents and double the number of highly-skilled foreign personnel in Japan. We will also aim to dispatch 300,000 Japanese students and workers abroad and accept 300,000 foreign talented students into Japan for study and training (The Cabinet, 2010, p. 55).

Billions of yen were allocated to the country's yearly budgets that funded several projects and partnerships in order to meet the New Growth Strategy goals (MEXT, n.d.). According to the latest statistics reported by MEXT, a Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO) survey in 2019 indicated that there were 312,214 international students studying in Japan, which is a 70% increase from the number in 2014, 184,155 (JASSO, 2014; JASSO, 2019). The goal of 300,000 international students in Japan had been met. As for Japan's other goal of sending 300,000 Japanese students abroad, according to statistics from MEXT, 115,146 students studied abroad in 2018, falling well short of its goal (MEXT, 2020).


According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD):

For host countries, mobile students (whether international or foreign) may be an important source of income and have a disproportionate impact on their economic and innovation systems...mobile students can contribute to knowledge absorption, technology upgrading and capacity building in their home country, provided they return home after their studies or maintain strong links with nationals at home (OECD, 2020, p. 227).

It is likely that the Japanese government included study abroad students and international students in their revitalization plan for exactly the reasons laid out by the OECD report: they offer the potential to upgrade knowledge systems, including cultural, linguistic, and technological practices, as well as the potential to create a positive impact on the economy

through innovations and building international partnerships. Figure 8 shows OECD statistics of Japanese students studying abroad from 1983 to 2012 and from 2012 until 2017. The former group includes all ages of students studying abroad and only includes Japanese nationals, while the latter group only includes tertiary education but does not distinguish nationality. So an American that was living in Japan who went to study abroad at a university in Canada, for example, would be counted as a student studying abroad from Japan since 2013. The numbers of study abroad students increased significantly in the 1990s and only decreased after the 2008 global financial crisis, mirroring the Nikkei communities migration pattern in and out of Japan. The numbers do not reflect, on the other hand, the myriad small language schools touted by various organizations and businesses that cater to Japanese students who want to spend short periods of time studying abroad.

### Japanese Study Abroad Students (OECD)



*Figure 8.* OECD Statistics on Japanese students studying abroad. MEXT, 2020.

For this reason, the Japan Association of Overseas Students (JAOS) conducted a survey in 2017 to get a fuller picture of all the different kinds of study abroad students from Japan. According to the survey, which partnered with 40 member organizations, there were a total of 79,123 students who studied abroad in 2017 (JAOS, 2017). In Figure 9 we can see that most Japanese students, 56.4%, study abroad at language schools for less than three months.

### Japanese Students Study Abroad (2017)




Figure 9. JAOS Survey of Japanese Study Abroad Students, 2017.

As noted in Fritz and Murao (2020), the short length of stay for most Japanese students calls into question the ability to meet Japan's lofty goals of improving and revitalizing the economy. How can students gain valuable skills from less than three months abroad? For this reason, my research focuses on graduate students completing their doctoral studies abroad, during which time they are able to gain a great deal of cultural, linguistic, and specialized knowledge, which the Japanese government highly prizes. In Chapter 6, I will discuss the analysis of several interviews I had with two Japanese graduate students over a three-year period. Next, I will summarize the content of this chapter.

## 2.6 Summary

From the Ancient Greek city states to beginnings of participatory democracy in the Middle Ages to the democratic revolutions of the 18th century, our geopolitical landscape has evolved into a system of interlinked sovereign nation-states, some more wealthy and powerful than others. Japan, from over 200 years of isolation to its imperialist expansion from the 1890s to World War II and finally to its defeat and subsequent rapid rebuilding of the economy, has sought to maintain its national identity and power. Since the 1980s, Japan has sought to remain globally competitive via its neoliberal and neoconservative nationalistic efforts. I have shown in this chapter the following ways that Japan's neoconservative nationalism has manifested itself:

Through the widespread prevalence of theories in mass media regarding Japan's racial and cultural purity and unique excellence, called *nihonjinron*;

Through the Japanese government's attempts to claim controversial rights to disputed territories, and revise embarrassing or unfavorable incidents in its history in school textbooks;

Through the Japanese government's and The Supreme Court's decisions regarding the unequal treatment of non-Japanese living legally in Japan (including different schooling policies, access to welfare, and access to the country itself);

Through the Japanese government's and The Japanese Supreme Court's decisions to force Japanese teachers to stand and sing the national anthem;  
 Through government policies and comments by government officials that encouraged the Nikkei community to leave Japan;  
 And, through government policies that do not allow dual or multiple citizenship.

I have also shown in this chapter the following ways that Japan's neoliberal nationalism has manifested itself in the form of its internationalization efforts:

Through government policies to encourage the Nikkei community to live and work in Japan;  
 Through the use of aikoku, or patriotism, in educational materials given to all students in Japan, which claims that loving Japan first will lead to spreading Japanese culture throughout the world and loving other countries' cultures;  
 Through government policies that help kikokushijo prosper, such as the maintenance of hoshūko schools abroad and the existence of special university entrance exams;  
 Through using government funds to promote programs to encourage international students to study in Japan;  
 Through using government funds to promote programs to encourage Japanese students to study abroad;  
 Through using government funds to promote programs to increase the number of highly skilled foreigners in Japan;  
 And through government policies to increase the amount and quality of English education in Japan.

In these neoconservative and neoliberal nationalist efforts, I argue that Japan has sought to maintain its national identity and cultural heritage in order to revitalize its position as a powerful and prosperous nation-state. My research is situated in this context of Japanese nationalisms that directly and indirectly affect all of my research participant groups, i.e. the Nikkei community, kikokushijo, and study abroad students. However, I have also shown that national identity is not static or monodirectional, but rather that it is ever changing and co-constructed. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I will analyze the voluminous data that was produced from all of my interviews. This analysis will illuminate how my research participants' national identities were affected by their mobility and language use within the greater context of Japanese nationalisms and also how they actively constructed their identities with these frameworks.

## Chapter 3 - Methodological Approach

### 3.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I introduced relevant background and historical information, including charts, graphs, statistics and facts, that have helped to lay the foundation for my analysis and to help the reader understand the environments in which my research participants traverse and occupy. In this chapter I introduce my methodological approach. First, I explain how positioning theory is appropriate for the type of data that I have co-created with my participants. Later, I detail my process of data collection and analysis, for example, by using a form of narrative positioning analysis. I then describe how I recruited my participants and summarize their basic information in two tables.

### 3.1 - Positioning theory

Rom Harré and Bronwyn Davies introduced positioning theory in 1990 as a way to understand the production of self, i.e. personhood, through active social interaction and discursive practices. Discursive practices, according to Harré and Davies (1990), are the ways in which individuals create psychological and social realities in discourses where meanings and phenomena are dynamically co-constructed. McVee (2011) writes that “positioning is a complex, multifaceted, dynamic construct related to the ways in which people construct self and other through discursive practices such as oral and written discourse, language use, and speech and other acts” (p. 4). Van Langenhove and Harré (1999) note that conversations are discursive practices within which the social world is created. Harré and Van Langenhove (1991) write that within conversations, “positioning can be understood as the discursive construction of personal stories that make a person’s actions intelligible and relatively determinate as social acts and within which the members of the conversation have specific locations” (p. 108). In other words, individuals position themselves in certain ways depending on the context and constraints present. Acts of positioning also refer to the assignment of fluid parts or roles in discursive practices, where one can be positioned by others as powerless, for example, or one can position oneself as powerful (Van Langenhove and Harré 1999). However, these positionings are not static. “Through the acts of positioning, subjects position themselves and others into more or less desirable or troublesome positions, forming the basis for further positioning” (Henriksen, 2008, p. 43). Initial positionings can be challenged, negotiated and reformed. We will later see in Chapter 5, how some of my kikokushijo participants had to negotiate their identities and reposition themselves when they encountered the *senpai* (senior)/ *kohai* (junior) relationship system that is prevalent in Japanese culture. In institutional structures in Japan, like high school and university clubs, older *senpai* students in higher grades are usually treated with reverence and more respect, including using a more polite and formal register in Japanese, even with only one year in age difference. If a *kohai* student is too familiar, using an informal register, or challenges the power difference, a *senpai* student may reposition the *kohai* student in order to maintain the power structure. The positioning efforts by the *senpai* student might include reminding the *kohai* student to use formal language when addressing *senpai*, bullying the *kohai* student by berating or asking others in the group to ignore them, or by forcing the student to choose to stay in the group and follow social norms or leave the group. Van Langenhove and Harré (1999) write about the rights, duties and obligations that occur within discursive practices,

where “the rights for self-positioning and other-positioning are unequally distributed and not all situations allow for or call for an intentional positioning of the participants” (p. 23). To return to the senpai/kohai example, the rights and duties are not distributed equally. Generally, senpais provide guidance and kohais are supposed to follow this guidance. For example, I will introduce a student in one of my previous research projects to illustrate this kind of positioning. In Fritz & Murao (2016), a Japanese graduate student, Eri, was studying abroad in the US where she was conducting research at a university laboratory. In the following conversation, Eri, a master’s degree student, explains why she could not become friends with her PhD senpai:

Eri: I’m hard to make a friends because lab in the PhD students only. And another lab is PhD students only. I...it is trouble to make friends.

Fritz: Oh really? Why? How...can you talk more about that?

Eri: The PhD students is very friendly. They are...they think me friends but I respect them. For me it’s different...different for, yeah, friends. [...]

Eri: In Japan we are [including Eri] ...graduate students is top in my lab. But the [PhD students in Indiana] are more three years perform their research. Their skill and brain is very intelligent. When I have a trouble they’re teach me to fix my trouble. (Fritz & Murao, 2016, p. 16).

Thus, for Eri, her PhD senpai are positioned as respected lab members higher up in the lab hierarchy and sought after for guidance, but not for intimacy and friendship. However, the Americans positioned Eri as another member of the lab and as their potential friend. Eri’s self-positioning as kohai effectively placed a barrier to making friends, even though she wanted to make friends and even though her lab members also wanted to become friends with her. Generally, kohais form strong bonds with members of their same cohort and age, where they can use a more informal register and are even expected to make friends within their cohort. The lack of a fellow master’s degree student kohai in her lab of all PhD students, then, prevented Eri from making friends in her mind. Even though she was in the US, Eri mentions her Japanese context (In Japan we are...), as the reason she cannot break out of her kohai role. Unless the senpai/kohai rights and obligations are challenged, intentional positioning may not be necessary since certain social norms are accepted and implicitly understood in Japanese culture. Kikokushijo raised in the United States and used to more relaxed interactions with their upperclassmen in the US, may need to reposition themselves into the kohai role if they transfer to a Japanese context, reframing their identity as ranked, unequal members of the group instead of being equal members of a group. If this self-repositioning does not occur, the senpai or other kohai members in the group may intentionally position the kikokushijo into the ‘appropriate’ kohai role. In Eri’s case, she self-positioned into the kohai role because she identified herself as having a weaker set of research skills and therefore she felt she was on a lower stratum than her PhD student colleagues. She didn’t feel that it was her right to become friends with her senpai, but she did think that her senpai had a duty to “teach” her. Thus, because positioning theory deals with power, agency and the social acts that occur in discursive practices, “analyzing positioning in written and oral discourse is a way of uncovering participants’ identities” (Kayl-Aydar, 2019, p. 50).

All of the data I use in this thesis comes from interviews I have conducted with my participants, and in one case a conversation between the participants themselves. Positioning theory will allow me to analyze these conversations to find out how my participants position themselves and others within multiple discourses. McVee (2011) notes that “positioning theory, with its emphasis on discursive processes of the mind and sociolinguistic utterances in the shaping of identity and self, requires close attention to language processes” (p. 14). Positioning theory gives me the tools, then, to discuss how my participants’ identities emerge in the micro-level discourses being created during our interviews and within the macro-level discourses outside the immediate interview context, like Japanese nationalism and social constructs such as senpai/kohai. Gee’s (2015) notion of small “d” discourses and big “D” discourses is useful to explain that language and speech do not occur in a vacuum. As Gee (2015) notes, a discourse, or language in use among individuals, always happens within larger Discourses, or socially constructed contexts that comprise past and present actions, beliefs, values, technologies, and ways of interacting. Thus, the junior kaigaishijo who informally interacts with her senior journalism club members in the US may not be able to have the same conversations and interactions as a kikokushijo in Japan, with her senior journalism club members, because the Discourses are different. Eri provides a clear example of how she is not able to transition into the new Discourse of an American laboratory.

All of my participants were confronted with new environments or Discourses to adapt to and new languages to learn. Leaving a familiar environment, with knowledge of its language, traditions, and cultural norms, for a new unfamiliar environment without this Discourse knowledge can create power imbalances, loss of agency and a struggle to define one’s identity. As Kayl-Adar (2019) notes:

It is therefore important to understand how newcomers or language learners are positioned by others as they gain social, linguistic, and cultural knowledge. Positioning theory can also be helpful in understanding how language learners draw from or negotiate different sets of linguistic, cultural, and discursive traditions or community affiliations as they (re)construct identities in the new culture and language (p.98).

Positioning theory, then, can help us to understand how mobility has shaped my participants’ identities, and in particular their national identities. We can understand how they were positioned by others in their own countries as well as their host countries. I will also be able to analyze how my participants position themselves when they discuss their home and host countries and in the narratives and storylines they co-construct with me in our interviews. Next, I discuss my interviewing practices and how I collected and analyzed my data.

### **3.2 Data Collection, Interview & Analysis Methods**

I conducted all of my interviews in person or online via video conferencing software. All of my interviews were one-on-one, except for one discussion between my two US graduate students that was led by a list of my questions. More explanation of this discussion can be found in Chapter 6. Although the interviews with my kikokushijo and Nikkei participants were only conducted one time, as opposed to several interviews over time, the combined narratives of each participant offers a wealth of data that can be individually analyzed as well as compared and

contrasted as a group. The use of qualitative data via interviews, as opposed to surveys and questionnaires, can offer much richer data due to the personalized co-creation of the interview setting. As a researcher conducting an interview, I can delve into topics that may only get a one sentence response in a questionnaire, and I can ask the interviewee to reevaluate certain beliefs and opinions in real time. I can also relate to, empathize with, and share certain feelings with my participants, which can help build trust and allow them to share their honest feelings and thoughts.

All interviews, except for one interview with a Nikkei Brazilian participant, which was conducted in Brazilian Portuguese, were conducted in English. The Portuguese language interview also included some Japanese words as well. This participant felt more comfortable conducting the interview in his primary language, Brazilian Portuguese, which I was happy to accommodate since I speak Brazilian Portuguese somewhat fluently. In addition, since I speak Japanese and I am familiar with Japanese customs and culture, sometimes my participants used Japanese words and referred to Japanese concepts. The reason to use English as the primary language of interviewing was a purposeful choice on my part. First, although I can speak conversational Japanese well, I knew that I would not be able to fully articulate everything I wanted to when discussing some academic subjects and topics. However, Japanese language in the interviews was not discouraged and, in fact, welcomed when the participant was having difficulty expressing something in English. Second, the level of English of all my participants was sufficient to have meaningful discussions in English. Third, given that my research is on how (mostly) English language learning has affected my participants' Japanese national identity, I wanted to give my participants a space to express themselves freely and in the language that may be connected to their non-Japanese identities. I realize that the results may be different had I been a Japanese person conducting interviews in Japanese language. Cortazzi, Pilcher and Jin (2011) interviewed 7 Chinese doctoral students in Chinese and English using the same questions, 10 days apart, regarding their PhD dissertations and found that some of the information that was shared with the English speaking researcher and the Chinese speaking researcher was different. For example, one participant remarked that they were more relaxed during the Chinese conversation and another participant apparently felt more comfortable sharing his lack of work ethic with the English speaking interviewer. Cortazzi, Pilcher and Jin (2011) suggest using all language resources to the fullest extent and framing questions that may be face-threatening in the third person.

My first priority was to conduct interviews in person, and if I could not travel to where my participants were I conducted the interview online. I recorded all interviews with a voice recorder and I recorded most online interviews with video recording software as well, as a backup in case the audio recording was damaged. Before all of my interviews, I gave my participants a detailed consent form explaining the goals of the study, risks and rewards and what I was asking from them. I explained that they could stop the interview at any time and that they didn't have to answer any questions that they didn't feel comfortable answering. I also explained that I would never publish any identifying information, including their names or the universities they studied at. Both before and after a participant's consent was given I allowed time for any questions they had about the interview process before recording began. Once I had answered any questions, I indicated that I would begin recording and I started the interview. I have taken part in several studies as a participant where I found out about the study's purpose right before the

study began. I had little time to process what I was taking part in. For my participants in this study, I wanted to give them time to process their thoughts about the topic and to help them start thinking about their experiences. I would send them an initial email explaining the study and then another email with the consent form, which had more detailed information. The whole process usually took several days to one week before the interview occurred. The goal was to allow my participants to start collecting their thoughts and thinking about them in an organized way, so that they would be able to narrate their experiences more fluently in the interview. Prior (2011) defines narratives as “autobiographical accounts through which speakers make intelligible their lives and actions” and argues that narratives should be treated as co-constructed speech events and “accounts that are managed by narrative tellers and their interactants” (p. 61). Thus, rather than my participants sharing the factual reality that I as the interviewer am merely tapping into, my participants’ narratives are accounts of their realities that I am actively constructing with them through my questions, backchannels, body language, all within a particular Discourse. Interviews, then, should be viewed less as research instruments, and more as social practices (Talmy, 2011).

Before moving on to my data analysis methods, I think it is important to discuss reflexivity in qualitative analysis. Mann (2016) describes reflexivity as a self-awareness and recognition of the mutual shaping and bidirectional nature of qualitative research interviews, where interactions are context-dependent and context renewing. Attia (2017) proposes that reflexivity comprises two interacting elements: The first element, prospective reflexivity, is how the researcher affects the research and the second, retrospective reflexivity, is how the research affects the researcher. How I position myself in the interviews and my relationship with each participant, for example, necessarily affects my research interviews. One of the Nikkei participants was my former Portuguese teacher, so our shared history and friendship directly affected the way I spoke to him and thus, my research. Some of my former students were also interviewed, as I will discuss in the next section, so how I spoke to them was different in nature from how I spoke to kikokushijo I had never met before. In addition, the ongoing research also changed my interaction with the data as I conducted more and more interviews. Thus, bidirectionality exists between me and my individual participants but it also exists between me and my overall ongoing research as a whole. Lastly, it is important to note that because national identity is not a topic that most people think about consciously on a day-to-day basis, the discussions I had with my participants were sometimes the first time they were thinking about their national identity. Some participants were initially confused with open-ended questions in English, such as, “How would you characterize your national identity?”. They were usually not able to understand open-ended questions or articulate answers very well to them. On the other hand, my participants were better able to respond to questions like, “Do you feel more American, Japanese or neither?”. By framing the discussion in this way the participants were better able to understand and reply to my research questions. Therefore, I, as a researcher, directly affected the direction and framing of each discussion with my participants and how they positioned themselves.

Now I will discuss my data analysis methods. Once the interviews were finished, I started the transcription process. At first, I transcribed about one quarter of the interviews by myself. This was done to familiarize myself with the data collection process and to practice transcribing my participants. However, because I was not conducting conversation analysis, I started searching for more efficient ways to transcribe my data. In addition, the technology I possessed was not

sufficient for editing and finding particular utterances. In my search for more efficient ways to transcribe, including the use of transcription software, I found a website specializing in professional transcription and translation that would aid in the transcription process. Transcription software was ruled out since many of my participants used non-English words and had non-standard accents, creating too many errors. Thus, I sent my recordings to be transcribed by professionals through this website. Additionally, one interview conducted in Brazilian Portuguese was translated into English through the same website. All other interviews were conducted in English, with some occasional non-English words and phrases. Once the transcription was finished, I logged in to my account and listened to the recordings while reading the transcriptions. The transcriptions were time stamped, meaning all utterances by each speaker were given time stamps and each speaker's utterances were synced and aligned to their written transcriptions. This allowed me to play one response back over and over, by clicking on the utterance. The website also allowed me to see the utterances highlighted as each speaker was saying them. There was also an editing function that allowed me to make changes and adjustments and add any missing or incorrect words. Once I edited the files, I listened again to make sure that everything was transcribed properly and accurately. Thus, the website allowed me to edit the transcriptions more efficiently than with transcription software or than just by myself alone in addition to making it easier to interact with the transcriptions digitally. Once the editing was finished I printed the transcripts to begin my analysis of the data.

The first step I took once I printed the transcripts was to read them several times. Even after having taken part in the interview, and having listened to and edited the interview at least twice, I still was able to gain a deeper understanding of the contents after each reading. Next, I looked for and highlighted any area where my participants talked about the three strands that I am focusing on in my analysis and how they may have impacted national identity: 1) choices (made for or by my participants); 2) language; and, 3) mobility. Any positioning acts that were present were highlighted. Afterwards, I made comments on the highlighted text to help me internalize what was being said and to connect to earlier discussions with the same or different participants. Below is an example of an interview excerpt and commentary with one of the US graduate students, Saki, regarding personal and national identity. Saki's positioning by others as Japanese in Brazil versus Asian, Chinese or Korean in the U.S. was a constant theme throughout our interviews.

*Table 1.* Interview excerpt and commentary example.

Interview Excerpt	Commentary
<p><b>Fritz:</b> So last time we talked a little bit about Trump and about racism, sort of very... I don't know if you've been watching the news. There's lots going on right now. And you kind of, you were saying that you didn't really feel so much that you were being discriminated against – you didn't say that but people didn't recognize you as Japanese sometimes. They recognized you as Asian or Chinese or Korean</p>	<p>{...} = skipping part of the conversation  <b>Bolded transcribed text</b> = areas of import or interest for further exploring</p> <p>In this discussion, our third interview, I am following up on our previous discussion in the second interview about how she felt stressed about not being identified as Japanese in the United States. Saki has</p>

<p>or not necessarily Japanese identity. How do you feel about that now? Before you said that stressed you out a lot about being... someone calling you oh you Chinese or um how do you feel about that now? Are you still stressed out?</p>	<p>connections to Brazil from her previous research when she lived in Brazil for one year, so she goes on a trip to visit her friends in Brazil. The trip makes her think about her status in the United States compared to her status in Brazil.</p>
<p><b>Saki:</b> Hmm about Asian maybe. Yeah probably. I just came back to Brazil and Brazil is kind of like really unique country. <b>Like they have like Japanese population a lot so they feel like Japanese are special compared with the other like Asian countries. So I found that it was why I liked Brazil very well.</b></p>	<p>Saki still feels ‘probably’ stressed out about her Japanese identity not being recognized and not feeling as special as she feels when she goes to Brazil. Later we talk about different places in the US that have more sizable Japanese populations, like California and Hawaii. She might feel differently if she were living in Hawaii.</p>
<p><b>Fritz:</b> Laughs.</p>	<p>I think I found this funny because of the frankness of the statement, as if to say, yeah, I would probably feel the same way too if I were given special treatment and elevated status.</p>
<p><b>Saki:</b> One of the reason because they likes Japan a lot so. So yeah it’s a little bit different in US. <b>In the US there is not ... Japan is not that famous so people doesn’t really distinguish. Laughs. Japan is not so identical for American people so yeah it’s kind of stressful but yeah that’s fine like.</b> Still I like Brazil than the United States to be honest but this is the US so yeah ... {...}</p>	<p>Feeling a special status while in Brazil and feeling like just another foreign Asian person in the US are the reasons she gives for liking Brazil more than the US and also for feeling more stress. Perhaps this is one of the reasons she is having difficulty assimilating to the US. Her Japanese identity is lost in the US, but celebrated in Brazil.</p>
<p>So yeah and it was a little bit easier to stay in Brazil <b>because people recognize Japanese.</b> Also there is like really <b>some Japanese community</b> even they are not really purely pure Japanese, but Brazilian Japanese. Yeah so it <b>was a little bit easier to adjust the life in Brazil.</b> So yeah. Hmm. Yeah I just came back from Brazil to the United States and I found that okay it’s a little bit more difficult compared with living in Brazil.</p>	<p>Here, Saki comments on the Nikkei community in Brazil having Japanese cultural knowledge, which made her adjustment to life easier in Brazil. Even though it is easier in Brazil, she realizes that she has accepted her slightly more difficult life in the US. Perhaps this is an important step toward accepting her status in the US.</p>

Thus, for each interview I tried to make links to previous interviews I conducted. Sometimes I used member checking to show the graduate students what they said in previous interviews so


they could comment on those thoughts and feelings, in order to gauge whether or not they had evolved or changed completely. Member checking is used by qualitative researchers not only to maintain valid results, but also to ascertain the accuracy and relevancy of previously reported statements (Birt et al., 2016). Although the kikokushijo and Nikkei interviews were one-off interviews, I used the issues brought up in earlier interviews in order to establish patterns and highlight differences between participants in later interviews. I sometimes asked for reactions to comments that other kikokushijo had made and if they felt or thought the same way. I included in this manuscript sections of interview excerpts that deal directly with my participants' national identity as well as language related issues. Any time my participants position their national identities or are positioned by others, I highlight and comment on these instances. I refer to this interview data as narrative texts, modeling Clandinin (2013), who defines narrative texts as co-constructed events created by the participant and researcher. Narrative texts in this study are the recorded, transcribed and curated interview transcripts, which are co-constructed events by myself and my participants. Kayi-Aydar (2019) writes that narrative texts, "help us see how characters get positioned during narration and how identities are constructed and negotiated" (p. 221).

Finally, I used narrative positioning analysis to connect all strands of my research, the transcriptions of the interviews, and the larger Discourse contexts together. To do this I used a method proposed by Søreide (2006) in her analysis of Norwegian teachers' narrative constructions. Søreide (2006) uses the terms "negative positioning" and "positive positioning" to refer to participants' distancing from certain positions and their recognition of others, respectively (p. 534). Thus, narrative positioning, in this study, is defined by the degree to which my participants: 1) distance themselves, are opposed to, and or reject certain national identities and group memberships; and the degree to which my participants 2) identify with, accept and recognize certain national identities and group memberships. This doesn't mean that there are only two categories, accept one national identity and reject another, but rather that my participants may distance themselves or identify with several nationalities and group memberships simultaneously and to varying degrees. Therefore, in addition to examining rights, duties, and privileges of my participants, I will be focusing on how much they distance themselves from certain national identities and groups and actively accept others. By examining their positionings via narrative texts, we can better understand how mobility and language have affected their national identities. Thus, positioning statements that my participants made regarding their Japanese national identities were categorized into the two types of negative and positive narrative positioning. With this final categorization, I am able to complete my narrative positioning analysis.

In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I will be introducing several examples of narrative texts of my participants paired with narrative positioning theory analysis.

### **3.3 Participants**

I engaged in multiple ways of recruiting the participants in my study. Figure 10 shows the three ways in which I was able to recruit participants for this study.



*Figure 10.* Types of Participant Recruitment

In the first round of interviews, I made contact with people I already knew who could be potential participants in my study. I asked two former students of mine who were kikokushijo to participate and they agreed. Two teaching assistants of mine also agreed to participate in the kikokushijo interviews. I knew two of the participants from the Nikkei community. One was my former Portuguese language teacher and the other was the owner of the language school where my Portuguese teacher worked. In the next round of interviews, I asked my colleagues if they knew of any potential participants that fulfilled my parameters, i.e. Japanese students about to study abroad for a long period of time, kikokushijo who had lived abroad for several years, and members of the Nikkei community in Brazil or Japan. I was introduced to several kikokushijo by a colleague who taught many of them at his university in Japan. Some of these kikokushijo then recommended other kikokushijo, like family members. As for the US graduate students, I was introduced to one by another colleague living in the United States. Soon after our first meeting, this graduate student recommended someone she knew that was about to study abroad in the United States as well. This graduate student also later recommended one of my Nikkei participants living in Brazil. For my final Nikkei participant, I was recommended to her by a former colleague at a previous university I worked for. Thus, all of my participants were either direct contacts of mine or recommended to me by my colleagues or by the participants themselves.

I did not have a particular goal for a certain number of participants for each group that I interviewed. I had at least one female and male in each one of the three groups of participants that I interviewed, but I did not purposefully select for gender. Because I knew that I would be interviewing the two US graduate students multiple times over several years, I felt that this would provide more than enough data and so I did not search for more study abroad participants. For the Nikkei community, I did want to make sure that all of my participants had lived, even for

a short time, in both Brazil and Japan. Thus, my four participants fit this description. I think the data might have been stronger with more Nikkei participants, but I was not able to find any more Nikkei participants despite searching. However, I am pleased with the variety of ages and lived experiences that I found among my Nikkei participants, who provide a rich source of data. As for the 14 kikokushijo participants, again I was fortunate to have a large number agree to participate in this study. Although I could have continued to interview kikokushijo through secondary and tertiary contacts, I felt that my 14 participants had supplied more than enough data to analyze. This study is not meant to be generalizable and is not quantitative in nature. There is no set amount of interview data that is necessary for a qualitative analysis to take place. In addition, I had to keep in mind the space limitations of this study. In order to give a full and complete analysis of each one of my participants, I would need to dedicate pages of space in this dissertation. Therefore, more participants is not necessarily better, and could even be problematic in terms of cutting down analysis in order to “fit in” analysis of others. This is one of the reasons that I decided to make the interviews with the kikokushijo and Nikkei one-time interviews, instead of multiple interviews. The amount of data produced in each interview, which generally lasted between one and two hours, was more than sufficient for the purposes of this study. Conducting multiple interviews with the US graduate students, however, was important in that they were experiencing changes in real time over several years. One interview took place in Japan before each graduate student left and one interview or discussion occurred after each semester of school. Thus, there were a total of 5 interviews each plus one discussion between the two graduate students, which was guided by questions that I gave each participant before the conversation. The interviews with the kikokushijo and Nikkei, however, focused on the past, present, and future at one particular point in time in their lives. One thing to note about my participants’ ages is that I refer to their ages as the ages they were at the time of the interview, not their current ages. This is done to reflect their feelings and thoughts at that particular time in their lives, which may have changed since then. All of my kikokushijo participants were in their 20s at the time of the interviews. The US graduate students were in their late 20s during the 3-year span of interviews I conducted with them. As for the Nikkei participants, two males were in their 40s, one male was 19 years old, and one female was 34 years old. All of the kikokushijo and US graduate students were Japanese citizens, and all Nikkei participants were Brazilian citizens, with one Nikkei being a dual citizen of Japan.

### 3.4 Summary

Mann (2011) writes that, “Articulating the processes associated with analysis of interviews involves ‘epistemological reflexivity’ and a critical examination of methodology, assumptions, choices, and theories that influence research” (p. 11). In other words, it is important to show *how* I arrive at my analyses. In the next three chapters I will make sure to explain the research contexts, the larger Discourses that pertain to my research, as well as detail the interview content, or narrative texts, that I co-constructed with my participants. In Table 2, below, I provide a chart summarizing my data collection and analysis procedures.

*Table 2.* Data collection and analysis procedures.

Data Collection #1	Participant recruitment (direct contact, colleague and participant rec.)
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Data Collection #2	Initial email and consent form, plus Q&A before interview
Data Collection #3	1 to 2 hour one-on-one interview with participant
Data Analysis #1	Transcribe interview (by myself or via website)
Data Analysis #2	Review transcription and edit at least twice
Data Analysis #3	Print transcript and do initial read throughs
Data Analysis #4	Highlight sections related to research focus areas
Data Analysis #5	Make comments and connections on highlighted sections
Data Analysis #6	Use narrative positioning analysis to analyze texts & Discourses

In Table 3, below, I provide a short summary of my participants.

*Table 3.* Summary of participants.

Nikkei	4 participants: 1 female (aged 34) and 3 males (aged 19, 41, 49); 2 direct contacts, 1 recommended by a colleague, 1 recommended by a participant; 1 one-on-one interview with each participant
Kikokushijo	14 participants: 4 male (aged 20, 22, 22, 27), and 10 females (aged 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 21, 22, 22, 27, 27); 4 direct contacts, 8 recommended by a colleague, 2 recommended by a participant; 1 one-on-one interview with each participant
US Graduate Students	2 participants: 1 female (aged 27-30), and 1 male (aged 26-29); 1 recommended by a colleague, 1 recommended by a participant; 5 one-on-one interviews with each participant, 1 one-on-one conversation between the participants

In the next chapter I will begin the analysis of my Nikkei participants.

## Chapter 4 - Analysis of Nikkei Brazilians

### 4.0 Introduction

In this chapter I will analyze the narrative texts I co-created with each of my four Nikkei Brazilian participants. Figure 11 shows the ages and time spent in Brazil and Japan for each participant. The ages for all participants are not current, but instead are fixed to the times I interviewed them. This was done in order to represent their feelings and thoughts at a specific point in their lives.

All participants spent at least some time in both Japan and Brazil. All names have been changed to protect their privacy. All interviews were conducted in English, except for the interview with Marcos, which was conducted in Portuguese. The transcript was translated into English by a professional translation service and so all interview data is presented in English. Narrative positioning analysis of their narrative texts is presented in the sections below.

First I present some studies related to Nikkei-Brazilian populations that are relevant to this study. Then I present the narrative texts related to my research questions. Next, I provide narrative positioning analysis of: 1) how my Nikkei-Brazilian participants distance themselves, are opposed to, and or reject Japanese and Brazilian nationalities, and how they 2) identify with, accept and recognize Japanese and Brazilian nationalities. Finally, I provide a preliminary discussion of the findings. The discussion is then continued in Chapter 7.

### Literature Review

Yamashiro (2011) interviewed 50 Americans with Japanese ancestry and inquired about their experiences in Japan and the US. She concluded that Sansei and Yonsei generations “may have similar experiences of alternating feelings of inclusion and exclusion from the homeland society due to their combination of shared ancestry yet differing socialization with those in the homeland” (p. 1518). According to Yamishiro’s (2011) study, national differences tend to become more salient in international contexts.

A 2006 survey of 403 Nikkei households in the states of Parana and Sao Paulo, conducted by McKenzie and Salcedo (2009), found that just 12.7% of households without previous migrants to Japan were likely or very likely to migrate to Japan in the next 5 years while 25% of households with previous migrants to Japan planned to return to Japan in the next 5 years. According to the authors, one reason for the decline in migration to Japan is falling Japanese proficiency among Sansei and Yonsei generations, with only 35.2% and 2.6% who can speak Japanese, respectively. In contrast, 88.8% of Issei and 61.9% of Nissei self-reported that they could speak Japanese. The authors also cite the increased wages of the Nikkei Brazilians, who on average made more than the non-Nikkei Brazilian population in 2006, as another reason for the lower interest in migrating to Japan. For those who did seek to migrate to Japan, however, the top three reasons cited were to seek opportunities to improve life (81.5%), to escape from unemployment in Brazil (67.3%), and to support family (53.5%) (McKenzie and Salcedo, 2009, p. 77). This indicates that mobility to Japan from Brazil is still driven by economic conditions in Brazil. Those who are comfortable with their lives in Brazil have little reason to migrate to Japan, while those seeking

better economic opportunities are more interested in migrating to Japan. Low Japanese proficiency among the younger Nikkei generations may also be a factor in reduced mobility to Japan.

Tsuda (2003a) conducted participant observation and interviews of Nikkei Brazilians and Japanese nationals at a Japanese factory in Japan. He observed that Nikkei were socially separated and interaction between the two groups was minimal at the workplace, in their communities, and where they lived. For example, Tsuda noticed that during lunch breaks at the factory the two groups usually ate separately and conversation between Japanese and Nikkei was “kept to a bare minimum” and sometimes no exchanges were made at all even after hours working side by side (Tsuda, 2003a, p. 124). Tsuda noted that the Nikkei who worked as bilingual liaisons were some of the only ones who regularly made daily contact with the Japanese. However, he observed that many Japanese considered the Nikkei as foreigners. Also contributing to the social separation of this group were the Nikkei’s lack of Japanese language fluency, their tendency to socially withdraw into their own group, which Tsuda (2003a) called ethnic self-segregation, and the likelihood of viewing themselves as temporary migrants with little incentive to invest time and energy into assimilating into Japanese society. The establishment of “self-contained immigrant communities in various parts of Japan” by Brazilian Nikkei with their own “Brazilian restaurants, food stores, discos, barbers, entertainment centers, clothing stores, and Nikkeijin churches” allowed the Nikkei to withdraw into their own communities without having to interact much with Japanese society (Tsuda, 2003a, p 126). Tsuda (2003a) argues that many Nikkei, having previously positioned themselves proudly as a Japanese minority in Brazil with heritage in Japan, became disoriented due to their transnational migration to Japan, where many become marginalized and experience a loss of their ethnic homeland. A highly proficient Japanese speaking participant of Tsuda (2003a) had the following to say about the effect of transnational mobility on his Japanese identity:

At first in Japan, I did feel an identity crisis and didn’t know who I was. Because I had convinced myself that I was so Japanese in Brazil and took pride in this, I wanted to be seen as Japanese in Japan. But the Japanese didn’t accept me. The Nikkeis always have this problem - of not knowing whether you are Japanese or Brazilian” (p. 134).

This reevaluation of national identity due to transnational mobility may have been more pronounced in highly proficient Japanese speakers. Nikkei with fewer investments in Japanese culture and language may have struggled less with their Japanese identities in Japan.

Nishida (2018) presents interview data of an ethnically Japanese Nikkei woman born in Brazil who could speak fluent Japanese and traveled to Japan to work from the early 90’s to the early 2000s:

The more Japanese you look and the better you speak Japanese, the less discriminatory treatment you receive from the Japanese. The racially mixed have a harder time, and so do those who do not speak Japanese (p. 152).

Despite her advanced Japanese language skills, “Japanese” appearance, and having not received any discriminatory treatment in Japan, she still felt that she was not positioned as Japanese by the

Japanese people. One of Nishida's (2018) Nikkei participants increased his Brazilian identity during his six years working in Japan. Another Nikkei who was also fluent in Japanese and who migrated several times from Brazil to Japan to work in factories "felt more comfortable with Brazilians" due to his native Portuguese language and he said that he was aware that Japanese people found him "too honest and blunt" (p. 156). Here he is referring to the *honne* (direct) and *tatemae* (indirect) style of communication that many of my *kikokushijo* participants also had difficulties adjusting to when returning to Japan. Thus, advanced Japanese language skills for many Nikkei living in Japan may perhaps be a necessary, but not sufficient, skill to obtain in order to form a stronger Japanese identity. If Nikkei felt more accepted as Japanese in Japan, perhaps they would feel a stronger sense of Japanese national identity.

Manzenreiter (2017) conducted field research observing, interviewing members of, and participating in community events in 15 Nikkei communities in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay in 2011. He concluded that "the most significant markers of collective identity are language, practice rules derived from traditional value systems, and cultural rites that have also been transferred from Japan" (Manzenreiter 2017, p. 209). It is through the neighborhood associations, community centers, or *kaikan*, schools and family structures that the Nikkei in South America have maintained their links to Japan and Japanese culture. However, when Nikkei "return to Japan", in the sense that they are reversing a journey made by their parents and grandparents, they are confronted with the question of what their homeland is. Manzenreiter (2017) argues that "the Nikkei's return to Japan demonstrated that reterritorialization of identity cannot be fully achieved" and exists in a kind of deterritorialized space (p. 210). This means that the Nikkei cannot fully embrace their Japanese identity in Japan, but the reasons for this are not outlined. In the following presentation of data and analysis, this study intends to shed further light on how four Nikkei Brazilians position their national identities in Japan and Brazil.

#### 4.1 Presentation of Narrative Texts from Marcos




Figure 11. Marcos' timeline.

Marcos is a 49 year-old Sansei, or third generation descendant of Japanese emigrants. His grandparents arrived in Brazil when they were 7 or 8 years old with their respective families from Japan. According to Marcos, the Brazilian government wanted the newly arriving Japanese to work in agriculture so many Brazilians were sent to the state of Amazonas to farm black

pepper. They then migrated south to work on coffee plantations in the state of Sao Paulo. They lived in Japanese colonias that were segregated from the Brazilian population. Marcos' parents were Nisei, or second generation Japanese, and they were neighbors in the colonia. They were born to first generation Japanese emigrants, who left Japan for Brazil in the early part of the 20th century. Marcos' parents started their courtship naturally, which was uncommon at that time according to Marcos' grandmother. Many people in the colonia married through arranged marriages, called *omiai* in Japanese. Marcos' parents were both born in Sao Paulo, but they moved to the state of Parana, where Marcos was born and where his father worked in a Japanese factory making beauty products and fabrics until he retired after 30 years at the factory. Marcos' grandfather never learned Portuguese, despite spending the rest of his life in Brazil. His grandmother only spoke very little Portuguese so communication was difficult between his grandmother and the rest of the family. Marcos grew up in Brazil and decided to move to Japan in 1991 when he was 21 years old to initially work in a factory. He was one of the first Nikkei to arrive in Japan after it changed its immigration laws to encourage Japanese descendants to live and work in Japan. He has lived in Japan for the past 30 years.

Marcos' mobility between Brazil and Japan, the reasons behind his choices to stay or leave, and how much Japanese language learning impacted Marcos' national identity will be outlined in the narrative texts that follow. In our interview, Marcos detailed the severe economic crisis affecting Brazil at the time. He had just started working for a large company in 1990 that had promised him internships abroad, but those were promptly cancelled. Japan had just opened up a new visa program for descendants of Japanese from Brazil and other South American countries. His cousins suggested they go to Japan to work and save up money.

On Christmas day that year, in 1990, my cousins who were in college said, 'Let's go to Japan since everything's stagnant here.' It was a decision made between cousins, 'Should we go?' 'Let's go.' That's it. There was no second guessing'

Marcos explains his decision to go to Japan as being related to his company being adversely affected by the economic downturn. "I had nothing to do. I sat in the office for three months. It was totally stagnant." Due to Brazil's economic crisis and Japan's labor shortage and the subsequent changes in immigration law, Marcos made a decision that would affect the rest of his life, to leave Brazil for Japan. Marcos' journey to Japan mirrored his great grandparents' journey out of Japan. They left Japan during an economic crisis, only to be welcomed in Brazil, where migrant labor was needed. Marcos said it was an impulsive decision to leave Brazil since he felt stymied at his job. "No plans at all. It was irresponsible. It was either irresponsible or destiny." Without the same timing of both the economic crisis in Brazil and the newly adopted Japanese immigration law, Marcos would have likely stayed in Brazil. These national level events directly affected Marcos' decision to become mobile, to become an economic migrant like his great grandparents. Thus, his personal choice to leave was due to factors occurring at the national level in both Brazil and Japan. His choice to stay in Japan, however, was based on his ease of transition to Japanese life. "After two or three jobs, I realized it was not what I wanted. I didn't want to work in a factory." Here Marcos explains that learning Japanese language may have influenced his decision to leave the factory work. "Maybe I left the company because I learned Japanese so easily and got used to the Japanese culture." His status improved as he transitioned to become a cultural liaison between Japanese and South American cultures at a Japanese

company. Similar to Tsuda's (2003) observation about liaisons between Nikkei Brazilians and Japanese at a Japanese factory, Marcos was in daily contact with both Japanese and Nikkei cultures, speaking Portuguese, Spanish and Japanese on a regular basis. He then worked as a salesman for a mobile phone company in the late 1990s and was contemplating going to a Japanese university to further his education when one of his friends asked him to help out at a language school in 2002. He did so as a favor and then almost 20 years later he is now running the school. He says that he didn't want to return to Brazil during his decades working and living in Japan. However, he is currently thinking of making Brazil his main base so he can be with his sister and help take care of his mother. He currently spends 10 months in Japan and 2 months in Brazil.

