

Race and Racism:
Black Existential Philosophy for
Peace Studies

Doctoral Thesis

Submitted by:
I Jin Jang

Directed by:
Dr. Alberto Gerardo Gomes
Dr. Jennifer Marie Murphy

January, 2022









**Doctoral Programme in International Studies in Peace, Conflict and
Development**

Doctorate School of the Universitat Jaume I

Race and Racism: Black Existential Philosophy for Peace Studies

A dissertation submitted by I Jin Jang in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor in Peace Studies at the Universitat Jaume I

<p>Doctoral student:</p> <p>I Jin Jang</p> 	<p>Supervisor:</p> <p>Dr. Alberto Gerardo Gomes</p>  <p>Supervisor:</p> <p>Dr. Jennifer Marie Murphy</p>  <p>Tutor:</p> <p>Dr. Jennifer Marie Murphy</p> 
--	---

Castellón de la Plana, January 2022

Funding:

This thesis was endowed with financial support to carry out an international stay within the framework of the *Convocatòria d'ajudes adreçades a l'estudiantat de l'Escola de Doctorat de la Universitat Jaume I, per a la realització d'activitats formatives* en el curso 2016-2017.

ABSTRACT

This thesis is about the question of race and racism with a focus on why they are not given due scholarly attention in the field of peace studies. The liberal philosophical approaches to race and racism offer a limited view on the relationship between race and European colonialism and modernity. To challenge such limitation, I argue that peace studies need to engage deeply with African and black existential philosophy for their critical and transformative ideas. Drawing on such range of theoretical sources, I propose pedagogical and disciplinary imperatives to engage with race and racism in peace studies and in the classroom setting.

Keywords: race, racism, colonialism, African philosophy, black existential philosophy, peace studies

RESUMEN

Esta tesis aborda la cuestión de la raza y el racismo poniendo el foco en la falta de atención dedicada en el área de los estudios de paz. Los enfoques liberales a la raza y el racismo ofrecen una visión limitada sobre la relación entre la raza, el colonialismo y la modernidad europea. Para tratar esta limitación argumento que los estudios de paz necesitan interactuar con la filosofía de la diáspora africana y la filosofía existencial negra por sus ideas críticas y transformadoras. A partir de esa variedad de enfoques teóricos, propongo, asimismo, imperativos pedagógicos y disciplinarios para afrontar la cuestión de la raza y el racismo en el contexto del aula.

Palabras clave: raza, racismo, colonialismo, filosofía de la diáspora africana, filosofía existencial, estudios de paz

To Professor Chang

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank my parents without whom my education would not even have begun. I am forever indebted to their love and sacrifice.

I am deeply grateful to the late Dr. Vicent Martínez Guzmán without whom none of this would have been possible. I especially thank him for the conversation we had in 2015 which was invaluable in formulating the ideas of this thesis.

I would like to thank my two supervisors Dr. Alberto Gomes and Dr. Jennifer Murphy without whom this thesis would not have been completed. You two are my intellectual parents who raised me as a critical thinker. I feel particularly grateful and lucky to receive your co-supervision, which has been the most rewarding and enjoyable team work experience I have had.

I would like to thank Dr. Lewis Gordon for his tireless correspondence over the years generously sharing his knowledge and insight on many of the questions I had during my research. I would like to thank Dr. Maria Paula Meneses and everyone at the Centre for Social Studies (CES) at University of Coimbra who made my research internship worthwhile and provided me a global and broader perspective to situate my research.

I would like to thank my colleagues Carlos, Gigio, Adela, Sofia, and Magda for their support and company as well as making work fun experience, without which I could not have made it through. I would like to thank my students, Tabby, Alex, Paula, Yulia, and Reney and her partner Pam whose words of encouragement made me want to finish the thesis. I thank Marc for the most practical help that enabled me to write: the heater.

I would like to thank my Seon (Zen) teacher Chunghye Sunim for her teachings without which I would not have been able to finish this thesis. My special thank goes to Gyeongmi and Sujin for their continued support throughout my PhD, without which I would not have been able to complete it. My deepest thank goes to Carlos, my partner in life and learning, for walking by my side. It is such a joy and privilege to learn and grow with you.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents	7
Chapter 1. Introduction.....	1
1.1 Race and racism from theory in black.....	1
1.2 Theoretical orientation and methodology	3
1.3 Research aim and chapter outline.....	20
Capítulo 1. Introducción.....	24
1.1 Raza y racismo desde la teoría en negro	24
1.2 Orientación teórica y metodología	27
1.3 Objetivo de la investigación y esquema del capítulo	44
Chapter 2. Race and Racism	48
Introduction	48
2.1 Why is race talk difficult and why should we talk about it?	49
2.2 We should not talk about race because race is not real	57
2.3 Culture and ethnicity for race	62
2.4 Delinking race from colonialism.....	76
Conclusion.....	92
Chapter 3. Race in the Euromodern World	93
Introduction	93
3.1 Race and the social sciences.....	96
3.2 Liberalism and racism	108
3.3 Human rights and race.....	119
3.4 Race and racism in international relations	144
Conclusion.....	149
Chapter 4. Africana Philosophy	152
Introduction	152
4.1 What is Africana philosophy.....	153
4.2 The geography of reason	158
4.3 Black Athenas	167
4.4 Africana philosophy as the underside	176
4.5 Shifting the geography of reason	181
Conclusion.....	189

Chapter 5. Black Consciousness	191
Introduction	191
5.1 Africana phenomenology and black existential phenomenology	192
5.2 Double consciousness	203
5.3. Black embodied consciousness	210
5.4 Black consciousness	225
5.5 Lewis Gordon’s black existential phenomenology	239
Conclusion.....	256
Chapter 6. Race Matters: Black Philosophy for Peace	257
Introduction	257
6.1 Disciplinary imperatives	258
6.2 Pedagogical imperative	274
6.3 Concluding remarks	290
6.3 Conclusiones	297
Bibliography	304

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Race and racism from theory in black

This thesis is essentially about race and racism. While I commenced my doctoral research in 2015, I did the bulk of the writing during these perilous times of the Covid pandemic. A virus invisible to the naked eye has wreaked the lives and livelihoods of so many people around the world. Face masks, physical distancing, and lockdowns have become quotidian health dictates. Medical scientists have quickly identified this deadly virus as a type of coronavirus as it resembles a crown and its mutated variants have been given Greek numerological names such as Alpha, Beta, Delta and Omicron. While the virus did not discriminate sex, gender, race, class, or nationality, it affected people in low economic sectors of society disproportionately primarily due to poor public health policy. As in Albert Camus' novel, *The Plague*, the pandemic exposed what humans do in crisis: face reality or turn away from it.

This thesis is about another virus that has afflicted humanity for quite some time now. This virus is called racism. It emerged as a virulent disease at the onset of European colonialism and spread across the globe in the service of political and capitalist imperialism and hegemony. It began as a pandemic and is now endemic, embedded and masked in range of social conditions and situations. Through the relentless anti-racism scholarship and activism, the insidious, suffocating (“I can’t breathe”), callous, brutal, and deadly nature of this virus has been unmasked. But it is still invisible or made invisible in several places or settings. My thesis focuses on one such setting: European-based peace studies and research.

While studying the virology of race and the epidemiology of racism, it became clear to me that the question of the human is at the forefront. I argue that racism is a form of dehumanization structurally built into the systems of power. The relevance of racism takes effect only when it is backed up by the political, economic, and social institutions. This includes the very academic settings where human sciences investigate race and racism. In this case, what will be the perspective through which one can discern racism that is, at first sight, invisible? Theory, from its etymology, comes from Greek *theōria*, indicating “seeing.” Theory enables us to see dimensions of the world which have previously been hidden. Thus, being able to theorize is a privilege and, as Foucault says, linked with power.

However, when it comes to race and racism, the lived experience of racialized people has often been used as raw materials for the white thinkers to theorize. Eurocentered ideas, albeit potentially liberating and insightful, are inadequate to deal with race and racism because of their myopia and shortsightedness to properly see the world in color. Furthermore, many of those ideas themselves have been formed and developed through the violence of European encounter with the colonized world. For this reason, I resorted to postcolonial theories, which have been introduced by the peace scholar Sidi Omar (2006) to peace studies in Spain. I took his undertaking further and explored theories which met squarely the question of race and racism with an inquiry into the meaning of the human. That was black existential philosophy.

Black existential philosophy is a branch of philosophy within the burgeoning field of Africana thought. This field has a distinctively political, ethical, and philosophical aim to counteract the hegemony of Euro-American centered knowledge production which theorizes the problems faced by the Africans and the African diasporic people. Black existential philosophy, in particular, deals with the question of the human by theorizing existence in *black*.

Its interrogation of the meaning of the human, in turn, offers an understanding of race and racism, which has not yet been provided elsewhere. As a result, this field of theory advances a possibility for transformative thought with which peace studies need to engage. For this reason, I have turned to Africana and black existential philosophy for intellectual, epistemological and pedagogical lessons and to shed a proverbial light on the issue of race and racism. What I propose as a way of addressing or eliminating the virus afflicting peace studies is black existentialist philosophy. And I contend that this will not just treat the “illness,” but it will restore the “health” of European based peace studies.

Africana thinkers are not limited to Africans or peoples of African descent, but joined by those who engage with the Africana thought. For the reason, their geographical reach is wide from the Caribbean, Abya Yala (Indigenous name for the Americas), Oceania, Africa, and Europe. The constellation of thinkers come from various disciplines beyond philosophy such as sociology, political science, and humanities. Their shared goal is to shift from the normative practices of thinking, knowing, and being in the world. They share the importance of fostering South-South dialogue and of giving values to theories emerging from such conversations. My thesis draws from this range of intellectual, philosophical, epistemological, and methodological work. I shall now provide an overview of the theoretical orientation of my thesis.

1.2 Theoretical orientation and methodology

This thesis comes from my previous engagement with postcolonial studies. My process of unmasking race and racism began in 2012 when I took a peace philosophy course in which

the professor, Dr. Jennifer Murphy introduced the work of Martinique-born Caribbean philosopher Frantz Fanon who was a psychiatrist, an Algerian revolutionary, and anticolonial thinker. Those pages of *Black Skin, White Masks*, although theoretically dense and nuanced with many layers and ironies, resonated with my experience as a woman of color living in Europe. I attempted to link Fanon's thought with my peace master's thesis on Eurocentric representation of the Others. At the time, I was disturbed by certain dehumanizing ways of representing the people in the Global South from a hegemonic Eurocentric view in the peace studies course material. In a recently published research, Nomisha Kurian and Kevin Kester shows this tendency continues and calls for critical intervention of the "cultural and structural violence within its own theory and praxis" (Kurian and Kester, 2018: 2).

For this reason, my previous work was largely informed by cultural studies theorists (Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, Raymond Williams), postcolonial theories (Gayatri Spivak, Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Aijaz Ahmad, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Trinh T. Minh-ha, Ranajit Guha, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Partha Chatterjee, Achille Mbembe, Ania Roomba, Ashis Nandy, Roberta Perry, Robert J. C. Young), Black feminist and women of color theorists (bell hooks, Patricia Hill Collins, Gloria Anzaldúa, bell hooks, Cherríe Moraga), decolonial theorists (Anibal Quijano, Walter Mignolo, Maria Lugones, Ramon Grosfoguel, Catherine Walsh, Nelson Maldonado-Torres), and poststructuralist theories (Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler), and Frantz Fanon. I could not quite pinpoint where to place Fanon because "Specters of Fanon appear in the texts of cultural studies, postcolonial criticisms, political theory, and feminist critiques" and he was read as a "Lacanian psychoanalytic, Marxist, Algerian revolutionary, race theorist, poststructuralist, apostle of violence, misogynist,

and even racist at times.” (Jang, 2016: 516). What I really liked about Fanon was his call for a “new humanism.”

Although I made an intuitive connection with race and racism, Eurocentrism, and the question of the human in peace studies, I was unable to connect the missing gap. Luckily, through Fanon, I came to know a Fanonian scholar Lewis Gordon, who established the genealogy of black existential thought within the broader Africana field. Throughout our correspondence since 2015, Gordon has introduced me many other thinkers, a constellation of thinkers who, like him, are dedicated to challenge the Eurocentric epistemological domination in their respective discipline. Many of them being scholars of color, their academic work in the mostly white institutions are themselves—as my co-supervisor Dr. Alberto Gomes would attest—products of much struggled political action (Henry, 2006: 223-245).

While I was doing the research, I had teaching experience which raised a pedagogical question of how to teach race and racism in the program. The general lack of attention paid on the subject is reflected in the classroom. Similarly, there has been an increasing call for decolonizing peace studies and peace pedagogy (Azarmandi, 2016, 2018; R’boul, 2020; Omer, 2020; Kester, 2018, 2019, Kurian and Kester, 2018; Hajir and Kester, 2020). Realizing peace studies need to engage deeply with the question of race, I have thus turned to the rich tradition of Africana thought to inform peace studies epistemologies and pedagogy.

1.2.1 Africana philosophy

The choice of Africana philosophy for the investigation of race and racism follows two basic reasons: First, putting the broader theme of this thesis at the center, Africana philosophy has engaged with the question more profoundly than East Asian or European philosophy. Second, the history of Africana philosophy is at the same time a history of racism. The African

diasporic thought emerges in the context of colonialism and racism. It is a philosophy that enables a metatheory about race and racism within the broad historical and political contexts.

The term Africana philosophy was first coined by Lucius Outlaw in reference to a “‘gathering’ notion,” a philosophical subdiscipline and tradition that situates and encompasses the discourses, the oral and written work of African and the African diaspora. Outlaw notes that Africana gathers a variety of discursive traditions, “agendas”, and practices including literary, political, philosophical texts of African and people of the African diaspora. The unifying element of diverse traditions and practices in Africana philosophy is not defined by race or geography but “the effort to forge and articulate new identities and life-agendas by which to survive and to flourish in the limiting situations of racialized oppression and New World relocations” (Outlaw, 1996: 89).

For Lewis Gordon, Africana philosophical reflection is animated by “the unique set of questions raised by the emergence of ‘Africans’ and their diaspora” in which those concerns “include the convergence of most Africans with the racial term ‘black’ and its many connotations” (Gordon, 2008: 1). In other words, it is the conjunction of the thematic variety and intellectual concerns within the sociohistorical dimension that defines the singularity of the field for both authors. Africana philosophy has diverse schools of thought: from pragmatism to postmodernism, analytical philosophy, liberal political theory to Continental philosophy. What they all share is the thematic centrality of race in their thought (Henry, 2006). The treatment of race, however, differs between two main groups: those who focus on the concept of race and its elimination (Anthony Appiah, Naomi Zack) and those who focus on racism and its existential reality (Lucius Outlaw, Paget Henry, Lewis Gordon). It is the theory of the latter group, known as Africana existential philosophy (otherwise termed Africana

critical theory) that bases this thesis. Reiland Rabaka notes that while Africana philosophy is broadly concerned with identifying and reconstructing philosophical traditions and enterprise continental and diasporan Africans, Africana existential thought is “theory critical of domination and discrimination in continental and diasporan African life-words and lived experiences” (2009: 147, 151). Thus, although wide overlapping areas are shared and interchanged between Africana philosophy and Africana existential philosophy, I delimit my theoretical orientation to the latter for the following reasons.

First, Africana or black existential philosophy uses phenomenology as a method. This has important theoretical advantages that phenomenology is a method that questions even its own method. Phenomenology also takes embodiment as an essential element of human experience. Existential phenomenology, in particular, treats humans as embodied social perspectives centering on human existence in the social world, an analysis that is lacking in the study of race and racism in the social sciences.

One of the foundational sources for Africana philosophy is the thought of Frantz Fanon, the Martinique born philosopher, psychiatrist, and anticolonial revolutionary thinker, who furthered this method in his aforementioned *Black Skin, White Masks* published in 1952 by showing how the methods produced in Europe failed to account for the lived experience of the blacks in a racist world. The attempt to bring Fanon’s theory to peace studies has been made by Carlos Cordero-Pedrosa (2021) in his doctoral thesis.

Fanon’s theory, then, has been revitalized by the leading Fanon scholar and Africana philosopher Lewis Gordon (1995, 1999, 2015). Gordon’s early work which engaged Fanon’s concepts became foundational to what later became known as black existential philosophy, which earned him a place as “the father of postcolonial phenomenology” (Michaut, 2017

quoted in Davis et al, 2019: 2). Gordon is best known for his systemizing Africana existentialism “by giving it a firm phenomenological grounding” (Henry and Maldonado-Torres, 2008). As Linda Martin-Alcoff asserts, “Lewis Gordon's work should be credited with reviving existential thought in new directions, for taking up the mantle of Fanon's underutilized existential contributions, and for furthering the development of a phenomenological ontology of race” (2008: 9).

Second, Africana or black existential philosophy rigorously employs methods for analyzing antiblack racism. In contrast to the liberal philosophical treatment of race as an abstract disembodied category, existential phenomenology takes race as a social relation in which consciousness and embodiment are given their due attention. The result is a (postcolonial) humanist theory with greater potential for social transformation, and a remarkable affinity with the non-western epistemologies. For this reason, black existential phenomenology has been increasingly adopted by race theorists outside the Caribbean and the U.S. to those in Brazil, South Africa, Australia where colonial racism prevails.

Third, black existential philosophy shares its intellectual underpinning of decolonial intervention with the Latin American scholars known as the decolonial thinkers. Through the Caribbean Philosophical Association (CPA) established in 2002 at the University of West Indies in Jamaica, their joint collaboration has been prolific and radically imaginative. The CPA has its principal goal as fighting epistemic racism, but in the way that creates broader discursive space not confined to the Eurocentric domain. The CPA links a network of the

Caribbean thinkers, African and African diasporic thinkers, and decolonial thinkers globally for an active exchange of ideas and generating knowledges of the South¹.

What black existential philosophers share with decolonial thinkers is that, as Enrique Dussel (1998) posits, colonialism has been coterminous with modernity and the underside of modernity is, for Africana theorists of existence, theory in black. Unlike postmodernist who reject modernity, these thinkers expand the meaning of modernity as it is a Eurocentric view to take modernity solely as a European affair. They agree that we need to “recoup what is redeemable in modernity and to halt the practices of domination and exclusion in the world system” (Dussel, 1998: 19). For the Africana and black existential thinkers, the project was an anthology titled *Not Only Master’s Tools* (Gordon and Gordon, 2006). As the birth of Black Studies had a fundamental purpose of decolonizing the minds of people, the anthology speaks for the importance of a theoretical framework through which to see and interpret the world. The tool, a metaphor for a theory, belongs not only to the master, but to all. The house has been built by not only the master’s tools, but also by other tools. It is in this regard that postcolonial, decolonial, and Africana critical theorist interrogated the theoretical framework which is embedded in racism. According to these thinkers, epistemic racism is also denying the full humanity of others as it negates their capacity of having theory (Maldonado-Torres, 2004). This is why Africana thinkers have undertaken responsibility for the theoretical frameworks as their political commitment for the decolonization project (Gordon and Gordon, 2006). To rephrase Gordon’s analogy², they have built their own house using their own tools—very aware

¹ The CPA has also published book series such as *Creolizing the Canon*, *Global Critical Caribbean Thought*, and *Living Existentialism*, and journals such as *The CLR James Journal* and *Philosophy and Global Affairs*.

² Lewis Gordon used this analogy of a new house during his keynote speech given for the Intercultural Conference held by the peace master’s program at University Jaume I in 2021.

of the master's tools and their relationship to them. The house is open and welcoming. Through this work, I invite the reader into this house to explore, to expand, to grow and to transform.

1.2.2 Methodology of black existential philosophy

The unique orientation of Africana existential phenomenology arises out the reflection on the meaning of being black in the world and the problematics of black existence and agency amidst colonialism, racism and slavery. What does it mean to be black in a world in which blackness is associated with negative values and the absence of values? What forms of consciousness are produced by black existence in an antiblack world? What does black consciousness mean politically and philosophically? From these initial questions emerge other questions in relation to what to do with the options scarcely available and limited by the colonial project, and nevertheless, still facing the responsibility over one's freedom of choice.

In this philosophical orientation, the importance of freedom, the notion of the human as devoid of essence and always in the making, and the emphasis on human agency are central for the study of racism and anti-racism. Existential phenomenology conceives the human being as embodied consciousness. As I will discuss in the main chapters, consciousness here does not refer to psychological consciousness. It is neither something substantive nor that which one possesses; it is rather an act through which the world, others and the self are disclosed. Existential phenomenology enables us to reflect on the body and its meaning in the social world which creates and is created by human relations. I will now briefly introduce key methodological insights of phenomenology and existential phenomenology in the following section.

1.2.2.1 Phenomenology

A methodological debate abounds in social sciences. For one part, social sciences, in their effort to have a rigor, emphasized a positivistic scientific method as that of natural sciences. Those who propose interpretive methods criticize the “scientific” method of observing and experimenting in search of repeatability and consistency to uncover causal laws (Rosenberg, 2016). They argue that social reality differs from natural reality in that the former has been produced by humans through meaning-constituting processes. Hermeneutics or interpretive sociological method has been advanced for this reason. Phenomenology offers a valuable method for social sciences as it understands that “objective meaning of social phenomena—that to which social-scientific investigation refers—can only be understood in terms of an ultimate appeal to subjective meaning” (Gordon, 1995: 53). Fundamentally, phenomenology does not only deal with the perception of phenomena and experiences, but also takes into account that the perceiving or experiencing subject is in a relationship with what she perceives or experiences.

The central pillar shared by all phenomenologists is the theory of intentionality. Intentionality means that “every act of consciousness we perform, every experience that we have, is intentional: it is essentially ‘consciousness of’ or an ‘experience of’ something or other” (Sokolowski, 1999: 4). Phenomenology, thus, deals with phenomena as they appear to consciousness. However, a distinction should be made with psychological consciousness; phenomenology radically differs from psychology although at a first glance both seem to share a commonality of centering human consciousness. As Edmund Husserl criticizes psychologism

within human studies³, phenomenology seeks a direct description of our experience without giving account of its casual explanation rooted in psychology. For phenomenology, consciousness is always consciousness *of* something. This overcomes a problematic of the method rooted in the liberal philosophical theory which treats the human as an autonomous and individually conscious (rational) being. Jean-Paul Sartre takes the Husserlian methodology even further and claims that consciousness is egoless in his 1936 work, *The Transcendence of Ego*, which I will elaborate in the following section of existential phenomenology.

The theory of intentionality informs that the object of consciousness does not have an ontological substance as perceived by the traditional Cartesian way. Rather, intentionality brings forward a relational ontology found in many other traditions outside of the particular western domain of philosophy. Taking consciousness as empty, open and infinite means that there is no separation between consciousness and the world. In other words, it allows one to focus on the relation with the phenomena as apprehended by consciousness. Meanings are produced within the relation between consciousness and the world. Phenomenology is a radical method as Maurice Natanson puts it:

radical way to examine consciousness directly, to appreciate its contents and structures quite apart from prior scientific commitments or from

³ Husserl's unfinished work *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (herein *Crisis*) was written during the European "crisis" of the 1930s and at the time when Europe witnessed some radical changes in the way the human was studied. As Randall Collins (1998) illustrates in his massive book titled *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*, tracking intellectual changes across the globe, the study of the human was increasingly taking the positivist turn in which the authority of science had finally reigned over the humanities' interpretive tradition of religious authority. The long-drawn battle between science versus religion had well been over. Explanatory power, in other words, justificatory power, was given to the natural sciences, and traditional philosophy lost its power to claim its status of knowledge. Against this backdrop, Husserl's intervention was timely and anticipated. The positivistic science excludes the most important questions which are "questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence" (Husserl, 1970: 6). For Husserl, the "crisis" of science means "the loss of its meaning for life" (1970: 5) which for him paralyses the ability to make a decision for a humanity, hence, *crisis*. The *Crisis* is "a profound critical interrogation and reflection on the meaning of humanity and the humanist ideals of the Enlightenment" (SEE Moran, 2000: 5).

philosophical pre-judgments, and which strives, above all, to regain the immediate experiential world we have forgotten, denied, or bartered away. (Natanson, 1962: 9)

Phenomenology attempted to rescue philosophy from “abstract metaphysical speculation wrapped up in pseudo-problems,” with the aim of addressing the meanings of concrete and direct experience in its different areas (Moran, 2000: xiii). It entailed a shift in European approaches to reality, and by extension a shift in philosophy and science, which hitherto had looked for causal explanations and the search for essences (understood as a substance, or what makes a thing to be what it is)⁴, either based on psychology, naturalism or on historical development. Premised on a notion of mind and consciousness as substance and matter, the philosophical efforts during several hundred years for perceiving reality and the existence of the external world as separate from the subject was trapped in an “egocentric predicament,” based on reasoning, concepts, models and hypotheses from the impressions of the mind (Sokolowsky, 1999: 9). Instead of focusing on how we know reality at the expense of reality itself, phenomenology focuses on the meanings of what is known. In phenomenology, through the aforementioned understanding of consciousness, the phenomenon that appears to consciousness does not point back to a phenomenon that can be known before being experienced by the senses. There is nothing behind the object, “the phenomenon is taken as that which gives itself directly through the acts of consciousness [...] a return to things

⁴ I will expand on the difference between this dominant understanding of essence in the next chapter and other possible notions of essence, which are not *essentialist*, that is, they are not based on a substantive ontology, or the thing-in-itself. By now, it suffices to point out that part of the significance of phenomenology in European thought is the introduction of a relational ontology, which has an impact in the understanding of essences. Merleau-Ponty referred to this relational conception of essence when he defined phenomenology as a “the study of essences,” and the core of the matter is “defining essences, such as the essence of perception or the essence of consciousness.” For him, phenomenology “is also a philosophy that places essences back within existence and thinks that the only way to understand man and the world is by beginning from their “facticity.” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: lxx)

themselves,” to the world as it appears (Natanson, 1962: 10). The experiential character is key to phenomenology: perception, movement, sensation, memory, or awareness of the body. Phenomenology deals with the conscious experience of the world. It can be described as “the study of human experience and of the way things present themselves to us in and through such experience” (Sokolowsky, 1999:2).

To grasp phenomena as they appear to consciousness, Husserl proposed what he named the phenomenological reductions, which entail the suspension of judgements over the existence of the world in order to reach the meanings and senses of reality. Husserl called the natural attitude to the life of the human beings as they function in the everyday. In the natural attitude, humans, including scientists presuppose the existence of an external world and an objective reality *out there*. The suspension of the natural attitude is a shift from previous philosophical and scientific approaches, especially in psychology, to the mind and the world. The reduction reduces the immersion with the things of the world and “leaves us with the intentional structures which show how objectivity is constituted out of subjectivity” (Moran, 2000: 164). Through questioning the presuppositions about existence, our assumptions and the things taken for granted, the suspension of the natural attitude is a way to become conscious of the experiences and the meanings given to them. As we will see, Husserl’s suspension of the natural attitude and his transcendental idealism are not unanimously shared by other phenomenologists, especially in existential phenomenology.

It is important to take into consideration that phenomenology is not an exclusively European approach to the relation between the existent self and the objects of the world, although it has been thematized under this name in Europe. Phenomenological reflection was not a new or a unique European phenomenon. Rather, it can be said that phenomenology’s

advance of intentionality means the western philosophy finally started communicating with and understanding the foundational ontology of other philosophical traditions for millenniums (Kang, 2012; Park, 2013; Kim, 2003). Different Asian, ancient African⁵ and Africana authors and traditions start from the basis of the emptiness or infinitude of consciousness, relational metaphysics, observing the world as experienced, and have produced reflections that could be described as phenomenological despite not having presented and called themselves as such. Partly, this is because these traditions preceded the European formation of phenomenology as a subfield under philosophy; the vital influence of other philosophical traditions on European philosophy have been documented (Park, 2013; Wright, 2001). As Henry (2006) points out, a “phenomenological” form of reflection is not exclusive to western philosophy and has been produced from other areas of knowledge. For example, there have been copious comparative studies between phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy, particularly that of Nagarjuna’s Yogachara (Williams, 2008; Jung, 2011).

Although there are strong Eurocentric stances in European phenomenologists, as we have seen in the case of Husserl or Heidegger (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) points out that the former is not necessarily reactionary, as the latter is). For Gordon phenomenological reflection is inherently a postcolonial form of thinking, or, as he expresses it, “postcolonial phenomenology” is redundant because “[no] moment of inquiry is epistemologically closed,” and closure is one of the features of racism and colonialism in their epistemic dimensions

⁵ Teodros Kiros notes the similitudes and the relation between the African concept of *Nun* and Lao Tzu’s *Tao*. Both have implications for their understanding of ontology and the self in Ancient Africa and Taoism. *Nun* is the material out of which the human was created and is related to and represented like water: fluid and “flowing toward infinity”, but is not water. *Nun* is “Being itself” (Kiros, 2021: 5), but it is not a being based on completeness and substance, it precedes all material world and is an undefinable. Both *Tao* and *Nun* “*Tao* is *Nun* itself. It is something by virtue of this nothingness” (Kiros, 2021: 22), which can be compared to the Buddhist concept of *Sunyata* (emptiness).

(Gordon, 2008: 129). What he calls “ontological suspension” entails the constant and radical interrogation of assumptions and presuppositions at each moment and stage of reflection including at the level of methods, their logic, legitimacy, and of the process of legitimation itself. This radical interrogation includes a metacritical approach to phenomenology itself and what legitimates it: “[t]he postcolonial/phenomenological approach suggests, then, that even phenomenology’s history must be engaged with the cautious eye of ontological suspension” (Gordon, 2006: 103). He adds that the different manifestations of phenomenological reflection, whether European, Africana or Asian are just that, manifestations of phenomenological reflection, but they are not what legitimate phenomenological work.

1.2.2.2 Existential phenomenology

Existential phenomenology entails two main aspects in the phenomenological analysis: the rejection of human nature and a priori understandings of what the human being is. It does not approach the human being in the abstract, but in the situations in which human beings live, the social relations in which they are embedded, how they are lived, how the conditions limit and enable the human, and how the human makes meaning and constitutes reality. As Gordon adds, this enables us to talk about race, the black or the human being without reducing it to an essence. Race, the black or the human are a function of the lived conditions and relations. In this way, racial terms are used without giving ontological status to them. In short, existential phenomenology is:

the position that ultimately human reality cannot be locked in terms of an essence and that, fundamentally, a strong or a proper philosophical anthropology is one in which the understanding of the human being emerges from how the human being lives (Gordon, quoted in Yancy, 1998: 102-3).

Relatedly, this distinction can be seen in European existential phenomenology beginnings with Heidegger's notion of Dasein which intrinsically linked with existence and time, Jaspers's understanding of the condition of *existenz* as an open, unfixed and situated self, Sartre's critique of the lack of historicity, the transcendental ego and the Idealism of Husserl, and the excessive cognitivism of the phenomenological reduction (More, 2017). Here, Sartre parts from Husserl's transcendental ego. His 1936 work *The Transcendence of the Ego* challenges the Husserlian egology claims that consciousness is egoless. For Sartre (2004), while consciousness is directed at an object as in consciousness *of* something, it also pertains non-positionality that is not directed at any particular object. Simply saying, self-consciousness is aware of being aware. Such awareness does not involve an ego, which is an object of consciousness. Sartre argues that ego only appears in reflection, a constitutive process and does not appear in the pre-reflective consciousness (Sartre, 2004). The distinction between the pre-reflective and the reflective is illustrated in Sartre's 1943 work, *Being and Nothingness* in the well-known example: A person is counting cigarettes, but he is not thinking "I am counting cigarettes." He counts, "one cigarette, two cigarettes, three cigarettes..." This is the pre-reflective mode. Then another person asks him, "what are you doing?" to which the first person answers, "I am counting cigarettes," which is the reflective mode (Sartre, 1992). Thereby, consciousness is *nothingness*. His ideas are remarkably similar to the nature of consciousness described in Zen Buddhism.

The body features importantly in Merleau-Ponty's (2012) work on perception and embodiment as the way to understand the meaning of human beings as they live. For Merleau-Ponty, the separation between the material body and intellectual consciousness has led to philosophical and scientific distortions in the understanding of the human and human reality,

which had consequential social and political implications. Consciousness is always embodied and this unity encompasses the experience of the world, how it is lived, perceived, how it is situated, and relates to other embodied consciousness, to social structures (Marshall, 2008). Hence, whereas Husserlian phenomenology brackets or suspends judgements about the existence of the world, existential phenomenology focuses precisely on everyday existence and concrete human experience in order to make manifest the being of human existence, and disclose the phenomena of human experience “as they appear in their existential immediacy,” as they are grasped and given meaning by consciousness (More, 2017: 88-89).

By placing existence at the center, the notion of lived experience acquires a significant role. Lived experience does not refer to the subjective meaning given to experience or an empirical account of an event passively lived in the past. Instead, it grasps the active participation of the embodied consciousness in an already given, shared, and historically formed world that is objectively encountered. The lived experience binds the inside and the outside, self and the world, the subjective and the objective, the pre-reflective and immediate consciousness of the lived with the reflective constitution of experience. Alfred Schutz writes:

Meaning does not lie in the experience. Rather, those experiences are meaningful which are grasped reflectively (...) It is, then, incorrect to say that my lived experiences are meaningful merely in virtue of their being experienced or lived through.... The reflective glance singles out an elapsed lived experience and constitutes it as meaningful. (Schutz, quoted in Burch, 1990:134)

Although Kant outlined that self-consciousness emerges in the relation of a self who experiences a world of connected phenomena, and these become phenomena through this experience and by the experiencing self, for Merleau-Ponty this is not enough. The difference with existential phenomenology and lived experience “is that the unity of the world, prior to

being posited by knowledge through an explicit act of identification, is lived as already accomplished or as already there” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: lxxxix). In other words, consciousness and the self does not only emerge in relation to a world of objects and phenomena that are constituted as such through the experience of identification, but the self is already embedded in the world and in relation to objects, events, or other selves. Meanings are not produced out of the detached perception of the world, but in the active engagement with it of the self as embodied consciousness. “The world is disclosed in the first place as the context of our motor projects, [...] wherein we are disclosed to ourselves in the first place as agents” (Burch, 1990: 147).

As Merleau-Ponty (2012) hints, the philosopher and the understanding of what is philosophy are not exempt from this existential reality. The philosopher no longer carries out an intellectual and conceptual activity detached from the surrounding world, but instead is situated in the world, in her concrete embodied existence, and interrogates herself and the world through the experience. It is then no coincidence that persons of action who were not strictly philosophers such as psychiatrists François Tosquelles or Franco Basaglia relied on existential phenomenology in their work on social transformation from and within their fields. So did Karl Jaspers and Frantz Fanon, inside and outside the psychiatric hospital, and other philosopher-activists-public intellectuals such as Steve Biko, Aimé Césaire, Simone de Beauvoir, and Jean-Paul Sartre. These cases reveal another aforementioned feature of existential thought, its lack of presumed ontological and epistemological closure. They were not only existential phenomenologists, but they combined it differently with Marxism, psychoanalysis, surrealism, and other social, political, philosophical and psychological approaches.

As we will see, the implications of existential phenomenology for the study of racism are manifold. Gordon notes that “any theory that fails to address the existential phenomenological dimension of racism suffers from a failure to address the situational dimension” (Gordon, 1997a: 70). As Linda Martín Alcoff points out, existential phenomenology sheds light on the confusion surrounding the study of race. It debunks approaches such as racial essentialism, race nominalism, the understanding that race is not real and does not exist, and it addresses purely objectivist or subjectivist accounts of race. It shows how race is lived in the body, how it informs subjectivity and everyday social relations, how it shapes perception and common sense, how racialization varies, and how meanings can be disrupted by phenomenological inquiry: “reactivations produced by the critical phenomenological description don’t simply repeat the racializing perception but can reorient the positionality of consciousness” (Alcoff, 1999: 25).

1.3 Research aim and chapter outline

This thesis aims to introduce the philosophical contributions of Africana and black existential thought to expand peace studies epistemologies and how they could inform peace studies approaches as well as peace pedagogy to address race and racism. The scope of the research is mostly grounded and limited by my being situated within the European peace studies as a student and teacher.

Chapter 2 starts with the confusion and difficulty around the issues of race and racism primarily in the academic institutions of peace studies. I problematize the evasion and confusion I often observe when discussing race and racism in the peace studies classroom setting. Before opening the discussion on race and racism, interrogation of the history of its conceptual foundations has to precede. The purpose of this chapter is to look at whether the

ontology of race is relevant to the effect of racism. I intend to show that the semantic use of the word race and debate over its elimination is misplaced. Displacement of race for culture and ethnicity is given as examples. I argue that the elision of race in many race-relevant discourses is due to its separation from its colonial roots. I look at how race has been exclusively associated with Nazism and the Holocaust. Subsequently, I look at the root of the word race, and how the usage was implicated in the notion of subhuman from the onset of the European colonial expansion.

In Chapter 3, I look at how race impacted the universal conceptualization of the human. The concept of race developed in relation to establishing the universal standard of humanity through colonial governance of violent exploitation and extermination of the subhumans, with the former informing the hierarchization of the latter. The objective is to investigate how race was co-constitutive of the way human was studied and included or excluded from rights by international law in the backdrop of the French Revolution in juxtaposition with the Haitian Revolution. Race-thinking shaped the wide discursive field in which human sciences, liberalism, and human rights were inaugurated.

For the following two chapters, I introduce the major historical and contemporary contributions of Africana thought and black existential philosophy that made critical and political intervention in the Euromodern systems of knowledge production that enforced and justified racist practices.

Chapter 4 introduces and offers a broad view and a profile of the field of Africana or African diasporic philosophy, including its limits, obstacles, questions and main concerns. In order to introduce Africana philosophy, I contextualize Africana philosophy within the historical and intellectual dynamics that has denied blacks and Africans the capacity of

reasoning and of acting in the world. As part of the project of “provincializing Europe” (Chakrabarty, 2001), Africana philosophy exposes the parochialism of European philosophy and enlarges the view of what philosophy is, its history, and what has been left aside. I do this by engaging the works of Africana philosophy with philosophy of Ancient Egypt or *Kemet* uncovering the African roots of Greek philosophy. I also explore the dialectical relation between Africana and European philosophy within the debate of universality and particularity. This show how Africana philosophy is a universalizing project by unveiling contradictions and particularities of European philosophy which prides itself to have a normative force of universality. Africana philosophy thereby carries out a shift in the geography of reason.

Chapter 5 narrows down the scope and puts the focus on Africana and black philosophy of existence and existential phenomenology. I introduce intellectual production and contribution of W.E.B. Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, Steve Biko and Lewis Gordon. These thinkers theorized out of their reflection on the meaning of being black in an antiblack world; on black existence, human agency challenged by colonialism, racism and slavery. What does it mean to be black in a world in which blackness is associated with negative values and the absence of values? What forms of consciousness are produced by the existence and the experience in a racist world? What does black consciousness mean politically and philosophically? From these initial questions emerged other questions in relation to what one does with the options available and responsibility over one’s choices. The crucial importance to the study of racism and antiracist praxis is the question of freedom, the notion of the human as devoid of essence and always in the making, and the emphasis on human agency in this philosophical orientation.

W.E.B. Du Bois opened up the field of phenomenological reflection through the theme of double consciousness, the veil, and the sight. His work abounds with meta-reflective

questions that he expresses through the notion of what it means to be a problem. Among the manifold existential phenomenological elements in the work of Frantz Fanon, I focus on two main aspects: the question of methodology, and the centrality of the body. I explore the thematization of the Black Consciousness Movement as formulated in the writings of Steve Biko. I highlight the explicitly political meaning of Black consciousness developed by Lewis Gordon and other existential phenomenological works.

In Chapter 6, I recapitulate the implications of the previous chapters for peace studies and peace pedagogy. I formulate disciplinary and pedagogical imperatives. I explore the identity and the foundational narrative of the discipline, the relationship with other fields, the disciplinary boundaries of peace studies, its relationship with international relations to analyze the reasons behind what Azarmandi (2018) calls the racial silence within peace studies. I advance some of the possible contributions Africana and black existential philosophy can offer peace studies.

Capítulo 1. Introducción

1.1 Raza y racismo desde la teoría en negro

Esta tesis trata esencialmente sobre la raza y el racismo. Aunque empecé mi investigación doctoral en 2015, hice la mayor parte de la redacción durante estos peligrosos tiempos de la pandemia de Covid. Un virus invisible al ojo humano ha acabado con la vida y el sustento de muchas personas en todo el mundo. Las mascarillas, el distanciamiento físico y los confinamientos se han convertido en dictados sanitarios cotidianos. Los científicos médicos han identificado rápidamente este virus mortal como un tipo de coronavirus, ya que se asemeja a una corona y sus variantes mutadas han recibido nombres numerológicos griegos como Alfa, Beta, Delta y Omicron. Aunque el virus no discriminaba sexo, género, raza, clase o nacionalidad, afectaba de forma desproporcionada a las personas de los sectores económicos bajos de la sociedad, principalmente debido a una mala política de salud pública. Al igual que en la novela de Albert Camus, *La peste*, la pandemia puso de manifiesto lo que hacen los seres humanos en las crisis: enfrentarse a la realidad o alejarse de ella.

Esta tesis trata de otro virus que afecta a la humanidad desde hace ya mucho tiempo. Este virus se llama racismo. Surgió como una enfermedad virulenta al inicio del colonialismo europeo y se extendió por todo el mundo al servicio del imperialismo y la hegemonía política y capitalista. Comenzó como una pandemia y ahora es endémico, incrustado y enmascarado en una serie de condiciones y situaciones sociales. A través de la incesante erudición y el activismo contra el racismo, se ha desenmascarado la naturaleza insidiosa, asfixiante (“no puedo respirar”), insensible, brutal y mortal de este virus. Pero sigue siendo invisible o se hace

invisible en varios lugares o entornos. Mi tesis se centra en uno de ellos: los estudios e investigaciones sobre la paz en Europa.

Al estudiar la virología de la raza y la epidemiología del racismo, me quedó claro que la cuestión de lo humano está en primer plano. Sostengo que el racismo es una forma de deshumanización estructuralmente incorporada a los sistemas de poder. La relevancia del racismo sólo tiene efecto cuando está respaldado por las instituciones políticas, económicas y sociales. Esto incluye los propios ámbitos académicos en los que las ciencias humanas investigan la raza y el racismo. En este caso, ¿cuál será la perspectiva a través de la cual se puede discernir el racismo que es, a primera vista, invisible? Teoría, por su etimología, viene del griego *theōria*, que indica “ver”. La teoría nos permite ver dimensiones del mundo que antes estaban ocultas. Así, poder teorizar es un privilegio y, como dice Foucault, está ligado al poder.

Sin embargo, cuando se trata de raza y racismo, la experiencia vivida por las personas racializadas se ha utilizado a menudo como materia prima para que los pensadores blancos puedan teorizar. Las ideas eurocéntricas, aunque potencialmente liberadoras y perspicaces, son inadecuadas para tratar la raza y el racismo debido a su miopía y miopía para ver adecuadamente el mundo en color. Además, muchas de esas ideas se han formado y desarrollado a través de la violencia del encuentro europeo con el mundo colonizado. Por esta razón, recurrí a las teorías postcoloniales, que han sido introducidas por el investigador Sidi Omar (2006) en los estudios para la paz en España. Llevé su empeño más allá y exploré teorías que enfrentaban directamente la cuestión de la raza y el racismo con una indagación sobre el significado de lo humano. Era la filosofía existencial negra.

La filosofía existencial negra es una rama de la filosofía dentro del floreciente campo del pensamiento de la diáspora africana. Entre sus claros objetivos políticos, éticos y filosóficos está el de contrarrestar la hegemonía de la producción de conocimiento eurocentrada que teoriza los problemas a los que se enfrentan los africanos y los pueblos de la diáspora africana. La filosofía existencial negra, en particular, aborda la cuestión de lo humano teorizando la existencia en *negro*. Su interrogación sobre el significado de lo humano, a su vez, ofrece una comprensión de la raza y el racismo, que aún no se ha proporcionado en otros lugares. Como resultado, este campo de la teoría ofrece un pensamiento transformador con el que los estudios sobre la paz necesitan comprometerse. Por esta razón, he recurrido a la filosofía *africana*⁶ y a la filosofía existencial y negra en busca de lecciones intelectuales, epistemológicas y pedagógicas y para arrojar una luz proverbial sobre la cuestión de la raza y el racismo. Lo que propongo como forma de abordar o eliminar el virus que afecta a los estudios sobre la paz es la filosofía existencialista negra. Y sostengo que esto no sólo tratará la “enfermedad”, sino que restablecerá la “salud” de los estudios sobre la paz basados en Europa. Los pensadores de la diáspora africana no se limitan a los africanos o a los afrodescendientes, sino que se suman a los que se comprometen con el pensamiento diaspórico africano. Por ello, su alcance geográfico es amplio, desde el Caribe, Abya Yala (nombre indígena de las Américas), Oceanía, África y Europa. La constelación de pensadores procede de varias disciplinas más allá de la filosofía, como la sociología, las ciencias políticas y las humanidades. Su objetivo común es cambiar las prácticas normativas de pensar, conocer y estar en el mundo. Comparten la importancia de fomentar el diálogo Sur-Sur y de dar valor a las teorías que surgen de esas conversaciones. Mi tesis se inspira en esta serie de trabajos intelectuales, filosóficos,

⁶ He traducido el término inglés *Africana*, que no solo designa la producción intelectual del continente africano sino de la diáspora africana, por el término *africana* (en cursiva) o por filosofía de la diáspora africana.

epistemológicos y metodológicos. A continuación, ofreceré una visión general de la orientación teórica de mi tesis.

1.2 Orientación teórica y metodología

Esta tesis surge de mi compromiso previo con los estudios poscoloniales. Mi proceso de desenmascaramiento de la raza y el racismo comenzó en 2012 cuando asistí a un curso de filosofía de la paz en el que la profesora, la Dra. Jennifer Murphy, introdujo la obra del filósofo caribeño nacido en Martinica Frantz Fanon, que fue psiquiatra, revolucionario argelino y pensador anticolonial. Esas páginas de *Piel negra, máscaras blancas*, aunque teóricamente densas y matizadas con muchas capas e ironías, resonaron con mi experiencia como mujer de color que vive en Europa. Intenté relacionar el pensamiento de Fanon con mi tesis del máster de la paz sobre la representación eurocéntrica de los Otros. En aquel momento, me preocupaban ciertas formas hegemónicas y deshumanizadoras de representar a los pueblos del Sur Global desde una visión eurocéntrica en el material del curso de estudios sobre la paz. En una investigación recientemente publicada, Nomisha Kurian y Kevin Kester muestran que esta tendencia continúa y piden una intervención crítica de la "violencia cultural y estructural dentro de su propia teoría y praxis" (Kurian y Kester, 2018: 2).

Por esta razón, mi trabajo anterior se basó en gran medida en los teóricos de los estudios culturales (Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, Raymond Williams), las teorías poscoloniales (Gayatri Spivak, Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Aijaz Ahmad, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Trinh T. Minh-ha, Ranajit Guha, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Partha Chatterjee, Achille Mbembe, Ania Roomba, Ashis Nandy, Roberta Perry, Rebert J. C. Young), feministas negras y teóricas de las mujeres de color (bell hooks, Patricia Hill Collins, Gloria Anzaldúa, bell hooks, Cherríe Moraga), teóricos decoloniales (Anibal Quijano, Walter Mignolo, María Lugones, Ramón Grosfoguel,

Catherine Walsh, Nelson Maldonado-Torres), y las teorías posestructuralistas (Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler), y Frantz Fanon. No pude precisar muy bien dónde ubicar a Fanon porque “los espectros de Fanon aparecen en los textos de los estudios culturales, las críticas poscoloniales, la teoría política y las críticas feministas” y fue leído como un “psicoanalista lacaniano, marxista, revolucionario argelino, teórico de la raza, posestructuralista, apóstol de la violencia, misógino e incluso racista en ocasiones.” (Jang, 2016: 516). Lo que realmente me gustó de Fanon fue su llamado a un “nuevo humanismo.”

Aunque establecí una conexión intuitiva con la raza y el racismo, el eurocentrismo y la cuestión de lo humano en los estudios sobre la paz, no pude conectar la brecha que faltaba. Por suerte, a través de Fanon, conocí a un pensador fanoniano, Lewis Gordon, que estableció la genealogía del pensamiento existencial negro dentro del campo más amplio de la filosofía de *africana*. A lo largo de nuestra correspondencia desde 2015, Gordon me ha presentado a muchos otros pensadores, una constelación de pensadores que, como él, se dedican a desafiar la dominación epistemológica eurocéntrica en sus respectivas disciplinas. Siendo muchos de ellos pensadores negros y del Sur Global, su trabajo académico en instituciones mayoritariamente blancas es -como atestiguaría mi co-supervisor, el Dr. Alberto Gomes- producto de una acción política muy luchada (Henry, 2006: 223-245).

Mientras realizaba la investigación, tuve una experiencia docente que me planteó la cuestión pedagógica de cómo enseñar la raza y el racismo en el programa. La falta general de atención al tema se refleja en el aula. Del mismo modo, se ha hecho un llamamiento creciente para descolonizar los estudios sobre la paz y la pedagogía de la paz (Azarmandi, 2016, 2018; R'boul, 2020; Omer, 2020; Kester, 2018, 2019, Kurian y Kester, 2018; Hajir y Kester, 2020). Consciente de la necesidad de que los estudios sobre la paz se comprometieran profundamente

con la cuestión de la raza, he recurrido a la rica tradición del pensamiento diaspórico africano para arrojar luz sobre las epistemologías y la pedagogía de los estudios sobre la paz.

1.2.1 Filosofía *africana*

La elección de la filosofía de la diáspora africana para la investigación de la raza y el racismo obedece a dos razones básicas. En primer lugar, situando el tema más amplio de esta tesis en el centro, la filosofía *africana* se ha ocupado de la cuestión más profundamente que la filosofía del noreste de Asia, o de Europa. En segundo lugar, la historia de la filosofía diaspórica africana es al mismo tiempo una historia del racismo. El pensamiento de la diáspora africana surge en el contexto del colonialismo y el racismo. Es una filosofía que permite una metateoría sobre la raza y el racismo dentro de los amplios contextos históricos y políticos.

El término filosofía *africana* fue acuñado por primera vez por Lucius Outlaw en referencia a una “noción que agrupa”, una subdisciplina y tradición filosófica que sitúa y abarca los discursos, la obra oral y escrita de los africanos y de la diáspora africana. Outlaw señala que *Africana* reúne una variedad de tradiciones discursivas, “agendas” y prácticas que incluyen textos literarios, políticos y filosóficos de africanos y personas de la diáspora africana. El elemento unificador de las diversas tradiciones y prácticas de la filosofía africana no se define por la raza o la geografía, sino por “el esfuerzo por forjar y articular nuevas identidades y agendas vitales con las que sobrevivir y florecer en las situaciones limitantes de la opresión racial y los traslados al Nuevo Mundo” (Outlaw, 1996: 89).

Para Lewis Gordon, la reflexión filosófica diaspórica africana está animada por el conjunto único de cuestiones planteadas por el surgimiento de los “‘africanos’ y su diáspora.” Entre esas preocupaciones “incluyen la convergencia de la mayoría de los africanos con el término racial ‘negro’ y sus muchas connotaciones” (Gordon, 2008: 1). En otras palabras, es

la conjunción de la variedad temática y las preocupaciones intelectuales dentro de la dimensión sociohistórica lo que define la singularidad del campo para ambos autores. La filosofía africana tiene diversas escuelas de pensamiento: desde el pragmatismo hasta el posmodernismo, la filosofía analítica, la teoría política liberal y la filosofía continental. Lo que todas ellas comparten es la centralidad temática de la raza en su pensamiento (Henry, 2006). El tratamiento de la raza, sin embargo, difiere entre dos grupos principales: los que se centran en el concepto de raza y su eliminación (Anthony Appiah, Naomi Zack) y los que se centran en el racismo y su realidad existencial (Lucius Outlaw, Paget Henry, Lewis Gordon). Es la teoría de este último grupo, conocida como filosofía existencial diaspórica africana (también denominada teoría crítica diaspórica africana) la que fundamenta esta tesis. Reiland Rabaka señala que, mientras que la filosofía *africana* se ocupa, en términos generales, de identificar y reconstruir las tradiciones filosóficas y la empresa de los africanos continentales y de la diáspora, el pensamiento existencial diaspórico africano es “una teoría crítica con la dominación y la discriminación en la vida y las experiencias vividas de los africanos continentales y de la diáspora” (2009: 147, 151). Así pues, aunque se comparten e intercambian amplias áreas entre la filosofía diaspórica africana y la filosofía existencial diaspórica africana, delimito mi orientación teórica a esta última por las siguientes razones.

En primer lugar, la filosofía existencial africana o negra utiliza la fenomenología como método. Esto tiene importantes ventajas teóricas, ya que la fenomenología es un método que cuestiona incluso su propio método. La fenomenología también toma la corporalidad como un elemento esencial de la experiencia humana. La fenomenología existencial, en particular, trata a los humanos como perspectivas sociales encarnadas que se centran en la existencia humana

en el mundo social, un análisis del que carece el estudio de la raza y el racismo en las ciencias sociales.

Una de las fuentes fundacionales de la filosofía africana es el pensamiento de Frantz Fanon, el filósofo, psiquiatra y pensador revolucionario anticolonial nacido en Martinica, que profundizó en este método en su ya mencionado *Piel negra, máscaras blancas*, publicado en 1952, mostrando cómo los métodos producidos en Europa no permitían teorizar sobre la experiencia vivida de los negros en un mundo racista. El intento de llevar la teoría de Fanon a los estudios sobre la paz ha sido realizado por Carlos Cordero-Pedrosa (2021) en su tesis doctoral.

La teoría de Fanon, entonces, ha sido revitalizada por el principal estudioso de Fanon, y filósofo diaspórico africano ,Lewis Gordon (1995, 1999, 2015). Los primeros trabajos de Gordon, que se ocuparon de los conceptos de Fanon, se convirtieron en la base de lo que más tarde se conoció como filosofía existencial negra, lo que le valió un lugar como “el padre de la fenomenología poscolonial” (Michaut, 2017 citado en Davis et al, 2019: 2). Gordon es más conocido por haber sistematizado el existencialismo africano “dándole una firme base fenomenológica” (Henry y Maldonado-Torres, 2008). Como afirma Linda Martin-Alcoff, “el trabajo de Lewis Gordon debe ser acreditado por revivir el pensamiento existencial en nuevas direcciones, por tomar el manto de las contribuciones existenciales subutilizadas de Fanon, y por promover el desarrollo de una ontología fenomenológica de la raza” (2008: 9).

En segundo lugar, la filosofía existencial africana o negra emplea rigurosamente métodos para analizar el racismo anti-negro. En contraste con el tratamiento filosófico liberal de la raza como una categoría abstracta incorpórea, la fenomenología existencial toma la raza como una relación social en la que se presta la debida atención a la conciencia y la corporalidad.

El resultado es una teoría humanista (poscolonial) con mayor potencial de transformación social y una notable afinidad con las epistemologías no occidentales. Por esta razón, la fenomenología existencial negra ha sido adoptada cada vez más por los teóricos de la raza fuera del Caribe y de los EE.UU. extendiéndose Brasil, Sudáfrica y Australia, donde prevalece el racismo colonial.

En tercer lugar, la filosofía existencial negra comparte su fundamento intelectual de intervención decolonial con los estudiosos latinoamericanos conocidos como los pensadores decoloniales. A través de la Asociación Filosófica del Caribe (CPA), creada en 2002 en la Universidad de las Indias Occidentales en Jamaica, su colaboración conjunta ha sido prolífica y radicalmente imaginativa. El objetivo principal de la CPA es luchar contra el racismo epistémico, pero de forma que se cree un espacio discursivo más amplio que no se limite al ámbito eurocéntrico. La CPA vincula una red de pensadores caribeños, pensadores africanos y de la diáspora africana, y pensadores decoloniales a nivel mundial para un intercambio activo de ideas y la generación de conocimientos del Sur⁷.

Lo que los filósofos existenciales negros comparten con los pensadores decoloniales es que, como plantea Enrique Dussel (1998), el colonialismo ha sido simultáneo y constitutivo de la modernidad. Ese reverso de la modernidad es, para los teóricos africanos de la existencia, la teoría en *negro*. A diferencia de los posmodernistas que rechazan la modernidad, estos pensadores amplían el significado de la modernidad, ya que es una visión eurocéntrica tomar la modernidad únicamente como un asunto europeo. Coinciden en que hay que “recuperar lo rescatable de la modernidad y detener las prácticas de dominación y exclusión en el sistema

⁷ La CPA también ha publicado series de libros como *Creolizing the Canon*, *Global Critical Caribbean Thought* y *Living Existentialism*, y revistas como *The CLR James Journal* y *Philosophy and Global Affairs*.

mundial” (Dussel, 1998: 19). Para los pensadores existenciales africanos y negros, el proyecto fue una antología titulada *Not Only the Master’s Tools* (Gordon y Gordon, 2006). El nacimiento de los estudios negros (*Black Studies*) tenía como propósito fundamental descolonizar las mentes de las personas, la antología habla de la importancia de un marco teórico a través del cual ver e interpretar el mundo. La herramienta, metáfora de la teoría, no pertenece sólo al maestro, sino a todos. La casa ha sido construida no sólo con las herramientas del maestro, sino también con otras herramientas. Es en este sentido que los teóricos críticos poscoloniales, decoloniales y africanos interrogan el marco teórico que está incrustado en el racismo. Según estos pensadores, el racismo epistémico es también la negación de la plena humanidad de los demás, ya que niega su capacidad de tener teoría (Maldonado-Torres, 2004). Por ello, los pensadores africanos han asumido la responsabilidad de los marcos teóricos como su compromiso político para el proyecto de descolonización (Gordon y Gordon, 2006). Para reformular la analogía de Gordon⁸, han construido su propia casa utilizando sus propias herramientas, muy conscientes de las herramientas del amo y de su relación con ellas. La casa es abierta y acogedora. A través de esta obra, invito al lector a entrar en esta casa para explorar, ampliar, crecer y transformar.

1.2.2 Metodología de la filosofía existencial negra

La orientación única de la fenomenología existencial africana surge de la reflexión sobre el significado de ser negro en el mundo y la problemática de la existencia y la agencia negra a partir de la inmersión en el colonialismo, el racismo y la esclavitud. ¿Qué significa ser negro en un mundo en el que la negritud se asocia a valores negativos y a la ausencia de valores?

⁸ Lewis Gordon utilizó esta analogía de una casa nueva durante su discurso de apertura de la Conferencia Intercultural celebrada por el máster de paz de la Universidad Jaume I en 2021.

¿Qué formas de conciencia produce la existencia negra en un mundo anti-negro? ¿Qué significa la conciencia negra desde el punto de vista político y filosófico? De estas preguntas iniciales surgen otras en relación a qué hacer con las opciones escasamente disponibles y limitadas por el proyecto colonial, y aun así, afrontar la responsabilidad sobre la propia libertad de elección.

En esta orientación filosófica, la importancia de la libertad, la noción de lo humano como desprovisto de esencia y siempre en formación, y el énfasis en la agencia humana son fundamentales para el estudio del racismo y el antirracismo. La fenomenología existencial concibe al ser humano como conciencia encarnada. Como discutiré en los capítulos principales, la conciencia aquí no se refiere a la conciencia psicológica. No es algo sustantivo ni que se posee; es más bien un acto a través del cual se revelan el mundo, los otros y el yo. La fenomenología existencial nos permite reflexionar sobre el cuerpo y su significado en el mundo social que crea y es creado por las relaciones humanas. En la siguiente sección presentaré brevemente las ideas metodológicas clave de la fenomenología y la fenomenología existencial.

1.2.2.1 Fenomenología

En las ciencias sociales abunda el debate metodológico. Por una parte, las ciencias sociales, en su esfuerzo por tener rigor, enfatizan un método científico positivista como el de las ciencias naturales. Quienes proponen métodos interpretativos critican el método “científico” de observar y experimentar en busca de repetibilidad y consistencia para descubrir leyes causales (Rosenberg, 2016). Argumentan que la realidad social se diferencia de la natural en que la primera ha sido producida por los humanos a través de procesos de constitución de significados. La hermenéutica o el método sociológico interpretativo han sido avanzados por esta razón. La fenomenología ofrece un método valioso para las ciencias sociales, ya que

entiende que “el significado objetivo de los fenómenos sociales—a los que se refiere la investigación científico-social—sólo puede entenderse en términos de una apelación última al significado subjetivo” (Gordon, 1995: 53). Fundamentalmente, la fenomenología no sólo se ocupa de la percepción de los fenómenos y las experiencias, sino que también tiene en cuenta que el sujeto que percibe o experimenta está en relación con lo que percibe o experimenta.

El pilar central que comparten todos los fenomenólogos es la teoría de la intencionalidad. La intencionalidad significa que “cada acto de conciencia que realizamos, cada experiencia que tenemos, es intencional: es esencialmente ‘conciencia *de*’ o una ‘experiencia de’ algo o de otro” (Sokolowski, 1999: 4). La fenomenología, por tanto, se ocupa de los fenómenos tal y como aparecen a la conciencia. Sin embargo, hay que hacer una distinción con la conciencia psicológica; la fenomenología difiere radicalmente de la psicología aunque a primera vista ambas parezcan tener en común el poner la conciencia humana en el centro. Edmund Husserl critica el psicologismo dentro de los estudios humanos⁹, la fenomenología busca una descripción directa de nuestra experiencia sin dar cuenta de su explicación causal enraizada en la psicología. Para la fenomenología, la conciencia es siempre conciencia *de* algo. Esto supera una problemática del método arraigada en la teoría filosófica

⁹ La obra inacabada de Husserl *La crisis de las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología trascendental: Una introducción a la filosofía fenomenológica* (en adelante, *Crisis*) fue escrita durante la “crisis” europea de los años treinta y en el momento en que Europa fue testigo de algunos cambios radicales en la forma de estudiar lo humano. Como ilustra Randall Collins (1998) en su enorme libro titulado *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*, en el que hace un seguimiento de los cambios intelectuales en todo el mundo, el estudio de lo humano estaba tomando cada vez más el giro positivista en el que la autoridad de la ciencia había acabado por reinar sobre la tradición interpretativa de las humanidades de la autoridad religiosa. La larga batalla entre la ciencia y la religión había llegado a su fin. El poder explicativo, es decir, el poder justificativo, fue otorgado a las ciencias naturales, y la filosofía tradicional perdió su poder para reclamar su estatus de conocimiento. En este contexto, la intervención de Husserl fue oportuna y anticipada. La ciencia positivista excluye las preguntas más importantes que son “las preguntas sobre el sentido o el sinsentido de toda esta existencia humana” (Husserl, 1970: 6). Para Husserl, la “crisis” de la ciencia significa “la pérdida de su sentido para la vida” (1970: 5) lo que para él paraliza la capacidad de decisión para una humanidad, de ahí la *crisis*. La *Crisis* es “una profunda interrogación crítica y una reflexión sobre el sentido de la humanidad y los ideales humanistas de la Ilustración” (VER Moran, 2000: 5).

liberal que trata al humano como un ser autónomo e individualmente consciente (racional). Jean-Paul Sartre lleva la metodología husserliana aún más lejos y afirma que la conciencia no tiene ego en su obra de 1936, *La trascendencia del ego*, que elaboraré en la siguiente sección de la fenomenología existencial.

La teoría de la intencionalidad se basa en que el objeto de la conciencia no tiene una sustancia ontológica como se percibe por la vía cartesiana tradicional. Más bien, la intencionalidad aporta una ontología relacional que se encuentra en muchas otras tradiciones fuera del dominio particular occidental de la filosofía. Tomar la conciencia como algo vacío, abierto e infinito significa que no hay separación entre la conciencia y el mundo. En otras palabras, permite centrarse en la relación con los fenómenos tal y como los aprehende la conciencia. Los significados se producen dentro de la relación entre la conciencia y el mundo.

La fenomenología es un método radical, como dice Maurice Natanson:

una forma radical de examinar la conciencia directamente, de apreciar sus contenidos y estructuras al margen de los compromisos científicos previos o de los prejuicios filosóficos, y que se esfuerza, sobre todo, por recuperar el mundo experiencial inmediato que hemos olvidado, negado o troceado. (Natanson, 1962: 9)

La fenomenología intentó rescatar a la filosofía de la “especulación metafísica abstracta envuelta en pseudoproblemas”, con el objetivo de abordar los significados de la experiencia concreta y directa en sus diferentes ámbitos (Moran, 2000: xiii). Supuso un cambio en los planteamientos europeos sobre la realidad, y por extensión un cambio en la filosofía y la ciencia, que hasta entonces habían buscado explicaciones causales y la búsqueda de esencias (entendidas como sustancia, o lo que hace que una cosa sea lo que es)¹⁰, bien basadas en la

¹⁰ En el próximo capítulo ampliaré la diferencia entre esta comprensión dominante de la esencia y otras posibles nociones de esencia, que no son *esencialistas*, es decir, no se basan en una ontología sustantiva, o de la cosa-en-sí. Por ahora, basta con señalar que parte de la importancia de la fenomenología en el pensamiento europeo es la

psicología, el naturalismo o el desarrollo histórico. Partiendo de una noción de mente y conciencia como sustancia y materia, los esfuerzos filosóficos durante varios cientos de años por percibir la realidad y la existencia del mundo exterior como algo separado del sujeto quedaron atrapados en un “predicamento egocéntrico”, basado en razonamientos, conceptos, modelos e hipótesis a partir de las impresiones de la mente (Sokolowsky, 1999: 9).

