Set on Competing: Contamination Effects and Parties' Entry Decisions in Mass Elections

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Als meus pares.

Agraïments

Trobar-se un altre cop davant d'una pàgina en blanc. Aquest cop però, no per parlar de la contaminació electoral. Tampoc de la viabilitat asimètrica dels partits, o de la gravetat Duvergeriana. I tampoc per intentar resumir, per enèsima vegada, el contingut d'aquesta tesi, esperant la que ja s'ha convertit en aquesta indefugible mirada a cavall entre la perplexitat i la indiferència. Aquest cop és per fer un sentit homenatge i agrair la tasca i la presència de tantes i tantes persones que d'alguna manera o altra són partícips d'aquest document que teniu entre mans.

Una tesi doctoral no és més que un constant procés d'aprenentatge i de superació personal que, per la gran majoria dels mortals, no ens hauria sigut possible de realitzar sense l'ajuda i la col·laboració d'aquells que t'envolten. Es fa doncs extremadament complicat haver de resumir en unes poques pàgines el sentiment d'agraïment que tinc per a tanta gent, sense la qual, sens el més mínim dubte, aquesta tesi no hauria estat possible. Al mateix temps però qualsevol expressió d'agraïment té una part d'injustícia amb totes aquelles persones que, més o menys conscientment, d'alguna manera han pogut influir en aquest procés i que no els ho podré reconèixer.

La primera persona amb qui em sento en enorme deute és amb el meu tutor, amb el Nacho. D'ell només en puc tenir paraules d'agraïment i de reconeixement. Ha estat, simplement, un tutor excepcional. Ell va ser qui em va guiar durant els primers i difícils passos en el doctorat, i amb ell i gràcies a ell he anat bastint aquest projecte. S'ha llegit les meves pàgines tantes vegades com ha sigut necessari, i en ell mai hi he trobat

un no per resposta. Va confiar en mi i he intentat correspondre-li amb el màxim esforç, dedicació i rigorositat com he sabut. Si aquesta tesi, com li agrada dir, "vola alt" és gràcies a la seva persona. Amb tota la sinceritat, em considero un afortunat per haver pogut treballar amb ell.

La segona persona amb qui estic profundament agraït és amb en Pablo Simón. Hem seguit carreres acadèmiques pràcticament paral·leles: vam cursar la carrera i el màster junts, i finalment el doctorat, compartint tutor i treballant en fenòmens molt similars. És una persona a qui li tinc una gran admiració intel·lectual; amb ell hi he mantingut discussions teòriques interminables i m'ha ajudat molt en moments crucials de la tesi. Amb ell ens hem passejat per mig món i hem viscut experiències i moments inoblidables. Ha estat un fantàstic company de viatge.

L'André Blais també mereix una menció especial en aquest capítol. Més enllà de la valuosa ajuda substantiva rebuda en el transcurs de l'estada a la Université de Montréal, de l'André n'he d'agrair el seu tracte exquisit, la seva proximitat i la seva voluntat de trencar barreres entre el món del doctorand i del professor. Pel seu caràcter i per la seva senzillesa, és una persona que admiro profundament. Així mateix, de l'estada a la UdM vull agrair el tracte rebut per part de la Silvina i de la Delia. Igualment, he d'agrair al Thomas Gschwend la possibilitat de passar uns mesos a la Universität Mannheim i pels valuosos comentaris que vaig poder rebre d'ell, una de les persones que més ha treballat i teoritzat sobre el fenomen de la contaminació electoral.

També vull agrair l'ajuda rebuda per l'amic Abel Escribà. Malgrat ser especialista en una branca de la ciència política completament deslligada del meu tema, d'ell he rebut algunes de les aportacions més

intel·ligents i més útils d'aquesta tesi. Ell, de manera totalment desinteressada, m'ha ajudat a completar un model teòricament coherent i a treure suc a una base de dades de "difícil tracte". Ell més que ningú ha notat el pes de la gravetat duvergeriana! Així mateix, vull donar les gràcies a la Tània Verge, especialment pel valuosíssim suport rebut durant el darrers mesos de la tesi en el desenvolupament de l'anàlisi referent als partits polítics. Dels dos n'he après que el tracte humà és compatible amb l'excel·lència dins del món de l'acadèmia.

El Toni Rodon ja fa temps que s'ha convertit en un company imprescindible de viatge. Gran amic dins de la universitat, però molt especialment fora, hem pogut tastar de primera mà la cruesa del món acadèmic. Amb tot, persistirem! Juntament amb en Toni he de referir-me al Marc Sanjaume. Les nostres rodades, les sèries de gran patiment, i les planificacions setmanals de curses han estat, sens dubte, una de les principals vies d'escapament de les penes que envolten tot aquest món de l'acadèmia. La Sílvia Claveria també ha estat una persona molt propera durant el transcurs del doctorat. És una persona a qui li tinc un enorme apreci i confio en què algun dia li farem superar aquesta pessimisme que porta intrínsec!

Tampoc no vull deixar de referir-me a la resta de les amistats que he fet a la universitat, amb qui hem compartit moltes hores, molts dinars de carmanyola, i amb qui el doctorat ha estat sens dubte quelcom més agradable. Juntament amb en Marc, en Toni, la Sílvia, l'Abel, la Tània, i en Pablo, han estat dins i fora de la universitat molt bones companyes de viatge la Núria, la Queralt, la Sandra i la Mariña.

Així mateix, sento la necessitat d'agrair la tasca als doctorands de les generacions anteriors a la nostra. En Gerardo, la Lorena, la Marga i l'Albert van ser un referent per nosaltres i ens van ajudar molt en els incerts moments inicials del doctorat. D'entre els professors, vull fer un especial èmfasi a en Javier Astudillo, un pou de coneixements sempre disposat a ajudar, i al sempre amable Robert Fishman, de qui tant vam aprendre en la seva assignatura del Màster. Igualment, és de justícia referir-se a totes aquelles persones de la universitat que, d'alguna manera o altra, m'han ajudat a arribar fins aquí: al Francesc, al Mariano, a la Mariona i al Romain, entre els més destacats. De fora de la UPF, vull donar molt sincerament les gràcies al Jordi Muñoz i a l'Aina Gallego, dues persones a qui tinc molta admiració i a qui els he d'agrair que m'hagin obert les portes a treballar amb ells. No pot quedar fora d'aquesta llista en Pedro Riera, una persona genial i un entusiasta coneixedor de tots els sistemes electorals del món, i a l'amiga Roser Rifà.

Fora de la universitat i del món acadèmic em vull referir als meus amics, que han hagut de patir en primera persona uns últims mesos durs de la tesi. Els companys d'estudi de la carrera: l'Agustí, que probablement ha estat la persona que més ha viscut l'estrès dels darrers temps, el David, en Joan, la Georgina, la Marta, en Pere i, evidentment, en Toni. Els amics del batxillerat: en Marc, el Roger, la Txell i en Pere. I del barri, en Roger, l'Ariadna i l'Alba. I a la Cris, que hem tingut el dubtós plaer de compartir uns darrers mesos frenètics de finalització de les nostres respectives tesis i l'ajuda de la qual ha fet aquest període molt més passable: esperem que vinguin temps millors. Tots ells es mereixen les més sinceres disculpes. Així mateix, no vull deixar de referir-me a la fauna diversa que, en algun moment o altre de la tesi,

s'ha creuat pel meu camí, i en especial a l'inefable Coco, gat monteralenc de terrible record, i al lloro Pepe, que ha persistit en xiular-me a l'orella ininterrompudament durant el darrer mes de la tesi...

Finalment, el darrer dels agraïments va dedicat, com no pot ser d'altra manera, a la meva família. A la família de Riudoms, i en especial als meus avis, de qui n'he après el valor de la humilitat, del treball, de l'esforç i de la superació. I de la família de l'Hospitalet, i particularment dels avis, de qui sempre he rebut una gran estimació i de qui n'he heretat l'interès per la cultura, la preocupació per la política i l'estima pel nostre país.

Però especialment els agraïments van centrats en el meu germà i en els meus pares. A l'Eloi, amb qui hem crescut junts, una persona d'una vàlua incalculable en tots els sentits, un treballador nat, i algú de qui no tinc cap mena de dubte que aconseguirà tot el que es plantegi en aquesta vida. I, evidentment als meus pares, que han viscut amb preocupació i sovint incertesa els darrers mesos de la tesi i a qui mai no podré agrair tot el que han fet per mi. A ells els dec tot el que tinc. A la meva mare, per haver-me estimat més que ningú i per haver-se preocupat més per mi que jo mateix; i al meu pare, per haver-me transmès millor que ningú la cultura de l'inconformisme, del rigor, i la necessitat de fer les coses ben fetes.

Per tot això, i per molt més, a ells dos va dedicada aquesta tesi.

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Barcelona i Riudoms, juliol de 2012

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Abstract

According to the Duvergerian theories, only viable parties would be expected to stand for elections alone in the long run, whereas non-viable parties would be thought to join a pre-electoral coalition with another party or to withdraw from competition altogether. However, non-viable political parties throughout the world have been shown to continue presenting candidacies, calling into question the Duvergerian theories. Developing from this apparent paradox, I argue that it is the overlap of electoral arenas that generates opportunities for viable parties to present candidacies in arenas where they are non-viable. Through in-depth interviews with political leaders in Canada and Spain, I show that the overlap of electoral arenas turns the decision to present candidacies when non-viable into the dominant strategy, whereas coalescing or withdrawing becomes the least favoured alternatives. This situation leads to an extra supply of parties competing to what the Duvergerian theories predict. Through a cross-national quantitative analysis with data from 46 countries, I address the institutional and the sociological determinants that account for variation in the number of parties competing, even if non-viable.

Resum

D'acord amb les teories Duvergerianes a llarg termini només els partits polítics viables s'haurien de presentar en solitari a les eleccions, mentre que els partits no viables haurien de crear coalicions preelectorals o retirar-se de la competició. Tanmateix, arreu del món partits no viables continuen presentant candidatures, posant en qüestió les teories Duvergerianes. Partint d'aquesta paradoxa, argumento que la superposició d'arenes electorals genera oportunitats per partits viables perquè presentin candidatures en arenes on no són viables. Mitjançant entrevistes en profunditat a líders polítics del Canadà i d'Espanya mostro com la superposició d'arenes electorals converteix la decisió de presentar candidatures quan no s'és viable en l'estratègia dominant, mentre que crear coalicions o retirar-se de la competició esdevenen alternatives subòptimes. Aquesta situació porta a un excés d'oferta de partits polítics competint en comparació amb el que les teories de Duverger prediuen. Mitjançant una anàlisi comparada amb dades per 46 països analitzo els mecanismes institucionals i sociològics que expliquen variació en el nombre de partits polítics que competeixen quan no són viables.

Index

List of Figures

List of Tables

CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION

The conventional wisdom when explaining the political consequences of electoral laws is based on Duvergerian theories (Duverger 1954) and in particular with the M+1 rule (Cox 1997; Cox 1999). When actors are primarily concerned with the outcome of the current election and when good information is available about the actual chances of parties competing, no more than M+1 parties –being M district magnitude– would be expected to stand for elections. Through the anticipation of the mechanical effects of the electoral laws, only political parties expecting to gain representation would enter into competition. Hence, the number of parties entering the race should never exceed M+1. However, when parties fail to anticipate these mechanical effects, through the psychological effects, voters would tend to concentrate on at most M+1 parties, the so-called 'viable' parties.

The number of entrants and the dispersion of votes may be temporarily boosted due to parties' long-term expectancies or the lack of public information. However, deviations should only be temporary. In the mid and in the long-term, only viable formations would be supposed to compete (Best 2010: 105) whereas non-viable parties would be expected to coalesce with another party or to withdraw from competition. Eventually, the decision to present candidacies or not should only depend on the actual chances of becoming viable at a given district, so that in the long-term, the M+1 rule should be observed.

However, empirical evidence questions this logic, even when rational choice assumptions are met. It is well-known that around the world 'serious' (Duverger 1954; Cox 1997)[1] but non-viable political parties present candidacies in districts or arenas where they do not have chances of obtaining representation. This calls into question the Duvergerian theories.

Multiple examples in different electoral systems can be found worldwide. In Great Britain, the Liberal Democratic Party systematically presents candidacies in all the uninominal constituencies of the country. Although the party has largely been failing to achieve representation in most of the constituencies, it continues presenting candidacies almost everywhere. Similarly, in the Spanish proportional representation electoral system, the post-communist party *Izquierda Unida* (IU) presents candidacies in all the 52 districts for the national elections. Although since the restoration of democracy, more than three decades ago, IU has only managed to achieve representation in 18 of the constituencies, the party continues running a full slate of candidates. Also, in the German mixed-member system the same pattern is observed. In the Bundestag elections citizens are allowed to cast two ballots: the first one is used to decide which candidates are sent to the parliament from 299 single member districts; the second one distributes another 299 representatives at the regional level through proportional representation. Although *Die Linke* should be predicted to

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[1] Both Duverger and Cox used the term 'serious' although they did not define it. In this research I understand as serious any party that is viable in at least one arena of representation.

withdraw from most of the single member districts because it is non-viable, this does not occur.

An endless list of examples can be found worldwide: The Green Party in France, the Communist Party in Greece, the Christian Democratic Party in Finland, the Social Democratic Party in Japan, the *Bloco de Esquerda* in Portugal, the *Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România* in Romania, or the *Concertación Nacional* in El Salvador, among many other cases, are examples of parties that systematically run in all constituencies of their country, without having chances of becoming viable in many of them.

The departing point of this research is the existence of incongruence between how the literature predicts political parties should behave when they do not have chances of obtaining representation, and what is observed in the real world. Hence, the primary aim of this research is to attempt to provide a response for the evident but still unanswered question, "How and why we might expect higher numbers of parties [to what Duvergerian logic predicts] to contest elections" (Best 2010: 115)?

The contribution of this thesis is twofold. First, I create a general theory about deviations in the Duvergerian equilibrium and I show that the decision to stand for elections when non-viable is a systematic behaviour which takes place across parties, countries and electoral systems. Second, I test the reliability of my arguments through both qualitative and quantitative techniques.

This thesis' first contribution is the creation of a general theory about deviations in the Duvergerian equilibrium. Until now deviations from

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the M+1 rule have been mostly considered as irrelevant. No efforts have been devoted to explain the reasons, if any, which stem from the decision to enter into competition when non-viable. This unexpected decision from the Duvergerian perspective could be considered as a mere residual and thus, as something which does not require any special attention. However, this thesis rejects completely this widespread perspective among scholars and actually turns this supposed residual into the core subject of research.[2] Here, I argue that far from being just a random or an irrational decision, the choice of political parties to present candidacies when they do not expect to become viable is something that needs to be addressed.

Under the Duvergerian assumptions, electoral arenas are believed to be completely independent among them, so party-entry decisions would be expected to be exclusively determined by its chances of becoming viable at each arena. My argument is that this theoretical assumption of the independence of electoral arenas does not actually hold in the real world, since parties compete in complex political systems where many districts and arenas overlap. As a consequence, the decisions taken by parties, which are non-viable in certain arenas, are 'contaminated' by the parties' viability in other arenas.[3]

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[2] There are a few exceptions to this widespread perspective. A few scholars have analysed the impact of having non-viable parties competing in the US on turnout (Koch 1998; Lacy and Burden 1999) and on the outcome of the election (Lacy and Burden 1999; McCann, Rapoport, and Stone 1999).

[3] Through this research when I speak of 'other electoral arenas' I understand it as any level of competition different from the one where decisions are taken. Thus, 'other arenas' may well be a single district, several electoral districts, a tier of representation

One of the first concerns regarding the phenomenon of contamination effects (or electoral contamination) is the meaning of the term. The concept of contamination effects has largely been surrounded by uncertainty. Many names have been used to label different casuistries of contamination effects –terms such as coattail effects, contagion effects or spillover effects. Therefore, the first devoted effort of this research has to do with the establishment of the phenomenon (Merton 1987) and the delimitation of its scope. Once this has been done, I revise in-depth the literature about contamination effects. I identify several contexts that can lead to the emergence of the phenomenon and I show that even though the literature abounds, it clearly lacks a general theory that brings out a universal explanation for it.

Indeed, from the study of the fragmented literature on contamination effects, it is evident that scholars have failed to understand that beyond the identification of the several causal effects that lead to contamination effects, a robust explanation about the phenomenon is required regarding the causal mechanisms behind it.

This is, actually, the purpose of this research. I define the phenomenon of electoral contamination, I systematise the casuistries where it can emerge, and I find the commonalities that stem from it. By so doing, I avoid the unnecessary proliferation of theoretical concepts that the literature on contamination effects has hitherto done, whereas I try to "bring out structural similarities between seemingly disparate processes" (Hedström 2005: 28). The building of this theory allows me

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or even a whole electoral body (such as the presidential arena). I use the term 'arena' in order to avoid the systematic use of the expression 'other districts, tiers or arenas', which would unnecessarily introduce confusion to the argument.

to construct a new and more encompassing conceptual framework through which to make sense of what, until now, have been understood as disparate phenomena (Monroe 1997: 285).

Eventually, I contribute to the literature by arguing that the overlap of arenas modifies the utility function of political parties to the extent that there appear incentives to compete alone even if non-viable. As a consequence of the overlap of arenas, the unexpected decision of political parties to compete when non-viable becomes the dominant strategy, whereas the Duvergerian decisions to withdraw from competition or to join a coalition become less preferred alternatives for parties.

The second contribution of this thesis has to do with the methods through which I test the veracity of my arguments. The nature of the research questions to be dealt with in this research recommends the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods. The integration of both techniques strengthens the conclusions obtained and allows the testing of two different but interconnected dimensions of parties' strategic entry decisions.

On the one hand, through in-depth, semi-structured interviews with political leaders and campaign managers in Canada and Spain –two countries with ideal characteristics to be studied and compared– I address the reasons that drive political parties' decision to enter into competition alone, or not, when non-viable. My argument is that the overlap of electoral arenas generates organisational incentives for political parties to compete even when they do not have chances of achieving representation. Up to now, the literature on party strategies

has mostly obviated the organisational reasons that drive political party strategies. This is, to my knowledge, the first time that such a question has been theoretically addressed and systematically tested in a cross-party and cross-country study.

On the other hand, through a cross-national, quantitative analysis, I delve into the causes that explain the presence of higher numbers of parties competing at the local arena as compared to what Duvergerian theories predict. To do so, I purposely develop a completely new database of national legislative elections, which includes data for 46 countries around the world, from 240 elections, and data compiled at the district level for over 25,000 constituencies. To my knowledge, this is also the first attempt to explain cross-national variation in the determinants of the number of party entrants. The nature of the new database created enables me to carry out a very ambitious analysis, which is able to account, for the first time, in a unique explicative model, for all the different factors that will have been hypothesized of being able to determine party-entry strategic decisions.

Overall, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of political parties' strategic behaviour. Although the Duvergerian theories have largely assumed independence between electoral arenas, virtually all democratic countries compete in multi-tiered electoral contexts where arenas overlap. By considering this overlap of arenas as a mechanism that may account for party strategies, I contribute to a better understanding of party-entry decisions at elections and, in particular, of the reasons that lead parties to present candidacies when they are non-viable.

The structure of this thesis proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I present the frame of reference upon which this thesis is built; the Duvergerian theories. In it, I argue why it should be expected that the overlap of several arenas of competition could deactivate the behaviour of parties and voters that the Duvergerian theories predict. Then I address which are the casuistries that lead to the emergence of such a phenomenon of electoral contamination and I propose a more encompassing definition of it.

In Chapter 3, I focus the attention on the institutional and sociological mechanisms that may foster the emergence of electoral contamination. From an in-depth revision of the literature related to the phenomenon of contamination effects, I reveal the existence of six different mechanisms that can foster the emergence of contamination effects. Five of these mechanisms are related to the supply-side of parties, whereas the last one is linked to the demand-side of parties.

The fourth chapter addresses the reasons that lead political parties to present candidacies when they are non-viable, instead of staying out of competition or joining a pre-electoral coalition.[4] The chapter argues that the overlap of electoral arenas generates positive political externalities that encourage non-viable parties to compete alone. Conversely, when non-viable parties decide to either join a coalition or withdraw from competition, negative political externalities appear.

In the fifth chapter, I empirically assess the extent to which those incentives put forward in Chapter 4 are able to explain party-entry decisions. I test the veracity of these hypotheses through in-depth

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[4] Through the thesis I define a coalition as a pre-electoral agreement.

interviews with political leaders and campaign managers in Canada and Spain. From an analysis of up-to-ten case studies, I conclude that parties' dominant strategy is to compete alone when they are non-viable. Instead, only under very specific conditions non-viable parties will prefer to join a coalition or withdraw from competition.

Finally, in Chapter 6, I focus the attention on determining the extent of the phenomenon of electoral contamination. I develop a new dependent variable that identifies the extra supply of parties competing when non-viable, as compared to what the Duvergerian theories predict. I rely both on the institutional and sociological factors, which have previously been argued, lead to contamination effects. Eventually, I find evidence of contamination effects in the national legislative elections from within districts of the same arena, from the upper tier in mixed-member systems, from the regional arenas, and as a consequence of the existence of an ethnolinguistic regionalised cleavage. Conversely, I do not find evidence of contamination neither from the presidential arena nor from the upper chamber in bicameral legislatures.

Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the main arguments put forward in this thesis and introduces the key findings. Eventually, the chapter also proposes new avenues for further research on the issue of electoral contamination.

CHAPTER 2.
THE DUVERGERIAN GRAVITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF CONTAMINATION EFFECTS

In this chapter, I first present the Duvergerian theories, the frame of reference upon which parties' and voters' strategic decisions have largely been explained, and latterly I address how these theories can be undermined by the overlap of electoral arenas. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.1 summarises the Duvergerian theories. Section 2.2 deals with the benefits and the costs of competing and summarises how party-entry decisions are expected to be taken under the Duvergerian assumptions. Section 2.3 argues that the assumption of the independence of electoral arenas that the literature has purported up to now is false, thus enabling the emergence of contamination effects between different arenas. This section proposes a new and more encompassing definition of the phenomenon of contamination effects and its theoretical implications. Section 2.4 summarises the main arguments of the Chapter.

2.1. The Duvergerian Gravity

Voters and parties' strategies at elections have been commonly explained and predicted through the Duvergerian theories. According to Duverger (1954) within pluralist systems the electorate tends to vote strategically, which encourages bipartidism, whereas in majoritarian and –especially– in proportional representation systems, voters tend to cast their ballot less strategically, which favours a multipartidist system. Riker (1982) labelled these propositions as 'Duverger's law'

and 'Duverger's hypothesis', respectively, although Duverger latterly specified that both were laws (Duverger 1986).

The Duvergerian theories are built upon the mechanical and the psychological effects of electoral laws.[5] On the one hand, the *mechanical effect* of electoral laws is the "electoral systems' systematic underrepresentation (in the share of legislative seats as compared to popular votes) of 'third' parties" (Blais and Carty 1991: 79). According to this theory, the electoral rules reduce the number of parties irrespective of the way in which votes are cast. It is thus the permissiveness of the electoral system –mainly represented by its district magnitude (Rae 1967; Sartori 1968; Sartori 1976; Riker 1982; Palfrey 1989; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1990; Myerson and Weber 1993; Lijphart 1994; Sartori 1994; Cox 1997; Singer and Stephenson 2009)– that reduces the number of parties managing to get a seat.

Through the *psychological effects* on the side of political elites, parties will change their patterns of behaviour according to their expectancies at becoming viable. In particular, non-permissive electoral systems will discourage political parties from presenting candidacies alone when they do not have any chance of obtaining representation, whereas they will generate incentives to party elites to look for decisions more adequate to the context, namely to coordinate with another party or to stay out of competition altogether.

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[5] Throughout this thesis an electoral law or an electoral system is understood as "all the institutional tools that a state has in its place to conduct elections. The most important of these are the franchise, electoral districting, voter registration, electoral management and administration, and method of voting" (Courtney 2007: 279).

Finally, the *psychological effect* on the side of voters is "the tendency for voters, realizing that votes for minor parties are not effectively translated into seats, to rally to what they consider the least unacceptable of the (…) major parties" (Blais and Carty 1991: 79). Through the psychological effects on the side of party elites, a political party is believed to stay out of competition or to join a coalition when it does not have any chance of achieving representation. But when the non-viable party fails to anticipate this mechanism, the psychological effect on the side of voters –which has commonly been called strategic voting– will prevent this party from gaining any votes. Parties failing to advance the constraints of the electoral laws will be penalised by voters. They will refuse to vote for their preferred political party because of their expected low electoral performance, and they would rather vote for their second-best party or for the least unacceptable of the parties expecting to become viable (Cox 1984; Blais and Carty 1991; Gutowski and Georges 1993; Blais and Nadeau 1996; Cox and Shugart 1996; Cox 1997; Blais et al. 2001; Blais, Young, and Turcotte 2005; Alvarez, Boehmke, and Nagler 2006; Abramson et al. 2010).

A large body of literature has documented evidence in favour of both mechanisms (Duverger 1954; Rae 1967; Shively 1970; Spafford 1972; Riker 1982; Blais and Carty 1991; Kim and Ohn 1992; Taagepera and Shugart 1993; Lijphart 1994; Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006) which entails what has been called the 'Duvergerian gravity' by some authors (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Lago and Martínez 2007; Lago and Montero 2009) or the 'Duvergerian equilibrium/equilibria' by others (Cox and Shugart 1996; Gaines 1997; Gaines 1999; Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Ferrara 2004; Jones 2004; Moser and Scheiner 2009).

The consequences of the Duvergerian gravity on the number of parties competing at the district level and on voter's behaviour are summarised by Cox (1997; 1999). For all the electoral systems, the maximum 'carrying capacity' of parties –the maximum number of political parties that can be sustained at a given district magnitude (Cox 2005; Cox 2006)– is M+1, being M district magnitude, which comprises all candidates that are expected to get a seat plus the first runner-up party.[6] Throughout the thesis, these will be considered and labelled as 'viable parties'.

When only M+1 candidates enter the race strategic voting is unnecessary (Cox 1999; Cox 2005; Cox 2006). But when entry coordination fails and more than M+1 candidates enter, then strategic voting is expected: Voters are believed to concentrate their votes on at most M+1 parties, avoiding wasting their vote on candidates without feasible possibilities to get a seat. Only when there is not a clear distinction between the expected performance of the first and the second runner-up parties –and provided that these are close to the expected winner party–, the M+1 rule will not temporary hold. In this case both the first and the second loser parties can be conceived as viable parties, in what has been labelled a 'non-Duvergerian equilibrium' (Palfrey 1989; Cox 1994). The nearly-identical expected vote totals prevent any of the parties being winnowed out from the field of viable candidates at the subsequent election. However this non-Duvergerian equilibrium is believed to disappear at the mid and the long-term.

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[6] The literature has indistinctively used the terms 'first loser' and 'first runner-up'.

In sum, political parties will only enter into competition when they expect to win a seat. This means that in single-member district (from now onwards SMD) plurality, two parties are expected to present candidacies at the district level, whereas in multi-member districts elected through proportional representation (henceforth PR), a maximum of M+1 candidates may become viable.[7]

The observance of the Duvergerian gravity is supposed to occur under two specific conditions (Cox 1999: 152):

First, "potential entrants must care mostly about the outcome of the current election (as opposed to the outcomes of future elections or non-outcome-related matters)", namely *short-term instrumentality* (Cox 1999: 152).[8] Political parties and voters are generally considered to take decisions on the basis of their expected results in the current election. However, in certain cases, parties may understand competition as a repeated coordination game (Cox 1997: 236). These cases may be attributable to a "swell in support for minor parties or a restructuring of voter alignments" (Best 2010: 107) and they lead to coordination failures, as political parties are unsuccessful at anticipating in a one-shot game the mechanical effect of the electoral laws. However, since the primary goal of parties is to achieve representation, failing to do so repeatedly would be thought to encourage them to withdraw from

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[7] In this respect, criticisms may be raised from the fact that the M+1 law does not tell us anything about how many parties can be expected in multi-member districts. In this sense, Taagepera and Shugart (Taagepera and Shugart 1993; Taagepera 2007) have performed some insights on the expected number of parties competing at the district and national arenas which question, to a certain extent, the simplicity of the M+1 law.

[8] The phenomenon has also been called 'instrumental rationality'.

competition or to join a coalition, at least at the mid-term. Therefore, within institutionalised political systems where voters' preferences are relatively stable, parties are generally considered to take their strategic entry decisions as a one-shot affair.

Second, it is also required to have *public information on standing candidates*. By public (or perfect) information is understood as the situation where political elites and individuals are aware of the parties that are going to be successful, and where there is low uncertainty about the candidates that will become viable. In these cases both elites and voters can anticipate their behaviour depending on its chances of becoming viable.

However, in certain contexts, the lack of perfect information may entail some disturbances in the accomplishment of the Duvergerian gravity (Forsythe et al. 1993; Best 2010: 107-108). The literature has identified two contexts where political information may be lacking.

On the one hand, in founding elections.[9] Founding elections are characterised by a lack of perfect information, which leads to uncertainty in the number of parties competing in elections; in voters' shares for the different parties; and on how the electoral rules will translate votes into seats (Andrews and Jackman 2005: 67). In founding elections, party elites will fail to "behave consistently with the

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[9] Founding elections are the first competitive multiparty election (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). According to Reich (2001: 1240) elections can be considered as founding when they occur during the transition to democracy after at least 10 years of authoritarian rule and following reforms that allow for the formation of multiple political parties independent of the state and free from state repression.

incentives inherent to the electoral law" (Gunther 1989: 851) given that every potential candidate may stand an equally good chance of winning a seat (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 147; Cox 1997). With regard to voters, founding elections will lead them to fail to behave strategically due to the lack of a learning process (Tavits and Annus 2006). As elections go by, information available to the voters increases, thus enabling both elites and voters to anticipate the mechanical effects of the electoral laws.

On the other hand, the lack of perfect information can occur in democracies with low party system institutionalisation or with unconsolidated party systems. Weak institutionalised party systems led to coordination failures (Indridason 2008: 84) because past elections do not always serve as strong informational cues (Best 2010: 108) and because voters are poorly informed about the relative placement of candidates (Clough 2007: 328).

The lack of public information and the existence of long-term expectancies can modify both voters and elites' behaviour. Since this thesis is focused on the effects that the overlap of electoral arenas inflict to party elites' strategic decisions, it is necessary that any causal inference drawn from the analysis is net of the effect that the lack of public information or the existence of long-term expectancies may cause. In order to do so, I only consider elections held under democratic and institutionalised systems, where the conditions of short-term instrumentality and perfect information are met.

2.2. The Determinants of Party-Entry Strategies under the Duvergerian Assumptions

Under rational choice assumptions, the decision to enter into competition depends on the costs and the benefits of competing. When the expected benefits associated with entering the race alone are higher than its costs, parties will decide to stand for elections alone. Conversely, when the costs of competing alone are higher than its rewards, parties will look for alternatives that best fit the context: namely to stay out of competition or to join a coalition with another party. The decision to enter when non-viable is conceived as an expressive action, which at the mid and the long-term should be solved against entering into competition alone. In this section, I briefly address the benefits and the costs associated with competing.

2.2.1. Benefits to Present Candidacies

Under the Duvergerian assumptions, where the principles of short-term instrumentality and perfect information are met, the benefits of competing are related to the fact of becoming viable. A political party decides to enter into competition when it expects to achieve representation.[10]

In SMD plurality and run-off systems there are, at most, two parties expecting to achieve representation at each district: the party that eventually obtains the representative and the first loser party. For the

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[10] Parties expecting to achieve representation are those which are sure that they will obtain representation, but also parties for which uncertainty in the electoral results allows them to think that they can gain a seat. Both casuistries are denominated throughout the research as parties 'expecting to achieve representation'.

case of PR electoral systems, this includes all the parties that eventually end up obtaining representation plus the first runner-up party.

However, it is noteworthy to mention that the first loser in multinomial districts is not necessarily a party that does not manage to get a seat but rather the party that, in case of increasing by one the number of seats elected in the district, would obtain the representative. In order to clarify such a key concept for the present research, Table 2.1 provides an example, in a multinomial imaginary district with magnitude equal to 4 elected in D'Hondt method.

Table 2.1 *Viable Parties in a Multinomial District*

Party	Votes	D'Hondt Divisors		
		1	2	3
P_A	50	**50**	**25**	*17*
P_B	40	**40**	**20**	13
P_C	10	10	5	3

In this imaginary district party P_A gets the first seat (value 50); P_B the second one (value 40); and the third and the fourth also go for P_A and P_B respectively (value 25 and 20). The first loser party, instead of being the first party which does not get a seat, P_C (value 10), is again P_A (value 17, in italics), which is actually the party that would get the seat in the case of increasing district magnitude by one seat.

Uncertainty in the electoral results can also allow the second loser party to think that it can become viable and, if it is close to the winner party, it may decide to compete. As mentioned above, when two parties are fighting in a very close race for becoming the first loser party, a non-Duvergerian equilibrium is reached. In the unlikely and temporary

event of having this situation, the theory would accept the two parties presenting candidacies until is solved which of them ends up becoming the first runner-up and which becomes a non-viable party. Table 2.2 provides an example for an imaginary uninominal constituency elected through plurality rule.

Table 2.2 *Viable Parties in a Uninominal District*

Party	Votes
P_A	**35**
P_B	*28*
P_C	*27*
P_D	10

In this case P_A is the winner party. But P_B and P_C are so electorally close that it is not possible to disentangle before the elections, which of these parties will be the first loser and which will be the second loser party. This case of non-Duvergerian equilibrium would be solved by considering that the two parties are viable and that they both have to run for elections alone.

In SMD electoral systems, this situation is supposed to be temporary. Subsequent elections are believed to solve the tie so that only one of the parties will be viable. However, in multimember districts it is more difficult to determine which will be the first and the second loser party, because as district magnitude increases, the smaller becomes the distance that separates winners and losers. This makes it more difficult to determine which party is out of the running (Cox 1997; Lago 2012).

2.2.2. Costs of Competing

The decision to stand for elections involves incurring some costs. Both political parties that run for elections alone and parties that decide to join a coalition, incur some direct costs of competing. Additionally, in the particular case of political parties joining a coalition, some supplementary costs, associated to the decision to coalesce, appear. It is only when political parties decide to withdraw from competition that no costs arise. In the following two subsections, I address, respectively, the direct costs of competing and the costs associated with joining a coalition.

a. Direct Costs of Competing

When political parties decide to run for elections, regardless of whether they do it alone or in a coalition with another party, they incur some direct costs of competing. These costs can come from two different sources.

First, in many countries, political parties are required to fulfil certain conditions to present candidacies, which will determine the chances of parties competing.[11] The most common requirement to present candidacies is to pay a deposit, although the terms associated with this payment and the conditions for recovering the money deposited vary considerably across countries. Normally, the amount of money to be paid for presenting candidacies is not a discouragement and it can be

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[11] Some scholars have shown for the particular case of the US that ballot access requirements discourage participation for non-viable parties (Lewis-Beck and Squire 1995; Ansolabehere and Gerber 1996; Winger 1997; Stratmann 2005; Lem and Dowling 2006; Burden 2007).

recovered after reaching a certain percentage –or number– of votes. In Canada for instance, every political party that obtains 1% of the votes at the national level will have the money spent during the campaign reimbursed. However, in some countries, the percentage upon which money will be reimbursed is considerably higher (in India 1/6 of the votes nationwide are required) or even the deposit is not reimbursed (e.g. Austria). Finally, the deposit may also be so high that it discourages political parties from presenting candidacies when they are not sure they can obtain representation. This is the case, for instance, in Japan, where 3 million Yen (US40,000$) are required for each candidate.

