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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SECURITY IN MOROCCO

Private Security and Authoritarianism in Neoliberal Times

PhD Dissertation

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Supervisor: Dr. Laura Feliu Martínez

Politics, Policies and International Relations

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to my child

Abstract

The expanding market of private security and global surveillance-technology in the world poses a novel opportunity to investigate the role of the state and dominant elites within the context of neoliberalism. The changes in the dominance over coercive power can shed new light on the relationship between state-sanctioned security and the current economic model. So far, most International Relations scholarship has neglected to account for the impact of new coercive actors on authoritarian regimes. This research uses a neogramscian framework to tackle the material and ideational dimensions of the current security order in the context of neoliberal times.

Specifically, this research aims to test the usefulness of a Marxian political economic focus within critical security studies and its dominant constructivist approach to the meanings and social practices of security, empirically situating the study in Morocco, an authoritarian regime at the periphery of the world-system.

Only a handful of PSCs existed in the 1990s in the country. Today, estimates account for hundreds of local and international companies acting in the country with dozens of thousands of workers. Yet the Moroccan regime does not seem to lose ground in its centrality in deploying state coercive power in the name of a certain narrative of security.

This study traces back the historical configurations of state security in context with the evolving power structures. Through a mix-methods toolbox that ranges from legal analysis to ethnographic work the dynamics that define relations between political elites, and old and new security elites are analyzed. It further examines the importance and effectiveness of accumulating and using coercive power in relation to other resources of power such as capital, land, the state, ideology or technology.

The research shows how private actors in the security sector profit from a strong state in order to provide a narrative and regulatory framework for security needs in areas not accessible/inefficient to ordinary public security deployment (free trade zones, factories, tourist and commercial sites, etc.). On the other hand, public elites show a complex attitude towards the sector but ultimately seem to accommodate by setting the boundaries and

through either finding ways to individually benefit from the sector or simply by reaping the benefits of the enhanced value of public order and surveillance.

Consistent with the massive privatization of public space and the continuation of 'land enclosure', private security is completing the task with a progressive 'life enclosure'. That is, an ever more pervasive surveillance over individuals' and communities' lives, and a destruction of informal community dynamics. This is securitization of life is unequally deployed through criminalization of communities and marginalized populations, through their forced professionalization, or through technological and gated protection of the privileged class.

Keywords: private security; neoliberalism; authoritarianism; elites; political economy;

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Resum (Català)

L'expansió del mercat de la seguretat privada i de les tecnologies de vigilància al món planteja una nova oportunitat per investigar el paper de l'Estat i de les elits dominants en el context del neoliberalisme. Els canvis en el domini del poder coercitiu poden donar nova llum sobre la relació entre la seguretat sancionada per l'Estat i el model econòmic actual. Fins ara, la majoria dels estudis en Relacions Internacionals no han tingut en compte l'impacte dels nous actors coercitius en els règims autoritaris. Aquesta investigació utilitza un marc neogramscià per abordar les dimensions materials i ideològiques de l'ordre de seguretat actual en el context neoliberal.

En concret, aquesta investigació pretén posar a prova la utilitat d'un enfocament d'economia política marxiana dins dels estudis crítics de seguretat i el seu enfocament constructivista dominant sobre els significats i les pràctiques socials de la seguretat, situant l'estudi empíricament al Marroc, un règim autoritari a la perifèria del sistema-món.

A la dècada de 1990 només existien al país un grapat d'Empreses de Seguretat Privada (ESPs). Avui dia, les estimacions parlen de centenars d'empreses locals i internacionals que actuen al país amb desenes de milers de treballadors. Tot i això, el règim marroquí no sembla perdre terreny en la seva centralitat en el desplegament del poder coercitiu de l'Estat en nom d'una determinada narrativa de seguretat. Aquest estudi rastreja les configuracions històriques de la seguretat estatal en context amb l'evolució de les estructures de poder.

A través d'un conjunt de mètodes mixtos que van des de l'anàlisi jurídica fins al treball etnogràfic, s'analitzen les dinàmiques que defineixen les relacions entre les elits polítiques i les antigues i noves elits de seguretat. A més, s'examina la importància i l'eficàcia de l'acumulació i ús del poder coercitiu en relació amb altres recursos de poder com el capital, la terra, l'Estat, la ideologia o la tecnologia.

La investigació mostra com els actors privats del sector de la seguretat es beneficien d'un Estat fort per proporcionar un marc narratiu i normatiu a les necessitats de seguretat a zones no accessibles/ineficaces per al desplegament de la seguretat pública ordinària (zones franques, fàbriques, llocs turístics i comercials, etc.). D'altra banda, les elits públiques mostren una actitud complexa cap al sector però, en última instància, semblen acomodar-se marcant

els límits i trobant maneres de beneficiar-se individualment del sector, o simplement collint els beneficis del major valor de l'ordre públic i la vigilància.

D'acord amb la privatització massiva de l'espai públic i la continuació del 'tancament del territori', la seguretat privada està completant la tasca amb un progressiu 'tancament de la vida'. És a dir, una vigilància cada cop més omnipresent sobre les vides dels individus i les comunitats, i una destrucció de les dinàmiques comunitàries informals. Aquesta securitització de la vida es desplega de manera desigual a través de la criminalització de les comunitats i les poblacions marginades, a través de la seva professionalització forçada, o a través de la protecció tecnològica i emmurallada de la classe privilegiada.

Paraules clau: seguretat privada; neoliberalisme; autoritarisme; elits; economia política;

Resumen (Castellano)

La expansión del mercado de la seguridad privada y de las tecnologías de vigilancia en el mundo plantea una nueva oportunidad para investigar el papel del Estado y de las élites dominantes en el contexto del neoliberalismo. Los cambios en el dominio del poder coercitivo pueden arrojar nueva luz sobre la relación entre la seguridad sancionada por el Estado y el modelo económico actual. Hasta ahora, la mayoría de los estudiosos de las Relaciones Internacionales no han tenido en cuenta el impacto de los nuevos actores coercitivos en los regímenes autoritarios. Esta investigación utiliza un marco neogramsciano para abordar las dimensiones materiales e ideológicas del actual orden de seguridad en el contexto neoliberal.

En concreto, esta investigación pretende poner a prueba la utilidad de un enfoque de economía política marxiana dentro de los estudios críticos de seguridad y su enfoque constructivista dominante sobre los significados y las prácticas sociales de la seguridad, situando empíricamente el estudio en Marruecos, un régimen autoritario en la periferia del sistema-mundo.

En la década de 1990 sólo existían en el país un puñado de Empresas de Seguridad Privada (ESPs). Hoy en día, las estimaciones hablan de cientos de empresas locales e internacionales que actúan en el país con decenas de miles de trabajadores. Sin embargo, el régimen marroquí no parece perder terreno en su centralidad en el despliegue del poder coercitivo del Estado en nombre de una determinada narrativa de seguridad.

Este estudio rastrea las configuraciones históricas de la seguridad estatal en contexto con la evolución de las estructuras de poder. A través de un conjunto de métodos mixtos que van desde el análisis jurídico hasta el trabajo etnográfico, se analizan las dinámicas que definen las relaciones entre las élites políticas y las antiguas y nuevas élites de seguridad. Además, se examina la importancia y la eficacia de la acumulación y el uso del poder coercitivo en relación con otros recursos de poder como el capital, la tierra, el Estado, la ideología o la tecnología.

La investigación muestra cómo los actores privados del sector de la seguridad se benefician de un Estado fuerte para proporcionar un marco narrativo y normativo a las necesidades de seguridad en zonas no accesibles/ineficaces para el despliegue de la seguridad pública

ordinaria (zonas francas, fábricas, lugares turísticos y comerciales, etc.). Por otra parte, las élites públicas muestran una actitud compleja hacia el sector pero, en última instancia, parecen acomodarse encontrando formas de beneficiarse individualmente del sector o simplemente cosechando los beneficios del mayor valor del orden público y la vigilancia.

En consonancia con la privatización masiva del espacio público y la continuación del "cerramiento del territorio", la seguridad privada está completando la tarea con un progresivo "cerramiento de la vida". Es decir, una vigilancia cada vez más omnipresente sobre las vidas de los individuos y las comunidades, y una destrucción de las dinámicas comunitarias informales. Esta securitización de la vida se despliega de forma desigual a través de la criminalización de las comunidades y las poblaciones marginadas, a través de su profesionalización forzada, o a través de la protección tecnológica y enmurallada de la clase privilegiada.

Palabras clave: Seguridad privada; neoliberalismo; autoritarismo; élites; economía política;

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List of Acronyms

AISP   Association Interprofessionnelle de la Sécurité Privée [Interprofessional Association of Private Security]

ALM   Armée de Libération Marocaine [Moroccan Liberation Army]

BCIJ   Bureau Central d'Investigations Judiciaires [Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations]

CDT   Confédération Démocratique du Travail [Democratic Confederation of Labor]

CGEM   General Confederation of Moroccan Employers

CSS   Critical Security Studies

DGED   Direction Générale de l'Etude et de la Documentation [General Directorate of Studies and Documentation]

DGSN   Direction Générale de la Sécurité Nationale [General Directorate of National Security]

DST   Direction de la Sûreté Nationale [Direction of National Security]

FA   Auxiliary Forces

FAR   Forces Armées Royales [Royal Armed Forces]

FIEP   Association of European and Mediterranean gendarmeries and police forces with military status

FTZ   Free Trade Zone

GR   Gendarmerie Royale [Royal Gendarmerie]

GWoT   Global War on Terror

MIC   Mobile Intervention Body

MoI   Ministry of Interior

MP   Mouvement Populaire [Popular Movement]

MPDC	Mouvement Populaire Démocratique Constitutionnel [Constitutional Democratic Popular Movement]
MRE	Marocain Résidant à l'Etranger [Moroccan Living Abroad]
ONCF	Office National de Chemins de Fer [National Railway Office]
oWS	Occupied Western Sahara
PI	Parti de l'Istiqlal [Independence Party]
PMSCs	Private Military and Security Companies
POLISARIO	Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqui el Hamra and Río de Oro
PSCs	Private Security Companies
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SEZ	Special Economic Zones
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
ST	Securitization Theory
WANA	West Asia North Africa

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To my colleagues at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and beyond, also rare to find such a welcoming and enticing environment to develop one's ideas, to passionately debate every angle of research. Amongst them Dr. Natalia Ribas-Mateos, Dr. Ferran Izquierdo, Dr. Guillem Farrés Fernández, Dr. Josep Lluís Mateo Dieste, Olivia Glombitza, Dr. Rachid Aarab, Dr. Alejandra Peña and Dr. María Angustias Parejo Fernández.

I also want to dedicate this book to Cari, for our short but deep talks in the corridors of the university.

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Biographical Sketch

I graduated as a Political Scientist in 2004. In 2006 I moved to Morocco to work for a Catalan NGO on youth and development projects. I stayed in the country until the end of 2010, working in different projects. As a result, I speak fluent Arabic Moroccan dialect. I have also worked on other human rights and development projects in other countries in the WANA region.

I moved back to Barcelona to study my Masters in International Relations, Security and Development. After enjoying academic research and appreciating the contribution of my live experience in the region, I decided to continue my work on Moroccan politics, also contingent on its proximity to Barcelona, my previous knowledge of the country and the demands of motherhood. Initially, my PhD project was related to the security sector with a focus on militarization.

As a researcher at a civil society organization (www.centredelas.org), I wrote several papers and reports that focused on the traditional aspects of the security sector: comparative military spending, arms trade or military to civilian ratio[1]. I also researched issues related to private military and security companies (PMSCs), resulting in a series of lectures for undergraduates and masters students. The study of PMSCs as well as other research I did on more sectorial economic issues[2] convinced me of the importance of including political economy in the study of the security sector.

On the other hand, at the UAB I have been frequently in conversation and academic events where Prof. Dr. Laura Feliu and Dr. Ferran Izquierdo's conceptual framework of the Sociology of Power was discussed[3]. I have used the fundamental tools myself for my recent

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[1] See for example, Camps-Febrer, B. & Ortega, P. (2014). *Informe 21: El militarisme al Nord d'Àfrica. El paper de les forces armades des de la descolonització a les revoltes.* [Report 21: Militarism in the North of Africa. The role of armed forces from decolonization to the uprisings]. Centre Delàs. Available in Catalan and Spanish at: http://www.centredelas.org/ca/publicacions/informes?start=24

[2] Through studying Morocco's Foreign Policy in Africa for a co-authored publication I started to focus on the elite network analysis of the Morocco's Foreign Policy towards the continent. A new report that I have co-authored on the Fishing Sector in Morocco and Western Sahara (2019) has also provided me with an insight on the dynamics between security, the state and business elites.

[3] The sociology of power is a neomarxist proposal that nevertheless decenters the importance of economic resources and means of production by introducing other resources of power equally central to the accumulation of power by elites, such as ideology, information,

papers on the security sector reform. Although I have always been attracted to constructivism, with hindsight I realized how much my fundamental understanding of the world I owed to a rudimentary Marxian perspective ultimately refined through the Sociology of Power. This has granted me the opportunity to develop a more acute sensitivity for resources of power (among them material and coercive resources) and power relations.

After developing and testing different theoretical and epistemological approaches I have come to favor the study of political and economic elites in the security sector as the baseline and focus of my research.

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coercion, etc. See the work of Ferran Izquierdo (2008, 20123, 2017) or Guillem Farrés (2012; 2018). Fernando Navarro (2015) developed his PhD Thesis on securitization processes in Israel within this framework.

Transliteration Note

This work has chosen to use the Romanization Table approved by the US Library of Congress as a guide[4].

For common used words in Arabic the IJMES list of commonly transliterated words[5] was used. Although this list was followed whenever possible, I have adopted the perspective of professor Dr. Laura Feliu, who argues that any word with a possible and accurate translation should be translate in order to avoid 'orientalized' discourses on the region. Whenever it has been deemed necessary for comprehension or for further clarification, the Romanized transliteration of a word or expression has been included in parenthesis.

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[4] Library of Congress. Romanization of Arabic. Online: http://archimedes.fas.harvard.edu/mdh/lcromanization.pdf

[5] See the list online at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-file-manager/file/57d9042c58fb76353506c8e7/IJMES-WordList.pdf (Accessed 12/10/2019)

Introduction: Commercializing Security

The discipline of International Relations (IR) has since its inception been dealing with security issues. Political Science, on the other hand, has also reflected on the relationship between state, security and violence. Recently, IR scholars like Rita Abrahamsen, Anna Leander, Michael C. Williams or Maria Stern, among others, claimed the importance of researching other actors like private security companies and their impact in today's world, moving away from state-centric views of security.

There is, however, and overall lack of research on the issue of private security providers in postcolonial authoritarian contexts, and more specifically in the North African countries. This research aims to identify the specific dynamics of the private security sector in Morocco, and to explore the correlation between its development in the context of a neoliberal era and the characteristics of the power structure in place.

This chapter provides an introduction to the study by first presenting the background literature, topic and context; followed by the focus and scope of the research; the objectives and questions; and the main purpose and motivation of the present dissertation. It further discusses the novelty and significance of this work. Next, the epistemologies and methodologies adopted are described. This is followed by a discussion on the limitations of the study and how I have tackled them. The last section briefly outlines the structure of the dissertation.

1. Background of the topic

The historical entanglement between the security sector and political power struggles seems obvious. Rulers have for centuries used their military power to conquest, defend their territories and defeat rivals. While greed is one of the drivers of war, and extraction of tributes one of the drivers of state building, the relation between state security and the changing economic conditions has not been thoroughly theorized. In 1985, Charles Tilly (1985) proposed a thesis for the relation between war and state, and the mutual dependence between mercantile capitalism and state making. His thesis is a very useful approach for a general understanding of security, and it has been partially used in this study. However, Tilly also acknowledged that his thesis was built out of West European history, and that other lands, like those with a colonial past, could show different entanglements. In addition, private security was not as relevant as it is today, and thus this aspect went untheorized in Tilly's proposal.

The emergence of private security contractors, coinciding with the neoliberal era, seemed a coherent phenomenon within the drive for privatization of state functions. Very early on, Spitzer and Scull (1977) tried to demonstrate that this was nevertheless not a new phenomenon, that 'guards for rent' and mercenaries were in fact the historical origin of capitalist state violence. They retraced the link between the mode of production and mercantile security. Unfortunately, their research was only marginally acknowledged and discussed at the time.

Forty years later, the phenomenon observed in the United States of America has expanded globally, and many countries have regulated private corporations offering and providing security services and products of different kinds[6]. The twentieth century conspicuous rise of private military contractors in armed conflicts[7], hand in hand with the United States wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, has provided a compelling and pressing reason for research[8]. The new

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[6] The Private Security Monitor is an initiative of the University of Denver and it includes information on international and national regulations on the issue. See: http://psm.du.edu/index.html

[7] Private military contractors or mercenaries was already a notable phenomenon in African countries throghout the Cold War, with the first modern-day military company, Executive Outcomes, originating in South Africa and operating throughout the contintent (Musah & Fayemi, 2000).

[8] The United Nations Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination was established in 2005. See: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/WGMercenariesIndex.aspx

landscape of private security poses important theoretical and empirical dilemmas, and evidences the need to investigate the consequences of these circumstances, from International Humanitarian Law to Conflict Analysis (Buzatu & Buckland, 2015; Palou-Loverdos & Armendáriz, 2011; Singer, 2009).

While these studies have focused on armed conflicts or military occupations, where the role of companies is especially salient, and dangerous, others have focused on private security in 'times of peace', in the context of Western countries, linking its rise to the increase in mass private property (Shearing & Stenning, 1983), increased perceptions of insecurity (Huysmans, 2006) or the loss of communal social bonds (Jones & Newburn, 1999).

Fewer scholars have tackled the issue of private security from a global perspective, from Cynthia Enloe (2007) through a feminist Global Political Economy by looking at the gendered militarization of global politics, to aforementioned Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams (2009) and their analysis of these private actors and their place in international politics.

These different bodies of scholarship, however, that investigate from military zones to surveillance in shopping malls, have not empirically looked at authoritarian regimes, where the centrality of state violence and deep-seated crony relations might differently intersect with neoliberal and privatization policies on security.

Furthermore, the Western-centered position of research makes certain assumptions in terms of concepts such as state making, or private-public distinctions, and most proposals are thus ill equipped to study the dynamics of the sector with a postcolonial regime. Research on how a neopatrimonial system like Morocco's enables or hinders the commercialization of security provides new insights into the relationship between state-violence and the mode of production, while it compels the research to unavoidably include the structural colonial legacy of today's world-system.

2. Context and Scope of the Research Problem: The Changing Security Order

Morocco is situated at the very Northwest corner of Africa, between the Atlantic, the Mediterranean coast and the Sahara Desert. The territorial state that emerged in 1956 after

the anticolonial struggle was created in the form of a monarchical system. While formal parliamentary and local elections are regularly held, a tight elite around King Mohammed VI, sometimes called the *makhzen*[9], takes the most important decisions in all domains, from religious to economic. The formally constitutional political system of the state contrasts thus with an authoritarian and neopatrimonial regime of power topped by a primary elite that controls most of the resources of power (Feliu & Parejo, 2013; Parejo Fernández, 1997).

The Northern African territory was coveted by European imperial powers that penetrated the territory especially since the nineteenth century, financially and militarily smothering the Alawite sultanate that dominated most of the region. By 1912, France and Spain had established their occupation through protectorates, officially safeguarding the centuries-long Sultanate, although the total occupation would not be effective until the 1930s. The colonial regime gave rise and strengthened some local elites and notables, consolidating their French ties after independence in 1956. Some of these elite families persist and control big proportions of the economy, notably the king's family.

Once an eminently agricultural country, today Morocco's rural population accounts for only 33% of its population, and the service and industrial sectors have emerged as the central economic sectors, along relevant mining as the largest phosphate reserves in the world are located between Morocco and occupied Western Sahara[10]. Morocco shows high levels of inequality, poverty and unemployment, which periodically drive social and political protests, from specific social demands to regional or national uprisings against corruption and regional underinvestment (Feliu, Mateo Dieste, & Izquierdo, 2019).

Coercion and organized state violence is crucial to power relations between the regime and the population, usually framed in terms of security. In the twenty-first century, security has been centrally traversed by the global anti-terrorist struggle, which has penetrated the government's concerns and narratives. Especially since the 2003 suicide bombings in Casablanca, and with the involvement of citizens of Moroccan origin in Europe's terrorist

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[9] The word *makhzen* refers to the core structure of government and rule in Morocco. Its meaning is now devalued and conveys archaic rule, as well as the unofficial center of the regime of power. The official preference is *dawla* (state) and *hukuma* (government).

[10] Services became the first sector of employment in 2012, surpassing agriculture, forestry and fishery for the first time. See the official statistics of the Haut Commissariat au Plan: www.hcp.ma

attacks, Morocco became an indispensable ally in the global counter-terrorist fight (Ennaji 2016).

Alongside the hyper focus on hard security at the authorities' hands, a private business has flourished. Some of this business goes hand in hand with the public forces, as illustrated by the national police purchase and use of spyware[11], the 'safe cities' initiatives and their emphasis on technology like street surveillance cameras[12], or the development of advanced biometric national ID cards[13]. Others, like private guards for luxury hotels or access guards for an industrial zone in Tangier, relate to another kind of protection needs that emerge within a specific economic order.

2.1 State security and the authoritarian regime

Security has commonly been theorized as the core role of the state, especially from the tradition of the social contract. Security is, according to Thomas Hobbes, what men [sic.] get from a superior authority when they give up their freedom, which in the wild simply meant that "the life of man, [was] solitary, poore, nasty, bruitish, and short" (Hobbes, 2017). The role of the state or of the superior authority as the paternal protector of the nation and its citizens is contested from Marxist to feminist thought[14], and especially through empirical experience (Der Derian, 1993; Williams, 1996). In the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region, state security apparatuses have usually been structured to protect the regime, the leaders, their properties and their privileges (Owen, 2013).

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[11] The spyware Pegasus, for instance, has been used since 2017 by the Moroccan intelligence services to spy on at least two human rights defenders. Pegasus is an intrusive spyware used on mobile phones, developed by the Israeli company NSO Group. See "Morocco: Human Rights Defenders Targeted with NSO Group's Spyware," Amnesty International, October 10, 2019. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/10/morocco-human-rights-defenders-targeted-with-nso-groups-spyware/

[12] See chapter 8 and 9 for a further description of this techno-optimistic private-public approaches to urban security.

[13] Morocco was one of the first countries to introduce nation-wide contactless biometric technology in their national id cards. In 2005, it was announced, that biometric and contactless electronic cards would be delivered in Morocco, in partnership with Thales and other international technology companies. This was, according to media, a 'revolutionary' project, and indeed one of the first countries to develop this technology. This electronic technology is fully endorsed by the World Bank, that has deployed the Program 'Identification for Development' in Morocco and which encourages advanced technology development in the global south. Atick, Joseph J; Palacios, Robert J.; Angel-Urdinola, Diego; Chen, Dorothée; El Kadiri El Yamani, Fatima; Pino, Ariel. 2014. Identification for Development (ID4D) country diagnostic : Morocco (English). Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/363901472492458796/Identification-for-Development-ID4D-country-diagnostic-Morocco . Also "Morocco issues the millionth biometric contactless national identity card with Thales's e-ID secure solution". Secure Technology Alliance, November 18, 2008. Online: https://www.securetechalliance.org/morocco-issues-the-millionth-biometric-contactless-national-identity-card-with-thaless-e-id-secure-solution/ (Accessed 06/04/2019)

[14] Marxists argue that the capitalist state essentially protects the dominant class, the bourgeoisie. Feminist critique of the social contract argues that the patriarchal state does not consider nor protect from gender relations and its constrains and violences.

Notwithstanding the classical theory that linked security to the nation state, the neoliberal agenda has also seemed to pose a contradiction with strong nation-states as the main political structures or the source of social and political order (Briggs 2019). After all, classic neoliberalism argued for the superfluous and even hindering nature of any "form of state oversight" (Zuboff, 2019, p. 38)[15]. It is therefore not irrelevant to question how an all-devouring neoliberal appetite affects the structure of the state when this reaches the very core function of it: the protection of the hegemonic social order.

Studying neoliberalism and the security sector is not an easy task, especially in authoritarian regimes that rely heavily on the security apparatus. However, these cases show a most vivid example of how the state might be privatizing even its most fundamental functions. How can an authoritarian state, with an elite that holds a tight grip on social control, be tempted to let go of direct control over the security apparatus by introducing imported technology and by externalizing security services? As Connell & Dados point out "[t]he contradictions of the state and neoliberalism in the periphery are perhaps sharpest around the security apparatus" (2014, p. 127).

The research presented here essentially looks at the current dynamics of the security sector in light of the neoliberal political economy that was deployed during the 1970s and thoroughly during the 1980s, and that has continued under Mohammed VI's reign, since 1999. While Mohammed VI's arrival to the throne after his father's death was publicized within a narrative of development and optimistic globalized modernization, the neoliberal policies of open doors to international trade and investment have continued.

2.2 Scope of the Research: Layers of Security in Morocco

Researching security in Morocco can be done from very different starting points. The focus on national security would surely look at the terrorist threat, at economic and societal

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[15] As is discussed extensively in Chapter 2, the inconsistences of neoliberalism theory and its political deployment are at the heart of this apparent theoretical pitfall long called out by authors like Karl Polanyi in his 1944 work *The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our time* (2001).

instability, at interstate threats like the tensions between Algeria and Morocco, in Western Sahara, etc. and at how these challenges are managed and dealt with. A liberal approach could also look at the advances in reforms and security integration of Morocco and its security agencies within different regional networks and international security organizations. A constructivist approach would analyze the narratives and practices that enable and construct that specific worldview where terrorism or the Polisario Front are the main threats as opposed to, say, poverty or lack of democracy.

In this dissertation security is approached from two different perspectives: the material structures of the security sector; and its normative arrangements. Both research lines are obviously interrelated and indivisible, and conflate as a neogramscian framework[16], but my attempt at analyzing them separately is prompted by the different nature of these processes, and the need to use distinctive analytical tools. Accordingly, my research undertakes the analysis of actors and networks not only with a structural perspective, but also as a means to engage with the subjectivities and cultural underpinnings that constrain actors' behaviors and practices (Cammett, 2004).

This study sets its scope within the security sector, that this author defines as a complex of actors, institutions and organizations whose main resource is the provision of a certain (meaning of) security, in line with the state-sanctioned ideas of security. Within this security complex, the research focuses on the case of private security provision. Specifically, the sector of physical or manned security is most scrutinized, through the characteristics of the corporations that offer this service and their strategies to compete and expand their own share within the sector.

This case study has been chosen as a very specific phenomenon that has intersected with Morocco's state security in the last thirty years. The case presents a strong opportunity to analyze the empirical unfolding of neoliberalism. It is through the detailed regard of practices of individual actors that we can understand the system.

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[16] See chapter 2 on the Theoretical and Conceptual Framework of this research.

3. Aims, Objectives and Research Questions

3.1 Purpose of the research

There has long been a need to draw from non-Western case studies and avoid Eurocentrism in International Relations theory (Acharya, 2011b; Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2019; Lugones, 2010; Powel, 2019). On the study of the private security sector, the academic production has usually been focused on the West or the Global North: origin and development of the new private security model. Alternatively, scholarship on the Global South has focused more on the effects of the sector: in occupation, in war zones, or as migrant workers for private contractors. But states and populations in the Global South are not just mere 'victims' of an unequal global world-system. Contribution to the power distribution and to the global economic and security model can be identified and studied in the Global South, and bring new and relevant findings. Researching beyond the West is not only interesting from a theoretical perspective in order to 'complete the fragmented picture of neoliberalism' (Connell and Dados 2014), but it is also useful in order to identify central elements from the analysis that might be obscured with a North-centered analysis.

In line with these claims, the **general aim** of this research is to analyze the rise and expansion of private security in Morocco. Specifically, this research aims to test the usefulness of a Marxian political economic focus within critical security studies and its dominant constructivist approach to the meanings and social practices of security, empirically situating the study within the context of an authoritarian state at the periphery of the world-system. There is an especially urgent task in shedding light on the nature of the relation between state-sanctioned security and the current economic model. In doing so, this research aims to contribute to the understanding of the current world-system and the assemblage of transnational business elites and states.

In this spirit, this research tackles a **General Research Question:** How does the private provision of security relate to an authoritarian regime?

In order to answer this general question, three main objectives have been developed, which guide and define the scope and methods of the investigation:

Objective #1: To identify the changing dynamics in the political economy of security from the formation of the precolonial Moroccan state until the current neoliberal context.

- **Specific Research Questions 1:** What are relevant actors, resources and practices in the security sector, and how have they evolved? What are the political economy conditions that can account for the transformations of the sector?

Objective #2: To explain how this security sector relates to the consolidation of the neoliberal agenda in Morocco, in terms of the dynamics between private companies and the structure of power.

- **Specific Research Questions 2:** How does the private security sector interact with the traditional security, business and political elites? What technologies and mechanisms are used in order to reframe the roles and needs of the different actors around security? What are the new elite networks that emerge from these changes?

Objective #3: Finally, this research also attempts to explore the deployment of the neoliberal 'security narrative'[17] and its material implications in everyday life.

- **Specific Research Questions 3:** How is the private security sector entrenched within a global and local narrative of neoliberal provision of services? How is the new neoliberal security impacting everyday lives?

3.2 Preliminary discussion of the Research Questions

While this study claims a clear dependency and relationship between the economic conditions and the material assemblages of security provision, it attempts to test this claim through the exploration of the historical construction of the security sector. This relationship is present in multiple questions that arise from a historical account. How did the will of the sultan Moulay Slimane (r. 1792-1822) to reduce trade with Europe affect the strength of his

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[17] Most IR scholarship dealing with security narratives focuses on two different narratives that arise from the liberal peace narrative: the security-development nexus and the anti-terrorist narrative (Jackson, 2005; Baker-Beall, 2009; Richmond, 2011, 2012; Chandler, 2010). See my sample paper Camps-Febrer, B. (2019b). See chapter 1 and 2.

military power and, in turn, his capacity to counter European imperialism? How did the dwindling capacity to extract tributes from distanced communities affect the coercive power of the sultan Moulay Abderrahman (r. 1822-1859) in the 1820s? Why were private guards regulated in 1916 under colonial authority and not before? How did the Moroccanization laws of the 1970s impact the retrieval of the military from political affairs?

Since the neoliberal agenda was deployed in Morocco and in the current transformation of security on the ground, how are traditional security actors – the heads of military and police institutions, those elites close to the primary actors[18] in the power structure of the country – (re)acting to these business projects? Are they engaging in the private sector by way of their privileged position, access to resources, etc.? Do they perceive commercial security with rivalry, fear, as a potential alliance? These business projects are not new but the accession of new actors with new behaviors might affect the capacity for material accumulation of traditional elites.

These and other questions that have fueled this research point towards the new assemblages of power networks and the practices that different actors use in order to compete. This research inquires into the extent of the development of a commercial security and how it reconfigures the hegemonic security order, that is, practices, methods, but also the understanding of what or who needs to be secure and how.

These different lines of inquiry covered in this research affect the dynamics and practices of the security sector, the provision of security in Morocco, the power distribution of elites, and ultimately the entrenchment of a neoliberal authoritarian state.

4. Significance of the research

Relevant scholarship has already engaged with particular transformations and redeployments of the Moroccan State powers in the context of a neoliberal development (Bogaert, 2018; Cammett, 2004; Catusse, 2008; Fernández-Molina, 2009; Fernández-Molina et al., 2019;

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[18] Primary actors or primary elites are those individuals that have the highest position in a given power structure and in relation to other actors that compete within that structure. Elites compete for a differential accumulation of power, in order to maintain or gain a higher position in relation to others; and primary elites try to prevent secondary actors from accumulating resources of power (Izquierdo Brichs, 2009).

Hibou, 1996; Izquierdo Brichs et al., 2021). Interestingly, however, one of the most fundamental roles of the state, that is the 'monopoly' of violence, has not been comprehensively addressed as a potential field for neoliberal transformation.

This research aims to contribute to updating the body of knowledge that inquires into the nature of the state and global political economy, as it addresses the Western-centric bias that the study of private security has been struggling with.

The empirical case study that focuses on Morocco will both address the shortage of research on postcolonial states and private security, as well as contribute to test the practical usefulness of a neogramscian framework in the study of security.

This is not to set a binary distinction between Western and non-western states and the social science approaches they require. However, in Cox words, "in the world-hegemonic model, hegemony is more intense and consistent at the core and more laden with contradictions at the periphery" (Cox, 1983, p. 171). The periphery will more easily adopt (or be forced to adopt) new economic practices and relations without necessarily changing the political model or "disturbing old power structures"(Cox, 1983).

> "It is the so-called margins, after all, that often experience tectonic shifts in the order of things first, most visibly, most horrifically. And most energetically, creatively, ambiguously. Nor are we speaking here of transition, of a passing phase in the life and times of the postcolony. This is history-in-the-making. Which is why postcolonies have become such a crucial site for theory-construction in the social sciences. To the extent that they are foreshadowings of a planetary future, of the rising neoliberal age at its most assertive, these polities are also where the limits of social knowledge demand to be engaged." (Comaroff & Comaroff 2007: 149)

Given the lack of empirical studies on the evolution of the security sector in Morocco, this research intends to set a first solid step in the development of critical studies on the subject, from a historical or contemporary perspective. In addition, this dissertation constitutes a contribution to the disentanglement of coercive practices and population control in Morocco, and to elucidate the practices of domestic and transnational actors, with the hopes of shedding light on the structural and global dynamics of power and authoritarianism.

5. Epistemologies and Methodologies of the research

The study of social sciences can (very) roughly be divided into three different epistemologies[19]: objectivism or positivism, constructivism and subjectivism (Crotty, 2003). While International Relations have had and continue to have their own abstract grand debates about epistemologies, and while some other labels might deserve to figure in the grand divide, this research is comfortable in the middle ground that constitutes constructivism. Chapter 1 and 2 engage specifically with theoretical and analytical proposals for security studies within the different epistemologies. Suffice to say here, that constructivism constitutes a broad enough understanding of the social world around us to fit in the observer, the observed and the unobserved.

Moreover, while this dissertation is not explicitly a feminist research, the reflections that emanate from constructivist feminist epistemologies in global politics contributed to opening up the sometimes too limiting analytical frameworks of IR research. This section aims to answer a single question: what is my understanding of knowledge? In practical terms, the question alludes to the limits this research sets for what constitutes an acceptable research question and what methodologies are effective in order to answer it.

The work of feminist scholars on the epistemological perspectives of research in IR have been of paramount importance to me (Ackerly et al., 2006; Tickner, 2011). Marysia Zalewski and Luce Irigay frame it in the methodology of 'getting lost', of using unclassifiable and varied methodologies – in this research, discourse analysis, security sector reform practitioners' tools, participant observation, among others – to search and research around an issue of interest (Ackerly et al., 2006, p. 10). There is no 'feminist way' of conducting research, although most feminist approaches will invest specific care in conversing constantly with the epistemological perspective of their work, of wandering about, of mixing different methods and, above all, of refusing a constraint positivist process. This approach is valuable

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[19] Other epistemologies of interest to Global Politics and International Relations are post-structuralist, postmodern, feminist, decolonial, postcolonial, among others (Adlbi Sibai, 2016; Tickner, 2011; Woons & Weier, 2017).

to a grounded theory, where the goal is to learn about the specific case study, not as exceptionality, but as an inductive device towards theory-building[20].

5.1. Methodologies and Sources

The methodologies and sources of my research have been 'rich and thick' when possible. Due to the novelty of the research issue in Morocco, I was confronted with the necessity to roam about from think tanks, to business fairs to interviews or media publications. There is indeed not one viable source of information, not even for quantitative data such as the number of private security companies active in Morocco. This situation thus forced me to not frame the research in strict quantitative methods, but rather to engage with it from a mix-methods perspective.

The sources used in this research have been manifold. The main sources of information for the research of the central issue of private security have been embedded ethnographic interviews that I conducted during my four-months stay[21] at the Centre Jacques Berque and in two other visits to Morocco during 2018 and 2020. The interviews have been the main source of information on the current market, since there exists no solid and detailed published research on the private security sector in Morocco, especially not from a political science perspective. While legal texts and quantitative data were paramount for the setting of the material structures, observation and interviews were crucial in identifying the processes, attitudes and ideational frames that moved and prompted actors to their specific actions.

The type of sources that I have used can be classified as follows:

- Secondary Sources (public access)
- Legal texts (mostly public access)
- Media narratives (public access)
- Corporate narratives: websites, brochures, interviews (Private/public access)
- Social Networks (public access)

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[20] David Harvey also puts it in a compelling way: "Theory should be understood […] as an evolving structure of argument sensitive to encounters with complex ways in which social processes ar materially embedded in the web of life."(Harvey, 2019, p. 79)

[21] From April to July 2019.

- Fieldwork observation (author's)
- Biographic narratives: embedded ethnographic interviews (private access)

This research has used abundant documentary data and secondary sources. For the history chapters, mostly secondary sources, local when possible, have been employed. Through my research stay at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University, I had access to British archives, and so I read hundreds of internal dispatches between the UKs diplomatic services and the government involving the negotiations to the Treaty of Algeciras and the creation of the police force, and other legal texts such as Treaties or regulations from the French Protectorate. I have also used the US Federal Procurement Data System to research security company contracts with the US Embassy and other US Departments in Morocco.

On the Private Security Industry, legal texts were an essential source in order to establish the legal framework of the private security sector (see Annex 1). The French version of legal texts has been used when available. In cases where the French version did not exist or the translation was unreliable, the Arabic version has been used (for example the Session Reports on the Debates at the concerning Parliamentary Commission, given to me by a Parliamentarian).

Other institutional sources include reports, power points and video presentations of officers.

Relevant information was also obtained from media publications of financial and political nature, corporate websites, brochures, interviews. Some of the companies and official institutions manage official or unofficial twitter accounts and other social networks accounts. Although it is difficult to gather deep detailed information through this public publications, some pictures or statements have been useful, for example from the National Police's (DGSN) twitter account.

Sectorial events were monitored and analyzed online and, when possible in person, as shown in the following table.

TABLE 1. Monitored Security Events

Monitored Events (in person/ not in person)	Organizers	Main Themes
Africa Security Forum (NIP) 8,9,10 October 2017, Casablanca.	Atlantis Center for Geostrategic Research and Studies, a branch of the AlOmra Security Company, and in cooperation with FITS, a French-international lobby	The African Cooperation Challenges on Terrorism, Radicalization and Transnational Crime
Africa Security Forum (NIP) 10th edition, 8-9 February 2019 Marrakech.	AfricaSec Centre Marocain des Etudes Stratégiques (CMES) en partenariat avec la Fédération africaine des études stratégiques	« Construire pour l'Afrique sa Sécurité du futur »
ASEC Expo. African Security Exhibition and Conference (NIP) 19-21 February 2019.	Intersec	Facility Management, commercial Security, smart home, information security, fire safety, labor safety conditions, physical security, etc.
Preventica The International Congress / Fair for Risk Prevention (IP) 11-12-13 April 2019, Casablanca.	Communicasa / Préventica	Work Safety Facility Management Surveillance Technology Guards Risk Prevention Private-Public Security
5th UN Forum on Safe Cities and Safe Public Spaces for Women and Girls (IP) 26-28 February 2020, Rabat.	UNWomen, Moroccan Ministry of Interior, Ministère de l'Amenagement, AECID (Spanish Cooperation Agency), Canada	Street sexual harassment Urban security Technological solutions

I conducted 37 interviews with 40 people (Annex 1). 19 of informants were from private security companies (12 managers positions, and 7 agents), 6 of them were former or active Moroccan public security agents, 9 civil society including NGOs, media and university professors, and 8 of them had public institutional roles (some of them had double adscriptions). 5 of the informants were non-Moroccans.

Most interviews were unstructured or semi-structured, with open-ended questions and lasted between 30 minutes to 2 hours. The informants were contacted by very different means, sometimes directly through cold door, but mostly through chain-referral. The chain-referral, while opportunistic, allowed me to open my research to different peripheral issues that I was not planning. However, since this technique can result on community bias, I also made sure to check the preliminary list of potential contacts and further struggle for a specific line of research that was not being covered. This involved cold door knocking, which in the case of security companies was quite unsuccessful, but easier in specific organized events that I attended (see Table 1 above). With security guards in different public or private spaces it was easier because of their mostly idle and boring obligations. The interviews with guards however were always more informal and shorter. Nevertheless, these men were always informed of my purpose as a researcher.

The preparation work for interviews was done through specific literature[22] on the subject that provided "useful communication techniques [including] paraphrasing, reflection, asking clarifying questions, open-ended probing, interpretation, and self-disclosure" (Dolnik 2011:27). I was also greatly benefited by the discussions, guidance and advice from my colleague anthropologist, R. Girós Calpé.

The fieldwork consisted of a 4-month stay[23] in the *Center Jacques Berque pour le développement des ciences humaines et sociales* in Rabat, associated with the French *Centre national de la recherche scientifique* (CNRS). During these months, I conducted most of the interviews. I used a smartphone app to record most interviews, although some were not recorded and only notes during the meeting were taken and a report was elaborated the same day or night of the meeting. The recorded interviews were transcribed and the audio-file secured and deleted from my phone in less than a day after the meetings took place.

Another short visit was made at the end of February 2020 in order to attend the Fifth UN Women Safe Cities and Safe Public Spaces Global Leaders' Forum[24].

The documents used for my fieldwork:

1. audio files from interviews (with EasyVoice app)
2. text file with transcript
3. text file with notes on my own performance conducting the interview (as a learning process)
4. text file with notes on the interviewee's responses, attitude, etc. Context of the interview.
5. Table file with coded names of interviewees, separated from the numbered transcriptions
6. Observation guideline for Preventica / UN Forum
7. Observation notes for Preventica / UN Forum
8. Table file with interviews' guidelines and research methods

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[22] Among them (Ackerly et al., 2006; Dolnik, 2011).

[23] From April to July 2019.

[24] UNWomen. Event Description https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/events/2020/02/event-fifth-un-women-safe-cities-and-safe-public-spaces-global-leaders-forum (Accessed 05/09/2020)

9. Research Design
10. Fieldwork diary

The research further relied on the tools of political ethnography in order to explore the practices and functions of these actors within the regime of power in Morocco. Cynthia Enloe's approach (Anderson et al., 2014; C. H. Enloe, 2014), for instance, has been invaluable to this work. Her work leads to an understanding of how the global linkages of gender, economy and militarism can be empirically researched. Through the attention to detail, to the margins, and to personal experiences, Enloe's global approach nevertheless develops a much broader focus of research than that looked for in this research.

5.2 The Case Study and the Historical Approach

The central case study of this dissertation is focused on the current phase of private security sector, dated since the 1990s until 2020. However, the case is understood and situated within a historical, cultural and geographical context. The research is dialectic in the sense that it points at the importance of contradictions, "as evolution itself is the constant struggle of conflicting forces" (Trotsky 2006:4).

The analysis of the security sector in Morocco traditionally focused on the state-formation, the colonial legacy of the Royal Armed Forces, or the power struggle between Hassan II and his army in the 1970s, with its subsequent restructuring (Leveau, 1985; 1993; Owen 1992; Daguzan, 1999, inter alia). More recent accounts have focused on the institutional structure, the potential reforms of the security sector (Saidy, 2011; Saaf, 2012), and its obstacles to democratization due to the nature of the political system (Kodmani 2009, Mattes 2009). However, focusing solely on the institutional and legal changes downplays the fact that a dynamic evolution of the economic environment might also have an impact in the security sector.

As such, this research retraces the evolution of the state and of its coercive arm, and the role played by the military and police forces in the structuring of the state and the shaping of a certain social order. It assesses the nature and dynamics of elites that intervene and control security. These elites stem with different capacities and interests from the political, the business and the security sector. Their transforming intertwining and positions are precisely what is revealing about security.

In this sense, the research engaged with a brief historical account of the security sector from the nineteenth century until today, looking at the use of violence as a changing resource for the enforcement of a specific economic and political order: from the need to centralize power in the Mohammed IV's (1859 to 1873) attempt at military reform, and Abdelaziz' and Abdelhafid's moves and contestations in the face of foreign colonial enterprises and indebtedness (Laraoui 1989), to the current neoliberal model and the accommodation of a private security industry.

5.3 Fieldwork: researching security in authoritarian contexts

"Everyone is working on security now", told me a former colleague from Chaouen[25], with whom I had worked on development projects for young people a few years ago. They were doing almost the exact same work that we had been doing a decade back (theatre activities in small villages, professional training, sexual and environmental education…), "but now we throw in the word de-radicalization and Foreign Aid Agencies are happy to fund our projects", they went on.

Although the word security and 'terrorism' are in the field and in academic products from all sides of the theoretical positions as never before, doing fieldwork on these issues is still a tricky question. On terrorism, Toros argues that fieldwork "remains an exception" (2008). Doing fieldwork on the topic of security is not easy, but luckily others have reflected about its intricacies (Azar & Moon, 1988; Cohn, 1987; C. H. Enloe, 2014; Toros, 2008).

Feminist and non-feminist scholars informed my view of what it is to do fieldwork, but also because, as women, they have reflected on the effect of their gender in their research relationships. Gender has a tremendous impact on fieldwork. Thinking about gender in relation to our fieldwork is not only important in order to perfect and improve the results of our work, the data we can obtain, the access to sources, or even personal safety. It is also important as we avoid biased, incorrect interpretations, being aware of the effects of the

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[25] Chaouen, or Chefchaouen in French, is a northern provincial town in the Moroccan Region Tánger-Tetouan.

principle of reciprocity on others: "No observation can become objective unless the observer is also observed objectively" (Mitroff cited in (Easterday et al., 1977).

Easterday et al. set the questions that I had in my mind:

> "What is it like to be a young, single male or an older, married male field researcher in a female-dominated setting? What about being a black researcher in a white setting? Or what happens if one is an older, married female in a male-dominated setting? When teams of researchers enter a setting, are there differences between the experiences of men and women, young and old, single and married, and so forth? Most important, how do these differences affect reality perspectives in any setting?" (1977, p. 347).

In his prelude to a more extensive guide on fieldwork on terrorism, Dolnik recommends using "open and non-threatening body language, with open palms up and frequent smiles, and a periodic but non-continuous eye contact" (2011:25) when talking to subjects. However, this recommendation would definitely not go well for many female researchers when interviewing male subjects, and could as well be interpreted as an invitation for some kind of sexual or romantic exchange, as cultural codes vary. This is especially true in non-mixed environments. Similar or other setbacks would also be encountered in the case of a male researcher interviewing a female subject. Dolnik only seems to be thinking of male-male rapports. Indeed, how do you build trust and rapport when this kind of trust between a young female and a male is practically non-existent in specific cultural contexts outside of the family circle and in certain economic or class groups? Realistically, avoiding personal involvement and intimacy with research subjects, avoiding over-rapport, as Easterday et al. suggest, should serve as a better guideline for female researchers, after all ethnography is about "involvement and detachment" (Powdermaker 1966:9 cited in Sluka & Robben). Moreover, can the 'mascot researcher role' (Adams 1999) category play any advantages in researching official and security issues? Easterday talks about fabricating information about one's story (the boyfriend/husband back home). In my experience, however unfortunate and disenfranchising this may sound, playing dumb-dumb can also be an effective and sometimes even unavoidable tool to gain attention and time from male subjects, as well as for safety reasons.

6. Limitations and challenges

Along the work of this research, various challenges have been encountered and they are worth being acknowledged. First and foremost, one important limitation that surfaced during the first stages of this PhD was the lack of prior research studies on the topic of business and the security sector in Morocco. Two elements were especially arduous in building up an informed research design and acquiring background knowledge on my main topic of study.

First, on a more theoretical level, there is an obvious lack of theory building in the entanglement between private security and authoritarian regimes. This means, that most thesis developed around the privatization or commercialization of security, including the theories of the history of the state and organized violence, have not emerged from the same historical context, especially, from a colonialized past. Therefore, most scholarship is based on specific ideas or private property, of capital accumulation, and on the liberal modern state. While this represents an opportunity for eager researchers to further expand the field and explore alternatives from different contexts, it means that we start with fewer or biased hypotheses that do not fit our contexts.

Second, as the historical approach was being built, specific security history was scarce and usually written from a European standpoint. Only Bahija Simou with her research *Les reformes militaires au Maroc de 1844 à 1912* and Abdelhak El-Merini, with his book *L'armée marocaine à travers l'histoire*, provide detailed accounts of historical moments in the military institutions (El-Merini, 2000; Simou, 1995). These accounts are nevertheless very technical and descriptive. Moreover, even a similar public history of the police, beyond the military, still needs to be written. This lack of specific literature requires an engagement with broader studies of the history of Morocco and to disentangle from them the coercive elements. What this further means is that it is easier to acquire a better knowledge of the warring events of the past two centuries than of the daily population control mechanisms, as they are mostly left out of history books.

As was mentioned before, the main disincentive to this topic was nevertheless the access to people and organizations directly involved with the security sector. Data-collection on the ground in Morocco was especially challenging, as security issues are always highly sensitive and secretive domain. This situation may discourage researchers.

In Morocco most of the data I gathered had to be carefully contrasted and triangulated with alternate sources. Furthermore, I focused on new policy development, political and individual changes at the top of the public security sector, public procurements for security provision from private companies (airports, ports and other strategic infrastructures), close informants and secondary sources. Some information, for example is self-reported data by former military officers. The defect of attribution, selective memory or even exaggeration from informants has been contemplated as it could deform specific events or data.

An added complication for the analysis of the security sector, and especially of private security companies, is the range and diversity of types of companies and types of security provided (from companies such as Deloitte providing financial security to those entrepreneurs installing home alarms). This limitation is not exclusive of Morocco and others have pointed at it for the European or French context (Hassid, 2010). I have limited my study of corporations to the case of physical security, that is security guards, but also, in less depth, of those providing surveillance technology.

As a consequence of these limitations, this work cannot provide a complete mapping of the sector. Nevertheless, the systematization of the reliable data in light of the conceptual framework and within a historical perspective helps us infer certain trends and dynamic changes in the practices of the security sector, especially on aspects of physical security and surveillance.

Another limitation concerns the Western Sahara. The Western Sahara militarized occupation is a very integral part of the current political and economic structure of Morocco. Its phosphate mines and fish resources account for a non-negligible part of Morocco's economy, usually at the expenses of most Sahrawi populations. Enhanced and forceful coercive and surveillance technologies also surround the contestation of Sahrawi activists (Allan, 2016; Ojeda-Garcia et al., 2017; Porges & Leuprecht, 2016). At the same time the Western Sahara issue weighs enormously in Morocco's foreign relations within Africa or with the international community in general. The occupation of Western Sahara also had an important role in the transformation of the military elites in Morocco after 1975.

Whenever possible, I have taken the issue into account. However, I have not deeply engaged with the issue by way of endangering the rest of my work. This research is thus incomplete.

6.1 Terminology and the language of research

This research has been traversed by at least 4 languages. It is written in English, but most of the interviews during my fieldwork were conducted in Moroccan Arabic and French. Most historical documentation and secondary sources were written in French, English or Spanish. And finally, my mother tongue is Catalan. Thinking and discussing about my project was done therefore in all of these languages.

This mix of languages is enriching, but also dangerous for the accuracy of terminology. Although securitization theory has provided a rich development of concepts I have gladly borrowed (reference object, securitizing actors, securitization, etc.) the variety of uses of the word security[26] (notwithstanding in these pages) makes it necessary to clarify the economic sector that we are looking at. I had real doubts about using the word security at all. Indeed I am truly rather looking at coercive forces, violence and social control, more than at security. But security is the word used in the sector, in corporate, and in public jargon, and even by most critical scholars. I reflect about this predicament in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Framework), from a conceptual perspective, and in Chapter 7 for my specific case study.

Security: 'without care' as its etymology conveys, has a rather twisted origin since security usually means the opposite, especially for the subaltern. When security is invoked it is precisely because there is a worry, a care. And we know that total security is a chimerical enterprise. As Chapter 2 further elaborates, security is understood here as an intersubjective, historically and geographically located concept, but also as a non-concept. It is a non-concept in the sense that its polysemic implementation has turned it into a blank concept to legitimize the use of violence and control over populations.

Furthermore, the concepts of private, public, security and violence differ from one context to the other[27]. One must be careful and question our understanding of public/private[28] and thus

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[26] The *Encyclopedia of Islam* refers to the Arabic word *aman* as a 19th century term (Schacht, 2012a). *Aman* referred to the protection granted to aliens.

[27] See in *Encyclopedia of Islam* the terminology of private and public *al-Khassa wa l-amma* (M.A.J. Beg, 2012) and also in Kadivar (Kadivar, 2003; M.A.J. Beg, 2012), also the terminology of *aman* (Schacht, 2012a). See also for specific debates and research about the terminology in the Moroccan context (Sebti, 1990).

[28] For a debate on these concepts within Islamic societies see (Kadivar, 2003). As Kadivar argues, this debate is particularly relevant in an ongoing 'privatization' of what in the West is conceived as the public sphere; as well as with a technological penetration of the private sphere.

in the case of private security perhaps a more appropriate terminology would be that of 'commercial security'. Since the latter is only marginally used, and not at all used in Morocco, I mostly use the common terminology 'private security'.

In the French conceptualization, the line of work of what is commonly translated as private security companies is *gardiennage* (guarding). Those that go beyond providing physical protection officers, that is, guards, might call them *societé de securité privée*. However, the current Moroccan law, institutions, media and most of the corporations acting within this sector, call the work *gardiennage*. I want to make this difference explicit because the noun *gardiennage* is not commonly used in the same way in English. However, it conveys a specific signification quite different from that of security. Guarding means protecting something from the outside. It conveys a meaning of materiality and spatiality. Providing security, on the other hand, conveys a less material, less limiting sense. Security does not seem to immediately convey a setting up of borders or walls, a necessary exclusion and inclusion, while guarding does. It is in this sense that, to my view, *gardiennage* or *harassa*, builds a much more different picture within the imaginary, a picture that might be lost to the English reader.

6.2. Challenges

Two challenges emerge from this work. First, the reader must be here warned that some parts of this research are rather detailed, especially when it refers to the supply chain of companies and public authorities. This style might be too nuanced for some scholars, as it is not usual to find this in academic literature. I assume the risk, as I believe that it is important to show the complexity of corporate structures. This complexity is part of the difficulty that scholars, journalists, activists and citizens alike have when they seek to trace responsibility for the present security regime. This is after all a PhD Dissertation. As such, it must stubbornly show evidence of the methods and render the possibility for others to retrace the steps.

Second, admittedly, it has been a terrible nightmare and headache for me to think of feminist perspectives and not find ways to include 'women' in the picture. Throughout all this research, I was trying to see how a feminist approach could be central to the work I was doing. But it was only men, men everywhere. Men as corporate executives, men as business entrepreneurs, men as cheap labor. Men as abused, men as abusers. Research could look at the masculinized labor sector that takes up so many men on the street reinforces a

masculinized public space, reinforces men's control and guarding, and passing, temporary women that use the public space. It could look at the issue of violence and harassment of women in public spaces is included in the narrative for enhanced security practices. It could look at the spacial deployment of policewomen, well visible in the busy roundabouts of Rabat.

As was explained above, I believe the feminist lens is still there, in the methods, in the epistemology, in the flexible ripping of concepts and theories, in the back and forth between theory and practice, between empirical and abstract.

7. Years in the making

The present research dissertation is the result of long years of investigation, reflection and discussions with colleagues and friends. I presented preliminary results of my work in different academic venues, and all occasions were an opportunity to understand new perspectives, to discover new layers of my research issue, to learn about new authors, to push myself to answer (or even to ask) difficult questions. Parts of this work were presented at the UAB Seminar on Security Sector Reform in 2017[29], MESA 2020[30], AECPA 2021[31], INMENAS Symposium 2021[32] and FIMAM 2021[33].

My creative and thinking process also resulted in parallel products in the form of articles and book chapters, and the issues and discussions have partially been included in this book. The most relevant ones for this research are the following:

- Benavides, F.; Mateos Martin, O.; & Camps-Febrer, B. (2018). "Límites y desafíos de la Justicia Transicional en las nuevas transiciones: Un análisis crítico a partir de los

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[29] Held at the IEMed (European Institute of the Mediterranean) on the 25th May 2017 and funded by ICIP (Catalan International Institute for Peace). I presented the draft article "Layers of Security: security sector and power struggle in Morocco" that was later published as part of a Special Issue: Camps-Febrer, B. (2019). "Layers of Security: The Security Sector and Power Struggle in Morocco". *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 12(1), 107–124. https://doi.org/10.1525/caa.2019.121007.

[30] I presented the paper "Neoliberal Security and the Authoritarian State: a contradiction in terms?" at the Middle East Studies Association Annual Meeting.

[31] 15th Congress of Spanish Association for Political Science and Administration. I presented the paper "La gobernanza securitaria en Marruecos: entre dinámicas neoliberales y autoritarismo", 9th of July 2021.

[32] Irish Network for Middle East and North African Studies (INMENAS) Postgrad Symposium, 12-13 November 2021. I presented the paper "Private Security and the Authoritarian State in Morocco: when the neoliberal agenda gets to the core".

[33] 23th Foro de Investigación de Mundo Árabe y Musulmán, held in Granada, 13-14 December 2021. I presented the paper "La Economía Política de la 'Seguridad' en Marruecos: entre dinámicas neoliberales y autoritarismo".

casos de Sierra Leona, Marruecos y Colombia". *Relaciones Internacionales*, *38*, 121–145. https://doi.org/10.15366/relacionesinternacionales2018.38.006

- Camps-Febrer, B.; & Mateos, Ó. (2018). "Marruecos y su nueva política exterior hacia África. Continuidades, discontinuidades y perspectivas". *Comillas Journal of International Relations*, *13*, 63–77. https://doi.org/10.14422/cir.i13.y2018.005

- Camps-Febrer, B. (2019b). "Layers of Security: The Security Sector and Power Struggle in Morocco". *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, *12*(1), 107–124. https://doi.org/10.1525/caa.2019.121007

- Camps-Febrer, B. (2019c, July 23). *Counter-terrorism as a technology of securitization: 69Approaching the Moroccan case.* Securitization Revisited. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429054648-4

- Camps-Febrer, B., & Farrés-Fernández, G. (2019). Power and the Security Sector: Thoughts from the Sociology of Power. *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, *12*(1), 3–18. https://doi.org/10.1525/caa.2019.121001

- Camps-Febrer, B. (2019). "Counter-terrorism as a technology of securitization: Approaching the Moroccan case". In M. J. Butler (Ed.), *Securitization Revisited: Contemporary Applications and Insights* (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429054648

- Camps-Febrer, B., & Carter Jr., J. A. (2021). "New security: Threat landscape and the emerging market for force". In N. Ribas-Mateos & T. J. Dunn (Eds.), *Handbook on human security, borders and migration* (pp. 108–121). Edward Elgar Publishing.

- Izquierdo Brichs, F.; Feliu, L.; & Camps-Febrer, B. (2021). "Acumulación y resistencias en el norte de África y Oriente Medio. Colonialismo, poscolonialismo y neoliberalismo". *Ayer*, *4*(124), 25–51.

- Camps-Febrer, B. (2022) "Morocco: Intelligence Culture At the King's Service". In Shaffer, Ryan (2022) *Handbook of Intelligence Services in Africa* (In Press)

8. Overview of the structure

This dissertation is built into 4 different Parts. **Part I** (Theory and Practice of the Research) refers to the theoretical framework in which this research has been based, from the existing scholarship to my own conceptual framework. **Part II** (A Political Economic History of Security) engages along 4 chapters with the evolution of violence as a resource of power,

especially at the hands of primary and secondary elites in Morocco since precolonial times to the current rule of Mohammed VI. **Part III** (Neoliberal Security) includes the analysis of my main case study: Private Security Companies. This is done through a series of different methods, described along 3 chapters. Finally **Part IV** (Discussion and Conclusions) includes the discussion of the results of my research and the conclusions put them in perspective within the broader context of scholarship.

Chapter 1 (Searching for Security: Literature Review) of the dissertation engages with the different scholarship on security, especially from the discipline of International Relations. From the realist and most hegemonic visions of 'national security' to critical security studies, I look at the debates and gaps in literature, especially focusing on North Africa and Middle Eastern studies and the main issues and perspectives used.

Chapter 2 (The Political Economy of Security: Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Foundations of the Research), building on a very thick literature on security that I have described in chapter 1, this second chapter discusses the selected theoretical foundations of my research, describing some of the most prominent and relevant scholarship that has inspired it. This chapter deals thus with some of the existing approaches of security studies, as well as with globalization studies, political economy, and regime analysis. Here, I lay out the basics of the sociology of power and its analysis of the regime of power in Morocco.

As part of the scheduled structure of my thesis, I had conceived the need to look at the historical formation of elites and the evolution of resources of power that facilitated the accumulation by dispossession. **Chapter 3** (Retracing Security), thus, looks back at the formation of the regime's structure and its elites to trace the use of violence. From the foundation of the Alawite dynasty the use of violence was fundamental, but up until the nineteenth century mostly directed against competing actors (not so much through centralized control of populations). The role of coercion –and with it its organization- progressively changes with the increase of structural power when consent becomes also fundamental for the stability of the regime. This chapter explores the progressive penetration of colonial powers in light of the dependence between state violence and the capacity to extract resources to sustain the coercive forces.

In **Chapter 4** (The colonial and the modern *makhzen*: Security sector and power struggle in Morocco) the decrease of the sultan's power and the subsequent establishment of the

protectorate are analyzed in light of the appearance of a new state, new actors and a new distribution of power during colonialism. This chapter also engages with the first years of the postcolonial state and links it with the continuities of both the colonial state mechanisms and the independence struggle.

Chapter 5 (Layers of Security: A Neoliberal Era) tackles the role of the security sector since the 1970s until now. This timespan encapsulates the neoliberal era in Morocco. In this chapter the structural nature of the sector is described from an organizational and institutional perspective of the public sector, the different leaders in charge of the units and departments, functions of the main bodies, main operations; coordination and participation in international networks, etc.

Chapter 6 (Intelligence Services) specifically delves into a crucial mechanism of state security, intelligence and secret services; describes the intricacies of political violence and surveillance, and their importance in the survival of the regime of power.

Part III of this dissertation encapsulated the in-depth case study and nucleus of the inquiry. Here the thesis tackles the material and immaterial characteristics and implications of the new neoliberal security order, specifically in terms of the private security sector.

Chapter 7 (Private Security Industries) looks at the legal and corporative development of the private security sector industry. This chapter focuses specifically on physical security, that is, the provision of guards. Chapter 7 constitutes the central element of my research. This is my case study and the dimension where data collection has been more intensive and extensive. The amount of companies and personnel working in this sector has provided a very rich sample of lucid economic and political entanglement that shows the relevance of the research issue.

Chapter 8 (Localizing Security Industries) is then devoted to the localization of securities, where the provision of private security is mapped, and it discusses the political and social implications of an uneven spatial deployment of this security.

Chapter 9 (The terrorist, the criminal and the unprofessional: The discursive construction of neoliberal security) adopts a more constructivist perspective through a look at the different narratives of securitization adopted in the last decades and that have been identified through the research. The main three narratives in homeland security are terrorism, criminality and

modernization. The chapter follows the thread of critical criminal anthropology and critical policing studies by tackling the narratives that frame the emergence and consolidation of this new neoliberal security, which includes a new assemblage between policing models and institutions.

Finally in Part IV, **Chapter 10** (Interpretation and Discussion) is conceived as an interpretation text where the main results collected throughout the research are discussed and contrasted against the existing body of scholarship; and **Chapter 11** (Conclusions: Securing Capitalism) rearranges these findings into general conclusions that connect and answer the main questions which originally fueled this research. This last chapter also discusses the shortcomings of the final dissertation and offers new potential lines of inquiry.

Part I

Theory and Practice of the Research

Chapter 1 - Searching for Security: Literature Review

This chapter retraces the literature that has informed, in one way or another, the perspective taken on the topic of this research. This is thus an argumentative and selective literature review that contains the works and authors that have contributed to this heterogeneous, plural and transdisciplinary framework of analysis. It is structured mostly as a chronological account of my literary and educational journey. Nevertheless, many areas that were tentatively stepped into but not further pursued as the research was advancing have been omitted. Some specific literature, very useful to the research and that has been used as source of information on the case study, is not presented here at length if it does not provide a substantial theoretical contribution to the field of study, but it will be introduced and referenced throughout the following chapters.

The present chapter is structured in five different sections. First, the classical and hegemonic approaches to security in International Relations are introduced, mainly realism and liberalism, where the focus and unit of analysis is the state. I do not delve too much in these widely known approaches, but instead use them to explain the critique that they receive. The second section deals with the quarrels that emerge when realist theories are reviewed critically from outside the West and the places of power where they were born. Scholars from the Global South might still use some realist and neorealist perspectives on international security that do not decenter the state, but they raise significant questions to be considered.

Third, the chapter approaches the constructivist and critical theories that deconstruct security and regard it as an intersubjective concept that is socially constructed. Different schools develop further theories to explain the contexts and mechanisms of security. While this section deals with the narrative and discursive practices of security, I also engage here approaches that have attempted to bridge the gap between a purely ideationist toolkit, to one where material conditions are also taken into account, as in the proposal of International Political Sociology.

A more situated look is approached in section four, where the specific scholarship on security that focuses on West Asia and North Africa is reviewed, and past contributions are discussed, as well as the challenges and opportunities for a political economy of security in the region.

Finally, section five briefly summarizes my take-aways from the chapter. It points in the direction of the next chapter, where the detailed epistemological and theoretical dispositives that shape this research will be laid out.

1. The breakup of National Security

Aside perhaps the idea of power, there are fewer concepts more central in International Relations than that of security. Der Derian noted that "[…] no other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power, of security" (1993, p. 95). It is in fact, a highly subjective and multilayered concept, and as such most debates and divides in the discipline start from the different ontologies awarded to the word. The practical meaning of security has a lot to do with our position in society and within the international system (Sjoberg, 2008). "To me security means a house and a job", told me a social worker living in Barcelona with her two kids and husband. We might not get the same immediate answer from someone in the midst of Yemen's war, or from a businessperson struggling to stay on top of the economic ladder.

Among academia, different, often contradictory definitions also abound. Anthropology, Philosophy or Political Science have very different commentaries around the issue of security. In the world of International Relations, 'national security' has traditionally been the primary concern, although what exactly that means remains controversial.

In realist and neorealist thought, security, international conflict and war are the main concerns in international relations, where the absence of a governing authority produces an anarchy that can only be survived by states that are prepared. For classical realists like Morgenthau, the international system was a kind of Hobbesian anarchy where the self-interest of states prevailed, and the constant pursuit of predominance prevented a stable balance of power between nations (Morgenthau, 2006). Traditional realists saw chaos and anarchy in the world and focused on states as unitary and rational actors (Barbé Izuel, 1987), effectively turning states into anthropomorphic unit of analysis that mirrored the aggressive nature of human beings. In short, the will-to-power of every self-interest state rendered utopian any idea of a supra-national organization structuring relations among nations and thus only theories of balance of power or hegemonic stability were reasonable.

The intellectual hegemony of realism throughout the twentieth century IR ensured that the security that mattered was linked to 'national interests', since states were the main central actors in international relations. Neorealists like Mearsheimer, while continuing to focus on state as units and agents of international relations, also emphasized the importance of the structural distribution of power among states. National interests had to be assessed as

objectively as possible in order to protect the sovereignty of the nation against external military threats. Subsequently, Stephen Walt defined security studies as "the studies of the threat, use, and control of military force" (Walt, 1991).

During the Cold War, especially in the USA, security studies focused strictly on the military dangers, "real or imagined" (Ullman, 1983), of sovereign states. The danger of a nuclear total war emboldened that focus although this danger still technically exists today.

The Cold War was indeed the perfect soil to develop a militarized security narrative, although the ideological charge of the two-blocs competition put a strain on the 'rational'-claim of what national interest meant. Morgenthau's and other realists' famous criticism about the US War in Vietnam was built on the analysis of the reduced gain and real interest of that policy for the national interest. As Mearsheimer discusses, Morgenthau would also probably have been against the 2003 War in Iraq on the same grounds, and would have dismissed it as an ideological project, "essentially Wilsonianism with teeth" (Mearsheimer, 2005).

In contrast, liberals and neoliberals focused more on the systemic level of analysis in world politics, studying the benefits of international institutions or economic liberal relations, and complex interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 1973) that would render international actors more dependent in their survival and therefore less prone to military confrontation (Griffiths, 2007; Navari, 2008). The importance of commercial liberal approaches and the democratic peace theory is not only found in academic scholarship. Rather, this approach permeates the narratives and agendas of International Financial Institutions like the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, as they promote open economic and trade relations as tools for democratization (Hibou, 2000), security governance and security sector reforms.

While realism pries itself on the contrast of an objective assessment of national interest as opposed to liberals and their idealism, the depth of positivism in the realist paradigm has been contested and revisited (Tickner, 1988; Williams, 2004). The discussion between ideology-oriented foreign policy and rational-oriented foreign policy however, has also been regarded as a construct (Hoffmann, 1996). Hoffmann argued that "[m]any of America's policies during the Cold War [...] resulted from preferences that could not be reduced purely and simply to the need to resist the Soviet menace or communism." (Hoffmann, 1996, p. 173). Goals of states go beyond national imperatives to safeguard the nation from threats and needs and "result from preferences and choices" (Hoffmann, 1996, p. 173).

It is however true, that most mainstream academia agreed during the Cold War about the centrality of national security, even if they disagreed on how to identify it or how to measure it. Proponents of liberalism, in contrast with realists, saw the international realm as a community where co-operation was possible and indeed happening in many spheres already. The real interest of states was indeed to co-operate for their own benefit, whether economic or for security matters, as neoliberal Keohane argued (Griffiths, 2007).

The clash was not only between traditional realists and liberalists but also with post-modernists and post-positivists that refused the possibility of explaining the social truth. In 1952, Wolfers had already attempted to distinguish between an objective and a subjective security. To him, "security in an objective sense measures the absence of threats to acquired values, and in a subjective sense the absence of fear that such values will be attacked" (Wolfers, 1952, p. 485). However, how can the measurement be objective when it deals with values, an inherently subjective element?

In 1983, Richard H. Ullman further criticized the view of security as entailing only military threats and military solutions, and suggested that many other resources were at the government's disposal to ensure national security[34]. Further, the actual terminology of 'national security' was used as an euphemism for the too military-sounding term of national defense after the creation of the US National Security Council in 1947 (Neocleous, 2006). Similar to peace researchers' hypotheses, Ullman thought that the narrow focus could also lead to excessive militarization of international relations that in turn would increase insecurity in the world (1983, p. 129).

To these new thinkers[35], national security did not mean only one thing, and economic, societal, political and environmental risks had to be assessed with the same level of concern. At the same time, and as the oil crises were unfolding, energy security was introduced as a fundamental part of the equation in the US, and thus in influential academic thinking.

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[34] Other authors such as Brown 1977, Matthews 1989.

[35] Other authors: such as Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Theodore Moran, Myron Weiner (cited by Krause 1998); Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations (Boulder, CO, 1987); Theodore Moran, 'International Economics and National Security', Foreign Affairs, 69:5 (Winter 1990/1), pp. 74–90; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, 'Redefining Security', Foreign Affairs, 68:2 (Spring 1989), pp. 162–77; Brad Roberts, 'Human Rights and International Security', Washington Quarterly, Spring 1990, pp. 65–75; Myron Weiner, 'Security, Stability and International Migration', International Security, 17:3 (Winter 1992–3), pp. 91–126; Richard Ullman, 'Redefining Security', International Security, 8:1 (Summer 1983), pp. 129–53.

Ullman's proposal, however, did not break the standpoint that defined the kind of security that was important in International Relations. The referent object continued to be the state.

It was only during the 1990s that some kind of debate[36] between 'traditionalists and wideners/deepeners' took place. Realists or neorealists like Mearsheimer (1995) or Waltz (2009) respectively kept arguing for the usefulness and clarity of the traditional approach even if their critics accused them of not been able to define security in a workable and useful manner[37]. The emerging world after bipolarity showed academic elite what many on the periphery were already aware of: security was not only about military threats.

It is now clear that not only in practice, but also abstract theorizing on security in International Relations always entails a specific ontological meaning, even if the working definition of what authors mean by security usually goes unexplained and is implicitly assumed. As feminist and postcolonial scholars have long pointed out, security studies have been clearly dominated by a Western white male elite of intellectuals whose pretense of 'neutrality' was actually marred with their own subjectivity and positionality (Tickner, 1988, 1997). Indeed, our definition of security and our use of the concept as an analytical tool will vary depending on our position in the world. Who or what we regard as the primary object of reference, namely the object that must be 'secured' from an 'existential threat'; who or what has the ability, capacity or legitimacy to provide that security; the tools we regard as useful, legitimate, etc.; and increasingly, how much security we regard as the ultimate goal of political and collective action.

Peace studies, international political economists, Marxian and structuralists, and others outside the world of academia, have long been quite conscious of the polysemic nature of security[38]. To peace and conflict researchers, security has been a powerful justification for the reinforcement of national military capacities. On the contrary, peace researchers such as Johan Galtung or Kenneth Boulding have been looking for decades at concepts such as

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[36] About the false myth of 'debates' in IR see (Wilson, 1998).

[37] Amongst them the most cited papers reflecting on this issue are Wohlforth, William C. "Realism and the End of the Cold War." *International Security* 19.3 (1994): 91-129; Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the cold war." *International organization* 48.2 (1994): 185-214; Lebow, Richard Ned. "The long peace, the end of the cold war, and the failure of realism." *International Organization* 48.2 (1994): 249-277.

[38] It had also been an issue during the idealist years of post-World War I. Peace activists and feminists from the beginning of the twentieth century called into question the idea of 'national security' that was pushing European nations into war (Stöckmann, 2017). See for example, Alfred Zimmern, 'The problem of collective security', in Quincy Wright (ed.), *Neutrality and Collective Security* (Chicago, 1936).

'positive peace' or stable peace that could be seen as precursors of a deepened concept of security (Boulding, 1978, 1995; Galtung & Fischer, 2013; Webel & Galtung, 2007).

Feminist scholars and activists also contributed to peace research by pushing the issue of gender in debates, especially in the 1980s through analyzing the links between war an patriarchy, although their initial success was limited (Wibben, 2010). Important milestones in the direct engagement of feminist scholars with security are Tickner's (1992) and Reardon's (1993) books[39], focusing both more on global than on national security (Blanchard, 2003; Wibben, 2010).

Some authors attempted to redefine security by broadening the concept as a multidimensional one - decoupling security from a necessary military response - that includes different sectors: economic, political, societal, environmental and military (Buzan, 1997). Broadening the concept of security still remained "within a state-centric approach, but deployed diverse terms (common, cooperative, collective, comprehensive) as modifiers to security in order to assess different multilateral forms of interstate security cooperation" (Krause, 1998, p. 127). This first approach did not challenge the centrality of the state as referent object, but it did help look into what and who was defining its interests.

Others attempted to deepen the concept by moving downwards or upwards the focus and the referent object, from global security (Tickner, 1992), societal security (Wæver, 1995), to human security (Glasius & Kaldor, 2005; UNDP, 1999).

So many different approaches to security can create a chaotic scenery and ultimately devoid the concept of its utility. While "[d]iversity is the key to understanding the current landscape and should be embrace to the fullest" (Dunn Cavelty & Mauer, 2010, p. 3), what becomes clear is the need for every scholar to be precise and explicit about their use of the term and to understand it as a working tool, since the hegemonic and implicit 'national security' no longer prevails. The fact remains that different layers of security make up a complex issue that can be seen from very different perspectives, each of them containing a certain incomplete truth.

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[39] I am referring respectively to Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (1992) and Women and Peace: Feminist Visions of Global Security (1993).

In the twenty-first century, some argue that the line between traditionalists, and wideners and deepeners has more or less been settled (Dunn Cavelty & Mauer 2010). Strategic Studies has become a sub-field of Security Studies, which is now more or less accepted to be about more than the inter-state military threat. Although commonly stated, in my view, this popularity of Security Studies has taken up not so much because of the attacks on US soil in 2001, but due to the beginning of the Global War on Terror (GWoT) and especially to its high level of moral and normative content.

2. Securities and Insecurities from the Global South

As it might seem obvious to those living, interested or researching outside of the Global North, state security doesn't usually coincide with people's security. Even in the North, anthropologists, sociologists of security or those researching the margins can also easily see the contradictions that people live with. To Krause (1996), it was the fact that liberal states in Europe had been able to gather a general consensus over their legitimacy what had fooled scholars into identifying 'state security' with the security of their citizens. This assimilation between national security and people's security is certainly problematic in most of the Third World, where authoritarian regimes abound[40].

It has been more than three decades since critical scholars called into question the adequacy of the western model of security. Non-western scholars like Mohammed Ayoob (1991, 2002, 2010) or Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon (1988) identified fundamental problems to the orthodox and realist concept of security that prevented it, according to them, from being applicable to third-world states. It was precisely the study of security outside the West that opened up possibilities to understand how fragile the 'consensual legitimacy of the state' is, even in the West. This fragility is also shown by political economy studies on militarism, that identify elites and their interests on arms trade and their impact on aggressive foreign policies (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009; Kinsella, 1998) or by anthropological and sociological work on the surveillance state (Breckenridge, 2014; Rigouste, 2007; Wacquant, 2009).

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[40] To Krause, "Third World implementations of security are amendments or extensions of western models: Ayoob 95; Barnett and Levy 91, David 91, Levy and Barnett 1992, Walt 87". Buzan in his classic book *People, States and Fear* (1991).

Ayoob's criticism of western theory left intact the realist approach and the centrality of states as central actors, but it nevertheless opened the way for others to advance the necessity of including different dimensions into the study of security. Human security, for instance, moved away from state-centric analyses and focused on the "challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people"[41]. Human Security, in its turn, would be criticized as a perilous mantra for liberal interventionism (Acharya, 2001), and others followed with the development of post-liberal peace critiques (Chandler, 2008; Richmond, 2011). Additionally, in the WANA region (West Asia and North Africa region), policy-oriented research has pointed towards local and 'indigenous agendas' to approach security issues (Sayigh 2007, Kodmani, 2009).

These new considerations on the meaning of security and how to approach it broke away from traditional security studies and would come closer to critical theory and constructivist approaches. If we further followed the questioning of security to its final consequences, we would end up where scholars of state violence started: outside mainstream IR, from African-American studies about the business of mass incarceration in the USA (Alexander, 2012; A. Y. Davis, 2005), to the accounts that explore the links of imperial and colonial practices with the development of security paradigms in Europe (Berda, 2013; Breckenridge, 2014; Rigouste, 2007).

Perhaps the realization that "Eurocentrism [is] a problem within the study of world politics" (Powel, 2019) is more common today (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006; Jones, 2006; Hobson, 2012; Sabaratnam 2013), but we still lack theoretical tools on how to overcome this Eurocentrism[42]. There is indeed a danger of recentering IR while trying to decenter it (Powel, 2019). Perhaps the problem resides precisely in the epistemology of IR: the self-imposed need to design simplified theories – or, alternatively, abstract complexities -, instead of the reliance on fieldwork and the social. Reflexivity, the constant questioning about the "limits of one's own gaze" (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 272), is here a potent first step to overcome these Eurocentric paradigms.

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[41] United Nations General Assembly resolution 66/290. While this resolution redefines security as being at the level of people, the responsibility and agency within the international community is nevertheless the role of states. For a discussion on the Responsibility to Protect of the international community see (Chandler, 2010).

[42] Powel (2019) has suggested that two elements linked to Eurocentrism are actor-centrism and tempocentrism. By rethinking actors and the temporality of our historical framework we might create new understandings of the world.

Since the weight of Western scholar production is still dominant, even critiques of liberal peace still mainly focus on western intervention (Duffield, 2001, 2007; Chandler, 2006; Richmond, 2005). The liberal peace project tended to universalize an international agenda, priorities, problems and solutions that were essentially a Western project, and that granted focus and agency to international actors, neglecting an epistemology based on local knowledge and local ownership (Chandler & Richmond, 2015; Jabri, 2013). Nevertheless, critical accounts of the liberal peace project must also be interrogated, as their critique of the West and of western action traps them into giving very little voice, space and visibility to locals (Sabaratnam, 2013).

The neglect is, on one hand, about the voices of local and subaltern actors, the 'majority world' as Frowd (2019) puts it; and on the other, about seeing other transnational dynamics that might not exclusively follow the North-South trail. It also is in this sense that Marxian and structuralist approaches have tended to neglect the local agency, instead simply focusing on the dependency element and thus further enfranchising 'the periphery' (Izquierdo Brichs, 2009)[43].

Transnational security practices also travell from South to North, as sociologist and activist Mathieu Rigouste explored with the colonial experience in Algeria and other parts of the French *outre-mer*. In his research (2009), military commanders learned and practiced population control and repression through the cities and villages of Algeria and Madagascar, later going back to France to sell their new techniques to be applied in rebellious workers' neighborhoods[44]. In Israel, Yael Berda (2013) linked Israeli practices in occupied Palestine with a colonial western tradition of subjugation and control of the subaltern with the help of a security narrative. Tahani Mustafa traces the influence of post-liberal security sector reform and the entrenchment of occupation and repression in Palestine (Mustafa, 2015).