En lugar de centrarse en cómo conocemos la realidad a expensas de la realidad misma, la fenomenología se centra en los significados de lo que se conoce. En la fenomenología, a través de la mencionada comprensión de la conciencia, el fenómeno que aparece a la conciencia no remite a un fenómeno que pueda ser conocido antes de ser experimentado por los sentidos. No hay nada detrás del objeto, “el fenómeno se toma como aquello que se da directamente a través de los actos de conciencia [...] un retorno a las cosas mismas,” al mundo tal como aparece (Natanson, 1962: 10). El carácter experiencial es clave para la fenomenología: la percepción, el movimiento, la sensación, la memoria o la conciencia del cuerpo. La fenomenología se ocupa de la experiencia consciente del mundo. Puede describirse como “el estudio de la experiencia humana y del modo en que las cosas se nos presentan en y a través de dicha experiencia” (Sokolowsky, 1999:2).

Para captar los fenómenos tal y como aparecen a la conciencia, Husserl propuso lo que denominó reducciones fenomenológicas, que suponen la suspensión de los juicios sobre la existencia del mundo para llegar a los significados y sentidos de la realidad. Husserl llamó

introducción de una ontología relacional, que incide en la comprensión de las esencias. Merleau-Ponty se refirió a esta concepción relacional de la esencia cuando definió la fenomenología como “el estudio de las esencias,” y el núcleo de la cuestión es “definir las esencias, como la esencia de la percepción o la esencia de la conciencia.” Para él, la fenomenología “es también una filosofía que vuelve a situar las esencias en la existencia y piensa que la única manera de comprender al hombre y al mundo es partiendo de su “facticidad.” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: lxx).

actitud natural a la vida de los seres humanos en su funcionamiento cotidiano. En la actitud natural, los seres humanos, incluidos los científicos, presuponen la existencia de un mundo exterior y de una realidad objetiva ahí fuera. La suspensión de la actitud natural supone un cambio respecto a los enfoques filosóficos y científicos anteriores, especialmente en psicología, sobre la mente y el mundo. La reducción deja a un lado la inmersión con las cosas del mundo y “nos deja con las estructuras intencionales que muestran cómo la objetividad se constituye a partir de la subjetividad” (Moran, 2000: 164). A través del cuestionamiento de los presupuestos de la existencia, de nuestras suposiciones y de las cosas que se dan por sentadas, la suspensión de la actitud natural es una forma de tomar conciencia de las experiencias y de los significados que se les otorga. Como veremos, la suspensión de la actitud natural de Husserl y su idealismo trascendental no son unánimemente compartidos por otros fenomenólogos, especialmente en la fenomenología existencial.

Es importante tener en cuenta que la fenomenología no es un enfoque exclusivamente europeo de la relación entre el yo existente y los objetos del mundo, aunque se haya tematizado con este nombre en Europa. La reflexión fenomenológica no es un fenómeno nuevo ni único en Europa. Más bien, puede decirse que el avance de la fenomenología de la intencionalidad significa que la filosofía occidental finalmente comenzó a comunicarse con la ontología fundacional de otras tradiciones filosóficas y a comprenderla milenios después (Kang, 2012; Park, 2013; Kim, 2003). Diferentes autores y tradiciones asiáticas, africanas¹¹ antiguas y

¹¹ Teodos Kiroso señala las similitudes y la relación entre el concepto africano de *Nun* y el *Tao* de Lao Tzu. Ambos tienen implicaciones en su comprensión de la ontología y el ser en el África antigua y el taoísmo. *Nun* es la materia de la que fue creado el ser humano y se relaciona y representa como el agua: fluida y “fluyendo hacia el infinito”, pero no es agua. *Nun* es el “Ser mismo” (Kiros, 2021: 5), pero no es un ser basado en la plenitud y la sustancia, sino que precede a todo el mundo material y es un indefinible. Tanto el *Tao* como el *Nun* “El *Tao* es el *Nun* mismo. Es algo en virtud de esta nada” (Kiros, 2021: 22), que puede compararse con el concepto budista de *Sunyata* (vacío).

africanas parten de la base de la vacuidad o infinitud de la conciencia, de la metafísica relacional, de la observación del mundo tal y como se experimenta, y han producido reflexiones que podrían calificarse de fenomenológicas a pesar de no haberse presentado ni denominado como tales. En parte, esto se debe a que estas tradiciones precedieron a la formación europea de la fenomenología como subcampo bajo la filosofía; se ha documentado la influencia vital de otras tradiciones filosóficas en la filosofía europea (Park, 2013; Wright, 2001). Como señala Henry (2006), una forma de reflexión “fenomenológica” no es exclusiva de la filosofía occidental y se ha producido desde otras áreas de conocimiento. Por ejemplo, se han realizado copiosos estudios comparativos entre la fenomenología y la filosofía budista, particularmente la del Yogachara de Nagarjuna (Williams, 2008; Jung, 2011).

Aunque hay fuertes posturas eurocéntricas en los fenomenólogos europeos, como hemos visto en el caso de Husserl o Heidegger (Maldonado-Torres (2008) señala que el primero no es necesariamente reaccionario, como lo es el segundo). Para Gordon la reflexión fenomenológica es intrínsecamente una forma poscolonial de pensamiento, o, como él lo expresa, la “fenomenología poscolonial” es redundante porque “[ningún] momento de indagación está epistemológicamente cerrado”, y la clausura es una de las características del racismo y el colonialismo en sus dimensiones epistémicas (Gordon, 2008: 129). Lo que él llama “suspensión ontológica” implica la interrogación constante y radical de los supuestos y presupuestos en cada momento y etapa de la reflexión, incluso a nivel de los métodos, su lógica, legitimidad y del propio proceso de legitimación. Esta interrogación radical incluye un enfoque metacrítico de la propia fenomenología y de lo que la legitima: “[e]l enfoque poscolonial/fenomenológico sugiere, entonces, que incluso la historia de la fenomenología debe ser abordada con el ojo cauteloso de la suspensión ontológica” (Gordon, 2006: 103).

Añade que las diferentes manifestaciones de la reflexión fenomenológica, ya sean europeas, africanas o asiáticas, son sólo eso, manifestaciones de la reflexión fenomenológica, pero no son lo que legitima el trabajo fenomenológico.

1.2.2.2 Fenomenología existencial

La fenomenología existencial conlleva dos aspectos principales en el análisis fenomenológico: el rechazo de la noción de naturaleza humana y de las comprensiones a priori de lo que es el ser humano. No aborda al ser humano en abstracto, sino en las situaciones en las que vive el ser humano, las relaciones sociales en las que está inmerso, cómo se vive, cómo las condiciones limitan y posibilitan al humano, y cómo el humano da sentido y constituye la realidad. Como añade Gordon, esto nos permite hablar de la raza, el negro o el ser humano sin reducirlo a una esencia. La raza, lo negro o lo humano son una función de las condiciones y relaciones vividas. De este modo, los términos raciales se utilizan sin darles un estatus ontológico. En resumen, la fenomenología existencial es:

la posición de que, en última instancia, la realidad humana no puede encerrarse en términos de una esencia y que, fundamentalmente, una antropología fuerte o propiamente filosófica es aquella en la que la comprensión del ser humano emerge de cómo éste vive (Gordon, citado en Yancy, 1998: 102-3).

En relación con esto, esta distinción puede verse en los inicios de la fenomenología existencial europea con la noción de *Dasein* de Heidegger, que está intrínsecamente vinculada con la existencia y el tiempo, la comprensión de Jaspers de la condición de *existenz* como un yo abierto, no fijo y situado, la crítica de Sartre a la falta de historicidad, el ego trascendental y el idealismo de Husserl, y el excesivo cognitivismo de la reducción fenomenológica (More, 2017). Aquí, Sartre parte del ego trascendental de Husserl. Su obra de 1936 *La trascendencia del yo* desafía las afirmaciones de la egología husserliana. Para Sartre (2004), mientras que la

conciencia se dirige a un objeto como en la conciencia de algo, también pertenece a la no-posicionalidad que no se dirige a ningún objeto en particular. En pocas palabras, la autoconciencia es consciente de ser consciente. Esta conciencia no implica un ego, que es un objeto de la conciencia. Sartre sostiene que el ego sólo aparece en la reflexión, un proceso constitutivo, y no aparece en la conciencia pre-reflexiva (Sartre, 2004). La distinción entre lo pre-reflexivo y lo reflexivo se ilustra en la obra de Sartre de 1943, *El ser y la nada*, en el conocido ejemplo: Una persona está contando cigarrillos, pero no está pensando “estoy contando cigarrillos.” Cuenta “un cigarrillo, dos cigarrillos, tres cigarrillos...” Este es el modo pre-reflexivo. Entonces otra persona le pregunta: “¿qué estás haciendo?” a lo que la primera persona responde: “estoy contando cigarrillos,” que es el modo reflexivo (Sartre, 1992). Así, la conciencia es la nada. Sus ideas son notablemente similares a la naturaleza de la conciencia descrita en el budismo zen.

El cuerpo ocupa un lugar importante en la obra de Merleau-Ponty (2012) sobre la percepción y la corporeidad como forma de entender el significado del ser humano en su vida. Para Merleau-Ponty, la separación entre el cuerpo material y la conciencia intelectual ha conducido a distorsiones filosóficas y científicas en la comprensión del ser humano y de la realidad humana, lo que ha tenido consecuencias sociales y políticas. La conciencia siempre está encarnada y esta unidad abarca la experiencia del mundo, cómo se vive, se percibe, cómo se sitúa y se relaciona con otras conciencias encarnadas, con las estructuras sociales (Marshall, 2008). Por lo tanto, mientras que la fenomenología husserliana pone entre paréntesis o suspende los juicios sobre la existencia del mundo, la fenomenología existencial se centra precisamente en la existencia cotidiana y en la experiencia humana concreta para poner de manifiesto el ser de la existencia humana, y revelar los fenómenos de la experiencia humana

“tal y como aparecen en su inmediatez existencial,” tal y como los capta y les da sentido la conciencia (More, 2017: 88-89).

Al situar la existencia en el centro, la noción de experiencia vivida adquiere un papel significativo. La experiencia vivida no se refiere al significado subjetivo dado a la experiencia o a un relato empírico de un acontecimiento vivido pasivamente en el pasado. Por el contrario, capta la participación activa de la conciencia encarnada en un mundo ya dado, compartido e históricamente formado que se encuentra objetivamente. La experiencia vivida vincula el interior y el exterior, el yo y el mundo, lo subjetivo y lo objetivo, la conciencia pre-reflexiva e inmediata de lo vivido con la constitución reflexiva de la experiencia. Alfred Schutz escribe:

El sentido no reside en la experiencia. Por el contrario, son significativas las experiencias que se captan reflexivamente (...) Es, pues, incorrecto decir que mis experiencias vividas son significativas por el mero hecho de haber sido experimentadas o vividas a través de La mirada reflexiva señala una experiencia vivida transcurrida y la constituye como significativa. (Schutz, citado en Burch, 1990:134)

Aunque Kant esbozó que la autoconciencia surge en la relación de un yo que experimenta un mundo de fenómenos conectados, y éstos se convierten en fenómenos a través de esta experiencia y por el yo experimentador, para Merleau-Ponty esto no es suficiente. La diferencia con la fenomenología existencial y la experiencia vivida “es que la unidad del mundo, antes de ser planteada por el conocimiento a través de un acto explícito de identificación, es vivida como ya realizada o como ya existente” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: lxxxii). En otras palabras, la conciencia y el yo no sólo surgen en relación con un mundo de objetos y fenómenos que se constituyen como tales a través de la experiencia de la identificación, sino que el yo ya está incrustado en el mundo y en relación con los objetos, eventos u otros yoes. Los significados no se producen a partir de la percepción aislada del mundo, sino en el

compromiso activo con él del yo como conciencia encarnada. “El mundo se revela en primer lugar como el contexto de nuestros proyectos motores, [...] en el que nos revelamos a nosotros mismos en primer lugar como agentes” (Burch, 1990: 147).

Como sugiere Merleau-Ponty (2012), el filósofo y la comprensión de lo que es la filosofía no están exentos de esta realidad existencial. El filósofo ya no realiza una actividad intelectual y conceptual desvinculada del mundo circundante, sino que se sitúa en el mundo, en su existencia concreta encarnada, y se interroga a sí mismo y al mundo a través de la experiencia. No es pues casualidad que personas de acción que no eran estrictamente filósofos, como los psiquiatras François Tosquelles o Franco Basaglia, se apoyaran en la fenomenología existencial en sus trabajos sobre la transformación social desde y dentro de sus campos. También lo hicieron Karl Jaspers y Frantz Fanon, dentro y fuera del psiquiátrico, y otros filósofos-activistas-intelectuales públicos como Steve Biko, Aimé Césaire, Simone de Beauvoir y Jean-Paul Sartre. Estos casos revelan otro rasgo ya mencionado del pensamiento existencial, su falta de presunta clausura ontológica y epistemológica. No sólo fueron fenomenólogos existenciales, sino que lo combinaron de forma diferente con el marxismo, el psicoanálisis, el surrealismo y otros enfoques sociales, políticos, filosóficos y psicológicos.

Como veremos, las implicaciones de la fenomenología existencial para el estudio del racismo son múltiples. Gordon señala que “cualquier teoría que no aborde la dimensión fenomenológica existencial del racismo adolece de una incapacidad para abordar la dimensión situacional” (Gordon, 1997a: 70). Como señala Linda Martín Alcoff, la fenomenología existencial arroja luz sobre la confusión que rodea al estudio de la raza. Desacredita enfoques como el esencialismo racial, el nominalismo racial, el entendimiento de que la raza no es real y no existe, y aborda los relatos puramente objetivistas o subjetivistas de la raza. Muestra cómo

la raza se vive en el cuerpo, cómo informa la subjetividad y las relaciones sociales cotidianas, cómo moldea la percepción y el sentido común, cómo varía la racialización y cómo los significados pueden ser desbaratados por la investigación fenomenológica: “las reactivaciones producidas por la descripción fenomenológica crítica no se limitan a repetir la percepción racializadora, sino que pueden reorientar la posicionalidad de la conciencia” (Alcoff, 1999: 25).

1.3 Objetivo de la investigación y esquema del capítulo

Esta tesis pretende presentar las contribuciones filosóficas del pensamiento existencial africano y negro para ampliar las epistemologías de los estudios sobre la paz y cómo podrían informar los enfoques de los estudios sobre la paz, así como la pedagogía de la paz para abordar la raza y el racismo. El alcance de la investigación se basa y está limitado principalmente por mi situación dentro de los estudios sobre la paz europeos como estudiante y profesor.

El capítulo 2 comienza con la confusión y la dificultad en torno a las cuestiones de raza y racismo principalmente en las instituciones académicas de los estudios sobre la paz. Problematizo la evasión y la confusión que observo a menudo cuando se discute sobre la raza y el racismo en el entorno de las aulas de los estudios sobre la paz. Antes de abrir el debate sobre la raza y el racismo, debe preceder el interrogatorio de la historia de sus fundamentos conceptuales. El propósito de este capítulo es examinar si la ontología de la raza es relevante para el efecto del racismo. Pretendo demostrar que el uso semántico de la palabra raza y el debate sobre su eliminación están fuera de lugar. Se da como ejemplo el desplazamiento de la raza por la cultura y la etnia. Sostengo que la elisión de la raza en muchos discursos relacionados con ella se debe a su separación de sus raíces coloniales. Examinó cómo la raza se ha asociado exclusivamente con el nazismo y el Holocausto. Posteriormente, examino la

raíz de la palabra raza, y cómo su uso estuvo implicado en la noción de subhumano desde el inicio de la expansión colonial europea.

En el capítulo 3, examino cómo la raza influyó en la conceptualización universal del ser humano. El concepto de raza se desarrolló en relación con el establecimiento de la norma universal de humanidad a través de la gobernanza colonial de la explotación violenta y el exterminio de los subhumanos. El objetivo es investigar cómo la raza fue co-constitutiva de la forma en que lo humano fue estudiado e incluido o excluido de los derechos por el derecho internacional en el telón de fondo de la Revolución Francesa en yuxtaposición con la Revolución Haitiana. El pensamiento racial configuró el amplio campo discursivo en el que se inauguraron las ciencias humanas, el liberalismo y los derechos humanos.

En los dos capítulos siguientes, presento las principales contribuciones históricas y contemporáneas del pensamiento africano y de la filosofía existencial negra que hicieron una intervención crítica y política en los sistemas euromodernos de producción de conocimiento que imponían y justificaban las prácticas racistas.

El capítulo 4 introduce y ofrece una visión amplia y un perfil del campo de la filosofía africana o de la diáspora africana, incluyendo sus límites, obstáculos, cuestiones y principales preocupaciones. Para introducir la filosofía *africana*, contextualizo la filosofía *africana* dentro de la dinámica histórica e intelectual que ha negado a los negros y africanos la capacidad de razonar y de actuar en el mundo. Como parte del proyecto de “provincializar Europa” (Chakrabarty, 2001), la filosofía africana expone el provincialismo de la filosofía europea y amplía la visión de lo que es la filosofía, su historia y lo que se ha dejado de lado. Para ello, relaciono las obras de la filosofía africana con la filosofía del antiguo Egipto o Kemet, descubriendo las raíces africanas de la filosofía griega. También exploro la relación dialéctica

entre la filosofía *africana* y la europea dentro del debate de la universalidad y la particularidad. Esto muestra cómo la filosofía *africana* es un proyecto universalizante al desvelar las contradicciones y particularidades de la filosofía europea, que se enorgullece de tener una fuerza normativa de universalidad. La filosofía *africana* realiza así un giro en la geografía de la razón.

El capítulo 5 reduce el alcance y se centra en la filosofía *africana* y negra de la existencia y la fenomenología existencial. Presento la producción intelectual y la contribución de W.E.B. Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, Steve Biko y Lewis Gordon. Estos pensadores teorizaron a partir de su reflexión sobre el significado de ser negro en un mundo anti-negro; sobre la existencia negra, la agencia humana desafiada por el colonialismo, el racismo y la esclavitud. ¿Qué significa ser negro en un mundo en el que la negritud se asocia a valores negativos y a la ausencia de valores? ¿Qué formas de conciencia produce la existencia y la experiencia en un mundo racista? ¿Qué significa la conciencia negra desde el punto de vista político y filosófico? A partir de estas preguntas iniciales surgieron otras en relación con lo que uno hace con las opciones disponibles y la responsabilidad sobre sus elecciones. La importancia crucial para el estudio del racismo y la praxis antirracista es la cuestión de la libertad, la noción de lo humano como desprovisto de esencia y siempre en construcción, y el énfasis en la agencia humana en esta orientación filosófica. W.E.B. Du Bois abrió el campo de la reflexión fenomenológica a través del tema de la doble conciencia, el velo y la vista. Su obra abunda en cuestiones meta-reflexivas que expresa a través de la noción de lo que significa ser un problema. Entre los múltiples elementos fenomenológicos existenciales de la obra de Frantz Fanon, me centro en dos aspectos principales: la cuestión de la metodología y la centralidad del cuerpo. Exploro la tematización del Black Consciousness Movement tal y como se formula en los escritos de

Steve Biko. Destaco el significado explícitamente político de la conciencia negra desarrollado por Lewis Gordon y otros trabajos fenomenológicos existenciales.

En el capítulo 6, recapitulo las implicaciones de los capítulos anteriores para los estudios sobre la paz y la pedagogía de la paz. Formulo imperativos disciplinarios y pedagógicos. Exploro la identidad y la narrativa fundacional de la disciplina, la relación con otros campos, los límites disciplinarios de los estudios de paz, su relación con las relaciones internacionales para analizar las razones detrás de lo que Azarmandi (2018) llama el silencio racial dentro de los estudios de paz. Adelanto algunas de las posibles contribuciones que la filosofía existencial *africana* y negra puede ofrecer a los estudios de paz.

Chapter 2. Race and Racism

Introduction

The chapter starts with the confusion and difficulty around the issues of race and racism primarily in the academic institutions of peace studies. In 2016, I took up a six months student fellowship at the Center for Social Studies headed by Boaventura de Sousa Santos oriented toward more radical social transformation and the discussion on race and racism was quantitatively and qualitatively much richer. Considering the rise of far-right politics, state violence on the racialized and migrant, and the significance of Black Lives Matter, the increasing relevance of race and racism has played a relatively minor role in the field of peace studies, which is the program of my postgraduate studies.

This chapter addresses the challenges posed by race and racism in the context of peace studies especially for pedagogy and research. In the first section, I problematize the evasion and the elision I often meet when discussing race and racism in the peace studies classroom setting. In the second section, by looking at the confusion around the topic, I argue that the social constructivist thesis of race on the basis of the avowed rejection of the biological is not adequate to tackle the real issue. The third section discusses that the displacement of race for culture and ethnicity is one outcome. The fourth section traces how the colonial roots of race were erased in the wake of Second World War which I contend is the main barrier in getting to the heart of the matter of race and racism.

2.1 Why is race talk difficult and why should we talk about it?

The word I most frequently use is “race” the topic of my research for the past seven years or so. I read about race, discuss race, think about race, and even dream about race, but as an academic concept. When a neighbor, friendly elderly lady who lived the next door used the word, I startled a bit. She questioned: “where is the girl from your race?” Conversing in Spanish, the word I heard was *raza*. It may have been the first time I heard that word directed at me and outside the academic context. Obviously, the lady was not aware that people no longer use the word “race” to refer to another human being, at least in Europe where the word ‘race’ brings back the memories of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. The use of the word often causes people to shudder upon hearing it. In France, the word “race” was removed from the National Constitution and any race-based data was deleted in 2018. Unlike the US and the UK, much of Western Europe do not collect racial statistics. Even in the US, debates often arise as to whether racial categories should be used in the census, as they may end up perpetuating those very categories. The American Sociology Association in 2002 stated that “[g]rowing numbers of humanist scholars, social anthropologists, and political commentators have joined the chorus in urging the nation to rid itself of the concept of race” (Banton, 2015: 1).

Underscoring such arguments is the idea that the evocation of race creates racism. If race is taken as a category that divides people mainly by skin color, it is fair to conclude that such a category should be abolished and eliminated. If one believes that race-thinking or rather, race talk causes racism, then, saying the word might make one feel racist. Being called out for racism is taken to be a serious offense to one’s moral integrity. In other words, seemingly unnoticing one’s “race” may even be encouraged as virtuous. With the added burden of having to avoid political incorrectness as a rule of thumb, the discussing of race and racism in the

classroom has already been made difficult from the onset. As Suhraiya Jivraj (2019) argues, “to talk about racism or even (institutional) whiteness has become almost taboo.” Thus, as Lewis Gordon points out, even when race and racism are being talked about, “there are ways of *not* talking about something through seemingly talking about it” (2018: 29).

Why is race (and racism) talk difficult? First of all, it is confusing. John Solomos and Les Back’s 1996 volume *Racism and Society* starts with:

[T]he notion of race is still widely used in both popular and scientific discourses when it is widely accepted that ‘races’ as such do not exist ... This has reached the stage where some writers argue vehemently that the notion of ‘race’ must be bracketed every time it appears in social scientific discussion. (Solomos and Back, 1996: 1)

What can we possibly talk about something that is, at least in academic settings, not supposed to exist? If race is something like a unicorn (a word that has sense but no referent), it seems meaningless to discuss it. Unlike in the U.S. where folk psychology takes the natural division of races for granted¹², the situation in Europe portrays a more of the “racism without race” phenomenon¹³ (Lentin, 2011; Layne, 2019; Wekker, 2016; Wischmann, 2016). Wischmann (2016) notes:

[C]ontinental Europe and in particular Germany avoids the concept of racism due to its history (Hund 2006). The claim that using ‘race’ as a critical concept reproduces racial stereotypes is combined in Germany with a taboo of ‘race’. The widespread belief is that racism has been overcome with the end of National Socialism in 1945 and the Re-education programme of the late 1940s. (2016: 476)

¹² It is also a place where the central role of race in the formation of the U.S. society (Omi and Winant, 1986) and the history of political resistance by the minority citizens enables a more open discussion on race and racism.

¹³ In the U.K. context, the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies (CCCS) and black power movement generated a critical discourse on race and theoretical framework for policy and public discussion (Fomina, 2010). The race discourse in Europe mostly takes place within the migration policies and debates.

Secondly, since it is a taboo subject in Europe, it has not been talked about. It is difficult to talk about something simply because we are not used to talking about it. When something has been repressed, a peculiar kind of anxiety surfaces upon bringing the topic. The anxiety is almost instinctual and visceral that no amount of composure can hide such spontaneous and automatic responses to the race talk. However, merely talking about it more often, though it might lessen the initial discomfort, does not mean the race talk benefits its participants. When the pedagogical aim targets “enlightening” the students who believe they do not need racial knowledge, theoretical and practical rigor is lost (Leonardo and Porter, 2010). A pedagogical strategy is important since race talks involves everyone who each is a different “stakeholder,” (Ibid.), which becomes another reason for the difficulty of race talk.

Third, race talk is even more challenging when it involves different positions within the social hierarchies of race. The international body of students studying in Castellón comprises of multi-national/ethnic/cultural/racial backgrounds from four corners of the world. Depending on the background, their conjecture and understanding of race and racism vary over wide spectrum. Sometimes, even when a rigorous approach has been made by a pedagogue, denial and violent eruption takes place. Tension arises because race talk “unveils things about ourselves that we may prefer not to know” (Gordon, 1999: ix). The need for defending against a disadvantageous (however conceived) claim on one’s position and justifying it is natural human reaction in most situations. This manifests in defense of white positions by deflecting or diminishing the issue, and turning the table on people of color. White students are also terrified of appearing to be racist, which makes them harder to accept a mistake when challenged by students of color. Students of color have epistemic privilege to see what white students often fail to see, although this does not mean they are always correct (Leonardo and

Porter, 2010). They are also in a more vulnerable position within a white academic institution. Their sense of indignation at times would dismiss discussion on race premised on the popular antiracist discourse of social construction of race. The followings are cases in point:

Case 1 – “This is not about race any more. It’s about the economic power!”

The supervenience of class argument takes place when economically underprivileged white students feel they are falsely accused of having white privilege. One time, a black male African student was confronted by two white female European students for having a more privilege in his country than they have whose postgraduate degrees would not necessarily guarantee (prestigious) jobs in Europe with high unemployment rates and numerous overqualified applicants for limited positions. I was also told once by a peer after reading my paper which contains the description of my experience of racism: “You have a privilege. You study in Europe.” Deflecting race by class, gender, sexuality, nationality is often adopted.

Case 2 – “It is really about cultural difference”

This attitude is most common as racial difference *ought* to be unrecognized. Jumping to a hasty conclusion for depoliticized intercultural solution exoticifies non-European cultures while the white norms remain intact.

Case 3 – “I experienced racism when I was in Africa!”

Although this usually has to do with conflation of race with prejudice which arises from conceptual confusion, this is most often used as a defense by white

students by using a false notion of “reverse racism.” In other cases, stereotyping among Europeans is pointed out to illustrate it as an instance of racism: “Isn’t it also racist to associate the French with baguette?”

Case 4 – “Race is a myth!”

This comes from those more versed in race literature. The only problem with this is it does not get discussion further than claiming that race is a social construction. This phrase is sometimes used to end the discussion or intellectualize.

Case 5 – “.....”

For white students, uncomfortable silence usually means dissociation with the discussion as they are afraid of making a mistake, or have little to say. They do not dare to question for fear of being called ignorant. For students of color, uncomfortable silence usually comes from a strategic choice: they may feel exhausted to reiterate their points; the teacher and classroom may feel “too white” or unsafe for them; or it feels too risky or vulnerable for them to speak up.

Above cases accompany emotions: outburst of tears, anger and rage, shame and guilt, frustration and humiliation, hostility and resentment. Some students may find some of their classmate’s remarks hurtful. Some may feel alienated from the discussion feeling they have nothing to contribute. Pedagogy plays a crucial role: as *how* to teach and lead a discussion is even more important than what to teach (Jacobs et al., 2006). A pedagogue has a double

challenge of accommodating students from different locations whose experience of race is either intellectual or lived (Leonardo and Porter, 2010). A black African student was upset by a white European professor's description of a racist phenomenon. Although, obviously, the professor may have spoken with antiracist intention for the purpose of his teachings, his portrayal of perceived value of skin color nevertheless seemed to leave an impression of essentialist assumptions. Providing empirical evidence of racism at the level of a mere factual account—although it can do a job of making the topic of race real for white students (Jacobs, et al., 2006)—can inadvertently have the effect of disempowering students of color. The negative representation and victimization of people of color only confirms the racist logic of ascribing inferiority to them: “something has gone incredibly wrong when students of color feel immobilized and marginalized within spaces and dialogues that are supposed to undo racism” (Leonardo and Porter, 2010: 147).

As we have seen, race talk is difficult because: 1) it is confusing 2) we are not accustomed to talking about it 3) it becomes an identity issue. It is understandable for the students not to want to confront openly in the class. A “safe” option is to play along but never to engage deeply, taking an objective or “balanced” position. Then, if not non-existent, discussions are carried out in a superficial and performative manner, hastily declaring to be antiracist (Ahmed, 2006), and saturated with evasiveness and circumvention of the heart of the matter. After a few of those failed attempts at meaningful discussions, students learn to avoid mentioning the topic altogether. Lewis Gordon describes the situation succinctly:

Race talk is dirty business, primarily because race discourse exists in a racist context, a context that is occasioned by such a desire to deny what it is that its mode of operation is to play on ambiguities of the human condition in order to avoid getting to the heart of the matter (1997b: 69).

What would be the way of talking about race without eschewing “getting to the heart of the matter”? I intend to get to the heart of the matter in this chapter but, firstly, I begin with the preliminary work that involves clearing out some conceptual confusions around the approach to “race.” The purpose of race talk, particularly *for* peace studies founded on normative values with an emphasis on praxis, ultimately is to unravel how racism works as structural, physical, and symbolic violence, so we can effectively combat racism. My position is with the scholars “who find race itself to be less an issue and racism to be the primary concern” (Gordon, 1997b: 61) but I also find, from my experience of teaching a peace studies master’s class on race and racism, that bringing race into the focal analysis can benefit the antiracist purpose and, subsequently, open up meaningful debates about racism. Elision of race in discussions of racism is, I argue, what precisely makes racism difficult to understand. This is detrimental for antiracist work to focus on what really matters:

One of the key problems preventing us from effectively combatting racism: so many people do not actually understand what it is. At the same time (and this compounds the problem) so many people are invested in describing things as NOT racism. (Barnor Hesse, 2019)

When discussing the ontology of race and gender, Ron Mallon (2006) provides a sketch of the contemporary philosophical terrain regarding the status of the concept of race, dividing it into three valid competing schools of thought regarding the ontological status of race, along with the discarded biological conception. *Racial naturalism* signifies the old, biological conception of race, which depicts races as bearing “biobehavioral essences: underlying natural (and perhaps genetic) properties that (1) are heritable, biological features, (2) are shared by all and only the members of a race, and (3) explain behavioral, characterological, and cultural predispositions of individual persons and racial groups”

(2006: 528–529). While philosophers and scientists have reached the consensus against racial naturalism, philosophers nevertheless disagree on the possible ontological status of a different conception of race. Mallon divides such disagreements into three *metaphysical* camps (*racial skepticism*, *racial constructivism*, and *racial population naturalism*) and two *normative* camps (*eliminativism* and *conservationism*).

For the metaphysics of race, although the outdated belief that races share essences has long been discounted from social sciences and humanities field, there is still a wide variety of dispute over what race is, if it exists. The belief that races do not exist is called racial skepticism. The opposing view that races exist as a social construct is called racial constructionism. There are also those who believe in biological differences among races, although they do not attribute social meanings to those biological traits. Such a view is called racial population naturalism. The metaphysical positions on race are closely related to the normative positions on ‘race’ talk. If races do not exist, it is not only an error but also misleading to talk about race as if it exists. This position argues for eliminating racial terms, and thus called eliminativism (or nominalism). While the constructionists argue for conservation of racial terms as the referents mean something. This position is called conservationism (Alcoff, 2006; Mallon, 2006).

While there are apparent disputes over the metaphysics of race, Mallon points out that they are shared by a broad base of agreement. Although eliminativists use the social construction argument to claim that races do not exist, the constructionism tends to start from the position that race exists but is a social construction. Both will agree that race is a social construct. What they are really arguing about is what we do with race as a social construct. Such a claim can never be the ending point, but a departure from which to discuss how we talk about race, which becomes a normative concern. Both theorists will also ultimately argue that

race, its concept and terms, will become eventually useless in an ideal world as neither is interested in preserving the human categories of race for its own sake. However, until that time comes, what we do to bring about that world more quickly will still involve thinking about what race means in a social world, which then will inform what we do with “race” talk. Here, race talk means the use of the terms and concepts of race to talk about the race and racial phenomena. While the metaphysical questions of race remain in the purely theoretical and philosophical domain, race talk involves the normative question. It is asking what we ought to do with race talk.

2.2 We should not talk about race because race is not real

“Race doesn’t exist! It has no scientific basis. It is a myth!”

How may one talk about race when the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) declared in 1950 in the wake of the Second World War that “race” be a social myth as it was biologically untenable? This is the kind of argument that is often heard in academic settings, and such disqualification of the legitimacy of race is precisely what impedes going deeper into the race discussion. It reflects a generally held scholarly consensus that there is no such a concept as “race” along which humans can be divided in a genetically meaningful way. Since it is unscientific, the concept and usage of the term has to be discarded. It is unreasonable and even unethical to continue to use “race.” This is the position of the so-called eliminativists or race skeptics (Appiah, 1992; Zack, 1993). They base their argument on the lack of biological validity of race. Kwame Anthony Appiah (1992) argues that, in philosophizing the meaning of the word “race,” it can be viewed in two aspects: ideational and referential. The ideational account of race indicates that univocality of meaning

is absent as the users have different ideas and beliefs about race across time and place. As for the referential account, race fails to refer to an object out in the world that can be called “race” neither scientifically nor culturally. According to Appiah, “race” is a historically mistaken biological concept thus its use is metaphysically unjustifiable and ethically risky. Correcting this metaphysical and ethical fallacy and eliminating the category of race from the discourse and the real life is Appiah’s view of a rational and just world according to the liberal tradition to which he adheres (1992: 92). At a first glance, this makes sense when we think of how race-thinking and race-talk appears to reenact social division and everyday life prejudices and fuel die-hard racism. It also seems to be a good idea not to talk about race at all since it is not only scientifically incorrect but also fallacious to invoke something that *does not exist*.

However, scholars who take a more relational view on race and racism (Linda Martín Alcoff, Lewis Gordon, David Theo Goldberg, Lucius Outlaw, Barnor Hesse, Alena Lentin) question this contention of the non-existence of race and the subsequent claim that the end of race leads to the end of racism. First of all, Appiah’s argument for the ontological basis of race shows a few erroneous assumptions on the basis of theory of reference he uses. The way Appiah problematizes the meaning of race on the ideational and referential grounds based in his semantic realism disregards what is involved in the human practices of meaning constitution in a messy world beyond the laboratory setting. As Lewis Gordon rightly points out, no other social categorization would meet such requirements:

Would not the objections about race on the basis of failed consensus and reference also apply to such concepts as “love,” “community,” “sociality,” “humanity” —or, perhaps words for Appiah, “science,” “logic,” and “reason”? (Gordon, 1997b:121)

Second, the eliminativist argument bases its claims on biological ontology (Alcoff, 2005; Gordon, 1997b, 2006; Lentin, 2015). This has been the main source of the confusion and rightly so, as the social sciences had to derive validity from other disciplines. However, “race” has never been a purely biological concept, to which I will return in the last section. Furthermore, the dependence on biology to determine its legitimacy is not only misplaced but also precarious. If genetic science was to validate —as the right-wing funded research programs on ethnobiology are returning to and recently reasserting— a scientific basis for race, the antiracist argument that asserts non-existence of race based on biology would backfire on itself. In fact, some scholars (Lewis Gordon, David Theo Goldberg, Paget Henry, Lucius Outlaw, Cornel West) observe that racism can continue without race. The racial formation theory, the classic work of sociology on race by Omi and Winant, according to David Theo Goldberg, went too far by insisting that “all racial categories and every racial distinction necessarily discriminate,” an implication of the definition they offer for racism (Goldberg, 1993: 88). Omi and Winant define racism as follows: “A racial project can be defined as *racist* if and only if it *creates or reproduces structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race*” (1987: 71, emphasis original). Race is, defined by Omi and Winant, “*a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies.*” (55, emphasis original) Their rejection of the biological on the basis of social constructivism follows that the meaning of race is transhistorical and transcultural, thus, shifting and unstable. Just because meanings of races change and vary historically and culturally cannot mean race does not exist. The social constructivist argument requires a theory of reference to conclude that the terms do not actually refer to reality¹⁴. And they point out that race does not

¹⁴ This is contradictory as a theory of reference posits what social constructivists reject. SEE Ron Mallon (2007)

refer to biological reality. This claim is contradictory because they base the social constructedness of race in biological ontology, which defeats the very premise of social construction itself. Race may fail to refer to an object in terms of biology but it may still have biological meaning as Gordon points out: “although meaning may be a function of societal conditions [...] it doesn’t follow that what is “meant” is social. [...] both race and racism emerge when the physical or the biological is invoked” (1997: 54). In other words, social categories, even if they are based in biological terms such as race or gender, exist as lived reality for people assuming those categories and bear subjective meanings given by social actors (Rex, 1972).

Thirdly, Appiah’s eliminativist claim “obscures the need for a real debate about the merits of racialized and race-based practices and institutions” (Taylor, 2000: 104). In the similar vein, Alana Lentin asks, if we do not speak about race, how do we “oppose the dehumanization and discrimination committed in its name?” (Lentin, 2019). David Theo Goldberg points out, “the end of racism is confused with no more than being against race” and, consequently, “racial refusal” consumes antiracism (2009: 1). However, as race critical scholars (Alana Lentin, Wulf D. Hund, Barnor Hesse, Sirma Bilge, Silvia Rodriguez Maeso and Marta Araújo) argue, what needs to be “post” (as in postrace) is racism, not race (Hund and Lentin, 2014), as seen in the “racism without race” phenomenon.

The last critique on racial eliminativism is about its resounding familiarity with race-neutral colorblindness adopted by liberal political positions and their attacks on so-called “identity politics.” In this way, the social dimension of race is relegated to an individual matter by which one’s sexuality or race may become “personal” dimensions of the self (Appiah, 1994:

160). When race is taken less as a political structure of social relations, but rather as the question of culture and identity, antiracism loses its political impetus (Lentin, 2004).

Having seen the effectiveness of the eliminativist argument, it may be reasonable to turn to the other option which sometimes is called the constructionist argument. The scholars in this group acknowledge that race exists as a social reality and want to keep the concept of race as it serves a useful category of analysis in social research. The problem is that many of those start with the tacit agreement that race is only a social construct. The social construct argument, like the eliminativist one, lacks in practical and pedagogical value. Not only does it serve to block the discussion from going further, it also leads to a performative contradiction. Believing that the negation of biology in race precedes or, even worse, completes antiracism (this comes from thinking race is a biological concept), students uncritically subscribe to the social construction theory. This is well illustrated in Lewis Gordon's experience of teaching race and racism in various places across the world:

For those of us who teach courses on the study of race and racism, this has led to strange situations in which students often perform what they think is expected of them, and that often involves demonstration of an appearance of thought instead of thinking. They thus often assert, without reflection, the well-known conclusion: race is a social construction. When I hear this, I often ask the students, 'Do you believe that?'

I have asked the question at universities and colleges across the globe. The students are often taken aback, since I have yet to meet any who have been asked such a question before. Although some stick to their claim, most students actually reflect for a moment and, as they think about it, they often admit, reluctantly, that they don't. In truth, more people believe that race is not socially constructed, although many of them do not take the view that the reality of race, or at least belief in its reality, entails a commitment to racism. They simply see a challenge to their commitment to reality. (Gordon, 2011: 56)

As Gordon points out, the rejection of the biological in the face of a recalcitrant reality of physicality of race leaves students to "avow what they do not believe" (Ibid.). Does this not go

against the purpose of critical thinking education? Uncritically offering a quick resolution to the problem, “race is a social construction” gives the impression of debunking the myth of race while still unable to give an answer to what race really is. The social construction thesis is also a vulnerable spot in the antiracist strategy, particularly with the re-emergence of racial science and ethnobiology on the one hand and public access to genetics information such as DNA ancestry testing on the other (McMahon, 2000). This is because the argument bases its justification on biology which itself can be politicized (McMahon, 2000) or, to the extreme, is socially constructed. With this circularity, the social construction argument fails to illuminate what race is, but instead leaves race to the analysis of culture.

2.3 Culture and ethnicity for race

2.3.1 Culture for race

The University of Jaume I peace master’s curriculum deals with philosophy for peace, conflict theory, and development. As an interdisciplinary field, it draws insight on many other disciplines but always with normative and practical purpose. Once a week, there is a course titled Intercultural Seminars which hosts both the first- and second-year students in the master’s program to promote interculturality. The program accommodates a diverse student body of twenty to thirty different nationalities and offers bilingual courses in English and Spanish. This indeed is a great place to learn about other cultures and diverse perspectives on any given topic. When I was in the master’s program, I had a classmate from Rwanda who was a journalist and recounted the media narratives about the ethnic conflict in Rwanda in the 1990s. And it was a fellow student from Afghanistan who told me that the author of *Thousands Splendid Suns* was problematic in her context when my only reference to Afghanistan was

through the said author. In this intercultural setting, the students get acquainted with the political situations, histories, and cultural lives of their peers while enthusiastically promoting theirs; the rising fascism in Brazil, the so-called “Candlelight Revolution” in South Korea, the protests in Lebanon, the elections in Kenya, the migrant debates in Germany, the legacies of Ho Chi Min in Vietnam, 15M in Spain, the mothers of the disappeared in Argentina, to name a few. This could be a potentially enriching experience for the students where they share their knowledge as well as friendship. However, in my view, things are not as enticing for everyone as it seems on the surface as I have elucidated in my co-authored article:

The implications of racism, colonialism, and Eurocentrism are mentioned but not often talked about with full honesty and depth, leaving this task to the practitioners of other disciplines. In our classroom, racism was mentioned as a form of structural violence that can be explained according to certain scientific formula of race, gender, class, nation, etc. (Galtung, 1996). This approach to racism often creates a volatile situation in classroom situations. Different views on what racism is and what it is not would clash in discussions. “Gender” and “Race” would clash sometimes and some female students of color would hesitantly confess their disapproval of feminism, not realizing that their sentiment was actually against apparent racism in certain brands of feminist theories. In general, a great level of confusion would often emerge from the discussion around race. As the program hosted a number of students from across the world, some of the students came from places where the term “race” was best avoided for its strong association with Nazism, while others had daily encounters of what “race” meant in their lived experience. The account of their lived experience as evidence of racism was either dismissed as an extraordinary situation or attributed to the manifestation of structural violence. (Jang & Cordero, 2018: 69)

For students of color, while encountering episodes of racism and the effect of one’s designated race as “a constitutive element of fundamental, everyday embodied existence, psychic life, and social interaction” (Alcoff, 2006: 183), the conceptual theorizing of their experience is lacking in peace studies. Seeing their presence invisibilized and their experience silenced, as much of the course content comes from the hegemonic Euro-American white

perspective, the kind of message they get is clear: you are inferior. This was my own experience as a student of color in my master's program (although I benefited immensely from a few professors who provided critical and radically different perspectives from which to view the hegemonic discourse and encouraged me to engage with critical theories for human liberation and what Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls "Epistemologies of the South"). I feel saddened to find this continues to occur a decade later, among the new generation mostly born around the mid-nineties during which cultural diversity was celebrated.

While the neglect of the issue of race in the academic discipline has students unprepared to tackle the same invisibility in the works of NGOs, UN, social policy, campaigns, interculturalism with an emphasis on community cohesion is promoted uncritically as an upgraded version to the so-called 'failed' multiculturalism of Europe. Implicit in this slogan is that since it is not about race but about cultural differences, learning about 'other' cultures will diminish racism (along with prejudices and ignorance) and foster a more inclusive society. Institutional interculturalism, multiculturalism, and diversity in this way are co-opted and diluted from their original political struggles of peoples (Walsh, 2018; Ahmed, 2012). Race has disappeared from public policy (Craig, 2013) and institutionalized antiracist organizations only meet funding conditions when promoting apolitical and ahistorical cultural events (Sahfi & Nagdee, 2020).

Admittedly, the usage of culture has been increasingly banalized (Beneduce, 2008) in the globalization of neoliberal culture. Culture is something that one consumes in a neoliberal global setting: ethnic foods, exotic holidays, "world" music, etc. Versed in this multicultural knowledge gives one cultural capital, which then is used as a proof of having transcended from "tribal" racism. Although the act of learning and understanding different cultures should be

valued, the institutionalized and consumer-oriented cultural diversity often elides the question of race and racism in “a harmonious, empty pluralism” (Mohanty, 2003: 193). As Lewis Gordon notes: “‘Diversity’ has become a mantra that, without the proviso of critique, could collapse into familiar and paradoxical tropes of celebrating diversity without a difference, or, specifically, power difference” (2020: 12). Sherene Razack points out how a superficial reading of cultural differences not only “keep dominant cultural norms in place” but also reinforce epistemological practices of who “can be studied, known, and managed” (Razack, 1998: 9-10).

Deleting biology from race, culture or ethnicity has become a sort of euphemism for race (de Lepervanche, 1980; Eipper, 1983). A biological meaning of race was replaced by cultural one (Daynes and Lee, 2008) by which the centrality of race is relegated to cultural explanation (Visweswaran, 2010). “New racism” or “cultural racism” described the persistence of racism after its biological reference had been discredited (Rattansi, 2020), particularly in the context of European politics where Islamophobia and anti-migrant sentiments are posed as a threat to culture. Such culturalist discourses, echoing the claims of Samuel Huntington’s *Clashes of Civilizations*, have gained more currency after the “Long Summer of Migration” (2015). In academic settings, culture and ethnicity feel safer, cleaner, seemingly more egalitarian and peace-oriented terms to use than race, which Alena Lentin points to:

The culturalist approach to opposing racism becomes dominant precisely because it focuses on the need to find an alternative to ‘race’ as an adequate means of describing human differences. The antidote to racism, according to this thinking, is the denial of the viability of ‘race’ as a category and the introduction of alternative conceptual tools based on culturalized understandings, such as ethnicity or, more recently, identity. (Lentin, 2005: 382)

When the use of culture and ethnicity in the place of race takes place, it brings a peculiar dimension to reality: a false impression of symmetry. This is plainly evident in many social science texts (Marsh and Keating eds., 2006). Ethnicity is something benign that purged the meaning of biological “subspecies” of race while emphasizing the aspect of “culture,” “seen as a non-hierarchical, and thus more suitable, means of conceptualizing diversity” (Lentin, 2005: 385). Lentin traces this culturalist turn to what Martin Barker (1983) calls ‘the UNESCO tradition’ of antiracism that, in their effort to eradicate the idea of racial superiority, promoted replacing ‘race’ with ‘ethnicity’:

3. (b) The division of the human species into ‘races’ is *partly conventional and partly arbitrary* and does not imply any hierarchy whatsoever. Many anthropologists stress the importance of human variation, but believe that ‘racial’ divisions have limited scientific interest and may even carry the risk of inviting abusive generalisation.

(c) Current biological knowledge does not permit us to impute cultural achievements to differences in genetic potential. Differences in the achievements of different peoples should be attributed solely to their cultural history. The peoples of the world today appear to possess equal biological potentialities for attaining any level of civilization. (UNESCO, 1968: 110)

The starting sentence, “The division of the human species into “races” is partly conventional and partly arbitrary,” needs further unpacking which I will address in the last section in depth.

From the above statement, we find a circular logic that goes:

- 1) A belief in race causes racial hierarchy.
- 2) This is false; thus, we abolish the use of race.
- 3) Instead, we use culture to explain human difference.

In this way, culture would still function as the determining factor in the existing— albeit falsely perceived— hierarchy of humans, which is what ‘race’ was supposed to do according to the

UNESCO logic. An anthropological understanding of culture was expected to relativize the hierarchy of cultural achievements. Thus, the renowned anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, one of the members of the think-tank behind the UNESCO statement, rightly rejected the idea of cultures evolving from ‘primitive’ to ‘civilized’ stages (Lentin, 2005: 386). Each culture had its own values to offer to the world, and thus, cultures had to retain their uniqueness for the enriching purpose of diversity and intercultural communication:

This extreme approach to the idea of cultural diversity, as something static within which cultural groups would ideally remain hermetically sealed despite the fact that they would increase their knowledge of each other, reveals the problems associated with anthropology’s involvement in the search for solutions to the ongoing problem of racism. While certainly no longer universally the case, the legacy of the anthropologists’ role in colonialist regimes and their contribution to an exoticizing and reifying view of non-European cultures cannot be completely overlooked. (Lentin, 2005: 387)

This obsession with diversity resembles the voiced concerns over biodiversity, and one’s cultural authenticity is to be evaluated to the extent they embody their traditions, customs, and mores. However, this rule only applies to those who are racialized as *nonwhite* while the cultures of the dominant white groups lost their anthropological value of ‘culture’ and have been rendered neutral and universalized. In this way, culture for race remains as essentialist and deterministic as what the UNESCO-led project tried to de-essentialize.

Secondly, what if the word culture already implies a notion of race? Robert J. C. Young (1995: 86) notes that the concepts of culture and race developed in tandem in the West, and this complicity has received a “not-so-benign neglect” when “racism lies hidden but propagated within Western notions of culture.” In this way, replacing race with culture did not change the mode of reference to talk about human difference: If inferior races created inferior cultures due to their races, now some cultures were inferior due to their cultures. This produces

the circular logic: “Inferior people create inferior culture, which is the mark of inferior people. Hidden in cultural racism is the notion that some people *could not* create valuable culture, or culture at all” (Gordon, 2013c: 2). The only way to break this logic seems to be, as Franz Boas argued hundred years ago, the cultural relativist option, which indeed has been adopted by the antiracist rhetoric (Kendi, 2009).

The European language *culture*, as it developed throughout the European modernity, has been a foundational element in racial hierarchy. Although the anthropological use of the term expanded its meaning to “the shared meaning and values,” it was not that the majority of people thought their way of living as such. For example, when the word came to East Asia in the nineteenth century, no such concept existed in that region that correlated with the European usage. The Japanese, working as the translator of many Euromodern concepts in the region, had to find an appropriate word from the old Chinese texts. They came up with 文化 (*moon hwa*, a literal meaning of which is “transform by letter, writing”). This shows the Sinocentric worldview in which ethnocentrism was a cultural one (Kang, 2010): while the Han people dominated the middle land for most of the time, its hegemony was founded in the ‘letter’ of Confucian philosophy. Those who assimilated to the ethics of Confucianism were therefore ‘transformed’ by the “letter.” This enabled those who were not ethnic Han to claim full legitimacy once they took the middle land, an example of which is the Qing dynasty founded in the seventeenth century until its demise in 1912 predominantly by the European imperial powers. This contrasts from *limpia sangre* (pure blood) of the Iberian Peninsula when *conversos* (the converted) stood an inadequate means to achieve the full membership in the Christian society.

As I shall elaborate in the last section, the word race has its origins in the Latin word,

radix which means roots of a plant. Hence, one could say from this etymological fact that the word race draws from a botanical or natural association. The separation of culture and nature was not present in the fifteenth century. Instead, it was more of carving out, cutting off, distinguishing from nature which made its etymology of culture (from the Latin word, *colere*). The symbol of “cutting” shared with words like science, judge, analysis, indicates the splitting of the world into two, carving out the human world from the natural world. In this way, culture was a concept that was severed from nature, and in the act of separating, was conferred a superior value to nature. It is this way that culture becomes a distinctively human world, which has another dimension of the symbolic: “producing culture, is therefore, at one and the same time, an act of separation and domestication of time (calendars) and space (brands, borders)” (Beneduce, 2008: 45, my translation)¹⁵.

Cultivation of the mind and the subsequent development of civilization was what culture came to mean in relation to other people the Europeans encountered. It also came to have class overtones (Williams, 1983), that culture only belonged to the European upper class. As the Enlightenment idea of progress became dominant, culture was used as the tool and measure by which the teleological purpose could be carried out and evaluated. There was a process of unilinear, historical self-development of humanity, which all societies would go through and in which Europe was at the pinnacle, played the central role, the highest point of civilization. An anthropological definition came from the criticism of such a view on culture with the capital C. Speaking of *cultures* in the plural meant the distinctive ways of life, the shared values and meanings by nations, classes, groups. Fanon’s well-known article “Racism and Culture” published in 1956 sums this up: “There is first affirmed the existence of human

¹⁵ “produrre cultura, è dunque, ad uno stesso tempo, atto di separazione e di addomesticamento, del tempo (i calendari) e dello spazio (marche, confini).”

groups having no culture; then of a hierarchy of cultures; and finally. the concept of cultural relativity” (Fanon, 1965: 31). Fanon observes that racism was not simply borne out of the idea of human difference in terms of race and/or culture, but rather, the Western conception of culture and its production of race were born as a discourse out of the practices of racism: “Racism is never a super-added element discovered by chance in the course of investigation of the cultural data of a group. The social constellation, the cultural whole, are deeply modified by the existence of racism” (Fanon, 1956: 46). Fanon points out the relationship between racism and culture. If culture is the product of the human encounter with nature and other human groups which is marked by exploitation, extraction, annihilation, and genocide, racism is a cultural element (32). Discourses on race in a racist culture resort to the justification of such domination by every means, both biological and cultural with a difference between the two merely “at the level of surface expression” (Goldberg, 1993: 71). Thus, Fanon observes: “This [scientific] racism that aspires to be rational, individual, genotypically and phenotypically determined, becomes transformed into cultural racism. The object of racism is no longer the individual man but a certain form of existing” (1965: 32).

2.3.2 Ethnicity for race

Inspired by the anthropological appeal to use ethnicity for race, and ethnocentrism for racism, ethnicity became a preferred term by the ethnic turn of the 1960s which gained more popularity at the turn of the century. This was led especially by the British social anthropologist tradition that displaced its inquiry from race to ethnicity (Daynes and Lee, 2008). The ethnic paradigm in sociology followed soon after, under which race is a subsumed category under a broader term “ethnicity” and, as such, has a narrower meaning (Banton, 1992). The tendency to reduce race as a matter of the body, the phenotype, presumes race to be a subtype of ethnicity

(Wimmer, 2014: 7). As Howard Winant critiques, the body only functions as “another signifier of ethnicity” (Winant, 2015: 2180). Winant argues that: “subsuming race as a particular form of ethnicity is part of a sinister neoconservative agenda meant to negate the role that racist ideologies have played in the colonization of the world and to deny that racial exclusion continues to be relevant in contemporary American society and beyond” (2184). Although ethnicity was expected to gradually disappear as modernization accelerated, the resurgence of ethnicity in the 1990s placed itself “at the center of politics” (Horowitz, 1983) and scholars have tried to understand why ethnicity and race persist as powerful forces in the modern world (Jenkins, 2008; Cornell & Hartmann, 1998, Fenton, 1999, Banton, 2015). This is frequently posed as the question in peace studies as to assess the nature of ethnic conflicts around the globe. However, such questions are usually approached by the dehistoricizing, depoliticizing, and abstracted theory of race under the dubious use of the concept of ethnicity (de Lepervanche, 1980; Eipper, 1983).

Michael Omi and Howard Winant, when they published what was to become a landmark in race theory in 1986 *The Racial Formation in the United States*, intended to debunk this mainstream tendency of ethnicity-based theories and class-based theories of race. Ethnicity-based race theories tend to treat race as culture while class-based theories treat race as class. Although it is now established as a classic work in the field of sociology of race, the initial reception of the work was more welcome in other disciplines such as literary and cultural studies where the social constructedness of race had already gained currency from the increasing popularity of the French poststructuralist theories. By showing the historical and political processes of racialization in the U.S., Omi and Winant critiqued the evasive tendency within the social sciences in their dealing with the very concept of race while treating race as

a given social fact and an independent variable in their analysis of social phenomenon. The paucity of the conceptual interrogation of race in mainstream sociology reflected the inability to theorize racism beyond either the understanding of it as a social aberration within the confines of the individual and the psychological or an ideology used by the elites to divide the working class.

The concept of ethnicity is useful when describing certain situations where ethnicity matters. However, there are other situations in which race cannot be reduced to ethnicity (Winant, 2015: 2177). When the conflation of these concepts occurs, it fosters a false symmetry. Read the sentence from *Sociology* by Anthony Giddens: “why racial and ethnic division so frequently produce social conflicts—as in South Africa and many other societies” (2009: 630). Empathy, cultural understandings, and peace communication are offered as a possible solution to the intractable problems that would not go away. Since the liberal political view endorses that cause of social conflicts are found in “an overemphasis on difference and identity at the cost of unity” (Alcoff, 2006: 3), any group identities are renounced in favor of commonality and cosmopolitanism. How does a word such as “division” accurately describe apartheid in South Africa? The grammar of racism is “fundamentally asymmetrical” (Lewis Gordon, *I write what I like*, forward, 2002: viii). Languages such as race relations, racial or ethnic conflicts, racial divisions are inadequate, deficient and show an incomplete picture that assumes false symmetry and equal part on the participants involved, without disclosing this “pervasive asymmetry” (Gordon, 2002: viii). It is also a type of narrative that hides the subject. As Gordon points out, such descriptions give the impression that social force, somehow by itself, can magically manifest practices of injustice. Concealing the subject and use of passive voice often

appear in generic description of racism but also in white antiracist scholarship. A white South African scholar Samantha Vice (2010) writes living as a white in South Africa:

Part of eradicating racism would be to eradicate the forced identification of oneself as a particular public and political product. But how is this realization to be lived and justified in *a strange place* like South Africa, in which the self *is so thoroughly saturated* by histories of oppression or privilege? It is morally appropriate to accept and live with shame, aware of oneself always as privileged and existing *in a world that accommodates one at the expense of others*. (Vice, 2010: 323, 329, emphasis added)

It gives the reader an impression South Africa is a strange place that has somehow autonomously saturated itself with histories of oppression and privilege. It is also the world that accommodates (undefined) one at the expense of (undefined) others, but “not white people who have created the world in which they actively exploit others” (Millazo, 2016: 8-9). Millazo notes: “The problematic logic that facilitates the construction of a passive white subject is endemic to scholarship that advocates white shame” (Ibid.). Likewise, “ethnic conflict” narrative enunciates a hidden message that “which that must not be named (read: race and racism)” are inherent part of society and, thus, inevitable. Although ethnicity scholars tend to shy away from essentialism and emphasize the cultural and historical make up of ethnicity, in leaving race out, they fall back on social essentialism: “the social essentialist concept of race asserts the inevitability of race and races without referring to an idea of intrinsic biological differences that the concept presupposes” (Daynes & Orville, 2008: 105).

Gordon notes that “the rejection of the biological” is “the basis for the recurring significance of culture in the analysis of race” (2011: 70). When the concept of race separates the body from culture, it becomes a somewhat benign and manageable concept of “ethnicity,” a preferred term over “race” for sociologists because it is “a social concept with no biological meaning to cause confusion” (Giddens, 2009: 630). However, if this was the case, assimilation

of migrants of color into the dominant white culture would have been successful. We know from history how the Irish, the Italian, and the Jewish migrants in the US had to earn membership in the dominant Anglo-Saxon white culture by joining the persecution of the nonwhite peoples (Ignatiev, 1995).

What did it mean to the Irish to become white in America? It did not mean that they all became rich, or even ‘middle-class’ (however that is defined); to this day there are plenty of poor Irish. . . . To Irish laborers, to become white meant at first that they could sell themselves piecemeal instead of being sold for life, and later that they could compete for jobs in all spheres instead of being confined to certain work; to Irish entrepreneurs, it meant that they could function outside of a segregated market. To both of these groups it meant that they were citizens of a democratic republic, with the right to elect and be elected, to be tried by a jury of their peers, to live wherever they could afford, and to spend, without racially imposed restrictions, whatever money they managed to acquire. In becoming white the Irish ceased to be Green. (Ignatiev, 1995: 76)

Taking the body out of race means underpins the social sciences which replaced a biological definition with a cultural one. Bernard Boxill, in his famed philosophical work titled *Black and Social Justice* (1992) offers the critique that “the cultural definition of race is evasive” (179) and boldly claims a physical definition of race, which is worth quoting at length:

I propose a physical definition of race. This definition is, for reasons which will presently emerge, the racist’s definition. Individual differences in culture are supremely irrelevant to the way in which the racist classifies people into races. A man with blue eyes and blond hair who loves chitlins and jazz is still a white man, though perhaps a depraved one. A man with black skin and nappy hair who loves Shakespeare and ballet is still a black man, though certainly one who needs putting in his place. And when the black who “passes” is unmasked, it is not because he reveals a secret weakness for chitlins, but because it is revealed that he has black-skinned ancestors. The racist, we observe, takes a race to be a group of people distinguished either by their physical appearance or biology, or else descended from such a group of people, and since I have adopted their conception, I propose that, insofar as black people are a race, they are people who either themselves look black—that is, have a certain kind of physical appearance—or are, at least in part, descended from such a group of people.

This definition of race better supports the idea of black pride and autonomy than the cultural definition and is more useful for an understanding of racism. Consider black pride. If to be black one must share in a particular culture, how can people who have black skins or black ancestors but who do not share in that culture have black pride? The cultural definition of race is evasive. When the racist tells black people that they can accomplish nothing because of their race, he is not telling them that they can accomplish nothing because of their culture. He is telling them that they can accomplish nothing because of their biological being. For racism is based predominantly on biology. Of course, it also maintains that black culture is degenerate, but it assumes that this is because blacks are biologically degenerate. Thus, to rebut racism's lie, to confront it directly, we must use words the way it uses words; we cannot use "race" to mean a cultural group. We must use "race," as racism uses it, to mean a group defined biologically. Only in this way can "race pride" mean "black pride" for all the victims of racism. (Boxill, 1992: 178-179)

Boxill's criticism illuminates the confusion arising when observing the cultural varieties within a said 'racial' group, and 'racial' varieties within a said cultural group. Such confusion needs not be if we see the false dilemma of culture and nature to frame the question in the first place. As Donna Haraway (1999) warns, the delineation between "biology" and the "social" will not lead to critically assessment of race. Furthermore, the tendency to reduce race to be a sole product of scientific racism and, therefore, rejecting "race" (or the *body* in race) results in performative contradiction of noticing race for the body but not admitting the body in race. "Race is not just the bodies, but *about* the bodies; and we don't just see the bodies, we *read* the bodies" (Gordon, 2011: 71, emphasis original). Trying to prove race as biologically false often poses as the initial barrier to being able to discuss race and racism.

Gordon makes the same point for the futility of arguing for non-existence of race:

But if races exist, that wouldn't change the moral impropriety of the general community response. A case in point would be extraterrestrials. In such a case, there is no notion of intraspecies' connection. Would that change one bit the question of treating extraterrestrials with moral respect? Shouldn't we then fight against antiextraterrestrial racism? (Gordon, 2000: 184)

He goes on to state that “From the existential and ethical standpoints, one doesn’t fight against racism simply because race is a scientifically problematic concept. Are we willing to say that if race were not a scientifically problematic concept, we should then not fight against racism?”

2.4 Delinking race from colonialism

The conflation of race with culture and ethnicity and the subsequent evasion of tackling race on its own term brings the confusion around the discussion on racism. This has been pointed out as the mainstream social sciences’ tendency to separate race from its colonial roots (Hesse, 2004; Lentin, 2020; Bhabra, 2011). This was achieved by associating race as a mistaken scientific concept produced by scientific racism of the nineteenth century, and linking it with Nazism and the Holocaust. As David Theo Goldberg (1993: 59) points out this tendency is manifested in social sciences as the prevailing methodology applied to the study of race. To understand what race means and its implications it is necessary to offer a historical account of the term and of the social and historical configurations in which it emerged and was used. The concept of race cannot be delinked from colonialism, the European expansion and conquest from the late fifteenth century on, and from the encounter with unfamiliar forms of human difference. However, as Geraldine Heng argues, racial, or proto-racial, and racist forms thinking were developing in Europe before colonialism (Heng, 2018).

2.4.1 Race after the Second World War

The end of the Second World War and the Holocaust signaled a turning point in delinking race from its colonial roots. A decisive element for the disconnection was the UNESCO-led antiracism project (van Dijk, 2021), *The Race Concept: The Race Question in Modern Science* was published in Paris in 1952 in the wake of the Second World War under

the commission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to rebut Nazi scientific racism. A board of physical anthropologists and geneticists were invited to investigate the scientific validity of the concept of race and author the statement. Amid much opposition and uproar caused by the first statement published in 1950 which clearly stated that race is a social construction, the second statement in 1952 was more tentative in negating the biological meaning of race.