Besides, in some other countries, it is necessary to gather a certain amount of signatures from eligible voters to present candidacies. In this case, the number of signatures and the conditions to collect them determine, as well, the extent to which presenting candidacies is easier or not. Gathering signatures is a typical requirement for Eastern European countries (in Croatia 5,000 signatures are required, in Poland 3,000 signatures per constituency or in Russia 200,000 signatures from each region), although it also exists in some European countries (in Belgium 5,000 signatures are required, in Spain 0.1% of the total electors in a district).[12]

Second, the direct costs of competing can also come from the financial resources required to launch and to promote the party candidature. The decision to enter into competition implies the presence of a certain

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[12] Information available at the IPU Parline database on national parliaments (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp).

basic infrastructure that is in charge of the political campaign. This includes the creation of a party slogan, the image of the party for the campaign, the creation of a central committee that coordinates the campaign (if the party is viable in more than one arena), etc. In addition to this basic infrastructure, the electoral campaign also requires spending some money on the promotion of the party, namely, on banners, posters, sticks, leaflets, the creation of a webpage, updating information to the social networks, etc. Although it has been shown that political parties concentrate resources on target seats rather than focusing in all the districts of the country (Denver et al. 2003: 548), these expenses are difficult to avoid. Any serious party that competes at a given district is expected to devote some resources to the promotion of the candidature, regardless of its chances of achieving representation.[13]

b. Costs of Coalition

When political parties have no chances of achieving representation by running for elections alone, they may decide to reach an agreement with another party so as to become viable. Although, through this agreement, the probability to gain more votes and hence winning a seat increases (Golder 2006: 196-98), coordination may also imply several

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[13] The effect of money spent during campaigns cannot be disregarded. This has been shown to be a good predictor of the party's electoral performance (Jacobson 1980; Green and Krasno 1988; Nagler and Leighley 1992; Carty and Eagles 1999; Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 2000; Benoit and Marsh 2010), especially for the challenger party rather than for the incumbent (Ansolabehere and Gerber 1994; Palda and Palda 1998; Carty and Eagles 1999; Gerber 2004; Shin et al. 2005; Johnston and Pattie 2006; Johnston and Pattie 2008; Chang and Lee 2009).

disadvantages, namely costs of coalition. The costs of joining a pre-electoral coalition can be determined by three different factors.[14]

First, the costs of joining a coalition are determined by the ideological distance between parties (de Swaan 1973). When the distance between the programmatic positions of political parties on the policy dimensions selected as relevant is small, the more likely a future alliance between the parties should be (Debus 2009: 48-49). Certain parties will be more likely to be rejected as pre-coalition partners. This is the case of the 'pariah-status' or 'anti-system parties' (Debus 2009: 48) and the case of extreme parties opposing the political system (Sartori 1976: 122). This is usually so because other parties will refuse any opportunity to coalesce with them, but also because the saliency of certain policy dimensions among these parties will prevent them from joining coalitions on the basis of a policy dimension which is not the most salient issue.

Second, the power of the local structure can also be a determinant of the costs of joining a coalition. Within decentralised parties where decisions are taken at the lower levels, political leaders will find it more difficult to gain the approval from their own organisation. In this context, taking a polemical decision may imply important contestation from the local arena (Meguid 2008: 105) since local activists and elites may "saddle the party with electorally undesirable policy platforms (…) or constrain its leaders in coalition bargaining" (Strøm and Müller 1999: 17). Hence, within decentralised parties, the possibility to

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[14] The literature on pre-electoral coalitions is very scarce (Golder 2005) and therefore, the revision of the literature that follows is related to the literature on government coalitions, which abounds.

coalesce will be lower (Harmel and Janda 1994) due to the higher costs associated with this decision.

Third, some endogenous situational determinants, inherent to parties and party leaders, can also determine the cost of joining a coalition. These include such heterogenic features as "personality characteristics and affinities, the timing of the bargaining situation relative to the electoral cycle or to intraparty event such as party congresses, the age and time horizon of individual party leaders, the existence or nonexistence of identifiable challengers in the various parties, and so on" (Strøm and Müller 1999: 25). The role of previous experiences may also be relevant in determining the chances of joining a coalition (Tavits 2008) and therefore, the costs associated with it.

2.2.3. The Decision to Enter into Competition under the Duvergerian Assumptions

Under the Duvergerian assumptions, party elites' entry decisions are taken at the local level and according to the expected benefits (B) and costs that this decision may bring. In a context of perfect information and short-term instrumentality, a political party is able to attach a probabilistic value (p) to its chances of becoming viable. When the party is expected to achieve representation, the expected benefits (pB) will be higher than the direct costs of competing (D). Conversely, when the party does not expect to achieve representation the costs of competing will be higher than the expected benefits.

There are three different strategic entry decisions that can be taken by political parties: entering into competition alone, joining a coalition, or staying out from competition. Whether it is one alternative or another

that is taken depends on the expected benefits and the costs that each of these alternatives brings, and more particularly, on the utility that parties obtain from each strategic entry decision.

Political parties under the Duvergerian assumptions will decide to enter into competition alone when the utility function (U_{Duv}) of the expected benefits of competing alone (p_aB) minus the direct costs of competing alone (D) is maximised:

$$U_{Duv} = p_aB - D \qquad\qquad (2.1)$$

When political parties decide to join a coalition instead of competing alone, the direct costs of competing (D) remain stable whereas the expected benefits of competing in a coalition (p_cB) increase. At the same time, there appear new costs associated to the decision of coalescing (C). Hence, if the marginal benefit obtained by joining this coalition is higher than the costs associated to joining a coalition, then the utility function that will be maximised will be the one relative to joining a coalition:

$$U_{Duv} = p_cB - (D + C) \qquad\qquad (2.2)$$

Finally, if in none of these two previous alternatives the expected benefits of competing are higher than the costs derived from the decision to enter into competition, the party will decide to stay out of competition. This decision does not bring about any benefit or any cost under the Duvergerian assumptions:

$$U_{Duv} = 0 \qquad\qquad (2.3)$$

According to these principles, the decision to enter, or not, into competition alone is just a function of the probabilities attached to obtaining representation. In particular, if the party is expected to achieve representation it will decide to run for elections alone, whereas when the party is not expected to become viable, it will either chose to coalesce or to stay out of competition depending on which of the two utility functions is maximised.

2.3. Deviations in the Duvergerian Gravity

Once the conditions of short-term instrumentality and perfect information are met, any deviation in the M+1 rule would be expected to be only randomly explained. Given that competing always has a cost higher than zero (Lago and Martínez 2007: 383), non-viable parties in a given district would be supposed in the mid and the long-term to either withdraw from competition or to join a coalition in order to become viable.

However, even when rational choice assumptions are met, empirical evidence points out that most political parties systematically enter into competition alone when non-viable, thus calling into question the Duvergerian theories. Table 2.3 shows only a few examples around the world of political parties which, although being mainly non-viable in most of the districts of the country, they compete in most (if not all) the constituencies.

How can Duvergerian theories explain this unexpected behaviour? Are these parties acting mistakenly? Are these the only isolated examples from around the world?

Table 2.3 *Party-Entry Decisions and Viability across Countries*

Party	*Country*	*Elections (Year)*	*Viable districts (%)*	*Districts presenting candidacies (%)*
New Democratic Party	Canada	Federal (2008)	103 (33.4%)	308 (100%)
Québec Solidaire	Quebec (Canada)	Provincial (2008)	2 (1.6%)	122 (97.6%)
Izquierda Unida	Spain	National (2008)	2 (3.8%)	51 (98.6%)
Ny Alliance	Denmark	National (2007)	5 (50%)	10 (100%)
Partido Humanista da Solidariedade	Brazil	Federal (2010)	2 (7.4%)	27 (100%)

Source: Own elaboration. Data from official directories

Evidence shows that, far from being these mere exceptions of political parties' strategic entry decisions, they are only the tip of the iceberg of a conscious behaviour common throughout the world. This thesis aims to deepen the understanding of this phenomenon. Departing from the unexplained paradox that more parties than those that are expected to run for elections decide entering competition, I raise the question "why we might expect higher numbers of parties [to what the Duvergerian theories predict] to contest elections" (Best 2010: 115)?

2.3.1. The Overlap of Electoral Arenas and its Consequences

The argument that this thesis raises –to explain the unexpected decision to present candidacies– departs from the questioning of the widely accepted but reductionist assumption of perfect independence of electoral arenas that the Duvergerian theories and most of the subsequent literature has purported. Indeed, party strategic decisions on whether or not to enter into competition alone, transcend the scope of each arena of competition to a multi-local logic (Lago and Montero 2009: 178-79), so that the implicit assumption of independence between electoral arenas given by the literature does not hold (Gaines 1999).

The departing point of this research is the existence of an individual fallacy: Political parties have been said to take entry decisions at the local level exclusively according to the institutional features of the arena at stake. However, party strategies cannot be drawn from each of the decisions that would be supposed to be taken at each district. Conversely, party decisions have to be drawn from an aggregate point of view, taking into account all the different arenas where a party is competing, realising that they are all linked, and that the decision to enter or not competition transcends each individual arena.

Actually, my argument is that political parties will decide to present candidacies everywhere, even in those arenas where the Duvergerian theories would have predicted them not to do so. The overlap of electoral arenas therefore, distorts the Duvergerian theories, so that political parties will decide to present candidacies both in those arenas where they are viable and in those where they are not.

However, the mere overlap of electoral arenas would not bring about any further consequences if all parties competing in all different arenas where equally viable. Under these circumstances, no dilemma would arise with regard to their strategic entry decisions: viable parties would enter everywhere and non-viable parties would be expected, at the mid and the long-term, to withdraw from competition or to join a coalition everywhere. It is only when parties are 'asymmetrically viable', i.e. they are viable in a certain arena but not in another, that they may take advantage of their viability in this arena to present candidacies in those arenas where they are non-viable.[15]

There are two different circumstances that enable the emergence of political parties with asymmetric viability.

First, from the *supply-side,* incongruent electoral systems will generate different party systems.[16] Through the mechanical and the psychological effects of the electoral laws both party elites and voters determine their strategic behaviour according to the constraints of the

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[15] It is very relevant to note that political parties which are not viable anywhere cannot be regarded as parties with 'asymmetric viability'. The fact that these parties present candidates when non-viable is believed to be just an expressive action, something which is not expected to be explained here. None of the arguments that are presented in this thesis are able to account for entry decisions from parties that are non-viable everywhere.

[16] Throughout this research I understand an incongruent electoral system as the one where different electoral rules are used to elect two or more districts or arenas. In particular, following Lijphart (1994), 'different electoral rules' are conceived as a variation/difference in any of the institutional component of the electoral system of at least 20%. Different electoral formulas to distribute seats in PR will not be considered different electoral systems.

electoral system. When the electoral system is the same between two different arenas, parties will be expected to be equally viable. Yet as differences in the electoral rules become greater, there are more chances of finding a political party with asymmetric viability.

A very clear example of a political party with asymmetrical viability is the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). The party presented candidacies in all of the 57 legislative districts for the 2009 national elections. The party has similar support across the country, and even in those districts with low magnitude the party performs well. However, the KKE manages to get representation only in the larger constituencies (in fourteen districts in the 2009 elections, for instance). It is, therefore, the presence of different district magnitudes that creates this situation of asymmetric viability.

Second, asymmetric viability may also arise from the *demand-side* of political parties. The presence of a regionalised cleavage may configure a party system in a certain region that is different from the one in the rest of the country. A national political party, which is viable in all territories of the country, may turn out to be non-viable in an ethnically different territory because of the presence of an ethnopolitical party, which displaces the viable party in the rest of the country to a situation of non-viability in the territory.

One example is found in Great Britain: In virtually all of the provinces except Scotland, the three main parties are competing in each of the SMD constituencies, namely the Conservatives, the Labour party and the Liberal Democrats. In the constituencies of Scotland, though, the Scottish National Party is one of the major parties, whereas the

Conservatives currently, have very minor support. It is therefore, the presence of a regional cleavage that makes the Conservatives a political party with asymmetric viability, i.e. mostly viable in all the British constituencies except the Scottish ones.

Hence, institutional and sociological factors can lead to the emergence of asymmetric viability. When political parties take advantage of this asymmetric viability to present candidacies in those districts where they are non-viable, it is said that *electoral contamination* or *contamination effects* appear.[17]

There is a large body of literature that, in recent times, has used the concept of contamination effects to designate diverse phenomena where either voters or political elites modify their expected behaviour as a consequence of the overlap of different electoral arenas. Given that this is the core concept of this research, before continuing with the line of argument it is relevant to properly address the phenomenon.

2.3.2. What Are Contamination Effects

The phenomenon of *electoral contamination* has received noticeable attention in recent years. Many names have been used to describe it: contamination effects, interaction effects, coattail effects, spillover effect, contagion effect, etc. Broadly speaking the phenomenon has been understood as a situation where either voters or party elites determine their political behaviour on the basis of other arenas, rather than the specific arena being contested. However, as mentioned above

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[17] Through this research I will indistinctively call the term 'contamination effects', as most of the literature does, or 'electoral contamination'.

there is a certain ambiguity on what does this concept precisely means and when is possible to speak about effects of contamination and when it is not.

The phenomenon of contamination effects was first reported in the US in the early fifties. Under the label of 'coattail effects' it was presented as a situation where presidential elections were able to influence the electoral outcomes in the legislative elections. In concrete, voters' behaviour in the legislative elections was said to be strongly affected by the existence of a more important contest such as the presidential election. However, the term 'contamination' was not used until 1992 when Shugart and Carey highlighted the concomitant tendency of presidential election campaigns to *contaminate* the context of parliamentary election for parties, the media and the voters (Shugart and Carey 1992: 239-242).

In the late nineties, the concept became widely used to designate any kind of deviation caused by a given arena of competition to another one, but it especially referred to the growing literature on contamination effects within mixed-member districts (henceforth MMS). Indeed the literature on contamination effects between presidential and parliamentary countries mainly continued speaking of 'coattail effects', whereas 'contamination effects' became a phenomenon intrinsically related to MMS, and to a lesser extent to other less studied forms of contamination such as from regional to national arenas.

The first attempts to define the concept were not found until recently. Ferrara, Herron and Nishikawa (2005: 8) first defined the phenomenon in the following manner:

> *"Contamination is present, at the micro-level, when the behaviour of the voter, a party, a candidate or a legislator in one tier of election is demonstrably affected by the institutional rules employed in the other tier. At the aggregate level, contamination is observed when a particular outcome produced in one tier (like the number of parties) is affected by the institutional features of the other tier".*

And only a few years later Gschwend (2008: 230) defined the concept again, in this case restricting the definition to the particular case of contamination effects in MMS:

> *"All too often outcomes of elections are interpreted as if these elections had been held in isolation (…). We speak of 'contamination effects' or 'interaction effects' between two electoral arenas if the null hypothesis of independence between both arenas cannot be sustained, i.e., when one electoral arena 'contaminates' the result in another electoral arena".*

However, both definitions present drawbacks that a new conceptualisation of contamination effects should overcome. First, both definitions address the question of *when* contamination effects appear but they do not actually face *what* contamination effects are. Second, the two definitions conceptualise contamination effects as a phenomenon that affects both *party elites* and *voters*.

From the party elites' point of view contamination effects are understood as a deviation in their entry decisions as a consequence of the overlap of arenas, and more concretely, to the decision to present candidacies when non-viable. Contamination effects from the elites' point of view lead to more parties competing than what the Duvergerian theories predict. It is precisely this context of higher numbers of parties competing that enables the emergence of contamination effects from the voters' point of view. This will take place when electors modify their behaviour due to the overlap of several arenas of competition. This behaviour though, is conditional on the previous existence of contamination effects from the side of political parties, which will have led to a higher number of parties competing to what the Duvergerian theories predict.

Although it is true that the concept of contamination effects may refer to deviations both in party elites' and voters' behaviour, in this thesis, I restrict the concept to party elites' behaviour. I do so for two crucial reasons:

First, because the study of how voters behave in multi-local contexts has already received substantial attention from the literature. In actual fact, a great variety of phenomena could be included in this group –the 'dual vote', 'ticket splitting', 'differential abstention'–, although none of these have been understood by the literature as electoral contamination. Second and most relevant, because the diversity of phenomena potentially related to contamination effects on the side of voters, would not enable the construction of a new theory about the deviations in the Duvergerian equilibrium which may identify commonalities among different processes –which actually is one of the

main purposes of the present research. Hence, the study of contamination effects from the elites' perspective, enables me to focus attention on an insufficiently-studied body of literature, and at the same time, by tracing commonalities between what until now has been understood as different processes, I am able to propose a new and more encompassing general theory about political parties' entry decisions.

Next, I present a new definition of contamination effects that tries to overcome the main drawbacks of the previous definitions: it addresses the question of what are contamination effects rather than when do they appear, and it is focused only on the elites' perspective. According to the new criteria I understand contamination effects as:

> *The situation in which the viability of a political party in a given arena shapes party elites' entry decisions in another arena where non-viable. In the long-run, when the assumptions of short-term instrumentality and perfect information are met, elites' dominant strategy is to enter into competition alone independently of the chances of obtaining a seat.*

Therefore, contamination effects are supposed to deactivate the functioning of the Duvergerian gravity. Party elites modify their strategic behaviour in one arena of competition, as a result of its overlap with another arena. Consequently, the number of parties competing at each arena is believed to be no longer determined endogenously by the chances of achieving representation but exogenously (Ferrara and Herron 2005: 18) by the viability of the party in another arena.

2.4. Concluding Remarks

Conventional wisdom on parties and voters behaviour has commonly been explained by the Duvergerian theories. Under the Duvergerian assumptions, political parties are expected to run for elections when they expect to achieve representation. It is only under this circumstance that parties' probability to obtain benefits from competing are higher than the costs associated with competing. Conversely, when parties are not expected to achieve representation they will either decide to compete in a coalition or to withdraw from competition.

The Duvergerian theories depart from the assumption that political parties compete in perfectly isolated arenas. In this sense, the party decision on whether to enter into competition or not in a given district is exclusively a function of its expectations at achieving representation.

However, I argue that the assumption of independence of electoral arenas does not hold true for the real world. Political parties take decisions at the district level, not only according to their probabilities of achieving representation in the given district, but their decision is also influenced by the overlap of other electoral arenas.

In particular, I sustain that political parties take advantage of a situation of asymmetric viability to present candidacies in districts where they do not expect to achieve representation. There are two contexts that can foster the emergence of asymmetric viability: the existence of two incongruent electoral systems and the presence of a territorialised cleavage. Under these circumstances, political parties will face the dilemma of whether or not to present candidacies in those districts where they are non-viable. If they take advantage of their viability in

certain arenas to present candidacies in those arenas where they are non-viable, contamination effects appear.

However, it is not clear that higher degrees of asymmetric viability will lead to high contamination effects. Indeed, both questions are, at least from a theoretical point of view, not related at all. The presence of asymmetric viability generates a situation in which political parties face the dilemma of whether to enter the arena or not, when they are non-viable. This situation may lead to contamination effects arising when the party decides to run for elections alone, taking advantage of its viability in the more permissive arena. But high levels of asymmetric viability may also lead to higher degrees of coordination between parties or higher quotes of withdrawals from competition than when asymmetric viability is moderate.

An example can clarify things. Imagine two different situations. First, in an electoral system where two arenas have few differences in permissiveness between them, asymmetric viability appears. If a party decides to run for elections in the less permissive arena where non-viable, by taking advantage of its viability in the more permissive arena, electoral contamination arises. In the second electoral system, the two arenas have a lot of differences in the levels of permissiveness, and therefore asymmetric viability arises as well. However, the party which is viable in the more permissive arena may decide to join a coalition in the less permissive one in order to become viable. In this second case, although differences of permissiveness between both arenas were higher than in the first case, electoral contamination will not arise.

Therefore, higher differences in permissiveness will be more likely to create a context with political parties potentially asymmetrically viable. However, asymmetric viability does not necessarily lead to more contamination effects. In the following chapter the relationship between the two phenomena is addressed.

CHAPTER 3.
CONTAMINATION EFFECTS: THE INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL INCENTIVES TO COMPETE

In the previous chapter, I have explained that the overlap of electoral arenas fosters the existence of political parties with asymmetric viability; the condition under which contamination effects can come out. Asymmetric viability can emerge either from the *supply-side* or from the *demand-side* of political parties.

First, from the *supply-side* of parties, when the electoral system between two arenas is the same, *ceteris paribus*, political parties will be homogeneously viable or non-viable. However, when different electoral rules are used to elect two electoral arenas, political parties will become asymmetrically viable. Actually, any combination of two incongruent arenas can lead to the emergence of the phenomenon. Second, asymmetric viability may also come from the *demand-side* of political parties. Regional ethno-linguistic diversity –or any regional cleavage– may create contexts of asymmetric viability when nationwide parties are not viable in areas where a regional cleavage, mainly an ethno-linguistic one, is strong.

However, as I have already stressed, asymmetric viability does not necessarily lead to contamination effects. It is only when parties decide to take advantage of their asymmetric viability to present candidacies in arenas where they are non-viable, that contamination effects appear.

The phenomenon of contamination effects can potentially take place from any arena of competition to any other arena, and in both

directions. Actually, there are multiple bilateral combinations of arenas that, conceivably, can generate asymmetric viability and they may ultimately bring about contamination effects. However, this is not all; contamination in each of these bilateral combinations of arenas can potentially take two directions, thus leaving a high number of potential sources and directions from which the phenomenon can take place.

Although there exists multiple combinations of arenas and directions from where contamination effects can appear, the literature has mainly focused attention on the different sources that can bring contamination effects to national legislative arenas. This is due to national legislative arenas being the more common elective body throughout the world. Following the same criteria, I also focus this research on contamination effects to these elections. Through an in-depth analysis of the literature, I identify six different contexts which lead to asymmetric viability and I address whether each of these situations is likely to bring about contamination effects to the national legislative arena. Five of these cases of potential contamination effects are related to the supply-side of parties, whereas the last one is connected with the demand-side of parties.

From the *supply-side* of parties, contamination can be divided between those cases where the phenomenon may come from within the same legislative arena (horizontal contamination) and other cases where contamination may come from another electoral arena (vertical contamination). Section 3.1 deals with the two potential cases of horizontal contamination; namely, from one district to another of the same legislative arena (section 3.1.1), and from the upper to the lower tier in mixed-member systems (section 3.1.2). Section 3.2 addresses all

the hypothetical cases of vertical electoral contamination: from presidential elections (section 3.2.1); from the upper chamber in bicameral legislatures (section 3.2.2); and from regional arenas (section 3.2.3). Finally, from the *demand-side* of political parties, contamination effects may potentially emerge in the presence of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity. This concept is dealt with in section 3.3. The outline of the main arguments of the chapter is found in Section 3.4.

Table 3.1 summarises all these cases from which contamination effects can possibly come from (in parentheses the section where each case is dealt with).

Table 3.1 Contamination to Legislative Arenas

| *Supply-side of parties* | | *Demand-side of parties (3.3)* |
Horizontal contamination (3.1)	*Vertical Contamination (3.2)*	
Districts from the same arena (3.1.1)	Presidential arena (3.2.1)	Ethnic heterogeneity (3.3)
Upper tier in MMS (3.1.2)	Upper chamber in bicameral legislatures (3.2.2)	
	Regional arenas (3.2.3)	

3.1. Supply-Side: Horizontal Contamination

3.1.1. Districts from the Same Arena

Variation in district magnitude (henceforth DM) within the national legislative chamber sets the basis for the existence of political parties

with asymmetric viability. Both in chambers with only one nationwide district and in chambers where the number of deputies elected per constituency is homogenous –typical but not exclusive of SMD electoral systems– the same political parties will be viable everywhere, *ceteris paribus*. In contrast, when DM between constituencies differs, there will be political parties with asymmetric viability.

However, does asymmetric viability lead to the emergence of contamination effects? According to the Duvergerian logic, political parties with asymmetric viability should reach agreements with a viable party to strategically withdraw from competition. Consistent with this reasoning, Cox (1997: 198) stated that entering a multiplicity of districts would be no more than a "bargaining game in which concessions in one district lead not to dispreferred equilibrium (...) but to gains in another district". Coupled with this argument, asymmetric viability should not lead to contamination effects but rather, it should promote coordination among political parties.

However, empirical evidence challenges this theory. Political parties that are viable in just a few districts from one arena of competition have predominantly been shown to run candidacies in the remaining districts of the arena. Rarely do political parties join coalitions or strategically withdraw from competition in order to become viable or in order to let a less preferred party to gain a seat. Hence, variation in DM leads to asymmetric viability, which eventually brings about contamination effects. The mechanism is straightforward; the viability of the party in a more permissive arena encourages this party to compete in the less permissive arena so that the entry decision becomes a function "of the

links between district and calculus that go beyond local considerations" (Lago 2009: 21).

There are some specific institutional designs that may enhance the incentives that those political parties with asymmetric viability face in order to run for elections alone in the non-viable districts. This is the case of those countries where the electoral system establishes a nationwide or region-wide electoral threshold that has to be surpassed in order to be eligible for the allocation of seats in each district. This threshold may encourage political parties to compete everywhere alone instead of reaching agreements in certain districts. In a similar way, the funds provided by the State may also encourage political parties to compete when the requirements to have access to public funding are made available only after a certain share of nationwide votes is obtained.

3.1.2. Upper Tier in Mixed-Member Systems

Mixed-member electoral systems (MMS) use a combination of proportional representation and plurality or majority rule for the election of a single body with two or more tiers. In the list tier (also known as the upper tier) a PR system is used whereas the nominal tier (the lower tier) is elected by plurality or majority rule. Nowadays there are less than 30 countries in the world were a MMS is used.

The use of two different electoral rules to elect a single body, enables the emergence of political parties with asymmetric viability. The number of viable parties at the list (upper) and more permissive tier is higher than the number of viable parties in the nominal (lower) tier. Hence, political parties competing in MMS would generally be

considered to adapt their strategic behaviour to the constraints of the system at each tier. A multipartidist competition would be expected in the upper tier in contrast to a bipartidist competition in the lower one.

However, do viable parties in the list tier join a coalition or withdraw from competition in the nominal tier, in line with what the Duvergerian theories predict? According to most scholars this is not the case. Viable parties at the most permissive tier have been shown to take advantage of their viability to present candidacies in the nominal tier when non-viable (Cox and Schoppa 2002), thus showing evidence in favour of contamination effects. Eventually, MMS have been shown to provide outcomes that are in between majority and plurality rule; more fragmented than expected in the nominal tier and less fragmented in the list one (Massicotte and Blais 1999; Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001a; Cox and Schoppa 2002; Moser and Scheiner 2004; Nishikawa and Herron 2004; Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005).

Furthermore, scholars have also shown that by presenting candidacies in the SMD tier parties boost their performance in the PR tier (Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Cox and Schoppa 2002; Golosov 2003; Gschwend, Johnston, and Pattie 2003; Ferrara and Herron 2005). This is so because non-viable parties "may increase their visibility, advertise their platform, and costlessly exploit the boost that contamination effects are likely to give to their PR performance" (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005: 20).[18]

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[18] Some scholars have pointed that the overlap of electoral arenas does not necessarily lead to electoral contamination in certain countries. This has been shown to occur in

There are five different institutional designs, related to MMS, that are said to foster or discourage a political party's decision from coordinating at the nominal tier, and which eventually determine the emergence of contamination effects or not.

First, the *percentage of seats elected through PR* is the most relevant factor in determining coordination among parties. As the percentage of seats elected in PR increases, party elites face more incentives to run for elections alone in the nominal tier (Kostadinova 2002; Moser and Scheiner 2004; Ferrara and Herron 2005). When most of the seats in MMS are elected through majority/plurality (e.g. South Korea, 85%) the percentage of seats elected through PR is "too small to offset the disproportionality that the majoritarian elections are likely to yield" (Ferrara and Herron 2005: 21). In these cases, forming broad, pre-electoral alliances not only help non-viable parties to become viable, but also help large parties to increase their chances to command a legislative majority. Yet, when most of the seats are elected in the list tier (e.g. in Ecuador, where 90% of the seats are elected through PR) incentives to coordinate in the nominal tier are lower. For a political party with asymmetric viability, the marginal benefit of becoming viable in the nominal tier becomes irrelevant, given that the importance of this tier in the overall assembly, is low. Therefore, as the percentage of seats elected in the list tier increases, the higher will be the electoral contamination to the nominal tier.

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the Italian Senate elections from 1994 to 2001 (Cox and Schoppa 2002); in the Italian Congress elections (Ferrara 2004); in Russia (Herron 2002); in Armenia, Ukraine and, again, Russia (Moser and Scheiner 2004); and in South Korea (Maeda 2008).

Second, the *number of ballots cast* is also a relevant determinant of the degree of coordination. MMS can be divided into two broad categories. In dual-ballot MMS, voters are allowed to cast two votes, one for the nominal tier and the other for the list tier. This design enables voters to split their vote between different parties in each tier. In juxtaposition, in single-ballot MMS, voters are only allowed to cast a 'nonexclusive vote' (Cox 1997: 41) which simultaneously elects the list and the nominal tier.

Coordination has been shown to be more likely to occur in dual-ballot MMS than in single-ballot MMS (Ferrara and Herron 2005; Ferrara 2006), where electoral contamination from the list tier to the nominal one will be higher. According to Ferrara and Herron (2005) the logic behind this argument is threefold. First, when the vote for a SMD list is the same as the vote for the PR list, parties do not face incentives to coalesce, especially if they want to maximise the number of PR seats they receive. Second, when the vote is the same in both tiers, voters would not consider it wasteful, to cast the ballot for a viable party in the PR list, even if the party is non-viable at the SMD tier. Third, in single-ballot MMS, parties can only maintain a separate identity by running their own candidate –in contrast to dual-ballot MMS, where parties can more easily preserve their independence by running autonomous PR lists (Katz 2001: 117; Ferrara and Herron 2005: 19). Hence, higher degrees of contamination effects will be found in single-ballot MMS than in dual-ballot MMS.

Third, the *type of electoral system* also determines the possibilities to coalesce or not. MMS can be distinguished between 'mixed-member proportional' (MMP) and 'mixed-member majoritarian' (MMM)

48

depending on the presence (in MMP) or absence (in MMM) of a seat linkage between tiers (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001b: 13).[19] In MMM, there is no compensatory mechanism that will guarantee the vote share being proportional to the seat share. This context encourages non-viable parties in the nominal tier to join pre-electoral coalitions to become viable (Moser 2001; Moser and Scheiner 2004; Ferrara and Herron 2005), in line with what the Duvergerian theories predict. Conversely, in MMP, seat linkage discourages coordination. Even for those parties that have no hope of winning a seat in the nominal tier, coordination in MMP is not a desirable alternative for the nominal tier since "the outcome is inconsequential for the maximization of their seat total" (Ferrara and Herron 2005: 20). Hence, MMP will more likely question the Duvergerian gravity.

Fourth, the *structure of the SMD tier* is also important in determining coordination. When the SMD tier is elected through plurality, political parties are encouraged to coalesce before elections in order to achieve a plurality of votes. Conversely, in nominal tiers elected through majority run-off, political parties have been shown to face fewer incentives to

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[19] There is some controversy among scholars on the classification of the type of MMS. In most cases Shugart and Wattemnberg's (2001b) 'MMM' correspond with the label 'independent' by Massicotte and Blais (1999) and 'compensatory' by Herron and Nishikawa (2001), whereas 'MMP' correspond to 'dependent' and 'noncompensatory' from the same respective authors. However, some particular MMS with vote linkage, but without seat linkage, are not understood as MMP, whereas Massicotte and Blais (1999) and Herron and Nishikawa (2001) understand them as dependent/noncompensatory MMS. For an extensive explanation about this classification and which empirical cases fit within each group see Shugart and Wattenberg (2001b).

coalesce (Ferrara and Herron 2005). In this latter case, party elites will more often decide to run for elections when non-viable, calling into question the Duvergerian gravity.

Finally, *district magnitude* at the PR tier, is also a modulating factor of party coordination. In single-member districts where the corresponding PR district magnitude is high, pre-electoral coordination has been shown to be lower than in single member districts where the corresponding PR district is low (Ferrara 2006). This is so because "high PR district magnitudes will encourage parties to run more SMD candidates in the hope that the PR vote bonus they receive by placing autonomous candidates in SMD races will translate into additional PR seats" (Ferrara and Herron 2005: 24). Therefore, as differences in permissiveness between the two arenas increase, the lower the probabilities of political parties joining pre-electoral coalitions, and consequently, the higher the possibilities of having electoral contamination.

To sum up, MMS have been said to generate situations of asymmetric viability, so that political parties usually have to decide whether or not, to enter alone in the most restrictive of the tiers, the SMD tier. MMS will tend to encourage political parties to compete alone in the nominal tier rather than coordinate, although there are many institutional features related to MMS that are able to modify the incentives that parties face to compete alone when non-viable.

3.2. Supply-Side: Vertical Contamination

3.2.1. The Presidential Arena

Up to sixty countries in the world –around 30% of the nations– have a presidential or a semi-presidential regime (Golder 2005). In most of these countries, the figure of the president is elected through a nominal district, where the district is the entire nation (Rae 1967; Shugart and Carey 1992: 21), whereas the legislative arena is most times elected through multimember districts.[20] This incongruence in the electoral rules enables the emergence of political parties with asymmetric viability, since higher numbers of parties are expected to be viable in the more permissive legislative arena than in the presidential one.

In MMS, it has been shown that the nominal tier, the one that is believed to be contaminated, has a less fragmented party system than the list tier, the one that is contaminating. However, in the case of contamination from presidential elections, the situation is the other way round. The number of presidential candidates is usually smaller than the number of parties in the legislative arena (Lijphart 1994; Golder 2006: 36). As a consequence, contamination from the presidential to the legislative arena cannot bring about more fragmentation in the legislative elections, but the overlap of both arenas can only be hypothesised to lead to a reduction in the number of parties presenting candidacies in the legislative arena.

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[20] Switzerland and formerly Uruguay are exceptions, as the election procedure to elect the president takes a proportional character (Cox 1997: 190).

Indeed, the literature on party fragmentation has largely confirmed this hypothesis. Given that the presidency is generally understood as the most important prize in a polity (Mozaffar, Scaritt, and Galaich 2003: 381; Clark and Golder 2006: 695; Golder 2006: 35), the lower number of parties competing in the presidential arena has lead scholars to argue that presidential elections will encourage parties to form pre-electoral coalitions in legislative arenas (Lobo 2001; Freire 2006; Harbers 2010: 615).

However, the mere presence of a presidential arena is not able to explain this decrease in the number of parties competing at the legislative arena. Instead, the literature has signalled the proximity between the presidential and the legislative elections as the driving factor explaining electoral coordination (Shugart and Carey 1992; Jones 1993; Shugart 1995; Cox 1997; Jones 1997; Mozaffar, Scaritt, and Galaich 2003; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Golder 2006). When the two elections are proximate in time, the higher will be the influence of the presidential arena to the legislative one. Conversely, the further apart both elections are, the more able will be the two arenas to maintain independent party systems, since neither elites nor voters' behaviour will be influenced by the proximity of the two elections.

This proposition, though, is done under the assumption of a small number of presidential candidates. The majority of presidential elections have less fragmented party systems than their counterparts in legislative elections. But, what happens when the number of presidential candidates is high? Should we expect an increase in the number of legislative parties competing?

According to Hicken and Stoll (2011: 25) this is certainly the case. Whereas "presidential elections with few candidates were more consistently found to induce better cross-district coordination (...) presidential elections with many presidential candidates were found to undermine the incentives to cooperate across districts".

However, most of the scholarly work in this area has indicated that the impact of both effects is conditional rather than constitutive (2000; Clark and Golder 2006; Golder 2006; Hicken and Stoll 2011). The magnitude of the timing of the elections depends on the degree of fractionalization of presidential elections. Temporary proximate presidential and legislative elections, where the number of presidential candidates is low, will lead to a decrease in the number of parties competing in the legislative arena, mainly by fostering coordination between parties. This is known as the 'deflationary effect' of presidential elections (Hicken and Stoll 2011). In contrast, when the number of presidential candidates becomes large enough, proximate presidential elections will have an inflationary effect on the number of parties competing at the legislative arena (Golder 2006; Hicken 2009), that is known as the 'inflationary effect' of presidential elections (Hicken and Stoll 2011). In addition, when presidential elections are held in the mid-term of two legislative elections, the impact of the fractionalisation of the presidential arena will be negligible.0

Hitherto, the proximity of the presidential elections, together with the number of presidential candidates has been shown to be the most relevant variables explaining coordination in legislative arenas. There are though, some new explicative factors, which can also explain the

emergence of contamination effects from presidential to national legislative elections.

First, Hicken and Stoll (2011) have recently linked the interactive effect of the proximity of the presidential elections and the number of presidential candidates with the permissiveness of the electoral system in the legislative arena. These authors have shown in a cross-national study, that a large number of presidential candidates will be able to increase the number of parties at the legislative arena, in temporary proximate elections *only* when the electoral system in this later arena is permissive enough. Conversely, when the electoral system in the legislative arena is not permissive enough (i.e. SMD plurality rule), a high number of presidential candidates in temporary proximate presidential elections will not lead to an increase in the number of competitors at the legislative arena, since the electoral system in this arena acts as a ceiling.

Second, the prize of the presidential arena, in comparison with the legislative one, may also be a relevant factor in explaining the intensity of contamination effects from the presidential to the legislative arena. Although Cox (1997) devised the hypothesis that contamination from the presidential to the legislative election was conditional on the power of the presidential arena, this proposition has only recently been tested. Hicken and Stoll (2013) have shown that when the presidency is from moderately powerful to powerful, proximate elections with few presidential candidates will promote the deflationary effect of the legislative elections, but when the presidential arena is very powerful, this deflationary effect disappears. Furthermore the authors have shown that when the number of presidential candidates is high, temporary

proximate elections will lead to inflation in the number of legislative parties only when the presidency is extremely powerful.

To sum up, it is expected that the interaction of the presidential and the legislative arenas will only lead to an inflation in the number of parties competing at the legislative arena, when the number of presidential candidates is enough high. In the more regular situation of having fewer parties in the presidential arena than in the legislative one, a decrease in the number of parties competing is expected.