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[43] Marxist critics like Samir Amin or Aijaz Ahmad argue that the subaltern studies and colonial discourse theory see symbolic, ideological and cultural elements as primary constitutive of the identities and knowledges of the Global South. These authors, conversely, try to understand the different non-western as also fundamentally 'explainable' through materialist theory (Sanyal, 2019).

[44] Rigouste uses the concept 'endo-colonial' to refer to those enclaves that are seen as the inner enemy, where the dangerous people are confined by the imperial tactics, not abroad but inside the metropole. He argues that there is a connection between the social and political repression of those at the bottom, and the development of colonial empires. This is similar to what Federici (2014) argues about the techniques of biopolitics and disciplines of the bodies that connected plantations and slave trade with the witch-hunt and repression of revolts in Europe.

These case studies decenter research from an actor-centrism to refocus on the relational (transnational and local) aspect of IR. All the while, they also show the importance of a historical and sociological approach to the study of security issues.

Critical Security Studies (CSS) have also been under-tested outside of their Western cradle (Wilkinson 2007). Although some efforts have been made ever since Wilkinson pointed at the shortcoming, most of critical security studies in the Global South have been prompted by the 'war on terror' and have focused mainly on discursive analysis of terror / anti-terror narratives. In the Securitization Theory (ST), introduced below, critics point at the need to rethink the place and notion of discourse, text, and the importance of official discourse. We must "think of sites in the 'majority world' as being spaces of *theory* generation too" (Salter et al., 2019, p. 20). Nevertheless, the reflexive nature of ST renders the use, some of its tools and postulates more flexible than other security orthodoxies.

Luckily, there seems to be a renewal of Critical Security Studies, finally catching up to globalization, and the plight against 'the universal white man' is starting to be taken serious. Some of the most influential CSS scholars see the need to include gender, race, environment, without it meaning a *dejà-vue* of widening the field. However, it is rather the 'view from nowhere' that feminists criticized as no longer acceptable (C. Enloe, 2010), as they see that critiques are routinely 'acknowledged' but not really 'taken up' (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2019) nor regarded as previously-ignored structural elements of the international world.

Case studies such as the one presented in this dissertation, that look into security issues in the Global South, have the double responsibility of seeing the transnational dependency of local elites, while also finding the specific voices that shape and impact ordinary lives and the ultimate experience of security.

3. Private security

It is precisely in the Global South, that Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) first emerged as an issue for IR scholars. While the heavy military industry has always been part of the critical military and security studies to a certain extent, other types of security provision have only recently emerged as part of the global security landscape (Marshall, 2021; Mintz, 1985; O'Reilly, 2010; Oudot & Bellais, 2019; Strom et al., 2010).

Surveillance security studies, for instance, deal with privately-developed technology, its social and political implications as well as their gendered or racial biases (Breckenridge, 2014; Dubrofsky & Magnet, 2015; Zuboff, 2019).

The interest of IR on the global private security landscape has to do more with the increasing role of private actors in defining societal and global dynamics, as well as their dashing increase in terms of market turnover and their visible implication at the forefront of battlefields. This was especially obvious in Iraq (Palou-Loverdos & Armendáriz, 2011). Private security is an object of study in border and migrant scholars, in armed conflict scholars as well as on those that deal with specific regions where the phenomenon is becoming especially relevant (Abrahamsen & Leander, 2016; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009; Buzatu & Buckland, 2015; Schreier & Caparini, 2005). Iraq and Afghanistan –and wherever the US goes, for that matter-, Israel (Grassiani, 2017) but also some countries in Africa such as Nigeria or South Africa are the rare sites of research (Breckenridge, 2014; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2016).

PMSCs represent a very specific type of actors in contexts of violent conflicts or occupation, and their proliferation is due to political factors as well as economic ones. On the political side, governments who hire private security reduce the political cost of deaths – as no young soldiers, but hired contractors die or kill; and so protect themselves from any negative consequence of policy decisions and actions, through plausible deniability (Abrahamsen & Leander, 2016; Singer, 2009). The presence of PMSCs poses a challenge to the public/private division of security and shows the necessary link between security and the economic order: "private security growth patterns, the dynamics of legitimation, the logics of security regulation and the relationship between security and the public good" are issues security studies must engage with (White, 2011, p. 81).

White's proposal, guided by political economy, is to overcome traditional dichotomies in spaces where "politics/economics, states/markets and structure/agency collide with and mutually constitute each other." (2011:81). While the discussions White raises are crucial, his assumption that private military security companies fill a void in security provision left by thinning and debt-ridden state budgets is highly problematic. In fact, White's conclusions are evidence of how important a combined ideational-materialist approach is. White simply ignores the subjective aspect of security and regards the security needs of a society as an objective and quantifiable indicator.

On the contrary, the 'private' turn of global security is consistent with a neoliberal narrative of efficiency, cost-effective solutions to every human problem. In neoliberalism, private projects are put forward as solutions to the problems of insecurity. The privatization or commodification of security responds to the ascetic and pseudo-objective world of technological solutions (Salter et al., 2019).

Even if PMSCs are seen as a new phenomenon, as they try to distance themselves from mercenaries, scholars Spitzer and Scull (1977) have contributed to a long-term analysis of the changing dynamics between private and public security, especially in the evolution of police and its link to the mode of production. A key attempt at analyzing security through a Marxist lens remains their 1977 research. It is rather telling that their work was not picked up by IR scholars until the 2000s, peaking in 2016 with citations[45]. In their paper, they accounted for a rather unknown history of private policing, linking the different forms of policing to the evolution of the capitalist mode of production.

Spitzer argues for a causal link between the mode of production policing and the evolution of policing (Spitzer, 1993; Spitzer & Scull, 1977). This author centres his research in the US and British cases, highlighting the dialectical nature of the development of police and its relation to the different phases of capital accumulation. However, he falls short of including two rather central dimensions. Firstly, the gender dimension is absent from his analysis of the evolution from an approach to peasants and workers as a 'finished product' to a 'social investment'. It is in this evolution were policing makes more sense outside of the enclosed capitalist arena, outside of the 'industrial town'. Since all dimensions of life become part of the 'capitalist way of life' the control of social order becomes more important in all its dimensions. An inclusion of the importance of reproductive forces for the reposition of productive forces would have rendered the importance of controlling social order in habits, social relations, church, family and community, much more central than they seem to be in Spitzer's account.

Secondly, the colonial dimension is only briefly mentioned through the acknowledgment of the creation of the Thames River Police (1798), initially funded mainly by West Indian Company merchants as a means to control trade and pilferage along the docks of the Thames

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[45] Analysis done through Web of Science (Accessed 8/10/2019)

River. The marine police force later joint the Metropolitan Police in 1839. The Thames River Police were the largest regular professional police force, and according to Spitzer, they became the model for the Metropolitan Police in 1829 (Spitzer, 1993, p. 586). This colonial dimension is central in Morocco's case where the link between the *Banque d'État* and the imposed creation of the Police in Morocco was explicit. The police was created under the French auspices in order to ensure that Moroccan debt was repaid to the European Banks. As Williams argues, "the institution of modern policing was colonial in form" (R. Williams, 2003, p. 322).

Notwithstanding the gender and colonial absences, Spitzer & Scull opened up a perspective for studying security with Marxist tools, which could prove very useful in today's neoliberal security.

4. Critical Security Studies: security as an intersubjective concept

Realists and liberals alike set their analyses with the more or less explicit assumption that security is an attainable and observable object of study, and even one that can be nationally agreed on. They do not concern themselves with the ideational aspect of security. To constructivists, on the contrary, the notion of security in a given time and context is indeed discursively constructed, reinforced through 'intersubjective rhetorical practice[s]' (Bigo, 1996), especially by policy-makers, media and other actors who have the capacity to present and shape the hegemonic narrative. In Katzenstein's words, "[s]tate interests do not exist to be "discovered" by self-interested, rational actors. Interests are constructed through a process of social interaction." (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 44). Burke (2002) argues that "security's claims to universality and wholeness founder on a destructive series of aporias, which derive firstly from the growing sense that security no longer has a stable referent object, nor names a common set of needs, means, or ways of being, and secondly, from the moral relativism that lies at the center of dominant (realist) discourses of security that pretend to universality but insist that "our" security always rests on the insecurity and suffering of an-other." The danger thus of research or of policy-making imbued by realist approaches is that it ignores the trade off between a certain security and liberty (Ullman, 1983, p. 130), between the security of few

and the exclusion of the other because in fact (in)security always entails a sacrifice (Bigo, 1996), usually by the same populations and peoples.

The crumbling of the Soviet bloc in the 1990s represented a rather speedy replacement of the soviet enemy, a political and economic threat, for a more culturally-dense narrative of the enemy such as in Huntington's "clash of civilizations" or in Kaplan's identity and religious analyses of the Balkan wars. This replacement of the *feindbild* or the ultimate bogeyman was sustained by ongoing historical supremacist and colonial narratives[46] that portrayed Arabs and Muslims in a backward, irrational and barbaric light (Buzan, 1997; Mamdani, 2004). With the end of the Cold War, western alliances in the WANA region shifted, and so did the Western representation of the region. While extremist views had often been encouraged by Western powers, pitted against leftist movements or even funded to fight soviet-leaning regimes, by the end of the century freedom fighters had become the barbaric extremists to be feared. The rise of a 'threat from the South', Bigo (1991) alerted, was dangerously reinforcing an inner/outer reassembling of illiberal practices.

The importance and danger that constructivists and critical scholars identified in the post-Cold War security framework led to two different research agendas.

The focus of most social constructivists was centered on unpacking the hegemonic meanings of security in order to shed light on power relations, construction of an enemy, mobilization of resources, etc. What constituted and still constitutes a pressing research object for these scholars is not security per se – since we can't really agree on what that is – but the deployment of certain conceptions that work as a 'normative enterprise' (Kolodziej 2005); the tensions between contradictory or exclusionary 'securities', the mechanisms that make a certain security productive to power or resistance[47]. Social constructivists, that probably constitute the main bulk of constructivist scholars[48], do not ignore the materiality of security, but they choose to engage with its ideational and subjective nature without denying its material effects (Jackson, 2011a).

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[46] As Edward Said had detailed in his work on *Orientalism* (Said, 2003), Melanie Richter-Montpetit (2014) highlights the importance of acknowledging the structural racism of these narratives instead of narrowly focusing on present framings (see chapter 2).

[47] In chapter 2 I explore further the conditions of these intersubjective meanings as historical structural factors are also essential in understanding the building of consent and hegemonic narratives of security.

[48] Although only a partial study of critical security studies that focus on critical terrorism studies, Herring & Stokes (2011) find most of the works published (57%) in the Journal *Critical Studies on Terrorism* are social constructivist approach, further divided between thin and thick social constructivism.

A second research agenda for critical security scholars as opposed to traditional security scholars, however, does focus on determining what security really *is*. Avoiding the absolute state-centered vision[49] and drawing from the feminist epistemological proposals, these trends of CSS do follow more or less objectivist understandings of security (Buzan et al., 1998) and their goal is to break down the hegemonic narrative and bring in new dimensions, issues and perspectives of security. Feminist research on security studies (FSS) has shown how paramount to the understanding of the world it is to study how (in)security is perceived, produced and reproduced by individuals, with a special eye to their gendered nature. In adopting an emancipatory agenda, FSS are compelled to find voices and visions that shatter the hegemonic consensus and open new understandings of security. It is through feminist and empirically-driven research[50] that we learn that violence in armed conflicts is not limited in the public space; that gender-based violence within families and communities actually escalates during armed conflict; or that violence does not end with a cease-fire (Cohn, 2011; Sjoberg, 2011; Soumita, 2011).

4.1 Securitization Theory

It was within the former research agenda that Securitization Theory (ST) was developed. The work of Ole Waever, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde provided a solid conceptual framework for deconstructing hegemonic narratives of security. Their 1998 book, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Buzan et al., 1998) provides a template for analyzing the empirically identified process of moving an issue from the political arena into the security arena. They worked with a very pragmatic definition of security:

> "Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics." (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23)

In this sense, the authors regarded the 'securitization move' as an exceptional and specific process in politics. For this move to be successful, a 'securitizing actor' would use certain 'speech-acts' that framed specific acts as 'threats' to the security of a 'referent object', the latter being typically generic concepts such as the nation, the country, even economic order

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[49] Sjoberg (2008) rather ironically asks: "At what 'level' if any in international politics is the 'war on terror' taking place?"

[50] Among many others, authors like (Cockburn, 2003, 2013; Cohn, 2008, 2011; Salter et al., 2019).

or freedom. Consider how different political violence against civilians has been framed (as an act of war or as a crime) and the political/military consequences of that framing.

The work that emerges from ST has very much been applied to the study of the state or supra-state institutions like the European Union (Baker-Beall, 2009; Huysmans, 2006; Jackson, 2007), as the main actors or as the 'securitization actors' that produce the speech-act that frames the issue. ST smoothly brought into IR socio-linguistic methodologies like Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)[51] that were engaged with analyzing issues such as anti-migration narratives and border control (van Dijk, 1993, 2006). The importance of the 'migrant threat' on security was equally picked up by critical security scholars (Baker-Beall, 2009; Berda, 2013; Huysmans, 2006; Shamir, 2005; M. C. Williams et al., 1998).

Further, ST was especially useful for the study of the GWoT and the US-led justifications of military interventions in the Middle East, as well as the reinforcement of authoritarian regimes. In the same sense as we deal with security, critical scholars argue that terrorism cannot or should not be objectively defined. There are enormous disparities of the definitions at use, and the term is especially politically charged (Tilly 2004, Ramsay 2015). In terrorist analysis, an especially significant breakaway from the orthodoxy has been embodied through the publication of research around the *Critical Terrorism Studies* Journal. Although this has remained marginal, especially for policy-oriented think tanks, it has provided an important platform for a conversation that was necessary among IR scholars with a critical perspective. Richard Jackson and others who within Critical Security Studies have focused on the deconstruction of anti-terrorist policies and discourses have pushed the Securitization Theory further against the current in the height of the Global War on Terror.

In this sense we find from the 2000s on some country-case studies looking at the domestic translations of the GWoT, from a constructivist position, notwithstanding an immense amount of orthodox security studies preoccupied with the geostrategic implications of terrorism (Barak & David, 2010). Although much has been written on the linguistics of non-state armed organizations, such as AlQaeda, *Daesh*, in recent years the appeal of

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[51] One of the main proponents of CDA, Teun van Dijk, understands that language and discourse as a social practice "implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it." (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997:258) cited in (Wodak & Meyer, 2014a, p. 6).

constructivism and critical terrorism studies has also produced some interesting research on the counter-terrorist Moroccan case (Bartolucci 2014, Salime 2007).

Indeed the anti-terrorist narrative has had and continues to have very profound implications for security and for the security sector in Morocco. And while its discursive analysis must be included, the tools of the ST seem to fall short of many interesting and explanatory implications of the anti-terrorist framework. Valentina Bartolucci's writings on Morocco (2010, 2014) can be taken as an example of a well-defined implementation of the discourse analysis in critical terrorism studies for Morocco. The value is however limited to supporting a global assumption that the Global War on Terror (GWoT) has reinforced authoritarian practices, but does not tell us much about those practices nor about their effects.

4.2 International Political Sociology and the everyday practices of security.

The very material implications of counter-terrorism and securitization narratives, however, cannot be researched through the framework that the ST alone provides. In the literary and theoretical journey of this study, my readings have taken me from focusing on the narratives to the nature of everyday security practices, and from those everyday practices to the power dynamics that operate in a certain system. Drawing from the subfield of political sociology, and at the intersection of constructivism, critical security studies and post-structuralism, we find International Political Sociology. This theoretical proposal was developed especially through the discussions and scholarship around the *Journal of International Political Sociology*, firs published in 2007 (Huysmans & Pontes Nogueira, 2016).

Two of the central proponents of this framework, are Jef Huysmans and Didier Bigo, who have the merit of successfully demonstrating how ideational and narrative *dispositives* frame and are framed by ordinary practices. In the book *Politics of Insecurity: fear, migration and asylum in the EU* (2006), Huysmans shows how security is no more an extraordinary stage of politics, not even in domestic politics, but it has indeed become the ordinary *mot-d'ordre* in many policy agendas. This 'normalization' of exceptionality connects with Agamben's thought of the prolonged or permanent state of exception (Agamben, 2014; Svirsky, 2017). Certainly the COVID-19 pandemic has shown us yet another new securitization narrative to reflect on.

In International Political Sociology (IPS), Securitization is not anymore about the exceptionality; it is also in everyday routines and bureaucratic practices (Huysmans, 2006; Tsoukala & Bigo, 2008). IPS studies power-relations with sociological tools, employing Foucault and Bourdieu to understand these practices[52]. The proposal implies a shift from the focus on agenda-setting and the successful speech act that Securitization Theory identifies. It also has the merit of helping us look further beyond 9/11 and, when engaging with the pervasive anti-terrorist narrative, it helps us locate and identify practices of repression/exclusion/alterity beyond the global narrative of the terrorist threat.

IPS focuses rather on policy implementations, not only the exceptional and coercive measures but especially the "mundane bureaucratic decisions of everyday politics" (Tsoukala & Bigo, 2008). The focus is now not so much about states or political elites or the will of a specific actor but about government and society, and about identifying the mechanisms that ensure the emergence of certain practices of security and insecurity. This approach sheds light on the contextual and historical experience of State, security, domination, violence and deviance. The study of neopatrimonial[53] regimes of power and their specific elite structures requires further development of tools that could connect a constructivist understanding of security with the political economy of its material implications. IPS and ST have excessively focused on Western contexts (Wilkinson, 2007)[54]. CSS scholarship on/from the WANA region could help consolidate and improve the thickness of a social constructivist approach.

5. The study of the Security Sector in the WANA region

The military sector and civil-military relations (Sorenson 2007) have traditionally been important research topics in the WANA region (Hurewitz, 1982; Vernier, 1966)[55]. The

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[52] *La Bureaucratisation néoliberale*, a coral book edited by Béatrice Hibou (2013), puts forward a similar idea: that processes, codes, policies and norms are embedded in a metanarrative of bureaucratization that underlines the 'inevitable' rise of a certain political and economic order. Although her book does not explicitly focus on security, it is evident that narratives that very often rely on a security framework push this neoliberal bureaucratization forward. My present research shows similar conclusions.

[53] For a critical discussion on the concepts of neopatrimonialism and patrimonialism see (Erdmann & Engel, 2006).

[54] See critique on this Western bias, and exceptions in (Camps-Febrer, 2019b; Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2019; Mustafa, 2015; Navarro Muñoz, 2015; Vieira, n.d.).

[55] Hurewitz's promising book *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension*, was published in 1969. Sixteen pages cover Morocco's 'Constitutional Absolutism' (330-346) in a comparative study with Jordan's case. The main idea is that the King's Absolutist stance would not be possible without the control of the Armed Forces, which in turn was made possible by France at the dawn of independence.

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predominant role of national armies in post-independence states was portrayed during the height of the Cold War as a force for social development and progressive policies, especially in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria, where military revolts were contesting colonial dependency.

Modernization theory sometimes saw military officers in a positive light, emphasizing their popular support and their modern and progressive orientation, especially in Egypt, Iraq or Algeria. Around the 'socialist' regimes, the role of the military was predominant in the control and development of industries, while some of their elites benefited from the access to State, land and other important resources. Thus the study of political economy was a way to understand the military regimes, as Roger Owen (1979) showed in his works. Most of the enthusiasm of the 1960s-70s however quickly vanished, as celebrated 'socialist' military projects transited into full dictatorial and authoritarian regimes (Grawert & Abul-Magd, 2016; Picard, 1990). The discussion evolved towards the challenges that the military were causing to a potential democratization process.

In the midst of the neoliberal turn in the 1980s, the North of Africa was suffering the consequences of Structural Adjustment Plans. Unrest for growing inequalities was everyday news. Quite naturally, the academic focus of regional area studies shifted towards economic reforms, relegating the importance of the military in the WANA to the background or the contextual factors. Economic research and political economy focused mainly on the effects and policies of liberalization and on development issues, as well as on the transnational element, given the forced nature and external push of economic liberalization of most countries in the region.

It is paradoxical that given the rapid economic changes in the region, the analysis of civil-military relations has usually been approached with little acknowledgement of the sector's linkage with the political economy of the state, with few notable exceptions in the last decade (M. H. Davis, 2021; Grawert & Abul-Magd, 2016; Hever, 2010, 2018; Hibou & Tozy, 2020; Navarro Muñoz, 2015)[56] .

The reasons behind the scarce economic approach to security are theoretical and practical. Joel Beinin argues that political economy in general was one of the most used analytical

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[56] Shir Hever played a pivotal role in investigating the political economy of the occupation of Palestine through the Project of The Economy of Occupation developed by the Alternative Information Center.

methods in the region up until the 90s, when Edward Said's influential work *Orientalism* encouraged if not incited the 'cultural turn' in area studies (Beinin, 2016). Said was evidently not alone in his thesis, as the urge to denounce the 1990s global political narratives of the 'clash of civilizations', along with a global rise of studies on 'identity politics', so-called 'ethno nationalist' and 'religious' conflicts, was becoming more pressing. Unmistakably, as part of a long orientalist scholarly tradition, it is in the WANA region and in muslim-majority countries that this 'cultural turn' impacted the most.

Another reason for the political economy neglect, especially on security-related issues, could also be linked to the fact that the availability of data and the access to credible and rigorous sources is difficult, scarce and oftentimes dangerous[57]. Thus, researchers are usually relegated to the study of legal documents and political discourses, from institutionalist perspectives, while the links between the security sector and the economy are often relegated to rare and brave investigative journalism.

While the last two decades have seen a timid resurgence in political economy research, it is notable that the growing body of literature focusing on globalization and neoliberalism in the region has yet to fully include the security sector in its analysis. Even though repression against the negative consequences of economic policies remains indispensable to the survival of many regimes, there has been undeserved lack of scholarly attention to the role of the security sector (Beinin et al., 2021; Bogaert, 2018; Cammett, 2007; D. K. Davis, 2006; Guazzone & Pioppi, 2009; Hever, 2010; Hibou, 2000; Kreitmeyr, 2019; Zartman, 1987).

In the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings and the violent reaction by most regimes, research on the role of the military and other security forces has picked up in relation to the different outcomes of anti-regime protests (Krieg, 2017). Further, many countries in the WANA region have seen a post-Arab spring resurgence of coercion as central to the political economies and to the state projects (Haddad, 2013; Abul-Magd & Grawert 2016). The security sector has been and continues to be the backbone of many regimes in the region (Kodmani and Chartouni-Dubarry 2009; Sayigh 2007). Notwithstanding more classical

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[57] Italian prosecutors linked in 2018 the murder of Italian PhD student Giulio Regeni to suspicions from the Egyptian national security agency. Regeni's research focused on trade unions in Egypt, but his inquiry seemed to tap on some issues related to national security. He was found dead the 4th February 2016 on a road near Cairo, with signs of torture in his body. See Tondo, Lorenzo & Michaelson, Ruth. (208) "Giulio Regeni: Italy names Egyptian agents as murder suspects", The Guardian, 29 Nov 2018. Online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/29/giulio-regeni-murder-italy-names-egyptian-national-security-agents-suspects

approaches to what soon became open armed conflicts along the region, some authors looked with renewed interest at the topic in Egypt (Brooks, 2015; Hussein & Martino, 2019; Ketchley, 2014; Kruger, 2013), on Tunisia and the critical impact of foreign security assistance for democratization (Hanau Santini & Cimini, 2019).

Masys' *Networks and Network Analysis for Defence and Security* (2014) only applies network analysis to security issues such as transnational drug trafficking (Boivin 2014), terrorism (Enders & Sandler, 2011), or even transnational security consulting (O'Reilly, 2010). The use of Network Analysis to the traditional security sector, however, remains absent.

The study of the security sector (and its reform) has traditionally neglected its private dimension, but the latter is increasingly seen as unavoidable in Western security studies or on conflict settings and non-state armed groups cases (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2006). The importance of material resources to the study of civil-military relations (Abul-Magd & Grawert 2016) has been more developed in specific cases such as Egypt or Israel (Barak, & Sheffer, 2006; Berda 2013; Navarro 2015; Armendariz 2015; Grassiani, 2017).

A recent exception worth noting is that of Abul-Magd & Grawert's book, *Businessmen in arms: how the military and other armed groups profit in the MENA region.* The book examines the "vital relationship between coercive power and material wealth" (2016:xii). Abul-Magd & Grawert, focus on civil-military relations and the actors involved are usually either part of the traditional military elite (in Egypt's case, for instance) or of other non-state armed groups (NSAGs). A similar approach can be found in Marshall's chapter for the book *A Critical Political Economy for the Middle East and North Africa*, where the author's interest lies in analyzing the dynamics of the global military-industrial complex in the region and the networks between political and military elites (Marshall, 2021).

In Morocco, academic work sometimes mentions the topic of military involvement in economy or illicit business, especially after the 1970s coups and in the case of Western Sahara's occupation (Zartman, 1987; Veguilla del Moral, 2011), but a thorough study is still lacking. Nevertheless, these efforts are crucial for understanding the role of military elites in the economy and their responsibility in militarization, underdevelopment and authoritarianism in the region. Further, private security actors need to be brought in in order to get a more complete picture of how coercive and material domains relate, and their role as leading actors of the neoliberal agenda (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2006, 2009).

Hever's PhD dissertation and book have done that for Israel's case (2018). Economist in training and pro-palestinian activist, Shir Hever tackled the economic aspects of the Israeli occupation and soon with the whole 'privatization turn' of military and security policies in Israel, researching the social and political impacts as well as the national, regional and global dynamics of the rise of private security (2010, 2018).

5.1 Security is not only Military

The scarcity of research on the Military from a political economy perspective in the region, let alone in Morocco, is indisputable. But it is relevant to acknowledge an even bigger gap in research, which is that on the Ministries of Interior, police and what we today call homeland security. No specific research agenda other than that of democratic transitions or dictatorships focuses wholly on the coercive sector as a whole and including military and police forces. In fact, can it be analyzed as a whole? The different nature of police and army is only a few centuries old in Europe, and indeed a European conceptualization exported to Morocco at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Critical Security Studies do view the security sector as a whole, a broad area of actors, from army or police officers, to pencil pushers, politicians, businesspeople or even researchers that impact or contribute to securitization narratives and practices. And while constructivist approaches do embrace a broader notion of security, there is a need to push the limits of critical security studies by reflecting on the entrenchment of security, even as a constructed and performative element, with the neoliberal agenda.

On the Moroccan case, the security dimension has been especially researched in the last two decades within the framework of the "war on terror", either from a developmental perspective (Ennaji 2016, Bensalah Alaoui 2017), a constructivist analysis (Bartolucci, 2010, 2014; Bastani & Gazzotti, 2021; Camps-Febrer, 2019c) or through Foreign Policy and security cooperation analyses (Alaoui, 2017; Boukhars, 2019; Ennaji, 2016; Keenan, 2011; Wright, 1983).

In general, however, as an International Relations scholar, the focus I was used to was a more military one. The armed forces were the main institution that was supposed to be of interest for international affairs. It dealt with wars, borders and, specifically for the WANA region, it had an important role in the perpetuation of autocracies. Exceptionally, and

especially in the last 30 years, non-state armed groups have become relevant as well. A less ample interest however, is that of police forces. Police forces have traditionally been understood as dealing with homeland security, a matter of internal affairs, irrelevant for International Relations. However, with the increasing militarization of police (Kraska 2007), especially in the West, and with the increasing involvement of the military in homeland affairs, the division has been blurred and police is an increasingly popular topic in IR, especially in liberal peace accounts and in international political sociology (Bigo, 2008; Laurent et al., 2016).

Independent from traditional or even critical security studies, there is an important body of literature that deals with police violence. In the WANA region, the importance of the police was traditionally only acknowledged by human rights scholars. Police Forces' actions in uprisings like the Egyptian 25th January uprising of 2011[58], or the Tunisian Revolt of the same year could have changed that. In both cases, the police appeared at first to be much more attached to the perpetuation of the regimes in place than most military ranks. In authoritarian regimes, however ignored by scholars, police and the military have systematically been a matter of concern to resisting populations.

Police violence, population control and surveillance are very rich subjects of research and analysis in sociology, critical criminology or anthropology. In the French speaking academia, François Dieu will even approach the topic of police violence describing it as a specific type of violence alongside other forms of violence like "murder, rape, or suicide" (1995:35). The French sociologist develops an institutionalist approach to the matter, looking at the different forces and their history (Police, Gendarmerie), in France or in former colonies.

Transgressing the borders of the IR discipline, the epistemologies to approach the security sector appear much more diverse, and shed light on hitherto ignored aspects of the sector, such as the colonial and the patriarchal structures in the long durée that sustain its perpetuation (Axster et al., 2021). The historical and the global appear as crucial elements in Davis and other activists in the analysis of the militarization of police, the private penitentiary

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[58] Egypt's Uprising in 2011 makes the point as the protests themselves started during the National Police Day and targeted the police as part of the status quo to change, whereas the military was seen as siding with the population (which subsequently did).

system in the USA with apartheid states and the militarized economy of Israel[59]. Their works show the relevance of opening up the focus of researching the coercive sector from a sociological and political economy perspective[60]. A sort of historical sociology of politics, as Béatrice Hibou calls it, brings an increased understanding of the most recent and probably future consequences of the evolution of the coercive sector.

6. The political economy of security: a new endeavor

In conclusion, the study of security needs to be undertaken through the disrupting of disciplines, especially that of IR. In the present work, this meant that historical sociology, social constructivism and political economy were fundamental, even when the scarcity and/or dispersion of specific literature on Morocco's security sector seemed discouraging.

Great work has been done on the study of the Moroccan regime and its elites (Benhaddou, 1997; Berrada & Saadi, 1992; Feliu & Parejo, 2013; Hammoudi, 1997; Leveau, 1985; Storm, 2007; Zartman, 1987), as well as from different dimensions of Morocco's political economy (Berrada & Saadi, 1992; Cammett, 2004, 2007; Catusse, 2009; G. P. Denoeux, 2007; Hibou, 2013; Saadi, 2016). However fundamental the coercive power has been for the state formation and its consolidation, the main institutions and actors that have access to coercion are not commonly the protagonists of research.

Historical accounts of military transformation in Morocco can be counted with one hand (El-Merini, 2000; Rollman, 2004; Simou, 1995)(Simou 1995, 2004; El Merini 2000; Rollman, Lamnaouer 2007). Even more despairing is the absence of literature on the Moroccan security sector that engages with its political economy[61].

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[59] Indeed Howell & Richter-Montpetit explain how Michel Foucault's theorizing of biopolitics was influenced by the Black Panther Party (BPP). "The writings and speeches of Angela Davis, George Jackson, and Huey P. Newton led Foucault toward conceptualizing power through the analytic of war. Yet Foucault failed to ever cite or make explicit reference to the BPP in his published works." (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2019, p. 6).

[60] This realization was also crucial to early feminist IR "[…] that addressed issues of security in global politics[, and] recognized and emphasized interlinkages between political economy and security, especially insomuch as it understood political economy to play a significant role in in/security at the margins of global politics, and security threats to be frequently manifested in political-economic distributional effects." (Sjoberg, 2006:155).

[61] Zemni's paper Economy and Security (Zemni 2018) is promising but unfortunately short. Some personal accounts might give us an insight into the military culture, albeit outside the social science approach (Merzouki, n.d.; Tobji, 2006).

An obvious reason for the lack of critical studies on the security sector in Morocco is the access to sources. While everyone can acknowledge the importance of the security apparatus in the maintenance of the political order (to cite but a few Slyomovics, 2001, 2008; Feliu 1995, 2013; Feliu, Mateo Dieste, Izquierdo 2019), its rigorous study remains elusive and political economy studies focus mainly on political and economic elites (Cammett, 2004, 2007; Cantrell, 2014; Catusse, 2008, 2009).

The security sector has basically been approached from an institutionalist perspective, especially from the transitology paradigm, focused on changes in the political system, and where jargon like 'security sector reform' or 'security governance' conveys a progressive trend towards liberal standards (BICC, Mattes 2009; Aboudahab 2013, Saidy 2007, 2009, 2011; Echeverría Jesús, C. 2003; Kodmani 2009, Saaf, 2012).

This research was motivated by the challenging realization that approaching the security sector from a different perspective, one that integrated the constructivist and materialist dimensions, could bring up unconventional and innovative research questions; and perhaps even result in novel and informative understandings of the nature of security, coercion and the state. It is, ultimately, an attempt to fix the "harmful separation of economics and politics" (Strange, 1970).

Chapter 2 - The Political Economy of Security: Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Foundations of the Research

1. A theoretical journey

The goal of this research is to analyze security in Morocco and its 'embeddedness' in the political and economic system. A market of private security has flourished in the country in the last 30 years. I intended to identify what dynamics this new market entails for the political system, how security is predominantly framed, and what type of technology is deployed in the name of that security. In doing so, this research defines security as **a social practice concerned with the exclusions and inclusions of violence as a legitimate or illegitimate tool of social control**. This uncommon definition of security will be further explained in the following sections.

Another overarching goal of this research is to reflect about the state of coercion, social control and the modern neoliberal state and the elites of a specific regime of power. Some of the most recurring questions during this research touched deep into the structures of my understandings of modern political thought. It is the intimate relation of state and violence, state and security that are at stake. How is it possible that an authoritarian coercive regime allows for non-state or even regime-unrelated actors to advance in the coercive market? Does the emergence of private-commercial security debilitate the (coercive) power of the regime? Will this new panorama weaken the role of the state at domestic level or as the constitutive pillar of the contemporary world?

When I started my research, the fundamental concepts that I worked with were inspired by the Securitization Theory and by a thin constructivist approach. Consistently, so were my initial questions. This aprioristic theoretical background was subsequently adapted, questioned and reformed in order to address the research questions that emerged with fieldwork and case analysis. In fact, a complete conceptual framework is only revealing itself truly after a time of exploration and fieldwork. Theories inform how the topic that prompted this research initially was tackled; they put some order into the facts and ideas that raw data have produced. They are not aprioristic in the sense that they were not followed as rules or assumptions from day one of the research. Without ever reaching the point of 'theory saturation', these theoretical assumptions or underpinnings have, nevertheless, helped me 'make sense' of the world in a systematic way, by providing the key conceptual tools and a loose neogramscian perspective where I could feel comfortable. This chapter has been built

in a coherent manner only after reflection through practice and a circular dialog between praxis and theory.

1.1 Epistemology and Internal logic of the research

This research is grounded in a neogramscian understanding of the social phenomena as part of a material world that is intersubjectively universal and can only be understood within human history[62]. In essence, this approach entails two different levels of analysis:

- Materialist analysis: a global political economy analysis that engages with the historical in order to trace a contextual understanding of elite formation and of societal relations. My goal is to understand the dynamics of the private security sector and the incentives or challenges that public elites faced in (allowing) the development of a private sector.

- Constructivist analysis: an approach that focuses on the everyday understandings and practices of security within the political and economic narratives; and discusses the social and philosophical implications of neoliberal security: the ideology that frames the current hegemonic idea of security, and what it means for populations in general, as workers, privileged dwellers, women, or impoverished and criminalized populations.

Both these levels are deeply intertwined, to my view, as the constructivist analysis can also help disentangle the way elite networks behave and develop, and how societal relations function through specific norms. However, these different elements of the analytical frameworks are identified for the sake of clarity and because they entail very different epistemologies and distinctive data-collection methods.

My conceptual understanding of the nature of the issue can be summarized as follows:

- Security is an intersubjective concept and a social practice: it is historically and geographically located. As such, the notion and narrative of security deployed through discourse and practice by the state-sanctioned actors depends on a

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[62] The best proponent of Gramscian conceptions in IR is Robert W. Cox, although he rejected the label neogramscinan (Cox, 1983; Leysens, 2008).

historical evolution and position of those actors; as well as on the location of the context within the world-system.

- Security is understood here as a non-concept, in that it throws a blank cover and legitimizes coercion and biocontrol. It ultimately refers to the sector and the discursive narrative that brings social control under the legitimacy of state authority.

- As a working and operational category, security is used here, as stated above, to convey a social practice concerned with the exclusions and inclusions of violence as a legitimate or illegitimate tool of social control/to maintain a certain order.

- The hegemonic narrative of security depends on the international narrative as well as on the local narrative.

- Hegemonic security is the framework that protects individual and class interests, and conveys a specific economic and political model. Security reinforces a normative and material logic of domination.

- Some actors (elites) acquire more capacity to influence the hegemonic meaning of security. Therefore, an analysis of the power structure of a specific context is necessary.

- A specific security engenders specific measures, technologies of security. These specific measures reinforce the bio/necropolitics and control over society and individuals.

2. Security as a non-concept: security as violence

An important consideration must be mentioned here. I view the word security per se as a non-concept. By a non-concept I mean that the hegemonic use of security, aside from many other meanings, is actually a blank cover that conceals, even diffuses and euphemizes the use of coercion and violence by state-sanctioned actors. Although **coercion**, **violence** and the **use of force** are not interchangeable concepts, the three are employed in this research,

sometimes in very similar ways. In fact, the state's use of the concept security is usually explained as the protection against illegitimate or avoidable violence, through centralizing and monopolizing the use of force[63].

This leaves us with the conundrum of using and reinforcing the concept while critically assessing the scaffolding of its deployment. In this research, thus, we refer to security as the non-concept that galvanizes coercive resources, narratives and technologies.

The monopoly of violence is said to be one of the core roles of modern states. Armed force has been theorized as a core sovereign feature or *jura regalia* from absolutist thinkers such as Jean Bodin, to what Max Weber termed the legitimate monopoly of violence in modern liberal states (Hibou & Tozy, 2015). The capacity to control violence certainly is presented as a feature of the 'successful' modern state. In contrast, failed states are depicted as those where violence is used by non-state groups or where even (ever present) interpersonal violence can raise to socially or internationally unacceptable levels of lawlessness. But the capacity to control violence also entails the capacity to legitimize certain uses of violence and exclude others. It follows, that sovereignty is the capacity to decide who dies and who lives, what is exceptional and what is normal (Mbembe, 2003; Svirsky, 2017).

Asides its contested legitimacy, if we look in more detail to what is supposed to be the *monopoly* of violence by the state, it becomes evident that this capacity to concentrate all the legitimate violence has only been achieved in a very limited period of time and location if at all (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2016; Negri, 2004; White, 2011). The legitimate aspect of state violence is fundamental, as the dominant actors in a society seek control of the political and economic structures not only through violence but also through the creation of consent. As Tilly attempts to argue for the European state-making, their actors are rather closer to "coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs" than to "the idea of a social contract" (Tilly, 1985, p. 169). The idea of a social contract, however, where the state and its representatives are protectors of a common good, is a useful tool for consent, it is in fact what distinguishes state-makers from non-state racketeers (Tilly, 1985). A certain level of 'insecurity', of crime,

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[63] Hever reminds us that the use of the word security also blurs the distinction between external and internal security, thus between military and police roles and technologies, between criminal and enemy, etc. (Hever, 2018, p. 7).

thus justifies – in other words, legitimizes – state coercion[64]. In fact, the identity and existence of the state is only possible by the existence of threats and a certain level of insecurity (D. Campbell & Dillon, 1993; Der Derian, 1993; Izquierdo Brichs, 2016a; Navarro Muñoz, 2015). The fetishism of lawlessness and crime helps define the contours of sovereignty (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2016) as state violence is not only meant to end disorder but with so-called constitutive violence, the state actors seek to establish their own order[65].

3. The Political Economy of Security

With the suspended definition of security in mind, this research aims to approach the issue from an interdisciplinary perspective that integrates political, economic and cultural dimensions. An endeavor and an analytical approach that is, to my view, that of critical political economy.

In the WANA region, one of the most interesting recent concerted initiatives on Political Economy, the Political Economy Project, defines this approach as follows:

> "Political economy addresses the mutual constitution of states, markets, and classes, the co-constitution of class, race, gender, and other forms of identity, varying modes of capital accumulation and the legal, political, and cultural forms of their regulation, relations among local, national, and global forms of capital, class, and culture, the construction of forms of knowledge and hegemony; techno-politics; water and the environment as resources and fields of contestation; the role of war in the constitution of states and classes; and practices and cultures of domination and resistance." *Cited in* (Beinin, 2016, p. 6)

Similarly, this research conceptualizes Political Economy[66] as the study of the politics of the material conditions, of how they come to be, how they are distributed in society and under what cultural conditions they are legitimized.

The goal is to present a critical political economy, decentering a neomarxist analysis from capital and labor, in order to shed light on a variety of resources of power that elite actors

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[64] Brilliant work has been done on this issue in unveiling the 'law and order' frame of systemic anti-black racism in the USA. See (Alexander, 2012)

[65] See the Works on constitutive violence in Joshua Stacher for the case of Egypt, and Glenn Bowmann for Palestine and former Yugoslavia.

[66] For the Moroccan case, relevant works are: Catusse (2009) looks at Morocco's Political Economy in a volume that interrogates the present and future of Arab state within neoliberalism. (Hibou 2004; Cammett 2004) Studying cronyism Cammett, 2007; Denoeux, 2007 and Moore, 2010, Saadi (2016) Berdouzi 2002. Veguilla del Moral, V. (2011) connects the Western Sahara conflict and its political economy, in particular in relation to fishery.

compete to accumulate. This is what a group of academics developed in the analytical framework termed the sociology of power. Ferran Izquierdo Brichs (2008) first developed the theory at length in his book *Poder y felicidad: Una Propuesta de Sociología del Poder* (*Power and Happiness: A Proposal of the Sociology of Power*), where he laid out his understanding of social competition and power relations in the world-system.

The Sociology of Power (SoP) emerges with the understanding of the shortcomings of most International Relations approaches, especially in the inability to provide the tools for a multilevel analysis (Farrés-Fernández, 2018) that connects the international struggles and power competitions with domestic and local power relations. The Sociology of Power attempts to develop an all-encompassing framework that is at once operational in the study of glocal phenomena and adaptable to different levels of macrosociological analysis.

In Izquierdo's outlook, the actors in a specific system are those that have the capacity and potential to mobilize resources in order to compete for their own interests within a structure. Elites use their resources of power to compete and gain a position in the power structure or to change the structure, but they are forced to compete endlessly because *their power* is always relative. In contrast, the population may become an actor when they mobilize their resources for a specific finite goal.

This approach to power is similar to the Differential Accumulation Theory or Capital as Power, developed by Nitzan and Bichler, in that it emphasizes the importance of understanding power accumulation as a *differential* accumulation (Bichler & Nitzan, 2018; Hever, 2018; Izquierdo Brichs, 2016a).

Some 'orthodox' Marxists believe that the mode of production drives all other factors including political and social structures. In my research, economy and specifically capital and labor, do not solely determine the rest of social relations. The expansion of capitalism is not solely deployed through the elites' goal of accumulating profit in the form of capital as the main source of power[67]. Beyond capital, global capitalism is "a mode of production, a system of circulation and consumption of commodities, and a structure of power" (Beinin, 2016, p.

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[67] Traditional definitions of capitalism view it as "a system of generalized commodity production structured by (industrial) forces of production and exploitative production relations between capital and labor. Workers, bereft of means of production, sell their labor power for wages and participate in the labor process under capitalist control. Their surplus labor is appropriated by capitalists as surplus value. The capitalist mode of production is animated by the twin imperatives of enterprise competition and capital accumulation which together account for the dynamic tendencies of capitalism to expand and to undergo recurring episodes of crisis." (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p. 3)

4). Although this definition ignores the exploitation of resources and nature, and it obscures other dynamics of power relations that are important, its basic idea is used here as a starting point.

It can be argued that the focus on proletarianization and mechanization as the main benchmarks of capitalism (Liu, 2020), lies in the European and gender blind genealogy of the Marxist analysis[68] (Federici, 2014; Robinson, 2019). In a recent article, Izquierdo, Feliu and myself described the evolution of some of the central resources of power in the WANA region, especially, land, the state, coercion and capital/finance, and showed how the availability, value and competition for these resources depended on global/imperial/colonial histories as well as on internal struggles between local elites and populations (Izquierdo Brichs et al., 2021).

As our article shows, power resources structuring the world-system and the region in particular are not only capital and they evolve and concur in value. While capital is a central resource of power in the structuring of capitalist world-system of the last two centuries , relations of production alone do not explain success or failure of uprisings or resistance when inequality enters in contradiction with the development of the productive forces. Other resources of power can be accumulated and used to compete for a position or to quench resistance. In fact, new resources that appear and become central to the accumulation of power - maybe currently technology and Big Data - might entail a transformation of the system, power relations and elite composition in the *long durée* (Izquierdo Brichs et al., 2021). As the value of resources changes with time specific resources such as ideology, capital, information, the State, and coercion, technology, vary in their importance depending on time, context, etc.[69] This is all the more important to understand when dealing with the coercive, understood also as a power resource and not merely as an instrument to ensure capital

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[68] "As the dawn of independence broke on a horizon of internal conflict, reconsideration of the African colonial experience began. Could it be that the African problem was not colonialism but an incomplete penetration of traditional society by a weak colonial state or deference to it by prudent but shortsighted colonizers? Could it be that Europe's mission in Africa was left half finished? If the rule of law took centuries to root in the land of its original habitation, is it surprising that the two sides of the European mission — market and civil society, the law of value and the rule of law — were neither fully nor successfully transplanted in less than a century of colonialism? And that this fragile transplant succumbed to caprice and terror on the morrow of independence? // With the end of the cold war, this point of view has crystallized into a tendency with a name, Afro-pessimism, and a claim highly skeptical of the continent's ability to rejuvenate itself from within. Whether seen as a problem of incomplete conquest or as one of unwise deference to traditional authorities, both sides of the Afro-pessimist point of view lead to the same conclusion: a case for the recolonization of Africa, for finishing a task left unfinished. Part of the argument of this book is that Afro-pessimism is unable to come to grips with the nature of the colonial experience in Africa precisely because it ignores the mode of colonial penetration into Africa." (Mamdani, 2018, p. 285) Other Caribbean and African Marxist authors that have improved the Marxist analysis from a decolonial perspective include Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, Robbie Shilliam, or Cedric Robinson.

[69] Another important resource in current times would be Big Data and further research needs to be done in that direction.

accumulation. The accumulation of coercive power, its distribution and ultimately the value of that resource changes in time. The capacity to wage war for a political leader might increase their position in the political structure. An example of this would be François Hollande's boost in popularity after he ordered the Serval Operation in Mali in 2013.

To identify this differential accumulation of resources and the subsequent structures of power relations in a given system, Laura Feliu and María Angustias Parejo Fernández developed an analytical framework in the book *Political Regimes in the Arab World*. Different types of regimes of power were identified under these premises for the Mediterranean region and for specific country cases such as Egypt (Lampridi-Kemou 2008; 2011); Lebanon (Farrés-Fernández, 2018; Goenaga Sánchez, 2008); Morocco (Feliu, Mateo Dieste & Izquierdo Brichs 2018; Camps-Febrer 2019); Palestine (Ávarez-Ossorio & Izquierdo Brichs, 2007; Velasco Muñoz, 2015); Libya (Feliu & Aarab, 2019); Turkey (Izquierdo Brichs & Farrés-Fernández, 2008) or even outside the region, the Congo (Farrés-Fernández, 2010) or other countries in Central Asia.

Further, the SoP has been sharpened by specific sectorial analyses of different resources of power such as for the study of Political Islam (Izquierdo Brichs et al., 2017) or the study of social movements and protests (Feliu, Mateo Dieste, & Izquierdo, 2019). Farrés-Fernández and this author also built a tentative proposal for the analysis of the security sector in the region (Camps-Febrer & Farrés-Fernández, 2019).

All of these different resources of power are essential to flesh out the evolution of security in Morocco. This research argues, however, that since official security is produced by the state, which ultimately provides its narrative and material framework, it is my first job to lay out here my working definition for the state. In fact, with the focus on the political economy of security the centrality of the state in the analysis deserves here an extended explanation as to its use as a dual category of analysis.

3.1 The dual nature of the state in the capitalist order

Although the State has sometimes been analyzed as an actor *per se*[70], the Sociology of Power sees it as a structure that might constrain action or socialize actors in specific norms and practices, as well as a resource of power that has been especially central in the twentieth century[71]. The modern capitalist state is one where, contrary to feudal times or to the 'socialist' state[72], the economy and the polity are officially presented as separate. Political actors acting 'in the name of the state' discuss and set the law and order, while the economy develops through other actors and in other terrains.

> "The state […] is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, these classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a power, seemingly standing above society, that would alleviate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of 'order'; and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state." (F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*)

Along with a structure where power relations are in competition, the state is a resource beyond its internal struggles. Marxist thinkers argue that the capitalist state becomes a resource at the hands of the capitalist class, who uses violence and law to ensure the accumulation of capital in the hands of the bourgeoisie. The modern capitalist states are seen as an instrument that would "[u]ltimately […] service capital accumulation and class regulation" (Mann, 1993, p. 45).

> "The [capitalist] State is, first of all, an organization of the ruling class. It assumes functions favoring social developments specifically because, and in the measure that, these interests and social developments coincide, in a general fashion, with

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[70] Actor-centrism, especially in terms of state-centrism (rather by anthropomorphizing the state or by focusing exclusively on the "big men") has been a longstanding accusation from IR scholars interested in decolonizing theory (Powel, 2019). The importance of subaltern actors, of social movements, of the 'middle men' and of women has been largely overlooked as a source of Theory-building. Actor-centrism also refers to the excessive focus on agency of actors rather than on structures, but this is a critique that the gramscian understanding of cultural and political superstructures tackles.

[71] A previous consideration, however, is the nature of what we understand as state. As the concept's baseline is the nation-state, the state is a central locus that structures the identity of a territory. As we will see in the following chapters, the Moroccan nature of state, sovereignty, security, authority must be historically embedded in order to understand public-private, formal-informal, etc.

[72] I am referring here to planned-economy models, not to the theoretical state of the proletariat and its subsequent disappearance.

the interests of the dominant class." (Rosa Luxemburg. *Reform or Revolution. Part One Chapter IV: Capitalism and the State*).

In the classic theory of neoliberalism, the state does not need to be democratic. On the contrary, neoliberals even see democracy as a luxury that can threaten private property, and it may only be advisable in stable and wealthy societies, especially in the existence of a middle class that can moderate the outcomes of democratic options (Harvey, 2015). In liberal social-democratic states, the capitalist class cannot entirely control the State as democratic parameters provide the channels for citizens to convey their interests and to push for their own agenda. Ideally it follows that the state mediates between the rights of workers and populations in general, and the actions of the capitalist class.

Gramsci explains this contradiction of democratic mechanisms with the help of the concept of hegemony. The Italian expands the definition of state as he sees other institutions outside of the concrete apparatus of government as constitutional for the formation of the political structure that constrains behaviors (Cox, 1983). In Cox words: "because their hegemony was firmly entrenched in civil society, the bourgeoisie often did not need to run the state themselves." Others "could do it for them so long as these rulers recognized the hegemonic structures of civil society as the basic limits for their political action." (Cox, 1983, p. 163). This expanded idea of state power which combines civil society and political society – and as such, hegemony and coercion – renders the gramscian approach helpful and compatible with other approaches such as "discourse theory, feminism, Foucauldian analyses, and post-modernism"(Jessop, 2001, p. 151).

The political class and the state come sometimes to be ambiguously conflated. It is however fundamental to be more precise in our use of the concept of State. In the sociology of power, the state is not conflated with the regime of power but those actors that occupy the higher positions within the regime might be able to use the instruments within the state for their own benefit. Those actors are individuals or tight groups of individuals and they might be constrained as well by the state, the most obvious example of state expression being the law.

State is the resource and the structure. It may act like a coherent and unitary actor at times, and it may be useful to see it as such for analytical purposes, especially at a macro level when studying international issues. In this research however, the state is conceived as all the official mechanisms and institutions that act to assert a certain social order.

Luxemburg already pointed at the dialectical nature of the state. In her analysis, tariffs and militarism at the hands of national elites evidenced how states were not solely there to advance capitalism, but to benefit those elites that could get ahold of the state mechanisms, even if measures like imposing tariffs to protect certain national industries were against the precepts of liberalism:

> "While industry does not need tariff barriers for its development, the entrepreneurs need tariffs to protect their markets. This signifies that at present tariffs no longer serve as a means of protecting a developing capitalist section against a more advanced section. They are now the arm used by one national group of capitalists against another group." (Luxemburg, 2008, p. 62)

The question in place is thus where to situate the state in the reconfigurations of a neoliberal order in the relationship between the governing and the governed. This new relationship might be very different from that of the past or simply a new expression of the same clientelist and patronage relations that manage to reconfigure power accumulation in the same hands of the same elites that already control the state (Benhaddou, 1997). As a result, we can ask ourselves if new elites are emerging or if old elites are simply relocating their power resources and technologies of governing.

According to neoliberal doctrine, the state's interference in economy should be simply directed at ensuring property rights and at promoting free markets and free trade. In many places around the world, however, the implementation of a neoliberal agenda has not resulted in a weakening of state power (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2016; Hibou & Tozy, 2015; Mbembe, 2001, 2003), at least not apparently[73].

Indeed, even within the framework of neoliberal policies, it becomes clear that the state is indispensable to capitalism (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Harvey, 2015; Polanyi, 2001). Briggs (2019) even argues that the existence of the state is one of the main reasons why capitalism persists[74].

Since the turn of the century, after two global crises already on our shoulders, the fundamental role of the state in the neoliberal context seems to remain the provision of "a good business climate" (Harvey, 2019, p. 25). As Harvey argues, this is done through

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[73] In fact, it might be the democratic and accountability mechanisms that are being weakened by externalizing and privatizing service.

[74] The other reason being the inexistence of a "theoretical and practical framework to counter capitalism's rule" (Briggs, 2019, p. 69)

violence and legality. He further identifies three fundamental ways in which the State plays an important role in the neoliberal agenda:

1. The State must create and defend a specific legal and institutional framework, protect the value and flow of currency;
2. it must ensure police and military structures that will defend and protect markets; and
3. it must create markets in those areas where they previously did not exist.

This last function is thought of in Harvey's theory with regards to land, water or education. The primitive accumulation of capital by dispossession of land, which continues today in many parts of the world against communal land[75] (see Ramirez 2017), takes up other mechanisms of accumulation of capital by dispossession in the neoliberal context: seeds, intellectual property, health systems, etc. Although Harvey does not mention it, I argue security is one of the late expanding commodities in a privatized market. It also fits in the background reflection of what has been called gig capitalism:

> "The social importance of these new markets is that by placing a price on things that previously had none, they transform mere goods into commodities with an exchange value. This expansion is not fundamentally different from the expansion of capitalism seen in 18th- and 19th-century Europe, when food, clothing, shoes and other goods that had been produced by households began to be produced commercially. Once new markets are created, a "shadow price" is placed on all such goods or activities. This doesn't mean that we all immediately start renting out our homes or driving our cars as taxis, but it means that we are aware of the financial loss that we make by not doing so. Once the price is right (whether because our circumstances change or the relative price increases), many people will join the new markets and thus reinforce them." (Milanovic, 2019).

How would security fit in this model? How can security be part of that process if it was originally a means, an instrument, a mechanism to enforce a certain 'law and order'? As shown in this research, security is being turned not solely into a mechanism anymore but into a 'capital' in itself. Similar to what Kaldor (2010) saw in the 'new wars' of the 1990s, where the aim is not to conquer and take military or political control over a territory (or not only), war becomes a business in itself, not only for the mercenary, but for the corporations that

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[75] On the current dispossession of common land in Morocco see Ángeles Ramírez (2017).

drive it[76]. In the same sense, security is a business and it is the dispossession of security that makes it a capital worth accumulating. This means that the security sector as part of the state and its functions must be rethought as a whole in light of the proliferation of private security companies.

3.2 The security sector and its functions

We hear that the security sectors in the WANA region have been structured to protect the regime, the leaders, their properties and their privileges (Owen, 2004), but that assertion is also generally true for the global political economy and the liberal state. Everywhere, security is still an indispensable part of the state. Coercion might not be that obvious in liberal democratic states. It might indeed be subject to different accountability mechanisms. A wide range of theories and analytical models try to assess the degree of democracy in civil-military relations and take stock of those mechanisms. However, as insinuated earlier, a decolonized look at the modern nation-state in the West and at the importance of colonialism and slavery will quickly reshape the centrality of coercive force as a fundamental basis for North-South structures, and indeed for the existence of any state[77]. The pretense of a decolonized look at the state, as this research sees it, is another path that leads to similar theoretical conclusions as those produced by "war-centered state theory" (Jessop, 2001, p. 154), among it that of Charles Tilly or James C. Scott (Scott, 2009; Tilly, 1985, 1992).

The security sector fulfills the second function of the State mentioned earlier: it ensures the smooth functioning of markets and trade, and the expansion of private property through repression or the stigmatization of failure and deviant behavior.

When we mention the 'security sector' we usually think of it as a set of institutions. In a functioning state in the liberal sense, the monopoly of violence is directly performed by the state institutions of the so-called security sector, namely the Armed Forces, Police, and other type of security bodies - border and customs police or intelligence services. Violence, unlike

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[76] My main concern with this approach is the claim that this is a new phenomenon, but the discussion around this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation, and is nevertheless at odds with the marxist analysis of war.

[77] Following Franz Fanon, Vergès states: "I can say that France is literally the creation of its colonial empire, and the North a creation of the South. I am therefore always surprised by the stubborn way in which slavery, colonialism, and everything related to the 'overseas' territories are overlooked in the analysis of contemporary France and the policies of its successive governments since the 1950s." (Vergès, 2021, p. 9).

force or power, always needs instruments and tools (Arendt, 2005, p. 10). But looking simply at the instruments, maybe comparing armed capacity with neighboring countries, or trends in arms imports, etc. will give us a very limited understanding of the rapport between security and the established order. Eirin Mobekk sees the scope of the security sector as a broad space of actors and institutions:

> "The security sector incorporates 'traditional' security actors (defence forces, police, border guards, intelligence services), justice institutions (judiciary, prosecution services), non-state security and justice actors (private military companies, rebel groups, militias, traditional justice mechanisms) and management and oversight bodies (ministries, parliament)." (2010, p. 279)

This broad definition, assumes that the institutions and actors that protect and ensure the security order through coercive means have changed throughout history, as explained in Part II of this dissertation for the case of Morocco. An in-depth case study interrogates the relation between those changes and the political and economic order. Why and how has policing come to be regarded as indispensable in today's nation-states? Why are demonstrations managed by public police while banks or factories are guarded by private security? Why is border control in Europe more and more implemented by private companies and what kind of private public partnerships emerge with Europe's 21st century border management? The study of the security sector needs to be historically embedded in order to answer these changing questions.

My research essentially tries to identify the current dynamics of the security sector in relation to the neoliberal political economy of Mohammed VI's reign. As such, I not only look at the traditional security sector. Here the **security sector includes a complex of actors, institutions and organizations whose main resource is the provision of a certain meaning of security, in line with the state-sanctioned values: protection of order, private property and (certain) people's integrity.**

Whether it is national or homeland security, the instruments, actors and threats evolve. This evolution is traditionally explained as follows: The modern-nation state retained the strongest monopoly of violence through the 19th and 20th century. It is in the framework of the neoliberal era, that security entered the trend of privatization. This privatization of security started originally in the United States of America and other countries followed the trend in the 1990s, albeit at different speeds (Hever, 2018).

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Charles Tilly's framework helps us account for a different chronology. Tilly theorizes about the "interdependence between war making and state making", and he claims "that mercantile capitalism and state making reinforced each other"(Tilly, 1985, p. 170). Further, he accounts for four different types of state-controlled violence: war making; state making; protection of 'clients'; and extraction of the means to carry out the other three activities. These four types of activities related to state violence are helpful in understanding, not only the deployments of that violence, but the actors who benefited from it. Political government at the summit of the state will be interested in eliminating rivals and opponents to that position by war or state making, thus expanding military and police institutions and capacities. A dominant capitalist class will benefit from the state's protection to continue its accumulation, but also might benefit from providing the tools (credit or technology) that the state needs. This is nothing new if we think of private profit from credits for war making to reliance on indirect groups to ensure the ruler's government.

Specifically on policing, an through a Marxist lens, Spitzer and Scull[78] (1977), argued that the different phases of capitalist development and therefore of social and economic relations are closely linked to its evolution[79]. Rather than situating the emergence of private companies as a new phenomenon, this body of literature studies the lineages of private police. During the stage of flourishing international trade and commerce in nineteenth century Great Britain, police was mostly private and reward-driven. Most private detectives worked on the recovery of private property for a bounty (Spitzer, 1993). At least in the Anglo-Saxon world and its colonies, policing originates from the non-state sector and progressively socializes its costs (Kempa, 2016).

The coercive apparatus of the state as well as the political class would in this alternative chronology be a resource or channel adapted to deploy the structure needed for the development of the capitalist class with the maximum cost-effective structure[80]. Tilly, on the contrary, does not build such a causal explanation, solely relying on the interest of a capitalist

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[78] Steven Spitzer has developed an interesting Marxist theory of crime and police. See: Spitzer, Steven. "Marxist Perspectives in the Sociology of Law." *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 9, no. 1, 1983, pp. 103–124. Spitzer, Steven. "Conflict and Consensus in the Law Enforcement Process. Urban Minorities and the Police." *Criminology*, vol. 14, no. 2, 1976, pp. 189–212.

[79] They distinguish three stages in the process: policing as piece-work, policing in the industrial age, and policing under corporate capital. Already by the end of the 1970s in the USA they were seeing a "privatization is the burgeoning of the private police industry" (1977:19).

[80] As Marx and Engels wrote over 150 years ago, the state is "only a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." (Communist Manifesto)

class. On the contrary, he argues that "on the course of making war, extracting resources, and building up the state apparatus, the managers of states formed alliances with specific social classes"(Tilly, 1985, p. 183).

Despite their contrasting focuses and theoretical depth, these analyses show us different historical genealogies of security and shatter the naïve idea of public security as based on a social contract. At the empirical level, however, the work to adequately explain post independence clientelism, coups d'état and other transformations in Africa, remains undone. Exclusively using a Marxist explanation of the development of capitalism based on the observation of European history would ignore the many principles and grounding mechanisms of government and power relations in Morocco.

In Morocco the political structure may often be contradictory to economic interests of powerful business elites[81]. Marxists may admit dilemmas when the state is forced to protect national business elites against the advancement of world capitalism, as Luxemburg argued. An obstacle for global capitalism can be useful for the national capitalist class. This competition between national elites, however, is seldom acknowledged at the domestic level and between competing capitalist actors. Even less possible would it be to admit the capacity of political elites to surpass economic elites.

In this sense, PART II of this dissertation will look at the evolution of the Alawite's rule and its coercive capacity in context with the evolution of North Africa within the world-system.

4. From the world-system to the analysis of the security sector.

It is difficult to build the framework for an analysis that takes into account the macro-structures of the world-system, while simultaneously acknowledging the local and context-situated distributions of power (the value of resources of power, the structuring conditions, the normative limitations or potentials, etc.). Our research questions, nevertheless, bring us to the need to find adequate tools for the simultaneous levels of analysis.

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[81] This could be the case of amazic support during the colonial period, against the interests of nationalist and urban bourgeoisie, but also of the business purge conducted during Hassan II's reign.

Studying the privatization phenomenon exclusively within the domestic level could be an option. The analysis could focus on the hypothesis that domestic state elites and domestic business elites could be the same or connive for similar goals. However, two rather obvious reasons stand against this assumption. First, the phenomenon of privatization and its acceleration in the 1990s and 2000s has been simultaneously observed even in the most state-militarized countries, such as Israel (Hever, 2018). Second, we can easily trace the European origin of the biggest companies operating in Morocco. It would consequentially be ill advised to ignore the international dimension.

Alternatively, we could approach it from dependency theory[82] or in the framework of neocolonialism. The question posed about the emergence of a private security sector in a peripheral authoritarian regime could be answered easily. In the analysis of the authoritarian nature of 'Arab' regimes the transnational element of domination and submission is put forward as the key explanatory factor. Just as colonial powers forced the Alawite regime into the form and (limited) governance of a nation-state, a neoliberal global agenda designed by powerful states and powerful elites determined and influenced the opening up of a market within smaller powers. Dependency would thus explain the commodification of security in a state dependent on coercion more than consent. The dependency of Morocco from the center of the system would shape its policies through an imposed neoliberal agenda that includes private security.

A recent example of the US-Morocco dependency is what Zakia Salime argues about the GWoT:

> "As far as Morocco is concerned, the war on terrorism came as a package. The discourse of the war is interwoven with a discourse celebrating neoliberalism and manipulating the themes of modernity and democracy. These themes have been articulated in different versions of the [US] Greater Middle East Initiative and have been presented with a consensual façade in the Forum for the Future." (Salime, 2007)

This North-South dependency, however, is not smooth and unidirectional. Hammoudi concedes, "Arab regimes seek the support of the privileged classes, whose interests are linked to those of international capitalism in a process of accumulation at the 'core', which

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[82] Dependency Theory developed in the 1950s and became popular during the 1960s and 70s as a response to liberal modernization theories, with thinkers like Dos Santos or Frank (Griffiths et al., 2010). In the region one of the proponets of this structuralist approach is Samir Amin (1989).

impoverishes the 'periphery'" (Hammoudi, 1997, p. 1). The Moroccan scholar however contends that the world-system and globalization of capitalism cannot stand alone to explain the Alawite regime's survival. Internal and cultural causes should be examined[83].

With his anthropological take on the double relation of domination and submission between individual and chief, Hammoudi helps explain a persisting stability against all odds. The hypothesis in Hammoudi's book (1997) is very much in line with the analysis of the sociology of power. However, Hammoudi completes other Marxian and interest-based explanation of the sociology of power with a profound description of the symbolic mechanisms of power.

> "How can modern authoritarianism succeed in renewing archaic power relations, especially given the radical changes transforming Moroccan society and the firm grip of a nationwide bureaucratic system since the protectorate? It is my contention that all dominance and submission relations refer to a set of cultural schemata, reelaborated or reinvented under colonial rules, by which tensions are arbitrated" (Hammoudi, 1997, p. 4)

As Wallerstein reminds us, global interactions have shaped the core of the world-system as well, as the core depends on the periphery and vice-versa. In the case of security, in fact, mechanisms, instruments and technologies used on the South, have made it through to the North, reversing or disrupting the widely-assumed direction of international relations influence (Breckenridge, 2014; A. Y. Davis, 2005; Rigouste, 2007). This is important when studying the private security sector because we could fall on the simplistic idea that western transnational corporations with the help of a global narrative of neoliberal security impose a private security market on Morocco, transcending or simply using the Moroccan state and regime elites with the help of their global capital accumulation.

> "Global neoliberalism cannot be understood as a by-product of the internal dynamics of the global North. Plainly, Europe and the USA and their ruling classes are important. But the story of the making of neoliberalism is bigger, and more multi-stranded, than Northern social science has usually recognized. Neoliberalism is not a projection of Northern ideology or policy, but a re-weaving of worldwide economic and social relationships. In this re-weaving, the shape of world trade, the strategies of developmental states, and the fate of agriculture, are all major issues" (Connell & Dados, 2014, p. 124)

It is with these assumptions in mind, that we must look at the global and within the local, that I approach the study of private security.

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[83] An exceptionally balanced collection between the transnational and the local factors can be found in (El-Affendi, 2011).

4.1 "Neoliberalism is made in places"[84]

The main focus of interest in our research is situated in the neoliberal decades. A commonly used term, neoliberalism mostly describes a specific economic and political project arising from the precepts of the Washington Consensus. It is also an ethical project, that stresses the *Homo Economicus* as a self-responsible individual (Ong, 2006). A neoliberal model of state management has shaped many public policies in the last decades around the world. Neoliberalism would now and since the 1960s have gained "world hegemony" but it would have been "in its beginnings an outward expansion of the internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant class." (Cox, 1983, p. 171)

Before the encompassing and hegemonic standing of neoliberalism as a world order, neoliberalism stemmed from a more minor school of economic thought. The classic writings of neoliberal Freidrich von Hayek[85] in the 1940s or the Mont Pelerin Society and his disciple Milton Friedman advocated for a timid role of the state in regulating markets and in attending citizens' needs. The state had to have a secondary role in the correct management of social life. It was the individual self-interest in a "competitive" environment that could better and more efficiently allocate resources for the benefit of the whole society. This competitive environment could only be achieved "through unrestricted and free development of business capacities and liberties of individuals within an institutional framework of strong private property rights, free markets and free trade" (Harvey 2007:6)[86]. It is competition that triggers innovation and growth that will eventually 'trickle down' to all of society.

The focus on 'free-market economy' of neoliberal theory that emerged in the 1920s and 1930s Central Europe also obscures the impossibility of an absolute market-regulated economy, and of permanent economic growth as the markers of human progress. While neoliberal enthusiasts try to explain the virtues of the *laissez-faire*, one of its early critics, Karl

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[84] I get this expression from the book *Globalized authoritarianism: megaprojects, slums, and class relations in urban Morocco* (Bogaert, 2018, p. 15).

[85] Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992) was born in Wien. He published The Road to Serfdom in 1944. He won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974 with Gunnard Myrdal.

[86] "Una teoría de prácticas político-económicas que afirma que la mejor manera de promover el bienestar del ser humano consiste en no restringir el libre desarrollo de las capacidades y de las libertades empresariales del individuo dentro de un marco institucional caracterizado por derechos de propiedad privada fuertes, mercados libres y libertad de comercio" in the Spanish version of the book.

Polanyi develops the idea of 'embeddedness' (Polanyi, 2001)[87]. Economy is not and cannot be autonomous from society, politics, but it is indeed subordinated to those domains. It is always a culturally and socially grounded phenomenon[88].

Current neoliberalism has little to do with the theoretical writings of early neoliberal economists[89], and more to do with a move by a capitalist class to counter a crisis of accumulation of the 1960s and 1970s (Duménil & Lévy, 2004; Gill, 1995; Harvey, 2019). Further, and in gramscian terms, neoliberalism embodies the hegemonic culture of a historical bloc, formed by the structures and superstructures that govern behaviors, expectations and actions in a political and economic order.

The 'freedoms' that are supposed to be brought by neoliberalism are the freedoms of private property and of the privileged class, against the freedoms of all peoples. Neoliberalism as a utopian theory has served as a justification and legitimation of a specific governmentality that involves tax cuts for capital, deregulation for the capital movement, cuts in social justice. The premise is what Stiglitz described as a "fundamentalist notion that markets are self-correcting, allocate resources efficiently and serve the public interest well" (Cornwall et al., 2009, p. 1). That governmentality is context-specific but inserted in a global narrative. It frames the calculation and process of governmentality by technical jargon. Problems are presented as if the only solution, or the most cost-effective and efficient, is private market, usually attainable by few.

The implementation of the neoliberal agenda is composed by two different strategies or a *double movement*, as described by Polanyi:

> "the *laissez-faire* movement to expand the scope of the market, and the protective countermovement that emerges to resist the disembedding of the economy. Although the working-class movement has been a key part of the protective countermovement, Polanyi explicitly states that all groups in society have participated in this project. When periodic economic downturns destroyed the banking system, for example, business groups insisted that central banking be strengthened to insulate the domestic supply of credit from the pressures of the global market."

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[87] For a critic on Polanyi's disregard for class struggle see Halperin (2004).

[88] To the economy and society equation, Zuboff would add technology, in a critique to the 'inevitabilitism' of certain technological practice in surveillance capitalists' discourse that conflates "commercial imperatives and technological necessity" (Zuboff, 2019, p. 15).

[89] And neither have actually the policy prescriptions of some of the main proponents of neoclassical theory.

Some have seen in this dual character rather the temporarily categorization of two distinct phases within neoliberalism: a roll-back and a roll-out phases (Bogaert, 2018). Bogaert uses the idea of two different stages of the development of neoliberalism in Morocco. The first phase, he explains, was the *roll-back phase* of neoliberalism, where the state was forced to privatize by renouncing to the control over some political domains. This is the classical era of neoliberalism, promoted specially from global international institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and through the Structural Adjustment Plans of the 1970s, 80s and 90s. These decades were characterized by the deployment of 'market fundamentalism', a phase where the link between classic neoliberal theory and neoliberal policies was more consistently sustained[90].

The roll-back phase in Morocco becomes more clearly understandable if we focus not only on the 'forced' nature of those policies as external pressure from financial institutions. Apart from the position of Morocco in the world-system and in the economic structure in the world, roll-back could have been done in many ways. What is telling is what policy acts were chosen and what the consequences for elites and populations were.

The disastrous consequences of that phase, especially noted during the 1990s brought with them a revision of the policies of deregulation and privatization of the previous phase. They did not bring about a demotion of the 'neoliberal model'[91]. This second phase, however, can be regarded as an intrinsically necessary phase of neoliberalism, already described by Polanyi. The State simply is used by elites to readjust in order to preserve the steering direction of reforms while controlling the negative impacts of capital accumulation.

In Morocco, the *roll-out phase* takes place with the formation of the Koutla or the Alternance in 1998. It is a more creative phase, a phase where the elites are not only concerned with the destruction of State powers, but rather with its re-institutionalization and its redeployment through other mechanisms that involve innovative participation of private partnership. The 'human face' of neoliberalism is the new tramway going through Rabat and Salé, the hundreds of royal foundations that assist children with cancer or fight analphabetism. But

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[90] In Myriam Catusse's words, "the Morocco of structural adjustment, of privatizations and of economic liberalization presents an interesting post from which to observe the reconstitutions of the powers of the state over economic regulation in the context of globalization. The nature and resources of public power are put to the test of the opening of economic borders and the normalization of markets at international level." (Catusse 2009: 185).

[91] This has sometimes been labeled as the 'post-Washington Consensus' or 'neoliberalism with a human face' (Cornwall et al., 2009).

this 'human face', this modernizing and developmental face still follows the privatization and neoliberal doctrine. And the negative impact on people's lives is not avoided.

> "In the negative aftermath of the SAP [Structural Adjustment Program] era, it was clear that mere market deregulation […was…] not enough to spur economic growth, under the inspiration of then chief economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, the idea emerged that supporting a free-market economy required strong state capacities (Kapoor 2008,29). As a result, the state first conceived as part of the problem, became part of the solution" (Bogaert, 2018, p. 59).

Explaining the neoliberal development into two stages makes its paradoxes and complexities easier to sort out. However, I would rather conceptualize it as two different strategies of the implementation of neoliberalism, as they may occur simultaneously, and indeed both are indispensable for the neoliberal agenda. Hibou & Tozy further show these two strategies in different institutions and their trajectories, and explain it rather from the historical governmentalities available (Hibou & Tozy, 2020).

In this sense, a real withdrawal of the state must be questioned. What seems to be going on, really, is a restructuring of elites, the creation of new strategies for accumulation within or outside the state, "sometimes to the point of crisis, [of the] social arrangements between the state and the wider population." (Connell & Dados, 2014, p. 126). The model of public-private partnerships, for instance, encapsulates in one act, the double movement of sustained state control and private gains. In Morocco, "the 'dismemberment' of the State is accepted, precisely because it is not perceived as such, but as a form of its redeployment"[92] (Hibou & Tozy, 2020, p. 449).

In sum, utopian neoliberalism is always contradicted by the very nature of economy as embedded in its context, and by the very same practice and deployment of a neoliberal agenda. As current times show, what we are living in today's world is not a free market with no rules but the state's protection of powerful oligopolistic actors under the narrative of neoliberalism. Stephen Gill consequently calls it oligopolistic neoliberalism, "oligopoly and protection for the strong and a socialization of their risks, market discipline for the weak." (Gill, 1995, p. 405). Thus, neoliberalism by no means entails the retreat of the State, a central element of governing.

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[92] In French in the original "*le 'démemebrement' de l'État est accepté, précisément parce qu'il n'est pas perçu comme tel, mais comme une forme de son redéploiement*".

> "The role of the State is still fundamental, and it ensures the emergence or demise of a certain economic system with the dominance of certain economic actors. Polanyi means by his claim that "laissez-faire was planned"; it requires statecraft and repression to impose the logic of the market and its attendant risks on ordinary people (Polanyi: xxvii).

Outside the West, and before the 1990s and the Thatcher/Reagan alliance, some authors were already engaging with pressing issues such as agriculture or land privatization, other than welfare rollback, de-industrialization or privatization. This new stage of capitalism, the "global neoliberalism cannot be understood as a by-product of the internal dynamics of the global North" (Connell & Dados, 2014, p. 121). Plainly, Europe and the USA and their ruling classes are important. But the story of the making of neoliberalism is bigger, and more multi-stranded, than Northern social science has usually recognized.

Retracing the story of neoliberalism outside or rather beyond the West is not only interesting from a theoretical perspective in order to 'complete the fragmented picture of neoliberalism' (Connell and Dados 2014), but it is also useful in order to identify central elements from the analysis that might be obscured with a North-centered analysis. It is the case of agriculture. Moreover, while 'privatization' of the security sector seems to stem mainly from the North, its strategic development in the South poses bigger questions that do not refer solely to the 'sector' per se or to the private security market, but further challenge the role of the state and its coercive arm.

4.2 Neoliberal security

Neoliberal security goes beyond the market of private military and security companies (PMSCs). The emergence of these new private companies that provide from camera surveillance technology to manned guards reveals the possibility and potential of a new security inserted in the neoliberal agenda. But the neoliberal landscape entails new actors, new enterprises, as well as a new ideological and technical framework to approach and signify security and its threats.

4.2.1 New actors, new networks

The first element of the analysis of neoliberal security, refers to the actors and agents of the new dynamics. It is here that we place our main research questions and hypotheses.

Understanding which actors have pushed for the new security paradigm, and what resources and assemblages they have used is paramount to answering our questions. If we find out that French Transnational Corporations lobbied alone for the privatization of security, or rather if it were actors within the state institutions that joint the wagon of 'modern security governance' to outsource services and benefits to particular local elites the conclusions differ.

The focus, however, is not exactly actors, but the relations they establish amongst them. Studying the changing configurations of actors helps us clarify relations - beyond the formal and institutionalized - rather than just look at the individuals, and their social capital, as well as on the dynamic nature of these relations [93].

Networks are "regular set[s] of contacts of similar social connections among individuals or groups" (Sfakianakis, 2004, p. 77). Whether in the textile and clothing sector (Cammett, 2004) or in the social sector (Bergh, 2012; Kreitmeyr, 2018), traditional elites and networks are being complemented by new individuals that have the ability to mobilize or access other resources of power. This new emerging neoliberal networks consolidate what some have called authoritarian neoliberalism (Bogaert, 2018; Kreitmeyr 2018) by way of adapting power accumulation to the new economic model.

In this research, moreover, useful categories are those of Politically Connected Firms (PCF) and Not Connected Firms (NCF), introduced by Mohammed Said Saadi (2016) in his quantitative research of Moroccan Cronyism. In his work, although he admits to the difficult access to data in order to clearly classify PCF and NCFs, he shows how the connection of corporations and businessmen with the primary elites of the regime has an important impact in the potentialities and possibilities of development of corporations.

Thus, the different actors in the security sector may use different strategies to advance their interests, from cultivating political connections to others such as competition, alliance, coordination, isolation, service, loyalty, break-through, push-through, bargaining, blackmail or others. In a comparative study of textile local industries in Tunisia and Morocco, Cammett found that in the different tactics adopted by local businessmen in order to protect their business from globalizing trends two dimensions were central (Cammett, 2007, p. 190):

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[93] Social-network analysis is also useful in the study of transnational activism. In particular, Stenner focuses on the study of transnational advocacy networks for the Moroccan anticolonial campaign (2019).

1. Influence of private over policy making and the control of state over private business can be determined by close or distant relations.
2. Capital can be highly concentrated or diffused.

In other words, the tightness of networks (whether through control or influence) between economic and political actors determined the repertoire of actions that businesspeople considered and deployed. Similarly, their position and potential mobilization of resources of power within their own field of power determined the capacity to collaborate or compete. These are relevant indicators to identify dynamics within the security sector business, even if the goals of the business actors are not immediately similar, as private security companies do not seek to protect their business from foreign trade, because of the nature of the sector.

Shifting assemblages can also be observed in the political realm (Parejo Fernández, 2009). Although its composition is not public, the Royal Advisory Council, for instance, has been gradually substituting some of the traditional advisors whose main asset was their loyalty to the crown and their so-called '*makhzen* pedigree', with other more sectorial and specialized individuals, many coming from the private sector (Iraqi, 2016).

As a consequence, a reconfiguration of the security sector and its elites might also imply different behaviors and patterns of relations, not only regarding the state and the deployment of its resources (coercive, financial…), but also in terms of societal practices and the provision of security. The different level of access to resources, as well as the different understandings of political alliances and practices, requires case-sensitive epistemologies (Wilkinson 2007).

> "[I]n order to analyze a society's power structure, it is necessary to identify the typology of its actors and their relevance, the dynamics that govern their relationships, the power resources at their disposal and their respective position in society" (Izquierdo, 2012, p. 8)

Studying elite networks does not preclude the ideational or rather normative dimension of privilege (Cammett, 2004). Indeed, getting closer to the personal and social networks will help researchers get a insight on the 'cultural and normative' structures of these networks, instead of quantitatively focusing on macro-economic indicators either from a Marxian or a liberal perspective.

