Emotional Experience: its Nature, its Rationality and its Epistemology

Autor/a

Álvarez-González, Aarón

Director/a

García-Carpintero, Manuel

Tutor/a

García-Carpintero, Manuel

Díaz León, Encarnación

Data de defensa

2023-11-09

Pàgines

144 p.



Departament/Institut

Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat de Filosofia

Resum

[eng] Emotions are intrinsically and extrinsically interesting. On the one hand, they are intrinsically interesting because they are part of our mental economy standing in relations to other mental states (e.g., the belief that I am in danger and the emotion of fear, the satisfaction of a desire and the experience of joy, etc.) and actions (e.g., the emotion of admiration and emulative behaviour, the emotion of disgust and avoidance behaviour, etc.). As an important part of our psychological inventory, they play an explanatory role, at least a partial one, in explaining and justifying our mental and physical actions and behaviour. On the other hand, emotions are extrinsically interesting as evidenced by their appearance in many philosophical debates. In chapters 1 and 2, I contribute to give an answer to this question: what are the primitive, in the sense of being fundamental, types of mental experiences that constitute the human stream of consciousness? I do so by answering this particular sub-question: is emotional phenomenology a fundamental or derivative type of phenomenology? In chapter 3, I explore a new puzzle for the relation between emotion and rationality. Emotional phenomenology seems to be dogmatic, in a certain sense, and hypothetic, in a certain sense, at the same time. I explore whether this apparently contradictory feature of emotional phenomenology is compatible with rationality. In chapter 4 of this dissertation, I will explore the epistemic nature of emotion. Particularly, I propose a way out of the dialectical impasse between perceptualist and non- perceptualist, using Ernest Sosa’s idea of animal and reflective knowledge. I propose a similar distinction for the epistemic role of emotion.

Paraules clau

Fenomenologia; Fenomenología; Phenomenology; Filosofia analítica; Análisis filosófico; Analysis (Philosophy); Emocions; Emociones; Emotions; Cognició; Cognición; Cognition; Racionalització (Psicologia); Racionalización (Psicología); Rationalization (Psychology)

Matèries

1 - Filosofia i psicologia

Àrea de coneixement

Ciències Humanes i Socials

Nota

Programa de Doctorat en Ciències Cognitives i del Llenguatge

Documents

AAG_PhD_THESIS.pdf

1.032Mb

 

Drets

L'accés als continguts d'aquesta tesi queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
L'accés als continguts d'aquesta tesi queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

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