I didn't look after my mother for nearly 30 years. Now I want to change that. To stay 2 months here and 10 months there, in 2020 or so. That's why I am making a big change in the company. 30 years living outside my country. I think it's a good time to actually go back to Brazil.

Marcos' decision to return to Brazil is due to his desire to be closer to his family. During his interview with me, in this instance, Marcos positions himself as a foreigner in Japan "living outside my country". Despite his Japanese ethnicity, Japanese language capabilities and his long, successful career in Japan, Marcos positions his national identity as more tied to Brazil. "By engaging in positioning moves, people are able to claim, deny, and give rights, as well as demand or accept certain duties" (Kayl-Aydar, 2019, p. 24). Marcos' right to continue living in Japan is now superseded by his duty to take care of his mother, and so he claims his Brazilian national identity here. He explains later:

I never thought about getting Japanese citizenship because I'm proud of being Brazilian. Not many people are, but I'm proud of being Brazilian because that's where I was born, and my story started there.

The abstract concepts of 'nation' and 'national identity' were not prevalent hundreds of years ago, as we learned in Chapter 2. Billig (1995) writes that "four generations ago there were people who neither knew, nor wished to know, their nationality," and instead identified with their local communities, villages, tribes, or spheres of trade (p. 62). The fact that Marcos identifies with the nation of Brazil not only denotes a geographic demarcation, and a link to a perceived community within those boundaries, but he establishes that there is an 'us', a Brazilian identity. National identity, according to Billig (1995), means "conceiving of 'us, the nation', which is said to have its unique destiny (or identity); it also involves conceiving of 'them, the foreigners', from whom we identify 'ourselves' as different (p. 61). This dichotomy of us versus them is real for Japan, because Japan does not allow dual citizenship, so there are Japanese citizens and there are foreigners. In order for Marcos to get Japanese citizenship, and become officially recognized as Japanese, he would have to relinquish his Brazilian citizenship, something that he was not prepared to do. Marcos positions himself, rather, as a leader in the Nikkei community in Japan, helping to increase the power and status of Nikkei Brazilians in Japan via his business of language education.

Fritz: And how do you identify yourself?

Marcos: I think I'm a Brazilian who achieved different things in Japan compared to the other Brazilians... I actually see myself as a person trying to leave a legacy of what I've done, a legacy of my 30-year life in Japan. I want to leave a legacy in relation to education because it's the only thing I'm certain that can be made by a foreign community in the country. It is improving the level of these people in order for this community to become more respected.

Here Marcos acknowledges the difficulties of the Nikkei community in Japan while making it his duty, or legacy, to help increase the status of Nikkei in Japan. Although Marcos has lived longer in Japan than in Brazil, Marcos maintains a strong Brazilian national identity. I asked how others, Japanese and Brazilians, position Marcos.

Fritz: When you are in Brazil, do people call you Japanese?

Marcos: Yes. Not much lately, but it's funny that when I'm in Brazil, people I know - my friends, many people - call me by my Japanese name, which is my middle name... I've lived my whole life being called Japanese in Brazil...

Fritz: And when you're in Japan, do people treat you like you're a Japanese?

Marcos: Everyone... But most of the time, I already say from the beginning that I am Brazilian. I don't hide it because I don't have to... so they know I'm a foreigner. But most of the time, after about five minutes of talking, they already treat me like a Japanese, because when I'm talking to Japanese people, I'm very Japanese.

Both Brazilians and Japanese, according to Marcos, position Marcos as Japanese in the way they treat him. Despite being positioned by others as Japanese, Marcos still maintains his Brazilian national identity. His strong Japanese skills segues to my research question about language and national identity.

Marcos' ability to seamlessly transition between Japanese and Brazilian culture is a result of his great efforts to learn Japanese, which he did not speak when he first arrived in Japan. He was very keen in the beginning to assimilate to Japanese cultural traditions at the factories where he worked, like attending all the after-work parties and *bonenkai*, or end of year parties. He said he was usually the only Brazilian at the parties and was even invited to his co-workers' houses, which is not so common in Japan. He says that "Brazilians...I think that due to the right they have to come to Japan, being descendants, they thought they wouldn't have the need to speak Japanese." Marcos positions himself as being different from many other Nikkei Brazilians in Japan because of his desire to learn Japanese. "Sometimes a Brazilian citizen gets traumatized with the Japanese language because they might think the Japanese are rude." Marcos says this is due to miscommunications and misunderstandings between Japanese and Nikkei Brazilians. When talking about the Nikkei community later in our conversation, Marcos described how important he thought learning Japanese was for the Nikkei community.

The only people the Japanese government helped pay for the ticket to go back to their country were the Brazilians. The Japanese government has always done a lot for the Brazilians... If you give, you have to ask for some things and they never do. Then the Brazilians got used to it like a spoiled child. Brazilians only ask but don't want to - It's like that, they just want the rights, they don't want to know about the duties. That's why I think that -- it's sad, but I think the Japanese government should make the Brazilians learn Japanese.

Marcos believes that it is the duty of the Nikkei Brazilians to learn Japanese while in Japan. He believes that the government should mandate Japanese language education for the Nikkei community in Japan.

In addition, learning Japanese was a personal responsibility to his family. Marcos relates a touching story about how he was finally able to connect with his grandmother, who couldn't speak Portuguese very well.

Once we spent six hours talking, only in Japanese. That was one of the best things. It was worth it having learned Japanese because then I learned the whole story. They told me everything, what happened, what Japan was like, when they arrived in Brazil. It was very good. I think I was one of the only grandchildren who had this opportunity. So I'm very proud of that, and I'm very happy about it.

Without his Japanese language abilities, Marcos would not have been able to learn about his family history or connect on a deeper level with his grandmother. Knowing Japanese language also allowed Marcos to transition from factory life, which he did not like, to a higher status when a company offered him to be a liaison between the Nikkei community and the managers at a Japanese company. He worked for five years translating for the Brazilian and Spanish speaking Nikkei community. In 2002, a friend asked him to help out a language school in the Chubu region, where many Nikkei Brazilians live working in factories for companies like Toyota. Marcos ended up becoming the owner of the language school, one he has operated for over a decade. This business is targeted at helping the Nikkei community learn Japanese. His investment in learning Japanese language paid off both personally and professionally. He positions himself and other Nikkei in Japan as bearing a responsibility to speak Japanese and thus having a duty to learn Japanese. The rights of being a Japanese descendant in Japan come with the duty of learning Japanese according to Marcos. When asked about his Japanese identity, Marcos explains that he has taken the best aspects of Japanese culture.

Fritz: Do you think you are Japanese-Brazilian, Brazilian-Japanese, or a hybrid?

Marcos: I'd rather be a hybrid. I think I got the best side from the Brazilian people, which is the joy, and the best side from the Japanese people, which is the responsibility. It's not that the Brazilians have no responsibility or that the Japanese people can't be joyous, but I know that my country, Brazil, if you talk about Brazilians, joy and friendliness come up. If you talk about the Japanese, it is accuracy, quality, and responsibility. I think I tried to get the best of both sides, even from my culture. I think every descendant has this 50% - 50% side.

When Marcos discusses the common stereotypes of ‘joyous Brazilians’ and ‘responsible Japanese’, he is reinforcing the idea that national identities encompass generalizations about its peoples and that these social discourses are widely recognized, if not accepted as common knowledge. These stereotypes may serve to further solidify the us/them dichotomy. Even when talking about his Japanese identity, Marcos positions himself firmly as Brazilian, using phrasing such as, “my country, Brazil” and “even from my culture”. Marcos does not claim Japanese culture as his own, even though he can be “very Japanese” when he wants to.

Marcos’ choice to leave Brazil for Japan was directly influenced by national level events in Brazil and Japan, namely an economic crisis in Brazil and a labor shortage and immigration law changes in Japan. He was also influenced by his family, his cousins, who suggested they should go to Japan. Thus his mobility can be said to be a result of personal as well as national choices. Japan chose to change their immigration laws to allow the Nikkei community to live and work in Japan and Marcos also chose to take advantage of that newly bestowed right. Despite living in Japan for 30 years, Marcos still feels Brazilian in his national identity and wishes to return to Brazil in the near future to help take care of his mother. Language is also very important to Marcos’ identity and how he positions other Nikkei in Japan. Japanese language was the key to his successes in Japan and crucial for connecting with his family. Nevertheless, Marcos still identifies as Brazilian. He appreciates and admires Japanese culture and language, but his country, his homeland, is Brazil.

#### 4.2 Presentation of Narrative Texts from Daiki




Figure 12. Daiki’s timeline.

Daiki is a 19 year old university student who lives in Brasilia, Brazil with his family. His father is a Japanese citizen from Japan, and his mother is Nisei, born in Brazil, whose parents were Japanese emigrants. “So I’ve also always [been] in an environment full of the Japanese culture, like directly.” According to Daiki, his grandmother was from a wealthy Japanese family that experienced severe economic hardship during and after World War II. Shortly after the war his grandmother’s parents moved to Brazil to start a new life when his grandmother was 4 years old. His grandfather’s family knew his grandmother’s family in Japan and they also moved to Brazil around the same time. They all arrived at the port of Santos in São Paulo, like thousands of

Japanese emigrants before them, and started working on a cotton farm in a colonia of São Paulo. “So they saw Brazil as the only opportunity.” Once the city of Brasilia was finished being built, Daiki’s grandparents moved and settled there, where his mother was born. Although his mother grew up in Brazil, she conducted her graduate studies in Japan, where she met Daiki’s father. Daiki’s parents moved to Brazil after his father completed his PhD studies in the Netherlands and they have been living in Brazil for the last 20 years.

For my first research strand, I want to focus on Daki’s mobility to and from Japan, and how that has contributed to his national identity. Daiki, like all of my participants, has spent time in Japan, but only for brief intervals in his life. Therefore, I will only focus on the one month period he spent in Japan for his internship, which is reflected in the graph in Figure 13. He said that he had been to Japan a total of five times, but he considered four of those times to be a “tourist vacation.” Although Daiki holds a Japanese passport and Brazilian passport, he positions himself in this instance as a tourist. According to Japanese law, Daiki needs to choose either Japanese citizenship or Brazilian citizenship by the age of 22, since Japan does not recognize dual citizenship in adulthood. Daiki says that there would be advantages to being a Nikkei and holding on to his Brazilian passport. “Because if I [would be] a former Japanese people [Japanese descendant] I can get scholarship from the government.” Daiki positions himself as a possible future Brazilian Nikkei, despite currently being a Japanese citizen. Although he would lose his right to vote as a Japanese citizen, something he mentions as a “drawback”, he would gain other rights. These rights include Japanese scholarships that are available to the Nikkei community in Brazil and being able to maintain his current life in Brazil.

Fritz: Do you think you would ever want to live in Japan one day?

Daiki: I think I would like it, but I recently think that I would miss Brazil somehow if I did. So certainly I want to move and stay abroad a lot of time, but I can’t say that I will stay there. I think that when I move to somewhere I will start listening country music or become a real fan of Brazil.

Daiki positions himself as possibly becoming more Brazilian while abroad and missing Brazil. At this moment in his life, Daiki chooses Brazil to be his home. His one-month internship experience in Japan may have something to do with this positioning. He received a scholarship from the Japan International Cooperation Agency, or JICA as it is known in Japan, to study in Japan as a junior high school student for one month when he was 12 years old. JICA is a government sponsored organization that provides technical assistance in the form of professional volunteers and grant aid to developing countries all around the world, with a 2020 budget of approximately \$1.5 billion. JICA’s mission is “to contribute to the promotion of international cooperation as well as the sound development of [the] Japanese and global economy by supporting the socioeconomic development, recovery or economic stability of developing regions” (JICA, 2021). The JICA program he participated in is called Nikkei Next Generation. The program has “the purpose of fostering Nikkei/Japanese descendants who can contribute to strengthening the relationship with Japan and the development of Japanese overseas migrant communities through providing programs in Japan for those generations who will play a role in leading the future Nikkei communities” (JICA, 2019). Its specific goals include “deepening their understanding of their roots and of Japan” and “strengthening their identity as Nikkei/Japanese

descendants” (JICA 2019). Daiki qualified for this program because of his mother’s Nikkei status and the fact that he was living in Brazil. Daiki spent time in a small Japanese city in Aichi prefecture, with a large Nikkei population. Daiki explains his trip in this way:

The internship is called the Nurturing the Next Generation of Nikkei Society. So it’s kind of a chance [for] Nikkei people to see how Japan really is and see its problems and also its good points. And then nurturing people to want to have a passion to solve problems.

He enjoyed his experiences, made friends, and could understand Japan on a deeper level. Although technically a Japanese citizen living abroad, Daiki experienced Japan as a member of the Nikkei community. Daiki positions himself - and the Japanese government positions Daiki - as effectively a Nikkei. Daiki’s mobility to and from Japan strengthened both his Japanese and Nikkei identities.

Fritz: How do you describe your own identity? Do you say you’re Japanese Brazilian, Brazilian Japanese? Do you identify as Japanese as well? How do you identify?

Daiki: I will probably say I’m Brazilian Japanese. But I think 80% of my personality is Japanese. So I think most of my foundations are Japanese.

Fritz: You also have Brazilian identity.

Daiki: Yes, and I’m proud of it. I’m proud of my Brazilian part.

Daiki separates his national identity from his personality. Daiki positions himself as Brazilian first, in terms of national identity, but more Japanese in character. Daiki was called *japa*, a pejorative term used in Brazil to refer to members of the Nikkei community, by some of his peers and he says, “I don’t like it, like I’m just some stereotype of the Japanese people.”

Some of the urban upper middle-class Japanese Brazilian youth have been valorizing their Japaneseness collectively by voluntarily separating themselves not only from non-Japanese Brazilians but also largely from less-educated, working class Brazilians. Unlike the immigrant and Nisei populations, who tend to dismiss the prevalent Brazilian racism against the “Japanese,” young Sanseis and Yonseis have been forced to deal with Brazilian racism individually and directly on a daily basis in primary and junior high schools (Nishida, 2018, p. 175).

Daiki is positioned by some as the “other”, the Japanese, even though he has spent his whole life in Brazil and is a Brazilian citizen. Although he feels more Japanese, Daiki is still proud of his Brazilian side. Yet he positions himself as 80% Japanese, perhaps in part due to being positioned by other Brazilians as Japanese. In Brazil, people like Daiki generally have a higher status because of their Japanese ancestry.

Fritz: Do you feel like you have a privilege or positive status?

Daiki: Yes. People [think] I'm better in some class just because I'm Japanese. But I also feel that I am a little better in this kind of classes than other people, maybe. So maybe perhaps it has some point.

“The use of stereotypes contributes to what is presented as a clear-cut distinction between individuals who are classified and attributed a set of positive or negative characteristics depending on their race” (Guibernau, 2013, p. 84). Daiki's positioning by other Brazilians as *japa* and as smart just for being Japanese may reinforce his own positioning as Japanese. This may partly explain his strong Japanese identity.

One goal of the Japanese government's Nikkei Next Generation program is to foster leadership in Nikkei communities. Daiki has indeed become a leader in his Nikkei community in Brazil, which I will detail below.

Now I will focus on my other research strands of language and his choice to become a leader in the Nikkei community, and how that affects his national identity. Since Daiki was 9 years old, he has been going to a church-based *kaikan*, or Japanese community organization. He attends four times per week. When asked about the people who regularly attend this *kaikan*, Daiki breaks up the main attendees into two groups.

The groups of elders where there are real Japanese people. So they don't speak Portuguese very much. And they work at the *colonia* so they're always working in the field and planting, and yeah agriculture. And the other part is a little bit younger and is a little diverse. There's, well I think the main activity there is that we hold a Japanese school there. We teach Japanese and then this is the main route of people that like Japanese culture...

Daiki positions the older Nikkei attendees as the “real Japanese people”, or the ones who speak primarily in Japanese. In fact, Daiki teaches Japanese language classes at night to mostly Nikkei. “Most of the Nikkeis go there because the parents want them to go, not because they want to go.” Maintaining connections to Japanese culture and language takes time and energy, a responsibility that Daiki enthusiastically upholds.

Fritz: How about for you? Do you go there because your parents initially asked you to go there or took you there and then you continued on your own?

Daiki: Well, actually I like Japanese very much so even if they said no, I would keep going there. I study here for 10 years, so I really like it.

Fritz: What do you like about it?

Daiki: Well, probably because I can keep in touch with Japanese culture...

Daiki claims ownership of his decision to regularly attend the Japanese community events and teach Japanese language. He actively chooses to be a member of, and leader in, the Nikkei community. His strong connection with Japanese language is a major reason for this. At home he

mainly speaks Japanese with his parents and Portuguese with his two younger sisters. He says that he often uses both Japanese and Portuguese in the same sentence at home, since everyone understands both languages. He studied at the Japanese school at the kaikan when he was younger and then volunteered to give back when he was older.

Fritz: Do you feel like you're a part of Japanese culture when you are teaching Japanese?

Daiki: Yes, I think I feel it way more than when I was studying... So I think I need to help and to share the Japanese [language] with them, the Japanese culture.

Daiki uses the Japanese language to connect with other Nikkei in Brazil and to connect with his own Japanese identity. At home he watches NHK, the Japanese government's public news channel, with his father. His father sometimes gets "stressed" when he has to speak Portuguese, and watching NHK is a way of destressing and maintaining a connection to Japan. Daiki positions himself as a Japanese language and cultural ambassador to others in his Nikkei community. Daiki possesses the exact kind of leadership skills that Nikkei Next Generation is hoping to foster, spreading Japanese culture and language in order to deepen the Nikkei/Japanese descendant identity.

In conclusion, Daiki is a dual citizen who positions himself as Brazilian first, in terms of national identity, but mostly Japanese (80%) in terms of character. His rights as a member of the Nikkei community afford him the chance to receive university scholarships from the Japanese government in the future, which are more valuable to Daiki since his life and family are based in Brazil, not Japan. His one-month internship in Japan, sponsored by the Japanese government, helped to foster his leadership skills in the Nikkei community. His Japanese language skills help him to connect with the Nikkei community and maintain his connection to Japanese culture. His homelife further cements his connection to his dual identity, speaking Japanese to his parents and Portuguese with his sisters. His choice to regularly attend the Japanese community kaikan and church is a major reason why he feels so close to the Nikkei community and this association strengthens his Nikkei identity.

#### 4.3 Presentation of Narrative Texts from Sofia




Figure 13. Sofia's timeline.

Sofia is a 34 year-old Sansei living in the State of Santa Catarina, Brazil. All of her grandparents came from Japan when they were children, during the 1930s or 1940s. Her grandparents all lived in small towns, in colonias, in the State of Sao Paulo. On her mother's side of the family, there was a hesitancy to intermarry with Brazilians.

But my grandfather was like, Brazilians, they are very different. You couldn't understand them so stay away. It's better to stay away. They're good, they're good friends, but not to family, so stay away. It's better to stay away.

On her father's side of the family, there was a similar dynamic of having Brazilian friends but not welcoming Brazilians into the family.

My fathers's side was like they have friends and everything, but like my aunt, she got married with a Brazilian and nobody spoke to her for like 30 years.

Sofia is very close to her family, but lives alone, teaching classes online. Growing up she regularly attended events at the local Japanese community center, or kaikan, maintaining a close relationship with Japanese culture, especially in her early life.

The first two strands of research I will focus on is Sofia's mobility and her choice to stay in Brazil. Like Daiki, Sofia also went to Japan for one month on a JICA scholarship when she was 28 years old. Her choice to go to Japan was influenced by her mother.

I went to Japan because my mum told [me] so... The thing that my mum said, that Japanese culture is different than we know. It's true, very true.

Sofia explains that the Japanese culture she learned in Brazil and the Japanese culture she experienced in Japan are different. The opportunity to experience Japanese culture in Japan allowed her to see the differences.

Fritz: So do you think you could live in Japan?

Sofia: No.

Fritz: And why?

Sofia: No, I wouldn't like it.

Fritz: Why not?

Sofia: Because I'm too Brazilian to live in Japan. I think I'm too different.

By spending time in Japan, Sofia positions herself as Brazilian first. Yet she still feels Japanese.

Fritz: Do you feel Japanese? Do you feel Brazilian? Do you feel both?

Sofia: I feel both. Before going to Japan, I thought I'm Japanese. I'm a little bit different from Brazilian, so I'm Japanese, okay. When I got to Japan I thought, my gosh, I'm Brazilian. I could leave and check that I'm Brazilian.

Fritz: Do you feel one part of your identity more Japanese or Brazilian? Is there something that's stronger that you feel when you think about your identity?

Sofia: As I live here, I'm more Japanese than Brazilian. But if I go to Japan, I'm more Brazilian.

Sofia's mobility directly affected her identity. When she is in Brazil, she feels more Japanese, but when she is in Japan, she feels more Brazilian. Because of her short stay in Japan, she chose not to live in Japan. She positions herself as "too different" from Japanese culture in Japan, something that was reinforced by her mother's comments that Brazilian Japanese culture is different from Japanese culture in Japan.

Now I will focus on the final research strand, language, and how it affected Sofia's national identity. Sofia explained the rise in status of being Japanese in Brazil, from her grandparents' generation to her parents' generation.

It's at that time of my grandparents it was not good to be Japanese. It was like ashamed 'cause almost all Japanese, they were poor, they couldn't speak Portuguese and it was not good to be Japanese. They couldn't say anything about Japanese culture and about Brazilian culture; they didn't know anything. But from my parents, with my parents they started to change that. They got into universities and got jobs and it started to change. So nowadays you have Japanese - they're good positions and that proud of being Japanese came back together with that. So it's like this person is Japanese so got discipline, got respect.

Her family wanted Sofia to maintain her unique status as Japanese in Brazil so Sofia learned Japanese first.

When I started to study at age three, we went to a school that only Japanese people used to go to. So there we learned Japanese and writing Japanese....we had all Japanese culture. After I went to Brazilian school I got to know that I was not normal for everybody. I was different. So I discovered at age 7 that I was different.

Sofia's early childhood was a kind of Japanese culture bubble in Brazil, that only bursted when when she enrolled in a Brazilian school. For example, Sofia has a Brazilian and a Japanese name, like Marcos and Daiki, and only learned of her Brazilian name when she was 7 years old, when she enrolled in a Brazilian school for the first time.

I got sad, very sad, because I didn't know. It was like wow, that's my name. Then it's like I'm not who I thought I was and I got mad. I remember talking to my parents like, who got that idea for giving me this name? And why didn't anybody told me that before. And I got resistant.

At first, she tried correcting her classmates and teachers to call her by her Japanese name, Mina. But that proved too difficult so she accepted her dual identity. “So I had to accept Sofia and I worked like that in my mind as well - when I’m working it’s Sofia and with my family it would be Mina.” Sofia continued to study Japanese and attend the kaikan community center until the age of 12, when she decided to stop studying Japanese and going to the kaikan.

It was like I’m here since always. I have spent my weekends here since always, doing the same stuff. And I’m different from my friends from the other school. So I want to try new things... Then I left Japanese culture. I stopped learning Japanese language. I stopped going to kaikan and everything.

Sofia’s realization that she was “different” from other Brazilians at age 7 was a shock to her identity. She said, “I resisted 5 more years, then I left.” Her extra duties and responsibilities of being Japanese in Brazil, i.e. learning Japanese language and using her free time on her weekends to go to the kaikan became too burdensome. Comparing her life to her Brazilian friends, she felt that she wanted to explore new things. Although her parents were disappointed and “sad” by her decision to discontinue her Japanese language and culture studies, they allowed her to try new things like playing the piano and singing. Although she tried studying Japanese again for a year, she gave up. Sofia said, “...at 15 I started studying English; after that, I couldn’t think about another language.” Sofia positions herself as a kind of Japanese language refugee, having “left” Japanese culture and language studies. Although her mother tried to push Sofia to continue studying Japanese, explaining that she would need that knowledge in the future, Sofia resisted and said that “it’s my life.” Although she did go to Japan at the suggestion of her mother, her experience only solidified her Brazilian identity.

In conclusion, the duties to learn Japanese language, go to the kaikan, and follow her parents’ wishes became too much at the age of 12, when Sofia decided to eschew these responsibilities. Even so, while in Brazil, Sofia still maintains her Japanese identity and now embraces her Brazilian name as well as her Japanese name. Her experience traveling to Japan, however, cemented her Brazilian identity and made clear her desire not to live in Japan. In a follow-up email after our interview, I learned that Sofia decided to do her graduate studies in Europe, using her English skills. Thus, her new experiences may further add to her Nikkei identity.

#### 4.4 Presentation of Narrative Texts from Bruno




Figure 14. Bruno’s timeline.

Bruno is a 41 year-old sole-proprietor of an English language school in Brazil. He lived for almost five years in Japan, working at the language school Marcos owns. His father is a Nisei Japanese descendant and his mother is Brazilian, whose family immigrated from Italy generations ago. Bruno identifies as “mixed race.” Bruno is referring to the mix of European and Asian ancestry, instead of, for example, a mix of Portuguese and Italian ancestry. “Japanese Brazilians distinguish unmixed Japanese Brazilians as *japonês puro/japonês pura* (“pure Japanese”) from mixed ones as *mestiço/mestiça*, a term that originally referred to racial mixture with non-Asian Brazilians but has recently come to include those mixed with Korean and Chinese descendants, as interethnic marriage among Asian descendants in Brazil has begun to increase” (Nishida, 2018, p. 13). Bruno’s paternal grandmother came when she was just 1 year old, and his Japanese grandfather was born in Brazil.

...this first generation, whether if they were born in Brazil or not, they were raised inside a capsule, let’s say. They wouldn’t mix. This first generation, they had this feeling like we are here temporarily, so don’t get involved with the savages because we are going back to Japan as soon as possible.

One of Bruno’s great uncles, brother to his grandfather, stole all the harvest money the family had saved up working in agriculture and used the money to return to Japan. Once this happened, his grandfather became head of the family. Originally, Bruno’s grandfather was placed into arranged marriage by his great-grandfather. But this marriage fell apart and then he met Bruno’s current grandmother, who he lived with for 30 years before finally officially marrying. Bruno’s father’s marriage to a Brazilian was initially met with some resistance by his father’s family, but they grew accustomed to his mother. Bruno lives with his family in a town in the State of Sao Paulo, which has a large Nikkei community.

In my first research strand, I will focus on Bruno’s mobility to and from Brazil and Japan, his decisions to leave Brazil and then to leave Japan, and how that has affected his national identity. In 1996, Bruno’s father had made arrangements to go to Japan to work in a factory in order to save up money to build a house in Brazil, but didn’t end up going to Japan at that time. In 2003, Bruno’s brother decided that he wanted to go to Japan for economic reasons and because he didn’t want to study at a university.

We knew people that went to Japan. They went, stayed two, three years, returned, and were able to buy a house or more than one. That’s how much money people would make at that time. My brother had this plan for him like, ‘I’m going in and I’m going to build three houses. I’m going to rent them, and then I don’t need to study.’ We were like, ‘Wow, genius.’ He was 17.

Bruno’s father decided to accompany his son this time in order to pay back mounting debts the family had accrued. His father still wanted to build his dream house in Brazil, so he saw this as his opportunity to work in a factory and save money in Japan in order to bring it back to Brazil. Bruno describes his decision to go as impulsive.

I had finished college. I was in post-graduation. Okay, we [his family] are buying tickets. At the last minute, at the 11th hour, I said, ‘You know what? These guys are going to return in two years with money, and I’ll probably be here trying to study my ass off, and maybe not. Okay, whatever. I’m going too.’

Bruno, like Marcos, was influenced by his family to go to Japan and also decided to go to Japan hastily due to economic reasons.

I just gave up on everything and went to Japan, which was like, at first, it was horrible for us. But it was the best decision ever. I think it was. It was a life-changing experience. The best experience ever. It was horrible in some moments, but it was the best thing.

Bruno’s decision to move to Japan for four years and seven months altered his life in many ways. He broadened his outlook on life, became more confident in himself and saw that he had many opportunities in the future.

That feeling that you are a world citizen. That was the feeling I had when I returned here [to Brazil]. And I still have this feeling. If I want I can give up on it. I can go. If I want to live, I don’t know, in Europe, in another country, if I want to do that, I can. It broadened my view. You don’t feel like, ‘Oh my God, what am I going to do?’ The possibilities multiplied by 1,000.

Living in Japan made Bruno feel more cosmopolitan. Bruno taught English and Portuguese at a language school instead of working at a factory. Teaching and speaking English also gave him more tools to be able to travel and possibly live in another country some day. Living in Japan allowed Bruno to get in touch with his ancestors and with Japanese culture on a personal level.

I can say that I have a Japanese background. I can say that I feel more Japanese than in the past. I feel more validated. I feel more like I know, this is right. ‘Oh no, in Japan they don’t do this. Oh no, not in Japan. I lived there.’ It gives me this feeling like I know what I’m talking about. I know traditions.

Bruno’s experience in Japan allowed him to claim his Japanese background and become more in-tune with his Japanese side.

Bruno: I am 100% Brazilian. This I know. But I feel more Japanese...I am Brazilian, but I was assembled in Brazil with foreign parts...50% from Japan, 50% from Italy. The 50% from Japan, it’s stronger to me now. That’s it.

Fritz: Stronger?

Bruno: I don’t feel Japanese. I feel 100% Brazilian. But my old touch with the culture, I feel stronger, more validated.

Bruno positions himself as “100%” Brazilian, while also feeling more confident in himself and his Japanese side after having experienced Japan first hand. He feels that he has the right to claim

his Japanese background because of his newfound knowledge of Japanese culture and his experiences living in Japan, and so he feels validated.

His decision to return to Brazil was something that he pondered for at least one year. It was a difficult decision to return. He said that he agonized over returning. But he eventually decided that it was time to return to Brazil.

Bruno: ...Brazil, my family, everybody I know and love. My original plans, feeling in my house and not in someone else's house. You have been there for 12 years, honey, but you're a foreigner.

Fritz: I know.

Bruno positions himself and me as always being foreigners in Japan. He feels that the Japanese people and the government position us as non-Japanese and that it's not "our home." We are visitors, or in my case, a permanent visitor. Bruno longed for the comfort of his homeland, surrounded by his family and friends. Although his first few years back to Brazil were a struggle, he managed to open his own English language school and is now prospering.

Next, I will talk about my research strand regarding language, and how that impacted his connections while in Japan.

Fritz: Did you feel closer to Japanese culture when you were in Japan?

Bruno: This is one of the things that I feel sad about. I didn't make Japanese friends while in Japan. I just didn't... I was in the culture but I wasn't... I could feel the society, but the culture, what people do 100%, I really missed this because I didn't have this experience with a Japanese friend who I could ask some things or could understand these things more. My background, I had the Japanese culture that they continued here. This is the Japanese culture they brought to Brazil from the '40s... That's a shock when you arrive... My life was a lie. You have this feeling, people lied to me all these years. How could they? Even the words, how to speak. So it's a bubble, it's a time machine here [in Brazil]. It's Japan from the '40s. It's not Japan from the 2000s. The little I knew, I got there [in Japan], like, okay, basically useless... My fluency with the language didn't help me so much. I could barely survive in Japanese. How could I have a friend who speaks Japanese? I missed this a little.

Like Sofia, Bruno learned about the differences of Japanese culture in Japan and Japanese culture in Brazil during his time living in Japan. His inability to make Japanese friends and speak fluent Japanese were barriers to a deeper understanding of Japanese culture. Had he learned Japanese fluently and established deeper connections with Japanese people, like Marcos did, he might have felt slightly more Japanese in his national identity. He mentioned that his father, too, did not mix with Japanese people during his years living there and did not speak any Japanese. They lived in the Nikkei community in the Nagoya area, spoke Brazilian Portuguese, and mainly associated with other Nikkei.

In conclusion, Bruno is a mixed race Nikkei who positions himself as 100% Brazilian. His mobility to and from Japan allowed him to get in touch with his Japanese side. After his experience living in Japan for nearly 5 years, Bruno feels his Japanese background more strongly and also feels more cosmopolitan. His lack of Japanese language skills and Japanese friends blocked his access to a deeper understanding of Japanese culture, which may have impacted his lack of Japanese national identity.

#### Section 4.5 Narrative Positioning Analysis

In order to aid in the analysis, I have created Figure 15, below, that contains all of my Nikkei participants' timeline information in one place.




Figure 15. Nikkei Brazilians' time spent in Japan and Brazil.

Now I will focus on how my Nikkei-Brazilian participants distanced themselves, were opposed to, and or rejected Japanese nationality. Marcos distanced himself from his Japanese national identity by expressing that he was proud of being Brazilian and didn't try to hide the fact that he was a "foreigner" in Japan, as he referred to himself. He also referred to his country as Brazil - "30 years living outside my country" - despite living in Japan for several decades. He hoped to return to Brazil in the future, physically distancing himself from Japan. Although a successful businessman who lived most of his adult life in Japan and who embraced Japanese culture and language, Marcos still wanted to return to Brazil. This reflects the post 2007 trend of more Nikkei returning to Brazil than entering Japan. Marcos even mentioned how the Japanese government helped to pay for Brazilians to return to Brazil in our interview, so he was aware that the Japanese government viewed most Nikkei as temporary workers that would eventually return to Brazil.

At 19 years old, Daiki is unique among my participants in that he needs to decide which citizenship to retain, Brazilian or Japanese. As a Brazilian Nikkei, Daiki said that he would potentially have more opportunities to receive Japanese government scholarships. Daiki distanced himself from his Japanese national identity for strategic reasons. He already has his family, his Nikkei community where he volunteered, and his schooling in Brazil. Although not necessarily directly distancing himself from his Japanese national identity, Daiki said that he was proud of his Brazilian identity. He could go to Japan on vacation with his family or via programs, like JICA, paid for with government grants. Giving up his Brazilian passport would uproot his life and would make little sense. Thus, Daiki will be forced to make a strategic decision about his Japanese nationality by age 22. Of course, the Japanese government only requires that those with dual nationality make an effort to renounce their non-Japanese citizenship. Other than challenging the law directly in the courts, there is little in the way of enforcement to check if people are actually making an effort to renounce their non-Japanese citizenship. Thus, it may be possible for Daiki to keep both of his passports, but only declare to the Japanese government that he is making an effort to rid himself of his Brazilian nationality. Either way, Daiki has to be strategic about his decision regarding his Japanese national identity due to Japan's laws. At the time of our interview, at least, Daiki seemed to lean toward keeping his Brazilian passport and recognizing more his Nikkei identity as a "Brazilian Japanese", as Daiki said in our interview.

When Sofia was a child, she said she became "resistant" to her Japanese identity after enrolling in a Brazilian public school, finding out about her Brazilian name and not being able to use her Japanese name. She distanced herself completely from Japanese culture for a while when she was 12 years old. She said she "left Japanese culture" and decided to stop learning Japanese and going to the kaikan on the weekends. Sofia felt that she was "not normal" and wanted to expand her horizons. Although Sofia tried learning Japanese again for one year, at age 15 she started learning English and this became her language of choice, rather than Japanese. Even though her parents encouraged her to keep studying Japanese, explaining that she would need it for her future, Sofia saw the English language as her future. Indeed, after our interview she decided to complete her graduate studies in Europe using her English skills, and not in Japan using Japanese. Another reason that cemented her decision not to study in Japan was actually when Sofia went to Japan on a JICA scholarship. In Japan, Sofia realized she was "too Brazilian to live in Japan". While in Japan she distanced herself from her Japanese identity because she said she was "too different" from Japanese people. In Japan she said she felt "more Brazilian." In Sofia's case, her mobility to Japan actually decreased her connection to her Japanese identity.

Bruno was the only mixed race Nikkei participant and had the least amount of connections to Japanese culture and language among my four Nikkei participants. Despite the fact that Bruno worked in Japan, he felt alienated from Japanese society while living in Japan. "I was in the culture...but I wasn't." He didn't make Japanese friends during his time in Japan and did not learn Japanese, except for basic words and phrases. His lack of Japanese proficiency was a kind of wall that kept him from exploring Japanese culture and integrating more into society. He lived with his father, who also didn't speak Japanese, in an area with many Brazilian Portuguese speaking Nikkei while in Japan. He lived in a Nikkei bubble, distancing himself from his Japanese identity even in Japan. This is similar to Tsuda's (2003a) observations about the ethnic self-segregation and the self-contained immigrant communities of Nikkei Brazilians in Japan.

Bruno's mobility, in this case, did not produce a stronger Japanese national identity, similar to Sofia's case. Bruno said that he was "100% Brazilian." He said he was "assembled in Brazil with foreign parts", referring to the Japanese ancestry on his father's side and the Italian ancestry on his mother's side. He referred to Japan as "foreign" and thus, not a part of his national identity. It is also possible that Bruno's strong English skills and his desire to make non-Japanese English speaking friends created a buffer between him and Japanese culture. Like Sofia, who also chose to focus on English rather than Japanese, Bruno's livelihood as an English teacher in Japan and Brazil allowed him to be one step removed from Japanese culture. Bruno could survive in Japan without Japanese, but this may have distanced him from his Japanese identity.

Now I will analyze how my Nikkei participants identified with, accepted and recognized Japanese national identity. First, Marcos decided to physically distance himself from Brazil due to worsening economic conditions and the cancellation of his promised internship abroad. This coupled with his lack of job duties and his cousin's suggestion to work in Japan prompted Marcos to distance himself from Brazil. His decision in 1990 mirrored the decisions of the Nikkei leaving Brazil in the 2006 Nikkei survey by McKenzie and Salcedo (2009), i.e. to seek greater economic opportunities in Japan. While in Japan, Marcos distanced himself from non-Japanese speaking Nikkei living in Japan by distinguishing himself a Japanese speaker. He refers to the rights and duties of the Nikkei in Japan, and specifically mentions that the Japanese government should require the Brazilian Nikkei to learn Japanese as part of their duty while living in Japan. Marcos was fulfilling his self-imposed duty to assimilate to Japanese culture while living in Japan, something that not all Nikkei strive for. Marcos is phenotypically Japanese, like Sofia and Daiki, meaning he can pass as a Japanese person due to both his parents being of Japanese ancestry who were born to Issei immigrants in Brazil. He said that Japanese people would realize that he was not "Japanese" after about 5 minutes of conversation. Although Marcos spoke Japanese well, he was still a non-native speaker of Japanese. He said, however, that other Japanese people still positioned him as Japanese. He embraced the positive stereotypes of Japanese culture, namely "accuracy, quality, and responsibility", and felt that he was a hybrid of Japanese and Brazilian cultures. Thus, he embraced Japanese language and culture and felt that they were a part of his identity, but this did not affect his view of his Brazilian national identity.

Daiki recognized himself, at least culturally, as more Japanese than Brazilian. He said that he thinks "80% of my personality is Japanese." Although only spending one month in Japan without his family, and his entire life in Brazil, Daiki positioned himself as mostly Japanese. Thus, his lack of mobility to Japan was not a barrier to his Japanese identity. He frequented his community kaikan several times per week where he taught Japanese language and culture to other Nikkei. Assuming the responsibility, or duty, of inculcating Japanese culture and language to a new generation of Nikkei likely strengthened his Japanese identity. He said, "I think I need to help and share the Japanese [language] with them, the Japanese culture." From the Japanese government's perspective, Daiki is an ideal cultural ambassador in Brazil, a success story of the Japanese government programs and initiatives, like the JICA program, for Brazilian Nikkei.

Sofia started studying Japanese quite early at age 3 and continued until the age of 12, with one more year of study until the age of 15. Like Daiki, Sofia spent many weekends at the local kaikan with other Nikkei learning about Japanese culture and customs. Her parents encouraged

Sofia to embrace her Japanese heritage and were saddened when she distanced herself from her filial duties to learn Japanese and continue to participate in kaikan activities. At the urging of her mother, Sofia did go to Japan on a JICA scholarship. She said that before she went to Japan she thought she was Japanese. She said that she felt both her Japanese and Brazilian identities, especially while in Brazil. She said that she is “more Japanese than Brazilian” in Brazil. Being less mobile in Sofia’s case seemed to increase her Japanese identity.

Bruno’s mobility to Japan actually increased his connection with his Japanese heritage, even though it did not increase his feeling of Japanese national identity. Bruno learned more about modern Japan and Japanese culture during his year living in Japan. Because of this he said that he felt “stronger and more validated” and said that his “50% from Japan” became “stronger.” He gained confidence and felt like he could travel to more countries after having lived in Japan. His decision to go to Japan in the first place, however, was, like Marcos’, impulsive and economically driven. Bruno didn’t want to miss out on possible financial gains. Thus, his decision to go to Japan was strategic and similar to the reasons many Brazilian Nikkei gave in the 2006 survey by McKenzie and Salcedo (2009). Although Bruno made stronger connections to his Japanese identity while in Japan, this mobility was not enough to alter his strong Brazilian national identity.

#### **Section 4.6 Discussion**

The effects of mobility and language on my Nikkei participants worked in surprising ways. The lack of mobility and time spent in Japan did not deter Daiki from making a strong connection to his Japanese identity. His Japanese identity was more solidified as he taught Japanese language and culture to other Nikkei at his local kaikan. As he explained, it was his choice and not his parents’ choice to frequent the kaikan several times per week. He did, however, express a strategic preference for his Brazilian national identity to be able to stay in Brazil with his family and continue his studies, while at the same time pursue avenues to increase his mobility to Japan via scholarships and grants as a Brazilian Nikkei. On the other hand, Marcos’ mobility and longevity in Japan did not translate to a desire to become Japanese. Marcos did not feel like a Japanese national, or even want to retire in Japan, despite the successful life he had built in Japan. His strong connections to the Japanese language and culture may have increased his fondness for Japan and resulted in profound effects on his development as a person. However, even his Japanese fluency did not result in him wanting to stay in Japan or feel Japanese. Like Nishida’s (2018) Nikkei participants, fluency in Japanese and being ethnically Japanese wasn’t enough to feel Japanese in Japan. It is possible that, due to his lack of Japanese language ability when he first arrived in Japan, Marcos did not struggle with an identity crisis. He already knew he was a Nikkei Brazilian. As he embraced Japanese culture and improved his Japanese language abilities, he was able to connect with his Japanese heritage and even finally speak at length with his own grandmother in Japanese, a proud achievement and precious memory in his life. However, as he started his journey in Japan as a Nikkei Brazilian, he remained a Nikkei Brazilian.