The security sector contains normative structures, assumptions of the practices and meanings that constrain and frame most actions, at least for most actors. That means that there are

material conditions that determine the use of force, as well as ideational assumptions about how the use of force should be used. In this sense, the study of the 'security sector' involves those actors that have access to the resources and the structures, even if they are not directly members of the security forces. An example of that would be legislators discussing and drafting law concerning private security. While they are not directly security actors and their influence might be limited, they take part in defining the framework for private security development in Morocco. A more extreme example, however, would be that of the parking guards on the streets. While they can be seen as subalterns without an immediate influence in the sector, informal networks among workers, relational aspects with their neighborhoods, clients or authorities constitute important sources of knowledge.

4.2.2 New technologies of security

Another important aspect of security to be researched refers to the ideological underpinnings of the neoliberal agenda. As researchers have observed, the technological-, efficiency- and private-oriented solutions play a prominent role in neoliberal governance (Axster et al., 2021; Ong, 2006; Wacquant, 2009). That permeates the work and identity not only of private companies, but also of competing police units or security agencies, and ultimately of the state.

Privatization is an integral part of the neoliberal actions undertaken by states. Hever explains that privatization is done through different mechanisms. The common mechanism for privatization is that of "direct sale of public property into private hands". This has been observed in many countries where the state-owned arms industry has been sold to private and foreign investors. A second mechanism is when services are outsourced to private entities (corporations, but also civil society organizations). This would be the case of Private Security Companies (PSCs) when they perform a security service previously provided by the state. We find examples of this in private guards that protect VIPs or airports previously protected by public police or other public security forces. A third mechanism, ideologically loaded, is the withdrawal of the state and the deregulation of a particular sector, allowing corporations to 'fill the void' or compete. This has been called "privatization by default" (Hever, 2018, pp. 4–6). In the case of security this could also entail a (perceived) escalation of violence and criminality that is unaddressed by public authorities and moves people to hire their own private protection services.

Other aspects of this neoliberal security, as deepening of population control or the push for 'professionalization' and 'formalization' that can be observed in Morocco, must also be researched within this framework.

5. Security as an intersubjective concept and a social practice

The second dimension of our study is concerned with the development of security in its ideational structure. This dimension is tackled through the constructivist approach of security schools, from the Copenhagen to International Political Sociology with the help of conceptual gramscian understandings of hegemony and other concepts developed by the Sardinian Marxist[94].

Constructivist scholars see international relations and the behavior of actors within the world as shaped by normative structures, as a socially constructed reality, ruled not only by material structures that physically constrain actors and their actions, but primarily by ideas and identities. The understanding of the world affects the behavior, identities and interests of actors. In other words, actors share and shape a specific ideational structure through which they act[95].

Constructivists differ in the weight they give to ideas and understandings as defining factors in actions and behaviors. Specifically, in the world of security, constructivists are interested in studying the perceptions and narratives of security and how they shape foreign policy. Why did the US perceive the USSR nuclear weapons and not the UK's as a national threat?

It is within this theoretical approach that I define security as an intersubjective concept and a social practice that is historically and geographically located. The notion and narrative of security deployed through discourse and practice by the state-sanctioned actors depends on a historical evolution and position of those actors; as well as on the location of the context within the world-system. As the proponents of the Securitization Theory argue:

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[94] Other than hegemony, useful concepts investigated by Gramsci are those of historical blocs, civil society and the organic intellectuals.

[95] Nicholas Onuf, Peter J. Kazenstein, Carol Cohn, Emanuel Adler, Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink (1998) studied how international norms influenced foreign policies of states.

> "Security is thus a self-referential practice, because **it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue** [bold is mine]– not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat." (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998:24).

> "Thus, the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects. […] The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?" (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998:25)

The security sector was the main working category in the first approach of this research in order to capture the material conditions and development of hegemonic security. In this second dimension the concept of security is expanded and presented **as a social practice concerned with the exclusions and inclusions of violence as a legitimate or illegitimate tool of social control**. Filling up the meaning of security is a social task, a social experience. The acceptable levels of insecurity; the victims/beneficiaries and the perpetrators/providers of that (in)security; are a contentious and dynamic matter.

Social and political reality is expressed through rhetorical and ideational elements as well as through material practices (Jackson, 2011a). It is the narrative and the permanent reenactment of that narrative through language and practice that builds the frame for policy choices, enabling and rendering necessary a certain set of behaviors, and limiting or blocking even the thought of a different course of action. The narrative that explains the reality thus constitutes and reinforces the foucauldian 'regime of truth'[96] through the functions and the "contexts of the language use" (Wodak & Meyer, 2001).

A persisting security discourse seems to indeed point to the Gramscian idea of the importance of ideology to preserve existing economic relations. Coercion is one of the fundamental instruments of the state to promote and protect a specific economic model. And protecting a specific model, whether by coercion or law is done in the name of security. In the Moroccan case, the political plays a fundamental role. As we will see in pre-colonial Morocco and the consolidation of the Alawite Dynasty (Chapter 4), it was the capacity to

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[96] The regime of truth "calls upon individuals to become amenable not only to being governed but also to governing themselves. Positive, productive power, therefore, creates self-governing, responsible citizens who willingly engage in practices that support the logics pursued by governments, and is disseminated through a complex web of macro and meso-institutions, akin to Gramsci's notion of civil society" (Purcell & Brook, 2020, p. 3). Didier Bigo has especially worked on updating and utilizing Foucauldian theory for critical security studies (Bigo, 2008).

successfully exert coercion that procured consent: not only is coercive power a way of forcing someone to do something but it is also a display of legitimacy/*autoritas* that can bring consent from tribes and cities, especially when it is waged as a *jihad* against the *ahl al-harb*, as the capacity to protect against European empires.

As mentioned earlier, security is here conceptualized as a process sanctioned by those who have the capacity to impose a specific course of action. Securitiziation Theory can make sense of the linguistic and discursive process that makes the *tsharmil* or street bands a security issue that justifies 1500 surveillance cameras on the streets of Casablanca[97], and why over-incarceration and diseases in prison, pervasive homelessness or business corrupt practices do not[98].

As was already laid out in Chapter 1, ST analyzes the securitization move primarily as a speech-act, and admits that this move does not always have to be a successful one. Indeed, scholars have looked at conflicting narratives of securitization in cases such as gender-based violence, climate crisis, etc. Why is it that some issues become effectively securitized? In the case of 'climate change', environmentalists and experts discussed for years the negative effects a securitization of the issue would entail at the international level, by bringing the issue into the hands of the Security Council, and thus to the possible veto of certain members states, instead of keeping the discussion at the General Assembly level (Boyer & Oculi, 2019). Migration or Asylum are today probably the cases in point of a 'security issue' at the human level that have been 'securitized' through xenophobic reasons, the closing and militarization of borders and migration flows (Huysmans, 2006).

To my view, three central factors can explain why some issues become securitized and others do not, and why some attempts prompted by speech-acts succeed in moving an issue from the political towards the security while others fail.

- A history of structural exclusions

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[97] The video surveillance project started in 2016 and was enlarged and upgraded in 2019. YABILADI (2019) "Maroc : Un nouveau système de vidéosurveillance dans les grandes villes". Yabiladi.com, 22/01/2019. Online: https://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/73636/maroc-nouveau-systeme-videosurveillance-dans.html (Accessed 5/2/2021).

[98] Buzan, Waever and de Wilde see three levels of policy framing: nonpoliticized, politicized and securitized.

First, a paramount factor that might not fit well with the neat Securitization Theory regards material and historical structures. Identifying which actors are those with capacity to affect a change in how an issue is perceived must go in hand with identifying the elements that are used to explain this move. An excessive focus on the 'securitizing agent' might obscure the structural and relational elements of that securitization. Securitization of certain populations could erroneously be portrayed as an "unfortunate cultural artifact" rather than shedding light on "the global system of expropriation fundamental to the conditions of possibility for the liberal way of war and biopolitical security assemblages." (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2019, p. 4)[99]. To go back to the example of securitizing borders and migration flows, the racist and colonial historical foundations of mobility regimes are obscured by the focus on time-limited narratives (Mayblin & Turner, 2021).

It follows that for a security narrative focused on White Supremacy terrorism securitizing actors would require many more mobilizing capacities than to frame 'radical jihadist terrorism' as the latter fits well in a centuries-long structure of oppression, racism, alterity and islamophobia.

In the same guise, gender norms and patriarchal structures, hardly ever discussed, underlie hegemonic understanding of/knowledge on/discourse about the world, of international relations and even of war and security, and they affect the decisions and actions of actors (Tickner, 1988, 1997, 1999). As the school of Feminist Security Studies develops, feminists and constructivists help bridge the gap between discursive norms in the international system and transnational actors acting and shaping domestic politics and, ultimately (and most importantly) affecting lives (Abu-Lughod, 2015; Cohn, 1987, 2011; Yuval-Davis, 1996).

In this sense, the historical exclusions and inclusions and the cultural underpinnings of a society are essential to the understanding of a certain security order in a specific context. A limited discourse analysis that looks at textual narratives of counter-terrorism, for example, needs to take these into account.

- The position of actors

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[99] Some authors are doing wonderful work in that sense by way of interpelling race studies, colonial history and surveillance and migration studies. See for example (Browne, 2015; Mayblin & Turner, 2021).

The second element that determines a successful securitization move is the position of securitization actors within the power structures. The power structures and opportunities and the capacity to mobilize power resources determine the success of an individual, group or organization, as a securitization actor. Even if a security discourse is perfectly consistent with the hegemonic order, who pronounces it matters. "Ideas have to be understood in relation to material circumstances. Material circumstances include both the social relations and the physical means of production." (Cox, 1983, p. 168). Threats might be taken much more seriously if they are assessed by a group of French TNCs (Transnational Corporations) with influence in media outlets, than if they come from a group of local SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) trying to get through to their regional MPs.

The position of an actor is determined by the accumulation of power resources relative to the amount of available resources in the field and their value. That is, for example, the capacity to influence media and push for a certain narrative, as well as the capacity to mobilize state mechanisms to implement technologies for a certain security.

- The Scale Economy of the Narrative

Third, a global narrative framed by global transnational elites helps other secondary elites frame an issue in similar terms. The hegemonic narrative of security depends on the international narrative as well as on the local narrative. The global narrative of security is circumscribed to a historic bloc that perceives 'salafi-jihadi terrorism' as a primary threat to global order, while 'misogynistic violence' or 'climate emergency' are presented as counter-hegemonies, potentially co-opted nevertheless. As such, if the Moroccan government frames a demand for international cooperation as part of the GWoT it is likely to get more attention from donors than if the narrative is specifically locally circumscribed.

Furthermore, the new global narrative of security is also framed within a neoliberal hegemony that frames the security agenda and the security technologies in related terms (technocracy, problem-oriented, individually-oriented, techno-optimism, etc.). Not only are security threats and risks similarly perceived, but also the solutions seem consistent with what neoliberalism has to offer (enhanced surveillance, biocontrol, private security, etc.).

International narratives on security permeate national borders. Again, we can view dependency theory as a starting point, whereas the 'security order' that maintains the historic bloc emanates from the powerful states and their organic intellectuals. However, this 'security

order' is also maintained through its *ta'assil* (rooting)[100] in a specific context and by everyday routines, bureaucratic practices (Bigo, 2005, 2008) and practices of civil society (as separate from ruling class)[101]. In other words, the global narrative and norms are locally subsidiarized (Acharya, 2004, 2011a).

The logic behind this *ta'assil* is easy to grasp. As a specific 'security order' is increasingly pervasive, so are the solutions and processes that it deploys. It is a specific knowledge that ensures specific technical applications, thus a technology. The state and local actors shape the sector and its limits, while the coercive nature of the regime is reinforced through the increased value of security.

A clarifying example was the Cold War. When the global narrative was a West-East confrontation, any conflict at local or national level was more successfully framed in those terms. At the same time, the framing of those small-scale conflicts in those terms further reinforced the bipolar transnational discourse. It was a narrative reinforced at all levels, from global to local. In the Moroccan case, for instance, the repression of the opposition could be framed and internationally sanctioned within the fight against communism, but this narrative changed in the 1990s (Feliu, 1994), when repression against social unrest became more of an issue of public order against vandalism, terrorists, national enemies, and so on (Camps-Febrer, 2019a) [102].

The Global War on Terror as a meta-narrative provides similar evidence. Analyzing Boko Haram or the MUJAO (Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa) as organizations moved by extremist ideologies without disentangling the discourse and its opportunistic essence from the local socio-economic factors might be politically beneficial to foreign policy or to reinforcing military decisions, but it is certainly over-simplistic as a serious analysis.

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[100] I get the concept of ta'assil from Hibou and Tozy in their discussion of the local language of neoliberalism in Morocco (2020, p. 415).

[101] See for instance the work on the views of NGO workers about Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs in Tangiers, Morocco (Bastani & Gazzotti, 2021).

[102] On my study on the 1990 uprising in Fez and other cities (Camps Febrer 2019) I saw an important shift in the official framing of the events, compared to previous similar events. In the riots that followed the general strike of 14th December 1990, those that the regime blamed as responsible for destruction and violence were not the unions or leftist political parties, it was the marginalized criminals, issuing from the precarious slums and poor neighborhoods.

Although hegemonic narratives are permanently challenged by other narratives, the narrative involving terrorism in the last two decades has become extremely similar among political elites around the globe[103].

5.1 The value of security

The rationale of this section might apparently differ from that of a materialist oriented understanding of the sociology of power. It is however, not contradictory with its groundwork. Furthermore, both levels provide different epistemologies to work with and that must be reconnected. As in Gramsci's historical materialism, "ideas and material conditions are always bound together, mutually influencing one another, and not reducible one to the other. Ideas have to be understood in relation to material circumstances." (Cox, 1983, p. 168).

Among the resources of power, the Sociology of Power admits immaterial and symbolic resources within the analysis. While symbolic resources were limited to ideology at first and with a very instrumentalist connotation, Farrés-Fernández worked on the inclusion of different Bourdieusian concepts that might help explain cultural and social elements that guide and shape actor's behaviors (Farrés-Fernández, 2018). The concept of *habitus*, helps us grasp the normative structure that frames decisions, even the perceptions and self-perceptions, of different actors, culturally constrained in a specific context. This situates a specific security within a rationale, that is, beyond its material implications.

The 'field of power' is also a clarifying concept to explain how competition among elites for a particular resource might increase the value of that resource. The field of power is the area or structure where different actors compete for resources of power. The actors' use and competition in the area determines the value of resources. It is from the 'field of power' where the 'security order' emerges: a hegemonic order of problems and solutions.

> "For Bourdieu, fields denote arenas of production, circulation, and appropriation and exchange of goods, services, knowledge, or status, and the competitive positions held by actors in their struggle to accumulate, exchange, and monopolize different kinds of power resources (capitals). Fields may be thought

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[103] An attempt to develop consistent critical approaches to terrorism and its social construction can be found in Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) (Jackson, 2007; Jackson et al., 2017). See Chapter 1.

of as structured spaces that organize around specific types of capitals or combinations of capital. In fields, actors strategize and struggle over the unequal distribution of valued capitals and over the definitions of just what are the most valued capitals." (Swartz, 2016)

In his study about the 2006 war in Lebanon, Farrés-Fernández identifies a field of power shared by opposing actors. These actors, while apparently being opposed and in conflict with each other, simultaneously share interests and synergies. Their discourses and actions against each other justify the rival's actions and discourses. The value of militaristic and conflictual responses, and therefore of the coercive resources they control, is increased. In other words:

"not only do they justify their speeches mutually […], but they even share the same objectives and interests in the field of power, defending with their actions the value of the power resources that both have. That is, the different actors (supposedly confronted) produce synergies to defend the importance that power resources have, in the system studied, such as the prestige gained through military actions, the militaristic ideology, or the military capacity itself as a material resource. Without the adversary's actions, these power resources will progressively devalue over time." (Farrés-Fernández, 2018, p. 4)[104]

The concept of field of power for the security sector is useful as the process of securititzation of normal politics increases the value of all security-related actions. My hypothesis is thus, that an increased importance of certain security issues attracts further resources for those who already possess security resources. This, in turn, might increase their competition through any resources that actors might be able to mobilize as the stakes become higher for everyone when the market of security grows.

5.2 Everyday practices of the exceptional normality

Finally, a specific security, that is, what is hegemonically understood as security, engenders specific measures that constrain the possibilities of the people and impact their everyday lives. The deployment of security is done in different ways, but mostly through a routinized exceptionality that 'normalizes' certain exclusions. This apparent contradiction is also found

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[104] Spanish in the original: "no solo justifican sus discursos mutuamente, como se había podido señalar hasta ahora, sino que incluso comparten los mismos objetivos e intereses en el campo del poder, defendiendo con sus acciones el valor de los recursos de poder que ambos disponen. Es decir, los distintos actores (supuestamente enfrentados) producen sinergias para defender la importancia que tienen, en el sistema estudiado, recursos de poder como el prestigio ganado a travéss de acciones bélicas, la ideología militarista, o la propia capacidad militar como recurso material. Sin las acciones del adversario, estos recursos de poder se ir.an devaluando progresivamente con el tiempo."

in the neoliberal paradigm and in the relationship between neoliberalism and exceptions. Neoliberalism as "a new relationship between government and knowledge through which governing activities are recast as nonpolitical and nonideological problems that need technical solutions" (Ong, 2006, p. 3).

When a terrorist act is portrayed as an 'act of war' the response must be a militarized one. Alternatively, if it is define as a 'crime', the response will probably involve judiciary and police measures. Therefore, the securitization act includes in itself the technologies of securitization, that is, the tools and methodologies that will be deployed.

While Foucault's meaning of technologies varies, I use the concept of **technologies of security (τέχνη)** to describe the methods and mechanisms designed to provide security. The term technology adequately conveys a strong relationship between knowledge and its practical application. It thus conveys the ideas that I work with:

- that security provision is based on a particular knowledge
- that this knowledge is socially produced
- that labor is treated as an element of it, as a resource

This approach attempts to unravel what the state – and the actors acting in accordance or in its name – understands as security, the official 'craftmanship' of security: how security is used as a technology of governance that secures/protects specific subjects, objects, places and ideas.

It would be naïve, thus, to think of this intersubjective establishment of an existential threat as a process without actors and without structures. A myriad of consulting agencies, think tanks and corporations, and the State officials, contribute to a specific discursive understanding of security issues: terrorism, development-security-stability, mis-à-niveau, etc. Identifying the securitizing actors[105] is an important element of Securitization Theory. It is all these myriad of practices and actors that make up the sovereignty of modern power. It is through the sanctioned security that the line between exceptional and normal is drawn. Contrary to Foucault's thesis of the retreat of death as a function of sovereignty in the

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[105] Securitizing actors would fall within the concept of organic intellectuals as conceived by Antonio Gramsci, all contributing in one way or another to strengthening the cements of the securitizing order.

modern state the exclusionary and exceptional violence as the norm have never left the stage, but it has been reframed, and in a way it is the West that has retraced back its steps towards a routinized exceptionality (Bigo & Guittet, 2003; Huysmans, 2006).

To engage with these issues requires a set of epistemological tools that, yet lack adequate underpinning for the study of neopatrimonial regimes of power and their specific elite structures and practices (Feliu & Parejo, 2013; Parejo Fernández, 1997; Veguilla del Moral, 2012).

International Political Sociology, as described in chapter 1, focuses on policy implementations, not only the exceptional and coercive measures but especially the "mundane bureaucratic decisions of everyday politics" (Bigo & Tsoukala 2009). The focus is now not so much about states or political elites or the will of a specific actor but about government and society, and about identifying the mechanisms that ensure the emergence of certain practices of security and insecurity. This approach sheds light on the contextual and historical experience of State, security, domination, violence and deviance.

What European IR scholars are now discovering, is something that would have been quite evident had they looked or listened somewhat closer to other parts of the world. Egypt or Algeria have lived for years under a state of emergency, framed under a security discourse where either the communist or the criminal or the terrorists were the baseline that justified 'iliberal practices' without a wink. Didier Bigo (2005) talks about the 'governmentality of unease', the process in which we are immersed and that is blurring the distinction between defense and homeland security. Further,

> "Beyond the existence of a transnational field of professionals of (in)security management coming from coercive visions of security, a large 'dispositif' relays and creates the conditions of the 'plug' into various national societies and cultures. It is not a contamination of the liberal society or its essence revealed which is at stake; it is a process of consolidation of different insecurities constructed as if they were unified and global. This construction is certainly a construction by language, but it is also and mainly the use of technologies which unifies different objects under the same logic of surveillance and control, and the political use of these technologies as if they were the only possibility to resolve the question and to remove the uncertainty which is at the heart of modern life."(Baker-Beall, 2009, p. 8).

If we are to fully acknowledge this blurring between inner/outer securities, however, some epistemological obstacles arise[106]. We could be tempted to think that an authoritarian regime is monolithically in-sync within a specific meta-narrative of securitization. The discussion of whether the impact of political and elite discourse be analyzed with the same parameters in a liberal-democratic state than in an authoritarian state such as Morocco arises. As we see with Lisa Wedeen's analysis on Syria, or James C. Scott, the imperative of building legitimacy is tantamount to any regime. In authoritarian regimes consent is also an important element of the domination strategy. In any case, "to the extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal, deviant cases. Hegemony is enough to ensure conformity of behavior in most people most of the time" (Cox, 1983, p. 164).

It is clear, however, that the resources, impacts, tensions and reference objects are neither universal nor ahistorical. Bringing ST and IPS to the South helps us study the limits and connections between coercion and consent. Critical security studies in the global south could as well contribute to breaking down the binary idea of liberal regimes versus authoritarian ones, as well as the dichotomy between coercion and consent (for coercion builds consent).

Hegemonic security protects individual and class interests, and conveys a specific economic and political model. Security reinforces a normative and material logic of domination. In the three levels of consciousness that Gramsci sees in the movement for a historic bloc, securitization constitutes a perfect hegemonic effort in the sense that it "brings the interests of the leading class into harmony with those of subordinate classes and incorporates these other interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms"(Cox, 1983, p. 168).

Some actors acquire more capacity to influence the hegemonic meaning of security, among them the organic intellectuals at think tanks, security experts and, of course, any successful securitizing actors. What I look at, is how the security narrative is inserted within the neoliberal narrative that justifies the presence of private surveillance and private security. Who are those actors performing that discursive role?

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[106] In Morocco, for example, we have to confront the historical evolution of the military as well as of the policing. This is a difficult task as not much historical work has been done on this behalf. As we will see henceforth, the study of the security sector in Northern Africa still poses very challenging questions.

In sum, even though neoliberalism is made in places, and we are looking at private security in Morocco, the narrative can help us pin down the normative referents, whether they are inscribed in a global narrative (like the Global War on Terror); if it plays by local unrelated elements (*tsharmil*); or postcolonial modernization (modernize, *mise à niveau*), these referents can be summoned by local or foreign actors.

6. New Security Assemblages: the Research Thesis

This study aims to analyze the rise and expansion of private security in Morocco.

Specifically, this research aims to test the usefulness of a post-Marxian political economic focus within critical security studies and its dominant constructive approach to the meanings and social practices of security. I believe there is an especially crucial task in shedding light on the nature of the relation between state-sanctioned security and the current economic model. In doing so, this research aims to contribute to the understanding of the current world-system and the assemblage of transnational business elites and states.

General Research Question: How does the private provision of security relate to a strong authoritarian State?

Objective #1: To identify the changing dynamics in the political economy of security from the formation of the precolonial Moroccan state until the current neoliberal context.

- **Specific Research Questions 1:** What are relevant actors, resources and practices in the security sector, and how have they evolved? What are the political economy conditions that can account for the transformations of the sector?

Objective #2: To explain how this security sector relates to the consolidation of the neoliberal agenda in Morocco, in terms of the dynamics between private companies and the structure of power.

- **Specific Research Questions 2:** How does the private security sector interact with the traditional security, business and political elites? What technologies and

mechanisms are used in order to reframe the roles and needs of the different actors around security? What are the new elite networks that emerge from these changes?

Objective #3: Finally, this research also attempts to explore the implications of the neoliberal 'security narrative'[107] and its deployment in everyday life.

- **Specific Research Questions 3:** How is the new neoliberal security impacting everyday lives? How is the private security sector entrenched within a global and local narrative of neoliberal provision of services?

The commonly held assumption about the Moroccan security sector is that it is tightly controlled by the political elites that also control the state. After the failed military coups of the 1970s and the subsequent rearrangements through repression, cooptation and other strategies, the military and the police actors and institutions have been cleverly managed to provide a stable loyalty to the monarchy. The security sector continues to be an indispensable resource for the regime's stability.

Now, since the last decade of Hassan II's rule, there has been an emergence of a private security sector in Morocco. This phenomenon provides the opportunity to analyze the relationship between a neoliberal agenda that modifies the capacities and deployments of the state and rearranges the regime of power. In the 1990s, thus, we are confronted with a new business sector, a commodified security that is no longer only provided by the state. The private actors in the provision of security may vary in their profiles and strategies from other usual business. This sector, unlike others, is not only a private one. These are not only businesspeople trying to sell more garments or to secure grand tenders for the construction of a road. It is not even the business of private education or private medicine, to cite two important social sectors related to the idea of the welfare state. Security, more than anything, is the *raison-d'être* of a central authority.

The new security sector is a fertile and untapped domain for research on elites. Changes and new dynamics are easier to spot, through the tensions and challenges that emerge between old and new actors (Sedjari, 2013), between private and public stakeholders in the sector, and

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[107] Most IR scholarship dealing with security narratives focuses on two different narratives that arise from the liberal peace narrative: the security-development nexus and the anti-terrorist narrative (Jackson, 2005; Baker-Beall, 2009; Richmond, 2011, 2012; Chandler, 2010). See my sample paper Camps-Febrer, B. (2019b).

through the narratives and resources that actors mobilize to advance their positions. The study of these new assemblages will help us understand how elites are embedded in a sociocultural context, and "*why* and *how* certain kinds of networks are more effective in capturing resources than others under certain reform conditions." (Sfakianakis, 2004, p. 78).

This research aims at describing the dynamics of the security sector and at exploring its relation with the political and economic system in place. A historical perspective explores the changing evolution of the regime of power, and the ebbs and flows of different resources and actors. My research examines particularly the 1990s to present-day security sector, when the neoliberal context, implemented actually since the 1970s in Morocco, coincides with the new security sector. That means that the way the security sector is structured, the capacity it has to mobilize valuable resources, the dynamics and relations of its elites and other national and transnational elites, is directly related to the regime of power during the neoliberal decades.

My main working hypothesis starting this research was that the neoliberal framework opened up new assemblages between the regime and the state. Given the existence of a private security sector, I contend that the regime is hitherto not protected exclusively by the state, and its coercive institutions. That means that the state's function as a coercive resource is not monopolistic, but rather that coercion is a resource coveted and mobilized by other actors outside the state.

My thesis is thus that neoliberal security weakens the state as a structure that determines or constrains power relations. In a neoliberal context, the state sets the framework for other actors to operate and act in specific areas. As actors outside the state accumulate resources (capital, coercion, media), the competition for power is also played outside the state, thus weakening the importance of public institutions. Moreover, while some private actors accumulate power, they increase their capacity to influence the state structure and thus weaken its governing capacity.

However, the rise of the private security sector does not erode the importance of the state as a coercive and regulatory resource of power. While the importance of the state as a structure is weakened, the capacity to mobilize the state for the benefit of certain elites remains indispensable. Competing actors need the state to regulate, set a specific framework for their private security provision, as well as to sanction the hegemonic neoliberal security order.

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Therefore, the state is a resource of power, among others, and those with the capacity to mobilize this resource have relative power over those who do not.

The regime structure and the importance of state security as a resource of power determine the kind of actors that can enter and operate in the private sector of security. The best-positioned business elites that emerged in the post-colonial period progressively built multisectorial and holding models of business (Catusse 2007:80). But were the main companies in the private sector business following a similar model? Are they well connected in the political sphere? Are they connected with the public security sphere? How do they bargain their position within the sector? In other words, what resources are valuable in the competition for power? Is it an important asset to present a good business model as opposed to informality and unprofessional business of small companies of guards? Or is rather more determinant to be able to mobilize strong political connections?

Nominally, new companies appeared with the new private security sector in the 1990s. This research wanted to explain how or whether the traditional elites were benefiting or even promoting the current neoliberalization of security. I wanted to question how much these elites were in synchrony with the new market or if, on the contrary, they were being swiped aside by a new emerging business-oriented elite?[108] It could actually be that the relevant actors within the private security sector came from within the same public security sector. This would mean that state security officers –maybe a younger business-oriented generation?- were branching out into the private business. Another possibility was that foreign business actors already working in the security sector in overseas markets were actually the ones promoting and pushing for a private sector. This would present a core-periphery approach and further the idea that neoliberal security is pushed especially from the global North. Subsequently, global capital could represent the main resource shaping the sector. Finally, local business actors, unrelated to security, could have detected an opportunity/necessity for marketization, and horizontally expanded their conglomerate business models into the attractive potential market.

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[108] An example of a sector in which similar transformations have happened is the fishery sector in Dakhla and Laayoune and the emergence of lobbies and new sectorial organizations in. These new business actors and their practices might have had an influence in certain military officers getting rid of their fishing licenses or adopting joint ventures as strategies of adaptation to the new context (see Veguilla del Moral, 2011).

These exploratory explanations concern the nature of elites in the SS, their resources and their positions within the global, transitional and local structures of power. Further, what I wanted to find out is how actors relate to each other (do they ally, do they compete, do they coordinate), how they gain tenders (by personal contacts, best performance), how they perceive their relation to other non-security actors or even to other type of security elites. The normative element of networks needs to be taken into account since a cultural set of values, whether conscious or unconscious, limit the possibilities of interaction. Further, the actors participating in these networks "are not just self-seeking animals but are also embedded in structures of economic life that construct and express common interests." (Sfakianakis, 2004, p. 77).

As new resistances emerge from the population and civil society as responses to the negative consequences of neoliberal policies and authoritarianism. How are this new resistances countered, narrated, faced by those defending the hegemonic order? With what resources? What practices? Who counters them? The establishment and defense of the neoliberal system is thus sustained in part by the control of a hegemonic narrative that will provide an explanation for the repression of resistance to the neoliberal agenda, while, at the same time, will expand the need for security into new domains.

Assumingly, in order to face new resistances, new functions of the security sector are deployed, that is: the securitization of life through enhanced biopolitical and social control. This is done through new mechanisms: biometrics, street cameras, spyware, satellite technologies, cyberspace control, but also proximity police, reinforcement of human intelligence, private guards, etc. The old functions of the state security are still widely useful: direct violence (repression, crime-chasing), and population control (*moqaddemin*, informants). But what the private sector has to offer might also be changing the way the regime deals with resistance.

The deployment of these new technologies of security affect not only the regime and the power structures of other competing actors, but ultimately everyday lives of people and the population-state relations.

7. Brief Summary

As this chapter displays, this research is informed by a neogramscian global political economy. Epistemologically, my research deals with the security order through two approaches: (1) a dialectical and material analysis, methodically deployed through the analysis of networks, actors and resource; and (2) a qualitative interpretation of the bio/necropolitics of security in the present neoliberal context: the narrative of security and the consequences of the deployment of its technologies.

These two approaches look at the security sector from different angles. In a positivist materialist understanding, the security sector is composed by the coercive technologies that ensure the correct continuation of the economic regime. From another perspective, we learn about the ideological and narrative mechanisms that convey an accepted/legitimate conception of security. The consensual dimension of violence and social control is thus relevant.

At the intersection of these two approaches –the material and the ideational – emerges a multidimensional picture of security. It is this security that speaks of the internal and external dynamics of the regime. It is through the study of this security that we learn about how elites interact: how they compete, how they align, how they capture other resources of power. It is through the study of this security that we can learn about the political economy of our times: what is precious, what is protected, what is excluded.

Part II

A Political Economic History of Security

Chapter 3 - Retracing Security: A Brief Historical Commentary

"They want to learn how to fight to protect the faith, but they lose the faith in the process of learning how."

Al-Naciri, *Kitab al-Istiqsa li-Akhbar duwal al-Maghrib al-Aqsa*, 19th Century.

« Écoute, ma chatte. Je vais te charger d'une commission pour ton mari. Dis-lui de ma part d'acheter, demain, pour dix mille francs d'emprunt du Maroc qui est à soixante-douze; et je lui promets qu'il aura gagné de soixante à quatre-vingt mille francs avant trois mois. Recommande-lui le silence absolu. Dislui, de ma part, que l'expédition de Tanger est décidée et que l'État Français va garantir la dette marocaine. Mais ne te coupe pas avec d'autres. C'est un secret d'État que je confie là. »

Guy de Maupassant, *Bel-Ami*, 1885

It has often been pointed out that International Relations' scholars or political scientists tend to study power relations within a historically reductionist framework (Izquierdo Brichs, 2016a). A short time scope is certainly inappropriate if our aim is not so much focused on actors' agency but rather on the unveiling of dynamic structures that explain and transform power struggles. First, as argued in Chapter 2, normative and non-normative structures are variables that determine limitations and opportunities for actors acting in a specific context. Second, these structures where power struggles are played out are born, consolidated and transformed through long periods of time. Thus, structural transformations can be better captured through a long and more systemic view of history that meshes global and local dimensions. Moreover, History is neither constant nor progressive:

> "Braudel (1995) was equally aware of the presence and alternating significance of multiple temporalities and that time moves at different speeds in different contexts. His three-layered understanding of time views political events, including battles, treaties, and political changes, as the most fast-moving layer. Next come the slower changes associated with social and economic trends, including technological shifts (and their utilitarian maturity), social structures, and (notably for IR) state systems. Finally, the most slow-moving of all layers of time are the cycles of historical repetition of the *longue durée*, frequently linked to natural conditions". (Powel, 2019)

If we wanted to retrace the state, and indeed a certain governmentality of coercion – a unified understanding of how power can be pursued and maintained –, we could acknowledge the Saadiens as the first to have "a real army" as they are portrayed at the Battle of the Three Kings at Oued Al Makhazine in 1578. Two or three centuries before that, the Almohads formed what has survived until today as the *makhzen*[109] and the first to codify the order of army. Further back we could study the Almoravids, the first to create some orderly and contingent army in the 11th century a.C. The acknowledgment of the enormous task that this chapter represents is almost discouraging. As historian Laroui complained decades ago:

> "[American] scholars, for the most part young, ignorant of Arabic or Berber, interested chiefly in the present, and seeing history as no more than a convenient introduction, required by academic curriculum, to studies in sociology and political science, tend to overestimate everything written in French, and this is true of not just an isolated few." (Laraoui, 1977, p. 4)

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[109] The word *makhzen* refers to the core structure of government and rule in Morocco. Its meaning is now devalued and conveys archaic rule, as well as the unofficial center of the regime of power. The official preference is *dawla* (state) and *hukuma* (government).

However daunting this task might seem, humble success lies on limiting one's ambitions. It is neither the place nor the time to attempt to provide a detailed account of Morocco's state formation[110]. I can only aspire to identify some trends in coercive structures since the formation of the 'modern' state[111]. In that task Hibou and Tozy's research is a useful starting point. In their 2020 book *Tisser le temps politique au Maroc*, they explore and build their own "theory of the state outside the hegemonic conception of the nation-state" (Hibou & Tozy, 2020, p. 41) that differs from former explanations of the late nineteenth century reforms and the confrontation of the Sharifian empire with the European nation-states. In this guise, I provide here a succinct account of the conversations around pre and colonial history of state-formation and the organization of violence. The old debate between coercion and consent stands at the center of this question:

> "Studies of the periods of weakness in Moroccan history have shown some of the Makhzen's characteristic features which distinguish it from other monarchies: for example, the sultan's Sharifian claims and their abilities to use these claims to maintain popular loyalty and control tribal dissent. Studies of seventeenth and eighteenth-century politics, during periods of relative strength and political stability, reveal another equally important dimension of Moroccan government: the sultans' despotism and their ability to rule by armed force." (Meyers, 1983, p. 48)

Following Meyers' line, this chapter is divided into two different lines of discussion. First, I look at the transformation of coercion and organized violence as a resource of power. What explains the changing importance of coercion in the pursuit of power, as it wanes and waxes through history and space? How do the use and the material technologies of organized violence change, from military power to policing, to private security?

Second, the organizations of armed coercion are also a source of actors that might rise and compete within the ranks of power relations. When and where are military elites decisive and closer to power, even contesters to primary positions? Section 2, thus, retraces the rise of different elites and their relationship to coercion.

These questions are relevant in order to understand the past, but also in order to provide a solid and situated understanding of today's power relations. For one, they situate the

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[110] Many formidable books can be read to that end. Among them 'Araoui, al-Naciri, Miège, Burke, etc.

[111] By modern state here I do not mean a specific time in history, but a specific development of state structures in line with the developing capitalist economy and the assimilation of geographies into the capitalist world-sytem. Many states have established or advanced towards modern state structures since the eighteenth centuries, but the pace, timeline and outcome are nuanced.

transnational relations and their evolution, from imperialist advances to the postcolonial; but they also insinuate the contours of the more anthropological construction of power. The dialogue between coercion and consent is still ongoing, and –as Hammoudi shows (1997)- consent and loyalty to the *makhzen* are indeed built on a specific historical coercive structure.

It is nevertheless important to go back to Hibou and Tozy's thesis to remember that these changes and transformations are not lineal in time, and mechanisms of power are at times used differently in different contexts where the authority of the sultan exists. Elsewhere I called these different layers of power (Camps-Febrer, 2019b), but Hibou and Tozy see it more like a web of different modalities or technologies of government that are cleverly applied to different contexts and different relations of authority between the central government and the local.

1. Organized Violence as a Resource of Power

1.1 The Alawites' rule and the formation of the state

An Army. This is what every leader must have. But what for? For prestige? For repression? For protection? To ensure allegance? The Alawite dynasties of the 17th and 18th centuries relied heavily on coercion and violent repression of resistance, but also on pacts and alliances. Although arguably the most powerful leaders from the 16th century on, the sultans and their government were not without contestation throughout the territory, and their leadership was continuously negotiated. In fact, negotiation was an intrinsic part of the modality of government. But they also relied on coercion because their lineage was still contested by other dynasties and legitimacies, among them sufi zawiyat[112] and tribal confederations. Organizing, training, funding, structuring and moving around an army are costly and dangerous tasks.

The first Moroccan resemblance of a state, in organizational terms, is usually attributed to the Saadi and Alawite dynasties from the 16th century on[113]. In Mann's definition, "[t]he state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a center, to cover a territorially demarcated area over which it exercises some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical force." (Mann, 1993, p. 55). One problem of definitions like Mann's that have been developed through European empirical observation, is that the territorial demarcation does not equally apply to Morocco. Hence comes the longlasting obsession of Europeans and colonial theory with the dycothomous '*bled makhzen*' and '*bled siba*'. Moreover, the negotiated policies developed within some contexts of the Sharifian[114] empire would not conform either to the vertical notion of rule. These distinctions show Morocco's precolonial

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[112] The most recent contestant of the Alawite Dynasty was the Dali zawiya, finally obliterated in the 17th century. Since then and until independence most resitance to the sultan came from the same lineage.

[113] The state is here understood as "an abstract entity that stood above [sic.] the tribal social organization" (Harrak, 2000, p. 177) but it nevertheless remained an unstable structure that had to coexist with other confederations and alliances.

[114] Sharifian is the attribute of those descended from the prophet Mohammed, as is the claim of the Alawite dynasty.

state more as an imperial power than as a state power, or as Hibou & Tozy show, a coexistence of two very different practices and models of state.

While territorial demarcation is not as clear as the Western conception would like, the organized physical force that backs the authority of the sultan becomes central in the consolidation of the state. We find the first semblance of military service in the so-called *jaysh* tribes[115]. The *jaysh* were originally ethnically diverse groupings, Arabic-speaking mostly, that had been settled from Tanger to Fes and around Meknes, Rabat and Marrakesh (Burke, 1976). Their origins were not of a single genealogy and thus the military arm of the sultanate was especially heterogenous. The *jaysh* tribes were given land and were exempted from paying taxes in exchange for the provision of troops for the sultan. Some of the highest elites in the *makhzen* also stemmed from these tribes, drawn for their military and political skills (Burke, 1976)[116]. Along with the service of *jaysh* men and boys, the authority of the central *makhzen* was maintained through a balance between taxes or military service that tribes[117] would provide on an irregular base in order to prove their allegieance (Hurewitz 1969).

At the end of the seventeenth century, Moulay Ismail Ibn Sharif (r. 1672-1727) both reorganized the *jaysh* into a closer-knight organization in the Oudaya *jaysh*[118], and created the new permanent troops called the *Abid al-Bukhari*[119]. Considered the first 'modern' army, at the time the *Abid al-Bukhari* might have consisted of one hundred thousand men (Meyers, 1983)[120]. They were the most visible and central troops of the sultan, entrusted with his own protection and with occupation and tax-collection duties around the territory. Their duty as a repressive force clashed frequently with urban leaders and tribes alike –both having their own security systems in place–, but their military prowess was unmatchable inside the country. In time, the *'Abid* would rise to outweight the Oudaya *jaysh*, and would represent an essential support for contesting leaders.

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[115] Jaysh in fact has come to mean Army.

[116] Some of the closest tribes to the 'royal' court were the reknowned Oudaia, Cherarda, Cheraga and Sousi. Burke also identifies the South Eastern Ait Atta, the Rifi Ait Waryagher, and the Ait Yafelman of Central Atlas as "the most militarily important groups in Morocco" (Burke, 1976, p. 7). Erckmann compares the 'cavaliers du guich' with the French gendarme, since they are soldiers as well as 'agents of the government' (1885, p. 244).

[117] For a disambiguation on the current notions of tribe and other identity markers in Morocco, see (Rachik, 2000).

[118] Oudaya *jaysh* is the name given to the renovated structure of these.

[119] The misconception that *Abid al-Boukhari* was a Slave Army or even a Black Army is addressed by Fatima Harrak in a very compeling research (Harrak, 2000). The name of *Abid al-Boukhari* comes from the loyalty they swore over the book *Sahih al-Bukhari*.

[120] Others estimate 150.000 men (El-Merini, 2000). What is important here is that it was a number of troops that exceded any other contestant of power.

> "[The 'Abid al-Bukhari] enabled [Ismail ibn Al Sharif] to establish a large and relatively durable Moroccan state. With the army's support, he was able to govern that state despotically – to collect taxes, suppress rebellion, and maintain public order, in some cases, in direct defiance of both religious authority and popular will." (Meyers, 1983, p. 40).

The rule of Moulay Ismail was a time of strength for the Alawite dynasty[121]. The despotic power of the *makhzen* was unwaivered, as the influence of the brootherhoods was debilitated and heavy taxations imposed (Laraoui, 1977, p.272). Moulay Ismail's army successfully stopped the Ottomans in Algiers and expelled European powers from North African ports like Tangier (1684) and Larache (1689). He ruled through "armed force and sharifian prestige" (Laraoui, 1977, p. 272).

After the death of Moulay Ismail in 1727, violent rivalries ensued from aspiring successors. One of his closest sons, Moulay Ahmed Addahbi[122] was proclaimed sultan by the *Abid al-Boukhari*. This military institution had become too powerful in the territory, and Moulay Ahmed, once it had secured their backing, reduced their power through intrigues and repression. Other groups like the *jaysh* could still contest Moulay Ahmed's power, as it happened when they backed the rebellions of the governors of Tangiers and Tetouan. Competing contenders that managed to align other military units, 'ulemas, notables, chorfa, etc. clashed in a 30 year-turmoil, until Mohammed Ben Abdallah al-Khatib managed to impose his rule in 1757. With Moulay Mohammed Ben Abdallah (r.1757-1790), the dangerous power of the *Abid al-Boukhari* was further curtailed through fragmentation and demobilization, that would eventually be reduced to tasks of Royal Guards (Rollman, 2004). While weakening the army defused opposition from it, the reduced capacity of the sultan to wage war in its turn made it difficult to control land and extract resources. Mohammed Ben Abdallah, with his sight on the coast and an empty state treasury, would have to rely more on negotiations and pacts to deal with a decentralized network of regional governors and princes.

Mohammed Ben Abdallah is considered the architect of the modern state as he routinized the financial system through the creation of a ministry, the Ministry of Finance (*amin al-umana*), and other key institutions loyal to him. It was through a reliance on taxation to

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[121] Moulay Ismael has been characterized by European accounts as a virulent, leading a repressive reign. He was nicknamed by Europeans as the *Assoiffé de Sang* [blood thirsty] for his virulent repression and his promotion of corsairs.

[122] The name of Addahabi (Golden) seems to come from the generous rewards he granted his supporters with.

foreign commerce as the main source for the *makhzen* –cheaper to control than land taxation- that Morocco laid its first steps into the Western-led capitalist world-system. The sultan pursued decisive reforms that affected diplomatic and foreign relations. His rule prioritized international marine trade, shifting power from transaharian routes and inner-land towards ports and commerce with Christian countries. He built a modest military marine accordingly. Mohammed III signed peace treaties and opened ports to European countries and to the brand new North American state[123], while driving out European occupation of certain ports and areas[124].

At the turn of the 19th century, along the regular *jaysh* troops, that constituted the bulk of the Sultan's military power, other tribes continued to pay taxes and irregularly provided troops through levies (*naiba*) for the formation of temporary expeditionary force (*mahallat*) when needed.

1.2 Decline in power, decline in coercion: 19th Century

While in the 19th century Europe the idea of state power was territorial[125], the concept in North Africa and in the Alawite sultanate was much more multilayered, or at least entailed different dimensions: religious (through imamat), community-based (caliphate), dynastical (amarat). Religiously, the sultan's lineage was traced back to the prophet Mohammad, and the law sanctioned that mandate at the social and political level. The ability to gather local and regional powers behind the sultan, and to ensure peaceful relations was also a source of

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[123] While European states had refused to protect US ships against piracy, the USA negotiated directly with the sultan in Morocco after pirates had seized the northamerican *Betsey* ship. The USA was a small state that had to pay taxes to Morocco to ensure its protection near the coasts, while European powers were exempt through favorable Commercial Treaties. On the 16th July 1786, US general consul in Paris Thomas Barclay negotiated an agreement directly with Morocco that included: protection of men and ships; freedom of navigation; most favored nation; establishment of a consulate. The negotiations were facilitated by Spain and led to the 1787 Treaty of Friendship and Amity, also known as the Treaty of Marrakech. See: https://ma.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/io/ (Accessed 19/09/2019)

[124] In 1769 his army expelled the Portuguese from Mazagan- El Jadida.

[125] The territorial dimension of the state, and even of political power before the state, is very central in Max Weber's stages of instititutional development. See Michael Mann's Chapter 3 for a critical overview of Western theories of the state. (Mann, 1993)

legitimacy. At the same time, another percept grounded the legitimacy and authority of the ruler: the ability to wage *jihad* against invadors[126].

A material example of this different conception of power is the institution of the *mhalla*, a practice that dates back from the Almorabitoun in the 11th century (Simou, 1995, 1999). The *mhalla* consisted of an almost continuous movement of the Sultan around the empire, with the main part of his administration and forces, an effectively moving 'capital' as the power was not embodied in one city but in the body of the sultan. The practice was common until the beginning of the twentieth century[127].

Another important element of legitimacy and authority was that of the *baraka*. "The sultan, despite the fact that he was a *baraka* holder himself, could not dispense with the *baraka* of others." (El Mansour, 1999, p. 67). Indeed every sultan had to negotiate and deal with the sanctity of other religious authorities, other holders of *baraka*, as there was no centralized or monopolized religious authority. This explains in part the loss of legitimacy of Moulay Abdelaziz in his handling of the Cooper incident in 1902[128], but also the centrality of negotiations or of the attempts at monopolizing and discrediting alternative sanctities throughout different periods[129].

Moulay Slimane's rule (r.1792-1822) tried to counter some of the policies towards the West that his father had pursued. Historians have traditionally depicted the 1800s in Morocco as a country that lived "turned in on itself"[130] (Émerit, 1965), especially from Europe, although transaharian relations are usually left out of this picture[131]. Wahabi salafi views progressively took root in Slimane's inner circle, the *makhzen*, and some Karawiyine Oulemas, as the sultan

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[126] *Jihad* is commonly translated as struggle, and it is a very central concept in Islam. Here it meant the struggle to keep the Chrisitan infidels out of the territory of Islam and protect its people from invasion. Its importance was only directed against attacking and invading powers, as numerous treaties in the marine regulations show for the reign of Sidi Muhammad Ben Abdallah in the 18th century

[127] Meyers argues that this was not Moulay Ismail's case, as his army of *Abid al-Boukhari* was stationed in garrissons extensively around the territory and it facilitated a steady flow of taxes and order (Meyers, 1983).

[128] In 1902 a British missionary named David Cooper was killed for inadvertingly venturing into the sacred limits of the Sharif Moulay Idriss in Fes, off-limits (*hurm*) to non-Muslims. The killer took refuge in the sanctuary but was later handed over to the sultan in the promise that his life would be spared. Moulay Abdelaziz however executed him in disregard of the assurances previously made to the Idrissi *shurufa'* and in disregard of the hurm-related costums. See more about this incident and the issue of *hurm* and central power in (El Mansour, 1999).

[129] This is still relevant in the twenty-first century, and the War Against Terror has been an effective tool to justify the *makhzen*'s development of control and centralizing mechanisms in this area. See (Wainscott, 2018).

[130] In French in the original, "*repliée sur soi-mème*".

[131] Transaharian relations might have declined already during the Saadi's dynasty, especially after Ahmed alMansour's pillage and attack against the Songhai Empire. However, some accounts have revisited this assumption and recenter the history of economic and social relations across the Sahara (Lydon, 2012; Newbury, 1966).

attempted to fight the power of certain zawiyas and to halt trade with Europe. His reign opposed Sufi brootherhoods and traditional Islam, which in turn also alienated Atlas tribes. The double mission of rebuilding the military power while shutting away from the easier custom extraction of tributes proved to be an insurmountable task.

> "Moulay Slimane […] tried to reform [the army] by giving new tribes *jaysh* status, by rebuilding the *abid al-bukhari* and by buying military equipment from abroad. Officers were educated in the palace, forming yet another quasi-familial link. But powerful tribal confederations could field as many troops as he did and famine shattered his army." (Pennell, 2000, p. 22)

The weakness of the military was patent in the uprising in Fez in 1820 that had been triggered by his troops' violent excesses in the city [132]. At the time, peace between the central power and the local power was unstable and it depended much on the changing *authoritas* of the Sultan (Cheraï, 2014). The rebellion against the Sultan came from his inability to protect the citizens of Fez against the pillage of his own army (Cheraï, 2014). Following Cheraï's interpretation of alZayyani's account of the revolt:

> "The revolt is perceived by al-Zayyânî under the sign of a double rupture: that affecting the values and symbols founding the local/global socio-political order, and that altering the identity that defines the local social hierarchy." (Cheraï, 2014, p. 154)[133]

Moulay Slimane was deposed after the uprising in Fes and his successor Moulay Abderrahman (r. 1822-1859) inherited a ruined *makhzen*. Upheaval and revolt, and the limited means available for state violence, limited the *makhzen*'s tax-collection, which had to rely on foreign trade and revamp foreign relations with Europeans. Moreover, harsh famines and climate crises forced the import of foreign wheat. In 1835, Abderrahman agreed to the export of wool that a Europe in crises demanded.

The development of these new opening to Europe, now in a much weaker position than during Mohamed Ben Abdallah's rule, took place against the backdrop of European competition against each other. The United Kingdom had ensured free trade with the Sultanate after 1856, which meant the end of the sultan's export monopole and the promotion of further foreigners trading in Morocco as an effort to raise revenues (Miller &

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[132] ElMansour, Mohamed. (2019). "La mystérieuse abdication de Moulay Slimane" in Zamane.org, 29th January 2019. https://zamane.ma/fr/la-mysterieuse-abdication-de-moulay-slimane/ (Accessed: 20-06-2020)

[133] In French in the original: "La révolte est perçue par al-Zayyânî sous le signe d'une double rupture: celle touchant aux valeurs et symboles fondant l'ordre sociopolitique local/global, et celle altérant l'identité qui définit la hiérarchie sociale locale."

Rassam, 1983). Eventually, this benefited all European trade, but France still pushed its way through arms and negotiations[134].

Despite his military efforts - in alliance with Abdelqader's resistance in Algeria -, the sultan's ability to stop France's assaults proved a failure after the battle of Isly (1844) [135]. The troops' numbers were not so much the problem of the military capacity of the *makhzen*, but rather the unstable nature, organization, technology and funding of the sultan's armed forces.

It is here that Hibou and Tozy (2020) attempt an alternative explanation. The government was not an unstable authority but rather a multilpilcty of modalitites of government that were deployed along different lines and different contexts. For example, the idea of territoriality, of borders, was more present in the fortress cities like Tetouan, that is in places where the european territorial invasions, and the 'Christian alterity' was obvious. In parallel, other modes of more indirect rule and negotiation based on communities and less on territories were useful in other regions like the Sous. Two strategies thus were deployed at the same time in different territories and with different communities: obeyance for territorial control –closer to nation-state model- and loyalty for tribal control –dissent is possible, but loyalty is expected-. In the second case, force was rather used as example in its brutality, and as a way of measuring up the balance of power.

In this sense, a simultaneous deployment of the Imperial state and the nation-state was not deemed a weakness but part of the theoretical conception of the state and its authority. Therefore, the reforms, especially with Hassan I (r. 1873-1894) were undertaken as a consequence of the specific pressure of European countries and regarded as a circumstantial instrument to oppose those countries, rather than as a realization that the sultanate had to be modernized, as it has usually been protrayed. Hibou and Tozy argue that still during reforms, the superiority of the sharifian model was not contested and the theoretical foundations of the soverignty, law and territory remained unchanged.

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[134] An inmense and now classic work on the comercial and trade issues in nineteenth century Morocco is that of Jean-Louis Miège (1961).

[135] His rule was, however, open to peaceful diplomacy with other countries willing do trade and do business. See for example, the 1836 Peace Treaty of Meknes between Morocco and the United States of America (El-Mostafa, 2003). English Translation of the Treaty available at Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/bar1836t.asp (Accessed 29/04/2019)

Abderrahman tried to reform his troops, influenced by the new ideas of military reorganization that Muhammad Ali had undertaken in Egypt (Rollman, 2004). Nevertheless, the need for reform became especially acute after the Battle of Tetouan (1859-60), when the Moroccan sultanate was defeated by a minor European power, Spain[136].

It was Sidi Mohammed's turn to attempt reforms after the defeat of the troops he had himself commanded. The *makhzen* army at the dawn of the battle of Tetouan was a composite army, with troops levied through different mechanisms, *jaysh* tribes, to permanent *Bukhari* units. Artillery units were mainly composed by former Spanish and French officials (Lyall, 2014).

> "It consisted of regular contingents (which needed a steady inflow of funds) with levies from allied tribes that could be mobilized in exchange for land or tax exemptions to their communities. [The 'military service' was in relation to the tribe and thus it paid off to benefit the whole community explicitly and directly. Today it is argued as an individual benefit – training, job opportunities – but also for the community, as it takes unemployed and potentially dangerous youngsters off the streets]." [137]

The shock of the defeat of Moroccan troops in the hands of a minor power such as Spain signals the end of the *jaysh* system in the Moroccan army (Calderwood, 2012) which led Moroccan authorities and the flamant Sultan Mohammed Ben Abderrahmane to the awareness of inferior military power that needed urgent reform. However, the economic situation was desperate. The indeminities to be paid for this defeat at Tetouan[138] were unattainable and they caused a financial and monetary crisis that affected domestic prices and currency values, depleting the treasury and the *makhzen* reserves (Burke, 1976).

> "It was paid, half at the signing of the treaties of 1860-1861, the other half being taken directly by the Spanish controllers on the receipts of the customs, during twenty years. And since Morocco was financially strapped, it turned to borrowing money, the repayment of which was also required by England in hard currency."[139] (Naciri, 2009, p. 139).

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[136] Under the justification of a clash at the Ceuta border and of failed negotiations, the Spanish government, desperately in need of a national propaganda boost, declared war to Morocco in 1859. Under the command of O'Donnell, they fought the Abas-commanded troops in 4 battles: Sierra Bullones, Castillejos, Tetouan and Wad-Ras.

[137] Boufous, Rachid. (2019) "Service militaire entre civisme et responsabilité" at *Maroc diplomatique*, January, 7 2019. Online: https://maroc-diplomatique.net/service-militaire-entre-civisme/ . (Accessed: 13/05/2020.)

[138] Tetouan was occupied by Spain from February1860 to May 1862, Treaty of Wad-Ras.

[139] French in the original: "Elle fut payée, la moitié à la signature des traités de 1860-1861, l'autre moitié étant prélevée directement par les contrôleurs espagnols sur les recettes des douanes, pendant vingt ans. Et comme le Maroc était exsangue sur le plan financier, il se tourna vers l'emprunt dont le remboursement était également exigé, par l'Angleterre, en monnaie forte."

The end of the war had been brokered by Brittish diplomacy and constituted the first indebtment of the Maghribi sultanate with European creditors as well as the direct seizing of half of custom revenues by foreign powers. The mounting the regime's debt to European banks cemented the imperial penetration. As Barbe explains:

> "If we focus in this thesis on the role of indebtedness, the French military pressure was always present. It directly participated to the Maghzen's financial weakening through the 1907 war compensations and the conquest and occupation of the country. It was also what prevented the successive Sultans to repudiate their debt. The role of indebtedness in the establishment of the French protectorate in Morocco could therefore be understood as a formalization and a materialization of a French supremacy which was already rooted." (Barbe 2016:53)

The other effect of this context of imperial pressure was on domestic power relations. With the pressing need to focus on countering European's imperialistic intentions towards the North African territory, the sultan developed a less coercive approach to local diplomacy. The effort to strengthen the charismatic leadership of the sultan was especially crucial as political and economic conditions were reduced and thus very little resources to impose leadership were available to the sultans (Meyers, 1983). The Sultan's image as mediator or broker was fueled by his involvement in local disputes, although his ultimate goal was to quell any instability that threatened tax collection or loyalty to his rule (Waterbury, 1970)[140]. Military strength was a good instrument for conquest but not for stable authority (Wyrtzen, 2018). The 1882 *harka* led by Hassan I into the Sous, for example, was an operation designed more "in order to impress than to engage in combat" (Hibou & Tozy, 2020, p. 58). Stability had to be brokered through other means of multilayered sources of authority, including personal and hereditary charisma (Meyers, 1983).

Whereas Meyer's arguments explain part of the use of ideology and the creation of consent, an important part of that image also arises from the need to counter the 'europeanization stigma'. Since commerce and even military exchange were made with Christian countries, the need to increase the Sultan's long-term legitimacy increased, as these relations were damaging his authority.

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[140] The sultan was also thus presented during anti-colonial campaigns in Europe and the USA, see (Stenner, 2019b) and this image was perfected in the postcolonial modern state (Hammoudi 1997) with the sultan acting as the embodiment of the nation and the figure that rises from above the petty corruption and disputes of political parties.

We can in fact situate the emergence and consolidation of a cultural hegemony in the 18th and 19th century Morocco. The competition for power was mostly circumscribed to members of the Alawites, and all other actors that competed for power from then on were forced to align behind one of the representatives of the dynasty. In this sense, as Izquierdo-Brichs and Etherington argue:

> "On the level defined by Gramsci as "cultural hegemony", a universalized belief system is established that causes the interests of certain sectors to be accepted as beneficial for the whole society. The capacity to have their own interests accepted as universal enables elites to establish the agenda and the priorities of that society. Hegemony is established by a large coalition of people from an important sector of society – almost a class in itself – that is impossible to manipulate in the short term at least; nevertheless, as it is more defined than Foucault's "regime of truth", open conflicts may break out to weaken it or establish counter-hegemonies." (Izquierdo Brichs & Etherington, 2017, p. 12)

The importance of the consent and legitimacy of the *makhzen* is evident in the fact that the central army was usually no better armed than local tribes and that the central power invested permanent efforts in cultivating good relations with *qaids* and local authorities[141]. However, these good relations are not, as is often seen, a sign of weakness, but rather part of the governing instruments of a rule that is not based over the whole territory as a direct rule, but rather shows variables adaptable modes of governing (Hibou & Tozy, 2020).

While some authors emphasize the role of diplomacy and political negotiation (Laraoui, 1977); others suggest that the *jihad* and the ability to wage war[142] were an integral or the fundamental part of the sultan's legitimacy (Bennison, 2002). Indeed it was rarely the case that taxes were collected without the use of force (Hammoudi, 1997). The fact remains that sultans like Sidi Mohammed (r. 1859-1873) tried diplomacy and politics locally, either out of conviction or, because of their military weakness. Mohammed IV's army was certainly busy with European pressure.

It seems paradoxical, thus, that in the second half of the nineteenth century, it was the penetration of globalized capitalism through European imperialism (and essentially the indebtment of the sultanate in war reparations) that came hand in hand with the expansion of

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[141] See for example the centrality of gift-giving in power relations in (Hammoudi, 1997).

[142] In 1885 the French Captain Erckmann wrote that "one could often see heads nailed above the cities' gates: these heads were cut off in the fights and sent to different areas to show to Arabs, always incredulous, that the *makhzen* is really in control of the territory" (Erckmann, 1885, p. 142)(Erckmann 1885:142)

infrastructural power of the state, in Michael Mann's terms[143]. In other words, the nation-state governance increased in confrontation with the imperial governance. The centralization of the state was at the same time a response to imperial penetration as well as a consequence of this penetration. The modern state was built with the model of overdevelopment of the European world, and on the imperatives of Morocco's indebtness. Functions like policing and tax collection, although officially improved by the *makhzen*, were directly controlled by European powers, and serving the interests of private companies, banks, among them Bank Paribas[144].

1.2.1 Reform or perish. Reform and perish.[145]

Within a growing modernization spirit and a pressing necessity to augment the state's capacities to extract taxes, both Mohammed IV (r. 1859 to 1873) and Hassan I attempted to reform and modernize the army. In fact, the idea of reform is sometimes seen as a conviction to transform the state into a new model that would supersede the old one and render more effective authority to the *makhzen*. Hibou and Tozy (2020) believe, however, that the reforms were a circumstancial attempt at facing colonial empires, and not a real attempt at change and transformation of the modes of governance.

The first of contemporary historian, al-Nasiri, talks of the decadence and problems of ever-growing foreign penetration at the turn of the century. More alcohol and drugs… even drinking tea was seen badly[146]. Especially in ports like Tangiers, moral corruption that could not be tackled trhough a weak state was set to build the case for reforms. As Calderwood (2012) writes, "[i]t is not a coincidence that al-Nasiri wrote his *Kitab al-Istiqsa* during the rule

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[143] Despotic power "refers to the distributive power of state elites over civil society. It derives from the range of actions that state elites can undertake without routine negotiation with civil society groups". Infrastructural power "is the institutional capacity of a central state, despotic or not, to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions." (Mann 1993, 2:59)

[144] On the use of debt as a tool for French and Imperial penetration in Morocco see Adam Barbe's Master Dissertation, (2016) *Public debt and European expansionismin Morocco From 1860 to 1956.* Master Public Policy and Development. http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Barbe2016.pdf (Accessed 29/04/2019).

[145] The most important research done on the issue of 19th century military reforms can be found in (Simou, 1995) and (Barradah, 1997).

[146] See Rassam and Miller (1983) for a discussion of other Moroccan views of 1880s disarray.

of Moulay Hasan (r. 1873–94), the most energetic of Morocco's 19th-century reformist sultans"[147].

> "[1845-1912] is the period during which a succession of Moroccan sultans launched and worked to expand and maintain a new military (*'askar nizami, nizam al-jadid*) order modeled on the armed forces of Western Europe, as interpreted by the governments of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire." (Rollman 2004)

But a growing regular army was also a dangerous endeavor for the sultanate[148], as it needed more resources to be kept and, as a consequence, a stronger incentive to open to European commerce. This was at least what British Consul-General Drummond Hay expected:

> "With regard to that passage in your Lordship's dispatch where I am directed to give my opinion as to the probability of the Moorish Government accepting the proposals that might be made to them for relaxing existing restrictions, I beg to repeat that I fear the Sultan's present advisers are opposed to liberal measures which would encourage the advent to this country and residence of Europeans, especially so long as the existing abuses in irregular protection continue; but, on the other hand, the expenditure of the Government has increased so materially since the introduction of disciplined forces and the purchase of heavy guns for the fortresses, that they will have to devise means and ways of increasing the revenue, and may therefore be more disposed to listen to measures which would hold out a prospect of improving the customs receipts." (J.H. Drummond Hay)[149]

Some authors have highlighted the impact that the smuggling and increase in arms trade had in the stability and power of the *makhzen*. The availability of modern weapons after 1880s challenged the monopoly of the central authorities and increased violent resolution of feuds between tribes. Indeed this increase during Hassan I contributed to violence, military revolts and unrest, especially during Moulay Abdalaziz and his regent Ba Ahmad's rule (Burke, 1976; Feliu et al., 2019, p. 24). Also arms from the *makhzen* ended up at the hands of local tribesmen in the High Atlas. This was caused by European interests to destabilitze the country; by corruption of *makhzen* officials; but also by a deliberate policy of Hassan I in order to secure support of some tribes (Burke, 1976, p. 32).

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[147] All of this is certainly true, but it also responds to a certain reformist spirit that pointed at certain needs for change and that was spearheaded specially by Hassan I.

[148] This military conscription from non-*jaysh* tribes was imposed and justified on the basis of a type of tax or as a punishment for challenging the central authority (Rollman 2004) as happened with the Ait Ndhiri's after their support to Kattani in 1909's revolt.

[149] Commercial negotiations between Great Britain and Morocco. Correspondence Part I. 1878-1885. Government Papers. The National Archives, Kew. Archives Direct. Web. September 20, 2019. <http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/Documents/Details/FO_413_5>.

An unaccounted consequence of this fragmentation of fire prowess was the increase in military repressive modes by the *makhzen*. As Layll (2014) argues, the centrally directed military repression was not a common feature of pre-Hassan I. The growing unrest and armed contestation brought about a change in that military-population relation[150]. Rural and urban unrest was common around the 1900s[151], and in turn it served as an excuse for imperialist interventions and military occupation. The re-centralization of the monopoly would only come by the hand of the colonial powers. Military repression of populations would continue through the colonial period with the French and Spanish armies and through the postcolonial periode.

In brief, the 1845-1873 reforms were still influenced and relatively modelled with the help of Egyptian, Tunisian and Ottoman instructors[152], inspired by Muhammad Ali's military reform in Egypt (Rollman 2004). In 1845 the sultan invited Tunisian instructors to form the first European-style army (*askari*) (Laroui 1989). Despite following Egyptian, Tunisian and Ottoman models, the material modernization already depended highly on importing arms and artillery from Europe:

> "It not only began adopting European drill and uniforms in 1845 but […] looked to the United Kingdom for training and technical assistance, especially for its artillery corps. The United Kingdom even established a permanent artillery base on Gibraltar to train Moroccan forces. Indeed, Spain would complain openly about British assistance to Morocco once the war began, though such efforts were too modest to affect war [against Spain] outcome" (Lyall, 2014, p. 38).

By 1873, and with the subsequent reform programs, dependence from Europe was not only material, but European powers had managed to take over instructors, training and structural reforms.

The need had been made clear after the French colonization in Algeria and the Isly and Tetouan defeats. However, the idea of reforms (*islah*)[153], especially as it had to match and mirror western military innovations, could also alienate more traditional elements of society

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[150] "See the analysis of the rise to power of the great qaid-s as connected to their possession of military superiority, in Robert Montagne, *Les berberes et la makhzen dans Ie sud du Maroc* (Paris, 1930), pp. 326-64."

[151] There are many interesting researches about the chaotic period of the 1900s. For a local perspective of power struggles and social mobilization, see for example the Hafiziyya Uprisings; AlKattani and AbuHimara uprisings in (Yechouti, 2019).

[152] It is at this time that the notion of tabours is introduced in Morocco, from the Turkish 'batallion'.

[153] For an introduction to the notion of *islah* in Moroccan and Islamic tradition; and of its evolution and understanding in the 19th century see (Simou, 1995).

and of power. Resistance was also met from members of the *Abids* and the *jaysh*, who saw it as a threat to their military and political power (Simou, 1995). Ironically, the internal disputes came to benefit foreign powers that eagerly offered their 'technical assistance'. Despite efforts to counter excessive weight from one European power, the association of the military forces entailed a stigma for the soldiers and officers:

> "[T]hey were taunted with shouts from the crowd calling them 'qa'ids of the Christians (*quwwad al-nasarah*) or the 'colonel's people' (*ahl al-quruni or awlad ala quruni or quruniyyah*) a term frequently used by Bu Himarah (Gilali Bin Driss, 1868-1909), the most prominent leader of anti-state opposition at the time, referring to Sir Harry Maclean (served in Morocco, 1876-1909), the senior and most widely known European military advisor to the mahzen and commander of the Insurrection Battalion (*tabor al harrabah*) […] remarkable too for its English-style uniforms." (Rollman 2004:213)

Burke argues that in contrast to other Arab countries were radical politics emerged from the armies, the inexistence of a truly modern army, and the importance of the "lords of the Atlas", prevented proreform groups to emerge and challenge the state (1976, p. 33). The stern French infiltration and obstaculization of every possible improvement, however, was also a central factor to the failure of reforming impetus. An already '*politique berbère*' was taking place with the auspices of the French, as it was the tribes' views that gained importance in shaping the nature and structure of the state. This was especially true after Moulay Hassan died, and the Grand Vizier Ahmad ibn Miisa, who could not match Hassan's energy and authority, came to rule as the regent for the young Abd al-Aziz,.

> "Even in their most humble and unthreatening appearance the members and officers of the *'askar nizami* became active participants in the construction of discourses of authority, legitimacy, and power at the local, regional, and higher levels."(Rollman, 2004, p. 210)

Following Mohammed IV and Hasssan I, the third attempted period of reforms before the protectorate was in 1900-1910 under Abdelaziz's rule. The efforts furhter showed the uneffectiveness and incapacity of the *makhzen*, and its dependence from European powers. These had penetrated the finances, controlled Morocco's debt and most of the costume revenues, but were also deeply entrenched in the military structures of the *makhzen*, especially France. The Armed Forces were underfunded, levies and taxes were contested. This situation affected not only on a material level, but also the authority and legitimacy of the sultan.

> "In the Middle East, the army constituted an important force for change during the protonationalist period. From the modernizing segment of the army emerged the advocates of more radical political reforms […]. In Morocco, by way of contrast, the attempted reform of the army never really got off the ground and, as

a result, no proreform group of officers ever emerged. Lacking a modem army, the Moroccan government was unable to tame its potentially fractious provincial notability or push ahead on its program of centralization. Instead, the Moroccan equivalent of the Turkish derebey-s (valley lords) came to play a similar role to that played by the army elsewhere in the Middle East in the political reform of the state. It was the "lords of the Atlas," and not the army, which backed the Hafiddya revolution in Morocco, and it was their interests, rather than the army's, which were represented in the subsequent attempts to change the policies and political structure of the state." (Burke, 1976, p. 33)

Local contestation such as the Kettania against Abdelaziz in 1907 (Bazzaz, 2019), or the Harka of Mohamed Amezian against the Spanish in the Rif (Yechouti, 2019) fed on the projected image of a sultan as a ruler unable to defend Islamic law from the penetration of imperial powers from Europe. The case of the Kettania revolt illustrates the contested nature of the charismatic leader (Hammoudi, 1997).

The French pressure to control the military from inside finally succeeded in 1910. The Turkish officers that had participated in Army operations against dissent during 1909-1910 were expelled. One of the pillars of colonization was finally under France's control (Chapter 3).

2. Competing elites and the Regime of Power

After the death of Moulay Ismail, the *Abid al-Boukhari* and the Oudaya *jaysh* were indeed the most powerful actors in the competition for the leadership of the sultanate. While the sultanate contenders after Moulay Ismail were all of lineage, they depended mostly on the coercive power of the armed forces – considering that they could all claim cherifian linage. The *Abid al-Boukhari* and the *jaysh* leaders were the only actors with access to fire arms, or even to horses. According to Bencheikh:

> "During the period of anarchy that followed the death of Moulay Ismaïl, it was the Abid Al Boukhari and, to a lesser extent, the guich of the Oudayas, who made and unmade the sultans. They offered their support to the one who offered them the best pay. In the absence of an agreement, they plundered Meknes which, since the reign of Moulay Ismaïl, served as their garrison. The seven brothers at war never ceased to play on both the terror that the Abids fueled and the interest they could draw from the support of the Berber tribes. But, despite the anarchy, the continuity of the dynasty does not seem to be threatened: the soldiers

> certainly overthrew the sultans, but always to replace them with new sultans, chosen from within the Alawite family." (Bencheikh, 2014)[154]

At the time of Mohammad Ben Abdallah's rule (r.1757-1790), the power of the *Jaysh* tribes was already in decline, but they still held enormous influence, for example in Fez where the Ouadayas enjoyed supremacy and power (Szymanski, 1970). The higher ranks of military organizations can be a source of, at least, secondary elite actors. During the 18th century and part of the 19th, until Hassan I, military elites also represented primary actors in local and regional politics, as it was from their ranks that many qaids and pashas were elected to represent the Sultan, and they controlled their own military units. This started to change through the mid nineteenth century and increasingly from urban bourgeoisie.

The power of the military elites was even sometimes threatening to the central power, but scattered heterogenous troops at least ensured felixibility for alliances that could counter any threat to the sultan. In 1757, for insantce, the Oudaya and the *Abid*, along with other powerful tribes in the territory, declared their support of Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdallah, gaining in turn reward with power, arms, horses and other important assets. By 1758, however, the Oudaya had gained too much power and were imposing their own alliances and law at the regional level. The Ait Idrasen, who had close ties to Mohammed's father, had been driven out of their territory by the Gerouans, militarly backed by the Oudayat, and were being attacked even after their settlement near Meknes. The sultan gathered some *Abids* and Ait Idrasen to crush the insurrects. The Oudaya eventually yielded to the Sultan, after having been decimated, imprisoned and scattered[155].

By 1775 another upheaval started. This time the *Abids* sided with Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdallah's son to try to contest his rule. After being defeated by Oudaya and other tribes, the rebellious *Abids* were resettled far from imperial cities and thus from power, first into coastal ports and further to the South into the Souss[156] (Szymanski, 1970)[157].

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[154] In French in the original: "Pendant la période d'anarchie qui suit la mort de Moulay Ismaïl, ce sont les Abid Al Boukhari et, dans une moindre mesure, le guich des Oudayas, qui font et défont les sultans. Ils offrent leur concours au mieux disant, à celui qui leur propose la meilleure solde. Faute d'accord, ils se livrent au pillage de Meknès qui, depuis le règne de Moulay Ismaïl, leur sert de garnison. Les sept frères en guerre n'ont de cesse de jouer à la fois sur la terreur que font régner les Abid et sur l'intérêt qu'ils peuvent tirer du soutien des tribus berbères. Mais, malgré l'anarchie, la continuité de la dynastie ne semble pas menacée: les soldats renversent certes les sultans, mais toujours pour les remplacer par de nouveaux sultans, choisis au sein de la famille alaouite."

[155] This and the following descriptions of the two upheavals are retrieved from the accounts gathered by (Szymanski, 1970).

[156] Interstingly, this will also be the obliged route of some powerful officers after the 1970s coups against Hassan II. [See chapter 5]

[157] In 1824, it was the Oudaya turn again to show their power, as they mutined against Moulay Abderrahman.

These threats to the central power provoked instability to rulers in the *makhzen*, especially as military elites were very enmeshed in the *makhzen*'s high ranks and as close advisors to the sultan. In parallel, they also caused upheaval among regional and local relations, as the military units usually represented the most powerful local actors with their arms and horses.

In the tipologies identified by the sociology of power (Brichs, 2013; Feliu & Parejo, 2013; Yechouti, 2019), the Moroccan territories at the end of the eighteenth century were mostly a land of diversified elites controlling diversified resources of power (Laroui 1980; Feliu, Mateo, Izquierdo 2018). Competition rose and declined but not one primary actor fully controlled the whole territory. This started changing throughout the nineteenth century as the structural needs of the state grew with mounting pressure from inside and outside actors. The primacy of the Alawite *makhzen* consolidated during European colonization.

Before the 1820s, the sultanate had lived in a stable instability. The sultanate was controlled by a primary elite that was nevertheless regularly contested through legitimacy/authority claims and through military power. Regional alliances could easily gather more troops than the sultan in order to contest the central power. The economic hardships, which raised discontent among the populations but also touched the *makhzen*'s finances, led to more pressure to open up to foreign powers. More reliance on foreign trade however, also entailed more dependence, lack of authority and legitimacy, and the emergence of a new bourgeoisie in the commercial cities that could challenge the traditional political-military *makhzen* elite[158]. This new merchant and urban elite[159] was different from other contesting actors in that it would not threaten to overthrow the *makhzen* but rather conquer its higher ranks, a 'state within the state' (Calderwood, 2012, p. 409).

The Sultan's supremacy had been progressively eroded with the expanding system of privileged, *protégés*, that reinforced commercial actors, an urban class that could leverage their social position and capital. The *protégés*, those that had protection (*himaya*)[160], were identified

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[158] Except for a few families of saint lineage (*chorfa* and *mourabitin*) and close families to the *makhzen*, few notables were stable before the advent of the colonial rule (Brown, 1976; Burke, 1976).

[159] The emergence of this bourgeoisie has been well documented (Berrada & Saadi, 1992; Burke, 1976; Feliu & Parejo, 2013; Issawi, 1982; Saadi, 2016).

[160] "In the national context of late 19th-century Morocco, *himaya* refers to the system of consular and diplomatic "protection," whereby European consular authorities could confer a "protected" status on their Moroccan political and business associates. These protégés, […], enjoyed extraterritorial privileges, which exempted them from paying Moroccan taxes and put them under the legal jurisdiction of the European consulates. The protégé system in Morocco originated with the Franco–Moroccan commercial treaty of 1767 but expanded exponentially after the Anglo–Moroccan Treaty of 1856 and especially after the Hispano-Moroccan War. The Spanish consular authorities,

by bilateral agreements and were exempt to pay taxes and respond to the Moroccan commercial legislation. The system had been established in 1767 with the Franco-Moroccan commercial treaty, primarily for secretaries and other people that worked for foreign actors, called *mihimi*, but it expanded dramatically to include intermediaries (*semsar*), business partners (*mokhalet*s) and others, effectively eroding the *makhzen* power over the richest populations and reinforcing the state's financial crisis (Naciri, 2009, p. 138). At the top of this system were the *ahl al-basbur*, people of the passport, as they acquired European citizenship (Miller & Rassam, 1983). Moroccan notables were evading tax payments through foreign protection, and many even accessed French nationality, among them hundreds of Jewish Baidani Moroccans (Clément 2019). A new urban capitalist class emerged (Brown, 1976). The marchands had capital and tax privileges, as well as social conections with the *makhzen* and the foreign powers. This new elite, less interested in military issues and more dominant in comercial and trade areas (Feliu, Mateo Dieste & Izquierdo Brichs 2018) was increasingly entrenched with colonial powers. "[T]he *makhzen* began to turn to the Andalusian families of Fez, Tetouan, Tangier, Salé whose education, talent, and skills best suited them for the task of seeking to transform and modernize the state." (Burke, 1976, pp. 13–14).

> "In addition to their commercial fortune, they had acquired the privilege of the office which, since the revolt of Fez in 1820, brought them to power. They were never to leave it again, at any time in the history of the Cherifian Kingdom. Later, when Moulay Hassan I acceded to the Throne in 1873 and confirmed his will to push Morocco in the path of civilization and reforms, it is to them that he called to introduce a certain rationalization in the management of economic and administrative affairs. And to ensure the success of his reign, he rehabilitated the charismatic figure of the Grand Vizier." (Benhaddou 1997:19)[161]

In fact, the system corroded the social interaction upon which *makhzen*-subjects was based:

> "Certain persons could now claim to owe or withhold loyalty to the state on the basis of the new concept of nationality, rather than through the older ties of

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for example, claimed roughly 90 Moroccan protégés in 1859 and over 1,000 by 1861. After 1860, the protégé system grew not only in number but also in kind. While the system was originally conceived to give special privileges to Moroccan interpreters and secretaries who worked in European consulates, during this period it expanded to comprise four distinct categories: the *ahl al-basbur* (people of the passport), Moroccans who acquired foreign nationality (usually French or Spanish) but continued to reside in Morocco; the protégés (or the *mahmis*, a colloquial Moroccan Arabic word derived from himaya), who were generally clerks, translators, or domestic servants in European consulates; the *simsars*, brokers who acted as intermediaries between foreign merchants and Moroccan business interests; and the *mukhalit s*, rural associates who formed joint farming ventures with Europeans." (Calderwood, 2012, p. 409)

[161] In French in the original: "En plus de leur fortune commerciale, ils avaient acquis le privilège de la fonction qui, depuis la révolte de Fès en 1820, les porta au pouvoir. Ils ne devaient jamais plus le quitter, à aucun moment de l'histoire de Royaume chérifien. Plus tard, lorsque Moulay Hassan I accéda au Trône en 1873 et confirma sa volonté de pousser le Maroc dans la voie de la civilisation et des réformes, c'est à eux qu'il fit appel pour introduire une certaine rationalisation dans la gestion des affaires économiques et administratives. Et pour assurer le succès de son règne, il réhabilita la figure charismatique du Grand Vizir."

religion. Jews in particular enjoyed the liberation from their second-class status imposed on them by their faith." (Rassam & Miller, 1983, p. 55)

The Conference of Madrid in 1880 tackled this issue of the *protégées*, that was contentious, not only as Moulay Hassan complained for the sultanate's finances, but also between foreign powers. The results of deliberations did actually aggravate the problem, as Europeans gained access to land owning and started investing in innovative and extensive agricultural projects. In contrast, the scarce 8 million people living in Moroccan territory lived in a traditional agro-sylvo-pastorale economy (Naciri, 2009).