The myth of 'race' has created an enormous amount of human and social damage. In recent years it has taken a heavy toll in human lives and caused untold suffering. It still prevents the normal development of millions of human beings and deprives civilization of the effective co-operation of productive minds. The biological differences between ethnic groups should be disregarded from the standpoint of social acceptance and social action. The unity of mankind from both the biological and social viewpoints is the main thing. (UNESCO, 1952: 101)

The authors emphasize that race is not a biological phenomenon but a social myth (Ibid). However, these statements, as Amade M'charek (2013) observes, did not shut the door to a biological use of race for scientific explorations in the laboratory, but emphasized the “myth” of race in public discourses, and in social and political common speech.

The association of race and racism with biology and Nazism had different implications. As Barnor Hesse (2004: 11) observes, racism is a fairly recent concept: “the lexical item ‘racism’ refers to a twentieth-century concept arising from intellectual critiques of the politics of National Socialism, antisemitism and racial eugenics applied to the Jews in Germany and other parts of Europe during the 1930s and 1940s.” Hesse identifies a “conceptual double bind” of racism between its differing conceptualizations that goes unacknowledged. What was foregrounded are the meanings associated with the anti-fascist critiques of the Jewish Holocaust, and on the other hand, what is foreclosed are the anti-colonial critiques on Western

imperialism (Hesse, 2004: 9). This does not mean that racism has two concepts. Rather, the conceptualization of racism after it appeared in the 1930s had two divergent, at times opposing and conflicting, yet dialogical ways between the hegemonic Eurocentric perspective and the other from anti-colonial orientations.

The European understanding that became hegemonic after the war delinked race and racism from colonialism. The biological critique of race as the ideology of Nazism was not extended to the colonies in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Racism becomes the paradigmatic experiences of the Holocaust, according to which other cases would be measured such as the apartheid and the Jim Crow (Hesse, 2004; Goldberg, 1993; Lentin, 2016).

Once the concept of racism became universalised (internationalised), beyond the particular paradigmatic experience (nationalism, Nazism, the Holocaust) in which it was initialised, it could be and was subject to conceptual claims for inclusion by ‘other’ particularised experiences (e.g., US racial segregation, European colonialism). A conceptual logic emerged where what became foregrounded (exclusion, discrimination, ghettoisation, exterminations) supplied the conceptual resources to translate ‘other’ experiences into the vaunted paradigmatic template. (Hesse, 2004: 14)

What this concept of racism and the process of its universalization hides is what did not fit, challenged or was incommensurable to the paradigmatic experience. As Hesse (2004: 14) poignantly indicates, “In this way the concept of racism is doubly-bound into revealing (nationalism) and concealing (liberalism), foregrounding (sub-humanism) and foreclosing (non-Europeanism), affirming (extremist ideology) and denying (routine governmentality).” What Hesse points out is the historical and the contemporary intricacy of colonialism and racism with liberalism. I will address these aspects in further detail in the next chapter. To that, I will add something that Hesse omits in his analysis, because he has another aim, the philosophical anthropology of liberalism does not enable to see races.

The legacy of this hegemonic view born from in the wake of Nazism is that racism, and with it the idea of race, is today treated a pathological remnant of the racial ideology. It entails an individual or a collective deviation from Western liberal democracy. In any case, it is a fascist anomaly incompatible with Western liberal, universal values, it is unacceptable and morally condemned (Césaire, 2001; Hesse, 2004; Lowe, 2015).

Treating race and racism as a distorted ideology is not only inaccurate to account what race is and how it functions in the colonial process, but also as Hesse (2004) contends via Foucault, analysis based on ideology rapidly lead to questions of truth or falsity, without considering the contextual power relations. In this framework, racism as the perverted ideology means that racism is exterior and non-constitutive of modern, liberal and democratic ideals, values and institutions of Europe, and as such is to be combatted by a neutral ideology predicated on science, Enlightenment values, and liberal democracy (Hesse, 2004).

2.4.2 Race as social construct

The aforementioned critiques of race in the aftermath of the Second World War led to a widespread view and the almost universal acceptance of race as a social construct. The problem is that race is to be done away by declaring it to be a social construct. What does it mean to say something is socially constructed? For Ian Hacking, social constructionist arguments generally posit three main aspects about the socially constructed object: (i) It is not natural, it is not inevitable, it needed not to have existed; (ii) it is not desired; (iii) it can be transformed (Hacking, 1999: 6). The social constructionist approach, in this account, can be considered a critical and transformative approach. However, it presents a serious of important political and theoretical limitations.

Eduardo Bonilla-Silva recalls a conversation with his white colleague that illustrates

the political efficacy of the social constructionist argument: ““Race is a myth, an invention, a socially constructed category. Therefore, we should not make it ‘real’ by using it in our analyses. People are people, not black, white, or Indian. White males are just people”” (Bonilla-Silva, quoted in Lentin, 2020). In that vein, Jason Antrosio (2012) proposes to evaluate the idea of race a social construction by its political effects. He contends that the debates whether race is a social construction or not are irrelevant outside of academic circles, and its political efficacy is insignificant. The social constructionist argument, he points out, favors conservative politics and has not led to any basic transformation of structural racism and the power imbalances. It does not only provide an insufficient explanation to refute biological understandings of race, but it is a “conservative goldmine”: “arguing against the biologization of race—again—provides fodder for conservative or reactionary political positions, since the underlying socioeconomic structural racism is unaltered.” Furthermore, framing debate between facticity and fiction is “untenable” (Antrosio, 2012). This situation echoes Michel Ralph Trouillot’s reflections on history:

Thus between the mechanically “realist” and naively “constructivist” extremes, there is the more serious task of determining not what history is—a hopeless goal if phrased in essentialist terms—but how history works. For what history is changes with time and place, or better said, history reveals itself only through the production of specific narratives. What matters are the process and conditions of production of such narratives. Only a focus on that process can uncover the ways in which the two sides of historicity intertwine in a particular context. Only through that overlap can we discover the differential exercise of power that makes some narratives possible and silences others. (Trouillot, 1995: 25)

Trouillot identifies two important elements when extrapolated to the debate at hand: (i) the focus on what race *is* shifts the focus from how race works; (ii) the debates on what race *is* cannot be separated from the power relations at play. Namely, from what the power relations

seek to silence and to reveal.

For Patrick Wolfe (2011), the idea of social construction of race has been useful to debunk the natural character of race, but it leads to a standstill when it should be the starting point of further questioning. As Lentin (2020) puts it, “[a]ntiracists are very good at denying the biological facticity of race, but not very good at explaining *what* is social about race” According to Alana Lentin, the social constructionism does not only fail to counteract the biological view, but may reaffirm it at the expense of the political. The racial silence that accompanies social constructionism occlude that race is “absently present”, and has never abandoned the biomedical sciences, which operate under the same discredited racial categories. Furthermore, biological research on race is also reappearing within the social and natural scientific and conservatives circles as the so-called race realists (Lentin, 2020).

The following quote is an excerpt from a talk given by Barnor Hesse, and gathered and commented by Alana Lentin, which diagnoses several limitations of the social constructionist argument:

Hesse asks: what is race the social construction *of*? The usual answer, he says, is “race is a construction of the idea that there is a biological racial hierarchy.” However, this does not answer the question “What is race?” “In effect,” Hesse remarks “social constructionists do not have anything to say about race that is not already said by the biological discourses” ...Hesse argues that to resolve the tautology posed by the formulation “race is a social construction of the idea of biological race,” we need an alternative account of race that goes beyond this unexplanatory circularity, because ‘our account of race as a social fact cannot be the same as the very thing we’re discrediting.’ ... And because race does not originate in nineteenth-century biological theorizations, but is, as Hesse explains, ‘colonially assembled over a period of time’ which goes back at least to the fifteenth century, we need more complete historical and political accounts of how race emerged and became institutionalized. What is clear is that there is no way of reducing the broad scope of racial rule to only the ‘bodily or the biological’ (Lentin, 2020, emphasis added).

Circularity, tautology and political inefficacy seem to be the common points among the critical commentators on the social construction of race. Hesse's question "what is race the social construction of?" starts a circular logic with no answers about what race is, how it emerges in the different geographical and historical contexts, and how it functions. Even if accepting that saying it is a social construction could discredit the biological accounts, what does it say about the theological accounts? Similarly to Hesse, for Lewis Gordon, positivism and social constructions are two mutually dependent poles. Positivism appeals to the physicality of reality. In this understanding, the social is secondary, epiphenomenal and fictitious. Social constructionism posits that phenomena are constructed in the social world.

The problem, however, is that social constructions are unveiled in such discourses as a challenge of their ultimate legitimacy, of their failure, that is, to be accountable in nonsocial-constructivist terms. What this means then, is that the first account, the positivist account as the real test that needs to be met, although the social constructivist is skeptical, and in some cases outright rejects the possibility, that such criterion can be met. In effect, then, there is neurotic circumstance of arguing against a position by appealing to another positing that itself has already been ruled out of the equation. (Gordon, 2006: 8)

In other words, there is no means to say that something is socially constructed without appealing to the physicality of positivism and the non-social. If someone ask what is race as a social construction, the answer will be an appeal to its materiality: "We will find ourselves in a trap if we propose the purely natural or the physical as our non-social alternative" (Gordon, 1995: 47). Gordon notes that to say that race is a social construction says very little about race. Far from being the end there, the question of race should raise further questions and open a different set of problems.

Furthermore, Gordon raises another important issue when he asks who *constructs* race as the social construct “only identifies society as a constitutor of race” (Ibid.). This is problematic in two related ways. First, it is redundant since the social world itself is a constructed one. The social is “a function of action, itself a function of subjective and intersubjective encounter” (Gordon, 1995: 50). Second, it is meaningless if it is not accompanied by a theory of agency or an account of how societies can constitute anything. Social constructionism situates society “above or beyond human involvement” (Gordon, 1995:47). Endowing agency to an actor as “amorphous” as society occludes the subject, the human intervention in it. It turns the functioning of the “anonymous individual” as “the microcosmic version of macrocosmic agency” (Ibid). Society is “a rather shy agent. It prefers to remain anonymous. A theory of agency is central for the identification not only of the oppressor, but also of the oppressed¹⁶” (Gordon, 1995: 48).

In sum, what Gordon argues is that instead of the aforementioned critical possibilities of social constructionist thought (social constructions are not inevitable, not desired, so it can be changed), appealing to social construction, like positivism, offer what Gordon calls an “hyper- or overdetermined reality” (Gordon, 2006: 8). They are both a form of approaching reality that eliminate the human element which results in a hyper- (post)structuralist view of society.

The critique of biology and asserting the social constructivism of race do not account for what race is: how it is a relationship between the human and the subhuman rooted in colonial racism; how it functions as governance and regimes of power; and how it has a socio-

¹⁶ Gordon contrasts the dominant approach to social construction to existential phenomenology’s theories of agency and, relatedly, to Fanon’s notion of sociogenesis, where he states the role of the human as agent in the constitution of society. I will address this aspect of Fanon in Chapter 5.

economic impact that has a biological reach onto the body, the life and the death of groups of people. Race has not been constructed with an arbitrary racial marker such as skin color, but, as Gordon, argues, that race (or any phenomena) is contingent does not mean that it is accidental (Gordon, 1995).

Patrick Wolfe (2016), in his work on race in settler colonialism, says that race is “a trace of history” by which he means that “colonized populations continue to be racialized in specific ways that mark out and reproduce the unequal relationships into which Europeans have co-opted these populations” (2016: 2). Wolfe identifies how race plays a central role in human division with its different operations in depending on the land, labor, and political economy. For example, in the case of black Brazilians in Brazil and the Arab Jews in Israel, race works through de-racination with purpose of controlling the populations to construct a uniformly European or Jewish nation (2016: 3). In the case of the Americas, the Europeans had to take the land so the indigenous had to be vanished from the land as “being out of place” (2016: 17), by the way of either extermination or assimilation into the white population. While the Indians were threat to the white settlement, the logic of slavery, on the other hand, required that the enslaved blacks were valuable commodities. The red in the U.S. and the black (the Aboriginal) in Australia have been racialized in remarkably similar ways. What matters is not, according to Wolfe, phenotypical endowment: “It is not as if social processes come to operate on a naturally present set of bodily attributes that are already given in history. Rather, racial identities are constructed in and through the very process of their enactment” (Wolfe, 2016: 5). The fight over land was the crucial factor for the process of racialization and it was the most vigorous and vicious acts of violence on humanity: “The different ways in which subordinated

populations are racialized continue to reflect and reproduce the different relationships of inequality into which colonizers previously coopted” (Ibid.). Now we turn to how it all started.

2.4.3 Race in 1492

Most of the confusion about what race is derives from delinking race from colonialism and colonial history. To understand what race means and its implications it is necessary to offer a historical account of the term and of the social and historical configurations in which it emerged and was used. This subsection offers a brief account of the origins of race in the Iberian Peninsula and its adaptation to the colonies from 1492 on. It also attempts to show how race and racism were delinked from colonial history and processes after the Second World War.

The concept of race cannot be delinked from colonialism, the European expansion and conquest from the late fifteenth century on, and from the encounter with unfamiliar forms of human difference (Goldberg, 1993; Hesse, 2004; Gordon, 2022; Dussel, 1995; Maldonado-Torres, 2008; Wolfe, 2016). At the same time, as Geraldine Heng argues, racial, or proto-racial, and racist forms thinking were developing in Europe before colonialism (Heng, 2018). The origins of the term lie in the Iberian Peninsula in the context of the so-called *Reconquista* (reconquest) of Christians over the presence of Jews and Muslims. The word *raza* came from the Arabic *ras* (head) and was used to refer to types of horses which were marked to be differentiated and recognized. In this setting, Christians used *raza* to differentiate the Christian from the non-Christian. The Iberian Muslims were a blend of different African groups, Arabs and Berbers, and in many cases shared a similar physiognomy to the Jews. In this early Christian use of *race* there is already a connotation of negativity and domestic animality. Muslims and Jews prayed to an inferior god, and as such they represented a deviation from the

natural hierarchy set by the Christian God: either they converted or would be fought against and expelled (Gordon, 2022).

Raza was connected to the notion of *limpieza de sangre* (purity of blood) which entailed a lineage of pure Christian ancestry. Purity of blood emerged from the suspicion of false conversions of Jews and Muslims, and prevented Jewish and Muslim converts from accessing to certain professions, public positions or religious ranks. This notion expressed the belief that blood did not only transferred biological/physical traits, but also cultural ones, which comprised morality, character and spirituality. This idea of blood was present in other parts of Europe, but it was in Spain where blood encompassed wider aspects such of social, economic and political life (Nirenberg et al, 2012).

The historical context in which race emerged already indicated a social order. In this setting, race was conceived as a natural order, and rationalized in theological terms. For Goldberg, the tension between the natural and the social “marks the conceptual history of race” (Goldberg, 1993:63). Gordon (2022) observes how the situation in the Iberian Peninsula contradicts the widespread argument that antisemitism and Islamophobia are different from racism because Jews and Muslims are not races. This argument follows that Judaism and Islam encompass a wide array of groups of people, identities, cultures and nationalities. However, as we have seen, Jews and Muslims were treated as races from the European Middle Ages. Religion, according to Heng, functioned both socioculturally and biopolitically to demarcate human beings (2018: 3). The racial grammar of social and human difference in these proto-race and proto racism was already indistinct to many divisions; in this theological understanding of the world, and of human hierarchies, the criteria that defined the social order was spiritual deviation. In this initial stage, Gordon identifies another pervasive element in

racism, the possibility of conversion and the suspicion that it produces. “Racism, which implies a hierarchy according to racial location, is haunted by the specter of conversion. The familiar script is of members of an oppressed group becoming members of the one that dominates” (Gordon, 2022: 117).

By the time Iberian Christians arrived to the Americas they were at war with a variety of forms of human difference: Jews, Moors, certain types of women, and in 1499 started the persecution of Roma population. Enrique Dussel (1995) contends that until 1502, the belief of having arrived to Asia did not produce the discovery of the other, but the “covering over the other”. The indigenous were taken as the Indian, not as different, and “America serves only as matter upon which the *Same* [Europe] projects itself” (Dussel, 1995: 34). The realization of having reached an unknown continent disrupted the self-understanding of the European. The Old World was established in relation to the discovery of the New World. A westward displacement in the world system took place through which Europe situated itself at its center as the starting point of history and as the site of universality (Dussel, 1995).

The unfamiliar forms of human difference encountered on the other side of the Atlantic were rationalized through the adaptation of the aforementioned theocentric imaginary and the criteria of the social/natural order of the *Reconquista*. Julia Suárez-Krabbe (2016) notices two difference in regard to the Iberian setting. First, unlike the case of Jews and Arabs, whose inferiority stemmed from praying to an inferior god, the humanity of indigenous people was put into question. Second, to the criteria of hierarchization and categorization of *raza* and the purity of blood, with their cultural, ethical and spiritual connotations, the most important additions to define the human beings were the criteria of productivity and property ownership, and their distance from nature.

The new racial configuration and the distinction between the human and the less than human had an impact on gender relations at different levels. As different scholars point out (Lewis, 2012; Ochoa Muñoz, 2014; Suárez-Krabbe, 2016), the initial response to the encounter with the indigenous was to feminize them. Indigenous would be adult and woman. This raised the problem of the development and the perfectibility of the indigenous population. Considering them as women would entail a permanent condition of dependency from and servitude to men and closeness to nature, but adulthood implied a definite stage of maturation, which posed a problem to their development. Thus emerged the possibility of their infantilization. Treating them as children opened the possibility to their education, conversion and perfection (Ochoa Muñoz 2014; Suárez-Krabbe, 2016). Furthermore, this raised debates about the status of European women. If indigenous people were women, what were the women in Europe? The intersection of race and gender in the colonial encounter brought about a shift in the understanding of social organization, social relations, roles, and identities.

The gendered dimension of the Christian-European colonizer also brought about and transformed patriarchal relations. His masculinity was not only built in relation to European women, but also in relation, based on violence, to indigenous women and men, and not much later, to African women and men. These new gendered and sexed relations over colonized population entailed new forms of violence and domination (Wynter 2003; Ochoa Muñoz 2014). As Suárez-Krabbe (2016: 67) notes, “The eroticism practiced in the colonies by this phallic ego was part of a practice of domination of the body through the sexual colonization of women and the forced labor of men.”

The forms of violence and power that structured gender and racial relations, what María Lugones (2007) would later call the colonality of gender, had also an impact on the notion of

the European woman, the transformation of gender in Europe, and the delimitation of gender to European, Christian, white, bourgeois men and women. European women were biologically distinct from men, they were expected to be sexually pure and restrained, with a passive character and a role of reproduction. By adjusting to their social role and values they were “fit to reproduce bourgeois, white males’ class, colonial, and racial position” (Suarez-Krabbe, 2016: 67). At the same time, European women did not participate in the public and were excluded from many human and everyday life activities on the basis of their perceived mental and bodily weaknesses. In the colonies, domination, control, and forced sex and labor were the basis of the relations. For Lugones, in coloniality there is no distinction between private and public, and there is no gendered dichotomy between men and women, although there is male/female distinction. As less than human, women and men in the colonies are not properly classed, gendered or sexed, albeit their hyper-sexualization. The main distinction is established between those inside and outside the colonial zones (Lugones, 2007; Suárez-Krabbe, 2016).

With this brief historical account in mind I shall return to the question at the beginning of the section, the delinking of race from colonialism through what Hesse called “the double bind” of racism that differentiates European conceptualizations from (anti/de) colonial notions of race and racism. The former, as I argued, treated racism as originating from race, an aberrant ideology that is external to Europe, the constitution of European modernity and its liberal values. Race is understood as the separation of human groups based on their physical, moral, intellectual, and also cultural characteristics.

However, by putting the events and processes that started in 1492 at the center, thinkers who have taken colonialism and race seriously from an anti-/decolonial perspectives offer a different account of racism. It is important to emphasize that race and racism did not emerge

in a straightforward, systemic and coherent way. They were developed contextually, *in situ*, through adaptations and improvisation depending on the contexts, the needs, and the interests. The meaning ascribed through the different races was also a function of debates, knowledge production, social, administrative and military policies. The term was not always used nor consistently used in the process (Wolfe, 2016). Also, the racist practices were done by the Europeans in the colony without their having an idea or concept of race. The violent racist practices were enacted by the Europeans in the colonies without having a clear concept of race, which continues to the present day (Gordon, 1997b).

As we will see in the next chapters, Fanon, Césaire and Du Bois were critical of the view of the Holocaust as the extreme and exemplary model of racism, and the view of racism as the ideology of biological race. For Fanon, in Hesse's (2004) reading, racism regulates and exploits forms of existing and being in the world. The focus of racism on the body aims at producing and regulating the conditions and situations in which "those bodies were socially enacted as racial differences" (2004:21). That is, racism impacts on the body and on the social spaces in which the body appears, moves and interacts (Hesse, 2004). In this vein, Hesse understands racism as forms of administration and development of policies, practices, relations, and forms of governance. An instance, for Goldberg (2002) is the modern state, which in his research shows that is a *racial* state. By this he does not mean that all states are developed according to racial and racist ideologies, but rather he means that different racial configurations shaped institutions and policies in a variety of ways.

In these understandings race functions like a relationship of political character that separates the standard of humanity, the European, the white, the Christian, from the less than human. In that vein, Oliver Cox asserts that, [h]istorically, racial ideologies were developed

with reference to the relationship of Europeans with non-European peoples and subsequently refined to meet the needs of imperialism within Europe itself” (Cox, 1948: 484). That is, race emerges in the framework of the rule, dispossession, exploitation and subjugation that starts in America. In that vein, Hesse writes:

The category of ‘race’ is more effectively understood *as a socially instituted conceptual form* of arrangements, relations, activities, representations, exploitations, domination and violence. This means that in reference to its own modern genealogy, ‘race’ is the institutional embodiment of European colonial governing in the Americas. (Hesse, 2004: 24; emphasis original)

According to Alex Weheliye, race is not to be thought “as a biological or cultural descriptor, but as a conglomerate of sociopolitical relations that discipline humanity into full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans” (Weheliye, 2014: 3). Like Cox, Weheliye connects the anthropological to the political. Race is a political relationship that disciplines, which entails a set of technologies of rules, practices, and institutions. In line with the political definition of race, for Lentin (2020) race functions as a “regime of power.” However, she points out that it does not exclude the biological, the theological or the cultural. Race is “assembled from a multiplicity of rationales, including the geographical, the religious, the cultural, the visual, and the biological, all of which intersect with other regimes of power, most significantly gender” (Lentin, 2020).

In these accounts race is a relationship between the human and the subhuman that marks this difference and how is to be regulated socially. It encompasses, then, the anthropological, the social, the political, institutional and the legal. In these understandings, race and racism are not peripheral anomalies, exceptions, or the product of ideological aberrations. They connect Europe with America, Africa and Asia, and emphasize the constitutive role of race in European

modernity, at the level of economy, institutions, policies, legal framework and knowledge production.

Conclusion

This chapter problematized the lack of proper attention paid to race and racism using a phenomenological method to look at my own experience in the European-based peace studies academic setting. Starting from a ground zero, I asked the question what the elision of race points to. I showed that similar debates and confusion also abound among theorists of race and racism. The missing link is located in the UNESCO antiracist project of declaring race as a social construct. However, this does not answer what race is socially constructed of. Looking at the etymology of race and how it was used in the Iberian Peninsula at the time of *Reconquista*, I argue that race already implies within both biological and cultural meanings.

This brings another question of how race played the central role in the emerging European colonial expansion after 1492. The next chapter looks at how the discourses about the new form of human difference at the juncture of the colonial encounter were integral to the formation of modern social sciences, notions of human rights, international legal frameworks, and the questions of freedom, equality and civil society in liberal political theory. This unfolded in two ways: the articulation of the epistemic and normative discourses were instrumental to the processes of racialization, which, in turn, generated a new set of questions at the level of knowledge production and governance.

Chapter 3. Race in the Euromodern World

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I conceptualized and situated race as a European modern phenomenon that marks human and subhuman difference. This chapter deals with some of the implications of the marker of human difference in the development of the modern world. First, it is important to present some brief considerations about the concept of modernity and what it implies. Peace studies has paid attention to the critique of modernity by treating it as an intrinsically European phenomenon that has been diffused or imposed onto the rest of the world through conquest (Cordero-Pedrosa, 2021). In Euro-US-American scholarship modernity is usually defined in terms of intrinsic developments, whether at the level of social processes such as secularism, industrialization, modern science and the formation of the nation state, or at the level of the contributions of thinkers such as Descartes and Newton. As Cordero-Pedrosa argues (2021) this Eurocentric view lies at the core of the discipline: it has conceptual implications and presents serious limitations in order to understand history, power relations, the role of racism and colonialism, and one's epistemic location in the world. However, this dominant account of modernity has been challenged differently by thinkers from the Global South. Enrique Dussel (1995) offers a different reading of modernity. He distinguishes a first modernity from a second modernity. The former refers to the arrival of the Spanish Crown in the Americas which set the beginning of mercantile capitalism. The latter is related with the European industrial revolution and the political, philosophical and scientific thought derived from the Enlightenment. He speaks of the "underside of modernity", the colonial processes that have been treated as separate from modernity but were decisive in the formation of

European modernity. To render this relation of co-constitution between modernity and colonialism decolonial thinkers talk about modernity/coloniality. In this understanding coloniality does not mean the persistence or the remnants of colonialism but the historical structures and relations at the level of knowledge, power and being derived from colonialism and that have a global impact (Suárez-Krabbe, 2016). Lewis Gordon (2013a) distinguishes Euro-modernity from other modernities. For him the term modern is understood in relation to time and temporality: the modern is the group whose legitimacy in the present leads the direction of humanity in the future. For Gordon, the main difference between Euro-modernity and previous empires such as the Greek or the Roman is that colonized people could become legitimate in the present by adopting Greek and Roman practices, whereas in Euro-modernity to be modern impacts at the level of being: colonized people must not only adopt European practices but must become European themselves. This impossibility makes them illegitimate in the present and devoid of a future.

Despite their differences, these conceptualizations of the modern have in common the mutual imbrication of colonialism in the formation of the modern world, at the level of social, legal and economic processes, power relations and knowledge production. I have structured this chapter in a way that untangles some of these implications as follows:

The first section briefly hints at the relationship between race and the formation of modern social sciences. The question of what the human being is informs knowledge production both in naturalist, theological responses as well as secular, modern scientific ones. In peace studies, Carlos Cordero-Pedrosa (2021) has pointed out how the work of African diasporic thinkers, statesman and anthropologist Anténor Firmin, the sociologist, historian, economist and philosopher W.E. B. Du Bois and the psychiatrist, philosopher and political

theorist Frantz Fanon addressed the problems of colonialism and racism concomitantly with a philosophical reflection on the human, and on the study of the human, at the level of methods and disciplines. In other words, for African thinkers colonialism and racism were not only “objects of thought,” but also informed thought itself (Cordero-Pedrosa, 2021: 77). I will repeat some of these concerns, but my approach differs in that I will mostly address this issue both from the standpoint of the European texts and the responses provided from the Global South.

The second section covers the intricacy of race and colonialism with modern liberalism and liberal political philosophy. This question is crucial for peace studies since, as we will see at the end of this chapter, and other authors have hinted at, peace studies has not properly challenged its epistemic-political matrix: modern liberal political theory (Jaime-Salas, 2019). This has serious implications not only for the lack of attention to race and racism in peace studies, as explored above in Chapter One, but also to clearly delineate the challenges peace studies faces for trying to rectify this glaring absence.

The third section addresses what are considered part of the historical antecedents of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Firstly, I will address the Valladolid debate between Sepúlveda and De Las Casas, and I will outline the importance of race and human difference in the development of European humanism and the question of rights. Secondly, I will cover the birth of international law through the influential work of Francisco de Vitoria. Third, I will explore the relation between the French Revolution and the declaration of man and citizenship and the Haitian Revolution, and how the latter is foundational yet ignored, for the creation of the modern world. In order to address the question of human rights, I will look

closely at some of its antecedents: the debate of Valladolid, the work of Francisco de Vitoria, the Haitian Revolution, and the discussions of the human rights declaration.

The fourth section addresses the question of race and colonialism in the formation of International Relations as a discipline. Both in its U.S. and European versions, International Relations emerged earlier than the dominant narrative of the field contends, and the focus was put on the management of racial hierarchies and the maintenance and expansion of colonialism from the global threat of colored peoples.

3.1 Race and the social sciences

Enrique Dussel (2008a) rejects the extended view that René Descartes is the first modern European philosopher on the basis of his definition of modernity and his philosophical work. Dussel argues that Descartes' masters were Spanish and Portuguese Jesuits such as Francisco Suárez, Francisco Sánchez and Gómez Pereira working in America. Their interrogations emerged from the new forms of human difference found during the colonial endeavor. Outside of the European framework of Christians, Muslims and Jews, the encounter with American indigenous groups raised the philosophical anthropological question of their humanity— “What are they?” “Are they human?”—and the epistemological question of how the Europeans know about it. These reflections had a bearing on Descartes' thought on doubt, mind and method. Following on Enrique Dussel's “Anti-Cartesian Meditations” Gordon (2013a) observes that Descartes removed the philosophical anthropological question of human difference, which was the origin of the doubt for his Jesuit teachers. Instead, Descartes articulated the model of abstract reasoning through mathematics. Thereby Descartes carried a

twofold move: (i) he moved from philosophical anthropology to epistemology as the *philosophia prima* to bypass the ethical and political dilemmas of the colonial Americas; and (ii) he expelled the human elements as the basis of knowledge and established the mind/body separation as the foundation of the scientific model. Eliminating the human embodiment out of the human had the “catastrophic consequence of offering models of science made supposedly rigorous through the expulsion of human elements” (Gordon, 2013a: 67). This was coterminous with the dehumanization taking place in the Americas. The theological expression of the Cartesian method became subsequently secular in the constitution of modern natural and social sciences. As Gordon (2013a: 67-68) posits:

This [Cartesian] premise of disunity was already receiving concrete manifestation in the presupposition of the Christian European as reality purged of supposed embodied vices of emotion and passion in a philosophical anthropology of the truly human as this disembodied Christian European archetype.

Howard Winant (2015: 2176) highlights the “historical complicity of the social science disciplines with the establishment and maintenance of the systems of racial predation, injustice and indeed genocide upon which the modern world was built.” He adds that “all the social sciences originate in raciology and race management,” and proposes “a critical reappraisal of ‘mainstream’ social science’s theoretical and methodological approach to race is therefore overdue” (Ibid). However, the question is not only about the complicity of the sciences in colonial oppression, but is also, as Gordon (2013a) points out above, the foundational role of race as the new problematic of human difference in the constitution of Euro-modern social and human sciences which, at the same time, formed a new meaning of the human. In other words, there was a process of co-constitution between the meanings ascribed to different groups and the foundation and consolidation of the European and by extension US social and human

sciences. Inquiry on the human in this new social and historical framework of colonialism was at the origin of knowledge production first in the Christian theological terms, and later, in a secular form. In this process of interrogation and production of knowledge about the human, new groups of people were gradually formed. As we will see throughout this dissertation, this knowledge about human difference informs political theories, questions of citizenship, rights and law, understanding of history, of reason, and formation of disciplines. This phenomenon of co-constitution is grasped by Nishitani's (2006) aforementioned distinction between *anthropos*, as the object of knowledge, and *humanitas*, as the knower constituted in relation to the object. The latter refers to the human who studies others. The former is the object of the study, and not fully human. The European becomes *humanitas* by turning the non-European into *anthropos*. It is in this relation between the studier and the studied that they are both configured and located differently in the hierarchy of humanity.

The colonial question in regard to social science is absent in *The Order of Things*, Foucault's (2005) archaeology of the human sciences. Amidst all that discourse on order, classification, categorization, and taxonomy of fauna and flora, there is no mention of race. The treatment of the social sciences just like the natural sciences came from this attitude that looked at, studied, dissected, and categorized humans in the same way one would study rocks, plants, and aquatic animals within Euromodern logics of science and reason. Alternatively, this question is central in the Haitian anthropologist Anténor Firmin's 1885 groundbreaking work *On the Equality of Human Races*. Although it is conceived as a response to the famous racist diatribe of Arthur de Gobineau's *Essay on the Inequality of Human Races* (1853), Firmin undertakes a deep study of modes of classification and approaches to the human being from Aristotle to Darwin in order to show the arbitrariness and lack of rigor of anthropological

classifications, and their relation to colonialism and the knowledge that is produced. Gordon (2008: 61) points out that Firmin's historical analysis shares resemblances with Foucault's archaeological analysis, since "the orders of knowledge of the nineteenth century were in fact constructing the very subject they had set out to study."

The case of anthropology is a paradigmatic one since its origin lies in the study of those societies considered pre-modern (Bhambra, 2014), while ignoring racial and colonial dimensions. If the modern anthropological question was purportedly left aside by Descartes, race and the colonized reappeared in Enlightenment philosophy in the works of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Hume, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and later, Nietzsche. Kant's philosophy and anthropology is illustrative of these points, due to its extension and influence. He provided the first systematic definition of race in order to explain human difference, defended it from Johann Gottfried Herder's criticism, and opened up the way for the budding scientific accounts of race (Eze, 1997, Bernasconi, 2001). Kant is considered in the western philosophical history as a thinker of decisive importance, known as the "Copernican Turn," in his effort to reconcile and synthesize the two opposing views of rationalism and empiricism. He also explored a wide array of philosophical themes, such as consciousness and knowledge, the perception and understanding of the world, and a humanist philosopher of ethics, human dignity, cosmopolitanism and peace. However, as Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (1997) brings attention to the fact that Kant also developed and taught courses on anthropology for more than forty years, until 1797. In German universities, he introduced the fields of anthropology and geography, which he treated as inseparable disciplines, in German universities. Kant's lectures on anthropology considerably outnumber his courses on logics, moral philosophy or metaphysics,

and his written work on anthropology is not reduced to a single work, but also permeates his corpus such as the *Critique of Judgment* (Eze, 1997).

Kant envisaged anthropology and geography together as the study of nature, of which man was a part. Geography dealt with the exterior aspects, the physical and the visible, whereas anthropology addressed, the internal, the moral and the psychological. Thereby, anthropology was the ideal tool to study the human in body (through physical geography as the domain of pure knowledge, cause and effect and science) and soul (through anthropology as the moral knowledge of the human). Through physical geography and the body, Kant differentiated four biological races: white, black, yellow, and red. Moral geography delves into the custom, the culture and the knowledge of the races, and moral philosophy enabled him to discern whether and to which extent these races belong to the human sphere. For Kant, the human is defined by reason and will, consciousness and action. It is both part of nature and transcendent of nature. Thus, the tendency of evil, impulsiveness, instinctive behavior, lack of reflexivity, ethics and self-development were defining features of the non-human and with the possibility of “education” or “training” into humanity (Eze, 1997).

For Kant, reds (indigenous people) were not educable. They did not possess a driving force, affects or passions, neither experienced love nor fear. They were lazy and incapable of communication. Blacks were the opposite of reds. They were passionate and affectionate, communicative and full of life. They were jealous, lazy and sensitive. They could only be trained to be servants or slaves. Kant also describes the best training method, that is, through coercion and violence, and even recommends the best material to whip them. The yellows, which comprised Turks, Persians, Hindus, Chinese, Romani population in Europe were passive, with a tendency to anger but not to love. They could be educated in arts but not in the sciences,

as they lacked the capacity of abstraction and were deceptive (Eze, 1997). Thus, for Kant, race is not a physical trait, but instead is “evidence of an unchanging and unchangeable moral quality (...) based upon an ahistorical principle of reason and moral law” (Eze, 1997: 119).

Kant collected information about these groups of people through the works of travelers, the arguments of pro-slavery, and the few anti-slavery documents. The existence of competing ideas reveals that he *chose* to follow certain lines of thought (Bernasconi, 2001). Moreover, Kant also purportedly ignored the work of his contemporaneous Anton Wilhelm Amo, a Ghanaian former slave who earned a doctorate in philosophy and taught philosophy at the universities of Halle and Jena. Concomitantly with Kant, Amo wrote about the rights of blacks in Europe. The fact that he was a *black* philosopher already challenged the dominant views of his time as he stood as the evidence contradicting the claims that blacks were incapable of reason and abstraction.

For Kant, the white is the only race that deserves to be fully human and, as such, is susceptible to education, to progress, and to express their natural talent in art and science. In *Physical Geography*, he states:

Humanity has its highest degree of perfection in the white race. The yellow Indians have a somewhat lesser talent. The Negroes are much lower, and lowest of all is part of the American races. (Kant, 2012:576)

As Eze (1997) notes, Kant established the distinction between the black as evil and the white as the negation of it. In a stroke of his pen, Kant set the white race as the ideal standard by which others are to be measured. Eze states:

in addition to its various conscious and unconscious ideological functions and utilities, [Kant] had uncritically assumed that the particularity of

European existence is the empirical as well as ideal model of humanity, of universal humanity. (Eze, 1997: 117)

Anténor Firmin, in the aforementioned 1885 study *On the Equality of the Human Races*, takes Kant to task for ignoring the previous and contemporary work of scientists and their naturalistic conception of the human (which Firmin also considers reductionist) in favor of his own idealist reductionism. At stake, for Firmin, was the problems resulting from the study of the human in “its multiple and complex facets,” (Firmin, 2002: 28) without the naturalist reductionism of scientists and the idealist reductionism of philosophers. Yet, both argued over the domain of anthropology. While scientists intended to make anthropology a biological or natural discipline, German philosophers wanted to turn it into a philosophical one. Firmin (2002: 4-7) points out that Kant’s understanding of anthropology can be discerned better in his works on ethics than in his last anthropological work. In the former, Kant distinguishes between practical anthropology as the empirical study, and moral anthropology deals with the rational element. Such distinctions were inherited by German idealists and were incorporated in the theories of Fichte and Hegel. For Kant and Hegel, the natural study of the human belongs to physical geography since racial differences are geographical ones, which diverge from Firmin’s vision of anthropology and from the very complexities of the human. As Gordon summarizes, Kant and Hegel allocate human difference through a “geographical theory of intelligence” which led them to a “form of geographic idealism” (Gordon, 2008: 60).

In respect of the different theories of human hierarchy, Firmin observed what few Enlightenment philosophers, scientists and anthropologists realized: “The anti-philosophical and pseudo-scientific doctrine of the inequality of races rests on nothing more than the idea of man’s exploitation by man” (Firmin, 2002: 140). After his long tour through all the systems of classification and study of the human, from Ancient Greece to his contemporaneous

anthropologists, philosophers and scientists, Firmin highlighted the relations of power and the society in which such knowledge is formed. As Greg Beckett (2017: 8) mentions, there is no fundamental incompatibility between the universalism and the humanism of Enlightenment thinkers and their support of the racial hierarchy, since “inequality was a central organizing value of European society that served to justify its domination of others.”

Currently, as Jason Antrosio and Sallie Han (2015) observe, anthropologists in the United States have silenced the centrality of race in the discipline by criticizing biological determinism and biological classifications in favor of cultural explanations in their objection to racism. I have identified the problems of this approach to race in the previous chapter. The silencing of race has resulted in the lack of attention to racism because the latter is treated as “an illusion about race, overlooking that structured racism itself gives importance to race.” As he sums up, the situation for the anthropologist ignoring colonialism is troubled:

While anthropology has therefore often been used to protest structured racism, its institutional position as an anti-race science has often also insulated it from a necessary self-critique of the discipline’s own silences, exclusions, and practices around race. (Antrosio and Han, 2015)

The development of the European study on non-European human beings, in turn, gave birth to modern sociology, initially conceived as the European study of their own societies. Knowledges about other cultures were produced to a great deal which led to a more self-conscious attempt of the Europeans to think of their own. For the philosopher of science Alexander Rosenberg (2016: 13), this is the main purpose of social science as opposed to that of natural science:

Consider how much more we know about our own society as a result of what we have learned about other societies. Our understanding of these initially strange peoples is not the product of “scientific investigation.” It is the result

of the cultural anthropologist's "going native," attempting to learn about a foreign culture from the inside, coming to understand the meaning of his subject's actions in the terms his subject employs. (Ibid)

There is, however, an additional dimension in the origin of modern sociology: the distinction between modern and pre-modern societies, where modernity refers to the processes taking place in Europe and the United States. That is, while anthropology deals with the traditional, sociology studies the processes of industrialization, revolution, democratization, urbanization and migration, conceived as separated from their relationship with colonialism (Bhambra, 2014). The scope of the discipline and its understanding of what constitutes the modern and what is exterior to it sets the path for the inattention and the denial of race and colonial matters (Lentin, 2017; Bhambra, 2014). At the same time, Alena Lentin argues, sociology's dismissal of race is because of its fear of enacting a pseudo-scientific language of race. She observes that "the problem created by this silencing is that the failure to name race dissociates contemporary racism from its roots in racial-colonial structures and thought" (Lentin, 2017). The sociological dissociation of slavery from the formation US-American modern societies is a case in point (Magubane, 2016). Likewise, the so-called founding *fathers* of the discipline in Europe disconnected the centrality of race and colonial questions in their analysis of the industrialization processes in Europe and the development of modernity (Zuckerman, 2004). When it is studied, racism is treated within "the subdiscipline of sociology of race," or a theme within "race and ethnicity," or "race relations". In this understanding, "racism has been made an anachronistic survivor in tradition, rather than a constitutive part of modernity" in sociological studies (Magubane, 2016: 1). This is not an exclusive phenomenon of U.S. sociology. Lisa Lowe (2015) observes, out of her experience of research in the archives, that in modern anthropology, political economy, history, philosophy, psychiatry or literary

studies, the question of human difference (that is, race as the difference between the human and the subhuman) was constantly present in the initial stages of the different disciplines, but once they began to split, distinguish from one another, take an autonomous path, and establish strong boundaries, the race element is dispersed until it disappears.

It is generally accepted that the canonical figures of the discipline of sociology are Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim. However, there were other scholars apart from these three “fathers” of sociology who were as prolific and path breaking in their sociological contribution. Among them, there were also *mothers* such as Jane Addams or Isabel Eaton. Yet, the process of canonization, Zuckerman (2004) and Morris (2015) point out, is not delinked from power, class, race, economics, or gender among other things. The sociological work of W.E.B. Du Bois is illustrative of this matter since he was central to the development of sociology in the United States (Zuckerman, 2004; Bhambra, 2014; Morris, 2015; Magubane, 2016) and also had a bearing on figures like Weber (Morris, 2015).

Today Du Bois’s sociological work is still considered within the subdiscipline of “sociology of race,” “sociology of racial relations” or “the Negro question”, which occludes his pioneering and foundation role in the field, and his creating the Atlanta school, the first sociological school in the United States (Bhambra, 2014; Magubane, 2016; Morris, 2016, Rabaka, 2010). For Aldon Morris (2015: 1), “The first school of scientific sociology in the United States was founded by a black professor located in a historically black university in the South. This reality flatly contradicts the accepted wisdom.” In the same vein, Reiland Rabaka (2010) identifies this invisibility in the history of sociology. The issue is not only that Du Bois does not receive the attention given to Marx, Weber or other giants, but rather that his work is rarely engaged, if not, ever mentioned in the curricula and classrooms:

as late as the dawn of the twenty-first century, undergraduate and graduate students, almost as a rule, are granted degrees in sociology in the United States of America and not only do the majority of them not read a single word Du Bois wrote but, even more maliciously, they never even hear his name “mentioned in any” of their “sociology classes. (Rabaka, 2010a :5)

More importantly for the scope of this section is that considering the work of Du Bois as foundational for this discipline sheds a different light between the relation of race and the discipline, since he connected slavery and race with processes of rural exodus, urbanization, industrialization, labor and female domestic labor, criminality, or alcoholism, among others. As Alana Lentin (2017: 181) points out, “racism was embedded in US social sciences from their inception.”

The origin of sociology in the United States is attributed to Robert Park and the Chicago School, whose work not only was undertaken more than twenty years later than Du Bois’s and the Atlanta School, but also approached the problems of black people in the United States through social-Darwinism and by revisiting Lamarck’s theories in order to justify their condition on the grounds of their biological or cultural inferiority (Magubane, 2016; Bhambra, 2014; Morris, 2015).

Race theorists such as John Solomos and Les Back (1996) observe that race and racism has become an established field of study. They argue that this is a quick development; the marginal position of the 1960s has changed to the incorporation of race and racism to teaching curricula and the research agenda (Solomos and Back, 1996: 1). This is an optimist position, as Gordon states, social sciences have only taken “a circumspect stand on race issues” (Gordon, 1997b:116). Likewise, Barnor Hesse (2014) argues that the developments in sociology are similar to the aforementioned ones taking place in anthropology: racism is objected without clearly studying and understanding what racism is and involves. Race is taken as related to

ethnicity, that is it refers to groups of people with certain commonalities, whereas as I maintain, race is not exclusively about groups of people, but it is rather related to the set of sociopolitical and epistemic questions. Another reason for the sociological reluctance is the discipline's lack of interest in the historical dimensions and the contributions from other fields, and the subsequent reliance on dehistoricized facts for analysis. Philosophy, sociology, or "any humanistic theoretical work unfolds much more productively when it declines to stray too far from the facts that give it its subject matter" (Taylor, 2013: 37). Concepts do not arise devoid of historical context. Sociology's lack of commitment in analytical and conceptual engagement with knowledge produced from anticolonial histories may be one of the obstacles for the discipline to study race and racism. Instead, the concept of race is treated in an abstract way, separated from its colonial roots and erasing its role in the formation of the modern world and human sciences. As a result, racism is rendered as reflecting essential and natural functions of society. If sociology believes social concepts and practices are the product of social constructions, then, the historical context and development of such constructions will first have to be established.

Indeed, Lisa Lowe (2015) observes that the very disciplinary separations through which race and racism disappears respond to the logic of modern political liberalism, to which I now turn in the following section. In the framework of liberal theory the intertwined histories of exploitation, displacements and dispossession between Asia, the Americas, Africa and Europe appear as disconnected from each other and are reduced to an unique History performed by a unique sovereign subject. Thereby, as Lisa Lowe (2015: 39) indicates, "the constitution of knowledge often obscures the conditions of its own making." In other words, modern liberalism hides the colonial setting as the condition of its own emergence through the

separation of histories and the compartmentalization of knowledge in closed and seemingly uncommunicated areas.

3.2 Liberalism and racism

The origins of modern liberalism are usually traced back to the processes taking place in European societies resulting from the French Revolution in 1789, which represented the departure from feudal and aristocratic societies, the origin of modern nation-states and the emancipatory aspirations of citizenship and democracy. This was concomitant with the development of modern scientific rationality, the gradual secularization of the state, industrial capitalism, the bureaucratic state, and the modern notion of citizenship. The foundations of liberal theory expressed in political theory, philosophy, and literary and cultural forms advocate for economic freedom of choice and exchange in the market, wage labor, private property, civil society, and individual rights. In this understanding, the individual is the basic political, legal and ethical figure. The rights, the autonomy and the privacy of the individual prevail over groups, external constraints and impositions. At the philosophical level, the liberal thought of John Stuart Mill, John Locke, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Kant, Hume and Hegel equate the human being with rationality. In the rational competence and the possibilities of reason lies the quality of being a human, and as such the right to freedom. At the ethic-political level, liberalism advocates for tolerance, hospitality, recognition, and the celebration of the human and humanity influenced by the humanist thought of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Liberal theories of government defend the rule of law and order as the basis of political society over the state of nature. The latter is understood as the domain of violence which poses a threat to life and property. Thus, in the liberal view, the government maintains the peace and guarantees the protection and security of the individual within civil society by means of the

legal apparatus—through the presumption of the equivalence between law and justice—and the adoption of the violence of the state of nature (Giroux, 2008; Losurdo, 2011; Lowe, 2015; More, 2017).

This brief summary of the tenets of liberalism may appear cursory since it encompasses and passes over different thinkers and schools (classical, utilitarian contractarian property liberalism, personhood liberalism), their divergences, and the different questions that each school or thinker emphasizes. However, the aim of this section is not to undertake an exhaustive cover of liberalism, but to unmask the dominant understanding of liberalism. The dominant narrative posits that liberalism is a unique intra-European phenomenon that was universally extended. Instead, I attempt to highlight the role of colonialism, and race as the marker of sub-humanity, in the formation of the principles of modern liberalism and its understanding of the human. In other words, liberal political philosophy and the subjugation of those considered as less than human are two sides of the same coin. This complicity of liberalism with colonialism, slavery, and capitalism at the level of its anthropological, ethical and political philosophy, economics, history, and forms of governance, has been differently emphasized by the likes of Paul Gilroy (1993), Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), Steve Biko (1987), Frantz Fanon (2004, 2008), Jean Paul Sartre (2004), Cedric Robinson (2005), Domenico Losurdo (2011), Susan Buck-Morss, (2009), Walter Mignolo (2011), Lewis Gordon (1995, 2015), Lisa Lowe (2015), and Mabogo More (2017), among many others. However, it is still absent in peace studies as well as in contemporary critiques of liberal peace.

One of the problems of liberal thought is that, as discussed in the previous section, it occludes the conditions in which such thought was made possible. The result is that notions and promises of the liberty of the individual, universal human rationality, equality, progress

and non-interference from the state or from others are delinked from the context in which they arose. This context was not an internal to and isolated in Europe, but the asymmetric relations across continents, which entailed the dispossession of lands from indigenous people, the transatlantic slave trade, the abolition of slavery, the forced migrations of unpaid labor from Asia to the Americas, the emergence of the bourgeoisie in Europe and the concomitant new and forms of reproductive control, of government, and of administration (Lowe, 2015). The notion of freedom, central in liberalism and its understanding of the human co-emerged within the conditions of bondage and the definition of the subhuman.

John Locke, considered the main figure in classical liberalism, co-writer of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, was an influential thinker over other liberal theorists and politicians such as Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin. In *Two Treatises of Government* Locke rendered his view of civil society out of a critique of patriarchalism, the notion of divine rights and absolutist forms of government. For Locke the state of nature is the deinstitutionalized domain of natural rights, lack of government and lack of subjection and subordination. But this is also the domain of the arbitrary because of the absence of a written law and judge who applies justice to the breaches of natural law. Instead, every individual is to punish and to correct the misdemeanor of others. In the state of nature humans are not free since they are subjected to one another's whim and susceptible to the violence against their lives or their property. In the chapters on conquest and slavery Locke justifies the arrival and the conquest of the Americas by the Englishmen on the basis of the state of nature; it was an empty land upon which the natural rights to possess could be applied. The notion of *terra nullius* or empty land provided a rationalization for the settler colonialism conquest of places considered inhabited. Indeed, rather than places they were spaces, and the people who

inhabited, indigenous people, were not considered fully people (Robbins, 2004). The foundation of civil and political society by the settlers serves to protect the domain of property, which encompasses life, freedom, and the estate derived from labor over land. Indigenous peoples were located outside of the realm of civility, which rationalized the defense of their lands as unjust, removed their right to conquest, and justified the war against them and their extermination.

John Locke, in his theorization of civil society, sees no contradiction between slavery and the doctrine of equality, individual autonomy and the protection of property by introducing a new *state* and form of servitude which escapes the civil contract:

But there is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call *slave*, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the rights of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and lost their estates; and being in a *state of slavery*, not capable of any property cannot in that state be considered as any part of *civil society*; the chief end whereof is the preservation of property. (Locke, 1980: 45-46; emphasis original)

As Domenico Losurdo (2011: 5) points out, “love of liberty and legitimation or revindication of slavery” were two sides of the same coin of liberal thought. The liberal notion of freedom was understood on the basis of non-freedom, the notion of human and humanism was conceived on the basis of the less than human and dehumanization. The criteria used to decide to which state one group belonged was their closeness or distance from the standard of humanity. Hence the almost obsessive presence and scrutiny of, mostly, the black, but also the East Indian, the Chinese and the indigenous in liberal political literature and Enlightenment philosophy.

In “The Laws of Civil Slavery”, Montesquieu justified the enslavement of Africans on the basis of the amount of labor and land to be covered after the extermination of Native Americans. Sugar would be too expensive if it was not by the labor of slaves (Montesquieu, 1989: 250). He wondered whether God could put a soul in the black bodies and concluded that “it is impossible for us to assume that these people are men because if we assumed they were men one would begin to believe that we ourselves were not Christians.” (Ibid) The *Fundamental Constitution of Carolina*, which Locke co-authored, states that all free men “shall have power and authority over his negro slaves” (quoted in More, 2017: 70). The presence of the black in Voltaire is recurrent in his plays, letters, philosophical and sociological essays. In the “*Le Nègre*” (“The Negro”) he argues that

The negro race is a species of men as different from ours as the breed of spaniels is from that of greyhounds (...) if their understanding is not of a different nature from ours, it is at least greatly inferior. They are not capable of any great application or association of ideas, and seem formed neither for the advantages nor abuses of our philosophy. They are a race peculiar to that part of Africa, the same as elephants and monkeys. (Voltaire, 2015)

David Hume states in the essay “Of National Characters,

I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual, eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the Whites, such as the ancient Germans, the present Tartars, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. (Hume, 1963: 213)

In *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, Kant confirms Hume’s statement, and adds that

among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who have been transported elsewhere from their countries, although very many of them have been set

free, nevertheless not a single one has ever been found who has accomplished something great in art or science or shown any other praiseworthy quality, while among the whites there are always those who rise up from the lowest rabble and through extraordinary gifts earn respect in the world. So essential is the difference between these two human kinds, and it seems to be just as great with regard to the capacities of mind as it is with respect to color. (Kant, 2011: 58-59)

As I pointed out, Kant's work on race set the basis for the scientific understanding of it. In the next chapter, I will situate the relevance of Kant's and Hegel's philosophy of anthropology and history for the delimitation of the field of philosophy as intrinsically European. For Hegel, concerning Africa "we must quite give up the principle which naturally accompanies all our ideas — the category of Universality" (Hegel, 2001: 110). He argues that "The Negro [...] exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state" (Hegel, 2001:111). He adds that black people are outside of history and they do not exhibit any feature that could show their belonging to the human species: they are incapable of self-consciousness, freedom, justice, morality and spirituality. The condition of enslavement seems for Hegel the logical path for blacks: "for it is the essential principle of slavery, that man has not yet attained a consciousness of his freedom, and consequently sinks down to a mere Thing—an object of no value" (Hegel, 2011: 113).

As Mabogo More (2017) remarks, antiblack racism is a constant in European philosophy. The list of philosophers, liberal or not, questioning the belonging of non-white people to the human sphere, could easily be extended well into the twentieth century. My point in providing the previous quotes is not to cast an ethical judgement over these thinkers. The debate on separating the person from his work also misses the point. One can discern how their understanding of what and who a human being is informed by their thought on government, institutions, practices, ethics and politics, and this reciprocally has shaped the organization and

the structure of knowledge. The point here is also to make explicit that it is through the creation and the universalization of the Christian, then European, then white man, that the different levels of sub-humanity were created. Charles W. Mills has defined modern liberalism as “Racial liberalism, or white liberalism,” a theoretical corpus that endowed human value exclusively to whites, and whose notions, values and promises were “all color-coded” (Mills, 2008: 1382).

At the same time, liberal humanist values, notions and promises would not have been possible without those social groups which were simultaneously formed and positioned as exterior to liberal humanism, but were *constitutive* insiders as Lowe contends:

Colonized peoples created the conditions for liberal humanism, despite the disavowal of these conditions in the European political philosophy on which it is largely based. (...) “Freedom” was constituted through a narrative dialectic that rested simultaneously on a spatialization of the “unfree” as exteriority and a temporal subsuming of that unfreedom as internal difference or contradiction. (Lowe, 2015: 40)

For Lowe a defining feature of liberalism is the resolution of this internal contradiction of freedom through the disavowal of the violent colonial conditions in which it arose, and therefore with the erasure of the double position, as both insiders and outsiders, of the subhuman. She convincingly points out that there is no liberalism without the Black, the Chinese, the Indian, or the Coolie, “the genealogy of modern liberalism is simultaneously a genealogy of colonial divisions of humanity” (Lowe, 2015: 7). She adds:

Race as a mark of colonial difference is an enduring remainder of the processes through which the human is universalized and freed by liberal forms, while the peoples who created the conditions of possibility for that freedom are assimilated or forgotten. *The genealogy of modern liberalism is thus also a genealogy of modern race*; racial differences and distinctions designate the boundaries of the human and endure as remainders attesting to the violence of liberal universality. (2015: 6-7; emphasis original)

She argues that the processes of racialization (understood as sub-humanization) were not lineal, homogeneous and universal, but were interrelated and differently informed by regional practices, forms of governments, economic necessities, connected to other forms of difference such as gender, class, national and geographical location, religion, or sexuality. That is, the taxonomies, the meaning imposed onto social groups varied and shifted across time, across regional specificities, and had to be adapted to the new, and almost improvised, forms of governance, economic life and social control that the situation demanded.

Furthermore, she contends that the processes of dispossession, genocide, forced migration, or expropriation that originated the human divisions in colonialism are far from being finished; instead, “they are ongoing and continuous in our contemporary moment, not temporally distinct nor as yet concluded. To investigate modern race is to consider how racial differences articulate complex *intersections of social difference within specific conditions*” (Lowe, 2015: 7; emphasis added). Lowe hints here three important elements in her analysis of contemporary and historical liberalism and how it functions, and masks its functioning, with racism: intersections, difference and specific conditions. Liberalism proposes an atomistic rather than a relational understanding of the human; is concerned with individual difference rather than with group difference, and its notion of the human abstract, disembodied and dislocated rather than rooted in her specificity.

Liberalism in its intricacy with racism functioned, and still functions, through a circular logic: it first defines the body, the behavior, and the form of life of the non-white as subhumans, while its humanist element asserts the universality and equality of all humans and condemns those who do not adjust to the standard of the human which they cannot meet. In this way, liberalism rationalizes racism. As Sartre put it: “You are making monsters out of us; your

humanism wants us to be universal and your racist practices are differentiating us” (Sartre, 2004: xliv). Fanon, expressed it in the following way:

Western bourgeois racism toward the *nègre* and the *bicot* is a racism of contempt—a racism that minimizes. But the bourgeois ideology that proclaims all men to be essentially equal, manages to remain consistent with itself by inviting the subhuman to rise to the level of Western humanity that it embodies. (Fanon, 2004: 110; translation modified¹⁷)

Liberal humanism occludes the racial, gendered and class dimensions of the abstract notion of the human that it mobilizes, and the interest that go hand in hand with it. And as such, humanistic values such as equality, justice or freedom, or the individual are to be questioned (More, 2017: 278). As we will see, neither Sartre, nor Fanon discarded universality or the category of the human, but what was at stake for them was, to use the expression of Aimé Césaire, the construction of “a true humanism—a humanism made to the measure of the world” (Césaire, 2001: 73).

I will address in Chapter 4 the question of universalism and a new humanism in the following chapters. By now, it is important to tease out Fanon’s methodological move which had important ethical and political consequences in relation to liberal theory. From the beginning, he posed the question of how to study the situation of the black with the understanding of the human, and with the dominant psychiatric, philosophical, sociological, and anthropological tools that were, if not always complicit, at least unsuitable and insufficient to study the black condition (Cordero-Pedrosa, 2021). Thus, one of the things that Fanon does, explicitly in several instances, and implicitly throughout his work, is to call into question,

¹⁷ I have maintained the original terms *nègre* and *bicot* to refer to the black and the Arab because, as commentators (Fanon, 2015; Cordero-Pedrosa, 2021) have argued, there is no English translation that renders its connotations in French. I have also preferred a literal translation of the original term “by inviting”, rather than the English translation, “by urging”.

abstract notions of the human that hide the asymmetrical relations between them. Illustrative of this is his treatment of Alfred Adler's psychological theory of recognition, and of Hegel's influential theory of recognition in the dialectic of the master and the slave. Interestingly, reinforcing the previous argument of the disavowal of the conditions of emergence of modern political theory, Susan Buck-Morss (2009) documents that Hegel's account was not based on classical Greece, but on the ongoing events of the Haitian Revolution, to which he paid close attention.

For Hegel, the human being achieves autonomy and self-consciousness in relation with the Other. The presence of the Other initially poses a threat to the Self and to self-understanding, and it is through a symbolic life struggle that the recognition of the Other is obtained and self-consciousness is achieved. He becomes the master and the defeated one becomes the slave. The slave, in turn, achieves self-understanding by focusing on labor and on the object of his labor. For Hegel this is the foundation of intersubjectivity and of the social world. For Fanon, in a racist setting, the master and the slave are not abstract, colorblind, bodiless, and ahistorical beings. The master is the white man and the slave is the black, the colonized. Under these circumstances, Fanon posits, the master does not need the recognition of the slave, but his work, and the slave does not achieve self-consciousness by focusing on his job, but instead turns to the master and seeks recognition from him (Fanon, 2008). Thereby begins the whole vicious circle of alienation and failures through the search of white recognition that Fanon describes in *Black Skin White Masks*. Already at the beginning Fanon situates the black in a peculiar zone:

There is a zone of nonbeing, an extraordinarily sterile and arid region, an utterly naked declivity where an authentic upheaval can be born. In most

cases, the black man lacks the advantage of being able to accomplish this descent into a real hell. (Fanon, 2008: 2)

In Chapter 5 I will unpack Fanon's existential phenomenological analysis. By now, what I would like to emphasize is that, as Gordon notes, what Fanon is questioning in his formulation of the zone of non-being, the dialectics of master-slave, Sartre's understanding of intersubjectivity, and other psychiatric and philosophical theories, is the presumed symmetry between the Self and the Other in liberal political thought as Gordon elucidates:

The search for recognition that emerges [...] fails [...] because the necessary conditions for Self-Other relations also fail: neither Hegelian Master nor the structural White Man wants recognition from blacks; each wants work, and bodies without points of view. Here we see why the demands of classical liberalism and Kantian humanism fail: they depend upon symmetry. White-black relations are such that blacks struggle to achieve Otherness; it is a struggle to be in a position for the ethical to emerge (Gordon, 2000: 35)

Gordon (2000, 2008, 2015) adds that for Fanon the black is not the Other in a racist setting, but the non-Other; what racism does is to expel the black, the colonized or the racialized from Self-Other relations. Thus, the black is neither Self nor an Other. This is a critique of the foundations and the interests of dominant political theories which presuppose an ethical substratum upon which political life is to flourish:

The critique of presuming the presence of a Self-Other dialectic leads to a critique of normative political theory. For such theory, most represented by modern liberalism, the claim is that it is about theorizing what should be, but the thought in fact presupposes the very political reality it needs to construct for its condition of possibility. To put it differently, for those who rule, ethics needs to precede politics since it presupposes an already just and humane, although often hidden, environment as the *de facto* context of its inquiry into what ought to be. Those who are oppressed regard the appeal to ethics as begging the question of the relevance of good will and argue for the need to shift the conditions of rule, to engage in politics, before addressing an ethics. Failure to do so would have the conservative consequence of preserving the colonial and racist condition. (Gordon, 2008: 88)

Gordon (2015) argues that the struggle for the black and the colonized against racism is to achieve Otherness, to become the Other, to enter the ethical relations from which they are expelled. It is not a failure of ethics, but the absence of it. Thus, racism and colonialism poses a challenge for antiracist and anticolonial thinkers and movements. Racism is a political matter, but there is not an ethical terrain upon which address the political issue, as dominant political theories argue. The challenge is then to create the political without the ethics, so that the political can create the ethics upon which further political work can be developed.

In Chapter 5, I will deal with Gordon's theory of what politics means. In chapter 6 I will address the significance that these accounts may have for the theorization of the social world and the relation between the ethical and the political in peace studies. In the next section I turn my attention to the genealogy of Human Rights through race and colonialism. Precisely, Human Rights and the discourses derived from them have been criticized from anti-racist and anticolonial positions on the same grounds: the liberal predominance of the ethical over the political, and the assumption that there is an ethical and humane terrain that needs to be recuperated without acknowledging that the meaning of this disembodied human towards racialized groups is based on unethical relations (Saucier and Woods, 2014).

3.3 Human rights and race

3.3.1 The Valladolid Debate

There is trend in human rights scholarship that conceives the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Right as the logical culmination of a genealogy that goes back to ancient Greece and Rome Stoicism, medieval natural law, the Debates of Valladolid between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepulveda, modern natural law and rights, the liberal tradition of civil law, the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the

Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789 (Hunt, 2007). This genealogy is far from being unanimously accepted (Moyn, 2010). However, it is useful to pay attention to antecedents, the questions of rights and the legitimation of war in relation to the question of the human and the meaning ascribed to groups of people in a nascent hierarchy of the humans.