Sofia’s resistance in her adolescence to continuing to learn Japanese and her fondness for learning English foreshadowed her future in Europe as opposed to Japan. Her mobility to Japan cemented her Brazilian identity as she realized that she was too different from Japanese people in

Japan. Because Sofia had made considerable investments in learning Japanese and studying Japanese culture in her childhood, her realization while in Japan that she wasn't actually "Japanese" was profound. Sofia decided not to pursue future studies in Japan or focus on Japanese language, but rather instead focused on English and in moving to Europe. Perhaps more predictably, Bruno's lack of Japanese proficiency and his motives to go to Japan for primarily financial reasons did not result in Bruno acquiring a feeling of Japanese national identity. His focus on English language learning and teaching, similar to Sofia, may have created an obstacle to forging stronger connections with Japan and Japanese culture. In addition, his self-segregation from Japanese culture and lack of Japanese friends may have also contributed to his isolation from Japanese society.

## Chapter 5 - Analysis of Kikokushijo

### 5.0 Introduction

In this chapter I provide analyses of the 14 kikokushijo participants in my study. I interviewed each participant one time, either in person or via online video conferencing software. All participants were in their 20s at the time of their interview. As with the Nikkei participants, I present not their current ages, but their ages at the time of our interviews to preserve their thoughts, emotions, and feelings at a particular moment in their lives. I will, however, write in the present tense to represent most of the participants' interviews, in order to contrast with their childhood experiences, which will be represented in the past tense. This contrast in past tense versus present tense helps the reader to understand the participants' changes in their positioning and repositioning, even though all interviews occurred in the past. Similar to the Nikkei participants, I will provide relevant background information for each kikokushijo.

Using narrative positioning analysis to analyze all 14 kikokushijo narrative texts, I made four categories of varying degrees of acceptance of and distancing from my participants' Japanese national identity, given that they are all Japanese citizens. Some kikokushijo positioned themselves as having a fixed Japanese identity while others had more of a nuanced national identity positioning, or eschewed national identity positioning altogether. As outlined in the methodology chapter, the narrative positioning of my participants, and the four national identity groups I created were based on the following two criteria : 1) how kikokushijo distance themselves, are opposed to, and or reject certain national identities and group memberships; and the degree to which kikokushijo 2) identify with, accept and recognize certain national identities and group memberships. After highlighting, categorizing and analyzing the narrative texts of my 14 kikokushijo participants, I created the following four groups: 1) No National Identity; 2) Minor Japanese National Identity; 3) Major Japanese National Identity; and 4) Japanese National Identity. The first group of participants, Minor Japanese National Identity, do not position their Japanese identity as a defining feature. Although their default identity may be Japanese, they feel that it is not their main identity. Among my 14 kikokushijo participants, four participants positioned themselves as having a mostly non-significant Japanese national identity. The next group, which I call Major Japanese National Identity, position themselves as mostly Japanese, but with influences from other cultures. Four kikokushijo identify as Japanese, but recognize the influence living in another country has had on their character and so may not completely identify as only Japanese. The third group, Japanese National Identity, position themselves as completely Japanese. Five kikokushijo have little ambiguity about their Japanese identity, and while they may acknowledge their kikokushijo experiences, they identify fully as Japanese. The final group, No National Identity, was created to accommodate only one of my participants. This participant did not really fit into the other categories because he resisted positioning himself as belonging to any one nation.

In this chapter I will proceed as follows. First, sections 5.1 to 5.4, I present highlights of the narrative texts that I co-constructed with my 14 kikokushijo participants. The presentation of each participant's narrative texts will be preceded by a graph of their individual timeline in order to easily see when the participant lived abroad and in Japan. The narrative texts show the degree to which my participants accepted or rejected their Japanese national identities and how much

they accepted and rejected their English and Japanese language studies. The lack of choice regarding their own mobility as children and the difficult but consequential choices regarding mobility as the kikokushijo became adults is also discussed. After having presented key sections from the narrative texts of my kikokushijo participants in sections 5.1 to 5.4, in section 5.5, I present the narrative positioning analyses within the four groups that I have created. Given the large number of participants, and the similarities within each group, I decided that grouping these analyses was beneficial and practical in terms of understanding the kikokushijos' national identity positioning.

### **Kikokushijo Literature Review**

Shao-Kobayashi (2019) conducted interviews and observed 25 Japanese high school students in the US and had follow-up interviews over several years after they had returned to Japan. She found that in the US the students (kaigaishijo) formed group identities based on English level and hoshūko (Japanese Saturday school) attendance, among other factors. When thinking about post-high school life, however, they renegotiated and repositioned their identities into kikokushijo. Only 6 out of 38 Japanese students, some of whom were not part of the study but known to the author, attended US universities or colleges after they graduated high school. This was because most students were encouraged to take advantage of the special perks offered to kikokushijo in Japan, such as the possibility of entering a prestigious university that they would normally not be qualified for without the favorable admissions processes available to kikokushijo.

Both the students and their parents acknowledged that they would be at a great disadvantage if they were to pursue higher education in the United States. In most cases, their choice was limited to community college (Shao-Kobayashi, 2019, p. 8).

Even among the few who managed to graduate from a US university, all but one student returned back to Japan due to lack of career opportunities and a difficult job market. The parents seemed to acknowledge using the kikokushijo experience as means to help their children excel within the Japanese system. “The kikoku title on a resume makes the application even more attractive for large corporations with a global market in sight” (Shao-Kobayashi, 2019, p. 10). Commoditizing the kikokushijo experience, then, links transnational mobility, English skills, and intercultural understanding with the Japanese governments' internationalization efforts outlined in Chapter 2. Most Japanese children living abroad eventually return to Japan because it is in their best interest to return to Japan. Japan's economy benefits by having bilingual and bicultural young adults invigorating their economy and the kikokushijo benefit from the special treatment and privileges available to them in Japan, but not necessarily outside of a Japanese framework.

Horoiwa (1987) classified kikokushijo into three groups: 削り取り型 (deletion); 付け足し型 (addition); and 自律型 (independence). Similarly Miyoshi, Asner-Self, Yanyan, and Koran (2017) categorize the process of fully identifying with their culture of origin to the exclusion of the host culture as separation, while identifying fully with the host culture to the exclusion of the country of origin as assimilation. They consider identifying with both cultures as being bicultural while identifying with neither culture as being marginalized. According to Horoiwa, the deletion group wants to conceal their overseas identity and experiences so as to not stand out. The

addition group has a strong sense of their Japanese national identity and they view their experiences as an additional part of their identity. The independence group embraces both identities, but does not have a strong allegiance to one or the other. In contrast to Horoiwa's deletion group, the Minor Japanese National Identity group is not trying to conceal their overseas identity, which may be a sign that kikokushijo's status has improved since the 1980s. Because my research is focused more on national identity, and not just kikokushijo identity, I have two versions of the addition group to distinguish the Major Japanese National Identity and Japanese Nationality groups. The No National Identity group has only one participant. This label is perhaps most similar to Horoiwa's independence group.

Although they are classified by the Japanese government as a uniform group, kikokushijo are actually quite diverse, both in terms of their kikokushijo and national identities. Each kikokushijo's narrative is unique with a complex set of factors involved in their transnational mobility. These factors include length of stay, developmental age when abroad, the number of repatriations, parental involvement and guidance, Japanese language use and study while abroad and after returning, English language support and use, friendships forged, positioning by others, self-positioning, access to financial resources, and institutional support from governments and non-governmental organizations. How kikokushijo are positioned by others in Japanese society may affect their own self-positioning. Are they positioned as "normal Japanese" or are they positioned as "foreign" in the ways they think, act, and dress? "It has been widely believed in Japan that kikokushijo are Japanese children who have lived overseas (normally thought of as the 'west') for such a long period of time that they have lost many of their Japanese cultural traits; have certainly forgotten many of their Japanese language skills; and have become imbued with non-Japanese ways of behaving, most notably with western ideas of individualism" (Goodman, 2012, p. 32). Goodman's observations about kikokushijo 30 years ago are still relevant today as my research will show. Goodman (2012) argues that the status of kikokushijo changed in three main phases, sometimes overlapping with one another, from the 1970s to the 1990s.

- (i) Initially there was public sympathy for such students, who were forced to have a foreign education because their parents were transferred abroad; there were demands that such children be 'rescued' and, as a result, some schools and universities in Japan started making special allowances for them. (ii) Later a feeling grew that those children who had lived in a foreign country should upon their return become fully Japanese again. (iii) By the early 1990s, there was a belief among some people that kikokushijo were a 'privileged class' protected by special educational advantages" (Goodman, 2012, p. 33).

Kidder (1992) interviewed 45 kikokushijo at two universities in Japan, one of them an American university satellite campus. She noted that Japaneseness, or being a "real Japanese" in the late 1980s and early 1990s was defined in the following ways.

Their manners of walking, sitting, and gesturing should be less vivid, confident, and spontaneous. Their body language should express more humility, restraint, and respect. Their speech must do more to honor the listener and humble the self (Kidder, 1992, p. 391).

Being unable to conform to Japanese culture was seen as a disadvantage. Yoshida et al. (2003) write that “until the mid-1980s, returnees were depicted as victims with Japanese language and culture handicap,” but that as quotas for kikokushijo were introduced at prestigious universities, the Japanese media began to depict kikokushijo as cosmopolitan and “much needed in the international workforce” (p. 642). Pang (1995) argued that due to the immigration law changes in 1990, by the mid 90s Nikkei immigrants became the public’s main topic of worry about the possible loss of Japanese identity instead of kikokushijo, whose possible “foreign-ness” was a popular topic in the media in the late 1980s and early 90s. Since the status of kikokushijo had improved, the newly arriving Nikkei replaced kikokushijo as the new ‘foreign Japanese,’ due to their sudden and rapid increase in population in Japan.

As outlined in Chapter 2, many universities still offer special entrance exams for kikokushijo. All of these schools and infrastructure exist to help Japanese students reintegrate into Japanese society more smoothly. The Japanese government’s investments in this type of schooling existed even before the era of globalization. According to Mizuno (2013), during the Japanese colonial empire in the early 1940s, there were 750 Japanese educational institutions worldwide. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there currently are around 200 hoshūko and 88 full-time Japanese schools around the world. Although not all kikokushijo participants want to stay in Japan, many plan on working for Japanese companies abroad, which still contribute to the Japanese economy. The Japanese government’s investments in overseas schooling and Japanese universities’ preferential treatment of kikokushijo has indeed reaped rewards for Japanese society. Instead of being shunned, kikokushijo are welcomed and privileged in Japan, and many become successful, contributing members of society. Their English skills and cultural knowledge are highly valuable commodities. Even though there are reentry issues, like being positioned as non-Japanese, being bullied or going through identity crises, kikokushijo are able to use their status to enter prestigious universities, learn English, get good jobs, and leverage their skills to possibly go abroad again someday. Whether or not kikokushijo position themselves as mainly Japanese or not, many use their Japanese citizenship, the financial resources from their parents, and their own linguistic and multicultural skills to align themselves with Japanese companies and universities for their own advancement.

In terms of choice, kikokushijo do not usually elect to live abroad. “The process of an adult who has deliberately chosen to engage in deculturation and acculturation must be carefully compared to that of a child, who involuntarily finds himself or herself in the situation of trying to figure out how to function effectively in a host culture while still enculturating to his or her home culture” (Lyttle, Barker, and Cornwell, 2011, p. 693). In general, some Japanese businessmen live alone during their posts abroad, in order to minimize any disruptions to their children’s lives. Many Japanese parents, however, decide to uproot their children’s lives, usually for strategic reasons. One of the major reasons is wanting their children to learn English abroad, which is a clear advantage in Japan.

Internationalization within the parameters of the Japanese society and Japanese ethnic identity is encouraged. That is to say that Japanese youngsters with excellent foreign language skills, intercultural skills and trained in Japanese universities are very much sought after in Japanese companies (Pang, 1995, p. 54).

Competing with Americans for a spot at an elite university would be a much more daunting challenge. Parents' choices, guidance, and financial support regarding hoshūko and Japanese private school attendance can also impact children's national identities. In research done by Peterson and Plamondon (2009) on 170 American returnees, they found that parents had a big impact on how well their children were able to adapt to life abroad. Of course, parents cannot always force their children to do what they do not wish to do. Many kikokushijo decide to quit hoshūko on their own. Fry (2007) writes that "individuals have more choices as to how far they wish to integrate or not integrate with the host culture, and similarly how far they want to maintain or not maintain association with the home culture" (p. 146). Because these are children, however, the parents of kikokushijo have a large role in shaping their children's futures. As kikokushijo move into post-university adulthood, they will be faced with many choices concerning their mobility and language use. They will be able to determine where they feel most comfortable, what languages they want to speak, and which national identity is more salient for them at any given time.

Although kikokushijo have rights and privileges that their non-transmobile peers do not have access to, there are costs and burdens associated with such a lifestyle. Lijadi and Van Schalkwyk (2017) interviewed 27 third culture kids, or highly mobile children, aged 7-16 years old regarding their place identity construction. They define place identity construction as fostering a sense of belonging and an emotional connection to the place where people live in the earlier years of development, which is important for maintaining emotional well being. Lijadi and Van Schalkwyk (2017) found that moving abroad regularly and needing to reestablish a sense of stability and belongingness in each new country poses a "threat to identity development, particularly as they continue the struggle to belong and find acceptance of and affirmation of who they are" (p. 127). Many kikokushijo struggle to fit in upon arriving in a new culture and then have to readapt to Japanese society upon return. Their subsequent identity crises, in addition to their difficulties making and maintaining friends, and the unending burden of learning two languages simultaneously mean that some kikokushijo reject their privileged label because of the hardships they have to endure. For example, Takashi, the most transmobile participant in my study, said:

While you do get the perks of being bilingual and bicultural, you also go through a lot of struggles for that, and you do pay a price for that. For example, you don't have childhood friends who you keep in touch with forever. So, in that regard you do pay a price for that. So, I wouldn't exactly say privileged. I would say the circumstances are different.

Despite financial and emotional support from family members, governmental support via overseas schools, and institutional support via company policies, university programs and specialized cram schools, kikokushijo's sense of belongingness and national identity are affected by their mobility. The degree of support, financial, emotional, linguistic and otherwise, may determine how much of an impact transnational mobility has on their identities and sense of belongingness to Japan.

Once kaigaishijo (Japanese children living abroad) become kikokushijo, or returnees living back in Japan, they have to reintegrate into Japanese society. In particular, kikokushijo need to reenter the Japanese school system and interact with their non-returnee peers. Yoshida, Matsumoto,

Akiyama, Moriyoshi, Furuiye, and Ishii (2003) surveyed 486 non-returnee Japanese high school and university students who attended schools with high numbers of returnees regarding their perceptions of kikokushijo. The most commonly perceived differences were kikokushijo's "foreignness, their language competency (in another language) or lack of it (in Japanese language), and their tendency to be too direct" (p. 650). This is a common theme among kikokushijo, i.e. arriving in Japan with a *honne* (direct) style of communication rather than the more common *tatemae* (indirect) style of communication in Japan. Being different was generally considered to be a disadvantage while learning a new language and being exposed to a new culture were considered to be advantages. Being positioned as foreign or non-Japanese by their Japanese peers can have a large impact on a kikokushijo's national identity, as is detailed below in my analyses of 14 kikokushijo.

Identities are not static or fixed, but rather constantly evolving and changing depending on a variety of factors, one of which is language. Sueda (2014) found that some kikokushijo purposefully weakened their English, declined to speak English, or spoke English with a Japanese accent in order to not stand out and be able to assimilate into Japanese society without appearing different. Similarly, Nukaga and Tsuneyoshi (2011) observed a specially designated kikokushijo elementary school by the Ministry of Education in Japan in 2000-2001, whose population of kikokushijo was about 15 percent (living abroad for one year or more) with around 200 kikokushijo. They found that the kikokushijo had varying degrees of English proficiency, some fluent and some unable to speak English, even though they were generally positioned as fluent speakers and 'international' by their teachers and peers. Some resisted speaking English even though they were fluent because their peers thought they were showing off if they spoke English. The non-English speaking kikokushijo, about 20%, were not given chances to show off their second language fluency, however, since foreign language activities in the classroom centered around English. The kikokushijo's behaviors and attitudes were often contrasted with the foreign students' behaviors, which were labeled more problematic than the kikokushijo behaviors. "Some returnees continued to remind others they were kikoku by presenting these differences, while some were no longer seen as kikoku when they refrained from showing these differences" (Nukaga and Tsuneyoshi, 2011, p. 239). Takeuchi, Imahori, and Matsumoto (2001) surveyed 70 kikokushijo as well as 109 non-returnees regarding communication styles, and in particular criticism. They found that kikokushijo used a more straightforward approach interacting with Americans while using a passive criticism style interacting with Japanese, and even used a more indirect style and hid their dissatisfaction more than non-returnees. Takeuchi et al. (2001) found that kikokushijo seemed to follow Japanese norms more than non-returnees, suppressing their expressiveness, and perhaps overcompensating for their lack of time spent in Japan. In her longitudinal study of four kikokushijo in the US and their return to Japan, Kanno (2002) found that "identities are shaped and reshaped in the interactions between the returnees and their sociocultural environments" (para. 20). Kanno (2000a) writes that her four participants were struggling with problems of belonging and identity, "an identity that did not quite fit in anywhere" (p. 374). Adjustment to their host societies and readjustment to Japan were both challenges they had to grapple with. Kanno (2000b) found that her participants "saw the majority language in each context as the key to full participation in society; high proficiency greatly facilitates entry into the mainstream while low proficiency may result in marginalisation" (p. 13). English language ability was a factor in how kikokushijo positioned and grouped themselves as cited in Shao-Kobayashi (2019) and Matsuda (2000). However, as we will see with the 14

participants in this study, Japanese language ability and communication styles also have an effect on how kikokushijo position themselves and their national identities. In a study by Matsuda (2000), five university-aged kikokushijo who spent 8 to 13 years abroad living in an English speaking country were interviewed once or twice about code-switching and identity. Matsuda (2000) found that code-switching among kikokushijo contributed to forming their bilingual identity and was “used as a social boundary marker and reinforcer; it allows returnees to associate or dissociate themselves from a particular group” (p. 54). Many participants in my study also used code-switching, i.e. using more than one language interchangeably and sometimes in the same sentence, among their kikokushijo friends in Japan and with their siblings and parents. Two of Matsuda’s (2000) participants, for example, mentioned how they were different from other kikokushijo who had been abroad only for a few years, indicating sub groups of kikokushijo.

Yoshida, Matsumoto, Akiyama, Moriyoshi, Furiye, Ishii, and Franklin (2002) surveyed 512 kikokushijo who spent at least 2 years living abroad between the ages of 5 and 18. Age of sojourn, length of stay, the type of schooling - Japanese or international schools - and help in adjusting back to Japan all affected their kikokushijo experiences. Kikokushijo from this survey had an easier time adjusting if they were older when they lived abroad, if they had good communication with their parents, if they had help from their schools in adjusting back to Japan, and if they had returned recently. Those who attended international schools were more likely to feel different, less accepted, and express negativity, but feel that they were in a more advantageous situation compared to their peers. Finally, the kikokushijo who spent more time abroad, lived in many countries, and went at an early age were less likely to be severely impacted by the returnee experience and less likely to be negative. Lytle et al. (2011) differentiate enculturation, or the process of being socialized into one’s home culture, from acculturation, or acquiring communication competencies when exposed to a new culture, from deculturation, or unlearning or adjusting the cultural norms into which one was first enculturated. Perhaps living in many countries for a long time prepared kikokushijo for a constant life of acculturation and deculturation, with the family unit and the boundaries within the physical house providing the main source of enculturation. These are generalizations, of course, and the interviews below with 14 kikokushijo will allow us to better understand their individual experiences than can be gleaned from a questionnaire. Using the same 1997-1998 survey respondents from Yoshida et al. (2002), but this time analyzing the answers to the open-ended questions, Yoshida, Matsumoto, Akashi, Akiyama, Furuiye, Ishii, & Moriyoshi (2009) published a new study. They found that many kikokushijo experience language-related issues, felt like they were stereotyped as a kikokushijo by their peers, and some experienced bullying and discrimination. Because there were no follow-up interviews with the survey respondents, however, the authors were not able to delve deeper into why some kikokushijo had an easier time adjusting than others. The current study’s interview format, in contrast, can provide a wealth of information that a survey cannot provide.

Above are the major studies conducted on kikokushijo that are available in English language peer-reviewed international journal and book publications. Horoiwa’s (1987) study was the only Japanese language article included in this literature review since it was cited by many authors and is directly linked with the focus of my research. With the exceptions of the Shao-Kobayashi (2019) study, whose ethnographic data was collected from 2004-2006, and Sueda (2014) study,

whose data was collected between 2000-2011, most research on kikokushijo was collected in the 1990s. My research on kikokushijo fills in a gap in the literature in two ways. First, my data was collected recently (2017-2019) and provides an updated qualitative look at a long-studied population. In addition, since there are no studies that I have found that focus mainly on national identity, this study fills an important gap in the literature. For example, the topic of the “Americanness” or “Japaneseness” of kikokushijo is mentioned often in the literature, but not examined deeply. The following sections provide an examination into the national identities of 14 kikokushijo, and a discussion of the myriad factors that are involved in how they position themselves.

### 5.1 Presentation of narrative texts from Minor Japanese National Identity group




Figure 16. Haruka’s timeline.

**“I’m like a Twinkie. Outside I’m Asian, but inside I’m white,” said Haruka.**

Haruka moved to the United States when she was in the 5th grade and stayed for 8 years. Like nearly all my kikokushijo participants, Haruka moved to the US due to her father’s job transfer abroad. She took English as Second Language (ESL) classes for three years and referred to learning English as her “only problem” adjusting to new life in New York. Her friends, however, were really patient while she learned English and were supportive of her. She also studied at a hoshūko, taking supplementary lessons at a Japanese school on the weekends for four years. She describes studying at the hoshūko when she was younger:

I didn’t take the class seriously... I hated that the teachers were like, um, I guess that the point they’re trying to do, like, going to Saturday school is to make you a bit Japanese. They have a Japanese culture there. Like you have to bow to the teacher. You have to respect them. You have to serve them tea. It was just so crazy. I was like, ‘That’s ridiculous. That’s so crazy.’ And like people, like friends around me [at the Saturday school], they grew up in America so they were all, ‘This is so stupid.’ Yeah it was really funny looking at them with protest in class or anything. They’re just like rebels, they don’t even do anything. Yeah it was fun, sort of, being a rebel, but not fun to study there.

From an early age, Haruka resisted learning at her hoshūko and these pressures to learn Japanese language and Japanese culture came to a head in the 8th grade. “It was in 8th grade and I actually had an identity crisis sort of thing.” Haruka decided to attend a regular American high school at first. However, in 10th grade she transferred to a Japanese high school in New York, where Japanese was mostly spoken and where Japanese cultural norms prevailed. Although she preferred her American high school, she switched schools to be able to skip the entrance exam process. “It’s like a free pass to go to college.” Here, Haruka uses her kikokushijo status to gain access to a prestigious university in Japan without having to go through the rigorous entrance exam process in Japan. Haruka explains her decision to go back to Japan:

I’ve been abroad and - passport says I’m Japanese, but I don’t consider myself as Japanese. I’m like a twinkie. Outside I’m Asian but inside I’m white. That’s when it hit me. Like, okay, do I just stay here and be a typical American Asian girl or do I go back and explore my roots. I want to know who I am in the bottom, so I was really curious... Yeah, I can spend four years of college there and decide whether I’m Japanese or American. That was my decision.

Our interview took place after Haruka had been studying for two years at a Japanese university. She had already experienced working as an intern for two large and well known international corporations in Japan, where she frequently questioned the duties she was assigned.

Even today, girls are supposed to pour out the tea and give it to your boss or men. You have to serve tea. When I heard that, I was like, ‘That’s ridiculous. Why do I have to do it because I’m a woman. Why do I have to be in a lower position just because I’m a girl.

Haruka explains how the reactions from her coworkers about her difficulty to conform to Japanese cultural norms led to her being positioned as a kikokushijo, and not fully Japanese.

They would be like, ‘Oh you’re kikokushijo. You’re from America. That’s why you don’t get it.’ They wouldn’t explain to me... They’re just like, ‘Oh, you’re kikokushijo. You don’t understand anything.’

She said that despite her unease at pouring tea for her male colleagues, she was open to trying and learning, but didn’t receive any help on how to do certain things, like preparing and pouring the green tea properly. Haruka explained that it was difficult to fulfill people’s expectations of her concerning Japanese cultural norms.

I’m Japanese, so they expect me to be Japanese, act like Japanese. But the truth is I’m not Japanese, and I don’t know anything I’m supposed to do or anything Japanese culture.

She says that she wants to go back to the US because she feels happier there, once she finishes university. She says she feels very “alienated” in Japan. However, she wants to get a job with an international company in Japan so that she can be transferred to the United States. Just as Haruka used her kikokushijo status to leave the US and get into a good Japanese university, once again she plans on using her status as a kikokushijo, her English language skills and her cultural

knowledge of the United States to return to the US. Although it wasn't her choice to move to the US initially, Haruka has made strategic decisions regarding her mobility and language studies, including attending a Japanese high school in the US in order to relearn Japanese and guarantee her access to a prestigious Japanese university. Graduating from a prestigious Japanese university can then help her to get a good job that will send her back to the United States, completing a kind of loop within the Japanese system that takes her back to where she is most happy, America. Thus, although Haruka rebelled at learning Japanese and maintaining Japanese culture in her early years, and despite her enjoying American high school, Haruka decided the best way to remain in the US would be via Japan. She rejected her responsibilities to maintain her Japanese language abilities while young, but later took on these responsibilities once she grew into adolescence, motivated by her desire to ensure entry into a Japanese university. Because of her dependent visa status, which reduced her mobility, she would have had to either marry an American as soon as her family left the US or find an American company or university to sponsor her on a new visa, which could have been a complicated process. Despite feeling more Americanized, she positioned herself, at least nominally, as a Japanese *kikokushijo*. Haruka was able to gain access to rights and privileges that would not have been available to her had she tried to go to an American university and work for an American company.




Figure 17. Gen's timeline.

**“There’s sort of a lack of effort on my part to go back into fully Japanese culture because my resistance towards becoming Japanese, because I was quite fond of living in the United States for so long,”** said Gen.

Gen's mother is Taiwanese and his father is Japanese. His father worked for a transportation logistics firm and was transferred to Germany at the time of Gen's birth. When Gen was one year old the family moved back to Japan until Gen was 9 years old. During his time living in Japan, however, his mother and two siblings spent two non-consecutive years in Taiwan, living with his mother's family while his father was working abroad. His mother wanted Gen and his two siblings to learn Chinese and connect with their Taiwanese roots. Gen felt accepted and made many friends while he was in Taiwan, although he struggled with learning Chinese language at first. His transition back to Japan when he was a child was also not difficult as he still had some

of the same friends and he spoke Japanese to his siblings. He also said he maintained his Japanese language skills while living in Taiwan. The family then moved to San Francisco, California to join their father when Gen was a fourth grader and spent one year there. Gen said it was difficult to move after just one year since he made two really good friends there. He didn't speak any English when arriving in San Francisco, so he studied in an ESL class, where a Chinese classmate translated what the teacher said from English to Chinese. Next, they moved to Los Angeles, California when his father was transferred yet again. The family spent 8 years living in LA. Right after graduation from high school in the US, Gen moved back to Japan to attend a specialized school to prepare him for the university entrance exam and to get up to speed on math and science in Japanese language. Gen described the process of learning Japanese and Japanese cultural norms, such as going to job interviews, as difficult. "Doing that in Japanese language, which I haven't touched in a while was a lot more difficult."

Like Haruka, Gen went to a hoshūko while he was living in San Francisco and LA in order to maintain his Japanese language skills. However, after 5 years of studying Japanese on the weekends, Gen decided to quit.

Gen: I thought that if we were going to stay in the United States for any longer there wasn't really any need for me to keep studying Japanese. That was sort of the source of my loss of motivation. I guess my parents could really see that I just wasn't interested. So they pulled me out of school. So I finished middle school and I just stopped going after that.

Fritz: How do you feel about that decision now?

Gen: Oh, I regret it so much. There's so much regret. So having spent nine years in the United States and the latter four years just not going to Japanese school, my Japanese skills are not as good as other returning students are. I think nine years is a pretty long time to be overseas. I've known some returning students who've just been overseas for a couple of years. And I think that's great because you get to see the culture long enough. Like, two years I think is long enough to see a culture and sort of understand the basics. But nine years sort of changes you into that country.

Like Haruka, Gen also spent 9 years in the US and then left for Japan to attend university, but unlike Haruka, Gen studied in an American public high school. Actually, his father was transferred back to Japan a few years after they moved to LA. It was decided by both of his parents that their children should keep studying English to "create more opportunities." In order to keep living in the US, his mother became a student and got a visa. His mother studied at night school, learning English and then herbal medicine. Gen was not able to work in high school because of his mother's visa status.

Gen explains his transformation from Japanese to Asian in middle school:

I was sort of like the 'Asian kid.' I stopped being the Japanese kid and I became the Asian kid. I was, I think like, middle school, I was fluent in English as much as the other

students were, just without understanding some references to current culture or modern culture.

In order to make up for his lack of understanding of cultural references, Gen went to the local library. “I think I cleared the entire DVD section, in like, a year and half or something.” He watched a lot of TV shows and movies and became fluent in American culture. He and his friends would often get together to hang out and play games like Cards Against Humanity. He didn’t have any Japanese friends during high school. “I don’t think I knew someone who was Japanese.” When asked how Gen positioned his national identity while in the US, he had this to say:

I think for the first couple of years I saw myself as like, a foreign student in America. So as like a Japanese student. But I think towards the last couple of years of high school is when I’ve started considering myself American. I wanted to go to American university, to study in the United States. But we just didn’t because of visa problems, not being able to get a green card... Yeah, I sort of became an American citizen almost. Yeah, I didn’t want to go back to Japan after high school.

Although technically a Japanese citizen, Gen was living with his Taiwanese mother and siblings, one of whom left to go back to Japan to attend university. Gen was immersed in American culture, stopped learning Japanese and didn’t have many Japanese connections. His American identity strengthened in high school and he only returned to Japan due to visa issues. Gen went to a school specially designed for kikokushijo, to help him acculturate back into Japan and learn Japanese language and cultural norms. Even after four years back, though, Gen prefers America. His current close group of Japanese friends - two kikokushijo who spent more than ten years in the United States, and a third who studied in an international school - mostly speak English with each other. “I still really don’t like Japan all that much. I would prefer to live in the United States if I could.” He is looking for graduate school options in the US. He now feels a bit more used to Japan, although he doesn’t watch Japanese TV or movies. He says he is still “more leaning towards the American side.” Gen still positions himself as more connected to American culture and is not even exploring options for graduate school in Japan. “There’s sort of a lack of effort on my part to go back into fully Japanese culture because my resistance towards becoming Japanese, because I was quite fond of living in the United States for so long.” He sees his future in America. Gen’s family, and especially his mother, made many choices that have affected Gen’s life and his national identity, like the decisions to maintain residence in the US after his father had left his job in the US. In fact, his parents were living in Hong Kong while Gen was living alone in Japan at the time of our interview, which left Gen without a “home” in Japan. Gen is, for the first time, preparing to make his own decisions regarding his own mobility and future language use, which does not appear to involve Japan or Japanese language. Gen positions himself as actively resisting “becoming Japanese” and has little interest in immersing himself in Japanese culture.




Figure 18. Yoko's timeline.

**“I was never proud to be Japanese,” said Yoko.**

Although Yoko positions herself as Japanese, it is by default and not something she identifies strongly with. In fact, she is constantly questioning her Japanese identity. Yoko was born in Singapore and lived there until she was nine years old. Yoko went with her mother, sister and father, who is an engineer that works with glass manufacturing, when her father was transferred abroad to Singapore. Yoko's parents are both Japanese. She then moved back to Japan and lived there for six years. When she was 15 years old her father was transferred to the Philippines for one year and she also accompanied him there with her family. She has been living in Japan since she has moved back from the Philippines. Yoko is 20 years old and has spent a total of 10 years living outside of Japan, or half her life.

Although Yoko was born abroad, she spoke Japanese with her parents while at home, and so she considers that her native language. Her older sister went to an American school in Singapore and so she decided she also wanted to go to the same American school. This is where Yoko learned English and some Chinese. At the time of our interview Yoko's sister was a graduate student in the United States. Yoko said that she never attended a Japanese primary or secondary school. While living in Japan, Yoko went to international schools. She enjoyed meeting people from around the world at her international schools, but her Japanese language skills did not progress at the rate she would have liked. “My speaking isn't as bad as my reading and writing because I speak with my parents. But I never learned grammatical terms and how to write reports and read kanji, so that's where I'm a bit slow at learning.” Yoko is now struggling to catch up as a Japanese university student. It was her parents' decision, not Yoko's choice, for her not to attend hoshūko.

My parents wanted me to learn English, or they wanted me to focus on English, so they didn't put me into those Japanese cram schools or Japanese learning schools... when I came to Japan, it was a big culture shock, and I guess I felt like an outsider more in Japan when I came back.

Like Haruka and Gen, Yoko struggled with Japanese cultural norms when she returned to Japan. Similar to Haruka, Yoko described looking Japanese but not acting Japanese.

Especially because I look Japanese or I am Japanese, so everyone assumes I know everything. But in reality, I didn't know anything at all and all the mannerisms of Japan, that's very strict... It was more difficult for me to adjust to Japan because it was like an outside country for me.

Yoko entered into an international school when she returned to Japan, but she was placed into a non-native Japanese class.

In Japan, in international schools, they have one class. Once a week we have Japanese classes, so that also helped me. I guess what was kind of embarrassing was that in fourth grade, I was put into the non-native Japanese class when I'm Japanese and everyone Japanese goes to a native class. That was embarrassing, but it helped me a lot because I could catch up on Kanji.

Yoko positions herself as Japanese and felt embarrassed about not being able to fulfill one of the duties of being Japanese, i.e. being proficient in Japanese language at a "native" level. Some of her classmates teased her about being in the non-native class and she says that "it was a little bit shocking to see that all of my Japanese friends were in another class."

Fritz: How do you feel about your identity, about Japanese identity? Do you feel a strong Japanese identity?

Yoko: I sometimes think that I am very Japanese. I don't know if that's the right term to use. But I am Japanese. But there's a part of me that questions whether I am Japanese because there will be times when I'm talking with my Japanese friends and I wouldn't be able to understand them as much. I guess their way of interacting with people are also a bit different, and so that also comes to me as a shock. I don't know if that's my personality or that's their culture. It really confuses me sometimes.

Like Haruka, Yoko is still confused about her Japanese identity. Yoko has had to change in order to adapt to Japanese culture. "Because I've been changing myself a little bit, it's kind of half and half." She positions herself as Japanese, but her character is still half non-Japanese.

When she returned, Yoko didn't understand when other Japanese people positioned her as a *kikokushijo*. "Everyone kept calling me *kikokushijo*, but I didn't know what that word itself meant." She said she feels the word *kikokushijo* has a negative nuance to it, and that *kikokushijos* use it as an excuse for not doing certain things in Japan, like not being able to fully conform to Japanese cultural norms. She also said that some people use the word to sound "cool" after only having spent a short time abroad. She distinguishes herself from this category, since she has lived 10 years abroad and many *kikokushijo* only spend one or two years abroad. Instead of positioning herself as a *kikokushijo* she simply says, "I lived in Singapore for 10 years." She doesn't feel like she has a privileged status in Japan. This is perhaps due to the fact that she is still struggling to learn Japanese, even though her English skills are highly valuable in Japan.

Fritz: You said in past tense, 'I had confusion about my identity.' How do you now feel about that?

Yoko: I still get confused about my identity in certain situations where I'm like, 'Am I really Japanese?' Now it doesn't bother much anymore because I feel it doesn't matter what I am. I guess it's something that I have to deal with for the rest of my life, because, well, I lived in, I was born in Singapore, and that's my background...I was never proud to be Japanese. I mean I'm not anything else, so it's something that I don't feel too attached to. But it's something I can't avoid. It's just there. It's not really something that I'm particularly like, 'I'm Japanese,' or something. Yeah.

Yoko said that the perception of her background has slowly changed in Japan, as more and more people have experienced living abroad. She says that people positioning her as normal helps lessen her identity confusion. Yoko has decided to stay in Japan and teach English in Japan because "we're really slow on speaking English and we're really focused on exams and writing English." In contrast with her more independent sister, who is living abroad, Yoko says that she is more dependent on her parents. Her parents' choice to limit Yoko's Japanese language education in favor of American and international schools, may have had an impact on Yoko's national identity. Although Yoko positions herself as Japanese by default, she is not proud of being Japanese and still is confused by her national identity at times.




Figure 19. Ayumi's timeline.

**"I consider myself flexible, I guess," said Ayumi.**

Ayumi spent six years, from kindergarten to part of elementary school, in California. Ayumi's father was an accountant for a large Japanese electronics company and the family moved to California when Ayumi was three years old, together with her mother and younger brother. When Ayumi was nine years old the family returned to Japan and Ayumi stayed in Japan until she studied abroad in Germany for one year during her undergraduate studies. At the time of our interview Ayumi was living abroad in Germany, conducting research for her Phd. From the ages of six to nine, Ayumi attended hoshūko on the weekends, studying math, science, and kanji in Japanese with 20 other Japanese children. Ayumi's younger brother attended a special Japanese preschool on the weekends and then went to a regular American preschool during the week.

Ayumi's transition back to Japan from the US was difficult, similar to the tough transitions to Japan experienced by Gen, Haruka and Yoko.

First, when I came back from Japan, I think I had an identity crisis, if I can put it that way. I didn't know to which group I actually belonged to, but I felt more American because I kind of neglected how the Japanese acted with each other. 'Cause I didn't really like the group activity thing, where there was always a leader and you have to follow her. I was pretty against that. Then becoming older you get used to the situation and you understand how the system works.

Like Haruka, Ayumi went through an identity crisis, not knowing to which group she belonged at first. Ayumi, however, was able to slowly adjust to Japanese culture over time. She still didn't feel fully Japanese, though, when I asked about how she positioned her national identity during the interview.

I consider myself flexible, I guess. If I'm in just like a Japanese group, yes, I feel Japanese. I act as a Japanese, you know, with the *desu, masu* hierarchy consideration [referring to using formal Japanese to address senpai or other adults], I guess, if you're with teachers or someone above you. But if I'm with other returnees, I think I'm acting like them... That's how I think about myself, it depends on where I am and with whom I am.

The senpai/kohai relationship is a pervasive and defining element of Japanese culture, one that really differentiates American and Japanese cultures. Ayumi is able to fulfill her duties as a kohai, but she associates these actions as Japanese. I also followed up with more questions about kikokushijo, since she referenced how being with them affects her identity.

Kikokushijo is, for me, um well, like a term to define that you were in the States, and you don't actually define yourself as Japanese. It's like you're not the typical, stereotypical Japanese group. It's something you differ, you use it when you want to differ yourself. That's what I see when the other kikokushijos use the term kikokushijo at our campus. There's a kikokushijo group, and the non-kikokushijo people. I think it's to differentiate yourself from the Japanese who don't have experience in America. I don't take it negatively. But from the other perspective, from the Japanese, so I think they use the word a bit in a like a not sarcastic, but a negative way, an envious way. That we're not 100% um, them, I guess.

Ayumi Ayumi feels that she is positioned as not fully Japanese by her non-kikokushijo peers for being a kikokushijo, which is similar to Haruka's experiences with her colleagues at work. Ayumi also positions herself as not fully Japanese because of her kikokushijo status and experiences. When asked about a future living in Japan, Ayumi says that it's possible, but with qualifications.

Um, I sometimes feel in Japan I need a break sometimes. I think you feel the same way too. But it's not because I don't like the culture or I don't like myself there... I think

maybe it's the pressure from work. Everything's more slow over here in Germany. People can relax, enjoy family time.

Ayumi speaks to me as two expats, both of us living outside the countries where we were born, as she was conducting research in Germany at the time of our interview. Ayumi explains that Japanese culture is “conservative” and that “it kind of prevented me to speak out your opinion, to be open minded.” Ayumi references the *tatemaie*, or indirect style of communication, as a barrier. Ayumi associates and positions actions like speaking one's opinion freely, the *senpai/kohai* formal language requirements, and enjoying a better work/life balance as non-Japanese. This is similar to the way Yoko positions herself, in relation to other Japanese. When Yoko acts or thinks differently she questions her Japanese identity and like Ayumi, associates these non-typical actions as being non-Japanese. When she is with fellow *kikokushijo* or non-Japanese people, Ayumi feels free to shed her Japanese identity, meaning that she can act in non-typical “Japanese” ways. Her flexible identity allows her to transition in and out of Japanese culture with relative ease. Ayumi chose to study abroad twice in Germany, in part to explore her non-Japanese identity and wishes to work with international companies in the future. Her English and German language skills have increased her potential to travel and work abroad in the future. Ayumi mentions working for a wine distribution company in the future that exports wine from Germany to Japan. Similar to Haruka, Ayumi can leverage her language skills and cultural knowledge to her advantage. In fact, Ayumi mentions to me that her family has a Japanese sake business and that in the future she would like to help her family's business by expanding abroad. She wants to be an entrepreneur that sells sake and wine in Europe, using her English and German skills.

All four participants in this Non-Japanese National Identity group struggled upon their returns to Japan. Language was a big factor in their national identities and struggles to adapt abroad and in Japan. Except for Yoko, Gen, Haruka and Ayumi all studied at *hoshūko*. Ayumi was perhaps too young to opt-out, but Gen and Haruka both decided to quit their supplementary Japanese studies. Haruka chose to attend a Japanese high school in the US to help ease her transition to life in Japan, while Gen had to take an intensive Japanese language course for *kikokushijo* upon return. Yoko is still struggling to learn Japanese. All four were affected by their parents' decisions regarding *hoshūko*. All four want to use their language abilities in their future careers, and only Yoko has expressed a desire to only live in Japan. All four do not have strong Japanese national identities. From their interview data, it was clear that feeling a part of one group, or nationality, can evolve or devolve over time.