> "The climatic fluctuations, the succession of good years and bad years, left the populations with only a narrow margin to manage, as best they could, the droughts, even the famines. A culture of scarcity was made up of precautions and anticipation, of storage and exchange habits, of social relations and group solidarity that allowed them to limit the damage of a subsistence crisis."[162] (Naciri, 2009, p. 133)

2.1 The rise of Notable Bourgoisie

The recurrent crises that affected populations living in subsistence economy were not only caused by drought. They were also intensified by the exponential rise in prices of cereal due to trade policies and the export of cereals to France. It was maritime commerce rather than the modernization of agriculture or industry that centered the Moroccan nineteenth century economy, and thus prices were dependent on European markets (Naciri, 2009, p. 138). The use of steamboats and the increase of transcontinental trade granted a new importance to Casablanca in the 1830s and 1840s (Issawi, 1982). Export-import firms flourished in the city. Morocco managed to keep markets relatively closed to European products until 1850s most imports, taxed at 50%, and exports were banned on religious grounds, some coming through Mogador (Essaouira) and Tangier. From the 1830s to 1865 "raw cotton, cotton cloth and manufactured cotton goods from Europe increasingly penetrated market" (Brown, 1976), causing a decline and impoverishment of the cotton and textile manufacturing in Morocco. Industrializing countries in Europe needed raw materials, especially, cereal and wool, while Morocco needed revenues from exports and trade, which accumulated at the hands of the

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[162] In French in the original: "Les fluctuations climatiques, la succession de bonnes années et de mauvaises années, ne laissaient aux populations qu'une étroite marge pour gérer, tant bien que mal, les sécheresses, voire les famines. Une culture de la pénurie était faite chez les paysans de précautions et d'anticipation, d'habitudes de stockages et d'échanges, de relations sociales et de solidarités de groupes qui permettaient de limiter les dégâts d'une crise de subsistance."

Sultan (Naciri, 2009). Nevertheless, some efforts to create domestic development were made. Sultan Mohammed owned sugar and cotton plantations and welcomed engineering and expertise, especially from Britain (Thomson, 2019). Commerce helped the *makhzen*'s finances short-term, since most revenues for the *makhzen* came from ports (Pennell, 1994), but raising prices on scarce cereal availability in the country further tipped the balance of trade against local economy.

Moreover, European currencies were common in trade during the 19th century, and this affected the policies and finances of the sultan, since the local currency progressively lost value (Naciri, 2009). The need for revenues also facilitated the acquisition of land by French migration (with Moroccan associates), "a Trojan horse for agricultural colonization" (Naciri, 2009, p. 138). At the dawn of the twentieth century the Sultan's treasury depended almost entirely on Europe.

The nineteenth century had completely transformed strucutres of power in Morocco. The country presented a diverse map of competing elites, from European powers that were increasing their foothold in the country; to the *makhzen* elite and their dwindling resources; to tribal notables, religious leaders or a well positioned bourgeoisie. They all controlled specific and changing resources of power, from coercion and land, capital, ideology and population, etc. and the alliances and competitions changed. The accumulation of capital in European hands, the evolution from mostly rural subsistence and non-monetary economy towards a growing monetary dependence progressively emptied the power of certain rural elites, but also the military influence within the ranks of the state (Feliu, Mateo Dieste, & Izquierdo, 2019).

3. From military control to policing consent

Organized violence as a resource of power can also be studied from the perspective of its structural changes. Until the European pressure became more evident, the Sultan's coercive power was only locally contested, but uncommonly so along all of the territory. Since the main interest of the sultan was to ensure loyalty and taxes, a closer force to control populations was unnecessary, and no real competition was incentive for reform. This stage would mean a relative monopoly, if not of violence, at least of the *makhzen* in a comfortable position as primary elite in the widest structure throughout the territory.

In 19th century Morocco, the production, trade and deployment of arms, as well as the salaries and conditions of soldiers were controlled by the central government, especially within the territories were European pressure was more evident. But the modernization of military technology was conditioned progressively by Western innovation and thus control over the means of coercion became dependant on available capital to purchase foreign military weaponry, and on the interests of those foreign actors. In Abderrahman's rule, the increased smuggling of European arms into the country led to an erosion of his authority and strengthening of some Middle Atlas tribes, which further eroded any semblance of monopoly of violence and the capacity to extract resources (tributes). The challenge against the *makhzen*'s power boosted armed rebellion along the territory.

It is within the context of a rapid integration of Morocco in the world-system, and thus the loss of primacy of the *makhzen*'s elite in an enclosed ecosystem of power struggles, that we can read the expansion instruments for closer population control by the central state.

Before colonial Northern Africa, the idea of crime and its relation to concepts of 'property', 'punishment', and 'robbery' and so on, might differ from the contemporary legal and social understandings. The accounts of how crime was tackled differ from city, to rural areas, and most notably from the nationality and religion of the people involved[163].

In eighteenth and nineteenth century Morocco, the military effort and the central administrative justice were quite entangled, as "the qaids of the military campaings were also responsible for the administration of justice" (Burke, 1976, p. 14). In the cities, pashas had a small garrison of the *jaysh*. The sultan's military units responding to the Pasha of the city, for example, since the 17th century, were used to enforce security in the cities (El-Merini, 2000; Muñoz Rodríguez & Lázaro Martín, 2019). But these *makhzen*-appointed forces, along with the Royal Guard, coexisted with other local assemblages. In Fes, the *Rumat* or *Jaysh AlFassi* responded to different leaders of the people, and factions were easily turned against each other in power struggles:

> "These *rumât* (or *jaysh Fâs*) were also identified with more or less secret societies, closely linked to craft guilds and mystical brotherhoods."(Cheraï, 2014)[164]

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[163] See Pennell (Pennell, 1994) for an early account of the handling and framing of a murder investigation in Tangiers in 1838.

[164] French in the original: ""Ces *rumât* (ou *guish Fâs*) étaient aussi identifiés à des sociétés plus ou moins secrètes, étroitement unies aux corporations artisanales et aux confréries mystiques."

As for rural security, Burke explains:

> "Rural security depended largely upon the collective personal authorities of the qaid-s and on their continuing acceptability to their tribes. It was the qaids who called out the local baraka, or militia, which was composed of those men in a tribe with sufficient wealth to afford a horse and a mounted retainer. It was the baraka which put down local disorders. If a qaid offended the local notables, he might find himself deserted by them in a time of crisis. Cities would generally have a small garrison of imperial troops which were drawn from the jaysh contingents and placed under the local pasha. In the event of widespread disorders, government troops could be sent to punish the offending tribes, but such expeditions included a large element of risk since royal forces were often no better armed, trained, and led than the tribes." (Burke, 1976, p. 14)

Some examples in history can certainly account for a different understanding of how crime intersected with social and communal life, and what the place of the 'criminal', e.g. the bandit, was in society and in the community. Spitzer tried to build a genealogy of policing in the west that showed how crime and police work were very much dependable on each other. In Morocco, this could also be true but other cultural and historical markers need to be accounted for. The specific story of policing in Morocco still has to be written, but historical accounts such as that of Rodríguez Mediano (2009) for the Saadis dynasty, or Hart's anthropological work on bandits provide us with a glimpse of the links between authority, crime, and punishment.

> "Although Islamic law has never developed a fully elaborated doctrine on penalties, other than the application of the qisas or the diya, it is obvious that the political powers did make use of their punitive function by acting in the absence of accusing parties. In fact, the judicial system appears to tend towards the establishment of a division between civil conflicts, the responsibility of the qadi, and penal conflicts, judged by a hakim (who would appear to have a rather more military character) acting in the name of the sultan. The establishment of penal authority required, as well as the setting up of a special judicial body, the organisation of a professional police force. In the case of Fez, the police received a certain sum for each person detained, subscribed by the tradesmen and craftsmen of the town. A frequent practice of the police was, besides, to run a *tabacchino*, a place which was dedicated to the consumption of alcohol, prostitution, and a multitude of other illegal activities. This close link between legal and illegal activities, between order and disorder, was presented as necessary, in the sense that authority uses penal and punitive language to express itself as a function of the power it exerts, both as pacifier and as the imposer of order. This was an overwhelming language, with no right of appeal, no room for doubt, expressed at full volume, a proclamation." (Rodríguez Mediano, 2009, pp. 183–184)

Rural security depended on the qaid, who was usually appointed by the tribe, and had to have the authority to impose the orders and policies of the central government. For example, he had to enforce the levy or *baraka* – wealthy men who could own a horse and that would

impose order onto the community – (Burke, 1976, p. 14). Some powerful bandits were also turned into *qaids* or governors like the bandit Raysouni in Assilah in 1911 (Hart et al., 2006). The capacity to exert coercion, to rally men and resources, and to submit areas to their will was thus an important resource of power, whether for its own profit, for the *makhzen* or for the colonial power.

> "It is recognized that professional compartmentalization between quwwad serving in the military and quwwad (officers) in the more general administrative sense of governors of particular tribes, areas, etc. is often difficult to establish and maintain. There was a great deal of fluidity between the military and civilian spheres in Morocco, particularly at the end of the pre-Protectorate period (1900-1912). In fact, one of the great challenges of nineteenth century military reformers was to make this distinction more clear. Doing the period of 1874-1900 they made headway in doing so, developing nomenclature and administrative and accounting practices and forms that encouraged this separation, a separation which also applied to some degree to the relationship between the traditional military establishments and the '*askar nizami*."(Rollman, 2004, pp. 213–214)

The civil-military separation of rule had been one of the objectives of the reform of 1874 onwards (Rollman 2004). In 1860, the *jaysh* units were reformed into rural constabulary and official urban police. Some *jaysh* unites were dismantled (Burke 32), while new units mirroring european or ottoman armies were created: elite infantry corps (*Askar*); the *nwaib*, a national guard; a modern artillery section called *tobjia*; and a corps of engineers (*muhandis*). Still under military structure – the first national non-military police would not be created until 1901 – these reforms might indicate that, in essence both 'security forces' are based on the means of coercion, but police developments were an instrument for both closer surveillance of populations (*'amma*) as well as to diminish the power to wage violence (or to command) against populations by local elites.

With the Treaty of Algeciras in 1906, colonial powers further created the police forces that would depend on the state bank and the debt administration (Chapter 4). They controlled directly, they created the means of coercion and accumulated the resource for their own goals. That is, they managed to control production of the means and their use at the same time (although obviously contested by resistance to colonization).

The new State Bank and the Administration of the Debt established the European financial control of Moroccan security forces – along with the deployment of metropole forces – . The restructuring of those forces through European instructors and a European model of policing ensured that their hierarchy was loyal to the colonial project. It is not hard to argue

how the agenda for the creation of the police was a direct consequence of the capital extraction.

Chapter 4 - The colonial and the modern *makhzen*: Security sector and power struggle in Morocco

"Ses brigades [de la Légion française de Gendarmerie du Maroc], entrées en actions dans la foulée de nos troupes et souvent dans leurs rangs, ont su imposer aux tribus sur tout le territoire le sens de l'ordre public, de l'obéissance au pouvoir central et de la justice. Elles sont devenues et sont demeurées jusqu'au dernier jour l'instrument respecté de l'unification politique, administrative et juridique du Maroc, élément déterminant de l'accession au rang de puissance modern de ce pays désormais lié au nôtre."

Général de Corps d'Armée COGNY, Commandant Supérieur Interarmées des Troupes Françaises au Maroc (n°966/CAB du 30 décembre 1957).

1. Colonized by debt, fire and law

The imperial and colonial strategy of European power was a mixed and long operation. While the first decades of the nineteenth century had been most favorable to British trade, the relationship between Moroccans and British declined, and the French presence became more salient and determinant, especially by the end of the century. The system of *protegées* (Chapter 3) had further eroded the sultan's supremacy, creating a local elite in close alliance to European capitalism. The imperial assault in the nineteenth century was conducted through three basic instruments: coercion, capital and law.

In this context, the decline of the military power of the sultan, thus, was achieved through outer and inner pressure. Although Ba Ahmed as the regent and later Abdelaziz tried to reform the Armed forces, their attempts further entrenched foreign intervention. The military pressure from foreign countries forced reforms that simultaneously brought in more and more foreign officers inside the army. The lost prestige for the inability to expel the invaders and to revamp Moroccan economy further eroded the Sultan's power.

In parallel, European powers were conveying a specific narrative of Morocco that was suitable of their interests and entrenched in the racist structures of colonialism. An anarchic vision of the rural world constituted an integral part of the discourse that portrayed a chaotic region marred with intertribal violence, thus legitimizing the subsequent violence and occupation of colonizers (Burke III; Rollman 2004). In its essence this narrative sanctioned colonialism and violence, through the 'writing about the other people' (Kunreuther, 2006) and what Derrida called the violence of the letter. Burke's account of the social and economic ties contradicts chaotic accounts:

> "existing colonial stereotypes of rural autarchy are in need of revision. Urban merchants often provided the capital for the raising of livestock by transhumant Berber tribes, as well as by the Arab tribes of the plains, and sold the animals in Algeria or at Melilla or Tangier. Tribesmen had need of the city markets for purchases of arms and ammunition, tea and sugar, cloth, and luxury items. Although itinerant peddlers (many of them Jewish) made regular rounds of the countryside markets from the cities, rural men went up to the city for important dealings. Many of the more wealthy tribal leaders came in this way to acquire houses in the cities, and eventually some moved permanently into the city. The industry of the cities depended in its turn on the rural areas for the raw materials from which leather, cloth, and metal goods were manufactured. In short, there were considerable economic ties between the cities and the tribes." (Burke, 1976, p. 5)

The instability and permanent conflict that had justified military interventions was paired with a parallel imagery that portrayed the Moroccan state as incapable of maintaining order and controlling its population. Law became an important field of contention. Through treaties and the capitulations, power was battled through legal systems as well as through capital and war. According to Pennell: "[…] in early nineteenth-century Morocco, no side had all the gold, in the sense that both sides were much more evenly balanced than would be the case in the second half of the century. At this time, both legal systems coexisted" (Pennell, 1994, p. 189). Pennell explains that, from wood-gathering to theft or murder, the foreign narrative framed local justice as lacking tools and will to solve and manage everyday problems.

Through a narrative of crime and disorder, legislation and justice became the shackles of the *makhzen*'s dependence (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2016). Already in 1839 British Consul-General, J.H. Drummond Hay, was framing imperialism as a law and order problem:

> "The Consul-General's opinion was typical of Europeans of his time: they proclaimed that the Moroccan government and officials paid no attention either to international law or to basic principles of criminal law in order to maintain peace, and shared no assumptions with the Christian nations about the way international relations or civil society should be run. Moroccans understood only force." (Pennell, 1994, p. 159)

The disorder and lawlessness would eventually build the 'need' for a French protection[165]. The 1907 assassination of a French doctor in Marrakesh –'a martyr for civilization' as he was portrayed in French media– provided the final justification for French troops to move in[166]. Nevertheless, this idea of lawlessness was not an excuse towards the Moroccan Government but, essentially, to the Germans (Vermeren, 2012, p. 85).

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[165] Courts and laws of the colony are a type of violence in the colony, or the soon-to-be colony. The court and the law are also described in Achebe's novel as weapons of the colonial mission (Kunreuther, 2006).

[166] Not everyone bought into the narrative of anarchy. Jean Jaurès opposed the protectorate and rejected the claims of 'reestablishing order' and 'promoting civilization' while refusing to ratify the Treaty in the National Assembly (Vermeren, 2012). The inexistence of organized political power is a recurrent prejudice of Western colonial power and remains ingrained in many studies, particularly on African politics. For further discussion see (Mamdani, 2018).

"France will be able to freely bring civilization, wealth and peace to Morocco"

1.1 The Treaty of Algeciras

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Morocco's debt had become the best imperial penetration weapon. French inspectors reported corruption in tax collection in Fez and Oujda (Clément, 2019, p. 89) and so a reform was imposed in 1901 onto the sultan. The main goal of the reform of the customs was to ensure the repayment of debts contracted with the French and Netherlands' banks (Clément, 2019, p. 89) mainly Paribas[167]. Crises and unsuccessful reforms fueled new credit loans that exacerbated the government's weakness. These loans were not only due for war compensation, in fact the 1904 and 1910 loans were allocated to the funding of Moroccan military expenditures. By 1910, only 5% of taxes on trade were destined for the *makhzen*, the rest being directly collected and absorbed by the institution created to ensure the debt return (Barbe, 2016).

European powers wanted to ensure secure business for foreign interests in ports - first step for the direct control of trade revenues -, and through the legal control of the *muhtasib*, the local officers responsible for the security and order in business and markets at the local level. These local officers under the authority of the makhzen were stripped of jurisdiction and competences with the Treaty of Algeciras.

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[167] On the use of debt as a tool for French and Imperial penetration in Morocco see Adam Barbe's Master Dissertation, (2016).

Signed on the 7th of April 1906, the Treaty of Algeciras established the groundwork for the final European take-over. The treaty, which liberalized trade, was signed after lengthy negotiations with the imperial powers to the exclusion of the Moroccan authorities. Sultan Abdelaziz was unable to effectively contest the outcome, a frustration that further undermined his legitimacy as the sultan. The Treaty entailed the creation of two central institutions: the bank, and the police.

As it was explained at the French Senate in 1907,

> "The State Bank of Morocco, which has just been constituted [...] in Paris last February 25th, is to be the principal instrument of the reforms studied and decided upon by the international conference of Algeciras. In particular, it will advance the funds necessary for the organization and pay of the port police for five years. It will work to stabilize the monetary situation, which is troubled by complications and exchange rate variations that are detrimental to trade. It will introduce order in the administration of the Cherifian finances by fulfilling the functions of treasurer-payer of the empire. Finally, it will contribute powerfully to raise the credit of the Moroccan government by becoming its agent and undoubtedly its financial adviser. It's work is thus destined to serve in the most useful way all Moroccan and foreign interests."[168]

The question of policing the coast and borders was of importance to all Western powers. Despite the Sultan's objections, by 1905 foreign officers –mostly Dutch, Belgian or Swiss– had been deployed to control ports, trade routes, etc.[169] Under the excuse of a modernization-civilizing mission, security forces had to be developed explicitly under foreign control in order to safeguard foreign people and commerce:

> "The reports and communications made to the Makhzen by the Inspector regarding his mission shall at the same time be reported to the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps so that the Diplomatic Corps may ascertain that the Cherifian Police is functioning in accordance with the decisions taken by the Conference and to monitor whether it is guaranteeing in an efficient manner and in conformity with the Treaties the security of the persons and property of the

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[168] French in the original: "La Banque d'État du Maroc, qui vient d'être constituée […] à Paris le 25 février dernier, doit être l'instrument principal des réformes étudiées et décidées par la conférence internationale d'Algésiras. Elle avancera notamment les fonds nécessaires pour l'organisation et la solde de la police des ports pendant cinq ans. Elle travaillera à assainir la situation monétaire troublée par des complications et des variations de change préjudiciables au commerce. Elle introduira de l'ordre dans l'administration des finances chérifiennes en remplissant les fonctions de trésorier-payeur de l'empire. Enfin elle contribuera puissamment à relever le crédit du gouvernement marocain en devenant son gent et sans doute son conseiller financier. Son œuvre est donc destinée à servir de la façon la plus utile tous les intérêts marocains et étrangers." In: "La Banque D'état Du Maroc." *Bulletin du Comité de L'Afrique Française*, no. 3, 1907, p. 106+. *Nineteenth Century Collections Online.*

[169] "But His Majesty appears to have strong objection to the name 'police' having some fear that officers of such a body might take upon themselves the duty of entering and searching the houses of Moors and interfering in civil matters. He would like this guardians of the peace to form part of the central army." Mr. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey (Tangier, December 29, 1905) Affairs in Morocco: Further Correspondence Part XXIX. 1906. Government Papers. The National Archives, Kew. *Archives Direct*. p11 of Part XXIX. Web. September 20, 2019. http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/Documents/Details/FO_413_41 .

nationals, as well as that of the commercial transactions." (10791. No.434. Sir A. Nicholson to Sir Edward Grey, Received March 28 1906)[170]

The creation of a Moroccan police was thus a point of friction, as the French proposal to advise and lead this creation for the sultan was seen by Germany as a means to further exert its influence. Germany was proposing an international force or various forces, and the model of the Macedonian gendarmerie[171], but these proposals were rejected.

Finally, the Moroccan Police was created and since 1910 attached to the French state budget and political control[172], with brigades managed by municipalities and under the influence of colonial France [173]. It was the coercive condition that went along with the creation of a State Bank in charge of Morocco's debt with foreign European banks. The process would be completed in 1918, when the Sherifian Customs Administration was relocated from the *Control de la Dette*[174] to the Protectorate's General Finance Directorate, under a French Chief of Service[175].

The new State Bank would be in charge of financing the police, the second central institution that the Treaty established[176]. The new units of tabors and battalions of police would be deployed and placed under French or Spanish commandment and the supervision of a Swiss general inspector.

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[170] French in the original "Les rapports et communications faits au Makhzen par l'Inspecteur au sujet de sa mission seront en même temps remis en copie au doyen du Corps Diplomatique afin que le Corps Diplomatique soit mis à même de constater que la Police Chérifienne fonctionne conformément aux décisions prises par la Conférence et de surveiller si elle garantit d'une manière efficace et conforme aux Traités la sécurité des personnes et des biens des ressortissants, ainsi que celle des transactions commerciales"

[171] Affairs in Morocco: Further Correspondence Part XXVIII. 1905. Government Papers. The National Archives, Kew. *Archives Direct*. Web. September 20, 2019. http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/Documents/Details/FO_413_40.

[172] Effectively in place since 1913 with the Decision of the Grand Vizir, September 17th, 1913.

[173] Before 1913, Western Morocco was policed by European agents with untrained indigenous soldiers: "Cette force de police pouvait être suffisante en période de conquête, mais elle devait se montrer au-dessous de sa tache lorsque commença l'organisation normale des villes" (chapitre VII Rapport général sur la situation du protectorat du Maroc au 31 juillet 1914: dressé par les services de la Résidence générale).

[174] "As a result of its growing weight, la Dette gained increasing responsibilities, in particular to provide police servicing. It is in charge of littoral security, lithering, and also fights against smuggling. La Dette was thus cooperating with the French Navy and had at its disposal two tugboats and four other boats which were controlled by a French navy officer. It employed as well coastguards, mercantile marine officers and created shipyards. Its action was not limited to harbours: its security role expanded on ground by establishing checkpoints." "La Dette was acting on behalf of a private banking consortium – under the auspices of the French government" (Barbe 2016: 57)

[175] http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO/fr/1918/bo_288_fr.pdf BORM322 Depuis le 1ère janvier 1918, l'Administration des Douanes Chérifiennes a passé des mains du Contrôle de la Dette aux mains du Protectorat. Art.4 agents de la forcé publique. Droit de port d'armes à feu et autres. http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO/fr/1918/bo_322_fr.pdf . Le statut particulier du personnel douanier français exerçant au Maroc fut adopté par Arrêté viziriel du 26 avril 1918.

[176] See specifically, articles 31 to 58 of the Treaty. http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/Documents?referrer=imap&page=1&returning=true According to the British government Archives three alternatives were put forward in the Conference of Algeciras. Different states could be in charge of the police. Another alternative was to entrust it to a small power like Switzerland or a makhzen-organized pólice with small powers supervisors. All these options met the staunch opposition of Germany. Finally at the end of march they gave way. (/art7) The General Inspector of the moroccan police would be a high-ranking officer of the Swiss Army, Col. Müller (Handbook of Moorish Army.). All instructors at the 8 ports should be French and Spanish. The conference excluded the border police which was already under French control.

> "We consider that France, as a Muslim Power and as a bordering Power, is qualified to obtain the mandate to exercise power in the Cherifian Empire. We are ready to share it with Spain, which for the same reasons is designated to fulfill this role jointly with us. The reform of the police force seems to us, moreover, to be limited to the cities of the coast and to include a recruitment of Moroccan gendarmes with mixed cadres." [177]

Police forces and guards of the gendarmerie woud have to be deployed along all economic interests, such as the State Bank's project to build a railway from Tetuan to the east[178]. Customs' control fell under the authority of French and Spanish forces, as a warrant to the loans. The direct control of border and taxes, however, did not seem enough, and under the excuse to ensure the payments, the military occupation started. In 1907, French troops entered Oujda, and continued towards Beni Snassen. By 1908, 6.000 soldiers were disembarking in Casablanca.

The penetration of colonialist forces was eroding the sultan's authority in the country, and threatening his rule. Paradoxically, it was the threat to Moulay Hafid (r.1904-1912) from tribes and local opponents that further pushed his alignment with stronger foreign forces, as a means to maintaining his domestic primacy. To get the French support, Abd el Hafid was forced to renounce to the program of *jihad* in 1909, and although further damaging his authority, he was able to quench rebellions such as the AlKattani or Abu Himara (Ouardighi 2005).

1.2 Officializing the colony: the Treaty of Fes

By the 30 March 1912, the Treaty of Fes made the occupation official, establishing the Protectorate[179]. Article 2 provides the rationale: the military occupation is necessary in order to "maintain order and security of commercial transactions" (Vermeren, 2012, p. 88). The

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[177] French in the original: "Nous considérons que la France, comme Puissance Musulmane et comme Puissance limitrophe, est qualifiée pour obtenir le mandat d'exercer la police dans l'Empire Chérifien. Nous sommes prêts à le partager avec l'Espagne que les mêmes raisons désignent pour remplir ce rôle conjointement avec nous. La réforme de la police nous semble, d'ailleurs, devoir être limitée aux villes de la côte et comporter un recrutement de gendarmes Marocains avec des cadres mixtes." In p.31 M. Rouvier to M. Révoil (Paris le 12 janvier 1906) part XXIX http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu

[178] "Powers would be given to the Railway Administration to recruit railway guards from subjects of all nations, and these guards would amount to a gendarmerie responsible for the policing of the country which the line passed through." (No.6 Confidential. Telegraphic) Madrid January 22, 1906. Mr Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey (received January 23). http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/Documents?referrer=imap&page=1&returning=true (Accessed November 2019).

[179] The '*entente cordial*' of 1904 between UK and France left some open door to France in Morocco, except for the northern part. The North was in fact too close to Gibraltar to be left to the French. It was thus ideal for the UK to leave that territory to a "weaker power, i.e. Spain" (Sebti, 2013, p. 41)

Treaty of Fez situated commercial transactions at the center of the new Protectorate's security concerns:

> "H. M. the Sultan accepts from now on that the French Government proceeds, after having warned the Makhzen, to the military occupations of the Moroccan territory which it would judge necessary to maintain order and the security of commercial transactions and that it exercises all police action on land and in Moroccan waters" The Treaty of Fez 1912 (artII)[180]

At the military level, the method emulated Gallieni's "oil stain" (Rigouste, 2007; Vermeren, 2012)[181], also named the 'tribal policy' or 'ink spot policy' (Sebti, 2013). The central feature of this method relied heavily on preexistent or newly created local structures, and focused not only on advancing territorial victories but also on establishing an effective social control over the populations through reinstituting the *makhzen* and through enforced transformative infrastructural projects (Burtin et al., 2019, p. 5).

Since 1908, indigenous *goumiers*[182] from forced tribal levies or troops served as well in the French and Spanish Army, under colonial officers. Nevertheless, the sultan still controlled 4000 troops of the Moroccan Army. One of the first actions of the protectorate, thus, was to abolish the Ministry of War and dissolve the tabours, further reorganizing the units under the French authority[183]. By 1912 those that had not abandoned the Moroccan Armed Forces, and the whole of the military budget were integrated in the French budget (Rollman, 2004). The trojan horse had finally opened its belly. The army that was to resist the invaders actually became part of the repressive force of the French. A majority of its officers and men accepted the new order, while others retired or joined the resistance[184].

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[180] French in the original, "S. M. le sultan admet dès maintenant que le Gouvernement français procède, après avoir prévenu le makhzen, aux occupations militaires du territoire marocain qu'il jugerait nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité des transactions commerciales et à ce qu'il exerce toute action de police sur terre et dans les eaux marocaines."

[181] La method gallieni https://www.penseemiliterre.fr/l-influence-de-la-methode-gallieni_864_1013077.html . Predecessor Bugeaud, and successor and later developer of counterinsuergency David Galula.

[182] One goum was about 200 people, 3-4 goums a tabor. 4 Moroccan Tabors a Groupements (GTM), each had 3 tabors, each tabor about 3 to 4 goums. This means they were around 6000 indigenous goumiers. "Le traité d'Algesiras (1906) crée les Tabors de police des ports marocains encadrés par des Français ou des Espagnols et commandés par un inspecteur général Suisse. Le Goum était le contingent levé dans les tribus, armé et équipé à ses frais, qui renforçait les Janissaires en Algérie. Les Français ont continué à lever des goums de la même façon que les Ottomans et ont ensuite introduit le mot au Maroc." https://lakoumia.fr/histoire/affaires-indigenes-goums-mixtes-marocains-et-gtm

[183] The only exception to this were the cherifian guard and the Tangiers auxiliary battalions (El-Merini, 2000, p. 323).

[184] There were of course episodes of resistance within the Army to the meddling of France. One of the most famous examples being the 1912 mutiny of tabours in Fes after the signature of the Treaty of Fes in 1912. The *askar* mutinied and attacked their French commanders while insurrection spread in the city (Simou, 1995).

According to Wyrtzen, it was the "mostly Berber-speaking rural groups" (2015, p. 275) that were at the forefront of the occupation of the territory in Morocco; later sent to fight for the fascist coup against the Spanish Republic; to colonial French campaigns, in Indochina or to the European theatre of World War II[185]. The 'berber policy' would constitute one of the colonial most long-lasting and pervasive strategies.

From Hubert Lyautey[186], the project of 'pacification', as the colonial jargon termed occupation, in Morocco was that of 'association', substantially different in method to that of 'assimilation' carried out in Algeria, where Lyautey had been previously deployed (Burtin et al., 2019; Vermeren, 2012). In Lyautey's view, this had to be done through a complex of international treaties, military penetration and seduction of the *makhzen*. In current terms: law-making, policing, law-enforcing and elite cooptation[187].

Understanding the differences in colonial imposition is important. Lyautey is nowadays regarded in the French strategy and military world as an example of the development of methods more concerned with consent of populations than in other French colonial enterprises. However, it was ultimately the use of coercion and despotism the main strategy in Morocco's protectorate. In 1904, around 85.000 soldiers from colonial troops were present in Morocco (Burtin et al., 2019). In other words, the so-called 'consent' was fabricated through economic stranglement, local cooptation and armed violence.

> "The military conquest of the country, only completed in 1934, thus took up half of the 44-year lifespan of this peculiar colonial regime. At first, the French army was keen to subjugate the economically 'useful' parts of Morocco (designated as *le Maroc utile*), a task accomplished by 1926. Priorities in this endeavor were stated explicitly, as was the close relationship between military and economic objectives." (Sebti, 2013, p. 43)

In 1918, the Cherifian Customs Administration came under the control of the Protectorate and the Debt Control, fulfilled by French military agents. Colonial rule was maintained

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[185] See more information on this period in the open archives of the French Defense Ministry (*Ministère des Armées*), *Service historique de la Défense*: https://www.servicehistorique.sga.defense.gouv.fr/

[186] Hubert Lyautey, originally from an aristocratic family of Nancy, was first deployed to Algeria for two years. After years back in the metropole, at the age of 40 he was finally deployed to Indochina: Tonkin (Indochine) and later in Madagascar where he met général Joseph Gallieni. In April 1912, he became the General Resident of French Morocco and remained in charge until October 1925.

[187] Lyautey's method is usually compared to the coercive campaign of Pétain in the Rif, where the lack of economic and political programs creates a more unstable and lasting resentment against the French and the sultan (Burtin et al., 2019).

through a structure of security forces that ensure control over finances/capital, territories and populations.

French overtake of Morocco's regime would also radically transform policing. While some historians might consider the French Empire of Napoleon as the first police or security state (Hicks, 2009), what remains valid for the 3rd Republic is that the French police model granted especial importance to population control.

2. Unfolding the coercive state

2.1 Elites and power distribution

During the Protectorate, colonial political and economic elites became the primary actors as they accumulated resources, from land, to military, state, capital and technological resources. Local elites' military and coercive power had been reduced and controlled under French and Spanish administrations. The military power of France outbalanced that of the sultan's army and the *mahallat* of the *khalifas*, which had already been infiltrated and hollowed out of its resistance pulse. The protectorate's strategy reinforced some local notables, bourgeoisie allied with foreign capitalists, and mostly the *makhzen*'s and the sultan's capacity to accumulate other resources. Those that collaborated with the colonial regime had lost coercion and political power, in other words, the control of the state, but in compensation they accumulated wealth in land and capital. The legitimacy of the Moroccan Monarchy was also cleverly reinforced during the period both by colonial power and later by the nationalist movement.

While 'law and order' rested at the hands of French and Spanish security forces, local elites saw the reduction of the competences of *sharia* courts and *muhtasib*, important figures in the control of populations and everyday business (Zirari-Devif, 1996). In the hybrid fashion of the protectorates, however, some economic and bureaucratic local elites, as well as religious ones, managed to maintain or rise as powerful yet dependent secondary elites in their alliance with colonial actors.

The military invasion of Morocco took until the mid-1930s to be officially fulfilled over all the territories. When areas were occupied they would first fall under military administration

and later, once secured, under a civilian rule[188]. The civilian rule, however, also relied massively on violence[189] (Vermeren, 2012). The so-called Protectorate was supposed to be based on 'indirect rule' and a hybrid system that took years to establish, but for the most part it was more of a self-built image than a reality[190]. Coercion and consent[191], however, were both important to colonial powers, or at least the illusion of consent, and it was usually solved by seeking leaders of tribes that could adhere to the colonial situation and to provide troops for the colonial endeavor.

Although the Protectorates were there to 'modernize and civilize' Morocco, they did make use of preexisting structures of power, and reinforced them while cutting off their communal accountability. The colonial project of social control is in fact planned within a "logic of permanent responsabilization of local elites" (Burtin et al., 2019, p. 7). The same method was used in Egypt as a hybrid system where "'modern' institutions and practices […] depended heavily on the persistence of 'premodern' institutions and practices" (Beinin, 2001, p. 112). This logic will function through a reinforcement or promotion of those elites that can adapt and adopt the 'modern' requirements of the metropolis while embodying a certain symbolic legitimacy[192]. In other words, the population, understood as a resource of power, would be for the most part subjugated under the claims of a legitimate state project until the rise of new actors, an urban middle class and a bourgeois nationalist movement, were able to effectively mobilize the masses.

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[188] The regional administration was modelled after Maréchal Bugeaud's divisions in Algeria and in 1913 after the Tunisian model "Morocco's regions were subdivided into 'territories', 'circles', 'annexes' and 'information bureaus' (bureaux de resneignements, later called bureaux d'affaires indigènes, or bureau of native affairs). The powers vested in the chef de région were modeled on those of a French prefect. In 1913, in accordance with another model – that of the French protectorate in Tunisia – 'civil districts' were created, each one placed under the authority of French-appointed 'contrôleur civil'. Contrary to the royally-appointed pashas and qa'ids who represented the Makhzen, the French-appointed civil administrations were backed up by military and legal structures which permitted them to effectively control the territories under their jurisdiction" (Sebti, 2013, pp. 43–44).

[189] The French Doctrine (*la guerre contre-insurgente; guerre moderne*, etc.) was the most developed doctrine that helped train from the Latin American dictatorships of the 70s to the Escuela de las Americas. It was through the French experience in Indochina and Algeria (they would even use the film *La Bataille d'Alger* as training resource, officers that had participated considered it very accurate. The doctrine, written in a few books and conference by Coronel Lacheroy develops a specific focus on population control during war. It highlights the importance of intelligence, and with it, of interrogations and even torture. Electric torture by dynamo would be especially developed within the French colonial context. These techniques have been reported in Morocco, but they are usually used by semi-democratic countries or outside war times because they leave few traces on the body but are very painful. http://guerredalgerie.blogspot.com/search/label/guerre%20r%C3%A9volutionnaire

[190] Indeed in 2019 the experience of Coronel Lyautey is being revisited in France as a valuable lesson for the AMO (*appuie militaire operationnel*) (Burtin et al., 2019).

[191] This differentiation between hegemony and coercion has perhaps more to do with the temporality of the project. Indeed, the use of coercion in the slave trade and plantations in America was much more central than that of Europe, but the resistance of peasants to 'land enclosure' through the 14th-17th centuries in Europe was countered not only by coercion but also by the development of biopolitics and a further entrenchment of control over women's bodies (Federici, 2014).

[192] In Madagascar, "[Gallieni] unified, not the malgasy nation, but the malgash power" (Jean-Luc Raharimanana https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rbRHyrU5StE). Lyautey met Gallieni in Indochina and later rejoint him in Madagascar in 1887 (Ouardighi 2005).

At the top of this symbolic structure was the sultan, whose legitimacy helped the French authorities maintain the imagery of 'Protectorate', promoting alliances with a more stable governing system. The reliance and the strengthening of the *makhzen* nevertheless broke the local checks and balances that diversified elites' powers in the territory. The lasting effect of the French and Spanish colonization project would turn out to be a concentration of resources at fewer hands. From a regime with diversified elites and resources during most of the nineteenth century, colonialism would promote a concentration of power, firstly of the European capitalist actors (extraction of resources from the periphery to the center); and secondly at the hands of the *makhzen*, furthering class stratification in the country[193].

The Protectorates thus rested in an ambiguous role that basically claimed consent from the coopted or sequestrated Palace and the traditional power structures. Aside the discharging of the figure of the *mohtasib*, local precolonial positions such as the qaid, cheikh or *moqaddem* were central to the colonial power, and their loyalty was assured by appointing wealthy individuals that would further profit from their power "to increase and diversify their wealth and prestige" (Leveau, 1985, p. 213). In the case of the *moqaddem*, today regarded as the lowest and most archaic role, it was in fact the French and Spanish Protectorates that their role was reinforced, in particular in their task of gathering all sorts of information for the authorities (Hibou & Tozy, 2020).

2.2 Evolution of the Resources of Power

The colonial period left an inheritance that above all is characterized by the concentration of power resources, among them: land, capital, state, symbolic power, and coercion. First, conquest meant access to land for French settlers, especially in the form of agro-corporations. The occupation also tried to buy the loyalty of certain local notables, through turning them into prosperous landowners. The 1914 decree created the instrument of land expropriation under the argument of public utility, but the consequences were a rise in private property, mostly at the hands of a few settlers (J.-F. Clément, 1992; Izquierdo Brichs et al., 2021). The hoarding of the best land at the hands of foreign settlers fueled local

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[193] Studying the case of the city of Salé, "[t]he early years of the protectorate encouraged this development because members of families that were considered by the French administration as 'noble' were appointed to positions of influence and offered the best educational opportunities. Yet until the 1870s the social structure of Salé appears to have been relatively undifferentiated in socio-economic classes or cultural categories."(Brown 1976:55)

sabotage and resistance, which foreign farmers had to counter with their own private protection. This explains why in 1916 'private police' was available to French companies and settlers in order to protect their economic endeavors (Chapter 7).

The privatization of agricultural land, along with the growing difference in investment and innovation in agriculture created an abysmal inequality in the country, with around 900 large landowners controlling most of the richest areas of land (Izquierdo Brichs et al., 2021). In what has been called the 'dual economy of the Protectorate', "[m]odernisation of the Moroccan agricultural sector involved not only reworking systems of land tenure, but also breaking down subsistence farming methods, reorienting famers away from local markets and developing an export economy – all of which required consolidation of land into large tracts that would be amendable to industrial farming and irrigation techniques." (Guerin, 2015, pp. 231–232).

Especially after 1925, with the departure of the first Résident Géneral, Lyautey, the arable land that was registered and sold increased exponentially. These 'official colonization programs' resulted in big French-Moroccan agrobusiness, some which persisted after independence. Above all the local actors that benefited from this 'dual economy' was the *makhzen*. Its growth under the protectorate was not only symbolic as a way to legitimize occupation, but it translated into material dominance of the state, as "modernization of the sultan's government dictated that his spiritual claim to land and water translate to a material claim based on modern notions of private property" (Guerin, 2015, p. 232).

The post-Second World War economy further benefited French business as well as a small fraction of their Moroccan counterparts, as wealth and economy reallocated to the coastal industrial parts of the country, especially in and around Casablanca (J.-F. Clément, 1986).

The new modern state, through taxes and regulations, and the advancement of private property, was becoming more ubiquitous. The increase of state mechanisms throughout the territories and domains also meant that local elites that complied would concentrate their mission in the economic dimension of accumulation competition, since political dominance was limited by the foreign presence.

This glass ceiling started shattering by the end of the 1930s with the rise of nationalism and the rising importance of a bureaucratic middle class with education, with foreign experience and in close contact to the colonizers. The nationalist narrative also helped consolidate the

Monarch's symbolic power, especially with the proud image of Mohammed V and the impact of his exile (1953-55).

Hibou & Tozy (2020) argue that the creation of the modern state in the European model, did not forgo the imperial power of the Monarchy. On the contrary, the need for local legitimization of occupation reinforced even archaic rites of monarchical rule, kept after independence (Hibou & Tozy, 2020). The Protectorate had created a modern state and expanded its reach throughout the territories. These mechanisms later would benefit the post-colonial monarchical regime, which directly inherited the institutional and administrative structures.

Coercion or state violence had also been concentrated at the hands of the colonial powers, the Moroccan forces brought under the authority of the protectorate, while intelligence services and surveillance had been modernized and further strengthened. The difference between the use of coercion in the metropolis and its use in the colonial state laid in the fact that the colonial project was not hegemonic, and despite the formalities, coercion vastly outweighed popular persuasion (Guha, 1997). In the racist colonial order, security forces:

> "constructed 'extremism' in light of the a priori exclusion of the Maghreb's subject populations from the republican Cité, from the rights, benefits, and shared interests of French citizens. Economically marginalized and denied basic freedoms, the indigenous majority were suspect because, whether or not they actively supported proto-nationalist groups, such as Messali Hadj's Etoile Nord-Africaine, or Algeria's pre-eminent Muslim cultural organization, the Association of reformist 'ulama, their assumed preference was for the overthrow, not merely of a particular government or regime, but of the entire colonial order. Viewed this way, the North African gendarmeries exemplified the dissonance between a relatively liberal metropolitan regime and routine repression in the colonial territories" (Thomas, 2010, p. 82)

Other than the war and the conquest -not until 1934 would the whole territory be subjugated-, the everyday policing affecting populations was an integral part of the politics of occupation. Indeed there were different modalities of policing (and of criminal justice)[194] that separated the Europeans from the indigenous, the men from the women, the Christian, the

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[194] In the Spanish Protectorate, the idea of creating an indigenous police after the Spanish model was postponed with the Great War and with the *Desastre de Annual* of 1921. Policing duties thus were left mainly to military troops. "Este proyecto quedó tan solo en eso, una pretensión, ya que la inacabable guerra que nuestros Ejércitos mantenían en la región administrada por España y muy especialmente la situación derivada de los sucesos del verano de 1921, el llamado Desastre de Annual, que provocaron el desplome de la Comandancia de Melilla, fueron aplazando esta decisión, al menos en lo que al Cuerpo de Seguridad se refiere ya que efectivos del Cuerpo de Vigilancia si fueron destacados a ciudades como Tetuán, existiendo en otras la llamada Policía Urbana con funciones similares a la Policía Municipal toda vez que el orden público y demás misiones propias de los Cuerpos policiales uniformados eran asumidos por efectivos militares." https://cnpjefb.blogspot.com/2016/04/la-policia-en-el-protectorado-de.html

Muslim and the Jew. Many women were also controlled and under surveillance in order to ensure their provision of sexual works to French settlers and tourists from the metropolis[195]. Nevertheless, the lessons in policing indigenous people in the colonies would later be hailed and valued in the metropole's own population control[196].

While the political entrenchment between the *makhhzen* and the Protectorate became tighter, the organization at the forefront of colonial state violence was the Moroccan gendarmerie, integrated into the French *Gendarmerie Nationale* by 1928 (Thomas, 2010). A paramilitary police, the gendarmerie was set up in urban areas such as Casablanca, Fez or Meknès, to carry out intelligence gathering about economic and political events[197]. With depression and crises during the 1930s, their role became more intensely focused on repressing labor and union protests. They were also the main tool for riot control and intervened especially as workers started organizing into labor unions and political organizations, "despite the [gendarmerie's] unequivocal status as members of the French Army." (Thomas, 2010, p. 77).

Around 1938, the gendarmerie's priorities shifted, as local protests started being framed more within a nationalist narrative. At the same time, labor rights and the access to union participation and protest was radically different for settlers than for indigenous populations. These discriminative policies contributed to the difficulty of solidarity class movements between working settlers and local workers (that had been demonstrating jointly during the 30s), in part clearing the way for a more nationalistic approach to the socio-political struggle.

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[195] "Recluses entre des murs infranchissables et bien qu'évoluant dans un cadre qui ne manque pas de poésie, ces dernières se trouvent là, obligatoirement assujetties à la surveillance constante et vigilante de la police et des services sanitaires (entrée gratuite, autorisée à tous les visiteurs, non recommandée aux enfants et aux jeunes filles » *Casablanca et sa région.* Guides Maroc-Presse, Casablanca, 1943. (cited in Mathieu, Jean & Maury, P. H. (2011). *Bousbir: La prostitution dans le Maroc colonial.* Étudié et présenté par Abdlemajid Arrif. Paris, Rabat : Dar Al Aman.)

[196] The French sociologist Mathieu Rigouste explores the mutually reinforcing elements of colonial violence and population control in the metropolis. Colonial rule becomes a laboratory for state violence and the development of the police state. In the case of France, "[the] generals in charge of the repression in France in 1848, including that of 1830, were chosen because they had become famous during the conquest of Algeria. Marshal Burgeaud, for example, wrote the *War Manual of Streets and Houses* to explain to everyone that what he had learned colonizing Algeria should be applied in a renewed way to the proletariat of the big French cities." (Rigouste, 2017, p. 30).

[197] "Precise economic information interested central gendarmerie commands in Algiers, Rabat, and Tunis the most. The utility of such material rested on the extent to which present data about market prices, fuel costs, foodstuff availability, and harvest prospects could be compared with equivalent information from earlier periods and nearby locations. Only then could estimates be made about agricultural lay-offs, internal economic migration, relative levels of poverty and infant mortality, and other demographic in- dicators regarded as weathervanes of criminal activity, labor militancy, and political dissent."(Thomas, 2010, p. 82)

3. Colonial negotiations, interdependence and the French Heritage

3.1 From the struggle for independence to the consolidation of the Monarchy (1950s-1960s)

The ongoing contestation started being framed in nationalist terms at the end of the 1930s, through the structuring of, first, the Moroccan Action Committee, and later political parties in the French and Spanish zones. It was in 1944 that the *Independence Manifesto* was published and spread and not until this narrative had caught up and spread did the Sultan start to become more reluctant to publically collaborate with the Protectorate[198].

After the widespread push of national aspirations, rebellions and armed struggled around the territory and beyond the cities, the negotiations in Aix-les-Bains led to the return of Mohammed V from exile where he had been sent two years before, and his signature of the La Celle-Saint-Cloud Accords on the 8th November 1955, in which Morocco became an independent state "united to France with bonds of consensual permanent interdependence"(Rivet, 2012, p. 344).

The relay between administrations would take some time, and foreign business elites remained in place. To put it in perspective, in 1955 only 5% "of the ownership of incorporated companies was in Moroccan hands" (J.-F. Clément, 1986, p. 13). After independence, while most capital and ownership of businesses remained foreign, notables and some bourgeoisie families were able to buy land and business for minimal prices, especially in agriculture, real state, textile and tourism sectors. Formal independence fueled the rise of a protectionist industrial class that was especially well connected to the state and the regime, and was to some extent interested in developing domestic industrial or agro-industrial projects. The rise of these few businessmen was the consequence of their active involvement in the anticolonial struggle, as well as their already amassed wealth, that the state

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[198] Some scholars argue a shifting support from the USA encouraged the Monarch's stand. Roosevelt had assured support to Mohammed V in 1943 (Miller, 2013; Stenner, 2019a).

perceived as a potential opportunity to modernize and stimulate the new economy (Cammett, 2007).

In fact, the biggest Moroccan Holdings and companies' still preponderant today trace their origins to the protectorate era, and they were transformed and restructured after independence without losing their links to foreign capital. Apart from the growing accumulation through purchase, many also benefited from patronage networks with the state, and, given the central role of the state in the country's economy, these businessmen exponentially increased their fortunes and assets (J.-F. Clément, 1986).

With the demographic growth and urbanization dynamics, real state became early on the mother source of capital accumulation after independence. Those close and politically connected benefited from 'administrative complicities' which informed them of future urbanization plans. Meanwhile the purchasing power of the population was declining and youth's unemployment increasing, estimated at 35% by 1971 (Seddon, 2014, p. 243). At the end of the 1970s about 200 people (families and groups) controlled 1/4th of real state. (Berrada & Saadi, 1992).

The industrial sector had been especially difficult to access for Moroccan bourgeoisie during the Protectorate. This was due to the need of capital mobilization and to the difficulties of technological import and knowledge for native businesspeople. From the 1960s on, however, some import substitution policies helped Moroccan businessmen expand into textile and food industries (Berrada & Saadi, 1992). The new picture portrayed a very concentrated sector in terms of financial sources and market actors. The ethnic composition of the bourgeoisie remained Fassis[199] in origin, although largely concentrated in Casablanca, and behind it the Soussi bourgeoisie[200].

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[199] Mostly living in Casablanca (Abu-Lughod, 1980).

[200] The Soussis elites will expand their power especially in the 1970s, after the nationalist bourgeoisie that had been most implicated in the Istiqlal became less relevant to the regime's stability.

3.2 The Regime takes over the structure of power

The structures that the protectorate had left behind translated into an inherited structure for a powerful state. These mechanisms were fairly familiar to the Palace, but similarly coveted by the nationalist movement with alternative projects. Most of all, Istiqlal and urban elites together sought economic rewards for their anticolonial struggle and a political say in the construction of the new regime. But the "berber strategy" of the French protectorate also proved an effective tool against the urban Istiqlalis. Understanding the potentital challenge of urban nationalists, Mohammed V sought to benefit rural notables through the promotion of agricultural investment, rather than industrialization. Paying special political attention to rural elites, was seen as a stabilizing mechanism for the regime (Cammett, 2007; Leveau, 1985).

The relatively open beginning of a new era thus produced short years of façade pluralism, however only limited to elites, with the Palace encouraging the creation of multiple political parties[201]. The official narrative was fairly progressive due to the mobilization of the street and to the influence of leftist movements in the height of the Cold War. This rhetoric, however, did not actually translate into real policies. Agrarian reforms, for instance, were limited by powerful elites and landowners (Izquierdo Brichs et al., 2021). Neither did it translate into real political pluralism, as the repression of social and economic protests *manu militari* was not uncommon. Since the very beginning, the Moroccan state violently cracked down on any dissent, from old anticolonial fighters to new political opponents[202].

The traditional structures and power relations existing in Morocco before the 19th century were superseded with western institutions and dynamics brought in by the French and, at a minor degree, the Spanish colonizers. Both structures evolved but persisted throughout colonization and thereafter. Ayubi describes Morocco's pre-colonization as a 'strong nation' with a 'weak apparatus' (Ayubi, 2001, p. 121). The colonial period alternatively developed a 'strong apparatus', a 'modern' state whereas the legitimacy as occupying power was weak.

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[201] The objective with the creation of the Popular Movement party (Mouvement Populaire, *Haraka alChaabia*), for instance, in 1958 a royalist party with mostly amazigh cadres that could compete and counter more challenging projects.

[202] See (Feliu, Mateo Dieste, & Izquierdo, 2019)

The regime emerging in post-colonial Morocco ably managed to keep the 'strong apparatus', especially at the bureaucratic and military level, while regaining the 'strong nation' legitimacy.

3.3 The Security State

The first decade and a half after independence was determined by the power struggle between the nationalist movement and the monarchy. The Sultan had a strong power base and was religiously and socially legitimized[203] but the different State projects of the Liberation Army and the different branches and armed groups were a threat to the monarchical project. Nevertheless, the fact that the armed struggle for independence had been less central than in the neighboring countries might explain the secondary role of the army as a post-independence actor (Feliu, Mateo Dieste, & Izquierdo Brichs, 2019).

King Mohammed V saw the immediate necessity to create a national army, as well as a national police that would fall under the monarchy's authority (Abitbol 2009). The creation of the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces in May 1956 was one of the first steps towards the entrenchment of the Monarchy as the primary actor in the regime of power. Those who refused the 1955 Aix-les-Bains agreements with France suffered persecution, torture, enforced disappearances and other violations of human rights at the hands of the newly born security services[204].

In terms of its composition, the elite of the newly created Royal Armed Forces had been trained and had already been part of the colonial armies[205] (Leveau 1985, Gallissot 1989, Abitbol 2009, Saaf 2012). Most of its forces were also largely drawn from rural Amazig areas[206] following the French policy, and created a useful counterbalance to the urban and nationalist forces, social base of the Istiqlal Party. The cultural background of army officials

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[203] The Sharifian dynasty of the Alawites traces its origins to the Prophet Muhammad. Additionally, the Sultans have married Amazigh women as a way of also enforcing the 'blood and racial bonds' of their authority (Ayubi, 2001, p. 121).

[204] The Final Report of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) published in 2009 by the CCDH documents the violations of human rights against members of the Liberation Army and of the Resistance such as the Secret Organization of the Black Crescent, some currents within the Istiqlal or the Democratic Party for Independence (PDI): "These violations took various forms, from abduction and incarceration in secret detention centers, to physical liquidation on the streets with firearms or in detention centers following torture and ill-treatment." (IER, 2009, p. 40). From the French by the author.

[205] Benhamou Kettani, Mohamed Ameziane, Driss Ben Omar and Mohammed Oufkir are among those high-rank officers issuing from the colonial armies (Abitbol, 2009).

[206] According to Susan Miller, 90% of the Moroccan Army was of rural and Berber origin (2013, p. 157).

preserved a linkage with France's interests and with the West, in accordance with the 'interdependence' formula of Morocco's new relationship with France. The origin, military culture, and even ideological stance of the post-independence army leaders determined the initial monarchical form of Morocco. The Arab and North African armies were at the spotlight of the leading national and independence movements. In Morocco, however, the use and role of the Army was nevertheless quickly turned into a power resource by the monarchy, which used it internally and externally.

The control of state-violence was useful, since recently gained-independence and the popular struggle had empowered populations towards political mobilization and contestation. The Rif revolt of 1958-59, which opposed different ideas of the State and of national identity, was the baptism of the Moroccan Army and indeed of soon to be King Hassan II, who at the time was already the head of all the Armed Forces. The Rif uprising, however, also helped the regime align urban nationalist political elites like those in the Istiqlal and UNFP into its project, as their involvement in the repressive approach to the conflict suggests (Aziza, 2019). During the following decades, army, gendarmerie but also the police under the Ministry of Interior repressed opposition and dissent through high levels of violence and human rights violations.

While the narrative of the new Kingdom of Morocco was still mildly pluralistic during the first years of independent rule, the security apparatus actively targeted all alternative projects and opposing movements on the streets. The Palace was simultaneously competing through cooptation and redistribution of resources to reinforce its uncontested position at the summit of the power structure. The excessive reliance on the Army, however, would soon proof too dangerous for the monarchical project.

Chapter 5 - Layers of (in)Security: A Neoliberal Era

This chapter analyzes the role of the security sector since the 1970s until now. This timespan has been chosen as it encapsulates the era of neoliberal policies in Morocco. The chapter is organized into three different periods. These periods are of course purely academic and working conceptualizations that will serve the purpose of identifying shifts and continuities, and will guide our explanations about the changes in the role of coercion and the nature of the security sector in relation to the economic situation of Morocco in the global framework.

The first period relates to the 1970s military coups, the economic crises, and the restructuring of military and capital resources. The period is also characterized by the outbreak of the war with Polisario, a war that would last until 1991 and which brought thousands of casualties and displacement, but also new opportunities and power resources to the regime and to some of its elites.

A second period of this era is situated from 1980s until the death of Hassan II in 1999. The need for re-endebtment together with the implementation of economic conditions established by international organizations such as the World Bank fueled a new cycle of social and economic protests throughout the country, protests that were met with strong violence and repression. As we will see, the end of the Cold War reevaluated alliances and imposed a different narrative that permeated official and diplomatic behaviors. Constraints at the global level reshaped, but the regime continued to be structured through a coercive-bureaucratic model.

A third period began with the ascendance of Mohammed VI to the throne. Admittedly, this third period could be merged into one period starting at the 1990s. The excessive focus on a new era with the new king has been deemed naïve and reflects the success of the publicity campaign of the first years of Mohammed VI. It is true that there is a discursive and economic continuity from the last years of Hassan II. Nevertheless, some milestones in reform such as the Instance of Equity and Reconciliation (IER), the new Mudawana and in personal changes at the top of the security apparatus can account and justify the clarity of separating these two periods. Moreover, given the importance of the primary elite and the centrality of the King, a change in the primary player is justification enough to give it a separate attention.

Wide movements took place during the first decade of Mohammed VI's reign, most importantly the Gdim Izik movement in Western Sahara. Although Gdim Izik is an

unforgettable marker in the history of the regime's repression, it wasn't until the 20th February movement initiated the protests of 2011 that some constitutional reforms and the regime realignments seemed to bring changes[207], however short-lived. In economic terms, also the continuity of the 2000s until now is obvious, as a new economic environment and a new institutional development have guided both decades. In coercive terms, however, state violence has become less covert and counterrevolutionary measures, ever present in occupied Western Sahara, have resurfaced in the country.

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[207] In 2015, the Moroccan government adopted a law to end military trials against civilians, in line with the 2011 Constitution. See Amnesty International (2020) "Morocco High Court Reviewing Key Western Sahara Case"Online: November 8, 2020. Online: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/morocco-high-court-reviewing-key-western-sahara-case-2/ .

1. 1970s: Restructuring neopatrimonialism

The periode from independence to the 1970s had been unstable. Different regions and populations contested the regime, and especially Hassan II's authoritarian rule since 1961 advanced in the progressive anihilation of any potential challenges to the power structure. The political instability of the first decade and a half of independence had moreover tigthened Hassan II's links to the military, which, despite their role in repression, played an important part in building the image and prestige of the state and the loyalty to the nation and the king (Régnier & Santucci 1973:141). Since 1966, the Armed Forces were also a source of absorbtion of unemployed youth[208].

After independence the liberalist trade regime established in 1906 began to be dismantled to favor local business through protectionist policies. These policies, however, only really benefited the wealthier families and private capital, and increased the strain on subsidies and public spending. The so-called 'dual economy' of the colonial times had not disappeared. If anything, disparities were increasing. The development plans of the first years had failed due to cronysm, dependency from external debt and low available investment or a lack of will for industrialization (Benhaddou, 1997; Cammett, 2007; Zartman, 1987). Meanwhile, young population in search of employment was confronted with the reality of growing disparities between the richest families and the majority of the population, still mostly rural and in a subsistance economy.

The Casablanca revolt of the 23rd March 1965 openly reflected these contradictions: a half-century of political activism and collective action here expressed in the discontent of students and unions in open definace of the regime. From then on, with a fully fledged politico-securitarian appartus, collective action and political contestation would enter a new phase of self-limitation and reorganization (Parejo Fernández, 2019).

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[208] Conscription was only decreeted in 1966 following mass turmoil and social protests (n° 137-66, 9 june 1966).

1.1 Forget politics and go make money!

The security sector had been one of the main pilars of support of the Monarchy, and Hassan II was especially close to its high-rank officers. This alliance between Hassan II and his officers accelerated in the 1960s, with the decline of Istiqlal's strategic importance for the King. In 1956, for instance, the Monarchy and the head of the national police, a prominent Istiqlali named Mohmmed Laghzaoui[209] shared common rivals and the interest of eliminating political opponents, especially the National Democratic Party and the Popular Movement (C. Clément, 1975). Mohammed Laghzoui was further appointed Minister of Interior in 1958, and istiqlali members dominated these institutions during the first years of independence in the 1950s-1960s. The Army continued to be at the hands of the rural and amazig leaders, perceived by French and the monarchy as more loyal than the bourgeoisie. In the mid-1960s, however, the work of Laghzaoui in the Ministry was done[210]. Hassan II was powerful enough to pass over police and surveillance to the military. General Mohamed Oufkir became the chief of the DGSN in 1960, and finally the Minister of Interior in 1967. The police forces would remain at the hands of military men until the turn of the century.

By the 1970s, however, the patronage system that had been built and that involved the elites of the security sector as well as notable rural elites was reaching its exhaustion. The sale of colonial land in favorable conditions to loyal elites and the development of the public sector, a source of employment opportunity for educated bourgeoisie, were slowing down. The exhaustion of these resources put the system in jeopardy, in a contradiction between the capacity of the regime to coopt and the capacity to reform the system (Hammoudi, 1997, p. 33). Everywhere else, the palace had been careful to design the strategy of "busy, dependent, and divided" (Zartman, 1987, p. 23) that hadn't been implemented in the military sector.

The coercive power acquired by internal repression, and the legitimacy gained through a territorial war with Algeria in 1963[211] increased the ability and ambitions of certain elites in

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[209] Laghzaoui owned the biggest Moroccan transport company at the end of the protectorate, and as treasurer of the Istiqlal Party, was part of the bourgeoisie that had enormously benefited from the Protectorate.

[210] He was appointed head of the State Phosphates Mining Company (J.-F. Clément, 1986).

[211] The so-called Sand War was a military operation initiated by Hassan II, allegedly to recuperate an area around Tindouf and Béchar. The war lasted less than three months and resulted in under a thousand fatalities. Its consequences, however are still felt today with the Algerian-Moroccan tensions. The critical position about the war from prominent leaders of the UNFP (National Union of Popular Forces) and the Moroccan Communist Party, led to repressive measures and the closing up of political room in the country (López García, 2019; Mundy, 2017).

the Army to contest the primary position of a King tainted by corruption and authoritarianism. The symbolic power of National Armies was still positive in many countries after short decades of independence. The decades from 1950s to the 1970s have been seen as the 'golden age of military coups' in the region, legitimized by an image of austerity, popular revolution in the fight against corrupted and incompetent regimes[212] (Rubin, 2001).

In Morocco, stories about Hassan's II golden plumbing in his palaces, of a lavish and extravagant lifestyle circulated among the military. The concentration of political and economic power in the Palace, and the subsequent blocking of reforms that could have alleviated rising inequalities and frustration among an unemployed educated class, might have in sum contributed to a growing discontent among some officers (Hammoudi, 1997; Tobji, 2006).

On the 10th of July 1971, Hassan II was celebrating his 42nd birthday at his summer palace in Skhirat with hundreds of guests. Lieutenant-colonel M'hamed Ababou and General Mohamed Medbouh stormed the Palace with a group of soldiers from the base of Ahermoumou. While guests and soldiers died, the royal family managed to take cover and the coup was eventually averted by loyalist troops. A year later, on the 16th August 1972, Hassan II suffered a second coup attempt when the plane where he was travelling was attacked from jets commanded from the Kenitra Air Base, apparently following orders from the powerful Mohamed Oufkir.

While the actual causes that motivated the coups are difficult to assess (Albrecht, 2015), the failed military coups of 1971 and 1972 are inscribed in a time of prominent and popular military regimes throughout the region, and part of the military elite tried to seize the opportunity of popular discontent against the lavish and vociferous Hassan II (Owen, 2013).

The failed overthow attempts were a warning sign for Hassan II, who realized that the Army had become too powerful. The army had been and would continue to be an indispensable resource to ensure the Monarchy's primary position, but its excesive concentration and closeness to the King meant that it was also a powerful resource at the hands of a few officers who controlled it (Saaf, 2012). The contentious position of military elites towards the

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[212] Incompetence came from the failure of ruling elites to defeat Israel in the 1948 war, from alienating and inability to move towards Arab unity regardless of a strong panarab rethoric. The post-independence evidence of a subservience to Western states through economic ties and dependencies was also a cause of delegitimization of elites.

monarchy led to an in-depth reorganization of the Army. The leaders and participants, if only unwilling, to the Skhirat coup of 1971 and to the second coup in 1972 were severly punished, leading to hundreds of soldiers and army officers dead or disappeared for years into the secret prison of Tazmamart (Merzouki, n.d.; Perrault, 1992; Tobji, 2006).

Aside the violent and massive repression, Hassan II used other strategies to reduce the military elite's power. First, the basis of the military was "Arabized" in order to counter the traditionally Amazic composite, whose leaders shared (Daguzan, 1999; Sorenson, 2007). The promotion of Islamism within its ranks was also meant to counter secularist ideologies (Saaf, 2012), and class consciousness, partly deemed responsible for the involvement of some officials in the coups (Tobji, 2006).

Secondly, the Armed Forces were divided internally. The Army was placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Defense[213] disappeared and the King started directly supervising all military affairs[214]. After the accusations of involvement of Oufkir and his execution[215], the secret unit CAB1 (Cabinet 1), inherited from the French colonial times and which had been responsible for most of the political repression of the first years, was dismantled. The unit was divided into different services which would be forced to overlap and concur. Ahmed Dlimi became the new strongman in the Army[216] and general Housni Benslimane, trusted for his support to the king during the 1972 coup, was put in charge of the Royal Gendarmerie, where he stayed until 2018. The modernization and newly acquired status of the Royal Gendarmerie, which had also been crucial to the colonial regime, was an important element in the creation of new elites and diversified resources that the actors had to compete for. The Royal Gendarmerie became the most advanced security apparatus under the control of Benslimane (Amnesty International 1993).

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[213] Dahir no 1-72-276 du 9 rejeb 1392 (19 août 1972) relatif à la suppression du ministère de la défense nationale et des fonctions de Major généraal et de major général adjoint des Forces armées royales.

[214] This restructuring did have a strategic cost in the war in Western Sahara, as most decisions had to wait for Rabat's approval (Wright, 1983).

[215] Oufkir's death was officially framed as a suicide, and his family, wife and children, were enforced disappeared until finally released in 1991 after prolonged French and US pressure.

[216] Mahjoub Tobji, exiled RAF officer and Dlimi's former aid-de-camp, argues that from 1973 on it was Dlimi who effectively controlled the regime, including the King (Tobji, 2006). Zartman, on the contrary, argues that it wasn't until 1980 that Dlimi gained control of the 'newly centralized and autonomous militarized structure' (Zartman, 1987, p. 24). After his death in 1983, his many roles were divided among other officers, especially Housni Beslimane, the new strongman, but also Moulay Hafid Alaoui, Abdelazziz Bennani and Mohammed Kabbaj.

The Palace made thus sure to atomize possible challenges to its status by creating different intelligence units, such as the DGED (Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation) [217][218], in order to disperse the accumulation of power by a few military officers. The DGST (Direction Génerale de Surveillance du Territoire), another intelligence service, was created in 1973, and led by Hamidou Laânigri. Laânigri, from the Royal Gendarmerie, had formerly worked under Kadiri in the DGED (Feliu & Parejo 2009). The increasing importance of the DGED and the DGST[219], both composed by police forces (3000 and 9000 at the time, respectively), reveals the suspicion of the Palace against the military corpus. Both secret services were commanded by military officers, but with the intention to remove power from the Army, they were composed of policemen, and placed under the control of the Ministry of Interior.[220]

Third, the war in Western Sahara (1975-1989) provided the perfect opportunity[221] to isolate the army in the so-called Southern provinces, while simultaneously increasing the legitimacy and role for the institution, which regained a long-lost status as a political actor (Rubin 2001, 58; Saaf 2012). Ahmed Dlimi, a powerful star after Oufkir's demise, became an important asset after the Green March in 1975 and was put in charge of the Southern Zone. He was also a Military Advisor and in charge of the military intelligence services or DGED[222].

Inspite of the repression and the reshuffling of the military, the data of military spending, along with the historic events of the war in Western Sahara, show how the post-coups era did not wane the military's material capacities. This was helped by the enormous increase in US financial military assistance and direct military support on the ground in Western Sahara,

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[217] Modelled after the French intelligence services of the SDECE. It was always directed by military personnel, first Abdelhak Kadiri and later Ahmed Dlimi. The DGED collects foreign information abroad, it follows the diaspora and its activities and it has members in many diplomatic representations. See Chapter 6 for more.

[218] The DGED was directed by military personnel and in charge of collecting foreign information abroad, well-known by the surveillance of the Moroccan diaspora and its activities. The first head of the DGED was Ahmed Dlimi (1973-1983). It wasn't until 2005, that the first civilian, Mohamed Yassine Mansouri, was apointed head of the DGED, when other new actors were allowed to enter the competition with traditional military elites.

[219] After a year of its creation, however, with the Dahir n°1-73-652 of 2nd January 1974, the General Directorate was relocated under the DGSN and became a Direcorate: DST. In 2005, it would become a DG again, DGST.

[220] The Ministry of Interior would be commanded by General Ahmed Dlimi, and after his dubious carcrash death in 1983, it would remain in Driss Basri's hands until the end of Hassan II's rule (Tobji, 2006).

[221] The Green March was a massive populist and military movement that started on the 6th of November of 1975, promoted by the King to force Spain out of Western Sahara. It marked "the beginning of a spectacular restoration of monarchic legitimacy after ten years of battles with opposition parties, characterized by repression and serious social and political upheavals" (Hammoudi, 1997, p. 20)(Hammoudi 1997:20).

[222] Dlimi died on a car accident in 1983. A truck crashed against his car on a road near Marrakech. Apparently, Hassan II had been warned of his manouvers to prepare a putsch against him by the US secret services (Pesnot, n.d.).

especially during the Reagan Administration (Wright 1983). In other words, the political power or the capacity to mobilize political power that the military elites had had was replaced by economic power. More over, Hassan II encouraged[223] the creation of clientelist networks of economic interests for the major officers in order to accommodate them (Mehaji, 2011), especially in business opportunities in Western Sahara (fishery, infrastructures, transportation) (Claisse 1987, Tobji 2006, Denoeux 2007, US Embassy Rabat 2008, Veguilla 2009).

The military occupation and control of Western Sahara helped promote a crony capitalist project for many officers within the security forces, who usually involved their inferiors in illegal businesses, nepotism or embezzlement (Bordes and Labrousse 2004, Tobji 2006, Cammett 2007, Hachemaoui 2012). Nevertheless, the overall impact of the army's involvement in the economy was not particularly extensive to the rest of the economy as in other neighboring countries (Grawert & Abul-Magd, 2016; Régnier & Santucci, 1973).

At an international level, Hassan II's strong anti-communist narrative reinforced a strategic relationship with the West, not only with France, but especially with the United States. Morocco became a pundit in the war against communism in Africa during the Reagan and Carter administrations, intervening in Zaire and Congo, and becoming a base for western operations in Africa (Wright 1983). The uncontestable anchoring in the Western Bloc meant a political and diplomatic support that often overlooked internal repression and human rights violations –often framed as part of the anti-communist struggle –, as well as an important flow of military assistance to the regime, which could readily be used to keep the Army and the police well equipped and well trained, in tune with the operationality of its western allies.

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[223] Tobji in fact explains in his book (2006) that Hassan II recommended the military officers to turn themselves away from politics and focus on 'making money'.

Morocco. Share of GDP Spending on the Military

Source: Data from SIPRI 2021. www.sipri.org

1.2 Political and economic transformation within a neoliberal framework (70s-80s)

In 1973, two Moroccanization Laws were adopted. The law now required companies to have at least 51% of their share in Moroccan hands in order to be able to operate in the country[224]. 400.000 hectares of agricultural land and farms were recovered at Moroccan private hands, although the conditions into which these was done were directly impacted by nepotism and patronage links with the state (Berrada & Saadi, 1992). Although more than 4000 companies were targeted by moroccanization laws, the measures only really touched 1500 companies, as others were able to evade or reconvert the business (J.-F. Clément, 1986). Nevertheless, the Morocconization process strengthened previously powerful families, not only of Fessi origin,

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[224] On the 'morrocanization' laws passed during the 1970s and their effects on economic elites see (Berrada 1988, Cammett 2004 and Catusse 2009).

but increasingly Soussis, that became dominant business groups. On top of them, King Hassan II became the first landowner in the country (Saadi 2016).

In the fishing sector, and following the royal push, a law to encourage maritime investment[225] established public aid to fund the acquisition of fishing vessels. Since then, names like that of General Abdelaziz Bennani, inspector general of the Armed Forces and in charge of occupied Western Sahara, are well known fishmongers in the country. Other names like Housni Benslimane y Abdelhaq Kadiri were also presumably in the business until recently (CFB et al., 2019).

The 1970s policies did not succeed in industrializing the country and the import substitution objectives could not be attained, as those leading it were more concerned with accumulating the newly availbale resources that with developing innovative projects or investing in new endeavors with long term returns.

Subsequently, the effort of the state into 'morocconization' process did not equally impact all social classes. With the first oil crises straining the economy, from 1973 to 1977, the prices of food increased "by an average of 11.1 per cent a year" (Seddon, 2014, p. 243), but despite the social and economic penalties, the new political and security landscape translated into less pressure from the streets and from the left, which in turn weakened the social policies and any timid redistributive programs previously deployed (Izquierdo Brichs et al., 2021).

2. The neoliberal agenda, the end of the Cold War and the cooptation of the human rights narrative

By 1978, there were in Morocco an estimated 2000 millionaires, many of them also dabbling in government functions and high positions in politics and in the public sector (Berrada & Saidi Saad 1992). The impact of the 1973 and 1979 oil crises contributed to the increase in prices and forced Morocco to further foreign debt assistance. In 1983, Morocco underwent

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[225] *Bulletin Officiel* n°: 3172 du 15/08/1973 – p. 1310. Dahir portant loi n° 1-73-410 du 13 rejeb 1393 (13 août 1973) Instituant des mesures d'encouragement aux investissements maritimes. https://adala.justice.gov.ma/production/html/Fr/118875.htm

its first Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)[226] with the IMF and the World Bank[227], one of the first plans of its kind in the region. The 1983 SAP was considered a "turning point in [World] Bank-Morocco relations" (World Bank 1997). Among the conditions for the international funds of 1983 and the subsequent years was the engagement that the government would cut down subsidies on basic products, cancel price control, reduce government spending, reduce tariff protection for national production, adjust the exchange rate regulation, and in general reform public finances, monetary policy and external trade arrangements in order to refocus the economy into a trade oriented program. The immediate SAP consequences were an unequal balance of trade, a rise in living costs for the population in general and a weaker public safety net and investment on public services (B. K. Campbell & Loxley, 2014; Izquierdo Brichs et al., 2021).

The state renounced to the control over some political domains and oriented the economy towards foreign trade, especially with the Eruopean Economic Community. In 1987, Morocco had fulfilled the conditions to enter the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, later World Trade Organization) and by the end of the decade, the country was fully integrated into the global economy[228]. By 1995, 90% of imports were free of taxes. The liberalization of trade was supposed to stimulate foreign private investment, and it allowed for a flow of foreign investment and investors, in what was also called a process of 'demoroccanization' (Catusse, 2009), but it also consequently fueled a specialization on non-manufactured goods for export, such as agricultural products towards the EU [229]. Nevertheless, in 1997 the World Bank already pointed at "obstacles to increased growth and employment". Some goals, like education and other social sector development had remained "elusive"[230].

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[226] Structural Adjustment Programs had the explicit objective to "ensure employment opportunities and acceptable living standards for its growing population, while --enhancing external credit worth". However, these goals had to be achieved through liberal practices such as privatization, etc. with the aim of achieving "a sustainable increase in the rate of economic growth". See Campbell & Loxley (1989) for a detailed critique of these programs around the Global South and their contribution to the empovering of states and populations. In particular see (Seddon, 2014).

[227] See the Country Assistance Review: World Bank. 1997. *Morocco - Country assistance review (English)*. World Development Sources, WDS 1997-1. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/155931468758128420/Morocco-Country-assistance-review

[228] In 1996, Morocco signed its Partnership Agreement with the EU, in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean process started at Barcelona in November 1995, the Agreement provided for the establishment of a free-trade area between Morocco and the EU by 2010. In 2004 a Free Trade Agreement would be signed with the USA.

[229] On the social and economic consequences of free trade agreements see (Aziki & Daumas, 2017).

[230] The World Bank Country Assistance Review of 1997 was the first comprehensive review of the economic changes undergone in Morocco since 1983.

2.1 New mechanisms and resources for the elites

In the process of 'liberalization' the state had lost mechanisms of intervention, among them the capacity to control prices, or to engage in any increase in budget for social programs. This affected the capacity of the state to 'buy social peace' and readily translated into increased unrest on the streets, met with violent repression. Casablanca in 1981 and again different regions in 1984 took to the streets into what has been called the 'bread revolts'.

The state had lost capacity to buy consent, but the regime itself did not lose weight or at least not in equal terms, as the Palace and the politically connected elites continued to accumulate. In 1989, Law 39-89 officialized the privatization of 112 state-owned companies. In the following years, 114 more were sold in a process of public tender that was anything but transparent (Catusse, 2008). The adjustment plans granted a new opportunity for the restructuring of capital in the country, and it proceeded with the progressive centralization of capital and assets in a few hands, from public control and thus a certain limited scrutiny to regime hand with no oversight.

In terms of general trends, most scholars agree that the privatization agenda initiated in the 1980s "transformed less the sociological fabric of the elites than the modalities of public action" (Catusse, 2009, p. 192) as it benefited those elites that were already in place and already accumulated personal capital, and social and material resources. The structure and identity of elite groups remained thus similar to the pre-SAP times but crony capitalism was excacerbated (Catusse, 2009).

Nevertheless, the liberalization conditions of the second half of the 1980s imposed by the SAP brought about the emergence of an uncontrolled economic elite with a different "entrepreneurial spirit" with some contestation or capacity to request reforms. In 1996, some business actors had become annoying to the regime. Aimed officially at "fighting contraband, drug trafficking, influence-peddling, and administrative corruption in the kingdom" (G. Denoeux, 1998), a 'sanitization campaign' was waged against certain people (Catusse, 2008; Oubenal & Zeroual, 2017). The spectacularly publicized campaign also touched costum's high-ranking officers and the presidents of six municipality councils. Most of all, the

campaign contributed to temper the General Confederation of Moroccan Employers (CGEM), the employers' organization, and any insubordinate businessmen.

In sum, in the global context of an expanding neoliberal agenda, what was usually seen as a program of dismantling welfare states was not exactly like that in Morocco or in other developing countries. Although Morocco had timidly tried some sort of import substitution policies during the 1960s-1970s with little success due to the scarce capacity to mobilize domestic capital for heavy industry, the target of the 1980s and 1990s 'liberal policies' was the dismantling of state-centered command economies (Connell & Dados, 2014). In Morocco's case, this translated into a thinner state that had in fact transfered some of its instruments and resources into a regime-centered economy. While market economy was nothing new, what changed throughout the neoliberal first decades was the contraction of the state's social dimension, as well as its employment capacity. "Added to reform of the public administration, this led to a remarkable reduction in the privileged power resource that was redistribution by means of public employment and impacted, as we shall see, on the field of wage and union relations." (Catusse, 2009, p. 13). This contraction of the state's social dimension, in its turn translates into a more security-centered state, since the mechanisms that the regime had in order to absorb discontent are reduced. Military service, for instance, was twice installed already during the 2000s, as a traditional means of absorbing unemployed and potentially distrubing precarious youth[231].

2.2 A new decentralized state?

A new category of technocrats trained in engineering and other technical backgrounds were increasingly seen as the solution to Morocco's problems. The technology-oriented, problem-solving framing of neoliberalism was translated into a reengineering of state institutions and a revision of public goods and general interests from, officially, a cost-efficiency approach. Even when the state remained primordial, it was formally undergoing profound changes. According to Catusse, "prior resources and regulatory capacities of state institutions [were] eroded, but their points of intervention multipl[ied] and shift[ed]" (Catusse 2009:187).

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[231] "Les agents d'autorité, à savoir les caïds et les moqaddems, croyaient nous envoyer de la racaille, c'est-à-dire des jeunes 'durs' qui leur posaient problem et qu'ils ne voulaient plus voir dans les quartiers populaires ou déshérités"(Tobji 2006:30). The Army was thus a place where troublemakers from the lower class could be put to service.

Among these new different 'points of intervention' throughout which public action was redeployed, decentralization and devolution programs were designed, while representative institutions were increasingly marginalized through the creation of new public private intitiatives[232].

It looked at first, that a new era was coming: the emergence of a new civil society -NGOs and neighborhood associations that collaborated with or were tolerated by the state in the name of human development-; the growing presence of socioeconomic organizations; and a western foreign policy that promoted democratization (Izquierdo Brichs, 2009, p. 17) contributed to the literature of transitions, booming, and the 1990-1996 reforms were seen as "a significant step forward in the democratization process" (Storm, 2007, p. 54). The hopes however, were too high, as the new engineering of state institutions was the not uncommon response of all governments to the disastrous consequences of the first phase of neoliberal policies, to the privatization and liberalization agenda of the 1980s, the *roll-back* phase. This new stage did not mean a demotion of the neoliberal project, but was indeed part of what Polanyi called the double movement, or the *roll-out* phase[233]. The state, in this stage, was an indispensable tool to readjust the movements in order to preserve the steering direction of reforms while controlling the negative impacts of capital accumulation.