From the earliest years of the Conquest of America, the question of the nature of the so-called Indians –whether they were human or not, and if they were so, to what extent, and which level of human development could they achieve – was linked to the possibility of endowing them with rights, and the legitimacy and the legality of the presence of the Spanish Crown in America. The question of the humanity of indigenous people also conditioned their subjugation, the justification of waging war against them, and the legitimacy of their responses. In 1511, amidst the ongoing slaughter, pillage and enslavement of natives in the Hispaniola island, the Dominican priest Antonio Montesinos delivered the following sermon to the mass of Spanish conquerors from the top of a straw church:

With what right (...) and with what justice do you keep these poor Indians in such cruel and horrible servitude? By what authority have you made such detestable wars against these people who lived peacefully and gently on their own lands? Are these not men? Do they not have rational souls? Are you not obliged to love them as yourselves?' (Montesinos, quoted in Padgen, 1992: xxi)

The Burgos Laws of 1513 granted antinomy to the Indians with autonomy, who were capable of self-government and responsibility, but like many other laws in the colonies, were hardly implemented. Their servitude continued and their recognized right to property was not put into practice (Padgen, 1992; Castro, 2007). Likewise, it did not put an end to the debate about what the Indians were. The widespread colonialist argument asserted that endowing freedom to Indians would lead them back to their natural laziness, sorcery, gluttony,

arbitrariness, dance and intoxication (Hanke, 1985). The dichotomy of the discussion was between the Indians as free beasts or enslaved humans. In 1517 Francisco Ruiz, Bishop of Avila, close friend to the Cardinal Francisco Cisneros, the most influential figure regarding Indian matters in the Spanish administration argued the following:

Although [the Indians] are evil when thinking about how to harm Christians, these people are not enabled for natural judgment, to receive the faith or other necessary breeding virtues for their conversion and salvation. ... They have to be ruled and governed, like horses or beasts, by Christians, with a good treatment and without cruelty. (Ruiz, quoted in Hanke, 1985: 34; my translation¹⁸)

In 1519, another priest declared that the Indians were “slaves by nature” (Hanke, 1985: 35). In 1520 King Charles V declared the Indians free beings who deserved to be treated as such, and who had to be converted to Christianity (Hanke, 1985); however, the debates focused on their nature, their location in the human hierarchy or in the animal kingdom, the behavior and the character of the Indians, their ability to learn or the impossibility of educating and civilizing them, and whether they were able of self-government and responsibility. Indeed, these debates were exacerbated insofar as the conquest moved from the Caribbean islands to other territories where the soldiers and conquerors found different groups of peoples, different customs, religious ceremonies, architectonics, and war techniques.

The debate that took place in Valladolid in 1550 and 1551 between historian and translator Juan Ginés de Sepulveda and Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casas was the formalization of the ongoing and constant discussions that mixed the theological, the legal, the military and the economic with regard to the form of colonization that was the adequate one

¹⁸ “Aunque es gente maliciosa para concebir ruindades en daño de los cristianos, no es gente capaz ni de juicio natural para recibir la fe, ni otras virtudes de crianza necesarias para su conversión y salvación (...) y han menester, así como un caballo o bestia, ser regidos y gobernados por cristianos, tratándolos bien y no cruelmente.”

according to the status of the Indies, either by means of war or through conversion into Christianity. Anthony Padgen argues that the debate had a ceremonial character without a definitive outcome (Padgen, 1992), whereas Lewis Hanke points out that King Charles V paid a close ear to the Las Casas, to the extent that before the debate, in 1543, the king doubted the legality of the Spanish conquest on the basis of the indigenous sovereignty over their lands (Hanke, 1985).

The two discussants were influential figures with seemingly opposite positions. Sepúlveda was an erudite humanist and translator, an official chronicler of the king. He published *The Second Democrates; Or, The Just Causes of the War against the Indians* where he rendered his positions on the debate. In this work, he argues that conquest and war against the Indians are justified based on the Aristoteles Doctrine of natural servitude, wherein the most accomplished should impose over the imperfect beings. War was the means to tame the barbaric creatures, devoid of reason and civilization and incapable of education by other forms. Sepúlveda states:

This war and conquest are just first of all because these barbaric, uneducated, and inhuman [Indians] are by nature servants. Naturally, they refuse the governance which more prudent, powerful, and perfect human beings offer and which would result in their great benefit (*magnas commoditates*). By natural right and for the good of all (*utriusque bene*), the material ought to obey the form, the body the soul, the appetite the reason, the brutes the human being, the woman her husband, the imperfect the perfect, and the worse the better. (Sepúlveda, quoted in Dussel, 1995: 63)

Sepúlveda denied that the presence of architecture, houses, commerce, rules, regular behaviors and ceremonies in Indian lives was a sign of reason and culture. What revealed their “half-men” nature was the absence of private property, inheritance to descendants, and their voluntary submission to the arbitrariness of own kings. Such depictions also included

descriptions of laziness, brutishness, cowardice, cannibalism and idolatry. Thus, war and conquest were the only means of salvation and liberation, to these uneducable, innate slaves from themselves. As Enrique Dussel (1995) points out, Sepúlveda's proposal was to enforce them into the Spanish empire first, through pacification, and then, if possible, by means of persuasion into Christianity.

Bartolomé de Las Casas was a missionary who had been bearing witness and denouncing the exploitation, rape and slaughter of indigenous peoples during the conquest and the settlement of the Spanish Crown. His prolific work included *On Royal Power*, ethnological accounts (*Apologetic History of the Indies*), or in historical ones like the three-volume *History of the Indies*. He was officially appointed "universal protector of all the Indians of America" by the regent Cardinal Cisneros for his defense of the humanity of the Indians, and for his advocacy of the reform of Spanish laws and institutions in the colonies expressed in his works. In *A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies*, written in 1542, he declared that he intended to show the truth of what he witnessed in America in order to promote the intervention of the King before the destruction of America, and also because of the fear of the destruction of Spain by a divine punishment (Las Casas, 1992: 127). Against Sepúlveda, Las Casas argued that the Indians were fully human, rational, possessing soul, but imperfect beings, in an inferior stage than the Europeans, and possessing a primitive culture. He depicted native Americans as docile, peaceful and simple. He understood the initial reluctance of the Indians to the conversion to Christianity, since it was an unfamiliar and external imposition, but that did not justify war against them. The practices of the Crown involved a threefold rupture of the law: it went against the divine law, natural rights and the laws of Castille. Las Casas hinted that such disrespect to the laws would justify the war of the Indians against the Crown (Las Casas,

1992: 70). Therefore, what was to be done instead was to stimulate their natural aptitude to learn and convert them into Christianity by peaceful means.

The figure of Las Casas is complex and controversial. Las Casas is considered a primordial character in the history of America since colonialism. His views were invoked by *libertadores* such as Simón de Bolívar and Fray Servando Teresa y Mier. He is considered a noble defender of the causes of Native Americans, a precursor of liberation and human rights from a Latin American perspective, or “the midwife of human rights talk”, in the words of Paolo Carozza (Castro, 2007: 183). He held a significant influence in the theology of liberation, and has also been labelled as the “authentic expression of the true Spanish conscience” (Castro, 2007:4). For Enrique Dussel, Las Casas is an antecessor of intercultural dialogue (Dussel, 1995).

Alternatively, For Julia Suárez-Krabbe, Las Casas must be understood “within the framework of Creole sympathism and indigenismo” (Suárez-Krabbe, 2016: 59). By this she means “a position that exercises whiteness in the name of the defense of the indigenous populations.” In other words, the study, the defense and the valorization of indigenous culture is accompanied by exerting the power to define and delimitate them, “and to determine their ‘political’ projects” and aspirations (Ibid). In the same vein, for Daniel Castro, Las Casas struggled *for*, but not *with* native American causes. He did not speak their languages, held a distant paternalist relationship with them, did not question the superiority of Christianity, and most of his actions were not translated in significant improvements in native’s lives (Castro, 2007). This also precedes one of the contemporary problems of human rights identified by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014): who is the subject and who is the object of human rights. Las Casas did not contributed to the agency of the native, but rather, through his reformist

approach, attempted to counterbalance the aims of settlers and conquerors. In Castro's terms, it was "a change of masters". Likewise, Las Casas was also a pioneer of the civilizing mission, and the forms of imperialism through conversion, spiritual perfection, and assimilations instead of violent domination (Castro, 2007).

Neither Sepulveda nor Las Casas questioned the legitimacy of colonization or the presence of the Spanish in America. The heart of the matter of the debate of Valladolid was what kind of action –whether violent or peaceful– depending on the rights and according to the location of indigenous people in the human hierarchy (Wynter, 2003). Indeed, the question of the legitimacy would never be posed again in Spain after their debate (Padgen, 1992). In a similar vein, Julia Suárez Krabbe observes that what was at stake was not the belonging to the human, but the hierarchical constitution and categorization of humans on the grounds of Spanish/Christian criteria that are to define the human and the subhuman. She adds: "The idea of the human being emerges as a category that does not capture the humanity of all human beings but which, instead, dehumanizes all those who are not constituted as Christian, European, property-owning, productive, and masculine" (Suárez-Krabbe, 2016: 61). Thus, the idea of the human in the colonial context and in Christian humanism emerges already as hierarchical, the human being is posed as a question, but it is not an open question since the possible answers are limited. Relatedly, the additional, and fundamental, problem with the terms of the Valladolid debate is that the question of whether indigenous groups have a soul has no satisfying emancipatory answer. As Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2008b) and Lewis Gordon (1999) remark, racism does not only function through racist assertions and beliefs, but more importantly through the doubt, the suspicion of the inferiority of groups of people, and the questioning of their humanity. For Maldonado-Torres (2008b: 123) racism is a

“misanthropic skepticism”, which “does not state a thesis, but only raises a question: (...) is the Other fully human?” A question that, independently of the answers, echoes across time, remains latent, more or less implicit, can be reformulated, and reappears in respect to other groups.

The Valladolid debate predates some of the questions covered in this chapter. As we saw in the previous sections, the question of the doubt and skepticism that lies at the origin of modern European philosophy has been transformed and reformulated throughout the centuries by diverse theoretical positions, theological and secular understandings of the world, naturalist and scientific understandings of knowledge. In this process of doubt and questioning, the humanity of groups has been affirmed, the humanity of others has been denied, while notions of culture, knowledge, rights, freedom, property and society have emerged. The problem does not lie in doubt and skepticism themselves, but rather, in the insufficient doubt and self-critical reflection to the extent of being unable to question the social and historical framework in which the doubt is posited.

3.3.2 Race and international law

As Julia Suárez-Krabbe (2016) notes, international law and human rights are in theory two separate domains, but in practice, in many cases, they function together. Contemporary studies reveal the intricacy of colonialism in the development of international law (Anghie, 2004; Pahuja; 2011; Koskenniemi, 2011; Suarez-Krabbe, 2016), its theological foundations (Supiot, 2017; Koram, 2017), and, from a Marxist perspective, the relation of international jurisprudence with the colonial seizure of lands and extraction of resources in the emergence of global capitalism (Marks, 2008). As Kojo Koram points out, the latter approach, although of decisive importance, does not enable to fully grasp “the theological undercurrents that

anchor the Euro-modern concept of ‘humanity’ that persists into the contemporary moment”, and is at the basis of human rights and international law (Koram, 2017: 3). A purely materialist analysis of international law makes visible how it is imbricated with primitive accumulation but does not enable to see the main argument that I sustain in this chapter: the role of the notion of human, the interrogation of who is a human being, and the formation of the less than human in the elaboration of the law. Koram identifies that the move from the theological to the secular framing of these questions did not entail a rupture. Instead, the theological element underlies secular rationalizations of law, rights and knowledge.

In this setting, rather than Hugo Grotious, Francisco de Vitoria is considered to be one of the earliest contributors to the creation of modern international law, and the initiator of “The School of Salamanca”, also known as the “*secunda* scholastic”, which encompassed several generations, including Jesuits like Luís de Molina or Francisco Suárez, (Koram, 2017), the aforementioned master of Descartes. For Vitoria, a humanist and a professor of law at the University of Salamanca, and a Dominican fray like his coetaneous Bartolomé de Las Casas, for Vitoria the question of colonial human difference and the legitimation of imperialism played an important role in his thought on sovereignty, just wars, natural rights, and also on trade. Vitoria’s work is not only important for his pioneering role, but also because it is part of the movement of legal and theological work oriented towards a secular understanding of the community of nations, centered around Europe rather than in Christianity.

The origin of international law can be found in *De Indis Noviter Inventis (On the Indians Lately Discovered)* and *De Jure Bellis Hispanorum in Barbaros (On the Law of War made by the Spaniards on the Barbarians)*. In these works Vitoria seeks to establish the legal framework for the relations between the Spanish Crown and Native American populations.

Taking this as the starting point of international law means that, contrary to mainstream international law scholarship, it “did not precede and thereby effortlessly resolve the problem of Spanish-Indian relations; rather, international law was created out of the unique issues generated by the encounter between the Spanish and the Indians” (Anghie, 2004: 5). In other words, there was not a preconceived framework in which colonized groups and non-European nations would be incorporated, but the problems resulting from the colonial human difference are what raised the question of the international order among peoples.

For Francisco de Vitoria, divine law could not be used to define the relations with the Indians, as it had been the case with the Moors. In Christian territories, the Pope would be the juridical authority who endows legitimacy to the sovereigns for the conquest of infidel territory. For Vitoria, the King of Spain did not have universal authority derived from the permission of the Pope, since the authority of the latter is circumscribed to the Christian world. Vitoria instead proposes a secular natural law to define the relations with the Indians. He considered them as owners of their land before the arrival of the Spanish despite being non-Christians. The question of property situates their relations in the framework of natural and human law. But the problem that he faced was that there was no universal law that encompassed what Vitoria considered two different social orders.

For Vitoria the Indians were rational human beings since he noticed coherent versions of what were European customs, beliefs, institutions, social and political forms of organization, and economic exchange. The Indians possessing reason led him to rely in a universal natural legal framework that would be determined by reason. This *jus genitum* bound human beings from all nations. Within this legal framework, Spanish could travel, sojourn, spread the Christian faith and engage in trade with Indians. Since they were included within the universal

law, the latter implied that they had to offer due hospitality as long as the Spanish did not inflict personal or property damage. Based on universality and equality Vitoria establishes an international legal system through which the breach between the Indians and the Spanish is closed and enables to define and judge their relations (Anghie, 2004).

Furthermore, this secular, universal and equal framework is imbued with Christian practices and values. Vitoria's humanism and initial recognition of the Indians conceals difference and power relations: universality and equality are tantamount to sameness and leaves no space for difference (Suarez-Krabbe, 2016). For Vitoria to be fully human, and to be fully rational, is to obey the law and adopt Christian Spanish practices, norms, and values. Failure to do so reveals a short development of humanity and justifies war; however, the failure was guaranteed from the beginning. For Anthony Anghie (2004), "cultural difference" is at the center of Vitoria's work since he considered Indians as humans but was puzzled by how to relate to different forms of being human. Indeed, Vitoria uses the framework of culture in his interrogation of indigenous people, but what Anghie's important analysis of Vitoria does not capture is the displacement of race by culture mentioned in the previous chapter. The underlying issue is that by looking at customs, institutions, knowledge, beliefs and social organization, Vitoria is elaborating a philosophical anthropology that measures the potential closeness of the Indians to the standard of humanity, the Christian Spanish. As Kojo Koram, puts it, "far from simply being a codified set of rules, law categorizes and constitutes notions of ideal humanity and in the process of colonization this categorization would be made explicit through the signifier of race" (Koram, 2017: 16). Indians have to be perfected through the conversion and adoption of the Spanish ideal of the universal human they embody. Since Indians are not and cannot be the universal Christian Spanish, they cannot comply with the

universal law that binds them. The result of not complying with the law, as Julia Suarez-Krabbe points out, is not attributed to their practices but to their very being: “indigenous peoples end up existing as violations, and not simply violators, of ‘universal’ law and cannot implement just war themselves”(Suarez Krabbe, 2016:72). This is the point that Fanon makes in the so often misinterpreted chapter on violence of *Les damnés de la terre*, the existence of the colonized in the colonial Manichaeian framework is itself violence: “Confronted with a world configured by the colonizer, *the colonized subject is always presumed guilty*” (Fanon, 1961: 16; emphasis original).

Through this particular form of inclusion and rejection from humanity, Vitoria legitimizes war against the Indians. Based on the apparent reciprocity to travel and hospitality, any Indian rejection of Spanish infiltration into their lands, exploitation, or conversion to Christianity would suffice to wage a just war against Indians with the subsequent expansion of the Spanish territories. Although Vitoria does not define the criteria of where sovereignty comes from, he equates it with the authority to wage a just war, of which the Indians like the Moors are deprived. They are instead objects of other’s sovereignty (Anghie, 2004).

Anghie states, by expelling the colonized from the sphere of sovereignty, international law entrusts itself with the mission of carrying sovereignty to the colonial world. In this way, “the colonial history of international law is concealed even when it is reproduced” (Anghie, 2004: 268). For the author, at the core of international law lies the dichotomy of colonizer and colonized. The terms employed, the social groups targeted and the meanings ascribed to them have varied across time. And according to these variations has unfolded the legal corpus and the institutional framework. This does not take place not on the basis of the development of a logical philosophical theory, but in an improvised way, and derived from the distinct

conjunctures of the colonial encounter. Thereby has been formulated international law: from Vitoria, Grotious, nineteenth century positivists, twentieth century pragmatists, to current humanitarian action.

This section and the preceding one could have been placed at the beginning of the chapter. In Dussel's understanding of modernity, the thought Vitoria and Las Casas are already modern. It was influential in the work of Descartes, and preceded the questions posed in secular political theory and social sciences. I have decided not to follow a linear development of historical processes and events because they are not always so linear, and also because I wanted to emphasize the different ramifications and the productivity of the question of race and colonial difference. The interrogation of the humanity of the colonized was fundamental for modern science and political theory, but it was also central in the development of early notions of human rights international law, and the changing configuration of the world. In Eurocentric accounts of modernity the colonized has an outsider position; modernity is extended to or imposed on the peripheries through conquest and colonialism. However, as we can see, the intricacy is deeper because the colonized has a double position to the formation of the Euro-modern world: it is both outsider and insider because of the aforementioned process of co-constitution. It is an outsider because she is not considered as an agent in these processes, and they were imposed. Yet, she is an insider because these processes were developed out of the creation of the colonized and the doubt over her humanity.

3.3.3 Haiti and the rights of human

The American and French revolutions in their respective ruptures with English colonialism and aristocratic hierarchies are considered foundational moments in the constitution of the Euro-modern world, and shifting points for thinking about legal notions of

equality and freedom. The Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) is mentioned in passing as an historical event that concluded in the first black republic of the New World, recognized but delinked from the formation of the modern world, or considered an extension or byproduct of Enlightenment and French revolutionary ideals (Bhambra, 2015; Buck-Morss, 2009; Fischer, 2004). Historian Sala-Molins affirms that “[t]here was no Haitian Revolution: there was only a Saint-Domingue episode of the French Revolution”. However, he observes that taking the thought of the Haitian Revolution as derivative of the Enlightenment begs the question of what their contribution was, because “these liberators subverted the language of the Enlightenment and gave it a meaning it did not have” (Sala-Molins, quoted in Bhambra, 2020:10). But, for Bhambra (2020), it was not only a question of “a meaning it did not have”, but also a meaning that would be rejected by Enlightenment thought.

This position illustrates what Sybille Fischer has called the disavowal of Haiti in modern world history. For Fischer (2004), the significance of the Haitian Revolution in the modern world lies beyond the fact that has been silenced and highlights how it has been disavowed, that is, it has been both acknowledged and denied. In psychoanalytical terms, this contradiction is related to forms of suppression and evasion from a challenge, threat or trauma. The trauma is related to its radical character. Michel-Ralph Trouillot’s (1995) defines the Haitian Revolution as “the unthinkable”: it was unprecedented and Europeans could not conceive, before, during and after the revolution that a group of people considered cattle and commodity, unable to think, to possess skills, to create knowledge or having war techniques could initiate a movement of emancipation. For Fischer, the suppression of the constitutive role of Haiti and the colonized in European modernity entails reconsidering what the modern means, how it is formed and what and who is located as external to the formation of the modern

world. This traumatic event challenges Euro-modern conventions and reveals that slavery and colonialism were not peripheral but central for the economic, politic and philosophical development of Europe. Furthermore, the enslaved population took the question of freedom to their own hands, brains and knowledges, and thereby challenged the liberal self-understanding of providing progress, equality, and emancipation from authoritarian constraints. Thus, she adds, “the suppression and disavowal of revolutionary antislavery and attendant cultures in the Caribbean was also a struggle over what would count as progress, what was meant by liberty, and how the two should relate” (Fischer, 2004: 24). For example, the constitution issued after American independence was considered the “foundation of freedom” by Hannah Arendt (1990: 71). Arendt’s comment is relevant here because freedom was not an obstacle to the legal continuation of slavery. What Fischer implies is that the avowal of Haiti and its theoretical, normative and political implications do not merely constitute an addition to political and social theories. These were formed through this disavowal. Taking Haiti seriously means assessing these theories, their silences and limitations, and to produce new theories which offer a broader epistemic and normative scope out of the experience of liberation.

Since 1685 the *Code noir* was the legal framework of the French empire that defined the relations between French and African slaves and the limited enfranchisement of free populations of color in the Caribbean. It was later extended to the whole colonies, and subsequently to the colonized in the metropolis (Bhambra, 2020). In 1780, the island of Saint-Domingue (renamed Haiti after the Independence in honor to the indigenous people who inhabited it before the arrival of Spanish and French colonizers) was the most profitable colony in the world on the basis of a plantation economy of sugar and coffee, and also derived from the profits of the trade of slaves, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the

population (Knight, 2005). Around that time, free black and mulattos such as Julien Raimond and Vincent Ogé claimed in France against the restriction of their rights and in favor of their right to political participation. Their petitions were rejected by the assembly and the lobbies of planters. In 1790, back in Saint-Domingue, Ogé initiated a rebellion for his cause, not for the abolition of slavery, which was quick and ruthlessly defeated (Fischer, 2004). One year earlier, *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* issued on the 26th August 1789 by the French National Constituent Assembly stated in the first clause that “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights”. This statement resulting from the French Revolution would find its limits in the civil situation of French women, and in the condition of colonized men and women in Africa and on the other side of the Atlantic. The echoes of liberty of the French Revolution resonated in Haiti and in the rest of the colonies as in the metropolis. In the island, the meaning of freedom, equality and citizenship was violently disputed according to the demographic composition and the different interests of the free colored and of the white minority: the main land and slave owners against small merchants and proprietors mobilized the slaves for their particular causes (Knight, 2005). The problem of the colonies, the distribution of the land, the aspirations of different groups was on the table of the National Assembly. So was the question of the hierarchies based on color, the issue of rights and citizenship of the black population, which was dismissed.

In 1791 the slaves, mostly born in Africa, started an insurrection for their own freedom, and unleashed a revolution that would transform the social, economic and political landscape of the island, and shook the metropolis and plantation societies in the Americas. The slaves, mostly of Congolese origin, were animated by the aforementioned echoes coming from France,

but the meaning of it, and the response that it elicited was also mediated by the military techniques derived from, in the majority of cases, their Congolese origin:

Increasingly, pamphlets from and hearsay about the rising tensions in the metropolis circulated amongst the slaves who interpreted these political contestations through Kongolese political philosophy. This syncretism rendered political freedom as the right to limited autonomy granted by a non-despotic, virtuous king. (Shilliam, 2008: 771)

In 1791, the French Assembly declared again the incompatibility between black men and French citizenship. Instead, it was decreed that “non-whites born of free parents, not freedmen” should be granted political equality, which was quickly revoked (Bhambra, 2020: 13). In 1793, pressured by the revolutionary events, the Jacobin commissioner in Haiti Léger-Félicité Sonthonax initially granted certain rights to the slaves, at the time led by the former slave Toussaint Louverture. Sonthonax ended up declaring equal citizenship, the emancipation of all slaves and the abolition of slavery. His move was not so much predicated on the belief in universal freedom and equality, but rather he wanted to keep slave militias on his side against the inferences of the British and the Spanish in the island, and to maintain the plantation economy. Emancipation was not accompanied by the redistribution of the land, civil and political equality, control over their own labor and freedom of movement. Former slaves were obliged to remain laboring in the plantation as waged labor and under military control. In exchange, they were freed on Sundays, pregnant women had shorter working hours, former slaves were allowed to present complaints against their bosses, and to participate in assemblies to vote for their managers, including women’s vote. Yet Sonthonax’s abolition of slavery in the island had not been ratified in the metropolis (Dubois, 2005). The intervention of three representatives of Saint-Domingue who travelled to France and spoke to the National Convention was decisive (Bhambra, 2020), and in 1794 the abolition of slavery was included

in the French *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*. Bhambra concludes that “the most radical political statement of the French Revolution, then, that is, *the one with the greatest universal potential*, came from Haiti” (Bhambra, 2020:9; emphasis original). However, the demands of the three representatives of Saint-Domingue for full inclusion and representation in the French state were denied. Race still determined citizenship and equality and aspirations of the former slaves were directed towards building an independent republic.

For years this emancipation was *de facto* threatened by slaveholders, settlers, lobbies of planters, the Napoleonean idea of the French empire, and the expansionism of the British and Spanish empires. Between 1797 and 1801, the armies led by Toussaint Louverture, governor general of the colony, rejected the French, British and Spanish invasion of the island (Bhambra, 2020; Dubois, 2005; Knight, 2005). The Constitution of 1801 situates Saint-Domingue as a colony within the French empire, but with its own laws. In condemnation of voodoo, Catholicism is the official religion. It declares the abolition of slavery and the freedom, equality and French citizenship of all its inhabitants without any other distinction. For his service in the revolution, Toussaint Louverture was named governor general *ad eternum*. The French responded by sending of additional military troops; Louverture was treacherously captured by Napoleon’s son-in-law Leclerc, and sent to France where he died prematurely. In 1802 Napoleon reinstated slavery, and in 1804, after the defeat of the French army, Jean-Jacques Dessalines declared the independence of Saint-Domingue.

The Constitution of 1805 not only entailed serious changes with regard to the previous one, it was also a subversion of the French understanding of human difference, universalism and particularism, equality, property and citizenship. It involved a political destruction and resignification of the inherited world, the categories, meanings and names received through

the history of oppression from which this constitution emerged (Fischer, 2004: 233). First, the name of Saint-Domingue was changed to Haiti in honor of the Tainos, the indigenous people who inhabited the island before the conquest of the French and Spanish empires. In contrast to the previous constitution, it asserts the freedom of worship, the absence of an official religion, and the legality of divorce. The preamble of the constitution declares the attempt to reconcile the universal equality of all human beings with the diverse and concrete manifestations of the human in light of the particular history of oppression of Haiti:

As well in our name as in that of the people of Hayti, who have legally constituted us faithfully organs and interpreters of their will, in presence of the Supreme Being, before whom all mankind are equal, and who has scattered so many species of creatures on the surface of the earth for the purpose of manifesting his glory and his power by the diversity of his works, in the presence of all nature by whom we have been so unjustly and for so long a time considered as outcast children.

As Fischer points, out the appeal to the history of slavery introduces an identitarian consideration in the birth of Haiti while at the same time the preamble rejects forms of exclusion and racial hierarchies. This is the framework of the whole constitution wherein equality, difference, universalism, identity and history are closely connected. In this dialectical tension between the universal and the particular “equality cannot be achieved without particularistic claims, and particularism is ultimately justified by a claim of universal racial equality” (Fischer, 2004: 232).

The twelfth article forbids white men the acquisition of property, or the entry in the country “with the title of master or proprietor”. The thirteenth article refers to the previous one and introduces the exception of German, Polish, or white women who had been granted Haitian citizenship by the government. The fourteenth article, which involves the most radical change concerning citizenship from previous constitutions, reads: “All acception (sic) of colour among

the children of one and the same family, of whom the chief magistrate is the father, being necessarily to cease, the Haytians shall hence forward be known only by the generic appellation of Blacks.”

In short, all Haitian citizens were black, free and equal. Black did not mean skin color, since mulattoes, the naturalized German, Polish, or white women would also be considered black. Black is then not a phenotype; it means a form of political citizenship and subjectivation that, as Fischer notes, breaks with the inherited past of oppression, and at the same time disrupts the emergent biological accounts of race and scientific racism of the time. The term black makes explicit what previous universal declarations of man and rights concealed: the existing racial hierarchies, and the relation between an abstract humanity and citizenship with race. Making black the generic term for the human departs from “the taxonomic lunacy of a colony that had more than one hundred different terms to refer to different degrees of racial mixture and color” (Fischer, 2004: 232). Black is not the reversal of white superiority. It does not attempt to erase difference. Instead, it starts from the position of subjugation and liberation to declare the end of racist hierarchies and exploitation. It is through this dialectical particularity where its universal scope of racial inequality and freedom lies:

Through the act of renaming, the constitution of 1805 thus performs one of the most troubling paradoxes of modern universalist politics—the paradox that the universal is typically derived through a generalization of one of the particulars. Calling all Haitians, regardless of skin color, black is a gesture like calling all people, regardless of their sex, women: it both asserts egalitarian and universalist intuitions and puts them to a test by using the previously subordinated term of the opposition as the universal term. (Fischer, 2004: 233)

In this section, I have briefly addressed the relationship between the Haitian and the French revolutions, and the tensions about the questions of rights, equality, freedom,

universalism and citizenship that taking seriously the Haitian Revolution, and its disavowal, reveal. Again, the racial element plays an important role in two ways: what is said, and what is not said about it. The Haitian Revolution cannot be treated as an autonomous event, as fully delinked from what was taking place in France. However, it was not a derivative product of the French, neither its direct application in another context. The relevance of the events in the metropolitan France, and the theoretical and normative production on freedom, equality and citizenship that has resulted from the French Revolution, are insufficient despite its significance considering the events in Haiti. This situation opens up a wide array of theoretical possibilities and new venues for thinking contemporary issues. Taking seriously Haiti entails not only reconsidering the aforementioned issues about modernity, knowledge production, rights, freedom and citizenship, but as, certain authors are doing, notions of development (Bhambra, 2020) or politics of security (Shilliam, 2008). With this background, the next section turns to the polemics revolving around the question of race and racism in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights

3.3.4 The Human Rights Declaration

At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference following the end of the First World War, Japan attempted to introduce a “race equality” clause in the creation of the League of Nations. This was grounded on the discriminatory laws regarding access to property, school segregation and the daily humiliation suffered by Japanese migrants in Canada, the United States and Australia. Although initially supported by Woodrow Wilson, imperial nations unanimously rejected the amendment to the “religious liberty” clause. The Japanese proposal read:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of States members of the League equal and just treatment in every

respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality. (Barth, 2008: 54)

After the negotiations, the Japanese amendment was reduced to “the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals,” which was dismissed by Wilson because it was considered redundant with the ideas of the League of Nations. However, the underlying reason was expressed by the British to the American delegate: “The trouble is that if this Commission should pass it, it would surely raise the race issue throughout the world” (MacMillan, 2003: 320).

The landscape was different at the end of the Second World War. There was unanimity in the West that another Nazi regime was not to be repeated, and that racism was morally unjustifiable and undemocratic. The European and American allies envisaged the construction of a different world order on the basis of justice and democracy. In its economic dimension, the Bretton-Woods meetings of 1944 set the foundations for the creation of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Alongside, and in close relation to it, the victors of the war organized the Human Rights Commission in 1946. It attempted to represent experts from different philosophical, cultural and religious traditions in order to draft what became *The Universal Declarations of Human Rights* issued by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. Its first article states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and consciousness and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” In short, the Universal declarations attempted to provide a legal and institutional foundation to previous discourses of human rights, and universalize and enlarge the number of social, civil and political rights (Hunt, 2007). The creation of the United Nations and its charter of human rights were central to the creation of an “internationalized antiracist discourse” rooted in Europe and

the United States. The aforementioned UNESCO declaration on the lack of biological basis of the concept of race and racial hierarchies was accompanied by a series of UNESCO special meetings for the protection of groups and minorities from racial discrimination (Hesse, 2004).

Yet, the negotiations and contributions that crystallized in the human rights declaration reveal that the problem of racism, besides the specificity of the Holocaust, was far from being a concern. In 1946, the historian Herbert Apheteker and the National Negro Congress (NCC) wrote an appeal to the U.N. where they presented the conditions of African-Americans in the United States. The U.N.'s response was that they lacked jurisdiction and authority in domestic affairs. In 1947, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), under the editorial supervision of W.E.B Du Bois resumed and expanded the proposal of the NCC, which he considered too short and insufficiently documented, and hence, politically inefficient (Anderson, 2003: 94). The NAACP submitted a 95-page petition, titled "An Appeal to the World!", to the Human Rights Commission calling for the Universal Declaration to pay attention to the problems of racism in the United States specifically, but also worldwide. Written by scholars and legal experts, it provided a detailed historical, economic, sociological and legal account of the situation of black people in the United States from slavery to post World War II. It addressed education and literacy rates, rent and urbanization, wage and unemployment, access to health care, life expectancy and infant mortality, and it specifically attempted to legally justify why the United Nations and the international community should take action.

The NAACP relied on the support of president Harry S. Truman, and of the former first lady Eleanor Roosevelt, who was a member of its board of directors, and also chair of the Human Rights Commission. Both Truman and Roosevelt had shown certain sympathy for

limited civil rights, but in the demands for accountability posed by black intellectuals and activists, they saw a threat to the United States, especially in the context of the Cold War.

“I wish to make clear,” [Truman] told a group of black Democrats, “that I am not appealing for social equality for the Negro. The Negro himself knows better than that, and the highest type of Negro leaders say quite frankly that they prefer the society of their own people. Negroes want justice, not social equality”. (Anderson, 2003: 2)

Roosevelt did not only turn down any form of public appearance of the petition. She also profited from her position to pressure against initiatives and treaties that could have an effect on racism in the U.S. She joined other U.S. representatives in their effort to undermine the complaints against human rights violations in Apartheid South Africa, since it could lead to investigating the conditions of blacks in their country. She also helped to introduce clauses in the petition in order to prevent the interference of the U.N. in federal states, so that questions of fair trials, murders, or legal discrimination in the southern states would fall outside the scope of the international treaties (Anderson, 2003). At the same time, Eleanor Roosevelt decisively contributed to the inclusion of socioeconomic rights of women in the declarations of rights (Suarez-Krabbe, 2016). In short, the United States and colonial powers directed their efforts to undermine the creation of an international venue in which the so-called “Negro problem” or the colonial question can be discussed and investigated. For Du Bois, the problem of human rights, was “not the lack of pious statements”, but their application when “human rights are denied in the face of law and declarations” (Du Bois, quoted in Anderson, 2003: 181). On Du Bois, Sean Elias writes:

Through these unsettling experiences with ‘more sympathetic,’ ‘liberal’ whites oblivious to rights abuses of white racism, DuBois realized that the human rights concerns of blacks, in the US and abroad, could not be entrusted to white political leaders, who knowingly or unknowingly have

historical strong interest in preserving their present power and income that rests on white racism. (Elias, quoted in Suárez-Krabbe, 2016: 96)

That U.S thinkers such as Du Bois or Malcolm X, anticolonial leaders, or black or indigenous activists throughout the world referred to human rights for practical reasons and used its language in their struggles (Burke, 2010; Klose, 2013), but this does not amount to the concordance, their complicity with power dynamics, or the absence of other proposals and conceptions of what human and rights mean (Maldonado-Torres, 2017; Suárez-Krabbe, 2013). Du Bois himself questioned the framework of the exceptionality of the Holocaust that underlies the human rights declaration and the antiracist approach after the Second World War. In 1947, he wrote:

There was no Nazi atrocity—concentration camps, wholesale maiming and murder, defilement of women or ghastly blasphemy of childhood—which Christian civilization or Europe had not long been practicing against colored folk in all parts of the world in the name of and for the defense of a Superior Race born to rule the world. (Du Bois, 2007b: 15)

Likewise, in *Discourse on Colonialism*, Aimé Césaire scathingly pointed out that Hitler was not an anomaly and an aberration, but the colonial logic and practices going out of control and coming back home to Europe. For “the very distinguished, very humanistic, very Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century,” Césaire observes, the scandal of Nazism was not the crime against humanity, but the crimes against the white man, “and the fact that he [Hitler] applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the “coolies” of India, and the “niggers” of America” (Césaire, 2001: 36). The main difference between Nazism and colonialism, he points out, is the civilizing mission: salvation, spiritual perfection, education, civilization, to which it could be added contemporary development and democratization. What Césaire brings up is that linking universalism, rights

and the idea of the human is not a new development of post WWII, but a part of colonial practices. The racist bedrock of human rights lies in the denial of the colonial understanding of what and who is a human being in the European humanist attempts of ending racism and totalitarianism after the Holocaust: “And that is the great thing I hold against pseudo-humanism: that for too long it has diminished the rights of man, that its concept of those rights has been—and still is—narrow and fragmentary, incomplete and biased and, all things considered, sordidly racist” (Césaire, 2001: 37). As in the case of the Haitian Revolution, Césaire provides here a view from “the underside of modernity” of the implications of race that is more expansive and universal. The next section moves back to the question of social sciences in the inter-war period and before in order to analyze the direct relation between race and the origin of the field of International Relations.

3.4 Race and racism in international relations

As addressed above in regard to modern philosophy, sociology and anthropology, the intricacy of race and colonialism lies also at the origin of International Relations. Robert Vitalis (2015) makes the case that the birth of international relations in the United States was entangled with questions of imperialism and racism. This is not how the discipline conceives of itself today and how the story of its foundation is told. The history of International Relations has been sedimented after the Second World War by the transmission of course designs from professor to professor, syllabi, reading lists, exams, research projects, journals, and textbooks. Through processes of homogenization and specialization, the field forged its own tradition and identification, accompanied with societal developments. As Vitalis (2015: 19) has noted, “Virtually every history of international relations to date turns out to be about white political

scientists teaching in white departments and publishing in white journals. The race blindness is almost certainly unselfconscious.” According to the dominant narrative the field of those international relations explains the order between states and deals with the world system of states mainly out of three divergent theories: realism, liberalism and constructivism. However, a deeper genealogy of international relations reveals that at the beginning of the twentieth century, “international relations meant race relations” (Vitalis, 2015: 1). The main concern for international relations scholars was the question of how to maintain, manage and expand the empire, or what was called “race subjection,” from the threat of international liberation movements by colored people, that is, backward and inferior beings. Before the Cold-War (and also after, Vitalis notes), scholarship, institutions, and public intellectuals of international relations, in their relation with policy makers, attempted to rationalize and provide arguments and policies to maintain the imperial order. Hence, “the biological division of the world mattered much more for theory building than a territorial division” (Vitalis, 2015: 20).

Vitalis points out that the first specialized journal of international relations did not emerge from international institutions such as the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, the Council on Foreign Relations in New York or the department at Aberystwyth University in Wales following the Peace Paris Conference in 1919, as the discipline today explains itself. Furthermore, the original aim of the discipline was not to study scientifically the problem of war. Instead, the first journal of the field was the *Journal of Race Development*, created in 1910, and renamed *Journal of International Relations* in 1919 without significant changes. In 1922 it was succeeded by *Foreign Affairs*: “The theory of ‘race development’ held out the prospect of a more peaceful and prosperous white hegemony while reducing the threat

of the race war that preoccupied self-identified white elites in the United States and elsewhere in the 1890s and 1920s and again in the 1950s” (Vitalis, 2015: 8).

W.E.B. Du Bois was one of the members of the founding editorial board of the *Journal of Race Development*, where he published several articles. The omission of race and colonialism in the current narrative of the discipline also entails an omission of the important contribution of black thinkers in the emergence of the discipline and in counteracting the “racist foundations of International Relations” (Vitalis, 2015: x). What Vitalis calls the “Howard School”, conformed by Du Bois, Alain Locke, E. Franklin Frazier, Rayford Logan, Eric Williams, Merze Tate, among others, comprised a group of African American scholars, with different theoretical and political orientations, but consistent in their analysis of race hierarchies and white supremacy as the bedrock of colonialism. They “represent a critical counternetwork” to the international networks of scholarship, institutions, policy makers that rationalized colonialism (Vitalis, 2015: 19); the work of the Howard School was not limited to a network of scholarship, but also established connections with anticolonial and Panaficanist leaders and theorists.

Vineet Thakur and Peter Vale (2020) concur with Vitalis’ points that race and colonialism were at the core of the origin of International Relations, and that the birth of the field precedes the end of the World War I and the search for peace, but they identify another context and time for its inception. For the authors, the development of International Relations in Europe can be traced back to the Boer War (1899-1902), the unification of the South African state, and the first signs of moral, territorial and economic decline of the British Empire. Thakur and Vale argue that South Africa was a laboratory for the reformulation of the empire and statehood within the empire. Methods, institutions, journals, capital and a network of

intellectuals and policymakers in South Africa are directly connected and almost transposed to the funding, ideas and individuals involved in the creation of the earliest departments, institutes and journals of the field in Europe.

Currently, Vitalis observes, the tradition of International Relations is conceived “to be race blind”. Failing to notice that this narrative started after the Second World War, scholars of international relations tell themselves that the field dates back to Thucydides and Machiavelli, that the basic unit of concern is the state, not race, and that the focus is on security in international relations. If people of color are absent in curricula and reading lists, it is because they did not contribute to the field, or their contributions do not adjust to the current concerns of the discipline (Vitalis, 2015: 19). For Sankaran Krishna, the field is based on the “systematic politics of forgetting, a willful amnesia, on the question of race” (Krishna, 2001: 401). For Krishna, the problem is methodological since the discipline fetishizes abstraction and ahistorical analysis as the desired modes of theorizing. Thereby the history of violence and theft unleashed against colonized populations is evaded and suspended, which enables the scholar to produce a sort of depoliticized theory (Krishna, 2001). Errol Henderson points out that the only problems are not the racist origins or the current silence on race, but how racism and white supremacy are still imbued in the central concept in the field, anarchy, and it has been unchallenged and supported by the three main paradigms of International Relations, constructivism, neorealism and liberal democratic peace (Henderson, 2013). For Persaud, race has not been ignored, but silenced, which amounts to silencing a central element of the configuration of the modern world, including contemporary democracies: “what needs to be underlined is that the struggle for racial equality has been fundamental to the emergence of democracy as a whole, not just for the colored world” (Persaud, 2001, 116). In line with the

approach of this chapter, Amy Niang makes an important point when she summarizes that what is left aside in the abstract and ahistorical theorization in International Relations is the human element:

the limited interest amongst IR scholars in addressing the question of the human in common deliberations about ‘the international’ walls off an important horizon of the present. Specifically, out of ignorance, inability or unwillingness to think about the history and aftermath of slavery emerges abstract orders of citizen, community and international. Each one of these orders not only has an inbuilt racialised notion of the human at its heart but also conveys an inability to examine the implications of interdependence in terms of a requirement of mutual care and mutual vulnerability where vulnerability is unevenly distributed and experienced. (Niang, 2020: 334)

Concurrently, to the analysis of the question of race and racism in the field, its history and its absence, there is also a growing scholarship from different parts of the globe and distant from mainstream positions that show how race and colonialism shape theories of governance and the state (Thompson, 2015; Gruffydd Jones, 2015); unveil concealed histories global colonial relations (Persaud, 2015; Krishna, 2015; Knox, 2015); shed light on the racist and colonial dimensions of liberal peace (Sabaratnam, 2018); build new approaches to international relations beyond Eurocentrism (Bilgin, 2008; Grovogui, 2006; Koram, 2017; Bendix, Müller and Ziai, 2020); start from anticolonial struggles and take seriously the theorization of the colonized as actors in shaping the contemporary world (Gruffydd Jones, 2011; Shilliam, 2011, 2015; Bogue, 2011; Getachew, 2020). Thereby this scholarship challenges underlying issues and dominant tropes in international relations: the notion of the human, the organization of knowledge production, the history and the self-understanding of the field, conceptual and theoretical paradigms. This entails a reconstruction of the field, assessing its roots, its methods, logics and criteria for evaluation. It precipitates an expansion of its scope because the field was not originally built to explore these questions.

Conclusion

This chapter has addressed some of the implications of race as the Euro-modern conceptualization of human difference derived from the colonial encounter. The arrival of the Spanish to the American continent elicited in Europe a series of questions and improvised responses provoked by these encounters outside of the framework of European Christianity. What are they? Do they have a soul? Are they human? Are they rational? Do they have rights? Through which ethical and legal framework shall we relate to them? As Dussel posits, the doubt that is attributed to Descartes as the initiator of modern philosophy was already present in the interrogation of the human being in the Americas by his mentors. The initial theological framework for asking and answering these questions was gradually secularized, but the underlying grammar remained. In this process of conquest and interrogation the standard of humanity was created and transformed. There was a move from the Christian (European) as the standard of the human, to the European and the white man. At the same time, new forms of being human, as lesser than human, were created: the indigenous, the black, the Coolie.

Race is not the only important element, but is one of the central aspects of the formation of European modernity. Taking race seriously means looking at the production of human and the subhuman in European expansion. The production of new forms of human beings was not a direct imposition, but a historical process of interrogation and knowledge production that was concomitant to the development of political theories, humanist conceptions, legal relations, notions of rights, of culture, liberty, equality and citizenship state formation, forms of governance, notions of, disciplinary formation and its organization. In other words, European modernity was not a phenomenon taking place in Europe that was imposed and extended through colonialism, but rather, these aspects were co-constituted in relation to the colonial

encounter, the creation of the less than human, and the accompanying dehumanization, seizure of land, exploitation, forced migrations and genocide.

Race and racism, and their implications, have been understudied in peace studies. There are different elements in the discipline that impede talking about race and racism as connected to colonialism and constitutive of European modernity. Despite peace studies' critical relationship to the discipline of international relations, critical scholars of the latter have produced a self-reflective work on the discipline, its origins, its locus of enunciation, and on the historical and present implications of race at different levels, including knowledge production. Taking race and racism seriously in peace studies means assessing whole set of questions: its foundational narrative, its relationship to international relations and to liberal political theory, the analysis of modernity and the conceptual disruption that it entails, the notion of the ethical and the political, its borders with other disciplines, how these are established, the role and the conception of violence in the field and its relation to peace, the notion of the human being and its relation with a whole set of questions. I will address some of these aspects in the fifth chapter.

The next chapter attempts to introduce and provide the main features and challenges of the field of Africana or African diasporic philosophy. As I shall elucidates, it addresses the underside of the developments covered in the present chapter. It emerges from the reflection of those who were not supposed to reflect, who were devoid of reason, and outside of history. Out of this condition emerges a thought oriented towards social transformation sustained in three main questions: the meaning of the human being, the question of freedom, action and social transformation, and the question of reason and how to think about reason and about

thinking. As I shall argue, these are important questions to consider in an endeavor to reform the pedagogy of peace studies.

Chapter 4. Africana Philosophy

Introduction

This chapter attempts to introduce, offer a broad view and a profile of the field of Africana or African diasporic philosophy, including its limits, obstacles, questions and main concerns. In order to introduce Africana philosophy, it is necessary to situate it within the historical and intellectual life that denied the capacity of reasoning to black and African people and delegitimized it as philosophy and philosophical inquiry (Gordon, 2013b, 2008). African diasporic form emerges in the context of colonialism and racism as a response to the questions that these historical situations generate. I have organized this chapter as follows: The first section offers an outline of Africana philosophy, its definition, the main questions, the difference between black and Africana philosophy, its different subfields, areas of inquiry, and the three main and interrelated concerns that have driven Africana philosophy according to Lewis Gordon (2008, 2013b): the question of philosophical anthropology, the question of freedom and social transformation and the critique and meta-reflection on reason. In this chapter, I mostly focus on the interrelation between the philosophical anthropology and the dynamics of reason.

The second section focuses on the dominant conception of philosophy and history in order to situate Africana philosophy within the intellectual dynamics that deny blacks and Africans the capacity of reasoning and of acting in the world. I cover the dominant geography of reason and history through the formation of the canon of modern philosophy in the eighteenth century, by exposing the paradox of the universality of philosophy and reason while simultaneously limiting its scope to Ancient Greek and modern Europe.

The third section continues with exposing the parochialism of European philosophy by enlarging the view of what philosophy is, its history, and what has been left aside. I do this by engaging the works of Africana philosophy on philosophy in Ancient Egypt or Kemet, on the African roots of Greek philosophy, on its influence in African culture and philosophy, and the possibilities for thought that stem from it.

After having situated philosophy within a broader historical perspective, the fourth section deals with the dialectical relation between Africana and European philosophy. The latter being the hegemonic, universal and normative philosophy, whereas the particular character of the former endows it paradoxically with a more universal character by unveiling its contradictions and double standards.

The fifth section adopts the principle of the Caribbean Philosophical Association as intimated by the title, “Shifting the Geography of Reason” in order to highlight the shift carried out by Africana philosophy, its expansion of the intellectual conversation, and its formulation of new questions and a different knowledge, by taking responsibility for it.

4.1 What is Africana philosophy

The term Africanist has been employed to refer to the European or American expert or theorist on African matters circumscribing the native to the role of the informant. However, neither Lewis Gordon nor Lucius Outlaw conceive Africana philosophy as a reversal or the exclusive terrain for African or black thinkers. For Outlaw, the field also includes and is nourished by “those who recognize the legitimacy and importance of the issues and endeavors that constitute the philosophizing of persons or African-descended and who contribute to the

discussions of their efforts” (Outlaw, 1996: 76). Other authors however, following Paul Hountondji’s concept of African philosophy argue that defining Africana philosophy involves the work of African and people of African descent, and must take into account, the author, the audience, the philosophical tradition, emphasized points (Mosley and Ferguson II, 2011). In a much discussed formulation Hountondji declares that African philosophy is made by Africans, and defined as philosophical by the authors. He points out that his intention behind this is more defensive than proactive, since Greek philosophy or German philosophy do not need to justify their existence and validity (Hountondji, 1983). In a similar line of thought, for William R. Jones, Africana philosophy involves identifying that:

the author is black, i.e., a member of a particular ethnic community, that his primary, but not exclusive, audience is the black community, that the point of departure for his philosophizing or the tradition from which he speaks or the world-view he seeks to articulate can be called in some sense the black experience. (Jones, quoted in Mosley and Ferguson II, 2011)

Jones, Mosley and Ferguson II (2011: 461) distinguish between “Africana philosophers and the philosophy of the Black experience”: the former would include all Black philosophers, is more general in its scope and includes themes of interest and approaches to philosophy, whereas the latter is a part and a manifestation of Africana that specifically deals with the theorization and reflection of the African and the diasporic experiences. However, as they point out there are black philosophers who contribute to philosophy of science, philosophy of value, or philosophy of history, for example, and are not part of the Africana tradition, even though their experience is informed by their African diasporic condition (Mosley and Ferguson II, 2011).

There may be different false dichotomies in their arguments: Neither Africana nor black philosophy is based on the racial or geographical belonging of its contributors.

Engagement with both Africana and black philosophy does not exclude questions of or engagement with philosophy of history, of science or other areas. For Gordon, Africana philosophy grew out of black philosophy and includes blackness, but also other concerns resulting from the African diasporic condition in the modern world (Gordon, 2013b). The term blackness is not limited to the African and its diaspora, since it also includes groups of people in Southern Asia and the Pacific. In his definition, Gordon already implicitly outlines that what matters in Africana philosophy are a common set of concerns when he says that it involves “theoretical questions raised by *critical engagements with* ideas in Africana cultures and their hybrid, mixed, or creolized forms worldwide” (Gordon, 2008: 1, emphasis original). Although the field emphasizes the black and the African as agents of knowledge production and challenges the historical depiction of whites as knowledge producers and the owners of reason, what distinguishes the discipline are the specific questions of the African diaspora rather than who engages with them. For Mabogo More, an instance of a European contributor to African diasporic philosophy would be the case of Jean-Paul Sartre (More, 2017).

Africana philosophy encompasses a variety of social questions, areas of thought and approaches to philosophy such as African philosophy, Afro-Caribbean philosophy, African-American philosophy, and also black philosophy, Africana Marxism, liberalism, different strands of feminism, Africana existential philosophy, Africana phenomenology, black philosophy of existence, Africa-American analytical philosophy, to name a few. What unifies Africana philosophy in its different interrogations and manifestations is the reflection related to dehumanization, slavery, colonialism and racism, and on the resistance and struggles for social transformation (More, 2017). In *Introduction to Africana Philosophy* Lewis Gordon (2008) offers a systematized and comprehensive account of the field as modern philosophy

dating back to the eighteenth century, but also locating its roots in the Middle Ages in African and in Ancient Egypt, 3000 years ago. He observes that unlike modern European philosophy, where epistemology has been the first philosophy, in African philosophy the point of departure for reflection is mostly through three interrelated questions: (i) the question of philosophical anthropology or what is a human being; (ii) the question of freedom and social transformation; (iii) the metacritique of the presuppositions of the previous two questions and of reason. Out of these three common and intertwined questions emerge others on culture, knowledge and method, aesthetics, metaphysics, religion, arts, the individual and social life, or justice, among others. Here I will briefly present the question of the human being, and I will expand on it in the following sections and chapters in conjunction with the other two main questions.

Philosophical anthropology is not a descriptive account of the human, but a reflection on the human condition through questioning what is a human being, and what it means to be human, and also how the human is thought and studied. Therefore, it also entails a methodological question and critique. As Mabogo More writes, it entails “a critical reflection not only in the human subject but also on the truth-claims of the various sciences which have the tendency to universalize the conclusions emanating from their particular focus into the explanations of the total human beings” (More, 2017:71). In the case of African reflection, the social, historical and political conditions of the human being are ones of expulsion from the domain of the human, of putting into question the humanity of people of Africa and African descent. It is from this standpoint of denied humanity that African reflection starts and from which stems the importance of interrogating what a human is. In *Return to My Native Land*

Aimé Césaire interrogates: “Who are we *and what?* Admirable question!” (Césaire, 1969a: 56, emphasis original) Fanon is more explicit:

Because it is a systematized negation of the other, a frenzied determination to deny the other any attribute of humanity, colonialism forces the colonized to *constantly* ask the question: “Who am I in reality?” (Fanon, 2004: 182, emphasis original)

The anthropological question is not only about cultural identity, but it is mostly about the belonging to humanity and the existence in the world as black, Arab, or colonized. Am I a thing? An animal? This is the underside of the Euro-modern questions: What are they? Do they have souls? Are they humans? The result of denying the belonging to the human to groups of people leads to them “being treated as property (slavery), as waste to be eliminated (genocides, holocausts), as subhuman or animals (racism)” (Gordon, 2008: 13). As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the “sub-ontological” (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) condition of the black is rendered by Fanon in what he called the zone of non-being, a zone between humanity and animality, which became the starting point for his theorizing on such a condition, and also for his critique and reformulation of European psychiatric, sociological and philosophical and political accounts of the black.

More (2017) and Gordon (1997a) concur that the question of what it means to be human and what it means to live, to exist, as black in the world endows to both black and Africana philosophy a strong existential character, without reducing these fields to philosophies of existence. “That Africana philosophy cannot, and should not, be reduced to existential philosophy is paradoxically because of a central dimension of philosophy of existence itself: The question of existence, in itself, is empty” (Gordon, 1997a: 4). Thus, the required

situatedness of philosophies of existence responds to the reason that questions of existence are intrinsically incomplete (Gordon, 1997a).

Relatedly, the existential element in Africana philosophy, and notably in black philosophy, is also suitable to respond to the twofold need: (i) to articulate a philosophical anthropology that does not impose a static, predetermined value and meaning onto the human as given (Gordon, 1997a); and (ii) to outline a conception of the human as an agent in the world, as a producer of knowledge, of history, of culture, of self-understanding. Blackness and agency, and blackness and reason have been historically treated as oxymoronic. Before continuing with the account of Africana philosophy and situating it in the broader field of philosophy and in relation to European philosophy, it may be important to take into account the history and the geography of reason to which I will proceed in the following two sections.

4.2 The geography of reason

As presented in the previous chapter the criteria in European humanism and Enlightenment of determining the belonging of humanity of non-Christians, non-Europeans and non-white groups was the consideration of the human as a rational being and by measuring the capacity to reason of these groups. The aforementioned distinction between *anthropos* and *humanitas* illustrates how the dominant standard of the human being in European modernity is symbiotically created through the production of knowledge on what is considered the object of study, the less than human. Since the birth of the social sciences, whether in its theological, naturalist or scientific form, then a very uncomfortable truth exists: the race-thinking from its inception:

Western intellectuals, after all, often considered themselves the custodians of bringing the light of reason to the understanding of African experience. (...) The consequence is that it has been difficult for black scholars to play roles beyond those of ethnographic informants. (Gordon, 2006: 79)

The rigid ontological divide between being and nonbeing, reason and unreason, historicity and ahistoricity dominant in philosophy, “the last bastion of implicit whiteness” (Ahab 2017): “bring blacks ‘in’ [...] subverts philosophical purity and relevance, whereas keeping blacks ‘out’ maintains those dimensions of philosophy” (Gordon, 1997b: 29). Thus, the existence of Africana or black philosophy appears as a “semantic monstrosity” (Mosley and Ferguson II, 2011) in light of the history of racial affiliation, which is associated with the self-appointed guardians/lovers of wisdom, reason and thought. Immanuel Kant rejected the statement of an African carpenter as follows:

There might be something here worth considering, except for the fact that this scoundrel was completely black from head to foot, a distinct proof that what he said was stupid. among all the savages there are none among whom the female sex stands in greater real regard than those of Canada. (Kant, 2011: 61)

This is not an anecdote of an individual philosopher. It rather carries with it a whole set of philosophies of history and histories of philosophy that seek to discern or circumscribe the realm of history and philosophy to Europe or by extension as a genealogical product of Europe elsewhere. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze points out how Kant, in appropriating Rousseau’s idea of human state of *nature* from natural nature to a *moral* nature, projected a teleological process of realizing full humanity by realizing good (rational and moral) out of evil (natural) and, in doing so, elevated European civilization as the standard by which humanity aims to (Eze, 1997: 103-140). For Edmund Husserl, philosophy and science would be “historical movement through which universal reason, ‘inborn’ in humanity as such, is revealed” (Husserl, 1970: 15).

The task of European philosophy is also to discern whether “European humanity bears within itself an absolute idea, rather than being merely an empirical anthropological type like ‘China’ or ‘India’.” (Husserl, 1970: 16) Firmin’s aforementioned critique of Kant’s and Hegel’s anthropologies actually being geographies is applicable also to Husserl.

The philosophical canon consolidated in historiographies, curricula, conferences, departments, and textbooks is that “philosophy proper” begins in Ancient Greece and is solely developed in modern Europe, where it reaches its peak. For Robert Bernasconi, this begs the question of “What is one to make of the apparent tension between the alleged universality of reason and the fact that its upholders are so intent on localizing its historical instantiation?” Bernasconi calls this “the paradox of philosophy’s parochialism” (Bernasconi, 1997: 215-216). Besides parochialism, there is also another element in this reconstruction of the history of, the narcissism, or the need to belittle others in order to ascertain one’s superiority. I will explore this question in chapter four.

As Gordon notes, the notion of Europeans as exceptionally gifted for philosophy is difficult to justify considering that the notion of Europe and Europeans has been and is continuously changing. As it has been pointed out, it emerged in a circular and symbiotic relation with the notion of the African and the black:

The notion of Europeans’ intrinsic connection to philosophy is, in other words, circular: it defines them as philosophical in the effort to determine whether they were philosophical. The effect is that the many Germanic groups who were considered barbarians to the ancient Greeks, Romans, Phoenicians, and Egyptians become realigned genealogically into the very groups who denied them membership. Thus, it really becomes the identification with ancient classical civilizations that determines the European identity instead of the link in itself from the ancient to the modern worlds. (Gordon, 2008:6)

The self-understanding of Europe as the telos of humanity is founded in the Renaissance through the elaboration of a mythical past stemming from Ancient Greece (removed from the contribution and its constitutive relations of ancestry with Asia and Africa), the Roman Empire, Christianity in the Middle Ages, and logically progressing into European Enlightenment and modern capitalism. The Hellenic past provided Europe with a rationality that the so-called Oriental philosophy had not been able to develop and mature (Amin, 1989: 166-168). The process through which Europeans from the Renaissance on understood themselves as the center, the present and the future of history, knowledge and humanity due to what they considered their unique, autonomous and exceptional features, has, as Enrique Dussel shows, a planetary dimension. Husserl's aforementioned historical movement of the realization of reason in Europe was simultaneous to the historical movement of conquest and colonization. The arrival, and the colonization of the America initiated a displacement of the "world-system" in terms of center and peripheries, from Asia towards the West (initially the Italian Mediterranean and then towards Spain and Portugal). This realignment positioned Europe— "which had never been 'center', and that during its best times only got to be a 'periphery'" (Dussel, 2003: 55)—at the center of the world-system. Europe (with its varying internal centers) became the hegemonic power in commerce, political religious, scientific, institutional, cultural and human terms, reciprocally putting paid to the entire European "Medieval paradigm" of being a periphery entered in a crisis. In other words, there was no sense of superiority in Europe before the Renaissance; in fact it was quite the opposite. The elaboration of the mythical past accounts for the creation of the new center out of a position of inferiority (Dussel, 2003: 59). Thereby, the areas known today as Italy, Spain and Portugal started to develop a "new consciousness" that gradually led to the formation of Europe: "with

that new consciousness, the notion of this new being ever having suffered a disconnection from the mechanisms of its emergence began to erode. Europeans began to forget that there was not always a Europe.” (Gordon, 2008: 5) Modern philosophy, by forgetting the provincial origin of Europe, from Descartes to Habermas, has exclusively focused on this new center, “resulting in a partial, provincial, regional view.” (Dussel, 2003: 59) Paget Henry summarizes the contradictory dynamic between the universal and the particular of European reason:

This particularization of universal reason was at the same time the universalizing of the European subject as its science and phenomenology would give reason a fully realized vision of itself. In this peculiar configuration, Europe acquired a monopoly that made it co-extensive with the geography of reason. (Henry, 2006: 2)

The self-understanding of European philosophy and philosophy as European is produced through a movement of contraction in historical and spatial terms, which clashes against the aims of philosophy and knowledge: reaching out to the world, unveiling its mysteries and making sense of it. Gurinder Bhambra (2014) posits that a canon is not a neutral device, but is rather protective. It is not constructed out of a meeting of intellectuals who decide which authors and texts deserve to belong and define the canon. These conversations take place under historical conditions and social relations that condition the participants in the conversations. Toni Morrison (1994) observes that canons are not necessarily characterized by their flexibility, but by their resistance to change: they also have a defensive function. At the same time, she notes not all “incursions” are treated as a threatening presence and elicit the “virulent passion that accompanies” the reasons for the construction of the canon. One of the fears she identifies in the rigidity of the European canon in regards to colored people’s contributions is that of “miscegenation,” a threat to purity. The need for purity obeys to notions of what is culture, who and how one can measure other cultures,

how we understand ourselves and how do we obtain our legitimacy to participate and hold our position in the conversation. It is loaded with political interests. “Canon building is empire building. Canon defense is national defense. Canon debate (...) is the clash of cultures. And all of the interests are vested.” The irony, Morrison notes, is that this purity has already been challenged from the outset, because “invisible things are not necessarily not-there” (Morrison, 1994: 378). That is, the efforts for exclusion, and the strategies of avoidance, denial, silencing, and masking the contradictions are also part of the canon (Cordero-Pedrosa, 2021).

In the construction of the modern philosophical canon, racism has played a decisive role (Bernal, 1987; Dussel, 2000; Gordon, 2008; Park, 2013). For Peter Park, history of philosophy serves to reinforce this canon. History of philosophy courses do not merely talk about the past, but rather in them, students are explained what philosophy was in order to define what philosophy is: the rules, the language, significant texts and authors that define philosophy and set the boundaries with other fields. The exclusions in this history also serve to define a certain understanding of what philosophy is and who philosophers are. He shows that the philosophical canon that equates philosophy with Europe is an active product of German philosophers and historians. In in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there were histories of philosophies in Europe that started from Ancient Egypt and encompassed Northeast and Southern Asian or Persian philosophers (Park, 2013). The first account of Thales as the first philosopher dates back to Jacob Brucker’s 1742 volumes on the history of philosophy. Notwithstanding, he mentions the “barbaric” philosophers (Jews, Chaldeans, Persians, Arabs and Phoenicians) Egyptians and Ethiopians, and “exotic” philosophies: Buddhist from North East Asia, and the Canadian as he referred to American indigenous groups (Bernasconi, 2002).

However, thirty years later all remnants of Asia and Africa in the history of thought disappeared when a group of neo-Kantian German historians and philosophers started a new historiography out of Kant's implicit philosophy of history and his explicit anthropology, and Hegel's philosophy of history and history of philosophy. The reform of history was also a reform of philosophy, its delimitation, the criteria for inclusion and the historical organization on the basis of Kant's definition and principles. This was not a matter of lack of interest or even expertise in Northeast and South Asian philosophy. References to Indian and Chinese thought appear with varying depth in the works of Goethe, Leibniz, Kant, Humboldt, Hegel, Herder, Nietzsche, and later in Buber, Heidegger, Scheler or Jaspers. Although these historians and philosophers acknowledged the ancestry of African, Chinese and Indian philosophy, they elaborated arguments to situate it in the "pre-history," and as such, as non-philosophical enough: either dismissed as poetry, based on religion faith and revelation, myth, or simply not philosophically refined. Non-European thought was engaged but delinked from the development of philosophy from Ancient Greece to Europe (Parker, 2013). This entailed ignoring or dismissing the Greeks' repeated claims of their philosophical ancestry in Africa. In his lectures, Hegel, who is considered a significant philosopher of the history of philosophy, repeatedly questioned the possibility of inclusion and exclusion of non-Western thought in the philosophical tradition. He initially rejected the possibility of a Persian and Indian philosophy on the grounds that these were not separated from religion, which was his requisite in the case of Christianity. He asserted that there could be no philosophical work outside of Europe. Yet with the appearance of new translations of Indian texts, he realized that this criterion was challenged not only because the distinction between religion and philosophy did not apply as in Europe, but also because he saw a certain philosophical elaboration in Indian works. Hegel

disliked Indian thought and despised Indian civilization, “the maddest of polytheism.” (Hegel, quoted in Bernasconi, 2002:11) Although Hegel and the Hegelians acknowledged the existence of Indian philosophy, they did not incorporate it in the history of philosophy. Together with Chinese and Persian, Indian philosophy was located outside of philosophy and in the pre-history (Bernasconi, 2002).