3.2.2. The Upper Chamber in Bicameral Legislatures

"Bicameral legislatures are those whose deliberations involve two distinct assemblies" (Tsebelis and Money 1997: 15). Around one-third of the countries in the word have bicameral legislatures, although only 23 of them have a directly elected upper chamber. Lower houses in bicameralist countries are normally designed to represent the population of the country, whereas the upper houses are conceived to represent the territories (ibid.: 48-53).

Given the territorial character of upper chambers, they usually have more restrictive electoral systems and elect fewer seats than in lower chambers. This incongruence in the electoral system, between both chambers, creates the possibility for the existence of asymmetric viability. Similarly to what occurs in the case of contamination from the presidential arenas, lower numbers of parties are expected in the upper chamber than in the lower one. However, are upper chambers able to enhance coordination in the lower chamber, as presidential elections do?

Cox (1997: 21) hypothesised that incongruence of the electoral system between both chambers should lead to contamination effects from the lower chamber to the upper one and vice versa: "One would hardly expect that the party system for house and senate elections would fully adapt to their respective electoral systems, in splendid isolation from one another. If a party can run and elect candidates under the more permissive system, it may decide to run candidates in the other system as well –not to win seats, perhaps, but to keep its electoral organization in good trim, to establish its blackmail potential, or for other reasons. In this case, the party system in each chamber should be influenced by that of the other, in such a way as to lessen observed differences." However, the author did not find enough empirical evidence for this hypothesis, but rather he realised that different electoral systems produced different party systems, thus confirming the Duvergerian predictions (Cox 1997: Chapter 2).

Some years later, Lago and Martínez (2007) provided evidence for the Spanish case, of the existence of contamination from the lower chamber to the upper chamber but not the other way round. This conclusion is in line with what would be expected from the theoretical point of view. The lower chamber, since it is usually the biggest prize, can contaminate the upper chamber; however, the upper chamber can rarely contaminate the lower one. This is so, because the upper chamber is, in most cases, at the same time more restrictive and less important than the lower chamber. In the case of contamination from the presidential to legislative elections, the presidential arena is not only the least permissive of the two chambers, but also the biggest prize. This latter feature enables the appearance of contamination from the presidential to the legislative chamber. However, since elections for

56

the upper chamber are both less permissive and less important than the ones for the lower chamber, a reduction in the number of parties competing, such as the one that has been hypothesised between the presidential and the legislative elections, is very unlikely to occur.

Overall, neither theoretical expectations nor the empirical evidence suggest the existence of any kind of contamination effects from the upper to the lower chamber in bicameral legislatures. Conversely, there is some evidence of contamination effects from the lower to the upper chamber and, specifically, there are strong theoretical arguments to expect such a phenomenon to occur. Nonetheless, this question falls beyond the scope of the present research, which is focused on contamination to lower chambers of representation.

3.2.3. Regional Arenas

Until now, I have only assessed the case of contamination effects between elections categorised as 'first-order' (Reif and Schmitt 1980). However, contamination effects are not restricted to presidential regimes, bicameral legislatures, MMS or from within the arena, but "they are also inherent to multi-level governance" (Hooghe and Marks 2001: XI).[21] In this section, I address the phenomenon of contamination effects when it involves, at least one, second-order election. All over the world, there are many different second-order elections that may cast a shadow on the legislative elections. This could be the case of the European elections, gubernatorial elections, local elections, and many others. However, since they are all believed to follow the same pattern of behaviour, heretofore, I focus the attention on the particular case of

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[21] Second-order elections are commonly understood as multi-level.

contamination from the regional to the national elections, which is the one that has received most attention in the literature.

Similar to what has been stressed in the previous sections, asymmetric viability will emerge when the electoral laws governing national and regional elections are substantially different. Given that in most countries in the world, regional electoral systems are more permissive than national ones (see Nagel and Pallarés (2007) for evidence from the EU), the overlap of regional arenas with national arenas will, very frequently, lead to the emergence of asymmetric viability.

Then, if parties decide to present candidacies in the national arena when non-viable, taking advantage of their viability in the regional arena, contamination effects arise. The arguments put forward by some scholars indicate that this situation of asymmetric viability is best resolved by competing alone. Evidence has been provided about the occurrence of this phenomenon in some countries. In Brazil, Samuels (2000: 2) asserted that "federalism generates incentives for legislators to pay close attention to state-based issues and scant attention to national partisan issues", thus making coordination between parties more difficult at the national level. Also, in South Korea, district-level partisan characteristics in sub-national elections have been shown to influence the degree of electoral multipartism in national legislative elections (Park 2003). As Gerring (2005) summarised: "[I]f a party can institutionalize itself in a state or province it has a much better chance of mustering the organization, resources and popular profile necessary to win seats nationally".

The causal mechanism explaining this inflation in the number of parties competing in the national arena is regional political decentralisation (Brancati 2008).[22] When regional arenas hold large numbers of powers, political parties that are viable in these arenas, will be more likely to consolidate their power and create a potent organisational structure, which may become useful to confront the national legislative elections. Therefore, the higher the power of the regional arena, the higher the likelihood of this arena to cast a shadow over the national one. This is so "even when controlling for the effect of regional cleavages and various political institutions" (Brancati 2008: 158).[23]

Ultimately, it is expected that in the more usual context where regional elections are more permissive than national ones, an increase in political decentralisation will yield a decrease in coordination at the national arena, thus enhancing contamination effects.

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[22] Chhibber and Kollman (2004) first hypothesized that fiscal decentralisation was the driving mechanism accounting for coordination in the national chamber. However Brancati (2008) revisited the theory by arguing that political decentralisation was the fundamental explaining factor.

[23] Jones (1997) questions this conclusion for the particular case of Argentina. The author showed that gubernatorial elections held in concurrence with the national elections led to a decrease in the number of parties competing. However, given that in Argentina gubernatorial elections are held under a more restrictive electoral system than national ones, the conclusion does not challenge the argumentations put forward above, but it only calls into question the assumption that regional elections are always more permissive than the national ones.

3.3. Demand-Side: Ethnolinguistic Contamination

Asymmetric viability may also arise from the *demand-side* of political parties. As has been argued in section 2.3.1 the presence in some part of the country of a regional cleavage may configure a different party system in this zone unlike the one in the rest of the country. In this case, the mechanism that activates asymmetric viability is no longer the presence of incongruent electoral systems. Conversely, it is the presence of a regional cleavage –mainly an ethnolinguistic one– concentrated in a certain territory, which makes it possible for parties that are viable in most constituencies of the country, to turn out to be non-viable in this ethnolinguistically different territory.[24]

However, asymmetric viability does not unavoidably lead to contamination effects. This only occurs when this party viable in most parts of the country decides to present candidacies in the ethnically-differentiated districts where it is non-viable. Gaines (1999: 854) summarised the logic that stems from political parties competing when non-viable due to the existence of a regionalised cleavage in the following manner: "The mere existence of candidates from several parties could follow from (a) small, regional-issue parties being popular and (b) larger, national parties fielding full slates of candidates throughout the country, without regard to local prospects".

The literature has shown that the presence of a regional ethnolinguistic cleavage will more likely lead to the emergence of contamination

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[24] It is worth mentioning that if this cleavage is homogenously distributed across the country, asymmetric viability from the demand-side of parties is not expected to emerge.

effects, rather than to coordination. Hicken and Stoll (2011) and Cox and Knoll (2003) have stated that high levels of ethnic heterogeneity decrease the incentives that political parties face for cross-district coordination. Furthermore, a large body of literature has also provided evidence of the fact that the presence of a regional cleavage has a positive impact on party fragmentation (Kim and Ohn 1992; Jones 1994; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Cox 1997; Neto and Cox 1997; Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 1999; Mozaffar, Scaritt, and Galaich 2003), something which can only take place when parties fail to anticipate the incentives that each local arena provides to compete.

Overall, it is expected that the stronger the regional cleavage the more likely it will be that political parties fail to coordinate or to withdraw from competition when non-viable, thus calling into question the Duvergerian theories.

3.4. Concluding Remarks

The phenomenon of asymmetric viability can emerge either from the *supply-side* or from the *demand-side* of political parties. Through an in-depth analysis of the literature, this chapter has addressed the different contexts which can lead to the emergence of political parties with asymmetric viability in the legislative arena, and whether these lead to contamination effects or not.

I have identified five different cases where asymmetric viability can emerge from the supply-side of parties.

First, from districts within the same arena, I have argued that the higher the incongruence between the two arenas, the higher will be the

likelihood that parties take advantage of their viability in the more permissive arena to enter into competition where they are non-viable, thus leading to contamination effects.

Second, from the list to the nominal tier in MMS, the literature has largely reported that political parties take advantage of their viability in the upper tier to present candidacies in the lower tier, where they are non-viable, which is also evidence in favour of contamination effects. Furthermore, there are some institutional designs intrinsic to MMS that have been shown to enhance contamination in the nominal tier: a high number of seats elected in the list tier, single-ballot MMS, mixed-member proportional electoral systems, nominal tiers elected in run-off system and a high district magnitude in the list tier.

Third, presidential elections also lead to a context of asymmetric viability. When the number of presidential candidates is lower than the number of parties in the legislative arena, concurrent presidential and legislative elections will yield a decrease in the number of parties in this latter arena. Conversely, when the number of presidential candidates is higher than the number of parties in the legislative arena, concurrent elections will preclude an increase in the number of parties in the national chamber, thus increasing contamination effects. When both elections are held the furthest apart, no contamination effects are expected.

Fourth, asymmetric viability also emerges between the upper and lower chambers in bicameral legislatures. However, given that upper chambers are at the same time less permissive and less powerful than lower chambers, no contamination is expected.

Fifth, political parties have been shown to take advantage of the more permissive character of regional arenas to present candidacies in the national arena even if non-viable. In particular, the higher the powers held by regional chambers, the higher will be the contamination from the regional to the national arena.

Finally, asymmetric viability may also come from the demand-side of parties. The presence of a regionalised cleavage displaces viable parties in most parts of the country, to a situation of non-viability in the region with ethnolinguistic specificities. Since these parties mostly continue competing, even if non-viable, coordination fails and thus contamination effects appear.

In sum, I conclude that the existence of asymmetric viability will lead to more parties competing than the ones that the Duvergerian theories predict. This contamination of the national legislative arena is evident from the revision of the literature in three cases: from the list to the nominal tier in MMS; from regional arenas; and in the presence of a regional cleavage. For what concerns contamination from the districts within the same arena, the literature has not yet addressed this issue, although it is theoretically expected that it will have a positive impact on the number of parties competing; and from the presidential arena, this relation has been said to be conditional on the existence of concurrent elections and given a high number of presidential candidates. Finally, no theoretical arguments can be presented to argue that asymmetric viability can lead to contamination effects from the upper to the lower chamber in bicameral legislatures.

Both institutional and sociological factors have been shown to be able to account for party entrance when non-viable. In the following chapters, I change the perspective of analysis by focusing on the organisational opportunities that the overlap of electoral arenas generates for political parties to compete alone when they are non-viable.

CHAPTER 4.
CONTAMINATION EFFECTS: THE ORGANISATIONAL INCENTIVES TO COMPETE

In the two previous chapters, I have shown that the overlap of electoral arenas generates deviations in the Duvergerian equilibrium. Parties' entry decisions are not only taken according to the chances of obtaining representation at the district level but rather they are influenced by the overlap of arenas. In particular, political parties have been shown to present candidacies when non-viable, taking advantage of their viability in other arenas.

In this chapter, I assess the organisational incentives that lead non-viable parties to present candidacies alone when they are non-viable. The literature lacks a comprehensive and systematic study of the opportunities that political parties face to compete alone rather than joining a coalition or withdrawing from competition. This theory should be able to transcend the particularistic features that are idiosyncratic to each country and to create an encompassing theory of the phenomenon.

This is the purpose of this chapter. In it, I argue that the overlap of arenas generates two fundamental organisational opportunities that encourage parties to modify their expected strategic entry decisions. First, the superposition of arenas is able to generate political externalities, which may appear in three crucial dimensions that intervene in the development of electoral campaigns, namely, in regard to (a) the image that the party projects to voters; (b) the relations of the party central elites with their local organisations and members; and (c)

the defence of the party's platform. Second, the superposition of arenas also generates decreasing costs of competing for parties, as the number of constituencies where they present candidacies increases.

Section 4.1 and 4.2 respectively deal with the political externalities to compete and the decreasing costs of competing; Section 4.3 formalises the decision to enter, in the contexts of overlapped arenas, and Section 4.4 briefly summarises the main arguments of the chapter.

4.1. The Emergence of Externalities

Riker and Ordeshook (1968), from a rational choice perspective, argued that the decision to vote depends on the fact that the personal benefits of voting exceed the personal costs:

$$R > pB - C \qquad (4.1)$$

Where the benefit R of voting is a function of the probability p of influencing the outcome, the benefit B to the voter of doing so and the cost C of voting. In this function, since any voter in mass elections is never pivotal (so that $p \approx 0$) the benefit R of voting is always smaller than 0 (R < 0).[25] As a consequence, from an instrumental perspective, no one would be expected to vote (see also Downs 1957: 36-50 and 260-276).

However, most of the literature has solved this contradiction between the theory and the empirical evidence, by arguing that the voting

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[25] The literature has shown that even in the rare event that the electorate is small enough to allow voters to become pivotal, most of the voters are unaware of the fact that they can become so (Farber 2010).

calculus must be amended by the inclusion of *D*, a sense of the citizen's duty (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Brennan and Buchanan 1984; Blais 2000; Campbell 2006; Blais and Achen 2010), which explains why voters go to the polls even when they know that the impact of their vote will be completely marginal.[26]

In a similar manner to how 'citizen's duty' is useful in explaining why, in non-pivotal contexts, people decide to cast their ballot, I also argue that the overlap of different electoral arenas generates *political externalities* that modify parties' entry decisions in contexts of non-viability.

The concept of externality is well established, being first coined in 1890 by Alfred Marshall.[27] Externalities had largely been considered as a negative phenomenon until the mid-1970's, when James Meade (1973: 15) asserted that an "external economy (diseconomy) is an event which confers an appreciable benefit (inflicts an appreciable damage) on some person or persons who were not fully consenting parties in reaching the decision or decisions which led directly to the event in question". Today, an externality is understood as a side effect arising from the production or consumption of a certain good or service, which affects another's utility "without being fully or directly reflected by market prices" (Merlo and Croitoru 2005). In economic terms, externalities are believed to generate market failures when the price

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[26] Some alternative explanations have also been provided: Hardin (1982) argued that voting was expressive or moral in nature, and Wilson (1974) related it with a sense of belonging to some place (state, region, etc.).

[27] For a revision of the meanings attributed to the concept over time see Bator (1958), Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962) and Baumol and Oates (1975).

mechanism does not reflect the social costs (in case of negative externalities) and benefits (positive externalities) that the production or consumption of a certain product entails; that is, when the activities of an individual result in costs or benefits the producer is unable to internalise or enjoy (Harrison 1995: 45).

The concept of externality has not been widely used in the field of political science.[28] Nonetheless, I argue that the overlap of electoral arenas generates political consequences that cannot be internalised by each party at the local arena, but rather they will be internalised by another political actor, namely, the party in another arena of competition where it is viable.

In particular, my argument is that when political parties are asymmetrically viable, the decision to compete in those arenas where the party is non-viable generates *positive political externalities*. These externalities will not be internalised by the local party, but rather by the homonym party at another arena of competition where it is viable. Conversely, the Duvergerian decision to withdraw from competition or to join a coalition when non-viable, yields some *negative political externalities*. Again, these negative externalities will be internalised by the homonym party competing in another arena.

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[28] Only a few studies in political science have already used the term. Jankowski (1988) studied how political parties could play a role in internalising the emergence of negative economical externalities; Klibanoff and Morduch (1995) analysed how voluntary coordination in decentralised systems can yield to efficient outcomes regarding the internalisation of externalities; and Schuessler (2000a) analysed the externalities associated to expressive voting.

Hence, the overlap of electoral arenas generates different opportunities for political parties. On the one hand, when non-viable parties decide to compete alone, *positive political externalities* (E_p) will arise. The utility function of a party that decided to compete alone when non-viable in a Duvergerian context (U_{Duv}) was said to be determined by the expected benefits of competing alone (p_aB) minus the direct costs of competing. However, when the arenas are overlapped ($U_{\overline{Duv}}$) positive political externalities (E_p) appear:[29]

$$U_{Duv} = p_aB - D \xrightarrow{overlap} U_{\overline{Duv}} = p_aB + \boldsymbol{E_p} - D \qquad (4.2)$$

On the other hand, the Duvergerian-based decision to coalesce with another party when non-viable is considered to generate *negative political externalities* (E_n), which are not internalised by the non-viable party at the local level but rather by its homonym party in other arena where it is viable. The utility function of the party in a Duvergerian context (U_{Duv}) was said to be determined by the expected benefits of coalescing (p_aB) minus the direct costs of competing (D) and the costs of coalescing (C). The superposition of arenas adds to this function negative political externalities (E_n) associated to the decision to join a coalition:

$$U_{Duv} = p_cB - (D + C) \xrightarrow{overlap} U_{\overline{Duv}} = p_cB - (\boldsymbol{E_n} + D + C) \quad (4.3)$$

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[29] In the equations that follow, characters in bold show the change between the utility function in a Duvergerian context (U_{Duv}) and the one with overlapped arenas, where the Duvergerian gravity is called into question ($U_{\overline{Duv}}$).

Similarly, when non-viable political parties decide to stay out from competition, *negative political externalities* (E_n) also emerge, which are not internalised by the non-viable party at the local level:

$$U_{Duv} = 0 \xrightarrow{overlap} U_{\overline{Duv}} = -\boldsymbol{E_n} \qquad (4.4)$$

Therefore, the decision to (not) enter into competition alone when non-viable generates positive (negative) political externalities to compete. In what follows, I argue that these externalities appear in three fundamental dimensions that intervene in the development of electoral campaigns. First, externalities may arise from the image the party projects to the citizenry. Second, externalities can also be related to the party organisation. Finally, externalities may also arise from the benefits the party obtains from defending and promoting its party platform.

In the next subsections I delve into each of these groups of externalities that party strategic decisions may lead to. In each case, I first deal with the positive political externalities that arise when political parties decide to compete alone, and later on, with the negative political externalities that emerge when parties decide to coalesce or stay out of competition. There are several hypotheses that are derived from this.

4.1.1. Image of the Party

Political campaigns are increasingly more market-oriented. The image of the party and, in particular, the image that its leader projects to the public has become a crucial element when designing electoral campaigns. Parties are concerned about providing the best possible brand image (Smith 2001; Reeves, de Chernatony, and Carrigan 2006)

and to do so, they increasingly rely on capital-intensive activities such as commercials, advertisements and opinion polls, especially during electoral campaigns (Bowler and Farrell 1992; Butler and Ranney 1992; Norris 2000; Ward 2003). The use of marketing techniques has, therefore, become very relevant in modern campaigns, as evidenced by the increasing use of public relations consultants and agencies (Scammell 1999: 720).

With regard to voters, political campaigns have also evolved. In this case, the local constituency is no longer the only source where individuals glean information about political parties and policies. Alternatively, a more global and intercommunicated market of information provides political information to the citizenry (Denver et al. 2003).

There are several mechanisms that may explain why the image the party projects may entail positive political externalities for parties that decide to enter into competition alone.

First, political parties may obtain positive political externalities from competing alone due to the possibility of increasing their visibility (Gaines 1999: 853). One of the party's main objectives in modern campaigns is to achieve a favourable image for the candidate or the party (Kavanagh 1995). By fielding a full slate of candidates, political parties will be able to show themselves as being serious organisations (Scammell 1999: 729), strong and committed to the country, to a region or to an ideological perspective. When voters see a party presenting candidacies everywhere, irrespective of its chances of becoming viable, they will form a positive idea of the party. This may eventually entail a

boost in the electoral performance of the party in those arenas where it is viable.

As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, scholars have empirically demonstrated that, in MMS, presenting candidacies at the more restrictive nominal tier enables an improvement in the electoral results in the list tier due to an increase in the party's visibility. The mechanism is quite straightforward: As long as voters realise that the party fields candidacies in the two tiers, they will be more likely to vote the same party for the two bodies. In contrast, if the party only stands for elections at the more permissive tier, the potential voter may get a more negative image of the party and before the possibility of splitting their vote, they may end up casting the ballot for a party which runs in the two tiers.

H1.1. Political parties running for elections alone will obtain positive political externalities from competing due to an increase in the visibility of the party.

Second, political parties may also present candidacies when non-viable in order to be able to run across arenas under the same label. Parties are highly concerned about maintaining a strong party label (Pekkanen, Byblade, and Krauss 2006: 182-83). Party labels are much more than just a name: they identify an ideology, a manner to confront problems – they are the reflexes of its history. Overall, party labels provide a valuable 'brand name' so that any of the members of the party will be interested to run under the same brand. As a consequence, party elites across arenas will prefer to stand for elections under a common party label, thus taking advantage of the reputation intrinsic to the party.

In addition, maintaining the party label is also a useful informational shortcut for voters. According to the literature on heuristics the decision to vote does not depend on either the existence of an organised belief or on factual knowledge; indeed, citizens are able to compensate for this absence by relying on heuristics (Kuklinski and Quirk 2001: 194), making the party label, together with political identification, the most important factors.[30] Hence, the party label is strongly effective for voters in providing cognitive shortcuts that allow them to compensate for their absence of factual knowledge (Campbell et al. 1960; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Rahn 1993).

H1.2. Political parties running for elections alone will obtain positive political externalities from competing by protecting and promoting the party label.

Conversely, staying out of competition or entering it through a coalition, can bring about the emergence of two different negative political externalities. First, especially when parties decide to withdraw from elections, but also when they join a coalition, they can suffer an important deterioration in their image. Beyond the specific pledges through which political parties contest elections, the overall perception of the party's character is what counts (Heath, Jowell, and Curtice 1985). In this sense, the Duvergerian decision to withdraw from competition when non-viable may bring about a loss of credibility of the party and a weakening of its image. Potential voters may consider that the party is no longer concerned with the defence of a certain set of

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[30] Heuristics are problem-solving strategies –often employed automatically or unconsciously– (Lau and Redlawsk 2001: 952) which serve to "keep the information processing demands of the task within bounds" (Abelson and Levi 1985: 255).

values and an ideology, but rather that the party is preoccupied only by maximising the electoral returns, regardless of its ideals. In this case, withdrawing from competition or joining a coalition may end up being even more costly than competing alone without the chances of obtaining representation.

H1.3. Political parties coalescing or withdrawing from competition when non-viable will obtain negative political externalities since this strategy may weaken the image of the party and entail a loss of credibility.

Also, the consideration of joining a coalition or withdrawing from competition in a certain arena(s) but not in others, may also generate confusion among voters. Scholars have shown how the confusion generated by party system fragmentation affects the levels of turnout (Blais, Massicotte, and Dobrzynska 1997; Gray and Caul 2000) and how confusion has an impact on mass involvement in elections (Wade, Groth, and Lavelle 1993). To my knowledge, there remains an unaddressed issue, namely the extent to which standing for elections under different labels or withdrawing from competition only in some districts, brings about confusion among potential voters.

The causal mechanism though is rather evident. Voters may be confused when the party runs under different labels and when it asymmetrically withdraws from competition, especially in current circumstances, where information available for electors transcends the borders of each district. Thus, confusion may deplete the electoral performance of the party in viable districts. As a consequence, political parties will prefer to run in all the arenas and to do so under the same label, in order to avoid the emergence of such negative political externalities.

76

H1.4. Political parties coalescing or withdrawing from competition when non-viable will obtain negative political externalities due to the generation of confusion among voters.

There are three different factors that can mould the emergence and the intensity of these political externalities related to the image of the party.

First, the concentration of several electoral districts in a territory with a high density of population, can determine the intensity of the political externalities to compete. In highly populated areas, if more than one district is elected, political parties will consider it more necessary to present candidacies everywhere. Especially in heavily populated areas in SMD electoral systems, the division into different districts does not distinguish between different regions, economies, languages, etc. but it only cuts across the territory into equally populated divisions. The population is included into one electoral district –although not necessarily where it works, where it has its social relations, etc. Hence, in heavily populated areas, parties will find it even more necessary to stand for election alone everywhere.

Second, the degree of institutionalisation of the party (Panebianco 1988) can also explain the emergence and the intensity of political externalities related to the image of the party. Among institutionalised parties with a long tradition of presenting candidacies everywhere (despite their viability), taking a decision, such as withdrawing from competition when non-viable, could entail an important break with the party's past tradition, which may bring about a severe deterioration of the image that the party projects to its voters. Conversely, for those parties –usually newer parties– that are not institutionally embedded, a lack of a tradition in presenting candidacies everywhere may prevent

77

the emergence of these negative political externalities, when the party decides not to stand for elections alone. Hence, institutionalised parties with a long tradition of standing for elections will find it more necessary to present candidacies everywhere.[31]

Finally, a third factor can also interact with the image of the party, thus increasing the intensity of political externalities; the political parties' 'core level of reference' (Deschouwer 2003: 216-17), that is, its preferred electoral arena of competition. It is expected that when political parties are competing at their preferred level of competition – or at the one where they usually perform better– they would be less likely to take certain decisions that can question the image of the party, since this could entail severe negative political externalities for it. Conversely, in secondary electoral arenas political parties may be less reluctant to modify their expected entry decision as long as its behaviour in this arena will be less monitored by potential voters.

4.1.2. Local Party Organisation

Political parties continue to play a central role in the governance of modern democracies (Whiteley 2011: 22). Despite this, in recent decades, scholars have largely documented a decline in party activism and grassroots party membership (Katz et al. 1992; Mair 1994; Whiteley and Seyd 1998; Scarrow 2000; Mair and van Biezen 2001; Cross and Young 2004; Dalton 2006). Party elites have steadily strengthened their power within the organisation by increasing the

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[31] It is noteworthy to mention that this intervening factor is not able to account for the initial moment, since it assumes that institutionalised parties already have a long tradition of running candidacies alone.

involvement of parties' central headquarters in planning and managing constituency campaigns (Fisher, Denver, and Hands 2006b) and by relying on outside professionals and party experts (Norris 2000; Carty 2004: 5). However, at the same time, "individual party members are winning increased decision-making power, especially on crucial personnel choices" (Carty 2004: 5; see also Hopkin 2001). This presents a new general portrait of political parties that are more leader-driven but internally democratic and which have to compete in an electoral market with less stable support bases (Carty 2004: 6). The increased predominance of a professional leadership is coupled with a "high degree of accountability to the lower strata in the party", thus reducing tensions between the two empowered groups (Koole 1994: 298-9).

Party entry decisions may lead to different externalities on the party's internal organisation. In particular, there are two possible positive political externalities that may arise due to a party's decision to enter into competition when non-viable.

On the one hand, by presenting candidacies when non-viable, the party is able to keep the organisation alive and active. The new portraits of political parties have led to a context where party members still continue being relevant assets, albeit for changing purposes (Scarrow 1994; Scarrow 2000; Fisher, Denver, and Hands 2006a). Scholars have largely reported the benefits of keeping strong and active local organisations and party activists.

The first and the most important of these benefits, is related to the opportunity that local organisations and activists bring to the party to be

closely connected with the preferences of the electorate (van Houten 2009: 141). Local organisations and activists perform as an "essential communication channel, as a link between the broad electorate and the party leadership" (Scarrow 1994: 49), and they bring new issues and demands to the party (Carmines and Layman 1997). Similarly, local organisations and activists have a positive impact in shaping the image the mass public has about the party's policy stances (Carmines and Layman 1997) and on providing inputs for the drafting of party platforms (Miller and Jennings 1986).

Second, local activists can also be regarded as a valuable source of labour for party efforts during election campaigns (Scarrow 1994: 48; Strøm and Müller 1999: 14-15). Whether viable or not, local organisations and party activists participate in local campaigns. This contributes to keeping the local structure of the party alive and active, which may eventually be useful for when the time comes to contest elections where the party is viable. This is actually what Christensen (1996) found regarding Japan. After studying the reasons that drove parties to compete alone when it was clear that party candidates did not stand a chance to win, he asserted that "the local party organization insisted on running its own candidate rather that throwing its support to an allied party. They wanted to keep the party organization alive for local elections and stem the decline of the local organization by running a campaign in national elections" (Christensen 1996: 320). Therefore, by presenting candidacies when non-viable the organisation collaborates in the maintenance of the organisation and prepares the party for those elections where it is viable.

H2.1. Political parties running for elections alone will obtain positive political externalities from competing due to the possibility of keeping the local organisation active.

On the other hand, when political parties decide presenting candidacies in arenas where they are non-viable, positive political externalities also emerge due to the possibility that parties have to test and recruit new candidates for the party. By presenting candidacies in arenas where non-viable, the party may manage to assess how certain candidates perform and eventually present them on electoral lists where viable. Indeed, electoral results have been said to be closely supervised by central party officials, as a criterion for allocating list positions in succeeding elections (Zittel and Gschwend 2008: 985).

Although most scholars have usually assumed that political parties will have no difficulty in recruiting members eager to be party candidates, there have been some exceptions. This is the case of Kitschelt (1989), which asserted that the Green parties in Belgium and West Germany wanted strong membership bases in order to find candidates for party or public offices. Similarly, in Spain, regional offices have been specifically used as platforms to gain experience and build political careers for politicians who eventually end up at the electoral list for the national elections (Morán 1996; Gangas 2000; Montero 2007).

H2.2. Political parties running for elections alone will obtain positive political externalities from competing due to the possibility of testing and promoting candidates for the party in other levels of competition.

Conversely, much related to H2.1 –although in this case in the opposite direction– not presenting candidacies alone may bring about negative

political externalities from the opposition that the party may face from local party activists.

A crucial goal for political parties is survival. By deserting competition in an arena where non-viable, the party may avoid incurring costs associated with competing. However, at the same time, the party could face the opposition of some organisation members (Blais and Indridason 2007: 196), which could affect the intraparty cohesion and harm the party's strength (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004: 192-94). Political parties will then try to avoid facing conflictive situations with local elites and activists, which could bring about serious negative consequences for the whole party.

Activists will probably be against the possibility of taking decisions that may enhance the performance of the party, if these call into question some of the principles of the organisation. As May (1973) suggested in his famous 'special law of curvilinear disparity', party activists will tend to be more ideological than both the leadership of the party and its voters. Hence, "unlike the professional politicians, these volunteer supporters would rather lose elections than compromise the purity of the party policy" (Scarrow 1994: 45). As a consequence, the decision not to enter into competition when non-viable, may entail severe negative political externalities for the party. In order to avoid such a conflictive situation from taking place, political parties will more likely decide to stand for elections alone, thus escaping the possibility of facing strong confrontation from local organisations or party activists.

H2.3. Political parties coalescing or withdrawing from competition when non-viable will obtain negative political externalities by facing confrontation within local organisations.

The role played by activists, especially during election time, could be a crucial intervening factor in explaining the emergence and the intensity of political externalities related to the party organisation. The change in the patterns of party organisation and electoral campaigns still assign to party activists some relevant roles within the organisation. However, the functions attributed to party activists diverge in different countries. In political systems where the figure of the candidate is very relevant and a proximate campaign is required, political parties will be more concerned about the satisfaction of their activists' demands. They are crucial –especially during election time– and thus, they will be more likely to avoid facing any controversy than in political systems where the role of party activists is less relevant. Hence, it is expected that when the role of activists is crucial for the party, it will avoid taking decisions that could upset party activists, such as staying out of competition or joining a pre-electoral coalition.

4.1.3. Party Platform

The Downsian theories (Downs 1957) have largely assumed that parties will adapt their platform in seeking votes and offices. However, some scholars have argued against the Downsian logic that voters' preferences are not only exogenous, but rather, these can also be moulded endogenously by the parties' own preferences (Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Iversen 1994; Kalyvas 1996). As a consequence, political parties do not necessarily need to adapt their ideology to the

voter's demands, but they may also influence voters' preferences by insisting on certain discourses.

Presenting candidacies when non-viable may bring about positive political externalities, since it allows the party to raise certain debates at the local arena that otherwise would not have been put forward. By standing for elections –whether viable or not– political parties will be able to raise citizens' awareness of certain issues during election time and shed light on debates that otherwise would have been obviated by viable parties. This is the case reported by Spoon (2009), who concluded that the Socialist and the Green Party in France did not coalesce for the 2007 legislative elections because the Green Party refused the agreement with a view to maintaining its ideological distinctiveness. Such behaviour may bring about positive political externalities since by increasing awareness about an issue, the party may also be potentially enhancing its performance in other arenas where it is viable.

Hitherto, the strategy of presenting candidacies as a means to raise certain policy debates has been considered as no more than an expressive decision (see, for instance, Sánchez-Cuenca 2004). However, in my view, the decision to present candidacies when non-viable has to be understood beyond this expressive component. Indeed, a non-viable party with asymmetric viability may choose to run for elections alone in the more restrictive arena, in order to keep a certain political debate active in other arenas where the party is viable or for when the time comes to contest other elections where the party expects to obtain representation. In this sense, presenting candidacies when non-viable can be conceived as a way of keeping a certain debate active

and to spread it across the country, something that transcends the expressive character of the explanations put forward to date.

H3. Political parties running for elections alone will obtain positive political externalities from competing due the possibility of raising citizens' awareness about an issue and to spread the debate across the country.

However, it is unlikely that all political parties will be concerned about the necessity to raise certain political discourses. The publication in 1966, of Kirchheimer's conceptualisation of 'catch-all parties' reflected the drastic reduction of political parties' ideological baggage, in favour of short-term tactical considerations and their attempts to appeal to new groups. These parties increasingly adapt their discourse in seeking, as their top priority, the maximisation of votes, and thus they may not be concerned about raising a certain political discourse, as the hypothesis defined above would suggest. Yet beyond catch-all parties, there are still many political parties which are concerned about their political discourse and which believe that by clearly defending its party platform, they may obtain substantial gains. These parties –'militant' (Roemer 2001) or 'dogmatic' (Sánchez-Cuenca 2004)– "derive utility not only from policy, but also from the defence and maintenance of certain ideological principles" (Sánchez-Cuenca 2004: 330). Hence, positive political externalities related to the party platform will only arise in political parties with a certain 'ideological rigidity' (Sánchez-Cuenca 2004: 330), that is, in parties where the execution of certain objectives would, to some extent, be constrained by some ideological principles.

Small parties, niche parties or single-issue parties are the most likely to be included within this category. For these parties' elites, for its

activists and for its voters, defending the ideological discourse of the party can be crucial. Renouncing it or adapting it to the particular necessities of an arena of competition, could subvert the essence of the party (Lago and Montero 2009: 180). Hence, it is expected that among these parties, the desire to run for elections alone will be explained by their wish to create awareness about their ideological discourse and spread it through the country.

4.2. The Decreasing Costs of Competing

The overlap of electoral arenas does not only generate political externalities but it also has an impact on the direct costs of competing when elections are concurrent. The costs of competing (D) are a function of the number of districts (d) where the party presents candidacies ($D(d)$). Both, when parties decide to run for elections alone, and when they decide to join a coalition, as the number of constituencies where the party presents candidacies increases, the unitary cost of running at each constituency becomes smaller.

For a political party i which presents a candidacy at district j and time t the cost of presenting candidacies increases as the number of districts where the party runs also increases ($D'_{ijt} > 0$). However, the marginal cost of presenting another candidate decreases as the number of districts where the party runs increases ($D''_{ijt} < 0$):

$$D(d) : D'_{ijt} > 0 \qquad\qquad (4.5)$$

$$D(d) : D''_{ijt} < 0 \qquad\qquad (4.6)$$

These decreasing costs of competing will appear both when political parties decide to compete alone:

$$U_{Duv} = p_a B - D \xrightarrow{overlap} U_{\overline{Duv}} = p_a B + E_p - \boldsymbol{D(d)} \qquad (4.7)$$

And when they decide to join a coalition:

$$U_{Duv} = p_c B - (D + C) \xrightarrow{overlap} U_{\overline{Duv}} = p_c B - (E_n + \boldsymbol{D(d)} + C) \quad (4.8)$$

Therefore, the overlap of electoral arenas generates economies of scale for political parties (Lago and Martínez 2007: 389-90; Brancati 2008: 139; Lago 2009: 8; Harbers 2010: 611). This makes both the decision to enter into competition when non-viable and the decision to join a coalition, more attractive strategies than those predicted by the Duvergerian theories.

This situation, though, may take place only when elections at different arenas are held concurrently. This occurs in two different contexts. First, when political parties compete in an electoral arena with more than one district; once the party has decided to present a candidacy in one of the districts where it is viable, the marginal cost of standing elections in the remaining districts becomes smaller. Second, in different elections held concurrently; once the party has decided to run for elections in one of the arenas of competition, the marginal cost of presenting candidacies in the other arena also becomes smaller.