An important moment of the *roll-out phase* can be situated during the formation of the 1998 political coalition that formed the first government that included traditionally opposition and left-leaning parties in Morocco[234]. This phase, that admitted and coopted a part of civil society and reformist wings within opposition parties was indeed a more creative phase, a phase where the elites are not only concerned with the destruction of State powers, but

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[232] In 2005, King Mohammed VI announced the creation of the INDH, Initiative Nationale au Dévelopment Humaine, to channel projects for socio-economic development of certain regions. However, as Bergh shows, the INDH actually "strengthen[ed] the power of the appointed representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, especially at the province level, at the expense of local governments", while "instrumentalizing local associations […] and contributing to the fragmentation and weakening of local (political) accountability." (Bergh, 2012, p. 410).

[233] The conceptual division of the two phases of neoliberalism is a temporal translation of the *double movement* described by Polanyi:

"the laissez-faire movement to expand the scope of the market, and the protective countermovement that emerges to resist the disembedding of the economy. Although the working-class movement has been a key part of the protective countermovement, Polanyi explicitly states that all groups in society have participated in this project. When periodic economic downturns destroyed the banking system, for example, business groups insisted that central banking be strengthened to insulate the domestic supply of credit from the pressures of the global market."

[234] A new coalition was formed in 1989, which became the 'democratic coalition' 1992, different from the 'national coalition of the 1970s, and the two original coalition parties Istiqlal and the UNFP, were joined by the PPS (Party for Progress and Socialism), OADP (Organization for Democratic and Popular Action), and the USFP (split from the UNFP). They finally were given the Prime Minister position for the first time in 1998, with the first Abderrahman Youssoufi (USFP) Government. (Feliu, Mateo Dieste, & Izquierdo Brichs, 2019, p. 50).

rather with its re-institutionalization and its redeployment through other mechanisms that involve innovative participation of private partnership. The privatization trend also reenforced the accumulation of the Palace, especially through the constitution of Funds financed by the state but with no real parliamentary oversight (Oubenal & Zeroual, 2017).

The 'human face' of neoliberalism is still patent in Hassan II Fund[235], the INDH, the new tramway going through Rabat and Salé[236], the royal foundations that assist children with cancer or fight illiteracy. But this 'human face', this modernizing and developmental face, comes at a high cost. And the negative impact on people's lives is not avoided.

2.3 Coercion and Repression in transition

In the 1980s, social contestation was high, and nevertheless promptly repressed, and the power of leftist organizations much weaker than in the post-independence years. The Fez uprising of 1990 exemplifies this social frustration. Even though unions and leftist movements were still protesting and negotiating labor and economic conditions, tensions were framed in a new light, and vandalism and irrisponsability justified violent crackdowns on protestors (Camps-Febrer, 2019a). Repression, however, had to be softened with cooptation and the encouragement of islamist movements that challenged student leftist movements.

The impact of socio-economic crises on the regime and the end of the Cold War forced Hassan II to initiate a softening of practices and discourses towards opposition forces. During these years, new Human Rights legislation was adopted, and two new constitutions were approved in 1992 and 1996[237], formally amplifying legislative powers and citizenship rights (Storm, 2007). In 1994, Human Rights courses for police officers were first introduced. Their contents remained theoretical (Ait Taleb 2013), but the inclusion nevertheless indicates a concern by the regime to feign some sort of reforming intention. The apparent openning

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[235] Some of the exemplary operations of the Hassan II Fund for the privatization in the 2000s is explained in Oubenal & Zeroual (2017).

[236] Mostly for the daily commute of Slawi workers towards the capital.

[237] The majority of the Kutla parties, including the Istiqlal and the USFP, advised their members and supporters to boycott the constitutional referendum, but the decision to advocate a boycott was not unanimous, and the coalition suffered some serious blows as divisions emerged (López García, 2000).

up also fuelled the creation of the Consultative Council of Human Rights, and a progressive emergence of a conversation on the repression perpetrated by the regime and its security forces (Saidy, 2012; Slymovics, 2001). Again, after the double layer of pre-colonial power and the western colonial bureaucratic apparatus, a third layer, that of liberal mechanisms, was added to the securing of the regime. These new practices did not substitute the former but were localized through a narrative of 'permanent transition' that despite the fanfare could not completely hide the bad practices of the security forces. The normative narrative of an effort towards conforming with the standards of a liberal state was at odds with habitual abuses and thus it complexified the language and practices of the regime, especially with the ascension of a young King Mohamed VI to the throne in 1999 (Feliu, 1994; Feliu & Parejo, 2013; Vairel, 2007).

The new scenario had forced Hassan II to soften practices and discourses towards leftist opposition forces, although not so much towards political Islamist movements. At the same time the discourse of liberal peace, human rights, or gender equality had an internal impact in the weight of on-going demands by opposition movements and activists, while external pressure to address human rights violations, that had been secondary for external allies in the times of the fight against communism, became an important factor in Hassan II's international support[238]. With the disappearance of the USSR, communists and leftists could not be blamed anymore, or at least not to the same effect. The red menace was gone. It was also in the 1990s that the terrorist threat became important in the narrative of the state, especially after the 1994 attack in Marrakech[239].

3. Mohammed VI: The 'political will'

The process of wealth concentration was ongoing throughout the 1990s, but when Mohamed VI came to power, it was accelerated through the promotion of 'national champions', big holdings that would become oligopolies or even monopolies in telecommunications, electricity or water management. Contrary to the idea of economy subordinated to politics

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[238] Laura Feliu has analyzed the French and North American policies of promotion of human rights in the context of the 1970s coups' repression, suspects' disappearances and human rights' violations after the coups. Feliu has pointed at the importance of including France's and US's political systems in order to understand how their policies affected and intervened in the process (Feliu 2013).

[239] Lessentiel de L'Information (2018). *Abdelhak Bassou, expert des questions sécuritaires : "il y'a une hybridation du terrorisme"*. Jan 2, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hn5oOSPoh70

and ideology, Samir Amin argues that from a historical materialist view, the difference between precapitalist societies and capitalist societies, is precisely the fact that in the latter "capitalism inverts the order of the relationship between the realm of the economic and the politico-ideological superstructure" (Amin, 1989, p. 2). This phenomenon is perhaps not observable in Morocco in terms of the substitution of power dynamics, but rather in the substitution of the political goals and the weight of resources: the primary actor, the monarchy remained at the top, but its objectives became more economic than political, and political mechanisms were just a necessary tool for business. In this landscape, it is useful to remind us that the state is a dual entity in nature, since it is partly a resource of power and partly a structure. Capturing or managing the state and its political-ideological dominance is done by elites that simultaneously control the capital.

Although the accumulation of resources, capital and companies by the monarchy's holding[240] started long before, Mohammed VI's reing has taken the concentration to a higher level. In 2014, Forbes described Mohamed VI as the richest leader in Africa (Izquierdo Brichs et al., 2021). His rule also constituted a generational change where the regime continued to accumulate capital inside and outside the country. This agenda has promoted political changes as well, from business-oriented governments to new 'friendships' with China or a new Foreign Policy towards other African countries (Fernández-Molina, 2016).

3.1 Mohammed VI's security order: the new master has arrived

The removal of Driss Basri, Hassan II's Minister of Interior and the darkest most notorious face of the regime's repression, was a hopeful starting point of the new reign[241]. The opening-up to liberal practices or at least a liberal narrative took shape with the initiative of a process branded as transitional justice, initiated during Hassan II's last years, as explained above. Mohammed VI started his rule promising to address the crimes and violations of human rights perpetrated by the regime until 1999. The IER investigated the enforced disappearance

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[240] The leading royal holding company being today SIGER, directed by Mounir Majidi, who is also the personal secretary of King Mohammed VI (Feliu, Mateo Dieste, & Izquierdo Brichs, 2019)

[241] Less spectacular but probably more relevant was the retirement in 2017 of General Hosni Benslimane.

of military men in the secret detention center of Tazmamart, tortures and deaths of dissidents and activists perpetrated by the police in police stations and other crimes, but it frustrated the hopes of accessing any kind of accountability, or of developing effective civilian mechanisms (Benavides et al., 2018; Feliu & Parejo, 2013; Slyomovics, 2008). The names of the victimizers were excluded from the process, and the failure to develop more than superficial reforms maintained the impunity of the regime. The work done by the IER brought up some of the brutish deeds done by the security forces, but it was also a failed opportunity for opening up the archives and for civilian if not control at least debate.

The failed 'transitional justice' in Morocco frustrated the hopes of accessing any kind of accountability from the security forces or those in charge of gross violations of human rights (Feliu & Parejo, 2013; Laouina, 2016; Slyomovics, 2008). Nevertheless, it did manage to portray the King's commitment towards the goals of liberal and human rights standards. The centrality of the King and his political will in fact initially overshadowed many of the analyses on Morocco's democratization process. The emphasis on his political will to reform seemed to provide an excuse for a slow and non-transparent reshuffle of the security apparatus (Alaoui, 2017; El Maslouhi et al., 2013; Mattes, n.d.).

3.1.1 The fight against terrorism

Parallel to the narrative of slow reform, however, Morocco has also adopted the macrosecuritization narrative of the Global War on Terror (GWoT), a narrative that has securitized ever-growing areas of people's life in many countries. The primary security threat that terrorism represents requires or normalizes extended executive powers, secrecy and exceptional measures that modulate policy areas that were traditionally not managed in a security rationale (Huysmans 2006).

Morocco's government at first conveyed this idea of a safe haven in the region, that Morocco was as a stable and terrorist-free country in the North of Africa, especially compared to Algeria (Saint-Prot & Rouvillois, 2013). Although this image was broken on the 16th May 2003, the regime nevertheless managed to show swift and strong decisions that mobilized political, security and economic actors. In this sense, previously contentious anti-terrorist legislation was passed unanimously ten days after the deadly attacks.

The strategic and intelligence importance of Morocco for the US and European fight against terrorism is not only due to Morocco's proximity to Europe, or to its nationals' involvement in the Middle East, but also, with special effort from the regime to highlight it, in the Sahelo-Saharian region. These three issues, that could be alternatively opportunities or liabilities have represented a leverage for Morocco's security sector and their position within international networks.

The involvement of Morocco in the 'rendition network' of secret detention centers developed by the CIA under the George W. Bush Administration has been revealed[242] (see chapter 6). The anti-terrorist practices of Morocco's security forces have involved mass detentions and criminalization of activists, limitation of media freedom on security grounds, etc. There have also been allegations of torture of salafist activists. Although some of these practices are internationally criticized, the importance of Morocco in the fight against terrorism ensures political and financial support to the regime.

Within this global security framework, the Moroccan security sector expanded (Saaf, 2012) and, while not a local phenomenon, this expansion entailed both equipping urban forces with more lethal and high-tech means[243], or redeploying military personnel in urban areas within the counter-terrorist framework. Although counter-terrorism remains a police and intelligence matter (Thompson & McCants, 2013), the militarization of police forces[244] and of urban surveillance with the Hadar Operation[245] has involved joint patrolling of Royal Armed Forces, the Royal Gendarmerie, the police and the Auxiliary Forces[246].

The Bureau Central d'Investigations Judiciaires (BCIJ)[247], a specialized police body created in 2015, has been at the forefront of the fight against terrorism and criminal networks. The very public image of the modern BCIJ is enhanced by its director, Abdelhak Khiame, regularly

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[242] Priest, Dana. 2005. "CIA holds terror suspects in Secret Prisons" *The Washington Post*, November 2. https://www.washingtonpost.com

[243] This includes drones, demining robots, and especially the most advanced equipment for surveillance technology. Telquel. 2017. "À 61 ans, la police marocaine offre une image moderne pour son anniversaire", *Telquel*, May 17, 2017. https://telquel.ma/2017/05/17/video-61-ans-police-marocaine-offre-image-moderne-anniversaire_1547126.

[244] Militarization can be seen as a four dimensional process that affects material, cultural, operational and organizational dynamics. See Kraska (2007).

[245] Hadar ('surveillance') was established in 2014 as a means to protect and control high-security spots in Morocco, especially regarding tourism. It was initially deployed in Casablanca and other international airports.

[246] Rural areas and entire regions such as the Rif or the Western Sahara have been subject to intermittent or permanent military control.

[247] Before its creation, the same tasks were assumed by other units of the DGED or the Police or even the military intelligence.

appearing on local and international media to promote this so-called Moroccan FBI[248]. Modern and salient bodies such as the BCIJ, however, do not imply an end to older practices. The figure of the *moqaddem*, an appointed local liaison of the Ministry of Interior, proofs the existence of these different layers of security. The old-fashioned *moqaddem* that controls what goes on in the neighborhood has not been substituted by a more professional police and will not be replaced by surveillance cameras[249]. New structures of surveillance and intelligence gathering are being added and co-exist with the traditional ones, since *moqaddimin* (pl. *moqaddem*) account for an enhanced gathering of information that is in fact branded as one of the main perks of Moroccan intelligence[250].

3.2 After the 20th February: counterrevolutionary reforms and new repression

The 2010s were convulsive years. After the massive demonstrations of the 20th February movement that took to the streets in 2011, the regime responded by opening a process towards constitutional reforms in Morocco (Benchemsi, 2012; Madani et al., 2013). A new Constitution was swiftly drafted and voted in a referendum. It included unprecedented public freedoms and civil rights. This hopeful times, however, only momentarily overshadowed the deep obstacles that the nature of the political system represented (Krieg, 2017; Mattes, n.d.). By the end of 2013, the political opening was closing again (Masbah, 2018a). Ten years after the 2011 Constitution, even the adopted reforms have not been put in place[251]; but more worrying, coercive responses to political and social contestation are unabated and popupulation surveillance pervasive.

Some factors explain the resilience of monarchies in the turmoils of 2011, among them the call from protesters to reforms rather than revolution. Protests were more directed at

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[248] The work and appearance of the BCIJ, however, sometimes resembles more the militarized US SWAT operations than FBI interventions (Kraska, 2007).

[249] There has been, however, attempts at modernizing and training the *moqaddemin* in order to make them more techonologically competent.

[250] El Ouardighi, Samir. 2015. "Pourquoi les services de renseignement marocains sont si efficacies" *Medias24*, November 23, 2015. https://www.medias24.com/NATION/159783-Pourquoi-les-services-de-renseignements-marocains-sont-si-efficaces.html.

[251] The National Security Council was hailed as one of the most important measures in civilian control of the Security Sector within the new Constitution (art.54). This body has not yet been created.

political corruption than at the whole power structure. In 2011, the Monarchy still retained its sacred aura, or at least its role as arbitrer. For Barany, this was the result of a "decade-long practice of promising major political reforms while in reality making only modest concessions". Monarchies like Jordan or Morocco skilfully "master[…] manipulation, co-option, and minor concessions masked as major reforms." (Barany, 2013, p. 95).

Post-2011 mobilizations[252] and the lost hopes after the constitutional reforms account for a new cycle of revolutionary protests, a new cycle that seems to channel less benevolent approaches to the Monarchy. From the Jerada Protests, the Hirak Chaabi in the Rif to the ongoing repression of activist in Western Sahara, the security apparatus remains indispensable in ensuring the status quo of the country.

The official political will to reform, however, has persisted, and is balanced with the global security concerns. The development of mechanisms that are labeled under the 'security governance' agenda provides the official evidence of a political commitment to liberal reforms. Security governance revolves around the idea of security as a 'human right', as expressed in the 2011 Constitution, and as the 'foundation of development' (Bensalah Alaoui, 2017; El Maslouhi, 2013). This 'human security' discourse tunes accordingly with the new conceptualizations of security at the UN level.

The need to balance the reformist liberal approach with the security approach accounts for a sometimes-ambiguous regime behavior. The specific tensions between these narratives can then be explained not so much as part of threat-level assessments but more as the evolving power struggle of elites within the regime. The ability of the regime to navigate and balance an enhanced structure of repression and social control while maintaining a 'reformist layer' allows room for a sticks-and-carrots approach to the security sector institutions and their elites. The goal to keep the security sector 'busy, dependent, and divided' still applies 30 years after Zartman's formulation (Zartman, 1987, p. 23).

In this sense, internal reforms touching the security apparatus, including penitentiary reforms or justice reforms, are officially explained in the light of security governance, but there are

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[252] One interesting example of a new kind of protest was the successful boycott campagin of 2018 against some of the biggest corporate groups in the country. A mass boycott campaign spread across Morocco. Afriquia Gas stations, Sidi Ali bottled water and the dairy products Centrale Danone were target for boycott through Facebook groups as a sign of discontent against the enromous disparities and high cost of living in the country (Masbah, 2018b).

other reasons like the capture of EU funds and the need to conform to certain standards to appeal to global markets.

Another variable that shapes changes in the security sector is the internal elite competition. A case in point is the changes within the national security forces, the police. The overarching modernization plan of the DGSN, dubbed Plan Hammouchi[253], was set to situate the police in a stronger, more legitimized position whether internally among other state institutions or externally towards society and the international community. The 'Citizen Police'[254], for instance, is a program intended to gain the trust of citizens[255]. Other reforms have entailed internal sanctions, feminizing all ranks of the police, reforming the training process and accession measures, etc.[256] These measures might be due to a conscious struggle to conform, at least apparently, to international 'liberal' norms, to build a new face for the security forces - and maybe settle a few old scores[257] –. It is a non-participatory approach to cleaning up the house, although anonymous denunciations such as that of the so-called Targuist Snyper[258], or international scandals like the 'Adib affaire'[259] might also have played a role in forcing the inclusion of the corruption problem within the political agenda.

Ever since the Plan Hammouchi was publicized, regular news about internal sanctions are published[260]. The DGSN announced that in 2016 2.007 disciplinary sanctions had been

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[253] Abdellatif Hammouchi is the director of, both, the National Police (DGSN) and the Intelligence Unit (DGST), as well as Royal Advisor in issues of counter-terrorism.

[254] MAP Express. 2018. "Les efforts soutenus de la DGSN pour consacrer les fondements de la police citoyenne mis en relief lors d'une conférence à Marrakech", *MAP*, September 27, 2018. http://www.mapexpress.ma/actualite/societe-et-regions/les-efforts-soutenus-de-la-dgsn-pour-consacrer-les-fondements-de-la-police-citoyenne-mis-en-relief-lors-dune-conference-a-marrakech/

[255] Since 2017, the Moroccan police offer an annual day of open doors with more than 80.000 visits on its first celebration, according to official sources. This Open Doors Day is in line with the modernization of the police forces and its very strong media component. 2017."À 61 ans, la police marocaine offre une image moderne pour son anniversaire."*Telquel*, May 17, 2017. https://telquel.ma/2017/05/17/video-61-ans-police-marocaine-offre-image-moderne-anniversaire_1547126; Tiamaz, Amine. 2018. "Portes ouvertes DGSN: voici 5 unités spéciales de la police nationale."*Media24*, September 29, 2018. https://www.medias24.com/MAROC/NATION/DEFENSE/186221-Portes-ouvertes-DGSN-voici-5-unites-speciales-de-la-police-nationale.html.

[256] 2018."Boubker Sadik: la DGSN, une police citoyenne proche du citoyen et plus efficace face aux nouveaux défis sécuritaires." *Barlamane.com*, January 7, 2018. https://www.barlamane.com/fr/boubker-sadik-dgsn-police-citoyenne-proche-citoyen-plus-efficace-faire-face-aux-nouveaux-defis-securitaires. Interview with Boubakr Sabik, DGSN Spokesperson: Zainabi, Mohammed. 2018. "La Sûreté nationale à l'heure de l'excellence opérationnelle" *L'observateur du Maroc*, May 16, 2018. http://www.lobservateurdumaroc.info/?p=39757.

[257] http://fr.le360.ma/politique/dgsn-valse-de-changements-a-la-tete-des-prefectures-de-police-45599.

[258] The "sniper de Targuist" was an anonymous youtube account that uploaded videos of police officers engaging in bribery and corruption. 2013. "Corruption au Maroc : le « sniper de Targuist » poursuit son combat à visage découvert" *JeuneAfrique* March 4, 2013. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/171981/politique/corruption-au-maroc-le-sniper-de-targuist-poursuit-son-combat-visage-d-couvert.

[259] After writing a letter to the yet-to-be king Mohammed VI denouncing the corruption of his superior officers, capitan of the Army Mustapha Adib was detained and emprisoned for 30 months. The case became an international affair when Adib denounced different Moroccan media outlets and the King himself for alleged accusations and diffamation against him, while in France.

[260] Global torture: https://www.reflexiondz.net/MAROC-Abdellatif-Hammouchi-le-sous-traitant-de-la-torturea46396.html

internally issued against its officers[261], 5.428 in 2018[262]. Although anti-corruption campaigns abound within state institutions and in media reports, indicators show that corruption is still generalized and pervasive[263].

3.2.1 The modern Police State

While the police is being modernized the main issue remains the lack of civilian and parliamentary control (Mattes, 2009), and the media attention to these reforms might indicate a strong leaning of the King towards his royal advisor and police chief[264]. These measures indeed stand at odds with the accusations of torture Hammouchi received in French courts, and especially at odds with the regime's attitude of closing ranks around him[265].

While the police have further increased their political influence in the regime, especially through Hammouchi's career, the Army has been compensated with exponential increases in budget and arms purchases. The mounting tensions in the South and towards Algeria could also be a cry for attention from the military, which is losing ground in their general weight in the King's direct entourage.

The need to enhance legitimacy for the military institution can also be seen in the reintroduction in 2019 of the compulsory military service for men[266]. On 20th August 2018, the Compulsory Military Service Bill was adopted for the conscription of young Moroccan males aged between 19 and 25 years for 12 months of military service, to enter into force in

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[261] Maroc Diplomatique (23rd December 2016) "Le renforcement de la relation de confiance citoyen-police au cœur de la stratégie de la DGSN en 2016", *Maroc diplomatique avec MAP*. http://maroc-diplomatique.net/renforcement-de-relation-de-confiance-citoyen-police-coeur-de-strategie-de-dgsn-2016/ (Accessed: 10/05/2018)

[262] 2018."Boubker Sadik: la DGSN, une police citoyenne proche du citoyen et plus efficace face aux nouveaux défis sécuritaires." *Barlamane.com*, 7th January. https://www.barlamane.com/fr/boubker-sadik-dgsn-police-citoyenne-proche-citoyen-plus-efficace-faire-face-aux-nouveaux-defis-securitaires/

[263] See the regular reports and investigations carried by Transparency International https://www.transparency.org/country/MAR.

[264] The position of Royal Councellor is not officially announced by the Moroccan State. Hammouchi's position as such has been disclosed by wikileaks: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06RABAT330a.html

[265] In 2014, however, the Ministry of Interior issued a lawsuit in a French Court against three people and the French NGO Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture ACAT, who had sued in their turn the DGST and its director Abdellatif Hammouchi for torture (http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140326-maroc-contre-attaque-justice-paris-affaire-hammouchi). In 2015, Hammouchi was awarded the Légion d'honneur by the French minister of Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve.

[266] The military service will "enhance the sense of belonging to the homeland" (King Opening of the 3rd legislature October 2018) and "to inculcate the spirit of patriotism in young people as part of a correlation between the rights and duties of citizenship", spokesperson for the royal palace, Abdelhak Lamrini (2018. "King Mohammed VI : Military Service Enhances Sense of Belonging to the Homeland" *The North Africa Post*, October 12, 2018. http://northafricapost.com/25799-king-mohammed-vi-military-service-enhances-sense-of-belonging-to-the-homeland.html).

2019. The military service would "enhance the sense of belonging to the homeland"[267] and "inculcate the spirit of patriotism in young people as part of a correlation between the rights and duties of citizenship"[268]. Forced conscription has been a source of instability for regimes in the Arab world, as well as a scape valve at certain moments of socio-economic pressure. The return of forced conscription in this case is better understood from a demographic and socio-economic perspective, as well as an educational tool for patriotism.

Alternatively, the use of the Royal Gendarmerie as repressor of social and political unrest could be regarded as a way to delegitimize this paramilitary body. The RG has been losing powers to other bodies, notably to Hammouchis' National Security, as in the summer of 2018, when the Kingdom's Palaces and the King's Personal protection, formerly performed by the RG, were transferred to the charge of the DGSN. The RG is still being deployed in social unrest, which might make this institution symbolically less powerful and legitimate among the Moroccan population and thus a useful coercive resource unthreatening to the King (See Annex 2).

In 2005, the riot police or GUS (Groupes urbains de sécurité), created the year before, was dismantled after the criticims of their use were echoed by international organizations. The GUS had been created by General Hamidou Laanigri, who was also dismissed as head of the DGSN during the 2005 reforms. Laanigri was put in charge of the Forces Auxiliaires (FA), well known for their role in repressing protests, officially with the mission to reform and improve the status of this irregular paramilitary unit of around 45.000 troops; the FA's budget increased. The appointment of Laanigri to the post, nevertheless, was read as a demotion and dismissal of the hitherto powerful officer[269].

This move might have meant a golden retirement of the old general, while the DGSN, which was in need of a new image, was led for the first time since 1960s by a civilian, Charki Draiss. Draiss, and his successor Rmail were career men within the MoI, low profiles with proven loyalty and former colleagues from Laayoune (oWS), which represented no real threat to

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[267] Speech of the King Openning of the 3rd legislature October 2018.

[268] Spokesperson for the royal palace, Abdelhak Lamrini. Quoted in North Africa Post. (2018) "King Mohammed VI : Military Service Enhances Sense of Belonging to the Homeland", in *North Africa Post* October 12, 2018. http://northafricapost.com/25799-king-mohammed-vi-military-service-enhances-sense-of-belonging-to-the-homeland.html. (Accessed 23/08/2019)

[269] He was finally retired in 2012, along with 10 other generals and 45 major-colonels. *Telquel* (2012) "Armée reliftée" In *Telquel*, November 16, 2012. https://telquel.ma/2012/11/16/Armee-reliftee_545_5130 (accessed 14/09/2021)

other security actors[270]. Successor movements, new appointments and early retirements have been common in the last few years, indicating shifts in alliances and competition at the summits of security institutions[271].

All these moves, however, did not reduce the military institutions' budgets. From 1999 to 2021, both the Ministry of Interior and the Administration of National Defense increased their budgets. The MoI budget in 2021 was 5 times the budget of 1999, from almost 6MDH to 30MDH[272]. As the following graphic shows, the percentage of the GDP that the Ministry of Interior represents has steadily increased. The Armed Forces, on the contrary, although their percentage is higher, have not increased in the same rate, except for 2020 and explained in relation to the raising tensions with Algeria and maybe the Polisario renewed open confrontation.

The mechanisms developed in the framework of counter-terrorism have especially emboldened the security sector in Morocco (Mattes 2009). The Moroccan security sector is well anchored and connected within the Western and European security complex[273]. The fight against clandestine migrations from Africa, and against terrorism are two key elements that make Morocco an indispensable partner for those countries more willingly promoting 'security sector reform' and 'rule of law'. The need to count on the alignment of Morocco for EU and US security policies (Thompson & McCants, 2013) reinforces the acceptance of exceptionality measures and relaxes the pressure on ending impunity, and the lack of transparency and accountability.

As Mattes (2009) argues, any reforms involving the security sector might be oriented towards improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the services, but they will not jeopardize or alter the position of the King within the political system. A need to put an end to illiberal practices

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[270] Charki Draiss was Wali of the Region Laâyoune-Boujdour-Sakiat Al Hamra, and Bouchaïb Rmail was the chief of the DGSN for the region. LGM (2006). "Tandem de choc Draiss-Rmail: Pour la quiétude de Laâyoune" in *La Gazette du Maroc*, 31 - 07 – 2006. https://www.maghress.com/fr/lagazette/10823 (accessed 14/09/2021)

[271] In 2017, Alouaraq was appointed Inspector General of the FAR. In 2018, eight generals from the RG and the FAR were collectively retired.

[272] See the complete data at SIPRI database: www.sipri.org

[273] Morocco signed Military and Security Agreements with Russia in 2017, but of little significance so far. See: MEMO. 2017. "Russia and Morocco sign agreements to inaugurate military and security cooperation" *Middle East Monitor*, October 12, 2017. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20171012-russia-and-morocco-sign-agreements-to-inaugurate-military-and-security-cooperation/. As with China, their relations are mainly commercial and financial, and Morocco wants to become part of the Belt and Road Initiative. DefenceWeb. 2018. "Morocco apparently operating Chinese multiple rocket launchers" DefenceWeb, March 13, 2018. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51026:morocco-apparently-operating-chinese-multiple-rocket-launchers&catid=50:Land&Itemid=105

is constantly acknowledged through grand operations or 'modernization plans' that more often than not involve an approach that includes technology-enhanced mechanisms (the classic train-and-equip approach) and superficial corruption and crime persecution within state structures.

3.3 Protecting good business

The Moroccan transnational economic elite needs a stable, modern and secure context. The functions that Harvey identified for the state in neoliberalism partly address the needs of economic elites[274]. However, looking at Tilly's activities of state violence[275], it seems like the current public security apparatus is shaped especially towards state-making and protection. State-making refers to the role of eliminating internal rivals that could challenge the power structure, such as opposition, political protests or other rival elites. Protection is the capacity of the state to provide the service of security to specific groups of the population, for example by repressing a protest against privatization of land (Ramírez, 2017). In our case, a business-oriented elite, as well as powerful transnational actors seek protection for their economic operations. This protection is mainly done through public security but private security increasingly complements this dimension, as the following chapters delve into.

The elites surrounding and including the King, embedded in the royal family's business interests, are more akin to a security perched to provide financial and economic stability than any of its other features. This explains the rapprochement of police to the central power, and the accomodation of the military in other less challenging roles. The articulation between the neoliberal economic world and the security sector is increasingly abandoning the military professional global scene in favor of a more global economic professional scene. In this sense, the Royal Institute for Strategic Studies (IRES), one of the most prominent public think tank, identifies its main global issues as being terrorism, migration, environment, economy and stability, technology and investment[276]. In these global issues the security

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[274] Harvey's functions of the state in neoliberalism were explained in Chapter 2.

[275] Tilly's proposal is explained in Chapter 2. Tilly (1985) lays out four activities of state-violence that reinforce each other: war-making, state-making, protection and extraction.

[276] Dahir N° 1-07-183 du 19 kaada 1428 (30 november 2007) http://www.ires.ma/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Dahir-portant-creation-de-l-Institut-Royal-des-Etudes-Strategiques.pdf Created in 2007, IRES accounts directly to the King and its main personalities in charge are appointed by him.

dimension is ever present. Stability plays a key role in the development of most state plans and thus public order that can guarantee a safe investment and development of policies, with the 'social touch' of human development (Catusse 2011) and modern technology added to the picture.

In this endeavor, private security plays an important role. Private provision of security, like manned security, has been present since the 1990s, especially as part of Facility Management and services provided to corporations. In the last two decades, however, technology has played an increasing role in the sector.

Chapter 6 - Intelligence Culture At the King's Service[277]

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[277] This chapter is a slightly modified version of "Morocco: Intelligence Culture at the King's service" book chapter in Shaffer, Ryan (ed.) (forthcoming) *The Handbook of African Intelligence Cultures*, Rowman & Littlefield, and has been reproduced here with the permission of the copyright holder.

This chapter examines the historical development of secret services and intelligence agencies in Morocco. It shows how contemporary history and the position of Morocco in the international system have shaped an intelligence culture based on density, operationalization, hierarchy and personalist goals. The chapter is divided in six parts and argues that the intelligence culture is characterized by impunity in safeguarding the monarchy's authority. The first examines the role of the monarchy after independence from France and how central preserving the monarchy was to the intelligence and security services. The second section explores the "years of lead" with the emergence of new intelligence and security services. In the third part, it analyzes the practices and personnel size of the intelligence services to show how vital informal networks are as well as highlight the diverse community of more than a dozen intelligence services. The fourth section highlights various foreign alliances, discussing how significant France was and is to Morocco's security. In the fifth part, the landscape of human rights is analyzed with attention to reform limits and how human rights violations perpetuated by the intelligence and security services continue. Lastly, the conclusion synthesizes the above sections to analyze the intelligence culture with attention to its character.

1. Independent Morocco: The Nation and the King

After a long nationalist struggle, Morocco became formally independent from France and Spain in 1956. Mohamed V, a nationalist charismatic figure himself, gathered the sympathy of French, American and most nationalist elites, and assured colonial powers there would be a smooth independence. One of the first steps in the construction of the new state was to build the military and police structures. Their main mission was to consolidate the monarchy in the new political system, especially by neutralizing possible opponents (Abitbol, 2009; Stenner, 2019a). Since then, the landscape of the intelligence services has been focused on strengthening and protecting the monarchical system.

The CAB1, for instance, was created within the police General Directorate for National Security (*Direction Génerale Sûrété Nationale*, DGSN) and engaged in counter-subversion operations under the leadership of Houssein Seghir, Mohamed Oufkir and later Ahmed Dlimi. A direct inheritance of the French colonial period, the CAB1 was fundamentally charged with countering political opposition. Along with the CAB1, the new landscape of public security was built following the French model with French training, equipment, and colonial-trained personnel[278]. Notably, Mohamed Oufkir, who had been aide de champ of the French *Resident General* and later became general, was also an informant for France's External Documentation and Counter-Espionage Service (*Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage*, SDECE) (C. Clément, 1975). Oufkir became head of the police (DGSN), Minister of Interior and later Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff until his assassination due to his involvement in the 1972 anti-monarchical coup.

After the death of King Mohamed V in 1961, his son Hassan II, a staunch anti-communist, became an important Cold War ally for the West, especially as a regional actor within West Africa and among Arab states. Morocco further developed its ties with France, Israel and United States' intelligence and defense services. In the process, the Moroccan intelligence services' role as operation-driven actors was consolidated, active not only in intelligence

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[278] Kittani, Ameziane, Driss Ben Omar and Mohammed Oufkir were among those high-rank officers issuing from the colonial armies (Abitbol, 2009).

gathering and surveillance through dense networks of formal and informal agents, but in the direct repression of political opposition.

One of the most well-known affairs involving Morocco's intelligence services happened in broad daylight on a busy street in Paris, France. On October 29, 1965 Moroccan opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka was kidnapped when coming out of the Brasserie Lipp, a French restaurant, presumably by three French agents, one of them from the SDECE. The specifics that followed are unknown, but Ben Barka disappeared after having become an international figure in the Non-Aligned Movement and one of the leaders of the Tricontinental. A CAB1 operation commanded by Oufkir and Dlimi, Ben Barka's disappearance greatly impacted Moroccan and French public opinion as well as the SDECE's existence itself[279]. Dlimi and Oufkir were sentenced in absentia in France, while in Morocco the CAB1 was officially dissolved but continued to operate in secrecy.

Enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, unlawful detentions and torture were not uncommon under Hassan II. Yet, what was uncommon was the bluntness of the operation against Ben Barka and the rising suspicion that Oufkir's intelligence and security services could act freely, or even worse, in compliance, across French territory. Nevertheless, the reliance on coercion produced a hypertrophy for those controlling the armed and security apparatus (Tobji, 2006). It caused Hassan II to end up "alone and vulnerable to the last direct challenge, coming from his security forces." (Zartman, 1987)

After two failed military coups against him in 1971 and 1972, it became evident to Hassan II that some had become too powerful and dangerous within the regime. The political unit CAB1 within the police was dismantled, partially transferring its agents to the Directorate for the Surveillance of the Territory (*Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire*, DST) (known as the DGST since 2005), which was charged with internal intelligence.

In 1973, the General Directorate for Studies and Documentation (*Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation*, DGED) was created and led by Ahmed Dlimi. With the death of Oufkir, Dlimi headed the DST, the new political police under the DGSN. Dlimi was simultaneously the director of the DGED, the intelligence service for foreign affairs and thus

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[279] Multiple intelligence agencies from different countries have been rumored to be implicated in the affair, among them the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad. According to some accounts, Ben Barka "was tortured to death, and Mossad agents disposed of the body, which was never found." (Bergman, 2020) .

managed to control the most important branches of intelligence in the country. Dlimi, who had been directly under Oufkir's authority, later became general and commander after his leadership in the Green March of 1975 in the Spanish-occupied Western Sahara and the subsequent war against the Polisario Front. A "suspicious" car accident in 1983 stopped the career of a man that had become perhaps all too powerful in Hassan II's regime.

The DGED mirrored the French SDECE, which had operated during the last years of the colonial period and trained several Moroccan officers. The DGED was charged with external intelligence and even other civil personnel unrelated to the secret services, but serving abroad was expected to inform and report to it.

After the 1970s, the military influence within the regime was thoroughly reduced, compared to most of its neighbors in the region. The most powerful actors within the military were either "disappeared" or sent to occupied Western Sahara, where they could build their own economic networks away from the capital and the king. In contrast, police and military intelligence services remained essential allies of the monarchy. Through a brief border war with Algeria in 1963, the Royal Armed Forces gained prestige in the country, a needed and improved status after it was tainted due to involvement in repressing protests.[280]

2. The Years of Lead

The last decades of the twentieth century are remembered as the "Years of Lead" or the "Black Years" in Morocco from 1961 to the 1990s. Thousands of opposition activists were arrested and tortured, and hundreds disappeared. According to Amnesty International, arrests were often carried out by officers outside their legal mandate, following a political campaign against the opposition or common protestors.[281] These arrests were attributed to the Office of Territorial Surveillance (*Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire*, DST). The DST was created in 1973 as an autonomous intelligence unit that responded directly to the king, but was officially within the Ministry of Interior. The DST was accused of most human rights

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[280] For a detailed analysis of protests and repression in Morocco during the twentieth century see Laura Feliu, Josep Lluís Mateo Dieste, and Ferran Izquierdo, eds., *Un Siglo de Movilización Social En Marruecos*, Colección Alborán [A Century of Social Mobilization in Morocco, Alboran Collection] (Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2019).

[281] AI Index: MDE 29/01/91Amnesty International, March 20, 1991.

violations during the period, despite not being officially allowed to make arrests because it was not part of the judicial police within the DGSN.[282]

In the new millennium under King Mohamed VI, Morocco was portrayed as a place safer than most other countries. The 2003 attacks in Casablanca and later Marrakech during 2011 did not fundamentally alter the image, but brought about legislative changes, enhanced executive powers for counterterrorist programs, new police units, modernization and increased resources. Even though Morocco later became one of the main exporters of jihadists to the Syrian and Libyan scenarios, the regime presented itself as an intelligence asset for its allies. In fact, Morocco was one of the regimes involved in United States' Central Intelligence Agency's extraordinary renditions program for the Global War on Terror.[283] It was reportedly organized in coordination with the Moroccan DST. The CIA rendered detainees for custody and interrogations under torture by Moroccan agents in two detention centers associated with the program in Témara and Ain Aouda (Open Society Foundations, 2013). The country also opened its airspace and airport facilities to the CIA for the extraordinary renditions.[284]

2.1 A Thick Web of Intelligence Services

There are two ways of approaching Morocco's intelligence culture. One can look at the big intelligence operations: drug trafficking networks exposed; terrorist cells dismantled; jihadists detained; even Morocco's important contribution to counterterrorist intelligence in Europe. Yet, there is another, less visible way of understanding the intelligence culture, and that is from the bottom-up, from the subaltern and lowest echelons of the information services.

The *moqaddem* reveals how intelligence services aim to control populations. The *moqaddem* is a man in charge of knowing and passing over information about everything that happens within a small area of a town or city: illegal sexual encounters, drugs, political stance or

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[282] The "black beast" of the terror was Driss Basri, chief of the DGSN since 1973. In 1979, Basri became the Ministry of the state for the Interior, until he was replaced in 1999 by the new King Mohammed VI.

[283] "Extraordinary Rendition," Frontline, November 4, 2007. https://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/rendition701/; "Rendition and secret detention: A global system of human rights violations Questions and Answers," Amnesty International, January 2006. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/80000/pol300032006en.pdf

[284] "Rendition and secret detention: A global system of human rights violations Questions and Answers," Amnesty International, January 2006. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/80000/pol300032006en.pdf

opinions, people moving in and out of the neighborhood, etc. The *moqaddem* is formally under the General Affairs Directorate (*Direction des Affaires Generales)*, and there could be around 45,000 of them across the territory. Their mission is based on proximity and knowledge of the people and their activities. They collect information and pass it over to higher echelons in the police that will filter and further analyze the data.[285] Their attachment in the territory as well as their ambiguous administrative status does not protect them from greedy businesses and scandals. The *moqaddem* is a "subaltern figure" who "evolve[s] at the margins of official bureaucracy." (Hibou & Tozy, 2020)

Morocco's intelligence services have been shaped by the need to keep a check on the population and communities' pulse through a vast territory. Although here is not the place for a nuanced political analysis of the Moroccan government, it is important to note that personal ties and loyalties is one of the features that continues to be central to the maintenance of central authority. Colonial occupation strengthened and institutionalized these allegiance practices through the extension of bureaucratized information networks. These networks relayed on traditional forms of local and communal authorities, such as the *moqaddem*. In parallel, the administrative colonial structure with the process-oriented production of intelligence reports was an important asset in gathering intelligence from all branches of the local civil administration.

Currently, Morocco has fifteen intelligence services with a highly stratified and diversified structure of agencies directly reporting to the Royal Cabinet. The diversity of services is designed to ensure a certain balance of power through competition. More a product of Mohammed V and his inheritors' own goals than of the French imprint, turf wars and reforms are not uncommon while impunity from law persists and whistleblowers are punished.

The DGED tries to follow the same model abroad: a thick network of informants, both within the migrant Moroccan communities and in the political and security apparatus of the host country (Devroe & Ponsaer, 2016). Departing from the French model, the intelligence landscape combines dense networks of formal and informal agents of human intelligence

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[285] The *moqaddem* is well known in the neighborhood he is in charge of. His mission is to learn about the "problems" and conflicts in the area and sometimes broker agreements between the population and the different administrations. Through legal or illegal means he can help register a newborn, suggest who the young troublemakers are and have them be recruited for the army, or even let some illegal activities happen for a personal fee.

throughout the territory, and a highly stratified and diversified structure of agencies that ensure a balance of power between the different agencies. The DGED is in charge of collecting information abroad and passing it to other intelligence services. It supervises political and economic activities of Moroccans abroad and it is present in all Moroccan embassies and consulates[286].

Along the central roles of the DGST and DGED, other important intelligence services have specific missions. Within the Royal Armed Forces, the 2nd Bureau is named from the French colonial empire of the Third Republic (*Deuxième Bureau*). It is charged with military surveillance of foreign armies and foreign land borders. The 5th Bureau was created in 1956 within the structure of the Army and it was split from the 2nd Bureau in 1976 to be an independent unit in charge of Military Intelligence inside the Royal Armed Forces. The Intelligence Service of the Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie (*Service de Renseignement de la Gendarmerie Royal Marocaine*, SRGR) is the military police created from the French model.

Other services include the Moroccan general information (*Renseignements généraux marocains*, RG); the Autonomous Intelligence Service of the Moroccan Auxiliary Forces (*Service autonome de renseignement des Forces auxiliaires marocaines*, FA) or the General Directorate for Home Affairs (*Direction générale des affaires intérieures*, DGAI) that are charged with political intelligence as well as surveillance of elections[287].

The most recently created unit is the National Service for Counter-terrorism (*Service National Pour la Lutte Contre le Terrorisme*), also called *Bureau Central d'Investigation Judiciaire* (BCIJ). The service was managed by Abdelhak Khiame until 2020 and was given the spotlight in media as the BCIJ claimed to have dismantled hundreds of terrorist cells using technological methods and informants network throughout the territory. According to the new director of the BCIJ, Cherkaoui Habboub, the "secret of their success" was the DGST's constant source of information[288].

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[286] Karim Boukhari and Abdellatif El Azizi, "Exclusif. Voyage au cœur des services secrets" [Exclusive. Journey to the heart of the secret services]. *TelQuel*, April 2, 2007. http://www.telquel-online.com/167/couverture_167_1.shtml

[287] Décret n° 2-97-176 du 14 chaabane 1418 (15 décembre 1997)

[288] S.A. "Le secret de la réussite du FBI marocain révélé" [Moroccan FBI's secret to success revealed], *Bladi.net*, Decembre, 31st 2020. https://www.bladi.net/cherkaoui-habboub-reussite-bcij,78018.html

3. Foreign Alliances

The Moroccan regime has one key ally: France. Although other European countries have more difficult relations with Morocco, the regime has groomed strong alliances with French business, political and security elites[289]. Even though some issues have also strained relations with France, from the Ben Barka affair to the recent surveillance scandal on French politicians and journalists, the intelligence and security cooperation is regarded as mutually beneficial, especially in counter-terrorism[290].

Morocco has good relations with the United States, but that relationship is not central to North American security[291]. The US-Morocco bilateral relationship transformed and toned down immediately after the two failed coups against Hassan II. During the Cold War, the US naval communications complex in Kenitra was by then the focal point of US communications towards the Mediterranean and the south Atlantic[292]. The strategic importance of the Moroccan Kingdom as a stable ally was a priority over the Hassan II's extravagant and violent rule[293]. The US-Morocco relations improved with the GWoT when Morocco became the regional asset for the GWoT, providing technological platforms and operations for intelligence gathering in the Sahara-Sahel region (Keenan, 2010, 2011). US-Morocco relations have continued in cooperation in military and security affairs[294].

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[289] An apparent paradox is the enormous anticolonial activity of Moroccans in France during the Protectorate. According to historian David Stenner (2019a) this could be explained by the alliances and friendships that some of the nationalist leaders had with important politicians, but also because some of the prominent key figures within the movement had also acted as informants for France.

[290] In July 2021, Amnesty International and Forbidden Stories published an investigation on the use of Israeli spyware Pegasus by several countries against activists and journalists. Amongst the concerned countries was Morocco, and one of the selected phones as potential target was that of French President Emmanuel Macron. According to several declarations, investigations have been launched, but the issue has so far had no diplomatic consequences. "About the Pegasus Project," Forbidden Stories, 2021. https://forbiddenstories.org/about-the-pegasus-project/

[291] Morocco was nevertheless important for the US during the Second World War especially for its geostrategic position and political leaning.

[292] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976*, Volume E–9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976. [Page 158]. 59. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon1. Washington, January 5, 1973. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p1/d59

[293] Laura Feliu, "Las Políticas de Promoción de Los Derechos Humanos de Estados Unidos y Francia. El Caso de Los Golpes de Estado En Marruecos" [The Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights of the United States and France. The Case of the Coups in Morocco], *Revista de Estudios Internacionales Mediterráneos*, no. 14 (2013), http://www.tallerteim.com/reim/index.php/reim/article/view/17.; "The King, now, as in the past, has shown himself impervious to advice regarding his method of rule. We must accept him as he is." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976*, Volume E–9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976. [Page 158]. 59. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon1. Washington, January 5, 1973. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve09p1/d59

[294] "Defense Secretary Dr. Mark T. Esper and Morocco's Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasser Bourita signed the defense cooperation road map that will expand until 2030," Department of Defence, October 2, 2020. https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2369742/us-morocco-chart-defense-cooperation-through-2030/; "Immediate Release. Readout of Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper's Meeting With Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Nasser Bourita," Department of Defense, October 2, 2020.

A less visible, but constant partner for Morocco's national and internal security has been Israel. Morocco and Israel have held unofficial relations almost since Israel's establishment. Morocco had an active and vibrant population of Jewish Moroccans. Most Jewish Moroccans left the country for Israel, but their ties are still palpable in the preservation of the Moroccan Arabic communities in Israel and historical memory in North Africa. During Gamal Abdel Nasser's rule in Egypt, Israel and Morocco consolidated their ties in the face of a pan-Arab movement that was seen as a common threat. According to some former Mossad officers, the Israeli intelligence agency "opened an office in Morocco as early as 1963."(Levi, 2018). Israel assisted Morocco in the war against Algeria as well as provided intelligence and defense equipment for the war in Western Sahara and the construction of the berm that divides the territory (Levi, 2018).

Hassan II had no problem spying on Arab leaders for the Israeli intelligence services in exchange for intelligence support in cases such as the abduction and disappearance of Ben Barka[295]. Indeed, this was the case in the 1965 Arab Summit in Casablanca when private conversations between Arab leaders attending the conferences were recorded for Israeli benefit ahead of the Arab offensive on 1967 (Bergman, 2020).

The Israeli Liaison office in Morocco was closed in 2000 following a regional push-back. Then in December 2020 a normalization agreement of Morocco-Israel diplomatic relations was signed and direct commercial flights are expected to operate soon. The declaration's third paragraph highlights "the proclamation by the United States of America on 'Recognizing the Sovereignty of the Kingdom of Morocco over Western Sahara'."[296]

Since the May 2003 attacks in Casablanca where 45 people died, Morocco fully entered the fight against terrorism. Anti-terrorist legislation was passed and the BCIJ was created with the specific purpose of leading the fight. Morocco built a narrative of competency and successes with the BCIJ, a modern and efficient anti-terrorist agency known unofficially as the "Moroccan FBI." Since 2002, the official numbers of dismantled terrorist cells are 210

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www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2370878/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-dr-mark-t-espers-meeting-with-moroccan-minister/

[295] Meit Amir, the former director of the Mossad services in the 1960s, provided a detailed description of the Mossad's involvement in the kidnapping and assassination of Mehdi Ben Barka. "History: 1965, when the Mossad helped Morocco murder Ben Barka," Yabiladi, October 25, 2017. https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/58726/history-1965-when-mossad-helped.html

[296] "Multilateral (20-1222) – *Joint Declaration Between the United States, Morocco and Israel*," Office of Treaty Affairs, Department of State. December 22, 2020. https://www.state.gov/20-1222

and 4,304 individuals were detained with 500 violent plots prevented[297]. The BCIJ also showcases the blurring between the military and the police (Kraska, 2007). This trend is obvious in its discursive nature: drugs/terror/crime are treated under similar understandings and operational practices, which conflate war and law enforcement.

The new framework in counter-terrorism has seemingly altered the security sector's landscape. According to Ahmed Aït-Taleb, "the interest of national public opinion now focuses on building staff capacities and providing the entities concerned with the technical and logistical means they need." (2014, p. 5). Indeed, anti-terrorist legislation and procedures have served as cover for enhancing selected agencies with invasive methods of surveillance on civil society actors and journalists. The spyware Pegasus, for instance, has been used since 2017 by the Moroccan intelligence services to spy on at least two human rights defenders[298]. Pegasus is an intrusive spyware used on mobile phones, developed by the Israeli company NSO Group.

4. Top-Down Reforms: Keeping the Regime Trendy

Morocco's intelligence services have a sad record of scandals and human rights violations. In 1999, it seemed that the years of discretional repression could become a thing of the past. Hassan II died and the new king, Mohamed VI was presented as a modernist, the "king of the poor" willing to turn over the page of human rights violations. Indeed, he dismissed the infamous Driss Basri as Interior Minister, who was Hassan II's right hand. The turn towards a more human rights-friendly narrative had started a few years before Hassan II's passing. International pressure, especially from France and the end of the communist threat made it difficult for the regime to continue massive repression.[299]

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[297] Official statement by Mohamed Nifaoui, general controller of the BCIJ. "210 cellules terroristes démantelées au Maroc depuis 2002," Bladi, May 19, 2021. https://www.bladi.net/cellules-terroristes-demantelees-maroc,82817.html

[298] "Morocco: Human Rights Defenders Targeted with NSO Group's Spyware," Amnesty International, October 10, 2019. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/10/morocco-human-rights-defenders-targeted-with-nso-groups-spyware/

[299] Laura Feliu, "La Apropiación de La Temática de Los Derechos Humanos Por Los Regímenes Marroquí y Tunecino: Retórica y Realidad" [The Appropriation of Human Rights Issues by the Moroccan and Tunisian Regimes: Rhetoric and Reality], *Papers: Revista de Sociologia*, no. 46 (1995): 077–094; Laura Feliu and Maria Ángeles Parejo, "Morocco: The Reinvention of a Totalitarian System," in *Power and Regimes in the Contemporary Arab World*, by Ferran Izquierdo Brichs (London: Routledge, 2013); Brahim Saidy, "Perceptions de Sécurité Nationale au Maghreb et Au Moyen-Orient" [Perceptions of National Security in the Maghreb and the Middle East], [no publisher], n.d., 12.

A process of transitional justice thus was promoted and in 2004 a mechanism for transitional justice, the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (*Instance Equité et Réconciliation*, IER), was established. This institution, headed by a former political prisoner reviewed hundreds of cases of human rights violations by state forces. These human rights violations were acknowledged for the first time as a systematic and pervasive phenomenon. However, the names of the victimizers could not be made public, no trials took place, state police archives were hardly opened and no real reforms took place. In practice, no accountability was achieved. The process, however, has been said to have been useful for the reconfiguration of security elite alliances within Mohamed VI's new reign.

Allegations of torture continue to be common and illegal acts within the security services are not addressed. On the contrary, whistleblowers are punished and attempts to seek justice abroad from security forces mistreatment can carry diplomatic consequences for the countries that receive the claims[300]. In 2013, the current chief of the DGST, Abdellatif Hammouchi, was accused in France for the torture of a Western Sahara activist. The regime closed ranks with Hammouchi and the diplomatic tensions caused the two countries to suspend judicial cooperation[301]. After the January 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France resumed judicial cooperation with Morocco as it remains France's unavoidable counter-terrorism partner.

Reform has thus always oscillated between the variables of a diplomatic need to show a modernized face, elite competition within the public security sector, protection of the King's closest allies and efficiency centered on strengthening control.

5. Conclusions

The history of Moroccan's intelligence culture has been determined by three major factors. Firstly, the French imprint on institutional structures, regulations, and cultural and

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[300] "Morocco Whistleblowing Overview," Transparency International, 2015. https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/Morocco__Whistleblowing_overview.pdf

[301] In 2014, however, the Ministry of Interior issued a lawsuit in a French Court against three people and the French NGO Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture ACAT, who had sued in their turn the DGST and its director Abdellatif Hammouchi for torture (http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140326-maroc-contre-attaque-justice-paris-affaire-hammouchi). In 2015, Hammouchi was awarded the Légion d'honneur by the French minister of Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve.

operational procedures is evident. It also continues through personal transnational networks of cooperation with training, restructuring and narratives.

Secondly, the intelligence sector has relied on a traditional thick network of informal and formal informants reporting and collecting information from even remote areas. A dense network of informants, even those that are not part of the services' payroll, provides detailed knowledge of the population's pulse. This focus on human intelligence, inside the country and abroad, has been a key factor for international counter-terrorism cooperation, especially with Europe. Nevertheless, the regime is also decisively investing in surveillance technology, even outside the limits of judicial control, as the NSO Group case has shown with the target of human rights defenders and journalists with malicious spyware on their mobile phones[302]. The acquisition of new surveillance technology might also serve in the ascendance of certain intelligence units and actors, like Hammouchi's DGST, against other more traditionally based ones.

The third and most determining factor is the personalization of power, the structure and culture being more a product of Mohamed V and his descendants' own goals for the country and the monarchy (Arboit, 2015). With the intelligence services' objective to preserve the centrality and popularity of the Monarchy, a strong culture against any opposition or critique is central in the DGST and DGED. Indeed, it is a pervasive culture engaged in surveillance of populations through institutional, informal and traditional networks as well as not uncommon unlawful repression of peaceful political activists.

The lack of democratic accountability, even with timid attempts at transitional justice and with other externally-funded initiatives to reform the justice system, continues to foster turf wars within the array intelligence services, along with "arbitrary" reshuffles and dismissals that seem to demonstrate power struggles within the political and security sectors. The task of reforming falls on the superiors' will, which consists of the monarch's immediate entourage. It is indeed based on a paternalistic model: impunity from law, but not from authority.

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[302] The Pegasus affair is not however the first known case about Morocco purchasing surveillance technology. See Privacy International's profile of the country: "Morocco," Piracy International, 2021. https://privacyinternational.org/state-privacy/1007/state-privacy-morocco

Morocco's intelligence community has always been very firmly anchored in the West, sometimes even by playing the Trojan role among African and Middle Eastern politics. Recent approaches to China, however, show that the Kingdom's priority is to stay on top of the global power reconfigurations.

The ability of the regime to politically use intelligence about its own citizens, as it happens with the jihadist and Salafi movements, while at the same time maintaining the narrative of exceptionality, stability and "reformism" in the region, has been effective during the first two decades of Mohamed VI. However, frustration at the lack of results of the post-2011 reforms, economic hardship following the COVID-19 pandemic and a decline of the king's popularity might foreshadow increased intelligence and security measures for the regime's self-preservation against popular discontent. Indeed, intelligence tools and resources, especially under a prolonged pandemic-related state of emergency, are readily available for the government.

Part III

Neoliberal Security

Chapter 7 - The Private Security Sector

Previous chapters described what the role of the security sector has been in the establishment of the current economic model, and the political regime that sustains it. In this chapter, the attention is centered in the creation of new markets. The chapter explores the shaky and hesitant beginnings of the current private security market and its development and deployment in Morocco.

If neoliberalism has changed the state and the methods or instruments of political action, has it changed the security sector? This chapter examines how the new industry flourishes and which actors intervene in the process. Does it follow a similar process of concentration of capital in the same traditional elites, foreign and some Moroccan groups? Does the private security sector reproduce the endogamic and crony dynamics of other business sectors (Cammett, 2007; Catusse, 2008; Saadi, 2016)?

1. The Definition of Private Security

Private Security can be defined in very different ways and it can include very different provisions of services and products. The contextual and legal definitions will determine the analysis of the sector as well as the policy frameworks that enable the sector's development. Sometimes, however, not even legal regulations provide a precise definition. As with the definition of security previously discussed (Chapter 1 and 2), the definition of private security is also easily stretchable. The word security can involve very different dimensions, from cyber to nuclear; and so private security can also define many different aspects of private entrepreneurship within these different areas.

Strom et al. (2010) collected 18 core elements of the industry that were mentioned at a seminar of security experts:

- physical security,
- personnel security,
- information systems security,
- investigations,
- loss prevention,
- risk management,
- legal aspects,
- emergency and contingency planning,
- fire protection,
- crisis management,
- disaster management,
- counterterrorism,
- competitive intelligence,
- executive protection,
- violence in the workplace,
- crime prevention,
- crime prevention through environmental design, and
- security architecture and engineering.

Regarding the business model and legal status of those agents providing private security, most definitions limit the concept of 'private security' to profit-oriented endeavours, excluding for example nonprofit institutions like NGOs' security provision. This ambiguity does not affect the present research, as these are exceptional cases, and concerns arise more starkly with the formality and informality of protection services, as we will later see.

The wide 'private security sector' would include big TNCs that mainly work with the defense sector, producing from weaponry to other double-use technology (companies like the Spanish Indra or French Thales); to those that install surveillance cameras as technicians (and actually act as specialized import companies); provide a risk assessment for a company; or place a bouncer at a night club's entrance.

In terms of the **functions** that the industry claims to provide, the primordial self-proclaimed function of the sector is to prevent crime, although other definitions include the prevention of "waste, accident, error, and unethical practice" (Strom et al., 2010, p. 14). The close relation between crime prevention and accident prevention is found in the development of the sector in Morocco, with fire-prevention and safety at work being part of the training provided to security guards, assessment service provided by the same companies, as well as assemblage of these functions in regulations and in business fairs in the last decade (2010s).

I would add here, that one of the functions that stretch from 'preventing crime' is also preventing unaccepted behavior within private spaces, irrespective of whether this behavior is or is not a crime. Some guards are charged with preventing workers of a factory from going to the restroom too often. That means that one of the functions of private security is not to prevent crime, but rather to ensure a specific order[303]. Shearing and Stenning (1983) argue that this is due to the fact that private security has a client-defined mandate. While public security is supposed to enforce state justice and allegedly the public and general interest, private security is based on a for-profit service and its objective is instrumental to the client. That means that social order becomes "both more extensive and more limited than that defined by the state; more extensive because it is concerned with matters […] which may

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[303] How can a security guard at a shopping mall stop a robbery when they do not have the legal authority to physically prevent a person from leaving the premises with stolen goods? In fact, in most legal frameworks security guards can only observe and report. Their authority is based on a performative projection of authority or on crossing the line of empersonating a police officer and their functions, a decision that can carry legal consequences for themselves. Their authority, however, increases with different power relations and in different spaces, such as in relation to workers of a factory who can be reported to their superiors; to homeless or marginalized people who would have no means to sue their illegal behaviors, etc.

threaten the interests of the client but are not violations of the law; more limited because it is not normally concerned with violations of the law […] which are not perceived as threatening the interests of the client" (Shearing & Stenning, 1983, p. 499).

An extreme example would be providing security services for Israeli Prisons inside the occupied West Bank, Palestine, in violation of international humanitarian law (Hever, 2018) or providing permiteral security for the Wall dividing the occupied West Bank. In the latter example, G4S security is not preventing crime but rather reinforcing it, given that the International Court of Justice deemed in an advisory opinion that the "construction of the wall and its associated regime" was contrary to international law[304].

A more corporate approach to the function of private security providers is that given by ASIS International. The largest association of private security professionals in the world defines their members (private and public officers) as "security practitioners […with] a role in the protection of assets - people, property, and/or information"[305].

The methods and resources by which this protection is granted also vary. They include human resources as guards, access controllers, or knowledge for enhanced and improved protection, to technological solutions like cameras or access control technology.

This chapter specifically tackles the issue of physical security or physical protection. The focus is thus mainly on companies that provide security guards: protection and surveillance provided by human agents, also called manned guarding. In French, the terms *gardien* and *gardiennage* are usually used to identify this line of work. However, some companies in Morocco use other terms as they view the concept of *gardiennage* as not 'noble', as one company executive told me. This company provides 'manned security services' not '*gardiennage*', he said[306]. This distinction comes from the fact that the sector in the country is in nature divided between two very distinct origins: those that stem from the defense and security sector, and those that come from the 'facility management' field, the latter being

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[304] Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-178825/ (Accessed 8/10/2020)

[305] See: ASIS (American Society for Industrial Security International). "Who we are". In: https://www.asisonline.org/footer-pages/about-asis/ (Accessed: 8/10/20)

[306] Interview 23.

closer to temporary employment companies and support services for other companies, rather than defense related areas.

1.1 Physical security in Morocco

The Minsitry of National Education and Professional Training published a report[307] that described the professional categories of guards, dividing the profession into "*Agent de Gardiennage*" and "*Agent de Transport de Fonds (convoyeur de fonds et conducteur*". Nevertheless, the *Agent de Gardiennage* can be called:

- *Agent de Gardiennage*
- *Agent de Surveillance*
- *Maître chien*
- *Rondier*
- *Vigile*
- *Veilleur de nuit*
- *Gardien*

Following the same official report, the tasks of these professionals are the following:

- To ensure, through a continuous presence, the intramural security of public places, buildings, premises, housing complexes, blocks ...
- To ensure the protection of people (inhabitants, users, customers, etc.) and property (premises, equipment, goods, etc.).
- To carry out surveillance in a restricted area or in a more wide requiring regular rounds on foot or using a means of locomotion, depending on the case.
- To monitor access and control the comings and goings of people.
- To intervene on call or prevent incidents.
- May be accompanied by a protection animal.
- May be required to perform first aid.

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[307] Departement de la Formation Professionnelle: https://www.dfp.gov.ma/component/content/article/307.html (Accessed 2021-03-13)

Moreover, they must fulfill the conditions:

- Moroccan nationality
- Proven maturity to practice the job / profession
- Not having a criminal record
- Good physical condition
- Minimum size 1m70
- Holds the diploma or certificate required for the exercise of the Employment
- Experience in the field of security is desirable
- Knowledge of the French language is desirable

The *Agent de Transport de Fonds* is also called *Conducteur, Convoyeur, Convoyeur Messager, Convoyeur Garde*. Their task is to transport funds, objects or valuable documents in optimum security conditions.

2. Legal development

Legal texts aim at establishing a certain order, a certain reality, even if their full implementation is not always the priority. They do point towards the interests and worries of legislators and other actors intervening in the process. They also show the models and influences of other legal frameworks; in the case of Morocco and the private security legislation, the French influence. This section analyzes the development of regulations of private security, from the first colonial texts that tackled the issue.

The first traces of private security in Morocco in the modern sense –as formalized enterprises with a specific legal status- can be found during the colonial occupation. Private surveillance arrived in Morocco with the goal to protect the colonial accumulation of capital at colonial hands. The first law that regulated the activity of "private surveillance" (*surveillants particuliers*) was adopted on the 23rd August 1916[308], under the French protectorat.

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[308] Dahir du 25 Aout 1916 (23 Chaoual 1334) sur les gardes particuliers. *Bulletin Officiel* 202, p.874. http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO/Fr/1916/BO_202_Fr.pdf

The decree clearly stated in its preambule and following articles that it was aimed at owners of property:

> "That Our Cherifian Majesty,
>
> Wishing to protect the properties and to safeguard the rights of each one;
>
> Having regard to Our Dahir of May 1, 1914 (5 Djoumada II 1332) relating to the oath of the verbalizing agents [unreadable]:
>
> [...]
>
> **Article 1**. The owners, possessors or holders of rural exploitations, lands, hunting rights and various real estate rights, building sites, enterprises, have the right to have, for the surveillance of these lands or perimeters and the safeguarding of their rights, one or several private guards or surveillance agents"[309]

The goal of the legislation was "the will to protect ownership and safeguard individual rights (*les droits de chacun*)" (preamble). The subjects of that protection were "the owners, [*proprietaries, possesseurs ou détenteurs*] of rural exploitations, land, hunting estate, real estate, worksites and companies" (article 1).

The need to regulate and control the private sector of security or, in fact, to encourage it, directly stemmed from the new colonial model of land tenance, and especially with the project to build the granary for France (Swearingen, 1987). Already in 1912, foreigners of different origins, as had been established by international treaties, had acquired 80.000 hectars of land around the Gharb and Chaouia regions (Bouderbala, 1996), "a Trojan horse for agricultural colonization" (Naciri, 2009, p. 138). Although the Protectorate was not designed as a settlers' project, by 1955 around 1 milion hectars of the best arable land belonged to 6000 settlers (Rivet, 2012)[310]. Officially only a quarter of the land was expropriated, in some cases under the justification of tribal dissidence. The rest of colonized land is acquired through the progressive privatization of land. At the end of the protectorate what had constitutet 70% of arable land at the beginning of colonization represented only 15% by 1956. Private land, on the contrary one 5th to 3/5(Bouderbala, 1996, pp. 152–153).

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[309] French in the original: "Que Notre Majesté Chérifienne, //Voulant protéger les proprieties et sauvegarder les droits de chacun;//Vu Notre Dahir du 1er Mai 1914 (5 Djoumada II 1332) relative au serment des agents verbalisateurs [unreadable]: […]//Article Premier. Les proprietaries, possesseurs ou détenteurs d'exploitations rurales, terrains, droits de chasses et droits reels immobiliers divers, chantiers, entreprises, ont le droit d'avoir, pour la surveillance de ces terrains ou périmètres et la sauvegarde de leurs droit un ou plusieurs gardes particuliers ou agents de surveillance."

[310] The number of settlers from the metropoles grew from 30.000 in 1913 to 350.000 in 1952 (Issawi 2013.79 in Feliu 2018), while the population more than doubled in 60 years (from 4.5M in 1900 to 11M in 1960), putting a strain on resources.

The pauperization of peasants was a result of direct land dispossession but especially of a progressive privatization of land[311], and more subtle instruments that favored French settlers such as "access to credit, tax breaks, production bonuses, and constraints on labor." (Sebti, 2013, p. 47).

Foreign-led police had been installed in 1906 (Chapter 4), but its role was mainly to control costums and ports, making sure the debt payment to European banks was beign honored (J.-F. Clément, 2019). Military forces, on the contrary, were engaged on advancing territorial control over Morocco's vast land. As for the gendarmerie, brigades were deployed especially to patrol and control the so-called 'useful Morocco', but their ineffectiveness to prevent sabotage or violence against settlers was notable[312].

In this framework of unstable colonization and premanent resistance from the local communities, the first regulation of private surveillance was explicitly aimed at helping rural private projects by providing additional means of protection where military and gendarmerie could not reach. The law of 1916 framed this activity as a mission of general interest and its object was individuals working as guards, and as "a measure to accompany the process of delocalization of European capital to Morocco during the inter-war period"[313] (Aït-Taleb, 2014, p. 45).

On the other hand, however, the 1916 regulation might show another interesting goal. First of all, private guards that protected private posessions already existed. Second, the law's main disposition is to make sure this employment is regulated by the regional authorities. The pacha or the qaid must previously provide a certificate for the activity. These facts could indeed point to the idea that the regulation's direct aim was to standarize and monitor this already existing practice by enforcing the need to obtain a working permit. The regulation would thus not encourage the use of private security, but rather its alignment under the state legal authority.

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[311] See also (Bessaoud, 2013, p. 24)

[312] Interestingly, Thomas notes that "immediately after World War I their companion gendarmerie squadrons in neighboring Algeria and Tunisia remained predominantly rural and small-town in their operational ambit. By contrast, Morocco's gendarmes, designated the protectorate's Force Publique, were from the outset concentrated in fast-growing urban centers such as Fez, Meknès, and Casablanca, the once quiet port, in French hands since 1907 that would soon become the most ethnically segregated of Morocco's cities"(Thomas, 2010, p. 77)

[313] French in the original: "une mesure d'accompagnement du processus de delocalization des capitaux européens vers le Maroc au cours de l'entre-deux guerres mondiales".

On the other hand, this decree, and the following main regulations on the matter (see Table 1 below) always begin by acknowledging the dahir of May, 1st 1914 (5 joumada II 1332) *relatif au serment des agents verbalisateurs*. This is especially important since it endows the private agents with the capacity and obligation to contribute to information collection of the state, and it assimilates their category as 'informants' to agents of the state.

> **Article 1:** In the future, the agents of the State, Municipalities, Public Establishments, Financial Administrations or Monopolies governed on behalf of the State, Municipalities or Public Establishments, the agents of the concessionaires of Public Services, who are or may be called upon to draw up reports intended to be produced in court and to be authentic, may not be installed until they have taken an oath before the Justice of the Peace of their district ....
>
> **Article 6:** The reports drawn up by judicial police officers or by sworn agents are not subject to any formality of affirmation.[314]

This mode of new private security deployed to complete and support the colonial project was further regulated in the subsequent years, most notably for the transfer of funds, in agricultural exploitations, mines, and other colonial forms of intervention and resource extraction[315].

Another Royal Decree from the 7th of April 1933[316] was adopted in order to clarify the limits, and frame the domain of the activities of surveillance and protection of private property. Aït-Taleb calls it the '*loi des interdictions*', as it limits the titles and names of those in charge, forbids uniforms or distinctions. This need to limit the image and competences of private agents suggests the fact that this private security market had become salient. In fact, article 1 starts with "It is forbidden to…".

The decree, this time, was not directed at natural but specifically at legal persons, that is companies. This indicates a mounting formalization of the work of security (*gardiennage*). The decree explicitly forbade the use of names such as "*police, sûreté, sécurité, sécuritas ou toute*

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[314] French in the original: "*Article Premier*. A l'avenir, les agents de l'Etat, des Municipalités, des Etablissments publics, des Administrations financières ou Monopoles régis pour le compte de l'Etat, des Municipalités ou des Etablissements publics, les agents des concessionnaires de Services publics, qui seront ou pourront être appelés à dresser des procès-verbaux destinés à être produits en justice et à y faire foi, ne pourront être installés qu'après avoir prêté serment devant le Juge de Paix de leur circonscription….//*Article 6*: Les procès-verbaux dressés par des officiers de police judiciaire ou par des agents assermentés ne sont soumis à aucune formalité d'affirmation."

[315] Also "terre domaniales concédées, aux réserves forestières, aux mines et chantiers de construction, aux magasins et usines, aux villas et locaux des sociétés, aux administrations et bureaux publics (SIC)… » (Ait Taleb 2014 : 46).

[316] *Dahir* du *7 avril 1933* (11 hija 1351) relative aux enterprises ou sociétées de gardiennage ou police privée. *Bulletin Officiel* 1072, p.410.

appellation analogue pouvant prêter à confusion avec les services publics de la police"[317]. According to the 1933 decree, these companies had the objective of "ensuring surveillance of shops, houses, villas, sites, chantiers, stores, construction sites and all kind of warehouses"[318]. It was evidently thought to protect industrial and commercial goods. The different list of places to be protected can also be highlighted. Whereas in 1916, the places mentioned were "rural holdings, land, hunting rights and various real estate rights, building sites, companies"; the 1933 dahir portrays a more urban picture indicating how the economy's values had diversified, from a more agricultural and natural exploitation economy to a more enmeshed trade and consumer's economy.

> "And the legal framework of the activity of guarding and convoying funds aimed at ensuring the protection of goods and investments from the hazards of war, not only against theft, looting or degradation, but also against the actions of the resistance directed against colonialism, its allies and its economic and financial structures"[319] (Aït-Taleb, 2014, p. 45).

A short royal decree was passed in 1951, which further entrenched private agents with the state and under its authority. Agents had to be sworn in and became as such enforcement agents in a further step towards the control and authority of the state over private agents.

2.1 New regulations

The 1933 and the 1951[320] decrees were in force until 2007. With independence, private surveillance had not been newly codified. Aït-Taleb argues that it was because of the intrinsic nature of support to colonialism that this kind of activities was not legally framed after independence. The sector was thus working within a French-regulated framework and companies and public institutions continued to employ informal guards, internal employees or, when estimed necessary, public officers.

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[317] L'Economiste. 1995. "Le gardiennage organisé freiné par le vide juridique". *L'Economiste*, n.190, 27th July, 1995. Online: https://www.leconomiste.com/article/le-gardiennage-organise-freine-par-le-vide-juridique (Accessed: 5/4/2019)

[318] L'Economiste. 1995. "Le gardiennage organisé freiné par le vide juridique". *L'Economiste*, n.190, 27th July, 1995. Online: https://www.leconomiste.com/article/le-gardiennage-organise-freine-par-le-vide-juridique (Accessed: 5/4/2019)

[319] French in the original "*Et l'encadrement juridique de l'activité de gardiennage et de convoi de fonds visait à assurer la protection des biens et investissement soustraits aux aléas de la guerre, non pas uniquement contre le vol, le pillage ou la dégradation, mais aussi contre les actions de la résistance dirigées contre le colonialisme, ses alliés et ses structures économiques et financières*".

[320] Dahir du 10 rabii I 1371 (10 décembre 1951) relatif aux gardes particuliers.

It wasn't until the 1990s when already several companies present in the country and providing private security started pushing for a new regulation. Business was booming, but some companies needed regulation to navigate. Foreign companies were part of the advancement of the market in other countries like France or the USA, but were struggling to open their way in Morocco. *L'Economiste* published several articles on the subject during the 1990s, from 1992 to 1996. The newspaper acted as mouthpiece for the companies:

> " 'Our strength lies exclusively in prevention, although the image of the security guard is still repressive', underlines Mr. Jean Claude Letetu, manager of the company RMO. 'We don't want to substitute ourselves for law enforcement officers' ".[321]

Public officials did not worry so much about the 'repressive' image of security guards, but their concern was focused on the relationship between these companies and the state forces[322]. In the 1990s there were discussions going on within the Ministry of Justice about the legality of this kind of companies[323]. What Jean Claude Letetu – from the now Moroccan Holding RMO – conveyed was an assurance that tried to soften the reticence of the regime to rule and legally frame this area instead of ignoring its existence.

Private security existed the facto but the fact that it was not regulated generated different problems that were voiced by the companies in the media. First, labor conditions were not monitored and the recruitment processes were open to lax criteria, based on age and with no training requirements[324]. Legal companies, they said, would train employees and improve their skills[325][326]. Companies claimed that a framework that conditioned recruitment on training would professionalize the job, and would also draw a line between employees of the

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[321] French in the original: " 'Notre force repose exclusivement sur la prévention, bien que l'image de l'agent de sécurité soit encore répressive", souligne M. Jean Claude Letetu, responsable de la société RMO. 'Nous ne voulons pas nous substituer aux agents de la force publique'." Mossadaq, Fatima. (1996). "Handicapées par une vieille législation : Les sociétés de gardiennage ont du mal à percer". Par *L'Economiste*, N°:232 Le 30/05/1996. Online: https://www.leconomiste.com/article/handicapees-par-une-vieille-legislation-les-societes-de-gardiennage-ont-du-mal-percer (Accessed: 05/04/19)

[322] Interviews by the autor in Rabat with former public official of the Ministry of Justice and former officer of Ministry of Interior, Spring of 2019. According to my informants, Wackenhut in the US Embassy had pushed for the need to bear arms in order to perform.

[323] Interview with former worker at the Ministry of Justice. June 2019.

[324]"Le gardiennage d'entreprise ne connaissait qu'un critère de recrutement, l'âge. Un gardien âgé était sensé être sage et digne de confiance." L'Economiste. (1992). "Les sociétés de sécurité: des chaouchs aux vigiles", *L'Economiste*, N°:13 Le 23/01/1992. https://www.leconomiste.com/article/les-societes-de-securite-des-chaouchs-aux-vigiles (Accessed: 05/04/2019)

[325] Loudiyi, Kenza. (1992). "Ecco arrive au Maroc avec Alpha Prestations". *L'Economiste*, N°:56 Le 03/12/1992. https://www.leconomiste.com/article/ecco-arrive-au-maroc-avec-alpha-prestations (Accessed: 05/04/19)

[326] L'Economiste. (1997). "Agents de sécurité: Les pompiers du travail". *L'Economiste*, N°:289 Le 17/07/1997. https://leconomiste.com/article/agents-de-securite-les-pompiers-du-travail (Accessed: 05/04/2019)

companies and the guards, avoiding potential solidarities or familiarities. This would be done through the requirement of three-months rotation of placements[327].

In 2003, an organization called AMEG (Association Marocaine des Entreprises de Gardiennage) grouped companies such as GPS, G4, Securicor[328], RMO, Jamain Baco, EGIDA and SOS in order to consertly lobby for a regulation of the sector. One of the arguments was that the informality of the sector was causing unfair competition and insecurity, as professionalism through training and safe labor conditions were absent[329]. According to a TNC executive "the law was adopted as a consequence of the efforts made by the big companies like G4S, Brinks, or Wackenhut."[330]

> "Why? Because we were bidding in tenders and the clients started asking for balance sheets, the number of agents with declared CNSS [Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale]. They started, but before, you could submit to a tender with a very minimum, I mean, just with the general assembly or the register at the trade office. Today they have started to formalize a bit, because even today the organisms, clients and all that, they ask for the reports, balance of payments, they ask about the CNSS, turnover. […] The societies that won't comply with the market requirments will have to quit the sector"[331]

This quote from an interviewee grants an almost natural explanation for the development of those requirements, as 'market requirements' that suddenly clients start asking for. But the fact was that the existance of a myriad of local small companies with personal contacts in the administrations, but with no specialized interest in the sector beyond business opportunities was not acceptable for multinational and bigger companies.

> "a plethora of companies operating in security and cleaning that often do not respect the rules of the art. We face an increasingly unfair competition where all blows are allowed" (Amine Kabbaj, PDG of Jamain Baco, 2007)[332].

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[327] El Kanab, Mohamed Jaouad. (2021) "Nouvelle vigie nationale, la sécurité privée saura-t-elle gagner en légitimité ?" In Hespress, 12th April 2021. Online: https://fr.hespress.com/122336-nouvelle-vigie-nationale-la-securite-privee-saura-t-elle-gagner-en-legitimite.html

[328] Group 4 and Securicor merged in 2013.

[329] Jamain Baco claimed in 2005 to be the first company to provide specialized training for guards. Haimoud, Atika. (2005) "Jamain Baco diplôme son staff", *L'Economiste*, March 28, 2005.

[330] Interview in Casablanca, April 2019. According to this person, they lobbied through letter-writing to the government.

[331] "Pour quoi? Parce que on sourmision dans des appel d'offres et les clients aujourd'hui commencent a demander les bilans, le nombre d'agents déclaré au niveau de la cnss.. ils ont commencé, mais avant vous pouviez soumissionné dans un marché avec le minimum, cad juste l'assemblée générale ou bien le registre de commerce et vous pouvez soumissionner et avoir un marché, mais maintenant ils ont commencé un peu de formaliser un petit peu les choses, cad même aujourd'hui les organismes, les clients tout ça, ils demandent le bilan, ils demandent la déclaration du CNSS, ils demandent les chiffres d'affaires… Ils ont commencé à formaliser les choses." Interview in Casablanca, April 2019.

[332] French in the original: "une pléthore d'entreprises opérant dans la sécurité et le nettoyage qui, souvent, ne respectent pas les règles de l'art. Nous faisons face à une concurrence de plus en plus déloyale où tous les coups sont permis». Quoted in : L'Economiste (2007) "La

By October 2006, parliamentary discussions ensued on the Bill submitted by the government to the Commission of Interior, Decentralization and Infrastructures. A second round of discussions took place in April 2007 in the same Commission. The parliamentary discussions revolved around the measures to prevent business managers or bosses to use armed guards against workers.