The debates over the so-called Oriental philosophy were closed by Hegel and disappeared with Hegel’s death. Kantians and the Hegelians locked the doors to non-Western thought. Within one generation the exclusion of Africa and Asia from texts, lectures and conferences had been normalized and the canon was formed. Greeks were the only people in the Ancient world who dedicated themselves to higher levels of reason, contemplation, mental activity, and to discerning the problems and mysteries of their surrounding world with a scientific mind. From this direct link with Germany/Europe an identity was formed that legitimized the field and oriented them towards the future. From Bertrand Russel to Martin Heidegger, the acceptance of the linear development of the history of philosophy delved into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (Park, 2013: 9). In a 1955 lecture, Heidegger states that Western or European philosophy is itself a tautology:

The often heard expression ‘Western-European philosophy’ is, in truth, a tautology. Why? Because philosophy is Greek in its nature; Greek, in this instance, means that in origin the nature of philosophy is of such a kind that it first appropriated the Greek world, and only it, in order to unfold. (Heidegger, quoted in Park, 2013: 4)

One year earlier, in 1954, Heidegger briefly referred for the first time to Northeast Asian philosophy on the occasion of the visit of the Japanese Germanist Tezuka Tomio. The only mentions in his written word to the Asian tradition are circumscribed to couple of references to Lao Tzu and to an aspect of Japanese philosopher Kuki Shūzō. However, interest

and influence are terms that fall short in reflecting the relationship of Heidegger with Buddhist and Daoist thought. Heidegger was a student of Daoism and Zen Buddhism. For fifteen years he corresponded with Japanese philosophers Miki Kiyoshi, Kuki Shūzō, and Nishitani Keiji on the Japanese language, art and culture. Reinhard May's (1996) comparative study reveals that there are a great number of vocabulary and locutions in Heidegger's work, notably on the issue of Being and Nothing, that *coincide* with translations of Chinese and Japanese texts. Moreover, May writes, "in particular instances Heidegger even appropriated wholesale and almost verbatim major ideas from the German translations of Daoist and Zen Buddhist classics" (May, 1996: xv).

May identifies a problem in Heidegger's "clandestine textual *appropriation* of non-Western *spirituality*," (May, 1996: xv, emphasis original) which is itself problematic. Leaving aside Heidegger's intellectual dishonesty, at which May hints, neither appropriation nor spirituality reach the core of the issue. Appropriation would entail an exclusive relation of property of Buddhist and Daoist philosophy over their own thought. There can be misreadings, poor readings, misuses or misrepresentations of Buddhism, but appropriation does not reflect the syncretism through which cultural and intellectual life are formed. By referring to Buddhism and Daoism as spiritualities, he falls into the similar dilemma of Hegel, and in a way, of Heidegger. Here lies the crux of the matter: the dismissal of non-European thought of forms of making meaning of the world, until they arrive to Europe where they are rethought, developed, and given proper content. Heidegger expresses this point in a 1966 interview in *Der Spiegel*, where he shows his reticence towards what he dismisses as "Eastern experiences of the world":

It is my conviction that a reversal can be prepared itself only from the same part of the world in which the modern technical world originated, and that it cannot come about through the adoption of Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the world. Rethinking requires the help of the European tradition and a reappropriation of it. Thinking is transformed only by thinking that has the same origin and destiny [*Bestimmung*]. (Heidegger, quoted in May, 1996: 8)

However, the adoption of the Zen Buddhist philosophy enabled him to advance nothingness in being, which was a radical departure from the Western philosophical tradition of ignoring absence in being since the Parmenidian formulation of what is is and what is not is not.

4.3 Black Athenas

In 1987, *Black Athena: Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, Volume I: The Fabrication of Ancient Greece, 1785-1985*, an archaeological work on history, philosophy and language which traced the origins of Ancient Greek civilization to Africa was published. In it, Martin Bernal, the Irish historian of China, argued that the racism of European historiographies of the previous two centuries had relegated the Ancient Egypt and Phoenician roots European civilization into the hinterlands. The book and the two volumes that followed it provoked a virulent debate and harsh criticisms from scholars of ancient and classical history, who, besides the legitimate questioning of Bernal's arguments and its flaws, put into question his professionalism and academic credentials. The critic Molly Levine praised the book as important because it was the "first to fully integrate [a] survey of theories (...) into a sociology of knowledge." That is, it challenged how knowledge is produced and organized, how it is socially used, and examined what knowledge says about the society the produces it (Levine, quoted in Keita, 2000: 42). Alternatively, Mary Lefkowitz wrote *Not Out of Africa: How*

Afrocentrism Became an Excuse to Teach Myth as History (1996) as a response not so much to Bernal's thesis, but to what she considered his agenda of blackwashing history, turning white important figures into black, and that it could be used as evidence by "Afrocentrist" African-American scholars. She condescendingly points out that what she sees as a reversal of history is partly understandable due to the long history and the currency of racist oppression and the underrepresentation of Africans in academia, but she considers that the ideological and mythical foundations of Bernal's historiography present an affront to the objectivity of the field. Despite the criticism, Bernal commented that had his work been produced by a black scholar the reception could have been worse:

Certainly, if a Black were to say what I am now putting in my books, their reception would be very different. They would be assumed to be one-sided and partisan, pushing a Black nationalist line, and therefore dismissed. (Bernal, quoted in Keita, 2000: 31)

He might have been partly right because Mary Lefkowitz also cites Molefi Asante as part of this Afrocentric threat to intellectual integrity. However, the thesis that the roots of Greek civilization lay in Ancient Egypt and that the Egyptians were black had been advanced and solidly argued a century before by African scholars. Mabogo More (2019) observes the ironic functioning of the geography of reason in that the danger of the great intellectual replacement is originated by the work of a white scholar, ignoring the previous work of black intellectuals. In the nineteenth century, David Walker, and Frederick Douglass argued that Egyptians were at the roots of classical and modern European civilization and that Egyptians were Africans on the basis of the scientific work of French Egyptologists of the previous century. So did Edward Blyden's historical work on the Hebrew Bible. In the early twentieth century, their work on ancient history was continued by Du Bois, George Washington Williams

and Carter G. Woodson, among others (Parris, 2015). Also, in 1946, the first volume of *World's Great Men of Color* appeared by Joel Augustus Rogers. In 1954, George J.M. James' work *Stolen Legacy*, was published. In the same year, Cheikh Anta Diop published *Nations nègres et culture*, which explored the influence of Egypt and the African origins of civilization, a theme that he researched and developed until his death in 1986. Likewise, the relation between Ancient Egypt and Greek philosophy has also been elaborated in the different works of Théophile Obenga, Molefi Kete Asante, and Lewis Gordon.

In 1885, Anténor Firmin anticipated some of these issues. In *The Equality of human Races*, he dedicated a chapter to Hinduism and Buddhism, and another to the importance of Ancient Egypt in the formation of Greek civilization and its African and black roots. The existence of a great black civilization at the origin of arts and sciences in African provoked anxiety among scientists, and around this question revolved the debates. A number of European and American linguists, anthropologists and historians sought, at the expense of evidence, to whitewash the blackness in Ancient Egypt and to explain the splendor of Ancient Egypt through the white race of Egyptians, the Asian influence, or, as a lesser evil, the Egyptians who were some sort of black, but not “true negroes, of the same race as the natives of Africa” (Firmin, 2002: 228). Throughout the book Firmin had not only dismantled the scientific and philosophical studies of the human that sustained the inferiority of the black, but also exposed their relation to power structures. Furthermore, he proposed a new way of studying the human being and producing knowledge and took up the proverbial gauntlet:

The existence of such a people would be enough to destroy the theory of the inequality of the races. One of the surest ways to refute such a theory would be to identify a period in history when the proud Europeans were absolute savages while Black people were holding up the flame of early civilization. (Firmin, 2002: 226)

Firmin notes that after the death of the eminent Egyptologist Jean-François Champollion, who defended the thesis that “Egypt was wholly African and not Asian,” (Champollion, quoted in Firmin, 2002: 225) the rigorous study of Ancient Egypt came to a halt. Although there were dissenting voices, the direct association of Ancient Egyptians with white modern Europeans was accepted on the basis of the studies of the well-known physician Samuel Morton, a defender of the theory of polygenism. The gap left by Champollion and his students was filled by historical and archaeological conjectures, craniometric studies of mummies accompanied by arbitrary (as Firmin shows) systems of classifications of humans, and comparative anatomy after the results of the craniometries—a situation that Firmin defines as a “vicious circle” that science must not tolerate (Firmin, 2002: 230). What is at stake in rebuking racist philosophies and sciences is truth, observes Firmin (2002: 225). Although I will not go into details regarding how he sustains his argument, his approach to truth is a meticulous, archaeological and transdisciplinary approach to language, history, arts, natural sciences and literatures.

Firmin looks at the representations of Egyptian monuments, artistic forms and mythological narratives. Concerning language, he points out that the Egyptian language blends Hamitic and African grammatical elements. He observes similarities with contemporary central African languages at the level of morphology and verb conjugation. He considers the migrations from within an area that goes from Ethiopia and encompasses East Africa, Chad, Sudan, Lybia and Egypt, and the “inevitable *métissage*” with other social groups, from Asia and also within Africa (Firmin, 2002: 240). In this regards he also analyzes the commonalities of fauna and the flora across this vast area, their uses in the everyday and for cults, many of them originating in East Africa, as indicators of these movements of people. Firmin also carries

out a detailed and innovative ethnographic portrait of Ancient Egypt through two dramas of Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* and *The Suppliants*, which had gone unnoticed by Egyptologists. Before the descriptions of black Egyptians provided by Herodotus, Aeschylus had expressed the African character of Egypt and also the relation between Greeks and Africans. The plays depict the movement of East Africans towards the North. Through the names of the characters, their roles, and their appearance, Firmin analysis African linguistic and mythological references, the transformation of the language from Egypt to Greek, and also the remnants and changes from African to Greek mythology.

Firmin's archeological work illustrates Gordon's warning against the well-established tendency to limit the historical reach in etymological and archaeological work. To end one's search for the origin of Western words in the Graeco-Latin classical past is to treat that world as civilizations that emerged, literally, *ex nihilo*, out of nothing or nowhere. They too had to have been built on earlier civilizations, and with that came even more archaic linguistic resources (Gordon, 2008: 2).

In that vein, as Enrique Dussel notes, the etymological origin of the term Europe is not in Ancient Greek, but rather derives from the Semitic and Phoenician language, and in turn from African ones (Dussel, 2000: 456). The origin of philosophy in Africa dates back to the Old Kingdom of Egypt (2780-2260 BC) and is rendered in the *Texts of the Pyramids*, the *Inscription of Shabaka*, or the *Teachings of Kagemi or Ptahotep* (Obenga, 2004). Indeed, the origin of the concept of philosophy as love of wisdom derived from the Ancient Greek *philei-* and *sophia* and has its roots in the Mdw Ntr, a language of Ancient Egypt (pronounced Medu Neter). The word 'Seba' means to teach, wisdom, school, and to be wise. Théophile Obenga writes:

The word ‘Sophōs’ has no etymology in Greek. As a matter of fact, the word ‘Sophia’ according to Asante, is derived from the ancient Mdw Ntr (African) word ‘Seba’ meaning wisdom, an earliest example of reflective thinking. The etymology of ‘philos’ is equally unknown in Greek. How can philosophy be of Greek essence or origin if the word ‘philosophy’ itself is not a Greek word?” (Obenga, 1992: 52)

‘Seba’ became ‘Sebo’ in Coptic and ‘Sophōs’ in Greek. The word ‘Seba’ appears on the tomb of Antef I in 2052 BC. A definition of ‘Seba’, the seeker of wisdom or the philosopher appears in the *Inscription of an Antef*, a 12th Dynasty scribe (1991-1782 BC). It has been translated by the German Egyptologist Helmut Brunner:

[He is the one] whose heart is informed about these things which would be otherwise ignored, the one who is clear-sighted when he is deep into a problem, the one who is moderate in his actions, who penetrates ancient writings, whose advice is [sought] to unravel complications, who is really wise, who instructed his own heart, who stays awake at night as he looks for the right paths, who surpasses what he accomplished yesterday, who is wiser than a sage, who brought himself to wisdom, who asks for advice and sees to it that he is asked advice. (quoted in Obenga, 2004: 587)

This definition of the philosopher stems approximately 1400 years before the pre-Socratics. According to it, the philosopher is a multifaceted person who not only gathers knowledge, but also learns different forms of knowledge, and especially he questions and pays attention to what is not known. This definition contains elements about the value of knowledge and also about the consciousness of not knowing that would also appear in Socrates. Ancient Greeks never claimed the origin or exclusivity of philosophy and acknowledged their philosophical ancestry in Kemet (meaning black lands) or the Old Kingdom of Ancient Egypt (Obenga, 1992; Bernasconi, 1997, 2002; Dussel, 2000, More, 2019). Besides, Herodotus, Thales, Pythagoras, Oenopidus, and Eudoxus are some of the earliest philosophers who studied in Africa. Thales learnt astronomy and geometry with African Egyptian priests; Plato studied geometry and theology with the Nubian priests Khnouphis and Seknouphis; Pythagoras spent

twenty two years in the temples of Egypt, and also Plato's student, Aristotle travelled to Egypt (More, 2019). In Plato's *Phaedrus*, Socrates refers to "an oral tradition from Antiquity": "It was the Egyptian god Thoth, I am told who invented numbers and arithmetic, geometry and astronomy, and even backgammon and dices and lastly, and above all, writing" (Socrates, quoted in Obenga, 2004: 262-263).

The interest of Africana philosophers in Kemet does not only lie in claiming the Black source of philosophy, or correcting the construction of the history of philosophy of the last 250 years, thereby rebuking the racism that portrayed Africans and blacks as outside of reason and history. As Cheikh Anta Diop notes, the Black Egypt thesis had already been demonstrated by ancient researchers. Looking back to Egypt is not only reflecting on the past, it is also a disalienating force in the present that enables rethinking modern intellectual and cultural production, and informs the orientation towards the future (Diop, 1991). In that vein, their interests also lie in discerning the historical transformations carried out by the Greeks, the remnants and the changes present also in different African cultures. Furthermore, Ancient Egyptian thought and concepts are valuable in themselves and help to think a variety of philosophical questions, thus helping to understand the world. It may be a tautology to say that philosophy is useful for addressing philosophical questions, but it may also be necessary if one considers the above accounts of the Eurocentric history of philosophy, and its narrow definition of philosophy and the philosopher.

The Congolese philosopher Théophile Obenga (1992, 2004) has extensively analyzed the cosmogony, and the ontological, ethical aspects of Egyptian philosophy, as well as the understanding of time, death, the body in medicine, the universe, and mathematics. In the *Intructions and Teachings* of Ptahhotep (circa 2450 BC), the moral treaties that combine

philosophy, ethics, social and political thought, form the moral code of Ancient Egypt. They address inner behavior, respect for others, humility, self-control at the level of the heart, emotions, desires, and other orientations for the good life. Egyptian morality do not stem from god, but they are practical, “eclectic”, “civil and secular, profoundly focused on the life of the community” (Obernga, 2004: 203).

This practical philosophy and psychology precedes by more than 2000 years the Socratic turn in Greek philosophy, which displaced the inquiry on the origin of the world, the cosmos, nature in order to discern the good in favor of focusing their interrogation on human life. Obenga highlights the notion of *maât*, which appears in this and many other texts as one of the central elements of Egyptian philosophy. *Maât* is a rich and complex notion that combines ethical and cosmological aspects. It refers to the universal order, balance and harmony, which also guides human action. It is partly related to the Greek *kosmos*, since both refer to the transcendental domain that orients the human, and at the same time it has other implications. *Maât* is related to injustice, it functions as an imperative law that Obenga translates as “Justice-Truth.” At the individual level, it is a universal law that teaches the assumption of duties within the community, and social and professional behavior. Therefore, *maât* has this triple dimension of cosmic order, Justice-Truth related to social balance, and individual behavior in relation to the universal order. From this emerge the notions of peace, the good, respect, right, and also the evil, crime, and falseness (Obenga, 2004: 207-226).

In his work on the decolonization of normative life, Lewis Gordon observes the incompleteness and the particularity of the concept of justice. Justice is considered, notably in liberal theory, as the main, universal virtue in social and institutional life. However, he continues:

Much of this emerges from the presumed translatability of justice as completely isomorphic with the norms of non-Western societies—or, worse, so valuable that if it is not part of the norms of those societies, it *should be imposed upon them*. Where there is a breakdown, the presumption has been that justice is the broader, because presumably more universal, term. (Gordon, 2021: 48; emphasis original)

In other words, the notion justice is presumed universal and can be translated into different languages. Justice is associated with the Latin *iustitia* and refers to the law and the system of law and institutions, and is extended to the Greek *dikē*. He argues that this is an impoverishing approach since different social realities have produced different normative responses, which can be broader than justice. Gordon observes that, although needed, justice is an insufficient value to respond to the problems of racism and colonialism, a question which will be detailed in the next chapter (Gordon, 2021). He brings up the notions of Ubuntu and *maât* and points out that translating them as justice is insufficient and misleading because there are elements of convergence and also of divergence, which are sedimented when translated as justice. Instead, he proposes the inverse movement: rather than subsuming *dikē*, *maât*, Ubuntu or others under justice, a more dialogical approach would be to particularize justice and unleash the other values whose scope and normative importance have been limited:

[W]hat might emerge from reformulating the question not only as one about the justice of Ubuntu, but also of the Ubuntu of justice? Formulated differently, is the scope of justice sufficient to incorporate Ubuntu or might the latter be a form of potentiated movement into a normative field where justice is simply not enough? (Gordon, 2014: 18-19)

This does not presuppose the completeness of Ubuntu or *maât*, but as Sousa Santos puts it (2014), the relativity (not the relativism), of justice, *dikē*, Ubuntu or *maât*. Signaling the relativity of justice and its hegemonic role already forms part of decolonizing practices. Moreover, treating them as different and incomplete elements of the same normative system

brings up the nuances. It also enables seeing the elements of one concept that are absent in the others. In sum, rather than translating, the focus is put on what can be learnt. This enlarges reality and offers a broader view of human possibilities (Gordon, 2014, 2021).

4.4 Africana philosophy as the underside

Considering the above accounts of the hegemonic history of philosophy and of what counts as history and philosophy, we are now better equipped to continue with the profile of Africana philosophy, its challenges, problems and limitations. A decisive aspect that informs Africana intellectual work, which as Gordon (2013b) points out, is a shared point of concern with black philosophy, is the historical relation between race and reason, and the antinomy between Africa, blackness, reason and philosophy. In other words, the question that Africana philosophy faces from the beginning is its legitimacy as a field that produces theory, ideas and thought (Gordon, 2013b, 2008; Henry, 2000; 2006). Besides providing case studies for existing theories produced in the West, “nothing new of theoretical importance is expected to emerge from the growth of Africana studies.” (Henry, 2006: 1) This is one of the points in which Africana philosophy differs from European philosophy. As Gordon argues, its existence is presupposed and does not need to justify itself.

As Heidegger put it above, the term European or Western philosophy is a pleonasm; it is redundant because one element is isomorphic with the other. At stake is not only who is able to contribute to philosophy, to which we will return later, but also the definition of philosophy, its contours limits, its rules, its language and discursive practices, which areas of inquiry are

considered significant or interesting, and who participates in the debates that constitute these aspects.

Robin Horton argues that there are similarities between Western sciences and African traditional thought. The latter is not only ritualistic but also theoretical and logically elaborated at the cosmological, sociological and psychological levels. Furthermore, it belongs to what he calls “philosophies,” but not to proper philosophy since “this thought includes among its accomplishments neither Logic nor Philosophy.” He argues that Logic and Philosophy are underdeveloped in African thought and they are the basis of “all scientifically oriented cultures”. By “Logic” he refers to “the general rules by which we can distinguish good arguments from bad ones?” And by “Philosophy” he actually means epistemology: “On what grounds can we ever claim to know anything about the world?” (Horton, 1967: 162) As Gyeke points out, Horton’s delimitation of philosophy is itself questionable, and, in Akan thought, there were concepts and expressions that reveal epistemological concerns, including, the concept of truth, skepticism or “mode of reasoning”, among others (Gyeke, 1987: 5).

Kwame Antony Appiah in *In My Father's House*, an important work in African philosophy, argues that African philosophy is “part of the universal discourse of philosophy that is carried on by Africans,” and not “about African concepts or problems.” (Appiah, 1992: 106) For Appiah:

black philosophy must be rejected, for its defense depends on the essentially racist presuppositions of the white philosophy whose antithesis it is. Ethnocentrism— which is an unimaginative attitude to one's own culture— is in danger of falling into racism, which is an absurd attitude to the color of someone else's skin. So that if the argument for an African philosophy is not to be racist, then some claim must be substantiated to the effect that there are important problems of morals or epistemology or ontology that are common in the situation of those on the African continent. And the source of that

common problematic, if it cannot be racial, must lie in the African environment or in African history. (Appiah, 1992: 92)

Appiah presupposes a univocal meaning of the term blackness, and also and exclusively antithetical relation of black philosophy to a white philosophy. As we saw in the first chapter, Appiah's understanding of racism is the belief in, and thinking in terms of, the delusion of race, which for him is basically the color of skin. Hence, his conclusion that blackness and a black philosophy is necessarily racist, instead of being oriented against racism. Appiah affirms that instead of moral, epistemology or ontology the issue of racism is not a proper philosophical one. As Gordon states, Appiah's restrictive delimitation of what proper philosophy studies, inverts the logic of philosophy's functioning, since philosophy is supposed to determine the questions of inquiry instead of the questions determining what philosophy is. Appiah creates a false dilemma here since there are also areas of study and question that exceed Appiah's concerns in European philosophy (Gordon, 1997b: 129).

For Appiah the question of race and racism seems to be ill-suited, too local and concrete to be "part of the universal discourse" of philosophical inquiry. As we saw in the previous section, European philosophy starts from the "hubris of the zero point" (Mignolo, 2009:1), a location of detachment, neutrality, and disembodied abstraction from which the philosopher or the knowing subject speaks. It is by hiding its own particular locus of enunciation that the underlying racial dimension of a universal reason is established, and the identity of European philosophy becomes isomorphic with philosophy. Questions of gender, sexuality and race are too particular for the universal conversation that leaves outside historical and social dimensions in order to arrive to "the deep eternalities of the human condition." (Mills, 1998: xiv). Within this logic, "a discipline that conceives of itself as seeking out the most general truths about human beings may find it difficult to see any significance in issues centered on race." (Ibid)

Within this genderless and raceless tradition, the growth of feminist theory in the second half of the twentieth century has introduced changes in philosophy beyond the question of representation. It has unveiled sexist dimension in theories, in the production and organization of knowledge, and has also emphasized aspects of reality that were not considered significant for reflection. Therefore, it is not only a matter of including feminist theory but also affecting philosophy at different and profound levels (Mills, 1998). In regards to race, Mills contends that unlike other humanities, philosophy has been resistant

Philosophy has remained remarkably untouched by the debates over 'multiculturalism', canon reform, and ethnic diversity racking the academy; both demographically and conceptually, it is one of the 'whitest' of the humanities (Mills, quoted in Mosley and Ferguson II, 2011: 462)

Considering the social, historical and political dimensions in which Africana philosophy arises, and the hegemonic position of European philosophy, Africana philosophy does not claim to be a fully autonomous field delinked from the history of philosophy and European philosophy. This does not mean that Africana philosophy does not have an identity and a tradition of its own, and different sub-identities, (Mosley and Ferguson, 2011). Additionally, it does not mean that it is subsidiary or dependent on the European tradition, a question that will be addressed in the following section. The relation of Africana and black philosophy to European philosophy is not so much of antagonism, as Appiah posits, but rather dialectical. Through the assumption of its sociohistorical particularities, Africana philosophy exposes the false universalism of European philosophical traditions. The assumption and the defense of its particularity, as stated, should not be seen as a retreat and a disconnection from the universal, nor "an act of transferring the citadel of philosophy from Mt. Olympus to Mt. Kenya" (Mosley and Ferguson, 2011).

Aimé Césaire exposed the political implications of the European universal in his resignation letter from the French Communist Party. For Césaire, among other problems, the party disregarded the colonial question and subordinated race to class as universal and objective. His defense of the particular is not at odds with a universal discourse. Through the particular, Césaire reformulates a universal that is inclusive and democratic:

Provincialism? Not at all. I am not burying myself in a narrow particularism. But neither do I want to lose myself in an emaciated universalism. There are two ways to lose oneself: walled segregation in the particular or dilution in the “universal.” My conception of the universal is that of a universal enriched by all that is particular, a universal enriched by every particular: the deepening and coexistence of all particulars. (Césaire, 2010:152)

For Gordon the “universalizing” potential of African philosophy lies precisely in unmasking the false universality of European philosophy and its normative status, and provincializing it. This amounts to unveiling a broader reality and expanding the practices of knowledge. Recognizing the incompleteness of the universal entails the expansion of the possibilities of scope, themes of inquiry, questions, disciplines and peoples because it includes ignored interlocutors and concerns without excluding the European. This brings to the fore the relational element in thought and in communicative and discursive practices that European philosophy denied since they conceived themselves as “the world”: complete, self-sustained, and only in relation with other Europeans. “This humility calls for a *universalizing* practice that is never *the universal*” (Gordon, 2021: 37; emphasis original).

Relatedly, through this universalizing movement that characterizes Africana philosophy, the field situates itself and engages with thinking from what Enrique Dussel calls “the underside of modernity” (1995) and what Gordon (2021: 90) calls “the black side of thought.” The black side of thought is not a type of thought restricted to black people or for

black people, but rather it refers to a form of thinking that exposes the contradictions and double standards, the occluded relationships, and expands the closed and small reality that dominant thought offers (Henry, 2006; Gordon, 2008). As discussed in this and in the previous chapter, different themes of philosophical reflection such as identity, reason, ethics, freedom, rights, law knowledge, the human, or social theories were informed by race and colonialism without being acknowledged. Blackness is not opposed to whiteness, it is rather a relational term and dialectically larger because it includes the white and what the white ignores, denies and considers illegitimate. Hence, Africana philosophy “is broader in scope than Western philosophy because it includes the Western in its self-articulation” (Gordon, 1997b: 145).

4.5 Shifting the geography of reason

Audre Lorde’s (2007) famous dictum “The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house” has been sometimes understood as a critique of the inherently imperial nature of theory itself, or the dangers of dominant or European theory for liberation purposes. The sentence has four related elements: the master, the tools, dismantling, and the house (of the master). However, the problem may lie not in the tools themselves but in the master. That is, the focus would be put in the power of the tools or in the power relations associated with what the tools have produced. Thereby the problem would not be the tools since they can be reappropriated and used to build different power relations. Focusing on the house, Lewis and Jane Anna Gordon (2006) observe that slaves have historically used the master’s tools, their own tools, and created new ones, but their aim was not necessarily to dismantle the master’s house, since they would still be homeless. Instead, they focused on building other houses, new houses, in order to “achieve the important task of rendering the master’s home irrelevant

without which his mastery loses its force” (Gordon and Gordon, 2006: 13). By rendering “irrelevant” the master’s house what they emphasize is the empowerment of the slave.

“Shifting the geography of reason” is the motto and one of the guiding principles of the Caribbean Philosophical Association. As it can be seen in Gordon’s reading of Lorde’s statement, the aim is not to focus excessively on the master, nor to abandon theory and thought, but to expand them, to reorient them and to nourish social transformation. There are many examples of the reorientation of reason towards emancipation and for constructive purposes in spite the fact, as we saw, that it has historically been denied to blacks and people of African descent. Moving within this difficult terrain requires extraordinary metareflective efforts. In *Black Reconstruction in America*, Du Bois’ 1935 study on the relation between slavery, the struggle for freedom of black people and democracy in the United States, the author introduces the work with a warning that deserves a lengthy quotation:

It would be only fair to the reader to say frankly in advance that the attitude of any person toward this story will be distinctly influenced by his theories of the Negro race. If he believes that the Negro in America and in general is an average and ordinary human being, who under given environment develops like other human beings, then he will read this story and judge it by the facts adduced. If, however, he regards the Negro as a distinctly inferior creation, who can never successfully take part in modern civilization and whose emancipation and enfranchisement were gestures against nature, then he will need something more than the sort of facts that I have set down. But this latter person, I am not trying to convince. ... I am going to tell this story as though Negroes were ordinary human beings, realizing that this attitude will from the first seriously curtail my audience. (Du Bois, 1998: xix)

Du Bois’ seemed resigned concerning the possibility of readers questioning the validity of his work according to the author’s position in the hierarchy of the human being. He offered such a warning in what was a groundbreaking work and a turning point in the study of history in the United States. That is, the work itself contradicted the position of the reader who believes

in the inferiority of the author. Yet, if the reader is not convinced by the argumentation, the evidence and the analysis in the book that the author is a thinking human being, the question, for Du Bois seems to be located in the terrain of faith and not as a matter of reason. In *Black Skin White Masks* Fanon notices that “for a man whose only weapon is reason there is nothing more neurotic than contact with unreason” (Fanon: 2008: 89). What to do in this neurotic situation? How to relate with this unreason? Fanon answers: “I intended to rationalize the world and to show the white man that he was mistaken” (Ibid.). However, he later notices that in the racist logic reason is slippery for the black, or worse, that the black person embodies such unreason:

Reason was confident of victory on every level. I put all the parts back together. But I had to change my tune. That victory [reason] played cat and mouse; it made a fool of me. As the other put it, when I was present, it was not; when it was there, I was no longer. (Fanon, 2008: 90)

As Gordon notes, struggling with this “unreasonable reason”, or forcing it to become “reasonable” would be “unreasonable” because it would be considered violence. Therefore, the answer that is implicit in their work is to “to reason with reason.” This is a particular characteristic of Africana philosophy because all thinkers use reason, “but only some face the situation of having to reason with reason” (Gordon, 2013b: 49-50). The question of reasoning with reason is an instance of the aforementioned “universalizing practices,” whereby the narrow circumscription of reason to the white is exposed and expands the reflection on reason.

Kenneth Knies considers Africana studies a “Post-European science,” which entails “a turning point in the life of Reason, a turning point that concerns the very possibility of achieving rigorous theory” (Knies, 2006: 85). By European and post-European, he does not refer to a geographical location, but to an *Idea* or a “spiritual shape,” as Husserl means it, that

is, “a supranational unity characterized by its having the theoretical attitude as its governing norm-style” (Ibid.). In other words, what Knies means by post-European science is that the defining idea of Europe as thought and science is shifted and transcended, and so is the dependency on its knowledge, theory and forms of theorizing. Post-European science entails taking responsibility for knowledge and for producing another knowledge. In his own words:

post-European scientific work entails a rethinking of constituted forms of knowledge that cannot proceed from within their own matrices. The need for philosophy does not entail a dependence upon extant philosophy departments; it requires that post-European science assume responsibility for philosophical questioning on its own. (Knies, 2006: 94)

As we have seen, Africana philosophy is a response against the dependency on others’ questions and responses about Africans and blacks, and entails taking responsibility for thinking and for producing different questions, thought and knowledge, and thereby establishing a different relation with European thought.

However, Africana philosophy is not exempt from the dynamics of dependency and internal colonization. Hence, the importance of the metacritical role of reason. Paget Henry (2000) notes that unlike other Caribbean cultural forms where the African, European, East Indian, Amerindian and Chinese elements are creolized, in Afro-Caribbean philosophy there is a “radical discursive and communicative inequality between Euro- and Afro-Caribbeans” (Henry, 2000: 9). The problem is not that the normative and hegemonic position of the European disrupts the purity and autonomy of Afro-Caribbean philosophy, something that Africana philosophy does not seek as his use of the term creolization denotes. Rather, the problem can be seen as Henry’s precise choice of words, “discursive and communicative inequality,” show that the hegemonic and normative position of the European legacy and the excessive identification with it in the Afro-Caribbean philosophical landscape silences certain

voices and privileges who speaks, about what, and how, conditions what is legitimate, what and who is valued, and what are the criteria for valuating. More concretely, Henry argues that this over-identification with European philosophy carries with it antiblack and anti-African positions, and inherited colonial dynamics that devalue other non-European cultural elements of the Caribbean (Henry, 2000). The dynamics of what Gordon (1999) calls “black antiblackness” were analyzed by Fanon (2008). Building on the latter, Gordon explains it as the delusional position that there is a white person that transcends blackness within the black skin. In his own words, the black antiblack “assumes the self-deceiving stance of a white foundational ego behind consciousness,” since reasoning and consciousness cannot be black. (Gordon, 1999: 108) The result is that:

few studies of black people in an antiblack world tell us anything significant about black people. They tell us much about how a white-dominated culture regards black people. Black antiblack attitudes tell us the same. Black antiblack perspectives are pseudo-white egos behind black reflective consciousness. (...) There is no black consciousness from the standpoint of the antiblack world. (Gordon, 1999: 116)

From a sociological perspective, Henry explains this phenomenon in Afro-Caribbean philosophy, which mirrors the political and economic order of Caribbean societies, in terms of centers and peripheries. The peripheral location of Caribbean cultural system within the colonial system has informed cultural production, its organization, hierarchies, validation, criteria and outcomes, since peripheral colonial systems revolve uniquely around the center of the system (Henry, 2000: 9-12).

What is in fact available to Afro-Caribbean philosophy is the option of using its limited autonomy to transform this antiblack context into an epistemic order that is more supportive of its growth. This option confronts Afro-Caribbean philosophy with the difficult task of trying

to change a tradition on which it is dependent and whose anti-philosophical, antiblack, and other negative values it has internalized (Henry, 2000: 13). *Caliban's Reason*, the title of Henry's sociological and philosophical outline and analysis of Afro-Caribbean philosophy, is already indicative of the different obstacles and reflective layers that are involved in transforming the context of dependency that Henry describes. Caliban is a character of Shakespeare's play the *Tempest* which can be interpreted as being set in the Caribbean in the time of the conquest. Prospero and his daughter Miranda arrive at an island inhabited by Caliban. Prospero is a man of magic and words, which represent the scientific authority of knowledge. He enslaves Caliban and in exchange he gives him his name and teaches him his language. The play has been readapted by Césaire, and the question of Caliban appears recurrently in Afro-Caribbean thought in the works of Gordon, Fanon or Sylvia Wynter, among others.

The problem of Caliban is that the language and the knowledge that he has received is the one that he has been used to subordinate him, and is part of the language and the knowledge that he has to use to set himself free. This sends us back to the metacritique of reason: how to think about thinking and how to assess about how one thinks about liberation. How does one think and transform what is received, what is inherited, so that it does not become an obstacle to the liberation purposes of the Caribbean?

In order to assess colonization at the level of methodology, Gordon makes a distinction that reason and rationality are not identical. That reason is a category broader than rationality is obvious to the colonized. We, as *homo sapiens sapiens*, live in the world of meaning, and sociality of human way of life requires philosophical reasoning. Human beings have been engaged in such activity for millenniums to justify their existence in the world that does not

require them. Myths are the stories we tell ourselves a generation after another in the effort to philosophize what it means to be human and our relationship to reality¹⁹. Reason is not separate from emotion as evinced in ancient and many non-western philosophical traditions. In many cultures where there is no mind and heart split, reason is only complete with emotion. Since reason ultimately refers to human consciousness, it is preposterous to deny consciousness on certain groups of people, which was in fact the driving force in the Euromodern human studies (see Chapter Two). As Sartre points out, consciousness *is* freedom and freedom is meaningless without consciousness²⁰ (nothing would be meaningful if one is not conscious). Colonialism which tried to eliminate the consciousness of the darker people or women thus denied the freedom of those people. For this reason, it is of fundamental importance to rescue reason from the Euromodern appropriation of reason by subsuming it under rationality. The role of reason which focuses on categorizing, classifying, and finding consistent patterns (what neuroscience links with the domain of the left cerebral hemisphere) has been branded as rationality and monopolized by Euromodern science over the other role which contextualizes, finds meaning, uses metaphors, and understands (the function of the right brain) (Niebauer, 2019)²¹. In short, it has been, as Gordon points out, the major project of Euromodern science which attempted to “elevate rationality as the model of reason” (2006: 102). Gordon succinctly makes a distinction between rationality and reason:

¹⁹ This is called “philosophy” in the Euromodern traditions. See Madina Tlostanova in conversation with Walter D. Mignolo: “Ancient Greeks named philosophy what they were doing, conceived and practiced it. What they were doing was what Homo Sapiens was doing at least for 200,000 years: thinking about what Greeks called cosmos and the Roman universe, its mystery, the mystery of life, the emergence of the living species to which they belong (the Anthropos), how to live together in the oikos, etc.” *EastEast* <https://easteast.world/>

²⁰ Sartre (1956:47): a human being is “a being such that in its own being, its being is in question.”

²¹ Gloria Anzaldúa, *contra* Kant’s *The Contest of the Faculties* (1798), proposes *la facultad*, which is the “capacity to see in surface phenomena the meaning of deeper realities...It is an instant ‘sensing,’ a quick perception arrived at without conscious reasoning... the knowing capacities of living organisms.” This resembles *prajna* the Buddhist reason rooted in the ways of knowing of living organisms.

The former [rationality] cannot suspend logic, for to be what it is, it must, at minimum, demand consistency. The demand for consistency eventually collapses into maximum consistency, in order to be consistent. In effect, this means that rationality must presume its method, and it must resist straying from its generating grammar. Reason, however, offers a different story. To be maximally consistent, although logically commendable, is not always reasonable. Reasonability can embrace contradictions. Even more, it must be able to do so in order to evaluate even itself. This means that the scope of reason exceeds rationality. (Gordon, 2014: 85)

There are extreme poles at odds within the method of the social sciences with one extreme reproaching that social science is not scientific enough and the other extreme claiming that it is not supposed to be scientific (Rosenberg, 2015). Max Weber proposes that social science theories need to reveal both causal laws *and* interpretive meanings, a dual task social sciences are imposed. However, can such causal laws even go together with the study of human beings? This question has fundamental roots in the cosmovision or what Karen Barad terms ethico-onto-epistemology²², and goes beyond the self-declared purview of social science itself. This debate over the method stems from the long unsettled philosophical problem since the time of Plato over the nature of reality (ontology) and how we know reality (epistemology) and, as a result, how we should live (ethics). Causal laws are based on consistency which enables predictability.

Science is more at home with rationality than it is with reason. Departure from consistency-maximisation would disintegrate an important foundation of modern science, namely, the notion of a law of nature. A law in this sense cannot have exceptions. Since reason at times demands exceptions, a marriage between science and reason would be shortlived. The project of much of modern European philosophical thought, however, has been the effort to cultivate such a marriage. Toward such a goal, the instruments of rationality are often unleashed with the result of the effort to yoke reason to

²² The notion coined by feminist physicist philosopher Karen Barad to argue that ontology and epistemology cannot be separated in knowledge production. What is in the world appears as phenomenon only through human perception, which means what is and what we know is are co-constituted by matter and meaning. Everything that appears for humans is imbued in politics, and for this, humans have responsibility to make an ethical choice. (Barad, 2007, p. 90).

rationality. This effort could be reformulated as the effort to colonise reason.
(Gordon, 2014: 85)

The effort to colonize reason has been challenged by Africana thinkers who raised a metacritical question of the very method itself of studying people—by which was turning people facing problems into problem people (“what is the problem with these people?”) They asked a radical question: “Why isn’t the system the problem?” (Gordon, 2006: 126). A suspension of method arose in their radicalizing the scope of reason to deal with paradox and contradiction and in their insight that epistemological colonization is at the heart of *method*.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the basic defining features, guiding themes, obstacles and challenges of Africana philosophy, and to situate the field within broader intellectual dynamics, its relation to the dominant understanding of philosophy, and to the imperial notions and geographies of reason and history. It provides the historical and intellectual context for the following chapter where I narrow down the theoretical and thematic scope and focus on the turn to Black consciousness, and black existential phenomenology’s analysis of racism, understanding of the human, vision of freedom and social transformation. The importance of black philosophy of existence, among others, lies in its effort to articulate an open conception of the human that connects the subjective experience with the social and historical dimensions, the individual and the collective, the activity of the subject in the production of meaning with the meanings and structures that have already been collectively constituted. This allows me to delve into the question of embodiment and consciousness, and the importance of the body as

a visible marker of race, how race is lived, and how it is used for the construction of meaning oriented towards liberation.

Chapter 5. Black Consciousness

Introduction

After offering a broad profile of Africana philosophy, its concerns, contours, limits and problematics, this chapter narrows down the scope and puts the focus on Africana and black philosophy of existence and existential phenomenology. As stated, existentialism and phenomenology offer significant elements for the study of race and racism. The starting point is that there is no human essence and no preconception of the human. Instead, the human being is conceived in the situation in which she is enmeshed, in the limitation that it poses, and the choices that she makes. The human being is in the making, and at the same time through choices and interaction is making the social world. Thus, the phenomenological focus on consciousness and experience does not amount to a pure psychological understanding of them. It rather focus on the social and intersubjective implications of racism as lived. How race appears to others rather than what race is. From here emerge other important implications for the study of racism: the body as lived, the visual aspect, and the question of liberation. The phenomenological method of interrogation, evaluation every step of thought, as I will address in this chapter, also favors the aforementioned metacritique of reason and the questions of philosophy of science that are embedded in racism and reflection on racism.

The first section will broadly present the main characteristics, authors and questions of Africana phenomenology, its particularities, and the relation with its European counterpart. The second section deals with the phenomenological and existential aspects of W.E.B. Du Bois. He opened up the field of phenomenological reflection through the theme of double

consciousness, the veil, and the sight. At the same time, his work abounds with meta-reflective questions that he expresses through the notion of what it means to be a problem.

The section addresses some existential phenomenological elements in the work of Frantz Fanon. Although in his production this form of reflection abounds in an implicit way, I have focused here on two main aspects: the question of methodology, and the centrality of the body in his work.

The fourth section deals with the thematization of the Black Consciousness Movement as formulated in the writings of Steve Biko. In this understanding blackness has an intrinsic political meaning. Through the critique of Biko of what he calls white liberals as the red thread, this section also will explore how black thinkers have addressed the question of whiteness differently from whiteness studies.

The fifth section addresses Lewis Gordon's existential phenomenological understanding of antiblack racism as a form of bad faith and the political meaning of Black consciousness developed.

5.1 Africana phenomenology and black existential phenomenology

5.1.1 Africana phenomenology

As stated in the previous chapter, Africana philosophy starts from the concrete and particular social, historical and cultural conditions and epistemic location as the origin and the motives of reflection. The case of Africana phenomenology is no different. For Henry (2006), Africana phenomenology raises two important theoretical elements of reflection: the relationship of phenomenology with different cultures, and with different disciplines. That is,

it is not limited to nor exclusively stems from the discipline of philosophy. In comparison with (European) phenomenology, the term *Africana* already indicates a distinct cultural point of departure for knowledge production, which “raises very explicitly the need to do phenomenology from a comparative cultural perspective” (Henry, 2006: 1). Henry identifies three main differences between *Africana* and European phenomenology: (i) the origin and the aim of reflection, (ii) the method of reflection, (iii), the relation between the telos of self-reflection and what is considered foundational in the production of knowledge.

In the case of phenomenology in Europe, the origin of phenomenological reflection lies in the question of universal reason, the problem of modern rationality and its intricacy with positivism, modern science and industrial capitalism. This issue has been articulated differently in the thought of Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Sartre, Heidegger, Habermas, or Derrida among others, in their concerns on the constriction of reason and the construction of a mechanistic subject by instrumental reason, positivist rationality, and the impact of modern technical world. Alternatively, the “governing telos” (Henry, 2006: 3) of *Africana* philosophy has not been the liberation of rationality but racial liberation, and the source of reflection is the racist denial of humanity and the different implications of racism and colonialism. Yet, as stated in the previous chapter, the problems of the colonization of reason, technical and instrumental rationality and racism are not treated separately by *Africana* thinkers, but as two sides of the coin of European modernity. *Africana* phenomenology’s inquiry on the “racist rationality” (Gordon, 2015) does not leave aside the “irrational shadow” (Henry, 2006) of European modern rationality. This entails that *Africana* phenomenology holds the aforementioned critical relation to European phenomenology. Henry writes:

Unlike European phenomenology, these Africana reflections have been interested in clarifying the systemic error producing foundations of the European humanities and social sciences that have had to legitimate and make appear as correct this racist reduction of African humanity. The positivistic reduction European humanity and the racist reduction of African humanity are opposite sides of the coin of modern Western capitalism. (Henry, 2006: 4)

Related to this first aspect arises a question of method of self-reflection. To the different paths for reflection, such as Husserl's phenomenological reduction, Sartre's existential analysis or Hegel's theological reflection, Africana phenomenology also incorporates poetics to the social, historical and philosophical reflection

The metaphysical foundations of Africana philosophy have never included the absolute claims for reason that have been at the center of the transcendental foundations of Western philosophy. In the Africana tradition, reason has always had to share the metaphysical stage with poetics and historical action. (Henry, 2006: 19)

With these considerations in mind, Africana phenomenological reflection started explicitly in the works of W.E.B Du Bois and Frantz Fanon, which I will cover in this chapter, and were continued from the end of the 1960's by William R. Jones, Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr. and Charles Johnson's in the context of African-American philosophy. After Du Bois and Fanon, the next turning point in Africana phenomenology were Lewis Gordon's works *Bad Faith and Antiracist Racism* and *Fanon and the Crisis of the European Man*, both published in 1995. I will dedicate part of this chapter to Gordon's intellectual production. Suffice it to say that Gordon's contribution lies also in making explicit the implicit existential and phenomenological insights of Africana thinkers, and also regarding the his philosophical and historical systematization of Africana philosophy (Henry, 2006). Gordon's path has been followed differently by Linda Martín Alcoff, who phenomenologically addresses questions of

gender, sexuality and race in Latina and Africana thought, as well as Clevis Headley, Kenneth Knies, and also Paget Henry in the Caribbean, Chabani Manganyi and Mabogo More in South Africa, or Sarah Ahmed in Britain. The latter and David Fryer bring Africana phenomenology in conjunction with queer theory.

Gordon notes that in the African-American context, the phenomenological analysis is not delinked from existential components, despite being distinct theoretical and analytical approaches and positions (Gordon, 2008). In fact, he points out, all black philosophy, whether religious, pragmatic, feminist, analytic, or Marxist philosophy, is animated by “an existential impetus” (Gordon, 1997a: 4), which does not amount to reducing Africana or black philosophy to philosophies of existence or existentialism.

5.1.2 Black philosophy of existence

Before addressing black philosophy of existence, it is important to distinguish existentialism from philosophy of existence (also called existential philosophy), because as LaRose Parris (2015) notes, existential philosophy is still associated with European thought despite its role in liberation and decolonization movements in the twentieth century and also in the thought of thinkers throughout the Global South during the previous century. For Gordon, existentialism refers to a philosophy of existence developed in Europe, mostly in the twentieth century, and with antecedents in the previous century. Yet the concerns of existentialists can be found in the thinking of different groups throughout the globe: questions of identity and the possibility of liberation, the centrality of freedom in the human condition, the agency and responsibility of the individual with respect to oppressive structures, the *angst* over choice and the lived situation, the anguish resulting from the awareness of the responsibility over freedom, the contingency and imperfection of the human being, the encounter with the other and the

possibilities and limitations that emerge. Such questions that have not only been explored in the last century in Europe. In other words, the questions raised by European thinkers such as Sartre, de Beauvoir, Marcel, Jaspers, or Merleau-Ponty, and to a certain extent Heidegger, Dostoyevsky, Kafka, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Ortega y Gasset or Buber, and the tools developed to respond to these questions arose from the problems they faced (Gordon, 1995). The problems they faced were the growing alienation and disillusionment in Europe notably after the Second World War and the realizations of the horror of the Holocaust. The existentialists provided a secular and rational explanation for such horror: “Only cruelty born of human agency could explain the genocide” (Parris, 2015: 18).

However, as we have seen through the critiques of Césaire and Du Bois, from the Global South the Holocaust was a continuation of a series of genocides rather than an exception. The anomaly is where it took place. Outside of Europe there were already theorizations on evilness, the absence of god, agency, and responsibility out of the lived conditions of systematic degradation and brutality. As LaRose Parris notes, the former slave Frederick Douglass questioned the existence of God at the same time that Nietzsche was declaring its death. And one can find in Douglass writings a conception of the human being as freedom and the problem of responsibility for freedom almost one hundred years before these questions were raised by Sartre and de Beauvoir (Parris, 2015). In the different autobiographies Douglass recalls the episode when he fought back the abuses of his master. In his own words, which I will quote at length, the fight

was the turning-point in my career as a slave. *It rekindled the few expiring embers of freedom, and revived within me a sense of my own manhood.* It recalled the departed self-confidence, and inspired me again with a determination to be free. The gratification afforded by the triumph was a full compensation for whatever else might follow, even death itself. He only can

understand the deep satisfaction which I experienced, who has himself repelled by force the bloody arm of slavery. I felt as I never felt before. *It was a glorious resurrection, from the tomb of slavery, to the heaven of freedom.* My long-crushed spirit rose, cowardice departed, bold defiance took its place; and *I now resolved that, however long I might remain a slave in form, the day had passed forever when I could be a slave in fact.* I did not hesitate to let it be known of me, that the white man who expected to succeed in whipping, must also succeed in killing me. (Douglass, 2009: 78; emphasis added)

Even though the fight did not immediately change his material conditions, it had implications for his existential condition. Douglass speaks of regaining humanity and freedom while still being formally a slave. He did not regain humanity because of the fight itself, but because of his choice of how to deal with the situation he was living. This choice and the responsibility for it is what led him from the level of property and almost imposed animality to being a free human who aspires for liberation.

The European brand of philosophy of existence, existentialism, may have for example Fanon, Richard Wright, Steve Biko or Ali Shariati does not mean that the ideas of Africana, black and other thinkers from the Global South derived from European existentialist thought. Mabogo More considers Sartre as an “uncommon catalyst” in black philosophy of existence rather than a founder (More, 2017: 96). For Gordon (1997a) the influence of Sartre and other European thinkers on black philosophy of existence and phenomenology is a consequence and an opportunity rather than a cause. That is, it is the consequence of the problems that black thinkers faced, and it is also the consequence of what was available to them due to the aforementioned normative weight of European thought as *the* only thought. Yet, this influence was not unidirectional. The work of Africana existential thinkers reveals that European existentialism could not be directly transposed; it was insufficient and on occasions inadequate in accounting for their condition. From this critical relation some European existentialists,

notably Sartre, de Beauvoir and Francis Jeanson, paid close attention to their responses and critiques manifested through art, thought and activism, to the extent of modifying their previous views and theories. However, it must be underlined that these were exceptional cases of European thinkers open to learn and engage in symmetrical relations with thinkers from the Global South in an asymmetrical setting. As Parris asserts, the reduction of philosophies of existence to European existentialism and the ignorance of the interplay between both reveals the “seemingly inevitable blind spot toward the philosophical dimensions of Africana writers works reveal the contradictory position of Africana thinkers within Western society” (Parris, 2015: 19).

From the account above and in the previous sections a general profile of philosophy of existence can already be discerned. It starts from the inquiry on the awareness of one’s existence as it takes place in everyday experience, life and relations. Gordon notes that the Latin term for existence, *ex-sistere*, means “to emerge from indistinction or insignificance or, simply, to appear,” and is related to live and the full awareness of what being alive means. “To exist at all is to appear to some consciousness, even if that means from one’s point of view” (Gordon, 2008:132). The reflection on existence is linked to the impediments and the possibilities encountered in the everyday. In relation to these situations is where the issue of agency is posed: the human beings experience themselves as “finite sites of agency in relation to the surrounding world.” (Henry: 1997: 15) Thus emerges the existential question of choice and agency: what to do in light of the possibilities and limitations encountered in the interaction with what Henry identifies as the three broad spheres of existing in the world that may enhance or deny human agency, “the material world of outer nature, the human world of social life, and the spiritual world of inner nature” (Ibid). This, broadly speaking, can be reformulated as the

question of how to face existence, life. Within this existential situation philosophies of existence can explore the question of what the human being *is*.

The famous existential statement that “existence precedes essence” (Sartre, 2007: 20) implies that the human cannot be conceived in advance, the human is open to possibilities and within constrictions. It is in how the human being faces these, in how the human lives, acts and gives meaning to existence that the human being and the world can be disclosed, but not captured as complete and closed. The issue of action in the concrete situations is not delinked from the responsibility for the action and the justification of it. Justification is not the same as rationalization. Rationalization is providing a reason for whatever one does or is, whereas justification refers to normative questions, meeting certain conditions of value and standards of evaluation. In existential terms the human being is contingent, which means that its existence is not necessary and self-justified. The self in the different philosophies of existence is not the omnipotent free-willed subject of the Renaissance. The existential subject is neither determined by theological, psychological, historical, or naturalistic causes. Instead, the existential subject is conceived as essentially nothing and in constant creation through action. Justification is intrinsic to this process of redefinition. Simone de Beauvoir sums up these aspects as follows:

(..) the being of the human is ‘being in the world’: it is indissolubly linked to the world she lives, without which she cannot exist and cannot even define herself; she is linked to it by her acts, and these acts are what require justification. Since every act is the overcoming of a concrete and singular situation, it will be necessary to reinvent in each new opportunity a mode of action that contains its justification within itself. (Beauvoir, 2009: 91; my translation²³)

²³ “(...) el ser del hombre es un ‘ser en el mundo’: está indisolublemente ligado a ese mundo que habita, sin el cual no puede existir y ni siquiera definirse; está ligado a él por actos, y son estos lo que es preciso justificar.

I have outlined throughout this work how these existential themes are relevant for the study and the struggle against racism. Racism attempts to close and fix the human being, imposes meanings and values upon it as if these are independent from human action, to the extent of expelling the human from the realm of humanity. In an antiblack world a group of people does not need justification for their existence (“It is not simply that I exist, but, “I must exist; I *ought* to exist,” (Gordon: 2000:122; emphasis original) whereas other groups see their presence questioned and their existence under constant threat. ‘Are they humans?’ ‘Do they have soul?’ ‘What are they?’ This situation demands as Gordon puts it, permanent explanations:

Antiblack racism espouses a world that will ultimately be better off without blacks. Blacks, from such a standpoint, must provide justification for their continued presence.

‘Why go on?’ (Gordon, 2000: 15)

Gordon recalls Fanon’s comment on the absence of studies of black suicide because social scientists considered that blacks did not possess the reflective capacity to understand the implications of their situation and to take their own life. Against all evidence, “[a]ccording to Durkheim, Jews never committed suicide. Now it is the Negroes.” (Fanon, 2008:170) A white character in a novel of Richard Wright states, “If I were a Negro I’d kill myself . . .,” (Wright, quoted in Fanon, 2008: 170) which as Gordon notes, is what a proper human being would do in the situation of the black. The question of suicide and nihilism acquires a different meaning than in European existentialists, it is not simply Camus’ question ‘Why?’ resulting from the absurdity of existence, but is manifested as the ‘Why go on?’ when the threat of death is

Como todo acto es la superación de una situación concreta y singular, habrá que reinventar en cada nueva oportunidad un modo de acción que tenga en sí misma su justificación.”

permanent (Gordon, 2000). One of the main differences with European existentialism, Chabani Manganyi notes, is that the origin of black suffering is clearly perceived:

We have been compelled to recognize that unlike the white man we live with the originators of our absurdity. The source of our suffering may be identified in the streets of Pretoria and Johannesburg. Should it surprise anybody that the problem of suicide recognised by Camus as the most important problem of philosophy should be recognized as a paltry matter by us? The fact of the matter is that we live suicide and are too involved in living to contemplate it. (Manganyi, 1973: 47)

Manganyi may be right in the difference between to suicide and life in respect of European and Africana existential thought. However, it may be important to notice that Du Bois' and notably Fanon's explorations of alienation reveal that part domination does not only functions through pure force, instead subjection partly functions by creating certain forms of consent among those subjected. What alienation does is precisely to hide the source of suffering and turn the gaze against oneself as a mechanism of reproduction of alienation and domination. In any case, the question of why keep on living is also that of the choice to live, of which meaning is given to life, and is also the question of action, what to do with the suffering, and relatedly, of identity: what is to be done with the blackness that seems to be the cause of the situation is also part of the process of self re-creation.

As Henry points out, Africana and black philosophies of existence are shaped by different cultural, historical and social particularities; the understanding, the experience and the role of individual and collective agency also varies culturally. Despite the considerable internal variations, in many pre-colonial African philosophies of existence, the demarcations of human agency, individual responsibility, the orientation towards the future and the relations with others were informed by the weight of the past, the authority of ancestors, and of the

domain of spirits, gods and goddesses. Caribbean philosophies of existence, Henry notes, are informed by the continuities and discontinuities between pre-colonial African thought on existence syncretized with Christianity, and the historical responses to the experience of slavery and colonialism. The continuity between these three elements is interrupted by the lack of recognition of each other: Christian religious thought did not recognize Africans as humans, and social and historical responses to colonialism rejected Christian discourses, resulting in the compartmentalization of these three approaches to existence (Henry, 1997). Concurrently to the absence of creolization of these Afro-Caribbean approaches to existence there were other creolization processes in the Americas between Africans, indigenous, Asians and Europeans, which raised new the existential concerns (Gordon, 2008).

As the ones who have systematized Africana and black existential philosophy point out (Gordon, 1997c, 2000; Birt, 1997; Henry, 1997, 2000 Outlaw, 1996), like in the European case, there is not a clear cut demarcation of who an existential philosopher is. There are significant existential reflections in the work of African-American novelists Phillis Wheatley in the eighteenth century, and James Weldon Johnson in the nineteenth century. There are also engagements with existential philosophy and existential dimensions and influences in the work of David Walker, Frederick Douglass, Anna Julia Cooper, bell hooks, Alain Locke, Toni Morrison, Angela Davis, C.L.R. James, Naomi Zack, Cornel West, and Chinua Achebe, despite the fact that their overall work may not fully fall in the category of black philosophies of existence. The novelists Richard Wright, Ralph Ellison explored problems of alienation, responsibility, liberation and invisibility in their works. Existential philosophy can be also represented by the novelist James Baldwin and philosophers William Jones, Robert Birt, Lucius Outlaw. In the Caribbean setting, the most significant and influential reflections came

from Fanon and Césaire, the explorations of consciousness have been continued differently by Sylvia Wynter, Edouard Glissant or Wilson Harris. And in the African continent, there are existential elements in the works of Leopold Senghor, Tsenay Serequeberhan, Chabani Manganyi, Tendayi Sithole or Mabogo More.

5.2 Double consciousness

5.2.1 Double consciousness: within the veil of the color-line

In 1903 was published W.E.B. Du Bois' 1903 work, *The Souls of Black Folk*. This influential study that blends sociological insights, philosophy, psychology, literature, personal accounts, and music is the first explicit phenomenological approach to black consciousness. The author opened the book with a well-known and sad premonition: "the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line" (Du Bois, 2015: 1). Although this work focused on the condition of black people in the United States, Du Bois' scope of the color-line, as subsequent works would show, extends to the men and women in Africa, Asia, and the American continent.

In the 1897 article "Strivings of the Negro People" he had already advanced that a "double consciousness" was one of the defining features of the experience of being in his country. The article later became the first chapter of this 1903 book, where he expanded the issue:

After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, *born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world,—a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world.* It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, *this*

sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. (Du Bois, 2015:5; emphasis added)

Du Bois did not use the expression again, although it is implicit throughout the book. The term double consciousness was not new at the time. Novelist Ralph Waldo Emerson uses to express the conflict between the individual and society, the tension between freedom and necessity, or the divide between mortality and immortality. It had also been employed in the medical literature, among others by the psychologist Oswald Kupe to refer to a conflictive separation within the individual (Allen Jr, 1997). Du Bois reformulated the concept which is here in dialogue with Hegel's (Henry, 2006; Allen Jr, 1997) description of intersubjectivity in the dialectics of lordship and bondsman. Briefly put, in Hegel self-consciousness is attained by the presence and the mutual recognition of another human being. In this process emerge two self-consciousness, two perspectives.

However, for Du Bois, in a racist context, the black develops a "second sight": he sees the world and himself through the gaze of the white. This configures a particular form of consciousness. However, this is also the negation of a 'first-sight', an actual self-consciousness for the black, where the black would see himself through his own eyes. The reason for this is because, as Henry puts it, unlike in Hegel, in Du Bois' colonial setting the movement is not fully dialectical. Through the transformation of Africans into blacks, blackness and racialization occluded any other form of identity, culture and difference with the white. In the racist logic, the white and the black are turned into oppositional irreconcilable positions. In this polarized context and due to the weight of racialization is the blackness and not the humanity

of the black what confirms the white as white, while blacks assume a white consciousness (Henry, 2006). In Hegel the position of the abstracts and disembodied master and the slave are transcended through the interplay between the self and the other. In double consciousness the “subject moves not between a changeable ‘I’ and an unchangeable “Other” but between two ‘We’s’” (Henry, 2006: 7). These two “We’s” inform the relation between the inner and the outer world of the black. The being-in-the-world of the black in the United States is characterized by “two-ness”, or a double world in which he struggles between two seemingly incompatible “thoughts”, “strivings” and “ideals”, “two warring ideals in one dark body”: to be both black and American, black and human, insider and outsider, to be “an outcast and a stranger in my own house” (Du Bois, 2015: 4).

Du Bois repeatedly uses the metaphor of the veil—inside the veil, beyond or above the veil, both sides of the veil, the light, the thickness of the veil, the veil of race, “within and without the Veil of Color” (Du Bois, 2015:152)—to mean the effect of masking and impending vision of this form of consciousness. Double consciousness and seeing oneself through the eyes of the other is an obstacle not only to seeing, but in phenomenological terms, to recognizing what one is seeing. In Henry’s words, double consciousness is a “categoric form of self-blindness, a deformation, a detour rather than a positive phase in the development of Africana self-consciousness” (Henry, 2006:8).

There is a clear psychological element in double consciousness. This form of consciousness is self-damaging through the interiorization of a negative view of oneself. To that, Gordon adds, the experience of double consciousness is loaded with the normative and epistemic tensions of living the contradictions of society. Double consciousness entails the double standards of societal norms: the claimed universality of social norms and ideals are

restricted to the white world. The claims of equality, justice, or citizenship are lived as inequality, injustice and exclusion or second class citizenship. The epistemological dimension is related to the claimed universality of the false universal, which I have already addressed in the previous chapters, and is also linked to the possibilities of double consciousness of providing a broader and dialectical view of social contradictions, which I will address below (Gordon, 2008).

5.2.2 The “Negro Problem”

Asked about the “Negro problem” in the United States, Richard Wright answered that “[t]here isn’t any Negro problem; there is only a white problem” (Wright, 1993: 99). Wright’s views had a bearing on Sartre’s approach to the so-called Jewish question in *Anti-Semite and the Jew* (Judaken, 2006). The question of antiblack racism in the United States was at the time framed as “race relations” or as “the Negro problem”. The former emerged later to euphemistically conceal the anti-democratic character of the issue and the power differentials (Fields, 2001). Du Bois’ assertion of the problem being the color-line is already an intervention of the direction of his attention. The color-line shapes how black people are studied in social scientists. *The Souls of Black Folk* is part of the response to the diagnosis that Du Bois had published in his 1898 article “The Study of Negro Problems”:

so much of the work done on the Negro question is notoriously uncritical; uncritical from lack of discrimination in the selection and weighing of evidence; uncritical in choosing the proper point of view from which to study these problems, and, finally, uncritical from the distinct bias in the minds of so many writers. (Du Bois, 1898: 12-13)

Du Bois explains that in the literature the problems of black people such as poverty, alcoholism, labor, access to healthcare and education, migration or delinquency were not treated as social problems but as intrinsic elements of black people. Gordon (2008) has delved

into the continuing question of “problem people” and the role of social sciences in the production and reproduction of new forms of problem people. The study of Negro problems did not address their problems, but turned them into the problems. The Negro problem is then the problem of the black presence and black appearance (Gordon, 2008). Du Bois expressed this point in his work on the history of slavery and emancipation. A free black was considered a contradiction and a threat. There is an intrinsic inadequacy and illegitimacy in the black:

As a thief and a vagabond, he threatened society; but as an educated property holder, a successful mechanic or even professional man, he more than threatened slavery. He contradicted and undermined it. He must not be. He must be suppressed, enslaved, colonized. (Du Bois, 1998:7)

What is at stake in the article, for Gordon, is a methodological question of how to study people whose humanity is questioned, without turning them into problems (Gordon, 2008). Du Bois put remedy to this issue in a variety of ways and disciplines. From empirical sociological studies such as the groundbreaking *The Philadelphia Negro* of 1899, and in *The Souls of Black Folk*, through the exploration of the subjective and intersubjective dimensions of black life.

Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly framing it. All, nevertheless, flutter round it. They approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, eye me curiously or compassionately, and then, instead of saying directly, How does it feel to be a problem? they say, I know an excellent colored man in my town; or, I fought at Mechanicsville; or, Do not these Southern outrages make your blood boil? At these I smile, or am interested, or reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. To the real question, *How does it feel to be a problem?* I answer seldom a word. (Du Bois, 2015: 3-4; emphasis added)

As Cordero-Pedrosa notices (2021) the issue of being a problem is not only analyzed in terms of feelings or through a purely subjectivist perspective, but is linked to “the strange

meaning of being black” (Du Bois, 2015: 1) Hence the intersubjective explorations of the meaning of being black through double consciousness. Double consciousness is then the interiorization of being a problem.

5.2.3 Beyond the veil

“What of the darker world that watches?”, asks Du Bois in *Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil*, published in 1920 (Du Bois, 2007a: 27). In the chapter entitled “The Souls of White Folk”, he relates racial formation, racism and white supremacy to global exploitation and the wider dynamics of political economy. Du Bois linked colonial expansion, extraction of resources and the exploitation and killing of colored people with the emergence of white people as white and the subsequent clashes of empires in the First World War: “The discovery of personal whiteness among the world’s peoples is a very modern thing.” (2007a: 17) He alternated between the sociology and geopolitics of colonialism with the personal and psychological way of being in the world of what he calls “the new religion of whiteness”, its self-righteousness, arrogance, entitlement and universality (Du Bois, 2007a: 18). About the “white folk”, he writes:

Of them I am singularly clairvoyant. I see in and through them. I view them from unusual points of vantage. Not as foreigner do I come, for I am native, not foreign, bone of their thought and flesh of their language (...) Nor yet is my knowledge that which servants have of masters, or mass of class, or capitalist of artisan. I see these souls undressed and from the back and side. I see the workings of their entrails. I know their thoughts and they know that I know. This knowledge makes them now embarrassed, now furious! My word is to them mere bitterness and my soul, pessimism. (Du Bois, 2007a: 17)

In a similar vein, novelist James Weldon Johnson posited that the standpoint of blacks entailed a clearer perspective: "I believe it to be a fact that the colored people of this country know and understand the white people better than the white people know and understand them"

(Johnson, quoted in Cordero-Pedrosa, 2021:136). Double consciousness may be a limited and damaging form of consciousness, but in it also lies the possibility of an expansive form of consciousness. Life behind the veil may enable to see both the lights and shadows of the society. This contains a different conception and forms of knowledge than in Plato's metaphor of the cavern. Here the shadows are not necessarily deceiving, but reveal the deceptions of the light. What Paget Henry defined as "potentiated second sight" (2006) is a form of consciousness that is aware of double consciousness and by extension of the contradictions, and double standards of the society. For Paul Gilroy double consciousness and its do not grasp an exclusive African-American phenomenon, but is recurrent in the African diaspora, or what he calls the Black Atlantic. It brings to the front "the inner contradictions of modernity and a radical skepticism towards the ideology of progress with which it is associated" (Gilroy: 1993: 117). This potentiated form of consciousness lays bare the aforementioned epistemological and normative tensions. The self-declared universal is a false universal, the claimed justice and equality of the society are also partial, those people considered problems are actually social problems, belonging and citizenship are sustained on the on rejection of groups of people, and the legitimacy of institutions are sustained on the illegitimacy of social groups. In this potentiated double consciousness the black is aware that she lives and incarnates the contradictions of the society. Expanding on this, for Gordon (2008), potentiated double consciousness is an expansive form of consciousness because it offers a dialectically broader view of reality and its scope is more universal: it encompasses seeing how dominant society sees itself, and also seeing the contradictions of society. As Gordon (2008: 79) avers, "Since to see both is to see the dialectical relationship constitutive of truth, then the first by itself must manifest a form of consciousness that hides itself."

5.3. Black embodied consciousness

5.3.1 Alienating methods

For Paget Henry, Frantz Fanon provided “the more detailed and incisive psycho-existential analysis of this historical phase of double consciousness identified by DuBois.” (2006:11) Fanon did not frame the issues as double consciousness and problem people, and was in conversation with different authors, theoretical perspectives and disciplines than Du Bois, but both the efforts to decolonize social of social and human sciences and the analysis of alienation are a constant in his work, especially in his initial book, *Black Skin White Masks*. One of the main differences of Fanon’s analysis, observes Gordon (2015: 21), is “the convergence of the ‘black problem’ with desire.”

Although implicitly in most cases, existential and phenomenological themes and insights insistently inform his whole intellectual production. I will briefly cover here two main aspects of his first book that can complement and expand the above account of double consciousness: his methodological approach and the question of embodiment.

In *Black Skin White Masks* Fanon sets himself the task of studying the being of the black in racist societies. How do black men and women respond to their situation, and make sense of themselves, and of the world in the sociohistorical circumstances of racism and colonialism. For Fanon, understanding and exposing how alienation functions is not enough. Being the goal disalienation and the destruction of the psychological complexes, it also required action. The effort is individual and collective, objective and subjective.

Coexisting with this aim, there is also the metacritical question of how to do think about alienation and disalienation, and how to think about thinking. As different authors argue *Black*

Skin White Masks is fundamentally a study on philosophy of social and human sciences, their intricacy with colonialism and the possibilities of decolonizing them and elaborating another form of knowledge. As Fanon shows in the book, the dominant medical, philosophical and sociological theories in Europe were not only insufficient to deal with the problems of black people because, but also their direct application would reinforce the position of black people as problems. It is necessary to reveal the intricacy of such literature with colonialism, their underlying understanding of the human and human agency (Gordon, 1995; Wynter, 2001; Mignolo, 2009; Maldonado-Torres, 2009; Cordero-Pedrosa, 2015). In the introduction, Fanon writes:

It is good form to introduce a work in psychology with a statement of its methodological point of view. I shall be derelict. I leave methods to the botanists and the mathematicians. There is a point at which methods devour themselves. (Fanon, 2008: 5)

Fanon does not reject method, but he treats them as part of the object of inquiry of his study of black alienation. What Fanon brings up here is the issue of justification and the “presuppositionless philosophy” (Natanson, 1962: 10) of phenomenology. As stated, this involves not taking for granted any step of the process of thought. the task is in Fanon’s words, “to get rid of the worm eaten roots of the structure” (Fanon, 2008: 4). The difference between belief and knowledge in European philosophy and modern science can be summarized in that knowledge is a justified true belief (Salomon and Higgins, 2016). Hence, method is an important element in the justification process and in the formation of knowledge as knowledge. However, there is the danger that the application of methods becomes truth itself. In other words, the application of a method does not directly mean that knowledge is produced. By questioning methods he demands the justification of the justification. This is what Gordon

means by the metacritique of reason, which, although differently expressed and approached, this is also what Du Bois does in his article on the study of the Negro problems.

By leaving methods to botanists and mathematicians, Fanon emphasizes the difference between natural and social phenomena, and the implications of the intervention of the human in the social. “But society, unlike biochemical processes, cannot escape human influences. Man is what brings society into being.” (Fanon, 2008: 4) The study of the black psychic and existential life had been carried out by theorists as if there was no human element in it, either explained in terms of natural or historical developments, or by means of a problematic conception of culture. In any of these cases the role of human agency in racism and the responses to it are omitted. In short, what is at stake is the study of racism as a problem of human oppression onto other humans, whose humanity is denied. In order to account for human intervention in the world Fanon uses the term sociogeny:

Reacting against the constitutionalist tendency of the late nineteenth century, Freud insisted that the individual factor be taken into account through psychoanalysis. He substituted for a phylogenetic theory the ontogenetic perspective. It will be seen that the black man’s alienation is not an individual question. *Beside phylogeny and ontogeny stands sociogeny.* (Ibid)

Sociogeny is a key aspect in the Fanonian analysis. It is an effort to bind the individual and the structural, the subjective and the objective, the psychological with the historical and the economic (Ibid), the agency of the human to participate in an already established world of meanings As Cordero-Pedrosa points out, sociogeny is not merely social constructivism, it is rather Fanon’s take on what in phenomenology is called the “problem of constitution”:

It [sociogeny] rather brings to the forefront the basic relationality and the interplay in the formation of the self and of society. Starting from the aforementioned existential phenomenological insight that it is the human

that brings society into being, it aims at exploring the twofold process through which meanings in the intersubjective world and the social structures are produced by human beings, while at the same time, such meanings and social structures constitute the human being. (Cordero-Pedrosa, 2021: 152)

Constitution is a central element in phenomenology, “the whole problem of phenomenology comes down to the problem of constitution” (Moran, 2000: 164) It refers to the possibilities and limitations of the subjects for meaning making, and how the objective is made out of the subjective. For instance, in order for my mind to constitute the room as I wake up and suffer a moment of not knowing where I am, which ‘space’ I am in, I need first, sensory institutions like sight, hearing, etc. And also it needs to connect ‘time’ or ‘temporality’ meaning that I have to understand the continuation of my being in the space in order to constitute that space in which I find myself as my room. Then, the act of constitution requires the sense of time having taken place in the space, which works as ‘memory.’ In other words, without recalling past events, that is ‘history,’ it is impossible to constitute an object. The ‘history,’ ‘time’ I said in my observation of trying to constitute the space I am in as my room is equivalent to Husserl’s later emphasis on genetic constitutional analysis which captures “the diachronic layering of our experiences of objects and of ourselves” (Moran, 2000: 167). In this way, race and phenomenology bring out interesting observation about how it is essential to understand genetic constitution of race only with temporality, that is sociohistorical context in which diachronic analysis of race is possible.

In the case of Fanon rather than the tension between the constituting and the constituted, there is also the tension between the created and the creative power of the human. Fanon states that the black is a creation of the white. Before being in touch with the white world, the cultural, social and individual self-conception of the black subject does not revolve around her

blackness. This state of “enforced negrification” (Henry, 2006:12) is not limited to the color of the skin, but also the interiorization of the historical values and the meanings assigned to it. In order to analyze the being in the world of the black, Fanon makes another existential phenomenological move: the suspension of ontology, and its replacement by an existential ontology:

Ontology—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside—does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. (Fanon, 2008: 82-83)

5.3.2 The lived experience of the black

This does not mean that he treated blacks as ontologically different. It means that the suffering, perception, social relations, the relation between the self to the body and the world in a racist society is different for the black. In order to understand the “being of the black” without just reducing it to being (ontology) as closed, fixed and complete, Fanon draws on the lived experience of the black, especially in the fifth chapter of *Black Skin White Masks*. Originally entitled “The Lived Experience of the Black”, this chapter has been mistranslated as “The Fact of Blackness”. But this title implies almost the opposite of what Fanon is attempting to. Blackness is not a fact. Furthermore, the translation omits the reference to Simone de Beauvoir and *The Second Sex* (Gordon, 2015).

For de Beauvoir, to approach the body of the woman as a “body-in situation” does not reduce her to an essence. The body-in-situation is not a thing, but “a lived body whose meanings are dynamic and contingent” (Alcoff, 2006: 153). For Linda Martín Alcoff, existential phenomenological descriptions of the “body-in-situation” that starts from the inner aspect of experience are not at odds with objectivist understandings of racialized and sexed

identities, but provide significant descriptions of what it is to live as racialized and sexed beings (Alcoff, 2006).

Fanon begins the chapter with what Stuart Hall calls the paradigmatic “metropolitan Diasporic moment” (Hall, 2017: 175): “Dirty nigger!” Or simply, “Look, a Negro!” (Fanon, 2008: 82). He noticed that he came into the world eager to find the meaning of it, but he found himself an object among other objects. This aforementioned existential theme of the agency of the human in an already constructed world is, however, complicated by his arrival to colonial which posits locks him into a state of inferiority.

Sealed into that crushing objecthood, I turned beseechingly to others. (...) But just as I reached the other side, I stumbled, and the movements, the attitudes, the glances of the other fixed me there, in the sense in which a chemical solution is fixed by a dye. I was indignant; I demanded an explanation. Nothing happened. I burst apart. Now the fragments have been put together again by another self. (Ibid)

Racism, racist comments, the white gaze, have an impact on the body, on perception, the sensory, the intimate, and the relationship with one’s own body and with the world. Fanon attempts to make sense of racism as a corporeal experience through Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of perception and the body schema. For the French philosopher, “the ‘body schema’ is, in the end, a manner of expressing that my body is in and toward the world” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 103). The body is the unperceived ‘here’ around which the world is structured. The world is not an object, it is a setting where tasks, projects, thoughts and perceptions take place. Yet the body is not only an object in a space, they are part of it, they become the space in which they dwell and move. The body is formed by moving and living in the space, which in turn also constitutes the space. The human is in the world, moves and acts in the world, orientates herself towards objects and gets to know it, establishes a relation of familiarity through the situation

of the body. The body schema is a form of knowledge of how the body is situated in regards to the world. It is conscious of the world through the body, and gets to know herself through the world. There is a dialectical relationship of the self and the world. Both constitute and get to know each other. “I am conscious of my body through the world and (...) I am conscious of the world by means of my body” (Merleu-Ponty, 2012: 84).

For Fanon there is no dialectical relation between the self and the world, there is no slow formation of the self in the interplay and equilibrium with the world. Racialization or negrification structures how the body orientates towards oneself, others, and moves in the world, shapes perception, of the world and the body image.

In the white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activity. It is a third-person consciousness. The body is surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty. (2008: 82-83)

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and the body schema is not enough. Fanon points out that “[b]elow the corporeal schema I had sketched a historico-racial schema” produced by the white man “out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories” (Fanon, 2008: 84). That is, the body is historically formed through discourses and practices that are accumulated beneath the skin. In short, there is depth that the body schema cannot grasp, and also there is a surface that it does not take into account. To this historico-racial schema, Fanon adds an “epidermal schema.” Fanon then recalls the well-known episode in the train: ‘Look a Negro’, a child says to his mom. Through the epidermal schema the surface imprisons the whole person. The black begins and ends at the surface. Sara Ahmed notices that Fanon’s example of the body schema –a man wants to smoke and tries to grab a packet of cigarettes, leans towards the desk to grab the matches– is that of an “active body” that moves and extends through the world and its objects,

whereas the interpellation of the child reveals a body “that is negated or "stopped" in its tracks” (Ahmed, 2006: 110). He writes:

Then, assailed at various points, the corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal schema. In the train it was no longer a question of being aware of my body in the third person but in a triple person. In the train I was given not one but two, three places. I had already stopped being amused. It was not that I was finding febrile coordinates in the world. I existed triply: I occupied space. I moved toward the other . . . and the evanescent other, hostile but not opaque, transparent, not there, disappeared. Nausea. . . I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors. (Ibid)

5.3.3 Visibility and black invisibility

The epidermic schema raises the question of visibility, which I will develop further in the next chapter. But as Fanon and others have underlined, the domain of the ocular, and the visible is important in the experience of race. For Alcoff, such experience is predicated first and foremost on the perception of race, a perception whose specific mode is a learned ability.” (Alcoff, 2006: 187) Perception is defined by Merleau-Ponty (2012) not as an act but as the background of actions. Actions presuppose perception.

Fanon observes that the corporeal/epidermal experience is one of the differences in respect of how the Jew experiences antisemitism: “He is not wholly what he is. One hopes, one waits. His actions, his behaviors are the final determinant” (Fanon, 2008: 87). Instead, the black, as I already pointed, is what it is and cannot be anything else. He is locked by his skin: “I am overdetermined from without. I am the slave not of the “idea” that others have of me but of my own appearance.” (Ibid) By appearance Fanon does not only refer to the color of the skin. The overdetermination of the black encompasses the outlook (the skin), the idea that others have of the outlook, and also where and to whom one appears. The result is that the black suffers

from “illicit appearance” (Gordon, 2015). In Sara Ahmed’s reading, “T[h]e body schema describes “a body at home’.” Yet racialization precedes such schema. Race does not interrupt the schema but structures it. The black body, which is historically shaped by colonialism, is out of place in the colonial world. “If the world is made ‘white’, then the body at home can inhabit whiteness,” which means that colonialism produces a world that is habitable by certain types of bodies (Ahmed, 2006: 111).

What is at stake in Fanon, as in Ahmed, Gordon or Alcoff, is not only the study of racism, but also how to think and study about it. For Nigel Gibson and Roberto Beneduce,

The most elegantly constructed ontologies and phenomenologies collapse when faced with the racial difference that had been systematically ignored and on which Fanon focused, positing the role of race in the sociopolitical constitution of psychic space and experience (Gibson and Beneduce, 2017: 71)

Linda Martín Alcoff’s existential phenomenological analysis of gender and race as “visible identities” reaches a similar conclusion. If racism affects and expresses itself in the domain of perception, she argues, the anti-racist task “is to make visible the practices of visibility itself, to outline the background from which our knowledge of others and of ourselves appears in relief.” Thereby, the meanings ascribed to the visible difference can be altered (Alcoff, 2006: 194). For her, Western hermeneutics, phenomenology and social psychology are “seriously deficient, not because they assume the justification of our existing beliefs but because they tend to portray our situation as if it were coherent, monocultural, and internally consistent in all respects” (Alcoff, 2006: 124).

Sartre explores three ontological dimensions of the body in *Being and Nothingness*. To live the body (*exist* the body in Sartre’s words) is a peculiar phenomenon for consciousness,

often leading to bad faith in denial of the fact that the human being is embodied consciousness. When I say I am not my gender, nor my race, I pretend I am beyond my body. On the other hand, I may believe I am only my body. Furthermore, human beings, as consciousness in the flesh, live as “individualized social perspectives” (Gordon, 1995: 20) in the world of Others. Sartre describes the human being’s three perspectives of embodiment and the subsequent effort to hide from one’s freedom using the metaphor of sadism and masochism. Sadism is the effort to evade the perspective of others. The sadist “abstracts one’s identity into complete subjectivity by ossifying all other human beings into dehumanized corporeality” (Gordon, 1995:19). What the sadist tries to achieve is to protect himself from “being seen” and to hide Others’ perspectives from himself, “reducing them to the level of pure materiality, flattening out their significance into a landscape of nonhuman significance.” (Gordon, 1995: 19) On the other side, the masochist wants to be seen as an object without a perspective. Both sadism and masochism are forms of bad faith denying social reality. The body has central importance in the social world because it is a condition of appearance (Gordon, 2015: 137). Gordon further develops the phenomenological embodiment to bring light on the problem of the racialized bodies:

The body has at least three characteristics. It is the perspective of consciousness. It is seen by Others. It is consciousness’ perspective of being seen by Others. Correlated to these three characteristics are two dimensions of bad faith. There is the form of bad faith that affirms the first characteristic of perspectivity but denies the other two. This is what Sartre means by sadism and hate—consciousness’ denial of being body. Then there is the affirmation of the second and third characteristics, but denial of the first. This is consciousness’ denying transcendence, consciousness’ claiming to be only an object for Others. This is what Sartre means by masochism and love. We can call these bad-faith attitudes toward the body, respectively, bad faith against facticity and transcendence, *Presence* and *Absence*. What happens when the human species is split into a duality of white and black? (Gordon, 1999: 97, emphasis original)

In an antiblack world, white and black bodies in bad faith embody a Manichaeic logic of good and evil, superiority and inferiority. This is, according to Gordon, ontological denial of human reality as one group would be valued on the basis of facticity (Presence) while the other group would be valued for transcendence (Absence) (Gordon: 1995: 98). Presence inscribes values on white people to appear in white bodies when those bodies are a mere fact of facticity. On the other hand, black people are expected to transcend their facticity by being absent. This peculiar antiblack racist logic renders the mere appearance of black people as violent. The continuing police brutality and the Black Lives Matter movement illustrate this point. Antiblack racism wrenches humans into most extreme poles based on the physical difference: black and white. Bad faith makes what, on the phenomenological level, appear to be dark and light human beings into *white* and *black*. Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man* illustrates the black experience of absence:

I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar Allan Poe; nor am I one of your Hollywood-movie ectoplasms. I am a man of substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids - and I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me. Like the bodiless heads you see sometimes in circus sideshows, it is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorting glass. When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination - indeed, everything and anything except me. Nor is my invisibility exactly a matter of a biochemical accident to my epidermis. That invisibility to which I refer occurs because of a peculiar disposition of the eyes of those with whom I come in contact. A matter of the construction of their inner eyes, those eyes with which they look through their physical eyes upon reality. I am not complaining, nor am I protesting either. It is sometimes advantageous to be unseen, although it is most often rather wearing on the nerves. Then too, you're constantly being bumped against by those of poor vision. Or again, you often doubt if you really exist. You wonder whether you aren't simply a phantom in other people's minds. Say, a figure in a nightmare which the sleeper tries with all his strength to destroy. It's when you feel like this that, out of resentment, you begin to bump people back. And, let me confess, you feel that way most of the time. You ache with the need to convince yourself that you do exist in the real

world, that you're a part of all the sound and anguish, and you strike out with your fists, you curse and you swear to make them recognized you. And, alas, it's seldom successful. (Ellison, 1990: 3)

Ellison's description of invisibility points to the racist denial of seeing the human presence of the blacks. The black is just the epidermis. If the white subjectivity imbued in rationality and liberty is always present in virtue of his body, the black's absence renders her body as a mere thing of the environment. Gordon takes Fanon's situation in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) to show how Fanon's problem of being *seen* as a black is also translated to Absence. Fanon is "seen in a way that *Frantz Fanon* is not seen" (Gordon, 1999: 99): "He is evaded. Missed. He is not seen in his individuality." (Ibid.) Fanon and Ellison's *Invisible Man* both suffer from being Absence: "The black body lives as Absence" (Ibid.). The white body as Presence means it has a perspective which is the norm from which the non-whites are gazed. For the blacks, consciousness, therefore a perspective, is denied. Africa, the dark continent, is devoid of historicity offering only her vast reservoirs of raw materials and labor.

5.3.4 Revolutionary consciousness

In *A Dying Colonialism* Fanon offers a description of the corporeal experience of Algerian women in their relation with the controversy over the veil. Fanon observes that Algerian women found themselves at a crossroad between three different forces. First, they had to deal with Algerian conservatives for whom the veil was a sign of resistance to the colonial power. Second, the question of the veil was central for the colonial regime. The unveiling of Algerian women was tantamount to their liberation: it was a triumph of modern European values over an archaic patriarchy, and as such, was a triumph over Algerian men, who were the actual target of the debate. At the same time women represented the last and most inaccessible corner of Algeria because behind the visible patriarchy that hid women from

sight, social scientists and colonial administrators noted an indoors matriarchal structure. Equating women and land, for the colonizers the conquest of Algerian women would lead to the definitive conquest and transformation of Algeria. Fanon notices that the veiled women disrupted the colonial dynamics of visibility and represented; the white gaze did not fall onto her and at the same she had a perspective of the world.

This woman who sees without being seen frustrates the colonizer. There is no reciprocity. She does not yield herself, does not give herself, does not offer herself. (...)The European faced with an Algerian woman wants to see. He reacts in an aggressive way before this limitation of his perception. Frustration and aggressiveness, here too, evolve apace. (Fanon, 1965: 44)

Fanon extends on the sexual and psychoanalytical dimensions in the unveiling of Algerian women that explained the aggressiveness of both European men and woman which I will not address here. The colonial pressure had a certain succeed and some women took off the veil. A third force emerged with the outbreak of the war and the participation of women in it. Algerian women veiled or unveiled themselves for tactical reasons or depending on the military necessities. With almost no training, unveiled Algerian women left the safe space of the Arab city and entered into the French town passing as French and mimicking their manners without exaggerating. Crossing the border was already rare for unveiled young women before the world. The one's who did had to face their resistance, unease, loss of assurance "her body did not have the normal mobility before a limitless horizon of avenues, of unfolded sidewalks, of houses, of people dodged or bumped into." (Fanon, 1965: 49)

With the direct involvement of women in the armed struggle, things changed. Fully engaged in the mission, women were no longer shy and insecure, but "completely at home in the environment" (Fanon, 1965: 56). Although there were other problems, the conflict with the body disappeared.

Fanon (1965: 59) notes that initially, with the absence of the veil the woman lost a form of protection, assurance and orientation. “The absence of the veil distorts the Algerian woman's corporal pattern.” It disrupts the unity of her body and the world. According to their dreams and testimonies, the unveiled woman “has an impression of her body being cut up into bits, put adrift; the limbs seem to lengthen indefinitely.” For a long time, the world is overwhelming and she experiences problems in measuring distances. She feels naked, incomplete, fragmented. With her involvement in the armed struggle:

She quickly has to invent new dimensions for her body, new means of muscular control. She has to create for herself an attitude of unveiled-woman-outside. She must overcome all timidity, all awkwardness (for she must pass for a European), and at the same time be careful not to overdo it, not to attract notice to herself. The Algerian woman who walks stark naked into the European city relearns her body, re-establishes it in a totally revolutionary fashion. This new dialectic of the body and of the world is primary in the case of one revolutionary woman. (Ibid)

This issue here is not so much about the veil itself, but about the agency and the changes of the corporeal experience of the woman, her redefinition, her reorientation in the world and the changes in perception and self-perception through her participation in a collective process of social transformation. Fanon described in this and other chapters how during the independence war there was a change of attitudes of Algerian men towards Algerian woman within and without the family. Such changes extended to men and women who were not at the forefront, or were not directly involved in the armed struggle. It has also to be noticed that Fanon’s analysis has been criticized by some Algerian feminists for overdoing the agency of women, which did not always correspond the facts (Sharpley-Whiting, 1998).

Returning to the question of the black in the colonial society, Fanon would not recommend carrying grenades into a forbidden quarter as a way out of disalienation. In the

same article on the veil Fanon states, “[i]t is the white man who creates the Negro. But it is the Negro who creates negritude” (Fanon, 1965: 47). Fanon was quite critical of negritude, especially of the branch which longed for a return to precolonial African culture and an uncorrupted human. His point is that the black is not only a creation of the white, but also the black has a creative and agential aspect to be exerted. The meanings and values of being black are not fixed and static. Blackness for Fanon is rather a relation term and an action. It is a form of subjectivity that is socially and historically situated. That it is situated means that is in relation with the white and with other social and cultural identities, and social structures. It is within this situation and relations that action can be carried out, new meanings can be given and it can lie at the origin of a decolonial politics. The book paradoxically closes in an open way, with a prayer that demands the human to be an embodied question, which is the opposite of what racism does:

At the conclusion of this study, I want the world to recognize, with me, the open dimension of every consciousness. My final prayer:
O my body, make of me always a man who questions! (Fanon, 2008: 181; translation modified)

However, abstract as this closing may sound, the last pages of the book hint a clear direction. After analyzing a whole set of attitudes of denial, evasive responds, the traps of recognition, self-damaging patterns, reactive positions (among which he included negritude), and his disappointment with what he called “a friend of the Negro” (Sartre), Fanon calls the black to be “actional”:

To educate man to be *actional*, preserving in all his relations his respect for the basic values that constitute a human world, is the prime task of him who, having taken thought, prepares to act. (Fanon, 2008: 173)

To be actional is a basic human feature of participating and changing it is a basic condition for the human. Action is not delinked from reflection, understanding and knowledge. In *The Wretched of the Earth* the focus on black embodied consciousness is replaced first by national consciousness and then by what he called social consciousness. “Self-consciousness does not mean closing the door on communication. (...) National consciousness, which is not nationalism, is alone capable of giving us an international dimension” (Fanon, 2008: 179).

5.4 Black consciousness

5.4.1 Steve Biko and Black Consciousness

The South African Black Consciousness Movement had in the activist and thinker Steve Biko one of its foremost proponents at the level of intellectual production and activism. Influenced, among others, by Fanon, the Black Power, black theology, the negritude, by Sartre and Marx, and by South African philosophers of existence, and indigenous thought, Biko articulated a philosophy of what it means to be black and what to do in the struggle against the apartheid. Besides these influences, Mabogo More situates Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement within a three century tradition of radical philosophy and activism that encompasses the Haitian revolution, Pan Africanist and anticolonial activism and thought, the Harlem Renaissance, the Black Power, negritude, several African intellectual traditions such as African socialism, and includes the thought of Louverture, Garvey, Du Bois, Fanon, Césaire, Alain Locke (More, 2017).

In line with existential philosophers for Biko, Black Consciousness is not a detached intellectual activity, but “is an attitude of mind and a way of life” (Biko, 1987: 90). It “refers

itself to the black man and to his situation” (Biko, 1987: 100). The situations, in existential terms, are the limits and the influence exerted on one’s choices and one’s capacity to act as a freedom. In his writings and interviews he offers different definitions and explanations of Black Consciousness. In the following biographical reflection Biko condenses the origins and the concerns of the movement.

Born shortly before 1948, I have lived all my conscious life in the framework of institutionalised separate development. My friendships, my love, my education, my thinking and every other facet of my life have been carved and shaped within the context of separate development. In stages during my life I have managed to outgrow some of the things the system taught me. (Biko, 1987:27)

Black Consciousness is the consciousness of being black in a society in which the standards, the notion of normality, meanings values ascribed, and the economic structures militate against black people. It entails the self-awareness of the black as a free human being, and its reaffirmation with positive meanings. This, he points out, is not “just a reactionary rejection of whites by blacks,” but focuses on self- definition, self-value, solidarity, unity in the struggle and in the creation of power (Biko, 1987: 68). It aspires to the elimination of racism and apartheid, and also to the complete social transformation. It does not renounce to the universal. Alternatively it aspires to the creation of a “true humanity” (Biko, 1987: 87). In sum, for Biko Black Consciousness expresses “[t]he interrelationship between the consciousness of the self and the emancipatory programme” (Biko, 1987: 49).

Biko’s existential analysis pays special attention to the aforementioned issues of seeing, making visible what is too familiar to be seen, and recognizing what is visible. speech, which for him were central on the formation of self-consciousness, and shaped white-black relations. Indeed one of Biko’s pseudonyms was Frank Talk. Biko diagnoses that “black people are

operating under a veil of silence,” (1987: 135) which he sees as a manifestation of their condition of unfreedom: “there is no freedom in silence” (Biko, 1972: 10). Retaking Sartre’s argument that the human is condemned to freedom, Biko (1972: 7) adds that the human is also condemned to responsibility. What Black Consciousness does is to take responsibility for creating a language that can be used for the purpose of emancipation (Biko, 1987: 32). In the next sections, I will elaborate further on the political implications of Biko’s point on language and speech. Before, and relatedly, I will address Biko’s and other black thinkers’ examination of whiteness.

5.4.2 Black consciousness of white consciousness

The critique of whiteness by black thinkers precedes the recent field of whiteness studies by almost a century. I already covered the reflections of Du Bois, and these have been followed by the likes of Steve Biko, Lewis Gordon, or black feminists such as Sara Ahmed, Audre Lorde or Toni Morrison. Ahmed observes that the study of whiteness is important for antiracist purposes since it enables to shed light on who whiteness produce the non-white, on the different ways that white dominance has been normalized, how it impacts on non-whites lives, and how it can be contested. To that effect it is important first to take this genealogy seriously rather than engaging directly and uncritically with scholarship of whiteness studies (Ahmed, 2004).

The difference between the critiques of black thinkers on how whiteness functions and whiteness studies is not only temporal, but also qualitatively different. Despite its declared antiracist commitment, the self-reflexive trend initiated in whiteness studies (Frankenberg, 1993; Dyer, 1997) does not exceed whiteness; whiteness is treated as a social identity, and the focus is put on how whiteness is experienced by white people, rather than confronting its

dominance (Ahmed, 2004; Hook, 2013). In this field whiteness is analyzed as the invisible norm, the standard that does not reveal itself as such, the “hidden referent, against which all other colours are measured as forms of deviance.” (Ahmed, 2004:1) However, Ahmed adds, whiteness is visible and omnipresent for those who live its effects; it “is only invisible for those who inhabit it.” The point is to shed a new perspective on what is already visible (Ibid.).

There is a shared concern among authors in the field that the study of whiteness would reify this category, fixing it, making into an object of study rather than a social relation, and re-centering while critiquing it, rather than decentering it (Hook, 2013), something that Ahmed (2004) corroborates and permeates her own analysis. She adds that centering whiteness risks becoming a “discourse of love”, a “pure spectacle of self-reflection augmented by an insistence that whiteness ‘is an identity too’” (Ahmed, 2004: 2). Ahmed mentions the recurrent critique of narcissism of whiteness, which I pointed out in the analysis of the history of philosophy in the previous chapter. I will return to the question of narcissism later, since it is a central component of black criticism. Before, it may be important to look at what centering and decentering whiteness means.

Marilyn Nissim-Sabat’s (2009) distinction conceptual clarification of decentering may illustrate the different approach of whiteness studies scholarship and black thinkers on the same issue. According to her, in the postmodern use of decentering is related to uncentering; it attempts to show that the centers are ideological illusions to be discarded. This meaning of decentering seeks the disappearance of the center through fragmentation, multiplicity, fluidity and the lack of substantive coherence. As Nissim-Sabat (2009: 104; emphasis original) suggests, “They do this because they *believe* that the villain in the story is the illusion of centering itself, rather than the reification of a structure.” She notes that there is another

meaning of decentering which understands it as the retreat from the center in order to gain a different perspective, so that it can be changed. This requires a previous center, otherwise there would be no decentering. The telos is to reconstruct not to eliminate the center. Decentering requires one's previous centering, "a prior capacity for ordering of experience along various dimensions—temporal, spatial, and emotional" (Ibid). Whiteness studies attempts to decenter whiteness through the first notion of decentering: the effort against, and the anxiety over, re-centering whiteness are a sign of the self-absorption that results from the resistance against fragmentation than Nissim-Sabat identifies in the postmodern decentering. As Ahmed (2004) observes, this narcissistic logic can be extended *ad infinitum*: the anxiety over whiteness can produce a new object to be decentered, an anxious whiteness, a whiteness that is anxious about itself, and so on.

From the perspective of black scholars, whiteness is not treated as an identity, a color, or another race, with a presupposed symmetry. They start from blackness as the main signifier of racism. Derek Hook (2013) points out that there is nothing that leads to white reification, redemption, complacency or agency in Biko's account of whiteness. Starting from the basis that "black is an aberration from the "normal" which is white," (Biko, 1987, 49) he outlines the disparity of their value as human, the material condition and the psychological consequences:

The homes are different, the streets are different, the lighting is different, so you tend to begin to feel that there is something incomplete in your humanity, and that completeness goes with whiteness. This is carried through to adulthood when the black man has got to live and work. (Biko, 1987: 101)

For Biko, the aforementioned silencing of blacks was not only a function of apartheid racism. Language and speech are also important elements in the relations between blacks and

what he called “white liberals,” to which he paid close attention. Liberalism and white liberals were for Biko not disentangled from apartheid and represented an obstacle rather than a support in the struggle against racism, even though they conceived themselves as different from the white racist and located the problem in apartheid. The efforts of the white liberal are directed to provide a self-portray as non-racist and non-complicit with racism rather than analyzing their imbrication in it, whereas for Biko, white people “are born into privilege and are nourished by and nurtured in the system of ruthless exploitation of black energy (Biko, 1987: 66). What the white liberals do not say is what to do with their “monopoly on comfort and security,” (Biko, 1987:76) their "monopoly on intelligence and moral judgement," (Biko, 1987: 21) that is, the whole framework of racism. Whites talk critically about the problem of racism as if they are external to it.

This arises out of the false belief that we are faced with a black problem. There is nothing the matter with blacks. The problem is WHITE RACISM and it rests squarely on the laps of the white society. The sooner the liberals realise this the better for us blacks. (Biko, 1987:23)

In other words, apartheid was treated as a moral stain in a system, “an eye sore spoiling an otherwise beautiful view,” (Biko, 1987: 22) whereas for Biko, “apartheid has been tied up with white supremacy, capitalist exploitation, and deliberate oppression” (Biko, 1987: 27). The moral distinction established by white liberals is not enough to differentiate themselves from the homogeneity of whites in South Africa (Biko, 1987:19). As Derek Hook (2013) posits Biko leaves whites no space to distance themselves from whiteness and to dis-identify with it. For that matter, “there is a necessary wounding of the narcissism of whiteness at work here” (Hook, 2013: 86). He adds that this is not only due to the peculiarities of the South African case. In the British context, other scholars have posited the same argument about the impossible

neutrality of the white person, and the inseparability of the white individual from the historical and social structure through individual behavior and goodwill (Garner, 2007).

The theme of narcissism that underlies Biko's account of white liberals is a central issue in the critiques of whiteness, and is not only circumscribed to white anti-racism (Fanon, 2008; Manganyi, 1973; Ahmed, 2004; Hook, 2013; Gordon, 2022). Psychologist Chabani Manganyi noted that the meeting of the terms "black" and "consciousness" elicited fear in different South African sectors: black people were becoming racist and ungrateful by rejecting their association with white liberals. He shows no surprise because in his view "liberalism can only be a form of narcissism— a form of white self-love. People who love themselves can pity only themselves, hardly anybody else" (Manganyi, 1973: 17).

Lewis Gordon offers a general description of narcissism on the basis of a clinical definition: narcissism is characterized by "an exaggerated sense of self-importance". It is self-told story of superiority, which entails belittling others. At the same time this superiority needs to be recognized as such by others even when there is no corresponding evidence for it. Narcissistic people consider themselves special and shall be surrounded by special people. They feel envious and also feel envied; they demand a special treatment and over react when they do not get it. They are extremely sensitive to criticism to which they respond with rage. Narcissism is based on hidden insecurity and vulnerability while fantasizing about power, beauty and perfection (Gordon, 2022: 27). He defines white consciousness as "a consciousness imposed on the world in which to be normal is to be white" (Gordon, 2022: 28). In this statement the narcissistic dimension of white consciousness is already present, although implicit. If being normal is conceived as white, it leaves not much space for others, but

deviancy and imperfection. The whole project of racism is loaded with narcissism²⁴. He notices that whites take accusations of being racist so personally because of the misunderstanding of what racism is, and also because of the “egological fragility” that accompanies narcissism and its intolerance for imperfection (Gordon, 2022: 3). In the case of white anti-racism, he notices that racism as a political problem demands political responsibility. However, this produces a crisis in white people that activates, through the aforementioned narcissism, a moral and individual responsibility and guilt. The struggle against racism becomes about being better and moral, and therefore, about them.

Moral focus at times quickly retreats into moralism, where guilt is the prime objective. Catharsis is achieved from regarding the self as moral, while oppression—the systematic structures of dehumanization—remains. (Gordon, 2022: 159)

Sara Ahmed notices in her examination of whiteness studies other manifestations of the functioning and reproduction of whiteness with an anti-racist commitment through what she calls a “politics of declarations” (Ahmed, 2004). Such declarations take the form of admissions, apologies or confessions of bad practices or historical racism in order to turn them into good practices. The individual or institutional recognition of racism serves to transcend what is recognized through a gesture of change that bespeaks awareness, and ethical improvement. Saying ‘I am racist’ is something that a racist would not admit, therefore I am

²⁴ This does not mean that there is no black narcissism. For Fanon (2008) narcissism is one of the consequences of racist settings in the white and in the alienated black. The narcissism of the latter is manifested in a variety of self-deceptive moves to generate a positive image of the self in the eyes of others, that is, to be seen as whites and recognized by whites. Although he does not put it in these terms, it could also be argued that for Fanon certain strands of negritude are not exempt of the self-deceptive and narcissistic dimension in their reaffirmation of blackness. For Gordon (2022) the claim of whites that blacks depended on them is loaded with narcissism on both sides: the different whites (liberal, Marxists or conservatives) who need to be needed, and the blacks who entertain this fantasy. He notices that this black is usually referred to as “smart” in a paternalistic way by both white liberals and conservatives. Examples abound, but in the cotemporary South African context an instance would be Ferial Haffajee’s work *What if there were no whites in South Africa?*

saying that I am not racist, or that I am racist in another way. Declarations of shame over a past individual racism or national and historical injustice follow a similar logic of transcendence. The shame of past injustices is incorporated into and saves national identity and national ideals in the present and hints a future of reconciliation. Shame is thereby turned into pride; the shame and the bad feeling is a mechanism to feel good and to pass over of what originates the shame. “The transference of bad feeling to the subject in this admission of shame is only temporary, as the ‘transference’ itself becomes evidence of the restoration of an identity of which we can be proud” (Ahmed, 2004: 5). Statements such as ‘I am white’ seek a distance from whiteness by implying that ‘I am white but I am not as white as others’. As Ahmed puts it, “when whiteness studies becomes a declaration about whiteness, then it constitutes its subject as transcending its object in the moment it sees or apprehends itself as the object (being white)” (Ahmed, 2004: 4). The self-critique enables to situate oneself as outsider to whiteness, and between and above black and white. This elevation results from the awareness of injustices and the consciousness of the structural positions from which one benefits, while obtaining social and moral capital from it (Hook, 2013). As Biko put it, “[t]hey want to remain in good books with both the black and white worlds” (Biko, 1987: 21).

This is not only a scholar phenomenon, but can be found in popular culture and in everyday parlance. The problem of these and other declarations lie not in their possible good or bad faith. Ahmed (2004) calls them “non-performative” declarations, following Austin’s speech act theory. Although in Austin’s theoretical framework every speech act is necessarily performative, that is, every saying does something, what Ahmed emphasizes is that they do not do what they say they do. There is a shortcut between speech and action, and the declarations are what enable such shortcut and lack of action.

For Biko what is at stake in the debate with white liberals is black agency; the white-black alliance that white liberals propose results in “the whites doing all the talking and the blacks the listening” (Biko, 1987: 21). In this regard, Linda Martín Alcoff points out that “rituals of speaking” are conditioned by power relations of domination and exploitation. Who speaks, on behalf of who, what is spoken about, and who is the listener “is a result, as well as an act, of political struggle.” What is said and who says cannot be delinked from the situation and its politics (Alcoff, quoted in Sithole, 2020: 130). For liberalism, the solution is non-racialism or the elimination of racial groups and the integration of blacks. A black and white alliance against apartheid was already an indication that the encounter between black and whites was possible, and therefore, an improvement. As stated, for Biko, the liberal talk consists in the moral search for a middle ground without actual political and programmatic content. In the liberal logic of integration and non-racialism, seeing, talking, and thinking in terms of races was itself the problem. For the liberals, “the thesis is apartheid, the antithesis is non-racialism, but the synthesis is very feebly defined. They want to tell the blacks that they see integration as the ideal solution” (Biko, 1987: 90). In this framework, Black Consciousness is part of the problem, and an antagonist extremism to that of apartheid. As I have already underscored in several parts of the thesis, liberal thought conflates racialism with racism, whereby the existence of races is confused with the hierarchy of races.

The controversy of race haunts current South African liberal democracy; seeing races is at odds with the understanding of post-apartheid as the miracle of the overcoming of racialism. The self-declared non-racialism and colorblindness clashes with the reality of the transformations and the continuities of racism in the country. Despite the legal changes that confer equal citizenship and the possibility of black social mobility, access to education,

property rights, and the possibility of the physical and moral encounter between different groups as humans, these are considered by social critics as “cosmetic” changes (Sithole, 2020) that have not affected the deep and structural inequalities between blacks and whites (Sithole, 2020; More, 2011; Mngxitama, 2020). The liberal framework “produces gestures of integration and de-categorization –tending towards accommodation within existing societal and economic structures – true ‘anti-racism seeks to end the world as we know it’.” (Hook, 2013: 88)

The existing societal and economic structures into which blacks have integrated are partly an extension and partly a transformation of the apartheid. Paraphrasing Sara Ahmed, what is inherited from the apartheid is turned into a possession that masks the conditions of what is received, and of having received it (Ahmed, 2006). The bill of equal rights has not been accompanied by the means to access to these rights and affirmative action and redistributive politics correcting the massive appropriations of land and wealth of the times of the apartheid. The right to education, property, healthcare and labor does not amount to land, education, health and property (More, 2011). Contrary to many analysts, for Mahmood Mandani South Africa was the model and not an exceptional case in African during the apartheid, and also in its postcolonial/neocolonial epoch. The neoliberal policies of the new regime established new forms of colonial indirect rule, according to the analysis of Mahmood Mamdani (1996). In the neoliberal logic there was a retreat of the state from intervening in civil society and correcting the issues of racism and social justice that were present in that society. The new state, now in the hands of black politicians, withdrew from addressing racial inequalities and established thereby a new and harsher form of apartheid at the level of civil society. Liberalism and neoliberalism put the emphasis on individuals rather than groups, which is at odds with the functioning of racism. And at the same time, civil society, which is etymologically linked to

civility and civilization does not work in the same way for whites than for colored people (Gordon, 2008). In this setting, whiteness still functions as the norm. Adile Mngxitama states:

Whiteness is so pervasive it has become invisible and normalised; it has become the 'normative state of existence'. This normative state of existence is also a powerful tool of silencing. "Why can't we all just get along?" someone asks innocently, while another claims that, "colour is just skin deep, at the end of the day we are all human beings". Blacks are under pressure to accept these claims – in fact, we are heroic when we accept our 'common humanity' with whites. But doing so is a failure to bracket whiteness off and make it obvious for what it really is. Mandela is loved precisely because he is so effective in shielding whiteness from view. (Mngxitama, 2020: 54)

The change of regime has not led to the exhaustion of the liberation discourses and practices of the previous decades, but to their recreation and reformulation in the new situation. As social critics observe, Fanon's analysis of the colonial and the postcolonial, and the words of Biko and other thinkers of the Black Consciousness Movement resonate with stronger force in the new South African situation (Gibson, 2011; More, 2014; Hook, 2013). For Desmond Tutu, the Black Consciousness did not fail, rather it "did not finish the work it set out to do," because the "demon of self-hate, self-doubt, of a negative self-image" persist in the current postapartheid (Tutu, quoted in Hook, 2013: 78). Although with variations, the color-line still informs social relations and the way they are expressed. The liberal multicultural framework of constitutional South Africa exacerbates the situation described in Biko's critiques of white liberalism, obfuscates white racism, and discredits the language, the claims and the analysis of the existential conditions of blacks in terms of race. Sithole points out that in order to explain contemporary racism race is underscored by the affected ones and evaded by those who do not want to face it (Sithole, 2020).

"Where you see complexity, I see black suffering," responded the activist, politician and public intellectual Andile Mngxitama in a 2009 interview. The interviewer, Ferial Haffajee,

had asked him whether he had an obsessive attachment to an old world of blacks and whites that no longer existed. This psychological flaw and the resentment would impede him to move forward and understand the current situation. The Marikana massacre of 2012 exposed what Mngxitama and other public intellectuals had been *seeing*: the contradictions, the inconsistencies and the fragility of the policies and discourses of the 'New South Africa'. The rainbow nation, the 'unity in diversity', the emergence of a black middle class and a black political group, and the miracle of democracy and forgiveness of Tutu and Mandela were built upon and coexisted with structural racism, dispossession and violence. The complexity discourse that accompanies the post-Apartheid has not put an end to individual and state sanctioned violence, humiliation and black exploitation, but postponed it, rendered it invisible or epiphenomenal. Individual acts of racism raise the outrage of the media, of both white and black liberals. The condemnation of such acts is unanimous, but it serves to avoid questioning what makes them possible (Lategan, 2020).

Mngxitama's 2009 book *Blacks can't be Racist*, anticipated another recurrent trope: whites could be victims of black racism. Some years later the political party Black First Land First, would be banned after the denounces of the Freedom Front Plus, a white supremacist organization whose origin lies in the army of the apartheid, and whose representative in the parliament is the grandson of the founder of the racist regime. Before, the Forum for Black Journalists had also been banned by the South African Human Rights Commission. As Mngxitama recalls, this was not a new phenomenon, it was already experienced by Biko or Malcolm X: appeals to black unity, organizations formed exclusively by black members, and calling out racism has been treated as racism itself. These phenomena, however, have been recently exacerbated globally by postmodern forms of white supremacy. Against all

historical and contemporary evidence, racist movements claim their condition of victims from affirmative action measures, as well as from the discourses of political correctness, cancel culture, grand replacement theories or ‘the white genocide’ that posits that the existence of white people is threatened by colored ones (Gordon, 2022). Fanon’s initial research question in *Black Skin White Masks* was what do blacks want. He did not pose the question of what do whites want, but he stated in passing:

The white man wants the world; he wants it for himself alone. He finds himself predestined master of this world. He enslaves it. An acquisitive relation is established between the world and him. (Fanon, 2008:97)

Fanon understood whiteness as a logic of unbridled possession. Gordon answers in similar terms: “whites want *everything*,” (Gordon, 2022: 39; emphasis original) and everything entails wanting to be victims, wanting to *have* oppression. This desire to possession demands the access to everything, which turns any limits and obstacles into property. In his own words, “[t]he presumption that one is entitled to everything creates a consciousness with presumed unlimited access and rights to whatever it wants. Such a consciousness treats a limitation as an intrinsic evil” (Gordon, 2022: 42). For him, “[n]arcissism plus radical access is indicative of a white consciousness” (Gordon, 2022: 40).

As we see in the critiques and analysis of whiteness by black thinkers, the agency of white is far from being enhanced, there is no redemptive approach, and whiteness is not re-centered, reified, turned into a substance or approached ontologically. Whiteness is neither reduced to skin color or something that one possesses. As Sara Ahmed puts it phenomenologically, whiteness “is an effect of what coheres rather than the origin of coherence” (Ahmed, 2006: 136). That is, whiteness cannot be talked about without the world behind that forms it and that it forms, a colonial world. Whiteness is “a social and bodily orientation given

that some bodies will be more at home in a world that is orientated around whiteness” (Ahmed, 2006: 138). Fanon’s phenomenology of black embodiment in the white world was a description of a body in crisis, stopped, and disoriented in a world in which it cannot be at home. She posits that a phenomenology of whiteness is a phenomenology of the “I can”, a body that is at home in the world and that extends its reach upon it (Ahmed, 2006). The question of “can”, of being able to, is intrinsically related to the definition of power.

5.5 Lewis Gordon’s black existential phenomenology

5.5.1 Blackness and the Manichaeian grammar of Racism

For Steve Biko, Black Consciousness is not about pigmentation or phenotype, although it takes seriously their role in the formation of social structures. For Biko being black “is a reflection of a mental attitude.” Black refers to the group legally, socially, economically and politically discriminated, and that work as a unity for their emancipation and complete social transformation. Biko distinguishes between blacks, whites and no-whites. Blackness is intrinsically subversive. The term non-white was used by the apartheid regime to refer to groups of non-European descent (More, 2017). However, for Biko, a non-white is a person with dark skin whose aspirations and identifications are aligned with whiteness (Biko, 1987: 49). As Mabogo More puts it, the non-white is “a white consciousness locked in a black body.” It also refers to the black person who consciously militates and benefits in favor of apartheid structures, whereas the term blackness points to the multiple dimensions of oppression and resistance (More, 2019). More asserts that the Black Consciousness inclusion of Indians, Chinese, Malaysians or Japanese under the political umbrella term black was met with resistance because these groups did not want to assume such a negatively loaded term. The

result was that Indians and other colored groups appealed to cultural or religious difference as a way to distancing themselves from Africans, and to explain their particular interests considering their different legal position in the hierarchies of apartheid. (More, 2017) On that matter, Biko states: “Coloured people harbour secret hopes of being classified as "brown Afrikaners" and therefore meriting admittance into the white laager while Indian people might be given a vote to swell the buffer zone between whites and Africans” (Biko, 1987: 36). For More, the limitation of this encompassing concept of blackness lies in that focusing on white supremacy and resorting to the common experience of oppression does not reveal the in-between, the inner dissensions, and black antiblack racism (More, 2017). However, this phenomenon actually illustrates the salience of the notion of blackness concerning racist oppression, and the importance of the white-black analysis in the functioning of racism. The point is that in South Africa nobody, or no other group, wanted to be black. The tactics of divide and rule also played a significant role in intergroup relations.

However, this is not a peculiar South African phenomenon. In the United States, Afro-Asian antiracists have challenged the tropes that pit the black as a problematic minority against the Asian as the model minority, and have joined forces around blackness (Prashad; 2001; Kelley, 2002). A similar phenomenon occurred in the Caribbean (Kelley, 2002; Shilliam, 2015), and in recent South Africa (Prashad, 2001). In Britain the conception of political blackness as intergroup solidarity between African, Caribbean and South Asian groups in antiracist struggles was used in the 1960's, eroded by multiculturalist politics, yet it is still present while being object of debates, discussions and critiques. Certain black scholars argue that black identity refers to the African diaspora, whereas others see their usefulness in subverting boundaries, mobilizing across communities and challenging the model of

competition among minorities (Marable, 2016). Other scholars argue that gathering different groups around political blackness diminishes the visibility of South Asian and British Muslim identities, and the problems resulting from the War on Terror and the rising Islamophobia. From a Marxist perspective political blackness has been dismissed as identity politics and as deviating the attention from class consciousness (Ambikaipaker, 2018). Africana scholars have not only taken liberalism to task, but also European/white Marxism for delinking capitalism from colonialism and slavery, subordinating class over race in emancipatory struggles, or failing to distinguish between white working class and black working class (Biko, 1987; Fanon, 2004, 2008; Césaire, 2010; Robinson, 2005; Boggs, 2011; Davis, 2011). Such critiques do not always amount to a rejection of Marxism, but its reformulation and expansion. Privileging an abstract notion of class implies uniquely the dominant working class, which is white, and treating race, sexuality and gender dismissively as identity politics presupposes that class struggles or any emancipatory struggles do not have identity (which also privileges the dominant). Tamil Sri Lankan intellectual Ambalavaner Sivanandan, the director of the Institute of Race Relations from 1973 to 2013, and editor of the journal, *Race & Class*, recalls the antiblack riots in Notting Hill upon his arrival in England in 1958:

I knew then I was black. I could no longer stand on the sidelines: race was a problem that affected me directly. I had to find a way of making some sort of contribution to the improvement of society. I had no excuse to go into banking or anything else that I was fitted up to do – yes, fitted up. I had to find a way of making some sort of contribution to the improvement of society, to bring about a society where human beings could be human. (Sivanandan, 2019: 9)

Similarly, Lewis Gordon writes about an episode in which he was taken by Puerto Rican:

So later that year, I received another surprise.
“Get out of the park, you fucking Puerto Rican!”

I looked around and saw black and white boys, with sticks and pipes in their hands. Perhaps I could have told them that I wasn't a Puerto Rican. I could have told them lots of things. I could have run. But at that point I thought I had had enough. Against whom was this encounter? The "Puerto Rican Nigger"?

I didn't realize it then, but I had decided at that moment to be, for that moment, a Puerto Rican because "they"—those anonymous, hating "they"—yes, those they whose anonymous, hating consciousness is saturated with American false identities promising them, at the end of all the misery and suffering, a promised land of the "we," for them I shall be whoever they hated. (Gordon, 1997b: 15)

In both accounts there is an ethical and political movement of identification and positioning of solidarity, even though in the latter there was no Puerto Rican involved. For Gordon, however, the significance of blackness in the analysis of racism lies not only in the ethical question of solidarity and political alliance, but rather, in the fact that "Blackness functions as the prime racial signifier" (Gordon, 1997b: 53) in the Manichaeian grammar that the racist project attempts to impose on an otherwise messy and complex human reality. Manichaeism, founded by the Persian Mani, is a dualistic religion that advances an ongoing struggle between the good, the world of the light, and the evil, the world of darkness. These virtues and vices are physically embodied by people, which is what existential philosophers consider as the spirit of seriousness, "the value system in which values are regarded as material conditions of the world" (Gordon, 1997b: 29). In the Manichaeian world, notions of physical purity are of utmost importance and thus maintained and disciplined in the way that prevents miscegenation and reinforces spatial control. In an interview with Linda Martín Alcoff he differentiates between the semantics and the grammar of race, and how the former (the meanings of race) can change while the latter remains and informs the meanings of race:

The relational theory of race has two structures. One could be semantic, in other words, what is the term white, the term black, or the term Asian American? A sort of term analysis. But there was another, more syntactical

model, more of an examination of the grammar of race. It offers a way of looking at how racial semantic terms are produced while holding back the question of what those terms will actually be or say. So this view is a more formalistic conception of race that functions almost like the propositional calculus. (Gordon, quoted in Alcoff, 2003: 175)

Gordon's formulation (1997b) decodes the hidden aspiration and avoidance by which racism functions. The two poles of the Manichaeian grammar have asymmetrical relations. The aspiration of the second pole lead towards the first one. It is the distance that maintains the one-directional aspiration toward which the other is avoided spatially and temporally. Racial terms acquire meaning through this grammar of distantiation, because of which race does not have an ontological fact but seems to be fluid and malleable as one can be called by different racial terms across time and place. In an antiblack world, this grammar manifests as: "blackness as a point *from which* the greatest distance must be forged" (Gordon, 1997b: 53, emphasis original). Blackness has no ontological status, rather it stands as metaphor through which the grammar of racism manifests.

The grammar of racism functions as the social systems which continue to produce new inhabitants to occupy the racial category. If this is so, the focus on the categories of race for the antiracist effort seems to be misguided. The racial formation theory, the classic work of sociology on race by Omi and Winant, according to David Theo Goldberg, went too far by insisting that "all racial categories and every racial distinction necessarily discriminate," an implication of the definition they offer for racism (Goldberg, 1993: 88). Omi and Winant define racism as follows: "A racial project can be defined as *racist* if and only if it *creates or reproduces structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race*" (1987: 71, emphasis original). Race is, defined by Omi and Winant, "*a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies*" (55,

emphasis original). Their rejection of the biological on the basis of social constructivity follows that the meaning of race is transhistorical and transcultural, thus, shifting and unstable. Just because meanings of races change and vary historically and culturally cannot mean race does not exist. The social constructivist argument requires a theory of reference to conclude that the terms do not actually refer to reality²⁵. And they point out that race does not refer to biological reality. This claim is contradictory because they base the social constructedness of race in biological ontology, which defeats the very premise of social construction itself. Race may fail to refer to an object in terms of biology but it may still have biological meaning as Gordon points out: “although meaning may be a function of societal conditions [...] it doesn’t follow that what is “meant” is social. [...] both race and racism emerge when the physical or the biological is invoked” (1997: 54). In other words, social categories, even if they are based in biological terms such as race or gender, exist as lived reality for people assuming those categories and bear subjective meanings given by social actors (Rex, 1972). Seen from Gordon’s schema of racism, the ontological fact of race may be empty but relations of reference remain intact. Racism can continue without races. Gordon puts it in a nutshell: “Blackness functions as the prime racial signifier”:

[Race] discourse is projected onto any location of group oppression, the consequence of which is that race and racism are spoken of in context ranging from Irish-Anglo conflicts to black-Korean conflicts.

Yet, if we were to deconstruct the order of racial signifiers in these contexts, we will notice the persistence of the metaphor “the blacks of...” If one has to be “the black” in or of a particular context in order to designate a racial and a racist formation, then the rug that slips away beneath one’s feet becomes apparent with the Fanonian historical “lived experience” of the black: Although there are people who function as “the blacks” of particular contexts, there is a group of people who function as the blacks everywhere.

²⁵ This is contradictory as a theory of reference posits what social constructivists reject. SEE Ron Mallon (2007)

They are called, in now-archaic language—Negroes. Negroes are the blacks of everywhere, the black blacks, the blackest blacks. (Gordon, 1997b: 53)

The meaning of race may vary depending on the location, context, time, and period but it will still be produced by the same Manichaeian logic of embodied whiteness *in contradiction to* embodied blackness. When whiteness *qua* the human standard as negation to blackness has been the logic functioning in the Manichaeian grammar, racism works as distance from blackness. In that world, no essentialist racial categories are needed to make black existence as unjustified existence for a raceless world means *white*. Race neutrality decodes as whiteness for normative life. In other words, “normativity is indexed by its distance from blackness” (Gordon, 1997b: 80).

5.5.2 Bad Faith and antiblack racism

Gordon’s theorization of racism is not limited to the aforementioned grammar and semantics of racism. The underlying theme that ties his numerous works is the human being as freedom and how human potential can flourish. Placing human existence and freedom at the center through Fanonian and Sartrean engagement in the study of race and racism was not a trendy move he made in 1995, a year he published three influential works, *Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism*, *Fanon and the Crisis of European Man: An Essay on Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, and “‘Critical’ Mixed Race Theory?” in *Social Identities*. He recollects:

That period was marked by some controversy in the academic study of race and racism, much of which I received for not following the expected approaches and sources. Poststructuralism, postmodernism, Marxism, German critical theory, ... liberal political theory, and hermeneutics ruled. Theorists such as Louis Althusser, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Antonio Gramsci, Jürgen Habermas, Karl Marx, and John Rawls were dominant proverbial sources of light (the *or* in *theoria*) through which to emerge from caves of ignorance. It struck me, however, that though race and racism were being talked about in those times, they were being done in ways saturated with the irony of evasion. ... Speech and writing could be

used to cover over reality instead of revealing it, or at least orientating our relationship toward or with it. (Gordon, 2018: 29)

He thus turned to converse with other thoughts:

Simone de Beauvoir, James Cone, Angela Davis, W.E.B. Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, Edmund Husserl, William R. Jones, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Alfred Schütz, Malcolm X, in addition to Gramsci and Marx, and since then, Sri Aurobindo, Steve Bantu Biko, Anna Julia Cooper, Anténor Firmin, C.L.R. James, Keiji Nishitani, and too many others to mention here, whose work I have elaborated in various studies in the history of philosophy in addition to my own thought. (Ibid.)

Through this engagement with the diverse thinkers around the globe who dealt with human existence and the lived social reality, he thematized and established the field of black existential philosophy within Africana thought.

His revival of existentialist thought brought a new dimension to the way the study of race and racism was done. In *Bad Faith and Antiracist Racism* (1995), Gordon explores the relational and existential dimension of antiracist racism by using and further developing the Sartrean concept of *mauvaise-foi*, bad faith. Bad faith, here, is used to evade the responsibility humans fundamentally have to relate to other human beings. Racism attempts to push human beings outside of human relations. A racist hides from the truth that she is in fact dealing with flesh and blood human beings instead of a category. In other words, the antiracist racist is lying to himself as he knows that blacks are humans but refuses to see it. To see human beings as categories such as “white” or “black” instead of people with different hues of skin color involves a form of bad faith. Bad faith, then, is an “essential attitude” for denying human reality. Thus, bad faith is not about being moralist about racism, but it draws our attention on the human ability to lie to ourselves, to attempt to escape things we do not like, to reach for a

pleasing falsehood and to run away from a displeasing truth. Such a tendency is rampant, according to Gordon, in the study of race and racism:

A great deal of effort to study racism is marred by the core problem of self-evasion. This is partly because the study of racism is dirty business. It unveils things about ourselves that we may prefer not to know. If racism emerges out of an evasive spirit, it is hardly the case that it would stand still and permit itself to be unmasked. Race theorists theorize in a racist world. The degree to which that world is made evident will have an impact on the question of whether the theorist not only sees but also admits what is seen. The same applies to the society in which the theorist theorizes. (Gordon, 1995: ix)

Reality, for Gordon, is the opposite of bad faith. Bad faith involves denying our relationship with and to reality. It denies the intersubjective world of each other, a world where human freedom is ultimately found. Racism, denying such freedom of oneself and other humans, is, according to Gordon, a form of misanthropy. In this way, it is not the elimination of race that will rid ourselves of racism. Rather, it is the Gordonian understanding of the human as a free being in her relations with other human beings that makes racism flawed as it is an effort to hide from one's freedom. Gordon's attempt to look at the bad faith dimension to racism gives an important aspect of what it means to be human. The human being is a fundamentally social being. This is the often-overlooked fact by how the human study is conducted with the tendency to treat society with its own organism and law that gives forms to social phenomenon. As seen in the Chapter 2, the conception of human along with the method of human sciences have been colonized by a particular way of envisioning the human developed in the Euromodern era. One of the limitations of liberalism involves its neglect of the embodiment of the subject (Maldonado-Torres, 2008: 66). From this perspective, liberalism fails because sociality is understood according to a paradigm of thought that takes the isolated individual at its center (Maldonadot-Torres, 2008: 65). Gordon's conception of

human surpasses such limitation. His commitment to the social dimensions of embodiment as a recognition of human being requires a social reality (Gordon, 1995: 21). Without the social world, a human being makes no sense. The lived-body has both the psycho-natural and the socio-historical dimensions. For Gordon, the study of humans must recognize the significance of such human situatedness. Failing to do so is what Gordon calls antihuman, which manifests as two extremes: the positivistic naturalism to explain humans on the one hand, and postmodern social constructionism on the other hand. Humans, as individualized social perspectives, cannot be explained by either nature or society alone (Ibid.).