The direct costs of competing, as shown in Section 2.2.2, can come from two main sources, namely the requirements to present candidacies and the money the party needs to devote to its promotion during the electoral campaign. In both cases, as the number of districts where the party stands for elections increase, the unitary costs of presenting candidacies decrease.

The first type of costs associated with competing were related to the requirements needed to present candidacies, either in terms of monetary costs or in terms of obtaining a certain number of signatures. Especially with regard to the necessity to gather a certain number of signatures, political parties will find it easier to collect them once the logistic infrastructure is created and once the party has the experience on how to deal better with such requirements.

Second, competing was also costly due to the financial resources required to launch and to promote the party candidature. As the party increases the number of districts where it runs, the infrastructure required to develop the electoral campaign will only see a slight increase. This is so since most of these expenses are fixed, and they hardly vary when the number of districts where the party runs increases (e.g. the party slogan, the image of the party). Similarly, with regard to the promotion of the party, as the number of constituencies where the party runs increases, the unitary cost to print banners, posters, sticks, etc. will decrease.

> *H4. The marginal cost of competing will become smaller as the number of constituencies where a party presents candidacies increases, thus encouraging parties to enter into competition alone or joining a coalition.*

The intensity of the decreasing costs of competing is believed to be determined by the incentives that each electoral system gives to cultivate a personal vote during the electoral campaign.[32] When campaigns are strongly focused on the candidate and the party has a

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[32] For a definition of personal vote and its relationship with the electoral system see Carey and Shugart (1995).

relatively weak role in publicising the candidature, local candidates can seldom take advantage of the existence of economies of scale. Campaigns are developed at the district level and the decreasing costs of competing will only come from those (few) actions, which are developed by the party centrally. This is more likely to occur in SMD electoral systems. On the contrary, when the figure of the candidate is weaker than the image of the whole party, it is expected that political parties will take especial advantage of the economies of scale. This will be more likely to occur in PR electoral systems. Hence, when electoral campaigns are focused particularly on the party –or on the national party leader– rather than on local candidates, the likelihood of facing decreasing costs of competing becomes more probable as the number of constituencies where the party presents candidacies increases.

All in all, it is worth mentioning that although the overlap of electoral arenas reduces the marginal costs of competing, these costs will always continue being higher than zero, thus becoming an important barrier for parties to compete (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005: 149). Hence, the cost of competing by itself will not be able to determine the entrance or not into competition when non-viable. It is rather the existence of the positive and negative political externalities outlined above that is able to drive political parties' entry decisions when non-viable in favour of competing alone.

4.3. The Final Decision to Enter in Overlapped Arenas

The overlap of arenas modifies the incentives that non-viable political parties face to compete in two crucial manners. First, when non-viable

political parties with asymmetric viability decide to compete alone, positive political externalities emerge; on the contrary, when parties decide to withdraw from competition or to join a coalition, negative political externalities arise. Second, when non-viable parties with asymmetric viability decide either to enter into competition alone or to join a coalition, the costs associated with competing follow a positive but decreasing trend as the number of constituencies where the party competes increases.

Equations 4.9 to 4.11 summarise the new utility functions of political parties' entry decisions in overlapped contexts.

$$Enter\ alone \qquad U_{\overline{Duv}} = p_a B + E_p - D(d) \qquad\qquad (4.9)$$

$$Coalition \qquad U_{\overline{Duv}} = p_c B - (E_n + D(d) + C) \qquad (4.10)$$

$$Withdraw \qquad U_{\overline{Duv}} = - E_n \qquad\qquad\qquad (4.11)$$

Accordingly, political parties will decide to compete alone when the utility function of this strategic decision (equation 4.9) is higher than the one obtained through joining a coalition (equation 4.10) or withdrawing from competition (equation 4.11):

$$p_a B + E_p - D(d) > max\ \{p_c B - (E_n + D(d) + C)\ ; -E_n\} \qquad (4.12)$$

Overall, does the decision to compete alone when non-viable ever become the dominant entry strategy due to the overlap of electoral arenas?

When confronting the decision to enter into competition alone (equation 4.9) and joining a coalition even if non-viable (equation 4.10) it can be observed that the overlap of arenas introduces some

modifications into the original function where the existence of independent arenas was assumed. In a Duvergerian context, political parties will run elections alone instead of joining a coalition, when the expected benefits of competing alone are greater than the expected benefits of coalescing minus the costs of joining a coalition:

$$p_a B > p_c B - C \qquad (4.13)$$

But the overlap of arenas adds two new elements to this function. First, there appear positive political externalities to compete alone (E_p); and second, joining a coalition entails the emergence of negative political externalities (E_n). Due to the fact that D, the direct costs of competing, decrease both when running alone and when joining a coalition, this does not bring about any net gain for either of the strategies and it can be dropped from the new function:

$$p_a B + E_p > p_c B - (E_n + C) \qquad (4.14)$$

The overlap of arenas, therefore, encourages the decision to run alone instead of joining a coalition, since in this new context, competing alone becomes cheaper (due to E_p) and joining a coalition more expensive (E_n).

For a party with asymmetric viability that has to decide whether to enter a district where non-viable, the expected benefits of competing alone are close to zero ($p_a \approx 0$). In this case, as equation 4.15 reflects, the decision to enter into competition depends on the magnitude of the positive political externalities compared to the difference between the expected benefit of joining a coalition and the sum of the negative

political externalities of joining a coalition and the costs associated with joining a coalition:

$$E_p > p_c B - (E_n + C) \tag{4.15}$$

Therefore, when non-viable parties with asymmetric viability are to choose whether to compete alone or to join a coalition, they will determine their strategic decision mainly on the basis of the magnitude of the positive political externalities to compete. This concept, then, becomes crucial in understanding political parties' strategic decisions in overlapped contexts.

Besides, when confronting the decision to enter into competition alone (equation 4.9) and withdrawing from competition when non-viable (equation 4.11) it can also be observed that the overlap of arenas introduces some modifications into the original function. Since, under the Duvergerian assumptions, no cost is associated with staying out of competition (see Equation 2.3), political parties in such a context are supposed to compete alone instead of withdrawing from competition when the expected benefits of running alone minus the direct costs of competing are larger than zero:

$$p_a B - D > 0 \tag{4.16}$$

However the overlap of arenas adds three new elements to the function: First, the costs of competing alone decrease as the number of districts where the party presents candidacies increases (D(d)); second, there appear new positive political externalities to compete alone (E_p); and finally, new negative political externalities associated with the decision to stay out from competition emerge (E_n):

$$p_a B - D(d) + E_p > -E_n \qquad (4.17)$$

Eventually, the overlap of arenas encourages political parties to run alone instead of withdrawing from competition, since in this new context competing alone becomes cheaper (due to E_p and to $D(d)$) and withdrawing from competition more expensive (E_n).

For a non-viable party with asymmetric viability, for which the expected benefits of running alone are close to 0 ($p_a \approx 0$), the decision to enter into competition depends, again, on the magnitude of the positive political externalities to compete. In particular, as equation 4.18 shows, when the externalities are larger than the differences between the direct costs of competing in overlapped arenas (D(d)) and the negative political externalities of not competing alone, the party will decide to present candidacies alone instead to withdraw from competition:

$$E_p > D(d) - E_n \qquad (4.18)$$

In this case, again, when non-viable parties with asymmetric viability have to choose whether to compete alone or to withdraw from competition, the magnitude of the positive political externalities will also be the indicator in explaining the party's entry decision when non-viable.

Overall, it becomes clear that the overlap of arenas generates a new context where the decision to compete alone when non-viable becomes more attractive for parties to what the Duvergerian theories predict. Besides, the decision to withdraw from competition and to join a coalition becomes less beneficial to what Duverger expected.

4.4. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have argued that the overlap of electoral arenas generates two fundamental organisational opportunities for political parties with asymmetric viability that modify their entry decision's function. First, the appearance of political externalities to compete, which will not be internalised by the party at the local arena but rather for another political actor, namely the homonym party competing in another arena where it is viable. Second, the overlap of arenas also causes the emergence of marginal decreasing costs of competing, when parties stand for elections alone or join a coalition.

Concerning the emergence of political externalities, I have argued that the decision of competing alone when non-viable, generates positive political externalities for the party; conversely, not competing alone is likely to bring about negative political externalities for it. Political externalities arise in three key spheres. First, with regard to the image of the party (H1), presenting candidacies alone when non-viable may entail positive political externalities due to the possibility of gaining visibility and promoting the party label. On the contrary, the decision to withdraw from competition or to join a coalition may bring about negative political externalities due to the possibility that the party loses reputation and generates confusion among voters. There are three factors which can mould the emergence and the intensity of these externalities related to the image of the party: the population density, the party institutionalisation, and whether the party is competing or not, at its core level.

Second, externalities can also be related to the party organisation (H2). By presenting candidacies alone parties will obtain positive political externalities from the possibility to keeping the organisation active and testing candidates. Conversely, by staying out of competition or coalescing the party may receive negative political externalities due to the possibility of facing confrontation from the local structure of the party. The role played by the activists within the party will determine the intensity of these political externalities.

Third, with regard to the party platform (H3), positive political externalities will arise from the decision to compete alone due to the possibility of keeping debates active and spreading them across the country. The party's ideological rigidity will be a determinant of the emergence of such externalities.

With regard to the marginal decreasing costs of competing, I have stressed that the overlap of electoral arenas also generates organisational opportunities for political parties to enter into competition –either alone or within a pre-electoral coalition– due to the presence of economies of scale (H4). The intensity of the decreasing costs of competing is believed to be determined by the incentives that each electoral system gives to cultivate a personal vote during the electoral campaign.

Table 4.1 summarises the opportunities that political parties face in overlapped contexts.

Table 4.1 *Opportunities to Compete in Overlapped Arenas*

	Entry decision			Modulating factor
	Compete alone	*Coalesce*	*With-draw*	*Modulating factor*
Externalities: Image of the party	Gain visibility (H1.1) Promote the party label (H1.2)	Lose reputation (H1.3) Generate confusion (H1.4)		Population density Party institutionalisation Party's core election
Externalities: Party organisation	Keep the organisation active (H2.1) Test and promote candidates (H2.2)	Face confrontation with the local structure (H2.3)		Role of activists
Externalities: Party platform	Keep debates active and spread them across the country (H3)	-		Ideological rigidity
Costs of competing	Decreasing costs (H4)	Decrea-sing costs (H4)	-	Personal vote

All in all, this chapter provides theoretical insights on the opportunities that the overlap of electoral arenas generates. According to these theoretical models, the decision to compete when non-viable becomes the dominant one in contexts of overlapped arenas, due to the emergence of positive political externalities for competing and the existence of decreasing costs of competing. On the contrary, the Duvergerian-based decisions to withdraw from competition or to

coalesce when non-viable, become less attractive alternatives due to the appearance of negative political externalities for competing.

In the following chapter, I empirically test the theoretical arguments presented herein through in-depth interviews with political leaders in Canada and Spain. Empirical qualitative evidence will thus allow me to determine whether competing alone even if non-viable becomes, as suggested in this chapter, the dominant strategic behaviour for non-viable political parties with asymmetric viability.

CHAPTER 5.
QUALITATIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: THE ORGANISATIONAL INCENTIVES TO COMPETE

What are the reasons that drive political parties' decision to compete alone or not when they are non-viable? Why, in certain contexts, do non-viable parties decide to stand for elections alone, thus calling into question the Duvergerian theories, whereas in other contexts they either desert competition or join a coalition, in line with what the Duvegerian theories predict?

Hitherto, this question largely remains unanswered, though empirical evidence shows that political parties take dissimilar decisions in different contexts. In the previous chapter, I have argued that the overlap of electoral arenas generates organisational opportunities for political parties to compete alone. When non-viable parties with asymmetric viability decide to compete, they obtain positive political externalities from doing so. When they desert from competition they obtain negative political externalities. Through in-depth interviews with political leaders and party campaign managers from Canada and Spain this chapter tests these theoretical arguments. The use of interviews with party leaders and campaign managers to address the reasons that lead parties to enter into competition when non-viable entails, to my knowledge, the first attempt to address party entry decisions in several parties and in more than one country.

The chapter is organised as follows: section 5.1 presents the puzzle and the selection of case studies. Section 5.2 introduces the particular cases to be studied, which have been divided between those cases where

parties have taken a Duvergerian decision (section 5.2.1) and those where they have called it into question (section 5.2.2). Section 5.3 presents the empirical evidence and finally, section 5.4 summarises the main findings.

5.1. Case Studies

Canada and Spain are ideal case studies to address the reasons that lead political parties with asymmetric viability to present, or not, candidacies when non-viable. There are four fundamental reasons that explain the suitability of the study of these two countries.

First, starting from the more generic reasons, a study that deals with the disturbances in the Duvergerian gravity necessarily requires considering countries where the conditions for the observance of this gravity –short-term instrumentality and perfect information (Cox 1999)– are met. By examining Canada and Spain I prevent any deviation in the Duvergerian equilibrium being explained either by a lack of short-term instrumentality or by errors in strategic calculus due to misinformation.

Second, while both countries meet the criteria for the accomplishment of the Duvergerian gravity, various political parties with asymmetric viability have taken divergent strategies in contexts of non-viability. Indeed, in both cases there are episodes where non-viable parties have taken a Duvergerian decision by staying out of competition or coalescing with another party, and others where they have challenged the Duvergerian gravity by running alone. Hence, the same institutional frame has produced divergent strategic decisions, enabling me to

address the causes that lead political parties to take, or not, a Duvergerian-based decision depending on the political context.

Third, by relying on Canada and Spain as case studies, I introduce variation into the electoral system while controlling many other factors that could disturb the obtaining of reliable results. Spain has a PR electoral system with varying district magnitude across constituencies, whereas Canada elects its representatives for the national elections in SMD plurality rule. Although no asymmetric viability should arise in Canada, since district magnitude is homogeneous across constituencies, political parties present heterogeneous levels of support across constituencies. Hence, both countries show important levels of asymmetric viability, thus making possible the study of contamination effects and the comparison between the two types of electoral systems.

Besides, some factors potentially accounting for variation in asymmetric viability do not vary across the two countries.[33] These are the presence of an ethnolinguistic regional cleavage –which fosters the emergence of contamination effects from the demand-side of parties– and the existence of decentralised regional arenas –which can account for variation in contamination effects from the supply-side of parties. Other sources that could introduce variation in the levels of contamination effects (presidential elections or mixed-member systems), are not present in any of the countries, thus reducing the likelihood of finding variation due to dissimilar institutional designs.

Finally, since both in Canada and Spain regional chambers are elected through direct suffrage, it is not only possible to study the strategic

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[33] These factors have been dealt with in Chapter 3.

behaviour of political parties at the national legislative arena, but also to extend the analysis to the regional chambers. The reach of this study includes not only two countries but also four elective chambers: the Canadian House of Commons, the provincial parliament in Quebec (*Assemblée nationale du Québec*), the Spanish lower chamber (*Congreso de los Diputados*) and the Catalan regional parliament (*Parlament de Catalunya*).

The empirical analysis is divided into those cases where parties have taken a Duvergerian decision and those where they have challenged it, as Table 5.1 illustrates. In particular, there are five different case studies where parties have taken a decision according to what Duvergerian theories predict. This includes one case, where two political parties have joined a coalition when non-viable, in Spain, and another four cases, where political parties decided to stay out of competition –two from Spain and two from Canada. Column 1 and 2 in Table 5.1 summarise the case studies where the Duvergerian gravity was accomplished. The empirical analysis also includes the study of six other case studies where political parties called into question the Duvergerian gravity, by competing alone when non-viable. Three of these cases are from Canada, and another three from Spain, and is presented in the third column in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 *Case Studies* [a]

	Duvergerian strategy		*Non-Duvergerian strategy*
	Coalition	*No entry*	*Entry alone*
Canada	-	QS in the federal elections. Strategic withdrawal of the Liberals in the constituency of Central Nova in 2008.	QS in the Quebecois parliament elections NDP in the federal elections. Failed attempt of fusion between the NDP and the Liberals.
Spain	Coalition PSC-ICV in the 1999 Catalan parliament elections	C's in the 2011 lower house elections. SI in the 2011 lower house elections.	IU in the lower house elections. C's in the 2008 lower louse elections and in the 2010 Catalan parliament elections UPyD in the lower house elections.

[a] Acronyms: PSC: *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya;* ICV: *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds;* QS: *Québec Solidaire*; Liberals: Liberal Party of Canada; C's: *Ciutadans - Partido de la Ciudadanía;* SI: *Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència;* NDP: New Democratic Party; IU: *Izquierda Unida*. UPyD: *Unión, Progreso y Democracia.*

At least one in-depth interview was carried out for each case study. All the interviews were conducted on a face-to-face basis and consisted of semi-structured questionnaires. Table I in Annex-Chapter 5 lists the people interviewed, their responsibility within the political party, and the date and the place where the interview was carried out.

In what follows, I briefly introduce the main features of the political and the party systems of the two countries –and four arenas– under

study. For the case of Canada, I provide some insights to contextualise both the national House of Commons and the regional parliament of Quebec; for Spain I do the same for the lower house and for the Catalan regional parliament.

5.1.1. Canada

Canada is a constitutional monarchy with a federal system of parliamentary government organised in 10 Provinces and 3 territories. Canada has two chambers of representation: the lower chamber, the House of Commons, and the upper chamber, the Senate. The House of Commons is elected using the first-past-the-post (or plurality) electoral system. This chamber holds the major legislative powers. The Senate, which consists of 105 members appointed by the regions, is necessary to pass laws.

The Canadian House of Commons is composed of 308 deputies. Four main nationwide political parties run for election in the federal parliament of Canada. First, the Liberal Party is a centre-left party that has ruled Canada for most of its history. Second, the Conservative Party, the main right-wing party, created in 2003 as a merger of the two previous conservative parties and which has ruled the country since 2006. Third, the New Democratic Party (NDP), a leftist party that has never won election at the federal level. Fourth, the Green Party, which did not manage to enter the Canadian House of Commons until the 2011 elections. Finally, the *Bloc Québécois* (BQ) is the main nationalist party in the province of Quebec, and won elections in this province

from 1993 until 2011. Figure I and Table II in Annex-Chapter 5 show the electoral results for the Canadian elections from 1974 to 2011.[34]

In Canada, nationwide political parties usually run a full slate of candidates for the federal elections. Figure 5.1 presents data on the viability of Canadian political parties in each of the 308 constituencies for the 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011 federal elections.[35] As can be seen, the three main Canadian political parties present candidacies in all constituencies –except for the Liberals in 2008, a case that is dealt with later on. The BQ also runs a full slate of candidates in the 75 Quebecois constituencies, being viable in almost all of them.

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[34] Data for Canada is available for previous elections, as well as data for the case that follows, the Quebecois provincial elections. However, I provide data from the 1974 elections for the Canadian House of Commons and from 1976 for the parliament of Quebec in order to show congruence with the case of Spain, which held its first democratic elections in 1977, and with the case of Catalonia, whose first democratic regional elections did not take place until 1980.

[35] I include data on the viability of parties for the last four elections in the country. I consider that four elections are a sufficient time span to understand the current situation of viability/non-viability of a party. I will use the same criteria for all the graphics that follow on parties' viability.

Figure 5.1 *Viability in the Canadian Federal Elections, 2004-2011*

Source: Own elaboration. Data from Elections Canada On-line (http://elections.ca/)

In Canada, the nomination of party candidates is the prerogative of each local constituency association (Carty and Erikson 1991). Central party leaders have the right to veto local candidates, although they rarely exercise this power since it is counterproductive, "generating widespread opposition within their own organizations and prompting the desertion of local supporters just at the moment they are most needed" (Carty 2004: 14).

In constituencies where candidates stand at good chance of obtaining representation local elites mount highly personalised campaigns that are weakly integrated with that of the wider party. On the contrary, in districts where parties do not have realistic chances of achieving representation, local leaders run campaigns parallel to those of their

national party (Carty, Eagles, and Sayers 2003: 622). However, although each local constituency is able to mount their own electoral campaign on local issues, the main strategic decisions are taken by the party leader (Courtney 1995: Chapter 13). This is especially true concerning national issues and strategies that the party will follow during the electoral campaign (Bell and Fletcher 1991) but also for party programmes, for party's parliamentary agendas and for defining government policy when in office (Adamson and Stewart 2001: 311-12; Cross 2004: Chapter 5).

The uninominal character of the Canadian electoral system requires personalised electoral campaigns for each constituency. It is in the constituencies where much of the hard work of Canadian party politics takes place (Carty, Cross, and Young 2000: 154). As a consequence, although party members in Canada constitute a very small proportion of the voting age population (Carty 1991; Cross and Young 2004), during elections, party membership increases in comparison with periods of quiescence in between campaigns.[36]

The expenditures of the electoral campaign are limited by the law (Noel 2007). This establishes severe limits for donations by corporations, unions and associations (Young, Sayers, and Jansen 2007). In terms of party strategy during electoral campaigns, political parties tend to make special efforts in the constituencies where they have a chance of winning a plurality of the vote (Cross 2004: 109). In arenas where parties identify they stand little chances of winning, they spend little

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[36] A recent survey found that 16 percent of Canadians claim to have belonged to a political party at some point in their life (Howe and Northrup 2002: 89).

money (Carty, Cross, and Young 2000: Chapters 6 and 9; Cross 2004: 127).

Presenting candidacies in the Canadian federal elections only requires submitting 250 signatures from party members entitled to vote in the elections. To present a candidature in one of the 308 district, the candidate has to present a nomination paper signed by at least 100 electors entitled to vote in the constituency and pay a $1,000 deposit. The deposit is reimbursed if the candidate fields all their financial returns on time. Any person allowed to vote in the Canadian federal elections can present a candidacy in any of the 308 constituencies of the country.

With regard to the provincial level, each of the 10 provinces elects its own parliament, which is entitled to legislate on a large number of issues. All the provincial parliaments in Canada are elected through single member plurality. Political parties at the provincial arena are normally unconnected with their homonym parties at the national arena (Cross and Young 2004: 428; Stewart and Carty 2006: 107). This is specifically the case of the Conservatives and Liberals in most provinces. Conversely, the NDP is the most integrated party and membership at the national arena involves membership at the provincial level –the exception being Quebec's provincial elections, where the party does not present candidacies (Dyck 1996).

In Quebec, the regional arena has traditionally been dominated by two main political parties. The main nationalist party is the centre-left *Parti Québécois* (PQ), which since its victory in the 1974 provincial elections, has alternated in government with the centre-right *Parti*

Libéral du Québec (PLQ). Two other parties have recently emerged; the rightist and autonomist *Action Démocratique du Québec* (ADQ), created in 1994, and the left wing and secessionist *Québec Solidaire* (QS), founded in 2006.[37]

In Quebec, neither the NDP nor the Conservatives have any homonym party at the provincial level, and the PLQ and the Liberal Party of Canada are fully unrelated parties. Figure II and Table III in Annex-Chapter 5 present the electoral results of the Quebecois provincial elections between 1976 and 2008.

Figure 5.2 presents data on the viability of the Quebecois parties in each of the 125 constituencies at stake in the Quebecois parliament for the 1998, 2003, 2007 and 2008 elections. As it can be observed, the PQ, the PLQ and ADQ have presented candidates everywhere for the last four elections. Yet, whereas the PLQ and the PQ are viable in most of the constituencies, ADQ only became viable in more than half of the districts in the 2007 elections; in 2003 and 2008 the party was viable in less than 20 districts. Finally, QS first presented candidates in the 2007 elections. In the last two elections, it has filled almost all the constituencies with a candidate.

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[37] In 2012 ADQ has merged into the new party *Coalition Avenir Québec*.

Figure 5.2 *Viability in the Quebecois Provincial Elections, 1998-2008 [a]*

[a] *Québec Solidaire* was founded in 2006. Data for the 2003 refers to its direct predecessor, the *Union des Forces Progressistes* (UFP).

Running candidates in Quebec requires presenting 100 signatures from voters of the electoral division and a $500 deposit (Blake 2006: 131). Any person allowed to vote in these elections can present a candidacy in any of the 125 constituencies of the province. Expenses during electoral campaign are limited. The Chief Electoral Office will reimburse half of the expenses, provided that a candidate has obtained at least 15% of the valid votes at the district level, or that a party has obtained at least 1% of the total valid votes in the whole province.

5.1.2. Spain

Spain is a constitutional monarchy with a decentralised State known as 'State of Autonomies' with 17 autonomous communities (from now onwards AC) and 2 autonomous cities (the African cities of Ceuta and Melilla). Spain has two national chambers of representation, the *Congreso de los Diputados* (Congress of Deputies, the lower house) and the *Senado* (Senate, the upper house). The lower house exercises most of the powers whereas the Senate is *de facto* an amendment house.

The Spanish lower chamber consists of 350 members directly elected in closed lists by proportional representation (D'Hondt method) in multinomial districts matching the Spanish provinces. Two main political parties dominate the political sphere at the Congress of Deputies. The *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) is the social-democratic party. The party ruled the country soon after democracy was adopted and until the PP gained power in 1996. Since then it has alternated power with the conservatives. The *Partido Popular* (PP) is the main conservative party. The party gained power for the first time in 1996 and ruled the country until 2004. In 2011 the party recovered control of the government again.

Two other political parties present candidacies in all (or almost all) the districts of the country: The post-communist *Izquierda Unida* (IU) and *Unión, Progreso y Democracia* (UPyD), a political formation recently created which aims for the recentralisation of power from the AC. Besides, there are many regional parties which present candidacies in their respective AC, mainly in Catalonia and the Basque Country.

Figure III and Table IV in Annex-Chapter 5 present the electoral results for the Spanish elections from 1977 to 2011.

In Spain, nationwide political parties usually run a full slate of candidates for the national elections. Figure 5.3 presents data on the viability of the four nationwide parties in the 52 constituencies of the lower house for the 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2011 elections. As can be seen, the two main nationwide parties present candidacies in all constituencies and they are always viable in all districts, with very few exceptions. Similarly, both IU and UPyD also present candidacies everywhere systematically, although both parties are viable in only a very few constituencies.

Figure 5.3 Viability in the Spanish Legislative Elections, 2000-2011

Source: Own elaboration. Data from the *Ministerio del Interior, Gobierno de España* (http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es)

Scholars have related territorial decentralisation with decentralisation in parties' internal organisation. However, party organisation in Spain has never been as decentralised as the State is (Montero 2005; Hopkin 2009; Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010; Fabre 2011). Party decisions among nationwide parties tend to be centralised, especially in the case of the PP but also in those parties which claim to have a federal organization such as the PSOE and, to a lesser extent, IU (Astudillo 2013; Méndez-Lago and Orte 2013; Ramiro-Fernández and Pérez-Nievas 2013).

Although a formal decentralised structure of power exists within the nationwide political parties, candidate selection for lower house elections is closely supervised by the party's national executive, which ultimately ratifies all party lists and can, therefore, make amendments or alter the order of the candidates of the lists drafted by provincial and regional constituency parties (see Verge 2007; and Pallarés, Astudillo, and Verge 2012).

Electoral campaigns are also quite centralised. Especially in those districts where the party stands a good chance of obtaining representation, the central party strongly monitors the electoral campaign and makes a special effort on it. Conversely, in districts where the party does not expect to obtain representation campaigns are minimal and are mostly carried out by local activists, which run campaigns parallel to those of their national party. With regard to the party's discourse, regional and local sections are, at most, able to raise local debates (see Pallarés, Astudillo, and Verge 2012).

PR systems with closed lists, such as the one in Spain, do not require personalised political campaigns (Carey and Shugart 1995). Instead, campaigns in this country are mainly focused on the image of the national leader. As a consequence, a heavily centralised electoral campaign is developed and party membership support is not very relevant.

Presenting a candidate, until the 2011 elections, did not have any other requisite than fielding the number of representatives to be elected at the district level. However, since then, presenting a candidacy has become more difficult. Political parties with no prior representation in the Congress or the Senate are required to collect 0.1% of the signatures and no fewer than 500 signatures of the constituency's registered electorate. This has reduced the number of political parties presenting candidacies although it has not had any repercussion on the fragmentation of the party system. Concerning a candidate's eligibility, any person entitled to vote in the Spanish elections is eligible for presenting a candidacy in any of the constituencies.

Political campaigns are publicly funded (Holgado González 2003) and parties receive annual subventions to cover regular expenses and electoral campaigns, where expenses are limited . All political parties presenting candidacies in national legislative elections have access to some minutes of free advertising in the public media.

With regard to the regional level, each of the 17 AC elects a parliament which has its own constitution, the 'Statute of Autonomy', and which is entitled to rule on several competences. Regional party systems have

become increasingly similar to the national party system (Wilson 2012).

In the particular regional arena of study for this research, the Catalan Parliament, the party system is more fragmented –due to a higher district magnitude– and Catalan nationalist parties are stronger than in the Spanish Congress –due to the prevalence of the regionalist discourse in this arena (Pallarés and Keating 2003). Nowadays, 7 political parties are present in the Catalan parliament. The main nationalist party in Catalonia is *Convergència i Unió* (CiU). The *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (PSC) is a political party federated with the Spanish PSOE. On the left of the political spectrum there is the federalist, post-communist and green *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds* (ICV) and the secessionist *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC). In parallel to this, the Catalan regional branch of the PP, the *Partit Popular de Catalunya* (PP) is the voice of the conservatives in the Catalan parliament. In 2007, a new political party *Ciutadans-Partido de la Ciutadanía* (C's) burst onto the regional scene with a discourse in favour of bilingualism. Finally, in 2010 a secessionist coalition, *Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència* (SI), also entered the regional parliament. Figure IV and Table V in Annex-Chapter 5 present the electoral results of the elections in the Catalan parliament between 1980 and 2010.

Figure 5.4 presents data on the viability of these seven parties in the Catalan parliament for the 1999, 2003, 2006 and 2010 elections. Since there are only four electoral constituencies and these have high district magnitude, most of the parties are viable everywhere. Indeed, this is the case of CiU, the PSC, PP and ERC –ICV is usually viable in 3 or 4

constituencies. Regarding the two new political parties, C's has only managed to become viable in Barcelona, whereas SI became viable in Barcelona and Girona in the first elections where the party competed.

Figure 5.4 *Viability in the Catalan Regional Elections, 1999-2010*

Source: Own elaboration. Data from *Departament de Governació i Relacions Institucionals*, *Generalitat de Catalunya* (http://www.gencat.net/governacio-ap/)

Most of the characteristics of the electoral system in the ACs are the same as the ones in the national legislative elections: entitlement to vote, funding of the electoral campaigns and public access to advertisement. Nonetheless, the requirement to collect signatures of the 0.1% of the people entitled to vote in the constituency, which is necessary in the Spanish legislative elections, does not apply to the regional arenas.

In the next section, I present the case studies. To do so, I first present five cases where non-viable political parties with asymmetric viability

have taken a Duvergerian strategy, either by withdrawing from competition or by joining a coalition (section 5.2.1). Later, I present six other empirical cases where parties have called into question the Duvergerian theories by running when non-viable (section 5.2.2).

5.2. How Parties Solve Problems of Non-Viability?

5.2.1. Duvergerian Strategies

Among the five case studies where political parties considered a Duvergerian strategy to solve a situation of non-viability there is one example of coalition –in Spain– and four examples of strategic withdrawal –two in Spain and two in Canada.[38]

a. Coalition PSC-ICV in the 1999 Catalan Parliament Elections

The PSC is a political party federated with the Spanish PSOE. The two parties are formally independent, although the PSC is integrated in the PSOE's parliamentary group in the Spanish lower house. The ICV is the federalist, euro-communist and green party. Although ICV used to hold organisational ties with IU, its homonym party in the rest of Spain, the two parties severed ties prior to the 1999 election.

The case that concerns the present analysis took place in the 1999 Catalan parliamentary elections. For these elections, the PSC and ICV agreed on joining an electoral coalition for the districts of Tarragona, Lleida and Girona, whereas both parties stood alone in elections in

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[38] Unfortunately there is a lack of relevant pre-electoral agreements in the two countries, especially for what concerns the case of Canada, where no pre-electoral agreement has taken place recently.

Barcelona. Since the 1984 elections, ICV had become viable in the districts of Barcelona (85 seats elected) and in Tarragona (18 seats), whereas they had failed to become viable in Girona (17 seats) and Lleida (15 seats). However, the electoral prospects for the 1999 elections were not favourable for the party. Additionally, the political context of the 1999 elections was very competitive because, for the first time since the restoration of democracy, the leftist forces in Catalonia were facing an election with real chances of beating the main Catalan nationalist party CiU.

In this context, negotiations took place between the PSC and ICV with the purpose to run for elections in a pre-electoral coalition. The leader of ICV, Rafel Ribó, showed support for the possibility of running in all the four districts of Catalonia, under the same formula of an electoral coalition, but the leader of the PSC rejected to coalesce in Barcelona. The agreement though, was not free from controversy. ICV, a political party created in 1987 as a federation of several euro-communist, communist and ecologist parties, had faced, in 1997, a split from its communist sectors. This faction, which maintained close links with the Spanish IU, created the Catalan section of IU under the label of *Esquerra Unida i Alternalitiva* (EUiA) and they rejected joining the coalition with the PSC. Indeed, they did so because IU and EUiA thought that they could overcome ICV and become the main euro-communist party in the Catalan parliament (see Verge and Barberà 2009).

In the 1999 Catalan elections the PSC obtained 50 seats and ICV five, of which two were from the coalition with the PSC and three from the district of Barcelona, where the party stood for elections alone. In

contrast to the 13 deputies obtained when competing alone in the 1995 elections, in this case the organisation suffered an important shrink in their vote share and in the number of seats. Part of the explanation for these electoral results could be attributed to the drain of votes the party suffered to EUiA. The communist formation received 45,000 votes and 1.4% of the ballots cast, but did not obtain any seat. However, ICV still lost an important amount of votes in Barcelona, in comparison to what had been obtained in previous elections.

In order to address the reasons that lead ICV to take the decision to join the coalition in Girona, Lleida and Tarragona but not in Barcelona, and whether this decision turned out to be positive in the light of the electoral results obtained, an interview with the leader of ICV in the 1999 elections, Rafel Ribó, was carried out. Furthermore, the member of the National Commission of EUiA and the Federal Executive Commission of IU, Ramón Luque, was also interviewed. In this interview, I addressed the reasons that drove EUiA to reject entering into the coalition.

b. *Québec Solidaire in the Federal Elections*

QS is a left-wing political party that stands for social equality, environmental protection, direct participation and sovereignty for Quebec. Founded in 2006 by the merger of two left-wing forces, the party presented candidacies in the Quebec parliament in the 2007 and 2008 elections. The party only competes in the Quebec provincial elections, where it almost runs a full slate of candidacies, as Figure 5.2 has shown. In the Canadian House of Commons, the party does not stand for elections (with no dissent registered for this approach).

In order to address why QS does not present candidacies in the federal elections the Head of the Electoral Committee of Campaigns and the Committee of Coordination of QS, Alain Tremblay, was interviewed.

c. Strategic Withdrawal of the Liberals in the District of Central Nova in 2008

The Liberal Party of Canada is the centre-left political party in Canada. The party historically presents candidacies in all constituencies of the country, as shown in Figure 5.1. The case under review took place in the 2008 federal elections. Stéphane Dion, the leader of the party at this time, was convinced that by introducing a 'green shift' in the party discourse, the party could obtain the majority of seats in the Canadian House of Commons, surpassing the Conservatives (Clarke, Scotto, and Kornberg 2011), which had been in power since 2006. The materialisation of this green shift became evident with the agreement that Stéphane Dion reached with the leader of the Green Party of Canada, Elisabeth May. This agreement consisted of the reciprocal withdrawal of each of the parties from the constituency where the other party leader was running, and the compromise that the Green Party would endorse Stéphane Dion as Prime Minister in case of winning the elections.

Hence, the Green Party did not run in Dion's constituency of Saint-Laurent–Cartierville (Montreal, Quebec) whereas the Liberal Party withdrew from the constituency chosen by the Green leader to run elections, Central Nova (Nova Scotia). Saint-Laurent–Cartierville is a Liberal stronghold. Stéphane Dion has won in this district since the 1996 by-elections. Conversely, the Green party in this constituency had always had a very weak presence. With regard to the district of Central

Nova, this had largely been a Conservative stronghold. The Liberals had only obtained the seat once (1993) and since the 2006 elections, they were the second loser party after the NDP. The Greens in Central Nova had never performed well before the 2008 elections.

This controversial agreement between the Liberals and the Greens received special attention by the media during the days following the deal. Eventually, the strategic decision did not work and the Conservative candidate in Central Nova was elected instead of the Green candidate, which ended up in second position (with 32% of the votes, 14 percentage points behind the Conservative candidate). After the elections, Stéphane Dion was replaced as leader of the Liberal Party of Canada by Michael Ignatieff.