> "Personally I do not agree with the carrying of weapons by all security agents, certainly there are exceptions and situations, for which the carrying of weapons is necessary and even obligatory, for example: the transport of funds, or for the sentries in front of embassies, consulates and in front of or inside some diplomatic residences, and also for private security guards in front of large luxury hotels like those attacked on May 16, 2003, and which know throughout the time and the year an important flow of tourists, it is necessary that the agent to whom one entrusts a firearm is married with children and mature, it is also necessary that his salary and his rights are compatible with the new tasks that he fulfills" Director of Mister Clean, 2007.[333]

As in 1933, the law was also repeatedly concerned with the distinction between private security and public order officers (articles 9 and 12, among others). As shown in article 9 of the Law 27/06:

> "**Article 9:** The administrative authorization does not confer any official character to the enterprises which benefit from it. It does not engage in any way the responsibility of public authorities.
>
> The companies governed by this law must mention their private character in their name, so as to avoid any confusion with the public authorities, especially those in charge of maintaining order and security.
>
> In no case may any of the company's directors or employees be identified as former police or military officers."[334]

The law allows for private agents to be armed following the necessary requirements and authorizations (art 13). If the law was drafted following the French legislative framework[335], it

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menace terroriste relance le gardiennage", *L'Economiste*, N°:2504 Le 12/04/2007. https://www.leconomiste.com/article/la-menace-terroriste-relance-le-gardiennage

[333] "Personnellement je ne suis pas d'accord pour le port d'armes par tous les agents de sécurité, certes il y a des exceptions et des situations, pour lequels, le port d'armes est nécessaire et même obligatoire, quan il s'agit par exemple: du transport des fonds, ou bien pour les sentinelles devant des ambassades, des consulats et devant ou à l'intérieur de certaines résidences diplomatiques, et aussi pour des vigiles de la sécurité privée devant les grands hôtels de luxe comme ceux attaqués le 16 Mai 2003, et qui connaissent à longueur du temps et de l'année un flux important de touristes, il faut que l'agent à qui on confie une arme à feu soit marié avec des enfants et mûr, il faut aussi que son salaire et ses droits soient compatibles avec la nouvelle tâches qu'il remplisse." Abkari, Mostafa. (2007) "La Sécurité Privée au Maroc", *Le Maroc* n3 August 2007: p.9.

[334] French in the original: "Article 9: L'autorisation administrative ne confère aucun caractère officiel aux enterprises qui en bénéficient. Elle n'engage en aucune manière la responsabilité des pouvoirs publics. // Les entreprises régies par la présente loi doivent faire mention de leur caractère privé dans leur denomination, de manière à éviter toute confusion avec les autorités publiques, notamment celles charges du maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité. // En aucun cas il ne pourra être fair état de la qualité d'ancien fonctionnaire de police ou d'ancien militaire que pourrait avoir l'un des dirigeants ou employés de l'entreprise."

is true that the French law for private security did not allow firearms until 1st January 2018. Since the new norm that acts as a disposition to the 2017 Law (March 1st, 2017)[336] adopted under François Hollande guards can carry firearms, battons, or teargas canisters. The only exceptions made until then had been for the French national railway company (SNCF) and Areva to guard stations and nuclear facilities.[337]

In France, private security was regulated in 1983, after two incidents involving violent behaviors of private guards: a homeless man was beaten to death; a factory strike broken up violently… and past incidents like the death of a maoist militant at a Renault premise (Minassian, 2008). Interstingly, the authority of private security has first been challenged, questioned or resisted in the workplace (Shearing & Stenning, 1983). In France, strikes and subsequent incidents with guards shed light on the dozens of thousands of employees with no regulated framework during convulsive years. That they were being employed violently against unions and the right to strike of workers created pressure and a political incentive to regulate[338].

In Morocco, after the concerted lobbying efforts and the existence of an active media conversation, the regulation of the sector came with the approval of law 27.06, November 30, 2007[339] "*relative aux sociétés de gardiennage et de transport de fonds*". This law was later developed through other norms:

- Decree published on the 4th November 2010: the obligation of having a ceritificate/authoristaion to operate
- Decree "*Décret n° 2-09-97 du 16 kaada 1431 (25 octobre 2010) pris pour l'application de la loi n° 27-06 relative aux activités de gardiennage et de transport de fonds*"

Two joint orders were published on February 24ᵗʰ, 2012[340]:

- *Arrêté conjoint du Ministre de l'Intérieur, du Ministre de l'équipement et du transport et du Ministre de l'Emploi et de la Formation professionnelle fixant les conditions d'obtention d'un diplôme ou d'un certificat justifiant l'aptitude professionnelle pour l'exercice des activités de transport de fonds;*
- *Arrêté conjoint du Ministre de l'Intérieur et du Ministre de l'Emploi et de la Formation professionnelle fixant les conditions d'obtention d'un diplôme ou d'un certificat justifiant l'aptitude professionnelle pour l'exercice des activités de gardiennage.*

In fact, the law 27-06[341] only came into force on the 22nd September 2012, until the adoption and publication of the *décrets d'application*. Once the regulation for the authorisation procedures was adopted there was a period of 6 months extended by the Ministry of Interior until the 22ⁿᵈ September 2012, and a second extension until 24ᵗʰ april 2013[342]. It took 4 years for the law to be effectively in place[343].

The 2006 Law nevertheless collected mainly the voices of bigger companies, but it established a framework that most companies are allegedly mildly satisfied with. The law set the standards for companies to operate, along with minimum labor conditions and administrative procedures to be able to operate.

The new regulation framework of the sector was meant to put pressure on smaller companies. In addition, non-security oriented companies had to either create a new company or simply externalize the service hitherto part of the team. This forced institutions such as hospitals, schools, etc, to contract external companies rather than the old janitor or doorkeeper (see Chapter 8).

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[340] These two last joint orders have not really been enforced, as many guards still work without ever having followed a training course.

[341] Dahir no 1-07-155 du 19 kaada 1428 (30 novembre 2007) portant promulgation de la loi no 27-06 relative a activités de gardiennage et de transport de fonds. *Bulletin Officiel* 5584, p.1364.

[342] L'Economiste "Les opérateurs tentent de s'approprier la loi", in *L'Economiste*, n.4138, October, 24th, 2013. Online: https://leconomiste.com/article/912161-les-op-rateurs-tentent-de-s-approprier-la-loi (Accessed: 04/06/2020)

[343] L'Economiste "Les opérateurs tentent de s'approprier la loi", in *L'Economiste*, n.4138, October, 24th, 2013. Online: https://leconomiste.com/article/912161-les-op-rateurs-tentent-de-s-approprier-la-loi (Accessed: 04/06/2020)

Another object of concern within the law was that of labor relations. Art 14 specifically indicated the obligation to abstain from mixing in work conflicts and from exerting surveillance of political, philosophical or religious opinions, nor membership to trade unions.

One of the results of the law, was the division of many companies that hitherto were offering different services, such as cleaning, gardening, building management, etc. mainly services with little training needs for employees. The new legislation established a clean division between these sectors and the need to create specific companies to provide guarding services. Companies like RMO, Baco, AINSI created their subsidiaries specialized in security and surveillance.

> "This compliance with the law is even becoming a competitive argument. The president of the RMO group, Miloud Eddari, justifies: 'This authorization is a recognition of the technical and operational capacities of our company.' "[344]

A further development of security regulations that came simultaneously with the law 27.06 was in the domain of bank premises. On the 12th June 2008, the Proffessionl Group of Moroccan Banks (*Groupement professionnel des banques marocaines*, GPBM) and the Ministry of Interior signed an agreement on the need to equip all banking agencies with videosurveillance and other security measures, which was later regulated by law[345][346].

TABLE 1: Summary of Regulations on Private Security

Year	Title	Object of the Regulation
1916	Dahir du 25 Aout 1916 (23 Chaoual 1334) sur les gardes particuliers	To bring "gardes particuliers ou agents de surveillance" under the authority of the state.

[344] French in the original: "Cette mise en conformité vis-à-vis de la loi devient même un argument concurrentiel. Le président du groupe RMO, Miloud Eddari, justifie: «Cette autorisation est une reconnaissance des capacités techniques et opérationnelles de notre société»." "De Bonnes Sources", *L'Economiste*, Edition N°:3922 Le 05/12/2012. Online: https://www.leconomiste.com/article/901187-de-bonnes-sources (Accessed: 05/04/19)

[345] Le Matin (2009) "En attente de conformité sécuritaire", LE MATIN 21st May 2009. Online: https://lematin.ma/supplement/economie/2009/MAROC-EXPORT_Relancer-La-machine/Agences-de-Societe-generale_En-attente-de-conformite-securitaire/113675.html

[346] Mansouri, Saloua (2009). "BRAQUAGES : Nos banques sont mal protégées!", Challenge, 31 - 01 – 2009. Online: https://www.maghress.com/fr/challenge/4041

1933	Dahir du 7 avril 1933 (11 jia 1351) relatif aux entreprises ou sociétés de gardiennage ou police privée	To stop confusion between private guards and public security forces.
1951	Dahir du 10 décembre 1951 (10 rebia I 1371) relatif aux gardes particuliers	It repeals the 1916 dahir. Guards have to be sworn (*assermenté*) Their role as enforcement agents (*agents verbalisateurs*).
2007	Loi n° 27-06 relative aux activités de gardiennage et de transport de fonds	It organizes the sector of private security, the conditions and requirements to operate, as well as its control and authorization, and the distribution of responsibilities

3. The Business of Private Security

It is very hard to estimate the amount and proportion of the sector. Among the sources that I have found none of them seem to have the same numbers. In 2014, the newspaper *L'Economiste*[347] estimated around 1.200 companies, many of them with less than 5 employees. About 70.000 people were thought to work in the private security sector[348]. However, at the

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[347] L'Economiste. 2014. "Sécurité privée: La profession en quête de standards", *L'Economiste.com* N°:4390 Le 30/10/2014. https://www.leconomiste.com/article/961227-securite-privee-la-profession-en-quete-de-standards

[348] For comparative purposes, Spain had 1.340 companies and about 83.000 employees in 2018. In: Yoldi, Marta. (2021). "La seguridad privada, cada vez más presente", in Forbes, 20th June 2019. Online: https://forbes.es/empresas/50348/la-seguridad-privada-cada-vez-mas-presente/

end of April 2013[349], only 368 companies had requested the authorization to work in the sector within the legal framework (Étude Sectorielle Gardiennage et Transport de Fonds, 2015). In 2019, other sources indicated around 3.000 companies.

If we focus exclusively on the 'Gardiennage', 479 companies had registered a trade mark under the activity of 'Gardiennage' on the 22th October 2020. For the Activity of Security, there were 1.596 registered companies[350], and these might include services of physical security as well.

There are two reasons for the divergence in numbers. One, companies that are legally registered are not necessarily active, so they might not have requested the authorization. That means that they legally exist but might not have any contracts in any region[351], nor any employees. The second reason, however, is that a lot of companies have been working on 'security services' since the 2000s, and once the legal framework has been in place it has taken them a while to get all the bureaucracy straight. Others might be working without the legal authorization, as a small-sample survey found out (Souibaa et al., 2018). And as I was told many times in my interviews, the state has no particular interest in implementing the law to the fullest as long as these companies do not cause much trouble (most of the guards that SME companies provide are really like janitors, they are not allowed any kind of weapons, etc)[352]. The sector is a source of employment for uneducated men. Strict enforcement of legislation would be counterproductive for the fight against unemployment[353].

The number of people that this sector employs is also unstable. According to what a CEO of a local company told me:

> "We for example, we use 10.000 during the year, but we have 3.500. Some will tell you that they have 20.000 but they are not counting right. And the Ministry of

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[349] The 24th of April 2013 was the deadline established by the decree for security companies to request their authorisation to continue their work.

[350] OMPIC. Office Marocain de la Propriété Industrielle et Commerciale. Keyword Search: Gardiennage. Keyword Search: Securite https://www.directinfo.ma/resultat-search-mot-cle . (Accessed: 23/02/2020).

[351] The region (with its administration of the wilaya) is the administrative level at which authorizations are granted.

[352] I presume that the MoI and the wilayat have bigger numbers than those publically available, but I haven't been able to get a straight answer. People from companies tell me that one can't know the exact number because they change everyday and they are not centralized and agregated, but it seems hard to believe there is no up-to-date list at the MoI.

[353] See the latest official numbers in the Haut Commissariat au Plan: https://www.hcp.ma/Taux-de-chomage_r72.html

> Interior cannot tell because they can come here and ask me and I can say whatever I want"[354].

Except for a few European and North-American companies (Wackenhut, G4S but also Jamain Baco), many of the private security activities were carried out through unofficial or informal work before the 2000s. Guards in Public Schools were civil servants and were only replaced by external workers after they retired. For the most part, Security Guards meant old men or unqualified youth, rural migrants, unemployed that would work at parking spaces, residential buildings or areas, providing factory surveillance, controlling access at night clubs and bars, etc.

Before the 2007 law, the companies that offered visible guards' services (in non-critical sites) were mainly those working on other services to companies like cleaning or gardening[355]. It was part of the Facility Management sector.

The authorizations to operate are regionally granted through the wilayat or the provincial prefecture, and there are no public agregated data. Nevertheless, the register of companies at the Moroccan Office of Industrial and Commercial Property (*Office Marocain de la Proprieté Industrielle et Commercialle*, OMPIC) shows companies where the activities they perform are still an array of mix services from cleaning to surveillance. This requirement set up by the law is not being fully implemented.

In the case of RMO, for example, the company registered different new subsidiaries, a specific for security in 2007 (see table of active companies from RMO):

TABLE 2: Example of Registration dates for RMO Companies

Name	Activity	Registration date	Capital (MAD)
RMO Maroc	*Entreprise se livrant pour son compte au placement ou a la gestion de valeurs mobilieres*	26/08/1988	8.000.000

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[354] Interview in Casablanca at the company's headquarters, Spring of 2019.

[355] "Sécurité/nettoyage, un duo presque inséparable", was said in L'Economiste (2007) "La menace terroriste relance le gardiennage", *L'Economiste*, N°:2504 Le 12/04/2007. https://www.leconomiste.com/article/la-menace-terroriste-relance-le-gardiennage

RMO Technologi es SARL	*Fournir des services ayant pour objet la surveillance, par tous moyens legalement autorises, ou le gardiennage de lieux publics ou prive, de biens meubles ou immeubles, ainsi que la securite des personnes se trouvant dans ces lieux ou immeubles*	16/12/1998	7.000.000
RMO Nettoyage	*Nettoyage propriete hygiene deratisation desinsectisation jardinage*	27/05/2005	3.700.000
RMO Gardiennag e Protection	*Gardiennage surveillance securite distribution installation materiel de securite*	20/03/2007	100.000

Source: www.ompic.ma (Accessed**:** 22/10/2020)

3.1 Companies, Actors and Elites

Although the sector is highly fragmented, in 2016 it was estimated that 85% of services were provided by only 10% of the existing companies[356], indicating a wide difference in the size of companies. The size of the company, in terms of turnout and number of employees for example, and the amount and size of the contracts they get relates to the type of company they are. In private physical security, as well as in technological security services, companies can be classified into four different types of structures:

1. Transnational Corporations specialized in Security Industries and Services
2. Big Holdings with a horizontal and diversified portfolio of investments, mostly specializing in Facility Management and Temporary Recruitment
3. Highly specialized Local Security Companies
4. Small and Medium companies

The first group includes companies that are transnational in origin, with their Headquarters abroad, and specialized in providing security. This is the case of Brinks, G4S, Securitas or Prosegur, with an unequivocally security identity (whether it is providing technology

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[356] Ismaili, Fayçal. (2016). "Sécurité privée: un marché de 6 milliards de dirhams", *Kiosk360*, 21/10/2016. Online: https://fr.le360.ma/economie/securite-privee-un-marche-de-6-milliards-de-dirhams-92187

surveillance or physical security). Among these companies Brinks and G4S dominate the market of bank security, especially funds transfer for all banks except the national Bank AlMaghreb. In the general commercial security G4S is the leading company. Although all these companies have foreign capital and entity, other TNCs also compete in the security sector.

The second group, big holdings, also includes TNCs of mostly European origin, mainly French, although most of them have undergone a process of Moroccanization (Chapter 5). This is the case of several:

- Baco Protect (from the originally French Jamain Baco Group)
- RMO Gardiennage Protection (from the originally French Group RMO)
- ADIA (from the Swiss Group ADIA and merged with ECCO into ADECCO in 1990.)
- Alpha Prestations (from the originally French ECCO)
- Derichebourg Guarding (from the originally French Group Derichebourg)
- Cleanco Service (from the originally French Group Atalian)

What these companies have in common is their mostly French origin and their specialization in Facility Management or Temporary Employment, that is, services to other companies, mostly in cleaning services, catering, recruitement, but also waste management. The main characteristic of these companies is that either with initial foreign capital or not they are bigger groups with a diversified portfolio of services that include security. The Facility Management sector has grown globally in the last decades, and it has been pointed at as one of the mechanisms for reforms of public institutions within the neoliberal agenda (Boge, 2010).

A study developed in 2013[357] found that most regulated companies – those that had already accessed the specific authorization regulated by law – were part of a national holding or group.

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[357] The sample of the study was in fact small, as only 3 of the 53 companies that were surveyed were part of a multinational company. 31 out of 53 were working only on one site. 93,9% of the guards of the surveyed companies was deployed between the regions of Casablanca and Rabat.

The third is a group of companies that is the least accessible in terms of research. These are stand-alone companies, local security companies with a fairly successful record of market gains and contracts. Among them we find Esdata and AlOmra. These companies are closely related to high ranks of the public security sector and the *makhzen*.

A fourth type of company involves Small and Medium Enterprises, specialized or otherwise. They are smaller actors in the market but sometimes their promoters have a public security background or an international training and experience in the sector. Also included in this group are smaller entrepreneurs investing in the sector for non-vocational reasons. This group would include most of the companies in the sector. Table 3 shows the classification of origin of some of the companies studied.

TABLE 3: Original field of companies

ORIGIN	Defense and Security Sector	Facility Management Other Business	Unknown
PROVISION	Security	Gardiennage	
COMPANIES	Alomra G4S Brinks ESDATA Securitas Prosegur Protectas Xact Security Securimag	Jamain Baco Derichebourg RMO Anichtrad Vigiprom Cleanco (ATALIAN Group) ADIA	AINSI Byblos Casa Technique Gardiennage

3.1.1 Founders: background in public security

While companies are the visible objects of study, the interest of this research lies rather on the actors that manage them and that take the strategic decisions within them. The business class in Morocco is not homogeneous (Catusse 2007:80), among its members some stem from elite families that spread across borders or within, and others are small local actors benefiting from a particular resource on their hands. The resources that smaller actors might

obtain or possess are specifically two: a political connection[358] that might assure them a specific public contract; or a certain amount of financial capital to be able to start a business.

Among the thousands of companies that participate in the security sector business, for example, only a few of their CEO's are clearly the elite that Berdouzi calls a 'strategic minority' (Berdouzi 2002). One can identify, however, similar patterns of business than in other sectors at different degrees. As with the best positioned business elites that emerged in the post-colonial period, a multisectorial and holding model of business (Catusse 2007:80), the main companies in the private security business respond to a similar model. These are big holdings invested in very different economic sectors, but also already experienced in catering, cleaning services, and in general in providing services to the industries and other companies. RMO and Jamain Baco fall into this description, as the following paragraphs elaborate.

The Group RMO (Relation Main d'Œuvre) was created in 1964 in Grenoble, France, as a company for temporary employment. It eventually became the 5th largest company for temporary employment in France and expanded in different countries. The company arrived in Morocco in 1988 under the name Maroc Travail Temporaire, led by Dominique Ney[359]. The French Group filed for bunkrupcy in 1991 and a judicial process landed his CEO and founder Marc Braillon in prison. Foreign subsidiaries were sold, and Miloud Eddari became the CEO of the now Moroccan Group, now led by Mehdi Eddari. In 2008, the company came under the spotlight for an investigation into unpaid social security contributions, which, contrary to the judicial process for other companies, was solved through a closed negotiation between RMO and the CNSS[360].

The Groupe Jamain Baco was founded in 1926, under the French 'Protectorate', in the chemical industry founded by a certain Jamain. In 1977, the company in its entirety was bought by Abdelhaq Kabbaj. The group has ever since grown and now is composed of various companies specializing in differeny Facility management services. The Group was very active during the first two years of the Covid-19 pandemic due to their disinfecting

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[358] In the cases individually identified, these kinds of connections of SMEs would be with what Feliu and Parejo (2013) call bureaucratic elites, part of the state network at regional and local levels and with a certain capacity for discretionary decisons.

[359] Dominique Ney later founded the Moroccan branch of Swiss company ADIA, also active in security service, and merged with ECCO into ADECCO in 1990.

[360] Machrafi, Khalil (2008) "Arriérés des cotisations sociales : Des entreprises d'intérim dans le collimateur", in *L'Economiste*, 28th May 2008. https://blog.ojraweb.com/arrieres-des-cotisations-sociales-des-entreprises-d-interim-dans-le-collimateur/ (Accessed: 20/08/2021)

services. Jamain Baco was especially well placed providing cleaning services for banks, but also industrial and energy plants.

In 1984 Jamain Baco created the branch of 'gardiennage'. In 2008 they created the subsidiary Baco Teleystems, specialized in electronic security, with a surveillance office. In 2011 the human security branch became a fully-fledged company called BACO Protect. The security branch represents about one third of the group's revenues. The current CEO is Amine Kabbaj[361], close relative of the royal advisor Omar Kabbaj, known as 'the Africa advisor'.

While the relation of the Kabbaj family with the political center is evident, identifying the Politically Connected Firms (PCFs), as Saadi calls them (2016), through the names of their main shareholders or head executives is particularly difficult in this sector. Nevertheless, I have identified some companies with direct relations with the public security sector or the *makhzen*. This has been done through either the companies' websites; commercial court's website; the Moroccan Office Industrial and Commercial Property's website; the Casablanca Stock Exchange; and newspapers. Access to this data had to be done manually in the absence of an agregated public database.

Unexceptionally, 'revolving doors' in Morocco are also present in the security sector. "Revolving doors" refers to the practice of former public officers to enter private businesses once they leave their public roles or while holding a private mandate. The potential conflict of interests as well as the privileged access to information and contacts situates these actors in powerful positions within the business. In Morocco, I found cases of former high-up officers from the Ministry of Interior or of the Royal Gendarmerie, as well as active members of the Armed Forces or the Police, that had set up private security companies or were thinking about creating a related business. This is not surprising[362] and it is common practice in other business sectors as well.

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361 Amine Kabbaj (PDG since February 2016). Amine has followed a traditional career. He studied at the Lycee Lyautey I (1982-1990), Collège Ste Barbe (1990-1992) and has an MBA at a school in France. He started his professional life after school as assistant at the service Nettoyage, the biggest branch of the company in 1995, and in less than 3 years he was the Department Director of the Cleaning Services. Finally in 2003, he became the General Driector of the Group and in 2016 the PDG. From 2003 he has been the DG, from 1998 to may 2003 he was the Department Director of the Cleaning Services, 1996-1998, responsible exploitation nettoyage, 1995-1996 Assistant-Service Explitation Nettoyage. Online: https://www.linkedin.com/in/aminekabbaj

362 For comparison, former Spanish Minister of Interior, Jaime Mayor Oreja, and members of his family, had been involved in various companies of private security. *Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo*. Sala De Lo Civil. 6th November 2008. Date: 06/11/2008. *Recurso de Casación* 2126/2003.

Other SME specialized in security have also been founded by men with a former public security background in all levels, from former policemen or the royal gendarmerie. They might not have specific social capital or benefitial access to contracts, but do have a background and training in the profession. Some small companies have also been founded by MREs with private training or security specialization abroad.

As the market emerged and expanded, firms became specialized and, apart from the lower ranks of guards, higher ranks were recruited from retired police officers or military personnel, as is the case in most countries (White, 2011). Indeed, the 2007 law explicitly mentions the limits of police officers and former military personnel in article 9: "Under no circumstances may the status of former police officer or former soldier of any of the company's managers or employees be mentioned."[363]

Exogenous Actors

Indentifying the main actors in the private security business is conducted here not only for those that are directly involved in companies, but it also includes exogenous actors. That means, that the external dimension of the research looks at the postion of the sector within the socio-economic and political system in Morocco. Therefore the target interest goes beyond establishing the competitive relations that position certain actors wihtin the sector, but rather how elite-actors use their resources to increase the value of private security and expand the sector's footing within Morocco. In this sense, they create alliances or compete with other actors outside the private security sector.

Some of the main actors with whom private security actors can interact are: public security officers, legislators (parlamentarians), media actors, *makhzen* or actors closely related to primary elite, business actors, regional and local authorities (bureaucratic elites), clients and potential clients, International Organizations, NGOs, etc.

Legislators and political parties were fundamental in advancing security regulations, especially after the first years of the GWoT (9/11 and 16May). Although the push for regulation came from the Ministry of Interior that proposed the bill and led discussions for the elaboration of

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[363] French in the original: "En aucun cas il ne pourra être fait état de la qualité d'ancien fontionnaire de police ou d'ancien militaire que pourrait avoir l'un des dirigeants ou employés de l'enterprise".

the 27/06 Law, legislators played a role and were approached by the concerted effort of certain companies (see below).

The liberal Moroccan media outlet *L'Économiste* was one of the newspapers that brought up the subject of private security more often during the 1990s, in part advocating for this "modern" model. Other outlets such as *LaVieÉco* regularly relaid information and opinions about the sector. During the 1990s the most mentioned companies were: RMO, ADIA Maroc[364], Eagle Sécurité, Wackenhut, ECCO[365], and Alpha Prestations.

As mentioned above, the sector was not well received by some political and security elites in the country. When asked by a journalist, a CEO of a company refused the idea that they were there to fight insecurity: "Not at all, since it is the authorities who are in charge of maintaining order and intervening in case of lack of security"[366]. The companies insisted through the 1990s about the distinctive role of private security, distancing themselves from public security concerns. The focus and frame for the expansive need of their services was mostly concentrated around messages of 'modernity' and 'prevention'.

The media presented the issue as a regulation problem, in light of an apparently obvious need for enhanced private protection, especially for companies. The focus was on prevention[367] against robberies and loss of products from industries at the hands of their own workers.

3.2 Resources of Power

Companies compete for market shares, position and contracts through different means. In general, actors' means or resources of power to advance their position in a certain political system refer to diffferent categories. These include the state, capital, ideology, information

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[364] ADIA Maroc was the local branch of a Swiss company for temporary employment.

[365] Merged with ADIA into Adecco.

[366] "Est-ce pour pallier le sentiment d'insécurité ambiant? "Pas du tout", répond un directeur de société de gardiennage, "puisqu'il revient aux autorités de maintenir l'ordre et d'intervenir en cas de manque de sécurité"." "Le gardiennage organisé freiné par le vide juridique" *L'Economiste* N°:190 Le 27/07/1995. https://www.leconomiste.com/article/le-gardiennage-organise-freine-par-le-vide-juridique (Accessed: 5/04/2019)

[367] L'Economiste. (1997). Agents de sécurité: Les pompiers du travail. *L'Économiste*, N°:289 Le 17/07/1997. https://leconomiste.com/article/agents-de-securite-les-pompiers-du-travail (Accessed: 05/04/2019)

and coercion (Navarro Muñoz, 2015) or even the population. These categories are useful to analyze the potential for power accumulation through the way they are mobilized. Farrés-Fernández (2018) goes further and classifies resources of power into material or inmaterial; and into circumstancial, cumulative or structuring, according to their short, medium or long-term potential of accumulation and impact in the structure of power (Chapter 2 and 10).

A modified version of Farrés-Fernández's Table is a starting point for identifying specifically the resources available and effective for the accumulation of power inside and around the security sector in Morocco. The internal and external dimensions of these resources effectiveness are essential. The approach here looks at both dimensions. First, the external dimension interrogates how a small sector increases its footing within the economy and social landscape in Morocco. That means that private security actors compete with external actors in order to advance or increase the value of their resources and their position. Similarly, private security actors, allied in different objectives and interests, compete to define the rules of the game.

TABLE 4: Resources of Power in the Security Sector

Resource of Power	Material	Immaterial
Circumstantial	Capital, a tool, a weapon, a contract, employees, authorization	Specific information about tenders Specific connection with someone
Cumulative	Capital, real estate, military units, manpower BIGDATA/technology	Knowledge, technology Prestige, a modern and expert image Social connections, same background
Structuring	Media outlets, Educational system, organizations Public Security Organizations	Ideology, Norms and Institutions Legislation, Inspections, State. practices and ideas. Neoliberalism

Through this approach the distinction between the French-oriented companies and the US ones becomes clear. The French companies, big or small, have a stronger foothold in the business sector and have had, by way of their diversified portfolio, more access to public and industrial contracts. Nevertheless, as the sector becomes more highly specialized, with the inclusion of new services like risk assesments, more technologically oriented services, etc., more specialized TNCs, with a global prestige and name in the sector, as well as with better training and labor conditions, increase their atractiveness for potential clients.

3.3 Formal and Informal Networks

Another element of analysis that data collection allows is the configuration of relations between the different actors in the sector. This section explores the networking strategies of companies in the process that led to the adoption of the Law 27.06 and after its adoption.

The companies in the private security sector united through different platforms. The first platform was the AMEG, created around 2002, and which later was replaced by the *Association Interprofessionnelles de la Sécurité privée* (AISP), presided by Rachid Aktouf, from Jamain Baco. AISP was created by around 20 of the biggest companies in the sector (G4S, RMO, Jamain Baco)[368]. In 2014, AISP signed a cooperation agreement with SNES, the French counterpart for security enterprises[369], in the framework of the first Preventica Fair in Casablanca[370].

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[368] Sylla, Adama. (2015). "Les opérateurs majorent leur facturation" in *Challenge*, 3-9 July 2015. https://www.cfcim.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/securite_privee.pdf

[369] AEF Info. (2014). "Le Snes et l'AISP-Maroc annoncent la signature d'une convention 'de coopération et de partenariat'". AEF, Dépêche n°478507. Online: https://www.aefinfo.fr/depeche/478507-le-snes-et-laisp-maroc-annoncent-la-signature-dune-convention-de-cooperation-et-de-partenariat (Accessed: 20/04/2021)

[370] SNES (2014) "Rappel: Avril 2014 Casablanca, dans le cadre du Salon Préventica International : Signature d'une convention de partenariat et d'Echanges entre le SNES et son confrEre marocain AISP. SNES website: http://esnes.safetyhost.net/news.html (Accessed 20/04/2021)

Rachid Aktouf (on the left) with members of SNES, Casablanca 2014. Source: SNES website

Some of the companies had a close relationship with the SNES in France (*Syndicat Nationale des Enterprises de Sécurité*), co-organizor of the Préventica Fair[371]. The growth of the security market had brought together the big ones, well connected internationally, united to lobby for a regulation of the sector.

> "In 1993, when VIP started to act in the security market, it was mainly multinationals that used this service. After the May 16 attacks, the market exploded. The liberal professions, small businesses and cafes have also become customers," says Madiou Hacen, general manager of VIP. "The need for security services is growing," says Mohamed Kadouri, general manager of Altaïr Sécurité Maroc"[372]

The Forum Preventica was organized by French stakeholders as the first step within Africa, with Senegal as the second stop in these fora in the continent. AlOmra cofinanced the event for a few years but finally dropped it because "it was always the same"[373] and did not see any potential growth in it. AlOmra finally set up their own think tank (Atlantis)[374] and security

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[371] https://www.preventica.com/actu-enbref-signature-convention-partenariat-snes-aisp-1160414.php

[372] "«En 1993, quand VIP a commencé d'agir sur le marché de gardiennage, il y avait principalement les multinationales qui recouraient à ce service. Après les attentats du 16 mai, le marché a explosé. Les métiers libéraux, les petits commerces et les cafés sont devenus aussi clients», témoigne Madiou Hacen, directeur général de VIP. «Les besoins en service de gardiennage vont crescendo», constate Mohamed Kadouri, directeur général d'Altaïr Sécurité Maroc." *L'Economiste* (2007) "La menace terroriste relance le gardiennage", *L'Economiste*, N°:2504 Le 12/04/2007. https://www.leconomiste.com/article/la-menace-terroriste-relance-le-gardiennage

[373] Interview in Casablanca, 2019.

[374] See Atlantis' website: www.atlantis-center.org

conference (Africa Security Forum)[375], in partnership with FITS[376], Forum Internationale des Technologies de Sécurité[377].

At the time of my fieldwork (2019-2020), the sector was disunited, and entrenched in different strategies, and although the AISP was still active, there were no core or unifying lobbying objectives. Having achieved their structuring interest for the sector, the big players had either lost their capacity or their interest in coordinating with other actors in the business.

> "No, it's everyone for themselves. AISP is nothing, we are alone. There is a lot of incompetence, they are not credible." Interview with CEO of security TNC, April 2019.[378]

Apart the AISP, a second existing platform is that of *Association professionnelle des agences de sécurité au Maroc* (APASM), representing the smaller companies[379] and not very active[380].

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[375] See the Forum's website: http://africa-security-forum.org/

[376] See FITS's website: www.fits-forum.org

[377] The president of FITS was Allain Juillet, former head of intelligence for the Directorate General for External Security (DGSE)—France's foreign intelligence service. www.cfcim.org/magazine/21959 (Accessed: 2021_05_20)

[378] « Non, c'est chaqu'un pour soi-même. AISP c'est rien, il y a que chaqu'un. Il y a beaucoup d'incompetence, ils ne sont pas crédibles. » Interview with CEO of security TNC, April 2019.

[379] Rachid El Mounacifi, Swedish criminologist of Moroccan origin, is the president of APASM, as well as the CEO of Dreampart Security (https://www.praeventionstag.de/nano.cms/personen/id/3472). See: https://aujourdhui.ma/culture/rachid-el-mounacifi-lart-et-la-maniere-de-securiser-90376

[380] Another grouping present in the country is that of the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) International, the largest association of private security professionals in the United States, and it has since 2001 expanded to other parts of the world. However, so far, the only role of this network is to provide a certain prestige and quality to those that become members, but it does not act in a concerted way in Morocco to advance the sector's or its members' interests.

Posters at Casablanca Security Fair, Préventica, 2019

AISP and ASIS stands at Préventica Fair. Most of the time I was there, AISP stand was empty and no one was in charge, only some of the RMO employees would be there some times. ASIS was mostly represented by small entrepreneurs who promted new membership to the organization. Source: Author, Préventica, Casablanca 2019.

One of the many images Morocco is willing to project globally is that of an advanced techno-savvy country in the North African area, with a high potential in securing the West African region. In the French military intervention in Northern Mali's Azawad, the control and intervention capacity over the communication systems and networks in the area provided by the Moroccan Intelligence forces seem to have constituted a key element to fighting criminal networks. Similarly, the Coronavirus Pandemic that started in 2020 was also an opportunity to promote this image of a socially and technologically advanced country.

The African market is being coveted by many, including Alomra Group, that has offices in Ghana and somewhere in the Gulf, and that, through its Think Tank Atlantis focuses on African security. They also developed the Africa Security Forum for 3 years. Alomra also works in partnership with Mauritanian Serval Security[381].

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[381] See Serval Group's website: www.servalgroup.com

Companies present, in this sense, very distinct market strategies that affect and are affected by their alliances and their social capital. Table 5 below tabulates some of these markers and caractheristics that will be later discussed in the following section.

TABLE 5: Main characteristics of Private Security Companies

	TNC	Local SEC	Holding Subs	SME
Type of company	Highly Formalized	Formalized but lack of transparency	Formalized but some traditional practices	Strong variations of degrees of formalization
Type of goods and services	High investment capacity, International prestige and social capital among other TNCs	High-security	Oriented to Facility management, services to other companies	Guards and other services
Actors within the company	Business oriented	Public Security and Political Elites	Business actors	Some individual background in security
Resources of power	Prestige, experience, capital, business connections	Public Security and Political Connections	Well inserted in the business sector and in contact with main business elites	
Patterns of relationships and social ties	Direct access to high-ranking business and some political actors	Direct access to high-ranking security and political actors	Varying degrees of access to political actors	Varying degrees of access to political actors in different levels
Power relations	Powerful but still need to negotiate	Unknown	Cliental networks	Fragile, personal
Networks	In 2003, AISP, later TNCs lost interest. Western oriented.	Unknown, some partner for Joint Ventures	AISP. Open to other African countries, China…	Informal, low

| **Dynamics within and between networks** | Sporadic and circumstancial alliances within the sector for lobbying purposes Trash-talking of smaller companies | Personal networks, similar education, status, social life, etc. | Personal networks, similar education, status, social life, etc. | Contacts in the administration are needed to land contracts |

4. Moroccan Political Economy: Cronyism, Neopatrimonialism and Globalization

Whether in the textile and clothing sector (Cammett, 2004) or in the social sector (Bergh 2012; Kreitmeyr 2018), traditional elites and networks are being complemented by new individuals that have the ability to mobilize or access other resources of power. This new emerging neoliberal networks consolidate what some have called authoritarian neoliberalism (Bogaert, 2018; Kreitmeyr 2018) by way of adapting power accumulation to the new economic model.

The phenomenon may also be observed in the political realm (Parejo Fernández, 2009). Although its composition is not public, the Royal Advisory Council, for instance, has been gradually substituting some of the traditional advisors whose main asset was their loyalty to the crown and their so-called '*makhzen* pedigree', with other more sectorial and specialized individuals, many coming from the private sector (Iraqi, 2016).

This substitution of the nature of actors within the higher echellons of the power structure (from a 'loyalty' pre-condition to a business profile) involves two interesting observations. First, a substitution of profiles does not necessarily imply a substitution of genealogies, but rather a different generation coming from within the same families. Second, a change in profiles may not significantly alter the structures of power or, to put it in another way, the spaces of connection, socialization and relations.

The question in this chapter was to explore the singularities of the sector of private security and identify differences and similar patterns to that of other sectors or to the general dynamics of the political economy of Morocco. Morocco is a neopatrimonial system where access to busniess and financial ressources is determined politically, especially by the

makhzen[382]. Access to markets "is made possible through state patronage over business or direct control of means of production by the makhzen." (Saadi, 2016).

Contrary to Cammett's and Catusse's visions of possible general changes in the neopatrimonial model through liberalization, Saadi argues that changes can only happen in the margins, and as long as they do not alter the fundamental pillars of power. The author explains why cronyism has not disappeared and has even been strenghtened by rollback neoliberal policies in light of two elements:

- the inexistence of political liberalization, which means that regime elites continue to interfere in economy
- the fact that neoliberalization only redefines the role of the state but it doesn't reduce it.

In his study of the manufacturing sector, Saadi finds that politically connected firms[383] "in various manufacturing industries […] outperform their non-connected counterparts. The superior performance of connected firms is due, in part, to the privileges they enjoy because of their political connectedness." (2016, p. 20). In the present research, evidence points to the idea that the interest of the *makhzen*-business elite in the private security sector is not big, and this might explain a higher capacity of foreign (non-connected) firms to succeed. It must be said, however, that TNCs that are not connected politically do develop strategies to gain this type of connections by seeking to appoint politically connected individuals to the higher positions in the country[384].

This remains to be seen in the future, as the value of security commercial provision rises, since there is a clear division between old business groups or well-connected individuals with some degree of political influence, and non-connected firms with high resources and globally powerful positions, especially TNCs. The oligopolisitc tendencies that we have seen within the sector in Morocco, for instance in the case of funds transportation (Brinks and G4S), but

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[382] "Passé chez les patrons, après 15 ans au cœur du pouvoir, Salaheddine Mezouar bute contre un constat implacable: c'est l'État et non le secteur privé qui mène la danse." In Dalil, Reda & Savage, Thomas. (2019) "Salaheddine Mezouar: "L'État contrôle tout". *TelQuel*, 17th September 2019. https://telquel.ma/2019/09/13/salaheddine-mezouar-letat-contro%CC%82le-tout_1650695/ (Access: 2020_04_23).

[383] Mohammed Said Saadi uses two categories of firms, the PCF and the NCF. My use of these categories is only descriptive as most of the information about these connections is inaccessible.

[384] TNCs are very aware of this necessity, as one foreign member of the executive board of one of the biggest TNCs operating in another sector in Morocco told me. My informant casually confirmed the issue of political connectedness and told me they had managed to get X person in their Advisory board; X being a very close financial partner of the King.

also at a global level, might furhter pressure in favor of the rise of non-connected firms ahead of the competition.

Up to date, the private security sector follows the same patterns that Saadi found for other sectors following the work of Cammett in the garment's industry. According to Saadi, it is the persistence of cronyism that "caused segments of the non-crony bourgeoisie to voice their claims for the rule of law, a level-playing field, and transparency" (Saadi, 2016, p. 7). This was the case of the lobbying for a regulation of the private security market. The disunion of the AISP and the disappointment expressed by some in the real efficacity of standarized norms as opposed to their aribitrary and politically-motivated use also shows the limited influence of the state. The state here becomes more a value, tool or resource of power mostly concentrated at the regime's hands than a constraining and levelling structure.

Nevertheless, it is intersting to note the dominance of big TNCs in the market of security, that is, of not-politically connected actors. How can we explain this? Reading Western authors working on neoliberalism can give us the wrong perspective at first. Regulations seem to be a way to expel the smaller local companies, the big white fish using the state to eat the small fish. This is also the dominant narrative in media and among companies:

> "The problem is that the market remains closed to medium-sized agencies. Airports, power plants, oil companies, hotel chains, embassies and other large contracts are entrusted to giants such as G4 Sécuricor, Brink's, RMO, Egida and Jamain Bacco, which manage to obtain large contracts. These contracts represent real gold mines. For example, the US Embassy in Morocco alone employs 300 people for security and guarding."[385]

But that may not be the main motivation. The key is the neopatrimonial nature of Morocco's political economy. In this context, capturing the state to expel small 'unprofessional' companies is one motivation indeed, but another driver behind lobbying for state regulations is the need for not-politically connected companies to be able to use their other resources, specifically capital, presitge, global position and know-how, to dominate. They know that the political and *makhzen* connection is essential and try to reduce the value of that resource in

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[385] "Le problème, c'est que le marché demeure fermé aux agences de taille moyenne. Les aéroports, centrales électriques, compagnies pétrolières, chaînes d'hôtels, ambassades et autres gros marchés sont confiés aux géants comme G4 Sécuricor, Brink's, RMO, Egida et Jamain Bacco qui réussissent à obtenir de gros contrats, souligne-t-on. Ces contrats représentent en effet de véritables mines d'or. Par exemple, l'ambassade des Etats-Unis au Maroc emploie à elle seule 300 personnes pour la sécurité et le gardiennage." In Lavieeco (2008) "Marché de la sécurité: 500 entreprises et un vrai bazar !", in *LaVieÉco*, 7th March 2008. www.lavieeco.com/economie/marche-de-la-securite-500-entreprises-et-un-vrai-bazar-3157/ (Access: 2021_03_13)

the competion by establishing other rules that might trump the traditional regime cronyism. They need the state for that.

Chapter 8 - Localizing Security Industries

 "L'usine explicitement s'apparente au couvent, à la forteresse, à une ville close; le gardien 'n'ouvrira les portes qu'à la rentrée des ouvriers, et après que la cloche qui annonce la reprise des travaux aura été sonnée'" (Foucault, 1975, *Surveiller et punir* Gallimard, p. 167).

"Il font la sécurité, mais ils ne sont pas sécurisés eux-mêmes" (Interview with female activist, Rabat, 2020).

The aim of this chapter is to describe the commercial security sector from other dimensions than those approached so far. This chapter follows a journey from the body of those providing security through the place where they do to finally the bodies that are 'secured'. The first section looks at the demography and nature of private security employment and at the image and representation of private security laborers in the provision of security. The question tackled here is how this employment and deployment dialogue with their counterparts in the public security and with the public notion of security. Second, I lay out the loci of the security provision and the different implications this provision have in some areas where they are deployed. The chapter finally engages with the ongoing debate on the reasons behind the increase of private security in light of Morocco's case.

1. Mapping the bodies of commercial security: who is secur(ity)?

Anyone who has paid attention in the West to the people that secure access to buildings and shops, to factories and commercial sites, might have noticed the racialized nature of this work. In Europe or in the West, this racialized nature of guardianship is obvious and it intersects with class and, notoriously, gender. But what about Morocco? Are there racial faultlines that can be found in the exploitation of this labor force? Here we might face the critique mentioned by Howell & Richter-Montpetit (2019) about the potential target of violent security practices:

> "If it is to apprehend the raciality and coloniality of contemporary liberal order and war, including the postcolonial and settler colonial present, [Feminist Security Studies] will have to grapple, not only with the ways subjects are targeted differently for security interventions by virtue of racialization but, more fundamentally, with the mutually constitutive nature of modernity and colonialism. (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2019)

While in a global perspective security labor is organized through colonial, gender and class identities (Chisholm, 2016), in Morocco, there is an obvious class and gender logic to the role and organization of the sector as well as to its labor force. It is not through a racialized axis that this market is fed, but more acutely through the destruction of industry employment, rural migration into the city and generally untrained working class men. Two unrelated guards that I talked to in Rabat had a similar story to tell. They were both living in Salé, they had worked in textile factories and been laid off. Both had tried their luck in the informal market selling garments on street markets. They had finally obtained a more or less secure job as security guards, one at a pharmacy, and the other at an education institution[386].

There are however hierarchies within the private security sector, and a division between the 'expert' and the so-called 'unskilled' laborer. On the other side of the service, on the client side, the colonial and class differences are further highlighted, as many foreign companies require especial security for the higher positions when they visit the country.

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[386] Interviews 3 and 19, March and June 2019, respectively. Both interviews took place in Rabat.

www.igs-securite.ma www.securitygroup.ma (Both retrieved: 8th April 2019)

1.1 The supporting role of protection

Although the first post-independence available information on PSCs in Morocco is for the protection of official US facilities, the emergence of a sector *per se* in private security was mostly connected to providing services for other private companies operating in the country.

One cannot help but notice here the similarities between security agents, cleaning services and even other kind of logistical services (catering, maintenance…). These are services directed at the same client, the TNC or big companies. They are second grade services provided to oil the wheels of production, of financing. Feeding, cleaning, making sure the environment is taken care of. As such, they are not the primary concern.

Private physical security has been seen as a remasculinzation of security in that the obstacles for women participation are currently higher than in public security. It is also a further lowering of the coercive force, as the status of these laborers and their origins are lower than that of police forces. I would add that the formalization of street surveillance, as opposed to the 'eyes on the street' or the informal surveillance and care of neighbors, enhances the authority and ubiquity of the male gaze.

Private guards support the 'real' activity, the productive activity. They accompany the 'real' protagonists. As such, for its supporting role, private security is always a second-class job. It is the security agent that will be sacrificed. In the suicide attacks of 2003 in Casablanca, at the Casa de España, the security agent at the door was stabbed. At the Hotel Farah, in the

Avenue des FAR, security guard and a doorman were killed first[387]. At the Belgium Consulate two policemen were killed. Security from a Facility Management perspective is emasculated, is part of the supporting role, and it has no firepower, it must be refrained from force. But it still must enforce an image of protection through force and authority.

There are around 70.000 police officers in Morocco while an estimate of 300.000 people work as security agents in the private sector[388]. These are a vast majority of men, untrained and employed in precarious conditions. I was told the story of guards at a foreigner's house that would at first pass on their shirts and uniforms to the guard providing the following shift. This later changed and both guards covering 24/7 in 12 hour shifts had their own uniforms. The same person also told me that she was once asked to remove spider webs from the guard's hut because the guard was afraid of the arachnids. This request sparked some doubts on the neigbor's side as to the effective protection that the guard could potentially provide in case of a non-arachnid security threat.

In the security sector it is also relevant to regard formalization in literal or legal terms. In the last decade, there has been an abrupt replacement of traditional guards through the formalization of legal labor contracts, social security payment, etc. However, different dynamics coexist:

- Legal companies with legal workers, complying with existing labor and safety regulations, etc.
- Legal companies with legal workers, not complying with existing labor and safety regulations[389].
- Informal workers outside regular contracts.

The biggest bulk of activity is found in the second and the third categories. Although no reliable statistics exist (or rather very different numbers are given by various sources), all

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[387] From Holding VIP Maroc, lead by Madiou Hacen. No record or further information of the company is available online.

[388] Mehdi Serghini Idrissi 11 avril 2019 Les partenariats publics-privés en sécurité. [Conference given at Preventica, Salle B – 16.00 a 17.00]. Serghini Idrissi is a member of ASIS.

[389] Sometimes guards have no contracts, or short-time contracts, no training is provided, and most of the time labor conditions on paper are different than reality. See the video compiled by Rachid Atkouf about this issue, featuring also different parlametarians' interventions on the same topic: https://www.facebook.com/G4Sca/videos/987823448815893 (accessed 20/01/2022).

interviewees agreed that the majority of companies did not respect labor and safety regulations.

The last decades have brought new forms of occupation among atypical labor (Bouharrou, 2014). An important part of it being the development of part-time jobs, security would not be one of them. It is true, however, that the professionalization of guards came along with temporary work agencies in the 1970s[390]. By professionalization I refer merely to the inclusion of a regulated market of labor demand and offer under that category. This did not imply *per se* the creation of new jobs, but rather the inclusion of traditionally informal or official jobs within the market of labor management. In other words, security became a formalized commodity and ultimately a commercial sector.

Contrary to part-time jobs, however, the amount of hours guards have to work per day is probably the most common complaint among those interviewed for this research and by the association of guards (see below). Except for those that work guarding banks who work only during the office opening hours - usually 8 hours a day -, most guards work 12 hours 6 days a week. These conditions are nothing new, only now happening within a regularized framework. Most of the interviewees, however, did not blame the security company but rather argued that the labor conditions depended on the clients' demands.

Regular protests for labor rights, especially unpaid salaries, are also common. While most guards are disunited and not unionized, employees of private security businesses still protest and demand better labor rights[391]. In 2018 a Workers' Union was set up in the form of an association, called *Association Union nationale des agents de sécurité privée au Maroc* and their goal is to sensitize on labor conditions[392], especially as most guards work shifts of 12 hours a day, six

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[390] "La première entreprise de travail temporaire qui s'est implantée au Maroc date des années 70. Elle assurait entre autre le gardiennage. Cette société a dû cesser son activité pour cause d'insuffisance de la demande à l'époque." Which one?? *L'Economiste* (1995). "Le gardiennage organisé freiné par le vide juridique", *L'Economiste*, N°:190 Le 27/07/1995. https://www.leconomiste.com/article/le-gardiennage-organise-freine-par-le-vide-juridique (Accessed: 5/04/2019)

[391] In 2018, employees of the private security business demonstrated for better labor rights: https://www.h24info.ma/actu/video-agents-de-securite-privee-se-mobilisent-leurs-droits/

[392] The president of the Union, which is actually an association, is Zine Rachid AlSharif AlIdrissi, vice-president Abdelhamid El Hachimi, and treasure Loubna Najib. The association has 47.000 followers on facebook (www.facebook.com/G4Sca) and its president works to improve labor conditions, the employees' rights and their responsibilities. They are also actively engaging with the administration and other unions like the CDT to campaign for the agents' conditions.

days a week, without a permanent contract, and get paid below the minimum wage (2.828,71 MAD)[393].

1.2 Security Guards – Private 'Stateness'

Security guards must be seen. They hold little power to prevent crime, but they represent order and security nevertheless. Their presence in their uniforms 'reassures' people, as a member of a Moroccan women's organization told me. 'They specially reassure women', she added[394].

The extreme case of blurring private and public security is found in the USA. In some regions of the USA, police officers are permitted to work as private security contractors and even to wear the official uniforms, badges and guns (White, 2011). Attire that mimics public security uniforms has also been a strategy to provide for that "stateness"; inducing the perception that even if it is privately provided, the guards are part of the legitimate 'security order'. However, in Morocco this strategy was not easily accepted by the public security forces. As described in chapter 7, during colonial times, 1933 law was especially passed to counter the blurring distinction between private and public officers. Similarly, in the 1990s one of the main concerns of legislators and of the Ministry of Interior was that of differentiation, as PSCs repeatedly tried to clarify in media.

The above picture[395] is from the Pinkerton agents, one of the first in the US, later absorbed by Securitas AB, now active in Morocco. Their uniforms are very reminiscent of state police forces.

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[393] The interprofessional salary is 14.81 MAD per hour. Data for January 2021 from www.lesalarie.ma

[394] Interview in Rabat on February 2020.

[395] Retrieved from Securitas Corporate website. Online: https://www.securitasinc.com/who-we-are/about-securitas-usa/our-history/. (Accessed: 03/08/2020)

Mister Clean Seminar Group Photo 2008. Source: Mister Clean

Private companies deploy all sorts of efforts in their 'legitimacy by association' (White, 2011), in trying to come closer to that symbolic power of elites encapsulated in the concept of 'legitimacy'[396]. It is in fact the distorted power of that 'legitimacy by association' that can provide a tool for authority as in legal terms no physical power is endowed upon private guards in Morocco.

While the public security actors' concern for differentiation is clear, it is also true that regulations nevertheless move towards a capture of the potential benefits of private security, either through the exemption from certain areas where the state security does not need to use up daily resources for surveillance because the capital's interests converge and ensure compliance; or by securing the connection of private agents as police informants. Moreover, and in line with this section, private security reinforces the cultural diffusion of the state and the state violence through a display and visible and pervasive representation of state-sanctioned security.

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[396] Legitimacy is the "distributive capacity of the regime to be accepted as it is, at minimum cost, and with the minimal use of coercion", French in the original (Régnier & Santucci, 1973, p. 139).

2. Mapping Private Security

While class and gender traverse the bodies of private security, the placement of guards also points at the socio-geographic inequalities of the country, with a stark contrast in their deployment between rich, productive spaces and precarious and marginalized areas.

In general in urban areas the distribution of private security – and what kind of corporations operate – tells us about the distribution of resources, a parallel between 'security disparity' and 'wealth disparity' (Shearing & Wood, 2003). Indeed the location of this security provision responds to different variables, such as 'mass private property', as the changes in communal space and the property of urban spaces have impacted the deployment and development of security (Shearing & Stenning, 1983)[397].

> "Expansive tracts of private property which are used predominantly as public spaces, such as shopping centres, industrial complexes, gated communities and so on (see also Kempa et al., 2004). On this property, Shearing and Stenning (1983) observe, landlords have the legal right to employ private security providers in order to control access to and behaviour within their borders. This in turn creates a latent demand for private security, which can easily be actualized if landlords are dissatisfied with —or simply want to supplement— public policing." (White 2011:88)

The hypothesis that relates the growth of private security with the changes in property and land ownership has been contested not for its inaccuracy, but for questions about the causal relationship and centrality of property rights in the paradigm shift. Jones & Newburn (Jones & Newburn, 1999) advance a different hypothesis. They argue that the urbanization processes of the last decades have resulted in a decline of 'secondary social control' – that of neighbors, bus drives, shopkeepers – and has resulted in a need to increase the formalization of social control. In other words, commercial firms have come to substitute what urban scholar Jane Jacobs called the 'eyes on the street'.

The Ministry of National Education and Professional Training published a report in 2015 which listed some of the scenarios of the work of private security: "administrations, shops, hotels, tourist complexes, restaurants, palaces, residences, clubs, schools, high schools, embassies, ports, airports, agricultural estates, car parks, construction sites, clinics and

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[397] For a recent debate on private police and its relation to 'mass private property' see (Kempa et al., 2004).

hospitals, etc." (Ministère de l'Education et de la Formation Professionnelle, 2015). Security Guards are deployed in very different areas and contexts (Table 1).

As described in the previous chapter, an evolution of private security locations could be traced through the first colonial laws (1916 and 1933, from a more rural to a more urban context). In post-independence times, embassies and consulates were the first ones to deploy formalized private security. These were the spaces that primarily represented sovereignty, the symbols of nation-states within another land. Moroccan private security was usually placed to protect and control the outside perimeter of the foreign diplomatic sites, as well as the access points. The US Embassy was the first to contract private security, albeit also from a US company[398]. In the past, Public Security Forces were in charge of their protection, with expatriate police forces for big embassies for internal security of the diplomatic locations.

In health institutions like hospitals and clinics, security guards have replaced janitors, who were part of the regular staff of the hospital. Their positions have been externalized and they are now employees of private companies. A prominent member of a national women's organization justified the need to have professional guards with the argument of an increase in violence, especially in Emergency Units, although the actual numbers of violent incidents might be decreasing. Nevertheless, guards have been under media attention now with the coverage of stories about guards "imposing their own law" through bribes at hospitals[399]. The increase in violence, however, is also part of the reasoning behind the introduciton of private security within education institutions. Private international schools are protected by private security and technological equipment. In public schools, the Ministry of Education is the main client, but the contracts are allocated by region[400].

The fact that private guards are employed at the school or hospital gates points at another dimension of privatization. These private workers, in fact, did not replace public security officers. A janitor is not a guard, although it would have had among its roles, but not exclusively, to act as one by controlling the people entering premises and eventually

[398] According to one of my informants and to the president of the Association National Union of Agents of Private Security in Morocco, Wackenhut was first providing these services to the US Embassy in Rabat, and to other US facilities. Through the Federal Procurement Data System (www.fpds.gov) I could only trace the contracts with Wackenhut back to 1992.

[399] Kanfaoui, Abdelwahed (2019) " [Mustashfa Al Hassani, satwa arrijal alharassa]" *Assabah*, 21st February: Available at: https://assabah.ma/366922.html (Accessed: 18/06/2019)

[400] In 2019 in the Oriental, for example, all schools had security guards from Anichtrad (Interview in June 2019, Rabat).

intervening to stop violent acts. On the contrary, the former position of the janitor is now first and foremost a security guard, although it also may act as a doorkeeper or attendant to help people navigate the facility. This inversion of the role is very telling, in that it places the emphasis and the core importance of the first person that we encounter as a 'protection' from the exterior. Their training, skills, and mindset are that of security.

The second mechanism of privatization seen in Chapter 2 (section 4.2), that of the outsourcing of security services, becomes enmeshed with the third mechanism, or privatization by default[401]. This is so because it is not only the actor that delivers the service that has changed, but also the nature of the service. This privatization by default relates to the hypothesis that a decrease in informal surveillance, that which is undertaken by communal and social networks, tends to be replaced by formalized surveillance (Jones & Newburn, 1999).

The thesis of Jones and Newburn connects with the provision of commercial security in residential areas of middle to high class, where life on the street is practically absent. They are usually paid by the neighbors' association, and act mostly as doormen. They can develop closer relations to those living in the building and they get extra money during festivities or when they perform extra tasks to help with chores and other maintenance work in the community (changing the gas bottle, helping with the groceries…). Even if this role is not a particularly new one for residential areas and wealthy or middle-class dwellers, again we find a reconfiguration of the doorman and janitor with a vague and more encompassing role into a security guard.

The tourism sector in general has seen an immense rise in demand of security guards: hotels, clubs, bars, or restaurants. Along with factory plants with female employees, tourist sites and services are two sectors were female guards are more present, in the case of the catering industry also in the role of stewardesses.

A central security concern is also infrastructures. The most visible ones are train stations, mines, ports, etc. However, the level of scrutiny and rigor of these guarding services differs. For instance, guards at train stations of the ONCF are usually not trained at all. They endure

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[401] Privatization by default refers to the decrease in quality or availability of public services, which forces or pushes those that can afford it to seek similiar services in the private sector.

the usual 12-hour shifts in standing positions. On the contrary, some of the port guards in Tangier, employed in 2019 by G4S were recruited for their command of English and specific computer skills, as required by the International Port Authority regulations such as the ISPS code [International Ship and Port Facility Security][402]. Port Security Guards are not in replacement of police forces[403], but in addition, and perform other roles. Critical infrastructures such as energy networks or ports are the contexts where the best-positioned companies can be found.

> "What can make a port successful is its competitiveness at the international level, but of course the operators must have confidence. And in particular the safety of navigation and all other types of security, whether it is the safety of goods, all this security must be able to give confidence to these operators". (Najlaa Diouri, DG Tanger Med Port Authority)[404]

In the following sections I analyze three cases of private security location: the urban space; the Special Economic Zones or Free Trade Zones; and the people. Further, I reflect on what the 'loci' of Morocco's commercial security tells us about the global and local power relations.

TABLE 1: Spaces for Private Security

	Type of services	Role of the State	Main companies
Health Institutions	Mainly security agents as replacement for old concierges (civil servants)	State is the main client	Diverse
Education	Mainly security agents as replacement for old concierges (civil servants)	State is the main client	Diverse

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402 Interview with North Region Regional Director of G4S, 24/04/2019. These agents earn also more than the standard guard.

403 See a video on the security of surveillance of the Tangier Port: Medi1TV Afrique. (2019) "Port Tanger Med: un système de sécurité efficace", posted on the 29th June 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D08qROz8p28 (Accessed: 2/10/19)

404 In French in the original "Ce qui peut faire la réussite d'un port c'est ça compétitivité au niveau international mais bien sûr il faut que les opérateurs aient confiance. Et en particulier la sécurité que ça soit la sécurité de navigation et toutes les autres types de sécurité que ça soit la sécurité de marchandises des biens, toute cette sécurité doit pouvoir donner confiance à ces operateurs" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qquDQZECrB4 (Accessed: 2/10/2019)

Free trade zones	Surveillance technology and area security	FZ Authorities State issues FZ regulations	TNCs and highly formalized companies (ex. G4S, Brinks)
Factories or Industrial plants	Perimeter security, access control and employees surveillance	Inspections	Diverse
Commercial centers	Security Agents	Informants	Diverse
Banks	Surveillance technology, security guards, funds transfers Cybersecurity	Enforced a specific law about security agents in Banks	Funds transport Brinks and G4S
Residential Areas	Physical Security – doorkeepers (police informants)	Informants	Diverse and SME
Other businesses: Hotels, clubs or bars, restaurants, Tourism sector in general **Pharmacies…**	Surveillance technology Physical Security / attendants	Informants	Diverse
Embassies and consulates	Surveillance technology Physical Security outside the premises	Unknown	US Embassy: Wackenhut, G4S… TNCs and highly formalized companies
Infrastructures: train stations, mines, ports, etc.	Surveillance technology Physical Security outside the premises	Main client or as PPP	TNCs and highly formalized companies for critical infrastructure Port of Tangier (Esdata, CleanCo, Athena, G4S,

2.1 Urban Spaces for the Safe Consumer

Shopping malls are the most visible places of mass private property, where those unwilling or unable to gain access and become denizens of these areas are excluded from their governance, and from their security services. Shearing and Wood point at the governance deficit of this type of security:

> "Those `unwilling or unable' to engage as `citizen consumers' are thus structurally excluded from opportunities to direct or `steer' service delivery. A second feature of the governance deficit is the extent to which poor people are subject to forms of exclusion through coercion and banishment by a range of agencies that operate in the interests of other collectivities. As individuals who are unable or unwilling to live up to the expectations and responsibilities ascribed to certain forms of communal space – such as shopping malls or Business Improvement Districts – poor people are largely unable to gain the status of 'denizen' within such spaces. Having been excluded from such 'bubbles of governance', these individuals are left to live and work in spaces surrounding the bubbles" (Shearing & Wood, 2003, p. 413)

We can also find this type of luxury, non-state security within stable communities like 'gated communities', corporate spaces, etc. or deterritorialized for VIP's security. In city centers, however, security is performed with the bodies of men in blue or brown uniforms, and by the visible cameras displayed in small and big shops.

In Rabat, differences from neighborhood to neighborhood are noticeable. Although the uses of spaces differ as well and one cannot expect to see guards in a residential area the same way they are seen in a commercial area, we can nevertheless very starkly see the difference between two commercial areas like Hassan and the old city (Souika, Rue des Consuls, etc.). While Hassan is densely positioned with visible security guards, in the old city of Rabat, professional private guards are absent. These two areas of trade are very differently traversed by professional guards, and indeed poignantly show a socio-spatial inequality.

Source of the map: Author. The different labels were marked through walks between March and July 2019. Symbols represent: banks (green), commercial centers and tourist sites (red), public institutions and infrastructure (orange), and education sites (blue).

An example of high interest places for private security is banks. There are very many related aspects to security and banks, from cyber-security to fund transportation. As described in previous chapters, it is indeed the bank-police tandem that represents the first institutional structure of colonialism. As the repayments of national debts were to be secured by public police, from the beginning of the twentieth century a proliferation of privately held banks has promoted the need of enhanced private responsibility to secure their funds and assets.

In the 1990s the transport of funds was made by the banks themselves[405]. It was through the GPBM (*Groupement Professionnel des Banques du Maroc*) that the service was externalized, following negotiations and spectacular bank robberies.

The transport of funds, part of cash processing, is an important aspect of this commercial sector, as it is valued at 350 millions MAD[406]. While Morocco's central bank, Bank al

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[405] NDOUR, Alié Dior (1996) "Banque : Des sociétés de sécurité convoitent le transport de fonds", in *L'Economiste*, 30 - 05 – 1996. Online: https://www.maghress.com/fr/leconomiste/11231 (Accessed: 04/06/2020). Electronique Système Data developed a suitcase for transporting funds that was exported to different countries in Europe or Latin Ameirca.

Maghrib, was traditionally guarded by public police, the rest of banks have been responsible for their own security. The Bank al Maghrib also externalized the security of transportation of funds to G4S[407]. Up until 2020, G4S worked with BMCE, BMCI, and Crédit Agricole du Maroc, while Brink's worked with BMCE, BP, Société General and Ittijari Wafae bank.

By the end of 2019, the sector of fund transport was "divided in two, half of it for Brink's Company and half of it for G4S",[408]. However, Brink's has been advancing and acquiring G4S cash processing services in different countries and might do the same in Morocco, as the company published negotiations in 17 countries (deals are public for the Netherlands, Belgium, Hong Kong and Ireland)[409]. According to their own corporate information, "[a]ll Morocco's banks rely on Thales cybersecurity solutions."[410]

2.2 The Smart and the Safe City

Urban settings, while at times performative, are also a market for the deployment of surveillance and control technologies. The use of the Internet of things (IoT) in authoritarian contexts seems to be unproblematic for companies selling the needed software and hardware for these practices. Indeed, a company CEO from Europe boldly told me that it was much easier to deploy certain technologies outside the EU and other Western countries with stricter data protection laws.

Security Technology Industries are a vast and complex sector. They might include the technology import companies that provide alarms systems, surveillance cameras and other perimeter-related technologies, sometimes without specific knowledge of security requirements. These are mainly logistics import companies, although some of them are specialized in providing know-how around this kind of technology. Moreover, big security

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[406] L'Economiste. (2014) "Convoyage de fonds: L'activité en phase de maturité", in *L'Economiste*, N°:4390, 30/10/2014. Online: https://leconomiste.com/article/961229-convoyage-de-fonds-l-activite-en-phase-de-maturite (Accessed: 04/06/2020)

[407] Interview with Regional Director of G4S, June 2019.

[408] L'Economiste. (2014) "Convoyage de fonds: L'activité en phase de maturité", in *L'Economiste*, N°:4390, 30/10/2014. Online: https://leconomiste.com/article/961229-convoyage-de-fonds-l-activite-en-phase-de-maturite (Accessed: 04/06/2020)

[409] Brinks. (2020). Press Release "Brink's Completes Next Phase of G4S Cash Acquisition" at Brinks Website. RICHMOND, Va., April 6, 2020. Online: https://www.brinks.fr/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Brinks-Completes-Next-Phase-of-G4S-Cash-Acquisition-vfinal-040620.pdf (Accessed: 17/08/2020).

[410] Corporate Website. "Security in Morocco". Online: https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/countries/middle-east-africa/morocco (Accessed: 07/08/2020).

companies also provide this kind of technologies and security assessments to companies and private individuals who request it, among them G4S or RMO.

Morocco's bilateral cooperation with China and its adhesion to the Belt and Road Initiative in 2017 have taken the path of projects into technology investment. Apart the star project Tanger Tech, that has been dragging for years over different investment and ownership disputes, an Artificial Intelligence model of management in the big cities is being developed partnering up with China (Feldstein, 2019); specially under the Safe City banner[411]. The Safe City model is sponsored by China, and it consists of a smart city focused not so much on the efficiency of managerial functions of the city, but rather on security and surveillance.

The Safe City model has been promoted by Chinese companies such as Huawei, Hikvision, Dahua and ZTE. A Huawei-sponsored video on the Safe City project in Marrakesh features regional security official Moulay El Hafid Zimirly describing the importance of the technological features. Huawei, indeed, is the first AI surveillance technology supplier in the world, "providing AI surveillance technology to at least fifty countries worldwide" (Feldstein, 2019).

The Moroccan Groupe Disway[412] partnered in 2017 with Huawei for the distribution of their products in Morocco. Huawei was in charge of installing the videosurveillance networks of Marrakech and Casablanca[413]. Huawei leads the way in Morocco's market of video surveillance[414], with the technical possibility of facial recognition[415].

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[411] Smart Cities/Safe Cities are "Cities with sensors that transmit real-time data to facilitate service delivery, city management, and public safety. Often referred to as "safe cities," they incorporate sensors, facial recognition cameras, and police body cameras connected to intelligent command centers to prevent crime, ensure public safety, and respond to emergencies." (Feldstein, 2019)

[412] Disway announces itself as the 1st technology distributor in Morocco. (www.disway.com). The case of the company Disway illustrates the connections of 'old' elites with the private security sector. The company is the importer for Huawei in Morocco. From the main shareholders we find Hakam Abdellatif Finance, Investment Fund created in 1995 very active in the Casablanca Stock Exchange (http://leboursier.ma/Bourse/999/2018/01/31/Bourse.-Ce-que-l-on-sait-de-Hakam-Abdellatif-Finance.html (3/4/2019)). They have participations in Auto Nejma (29,07%), Auto Hall (10,05%), Timar (10%), Disway (10,03%), CTM (5%), Maghreb Oxygene (5,71%), Delattre Levivier (10%). Karim Radi Benjelloun is part of those included in the "generation Mohammed VI". DG de Microsoft Afrique du Nord (Les Hommes qui font l'actualité. *L'Economiste* N°:228 (02/05/1996.).

[413] "Disway distribue les solutions d'entreprise Huawei" *Lavieeco*, Nov, 12, 2017. See also: (Artigas, 2017)

[414] "Huawei goes after urban video surveillance grand slam Chinese group Huawei, which has a dominant position among Moroccan telecommunications operators to which it supplies GSM aerials and core". See:: https://www.africaintelligence.com/mce/business-circles/2019/03/28/huawei-goes-after-urban-video-surveillance-grand-slam,108351131-art?CXT=PUB

[415] A 2009 law (loi N°09-08 promulguée par le Dahir 1-09-15 du 18 février 2009) created this "Commission Nationale de Contrôle de la Protection des Données à Caractère Personnelle" in charge of controlling the limitations camera surveillance etc. Check the new cybersecurity law: https://www.challenge.ma/une-loi-cadre-pour-reguler-les-activites-entre-en-vigueur-152930.

Dahua Exhibition Stand at Casablanca's Security Congress, Préventica, 2019. Source: Author

In Casablanca the DGSN[416] launched the videosurveillance program in 2016 as a pilot project, with the deployment of 760 cameras and an optic-fiber network, 2 surveillance and traffic management posts, etc. (460M dh)[417]. The program was upgraded in 2019 and expanded to other cities like Marrakech, Tangiers or Agadir[418]. The decision of these urban plans is attributed to the DGSN.

> "Our team ensures the safety of the citizens. Our team members monitor all suspicious movements, note them and notify the appropriate departments. We also monitor people whose actions seem suspicious to us." Karim Chahti, Casablanca Préfecture. [419]

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[416] Maroc diplomatique (2019) "La stratégie de la DGSN en matière de lutte contre la cybercriminalité mise en exergue au Marrakech Security Forum", *Maroc diplomatique*, February 9, 2019. Online: https://maroc-diplomatique.net/la-strategie-de-la-dgsn-en-matiere-de-lutte-contre-la-cybercriminalite-mise-en-exergue-au-marrakech-security-forum/ (Accessed: 5/2/2021).

[417] MAP (2016) Casablanca : "SM le Roi lance le projet de développement d'un système de vidéosurveillance urbain, intelligent et optimise. MAP, 25 janvier 2016. https://www.mapnews.ma/fr/activites-royales/casablanca-sm-le-roi-lance-le-projet-de-d%C3%A9veloppement-d%E2%80%99un-syst%C3%A8me-de (Accessed: 05/02/2021)

YABILADI (2019) "Maroc : Un nouveau système de vidéosurveillance dans les grandes villes". Yabiladi.com, 22/01/2019. https://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/73636/maroc-nouveau-systeme-videosurveillance-dans.html (Accessed: 5/2/2021).

[418] MAP (2021) "Programme de développement urbain d'Agadir 2020-2024 : Quand la capitale du Sousse continue à renaître de ses cendres sous l'ère de SM le Roi Mohammed VI". MAP, 17 july 2020. https://www.mapnews.ma/fr/dossier/programme-de-d%C3%A9veloppement-urbain-dagadir-2020-2024-quand-la-capitale-du-souss-continue-%C3%A0 (Accessed: 05/02/2021)

[419] In French in the original: "Notre équipe veille à la sécurité des citoyens. Les membres de notre équipe surveillent tous les mouvements suspects, les notent et préviennent les services concernés. Nous surveillons aussi les personnes dont les actes nous paraissent suspects" http://fr.le360.ma/societe/video-casablanca-criminalite-au-coeur-du-systeme-de-videosurveillance-174038 (Accessed 20/10/2021).

Marrakech and Rabat [420] have projects as Safe Cities where the main ingredients are technology-oriented practices. Tramway and bus lines have been included in the project as places of violence, especially against women. With the leading role of the police, some buses are equipped with surveillance cameras. Surveillance cameras are hailed and demanded as the law of sexual harassment is restrictive and demands evidence to be able to prosecute. These evidences are pictures, witnesses, video, and they are presented as mechanisms to fight gender-based violence. At the UN Conference, pannelist Lamya Ben Malek asked for cameras 'everywhere in the city' to be able to have this evidence against sexual harassment[421].

The United Nations is also invested in a technological approach to security. Marrakech and Rabat are participant cities in the UN Women's Global Flagship Initiative "Safe Cities and Safe Public Spaces"[422], a continuation of the program "Safe Cities Free of Violence against Women and Girls", that had the goal to prevent and respond to Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in public spaces.

In March 2015, UN Women Morocco developed a new partnership with private bus company ALSA, with the mission to integrate the issue of sexual violence prevention in ALSA's drivers' training modules. Under the agreement, bus and taxi drivers will be trained and sensitization videos on sexual harassment will be broadcasted on the buses' screens[423].

The gold rush for surveillance cameras in the cities and communal spaces brought Fes to the late scandal. According to media, 288 surveillance cameras that were installed around 2018 were discovered to not be working in 2021. They had been neglected beyond repair[424]. On

[420] "The Spanish Agency for International Cooperation Development (AECID) from 2015-2017 provided seed money to develop a Safe City Free of Violence against Women and Girls Programme in the city of Rabat (pop. 572.717, 48% male, 52% female). // The Rabat Safe City Free from Violence against Women and Girls Programme was officially launched in June 2015, with a specific focus on two intervention sites: Hassan district (pop. 107.188, 48% male, 52% female) and Yacoub el Mansour district (pop. 194.433, 49% male, 51% female) in partnership with local and national government, UN Women, women's organizations, and other key stakeholders." Concept Proposal: Rabat Safe City Free from Violence against Women and Girls Programme, Morocco. January 1 2018 – December 31, 2019

[421] Among others, Lamya Ben Malek at the 5th Safe Cities and Safe Public Spaces Global Leaders' Forum, Panel "Accelerating the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action and Generation Equality: Local Leadership and Action" 10:00-11:00, February 27th 2020.

[422] UNWomen website section on Safe Cities and safe public spaces: www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/how%20we%20work/flagship%20programmes/fpi-brief-safe-cities-and-safe-public-spaces-en.pdf?la=en&vs=2740

[423] Marrakech: Safe and Friendly City for All. Video on Youtube from UN Women (published June 11th 2015) https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=22&v=AcxNMw3w8_s This video showcasing interventions in Marrakesh, has been produced by UN Women with support from the Spanish Agency for Development Cooperation (AECID), which is currently funding the Marrakesh Safe City programme.

[424] Kiosque360. Ayant négligé l'entretien et la maintenance des 288 caméras de surveillance installées il y a trois ans, le Conseil de la ville de Fès est pointé du doigt pour avoir failli à ses engagements dans la gestion sécuritaire. Elles ont coûté plus de 70 millions de DH à la mairie de Fès. Pourtant, quelques années seulement après leur installation, plusieurs d'entre elles ne fonctionnent plus. https://fr.le360.ma/politique/fes-des-cameras-de-surveillance-en-panne-faute-de-maintenance-85089

October 2008, 20M MAD were allocated for the municipality for the purchase of 265 cameras. In 2010, Hamid Chabat, the president of the commune announced the intention to install the cameras in a bid to fight the criminality rates in the village[425], but this millionaire program did not bear the promised fruits.

The same security technology is being used not only for fighting crime, but for a more general approach to modernizing the city, as in many places around the globe. In Casablanca, the Smart City Cluster was created from a model of the Smart City 4P, that involves Public-Private-People Partnership[426]. In occupied Western Sahara, the technology and model of smart cities is also being deployed. Speaking at a Nordic Conference in 2016, Hajbouha Zoubeir (Vice President, Phosboucraa Foundation & OCP Group) presented the project "Smart City Foum El Oued Technpole" based in Laayoune. The project was conceived as a way "to serve the growth of the southern regions of Morocco. […] Developing a best know-how model to serve population growth in Sub-Saharan African countries"[427]. The reasons behind the development of technologically advanced projects in occupied Western Sahara could be that the "use of technology of control […] minimizes human involvement in security", as in the case of Palestine (Hever, 2018, p. 161), but it could also be due to the need to modernize and entrench settlers' life in the region as part of a policy of *faits accomplis* and as a narrative of modern and trustworthy governance towards the international community. In the case of Dakhla's digital project, Huawei Technologies Maroc is one of the main investors[428].

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[425] Laaboudi, Jalil. (2010). Fès: 265 caméras de vidéo-surveillance pour combattre le crime", in bladi.net, 31st August 2010. www.bladi.net/fes-cameras.html

[426] Casablanca: http://www.e-madina.org/ E-Madina, the Smart City Cluster. White paper : e-Madina for Casablanca Smart City : Vision and-Concepts.

[427] Laayoune: https://tv.theiet.org/?videoid=9465. Presentation by Hajbouha Zoubeir (Vice President, Phosboucraa Foundation & OCP Group). "Creating Smart City Foum El Oued Technpole in Laayoune, Morocco. Event: Nordic Smart Cities 2016.

[428] MAP. (2021) "La wilaya de Dakhla et Huawei, une coopération pour le lancement de Dakhla Smart City", Agence Marocaine De Presse (MAP), 01/06/2021. https://www.msn.com/fr-xl/afrique-du-nord/other/la-wilaya-de-dakhla-et-huawei-une-coop%C3%A9ration-pour-le-lancement-de-dakhla-smart-city/ar-AAKARaM; also Amaoui, Rachid. (2021) "La transformation digitale de la ville de Dakhla est imminente", TIC-Maroc, 31st May 2021. https://www.tic-maroc.com/2021/06/la-transformation-digitale-de-la-ville-dakhla-est-imminente.html

Presentation by Hajbouha Zoubeir (Vice President, Phosboucraa Foundation & OCP Group). "Creating Smart City Foum El Oued Technpole in Laayoune, Morocco. Event: Nordic Smart Cities 2016.

2.3 Special Economic Zones as mass privatization of public space

The model of private security provision is most evident in Free Trade Zones, Offshoring Areas or Special Economic Zones[429]. These are hectare-wide areas of industrial, urban land, designed to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The space is offered to foreign and local investors for special very advantageous conditions such as tax exemptions (costum-tariffs, implantation taxes, etc.) and simplified administrative procedures. These areas have proven increasingly interesting to capitalist elites around the globe since the beginning of the Cold War (Neveling 2015).

The World Customs Organization defines a free zone or a special customs zone as "a part of the territory of a Contracting Party where any goods introduced are generally regarded, insofar as import duties and taxes are concerned, as being outside the Customs territory"[430].

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[429] Special Economic Zones is a denomination first used in China.

[430] Specific Annex D, Chapter 2 (Free Zone) of to the *Revised Kyoto Convention*. http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/activities-and-programmes/free-trade-zone-special-customs-zone.aspx (Accessed: 4/10/2019). "Free zones generally fall into one of four categories: free trade zones, export processing zones, special economic zones, or industrial zones. Free trade zones, typically located near seaports or airports, mainly offer exemptions from national import and export duties on goods that are re-exported. Local services gain, though there is little, if any, value added to the goods traded. Export processing zones go a step further by focusing on exports with a significant value added, rather than only on re-exports. Special economic zones apply a multisectoral development approach and focus on both domestic and foreign markets. They offer an array of incentives including infrastructure, tax and custom exemptions, and simpler administrative procedures. Industrial zones are targeted at specific economic activities, say media or textiles, with infrastructure adapted accordingly." ("Free Zones: Benefits and Costs", in OECD Observer. Online: http://oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/3101/Free_zones:_Benefits_and_costs.html).

Free Trade Zones especially devoted to commercial storage and exchange have been replaced and superseded by Industrial and Productive areas for export[431]. These policies are regarded by "[m]any economists […] as a second best policy, preferring economy-wide liberalization of trade and investment." (Farole 2011:1-2). In fact, they seem to be a parallel or subsequent stage of liberalization. The expansion of these areas can be seen as part of the megaprojects preference of current regime (Bogaert, 2018; Kanai & Kutz, 2011).