Bad faith mediates between the individual and the structure. If the relationship I have with the other and the world is determined by structure, I end up becoming an automaton unconsciously acted by that structure whether it being the biological one such as my genes or the social one such as class. In that, I will be left with no sense of agency or power to change the relation. At the same time, if I consider my subjective dimension as the most important site for defining the relations, I will tend to withdraw 'within' myself focusing on describing interpreting my inner world. When applying to the study of racism, Gordon points out two fallacious approaches: the purely structuralist model and, on the other extreme, the purely subjectivist-psychological one. Neither is sufficient to fully understand race and Gordon brings the individual and the social in relation by his unique blend of existential phenomenology. This way of looking at race and racism gives Gordon a humanist ethos, albeit a liberated one from European humanism.

Bad faith, when applying to the study of human beings, becomes a choice a theorist takes. The antiblack world, according to Gordon, is a "subjunctive reality," meaning that that world has an antiblack aspiration with its own logic and rationality that collapses human

existence with its specific ontology (Gordon, 1997b: 83). To theorize such a world, a theorist is faced with more task than one:

Although in such a world there is only one perspective, the *critical* theorist who attempts a hermeneutics of such a world has the triple task of interpreting the two poles as perspectives and interpreting her or his own relation as a critical relation to such a world. By considering the bottom-pole of such a world, the theorist raises the question that Fanon raised in 1952: What is “the lived-experience of the black”? (Gordon, 1997b: 83-84, emphasis original)

Bad faith emanating from racism continues in knowledge production: “the full identification with my past to the exclusion of my future possibilities, my facticity to the exclusion of my transcendence, my body to the exclusion of my consciousness, or my universality to the exclusion of my particularity, or [my particularity to the exclusion of my universality]” (More, 2004: 97).

5.5.3 Ethics and politics of Black consciousness

Gordon identifies four manifestations consciousness resulting from the imposition in the world of a white consciousness as normal: (i) consciousness of being a race as a product of the white world; (ii) the perspectives of black people figuring out the experience of this consciousness; (iii) the perspectives of black people from their everyday experience, without whites being involved in it; (iv) “there is the active political transformation of the first, second, and third perspectives into a movement from “black” to “Black” consciousness” (Gordon, 2022: 29). In this section I will focus on this fourth aspect. It encompasses, makes explicit and develops the questions addressed by Du Bois, Fanon and Biko, among others. This form of consciousness is a movement from black consciousness (with lowercase) to “Black consciousness”. The former is a realization, whereas the latter emerges from this awareness.

The former can be suffering, passive and latent, whereas the latter is active and liberatory. It is a political consciousness that leads to be “actional” and struggle against oppression.

In his formulation, “Black consciousness is political” because racism and societies premised on antiblack racism are “fundamentally anti-political and antidemocratic”. That is, racism is not about morals or the good behavior of a person. It is neither an accident, as Biko already argued; it is not about different political positions in the democratic arena, or bad politics. It is an attack on politics and democracy itself since it is based on the disempowerment of groups of people, and the denial or the blocking of their participation in the political sphere as citizens (Gordon, 2022:19).

Before addressing what Gordon means by the antipolitical and Black consciousness as the struggle for politics, it should be briefly noted that the literature on what is the political is as wide as divergent, and falls beyond the scope of this chapter. As Ricardo Sanín-Restrepo points out, beyond difference there is no ethical or ontological condition to discern what politics means. And as such, politics is “the question of all questions, because it is the question of who can formulate questions” (Sanín-Restrepo, 2018: 180). This succinct view of the political resonates with Gordon’s in that it brings the dimensions of communication and power to the forefront of the political. Gordon understands the political through the activities of ancient cities and city-states in different cultural and historical contents. For Gordon what historically defined the city is not an architectural space but the relations that took place within the space. As he puts it, citizens preceded and produced the city through their practices (Gordon, 2017). The growing gathering and concentration of different and anonymous people living together in a determined space raised the question of how to interact and relate to each other in relation to this space. The negotiation of these relations of power between citizens resulted

in the transformation of the space and the formation of the city. In the case of Ancient Greek, politics refers to the activities of citizens within the *polis* oriented to nurture and optimize the potential of human life. Thus, politics and citizenship are linked since being part of the polis does not make one a citizen, but the practice of citizenship is what constitute the political. The citizens who refused to engage in politics were called *idiotes*. Ancient idiots were those who focused on their own activities, they are concerned by the singular rather than by the common and public life of citizenship. Gordon notes that the word idiot has its etymology in Kemet. *Idi* was the Mdw Ntr's word to mean deaf. The lack of hearing did not entail exclusion and the impossibility of communication in ancient Egyptian and Hebrew cultures, although in Greece it was associated with a certain isolation and a lesser capacity to learn. What the etymology implies is that the political is a fundamentally an activity of speech and of listening to each other. Conflict, intellectual and ideological differences are addressed through language and communication, and the military and the police intervened at the rupture of communication in the *polis* (Gordon, 2022: 148). To live in good terms with others in the city is to live civilly. The norms that defined the proper behavior of city dwellers lies at origin of the understanding of civility, the civilized and civilization (Gordon, 2017). The within the city had also its counterpart in the outside. The limitations of space and resources involved different types of relations with what was outside. The use of force was one of the ways to relate with most of the outsiders of the city, or at least with those who were not allowed to enter into it.

Gordon notes that there were also city dwellers who were not citizens, such as foreigners, slaves and women. The situation of those who live within the *polis* but are impeded to participate in its political activity raised the issue of the equality of rights, the scope of the law, the form of government and the representation, which are central concerns of the

republican tradition. However, the modern republic as the form of government has not been not at odds with the legitimacy of the exclusion of groups of people for the sake of the protection of the republic. Following the logic of theodicy, Gordon calls “cividity” to the conception of the state, the city or the political system as intrinsically good and just. The possible injustices or wrongs are either external, or the blame falls on the victims. Cividity is sustained in a logic of opposites that separates those who are inside and those who are outside (Gordon, 2022).

Theodicy is a theory that justifies the legitimacy of God. It comes from the theological question as to why there is evil if God was perfect; why would God allow evil? In order to justify God as omnipotent, omniscient, and good, the theological rationalization puts the blame on humans, either for the human misuse of free will, or the human’s limited ability to see God’s will. God’s actions, after all, are of “ultimate justice; hence the term theodicy (*theo* [god’s] *dikē* [justice])” (Gordon, 2006: 91). There is “nothing wrong with God, but there is much wrong with humanity” (Ibid.). Although the secular rationalization replaced God in the modern world, the theodicean element remains intact as the “*grammar* of legitimating practices” in knowledge production and social systems (Gordon, 2006: 40, emphasis original).

Even secular societies may have a theodicean mode of rationalization, where the society itself or some system of treasured knowledge or values occupies the deific role. [...] Its rationalization depends on rendering its contradictions *external* which means, from a systemic point of view, systemically “dead.” This dimension of theodicy, then, shifts as normative investment moves from knowledge and society to life, from biology (*biologos*) to a biodicy (*life-justice*). We could call this the presupposition of inherently lived justification. (Gordon, 2013: 726-7)

Citizenship in the Euromodern republics was racially inflicted, initially *de iure* and then *de facto*. The citizen in urban and rural spaces was white, and the presence of non-white

subjects was restricted to labor. However, density of population and the permeability of the borders made difficult to restrict the mobility of non-white groups, hence the resort to police and law enforcement. For Gordon there was a shift from citizenship to rule that changed the character and the function of the cities. Cities became sites of citizenship (although it was not always exerted) and criminality (non-white populations).

There was (and often continues to be) thus the ironic situation of noncitizens such as immigrants (documented and undocumented) often embodying citizenship with legally designated citizens either not doing so or actively blocking the path of political appearance through investments in law enforcement and order. (Gordon, 2017:39)

The political function of cities—the site of negotiation and distribution of power—declines because of “the subordination of citizenship to the law”, and migration to suburban areas of the citizens (racial and economic capital), and their transformation into centers of consumption rather than production, that is, the activity is left in the hands of the private and the corporate sectors. For Gordon these conditions turn cities into urban centers.

What defines politics for Gordon are speech and power, or “power in speech” (Gordon, 2022: 152). The creation of institutions depends on this type of communicative relations. The question of power is central for the political, as I pointed out in regards to human rights discourses. He adds that there is a tendency to conflate the moral with the political, or to pass the moral as political. The logic is that a good or a better behavior would lead to a different organization of society, a more just society. However, Gordon notices that the appeals to order and justice are not devoid of problems. Besides the inherent incompleteness of the notion of justice covered in the previous chapter, the aforementioned logic of cividity exemplifies that a society can be considered well-ordered and just on the grounds of the subordination and oppression of groups of people who are not external but belong to the society. Justice and order

here function as measures of protecting the society and the political system. Likewise, the aspirations of those who are both insiders and legitimately considered outsiders to the society cannot be channeled by the moralistic terms. They do not aspire to integration or recognition but to the transformation of the society and the system that considers itself just. The moral treatment of political issues also fails because of the intrinsic limitations of the human condition and the limited scope of her actions, even when individually doing the right thing:

Another problem with the moral applications model is that it makes sense if people really can, individually, put into effect what is right. But human beings are not divine and omnipotent; we are fallible and physically limited; we must find alternative ways of building society and living together. To do that requires community empowerment: we must foster community empowerment through which we can live and flourish. (Gordon, 2022: 153)

By referring to god and the human Gordo implies important aspects of his conception of power and the political. God is omnipotent, he can do anything. Alternatively, the human is limited, there is an intrinsic limitation in the scope of her actions and may need to rely on others. In short, power is related to the ability to do something, and it is also collective and relational, it cannot be cultivated individually. Power for him is not a complex notion and is not intrinsically negative. He defines it as “the ability to make something happen, with access to the means for implementing it” (Gordon, 2022: 153). In European accounts, power is related to the Latin *potis*, which refers to potency and the notion of an omnipotent god. This meaning is present in Kemet’s *pHty* during the Middle Kingdom. Yet this is complemented by the Ancient Kingdom’s notion of *HqAw* or *heka*, “which activates the *ka* (sometimes translated as “life force,” “soul,” “spirit,” “womb,” or “magic”) that sparks reality” (Gordon, 2022: 153). *Heka* is the condition of possibility for *pHty*, which means for Gordon that power is related to making things happen.

Phenomenologically, Gordon links power and speech to the political through embodiment and the capacity and the reach of having an effect on the world. The body is the initial mean and also the limit to condition the reach of the actions in the world. Language is a mean to extend the reach and the impact of our actions in the world. Through language meanings and things can be created. He notices that this creative aspect that produces the social world is accompanied by the negotiation of responsibilities:

We have ways of controlling our environment and preserving or cultivating our health, and we enact rules and regulations to mitigate our conflicts with one another. To aid the latter, we have built institutions, such as courts, governments, hospitals, markets, schools, temples, and unions, in which we divest some of our power for the expanded benefits of others. Expanding the capabilities of those in need is “empowerment”. (Gordon, 2022: 154)

The political refers to the collective creation of institutions whose aim is the expansion and the sharing of power. Power enhances the possibilities and the options of one’s choices. When power is restricted to a few, the power of others is reduced to the extent that their sphere of influencing on the world is limited to the body. Disempowerment diminishes the options and possibilities, but not the capacity of choice. Oppression for Gordon is the product of this limited reach of one’s actions to the extent that such actions and choices can only be directed toward oneself. Power is expansive and outward oriented, disempowerment and oppression are inward oriented and lead to “implosion.” Racism is an effort at the state and institutional level to disempower groups of people. It entails a degradation of institutions, which were not created in order to disempower. It diminishes the capacity and the scope of their expression so that their actions do not reach the social sphere. Hence, “all racist societies eventually become anti-political, anti-intellectual, and unimaginative” (Gordon, 2022: 155). The anti-political entails attacking the communication, the interaction, the outward movement and the relational aspect

of groups of people, and as such is an attack on the institutions produced by citizenship and democracy. Gordon notes that the association of blackness with power, as in Black Power, has been a cause of fear for many whites. However, this is what Black consciousness is about. Black power involves rejecting the imposed subordination, questioning the legitimacy of the self-declared democratic system, and the creation of a new legitimacy based on the aspirations of the people. In this political and democratic sense, the transformative scope of Black consciousness is not restricted to black people, but to the whole society.

Whereas black consciousness may be linked to the role consigned to the black person in an antiblack society, Black consciousness is organically linked to what black and all people ultimately need: the transformation of the society that produces antiblack racism and other kinds of dehumanization into something better. Black consciousness is linked to building a better world to come. (Gordon, 2022: 162)

Conclusion

The next chapter deals with the implications for peace studies of the questions addressed in the previous chapters. I will briefly analyze how the questions of race, racism and colonialism have been addressed in this discipline, and what Africana and black existential phenomenology can contribute to the field. Since I contend that race as the colonial marker of human difference has been understudied, this entails looking at the constitutive absences. In other words, how what is absent shapes the discipline concerning identity and self-understanding, methodology, relations with other fields, social problems that it privileges, the understanding of history and normative considerations. I will close the chapter by returning to the aforementioned problems that I encountered in the classroom both as a student and as a teacher. To that effect, I will rely on the notions on Africana pedagogical experience and theory.

Chapter 6. Race Matters: Black Philosophy for Peace

“The end of racism begins with a sudden incomprehension.” (Fanon, 1967: 44)

“Toward a new humanism...” (Fanon, 2008: 9)

Introduction

Thus far, I have discussed the debates on race, its intricacy to colonialism, the implications for the European modern world, and the intellectual responses of Africana thinkers exposed in the previous chapters. This concluding chapter aims at bringing those issues together in order to discern the implications for a field that has neglected these questions. I also attempt to propose lessons for the discipline from Africana philosophy and black existential phenomenology. To that effect I have divided this chapter in two main sections.

The first section explores the reasons behind the absence of issues around race, and the understudy of racism in peace studies. I look at its self-understanding, foundational narratives, the relationship with international relations, and the boundaries with other fields. I also pay attention to the critical approaches within peace studies and the calls to “decolonize” the field. I draw theoretical and conceptual lessons from the previous chapters.

The second section focuses on the setting of the classroom, and brings together the pedagogical questions raised by Africana thinkers and black existential philosophers for raising pedagogical orientations that can facilitate the understanding of race and racism.

6.1 Disciplinary imperatives

6.1.1 Race and peace studies: constitutive absences

Peace studies initially emerged as a branch of International Relations, but it was partly through its critical approach to it that peace studies gradually consolidated as an autonomous and interdisciplinary field. The first seeds were planted in the United States after the First World War by pacifist social and religious movements through a multidisciplinary approach, which put the focus on the study of war (Jaime-Salas, 2019). In Europe, the field started to develop academically after the Second World War, also with an emphasis on the study of war and oriented for peace. The first important point of rupture took place at the end of the 1950's with the foundation of the Peace Research Institute in Oslo by Johan Galtung and the creation of the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964. The focus shifted from polemology to peace research, from the scientific study of war, to the study of peace and for peace. Instrumental for this was Galtung's distinction between negative peace (absence of direct, physical violence) and positive peace (absence of indirect, structural violence). Positive peace initially included justice in its definition, but its reformulation of what peace is beyond the absence of war is open-ended and is still one of the engines of the field (Dietrich and Sützl, 1997). The turn from the study of peace as the absence of war to the study of peace related to social justice and development coincided with the institutionalization of humanitarian and development aid (Guzmán, 2001).

Throughout the years of consolidation and expansion, besides the aforementioned definition of peace and its implementation, the discipline has dedicated special attention to its epistemological status in respect to the standards social sciences from which it distances itself (Martínez Guzmán, 2001; Galtung, 1996). To that effect, the field questions the scientific

notions of neutrality and puts the emphasis on values and the commitment of scholarship to diminish violence in order to bridge the gap between scholarly work and activism. Likewise, it reconsiders the role of the human being as the producer of knowledge in its relation to the subject of study (Galtung, 1996), and it incorporates the contributions of feminisms and gender studies. The emphasis on the human being has been mostly put on the question of her inherent capacity for peace and for violence (Martínez Guzmán, 2001). The centrality of peace is a defining element of the identity of the field, and forms a boundary in the relationship with other fields and other forms of knowledge. Violence has been over-emphasized in society and over-studied in academia. Peace is the norm while violence is a deviation from it (Martínez-Guzmán, 2001). I argue in the next section that this delimitation poses an obstacle to the study of race and, at the same time, that race poses a challenge to the study of peace.

Peace studies has a critical stance on International Relations at the level of epistemology, geopolitics of knowledge, and ethics of scholarship working with the normative values. However, the analysis of colonialism, the implications of racism in the modern world, and the persistence and mutation of colonial relations are the areas where peace studies lag behind International Relations where scholarly efforts to address those issues have been made (Wright, 2001; Chowdry and Power, 2002; Anghie, 2005; Anievas, Manchandra, and Shilliam, 2014; Shilliam, 2008, 2010; Vitalis, 2015; Phạm and Shilliam, 2016; Sabaratnam, 2017). As Madhis Azarmandi points out, there is a “racial silence” in a discipline which also omits questions of “coloniality” in the analysis beyond and below the nation-state level (Azarmandi, 2016; 2018). Racism is addressed following Galtung’s triangular template for the study of violence which dominates the field from the first day of class, and is mostly uncontested (Confortini, 2006). Galtung (1996) proposes a model in which a form of “cultural violence”

obscures “structural violence,” which in turn legitimizes physical, “direct violence.” Galtung uses this model to analyze racism, sexism, colonialism, and capitalism. He proposes an alternative triangle that advances negative peace as the alternative to direct violence, positive peace as the alternative to structural violence, and cultural peace as the alternative to cultural violence. Galtung’s formulation has been criticized from peace feminist perspectives for leaving micro forms of violence out of the analysis (Brock-Utne, 1989), and for ignoring gender in his analysis while gender informs categories of violence and peace (Confortini, 2006).

I would add that Galtung’s analysis does not place adequate attention to another important social category: race. Based on the analysis that I carried out in Chapters 1 and 2, the violent processes of racialization were coterminous to the creation of forms of governance, legal frameworks, rights, citizenships, social institutions, and knowledge production. In other words, race was one of the organizing principles for how modern institutions have been constituted through extreme violence. Violence built in these is not readily visible. As the peace pedagogue Sara Shroff (2018: 149) points out, Galtung “fails to recognize the structural logics of racism, sexism, and colonialism that re/produces, legitimizes, and naturalizes violence and peace.” I would rephrase that as the “racist (sexist, and colonial) logics of structure.” This means the very knowledge of violence has been shaped and informed by a racist logic. What distinguishes violence from nonviolence may also be informed by it. In short, race blurs the distinction between peace and violence.

The existential phenomenological approach can add depth to Galtung’s model of violence. Fanon’s sociogeny can enrich peace studies’ emphasis on intersubjectivity (Galtung, 1996) in a critical way. Fanon writes:

All forms of exploitation are identical because all of them are applied 'against the same object': man. When one tries to examine the structure of this or that form of exploitation from an abstract point of view, one simply turns one's back on the major, basic problem, which is that of restoring man to his proper place. (Fanon, 2008: 71)

Fanon would agree with Galtung's model in that the human is the object of violence independently of its forms. However, by asking to take the human seriously Fanon is not merely advancing an ethical humanism, but also to take the human elements in the formation of the social world seriously. In other words, he proposes seeing how meanings and institutions are created through social interactions. The peace scholar Jean Paul Lederach (1995: 8) wonders why phenomenology of Alfred Schutz is not frequently cited in peace and conflict literature, since his theory provides "important perspectives and lenses on social interaction." Lederach emphasizes that such an approach "suggest the construction of social meaning, as an intersubjective process, lies at the heart of how human conflict is created" (Ibid.). Lederach raises the point I argue above, but it is important to notice that Schutz's phenomenology of the social world is mostly descriptive, whereas black existential phenomenology of the social world, as examined in the previous chapter, is transformative since it concerns normative considerations. Fanon's formulation of sociogeny, Gordon's concept of bad faith, and Linda Martín Alcoff's phenomenology of the visible are rich accounts of how humans, as embodied social perspectives, are enmeshed with and co-constitutive of the social world . Interestingly, none of them use the concept of violence to analyze racism, sexism, and other forms of what Galtung calls structural violence. It may be redundant because for many blacks and colonized living in a racist/colonial world, violence is the system, which I will turn to in the next section. Their emphasis on the element of agency and their treatment of structural violence as *lived*, make visible the complex dynamics of the way humans inhabit and can transform the social

world. As Lederach recommends, Galtung's superimposed triangles of peace and violence may be enhanced and nuanced by peace studies' engagement with phenomenological analysis of race and racism.

6.1.2 Non-being and peace

Concomitant with the aforementioned racial silences in peace studies, there have been recent efforts to “decolonize peace” (Fontan, 2012) with regard to peace studies epistemologies and methodologies (Pureza, 2005; Pureza and Cravo, 2005; Richmond, 2014; Moura, 2016; Jaime-Salas, 2019). However, for “decolonization” to be more than a trendy buzzword in academia, it needs to go beyond the level of deconstruction and criticism. As Tuck and Yang (2012) warns, decolonization is not a metaphor when it involves land; we need to be cautious with regards to the extent to which we use the term. To decolonize, there first needs to be colonialism, and second, the colonial elements have to be identified. As Tuck and Yang (2012) point out, these colonial dynamics play out differently in settler colonialism. For the scope of this thesis, when we use the term within academic settings, it suffices to make a distinction between domination and colonialism (Fanon, 2004). The example of the former is the German occupation of France. Although the French were dominated, they were treated as humans. The Hegelian Self-Other dialectic, and a struggle for recognition featured in the work of Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* would be applicable for this. Fanon differs from Honneth and his forms of value such as love, rights, and social esteem, as they would be absent in the colonial world (Maldonado-Torres, 2008). As discussed in previous chapters, Africana thinkers' theorization of the human as *nonhuman* pose a series of epistemological and methodological challenges to dominant political and social theories relevant for peace studies. Fanon starts theorizing racism from what he calls the “zone

of non-being,” which is a zone where the “ordinary” ethical and social relations between self and other are not possible. Under the civilizational project of European modernity, the rupture of ethics that is usually applied to wartime scenarios is lived by the black and indigenous theorists as the everyday social world (Maldonado-Torres, 2008).

I reiterate the importance of philosophical and political underpinnings for the theorization of the social world under racism. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is a zone below self-other relations, devoid of ethics, and below the level of inter-human conflicts. As Gordon (2015) states racism is not the problem of the other, but of the “non-other” struggling to be the other. As such, it is not a problem of ethics, but of a very political nature. Decolonization, in this sense, is fundamentally political struggles to make ethics possible. As I discussed the critique of human rights in Chapter 3, this is an important aspect for peace theory. Maldonado-Torres captures these two aspects as follows: “beyond a ‘science of being’ we must engage in a science of the relations between being and non-being, describing how the exclusion from being is performed and how non-beingness is lived or experienced” (2008: 105). Decolonization of normative life, in this sense, needs to precede before even a possibility of ethical relationships of Self-Other is assumed. The zone of non-being entails a rupture of normal social and ethical relations that the peace studies analysis must take into consideration.

Julia Suárez-Krabbe (2016) identifies two interrelated reasons for the difficulties of decolonizing universities and disciplines in the Global North. The first is the divergence between scholars in the Global North and anticolonial thinkers about the understanding of the contemporary role and functioning of colonialism. This creates a gap that is manifested in the denial of coloniality and the contributions of colonized subjects. The second reason is the view that contemporary colonial problems can be solved by addressing one of its elements, which

is taken as the central element. The result is that “anticolonial scholars are behind in the relation to their analyses of reality or the criticism of Eurocentrism may be obsolete” (Suárez-Krabbe, 2016: 11). She illustrates this by pointing out that divisions such as reason/emotion, human-nature, mind/body that have characterized Eurocentric thought have been challenged by European thinkers. However, the divisions in themselves are insufficient without addressing what makes them possible: coloniality, as the racial and gender nexus of power makes these divisions possible (Ibid). A similar situation takes place in peace studies: to name a few, there have been critiques of liberal peace (Bautista, 2017; Richmond, 2015), substantive ontology (Julio-Salas, 2019), gender and war (Reardon, 2010), modernity or “modern rationality”(Guzmán, 2001; Dietrich, 2012), whereby modern means the diffusion and imposition of European thoughts and processes, without taking into account, its condition of possibility, the “racist rationality” (Gordon, 2015) that underlies it (see Chapter 2 and 3). Such critiques are mostly based on Frankfurt critical theory, postmodern and poststructuralist thought, cultural studies and certain streams of feminism. The thought from the Global South has been included mostly through the perspective of interculturality in the analysis of peace and conflicts (McGinty, 2008; Sandoval, 2016), mostly represented by indigenous groups and Eastern ethics. However, this form of correction does not challenge the basis of epistemological practices as it merely ends up being additive. It is mainly used to fill, illustrate and to reaffirm theory, which is mostly, within the Euro-American philosophical and political frameworks.

One of the foundational tenets of the field is the aforementioned narrative of the Holocaust: peace studies emerged after the Second World War as part Euro-US American initiatives to provide an answer to the highest peak of violence in human history, namely the

Holocaust and the use nuclear bombs (Dietrich, 2012). For Cordero-Pedrosa (2021), this starting point provides an “ill equipped” framework to deal with the implications of colonialism and racism. He reads the aforementioned critiques of Du Bois and Césaire not as undervaluing or relativizing the Nazi horror, but as connecting histories that appear disconnected and which meanings attributed to the Holocaust continues to delink. This foundational narrative not only has implications in the way the past is studied and how it informs the present, as the author underscores, but it also has implications on how race and racism are to be understood. As I developed in the first two chapters, the Second World War elicited a change in the conceptualization of race and what racism is through the UNESCO meetings and the scientific rejection of the category of race. The consequence of this view is what Alana Lentin (2016) calls “frozen racisms”: racism is a thing of the past, it takes place elsewhere, and its overt, contemporary manifestations are the product of unethical, deviant and excessive individuals. In “Racism and Culture” Fanon (1964: 33) warns that “the memory of Nazism” has changed how racism manifests and also how it is approached, talked about, and denied. This situates the point of departure of peace studies within the liberal political framework, whose historical connection with colonialism have already been outlined. Barnor Hesse writes:

The emphasis on the Holocaust providing the paradigmatic experience has underwritten a liberal critique of the political extremism of fascist racism, obliging the foreclosure of a radical critique of the social conventions of colonial racism. It has rendered inviolable the vaunted western ideal of a universal liberal political culture, only aberrantly fascist and benignly colonial. (Hesse, 2004: 15)

What underlies the field of peace studies since its inception is the liberal political philosophy in its two main bifurcations, both the current that is oriented towards peacebuilding,

security, and conflict intervention through international institutions and discourses of peace, and the critical branch that is oriented towards social justice (Jaime-Salas, 2019). As Toni Morrison points out in *Playing in the Dark*, “the habit of ignoring race is understood to be a graceful, even generous, liberal gesture” (Morrison, 1992: 9). She argues that liberal ways of evading the question of racism set the language and the terms in which the conversation is to be held, which actually functions by closing off the debate. She continues: “To notice is to recognize an already discredited difference. To enforce its invisibility through silence is to allow the black body a shadowless participation in the dominant cultural body” (Morrison, 1992: 9-10). Thus, what is at stake is not so much about an addition or an inclusion of race in peace studies, but more about how this absence is already part of the formation of peace studies. Furthermore, taking into account the relational character of race, bringing this absence to the light changes other relations. In other words, it is not so much about including race, but the reconfigurations and re-structuring that it would provoke.

6.1.3 Teleological suspension of disciplinarity

The issues addressed so far in this chapter concerning the self-understanding of the field, its foundational narrative, the formation of its identity in relation to international relations and the shift from the study of violence to the study of peace, the understudy of violence, and the lack of attention of race and racism raises questions of the disciplinary dynamics in peace studies. I will deal with these, partly through Lewis Gordon’s notion of disciplinary decadence, which refers to disciplinary form of bad faith addressed in the previous chapter. In his work, *Disciplinary Decadence: Living Thought in Trying Times*, Gordon diagnoses the pervasive tendencies within academia:

Disciplinary decadence is the ontologizing or reification of a discipline. In such an attitude, we treat our discipline as though it was never born and has always existed and will never change or, in some cases, die. More than immortal, it is eternal. Yet as something that came into being, it lives, in such an attitude, as a monstrosity, as an instance of a human creation that can never die. Such a perspective brings with it a special fallacy. Its assertion as absolute eventually leads to no room for other disciplinary perspectives, the result of which is the rejection of them for not being one's own. Thus, if one's discipline has foreclosed the question of its scope, all that is left for it is a form of "applied" work. Such work militates against thinking. (2006: 4-5, emphasis original)

In short, disciplinary decadence is when a discipline becomes isomorphic with the world; it conceives itself as complete either for on the basis of its identity or on the basis of a concrete method. Thereby the discipline closes off onto itself: what falls outside the scope of its identity or method, then, does not belong to the world of the discipline. When a discipline takes place of God, the theodicean grammar operates by which the "system of organizing knowledge, of exemplifying the conditions of knowledge, emerge itself as the bounding force by which all things negative or contradictory stand as *external* exemplars of evil" (2006:40). It is important to mention that Gordon treats thought and disciplines as *living*, which, then, are exposed to decay. Drawing on John Dewey's reflection of discipline and power in education, Gordon conceives that disciplines started off through an outward movement of inquiry that interrogates aspects that insofar had not been addressed by other disciplines. However, there is a risk of foreclosure through which they eventually become "disciplinary" in the sense of controlling and regulating the knowledge-producing practices (2006: 4). It is a "phenomenon of turning away from living thought, which engages and recognizes its own limitations, to a deontological or absolute conception of disciplinary life" (Gordon, 2014: 86). Practitioners of a particular discipline believe that their discipline's methods are the most legitimate ones and ontologize their discipline beyond its scope, thus creating the following scene:

A decadent scientist criticizes the humanities for not being scientific; a decadent literary scholar criticizes scientists and social scientists for not being literary or textual; a decadent social scientist sins in two directions- by criticizing either the humanities for not being social scientific or social science for not being scientific in accord with, say, physics or biology. And, of course, the decadent historian criticizes all for not being historical; the decadent philosopher criticizes all for not being philosophical. The public dimension of evidence is here subordinated by the discipline or fields functioning, literally, as the world. Thus, although another discipline or field may offer evidence to the contrary, it could, literally, be ignored simply on the basis of not being the point of view of one's discipline or field. (Gordon, 2006: 33)

I have to admit, during the short time span of being in academic institution, I have observed such tendencies, including, in myself; a decadent peace studies practitioner criticizes international relations for not being peaceful. Peace studies is an interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary field that draws on many other human sciences. However, according to Gordon, interdisciplinarity is not an apt response to disciplinary decadence as it treats each discipline as complete. Although Gordon suggests that a more suitable approach should be transdisciplinarity where disciplines “work *through* each other,” such a route is still “susceptible to decadence so long as it fails to bring reality into focus” (2011: 99). What he calls for instead is “teleological suspension of disciplinarity,” which is an act of transcending disciplinary decadence: “when a discipline suspends its own centering because of a commitment to questions greater than the discipline itself.” (2006: 34)

What would the teleological suspension for peace studies be? Within the field of peacebuilding under international relations discipline, the problem people have traditionally been the victims of the conflict zone in the presence of peacebuilding, and those in the Global South, (or what is called the non-liberal worlds in peace studies) who are recipients of the aid programs of international organization. Since the “crisis” of liberal peace amidst dwindling confidence in the Western liberal peace project (Cooper, 2011), critiques on liberal peace

plummeted (Duffield, 2001; Cooper, 2011; Richmond, 2011; Mann, 2004; Sabaratnam, 2013). This has caused what Michael Barnett (2014) calls the divide between “blame the victim” and “blame peacebuilding,” that is, proponents and critics of liberal peace. For a peace studies field that advocates expanding the meaning of peace to positive peace, the method of nonviolent solution precludes the engagement with what the discipline would deem “violent.” Here is a conversation that took place years ago:

At a break during a conference on decolonial thought, we approached a peace scholar:

- “What are you working on?”
- “On Palestine and decolonization.”
- “Are you using Fanon?”
- “No, no,” the scholar answered nervously, somewhat surprised. Later, during his conference he mentioned the “theories of Fanon,” probably meaning armed struggle, to refer to outdated approaches to decolonization in contrast to his Gandhian one. (Jang and Cordero Pedrosa, 2018: 72)

Another conversation happened at a different conference where, upon my saying that I was writing about racism and colonialism, a peer questioned my intention of focusing on violence instead of peace. In a similar vein, the editors of *Geographies of Peace* claim that while the discipline has been “doing the important task of challenging the moral logic of war, it has failed to develop equally sophisticated theoretical engagements with, and devote sustained empirical research to, peace” (McConnell et al., 2014: 1). Important though such theoretical and empirical work on peace may be, the problem is the way the teleology of the discipline is avowed as a call for purity to close the boundaries of the discipline wherein peace is implicitly reduced to nonviolence (Loyd, 2015; Jang and Cordero Pedrosa, 2018).

In his examination of how Fanon has been engaged in peace studies, Carlos Cordero-Pedrosa (2021) addresses that it suffers from a triple reductionism: Fanon is considered as the

“apostle of violence” despite of the wide range of the themes he explored²⁶; his thought on violence is reduced to his opening chapter of *Les damnés de la terre*; and the chapter is analyzed through a moral lens—mostly focused on Fanon’s alleged position that violence is psychologically liberating—which occludes the analysis he makes in the chapter of the different forms of violence, and how it is related to a variety of other questions. Gordon notes that the norms and legal systems of colonialism renders the appearance of the colonized in the system already violent: their mere appearance violates the colonial system. This logic continues to the present in the Western societies; the U.S. police brutality on the black who get arrested or shot to death even by merely being in their own houses; the black students in my peace studies in Europe who have to produce their identification to the police by appearing on the street, among many other examples. While violence is recognized when is exerted against the human (whites), the racist system renders violence against the black invisible. Black Lives Matter emerged to make visible the brutal violence on the blacks unseen by the system:

Black Lives Matter does not mean your life isn’t important—it means that Black lives, which are seen as without value within White supremacy, are important to your liberation. Given the disproportionate impact state violence has on Black lives, we understand that when Black people in this county get free, the benefits will be wide reaching and transformative for society as a whole. (Garcia, 2014)

²⁶ Richard Pithouse (2003) argues for taking Fanon’s humanism seriously. After providing evidence how Fanon cannot be reduced to “apostle of violence,” he says John Locke whose investment in slave trade is well known did not need to be justified for his thought: “Said calls this a ‘caricatural reduction more suited to the Cold War than to what Fanon actually says and to how he says it’.¹² But there is also a significant degree to which this caricature is motivated by a racist double standard. After all there is no scandal about the fact that most of the political philosophers in the (white) Western canon gave a theoretical endorsement to the use of violence in certain circumstances; Sartre’s support for the (violent)

Actually, a close reading of Fanon shows that he was appalled by violence. The skeptical have Simone de Beauvoir’s autobiography to make it clear that the author of *On Violence* was always ‘horrified by it’. We have no similar evidence that, for example, John Locke was similarly appalled at the violence that sustained the slave trade that generated his prosperity. But Locke is not routinely placed on trial. His whiteness usually means that he does not require witnesses.” (109)

Peaceful protests by Black Lives Matter are seen violent with exaggerated military presence while the violence of the white supporters of Trump was left untouched. Fanon was pointing at the contradiction and hypocrisy of the colonial racist system that degrades the blacks, and the colonized. When they fight for their rights, their resistance has to remain within institutional or disciplinary boundaries before it is branded violent. The radical elements of Martin Luther King Jr. are subsumed under the more peaceful version of his leadership. As Alena Lentin notes, antiracism that emerged from the anticolonial struggles “differs radically from that typified by the US Civil Rights Movement” (2004: 97). On the other hand, Gandhi stands in the pantheon of pacifism omitting that he took part in the war against the Zulu; neglected the situation of Indian workers, advocated for apartheid in South Africa; considered black people infantile (Desai and Vahed, 2015), he promoted recruitment campaigns for the Second World War (Losurdo, 2015), or he used nonviolent methods against the Dalit (Roy, 2014).

My purpose here is not to place a moral judgement on Gandhi but to illustrate the question of visibility, which, throughout history, has been repeatedly raised by the Africana thinkers. In the pacifist canon what is considered violence and nonviolence is racially inflicted. The question of violence versus nonviolence needs to take this careful approach to see invisibility of violence in the zone of non-being. When such question dictates *a priori* ontology of the discipline, its scope will be challenged to meet reality in human condition. Similarly, Cordero-Pedrosa (2021) argues through Gordon’s concept of disciplinary decadence, the question of peace which first generated the discipline, has also become a boundary that functions as an epistemic closure eschewing from meaningful communication with other fields. He notes that violence becomes one of the methodological and identitarian criteria to demarcate the boundary and the scope of peace studies. However, as Cordero-Pedrosa (2021)

argues, the methodological resources of what Fanon can offer to peace studies is manifold. This may sound surprising to some peace scholars, but as Gordon reminds us, a teleological suspension means going beyond one's disciplinary identity and bound, at times, to respond to reality.

The history of race is imbued with many forms of violence. Looking at the violent history of racism through the theoretical frameworks offered by African thinkers also means interrogating the Euromodern liberal conception of the standard of human beings, which is entangled with questions of rights, law, freedom, peace, formation of social and economic institution, culture, gender, and ultimately, the very production of knowledge itself.

At the same time, the strength of peace studies also lies in its rigorous question of peace. Peace theorists have understood that the meaning of peace differs across cultures and contexts and continue to challenge the narrow definition of peace prescribed by the Western neoliberal market economy and liberal political system. The praxis-oriented approach enables the practitioner to be actional. The stress on intersubjectivity, criticisms on Eurocentered perspectives, and the call for an "epistemological turn" (*giro epistemológico*) have been the foundation of Philosophy for Peace, a project initiated by the late Vicent Martínez Guzmán who founded the very peace studies where I am located (Martínez Guzmán, 2001). Academically trained as phenomenologist, Guzmán was a living example of an act of teleological suspension. His theoretical engagement with Husserl's methodology and crisis of the European human sciences led him to act when confronted with reality in Spain of the 1980s (Forastelli, 2013). In the following years, he became committed to transforming conflicts and human suffering, expanded his disciplinary scope to peace theories, and, realizing the importance of globally interconnected efforts for peace, founded the international peace

programs, the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace at the University Jaume I, Castellón in 1999 (Ibid.).

I remember one lengthy conversation that took place between Martínez Guzmán and me in 2015 when I asked for his advice on my research. Being a phenomenologist, he took delight in my engagement with phenomenology. What struck me though was his humility to learn about black existential phenomenology, with which, at the time, he had not been familiar. The next time I saw him at a public talk he gave on the migration and European border politics, he was already stressing the importance of black philosophy. Learning from other disciplines at the level of the teleological suspension of disciplinarity, according to Gordon, requires humility. It is humility knowing that we can only conceive part of reality and reality is always larger than us. Martínez Guzmán was, in the way I remember him, what Gordon calls an “advanced student,” a scholar who continues to engage in the intersubjective learning with beginning students and expand one’s understanding of reality in the world of others. Maurice Natanson, the existential phenomenologist writes about this way of doing philosophy:

To be existentially involved in philosophy is to confront oneself and others in a dialogue that goes beyond both chatter and conversation. Such dialogue requires the listening that transcends hearing and the seeing that is never synonymous with looking. Philosophy is an act of imaginative exploration founded on existential commitment, quite independent of particular standpoints and regardless of concrete results (Natanson, 1962: 3).

An act of teleological suspension means, as we have seen in the story of Martínez Guzmán, a suspension of the discipline’s “own centering because of a commitment to question greater than the discipline itself.” Gordon notes that when philosophers “attempt to think beyond philosophy to greater commitments—they ironically breathe life into philosophy’s gaping lungs” (2006: 34).

A teleological suspension of peace from the perspective of black philosophy of existence entails bringing freedom at the forefront of the concerns. Does evidence not abound that “talk of peace before freedom is quiescence” (Gordon, 2015)? I am not diminishing the value of peace and I believe that we must strive for peace at every level. I am referring to the performative act of sloganeering peace before we pay more attention to the question of freedom in anticolonial and decolonizing struggles for talking about peace before freedom can be, at times, acquiescence. “It is not peace that interests me, you know it well. It is to be free. Free, you hear me!” (Césaire, 1969: 87; my translation²⁷). These are the words of the enslaved Caliban to Prospero, the master, in Césaire’s adaptation of Shakespeare play *The Tempest* (see Chapter 3). Césaire is talking about liberation here, but black existential philosophy conceives consciousness as freedom. This freedom is different from the free-willed subject of the Renaissance. It is a freedom for responsibility because to make a choice means taking responsibility. This dimension of black thought, and black existential philosophy that speaks what it means to be human, that is, freedom may be an important theoretical contribution to peace studies.

6.2 Pedagogical imperative

Like Martínez Guzmán who taught in high school in the early 1980s as a committed teacher devoted to innovating education (Forastelli, 2013), Gordon also taught in a high school in the U.S. during the 1980s. The following is the excerpt from his acceptance of award for Contributions to the Philosophy of Education:

²⁷ « Ce n’est pas la paix qui m’intéresse, tu le sais bien. C’est d’être libre. Libre, tu m’entends.»

[I became] a New York City high school teacher in the 1980s and [created] The Second Chance Program, a resource for in-school truants at Lehman High School. Given the challenges raised in teaching such students, the principal had told me that a 10% retention rate would have been sufficient for the success of the program. It was fortunate that I was young, enthusiastic, and naïve.

All that enabled me to try things that many thought would fail, and the results were, instead, an 85% rate retention of those students completing high school. ...How does one quantify and thematize ... that my colleagues and I succeeded by respecting the humanity of our students? ...

It was thus the case that problems of philosophy of education and its relation to the human condition, or what it means to be a human being, were preoccupations of mine from the beginning of my graduate school career. (Gordon, 2010: 29)

Gordon realized that human beings thrive when they are seen as human, and wither when they are not seen as such. As Gordon states: “To be ‘seen’ calls for the perspective of another or others” (2010: 29). Bad faith, however, is about anxiety and fear of “what evidence reveals,” a disclosure of hidden things to emerge which face us to make decisions (Ibid.). For Gordon, this is being *critical*. The etymology of the ancient Greek word *krinein* meaning “to choose” and “to decide.” To choose or decide, we must judge or make a judgement. To be able to judge, we must be informed. Being in *crisis*, sharing the same etymological roots, means being unable to make a decision. Although we cannot know outcomes, the decision to be made is our responsibility. In this way, Gordon argues that bad faith is an “effort to hide from responsibility” (30). What would be bad faith in a pedagogical situation?

6.2.1 Pedagogy of fear

I discussed in Chapter 2 about the difficulty of bringing the reality of race to the fore in the classroom. To reiterate, it is a confusing topic exacerbated by the fact that, we are not used to openly talking about it; furthermore, it is anxiety ridden with different identitarian investment. To really talk about the roots of race and racism is a difficult decision to make. However, I argue that the pedagogical aim here should not concern the “ease” with which the

discussion could go. I start from the premise that race talk *is* difficult and dirty. Lucia Pawlowski says it simply: “There are two ways to teach about race—badly, or not at all” (Stephen, 2019: 15). The problem is, as discussed in Chapter 5, bad faith: the effort to hide from one’s relationship to reality. Pedagogical imperative, then, requires facing the difficult task. Assuming that it can be easy, or trying to make it easy by creating a “safe” space²⁸ is saturated with bad faith. This is an observation from a white female lecturer teaching race and racism in the U.K.:

White students sometimes do not feel they can speak about racism and they let the Asian and African/Caribbean students speak; I do think we should *create a safe environment* for all to speak ... white students once said to me – “every time I come to your lectures you make me feel like a racist. (Jacobs, et al., 2006, emphasis added)

Is the classroom really safe for all? Katherine McKittrick (2014), talking about her own pedagogical practice as a black feminist scholar in Canada, calls the need for safe space a white fantasy that harms:

I call this a white fantasy because, at least for me, only someone with racial privilege would assume that the classroom could be a site of safety! This kind of privileged person sees the classroom as, a priori, *safe*, and a space that is tainted *by* dangerous subject matters (race) and unruly (intolerant) students. But the classroom is, as I see it, a colonial site that was, and always has been, engendered by and through violent exclusion! (McKittrick, 2014: 238, emphasis original)

Zeus Leonardo and Ronald K. Porter (2010) argues against the procedural rule of “safe space” that it is to maintain a white comfort zone which is already violent for people of color.

²⁸ Pawlowski (2019) accounts that safe spaces initial began for the marginalized groups for sharing experiences and solidarity for political action. They needed such shared spaces free from having to defend and explain their perspectives. However, as the safe space policy has been institutionally adopted by universities where classrooms are multiracial or predominantly white, the space was no longer safer for the students of color. Critiques of safe spaces emerged in the 1990s by feminist of color and queer pedagogues Pawlowski argues for the concept of “brave space” which recognizes the inherent risk within classroom and invites controversy and open discussion.

Instead, they propose “Pedagogy of Fear” drawing on Fanon’s theory of humanizing violence: “A subtle but fundamental violence is enacted in safe discourses on race, which must be challenged through a pedagogy of disruption, itself a form of violence but a humanizing, rather than repressive” (Leonardo and Porter, 2010: 139). They argue that a safe space for people of color in race discussion does not exist and violence is *already* there: “In their naiveté, many white students and educators fail to appreciate the fact – a lived experience – that race dialogue is almost never safe for people of color in mixed-racial company” (147). The current safety-discourse defaults to a white framework of rationality: non-violent communication, self-control, preserving peace and order (152). The authors, of course, do not renounce the needs for the procedural arrangement to avoid outright violence nor recommend to create a hostile environment. They urge the pedagogues to acknowledge that having a safe space does not mean there is an absence of violence; it is already unsafe and hostile for students of color. From their experience of many years in the university setting, they learned that “creating risk as the antidote to safety leads to more transformative learning opportunities” (153).

Pedagogy of fear, risk, and humanizing violence as a method to teach race and racism does not intend to create discomfort for its own sake. Rather, it is to acknowledge that violence is already present in the wider context of racist society in and outside the classroom. George Yancy observes that “predominately white classrooms and academic institutions function as microcosms of the larger white societal ethos” (2019: 22). Also, as McKittrick points out, to think that teaching and learning about racism, sexism, homophobia, anticolonialism *can be* safe, easy, and comfortable is not only an illusion but also “an injustice to those who have lived and live injustice” (2014: 237). This, however, manifests in bad faith in peace pedagogy when

its methodological fetishization of nonviolent communication, empathy, and compassion precludes the possibility of going beyond the superficial engagement with race and racism.

What would be the pedagogical imperative for critical race pedagogy for peace studies? The purpose of teaching race must have an ethical and political question at heart from a humanistic perspective²⁹. Gordon (2010: 30) says: “I have never been ashamed to call my work humanistic.” Throughout his works featuring many different themes from race and racism, the study of human and human reality, and epistemic colonization, he unswervingly interrogates the meaning of human existence: “One of the things that connects all my work is that everything I do and write about comes down to the question of what it means to be a human being” (Gordon and Gordon, 2012). For Gordon, race serves as the basis for critically investigating black existence in an antiblack world, through which critiques on the meaning of human, the view of social reality, and the hegemonic form of knowledge production have been enabled.

In the peace studies pedagogy, the hegemonic liberal view of racism as instances of prejudice and discrimination that comes from ignorance and mistaken beliefs about biology needs to be undermined. Nor is race an arbitrary marker such as skin color to be “summarily rejected in the name of objectivity, rationality, and neutrality” (Headley, 2006: 334). Following the liberal treatment of race as something to transcend in order to achieve equality and justice, we inadvertently advise the students not to see race. Not *seeing* race requires seeing people as individuals (Gordon, 2006; Headley, 2006). It thwarts political effort for antiracism since racism has never been about an individual, but always about a group of people. This is where

²⁹ He continues: “It is an admission for which I have received criticism in the postmodern academy” (2010: 30)

the historical and analytical explanatory potency of race comes in. What race reveals, then, is reality. The colonial violence needs to be at full exposure. When I asked the European students in my class whether they had been taught over the history of European colonialism, the response was negative. Marta Araújo and Silvia Rodríguez Maeso (2010) find that, in their analysis of Portuguese history textbooks, the master narratives of history depoliticize and naturalize the Portuguese colonialism, slavery, and racism. At the same time, the degrading condition of the enslaved are highlighted to elicit empathy for the victims who are defended by the good Europeans. What is even more important than disclosing the reality of brutal colonial histories is recounting histories of resistance and struggles of the colonized, the enslaved, and the racially oppressed. In showing how race is constitutive of the modern world, race is also “assumed as a category of political contestation, of resistance, a rallying point of the racially oppressed” (Goldberg, 1993: 88). Gordon urges:

The double reality that people of the African diaspora knew and lived was that there was always more to the story of history and its “underside,” its “modern people beneath modernity,” and to the movement of reason and truth. In a nutshell, conventional education told a story of black inferiority marked by delusion, short-sightedness, imitation, servitude, and diffidence, and the movement of whiteness as a beacon of clarity, prescience, creativity, freedom, and courage. Black people of the modern world *knew* and *lived* a different story. Could, many seemed to ask, most white people survive a single day living in black people’s shoes? One could imagine the sense of betrayal that emerged as many students – black, white, and brown – began to look into the history of the human species and discovered that the contributions of dark peoples were significantly more than presented in the colonial narratives (Gordon and Gordon, 2006: xxii, emphasis original).

The fundamental pedagogical imperative seems to point at the responsibility the pedagogue is willing to take. Is it not a form of bad faith to say that I am unable and/or unwilling to bring evidence to the classroom for hidden realities to appear? Gordon says: “The student’s outrage is stimulated [...] from realizing that the educator has not made the effort to

learn and appreciate the scope of reality” (2010: 31). Gordon calls it “epistemological laziness” for some cases of instructors and “willful ignorance” in others (Ibid). Gordon urges:

Whatever racial background the student may have, it is his or her expectation that the teacher should do his or her best to offer the most truthful portrait of reality available. We call this the *pedagogical imperative*. It is a moral code, the violation of which is a betrayal of the implicit trust or, one could say, “ethics” of the teacher–student relationship. (Gordon and Gordon, 2006: xxii, emphasis original)

As Leonardo and Porter points out, leaving the safety discourse on race talk means “aiming at rigor” (153). They observe: “In an educational system that prides itself on excellence, pedagogues paradoxically aim low when it comes to race dialogue, settling instead for mediocrity” (Ibid.). This is true that more often than not most attention is allocated the students who have the least race literacy, usually white students, at the expense of more competent ones.

6.2.2 Ontological suspension of identities

The second pedagogical imperative I propose is an ontological suspension, which is Gordon’s innovation in the phenomenological method. For Gordon, ontological suspension means:

that we are less concerned with what something is and more concerned with its thematization, its meaning. With a rock, a chair, or a tree one could suspend ontological commitments and simply study its meaning. (Gordon, 2000: 79)

I reformulate his ontological suspension and phenomenological consciousness with Zen Buddhist philosophy. The similarity between two forms of thinking is that both reject Aristotelian ontology of substance. Ontological suspension can be translated as, in the Zen Buddhist language, *neither-self nor-nonsel*. It does not deny the role of egoic form of living—for that means not living in the human world—but realizing the egolessness and impersonal

consciousness of *all there is*³⁰(as similar to Sartre's and Gordon's argument) can be translated as ontological suspension of egoic thought.³¹ Gordon reaches this conclusion through a rigorous phenomenological method: Human being faces the problem of self. As discussed in this thesis, the existentialist view of the self means an open question, which means that there is "no complete *existing* self" in ontology." (Gordon, 1999: 19, emphasis original). The proverbial "true self" is like a unicorn with no referent. "I" is an empty concept, "me" is the psychological, historical, and biographical self. As Gordon argues (2000, 2008), ontological suspension questions our ontological commitments to a thing. This can apply to the problem of self in the way the ontology of ego is suspended to allow a deeper inquiry into the meaning of self. It is not to reject a unique individuality.

When self is liberated from egoic substance, it manifests in full individuality. It is individuality deeply rooted in sociality. As Marilyn Nissim-Sabat says "there is no inherent conflict between human individuality and sociality (Nissim-Sabat, 2008: 56). Paradoxically, Gordon says: "communities are social relations that heighten each member's understanding of every other member's value and uniqueness. Such understanding leads to relations that are empathetic without egoism" (2008: 56). A stage of living this paradox of being an individual and social being at the same time, albeit in a different context, is well captured by the poem of the eighth century Zen monk Qingyuan Xingsi³², on which I base the following process:

1) I am X: ego-bound identity

³⁰ Unlike Sartre, Gordon believes we can also reach this conclusion by using Husserlian method of reflection: "the transcendental ego, in this [Husserlian] reading, cannot be a neat, closed substance, as Sartre presupposed, but instead a formal relationship to, proverbially, all there is." (Gordon, 2008: 309)

³¹ I would like to thank my Zen teachers Cheong Hye Sunim, Shim, Sung Il and Im Soon Hee for sharing this insight.

³² Qingyuan Xingsi talks about the three stages of transformation of egoic divestment: 1. Mountains are mountains and waters are waters. 2. Mountains are not mountains and waters are not waters. 3. Mountains are mountains and waters are waters.

2) I am not X: ontological suspension

3) I am X: egoless identity

X refers to racial identities such as white or black.

The three stages illustrate the transition from a view of racial identities as the matter of separate individual ownership to that of identities constituted by and constituting the social world in which the previously limiting sense of racial identities can be politically reworked for a shared political goal.

1) I am X: ego-bound identity

In the first stage, we have ontological commitments about ourselves and the world. It manifests in two ways. First, the natural or commonsensical attitude takes values of the world as ossified: one's identity is given and material. We take our identities seriously and do not doubt what they mean to us. This is a form of bad faith. Bad faith can manifest in an opposite way in which one believes one has transcended the world. Embodiment yields to spiritual essence. In this context, it would be those who deny racial reality and insist on commonality of the human based on love and mutual respect. This person is in bad faith because, by having transcended too early, she evades responsibility for the world. The possibility of transformation is, thus rejected. While many whites say they do not identify themselves as white and they fear to be racialized (Leonardo and Porter, 2010), people of color meets situations where racial ascriptions are imposed on them. They are, thus, more aware of their racial identities as lived.

One's ontological status as a certain "race" cannot be rigorously investigated without understanding the social world. While human beings create the social world through a meaning-constituting process, each human being also live such a world already constituted.

We cannot simply denounce race or any other social category because that is to presume, we exist separately from the world. This idea of separation distorts reality when we enter the world to investigate meanings constituted. What prevents us from seeing reality? I argue it is the natural attitude, or ontological commitment that hinders rigorous investigation. When the question of race and racism becomes a matter of culture and identity, as adopted by both antiracist and racist discourse (Lentin, 2004), a false symmetry of diversity becomes social reality. I will briefly illustrate a few examples.

Some of ineffective aspect of widespread antiracist discourses are that they can easily create animosity, turning what should be a constructive discussion into a battlefield or a performative act. Much of antiracist literature, although they are valuable in their effort to raise racial consciousness, finds its limitation because those antiracist practices are premised on the western liberal understanding of the human as an atomic individual (Headley, 2000, 2016). This is ironic because anticolonial antiracism called for a new humanism, that is to decolonize the human from the western vision of humanity. The investment in and attachment to personal identity in egoic form is an obstacle to for antiracist effort. The whites have to be abdicated and sworn to relinquish their privileges. The people of color, on the other hand, are pressurized to perform their victimization in order to be heard by the whites. They are not beneficial for solidarity work at the least, and at the more serious level are antipolitical.

Gordon (2004) points out the popular tropes of the whiteness studies: the white privilege discourse and victimization. The white privilege discourse (McIntosh, 1989) advanced by the whiteness studies is often detrimental than beneficial. It makes the neoliberals happy: if access to housing, education, health care, job opportunities, longer life expectancy, and not having to fear the police are privileges, the already auspicious neoliberal states can get

away with doing little. Having a privilege is a good thing, and with a privilege, one is obliged to return to the society. But the above are hardly privileges, they are simply called rights which everybody ought to have, including the whites. On the other hand, how is being racist a privilege? Gordon (2017) retorts, in the wake of killing of Heather Heyer by the neo-Nazi terrorist attack in Charlottesville U.S., “if someone were to say it was a privilege to be able to rape someone or massacre someone, that just makes no sense; it’s oxymoronic” (he suggests that, instead of privilege, the use of white *license* will enable political action). As for victimization, Gordon (2004) contends that oppressed groups should not need a claim of victimhood to appear in the political space. When antiracist activism focuses on privilege check and victim discourse, a real dialogue and concerted political action become diluted.

Another example of this can be found in the misuse, neutralization, and depoliticization (Bilge, 2015) of what was the black radical feminist politics of intersectionality³³ by the critical race and legal theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989). A certain misuse of intersectionality has been critiqued by Africana thinkers for their illusion of race and a false symmetry among “equally” different races (Collins and Bilge, 2016). While her theory of intersectionality³⁴ was for the appearance of black women whose illicit appearance was made invisible by law, the tendency to impose the non-relational view of identity often ends up as “counting one’s

³³ The idea of intersectionality started in Black feminist thought and activism with its roots in the nineteenth century of the U.S. but is also evident in the colonial worlds of Latin America, Africa, and Asia as women in the colonial situation had to think in the matrices of race and gender.

³⁴ Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality (1989) accounts: While studying the 1976 *Emma DeGraffenreid vs. General Motors* case, she was struck by how the court dismissed Emma’s case on the basis of lack of evidence for their race and gender discrimination. The court saw that General Motors’s policy was not sexist as they hired (white) women, and nor it was racist as (male) blacks were hired. The court did not want the black woman to combine both race and gender claims because the black man and the white woman could only use one claim respectively. This still continues as a form of the popular misuse of Crenshaw’s original intention of intersectionality: the tendency to collapse it into a theory of identity. Crenshaw was working through a position in tort law, where harm is like a traffic collision in an intersection. Her point is that if we do not see where the roads meet, we may not see who or what is harmed.

oppressions.” Gordon points out that people tend to collapse it into an identity matrix in which the outcome is always the same: the more identities one wears, the more disadvantageous one is, the prime example of which is black, lesbian, poor, and so on (Gordon, 2018).

Intersectionality, used as a metaphor, elucidates on human reality that “no human being exists exclusively as a representative of one class, gender, race, sexual orientation, or other limited identity, and it is impossible, without bad faith, to see a human being as manifesting only one of these identities” (Gordon, 2022: 87). Crenshaw thought about the absence of black women’s experience: as it was absent, the harms they received did not appear in the legal system. Harms are invisible although evidence abounds to attest their lived reality. For the black women to appear as identified subjects, the idea of intersections and collision were born. Crenshaw’s metaphor of intersection, then, summons evidence to appear and disclose that hidden reality. Intersectionality is about seeing the world through the body and others. Gordon posits:

[Crenshaw’s] theory is also about the radicalization of appearance in that the identified subjects emerge, so to speak, not only in terms of being seen but also through an effort to see what they see or experience – in short, to see or at least understand their point of view in terms of the conditions they face. It is thus not a subjective theory or a narrowly objective one but instead an *intersubjective* theory because it requires understanding how different human beings relate to and encounter legal structures – products of the human world – as simultaneously alienating and enabling. (Gordon, 2018: 34, emphasis original)

This intersectional idea of seeing the larger world disclosing previously hidden realities has been pedagogically used by the black existential philosopher and educator, George Yancy (2019), through what he calls pedagogy of vulnerability. Teaching race and whiteness at a predominantly white university, he observes: “my white students have been inculcated by a white racist ideology that is so taken for granted that how they see themselves is taken as an a

priori truth” (Yancy, 2019: 26). He finds his white students entering the learning space with “a false understanding of themselves as autonomous (as if presocial), free from the weight of white racist history, and exempt from perpetuating systemic white oppression” (Ibid.). He uses pedagogy of vulnerability which involves opening up himself and accounting his own implication in the sexist system and the “social, relational and embodied marking of the reality” of his sexism (28). His point is to show his students that he does not have to be a horrible human being to be a sexist: his very existence as a male rooted in the social world does not exempt him of responsibility for the sexist world. as there cannot be an autonomously existing human being. This impacts his students, and although the process of relearning is not easy (denials, discomfort, missing or leaving the class, tears, guilt), many of his students go through the transformation, which Yancy describes as: “[white students] undergo a form of conceptual and embodied disorientation that leaves them ethically disturbed and eager to engage in acts of liberation” (Yancy, 2019: 29).

2) I am not X: ontological suspension

The second stage turns to the question of the human. The reason to investigate race and racism is, in the end, to regain humanity and create a human world as such. What does it mean to live in the world of intersubjectivity? involves finding the space of intersubjectivity. The question of ego is the foundational question at the basis of the modern political, social, economic, and cultural life. As summed up by *cogito ergo sum*, Renaissance and the humanism led to enormous pride in human subject. However, the Cartesian declaration of *cogito* involves two modes of consciousness, the pre-reflective and the reflective (Reynolds, 2006). The former is *I*, consciousness which does not involve the ego. For Sartre, while consciousness is directed at an object as in consciousness *of* something, it also pertains non-positionality that is not

directed at any particular object. Simply saying, self-consciousness is aware of being aware. Such awareness does not involve an ego. Ego is an object of consciousness which only appears in reflection. Rejecting the notion of the unified or true self as an ego, Sartre argues that ego only appears in reflection, a constitutive process and does not appear in the pre-reflective consciousness (Sartre, 2004). The material presence of *me* is fiercely rejected. What happens when *me* is activated in antiracism? How can it be decentered?

As discussed in Chapter 5, the notion of decentering used by black scholars is different from how it is perceived in whiteness study. To reiterate, whiteness or blackness has no ontological status *per se*, but is the prime signifier of racism which unveils a racist system that designates the normative value as whiteness. However, rejecting the ontology of whiteness means that its meaning only depends on its relation to others. Throughout this thesis, I have argued that the notion of the human is premised on whiteness which has been constituted as a degree to which is distant from blackness. Without understanding this relational aspect and the Manichaeian reduction of the humans to such relations— which is the very project of racism, the efforts for antiracism may be dislocated and derailed. Antiracism informed by liberal political ideas may run a risk of rejecting the semantic use of racial terms appealing to the social construction of them, while leaving the racist logic unseen. As I argued, racism can continue without race as long as the human difference bases its normative value in the structure of whiteness as a distance from blackness. In that case, as Gordon predicts, antiblack racism may remain even after white supremacy disappears. Interrogating how the structure has been historically, politically, economically, and socially constituted precedes. Since this process has been ignored in the mainstream social sciences, Africana postcolonial and decolonial scholars have been pointing it out. The problem is, in the current global neoliberal culture, the

heightened individualism has been a personal ethics (Judith Butler's partner, The We teacher).

As Yancy and many others point out, this is a difficult task for educators who teach race and racism. There is no individualistic approach to antiracism. Racism is a political problem that demands political responsibility (Gordon, 2022). White narcissism in the form of a moral and individual responsibility and guilt poses as an obstacle. As Ahmed (2004) points out, self-declarative acts of relinquishing white privilege at an individual level is irrelevant at its best, and destructive at its worst, to antiracism. By trying to “decenter,” their own whiteness, whiteness has become a social identity just like black, Latino, or Asian identities. Such reification of the values onto the human as white or black by treating them "equal but difference races" each fighting and negotiating for recognition. The result is the moralist purging oneself or others for what they are, an answer to which may well be “I shouldn't have been born.” What requires a pedagogue is to elicit a transition from a focus on individual identity ownership to seeing wider social relations in which “my” identity is constituted and given meanings. The notion of human difference is embedded and constituted in the historical and social structure, which in turn affects the lived reality of those who live such structure. This understanding prepares one to see the structure in the way it manifests in everyday social interactions without one's identity hindering it. This is the meaning of decentering proposed by Nissim-Sabbat and other Africana philosophers.

A task accompanying antiracist work is the philosophical question of what it means to be human and live in the world of others. For this reason, I propose ontological suspension of ego, a construct we take it, in the natural attitude, for granted. Similarly, Gordon (2022) calls for letting go of ego joining other thinkers such as Simone Weil and Keiji Nishitani:

The spirit of seriousness, turned onto the self, slides into *taking oneself too seriously*, which is a form of egotism. Doing so closes the door on relationships with others, and consequently social reality and love. To avoid closing oneself off, it's a good idea to "decreate" the ego. "Decreation," writes Simone Weil, means to "make something created pass into the uncreated. . . . We participate in the creation of the world by decreasing ourselves." There is a similar idea in Eastern thought, Keiji Nishitani explains, in which egotism is a source of evil. Letting go of the ego affords radical responsibility: there is no longer a lifeline from the abyss. (Gordon, 2022: 65, emphasis original)

3) I am X: egoless identity

As the Korean Zen monk Seungsahn (2012) says, we make a full circle to come back to the original premise of where we started: I am X. However, throughout the process of A and B, the relationship between "I" and "X" has been transformed. This process is not lineal but rather, composes of a series of awakening to a new dimension of reality, which, then, unveils another. Our capacity to see reality is structurally challenged by what Charles Mills calls "epistemologies of ignorance."