An interview with the leader of the Liberal Party of Canada in the 2008 elections, Stéphane Dion, was carried out in order to address the reasons that led the Liberals to accept such a deal with the Green Party in the district of Central Nova.

d. Ciutadans in the 2011 Lower House Elections

C's is a party that was founded in 2007, and stands for bilingualism in Catalonia. C's presented candidacies for the first time in Catalonia, in the 2006 regional elections and managed to achieve three representatives in the most permissive district of Barcelona. In the three remaining districts the percentage of votes fell far short of obtaining representation. In the 2010 regional elections, the party obtained similar electoral results, also becoming viable only in Barcelona and also gaining three seats.

While the experience of competing in the Catalan parliament was considerably fruitful, the attempt in 2008 to enter the Spanish lower house was a failure. The party tried to reach an agreement with a newly created political party with similar postulates, UPyD, but they, eventually, did not reach an agreement (this case is dealt with in depth in section 5.2.2e). In light of the poor electoral results obtained by running alone in the 2008 national elections, in the 2011 elections, the intention of C's was again to reach a coalition with UPyD, at least in the Catalan districts, where C's had some stable support (and UPyD had not). However UPyD considered the offer made by C's as unreliable and eventually C's announced that they would not stand for elections in the 2011 Spanish lower house elections.

An interview with the Organisation secretary for C's, José Manuel Villegas was carried out in order to address the reasons that led the party to take a Duvergerian decision such as withdrawing from competition.

e. Solidaritat Catalana in the 2011 Lower House Elections

SI is a coalition party that stands for Catalan secession. Founded by critics from the main secessionist party, ERC, in the 2010 elections the party became viable in the districts of Barcelona and Girona, where it obtained three seats and one seat, respectively.

In light of the percentage of votes the party received in the Catalan regional elections, the party stood little chance of surpassing the 3% electoral threshold needed at the district level to enter the process for the distribution of seats in the Spanish lower house elections. Given these low chances, the party held an internal referendum among its

members, asking for the preferred formula under which to compete in the Spanish national elections. 55% of the activists favoured the option to run for elections integrated within a pre-electoral coalition with other secessionist parties, and just in case of not reaching an agreement the party should stay out from competition. The party accepted the mandate of the activists to negotiate an agreement with the other secessionist parties –mainly ERC– to run for elections in a pre-electoral coalition. However, an agreement was not reached between both parties and eventually, SI decided not to stand for the 2011 Spanish lower house elections.

In order to address the reasons that led SI to reject joining a coalition with ERC and ultimately, not standing in the 2011 Spanish legislative elections, an interview with the deputy of SI in the Catalan parliament Alfons López Tena was carried out.

5.2.2. Non-Duvergerian Strategies

Political parties with asymmetric viability that decide to run for elections when non-viable are challenging the Duvergerian theories. These predict non-viable political parties either to desert from competition or to reach an electoral agreement with another party, in order to become viable. In what follows, I present six empirical cases where the Duvergerian gravity has been called into question; three of them in Canada and another three in Spain.

a. Québec Solidaire in the Quebecois Parliament Elections

In the 2003 elections, an embryonic version of QS, called *Union des Forces Progressistes* (UFP), presented candidacies in 74 of the 125 Quebecois constituencies. In the 2007 and the 2008 elections, already

competing under the label of QS, the party ran almost a full slate of candidates (123 and 122 respectively), and obtained 3.6% and 3.8% of the votes cast throughout Quebec.

Table 5.2 shows the viability of the UFP for the 2003 elections and QS's viability for the 2007 and 2008 elections. As can be observed, in the 2003 elections the UFP did not manage to become viable in any of the 74 constituencies where it stood. In 2007, QS became the first loser in two districts and finally in 2008, the party managed to win one seat and became the first loser in another constituency.

Table 5.2 *Electoral Viability of the UFP and QS, 2003-2008*

	2003		*2007*		*2008*	
Winner	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.8%
1st loser	0	0.0%	2	1.6%	1	0.8%
Non-viable	74	59.2%	121	96.8%	120	96.0%
Not presenting	51	40.8%	2	1.6%	3	2.4%

Source: Own elaboration. Data from *Le Directeur Général des Élections du Québec* (http://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca)

The entry of QS in almost all the provincial constituencies is the first case where the Duvergerian gravity is called into question. To analyse the reasons why the political party enters most of the constituencies in the Quebecois parliament, an interview with the Head of the Electoral Committee of Campaigns and the Committee of Coordination, Alain Tremblay was carried out.

b.   NDP in the Federal Elections

The NDP is the main left-wing political party in Canada. Founded in 1961, it has never won any election at the federal level. Despite that,

the NDP has historically presented candidacies in almost all constituencies of the country. Having been confined for many years as the minority alternative to the two leading political parties in Canada, the party has, nonetheless, systematically presented candidacies in almost all districts of the country (as shown in Figure 5.1).

Table 5.3 presents the evolution of the viability of the party in the last four federal elections. Beyond the fact that the NDP has increased its electoral viability in recent years, even becoming the first opposition force in the 2011 elections, it is still relevant to explore the reasons that have led the party to systematically present candidacies in all constituencies of Canada. Hence, the significance of this case does not lie in the particular situation occurred in the last elections, but on the strategic behaviour that the party has continuously maintained in the Canadian federal elections until date.

Table 5.3 *Electoral Viability of the NDP, 2004-2011*

	2004		*2006*		*2008*		*2011*	
Winner	19	6.2%	29	9.4%	37	12.0%	103	33.4%
1st loser	51	16.6%	53	17.2%	66	21.4%	121	39.3%
Non-viable	238	77.2%	226	73.3%	204	66.5%	84	27.2%
Not presenting	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%

Source: Own elaboration. Data from the Official Webpage of the Canadian parliament
(http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Sites/LOP/HFER/hfer.asp?Language=E&Search=G)

In order to address the reasons that have led the NDP to present candidacies in all districts in Canadian federal elections, an interview

with the Senior Press Secretary for the New Democratic Party and leader of the NDP in Quebec, Karl Bélanger was carried out.[39]

c. Attempt of Fusion between the NDP and the Liberals

The SMD plurality rule system in Canada strongly punishes non-winner parties. Since the late 2000's some voices have been raised in favour of a pre-electoral agreement between the NDP and the Liberals, the two main leftist forces in the country. Well before the 2011 federal elections the issue was a matter of debate in Canadian politics, although this was more an idea of certain sectors within the party, rather than a feasible possibility. However, the clear victory of the Conservatives in the 2011 reactivated the debate more vigorously than ever before, and there was a split between those in favour and those against a merger. According to a survey carried out in September 2011, 24% of the Canadians were in favour of a potential merger between both parties; among NDP voters the percentage increased to 26% and among the Liberal voters up to 38%.[40] All in all, the main leaders of both parties have constantly baulked at the possibility of reaching a pre-electoral agreement and there are no reasons to expect that this could take place in the near future.

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[39] The interview was carried out in June 2010, before the 2011 elections where the NDP became the first opposition party in the Canadian parliament. The interview hence has to be framed in this particular context.

[40] Survey carried out by Harris Decima. An executive summary can be found at http://www.harrisdecima.ca/news/releases/201109/1224-majority-oppose-liberal-ndp-merger (Last accessed: 17th June 2012).

In order to address the reasons that drove both the Liberals and the NDP, to reject this possible agreement, two interviews were carried out. The first interviewee was Stéphane Dion, leader of the Liberals in the 2008 elections, and the second, was Karl Bélanger, Senior Press Secretary for the NDP and leader of the party in Quebec.[41]

d. Izquierda Unida in the Lower House Elections

IU was created as a coalition in 1986 between different communist, green and republican parties. IU has historically run almost a full slate of candidates in the Spanish lower house elections, as Figure 5.3 has shown. Actually, since the restoration of democracy, the party has only deserted competition in the two African cities of Ceuta and Melilla, two rightist strongholds where only one representative is elected. As Table 5.4 shows, until the 2011 elections IU was losing electoral viability. In the 2000 elections, the party became viable in seven districts, in 2004 only in five, in 2008 in two and finally in 2011, again in seven.

Table 5.4 *Electoral Viability of IU, 2000-2011*

	2000		*2004*		*2008*		*2011*	
Winner	7	13.5%	3	5.8%	2	3.8%	7	13.5%
1st loser	0	0.0%	2	3.8%	0	0.0%	0	0%
Non-viable	45	86.5%	47	90.4%	49	94.2%	44	84.6%
Not presenting	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	1.9%	1	1.9%

Source: Own elaboration. Data from the *Ministerio del Interior, Gobierno de España* (http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es)

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[41] Note, again, that both interviews were done before the 2011 elections so that the second part of the debate, which took place after the 2011 federal elections were held, had not occurred yet.

In order to address the reasons behind IU presenting candidates in all the districts of the country in the Spanish lower house elections, the member of the Federal Executive Commission and campaign manager of IU for the 2011 national elections, Ramón Luque, was interviewed.

e. C's in the 2008 Lower House Elections and in the 2010 Catalan Parliament Elections

C's decided in the 2011 lower house elections to desert competition given that it was not expected to become viable (see section 5.2.1d). However, both for the 2008 Spanish lower house elections and the Catalan parliament elections of 2010, the party challenged the Duvergerian theories by running in districts where it was non-viable. I deal with these two cases as additional examples of parties competing alone without chances of obtaining representation.

First, I assess the reasons that led the party to present candidacies in the 2008 lower house elections without chances of obtaining representation. The 2008 elections were held after C's had obtained three representatives in the Catalan parliament. Parallel to the emergence of C's another political party with similar postulates, UPyD, was founded and soon created a strong support base throughout Spain except in Catalonia, where C's was still more entrenched. In this context C's tried to reach an agreement with UPyD in order to run elections together. However, UPyD rejected it and C's decided to present a full slate of candidacies. In light of the support the party received in the Catalan parliamentary elections, the party was not expected to achieve representation either for the district of Barcelona (the more permissive constituency) or for any of the other Catalan constituencies. For the remaining Spanish districts, the party had never

presented candidacies and none of the polls released, predicted that the party would be able to obtain a representative. Eventually, the electoral results of the party at the national elections were disappointing throughout the country, failing to achieve a 1% vote in any of the constituencies.

Second, I also address the decision of C's to present candidacies in all four constituencies of the Catalan parliament. As Figure 5.4 has shown, C's presented candidacies for the Catalan parliament elections in 2006 and in 2010, in both cases obtaining three representatives for the most permissive of the constituencies, Barcelona. In comparison, in the three most restrictive constituencies, C's ran candidacies and fell short of obtaining representation.

In order to address the reasons that led C's to present candidacies when non-viable in the lower house elections and in the Catalan parliament elections, the Organisation Secretary for C's, José Manuel Villegas, was interviewed.

f.   UPyD in the Lower House Elections

UPyD is a relatively new political party, created in 2007, that stands for the recentralisation of powers in Spain. As previously mentioned when dealing with the case of C's (section 5.2.1d and 5.2.2e), in the 2008 and 2011 elections UPyD rejected joining a coalition with C's –a party with similar ideology–, and decided to stand for elections alone in the 52 Spanish districts. Table 5.5 shows that the party only became viable in one and two constituencies, respectively, for the 2008 and 2011 elections.

Table 5.5 *Electoral Viability of UPyD, 2008-2011*

	2008		*2011*	
Winner	1	1.9%	2	3.8%
1st loser	0	0%	0	0%
Non-viable	51	98.1%	50	96.2%
Not presenting	0	0%	0	0%

Source: Own elaboration. Data from the *Ministerio del Interior, Gobierno de España*
(http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es)

To address the reasons why the party decided to run for elections alone in all the Spanish constituencies and why they rejected a coalition with C's in the 2008 and 2011 national elections, an interview with the campaign manager for UPyD in the 2011 Spanish Congress elections, Francisco Pimentel, was carried out.

5.3. Empirical Results from In-Depth Interviews

In this section, I test the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 4, to explain parties' incentives to enter into competition alone rather than joining a coalition or withdrawing from competition. Sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.3 present the empirical results with respect to the existence of externalities to compete. In particular, section 5.3.1 addresses the externalities from the point of view of the image of the party; section 5.3.2, from the party's organisational perspective; and section 5.3.3, from the point of view of the party's platform. Finally, section 5.3.4 addresses whether empirical evidence proves the existence of marginal decreasing costs of presenting candidacies.[42]

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[42] Quotations have been translated from the original language in which the interview was conducted. The interviews with Stéphane Dion (Lib) and Karl Bélanger (NDP)

5.3.1. Image of the Party

Competing, even if non-viable at the local level, has been theorised to be preferable to joining a coalition or withdrawing from competition, since it increases the visibility and the image of the party (H1.1) and it contributes to conserving and promoting the party label (H1.2). These *positive political externalities* will not benefit the party at the local arena but rather another political actor, namely the party in another arena of competition where it is viable. Empirical evidence, derived from interviews, shows important support for these two arguments to explain party-entry decisions when non-viable.

The image and the visibility of the party is something that seriously worries political parties. Stéphane Dion (Liberal Party of Canada) expressed very clearly, why the party always runs a full slate of candidates and rejects joining coalitions with other parties:

> *"I think that first you need to show you are a national party and you don't give up. It's important for the people where you are strong to show that you are crying for all the Canadians as well, because they want to vote for a national party. It is why they believe in you. Thinking for the Liberals, if we give up a region they will be less likely to vote for us, even if they are not in the region. Imagine we only present in Ontario, where the liberals are strong, and that we give up the West, they will not have any incentive to vote Liberal".*

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were both conducted in English. Alain Tremblay's interview was in French. The interviews with Rafel Ribó, Alfons López Tena and Ramón Luque were conducted in Catalan. Finally, José Manuel Villegas and Francisco Pimentel were both interviewed in Spanish.

131

For Alain Tremblay (QS) presenting candidacies in districts where the party does not stand any chance to become viable has to be understood as a matter of political posturing, as a way to increase the visibility of the political party and to show a certain commitment with the country (whether it is the whole State or a particular region) or with some ideological principle. Political parties need to show that they are concerned about all citizens, regardless of whether they live in a district where the party gets elected or not:

> *"Once the party has reached its first representative in the assembly it is necessary to present candidates in as many ridings as you can. We have to show to voters and to the media that we are a significant player and a serious party. (...) If we decide to present candidates everywhere the party can no longer be regarded as an irrelevant actor and hence we need to behave in accordance. (...) But on the contrary, if the party presents candidacies only in the districts where it is viable, it does not have the possibility to gain visibility and to grow. (...) This is actually a matter of 'political posturing'".*

Karl Bélanger, from the NDP also agreed with the fact that political parties have to present candidacies in every district in the country. As he asserted:

> *"We do want to give the option to every Canadian to vote for the party. If you decide you do not want to run this means that you are not offering the other Canadians the chance to express their opinion".*

However, this is not all. Karl Bélanger (NDP) drew not only on the necessity to present candidacies everywhere in order to keep the party

visible. However, he also noted that this is especially relevant in urban areas, one of the intervening factors hypothesised to explain the intensity of political externalities to compete:

> *"If you only run in the best ridings people that go in the different communities they don't see you, so you need to have the maximum impact by being present everywhere. This is true especially in urban ridings: If you go to Montreal you cannot win all the seats there; but if there is only one riding where we can run seriously, people don't stand on the riding, they move around the city, so if they don't see the presence of the party, they don't see us as actives and therefore they don't see us as viable when it comes the time to make their vote choice".*

However, it is not only a matter of gaining visibility, but also as a way to keep the party label, as hypothesised in H1.2. Indeed, several interviewees highlighted the benefits of competing in all elections and across districts under the same label.

Stéphane Dion supported this idea. When the former Liberal leader was asked about the possibility of reaching an agreement with the NDP, either through an electoral agreement or through the fusion of both parties, the party leader asserted:

> *"Our party, the Liberal Party, has existed since confederation in 1867; we have delivered more governments to our country than other party in the democratic world. I think we have done a good job, this time Canadians choose to put us in the penalty box, because you cannot win always, but to merge with another party, for us it would be a mistake".*

Meaningfully, the party leader appealed to the institutionalisation and to the longevity of the party as a constraint against joining a coalition, thus showing some evidence for another of the intervening factors explaining the intensity of political externalities.

UPyD, a recently created party also put forward the necessity to run across arenas under the same label, although in this case, rather than to *keep* the party label, it was to *promote* it and to obtain the loyalty of their voters. Indeed, Francisco Pimentel (UPyD) set forward the necessity to run under the same label across the country as an argument to refuse an agreement with C's. Although C's –another newly created party– was willing to articulate a pre-electoral coalition for the 2011 Spanish lower house elections, UPyD's positioning was very clear. According to Pimentel:

> *"We are a national party and as a consequence we have to behave as such. This involves not only competing in all districts of the country regardless of our electoral performance, but also competing everywhere under the same identical label".*

Pimentel emphasised the fact that UPyD was actually the only nationwide party in Spain that was running in all constituencies of the country under the same label, rejecting reaching coalitions with local formations. According to the interviewee, this is a way to show internal coherence, a way to demonstrate that they are a trustworthy party and in the end, the way to gain loyalty from its voters.

But for SI, another newly created party, the need to keep the name of the party and the reputation associated with it, was of relatively low importance due to its low level of institutionalisation. When Alfons

López Tena was asked whether the brand was an important asset for the party, he stated the following:

> "Not in this case because SI is a political party with only one year of history. The problem may exist in other parties: ERC is 80 years old, CiU is 30, or ICV. (...) Our party has, on the one hand, only one year of existence, and on the other hand, the electorate and the activists are very interested in politics and thus the label is not important for them at all".

Hence, it seems that for institutionalised political parties, presenting candidacies everywhere may be understood as a way of keeping –and taking advantage of– the party label. However, as the case of UPyD highlights, for recently created parties, if the necessity to present candidacies everywhere exists, it may be due to the desire to promote the party name and to show consistency and seriousness; for other newly created parties, though, this necessity may not arise, such as the case of SI shows.

José Manuel Villegas (C's) introduced a slight nuance on this widespread perspective in favour of positive political externalities to compete. According to Villegas, presenting candidacies when non-viable is understood in general terms as beneficial. However, if the party stands for elections in an arena, which it is not its 'core level' election and performs poorly, this could become harmful for the party:

> "At the end we have realised that it punishes more presenting candidacies and obtaining very bad results than not presenting candidacies. (...) Presenting candidacies and obtaining poor results does not only entail an economical waste and a cost for the activists but also a weakening of the 'brand' and the

leadership of the party. In the lower house elections we presented Albert Rivera [current president of the party]*; obtaining a poor result with him as a candidate does not benefit the pillars of the party, which are the brand and the image of Albert".*

Therefore, some initial evidence points to the fact that when political parties are not running in their 'core level' election, certain exceptions can apply. More evidence follows with regard to this intervening factor in the negative political externalities related to the image of the party.

Overall, evidence has shown that the possibilities to gain visibility (H1.1) and to keep the party label (H1.2) are, for most of the parties, relevant factors when determining their strategic behaviour. The decision to compete alone, even if non-viable, generates positive political externalities that can be enjoyed by the party in another arena where it is viable. These positive political externalities of competing put more pressure on competing alone when population density is high. Additionally, within highly institutionalised parties the decision to compete will be related to the possibility of keeping the party label, whereas for new parties –if the party brand turns out to be an important asset for the party– this will be to promote the brand rather than to keep it.

Besides, the decision to compete within a pre-electoral coalition or staying out of competition when non-viable, has been theorised to bring about *negative political externalities* for the party. In particular, such a decision may entail a loss of credibility and reputation of the party (H1.3) and may also generate confusion among voters (H1.4).

Dealing with the possibility that joining a coalition or withdrawing from competition may bring about a loss of credibility for the party, Stéphane Dion's asserted:

> *"Giving up districts where you are weak may weaken you where you are strong. For people in the street: They care about their country. They have relatives in other regions. If they have the sense that this party that they like is giving up in the region, they'll be less likely to support their own party".*

Dion's successor, Michael Ignatieff, even considered that reaching a deal such as the Dion-May agreement where the Liberals did not stand in the district of Central Nova, was something the Liberal Party would not have had to do under any circumstance. In Ignatieff words: "I'm honoured to run a national party. And a national party runs 308 candidates in every riding in the country without exception".[43] Very similarly, Ray Heard, former communications director of the Liberal Prime Minister, John Turner, asserted in a letter to the *Toronto Star* that the deal with May "denigrates the tradition that the Liberals are a national party".[44]

Likewise, Ramón Luque also dwelt on the necessity to present candidates everywhere since the party has a project for all the country:

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[43] "Ignatieff dedicates Liberals to early childhood learning". *Metronews*, 2 March 2009, http://metronews.ca/news/154653/ignatieff-dedicates-liberals-to-early-childhood-learning/. (Last accessed: 17th June 2012).

[44] "Liberals angry at Dion's deal to help Greens". *The Star*, 14 April 2007, http://www.thestar.com/News/article/203059 (Last accessed: 17th June 2012).

> *"Not running everywhere would seriously damage the image of IU as it is nowadays conceived, as a serious party. This would also show to the electorate that the political formation has an opportunistic behaviour and that it is not interested in anything else but the electoral rewards it can obtain from elections. But it could be even worse: People could perceive the party as being no more than a mere sum of regionalist, nationalist or whatsoever type of parties. And this is not the case: We have a federal project for Spain".*

These are however, all case studies where parties have taken the non-Duvergerian decision of competing alone even if non-viable. But, what were the reasons stressed by those non-viable parties that followed a Duvergerian strategy when they gave up competition or joined a coalition? Did they consider that staying out of competition may cause negative political externalities for the party?

According to Rafel Ribó, the pre-electoral agreement between the PSC and ICV in the districts of Girona, Lleida and Tarragona did not bring about any negative consequences for the image or the credibility of the party. According to Ribó the context in which elections were held –the nationalist and conservative CiU was faced with the possibility, for the first time ever, of being removed from power in the regional government– asked for such a courageous decision. Indeed, Ribó would have preferred to enter into competition in a pre-electoral coalition in all the four Catalan constituencies.

However, Ramón Luque (EUiA –a split in ICV that did not agree with joining the coalition) expressed a completely different opinion. Luque argued that the agreement between the PSC and ICV was heavily

damaging for the image of the party, and actually, he outlined the fact that this was the reason why EUiA eventually decided to run elections alone in the 1999 elections. For Ramón Luque, Rafel Ribó's decision was completely inadequate and challenged the principles of the party. As Luque argued, this type of proposition had already been done by the PSOE on other occasions, although they had always been rejected in order to avoid damaging the reputation and the credibility of the party:

> *"Once, the leader of the PSOE in the 2000 Spanish national election, Joaquín Almunia, proposed to us to reach an electoral agreement for which we would not be running in certain constituencies, and in compensation, some of the deputies elected in the PSOE list would be given to the parliamentary group of IU. Apparently the agreement was beneficial for IU since we were assuring a larger number of deputies than by running alone, but we did not come to terms because this proposition broke our State conception* [that we are a national party which has to run everywhere]. (…) *Only Rafel Ribó did this once, which disabled the possibility of EUiA running elections together with ICV. He decided to run alone in Barcelona and integrated within the PSC in Lleida, Tarragona and Girona. (…) They managed to obtain the parliamentary group, but it was a very bad electoral result. Such were the electoral results that the strategy was never repeated".*

In contrast, neither C's, nor SI, nor QS considered that not standing alone could damage the image of the party. C's and SI decided to withdraw from competition in the 2011 lower house elections. In both cases, the impossibility of joining a pre-electoral coalition with UPyD and ERC, respectively, led the parties to take such a decision. The

reasons that brought each party to the decision not to compete were different, although they both appealed to one of the intervening factors that were hypothesised to shape the intensity of political externalities: the party's core election. Indeed, both C's and SI considered that since the national elections were not the party's core elections, not competing there would not damage the image of the party.

When José Manuel Villegas (C's) was asked about the possibility of the party being penalised in the subsequent elections due to a loss of visibility and credibility he answered:

> *"Experience has shown us that in our five years of history we have a very important differential vote in our party. We first thought that if the voter did not have our ballot they would vote for another party and we would lose their loyalty. Then you present candidacies and you obtain a few votes in the European and the national elections, but afterwards regional elections come again and you obtain very good electoral results. (...) We think that people do not vote for you in those elections that they do not consider as 'yours', but then they vote for you in 'your' elections".*

Alain Tremblay (QS), similarly considered that not presenting candidacies in the federal elections did not entail a weakening of the image of the party or a loss of credibility, since this was not an election in which the party was interested at all. According to Tremblay this is due to the particularities of the party system in Canada. Indeed, in this country, the federal and the provincial elections are completely separated and voters know perfectly well the level of election that is being contested at any given time. As Tremblay noted, QS's voters

already have a preferred political party for the federal elections and hence the possibility to run elections at this arena is not an open debate within the political formation:

> *"Most of the voters of QS cast their ballot at the federal elections for the NDP or the Bloc Québécois, depending on which issue – the left-right axis or the secession debate– do they give prevalence. (...) Creating a political party implies wasting a lot of time and money, the majority of the activists have already a preferred political party at the federal level, and we would not manage to get any seat".*

Political parties may also obtain negative political externalities in competing from the confusion that the decision to stand for elections under different labels may generate, as H1.4 hypothesised.

Evidence from interviews however does not support this possibility. The agreement between the PSC and ICV when they ran together in Tarragona, Lleida and Girona but separated in Barcelona could have been hypothesised to generate confusion to the electorate. This could have been an explicative factor of the poor electoral performance of ICV in the district of Barcelona, where it ran alone. However, in trying to link the poor electoral results of the party in the district of Barcelona with the hypothetical confusion that the strategy the party followed could have triggered, Rafel Ribó (ICV) denied this option. Instead, he attributed the poor results of the party in Barcelona to other factors:

> *"It could be possible that it had an influence* [the confusion on the poor results obtained by the party]*, but this is the least important of all factors. The main question for the ICV voter was*

to choose between ICV and EUiA [the party split some years before which refused to enter the coalition]*"*.

When Ramon Luque (EUiA) was asked whether ICV's decision to present candidacies together with the PSC in Girona, Tarragona and Lleida but not in Barcelona could have brought some confusion to voters he expressed his doubts about this possibility. Instead, Luque attributed the poor electoral performance, not to voters' confusion, but rather to the lack of credibility that ICV's decision to join a coalition with the PSC in three constituencies but not in Barcelona entailed, as suggested by H1.3.

To sum up, interviews have shown enough evidence to confirm that staying out of competition or joining a coalition, even if non-viable, may lead to negative consequences for the party in another arena, as H1.3 proposed. This is actually what the parties that decided to challenge the Duvergerian theories believe, but it is also the argument that Ramón Luque (EUiA) put forward with regard to the agreement that ICV reached with the PSC. Despite this, it also seems clear, that such negative political externalities do not apply for those parties that do not compete in their core election, thus showing evidence for this intervening variable. Indeed, as the case of C's, SI and QS shows, not presenting candidacies in national elections was not expected to bring about negative political externalities for any of these parties since these were not their main elections. However, none of these three parties would have agreed on staying out of competition in the regional arena, the party's core election.

Eventually, evidence from interviews considerably supports H1.3. Contrarily, there is not enough evidence to accept H1.4, for which

running under incongruent labels may entail a negative political externality due to the confusion that such behaviour may lead to.

5.3.2. Party Organisation

Competing when non-viable at the local level is expected to be preferable than joining a coalition or withdrawing from competition due to the emergence of *positive political externalities* for the party organisation. The decision to compete alone may allow the party to keep the local structure active for elections where the party is viable (H2.1) and to test and promote candidates and to recruit new political elites (H2.2).

As regards the possibility that by presenting candidacies, the party may safeguard its local structure (H2.1), empirical evidence from interviews considerably supports this hypothesis, at least in the case of Canada. Political parties in Canada strongly rely on the local organisation when publicising the party during elections. Stéphane Dion defined the role of local activists during elections as follows:

> *"You have your grassroots working door to door, helping your candidate everywhere, working as volunteers, they believe in you, in your party, in your platform".*

Hence, conserving the local structure is especially relevant in an electoral system such as Canada's, where local activists play a crucial role in publicising the party and in keeping it active. To do so, as Alain Tremblay (QS) noted, the best manner is to concur in elections:

> *"Presenting candidacies everywhere is the way to have a strong organisation that confronts a fight, a target, an objective to*

143

reach. It is a way to keep the organisation alive and its members with enthusiasm. Within the organisation the simple fact of fighting for an election means to gain collective experience. The organisation assumes a political culture and learns to be serious".

The case of Spain is considerably different because, the evidence suggests, political parties do not need to rely on local structures as much as parties do in Canada. When José Manuel Villegas (C's) was asked about the possibility that by presenting candidacies the party could keep the organisation active, referring to local elections he partially accepted the point by arguing that these may serve "as a mechanism to stimulate local activists, as a way to show that the party is active and that its members have a certain objective".

Actually, it seems that the role that activists are expected to play in each of the countries is crucial for understanding differences, thus showing support for another intervening factor. In Canada, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the role of activists is crucial at election time due to the need to perform proximate electoral campaigns. Conversely, in Spain political parties do not rely as much on party activists, since campaigns are not very personalised and most of them are centrally driven.

Overall, it is clear that keeping the local organisation in a good shape is especially relevant in Canada. Local organisations are, in Dion's words, "our blood", and as such political elites are very concerned about keeping them satisfied. However, in Spain, the evidence is not so correlated since districts are bigger and political parties do not need the aid of local organisations in the same manner as they do in Canada.

Therefore, H2.1 can only be accepted through the intervening factor of the role of party activists.

Concerning the possibility that presenting candidacies may serve to test and promote candidates and to recruit new political elites (H2.2) no evidence is found from interviews. From a theoretical point of view, local arenas could be conceived as the battlefield for young politicians and new leaders of political parties to gain experience. Presenting candidacies could thus be hypothesised to be useful to test how certain local leaders perform. However, in none of the interviews was the possibility of presenting candidacies to test, promote or recruit political elites highlighted. Actually, it is to a certain extent, reasonable to think that political parties will not present candidacies *only* because they want to test, promote or recruit a political candidate, but it is more reasonable to think that *because* they have decided in advance to present candidacies, they will take advantage of this decision to test, promote or recruit new political elites. Nevertheless, this issue was not raised by any of the interviewees, so that H2.2 has to be rejected.

Besides, the decision not to enter into competition alone, may entail some *negative political externalities* due to the possibility of facing confrontation from the local structures of the party (H2.3).

There is a considerable agreement among all the party officers on the fact that any strategic decision that moves away from the classical behaviour of the party has to contend with the agreement of the local bases of the organisation. Not doing so may entail a negative political externality for the organisation. Indeed, all politicians interviewed in Canada agreed that systematically not standing in districts where the

party does not have any chance to get a seat would cause atrophy to both the local organisation and the supporters of the party in the constituency. Stéphane Dion noted:

> *"If you give up a constituency, two, three or four, you have always ten, twenty, one hundred, two hundred, people disappointed to not be ready to help you, to give money, hope, etc. They would feel betrayed".*

Similarly, Karl Bélanger (NDP) asserted:

> *"The impact of not running in any riding would certainly upset many people. (…) There is no movement I can find of not running a full slate in all the country".*

With regard to QS, although being a much smaller party than the Liberals and the NDP, Alain Tremblay also emphasised that the party would face some controversies from local activists in most of the districts if they ever decided not to stand for elections in the Quebecois parliament:

> *"In some 10 districts the party could abandon the fight and it would not face important contestation from the people in the riding. In some other 15 districts the party sends candidates from outside because the local organisation is not able to present a candidate, but in the case of withdrawing from competition, it would face major contestation from local activists. In most of the constituencies of Quebec activists ask to present candidates at their riding even though they do not have chances to get a seat or even though we have to send them a candidate from abroad".*

In a similar manner, Ramón Luque (IU) also expressed his concern that in the case of the party or a section deciding not to present candidacies or reaching a controversial coalition, this could upset local activists, to the extent that some of them could even decide to present an independent candidacy. Obviously, this would bring about a clear negative political externality for the party, probably much more important than the cost of running without chances of obtaining representation.

However, these are all cases where the party decided to compete alone when non-viable, calling into question the Duvergerian theories. What was the opinion of those parties that took a Duvergerian-based decision and decided either to join a coalition or to withdraw from competition? To what extent was the possibility of facing negative political externalities something the party took into account when deciding its strategic entry decisions?

Not losing the favour of the local organisation was the main concern Stéphane Dion considered before taking the decision to stay out in the district of Central Nova. In Dion's words:

> *"Many liberals of new generations were excited about this new way to do politics. For Liberals from other times it was difficult to swallow; especially from some members of Central Nova. (…) When I made my decision they were reluctant to accept this decision, they didn't like it, but they accepted it. Some of them supported it; some spitted".*

However, although he noted that some people reacted negatively to the possibility to withdraw from Central Nova, he subsequently noted:

"If I have had the sense that both the riding association and the liberals in Nova Scotia were really against with what I was going to do, I wouldn't have done that. I had enough support, the reluctance was not strong enough, and so I could go ahead with this idea".

And it followed:

"The one we did in Central Nova may not have been done. If local liberals in Central Nova or Nova Scotia would have made more resistance to my view I wouldn't have gone ahead, because you need a motivated party. If I had had the sense that the Liberals would not follow my call, they would have come with an independent liberal anyway, they would have not worked hard for you, I wouldn't have done that".

All in all, contestation for reaching this agreement did not come from the Liberals but it came especially from the Conservatives and the NDP, which instrumentally used this decision to defend the need to present candidacies everywhere. Both parties fiercely discredited the decision, arguing that by reaching this agreement the party was conceding defeat before going to the polls and that such a decision was denying people choices in an election.[45]

In a similar manner, the agreement reached by the PSC and ICV in the 1999 Catalan regional elections, counted as well with notable support

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[45] See "Critics charge May, Dion made backroom deal." *CTV News*, 13 April, 2007, http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070413/Liberals_May_070 413/20070413 (Last accessed: 17th June 2012).

from the local organisations within ICV. Rafel Ribó first pointed out that few people raised their voices against the agreement:

> "Of course there were those who did not agree with the idea [of joining an electoral coalition with the PSC in Lleida, Tarragona and Girona], very few people, but there were some. They considered that by running together the party was losing its personality and image, becoming diluted in the three constituencies where the coalition was formed".

However, most of the local bases in the three constituencies where the agreement was reached agreed on the decision. According to Ribó, "in Barcelona, since the final decision was to run for elections alone, no further problem arose". Barcelona was thus treated particularly, due to the exceptionality of the case. Joining a coalition in Barcelona, where the party had hitherto largely been viable and where it had the stronger local organisations, could have led to severe disagreements within the party:

> "Barcelona was left apart [from the coalition] because it had a great singularity, with a strong presence of the party in the different cities and neighbourhoods in the metropolitan area, and the second ring of Barcelona. In this sense we estimated that it was more productive to stand alone in Barcelona".

Finally, regarding the cases of both C's and SI in the Spanish lower house elections, many similarities can be found. As mentioned earlier, C's tried to craft an electoral agreement with UPyD for standing in elections together, though UPyD rejected the proposal, and eventually C's decided not to run for elections. According to José Luís Villegas, party activists always accepted the party decisions: first, they supported

running elections with UPyD; later, when the agreement was shown not to be feasible, they supported the decision not to enter into competition:

> *"Mostly the decision has been understood and there have only been some voices which have manifested their desire to compete, in order to be able to cast their ballot for the party".*

All in all, only a few weeks after the decision not to stand for elections in the lower house was taken, C's held its party conference (October 2011). Members of the same executive committee were re-elected by an overwhelmingly majority and only the defeated candidate timidly proclaimed that not entering into competition could be a political mistake, at the same time that he accepted that the adequate conditions to run candidates in the national elections were not met.[46]

Regarding SI, party members took the ultimate decision of the party's strategy in the Spanish lower house elections. The party held an online referendum asking for the most preferred political strategy before elections. Given the low chances to achieve representation, the winning option was to run for elections in a coalition with other Catalan secessionist parties and, just in case of not reaching an agreement, stay out of competition. Hence, the decision of the party was supported by its party members, thus automatically avoiding any confrontation.

To sum up, counting on the support of the local bases is particularly relevant at the moment of deciding political parties' strategic decisions. Confrontation from local activists may entail important negative

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[46] "Mario Ruiz presentará una lista alternativa en el congreso de C's". *La Voz de Barcelona*, 28th October, 2011, http://www.vozbcn.com/2011/10/28/90568/mario-ruiz-alternativa-ciudadanos/ (Last accessed: 17th June 2012).

political externalities for the party, since it may result in internal opposition. However, interviews have also shown some evidence against these negative political externalities. In certain contexts, political parties have decided not to enter into competition alone, realising that this would not bring about any negative consequence for the whole party. These are, though, very particular situations where the conditions for such behaviour to be taken were met. Indeed, political elites know that moving the strategic behaviour away from what one would, conventionally, have thought to be the norm has to be very well explained. Stéphane Dion insisted on this point when he was asked whether he would repeat his decision in Central Nova:

> *"You need to have a context, to make you an assessment, and I cannot do it in a hypothetical case; you need to have a context such as the one we had there".*

Overall, evidence from interviews allows partially accepting H2.3, for which non-viable political parties are expected to avoid joining a coalition or to withdraw from competition as a way of avoiding confrontation with local organisations. However, the hypothesis cannot be fully accepted, since certain political contexts might not bring about any kind of confrontation within the party, thus allowing parties to withdraw from competition or to join a coalition without suffering any substantial negative political externality.