## Section 5.2 - Presentation of narrative texts from Major Japanese National Identity group




Figure 20. Lisa's timeline.

**“Right now, I feel being a Japanese more stronger, I guess, because my daily life is like using Japanese and being Japanese; but yeah I do feel that I’m an American as well,” said Lisa.**

When Lisa was two and a half years old, she, her sister, mother and father moved from Japan to California. They stayed there for about one year and then moved to Illinois, where they lived for the next six years. Lisa moved back to Japan when she was nine and a half years old and has been living in Japan ever since. So Lisa spent a total of seven years living abroad. Lisa has a twin sister that did not take part in the interview, although she listened in while we were speaking. Both of Lisa's parents were kikokushijo as children. Lisa's father lived in Asian countries and Lisa's mother lived in California and is an English teacher.

Lisa went to a public elementary school and, because her house was far from a hoshūko in Illinois, both of her parents taught her and her sister Japanese and math on the weekends. Her parents received textbooks from Japan that were suitable for their ages. Lisa continued her studies during the entire seven year period. Lisa doesn't detail any major adjustment issues either going to the US or returning to Japan, but wishes she could have spent more time in the US.

I wanted to stay in the States more longer and, actually, right now I feel that I wanna go back to the States as well. But I really enjoy my life in Japan, so I feel like I wanna live in both countries at the same time.

She and her sister were put into two different classes at school. They would speak in English “because we were really used to talking in English.” She speaks mostly Japanese now with her sister, but in some situations speaks English. She also speaks Japanese with her parents, but sometimes uses English words that are difficult to translate in Japanese while speaking to her mother. When they were living in the US, Lisa's parents wanted their children to speak Japanese at home with them. There were also Japanese neighbors in their community, so there were more opportunities to speak Japanese outside their home.

And with my sister, as I said, I would speak English with her right after I came back from school, and with my friends. But my mother would always say to us to speak in Japanese. But it was a lot easier to speak in English. We would fight with each other in English.

The conscious choices made by Lisa's parents, to homeschool their children in Japanese language and math, encourage Japanese language use at home, and connect with other Japanese living in the community, may have helped Lisa and her sister to more easily transition back to life in Japan. Given that both her parents were kikokushijo, their knowledge about transitioning between cultures may have been the impetus for their considerable efforts to provide so much support to their children.

When asked if she sees herself as a kikokushijo, Lisa responds affirmatively and embraces this part of her identity.

I feel that as one of my really special identities. I guess not everyone can be a kikokushijo. I can feel a lot of feelings and I can experience a lot of stuff that not other people can do that easily.

Lisa feels special because of her experiences living abroad for seven years as a child and still tries to maintain her English levels by taking extra classes and seeking out people to converse in English with on her university campus. When asked about her national identity Lisa positions herself in the following way:

Lisa: I feel like I'm Japanese, but a kikokushijo. But I don't want to be seen as a foreigner, like, because I'm Japanese. I'm full Japanese. I feel like I want to be same as other people who are living in Japan... I do feel like I want to, um, be a kikokushijo forever because my, you know, feelings and my emotion as an American, and also the same thing as Japanese.

Fritz: ...you don't want to be seen as a foreigner, but you also mentioned that you have an American part as well. Can you talk more about that?

Lisa: Well, I feel like, since I lived in Chicago when I was young and lived in the States when I was young, I feel that my whole base part was made as an American. But since I came back to Japan, I also have kind of like the Japanese identity as well. And when I'm in Japan I feel like I want to be Japanese.

Lisa wants to be seen as a Japanese kikokushijo, but acknowledges that the foundation of who she is was constructed in the United States.

I want to be seen as Japanese. But I also feel that when I go back to the States I'll probably think that I want to be seen as, maybe a Japanese who lived in the US and knows all the US cultures and stuff. So yeah, I want to be fully adapted to the culture in Japan or also in the US. So when I just look at myself I feel like I have the base of the American, but also have the identity of the Japanese. But I kind of change, like, in each culture that I'm in.

There are times when Lisa also taps into her American identity while in Japan.

Also, being in Japan, kind of, there are times that I want to be an American just to kind of, I don't know, how should I say it? I feel really safe and, I don't know, really heart-warming maybe, when I'm kind of like feeling stressed and really tired, I try to be an American and have like the heart-warming feelings and stuff.

Like Ayumi, when Lisa feels that she is stressed and needs a mental break, she uses her American identity as an escape. Although Ayumi physically chooses to leave Japan when she needs a break, Lisa mentally escapes by channeling her nostalgic feelings for her American childhood. She also tries to maintain her connections to American culture by consuming American media and contacting her American friends via Facebook. “So yes, naturally I keep my Americanness, yes.” Although Lisa positions herself as “full Japanese” and does not want to be seen as a foreigner in Japan or abroad, she embraces her *kikokushijo* identity and maintains a strong connection with her American roots. Lisa's resistance to being positioned as foreign in Japan and her wish to be positioned as Japanese while abroad are clear indications that she positions herself as more Japanese than American. In contrast to some of my other *kikokushijo* participants, she said she was “kind of enjoying the *senpai/kohai* culture.” She takes her duty to represent her Japaneseness seriously, because she “is Japanese,” but still maintains a space to reposition herself as American at times. In terms of rights, duties and responsibilities, Lisa fulfilled her parents' wishes to study on Saturdays and Sundays for seven years while living in the United States. Her parents' also fulfilled their responsibilities of supporting their children through major changes in their childrens' lives caused by moving from and back to Japan. It's clear that Lisa's mobility has introduced this “American base” into her national identity. Had she lived her whole life in Japan, her strong connections to English and American culture would have likely not been defining features of her identity.




Figure 21. Rina's timeline.

**“It's more like I have to keep up my English,” said Rina.**

When Rina was nine years old, she moved to Virginia in the United States with her parents. She lived there for nine years, returning to Japan to attend a Japanese university. Before they left, Rina was resistant to go to the US saying, “I didn't feel angry or anything, but I was more like, ‘I

don't want to do; why do I have to do this?'" Her Japanese parents continue to live in the US while Rina studies at a university in Japan. When Rina arrived in the US she didn't speak English. There was a Japanese girl in her class that helped her translate English into Japanese at first. It was very difficult for Rina to adjust because of cultural and linguistic barriers.

My mom told me that when I was in elementary school, every single day when I came back to the house, it's like she said, 'You were saying, I don't want to go to the school, I don't want to go to the school, I don't want to go to the school, I don't want to go to the school.'

Rina said that this feeling of not wanting to go to school lasted until she was able to transition out of ESL classes in the eighth grade. Given that she arrived in the fourth grade, this was quite a long transition period. Rina spoke about her time taking ESL classes:

It was difficult. Yeah, it's like I didn't really get used to speak English the whole time, and everyone speaks English the whole time.

Rina started going to hoshūko right after she arrived in the US and continued attending every Saturday until she returned to Japan. Out of all my participants, Rina studied the longest at a hoshūko. This indicates that Rina actively chose to attend and maintain a connection to Japanese language and culture. She made friends there and was able to speak Japanese to her friends there. At home she only spoke Japanese with her parents. Rina liked to read Japanese books at home, which were easier for her to read than her high school reading assignments like *The Scarlet Letter* or *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*. She made some American friends in middle school and high school, but not many. These difficulties with the English language contributed to her decision to attend a Japanese university, even though she could have stayed with her parents and attended a university in the United States.

...I didn't like English and I didn't want to go to university in the US... and also before I came back here [to Japan], I thought, as I said, I was 100% pure Japanese. 'So maybe I should go back to Japan. Maybe college would be the good time to go back to Japan.'

In the United States Rina positioned herself as "100% pure Japanese", but once returning to Japan, she repositioned herself as not completely Japanese.

Fritz: If you had to say, what percentage would you think of yourself as American?

Rina: I think 30% to 40%.

Rina's national identity changed as a result of her mobility, which is similar to Sofia in Chapter 4 when she went to Japan and realized that she wasn't Japanese, but Brazilian. Repatriations, returning to Japan in Rina's case, "are stressful precisely because they involve threats to an individual's past and present worldviews" and so have the "potential to dredge up discontinuities between the identity concerns of a third culture kid (growing up in fluid, multicultural environments) and the behaviors and attitudes of peers raised solely" in their home countries (Peterson and Plamondon, 2009, p. 756). Even though Rina came back to Japan for short periods

of time, for one month or so, during her nine years living in the US, she only repositioned her identity when she permanently changed her address to Japan.

Well, before I go back to Japan, I thought like I was solely a 100% pure Japanese, because I can speak Japanese. And although I was like living there for nine years, every once in two years I went back to Japan for about a month. So I was like, until that, like I was like totally 100% pure Japanese, but when I came back here and then like maybe get into college and talk to those Japanese people who are living in Japan for a long period of time, I just realized it's like I'm not 100% pure Japanese. It's like I'm the mixture of the US culture and Japanese culture, and then now sort of like identity crisis going on.

Even three years after her return to Japan, Rina is still going through a national identity crisis. She repositioned her national identity once she returned to Japan and started interacting with “those Japanese people” who haven't spent a large portion of their lives abroad and noticed that she wasn't “pure Japanese.” This notion of purity was mentioned in the nihonjinron section in Chapter 2, a theory claiming that the Japanese are a unique and homogeneous people with Japanese blood being a defining characteristic. Japan is a country with a low percentage of non-Japanese residents, accounting for just 2.25% of the total population as of 2020 (Japan Data, August 18, 2020). So Rina's talk about Japanese purity is not uncommon in Japan. Rina's new found American identity, only realized when she returned to Japan, prompted a national identity crisis, similar to Haruka's and Ayumi's national identity crises. If her language usage, personality, thinking and mannerisms were not completely “Japanese”, then was she a “pure Japanese?” Like other kikokushijo, her interactions with other Japanese and how they positioned her would contribute to this identity shift. Even her mother sometimes says Rina is “more like the American culture” because of her thoughts and actions. Rina fulfilled her duties as a Japanese citizen living abroad by continuing with hoshūko for the entire nine years and then returned home to Japan, something that the Japanese government welcomes. A kikokushijo's skills and cultural knowledge can be utilized to increase the competitiveness of Japanese corporations, and therefore help to improve the Japanese economy, as was detailed in Chapter 2. Rina said, “When I came back here [to Japan], I realized how the English is essential in maybe the globalization... It's more like I have to keep up with my English.” Rina hasn't yet decided whether she will attend graduate school in the US or in Japan. Her long-term plans most likely involve living in Japan because even though her adolescence was in the US, “I feel like more, I was like in Japanese culture than the US.” As a science major, Rina's scientific knowledge combined with her English language skills and cultural knowledge could end up benefiting Japan.




Figure 22. Ayako's timeline.

**“Yes, even for me they seem a little foreign,” said Ayako.**

Ayako is 27 years old and spent about 11 years abroad. Gen, Ayako and Maya are siblings. Like Gen, Ayako and Maya lived in Taiwan with their mother for about 2 non-consecutive years before they moved to the US. Maya was born in Japan. Ayako was born in Germany and spent the first few years of her life there, but doesn't remember much from her time in Europe.

Ayako is a graduate student studying inorganic chemistry in Japan. She moved to the US when she was 11 years old and left when she was 18 years old to enter a Japanese university. She took the special entrance exam for kikokushijo, which meant she did not have to take Japanese literature and history subjects on the test. Before entering university she attended a special cram school. There she studied Japanese and caught up on any science education that was not taught to her in the US, but that was necessary for her Japanese entrance exam. As a kikokushijo, Ayako only had to take math, science, and English for the entrance exam. As detailed in Chapter 2, many universities offer special ways for kikokushijo to be admitted, like separate entrance exams and interviews. Ayako also explained that she applied to a top university in Japan via an interview and writing an essay in Japanese based on an English language article, which is not common. Ayako could not speak English when she first arrived in the US and was placed in ESL classes for two years. At first she asked for help from some of the Taiwanese students, since she could understand some Chinese from her time living in Taiwan. But after one year, Ayako said she learned a lot of English. Her parents made strategic decisions about school placement.

Ayako: My parents chose schools that did not have a lot of Japanese students, because they didn't want me speaking Japanese. They wanted me to learn English as soon as possible.

Her parents also advised Ayako to study in the US during high school so that she could take the special entrance exam for kikokushijo after graduating, which she did. Her parents also reduced support for her Japanese language studies. She studied at a hoshūko for three years but then stopped.

Fritz: Why did you stop? You said you took [lessons] for three years in middle school. Is there a reason you stopped taking those classes in high school?

Ayako: One of the reasons was that I wasn't taking it seriously, and my parents were like, 'I'm not paying money for that anymore.' So I stopped. That was okay for me.

Being the oldest, and the one with the most time spent in Japan, Ayako sees herself as different from Maya or Gen.

Ayako: My younger siblings, my little sister, she went to the United States in second grade, and most of her ways of thinking are closer to Americans than Japanese. I think that does have an effect.

Fritz: Interesting. Do you feel different to your siblings in that way?

Ayako: I do. I do. Yes, even for me they seem a little foreign.

Ayako positions her siblings as more “foreign” than she is because their thinking is different. When asked to elaborate more, Ayako describes how Gen wishes to move from company to company to get more experience, whereas Japanese tend to stay in one company for a longer period of time. “That’s how I realized his thinking is more like American than Japanese; that’s how I realized mine is closer to Japanese,” said Ayako. The duties and responsibilities expected of Japanese workers are usually higher if they are given 正社員 (seishain), or full employment. Switching companies often is also generally regarded as undesirable by companies in Japan, who expect more loyalty in exchange for lifetime employment. In addition, remuneration is often tied to length of employment, rather than specific skill sets in Japan. Gen’s strategy of switching companies often may not be recommended in Japan, which is why Gen is planning on living in the US in the future and why Ayako positions him as more American in his thinking. Ayako also contrasts her thinking with her American friends.

Ayako: I might be more comfortable in Japan rather than the United States.

Fritz: More comfortable, like how?

Ayako: More comfortable in ways of thinking, I guess. Because in the United States all my friends speak out their mind. They would say what they want, but then I wasn't really used to that. I guess my way of thinking was closer to Japanese rather than United States. I thought I might be more comfortable in Japan.

Similar to Haruka, Yoko, Rina, and Ayumi, Ayako defined her national identity in terms of her thinking and actions being similar to or different from Japanese or Americans. In other words, how we think and act is associated with national identity. Speaking one’s mind, or honne, is more associated with an American way of thinking than a Japanese way of thinking. Ayako feels more comfortable with the less confrontational Japanese style of speaking, or tatemae. Gen, on the other hand feels that communication in Japan is difficult due to keigo, or polite language, being “sort of like a wall that comes in between people because it forces you to be polite and

doesn't really connect you to that person." Ayako feels more comfortable with the deferential style of communication in Japan and therefore feels more Japanese. Even so, Ayako does not feel completely Japanese.

Fritz: How do you characterize yourself? Japanese? Japanese American? American? You don't know?

Ayako: I can't say I'm 100% Japanese, because some of my friends would say that I think a little different from typical Japanese.

Fritz: Do you feel like you have that American cultural influence on you? Do you feel that part of your identity is connected to America?

Ayako: Yes, I do think part of me, yeah, I think my experiences in America has made me different from regular Japanese people.

When compared to her siblings Ayako positions herself as more Japanese, but when compared to a typical Japanese person, Ayako repositions herself as different from "regular" people. Like Ayumi, the group of people she is with determines Ayako's positioning of her national identity. Ayako has spent more time in Japan, learning Japanese language and adopting Japanese customs than her siblings, which Ayako cites as a key factor in the differences in thinking among the three siblings.




Figure 23. Maya's timeline.

**“So even though I do have more ties to the Japanese culture, I wouldn't want to cut away the American part,” said Maya.**

Maya is 20 years old and spent about 12 years abroad. Maya arrived in the US when she was in 2nd grade. She spent two years in ESL classes. She says her experiences in Taiwan helped her prepare for life in the US “because I didn't speak the language in Taiwan [so] it kind of helped me get an idea of what it was going to be like when I went to the United States.” Maya says that she was “socially awkward” as a child and didn't really like meeting new people. Maya attended hoshūko from the second grade to the middle of the sixth grade. Maya wanted to continue studying at the hoshūko, but her mother didn't want to drive just one child to the school, so she

had to stop. Her mother encouraged her to study at home instead, but Maya said “it wasn’t as rigorous as the Japanese school.”

Fritz: At home did you speak, what language?

Maya: Uh, I spoke Japanese. But my mom spoke Chinese when she was angry. (Laughs). Mainly Japanese.

Fritz: (Laughs). Yeah.

Maya: And I was encouraged not to speak English at home because they wanted me to at least get some Japanese in.

Fritz: Yeah, and did you speak, what language did you speak with your siblings?

Maya: Uh English. In the very beginning, Japanese, but in the very end English.

Fritz: Yeah. Um, what about now? Do, now that you’re um, all in Japan, what language do you, do you still speak English, or a mixture or?

Maya: Uh, with my brother it’s all English. But with my sister, when we text it’s all English but when we talk on the phone it’s Japanese.

When Maya was at school, however, Maya’s mother told her to speak in English. Her mother made most of the decisions because her father would often be travelling abroad for work. Given Gen’s orientation toward American culture and Ayako’s orientation toward Japanese culture, it makes sense that Maya speaks English with Gen and Japanese with Ayako. Still, Ayako and Maya text in English, continuing some of the linguistic habits that started in America.

Maya said that her peers noticed her accent change from Japanese to American over the years, but that they still positioned her as Japanese.

Maya: And whenever there was like a Japanese person in a piece of literature or whatever book we were reading, they would be like, ‘Hey, it’s you.’ And so, I guess I was never an American to them. Which is okay.

Fritz: Did you feel part of American culture?

Maya: Uh, when I came back I definitely felt it. I was like, ‘Okay, people are very proper here. And they have all these manners I don’t know about.’ And so, in that sense, I felt that I was more American than Japanese.

Like Rina, Maya felt her American Identity when she returned to Japan and realized that her actions and thinking were different from those of many Japanese people. And similar to Sofia experiencing different identities in Brazil and Japan, Maya felt different depending on who she was with. Ayumi also mentions this in her interview as well.

Maya: But when I was in America, uh, I would have my set of, like morals, or like the way I live. To them [I] would be like Japanese, and in that sense, I was like okay. I am more Japanese. So depending on which environment I was in I would either associate myself more with the Japanese or the American people.

Maya being positioned as Japanese in America and her different upbringing than her American friends led her to feel more of a Japanese national identity in the United States. However, sometimes while in Japan, Maya feels more connected to her American identity.

Fritz: Do you think you could be both though? You know, like bicultural?

Maya: Hmm, yes and no. Uh, I know that I will never actually be an American citizen. But I feel that I can like, there are part of their culture that I am a part of, I guess, because I lived there for so long.

When asked if she felt half American and half Japanese, Maya said, “Uh, I think I lean more toward Japanese culture.” Despite being positioned as more American and “foreign” by her elder sister, Maya says she feels more Japanese and likes Japanese history. Yet, Maya defends her Americanness.

Maya: But if someone were to say that I am not American, in that my experiences there didn’t have any influences on me, it would be very, um I wouldn’t say upset, but I would kinda be irked, because I would say that it is part of me and it is part of the culture that I grew up in.

Although Maya positions herself as Japanese, she reserves the right to claim her American identity, even though she is not an American citizen. Like Lisa, who claimed the foundation of her identity was created in America, Maya denies others the power to strip her of her foundational American identity, since it is part of who she is. When asked about her future plans, she said she was interested in IT and programming and wanted to use her English skills.

Fritz: You want [your career] to be something involved... that will use your English?  
Or...

Maya: Mm-hmm (affirmative). I feel like it would be a waste if I didn’t use my English. And also I don’t want to lose it, because it’s important to me to be able to speak English

English is a valuable skill that can potentially increase her hireability in the IT sector and a part of her identity.

With regard to relationships, Maya says that she was able to make friends easily in the US but has had a more difficult time making Japanese friends. She says that some of the international students on her Japanese university campus view her as more American, but she feels more Japanese around them. “So like, I feel like my Japanese/American identity is just like a comparison.” Like Sofia and Ayumi, Maya positions and repositions her national identity

according to who she interacts with. National identity is variable and changing even within the same day as Maya interacts with her Japanese classmates in the morning and then speaks to her friends in the international program in the afternoon.

### Section 5.3 - Presentation of narrative texts from Japanese National Identity group




Figure 24. Shiho's timeline.

**“I view myself as a Japanese, completely a Japanese right now,” said Shiho.**

Shiho moved to the State of North Carolina in the United States when she was 5 years old and lived there with her parents for five years. When she was 10 years old, the family moved back to Japan and she has been living in Japan ever since. Shiho is 22 years old. Her father is an engineer and, like all my kikokushijo participants' fathers, was transferred abroad. Shiho didn't know any English before going and spent one year in ESL classes, which she said was sufficient. She said that she could have used more support transitioning to her elementary school in the US.

My parents would always tell me to be respectful to the teacher. In Japan, you know how you have to keep a certain distance between your teacher? I did the same thing with my teacher in my elementary school. I felt like the teacher was thinking that I didn't like her that much. For me, I thought we were having trouble getting along. I couldn't open up to her that much. I don't know. It was a bit weird for me.

Similar to Gen feeling that barriers are erected when using polite communication, or *tatemae*, Shiho also expressed difficulty opening up and using *honne*, or one's true feelings. Although these concepts, a public stance and a private stance, are not exclusively Japanese, Americans tend to share more of their *honne* or private feelings and opinions than Japanese usually do. Being careful not to offend others and keeping a certain social peace is generally highly valued in Japanese culture. Both *honne* and *tatemae* have their benefits and drawbacks. Using *honne* has the benefit of being able to forge closer relationships with individuals while *tatemae* has the benefit of maintaining harmonious relationships within groups. A drawback of using *honne* is the possibility of offending others and destabilizing group dynamics while a drawback of using *tatemae* is not being able to bond more closely and understand one another on a deeper level. *Honne* and *tatemae* also are connected to power dynamics in communication. *Tatemae* works well in Japan with its very hierarchical *senpai/kohai* system and the need to use a different

register with completely different grammar and vocabulary for those older than you and in positions of power, like teachers, lawyers and doctors. Ayako said she felt more comfortable with *tatemae*, or polite Japanese culture while Gen felt more comfortable with *honne*, or being able to fully express himself, a feature of American culture. Even at a young age, Shiho recognized the difficulty of using *honne* in the United States.

Shiho attended *hoshūko* for all five years she lived in the US and looked forward to her Saturday classes. She was able to make Japanese friends at her *hoshūko* that she still maintains contact with. Like Rina, Shiho enjoyed the connections to Japanese culture that the *hoshūko* offered. Shiho was told that she was only going to live in the US for three years, but then her parents had to extend their stay two more years due to work obligations. Shiho was “a bit disappointed” that she had to stay because she would go back to Japan every summer for a few weeks and “that made me miss Japan every year.” When asked about how her classmates positioned Shiho, in terms of national identity, she said she was positioned as Asian.

Fritz: Did people identify you as Asian or Japanese?

Shiho: I think Asian because everyone would first ask me if I was Chinese or Korean, not Japanese. I think they thought of me as an Asian in general. Yes.

Shiho said she had some problems transitioning back into the Japanese school system when she returned at 10 years of age.

Shiho: I didn't have any problems regarding the Japanese culture itself. I had more problems dealing with the school rules. The rules and how things are. I don't know how to put this in English, but the *shunkan* in school.

Fritz: Customs, habits?

Shiho: Yes.

Although Shiho viewed the rules as strict at first, now Shiho accepts those rules because, “I think maybe getting used to it after some time; I felt okay with them.” She acknowledges that if she had spent more time in the US “I would have been more rogue.” When asked about how Shiho positions her national identity she says the following:

Well, right after I came back to Japan, I was kind of blurry about which am I more: American or am I more Japanese? It was because other kids in the school in Japan treated me as a foreigner. But what I thought was, Japanese, because at the school in the United States, I was treated as an Asian, but as Japanese. I think my sense as a Japanese grew stronger until I came back to Japan. But right after that, it became a little bit fuzzy. But after time, my sense as a Japanese grew stronger I think. So it made me really look back at who I really am in the sense of being Japanese or like in the sense of which country I belong in.

Similar to the identity crises experienced by Rina, Harkua, and Ayumi, Shiho questioned her national identity. Like other kikokushijo, Shiho positioned and repositioned herself based on how others positioned her. When Americans positioned her as Asian, she felt more Japanese, but when Japanese positioned her as foreign, she felt more American. As Shiho got used to the rules and customs in Japan, she became more comfortable with them.

Fritz: How do you view yourself now?

Shiho: I view myself as a Japanese. Completely a Japanese now.

Fritz: What does that mean to you to feel Japanese?

Shiho: I think it's a sense of belonging to a group. I feel like even if I go somewhere else, I'm still from a group of Japanese. And yes, that is also about my nationality, but also, um, yeah, I think of it as a home.

Shiho was able to maintain her connections to Japanese culture abroad via the hoshūko, and despite some difficulties readjusting to Japanese culture at first, she gradually reaffirmed her Japanese identity. The biggest impact on Shiho's life from her kikokushijo experience was learning English.

I think the five years made up of my whole, I don't know, my life plans. It made me, this five years was the reason I became interested in English, and made me want to use English more in my life in the future. And also what I'm majoring in in college and future jobs I want to do. So yes, I think it had a lot of impact on me.

Shiho wants to either be an English teacher or a teacher trainer for other English teachers.

I want to educate English in Japan. It's more of a domestic aspect, right? I'm not as much interested in going international, going worldwide as much as staying in Japan and using what I learned from my experience and distribute it to the younger generations, I think.

As outlined in Chapter 2, Shiho's future plans align perfectly with the Japanese government's objectives of using the skills of kikokushijo and study abroad returnees to advance the skills of future generations in Japan. English language education is prominent among these objectives. Shiho mentions that she wants to teach English "not how it is taught in Japan now," but "how to be able to use English to actually communicate to other people around the world." The English lessons Shiho took in Japanese schools were not focused on communication, but more on passive skills like reading, writing and grammar. Shiho feels that it is her duty to spread this knowledge of how to communicate in English to other Japanese. Her mobility and English language knowledge, in this case, strengthened her Japanese identity and motivated her to make the choice to take on the responsibility of advancing English language education in Japan.




Figure 25. Kayoko's timeline.

**“Personally, I don't feel like I'm different from other people, but I guess like from other points of view, people do think I'm different from other people,” said Kayoko.**

Kayoko was born in Japan and when she was seven years old, she went to live in the UK with her mother and sister because her mother wanted to learn English. Kayoko is the only kikokushijo that did not go abroad due to her father's work. However, Gen, Maya, and Ayako's mother also stayed in the US alone with her children so that she and her children could learn English, even though they initially moved there due to their father's work. Kayoko and her mother and sister stayed for two years in the UK and then returned to Japan. Kayoko finished her primary school at a Japanese school but transferred to a British international school in Japan and studied there for three years, maintaining her English education. She said that her transition to Japanese primary school was difficult because “people started to not like me for who I was,” which was a motivating factor to switch to a British international school. But the international school in Japan was not sufficient, as Kayoko “always wanted to go back to the UK.” So she decided to go to a boarding school in the UK when she was 14 years old. This boarding school was full of international students from around the world and was an all girls school. She went alone because her sister wasn't interested in returning to the UK. Kayoko spent the next four years in the UK and returned to study at a Japanese university when she was 18. She explains that her time apart from her family made her more independent.

So my view changed a lot, I think, towards my mum. Like I was really thankful that she did everything for me, um, but on the other side because I didn't spend a lot of time with my family during those four years, um, I am thankful, but I don't think that I am that close to my mum or my sister. So, I don't know, like, I think some people would think that going abroad alone would cut the connection with your parents and all that. It didn't, but I'm not that close to my mum, and because we don't have a dad, like, um, I don't know, but yeah.

Kayoko made a decision at a young age to become mobile as a kikokushijo for the second time, the only one of my participants that was able to make this choice. Of course, going abroad would not have been possible without the support from Kayoko's mother. Yet, Kayoko's independence from her family sets her apart from other kikokushijo in that she was able to make most of the

decisions about her future at a young age, instead of her parents. Some of these decisions she later regretted.

But sometimes I do think that I should have thought more thoroughly about what subjects I should have taken in A levels, because I guess that's what kind of affects you in uni. I'm happy here [in Japan], but sometimes, like seeing my friends on Instagram and all that in the UK, I do miss being in the UK, to be honest. But I'm happy, I guess.

Kayoko chose to study law in the UK, but realized too late that she wanted to study medicine instead of law. Because of the way UK schools are structured, it was too late for her to change, "so I told my mum that I wanted to come back [to Japan] and reapply to do medicine." Kayoko explains that her decision to return to Japan was not motivated by any sense of longing to be back in Japan.

So it wasn't like, 'I'm ready to go home to Japan. I really want to be back in Japan.' It was kind or more like bureaucratic.

Although Gen and Haruka returned to Japan for different bureaucratic reasons, Kayoko wanted to study medicine, which could only be achieved in Japan due to the way the UK system works. She immediately enrolled in a school for kikokushijo that specialized in helping Japanese students relearn subjects important for university education in Japanese.

When Kayoko was at her boarding school she positioned herself as Japanese.

So there are a lot of people from Hong Kong, some from Russia, Germany, Spain. It was really international. So yeah, I did feel like I was Japanese, I guess, because we didn't know anything about each others' culture. So we would talk about our own culture. So if a person from Germany was like, 'In Germany we do duh, duh, duh.' Then people would be like, 'Oh, in Hong Kong we would do that.' So, I guess in that sense I would feel Japanese.

Like other kikokushijos in this study have mentioned, Kayoko positioned her national identity vis a vis her classmates' positioning of themselves and how she was positioned by others. By contrasting Japanese culture with other cultures, Kayoko positioned herself as Japanese. Furthermore, when she returned to Japan and started taking classes at a Japanese university, she began to position herself in relation to other Japanese university students.

Fritz: So you also mentioned about that you felt pretty Japanese inside. Can you talk more about that?

Kayoko: Well, back then I was really shy.

Fritz: Does that equate with Japanese?

Kayoko: Okay, maybe it's a stereotype. I shouldn't have stereotypes towards Japanese people, but Japanese people are really shy, I think. Some people are really outgoing and

all that, but if you think about classes, not a lot of people volunteered to speak up.

Kayoko, in this instance, positions herself in contrast to her Japanese peers. She equates national identity, as other kikokushijo do, with generalized personality characteristics of groups of people. She said that in the UK people speak up more and in Japan they are more passive in class. This is perhaps due to a different style of education where the Japanese teacher, or professor, usually calls on students to participate rather than students initiating discussions in class. When asked about how she feels now, Kayoko says that in Japan she “feels different.” This is due to others positioning her as different because of how she dresses and her more direct honne conversational approach, in contrast to her Japanese classmates.

Personally, I don't think that I'm different from other people, but I guess like from other point of views, people do think I'm different from other people. Like the way I dress, but also the way I think. It's not that I'm mean, but if I don't like something, then I say that I don't like it, and I try to have my own opinion. So people think I'm, not harsh, but I say things pretty clearly, and some people might think about something mean, but my friends like that about me.

Kayoko, like Gen, feels more comfortable speaking honne, or her real feelings and opinions, rather than tatemae, like Ayako does. Some of Kayoko's friends are from the UK and others are from her cram school where she studied with other kikokushijo. Now Kayoko feels comfortable in both Japanese and British cultures, “I guess I'm used to both of them... I like both countries.” Kayoko doesn't identify as British, perhaps because of her time in an international school in Japan and at a boarding school with students from several different countries. Kayoko also resisted being defined as different, as being positioned as non-Japanese by others. Kayoko was able to leave her Japanese primary school when her more honne style of communication clashed with other Japanese students, after she had spent her first two years abroad in the UK. Thus, Kayoko still has her UK connections and connections to other kikokushijo that insulate her from having to position or reposition her national identity in a completely Japanese context. As a way to maintain her English and have a connection to non-Japanese culture, Kayoko sought out opportunities to work as an assistant to me and other non-Japanese professors.




Figure 26. Yutaro's timeline.

**“I think in Japan, I’m a bit more shy than I should be. And I’m less social. But in America, I felt that I could be a little more, you know, friendly and social. I felt that my characteristic were leaning a little more towards average American than Japanese,” said Yutaro.**

Yutaro is a 20 year-old bioscience major at a Japanese university who lived in the state of Indiana in the United States with his parents and his younger sister. His father was transferred to the US when Yutaro was 8 years old and the family stayed for seven years. He was happy to go to the US even though he didn’t speak any English when he first arrived. Yutaro attended regular classes concurrently with his one ESL class for six years. When he started high school his ESL teacher informed him that, “You don’t need ESL anymore.” Yutaro made friends from his ESL classes, which he said was “the most important part.” They would have sleepovers and hang out with each other at their houses, which is not so common in Japan. Many Japanese students spend time at school doing club activities until the evenings instead of hanging out at their friends’ houses. Yutaro said that he joined his high school band practice during his first and only year at his American high school and also made friends there that he is still in contact with. Yutaro attended hoshūko for all seven years of his stay in the US, the second longest time spent studying Japanese abroad after Rina. He mostly concentrated on studying Japanese language and math taught in Japanese language.

Fritz: At home did you speak in Japanese, English, mixture?

Yutaro: I spoke with my parents, Japanese. And I speak with my sister in English. And I still do so with my sister....It’s easy to say bad things with my sister since my parents don’t understand.

Although Yutaro’s parents took English language classes while they were there, their proficiency levels never matched Yutaro’s and his sister’s English capabilities. Yutaro would return to Japan every two years or so for about a month, but he didn’t have any friends in Japan during those times. At age 15 his father’s company transferred him back to Japan and Yutaro “was kind of excited.”

It was like, I had a feeling that I could start over again. And felt really fresh and good.

Yutaro’s parents made a decision about schooling in Japan early on. “My parents always told me that they wanted me to go to high school here [in Japan], and they wanted me to go to university here.” His parents’ reason for this was strategic. “They thought if I were gonna go to a company in Japan, Japanese companies usually prefer people who graduated Japanese university.” He said his transition back to life in Japan was not so difficult. “It wasn’t so difficult since I went to Saturday school, Japanese language school there.” As detailed in Chapter 2, the hoshūko, which are usually supported by the Japanese government, are very important in terms of allowing kikokushijo to maintain a connection to Japanese language and culture, and therefore Japanese national identity. Some of my kikokushijo participants regretted not continuing with their hoshūko Japanese language classes.

Yutaro said that he wasn’t positioned as foreign in either the United States or Japan.

Fritz: Did people call you Japanese [in America]?

Yutaro: No, not really. They just treated me like I'm a part of them. They didn't think I'm different just because I was Japanese. I could speak English, I could just talk with them. They treated me like I was no different from them.

Fritz: So when you were there did you feel Japanese?

Yutaro: No, not really. I felt pretty American.

Fritz: Can you tell me more about that? What do you mean by feeling American?

Yutaro: I think in Japan I'm a bit more shy than I should be. And I'm less social. But in America, I felt that I could be a little more, you know, friendly and social. I felt that my characteristic were leaning a little more towards average American than Japanese.

In contrast to some other kikokushijo participants, Yutaro was not positioned as Japanese in the US and therefore positioned himself as American. However, like Kayoko, he associates national identity with certain personality characteristics, such as the generalization that Americans are friendly and Japanese are shy.

Fritz: Why do you think you can be more friendly and social in America, but not in Japan?

Yutaro: In Japan? Because I'm trying to adapt to the average Japanese society. And go towards them. So I think I'm being a little more shy. Like that.

Fritz: Is it better not to stand out in Japan?

Yutaro: I think so. I don't think Japanese people like things that stand out, because they just attract attention. And they think attracting attention isn't very good. People don't like things being different from them. And, some people just think being different is a bad thing in general. So try to avoid that.

Fritz: Do you feel like there is pressure to be the same in America?

Yutaro: No, not really. They're all friendly and they accept what I am. So I don't really think about what I should do and what I should be compared to Japan. I know in Japan I have to adapt to Japanese culture. But in America, I can do whatever I want, and express myself, and that's fine.

Yutaro references the honne style of communication as allowing him to be more free in the US to express himself. He also mentions the tatemae style of communication, when he has to become more shy and hide his true feelings in Japan in order to blend in and not attract too much attention.

Fritz: Do you feel like part of you is American?

Yutaro: If I go to America, maybe I might feel that way. But as of now, not really.

Fritz: Yeah. Do you feel now that you're completely Japanese?

Yutaro: Pretty much, yes.

If Yutaro goes back to America, his American identity might be (re)activated. This is similar to what other kikokushijo, like Ayumi, have mentioned. The people you associate with and the geographical place you are in can affect your national identity affiliation. While in Japan, however, Yutaro's lack of mobility has affected his national identity, so he feels more Japanese now. Nevertheless, when asked about his future living in Japan, Yutaro responds with mixed feelings.

Yutaro: ...I prefer something in Japan, I prefer something in America. So, I can't just live in Japan and be satisfied with Japanese everything. Then I would want American things like Taco Bell. Things like that.

Yutaro is fine with living in Japan as long as he can satisfy his American food cravings.




Figure 27. Ryo's timeline.

### **“I feel more Japanese when I came back,” said Ryo.**

When Ryo was around 5 years old, his father was transferred abroad to the state of California in the United States. Ryo lived in the US for seven years, returning when he was 12 years old. He attended ESL classes his first year there in kindergarten. His family moved to a different location in the same city. This was because one of the schools was scheduled to close and so he had to move to another school. Ryo attended a total of three different elementary schools during his time in the US. Ryo attended hoshūko from 1st to 6th grade, so he was able to maintain his Japanese language skills throughout. However, because he was so young when he moved to the US, he was still learning Japanese.

Fritz: Once you got there how was it to adjust to new life?

Ryo: Actually, it was very hard to adjust in life since before going to America because it's just hard to get used to words, not only in America, but when I was in Japan.

Fritz: Even in sixth grade?

Ryo: Yes, I actually had a hard time getting used to classes...Almost everything is difficult.

Ryo had a difficult time in social studies classes, especially, since most of the references were unfamiliar to him. He said it was “fun” when he was studying at his third elementary school, but his father’s job ended so they returned to Japan and Ryo started junior high school there. Ryo explains his difficult transition back to Japanese life.

Ryo: I don't have so much friends, and I was bullied because of the, because of my not, not good at Japanese. It's very hard to get used to what they're saying, like 方言 (*hougen* or kansai regional dialect).

Fritz: Right, right. Maybe it was different than you learned in your Saturday school [where they would be teaching standard Japanese or 標準語 (*hyoujungo*)]?

Ryo: Yes, and the pronunciation sounds like English, so the pronunciation is different from like other students and me.

Fritz: Ah, your pronunciation was different. Okay.

Ryo: Like are you a foreigner, are you a 外国人 (*gaikokujin* or foreigner)?

Fritz: Really? How did you feel when they said that?

Ryo: Uh, I felt, I felt alone.

Ryo was positioned as a foreigner by some of his Japanese peers, causing him to feel ostracized at first. His lack of regional language use together with his *kikokushijo* status marked him as non-Japanese to some. Ryo said, however, that “it started to get better in high school.” Ryo moved out of the school district because of his experiences with being bullied. He was able to make a fresh start at a new school and there was a more accepting environment at his new high school. “Actually, the people has to be like equal; it doesn't matter who it is - Japanese or foreign.” When asked if he wanted to return to the US to live, Ryo said, “Actually I want to go to US as travelling, not staying.” Ryo said he didn't want to live in the US again because “the main reason is the class was so hard.” Ryo's difficulties with English discouraged him from applying to graduate schools in the US. At the time of our interview Ryo had already finished graduate school in Japan and was in his second year working for a company that analyzed data from medical and clinical trials, where he sometimes was asked to translate documents into English.

He said that his kikokushijo status may have helped him get a job and that his company has regular English classes for their employees, which Ryo does not have to take. He said that his company was thinking of expanding abroad and that he may have to work abroad someday.

Fritz: How do you feel about that? Going to a new country for work?

Ryo: If I have to then I have to get used to it. Um, just a little looking forward. But, actually, I have to get used to, like, [the] job. Learning English in a different country and working in a different country is very different.

Ryo seemed hesitant in his tone of voice when speaking about working abroad in the future, and it was not something he was overly excited about.

When asked how people in the US positioned Ryo, he said “I feel Asian.” But when he returned to Japan, Ryo said, “I feel more Japanese when I came back.” He said that his Japanese national identity is most salient when he needs to explain Japanese culture to non-Japanese. Yet he says, “I don’t know how to explain, like Japanese history” or sometimes it’s hard for Ryo to understand “some opinions” of Japanese people. Although Ryo positions himself as Japanese, he finds it difficult to fulfill the obligations of being a Japanese cultural ambassador as he finds his knowledge lacking. He seems frustrated when he says, “It’s very hard; I can explain some, but it’s very hard to get used to how to understand.”

From the Japanese government’s perspective, Ryo is using his English skills at a Japanese company to help improve the economy, which can be seen as a success. The investments the government makes in hoshūko school abroad has allowed Ryo and other kikokushijo to maintain their Japanese language skills while their parents work for Japanese companies abroad, which contribute to the Japanese economy. His kikokushijo status and English skills ended up benefiting Ryo in his job search and will possibly aid him in his future career if he is sent abroad with his current company.




Figure 28. Kana’s timeline.

**“There’s so many special, unique culture in Japan. And I told this to the other students in international school,” said Kana.**

Kana is a 20 year-old university student who moved to Europe with her family due to her father's job transfer, working for a large Japanese electronics company. When Kana was 5 years old she moved to Hungary with her parents and lived there for three years. She studied at a Japanese school in Hungary for the first year and then transferred to an American international school for the remaining two years. When Kana was 8 years old, her family moved to Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, where they lived for five years. Kana spent a total of 8 years living in Europe. In Slovakia, Kana attended a British international school the entire 5 years. Like other kikokushijo parents in this study, Kana's parents decided that an English-based education, not Hungarian or Slovak, would be beneficial to Kana's future.

Kana: I was in Japanese school but my parents decided to move to an international school because studying Japanese in Europe is kind of like not [a] really good experience and there's no sense of studying Japanese in other countries. So they decided to move me. So, that was not my decision, but my parents' decision.

Fritz: What do you think about that decision now?

Kana: More thanks for my parents because my exams in high school, in university, like English made me successful. And by learning English it's easier to understand other languages, I think. That's why I'm learning German now...Yeah, I'm really impressed with my parents.