[On] matters related to race, the Racial Contract prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made." (Mills 1997: 18)

As discussed in the previous chapter, bad faith involves denying our relationship with and to reality. Through the phenomenological reflection as a method, we uncover deeper meanings of things we usually take for granted as standing objectively on their own, including our ego. This is why phenomenology is fundamentally postcolonial as it questions even its own method by suspending the inquirer's natural attitude. That the world of intersubjectivity requires the world of others means that a denial of other's perspectives seriously limit our understanding

of reality, which has been, throughout this thesis, pointed out by the Africana thinkers. Similarly, the feminist philosopher Sally Haslanger reminds us: “We should not resist seeing the reality that we should, in fact, resist; in fact, disclosing that reality is a crucial precondition for successful resistance” (Haslanger, 2012: 30, emphasis original). Only by seeing the full reality of race, we can resist it. Here, consciousness *of* race takes transformative effect of potentiated double consciousness. The lived reality of one’s identity comes at the forefront. Race, no longer, is about who *I* am, but is about how race is *lived* through which I am aware of the (previously) unseen dimensions of social reality and through which I take responsibility.

Identity, without egoic investment, provides a political platform on which to fight racism without it being the egoic expression. This makes us focus on the problem at hand, as the problem shared. It is no longer my or your problem but becomes ours. Race no longer needs to denote human divisions. Race, as a rallying site of resistance, can create new human relations. A new humanism, as Fanon argues, must be based on the conception of the human grounded in the intersubjective relations: “Was my freedom not given to me then in order to build the world of the *You*?” (Fanon, 2008: 181, emphasis original). Fanon showed his fearless love for humanity through his actions. Love is the ability to love that which is not the self. As Gordon says: “political love is an expression of our capacity to love that which is beyond the self” (2020: 223).

6.3 Concluding remarks

I closed this dissertation through an appeal to openness with a reflection on pedagogy, humility and love. Overall, this thesis is treated as a starting point to open the debates within

the field of peace studies on matters that are integral to the concerns and the origin of the field, but have been understudied.

This thesis is about race and racism with a question of opening up the meaning of the human. Therefore, I started with the most immediate question at hand as to how to approach race and racism in the field I reside in. For me, it indicates doing research, communicating, and teaching race and racism within the peace studies program in Europe where the talk of race is circumvented by migration discourses and interculturality. Using a phenomenological approach, I described my observation of certain tendencies of talking about race in the classroom and in peace studies: the misunderstandings, the confusions, the dominant tropes, the presuppositions, the silences, the resistance, the evasion. These obstacles prevented the race discussion from going further.

Thus, in Chapter 2, I attempted to identify the obstacles which posed as an excessive reliance on the social constructedness of race and the historical background how race has come to stand as a remnant of scientific racism. This results in rejecting the validity of race based purely on its biological meaning. At the same time, the debates on culture and ethnicity often take racial undertone. The human difference continues to be reenacted whether defined by biology or culture, neither of which plays a defining role in race or racism. Arguing that displacement of race for culture and ethnicity bases its assumption of race solely as a social construct, I looked at how this process has been taken by the UNESCO antiracist project. The works of Lentin and Hesse points to the exclusive association of racism with Nazism and the Holocaust, which forecloses its implication of liberalism and separates race from its colonial roots. By looking at the etymology of race and its reference, I argue that race has both cultural (theological) and biological (heritable) underpinning to demarcate the difference of the human

from the European perspective. In this way, as Gordon says, race is not just the bodies or cultures without the bodies, but *about* the bodies (2011: 71). If then, how has the initial European colonial expansion of 1492 which exerted an extreme form of violence on human bodies informed the human difference?

In Chapter 3, I focus on how the conception of the human has been formed in relation to the idea of race through the history of European colonialism. As decolonial scholars have argued, colonialism is co-constitutive of European modernity in which the difference between Europeans and non-Europeans has been the foundational to building the Euromodern world. The question of philosophical anthropology was relegated to epistemology, which became the method of human sciences. The deviation of groups of human beings from the universal standard of the human permeated philosophy, anthropology, and later, social and human sciences. The colonial human difference lies at the heart of Euromodernity, a process which human studies, liberalism, the notion of citizenship and human rights, and international and local legal frameworks were shaped by the human and subhuman distinction. I looked at such processes through the theoretical frameworks of the “underside of modernity” by Enrique Dussel (1995) and “the black side of thought” of Lewis Gordon (2013), in contradiction to the hegemonic Eurocentric account of modernity an internal European phenomenon. The notion of freedom, justice, equality, property, and humanity property was informed and conceptualized by the colonial practices of enslavement, dehumanization, violence, injustice and dispossession.

I foreground the role of race as the marker of sub-humanity in the formation of the principles of modern liberalism and its understanding of the human. The liberal political philosophy and the colonial subjugation of those considered as less than human are two sides

of the same coin. While this complicity of liberalism and colonialism, slavery, and capitalism in the formation of anthropology, ethics, political theory, political economy, and forms of governance has been interrogated by anticolonial, postcolonial, decolonial, and Africana thinkers, it has not been the area of strength for peace studies. Against this backdrop, I attempt to bring the rich traditions of Africana critiques in their interrogation of race and racism in the following two chapters.

Chapter 4 introduced a broad terrain of Africana philosophy and its thematic concerns and problematics. The umbrella term, Africana, encompasses a diverse set of philosophical orientations arising out of the reflection on colonialism, racism, and enslavement. As Gordon (2008) points out, this field is generally orientated around three major interrelated questions through which to account for the aforementioned underside of modernity: the meaning of the human being, the question of freedom and action, and the metacritique of reason. In this chapter I have addressed mostly the conjunction of the first with the third question. From its inception, Africana philosophy had to challenge the dominant belief of European philosophy that blacks and Africans cannot think. Hence, the central concerns for the Africana thinkers necessitated the meta-reflection about reason, the liberation of reason from rationality, and from European geography and philosophy of history. At the same time, Africana philosophy is not an autonomous field, but stands in a dialectical relationship with the dominant conception of philosophy. This relationship expands what philosophy is, and has a broader universal scope precisely because the black side of thought acknowledges its particularity in relation to others, and, thus, unveils the particularity of the false European universalism. Thereby, Africana philosophy offers a richer and larger reality of the human.

In Chapter 5, I explored politically powerful and transformative thought of black philosophy of existence and existential phenomenology. This burgeoning subfield has explored the existential meaning of being “black” in the Euromodern world which created the category of black in relation to white; the question of black existence and agency confronted by colonialism, racism, and enslavement. Existential phenomenology’s approach to racism as *lived* enables to overcome one of the problems when talking about racism: the problem of essence. Phenomenological description is important since blackness is not an ontology premised upon the Aristotelian substantive ontology. The phenomenological ontology of race deals with how race *appears* in relation to others within the social world rather than the ontological question of what race *is*. This is why, for black existential philosophers, the concept of race is less important than the lived effect of race, that is, what race does and how it affects human relationships. Contrary to other Africana or race theorists, they show that race does not need to be defined or stabilized as such since race, as a social relation, can be changed and replaced by other categories while the grammar of racism remains intact. In this way, race and racism are understood relationally rather than having a fixed ontological status.

Lewis Gordon’s work has been particularly important in the field of black existential philosophy in the way he revives the existential thought of black intellectuals and anticolonial thinkers who made important, but often underrecognized, interventions in their field against racism and colonialism such as Anténor Firmin, W.E.B. Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, and Steve Biko. For Lewis Gordon, Black consciousness emerges out of consciousness of being a race in the world of white consciousness through political transformation. The theodicean logic of legitimizing practices renders those outside the system as illicit. This logic governs citizenship and the rights to exert political power. For this reason, Black consciousness is political because

blacks have to fight to exist and appear in such a system. In other words, the societies that push the blacks outside the social relations are anti-political. Antiracism, in this way, is a fundamentally political action, and therefore, there is fear of the politically potentiated Black consciousness (Gordon, 2022).

The concluding chapter attempts to bring the implications of Africana thought to peace studies and peace pedagogy. The contributions of Africana philosophy reach beyond their analysis of race and racism. Through the question of race and racism, the universalized concepts such as justice, reason, freedom, citizenship, human rights, and violence have been interrogated and scrutinized by the “black side of thought.” The philosophical anthropological question of the human, the epistemological inquiry of knowledge, and the ethical question of human relations through political action have been at the heart of these important interventions. Thus, in an attempt to engage with these questions within peace studies, I propose disciplinary and pedagogical imperatives to expand the scope of the discipline in its approach to race and racism.

As I argue throughout the thesis, the study of race challenges disciplines and their boundaries. The works of Fanon, Du Bois, or Gordon extends beyond their respective fields through delving into human reality that is always larger than one’s discipline. Gordon’s notion of disciplinary decadence elucidates on the tendency of methodological fetishism and identitarian assumptions which lead to poor communication between disciplines, a consequence of which is a narrow vision of reality. As I have argued, the racial silence in peace studies results from its narrow understanding of race informed by the liberal political theoretical frameworks which delink race with its very material conditions rooted in the colonial history in which liberalism has been implicated. This is a challenge to peace studies

as the field works with the normative values such as peace, nonviolence, justice, and human rights. However, Gordon's call for an act of teleological suspension means that peace studies can reflect on how peace studies research and practices are sometimes rooted in their specific understanding of the normative. The implications of race in knowledge production are manifold at the level of literature, research content and organization, and determining who is the legitimate producer of knowledge. The study of race and racism also challenges disciplines and their boundaries working with monodisciplinary approaches. As Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999) and Lisa Lowe (2015) identify, the very disciplinary divisions hide the transcontinental histories and processes of subjugation and dispossession in which knowledge and political theories were produced along with different formations of racialization.

As I have maintained through the dissertation, the history of race is both a history of violence and a history of the question of the human. For peace studies to open up to the question of race and racism, a teleological suspensions of the discipline's main identities may have to be considered. Drawing on Gordon's phenomenological method, I reformulate ontological suspension to rethink the way critical peace pedagogy can engage with race and racism. This is an area where peace studies can excel with its strength in peace education. The values of intersubjective learning and philosophical traditions other than western scientific rationality are recognized as integral to peace pedagogy. Braving into the unfamiliar terrain of race and racism with both teleological and ontological suspension may generate new and creative ways of transforming human relations. For peace work aiming at political and social transformation, I humbly suggest an ontological suspension of egoic identities through a pedagogical imperative based on humility and love, which, after all, work as proven vaccines against the virus of racism.

6.3 Conclusiones

Concluí esta disertación mediante un llamamiento a la apertura con una reflexión sobre la pedagogía, la humildad y el amor. En general, esta tesis es un punto de partida para abrir los debates dentro del campo de los estudios sobre la paz en cuestiones que forman parte de las preocupaciones y el origen del campo, pero que han sido poco estudiadas.

Esta tesis trata de la raza y el racismo, y pone el foco en abrir el significado de lo humano. Por lo tanto, empecé con la cuestión más inmediata de cómo abordar la raza y el racismo en el campo en el que resido. Para mí, esto indica investigar, comunicar y enseñar sobre la raza y el racismo dentro del programa de estudios sobre la paz en Europa, donde el discurso sobre la raza se esconde con discursos sobre la migración y la interculturalidad. Utilizando un enfoque fenomenológico, describí mi observación de ciertas tendencias al hablar de la raza en el aula y en los estudios sobre la paz: los malentendidos, las confusiones, los tropos dominantes, las presuposiciones, los silencios, la resistencia, la evasión. Estos obstáculos impiden que el debate sobre la raza vaya más allá.

Así, en el capítulo 2, intenté identificar los obstáculos que suponen una excesiva dependencia en la construcción social de la raza y el trasfondo histórico de cómo la raza ha llegado a ser un remanente del racismo científico. Esto hace que se rechace la validez de la raza basándose únicamente en su significado biológico. Al mismo tiempo, los debates sobre la cultura y la etnicidad suelen tener un trasfondo racial. La diferencia humana sigue representándose ya sea definida por la biología o la cultura, ninguna de las cuales desempeña un papel definitorio en la raza o el racismo. Argumentando que el desplazamiento de la raza por la cultura y la etnicidad se basa en la asunción de la raza únicamente como una construcción social, analicé cómo ha tomado este proceso el proyecto antirracista de la UNESCO. Los

trabajos de Lentin y Hesse señalan la asociación exclusiva del racismo con el nazismo y el Holocausto, lo que excluye su implicación del liberalismo y separa la raza de sus raíces coloniales. Al examinar la etimología de la raza y su referencia, sostengo que la raza tiene un sustento tanto cultural (teológico) como biológico (hereditario) para demarcar la diferencia de lo humano desde la perspectiva europea. De este modo, como dice Gordon, la raza no es sólo los cuerpos o las culturas sin los cuerpos, sino *sobre* los cuerpos (2011: 71). Si entonces, ¿cómo ha informado la expansión colonial europea inicial de 1492 que ejerció una forma extrema de violencia sobre los cuerpos humanos la diferencia humana?

En el capítulo 3, me centro en cómo se ha formado la concepción de lo humano en relación con la idea de raza a través de la historia del colonialismo europeo. Como han argumentado los estudiosos del decolonialismo, el colonialismo es co-constitutivo de la modernidad europea, en la que la diferencia entre europeos y no europeos ha sido la base para construir el mundo euromoderno. La cuestión de la antropología filosófica quedó relegada a la epistemología, que se convirtió en el método de las ciencias humanas. La desviación de grupos de seres humanos de la norma universal de lo humano impregnó la filosofía, la antropología y, más tarde, las ciencias sociales y humanas. La diferencia humana colonial se encuentra en el corazón de la euromodernidad, un proceso en el que las humanidades, el liberalismo, la noción de ciudadanía, los derechos humanos, y los marcos jurídicos internacionales y locales se vieron moldeados por la distinción entre lo humano y lo infrahumano. Examiné estos procesos a través de los marcos teóricos del “reverso de la modernidad” de Enrique Dussel (1995) y del “lado negro del pensamiento” de Lewis Gordon (2013), en contradicción con el relato hegemónico eurocéntrico de la modernidad como fenómeno interno europeo. La noción de libertad, justicia,

igualdad, propiedad y propiedad de la humanidad fue informada y conceptualizada por las prácticas coloniales de esclavización, deshumanización, violencia, injusticia y desposesión.

Pongo en primer plano el papel de la raza como marcador de sub-humanidad en la formación de los principios del liberalismo moderno y su comprensión de lo humano. La filosofía política liberal y la subyugación colonial de los considerados menos que humanos son dos caras de la misma moneda. Aunque esta complicidad del liberalismo y el colonialismo, la esclavitud y el capitalismo en la formación de la antropología, la ética, la teoría política, la economía política y las formas de gobierno ha sido cuestionada por pensadores anticoloniales, poscoloniales, decoloniales y africanos, no ha sido el área de fuerza de los estudios sobre la paz. Con este telón de fondo, intento aportar las ricas tradiciones de la crítica *africana* en su interrogación de la raza y el racismo en los dos capítulos siguientes.

El capítulo 4 introdujo un amplio terreno de la filosofía *africana* y sus preocupaciones temáticas. El término *Africana* abarca un conjunto diverso de orientaciones filosóficas que surgen de la reflexión sobre el colonialismo, el racismo y la esclavitud. Como señala Gordon (2008), este campo se orienta generalmente en torno a tres grandes cuestiones interrelacionadas a través de las cuales se da cuenta del mencionado envés de la modernidad: el significado del ser humano, la cuestión de la libertad y la acción, y la metacrítica de la razón. En este capítulo he abordado sobre todo la conjunción de la primera con la tercera cuestión. Desde sus inicios, la filosofía africana tuvo que desafiar la creencia dominante de la filosofía europea de que los negros y los africanos no pueden pensar. Por lo tanto, las preocupaciones centrales de los pensadores africanos requerían la metarreflexión sobre la razón, la liberación de la razón de la racionalidad y de la geografía y la filosofía de la historia europeas. Al mismo tiempo, la filosofía africana no es un campo autónomo, sino que se encuentra en una relación dialéctica

con la concepción dominante de la filosofía. Esta relación amplía lo que es la filosofía y tiene un alcance universal más amplio precisamente porque la vertiente negra del pensamiento reconoce su particularidad en relación con los demás y, por tanto, desvela la particularidad del falso universalismo europeo. De este modo, la filosofía africana ofrece una realidad más rica y amplia de lo humano.

En el capítulo 5, exploré el pensamiento políticamente poderoso y transformador de la filosofía negra de la existencia y la fenomenología existencial. Este subcampo floreciente ha explorado el significado existencial de ser “negro” en el mundo euromoderno que creó la categoría de negro en relación con el blanco; la cuestión de la existencia y la agencia negra enfrentada al colonialismo, el racismo y la esclavitud. El enfoque de la fenomenología existencial sobre el racismo vivido permite superar uno de los problemas al hablar del racismo: el problema de la esencia. La descripción fenomenológica es importante ya que la negritud no es una ontología basada en la ontología sustantiva aristotélica. La ontología fenomenológica de la raza se ocupa de cómo aparece la raza en relación con los demás dentro del mundo social, más que de la cuestión ontológica de qué es la raza. Por eso, para los filósofos existenciales negros, el concepto de raza es menos importante que el efecto vivido de la raza, es decir, lo que la raza hace y cómo afecta a las relaciones humanas. A diferencia de otros teóricos africanos o de la raza, muestran que la raza no necesita ser definida o estabilizada como tal, ya que la raza, como relación social, puede ser cambiada y sustituida por otras categorías mientras la gramática del racismo permanece intacta. De este modo, la raza y el racismo se entienden de forma relacional en lugar de tener un estatus ontológico fijo.

El trabajo de Lewis Gordon ha sido especialmente importante en el campo de la filosofía existencial negra por la forma en que revive el pensamiento existencial de los

intelectuales negros y los pensadores anticoloniales que realizaron importantes, pero a menudo poco reconocidas, intervenciones en su campo contra el racismo y el colonialismo, como Anténor Firmin, W.E.B. Du Bois, Frantz Fanon y Steve Biko. Para Lewis Gordon, la conciencia negra emerge de la conciencia de ser una raza en el mundo de la conciencia blanca a través de la transformación política. La lógica teodicea de las prácticas legitimadoras convierte en ilícitos a los que están fuera del sistema. Esta lógica rige la ciudadanía y los derechos para ejercer el poder político. Por esta razón, la conciencia negra es política porque los negros tienen que luchar para existir y aparecer en dicho sistema. En otras palabras, las sociedades que empujan a los negros fuera de las relaciones sociales son antipolíticas. El antirracismo, de este modo, es una acción fundamentalmente política y, por lo tanto, se teme que la conciencia negra se potencie políticamente (Gordon, 2022).

El capítulo final trata de aportar las implicaciones de la filosofía *africana* los estudios sobre la paz y la pedagogía de la paz. Las aportaciones de la filosofía *africana* van más allá de su análisis de la raza y el racismo. A través de la cuestión de la raza y el racismo, los conceptos universalizados como la justicia, la razón, la libertad, la ciudadanía, los derechos humanos y la violencia han sido interrogados y escrutados por el “lado negro del pensamiento”. La cuestión antropológica filosófica de lo humano, la indagación epistemológica del conocimiento y la cuestión ética de las relaciones humanas a través de la acción política han estado en el centro de estas importantes intervenciones. Así pues, en un intento de abordar estas cuestiones dentro de los estudios sobre la paz, propongo imperativos disciplinarios y pedagógicos para ampliar el alcance de la disciplina en su enfoque de la raza y el racismo.

Como sostengo a lo largo de la tesis, el estudio de la raza desafía las disciplinas y sus límites. Los trabajos de Fanon, Du Bois o Gordon se extienden más allá de sus respectivos

campos al ahondar en la realidad humana que siempre es más amplia que la propia disciplina. La noción de Gordon de decadencia disciplinaria dilucida la tendencia al fetichismo metodológico y a los supuestos identitarios que conducen a una mala comunicación entre disciplinas, cuya consecuencia es una visión estrecha de la realidad. Como he argumentado, el silencio racial en los estudios sobre la paz resulta de su estrecha comprensión de la raza informada por los marcos teóricos políticos liberales que desvinculan la raza de sus propias condiciones materiales enraizadas en la historia colonial en la que el liberalismo ha estado implicado. Esto supone un reto para los estudios sobre la paz, ya que este campo trabaja con valores normativos como la paz, la no violencia, la justicia y los derechos humanos. Sin embargo, el llamamiento de Gordon a un acto de suspensión teleológica significa que los estudios sobre la paz pueden reflexionar sobre cómo la investigación y las prácticas de los estudios sobre la paz están a veces arraigadas en su comprensión específica de lo normativo. Las implicaciones de la raza en la producción de conocimiento son múltiples a nivel de la literatura, el contenido y la organización de la investigación, y la determinación de quién es el productor legítimo de conocimiento. El estudio de la raza y el racismo también desafía a las disciplinas y sus límites al trabajar con enfoques monodisciplinarios. Como identifican Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999) y Lisa Lowe (2015), las propias divisiones disciplinarias ocultan las historias y procesos transcontinentales de subyugación y desposesión en los que se produjeron conocimientos y teorías políticas junto con diferentes formaciones de racialización.

Como he mantenido a lo largo de la disertación, la historia de la raza es tanto una historia de la violencia como una historia del ser humano moderno. Para que los estudios sobre la paz se abran a la cuestión de la raza y el racismo, quizá haya que considerar una suspensión teleológica de las principales identidades de la disciplina. Basándome en el método

fenomenológico de Gordon, reformulo la suspensión ontológica para repensar el modo en que la pedagogía crítica de la paz puede abordar la cuestión de la raza y el racismo. Se trata de un ámbito en el que los estudios sobre la paz pueden sobresalir gracias a su fortaleza en la educación para la paz. Los valores del aprendizaje intersubjetivo y las tradiciones filosóficas distintas de la racionalidad científica occidental se reconocen como parte integrante de la pedagogía de la paz. Adentrarse en el terreno desconocido de la raza y el racismo con una suspensión tanto teleológica como ontológica puede generar formas nuevas y creativas de transformar las relaciones humanas. Para el trabajo por la paz que tiene como objetivo la transformación política y social, sugiero humildemente una suspensión ontológica de las identidades egoístas mediante un imperativo pedagógico basado en la humildad y el amor, que, después de todo, funcionan como vacunas probadas contra el virus del racismo.

Bibliography

- Ahmed, Sara. 2004. "Declarations of Whiteness: The Non-Performativity of Antiracism." *Borderlands E-journal* 3(2).
http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol3no2_2004/ahmed_declarations.htm
- Ahmed, Sara. 2006. "The Nonperformativity of Antiracism." *Meridians* 7(1): 104-126.
- Ahmed, Sara. 2006. *Queer phenomenology. Orientations, Objects, Others*. London: Duke University Press.
- Ahmed, Sara. 2012. *On Being Included: Racism and Diversity in Institutional Life*. London: Duke University Press.
- Alcoff, Linda Martín. 1999. "Towards a Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment." *Radical Philosophy* 95 (May/June): 15-26.
- Alcoff, Linda Martín. 2003. "A Philosophical Account of Africana Studies. An Interview with Lewis Gordon." *Nepantla: Views from South* 4(1): 165-189.
- Alcoff, Linda Martín. 2006. *Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Alcoff, Linda Martín. 2008. "Caliban's Phenomenological Ontology." *C.L.R. James Journal* 14 (1): 9-25.
- Alcoff, Linda Martín. 2017. "Decolonizing Feminist Philosophy." in *Decolonizing Feminism: Transnational Feminism and Globalization*. Margaret A. McLaren (ed.) London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Allen Jr. Ernest. 1997. "On the Reading of Riddles: Rethinking Du Boisian Double Consciousness." in *Existence in Black: An Anthology of Black Existential Philosophy*. Lewis R. Gordon (ed.) New York: Routledge.
- Ambikaipaker, Mohan. 2018. *Political Blackness in Multiracial Britain*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Amin, Samir. 1989. *Eurocentrism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Anderson, Carol. 2003. *Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Andreason, Robin O. 2000. "Biological Reality or Social Construct?" *Philosophy of Science* 67: 653-666.

- Anghie, Antony. 2004. *Imperialism, sovereignty and the making of international law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Antrosio, Jason. 2012. "Social Construction of Race" = Conservative Goldmine." *Living Anthropologically*. <https://www.livinganthropologically.com/social-construction-of-race/>.
- Antrosio, Jason and Sallie Han. 2015. "The Editor's Note: Race, Racism, and Protesting Anthropology." *Open Anthropology* 3(3).
- Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 1992. in *My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 1994. "Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction." in Taylor, Charles et al. and Amy Gutmann. *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: An Essay*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Araújo, Marta and Silvia Rodríguez Maeso. 2012. "History Textbooks, Racism and the Critique of Eurocentrism: Beyond Rectification or Compensation." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 35 (7): 1266-1286.
- Appiah, Kwame Anthony and Amy Gutmann. 1998. *Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Arendt, Hannah. 1970. *On Revolution*. London: Penguin Books.
- Azarmandi, Mahdis. 2016. "Colonial Continuities". *Peace Review* 28 (2):158-164.
- Azarmandi, Mahdis. 2018. "The Racial Silence within Peace Studies" *Peace Review* 30 (1): 69-77.
- Banton, Michael. 1992. *Racial and Ethnic Competition*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Banton, Michael. 2015. *What We Know About Race and Ethnicity*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn
- Barth, William K. 2008. *On Cultural Rights: The Equality of Nations and the Minority Legal Tradition*. Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Beckett, Greg. 2017. "The Abolition of all Privilege: Race, Equality, and Freedom in the work of Anténor Firmin". *Critique of Anthropology* 0 (0): 1–19.
- Bendix, Daniel, Franziska Müller, and Aram Ziai, London (eds.) 2020. *Beyond the Master's Tools: Decolonising Knowledge Orders, Research Methods and Teaching*. London: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Beneduce, Roberto. 2008. *Breve dizionario di etnopsichiatria*. Carocci Roma: Carocci editore.

- Bernal, Martin. 1987. *Black Athena. The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization. Volume I: The Fabrication of Ancient Greece 1785–1985*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Bernasconi, Robert. 1997. “Philosophy’s Paradoxical Parochialism: The Reinvention of Philosophy as Greek.” in *Cultural Readings of Imperialism*, Keith Ansell-Pearson, Benita Parry, and Judith Squires (eds.) London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1997.
- Bernasconi, Robert. 2001. “Who Invented the Concept of Race?” in *Race*. Robert Bernasconi (ed.) Blackwell: Oxford.
- Bernasconi, Robert. 2002. “Religious Philosophy: Hegel’s Occasional Perplexity in the Face of the Distinction between Philosophy and Religion.” *The Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain* 45/46: 1–15.
- Bhambra, Gurminder K. 2011. “Historical Sociology, Modernity, and Postcolonial Critique,” *American Historical Review* 116 (3): 653-662
- Bhambra, Gurminder K. 2014. “A Sociological Dilemma: Race, Segregation and US Sociology”. *Current Sociology* 62 (4): 472-492.
- Bhambra, Gurminder K. 2015. “On the Haitian Revolution and the Society of Equals.” *Theory, Culture & Society* 32 (7–8): 267–274.
- Bhambra, Gurminder K. 2020. “Undoing the Epistemic Disavowal of the Haitian Revolution: A Contribution to Global Social Thought.” in *Knowledges Born in the Struggles: Constructing Epistemologies of the South*. Boaventura de Sousa Santos (ed.) London: Routledge.
- Biko, Steve Bantu. 1972. “I Write What I Like”. *SASO Newsletter* 2(1): 9-10.
- Biko, Steve Bantu. 1987. *I Write What I Like: A Selection of His Writings*. Oxford: Heinemann.
- Bilge, Simar. 2014. “The Whitening of Intersectionality.” In *Racism and Sociology*. Wulf D. Hund, Alana Lentin (ed.). Berlin: Lit Verlag.
- Bilgin, Pinar. 2008. “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?” *Third World Quarterly* 29(1): 5–23.
- Birt, Robert. 1997. “Existence, Identity, and Liberation.” in *Existence in Black: An Anthology of Black Existential Philosophy*. Lewis R. Gordon (ed.) New York: Routledge.
- Boghossian, Paul. 2006. *Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bogues, Anthony. 2011. Radical Anti-colonial Thought, Anti-colonial Internationalism and the Politics of Human Solidarities. in *International Relations and Non-Western Thought:*

Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity. Robbie Shilliam (ed.) London and New York: Routledge.

Boggs, James. 2011. *Pages from a Black Radical's Notebook: A James Boggs Reader*. Stephen M. Ward (ed.) Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Brock-Utne, Birgit. 1989. *Feminist Perspectives on Peace and Peace Education*. New York: Pergamon Press.

Brookerfield, Stephen D. 2019. *Teaching Race: How to Help Students Unmask and Challenge Racism*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Buck-Morss, Susan. 2009. *Hegel, Haiti and Universal History*. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press.

Bulhan, Hussein Abdilahi. 1985. *Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression*. New York: Plenum Press.

Burch, Robert. 1980. "Phenomenology, Lived Experience: Taking a Measure of the Topic." *Phenomenology + Pedagogy* 8: 130-153.

Burke, Roland. 2010. *Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Castro, Daniel. 2007. *Another Face of Empire: Bartolomé de Las Casas, Indigenous Rights, and Ecclesiastical Imperialism*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Césaire, Aimé. 1969b. *Une tempête*. Paris: Seuil.

Césaire, Aimé. 1969a. *Return to my Native Land*. Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Césaire, Aimé. 2001. *Discourse on Colonialism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Césaire, Aimé. 2010. "Letter to Maurice Thorez". *Social Text* 28 (2 (103)): 145–152.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2000. *Provincializing Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Collins, Randall. 1998. *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.

Confortini, Catia C. 2006. "Galtung, Violence, and Gender: The Case for a Peace Studies/Feminism Alliance." *Peace & Change* 31 (3): 333-367.

Constitution of Haiti. 1805.

<http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti/history/earlyhaiti/1805-const.htm>

Cordero-Pedrosa, Carlos. 2021. "Relevance of Frantz Fanon's Intellectual and political Work for Peace Studies." Doctoral dissertation. Universitat Jaume I de Castellón.

- Cox, Oliver C. 1948. *Caste, Class and Race*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Craig, Gary. 2020. “‘Race’: the Missing Dimension in Social Policy Higher Education?”
In Rees, James, Marco Pomati and Elke Heins. *Social Policy Review* 32. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Crenshaw, Kimberle. 1989. “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics.” *University of Chicago Legal Forum* 1(8): 139-167.
- Davis, Danielle. 2019. “Introduction”. in *Black Existentialism: Essays on the Transformative Thought of Lewis R. Gordon*. Danielle Davis (ed.) London: Rowman & Littlefield International.
- Daynes, Sarah and Orville Lee. 2008. *Desire for Race*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- De Beauvoir, Simone. 2009. *El existencialismo y la sabiduría de los pueblos*. Barcelona: Edhasa.
- De Lepervanche, Marie. 1980. "From Race to Ethnicity." *The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology* 16 (1): 24-37.
- Desai, Ashwin and Goolam Vahed. 2015. *The South African Gandhi: Stretcher-Bearer of Empire*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Dietrich, Wolfgang and Wolfgang Sutzl. 1997. “A Call for Many Peaces”. *Schlaing Working Papers* 7: 3-18.
- Dietrich, Wolfgang. 2012. *Interpretations of Peace in History and Culture*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Diop, Cheikh Anta. 1991. *Civilization Or Barbarism: An Authentic Anthropology*. New York: Lawrence Hill Books.
- Douglass, Frederick. 2009. *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass. An American Slave. Written by Himself*. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press.
- Dubois, Laurent. 2005. *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Du Bois, W.E.B. 1898. “The Study of the Negro Problems.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* XI: 1–23.
- Du Bois, W.E.B. 1998. *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880*. New York: The Free Press.

- Du Bois, W.E.B. 2007a. *Darkwater: Voices from within the Veil*. New York: Dover Publications.
- Du Bois, W.E.B. 2007b. *The World and Africa and Color and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Du Bois, W.E.B. 2015. *The Souls of Black Folk*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dussel, Enrique. 1995. *The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of "the other" and the Myth of Modernity*. New York: Continuum.
- Dussel, Enrique. 1998. "Beyond Eurocentrism: The World System and the Limits of Modernity." in *The Cultures of Globalization*. Frederic Jameson and Masao Miyoshi (eds.) Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Dussel, Enrique. 2000. "Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism." *Nepantla: Views from South* 1(3): 465–78.
- Dussel, Enrique. 2003. *Beyond Philosophy: Ethics, History, Marxism, and Liberation Theology*. Eduardo Mendieta (ed.) Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Dussel, Enrique. 2008. "Meditaciones anti-cartesianas: sobre el origen del anti-discurso filosófico de la Modernidad." *Tabula Rasa* 9: 153-197.
- Dyer, Richard. 1997. *White: Essays on Race and Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Eipper, Chris. 1983. "The Magician's Hat: A Critique of the Concept of Ethnicity." *The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology* 19 (3): 427-446
- Ellison, Ralph. 1990. *Invisible Man*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi 1997. "The Color of Reason: The Idea of 'Race' in Kant's Anthropology". in *Race and the Enlightenment. A Reader*. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, (ed.) Malden: Blackwell Publishers.
- Fanon, Frantz. 1965. *A Dying Colonialism*. New York: Grove Press.
- Fanon, Frantz. 1967. *Towards the African Revolution*. New York: Grove Press.
- Fanon, Frantz. 2004. *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Press.
- Fanon, Frantz. 2008. *Black Skin, White Masks*. London: Pluto Press.
- Fields, Barbara J. 2001. "'Origins of the New South" and the Negro Question". *The Journal of Southern History* 67 (4): 811-826.
- Fontan, Victoria. 2012. "Replanteando la epistemología de la Paz: El caso de la descolonización de paz." *Perspectivas Internacionales* 8: 41–71.

- Forastelli, Fabricio. 2003. "Peace Profile: Vicent Martínez Guzmán." *Peace Review. A Journal of Social Justice* 25: 439-446.
- Foucault, Michel. 2005. *The Order of Things*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Firmin, Anténor. 2002. *The Equality of the Human Races*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Fischer, Sibylle. 2004. *Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery in the Age of Revolution*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Frankenberg Ruth.1993. *White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Galtung, Johan. 1996. *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and conflict, development and civilization*. Oslo/Thousand Oaks, CA: International Peace Research Institute/ SAGE.
- Garner, Steve. 2007. *Whiteness: An Introduction*. London: Routledge.
- Garret, Erik A. 2008. "The Rhetoric of Antiblack Racism: Lewis Gordon's Radical Phenomenology of Embodiment." *Atlantic Journal of Communication* 19:6–16.
- Getachew, Adom. 2020. *Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gibson, Nigel C. 2011. *Fanonian practices in South Africa: From Steve Biko to Abahlali base-Mjondolo*. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
- Gibson, Nigel C. and Roberto Beneduce. 2017. *Frantz Fanon, Psychiatry and Politics*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Gilroy, Paul. 1993. *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Giroux, Susan Searls. 2008. "Critique of Racial Violence: The Theologico-Political Reflections of Lewis R. Gordon." *C.L.R. James Journal* 14 (1): 217-244.
- Goldberg, David Theo. 1993. *Racist Culture. Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning*. Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Goldberg, David Theo. 2002. *The Racial State*. Malden/Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Goldberg, David Theo. 2009. *The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 1995. *Fanon and the Crisis of European Man: An Essay on Philosophy and the Human Sciences*. New York: Routledge.

- Gordon, Lewis R. 1996. "The Black and the Body Politic. Fanon's Existential Phenomenological Critique of Psychoanalysis". in *Fanon: A Critical Reader*. Lewis R. Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting and Renée T. White (eds.) Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 1997a. "Introduction: Black existential Philosophy." in *Existence in Black: An Anthology of Black Existential Philosophy*. Lewis R. Gordon (ed.) New York: Routledge.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 1997b. *Her Majesty's Other Children. Sketches of Racism from a Neocolonial Age*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 1997c. "Existential Dynamics of Theorizing Black Invisibility". in *Existence in Black: An Anthology of Black Existential Philosophy*. Lewis R. Gordon (ed.) New York: Routledge.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 1999. *Bad faith and Antiblack Racism*. Amherst: Humanity/ Prometheus Books.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2000. *Existential Africana: Understanding Africana Existential Thought*. NY: Routledge.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2000. "Identity and Liberation: An Existential Phenomenological Approach." in *Phenomenology of the Political*. Kevin Thompson and Lester Embree (eds.) Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2004. "Critical Reflections on Three Popular Tropes in the Study of Whiteness". in *What White Looks Like: African-American Philosophers on the Whiteness Question*. George Yancy (ed.) London: Routledge.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2006. *Disciplinary Decadence: Living Thought in Trying Times*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2008. *An Introduction to Africana Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2010. "A Pedagogical Imperative of Pedagogical Imperatives." *Thresholds in Education* XXXVI (1& 2): 27-35.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2011. "Race in the Dialectics of Culture." in Abdul R. JanMohamed (ed.). *Reconsidering Social Identification: Race, Gender, Class, Caste*. London: Routledge India.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2013a. "Thoughts on Dussel's Anti-Cartesian Meditations". *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self- Knowledge* 11 (1): 67-71.

- Gordon, Lewis R. 2013b. "Africana Philosophy and Philosophy in Black." *The Black Scholar* 43 (4): 46-51.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2013c. "Race" in *The Encyclopedia Applied Linguistics*. Carol A. Chapell. Malden: Blackwell.
- Gordon, Lewis. 2014. "Justice Otherwise: Thoughts on Ubuntu." in *Ubuntu: Curating the Archive*. Leonhard Praeg, Spiphokazi Magadla (eds.) Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2015. *What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to his Life and Thought*. NY: Fordham University Press.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2017. "Cities and Citizenship". *Kettering Review* 34 (1): 36-43.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2017. "Phenomenology and Race." in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race*. Naomi Zack (ed.) New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2018. "Thoughts on Two Recent Decades of Studying Race and Racism." *Social Identities* 24 (1): 29-38.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2021. *Freedom, Justice and Decolonization*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Gordon, Lewis R. 2022. *Fear of Black Consciousness*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux Books.
- Gordon, Lewis. R. and Jane Anna Gordon. 2006. "Introduction: Not Only the Master's Tools". in *Not Only the Master's Tools. African-American Studies in tjeory and Practice*. Lewis Gordon and Jane Anna Gordon (eds.) London and New York: Routledge.
- Grovogui, Siba N. 2006. *Beyond Eurocentrism and Anarchy: Memories of International Order and Institutions*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gruffydd Jones, Branwen. 2015. "Good Governance' and 'State Failure': the Pseudo-science of Statesmen in our Times." in *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Color Line*. Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda and Robbie Shilliam (eds.) London and New York: Routledge.
- Gruffydd Jones, Branwen. 2011. "Anti-racism and Emancipation in the Thought and Practice of Cabral, Neto, Mondlane and Machel." in *International Relations and Non-Western Thought. Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity*. Robbie Shilliam (ed.) London and New York: Routledge.
- Gyekye, Kwame. 1987. *An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

- Hacking, Ian. 1999. *The Social Construction of What?* Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.
- Hajir, Basma and Kevin Kester. 2020. "Toward a Decolonial Praxis in Critical Peace Education: Postcolonial Insights and Pedagogic Possibilities." *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 39 (5): 515-532.
- Hall, Stuart. 2017. *Familiar Stranger: A Life between Two Islands*. Bill Schwarz (ed.) Durham: Duke University Press.
- Hanke, Lewis. 1985. *La humanidad es una: estudio acerca de la querrela que sobre la capacidad intelectual y religiosa de los indígenas americanos sostuvieron en 1550 Bartolomé de las Casas y Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda*. México D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Haraway, Donna. 1988. "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism as a Situe of Discourse on the Privilege of the Partial Perspective." *Feminist Studies* 14 (3): 575-680.
- Headley, Clevis R. 2000. "Philosophical Approaches to Racism: A Critique of the Individualistic Perspective." *Journal of Social Philosophy* 31 (2): 223-257.
- Headley, Clevis R. 2008. "Lewis Gordons Existential Phenomenological Project and Deconstruction Bad Faith, Alterity and Ethics." *C.L.R. James Journal* 14 (1): 170-216.
- Headley, Clevis R. 2016. "Three Recent Texts in Africana Philosophy: Overcoming Disciplinary Decadence." *Journal of World Philosophies*. 1 (1): 141-149.
- Hegel, G.W.F. 2001. *The Philosophy of History*. Kitchener: Batoche Books.
- Henderson, Errol. 2013. "Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism in International Relations theory." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26 (1): 71-92.
- Heng, Geraldine. 2018. *The Invention of Race in the European Middle Ages*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Henry, Paget. 1997. "African and Afro-Caribbean Existential Philosophies." in *Existence in Black: An Anthology of Black Existential Philosophy*. Lewis R. Gordon (ed.). New York: Routledge.
- Henry, Paget. 2000. *Caliban's Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy*. New York: Routledge.
- Henry, Paget. 2006. "Africana Phenomenology: Its Philosophical Implications". *Worlds & Knowledges Otherwise* 1(3): 1-22.

- Henry, Paget. 2006. "Afro-American Studies and the Rise of African-American Philosophy" in *A Companion to African-American Studies*. Lewis Gordon and Jane Anna Gordon (ed.) Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Hund, Wulf D. and Alana Lentin (eds.). 2014. *Racism and Sociology*. Berlin: Lit Verlag.
- Athar, Sohaib (ReallyVirtual). "Helicopter hovering above Abbottabad at 1AM (is a rare event)." 1 May 2011, 3:58 p.m. Tweet.
- Hesse, Barnor. 2004. "Im/plausible Deniability: Racism's Conceptual Double Bind". *Social Identities* 10 (1): 9-29.
- Hesse, Barnor. 2015. "Racism's Alterity. The After-Life of Black Sociology" In *Racism and Sociology*. Wulf D. Hund, Alana Lentin (ed.) Berlin: Lit Verlag.
- Hesse, Barnor (barnor_hesse). "One of the key problems preventing us from effectively combatting racism: so many people do not actually understand what it is. At the same time (and this compounds the problem) so many people are invested in describing things as NOT racism." 19 August 2019, 7:58 p.m. Tweet.
- Hill Collins, Patricia and Sirma Bilge. 2016. *Intersectionality*. Malden: Polity Press.
- Hook, Derek. 2013. *(Post)apartheid Conditions: Psychoanalysis and Social Formation*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Hountondji, Paul. 1983. *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality*. London: Hutchinson.
- Horton, Robin. 1967. "African Traditional Thought and Western Science." *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 37(2): 155-187.
- Hudson, Peter James. 2014. "The Geographies of Blackness and Anti-Blackness: An Interview with Katherine McKittrick." *C.L.R. James Journal* 20 (1-2): 233-240.
- Hume, David. 1963. *David Hume: Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hunt, Lynn. 2007. *Inventing Human Rights: A History*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1970. *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Ignatiev, Noel. 1995. *How the Irish Became White*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Jacobs, Susie et al. 2006. *Pedagogies of Teaching 'Race' and Ethnicity in Higher Education: British and European Experiences*. Birmingham: University of Birmingham.
- Jang, I Jin. 2016. "What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought." *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 28: 516-519.

- Jang, I Jin and Carlos Cordero-Pedrosa. 2018. "Peace, Race and Disciplinary Violence." *Entreletras* 9 (1): 66-79.
- Jaime-Salas, Julio Roberto. 2019. "Descolonizar los Estudios de Paz un desafío vigente en el marco de la neoliberalización epistémica contemporánea." *Revista de Paz y Conflictos* 12 (1): 133-157.
- Jivraj, Suhraiya. 2019. "Why Are Students Having the 'Uncomfortable' Conversations about Race?" <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/blog/why-are-students-having-uncomfortable-conversations-about-race>
- Judaken, Jonathan. 2006. *Jean-Paul Sartre and The Jewish Question: Anti-antisemitism and the Politics of the French Intellectual*. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press.
- Jung, Hwa Yol. 2011. *Transversal Rationality & Intercultural Texts: Essays in Phenomenology and Comparative Philosophy* Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Kang, Jong In. 2004. *Beyond the Shadow of Eurocentrism*. Seoul: Acanet
- Kang, Shin Ju. 2012. *Philosophy Vs. Philosophy* Seoul: Greenbee
- Kant, Immanuel. 2011. *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel. 2012. *Natural Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Keita, Maghan. 2000. *Race and the Writing of History: Riddling the Sphinx*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kelley, Robin D.G. 2002. *Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Kester, Kevin. 2017. "The United Nations, Peace, and Higher Education: Pedagogic Interventions in Neoliberal Times." *The Review of Education, Pedagogy and Cultural Studies* 39 (3): 235–264.
- Kim, Sang Bong. 2003. "The Monosubjectivity of the Sensibility." *Korean Semiotics Studies* 14(0): 9-52.
- Kiros, Teodros. 2020. *Self Definition: A Philosophical Inquiry from the Global South and Global North*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Koskenniemi, Martti. 2011. *From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Klose, Fabian. 2013. *Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence. The Wars of Independence in Kenya and Algeria*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

- Knight, Frankin W. 2015. "The Haitian Revolution and the Notion of Human Rights." *The Journal of The Historical Society* 3 (Fall): 391-416.
- Knies, Kenneth Danziger. 2006. "The Idea of Post-European Science: An Essay on Phenomenology and Africana Studies." in *Not Only the Master's Tools. African-American Studies in theory and Practice*. Lewis Gordon and Jane Anna Gordon (eds.) London and New York: Routledge.
- Knox, Robert. 2015. "Race, Racialization and Rivalry in the International Legal Order." In *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Color Line*. Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda and Robbie Shilliam (eds.) London and New York: Routledge.
- Koram, Kojo. 2017. "'Satan is Black'—Frantz Fanon's Juridico-Theology of Racialisation and Damnation." *Law, Culture and the Humanities* 00 (0): 1– 20.
- Krishna, Sankaran. 2001. "Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 26(4): 401-424.
- Krishna, Sankaran. 2015. "A Postcolonial Racial/Spatial order: Gandhi, Ambedkar, and the Construction of the International." in *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Color Line*. Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda and Robbie Shilliam (eds.) London and New York: Routledge.
- Kurian, Nomisha and Kevin Kester. 2018. "Southern Voices in Peace Education: Interrogating Race, Marginalisation and Cultural Violence in the Field." *Journal of Peace Education* 16 (1): 1-28.
- Las Casas, Bartolomé. 1992. *A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies*. London: Penguin Books.
- Lategan, Ziyana. 2020. "Blacks Can't Be Racist: A Text and its World." in *Blacks Can't Be Racist: 10th Anniversary Edition*. Andile Mngxitama. Malvern: Sankara Publishing.
- Lederach, John Paul. 1995. *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Lefkowitz, Mary. 1996. *Not Out of Africa: How Afrocentrism Became an Excuse to Teach Myth as History*. New York: Basic Books.
- Lentin, Alana. 2004. *Race and Anti-Racism in Europe*. London: Pluto Press
- Lentin, Alana. 2011. "What Happens to Anti-Racism When We Are Post Race?" *Feminist Legal Studies*. 19(2): 159-168.

- Lentin, Alana. 2016. "Racism in public or public racism: Doing Anti-Racism in 'Post-Racial' Times". *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39 (1): 33-48.
- Lentin, Alana. 2017. Review of *The Scholar Denied: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Birth of Modern Sociology* by Aldon Morris. *Sociology* 51(1):181–182.
- Lentin, Alana. 2020. *Why Race Still Matters*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Leonardo, Zeus and Ronald K. Porter. "Pedagogy of Fear: Toward a Fanonian Theory of 'Safety' in Race Dialogue" *Race Ethnicity and Education* 13 (2): 139-157.
- Lewis, Laura A. 2012. "Between 'Casta' and 'Raza': The Example of Colonial Mexico." in *Race and Blood in the Iberian World*. David Nirenberg et al. (eds.) Berlin: Lit Verlag.
- Lizardo, Omar. 2017. "Social constructivism and theories of reference." *SocArXiv* <https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/x7jqg/>
- Locke, John. 1980. *Second Treatise of Government*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Lorde, Audre. 2007. *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches*. New York: Crossing Press.
- Losurdo, Domenico. 2011. *Liberalism: A Counter-History*. New York and London: Verso Books.
- Losurdo, Domenico. 2015. *Non-Violence: A History Beyond the Myth*. Lanham/London: Lexington Books.
- Lowe, Lisa. 2015. *The Intimacies of Four Continents*. Durham/London: Duke University Press.
- Loyd, Jenna. 2015. Review of *Geographies of Peace* by Fiona McConnell, Nick Megoran and Philippa Williams (eds). *Antipode: A radical journal of geography*. in <https://antipodeonline.org/2018/12/31/geographies-of-peace-2/>
- Lugones, Maria. 2007. "Heterosexualism and the Colonial/ Modern Gender System." *Hypatia* 22 (1): 186– 209.
- MacGinty, Roger. 2008. "Indigenous Peace-Making versus the Liberal Peace." *Cooperation and Conflict* 43: 139–163.
- MacMillan, Margaret. 2003. *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World*. New York: Random House.
- Magubane, Zine. 2016. "American Sociology's Racial Ontology: Remembering Slavery, Deconstructing Modernity, and Charting the Future of Global Historical Sociology". *Cultural Sociology*: 1–16.

- Maldonado-Torres, Nelson. 2008. *Against War. Views From the Underside of Modernity*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Maldonado-Torres, Nelson. 2008b. "Lewis Gordon: Philosopher of the Human." *C.L.R. James Journal* 14 (1): 103-137.
- Maldonado-Torres, Nelson. 2009. "Desigualdad y ciencias humanas en Rousseau y Fanón". in *Piel negra, máscaras blancas*. Frantz Fanon. Madrid: Akal.
- Mallon, Ron. 2006. "'Race': Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantic." *Ethics* 116 (3): 525-551.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Manganyi, Chabani N. (1973) *Being- Black-in-the-World*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- Marable, Manning. 2016. *Beyond Black and White: From Civil Rights to Barack Obama*. New York: Verso.
- Marks, Susan. 2008. "Introduction." in *International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies*. Susan Marks (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Marsh, Ian and Mike Keating (eds.). 2006. *Sociology: Making Sense of Society*. Essex: Pearson Education.
- Marshall, George J. 2008. *A Guide to Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
- Martínez Guzmán, Vicent. 2001. *Filosofía para hacer las paces*. Barcelona: Icaria.
- May, Reinhard. 1996. *Heidegger's Hidden Sources: East-Asian Influences on His Work*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Mbaye, Judge Kemba. 1968. "Statement by UNESCO on Race and Racial Prejudice." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6 (1): 109-113.
- M'charek, Amade. 2013. "Beyond Fact or Fiction: On the Materiality of Race in Practice." *Cultural Anthropology* 28 (3): 420-42.
- McKittrick, Katherine, Peter James Hudson. 2014. "The Geographies of Blackness and Anti-Blackness: An Interview with Katherine McKittrick" *The CLR James Journal* (20)1-2: 233-240.
- McMahon, Richard. 2020. "Resurrecting Raciology? Genetic Ethnology and pre-1945 Anthropological Race Classification." *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biol & Biomed Sci* 83: 1-15.

- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2012. *Phenomenology of Perception*. Routledge: London and New York.
- Mignolo, Walter. 2009. "Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom." *Theory, Culture and Society* 26 (7-8): 159-181.
- Mignolo, Walter. 2011. *The Darker Side Of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*. London and Durham: Duke University Press.
- Milazzo, Maria. 2016. "On White Ignorance, White Shame, and Other Pitfalls in Critical Philosophy of Race." *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 34 (4): 557- 572.
- Mills, Charles W. 1998. *Blackness Visible. Essays on Philosophy and Race*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Mills, Charles W. 2008. "Racial Liberalism." *PMLA* 123(5): 1380-1397.
- Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 2003. *Feminism without Borders. Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Montesquieu, Baron de. 1989. *The Spirit of the Laws*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Moran, Dermot. 2000. Introduction to Phenomenology. London and New York: Routledge.
- More, Mabogo P. 2011. "Fanon and the Land Question in (Post)Apartheid South Africa." in *Living Fanon*. Nigel Gibson (ed.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- More, Mabogo P. 2014. "Locating Frantz Fanon in Post-Apartheid South Africa". *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 52 (2): 127-141.
- More, Mabogo P. 2017. *Biko: Philosophy, Identity and Liberation*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- More, Mabogo P. 2019. *Looking through Philosophy in Black: Memoirs*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Morris, Aldon D. 2015. *The Scholar Denied: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Birth of Modern Sociology*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Morrison, Toni. 1992. *Playing in the Dark. Whiteness and the Literary Imagination*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Morrison, Toni. 1994. "Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-American Presence in American Literature". in *Within the Circle: An Anthology of African American Literary Criticism from the Harlem Renaissance to the Present*. Angelyn Mitchell (ed.) Durham and London: Duke University Press.

- Mosley, Albert and Stephen C. Ferguson II. 2011. "Philosophy in Africa and the African Diaspora." in *The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy*. William Edelglass and Jay L. Garfiel (ed.) New York: Oxford University Press.
- Moura, Tatiana. 2016. "Novíssimas guerras, novíssimas pazes. Desafios conceptuais e políticos". *Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais* 71: 77-96.
- Moyn, Samuel. 2010. *The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History*. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press.
- Mngxitama, Andile. 2020. *Blacks Can't Be Racist: 10th Anniversary Edition*. Malvern: Sankara Publishing.
- Natanson, Maurice. 1962. *Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences: Essays in Existentialism and Phenomenology*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Niang, Amy. 2020. "The slave, the Migrant and the Ontological Topographies of the International." *International Relations* 34(3): 333-353.
- Nirenberg, David. et al. 2012. "Editorial." in *Race and Blood in the Iberian World*. David Nirenberg et al. (eds.) Berlin: Lit Verlag.
- Nishitani, Keiji. 1982. *Religion and Nothingness*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Nishitani, Osamu. 2006. "Anthropos and Humanitas: Two Western Concepts of 'Human Being'". in *Translation, Biopolitics, Colonial Difference*. Naoki Sakai, and Jon Solomon, Jon. (eds.) Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Nissim-Sabat, Marilyn. 2008. "Lewis Gordon: Avatar of Postcolonial Humanism." *C.L.R. James Journal* 14 (1): 46-70.
- Nissim-Sabat, Marilyn. 2009. *Neither Victim nor Survivor: Thinking toward a New Humanity*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Obernga, Théophile. 1992. *Ancient Egypt and Black Africa*. Chicago: Karnak House.
- Obenga, Théophile. 2004. *African Philosophy: The Pharaonic Period: 2780–330 BC*. Popenguine: Per Ankh.
- Ochoa Muñoz, Karina. 2014. "El debate sobre las y los amerindios: entre el discurso de la bestialización, la feminización y la racialización." In *Tejiendo de otro modo: Feminismo, epistemología y apuestas descoloniales en Abya Yala*. Yuderskys Espinosa Miñoso et al. (eds.) Popayán: Editorial Universidad del Cauca.
- Omar, Sidi Mohamed. 2006. "Los estudios post-coloniales. Hacia un nuevo proyecto para la transformación crítica y cultural". Doctoral dissertation. Universitat Jaume I de Castellón.

- Omer, Atalia. 2020. "Decolonizing Religion and the Practice of Peace: Two Case Studies from the Postcolonial World." *Critical Research on Religion* 0 (0): 1-24.
- Outlaw Jr, Lucius T. 1996. *On Race and Philosophy*. New York: Routledge.
- Padgen, Anthony. 1992. "Introduction." in *A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies*. Bartolomé De Las Casas. London: Penguin Books.
- Pahuja, Sundhya, 2011, *Decolonizing International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pawlowsky, Lucia. 2019. "Creating a Brave Space Classroom through Writing." In *Teaching Race: How to Help Students Unmask and Challenge Racism*. Stephen D. Brookerfield (ed.). San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
- Park, Peter K.J. 2013. *Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy: Racism in the Formation of the Philosophical Canon, 1780–1830*. Albany: New York University Press.
- Parris, LaRose T. 2015. *Being Apart: Theoretical and Existential Resistance in Africana Literature*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia.
- Persaud, Randolph. 2001. "Re-envisioning sovereignty: Marcus Garvey and the making of a transnational identity." in *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Kevin C. Dunn & Timothy M. Shaw (eds.) London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Persaud, Randolph. 2015. "Colonial Violence: Race and Gender on the Sugar Plantations of British Guiana." in *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Color Line*. Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda and Robbie Shilliam (eds.) London and New York: Routledge.
- Prashad, Vijay. 2001. *Everybody Was Kung Fu Fighting. Afro-Asian Connections and the Myth of Cultural Purity*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Pureza, Jose Manuel. 2005. "Os Estudos para a Paz – Tendências e debates." *Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais* 71: 3–4.
- Pureza, José Manuel and Teresa Cravo. 2005. "Margem crítica e legitimação nos estudos para a paz". *Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais* 71: 5-19.
- Rabaka, Reiland. 2009. *Africana Critical Theory: Reconstructing the Black Radical Tradition, From W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James to Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral* (Reprint ed.). Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Rabaka, Reiland. 2010. *Against Epistemic Apartheid: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Disciplinary Decadence of Sociology*. Plymouth: Lexington Books.
- Rattansi, Ali. 2020. *Racism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Razack, Sherene H. 1998. *Looking White People in the Eye: Gender, Race, and Culture in Courtrooms and Classrooms*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Courtrooms and Classrooms. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Rex, John. 1972. "Nature Versus Nurture: The Significance of the Revived Debate." in Richardson and Spears (eds.). *Race, Culture and Intelligence*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Reynolds, Jack. 2006. *Understanding Existentialism*. Chesham: Acumen.
- Richmond, Oliver. 2014. *Failed Statebuilding*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Robbins, Paul. 2004. *Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
- Robinson, Cedric J. 2005. *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. University of North Carolina Press.
- Rosenberg, Alexander. 2016. *Philosophy of Social Science*. Boulder: West View Press.
- Roy, Arundhati. 2017. *The Doctor and the Saint*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- R'boul, Hamza. 2020. "Postcolonial Interventions in Intercultural Communication Knowledge: Meta-intercultural Ontologies, Decolonial knowledges and Epistemological Polylogue" *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication*. 13 (3): 1-19.
- Salomon, Robert C. and Kathleen M. Higgins. 2016. *The Big Questions: A Short Introduction to Philosophy*. Boston: Cengage Learning.
- Sartre, J., Brown, A., & Richmond, S. 2004. *The Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch for a Phenomenological Description* (ed.). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Seung Sahn. 2012. *The Compass of Zen*. Hyon Gak Sunim (ed.) Boston and London: Shambala.
- Solomos, John and Les Back. 1996. *Racism and Society*. London: Palgrave.
- Sandoval, Eduardo. 2016. *Educación para la paz integral - Memoria, interculturalidad y decolonialidad*. Bogotá: Arfo editores.
- Sanín-Restrepo, Ricardo. 2018. "The People vs. Hegel: The Mystifying Transcendence of Time and the Immanence of Radical Democracy." in *Decrypting Power*. Ricardo Sanín Restrepo (ed.) London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. 2014. *Epistemologies of the South. Justice Against Epistemicide*. Boulder: Paradigm.
- Sabaratnam, Meera. 2018. *Decolonising Intervention: International Statebuilding in Mozambique*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

- Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1992. *Being and Nothingness. A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology*. New York: Washington Square Press.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. 2007. *Existentialism is a Humanism*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. 2004. "Preface". in *The Wretched of the Earth*. Frantz Fanon. New York: Grove Press.
- Saucier, P. Khalil and Tryon P. Woods. 2014. "Ex Aqua: The Mediterranean Basin, Africans on the Move, and the Politics of Policing." *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory* 61 (141): 55-75.
- Serequeberhan, Tsenay. 1994. *The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse*. New York: Routledge.
- Shafi, Azfar and Ilyas Nagdee. 2020. *Recovering Antiracism: Reflections on Collectivity and Solidarity in Antiracist Organizing*. Amsterdam: Jubels.
- Sharpley-Whiting, T. Denean. 1998. *Frantz Fanon: Conflicts and Feminisms*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Shilliam, Robert. 2008. "What the Haitian Revolution Might Tell Us about Development, Security, and the Politics of Race." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50 (3):778–808.
- Shilliam, Robert. 2011. "The Perilous but Unavoidable Terrain of the non-West." in *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity*. Robbie Shilliam (ed.) London and New York: Routledge.
- Shilliam, Robert. 2015. *The Black Pacific: Anti-Colonial Struggles and Oceanic Connections*. London and New York: Bloomsbury.
- Shiroff, Sara. 2019. "The Peace Professor: Decolonial, Feminist, and Queer Futurities." in *Peace and Justice Studies: Critical Pedagogies*. Margaret Groarke and Emily Welty (eds.) New York: Routledge.
- Sithole, Tendayi. 2020. *The Black Register*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Sivanandan, Ambalavaner. 2019. *Communities of Resistance. Writings on Black Struggles for Socialism*. London and New York: Verso.
- Sokolowsky, Robert. 1999. *Introduction to Phenomenology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Smith, Linda Tuhiwai. 1999. *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*. London and New York: Zed Books.
- Suárez-Krabbe, Julia. 2016. *Race, Rights and Rebels. Alternatives to Human Rights and Development from the Global South*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Taylor, Charles et al. and Amy Gutmann. 1994. *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: An Essay*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Taylor, Paul C. 2000. "Appiah's Uncompleted Argument: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Reality of Race." *Social Theory and Practice* 26 (1): 103-128.
- Taylor, Paul C. 2013. *Race: A Philosophical Introduction*. Malden and Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Thakur, Vineet and Peter Vale. 2020. *South Africa, Race and the Making of International Relations*. London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Thompson, Debra. 2015. "Through, against, and beyond the Racial State: the Transnational Stratum of Race." in *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Color Line*. Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda and Robbie Shilliam (eds.) London and New York: Routledge.
- Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. 1995. *Silencing the Past. Power and the Production of History*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- UNESCO. 1952. *The Race Question in Modern Science. The Race Concept: Results of an Inquiry*. Paris: UNESCO.
- UNESCO. 1968. *Statement by UNESCO on Race and Racial Prejudice*.
- Van Dijk, Teun A. 2021. *Antiracist Discourse: Theory and History of a Macromovement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vice, Samantha. 2010. "'How Do I Live in This Strange Place?'" *Journal of Social Philosophy* 41 (3):323-342.
- Visweswaran, Kamala. 2010. *Un/common Cultures: Racism and the Rearticulation of Cultural Difference*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Vitalis, Robert. 2015. *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Voltaire, François-Marie. *Collected Works of Voltaire*. Hastings: Delphi Classics.
- Weheliye, Alexander G. 2014. *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black feminist Theories of the Human*. Durham: Duke University Press.

- Williams, Philippa, Nick Megoran and Fiona McConnell. 2014. "Introduction: Geographical Approaches to Peace." in *Geographies of Peace*. Fiona McConnell, Nick Megoran and Philippa Williams (eds.) London: I.B. Tauris.
- Williams, Paul. 1989. *Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations* Abingdon: Routledge.
- Walsh, Catherine. 2018. "Interculturality and Decoloniality." in *On Decoloniality. Concepts, Analytics, Praxis*. Walter Mignolo and Catherine Walsh (eds.) Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Williams, Raymond. 1983. *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. London: Fontana Press.
- Wimmer, Andreas. 2014. "Ethnic boundary making as strategic action: reply to my critics." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37 (5): 834-842.
- Winant, Howard. 2015. "Race, Ethnicity and Social Science." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38 (13): 2176-2185.
- Wischmann, Anke. 2016. "The Absence of 'Race' in German Discourses on Bildung. Rethinking Bildung with Critical Race Theory." *Race Ethnicity and Education*. 21 (4). 471-485.
- Wolfe, Patrick. 2011. "Race and the Trace of History: For Henry Reynolds." in *Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, Identity and Culture*. Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington (eds). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wolfe, Patrick. 2016. *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race*. London: Verso.
- Wright, Richard. 1993. *Conversations with Richard Wright*. Kenneth Kinnamon and Michel Fabre (eds.) Jackson: University Press of Mississippi.
- Wright, Shelley. 2001. *International Human Rights, Decolonisation and Globalisation*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Wynter, Sylvia. 2001. "Towards the Sociogenic Principle: Fanon, Identity, the Puzzle of Conscious Experience, and What It Is Like to Be "Black"". in *National Identities and Socio-Political Changes in Latin America*. Mercedes F. Duran-Cogan and Antonio Gomez-Moriana (eds.). London and New York: Routledge.
- Wynter, Sylvia. 2003. Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument. *New Centennial Review* 3 (3): 257– 337.
- Yancy, George (ed.). 1998. *African American Philosophers: 17 Conversations*. New York: Routledge.

- Yancy, George. 2017. "The Violent Weight of Whiteness: The Existential and Psychic Price Paid by Black Male Bodies." in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race*. Naomi Zack (ed.) New York: Oxford University Press.
- Yancy, George. 2019. "Guidelines for Whites Teaching about Whiteness." In *Teaching Race: How to Help Students Unmask and Challenge Racism*. Stephen D. Brookerfield (ed.). San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
- Zack, Naomi. 1993. *Race and Mixed Race*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Zack, Naomi (ed.) 1997. *Race/Sex: Their Sameness, Difference, and Interplay*. New York: Routledge.
- Zuckerman, Phil. 2004. "Introduction". in *The Social Theory of W.E.B. Du Bois*. Phil Zuckerman (ed.) London: Sage Publications.