5.3.3. Party Platform

Competing, even if non-viable, has been theorised to be preferable than joining a coalition or withdrawing from competition since it will

generate *positive political externalities* due to the possibility to keep debates active and to spread them across the territory (H3).

Evidence from interviews considerably supports H3, although this evidence seems to apply only for political parties with important degrees of ideological rigidity, the intervening mechanism hypothesised to explain the existence of such political externalities. In particular, interviews show evidence of this externality for the two most leftist parties under study, IU and the NDP, whereas mixed evidence is found for C's.

According to Karl Bélanger (NDP), presenting candidacies everywhere, even if non-viable, is important to extend political debates throughout the districts of the country, even where the party does not have any chance to achieve representation:

> *"When you come from a riding where you have no chances of winning you still want to make a difference, you want to try to raise issues, to try to frame the debate, and if you are not running anyone will talk about what you can do to* [help] *the elderly, poor, or housing, or homeless".*

Bélanger however, did not explicitly consider this as something that may be useful for another political actor such as the homonym party in another arena, but rather this was just a strategy that may benefit the party platform *per se*:

> *"If you don't have someone from the NDP running maybe these issues will not be raised at all. And there are important issues. And you force the other candidates to react to those issues. If you are not there, you cannot influence the debate at all. Sometimes*

you may not be successful at winning but you may create awareness about issues".

In a similar vein, Ramón Luque (IU) stressed the utility of presenting candidacies everywhere to activate the leftist discourse, especially in the present context of crisis of social democratic discourse:

"This has also been of especial relevance within the leftist forces. And as time goes by it becomes even more important to present candidacies everywhere in order to create awareness of the political context we are facing, since confusion within the European social democratic forces is very evident".

José Manuel Villegas (C's) also mentioned the fact that by running candidacies when non-viable they were able to raise their political discourse, that otherwise would have been omitted. Indeed, the fact that UPyD decided to stand candidacies in the 2011 national elections made it easier for C's to decide not to enter into competition. The party felt that, despite not running candidacies, their discourse was at least partially raised by UPyD. José Manuel Villegas is unable to answer what would have happened if UPyD had decided not to enter into competition; however, he points out that they would have, more than likely, decided to stand for elections.

Evidence from interviews has shown that by running candidacies when non-viable, political actors are able to create awareness about some issues and to spread debates across arenas. At first sight though, this may primarily benefit only the popularity of the discourse itself, whereas the party that is promoting it may only indirectly benefit from it. However, it is undeniable that certain political discourses are

associated with certain political parties. Hence, by promoting this discourse both in arenas where the party is viable and in those where it is not, the party will be able to derive positive political externalities. This will eventually end up with an improvement in the party's electoral performance in other arenas where already viable.

Hence, there is considerable evidence in favour of H3, although this would only be relevant at explaining the emergence of positive political externalities within parties with an important degree of ideological rigidity.

5.3.4. Decreasing Direct Costs of Competing

Finally, H4 established that in concurrent elections the overlap of arenas reduces the direct costs of competing as the number of districts where the party presents candidacies increases. This occurs both when political parties decide to compete alone and when they join a coalition.

This argument has received very strong support from within the Spanish political parties who have challenged the Duvergerian gravity. Indeed, both C's and IU have asserted that, as a matter of fact, once the party is already viable in at least one of the districts of a certain arena of competition, the decision to run a full slate of candidates is the more appropriate, given the decreasing costs of competing.

The more straightforward argument in favour of this hypothesis was provided by José Manuel Villegas (C's). He justified the decision to present candidacies in all the four constituencies for the Catalan regional elections as follows:

> *"The basic difference is on whether to run or not to run in an election. Once you have decided to compete in an election, going to one constituency or going to four constituencies it does not involve multiplying by four the expenses or multiplying by four the efforts".*

Ramón Luque (IU) further argued:

> *"It is not only the fact that once you have decided to present some candidacies it becomes cheaper to run a full slate of candidates, which is true. It is also that the amount of money and resources that the party devotes to these districts is very small and that most of the campaign is driven by the regional section of the party. This reduces considerably the efforts that we the national party have to devote there".*

In Canada, none of the parties explicitly highlighted the presence of economies of scale as a reason to present candidacies. Both the Liberals and the NDP manifestly do not have a problem providing the $1,000 deposit and the 250 signatures needed to present candidacies at every district. Similarly, Alain Tremblay (QS) asserted that obtaining 100 signatures and paying a $500 deposit at the district level are not painful requirements for the party.

The fact that none of the Canadian parties explicitly mentioned the presence of economies of scale as a reason to present candidacies, might well be explained by the degree of personal voting that exists in this country. Indeed, as has been hypothesised in the previous chapter, when the local candidate has a crucial role in promoting the party during an election campaign, it is less likely that political parties will benefit from economies of scale. This is actually what occurs in the

SMD plurality electoral system in Canada, where political campaigns are strongly localised. Conversely, in Spain, the national party overshadows the local candidates, thus enabling the emergence of important decreasing costs of competing.

Hence, there seems to be enough evidence to accept the existence of decreasing costs of competing when the number of districts where the party presents candidacies increase, as H4 suggested, although these seems to be conditional on electoral systems that do not cultivate a personal vote and where party campaigns are mostly driven by the central party.

5.4. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have addressed the reasons that drive political parties' entry decisions when non-viable. Relying on in-depth interviews with party elites in Canada and Spain, I have analysed several case studies where parties either took a Duvergerian or non-Duvergerian strategy, when facing a context of non-viability.

Most of the hypotheses drawn in Chapter 4 have been confirmed. Evidence from interviews has shown that there are several positive political externalities that arise when non-viable parties with asymmetric viability, decide to run for elections. Table 5.6 briefly summarises the main findings with regard to the emergence of positive political externalities.

The first factor that explains party entry decisions when non-viable is the possibility that by doing so, political parties will be able to gain visibility, as H1.1 hypothesised. The population density is a relevant

modulating factor: in heavily populated zones, the need to present candidacies everywhere seems to increase in comparison to what may occur in more dispersed territories.

Second, political parties may also decide to run for elections alone, in order to keep and promote the party label (H1.2). The degree of party institutionalisation is a strong factor explaining both the emergence and the intensity of such externalities. The more institutionalised and the more long-lived a party is, the more likely it is that this party wants to run across constituencies under the same label. For new political parties, the need to protect the party label is not relevant, but rather, if they decide to present candidacies it may be just to promote the party brand and to show consistency and seriousness across arenas. Overall, new parties seem to be more likely to desert from competition due to a lack of institutionalisation.

Third, political parties may also want to compete alone in order to keep the organisation active for when the time comes to contest elections where the party is viable, as H2.1 suggested. This relationship, though, is conditional on the role of party activists: In those parties where activists have a very relevant role at promoting the party, there is a high concern about keeping local structures in good shape, whereas this becomes far less relevant in parties where the role of activists is more limited.

Finally, there is also evidence showing that political parties may also run a full slate of candidacies in order to keep political debates active and to spread them throughout the country (H3). This evidence, though,

only appears to be a relevant factor for political parties with a certain ideological rigidity.

With regard to the possibility that by running candidacies when non-viable political parties may obtain positive political externalities from testing and promoting party candidates (H2.2), evidence does not support this idea. Whereas it is true that parties tend to use local and regional arenas to test candidates, this is not a reason that explains parties' entry decisions, but rather it is a consequence of the party's decision to enter when non-viable.

Table 5.6 Positive Political Externalities to Compete

Hypothesis	Accepted?	Modulating factor
Gain visibility (H1.1)	Yes	Population density
Promote the party label (H1.2)	Yes	Party institutionalisation
Keep the organisation active (H2.1)	Yes	Role of activists
Test and promote candidates (H2.2)	No	-
Keep debates active and spread them across the country (H3)	Yes	Ideological rigidity

Besides, evidence from interviews has also shown that there are two fundamental negative political externalities that arise when non-viable parties decide not to compete alone. Table 5.7 summarises the main findings with regard to these externalities.

The first of the negative political externalities for not entering into competition when non-viable, is related to the possibility of losing

reputation. Evidence from interviews supports H1.3 although this seems not to apply when political parties are not competing in their core election. In this event, not entering into competition may not involve any negative political externality for the party.

Second, interviews partially support the idea that by not running alone political parties will face confrontation with the local organisations and party activists (H2.3). This hypothesis, though, cannot be fully accepted because in some particular contexts parties have been shown not to face such negative political externalities.

With regard to the possibility that the decision to not compete when non-viable may generate confusion among voters (H1.4), empirical evidence from interviews does not support this idea.

Table 5.7 Negative Political Externalities to not Compete

Hypothesis	Accepted?	Modulating factor
Lose reputation (H1.3)	Yes	Party's core election
Generate confusion (H1.4)	No	-
Face confrontation with the local structure (H2.3)	Partially	-

Finally, interviews have also shown that political parties face decreasing costs of competing, as the number of constituencies where the party presents candidacies increases (H4). Evidence from interviews points to the fact that these decreasing costs arise in those arenas where the electoral system does not cultivate the personal vote, whereas when campaigns are focused on the local leader, the impact of these decreasing costs of competing is non-conclusive. However, the

presence of economies of scale cannot explain, by itself, the decision to enter into competition when non-viable. Indeed, presenting candidacies when non-viable always has a cost higher than 0, so that without the existence of externalities to compete, the decreasing costs of competing would never be enough to explain the decision to enter into competition when non-viable.

Hence, the concept of externality becomes crucial for explaining party entry decisions in contexts of non-viability. Interviews with party leaders and campaign managers in Canada and Spain have revealed that the overlap of arenas generates positive political externalities for parties which decide to compete when they are non-viable. Besides, the decision to withdraw from competition or join a coalition when non-viable may bring about some negative externalities for the party.

These are not though, closed statements. The decision to compete when non-viable will not always lead to the emergence of positive political externalities; similarly, not entering competition alone does not unavoidably promote negative political externalities. Yet, beyond the particularistic features that may disable the functioning of these mechanisms, evidence from this chapter allows me to accept that, as had been theorised, the overlap of electoral arenas turns the decision to enter into competition alone, into the dominant one, whereas joining a coalition or withdrawing from competition, become both less preferred alternatives for non-viable parties.

In the previous two chapters I have addressed the reasons that drive political parties' decisions on whether to compete alone or not, when they are non-viable. In the following chapter, I focus the attention on

the consequences that this entrance when non-viable brings about, namely, an extra supply of parties competing as compared to what the Duvergerian theories predict.

CHAPTER 6.
QUANTITATIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: THE INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS TO COMPETE

In Chapter 5, I have demonstrated through in-depth interviews that the dominant decision among parties with asymmetric viability is to run for elections in those districts where they are non-viable. Such a decision has been shown to provide several positive political externalities for the party, whereas the decision to withdraw from competition or to join a coalition may entail some negative political externalities. At the end, the overlap of electoral arenas turns the decision to enter competition when non-viable into the dominant one, whereas both joining a coalition and withdrawing from competition become less preferred alternatives.

Henceforth, I go one step further to what I have done until now. Departing from the main arguments and findings hitherto presented, I assume that when non-viable political parties with asymmetric viability have the opportunity to enter into competition they do so. Then, I focus the attention on the *consequences* that this entrance when non-viable brings about.

Actually, entrance when non-viable would not involve any further consequence if voters concentrated their vote in at most M+1 parties, as the Duvergerian theories suggest. Under this situation in the long run, non-viable parties would decide to join a coalition with another party or to stay out of competition. However, high numbers of parties presenting candidacies have been shown to lead to high numbers of

wasted votes. There have been two main arguments within the literature trying to account for this situation. On the one hand, scholars have shown that some individuals cast their ballot expressively rather than instrumentally (Schuessler 2000a; Schuessler 2000b), thus avoiding concentrating their vote in the M+1 viable parties. Indeed, as Tóka stresses (2009: 24) "expressive vote is probably an inevitable feature of mass democracy". On the other hand, some researchers have recently shown that elites' decision to enter (or not) competition is able to shape the volatility and stabilisation of party systems (Zielinski 2002; Tavits 2005), thus challenging the widespread opinion which argues that party elites are just responding to voters' demands or to the institutional features of the system.

Overall, irrespective of which of these two arguments is more accurate, it becomes clear that non-viable parties entering into competition alone will receive electoral support, which will lead to higher numbers of parties receiving votes in comparison to what the Duvergerian theories predict. This chapter then, aims at uncovering whether electoral contamination, and more specifically, the overlap of electoral arenas, brings about an *inflation* in the number of parties as compared to what should be expected in a Duvergerian world.

Before addressing the reasons that may explain this inflation in the number of parties competing, I will dedicate some pages to establishing the phenomenon from its theoretical and its descriptive grounds. This task will provide a clearer picture of the phenomenon and will allow me to compare it cross-nationally. Then, I will proceed to develop an empirical, explicative model, which addresses from a comparative perspective, the mechanisms that explain the presence of this inflation

in the number of parties competing. To do so, I rely on the institutional and the sociological factors hypothesised in Chapter 3 to explain the emergence of asymmetric viability.

The chapter is organised as follows: section 6.1 presents the dependent variable; the theoretical grounds for its operationalisation, the way to calculate and interpret it, and the countries included in the analysis. Section 6.2 deals with the independent variables and the hypotheses of the research. In the third section of this chapter, I present descriptive data on electoral contamination across 46 countries of the world. The fourth section introduces the methods and the models developed in this analysis and the fifth section presents the empirical results. Section 6.6 summarises the main arguments and findings from the chapter.

6.1. Measuring Contamination

The idea of measuring contamination effects is to capture the counterfactual of what would have occurred in the event that only viable parties had entered into competition, in comparison to what truly occurred when both viable and non-viable parties entered into competition. To do so, I rely on a dependent variable that captures the extra supply of parties competing at the district level in the national legislative elections, in comparison to what the Duvergerian theories predict.

6.1.1. Operationalisation

There are three, at least, different ways through which it is possible to calculate the extra supply of parties competing (henceforth, ESPC) at the district level. The first and the most straightforward way to address

it would be through a simple count of the raw number of parties standing for elections at each district without chances of obtaining representation (see, for instance, Best and Lem 2011, which count the number of third-party competitors in US gubernatorial elections). Although this method would indeed identify the number of non-viable parties standing for elections, the procedure is insensitive to the magnitude of the support that each party receives. This would potentially lead to a measure bias across districts and especially across countries. For instance, the raw number of non-viable parties would be the same in one district where five non-viable parties manage to get half of the votes than in another district where five non-viable parties gather just a residual 1% of the ballots cast.

A standard solution for this problem would be the use of Cox's (1994) 'second-to-first loser's vote' (SF) ratio or the Selb's (2012) improved measure of the 'minimum of the first-loser's-to-(last)-winner's ratio and the second-to-first-loser's ratio' (mSF ratio). Although these two measures would adequately capture the magnitude of the wasted votes, both measures are biased in favour of big parties and are insensitive to the small ones. For instance, each measure would provide an identical value in two SMD plurality rule elections where the distribution of votes was 45-20-20-15 and 45-20-20-5-5-1-1-1-1-1, respectively. Both measures are, therefore, insensitive to the presence of more than three parties competing and thus they would not be able to measure the intensity of electoral contamination when large numbers of parties are competing (as usually occurs in PR systems).

A third measure would overcome these problems by counting parties – as the first measure proposed– through weighting them by their

166

electoral strength. The Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) 'effective number of parties' (ENP) is able to count the *real* parties competing, allowing big parties to count more than small ones:

$$ENP_{jt} = \frac{1}{\Sigma_{i=1}^{n} p_{ijt}^2} \qquad (6.1)$$

Where *p* is the percentage of votes received by party *i* at the district *j* and time *t*.

This index "has the property that, if there are *n* equally sized parties, then ENP = *n*. As inequalities in vote share among the *n* parties grow, ENP shrinks. Ultimately, if one of the *n* parties secures all the votes, ENP = 1" (Cox 1999: 148). The ENP is however, only the baseline measure to count parties. To calculate the ESPC I rely on the classical measure of the inflationary rate used by economists.[47] This measure estimates the percentage rate of change in price level over time:

$$P_{t+1} = P_t \cdot \left(1 + \frac{I_m}{100}\right) \qquad (6.2)$$

Where P_t is today's price, P_{t+1} is tomorrow's price and I_m is the monetary inflation rate. From Equation 6.2 it results:

$$I_m = \left(\frac{P_{t+1} - P_t}{P_t}\right) \cdot 100 \qquad (6.3)$$

Departing from this inflationary rate, and relying on the Laakso and Taagepera's ENP measure, I construct a dependent variable (Equation 6.4), which assesses the *extra supply of political parties that present*

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[47] Inflationary rates are not novel measures in political science. Some scholars in the discipline have also relied on these measures (e.g. Moenius and Kasuya 2004).

candidacies at the district level in comparison to what Duvergerian theories predict.

$$ESPC_{jt} = \left(\frac{ENEP_{jt} - ENVP_{jt}}{ENVP_{jt}} \right) \qquad (6.4)$$

Where:

- *ESPC_{jt}*: Extra supply of parties competing in district *j* and time *t*.
- *ENEP_{jt}*: Effective number of *elective* parties at the district *j* and time *t*
- *ENVP_{jt}*: Effective number of *viable* parties at the district *j* and time *t*

The calculi for the 'effective number of elective parties' and the 'effective number of viable parties' are formally the same but they only differ in which parties are included in each measure.

In the case of the ENEP, all parties receiving electoral support at the district level are included, regardless of whether they achieve representation or not. In contrast, in the calculus of the ENVP only political parties that are expected to achieve representation are included. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this comprises the sure winner, the first loser party in a Duvergerian equilibrium and the second loser party in a non-Duvergerian equilibrium.[48]

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[48] According to my theory (see Chapter 2), in the calculus of the ENEP, it would be convenient to take into account only those parties which are viable in at least one of the arenas of competition in the country. Those parties which are not viable in any arena have been said to take an expressive decision and they would be supposed to be

The ESPC is first calculated at each district from the legislative arena. Then the measure has to be aggregated at the national level, so that the final output consists of a single observation for each country's election. There are two fundamental reasons that counsel this variable to be treated aggregately.

First, from a substantive point of view, contamination is a process which takes place in a context of overlapped arenas and which claims that the district level is no longer the frame of reference where decisions are taken. Contamination is a phenomenon that is intrinsically aggregate and it would make no sense to analyse independently, the extra supply of parties competing at each district when the phenomenon is precisely a consequence of the overlap of different electoral arenas. Second, from a methodological point of view, although the dependent variable is calculated at the district level, data availability for most of the covariates are available only at the national level.

Several criteria can be followed to aggregate data from the district level to the national one. Moenius and Kasuya (2004: 550) have stressed that

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excluded from the analysis. However, it is virtually impossible to address whether each party that is non-viable at a given district is presenting candidacies because it is actually viable in another arena (such as the regional one or the local one) or whether this is just an expressive decision and should be therefore excluded from the calculus of the dependent variable. If this was to be done it would be necessary to check whether the party was viable in any of the multiple arenas of competition where it may be competing, and afterwards drop it from the calculus. Data unavailability would not allow performing this calculus. All in all, including expressive parties in the calculus of the dependent variable when unnecessary may have a very minor effect since these non-viable political parties always have a very irrelevant support and their contribution to the increase of the ENEP is completely marginal.

the most appropriate manner to do so would be by using the percentage of votes cast at the district level, since this method allows controlling for a hypothetical malapportionment in the electoral system. However, due to data constraints and following most of the literature (Cox and Morgenstern 1995: 334; Neto and Cox 1997), I aggregate data at the district level through district magnitude:

$$ESPC_t = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \left(\frac{(ENEP_{jt} - ENVP_{jt})}{ENVP_{jt}} \right) DM_{jt} \qquad (6.5)$$

Where DM_{jt} stands for the number of seats elected in district j and time t.[49]

In the following subsection, I present an example, which clarifies the understanding of the dependent variable and shows how it behaves in different contexts.

6.1.2. Example and Interpretation

To make easier the understanding of the dependent variable, I present the case of a country with two districts: the first one elected under PR system with d'Hondt seat allocation, the second one elected under SMD plurality.

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[49] In the presence of a large lumped category of 'Other' parties in the database, treating this category as a unified single party would provide a value of the ENP lower than expected, whereas subtracting the category 'Others' from the calculus would bias upwards the measure. To solve this problem I rely on Taagepera's (1997) advice, which suggests that a reliable measure is obtained by averaging the ENP obtained when the others category is treated as unified and when the category is excluded from the calculus.

In the first district six deputies are elected and four parties present candidacies: P_A, P_B, P_C and P_D. Table 6.1 shows political parties' viability at this district for a given electoral results.

Table 6.1 *Distribution of Seats in a Multinomial District*

Party	Votes	D'Hondt Divisors		
		1	2	3
P_A	40	**40**	**20**	13.3
P_B	35	**35**	**17.7**	*11.6*
P_C	15	**15**	7.5	5
P_D	10	10	5	3.3

P_A (three seats), P_B (two seats) and P_C (one seat) would be the winner parties, whereas the third representative for P_B (in italics) would be the first-loser. P_D would be a non-viable party. The ENEP is calculated by summing up the squares of the percentage of votes obtained by each party, and dividing up the value obtained from 1.

$$ENEP_{j=1} = \frac{1}{0.4^2 + 0.35^2 + 0.15^2 + 0.1^2} = 3.17 \qquad (6.6)$$

To obtain the ENVP the same procedure is taken, but in this case only viable parties are considered, exactly as if votes devoted to non-viable parties were evenly distributed across the viable parties.[50] To do so, in

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[50] Note that when calculating the ENVP I am implicitly assuming that votes devoted to non-viable parties would be uniformly distributed across the viable parties, in the event that only viable parties were standing for elections. Even though this is an evident methodological shortcut, assuming this homogenous distribution of votes does not entail a very problematic situation as long as the percentage of votes of the non-viable parties is, most of the times, not too large and the effect of a heterogeneous distribution of the non-viable votes in comparison with a homogenous distribution would not have a very relevant impact on the final value of the dependent variable. Of

Table 6.2, I calculate the percentage of votes that each viable party obtained in comparison with the total number of votes cast. Equation 6.7 calculates the ENVP for this district:

Table 6.2 *Distribution of Viable Votes in the PR District*

Party	*% votes*	*% viable*
P_A	40	44.4
P_B	35	38.9
P_C	15	16.7
P_D	10	-
Total	100	100

$$ENVP_{j=1} = \frac{1}{0.44^2 + 0.39^2 + 0.17^2} = 2.66 \qquad (6.7)$$

The value for the dependent variable in this district would then be:

$$ESPC_{j=1} = \left(\frac{3.17 - 2.66}{2.66}\right) = 0.19 \qquad (6.8)$$

In the second district, where only one seat is elected, the electoral results are the ones presented in Table 6.3:

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course, as the percentage of votes to non-viable parties increases, the assumption of a homogeneous distribution of votes across the viable parties in the calculus of the ENVP becomes more dubious. All in all, as long as the value of the Duvergerian equilibrium in any district is a non-observed counterfactual, any calculus estimating this value has to be done under the assumption of an expected homogeneous distribution of votes.

Table 6.3 *Distribution of Viable Votes in the SMD*

Party	Votes
P_A	**45**
P_D	*35*
P_B	20

In this case the ENEP takes the value of 2.74 and the ENVP, 1.97. The value of the dependent variable at this district would then be:

$$ESPC_{j=2} = \left(\frac{2.74-1.97}{1.97}\right) = 0.39 \qquad (6.9)$$

To calculate the ESPC at the country level, it is necessary to weight the extra supply of parties at district *j* by its relative importance in terms of seats elected. Table 6.4 summarises the values obtained both for the ENVP and the ENEP in each district *j*, together with its corresponding district magnitude *(DM)*.

Table 6.4 *Summary Values Obtained by the ENEP and the ENVP*

	j=1	*j=2*
ENEP	3.17	2.74
ENVP	2.19	1.97
DM	6	1

Eventually the value of the dependent variable for this country at time *t* would be:

$$ESPC_t = \left[\left(\frac{(3.17-2.19)\cdot 6}{2.19\cdot 7}\right) + \left(\frac{(2.74-1.97)\cdot 1}{1.97\cdot 7}\right)\right] = 0.22 \qquad (6.10)$$

How can this value be interpreted?

The dependent variable always takes positive values. A value close to 0 indicates that the number of parties which present candidacies at the district level corresponds to the number of parties which manage to get a seat in the district, in line with what the Duvergerian theories predict. Concretely, the value 0 means that only viable parties in each district present candidacies. This shows evidence for a lack of contamination effects from other arenas.

Conversely, values different from 0 show evidence of an imbalance between the number of parties which present candidacies and the number of parties that eventually end up obtaining a seat. As the value of the dependent variable increases, this imbalance becomes clearer, thus showing evidence in favour of electoral contamination and against the Duvergerian gravity.

The value of the dependent variable can be directly interpreted as long as it is an increasing rate. Hence, a value of 0.2 means that the ENEP is 20% higher than the ENVP, i.e., the value that would be found in a Duvergerian world. A value of 1 means that the ENEP is twice (100% of increase) the value expected to be found according to Duvergerian theories. Therefore, low values of the dependent variable signal that the number of parties competing when non-viable, is low, whereas high values in the dependent variable indicate an important imbalance between the number of parties competing and the number of parties obtaining a seat.

6.1.3. Data

In order to carry out this research, I purposely elaborated a completely new database on legislative elections held in democratic countries.[51] The calculus of the dependent variable requires not only that the electoral results are available for each district in the country, but also in order to determine the equilibrium it is also necessary to know the number of seats elected in each district and the final distribution of these seats among the parties.

Two different groups of sources of information have been used to elaborate the database on legislative elections. On the one hand, in several cases information comes from archives and databases from non-governmental or supranational institutions. This is the case of the *European Election Database*[52], the *Constituency-Level Elections Archive* (CLEA)[53] or the *Constituency-Level Elections* (CLE) dataset[54]. On the other hand information about the electoral results at district level has also been obtained from the country's electoral bureaus. Table VI in Annex-Chapter 6 details all the sources from which the dependent variable is calculated.

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[51] The complete database, the codebook and the commands for STATA to perform the analysis are available on the internet at http://hdl.handle.net/10230/16502. Any further explanation or alternative calculus not included on the net will be solved by the author upon request.

[52] Available on-line at http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/.

[53] Available on-line at http://www.electiondataarchive.org.

[54] Brancati, Dawn. Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) Dataset, 2007 rev. 2011 [computer file]. New York: Constituency-Level Elections Dataset [distributor], http://www.cle.wustl.edu.

Two main criteria have been set up to determine which countries and elections are included. First, I only consider democratic elections. In order to determine whether an election was held under a democratic period, I use the Polity IV Project, which provides yearly data on the level of democracy in each country of the world.[55] Second, for each country I include at most, data since 1985. This threshold helps to prevent the number of observations for certain countries for which data is easily available (e.g. USA, Israel or the Netherlands) from being too high as compared to those countries for which the number of elections available is reduced (e.g. Albania, Cyprus, Italy). The criterion to select a year beyond which data are included is common in the discipline (see, for example, Cox 1997: Chapter XI).

Figure 6.1 plots the histogram with the distribution of the ESPC for the 240 elections taken into account. The mean of the dependent variable is 0.37. This means that for all countries and years, on average, the ENEP has been 37% higher than it would have been in cases where only viable parties would have competed. The minimum value of electoral contamination is 0.01 (Netherlands, year 2002) and the maximum value is 2.83 (Lithuania, 2008). The median of the variable is 0.26, considerably distant from its mean. As Figure 6.1 shows, the distribution of values of the dependent variable is considerably skewed to the right –far from being a log-normal distribution: 90% of the values are smaller than 0.7, whereas the remaining 10% is distributed in a range which goes from 0.7 to 2.8.

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[55] Available on-line at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. An election is considered as being democratic when the Polity IV index has a value equal or higher than 6 for the year when the election was held.

Figure 6.1 *Histogram of the ESPC*

In order to obtain a more log-normal distribution the dependent variable will be log-transformed for the empirical analysis.[56] Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of values that the ESPC has, once the transformation is done. The mean of the (log) ESPC is 0.29; the minimum value is 0.01 –as in the previous model– whereas the maximum value is 1.34. In this case the median (0.23) is closer to the mean. As can be seen in Figure 6.2, the histogram shows a considerably more log-normal distribution, where lower values are more uniformly allocated and where the previous long right-tail becomes shorter.

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[56] Since the logarithm of numbers lower than 1 is negative, the transformation has been performed summing up 1 to the value of the dependent variable. Then: (log) ESPC = log (1+ESPC).

Figure 6.2 *Histogram of the (Log) ESPC*

6.2. Explaining variation in the ESPC

The revision of the literature on electoral contamination in Chapter 3 has shown that asymmetric viability and, eventually, electoral contamination can come both from the supply-side and from the demand-side of parties. In this chapter, I rely on these factors to account for variation in the ESPC. However, before introducing the main independent variables and the hypotheses of the present research, it is necessary to acknowledge that variation in the ESPC, besides the institutional and sociological factors, can be explained by the presence of two distorting variables, whose impact should be minimised.

On the one hand, variation can come from parties' mistaken anticipation of their chances of becoming viable, or from voters' failure at predicting which party is going to be viable. Calculus errors are usually attributed to a lack of perfect information. This will take place especially in founding elections (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986;

Gunther 1989; Andrews and Jackman 2005; Tavits and Annus 2006; Lago and Martínez 2012) or in democracies with low party system institutionalisation or unconsolidated party systems (Clough 2007; Indridason 2008; Best 2010). Within these contexts, elites may fail to "behave consistently with the incentives inherent in the electoral law as a result of uncertainty about their likely levels of electoral support" (Gunther 1989: 851). Likewise, among voters, party identification is believed to be weaker and public opinion highly volatile (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: Part IV, 61). In order to avoid these disturbances only democratic elections are considered. With regard to founding elections, a control variable is included, just to prevent variation in the ESPC of being explained by the unusual levels of parties competing in first elections.

On the other hand, variation in the ESPC across countries can also come from country-specific factors and from random factors, which cannot be considered in a cross-national analysis such as this. The inclusion of country dummies in the model will try to account for country-specific variation; random factors will be attributed to the residual (ε) in the empirical model.

Once controlled by all these distorting sources of variation, only institutional and sociological factors are expected to account for variation in the extra supply of parties competing. Indeed, as has been argued in Chapter 3, there are five contexts that can bring about asymmetric viability, and therefore, they may generate electoral contamination. Four of these contexts are related to institutional features, that is, to the supply-side of political parties. These are the hypothetical cases of contamination effects (a) from districts within the

arena at stake; (b) from the upper tier in mixed-member systems; (c) from the presidential arena; (d) and from the regional arenas.[57] Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.4 deal with each of them. The fifth factor is related to sociological features, i.e. to the demand-side of parties. This is dealt with in Section 6.2.5. In section 6.2.6 I present the control variables of the empirical analysis.

6.2.1. Districts from the Same Arena

A party strategic decision to compete alone, even if non-viable, in a given district can be explained by the viability of the party in another district in the same election. In countries where DM is equal throughout constituencies, *ceteris paribus*, all the same political parties are expected to be either viable or non-viable everywhere. But it is in countries where differences in the number of seats elected in each constituency vary, that the emergence of asymmetric viability becomes plausible. I hypothesise that political parties will take advantage of their asymmetric viability to present candidacies in the more restrictive districts of the legislative arena where non-viable, thus calling into question the Duvergerian gravity. Hence, a high variation in the

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[57] The case of contamination effects from the upper chamber in bicameral legislatures has been excluded from the hypotheses since from a theoretical perspective the overlap of both chambers could only lead to contamination from the lower to the upper chamber, not otherwise. For further details see section 3.2.2, in the third chapter.

number of seats elected in the different districts of the legislative arena, will yield a higher ESPC.[58]

However, it could also be argued that the effect of asymmetric viability will be negligible up to a certain level of variation in DM. When differences in DM are equal or close to zero, the same numbers of parties are believed to become viable in all districts, thus not allowing the emergence of asymmetric viability. It is only beyond a certain threshold that the effect of the deviation in DM will become apparent. An exponential function is additionally proposed.

H1: The higher the variation in district magnitude, the higher will be the extra supply of parties competing. This effect will be especially relevant when a certain deviation in district magnitude has been reached.

These two variables are labelled *Std. Dev. DM* and *Std. Dev. DM Squared*, respectively. Data come from the same sources to calculate the dependent variable.

6.2.2. Upper Tier in Mixed-Member Systems

The existence of an upper tier elected by proportional representation (PR) modifies party entry decisions' in the lower tier, which by definition is elected by plurality or majority run-off. Political parties with asymmetric viability may decide to present candidacies in the nominal (lower) tier of MMS, where they are not viable, taking advantage of their viability in the list (upper) tier.

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[58] The deviation of district magnitude is not a novel variable in this field. Monroe and Rose (2002) theorised and empirically tested the consequences of the variance in district magnitude on some partisan and electoral issues.

There are many features related to the institutional design in MMS that have been shown to have an explicative power in predicting the chances of political parties to coordinate or not. Among these, the percentage of seats elected through PR is the most relevant determinant of the level of coordination between tiers (Kostadinova 2002; Moser and Scheiner 2004; Ferrara and Herron 2005).

H2.1: The higher the percentage of votes elected through PR in MMS, the higher will be the extra supply of parties competing.

A variable identifying the percentage of seats in mixed-member systems elected through proportional representation, is used. This variable, which I label *Upper Tier*, is built mostly from the *PARLINE database on national parliaments*[59], and complemented with data from Golder (2005), the *Constituency-Level Elections Archive* (CLEA) and from national parliaments' official websites.

Besides, I draw a second hypothesis, which captures the number of votes cast in MMS elections. When voters are allowed to cast separate ballots for the upper and the lower tiers, both tiers will be more likely to maintain their independence, thus reducing contamination effects. Conversely, when only one vote can be cast, higher electoral contamination is expected from the more permissive to the more restrictive tier (Ferrara and Herron 2005; Ferrara 2006).

H2.2: MMS with two votes will lead to a decrease in the extra supply of parties competing.

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[59] See http://www.ipu.org/parline/.

A dummy variable identifying whether voters are allowed to cast only one ballot (0) or two separate ballots (1) is created. This variable is labelled *Second Ballot in MMS* and is built from the same sources as the previous variable *Upper Tier*.

6.2.3. The Presidential Arena

Presidential coattails have been shown to depend mainly on the *timing* of the legislative elections with respect to the presidential elections (Shugart and Carey 1992; Cox 1997; Reich 2001; Gélineau and Remmer 2005; Clark and Golder 2006; Hicken and Stoll 2007). When both elections are proximate in time, the presidential arena will be more likely to contaminate the legislative elections, whereas when the two elections are held the furthest apart, the legislative and the presidential elections will be best able to support separate party systems.

Given that typically, there are only a small number of viable presidential candidates, concurrent and/or proximate elections are likely to yield a reduction in the number of parties competing at the legislative arena. Conversely, no reduction is expected between non-concurrent presidential and legislative arenas.

H3.1: The closer the presidential races to the legislative elections, the lower will be the extra supply of parties competing.

To operationalise the temporal distance between the presidential and the legislative arenas, I rely on the classical continuous measure of temporal proximity used by most of the literature (Cox 1997; Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006; Golder 2006). This measure is calculated as:

$$2 \cdot \left| \frac{L_t - P_{t-1}}{P_{t+1} - P_{t-1}} - 1/2 \right| \qquad (6.11)$$

Where L_t stands for the year of the legislative election, P_{t-1} for the year of the previous presidential election, and P_{t+1} for the year of the next presidential election. This continuous variable, which I label *Proximity*, equals 1 whenever both elections are concurrent and 0 whenever both elections are held in the midterm. Within parliamentary countries the variable also takes a value of 0. This variable is built from national parliaments' official websites.

This hypothesis, though, is drawn from the assumption that the number of presidential candidates is lower than the number of elective parties. However, given the fact that winning the presidential race is, most of the time, a bigger prize than winning the legislative elections, the presence of a higher number of presidential candidates could boost the number of parties competing at the legislative arena (Clark and Golder 2006; Golder 2006; Hicken and Stoll 2011).

> *H3.2: The higher the effective number of presidential candidates, the higher will be the extra supply of parties competing at the legislative arena.*

The Effective Number of Presidential Candidates (ENPRES) is built from official directories reporting presidential elections results at the national level.[60]

However, most scholars have shown that H3.1 and H3.2 have a conditional relation rather than a constitutive one. The deflationary

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[60] Whether the ENPRES or the 'extra supply of presidential candidates' is taken into account, no differences are observed since both measures are highly correlated (r=0.97).