Kana went to hoshūko for the first year but then stopped because she said there were very few Japanese students. During the second year in Europe, Kana didn't study Japanese at all and fell behind with her Japanese proficiency. Her parents decided to hire a teacher from Japan to teach on Skype once or twice a week. Kana continued receiving Skype lessons where she would learn Japanese for six years. Kana said that her mother also taught her sometimes.

Fritz: How do you feel now, your Japanese language ability, as a Japanese university student?

Kana: Actually, it's quite surprising. Now my Japanese ability is quite higher than the normal students, which is interesting because I don't know, I read many novels. Like I had to buy many books when I was in Japan and then bring that back to Slovakia and that would take me some time. So we bought like 20 or 30 books at once, so I read all of them. So we had to go back to Japan again and we repeatedly, like several times like this. So, I read so many novels and that made my ability higher, like improved. And like normal people in Japan, they have many club activities and they don't have enough time to read novels, I think, and that made them not really, not enough Japanese ability. I don't know how to say it but I got higher than them.

Kana positions herself as special and different from "normal Japanese" people due to her self-perceived above-average Japanese language abilities. She said that as she entered junior high school she started to take her Japanese studies more seriously. "I felt that my Japanese abilities really not enough, compared with natural, normal people, so I started studying harder." Kana

also joined sports clubs and made friends at her international school in Slovakia. She said her low level of English skills while she was living in Hungary prevented her from making many friends at the international school there. When Kana returned to Japan, she attended a Japanese middle school for six months, which was difficult because the students used “slang words” and she failed many math and Japanese history tests. She said her peers often used abbreviations and she “couldn’t understand anything.” When her mother was teaching Kana Japanese, she purposefully taught her only standard Japanese.

My mother hates those young words, because it’s not really a proper words, right? So, actually, my mother knew that young people use those things, and some words she knew, but she tried me not speak like those. Just only using clear, proper words. But that made me actually harder to live in Japan because I was only 14 years old I think. Yeah, 13 and 14. And that is the time when we use most of the younger words... Like novel, we don’t use young words in novels.

Kana positions her Japanese as “proper,” in contrast to the Japanese argot used by her peers. And thus, due to her lack of knowledge of common Japanese argot and other school subjects, she had a difficult time adjusting to her Japanese school in Japan. To ease her transition to Japanese schooling, Kana matriculated at a private high school with a large population of international students and many other kikokushijo students. Compared with other kikokushijo, Kana positions herself as being unique due to her experiences living in Europe.

Sometimes they [other kikokushijo] say, ‘Well, I was in China for 13 years,’ or like ‘I was studying abroad in America,’ but for me it sounds not really special, because America there’s so many Japanese people, because it’s in English...And for me, I earned much more, not only language, but some other culture knowledges. I don’t want to say that I’m special, but we’re not the same.

Kana also mentions her experiences with bullying as a defining experience since she was the only Japanese person at her international school. There was a Korean car factory near the school so there were many Korean students. “I was fighting with Korean, like 100 Korean people against one person, but that made me feel 100% Japanese.” Kana’s national identity also became salient when she had to explain Japanese culture at her school, similar to Kayoko and Ryo.

I was still only one, the Japanese, so I felt like I was 100% a Japanese person, especially when we had international day. Every year we had that. And I was the only one, so I had to make many Japanese foods and so on, and told them some cultures.

When Kana returned, she felt some relief at not having to defend her culture like she did with some of the Korean students.

Fritz: Do you feel proud being Japanese?

Kana: Proud, yeah. Because Japanese is really hard to learn, and if I was a foreigner, I think it would be, I couldn’t learn Japanese. It has too many characters, and polite

language. It's really difficult...There's so many special, unique culture in Japan. And I told this to the other students in international school.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, *nihonjinron* is the theory that the Japanese people are unique in the world and that the language is too difficult for non-Japanese to really understand. Kana positions her Japanese identity as closely aligned with Japanese language.

Yeah, sometimes I feel like a foreign people. But that's because I'm speaking other languages, foreign language. But while we're speaking Japanese, I feel normal. Because now I get used to young words also, so no problem.

Language is the biggest factor for Kana when positioning her national identity. She also recognizes her English skills as valuable in Japan. "Because [English] language is the most important ability in Japan, so, *kikokushijo* is really strong these days, I think, and also in the future."

My interview in English with Kana seems to strengthen her self-positioning as Japanese.

This kind of experience, like having interview with other countries, is also feeling, making me that I am 100% a Japanese. Because I'm talking about experiences on other countries. This is also having speaking out to others. And thank you for this really important experience.

Kana's national identity became more salient during the interview process, whereas some participants, like Haruka, remained confused about their national identity throughout the interview process.

#### Section 5.4 - Presentation of narrative texts from No National Identity group




Figure 29. Takashi's timeline.

Out of all my 14 *kikokushijo* participants, Takashi spent the most time living abroad, 18 years. Takashi's father works for a Japanese bank and travels all over the world as part of his job, which often involves taking his family with him. Takashi was born in Hong Kong and when he was three years old he moved to the Philippines, where he lived for four years. He moved to

Japan when he was seven years old and stayed for one year. After that his family moved to New York, where Takashi lived for 11 years until he graduated high school. He moved back to Japan to attend a Japanese university. He had been living in Japan for three years when I conducted this interview with him.

After living in the Philippines, where he attended an American international school, Takashi attended a public elementary school when he returned to Japan for one year.

Fritz: Do you remember anything about that time?

Takashi: Yeah, I do remember I had issues about my Japanese, because I obviously hadn't used Japanese up until that point. I went to a normal elementary school in Tokyo, which was a public one. And I didn't go to an international school or anything...But I did have issues with language skills, Japanese to be exact. And I did have issues with Japanese culture, because it was something I had never been exposed to up until that point...And also, I just didn't understand how Japanese kids interacted with each other.

Takashi explains that he felt “devastated” when he found out that he would be moving to New York, because it was difficult to make friends. “I will say that in the end, as a 22 year old me, I'm glad it all happened, but the seven year old me wasn't very happy about it.” Takashi attended an American public school and only took about a month before he was comfortable with using English as his main language again. Takashi spoke Japanese at home, “but because the words that you use at home with your parents are so limited, it wasn't nowhere near enough to help me with daily conversations when I moved to Japan.” His transition to American life was “pretty easy” as he attended a “prestigious” public elementary school and had “fond memories in middle school.” For high school, however, Takashi decided to attend the same Japanese private high school as Haruka attended in New York, which is a boarding school. According to Takashi, “a third of the classes were in Japanese [and] about two-thirds were conducted in English.” He said that the English classes were “weird” because “no one in the class can speak English.” Attending this high school, however, would guarantee Takashi admittance into a top-ranked university in Japan.

All my friends, all the kids from middle school all ended up going to the same high school...I ended up not going to the local high school, which I wish I did. For at least a year, I wish I went to the local high school there.

Takashi “regretted” his inability to experience at least one year of American high school, as Haruka had. One of the major reasons why Takashi disliked his Japanese high school experience was because of the senpai/kohai system.

There is a huge hierarchy thing. Have you heard of the word senpai? It's literally nothing...Everything that, whoever's older than you, or whoever's in grade above you says is right. And that was a bit difficult for me to adjust, because that was ridiculous to me. There were a lot of ridiculous things that happened during high school, especially because of that hierarchy.

Takashi explained that he was more used to American culture without such strict rules of the senpai/kohai system, which involves using a different and polite form of Japanese for students who are even just one year older. Like in the military ranks, questioning a senior officer, or in this case a senpai, is usually frowned upon.

The hierarchy thing. That was the biggest culture shock for me, because I was never used to my peers telling me what to do. Especially being in America, where you're the individual, and you're told to be different and to be unique. In a Japanese high school you're told not to be unique.

The power relationship between Takashi and his peers changed once he attended a Japanese high school, where the hierarchical senpai/kohai system is in use. Even after three years living in Japan, Takashi is still resistant to these Japanese cultural norms.

Fritz: How do you feel about it now looking back? Do you accept the senpai/kohai system or are you still resistant?

Takashi: I'm still quite resistant to it. It's still, obviously, it doesn't stop in high school. It just goes on for the rest of your life. As long as [you're] living. And, I don't agree with that, because it really gives the sentiment that everyone who is older than you is always correct. That obviously doesn't make any sense. This whole seniority thing is just very ridiculous...And because it's even more prevalent once you're an adult, that really does bother me. It's a world that I don't want to get into, but I have to get into. Especially because of that, I'm looking to leave the country. Yeah.

On account of having to fake-position himself as an unquestioning and dutiful kohai, Takashi wants to leave Japan. Even so, Takashi accepts his responsibilities and duties to be reverent, unquestioning, respectful, and to be positioned as a kohai. Similar to the results in the Takeuchi et al. (2001) study, where kikokushijo overcompensated and were more adherent to Japanese style communication norms, Takashi overcompensates as a coping mechanism.

While, to be honest, I don't agree with the senpai/kohai thing, I'm very good at it. Since entering university, I've done a lot of internships. I've gone to a lot of places where you have to respect senpai/kohai, I think. Especially when talking to someone who's not a student, who's an adult. People always tell me, people who are older than me, would tell me that I'm very respectful, and I'm very well mannered. What they're trying to say is that I'm very good at this whole senpai/kohai thing. And I would say I'm even better than most people who've grown up in Japan, because I've really taken it to an extreme during high school. That was just kind of my coping mechanism to get through high school. To take this whole thing to an extreme, especially for being a kohai. So, I think that really helped me boost just getting along with Japanese society.

Whereas Haruka outwardly rejects her kohai roles of serving tea and being dutiful in her internship whilst showing her honne, or true feelings, Takashi embraces the kohai role on the surface, showing his skill using tatemae, or polite face. While Haruka is struggling with her

national identity and figuring out where she belongs, Takashi, on the other hand, seemed to reject national identity labels.

And when I moved to the States, I just said, ‘I moved from Japan,’ rather than, ‘I am from Japan,’ because I didn’t have an emotional connection to Japan. So, it didn’t really make sense for me to introduce myself as Japanese, although I do have a Japanese passport... I do feel like I’m from New York...So yeah, I would say that I’m Americanized, but I wouldn’t say that I’m completely American, because I’m a blend of a lot of different cultures...My American experience isn’t 100% American. So what I mean by that is, because you’re speaking Japanese at home in a Japanese household, you do get a sense that you have your own Japanese culture even when you’re abroad.

Takashi also mentions that Americans have an “expressive” way of communicating, referring to *honno*, rather than the more “restrained” way of communicating in Japanese culture, referring to *tatema*. This distinction of American and Japanese communication styles is one of the reasons why Takashi positions his experience as not completely American. Takashi seems to connote mainstream American culture with non-immigrant culture, perhaps due to where he lived as a child. “It was a White community, by the way, and that I was a minority.” Takashi said he wasn’t positioned as an outsider in New York.

While people did have a distinction that I was Japanese, I don’t think they saw me as something different, because I spoke like them, I walked like them, I talked like them. I had just been there so long at that point. So, I do believe that I didn’t exactly have a label. But the other thing is, moving to Japan, I do have a label that I’m American...in my university...So, I think people labeled me as an American because of the way I speak...because I spoke like an American.

While Takashi did not feel he was positioned by others as a foreigner in the US, Takashi did feel he was positioned as an American in Japan due to his communication style at his university. While in his internships, Takashi can position himself as the dutiful Japanese *kohai*, but in a more relaxed atmosphere Takashi’s communication style becomes more American.

Takashi: Growing up in the States, you’re educated to be unique and stick out rather. So, I haven’t forgotten that. I still have that in me. But at least while I’m living in Japan, I will try not to do that. But, I won’t forget that.

Fritz: How do you feel about your own identity? Do you see country? Do you have that national pride about Japan or America? Does it matter?

Takashi: It’s not very important to me.

Fritz: ...How do you, yourself, identify?

Takashi: I’m not sure. I’ve actually thought about that recently. I didn’t exactly live in a very American town. That also gives me a disconnect from the American identity. But at the same time, I also don’t exactly feel Japanese...I feel like it’s a very hippie thing to

say, but I do feel like I'm just a person who is floating around, and who just happens to live in a particular spot at a certain time. So, because I've been living in the States for half my life, and in other places for the other half, I really don't have a strong national identity or connection to any country in particular. But if I had to choose, I would say American.

Although Takashi positions himself as more American than Japanese, he does not have a strong national identity due to his itinerant life. Takashi refers to not living in a typical American town as meaning not reflecting America's racial diversity, as his town was mostly White. Even though Takashi doesn't identify strongly as Japanese, he, like Haruka, will position himself as Japanese in the future to take advantage of working at a Japanese company as an English speaking kikokushijo.

As for now, I hope to get into a Japanese company and to get transferred abroad, because you get a lot of benefits from that. So, if your pay is like \$50,000 US dollars in Japan, it would most likely double if you're transferred abroad. You get free rent, free health care, free cars sometimes...I am trying to get into a Japanese company and to get transferred abroad using my language abilities and my cultural understanding as my advantage to get into those companies.

All 14 of my kikokushijo participants came from families with the financial means to give their children opportunities that children from working class families would not have the ability to obtain, like paying for private boarding schools. Kayoko, the only one of my participants whose father was not transferred abroad, was still able to go to an elite private school in the UK, which was paid for by her mother. Being transferred abroad, working for large Japanese corporations, allowed the families of my kikokushijo participants to earn more money, and thus, have access to more resources, like paying for supplementary education, private schooling, and vacations in Japan. Takashi, like Haruka, wants to be able to maintain his lifestyle. The easiest path to living in America while being financially independent is via a Japanese company, working abroad, just as their parents had done before them.

Now I will move on to the analysis section where I will use narrative positioning analysis to synthesize the above narrative texts. I will present the analysis grouped in the same aforementioned four identity groups.

### **Section 5.5 - Narrative Positioning Analysis**

Before presenting the narrative positioning analysis, and in order to compare all kikokushijo, I have created Figure 30 below. All 14 participants are listed in order of time spent abroad, with Takashi spending the most time abroad, 18 years, and Shiho spending the least time abroad, 5 years. Next to each bar, the "A" stands for years abroad and the "J" stands for years in Japan. Figure 16 also provides information on how old my participants were at the time of our interview.




Figure 30. Kikokushijo participants' time spent abroad and in Japan.

### Narrative positioning analysis of Minor Japanese National Identity group

I will use narrative positioning analysis to analyze the narrative texts of Haruka, Gen, Yoko, and Ayumi. First, I will examine the degree to which these kikokushijo distanced themselves from their Japanese national identity, Japanese language and culture. Gen spoke of his “resistance towards becoming Japanese” after returning to Japan. Living with his non-Japanese mother while his Japanese father was working in other countries, not having any Japanese friends, and not studying Japanese language separated Gen from his previous connections to Japan. Gen spoke about physically distancing himself from Japan by planning on going to graduate school outside of Japan.

Haruka felt confused about her Japanese identity and actively resisted Japanese gender roles when she returned to Japan. At a young age, Haruka spoke about “being a rebel” and actively resisting being taught Japanese language and Japanese culture at her hoshūko in the US. During her first year at her American high school Haruka felt like a “typical American Asian girl” and felt little connection to Japan. While living in Japan as a university student Haruka further distanced herself from her Japanese identity because she didn’t “act like Japanese,” and lacked familiarity with Japanese cultural norms and customs. Haruka mentioned how others positioned her as a kikokushijo when she didn’t act in a typical Japanese way. Haruka spoke of eventually physically distancing herself from Japan in the future by working for a Japanese corporation outside of Japan.

With Yoko and Ayumi, there was less resistance and more ambivalence regarding their Japanese identities. Yoko was purposely distanced from a kind of Japanese enculturation, the Japanese education system, by her parents. Yoko attended non-Japanese schools abroad and international schools while in Japan. She was even put in the non-Japanese language class in her international school in Japan so she could learn Japanese as a “non-native.” Yoko didn’t actively define

herself as Japanese, nor is she proud to be Japanese, making her Japanese identity not something she says she is particularly “attached” to. In contrast to her sister, Yoko decided to stay in Japan to teach English. Yoko is the only one in this group who doesn’t speak about the need to physically distance herself from Japan.

Ayumi presents herself more like a chameleon, being able to adapt to Japan while in Japan, but also embracing her expatriate identity while abroad. Ayumi regularly attended hoshūko while in the US, but still struggled to adapt initially to Japanese culture when she returned to Japan. She spoke about other Japanese people distancing her from her Japanese identity because of her status as a kikokushijo. She talked about needing to physically distance herself from Japan sometimes in order to have a “break” from Japan. Our interview actually occurred while she was living in Germany and conducting research there.

Now I will examine to what degree Haruka, Gen, Yoko, and Ayumi accepted, embraced and recognized their Japanese national identities. Haruka expressed that she had a choice to make regarding her future: to live as an American and keep going to an American high school, or to explore her Japanese roots and start attending a Japanese high school in New York. Her identity crisis began, not when she embraced American culture, but when she decided she wanted to recognize her Japanese identity. She also realized that she would have to return to Japan one day to attend university. She realized that she would have an easier time transitioning to a Japanese university and better chances matriculating at a prestigious Japanese university via the elite Japanese high school in New York. Once Haruka was accepted into an elite Japanese university in Japan, she realized that she wanted to live abroad. The best way to do this, according to Haruka, was to use her Japanese identity and Japanese language skills to get a job at a Japanese company, but also use her kikokushijo status and her cross-cultural and English language skills to be able to work internationally for a Japanese company.

Gen accepted and embraced his Japanese identity the least of all my participants. He didn’t really enjoy living in Japan and looked forward to the day he could leave Japan. Although Gen recognized that he was Japanese, if not for bureaucratic reasons like trouble obtaining a visa, it is likely that Gen would have remained in the US as he originally intended. He said, “I sort of became an American citizen almost,” but then had to return to Japan because of visa troubles.

Yoko, on the other hand, had slowly adjusted to life in Japan and expressed interest in helping Japanese people increase their English level. Although she felt confused about her Japanese identity at times and did not actively embrace it, she did recognize herself as Japanese. She mentioned feeling that, at least culturally speaking, she was half Japanese and half non-Japanese. She also wanted to capitalize on her advanced English speaking skills while living in Japan. She remarked that a majority of the Japanese public could not speak English well and she wanted to help change that. In some senses, Yoko is an ideal kikokushijo from the government’s perspective. She learned valuable English language skills while she was abroad and has now returned to Japan with a mission to teach those very skills to help future Japanese generations succeed.

As for Ayumi, she embraced her dual identities as Japanese and as an expat living abroad. Although she initially went through an identity crisis upon her return to Japan, she was

eventually able to “act Japanese” by, for example, using polite language with her senpai. Ayumi recognized and accepted her Japanese identity, but with some conditions. As long as she was able to escape Japan for a while and live abroad, she accepted and was able to negotiate her way through Japanese culture. She wanted to be able to use her English and German skills to expand her Japanese family business to Europe. In this way, she is able to maintain her Japanese identity whilst maintaining her transnational mobility.

Despite the variance in the experiences of these four kikokushijo, I grouped them together based on how much they distanced themselves from their Japanese national identities. Gen and Haruka distanced themselves the most from their Japanese identities and wanted to leave Japan. Yoko and Ayumi were more adept at negotiating Japanese culture, but still didn't place their nationality as central to their identities. All kikokushijo in this group, however, did recognize that they were in fact Japanese. This is how I came to define this group as Minor Japanese National Identity. The English language and cultural skills they learned while living abroad as children played a big role in how much they negotiated their physical and emotional distance from Japan as returned kikokushijo. Haruka, Gen and Ayumi all used their cultural and English language skills to find or plan an escape from Japan, while Yoko used these same skills to tether her to Japan. Gen, having the most difficult time transitioning to a Japanese language environment after years of not studying Japanese, was the keenest to leave Japan. Haruka, Ayumi and Yoko all had more time to study the Japanese language, although adjusting to Japanese culture was not easy. However, these kikokushijo were able to use their English language skills to pursue graduate school in the US (Gen), research abroad (Ayumi), prepare for a English teaching career in Japan (Yoko), and search for jobs postings abroad with international Japanese corporations (Haruka). Being advanced English language speakers, for this group, is more salient than their Japanese identities.

### **Narrative positioning analysis of Major Japanese National Identity group**

First I will use narrative positioning analysis to analyze the narrative texts of Lisa, Rina, Ayako, and Maya to determine the degree to which these kikokushijo distanced themselves from their Japanese identities. Lisa sometimes distances herself from her Japanese identity when she is feeling stressed in Japan. Unlike Ayumi, who physically distances herself from Japan when feeling overwhelmed in Japan, Lisa says she tries “to be an American” and gravitates toward her American identity in Japan. This makes Lisa feel warm and fuzzy and “feel really safe.” Lisa has an emotional connection to her American identity. She feels that part of the foundation of her identity was created in the US and is still very much a part of her.

Although Rina positioned herself as 100% Japanese while living in the US, once she returned to Japan she recognized her American identity. She claims that 30% to 40% of her national identity was American. She said that she realized she was not “pure Japanese” because of the mixture of cultures that makes up her life experiences. She contrasts herself with other non-kikokushijo Japanese and realized she was different.

Like Rina, Ayako doesn't feel 100% Japanese because she feels the way she thinks is different from non-kikokushijo Japanese. Part of the reason she says this is because her friends position her as unique. She says that her experiences living in the US made her “different than regular

Japanese people.” By positioning her kikokushijo status as unique and different distances her somewhat from a “normal” Japanese national identity and from “regular” Japanese people.

Ayako and Gen’s youngest sibling, Maya, also grew up in the US with an emphasis by her parents on speaking and learning English outside the home and speaking Japanese inside the home. Yet, even when she returned to Japan she still spoke English to her brother and texted in English with her sister. Although Maya says she will never be an American citizen, she still claimed her American identity because she felt it was a part of who she was as a person and that she belonged to the culture she grew up in. She even said that it would bother her if someone else tried to deny her American identity.

Now I will use narrative positioning analysis to analyze the narrative texts of Lisa, Rina, Ayako and Maya to determine the degree to which these kikokushijo accepted and embraced their Japanese national identities. Lisa said that she felt more Japanese because she was speaking Japanese in her daily life and “being Japanese”, or performing acts that show she was conforming to Japanese culture. Lisa was afraid of being mistaken as a “foreigner” due to her kikokushijo status. Her desire to “be the same as other people living in Japan,” pushed her American identity to the periphery. In addition, Lisa was the youngest out of all the 14 kikokushijo to return permanently to Japan at 9.5 years old so she has had almost 10 years in Japan to readjust back to Japanese culture. Her formative adolescent years were spent entirely in Japan.

Rina’s strong sense of Japanese national identity while she was living in the US was perhaps due to her suddenly finding herself in a new country with a new language to learn and a new cultural landscape to negotiate, something that she was loath to accept. Her lack of interest in the English language and subsequent struggles, despite her 9 years living in the US also pushed her toward her Japanese identity. “Why do I have to do this?” she said. Rina, more than any other of my kikokushijo participants, actively participated in and looked forward to studying Japanese language and other subjects at her hoshūko for the entirety of her stay in the US. Rina held on to her Japanese identity closely during her stay in the US, where she retreated into reading Japanese books and struggled to read English books that were assigned to her. By embracing her Japanese identity, Japanese culture and Japanese language, this acted as a kind of shield that buffered her from the difficulties she was facing at school. Only once she was in Japan, and her protective shield could be lowered, was she able to see how much her experiences in the US had changed her. Although she maintained that her identity was mostly Japanese, she was still having an identity crisis at the time of our interview.

Ayako felt more comfortable in Japan, expressing her preference for the tatemae way of communication, a less direct way of expressing her feelings. She didn’t envision her future abroad, but rather in Japan. Although Ayako acknowledged that she felt different from “regular Japanese people,” she still felt at home in Japan. Her younger sister, Maya, explained that she felt that she wasn’t positioned by other Americans as American, which may have affected how she positioned her Japanese identity. When she returned to Japan, like other kikokushijo, she said that her American identity became more salient. Nevertheless, Maya said that she “leans more toward Japanese culture.”

Although kikokushijo in this group acknowledged their non-Japanese identities and cultural influences, they felt mainly Japanese. The degree of acceptance of their Japanese identity together with their embrace of emotional and cultural connections to the US were the defining factors in how I formed this group.

### **Narrative positioning analysis of Japanese National Identity group**

Now, I will use narrative positioning analysis to analyze the narrative texts of Shiho, Kayoko, Yutaro, Ryo and Kana to determine the degree to which these kikokushijo distanced themselves from their Japanese identities. While in the US Shiho mentioned that she was positioned as Asian by her peers. Once Shiho returned to Japan from the US she contemplated her national identity. “Which am I more: American or am I more Japanese,” she said. She had some troubles dealing with the Japanese school rules and customs. She admitted that she probably would have been more “rogue” had she spent more time in the US. However, the length of time spent in the US is not necessarily the only factor that may cause someone to distance themselves from their national identity. Kidder (1992) gives an example of a kikokushijo who spent only 3 years living in the US between the ages of three and five years old, and who still felt deep in her heart that she “didn’t forget how to be American” (p. 391). Although she could conform to the “Japanese way” of the senpai/kohai system, she said that it was “not my real self” (p. 391). Thus, Kidder’s (1992) participant left Japan to finish her university degree in the United States.

Kayoko was the only one of my kikokushijo participants to leave Japan as a child on her own accord. Kayoko went to an international school in Japan after her first stint abroad, but was left yearning to return to the UK. She chose to distance herself from Japan and her family to attend the boarding school. She remarked that she didn’t return to Japan because she wanted to, but because she wanted to study science instead of law. Because of the way the UK schooling system works, she said she was not able to change course so she returned to Japan. Kayoko was positioned by some of her Japanese classmates as different due to her *honne* style of direct communication, the way she dresses and the way she thinks.

Yutaro said that he felt “pretty American” while living in the US. He said that he felt free to do what he wanted and express himself openly, and his advanced English skills allowed him to do that. He was also not positioned as Japanese because of his high English ability. Had he remained in the US, perhaps he would have continued to distance himself from his Japanese identity.

Ryo had spent the longest time living in Japan after returning from abroad out of all of my participants, almost 15 years. He returned when he was 12 years old and said that he was bullied because he wasn’t “good at Japanese,” and had to move to a different school. He was positioned as different, and was asked if he was a foreigner by his classmates. Once he moved to a different school he said he had a better time as he made a fresh start in Japan. Nevertheless, he found it difficult to articulate and explain Japanese culture.

Kana distanced herself from “normal students” as she phrased it, by positioning herself as having more advanced language skills because she is well-read and spoke “proper” Japanese. She also distanced herself from other Japanese kikokushijo because of her European experiences,

where there were few Japanese people living. She said that kikokushijo who lived in China or America, even for an extended period of time, were not the same as her. It was interesting that she distanced herself from “regular” Japanese people and other Japanese kikokushijo while at the same time affirming her Japanese identity. While she was in Europe, she said she was bullied by her classmates for being Japanese. Kana also distanced herself from her Japanese identity when she was speaking foreign languages. She said she sometimes felt like “a foreign people” when not speaking Japanese.

Next, I will use narrative positioning analysis to analyze the narrative texts of Shiho, Kayoko, Yutaro, Ryo and Kana to determine the degree to which these kikokushijo accepted and embraced their Japanese identities. Shiho returned to Japan when she was 10 years old, which was the second youngest kikokushijo to return permanently to Japan after Lisa. Thus, Shiho had 12 years to assimilate back into Japanese culture while still being relatively young. Like Lisa, Shiho also spent her formative teenage years living in Japan. Therefore, she was able to assimilate to Japanese culture eventually. She said she positions herself as “completely a Japanese now.” Like Yoko, Shiho wanted to stay in Japan and use her English skills to either teach English or train English teachers. As in Yoko’s case, Ayumi would also be seen by the Japanese government as an asset. This is the result of the extensive hoshūko system of Japanese schools abroad, the special kikokushijo entrance exam system and other initiatives by the Japanese government and universities to support kaigaishijo abroad (Japanese children abroad) and kikokushijo (returnees) in Japan. Both Yoko and Shiho want to help make Japan and its citizens more educated and more skilled in English using skills they learned abroad.

Although Kayoko said other Japanese people positioned her as different, she said that she felt she was normal and rejected this positioning. Because Kayoko was surrounded by several international students at her boarding school in the UK she positioned herself as Japanese and didn’t feel pressure to assimilate or become British. Also, when she returned home she said her Japanese and UK friends accepted her the way she was so she didn’t feel the need to change to a tatemae style, or indirect, form of communication. Kayoko viewed her Japanese nationality not as a way to help improve Japan with her skills learned abroad, but as a way to be able to major in a science related field, something she was not able to do in the UK.

Yutaro’s parents made it clear to him that he would eventually return to Japan with the goal of entering a Japanese university so Yutaro maintained his Japanese language skills by attending hoshūko for the entire 7 years he lived in the US. This was the second longest time, after Rina, that one of my kikokushijo participants attended Japanese language school. It was for this reason, Yutaro said, that he was able to transition to Japanese life without many issues. Although he had developed a honne style of communication, he was trying to adapt to the tatemae style of communication since moving to Japan. He said that he no longer felt American after living in Japan for approximately 6 years and positioned himself as “pretty much” completely Japanese.

Because Ryo had been living in Japan uninterrupted for 15 years, his Japanese identity seemed more fixed than other participants. He said that once he was in Japan he felt more Japanese. Ryo’s English skills were lower than most of my kikokushijo participants. He struggled with his kikokushijo identity to both be good at English and be a cultural ambassador for Japan with non-Japanese people. Ryo’s struggles highlight the pressures that kikokushijo face even years after

they have returned to Japan. Ryo got his master's degree and was working in a company that expected Ryo to use his English skills, even though Ryo hadn't lived in the US for so many years. Once a Japanese company knows about the (former) kikokushijo status of one of their employees, the company may expect more than the employee can deliver.

Kana said that her experience being bullied by her Korean classmates in Europe made her feel like she was "100% a Japanese person." She said that her Japanese identity was activated when she was explaining Japanese culture to non-Japanese people and when she spoke Japanese. She felt proud to be Japanese because "there are so many special, unique culture in Japan". In addition, she thought that the Japanese language was too difficult for foreigners to learn. Here Kana displays the nihonjinron philosophy mentioned in Chapter 2, that proclaims the Japanese people and language to be special and inaccessible to non-Japanese. Kana seemed the most nationalistic of all the kikokushijos I interviewed. She even positioned herself as superior to other Japanese people due to her excellent Japanese and superior to other kikokushijo due to her experiences in Europe, where she assumed the role of Japanese ambassador, explaining the positive aspects of Japan. During our interview, Kana reaffirmed her Japanese national identity, saying that talking about Japan and her feelings toward her national identity made her feel "100% Japanese."

### **Narrative positioning analysis of No National Identity group**

I will use narrative positioning analysis to analyze the narrative text of Takashi to determine the degree to which he both distanced himself from and affirmed his Japanese identities. Takashi spent the most time physically distanced from Japan, nearly 18 years. Takashi learned about Japanese culture at the same Japanese high school Haruka attended in New York. He distanced himself from the senpai/kohai hierarchical structure that is so prevalent in Japanese culture and was very much a part of his high school experience. He said he was still "quite resistant to it" at the time of our interview when he was in Japan. Although internally resistant, Takashi was able to perform his duties as an obedient and resourceful kohai at his many internships in Japan. Similar to Kana, he positioned himself as better able to perform his kohai duties than non-kikokushijo Japanese due to his unique upbringing. At once distancing and affirming his Japanese national identity, his performative Japaneseness was a coping mechanism designed to survive Japanese culture. Takashi wanted to use his Japanese national identity and native-like English proficiency to be able to work for a Japanese corporation based overseas. This way, he would be able to make more money, much as Haruka planned to do. His Japanese national identity, then, was a means to an end, with the aim being monetary and professional gains. Takashi seemed to symbolize and embrace the idea of post-national identity, which was explained in Chapter 2, the most out of all my participants. Takashi's individual identity is more salient than his national identity. And national identity is only salient when it can be used for personal gain.

### **Section 5.6 Discussion**

Some patterns have emerged from the narrative positioning analysis. The degree of distancing or acceptance of Japanese national identity among my participants depended on a number of factors. These include the level of Japanese and English language proficiency, the time spent

abroad and time spent in Japan, the degree to which the kikokushijo were prepared by their parents to reenter Japanese society and the Japanese education system, and my participants' preferences for Japanese style communication and cultural norms. All kikokushijo, with the exception of Gen, wanted to maintain some connections to their Japanese national identity, whether for strategic or sincere reasons. Gen's strategy was to avoid his connections to Japan and leverage his English skills and cultural knowledge to return to the US. His strategy of resistance to Japanese culture and avoidance of Japan heavily relied on his English language skills learned abroad. Without a high level of English ability, it is unlikely Gen would be able to get a masters degree in the US. Gen also had trouble transitioning into Japanese life because he had neglected to maintain his Japanese language skills, something he regretted.

Several kikokushijo used their Japanese nationalities and their English and Japanese language abilities to strategically pursue their interests, not for the love of Japan or Japanese culture, but for their own personal and professional gain. Some kikokushijo, like Takashi and Haruka, wanted to use their Japanese national identities combined with their advanced English proficiency and cultural knowledge to work for Japanese international companies abroad. They both went to an elite Japanese high school in the US in order to attend an elite Japanese university in Japan, to eventually be able to work for an elite Japanese company. All the while, their Japanese national identities were not strong, suggesting a strategic, not emotional or patriotic, connection to their national identities. Their Japanese national identities, and Japanese and English language skills, were a means by which they would become successful in their professional lives outside of Japan. Ayumi also wanted to strategically use her Japanese national identity combined with her language skills to be able to work in Europe to become an entrepreneur. She would be able to have access to the Japanese market via her family and Japanese skills, while also tapping into the European market with her English and German skills. Her increased transnational mobility, moving to and from Japan and Europe, would accommodate her preference for leaving Japan when she was feeling overwhelmed with Japanese life, another strategic use of her dual identity as a Japanese citizen and expat entrepreneur. Yoko, more dependent on her parents and confident in her English abilities, decided to stay in Japan and teach English. Teaching English as a foreign language in Japan would allow Yoko to leverage her advanced English skills into a career, one that she could excel at and make more money than she would be able to do abroad. Yoko's strong connection to her family and English skills, not necessarily love of Japan itself or pride in Japan, was the reason Yoko wanted to stay in Japan. Maya also viewed her English skills as a way to be able to get ahead professionally in the Japanese IT sector. Lastly, Kayoko used her Japanese national identity to be able to return to Japan to major in a science related field simply because she decided too late to change her course of studies in the UK. Had she been able to study medicine in the UK, it is likely Kayoko would have stayed. In this case, Kayoko's Japanese nationality was used as a backup, a safe place to return to without worry of visas and language issues, in order to pursue her studies further.

Other kikokushijo sincerely connected with their Japanese national identities, and wanted to stay in Japan to further their and Japan's interests. Shiho became interested in English while living abroad and carried this interest into her future career aspirations. She wanted to stay in Japan to share her kikokushijo experiences with other Japanese youth and improve the English education of the "younger generations." Shiho's relatively short time abroad, just five years, and early

return to Japan at the young age of 10, allowed for Shiho to formulate her Japanese identity firmly. Ayako felt more comfortable in Japan and preferred the *tatemae* style of communication. Ayako wanted to stay in Japan and, as a future scientist with English language capabilities, she would be an asset to Japan's future economic growth. Rina had a preference for living in Japan and speaking Japanese language, studying at her *hoshūko* for the entire 9 years she lived in the US. She mentioned her realization upon returning to Japan that she needed to maintain her English skills, which was "essential in maybe the globalization," she said. She recognized that her English skills would be valuable to her future career as a scientist in Japan. Kana, perhaps the most effusive about her love of Japan, also recognized the value of English in Japan. She said, "Because [English] language is the most important ability in Japan, so, *kikokushijo* is really strong these days, I think, and also in the future." Kana hoped to be able to use her *kikokushijo* status and English skills to improve her own career trajectory while also contributing to Japan's growth. Lisa said that she was "enjoying" the *senpai/kohai* system and embraced her Japanese identity, while also maintaining that she was influenced by her time in the US. She envisioned using English at some point in her future career, although she hadn't yet decided her career path. By using her English skills in Japan, she would be furthering the Japanese government's goals of increasing the English language skills of the Japanese populace. Ryo, a full-time employee in Japan using his English skills at his workplace, was also furthering the government's goal of increasing the competitiveness of its industries through skills like increased English language proficiency. Lastly, Yutaro felt excited to be able to make a fresh start in Japan and knew that he would have better prospects in Japan with a Japanese university degree. He always knew he would return to Japan and his parents helped prepare him for his return with constant *hoshūko* lessons during his almost 8 year stay. As a bioscience major with advanced English language skills, Yutaro will be a future asset to Japan's economy.

Whether Japanese national identity positioning is strategic or sincere, it is clear that both English and Japanese language abilities are key to my *kikokushijo* participants' futures. Bilingual *kikokushijo* are also a boon to Japan's future economic growth, whether they work for Japanese companies abroad or in Japan. Only Gen positioned himself outside of "the system," meaning he didn't want to use his Japanese national identity for either strategic or sincere purposes. Similar to Shao-Kobayashi's (2019) results, this study shows that most Japanese *kaigaishijo* become *kikokushijo* and use their Japanese nationalities to work within the system to their advantage. That there was only one out of 14 *kikokushijo* in which Japanese national identity was not a significant factor, connotes the strong presence of Japanese national identity in my participants' lives. Whether it was peripheral or central to their identities, Japanese national identity and Japanese language skills combined with the English language skills and the cultural knowledge these *kikokushijo* gained while living abroad have played major roles in how they choose to live the rest of their lives. The Japanese government, based on these results, should keep funding *hoshūko* abroad and encourage special entrance examinations for *kikokushijo* in Japan to provide support and incentives for *kikokushijo* to maintain their elevated status in Japanese society in order to fulfill its goals of growing the economy in a globalized world.

## Chapter 6 - Analysis of Japanese Graduate Students Studying Abroad

### Section 6.0 - Introduction & Long-term Study Abroad Literature Review

#### Introduction

In this chapter I present the interview data, i.e. the co-created narrative texts, and narrative positioning analysis from my two participants, Takahiro and Saki, who chose to leave Japan to enter doctoral programs in the United States. My interviews span approximately three years, from the time just before they left for the U.S. until their third year of graduate studies. Thus, this chapter presents data that is more significant in both kind and quality than the data presented in Chapters 4 and 5. In addition, the amount of data generated from each participant was much larger in scope than the data generated from the one-time interviews with my kikokushijo and Nikkei participants. This is due to the fact that the narrative texts were co-created across several years and allowed for more in-depth portraits of real-time changes in my two participants' thoughts, feelings and emotions over time. This is in contrast to my kikokushijo and Nikkei participants, who tended to recollect events that had happened sometimes years ago. Thus, the interviews presented in this chapter are iterative events, with the benefit of being able to refer back to specific sections of previous interviews, sometimes called member checking. The multiple interviews over time also allowed for my participants and me to maintain a closer relationship. Being at a similar social status (they were also PhD students at the time of our interviews), and going through similar cultural adaptations - I as an American living in Japan and my participants as Japanese living in the US - helped to create closer connections than, for example, some of my one-time interviews with undergraduate kikokushijo still in their early 20s. Although the data presented in the previous two chapters has the benefit of a greater variety of experiences and the ability to compare and contrast several unique experiences, the data in this chapter has the advantage of having a greater depth and length of inquiry.

Both Saki and Takahiro started their Phd studies at the same time in the US. Takahiro's research focused on American politics, specifically statistical analyses of voting groups. Saki's research focused on authoritarian regimes and electoral systems, concentrating on Latin American politics. Saki lived in the state of Missouri and Takahiro lived in the state of Texas. I interviewed both participants in Japan before they embarked on their journeys to the United States to start their doctoral programs. Subsequent interviews, except for one interview with Takahiro in Japan while he was on vacation, were conducted online using video conferencing software. Most interviews were conducted after each participant finished their semester studies, so there were about two interviews per year. The semester spacing allowed the participants to reflect on what had transpired in the previous six months. Given that the participants' lives were structured around their studies, the end of the semester provided a clean break from one defined period of time to the next. In total, I conducted 6 individual interviews each with Saki and Takahiro over the period of about three years. The penultimate recording session, recorded using online video conferencing software, was a conversation that took place between Saki and Takahiro. I only observed the conversation and did not participate in the discussion, other than providing written questions in advance. They could not see me or my reactions during their conversation. The decision to record a final conversation between my two participants was done for two reasons. First, the two participants are acquaintances and so it was expected that they would freely talk

about their experiences and feelings. Second, since both participants were about the same age, Japanese, and experiencing US culture over the same time period, having them compare and contrast their experiences in real time was thought to be illuminating regarding how they positioned their own identities. I provided the following list of topics and questions to Takahiro and Saki, about one week prior to what I term “Interview #6”, which is essentially a guided discussion between the two participants:

- Integration into the American academic community
- Progress with your research projects
- Making friends and personal life satisfaction
- Connection to America and American culture - Do you feel American or Americanized at all?
- Your connections to countries outside of America and Japan
- Your Japanese identity - has it changed over the past few years?
- Do you feel 100% Japanese right now?
- Are you proud to be Japanese?
- Becoming Asian in America
- Do you think there is a Western or American way of thinking and a Japanese way of thinking? If so, what are the differences? Which one do you prefer and why?
- Is national identity important?
- Your future lives in America, abroad or Japan

These topics and questions were all based on the prior interviews that I had with my two participants. The topics and questions were also derived from my research focus on national identity.

In the following literature review section, I will only focus on study abroad research that is directly related to this study’s focus. Mainly these are studies on long-term study abroad, or research on the national identities of long-term immigrant communities. Due to the plethora of research focused on study abroad, I necessarily excluded studies that were not related to my research focus. Studies, for example, that focus on short-term study abroad (one semester or less) and national identity - see Dolby (2004), Jones (2014) and Cheng and Szeto (2019) - mainly highlight the awakening or strengthening of students’ national identities. The focus of this study, however, is on how an individual’s national identity may change over several years, and is not intended to be compared with sojourns of six months or less. After the literature review, I will present narrative texts relevant to my research focus for both Saki and Takahiro. I separate their narratives so as to more easily describe their experiences and identity trajectories and because their experiences are unique. Finally, after presenting and commenting on the relevant narrative texts, I present my narrative positioning analysis, outlined in Chapter 3, of each participant. I analyze how each participant distances themselves from certain national identities and also how they accept and embrace others. Through this analysis we are able to see how my participants’ identities change over time and the reasons behind these changes.