North African countries have been an attractive region for the design of FTZ. The first FTZ in Africa[432] was created in Morocco in 1962, in the port of Tangier[433]. Today, the Tanger Med Industrial Platform comprises around 3000ha, had in 2015 about 650 active companies, included in Tanger Free Zone; Tangier Automotive City; Renault Tanger Med; Tetouan Park Tetouan Shore; and the Logistics Free Zone.

Morocco has been extending its land to this type of industrial and investment land, while promoting it across Africa[434].

"Africa Free Zones Organization was founded in 2015 on the initiative of Tanger Med, with the objective to provide strategic and technical assistance, identify business opportunities and promote sustainable economic development models and best practices to AFZO community. All African countries need to attract foreign direct investments and to establish strategic government policies in order to accelerate industrialization in Africa".

Fouad Brini, Chairman of Tanger Med

Source: 2018 AFTZ Annual Report

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[431] These SEZ were regarded by some in the 70s and 80s as a new pattern of Western imperialism, through the action of then-called MNCs of former colonial powers within the Third World; while other authors considered the domestic pressure that third world bourgeoisies were feeling to open up these spaces (Neveling 2015). From the first free zone at Shannon Airport ON ESTÂ? (Barbiér & Veron 1991) in 1959, the model has proliferated to the point where there are an estimated 2,200 free zones around the world, employing around 70 million people. See World Free Zones Organization. https://www.worldfzo.org/About-Us/Our-history

[432] The first Free Trade Zones were established in Latin America in the beginning of the 20th century and the first FTZ regulations date of the 1920s in Argentina and Uruguay (Economy Watch 2014). Obviously, this was not necessary for colonized Africa were most-favored nation was been applied to many Western countries.

[433] It is remarkable how little critical research has been undertaken on the issue of Free Trade Zones given their importance in current neoliberal policies. The ILO has some interesting reports. Research supporting FTZ as an opportunity for economic growth nevertheless point at the risk of "resource misallocation and rent-seeking […], both from businesses and from government authorities."(Moberg 2015:167). Morocco (Mansouri)

[434] See its website: https://www.africafreezones.com/afzone/

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As of 2015, there were 13 free zones in Morocco, including the Nouaceur Free Zone in Casablanca; Free Zone at Tanger Med Ksar el Majaz Mellousa 1 and 2; Oujda Free Zone; Export Processing Zone in Kenitra; Export Processing Zone of Tangier; Tangier Automotive City; Technopolis; Technopole d'Oujda; Tétouanshore; Casanearshore; Fèsshore; Oujdashore; and Free Storage Zone of hydrocarbons at Kebdana and Nador[435]. The SEZ are also being expanded in occupied Western Sahara, especially in Laayoune and Dakhla[436].

The Project Tanger Tech Mohammed VI, a joint development project with Chinese Investors and corporations, will also comprise more than 2.000 hectares in the area of Assilah Province, à Ain Dalia, dans la commune Al-Aouama[437].

The expansion of these geographical areas raises different issues such as land-dispossession, labor conditions and development. Insofar as the areas in Tangier are concerned, the enforcement and follow up of labor rights seems to be more difficult than outside these areas. A 2012 report from the International Labor Organization found that "Moroccan labor laws still apply, but few, if any, firms are unionized"[438] in the Tanger Free Trade Zone. As a union representative told me, workers' unions were de facto forbidden from entering the free zone of Melloussa[439]. Some workers who had joint their union were fired[440]. In the Port Tanger Med, workers were forced to join one specific union, the UGTM [441]. Some however assert that wages inside the FTZ are fair or even higher than outside, "[b]ut these wages (in cases less than a Euro per hour) have created situations of working poverty, particularly in the context of a rapidly rising cost of living" (Kanai & Kutz 2010:349).

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[435] On the transformation of offshoring areas into free trade zones in Morocco see Telquel.ma, 17th September 2019. https://telquel.ma/2019/09/17/medz-a-la-loupe-ou-quand-jettou-audite-le-modele-doffshoring-quil-a-porte-treize-ans-plus-tot_1650838/?utm_source=tq&utm_medium=normal_post&utm_source=sendinblue&utm_campaign=17092019&utm_medium=email

[436] http://www.cadtm.org/Maroc-Zones-franches and https://aafir.ma/zones-franches-dexportation-zfe-maroc/

[437] https://www.leconomiste.com/article/1050568-le-bout-du-tunnel-pour-tanger-tech

[438] *2012 Investment Climate Statement – Morocco Report*, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, June 2012. https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191203.htm (Accessed: 2/10/2019)

[439] The fiscal conditions as well as the investment in infrastructures and workers' training provided by the Moroccan state to the Renault-Nissan Plant in Tangiers are very favorable for the company even if the labor conditions remain similar to those in Morocco in general https://www.humanite.fr/les-opportunites-de-renault-tanger-cgt-coordination-groupe-renault-489742

[440] Infringement of union, labor and workers' rights have been reported in the FTZ in Tangiers, where 60% of employees are women, where there is also a lack of work inspections (ILO 2014). https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---actrav/documents/publication/wcms_324632.pdf. Also economic data here: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/africa-s-development-dynamics-2018_9789264302501-en#page170

[441] Interview in Tangier 6/05/2019 with a member of the CDT.

Source: http://www.tangermedzones.com/en/

Free Trade Zones are managed by a Public Private Entities (PPE) created *ad hoc*[442] and managed in consortium. The Entity is in charge of ensuring basic services within the FTZ. Security Companies play a role in the control of factories and plants in these areas, but also in controlling the entire communal spaces and access points[443].

Every one of these free zones, or offshore areas has specific surveillance and private security, which translates into the fact that these are thousands of hectares in the Moroccan territory where public security is absent, where the PP Authority of the area procures their own commercial security, playing the role of 'administrative police' or ordinary order keeping.

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[442] In Morocco a 1995 Law (loi 19-94 *dahir* n°1-95-1 du 26 janvier 1995) regulates the areas called Zones Franches d'Exportation (ZFE).

[443] Article 6 of Law 19-94.

View of the Custom Border at one of Tanger Med entries. Source: Souhail EL GUELYOUY (Youtube) TANGER MED ZONES, Jun 18, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXKLE1Bo7o8 (Accessed 4/10/2019).

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Source: Souhail EL GUELYOUY (Youtube) TANGER MED ZONES, Jun 18, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXKLE1Bo7o8 (Accessed 4/10/2019).

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmHikyoaCjE

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
In 2013, G4S won the tender for security and surveillance of TangerMed. The three-year contract[444], signed with the Tangier Med Port Authority and Tangier Med Special Agency, was worth about 128M MAD, and was going to employ about 300 "specially qualified security personnel"[445]. According to *L'Économiste*, G4S's main target in the portuary area is the *harragas*, or those trying to board a ship irregularly[446], an example of the penetration of private security into a very specific task of law enforcement and border control.

> "A team of 300 employees will be deployed. Their duties will include access control and video surveillance. G4S agents will also be responsible for other tasks such as searching for human presence in vehicles and controlling goods. These agents will even be empowered to conduct searches of individual vehicles and cargo vehicles. They will also have responsibility for handling environmental disasters and fires."[447]

Moreover, ships can carry their own security agents, but they must comply with the requirement of the Tangier Med Port Authority. Apart from the compulsory ISPS certificate that agents must possess, the Port Authority authorizes companies to operate (Table 2).

TABLE 2: Tanger Med Port Authority – Guarding Companies

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[444] According to the G4S Regional Director, this contract was still valid in 2019.

[445] G4S Press Release, 23rd July 2013. https://www.g4s.com/media-centre/news/2013/07/23/g4s-awarded-tangier-med-port-security-contract

[446] Abjiou, Ali (2013) "TangerMed: G4S se charge de la sécurité et du gardiennage", *L'Économiste*, N°: 4087, 2 August 2013. https://www.leconomiste.com/article/909533-tangermedg4s-se-charge-de-la-s-curit-et-du-gardiennage (Accessed: 2/10/2019)

[447] In French in the original: "Une équipe de 300 collaborateurs sera déployée. Parmi leurs fonctions figurent, entre autres, le contrôle d'accès et le contrôle par vidéo-surveillance. Les agents de G4S auront aussi à assurer d'autres tâches telles que la recherche de la présence humaine au sein des véhicules et le contrôle des marchandises. Ces agents seront même habilités à assurer des fouilles de véhicules individuels et des véhicules de transport de marchandises. Ils auront aussi une responsabilité en matière de traitement des désastres environnementaux et des incendies." Abjiou, Ali (2013) "TangerMed: G4S se charge de la sécurité et du gardiennage", *L'Économiste*, N°: 4087, 2 August 2013. https://www.leconomiste.com/article/909533-tangermedg4s-se-charge-de-la-s-curit-et-du-gardiennage (Accessed: 2/10/2019)

GUARDING COMPANY	AUTHORIZATION N°	FROM	TO
ESDATA GUARDING	TMPA_AU_04_18	08/04/2018	07/04/2023
CLEAN CO SERVICES VIGILANCE SARL	TMPA_AU_05_18	25/03/2018	07/04/2023
CLEAN CO SERVICES CENTURY SARL	TMPA_AU_06_18	25/03/2018	07/04/2023
ATHENA SURVEILLANCE	TMPA_AU_07_18	10/03/2018	07/04/2023
G4S MAROC	TMPA_AU_08_18	22/01/2018	07/04/2023
AINSI MAROC	TMPA_AU_09_18	04/01/2018	07/04/2023
PROTECTAS MAROC	TMPA_AU_10_18	01/01/2018	07/04/2023
SNJH SARL	TMPA_AU_12_18	09/11/2018	08/11/2020

Source: Tangier Med Port Authority website. http://www.tmpa.ma/en/activites-services/services-aux-navires (Accessed 2/10/2019).

The US-based company Brink's lost its contract after 7 of its security agents were arrested involved in a network of irregular migration. "[A] group of their locally hired employees were accepting bribes to facilitate the crossing of migrants by truck through the port and onto the ferries heading to Europe" [448].

The Special Economic Zones (SEZ) are a very specific mass privatization of land, non-negligible when researching the spread of private security. Conceived as attractive poles of modernity, innovation and investment, they constitute a laboratory for the development of private-public partnership with special leaning on the free market and neoliberal development. Thus, while public security can still access the premises, daily surveillance and policing is delegated to private companies, as is most of the mass management of the area.

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[448] Laaboudi, Jalil. (2013) "Des agents de Brink's impliqués dans un réseau de clandestins au port Tanger Med", *Bladi*, February 28. Online: https://www.bladi.net/agents-brinks-clandestins-tanger.html

3. Securing the bodies: biometric control

Biometric technology is the technology dedicated to the storage, analysis and management of physical data from individuals. The concept of biometric identification not withstanding the earliest statistical and mathematical sense of biometrics, has come to refer to "the automated recognition of individuals based on precisely measured features of the body" or, in a more straightforward way "the identification of people by machines" (Breckenridge, 2014, p. 12).

> "Fingerprints, hand geometry, retinal patterns, voice recognition, keystroke dynamics, signature dynamics, and lip prints are common methods used to identify authorized users." (Fischer et al., 2019, p. 433).

Digital or analog biometric identification is one of the features of the modern state. An NGO worker told me that their project was mostly about promoting and helping people from small villages register legally at the administrative commune, with the help of the *moqaddem*. "If the kids that are born do not register before a month, they have to do it through the contentious, through courts and it gets difficult. The main problem is that many couples are not legally married but only through *fatiha* and then it is also more difficult to register." The register "is for the school, the card for social security, if they ever want to have a formal job… basically if they are not registered they don't exist"[449].

The Moroccan state prides itself on an advanced use of digital biometric technology. Automatic fingerprint identification, biometric identification cards and face-recognition software[450] are some of the most visible technologies already being developed in Morocco. These technologies are now being applied to border control, urban surveillance, and in the occupation of Western Sahara.

Breckenridge (2014) observed how the newest biometric technology is being implemented more rapidly in the Global South, especially in Africa and Asia. In Western countries the advance has been much more careful. In the case of the European Union, for instance, the exception is the intense identification processes that foreign migrants go through as compared to the more careful deployment of this kind of technology with European citizens

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[449] Interview with NGO worker from Chefchaouen, May 2019.

[450] Face-recognition software although still partially effective would come to include photographs in the type of biometric identification, since biometrics is about "the ability to extract standardised mathematical data from each contact." (Breckenridge 2014:12)

(Akkerman 2016). Indeed biometric identification has grown from the racist and colonial practices of empires. As corporations know, developing surveillance technology, especially facial recognition software (biosurveillance), is much easier in securitized and authoritarian states:

Source: Archivo General de la Administración, Alcalá de Henares.

> "Biometric government – as many scholars have shown – was first developed in India, it was brought to South Africa by officials of the Indian Colonial Service in 1900, where it was quickly put to use against the Indians in the Transvaal." (Breckenridge, 2014, p. 19)

In 2005, the DGSN announced that biometric and contactless electronic cards would start to be issued. This was, according to media, a 'revolutionary' project[451]. The issuing of the new cards started in 2007 with the technology provided by the French company and arms producer Thales Security Systems[452], which was awarded a contract by the DGSN for an amount of more than 100M euros[453]. The cards contain an integrated module linked to the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), a software developed by the US

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[451] "Morocco issues the millionth biometric contactless national identity card with Thales's e-ID secure solution". Secure Technology Alliance, November 18, 2008. https://www.securetechalliance.org/morocco-issues-the-millionth-biometric-contactless-national-identity-card-with-thaless-e-id-secure-solution/ (Accessed: 06/04/2019)

[452] The French company Thales has worked for over 40 years in Morocco, but has a small presence in terms of employment (about 45 people). According to their own site, they work in defence, aerospace, transportation and security markets. "The Group has close ties with local SMEs and universities and is a member of leading professional associations including GIMAS (Groupement des Industries Marocaines Aéronautiques et Spatiales), GIFER (Groupement des Industries Ferroviaires), CFCIM (Chambre Française de Commerce et d'Industrie du Maroc) and CLUSIM (Club de la Sécurité de l'Information Marocain)." Corporate website THALES. https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/countries/middle-east-africa/morocco (Accessed: 07/08/2020).

[453] http://www.agfa.com/corporate/news-item/agfa-supplies-high-security-identification-cards-system-to-thales-security-systems/

company Cogent Systems[454], with a contract valued in 28 million euros to install the AFIS "for a national criminal and civil deployment supporting a national identification program in Morocco."[455] 20 million e-ID cards were estimated although, according to Thales, by 2017, only 1.9 million cards had been issued[456].

Further, the passport verification and biometric data register control technologies for the Moroccan police were developed in 2016 by the German company Veridos[457], while the Catalan company Herta Security is developing a project of face recognition cameras in the Port of Tangier[458]. Veridos is part of the project of border biometric surveillance in the European Union "Pervasive and user focused biometrics border project" (PROTECT) (Akkerman 2016).

By the year 2020, every adult in the country was to hold this type of ID card which includes a nonvisible electronic unit and a readable barcode for 'appropriate machines'[459]. The added value of this card is the enhanced difficulty in forgery. However, how many police stations have the technology to read these cards? In 2018, the official press agency of Morocco explained that the program entailed a new constitution of 134 CEDIs or Center for the Registration of Identity Data (*Centres d'Enregistrement des Données Identitaires,*), as well as the establishment of 130 centers abroad (mainly in consulates) in order to serve the Moroccans Residing Abroad (*Marocains Résidants à l'Etranger* or MREs)[460].

> "a produit depuis le 1er avril 2008, un total de 29.860.000 CNIE pour les Nationaux, et 2.700.000 cartes pour les MRE. Le but recherché étant de faire

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[454] "Morocco awards new ID card contract, Card Technology Today". Volume 17, Issues 11–12, November–December 2005, Page 4. National Id. Available online 27 November 2005. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0965-2590(05)70399-6Get rights and content

[455]   https://www.securityinfowatch.com/access-identity/biometrics/press-release/10593237/business-wire-via-newsedge-corporation-cogent-systems-lands-34-million-contract-in-morocco

[456] http://www.cnie.ma/sinformer/Pages/A-propos-de-la-CNIE.aspx

[457] "German company Veridos already got a piece of the cake in March when the Moroccan government selected it to provide stationary and mobile equipment for screening at all land, air, and sea ports of entry." (Akkerman 2016).

[458] Informal interview with a company's executives.

[459] Art. 2 of the Dahir no1-07-149 du kaada 1428 (30 novembre 2007) portant promulgation de la loi no 35-06 instituant la carte nationale d'identité électronique

[460] Maroc Agence Presse. (2018). "La CNIE, où quand la DGSN veille à l'amélioration et la modernisation de ses prestations de service au profit des citoyens." Maroc Agence Presse, 30th september. http://www.mapexpress.ma/actualite/societe-et-regions/la-cnie-ou-quand-la-dgsn-veille-a-lamelioration-et-la-modernisation-de-ses-prestations-de-service-au-profit-des-citoyens/   See   also   CNIE http://www.cnie.ma/sinformer/Pages/A-propos-de-la-CNIE.aspx

bénéficier l'ensemble des citoyens marocains de la CNIE dans les meilleurs délais et les meilleures conditions."[461]

This ID card will also work for banks, so banks can access the ID data of the person.[462]

> "In addition to serving as secure authentication credential, Moroccan citizens will be able to conveniently present the ID cards in place of their birth certificate, certificate of residence, certificate of life and certificate of nationality in all procedures for which these documents must be provided. This advanced ID system includes both personal details and biometric data and meets new security requirements concerning travel documents and control of migration flows."

Morocco, with Malaysia, is one of the first countries to use contactless technology integrated in ID cards. According to DGSN officer, the card-holder will have to give the consent to read the digital data through a PIN code. However, this technology opens the door to the possibility that the holder of the card might not be able to refuse control of their personal data in order to access particular benefits or services (private banking, private access to spaces, etc.).

As the case of biosurveillance of the people and of the spaces shows – for smart and safe cities and borders –, a cluster of private and foreign technology companies intervene in the process of enhanced population control and management, and Morocco is regarded as a welcoming market for innovation. While still a business, this digitally oriented model is fully endorsed by the World Bank, which has deployed the Program 'Identification for Development' in Morocco[463]. This program measures progress of technology as a source of access to state services in Africa and elsewhere. The Program specifically targets countries in the Global South, and runs in line with the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target 16.9: "By 2030, provide legal identification for all, including birth registration". The World Bank's diagnosis for the need to develop the ID4D program:

> "There are an estimated 1.1 billion people, the majority living in Asia and Africa, who are unable to prove their identity. The problem disproportionately affects children and women from poor rural areas. The ability to prove your identity is critical to ensure access to educational opportunities, financial services, health and

[461] Maroc Agence Presse. (2018). "La CNIE, où quand la DGSN veille à l'amélioration et la modernisation de ses prestations de service au profit des citoyens." Maroc Agence Presse, 30th september. http://www.mapexpress.ma/actualite/societe-et-regions/la-cnie-ou-quand-la-dgsn-veille-a-lamelioration-et-la-modernisation-de-ses-prestations-de-service-au-profit-des-citoyens/

[462] Explanation by officer of the DGSN. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2GeYaqNrGSQ

[463] Atick, Joseph J; Palacios, Robert J.; Angel-Urdinola, Diego; Chen, Dorothée; El Kadiri El Yamani, Fatima; Pino, Ariel. 2014. Identification for Development (ID4D) country diagnostic: Morocco (English). Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/363901472492458796/Identification-for-Development-ID4D-country-diagnostic-Morocco

social welfare benefits, economic development, and the right to vote. Robust identification systems also strengthen governance and the effectiveness of public and private services."[464]

In April 2018, a new press release from the DGSN explained that more robust measures for the electronic IDs would be developed, with citizens being able to use them "facilitating access to public administration and private sector services, including public programs and health benefits." [465] Even further, eye-recognition software is contemplated as the next step[466].

The deployment of AI intelligence and private corporate technologies in the policing system is not perceived, on the contrary, as a threat or challenge to public forces. While it is being hailed as a reinforcement, modernization and effective enhancer of national and citizens' security, official conventions do show a requirement to entrench the business side of the development with Morocco's economy and business sector. At the same time, new technology and modernization programs have become a resource of competition among the different security agencies.

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[464] World Bank Group. Identification for Development (ID4D). Making Everyone Count. www.worldbank.org/id4d

[465] This new technology, that so far was offered to citizens 18 and up will be available for minors, migrants, professional cards for police officials, etc. AI. (2019) "Idemia delivers new biometric id cards to the DGSN", in *Africa Intelligence*, 3rd October, 2019. https://www.africaintelligence.com/mce/business-circles/2019/10/03/idemia-delivers-new-biometric-id-cards-to-the-dgsn%2C108375398-art?CXT=PUB&utm_source=MCE&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=PROS_EDIT_FOC&did=107976420&eid=463497

[466] Amaoui, Rachid (2019) "Les marocains seront bientôt identifiés via la reconnaissance rétinienne", TIC Maroc, February, 5, 2019. https://www.tic-maroc.com/2019/02/les-marocains-seront-bientot-identifies-via-la-reconnaissance-retinienne.html (Accessed: 15/05/2019).

Source: https://www.genetec.com/fr/solutions-/industries/forces-de-lordre Genetec describes the goal of its technology as that of "simplifying the work of security officers".

As explained in Chapter 6, surveillance technology has especially targeted opposition and critiques to the regime and to the security order. In 2017 it was revealed that Morocco had bought surveillance software called Evident, from a Danish subsidiary of BAE Systems[467]. According to Privacy International, members of the Rif Hirak were also targeted by enhanced social engineering messages[468].

Also rivals and competing actors, even Algerian and French authorities were targeted by Morocco's deployment of the Pegasus software, from the Israeli NSO Group + Circles. Nevertheless, Morocco denied their involvement[469].

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[467] Evans, Rob. (2017) "BAE 'secretly sold mass surveillance technology to repressive regimes' This article is more than 4 year" in *The Guardian*, 15th June 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jun/15/bae-mass-surveillance-technology-repressive-regimes

[468] https://privacyinternational.org/state-privacy/1007/state-privacy-morocco

[469] MAP. (2021) "Pegasus le Maroc va engager des actions en justice en Espagne", *Medias24*, August 7, 2021. https://medias24.com/2021/08/07/pegasus-le-maroc-va-engager-des-actions-en-justice-en-espagne/

4. Conclusions: A geospatial account of power relations

How are we to understand the permanent gaze of the parking guard on the street; the surveillance camera on a busy junction; the security guard controlling workers while they enter their working space? How do these eyes relate to the privacy/security of social and individual life? While the social impact and consequences of this 'security and surveillance' landscape must be located in a cultural understanding of the public/private sphere (Kadivar, 2003), the dynamics of foreign investment, TNCs and technology development require a (global) political economy approach.

Whereas in urban commercial and residential areas the market is more plural and many different companies can be found, strategic areas such as SEZ or ports and airports, consular facilities etc. are usually clients of the biggest companies, mostly foreign and TNCs: especially G4S. The SEZ is where the good and the bad are sorted. Those that access the shopping mall are not those that access the factory. The policing style in SEZ is focused on order; the target is to ensure that the machine runs smoothly, and only those that are productive or labor force are allowed in the SEZ or FTZ. On a luxury restaurant, private security sorts out the potential consumer from the inappropriate visitor. As Shearing & Stenning (1983) argue, the client-defined mandate of commercial security operating in mass private spaces is oriented towards preserving the interests of the clients, rather than the law and the public interest. The north-American scholars contend that this mandate and the subsequent allocation of resources necessarily means a focus on a new kind of offenders: "those who create opportunities for threats against the interests of the client" (Shearing & Stenning, 1983, p. 501). The focus is thus not crime, but to protect the profits of the client. This is however challenged when the 'private' security company is mandated with stopping stowaways in the ships that go to Europe, a border control duty that is traditionally part of the public forces' mandate. In this case, private security expands into public roles rather than into private spaces. The pervasiveness, thus, is influenced by both an increase in privately owned or privately managed land, both deriving its "legitimacy from the institution of private property"(Shearing & Stenning, 1983).

> "It is here that the origins and development of the shift to prudential policing that problem-solving realizes are located. It is these structural changes, the story maintains, that have prompted the change in the way policing has come to be

viewed. This is so because from the perspective of corporate communities - be this a bank or a homeless peoples' federation - it is not the criminal law that is the most relevant source of definitions of disorder but rather the values and objectives that define the "community"." (Shearing, 1997, p. 222)

Challenging the centrality of mass private property beyond North America, Jones & Newburn (1999) argued that the boundaries between private and public become blurred partly because public police is more likely to penetrate private property. If we go through the history of technology deployment within police surveillance and population control, it seems evident that life is increasingly registered and collected. Be it under human and social development purposes or for political control, private corporations penetrate and even spearhead urban development projects. In the short and medium term, it portrays a win-win situation for public and private security actors alike. Those state forces that manage to secure resources and new technologies for surveillance advance their position in the coercive and security field of power relations. However, as the case of the Fes street surveillance cameras reveals, purchase, deployment and benefit might lay on different actors at different times. And the reasons behind the deployment of surveillance technology might also lie in political benefits rather than the effectiveness of the technological practices.

Indeed the locations of private security, as labor intersected by class and gender, as investment intersected by transnational economic relations, as technologies that impact life and space; contribute and are possible through a representation of security. In the case of Fes, the short-term benefits of announcing modern and expedient policies could overweight the real surveillance incentives, in line with Securitization Theory. In the next chapter I will deal with other narratives that intertwine the neoliberal agenda with the security order.

Chapter 9 - The terrorist, the criminal and the unprofessional: The discursive construction of neoliberal security

'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.'

'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.'

'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master — that's all.'

Through the Looking Glass, by Lewis Carroll

"In other words, we should not say that an act offends the common consciousness because it is criminal, but that it is criminal because it offends that consciousness. We do not condemn it because it is a crime, but it is a crime because we condemn it.'

The Division of Labour in Society, by Émile Durkheim.

The new security panorama described in its material dispositives through the last chapters comes with a normative and sociolinguistic understanding of the world.

The goal in this chapter is to understand "how language functions in constituting and transmitting knowledge, in organizing social institutions or in exercising power" (Wodak and Meyer 2014). The chapter is organized in three main sections. The first section engages with the actors and channels that voice the hegemonic security. The second part deals with the narratives that explain and describe the threats to security in the current moment. The third part takes the narratives identified in the latter section and explores the solutions and technologies implied in the framing of the identified threats.

The organization of this chapter might unintentionally convey a functionalist perspective of the narratives that state actors and others (academia, experts, business actors) use. While I don't want to focus on the intentionality of these narratives, the problem-solving orientation of the narrated threats is undeniable. The official or officially-sanctioned descriptions of the threats dialectically include the solutions to these same threats. However, as mentioned above, 'securitizing actors' or 'communicative actors' in general are in different positions and convey different levels of conscious framing. Some might have clear interests in creating a specific narrative of 'insecurity', but they are also embedded in normative contexts and thus the 'speech acts' cannot be detached from the speakers' worldview. As a result, seeing these narratives as entirely Machiavellian instruments for control and power is far from the intention of this analysis[470].

The scope of this research excludes the analysis of alternative narratives of security, as I have chosen to focus on hegemonic and state-sanctioned narratives. Human rights defenders, political activists, dissidents, marginalized populations, can and do have very different perceptions of what their inmmediate threats are, and of who and what needs to be protected. A further in-depth research on the alternative constructions of security remains to be done.

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[470] In this sense Herring & Stokes (2011) classify social constructivism in terrorist studies as the approaches that identify discourse as instrumental (for thin social constructivists), and productive and constitutive (for thick social constructivists).

1. The language of neoliberal security

Discourses are "relatively stable uses of language serving the organization and structuring of social life" (Wodak & Meyer, 2014b). Discourses always have certain ideological effects as they ultimately convey an ideal of power relations. This chapter's basic material comprises textual documents such as royal speeches, media articles, legal texts or interview transcripts, as well as ethnographic observation of relevants events.

The analysis is based on the conception that discourse is not only speech, it can be a monument, a political strategy, a ceremony, or any act that conveys a specific symbolic meaning (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). Discourse is constitutive and constituted, embedded in a social context. We do not see texts as mere individual acts, but part of an institutionalized strategy. Discourse contributes to the status quo or it helps transform the power relations. As my focus is on the development of a neoliberal security consensus, it is not the individual pronouncing the words that constructs the discourse, but all kinds of practices that jointly manufacture the consensus that will help maintain dominance and that will ultimately align with the elite's interests.

In this sense our approach is top-down not because we deny the intrinsic relational character of power, but because we choose to focus on the reproduction and use of discourse by elites and institutions as a tool orresource for maintaining and reinforcing dominance. An act of speech legitimizes a certain course of political, legal or military action. It is ultimately about power. It is thus important to bear in mind the relational nature of power as it effectively limits and shapes the possibilities of political discourse. In fact, this relational nature is the ultimate cause of political discourse. Without an audience, there is no discourse, no need to articulate a narrative that will frame reality and its possibilities.

1.1 Neoliberalism and neoliberal security

In the neoliberal ideology, it is assumed that it is the individual self-interest in a "competitive" environment that can more efficiently allocate resources for the benefit of society. This competitive environment could only be achieved "through unrestricted and free development of business capacities and liberties of individuals within an institutional framework of strong private property rights, free markets and free trade" (Harvey, 2015, p.

6)[471]. The neoliberal narrative includes, thus, a destruction of the 'public res' in the sense that it portrays an image of 'inefficency, corrupt practices and self-interest' of public administration. Especially important to this image is not the accuracy of the assesment, but the fact that it is built in opposition to an image of 'efficiency, efficacity and merit' of the private endeavor.

Additionally, the neoliberal ideology is not developed as an insulated package, but rather it goes through the mediated translator of bearers: individuals and actors that promote certain practices, who carry their own background, hold their own interests and are limited by their material and ideational conditions (Hibou & Tozy, 2020, p. 423).

Neoliberalism is not a commonly used term in Morocco, not even in specific policy-development discussions (Hibou & Tozy, 2020). One might contend, however, that even globally, the concept is more commonly used in a pejorative way for its opposers than as an explicit guiding leitmotive. Hibou & Tozy identify a certain *ta'assil* or rooting for related concepts that come together in the language conveying the specific technologies of power in neoliberalism: as is the case with partenrship (*charaka*), participation (*mousharaka, tacharouk*), governance (*hawkama or hokum jayid*), that include private, public, state and civil society in a united conception of social order, as well as other concepts such as reforms (*islah*) already part of the administrative and political vocabulary.

The question in this chapter is that if neoliberalism has changed the methods or instruments of political action in general, has it also permeated and transformed the narrative or logic of the security sector? This research certainly points in this direction, as the studied cases in this chapter show.

As mentioned previously, security is here defined as a social practice concerned with the exclusions and inclusions of violence as a legitimate or illegitimate tool of social control/to maintain a certain order. Filling up the meaning of security is a social task, a social experience. In line with a constructivist approach on the issue, we presume that there are different possible securities, different stories in which some issues are tackled as 'security issues', as threats against a certain order, and some aren't. The acceptable levels of insecurity

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[471] "un teoría de prácticas politico-económicas que afirma que la mejor manera de promover el bienestar del ser humano consiste en no restringir el libre desarrollo de las capacidades y de las libertades empresariales del individuo dentro de un marco institucional caracterizdo por derechos de propiedad privada fuertes, mercados libres y libertad de comercio" in the Spanish version of the book.

–the victims/beneficiaries and the perpetrators and providers of that (in)security – are a contentious and dynamic matter.

What I call hegemonic security is a collection of symbolic and linguistic acts that reinforce a specific normative and material logic of domination, as it is the framework that protects individual and class interests, and conveys the naturalization of the neoliberal economic and political model.

Security is also historically and geographically located. As such, the notion and narrative of security deployed through discourse and practice by the state-sanctioned actors depends on a historical evolution and position of those actors; as well as on the location of the context within the world-system. In this chapter we focus on the narrative around security that has accompanied the process of private security development in Morocco. Three variables are essential and will accompany this chapter's analysis:

1. A history of structural exclusions. The premise of structural conditions must be taken into account against the "invisibilization of the social substrate and the collective bonds" (García García et al., 2021, p. 32). And against that invisibilization, "[…] "new" and "neoliberal" forms of domestic control must be situated within the global *longue durée* of racialized and colonial accumulation by dispossession." (Axster et al., 2021, p. 415).

2. The position of actors within the structure of power. The capacity of actors to produce a communicative act and to have an audience is constraint by their position in the relations of power. Their capacity to mobilize resources: symbolic, media, coercive, etc. that conferr influence and impact to their communicative act.

3. The Scale Economy of the Narrative: The hegemonic narrative of security depends on the international narrative as well as on the local narrative.

2. The communicative actors

The actors whose speeches are collected here are either directly part of the political system (legislators, public security officers, politicians), the media, the private 'business' sector or

civil society[472]. Here indeed aplies the gramscian notion of civil society as inherently connected with the state, and we will see in this chapter some examples of IOs and civil society organizations closely reproducing the neoliberal discourse on security.

2.1 The instrumental versus the constitutive

As mentioned earlier, social constructivists might begin their critical discourse analysis from two different positions. Herring & Stokes (2011) classify scholar's position between thin social constructivism that adscribes instrumental meaning to discourse, and the thick social constructivists that understands discourse as productive and constitutive. More than two separate options, however, the debate lies on a continuum spectrum of understandings.

This study's position in this spectrum is clear and it is based on two apriori. First, the impossibility of determining people's intentions (and thus their instrumental use of social practices) beyond their own words is assumed. In this sense, the starting point is not the rigid assumption that narrative is constructed in a void to the favor of the speaker's interest, but that the speaker is in itself constraint by events, acts, previous meaning-giving, labels and narratives. Each actor owns a specific sort of repertoire of language, in Tilly's sense (1987). The formulation and meaning-giving to events, actors and things, within a framework of security, determines greatly the limits and possibilities of further decisions and actions, as well as of future narratives.

Second, these actors can act in three different levels of consciousness as described by Gramsci: the economic-corporative "aware of the specific interests of a particular group", the class consciousness, which simply focuses on the economic participation to the hegemony; and lastly the hegemonic, "which brings the interests of the leading class into harmony with those of subordinate classes and incorporates these other interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms."(Cox, 1983, p. 168). We can only ever abstractly infer their level of 'conscious' or 'instrumentalization' from their position, but a further study on the accuracy of the three-levels theory is beyond the scope of this chapter.

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[472] I understand here this group of actors in the Gramscian sense of the state, that is the political society and the civil society that allies and sustains it, even involutarily.

The capacity of actors to impose or push a certain view of the issue is thus constrained by their identity, position and by the symbolic and material structures that they inhabit and circulate. It is thus worth asking ourselves who has acces to communicative events and how that symbolic access relates to other power resources. In sum, "who is allowed to say/write/hear/read what to/from whom, where, when and how" (van Dijk, 1993, p. 257).

In the classical tradition of Critical Discourse Studies, the interaction and politics of power that embed the discourse are dealt with here. Discourse is thus a social phenomena and it is as such studied, not as a linguistic unit *per se* but as a construction of reality that in its turn forms and is informed by that social reality. To translate this rather into the actual issue of this research, the explanation that the Moroccan elites formulate about the phenomena of violence is built on the interaction of violence itself and the socio-linguistic and historical context in which it happens and in which it is explained.

2.2 Communicative actors in Morocco

This research has targeted different actors and speech-acts that relate to the security order. These actors are not all in agreement and indeed they all might have their own agendas and perspectives. They only have in common that their speeches are built on elements consistent with a neoliberal discourse. The direction or strategy used in their discourse might differ nevertheless. Wodak and Meyers (2001, pp. 71–72) distinguished four different discursive macro-strategies about nations and national identities (in Europe): constructive, preservative or justificatory; transformative; or destructive strategies[473]. Although these four strategies were identified within national and nationalism narratives, their categorization is generic enough to still be useful as inspiring categories that can guide the structure of our analysis of the security order.

It follows that those in a position of relative stable power will commonly use preservative and justificatory strategies to naturalize and preserve the status quo. New actors competing to improve their position will seek either constructive or transformative strategies, or further and more structurally challenging, they might engage in destructive strategies.

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[473] "By 'strategy' we generally mean a more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim." (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p. 73).

Table 1 shows the classification of actors' identified strategies. This classification does not preclude a fix and rigid use of these strategies, as any actor can use all strategies at specific time. Indeed the variations of one same actor's strategies in different discursive productions can point at their changing position in the power structure.

TABLE 1 Discursive Strategies and Actors

Discursive macro-strategies*	Actors	Observations
Constructive	Public Officers The King	Build on long historical narratives to shape the existing security order and reinforce it: African Roots; Algerian rivalry, etc.
Preservative or justificatory	Public Officers The King	Committed to preserving the red tape around public security
Transformative	IOs: World Bank, United Nations TNCs Media Security think tanks Some civil society organizations	A narrative that conveys the security-development nexus, ultimately criminalizing poverty as the source of violence and insecurity. A narrative that pushes for increased securitization and increased technologization.
Destructive strategies	Opposition Activists Some civil society organizations	A narrative that critically targets hegemonic security and its negative implications

*Following Wodak and Meyer (2001).

In the following excerpt from a Royal Discourse pronnounced by Mohammed VI against the background of massive contestation in the Rif region in 2017, a clear tension can be seen. The speech is directed against the Hirak narrative of repression and the 'surveillance state'.

"Le constat que Je dresse ici contredit les allégations portées par certains concernant le recours à ce qu'ils désignent abusivement sous le nom d'approche sécuritaire. Leur vision donne l'impression que le Maroc est assis sur un volcan, et qu'à chaque foyer, à chaque citoyen correspond un policier qui surveille.

[…]

La vérité, c'est que, pour garantir la sécurité des citoyens et préserver leurs biens, il y a une seule ligne à appliquer : la loi ; un engagement ferme à respecter : les institutions.

Est-ce donc l'appareil sécuritaire qui gère les affaires du pays ? Est-ce lui qui contrôle les ministres et les responsables ? C'est peut-être lui aussi qui fixe les prix ?

En réalité, les agents des forces de l'ordre consentent d'énormes sacrifices, travaillent jour et nuit, dans des conditions difficiles, pour remplir le devoir qui leur incombe: assurer la sécurité et la stabilité du pays, intérieurement et extérieurement, et veiller sur la tranquillité, la quiétude et la sûreté des citoyens.

A cet égard, les Marocains ont le droit, et même le devoir, d'être fiers de leur appareil sécuritaire. Et là, Je l'affirme avec force et sans la moindre hésitation ni complexe d'infériorité: Si certains nihilistes ne veulent ni admettre ni proclamer cette vérité, c'est leur problème à eux-seuls."

Discours royal à l'occasion du 18-ème anniversaire de l'accession du Souverain au Trône de Ses glorieux ancêtres (MAP 27/07/2017)

[annotations: justificatory strategy against allegations of 'securitizatiion'; referent object: citizens and their goods; rhetoric questions point at different possible answers; the "good guys"; Referent Object: Country & Citizens; justificatory strategy; exclusion of citizens who are not proud of their security apparatus]

Source: Author

Although sometimes this might be more subtel, this short scerpt from the royal speech shows that "texts are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance" (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p. 11). A text cannot be regarded as an isolated item but as an interaction embedded in a cultural and social context. It is a struggle, even in the words of the King.

Beyond the contestation and the 'destructive strategy' of opposing political projects, I focus here on the internal struggles of the development of a neoliberal security. In the neoliberal security narrative, two apparently alternative 'securities' enter in dialogue through the private-public dichotomy. The dichotomy only entails a discussion about the role and domain of private enterprises, private technology and public security forces. The consensus on a need of enhanced technologically-oriented security prevails. As shown in the analysis of the lobbying campaing towards a regulation of private security (chapter 7), the struggle lays in the

definition of borders between private and public security. While some actors push for more responsibilites for the private, and furhter private-public partnership; others are concerned with distributing tasks[474].

The consensus of these private and public actors, however, lies in the need for 'more' security, as they collectively increase the 'value of security' when they compete for its meaning within the same 'field of power'.

3. The People as Threat

The competition for signifying the meaning of security and therefore its technologies brings in a 'securitization' of life and of a securitization of different issues in the political agenda. It is relevant in this sense that part of that dual strategy that increases the value of a certain security produces a destruction of the perception of security, even when the perception that there is more insecurity does not directly correspond with quantitative figures of criminality[475].

I chose three very particular study cases for the analysis of the narratives on threats: terrorism, the *tsharmil* phenomenon, and the parking guards. These are three completely different topics that represent different dimensions of the construction of the narrative of insecurity. The first one represents a global phenomenon, the defining security issue of the first 20 years of the twentieth century, and as such, and due to its implications in Morocco and for Morocco, it is relevant here. The *tsharmil* phenomenon is, on the contrary, a very local Moroccan phenomenon, and indeed one that presents a logic of infotaiment and fearmongering amplified through social media and mainstream media. Lastly, a very marginal case, that of parking guards shows a push for "professionalization" of informal work through a narrative of 'insecurity' and 'responsabilization' of the poor.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the factors that determines the success of a securitization story is the macro-narrative and its global predicament. The Africa Security Forum of 2017

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[474] See the case of Aït-Taleb below.

[475] In the most comprehensive study of US trends on private security from the 1970s to 1990, the "[i]ndicators suggest[ed] strongly that fear of crime [was] increasing even while some statistics indicate[d] that crime itself [was] stabilizing or declining." (Cunningham et al., 1990, p. 305)

shows evidence of shared perceived threats in Morocco and at the international level. The Africa Security Forum was organized by the think tank Atlantis Center for Geostrategic Research and Studies, a branch of the AlOmra Security Company, and in cooperation with FITS, a French-international lobby[476]. The presentation of the forum indeed points at the international dimension of the discourse:

> "The purpose of the Atlantis Center is to contribute to the ongoing international discourse with reflection to security problems on the African continent".

The Forum was planned around three axes, as shown in this screen caputre (Picture 1):

Main Themes :
The African Cooperation Challenges on Terrorism, Radicalization and Transnational Crime.

Thème 1 : Terrorism, cyberspace, and new vectors of radicalization

Thème 2 : The new challenges of migration and transnational criminality

Thème 3 : The Inter-African cooperation and its new challenges

The trinity of security threat in this international forum was incredibly similar to the trinity of threats that has been analyzed by different authors and identified in different contexts: crime, terror and migration (Shamir 2005). In fact, Theme 2 of the Forum (Picture 1) links migration with transnational criminality (migration and crime). In this chapter I do not deal with migration, but poignant work has been done on the issue of criminalization of migration, and especially the stereotyped image building of African migrants in Morocco (Faouzi, 2020; Gazzotti, 2019, 2021).

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[476] "The International Forum on Technology and Security (FITS) is a nonprofit association founded on January 16th, 2013. Its origin stems from the forum Technology Against Crime, held in July, 2013 in Lyon, the world headquarters of Interpol, which was chaired by Boon Hui Khoo, former president of Interpol. Alain Juillet, President of the Companies Security Directors Club, is the new Chairman of FITS." (*Africa Security Forum 2017: "Casablanca Meetings,"* 2017)

The following sections, depict the development of three narratives and their consistency and relationship with the neoliberal context of security: Next, the possible solutions that these three narratives convey are discussed within the new deployments of security technologies.

3.1 The terrorist threat

IR scholars studying transnational discourses on security have identified very different discourses that frame international relations among states in the name of security. In the two decades of the twenty-first century global terrorism, especially that based on an exclusionary jihadist ideology, was framed as the central threat to global peace and security. "Because security is relational, one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded." (Buzan 1983:187).

The global discourse on terrorism has a direct influence on the discourse on terrorism by Moroccan elites. Global elites also play an influential role in domestic decisions and the hegemonies that sustain a certain order (Izquierdo Brichs, 2016b). The centrality of terrorism in framing security in international politics also integrated Moroccan politics, in a hegemonic way especially after the 2003 attacks in Casablanca. Evidently, it was not the first time that terrorism had been identified as a security-threat in the country. Violent attacks on Hotel Atlas Asni in Marrakech in 1994 were a precedent, albeit in the midst of the Algerian civil war. Political violence from other groups had also previously been labeled as terrorism and they continue to be, as in the case of Polisario, although the international echo of that narrative has been unsuccessful so far.

The dramatic legal and political changes after the suicide attacks of 16th May 2003 cannot be explained solely by the violence in Casablanca. The opposition turned silent support of an anti-terrorist law cannot be understood without the knowledge about the dynamics and elites promoting a limited set of tools to depict, interpret and act upon the terrorist threat. Even non-traditional security actors such as NGOs are now dealing with funding that comes attached with the task of working on Countering Violent Extremism (Bastani & Gazzotti, 2021).

The international global narrative on terrorism becomes localized in Morocco and among Moroccan elite. However, there is not only a localization of a global narrative at the state

level (international to national) but also a retextualization of the narrative from the national to the international level (*ta'assil*). The importance of subsidiarized narrative has been underestimated in most academic literature (Acharya, 2004, 2011a), and Morocco is an example of how a local narrative coherent with a global narrative is not only a copy but it also takes up local meanings that will contribute to the global narrative. The important number of Moroccan nationals that are suspected to be involved in salafist jihadist networks brings Morocco to the spotlight. This means that Morocco will have to explain its policies and actions undertaken in order to stop or control these number of suspects.

At the same time, the Moroccan official discourse provides a framework of counter-terrorism destined for West-African consumption, and especially in countries with Muslim populations, through the notion of 'spiritual security' (*al-Aman al-rohy*)[477]. As an Islamic country where the Head of the State is also the Spiritual Guide ('*amir al mouminin*), control over religious beliefs becomes an important dimension of political control. The new concept of spiritual security is proposed as a way of countering extremism and attempts to strengthen the limits of acceptable values as well as to strengthen the legitimate interference of the state in controlling the 'souls' of the people.

 "The Commandery of Believers, base of the spiritual security of the Kingdom" highlighted an article on the officialist paper *Le Matin*[478]. Under the title, the king dressed in traditional attire waves at an audience outside the frame of the picture. The reforms and transformation of the religious institutions is thus framed by this spiritual security, and its keystone is the *Imarat Al Mouminine*[479]. Ann Marie Wainscott looked at the state control of religion through its increased institutionalization in her book *Bureaucratizing Islam* (2018). In the context of the GWoT, the popular pressure for political reforms during the 2011 Uprising, and the counter-terrorist measures, Wainscott contends that it is partly due to its counterterrorism strategy that the regime has been able to control demands for democratic reforms with relatively little coercion.

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[477] Saba'ai, Rami. 2019. "Al'amn al-rwhy… mafhum 'mustahiditha' li muahahat alttaruf 'am hajar ealaa huriya al-taabir? Marayna", 3rd April. http://marayana.com/laune/2019/04/03/6725/ (Accessed: 15/05/2019)

[478] Rmiche, Abdelwahed. 2019. "La Commanderie des croyants, socle de la sécurité spirituelle du Royaume", *Le Matin*, 29th July. https://lematin.ma/journal/2019/commanderie-croyants-socle-securite-spirituelle-royaume/320271.html (Accessed: 13/10/2019)

[479] Rmiche, Abdelwahed. 2019. "La Commanderie des croyants, socle de la sécurité spirituelle du Royaume", *Le Matin*, 29th July. https://lematin.ma/journal/2019/commanderie-croyants-socle-securite-spirituelle-royaume/320271.html (Accessed: 13/10/2019).

3.2 Crime and Lawlessness

Two of the experts interviewed refered to 'security and safety' while one argued that the distinction in French was "difficult to make". These conceptions are linked to the way they are thought of in the business. One of the experts in security that I talked to refered explicitly to the "vol et vandalism"[480]: robbery and vandalism.

The problem of petty criminality and violence from poor neighboorhoods has grabbed especial salient media attention since the 1990s in Morocco. In fact, the reduction of leftist political protest from radical organizations coincided with an abandonment of the idea of social justice, the rise of a human-rights based agenda as well with a media and official framing of violence during social unrest as an exclusively vandalic and apolitical act (Camps-Febrer, 2019a). While in the 1990s on, this framing served to justify heavy-handed responses to protest, in the 2000s it reinforces the so-called securtiy-development nexus, and to bring about security solutions to social issues. The 'vandalism' and criminalization of the poor denies the political prisoner narrative, legitimizes the discriminatory and arbitrary police repression, and refocuses the social, historical and class variables into an individual responsibility representation, a moralizing vision of the deserving and honest citizen.

> "More and more frequently, the concept of delinquency is merged with the concept of poverty […] even of pre-delinquency (subjects and spaces intervened not for what they have done, but for what they can potentially do)"(García García et al., 2021, p. 32)

The specific case that I have focused on is that of the so-called *tsharmil*. The name *tsharmil* caught on in 2014 after a few robberies and videos went viral, portraying young men in tracksuits and flashy watches with thug-like and macho attitudes and brandishing knives[481]. According to Taieb Belghazi, "the tsharmils reflect the discouragement felt by many Moroccan youth."[482]. Nevertheless, the majority approach of media[483] and authorities was

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[480] Interview 25.

[481] The designation might refer to the "charmoula […] a marinade or seasoning used for the preparation of meat"(Strava, 2020).

[482] Stiles, Frankie. 2015. "Morocco's Tcharmils 'consider jail home'", AlJazeera, 27 Feb 2015. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/morocco-tcharmils-jail-home-150217102015902.html (Accessed: 11/10/2019)

mainly securitarian, and as such, the issue wass tackled and covered by the Ministry of Interior.

> "The government, in cooperation with the police, are doing our best to stop those who make people unsafe and fearful, so we are organising security campaigns all over the country to bring safety back." (Minister of Interior, Mohammed Hassad) [484]

Gore images of street violence of young boys armed with long knives[485] became the visible image of security problems in the big cities, especially in places like Casablanca, Fes or Tangier. A reportedly vigorous speech by the King, behind closed doors, was followed by 'cleaning up' campaigns inside the General Directorate of National Security (DGSN), allegedly against those police chiefs that hadn't been adequately tackling the issue[486]. In the spring of 2014, an extensive campaign of police raids was conducted in lower-class neighborhoods against young males matching the style of *tsharmil*. It was dubbed 'Operation Tsharmil' and according to an official report, "103,714 arrests had been carried out in the first semester of 2014" (El Afass, 2014).

Tsharmil manifested itself in urban and internet spaces (El Maarouf & Belghazi, 2018), but the perception of violence and insecurity was exponentially increased by the media coverage and by citizen dissemination of videos (especially through facebook and youtube), which produced a "sense of panic towards 'deviant' youth that pose[d] a serious 'threat' to public law and order" (Yassni, 2018). Meanwhile, "honest citizens" were denouncing a real "war" on the streets of Casablanca (Strava, 2020). Strava (2020) argues that this panic and national fear that suddenly erupted in 2014 in fact reflected long-groomed middle and high-class

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[483] A well documented ethnography on the online media and social media development of the viral *tsharmil* phenomenon can be found on Cristian Strava's research (Strava, 2020).

[484] Stiles, Frankie. 2015. "Morocco's Tcharmils 'consider jail home' ", AlJazeera, 27 Feb 2015. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/morocco-tcharmils-jail-home-150217102015902.html (Accessed: 11/10/2019)

[485] One example of images that can be found on the internet: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=28&v=ET9JyBP_Clg The video uses phone recorded footage with different rap and drama music to scramble together hooliganism, young men with long knifes in street fights, teenagers riding a tram hanging by the windshield wipers. It ends with an epic music and images of police and the city.

[486] Citing different media outlets, an article on Le360 informed that about a thirty of pólice officers had been affected by the campaign, among them the prefect of Tetouan, Fes and Casablanca, and the colonel at the perfecture of Kenitra. Moutik, Meriama. 2014. "Secouées par le roi, les forces de l'ordre se mobilisent", Le 360, 7th April 2014. http://fr.le360.ma/societe/secouees-par-le-roi-les-forces-de-lordre-se-mobilisent-12713 (Accessed: 11/10/2019). See also: http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2014/04/127850/morocco-tchermil-prompts-ministry-of-interior-to-mobilize-its-security-apparatus/

anxieties, and were paired with a moralizing and responsibilizing vision of the poor, devoid of any economic or social extenuanting reasons.

Wadie and Said reenact their version of the Tsharmil phenomenon. Said teaches Wadie to behave like a badass to help him end up in prison, where he thinks he will be able to learn English. The video ends with the two actors off scene showing a sign that reads "No to tcharmil". 6M views on youtube. *https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NNMvf7977cE*. Other satirical video by comedian Hassan ElFad: *https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ynpCbJu8nok&list=RDNNMvf7977cE&start_radio=1*

The phenomenon of *tsharmil* has been related to longtime issues such as that of hooliganism (*shaghab al-mala'ib* or stadium violence), that engage with similar visions of the low class men. In the 2019 Preventica Fair, there were several conferences on hooliganism and stadium security[487], where the approach was basically securitizing and usually justified police violence[488].

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[487] Sécurité urbaine : dynamique des espaces sportifs de foot (hooliganisme). Conference 12.04.2019. A sociologist, Prof. Errachidi spoke about their violence, their social and cultural background.

[488] The case of soccer fans in occupied Western Sahara, for instance, takes on a specially political dimensions (Drury, 2019).

As Boukhari wonders, the phenomenon of *thsarmil* can simply be an old phenomenon with a new name[489]. Yasni argues that the *tsharmil* phenomenon could be indeed a subculture aesthetic, sytle and practices that emerge from the marginalization of a frustrated youth in a consumerist culture (Yassni, 2018).

In fact as google-stats show, the search for the word appeared in 2014 and peaked in popularity in April of the same year, only to practically drop drastically for web searches after less than two year (more sustained in image search as it also represents a specific aestetic style).

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
[489] Boukhari, Karim. (2014) Vous avez dit Tcharmil ?, at Le360, 9 Août 2014. Online: https://fr.le360.ma/blog/entre-amis/vous-avez-dit-tcharmil

Statistics tabulated with the tool of google-stats.com (Research done 24/09/2021)

Although the *tsharmil* phenomenon as a popular narrative seems was a very short lived phenomenon, it was mentioned to me on several occasions by my informants and security experts, and it has also appeared in news covering increased funding, new equipment and reforms in police agencies.

3.3 The Unprofessional: The parking guards

A high-middle class professional man from Casablanca argued in an interview with me that the problem with professional guards was that the men with their (poor and uneducated) background were usually better off in the informal sector[490]. This statement has been contradicted by all the security guards I interviewed, even if they complaint about their labor conditions. One important informal sector he mentioned was the car guards. These are mostly men, but also some women, with little to no education that get 5-10dh per every car that parks in their part of the street. The parking guard is the informal job performed by thousands of people in Morocco as well as in Algeria[491].

> "Ils font partie de notre quotidien. Jours et nuits, ils sont là dans les ruelles, les boulevards, les places… Ce sont les gardiens de voitures avec lesquels on entretient des relations 'je t'aime, moi non plus'" (Benchekroun et Satori 2011). Quoted in (Ghiat, 2013).

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[490] Interview done in Casablanca

[491] "Les gardiens de voitures en A...   13)

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Amateur Satire about Parking Guards: https://web.facebook.com/100006873318532/videos/2285142145058207/

Guards work sometimes in groups; they run their part of the street and divide shifts, night and day, weekends, etc. Sometimes streets are guarded by members of the same family or by groups of organized neighbours (Ghiat, 2013). They can also be an important part of the neighborhood solidarity, or help street children (Laabi, 2016).

> "Un gardien marocain s'est exprimé : 'Je ne paie ni loyer, ni électricité ni eau. Les gens m'apportent tous les jours de quoi manger, et sont ici très généreux avec moi. Je vie très bien et de plus j'arrive à faire vivre ma famille très bien aussi'" (Mouhcine, www.emc-mag.com).

Some of the guards do have permits to work, but these have ususally been obtained through personal contacts with the administrative police, municipal or communal elects or members of political parties[492]. The work provides an alternative to unemployment (Ghiat 2013).

One of the guards I talked to during my fieldwork in 2019 worked as the night shift guard, covering also Sundays. He said he earned 1.000 'real', 50 dh. The money they earn depends where they work: some get 50dh per car every month if it is a residencial place, or 100dh. The usual amount paid per car is 5dh, but in some places you might pay much more, like in upper neighborhoods. The municipality has started managing specific permits for their work. The authorities rent a part of the street to someone. Then there are private parkings like that in Marina in Bouregreg, and in Hay Riad. So the parking guards too are being 'regularized'. There are no specific requirements to the job or regulations, they simply have to be registered with the authorities.

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[492] Source: https://www.le212.info/Enquete-mekanikus-com-Qui-sont-nos-gardiens-de-voitures-au-Maroc_a27603.html and https://www.mekanikus.com/qui-sont-nos-gardiens-de-voitures-au-maroc-enquete/

Source: Khadija Chafai. "Istimrar al7amla ded 7orass al-sayarat bi alBayda u alJama3a tdaker bt3yra alrakn" [Campaign against the parking guards continues in Casablanca and the Commune reminds of the prices] LeSiteInfo. *https://ar.lesiteinfo.com/maroc/543812.html* (Accessed July 6, 2021)

The existence of this line of work, however, has become a more salient 'security problem' in the last few years. In an article published in 2021 some unknown social network users have been complaining about the parking guards, and the district of Aïn Chok has issued a statement with fixed fees (Chafai, 2021). A previous article[493] reported on complaints from similar 'absuive' prices in Salé. The case of parking guards, as well as the case of *tcharmil*, and the way their stories are portrayed point to similar "[m]iddle and upper-class voices, their anxieties and the affective economies they mobilize [and how these] have become particularly instrumental to how social fears are dealt with in Morocco." (Strava, 2020, p. 3).

4. The solutions

As the *tsharmil* and the parking guards cases show, the way security is hegemonically defined tells us more about "middle and upper class anxieties" and about the ideal hegemonic social order than about the real risks and threats. The responses tell us about the way the state – and the actors acting in accordance or in its name – understands security, the official 'craftmanship' of security: how security is used as a technology of governance that secures/protects specific subjects, objects, places and ideas. The portrayal of threats directly

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[493] https://www.lesiteinfo.com/maroc/parking-a-5-dirhams-les-precisions-du-vice-maire-de-sale/

influences the universe of possible, thinkable solutions. "Security provision" is based on a particular knowledge, and this knowledge is socially produced.

4.1 The terrorist threat: securitizing life

The threats portrayed above are mostly no novelty. Terrorism, criminality, have been shaped in many ways, and the faces of the perpetrators have changed, but in general terms, the issues have always been located in the realm of security. The phenomenon of terrorism is not a phenomena recently securitized. 'Terrorism' as a threat to the existing order has mostly been dealt with from a securitized perspective. We cannot identify a transfer of the issue of terrorism from one level to the other as other researchers have pointed in reference to other issues (climate change, migrations, refugees…) (Huysmans, 2006).

However, the way the terrorist threat is portrayed entails specific technologies of security. In this sense, terrorism is the argument used to spread securitization to other areas that previously belonged to the political level or to reinforce other previously securitized issues. Terrorism is thus not only approached through hard security[494]. The terrorist threat is explicitly tackled through a comprehensive global approach that includes legal and justice reforms, education, the religious field as well as socio-economic development policies or the active participation and cooperation at the multilateral level in the 'fight against terrorism'. The approach taken by most Moroccan official discourses internationally and locally is imbued from a security-development nexus. It implies an amalgam of hard security policies and state-building policies and thus encompasses most issues on the Kingdom's agenda on different levels (domestic, regional as well as international). The comprehensive approach is best represented by the view of the Moroccan scholar Moha Ennaji:

> "Appropriate laws should be enacted as soon as possible and policies must be implemented to ensure border control, the closure of financing ports, propaganda platforms, anti-addiction, etc. Civil society has to be proactive in countering Daesh and its allies. Counter terrorism should emanate from the inside, in coordination with the outside world, through sensitizing youth, reforming education and media, regional and international cooperation and coordination,

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[494] This and the next few paragraphs are a partially ammended version of my chapter Camps-Febrer, B. (2019). "Counter-terrorism as a technology of securitization: Approaching the Moroccan case". In M. J. Butler (Ed.), Securitization Revisited: Contemporary Applications and Insights (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429054648

and through awareness-raising in families, schools, universities and civil society organizations." (Ennaji, 2016, p. 9)

This rationale of the counter-terrorist technology encompasses all domains of policy, it modulates all domains of (in)security through the creation of regulatory and capacity instruments. As Bogaert shows in the case of slums and urban transformation (2018), the danger of conflating terrorism with development is particularly worrying when counter-terrorism becomes the main technology in governing (in)security practices. This security-development nexus has indeed been common practice when security experts or good-intentioned politicians have focused on the origins of violent actors, coming from marginalized ghettos, seeking a way out of poverty and marginalization through radicalized ideologies and 'irrational' and 'barbaric' violence (Ennaji, 2016). The fight against terrorism, with its core military and police rationale, becomes entangled with development policies and social and economic programs as part of the justification for the government of (in)securities and thus managed in a securitized logic[495] (Piazza 2006; Bogaert 2018). The fight against terrorism means upgrading state institutions and policies, as well as mobilizing private and transnational agents, in order to provide a human security that will make sure citizens (only citizens) do not fall into the luring trap of terrorism. The idea of sacrifice that Bigo raises is ever present, against the claim for the need of "[...] a balanced approach that guarantees security without sacrificing basic human rights and freedoms, one that restores confidence in the political process and integrates all groups that renounce violence" (Masbah 2014).

In the security-development nexus security and security technologies are also introduced as a solution to all economic and societal problems. The slogan of the 2019 ASEC Expo was "Technological Solutions of Security for Human Development in Africa"[496]. According to the fair's commissioner, Mohamed Achbal, the objective is to "help all African countries to securitize [sic.] the economic potential"[497]. Further France24 explained how "tech companies

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[495] This process is taking place within a phase of roll-out neoliberalism (Bogaert 2018) whereby the state acts as a media for private agents who effectively benefit from this modulations of (in)security domains, among them the royal family.

[496] M24TV (2019) *Inauguration à Rabat d'''ASEC EXPO''*, 3rd March 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=plAsKuZoRPE (Accessed: 05/09/2021)

[497] "à aider l'ensemble des pays africains à sécuriser leur potentiel économique, et pour l'échange entre, d'une part, les consultants, les experts, les spécialistes, les opérateurs technologiques et d'autre part, les autorités publiques, les responsables sécuritaires, les opérateurs dans les domaines économiques et les intégrateurs. // Le Salon permet aussi de faire le point sur les avancés technologiques dans les domaines du contrôle électronique des accès, de la gestion du feu, la protection des systèmes d'information et la cybercriminalité, a-t-il expliqué, ajoutant que le salon sera aussi une occasion pour débattre de deux thèmes d'actualités, à savoir "La ville intelligente" et "La protection de l'hygiène alimentaire" cited in Amaoui, Rachid (2019). "Inauguration d'ASEC EXPO, premier salon africain dédié aux technologies de la sécurité et la sûreté" TIC-Maroc, 19th February, 2019. https://www.tic-maroc.com/2019/02/inauguration-asec-expo-premier-salon-africain-dedie-aux-technologies-securite-surete.html

pushed to convince African officials that their state-of-the-art surveillance tools are the key to stability and development."[498]

4.2 Parking Guards: A problem with a solution?

Two problems are pointed at within the framing that emerges about the situation of parking guards: crime and unproductivity. The phenomenon is presented as criminal firstly because it is unregulated: it bears no sign of formality. This formality drive has changed in the last few years: some are already wearing the yellow or orange vest, inducing a legitimacy by association, that is, a legitimacy through a performative act of uniformization. They are also judged by the absence of badges or ticket, receipt. No authority –no official authority, one may precise- controls their work in a standardized manner (Ghiat, 2013)[499]. It is also presented as criminal because conflicts and violence may arise with drivers or among guards competing for a part of the street.

Take the example of an article in *L'Économiste*, a business news outlet. "The parking guards are the nightmare of drivers", writes the journalist[500]. The National Federation of Associations for the protection of the consumer sounds the alarm. A driver in Saïdiya, a touristic town in the Mediterranean coast, was stabbed to death when he refused to pay 5dh. This death is not a mere criminal case, but rather, according to the Federation, a consequence of "the anarchy and absence of regulation of carparking"[501]. The citizen is here the driver, the consumer, even the MRE who comes to Morocco in the summer and wants to relax without concerns. The parking guard, on the contrary, "does not represent any added value"[502] precisely because their job is not regulated[503]. The money that they win is regarded as 'survival economy' and thus has no 'added-value'. It is a million-dollar business, 'lost to the

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[498] France24. (2019) "Tech companies scope out Africa surveillance sector". 24/02/2019. https://www.france24.com/en/20190224-tech-companies-scope-out-africa-surveillance-sector?ref=tw (Accessed: 15/05/2019)

[499] Government must thus become "a licensing and-franchising authority" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2016).

[500] El Arif, Hassan (2019) "Gardiens de voitures: Coup de gueule de la Fédération des consommateurs", *L'Économiste*, N°:5573 Le 09/08/2019. https://leconomiste.com/article/1048901-gardiens-de-voitures-coup-de-gueule-de-la-federation-des-consommateurs (Accessed: 22/10/2019).

[501] «l'anarchie et à l'absence d'une réglementation régissant le stationnement». El Arif, Hassan (2019).

[502] "Certains automobilistes sont obligés de payer des montants largement exagérés lorsqu'il y a une forte affluence parce qu'ils n'ont pas le choix, et ce parfois sous la menace. Le montant versé aux gardiens ne représente aucune valeur ajoutée." El Arif, Hassan (2019).

[503] The colonial narrative of *le Maroc inutile* echos here. But finally it is not an echo, it is the same development of capitalism in the name of progress, modernity, and efficiency.

State'[504]. It is a system of criminal business – 'organized racket' claims a commentary under the article- an economic crime (unproductive, extorsionary) and a security challenge: especially against vulnerable women, as violence against women committed by parking guards is mediated by class and by the 'sexual scripts'[505].

Alternatively, one could talk of precarious unprotected work, or about the fragilization of social ties, but the way it is framed in urban spaces can only induce to be solved through regulation and privatization. The voices of the parking guards remain silent[506], only audible through the strident images of sporadic crime. This is an economic and a security problem.

The parking guards are thus excluded, but not *ad eternum*. It is crime, law-breaking and unproductivity that pushes for the law-making (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2016), opening the door to companies that will 'manage' parking lots, thus solving this issue through a process of inclusion of some and of further exclusion and dispossession of others. It will also transform hierarchical and social networks of the street.

The public space for parking cannot be appropriated by an informal guard, but by the municipal government, by the police, or by a constituted and regulated company. The result is a privatized and exclusive private space (either one must pay the municipality or a private carpark) but within a morally higher order. As Lea and Hallsworth put it:

> "Neoliberalism aims not just at warehousing the very poor or forcing them into low-wage labour but more widely at the breaking up of all forms of class, community or political organization or spontaneous appropriations of space which might interfere with capital and which are to be redefined as threats to security." (Lea & Hallsworth, 2013, p. 24)

Cities like Casablanca, Rabat or Fes are undergoing urban plans for the regulation of public parking spaces, through the establishment of procurement mechanisms. In Fes, the

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[504] Source: https://www.le212.info/Enquete-mekanikus-com-Qui-sont-nos-gardiens-de-voitures-au-Maroc_a27603.html https://www.mekanikus.com/qui-sont-nos-gardiens-de-voitures-au-maroc-enquete/

[505] Stevi Jackson uses the concept of 'sexual scripts' to explain the 308eutralization of violent male sexuality as a historically located culture that is mediated by other variables such as social status, class and power relations. Sexual violence from lower class men contributes to the narrative of sexual violence as a deviance perpetrated by marginal men, instead of an intrinsic part of contextual sexual scripts that frame the 308eutralization of violent male sexuality. (D'Cruze, 1992).

[506] "Ignorons-les! La solution à ce problème de taille qui ronge nos rues? Gardez votre fenêtre fermée, démarrez votre voiture et partez! Faites comme s'ils étaient invisibles…" Comment by Yassin (2019) "Courrier des Lecteurs: Parkings publics: Les gardiens de rue font leur loi", L'Economiste, N°:5559 Le 18/07/2019. https://leconomiste.com/article/1047993-parkings-publics-les-gardiens-de-rue-font-leur-loi (Accessed: 23/10/19)

management was given in 2018 to an Italo-French venture, Group KLB[507], and the informal guards are pushed aside.

One may see here a common threat of the colonial narrative, of the 'native improvidence' (D. K. Davis, 2006) that suggests that commoners need a modern norm and order to provide security. In what may be seen as a bit of a stretch, the need to regulate everything that falls under the control of the law echoes the Parisian claims of Lyautey to conquer Fes in order to fight the 'Moroccan anarchy' (Vermeren, 2012, p. 88). But consider the case of 'privatization of the common':

> "Land degradation in the dryland agricultural areas of Morocco is commonly blamed on overgrazing by local pastoralists despite existing documentation that suggests instead that ploughing of marginal lands and over-irrigation are the primary drivers of land degradation in the region. The deployment of this colonial environmental narrative of 'native improvidence' has facilitated an expansion of state power over collective rangelands under neoliberalism at the same time that government involvement has decreased in other sectors" (D. K. Davis, 2006).

The representation of street guards in media and the progressive 'formalization/privatization' of the métier falls well into what Elyachar criticized as insidious theories that encouraged corporations to look at the poorest of the poor, the BOP (Bottom of the Pyramid), not only as potential consumers, but "as a giant laboratory in which new business models, and a new kind of business infrastructure" can be discovered (Elyachar, 2012, p. 110).

In this perspective of 'next practices' to look at for TNC's benefit and growth, NGOs play an important role as connectors between the BOP and the private world. Research and expertise can also help boost the economic value and the corporate interest of the subaltern.

Professor Ghiat conducted fieldwork with 30 parking guards in Oran, Algeria. He concluded that the work could be regarded as a "social business", since it helped with unemployment and it deterred damage and robbery of private property (cars). Nevertheless, the recommendation of the paper was to pay more attention to these initiatives, guards should be

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[507] Saad Alami, Youness. 2019. Régions: Fès/Parkings: C'est l'anarchie totale… en attendant la SDL", L'Économiste, Edition N°:5532 Le 11/06/2019. Online: https://leconomiste.com/article/1046170-fes-parkings-c-est-l-anarchie-totale-en-attendant-la-sdl (Accessed: 23/10/19)

trained in communication skills, and their work formalized in order to ensure "compliance with international norms" (Ghiat 2013:12)[508].

In relation to the security order, an added paradox emerges. In fact, it is well known that guards are part of the informal network of police informants[509] (Ghiat, 2013; Hibou & Tozy, 2020). The professionalization, corporatization and regulation of this employment might clash with the assumed role of informants that these guards are tasked with by the police. Their precarious situation can constitute a bargaining resource for the *moqaddem* or other information-collection officers, a resource that might disappear with the entray of corporations, not because the task of informant can't be asked of employees of private companies, but because of their possible foreignnes to the area where the company places them.

On the other hand, the economic and social crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has strengthened the perception that informal sector is a vulnerability factor. According to the official numbers, 5.2 million families that lived from informal economy were aided by the state during lockdown. As Ahmed Reda Chami, former minister, said "the size of the informal sector, […] was the most obvious thing that hit us in the face"[510]. Beyond the scope of this research, informality is traversed by class, rural-urban and other structural factors in which the pandemic and the implications of lockdowns have varied, especially against the background of those places where the only authority legitimized to redistribute is the state and other sanction charity organizations.

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[508] "Plus d'attention doit être payé à cette activité sociale et économique, pour répondre aux normes internationales d'entreprises sociales. // L'activité de gardiennage de voiture doit être régularisée en forme d'entreprises, ou le métier de gardien doit être revalorisé, et les gardiens doivent être formés sur les techniques de communication et de respect des clients, afin d'aboutir à des entreprises sociales, adaptées aux réalités des pays en voie de développement."

[509] Source: https://www.le212.info/Enquete-mekanikus-com-Qui-sont-nos-gardiens-de-voitures-au-Maroc_a27603.html https://www.mekanikus.com/qui-sont-nos-gardiens-de-voiture-au-maroc-enquete/

[510] Saleh, Heba. (2021). "Pandemic exposes vulnerabilities in Moroccan economy", *Financial Times*, 12th October 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/2e16babc-7d31-4af7-acec-9bf9409988e4

4.3 More security, more technology, more surveillance

In a similar vain, the issue of sexual harassement on the streets has entered the official discourse and policies. Through different projects in partnership with civil society, feminist and youth organizations, municipalities, international NGOs, etc., the issue is being tackled and put on the political agenda.

The Fondation Ababou in partnership with UNWomen worked on a project against sexual harassment (*Baraka min Taharrouch*)[511]. As they see it, it is mostly the girls from outside the neighborhoods, unknown to the neighboors, who are most at risk[512]. The girls from the workshops organized by Ababou demand more protection from the state, cameras, etc.

"Security guards and their uniforms reassure people", told me a member of a Moroccan women's organization. "They specially reassure women", she added. It was also the main claim at the 5th UN Forum on Safe Cities and Safe Public Spaces for Women and Girls. More female officers, cameras in buses and streets were also part of the comprehensive solution given to violence against women on the streets and public spaces. As a reproduction of the authoritarian, paternalistic and patriarchal state, cameras (eyes) and uniforms (bodies) reproduce the type of individualized, suspicious, panoptic culture that is the solution for insecurity.

Fondation Abdou trained 100 street guards against sexual violence while promoting fix prices and identity badges expedited by the Commune. The project, thus, is focused on the underlying idea that education and cultural obstacles are responsible for individual behaviors. The morality and individual responsabilitzation is also exemplified by a project of training 'minors in contact with law' (sic.) or young offenders to become security guards, since "they

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[511] In a UNWomen Report on Masculinites in the MENA Region: In Morocco the report was based on the interviews on 1,200 men and 1,200 women, a third of them living in urban areas, aged 18 to 59, from seven provinces and prefectures within the Rabat- Salé-Kénitra region of Morocco were surveyed. "Street sexual harassment is commonly perpetrated by men and frequently experienced by women. More than half of men reported ever having sexually harassed a woman or girl, and more than 60 per cent of women reported such unwanted attentions [sic!]. More women than men blamed the victim's appearance for provoking harassment."(UN Women & Promundu, 2017, p. 92). Also, "Men and women reported high rates of violence growing up. More than 60 per cent of men were beaten as children at home, and 80 per cent physically punished by their teachers. Girls were less vulnerable to physical violence at school, but at home, were almost as vulnerable as their male peers. " (UN Women & Promundo, 2017, p. 92).

[512] "Les filles des quartiers populaires, s'organisent entre elles ou bien en appellant a un voisin, etc. Mais c'est les filles de hors de quartiers qui sont harcelées."

already know what's cooking"[513]. A link between crime and its positive side 'security provision' that presents crime and 'deviant' behavior as a personal choice.

The project of Ababou, like the one for young offenders trained to become security guards are based on the same premis. The goal, as expressed by Ababou's member in the conference, is to boost the street guards with ego by reinforcing their role as protectors. They can turn their behavior/attitude and image around by becoming warrants of girls and women's safety.

Slide from the presentation given by Nabila El Ajraoui Saadi, Fondation Ababou, *Session 4. Engaging the community and transportation in increasing women's mobility*, 26th February 2020, Sofitel, Rabat.

Can social causes be separated from individual responsibility in crime? Wacquant argues that the State, in partnership with other private actors, provides professional training and educational support for the marginalized as a means to blame them individually for their potential failure.

> "These debates are rooted in a narrative shift that promotes a reductive view of "responsibilization," particularly with regard to the lower classes. As I elaborate below, this shift has been aided by the progressive delegitimization of social justice discourses and their replacement with agendas framed by a politically neutralizing human-rights approach as a consequence of the (incomplete) neoliberalization of Moroccan spaces and forms of governance." (Strava, 2020, p. 3)

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[513] Interview with NGO worker.

Those that protest and resist collectively are acting against the meritocratic view of this model. They might want to access some sort of meritocratic workforce, but at the same time, they are the reminders that their lack of opportunities, their precarious lives, are a collective, structural issue. Thus, marginalized people are trained as a form of discipline. In this different ways of controlling the poor, assistance is linked to the moral merits of people, as professional training is.

At a national level, as well, not only the narrative of barbaric or stupid or violent crime is portrayed in a moralistic light, but it is also used as a repressive tools: we saw this with the police raids of marginalized neighborhoods, with the repression of all salafist members, but also through the use of accepted narratives of the fight against gender-based violences to repress annoying opposition. A collective created in 2020 under the name of *Khmissa*[514] published a petition that denounce the political exploitation of women's issues to curtail freedom of opinion and expression, silencing and punishing activists[515].

The issue of violence against women on the public space shows a subtle case of neoliberal narrative. While the technologically oriented solution of deploying surveillance cameras everywhere speaks for itself, civil society initiatives that are state-sanctioned entail a more subtle form of neoliberalism that threatens the core liberal myth of citizenship rights. As Carol Pateman challenged in her book *The Sexual Contract* (1998), the idea of freedom in exchange for protection of the state would only apply to elite, white European men. She "demonstrated that the state's monopoly on power did not guarantee women freedom from violence in either the private or the public sphere. On the contrary, it is only a recent trend that states prosecute domestic violence and other forms of gender-specific violence." (Kamp, 2009, p. 194).

In line with what Hibou & Tozy describe, the protection from violence, the security of women is left here to the tackling by civil society, in interventions that align with the neoliberal state and the private-public partnership model. Neoliberal policies "cut back the very aspects of the state that feminist activists seek to build up […] and are accompanied by a

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[514] Among them: the human rights defender, Khadija al-Riyadi, the journalist Hajar Raissouni, the activist Afaf Bernani, the writer Naima Abd al -awi, the human rights defender, Fatiha Aarour, the two wives of the detained journalists Tawfiq Bouachrine and Suleiman Raissouni, Asma al-Musawi and Khouloud al-Mukhtari, the writer Nihad Fathi, the actress of Lubna Abidar-e Khashir, and the former police officer.

[515] Warshashen, Wael. 2020. "Activists denounce the political exploitation of women's issues" (*nashatat younadidoun alistighlal assyassy lqadaia annissa*), Hespress, 2020/27/10. www.hespress.com.

gendered reconfiguration of responsibilities between citizens and the state" (Ong, 2006, p. 121), depoliticising civil society into an 'NGOisation', as mere executers, or partners of the state political policies.

> "This logic operates in two ways: on the one hand, it functions to shift the burden of socio-economic security from the state to individuals as autonomous, rational actors; on the other, it becomes the field on which a politics of morality that stigmatizes and blames the poor for their own predicament has gained increasing political currency (see Hache 2007)." (Strava, 2020, p. 12)

Nevertheless, and much in detriment of a real fight against gender-based violence and especially working-class women's rights, the state also benefits from the global and local narrative of #MeToo and #Masaktach and approaches gendered policies in consistency with the regime's neoliberal agenda (Errazzouki, 2014) [516].

4.3.1 Prevention

Security Governance is structured around two paradigms, that of prevention and of reaction (Johnston & Shearing, 2003). Aït-Taleb, a Commissaire Divisionnaire and PhD in Law, takes up these two paradigms in the Moroccan context. According to Aït-Taleb, the old definition of security refers to the "law enforcement and the fight against delinquency" (Aït-Taleb, 2014, p. 52)[517]. The new conception of security "extends, rather, as the action, even the state of being safe from delinquency and any other imminent or virtual risk or threat to institutions, persons and property" (Aït-Taleb, 2014, p. 52)[518].

This new broader conception forces the inclusion and existence of a private security market as it conveys an emphasis on prevention (anticipatory protection) rather than on repression (proactive reaction). This logic entails that the state is not renouncing to its competences in

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[516] Indeed, Morocco's director of the judicial police Mohammed Dkhissi warned against those that "take advantage of the widening of the margin of freedom and the climate of democracy". The head of the judicial police was speaking in the aftermath of the viral and critical videos that a former policewoman Wahiba Kharchich had posted denouncing the harassment suffered by her superiors, that had not been addressed inspite of her formal complaints. MEO. (2020) "Morocco's head of judicial police warns against undermining state institutions" Middle East Online, 10/12/2020. https://middle-east-online.com/en/morocco%E2%80%99s-head-judicial-police-warns-against-undermining-state-institutions (Accessed: 15/03/2021)

[517] French in the original: "maintien de l'ordre et la lutte contre la délinquance".

[518] French in the original: "s'étend, plutôt, comme l'action, voire l'état d'être à l'abri de la délinquance et de tout autre risque ou menace imminente ou virtuelle qui guettent les institutions, les personnes et les biens".

the 'maintenance of order' but rather it reconceptualizes or resignifies order and social peace in order to create 'new' competences that must be covered through private initiative.

The discourse that differentiates between prevention and reaction vaguely recalls the binary separation in the Israeli privatization logic. According to Hever (Hever, 2018), decision-makers present a discourse framed in the notion of "core vs periphery", where only peripheral security functions can be privatized. As Herver demonstrates, in the Israeli case the discourse is disconnected with empirical reality.

In the same dicotomic way, private corporations can more easily penetrate prevention roles: routine surveillance, biometric software and technological development, permietral and access controls, etc. Nevertheless, private companies express their readiness to participate in other dimensions and especially as part of the reaction to crime.