(inflationary) effect of presidential elections will only take place when both elections are proximate in time, thus leading to higher (lower) degrees of coordination among parties.

H3.3: Temporary proximate presidential elections will increase the extra supply of parties competing only when the number of presidential candidates is high.

The conventional measure to calculate the variable *Proximity* and the *ENPRESS* has been called into question in recent times (Stoll 2011). In order to improve the accuracy of the measure Stoll has suggested three modifications as to how these variables are calculated.[61] Thus, an additional model with this alternative operationalisation of these two variables is used so as to test the validity and the reliability of the results obtained, in comparison with the classical operationalisation of the variable. The new variables are respectively labelled *Proximity (Stoll)* and *ENPRES (Stoll)*.

6.2.4. Regional Arenas

Regional chambers are usually more permissive arenas than national legislative chambers. This creates more fragmented party systems at the

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[61] These modifications are: First, calculating the proximity between presidential and legislative arenas using days as the unit of analysis instead of years. Second, adding 1 to the variable Proximity in presidential elections so that non-concurrent presidential elections and parliamentary elections can be distinguished (0 for parliamentary elections, 1 for non-concurrent presidential elections and 2 for concurrent presidential elections). Third, in the calculus of the ENPRES, instead of allowing only the preceding elections to have coattails, allowing also the subsequent elections to drive them, although privileging the preceding presidential elections.

regional arena than in the national one (Park 2003; Gerring 2005; Brancati 2008). Then, political parties may take advantage of their viability in the regional chamber to present candidacies in the national one, where they are non-viable.

However, decentralisation *per se* does not explain the emergence of electoral contamination. It is rather, the level of self-rule achieved by the regional chamber that explains the strength of regional parties in the national elections (Brancati 2008: 158). The higher the level of self-rule held by regional governments, the more likely it is that political parties that are viable at regional elections, decide to present candidacies in the national arena, irrespective of their chances of obtaining representation, thus increasing the ESPC.[62]

> *H4: The larger the powers attributed to the regional arena, the higher will be the extra supply of parties competing.*

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[62] One could argue actually that the level of regional self-government could be a predictor of the ESPC at the national arena, conditional on the existence of a permissive system at the regional arena. Although probably true, there are two reasons that make difficult the inclusion of such a variable in this analysis. First, the permissiveness of regional arenas does not only vary between countries but also within countries, since normally each country elects more than one regional arena and these vary in permissiveness. Trying to obtain a reliable averaged value of the permissiveness of the regional arenas for each country would be very complicated. Second, data availability on regional parliaments is, in general lines, very scarce, and as the level of self-government decreases, the difficulty to obtain such information also increases. Hence, although it would be a valuable contribution, both methodological and practical reasons discourage including such a variable in the analysis.

The best indicator to measure the level of powers transferred to regional governments is the *Regional Authority Index* (RAI) (Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2010)*,* a yearly measure of the authority of regional governments in 42 democracies or quasi-democracies over the period 1950-2006.[63] This indicator provides data both for the level of self-rule and the level of shared-rule owned by regional entities. Since I am only interested in the powers attributed exclusively to regions but not in the powers that regions share with national government, I use the level of self-government as a predictor of the ESPC. I logarithmically transform the variable since I do not expect it to have a linear relationship with the ESPC. I label the variable *(Log) Self-rule*.[64]

The level of decentralisation could also have been operationalised through other measures that provide reliable information on the level of decentralisation. This is the case of the indices from Lijphart (1999), Baldi (2003) or Fan, Lin and Treisman (2009). Unfortunately, these measures only include data for a limited number of countries. Elazar's (1995) classification on federal/unitary countries overcomes this drawback by including data on many countries around the world. However, the dichotomous character of this variable does not allow me

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[63] Available on-line at http://www.unc.edu/~gwmarks/data_ra.php.

[64] The RAI included data for 190 observations in the database*,* thus missing 50 observations for which the remaining data were available. In order to increase the number of observations available, a value of 0 (total centralisation) has been given to three countries without territorial or decentralised administrations. These countries are Costa Rica, Israel and Taiwan. The number of observations in this case increases up to 208. The inclusion or exclusion of these countries in the dataset does not have any impact on the empirical results. The variable without this additional transformation is available on-line.

to differentiate between the level of self-rule and shared-rule enjoyed by regional entities, as the RAI measure does.

6.2.5. Ethnolinguistic Heterogeneity

Asymmetric viability is not only restricted to the supply-side of parties but also to its *demand-side*. The presence in some part of the country of a territorialised regional cleavage –mainly an ethnolinguistic one– may displace a viable party in most regions of the country to a situation of non-viability in the region with ethnolinguistic specificities.

Thus, the decision of viable parties in most parts of the territory to present candidacies in the ethnically differentiated districts will increase the ESPC. Additionally, it is expected that the more important are the regional cleavages within a country, the more likely it will be to find political parties competing when non-viable.

> *H5: The higher the regional ethnolinguistic cleavage, the higher will be the extra supply of parties competing.*

There are several indices that provide comparative data on both ethnolinguistical *fractionalisation* and on ethnolinguistical *segregation*. Although considerably correlated, both measures point at different causal mechanisms.

Fractionalisation indexes evaluate the probability that two randomly selected people belong to different ethnic or linguistic groups. A value close to 0 indicates that all the population is ethnolinguistically equal, whereas values close to 1 provide evidence for very heterogeneous societies. Fractionalisation indices do not consider whether ethnic groups are concentrated within a given territory or not. This is actually

what segregation indices do. These measures take into account how the different ethnic or linguistic groups are distributed geographically within the country. Values close to 0 reflect a situation where all regions are ethnically identical, whereas values close to 1 refer to a situation where each ethnical or linguistic group occupies a separate region and therefore each region is fully homogeneous.

As I have hitherto mentioned, it is mainly the presence of a regional cleavage concentrated in a territory that is expected to drive the ESPC upwards. Thus, ethnic or linguistic segregation would be thought to better account for variation in the dependent variable, rather than fractionalisation measures. Unfortunately, segregation measures are still scarce at present, in comparison with fractionalisation indices, at the same time that the number of countries for which segregation data is available is smaller than for fractionalisation measures. In order to avoid depleting too much the number of observations from my models, I will mainly use a fractionalisation measure to account for variation in the ESCP, although a measure of segregation will additionally be tested.

As a measure of fractionalisation I use the widely used index of fractionalisation by Alesina et al (2003). This index provides data for all the case studies in the analysis. I label this variable *Fractionalisation*. Additionally, as a measure of segregation I rely on the index of ethnic segregation from by Alesina and Zhuravskaya

(2011). This variable, which is labelled *Segregation,* includes data for 39 of the countries in the dataset.[65]

6.2.6. Control Variables

In order to keep the models as simple and as stable as possible, only two control variables have been included. First, I control for the existence of *first elections.* I understand as first elections any election that has taken place, either (a) after a process of transition to democracy, or (b) after a reform in the electoral system. There are theoretical reasons to expect that in both contexts, the ESPC will be higher than in consolidated party systems.

Concerning *transitions to democracy*, scholars have argued that during the early democratic years information cues are weaker and outcomes are more uncertain, due to the presence of low levels of information, which lead to high levels of electoral volatility and party system turnover (Olson 1998; Tóka 1998; Bielasiak 2002; Birch et al. 2003; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Sikk 2005). The expected low level of

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[65] This database includes measures for ethnic, linguistic and religious segregation. Given that the number of observations for which data are available are higher in the measures of ethnic segregation than in the ones of linguistic segregation I use the first ones. Further, there are several measures of ethnic (and linguistic) segregation. In particular I use the variable labelled by the authors as 'ethnicity_C'. However, the use of one of these variables instead of another does not bring any significant change in the empirical results.

Additionally, I have tested the validity and robustness of the results through other measures such as the *Ethnic Power Relations* dataset (Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2009) or the measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation by Roeder (2001). In both cases the results point in the same direction.

190

information available in these elections will lead to low levels of coordination and strategic voting (Sartori 1986; Moser 1999; Moser 2001; Tavits and Annus 2006), thus probably enhancing the ESPC.

Similarly, *reforms in the electoral system* in democratic countries may also lead to high levels of uncertainty due to the lack of accurate information on the chances of parties standing for elections, but also due to voters' slow adaptation to the new electoral rules.[66] As Denemark (2003: 615) noted when studying the change from a SMD plurality system to a mixed-member proportional representation (MMP) in New Zealand, "while the party elites were aware well before the campaign began of the need to embrace new tactics to maximize party list votes, the first MMP election in 1996 reflected important residues of the FPP mindset. (...) [T]he patterns of constituency-level activities in the first election campaign under MMP reflected the important influence of inertia amongst the various political actors involved". Similar patterns of behaviour can be expected elsewhere after a reform in the electoral system. Hence, low levels of coordination are also expected after reforms in the electoral system.

In the dataset I have data for five elections held after a *Transition* from a non-democratic period (2.1%) and seven elections (2.9%) held after a *Reform* in the electoral system. In order to enhance the number of observations I aggregate both casuistries into a new variable which I label *First Elections* (12 observations, 5% of the total cases). Besides, I

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[66] As I have mentioned earlier in Chapter 2 (see footnote 16), I understand a reform of the electoral system as Lijphart (1994) does.

also test the independent effect of each of these variables in two complementary models.

Second, a control for *district magnitude* has also been included. DM has been largely used, most times in its logarithmic transformation, to explain party system fragmentation (Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1990; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Cox 1997; Mozaffar, Scaritt, and Galaich 2003; Golder 2006). In this thesis, this variable is used, also in its logarithmic transformation, as a control to explain the ESPC at the district level.

Under the Duvergerian assumptions one could argue that political parties would respond to the constraints of the electoral system regardless of DM: Non-viable political parties would desert competition both in very restrictive arenas and in the most permissive ones. However, it has been shown that political parties challenge the Duvergerian theories to the extent that they present candidacies when non-viable. If it is assumed that, *ceteris paribus*, political parties in the more restrictive and in the more permissive arenas behave equally, i.e., they present candidacies even if non-viable in the same proportion, no control would be required. However, scholars have argued that as DM decreases the number of wasted votes is higher (Carsten 1997; Cox and Knoll 2003). Then, it could be that a reduction in DM does not linearly reduce the number of parties competing, but rather the decrease is smoother. Whether true, this would show evidence of inelasticity in the supply of non-viable political parties as DM decreases. Consequently more ESPC would be found in the most restrictive districts, although this would be unrelated to the phenomenon of contamination effects.

Thus, a control variable for (log) DM is included, expecting that it will take a negative sign.[67]

Data on DM come from the same sources from which the dependent variable has been built. The variable, which I label *(Log) DM*, is aggregated at the national level through its mean and afterwards logarithmically transformed.[68]

Table VIII in Annex-Chapter 6 summarises the main descriptive statistics for all the variables included in the empirical analysis.

6.3. Descriptive Analysis of the ESPC

Before addressing the reasons that are able to account for variation in the ESPC, it is worth describing the distribution of the dependent variable across countries and presenting some insights of the expected value of the ESPC on the basis of the main independent variables,

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[67] The correlation between (log) DM and the standard deviation of DM is 0.38 for the baseline model in this research. There are two reasons that recommend the inclusions of both variables at the same time in the model. First, the two variables are pointing at different causal mechanisms, which are well developed theoretically. Second, the expected directions of both variables is opposite: Std. Dev. DM should be positively related with the ESPC and (log) DM negatively related.

[68] Other control variables have been discarded. These are, among others, the longevity of the democracy (Converse 1969; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Brader and Tucker 2001; Rose and Munro 2003; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006), the control for the post-communist past (Evans and Whitefield 1993; Kolankiewicz 1993; Rychard 1993; Kitschelt 1995; Duch 1998; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Bielasiak 2002) or some variables related to the institutional design such as elections where electorate can rank votes, or the existence in SMD of a run-off system rather than the more usual first-past-the-post system.

hitherto presented.[69] To begin with, Table 6.5 presents the country mean values of the ESPC, the standard deviation and the number of elections for which data are available. The table is ordered from the lower to the higher levels of ESPC.[70]

Table 6.5 *Aggregated Descriptives of the ESPC by Country*

	Number of Observations	Mean ESPC	Std. Deviation of the ESPC
Netherlands	6	0.03	0.02
USA	11	0.06	0.02
Trinidad y Tobago	6	0.09	0.10
Israel	7	0.09	0.03
South Africa	3	0.09	0.03
Austria	8	0.11	0.05
Luxembourg	5	0.12	0.06
Sweden	8	0.16	0.05
Finland	5	0.17	0.04
Belgium	5	0.17	0.05
Portugal	8	0.19	0.03
Poland	4	0.19	0.07
Iceland	5	0.21	0.10
Spain	6	0.21	0.09
Switzerland	6	0.22	0.05
Greece	10	0.22	0.07
Slovakia	5	0.22	0.08
Botswana	2	0.25	0.01
Norway	7	0.26	0.03
Latvia	6	0.26	0.08
Czech Republic	5	0.29	0.09
Slovenia	3	0.29	0.07
Costa Rica	7	0.31	0.14
Hungary	5	0.33	0.13

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[69] Note that for descriptive purposes I use the variable ESPC without its logarithmic transformation. The log-transformed ESPC will exclusively be used in the quantitative analysis (section 6.5).

[70] In order to further analyse the distribution of values of the ESPC, Figure V to Figure XII in the Annex-Chapter 6 present the temporal evolution of the ESPC for each country included in the analysis.

Denmark	7	0.37	0.14
Albania	2	0.38	0.01
Taiwan	4	0.38	0.10
India	3	0.39	0.03
Australia	4	0.43	0.10
Moldova	6	0.43	0.30
Italy	2	0.45	0.29
South Korea	6	0.45	0.12
United Kingdom	5	0.49	0.09
Canada	7	0.52	0.06
Bulgaria	4	0.53	0.11
Croatia	4	0.54	0.17
New Zealand	6	0.57	0.19
Mexico	4	0.59	0.17
Germany	5	0.68	0.02
Estonia	6	0.69	0.49
Ireland	6	0.82	0.20
France	5	1.05	0.35
Cyprus	2	1.09	0.33
Turkey	2	1.20	0.79
Bolivia	2	1.45	0.03
Lithuania	5	1.92	0.51

In the Netherlands, the USA, Trinidad and Tobago, Israel and South Africa, the mean increase of the number of parties competing compared to the ones that ended up becoming viable, is lower than 10%. This indicates that in these countries, the Duvergerian gravity is not far from being observed. In 17 countries (37%), the ESPC ranges between 0.1 and 0.3, and in another 16 countries (35%), the value goes from 0.3 to 0.6. Overall, in 38 of the 46 countries included in the analysis (83%), the mean increase of the number of parties competing compared to the ones which ended up becoming viable is lower than 0.6. The 8 remaining countries (17%) have a mean value of ESPC higher than 0.6. Among these, five countries (France, Cyprus, Turkey, Bolivia and Lithuania) have a value higher than 1, indicating that the effective

number of parties competing is more than double the value of the effective number of viable parties.

Figure 6.3 presents the evolution of the values of the ESPC from 1990 to 2011.[71] The graphic bars show the number of observations for which data on the ESPC are available for each year. The dotted line shows the standard deviation of the ESPC by year, and the continuous line shows the evolution of the ESPC since 1990. According to the figure no trend is observable throughout time.

Figure 6.3 Evolution of the ESPC, 1990-2011

Table 6.6 presents the summary statistics of the ESPC in relation to all the five main independent variables and the two control variables in

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[71] Note that the database includes elections since 1985. However, given that the number of observations up to 1990 is too small, the evolution of the values of the dependent variable is presented from 1990, when data for already 21 elections are available.

196

this research. The last column indicates whether differences in the mean for each of the covariates are statistically significant.

Table 6.6 Descriptive Statistics of the ESPC in relation to the IV

Variable		N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Sign
Std. Dev. DM	No	112	0.46	0.45	0.01	2.83	(**)
	Yes	128	0.31	0.28	0.05	1.76	
MMS	No	144	0.33	0.30	0.01	1.77	(*)
	Yes	96	0.45	0.46	0.05	2.83	
Presidential elections	No	158	0.32	0.25	0.01	1.77	(**)
	Yes	82	0.49	0.53	0.02	2.83	
Self-rule	No	184	0.41	0.41	0.01	2.83	(*)
	Yes	56	0.29	0.22	0.02	0.81	
Ethnic fractionalisation	No	120	0.35	0.28	0.01	1.35	-
	Yes	120	0.41	0.45	0.02	2.83	
SMD	No	160	0.29	0.27	0.01	1.77	(**)
	Yes	80	0.54	0.49	0.02	2.83	
First elections	No	228	0.37	0.37	0.01	2.83	(†)
	Yes	12	0.58	0.51	0.16	1.69	

Standard errors in parentheses. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

The first row shows the averaged ESPC between countries where the standard deviation of district magnitude is equal to 0 from those where deviation is higher than 0. Evidence shows that when there is congruence in the number of seats to be elected within the legislative arena, the ESPC is significantly higher. This goes in the contrary direction than what was theoretically expected, although this is not a

surprise given the correlation between this variable and the averaged district magnitude, which is included as a control variable.

On the second row the averaged ESPC is provided for countries with and without a MMS. In line with what the literature has already stressed, data show significant evidence in favour of MMS articulating party systems where the number of wasted votes at the lower tier is higher than in one-tiered legislatures.

On the third row is shown the averaged ESPC in presidential and parliamentary countries. Presidential countries should lead to higher degrees of coordination in the legislative arenas. However, according to the data the ESPC is significantly higher in presidential countries than in parliamentary ones. The inferential model will have to clarify this point since presidential countries are used to having more restrictive electoral systems, which could actually be introducing some noise into this bilateral comparison.

On the following row, I present the averaged ESPC as a function of the level of self-rule held by regional governments.[72] According to the hypothesis established above, in decentralised countries the ESPC should be higher. However, evidence shows that in the more decentralised countries, the ESPC is significantly lower than the one in the more centralised countries. As happened in the previous case of presidential and parliamentary countries, the inferential analysis will have to address the extent to which this variable takes this unexpected direction or not.

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[72] To calculate it, I split by the median value the level of self-rule held by regional chambers, using the RAI measure (Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2010).

On the fifth row, differences in the averaged ESPC are provided with regard to the level of ethnolinguistical fractionalisation of the country.[73] As was theoretically expected, in ethnolinguistically diverse countries, the ESPC is higher than the one in more homogenous countries, although differences are not statistically significant.

The last two rows present evidence for the two main control variables used in the empirical analysis. With regard to the dummy variable between uninominal and multinominal districts, the averaged mean in countries elected in SMD is almost twice the one obtained in PR countries. Differences are statistically significant, thus showing initial evidence in favour of the inelasticity of the supply of parties as DM decreases. For what concerns first elections, statistical evidence shows at the 10% level that the ESPC is higher in these elections, as theoretically expected.

All in all, this is only initial evidence in favour or against the hypotheses presented previously. The empirical analysis that follows will have to address the extent to which these relations hold, or not, when controlling for all the intervening factors that may be contemporaneously accounting for differences in the ESPC.

6.4. Methods and Models

Data included in this research have a time-series cross-sectional structure (TSCS). TSCS models have been shown to be difficult to estimate since the error process of these models is more complicated

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[73] As in the previous case, I also split into two groups of the same size the variable 'Ethnic fractionalisation' by Alesina et al (2003).

than in either time-series or cross-sectional models, and different assumptions about this error process lead to different preferred methods of estimation (Beck and Katz 1995: 636).

The most used procedure to estimate TSCS data, the generalised least squares (GLS) –described by Parks (1967)– has been shown to have some problems. In particular, this model usually leads to extreme overconfidence for typical TSCS data (Beck and Katz 1995: 635), and this situation especially, takes place when the number of time points is not much bigger than the number of cross-sectional units. In the present database, there are substantially more cross-sectional units (46 countries) than time points (number of elections for each country, which range between 2 and 11). Hence, TSCS estimated through GLS is not the most adequate procedure to use.

According to the structure of the data, a lineal regression by Ordinary Least Squares is the more appropriate method to estimate the effect of the different independent variables on the (log) ESPC. OLS estimates of TSCS models usually perform well in practical research situations, although the standard errors in these contexts are inaccurate. In order to solve this common problem in comparative politics, I will correct the standard errors with the technique of panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE), as Beck and Katz (1995: 635) proposed. Besides, a Hausman test (Hausman 1978) indicates that there are factors distinctive of each country that recommend the use of fixed effects.[74]

Hence, an OLS with PCSE model and country dummies is run. This allows testing the unitary effects of each explicative variable

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[74] Results not reported.

independent of the factors idiosyncratic to each country. The use of an OLS regression with PCSE and country dummies is a more precautious solution than using OLS regression with standard errors and clusters by country, since standard errors in PCSE are corrected by the contemporaneous correlation of the errors. Besides, since variation in time is not relevant in this model (see Figure 6.3), it is not necessary to control for the serial correlations of the errors.

Ultimately, the models drawn are robust. The empirical results are coherent and show only small variation when the estimation method is changed. Inference has been run with several alternative methods: OLS model with country dummies, OLS model clustered by country, and TSCS analysis with GLS estimator and fixed effects (in this later case, dropping the variables that do not vary along time). The results obtained do not vary substantially and the most relevant variables conserve their explicative power. Furthermore, the inclusion or exclusion of certain variables does not affect the main results obtained and different operationalisations of the variables do not lead to relevant changes in the empirical results. Actually, in order to show that the empirical results are robust to different operationalisations, several models are designed.

Indeed, a first set of five models is originally designed. Then, four additional models are also run to test the robustness and validity of the results, irrespective of the type of variable codification used.

Following a similar structure to Cox (Cox 1997; Neto and Cox 1997: 164) the first model includes only one covariate for each of the main explicative institutional settings that may bring asymmetric viability.

These are the standard deviation of DM, the presence of an upper tier, the proximity between presidential and legislative arenas, and the level of regional decentralisation. The second model is the sociological one and thus incorporates only the variable related to the demand-side of parties, ethnic fractionalisation. The third one incorporates variables from models 1 and 2 plus the two control variables: the (log) DM and the dummy variable for first elections. Model 4 adds to the previous one the remaining variables from which contamination effects can arise from an institutional point of view: the square of DM, the presence of a second ballot in MMS and the effective number of presidential candidates. Model 4 is the baseline model of this research. Finally, the fifth model adds to the fourth one the interaction between proximity and ENPRES.

These are the five main models. However, in order to show the robustness and validity of the empirical results found, several alternative models are also designed. Model 6 evaluates the alternative measures designed by Stoll (2011) to account for contamination from presidential to legislative elections. The fourth model serves as the baseline for the subsequent models to be developed. In Model 7 and Model 8, the variable identifying the presence of first elections is, respectively, replaced by the existence of a transition from a dictatorship to a democracy (Model 7) and by a dummy variable identifying a change in the electoral system (Model 8). Finally, in Model 9 the fractionalisation variable is replaced by the measure of segregation from Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011). This enables me to test the extent to which the concentration of a cleavage within a territory is better able to account for variation in the ESPC than when

202

the measure is insensitive to the concentration or dispersion of the cleavage.

6.5. Results

Table 6.7 presents the results of the five OLS regressions with PCSE, in which the independent variables are progressively introduced.

Given that the dependent variable is log-transformed, the interpretation of the effect of a one-point change on the ESPC is complicated. In order to ease the comprehension of the beta coefficients Table 6.8 reports the percentage change that the different independent variables in Model 4 –the baseline model– produce in the ESPC according to my estimates.[75] The table further reports the expected direction of the variable according to the theoretical argumentations, the range of the independent variable, the original beta coefficients in the OLS model and its signification, as well as the maximum impact in terms of percentage that each covariate can inflict to the ESPC when changing from the lowest to the highest value in the independent variable.

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[75] When the dependent variable is transformed through the natural (or Neperian) logarithm, the percentage change for the linear independent variables is calculated using $100 * (e^{\beta} - 1)$, where β is the coefficient of each independent variable. For log-transformed independent variables the formula is $100 * (e^{\beta * ln(1.01)} - 1)$ (Vittinghoff et al. 2005).

Table 6.7 OLS with PSCS Analysis of the (Log) ESPC

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*
Std. Dev. DM	-0.018		-0.009	-0.043*	-0.045*
	(0.011)		(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Std. Dev. DM Squared				0.003*	0.003*
				(0.001)	(0.001)
Upper Tier	1.509**		1.158**	1.119**	1.136**
	(0.148)		(0.143)	(0.138)	(0.140)
Second Ballot in MMS				-0.723**	-0.625**
				(0.163)	(0.174)
Proximity	-0.015		-0.013	-0.019	0.121
	(0.025)		(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.104)
ENPRES				0.028	0.068*
				(0.018)	(0.033)
*Proximity*ENPRES*					-0.052
					(0.042)
(Log) Self-Rule	0.067**		0.039†	0.043*	0.044*
	(0.022)		(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Fractionalisation		3.050**	2.504*	3.188**	3.655**
		(0.903)	(1.097)	(1.069)	(1.126)
(Log) DM			-0.226**	-0.269**	-0.260**
			(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.057)
First Elections			0.024	0.030	0.032
			(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Constant	-0.038	-0.220*	0.352	0.294	0.135
	(0.154)	(0.105)	(0.280)	(0.279)	(0.301)
Observations	208	240	208	208	208

Standard errors in parentheses. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 6.8 *Percentage Change in the (Log) ESPC*

	Hypothesised direction	*Range*	*Beta coefficients*	*% Change*	*Range x %Change*
Std. Dev. DM	+	10	-0.04*	-4.02	-40.23
Std. Dev. DM Squared	+	122.47	0.003*	0.31	38.12
Upper Tier	+	0.59	1.12**	192.88	114.57
Second Ballot in MMS	-	1	-0.72**	-50.04	-50.04
Proximity	-	1	-0.02	-1.80	-1.80
ENPRES	+	8.66	0.03	2.74	23.68
(Log) Self-Rule	+	3.14	0.04*	4.12	12.93
Fractionalisation	+	0.75	3.19**	2036.81	1525.57
(Log) DM	-	5.01	-0.27**	-25.68	128.66
First Elections	+	1	0.03	2.91	2.91

[†] $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

Results in Table 6.7 confirm many of the expectations. Model 1 shows empirical evidence and in the expected direction for a positive and very significant effect of the percentage of seats elected in the upper tier on the ESPC, as was hypothesised in H2.

Second, the variable (log) self-rule, which accounts for the existence of contamination from regional arenas to the national ones, is statistically significant and in the expected direction. This implies that the higher the level of self-rule achieved by regional arenas, *ceteris paribus*, the higher will be the ESPC in the national arena, as expected in H4.

Third, the standard deviation of DM is negatively but non-significantly related with the dependent variable, against what hypothesised in H1. Variation in DM tries to capture the effect of having political parties

with asymmetric viability on the ESPC. Empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that high asymmetric viability leads to high levels of ESPC. However, additional specifications in subsequent models will address whether the explicative power of asymmetric viability appears only after reaching a certain level of variation in DM.

Fourth, the proximity between the presidential and the legislative elections does not appear to be a relevant predictor of the ESPC either. Given that the number of parties competing in presidential elections is normally lower than in legislative elections, H2.1 hypothesised that close presidential elections should have a negative impact on the ESPC. The coefficient for this variable is negative although not statistically significant. I will come back to the effect of presidential elections on the ESPC with the inclusion of the effective number of presidential candidates (ENPRES) and the interaction between the proximity between elections and ENPRES.

In Model 2, I address whether ethnic fractionalisation has any positive impact on the ESPC, as hypothesised in H5. In light of the results obtained in the second column, the presence of ethnic fractionalisation is a relevant predictor of the ESPC in this purely sociological model.

Model 3 adds to the variables of the previous models, the two control variables considered in this research. The inclusion of these two controls does not lead to too many changes in the empirical results. Both the standard deviation of DM and the proximity between the presidential and the legislative arenas continue being non-significant. The percentage of seats elected in an upper tier and ethnic fractionalisation are still very relevant and significant variables.

206

Similarly, the level of self-rule achieved by regional governments continues being positive and statistically significant, although at the 10% level.

With regard to the control variables, the (log) DM arises as a powerful covariate, showing evidence of the inelastic component of the supply of parties as DM decreases. This means that as district magnitude is reduced the ESPC does not proportionally shrink. The control for the existence of first elections –either after a democratisation or a change in the electoral system– does not have a significant effect on the dependent variable although the beta coefficient is positive as expected.

Model 4 adds to the previous model the three last factors that may account for differences in asymmetric viability from the supply-side of parties: the square of the standard deviation of DM, the second ballot in MMS, and the ENRES. Since this is the baseline model I go in-depth in the empirical results found.

The inclusion of the squared standard deviation of DM wants to account for the possibility that an increase in the ESPC does not take place before a certain threshold in the deviation of DM is reached. When this squared term is included, the negative coefficient of the standard deviation of DM becomes stronger and statistically significant, showing thus, that as variation in DM increases, *ceteris paribus*, the ESPC initially decreases, against what was hypothesised in the first part of H1. However, the quadratic term of the variation in DM is positive and statistically significant, as was additionally specified in H1. This coefficient indicates that, actually, the positive effect of the variation in DM on the ESPC only takes place after a certain threshold is reached.

In particular, it is beyond a variation in DM around 10 that the dependent variable starts to increase. This evidence may indicate that a low variation in DM is not enough to foster competition when non-viable, but rather that this only occurs when variation in DM is very high.

As shown in Table 6.8, an increase in one point in the deviation of DM will have a negative impact on the value of the ESPC of 4%. Given that until a value of 10 in the deviation of DM, the ESPC will decrease, changing from a country without variation in DM to a country with a variation equal to 10 would entail a negative change on the ESPC of 40%. Beyond a value of 10 in the deviation of DM the ESPC will start to increase. Changing from a country with DM equal to 10 to a country with DM equal to 15 (the maximum in the database) will imply an increase in the ESPC of 38%. Therefore, contamination from within the districts of the same arena will take place, although this is expected to occur given a deviation in DM close to 10. Below this threshold, an increase in the deviation of DM will yield a reduction in the ESPC.

With regard to the two variables related to contamination from MMS evidence strongly supports both hypotheses. As the percentage of seats elected in the list tier increases, the ESPC also increases, showing evidence for H2.1. In particular, an increase in one percentage point on the number of seats elected in the upper tier produces a boost in the ESPC of 2%. Overall, changing from a country without MMS to a country with MMS where 60% of the seats are elected by PR, more than doubles the ESPC.

The presence of a second ballot in MMS is also a good predictor of the ESPC, as hypothesised in H2.2. As Table 6.8 shows, in MMS where voters are allowed to cast only one ballot, the ESPC will be halved when compared to those MMS with second ballot. Overall, evidence strongly confirms the existence of contamination effects from the upper tiers in MMS to the lower tiers.

As in previous models, the proximity between the presidential and the legislative areas does not appear to be a good predictor on the ESPC, as hypothesised in H3.1. The covariate is negatively related with the dependent variable although it is far from statistical signification. The inclusion of the number of presidential candidates (ENPRES) does not show a statistically significant relation with the ESPC either, although the beta coefficient takes the expected value and is not far from signification. In light of these results H3.1 and H3.2 cannot be accepted.

The level of self-rule, again, seems to be a good predictor of the ESPC. As expected in H4, as the powers attributed to the regional arenas increase, the higher will be the ESPC. In particular, as Table 6.8 shows, changing from a completely centralised to the most decentralised country is expected to increase the ESPC by 13%. This shows evidence of contamination effects from the regional chambers to the national ones, although the impact of the variable on the ESPC is not particularly strong.

With regard to ethnic fractionalisation, the variable is strongly powerful and significant at explaining variation in the ESPC. This confirms H5, for which ethnic fractionalisation will increase the number of wasted

209

voters in the national chamber. Table 6.8 shows that changing from the most homogeneous country to the most heterogeneous one, will multiply the value of the dependent variable by 16. This shows evidence of contamination effects from the demand-side of political parties. However, the results yielded by this variable show a coefficient unexpectedly high –although stable across models. In this regard, it will be worthwhile addressing the impact of the segregation index on the ESPC. This measure of segregation is theoretically expected to better account for variation in the dependent variable, and although the number of observations in the model will shrink, it should clarify the impact of the demand factors on the ESPC.

The two control variables show very similar patterns to the ones observed in Model 3. The (log) DM arises again as a powerful explanatory variable in accounting for variance in the ESPC. As Table 6.8 shows, changing from a SMD electoral system to the country with the highest (log) DM, will imply a reduction in the ESPC of 129%. With regard to the control for first elections, empirical evidence does not significantly support the idea that a higher number of votes devoted to non-viable parties will be found in first elections. Despite that, the variable takes a positive value, as expected. Given the low number of observations for this variable, it is not conclusive considering that first elections will not yield an increase in the number of wasted votes.

The fifth model includes an interaction between the effective number of presidential candidates and the proximity between the presidential and the legislative arenas. The inclusion of this variable does not lead to any significant change in the remaining variables of the model.

However, adding the interaction term between Proximity and ENPRES reverses the coefficient of proximity, becoming on this occasion positive but still statistically far from signification. The ENPRES, as hypothesised in H3.2, becomes significant, thus showing that a high number of presidential candidates in non-concurrent elections will lead to an increase in the ESPC. In particular, according to figures presented in Table 6.8 changing from an (imaginative) country with a number of presidential candidates equal to zero to the country with the highest number of candidates would bring about an increase in the ENPRES of 24% when elections are non-concurrent. However, the interactive term between both variables is negative, against H3.3, although non-significant. This situation shows that the marginal effect of temporary proximate elections will not have any impact on the dependent variable depending on the number of presidential candidates.

In view of the results, H3.2 could be accepted whereas H3.1 and H3.3 would have to be rejected. However, when plotting these results as Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) suggest it becomes clear that the ENPRES has a positive but very small effect on the ESPC when elections are non-concurrent; conversely, when elections are concurrent the ENPRES does not have any impact on the ESPC.[76] Overall, the negligible magnitude of the effects observed would recommend discarding any kind of contamination effect from the presidential elections on the ESPC, thus rejecting H3.1, H3.2 and H3.3.[77]

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[76] The figure is not provided. But commands for reproducing it are available on the web.

[77] Other interactions of variables that receive support from theories have been tested, although since they do not become statistically significant, they have been excluded.

In order to assess the robustness and validity of the results presented in the previous models, Table 6.9 presents the results of four OLS regressions with PCSE where different operationalisations and specifications are tested.

The classical interaction between the permissiveness of the electoral system and ethnic heterogeneity, which has largely been shown by the literature to explain party system fragmentation (Jones 1994; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Cox 1997; Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 1999; Mozaffar, Scaritt, and Galaich 2003; Lago 2004, 23-43; Clark and Golder 2006; Golder 2006; Hicken and Stoll 2011) does not appear to be a determinant factor at explaining the ESPC. Similarly, the triple interaction between the proximity of the presidential elections, the number of presidential candidates and the permissiveness of the legislative arena proposed by Hicken and Stoll (2011) to account for variation on the number of parties competing does not appear to have a significant effect either, although its coefficient is positive as expected.

Table 6.9 *OLS with PSCS Analysis of the (Log) ESPC*

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Std. Dev. DM	-0.039*	-0.047*	-0.042*	-0.047*
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Std. Dev. DM Squared	0.003*	0.003**	0.003*	0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Upper Tier	1.134**	1.126**	1.154**	1.116**
	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.140)	(0.140)
Second Ballot in MMS	-0.626**	-0.737**	-0.750**	-0.680**
	(0.236)	(0.165)	(0.161)	(0.170)
Proximity (Stoll)	0.084			
	(0.113)			
Proximity		-0.019	-0.019	-0.031
		(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
ENPRES (Stoll)	0.0705			
	(0.075)			
ENPRES		0.028	0.027	0.032†
		(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
*Proximity*ENPRES*	-0.038			
	(0.045)			
(Log) Self-Rule	0.044*	0.045*	0.042†	0.045*
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Fractionalisation	3.582**	3.159**	3.125**	
	(1.270)	(1.053)	(1.089)	
Segregation				2.046**
				(0.660)
(Log) Mean DM	-0.264**	-0.272**	-0.272**	-0.275**
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.056)
First Elections	0.024			0.029
	(0.028)			(0.030)
Transition		0.022		
		(0.044)		
Reform			0.035	
			(0.032)	
Constant	0.150	0.320	0.321	0.602**
	(0.381)	(0.279)	(0.281)	(0.197)
Observations	208	208	208	195

Standard errors in parentheses. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Model 6 in Table 6.9 replicates the analysis carried out in the fifth model (Table 6.7). In it, variables related to the process of contamination from presidential to legislative elections are calculated using the operationalisation proposed by Stoll (2011). The use of this new codification does not bring any significant difference in comparison with the results obtained in Model 5. None of the three variable related to the process of contamination from presidential arenas are significant through this new operationalisation. Actually, the number of presidential candidates, that was significant in Model 5, in this case loses statistical signification. This supports the conclusion indicated previously. Neither the proximity between the legislative elections (H3.1), nor the effective number of presidential candidates (H3.2), nor the interaction of both variables (H3.3) have any significant impact on the ESPC, once it has been controlled by all the remaining intervening factors.