## Literature Review

Higgins (2011) used positioning theory and narrative analysis to examine three women from the United States, Canada, and Britain who lived and worked in Tanzania for several years. She wanted to find out how much ‘identity slippage’, i.e. the ability to develop a new identity as a result of being accepted in another culture as well as being culturally and linguistically competent in another language, occurred as they learned Swahili and integrated into their communities. In essence she wanted to know if they became Swahili. She found that instead of her participants identifying as American, Canadian, British, or Swahili, they positioned themselves as expatriates who “are able to decenter from their original languages and cultures as well as their current context in Tanzania” (Higgins, 2011, p. 171). She found that none of the three women planned to stay in Tanzania for the rest of their lives, despite two of them being married to Tanzanians and having families. Higgins (2011) writes that, “This mobility seems very likely to impact their positioning as ‘world citizens’ rather than as American/British/Canadian or Tanzanian/Swahili selves” (p. 187). Although Tanzania was a welcoming society, the participants cited differences in wealth, power, race, and gender roles as barriers that were too high to overcome identity slippage. In addition, their future desire to become mobile, rather than settle down in Tanzania, affected how they viewed their national identities. This in-between positioning, as Higgins (2011) classified it, highlighted their lack of attachment to either home or host countries.

Edwards and Ye (2018) conducted four focus groups and individual interviews with 11 Chinese PhD students in the United Kingdom to explore the impact of study abroad on self-identity. Through dealing with the challenges of study abroad, the participants were able to accumulate forms of capital, including improved English proficiency, personal empowerment, more independence, and new sociocultural awareness. “The findings demonstrate that study abroad provides students with an opportunity for self-transformation and identity expansion” (Edwards and Ye, 2018, para. 1). However, studying abroad also has its challenges. Brown (2008) used participant observation and conducted interviews with 13 international students in a master’s degree program in the UK to measure study-related stress. The author found that stress was most acute in the first semester and was prevalent for a majority of students. In particular, it was found that language difficulties, academic cultural differences, and the intensity of the workload for classes caused the most study-related stress.

Güngör et al. (2013) measured the personalities and acculturation levels of 40 adult Japanese women who immigrated to the United States, with an average of about 6 years living in the US. One of the authors’ goals was to find out “whether immigrants’ engagement with U.S. culture implies becoming less Japanese” (Güngör et al., 2013, p. 703). The authors compared the Japanese immigrants’ data by also measuring the personalities of 57 Japanese women living in Tokyo and 60 American women living in Washington D.C. The authors linked personality to national identity by reasoning that cultural norms dictated which personality traits elicited social validation or dictated those that were discouraged, thereby reinforcing some personality traits over others. Five personality traits were measured: openness to experience, extraversion, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and neuroticism. According to the authors, Americans tend to score higher on extraversion and openness while East Asians score higher on neuroticism and agreeableness. The Japanese immigrants also took the Japanese American Acculturation Scale, with 80% taking the survey in Japanese, answering questions regarding their identities, friendships, behaviors and attitudes. Most immigrants self-identified as Japanese-American and


affirmed their bicultural identities. The authors found that the Japanese-Americans were “significantly more Japanese than European Americans yet significantly less Japanese than monoculturals in their homeland - except for Openness on which the two Japanese groups were similar” (Güngör et al., 2013, p. 708). This finding indicates that the Japanese immigrants’ personalities were significantly different from the Japanese living in Japan and significantly different from the Americans living in the U.S., with the implication that personality is subject to change when adapting to a new culture, but may not completely change. The authors also found that involvement in mainstream U.S. culture was more predictive of acculturation than mere exposure. The more the Japanese immigrants endorsed American culture, the lower their cultural fit was with their Japanese mainland counterparts.

Miyoshi, Asner-Self, Yanyan, and Koran (2017) surveyed 273 adult Japanese sojourners and immigrants to the United States with an average age of about 37 years old. The survey measured a person’s degree of acculturation to a host culture and included questions on identity, language competence, and cultural competence. Around three quarters of the respondents were female and one quarter were male. About 90% were Japanese citizens, 6% were only U.S. citizens, and 3% were dual citizens. Approximately 50% of the respondents were permanent residents in the U.S. The authors found the number of years spent living in the United States moderately correlated with acculturation. The survey asked respondents to categorize their national identities as Japanese-Japanese, Japanese-American, American, and other, but the study did not report how participants categorized themselves.

There are a dearth of studies that focus on how the national identities of Japanese nationals are affected over time when they are living abroad. Factors such as language issues and transnational mobility are rarely examined. Thus, this study has the potential to contribute to the literature in a meaningful way.

### Section 6.1 - Presentation of narrative texts from Takahiro

Figure 31 shows the time Takahiro spent in Japan and the US. Takahiro had no experience living abroad, apart from a short three week stay in the U.S., prior to embarking on his journey to complete his graduate studies in the U.S.



*Figure 31. Takahiro's timeline.*

#### Interview #1 - Pre-Abroad

In our first interview, Takahiro positioned himself as Japanese and specifically identified as a person from Osaka, which is the second most populous prefecture after Tokyo with 8.84 million inhabitants. In Osaka, most people speak a dialect, called Kansai-ben, which is markedly different from the standard Japanese dialect spoken in Tokyo. When spoken, Japanese speakers can quickly categorize a person from the Kansai region, becoming a sort of linguistic marker.

I am very much Osaka people. I try to make rough when I meet new people. And I really identify myself with Osaka area. Sometimes I have a small conflict with people from other area, especially when I, when I try to say something, something funny, but they felt that was not funny.

Takahiro was very fond of American culture growing up, especially music and movies. He is a big fan of hip hop culture and rap music. The first time he went to the US as an undergrad he went to New York City for 19 days when he was 20 years old. He said he was “very happy to talk to real, real black people, not in Japan but in Harlem.” He had a “big transition moment” in his life when he took English lessons from a black woman in Harlem and learned about his “first real English education, including culture.” He found that “people in New York City were very free.” He said that “when I went to New York City I became very open and I became more confident to, to claim something about me, my opinion.”

When he was ready to start searching for a job at the end of his undergraduate studies, he wrote on a job application that “in Japan it is difficult to pursue one’s own dreams” and he said that he realized that “it is me that not pursue my own dream.” So, he decided to quit job hunting and he applied to a graduate school in Kyoto. He studied African American studies and black culture as an undergraduate so he said he went to a particular graduate school in Japan “because there was one African American teacher, professor, whose, whose field is African American culture and history.” He got a fully funded scholarship to do his master’s there. However, Takahiro said that after he finished the program in 2014, the professor “was not in a good direction and I didn’t know how to conduct research properly and my professor was in the States as part of sabbatical.” He was 24 years old and said, “I was in very bad situation, my private [life] and my job.” But then he met another professor from his same university at a conference. This professor focused on a different field, political science. Takahiro decided he really wanted to learn more about this area and also more about scientific methods. The professor he met suggested that he study political science in the US. He said he was not ready to apply to US schools so he started a doctoral program at the same university in Japan. A year later he applied to 14 schools in the US and got one acceptance from a university in Texas. He also got a Fulbright scholarship.

He says that after going to study in America he wants to become more outgoing on a personal level because he is “pretty much outgoing but that’s a professional outgoing.” He says he does not like small talk and “cannot stand for doing superficial speaking.” In addition, Takahiro “really cares about other people’s eyes and I always care about how other people think and

feel.” But he wants to change that in America and he said, “I have to have a ability to sympathize or share other people’s feeling.” Asked about his views on Americans he says, “in my image people are more outgoing, and speak loudly and talk to me a lot.” He also said that in the US he “might meet more variety of people, so that will change my ideas, my common sense.”

He says that “safety is one of my concerns” about living in the US because he had his cell phone stolen in New York. He is also worried about health care if he gets sick. Lastly, he is also worried about building good relationships with his mentor in the US because his professor said that, “in the United States connection is much more important than in Japan.”

## Interview #2 - 6 Months

In our second interview Takahiro had been in the US for one semester. He said he was really “insecure” in the first semester because of the competitive environment, which distressed him, and due to language issues. He said, “everybody wants to look smart and feel respected by their colleagues.” He said he found that with his American cohorts, “in terms of social behavior I think people are really trained as professionally outgoing.” He talks about how people do not really answer their true feelings when greeted with, “How are you doing?” or “How are you?”. I explained to him that these questions are mostly treated as generic greetings rather than opportunities for discussions about real feelings. He said he was having trouble finding what to say when people greet him. “I’m still thinking about how to respond to the kind of greeting.”

However, he now has a research assistantship so he feels like “professors are more likely to treat us as their junior colleague and not as their student, which is nice.” When talking about people at his university he said,

People are more responsible for their career, which is inspiring. People expect you to do something by yourself. Otherwise nobody don’t really care about you because they are not, they don’t feel I think responsible for other people’s decisions. So yeah I think relatively people are more individualistic in a good sense.

He says, “I feel like I’m more independent. I think I became more responsible for my research and for my career.” He talks about how he used to rely on his Japanese professors a lot, asking for their advice before doing something when he was in Japan so this is a fairly big change. He also has a good relationship with his advisor. “She really care about me.” He is also working with another professor to study statistics more. “I think he kind of appreciates me.” He was given possible dissertation topics by this statistics professor as well. “I took his class. Then I tried to build a relationship. Then it worked well. So I feel like I fulfilled my mission in the last semester.”

He also said about the environment in his city that, “in terms of social interaction I think I feel much freedom here. I don’t really care about other people on the train or on the shuttle or any other place compared to Japan because I used to care about people...people’s eye in the restaurant or the café or any place.” In the United States, however, he doesn’t feel that sort of social pressure. Comparing people in New York to people in Texas he said, “New York people are much freer and atomic I would say. In a good sense, in a bad sense I don’t know.” However,

regarding people in his Texas town he said, “Yeah I think people are more – I don’t feel difference here compared to Japan. They are normal human being, which is good.”

When I asked him about the comment he made in his pre-abroad interview about his image of Americans as being outgoing he had this to say:

I definitely have, in statistical language we call it sampling bias, selection bias – because I haven’t met American people at the regular moments. I have only met people who are traveling, who are moving around. Or they’re doing something special. So in that moment I think people are more outgoing, right, compared to other people who are living their normal or who are not in normal life who are doing regular office work.

Takahiro changed his original image of outgoing Americans he formed when traveling in the U.S. to a more nuanced opinion now that he is living in the U.S. He then said that many of his American cohorts were actually shy. In his first interview he asked me: “Do you have a quiet American?” So we can see here that after about half a year living in the US he has changed his image of Americans. When his fiancé came to visit him in Texas, “there were several homeless people walking down so she said it was really scary.” He said that “in Japan you don’t really care about yourself – you can walk by yourself at night... It’s not dangerous.” He said the city he was living in is “really segregated.” He said, “One area is really impoverished community and nobody wants to be close to the communities because it’s kind of dangerous without car. It’s not walkable.”

He is living in graduate student housing and is enjoying it. Takahiro had a roommate who left, and so he was living by himself for a while, but now has a Taiwanese roommate. “We are doing great,” he says of his new roommate. He said he is trying to be more outgoing and get better at small talk but he feels the same, just professionally outgoing. He says that it could be because he needs more time to speak “casual English.” However, he still needs time to adjust to speaking English on a daily basis.

I can talk to somebody who is not native speaker easily but somehow I can’t speak...I can’t start speaking out with native speakers, mainly because of my mysterious Japanese-Western complex. I think it’s not even Japanese but I feel like I grew up in American culture so I feel like if I don’t speak American English I’m not...I’m not eligible to speak on something, right? I feel like kind of complex or that I try to imitate American accent.

He says that he finds it difficult to talk about non-academic topics, like about TV shows because he doesn’t know any of the shows. At this point Takahiro does not feel he has the right to speak to Americans. He mentions he is not “eligible” yet. He feels it is his duty to perfect his American accent and gain more knowledge of popular culture before engaging in non-professional conversations with Americans. So one of his goals for the next semester is to be able to speak more to his American cohorts.

“After I finished my first semester I got a little confidence.” When I asked him if he had changed after coming to the US and in light of his comments about feeling more independent he said, “I’m still the same Takahiro. But at the professional level I feel like I have more confidence on

what I'm doing and I have visions and I have specific goals to achieve." However, he did notice some change in how he positions his national identity in the US.

Since I came here I have been totally racialized here. I think positively I have accepted the racial framework in the US because I don't feel like I'm Japanese but I feel more like I'm Asian. I found many similarities between Japanese, Koreans, Taiwanese, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cambodian. And I mean the difference is really small compared to the difference between me and someone who from Africa or who are born here [in the US]. And I noticed that many people from other Asian countries know more about Japan and we share the similar social code.

After six months of living in the US Takahiro no longer positions himself as the Osaka guy, or even Japanese, but rather he repositions himself as Asian. He accepts this positioning by others as well, even if they mistake him for a Chinese or Korean person.

Takahiro: My friend said that I look Chinese and some people say I look like Korean... But otherwise I think I just look like another Chinese here.

Fritz: But how do you feel when someone says, 'Are you Chinese?' or, 'You look Chinese.'? How does that make you feel?

Takahiro: I don't feel anything because in the US Chinese refers to Asian basically. So I mean I don't feel annoyed or I don't feel anything special.

In the following section detailing the interview data with Saki, we will understand that Saki has a completely different reaction than Takahiro to others positioning her as Chinese or Korean.

### Interview #3 - 1 Year

After about one year of living in the U.S., I had my third interview with Takahiro. I followed up with Takahiro regarding what he termed his Japanese-American complex.

Fritz: What does that mean?

Takahiro: Actually, I was thinking about that thing, um, this week. Then, um, so basically my understanding, like Japanese-American complex, is a kind of idea that was born after World War II and so, and the idea - maybe that was just me but - I think basically it's about some cultural preference. And if you could speak in an American accent you sound cool, you sound really professional. So that's the basic idea and I, so I have been imitating those accents based on the information I collected from music, you know, and media, something like that. I sometimes still doing that but at some point I noticed that it's obvious that it's more important to convey something you want to say and uh. So I noticed that during the process of purchasing a car and taking a license. And if you go out of the university nobody gives a shit from people from other countries if you don't speak English right...I have to do that correctly no matter what, no matter how I sound like, right? I have to say something. I have to say it.

After one year living in the US Takahiro is realizing that accents matter less if the message is successfully conveyed. Takahiro grew up consuming American media, rap and hip-hop music. In our first interview, Takahiro mentioned his fondness for Black culture and the fact that he was studying about hip hop in his undergraduate classes. I followed up again in the third interview about how this topic and his Japanese-American complex might be linked.

Fritz: You came to New York and you were studying about hip hop and Black culture. Did that idea about, did that influence your idea about having a complex? Did you want to sound like hip hop in particular or was there a group in particular that you were thinking about?

Takahiro: Um actually, not necessarily. In New York City I tried to sound Black but it didn't work obviously because we don't have those same kind of physical structures to make the sound right. So I quit, but I still trying to speak like an American, but I think I'm giving up at some point. And I have met several Asian Americans, and they speak like me in terms of, I don't know, like voice or. Then you know, they don't speak White, they don't speak Black, they don't speak Latino.

Since the second interview, Takahiro continues to re-position himself and his accent as belonging to the Asian American community in the U.S. The goal of sounding like a native born American is in question, especially when he is around other Asians. Takahiro mentions meeting a Chinese American born in the US at an academic conference.

And I just noticed that I don't feel stressed or I don't feel nervous in front of her. Maybe that kind of, that's just kind of racial thing.

Takahiro's positioning of his identity at this point is less concerned with national categorizations and more with racial categorizations. He even mentions supposed physical differences between Asians and Black people as a reason he cannot imitate a stereotypical "Black accent." He feels more comfortable when speaking to Asians, even if they are native speakers, which is something he mentioned was a barrier before. In the second interview, Takahiro said that he had been "totally racialized" in the U.S. and positioned himself as Asian in America. In the third interview, we understand that Takahiro associates ways of speaking English with racial categories. Takahiro not only feels Asian in the U.S., he feels like he *sounds* Asian. The way Takahiro speaks English, according to him, positions him as Asian. When he was younger, he tried imitating a stereotypical "Black accent", but was unable to do so. In his first year living in the U.S., he tried imitating an "American accent", an image of which was perhaps formed from years of consuming American media. He has struggled with confidence issues while speaking to non-Asian native speakers. Now, after a year of living in the U.S. he is questioning whether he can continue trying to "speak like an American." Takahiro describes his struggles with pronunciation compared to his Colombian friend:

I think I've given up in terms of L and R. And my yeah, one of my friends is from Colombia. And you know he doesn't correct anything. I mean he does but basically he speaks Spanish English. And you know he speaks more than me, right. So in terms of L

and R I'm kind of giving up because it stops my conversation all the time, to control my tongue. It's bad. It's a waste of time.

Speaking English "like a native" is now an impediment that physically slows Takahiro's speech down. Now cognizant of this barrier, Takahiro is consciously choosing to become more like his Colombian friend, i.e. become less concerned with precise pronunciation, in order to increase his speaking fluency. He is questioning his previous positioning as not being eligible to speak to Americans.

#### Interview #4 - 1.5 Years

Now a year and a half since our first interview, I have my fourth interview with Takahiro after he has finished three semesters of his PhD course work. Several big changes in his life, both professionally and personally, have taken place since our third interview. Professionally, he has decided to change advisors to focus more on statistical analyses. Personally, he was able to get his U.S. driver's license. In addition, he got married and he moved into an apartment by himself and lived alone for a few months to prepare for his wife's arrival. His Japanese wife was eventually able to obtain a visa to live in the U.S. and moved to Texas to live with Takahiro. He was invited to dinner parties and also hosted others for a dinner party at his apartment. "So doing that I guess I [am] really more confident, um communicating with people." Although there are still linguistic barriers, Takahiro felt that there were fewer barriers than 6 months ago. During our interview, I ask Takahiro about how he positions his national identity.

Fritz: ...You were sort of, okay I see myself as Asian here. I'm wondering, has that changed at all with your wife being with you now? Do you feel more Japanese? Do you feel Asian? Do you feel American? Do you feel, how do you feel now about your national identity?

Takahiro: Um it's kind of weird. Um so first of all I'm Asian stays, remains the same. But when I think about my future, and you know, career, all this stuff, and when I look at other people, people from other countries and how they, you know, get adapt to the U.S. culture, some point I feel like, oh, maybe I want to be an American, like culturally and, you know, because I want I want to work here and I like, you know, the culture here. So I, I don't really feel, I don't really empathize my origin of Japanese now, except for now when I make some jokes or something like that. Um, otherwise I feel Asian here.

Part of the reason Takahiro positions himself as Asian is because his PhD cohort is mostly from Asian countries.

It's funny because I'm talking with one of, one of my colleagues, one of my friend from my cohorts. And he's a, he's White and he's from Oklahoma. And I said to him, 'Ah maybe you the only one American citizen in this classroom.' I mean it's kind of true. Most people are Chinese. Some people are from India, maybe. Me only Japanese. And it's kind of not US, linguistically. And um so I feel like Asian still.

It's not clear whether being in an environment with all White native English speakers would make Takahiro position himself as more or less Asian, or even whether he would position himself as Japanese. However, he has positioned himself as belonging to the mostly Asian cohort of his peers, whose foreign status and ways of speaking English mark them as not belonging to the "real U.S." I asked Takahiro if he ever wanted to become a U.S. citizen.

I don't know about citizenship, but I think green card would be nice. Okay, uh, I would say I come to feel like that um maybe I want to be an American because I got married and we talk a little about our [future] kids. You know we would have kids and my kids, if any, would be, you know, raised in the U.S. and, you know, technically, culturally, socially they are going to be Americans. Like first generation, you know, Japanese immigrants. So in that sense, my sense of nationality and like the border is kind of blurred now in an interesting way.

Takahiro can envision a future in the U.S. with his American children and himself becoming culturally American at first and then possibly becoming an American citizen. Becoming culturally American for Takahiro might mean becoming more fluent in English and being able to speak with confidence to native born, non Asian Americans. Becoming a permanent resident and possibly even an American citizen are, at this point in his life, possibilities and part of Takahiro's future national identity positioning.

Takahiro also mentions safety as activating his Asian American identity during a recent road trip to New Orleans with his wife. At a fast-food restaurant in rural Louisiana, Takahiro noticed that his wife was being stared at and he did not feel safe.

In that situation, because of the safety reason, I tried to act cool...but in that situation or in a place where I've never been to, I try to act like American, like Asian American. I really care about my accent and I really care about my behavior, such as you know, walking a little bit roughly, that's not like neatly, neatly walking or neatly, I act like American, like I don't care just like just, but that's for safety reason kind of, because it's, you know, better and, you know, if you do that you will be more, you will look like American person.

Takahiro positions foreign-born Asians as potentially more vulnerable and susceptible to unsafe conditions in the U.S. than Asian Americans. Speaking English by sounding 'non-foreign' is a big component in his efforts to pretend to be Asian American. In his first interview, Takahiro mentions that he is worried about his safety, since his cell phone was stolen during his first trip to New York. In his second interview, Takahiro mentioned certain areas of downtown that he felt were not walkable and where many homeless people lived. Thus, if he can appear to be an American and sound like an American, perhaps this will add a layer of protection or prevent any unpleasant incidents.

#### Interview #5 - 2 Years

In our fifth interview, as I had done in previous interviews with Takahiro, I used member checking in order to allow him to reposition himself or maintain his previous positioning.

Fritz: And then you said that you thought that: ‘nationality is kind of really rigid, fixed object, but when I think about family building here, and I think about the future, maybe it’s kind of blurred. I could get a green card if I got a job here. And if I got a job here, and if we have children they will be American citizens. So thinking about that I can no longer be a foreigner because I have to overcome several steps to get something.’ So do you think, are the lines still blurred for you? Are you thinking about American citizenship, possibly in the future?

Takahiro: In an ideal situation, I would love to have that option. And if I could have an opportunity to work at [a] US university, I would rather be here than going back to Japanese college. And also my wife, she started working in an international school, and it’s basically a Saturday school, basically for children who has some kind of relationship with Japanese culture or Japanese language...And after hearing a lot of stories about people migrating to US, and migrating inside of US, I kind of feel that the line is blurred right now.

Fritz: ...Do you still see yourself as a foreigner now?

Takahiro: So it depends on the situation, but lately, I feel more comfortable without thinking about my nationality. So for instance, I was talking on the phone to a person at [insurance company] because I had to report a claim. But she doesn’t care where I’m from, and she know the only important thing is that I can communicate well, in a plain language, so that she could understand me...As long as I’m communicating well, I don’t really have a sense of borderline or challenge right now. And also a driver’s license helped a lot, maybe. If you don’t have a driver’s license, you need to bring your passport because that’s your only identification item. But with a driver’s license you can just go to a club, and people don’t care where I’m from because I have a driver’s license. So people think [of] me, as a person, living in Texas than a person with red [Japanese] passport. So I think that’s kind of visually big.

Not being positioned by others as foreign in daily life is a new feeling for Takahiro. In the fourth interview he spoke about sometimes faking his Asian American identity, but now Takahiro isn’t reminded of his Japanese identity often. Because of his Texas driver’s license, his improved communication skills, and increased confidence, Takahiro doesn’t have to position or negotiate his national identity so often. Every time Takahiro buys alcohol at the store, goes to a club or rents a car, for all intents and purposes he is a Texan. Although seemingly bureaucratic and quotidian, using an officially granted form of identification by the state of Texas allows Takahiro to leave his Japanese passport at home, which frees him to some degree from his Japanese identity.

I asked Takahiro if living in the U.S. had changed his way of thinking in any way.

I think living in the U.S., um, just eliminated my sense of, you know, Japanese norm from me. Then focus on individual way of thinking...I feel that there are lots of opportunities, and in terms of this field or academia or political science maybe, I think

the U.S. is the land of promise in a way... Even though I know that it's not perfect and there are a lot of injustice going on, thinking super individually, I think U.S. is really the land of promise to me.

Takahiro positions himself as more culturally American in his thinking, having shed some of his Japanese norms after two years of living in the U.S. After two years living in the U.S. Takahiro still feels that the U.S. promises more opportunities for his future than Japan.

#### Interview #6 - 2.5 Years

The sixth interview was an online video-recorded conversation between Saki and Takahiro. The sixth interview was an online video-recorded conversation between Saki and Takahiro. I provided the following list of topics and questions to Takahiro and Saki, about one week prior to their discussion, which is essentially a guided conversation between the two participants:

- Integration into the American academic community
- Progress with your research projects
- Making friends and personal life satisfaction
- Connection to America and American culture - Do you feel American or Americanized at all? Speaking English in the US.
- Your connections to countries outside of America and Japan
- Your Japanese identity - has it changed over the past few years?
- Do you feel 100% Japanese right now?
- Are you proud to be Japanese?
- Becoming Asian in America
- Do you think there is a Western or American way of thinking and a Japanese way of thinking? If so, what are the differences? Which one do you prefer and why?
- Is national identity important?
- Your future lives in America, abroad or Japan

These topics and questions were all based on prior interviews that I had with my two participants. The topics and questions were also derived from my research focus on national identity. I also said that they could cover any topic they wished to discuss that was not mentioned in my questions. I turned off my camera and left the room during their conversation in order to allow their conversation to flow without any interruptions from me. I wanted Takahiro and Saki to be able to interact without my presence so that they might feel freer to say things that they might not say to me directly. I said that they could speak in Japanese or in English, whichever made them feel more comfortable. Takahiro seemed most comfortable using English and so they mostly spoke in English during the entire conversation. Here I will focus on Takahiro's responses in this conversation and in the next section I will concentrate on Saki's responses.

The topics I asked Takahiro and Saki to cover were oriented towards my research focus on national identity and their experiences using English language in the U.S.

Saki: ...Do you feel American or Americanized at all? That's embarrassing question. How do you think?

Takahiro: This is a, this is one of the difficult questions, I guess. So, um [20 second pause] I think in a way, I have been, um, I feel like I have been Americanized in a way that I have been living here for some years. And, um, I just make a living here, right?. Um, so as a resident I feel more Americanized. Um, though, it doesn't mean that I have completely incorporate all of the mainstream culture, including how, like you talk or how you, like, behave I guess. If you define American culture as the one that incorporates multiple immigrant cultures, I guess I feel Americanized. But it doesn't mean that I feel like I want to, like, before I think I was naive in thinking that I would be able to talk like people in *The Office* or some American shows. Right? But, like now I don't really feel like it. So, when I'm doing hip hop or making music, so I always wanted to talk, talk Black because that used to be authentic to me. Right now, I know that I don't have to do that and I shouldn't, and I don't really want to do that. I think the obsession with some aspects of American culture has been fading away over time. But I think it in turn makes more, more American in a sense. In a sense I can just be myself. I don't care about, I'm just letting things go where things go.

Takahiro positions himself as a US resident who is growing more comfortable expressing his true self, one that is more Americanized but less obsessed with American mainstream culture. This involves embracing his own accent, and not trying to imitate hip-hop musicians or other American media stars. We can infer from Takariho's answer that there are multiple ways America is defined, one of them being that America is the land of immigrants. In this narrative, Takahiro seems to position himself as a possible future immigrant rather than a temporary student that will stay for a few years and promptly return to Japan.

Saki: Okay, the next question here. Your Japanese identity, has it changed at all in the past few years? Do you feel 100% Japanese right now? Are you proud to be Japanese? And becoming Asian in America ...About your Japanese identity.

Takahiro: I don't know. [13 second pause] So I would say that I have um, I have a sense of recognition that I have a Japanese background because I was born in Japan and grew up there. Um, um, but I, let's change the order. But I'm not, I don't really feel proud to be Japanese. It doesn't mean that I'm not, I'm not proud, but I have no sense of proudness to be in one category. Then the last question. I think I'm becoming more Asian in America than being Japanese. Regarding the change over time, it's, I don't know. [15 second pause] So I came to know that there is a possibility that I can live and I can, like, have a life in other countries with full legal responsibility. And so it makes me think that the location where you are living doesn't really define who I am. And that makes me I don't know what. I just feel like I am a person with Japanese background living in the US temporarily right now. So that's, that's my identity.

Saki: You're thinking you haven't changed over time?

Takahiro: No, no, I think I have changed. [15 second pause] I think it changed, um. So I know that there is a possibility for me to be an American, legally. And I know that is possible *legally*. And, and, what about my identity? So I think before, I guess, being Japanese was my identity, right? It's at the core of, like, me living. But right now it's, being Japanese is more like one of my attributes that I have...

Takahiro's positioning of his national identity has changed during his two and a half years living in the US. From being the core part of his identity when he arrived, his Japanese national identity has now moved to the periphery of how Takahiro positions his identity.

Takahiro: Um, in a sense I feel like right now I feel more like I'm a foreigner. Actually, some dimension that makes a distinction between things is I guess on whether I, whether people are foreigners or not, I guess. Or like, people who grew up in US or not. I think that that's the main dimension that I'm living right now. So in a way my national identity is important, but it's not because it is Japanese but it, it is not, you know, native [born] American. I mean quote, unquote "native [born] American."

Takahiro frames his national identity as a gap between his future life as a possible American citizen and his current reality as a non-American. He positions himself not as a Japanese national living in the US, but rather as not a native born American. It's a subtractive positioning. He is lacking American citizenship, something that is desirable and attainable in the future, and therefore this is the most salient aspect of his national identity.

#### Interview #7 - 3 years (Final interview)

The final interview gave us a chance to go over the conversation that Takahiro had with Saki, to review our previous interviews, and talk about the past three years Takahiro had been living in the US. I asked Takahiro about his future plans, with regard to staying in the US. He said that because of his Fulbright scholarship, he is required to return to Japan. Visa requirements dictate that he needs to spend at least 2 years living in Japan before he can return to the US. During that time in Japan he and his wife may plan to have children so that they can be supported by their families while in Japan. This plan is different from our previous discussions about possibly having children in the US so they can become American citizens. Takahiro mentioned that his mother would come to the US to help care for his future child if they had a baby in the US. Because of immigration issues, however, this plan has been shifted to having children in Japan. During this mandated two-year period living in Japan, Takahiro plans to apply for jobs in the US so that he can eventually return. "And if I haven't had that restriction, I would have just applied to US positions immediately." Here Takahiro talks about his rights and privileges. He was privileged to receive a scholarship, but that will prevent him from his goal of continuing to live and work in the US. His rights to stay in the US will end when he finishes his doctoral program. Like some *kikokushijo* who wanted to stay in the US, but couldn't due to visa restrictions, Takahiro's imagined future as a long-term US resident or US citizen will have to wait until he can find a way back to the US.

One of the constant themes we explored throughout our interviews was accent and pronunciation when speaking English.

Fritz: Moving on to something that has kind of come up over the last three years in our discussion is: accent and pronunciation. You've kind of been, it seems like when you at least speak English, the pronunciation and accent are always in the back of your mind. Sort of consciously thinking about, 'Okay, I need to pronounce this way - if I say it this way, so I seem Asian, do I seem American?' So, I'm wondering if that still is going on in your mind, like, when you speak English - are you still thinking actively about accent and pronunciation?

Takahiro: Um, I think I'm not thinking about it now, I guess. Um, I think I came to learn that these people have different accents, even within the US.

Fritz: Yeah, you had mentioned over a year ago now, Japanese-American or Japanese-Western complex, about wanting to imitate things in the West. Um, and you sort of were thinking about imitating the accent a little bit. Um, is that still one of your goals, or are you moving onto you, 'This is how I speak - I'm not trying to imitate American actively'?

Takahiro: I think so. Yeah. I'm not really, like, imitating or anything. Especially because I think I had this imaginary reference point that I was thinking I'm supposed to, like, mimic. But turns out that there's no such thing. Maybe if like if you go to Colorado, maybe, like, you may find someone who really, you know, speaks a standard, like, US English. But how you speak depends on your race, ethnicity as well, and culture and the regions and everything. Um, so now I feel like I was aiming at a, like, wrong imaginary target...So yeah, I'm not going to do it anymore.

Takahiro had overcome his preoccupation with accent and pronunciation and realized that he had created an idealized "American accent" in his mind that was actually several different accents and dialects. Living in the US had shown him the wide variety of ways to speak English in the US. This was difficult to know by consuming American media in Japan, media that may filter out immigrant populations or lack linguistic and cultural diversity.

We also spoke about his national identity. Takahiro still feels more Asian than Japanese after living in the US.

Fritz: Speaking of Asian, the last time you spoke [1 year ago], you had said that you were feeling more comfortable claiming your Asian identity, at least in the US. Do you still feel that way?

Takahiro: I think so. Um, I wouldn't say like "Asian American" because that's very different from the broader category of Asians. Like, um, but yeah I still believe that I'm more comfortable saying myself as an Asian person than like a Japanese guy or something. So, like when I email with someone I met, I usually, like, as a half-joke and and as a, like, half-information, I'm saying, like, 'Hey, I'm the Asian dude with the glasses that I, you know, talked to you...'

Takahiro's national identity has been replaced with a regional identity. He is not the "Osaka guy" anymore, but is now the "Asian dude." I used member checking to replay Takahiro's first interview when he positioned himself as "Osaka people."

Fritz: So do you still, after three years, being a little over three years now, living in the US, do you still feel that you're very much an Osaka person?

Takahiro: Um, that's a great question, and, um, I wouldn't say that right now. Um, and I think the sense of locality for me is kind of fading away right now...

Fritz:...So last time you talked, you had the conversation with Saki, you said, 'I just feel like I'm a person with Japanese background living in the U.S. temporarily right now. That's my identity.' Do you still feel like that's... do you think that accurately captures how you feel right now? Or has it changed?

Takahiro: Um, I think legally it hasn't changed, so that's an accurate description. But at the same time, um, I don't know. I feel like I'm more, I try to feel more entitled, a little bit at least, as long as I'm doing good with research and my academic career. So I would say like I'm a, you know, researcher, who happens to be from Japan, and who's doing his job in the US...

Fritz: ...Do you think being a researcher gives you more claim - especially a researcher living in the US - gives you more claim to, or makes you feel closer to America? Or is there any connection to that?

Takahiro: Um, I think so. Like I don't really know how this is generalizable or maybe it's in my mind, but the sense of this, like, um, meritocracy is um, I think really big in me. And I feel like, if you're beneficial, you should be part of it. That's like super America[n], right? I don't care how you grew up, where you're coming from... And I feel like as long as I'm doing my job alright then I'm entitled, or I'm good to be here and nobody really says anything. Um, so I think it's a positive connotation.

Speaking of rights, duties, and privileges, Takahiro mentions the American concept of a meritocratic society. This is especially the case with immigrants, who have to "earn" their place in the US. In this narrative, immigrants have a duty to contribute to their adopted nation. Takahiro positions himself as entitled to his place in America, as adding value to American society through his research. Though not legally allowed to permanently stay in the US yet, Takahiro has already positioned himself as a future immigrant contributing to American society and doing his duty, in this case his research, to prove his merit.

Takahiro has expressed interest in establishing permanent residence in the US in the future. Citizenship, however, is more complicated because that would involve renouncing Takahiro's Japanese citizenship. In our final interview, I asked him if he would change his nationality from Japanese to American if he had the choice.

Takahiro: If I need to choose one, I might choose the US citizenship. In terms of like, as a country, and as like geopolitically I think, there are much more opportunities for people to, like there are opportunities if you are like US citizen than Japanese citizen, like for future...I'm not quite sure about the future status of Japan.

Takahiro envisions a more prosperous life for himself and his family in the US. He would even be willing to give up his Japanese citizenship to do so.

Finally, in contrast to kikokushijo who have little choice in their mobility abroad, Takahiro chose to go abroad and live in another country for several years. I asked him about this choice.

Fritz: So when I'm looking at choice, obviously you're an adult and you made this choice. But what I'm wondering, given the hierarchical nature of Japan, when a professor suggests or says you should do this, a lot of Japanese students usually follow that advice. Not always, of course. So I'm wondering if you consider the decision to come to the US as your own choice? Or do you feel like it was a choice made for you and you just followed it and then now you're sort of living that decision? I'm curious to know your perspective.

Takahiro: Um, that was totally my own choice. Um, and it should have been... And also I was thinking back then I was desperate for looking for some advice or tips to get out of the situation. Then the person that I relied on was the person that I felt was really cutting edge and successful in a way that I was imagining. So he was the best bet at that time for me. So there was no other way, no other options... So it was more like, I was desperate and I was looking for some ways out. Then I learned that from him going to the US is both financially and also career-wise great option too. So that was reactive and not a passive decision.

The "desperate" situation that Takahiro describes is the time just before he decided on applying to graduate schools in the US. Takahiro was a PhD student at a well known university in Japan. He was unhappy with his program and his future trajectory and sought the advice of a respected professor that was not his advisor. This professor suggested applying to US graduate schools. Once Takahiro was accepted to a university in Texas, he quit his Japanese PhD program and moved to the US. Although it was clearly Takahiro's decision to move to the US, without the timely advice of a trusted professor, it is unlikely he would have gone to the effort to take the GRE (graduate record examination) and apply to 14 universities and eventually drop out of his doctoral program. Being encouraged and believing that studying abroad was a possibility changed his motivation. The US provided an escape to a languishing career in Japan.

In our first interview three years prior, Takahiro said, "In Japan it is difficult to pursue one's own dreams." For Takahiro the US is the land of opportunity where he can fulfill his dreams and have a successful career. In the three years of interviews with Takahiro, his national identity changed from regional Japanese to Asian to possible future permanent US resident or American citizen. Japanese national identity moved from the core of his self-identity to a peripheral part of his identity. In the future, it may be diminished further if he becomes an American citizen. His mandated two-year stay in Japan after his doctoral program finishes will allow Takahiro the

chance to reevaluate his future career and allow him and his family to choose how mobile they will become.

## Section 6.2 - Presentation of narrative texts from Saki

As we can see in Figure 32 below, Saki already had considerable experience living and travelling abroad before she embarked on her journey to live and study in the US. Saki studied abroad for one year in high school when she was 16 years old, living with a host family in Australia. In her early 20s, she went to Malta for three weeks to study English at a language school and then went to the Philippines for a month and a half to volunteer for a Japanese non-profit organization, as well as two weeks in Bangladesh to also work as a volunteer. In her mid 20s, Saki lived in Brazil for almost one year to conduct research for her master's degree.




Figure 32. Saki's timeline.

### Interview #1 - Pre-abroad

In our first interview, Saki and I discussed her previous experiences living abroad in Australia and Brazil. Saki explains that she had only a very basic level of English before going to Australia.

...I just know how to say, 'Hello, how are you?' and I had not many chances to speak with foreigners so I couldn't really understand how they think or how they live, their custom...

Saki lived with a host family and attended an Australian high school so her English proficiency improved markedly over the year-long stay. Saki mentioned that her readjustment back into Japan was difficult because, for example, she had to dye her hair black as most Japanese secondary schools have strict policies about hair color.

Fritz: ...do you think, like, after one year, do you feel like you understood more kangaekata [way of thinking], the thinking?

Saki: I think so. A little bit. I just accustomed to the Western thinking so that why I couldn't fit with traditional Japanese way of thinking after coming back to Japan, I think.

Fritz: Can you describe more what would be more examples of Western versus Japanese thinking, for example? Can you talk more about that?

Saki: So I think, like, Japanese customs make people, everyone same, same thinking, same looking... So I think that - it's just my feeling - but Western countries treat individual much more and treat each student individually. Like in Japan, it's only the group and individual is not really important.

Saki discusses the oft-repeated generalization that the West is more individualistic and Asia is more group-oriented. There is a well known Japanese aphorism about Japanese society: 出る杭は打たれる (deru kui wa utareru), or the nail that sticks out gets hammered in. In the United States, however, the saying, "The squeaky wheel gets the grease," perhaps captures the opposite phenomenon, that speaking out has its advantages. Speaking out in Japan, conventional wisdom dictates, tends to lead to being punished or silenced. Of course, these are just generalizations and it's hard to know how much conformity Saki overlooked while in Australia and how many examples of individualism in Japan Saki may not have realized exist. The important point to highlight here is that Saki mentions Japanese thinking on the one hand and an amorphous "foreign" thinking on the other hand. This dichotomy exists in nihonjinron writings, as presented in Chapter 2, presenting Japanese thinking as special and unique.

When Saki moved to Brazil, her Portuguese language proficiency was low. She conducted interviews for her research in English. However, if her participants were not able to speak English, she said she used some Portuguese and her language skills slowly improved. She was also able to speak Japanese sometimes because she lived in a Nikkei dormitory. I asked her about her experiences living with mostly Sansei and Yonsei, third and fourth generation Nikkei.

Saki: ...they are a little Nikkei mind but

Fritz: What is Nikkei mind, for example?

Saki: Like compared with Brazilian people, like Nikkei, Nikkei-jin is like more polite and a bit friendlier than Japanese people because they know some custom of Japanese people and they're interested in Japanese things...a little bit like small things of Japanese character...and like Japanese mind is also like polite and *nandake, majime* (how shall I say, serious and studious)...modest, yeah modest. *Kinben toka* (also industrious and diligent).

Fritz: What about Brazilian style?

Saki: Brazilian style is much more easy going (laughs). Very open and a little bit rude. Not only a little bit, very rude (laughs).

According to Saki, Nikkei were friendlier than Japanese people but still retained Japanese qualities of being diligent, modest and studious. Non-Nikkei Brazilians were distinctly different in character, without retaining any “Japanese characteristics.” I asked Saki to compare her experiences in Australia and Brazil with regard to any discrimination she faced.

Saki: ...In Brasilia there’s not much racism to Japanese people...I think there is like, kind of feeling to expect Japanese, like Nikkei-jin, because Nikkei-jin has a lot of great job actually. There is some influence. Politicians, bureaucrats, from Nikkei, because they are hard working, serious and honest, so they are like succeeding in Brazilian country...Australia is like have a bit of racism to the Japanese people. So especially like my high school, there was community of Asian people and they just really distinctive from the Australian native, like White communities. So I had some friends from these communities, but I couldn’t really enter that community.

Fritz: The White Australian community?

Saki: The White Australian community.

Saki explains that the Nikkei community was much more welcoming and interested in Japanese culture than what she experienced in Australia. She also mentioned that Nikkei have an elevated status in Brazil and are well-respected.

I asked Saki why she wanted to study in the US and, like Takahiro, several professors advised her to go to the US to complete her doctoral research because it was seen as more rigorous than a Japanese PhD in her field. At first she was hesitant, but after she attended an academic conference in the US, she changed her mind because she enjoyed her experience. I asked Saki how conferences were different in Japan and the US.

Saki: [In Japan] it’s a very tough experience for every student because the professors criticize and it’s not really natiouka (how shall I say) fun or really really interesting place. But in the US, like really open to everyone and...like they criticize but they make lots of comment; it’s really encourage and and it’s helpful to research... So yeah I found the atmosphere, academic atmosphere much more better compared with Japan, Japanese, like traditional styles.

Fritz: Do you think those students can make comments freely in Japan normally?