4.3.2 The *mise-à-niveau*

The process of Morocco's full inclusion into the neoliberal world-system during the 1980s-1990s was framed within a narrative of a mise à niveau. Studies commanded by the World Bank, for example, recommended a structural reform process on the basis of expert analysis, which concluded that:

> "Most urgent are policies to address the structural elements of the budget deficit, improvements in public sector management and the enabling environment for private sector growth, and a more aggressive program of social sector development". (World Bank 1997)

Although reports as such pointed at different directions, not only at privatization of state assets, they invariably became a reality in a specific direction, that of budget deficit improvement through the selling of public assets, etc. Social sector development remained a permanent to-do task. It is not here my task to provide an assessment of the sociopolitical impact of the different SAPs that Morocco underwent since 1983[519]. Rather, SAPs are important as they helped create the narrative of market-rationalization and neoliberal calculation as technologies of governance.

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[519] See Adam Hanieh's article for a comparative analysis of pre- and post-Uprising and the role of international financial institutions to the region (Hanieh, 2015).

"A spectacular growth of auditing mechanisms […], and a language of "excellence" and competitive "performance," have been changing organizational life. Market thinking penetrates communities and even families, changing the way people relate to each other and think about their everyday lives (Braedley and Luxton 2010)." Connell, R. & Dados (2014)

The course of privatization is legitimized through a discourse that demotes public management and promotes private management as an efficient and effective mode of management, (Hibou 2004). "The 'dismembering' of the State is accepted, precisely because it is not perceived as such, but as a new redeployment" (Hibou & Tozy, 2020, p. 449)[520].

The narrative used to frame the process of structural adjustment has also permeated the logic of the provision of security. This grammar is best explained in the words of the international general commissioner of the International Fair Préventica (sixth edition 2019)[521], Éric Dejan-Servières:

"This event is educational. It's an event to raise awareness about the culture of prevention. Security is a synonym of business performance."

It is also the logic of a *mise à niveau*. This pedagogic side of Preventica points to the gramscian notion that hegemony is a "consentually produced domination" (Geeta & Nair, 2004). In my interviews and fieldwork, the narrative of 'modernization' recurrently framed other specific technologies of security. This type of organizational management is also introduced into public management, through the model of the the NPM (New Public Management) and it has also been brought to the public security sector (Belhassan & Azegagh, 2020), especially after the apointment in 2015 of Abdellatif Hammouchi at the head of the National Police.

Since 2015, the 'modernization' of the police has been publicized, especially with the creation of the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations (BCIJ), routinely dubbed as the "FBI of Morocco" and hailed as the hero agency in the fight against terrorism. The spectacle has been culminated with the organization of Open Doors in different cities, in order to promote an image of transparency as well as to show off the modern techniques and advancements in policing ("Maroc: La Police En Opération Séduction," 2018).

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[520] "[L]e 'démemebrement' de l'État est accepté, précisément parce qu'il n'est pas perçu comme tel, mais comme une forme de son redéploiement" (Hibou & Tozy, 2020, p. 449).

[521] "Cet évennent se veux pédagogique, c'est un evenement de sensibilisation. Culture de prevention. Securité est synonime de performance de l'enterprise.". See "Annex Preventica Observatory Fieldwork Notes": Éric Dejan-Servières, commissaire général international des Congrès/Salons Préventica. https://lematin.ma/journal/2019/preventica-maroc-prend-quartiers-casablanca-10-13-avril/311208.html

Criminolgy scholars and policing studies identify the turn to prevention through "'community-oriented' policing style" (Shearing, 1997). This approach of policing as a risk-evaluation task that focuses more on disorder than on crime has been structurally adopted by many police forces. However, some authors alert on the risks of these models based on New Public Management, that involve civil society and private partners into the control and surveillance framework (Sanders & Langan, 2019). In the case of Morocco, it remains to be seen how much of it is an 'extension of police control' or rather a formalization, 'modernization' and further institutionalization of the *moqaddem*'s work.

In the private policing the mission is more about problem-solving, and 'colonizing the future' (Shearing, 1997), creating and sustaining a specific order. In different undertones than those of Shearing, corporate security is colonizing the future, and is more focused on tackling disorder rather than crime, mainly because it is focused on securing neoliberal relations. It polices the smooth functioning of 'wealth disparity'. Nevertheless, this new security order does not hesitate to ground its essence in the bandit-catching narrative if necessary.

What Rigouste (2017) calls *capitalisme securitaire*[522] entails not a 'reaction to' but a prevention. Prevention is a better business than reaction, and it does not always have to be accompanied by real risks and threats. On top of a modern FBI-like police that catches 'terrorists' and 'drug dealers' every week, enhanced prevention can be bought by the wealthy. Never total prevention will be obtained, as chilling stories about rowdy and vicious criminals flod the screens.

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[522] Rigouste Mathieu. (2017). *Estado de emergenica y negocio de la seguridad. Conversaciones con Mathieu Rigouste*. Ed. Doble Vínculo. (ed. Original en francés Niet! Éditions, 2016).

Part IV

Discussion and Conclusions

Chapter 10 - Interpretation and Discussion

This research has used different methods and sources to answer the **General Research Question** on how the private provision of security relates to a strong authoritarian regime. To try to elucidate this issue, the research laid out three objectives with related sets of questions surrounding the rise and expansion of private security in Morocco. First, the study tackled the changing dynamics in the political economy of security from the formation of the precolonial Moroccan state until the current neoliberal context **(Objective #1)**. The research determined the relevant actors, resources and practices in the security sector, and how they evolved through time. The goal was to identify the political economy conditions that accounted for the transformations of the sector.

Second, the research attempted to explain how the security sector related to the consolidation of the neoliberal agenda in Morocco, in terms of the dynamics between private companies and the structure of power **(Objective #2)**. In other words, it scrutinized the interactions between the private security actors and the traditional security, the business and the political elites; it interrogated the technologies and mechanisms used in order to reframe the roles and needs of the different actors around security; and, in sum it identified the new elite networks emerging from these changes.

Finally, it also attempted to explore the deployment of the neoliberal security narrative and its material implications on everyday life **(Objective #3)**, by which it looked at the entrenchment of the private security sector within a global and local narrative of neoliberal provision of services; and at the consequences the new neoliberal security had on everyday lives.

This chapter lays out the results of pursuing these objectives and questions by contrasting them with a discussion of the implications of these outcomes and how they support or challenge existing knowledge on the issue. Sections 1 to 3 tackle the three specific objectives of this research, while section four discusses the general implications of the main research question. Next, certain limitations in the research are acknowledged. These limitations are discussed and potential future lines of inquiry are suggested as means of further contributing to the understanding of Morocco's power dynamics, as well as to continue to illuminate the development and implications of today's security order.

1. The changing security order: a political economy

This study attempted to identify the changing dynamics in the political economy of security from the formation of the precolonial Moroccan state until the current neoliberal context. This was done through the examination of the relevant actors, resources and practices in the security sector, and their evolution. The present section discusses these previously mentioned elements and tackles the political economy conditions that can account for the transformations of the sector.

1.1 Relevant actors, resources and practices in the security sector

Four different types of actors have played an important role in the security sector. These are the actors that are capable of mobilizing resources to influence or shape in any way the security order.

The first central actor of the security sector is the Palace, specifically the king – previously sultan – and their direct entourage as the primary actors in most of the studied time periods. While today the monarch is the Chief of the Royal Armed Forces formally, he also has the capacity to use organized state violence and to command all other actors within the formal institutions.

A second group of actors are the contestants to the primary position within the structure of power. Most rival competitors have tried to mobilize coercive power in order to challenge the primary position of the Palace within the national political structure. Among these competitors, the only successful ones to eventually become primary actors were the colonial powers, which succeeded by first financially smothering the *makhzen* and later entering militarily into territorial conquest.

A third group of actors are those that control certain institutions and agencies within the coercive institutions, mostly high-ranking officers. They have mostly competed against each other or they have become resources for the state and the regime against other rivals: international or domestic. Security forces such as the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie Royal

and the Police are fundamental pillars of the current regime. Indeed, one of the first actions of the Monarchy after independence was the creation of the security apparatus, which, along with other strategies like cooptation, served to eliminate competition from the nationalist movement or any other contestant to the Monarchical project. While the elite actors within these institutions can be either allied to the primary elite or secondary actors, at some specific times in history, these actors have also challenged the primacy position of the Palace, as was the case with the military coups of 1971 and 1972.

With independence in 1956, most means of coercion controlled by the colonial powers were passed over to the centralized and concentrated elite, with the Palace at its summit, which cleverly continued to play the arab-berber policy among the military arm (Chapter 5). The public security apparatus was a continuation of the French colonial institutions, and as such its leaders enjoyed good relations with the French security and intelligence establishment.

High army officers represented the closest allies to Hassan II, and their role was eminently political and securitizing. When the army became too powerful, and threatened the Palace in the 1970s, economic incentives and other mechanisms of elite fragmentation were used to devalue the different actors' share in the competition. Although some were already business actors, their economic interests only really expanded after the 1970s coups, and especially with their deployment in Western Sahara. Research is still lacking, but the Army's role in the economy is not as pivotal as in other countries of the region[523]. One obvious reason for that is the Monarchy's preeminence in business, notably through the royal holding companies, as well as the close 50 or so bourgeois families, mostly Fessies in origin (Berrada & Saadi, 1992).

Although the military and the police arms are theoretically separate, one dedicated to the defense of the country and the other to the homeland security, this division of European origin was always blur in Morocco. Army and police have been very entrenched. Their rebirth in the postcolonial state stems from the same colonial context and thus similar background elites and shared goals. The police-army division was not clear-cut during the first decades after independence, with most high positions in all domains and security agencies being filled by military men. Until the 1970s, all the security institutions of the state were actually commanded by military officers.

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[523] The fishery industry in Western Sahara, the southward trade to Mauritania, or the kif business in the Rif are perhaps the most well known topics where public agents are involved.

This feature has radically changed in the last two decades.

While the Army is still numerically and financially important for the state, Mohammed VI's rule, coinciding with the Global War on Terror (GWoT), has brought to the forefront the national police's (General Directorate of National Security, DGSN) political and social prominence, as well as closer personal ties between the king and the police, which has gained official support and widened its competences. This is not to say that the Ministry of Interior was not crucial in Hassan II's rule. While the 1970 coups alienated the king from the Royal Armed Forces, the security institutions were still eminently populated with military men.

A look at the map of current security sector bodies shows a confusing picture and overlap of functions and roles (Annex 4). Shared control of the different units, where the institutions fall under the authority of the King, and the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Interior is evidence of the delicate balance the regime has placed upon the institutions. This confusion is however, not a random accident of bureaucratic incompetence but rather a complex strategy of power struggles and balances between competitor actors and units. It reflects also the rewards and punishments of the King and his entourage. The current structure of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air, Gendarmerie, Royal Guards and Auxiliary Forces) and the complex of changing functions and roles are the result of years of institutional engineering as a method for balancing competition.

New actors for a new market

The fourth group of actors identified here are those that control private security corporations, fundamental in this analysis because, even while they do not challenge the position of primary actors in the security order, they influence the power structure in that they render certain practices as more valuable than others in the competition for power within the security institutions. For example, acquiring surveillance technology from private providers might or might not be effective in terms of the mission of a security agency. Nevertheless, surveillance technology has become a symbol of modernization, prestige and of competition between different agencies.

In the 1990s business corporations were increasingly offering security services, mostly to other companies and as part of a broader Facility Management market. The private security in Morocco appeared within the same period of neoliberal policies. Today, its visibility is

obvious, although dissimilar across space. Since the last decade of the 20th century, we find hundreds of companies and thousands of workers, although the exact numbers are not available.

The current landscape of companies offering physical security is highly fragmented, and the number of companies is unknown. Through different media, official and personal sources, this research identified four different types of corporations:

5. Transnational Corporations (TNCs) specialized in Security Industries and Services
6. Big Holdings with a horizontal and diversified portfolio of investments, mostly specializing in Facility Management and Temporary Recruitment.
7. Highly specialized Local Security Companies
8. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)

The first group includes companies that are transnational in origin, with their headquarters abroad, and only or mainly providing security. This is the case of Brinks, G4S, Securitas or Prosegur, with an unequivocally security identity (whether it is providing technology surveillance or physical surveillance). Among these companies Brinks and G4S dominate the market of bank security, especially cash transfer for all banks except the national Bank AlMaghreb. In the general commercial security G4S is the leading company.

The second group, big holdings, also includes TNCs of mostly European origin although most of them have undergone a process of Moroccanization. What these companies have in common is their mostly French origin and their specialization in Facility Management or Temporary Employment, that is, services to other companies, mostly in cleaning services, catering, recruitment, but also waste management. The main characteristic of these companies is that either with initial foreign capital or not they are bigger groups with a diversified portfolio of services that include security.

The third group includes local security companies with a fairly successful record of market gains and contracts and closely related to high ranks of the public security sector and the *makhzen*. This group includes very few companies, and by size, they could also be similar to others in the SMEs group. However, their specific characteristic is that, contrary to the big holdings that can also be politically connected, these companies are connected specifically to

the public security apparatus. They do not stem from the Facility Management sector, but from the state security apparatus.

A fourth type of company involves Small and Medium Enterprises, specialized or not. They are smaller actors in the market and sometimes have a public security background or an individual international training and experience in the sector, but they are not politically connected. Also included in this group are smaller entrepreneurs investing in the sector for non-vocational reasons. This group would include most of the companies in the sector.

This four-group classification of private corporations was very helpful for the research purposes set. Other classifications could have been made since SMEs, for example, are a very heterogeneous group, from free-lance entrepreneurs to fairly sizable operations. Nevertheless, the chosen structure was coherent with the classification of different resources of power, as well as with the position of their actors and their distance to the regime and Moroccan power structure. Saadi's (2016) differentiation between politically connected firms (PCFs) and non-connected firms (NCF) was decisive, but further precision to study the dynamics of competition was needed for this particular research objectives.

In the classification developed, what defined the differences between the groups were their original sector and the resources they could mobilize because those two characteristics determined their impact in the sector and their strategies to compete and advance their positions. Thus TNCs that specialized in security could show a certain prestige, global position, know-how, and of course, capital. They also came along with other foreign companies investing in the country and that would feel comfortable with their services. However, these companies were not directly or originally in close connections to the regime, and thus they perceived obstacles in accessing certain markets. This realization would partly explain their interest in state regulations, as we will later see.

In sum, the security sector is a complex of primary actors with a direct access to the state means of violence –the Palace and the royal advisors and tighter *makhzen*, amongst them security leaders-; also controlled by relevant secondary actors that compete against each other; actors that throughout history have challenge the hegemony of the *makhzen* within the political system by appropriating state or alternative means of coercion; and the secondary actors that contribute to expand the hegemonic order by providing private security.

1.2 Coercion and its relation to other resources of power

This section briefly retraces the historical account of chapters 3 to 6 to examine the dynamics between coercion and different resources of power. It briefly delves into the relationship between coercion and land; coercion and the state; coercion and capital; coercion and ideology; and coercion and technology.

First, the relationship between coercion and land has to be examined. This is relevant because different ways to control of territories imply different mechanisms, among them that of coercion or its threat. The control of territories through a centralized nation-state model needs a specific structural development of the state, and produces more surveillance and police mechanisms, than a negotiated and decentralized authority –which relies more on community authority, or even tribal security– . Additionally, the extraction of resources from different types of economies also shapes the type of coercive force that primary elites need to entertain. The extraction of trade tributes, for example, was easier in terms of the force needed during the nineteenth century, because it meant troops in the ports and main routes, but not extensively spread or moving along all of the territory. But coercion has also been paid and maintained through land in exchange for troops, as is the case for the *guish* tribes. Similarly, with the expansion of mass private property in the 1990s, and with the Free Trade Zones and Special Economic Zones, land becomes less the site of state surveillance and the daily provision can be delegated to private security.

Second, to briefly outline the relationship between coercion and the state we must stop here for a minute. It would be extremely absurd to try to reduce an account of coercion and the state to a few paragraphs, when the issue continues to generate an entire corpus of scholarship *per se*. Without delving into foucauldian discussions about the nature of state power, the aim of these following paragraphs, much more humble, is built inductively from the case study of Morocco, and it only sketches some of the most relevant findings of the empirical inquiry.

This research conceptualized the state not as an actor but as a resource and a structure (see chapter 2). In the case of private security in Morocco, the state mechanisms like regulations are crucial resources, as they affect the structure. That means, that controlling the state

mechanisms and the state and government decision-making is still relevant to elites. State mechanisms can be used against a particular actor, as it happened with the 1996 'sanitization campaign'[524]. But it is also a relevant structure that constrains most actors' behavior, except a few primary ones. This is clear when the law is not being respected or even implemented, from the Law 27.06 on guards in 2006 to the 2011 Constitutional reforms.

Similarly, state violence exerts the maximum force to preserve and advance neoliberal social dynamics, and it does so with a lack of accountability and oversight from the population. Even if popular forces (20th February movement) and historical events (monarchical relay) produced certain formal or institutional reforms – i.e. the National Human Rights Council (CNDH) or the 2011 Constitution –, what these reforms have actually evidenced in their incapacity to change the authoritarian violence is that coercion is more linked to the needs of the regime than to the specific historical state form.

The timid reforms and changes that one can identify within the security sector have so far been superficial, top-down and more intended as a way to publicize a new and modern image than anything else. These changes are fueled by two main drivers: first, a need to publicly and internationally reaffirm a permanent 'political will'; and second, internal elite competition between security agencies and elite actors within them. The increased securitization of life, not least with the anti-terrorist narrative, helps obscure and 'slow down' real changes and civilian accountability.

The third relation that this section explores is that of coercion and capital. From war-centered state theories, which see the state as a product of war, to Marxist theories where coercion is a mechanism of the state to enforce capital accumulation, this study sees historical elements that stand as evidence for both approaches. In fact, no finite theory of the state is satisfying. Coercion served extraction and build-up of power of the *makhzen*, from the early days of Moulay Ismail in the 17th century, and extraction in its turn was necessary to maintain or increase the coercive capacity of the central authority. During the 19th century, however, we see how the progressive inclusion of Morocco within the global system, and the substitution of the capital inflows for the *makhzen*, created a dependency from maritime trade, and ultimately from European power. At the same time, military defeat resulted in

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[524] See Chapter 5.

foreign debt for war compensations, especially with the 1859-60 war against Spain. The impossible return of debt for war reparations to European capitalist financial structures 'legitimized' – to European consciousness mostly – the imposition of foreign control of ports and financial issues; in other words, of foreign state structures.

Capital has also been important in buying loyalties from challenging rivals to the Palace. This was the case in the 1970s where economic resources (business authorizations, bails, etc.) were used by the regime in order to compensate and prevent political action from security actors.

Today, capital is also one of the main resources that companies, whether politically connected or newly landed in the country, can use to further their position in the competition for market share within the private security sector. This could be also true for the allocation of budgets to different state security agencies, as more budget and investment projects would represent a stronger position within the competition for power. Nevertheless this last argument is difficult to prove through this research and can only be taken as a plausible hypothesis as it needs to be further scrutinized in future empirical research.

To sum up, the relationship between coercion and capital, thus, goes in two directions: from coercion as an indispensable element to ensure the economic order and the extraction of capital for the benefit of elites (rulers and dominant class); and from the capital needed to maintain coercion and maintain the loyalty of those in charge of coercion.

A fourth relevant relationship between resources is that between coercion and ideology. Securitization Theory has amply set the baseline for understanding the role of ideology and of narratives and discourse in the development of a specific security order. In line with this constructivist framework, this research developed a conceptual definition for security as a social practice concerned with the exclusions and inclusions of violence as a legitimate or illegitimate tool of social control. What this meant in practical terms is that exploring the organized use of violence had to be done in parallel with the normative underpinnings of that use.

In this sense, throughout the nineteenth century the use of violence by the sultan was scrutinized and challenged not only in terms of capacity but also in terms of legitimacy. In the nineteenth century, the military and coercive arm of the sultan was weakened by its inability to counter imperial European powers. The latter used military prowess but also

financial mechanisms to strangle the *makhzen*. Europeans also sabotaged the sultan's security order by smuggling arms and fueling havoc among regional notables.

The excessive violence of the sultan's army in Fes in 1920 sparked outrage in the city and a revolt that would eventually contribute to the demise of Moulay Slimane's rule. Alternatively, the incapacity of Moulay Hassan (r.1873-1894) and Moulay Abdelaziz / Ba Ahmad (r.1894-1904) to counter European penetration represented a loss of legitimacy of their rule, even if they were also in parallel reforming their army. These two events exemplify the value of violence as a social practice with cultural meaning, and judged not for its potential but for the legitimacy of its use.

For the present context, Chapter 9 delved into the current neoliberal understanding of security, and approached three different narratives that are setting the framework for the needs and accepted assemblages of state and private security. The three studied narratives were terrorism, a global narrative that garners global support and legitimacy; criminality as part of the security-development nexus narrative and the blaming of the poor; and modernization, which includes a techno-optimism and an annihilation of community-based protection practices.

Finally, a fifth relevant relationship between coercion and other resources would be that with technology. Technology and innovation indeed are regarded in military studies as a fundamental variable that explains transformations in military affairs. In this sense, public security is very rapidly adopting technological programs, but this is not perceived by state actors as a privatization of security neither as a penetration of private companies within public security. In my interviews, public security actors regarded new technology as a necessary upgrade to face current global challenges, and actually seemed astonished (even vexed) at the thought of it representing a loss of sovereignty.

The relation between technology and state violence is crucial, and here it has been only partially tackled, especially from the perspective of the narrative that frames its ascendance. In line with the modernity-performance, obtaining new equipment and new technology could also be a sign of power and higher capacity to obtain funds from the state. Public Services compete for increased budgets and these are justified through performance and through modernization in procedures and structures, as well as in technological deployment. It is the case of the BCIJ (Central Bureau for Judicial Investigations) and its 'modern' allure and

portrayal that has correlated with their increased budget and centrality and the media coverage of their advanced technical capacities. When some units or regional departments get modernized and more advanced equipment it's a win in the competition.

In surveillance and biometric technology, public security is one of the main clients. If we go through the history of technology deployment within police surveillance and population control, it seems evident that life is increasingly registered and collected. Be it under human and social development purposes or for political control, private corporations penetrate and even spearhead urban development projects. In the short and medium term, it portrays a win-win situation for public and private security actors alike. Those state forces that manage to secure resources and new technologies for surveillance advance their position in the coercive and security field of power relations. However, as the case of the Fes street surveillance cameras reveals[525], purchase, deployment and benefit might lay on different actors at different times. And the reasons behind the deployment of surveillance technology might also lie in political benefits rather than the effectiveness of the technological practices.

In the transformation of institutions and technologies capable of deploying coercion for political goals, however, we could focus in the division between the use of coercion and production of the means (Izquierdo Brichs, 2016a). These two different dimensions also entail different elites with different goals that might be the same, might ally or might find themselves with clashing agendas[526]. Although the concern to control the production of these new technologies was not explicit in my interviews, it can be seen in the steps Morocco has made in developing its own technology when possible (with biometric IDs, for instance, local satellites, etc.), but also in the importance of controlling who the intermediaries and importers of technology are. Morocco's technological sector can generally not compete in the first league of surveillance technology, and it basically depends on imports, thuss playing a secondary role at the global level as regional and transnational facilitator (towards Africa and Europe) to carve out for itself a broker's indispensable role for foreign actors.

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[525] As was described in Chapter 8, 288 surveillance cameras that were installed around 2018 by the municipality of Fes were discovered to not be working in 2021. They had been neglected beyond repair.

[526] A lot has been written on the US industrial-military complex; and in the last decades about the academic-technological-military triangle in Israel (Hever, 2018; Marshall, 2021; Mintz, 1985).

1.3 The evolution of the security order: from state-building to the neoliberal state

Organized violence is one of the defining elements of a state and as such the birth of the Moroccan state is sometimes situated with Moulay Ismail (r. 1672-1727) and the formation of a stable *Abid al-Bukhari* army. The sultan's coercive power consisted of both a stable structure, costly to maintain, and a more flexible structure, done with levies, alliances and *guish* tribes. A strong coercive arm was a potential challenge for the primary authority of the sultan as well as in terms of the cost and capacity to sustain it. In this sense, the rise of maritime trade in the 19th century enabled the sultan to concentrate coercion in the ports, as commercial tributes are easier to extract than land tributes (more disperse) and thus require fewer resources. Nevertheless commercial disadvantage and reduced military power amounted to a weakening of the regime.

By the twentieth century the imposition of the new European political and economic order came hand in hand with the use of violence, the takeover of the Moroccan armed institutions and the expansion of population control mechanisms with the deployment of a European model of the modern nation-state. The extraction and plundering were done through military occupation and, the submission of populations was ensured through the army, the gendarmerie and intelligence gathering.

What is interesting to note, however, is that although the colonial project was established through state violence and other mechanisms (cooptation, financial extortion, etc.), the everyday protection of mining projects, agro-business, etc., contested by local populations needed private guards.

Contrary to most traditional security studies in IR, some criminologists have already seen the link between the changing economic model and the 'security and policing' arrangement. As Spitzer and Scull had described for the late nineteenth century middle America (1977), France's model of agricultural and mines exploitation during the first colonial period, had created the incentives for additional security guards for settlers and landlords, while the occupation struggle –pacification, in colonialist terms- was still ongoing.

Chapter 7 of this thesis looked at the first regulations concerning private security. The fact that they went hand in hand with the progressive deployment of the state and the

privatization and enclosure of land indicates some interesting postulates. First, private security or rather, the regulation of private security, appears within the context of changing economic conditions. Specifically, the state colonial project, a violent project, allows for private protection of those that benefit from it, but it regulates and thereby authorizes their 'private police'. Second, this regulation, which first appears in 1916, does not create private security but rather it sanctions it, accepts it and includes it as legitimate. Thereby, private control is legitimate as long as it is consistent with the economic and political colonial project.

The study of colonial legislation on private security indicates a concern for monitoring and utilizing the practice, as well as for ensuring its distinction from state security bodies. What is more astonishing is that these same concerns were present during the 1990s and following years (Chapter 7), as well as deep changes in relation to private property that can be identified during both private security waves. However, further comparisons, even within the narrative of neocolonialism, would be a dangerous stretch. Some distinct elements of the 1990s wave are worth mentioning.

First, during this 'second private security wave', the promoters of legislation were not the state actors, but rather private corporations. Although the contextual data of the first private wave is scarce, the debate and specific legislation conveys the promotion of legislators to regulate because most of the regulation is focused on limitations, distinctions and prohibitions. In the second wave, on the contrary it was the bigger companies that allied and lobbied to establish a legal framework.

Second, the international ideological context of neoliberalism and corporate dynamics encouraged the assimilation and mimicry of certain modes and practices. In security, the market standards or especial security requirements of TNCs to move and subcontract in Morocco created a demand for commercial security. It is the case of the port of Tangier, for example, were its international and commercial solvency requires certain training and skills for private security agents set by international maritime standards. The same is true for the subcontracting of private security for foreign companies that decide to set up shop in Morocco. At the same time, professional private security conveys an enhanced image of stability, formality, modernity and security for the country: it's good for business.

The second wave of private security emerged in the 1990s with the neoliberal agenda, and with the inflow of foreign capital. Although the economic model changed with privatization and liberalization policies, the structure and identity of elite groups remained similar to the pre-SAP times. This coincided with a drive for privatization of state assets and a rise in the privatization of land, the development of macro-projects, and proletarianization of the population. It is in this context of rise of private companies with extensive labor demands that most private security companies first started: protecting other private companies, private goods and the business place. In this sense, they emerged as a complement of the state functions that Harvey[527] identifies as creating and defending smooth market functioning (ensuring cash flow, protecting sell-buy transactions, protecting production through the control of workers, etc.). It is not farfetched to see the similarities in functions for the colonialist settlement projects of the 'Protectorate'.

In the Moroccan context of neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s, private security seemed to appear as an adjacent function of the new capital. This supports Shearing and Stenning's hypothesis (1983) researching the North American expansion of commercial security. The authors argued that the changes in private property dynamics – especially the expansion of mass private property – were key to the expansion of the sector. Since then, other voices have proposed alternative explanatory variables. Jones & Newburn (1999) argued that changes in private property perhaps could explain the North American context. In other latitudes, the need for commercial formal security was due to the disappearance of informal security, that is the social bonds that tied neighbors together and built a community attentive to each other. The retreat of the 'eyes on the street' seems counter-intuitive if we have an orientalist, romanticized idea of the 'Arab street', but indeed, looking at the mapping of private security, its deployment not in the old city, but rather in new neighborhoods or residential areas, this retreat would probably make sense[528]. This is also true for rural tribal security deployed locally and that has been either coopted by state mechanisms or disappeared. An interesting case that illustrates the intricacies of local security is that of the *moqaddemin* and their institutionalization and reinforcement of security attributes within the colonial state (Chapter 4).

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[527] "The fundamental mission of the neoliberal state is to create a 'good business climate' and therefore to optimize conditions for capital accumulation no matter what the consequences for employment or social well-being." (Harvey, 2019, p. 25).

[528] This issue is further from concluded here, as the anthropological and sociological literature show, and other coercive regimes interact with the state-commercial order, saliently the patriarchal control of social dynamics.

Nevertheless, even though these different theories on the rise of private security correlate with the sector's evolution since the 1990s, the constructivist element also contributes with some explanatory elements. While it has been shown how the 9/11 narrative elevated the importance and value of private security provision, that would not explain the 1990s. A neoliberal framework, however, could provide some disclosure. The promotion of private security through media outlets by big capital holders during the 1990s and 2000s benefited an understanding of security as a commodity that was better provided to companies and citizens through private professional services.

As mentioned above, in Chapter 9 I looked at securitization through three different empirical cases. The anti-terrorist narrative has been profusely studied elsewhere as promoting securitization practices and technologies (Atkinson, 2015; Baker-Beall, 2009; Bigo, 2005; Jackson, 2011b). In Morocco, the same narrative after 9/11, and after the 16th May 2003 Casablanca bombings, preceded extensive political, legislative and operational changes that resulted in a higher demand of private security. The anti-terrorist narrative constitutes one of the cases I worked on. The other two cases I analized, the *tsharmil*[529] and the parking guards[530], point at a broader discursive narrative of the neoliberal self: the criminalization of the poor and the push towards formalization and institutionalization of social dynamics.

While all of these three examples work through a first increase in the perception of insecurity and thus the need for additional surveillance and protection, they also contribute to a very particular 'security order' engrained in individual responsibility and permanent suspicion. Further, the securitization narrative in all its meanings and layers potentially benefits the field of power as a whole, as it raises the value of all kinds of security provision, private and public, commercial and state.

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[529] *Tsharmil* was the name given popularly to a specific youth around 2014 after a few robberies and videos went viral, portraying young men in tracksuits and flashy watches with thug-like and macho attitudes and brandishing knives. The publicity and discourse generated around their dangerous acts framed the deployment of surveillance cameras on the street of Moroccan cities.

[530] Informal parking guards have been portrayed as dangerous, scams and unproductive to the economy.

2. The private security sector and the neopatrimonial state

2.1 The private security sector within the Moroccan power structures

As has been described in detail in previous scholarship, the neopatrimonial nature of Morocco's regime entails both a small and tight nucleus of primary elite, and the pervasiveness of client-patronage dynamics at all levels (Benhaddou, 1997; Berrada & Saadi, 1992; Feliu & Parejo, 2013; Saadi, 2016). The most important business elites stem from a small number of families that were already prominent in the sultanate period, already in charge of economic enterprises or as religious or administrative officers within the central authority of the *makhzen* (Benhaddou 1997). In fact, the biggest Holdings and companies' origins can be traced back to the protectorate era. These were transformed and restructured after independence[531] without losing their links to foreign capital. Benhaddou named this situation as 'family capitalism', as he traced the preeminence of a small group of families with no interest in innovating or changing their methods and their deep entrenchment with the regime[532].

It is in this system that private security companies start to navigate. This inquiry did not find very direct involvement of the core primary elites in the sector. This suggests that the sector first expanded unnoticed and unregulated because it was not perceived as particularly relevant (nor in economic terms neither in its security or coercive dimension). The latter assertion is also supported by the circumstance that most companies that provided guards issued from the Facility Management sector, a minor sector, as well as by the convenience that the sector absorbed an interesting proportion of low-paid labor.

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[531] Especially under the 1973 'Moroccanization' Law.

[532] Similarly, Branko Milanovic (2019) has observed this trend of inter-marriage in the top of the system as global in, and he has termed it Homogamy.

Chapter 7 developed a table of power resources based on Farrés-Fernández's proposal (2018) that will be useful here to go through the fine grain of the analysis. What is most helpful in the classification of resources is the three levels where these resources can be situated.

Circumstantial resources are only indicative of specific tools that can advance some actors' position in a short event. This could be the case, for instance, in the awarding of a service contract with the administration. Identifying these resources is useful when studying a particular firm and its weight in the sector: for example, big companies issued from the Facility Management sector might have a stronger position and bigger market share in service provision to other companies and to municipalities, as their social capital lays more on those areas; but they might have less opportunities when the procurement decision bodies are at higher levels of administration, such as for critical infrastructure.

Cumulative resources, on the contrary, are those that can be accumulated, the fertile ground for capitalist actors. Here, the actors in the security sector compete to accumulate capital, real state, manpower, technology and knowledge, prestige, a modern and expert image, and social connections. One of the research paths of this study concerning the cumulative resources had to do with the importance of social connections. The question to tackle, which connects with a broader understanding of neoliberal development, was how transnational corporations, foreign actors outside the domestic power relations, could enter the local market. Foreign capital, prestige and know-how account for first important assets, but these may only be useful to be mobilized in order to acquire social capital and to be able to enter the client-patronage relations. The following section further elaborates on this topic.

Finally, structuring resources are those that may have an impact on shaping the general power distribution. This research identified concerted strategies in structuring resources that had to do with media outlets, legislation and state security organizations. Strategies such mobilizing the media outlets in favor of private security regulation had an effect not only on the state but also on ideology. Therefore, the big companies that allied to influence the political field –and notwithstanding the competition among them within the private security sector– counted on media and regulation to contribute to the shaping of an acceptable 'new security provision order'. Farrés-Fernández situates this influence in the third dimension of Steven Lukes' theorization of power, where changes influence not only specific measures but the practice and *habitus* of other actors (Farrés-Fernández, 2018, p. 68). In this sense does the

modernization narrative go, the *mise à niveau* that all corporations must engage in if they want to be competitive (chapter 8 and 9).

2.1.1 State regulations as a competing strategy

Notwithstanding the main discourses published in the name of the sector, the need to regulate also served other goals. Experts and bigger companies pushed for a regulation that would expand and fortify the market as well as define the rules of the game. It was the big companies that actively sought specific regulations, with the underlying claim that those that did not comply with the standards should be expelled from the market. They allied and lobbied the state to protect their business. Their argument was also supported by the claim that the labor conditions for their workers would be better, their internal procedures more modern and legally transparent, etc.

This research indicates that regulations benefit TNCs for three purposes. First, the rules of the game in legislation are clearer than through traditional social interaction with political elites. Even though client-patronage practices remain fundamental, administrative and formalized procedures are a language TNCs master. Regulation serves to increase the value of standardized and 'modern' procedures against, or in addition to, other values such as political connections of traditional business elites. This would be a strategy to counter what some see as cooptation of certain sectors of the market by a few politically connected firms. This statement of course does not preclude the need for transnational corporations to bargain with the regime their way in by other means, but it adds to the bargaining capacity of the former.

Second, regulations can be used to expel those corporations that do not have the financial resources or the educational capacities to comply, especially small and medium companies. This is not specific of Morocco or of the security sector, as hyper-regulation imposes bureaucratic and administrative costs that small companies cannot face.

Third, regulation also serves the purpose of pushing for the professionalization of some previously informal positions (like janitors), eating away other forms of economic entrepreneurship that are regarded as unmodern, potentially risky, image- and fiscally-damaging for Morocco, low-performing, etc.

The main aspect of the law being respected in the market is the creation of separate companies entirely devoted to security. This issue might seem as a minor one. After all, companies provide the same services they used to. They have simply changed their name, created a new subsidiary with a similar name. It is also a common practice in late capitalism, when holdings and complex networks of parent and subsidiary business make it hard to disentangle responsibilities and the entirety of the value chain. Isn't it thus a valid point to ask oneself why it is that, from all of the conditions and requirements that followed the adoption of the law, only this aspect can be said to be adequately fulfilled? Unfortunately, this work does not elucidate this issue. Tentatively, I would argue that the specialization of companies brings this activity closer to the authority of the state, calming the initial fears of public actors. This evolution would be reminiscent of the colonial laws on 'private police', which regulated an already existing work to simply bring it under the state's authority. But enough evidence has not been found to fully support this hypothesis for the present situation.

In the meantime, however, the state mechanisms are not used to expel, even if the law is not being applied fully, no inspectors enforce or monitor labor conditions, etc. Law can still be useful for arbitrary punishment, but its full enforcement and supervision is constrained by patronage as well as by the unemployment rates and the reality of untrained, uneducated, underpaid labor force.

These findings support the argument that the Moroccan market of the private security sector does not directly originate from the will of the regime to privatize. It is, conversely business actors expanding this kind of business, pushing the state to create a new market, and showcasing the advantages of this kind of 'protection'.

2.2 A transnational project from the Global North?

There has been special interest from decolonial and postcolonial scholarship in showing how capitalism and neoliberalism do not only work in one direction, e.g. center-periphery or North-Southwards (Acharya and Buzan 2010). This question remained on the background of this research throughout its development. Was it the TNCs, the US or the French security lobbies, that promoted the sector and managed to crack the traditional security approach of

the regime? Or was it, conversely, a more business-oriented local elite that saw an opportunity (or need) to engage in a globally growing and attractive market that was almost untapped in Morocco? The global liberalization and privatization course could also have favored the formalization and growth of private security, as a necessary complimentary force for the protection of the new local neoliberal business environment.

In attempting to map out the new elite networks that emerged from these changes, this study went through different thesis from previous scholarship. Although nothing has been written about the private security sector in Morocco from a network analysis perspective, other economic sectors that experienced profound changes with the neoliberal restructuring polices had been researched and the results represented useful starting points for this work.

In 2004, Professor Cammett argued that market-state relations, although traditionally based on personal connections, had started shifting since the last few decades of liberalism. According to her observations and analysis on the case of the textile sector, relatively modest textile business actors were trying to make their voices heard and organizing in the face of globalization and trade liberalization in order to seek clearer protective regulations (Cammett, 2007). She claimed that what she had identified could mean "a significant transformation in Moroccan business-government relations and signal changes in the nature and role of traditional elite networks" (Cammett, 2004, pp. 245–246). She argued that a sector with more concentrated capital structure, combined with low government control, made up for a smaller elite with a higher capacity to 'infiltrate' government circles. In the case of Morocco's textile,

> "small and medium-sized firms believed that protectionist elites blocked their access to state decision-making channels. A shared sense of marginalization among a cohort of Moroccan apparel manufacturers coalesced in a self-image as "self-made men" opposing protectionist "fat cats," galvanizing them to organize collectively through an existing producer association. Lacking personal connections, these new exporters relied on public and formal channels such as the economic press and business associations to lobby for their interests. Their efforts were rewarded with certain policy changes and greater access to officials in relevant government agencies." (Cammett, 2007, p. 193)

These observations apply partly to the private security sector. Similar traits could be found in the 1990s and early 2000s as the business exploded: "aspiring entrepreneurs form nonelite backgrounds", "minimal start-up capital and technical expertise", plenty of available labor (Cammett, 2004, p. 256).

However, the market at focus here is not an exporting sector, and the technical expertise, although sometimes overlooked, does play an important role in high-level procurement processes. As we have seen, a few big companies concentrate a big part of the sector's turnout (the sharpest case being the cash-transportation area).

Another discording element is the fact that this sector does not show as sharp a division between old traditional and well-connected families and a younger more export-oriented bourgeoisie as Cammett (2004) describes in her textile industrial case.

The fact that our studies are more than a decade apart, and the now accepted landscape of a generational and profile change within the closest allies to the King, might also determine our different outcomes. Cammett seems optimistic about the transformation of business-state relations into more formalized and standardized channels. While regularization is indeed one of the most visible strategies for collective action in our sector, my research reveals a more modest success on the reconfiguration of business-state networks.

This distinct outcome can further be explained through two central elements. First, the sector appeared in a time when the absence of traditional elites in the business allowed for more modest or foreign corporations to set up shop. It was only later that the public security sector became suspicious of its rapid development. Second, foreign TNCs which concentrate important resources (global position, capital, prestige, expertise) have overcome specific areas of the sector using primarily other resources like capital and technology, without the need to be part of the well-connected elites. How these companies have however, been able to do that through alliances or common interests could be more clearly explored through the technology part of the security sector, a much more import-oriented area where the foreign connection is essential.

Another relevant study for our research is Shir Hever's analysis of the privatization of security in Israel. He found that the increased privatization could be accounted for the weakening ties of Israeli security elites with the political elites, while they were strengthening their ties with business and economic elites (Hever, 2018).

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The present research indicates that it is foreign business actors already working in the security sector in overseas markets that promote, push or take over the Moroccan market. Local business actors, unrelated to security, also see an opportunity for marketization, and horizontally expand their conglomerate business models into a global growing sector, and following the demands of private corporations in the country. In other words, it is the business sector that initiates the commodification of security by expanding its appeal in previously untapped spaces; and by re-signifying and formalizing previous informal work. This is especially true for physical security. The appeal of surveillance technology is also politically beneficial, from a performative perspective and for prestige and image reasons.

Therefore, contrary to the Israeli case, physical security in Morocco met with more resistance from the 'security apparatus' for reasons of competence and role rivalry. This resistance has however been toned down. The idea of complementarity has been accepted, although some entrepreneurs would wish and might push in the future for more enhanced private-public security partnerships, for example in the management of penitentiary facilities. The sector is also an opportunity for publically trained personnel to create their own businesses. Moreover, a few select companies benefit from their direct links to the public sector.

3. Implications for life

3.1 Invest in yourself!

The third set of research questions interrogated the impact of this new security landscape in everyday lives. As it is analyzed in Chapter 8, private security is visible and pervasive in many sites of economic interest, especially urban or industrial.

New private spaces for consumers, as well as for workers, demand permanent surveillance from private security, due to their private or semi-private nature (as in the case of Special Economic Zones). The identified mapping of security on the bodies and around them shows a correlation in privatized land and commercial security. Protection services are becoming increasingly omnipresent in leisure, business, and institutional spaces. Protection services are being regulated and formalized in certain areas, and for certain class groups. The visibility of security agents in middle- to high-class areas is striking in contrast to other poorer areas.

What this means, as Shearing & Stenning (1983) warned us, is that the client-defined mandate of commercial security operating in mass private spaces is oriented towards preserving the interests of the clients, rather than the law and the public interest. The north-American scholars contended that this mandate and the subsequent allocation of resources necessarily meant a focus on a new kind of offenders: "those who create opportunities for threats against the interests of the client" (Shearing & Stenning, 1983, p. 501). The focus is thus not crime, but to protect the profits of the client. This is however challenged when the 'private' security company is mandated with stopping stowaways in the ships that go to Europe, a border control duty that is traditionally part of the public forces' mandate. In this case, private security expands into public roles rather than into private spaces. The pervasiveness, thus, is influenced by both an increase in privately owned or privately managed land, both deriving its "legitimacy from the institution of private property" (Shearing & Stenning, 1983).

On the other hand, private security is replacing informal positions as well as redefining jobs that were not only or centrally focused around security. The doorkeeper or the janitor at a school is an example of the formalization of already existing positions through an enhanced emphasis on the security role.

A third dimension of this neoliberal security is the promotion of a technical solution to social problems, a techno-optimism that overhauls any political or structural debate about the challenges of social life. As such, questions of marginalization or sexual harassment are not approached as structural problems (economic, political, social, patriarchal, etc.) but through the smart and safe cities, and through technology. A life enclosure that is framed within the neoliberal individual, where security, 'surveillance' and 'control' become essential tools to manage life.

Following the global trend, digital security technology is in vogue (surveillance cameras, alarm systems, access control systems…). This technology is linked to modernity and progress and it is explained as a necessity for the '*mis à niveau*' and for reaching economic status, even when the material technologies are sometimes useless in terms of effectively preventing or persecuting crime. Like physical guards with no training, defective or unplugged cameras still play a performative role to convey modernity.

Private security actors contribute to transforming everyday practices of security, not only by providing services but also by acting as authorized speech actors (Leander, 2009). As such,

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they are actors of change at different levels: they shape the perceptions of '(in)security'; they shape the repertoire of possible and accepted actions to be taken; they transform the evaluation standards for public security; and they contribute to the neoliberal approach to collective provision of goods and services. Moreover, the meaning of security evolves from disciplinary power to control power. The neoliberal security is no longer just the exclusion, repression and deletion of the criminal, but the control over behavior of all[533].

An interesting aspect of the sector is its low-end dimension combined with the very central state security dimension. During these years of research, I have talked to many people about the topic of research. Outside Morocco, talking to people from Europe or Latin America, most of the first reactions I got were about the impunity, violent and mafia-like style of security guards. "They are so scary", said an Argentinian. "They can do whatever they want", told me a Catalan activist. "*El que no vale para nada, vale para segurata*"[534] some fellow metro rider told me when we were witnessing a guard helping police stop people riding without tickets. It is the working class strikebreaker, the fink of the working class.

These visions all have in common the assumption that commercial security is more dangerous than public security, or at least less scrutinized. The assumption has been amply corroborated by the Iraq and Afghanistan US and coalition wars of the twenty-first century. Indeed one of the reasons behind the booming sector is the difficult accountability of private security contractors' actions, which makes it less costly for actors to increase the risk of their interventions. Nevertheless, this vision of the security guard rest upon a certain assumption of state agents and conflicts with a context where police impunity can be much more dangerous than the acts of a private guard.

The profession of guard or security officer is a masculinized profession, with mainly very low-educated men from economically poor backgrounds. Their deployment rather seems more of cannon fodder, a distraction for the unemployed masses. It seems contradictory, because these male bodies can still exert some kind of violence, because they are at the factory gate to protect the factory's property and endeavor, they monitor and they control

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[533] This trend of surveillance of all does not start with neoliberalism, but rather with the territorialization of power and the modern nation-state. In the case of Morocco, the importance of the *moqaddem*, the lowest level of the police administration is institutionalized with the colonial powers in the beginning of the 20th century. It is in the same period that biometric controls were introduced in Morocco, developed to control the criminal and the deviant, as later become a tool for population management as a whole. Neoliberalism accelerates the project.

[534] "He who is good for nothing is good to be a security guard."

access and whereabouts of people. And yet, these are poorly paid men that will be at the forefront of a robbery, of an attack, of a trifle. These are the wheat, the textile, the means of production by which their bosses accumulate benefits.

The bodies that secure the system are a very vivid example of sovereignty and how power deploys itself. They represent a dual and ambiguous power. They are badly treated. Their pay is low. Within the secured institution or space they are external, they are excluded. They do not have access to even the conflictive dimension of the factory[535]. They are not part of the class struggle. They are above the class struggle, disconnected from it. They control the access to the embassy, but they do not have access to a visa. They control the access to the library, they do not have access to the books.

The debates on uniforms, terminology and equipment show that the political elite was reticent to the private security sector. Although some within the public security sector see the benefits either personal or in terms of security provision, the regime is not specifically happy to share the image of 'pluralistic security provision'. Security agents, from the regime's perspective, are rather seen as a necessary element against unemployment and idle low class men. Incidentally, the informal surveillance of police informants on the Moroccan streets is reinforced with these new agents of the law.

3.1.1 The sacrifice of security

But security is no ordinary business. As Bigo contends, security entails a sacrifice (2008). The sacrifice is that of freedom, of accepting control and surveillance for the promise of physical safety: accepting security from unlawful violence. That entails an enhanced perception of insecurity, of risk and threat. Paradoxically, the proposed model of private-public security entails a destruction of security, and it is thus based on a dispossession of 'freedoms' and 'security-perception'. Raising the perceptions of threat and insecurity, especially for those who can afford it, could be seen as a 'privatization by default' (Hever, 2018).

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[535] As explained in Chapter 7, when they guard factories or working sites, guards are isolated from the other workers' unions and labor movements, and many companies ensure a three-month relay in order to avoid excessive confraternization with the other workers.

This research shows how coercion and direct violence are directly deployed by the state actors in two occasions. First they fall on to the heads of those that protest or break the hegemonic narrative of a successful system. Workers' strikes or alternative political or regional orders can oppose this narrative and can threaten economic and political elites even when the movements might not be ideologically motivated. Nevertheless, protests or riots happen to break the hegemonic consensus that free-market benefits all, and thus they threaten the symbolic power of governmentality.

Secondly, coercion is also deployed in order to reinforce its predicament, as a kind of symbolic violence that chooses its victims as exemplary. This sovereignty of state security is not only deployed through the use of force, but through the threat of the use of force[536]. This means that part of the monopoly of violence is also exerted through the cultural diffusion of the dichotomy between acceptable/legitimate and unacceptable/illegitimate violence. The legitimacy of that violence that the state has the capacity to use is "in itself […] always a claim, never a given, always open to contestation, never unequivocal" (Comaroff & Comaroff 2016, 11). As a result, coercion needs to be accompanied by a normative endeavor. That is, a certain foucauldian governmentality provides for cultural and social guidelines of the meaning of violence: homelessness, unhealthy labor conditions, animal mistreatment, body-shaming can be accepted types of violence; while others, like police torture, sexual violence against minors, or gender-based violence, once acceptable, might become less and less acceptable. At a communal level, violent protests against state or private institutions are also delegitimized through a nonviolence discourse applied solely to the contestants of social and political order (Fanon, 2001).

In coercion, the forms and methods have changed. While direct mass repression disenfranchises young populations that have lived through the 'Arab Spring', surveillance, control and targeted repression, with the aid of private provision, become especially effective to keep dissidence in line.

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[536] On the issue of consent and coercion, aside the gramscian foundation, see for authoritarian contexts (Scott, 1990; Wedeen, 1999).

3.2 The Neoliberal Order

The new security order that was identified in this research is consistent with the neoliberal narrative and construction of a specific subjectivity, the responsibility of the individual and the management of the self as an entrepreneurial endeavor. In this narrative, the state offers the regulatory framework and the legitimacy for certain violence and control mechanisms, while it is unequally displayed towards the higher classes than towards the lower classes:

> "Neoliberalism aims not just at warehousing the very poor or forcing them into low-wage labor but more widely at the breaking up of all forms of class, community or political organization or spontaneous appropriations of space which might interfere with capital and which are to be redefined as threats to *security*." (Lea & Hallsworth, 2013, p. 24)

This research found evidence of that in the narrative of criminalization of lower classes; and especially in the push for professionalization of informal work, which is built around arguments of improved labor conditions, but also order and control of so far autonomous activities. In the case of parking guards, this study observed a process of formalization of labor composed by the aforementioned narrative that brings together all of what Gramsci broadly called the state: in it, the municipality will administer authorizations, the civil society trains in social and communication skills, and the private enterprises may enter the management of these parking spaces. Civil society, the state and private corporations are sites of neoliberal hegemony that conform a specific morality of acceptable action and identity of life.

4. Consequences for the Regime: Private Security and Authoritarianism

4.1 Security as Organized Violence: bringing the private in in Tilly's model

The General Research Question of this research asked how the private provision of security related to a strong authoritarian regime. This research clearly distinguished between regime

and state, understanding state as one of the central resources of the primary elites in a specific domestic context. The state also remains an indispensable site of power. In this section, thus the empirical findings are first contrasted with Tilly's theory of state violence, and followed by a reflection in relation to the regime.

As explained in Chapter 2, the sociologist distinguishes four activities that the agents of the state violence carry out: war-making, state-making, protection and extraction (Tilly, 1985). The commercial market of security in Morocco has so far managed to penetrate three of the four functions. War making is still a strong prerogative of state violence, and although others have researched the privatization of war, the present study has not specifically identified this trend in the military sector of the Moroccan security, except in the case of the occupation of Western Sahara. Even in the occupied territories, however, private security would be more devoted to state making than to war making – notwithstanding arms and weapons industrial production.

In state making, which refers essentially to development of police and intelligence mechanisms that protect the state project, the status quo and the primary actors, while institutions are keen to acquire new technologies even to the aim of competing through modernization, nothing indicates a loss of power in this capacity for the state forces. On the contrary, as we saw, a pervasive securitization narrative, promoted by private and public actors, increases the value of all security-related resources in the general structure of power. As Lea and Hallsworth remind us, this growth of mechanisms in the provision of security do not entail a loss of sovereignty for the state. Moreover, this is not a singular feature of neoliberalism but rather "of any period of 'state crafting' in which the state is being reconfigured to deal with new social processes" (Lea & Hallsworth, 2013, p. 33).

It is rather on the third function of state violence that this thesis detects more insidious transformations. Protection refers to the activity of "eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients" (Tilly, 1985, p. 181), in which Tilly understands that the state agents protect, ideally all citizens, and in most contexts a dominant class. Protecting capital accumulation and the capitalist class is done through different state mechanisms.

As it was explained in the previous section, two types of state violence are deployed: the state represses dissent, and it builds consensus through the cultural diffusion of violence. It is in this sense a negative and positive force, a productive force, in the foucaultian sense. It must

ensure the smooth functioning of markets and the expansion of private property through repression or the stigmatization of both failure and deviant behavior. This cultural diffusion of state violence is aided and boosted by private security, which conveys a certain 'stateness', as explained in chapter 8, and thus contribute to extending the idea of state control.

The fourth activity, extraction, refers to the plundering of resources or collecting of tributes and taxes that will pay for the rest of the activities. In this case, although private security might gain some contracts that were previously the state's competence, all in all, their competition seems to paradoxically boost the extraction capacity of the state. The reason lies in the nature of security.

The new neoliberal security is based on growth and on the conquest of new markets, from the life-enclosure and an ever closer surveillance of populations and territories, to a material opening of new markets: selling surveillance cameras and putting them up where they did not exist[537]. Through the visible boost of 'security markets', the 'field of power' of security has expanded as the value for security-related services, products and operations increased, allowing powerful actors to invest in the sector.

Security is not just a mechanism of the state anymore but a 'capital' in itself. Security is a business and it is the dispossession of security that makes it a capital worth accumulating. This explains why public security has not lost importance in the deployment of the state, as the general securitization narrative reinforces its role. Private corporations provide additional security for those who can afford it, for a dominant class, and even help modernize public forces and units. Public security is rapidly adopting technological programs. Traditional public security practices are not being threatened, rather enlarged by new groups of personnel, new modernized units, etc. Only internal competition between public security actors for the accumulation of these 'modern technology' can challenge and expel certain public actors.

Tilly claimed that each of these four activities of state violence – war making, state making, protection and extraction – reinforced each other. Therefore it is reasonable to wonder how

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[537] Just as the "ASEC Expo in Rabat […] brought together firms from across the world looking to conquer new markets in a region marked by rapid urbanisation and economic growth." France24. (2019) "Tech companies scope out Africa surveillance sector". 24/02/2019. https://www.france24.com/en/20190224-tech-companies-scope-out-africa-surveillance-sector?ref=tw (Accessed: 15/05/2019). For a longer discussion on the opening up of markets and the narrative that frames it see Chapter 9.

the decreased monopoly of the protection that the state grants to the capitalist class can affect the other activities.

Paradoxically, neoliberal security helps securitize the state in that the value of security within the state structures increases its share among all other domains. This argument does not solely refer to the securitization of all kinds of policies and state actions, but to the actual budget and the share that security bodies obtain.

The securitization narrative helps enhance the value of security forces, of coercion and surveillance. A shared understanding of security, where all the public and private agents move, enhances Bourdieu's field of power. The value of 'security provision' as a resource of power increases.

In this sense, this study agrees with other works in that neoliberal policies have not resulted in a weakening of state as a coercive power (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2016; Mbembe, 2001, 2003). These policies have weakened the political class in the face of an ever more concentrated and powerful economic elite –also politically active-, but the state remains an important resource of power to mobilize for competition.

This study, however, differs from the approaches that focus on the state as the central structure for power distribution. Beyond the state, it is much more useful to detach the structure of power in Morocco and conceptualize it separately as the regime of power[538]. In the case of Morocco, the regime of power is similarly structured and stable since the 1960s (Feliu & Parejo Fernández, 2009). Nevertheless, the neoliberal era and the policies of the last 40 years have increased the accumulation of resources at the top, including the capture of the state and of capital.

Global capital and open markets represent both a challenge and an opportunity for the regime's elites. Therefore, in the domestic regime of power, the protection of the domestic dominant class needs enhanced layers of security, and this is done with the converging agendas of private, public, state, commercial actors alike.

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[538] Some have used the idea of the 'deep state', but again, this is conceptually ambiguous and seems to suggest that elites that control the state emerge from it, which may or may not be the case. In general, in marxist terms, it is rather the capitalist class and its elites that engender the state, and not the other way around.

5. Comparisons with literature

The main theoretical and analytical frustrations for this research remained the scarce work on the place of coercion in relation to the mode of production and from a political economy perspective. The nature of security, and the traditional monopoly of the state over it ruled out tackling the security sector and private security companies as just one other business sector. However, some of the tools of economic analysis were used within a broader framework of its political and social impact. I am not trying here to overstate the importance of security as compared to other resources that were once just communal or public goods, but the abstract nature and yet violent potential of security needed to be taken into account. In this vein, the bicephalous approach developed in this research has had to bridge many different gaps in literature, especially, in the IR discipline.

By looking at the material and ideational nature of the security sector, I followed the steps of those that look at neoliberalism from an empirical perspective, in an understanding that, while the doctrine is a 'cultural artifact', its true nature is much more built on case by case projects and their tensions than by the writings of twentieth century thinkers.

My theoretical strive was to further include a Marxian political economic focus within critical security studies and their dominant constructive approach. I believe we need to continue to build analytical tools to approach the meanings and social practices of security without ignoring the relation between state-sanctioned security and the current economic model.

I have thus tried to show the utility of Marxist approaches to study coercion, and to further develop this much pressing and needed area of research into the privatization of security. As I see it in security, the push is from outside, with initial tension, and later accommodation by the regime. However, neopatrimonialism and patronage rules still apply. The regime's agency is important. Regulations are passed, but not enforced. New Security technologies are performed for political and social reasons, such as electoral gains or publicity. Nevertheless, although broken street surveillance cameras cannot control passers-by; although they may not contribute to fighting criminality; their installation does impact the perception of security, of modernization through the model of safe cities, to the perception of the permanent gaze of the police, and ultimately to a neoliberal security.

As it was discussed in chapter 2 (The Political Economy of Security), different bodies of literature have influenced this research. The current process of securitization has been researched globally and also in Morocco. Especially through the narrative of terrorism and counter-terrorism, executive measures and further hard security has been deployed in the country. Away from IR and political science, and more in anthropology and criminology, excellent work has been done on the criminalization of the lower classes, as with the seminal work of Loïc Wacquant (2009), such as in the case of the *thsarmil* phenomenon. From a constructivist perspective, thus, previous work developed in the country was useful to attempt to link together these different bodies of work. The aim was to contrast those previous studies with the narrative of private security, that is, the legitimation or justification of why security could be commercially provided. In doing so I found the similarities that bound together a narrative of securitization of social life through the approach of moralizing individualism, self-investment, formalization and the foucauldian construction of the self as a place for investment and perpetual innovation.

In this picture of the self, the state monitors, invests, controls and represses. The paradox here is that an individualist take on the self does not forgo the strong arm of the state, and this is imbued by the same modernizing, techno-optimistic narrative. It is not control, it is smart and safe policies, it is investment, it is innovation. The DGSN modernizes its methods, buys and deploys new technologies, while older traditional methods of surveillance, like the *moqaddem*, are still in place.

6. Contribution and further research

When I first started researching the issue of private security my doubts laid around the tensions between a neoliberal capitalism and authoritarianism. Were they compatible? Which of these two agendas was driving the commodification of security? A global drive for privatization and to open new business, or the security demands of the regime?

What this research shows is that there is no contradiction between the drivers: neoliberalism is not the *laissez-faire*. Polanyi warned us half a century ago:

> "There was nothing natural about laissez-faire; free markets could never have come into being merely by allowing things to take their course. Just as cotton manufactures -the leading free trade industry- were created by the help of

protective tariffs, export bounties, and indirect wage subsidies, laissez-faire itself was enforced by the state. The thirties and forties saw not only an outburst of legislation repealing restrictive regulations, but also an enormous increase in the administrative functions of the state, which was now being endowed with a central bureaucracy able to fulfill the tasks set by the adherents of liberalism." (Polanyi, 2001, p. 145).

Similarly, the state is needed, and the authoritarian form is not a bother for those actors within the neoliberal agenda. Hibou and Tozy (2020) argued in their recent book that an imperial mode of government that has been always part of the Moroccan governance made it easier for the accommodation of a neoliberal agenda in the country. While this research does not contradict the premise of their hypothesis, I would rather put it in other words. Authoritarianism is a very favorable terrain for capitalist interests and for the development of neoliberal policies. As critics of neoliberalism have long argued, the doctrine and practices of the Chicago boys are not averse to authoritarian states, and rather perceive democratic governments as a luxury or threat to free market and free trade.

As it is shown in this work, coercion and surveillance are much more related to the material conditions and the elites' race for growth and accumulation, than to actual threats. This competition is nevertheless decisive to establish a broader 'security order' and a securitization of social and political tensions. I see therefore the strong necessity to continue to approach security from a materialist perspective, and to further develop the tools to analyze the costs of the growing security market on life. As was argued with the help of Bourdieu, this 'growing security market' refers not only to the private corporations but rather to the growth in value of all security-related acts, be it enhanced authoritarian mass surveillance and state violence or the technification of all problems through private production of IoT appliances, Artificial Intelligence technology, etc.

This dissertation engages with the political economy of security, an ambitious endeavor that had not been attempted in a comprehensive way for the case of Morocco. Security remaining one of the most elusive, secretive and yet pervasive issues in politics, its research is limited by the availability of data (access to sources) as well as by the risks related to the will to uncover such issues. These challenges should not be enough to stop humble and cautious theoretical or empirical research.

Surveillance technology and other types of security technologies must also be further studied including the colonial, racial and gendered structures behind their deployment. Macro-projects from foreign companies (such as the Huawei-sponsored safe city in Marrakech) are quickly becoming part of the urban landscapes and of the Moroccan selling pitch. They are also increasingly pushing the focus and the narrative towards techno-security solutions to social or political problems, from violence against women to petty theft.

While most people are excluded from the alleged benefits of today's security order, Morocco has impetuously entered this path of technological utopia, from planned smart cities in occupied Dakhla to mass privatization and privately secured land for foreign investment in Free Economic Zones. The web that this investment folly creates between private businesses and the Moroccan political elites is thick and complex, and much more remains to be explored and identified. My research suggests that foreign capital can adapt and penetrate local structures without necessarily shaking the power structures. However, the effects of this on local elites' economic power, on population's dispossession, and in general on the country's availability to its own resources have been explored here only from a tiny fraction of the security sector, mostly involving physical security. Surveillance technology and biometric controls might further illuminate the issue, and their analysis needs more attention than what my research was able to pay.

Chapter 11 - Conclusions: Securing Authoritarianism

Following the detailed discussion of the findings described in Chapter 10, this chapter briefly recounts the cementation of the outcomes and the overall conclusions of the research.

1. The Evolution of Security

As the historical approach showed, coercion has transformed with the changing political and economic context. Approaching security through its political economy helps analyze the evolving relations of coercion to other means and resources of power: when direct coercion is used against rivals or against population, when other mechanisms like legitimacy or financial debt are used to curve competitors. The historical evolution of the relationship between coercion and capital, the state, land, ideology or technology, illustrates the complexity of organized violence beyond its physical enforcement.

A significant finding that the historical approach has surfaced is the fact that while the penetration of European imperial powers was done through coercion, capital and state, the colonial French administration also sanctioned and regulated private security as part of the economic project.

Usually regarded as a new phenomenon linked to neoliberalism, in fact private security already existed during the protectorate, and its regulation in 1916 coincided with a dynamic of privatization of land and the development of agribusiness. Its composition at the beginning of the twentieth century was very distinct from the modern corporations that provide these services today. In fact, it would be more accurate to label today's sector as commercial security, distinguishing it from private security as an endeavor promoted not by the state but by private initiative, whether it is community, tribal or personal security.

Nevertheless, regulated private guards were first used in rural remote settlers projects. During the colonial period the privatization of land is supported by private security because forces are busy in the cities, ports and conquest. When the mode of production becomes more centered in urban cities and the rise of workers movements challenges order, private guards become more visible in the city, as the 1933 regulation shows.

After independence, the idea that security forces were only the *makhzen*'s prerogative and an essential part of the postcolonial nation-building did not change until the 1970s. Neoliberal policies would later help shape the idea that security is, to some extent, a good or a service

that can be privately provided. This changing idea of security provision does not preclude the centrality of state-sanctioned security but on the contrary it complements it and boost the importance of security as a valued resource.

Since the 1990s protection services have become increasingly pervasive in leisure, business, institutional spaces and other sites of interest in Morocco. First present in embassies, they later became an essential element in industrial companies, especially in the surveillance and monitoring of labor. Most formalized private security during the 1990s, indeed, fell within the Facility Management sector, along with other services to companies such as cleaning, catering, gardening or waste management.

As this research indicates, public security apparatus and its actors were initially challenged by the emergence of private security, as the media narrative and legal analysis shows. There was, during the 1980 and 1990s some concern on the limits of private security, the impact on the state apparatus, etc. This was so because the sector was initially promoted by actors that were external to the state 'security apparatus'. Since then, actors close to the public security and the Ministry of Interior have developed their niches companies; and the rest of the companies also expand the stateness or cultural diffusion of hegemonic security.

Public Security elites also use private security, especially technology, as a resource of power to compete against other secondary actors in the sector. Different security agencies thus compete for a more technological and modern image, as part of the narrative of reforms and modernization that 'must' be undertaken, but that nevertheless has not improved the oversight and democratic accountability of security forces. Security technology is a sign of modernity, of *mis à niveau* and of economic status, even when the material technologies are sometimes useless and play a performative role.

Moreover, manned security has grown as a service market and is consistent with the massive privatization of public space and the continuation of 'land enclosure'. Private security is completing the task with a progressive 'life enclosure'. That is, an ever more pervasive privatization of individuals' and communities' lives. This is either done through criminalization of communities and marginalized populations, through their forced professionalization, or through technological and gated protection of the privileged class. The expansion of physical security and technology surveillance relates to a privatization of

public spaces and a disappearance of traditional common social networks of protection: the "eyes on the street" are formalized.

2. Neoliberal Security

Private or Commercial security does not weaken the state, nor the regime, and it adds a new layer of securitization practices and technologies to the hegemonic security order and to the preservation of a good business climate. The media, state and business narratives converge in the promotion of the securitization of all dimensions of social life and surveillance technology is used as a problem solver for social and political problems. The new security order is consistent with the neoliberal narrative and construction of subjectivity: the responsibility of the individual and the management of the self as an entrepreneurial endeavor.

The sector of private security, especially physical security, is a very fragmented one. Although a few companies dominate the market, the sector includes big corporations and small companies. Big companies that were at first not politically connected saw state regulations as a mechanism for non-connected companies to advance and enter the social and personal connections, fundamental in a neopatrimonial regime like Morocco.

The findings in this research support the argument that the Moroccan market of the private security sector does not directly originate from the will of the regime or of some primary actors to privatize. It is, conversely secondary business actors expanding this kind of business, pushing the state to create a new market, and showcasing the advantages of this kind of 'protection'.

The rapid growth of private security in the world in the last four decades has instigated heated discussions from the changing nature of war and the challenges of International Humanitarian Law, to the privatization of population control around the globe. So far, most research on private security has been done in contexts of open armed conflict or in countries identified as the biggest exporters of private security, namely the USA and Israel, and some European countries. Some have discussed private security in relation to the role of the states within the neoliberal context. Very rarely, however, has this been researched in authoritarian contexts, such as Morocco.

Looking outside the centers of global power to understand the nature and evolution of neoliberalism remains the endeavor of few. This research shows how margins, peripheries or indeed simply other contexts can be very valuable for shedding light on social phenomena.

Adopting political economy in the WANA region for the study of security is challenging, but, as this research shows, also fruitful and exciting. Political economy is about studying the dynamics that interlock economic phenomena with their political and social context. Studying the emergence of private security, to my view, needed to be put in its context. In Morocco, the neoliberal agenda, the push of global companies and the growing power of a few local corporation holdings fueled the growth of the private security market.

In a country where business is said to be subordinated to politics through dynamics of client-patronage and a pervasive neopatrimonial system, the thesis that neoliberalism would supersede that structure was enticing. But the problem with this thesis is that it overlooked that, in Morocco's context, politics was not exactly about the state. Other structures of power, structured around the *makhzen* and the regime, play a decisive role. What this research found in the sector of commercial security is illustrative. First, state regulations serve three purposes. Big companies, especially TNCs, see regulations as a way to lay out clearer rules and a field where they can compete. They can thus try to outgain those companies without technological and structural capacity whose only resource is the social capital and their political connections. Second, for big companies, whether connected or not connected, regulations are also a mechanism to push small companies out of the game. Third, and in more general terms, they formalize a sector, increasing its value and its general appeal.

The situation also evidences a paradox that has to do with the biggest transnational companies, which can mobilize resources to push for regulations that benefit their investments. While the regulations they push for in a country might benefit the labor conditions in their sector; these same companies might be profiting from illegal or unethical situations in other parts of the world, such as military occupations, armed conflicts or extraterritorial refugee detention centers, and in general in human rights violations. The case of G4S is exemplary. While the company has been involved in politically murky businesses, workers in Morocco portray G4S as provider of better labor conditions, better training and career opportunities, more fiscal transparency etc., than the average small local company. In a way, these consequences favor the neoliberal doctrine of success stories. Although this image stands in Morocco in general terms, a thorough research shows that minimum labor

conditions are almost never enforced but at client's discretion, and the law is seldom enforced.

In this sense, therefore, what we see is an interested use of the state mechanisms, as a resource that seems essential to the elite competition, structuring, but not constraining in the outcome of it. Beyond the results for the sector in Morocco, the structure of power in any country does not equate with the state. What the Moroccan case shows in stark contrast, is perhaps more subtle in other contexts. This is why the case is relevant. It shows patterns that might not be that easy to elucidate in other contexts where client-patronage relations are not that obvious, or where they are built closely around the mechanisms of the state.

2.1 A private sector and an authoritarian state.

This research aimed to understand how the emergence of a growing private sector of security was compatible with an authoritarian state. The study concludes that there are no strong incentives within privatization or neoliberalism to democratize the state. On the contrary, the expanding securitization pushed by security actors further reinforces the role of the state security apparatus.

The state, as we have seen, is still indispensable in the framing of societal phenomena, but other resources such as foreign capital, technology, and know-how are increasingly important beside the state. In this sense, a specific elite, that has accumulated the state as a resource and other resources of power such as land and capital in Morocco, also plays an important role in defining the terms of the neoliberal security order.

While the analysis on companies and their dynamics in this research has focused mainly on the physical security, it has also shown how technology companies are more selective, require more know-how, foreign connections and capital, and the public procurement and contracts are more substantial. The implications of technological security and surveillance might differ in terms of elite accumulation of technology imports, and the power relations of the sector with the business and security elite in Morocco. Nevertheless, the global framework of securitization is globally benefiting for all sectors of private security.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the limitations of access to information that my research has encountered, it has been evident that the public security sector, and especially some of its

actors, benefits from the private security sector. On the one hand, private companies represent a business or employment opportunity for former offices. In the higher ranks, some well-connected individuals have also profited from their contacts within the *makhzen* and the Ministry of Interior, although, so far, the evidence of a captured market is inexistent, and leading transnational corporations prevail. On the other hand, surveillance and biometric technology is also a resource for competition among police agencies and departments. Modernization *per se*, but also further control of populations through new equipment is a valued aspect in the competition among public elites. To put it in other words, new elites within the public security sector, those that are capable of capturing these new resources, emerge in the struggle for power within the public sector.

Security is expanding into all spheres of life. This is an opportunity for all the actors involved in the sector, from public security to general *makhzen* actors to private companies. In no way has private security reduced the budget and importance of public security, which on the contrary has risen in the last few years. Although all these different actors must compete or ally in order to survive, the general value, or field of power, is increased through the current process of securitization, which devours all social and human interactions through a neoliberal narrative of technological solutions and permanent surveillance.

It is in this sense that the private sector needs a state to regulate and frame the accepted security. Further, neoliberal dynamics of the private security sector reinforce the state. They reinforce the state as a regulatory and sanctioning mechanism and as a formalization tool to annex untapped spheres of social life.

Workers, consumers, populations in general, are further monitored, through biometric IDs, cameras on the streets and untrained guards in every door. Their problems are not discussed with a structural perspective, but rather tackled from a morality of self-responsibility. In Morocco, the security sector is integrating formerly irregular workers into a regularized, controlled employment. Formalizing and professionalizing the parking guard can also fall on the shoulders of some civil society organization that contribute to reinforcing the individual responsibility of social violence and precarious work.

The picture that emerges from this research contests my originally naïve question about the weakening *raison d'être* of the state in the face of private security. Rather, it becomes clear that neoliberal security does not contradict the authoritarian project but reinforces it. Moreover,

resistance to the political and economic project becomes more difficult as its control is not centralized but diffused. While in the Moroccan case the king is central, and the National Security (DGSN) remains essential, de facto, the bureaucratic management of life is diffused by a myriad of companies and practices, and managed by a complex of actors with different positions in the structure of power.

This research ultimately shows the relevance and usefulness of including both political economy and constructivist tools into the study of security, as this concept, usually used to portrayed surveillance or coercive policies, is invariably shaped and traversed by the materiality and normative constrains of elite struggles in their competitions for power.

Annexes

Annex 1: Main Legal Sources

On Private Security:

- Dahir du 25 Aout 1916 (23 Chaoual 1334) sur les gardes particuliers
- Dahir du 7 avril 1933 (11 hija 1351) relatif aux entreprises ou sociétés de gardiennage ou police privée
- Dahir du 10 décembre 1951 (10 rebia I 1371) relatif aux gardes particuliers
- Décret n° 2-96-72 du 28 novembre 1996 (16 rejeb 1417) portant statut particulier du corps de gardiennage des monuments historiques, des sites, des musées et des bibliothèques
- Dahir n° 1-07-155 du 30 novembre 2007 (19 kaada 1428) portant promulgation de la loi n° 27-06 relative aux activités de gardiennage et de transport de fonds
- Décret n° 2-09-97 du 25 octobre 2010 (16 kaada 1431) pris pour l'application de la loi n° 27-06 relative aux activités de gardiennage et de transport de fonds
- Arrêté conjoint du ministre de l'intérieur et du ministre de l'emploi et de la formation professionnelle n° 900-12 du 24 février 2012 (2 rabii II 1433) fixant les conditions d'obtention d'un diplôme ou d'un certificat justifiant l'aptitude professionnelle pour l'exercice des activités de gardiennage
- Session Reports on the Debates at the Parliamentary Commission

Decree published on the 4th November 2010: the obligation of having a ceritifacte. Two regulations on certification, published on the 24the February 2012:

- Arrêté conjoint du Ministre de l'Intérieur, du Ministre de l'équipement et du transport et du Ministre de l'Emploi et de la Formation professionnelle fixant les conditions d'obtention d'un diplôme ou d'un certificat justifiant l'aptitude professionnelle pour l'exercice des activités de transport de fonds;
- Arrêté conjoint du Ministre de l'Intérieur et du Ministre de l'Emploi et de la Formation professionnelle fixant les conditions d'obtention d'un diplôme ou d'un certificat justifiant l'aptitude professionnelle pour l'exercice des activités de gardiennage.

About Free Economic Zones:

- 1995 Law loi 19-94 (dahir n°1-95-1 du 26 janvier 1995): Dahir no 1-95-1 du 26 janvier 1995 portant promulgation de la loi no 19-94 relative aux zones franches d'exportation.

- Arrêté conjoint du ministre de l'industrie, du commerce et de l'artisanat et du ministre de l'économie et des finances n° 619-00 du 2 rabii I 1421 (5 juin 2000) approuvant le règlement intérieur définissant les modalités et les règles relatives à l'exercice des activités à l'intérieur de la zone franche d'exportation de Tanger
- Arrêté conjoint du ministre de l'économie et des finances et du ministre de l'industrie, du commerce et de l'artisanat n° 374-98 du 17 ramadan 1419 (5 janvier 1999) fixant la liste des services liés à l'industrie pouvant s'installer dans la zone franche d'exportation de Tanger

Other relevant legislation

- Dahir n° 136-65 du 7 safar 1385 (7 juin 1965) proclamant l'état d'exception.
- Dahir n° 1-56-138 du 16 kaada 1375 (25 juin 1956) portant création des Forces armées royales.
- Dahir n° 1-56-270 du 6 rebia II 1376 (10 novembre 1956) formant, code de justice militaire, tel qu'il a été modifié ou complété.
- Dahir n° 1-58-008 du 4 chaabane 1377 (24 février 1958) portant statut général de la fonction publique, tel qu'il a été modifié ou complété.
- Dahir n° 1-62-113 du 16 safar 1382 (19 juillet 1962) relatif au statut des personnels de diverses entreprises.

Annex 2: Interviews

CS= Civil Society

SA= Security Agent

PSC= Private Security Company

TNC= Transnational Corporation

SME= Small and Medium Enterprise

Hold= Holding Company

PbS= Public Security

Pol= Politician

Exp= Expert

Inst= Institution

#	Date	Time	Place	City	Mode d'enregistrement	Name	Type
1	9.04.2019		House	Chefchaouen	cellphone		CS
2	13.04.2019		Coffee shop	Casablanca	notes		CS
3	16.04.2019		Office	Rabat	cellphone		SA
4	16.04.2019		Coffee shop	Rabat	notes		SA
5	20.04.2019		Coffee shop	Casablanca	cellphone		PSC (TNC)
6	15.05.2019		Coffee shop	Rabat	cellphone		PSC (SME)
7	16.05.2019		Office	Casablanca	cellphone		PSC (Hold)
8	17.05.2019		Hotel Coffee shop	Saleh	cellphone		PbS-PSC
9	20.05.2019		Public Place	Kenitra	notes		PbS-PSC
10	23.05.2019		Coffee shop	Rabat	notes		PbS-PSC
11	24.05.2019		Car moving around	Rabat	post-meeting notes		PSC (SME)
12	10.06.2019		Coffee shop and Office	Rabat	post-meeting notes		CS
13	13.06.2019		House	Rabat	cellphone		Exp
14	16.06.2019		Public Place	Rabat	post-meeting notes		SA
15	17.06.2019		Coffee shop	Rabat	cellphone		Pol
16	17.06.2019		Coffee shop	Rabat	cellphone		CS
17	17.06.2019		Coffee shop	Rabat	post-meeting notes		Pol
18	14.06.2019		House	Rabat			Exp
19	22.06.2019		Street	Rabat	post-meeting notes		SA
20	10.07.2019		Public Institution	Rabat	post-meeting notes		PbS
21	12.07.2019		Telephone	phone	notes		PbS-PSC
22	13.07.2019		Coffee shop	Rabat	post-meeting notes		Pol
23	software		Office	Casablanca	notes		PbS-PSC (Sec)
24	16.07.2019		Public Institution	Rabat	cellphone		Pol
25	16.07.2019		Office	Casablanca	cellphone cut at mid-interview		PSC (SME)
26	17.07.2019		Public Institution	Rabat	notes		PbS-PSC
27	17.07.2019		Office	Rabat	none		CS
28	18.07.2019		Public Institution	Rabat	cellphone		Inst
29	18.07.2019		Public Institution	Rabat	cellphone cut at mid-interview		PbS-PSC

30	16.07.2019		Public Institution	Rabat	cellphone		Inst
31	20.07.2019		Gare de Mohammedia	Mohammedia	Notes		SA
32	27.02.2020		Public Institution	Rabat	Cellphone		SA
33	27.02.2020		House	Rabat	Notes		Exp
34	02.03.2020		Coffee shop	Rabat	notes		CS
35	02.03.2020		Coffee shop	Rabat	notes		CS
36	22.12.2021		Coffee shop	Barcelona			Exp (TNC)
37			Public Institution	Barcelona			PSC

Annex 3: Public Security Bodies and Functions

(In a separate document due to formatting style)

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ANNEX 3

Annex 3 Public Security Bodies and Functions

Functions/ SS Actors	Foreign intelligence	Intelligence on the Diaspora	Domestic Intelligence	Defense	Border Control	Western Sahara	Counter-insurgence Terrorism	Policing	Administrative Police	Public Order	Judicial Police	King's Personal Protection	Ministry
Police DGSN (Abdellatif Hammouchi)					Entry points							New since summer2018	MoI
DGST (Hammouchi)	(hatched)												MoI
Bureau central d'investigations judiciaires (BCIJ)													Under the DGST
Forces Auxiliares (Hamidou Laânigri)					Surveillance								MoI
Gendarmerie Royale GR			(hatched)					Military Police	MoI		MoJ	(grey)	M6, FAR, MoI
Direction Generale des Affaires Interieures (DGAI)													MoI

FAR (Abdelfattaj ElOuarak)						■							Palaces	M6
Direction Generale des etudes et de la documentation DGED	■	■	▨			■	■							Mohamed Yassine Mansouri FAR
2ème Bureau	Surveillance of military staff				Borders	■								FAR
5ème Bureau		■	■											FAR

Lost attributions
Military Roles
Police Roles
NON-OFFICIAL