The next two models test whether the existence of a transition from a non-democratic regime, or the change in the electoral system, are able to account for variation in the ESPC. These models are presented as alternatives to Model 4, where the variable accounting for first elections included, at the same time, transition processes and electoral reforms. In Model 4, the variable identifying first elections was not significant. Similarly, the substitution of this variable by a new one identifying a transition (Model 7) or a reform in the electoral system (Model 8) does not bring any relevant result either. None of the variables are significant, although in both cases the beta coefficient is also positively related with the ESPC.

In the last model the measure of ethnic fractionalisation used up to now is substituted by the measure of ethnic segregation by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011). The use of this variable provides a beta coefficient, which is far more reliable than the one obtained through the Alesina et al's (2003) measure. Indeed, changing from the least segregated to the most segregated country in the sample would have a positive impact on the ESPC of 106%, –a value far more reliable than the one obtained through the fractionalisation measure. This would show evidence in favour of the fact that it is the concentration of a regional cleavage within a territory, that is better able to account for variation in the ESPC, rather than the mere presence of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation within a country. Unfortunately, the number of observations for this variable is smaller, so that the use of fractionalisation measures was more recommendable for running most of the models. Further research will have to go further on the impact of segregation measures on the number of wasted votes, but overall it seems clear that ethnolinguistic heterogeneity has an impact on the ESPC, as H5 suggested.

6.6. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter I have focused attention on determining the extent of the phenomenon of contamination effects. In it, I have addressed the impact of both institutional and sociological factors on a dependent variable that accounts for the extra supply of parties competing, as compared to what the Duvergerian theories predict. To do so, I have purposely built a new database, which includes 46 countries and data for 240 democratic elections. Through an OLS regression, with PCSE

and country dummies, I can confirm many of the theoretical expectations put forward.

First, and in the same direction of what has been largely pointed to by the literature, an increase in the percentage of seats in a MMS elected through PR has a positive impact on the ESPC in the lower and less permissive tiers of MMS, thus confirming H2.1. However, the percentage of seats elected in the upper tier is not the unique source of contamination effects from MMS. Indeed, MMS where voters can only cast one ballot for the upper and the lower tiers have been shown to have a positive effect on the ESPC. H2.2 can thus be accepted.

The degree of self-rule attributed to the regional arena is also able to explain variation in the ESPC, showing evidence in favour of the existence of contamination effects between national and regional arenas (H4). The higher the powers held by regional governments, *ceteris paribus*, the larger the electoral contamination from the more permissive regional chamber to the national arena will be.

The presence of an ethnolinguistic cleavage has been also shown to be a good predictor of the ESPC, thus providing evidence in favour of contamination effects from the demand-side of parties, as H5 suggested. The segregation measure has provided far more reliable results than the fractionalisation index. Further analysis will have to go further on the effect of segregation measures in the number of wasted votes, although it seems that –as was theoretically expected– it is the concentration of a regional cleavage within a territory that is better able to account for differences in the ESPC.

Finally, it has also been shown that an increase in the variation of DM, leads to a decrease in the ESPC until a certain deviation in district magnitude is obtained (around 10). Beyond this point, increasing the variation of DM will yield an increase in the ESPC, thus partially confirming H1. This provides evidence of the existence of contamination effects from within the same legislative arena, although this only applies when differences in district magnitude are very high.

None of the variables related to the process of contamination from the presidential to the legislative elections, have been shown to have an impact on the ESPC. Neither the proximity between the legislative elections, nor the effective number of presidential candidates, nor the interaction between both terms has been able to account for variation in the dependent variable.

Besides, it is also relevant to pay attention to the empirical results of the control variables. Although they do not tell us anything about the existence of electoral contamination, they can also provide some interesting insights on the explanation of the ESPC. First, a low (log) DM has been shown to increase the number of parties competing even if non-viable, showing thus, evidence in favour of the inelasticity in the supply of political parties as (log) DM decreases. Second, no evidence has arisen with respect to the possibility that first elections lead to a significant increase in the ESPC. Neither when only founding elections after a non-democratic period are taken into account; nor when considering only elections, which have taken place after a reform in the electoral system; nor when both casuistries are grouped together, empirical evidence is strong enough to account for differences in the ESPC.

CHAPTER 7.
CONCLUSIONS

7.1. Contribution

According to the Duvergerian theories, the entrance of non-viable parties is a random phenomenon. Political parties should only present candidacies when they have chances of achieving representation, so that deviations in this equilibrium should only be temporary. At the mid and the long-term, parties would be thought to desert competition when non-viable. In this thesis I have called into question this largely accepted assumption by claiming that, even when rational choice assumptions are met, the decision to stand for elections when non-viable, is a systematic phenomenon that takes place across parties, countries and electoral systems. Thus, entering into competition when non-viable, far from being a random phenomenon, becomes the dominant strategy among political parties in mass elections.

Before addressing the reasons that explain why political parties decide to present candidacies when they are non-viable, the first and foremost purpose of this thesis has been to establish the phenomenon, to show that it exists, and to identify its commonalities among apparently different processes. Through an in-depth revision of the literature, I have identified five different contexts that can *contaminate* political parties' entry decisions in national legislative arenas. Four of these factors are related to the supply-side of parties: (a) from districts within the same national legislative arena; (b) from the list to the nominal tier in mixed-member systems; (c) from presidential elections; and (d) from

second-order elections, specifically from regional arenas. The last factor is connected with the demand-side of parties: (e) from the presence of a regionalised ethnolinguistic cleavage.

However, beyond the different casuistries that can bring about the emergence of contamination effects, I have argued that the causal mechanisms behind each of these phenomena are universal and they lead to a common pattern of behaviour which can be explained by a general theory: Political parties take advantage of their viability in a certain arena to present candidacies in other arenas where they are non-viable.

In this thesis, I have argued that the dilemma of coordination among non-viable political parties is most often solved in favour of competing alone, rather than coalescing or joining a coalition. This is as a consequence of two fundamental organisational opportunities that the overlap of electoral arenas generates.

First, the presence of *economies of scale*: As the number of constituencies where the party decides to present candidacies increases, the marginal cost of doing so decreases, thus easing the entrance for competition.

However, the presence of decreasing marginal costs of competing is not enough to explain parties' entrance when non-viable. The costs of competing, although becoming marginally smaller, continue being higher than 0 in those constituencies where the party does not expect to achieve representation. Thus, still another factor is required to explain the decision to enter when non-viable.

The appearance of *political externalities to compete* is precisely the second organisational opportunity that encourages parties to compete alone when non-viable. The decision to stand for elections in those arenas where the party is non-viable, generates *positive political externalitie*s that will not be internalised by the local party, but rather they will be internalised by another actor, namely the party at other arenas of competition where it is viable. Analogously, the decision to withdraw from competition or to join a coalition will usually bring about some *negative political externalities,* which will not be internalised by the non-viable party at the local arena but rather for the homonym party in other arenas where it is viable.

The emergence of political externalities to compete thus becomes the identifying factor in explaining parties' decision on whether to enter into competition alone, or not, when non-viable. Political parties will generally find it more attractive to compete alone when they are non-viable –due to the emergence of positive political externalities to compete and the decreasing marginal costs of competing–, whereas withdrawing from competition or joining a coalition, will usually be less favourable strategies –due to the negative political externalities to compete.

7.2. Findings

Through in-depth interviews with party leaders and campaign managers in Canada and Spain, I have addressed the reasons driving political parties' entry decisions in contexts of non-viability. Interviews have shown that political parties obtain several *positive political externalities* from competing alone due to the overlap of electoral arenas.

First, they may *gain visibility*: By running candidacies when non-viable, parties are able to show that they are a serious and committed party. In heavily populated areas, the intensity of this externality becomes stronger because parties will feel, to a higher extent, the need to show that they stand everywhere, irrespective of their chances of obtaining a seat.

Second, they may also c*onserve and promote the party label*: By standing for elections everywhere under the same label, parties show an image of internal coherence. The more institutionalised parties will decide to run for elections with the aim of keeping the party label, whereas new parties, if they decide to compete, they will do so to promote the party label.

Third, parties may also be able to *keep the organisation alive*: Entering into competition when non-viable enables the party to keep the local organisation in good shape for when the time comes to contest elections where the party is viable. However, this only occurs in parties where party activists have a very relevant role at promoting the party, especially during electoral campaigns.

Fourth, they may promote their *party platform*: Within parties with a certain ideological rigidity, running a full slate of candidates enables the party to keep political debates active and spread them throughout the country.

Besides, evidence from interviews has also shown that there are two fundamental *negative political externalities* that usually arise when parties decide not to compete alone when they are non-viable.

First, parties may *lose credibility and reputation*: Not entering into competition alone has been shown to bring about a deterioration in the image of the party. However, this only holds within parties, which are competing in their core election. When parties are not competing in their main electoral arena the decision not to stand for elections alone will not see punishment from voters.

Second, they may *face confrontation from local organisations*: Some parties have argued that in the case of not entering into competition alone, the local organisation could feel slighted. However, others have argued that these negative political externalities will not appear when the conditions for withdrawing from competition or joining a coalition are very clear and most of the organisation agrees with the strategy.

Overall, from in-depth interviews, it has been possible to conclude that the overlap of electoral arenas modifies the incentives political parties have to compete alone when they are non-viable. In particular, due to the emergence of positive political externalities, and given marginal decreasing costs of competing, the decision to stand for elections alone becomes the dominant strategy. Conversely, due to negative political externalities to compete, withdrawing from competition or joining a coalition will be less preferable strategies than what the Duvergerian theories presume.

In the quantitative analysis of this research, I have focused attention on determining the extent of the phenomenon. To do so, I rely on a dependent variable that accounts for the extra supply of parties competing (ESPC) as compared to what the Duvergerian theories predict. As covariates, I use the institutional and sociological factors,

which have previously been argued lead to contamination effects. To assess the impact of these factors on the ESPC I have constructed a completely new database of national legislative elections, which include 46 countries from around the world, 240 elections, and data compiled for over 25,000 districts. The results show evidence of contamination effects to the national legislative arenas both from institutional and sociological factors.

First, from the *nominal to the list tiers in mixed-member systems*: In line with what has been largely stressed by the literature, an increase in the percentage of seats elected in the list tier in MMS has a positive impact on the ESPC in the nominal tier. Also, MMS where voters are allowed to cast only one ballot for the two tiers will lead to an increase in the ESPC, thus confirming again the existence of contamination effects from the upper to the lower tiers in MMS.

Second, from *regional arenas*: The higher the powers that regional governments hold, the larger electoral contamination from the more permissive regional chamber to the national arena will be.

Third, from the *presence of a regionalised ethnolinguistic cleavage*: Regional cleavages displace nationwide parties to contexts of non-viability in ethnolingusitically-differentiated regions, thus enhancing the number of parties competing when non-viable. This confirms the existence of contamination effects from the demand-side of parties.

Fourth, from *districts within the same national legislative arena*: Although low levels of variation in DM across districts lead to a reduction in the ESPC, variation in DM higher than 10 will lead to an

increase in the ESPC, thus showing partial evidence of contamination effects from within arenas.

For what concerns the variables related to the process of contamination from the presidential to the legislative elections, none of these have been shown to have any impact on the ESPC.

7.3. Further Research

The development of this thesis has left some questions still open and points to several future lines of research that may improve the theoretical argumentations and the empirical findings presented hitherto.

Some of these avenues for research are related to the need to increase the *number of countries* included in the analysis.

First, *the database should be opened to new countries*: The dataset I have built to carry out this research is, at present, one of the largest databases that can be built with the data currently available on the Internet. This dataset guarantees that all the information included is completely reliable and that only exclusively democratic countries are considered. All in all, nowadays, it is becoming more and more usual for countries to provide detailed information about electoral results at the district level. This will soon allow increasing the number of countries included in cross-national studies, thus making analysis more compelling. In this sense, the availability of more electoral results, beyond the European boundaries, would be crucial so as to test the robustness of the results obtained.

Second, it should be *reconsidered the impact of founding elections*: A crucial question yet to be solved by scholars is the understanding of the process of learning from both the side of voters and organisations. Evidence from this research seems to indicate that founding elections will lead to higher numbers of wasted votes, although the number of observations in the sample is not large enough to gain statistical significance. The inclusion of a higher number of time points per country would allow the temporal evolution of contamination effects to be addressed, and specifically, the emergence and the hypothetical disappearance of the phenomenon of contamination effects.

Third, *the impact of variation in DM should be reconsidered*: Variation in DM has been shown to increase the ESPC only when the standard deviation of DM is higher than 10. Given the low number of observations with such levels of variation, the inclusion of more countries in the dataset should allow the robustness of this finding to be readdressed.

Other further avenues for research are related to the *scope of analysis* of this research.

First, *alternative directions of contamination should be considered*: National legislative arenas are not only contaminated but they can also impinge upon contamination. Given that winning the legislative elections is usually a big prize, it is very likely that these elections will contaminate other elections that are less important, namely, second-order elections. This has been voluntarily omitted from the present research, since I have focused the attention on contamination directed towards the legislative arena. However, scholars in the future should

change the perspective and address the effects of contamination from the legislative to other electoral arenas.

Second, *the analysis should be broadened to other electoral arenas*: The analysis of the factors that can account for the emergence of asymmetric viability has been restricted to a limited number of institutional designs –namely, from within the arena, in MMS, from the presidential arena, from upper chambers and from regional arenas. However, these are not the unique institutional settings from which contamination effects can arise. These should be extended to other electoral arenas, such as municipal elections, European elections, gubernatorial elections, etc.

Additionally, further assessments of the ESPC should consider some *new explanations and hypothetical shortcomings*.

On the one hand, it should be *refined the impact of segregation and fractionalisation measures*: The empirical analysis has shown that outcomes for fractionalisation measures provide unusually inflated coefficients, whereas the measure of segregation shows a coefficient more in accordance with what could be expected. Whereas at first sight, it seems that the segregation measure is more trustworthy, it still remains open to determine whether the fact that different ethnolinguistic collectives are grouped together in certain zones, as indices of segregation presuppose, can better account for differences in the ESPC.

On the other hand, *new control variables should be included*: Future research should consider the impact of competitiveness on the number of wasted votes. High levels of electoral competition had been said to

increase the number of third-party candidacies (Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1996; Lem and Dowling 2006), although in recent times this relationship has been said to be curvilinear rather than linear: Large numbers of wasted votes will be found, both in very competitive, and in non-competitive elections (Best and Lem 2011). Besides, further research should also try to address the ballot access laws to explain differences in the ESPC. Best and Lem (2011) have shown for the US gubernatorial elections that the presence of third-party competitors can be explained by the percentage of signatures required from the total state population to appear on the ballot. Although this is a plausibly relevant factor, there is a lack of cross-country comparative data that does not allow, at this moment, the inclusion of such a variable in the analysis.

Finally, a *new dimension* with regard to the concept of contamination effects should be addressed, namely the need to c*onsider political parties instead of countries in the quantitative analysis*. By focusing the attention on each parties' decision to enter into competition rather than in an aggregated measure of inflation, it could be possible to address the impact of variables related to party support, internal organisation, ideology, sphere of competition, etc., on parties' entry decisions. Such an analysis however, is highly data-demanding because it not only requires the information on which party is running at each district to be available, but also it is necessary to obtain quantitative data for variables which hitherto have mostly been treated qualitatively.

Overall, this thesis has gone one step further by raising a new general theory about party strategies. Many questions still remain unanswered, but what is certain is that we need to avoid the unnecessary

proliferation of theoretical concepts and make special efforts to identify the causal mechanisms underlying, apparently, disparate processes. In this sense, this thesis has been a first attempt to fill the gap in the literature on contamination effects and on the consequences that the overlap of electoral arenas may bring about for party strategic entry decisions.

Annex-Chapter 5

Table I List of People Interviewed

Case	Interviewees	Position	Place	Date
1) Coalition between the PSC and ICV in the 1999 Catalan parliament	Rafel Ribó	Leader of ICV in the 1999 Catalan parliament elections	Barcelona (Catalonia, Spain)	06/10/2011
	Ramón Luque [a]	Member of the National Commission of EUiA and the Federal Executive Commission of IU	L'Hospitalet de Llobregat (Catalonia, Spain)	16/12/2011
2) QS in the federal elections	Alain Tremblay	Head of the Electoral Committee of Campaigns and the Committee of Coordination of QS	Montréal (Quebec, Canada)	17/06/2010
3) Strategic withdrawal of the Liberals in the 2008 federal elections in Central Nova	Stéphane Dion	Leader of the Liberal Party in the 2008 federal elections	Montréal (Quebec, Canada)	11/06/2010
4) C's in 2011 lower house elections in favour of UPyD	José Manuel Villegas	Organisation secretary for C's	Barcelona (Catalonia, Spain)	03/10/2011
5) SI in the 2011 lower house elections	Alfons López Tena	Deputy of SI in the Catalan parliament	Barcelona (Catalonia, Spain)	25/11/2011
6) QS in the Quebecois parliament	Alain Tremblay	Head of the Electoral Committee of Campaigns and the Committee of Coordination of QS	Montréal (Quebec, Canada)	17/06/2010
7) NDP in the federal elections	Karl Bélanger	Senior Press secretary for the NPD and leader of the NDP in Quebec	Ottawa (Ontario, Canada)	28/06/2011
8) Failed attempt of fusion between the NDP and the Liberals	Karl Bélanger	Senior Press secretary for the NDP and leader of the NDP in Quebec	Ottawa (Ontario, Canada)	28/06/2011

	Stéphane Dion	Leader of the Liberal Party in the 2008 federal elections	Montréal (Quebec, Canada)	11/06/2010
9) IU in the lower house elections	Ramón Luque [a]	Member of the Federal Executive Commission of IU and campaign manager of the party for the 2011 lower house elections	L'Hospitalet de Llobregat (Catalonia, Spain)	16/12/2011
10) C's in the 2008 lower house elections and in the 2010 Catalan parliament elections	José Manuel Villegas	Organisation secretary for C's	Barcelona (Catalonia, Spain)	20/12/2011
11) UPyD in the National elections	Francisco Pimentel [a]	Campaign manager for UPyD in the 2011 lower house elections	Madrid (Madrid, Spain)	20/12/2011

[a] Both the interview of Francisco Pimentel (UPyD) and Ramón Luque (IU) were carried out in the framework of the *Making Electoral Democracy Work* project (http://electoraldemocracy.com).

Figure I *Share of Votes and Seats in the Canadian Federal Elections, 1974-2011* [a]

Source: Own elaboration. Data from Elections Canada On-line (http://elections.ca/)

[a] Between brackets the number of representatives the party achieved.

**Table II** *Share of Votes and Seats in the Canadian Elections, 1974-2008* [a]

	1974		1979		1980		1984		1988		1993	
Lib	43.2	141	40.1	114	44.4	147	28.0	40	31.9	83	41.3	177
C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BQ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13.5	54
NDP	15.4	16	17.9	26	19.8	32	18.8	30	20.4	43	6.9	9
CA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.1	0	18.7	52
PC	35.5	95	35.9	136	32.5	103	50.0	211	43.0	169	16.0	2
Green	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0	0.4	0	0.2	-
SC	5.1	11	4.6	6	1.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Others	0.9	1	1.5	0	1.6	0	2.9	1	2.2	0	3.3	1
TOTAL	100	264	100	282	100	282	100	282	100	295	100	295

	1997		2000		2004		2006		2008		2011	
Lib	38.5	155	40.8	172	36.7	135	30.2	103	26.3	77	18.9	34
C	-	-	-	-	29.6	99	36.3	124	37.7	143	39.6	166
BQ	10.7	44	10.7	38	12.4	54	10.5	51	10.0	49	6.1	4
NDP	11.0	21	8.5	13	15.7	19	17.5	29	18.2	37	30.6	103
CA	19.4	60	25.5	66	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PC	18.8	20	12.2	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Green	0.4	0	0.8	0	4.3	0	4.5	0	6.8	0	3.9	1
Others	1.2	1	1.4	0	1.3	1	1.1	1	1.2	2	0.9	0
TOTAL	100	301	100	301	100	308	100	308	100	308	100	308

[a] Acronyms: Lib: Liberal Party of Canada; C: Conservative Party of Canada; BQ: *Bloc Québécois*; NDP: New Democratic Party; CA: Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance / Reform Party; PC: Progressive Conservative Party of Canada; Green: Green Party of Canada; SC: Social Credit.

Figure II *Share of Votes and Seats in the Quebecois Provincial Elections, 1976-2008* [a]

Source: Own elaboration. Data from *Le Directeur Général des Élections du Québec (*http://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca)

[a] Between brackets the number of representatives the party achieved.

Table III *Share of Votes and Seats in the Quebecois Parliament, 1976-2008* [a]

	1976		*1981*		*1985*		*1989*		*1994*		*1998*		*2003*		*2007*		*2008*	
PLQ	33.8	26	46.1	42	56.0	99	50.0	92	44.4	47	43.6	48	46.0	76	33.1	48	42.1	66
PQ	41.4	71	49.3	80	38.7	23	40.2	29	44.8	77	42.9	76	33.2	45	28.3	36	35.2	51
ADQ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.5	1	11.8	1	18.2	4	30.8	41	16.4	7
UFP / QS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	1.1	0	3.6		3.8	1
Green	-	-	-	-	0.1	0	2.0		0.1	0	-	-	0.4	0	3.9		2.2	0
Independent	0.4	0	0.1		0.4	0	0.9	0	1.7	0	0.3	0	0.2	0	0.1	0	0.2	0
Others	24.5	13	4.5		4.8		7.0	4	2.6		1.5	0	0.9	0	0.1		0.2	0
TOTAL	100	110	100	122	100	122	100	125	100	125	100	125	100	125	100	125	100	125

[a] Acronyms: PLQ: *Parti Libéral du Québec*; PQ: *Parti Québécois*; ADQ: *Action Démocratique du Québec*; UFP / QS: *Union des Forces Progressistes / Québec Solidaire*; Green: *Parti Vert du Québec*; Independent: Independent candidates or candidates without affiliation.

Figure III *Share of Votes and Seats in the Spanish Legislative Elections, 1977-2011* [a]

Source: Own elaboration. Data from the *Ministerio del Interior, Gobierno de España* (http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es)

[a] Between brackets the number of representatives the party achieved.

Table IV *Share of Votes and Seats in the Spanish Elections, 1977-2011* [a]

	1977		1979		1982		1986		1989		1993		1996		2000		2004		2008		2011	
PSOE	29.4	118	30.5	121	48.3	202	44.1	184	39.9	175	39.1	159	38	141	34.7	125	43.3	164	44.4	169	29.2	110
AP / PP	8.2	16	6.1	10	26.5	107	26	105	26	107	35	141	39.2	156	45.2	183	38.3	148	40.4	154	45.3	186
PCE / IU	9.4	19	10.8	23	4	4	4.6	7	9.1	17	9.6	18	10.6	21	6.1	9	5	5	3.8	2	7.0	11
UPyD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.2	1	4.8	5
CIU	2.8	11	2.7	8	3.7	12	5	18	5.1	18	5	17	4.6	16	4.3	15	3.3	10	3.1	10	4.2	16
PNV	1.6	8	1.6	7	1.9	8	1.5	6	1.3	5	1.3	5	1.3	5	1.6	7	1.7	7	1.2	6	1.3	5
ERC	0.8	1	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.4	0	0.4	0	0.8	1	0.7	1	0.9	1	2.6	8	1.2	3	1.1	3
BNG							0.1	0	0.2	0	0.5	0	0.9	2	1.3	3	0.8	2	0.8	2	0.8	2
UPC/CC			0.3	1	0.2	0	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.9	4	0.9	4	1.1	4	0.9	3	0.7	2	0.6	2
HB			1	3	1	2	1.2	5	1.1	4	0.9	2	0.7	2							1.4	7
UCD	34.5	166	35	168	6.8	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-						
CDS	-	-	-	-	2.9	2	9.2	19	7.9	14	1.8	0	-	-	-	-	0.1	0				
EE	0.3	1	0.5	1	0.5	1	0.5	2	0.5	2												
PAR	0.2	1	0.2	1	-	-	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.6	1			0.2	0	0.1	0	0.2			
PSA-PA			1.8	5	0.4	0	0.5	0	1	2	0.4	0	0.5	0	0.9	1	0.7	0			0.3	
UV							0.3	1	0.7	2	0.5	1	0.4	1	0.3	0						
EA									0.7	2	0.6	1	0.5	1	0.4	1	0.3	1	0.2			

240

UA-CHA											0	0	0	0	0.2	0	0.3	1	0.4	1	0.2	
Na-Bai / Gbai																	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1
Others	12.8	9	8.9	1	3.2	0	5.8	1	5.6	0	3.0	0	1.5	0	2.8	0	2.3	0	2.4	0	3.8	2
TOTAL	100	350	100	350	100	350	100	350	100	350	100	350	100	350	100	350	100	350	100	350	100	350

[a] Acronyms: PSOE: *Partido Socialista Obrero Español*; AP/PP: *Alianza Popular / Partido Popular*; PCE / IU: *Partido Comunista de España / Izquierda Unida*; UPyD: *Unión, Progreso y Democracia*; CiU: *Convergència i Unió*; PNV: *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*; ERC: *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*; BNG: *Bloque Nacionalista Galego*; UPC / CC: *Unión del Pueblo Canario / Coalición Canaria*; HB: *Herri Batasuna* (includes all brands under which Basque secessionists have been presenting candidacies throughout the history); UCD: *Unión de Centro Democrático*; CDS: *Centro Democrático Social*; EE: *Euskadiko Ezkerra*; PAR: *Partido Aragonés Regtionalista*; PSA / PA: *Partido Socialista Andalucista / Partido Andalucista*; UV: *Unió Valeciana*; EA: *Eusko Alkartasuna*; UA / CHA: *Unión Aragonesista / Chunta Aragonesista*; Na-Bai / GBai: *Nafarroa Bai / Gueroa Bai.*

Figure IV *Share of Votes and Seats in the Catalan Regional Elections, 1980-2010* [a]

Source: Own elaboration. Data from the *Departament de Governació i Relacions Institucionals, Generalitat de Catalunya* (http://www.gencat.net/governacio-ap/)

[a] Between brackets the number of representatives the party achieved.

	1980		1984		1988		1992		1995		1995		2003		2006		2010	
CiU	27.8	43	46.8	72	45.7	69	46.2	70	41.0	60	37.7	56	30.9	46	31.5	48	38.5	62
PSC	22.4	33	30.1	41	29.8	42	27.6	40	24.9	34	37.8	52	31.2	42	26.8	37	18.3	28
AP / PP			7.7	11	5.3	6	6.0	7	13.1	17	9.5	12	11.9	15	10.7	14	12.3	18
PSUC / ICV-EUiA	18.8	25	5.6	6	7.8	9	6.5	7	9.5	13	2.5	3	7.3	9	9.5	12	7.4	10
ERC	8.9	14	4.4	5	4.1	6	8.0	11	9.7	11	8.7	12	16.4	23	14.0	21	7.0	10
CDS			3.8	3														
UCD	10.6	18																
PSA-PA	2.7	2																
C's															3.0	3	3.4	3
SI																	3.3	4
Others	8.2	0	2.8	0	4.9	0	4.7	0	0.9	0	2.8	0	1.4	0	2.4	0	6.9	0
TOTAL	100	135	100	135	100	135	100	135	100	135	100	135	100	135	100	135	100	135

[a] Acronyms: CiU: *Convergència i Unió*; PSC: *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya*; AP / PP: *Aliança Popular / Partit Popular*; PSUC/ICV-EUiA: *Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya/ Iniciativa Catalunya Verds - Esquerra Unida i Alternativa*; ERC: *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*; CDS: *Centre Democràtic i Social*; UCD: *Unió de Centre Democràtic*; PSA-PA: *Partido Socialista de Andalucía-Partido Andalucista*; C's: *Ciutadans. Partido de la Ciudadanía*; SI: *Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència.*

Annex-Chapter 6

Table VI *Sources of Information for the ESPC*

Country	Source / (*) Notes
Albania	Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset.
Australia	Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset.
Austria	Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset until the 1990 elections. From 1994 onwards, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (http://www.bmi.gv.at/).
Belgium	Belgian Ministry of the Interior (http://www.ibz.fgov.be/).
Bolivia	Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset.
Botswana	1999: Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset and Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA, http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/ botelectarchive.htm). 2004: EISA.
Bulgaria	Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset.
Canada	Until 2000, Constituency Level Elections Archive, CLEA. From 2004 onwards, Elections Canada (www.elections.ca/home.asp).
Costa Rica	1994 and 1999: Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset. Remaining years: Supreme Electoral Tribunal (http://www.tse.go.cr) and the Digital Electoral Atlas of Costa Rica (http://www.atlas.iis.ucr.ac.cr).
Croatia	2000 and 2003: Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset. 2007: Adam Carr. http://psephos.adam-carr.net. *Since the electoral results for Croatians abroad and the ones for the minorities (SMD plurality) are presented differently in the different elections for which data are available, only data for the 10 districts with 14 representatives are considered.
Cyprus	Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset.
Czech Republic	Czech Statistical Office's Election Server (http://www.volby.cz/).
Denmark	Danish Ministry of the Interior and Social Affairs (http://elections.sm.dk/). Danish Folketing (http://www.ft.dk/). 2011: Danmarks Statistic (http://www.dst.dk/).
Estonia	Until 1999, Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset. From 2003 onwards, the Estonian National Electoral Committee (http://www.vvk.ee/).
Finland	Statistics Finland (http://www.stat.fi/).
France	1988: Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset.

	For the remaining elections, Bureau des élections et des études politiques. Ministère de l'intérieur, de l'outre-mer,des collectivités territoriales et de l'immigration (http://lannuaire.service-public.fr/services_nationaux/service-national_180396.html). * For the 1988 elections data for only 469 districts are available.
Germany	German Elections Office (www.bundeswahlleiter.de). Der Bundeswahlleiter (http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/frueher e_bundestagswahlen/)
Greece	Until 2007, Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset. For the 2007 elections, the Ministry of the Interior [http://www.ypes.gr/].
Hungary	Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe, University of Essex (http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/database.asp).
Iceland	Statistics Iceland (http://www.statice.is/).
India	Electoral Commission of India (http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx).
Ireland	Elections Ireland (http://www.electionsireland.org/).
Israel	Central Bureau of Statistics (http://www.cbs.gov.il/) and The Knesset (http://www.knesset.gov.il/).
Italy	Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset.
Latvia	Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset.
Lithuania	1992 and 1996 elections: http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/database.asp. From 2000 onwards, the Central Election Commission of Latvia, CVK (http://web.cvk.lv/pub/public/).
Luxembourg	Until the 1994 elections, Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset. From 2004 onwards, Le site officiel des élections au Grand-Duché du Luxembourg (http://www.elections.public.lu/).
Mexico	Instituto Federal Electoral (http://www.ife.org.mx/portal/site/ifev2/HRE_2001-2009/).
Moldova	Until the 2001 elections, Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe, University of Essex (http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/database.asp). From 2005 onwards, the Association for Participatory Democracy of Moldova (http://www.e-democracy.md/en).
Netherlands	Dutch Electoral Council, Kiesraad (http://www.kiesraad.nl/) and Statistics Netherlands (http://www.cbs.nl/).
New Zealand	Electoral Commission of New Zealand (http://www.electionresults.govt.nz/).

Norway	Until 1997, Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset. From 2001 onwards, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development's Election Portal (http://www.valg.no/) and Statistics Norway (Statistics Norway).
Poland	Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset and Poland's National Election Commission (http://www.pkw.gov.pl/).
Portugal	Secretariado Técnico dos Assuntos para o Processo Eleitoral, STAPE (http://www.stape.pt/). 2009: Legislativas 2009 website (http://www.legislativas2009.mj.pt/) and Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset.
Slovakia	Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset and the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (http://portal.statistics.sk/).
Slovenia	2000: Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset. From 2004 onwards, the Ministry of Public Administration (http://volitve.gov.si).
South Africa	Electoral Commission of South Africa (http://www.elections.org.za).
South Korea	Until 2000, the Constituency Level Elections Archive CLEA (http://www.electiondataarchive.org/). From 2004 onwards, the Republic of Korea, National Election Commission (http://www.nec.go.kr/engvote/main/main.jsp).
Spain	Ministerio del Interior de España (http://mir.es).
Sweden	Until 2006, the Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset. 2010: Swedish Election Authority (http://www.val.se/) and Statistics Sweden (http://www.scb.se/). *Due to unavailability of disaggregated results, data for the Sweden elections include always the allocation of seats of the upper tier (39.11%), although it should not be included in the calculus.
Switzerland	Federal Chancellery (http://www.admin.ch/) and the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (http://www.bfs.admin.ch/).
Taiwan	Constituency Level Elections Archive (CLEA).
Trinidad and Tobago	Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset.
Turkey	Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset.
United Kingdom	Until 1997, the Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) dataset. From 2001 onwards, Pippa Norris data (http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm) and the European Election database (http://www.nsd.uib.no/ european_election_database/index.html).
USA	Constituency Level Elections Archive (CLEA).

***Table VII*** *Countries and Elections Considered in the Empirical*

Analysis

Albania	2001	2005				
Australia	1993	1996	1998	2001		
Austria	1986	1990	1994	1995	1999	2002
	2006	2008				
Belgium	1995	1999	2003	2007	2010	
Bolivia	1997	2002				
Botswana	1999	2004				
Bulgaria	1994	1997	2001	2005		
Canada	1988	1993	1997	2000	2004	2006
	2008					
Costa Rica	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006
	2010					
Croatia	2000	2003	2007	2011		
Cyprus	1991	1996				
Czech Republic	1996	1998	2002	2006	2010	
Denmark	1990	1994	1998	2001	2005	2007
	2011					
Estonia	1992	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Finland	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	
France	1988	1993	1997	2002	2007	
Germany	1990	1994	1998	2002	2005	
Greece	1985	1989 (I)	1989 (II)	1990	1993	1996
	2000	2004	2007	2009		
Hungary	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	
Iceland	1987	1999	2003	2007	2009	
India	1998	1999	2004			
Ireland	1989	1992	1997	2002	2007	2011
Israel	1988	1992	1996	1999	2002	2006
	2009					
Italy	1994	2001				
Latvia	1993	1995	1998	2002	2006	2010

Lithuania	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	
Luxembourg	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009	
Mexico	2000	2003	2006	2009		
Moldova	1998	2001	2005	2009 (I)	2009 (II)	2010
Netherlands	1994	1998	2002	2003	2006	2010
New Zealand	1996	1999	2002	2005	2008	2011
Norway	1985	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005
	2009					
Poland	2001	2005	2007	2011		
Portugal	1985	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002
	2005	2009				
Slovakia	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	
Slovenia	2000	2004	2008			
South Africa	1994	1999	2004			
South Korea	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008
Spain	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004	2008
Sweden	1985	1988	1991	1994	1998	2002
	2006	2010				
Switzerland	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007
Taiwan	1995	1998	2001	2004		
Trinidad and Tobago	1986	1991	1995	2000	2001	2002
Turkey	1999	2002				
United Kingdom	1987	1997	2001	2005	2010	
USA	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996
	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	

***Table VIII** Statistics of the Dependent and Independent Variables*

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
(Log) ESPC	240	0.29	0.22	0.01	1.34
Std. Dev. DM	240	3.51	4.14	0	14.92
Std. Dev. DM Squared	240	29.42	47.57	0	222.47
Upper Tier	240	0.11	0.17	0	0.59
Second Ballot in MMS	240	0.13	0.34	0	1
Proximity	240	0.20	0.35	0	1
Proximity (Stoll)	240	0.56	0.79	0	2
ENPRES	240	1.02	1.58	0	8.66
ENPRES (Stoll)	240	0.99	1.57	0	8.66
(Log) Self-rule	208	1.80	1.11	0	3.14
Fractionalisation	240	0.30	0.21	0.002	0.75
Segregation	213	0.06	0.08	0.002	0.36
(Log) DM	240	1.78	1.52	0	5.01
First Elections	240	0.05	0.22	0	1
Transition	240	0.02	0.14	0	1
Reform	240	0.03	0.17	0	1

Figure V Extra Supply of Parties by Country

## *Figure VI* Extra Supply of Parties by Country

**Figure VII** *Extra Supply of Parties by Country*

***Figure VIII*** *Extra Supply of Parties by Country*

Figure IX *Extra Supply of Parties by Country*

Figure X *Extra Supply of Parties by Country*

Figure XI *Extra Supply of Parties by Country*

258

Figure XII *Extra Supply of Parties by Country*

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