Saki: No, no, no, no. Even PhD students can’t really make comments, like traditional Japanese culture.

In several instances during our interview Saki refers to traditional Japanese culture, which from her examples seems to signify the necessity to follow strict rules and an adherence to established hierarchical structures. The US and Australia are characterized as more open societies that allow

individuals the possibility to flourish, despite problems of racism. Saki is worried about starting a new life without any friends or a support network, like she had with her host family in Australia or the friends she lived with in Brazil. She also expressed concerns about systemic racism in the US. "So like the Black and White, Black versus White conflict is really serious, rather than I thought, still now." She mused about whether she might have a difficult time living as an Asian in the US.

So I don't know about Asian, but maybe like even compared with Brazil, like ethnicity might be kind of, can be more conflictive...In these days I feel like it's much more tough to live in the US.

She refers to a regional identity, Asians, instead of a national identity, Japanese, already categorizing herself as Asian. When asked about her image of the US Saki said that, "It's very free but there is a lot of responsibility to the individuals." She cited being responsible for one's own health insurance as an example. In contrast to Takahiro, who had a more idealized vision of the US, Saki seems to have a more pragmatic view about her possible future struggles.

Finally, I asked Saki about her future plans and if she might want to continue living in the US after finishing her degree. She expressed that she would be open to the possibility but then said, "Yeah, maybe I don't want to live in the US anymore." Before going to the US, Saki leaves open the possibility of either staying or leaving the US after she finishes her doctoral program.

Interview #2 - 6 months

After six months of living in the US, I asked Saki about how she was adapting to American life.

Fritz: ...How was adjusting to life in Missouri?

Saki: Yeah, uh, yeah I feel like I didn't really have hard time adjusting to American life. Like yeah, like I feel like 'cause I lived in Brazil or Australia before - and Brazil was so different (laughs) so it was so hard. But America is not that different from Japan so it was a bit easier for me to adjust. So yeah and also maybe English is a little bit easier for me.

Saki first contrasts her experience living in a less populated part of the US from Los Angeles or New York and says that "most people are supportive and very kind." She then compares her experiences to her previous times living abroad and, since she spoke very little English as a 16 year old, now she is much more prepared to live in the US with a higher English proficiency. However, the Phd program still presents some difficult linguistic obstacles that she needs to overcome. Saki needed to take an English speaking exam in order to qualify to be a teaching assistant (TA) at her university.

Yeah, actually I had to take that exam because I want to be like TA...but I have to have like high score...and I got like worst, worst score. So it was so terrible. I feel like, yeah, I already spent like five month in America and still a daily low speaking (laughs).

Saki discusses how her speaking habits are not just due to proficiency but also to cultural norms.

Not only the American student but also the people, uh, the student from European countries speak a lot, like compared with Asians, like Japanese and South Koreans. And we have the same problem about participation because it's like cultural things, like we are all educated as like listen to the professors, what professor says in lectures.

Saki mentions that in her classes in Japan she did not usually make critiques or have the types of discussions that she now needs to be able to have in her current classes.

...I have to progress, make a progress on my oral communication skills, especially I didn't have like much confidence about my oral communication skills. I not have confidence to participate the argument because if I participate maybe the discussion gonna be a little bit delay and slow down. So I little bit hesitate to like make a comment.

Although Saki has a duty to participate in her class, due to low confidence in her ability to critique and make arguments in English during class, which are new skills for her, she feels that she doesn't have the right to speak up. Similarly, during the second interview, Takahiro also didn't feel like he was "eligible" to speak to Americans due to his perceived accent and low confidence in his speaking ability. Takahiro and Saki both mention the ability of non-Asian foreign students to speak up and participate more in class. After six months, Saki and Takahiro are both hesitant to exercise their rights to speak English in their professional lives. Saki says that her inability to speak without hesitance comes from her Japanese education.

...I feel like, like Japanese education is a little bit stupid... Yeah it's so stupid, so we are kind of afraid to make the wrong answer. So that is like, that makes us to pressure to make a comment because we are afraid to make a wrong answer like a mistakes.

Saki talks more about her decision to leave Japan and her reasoning behind choosing to study in the US. One of the reasons was that her supervisor transferred to a new university. The other reason was similar to Takahiro's feeling of lacking direction.

Yeah, I feel like I'm really glad to come here, like in the United States, because like when I stay in Japan I was like I'm kind of stuck. I didn't have any idea to make progress afterwards in the like PhDs in political science...After come here in the United States like the academic, yeah academic, I had a lot of academic experiences, more than Japan. And I feel like my brain's expanding. My knowledge is extended much, much more. Maybe that's because political science in the United States is most advanced rather than other countries. And not only maybe political science, but yeah so I'm really glad to come here.

I followed up from the first interview about her worry about how she might be treated as an Asian in the US.

Fritz: Can we talk a little about, the last time we talked about racism and how you, you didn't know how you would be accepted as Asian in the US. Have you had any experiences regarding that? Do you feel accepted or have you had any difficulties as Asian in the US.?

Saki: Not yet, actually. But especially like in the days after Trump out after president, so this is like a little bit sensitive moment to be minority in the United States I think. I saw a lot of the protests of minority groups even in this small town...Yeah and so I really didn't understand what is like racism or what is to be discriminated. I didn't really understand but after come here in the States, like race is so sensitive issue and it's not only myself, like Asian, maybe a little bit different...As Asian, I'm not feeling like I am discriminated from society or something... Yeah, but still, hmm, I feel there's a lot of difference between Asian culture and American cultures.

Takahiro also makes a similar comment about how sensitive an issue race is to talk about in the US. Saki positions herself as Asian and refers to Asian culture, rather than Japanese culture.

Saki: Yeah, maybe most Americans don't know much about Japan or Japanese culture. Yeah, and also I found that the, most of the people can't distinguish Japan, South Korea, and China. So sometime people ask me, like, how is China (laughs), how is Chinese? Or Pokemon is coming from South Korea or something like that. Oh no. So yeah, I was kind of stressed about this. No, I'm not Chinese...

Fritz: How does that make you feel when people say, 'Oh how's China?' or 'You're Chinese'? How do you feel?

Saki: I'm so, so stressed by this. Especially, I'm not racist and I don't have any particular feeling about China, but if people say like China, in China or Chinese, I'm like, 'Noooo, I'm not Chinese!'. I'm so stressed by this.

In contrast to Takahiro, who accepted his Asian identity and was not bothered by being positioned mistakenly as Chinese or Korean, Saki is having a difficult time accepting these interactions even though she identifies as an Asian.

### Interview #3 - 1 year

Over the summer Saki went back to Japan for one month and then went to Brazil for one month to take Portuguese classes. She has also decided to take an English language class this coming semester to improve her communication skills. In the previous semester Saki said she could "participate with more confidence" than in her first semester.

Saki: ...I don't feel like, compared with the previous year, I don't feel like I have, like, to hesitate to speak up that much now. Probably that because I know the people a lot than last year. So yeah, and I'm getting used to explain myself in English.

Fritz: ...You were worried about your quality of English speaking. You said lower level. Are you worried about your English skills as much? Do you feel like you have improved?

Saki: Hmm, probably, hopefully (laughs). I haven't start the class, classes yet so I probably gonna realize that I still need to improve my English skills after starting my

classes. But, hmm, yeah I don't know. I just get back from Brazil and my, I know that my English skill is much better than Portuguese so (laughs) I feel like I have confidence in speaking English than Portuguese.

I asked Saki about our previous discussion about adopting American ways of thinking.

Fritz: Um, do you feel like you're more used to what you said, this American way of thinking, or how do you feel about that now? Same?

Saki: Yeah, probably. I'm getting used to that and I probably can't get back to the Japanese way of thinking.

Fritz: Oh, really?

Saki: Because I actually presented my work in Japan this year...And actually, I was the only one that I discussing now, American ways of political science. The other two guys are like presenting really the traditional way of comparative politics. So I was like, hmm, okay that's fine, but I'm kind of disappointed the way presented.

Saki explains that the way Japanese political scientists analyze is more descriptive in order to try and understand what is going on in a region. She said, "it's not really science, actually." According to Saki, Americans are more analytical, examining the issues with data. I asked her if she was still happy about her decision to come to the US.

Hmm, probably it was good for me, yeah, because I just saw that, like, academic environment in Japan is not, like, that good when I came back to Japan. So that's good decision I came to the US.

I followed up with Saki about being positioned as Chinese or Korean.

Fritz: They recognized you as Asian, or Chinese, or Korean, or not necessarily Japanese identity. How do you feel about that now? Before you said that stressed you out a lot, being, someone calling you, oh you Chinese, or um how do you feel about that now? Are you still stressed out?

Saki: Hmm, about Asian maybe. Yeah, probably. I just came back to Brazil and Brazil is kind of like really unique country. Like they have, like, Japanese population a lot so they feel like Japanese are special compared with the other Asian countries. So I found that is why I liked Brazil very well.

Fritz: (Laughs)

Saki: One of the reason because they likes Japan a lot so, so yeah it's a little bit different in the US. In the U.S. there is not, Japan is not that famous so people doesn't really distinguish (laughs). Japan is not so identical for American people. So yeah, it's kind of stressful. But yeah, that fine, like, still I like Brazil than the United States to be honest but

this is US, so yeah...So yeah, it was a little bit easier to stay in Brazil because people recognize Japanese. Also there is like really some Japanese community, even they are not really purely, pure Japanese, but Brazilian Japanese. Yeah, so it was a little bit easier to adjust the life in Brazil. So yeah, hmm. Yeah, I just came back from Brazil to the United States and I found that, okay, it's a little bit more difficult compared with living in Brazil.

By returning to Brazil after almost one year living in the US, Saki was able to compare the two experiences. Because she does not feel unique and recognized as Japanese in the US, like she does in Brazil, she prefers to be in Brazil. Having experienced an elevated status in Brazil, where her Japanese identity is respected and recognized, now experiencing a loss of national identity and reduced status as an Asian immigrant in the US, Saki feels stressed. Although Saki positioned herself as Asian in our second interview, during this interview it seemed to bother her that she was being positioned as Asian and not Japanese. This may be due to the fact that she had just returned from Brazil, where she was positioned as Japanese. Saki also mentions that there are Japanese communities in Brazil, which make living easier for her. When I mentioned that there are also Japanese-American communities, especially in California and Hawaii, in the US, she said that, "Ah, I see, California is kind of different." Saki is comparing living in a small town in Missouri, without a large Japanese-American community, to a city in Brazil with a large Nikkei Brazilian community, one that she is already connected to. Had she moved to an area in the US with a large Japanese-American Nikkei community, she might have had less stress while living in the US. However, Saki mentions that race relations also are a concern due to the rise of white supremacy in the US, so even if she were living near a Japanese-American community it still might be stressful for her.

Saki: Yeah and one of the things I was a little bit concerning about what's going on in Virginia right now. Yeah like white supamacy.

Fritz: Supremacy.

Saki: I can't pronounce that very well. The movement. So this it what I was really concerning about, Donald Trump, Donald Trump was became the president. So I feel like, so because of the [unintelligible] people feel it is acceptable to say like racism comments in public. So yeah I feel like this movement, it's like only this time but it's gonna be continued and it can expand. So like in my city is like, it's not that huge city or something. It's like really small...It's not gonna be so dangerous or something. But in the United States, in general, gonna be a little bit harder to live for like, even the Asian, like. Of course, like Arabis people or Black people gonna be much more harder to be, or Latinos.

In our first interview, while she was still in Japan, Saki was concerned about race relations in the US. Now she is even more concerned about the difficulty of living in such a fraught environment.

Saki also mentions that some of her goals for the coming semester are to become more involved in the Christain church community, Brazilian community, and work on her teaching skills in

English. She also mentioned that she was thinking of finding a partner. And depending on her partner, she may decide to stay or leave the US.

I feel like I can live in the United States and I can live in Brazil. Or I can come back to Japan. But probably it's, depends on who I gonna stay with like. So if I gonna stay with American guy, maybe I'm stay in the US. And if I got a Brazilian partner, maybe I gonna move to Brazil.

At this point, Saki positions herself as the one who needs to choose a country based on her partner's location. She doesn't mention anything about a possible Japanese partner, however.

Interview # 4 - 1.5 years

I followed up with Saki about her concerns about racial issues in the US and if they were impacting her in any way.

Uh, in this moment I don't feel like so. But maybe because I am like just stuck with my work and I just stay at my university. And so I don't really interact with society.

With the pressures of her coursework, Saki was too busy to make connections with the local Christian or Brazilian communities or have time to look for a partner. She did make a Japanese friend who was doing her master's at Saki's university, so she said she "is getting new community."

I also followed up regarding her feelings about her preference for living in Brazil versus the US.

Yeah, I'm still feeling like Brazil, uh, much more enjoyable to me. But maybe that's because now I'm doing much harder stuff like doing the PhD and I don't have much time. Also don't study [in Brazil], so that is one reason why. One of the other reasons is that Brazil people has a lot, much more like Japanese community. So it's kind of easier to get connected with people because more people know about Japan. And much more people are interested in Japanese society, so it's kind of get used to the society. But yeah I feel like the most of the problem I just too busy right now as graduate student. Otherwise I feel like I can, I can enjoy myself living in the US.

Saki realized that she was comparing two different living experiences in Brazil and the US and that most of her difficulties stemmed from her harried schedule. Nevertheless, Saki still remarked that Brazil was easier for her because Brazilians embraced Japanese culture in a way that the Americans did not. I asked Saki whether living in the US was affecting her national identity.

Fritz: Do you have a feeling toward American culture or any sort of feeling any sort of Americanness? Or is it just a student - I'm just a Japanese student. Or do you feel Brazilian a little bit? Or how do you feel in that way?

Saki: Hmm, yeah I'm not sure because I'm in the US and I don't have comparison right now. But when I went back to Japan I was talking with my Japanese friends, and at that time I was like, okay, I'm kind of Americanized a little bit, compared with like traditional Japanese thinking, way of thinking.

Fritz: What is traditional Japanese thinking?

Saki: Much more ordered. Yeah, especially, I was talking with friends working at the company. So people are like get used to working at the like traditional company. Like you don't have to think about, like I'm not sure, like creative working style or you don't have much to criticize on their environment. Like, and living in the US is much more individual.

Fritz: Oh yeah? Can you talk more about that? How individual?

Saki: Like I feel like Japanese society is much more homogenous and people are supposed to act in the same way, kind of. So you don't have to really think yourself how you have to behave, like in the society, like in the company, or university community or anything. In the US, people are more like, have to be responsible by yourself.

Saki has talked about Japanese traditional thinking in each interview. In the first interview, she remarked how hard it was to return to Japan after Australia and conform to Japanese rules and norms, like having to dye her hair black and not feeling respected for her individual talents like she was in Australia. She also cites the Japanese traditional way of political science as one of the reasons why she left Japan to study in the US. Now, Saki is comparing her life to her Japanese friends' lives in Japan, where their freedom to individually express themselves, for example by using honne, at their workplaces is limited. Perhaps because Saki is still a student with more ability to think creatively, and not yet a member of the workforce, she might have a different experience, even in an American company. However, Saki did mention how she was less able in her Japanese university to discuss in class, make critiques and think creatively. The price for this freedom is that she has more responsibility to direct her own research and studies.

I asked Saki about her connection to Brazil.

Fritz: Do you feel like you have Brazilian identity or connected to Brazilian culture in any way?

Saki: Hmm.

Fritz: Like you said you were a little bit Americanized you said you realized when you went, do you feel Brazilianized a little bit too?

Saki: Ahh, not really, maybe right now.

Fritz: And why do you think that is that you don't? Last time you said you spent a month in Brazil and you've, you spent four years learning Brazilian Portuguese. Why do you

feel like you don't, you're not Brazilianized?

Saki: Uh, probably I'm not connected right now. I'm just stuck with my own life in this moment. Yeah, I have to take care of myself in American way. So yeah, kind of hard to think like the other country, Brazil, even Japan.

Fritz: Do you wish you were more connected with Brazil?

Saki: Hmm, yeah maybe. But to do that, maybe I have to learn language a little bit more.

Saki's lower proficiency in Brazilian Portuguese is a barrier to feeling more connected with Brazilian culture. Her distance from Japan is also a barrier to feeling more connected with Japan. She said, "I feel like a little bit tough distance." Saki said that she needed to return to Japan eventually to take care of her parents. Saki said, "...my parents is getting older so I feel like, yeah, I have to go back to Japan." After finishing her PhD, though, Saki wants to do a post doctoral fellowship outside of Japan before she eventually returns.

I also followed up regarding the stress Saki said she felt if people positioned her as Chinese or Korean.

Fritz: When people identify you as, 'Oh, are you Chinese or Asain', when they don't identify you as Japanese, are you, does that stress you out?

Saki: Hmm, yeah, not that much. That's because I'm get connected with other Asain people, like Chinese and Korean. So yeah, not that much.

Saki said that she took classes with mostly Asians and made some Asian friends. She said, "My community is much more related with Asians." Now that she has been able to interact with other Asians more, Saki feels less stressed about being positioned as non-Japanese.

I asked Saki about how she positioned her national identity.

Fritz: How do you see yourself now in America, your identity?

Saki: Not really changed. I think I, yeah, I want to, I want to get connected with American society a little bit more. But in this moment I'm not really doing well in that sense.

Fritz: And do you see yourself as Asian, as Japanese, as, or do you not think about your identity really, national identity?

Saki: Yeah, probably I'm much more feeling like Japanese, But also Asian.

Fritz: Yeah?

Saki: Yeah, especially staying in the US, Asia is Asian rather than Japanese.

Fritz: Yeah, did you feel like that before too or is that recent? Feeling kind of Asian.

Saki: Probably recent. I think from the last semester, because Asian people really struggle with the language, especially compared with other international student, like from Europe or Latin America. So in that sense we are having the same trouble and the same stress living in the US. So I think that's why we are, like, feeling sympathy together. So, yeah, and I haven't see with Japanese friends for a while, from the last semester. Because one of my friends left to the other states and I don't have much other, the other, like, very close friend, Japanese friend, right now. So that's maybe the other reason why I'm not really sure I'm feeling Japanese or not. That's interesting.

Saki's lack of contact with her Japanese friends and her feeling of solidarity with the other Asians in her classes, who have similar experiences, have led to more acceptance of her Asian identity in the US.

Finally, I asked Saki about her English language development.

Yeah, I feel like I'm, my English is improving in terms of everything like speaking, writing, and reading. But still, still there is too much gaps between me and other, even other international student or of course native speakers.

Part of Saki's Asian identity is linked to her struggles with English as she remarked above about Asian people really struggling with the language.

Interview #5 - 2 years

Saki attended summer school at a university in Michigan over the summer where she met a Brazilian political scientist. She said they became boyfriend and girlfriend and she went back to Michigan again to visit him at the start of the semester. Saki was able to present at two conferences, one in Chicago and the other in Barcelona. She is also working on a publication. She said that she feels "much better" for having so many new academic experiences, which has decreased her stress level and increased her confidence in her academic abilities. In addition, Saki was living with an American roommate before but two months prior to this interview, she moved into an apartment alone. "So I feel like I really live in the US, independent from anyone else." Before, her roommate took care of handling the bills and the rental contract, but now Saki is doing all of these tasks. She said, "...and so now I feel like I know how to live in the US at least." Perhaps, similar to how Takahiro enjoyed the freedom that his driver's license brought him, Saki also has gained more independence through accomplishing bureaucratic tasks like paying the gas bill. Saki doesn't have a driver's license in Japan so she uses a ride sharing application and public transport to get around.

I asked Saki if she was making more connections to American society, which was one of her previous goals. She said that she was interested in making connections with Latin Americans, since that was the focus of her studies.

Saki: And also I realized that I'm studying about Latin America, so, you know, um, I'm more interested in making the connection with Latin Americans, not Americans. So, and I have, like, little time, besides working. So I'm kind of, hmm, preferred, or yeah, to making the connections to Latin Americans...So I'm studying about Latin America and I'm Japanese, so I need more connection with Latin American people rather than the American.

Fritz: Oh, okay.

Saki: Yeah, because I need to understand them, and I also realized personally I like Latin Americans (laughs). So yeah, I'm more tend to be, or likely to, talk with Latin Americans than the Americans (laughs). So yeah, yeah I realized myself that I even like to talk with Latin Americans [more] than the Asians. Like with Japanese is kind of different, but like Korean or Chinese I don't feel like staying with them is so comfortable. But I feel really comfortable staying with Latinos (laughs). So yeah, hmm.

In this interview, Saki distances herself from the Asian community that she felt more solidarity with during our last interview. Because she is studying Latin America and now has a Brazilian boyfriend, Saki realizes that she doesn't have a need to make connections to the US or Asian communities in the US. She prefers associating with Latinos because she feels more comfortable with them.

Interview #6 - 2.5 years

This interview, as indicated above, was a discussion that was recorded between Takahiro and Saki, guided by my questions that were distributed about a week prior to the interview. This allowed each participant time to think about the questions to prepare for their discussion. Although I said they could speak in Japanese or English and talk about topics not included in my list of questions, they mostly stayed on my topics and spoke in English.

On the topic of whether or not Saki feels like she has been Americanized, Saki's answers contrast to those of Takahiro.

Saki: I feel like you're more Americanized than I am maybe. I don't feel like I'm Americanized at all to be honest, but I'm not Japanese at all either. As you say, we're more, like, multicultural. Yeah, because in my case I don't have any American friend I can say my best friend actually...My best friend is from Greece, or from Chile, or from Brazil. Really multicultural. But, I'm not really engaged in the community, like American community. So that is my, kind of, so I'm not really, I don't feel like I'm really feel, maybe feel comfortable like staying just in the American community.

Takahiro: ... So do you want to, if I continue the question, do you want to feel, like, American or Americanized?

Saki: Hmm. So it kind of depends. But not, I feel like I want to get the job here in the US. That means that I have to like really, as your first topic, we have to communicate very

well in America's party, right? And then, yeah, I feel like I probably need some more effort to, hmm I don't know how to say, but communicate better in American society or American groups.

Although Saki doesn't feel so Americanized, compared to Takahiro, she doesn't feel very Japanese either. Although she hasn't made great efforts to integrate into American society, at this point she wants to work in the US in the future and recognizes that she needs to make more efforts to connect with Americans to accomplish her goal. In order to do that, she says she needs to improve her communication skills. The discussion then moves on to connections that Saki has made.

Saki: I feel like I have more connection to other country compared with American actually. And, yeah, to be honest, ...I feel more comfortable to stay in the Latino community rather than, like, American community or Japanese community.

Takahiro: Why is that? You feel more South American?

Saki: Maybe (laughs).

Since our last interview, Saki continues to feel more connections to the Latino community and Latin America than she does to the US. The discussion moves on to national identity.

Saki: Okay, I was thinking about this question. And, I don't know. I don't feel like I really changed my identity after these three years. Maybe I slightly changed. But, I think maybe because I stayed in Brazil for a year before I come here. Actually, I also spend one year in Australia, as well, when I was high school... So, hmm, I don't feel like I was like 100% Japanese even before coming here. And, so in that sense now I don't really [feel] like I have changed only within these three years. So yeah, It's kind of interesting, you said that you are becoming, like, more Asian in the US rather than Japanese, right? But I never feel like that way... I'm much more comfortable staying with the Latinos compared with, like, Japanese or any other Asian communities.

Although Saki felt a little bit Americanized and somewhat Asian in our fourth interview, since the fifth interview Saki has felt more comfortable aligning herself with the Latino community, even more than the Japanese community. Since she felt that she was not completely Japanese before coming to the US, citing her previous experiences abroad, she felt that her national identity has not changed significantly since moving to the US. The discussion then moved on to whether or not they felt proud to be Japanese.

Saki: I was more proud to be Japanese when I was in Brazil, actually, compared with staying in the US. I think that's because the, hmm I don't know, kind of the reputation for Japanese is much higher in Brazil compared with the US. The US, probably most of the people doesn't care I am Japanese or Chinese or Korean, right (laughs)? Like people recognize you as Asian, but not like specifically Japanese, right? But in Brazil it was like completely different. I think that's because of history. Brazil has like really, um, very great number of [unintelligible] from Japan. And yeah, they are really the group of people

who achieve really well in Brazilian society. So yeah, Brazilian people, like, think Japanese is, like, they have really good image of Japanese - they are like hardworking, they have really good skills (laughs). And that is really distinctive compared with others, even for like Chinese or Koreans. So they really have positive feeling to Japanese. Like so, after coming here, I was kind of disappointed when I was talking with American people... People doesn't know anything about Japan or Japanese culture... I can't be proud of myself as Japanese living in this society. Probably not.

Saki is positioned as Japanese and enjoys the privilege of a higher status in Brazil, whereas she is positioned as Asian without this respected status in the US. Although she expected Americans to be more familiar with Japanese culture, she was disappointed to find that many Americans couldn't even recognize her as Japanese, let alone know about and praise Japanese culture. On the other hand, parts of American culture do appeal to Saki.

Saki: I think maybe I prefer American way of thinking compared with Japanese. As you say, like, Japanese if you, it's kind of hard to explain but, you have some certain level of expectation what you behave... you have to be in like that circle, right? In the US you can decide what circle you are in, right (laughs)? You can decide what you want, or you can try whatever you want, right? Of course you can realize that, it depends, depending on your ability. But, I think American way of thinking, people really see their motivation and they regard their motivation as one of the, like main factor or main reasoning to evaluate people, right? I think that is the things I like about in America, in the US. In Japan you're like kind of expected to behave in the same way in the group does.

Saki seems to agree with Takahiro about America being a freer, more meritocratic society. Saki continues to speak about her national identity.

Saki: As far as like identity, I feel the same. I have identity as a political scientist that is stronger... I still have lots of difficulty and I still don't feel like I'm really part of the American community or anything.

When asked if she wanted to return to Japan in the future, Saki said that, "I have to be outside of Japan because it's more advantageous." She talked about wanting to maintain links to Japan, to her family and professional network, even if she doesn't want to return to Japan after she finishes her PhD. She said, "In that sense, it's not about the like identity, but about the network and community." Saki seems to relegate national identity to something that is peripheral to her main identity as a political scientist. With weak ties to the US, Saki doesn't feel connected to American society.

Interview #7 - 3 years

Saki has decided to stay at her university over the summer months. She is already thinking about doing a postdoctoral fellowship in the US or Europe. Saki said she wants to "focus on the research and building up my academic community in the US, or maybe in Europe is fine too, but not back in Japan." She said that she doesn't think that she would be able to do her research on

Latin America in Japan. For part of her dissertation research, Saki plans to travel to Brazil for 6 months. I followed up about whether she still felt more connected to the Latino community.

Fritz: I think in your previous interview you said you were more comfortable with Latinos, and you said you still don't feel like part of the American community. Um, I'm wondering if you still feel that way now? And, uh, maybe if you could explain why you feel more comfortable with Latinos and, um, still not part of American culture.

Saki: Mm-hmm (affirmative). So basically yes, I feel the same, exactly the same. And I feel more distance from American community, to be honest... So in my case to teaching the class as a TA or instructor here in the department I have to pass the, like, speaking exam. And I really, really couldn't make it. And, like, so everyone, every international student have to take that exam. And I really have to pass that exam to do the teaching. But, I and most of my friend from Eastern Asian countries cannot make it. So (laughs) and I saw the evaluation, and I was like, they saying like my level of intelligence, in terms of English, English speaking is like 75%. I'm like (laughs), I'm like yeah I understand. But it's really bad. Like I studied for, like, my PhD for three years and they only look at my intelligence, just because of the pronunciation, just my - maybe not only about the pronunciation, it's word choice and how I speak. But I was like, okay, [if] I stay in this country, I'm not like fully respected in my career, but only [based] on the English level. And that, that's just really like tough to me because I couldn't really, I know that I couldn't really improve my English because I was more focusing on the research. And I spent more time on library or office than speaking with people.

Saki explains that she feels even more distant from American society because her English level was evaluated negatively, affecting her career and PhD studies. As Saki identifies more strongly as a political scientist, who does not want to return to Japan in the near future, this negative evaluation is a blow to her core identity.

Saki: I can't get any opportunity for teaching because of my English skill. Yeah, I'm kind of (deep sigh) disappointed. Okay the US, the US is evaluate people in that way, based on English skill. And so yeah, yeah now I feel like, I don't, I don't feel like I totally gave up my career in the US. But I feel like, hmm [if] I stay in the US, I have to feel the same way in my career all the time. That's really stressful to me. ...The thing is that if I want to apply for teaching job or even a researching job with teaching obligation, I have to have teaching experience here in the US. And department really doesn't allow me to do that. And then I can't really apply for those jobs... So, yeah, I think there is some problem on the system in the USA.

Saki said that she had already taken two courses to improve her English and pronunciation. She said that she still has two more chances to take the speaking test and if she doesn't pass, she will not be able to teach. She plans on taking another English course, the course she already took, next semester. However, it is difficult now for Saki to imagine a future in the US.

Saki: In this moment, I feel like it's really tough to realize, just staying in the US forever. I don't feel like I can do that. It's too stressful.

Saki's confidence also took another hit because she just recently broke up with her Brazilian boyfriend and many of the friends she made have just graduated or returned to their respective countries. She said she doesn't have any more Japanese friends either. In our last interview, Saki finds herself in difficult situations in both her personal and professional lives.

Fritz: Looking back now, do you feel like everything you're learning and your experiences, you made the right choice of choosing the US instead of choosing Brazil to do your PhD?

Saki: ...Yeah, because political science in the US is the best, even if you are studying South American politics...I could go other university, not here. Like maybe the bigger university in the city, in the bigger city. Actually, my advisor left from the department. Actually two advisor left...They both moved to the other university.

Saki expressed regret for choosing her university over others in the US, but not for choosing the US to do her PhD. I asked her about whether she thought her positive experiences being welcomed in Brazil created a barrier to her life in the US. She agreed but said that she experienced a similar feeling in Australia as she does in the US.

Saki: Australia is so, so like, really White society...Yeah I felt the same, I didn't like Australia that much, as a society. I did like the country, like nature or stuff, but I didn't like the people or society. Because of the same reason, like the White male, mostly the male is dominating society, and everything else is like kind of left out. Even for the high school experience.

Fritz: That's interesting. And you noticed that while you were in high school?

Saki: Yeah, because even the society within the high school is pretty much, like, separate. Like, international community is international community and White is White and Black is Black. I don't know in the US as well, but I feel like it's pretty much similar in this country as well. And mostly it's interesting like, highest position in the high school, like, student association co-chair or something like that, is all dominated by White. So yeah, I kind of learned that kind of system and then I really learned that I'm the minority in this world.

Fritz: But when you went to Brazil, how did you feel?

Saki: Brazil is totally different, I think... I don't know for sure but I feel like Brazil is much, much more mixed. Maybe someplace, maybe like Rio, it's kind of different. I feel like when I went to Rio, the majority was White, and they feel privileged about that. I found that. But at least in, I was staying in Brasilia, and that is more mixed. And then when I stayed in Sao Paulo as well, that much more like, they were mixed. And as you said, Japanese is much more the position, which is still respected because of some Japanese immigrant made this position by themselves. So yeah, between these three countries, for me, Brazil is the best. And even compared it with Japan, maybe Brazil was

the best and Japan was third. Yeah, because Japan is also have a similar thing going on. Like Japanese male is dominate society. And even for Japanese women is kind of less respected, so yeah. I kind of feel bad, like I'm the Japanese, like, Asian, and then the women, so I'm the minority of the minority. So everywhere I have to fight with that thing...For me, Japanese society is also kind of hard to get used to.

Saki explains that when she attends any international conference she talks to her Japanese colleagues, who are almost all men. Saki feels most welcome in Brazil because she feels most respected there, not only for her Japanese identity but also because she feels that some cities are more racially mixed. She didn't mention if she thought Brazil was also male-dominated, however.

I asked Saki to give an update about speaking English.

Saki: Speaking English is much more about accent and pronunciation. So yeah. So probably my English is kind of tough, even after three years living here...So it's totally different talking with native speaker and talking with international student, like non-natives. And speaking with non-natives is so much less stress, because we're not really afraid of making the mistakes. Because we're both making the mistakes. We're not perfect at all. So it's much less stress.

Similar to Takahiro in his first year living in the US, Saki feels stress when speaking English, perhaps due to her negative speaking test results. Also they both felt more comfortable speaking to non-native speakers of English.

Finally, I followed up with Saki about her national identity.

Fritz: So we also talked about feeling American versus feeling Japanese and Takahiro said he felt more Asian. And you said that you still felt Japanese, that you hadn't really changed so much. Has that changed at all? Do you feel Asian? Japanese?

Saki: Yeah, I feel like more Japanese rather than Asian. Yeah, but I'm getting much neutral though, because I got more friends, like more Korean and Chinese friends, and other. Yeah, but I also have the, like, really close friends from Brazil and Latin American countries and Europe as well. So my best friend is actually from Chile and from Greece. And these two are like, best, best friend in the US. So yeah, I'm not sure. I'm not sure I have, like Asian, like really strong Asian identity. I feel like it's me (laughs). I don't even know I have Japanese identity as well, that much Japanese identity either. Just because my community is so mixed, and I just feel like I'm just me. Not belong to anything else. ... My Japanese identity is getting less and less (laughs).

Saki positioned her national identity as weakly linked to Japan. However, when she brought up news that she had a new Japanese boyfriend she positioned part of her identity as still Japanese.

Saki: It's funny. I actually have boyfriend right now. And I start dating with Japanese guy. Yeah, I didn't even think about other Asian, actually. So yeah, I guess my core identity is still in Japanese, in that way.

Fritz: You mean you rather prefer to Japanese guy than Chinese, Korean, Thai?

Saki: No. Yeah, actually, sort of.... I think now I feel like I feel comfortable dating only Brazilian guy or Japanese guy. And more confident with staying with Japanese now, because of my experience before (laughs)..

Saki's national identity seems to be influenced by the people who are close to her. When she began dating a Brazilian man, her Asian identity from the previous interview had diminished and she felt closer to Latin American communities. Because she has friends from several nations, she feels less attached to a national identity. And now that she has begun dating a Japanese man, she positioned part of her core identity as Japanese. Even though she may not feel a strong Japanese national identity, it seems to be a key part of her identity.

#### Section 6.4 - Narrative Positioning Analysis & Discussion




Figure 33. Japanese graduate students' time spent abroad and in Japan.

#### Narrative Positioning Analysis of Takahiro

Table 4. Interview highlights regarding Takahiro's national identity positioning.

Interview Number	National Identity Positioning by Takahiro Over Time
1	"I am very much Osaka people. I really identify myself with Osaka area."

(pre-abroad)	
2 (6 months)	“I don’t feel like I’m Japanese but I feel more like I’m Asian.”
3 (1 year)	“I still trying to speak like an American, but I think I’m giving up at some point.”
4 (1.5 years)	“[At] some point I feel like oh maybe I want to be an American, like culturally, you know, because I want to work here and I like, you know, the culture here.”
5 (2 years)	“Lately, I feel more comfortable without thinking about my nationality.”
6 (2.5 years)	“Right now I feel more like I’m a foreigner...it is not, you know, native [born] American.”
7 (3 years)	“If I need to choose one, I might choose the U.S. citizenship.”

First, I will use narrative positioning analysis with Takahiro. In Table 4, highlights of Takahiro’s identity positioning over three years can be found. Takahiro experienced significant changes in his national identity positioning during his time studying and living in the US. As outlined in Chapter 3 of my methodology I ask the following two questions in order to analyze Takahiro’s national identification over time:

1. To what degree does Takahiro distance himself, oppose or reject certain national identities or groups?
2. To what degree does Takahiro identify with, accept, and recognize certain national identities or groups?

To answer the first question, Takahiro soon distances himself from his local/regional “Osaka guy” identity from our first interview after 6 months of living in the US. In Japan, people from the Kansai region frequently use a dialect called Kansai-ben when speaking, linguistically marking them as “not from Tokyo.” However, this regional identity becomes less salient when he is the only Japanese person in his cohort or his department. Thus, by the second interview, he has already distanced himself from his regional Japanese identity. In addition, because he refers to himself as Asian, he further distances himself from Japanese national identity. Yet he distances himself from so-called ‘native born’ Americans because he feels he doesn’t have the right to speak to them if he does not speak ‘American English’ well. In the third interview, in a reversal Takahiro begins to distance himself from his fixation with imitating a stereotypical American accent. After one year of living in the US he is starting to realize that his fixation with accent and pronunciation in English is less important than simply conveying information that is easily understood. This process of distancing away from his so-called “Japanese-Western complex” is a crucial step for Takahiro’s goal to be able to speak confidently to non-Asian Americans. During the fourth interview, after one and a half years living in the US, Takahiro starts to distance himself from his Japanese national identity. He says, “I don’t really empathize

[with] my origin Japanese now,” meaning he has distanced himself significantly away from his Japanese national identity. He starts talking about a possible future as an American citizen and envisions his future children as American citizens as well. When travelling with his wife in a rural southern state, Takahiro feels uncomfortable and actively rejects his foreign identity by trying to seem Asian-American. The logic here is that by appearing American rather than foreign, he may face less discrimination or harm. In the fifth interview, after 2 years living in the US, Takahiro distances himself from national identity categorizations, feeling more comfortable not being reminded that he is a foreigner in order to blend in.

In the sixth interview, after two and a half years living in the US, Takahiro explains that his core Japanese identity has been distanced to the periphery of his self-identity. Being Japanese is now just another “attribute”, not *who he is*. He says, “I don’t really feel proud to be Japanese.” In this interview he expresses a subtractive positioning by framing his national identity as non-native-born American, rather than Japanese. The gap between his imagined American self and his current status as a “foreigner” is conveyed by Takahiro in this interview. During our final interview, Takahiro talks about becoming the ideal immigrant, one who contributes to a meritocratic America that accepts hard-working immigrants. By distancing himself from the negatively stereotyped images of undocumented, lazy, uneducated, low-skilled, and lower-status immigrants, Takahiro positions himself as earning his place in American society by fulfilling his duties. Through his hard work and contributions to American society via his research, Takahiro feels he has the right to become a permanent resident and possibly an American citizen. When I applied for permanent residence in Japan, for example, I was asked to explicitly detail the ways I positively contribute to Japanese society. Therefore, this reasoning seems perfectly sound, taken from the stance of how governments evaluate their immigrant populations for visas, permanent residency and possible citizenship. As a privileged member of society with access to various resources, Takahiro effectively distances himself from “the bad immigrant” image. Finally, Takahiro, after three years living in the US, makes plans to return to the US after he completes his mandated two-year stay in Japan due to the rules outlined by his Fulbright scholarship. When asked if he would choose American or Japanese citizenship, Takahiro said he would reject his Japanese citizenship for the chance to become an American citizen. This is due to his belief that there are more opportunities and a better life for him in the US. After three years living in the US, Takahiro’s positioning of his national identity has profoundly changed, as he has gradually distanced himself more and more from his Japanese national identity. Below I will further summarize how Takahiro has accepted certain identities during his time in the US.

As for the second question, Takahiro soon accepts his Asian identity in the second interview. He accepts the racial categories that he says exist in the US. He accepts being grouped with Chinese, Koreans and other Asians living in the US. Thus, he accepts that being positioned as Asian, rather than Japanese and has adopted this new identity shortly after arriving in the US. He is also recognizing that there are a wide variety of Americans, not just the stereotypical image of the outgoing and friendly American. By the third interview, Takahiro starts to accept his Asian identity more because he feels that he *sounds* Asian when he speaks English. He categorizes racial and ethnic groups based on the way they speak English. I surmise that most people have a stereotypical image of what a Black person or an Asian person or a Latino person sounds like. Takahiro embraces these categories, as he feels he sounds stereotypically Asian in the US. After one year in the US, then, Takahiro begins to accept his Asian identity more, which is linked to

his growing acceptance of the way he speaks English. In his fourth interview, he starts to accept more of an American identity. He says, “maybe I want to be an American, like culturally.” He starts to envision a future living and working in the US and becoming more assimilated and adapted to life in the US. In addition, Takahiro starts to think about the possibility of his future children becoming American citizens. By the fifth interview, Takahiro now discusses how freeing it is not to be positioned as a foreigner all the time because of his Texas drivers’ license, which is indistinguishable from other Texans’ licences.

I completely understand how freeing this might feel. Actually, I am constantly reminded of my non-Japanese identity in Japan because of its laws and bureaucracy. Even though I am a permanent resident who has lived in Japan for the past 15 years, I have to carry my foreign residence ID card with me at all times, which is a different ID card than Japanese citizens carry. Even just taking a walk two blocks to the park, I constantly have to remember to bring my wallet and foreign ID card, something that is not required for Japanese citizens. If I were a naturalized Japanese citizen, I could go for a run and not worry about carrying my ID card in case the police want to stop me. I have been stopped by the police, in fact, 4 times in my 15 years living in Japan. One time I was sitting in the airport reading, another time I was walking in the subway station calmly, and two other times I was slowly bicycling on a bicycle path. I was just existing normally. However, each time the police stopped me and checked my foreign residence card, they wrote all my information on their clipboards and made sure I had a valid visa and valid bicycle registration. Being constantly reminded and positioned by others that you are a foreigner, even if you are a permanent resident, can be taxing. The fact that Takahiro is able to operate in his daily life without constant reminders that he is Japanese allows him the freedom to not have to negotiate his national identity constantly. By blending in, and not having to produce his Japanese passport when he buys a bottle of wine, for example, he can feel more like an everyday American.

In the sixth interview with Saki, Takahiro discusses his growing acceptance of his Americanization. This is due to shedding his previous fixations on idealized mainstream American culture, and his growing acceptance of immigrant cultures in the US. He says, “I think I am becoming more Asian in America than being Japanese.” He is also more and more contemplating a future as an American citizen. He identifies as a foreigner because he feels this gap between his possible future as a permanent resident or American citizen and his current status as a temporary Japanese immigrant. His visa status is keenly felt after 2.5 years living in the US. In the final interview, he further discusses his visa troubles. Although he would have preferred to keep living and working in the US, he will have to return to Japan for two years due to regulations set forth by his Fulbright scholarship. His plans for having children in the US are also in doubt because of the same visa rules. Although he wants to be able to accept a new group identity, as an Asian-American, immigration issues are making this process more difficult. In the future, however, he would rather position himself as an American citizen than a Japanese citizen.

Renouncing one’s citizenship is perhaps the ultimate kind of acceptance of one group over another. Takahiro’s three year journey as a graduate student living in the U.S. has shown that national identity can change over time, despite governmental laws or status of one’s visa. An imagined national identity, i.e. envisioning a future living as a citizen of a certain country, is a

real phenomenon as evidenced in Takahiro’s journey. Positioning one’s own national identity, in this case Japanese, from part of one’s core identity to the periphery is a phenomenon that Takahiro has experienced over time. Complex processes, including Takahiro’s own acceptance of his immigrant identity and his English language accent and proficiency, helped Takahiro to embrace his Asian identity in the U.S. Similar to the results in the study by GÜNGÖR et al. (2013), the more the Takahiro endorsed American culture, the lower his cultural fit was with his Japanese mainland counterparts.

### Narrative Positioning Analysis of Saki

Table 5. Interview highlights regarding Saki’s national identity positioning.

Interview Number	National Identity Positioning by Saki Over Time
1 (pre-abroad)	“I just accustomed to the Western thinking so that why I couldn’t fit with the traditional Japanese way of thinking after coming back to Japan, I think.”
2 (6 months)	“As Asian, I’m not feeling like I am discriminated from society or something...” “...but if people say like China, in China or Chinese, I’m like, ‘Noooo, I’m not Chinese!’. I’m so stressed by this.”
3 (1 year)	“In the U.S. there is not, Japan is not that famous so people doesn’t really distinguish (laughs)...So yeah, it’s kind of stressful. But yeah, that fine, like, still I like Brazil than the United States to be honest but this is U.S. so yeah.”
4 (1.5 years)	“But when I went back to Japan I was talking with my Japanese friends, and at that time I was like, okay, I’m kind of Americanized a little bit, compared with like traditional Japanese thinking, way of thinking.” “Yeah, probably I’m much more feeling like Japanese, But also Asian.”
5 (2 years)	“I’m more interested in making the connection with Latin Americans, not Americans.” “Like with Japanese is kind of different, but like Korean or Chinese I don’t feel like staying with them is so comfortable. But I feel really comfortable staying with Latinos (laughs).”
6 (2.5 years)	“I don’t feel like I’m Americanized at all to be honest, but I’m not Japanese at all either.”
7 (3 years)	“But I was like, okay, [if] I stay in this country, I’m not like fully respected in my career, but only [based] on the English level.” “I can’t be proud of myself as Japanese living in this [American] society.”

Moving on to Saki’s narrative positioning analysis, we see that her journey is very different from Takahiro’s. In Table 5, highlights from interviews with Saki over three years show her attempting to negotiate various national and regional identities, namely American, Asian,

Japanese, Brazilian, and Latin American. I will analyze the narrative texts using the following two questions to guide my analysis:

1. To what degree does Saki distance herself, oppose or reject certain national identities or groups?
2. To what degree does Saki identify with, accept, and recognize certain national identities or groups?

In our first interview Saki distanced herself from what she called traditional Japanese thinking, referring to a conformist culture. She was able to realize this while she was reintegrating into Japanese society after returning from one year abroad in Australia during high school. In addition, Saki said she wasn't able to enter the White community in Australia, so she may have felt rejected by mainstream society in Australia. She also spent one year in Brazil prior to embarking on her journey to the US. There she distanced herself from certain Brazilians, making a clear distinction between Nikkei Brazilians, who Saki says are positively influenced by Japanese culture to be diligent, and non Nikkei Brazilians, who she characterizes as easy going but rude. During a conference in the US, Saki realized that Japanese professors did not provide enough constructive criticism and somewhat distanced herself from Japanese academic life. Even before moving to the US, Saki predicted that her life would be difficult there due to racial tensions, already distancing herself from her future life in the US. In this interview, Saki seemed to distance herself in certain ways from Australia, Brazil, and the US.

In the second interview, Saki positions herself with the other Asians in her program, and then distances this group away from the Europeans and Latin Americans, due to the lack of participation and struggles with the English language. She rejects certain aspects of Japanese education, namely the tendency to focus on avoiding mistakes, which she calls "stupid." Saki also distances herself from her academic career in Japan, saying she was "stuck," similar to Takahiro before he decided to go to the US. Saki received a low score on her speaking test, something she needs to pass to become a TA, and felt hesitant to speak up in class. She distanced herself from her classmates so as not to burden them by potentially slowing down the course. Although her opinions, experience and intellect could be important contributions to in-class discussions, she feels limited by her English communication skills. Though Saki mentions that she is part of a group of Asians going through similar difficulties, she feels stressed when people position her as Chinese or Korean. People are distancing her from her own Japanese national identity, which makes her feel uncomfortable. As an Asian, Saki also feels some distance from other Americans in the climate of the Trump Administration.

In the third interview, Saki further distanced herself from Japanese academia after she participated in a conference in Japan where she found the Japanese researchers' presentations disappointing. Saki is still feeling stressed about being positioned as Korean or Chinese, especially after a month-long visit to Brazil where she enjoyed a higher status as a Japanese national. Saki again brought up that it will be difficult for Asians to live in the US, due to ongoing racial tensions during the Trump era, positioning herself as being distanced by Americans in the White supremacy movement. In the fourth interview, I followed up with Saki about her feelings about racial issues in the US, but she replied that she had been so busy with her studies that she hadn't really actively participated in American life or society. Whether by

choice or circumstance, Saki had distanced herself from American society to remain focused on her studies. She said that she wasn't enjoying her life in the US after a year and a half living there. Saki again distanced herself from traditional Japanese thinking in the fourth interview. She indicated that she rejected environments, like many Japanese workplaces, that lacked creativity and individual expression, or *honne*. Even though Saki embraces Brazilian culture, especially Nikkei Brazilian culture, she doesn't feel Brazilianized or have a Brazilian identity. This is possibly due to her low Brazilian Portuguese proficiency, at least compared to English. Finally, Saki distances herself from American culture by grouping herself with other Asians struggling to speak English. Both Brazilian Portuguese and English seem to act as barriers to forming a closer national identity with Brazil and the US, respectively.

In the fifth interview, Saki seemed to make a pivot away from trying to integrate into US culture and society, which coincided with her new relationship with a Brazilian political scientist. In the sixth interview, Saki further distances herself from the Asian community by saying that she is not very comfortable speaking with Chinese or Koreans. She also distances herself from both American and Japanese national identities. She feels distanced from the "American community," in general. Saki says that she cannot be proud of herself living in the US, although she may want to work there in the future. Because of her field of research, Saki thinks it is better to physically distance herself from Japan, a place she doesn't think is the best research environment for Latin American politics. If this means living in the US, even though she doesn't feel connected to society, she appears willing to make this sacrifice. Her choice to be mobile and distance herself from Japan seems more connected with job and research opportunities, rather than any connection to US society and culture. This is partly in contrast to Takahiro, who also wants to distance himself physically from Japan not only for job and research opportunities, but because of his interest and preference for American society and culture.

In the final interview, Saki says she feels more distant from American society since the previous interview. One reason for this is her continued struggle with passing the English speaking exam so she can become a TA at her university. She felt that she was being positioned and judged as less intelligent and less capable than she feels she really is, just because of a speaking test. She needs this experience for her future post-doctoral fellowship and future job. Saki seems disillusioned with the process and has few chances left to become a TA. She enrolls in the same English speaking course she had already taken but seems to distance herself from her PhD program after two of her advisors left for other universities. When asked if she regretted her decision to come to the US, she says that she only regrets her choice of universities, but not coming to the US. Still, she said that she would not be able to live in the US indefinitely due to how stressed she felt living there. She said that her Japanese identity was diminishing over time, but that she was seeing a new Japanese man, which she said was evidence that at least part of her core identity remained Japanese. Yet, she said that she had distanced herself from her Japanese identity before she even arrived in the US. Finally, Saki explains more reasons why she wants to distance herself from Japan and Japanese society, which is due to her perception that Japan is a male-dominated society. Within her own field of study, there are mostly Japanese males who are professors and researchers. She feels like a minority not only in the US, but also in Japan and around the world for being a Japanese woman academic, a demographic that is rarely represented at the international conferences she attends.

Now I will move on to answer the second question: to what degree does Saki identify with, accept, and recognize certain national identities or groups? Saki embraced the individualism and the so-called “Western thinking” she experienced in Australia as a high school student. She associated herself with Western ideals, but did not identify as Western or Australian. She also lived in Brazil and embraced the positive qualities of Japanese culture that she found in Nikkei Brazilians. Saki felt welcomed and comfortable for two main reasons. The first reason was that she was recognized as Japanese, because the Japanese have an elevated status and are generally respected in Brazil, according to Saki and also according to the Nikkei participants in this study. The second reason was that Saki was able to speak Japanese with some Nikkei Brazilians and it was easier to adjust to this community given their close cultural ties with Japan. Thus, before going to the US, Saki already displayed an affinity for the Nikkei Brazilian culture.

In our second interview, six months after arriving in the US, Saki expressed, perhaps, her most positive remarks regarding her stay in the US in all of our interviews. She felt that the transition to life in the US was easy at that point, that the people were kind, and that, because of her English level, she was adjusting well. In her previous two experiences living abroad, her English level was very low when she went to Australia and her Brazilian Portuguese level was similarly low when she went to live in Brazil. Compared to those two experiences abroad, Saki was doing much better than she previously did while starting out in a new country. Her classes were also easier since she had covered most of the material at her Japanese university. In this interview she identifies with the other Asians in her class. Due to cultural styles of learning, Saki said, Asians were more used to listening to the teacher, rather than critiquing and leading discussions. This cultural difference in learning styles led Saki to identify with the other Asians in her course. Saki also identifies as Asian when speaking about discrimination in the US. Saki doesn’t talk about being discriminated against for being Japanese, but rather for being Asian. This is due to what Saki feels is low knowledge about Japan and Japanese culture in the US in general. Compared to Brazil, where she is positioned as Japanese, Saki begrudgingly recognizes that in the US she is positioned as Asian first, or even worse for her, as Chinese or Korean. Her identification as Asian has less to do with acceptance of this identity and more to do with recognizing the reality of her situation in the US.

In the third interview Saki further cemented her beliefs in the American way of doing political science and her preference for the academic environment in the US. However, compared to Brazil, where she traveled to for one month over the summer, Saki was finding the US less hospitable. She further displayed her affinity for Nikkei culture in Brazil because of their links to Japanese culture, “even [though] they are not really purely, pure Japanese, but Brazilian Japanese.” She felt more accepted in Brazil, where she was recognized as Japanese and positioned as a respected member of the community. In addition, she felt that there were fewer problems of racism against Asians in Brazil compared with the US. Saki mentioned that the country in which she would reside in the future might depend on her future partner, and their nationality. She discussed the possibility of having to choose a country not based on her own agency and desires, but those of a future partner.

By the fourth interview, Saki had made more Japanese friends than American friends in the US. However, when she returned to Japan and spoke to her friends, it was the first and only time in our three years of interviews that Saki said she felt somewhat Americanized. She felt she was

more able to express her opinion, similar to what my kikokushijo participants said about honne (being forthright and direct) and tatemae (hiding your true feelings). Saki preferred the American style of communication over the Japanese style and thus felt more Americanized, suggesting a linguistic component to national identity. When asked about her national identity, though, she positioned herself as Japanese and Asian. In previous interviews, Saki felt stressed about being positioned as Chinese and not Japanese. Due to her interacting with more Asians at her university, however, she felt more accepting of being positioned as Asian, or not being recognized as Japanese. She also cited English language struggles as one reason she felt more “sympathy” and solidarity with other Asians. For Saki, language proficiency is a big factor in how she identifies with one group or another. For example, she said she didn’t feel a strong Brazilian identity because her Brazilian Portuguese level was low. The fourth interview, however, would be the last time that Saki identified with and connected herself to Asians.

In the fifth interview, after two years living in the US, Saki establishes a new relationship with a Brazilian political scientist and pivots toward the Latin American community. She says she feels more comfortable speaking with the Latin American community. Before this interview, she talked about her preference for the Nikkei community in Brazil, but now Saki was talking about being more connected to people from several countries. Given the focus of her studies was on Latin American politics, perhaps this was already the case, but Saki had not mentioned this in prior interviews. However, her pivot to the Latin American community seems to be recent because she said, “And also I realized that I’m studying about Latin America, so, you know, um, I’m more interested in making the connection with Latin Americans, not Americans.” After this realization, Saki would not feel connected to American society or the Asian community again in our following interviews.

In the sixth interview, during the discussion with Takahiro, Saki further identifies with the Latin American community. She says that her national identity hasn’t changed at all since coming to the US. According to our conversations, however, Saki has fluctuated from her acceptance of Western thinking and rejection of traditional Japanese thinking, to somewhat Americanized, to Asian, and now to identifying more with the Latin American community. She also said, “I don’t feel like I was like 100% Japanese even before coming here [to the US].” Saki’s previous experiences living abroad made her feel less connected to her Japanese identity, and since starting her PhD program she has realized that she feels the most comfortable with people from the Latin American community. This is especially the case with the Nikkei Brazilian community in Brazil, since she is recognized as Japanese, enjoys a respected status within the community, and easily navigates her way in this community due to its links with Japanese culture. Interestingly, however, Saki still accepts American ways of thinking and embraces the image of America as an individualistic and meritocratic society.

In our final interview, after three years living in the US, Saki still embraces her choice to live in the US, despite her English language difficulties and issues with her PhD program. She recognizes the US as the best country in which to learn political science. Yet Saki doesn’t see a future for herself in the US. She still maintains a strong preference for Brazil. “So yeah, between these three countries, for me, Brazil is the best. And even compared it with Japan, maybe Brazil was the best and Japan was third.” Again, due to her enjoying an elevated status, being accepted in the Nikkei Brazilian community, and her research focus on this region in the world, Saki is

drawn to Brazil. She cites the male-dominated Japanese society as one reason that is repelling her away from Japan and toward Brazil or Europe. Racism in the US and her struggles with being judged harshly on how she speaks English is making Saki feel stressed and feeling like she cannot continue living in the US. Like the students mentioned in Brown's (2008) study, Saki's stress was prevalent during all our interviews. This stress was due to the pressures of her PhD program, but also due to her struggles with the English language and her lack of connection with American society. In our final interview she said, "I don't even know I have Japanese identity as well, that much Japanese identity either." However, she starts a relationship with a Japanese man and still feels like a part of her core identity is Japanese.

Saki's national identity over time is highly nuanced and makes subtle, yet significant shifts over the three years of our interviews. Her national identity seems to be influenced by three main factors: language proficiency, the level of acceptance and degree of respect shown by others, and the people Saki associates with closely. In contrast to Takahiro, whose affection for the U.S. grew stronger over time, Saki's acceptance of her life in the US decreased significantly after the two-year mark. Similar to the women in the Higgins (2011) study, Saki seemed neither connected to her host or home countries and also wanted to become mobile in the future, after she finishes her doctoral studies. Barriers, such as feeling accepted in American society, being judged harshly on her English language performance, and her affinity for Latin American cultures proved to be too high to overcome in order to connect with American society and be more Americanized. Saki herself admitted that she made little effort to integrate, at first due to lack of time, and later due to language problems and issues with her PhD program. As indicated in the study by Güngör et al. (2013), the Japanese immigrants who did not acculturate and participated less in mainstream American society were less likely to be similar to Americans. Her relationship and acceptance of her Japanese identity, however, was complex. On the one hand, she enjoyed her elevated status as a Japanese national in Brazil, and praised the stereotypically positive attributes of Nikkei Brazilians, like their diligence and good jobs. On the other hand, Saki distanced herself in almost every interview from Japanese education, Japanese traditional culture, Japanese ways of thinking, Japan's male-dominated environment, and even from Japanese society itself. She didn't want to return to Japan for these reasons, in addition to feeling like Japan would not be the appropriate country to conduct her research on Latin American politics. Although Saki felt like part of her identity was Japanese, it was diminishing over time.

## Chapter 7 - Discussion & Conclusions

### 7.0. Introduction

Japanese national identity is *prima facie* a straightforward concept: either you are Japanese or you are not. However, as we have seen with my three groups of participants, the distancing from and accepting of Japanese national identity is much more complicated and varied than what official records declare. Just because a piece of paper pronounces someone a citizen of Japan does not necessarily mean that every citizen views themselves as 100% Japanese or even as a Japanese at all. My research focuses on how transnational mobility and language use affects how Nikkei Brazilians, kikokushijo, and Japanese graduate students studying abroad view their Japanese national identities. In this chapter I will discuss the results of my research analyses concerning all 20 of my participants. By examining different groups of individuals with various connections to Japan and Japanese culture and heritage, and differing levels of Japanese language proficiency, I can cultivate a deeper understanding of how Japanese national identity is expressed in transnational contexts.

First, I will review my participants' Japanese national identity positions with regard to their rights and duties. Then, I will offer my conclusions based on my narrative positioning analysis in the previous three chapters. These conclusions will provide answers to my initial research questions outlined in Chapter 1. Finally, I will outline the limitations of this research project as well as suggest possible future research studies.

### 7.1 Rights & duties

Rather than positioning themselves in binary language - I am Japanese or I am not Japanese - many of my participants positioned themselves as somewhere in between, creating a sort of national identity spectrum. Some participants recognized their Japanese identities but did not feel particularly attached to them, and some embraced and felt pride in their Japanese identities, while others rejected their Japanese identities. Positioning oneself as feeling more Japanese or less Japanese, regardless of official status, can signal a rejection of, an embrace of, or an acquiescence to fulfilling the duties of 'being Japanese'. Japanese cultural norms, while not expressly written as duties, can be conceived of as forms of societal obligations for most Japanese people. For example, the practice of using polite forms of Japanese called *keigo* (敬語), which includes *teineigo* (丁寧語) or polite language, *kenjougo* (謙讓語) or humble language, and *sonkeigo* (尊敬語) or honorific language, is usually expected when talking to *senpais* (seniors), customers, and those who are not members of your company or inner circle of friends and family. Some of my *kikokushijo* participants, for example, experienced difficulties accepting their *kohai* (junior) duties when it made little sense to them. Some acquiesced to conforming to this *kohai* role, but did not accept the underlying rationale for this type of hierarchical structure, which led to a distancing from their Japanese national identities, both physically by wanting to leave Japan itself and emotionally by not feeling comfortable following Japanese norms and customs. If a position is "a cluster or a group of rights and duties" and if "it is through positioning that those rights, duties, and obligations are distributed in conversation" then some of my participants have created nuanced positions of their Japanese identities (Kayl-Aydar, 2019, p.

31). By accepting and successfully fulfilling his kohai obligations, for example, Takashi leveraged his skilled execution of his kohai duties in exchange for access to elite Japanese companies where he could eventually make a good salary and live abroad. Thus, he positioned himself as Japanese strategically, even though he actually felt like he didn't belong to any nation in particular. What duties of being Japanese, then does each group of my participants share and do these lead to a stronger Japanese national identity? Equally, what rights are afforded to each group and do more rights translate to an increased sense of Japanese national identity?

I believe that my Nikkei participants did have some duties to adhere to when they were in Japan and even when they were in Brazil, but to varying degrees. Sofia and Daiki from a young age were expected to learn Japanese and maintain Japanese cultural and familial connections while living in Brazil. In contrast, Bruno and Marcos did not learn Japanese when they were children growing up in Brazil. Once in Japan, Marcos felt that it was his duty and the duty of other Nikkei in Japan, to learn Japanese. Bruno, on the other hand, eschewed this linguistic duty while living in Japan and concentrated on English, something more useful for his future. After he returned to Brazil, he eventually opened up his own business teaching English and said he was successful in that venture. Similarly, Sofia switched from Japanese to English learning and eventually started her graduate studies in Europe. Thus, Sofia and Bruno rejected their Japanese language learning “duties” and opted for learning English instead. Daiki, who also spoke English, though to a lesser extent, positioned himself as a Japanese language and cultural ambassador in Brazil, successfully fulfilling his duties of being Japanese. Yet, even embracing these duties of being Japanese, i.e. speaking Japanese language and learning about Japanese culture, both Daiki and Marcos expressed their pride in being Brazilian. The three non-Japanese Nikkei Brazilians did not have the same rights that are afforded to Japanese nationals. Even so, Sofia was able to travel to Japan on scholarship as a Nikkei and Bruno was able to live in Japan due to his Nikkei status, a right afforded to him through changes in Japanese immigration law. These connections to Japan, made possible by the Japanese government, were not enough to establish strong Japanese identities in either Sofia or Bruno. It is not clear that the JICA program or the immigration law's purpose, however, was to foster Japanese identity. Nevertheless, in these individuals, an increased sense of Japanese national identity was not the outcome. Even being a Japanese national, however, did not compel Daiki to choose his Japanese citizenship over his Brazilian citizenship. Giving up his rights as a Brazilian citizen would have been too much of a sacrifice for Daiki, who had built his life in Brazil with his family. The fact that Marcos did not pursue Japanese naturalization, a right afforded to him in Japan due to his long-term residence, and instead wished to return to Brazil, indicated his strong Brazilian identity. My four Nikkei Brazilian participants, therefore, presented four different scenarios with similar outcomes, that their Brazilian identities remained strong despite the various rights afforded to them by the Japanese government.

Regarding the kikokushijo group, all of whom were Japanese nationals, some fulfilled their societal obligations as a means to an end, others embraced these duties, and yet others rejected them completely. *Tatemae*, or indirect style of communication, is usually expected in Japanese society in certain situations. Using *honne*, or direct style of communication, in some work environments, for example, may be seen as uncouth in Japan. Ayako, for example, expressed a preference for *tatemae*, while Kayoko expressed a preference for *honne*. Although Kayoko said some of her classmates characterized her language as “mean”, she indicated that her *honne* style of communication was part of her identity while also acknowledging her Japanese identity. They

were not mutually exclusive. Ayako, meanwhile, acknowledged that she was “different from regular Japanese people” but yet wanted to remain living in Japan and embraced Japanese customs and norms. Embracing or rejecting certain Japanese duties, then, did not necessarily translate to embracing or rejecting Japanese national identity. Several other factors were involved, including Japanese language use. Many kikokushijo had difficulties assimilating back into Japanese culture, for example, after long absences with little Japanese language study. Gen and Yoko both struggled with Japanese upon return to Japan and both did not have strong Japanese national identities. The privileges of being a kaigaishijo and kikokushijo, on the other hand, like being able to take special entrance exams or attend schools abroad that offer access to Japan’s elite universities, seemed to be a motivating factor for many participants to use their Japanese national identity strategically. Both Takashi and Haruka, for example, gained access to a prestigious Japanese university via a Japanese high school in the US. They both wanted to use their elite university status to gain employment with a prestigious Japanese company so they could work abroad. Working within the Japanese system to distance themselves from Japan shows that strategic use of Japanese identity, Japanese language and Japanese cultural knowledge, combined with their English language skills and non-Japanese cultural knowledge can result in professional gain, but not an increased sense of Japanese national identity.

With regard to the two Japanese graduate students studying abroad, the duties of being Japanese in Japanese society suddenly became mostly moot once they arrived in the US. There were new duties to fulfill and principally among them was mastering the English language in order to excel in their graduate programs. Takahiro struggled internally with attaining his ideal of native-like pronunciation while Saki also struggled to be cleared to student teach after her university’s negative evaluation of her English pronunciation. However, there were benefits to their decision to study abroad. They gained access to elite institutions abroad and used, or wanted to use, this experience as a way to further their careers abroad. After our interviews, Saki, for example, finished her PhD and moved to Europe to do post-doctoral research. Takahiro wanted to continue living in the US after his post Fulbright obligation to live in Japan was finished. Thus, even though they each had limited rights as Japanese citizens on student visas to live in the US, they each devised strategies to maintain their presence abroad.

More than looking at just rights and duties, my narrative positioning analysis in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, however, delved deeper into how my participants distanced themselves away from and recognized and accepted their Japanese national identities. This analysis, coupled with my literature review, has led to the following conclusions in the next section.

## **7.2. Conclusions - Answering my research questions**

1. How does language learning and language use affect my participants’ Japanese national identity?

In the Nikkei Brazilian group, fluency in Japanese language was not enough for any member to identify as Japanese. Despite Marcos’s several decades of living in Japan and his Japanese fluency, he identified as Brazilian and indicated that he wanted to return to Brazil in the future. Daiki, who held Japanese citizenship from his Japanese father, taught Japanese at his kaikan, or local community center for Nikkei Brazilians, and said that his personality was mostly Japanese.

Nevertheless, Daiki indicated he wanted to remain Brazilian and was proud of his Brazilian identity. Embracing his Nikkei Brazilian identity, with his mother being Nikkei Brazilian, Daiki was able to continue going to the kaikan, which he loved, and interacting with other Nikkei Brazilians while teaching Japanese language and culture. If he were to move to Japan, he would most likely enroll in a Japanese university and lose his status in Brazil as a cultural ambassador, lose the connections he has built at the Nikkei community center, and fray his immediate family connections. Thus, Daiki has chosen to stay in Brazil. Although Sofia had learned Japanese as a child and was surrounded by Japanese culture at her kaikan on the weekends, she started to change when she enrolled in the Brazilian schooling system. She found out that she had a Brazilian name and realized that she was different from the others. Although she tried learning Japanese for one more year, she decided to quit learning Japanese to the disappointment of her parents. Bruno, the only one of my participants who was mestiço or of mixed ethnicity, had the lowest level of Japanese proficiency and the least amount of connections to Japanese culture. Bruno's identity was firmly Brazilian, although he appreciated learning more about Japan and Japanese culture. English language proficiency seemed to be a part of Sofia's and Bruno's professional identities more than their national identities. Sofia enjoyed learning English and eventually used her skills to be able to study in English at a university in Europe. Bruno, the most advanced English speaker of my participants, parlayed his English language skills into a successful business in Brazil. English was not a large part of Daiki's life, who had intermediate level English and was studying English as a university student. Marcos, who had the lowest proficiency, did not need English to run his language school in Japan since he catered to Nikkei Brazilians and interacted with Japanese people to run his business. Thus, the higher the Japanese language proficiency the more connected my participants felt to Japan and Japanese culture, but their Brazilian identity remained strong nonetheless. Higher English language proficiency resulted in professional gains for some, but not a change in national identity.

Although Marcos called for more Nikkei Brazilians to learn Japanese, lack of support from the government, as noted in Chapter 2, has resulted in many Nikkei children not attending primary and secondary schools while living in Japan. The Japanese government should increase its efforts to help Nikkei children attend schools with language support. It should also provide free Japanese language programs for Nikkei workers, who may end up lengthening their stays in Japan, as Marcos did, or return to work in Japan with increased Japanese proficiency, as Nishida (2018) noted with some of her Japanese-speaking participants. With each generation of Nikkei decreasing in their Japanese proficiency and having fewer cultural ties to Japan, as evidenced in McKenzie and Salcedo's (2009) survey of Nikkei-jin in Brazil, it would behoove the Japanese government to make more efforts to help younger generations learn Japanese in order to increase numbers of Nikkei immigrants to Japan. Although the Japanese government's new plans to allow entry to Yoneis, or fourth generation Japanese, requires proof of some mastery of Japanese language, there are no indications that the government is helping Yoneis learn Japanese. In addition, if Yoneis are granted entry into Japan and wish to stay for longer than one year, as noted in Chapter 2, they need to obtain higher Japanese language proficiency. The longer they stay the higher the proficiency they need. The government, however, does not detail any support for Japanese language services to Yoneis. They only require that Yoneis have a dedicated sponsor in Japan to accept them. Thus, if Japan wants to increase its economic competitiveness by encouraging Japanese descendants to come and work in Japan, they will need to provide more Japanese language training.

With regard to the kikokushijo group, my participants had varying levels of Japanese and English proficiency over time, both abroad and in Japan. Haruka disliked hoshūko as a child, resisted learning Japanese language in the US and was hesitant and critical of Japanese culture and customs while living in Japan. These factors may have contributed to Haruka not identifying as Japanese. For Gen and Yoko, one factor that may have contributed to a reduction of Japanese national identity is the lack of Japanese language learning during childhood. Gen regretted not studying Japanese while living in the US, but said he wanted to leave Japan and wasn't interested in Japanese culture. Yoko questioned her Japanese identity and was still struggling with catching up with her Japanese language skills at the time of our interview. Of the kikokushijos who maintained their Japanese language skills the most while abroad, like Rina and Yutaro, there was less Japanese identity confusion. Although Yutaro "felt pretty American" in the US, his continued hoshūko attendance allowed for a relatively easy transition when he returned to Japan after 7 years. Rina, in contrast, felt more Japanese in the US and enjoyed her hoshūko lessons, but only acknowledged her American identity once she returned to Japan. Rina still maintained her core Japanese identity and only wanted to pursue English strategically to benefit her future career. Takashi, perhaps one of the most fluent English speakers of all my kikokushijo participants, was able to "act" Japanese. He seemed to be able to separate his ability to perform Japanese duties and speak Japanese well from his Japanese identity. Takashi spent most of his life living abroad - 18 years - and thus had much fewer total Japanese language interactions than all of the other participants. Takashi said he felt like he was nationless, or American if pushed to identity with one country since he had spent half his life there. Kana, even when speaking English, felt more Japanese and said that her Japanese language abilities were better because they were more proper than most non-kikokushijos' Japanese language use. Kana read Japanese books extensively while living abroad, which she attributed to her advanced Japanese language skills. Other kikokushijo had lived in Japan for several years at the time of our interviews, and their Japanese language ability and the transition to Japanese culture and society were no longer issues. From this analysis, it appears that the lack of time spent learning Japanese while abroad plus the lack of time spent in Japanese institutions of learning in Japan did affect how kikokushijo positioned their Japanese national identities. In general, the more kikokushijo spent learning Japanese language, and speaking and learning in Japanese, the more they seemed to connect and be closer to their Japanese national identities. Thus, the Japanese government's investments into hoshūko, or Japanese schools abroad, seem appropriate in light of their economic goals for the country. The strategy of encouraging bilingual Japanese citizens to promote economic growth for Japan, at least among most of my kikokushijo participants, seems to be working well.

English language learning and use, on the other hand, seemed to be less of a factor in how kikokushijo positioned their Japanese national identities. Still, English language learning and usage seemed to be part of their kikokushijo identities, rather than Japanese identities. Being a kikokushijo with fluent English and having lived abroad for 5 or more years, as all of my participants were and did, seemed to set them apart from other kikokushijo who were not fluent in English and only spent one or two years living abroad. They were the elite kikokushijo, the ones that lived up to the stereotypes of being bicultural and bilingual. High English proficiency was very much a part of their kikokushijo identities. Several kikokushijos commented on how they were different from other kikokushijos and even from other Japanese people, i.e. more

special. English was key to many kikokushijos' futures, both abroad and inside Japan, whether through teaching English as a career or leveraging their English language skills to be able to work for elite companies abroad. English language ability was also important for some kikokushijos who entered university via the special kikokushijo university entrance exam or via special schools abroad designed to allow kikokushijos to enter prestigious universities. Thus, fluency in the English language was a way for Japanese kikokushijos to advance in Japan within Japanese systems, even if those systems were outside of Japan.

The two Japanese graduate students who studied abroad in the US had a more complicated relationship with English language and national identity during the three years I interviewed them. Takahiro slowly distanced himself away from his Japanese national identity over time. As he improved his English language proficiency and gained more confidence in being Asian in America, he felt less connected to his Japanese national identity. He said that he would reject his Japanese citizenship for the chance to become an American citizen. Although he spoke Japanese with his wife at home once she moved to the US, Takahiro felt comfortable establishing a career in the US so that he could concentrate his research on the American electoral system. Speaking English was key to his future success in this research area. The effect of English language learning and use, while in the US, on Takahiro's national identity seemed to be significant. As for Saki, early on she expressed her preference for the American style of communication, *honne*, and American education system over the Japanese style of communication, *tatemae*, and Japanese education system, suggesting some linguistic component to her identity. However, Saki eventually grew disillusioned with her doctoral program, the location of her university, and the evaluation system of her university. In contrast to Takahiro, who overcame his struggles with confidence and pronunciation when speaking English, Saki's inability to start her student teaching due to negative evaluations of her English speaking abilities seemed to alienate Saki from the US. In addition, the focus of her research was on Latin American politics and so she was not tied to the US like Takahiro was. Despite Portuguese being her least proficient language, Saki felt more comfortable in Latino communities in the US and when staying in Brazil. Thus, even if Saki had received better English speaking evaluations or even had she chosen a different doctoral program in a more urban area, she still may have not developed a North American identity. Her interests lay in South America, and the English language was a way for her to professionally navigate her elite status as an international researcher. Takahiro loved American culture before going to the US and wanted to concentrate his career and research in the US. Saki, on the other hand, strategically completed her graduate program in the US, while publishing her research in English, in order to be able to conduct research abroad with these elite credentials. In Saki's case, then, English language learning and use contributed more to changes in her professional identity than her national identity.

## 2. How does transnational mobility affect my participants' Japanese national identity?

Japan's immigration law changes regarding the Nikkei community, outlined in Chapter 2, allowed for a kind of ethnic identity experiment. Would Nikkei-jin, many of whom had never been to Japan or spoke Japanese, be able to prosper in Japan whilst relieving worker shortages in crucial areas of the economy, like manufacturing? Hundreds of thousands of Nikkei Brazilians would eventually answer the call from Japan to 'return' to their supposed homeland. Most Nikkei Brazilians, like Bruno, came to Japan and eventually left after having saved or remitted

enough money to restart their lives back in Brazil. Some, like Marcos, stayed for decades. Others came to Japan on short-term stays, like Daiki and Sofia, via government sponsored scholarships. The Japanese government, hoping to foster next-generation Nikkei leaders in Brazil with connections to Japan, invested in this type of transnational mobility. With Daiki, in particular, these efforts seemed to be successful, given his leadership as a cultural ambassador in his Nikkei community in Brazil. How did these programs and laws, however, affect my participants' positioning of their Japanese national identities? First of all, it is clear that the Japanese government did not want all of the Nikkei immigrants to stay in Japan indefinitely, as was evidenced in Chapter 2 with the Japanese government offering to pay for Nikkei to return to their countries. Japanese naturalization laws were also a major barrier to the Nikkei community. Some nations, like Spain with its law allowing those with Sephardic Jewish ancestry as far back as the 15th century to apply for citizenship, welcome those with proven ancestry and heritage to apply for citizenship. Japan, on the other hand, required proof of ancestry for a visa only, and did not open up pathways to citizenship for Nikkei-jin. According to Japanese law, any adult Brazilian citizen would need to renounce their citizenship in order to become officially Japanese. Perhaps my Nikkei participants would have positioned themselves as Japanese had they been afforded the opportunity to become dual citizens. However, due to the structure of immigration and citizenship laws in Japan, at least in part, all of my participants identified as Brazilian and none wanted to remain in Japan indefinitely. More welcoming immigration and naturalization laws, in my opinion, would help Japan retain more workers with more rights, like voting and welfare rights, and help foster a stronger sense of Japanese national identity among the Nikkei community.

Most of my kikokushijo participants, some living in several different countries as children, did not change their core Japanese national identities due to their transnational mobility. Five participants, Haruka, Gen, Yoko, Ayumi, and Takashi, questioned and distanced themselves from their Japanese national identities. However, all except Gen used their Japanese national identities strategically to be able to make professional gains. As kikokushijo with advanced English skills and cultural knowledge due to their transnational mobility, they realized that they would be able to gain much more within Japanese systems than cutting ties and starting anew abroad, as Gen wanted to do. Like Shao-Kobayashi's (2019) research of Japanese high school students abroad, most returned to Japan because they, and their parents, realized that their skills were much more valued in Japan. The rest of my kikokushijo participants, nine in total, mostly recognized and accepted their Japanese national identities. Their transnational mobility created new identities like being a kikokushijo, and enhanced their outlooks and life trajectories, but this mobility did not change their Japanese national identities. In Chapter 2 I outlined the myriad ways the Japanese government tried to instill patriotism in its schools, via singing of the national anthem and through nationalistic children's textbooks like *Kokokro no noto*. It is unclear to what degree the Japanese formal education system affected my participants' Japanese national identities. Other factors, such as length of time abroad, developmental age when abroad, and the number of years living in Japan since returning from abroad, are likely significant. Yet, Rina, for example, was abroad from ages 9 to 18, crucial identity development years, and her parents still lived abroad at the time of our interview. Yet, after only having lived in Japan for a few years, she identified as mostly Japanese. Obviously, it is difficult to account for so many factors, but the results of my research suggest that Japanese national identity remained strong, for various

reasons, among my kikokushijo participants, despite their transnational mobility during childhood.

For my Japanese graduate students studying abroad, transnational mobility seemed to have an effect on both of their Japanese national identities, although to different degrees. Saki mentioned that, due to her previous transnational mobility to Australia and Brazil, she didn't "feel 100% Japanese" before arriving in the US. She expressed unease about returning to Japan as a woman, which she characterized as a male-dominated society. Nevertheless, Saki did make some shifts with regard to her Japanese national identity while in the US. At first, she was stressed out by being labeled as Chinese or Korean and not as Japanese. Then she seemed to accept her Asian identity in the US. However, her trip to Brazil during a break, and her relationships with Brazilians seemed to prompt a shift in how comfortable she was spending time with other Asians in the US. She seemed to shift to prioritizing her relationship with the Latino community and expressed her preferences for Brazil, where she enjoyed an elevated status as a Japanese national and was recognized as Japanese. Thus, although Saki's Japanese national identity did not dramatically shift over the three years I interviewed her, she did experience minor shifts in how she labeled her national identity in the US (Japanese versus Asian) and which regional groups she felt most comfortable associating with (North Americans, Asians, and Latin Americans). She said that Brazil was her preferred choice to go to, rather than the US or Japan. Like some of my kikokushijo participants who did not feel 100% Japanese, Saki still identified as mostly Japanese and strategically chose the country, Brazil, where she enjoyed the highest status as a Japanese woman. Unlike many kikokushijo participants, however, Saki was able to break free of the Japanese system due to her decision to study in the US. While she could have applied to a post-doctoral position in Europe had she studied in Japan and written her dissertation in Japanese, it is less likely she would have had the same chances to be accepted. Thus, transnational mobility resulted in Saki feeling not completely Japanese and more confident to break free of the Japanese companies and systems that many kikokushijo decided were their best chances for success.

Takahiro's Japanese national identity, on the other hand, seemed to dramatically change over the course of the three years of interviews. At first, when I interviewed Takahiro in Japan he identified with the Kansai region in Japan, saying he was very much an Osaka person. Soon after arriving in the US, however, he pivoted to accepting an Asian identity. Soon thereafter, he started imitating American accents and said that he wanted to become culturally American. In the later interviews, he acknowledged his status as a non-native American, but remarked how important his American driver's license was in allowing him to blend in without showing his Japanese passport. Eventually, Takahiro decided that, for his career path, he could envision his future life living in the US and contemplated becoming an American citizen. Had he not traveled to the US, it is unlikely he would have contemplated becoming an American citizen while living in Japan. It is clear that his transnational mobility affected his Japanese national identity. His fondness for American culture and his focus on researching the American electoral system were certainly factors in this decision, but it was the time spent abroad in the US that allowed Takahiro to envision creating his future life in the United States as an American.

Most of the study abroad programs the Japanese government encourages its citizens to participate in are short-term stays of less than one year, as was detailed in Chapter 2. These programs encourage Japanese university students to study English and gain research skills, for

example, and return to Japan where, it is hoped, they will employ those skills to revitalize the Japanese economy. In essence, they are Japanese university students studying abroad within a Japanese framework. My two graduate student participants, however, broke free of this system to enter American universities on their own accord. This allowed them to pursue non-Japan related future goals. Thus, by continuing to invest in short-term study abroad stays, which a large majority of Japanese students choose, the Japanese government can encourage its citizens to stay in Japan and boost its economy.

In conclusion, language learning/use and transnational mobility have varying effects on my participants' Japanese national identities. These results suggest a kind of Japanese national identity spectrum, with some who feel they are 100% Japanese, some who do not position themselves as fully Japanese, and others who want to avoid their Japanese identity or become non-Japanese. Regardless of where they are on the Japanese identity spectrum, most of my kikokushijo participants have helped to improve or are likely to aid in improving the Japanese economy and society since they are staying within the Japanese system in order to advance professionally in their careers. Investments in hoshūko Japanese schools abroad appear to be necessary for children to be able to more smoothly re-enter Japanese society. As for the Japanese immigration laws and programs, like the JICA scholarships directed at Nikkei Brazilians, these have not been successful in fostering a Japanese national identity in my participants. For more Nikkei Brazilians to connect with Japan and Japanese culture, offering subsidized Japanese language lessons and pathways to Japanese citizenship may increase Japanese identity in diaspora groups with Japanese heritage. Japanese long-term study abroad students seem to be outside the purview of the Japanese government's focus when it comes to study abroad. The government is mostly focused on short-term study abroad programs. Both of my long-term study abroad participants envision futures outside of Japan. Their continued English language studies and transnational mobility seemed to encourage their desire to distance themselves from Japan.

### **7.3 - Limitations and future research**

This study is not without its limitations. Although one-time interviews with my kikokushijo and Nikkei Brazilian participants afforded me the time to interview more participants, follow-up interviews with each participant might have been illuminating regarding my participants' positions over time. However, that would have reduced the number of participants I could have included in this study due to the volume of research data gathered with multiple interviews, as is evidenced with my long-term study abroad participants. Thus, there are trade-offs with both approaches. One strength in my analyses is that I included both approaches, i.e. depth with the three years of interviews with the study abroad students and breadth with the relatively large number of kikokushijo interviews. Ideally, however, I would have liked to have included a few more Nikkei Brazilian voices, especially those who were still living in Japan. More Nikkei Brazilian voices could have provided more perspectives regarding how Japanese national identity is negotiated in Japan.

In addition, my study offers a unique look at Japanese national identity by examining three distinct groups, all of whom have had transnational mobility to and from Japan. Their mobility and the languages they learned and used in their journeys allowed for a complex and nuanced view of Japanese national identity. Unfortunately, however, I was not able to research all of the

various permutations of these groups. For example, studying former kaigaishijo, or Japanese children who were living abroad, but who stayed abroad rather than returning to Japan, may have shown completely different perspectives of Japanese national identities. Examining current Nikkei Brazilian factor workers, also, may have resulted in different kinds of data than presented in this study. This study mostly examined elite members of society rather than individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Thus, my study is limited to the number of voices that are presented, the lived experiences of my participants, and the kinds of experiences that were shared and co-constructed in the interviews. The results, then, are biased to reflect my participants' mostly high socioeconomic and university-educated status.

Future research in this area could focus more on lower socioeconomic status individuals in Japan, for example by updating Tsuda's (2003b) research on the remaining Nikkei factory workers in Japan. The new 2018 program by the Japanese government for Yonseis, which has a linguistic component as one of the visa requirements, could also be a potential area of research interest. Interviewing multiracial Japanese children and adults who travel to and from Japan often, like tennis star Naomi Osaka who lives in the US and decided to declare her Japanese nationality, could also be one potential area that sheds further light on how language use and transnational mobility affects Japanese national identity.

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